
BY

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DISSERTATION

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Abstract:

The objective of this study is to nuance our understanding of the temporal trajectory and dynamics of neoliberal redevelopment governance in large American cities. Recent studies have revealed a rupture in the manifestation of this mode of governance in Chicago, IL. I suggest this shift marks a transition between the roll-out (1989-2005) and roll-with-it (2005-present) periods of neoliberal restructuring in this setting and, perhaps, beyond. Although the wider literature acknowledges the spatial contingency of neoliberal redevelopment governance, temporal contingencies within the same city remain comparatively less explored. In this context, this study chronicles the evolutionary trajectory of Chicago’s fluid and evolving neoliberal redevelopment governance with a specific focus on the contemporary socio-spatial transformation of the city’s south-side neighborhood of Bronzeville. In the current context of the global economic crisis and increased grass-roots efforts to thwart gentrification, the legitimacy of this mode of urban governance is now increasingly questioned. Set against this reality, new pragmatic strategies are now required to keep the neoliberal order alive. As a result, governance actors in this setting now articulate an evolved rhetoric that is increasingly sensitive to the historical effects of structural economic insecurity upon the urban and racialized poor. But this “revisionist” rhetorical strategy is revealed as a politically-expedient necessity merely designed to mobilize and legitimate the same revanchist redevelopment schemes. While its “humanist” clothing holds the potential for stimulating more progressive activism and fundamental change, it is a rhetoric that nonetheless remains guided by the ideological underpinnings of neoliberal theology. The study concludes by exploring the terrain of transformative possibilities and capacity of this governance to further adapt to mounting neoliberal-induced obstacles.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

This study nuance our understanding of the temporal trajectory and dynamics of neoliberal redevelopment governances in large American cities.¹ Neoliberalism, since the 1970s, has emerged as a deeply engrained and defining aspect of the latest round of global capitalism. A central constitutive aspect of this neoliberal form of capitalism has been a “significant restructuring of the economic role, political environment, and spatial terrain of the city” (Sites, 2007: 116) – what Peck and Tickell (2002, 2007) have characterized as the neoliberalization of urban governance. Triggered by the welfare-state induced crisis of the 1970s, this restructuring process has entailed the crystallization of new private-public partnerships, an “entrepreneurial” business ethic (Harvey, 1989a; Hall and Hubbard, 1998), and the harsh and callous treatment of the poor coupled with an insatiable drive to redevelop long deteriorated urban cores (Smith, 1996; Brenner and Theodore, 2002a). This governance formation, the result of this process of neoliberal restructuring, is this study’s central analytic object: what I refer to as neoliberal redevelopment governance.

Although there has been a tendency to treat the neoliberal mode of urban governance as a monolithic, static entity, it is increasingly recognized as best interpreted as a hybrid, constantly evolving institutional formation (Leitner, Peck, and Sheppard, 2007; Wilson, 2004a, 2007; Peck, et al., 2009; Brenner, Peck, and Theodore, 2010a, b; Peck, 2010a). It is also a process that has

¹ The study focuses on the contemporary role of cities within the neoliberalization process because cities ultimately act as key sites for the installation of neoliberal policies, practices, and multi-scalar discourses (as well as the mobilization of anti-neoliberal resistance movements). Here, following Peck, Theodore, and Brenner (2009), urban regions represent strategic nodes within the complex and dynamic multi-scalar process of neoliberal regulatory restructuring.
unfolded in a distinctly spatially and temporally variegated manner. Indeed, it’s “generic features, family resemblances, and structural interconnections” (Peck, et al., 2009: 51-2) often give an impression of monolithic ubiquity. Yet no two neoliberal formations are manifest concretely in exactly the same way. Structure and contingency operate simultaneously as neoliberal redevelopment unfolds in accordance to both place-specific structures and the broader-scale socio-political conditions and rhythms of capital accumulation (see Pred, 1984).

The literature on neoliberal redevelopment governance, however, has predominantly focused on addressing its spatial contingency and variegation between different cities (see Keil, 2002; MacLeod, 2002; Wilson, 2004a). Alternatively, the essence of its temporal contingency remains comparatively less explored. Although the evolving character of redevelopment governances is increasingly acknowledged (see Brenner and Theodore, 2002b; Peck, et al., 2009; Brenner, et al., 2010a, b), there remains a dearth of empirical studies that uncover the place-specific complexities of this evolving process (Peck and Tickell, 2007). This is not, as Peck (2010b: 20) asserts, a “matter of calling contingent exceptions” but “key to understanding the process itself,” of its spatially and temporally variegated unfolding and form of development.

This study contributes toward filling this vacuum by examining the temporal dimension of neoliberal redevelopment governance in one prototypical “rust belt” neoliberal city: Chicago, Illinois. It empirically explores this formations post-1989 unfolding, in its composition and dominant attributes, 2 and answers Peck and Tickell’s (2007: 48) call for “historical-geographies” of the neoliberal project “that are sensitive” to its “constructed,” “contextual,” and “hybridized” form. In the process, the study provides a specific focus on the contemporary redevelopment of

2 Although these two temporal markers (1989 and 2005) are specific to Chicago, they also reflect a similar and more general trajectory experienced in many other cities. While the roll-out period may have emerged at different moments in different cities, it has nonetheless emerged in all of them.
Chicago’s “historic” south-side neighborhood of Bronzeville (Fig. 1.1). 2005 is revealed as a key temporal marker, the transition point between two distinct periods of redevelopment governance in this particular urban setting: what I call the “roll-out” (1989-2005) and “roll-with-it” (2005-present) periods of neoliberal governance.

The Neoliberalization of Urban Governance

Following Peck and Tickell (2002), the term neoliberalization highlights the contextually-specific “path-dependency” and “path-shaping” capacity of what has essentially been a process of capitalist restructuring unfolding at a variety of inter-connected spatial scales (Swyngedouw, 1997; Brenner and Theodore, 2002a; Brenner, 2004; Brenner, et al., 2010a, b).

Soja (in Brenner, 2009: 62) provides the following elaboration on the notion of restructuring:

“Restructuring is meant to convey a break in secular trends and a shift towards a significantly different order and configuration of social, economic and political life. It thus evokes a sequence of breaking down and building up again, deconstruction and attempted reconstitution, arising from certain incapacities or weaknesses in the established order which preclude conventional adaptations and demand significant structural change instead … restructuring is rooted in crisis and a competitive conflict between the old and the new, between an ‘inherited’ and a ‘projected’ order. It is not a mechanical or automatic process, nor are its results predetermined … Restructuring implies flux and transition, offensive and defensive postures, a complex mix of continuity and change.”

In this context, the neoliberalization of urban governance is the process of this political amalgam being transformed to embody and exude neoliberal sensibilities and principles. This governance, in this process, comes to spurn traditional economic and political goals and sensibilities – resource redistribution, state concern for the poor and indigent, sensitivity to low- and moderate-income housing and living needs – and substitutes a preoccupation with the likes of municipal resource attraction, tax base replenishment, and centrality of the private-market. Here, there has been a governance negotiating a variegated landscape of inherited, cemented structures – of
outmoded “welfare-state” discursive and ideological landscapes, policy formations, and material practices – amid needing to build new infrastructures consistent with the ever in-flux, temporal rhythms of capital accumulation (Brenner and Theodore, 2002a).

Yet, all is not new and fresh, there is always the inheritance of the past that pervasively lives on and embeds in this current formation. Marx’s ([1852] 1996: 32) famous aphorism captures this insight:

“Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please in circumstances they choose for themselves; rather they make it in the present circumstances, given and inherited.”

It follows that this neoliberalizing of redevelopment governances has been as much a “restructuring strategy” as an “alternative governing ideology” (Peck and Tickell, 2007: 31). It is a process which is constantly unfolding through a dialectical relation between a “critique of the old” and the “facilitation of the new.”

The transition to neoliberal modes of governance, then, should not be interpreted as the full replacement of an out-going regime (i.e., Keynesian-managerialism). Instead, it is a perpetually conflict-ridden “reconstitution of state-economy relations” (Brenner, et al., 2010a: 3). The proliferation of not only neoliberal ideologies and discourses, but the actual policies and practices that are advanced – of “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002b) – are constantly mediated by and unfold in response to inherited, contextually specific political-institutional configurations. In this context, neoliberal redevelopment governances represent spatially and temporally contingent hybrid formations that are always being (re)constituted by a complex of forces, i.e., transforming local identity formations, discursive practices, power relations, and the temporal rhythms of capital accumulation.
Although the neoliberalization of urban governance is treated as a constantly evolving process, distinct periods of the process can be discerned via specific packages of policy prescriptions and discursive formations that come to define those particular time periods. This includes the creative implementation and proliferation of new policies, practices, and discourses as well as the destructive processes of dismantling inherited and outmoded political-institutional and regulatory structures (Brenner and Theodore, 2002a). In this study, I follow and update the periodization marked by Peck and Tickell (2002, 2007). Here, the 1980s represent the period of “roll-back” neoliberalization while the 1990s represent the period of “roll-out” neoliberalization.

Indeed, neoliberal redevelopment governances in both decades featured a complex hybrid of creative roll-out and destructive roll-back moments of policy implementation and practices. In this context, the transition between these two periods is marked by a shift where neoliberalizing urban governances, characterized by predominantly roll-back measures in the 1980s, began to promote and facilitate predominantly roll-out measures in the 1990s. Both moments, however, coexist between these two periods, but in different configurations and intensity (Keil, 2009).

In the context of contemporary neoliberal urbanization, the literature has recently uncovered a shift within this on-going process of urban capitalist restructuring; an unsettling of the deeply unstable, uneven geographies established during the past three decades (Brenner, 2009; Keil, 2009; Sheppard and Leitner, 2010). Following Wilson and Sternberg (2012), evidence suggests that redevelopment discourses in Chicago have at least subtly changed around 2005, and potentially point to a broader process of recalibration in this setting as a response to emergent political and social realities. The racialized poor are here portrayed in a more humanized manner, sensitive to the historically and increasingly pummeling effects of structural economic insecurity upon this particular vulnerable population. As Keil (2009: 233) asserts,
“these shifts in discourse are beginning to lead to institutional transformations and new public policy, and are accompanied by realignments of social and political power relations…” But Keil, however, is not specific in terms of what these institutional transformations look like in actually-existing urban settings.

This study interrogates the ways in which this discursive fix has indeed materialized into new ensembles of redevelopment strategies and practices in Chicago. Keil’s (2009) notion of “roll-with-it” neoliberalization is adopted to empirically examine this particular post-2005 governance and the degree to which it exhibits a significant temporal rupture from its pre-2005 incarnation.³

**An Emergent Phase of Neoliberal Urban Politics**

According to Keil (2009), we have now entered a distinctly new and different period of neoliberalization: the “roll-with-it” period. For Keil, the roll-back, roll-out, and roll-with-it notions refer to three key concepts in relation to the process of neoliberalization: they are 1) historical periods, 2) moments of policy implementation, and 3) contradictions within the process. Since most empirical studies on neoliberalism have focused on either the roll-back or roll-out moments (Hackworth, 2010), Keil’s notion of a new phase of neoliberalization renders this two-part typology no longer sufficient. Here, the roll-with-it designation is defined by “the normalization of governmentalities associated with the neoliberal social formation and its emerging crises” (Keil, 2009: 231). The central contradiction of the roll-with-it period is that the

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³ Keil’s (2009) proclamation of an emergent third phase of neoliberalization – the roll-with-it phase – mirrors Peck’s (2010a) notion of “zombie” neoliberalization as well as Hendrikse and Sidaway’s (2010) designation of “neoliberalism 3.0.” Keil, however, provides the most explicit extension of the roll-back/roll-out paradigm as well as in relation to urban-scale transformations.
very moment neoliberalism achieved hegemonic dominance is also the very moment that its internal contradictions were exposed. Keil (2009: 239) elaborates:

“...neoliberal governmentality has been generalized to the point that it does not have to be established aggressively and explicitly [yet] the far-reaching crises of regulation that have gripped the capitalist urban system as a result of neoliberal roll-out now demand new orientations in collective action that involve both ‘reformed’ neoliberal elite practices and elite reaction to widespread contestation of neoliberal regulation.”

For many, neoliberal programs of capitalist restructuring, despite their destructive consequences, will remain intact at least for the foreseeable future (Smith, 2008; Castree, 2010; Peck, 2010a; Hendrikse and Sidaway, 2010; Sheppard and Leitner, 2010). But, to Peck, Theodore, and Brenner (2010: 110), the challenges posed by the post-2008 crisis – a “genuinely global crisis” – “are of a qualitatively different order from the succession of local (or localized) crises that neoliberalism has confronted since the 1980s.” In short, the continued advancement of neoliberalization no longer represents a response and solution to the post-1973 global recession as it now lies at the root of the present crisis (Harvey, 2010). The last three decades of crisis-induced restructuring in response to the collapse of the Fordist-Keynesian regime of accumulation are, in effect, now over. Neoliberalization is now increasingly a response to its own contradictions and crises (Keil, 2009; Peck, 2010a; Sheppard and Leitner, 2010). In this context, the current roll-with-it period represents a post-crisis, transitional, and potentially ephemeral moment of extreme uncertainty of which the outcome has yet to be determined.

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4 This “moment,” following Keil, was a long moment of which has unfolded throughout the 2000s, beginning with the WTO riots in Seattle in 1999, and followed by the Post-9/11 Bush wars, the urban riots across France in 2005, the sub-prime mortgage crisis, and culminating in the recent post-2008 global financial collapse.

5 The post-2008 crisis has triggered a cacophony of competing voices regarding the future of neoliberal ideologies and practices (see Brenner, et al., 2010a). Many have claimed that neoliberalism, as a mode of discourse, entrepreneurial ethic, and political-institutional framework is now untenable, its internal contradictions exposed, while a new period of “neo-Keynesian” market-intervention and regulation looms on the horizon (Alvater, 2009; Stiglitz, 2008; Wallerstein, 2008). Others have advanced the notion of “post-neoliberalism” to describe the contemporary post-2008 crisis-inflicted period; that we are potentially on the cusp of some new and unknown era (Peck, et al., 2010).
Roll-with-it marks the onset of a new neoliberal period which “replaces and supplements roll-back and roll-out historically” (Keil, 2009: 232) while dialectically intertwining both roll-back and roll-out moments with something qualitatively new: roll-with-it moments of policy implementation. Roll-with-it measures, however, are not implemented in relation to something that “first has to be brought down or brought in,” but merely by virtue of neoliberalism’s utter hegemonic dominance of life under capitalism today (Keil, 2009: 232). Thus, they refer to governance actions that resort to established roll-back and roll-out policy prescriptions primarily due to the current and profoundly normalized neoliberal mentality.

Such practices, of course, were originally designed to confront the crisis of the welfare-state and not the full implications of the current crisis of neoliberal capitalism. Yet no alternatives seem presently conceivable other than the very policies and practices that directly (and ironically) contributed to the recent crisis to begin with (Keil, 2009; Peck, 2010a; Harvey, 2010). In this context, roll-with-it moments represent policies and practices that are “self-referential.” Here, the perpetuation of roll-back and roll-out measures under roll-with-it is designed to counter the current crisis rather than the crisis of the 1970s: the roll-back of established neoliberal practices in favor of new ones or the deepening of such established policies.6 Peck (2010a: 109) parodies the moment as follows:

“‘Dead but dominant’, neoliberalism may indeed have entered its zombie phase. The brain has apparently long since ceased functioning, but the limbs are still moving, and many of the defensive reflexes seem to be working too. The living dead of the free-market revolution continue to walk the earth, though with each resurrection their decidedly uncoordinated gait becomes even more erratic.”

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6 For example, the retreat of explicit revanchist articulations in favor of humanism (Wilson and Sternberg, 2012), the further erosion of social-welfare policies in the UK (Hamnett, 2011), and emergent redevelopment ideas in New York (i.e., Bloomberg’s now failed “Opportunity NYC program,” see Peck and Theodore, 2010).
In short, the study explores the ways in which this emergent phase of neoliberal urban politics is manifest in Chicago.

**Why Bronzeville?**

Bronzeville was chosen as the study site for the following reasons. First, it is a neighborhood of national fame and currently undergoing rapid physical and social change in Chicago (Bennett, 2006; Pattillo, 2007; Boyd, 2008a; Hyra, 2008). Second, while Bronzeville has a long and richly documented history (see Gosnell, 1935; Drake and Cayton, [1945] 1993; Pierce, 1957; J. Wilson, 1960; Meier, 1962; Spear, 1967; Philpott, 1991; W. Wilson, 1996; Hirsch, [1983] 1998; Venkatesh, 2000; Bennett, 2006; Pattillo, 2007; Boyd, 2008a; Hyra, 2008; Wacquant, 2008; Schroeder, 2008), it has curiously not been studied from a distinctly Marxian political economy perspective. This study fills this gap. Moreover, as Bronzeville continues to redevelop, it now confronts a devastating local mortgage crisis and “grass-roots” activist movements mobilized against the city and prominent developers. As Keil (2009: 232) notes, “the current crisis provides an excellent lens through which to observe the interaction among different registers as politicians, capitalists and activists want to stabilize, restore and revolutionize ‘the system’ all at once.” It is through such a lens that this study proceeds.

At the same time, the current transformation of Bronzeville represents one of few gentrifying urban neighborhoods in the United States experiencing the displacement of a low-income black population by an affluent black population (see Hyra [2008] for a comparative study of Bronzeville with New York’s Harlem; Moore [2005, 2009] for the experience of Brickton in Philadelphia; and Inwood [2010] for the experience of Auburn Avenue in Atlanta). Until recently, gentrification in Chicago and other large US cities has primarily meant the
displacement of the poor (primarily non-black, Latino or mixed populations) by affluent white populations (Smith, 1996; Wilson, Grammenos, and Wouters, 2004; Wilson and Grammenos, 2005). Gentrification has only recently (until the 2000s) affected low-income, black inner-city neighborhoods. Yet, despite a growing body of literature, we still know relatively little about the racial contours of gentrification. In this context, this rather peculiar example of “black gentrification” (lacking the typical component of racial displacement) offers a nuanced understanding of 1) the intersection of race and class during contemporary neoliberal times, and 2) the constitutive role of race within the unfolding of urban political economies.

Lastly, the monumental demolition of the neighborhood’s public housing stock (which has allowed the neighborhood’s gentrification to proceed) suggests a reworking of the political-economic function of this neighborhood. After decades of socio-economic neglect – the city’s principle “warehouse” of the racialized poor (Wyly and Hammel, 2000) and basis for Wacquant’s (2008) notion of the “hyper-ghetto” – Bronzeville is now a burgeoning site of racialized affluence. The dismantling of America’s public housing stock has opened up a wealth of strategically located urban spaces as sites for real-estate accumulation. In this context, the redevelopment of Bronzeville (and other neighborhoods like it) can also be interpreted as representing an emergent layer of capitalist uneven development now unfolding across America’s urban landscapes.

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7 The role of race within critical urban geography has only recently been explored and theorized in depth. For example, see Wilson (2007, 2009) for empirical and theoretical accounts, respectively. Also see Wyly and Hammel (2004), Wyly, et al. (2006), Wyly, et al. (2009), Cope and Latcham (2009), Barraclough (2009), Heynen (2009), and Roberts and Mahtani (2010).
Research Questions

The study examines the notion that it is conceivable that Chicago’s redevelopment governance has changed in important ways after 2005. Following Hackworth’s (2007) identification of the salient constitutive features of a redevelopment governance, this assertion will be explored through the following four aspects: its institutional content, its political goals and agendas, its prominent rhetorical features, and its impacts on the ground. These aspects are to be held in dialectical tension, each evolving in relation to the others. The following operational questions are explored in relation to these governance-constituting features:

A) To what degree has the institutional composition of Chicago’s redevelopment governance changed after 2005?

B) In what ways have the political goals and agendas of this redevelopment governance (and the means of achieving them) changed between these two periods?

C) In what ways have the prominent rhetorical themes and devices used to attempt to restructure Bronzeville changed between these two periods?

D) In what ways have the spatial impacts of governance actions within Bronzeville changed?

Specifically, what has been the intensity of the production of space and the kinds of spaces produced in Bronzeville since 2005? And how does this compare to the pre-2005 period?

The study reveals that this post 2005 redevelopment governance has significantly changed in the following ways: an evolved ensemble of actors now constitute it, a new set of rhetorical themes are now deployed, and new kinds of spaces have emerged as distinctly new

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8 For example, the ensemble of actors/institutions evolves in relation to the progression of the discursive-mobilizing restructuring process itself, attracting new agents and/or disrupting the interests of existing agents. Conflicts arise between different/competing goals and agendas of this evolving set of agents, which further influence the other dimensions (i.e., in its discourses, actions, and agendas) and the relations between them.
transformations representative of the materialization of these changes. Yet, I suggest, all is not new. In this sense, the newness is deceptive. In a central repetition from the past, the goals and objectives of this governance have stayed the same. Amid evolving and changed rhetoric, organizational partners, and new kinds of transformations, the drive of this amalgam to acquire resources – power, prestige, and capital accumulation – persists in the face of altered forces and obstacles. Here, I chronicle, is an adept and flexible governance that continues to read and respond to evolving socio-political landscapes and circumstances which necessitate an alteration of rhetoric, actions, and institutional affiliations. Finally, it is suggested that similar recent temporal trajectories may mark, or will mark, the experience of many other large US cities as well, pointing to a broader restructuring process at work within the capitalist urban system.

**Significance of Research**

This study contributes to our understanding of cities in the context of contemporary political-economic realities. Theoretically, the study nuances our understanding of the temporal ebbs and flows of neoliberal redevelopment governances through an intensive examination of the restructuring of urban space in one specific setting: Chicago’s Bronzeville. On the policy front, the study contributes to the striving of local institutions and policies to produce a more socially just and fair city. The (re)production of ghetto space continues to deepen and widen across American metropolitan regions. This is the creatively destructive outcome of contemporary processes of capitalist uneven development at the metropolitan scale (Harvey, 1982, 1989b; Smith, 1984; Massey, 1984). The effect has been to render the most vulnerable and marginalized urban inhabitants as non-existent, true “urban outcasts” (Wacquant, 2008) further relegated to the absolute margins of a society that has erased them from public consciousness.
Since “there is no alternative,” Margaret Thatcher’s now infamous pronouncement, the harsh, human-inflicting consequences of this ideological formation and “actually existing” practices are profoundly naturalized. As a result, they are easily accepted as rational and necessary to maintain city competitiveness, especially in the current crisis-laden moment. This naturalization occludes the fundamental connection between capital accumulation, poverty production, and the constitutive role of this relation in the emergent post-2008 crisis. The study illuminates these connections, revealing a dire need for urban policy to be sensitive to their associated and ongoing consequences.

Theoretical Orientation: Cultural Political Economy

The study draws upon a “cultural economy” analytic to nuance Marxist political economy as the study’s over-arching theoretical framework. Specifically, it interrogates and builds upon Bob Jessop’s (2004, 2005; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008) cultural political economy (CPE). It should be stressed, however, that the study is not applying CPE as a framework for analysis, but offers it more as an interpretive lens that illuminates a number of insights and sensibilities for the reader to keep in mind. The wealth of literature that now appears under the banner of “cultural economy” is diverse and spans numerous disciplinary boundaries and ontological orientations (Gibson and Kong, 2005; Hinde and Dixon, 2007). CPE merely represents one variant within this wider “cultural economy” literature (Ribera-Fumaz, 2009).^9

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^9 Much of this literature, broadly speaking, either focuses on how culture is embedded within economic production (i.e., the cultural industries, see Bourdieu, 1993; Scott, 2000, 2001); how economic relations are embedded within wider structures of social relations (i.e., Granovetter, 1985; du Gay and Pryke, 2002; Amin and Thrift, 2004a); or seeks to emphasize or re-imagine the articulation of culture within urban political economies (i.e., Jessop and Sum, 2000, 2001; Amin and Thrift, 2002, 2007; Latham, 2003; Sennett, 2006; Dannestam, 2008; Jones, 2008; Ribera-Fumaz, 2009), of which human geographers have made central contributions (Ribera-Fumaz, 2009). Even the Richard Florida inspired “creative class” genre of pro-entrepreneurialism can also fall under the banner of cultural economy (Gibson and Kong, 2005). In this context, it is imperative to define both culture and economy before
This “cultural economy” notion, broadly speaking, stresses the inseparability of economic and cultural realms. Research within this “post-disciplinary field” (Jessop, 2004; Amin and Thrift, 2007) aims to unearth the myriad ways in which the culture-economy relation is manifest in particular institutional settings. Yet, following Jessop (2004, 2005) and Ribera-Fumaz (2009), these insights have been slow to impact urban political economy. In this context, CPE posits a “third way,” a theoretical orientation that purportedly moves urban political economy beyond the one-sided fronts associated with orthodox (Marxist and neoclassical) political economy on the one hand and soft economic sociology on the other:

“First, insofar as semiosis is studied apart from its extra-semiotic context, resulting accounts of social causation will be incomplete, leading to semiotic reductionism and/or imperialism. And second, insofar as material transformation is studied apart from its semiotic dimensions and mediations, explanations of stability and change risk oscillating objective necessity and subjective contingency. To avoid these twin problems, CPE aims to steer a path between “soft cultural economics” and “hard orthodox economics” (Jessop, 2004: 171).

Following Jessop (2004, 2005), CPE is a conceptual framework with a focus on unearthing the relation between culture and economy within the constitution and evolution of wider capitalist social formations. The aim is to nuance urban political economy by uncovering the ways in which economic practices are held within co-constitutive relations with what is identified as “semiotics.” “Ontologically,” to Jessop (2004: 160), “CPE claims that semiosis contributes to the overall constitution of specific social subjects and, a fortiori, to their co-

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10 Since the 1990s, much of the critical urban studies literature has been significantly influenced by the “cultural turn” in terms of theorizing the role of local cultures within urban political economies (see Ribera-Fumaz, 2009). However, only a handful of more recent work has explicitly adopted cultural economy analytical frameworks (e.g., McCann, 2002; Hackworth and Rekers, 2005; Dannestam, 2008; Cartier, 2009; P. Jones, 2009; Pratt, 2009; Wilson, Beck, and Bailey, 2009).
constitution and co-evolution in wider ensembles of social relations.” In this context, processes and practices of capital accumulation are interpreted as deeply influenced by prevailing meaning systems, value structures, and discursive practices just as the formation of these “semiotic practices” are influenced by capital accumulation. Lastly, Jessop embraces the method of critical semiotic analysis to explore this “doubly tendential dynamic” (Jessop, 2004: 162).11

Periods of crisis are interpreted as pivotal moments that force revisions within a capitalist social formation’s complex web of semiotic and economic relations. Moments of crisis emerge when “established patterns of dealing with structural contradictions, their crisis-tendencies, and dilemmas no longer work as expected and, indeed, when continued reliance thereon may even aggravate the situation” (Jessop, 2004: 167). Thus, semiotic and material adjustment must be exercised to restore conditions of relative “structured coherence” (Jessop, 2004, 2005; also see Harvey, 1989b). Such moments of crises, however, are potentially threatening to existing power relations and rife with path-shaping capacities. This “highlights,” to Jessop (2004: 162), “the importance of retaining an appropriate repertoire of semiotic and material resources and practices that can be flexibly deployed in response to emerging disturbances and crises.”

CPE, however, tends to treat capital accumulation as the central, overarching goal to which economic agents are oriented. This is not to counter the centrality of capital accumulation to economic practices under capitalism. Indeed, the capitalist imperative of profit maximization is a central guiding logic compelling economic agents within capitalist societies and should be privileged as such. But it should not be understood as the ultimate end or single force compelling people’s behavior in all instances. Yet CPE tends to only consider the role of “semiotic

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practices” insofar as they serve the perpetual quest for profit maximization. Non-economic motivations or the role of capital accumulation as a means of achieving other non-economic goals, or semiotic ends, tends to be insufficiently acknowledged.\textsuperscript{12}

To address this shortcoming, this study places greater emphasis on the variety of motivations governing social behavior in addition to economic considerations (see Amin and Thrift, 2004, 2007). Here, people are understood to engage in economic practices for reasons of individual fulfillment, power, pleasure, self-worth, and identity constitution \textit{in addition} to capital accumulation. In this context, and notwithstanding its \textit{central} role under capitalism, the role of capital accumulation is treated as one among many motivations and/or imperatives.

Moreover, the focus on the economy-semiotic relation leaves the notion of culture underexplored. In fact, CPE offers no explicit conception of what “culture” is and how it enters into the world of economy and semiotics. The category of semiotics also tends to encompass a rather diverse array of concepts. It is, in short, the domain of meaning systems: the realms of discourse, ideology, imagination, the symbolic, and modes of subject formation; a variety of notions that typically do not fall within the bounds of the “economic” but are nonetheless intimately wrapped up with it. In the end, as the semiotic category is dialectically pitted against economy, the notion of culture tends to be, at least implicitly, equated with that of semiotics. But while the proposition of a dialectic is meant to collapse this tension-ridden binary – it ultimately

\textsuperscript{12} Moreover, as M. Jones (2008) has noted, there is a lack of significant engagement in CPE with the role of the state in influencing the development of the KBE master discourse. This limitation is addressed here in the designation of the \textit{political} dimension within the proposed five-fold bracketing that is presented below.
maintains it by signifying an invocation of the longer and even more fundamentally antagonistic duality between the material (economy) and immaterial (semiotics, culture)."13

In this context, this study breaks apart the category of semiotics to make meaningful distinctions between three analytic spheres: discourse, ideology, and identity. I suggest the ways in which the economic sphere and these three distinct semiotic dimensions are differentially brought together in particular places and times is what, in part, constitutes the “culture” of a given socio-spatial formation (conceived at a variety of spatial scales) (Smith, 1984; Harvey, 1996; Brenner, 2004). In this context, these formations – such as neoliberal redevelopment governances – are interpreted as dialectical systems that encompass an evolving constellation of political, economic, and semiotic relations.14 The “economy,” in this sense, is one sphere among many within a given “culture” – rather than viewing the spheres of economy and culture in a kind of dichotomous tension (whether dialectical or not). If this duality is to be sufficiently overcome, I suggest an ontology of “culture” – such as the one proposed here – should be constructed that avoids invoking the duality altogether.

In this study, I distinguish between the spheres of economy, politics, discourse, ideology, and identity as each represent analytic categories that can be grounded by distinct, irreducible qualities of social action – of which “culture,” following Warde (2002), cannot:

1) The economic dimension refers to the diverse forms of social behavior associated with practices of exchange.

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13 This duality stems from Descartes’ “mind/body” distinction, and later manifest with Hegel and Marx, between the privileging of the “Idea” and the “Material” as driving forces of historical and social change.
14 The notion of a “dialectical system” follows Lefebvre’s ([1958] 1991, [1974] 1991) method of structural analysis that understands everything as heterogeneously formed and embedded within an “organic” or “ecological” totality (also see Harvey, 1996; 2010); a concrete yet fluid “unity” that is constituted by a set of internal components that are held in dialectical tension.
2) The political dimension refers to the structures and hierarchical relations of power that constitute the relations within and between state and non-state institutions.

3) The dimension of ideology refers to belief systems that consist of relatively coherent ensembles of ideas. As such, they are often unspoken, but nonetheless communicated through the constellations of “code words” that populate discourses.

4) The dimension of discourse refers to the practices of communication. Not to be confused with ideology, discourses are the linguistic structures which permit and/or constrain the flow of the ideas and beliefs that constitute ideologies (Smith, 2011).

5) The dimension of identity refers to the processes of “subject formation,” or the myriad practices related to the ways in which people constitute their identities: the intersection of class, race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, religion, political subjectivities, and the like.

Through this lens, the concept of “culture” is interpreted as an active medium through which each of these dimensions internalizes the effects of the others at a given time and place (Fig. 1.2). It should be stressed that each dimension should be held in, more or less, equal dialectical tension within this web of internal relations. No one dimension should be given privileged status or causative power with respect to the others. Indeed, the evolution of capitalist social formations remains deeply structured by the temporal and tension-ridden logic of capital accumulation. But moments of economic crisis should not be interpreted as the only point in this evolutionary trajectory that ignites change across this cultural medium.

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15 Despite their differences, Harvey (1996) and Amin and Thrift (2005) agree that outcomes cannot be determined in advance; that capitalism is a highly differentiated and spatially variegated social formation, constantly evolving and never static. But since capitalist social formations are indeed structured, in part, by a “core dynamic” (as Amin and Thrift [2005] concede), any perspective of cultural economy in relation to capitalism must take this into account.
In fact, crises can erupt, often simultaneously, within any of these social dimensions (even to natural disasters, i.e., Hurricane Katrina). Ideologies and discourses can go out of favor for reasons other than incompatibility with capital accumulation. And political practices and policies (always impregnated with the ideology/discourse nexus), in support of one regime of accumulation, can directly lead to economic crisis necessitating revisions of its ideological basis and/or discursive strategies that may ultimately support either something entirely new or the restructuring of the old (see Keil, 2009). In short, changes in one or more dimensions always reverberate across the cultural medium and affect the ways in which each dimension consequently internalizes the effects of, and relates to, the others.

This adjusted framework, I suggest, offers a nuanced lens in terms of not just answering the research questions guiding this study but also advancing our understanding of the culture-economy relation and Marxist political economy.
Chapter 2

Chicago’s Bronzeville: A Brief History

The term “Bronzeville” was originally used in reference to the area of Chicago’s south-side known as the black belt. At its largest, the black belt encompassed a mile-wide strip of land between State Street and Cottage Grove Avenue running south from approximately 26th to 55th Street. The name, Bronzeville, however, was largely forgotten once the black belt exploded from its spatial confinement during the period of urban renewal and white flight in the 1950s and 1960s. This period witnessed the erosion of the culturally rich and “vibrant” character now commonly associated with this urban territory of which the term, Bronzeville, had once signified. But this term has now been resurrected, seized and re-animated by well-organized and politically mobilized property owners during the 1980s and 1990s (appearing in local newspaper articles only by the mid-1990s) (Pattillo, 2007; Boyd, 2008a).

Bronzeville is not an officially recognized Chicago community area, and a significant degree of debate has emerged among local residents, community organizers, and city officials regarding its territorial boundaries in recent years (Boyd, 2008a).16 Much of this debate has stemmed from local community organizations that represent the four south-side community areas of Douglas, Grand Boulevard, Oakland, and North Kenwood (see Fig 2.1),17 such as the Quad Communities Development Corporation (QCDC)18 and Mid-South Planning & Development Corporation (MSPDC). This relatively large territory is often referred to as the “Mid-South”

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16 For example, one local journalist writes, “Bronzeville…an ambiguously defined district that runs mostly along the lake from 29th to 51st Streets through the Grand Boulevard and Douglas community areas” (Almada, 2000).
17 These four community areas are nestled between Lake Michigan to the east, the Dan Ryan Expressway to the west, Hyde Park/Kenwood to the south, and the South Loop neighborhood to the north.
18 The QCDC is headquartered at the 4th ward aldermanic office and run by Toni Preckwinkle since 2003. However, Will Burns was elected 4th ward alderman in February, 2011, in an election to fill the vacancy recently left by Preckwinkle who was elected Cook County President in 2011.
area, a designation that originated with the MSPDC, a coalition of local-based community organizations formed in 1990 (von Hoffman, 2003; Boyd, 2008a). It was out of this “Mid-South” designation by the MSPDC and its revitalization efforts that the Bronzeville moniker was resurrected (N. Moore, 2007). As a result, this historic name now tends to signify this broader territory as opposed to the much smaller tract of land that used to represent the black belt.

This discrepancy, however, has led to much confusion when designating the exact boundaries of Bronzeville within the broader Mid-South area. Although many now consider the Mid-South area and Bronzeville to be more or less synonymous, residents and community organizers in Oakland and North Kenwood vehemently reject the Bronzeville designation. To one North Kenwood/Oakland organizer, many residents, especially “the older residents,” “are not happy about being associated with the term ‘Bronzeville’” (Interview, 8/19/2010). These residents argue that Cottage Grove has historically divided Oakland and North Kenwood from what they consider to be Bronzeville to the west (see Pattillo, 2007). Bronzeville is here typically referred to as the Douglas and Grand Boulevard community areas, west of Cottage Grove, as well as the site of the original black belt. Oakland and North Kenwood experienced a different historical trajectory from that of Douglas and Grand Boulevard: the black belt was considered separate from what was a racially mixed, middle-upper class constituted Oakland and North Kenwood during much of the early to mid twentieth century.

The 1950s and 1960s, following Pattillo (2007: 52), are actually considered by many as a “golden era” for Oakland and North Kenwood. These neighborhoods, then, held a majority black population. During this brief period, the Cottage Grove boundary essentially dissolved and the

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Oakland and North Kenwood community areas were effectively absorbed into the all-black Bronzeville to the west. Many famous African-American figures (i.e., Muddy Waters) began to take residence east of Cottage Grove (Pattillo, 2007). This absorption, however, was short lived as the overcrowded population in the black belt spilled across Cottage Grove as well as other bordering all white neighborhoods vacated by mass suburbanization. At this point, both sides of Cottage Grove experienced the same process of systematic socio-economic disinvestment brought on by deindustrialization during the 1970s and 1980s.

The designation of Douglas and Grand Boulevard as Bronzeville is now widely accepted among local residents, community organizers, and even city officials. However, many local residents within these two community areas argue that even this is too large of an area to be accurately considered Bronzeville (Boyd, 2008a). For these residents this term has specific and historical connotations, signifying the “Black Metropolis” (Drake and Cayton, [1945] 1993) of the early decades of the twentieth century, which typically refers to the more narrowly defined commercial downtown that formed at State Street and 35th Street. As MSPDC member Leroy Kennedy has noted, “Bronzeville is more of a cultural, social and anthropological area, more of a state of mind,” whereas “Mid-South” is simply a “geographic locator” (in N. Moore, 2007).

It is in this context that Bronzeville, to some, is beginning to signify the entire African-American community in Chicago, as residents in Woodlawn and Englewood (to the south and southwest, respectively) are beginning to identify as members of the Bronzeville “community” as well (Boyd, 2008a). But many residents are also becoming increasingly skeptical of the use of both terms – Bronzeville and Mid-South – by the city and real estate community. Both terms are here viewed as “sanitized” and “development-friendly” phrases instead of the ghetto-invoking traditional “South-Side” moniker (N. Moore, 2007).
For the purposes of clarification, I will use the term “Bronzeville” in reference to the broader four community areas represented by the QCDC and MDPDC for its historical resonance and symbolism. As this redevelopment agenda encompasses both sides of Cottage Grove and is propelled by the same institutional and discursive forces, the notion of “Bronzeville’s revival” typically signifies the redevelopment unfolding in all four community areas despite the varying local understandings of what and where Bronzeville “really” is.

In this chapter, I present a brief historical overview of Bronzeville and its relation to Chicago’s evolving political apparatus through the twentieth century. The first section chronicles the first half of the twentieth century (1900 – 1950), a period that is now remembered as a time of romanticized nostalgia by community organizers, developers, and city officials alike in their current quest to spur redevelopment. Then, I document 1) the consolidation of Chicago’s growth-machine governance with the reign of Mayor Richard J. Daley and 2) the role of racial discrimination in the neighborhood’s drastic socio-economic disinvestment during the mid-late twentieth century (1950 – 1989). The chapter concludes with a discussion on the emergence of CDCs and grass-roots based redevelopment movements during the 1970s and 1980s. These early movements are considered to have effectively set the stage for the city-sponsored redevelopment that has since gathered steam, from the late-1990s to the present.

The “Golden Years” (1900-1950)

The early decades of the twentieth century (1900-1950) are now represented by developers and city planning officials in a very selective and nostalgic way for the purposes of promoting a class-based redevelopment (Bennett, 2006; Boyd, 2008a). To Boyd (2008a), this period is, for these agents, remembered as the “golden era,” the high point of African-American
culture and life in the city. It was, purportedly, a period of social and economic “vibrancy” and “stability,” economic diversity, and the origins of a rich cultural heritage (i.e., the famous Blues and Jazz bars, etc.) of community independence and economic self-sufficiency. These were the benefits of racial segregation, so it is argued.

As Schroeder (2008) chronicles, Bronzeville, during this period (especially from 1932-1945), did indeed experience a distinct African-American cultural movement. Commonly referred to as Chicago’s “Black Renaissance,” this moment in Bronzeville housed such notable figures as Richard Wright, Gwendolyn Brooks, Duke Ellington, Louis Armstrong, Langston Hughes, and many other well-known artists, writers, and musicians. It was in this context that Bronzeville became the most famous black community in the United States outside of Harlem. However, following Boyd’s (2008) analysis of this narrative, the designation of this time period as the “golden years” – despite the historical and material reality this notion signifies – serves as a political device to attract resources and facilitate gentrification, first and foremost.

This current narrative on Bronzeville’s history, what I call “community nostalgia,” ultimately emanates from the actors and institutions invested in its redevelopment. It represents an appropriation of this history by neoliberal designs (see Inwood [2010] for the astonishingly similar experience of Atlanta’s “Auburn Avenue” revival) by operating as a distinct space-producing narrative. It specifically caters to an emergent and growing black affluent class, fosters demand by suggesting a return to a period of racial harmony and community vitality (Boyd, 2008a), and ultimately fuels the engine of capital accumulation. It also represents an acute mutation of the actual historical record by focusing exclusively on the positive aspects of this “forgotten” cultural movement and time period. In this context, it is a politically charged perspective on the history of this neighborhood that strategically ignores important, less-than-
ideal elements, particularly those that problematize the purely harmonious “golden” image.\textsuperscript{20} These less-than-golden, historical blind-spots are now addressed in the rest of this section.

The black population in Chicago was essentially non-existent before the turn of the twentieth century. As Sawislak (1995: 10) reports, on the eve of the Great Fire of 1871, Chicago’s black community was still “miniscule” in relation to the city’s European immigrant population base.\textsuperscript{21} However, during the immediate aftermath of the Great Fire, brigades of militiamen and troops were called up to assist the military to “maintain order” (i.e., against rioting, looting, etc.) in the city. Many of these brigades, curiously, consisted of black militiamen from rural downstate Illinois (Sawislak, 1995). This influx of hundreds of rural black militiamen into Chicago, “who shouldered the musket in their working garb” (Sawislak, 1995: 58), essentially signaled the onset of a slow but steady black migration into Chicago over the following decades. Ironically, it would be the city’s black population during the following century that would symbolize the very kind of “disorder” that these black brigades were tapped to combat in the wake of the Great Fire.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Chicago began to experience a significant spike in black migration from the American South. Attracted to the city by the promise of jobs and prosperity via the widespread availability of The Defender, Chicago’s black newspaper, the city’s black population grew from 14,000 to 44,000 between 1890 and 1910 (Hirsch, 1998). Entering the city at the Dearborn and Illinois Central rail stations south of the Loop (von Hoffman, 2003), the majority of this growing and relatively immobile population settled and

\textsuperscript{20}Boyd (2008a: Ch. 1) presents this conflicting history by drawing from a number of historical narratives (Gosnell, 1935; Drake and Cayton, [1945] 1993; Pierce, 1957; J. Wilson, 1960; Meier, 1962; Spear, 1967; Hirsch, 1998; Philpott, 1991).

\textsuperscript{21}In fact, to Sawislak (1995: 10), this population base consisted of primarily “German, Irish, and Scandinavian immigrants and their children” of which far outnumbered “native-born Americans.”
concentrated along the State Street corridor (eventually stretching as far south as 55th Street) forming what became known as the black belt.

As the black population expanded a black political elite emerged within the local political structure and formed close ties with the city’s then dominant white politicians (Boyd, 2008a). This collection of black elite’s, however, were quickly absorbed into the Chicago political machine and subordinated to the city’s white political leaders – a distinct power relationship that seemingly remains intact today. And while this current “community nostalgia” narrative treats this early period as a time of racial harmony and black/white political partnership, this relationship was in fact characterized more by racial tension and political strategy (i.e., the race riots of 1919 and the anti-black riots from 1946-1951, see Drake and Cayton, [1945] 1993; Hirsch, 1998; Pennick and Stanback, 2006; Pattillo, 2007).22

During this early period, many black migrants, in fact, secured decently waged manufacturing and industrial work, particularly in the steel mills, meat-packing, and metal and machine companies. And due to ruthless segregation – most notably through the financial and real-estate sectors via 1) mortgage denials regardless of qualification and 2) the widespread use of racial covenants placed on property deeds – these working-class blacks had little opportunity beyond the black-belt to live and consume. Ironically, as a result of this convergence of decent employment and discriminatory segregation, a host of local, black-owned businesses were able to thrive off this local middle-income consumption, particularly in the “small service and retail establishments” (Boyd, 2008a: 13), such as barber shops, groceries, and restaurants, not to

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22 While the “community nostalgia” narrative is introduced here, it distinctly forms a prominent rhetorical theme within this neighborhood’s broader redevelopment discourse, which is explored in detail in Part II and III.
mention the now famous jazz and blues bars that dominated the night life of this “city within a city” (also see Drake and Cayton, [1945] 1993; Spear, 1967).

The black population, however, exploded after World War I, nearly doubling in size to 100,000 (Philpott, 1991: 117). The black belt became seriously overcrowded, rents increased with heightened demand for housing, and the growing black population became increasingly noticed by the surrounding all-white neighborhoods. As Chicago’s post-Fire redevelopment and CBD expansion proceeded (and did so spectacularly), the city’s black population was to be, for all intensive purposes, quarantined in order to protect the city’s booming commercial and real-estate growth. Yet the black belt continued to grow wider and longer through the 1920s, rising to a population total of more than 200,000 by 1930 (Hirsch, 1998).

Due to this racist-driven quarantine, the majority of this vastly burgeoning black population, regardless of income, remained forced to live in what became increasingly cramped living conditions, “hemmed in like no other ethnic group” within the Douglas, Grand Boulevard, and Washington Park neighborhoods (von Hoffman, 2003: 115). Although decent employment and discriminatory segregation provided the structural and material basis upon which the “Black Metropolis” could thrive, it also meant living in conditions of squalor and cut off from public services that mostly flowed elsewhere in the city (Hirsch, 1998) – realities to this story that are typically downplayed by the narrative that dominates today (Boyd, 2008a).

The 1930s was a turbulent decade. Although unemployment soared after the Great Depression, the black migration persisted (the black population in Chicago grew to 277,731 by 1940) (Hirsch, 1998). And as this population began to spill into neighboring white communities, racial tensions grew increasingly hostile (Hirsch, 1998; Spear, 1967). White homeowners and realtors responded by enforcing racial covenants and violently terrorizing black families who
ventured out of the black belt, including those who rented to them (Hirsch, 1998; von Hoffman, 2003). Due to this “rigorously enforced residential segregation,” thousands of blacks had no choice but to continue to live in increasingly inadequate and over-crowded housing conditions as existing buildings were chopped-up into “kitchenette apartments” with multiple families piled in together (J. Smith, 2006: 27). But the housing supply in the black belt simply could not absorb this increasing number of black migrants into the city while the media actively ignored the numerous incidents of racial violence and rioting to hide its existence. In addition to the image of “golden” tranquility and vibrancy, this period is also characterized by Hirsch (1998) as the “era of hidden violence” (Hirsch, 1998) which culminated with the Cicero race riots in late 1946, an incident that brought in the National Guard and made international headlines.23

During the equally turbulent 1940s, the black population in the city grew by 77 percent to a total of 492,265 (Hirsch, 1998). The post-war economic boom brought a good amount of well-paying manufacturing jobs to black workers, further fueling the thriving conditions of the “Black Metropolis.” But the housing situation grew progressively worse. Although public housing construction began during this period (i.e., the Ida B. Wells Homes), housing supply remained extremely low compared to the surging black migration. Here, through the manipulation of supply/demand conditions within the black belt housing market, the relatively decent wages of many black workers and businesses were systematically appropriated by (mostly white) landlords in the form of what Harvey (1974) has called “class monopoly rents.”24

The neighborhood’s current “community nostalgia” narrative, however, paints a uniformly golden picture of this time period. It presents a “rise and fall” story of this historical

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23 As Hirsch (1998) reports, after a number of black families moved into Cicero during the 1940s, the predominantly Eastern European immigrant population of this inner-ring suburb responded violently and forcefully by looting, rioting, and attacking black newcomers in protest of this racial infiltration.

24 A review and exposition of this concept is presented later in chapter 6.
African-American community with the goal of returning it to the “way it was.” But, as Boyd (2008a: 36) argues, this story is fundamentally misguided: “The experience of Douglas/Grand Boulevard residents during this period was not one of unmitigated triumph followed by unfortunate demise; instead, it was a contradictory blend of expansion, progress, and stagnation.” It was also a period characterized by unbridled racial discrimination, horrific living conditions, and political tension and violence, historical realities conveniently purged from the exclusively homogenous and rosy image of “vibrancy” and racial harmony that is propagated today.

As W. Simpson (1996) cleverly recognized in a *Chicago Sun-Times* editorial, “trying to reincarnate Bronzeville like it purportedly was – without recognizing the area’s capitulation to white supremacist philosophy and practice – seems to deny how it really was.” Although Bronzeville may have “thrived” economically in comparison to the post-1950 period, it must be stressed that the formation of this “city within a city,” fostered by a historically-specific convergence of conditions (i.e., industrial employment and racial segregation), functioned, first and foremost, as a means of protecting 1) Chicago’s post-Fire expansion in the Loop, and 2) its more politically connected white neighborhoods. These motivations played central roles in terms of underpinning the existence of Bronzeville as Chicago’s Harlem.

**Chicago’s Growth-Machine Governance and Bronzeville’s Disinvestment (1950-1989)**

Between 1940 and 1960, the black population in Chicago swelled from 277,231 to 812,637 (Hirsch, 1998). In the process, this burgeoning population quickly proliferated across the existing boundaries of the black belt, infiltrating surrounding and previously all-white neighborhoods. Non-coincidentally, this period also experienced the rapid suburbanization of the

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25 The Loop is the name given to Chicago’s central business district (CBD).
city’s white population made possible by the completion of the federal interstate system and innovations in housing construction and mortgage finance (Jackson, 1985). As Hirsch (1998) chronicles, fear of this expanding black population played a key role in securing demand for suburban housing, a fear that was aggressively nurtured by scrupulous speculators.

Moreover, as financial institutions redlined these neighborhoods, black families who possessed decent financial resources still could not get mortgages simply because they were black. White speculators, however, could secure such mortgages, buying them cheaply from suburban-bound white families, and effectively acted as the middle-men between mortgage lenders and black buyers. And further, making these sales possible, racial covenants, non-coincidentally, were deemed unconstitutional in 1948. These older homes, vacated by white flight, were then sold at artificially high prices to black families desperate to flee the horrific housing conditions in the black belt.26 In this context, racism played a key role for speculators in the process of extracting “class monopoly rents” during this period (Harvey, 1974). Here, established conceptions of race were used as a means to justify the class exploitation necessary for an expanding metropolitan housing market (Smith, 1996; Hackworth, 2007).

As much of the city’s white population fled to the suburbs, so did a good proportion of the city’s employment base (W. Wilson, 1996; Rast, 1999). Consequently, Bronzeville’s once flourishing commercial landscape suffered as its middle-class consumption base departed for greener pastures, in previously white neighborhoods or the even the suburbs. Moreover, Chicago business elites felt increasingly threatened as the remaining lower-income black population encroached on the coveted Loop to the north. In response to this “threat,” downtown businesses

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26 This process was further lubricated by the now illegal practice of “blockbusting,” also known as “panic peddling,” where speculators hired black youths to loiter on street corners in all-white neighborhoods as a means to support claims that the block was about to be overrun by blacks, fueling existing fears of black infiltration and motivating white families to sell before it was too late (Hirsch, 1998).
and institutions lobbied the city in favor of “urban renewal” projects that would protect the “integrity” of their institutions (Hirsch, 1998; von Hoffman, 2003; Boyd, 2008a).  

These private interests were quickly consolidated through the formation of the machine politics of the business-friendly Richard J. Daley administration in the late 1950s. The marriage of these elite institutions with this newly elected and centralized city government thus formed a cohesive redevelopment governance to defend their collective land-based interests. A central agent to this governance, the Commercial Club of Chicago, played a pivotal role in preserving the interests of these privileged institutions. The Commercial Club, a bastion of private sector elites, has historically played an immensely powerful role in Chicago (and still does) by influencing local public policy, city decision making, and directing investment funds toward arenas deemed most profitably employed.

After spearheading the city’s much celebrated Burnham Plan of 1909 and its associated “City Beautiful” development, the Commercial Club “took the lead in getting state legislation passed” to defuse this encroaching racial threat (Ferman, 1996: 55-6). As a result, Daley was able to utilize an ensemble of legal tools (i.e., eminent domain, the Illinois Blighted Areas and Redevelopment Act of 1947, the Urban Community Conservation Act of 1953, and the Housing

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27 For example, local Bronzeville institutions, the Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT) and Michael Reese Hospital, participated in this lobbying.

28 It should be stressed that Richard J. Daley’s 21-year reign as mayor of Chicago, from 1955 to 1976, represents one of the most centralized and powerful urban regimes in American history. Daley was not only mayor, but also the chairman of the Cook County Democratic Committee, which meant that he “controlled roughly thirty thousand patronage jobs and had a key voice in slating Democratic candidates for office,” which gave him nearly complete support from the city council throughout his reign (Rast, 1999: 28). And this machine political structure and style of real-estate dominated governance that the first Daley regime developed essentially provided the blue prints for the second Daley regime (see Simpson and Kelly, 2008), marked by the mayoral election of Daley’s son, Richard M. Daley, in 1989.

29 The Commercial Club was founded in 1877 by 17 prominent Chicago business elites with today roughly 500 institutional members.

30 The Commercial Club here operated through the private, non-profit Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council led by Fred Kramer, a south-side real-estate mogul and founder of the present day and influential Draper & Kramer real-estate conglomerate.
Act of 1954) as “slum prevention measures” (Ferman, 1996: 56) to protect the Loop and privileged institutions (also see Hirsch, 1998; Rast, 1999).

In the process, this governance, led by Daley and the Commercial Club, executed the demolition of large swaths of older decayed housing stock for the sole purpose of creating “buffer zones” between the expanding black population and the Loop (Rast, 1999). This process of “urban renewal” was mobilized toward a simple, straight-forward end: save the Loop and white middle-class neighborhoods (i.e., Daley’s home neighborhood of Bridgeport on the city’s near southwest side) from the racialized disinvestment then engulfing the city’s west and south-sides. Bronzeville, at this time, continued to serve as a zone of racial containment, a necessary measure to protect the city’s white-led business interests associated with continued CBD development. But with the neighborhood’s middle-class evaporating, local businesses suffering, and many of its buildings lost to demolition, the material foundation (racial segregation) upon which the “Black Metropolis” rested was slowly unraveling.

Moreover, the demolition of countless tracts of historically over-crowded housing structures left a large percentage of the city’s black population displaced – the process coined “Negro Removal” by many critics and activists (Hirsch, 1998). In the context of heightened political activism and resistance from the city’s black population, Daley and elites knew that an increasing concentration of displaced and politicized black residents had to be addressed simply to divert a potentially threatening and socially volatile situation. Thus, the city’s massive construction of public housing was set in motion. But this should be seen as having been, first and foremost, a functional necessity to preserve the interests of Chicago’s capitalist elite as opposed to the central tenets of the social-welfare rhetoric that underpinned its construction.

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31 This is essentially laid bare in Daley’s Chicago Plan of 1958 (Ferman, 1996; Rast, 1999).
Simply put, city and private elites did not support public housing simply out of the good will of their hearts, as the content of this “liberal” rhetoric would suggest (see Wilson, 2005), but out of pragmatic, capitalist-driven necessity.

The vast majority of the city’s public housing units were concentrated in both Douglass and Grand Boulevard community areas (Boyd, 2008a). As a result, existing patterns of socio-economic segregation were reinforced (Hirsch, 1998; J. Smith, 2006). To this emergent growth-governance, this threatening low-income, racialized population had to be contained in the smallest footprint of land possible, particularly and preferably in already racially and economically marginalized urban spaces. The “buffer zones,” in the form of vacant land, that were produced by this extensive demolition had to be preserved. Rather than being developed for public housing, these spaces, subsequently remained vacant for decades simply to maintain adequate distance between the Loop and this newly formed, hyper-concentrated ghetto.

The Dearborn Homes, Stateway Gardens, and the nationally infamous Robert Taylor Homes (see Venkatesh, 2000) which lined the State Street corridor in Bronzeville (the same space where the former black belt once existed) were erected during this period. They would provide an incredibly ominous image for inhabitants and viewers alike for decades. In addition to holding the poorest four-block area (in 1980) in the United States (see Goetz, 2003: 39), Robert Taylor’s 4,312 units housed in twenty-eight identical sixteen-storey buildings made it the single “largest public housing project in the world” (von Hoffman, 2003: 140; also see Bennett, 2006: 215). As public housing served, first and foremost, as the receptacle for those displaced by urban renewal, the result was the “making of the second ghetto” (Hirsch, 1998), the concentration of the city’s lowest-income black residents in what became known simply as “the projects.”
After securing the survival of the Loop, Daley’s redevelopment governance quickly forged plans in the late 1950s that aimed at redevelop the inner-ring neighborhoods surrounding the Loop, i.e., Lincoln Park, River North, and the West and South Loop (Rast, 1999). But the urban renewal induced concentration of poverty that unfolded during this period only fueled the anger and resentment that became manifest in the civil rights protests that marked the turbulent 1960s. This heightened period of social angst effectively stalled many of these redevelopment agendas for years. The 1970s also signaled the end of the long post-war period of prosperity which brought devastating economic brutality to the Chicago metropolitan region and the south-side in particular (W. Wilson, 1996; Rast, 1999; Ranney, 2003).

The 1970s and 1980s experienced waves of lay-offs as the majority of the Chicago manufacturing and industrial sector evaporated (Doussard, Peck, and Theodore, 2009), the very jobs that once supported the existence of the thriving “Black Metropolis.” Many black middle-class families, already imprisoned by large mortgages, were hit hard by these years of deindustrialization (W. Wilson, 1996) as jobs fled to either the suburbs, the burgeoning US sunbelt region, or other countries as a means of securing cheaper sources of both land and labor (Harvey, 2005; Wacquant, 2008). Many of these jobs were also rendered obsolete my innovations in production (Ranney, 2003; Harvey, 2005).

This process disproportionately affected the city’s black population and produced an intensification and expansion of racialized poverty on the city’s south-side: those middle-class blacks that weathered the storm typically fled to the suburbs while those that failed to recover fell into welfare and public housing (W. Wilson, 1996). Although public housing increased, the “total number of housing units decreased by one-third,” partially due to arson perpetrated by landlords seeking to collect insurance money (Wacquant, 2008: 57). Through the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s, Bronzeville continued to serve its vital and long-lasting function for Chicago’s growth-governance and political economy: a warehouse for the most impoverished black residents. But this warehousing now served as a necessary receptacle for the poorest of the poor and the victims of deindustrialization.

Chronic unemployment and hopelessness ripped apart the most vulnerable and marginalized families left on the south-side, particularly in public housing concentrated Bronzeville. These residents also bore the brunt of an increasingly punitive and hostile federal government as the neoliberal order emerged in the 1980s. Those who could find work were often limited to local, dead-end service sector or janitorial/maintenance jobs. By 1980, “the number of working residents had fallen by a staggering 77 percent, leaving jobless nearly three out of every four persons over the age of 16” (Wacquant, 2008: 58). The city’s progressive Washington administration in the mid-1980s, however, did aim to tackle the problems that plagued this immobile and impoverished urban population (mainly by stimulating community development initiatives, see Immergluck, 2005). But the systematic dismantling of the “welfare state” during the Reagan administration ultimately compounded these very problems, resulting in the formation of what Wacquant (2008) has famously called the “hyper-ghetto.”

The significant decline of available housing units, loss of employment opportunities, and the flight of the better-off black families to the surrounding city neighborhoods vacated by white flight contributed to a drastic population decline in Bronzeville (and a perpetually dwindling local tax base as a result). The thriving “Black Metropolis” of the early twentieth century was now a distant memory. This urban territory was all-but hollowed out, reduced to what is now often remembered as a barren, no-man’s land of weedy vacant lots and dilapidated structures (some inhabited, some abandoned) rife with gangs, crime, and drugs. And further, to add insult
to injury, these terms – “gangs,” “crime,” and “drugs” – swiftly and conveniently became “racial” code words for neoliberal political pundits and rhetorical resources for an emergent anti-welfare politics (i.e., Reagan’s infamous “Welfare Queen”) (Wilson, 2005).

The combined populations of Grand Boulevard, Oakland, and Washington Park declined from “200,000 in 1950” to “64,000 in 1990,” while 64 percent of the remaining population “lived under the poverty line…up from 37 percent only a decade earlier…” (Wacquant, 2008: 57, 59). Moreover, the steady increase of female-headed households during this period coincided with the absorption of the black male population into the neoliberal prison-industrial complex (Peck and Theodore, 2008; Wacquant, 2008, [2004] 2009): the devastating effects of joblessness on the “traditional” family structure as well as the criminalization of poverty.

This period of history is almost completely ignored by the neighborhood’s current “community nostalgia” growth-narrative. The propagators of this narrative hold that the “vibrant” and triumphant “golden years” of the early twentieth century represent the origin of a rich African-American cultural heritage that should be heralded and realized once again. But the brutal effects of deindustrialization and evacuation of wealthier residents is what eroded the very conditions that fostered this “golden era” (decent jobs and local consumption made possible by ruthless segregation). Rather, the neighborhood’s “downfall” is explained entirely by the decision to concentrate the majority of the city’s public housing in Bronzeville. In fact, the now common use of the term “downfall” to describe the neighborhood’s disinvestment reflects this class-biased rhetorical colonization: the term “downfall” denotes a strictly quantitative loss of something; in this case, of class-based measurements of money and resources. But now that Bronzeville’s once vast stock of public housing has nearly entirely evaporated, it is, to redevelopment agents, now free to replicate its long-lost “glory years” (Boyd, 2008a).
The Community Economic Development Movement: The 1970s and 1980s

The roots of Bronzeville’s present redevelopment can be traced to the early 1970s with the city-wide emergence of minority led “grass-roots” based neighborhood organizations. These institutions formed with the purpose of redirecting resources toward the benefit of their own neighborhoods instead of the city’s established real-estate community and downtown business elite (Rast, 1999). A convergence of forces provided the socio-political conditions ripe for this emergent minority based neighborhood movement to blossom.

The recession of the 1970s, disproportionately affecting the city’s lower-income neighborhoods, magnified the inherent “tension between capital and community” (Rast, 1999: 13; also see Logan and Molotch, 1987). Communities (i.e., their use-values for inhabitants) were systematically ripped apart by the disinvestment wrought from capital flight (i.e., their exchange-values for property owners). In addition, the civil rights era mobilization against racial discrimination, loss of viable employment opportunities, and growing impoverishment of many inner-city neighborhoods produced a climate of heightened social angst and unrest during the 1960s and early 1970s. In short, this now famously turbulent period posed serious constraints upon the city’s established and elite-dominated redevelopment governance.

The “Chicago 21 Plan” (see Rast, 1999; Ranney, 2003; L. Bennett, 2006a), proposed by the city in 1973 to resuscitate plans to redevelop the city and inner-ring neighborhoods, ignited the formation of a city-wide coalition of “grass-roots” movements. This coalition, constituted by alliances between many block groups and CDCs, was mobilized in critical response to the

32 For instance, in Chicago, the Gautreaux lawsuit against the CHA and HUD in 1966 and the race riots after the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968 (see Rast, 1999; Boyd, 2008a).
perceived “priorities of city redevelopment policies” (Wright, Wheelock, and Steele, 2006: 169; Immergluck, 2005). They were explicitly aligned against the city’s established growth-machine governance (Rast, 1999). Daley, who amassed an unprecedented degree of power during his 21-year monarchical reign as Chicago’s mayor, was increasingly challenged by the mobilization of this lower-income minority-led movement (Rast, 1999; Boyd, 2008a). Daley’s authoritarian rule was seen by many as the very source of inner city problems (i.e., poverty, public housing failures, and racial discrimination) in this post-civil rights period.

After Daley’s sudden death from a heart attack in 1976, a power vacuum allowed for increased political mobilization of the city’s “neighborhood development community” (Rast, 1999: 95; Clavel, 2010). This effectively cemented the socio-political pre-conditions necessary for the property-owner led redevelopment initiatives that emerged in Bronzeville during the 1980s, particularly in Oakland and North Kenwood (Pattillo, 2007). The Kenwood-Oakland Community Organization (KOCO), Douglas Community Organization (DCO), and Gap Community Organization (GCO) were among the south-side’s early representation during this initial wave of neighborhood-based resistance (Boyd, 2008a: 47). These were the groups that served as the venues that produced the initial efforts and plans that wound up guiding the MSPDC-led “historical preservation” of Bronzeville in the early 1990s.

Without a competent, strong political figure to emerge from Daley’s shadow, the city’s centralized and hierarchical political structure began to crumble. As a result, many local-based organizations seized the moment and were able to successfully advance their anti-downtown,

33 The growing power of CDCs, in Chicago and across urban America during the 1970s, was significant in that they could utilize a host of new federal housing programs, such as HUD’s Section 8 and the Rental Subsidy Program via the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 (see Goetz, 2003; J. Smith, 2006). In Chicago, these programs “supported the construction or rehabilitation of 8, 976 housing units…between 1975 and 1980,” through the assistance of local CDCs (Rast, 1999: 90).
pro-neighborhood interests (Clavel, 2010). However, the growing political strength of this movement through the 1970s and 1980s, as Rast (1999: 17) points out, led to a “strategic shift” away from its “social/protest origins toward a new focus on neighborhood economic development.” This coalition of CDCs, as Rast (199: 85) continues “was not so much in opposition to growth,” but rather “in favor of an alternative set of economic development priorities” to the city’s entrenched and centralized growth-machine.

Tension between these two opposing interests persisted through the inept Michael Blandic (Daley’s replacement) and internally conflicted Jane Byrne administrations (1976-1983). It was not until the Mayoral election of Harold Washington in 1983 that a consensus formed between the city and this neighborhood-based development movement. Washington’s election, a beloved black mayoral candidate, featured a massive grass-roots led voter registration drive that “increased the eligible black electorate by 125,000” (L. Bennett, 2006b: 46). This was an unprecedented feat which ultimately led to Washington’s victory by effectively overwhelming Jane Byrne’s bid for re-election as well as that of a young Richard M. Daley.

The 1980s, as a result, were a uniquely progressive period in Chicago compared to urban America more broadly (Clavel, 2010). While many large American cities were experiencing the transition to neoliberal modes of governance (Harvey, 1989a; Cox, 1993), Chicago’s transition was stunted by a Washington administration that favored the interests of lower income minority-based neighborhoods and that of industrial capital over real-estate interests (see Rast, 1999). Although compromises certainly had to be made with the historically resource-rich business community, the Washington era (1983-7) represented an unprecedented degree of political power held by the historically less privileged lower-income minority populations in Chicago (Ferman,
This progressive period, however, was sadly cut short due to Washington’s tragic death from a stroke in 1987.

Despite the political power gained by Bronzeville CDCs, these institutions still faced a steep up-hill battle in terms of changing the common perceptions and spatial imaginaries (i.e., gang violence, drug infestation, and crime) of the city’s south-side. Excluded from the formal gentrification process in non-black neighborhoods (Wyly and Hammel, 2004), Chicago’s emergent black middle-class population had limited options outside of the existing less-than-ideal black ghetto for possible urban spaces to colonize.34 As a result, these “brave souls,” as von Hoffman (2003: 113) points out, “made homes in architectural land-mark houses as they tried to ignore the crime, abandoned buildings, and dreadful public housing projects that surrounded them.” As one Oakland-North Kenwood organizer explained, it all began in the early 1980s when a few local residents who “couldn’t stand the filth anymore … the weeds, trash, broken down cars in vacant lots” (Interview, 8/19/2010), joined together to clean up and change the negative perceptions of the neighborhood.

Reflecting the difficulty of the task, the same organizer recalled the following remarks after delivering a set of redevelopment/beautification proposals to Washington’s city council in the early 1980s: “One council member said ‘is this a joke?’…and another said ‘over my dead body’” (Interview, 8/19/2010). “I can’t see how it will work,” claimed Dempsey J. Travis, local black developer, who then asked “who wants to look at a historic building on Martin Luther King Drive, marvel at it, and then get shot?” (in Quintanilla, 1994c). For many, the negative

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34 This story, and others like it, implicate the role of race as an important variable in terms of understanding gentrification as a contingent process. Here, race should be interpreted as playing an often decisive role in terms of understanding the multi-faceted ways (in addition to class) in which the “rent gap” (Smith, 1996) is filled.
associations with public housing (and the impoverished, racialized bodies it housed) stifled any consideration for redevelopment on the south-side (von Hoffman, 2003).

By the late 1980s, the immense concentration of the area’s public housing was in horrendous decay as the “hyperghetto” deepened and widened across Chicago’s south-side. The association of this public housing-infested urban territory with gang violence, drugs, abject poverty, and “blackness” had become deeply entrenched within mainstream consciousness. But while the process of transforming this spatial imaginary proved to be slow and arduous, these CDCs were successful in gaining political influence with at least a few city officials. And the rediscovery of the neighborhood’s “culturally-rich” past by these organizers provided the semiotic resources necessary to produce an alternative and more attractive imaginary of Bronzeville (discussion with local organizer, 8/19/2010). But redevelopment initiatives were primarily led by the neighborhood’s minority (but growing) base of middle-income property-owners. The city and established real-estate community, at this point, favored minimally.

The public housing question emerged as a central issue of debate in Oakland and North Kenwood during this early period. In 1985, the CHA submitted a “plan for renovation” to HUD that would “renovate nearly forty thousand units of public housing at a cost of almost $750 million” (Pattillo, 2007: 221). Conflict quickly arose between existing public housing residents of the targeted Lakefront Properties and local property owners (L. Bennett, 2006a; Pattillo, 2007); a conflict that foreshadowed the heated public housing debates that would erupt between residents, organizers, and the city in the 1990s (discussion with local organizer, 8/19/2010).

Local public housing residents, represented by the Lakefront Community Organization (LCO), feared displacement from the renovation plan while local property owners tended to argue for total demolition as opposed to renovation or construction of new public housing.
Instead, these property owners promoted the production of “replacement units” that were to be deemed “appropriate” for the preservation and enhancement of existing property values. Backed by the city, developers, and many community groups, this proposal eventually succeeded as most of the drafted plans “envisioned the demolition, not the rehabilitation, of the Lakefront Properties” (Pattillo, 2007: 224).

This particular conflict, however, which lasted well into the 1990s, highlighted the class contours of many of these neighborhood-based movements and the “immense power differential between public housing residents on the one side and city officials and private investors on the other” (Pattillo, 2007: 225). As a result, the Lakefront Properties were closed and eventually demolished. Two of the buildings, however, were left to be renovated as Lake Parc Place in 1991 (L. Bennett, 2006a; Pattillo, 2007), a “mixed-income” development and early manifestation of a theme that would later become one of the dominate ingredients of public housing reform and redevelopment in Chicago and beyond (Goetz, 2003).

West of Cottage Grove, revitalization was less forthcoming. Here, investment initially emerged in a small enclave adjacent to the IIT campus called the Gap, bounded by 31st and 35th Streets and Michigan Avenue and King Drive (Handley, 2002). The Gap, a district of Victorian homes dating from the 1880s, attracted admirers and attention from black professionals for the value and historical significance of the neighborhood’s housing stock (Handley, 2002; von Hoffman, 2003). Stimulated by “community-nostalgia” rhetoric, a wave of middle-income blacks subsequently purchased and rehabilitated homes in the Gap during the late 1980s.

After gaining political support from the GCO, IIT, and city officials, the Gap was approved as a landmark district in 1988 by the Commission of Chicago Landmarks (von Hoffman, 2003). Its nineteen newly constructed homes represented the “first significant housing
construction in the neighborhood in a century” (von Hoffman, 2003: 129). Thus, and combined with a number of redevelopment projects unleashed in the South Loop (i.e., Dearborn Park I and II, River City, and the Printer’s Row loft conversions, see Rast, 1999; von Hoffman, 2003; Ranney, 2003; L. Bennett, 2006a), the south-side, after decades of neglect, had finally gained the attention of the city and real estate community by the end of the 1980s.

Coming off the heels of this housing restoration in the Gap, Leonard McGee of the GCO and Leroy Kennedy at IIT organized an alliance of local institutional elites and activists to form the South-side Partnership, a “permanent coalition of institutions” (i.e., colleges, hospitals, and community groups) aimed to facilitate redevelopment across the city’s south-side (von Hoffman, 2003; Boyd, 2008a). This coalition swiftly led to the establishment of the Bronzeville-focused MSPDC in 1990. Upon formation, the MDPDC was immediately armed with a $300,000 endowment channeled through the city from an $8 million donation to IIT by the McCormack-Tribune Foundation (von Hoffman, 2003; Boyd, 2008a). Suddenly, local organizers finally had the resources to move forward with Bronzeville’s long-awaited revival.

The MSPDC, a broad coalition of Bronzeville community organizations and institutions (i.e., the DCO, GCO, the Grand Boulevard Federation, and Centers for New Horizons, see von Hoffman, 2003; Boyd, 2008a), proposed that the revival of Bronzeville should be based on “historical preservation and tourism development” (Boyd, 2008a: 39). The culmination of this vision was the “Mid-South Strategic Development Plan: Restoring Bronzeville,” officially published by the MSPDC in 1993. As Boyd (2008a: 51) asserts, the plan “would eventually gain the greatest city-wide attention for its promotion of historical Bronzeville.” And, indeed, the MSPDC owes much of this success to the construction and deployment of the now hegemonic “community nostalgia” narrative, the rhetorical carrier of this ideological vision for revival.
This homeowner-led movement and redevelopment strategy stemmed from the work of earlier CDCs (i.e., the KOCO, DCO and GCO) during the 1970s and early 1980s, particularly their increased access to decision-making processes during the Washington years (Boyd, 2008a). The high participation of middle-income homeowners within Bronzeville CDCs fed the class content to the “Restoring Bronzeville” plan and broader redevelopment movement (despite the explicitly racial focus of the plan and Bronzeville’s racially homogenous population). While these black homeowners consisted of a relatively small proportion of the neighborhood’s total population, they nonetheless held the most political sway in directing redevelopment in self-beneficial ways. Their status as “homeowners” also marks a clear break between today’s Bronzeville and its heralded past. Although homeownership is posited as a means of reviving the “Black Metropolis,” it also acts as a silent barrier: it casts a divide through this population that did not exist during the “golden years.” Because the wealthier black residents of the “Black Metropolis” did not own property they would not have been threatened by their lower-income neighbors in the same way nor consumed by contemporary concerns of property values.

The political mobilization of this coalition of property owners during the 1980s ultimately set the stage for the widespread redevelopment and city-sponsored revival of Bronzeville in the late 1990s. But this black population, initially attracted to the neighborhood by its historical legacy and the prospects of lifting their lower-income brethren (Pattillo, 2007; Moore, 2005, 2009), increasingly felt the tension of their racial and class identities pulling them in opposite directions (Pattillo, 2007; Hyra, 2008). Moreover, many CDCs, originally progressive agencies aimed to alleviate conditions of urban poverty, were slowly compromised and appropriated by neoliberal designs during the 1990s through competition for federal block grants. In Chicago, these grants are entirely distributed by city hall. If such grants are not used
“properly,” such as preparing lower-income neighborhoods for private capital investment, they tend to be re-routed as opposed to staying put (see Ranney, 2003; DeFilippis, 2003; Immergluck, 2005; Mayer, 2007). Consequently, as Boyd (2008a: 40) notes, the MSPDC would eventually “pursue their goals through partnerships with the city government and private institutions” to secure a steady stream of funds, some of whom were ironically “the very architects of past neighborhood disinvestment and racial discrimination.”

With the inauguration of Mayor Richard M. Daley in 1989 and the implantation of neoliberal rationality into the city’s governing logic, the class-biased character of this “historical preservation” movement was fully integrated into the neoliberal project of resurrecting inner-city Chicago neighborhoods for profitable capitalist investment. But despite this initial homeowner-led revival, Bronzeville continued to be treated as relatively untouchable by the city’s broader redevelopment governance. As long as other non-black, non-public housing contaminated neighborhoods remained available for profitable redevelopment (i.e., Wicker Park, Bucktown, South Loop, and University Village), Bronzeville’s revival could seemingly wait. It was not until the neighborhood’s public housing demolition and the saturation of housing markets in other fully gentrified neighborhoods in the late 1990s that the city and large-scale players “wholeheartedly” shifted their attention to Bronzeville.
Chapter 3

Neoliberalism and the Formation of Neoliberal Redevelopment Governances

This chapter chronicles the rise of neoliberalism as 1) an ideological system consisting of a relatively coherent ensemble of ideas and beliefs, and 2) its manifestation as an assemblage of redevelopment institutions in the United States. I document the rise and evolution of this social formation with specific reference to the experiences of Chicago and Bronzeville. As much of Bronzeville’s redevelopment has unfolded in the context of the neighborhood’s long and notorious history of holding the nation’s largest concentration of public housing, an emphasis on local and national public housing policy is also provided.

In what follows, I first identify the emergence of neoliberalism as a pragmatic response to the global recession of the 1970s. Second, I review the initial installation of neoliberal policies and practices (at the national and urban scale) in the 1980s, of roll-back neoliberalization. This period was predominantly geared toward the “active destruction and discreditation of Keynesian-welfarist and social-collectivist institutions (broadly defined)” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 384). Third, I document the transition to roll-out neoliberalization in the 1990s (which I propose lasted from 1989-2005 in Chicago). To Peck and Tickell (2002: 384), this period is characterized as an “emergent phase of active state-building and regulatory reform” focused on the “purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations.”

The roll-out period experienced a transition where the creative moment of the neoliberalization process took center stage as opposed to the destructive moment which dominated the roll-back period. I here further distinguish between two distinct sub-periods
within the roll-out period in the context of Chicago: roll-out period I (1989-1998) and roll-out period II (1998-2005). Both periods are characterized by distinct waves of roll-out policy prescriptions. Finally, I interrogate the implications of an emergent roll-with-it period (2005-present) specifically in Chicago. While the dates assigned to these periods are specific to Chicago, it should be stressed that this general periodization, nonetheless, characterizes the trajectory of most large American cities.

The Rise of Neoliberal Capitalism: the 1970s and 1980s

The dissolution of the Bretton Woods agreement in 1971 and the OPEC embargo in 1973 effectively signaled the end of the post-war economic boom in the United States (Ranney, 2003; Harvey, 2005). The onset of the global recession in the early 1970s represented the fracture of the Fordist – Keynesian regime of accumulation. This fracture necessitated a period of intense (re)structuring and (re)territorializing of pre-existing political, economic, and regulatory configurations (Smith, 1988; Swyngedouw, 1997; Brenner, 2004). The doctrine of neoliberalism, produced at the University of Chicago and propagated through global financial institutions and conservative think tanks (Peck, 2006), gained widespread currency during this period as the solution to the supposed “welfare-state” induced recession of the 1970s (Peck, 2008).35

Neoliberalism, as Bourdieu (2005: 10-11) has written, rests on two fundamental tenets:

“The [1] economy is a separate domain governed by natural and universal laws with which governments must not interfere by inappropriate intervention; [and]

35 Although the epicenter of the formation of neoliberal doctrine may have come from the Chicago School, the origins of this ideological formation was in fact more polycentric in nature, with other semi-autonomous nodes emerging in Paris, Freiburg, and Vienna with Hayek and Mises its chief representatives. These nodes were just as influential in what was more realistically a multi-polar emergence. Although the Chicago School, arguably the most ideologically drenched variant, ultimately produced the biggest political impact within the neoliberal ascendency (see Foucault, [2004] 2008; Peck, 2010b).
the [2] market [as] the optimum means for organizing production and trade efficiently and equitably in democratic societies.”

Not simply a revival of enlightenment era liberalism (see Smith, 2005), the neoliberal project entails a sympathetic critique and “reformed” reinstatement of classical free market and laissez-faire discourse. The ideology of unregulated markets, free trade and competition, deregulation of state intervention, financialization, commodification, and privatization subsequently and swiftly proliferated through global institutions (i.e., the World Bank and IMF, see Peet, 2003, 2007; Goldman, 2005; Harvey, 2005) and western governments (led by the Reagan and Thatchter administrations) during the 1970s and 1980s. For Harvey (2005), the neoliberal project has been nothing short of a systematic and deliberate restoration of class power and conditions favorable for capital accumulation. Neoliberalism has, in short, ascended to hegemonic status in the western world as the “ideological software” for the competitive finance-led global capitalism characteristic of the past three decades (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 381).

Termed the period of “proto-neoliberalization” (Peck and Tickell, 2002), the emergence and unfolding of this “ideological-fix” in the 1970s is now well documented (see Brenner and Theodore, 2002a; Ranney, 2003; Harvey, 2005; Peck, 2010b). It was, however, not until the 1980s that neoliberal-guided discourses were translated into actual policies and practices. The primary objective at this point was to roll-back pre-existing “welfare state” political-institutional configurations: the erosion of labor union rights, privatization of publicly subsidized services, and the erosion of national protectionist policies and barriers to foreign direct investment. In this

36 Neoliberalism is more than simply the reinstatement of classical liberalism, as it incorporates an emphasized role of individualism, competition, and personal responsibility (the illusory virtues of a meritocracy), and the merits of building “human capital” (Foucault, [2004] 2008; Peck, 2010b), each on to his own, as the true means to success. As Peck (2010a: 108) summarizes, it has essentially been, sixty years in the making, an “evolutionary development of proactive forms of liberal statecraft…” (also see Peck, 2008; Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009).
context, roll-back neoliberalization entailed the transition of a set of ideological prescriptions into the guiding logic of governance institutions at both national and sub-national scales.

The largely experimental policies and practices previously facilitated primarily in the global south were now being implanted across North American and Western European nation-states and metropolitan governances alike. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Chicago’s redevelopment governance was slow to adopt neoliberal policies and practices due to the progressive Washington administration in the 1980s (Ferman, 1996; Clavel, 2010). As a result, the institutionalization of roll-back measures within Chicago’s political structure was slow in relation to the experience of other large American cities (i.e., New York and Philadelphia, see Zukin, 1991; Smith, 1996).

Since federal funding to cities was severed during the recession of the 1970s, city governments were suddenly on their own to secure funding, loans, and produce new sources of tax revenue. The dismantlement of welfare provisions and outmoded redistributive policies forced cities into increasingly tenuous positions. They were now dependent “on own-source revenues, namely property tax revenues, which in turn made them more dependent on those who create value: the private real-estate market” (Weber, 2002: 190). In the process, a more intimate marriage was fostered between the real-estate sector and the local state, aligned by their common interests of securing outlets for profitable capital investment in the built-environment.

This marriage effectively anchored the formation of neoliberal redevelopment governances across urban America as the local state now assumes the status of a private enterprise “hustling inexorably to the tune of the bottom line” (Merrifield, 2002: 75). But it should also be stressed that the generation of this “new urban politics” (Cox, 1993) was part and parcel of a drastic multi-scalar (i.e., urban, regional, national, and international) restructuring of
pre-existing divisions of labor and class structures as the basis for a new round of expanded capitalist industrialization: the “flexible-neoliberal” regime of accumulation.

In the United States, the middle-class blue-collar labor force absorbed in the manufacturing base of urban economies during the Fordist – Keynesian regime (1945-1973) was decimated. The American class structure, through the 1980s, rapidly evolved into an increasingly polarized division of labor between low-wage service/retail jobs (the development of the “working poor”) and a new “professional” white-collar middle-upper class (i.e., lawyers, accountants, financial services) (Lash and Urry, 1987; Castells, 1989; Storper and Walker, 1989; Smith, 1996; Ranney, 2003; Harvey, 2005). The effects of this macro-structural transformation on “rust belt” cities, including Chicago, were particularly acute (Doussard, et al., 2009) as many working-class neighborhoods were reduced to socio-economic ruin.

While the roll-back period is characterized by the proliferation of urban policies and practices geared toward the destructive side of capitalism’s “creative-destruction” inner dialectic, the 1980s was not void of initiating certain creative roll-out measures. This period produced the initial wave of urban restructuring which came in the form of massive downtown “themed” redevelopment projects geared toward redefining CBDs as “culturally-scripted” spaces (Spirou, 2006): place-promoting festivals and carnivals, convention centers and sports stadiums, middle-upper class “themed” consumption spectacles, and new gentrified living spaces to attract new professional white-collar workforces (Zukin, 1991, 1995; Smith, 1996; Hannigan, 1998). Chicago’s experience, however, remained stunted with gentrification only beginning to gain a foothold in the near north side (predominantly in the now affluent Lincoln Park).

The emergence of these redevelopment governances was also accompanied by the ascendancy of a new neoliberal-anchored rhetorical theme: the “global trope” (Wilson, 2007).
This narrative explicitly capitalized on the widespread sense of a new reality of harsh place-punishing globalization and inter-locality competition for employment and investment. Cities, here, had to fight to remain competitive amidst this new ominous realty. With the health of urban economies at stake, and forced to “entrepreneurialize” and discipline their physical forms, social relations, and business climates, city governments supposedly had no choice but to adopt the global trope as a dominant discursive practice (Harvey, 1989a; Knox, 1997; Jonas and Wilson, 1999). Privatization and socio-spatial regulation were the anecdotes against the fears that haunted this new period of “ominous global times”; the consequences of which has been a widened and deepened degree of poverty production across urban America (Wilson, 2007).


The brief recession between 1989 and 1993 marked the shift to the period of roll-out neoliberalization. With roll-back measures already under way, the balance of the “creative-destruction” dialectic shifted in favor of the *creative* moment of policy construction. At this point, redevelopment governances installed a host of diverse programs and initiatives designed to both foster the continued production of new spaces and protect the new spaces already produced. Gentrification was now generalized as global urban policy (Smith, 2002). I now shift to a more specific focus on the experience of Chicago, although this city’s roll-out period in many ways can be seen as emblematic of its broader manifestation across the United States.

In Chicago, the inauguration of the second Daley regime in 1989 quickly institutionalized neoliberal policies and practices within the local political infrastructure (Wilson and Sternberg, 2012). Daley’s authoritarian rule (much like his fathers, see Simpson and Kelly, 2008) proved highly compatible with the emergent neoliberal order. As a result, the latent demand for
gentrified urban spaces in Chicago after the progressive 1980s was met with immense enthusiasm and luster in the 1990s. In synchrony with favorable structural conditions (i.e., the boom of the 1990s), gentrification steam-rolled across many inner-city neighborhoods during this period, from Wicker Park, Bucktown, West Town, South Loop, and later to Humboldt Park, Uptown, and Pilsen (see Wilson, et al., 2004; Betancur, 2005; Wilson and Grammenos, 2005; Wilson, 2007). Chicago, a city with global aspirations, formalized gentrification into urban policy and practice as Daley and nobility flagrantly greased its wheels. It was also emblematic of the broader-scale “third wave of gentrification” chronicled by Hackworth and Smith (2001).

Although the city’s initial waves of gentrification targeted primarily Latino neighborhoods (i.e., Wicker Park and Bucktown), Bronzeville remained relatively unnoticed until the late 1990s. In fact, while these selective neighborhoods gentrified, other remaining communities experienced an exacerbation of pre-existing levels of poverty. The black south-side neighborhoods of Englewood, Woodlawn, and Bronzeville, still plagued by concentrations of public housing, experienced the downside of this growing socio-spatial polarization (Wilson, 2007; Wacquant, 2008). New ghetto spaces also began to emerge in older deteriorating suburbs while continued sprawling suburbanization only accelerated at the metropolitan fringe.37

At the core of this emergent redevelopment governance was the formation of a discourse that melded the global trope with an increasingly punitive and hostile portrayal of the racialized

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37 This emergent pattern of capitalist uneven development which unfolded across North American metropolitan regions is referred to by Hackworth (2007) as the “neoliberal spatial-fix” in that it reflects a distinct break from the spatial fix that characterized the Keynesian-Fordist period (i.e., mass suburbanization and inner-city disinvestment, see Harvey, 1975a, 1982; Walker, 1977, 1981). It should also be noted that these models are simplified explanations of urban transformation occurring at the macro-urban scale. These national scale processes have generally been regionally contingent during both the Keynesian-Fordist and Neoliberal-Flexible regimes of accumulation with variations occurring between and within regions (see Hackworth, 2005; Skaburskis and Moos, 2008). However, although metropolitan regions often behave quite differently, particularly at the micro-urban scale, subject to varying local and regional conditions (see Wilson, 2004a), they also remain subject to the same capitalist imperatives that drive each period of accumulation (Harvey, 1989b).
poor: what I call the *revanchist* redevelopment discourse (following Smith’s [1996] term of “revanchism” which means the taking revenge on the poor). The function of this discourse was to justify gentrification by arguing that impoverished neighborhoods, purportedly corrupt with culturally pathologic populations, must be sanitized and/or sacrificed for the sake of the city’s competitiveness and economic vitality (Smith, 1996; Macleod, 2002). The displacement of the poor simply must be accepted in the face of supposedly harsh global times, so it is argued.

Race-class realities also became an increasingly important semiotic element for redevelopment governances in Chicago and beyond (Wilson and Sternberg, 2012). These “socio-racial” governances are seen to fuel redevelopment by working through prevailing (stereotyped and caricatured) understandings of the racialized poor (Wilson, 2007, 2009; Cope and Latcham, 2009). A vital dimension to this “revanchist” and “racialized” discourse is the constant deployment of “imagined spatialities” or “geographic knowledges”: of decrepit ghettoscapes, community contaminating land-uses (i.e., public housing), and frightening black youths loitering on street corners (Wilson, 2007). In this context, this adept and potently “imaginative” discourse, attuned to mainstream sentiments and attitudes, infused the rationalization of these urban redevelopment agendas into public consciousness. The following sub-sections list the prominent neoliberal-guided roll-out policies, practices, and institutional arrangements that marked this period in Chicago and many other large American cities.

**Bond-Rating Agencies**

The role of bond-rating agencies became increasingly significant in the 1990s as a central source of funding. Cities must now score high ratings from these agencies (i.e., Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) to secure vital loans for redevelopment projects that are assumed to induce private capital investment (Hackworth, 2007). And to secure favorable ratings, cities must
be able to show a commitment to policies and practices favorable to the interests of finance and real-estate capital: executing major beautification projects in Chicago’s Loop (Spirou, 2006) and neighborhoods targeted for gentrification (Wilson and Grammenos, 2005), designating historical preservation districts (Wilson, 2004b), tax increment financing districts (TIFs) (Weber, 2002; Ranney, 2003), and providing tax abatements to local speculator/developers. In this context, for these lending agencies, cities perceived to be most committed to the neoliberal agenda are deemed less risky investments (Hackworth, 2007). Chicago, like many other cities, has been increasingly subject to the structural dictates of these agencies.

**TIFs**

The TIF gained widespread currency during this period as a tool for targeting specific urban spaces perceived to be potential sites for profitable redevelopment projects (Weber, 2002; Ranney, 2003). In Chicago, funding for public services (i.e., schools and parks) in these established districts are frozen for twenty-three years. “After designation,” as Weber (2002: 188) explains, “the city borrows against the *potential* stream of future revenues in order to absorb the present cost of land development, infrastructure improvements, property assembly, and demolition so that developers do not have to do so” [my italics]. As initial investment is made and tax revenues begin to rise, surplus revenues are ploughed back into further redevelopment projects to spurn higher revenues through resulting waves of private capital investment. Particularly prevalent in Chicago, the TIF has proved to be instrumental in upgrading the Central Loop, South Loop, Bronzeville, Pilsen, and the East-West ‘Wicker Park’ gentrification corridor (Wilson and Sternberg, 2012). In an almost comical response regarding a proposed TIF, Daley
reflects the normalization of this practice: “We think it’s needed because I’m a TIF person. I like TIFs. It works and it’s the best thing” (in Spielman, 1997).

**Historical Preservation Districts**

Neighborhoods with some semblance of a positive historical legacy are often designated “historical preservation districts.” This is typically done by cities in advance of and to justify investments made in elaborately themed beautification and “street-scaping” projects (see Wilson and Grammenos [2005] for the case of Humboldt Park). These neighborhoods, like Chicago’s Bronzeville, are often spatially transformed in the name of preserving their historical integrity while being made attractive to finance and real-estate capital in the process. In this context, historical preservation districts serve as land-valorizing redevelopment tools designed to augment the use-value of these urban spaces for middle-upper class consumption and, thus, stimulate gentrification (Wilson, 2004b).

The notion of “culture” is often deployed as part of these historical legacies which can, purportedly, only be preserved through the neighborhoods “preservation.” “Culture” here becomes a discursive construct, appropriated by redevelopment agendas and colonized with class-specific content (Mitchell, 1995). The process of designation is also often accompanied by corresponding nostalgic-oriented rhetorical themes that codify this “culture” en-route to neighborhood transformation through preservation (Wilson, 2004b; Inwood, 2010). This redevelopment practice has deeply colored the experience of Chicago neighborhoods such as

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38 Chicago is considered to be one of the pioneering cities in TIF implementation (Ranney, 2003).
Bronzeville, Humboldt Park, and Pilsen, and also reflects the increasingly active role of the local state within the “third wave of gentrification” (Hackworth and Smith, 2001).  

**CDCs**

The neoliberal agenda has also served to significantly compromise the original and socially-progressive mission of CDCs. These organizations, holdovers from an outmoded Keynesian political landscape, peculiarly represent something that is neither rolled back nor rolled out. Rather, they represent pre-existing institutional arrangements that are increasingly “rebooted” by the neoliberal order (DeFilippis, 2003; Mayer, 2007) in a manner not too dissimilar from the “faith-based” social-welfare organizations chronicled by Hackworth (2010).

This cooptation of CDCs also reflects an interesting paradox exhibited by neoliberal forms of governmentality: that increasing avenues for citizen participation (although reflective of increased participatory democracy) tends to ultimately serve as a means for covert citizen control (Blakeley, 2010). CDCs have also been increasingly forced into a process of militarization to secure funding sources. As Goetz uncovers (2003: 117), “low-income neighborhoods became the testing grounds for a variety of allegedly community-based, crime prevention strategies” where CDCs have often served as facilitating agents. Here, neoliberalized CDCs are seen to oddly but effectively link revanchist crime prevention policies with neighborhood-based social services and economic development initiatives.

It should be stressed, however, following Pattillo (2007), Boyd (2008a) and Hyra (2008) that the CDC also remained an integral site and venue for local class-based struggles within neighborhoods such as Bronzeville. A rise in local-based resistance movements to gentrification

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39 It is serves as an example of this in how “states,” to Weber (2002: 177), “discursively constitute, code, and order the meaning of place through policies and practices that are often advantageous to capital.”
has been experienced in this setting in recent years and owes much of its political mobilization to the inherited legacy of the neighborhood’s CDCs. In this context, despite their increasing cooptation, these organizations continue to serve as a principal venue of discursive struggle over competing visions of neighborhood change.

Public Housing

The proliferation of these roll-out measures in the 1990s also accompanied the rolling back of public housing through demolition. The survival of such welfare-state public housing complexes into the 1990s represented physical relics of a bygone, outmoded era. Their function had grown increasingly inconsistent with the evolving requirements of contemporary neoliberal capitalism. The HOPE VI program – an embodiment of both roll-back and roll-out moments of neoliberalization (Hackworth, 2007: 50) – put forth by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in 1992, served as the first significant program aimed at clearing these supposedly “community-contaminating” physical structures.

Through Hope VI, local public housing authorities could apply for HUD grants that proposed the demolition of existing public housing and their replacement with “mixed-income” and/or “mixed-use” redevelopment projects (see Goetz, 2003; L. Bennett, J. Smith, and Wright, 2006; Hackworth, 2007). The purposed goal was, following Crump (2002), the “deconcentration of poverty,” a spatial metaphor designed to veil the structural roots and complexities behind the causes of poverty. As this study reveals, the primary goal, first and foremost, has been to prepare long untouchable urban spaces for redevelopment. “In this line of thinking,” to Joseph, Chaskin, and Webber (2007: 370), “mixed-income development is less about poverty alleviation and much more about an approach to inner-city redevelopment that is economically lucrative and politically viable.”
In the process of executing this expansive demolition, a host of “mobility programs” (i.e., Movement for Opportunity, project-based and tenant-based programs) were spawned to “disperse” public housing residents throughout metropolitan regions, thereby alleviating the social ills purportedly associated with concentrated poverty (Goetz, 2003). It was in this context that the neoliberal-tinged “mixed-income” narrative emerged as a means to rationalize this redevelopment endeavor in public housing infamous cities like Chicago.⁴⁰ In fact, nowhere has this process been as monumental and closely observed by the nation than in the Windy City (Crump, 2002; L. Bennett, et al., 2006).


The onset of the second roll-out period in the late 1990s was marked by the proliferation of a distinct package of roll-out measures in Chicago and beyond. It remains part of the broader roll-out period in that it represents an intensification of the same redevelopment discourses and strategies that characterized the first roll-out period. The revanchist redevelopment discourse remained constituted by the same rhetorical themes: the global trope became increasingly normalized and its revanchist articulations grew increasingly draconian. A new wave of policies and practices, mobilized by these increasingly punitive redevelopment governances, intensified the onslaught of revanchist measures taken against the racialized poor as the Bush administration settled into place (see Wilson, 2007; Wacquant, [2004] 2009). This period also experienced a

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⁴⁰Certainly, following Hackworth (2003, 2007), the power of the local state and PHAs has increased during the neoliberal upward and downward transfer of policy implementation from the national scale. In the process, increasing local institutional variation has emerged where public housing policy is increasingly contingent on local political conditions. Following Hackworth (2003, 2007) and Hyra (2008), for example, such variation has led to the nearly full retention of the public housing stock in New York City whereas Chicago’s stock has all but vanished.
major “building boom and reconfiguration of city space” that swept across urban America in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Merrifield, 2002: 77).

New waves of public-space cleansing initiatives (i.e., clean-up-the-streets programs and anti pan-handling laws) mobilized expanding police forces to crack down on petty violations in city centers and lead sting-operations into low-income neighborhoods. The goal was the full removal of beggars, the homeless, and informal economic behavior to protect and form buffer-zones around the city’s new and emergent “culturally-inscribed” utopias (Macleod and Ward, 2002; Mitchell, 2003; Klodawsky and Blomley, 2009).

The rapidly bourgeoning neoliberal prison-industrial complex absorbed much of this “disorderly” and “surplus” (mostly black male) inner-city population (Wacquant, [2004] 2009; Peck and Theodore, 2008). The proliferation of Workfare programs further funneled remaining vulnerable and marginalized populations into the dead-end service sector to meet low-wage labor requirements (Peck, 2001; Wilson, 2007). Faith-based organizations (i.e., Charitable Choice and Bush’s Faith-Based Initiative) were increasingly mobilized to condition and discipline homeless and low-income populations into individualistic neoliberal work ethics (Hackworth, 2010). And education policies such as No Child Left Behind have only further marginalized racialized inner-city youths from mainstream society (see Wilson, 2007).

The drastic surge of Latino immigrants across urban America during the booming 1990s (see Grammenos [2006] for the experience in Chicago) brought in pools of low-wage labor and further contributed to the depression of already declining wages (which is characteristic of booming economies!). In the process, the formation of “parasitic neoliberal economies” (i.e.,

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41 As Merrifield (2002: 89) poignantly asserts, “whatever its virtues about instilling dignity in people, ‘workfare’ really means that there’s a huge pool of vulnerable men and women shoved on to the labor market where they can be used to undercut prevailing workers and prevailing wage rates.”
temp agencies, day-labor sites, and payday lenders) emerged in many low-income urban neighborhoods (nearly exclusively Latino instead of black, see Peck and Theodore, 2001, 2008) to further pillage this immobile and marginalized pool of cheap labor (Wilson, et al., 2009; Wilson, 2011).

Finally, HOPE VI-funded demolition programs (i.e., the Chicago Housing Authority’s [CHA] “Plan for Transformation,” see J. Smith, 2006b) have proceeded to raze the majority of the nation’s public housing stock to the ground. Massive amounts of open space have been produced in neighborhoods previously unripe for gentrification. In these ways, the second roll-out period made the city an acutely inhospitable place for the already most vulnerable segments of urban populations. Chicago, if anything, has been exemplary of these trends.

Public housing demolition had previously required one-to-one replacement for displaced residents. This ended in 1995 and was permanently repealed in the Quality Housing and Work Reform Act of 1998 (QHWRA) (Goetz, 2003; L. Bennett, et al., 2006). As is detailed in chapter’s 5 and 6, only a miniscule proportion of displaced families were “allowed” to remain in the “mixed-income” redevelopment sites that have, by and large, been slow to materialize. As a result, displaced public housing residents (mostly black), numbering in the thousands in cities like Chicago, were, for the most part, given Section 8 vouchers to find shelter within a private housing market plagued by 1) a severe undersupply of available affordable housing and 2) the legacies of past and lingering racial discriminatory practices (J. Smith, 2006c).

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42 The public housing residents rewarded replacement units at “mixed-income” redevelopment sites have been selected through strict “screening” processes executed by private property management firms contracted by local PHAs. As a result, the few lucky public housing residents that return to replacement units are ultimately selected by virtue of their character profile: one that is deemed least threatening to the interests of their would be higher income renters and homeowners, and thus, the viability of “mixed-income” based redevelopment in general (see Goetz, 2003; L. Bennett, et al., 2006).
The rationale was that this would “deconcentrate” existing pockets of inner-city poverty and disperse the poorest members of society throughout the rest of the metropolitan region. Residents would purportedly benefit from improved suburban living conditions and proximity to good (middle-upper class) role models whose presence would encourage them to ascend the socio-economic ladder. It is in this context that the philosophy of mixed-income development is registered as fundamentally neoliberal in that it rests on the virtues of individual choice and competition. It also rests on “market-based” strategies for addressing urban poverty (A. Smith, 2002; Chaskin and Joseph, 2010):

“[it] uses public-sector investment and incentives to promote free-market enterprise on the part of individuals and developers as a way to catalyze neighborhood revitalization.” (Joseph, et al., 2007: 370-1)

Implicit to this argument is that the poor’s plight is of their own doing and would conceivably change with such behavioral influences. Silenced, in the process, is any consideration of what are deeply influential macro-structural factors and causes. And with the historically powerful force of existing suburban NIMBY sentiments toward receiving poor inner-city (especially racialized) residents (see Goetz, 2003), the pro-“mixed-income” argument is rendered not too dissimilar from the “liberal” social-welfare rhetoric of the Keynesian period in its pragmatic intentions of funneling the displaced poor to spaces least threatening to the demands of capital.

The case of Chicago has been particularly instructive as the city’s “Plan for Transformation” represents the most extensive public housing overhaul in the United States. Proposed by CHA in 2000, the Plan officially announced the city’s agenda to raze the city’s most “distressed” public housing to the ground (J. Smith, 2006b). Almost all of the units targeted for demolition, unsurprisingly, existed in neighborhoods strategically positioned and already
undergoing redevelopment. The few public housing projects untouched by the plan exist in areas still drowning in Smith’s (1979, 1996) “land-rent valley.”

The majority of the public housing stock in Chicago (heavily concentrated in Bronzeville) was targeted for demolition (Bennett, 2006; Hackworth, 2007). And despite the contentious struggle that ensued over the demolition of Cabrini-Green on the city’s near north side (see L. Bennett and Reed, 1999; Wright, et al., 2006; L. Bennett, 1998, 2006), almost everything, including Bronzeville’s Stateway Gardens, Robert Taylor Homes, Dearborn Homes, Ickes Homes, and Madden Park-Wells-Darrow Homes, has since been demolished (Boyd, 2008a; Hyra, 2008). The central justification was simple: to rid these neighborhoods of the supposed source of their impoverishment.43

As a result, expansive swaths of vacant land were left across the Douglas and Grand Boulevard community areas that, for the most part, remain vacant today (Bennett, 2006; Cottrell, 2008a; Healey, 2009; Russell, 2009). Most tenants were given section 8 vouchers and left to their own accord to secure shelter in an increasingly undersupplied stock of affordable housing (Hackworth, 2007) on a now collapsed real-estate market. Thousands of residents have been displaced (Bennett, 2006; Hyra, 2008). Moreover, remaining poor residents are faced with the incredible sight of the vacant land left behind; land that could be used to fulfill the immense local demand for affordable housing. Instead, this land is being held by the city as part of an elaborate land-banking process (Cottrell, 2008a; Healey, 2009; Russell, 2009), auctioning bits and pieces off to developers at bargain prices well below actual market-rate land values.44

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43 The focus on public housing was a convenient cover for the more onerous goal of removing the racialized poor. I assert that these two factors cannot be separated. It’s not high-rises that are problematic (just look at the affluent high-rises that constitute the Gold Coast!), but the existence of poor people (in high-rises or not).

44 This process and critique of Chicago’s public housing demolition and mixed-income redevelopment is empirically elaborated in chapters 6 and 7.
At the same time, Chicago’s South Loop (directly north of Bronzeville) was significantly transformed from a barren landscape of abandoned rail yards, warehouses, and vacant land, to a landscape featuring affluent condominium towers and skyscrapers. Within a few short years and an immense amount of capital investment, the South Loop emerged as a leading edge of redevelopment in Chicago. This subsequently placed a significant amount of speculative pressure on Bronzeville to the south (Hyra, 2008). The black middle-class, of which has tripled over the past three decades (see Hyra, 2008: 6) and largely excluded from the gentrification process in non-black neighborhoods (Wyly and Hammel, 2004), capitalized on this pressure as their cheaply acquired properties appreciated in value.

This black middle-class also provided the consumptive demand necessary for expanding city-wide gentrification as housing markets within the pool of non-black gentrifying neighborhoods began to saturate. In the process, the south end of Bronzeville, particularly in North Kenwood, was slowly gentrified by this emergent affluent population (mostly lawyers, doctors, and professors affiliated with the University of Chicago, see Pattillo, 2007). The neighborhood’s revival was also now systematically promoted through its locally-crafted “community nostalgia” narrative. This promotion and subsequent redevelopment significantly intensified off the heels of the city’s official endorsement and landmark designation of eight buildings in the “Black Metropolis” historical downtown in 1998 (between 31st, 39th, State Street, and King Drive) (see Chicago Tribune, 1998; Boyd, 2008a). This moment in Bronzeville also coincides with the broader transition between the first and second roll-out periods, when this neighborhood’s redevelopment was officially endorsed by the city and large-scale developers, builders, and financial institutions.
Post-2005: A Moment of Transition?

This section provides a glimpse into what’s to come. During the 2000s, the racialized poor continued to be savagely impugned by the revanchist redevelopment discourse and relentlessly displaced by on-going redevelopment projects across urban America. But a distinct discursive shift has been uncovered within Chicago’s redevelopment governance circa 2005. Neoliberalism, in general, has also come under scrutiny as a result of the real-estate and financial collapses in 2006-7 and the broader global economic crisis in 2008-9 (Keil, 2009). This emergent post-2005 redevelopment discourse now embodies, to Wilson and Sternberg (2012), a twin theme. The punitive and hostile sentiments of the revanchist discourse are still present, but are now less explicitly communicated. And this is now interwoven with a subtly humanized portrayal of the racialized poor, one that is sensitive to the increasingly pummeling effects of structural economic insecurity upon this historically marginalized population.

In the context of Bronzeville’s revival, this revised and “tension ridden” discourse now communicates the necessity to cater to an increasing black affluent gentrifying population (lawyers, doctors, and a new black professional class), appease local activists and resistance movements, but also the continued need to redevelop Chicago into a globally competitive city. This rhetorical-shift, however, merely represents one component to this now evolved redevelopment discourse. It is revealed in this study as increasingly interwoven with the on-going and increasingly salient “community nostalgia” and “mixed-income” narratives that also constitute this neighborhood’s fluid discursive landscape.45

45 The “mixed-income” narrative also represents a “soft-revanchist” articulation, as the agenda is “purportedly” aimed at solving the structural conditions that lead to concentrated poverty, thus, relieving partial blame off the poor. However, it’s also implicitly revanchist in that it still assumes a degree of “cultural deficiency” is the culprit.
Although Bronzeville remains predominantly African-American, the population has become increasingly stratified across the class spectrum and is now home to a mixed-income but internally segregated black population. Although racially homogenous, racial solidarity is far from a reality (Bennett, 2006; Pattillo, 2007; Boyd, 2008a; Hyra, 2008). Balkanized enclaves of affluence increasingly litter this landscape amidst remaining vacant lots and dilapidated physical structures. Public housing demolition has also drastically altered Bronzeville’s spatial imaginary to one favorable for profitable redevelopment. Large-scale builders, developers, and finance capital are now increasingly attracted to the neighborhood. These are now the main players propelling Bronzeville’s revival post-2005, effectively overwhelming the interests and political power of the original middle-class black property owners.

The social impacts of Hurricane Katrina in August of 2005 also drastically altered the national socio-political climate. The question of urban poverty was suddenly thrust back into the national spotlight after decades of neglect (Dreier, 2006; Steinberg and Shields, 2008). The inequalities associated with socio-economic segregation that were horrifically magnified in the aftermath of Katrina in New Orleans ultimately, and effectively, sealed the death blow to the revanchist redevelopment discourse. Of course, capital still managed to find avenues for investment by taking advantage of this tragedy—a kind of “disaster capitalism” (see Peck, 2006; Klein, 2007).

Combined with the global economic crisis that continues to plague the post-2005 period, the revanchist articulations that characterized the roll-out period are less politically viable tactics in this fundamentally altered national-scale socio-political climate. President Obama’s post-neoliberal/neo-Keynesian rhetorical tenets (although still authoritarian, capital-oriented, and
market-serving in practice) serve as such an example of this broader discursive shift away from
the explicitly revanchist tone of the increasingly unpopular Bush regime (see Wilson and

Chicago developers and city officials, working through the logic of mixed-income
neighborhoods, now denounce displacement of the poor as a necessary consequence bound with
redevelopment agendas; a distinct departure from the avowedly pro-displacement revanchist
articulations that colored this rhetoric throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (see Wilson, et al.,
2004; Wilson and Grammenos, 2005). Roll-out neoliberalism as political rhetoric,” Keil (2009:
234) observes, “has run its course in many jurisdictions. It is close to impossible for any political
party in the current period to win an election with an openly revanchist and neoliberal program.”

To further complicate matters, Chicago’s 2016 Olympic bid placed Bronzeville on the
fast track to full redevelopment since the bid’s inception in 2006. This moment also spawned a
local growth-narrative surrounding the bid: what I call the Olympic redevelopment trope (for
studies on other Olympic narratives, see Cochrane, Peck, and Tickell, 1996; McCallum, Spencer,
and Wyly, 2005; Short, 2008). This rhetorical theme posits that while the Olympics would seal
Chicago’s status as a global city, Bronzeville’s revival would be significantly accelerated. The
effect was to profoundly normalize this redevelopment process as a rational endeavor, a
necessity if Chicago were to follow its global aspirations by landing the Olympics. But it also
fueled the fire of a coalition of local, middle-class activists mobilized against the city’s bid as a
symbol of the neighborhoods inevitable gentrification (Uribarri, 2009). And while the loss of the
bid to Rio de Janeiro in October, 2009 can be interpreted as a small victory for this resistance
against the city, the counter-discourse also lost the symbol of which this resistance was based.
While the global trope continues to anchor Chicago’s redevelopment discourse, the shift to a dual-themed (humanist and revanchist) portrayal of the racialized poor, the intensification of a “community nostalgic” and “mixed-income” Bronzeville, and the Olympic redevelopment trope represent distinct rhetorical themes that form a hybrid and place-specific manifestation of what I call the revisionist redevelopment discourse. It also represents a temporal slice of this evolving redevelopment governance undergoing adjustment. The remaining chapters empirically explore the extent to which this revisionary discursive movement 1) marks a rupture from its previous pre-2005 incarnation, and 2) is potentially embedded within a wider institutional evolving in this setting.

The evolutionary dynamics of place, in general, is now well understood (Pred, 1984; Massey, 1994), particularly in relation to broader national and global scale processes of social and geographical restructuring (Swyngedouw, 1989, 1997; Brenner and Theodore, 2002a; Brenner, 2004). Yet we know comparatively little about the concrete specificities of the temporal ebbs and flows of neoliberal social formations at specific urban settings. Although the spatial contingency of this formation – the differentiation of governance formations between different cities – is now well established (Brenner and Theodore, 2002a; Wilson, 2004a), there is comparatively scant work done on its temporal contingency – the differentiation of path-dependencies and path-shaping capacities between different cities as well as within the same city. This study seeks to correct for this imbalance as both spatial and temporal dimensions of capitalist social formations are viewed as fundamentally inseparable.
Chapter 4

Research Methods

This chapter presents and describes the research methods employed in this study. As I detail in this chapter, I adopt a single-case study format and use a mix of primarily qualitative methods to address the research questions presented in the introduction. 47 The study’s principle mode of data collection is textual analysis (Fairclough, 2003): the systematic assemblage and content analysis of newspaper articles, city press releases, and policy/planning documents. In addition to this, semi-formal interviews with local organizers, residents, planners, and business owners were also conducted. A land-use mapping procedure, in addition, was performed to provide a detailed image of the spatial extent of redevelopment within a selected micro-space of Bronzeville. In what follows, I elaborate on the use of each of these methods and discuss how they relate to and inform the research questions guiding the study.

Textual Analysis

A collection of roughly 500 documents (dating to 1989) was assembled via a systematic search of Chicago-related media outlets. 48 The two central sources of information were the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Sun-Times, the city’s two mainstream newspapers. 49 In addition to these two sources, a host of other media outlets were either directly searched or

47 The benefit of using a variety of methods is that it allows for cross-verification. Here, validity and reliability are strengthened as the data collected by each method can be used to inform/support the others.
48 Searches included key words, Bronzeville, Mid-South, Redevelopment, Gentrification, and Public Housing.
49 Especially during the 1990s, the Tribune has tended to be more conservative than the more liberal leaning Sun-Times. Both, in recent years, have converged along a more critical stance against the city. The Tribune tended to back the neoliberal doctrine in the discursive war against social-welfare policies and ideologies during the 1980s and 1990s.
revealed as relevant sources, particularly the *Chicago Defender*, *Chicago Reporter*, and the *Resident’s Journal*.\(^{50}\)

These three sources have provided consistent coverage of Bronzeville and its redevelopment, and/or the progress of the CHAs Plan for Transformation (which directly implicates redevelopment in Bronzeville) since the 1990s. They also tend to provide more critical representations of the city in relation to these processes. The *Chicago Defender* has historically been an African-American newspaper and features a bias toward Bronzeville’s rich history (i.e., “community nostalgia”) and redevelopment schemes. The *Chicago Reporter* also proved to be a valuable source for more critical journalism, particularly in the context of the Plan for Transformation. The *Resident’s Journal* is a media-outlet, available via print-form and online, that is run by and for low-income and public housing residents in Chicago. This source proved invaluable in terms of getting a sense of the attitudes and perceptions of public housing demolition and redevelopment from the perspective of low-income residents. Many in-depth interviews with residents as well as city officials are presented in this media outlet.\(^{51}\)

Document searches also yielded press releases from the City of Chicago as well as other policy documents, including the major plans for Bronzeville’s redevelopment, public housing policy, and Chicago’s “go-global” agenda (i.e., the MSPDC’s “Resoring Bronzeville” [1993], the CHA’s “Plan for Transformation” [2000], and the Commercial Club of Chicago’s “Metropolis 2020” [1999]). Three ethnographic studies, Pattillo (2007), Boyd (2008a), and Hyra (2008), have recently been done on Bronzeville’s redevelopment through the 1990s and early 2000s. These

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\(^{50}\) *Crain’s Chicago Business*, the *Hyde Park Citizen*, and the *Chi-Town Daily News* also provided coverage but to a lesser extent.

\(^{51}\) The *Resident’s Journal* is available on-line and offers every article published since 2001 for download.
sources have provided a wealth of supplemental documentation and analysis from different perspectives and research objectives.\footnote{I have critiqued Boyd (2008a) and have discussed these three studies elsewhere (Anderson, 2011). Bennett (2006) and von Hoffman (2003), while less extensive, have also been useful resources.}

**Semi-Structured Interviews**

To supplement the textual analysis, semi-structured interviews were conducted with two local business owners, three local organizers, four local residents, and a local planner (10 in total). The role of interviews was ultimately relieved as a primary method due to the existing wealth of ethnographic work already done on Bronzeville’s redevelopment (particularly through the early 2000s). Moreover, the numerous interviews and statements uncovered through the assemblage of newspaper articles and documents proved to be thoroughly sufficient in terms of providing an adequate degree of evidence.

These discussions were geared toward uncovering the competing perceptions of current change in Bronzeville, reflections on how the neighborhood has changed in recent years, and where the neighborhood is headed. Following Williams (2001), Longhurst (2003), and Seidman (2006), semi-structured interviews create an informal setting which allows flexibility in terms of exploring participants’ responses to questions. As Seidman (2006: 15) asserts, the “goal is to have the participant reconstruct his or her experience within the topic of study.” The same ensemble of questions was arranged in advance of each interview for the purpose of guiding and keeping the discussion flowing in a relevant direction (Longhurst, 2003; Seidman, 2006). A diverse range of questions, following Longhurst (2003), can be effective in terms of casting a
wide net while simultaneously guiding discussions in a relevant direction. The following questions were prepared in advance and posed during the course of each discussion:

1. Is redevelopment proceeding in Bronzeville?
2. Who is leading the drive to redevelop the area?
3. What actions are being taken to change the area?
4. How are you talked to/presented by them in public forums and in common discussion?
5. Is there anger/protest against community change taking place?
6. If so, what form is this anger/protest against community change taking?
7. What agencies/people/organizations are actively involved in this protest?
8. How would you like to see the area change?

The interviews, in short, were designed to examine how Bronzeville’s redevelopment is represented through the rhetorical content of developers, neighborhood organizations, and local planning officials; and conversely, how these representations are perceived by local residents, organizers, and activists.53

**Land-Use Mapping**

A land-use mapping procedure was also conducted on a micro-section of Bronzeville. The section designated “quadrant 4” by the MSPDC (1993) was selected because it was deemed “representative” of the entire Bronzeville landscape. Quadrant 4’s location between King Drive and State Street is also situated within a section of the neighborhood considered by local

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53 In the context of the pre-2005 period, interview responses tend to be limited to the relatively unreliable nature of participants’ memories. However, it is here that Pattillo (2007), Boyd (2008a), and Hyra (2008) are able to fill in the blanks. In this context, these discussions were intentionally geared toward the post-2005.
residents as part of “historic” Bronzeville and the former black belt (as opposed to Oakland and North Kenwood to the east of Cottage Grove).

This exercise revealed a detailed image of this community’s transformation. Chicago’s Department of Zoning provides a GIS “mapping” service where every parcel (and related information) within the city limits is made available to the public. Information available for every parcel within quadrant 4 was acquired and assembled into an excel spreadsheet: address, date of construction, current zoning designation and dates of zoning changes, and condition of physical structure. The property identification number (PIN) for each parcel was used to look up additional information at the Cook County Assessor’s Office (www.cookcountyassessor.com), such as specific details about the use of each building, such as whether it is rental, multi-family, or single-family residence; as well as the assessed land, building, and market rate values; and even pictures.54

The addresses of abandoned structures in Bronzeville were obtained from the City of Chicago Department of Buildings. Average monthly rents were calculated by web searches for apartment postings (i.e., craigslist and hotpads.com). The history of the city’s land-banking process in Bronzeville was primarily compiled from newspaper/document reports. Numbers of vacant lots in the neighborhood are traced since 1994 with updated figures also given in 1998 and 2005. And based on the construction dates for the newly erected structures, an image is produced of how the redevelopment and land-banking process within this micro-space has evolved.

54 This procedure was supplemented by several in-person visits to this particular Mid-South section to take pictures, visit newly constructed developments, and follow-up on uncertainties left from the Dept. of Zoning and Cook County Assessor’s Office.
This data was then used to map the land-use and residential differentiation of this micro-space as well as its current degree of redevelopment (i.e., the map specifically reveals the extent of vacant land, low-income housing, and gentrified spaces). Areal images were used to trace the street-pattern using Corel Draw which provided the base-map for Figures 2.1 and 6.1.

**Methods and Research Questions**

*In what ways has the institutional composition of this redevelopment governance in Bronzeville changed between the pre-2005 and post-2005 periods?* The prominent agents involved in Bronzeville’s redevelopment were revealed through the volume of textual data obtained via document searches. The key players during the roll-out years, additionally, are also revealed in other studies (Pattillo, 2007; Boyd, 2008a; Hyra, 2008). The involvement of key financial institutions and developers/builders, however, was less forthcoming than the principle city officials and local organizations. But, nonetheless, a comprehensive image of these actors and how they have changed since 1989 emerged by simply going through the collection of documents assembled in chronological order. Web searches of particular developments also revealed additional details about invested financial and real-estate firms as well as in-person surveys of the neighborhood (i.e., visiting developments and associated sales centers).

*In what ways have the prominent rhetorical themes and devices used to attempt to restructure Bronzeville changed between the two periods?* The prominent rhetorical themes deployed by this evolving ensemble of actors and institutions are derived from the same textual data and consulted in chronological order to construct an image of how this rhetorical landscape has evolved. The prominent narratives identified in this study are pieced together from public statements delivered from these agents (i.e., developers and city officials). And a sense of how
they have changed (i.e., intensified, lessened, emergence of new narratives) is constructed via the chronological consultation of the data. Interview results also provide supplemental data particularly in the post-2005 context.

The analysis of these rhetorical themes follows the method of “critical discourse analysis” (CDA). To briefly elaborate, this perspective focuses on uncovering the rhetorical underpinnings that mobilize the production of particular social policies and practices – their discursive system of meanings, values, and intentions (Fairclough, 1992, 2000, 2001; P. Jones, 2004). CDA posits that beyond just the mere analysis of texts, we should also examine the relations between texts as well as their dialectical interplay with existing social structures, relations, and processes. Here, discourses are interpreted as always mobilized to colonize existing stocks of knowledge, continuously assimilating society’s central sentiments, ideals, and fears into their evolving “archive” of rhetorical tools. In this context, discourses are understood as thickly inter-textural, drawing on a variety of existing rhetorical themes embedded within wider discursive formations. Thus, the formation of a discourse is never de-rooted from the societal settings from which they are anchored.

In this study, the notion of rhetorical theme is used to refer to a distinctly formed narrative, either drawn from a wider discourse or within a given place-specific setting (i.e., Bronzeville’s “community nostalgia” theme), and forms one of several dialectically-related textual components within the discourse being analyzed. In this context, discourses are inherently hybrid formations that draw from and fuse pre-existing rhetorical themes into one coherently formed ensemble of semiotic resources: the discursive formation. Such rhetorical themes are typically structured in the form of a “full-fledged narrative,” which, to Boyd (2008a:
moves beyond mere description to the formation of an established “common-sense” script that performs certain ideological functions.

CDA also looks not just at the explicit content or topic of a discourse, but seeks to uncover 1) its ideological underpinnings which, often implicitly, either reinforce or “ground” the discourse as coherent and/or rational, and 2) the strategic silences it imposes in the process of illuminating its carefully crafted content. Such silences – what it does not say – are, to Foucault ([1976] 1990: 27), interpreted as fundamental components to the formation of discourses:

> Silence itself – the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the discretion that is required between different speakers – is less the absolute limit of discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an element that functions alongside the things said, with them and in relation to them within over-all strategies…There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and permeate discourses.”

Finally, CDA identifies that discourses are populated by a wealth of grounding, knowledge-building imaginative spaces (Wilson, 2004b, 2007, 2011; Wilson and Anderson, 2011). Such imaginative spaces, it notes, move in and out of discourses as fleeting but unmistakably key signs and signifiers.

In what ways have the spatial impacts of governance actions within Bronzeville changed? Specifically, what has been the intensity of the production of space and the kinds of spaces produced in Bronzeville since 2005? And how has this varied from the pre-2005 period?

Tracking the evolution of this social and physical landscape was more complicated. Textual data and interview results are primarily limited to revealing the perceptions of this change from local actors. This was, however, quite useful for establishing the kinds of spaces and categories that

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55 Textual and interview data has been particularly useful for establishing the kinds of humanly-lived (Lefebvrian) categories that constitute this evolving landscape. The categories (as well as the physical-absolute spaces), to be presented in chapter 5 and 6, are primarily derived from these data sources. A chronological reading lends a sense of
constitute this evolving landscape. An “inventory of spaces” is presented in chapter’s 5 and 6 and is primarily derived from these data sources. And a chronological reading lends a sense of how the impressions and meanings ascribed to these spaces by these agents have changed.

The land-use mapping procedure was deployed to produce a more concrete and empirical image of the spaces (i.e., the redeveloped, low-income, and vacant spaces) that constitute the current landscape. Although the kinds of physical and emotive spaces identified as characterizing this evolving landscape are mainly derived from textual and interview data, a sense of how these spaces are distributed and differentiated was solidified by this procedure. Comparative analysis of the current landscape with maps from previous years, however, was not possible. But analysis of construction dates provided a thorough sense of this evolutionary picture. Moreover, descriptions of how the landscape has evolved (i.e., where the redevelopment initially began and where and how it’s moved through the neighborhood) are given by a number of commentators.

The evolution of this landscape is seen as the spatial expression of the evolving growth-discourses and practices that are mobilized by the actors and institutions that comprise this redevelopment governance. In terms of determining the categories that constitute the “inventory of spaces” presented in this study, an elaboration is necessary. The spaces that are identified and described are dissected in two different but inter-related spatial dimensions: physical-absolute and humanly-lived (see Harvey, 2006, 2009). The purpose of distinguishing between these two dimensions is that I am not merely interested in just the physical-absolute character of these spaces but the semiotic and emotive content infused within them as well: how they are lived.

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how these agent’s impressions of the neighborhood has changed and the meanings ascribed to the spaces that characterize the landscape.
The first spatial dimension, of *physical-absolute* space, follows Harvey’s (2009: 134) understanding of absolute space as “the exclusionary space of private property in land and other bounded entities ... bounded spaces that can be conceptualized as containers of power.” Yet, such socially produced, absolute spaces are also interpreted in a “relative” sense in that their character changes through time as new spaces are erected and old ones are removed or transformed.\(^{56}\)

Thus, the physical-absolute spaces of this landscape are discerned in terms of what these relatively permanent spaces objectively are at given slices of time.\(^{57}\)

The second spatial dimension, of *humanly-lived* space, deploys Lefebvrian categories of social space identified by the semiotic and emotive content infused within them (Harvey, 2006, 2009). Lefebvre ([1974] 1991) stresses the dialectical relationships between the following three dimensions of spatiality: 1) *perceived* space, 2) *conceived* space, and 3) *lived* space. The category of humanly-lived space used in this study closely resembles the third dimension of “lived” space, the dialectical fusion of *perceived* (similar to physical-absolute) and *conceived* (i.e., spaces of representation) space. In other words, the relationship between human representations of particular spatial configurations (i.e., the *conceived* spaces that are conjured up through policy and growth discourses) and the actual, physical spaces that ultimately get produced (*perceived* space) in the image of these representations is to be understood as dialectical (Soja, 1989, 1996).

The *physical-absolute* spaces that embody humanly-made landscapes are viewed as the material embodiment of the social relations that produce them. And, conversely, these “meaning-

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\(^{56}\) As Harvey (1982) has famously stated, the crowning glory of past periods of capitalist development invariably becomes spaces of disinvestment and barriers to development at a later date necessitating perpetual and successive rounds of creative-destruction in the built-environment.

\(^{57}\) Absolute spaces are also understood as “relational” in that their meanings represent internalized understandings of the world around them (Harvey, 2006, 2009). However, the physical-absolute spaces that characterize the Mid-South landscape, and are compiled here, primarily follow the first two notions: what these relatively permanent spaces objectively are at given slices of time.
laden” socially produced landscapes (humanly-lived space) play an active mediating role in the (re)constitution (or evolution) of these very social processes and relations. In this context, meaning-infused “symbolic spaces” (i.e., the suburban single-family home, gentrified condominium complexes, spaces of monumental architecture), then, not only come to embody, but actively communicate and reinforce these very conceptions and representations to their “inhabitants” and “users”: they are the material manifestation of humanly-mediated ideological and discursive content.\(^\text{58}\)

In what ways have the political agendas and goals of this current redevelopment governance (and the means of achieving them) changed between the two periods? The answer to this question is informed by the answers to the previous four questions. Again, it was primarily through textual data that revealed whether the goals of the actors and institutions within this governance have changed or not (i.e., through public statements from developers and city officials). The second part of this question – the means of achieving these goals – refers to 1) the relationship between the prominent rhetorical themes and the policies and practices these agents mobilize and 2) the responses given to the conflict they confront. This refers back to the first and second questions and was also revealed through textual analysis.

\(^{58}\) In other words, they are spaces that, to Merrifield (1993: 520), are constantly “imbued with meaning in everyday place-bound social practices.” They are spatial expressions of social relations, encapsulated with often multiple meanings which can be interpreted differently and change in relation to evolving social relations.
Chapter 5
Roll-Out Neoliberalization and the Revitalization of Chicago’s Bronzeville
(1989-2005)

Starting in 1978, the legendary El Rukn gang owned and operated their narcotic business out of the historic Oakland Square Theater, located at 3947 South Drexel Boulevard (Pattillo, 2007). As Pattillo (2007: 271-4) notes, the “Fort,” as it came to be known, stood as a physical emblem of the historical dangers associated with this neighborhood and the south-side in general. Although the gang is reported to have exhibited many atypical qualities, i.e., loyalty and respect for many of the residents in the neighborhood, they embodied the image of what this urban territory represented in the common imaginary: the “hyper-ghetto.” However, the Fort, a spatial marker for this common representation, was seized by the Chicago Police Department in 1989 and “ceremoniously demolished in June, 1990” (Pattillo, 2007: 273).

Coinciding with the mayoral election of Richard M. Daley, the demolition of the Fort – and with it the image of drugs, violence, and crime – signaled the beginning of what was to come: a concerted onslaught against the neighborhood’s gang presence and common perceptions of Bronzeville in general. In many ways, following Pattillo (2007), the ceremonial demolition of the Fort, accompanied by a demonizing, revanchist rhetoric deployed by hand-picked residents, police, and city officials through the media, can be interpreted as an early metaphor for “rebirth”: the revival of Bronzeville after a long, half-century of disinvestment. With the Fort seized by the city, media attention quickly shifted to the neighborhood’s concentration of public housing, the

59 The El Rukn gang had been a legendary gang with a formidable presence on the south-side since the 1960s until their headquarters was seized in 1989 (Pattillo, 2007).
central “visual” signifier of what Bronzeville represented in the common imaginary. For much of the following decade, the political debate in Bronzeville fixated on the topic of public housing, the most significant perceived inhibitor to redevelopment.

The demolition of the Fort can also be viewed as one of the first actions undertaken by the city’s emergent neoliberal governance. With Daley in office, the downtown business elite and real-estate sector, after 13 years, was suddenly back in business as a privileged actor and beneficiary. The city’s “grass-roots,” minority-based neighborhood organizations, however, remained a formidable political presence in the city despite this post-1989 power shift (Rast, 1999). But the neoliberal-guided vision of preparing long, disinvested inner-city neighborhoods for redevelopment was now a prioritized feature (Harvey, 1989a; Ferman, 1996).

In what follows, I empirically chronicle the emergence and evolution of Chicago’s neoliberal redevelopment governance in relation to Bronzeville’s revival during the city’s period of neoliberal roll-out. I follow this governance’s temporal unfolding as it initially crystallized with Richard M. Daley’s mayoral election in 1989 and evolved as the revival of Bronzeville gathered steam in the mid-late 1990s. The evolution of the institutional content of this governance is unpacked in the following dialectically-intertwined features (as stated in the introduction): the ensemble of actors and institutions that constitute it, its political goals and agendas, the prominent rhetorical themes that it deploys to advance redevelopment, and the socio-spatial impacts of its actions.

The Formation of the MSPDC and its Vision for Redevelopment

At the dawn of the 1990s, Bronzeville was not on the city’s list of neighborhoods suitable for redevelopment. The area remained plagued with the world’s highest concentration of public
housing and continued to serve the function of warehousing the majority of the city’s most impoverished, racialized population. But the rhetorical battle over colonizing the common imaginary of this neighborhood was well underway. Bronzeville’s local assemblage of community organizations, consisting of predominantly middle-income homeowners, now battled with the city’s perception (as well as the general, common perceptions) of Bronzeville as hopelessly unsuitable for capital investment.

As the city and established real-estate community focused on redeveloping other, better-suited (i.e., non-black and non-public housing concentrated) neighborhoods during this early period (i.e., Wicker Park, Bucktown, University Village, and the South Loop), the formation of this neighborhood-scale governance began with the political organization of the neighborhood’s middle-income homeowners in the context of local block clubs and community organizations. The principle actors involved in this initial “grass-roots” formation were primarily local, individual black developers (i.e., Alpha Village, see Bey, 1996a), small/local financial institutions (i.e., Seaway National and Shorebank Development, see Lees, Slater, and Wyly, 2008) and, most of all, black homeowners themselves (some of whom were or became local developers in the process) (Pattillo, 2007; Boyd, 2008a; Hyra, 2008).

Discussions between many of these organizations and IIT officials led to the formation of the South-Side Partnership (as discussed in chapter 2). This broad, diverse coalition of local

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60 Such institutions have included the Douglas Community Organization (CDO), Gap Community Organization (GCO), Grand Boulevard Federation (GBF), Centers for New Horizons, Inc. (a social service agency in Grand Boulevard geared toward promoting local, citizen empowerment), Ahkenaton Community Development Corporation (a local CDC in Grand Boulevard), the Black Metropolis Convention and Tourism Council, the Bronzeville Homeowners Association (BHA), Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT), Michael Reese Hospital, the Lakefront Community Organization (LCO), Kenwood-Oakland Community Organization (KOCO), the Residents for Responsible Redevelopment (RRR), the Community Conservation Council (CCC) (formed off the heels of the city’s designation of Oakland and North-Kenwood as a “conservation area” in 1990), the South-Side Partnership (a coalition of these very local organizations/institutions), and the Mid-South Planning & Development Commission (MSPDC). List compiled from the Mid-South Planning & Development Commission (1993), Quintanilla (1994a), as well as von Hoffman (2003), Pattillo (2007), Boyd (2008a), Hyra (2008).
institutions (i.e., the DCO, GCO, GGF, and Centers for New Horizons), led by Leroy Kennedy (a community organizer who also served as director of community relations at IIT), was fortunate enough to take advantage of an $8 million donation from the McCormick-Tribune Foundation by channeling $300,000 through the city government to form the MSPDC in 1990 (von Hoffman, 2003: 132). The MSPDC, ultimately funded through the city and IIT, became unequivocally the most influential local institutional force concerning the redevelopment of Bronzeville in the 1990s, producing the pivotal “Mid-South Strategic Development Plan: Restoring Bronzville,” published in 1993 (MSPDC, 1993). In this plan, the MSPDC strongly promoted a particular image for the future of Bronzeville: its historic revival:

“The Plan provides a blueprint for the rejuvenation of one of the most historically important areas of the city of Chicago...an improvement plan to enhance the quality of life and maintain the cultural heritage of the indigenous people who live and work in the Mid-South planning area” [my italics]. (in MSPDC, 1993)

This “revival” conjured up the image of a “vibrant,” mixed-use and income African-American “community”; the return of the neighborhood’s glory days of racial solidarity and rich cultural legacy during the early twentieth century.61 It was here with the MSPDC that the local “community nostalgia” narrative found its principle propagator.

Based on this vision, redevelopment initially emerged east of Cottage Grove in Oakland and North Kenwood and in the Gap, located in northern Douglas. These were the initial points of entry. In fact, the “Parade of Homes” in the Gap in 1992, a showcase of the neighborhood’s historic architecture by the Home Builders Association of Greater Chicago, is often remembered as the moment Bronzeville’s revival “officially” broke ground (Handley, 2002).62 This revival

61 The plan received praise from a handful of city officials, including Vincent Lane, the head of the CHA until 1995, whose vision of mixed-income housing was broadly consistent with the plan’s vision of a revitalized Bronzeville.  
62 As Handley (2002) notes, “the revitalization of Bronzeville is often dated from 1992,” when the Home Builders Association held this event in the Gap.
predominantly took the form of local homeowner-led renovation of existing homes. Many of these homes, particularly in the Gap, were old greystones that dated, in many cases, to the late nineteenth century (von Hoffman, 2003; Pattillo, 2007). Although these newly renovated, historic residential spaces were slow to develop during the 1990s, they represented (and still represent) a melding of two distinct types of space within the neighborhood’s broader physical-absolute landscape: what I call historical preservation space and local capital crafted affluent and middle-income residential space (Fig. 5.1, 5.2, 5.3).

As Boyd (2008a) and Hyra (2008) chronicle, this image of a renovated Bronzeville promoted in the plan, however, was highly biased toward the middle-income, homeowner interests of the community members that formed the MSPDC:

“[Although] Mid-South wanted residents with a mix of incomes … as an organization it did not make the creation of affordable housing or the preservation of public housing a priority issue.” (Boyd, 2008a: 143)

In fact, while the MSPDC Plan listed one of its principle goals as accommodating “households with a wide range of interests,” the “new developments should focus on owner – occupied housing units” (MSPDC, 1993). Given the “middle-class vision that prevailed” (Boyd, 2008a: 141), the city watched from afar, as the MSPDC ultimately (and, for the most part, unwittingly) did the bidding for real-estate capital for them, slowly sanitizing the neighborhood landscape (cleaning up weedy vacant lots), investing/restoring housing stock, and altering the common imaginary of this urban space.

Bronzeville’s middle-income homeowners and “grass-roots” organizations were the chief redevelopment agents in these early years and represented what could be called an “embryonic” local redevelopment governance. Larger “players,” such as the city and large-scale developers and financiers, had yet to gravitate to the neighborhood (von Hoffman, 2003; Boyd, 2008a).
Thus, Bronzeville’s locally-originated “community nostalgia” growth-narrative served as the principle rhetorical theme propelling these early years of “grass-roots” redevelopment. The other rhetorical components embedded in what would become Bronzeville’s *revanchist redevelopment discourse*, however, were also in formation during this period. But just as the ensemble of actors and institutions that would later constitute this neighborhood-specific governance had yet to join forces, its prominent rhetorical themes were, similarly, not yet operating together within a cohesively formed discourse. These themes and their points of penetration in the Bronzeville context are now presented.

**The Global Trope**

The global trope was quickly embraced by Daley and nobility during the early 1990s. This narrative forcefully argued that if Chicago was to remain competitive and become a “global city,” especially during a new epoch of place-punishing globalization, the city had no choice but to sell itself to purportedly hyper-footloose capital (Knox, 1997; Wilson, 2007). This, as the script goes, would bring middle-upper income “professionals” to the city and provide the demand for new gentrified and upscale consumption spaces. This was the path for the city toward salvation against a future of otherwise certain doom in a new era of supposedly “ominous” global times (Wilson, 2007).

Illuminated by this rhetorical theme, two entities led the charge to transform Chicago: Daley’s highly centralized city government and the Commercial Club of Chicago. To Wilson and Sternberg (2012: 5), these two agents deepened an already formidable growth-coalition “of prominent state planners, builders, developers, realtors, and auxiliary players…” to articulate, legitimate, and implement a new vision for Chicago’s future. The main objective, according to
the Commercial Club (Chicago: Metropolis 2020 Plan, 1999), was (and still is) to “mold Chicago into one of the great cities of the world” through a development vision that entailed a beautified, city up-scaling focused on the Loop. To Daley, “we, the city and suburbs, are in this all together. [We must] tackle the big issues” (in Wilson and Sternberg, 2012: 6). Cities, it follows, had “no alternative” but to follow this set of prescriptions; the consequences of which (i.e., the displacement of the racialized poor) had to be accepted without question. Despite the numerous problematic aspects of this neoliberal-anchored narrative (see Cox, 1997), it gained considerable currency across urban America during the 1990s. It also melded seamlessly with the revanchist-tinged “urban pioneer” narrative in many cities (Smith, 1996), including Chicago, to form a standardized version of the revanchist redevelopment discourse.

This discourse was flagrantly deployed by city officials and developers in gentrifying Chicago neighborhoods such as Wicker Park, Bucktown, University Village, and later Pilsen and Humboldt Park (Wilson, et al., 2004; Wilson and Grammenos, 2005; Wilson, 2007). At its core was an explicit demonization of the local, lower-income residents (mostly Latino) of these targeted neighborhoods as culturally-pathologic, lazy, and/or gang-bangers. Such disinvested landscapes needed brave (wealthy and white) citizens to “pioneer” the way into these neighborhoods, taming the “urban wilderness” with dubious notions of “culture” and civic-minded values (see Mitchell, 1995). And finally, bolstering this formation’s rationality, were two key spatial imaginaries: 1) the tough, crime-infested and decrepit “urban jungle” and 2) the dangerous, culturally-pathologic being: the uncivilized, morally-lost gang-banger and bewildered junkie (Wilson, 2007). These imaginative, visual signifiers are deeply embedded within the discourse as a kind of socio-spatial architecture (Lefebvre, [1974] 1991).
Pulling Strings From Afar

As Chicago’s principle growth-governance actors remained preoccupied with redeveloping other non-black city neighborhood’s during these early roll-out years, the global trope did not, at least directly, impact Bronzeville’s early “grass-roots” redevelopment. In fact, the neighborhood’s homeowners and organizers have never genuinely sanctioned or included the global trope as part of their rhetorical arsenal. This narrative, as a result, was and remains a rhetorical resource mostly deployed by city officials and connected developers.63

The revanchist “urban pioneer” narrative also never formed as part of Bronzeville’s assemblage of rhetorical resources (Boyd, 2008a). Neither the city nor the neighborhood’s local activists drew upon this narrative to propel redevelopment despite its near ubiquity in relation to other gentrifying neighborhoods. But the global trope, however, can be interpreted as playing an indirect role through the city’s close monitoring of the neighborhood’s redevelopment progress. In fact, although the city may not have played an immediately direct role at this point, Daley’s highly centralized and hierarchical political structure provided the city with a set of “control mechanisms” that could be wielded from afar.

For example, the members of the Community Conservation Council (CCC) in Oakland and North Kenwood were almost entirely middle-income homeowners. This was, indeed, no coincidence as these members were hand-picked by local alderman, Toni Preckwinkle, who ultimately answers to Daley (Pattillo, 2007). It is in this context that the CCC and other local organizations were often interpreted by lower-income residents as nothing but a “puppet board waiting to have its strings pulled,” as one critic argued (in Pattillo, 2007: 6). While the board

63 This discursive fragmentation, as is chronicles in chapter 7, would later be the source of internal conflict between the city and privileged developers and local activists concerning competing visions of Bronzeville’s redevelopment.
likely did not have its strings *directly* pulled, their middle-income, homeowner sensibilities provided assurance that they didn’t have to be; an example of how “middle-class activism” has come to represent a hallmark of neoliberal governmentality (see Anjaria, 2009; Blakeley, 2010).

This aspect of homeownership also drove a significant wedge between the neighborhood’s middle-income and lower-income residents, disrupting the kind of solidarity that existed during the golden years. Golden era middle-class blacks shared their renter-status with the low-income, and were, thus, not as aligned with the city’s class-based interests to the extent they are today. As Pattillo (2007: 132) notes, middle-income homeowners, “driven by the self-interest of protecting and growing their housing investment … began to do the bidding of larger outside developers and the city, which always looks to fatten its tax coffers.” Here, the city could continue to focus on its other redevelopment projects (i.e., Wicker Park, Bucktown) knowing that Bronzeville was being prepped as a future space for investment.

*Daley’s Feudalistic Mode of Government*

Unraveling the relations between these neighborhood-specific redevelopment agents (and their associated rhetorical themes) necessitates an understanding of how they are situated within Mayor Daley’s near authoritarian political structure. Daley, upon inauguration in 1989, quickly began restoring the highly centralized, hierarchical political regime his father controlled during the mid-twentieth century (Ferman, 1996). The political structure of the second Daley regime, however, incorporated a more complex, multi-tiered layering of inter-mediate actors (Simpson and Kelly, 2008). But while presiding over a more complex web of power relations, the second Daley, alone, remained at the top of the city’s political hierarchy. Flanked by the city’s Department of Planning and Development, the Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce, and the city’s long-time principle public-private civic group, the Commercial Club of Chicago, the
second Daley regime has arguably represented the most powerful urban government ever constructed in the history of American urban politics.

Daley’s monarchical-like reign quickly led to portrayals of Chicago’s neo-machine politics as akin to a “feudal system,” “where Mayor Daley is king and the aldermen are the lords and ladies of their ward,” as one alderman caricatured it (in Hyra, 2008: 120). This portrayal is, in fact, fairly accurate in that the city council is strongly controlled by Daley through his “political war chest” of fundraising dollars (Hyra, 2008: 63). As a result, Daley absorbed the power to overwhelmingly control the outcome of aldermanic elections (also see Simpson, 2001; Simpson and Kelly, 2008).64 “Rather than controlling the party and the ward committeemen (i.e., precinct captains) as his father did,” Hyra (2008: 63) notes, Daley ruled over the city “by directly influencing the fate of the aldermen.” Bronzeville’s local aldermen – Haithcock, Tillman, and Preckwinkle – were no exception.

In this context, not much was able to happen without Daley’s personal consent. Aldermen who dared stray from Daley’s agendas strongly jeopardized their chances for re-election: “the machine acts much like a business monopoly, consolidating power, limiting competition, and harnessing the distribution of political rewards” (Hyra, 2008: 58; Simpson, 2001; Simpson and Kelly, 2008). In short, the second Daley regime has resembled a structure of urban politics that can fruitfully be called a modern day feudalistic mode of government – in this study’s CPE terms, the political dimension of this socio-spatial formation (Chicago’s redevelopment governance) which has had considerable influence over the performance of the city’s economic

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64 The city council has consisted of almost entirely aldermen who have either been directly appointed by Daley (in the case where an aldermen steps down or dies in office) or have been heavily favored in the campaign process by Daley’s unmatched fundraising capabilities (Hyra, 2008).
restructuring (see Hyra’s [2008] comparison between gentrification in Bronzeville and New York’s Harlem and the divergent roles of both city’s structure of urban politics).

By virtue of this strong centralized political control, the distribution of federal and private investment funds (i.e., Community Development Block Grants [CDBGs], Empowerment Zone [EZ] funds, and private donations from civic groups such as the Commercial Club of Chicago) was virtually entirely controlled by Daley himself. After Daley’s power was consolidated in the city council shortly after his election in 1989, “he was able to appoint leaders of the EZs coordinating council and eliminate grassroots participation in the decision making process” (Hyra, 2008: 69). As the lifeblood for many of these neighborhood organizations in Bronzeville, their fate was (and remains) entirely tied to Daley’s allocation decisions, which necessitated their compliance (willingly or unwillingly) with Daley’s goals and agendas as a means of survival. Moreover, in addition to funding Bronzeville’s neighborhood organizations, much of these funds also wound up fueling local black churches and black developers, actors strongly dominated by middle-class, homeowner interests (Pattillo, 2007; Hyra, 2008). As a result, Daley quickly gained the political support of this particular population segment due to this financial support.

In these ways, although the global trope was never adopted by Bronzeville’s local assemblage of organizers, activists, and empowered homeowners, it nonetheless impacted this early revival process as decisions were ultimately influenced by Daley’s authoritarian grip – a grip seared by the mayor’s “go-global” aspirations.

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65 EZ funds are federal funds directed to cities via the Empowerment Zone Initiative, an aspect of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, signed by President Clinton in 1993. EZ funds are designed to aid the revitalization of distressed urban neighborhoods by providing incentives to businesses to locate in such distressed communities and to hire community residents (Hyra, 2008: 59).

66 The strategic deployment of CDBGs and EZ funds in these directions, however, has consequently led to very little fiscal and job growth in Bronzeville; the original intent of the EZ Initiative (Hyra, 2008: 69).
The Revanchist-Public Housing Trope

Since Bronzeville remained a neglected, public housing-concentrated neighborhood during this early period, the city had yet to form a coherent discourse on its redevelopment, which was still in its grass-roots phase. As a result, the city’s pre-packaged “global trope-urban pioneer” constituted redevelopment discourse was never systematically used in this setting. Instead, a different but similar set of revanchist articulations emerged from both the city and local population through the contentious public housing debate that erupted during the early 1990s. Mobilized off the heels of HUD’s HOPE VI program, launched in 1992, the revanchist-public housing trope, a deeply neoliberal-anchored, racialized narrative, was forged in relation to the image of concentrated public housing as a symbolic emblem of the characteristics associated with this now infamous “hyper-ghetto”: drugs, crime, gang violence, and hopeless poverty.67

Before chronicling this debate and internal conflict in Bronzeville, this narrative’s revanchist content and formation at the national scale is presented.

Revanchism, Public Housing, and the Black Poor

Considering the overwhelming majority of Chicago’s public housing population has historically been African-American, this narrative, while explicitly targeting public housing itself, was also, and much more implicitly, a demonization of its inhabitants: the black poor. According to this narrative’s proponents, the purported failure of Keynesian-era public housing was also, to a large degree, a failure of this population (Anderson and Sternberg, 2012). Thus, it required not just the “healing” of this landscape but these culturally-affected and socially pathologic beings as well (or their “banishment,” see Beckett and Herbert, 2010).

67 The revanchist-public housing trope was deeply underpinned by the dominant, national-scale discourse on black-on-black violence (Wilson, 2005), and overwhelmingly deployed through heavily biased, local news media outlets (Dreier, 2005).
The strong focus on the most extreme behaviors (i.e., drug dealing, murder) by the media easily indicted the entire low-income black population in the process (an integral component to the discourse). The failure to acknowledge the rest of this population, the majority of which are hard-working, resilient residents (Wilson and Keil, 2008), translates into an image of the “ghetto” as entirely consisting of public housing towers infested with uncontrollable criminals. As a result, an entire and diverse population is ultimately reduced to its worst examples, a “general disqualification by the worst” (Foucault, [2004] 2008: 188; also see Crump, 2002).

Urban poverty, in general, and in non-public housing neighborhoods, was simply not discussed, presumably because it was not considered problematic by the narrative’s proponents. At a deeper level, this strategic silencing prevented the debate from potentially addressing more broader-scale, structural forces operating behind the production of poverty. Thus, the existence of such forces was not recognized at all. This is because the goal of the narrative was to produce popular consent for a “solution” to public housing favorable to elite political and capitalist interests; interests which are, ultimately, diametrically opposed to the alleviation of poverty.

Along with many other American cities, this public housing narrative and debate proliferated across Chicago in the 1990s. And Bronzeville, representing the largest, most densely concentrated version of this demonized symbolic landscape in the city (as well as the entire country), consequently bore the brunt of its usage. For city officials and prominent developers in Chicago, the narrative also conveniently melded with the aims of the global trope. Specifically, the removal of these outmoded, welfare-state relics was deemed a necessity in the context of Daley’s aggressive “go-global” campaign. Their continued presence was considered incompatible with the city’s goal of becoming a “global city” (L. Bennett, et al., 2006).
This narrative is strongly represented in numerous Chicago newspaper articles published during these years, particularly in the *Chicago Tribune*, a historically conservative and often neoliberal leaning newspaper (c.f., *Chicago Tribune*, 1993a, 1994; Chapman, 1990). Initially, revanchist sentiments were reflected in articles covering the George H. W. Bush administration’s proposed nationwide crime crackdown in public housing (*Chicago Tribune*, 1989, 1990a, b). This crackdown aimed to make it easier to evict tenants for dubious behavioral reasons, “such as making too much noise” or “if any member of a household or person under the tenant’s control engages in drug-related activity” (*Chicago Tribune*, 1989).

These stories often included the use of key visually-rich signifiers in relation to public housing, of “ever-present enemies”, such as “crime, poverty, drugs, unemployment, bad schools, broken families, rats and roaches” (Chapman, 1990). In another report:

“… rival gangs waged an all-out war for control of a blighted 13-story high-rise. By summer’s end, there were two murders, several shootings and a fire-bombing. In the funeral parlor, the rival gang overturned the corpse of one of the victims. As the warfare escalated, it forced maintenance personnel out of the 138-unit building and spread a wave of terror among its residents. First-floor tenants began sleeping in bathtubs or huddling in closets to evade the nightly spray of bullets …” (Caruso, 1990)

The narrative is also distinctly racialized in that the vast majority of these public housing residents are African-American. Although hardly never explicitly discussed (this would be tantamount to being considered racist in an era of color-blind racism, see Bonilla-Silva, 2001, 2009), this racial-component is not lost on local residents, as the following remark from middle-school student, Angela Stevenson (1996), revealed: “When some think of African-American’s they think of poverty, pain and projects.”

In fact, the decision to concentrate the majority of the city’s public housing in Bronzeville was itself racially charged, as the vast majority of this housing stock was
intentionally located entirely within disinvested black inner-city neighborhoods to protect the city’s more politically-connected, white neighborhoods (Hirsch, 1998; Bennett, et al., 2006). As a result, the image of public housing and black poverty, particularly in Chicago, are inextricably linked. To think of public housing and Chicago’s south-side is to think of the black poor. As one developer famously described the problem, “it’s people’s conception … and the conception they have about it [the South-Side] is one word: Black, B-L-A-C-K, Black” (in Rast, 1999: 31). Consequently, to Krysan (in Lowenstein, 2007), “the percentage of black people predicts and controls the perception of crime … many whites’ vision is colored by pre-existing stereotypes.”

This narrative formed as an aggressive rhetorical assault against the still prevalent but fractured Keynesian-social welfare discourse. It explicitly indicted the high-rises themselves and the policies that produced them as the cause of these social problems:

“The chairman [CHA head, Vincent Lane] should be plotting an alternative to the blighted high-rises that have bred hopelessness and crime, not concentrating his energies on trying to salvage them …” (Paraphrasing Ed Marciniak, professor at Loyola University, in Caruso, 1990)

“Combine this physical isolation with an overwhelming concentration of poor people and you have festering trouble spots that breed welfare dependency, inadequate schooling and violence.” (Kamin, 1993b)

Legislative efforts to preserve the nation’s public housing stock, rooted in social-liberalist rhetoric (i.e., advanced by Ted Kennedy, see Chapman, 1990), remained a defiant obstacle for this emergent neoliberal discourse. But the pro-Keynesian argument, however, received a terminal blow in 1992 after the fatal shooting of seven-year old Dantrell Davis while walking to

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68 This was facilitated by the Richard J. Daley Administration during the 1950s and early 1960s. The city was taken to court in the now legendary Gautreaux case and found guilty of intentional racial discrimination (L. Bennett, et al., 2006; Pattillo, 2007).
69 In Chicago public housing residents have been nearly entirely African-American since the earliest years of construction (Hirsch, 1998). See Anderson and Sternberg (2012) for a more detailed analysis of this historical and deeply embedded link between race (blackness) and public housing in Chicago.
school in Cabrini-Green (Reardon, 1992; Wiltz and Thomas, 1992; Grady, 1992). The north-side public housing complex instantly became nationally notorious after this incident, thrusting the public housing issue onto the national stage and sounding the death-knell for Keynesian-social welfare policies as proven failures.

The tragedy highlighted public housing social ills through frequent and often sensationalizing expositions of the tough life in public housing:

“For a window into the hell of high-rise public housing … four handguns float menacingly in the night sky outside the bedroom window of a Cabrini-Green high-rise. A monolithic heap of a brick building tumbles into a state of collapse. A shrouded figure, perhaps the Angel of Death, moves across the swirling clouds. There is no rest for the innocents damned to grow up amid this real-life nightmare. Inside, bathed in a ghastly blue light, a black baby lies awake in its crib, with only its blood-red doll to offer comfort.” (Kamin, 1993a)

“Walking to school means taking the long route to avoid the high-rise buildings where gunshots can ring out at any hour. Mothers coach their young ones to ‘drop and roll’ at the sound of gunfire. And because of the danger from crossing gang turf lines, teenagers from the southeast side of the development think twice about venturing to the northwest side. To many Chicagoans, Cabrini-Green is 70 acres of prison-style high-rises and rowhouses raked by constant gang warfare” [my italics]. (Wiltz and Thomas, 1992)

“… as the children grew up, they had fewer and fewer models of people succeeding in the workaday world. Instead, the ones they could look up to—the ones who had ready cash in an environment of privation—were the gang leaders and the drug dealers. In effect, public housing, which initially had been seen as a temporary stopping-off point for low-income families, had become the housing of last resort for the poorest of the poor.” (Reardon, 1992)

The tragedy also led to numerous clamors for new solutions to the public housing “crisis” as well as stiffer penalties for drug-related crimes in public housing (Grady, 1992; Locin, 1994). The effects of this acutely spatialized imagery ultimately and deeply reinforced common perceptions of these urban spaces as wretched sites of morally deficient, deviant beings and helpless, needy families mired in fear within crumbling, demoralizing physical structures:
“In enclaves of poverty, people have been literally cut off from the rest of society … with low-wage or no jobs … (living) where gangs and drug dealers control the stairwells, where children can’t go outside to play, where mothers put their infants to bed in bathtubs and erect mattresses in the windows at night to protect their families from stray bullets.” Henry Cisneros, head of HUD during the Clinton Administration, discussing the Robert Taylor Homes (in Broder, 1994)

In the final analysis, the narrative ultimately succeeded in mobilizing and producing popular consent for two key neoliberal federal public housing programs: new anti-crime legislation and HUD’s HOPE VI program. The $840 million crime crackdown (see Locin, 1994; Banchero, 1996), drastic budget cuts to public housing (Chicago Tribune, 1994), and the revanchist “one-strike-and-you’re-out” policy (Myers and McRoberts, 1996; Neikirk, 1997; also see Hackworth, 2007: 51) passed by the Clinton administration coincided with the emergence of the federal HOPE VI program to cleanse targeted public housing units in anticipation of their demolition and eventual redevelopment (Chicago Tribune, 1996). Considered the worst public housing city in the nation (L. Bennett, et al., 2006), Chicago was swiftly granted a collection of federal HOPE VI funds to demolish Cabrini-Green on the near north side, Henry Horner Homes and ABLA on the west side, and Stateway Gardens, Robert Taylor Homes, and the Madden-Wells-Darrow complex in Bronzeville to south (Hackworth, 2007: 55).

The Spaces of the Revanchist-Public Housing Trope

Until their actual demolition in the early 2000s, Stateway Gardens, Robert Taylor Homes, and the Ida B. Wells Homes remained looming physical fixtures in Bronzeville: what I simply call public housing space (Fig. 5.4). But this narrative signifies a litany of other imagined spaces that are also associated with this landscape; spaces that are not merely imaginary but have actual, concrete manifestations. In addition to the neighborhood’s public housing, much of the landscape

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70 The debate over the social ills and problems associated with public housing was perhaps most played out in the context of Cabrini-Green during this time.
(particularly Douglas and Grand Boulevard) remained dominated by deteriorating residential homes in the early 1990s – *low-income residential space* (Fig. 5.5, 5.6) – and the commercial spaces typical of low-income neighborhoods: what I call *parasitic-economy space* (i.e., check cashiers and payday lenders, see Wilson, et al., 2009; Wilson, 2011) and *low-income retail space* (i.e., liquor stores, local-run grocery stores, and fast food).

Interwoven with these disinvested residential and commercial spaces was also the increasing ubiquity of abandoned vacant spaces, the result of the city’s progressive land-banking campaign: *city-owned vacant lot space* (in fact, 72.8 percent of the aldermanic holds in the city in 1994 fell within Bronzeville, see Fig. 5.7). Reference to this landscape’s vacant lots and abandoned buildings littered media accounts as much as its public housing. Although the common perceptions of this landscape were actively being altered by the neighborhood’s middle-class political organizers, the material landscape remained primarily dominated by these spaces of disinvestment (von Hoffman, 2003).

But the dominant representations of these physical-absolute spaces communicated through this revanchist narrative have deeply impacted the way this landscape is perceived and humanly-lived. In this context, this landscape can also be understood by the kinds of emotively-charged spaces that characterize it. Low-income residential space, for instance, is humanly-lived and mediated in different ways. Inhabitance within disinvested, crumbling homes – what I call *crap residential space* (Fig. 5.8, 5.9) – is internalized by inhabitants as constant reminders of who they purportedly are: poor and culturally-deficient. To one former resident, “I take no pride in Bronzeville … In fact, I was ashamed” (in M. Mitchell, 1996). Disinvested homes that are abandoned – *decrepit-abandoned residential space* (Fig. 5.10, 5.11) – are also visual reminders of what this landscape is: the ghetto. And the immense swath of neglected, trash strewn city-
owned vacant lots – desolate-weedy space (Fig. 5.12-5.16) – only contributes to this negative perception among inhabitants of what they are and where they live:

“… it was embarrassing … associating yourself with this area … block-to-block, there were weeds, trash, abandoned cars … you weren’t afraid for people’s safety, but embarrassed to have people over for company.” (Interview with local organizer, 8/19/2010)

“It’s just negative space, you see the potential of it, but it’s stagnant … in a way you have, or could have something beautiful … in a way because it’s undeveloped, it means your stable … nothing’s changing, but it also means you’re still living with neglected spaces like this, that nobody really cares about…” (Interview with resident, 5/29/2011)

“You want to feel like you have a community that has possibility and that has growth rather than looking at vacant lots, boarded-up buildings and foreclosed properties that not only give a sense of insecurity, but also decrease property values and give people the feeling that their neighborhood and the city is on decline.” (Joel Bookman, co-director of LISC Chicago, in Olivo, 2011)

These are the spaces that are treated as “trash cans,” and were even illegal dumping sites of toxic materials for commercial firms (see Pattillo, 2007: 70). These spaces also form a kind of broader emotive space: what I call social isolation space. The swaths of cracked, weedy concrete lining the exteriors of public housing high-rises; abandoned public housing units inhabited by squatters (see Turner, 2002); garbage littered, crumbling streets; and polluting and/or abandoned industrial structures (Fig. 5.17) are here representative of this type of space.

Moreover, the playgrounds and street corners where youths congregate amidst these spaces of isolation can be interpreted as youth-alienation space while parasitic-economy and low-income retail space can be interpreted as discord-producing ghetto retail space (Fig. 5.18, 5.19). The following resident provided the following when asked the extent to which these spaces represent and impart feelings of isolation and marginalization:

“Absolutely! They represent neglect, that nobody cares about you … they are functional though, depending on who’s using them [vacant spaces], children play there and socialize [youth-alienation space], drug-dealers hide stuff there, sell
drugs and what not, or people just dump trash there [desolate-weedy space] … the liquor stores and bars on the windows are different [discord-producing ghetto retail space] … yeah, it’s bad, but it’s kind of a paradox because people need these stores … it’s real, and it’s who and where we are … and those stores need those bars and bullet proof windows for protection … but they’re certainly not improving anything, nobody needs another $10 bottle of Hennessy, they’re not contributing a thing.” (Interview, 5/29/2011)

Finally, the profoundly negative image commonly attributed to public housing high-rises (see Fig. 5.4) can be understood as ominous public-housing space. These are the now infamous spaces “picked apart by scavengers and burrowed through by gangs,” and have the “look of desolation and the stench to match” (McRoberts, 1994b).

In short, these spaces represent the spatial expression of the revanchist-public housing trope mediated by people on the ground; the narrative embedded into the very fabric of this landscape and read and internalized by its inhabitants and outsiders alike. In the physical-absolute dimension, these actual, concrete spaces supplied the narrative with its potently imaginative content; the goal to negatively sear the landscape in the common imagination of both users and outsiders. This was precisely what Bronzeville activists and organizers were fighting against. But for things to change, this revanchist narrative ironically proved vital in that it ultimately served to justify the necessity for change.

Mixed-Income Housing

This revanchist pro-demolition narrative continued to flourish as the HOPE VI program was proposed and installed. But in the process it became increasingly interwoven with an emergent narrative on the solution to this purported failure of public housing: mixed-income development. Here, the philosophy of mixed-income housing served as the roll-out correlative to the roll-back revanchist-public housing trope. This two-sided rhetorical formation increasingly penetrated Chicago’s political landscape as the CHA was overtaken by HUD in 1995 due to
flagrant corruption, a collapsing of the national and urban scales in this setting. The point of intersection between these two narratives emerged in the context of increasing renditions of the explanations of poverty: public housing as “deepening holes of self-reproducing social disaster” [my italics] (Raspberry, 1996). Once the most problematic complexes were scheduled for demolition, attention shifted to the human side of the problem:

“We’ve got to change the human dynamics of public housing … We can’t have buildings where no one works, where there are no role models, where children never have an example of someone who’s thinking about sacrificing today to save something for tomorrow” (Cisneros, in Raspberry, 1996).

In terms of comments like these, such poverty explanations, although only implicitly communicated (c.f., Kamin, 1993a, b, 1995a; Cohen, 1996), are interpreted here as grounded in the neoliberal assumption that poverty can be corrected by altering people’s behavior and that poverty is ultimately the outcome of bad choices. Here, the notion of having good (wealthier) role models as neighbors, an assumption central to this morally-persuasive narrative, is nowhere more clearly rooted in Max Weber’s protestant ethic. The solution is simple: “to give individual families individual choices” in complexes with a “mix of incomes,” “a crusade that is nothing less than saving lives and saving families, saving neighborhoods and saving whole cities” (Cisneros, in Rodrigue, 1996). Note the neoliberal focus on “the individual” and “choice” and the underpinning of the global trope in relation to “saving whole cities.”

Coinciding with the birth of the federal HOPE VI program in 1992 the mixed-income philosophy gathered considerable steam at the national scale as the solution to the failed Keynesian-era mode of public housing (Goetz, 2003; Hackworth, 2007).71 The narrative was manifest in Chicago immediately after the tragic murder of Dantrell Davis at Cabrini-Green and

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71 The philosophy of mixed-income development and housing can arguably be considered a now global phenomenon; penetrating many urban regions in a multiplicity of settings (see Bacque, Fijalkow, Launay, and Vermeersch, 2011 for the case of Paris).
the Chicago Tribune Architecture Competition for Public Housing that followed shortly thereafter (and put together by the newspaper’s editorial board itself, *Chicago Tribune*, 1993b).

In the wake of these events, the idea of mixed-income housing, also a central component to the parallel emergence of the New Urbanism movement (Gonzalez and Lejano, 2009), was forcefully propagated in Chicago as the solution to the problem of concentrated poverty. For example, Blair Kamin, *Tribune* architectural critic, strongly promoted “traditional-style” neighborhood developments such as New Urbanism. These “traditional” designs married with the private-sector were here perceived as better solutions to the supposed “root mistake” of isolating public housing towers from the rest of the “urban fabric” (Kamin, 1995b). Such developments have typically entailed mixed-income philosophies:

“… connecting low-income housing to its surroundings should begin-through a return to traditional urban forms that replace the tower-in-the-park model of urban planning and a mix of income groups that shatters public housing's social isolation.” (Kamin, 1995b)

“Still, some of the privately developed projects appear to be doing the job … the design integrates public housing into the public realm of the street: The brick facade, with its three gables, faces Racine Avenue and blends neatly into the neighborhood of masonry apartment buildings. In addition, each unit has its own entrance, freeing residents from the crime-ridden elevators and the darkened corridors of CHA high-rises.” (Kamin, 1993b)

“End the social isolation of public housing: Experts agree that one of the underlying causes of Cabrini's problems-violence, welfare dependency and low educational attainment-is the development's overwhelming concentration of poor people. There are few middle-class role models who live in the complex, as there were in the racially segregated, but economically mixed, black neighborhoods that predated the existence of public housing.” (Kamin, 1993e)

This dual-themed narrative, in short, contributed important rhetorical resources for Bronzeville organizers and homeowners to draw upon in their quest to propel the neighborhood’s

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72 It was most heavily promoted via the mixed-income friendly *Chicago Tribune*. For example, see *Chicago Tribune* (1993b, c, 1994), Kamin (1993a, b, c, d, 1994, 1995a, b), and McRoberts (1994a) for Tribune articles on the public housing solution issue.
revival. Public housing was and still is deemed the source of Bronzeville’s mid-twentieth century disinvestment as the neighborhood is commonly imagined as once thriving in a mixed-use and mixed-income setting.⁷³

“There is a rich heritage here … the way to (preserve) that is to make sure we can maintain the diversity of incomes that have always lived here …” (Cheryl Spivey-Perry, director of Virginia Bums Hope Center, in Lynch, 2007c)

“Bronzeville has historically been a mixed-income community, initially due to the restrictive covenants that forced all black Chicagoans, regardless of income, to live on the south-side.” (Rodriquez, 2008)

Here, in a kind of “back to the future movement” (Gonzalez and Lejano, 2009: 2960), this “pro-demolition/mixed-income” narrative is seen to meld cohesively with Bronzeville’s “community nostalgia” theme to form a neighborhood-specific incarnation of the broader-scale revanchist redevelopment discourse.⁷⁴

**Revanchist Bronzeville**

Although the revanchist “urban pioneer” narrative never coherently crystallized in Bronzeville, many middle-income black homeowners who moved to Bronzeville in the 1980s and early 1990s certainly felt like “pioneers,” as one organizer confirmed (interview, 8/19/2010; also see von Hoffman, 2003; Pattillo, 2007). But as a public housing concentrated neighborhood, the revanchist-public housing trope served as the rhetorical venue for the neighborhood’s middle-income homeowners (the minority of the population) to assert their class-based interests: the local manifestation of this broader metropolitan and national scale discursive formation.

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⁷³ Of course, this assertion that Bronzeville has *historically* been mixed-income silences its decades-long history as uniformly low-income and disinvested.

⁷⁴ Vincent Lane, head of the CHA until his resignation due to corruption in 1995 was one of the early champions of promoting mixed-income development in this context (see *Chicago Tribune*, 1990c; Caruso, 1990; Pattillo, 2007)
As Pattillo (2007: 276-7) reports, Bronzeville’s concentration of public housing was “epitomized as the demise of the neighborhood” among non-public housing residents, newcomers, and old-times alike (e.g., Chicago Sun-Times, 1996a). As a result, it was often the receiver of “venomous language” in support of its demolition:

“The aggressive, perhaps, even vengeful, response to what some perceive as the physical manifestation of crime and disorder – those buildings, which sent some residents running to other parts of the city, bottomed out the property values of those who remained, curtailed residents’ daily routines, and raised the cost of home insurance – is no less than demolition.” (Pattillo, 2007: 276-7)

As one local organizer and resident recalled, “the state of public housing [during the 1990s] caused a great divide in the community” (Interview, 8/19/2010). This divide emerged in the context of the initial debates surrounding the Lakefront Properties in North Kenwood, whether the public housing high-rises should either be demolished or rehabilitated (McRoberts, 1994b; Pattillo, 2007). The Responsible Residents for Redevelopment (RRR), a local organization consisting of middle-income homeowners, “primarily newcomers” (Pattillo, 2007: 195), had forcefully argued for the demolition of the high-rises. Demolition was then to be followed by replacement with “attractive” mixed-income developments. For these residents, the alternative of “rehabilitating” the structures was perceived to be a threat to their property values as the external façade of the high-rises would remain intact:

“If the court allows Chicago Housing Authority to build 241 units of public housing in North Kenwood-Oakland, that would be a ratio of 6 public units to every 1 market price unit. Statistically and in reality that would permanently devastate the development of North Kenwood-Oakland … Finally, in my twelve years of being a real estate broker and developer, no one has ever called our office and asked to live next door to public housing.” (RRR member and local developer, in Pattillo, 2007: 200)

For many, “Bronzeville had long been swallowed up by CHA’s massive housing developments that included Dearborn Homes, Stateway Gardens, Robert Taylor Homes, Ida B.
Wells, and Clarence Darrow Homes” (M. Mitchell, 1996). This late-twentieth century, disinvested landscape was no longer considered to be the “thriving” Bronzeville that was once “tended and preserved by middle-income blacks” (M. Mitchell, 1996). As a consequence, M. Mitchel (1996) reports, “the silence from Chicago's black wealthy elite goes to show you that not even rich black folks want to invest in an area overrun by poor black folks.” The answer for these wealthier blacks was simple: public housing demolition.

Such revanchist sentiments are thoroughly chronicled by Pattillo (2007), Boyd (2008a), and Hyra (2008) in ways that illuminate the intersection of class and racial identity in this redeveloping neighborhood. As these accounts reveal, race is often used as a convenient rhetorical tactic to cloak what are ultimately class-biased interests – interests that are posited as representative of an entire racially homogenous (but class-divided) population (see Moore, 2005). In fact, redevelopment is treated by Bronzeville’s “community-nostalgia” narrative as recovering a sense of racial solidarity and identity – an important relation, to put it in the study’s CPE terms, between discourse and identity. But this recovery, however, has been a pipe dream. Intra-racial class conflict has deeply colored this redevelopment process (Pattillo, 2007; Boyd, 2008a; Hyra, 2008), effectively overwhelming the notions of racial solidarity:

“Although coalition activists presented “Restoring Bronzeville” [the MSPDC Plan] as the direct expression of resident preference, the planning process leading up to it nevertheless drew sharp lines between middle-income and lower-income residents, and increased tensions between community leaders and black elected officials.” (Boyd, 2008a: 102)

“Both black politics and neighborhood development analyses often operate ‘as though there were a monolithic community,’ downplaying the divisions that exist within urban black communities.” (Rachel Bratt, in Boyd, 2008a: 102)

This particular kind of intra-racial class conflict was not an issue in golden era Bronzeville as homeownership was not possible for any class-segment. As such, with reason to
fear a now threatening lower-income presence, contemporary class-based issues were often (and still are) communicated through revanchist sentiments and deployed in the context of behavioral issues. Here, residents who conduct themselves in ways considered by middle-income homeowners as “out of place” were harshly called out (Cresswell, 1996). Pattillo (2007: 260) reports one local police officer as stating:

“… We should really think about discouraging some of the current uses there [the park in the middle of Drexel Boulevard] because people are out there barbecuing and setting up tents, selling snow cones, and drinking, and just doing all kinds of things. People seem to think of it as a park, and they just come out and plant themselves. I would like to see a larger contingent of residents use the parkway. I’ve heard complaints from many people that they are afraid to go out and use it because of some of the people there …”

Behaviors such as “barbecuing,” “fixing cars on the street,” “porch-sitting,” “honking horns,” and “loitering” were vilified with as much force as “drug-dealing” and other criminal actions (Pattillo, 2007: 262, 288). For wealthier residents, these are behaviors that have no “place” in the predominantly public spaces in which they are witnessed. At the core of this conflict is class, as the very same spaces are read and used differently based on this social distinction: visual aesthetics versus barbecuing and loitering (see Pattillo, 2007: 259-262).

The stepped-up police presence in Bronzeville at this time (see Chicago Tribune, 1996; Pattillo, 2007), meant to “police” the use of these spaces and “impart” a general sense of safety and security for incoming capitalist investment and gentrifiers, has led to new spaces of what I call upper-class community safety (Fig. 5.20, 5.21): the sanitization of public spaces by upper-class sensibilities and values. “People don’t like to lose police stations or even have them move a block or two … That’s why this is sensitive,” according to one city official (in Kass, 1996). Robert Pritzker even acknowledged that the relocating of the police headquarters to 35th and State played a “big part” in his decision to donate to IIT: “The perception is terrible [of IIT's
location], and perception is very important … so from IITs point of view, it’s just wonderful to make mothers and fathers feel their kids are safe” (in Sector and Worthington, 1996).

Here, we see the “criminalization of poverty” in full force as behaviors associated with the poor get demonized by wealthier homeowners in the name of “community” and “neighborhood” safety. Such code words get colonized with class content and are expressed in the following through behavioral and terms:

“There are several nuisances, but two I would say would be the top priorities. The first one is the undesirables. You know, either they will have to be taught how to live correctly or they will have to find where they feel comfortable to do whatever they’re doing. It’s nothing against them, but if they don’t know the meaning of community, either they get someone to teach them or they need to go someplace where they can, you know, have the same behavior.” (Homeowner, in Pattillo, 2007: 289-90)

“All of that [public housing] was suppressing the value of this very valuable land. People who are on governmental subsidies, in general, don’t have a right to any particular land because taxpayers are the ones paying for it, anyway. If I’m supporting this whole thing, should they get a better view of the lake and I get a south suburban neighborhood and an hour-and-a-half commute.” (Homeowner, in Reed, 2005)

Much less is veiled, however, in the following quote from another local homeowner (in Hyra, 2008: 138):

“Long-term residents, meaning people who bought into Bronzeville ten, fifteen, twenty years ago, really want to see the benefit of their investment and I’ve heard folks saying, ‘I’m tired of poor people, I want some good homeowners in the community, we need more homeowners [my italics].’”

There is, moreover, often a conflation between low-income residents, public housing residents, and drug-dealing criminals in this rhetoric. The distinction between criminals and non-criminals is blurred at best.

Intra-racial class conflict even emerged within the MSPDC housing committee, particularly between public housing representatives and the homeowner majority:
“… a faction that represented public housing. And there was a faction that had represented the urban pioneers, who came down and purchased a lot of their greystone homes and had invested, you know, considerable amount of money into maintaining them and they felt threatened by all the public housing people and the public housing people felt threatened by these people.” (MSPDC member, in Boyd, 2008a: 111-2)

Another member, a homeowner, recalled the following revanchist statements delivered in critical response to the idea of mixed-income development and a clear example of the “disqualification by the worst” dimension to the revanchist-public housing trope:

“We don’t want those people living next door to us! Hell no! ... Not in my backyard. We don’t want those poor people over here, they’re going to be breaking into our houses! Our, you know, sweat and tears going into fixing these houses, these people are gonna break in and steal everything.” (in Boyd, 2008a: 112)

In the long-run, of course, the politically more powerful middle-income vision came to fruition as almost all the neighborhood’s public housing was eventually demolished. Even worse, the mixed-income replacement housing has been painfully slow to develop (see Johns, 2004a), leaving many displaced public housing residents waiting indefinitely to return. Many have been forced to abandon hope of returning and have sought permanent housing elsewhere.

In this context, the very possibility of displacement today represents a considerable barrier to Bronzeville’s “revival”; an important and fundamental distinction between the past and present which is not even remotely considered by “community nostalgia” supporters. In short, displacement would not have even been possible in golden era Bronzeville (even if it had been a target for redevelopment) due to a legal structure of segregation that is no longer in place. And since displacement of lower-income residents is to be avoided – absorbed by these “mixed-income” redevelopments – as a means of reviving golden era intra-racial solidarity (of which has been a woeful failure), lack of recognition of this historical (and structural) distinction has
proven problematic. In short, race and identity – as opposed to golden era Bronzeville – now operate more as a medium (or strategy) through which class interests exert their primacy.

A further internal division emerged when the feeling among many existing residents, across the class spectrum, grew less favorable toward the slowly arriving gentrifying population:

“… people that are not indigenous to the neighborhood, that move in and set up at settlement. Like they may set up two, three houses of people that they know. And then they don’t really buy into the community businesses or [get] involved in other community stuff, they just come on in, live there, kind of hold on to their property and wait for the property values to turn.” (Local resident, in Boyd, 2008a: 119)

The feeling here, among existing residents, is that these “newcomers” are not coming back to take part in Bronzeville’s revival. The perception was that they were, instead, “returning” to merely profit from a redeveloping neighborhood and rising property values at the expense of the “community” and their lower-income racial brethren. This “homeownership” factor, in this context (coupled with the possibility of displacement) has impeded what can be called the “genuine” revival of Bronzeville from the very beginning.

This locally-formed redevelopment discourse (“community nostalgia” – “revanchist-public housing” – “mixed-income”), however, remained confined to Bronzeville’s slowly increasing middle-income population base (and local organizations such as the MSPDC). The city’s absence is reflected by the relative dearth of Bronzeville-related stories from mainstream media outlets before 1995 (see Reardon [1994] and Quintanilla [1994b] for early examples). But the “symbolic violence” (Pattillo, 2007) of public housing demolition was now underway. In the process, this largely local rhetorical assault combined with the neighborhood’s “grass-roots”
reinvestment efforts, and slowly turned the heads of city officials and prominent developers as these agents searched for new outlets for lucrative real-estate investment.\footnote{This search for new outlets for investment is reflected by Greg Longhini (spokesman for the Department of Planning & Development in 1997) in the following statement made during this period: “there’s a lot of companies in the city looking for space” (in McRoberts, 1997).}

**The City’s Seizure of Bronzeville’s Revival**

By the mid-1990s, Bronzeville’s redevelopment had reached its limit without the aid of larger players. This began to change in 1996 when IIT began to reconsider the location of its campus. In response, Daley ordered the proposal of a giant police headquarters to be located nearby the IIT campus (35th and State Street) (von Hoffman, 2003: 134). The gesture, to help mitigate the crime-ridden image of the area, led to the decision by the University to remain on the south-side. This decision triggered a domino effect of subsequent city investment, i.e., further beautification efforts, a $10.5 million beautification project (Hill, 1996; von Hoffman, 2003; Boyd, 2008a), the distribution of another $1 million of EZ funds to the Black Metropolis Historic District (King Drive and 35th Street) (Hill, 1996), and the refurbishment of the Green Line transit service (White and Washburn, 1996). But most importantly, it influenced a massive, record-setting $120 million donation made to IIT from corporate giants Robert and Jay Pritzker and Robert Galvin (Secter and Worthington, 1996; von Hoffman, 2003).\footnote{The Pritzkers (local and leading figures in the Hyatt Hotel chain) and Galvin (chairman of the executive committee of Motorola at the time), both alumni of IIT, made twin $60 million grants to IIT to invest in the IIT campus and surrounding neighborhood (Secter and Worthington, 1996).}

The grant, to revitalize the image of IIT as a leading academic institution in Chicago (along with the University of Chicago and Northwestern University), was framed by IIT President and Commercial Club of Chicago member, Lew Collens, as a “major element in the revitalization of the nearby Bronzeville neighborhood” (in Secter and Worthington, 1996). The
goal, to Collens, was to “change the perception” of the surrounding neighborhood so, as Robert Pritzker stated, parents can feel that “their kids are safe” (*ibid*). A full list of Commercial Club members reveals Lew Collens (1991- ), Robert McCormack (1985- ), and Thomas (1993- ) and Penny Pritzker (1998- ) as active members, suggesting a veiled role of the Commercial Club (and with it, the city’s “go-global” aspirations) in directing resources and institutions (i.e., IIT and the McCormack-Tribune Foundation) toward Bronzeville’s redevelopment as early as the formation of the MSPDC itself.\(^7\)

This re-investment in the IIT campus proved to be a successful catalyst for further public and private investment in the neighborhood’s on-going redevelopment efforts (Guarino, 1998). It also coincided with the declaration of Daley’s “full support for the revival of Bronzeville” in 1997 (von Hoffman, 2003: 134; also see Daley, 1996; Kilian, 1996; Bey, 1997a; Washburn, 1997).\(^8\) Daley’s backing is perhaps best represented in the following statement:

> “That’s exactly how Bronzeville became the center of African-American business and culture during the period between the two world wars … The members of the community built their own homes, churches, clubs and businesses. Families were strong, and people looked out for each other.” (Mayor Daley, in Kamins, 2000)

This sanctioned support, not coincidentally, came shortly after the formation of the city-sponsored Bronzeville Resource Committee and Blue Ribbon Committee in 1996.\(^9\) As Daley-led initiatives, these committees were immediately seen as a challenge by the MSPDC to its previously held autonomy and control over the neighborhood’s vision for redevelopment (Bey, \(\ldots\))

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\(^7\) See the Commercial Club’s listing of members at [www.commercialclubofchicago.org](http://www.commercialclubofchicago.org).

\(^8\) In a Chicago Sun-Times editorial, Daley (1996) stated that “the effort to restore Bronzeville has had the direct support and involvement of my office for years, which is why we restored the Bee Building, rebuilt the Green Line, designated the area for Empowerment Zone funding, and are now reconstructing Martin Luther King Drive, just to name a few improvements in that area.”

\(^9\) The Bronzeville Resource Committee was designed to market “historic” Bronzeville as a site for tourism and commercial development (see Bey, 1996b, 1997a) and the Blue Ribbon Committee formed specifically as a new planning board appointed by Daley and designed to guide redevelopment initiatives *in addition* to the MSPDC (Bey, 1996b).
1996c; Hill, 1997a, b, c; Boyd, 2008a). The biggest concern was that Daley’s pledged support would translate into privileged white developers and businesses benefitting in ways opposed to the local vision of “historical preservation.”

The MSPDC, in fact, blocked the demolition of a number of historically significant buildings and charged the city with taking credit for the success already achieved. This sudden designation of demolition of historically significant buildings served to cement the legitimacy of these fears. To one MSPDC member, the appointment of the committee’s board members by Daley made “it likely the board will be controlled by City Hall” (in Hill, 1997b). Another member decried that the Mayor’s effort was attempting “to take credit for what is already happening … to take credit for what happened in Bronzeville” (in Boyd, 2008a: 67; also see Bey, 1996c, f; Dowell, 2005a).

This moment also stimulated a conflict, between the city and local organizers, which still persists today (although it has evolved). At its core, although more explicitly articulated in the post-2005 period, has been an overwhelming fear among local organizers that if the city appropriated the levers of Bronzeville’s redevelopment, Daley’s “go-global” agenda would move Bronzeville’s revival toward the kind of generalized, white gentrification that marked what was then happening in neighborhoods like Wicker Park, Bucktown, and the South Loop. This would, in short, represent nothing but a betrayal by the city of the local, “nostalgic revival” vision of historical preservation and mixed-income redevelopment. It is in this context that Boyd (2008b) refers to the vision of “community nostalgia” as a kind of “defensive development,” a form of gentrification by and for African-Americans against the perceived threat of whites.
Land Banking by the City

Local activists and organizers had been clamoring for years for the city’s involvement. But once these calls were answered, these local actors ironically checked their emotions with caution as the city’s growing monopolization of Bronzeville’s land underpinned their fears of inevitable city sabotage. During the 1990s, Bronzeville’s three local aldermen, Madeleine Haithcock, Dorothy Tillman, and Toni Preckwinkle, emerged as particularly powerful local agents through their exclusive authority over the use of the neighborhood’s immense and growing quantity of city-owned vacant land (von Hoffman, 2003). Working through the aldermen, the city embarked on a strategic land-banking mission in Bronzeville. Homes lost to tax-delinquency and the acquisition of an increasing number of condemned physical structures by the city slowly added to a stunning swath of Bronzeville possessed by the city (Tate, 1998).  

In 1994, eighty-five percent of this vacant land, 756 parcels, was legal property of the city (Quintanilla, 1994c). Of these parcels, 122 were “held” by Alderman Haithcock (the northwest segments), 117 by Tillman (most of Douglas and Grand Boulevard), and 211 by Preckwinkle (mostly Oakland and North Kenwood) (see Quintanilla, 1994c). The total number of city-owned lots in the city, however, jumped in 1998, with Tillman then holding 211, nearly twice as many acquired in four years time (Tate, 1998). In 1997, the city acquired 1,500 tax-delinquent properties (90 percent vacant) in one of the city’s largest land grabs in history and mostly in racialized neighborhoods on the west and south-sides (Heard, 1997). The city’s goal was made explicit by the following statements from Daley and then Deputy Housing Commissioner, Dave Doig:

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80 Bey (1996a) reports that 25,000 housing units were lost (due to demolition, etc.) in Bronzeville between 1970 and 1990. Much of this land was subsequently seized by the city and contributed to this growing stock of city-owned vacant land in the neighborhood.
“This is critical to our ability to further expand development in needy communities. Without it, the city and private developers will lose precious time and money before redevelopment efforts can get underway … this will streamline efforts to create new housing.” (Mayor Daley, in Heard, 1997)

“The properties are in some areas where developers are interested and others where development is already occurring and still others where we expect it to happen.” (Dave Doig, in Heard, 1997)

By monopolizing such a degree of the neighborhood’s land, the city has been able to significantly control the redevelopment process and make sure it proceeds in the direction of its own design. This unfolds, of course, often at the expense of individual requests for purchase by local residents that hold visions that depart from this city-led design. According to Tillman, “you have to put that land on hold for the land to be available” (quoted in Tate, 1998). By “holding” the land, Tillman is referring to it being available for her own interests. Preckwinkle similarly explained her rejection of purchase requests from local residents by stating that the lots would’ve blocked the path of the redevelopment area: “If I don’t put holds on the land, it’s the obligation of the Department of General Services to take whoever comes in and has a bona fide offer and wants to develop it … I want a comprehensive plan” (in Tate, 1998).

Criticizing the aldermanic holds, Pat Dowell, then MSPDC director (in Tate, 1998), stated that “the city’s policy of allowing holds is not in and of itself a bad policy … But it doesn’t work when there’s no system of accountability.” Both aldermen, however, typically countered by arguing that this is what they were elected to do, and if you don’t like it, you can take your disagreement to the voter box. “That’s the ultimate accountability in a democratic system,” states Preckwinkle (in Tate, 1998). However, according to this logic, public officials can, in a democratic system, rightfully ignore the majority of their constituents until they get voted out of office (which is ironically what happened to Tillman in 2007).
The land-banking of Bronzeville by the city has ultimately played a significant role in how the neighborhood’s revival has unfolded. It has kept the landscape hyper-balkanized, manipulated supply-demand conditions within the local renters market (by limiting the number of units available), and limited the number of market-rate units available at any given time. And while the presence of vacant land tends to suppress land values (von Hoffman, 2003: 135), making them cheaper to auction to developers, the controlled amount of redeveloped, market-rate units allows for the extraction by developers of what Harvey (1974) has called “class monopoly rent.” To Harvey (1974, 1975b; Harvey and Chatterjee, 1974), the mechanisms of absolute and class monopoly rent extraction and residential differentiation are interpreted as fundamental dimensions to the inner-workings of capitalist housing markets. Much of this socio-spatial transformation in Bronzeville has been mediated and influenced by this process and is further interrogated in chapter 6.

This process, however, did not go unchallenged. In a series of contentious public meetings in 1998 regarding the erection of the first Bronzeville TIF district, both Aldermen Haithcock and Preckwinkle were confronted with critical questions and discontent from local residents, activists, and organizers. In another meeting, Charles Bowen, executive assistant to Daley in 1996 (and lifelong resident of Bronzeville!), flippantly addressed an angered audience of fifty local residents:

“All anybody who stands here and does not understand what’s happening here is absolutely crazy … you’re in a meeting that’s been called to say (you) want to get some information. We already have an avenue to try to give you all the information that you’re asking about … because someone else calls for this

81 For example, local developer Leslie Pilot-Gatton was able to purchase nine scattered lots in Grand Boulevard for a mere $1 a piece (Almada, 2002); the discount a means of subsidizing developers invested in Bronzeville’s redevelopment by the city.
82 See Boyd (2008a: 105-6, 125-8) for a detailed report of specific questions delivered to the aldermen and their responses.
meeting does not say that the city is going to respond in that matter.” (in C. Hall, 1996)

The MSPDC, directly and indirectly, sought to undermine the aldermen’s control in the redevelopment process every step of the way (von Hoffman, 2003; Boyd, 2008a). Discontent for Tillman among MSPDC members was particularly palpable:

“Dorothy Tillman has said publicly after receiving state and federal dollars that she’s not going to work with the local merchant’s association to do her Lou Rawls and African Village concept on Forty-seventh and King Drive. Said it point blank … when in fact, she shouldn’t even be doing development …” (Local organizer, in Boyd, 2008a: 114)

My entreaties to Ald. Tillman over the past few years have gone unanswered … Now, I am prevailing on you [Mayor Daley] as the chief executive of the city to hear us.” (Rev. Mitty Collier, in Lynch, 2001)

This conflict essentially revolved around 1) competing visions for what Bronzeville should look like and 2) who should benefit in terms of getting the contracts and businesses. And control of the vacant land was perceived by MSPDC members (and rightfully so) to be a means of controlling the trajectory and shape of redevelopment by the city through the aldermen.

However, with the city’s HOPE VI funds set to demolish the neighborhood’s public housing stock, the revival of Bronzeville was suddenly faced with significantly fewer obstacles in the late 1990s. And combined with the full-throttle redevelopment of the South Loop (immediately north of Bronzeville) and saturated real-estate markets in other gentrified Chicago neighborhoods, the stage was set for the revival of Bronzeville to proceed with the city, prominent developers, and large-scale real-estate and finance capital centrally involved in the process: “The Bronzeville redevelopment project, for a long time largely a gleam in the eye of a few African-American visionaries, has begun to come to life” (Chicago Tribune, 1996).
Bronzeville’s Post-1998 Redevelopment

The late 1990s signaled a new wave of “commercially sponsored development” in Bronzeville (this was reported by Almada [2001]).83 This wave of reinvestment followed in an east-to-west direction (from the Lake west to State Street) with initial footholds in the north (Oakland and the Gap) and southern sections of North Kenwood (see Almada, 2001; Pattillo, 2007).84 And with the city and prominent developers now invested in Bronzeville’s revival, new types of spaces began to emerge. Alongside the continued production of local capital crafted affluent and middle-income residential space was an emergent, multi-scalar fusing space, what I call glocal capital crafted affluent and middle-income residential space (i.e., “Bronzeville Pointe” by Urban Equities, see von Hoffman, 2003: 135; Fig. 5.22). For these newer spaces, global (primarily financial) capital melds with metropolitan-wide and/or local real-estate capital to spearhead the production of condominium complexes, townhouses and single-family houses (some priced as high as $450,000, see von Hoffman, 2003: 135-6), and rows of “commercially-sponsored” rehabbed homes.

A fraction of these emergent spaces were also increasingly fitted with hyper-securitized features in new gated communities (mostly condos and townhomes) (Chicago Sun-Times, 1997; von Hoffman, 2003). This specific type of glocal capital space represents what I call upper-class defended social exclusion residential space. The following remarks from an interview with a homeowner and newcomer reflect this humanly-lived type of space:

“… describes his house as a ‘fortress,’ outfitted with security cameras front and back. They know the other newcomers on their street but don’t interact much with

83 It should be stressed that this transition to Bronzeville as a new outlet for capital accumulation was lubricated by the development of the sub-prime mortgage market (Wyly, 2002; Wyly, et al., 2006; Harvey, 2010). Much of this revitalization process has been supported by the penetration of this mortgage market into Bronzeville. This is further elaborated in chapter 7.

84 This is a pattern that can clearly be detected today simply by driving through the neighborhood.
people elsewhere in the neighborhood. They shop and dine in other neighborhoods.” (Reed, 2005)

These are the “newcomers” deemed by “old-timers” as less interested in reviving golden era Bronzeville than gaining individually through real-estate investment. The post-1998 period witnessed the increased presence of these residents and, with it, a hardened line between these two resident types: “original” gentrifiers versus “new” gentrifiers.

With Daley now championing the “Restoring Bronzeville” vision proposed by the MSPDC, a growing number of structures were also converted into historical preservation space, i.e., the landmark designation of the Supreme Life and Chicago Bee Buildings (see Gillis, 1998; von Hoffman, 2003) and the former homes of Richard Wright and Muddy Waters (see Pattillo, 2007; Boyd, 2008a). This also coincided with the addition of city-sponsored beautification projects (i.e., “streetscaping” through IIT campus and the Green Line refurbishment, see von Hoffman, 2003: 134; Hill, 1996; White and Washburn, 1996) and recreational spaces (the refurbished Mandrake Park, see Washburn, 1997), what I call city-funded beautification space and city-funded recreational space (Fig. 5.23, 5.24).

The anchor of this city-sponsored investment was the 35th Street commercial corridor. Buttressed by streetscape beautification (i.e., “King Drive landscaping,” including “new lighting” and “markers,” see Almada, 2002a), this investment was to spearhead further redevelopment and underscore the neighborhood’s already rising land values with new retail development. At the center of this 35th Street reinvestment was the revitalization of the historic Supreme Life Building, sold to Liberty Life LLC, a partnership between Eastlake Management and the newly formed Bronzeville Community Development Partnership. The hope, to Cheryl Cooke (Assistant Commissioner, Dept. of Planning & Development), was that “this redevelopment” would serve “as a catalyst for other development along 35th Street,” and to “set
the stage for developments that will suit the changes that have [already] taken place in the neighborhood” [the addition of upscale retail spaces]” (in Almada, 2002a).

The desired retail development, however, remained firmly behind the neighborhood’s on-going and steady residential growth. But aside from the established forms of lower-income commercial space (i.e., parasitic-economy space), a small number of predominantly local-owned businesses (i.e., coffee shops, bed & breakfasts, ethnic restaurants, see C. Jackson, 2004) geared toward the incoming gentry did begin to emerge: what I call local capital crafted conspicuous consumption retail space (Fig. 5.25, 5.26). In humanly-lived terms, the class-content infused within this segment of retail space also render it interpretable as consumptively nourishing elite space. These spaces were and remain vigorously sought in terms of attracting affluent newcomers as well as satisfying the consumption needs of the existent affluent population.85

This new wave of investment was also further accompanied by Daley’s re-claiming of CHA control from HUD in 1999 (L. Bennett, et al., 2006). The proposal of the “Plan for Transformation” in 2000 by this new city-controlled CHA subsequently stimulated more attention to Bronzeville’s on-going redevelopment. And with the now immanent HOPE VI-funded demolition of the neighborhood’s public housing stock combined with a newly established Bronzeville TIF (see Bey, 1997b; Spielman, 1998),86 prominent Chicago developers, builders, property management firms, and major financial institutions increasingly flocked to Bronzeville to claim a slice of the neighborhood’s newly found profitability.87

85 Large-scale retailers in general, however, remained stubborn to invest in this landscape (and still do), fearful of its lingering negative perception as crime-infested. This issue is elaborated in chapter 6.
86 The establishment of the Bronzeville TIF (which occurred in 1998) is forcefully promoted by Bey (1997b) in the Chicago Sun-Times. It is also promoted by Daley and others as being a stimulator for further capital investment and redevelopment (Spielman, 1997).
Compared to the predominantly “grass-roots” pre-1998 period, this redevelopment governance in Bronzeville now consisted of an evolved ensemble of local and metropolitan-scale developers, builders, and even global architectural and financial institutions. Established local institutions, i.e., the faith-based Genesis Housing Development Corporation (Garza, 2000a) and the local African-American Home Builders Association (Kamins, 2000), now competed with larger-scale developers/builders, i.e., New England Builders (working with Habitat Co., receiver for the CHA), Enterprise Development Chicago (Adler, 1997a), Chicago-based Urban Equities (Chicago Sun-Times, 1997), Glencoe-based Otima, Inc., (a wealthy north shore Chicago firm), Wade Enterprise & Associates, and OWP/P Architects.

This increasingly hybrid governance also included Stateway Associates, a coalition of prominent Chicago developers including the Allison Davis Group and Mesa Development, larger regional builders such as Walsh Construction and now bankrupt Kimball Hill Homes, Johnson & Lee Architects and global architectural giant, Skidmore, Owings, & Merrill (Handley, 2002, 2004; Almada, 2003). Moreover, established local financial institutions such as Seaway National Bank and Shorebank Development now competed with large-scale financial capital from Bank One/First Chicago and Bank of America (South-side Partnership, 1999; Miller, 2002). As a result, this evolved set of actors represented an increased melding of local and regional real-estate capital with local and global financial capital as Bronzeville’s revival accelerated post-1998 (Hyra, 2008).

However, amidst this convergence of multi-scalar redevelopment agents, the Allison Davis Group, Draper & Kramer, and Eastlake Management & Development emerged as key prominent actors in this post-1998 wave of development. Each firm, with close ties to Daley

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88 Even AT&T has been involved in local fundraising campaigns (Miller, 2002).
(and, thus, indirectly to the Commercial Club of Chicago), previously held a strong foothold in the area and now acted as the thread tying together this rather diverse pool of invested interests. 89 Allison Davis, a successful black developer, emerged to prominence in the 1990s by forging a close relationship with City Hall and Daley in particular. Many contracts have since been directed to Davis as the city’s principle south-side developer (discussions with local resident [4/5/2011] and local organizer [8/19/2010]). 90

Draper & Kramer, long-time south-side developer (Pattillo, 2007), has its name on a number of existing residential complexes (i.e., the Lake Meadows and Prairie Shores high-rises along King Drive) and is the current developer of one of the highly lucrative and competitive mixed-income HOPE VI redevelopment sites, Lake Park Crescent (the replacement of a section of the former Lakefront Properties). 91 Having developed the pioneering Lake Meadows in Bronzeville during the 1970s and Dearborn Park in the South Loop during the early 1980s, Draper & Kramer has remained a fixed and privileged agent in the burgeoning Bronzeville landscape despite expanding nationally, including a “$70 million dollar Lake Meadows townhome/detached house project” as well as another $10 million investment to the existing high-rises (Hill, 1997b).

Eastlake Management, founded and chaired by black entrepreneur, Elzie Higginbottom, “one of the city’s biggest and most subsidized landlords” (Bebow, 2004), has also been firmly embedded in the south-side real-estate community for decades. By the 1990s, Eastlake

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89 Although neither of these real-estate firms have direct ties to the Commercial Club, their close ties with Daley has assured an indirect and likely no less important connection.
90 As previously noted, the Allison Davis Group spearheaded the formation of the Stateway Associates, leading the redevelopment team at the HOPE VI-funded mixed-income sites (Park Place and, more recently, Legends South) replacing Stateway Gardens and Robert Taylor Homes.
91 Ferd Kramer, starting as a local developer on the south-side in the early twentieth century, is now owner of a national-scale company focused on the development of high-end residential condominiums. Yet, the company, Draper & Kramer, still considers Chicago’s south-side home, maintaining investment steadily through the decades (Pattillo, 2007).
Management acted as local landlord, developer, construction manager, and property manager for a number of low-income and subsidized housing complexes (see Bebow, 2004). Higginbottom, a long-time Daley supporter (since Daley’s failed 1983 mayoral campaign against Washington), has enjoyed significant political clout and inside access to contracts by funneling healthy doses of these proceeds back to Daley as political donations.

As redevelopment progressed, more players gained entrance into this already internally-differentiated assemblage of governance actors. In 2003, the Chicago Public Schools and “a host of universities, foundations and think tanks” joined the CHA “in an ambitious effort to overhaul 25 schools and transform a blighted swath of the city’s South-side” (Olszewski and Sadovi, 2003). Since better schools are seen to attract potential gentrifiers, this effort, led by the Ariel Foundation and the University of Chicago, helped further lubricate the redevelopment process:

“We’re aiming for dramatic change; we’re not going to recreate the status quo … No other school system in the country has pursued this link between community revitalization and school development.” (Arne Duncan, then Chicago Public Schools CEO and founder of Ariel Foundation, in Olszewski and Sadovi, 2003)

Some who were involved, however, as Pattillo (2007: 161) reports, “commented in hindsight that they did not anticipate how rapidly the neighborhood would change and how much they would be unintentionally complicit in urging it on.” Such an acknowledgement further reveals the role of local organizers in unwittingly nurturing the very processes they’re often actively seeking to prevent (i.e., excessive gentrification).

Another significant institutional shift commenced at the close of the pre-2005 period in Bronzeville. In 2003, the formation of the Quad Communities Development Corporation (QCDC), headquartered within Preckwinckle’s aldermanic offices, quickly emerged as a central institution within this evolving governance. Here, the city, through the relative autonomy of the neighborhood’s aldermen, is seen as playing an increasingly more direct role within the actual
redevelopment process. Another coalition (separate from direct city involvement at least), the Bronzeville Community Development Partnership, also emerged as an influential actor during the early 2000s, particularly as an invested actor in the commercial redevelopment of the 35th Street Corridor between State Street and King Drive. An umbrella organization, the Partnership consists of a consortium of 7 actors and has partnered with a number of developers, most notably Eastlake Management (Almada, 2002a). Its purpose has been to acquire funding for their constituent base of neighborhood community development organizations. In short, these two institutional forces effectively replaced the former-centrality of the MSPDC (although on the board of both institutions) at the dawn of the post-2005 period, indicating a subtle but decisive convergence between the city and established local organizers and activists.

Although Bronzeville’s redevelopment was accelerating, it did not advance in a spatially uniform manner. Rather, the landscape grew increasingly balkanized, featuring pockets of concentrated affluence (i.e., the Gap and some sections east of Cottage Grove) interwoven with many blocks still characterized by disinvestment (i.e., west of King Drive and along Pershing Ave. and 43rd Street) and growing amounts of vacant land (i.e., open space left from public housing demolition). As Garrett (1996b) remarks, “the landscape is a mixture of rehabbed mansions, vacant lots, and dilapidated homes.” Although Bronzeville’s “community nostalgia” narrative conjures up the image of a class-integrated utopia of racial solidarity, Bronzeville’s revival has certainly not replicated this homogenous vision (and still doesn’t). Rather, it has advanced in a hyper and internally segregated way, punctured by the city’s continued land-banking process and the coordinating effects of “class monopoly rent.”

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92 These actors are the MSPDC, the Bronzeville Merchants Association, the Black Metropolis Convention Tourism Council, the Franchise Partnership, IIT, the Abraham Lincoln Center, and the Women’s Self Employment Project.
Chicago’s Revanchist Redevelopment Discourse on Bronzeville

This section chronicles the crystallization of Chicago’s revanchist redevelopment discourse on Bronzeville post-1998. If the pre-1998 period experienced the initial formation of this discourse’s rhetorical themes, they were effectively cemented as internally and dialectically related discursive components in the post-1998 period as the city and prominent developers joined local organizers as chief proponents. The revanchist-public housing trope framed the problem (concentrated poverty in poorly designed public housing and the social pathology of the poor) and justified the solution: mixed-income housing developed in the style of New Urbanism. For local organizers and activists – in the study’s CPE terms – the proposal of mixed-income redevelopment functioned, discursively, as the identity-realizing means of returning Bronzeville to its “golden years” of African-American prosperity and cultural vitality. And for the city, the global trope operated as the ultimate justifier: “city government, in an effort to make Chicago appealing worldwide, apparently decided a major change [public housing demolition followed by “mixed-income” redevelopment] was in order” [my italics] (Beckless, 2004).

It was in this context that the city, prominent developers, as well as some local officials and organizers collectively and forcefully articulated this neoliberal, place-specific discursive formation. Each rhetorical theme flutters in and out of the conversational rhetoric offered by these agents during this period as the Keynesian-era public housing was brought down with impunity and redevelopment forged ahead. In what follows, I present and deconstruct the “mixed-income” and “community nostalgia” rhetorical themes as they developed and melded cohesively with the established revanchist-public housing trope to constitute this discourse.
The Intensified Mixed-Income Narrative

The idea of mixed-income housing as the solution to America’s public housing “crisis,” in part popularized by the work of W. J., Wilson (1987, 1996; also see Crump, 2002), was institutionalized at the national scale through the QHWRA of 1998 (Goetz, 2003; L. Bennett, et al., 2006; Hackworth, 2007). In Chicago, a barrage of media stories and newspaper articles championed the idea of mixed-income development and was institutionalized via CHA’s “Plan for Transformation” in 2000. The first of eleven goals proposed in the Plan was to “provide quality housing opportunities to very low and low-income households in mixed-income settings” [my italics] (Chicago Housing Authority, 2000: 11). This was also articulated locally in Bronzeville by the MSPDC:

“This vision, articulated in Restoring Bronzeville [MSPDC, 1993], is of a vibrant, mixed-income African-American community with plentiful jobs, affordable housing, top quality schools, accessible health and human services, well-maintained parks and public services, and safe streets.” (South-Side Partnership, 1999)

Considered controversial at first, mixed-income development was now, by the late 1990s, considerably normalized as the dominant discourse on the solution to concentrated poverty (Crump, 2002; Goetz, 2003) as well as the vision for Bronzeville’s revival.94 The mixed-income narrative was strongly intertwined with New Urbanism design principles and the “concentration of poverty” thesis, the intersection with the revanchist-public

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94 “The new mix of incomes in public housing is controversial,” stated Ronal Utt of the Heritage Foundation (in Lytle, 1998). In fact, it was treated as controversial as early mixed-income promoter Vincent Lane who experienced staunch resistance from many in the city council against his ideas and CHA appointment in 1988 (Caruso, 1990). Lingering social-welfarist arguments charged, and apparently correctly, that mixed-income redevelopment would likely displace many of those who had previously occupied the former public housing complexes as “not-in-my-backyard” cries came from many aldermen (Chicago Tribune, 1990; also see Seigel, 1991). Although social-liberalist formulations remained in the post-1998 period, they were now relegated to the political margins.
It was here that the idea of mixed-income development was proposed, specifically, as the solution to the social ills that inherently develop through the concentration of poverty in towering high-rises. And through the “deconcentration of poverty” by dispersing the poorest of the poor in scattered, mixed-income housing, it is assumed that such extreme socially pathologic behavior will simply vanish merely by living in close proximity with and learning from wealthier “role models”:

“… You live in public housing, you don’t live in the city … I am convinced that it’s not the brick and mortar, but that you have to rebuild the soul … Anybody can build a house, but you’ve got to improve lives.” (Mayor Daley, in Kotlowitz, 2002)

Vincent Lane (CHA head, 1988-1995), early supporter of mixed-income philosophy, felt that the integration of “role models” was absolutely vital for success:

“By bringing in working tenants as well as evicting troublesome residents, Lane hopes to provide badly needed role models who will help change the deeply entrenched feeling of hopelessness and inferiority that pervades public housing.” (Caruso, 1990)

By adopting a strong work ethic through emulating the behavior of their more successful neighbors, proponents argue, the elimination of poverty and its physical manifestation, the “ghetto,” will simply follow:

“The theory is that those very low-income families will learn from the working families when they see people getting up at the crack of dawn and leaving with their lunch buckets; that is supposed to inspire these people to do the same thing” (William Willen, attorney for low-income residents, in Fegelman, 1997).

“When people are isolated on a [public housing] property like Stateway Gardens or the Robert Taylor Homes, all they see is poor people, people who sell drugs, bad habits … [In a mixed-income community] children may be inspired to be a

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95 New urbanism, an architectural movement led by Andres Duany in the early 1990s (see Duany, Plater-Zyberk, and Speck, 2000), popularized a kind a neo-traditional neighborhood planning style that incorporated the virtue of mixed-income housing as a means to address socio-economic inequality. Although a response to wasteful suburban sprawl, the idea of mixed-income housing proliferated into a variety of other contexts, i.e., part of the solution to public housing in the United States.
doctor or nurse or like anyone who lies around them … poor people will learn from their more affluent neighbors and enjoy the increased resources and amenities that inevitably flow to higher-income areas.” (Derek Hill, CHA Press Secretary, in Lydersen, 2008)

This belief, however, is deeply rooted in assumptions that 1) there are always plentiful decent paying jobs available to motivated individuals, and 2) all it takes is exposure to such motivation and success to solve a problem that is considered to be rooted in individual apathy and hopelessness. It also uncritically assumes the poor, middle-class, and wealthy alike will co-habit peacefully and joyfully; an assumption that is uncovered in chapter 6 to be seriously problematic for a multiplicity of reasons.

One of the often-expressed goals in this narrative is to enable public housing residents to become “self-reliant” or “economically self-sufficient”:

“It’s not getting them a temporary place to stay so they can get another public handout. It’s getting them to be self-reliant” (Brady Harden Jr., west-side local organizer, in LeDuc, 1997).

“This legislation [the QHWRA of 1998] will improve the economic and physical viability of public housing and provide a platform consistent with welfare reform, from which low-income families can achieve economic self-sufficiency.” (Sen. Connie Mack, (R-Fla.), in Lytle, 1998)

“… CHA must provide the long-term, comprehensive services needed to help residents become economically self-sufficient.” (Terry Peterson, 2000)

“All families living in CHA-subsidized units should be working towards economic self sufficiency by seeking employment and educational opportunities. The CHA will support families in these efforts by facilitating connections to supportive services and will also encourage and support those families who attain self-sufficiency to seek homeownership and other housing opportunities in the private market …” (Chicago Housing Authority, 2000: 12)

The notion of “self-sufficiency” operates here as code for the neoliberal ethic of personal responsibility and “pull yourself up by the bootstraps” philosophy. This last passage above, from the Plan for Transformation, offers an image of what is meant by this notion: “seeking
employment,” “educational opportunities,” and finally “homeownership.” In this context, it is more than merely becoming independent from welfare dollars, it is ascending the socio-economic ladder to the middle-class through the subsidized development of what Foucault ([2004] 2008) considered to be a hallmark of American neoliberalism: human capital. In fact, an entire section of the Plan (2000: 34) is devoted to addressing this concern of human capital.

Another problematic assumption underpinning this narrative, and drawn from the revanchist-public housing trope, is the neoliberal belief that the root causes of the social ills associated with poverty are directly linked to urban spatial structure (Crump, 2002): its concentration in the Corbusian design of tall high-rises and the self-perpetuating behavioral choices of its inhabitants as a result of this design. However, which is considered to be the cause is not always clear, as Garza (1999a) reports: “The [mixed-income housing] problems at Horner raise perplexing questions about whether architecture or more stubborn cultural pathologies are at the heart of public housing woes.”

The narrative, ultimately, tends to prioritize architecture. As Kamin (1993b) reports, “proponents believe that scattered-site housing represents the most effective attack on the root cause of public housing’s problems – the concentration of the poor in high-rise ghettos.” For proponents, only through a massive reform in architectural design will such social problems be alleviated. I suggest this is, in short, colossally ignorant at best and intentionally deceptive at worst. Why? Because reducing the problem and explanations to the individual scale elides the influence of wider structural forces and the capitalist power relations operating behind what has ultimately been a massive (re)structuring of urban space.
“Community Nostalgia” and its Spatial Expression

Once the city turned to Bronzeville for redevelopment, the local “community nostalgia” narrative was suddenly and forcefully propagated through Chicago’s local media. A barrage of news stories that told and re-told the narrative of Bronzeville’s “golden” past flooded both the Tribune and Sun-Times, indoctrinating readers into the memory and long-lost historical legacy of this now purportedly pummeled and in-need of investment neighborhood.⁹⁶ As Boyd (2008a: 86) notes, “learning this part of the neighborhood’s history and folklore was clearly and deliberately linked to the neighborhood’s long-term historic preservation agenda”:

“Grady Karl [an alias given by Boyd], who has been here all his life, is one of the person’s who helped me understand this place because he was an organizer and sort of, a community politician, everything. And he was the first who introduced me to preserving all of this … the Binga Bank Building, the Overton Building, the building where they just put the library, all of that … First time I met him, in ’78 was at a meeting over at IIT, we were trying, focusing on preserving buildings. So that came out of that, and then my – a lot of conversations with Mr. Steven Anthony, he’s like the community historian. And so between the two of them I really gained a sense of … a sense of what this community used to be like” [my italics]. (Local organizer, in Boyd, 2008a: 86)

In short, through the push to preserve the historical integrity of the neighborhood and stimulate redevelopment, the constant telling of this narrative – a kind of “community folklore” – became an integral component to the process. And the city’s expressed involvement meant its city-wide propagation through the local media. As a result, this narrative was further cemented within the neighborhood’s community fabric as a core truth.

⁹⁶ In Chicago, many articles appear covering, introducing, and reinforcing this dominant narrative on Bronzeville around 1997-8 (i.e., see Quintanilla, 1994b; Chicago Sun-Times, 1996a, b, c, 2001; Bey, 1996a, b, c, 1997a, 1999; Ehrenhalt, 1996; Garrett, 1996a; Hayes, 1996; Hill, 1996, 1997a; M. Mitchell, 1996; Stevenson, 1996; Thomas, 1996; W. Simpson, 1996; Adler, 1997b; Washburn, 1997; McRoberts, 1997; Sachs, 1997, 1999a, b; Guarino, 1998; Martin, 1998; Reardon, 2000; Almada, 2000; Chicago Defender, 2000; Ciokajlo, 2000; Kamins, 2000; Houlihan, 2001; Lawrence, 2001; Busk, 2002; Handle, 2002; Lydersen, 2004; Storch, 2004; Olivo, 2004; Beckless, 2004). See Boyd (2008a) for further empirical analysis and documentation.
Coinciding with this sedimentation was also the narrative’s concretization in space. As this narrative increasingly normalized and more spaces were erected (or preserved) on its behalf, its means of communication became less a matter of actual storytelling. This is not to say that storytelling became less prevalent, on the contrary. But the content of this narrative could now be communicated increasingly through its spatial expression: the growth in historical preservation space, such as the historically significant homes given landmark status, the architecturally significant homes restored/renovated (Fig. 5.27, also see Fig. 5.2, 5.3), and the landmark commercial buildings in the so-called Black Metropolis Historic District. These spaces can also be interpreted in humanly-lived terms as community nostalgia space. These are spaces inscribed with this narrative’s emotive content, from development names such as “Ellington Court” and “Jazz on the Boulevard” (Pattillo, 2007: 3) to even the celebrated 25,000th McDonalds restaurant. This “honorary” fast-food joint, established in Bronzeville, includes murals of Duke Ellington, Ella Fitzgerald, and Billie Holiday as visual signifiers of the neighborhood’s “culturally-rich” history, communicated without even speaking a word.97

These spaces of community nostalgia also represent the physical “branding” of the neighborhood (Fig. 5.28, 5.29, 5.30, 5.31): the colonization of spaces and physical structures (i.e., historic preservation sites), through the economic sphere, with the constructed racial identity and selective memory propagated through the discourse, to put it in the study’s CPE terms. Such spaces, for example, have included the renaming of the current “Bronzeville/IIT”

97 Following Lawrence (1999) and Roeder (1999), the decision by McDonalds to locate their 25,000th restaurant was billed as beneficial to the community in that it would help local economic development initiatives by bringing jobs to local youths. The owner-operator of the store even stated that “we have future CEOs working right here as crew, and that’s the way we want them to see themselves” (in Lawrence, 1999), as if these jobs genuinely represent anything other than dead-end low-wage service jobs, a move by McDonalds to exploit the neighborhood’s remaining relatively immobile low-income population as cheap labor (and servicing the same captive population with cheap unhealthy food) under the guise of contributing to Bronzeville’s glorious revival.
renovated El-stop and the Bronzeville “Walk of Fame,” consisting of 91 bronze plaques commemorating historic African-American figures (Boyd, 2008a: 89):

“… these buildings [the eight landmark sites] are a part of the fabric of this community. They are part of the history of this area, and we need to preserve them” (Mary Steward, MSPDC board member, quoted in Hill, 1997b).

According to this MSPDC member, we get the sense that these historic spaces are *themselves* constitutive of this racial heritage and identity. Their potential demolition is equated with the loss of this history and, with it, its associated identity as well:

“For black Chicagoans, there is a history lesson trapped inside those old buildings. There is also a spirit that survived even the worst of times. Neither can be allowed to fall to the wrecking ball.” (M. Mitchell, 1996)

“The most important reason for preserving Bronzeville is the richness in culture that these landmarks have to offer … The history that echoes from the walls of these buildings cannot be unheard.” (Stevenson, 1996)

“All that remains of Bronzeville are its famous architectural landmarks that once gave hope to the people who lived there. When the buildings are gone, what hope will there be? Bronzeville has everything to do with me and every African American in Chicago. It is essential African Americans know their history and preserve it.” (Thomas, 1996)

It is in these contexts that Bronzeville’s history, to Boyd (2008a: 85), can be interpreted as “site specific,” “linked to particular buildings that serve as reminders and expressions of the past.”

Perhaps Margaret Kohn (in Harvey, 2009: 158) best elaborates this relation between social space and the symbolic and historical meanings invested within it:

“The meaning of a space is largely determined by its symbolic valence. A particular space is a way to locate stories, memories and dreams. It connects the past with the present and projects it into the future. A place can capture symbolic significance in different ways: by incorporating architectural allusions in the design, by serving as a backdrop for crucial events, or by positioning itself in opposition to other symbols … The physical environment is political mythology realized, embodied, materialized.”
The Revival of Bronzeville as a Mixed-Income Utopia

The philosophy of mixed-income housing is strongly imagined and proposed as the means of achieving Bronzeville’s revival, particularly in the style of new urbanism. Following Harvey’s (2000) critique of New Urbanism, this “community nostalgia” narrative is seen to represent a distinct “utopian image” of the future which is exclusively tied to “spatial form.” Yet in all of its spatial sensitivity, it is completely divorced from “temporal process”: get the spatial form right and the rest will follow. This utopian dimension to “urbanistic discourse,” to de Certeau (1984: 94), is in fact a foundational pillar to the very concept of the “city,” as “rational organization” is believed to be capable of repressing “all the physical, mental and political pollutions that would [otherwise] compromise it.”

This spatial-privileging is implicit in the following statement (and the numerous others like it) from Terry Peterson, CEO of CHA in 2003: “We are trying to turn dysfunctional neighborhoods into healthy mixed-income neighborhoods” [my italics] (in Olszewski and Sadovi, 2003). The solution to the social problems of “concentrated poverty” and the means of returning Bronzeville to its heyday (a utopian imagining itself) is entirely focused on architectural design. It is inherently physically deterministic. “The goal is to break the cycle of poverty,” according to Peterson (in Handley, 2004), yet no attention is ever given to what kind of social process can best sustain such a utopian space. The role of wider political-economic structural forces in (re)producing socio-economic inequality and residential segregation is nowhere to be found in this explanatory rhetoric.

98 For example, a vision for one project “includes having ground level retail space with residential units on the second floor,” a central component to new urbanism philosophy (Hutson, 2008b).
99 See Mills (1997) for a review of a study by Kuo and Sullivan who find a “connection between the lack of trees and increased violence and crime.”
100 See Kamin (1995b) for a full-length newspaper article on the virtues of New Urbanism and mixed-income housing, strongly reflecting this form of spatial utopia.
It also completely silences the now long obsolete legal structures of segregation (i.e., racial covenants, mortgage discrimination) that made this kind of “thrusting” mixed-income community possible. According to the narrative, the sheer presence of affluent blacks is all that’s needed; everything else will “naturally” flow from this basic premise. This assumption is, of course, rendered seriously flawed for what it ignores: the historical conditions that made golden era Bronzeville possible no longer apply. The mere presence of affluent black homeowners (notwithstanding all the problems this status implies) simply cannot turn back the clock to a time where brutal segregation forced blacks of all stripes to live and consume together.

To further the critique, the notion of scattering displaced public-housing residents (whether in mixed-income developments or not) through housing vouchers across the metropolitan region is also deeply structurally flawed. The reasons here are three-fold: 1) there aren’t enough vouchers or affordable housing to absorb the displaced population (Hackworth, 2007; Hyra, 2008), 2) it naively ignores the general unwillingness of landlords to accept such vouchers, and 3) pays too little attention to the historically and politically powerful force of suburban NIMBYism in the United States (see Kamin, 1995a; Pennick, 1996; Pennick and Stanback, 2006; Goetz, 2003; L. Bennett, et al., 2006; Hackworth, 2007). Consequently, since many suburban jurisdictions are able to prevent absorbing displaced public housing residents, the politically weakest suburbs are typically the ones left holding the bag and a future of likely increased disinvestment as a result.101

Moreover, Bronzeville’s accelerated post-1998 redevelopment underscored an escalating speculative rise in land values. As a consequence, “several large apartment complexes that once accepted section 8 vouchers” began to be “converted to luxury condominiums” (Hyra, 2008: 90).

101 In 1999, the number of poor suburban and urban poor was almost equivalent, but in 2005 the suburban poor was greater than the inner city poor by nearly 1 million (Puentes and Warren, 2006; see Hyra, 2008: 164).
This speculative rise, stimulated in part by the city’s aggressive land-banking, has had the unfortunate effect of lessening the amount of housing affordable to the neighborhood’s lower-income residents. The on-going growth in the neighborhood’s city-owned vacant lots has also served to block the potential production of such affordable living spaces. In Tillman’s ward alone, roughly 3,300 vacant lots were reported at this time, “over a third of such lots in all of Chicago” (von Hoffman, 2003: 137). The neighborhood’s aldermen have held a tight grip over these lots, picking and choosing which offers to honor and reject. In short, the spatial effects of these increasing practices has been that many displaced public housing residents were not just displaced from public housing but Bronzeville altogether (Hyra, 2008: 3; Johns, 2002).

New draconian screening measures also became regularly administered by city-selected private management firms (i.e., Eastlake Management) at existing and redeveloped CHA sites (see Goetz, 2003; L. Bennett, et al., 2006). As a result, only the most favored tenants are selected to return to Bronzeville. Essentially, only those deemed least threatening to the neighborhood’s gentrifying population and potential neighbors at the mixed-income replacement sites have made the highly selective cut (i.e., senior citizens with clean records) (Hyra, 2008):

“Improved lease enforcement must be coupled with tougher screening procedures to insure that public housing communities are safe and desirable place to live. The CHA will require the professional property managers and RMCs to conduct screening to determine if applicants will make suitable residents.” (Chicago Housing Authority, 2000: 31)

These mixed-income replacement sites, representing a curious blend of *glocal capital crafted affluent, middle-income, and public housing residential space* (an amalgam of all three within the same physical complex, see Fig. 5.32), were slow to break ground during the post-1998 period (and still are). But for those displaced public housing residents who made the cut, the “best of the best” (Harold Lucas, in Rodriquez, 2008), this type of space can be interpreted as
tenant-serenity residential space, representing the increased quality of living experienced by those lucky few residents deemed worthy to return to the neighborhood. Former Ida B. Wells resident stated that “I love where I am,” referring to her new home in mixed-income Oakwood Shores (in Rodriguez, 2008). To other residents:

“We are all very excited about what is happening here [the Hilliard Homes] and what is happening all up and down State Street … it should have been done this way all along.” (in Garrett, 2003).

“I don’t think anybody ever believed back in the 1990s … that any of us would live to see the dramatic changes in the State Street Corridor.” (in Garrett, 2003)

Bolstered by these positive portrayals, housing vouchers are often expressed as a mechanism of “greater housing choice” for public housing residents by city officials and developers alike (Chicago Housing Authority, 2000: 11). But this ignores the fact that structural conditions revolving around a pre-existing racially and economically segregated capitalist housing market woefully incapable of absorbing these vouchers (see Hyra, 2008: 92) have often assured that these vouchers amount to a “de facto eviction notice” (Hackworth, 2007: 177-8) from the neighborhood (and even the city) altogether. Empirical evidence now validates this reality that many displaced residents have had nowhere to go but toward increasingly disinvested, racialized neighborhoods not too dissimilar from where they came (see Fischer, 2001, 2003; Kotlowitz, 2002; Ranney, 2003; Lewis and Sinha, 2007; Oakley and Burchfield, 2009; Sink and Ceh, 2011; Glanton and Gorner, 2011).

These emergent impoverished spaces also lack the necessary “community” ties and social bonds that low-income residents heavily rely and which displacement effectively destroys (see Betancur, 2011): “families are suddenly on their own without the social service groups and

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102 Following Wisby (2000), many low-income “old-timers” are being pushed out due to rising mortgages, property taxes, and the like, and relegated to a similar fate as displaced public housing residents.
churches once embedded among the high-rises” (Olivo, 2007a). Moreover, Johns (2003), Michaeli (2004), and Turner (2007) have reported (based on interviews with displaced residents) that the quality of many relocation units for displaced residents has often been just as physically deteriorated and crime-ridden as the complexes from which they came. This has particularly been the case for existing public housing relocation sites like Rockwell Gardens and Altgeld Gardens, well removed from the path of redevelopment.\(^{103}\)

The typical argument from city officials and developers, which is always cloaked in a rhetoric of benevolence (see Pattillo, 2007: 19), is that displacement will not occur since the high-rises being demolished are already highly vacant and that the number of replacement units (which have taken years to develop) equal the number of existing residents left in the high-rises targeted for demolition (see McCarron, 2006):

> “Because of the extremely high vacancy rate in the targeted properties, the number of households to be relocated is far less than the number of units to be demolished.” (Chicago Housing Authority, 2000: 24)

This argument, however, ignores the decades of systematic withdrawal of funding to these public housing complexes of which effectively forced this abandonment: a slow, methodical form of displacement achieved over the course of many years of public neglect.\(^{104}\) It also uncritically treats gentrification as a static event that simply happens in one swoop. This rather simple and non process-based understanding misses the reality that gentrification often unfolds over many years and, in some cases decades, where displacement can occur either many years before and/or after the actual physical redevelopment itself (Newman and Wyly, 2006).

The city, however, rejects the charge of displacement on the grounds that 1) residents technically abandoned them voluntarily, and 2) that enough replacement units will account for all

\(^{103}\) In fact, 25 displaced families ended up in shelters within just a 3-month period in 2002 (Johns, 2002).
\(^{104}\) 10,000 public housing units in Bronzeville were already vacant by 1990 (von Hoffman, 2003: 117).
existing residents. This allows Mayor Daley to frequently assert that “no one is going to be displaced” (in Garza, 1999c) despite the city’s record (along with Washington DC) as worst in the United States regarding public housing displacement (Hackworth, 2007). “Simply stating the goal is not to drive out the very low-income does not mean that there won’t be fewer units available,” as Wayne Sherwood (in Cloud, 1996) rightfully argues. And when displacement is acknowledged, it is often treated as an acceptable consequence; an outcome which is treated by proponents as somehow fundamentally different than if it were an explicit or conscious goal.\(^\text{105}\)

Compounding this displacement of problems was the Bush-led defunding of many remaining public housing related social programs (i.e., the Public Housing Drug Elimination Program, Holland, 2001). Bush declared such programs as having “limited impact” and that “regulatory tools such as eviction are more effective at reducing drug activity in public housing” (in Holland, 2001). Such increasingly draconian policies, of course, have had the effect of merely evicting such problems elsewhere, as genuine solutions are no longer considered (at least explicitly) worthy of pursuing. In fact, the resulting inner-suburbanization of poverty is often billed as moving displaced residents closer to suburban jobs through the CHAs “human capital” programs, a supposedly good thing. But functionally speaking, however, it can be countered that this is merely delivering cheap labor to the demands of a burgeoning suburban, dead-end service-sector as the geographical-labor dimension within a broader neoliberal spatial-fix and associated capitalist uneven development (Hackworth, 2007).\(^\text{106}\)

\(^{105}\) This also ignores the reality of an increasing population of squatters inhabiting vacant public housing units (see Johns, 2001; Turner, 2002). In short, the growing (and uncounted) homeless population in the revanchist city is here denied yet another urban space to seek shelter.

\(^{106}\) As Farmer (2011) reports, however, in the process of displacement toward the fringes of the city and inner-suburbs, low-income residents are also rendered increasingly immobile due to less access to a public transportation (particularly CTA rail transit) system that favors the city’s wealthier neighborhoods and north suburbs.
Ultimately, the material affects of this profoundly “de-racialized” mixed-income narrative (Crump, 2002) have been the (re)production and spatial-shifting of Chicago’s pre-existing racially discriminatory residential landscape. In this context, the result of this push toward “mixed-income” development has ironically (re)produced the exact conditions it was supposedly designed to alleviate.107 Pattillo (2007: 182) corroborates:

“Past racism has so distorted the functioning of institutions and markets – here the housing market – that overt racism is no longer even necessary to ensure inequality, and the discriminatory racial history is no longer visible. The legacy of past racism sustains and reproduces contemporary racial disparities without even having to mention race.”

However, despite these contradictions and manifest material failures, the “mixed-income” narrative gained considerable purchase into the 2000s (especially in Chicago where mixed-income redevelopment has been most intense). This is in part because it taps into both existing and increasingly popular “green” and “New Urbanism” discourses (Goetz, 2003; Gonzalez and Lejano, 2009).108 But most importantly, its morally-persuasive rhetoric successfully prepared previously untouchable inner-city spaces for gentrification by justifying and mobilizing public housing demolition (Hackworth, 2007). This narrative has also, as a result,

107 This essentially amounts to a monumental loss for the Gautreaux victims, as no legal case can be made since the effects of socio-economic (re)segregation now associated with the Plan for Transformation have been indirectly produced via the legacies of the very discriminatory residential landscape and housing market that the Plan was purportedly designed to address and correct, thus, letting the city’s supposed “best intentions” off the hook (see L. Bennett, et al., 2006; Pattillo, 2007).

108 The “mixed-income” rhetorical theme is also intertwined with the similarly “progressive” touted notions of “green” development and New Urbanism (Gonzalez and Lejano, 2009). The “greening” of metropolitan and regional development has increasingly colored neoliberal discourses during the neoliberal period (see Anderson, 2010), particularly in Chicago. Many of the resulting physical landscapes, including the “mixed-income” redevelopment projects in Bronzeville, have adopted new urbanist styles of development. However, the inter-relation of these discursive formations – the “mixed-income,” “green,” and “New Urbanism” narrative – are ultimately deemed consistent with the neoliberal order, and have yet to prove as “progressive” as their neoliberal proponents (i.e., Mayor Daley) tend to posit. Perhaps “progressive” to an extent to begin with, they were swiftly appropriated by the neoliberal order in its “roll out” phase and continue to operate as such in the emergent “roll-with-it” period, as “zombie” practices of neoliberalization. Although the “green” revolution could become an anecdote to the costs and contradictions of neoliberal capitalism – the seed of its destruction – this remains to be determined.
consequently and disturbingly, contributed to the “eviction” of critical perspectives from gentrification research in general. Particularly worrisome has been the “displacement of displacement” from the literature as a defining and fundamental component of the gentrification process (Slater, 2006, 2009).109

**Bronzeville Nostalgia: Reclaiming the “Vibrancy” of a Lost “Community”**

This redevelopment discourse is also populated by a wealth of code words. Words such as “community” and “neighborhood” often stand as key rhetorical devices that are deployed as a cover for their class-biased positionality. The notion of “community” is often represented here as “vibrant” and “flourishing” and signifies the mixed-income, traditional “neighborhood” spatial form of what Bronzeville supposedly was in the past. It also simultaneously (and usually implicitly) designates the previously high-rise dominated, disinvested landscape as non-representative of “community” (or an inferior one). The quotes below implicitly demonstrate that public housing high-rises and the “community” are mutually-exclusive terrains:

“‘The new management contract undoubtedly will cost the CHA – it remains unclear how much – but officials say the expense is necessary to save the community.’” (Garza, 1999a)

“We want to reintegrate public housing into the community.” (John Robinson, Chief of Development for CHA in 1999, in Garza, 1999a)

“‘…redevelopment of public housing areas east of the Dan Ryan could help the stadium [U.S. Cellular Field] gain a greater neighborhood feel.’” (McCormick, 2003, paraphrasing Philip Bess, Chicago architect)

“‘Now we intend to do more openings to attract entertainment stars and get them to talk to people about the rebirth of the community.’” (Herb Kent, unofficial Mayor of Bronzeville, in Chicago Defender, 2000)

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109 In fact, an emergent literature, led by Lance Freeman (2006), has emerged that declares displacement not an issue and even celebrates gentrification as a collective good within what Slater (2009) now calls “mainstream urban studies” (also see Newman and Wyly, 2006; Wyly, et al., 2010).
“… federal and local housing officials need to transform the country’s high-rise ghettos into neighborhood communities.” (Starks, 1997, paraphrasing Andrew Cuomo, HUD Secretary)

The notion of “community” is also almost always discussed in positive and objective terms, eliding the class-biased, subjective understandings that are infused within the term. Language, thus, acts as a kind of hollow construct as these terms, “community” and “neighborhood,” are understood as the meanings the reader and/or user (always influenced by his/her socially produced identities) assign to them. Middle-income users, for instance, typically assign meanings that are biased to their middle-income positionality. And the terms “vibrant” and “flourishing,” although void of any intrinsic specificity, tend to signify positive, inclusive images (i.e., “bustling” successful businesses) associated with this spatial utopia:

“Fortunately, a great number of Chicagoans were unwilling to let this historical community die … The result is what you see today: a Bronzeville that has come alive with public and private development. A Bronzeville that is becoming stronger and more vibrant every day.” (Mayor Daley, in Kamins, 2000)

It should be stressed that this discourse represents the interests of the black, middle-upper class property owners, the city, and prominent developers. Thus, the notions of “community” and “vibrancy” are here deployed to represent how these particular subject formations understand the meaning of the term: as an upscale mixed-use and income, traditional neighborhood spatial form.

The common implication that the public housing towers were void of “community,” however, is problematic. On the contrary, “communities” certainly did exist in this setting before their demolition (see Venkatesh, 2000). They were just different “communities” than what more affluent residents understand this term to mean; not necessarily “better” or worse,” but simply different in a strictly qualitative sense. One former Stateway Gardens resident recalls:

“… you could go to anybody’s house and get a plate … Back then, people dressed up in their Sunday best, hollering each other’s name outside their window, and
over in the field there’d be a softball game. It was a fun place to be a kid.” (in Olivo, 2007a)

Clearly, this understanding does not represent the kind of “community” the area’s property owning population desire or identify with. But as Handley (2004) paraphrases Peterson, “the goal is to keep public housing residents from being isolated in ghettos, but rather to integrate them into the community.” The implication here is that public housing is not part of “the community,” but rather part of the “ghetto.” The “ghetto” is here only defined as being not equated with “community,” the two categories implicitly understood as mutually-exclusive.

Moreover, to Esther Barnett (in Chicago Defender, 2000), “Our association [the Bronzeville Merchants Association] brings back a sense of identity to the area.” In this context, no place-based identity is assumed to have existed among residents before Bronzeville’s revitalization. But, of course, it was simply not the middle-upper class identity attached to this nostalgic construct, but another form of identity held by a mostly poor and voiceless black population. For instance, another life-long public housing resident noted that “the neighborhood is leaving” [rather than being restored] because “everyone is moving out” (in McCormick, 2003). Another resident added that “before it was like family and everyone knew each other … then they started tearing down Robert Taylor and everyone scattered” (in Lydersen, 2008). The “community” as these residents knew it was vanishing rather than reviving.

In short, this place-specific discourse presents a positive, objective understanding of “community” (c.f., Kamin, 1995) to cover its more subjective, class-based foundation, as the following comments from local homeowners blatantly reveal:

“Nobody feels bad” [in relation to displacement of the poor] “This really is a prime area, and in its heyday, Bronzeville and this neighborhood was really for upper-middle class blacks. It’s kind of going back to that day.” (in Reed, 2005)
“Now, all of a sudden, the land starts to appreciate in value, and we can live close
to downtown and be around people who like us, who are not drug dealers, gang-
bangers and low-income people.” (in Reed, 2005)

Yet, “community” is often deployed as representative of an entire population as opposed
to its more subjective, middle-class foundation:

“The South-side Partnership was organized in and outside of Bronzeville who
could create, with residents, a collective vision for the community and carry out plans emanating from that vision.” (in “Rebuilding Bronzeville through Collaborative Action,” South-side Partnership, 1999)

“The innovative development and the approval for the $35 million grant are proof of what can be accomplished when neighboring residents work together for the benefit of the whole community.” (Toni Preckwinkle, in Ruklick, 2000)

“In the last 20 years, it’s clearly been unbalanced where you had people who were barely able to make it living in those communities…it’s really key to get the middle-class back in because that impacts the larger community in a way that’s really going to benefit everybody.” (Arnold Randall, deputy commissioner for the Department of Planning & Development, in Lawrence, 2001)

Bronzeville’s revival is here commonly posited as beneficial to the entire “community.” This is exhibited in Randall’s statement above as the prospect of middle-class colonization is not considered to equate with displacement of lower-income residents. Rather, it will “benefit everybody” in the “larger community.” Following Boyd (2008a), this understanding rests on an invented tradition of a “unified” racial identity which gives the meaning of “community” coherence. This is done by tapping into “community nostalgia” rhetoric. Such a representation, of course, operates under the assumption of the purported “monolithic community,” a notion which functions as an erasure of the historic, class-based divisions (and associated identities) within black neighborhoods in general (Bratt, 1997: 24).

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110 See Pattillo (2007) and Boyd (2008a) for further discussions on this problematic notion of a monolithic “community.”
The rhetorical focus on race also acts as a cover to evade the class-based issues (displacement, gentrification) often articulated by the “community’s” lower-income population. In response, city officials and developers often re-frame Bronzeville’s revival in terms of race in an effort to convince this population that they will also benefit from redevelopment. Here, by attaching this socio-politically constructed racial and class-transcending identity to Bronzeville’s redevelopment project, this population’s identity-based sensibilities (of race) are essentially exploited by this narrative through moral persuasion. But this revitalization project, despite its promotion of “racial unity,” has predominantly serviced the interests of the “community’s” more affluent property owning population at the expense of the “community’s” increasingly dwindling poor. At this point, as Pattillo (2007: 300) asserts:

“If gentrification is the point at which mixed-income communities tip upward, then whatever structural reforms had been enacted – better schools, more jobs, cleaner environment – now disproportionately benefit the incoming gentry rather than the outgoing poor residents … in this formulation, gentrification – and the mixed-income communities that precede it – is not simply nonstructural in its ideological foundations, but antistructural, reinforcing and replicating a system of haves and have not’s with government support.”

Bronzeville’s “community nostalgia” narrative has ultimately served the same function as the more standardized revanchist “urban pioneer” narrative deployed in many other gentrifying neighborhoods. Boyd (2008a: 81) comes to this determination by asserting that “this narrative [nostalgic Bronzeville] replaces the ‘Urban Jungle’ metaphor, which frames poor and minority communities as wild and unmanageable, while portraying gentrifying families and individuals as a necessary civilizing influence.” The problem with the more racially-stigmatizing “urban pioneer” narrative is that it functions more to justify displacement, as many Bronzeville

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111 See Pattillo (2007), Boyd (2008a), and Hyra (2008) for detailed accounts of such interactions.
112 In this sense, Omar McRoberts’ interpretation of the celebrated “neighborhood” as a “political strategy” and “device for making sure people stay in their place” has relevance beyond the context of inter-neighborhood competition for resources (Kleiman, 2003).
gentrifiers do not actually wish for this outcome. Yet without the legal structures of segregation in place today, those which restricted displacement in golden era Bronzeville, displacement is seemingly imagined as “magically” preventable, by nothing more than genuine good-will toward the poor. In this context, the revival of the “Black Metropolis” is rendered a pipe dream as neoliberal market-dynamics, a home owning middle-class, and the erosion of “Jim Crow” segregation act to prevent rather than restore the material realization of this vision.

The class-based distinctions explicit in the “urban pioneer” narrative are superficially dissolved within the myth of racial solidarity. In this vision, rather than vilifying low-income residents, they are considered vital to returning the neighborhood to its mixed-income origins. Thus, the requisite consent among enough existing residents and potential gentrifiers is produced; those who want to believe their presence will aid lower-income blacks. In this context, this “good-will” sentiment functions to rationalize and legitimate redevelopment practices (a mode of justification not necessary for the more explicitly revanchist “urban pioneer” narrative) that are understood as facilitators rather than inhibitors to the realization of this vision.

Conflicting Spatial Imagery and the Roots of Humanist Articulations

The portrayal of Bronzeville within this discourse, at this point, curiously began to depict two key, yet conflicting, spatial imaginaries: 1) Bronzeville as a flourishing and revived up-scale neighborhood but 2) still plagued by crime, gangs, deteriorating abandoned buildings and weedy vacant lots.¹¹³ In relation to the redeveloped site adjacent to the Hilliard Homes, Garrett (2003) reports one gentrifying couple as expressing the following: “We walk to Chinatown all the time

¹¹³ For example, see Reardon (1994), Garza (1999a), Olszewski and Sadovi (2003), McCormick (2003), Grady (2003), and Handley (2004).
now,” “It’s pretty amazing,” and “What’s happening now, I love it.” However, many news stories continue to depict Bronzeville as crime infested and physically obsolete:

“The poverty that remains to the east of U.S. Cellular [referring to Stateway Gardens and Robert Taylor Homes], meanwhile, remains some of the worst in the nation … While the number of residents in those tracts has dropped since the census, the level of poverty likely remains unchanged.” (McCormick, 2003)

In some instances, these two imaginaries are interwoven within the same story. Amid the broader recognition of Bronzeville’s revival, Olivo (2004) reports the following:

“Inside a partially demolished brick building … a pile of rotting wood and debris sits near where heavyweight champ Joe Louis once held court before crowds of adoring fans …”

This building, the remains of the historic but now defunct Gerri’s Palm Tavern, was “meant as an anchor to a long-planned 47th Street Blues District”:

“… the boarded up building advertises a new Nostalgia Jazz and Wine Club to be built a short walk from the recently opened Harold Washington Cultural Center at 47th and King Drive.”

However:

“… with the Blues District slowly rising, community development groups say they fear the slumped building … carries the potential to remain a local eyesore in a neighborhood rife with gangs, drugs and crumbling homes.”

Bronzeville is here a site receiving much needed upgrade yet still crime-ridden and disinvested.

In another report, a local teacher asserts “it [the neighborhood] changed for the worse, but now it’s changing for the better” (in Olszewski and Sadovi, 2003), yet the same report also reveals that “community leaders concede it is far from clear whether the city can attract families back into an area historically identified with gang violence and drug dealing.” In another report, Storch (2004) acknowledges that, indeed, “Bronzeville … is undergoing a long-awaited revitalization,” but Maren Strange, DuSable Museum curator, notes in the same story that Bronzeville’s history “reminds us today of urban possibilities yet to be recognized and fulfilled.”

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In relation to Westhaven Park, the mixed-income redevelopment at the former Henry Horner site on the west side, one new resident reported that “the neighborhood is up and rising. I was shocked when I saw all the changes that have occurred” (in Handley, 2004). Yet, the same resident also admitted “she still is not comfortable walking in some parts of Henry Horner.” Incoming residents are often reported as praising the new, wonderful changes, but also express concern over the problems that remain (i.e., gang-related crime, abandoned houses). Another resident explains that the quiet, nice and tidy part of the development is called “the country,” while the other part is called “the city,” “where a knot of teenagers chattered loudly on the sidewalk as car radios blared reggae and rap into the September afternoon air” (in Garza, 1999a).

Andrew Scholnick, of Ansco Development, describes Bronzeville as having potential and changing, but still predominantly a space of disinvestment and seemingly void of people entirely:

“[The neighborhood’s] potential simply has not been discovered yet. Currently, it may seem a no-man’s land with a lot of vacant property, but it is a great location. It’s kind of a pocket just waiting for pioneers.” (in Almada, 2001)

This echoes earlier statements that Bronzeville’s rich past is now “just a memory”:

“After decades of economic disaster, social change and the ravages of urban renewal, Bronzeville today is ‘one of the most devastated communities in the city of Chicago’. (Local planner, in Reardon, 1994)

I suggest that the targeted and actual demolition of Bronzeville’s public housing stock during the late 1990s and early 2000s underpinned the formation of this ambiguous spatial imagining:

“The physical act of tearing down some of the Robert Taylor homes is the most important first step (so) people can see that things are not going to stay the same forever … Middle-class families and working-class families won’t touch an immediate public housing area until they see those buildings coming down.” (Greg Longhini, spokesman for the Department of Planning & Development, in McRoberts, 1997)

Both imaginaries represent two sides of the same coin. The new, up-and-coming and “vibrant” neighborhood image here functions as the hook for potential gentrifiers and future private
investment, actions necessary for the evaporation of the “ghetto” urban jungle image. As Boyd (2008a: 68) notes, “localities use these narratives to create an idealized vision of urban space, to distract visitors from the city’s less appealing qualities …”

The goal of this dual-imagined space is the complete alteration of the common perceptions associated with this historically disinvested, crime-infested landscape. The MSPDC (1993) even made this explicit: “... changing the negative perception that many outsiders now have of the area … the creation of both a new image and a new reality for the area.” To the following local resident and student:

“Renovating the Bronzeville landmarks would help create a more positive image of African-Americans. When some think of African Americans they think of poverty, pain and projects. Preserving these historic sites would help to put an end to this stereotype.” (Stevenson, 1996)

But the positive image needs to articulate the negative image in order to supplant it. By carefully navigating these two strategic spatialities, the reputation of Bronzeville is slowly altered through its ensuing redevelopment (see Boyd, 2008a: 96-7). The selective memory embedded within Bronzeville’s “community nostalgia” narrative provides the positive image necessary to mobilize residents and investors along a common vision: the past serves up the semiotic resources for future transformation:

“We have to look back to see what this community was in order to see what it can become.” (Leroy Square, MSPDC member, in Reardon, 1994)

Yet, the notion of Bronzeville’s “revival” implies the neighborhood lost something that needs to be restored: that it is currently not what it used to be and what it needs to become. In this context, the contemporary image of Bronzeville must be situated in a zone of purgatory for this broader discourse to have coherence. Although it has changed, it must also still be a negatively-tinged space that needs to continue to change to justify further redevelopment.
However, Bronzeville’s revival at this point, according to common depictions in the media, was still only elementary in scope, a genuinely liminal space. This is despite its increasing portrayal as a newly thriving neighborhood with great investment potential:

“We hope there will be some retail development along 35th Street that would add some vibrancy to the community … As you draw more people in the area, that’s just going to happen naturally” [my italics]. (Christine O’Reilly, White Sox’s Community Relations Director, in McCormick, 2003)

“There will be, we hope, some really good-looking mixed-income housing where you had those hulking buildings that didn’t serve anyone … We’re excited about the possibility of retail and commercial development and re-creating a community…” [my italics] (David Baker, IIT administrator, in McCormick, 2003)

This ambiguity was also registered in the evolving treatment of the neighborhood’s city-owned vacant lot space. Indeed, these spaces were still commonly represented as desolate-weedy, but they also started to acquire new meanings with the erosion of the neighborhood’s ominous public housing space. Reflecting this increased positive rendering, these spaces were now represented positively by potential investors: what I call potential community revival space:

“There’s a lot of vacant land available. This is a great time for investment. The area is destined to come around” (Mel Monroe, co-president of the Grand Boulevard Homeowners Association, in Handley, 2002).

Many lots also experienced a significant degree of “sanitization,” mostly as cleaned-up, “tidy” open spaces in already revitalized blocks. These vacant lots, parks, and beautified streetscapes, what I call sanitized leafy-green space (Fig. 5.33, 5.34), are experienced differently from desolate-weedy space. One resident of the Gap reported that he “could walk his dog in the vacant lots,” indicating a positive utility of these vacant spaces (von Hoffman, 2003: 135). To another resident, “you still have vacant lots, just down the block here, but at least they’re nice looking” (Interview, 8/19/2010). Another resident provided the following:

“That’s exactly it [sanitized leafy-green space], you saw the potential even before it was fixed up … but now you know things are starting to change … it’s
definitely been revived, but it’s really more commercial now, meant to attract investment and change.” (Interview, 5/29/2011)

The emergence of a new rhetorical device also accompanied this growing spatial ambiguity: the humanist-portrayal of the poor. This rhetorical theme emerged out of the mixed-income narrative as a necessary imaginative rendering. The purpose was to differentiate the responsible, deserving poor from the criminals and hopeless, undeserving poor. This was reflected by Terry Peterson (2000) who argued that “in fact most residents of public housing are decent, hardworking families who want to live in dignity, security and comfort.” In this context, compassion for the poor had to be produced and made persuasive to attract the requisite middle-upper income residents to invest in the mixed-income redevelopment sites. If the entire black poor remained “disqualified by the worst,” it follows that the incentives for potential gentrifiers to purchase units in such proximity to dangerous criminals would be non-existent.

In response to this dilemma, city officials began painting increasingly positive images of low-income residents as well as representing mainstream society as less indifferent to the plight of the poor, as commonly perceived. Stemming from the Plan for Transformation, city officials were suddenly receptive to and concerned with the well-being of everyone they serve:

“… We really go out of our way to accommodate the needs of the residents and help to make their transition from project-based subsidized housing to the voucher subsidy as smooth as possible.” (Kenneth Coles, CHA official, in Ibrahem, 2001)

As Grady (2003) reports, Chicago area residents were also seen to increasingly “favor more low- and moderate-income housing in the towns and neighborhoods where they live,” despite “evidence of persistent fears about affordable housing.” The sudden presence of reports like this indicates a potential sympathy for the poor that is typically not acknowledged.114 This more

114 This emerged from a poll conducting on behalf of Housing Illinois, a coalition of invested interests in affordable housing construction. Housing Illinois is a coalition of 30 members, including Chicago Rehab Network, Business
humanist rendition of the poor, however, figured only minimally at this point. But it slowly emerged in the post-1998 period to constitute what is revealed in chapter 6 as a key rhetorical ingredient within the present incarnation of this evolving redevelopment discourse.

**Intra-Governance Conflict and Contestation**

These previously less connected rhetorical themes became more inter-twined in the post-1998 period as the city’s influence increasingly marked Bronzeville’s on-going redevelopment. But with this now coherently formed redevelopment discourse, the increasingly diverse set of actors propagating it were not necessarily on-board with exactly the same visions for redevelopment. The two principle “groups” of agents within this governance, in fact, deployed these rhetorical themes in subtly different ways. The source of this divergence was the privileging of the global trope by the city and perceived insensitivity to the nostalgia-inspired vision. This consequently stimulated a significant degree of fear among local organizers and homeowners who rejected the generalized “global” redevelopment vision implicated by the global trope. These agents, of course, favored the vision of nostalgic-revival.”

Although Bronzeville’s median household income skyrocketed between 1990 and 2000 (Hyra, 2008: 43-4, 135) (the number of issued mortgages jumped by 330% between 1994 and 2000, see von Hoffman, 2003: 136), a major disconnect remained between the South Loop and Bronzeville. Redevelopment in the South Loop was still several steps ahead of Bronzeville. It was also proceeding in the generalized “global” vision typically advanced by the city, of tall, “glossy” high-rises and generic rows of townhomes. Although this redevelopment vision is

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and Professional People in the Public Interest, the Chicago Department of Housing, Harris Trust and Savings Bank, the Lake County Affordable Housing Commission, and the Metropolitan Planning Council (Grady, 2003).
usually not explicitly communicated through the global trope, it is nonetheless tied to it as this is ultimately the vision pursued by its proponents: the city and connected developers.

This is reflected by Daley and Christopher Hill, former head of Chicago’s Department of Planning & Development, in the following statements:

Bronzeville will be a thriving middle-class neighborhood for the city … This is a community that, because of its incredible proximity to downtown, will be one of the places that people will want to live in. It’s really the South (Side) equivalent of Lincoln Park … (Christopher Hill, in Reardon, 2000)

“When we build this park [campus park along Pershing Road], (students will) feel like they’re in Naperville [a white affluent Chicago suburb].”  (Mayor Daley, in Spielman, 1997)

Joel Stauber’s (senior Associate of OWP/P Architects in Chicago) prediction that these two neighborhoods, Bronzeville and the South Loop, would “become one long area of redevelopment within ten years,” for instance, implies a concerted agenda of transforming Bronzeville into the South Loop (in Handley, 2002). Statements like these, despite the city’s now expressed interest in aiding Bronzeville’s revival and “historical preservation,” only stimulated further antagonism, validating the fear of sabotage that continued to be felt among MSPDC constituents.

At the core of this conflict was the privileging of city-connected, white developers and the neighborhood’s established local, but smaller-scale, black developers. The charge against the city was that only a select few developers were receiving the majority of the contracts, and were not genuinely interested in following the established vision of “nostalgic revival.” To local activist Omar Shareef, the city has to “open up the process” and stop “feeding the Talented Four or Five” contractors (i.e., the Allison Davis group and Eastlake Management & Development), effectively blocking others from bidding for construction jobs: “It’s time for the city to be fair with the black community … the city has to be fair when it comes to set aside contracts or target marketing” (in Strausberg, 2004):
"Here the vestiges of past discrimination linger on to skew the marketplace and adversely impact M/WBEs disproportionately as more recent entrants to the industry … [white male firms] are the beneficiaries of a continuing adherence to old relationships." (Judge Moran, in Strausberg, 2004)

In short, it was (and still is) a form of inter-racial tension within this hybrid redevelopment governance, between competing factions of capital along racial lines. It also represented a divide between neighborhood-scale (i.e., local black developers) and metropolitan-scale real-estate capital as well (i.e., politically connected, city-wide white developers) (see Heard, 1997).

Resistance to Demolition

Resistance to public housing demolition in Chicago has been spotty and uneven, with Bronzeville lagging behind the political mobilization of other public housing concentrated neighborhoods. In the context of Cabrini-Green, Henry Horner, and ABLA, developers had long salivated over access to what was perceived as “prime real-estate.” This was particularly true of Cabrini-Green, sandwiched between the Gold Coast and gentrifying Wicker Park/Bucktown. As opposed to the less speculatively desirable Bronzeville to the south, the north and west-side sites were targeted by developers first.

The case of Cabrini-Green erupted into a fierce battle between the city, developers, and a well-organized group of tenants, the Coalition to Protect Public Housing (CPPH) (see L. Bennett, 1998; L. Bennett and Reed, 1999; Wright, et al., 2006). Numerous public demonstrations held against Daley and the CHA took place in the context of Cabrini-Green’s demolition. The charge was that the city was doing the bidding for privileged developers and that redevelopment would invariably lead to displacement (see McRoberts, 1996b; Garza, 1999c; L. Bennett, et al., 2006). The CPPH ultimately brought a lawsuit against the city and would have, in fact, secured a legal victory had it not been for the suspiciously late involvement of the Habitat Company in the court proceedings. As the 1987 court-appointed receiver for public housing production in Chicago,
Habitat argued, successfully, that their participation was legally required and ultimately reversed the court’s decision. This was nothing short of a resounding defeat for the interests of public housing residents city-wide (Wright, et al., 2006; Pattillo, 2007).

In Bronzeville, however, resistance of this magnitude never quite formed. This is partially due to the delay of demolition and redevelopment at Bronzeville locations (mostly until the early 2000s) in favor of Cabrini Green and Henry Horner which were situated in more strategic locations. The close proximity of these north and west-side sites to white, affluent neighborhoods deemed them more gentrifiable. And since many Taylor residents “expressed interest in moving out of the neighborhood with rent vouchers or other assistance” (McRoberts, 1997), resistance to demolition never reached the heights it did at Cabrini-Green.

The interests of the CPPH (i.e., the preservation of affordable and public housing) also never quite aligned with those of the middle-income, homeowner constituted MSPDC (see Boyd, 2008a: 143). As a result, the socio-political conditions for a well-formed and organized lower-income movement in Bronzeville remained significantly impaired. The relative success and political power of the CPPH also led to the election of particular CPPH activists to local advisory councils (LACs) at Cabrini Green, and eventually, the charge by residents of co-optation by city interests as a result (Wright, et al., 2006):

“Its purpose [the CPPH] is not just for the concerns of the residents, but seems as though it is more of a matter of what can be gotten from all the demonstrating and bringing all these outside organizations in … It just seems like it’s more for the benefit of these organizations than for the benefit of the residents.” (Public housing resident, in Watkins, 2002)

“Many residents I spoke with said their leaders [the CPPH, and Local and Central Advisory Councils] have become ‘sell-outs’ since the launch of the Chicago Housing Authority’s Plan for Transformation in 1999. Some residents accuse their leaders are getting what they can for themselves and of not being concerned with the benefit of the residents as a whole.” (Watkins, 2002)
The public housing debate shifted to the CHAs Plan for Transformation in the early 2000s (Amdur, 1999; Garza, 2000b; Hyra, 2008). Although considered controversial at first (L. Bennett, et al., 2006), the rhetorical marriage between mixed-income redevelopment and Bronzeville’s revival was, at this point, hegemonic and morally persuasive enough to avoid the formation of a serious and systematic resistance movement in Bronzeville. In this setting, the prospect for receiving a rehabilitated unit actually had the fragmenting effect of pitting residents against each other rather than uniting against the city (Hackworth, 2007). This, however, is not to say that disapproval for the Plan was never expressed. But as Hackworth (2007: 177) notes, “the discursive framing of HOPE VI cleverly situated the policy as ‘progressive’ and those who disagree as resistant to change.”

As Johns (2004a) reported, between 1998 and 2001, none of the $35 million in HOPE VI grants per development received by the CHA was spent on construction. And since the Plan took effect in 2000, a total of 906 families city-wide were evicted from targeted public housing complexes, as reported by Kotlowitz (2002). Reports like these only supported the worst fears held among many remaining public housing residents concerning the Plan’s intent: that the relocation programs, vouchers, and net loss of nearly all existing public housing would translate into their displacement far from Bronzeville.

“I don’t like what’s going on, because it’s nothing like when we started out. This thing has changed from the very beginning …” (Former Ida B. Wells resident, in Johns, 2004a)

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115 As proposed in the Plan for Transformation, 18,000 “obsolete units” are to be demolished while a further 25,000 units will be redeveloped/rehabilitated into primarily mixed-income housing, where very few units will be reserved for public housing. 6,000 households were anticipated to be absorbed into the private housing market via the Section 8 program (Chicago Housing Authority, 2000: 2).

“Public Housing resident leaders and housing advocates say the CHA Plan for Transformation is contributing – in one form or another – to the recent surge in homelessness.” (Johns, 2001)

“We are seeing a higher rate of people who haven’t been able to get housing and they haven’t been able to find a Section 8 (unit). I have been talking to landlords who aren’t very satisfied with Section 8, with the process they have to go through to take Section 8. So they are choosing market rate or regular tenants as opposed to those having Section 8 certificates.” (Brady Harden, President of non-profit Inner Voice, in Johns, 2001)

“We’re [Matthew House, homeless shelter] getting basically individuals who have been displaced, who in CHA probably were staying with some family members and maybe there was more than one family staying in the apartment.” (Rev. Sanja Stinson, in Johns, 2001)

“A persistent criticism of the HCV [Housing Choice Vouchers] program in the CHA relocation process is that most of the families have been relocated to highly segregated areas inhabited largely by families whose income is below the poverty level …” (Tom Sullivan, attorney, in Johns, 2003)

Demolition has also unfortunately had the effect of geographically dispersing a formerly spatially concentrated population of real and potential activists to the extent that formal resistance became increasingly difficult to mount; the debilitating and disempowering effects of working-class geographic de-concentration by the hands of capital (Hackworth, 2007: 177; also see Harvey, 1975b, 1982; Walker, 1977, 1981).

Not surprisingly, as demolition proceeded through the early 2000s, the voice of the poor increasingly diminished (as did their physical presence in the city) from media attention as well as any effective resistance against displacement. “What is going on?” declared Johns (2004b), “what happened to the people who believe in social justice” (also see Johns, 2003; Ibrahem, 2004; Turner, 2004; Piemonte). However, in recognition of this troubling trend, increasing criticism – of the CHAs Plan for Transformation, the effectiveness of mixed-income solutions, and the city’s principle objectives – did mount in the city’s secondary media outlets (i.e.,
Chicago Reporter and Resident’s Journal). But this would not receive major media attention until the post-2005 period, as revealed in chapter 6.

Finally, it is worth stressing the deepened and widened degree of poverty registered across the city during the pre-2005 roll-out years (Wilson, 2007). The emergent “mixed-income” and “community-nostalgia” narratives, despite their apparent benevolence, inclusiveness, and increasing humanist tendencies, have ultimately translated into policies and practices that have had increasingly punitive material effects upon the black poor. These effects only further displaced and marginalized this population to newer spaces of poverty at the fringes of the city and inner-ring suburbs. There, they could be more adequately exploited by growing suburban low-wage labor markets while gentrifying neighborhoods could proceed free of obstacles. In this context, these two “soft-revanchist” narratives represent a kind of “silent” or “symbolic” violence enacted on the poor by the city’s elite, aided and abetted by strong federal policy (i.e., HOPE VI), and for the sake of power, prestige, and capital accumulation.

**Political Goals and Agendas: Neoliberal Subjectivization and Governmentality**

This chapter has chronicled the manifestation of Chicago’s redevelopment governance in Bronzeville through the city’s period of roll-out neoliberalization ending in 2005. The key agents that constituted this neighborhood-specific redevelopment governance – the local black property owners (manifest in the MSPDC), local businesses and developers, the aldermen, and eventually the city and prominent developers – all had similar but competing visions of how this redevelopment was to proceed (and who was to benefit). In the process of articulating these visions this ensemble of actors drew upon existing neoliberal-guided discursive formations to form a coherent but hybrid redevelopment discourse on Bronzeville.
Broader-scale political-economic conditions directed the attention of the city and prominent real-estate community to Bronzeville’s “grass-roots,” homeowner-led redevelopment movement. But competing redevelopment visions, colored by local (racial and class) identity configurations and internal politics, shaped the constitution of this governance in the process of propelling the neighborhood’s redevelopment (and its emergent spatial form). Conflict between MSPDC organizers and activists, and city officials and developers also shaped the discursive tactics deployed by these agents and the redevelopment vision ultimately realized.

It should also be stressed that the motivations behind these redevelopment agents extend beyond just capital accumulation. Driving Mayor Daley’s aspirations are concerns of his reputation for historical preservation, political success, building Chicago into a “global” city, and the individual self-fulfillment of establishing and preserving a positive long-term mayoral legacy. Developers imagine themselves as salvationists for the neighborhoods they redevelop (Wilson, 2007). They also seek power and individual fulfillment through establishing positive reputations for success. For Alicia Berg and John Roberson, Commissioners of the Department of Planning & Development and Department of Buildings, respectively, capital accumulation favors just as much as following Chicago’s “global” ambitions:

“… we will not forsake our duty to foster more economic development, nor stand in the way of Chicago’s bright future” [my italics] (Alicia Berg and John Roberson, Commissioners of the Department of Planning & Development and Department of Buildings, 2003)

Invested homeowners and neighborhood organizers, however, are interested in “reclaiming their roots” (Dorothy Tillman, in Mowatt, 2000), a form of identity constitution realized through both political empowerment and taking hold of capital accumulation. It should be

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117 Such as the saturation of housing markets in other gentrified city neighborhoods combined with HOPE VI grants to demolish the neighborhood’s public housing stock.
stressed that the goal of the MSPDC was not to radically alter the course of capital accumulation but simply allow a historically under-privileged population a slice of the pie:

“It’s a monument for black capitalism … It was built by black people, financed by black people – black people worked there…it shows what black people can do.”

(Mary Steward, executive director of the MSPDC, quoted in Ciokajlo, 2000)

“It [Bronzeville’s revival] shows we as African-Americans can do anything we can set our minds to do.” (Ernest Brown, President of the African-American Home Builders Association, in Mowatt, 2000)

In this context, the middle-class underpinning of this race-based politics represents more of a “symbolic resistance” (Inwood, 2010) as redevelopment itself was not the object of debate but the form in which it was to take. To Pat Dowell (former chairman of the MSPDC and future 3rd ward alderman), gentrification was not the immediate concern but how it was to proceed:

“The opportunity to serve as a model for neighborhood rebirth, by including mixed-income housing along with condominiums, retail space and parking, is what the neighborhood truly needs – not another symbol of gentrification that erases historical relevance rather than honor it” [my italics]. (Dowell, 2005a)

This was in fact central to the visions of both Tillman and the MSPDC, despite their disagreements. Their debate was over which black interests would have control: politically connected black elites (i.e., Higginbottom and Davis) or smaller, individual entrepreneurs. In these contexts, capital accumulation, rather than an end goal, is understood more as the means of achieving broader agendas related to issues of identity constitution and political power.118

Confronted with the political organizing capabilities of the MSPDC, the city quickly conceded such seemingly direct control by adopting the MSPDCs vision as their own (see Kamins, 2000). Here, as far as the city was concerned, redevelopment would proceed regardless of the specificities of its shape or appearance. And it was, curiously, around this point that Daley

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118 Each, of course, is deeply inflected with the effects of (and constitutive of) prevailing ideological and discursive regimes.
branded himself as a leader in historic preservation: “…the mayor has been recognized as a national leader in historical preservation” (Alicia Berg, Commissioner, Department of Planning & Development, 2002). Of course, the intentions of this association with historical preservation are made clear in the following:

“Since the Landmarks Commission was merged into the Planning Department in the early 1990s, historic preservation has been successfully used as a tool for economic development…it has also spurred neighborhood revitalization in such neighborhoods as Bronzeville, North Kenwood, and Edgewater” [my italics]. (Berg, 2002)

But despite the varying and multi-dimensional goals and agendas of these often conflicting agents, capital accumulation, nonetheless, forms a central pillar for each. The shared class-based, economic interests of these agents alike, of transforming Bronzeville into a site suitable for capital accumulation, ultimately fueled the engine of this redevelopment project of which the local vision of “nostalgic revival” was deemed most politically viable. For the city, non-compliance with this vision would unnecessarily risk alienating the very black gentrifying population (and source of effective demand for this niche housing market) fueling this redevelopment to begin with: the economic dimension inflected with local politics and identity.

In short, once city officials realized redevelopment in Bronzeville would proceed regardless of the specific form it took, indifference set in with regard to whose economic interests would be served (although politically connected developers did gain entrance) as increased tax revenues would be secured either way. As one local planner noted, “for many [city officials and planners], if it means having to put up some statue of some local historical figure to get things rolling, then so be it …” (Interview, 2/8/2011). In this context, the city’s adoption of the local narrative of “community nostalgia” (rather than the established “urban pioneer” narrative) represents an adroit (and necessary) maneuver in response to a particular set of local
circumstances to essentially maintain the same redevelopment goals and agendas. This gives further substance to Hackworth’s (2007: 123) claim that the local, place-specific conditions of “a particular neighborhood” are “important factors in how neoliberalism gets localized through gentrification” (Hackworth, 2007: 123). In this context, race is interpreted as a semiotic medium (in its discursive, ideological, and identity constituting dimensions) through which this neighborhood’s neoliberal redevelopment has unfolded.

Following Foucault’s ([2004] 2007; [2004] 2008) concept of governmentality, the city can be here understood as simply allowing a pre-existing, local-based form of class power – albeit racially charged – to pursue their interests. This is achieved by virtue of the class-based alignment of these interests with the more centralized, political-economic interests of the capitalist state. The adherence among these local property owners to the capitalist imperative, of behaving as ideal economic subjects pursuing their economic interests (i.e., of increasing and realizing their investments), ultimately served the interests of the city (of increasing its stock of wealth through increased tax revenues) without having to resort to direct manipulation. In this context, this local property-owning population can be interpreted as the result of a conditioning process referred to by Springer (2010: 931) as neoliberal subjectivization:

“Neoliberal subjectivization is the process whereby one memorizes the truth claims that one has heard and converts them into rules of conduct, thereby effectively locking in the rights of capital.”

It should be stressed that this conditioning process renders irrelevant the moral responsibility genuinely felt by many of these local property owners to aid their lower-income brethren and advance the black race. This is because this goal is to be realized by virtue of this very neoliberal-conditioned behavior: a belief of gentrification without displacement. And this is a belief that is, of course, rendered delusional by its ignorance of the creative-destructive realities
of capitalist housing markets and uneven development. This is, indeed, not to say that this seemingly good-willed sentiment is not genuine. Many of these “grass-roots” agents, at least rhetorically, did not wish for anyone to be displaced.

But the individual aggregation of the capitalist imperative has tended to result in the opposite effects of this purported goal of racial uplift and solidarity, leaving the lower-income segment behind and displaced despite all the best wishes and intentions. Perhaps the chief mechanism that continually (and blindly) disrupts this goal is the role of homeownership in contemporary Bronzeville; a factor that was not present among golden era Bronzeville’s unified population as exploited renters. It is here, to Lefebvre ([1966] 1982: 70-1), that “ideologies are ignorant of the exact nature of their relations with praxis” and “do not really understand their own conditions and presuppositions, nor the actual consequences to which they are leading.”

In this context, the neoliberal subjectivization of this local identity formation can be interpreted as a mechanism of power that has acutely disciplined this population’s behavior without direct or “oppressive” forms of manipulation (i.e., via the state).\textsuperscript{119} Bronzeville’s revival, thus, can here be understood as a movement “invented and organized from the starting points of local conditions and particular needs” (Foucault, 1980: 159). Yet it also formed as an internal component within a larger, coherent alignment of class power mobilized around the movement’s relative success. Capital did not create this movement, although it certainly exploited and manipulated it in the process of procuring its own conditions for survival and expansion.

Also central to neoliberal modes of governmentality is the management of the “other,” of those who are not disciplined into ideal neoliberalized economic subjects. This population, the

\textsuperscript{119} Class-power, here, following Foucault ([2004] 2007, [2004] 2008), rather than originating from an immediate, central source of dissemination, should be understood more as a long-established form of power, dating to the emergence of the capitalist bourgeois, and one that is perpetually seized upon by such centralized nodes merely by recognizing its existence within the population and allowing it to operate relatively free of state intervention.
black poor, because of their purportedly undisciplined nature (of which mixed-income housing is designed to correct), are deemed threats to perpetual capital accumulation. The result of this “management” has generally been the production of a disillusioned subject perpetually conditioned to internalize their position at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder: that they are poor due to their own individual failures – a kind of “internalized hate” or “self-racism.” Here is Lefebvre’s ([1966] 1982: 76) interpretation of capitalist ideology as creating an image of the dominant class for the remainder of society (especially the poor), one “which devalues them in their own eyes, drags them down, tries to defeat them,” and “without a shot being fired.”

In the final analysis, such a hopelessly disempowered subject is more likely to accept their supposedly “rightful” position at the absolute fringes of society without threatening the capitalist interests that put them there. As a consequence, the racialized poor are easily and systematically banished from the city into increasingly peripheral spaces of disinvestment and marginalization (Beckett and Herbert, 2010). The political-economic function is to clear the way for capital accumulation in the vacated spaces produced by this banishment. In the words of de Certeau (1984: 94), it is a process that represents, on the one hand, a massive “redistribution of the parts and functions of the city, as a result of inversions, displacements, accumulations,” and, on the other hand, a “rejection of everything that is not capable of being dealt with in this way … the ‘waste products’ of a functionalist administration.” This is, in the context of Bronzeville’s demolition, displacement, and gentrification, nothing more than the inevitable and necessary outcome of capitalist uneven development and contemporary example of what Frederick Engels depressingly observed in 1872 (in Harvey, 2010: 177):

120 Following Harvey (2010: 132), many who have lost their homes to foreclosure tend to “blame themselves rather than systemic conditions ...”
“...the result is always the same; the scandalous alleys disappear to the accomplishment of lavish self-praise by the bourgeoisie on account of this tremendous success, but they appear again immediately somewhere else...the breeding places of disease, the infamous holes and cellars in which the capitalist mode of production confines our workers night after night, are not abolished; they are merely shifted elsewhere! The same economic necessity that produced them in the first place, produces them in the next place.”
Chapter 6

The Transition to Roll-With-It Neoliberalization (2005 – Present)

On August 29th, 2005, Hurricane Katrina steam-rolled across the gulf coast and particularly devastated the lower-income (mostly black) residential sectors of New Orleans. Media coverage of the social atrocities which occurred during and immediately after the Hurricane swept through the city effectively brought the issue of urban poverty back into the national spotlight after years of silence. The pummeling of the gulf coast by Katrina re-ignited a thunder storm of debate (dormant since Reagan’s welfare queen icon) throughout the US (and even the world) about the social causes and consequences of urban and racialized poverty (Dreier, 2006; Steinberg and Shields, 2008; Rhodes, 2010).

The range of opinions expressed covered typical neoliberal revanchist sentiments (Peck, 2006), classic liberalist-welfare arguments (Johns, 2008a, 2010a), and even religious postures that god had delivered to these people what they deserved: “We finally cleaned up public housing in New Orleans. We couldn’t do it, but god did” (Richard Baker, R-LA, in Medina, 2010). Despite this diverse range of opinions, the social consequences of Katrina served as a resounding reminder to mainstream America that urban and racial poverty still existed and should be considered a serious problem.\(^\text{121}\) Countless displaced and poor New Orleans residents fled to many US cities (including thousands in Chicago, see Glanton and Trice, 2010)\(^\text{122}\) as the

\(\text{\textsuperscript{121}}\) See Medina (2010) for a local journalist account and Dreier (2006), Rhodes (2010), and Steinberg and Shield’s (2008) edited collection for scholarly commentary.

\(\text{\textsuperscript{122}}\) Following Glanton and Trice (2010), over 10,000 displaced, mostly poor African-American, residents from New Orleans landed in Illinois after Katrina hit (although many have since returned to New Orleans or moved to other cities).
rhetorical landscape within urban governances across the United States was forced to adjust to this suddenly evolved national socio-political climate.

As a result, criticism of public housing demolition (a pillar and defining characteristic of roll-out neoliberalization) erupted from the sidelines to take a more center stage on the national political scene. Continued demolition is now challenged in congress as increasingly draconian at a time of affordable housing hyper-scarcity for the poor. In fact, demolition of three public housing complexes in New Orleans were halted in 2007 for this very reason, “amid complaints about the scarcity of housing for the poor after Hurricane Katrina” (Chicago Tribune, 2007; also see Johns, 2008a). In a more recent call to halt public housing demolition nationally, US representatives, Maxine Waters (D-CA) and Barney Frank (D-Mass.), issued the following:

“A further decline in the number of public housing units will only exacerbate the affordable housing needs of our most vulnerable populations and may force them into substandard or unsafe situations or homelessness … Vouchers are not a substitute for the permanent replacement of hard public housing units, which represent a permanent commitment to providing affordable housing and services within a community … Until such time as housing authorities are required to replace demolished or disposed units on a one-to-one basis, we risk losing the crucial investment and significant asset these units represent.” (in Johns, 2010a)

Combined with the utter failure of FEMA during the Katrina aftermath, an already unpopular Bush Administration charged with gross insensitivity to the poor (i.e., summed up by Kanye West’s allegation that George Bush hates black people), and the urban uprisings that erupted across France in early 2005, overtly revanchist articulations went from politically sanctioned to political suicide (see Keil [2009], although he does not address the role of Katrina). This was rudely realized by Dorothy Tillman after her 2007 loss to Pat Dowell (former MSPDC director) after twenty-two years serving as alderman of Chicago’s 3rd ward.123

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123 Both Tillman and 14-year 2nd ward alderman (northern segment of Bronzeville), Madeline Haithcock, were defeated in the 2007 elections, a reflection of significantly altered local political and social climates.
Coupled with the rise of Barack Obama and his associated discourse on urban poverty (Wilson and Anderson, 2011), a hyper-sensitivity to the racialized poor emerged as increasingly rhetorically favorable. Following Johns (2009), Obama’s Rebuilding New Orleans agenda for Katrina victims, to Obama, centers on “keeping the broken promises made by President Bush to rebuild New Orleans and the Gulf Coast.” The socio-political effects of Katrina are here felt through this national-scale shift to a more classic liberalist, almost neo-Keynesian rhetoric, of which I argue is registered (albeit differentially) within urban-scale redevelopment discourses across urban America. Giving this discursive-shift further political purchase was the material effects of the sub-prime mortgage crisis and consequent global economic recession in 2007-8. These economic eclipses continue to disproportionately bludgeon low-income racialized poor neighborhoods across urban America (Bronzeville has been no exception) (Wyly, et al., 2009). This has only compounded the effects of Katrina even further.

In short, a convergence of multi-scalar forces that span the entire five-fold division of the social process now confronts Chicago’s redevelopment governance forcing this rhetorical adjustment: deepened impoverishment and marginalization due to roll-out neoliberalization (Hughes, 2007; Wilson, 2007), the effects of the local mortgage crisis, the broader post-2008 economic crisis, more effective activism and resistance to redevelopment (in Bronzeville and beyond), growing racialized gentrifying populations (i.e., Bronzeville and Pilsen), and the national scale socio-political effects of Katrina. As this chapter reveals, while redevelopment agendas continue to proceed aggressively, their guiding logic has registered a “discursive-fix”: a shift from overt revanchist articulations to more covert, or “soft-revanchist,” rhetorical tactics.

The racialized poor are now depicted in increasingly sensitive ways (see Wilson and Sternberg, 2012). Yet this shift is partial in its ambiguity and conflicting content: redevelopment
agents increasingly tap dance between vilifying and humanizing this racialized poor. Although overt revanchism is now less politically viable (Keil, 2009), it has not disappeared. In fact, revanchist articulations remain paradoxically prevalent despite this parallel humanization. They also remain implicitly communicated through the intensification and normalization of “soft-revanchist” rhetorical themes such as Bronzeville’s “mixed-income” and “community nostalgia” narratives: neither narrative paints overtly hostile pictures of the racialized poor although both are nonetheless underpinned by established revanchist assumptions and understandings.

Reflecting this ambiguity, this revisionist formation also consists of a further entrenching of the global trope. As Wilson and Sternberg (2012) reveal, the post-2005 climate of heightened economic uncertainty has also fueled the central object of this rhetorical theme: the competitive reality of globalization. Both of these discursive movements, the humanist-turn and deepened rationalization of the global trope, represent two key dimensions within what I call Chicago’s revisionist redevelopment discourse on Bronzeville. This evolved discourse also encompasses the increased normalization of 1) the “mixed-income” narrative, 2) “community nostalgia” narrative, and 3) the redressing of the global trope in the guise of the Olympic redevelopment trope (see Table 6.1). Indeed, as the global trope remains a normalized feature of this emergent discourse, its forceful articulation through the context of Chicago’s bid for the 2016 Olympics suggests a subtle makeover and necessary re-charging of its rationality.\[124\]

This chapter empirically uncovers this “discursive-fix” as part of a broader transition within Chicago’s redevelopment governance post-2005. In the process, I unpack 1) the evolved post-2005 institutional content of this governance in relation to Bronzeville’s on-going

\[124\] The role of the Olympic bid in coloring the global trope, particularly in Bronzeville, is not taken up by Wilson and Sternberg (2012), but is nonetheless an important element to consider in how this neighborhood-specific incarnation of this formation evolved in the post-2005 period.
redevelopment, and 2) the socio-spatial effects of this evolved socio-political landscape and ensemble of governance actors. It is argued that the relatively unchanged political goals and agendas of these Bronzeville redevelopment agents in relation to this post-2005 convergence of forces reflects a temporal transition akin to Keil’s (2009) notion of a roll-with-it transition.

The Humanist-Revanchist Rhetorical Paradox

Humanist depictions of the racialized poor were readily apparent during the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, this rhetorical tactic did not become a central feature within this redevelopment discourse until the mid-2000s as a response to established but increasingly politically problematic revanchist articulations. This is not to suggest the complete withdrawal and replacement of overt revanchism, but more a parallel usage of a humanist sensibility. Revanchist articulations remain a prevalent rhetorical thread uniting these two periods, yet the post-2005 discourse is revealed as more of a hybrid formation constituted by these two paradoxically conflicting themes. This humanist-turn is also dialectically inter-twined with the normalization of the discourse’s two “soft-revanchist” rhetorical themes. The silent-violence embedded within such narratives, of mixed-income housing and nostalgic Bronzeville, has provided a convenient rhetorical structure for this humanization to blossom.

Public housing residents are now increasingly referred to as “CHA families” where “a law-abiding majority lived in constant fear of the gangsters and addicts” (McCarron, 2006a). Rather than continuing to reduce this population to its worst examples – a hallmark of the revanchist-public housing trope – it is now important to distinguish between the “responsible” and “irresponsible” public-housing resident if the mixed-income redevelopment sites are to attract the necessary middle-upper income homebuyers that make them viable:
“This is not a neighborhood of the poorest of the poor [the Woodland Park development at 35th and Cottage Grove] … that was a fallacy in the first place. These are good residents of modest means.” (Michael Tobin of Northern Realty, in Wheeler, 2006)

This statement implicitly distinguishes between “good residents of modest means” and the “poorest of the poor.” Although it is not explained why, the poorest of the poor are not considered good residents: they are presumably drug addicts and criminals.

Although the non-criminal poor are now given a presence, the discourse still requires the stereotypical “racialized criminal” to give this humanist-turn coherence. For instance, those lucky enough to return to the mixed-income sites, as McCarron (2006a) reports, “must work at least 30 hours a week (or go back to school) and do without addictive drugs, live-in boyfriends, loud music or their kids hanging out in doorways”:

“The bottom line is that we can as a society begin with making sure affordable housing is available to everyone who is at least trying to make something of themselves” [my italics] (Jenna Rose, board member at the Department of Aging, in Ibrahem, 2006).

To David Chase, President of Thrush Drexel Inc. and co-developer of Jazz on the Boulevard, “It’s [Jazz on the Boulevard] not for the very low income … It's designed for working people, people who want to live in the city but are getting priced out” (Jazz on the Boulevard, 2011).

Notice the curious distinction made between the “very low income” and “working people,” as if people who are very low income, by definition, are not “working.”

This statement is particularly revealing in that the very low income is treated as synonymous with the “irresponsible,” undeserving poor. Yet those who are “working,” translating into “less poor and lucky enough to be steadily employed,” are deemed deserving of such admittedly evasive opportunities, acknowledging the structural constraints of “getting priced out.” In this context, the “working-class” and the “lower-class” are mutually-exclusive.
The use of the “working” designation also allows for the sneaky portrayal of benevolence and sensitivity to structural constraints even though the “very low income” is not given the same treatment.

An interesting structure-agency tension runs through this conflicted humanist-turn.

Central to its functioning is an acknowledgement that poverty and marginalization is to some degree an outcome of structural conditions of which individuals have no control. Yet it still communicates established behavioral imperatives such as classic neoliberal-friendly notions of individual culpability and pull-yourself-up-by-the-bootstraps philosophy:

“What a great community it was, before the public housing … that’s the truth, whether it was fair or not … These people were here, through no fault of their own, we need to embrace them, come back together … Day of entitlement should be over, everyone should work … we should not have had the numbers back then, and the numbers are now down …” [my italics] (Local organizer, interview 8/19/2010)

This rhetorical tap dance, in short, reveals a paradox, a conflicting simultaneity to this evolving post-2005 discourse. Bronzeville’s low-income inhabitants are depicted as civically-productive, hardworking, and subject to larger structural forces as well as hopelessly culturally deficient and continually mired in their own personal failings. Wilson and Sternberg (2012: 12) corroborate:

“The result is an open and highly multi-interpretable symbolic formation. Seen one way, here are tragically horrendous and sadly dysfunctional people. But seen another way, human possibility is being stunted by forces and realities that afflict ordinary people.”

This rhetorical humanization also found political currency in the context of the city’s acknowledgement of the city’s growing affordable housing crisis. This is reflected through the humanist-inspired “Plan to End Homelessness” proposed by the city in 2003:

“Housing is the key to the success of any individual and family. Our goal in the Plan to End Homelessness is to quickly move people into permanent housing because we know there’s no place like a home; that kids do better in school when they are sleeping in their own bed and not on a couch. It’s easier to hold a job and
take care of your health when you have a place to call home. It provides a sense of security and belonging to a community.” (John Markowski, Chicago Commissioner of Housing, in Ibrahem, 2006)

“I feel that not having access to affordable housing places one in a very precarious position… [Housing] is something which I guess that most of us take for granted. But, just think, if you did not have that one convenience and lump that together with not having close family or friends to rely on, that’s a terrible situation.” (Public school teacher, in Ibrahem, 2006)

It also figured as a convenient rhetorical response to the fiasco of re-opening the Housing Voucher waiting list in 2009 (the first time since 2001) for low-income families. More than 200,000 applications were filed for a mere 40,000 slots (Johns, 2010b), only reaffirming the reality of this burgeoning affordable housing crisis, and the necessity of this humanized rhetoric.

This theme also got a pragmatic boost in the aftermath of the post-2008 crisis. The material effects of the crisis forced increasing acknowledgement of the inherent limitations to the notion of individual culpability in the face of wider structural forces. This is reflected in Tom Dart’s (the Cook County Sheriff) refusal to continue enforcing evictions during the mortgage crisis in order “to protect renters – most of whom are dutifully paying their rent every month, only to later learn their landlord has fallen behind in mortgage payments and the building has gone into foreclosure” (in Johns, 2008b). To Dart, these people are “innocent victims” (although judgment is reserved for those who foreclosed) as mortgage lenders are cast as the villains:

“Mortgage companies only see pieces of paper, not people, and don’t care who’s in the building … they simply want their money and don’t care who gets hurt along the way…On top of it all, they want taxpayers to fund their investigative work for them. We’re not going to do their jobs for them anymore. We’re just not going to evict innocent tenants. It stops today.” (Dart, in Johns, 2008b).

“Since the nation’s worst housing foreclosure crisis began two years ago, the octopus-like tentacles of the global home mortgage industry have orchestrated the repossession of thousands of small apartment buildings in Cook County, affecting thousands of renters who live there … roughly one third … were from renters being wrongfully evicted … illegal evictions are attributed to the economic self-
interest of mortgagees. The faster and cheaper they repossess properties and evict tenants, the faster and cheaper those properties can be sold …” (Virella, 2008b)

At the core of this ambiguity in relation to Bronzeville is the conflicting spatial imaginaries that continue to plague the perception of this neighborhood: a reviving mixed-income utopia but still enmeshed with “lingering crime and drug activity” (William Wilen, in Diesenhouse, 2007; also see Reed, 2005). This tension is now more prevalent as a result of this conflicting humanist-revanchist simultaneity. In 2009, a crime report was conducted and published by America Online, Inc. reporting Bronzeville to be among the nation’s most dangerous (Hutson, 2009). This did not sit well with the long-time activists and organizers who continue to work tirelessly to change these negative perceptions:

“Let me first say that I think it was irresponsible on AOL’s part to put out this list … It gives the wrong impression about the area (55th and State Street) but that area has changed tremendously since the Robert Taylor Homes were demolished (in 2007).” (Pat Dowell, in Hutson, 2009)

Of course, the report, accurate or not, threatens continued redevelopment as established negative perceptions are reinforced rather than chipped away. “Homeowners,” as Hutson (2009) reveals, are also “worried that the report, which paints a negative picture of the neighborhoods, could decrease their property value.”

It should be stressed, however, that crime does continue to plague Chicago’s south-side in general despite this on-going struggle to rhetorically sanitize its image. Concentrated poverty and crime, in fact, has only been displaced by demolition and redevelopment rather than reduced (Chicago Reporter, 2007a; Chicago Tribune, 2010):

“… a year-long investigation found that the murder rate increased in public housing developments and areas where CHA residents had been relocated across the city under the Chicago Housing Authority’s $1.6 billion Plan for Transformation … the program [a new police initiative] called for the deployment of 120 more officers to ‘hot spot areas’ across the city which included CHA public housing developments … including an increase in crime in specific south-
side neighborhoods and complaints from across the city of a spike in drug activity…” (Johns, 2006)

Turner (2006) has even referred to the lingering Dearborn Homes as “new crack city,” reflecting the increased crime reports in the northern Bronzeville CHA complex due to continued demolition at other sites:

“My son has asthma, and there are not only gangs and drugs down here but so are mold and mildew in my apartment … My son had to keep running to the hospital for 9 months because of the condition down here…” (Michelle Lawson, Dearborn Homes resident, in Turner, 2006)

In 2006, fourteen-year-old honor-student, Starkesia Reed, was fatally shot while waiting for a ride to school in the south-side neighborhood of Englewood (Turner, 2007). This was followed eight days later by the fatal shooting of ten-year-old Siretha White (ibid). These events eerily recall the 1992 fatal shooting of seven-year-old Dantrell Davis at Cabrini-Green. Despite the demonstrations and marches that these two more recent events triggered (ibid), they did not remotely receive the national media attention the Davis incident received 15 years previously. The reason is that these horrific incidents no longer mobilize capitalist-friendly policies (i.e., HOPE VI and mixed-income redevelopment) as they did in the 1990s. Rather, they represent the failure of those mobilized policies and practices by calling attention to the (re)production and displacement of the very problems they were purportedly designed to ameliorate.

Another key ingredient to this humanist-turn has been the emergence of positive and nostalgic portrayals of public housing and what life was like for those who lived there:

“It is safe to say that many of the memories people have of public housing are not pleasant. But not all was nightmares and hopelessness. For thousands, public housing was salvation. It was home.” (Kogan, 2008)
These depictions of public housing radically diverge from the established treatment they have traditionally received. Public housing is now suddenly remembered by nostalgic (now displaced) inhabitants as tight-knit “communities” where people learned life-long lessons:

“Living in the Robert Taylor Homes, my one and true home, was what prepared me for facing the world. It taught me how to provide for myself and not to depend on a lot of people … I learned other fundamentals like how to play ball, rap and to dream of a better life.” (Former Taylor resident, in Kizer, 2009)

“It was the best time of my life … we all had a camaraderie … we were all one big family.” (Former public housing resident, in Burnette, 2009)

“I grew up down here … During my life in Ickes, I have seen some good and bad things but what I’ll miss is the good times … I remember good neighbors. If you needed anything, you could get it. I’m very sad about it all because my memories keep coming from age 10 on through, baseball in the back, sprinklers on the side, giant slides and merry-go-rounds in the front … I have so many memories. I hope they don’t dissolve when the buildings are torn gone” [my italics]. (Former Ickes resident, in Thompson, 2010a)

Michaeli (2010) adds the following:

“On the outside, Robert Taylor Homes was known mostly for the violence fueled by street gangs and drug dealers. Newspaper stories and television features almost always included descriptions of dark, dirty hallways and tenants desperate to get out [the revanchist-public housing discourse]. But for Robert Taylor Homes’ ‘fans,’ [Facebook fan page] the high-rise buildings were home, a place to form community and build lifelong relationships with neighbors.”

Glanton (2009) further reports on the various success stories of former public housing residents who now occupy significant political positions and the like (although, in the process, further reinforcing the neoliberal mantra of individual culpability and a meritocracy). Although the revanchist-public housing trope remains a prevalent rhetorical theme, it now reflects this subtle humanizing through an explicit acknowledgement of public housing residents as misguided victims as opposed to the worst examples:

125 Notice the attachment of memory and identity to the actual physical spaces in which these memories were experienced and this identity was formed.
“If there weren’t people like my husband and me moving into neighborhoods like Bronzeville, they would continue to decline … I think it’s a good thing that they tear down those projects. They are crime-ridden, and that’s not appropriate for anybody. The people who would disagree are the people who grew up there and don’t know any better.” (Local homeowner, in Reed, 2005)

This more humanized reflection of life in public housing is also curiously deployed in the recent push to fund a museum dedicated to the city’s now demolished public housing stock. Although considered a “gruesome joke” by many (Kamin, in Kogan, 2008), the museum would be for “those who lived and worked and slept in public housing,” a “place where memories can be evoked,” and a place for the “rest of us to learn” (Kogan, 2008). But what would the museum be teaching visitors? As one critical resident observed, “too many people are homeless … they could at least make it a place for the homeless to stay” (in Meyer, 2004). In this context, the idea of channeling money into a museum for a public housing once demonized for fostering horrific social conditions and reproducing abject racialized poverty should be a sobering reminder of the superficiality of this humanist-turn: the endeavor strikes as an attempt to wipe clean the negative “anti-community” portrayals and functional aspects of public housing in favor of a selective and nostalgic “new view of public housing” (Mullaney, 2010).

This discursive evolving functions to maintain the status-quo. But in the process it also unintentionally shifts the rhetorical landscape in ways favorable for generating effective counter-discursive assaults and a potential revival of a redistributive politics long-silenced by neoliberal hegemony (Wilson and Sternberg, 2012). At present, however, while a number of protests and activist interventions have proliferated across the south-side since 2006, a coherent, unified low-income resistance movement has yet to materialize and connect smaller neighborhood-based modes of resistance across trans-local scales.
Bronzeville’s Post-2005 “Affluent” Redevelopment

Reflecting a nationally booming real-estate market, the unfolding of this rhetorical humanization, paradoxically, corresponded with a new wave of affluent development in Bronzeville during the mid-2000s. Land values and “housing prices skyrocketed” to levels affordable only to the wealthiest members of this population base (Lydersen, 2004).\(^{126}\) Also referred to as a “burst of community redevelopment” (Luman, 2007) and “a grounds well of new housing” (Lynch, 2007a), nearly 3,000 new homes were reported as under development in the Bronzeville area in 2007 (also see Reed, 2005).

“… one thing the areas have in common [Wrigleyville and Bronzeville] these days is the real estate boom – new construction, condo conversion and rising prices.” (Handley, 2005)

“Handsome mixed-income housing are replacing deteriorated public housing, and developers and entrepreneurs are rehabbing the area’s historic structures and putting up new ones.” (Bergen, 2006)

Many of these more affluent developments proliferated through the neighborhood in the immediate post-2005 period, featuring new construction of condos and townhomes, renovated “historic” graystones, and condo conversions of nineteenth century apartment complexes priced in the $300,000-$400,000 range (see Davis, 2008; Liebenson, 2009).\(^{127}\) As Davis (2008) reports, median sale prices in Oakland rose 19% in the past year [2007] to $345,000” as “sales in second-quarter 2008 jumped to 211 from 28 during the same period last year.” The push for National Heritage Area (NHA) status (Johns, 2005; Swint, 2007; Hinz, 2009) coupled with the city’s bid

\(^{126}\) It should be stressed, as Loury (2007) reports, much of this redevelopment in Bronzeville and other low-income racialized neighborhoods rested on the penetration of the sub-prime mortgages into such housing markets (also see Wyly and Hammell, 2004; Wyly, et al., 2006).

\(^{127}\) One example was the construction of Drexel Square Townhomes, which featured three- to four-bedroom units ranging from $350,000 to $465,000 (see Mann, 2009).
for the 2016 summer Olympics (inaugurated in 2006) also fueled additional speculative pressure from large-scale real-estate and finance capital (Wheeler, 2006; Bergen, 2006; Chandler, 2007):

> “Since Chicago announced its intention … to bid on the 2016 Olympic Games and to put the Olympic Village in Bronzeville – a gateway to the venues planned for Washington Park – the speculators are back in action.” (Klein, 2008)

> “You know the Olympics will create speculation and investment in Washington Park … Whether 2016 happens or not … it will happen faster with the Olympics.” (Willie Cochran, Alderman, 20th ward, in Pletz, 2009)

Much of this booming housing market was increasingly spearheaded by a melding of global financial capital with local and/or metropolitan-scale real-estate capital: glocal capital crafted affluent and middle-income real-estate space. This type of physical-absolute space (i.e., Park Boulevard on State Street, see Fig. 6.1, 6.2), which existed in the pre-2005 period, increasingly defines the gentrified spaces that now appear throughout Bronzeville (also see Fig. 6.3-6.6). An increasing number of smaller-scale/individual developers are also attracted to Bronzeville’s revival as upwardly-spiraling costs and prices have pushed them from other more established markets (i.e., Lincoln Park, Wicker Park).\(^\text{128}\) This increasingly prevalent kind of residential space, crafted by mostly local capital, tends to be geared toward the upper-income markets. In this context, it represents a relatively new kind of local capital crafted affluent and middle-income real-estate space in addition to the homeowner-led investment/renovation that marked (and continues to mark) this kind of space in the pre-2005 period.

Although the tension-ridden division between local (primarily black) and global capital has remained a feature within this evolved institutional composition, the increasingly organized and aligned local real-estate community (i.e., the Southside Builders Association, see Cuniff,

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\(^\text{128}\) For example, Sutherland Pearsall Development Corporation, a tag-team of two individual developers, represents this emergence of small-scale capital infiltration into Bronzeville in the post-2005 period (see Mann, 2009).
2006) now increasingly works together with global firms. For instance, new large-scale firms such as Northern Realty and CityView (a development and housing finance company chaired by Henry Cisneros, former HUD chief, Wheeler, 2006) and additional investment from firms such as Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill LLP (Chittum, 2007; Starks, 2007) and Johnson & Lee Architects (Liebenson, 2009) now increasingly join forces with (new and old) local developers and builders such as Capri Capital Partners (see Olivo, 2007a) and Urban Juncture Development (see States News Service, 2009; Roeder, 2010) within the same projects.129

In other instances, local capital isn’t even involved. Developments such as Eastgate Village, a jointly-developed venture between Chicago-based Fogelson Properties and Cleveland-based Forest City Enterprises, were also on the rise and represent trans-local marriages of real-estate capital typically melded with global financing (Bergen, 2006). Even donations from Boeing and ComEd now penetrate Bronzeville’s redevelopment (Hood, 2010). It is in this context that Pamela Johnson (head of the Bronzeville Black Chamber of Commerce) remarked that the “Bronzeville of today is not the Bronzeville of ten years ago” (in C. Jackson, 2004).

At the trigger of this spike in affluent gentrification and speculative development was an evolved assemblage of local actors; some new, some old (see Table 6.2). The formation of the QCDC in 2003 emerged as an institutional leader that continues to drive this micro-scale redevelopment governance in Bronzeville (see Lynch [2007a] for a synopsis). Located at the 4th ward aldermanic offices on 47th Street and Cottage Grove, this organization is also an overt acknowledgement of the alderman as a kind of “public developer” in the city. It also represents an unveiled institutional melding of the MSPDC and CCC with the city as both organizations sit on the QCDCs board. The Bronzeville Black Chamber of Commerce also formed during this

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129 For example, see the proposed “Metropolis project” on State Street (see Business Wire, 2007a, b).
time as well as new venues for public dialogue (i.e., the Bronzeville Summit Alliance). The
effect has been an enlarging and diversified assemblage of local invested interests. But most
importantly, the MSPDC is no longer the “principal” local actor it once was.

It should also be stressed that much of this speculative real-estate boom continued to
permeate the neighborhood unevenly. As one local resident observes:

“I see new construction of condos and town homes all around the Oakwood
Shores complex [the mixed-income redevelopment of Ida B. Wells Homes at 39th
Street and Cottage Grove] but very little around here [47th Street and Drexel
Boulevard] …” (in Hutson, 2008b)

The Oakland and North Kenwood community areas, historically separate from the traditional
“Bronzeville” east of Cottage Grove, are now all but gentrified:

“Without question, the hottest community with the best architecture, renovated
condominiums and new construction is from 39th to 47th, east of Cottage Grove.”
(Lauren Lowery, Finders Realty Plus, in Davis, 2008)

The northern and eastern sections of “historic” Bronzeville (between Cottage Grove, King Drive,
and as far south as 47th) are now increasingly remade as sites for affluent residential
development. Yet this has only begun to gain a foothold in the least invested spaces of the Grand
Boulevard community area west of King Drive and south of the IIT campus.

At a more micro-scale resolution, individual blocks themselves tend to “alternate between
new condominiums and empty lots” (Cromidas, 2010). For instance, the southern portions of
Grand Boulevard remain starkly disinvested: “51st Street remains mostly vacant, but other
pockets of the neighborhood are resurging” (Liebenson, 2009). Some blocks are even internally-
differentiated as well. Keith Giles of Kargil Development explains:

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130 The Bronzeville Black Chamber of Commerce represents a new coalition of local black developers and
businesses aligned against the fear of displacement by continued affluent gentrification (C. Jackson, 2004). The
Bronzeville Alliance Summit took place in June, 2007 to discuss the rising land values and housing prices ignited by
the new wave of affluent gentrification and speculative development driven by the city’s Olympic bid (Lynch,
2007b).
“…there’s new developments on one block, and you go across the street and there’s a burned-out building.” (in Cromidas, 2010)

This balkanization is further deepened as the incoming affluent population increasingly seeks to insulate themselves (and their property values) from the remaining vacant and low-income residential and retail spaces that continue to pockmark the landscape (Reed, 2005). As such, many of the more affluent gentrified spaces also feature increasing measures of securitization (i.e., through fortified designs and gated-alarm systems) to ensure adequate degrees of upper-class social exclusion residential space (see Fig. 6.7).

This post-2005 landscape also continues to possess a significant amount of low-income residential space. Although many vacant lots – city-owned vacant lot space – have served as sites for new affluent construction (Fig. 6.8-6.11), other low-income residential and commercial spaces (expanded and deepened by the foreclosure crisis) have entered into disrepair and abandonment (i.e., crap residential space, decrepit-abandoned residential space, and discord-producing ghetto retail space). As these emergent structurally-afflicted spaces are demolished along with the now total erasure of Bronzeville’s stock of ominous public housing space, the neighborhood’s supply of vacant lots are seemingly replenished.

But while much of this vacant land remains rather desolate, it is increasingly perceived as potential community revival space or converted into sanitized leafy-green space, particularly in the neighborhood’s more gentrified sections. Although vacant lots are still commonly assigned negative ascriptions (see Lydersen, 2004; Cottrell, 2008a; Davis, 2008; Olivo, 2007a, 2009, 2011; Bowean, 2010), especially in the desolate-weedy variety, the emergence of more positive

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131 In fact, to one local organizer, the condo market has experienced the majority of the neighborhood’s foreclosures, particularly among new and younger home buyers (Interview, 8/19/2010).
132 All of the public housing complexes that once dominated Bronzeville’s skyline (all but a handful of Robert Taylor high-rises) were demolished by 2005.
perceptions and uses reflects the higher-income population increasingly attracted to and invested in the neighborhood’s redevelopment:

“Yeah, you end up seeing a lot more of this, empty lots getting filled, if not with a building, then as a park like space, jungle gyms and what not, or just nicely trimmed open space … but it’s more the feel to it, for many people it represents what’s about to come. Ok, here it is! The yuppies are coming in and you’re doomed.” (Interview with local resident, 5/29/2011)

*The Retail Debate*

Despite Bronzeville’s post-2005 (albeit uneven) affluent residential growth, non-black gentrifying populations and businesses remain stubbornly reluctant to venture into even *gentrifying* black neighborhoods, a legacy of Chicago’s long deep-seeded history of black-white racial tension. As a result, large-scale retailers and upscale retail capital alike have yet to match the degree of purchasing power the neighborhood’s gentrification has produced. To one local planner (Interview, 2/8/2011), retail capital remains guided by “misconceptions that poor neighborhoods provide too little purchasing power” to justify investment. But Bronzeville remains plagued by a lack of upscale retail *despite* the neighborhoods increasing middle-upper class population (who are clamoring for such retail), leading some to conclude that it is not just poverty, but lingering stereotypical perceptions of *black* poverty driving this persistent reluctance. To Alderman Preckwinkle:

“Retailers look at rooftops, how many houses there are. The look at median income instead of aggregate disposable income. And they’re bigots. Where in the city is retail non-existent? Hispanic and black communities. They’re scared of poor people of color.” (in Chandler, 2007)

But as race is now commonly portrayed as less of a political and social issue, “many people find it difficult to speak frankly about such a touchy subject” (Sector, Glanton, and Trice, 2011). Despite the presidential election of Barack Obama, a Chicago south-sider, mainstream declarations of America “overcoming race” have proved superficial and premature. For example,
an entire discussion with a local organizer (6/18/2009) in relation to gentrification in Bronzeville did not yield even one reference to race. The following remarks from a local resident address this increasing “color-blind racism” (Bonilla-Silva, 2001, 2009) in the neoliberal period:

“I don’t think about race now in Chicago the way I look back on the 1950s or 1960s here. But there is an invisible veil that covers everything. You don’t realize you’re peeking through the veil until things start to look blurry and then suddenly you can’t breathe” (Sector, et al., 2011).

In short, race remains a prevalent issue in Chicago despite its invisible veiling. In this context, this emergent period of supposed racial tolerance only serves as an elaborate cover for the same lingering racism that has historically maligned, discursively and materially, Chicago’s low-income black population.

As a result, Bronzeville’s redevelopment is increasingly frustrated “by the liquor-store-as-nearest-food-store-dilemma,” as middle-income residents live in what’s deemed a “food desert” in some cases miles away from the nearest “mainstream grocery stores or supermarkets” (Guy, 2008a; also see Lynch, 2007a). The Jewel-Osco that does exist, at 35th and King Drive, is often avoided as some local residents have noted that it is “old, dirty, and ‘doesn’t smell good’” (Guy, 2008a). In fact, the closest concentration of upscale retail lines the Roosevelt Road corridor in the mixed but largely white South Loop to the north or in racially-mixed but middle-upper income Hyde Park to the south. As Reed (2005) reports, many middle-income Bronzeville homeowners often leave the neighborhood to enjoy a nice dinner out primarily because of the lack of such establishments nearby:

“The retail that has moved in is very typical of what you get in an African-American community – which is another Foot Locker, Pizza Hut, KFC … But there’s nothing like a Panera Bread or a Starbucks or an Einstein Bagels. There’s no nice deli to offer you a nice lunch, vs. having to go get Popeye’s or White

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133 For an in depth report on racist comments received by the Chicago Sun-Times in response to a series of reports on the lingering role of race, see Reed and Thomas (2005), and Chicago Sun-Times (2005).
Castle or McDonald’s. It’s been very disappointing.” (local homeowner, in Reed, 2005)

The neighborhood’s retail landscape, as a result, continues to be dominated by *discord-producing ghetto retail space* (particularly along the Pershing Avenue, 43rd and 47th Street corridors west of King Drive):

“The vacant lot [where the historic Gerri’s Palm Tavern once stood], filled with drained 32-oz. beer bottles, dirty potato chip bags and other trash, is among several empty parcels and abandoned businesses on a strip also occupied by nail and hair salons, liquor stores and chicken shacks.” (Olivo, 2009)

As much of the neighborhood remains disinvested, its associated spaces of social neglect persist and increasingly represent eyesores to the neighborhood’s gentrifying population: “the shuttered storefront churches, abandoned chicken joints and rusting, unused tot-lots that make the once swirling 20-block area seem like a ghost town” (Olivo, 2007b; also see Reed, 2005).

But these spaces are now increasingly under rhetorical assault from the neighborhood’s middle-income homeowners. Spearheaded by the QCDC, an agenda to stimulate commercial development (mainly along 47th Street, 43rd Street, and Cottage Grove Avenue) has emerged to fill this vacuum and growing retail demand (Chandler, 2007). But it is aimed specifically toward growth in middle-income oriented businesses in an effort to attract future investment and consumers and to prevent “retail leakage” by keeping consumer dollars in the neighborhood (discussion with local organizer, 6/18/2009):

“That’s what we would like to create, a mix of small businesses and restaurant so you can go there and spend the day … so far everyone has been interested … they can lease to nice tenants, and the value of their property will go up.” (Bernita Johnson-Gabriel, in Chandler, 2007)

What is here completely unrecognized is the role of “Jim Crow” segregation in structurally preventing golden era middle-income residents from leaving the neighborhood and consuming elsewhere. Without addressing this fundamental distinction between the past and present,
attempts to revive the “thriving” commercial landscape of the “Black Metropolis” mistakenly ignore an important dimension to what made this historical landscape possible to being with.

What this effort has accomplished, instead, is an exacerbating of the neighborhood’s existing intra-racial class divide. For instance, while Alderman Preckwinkle is clear about the need for commercial development, “she’s just as clear about what she doesn’t want – no more nail salons, barber shops, hair salons or beauty stores” (Chandler, 2007). To Pam Dempsey, local real-estate broker, there’s no need for “the fast-food stuff we already have around here … but nicer retail, like the stuff that came to the South Loop and Hyde Park …” [my italics] (in Cromidas, 2010; also see Rodriquez, 2008). These spaces are increasingly perceived as barriers to future upscale redevelopment in general. In fact, many have even been targeted for removal. Conflict has since erupted between QCDC constituents and the remaining low-income businesses that continue to litter Bronzeville’s landscape.

Liquor Stores have been particularly targeted, especially by the middle-income based Bronzeville Area Resident’s & Commerce Council (BARCC). To Meli Monroe, President of the BARCC, the goal of the organization has been to “rid the community of unwanted liquor stores” (paraphrased in Hutson, 2010c). “Bars, banquet halls, and restaurants” are considered to be more “acceptable alternatives” because “customers cannot take liquor off the premises” (ibid). Notice the class content communicated through words such as “community” and “banquet halls” as well as in the following passage from Monroe:

“Liquor stores attract the wrong crowd. They also interfere with tourism and commerce … We are not against liquor being sold in Bronzeville but are against packaged liquor sold…” (ibid)

This statement clearly identifies the class-based sensibilities of this anti-liquor store movement. Liquor itself isn’t the problem, but liquor being sold to poor people; people who
can’t afford it any other way than cheaply and in bulk at local convenient stores. The BARCC in fact has made its mission to close down any business that sells “packaged liquor,” claiming that “it is a well known fact that liquor stores have historically crippled the Black community” (Hutson, 2010c). Some targeted business owners, however, have called out the class-biased aspect to this anti-liquor store campaign led by the BARCC:

“When there were public housing buildings throughout Bronzeville no one complained about liquor stores being there. But now that is gone and more homes are being built with new residents moving into the area so now liquor stores are bad tenants … personally, I think liquor stores are being unfairly targeted.” (Kamel Fakhouri, local business owner, in Hutson, 2010c)

This class-biased battle, however, is still being fought with no significant victories claimed by either side. But the QCDC and BARCC initiatives have mobilized the increased presence of upper-class community safety space (see Fig. 5.33, 5.34) which has contributed to a general transformation of social isolation space to social removal space: spaces permeated by stepped-up and enforced anti-loitering ordinances and police presence.

“Yeah, especially for those spaces where people used to hang-out and socialize, outside of stores, in parking lots, even in those vacant lots … when they implement those laws [anti-loitering], make it illegal, or just remove the space outright, like taking the [basketball] rims down … then they’re removing that sociable character that people once needed, that brought people together…” (Interview with local resident, 5/29/2011)

The QCDC-led movement to stimulate upscale retail growth, however, has struggled to secure the desired amount of capital from established financial institutions. In response to this blockage, a number of local, black-run financial institutions have emerged to fill this immense demand for financial capital among existing and potential businesses. Long-standing Chicago banks invested in Bronzeville (i.e., Citibank, Shorebank, and Seaway Bank and Trust, see Hutson, 2008b, 2010a) and newer, local banks (i.e., Harris Bank, Generation Community Bank, see Harris, 2010; Hutson, 2010b) have recently stepped in to fill this vacuum.
It would be a mistake, however, to argue that retail growth in general has been non-existent. Despite the absence of large-scale retailers, there has been an increase in smaller-scale higher-income businesses, of *local capital crafted conspicuous consumption retail space*. In part stimulated by the QCDCs TIF-channeling capabilities, individual business owners and entrepreneurs (mostly black) are increasingly starting up their own businesses to fill the demand for local middle-upper class consumption.\footnote{134} As a result, an influx of art galleries (see *PS Newswire US*, 2005; *N’ Digo*, 2006; *Chicago Sun-Times*, 2007; Hood, 2010) now litter the neighborhood as new upscale eateries (see Fig. 6.12),\footnote{135} coffee shops (i.e., the Bronzeville Coffee House), farmer’s markets (see Rodriguez, 2008; Marek, 2008; Mack, 2010), bed & breakfasts (See C. Jackson, 2004), and other upscale shops (see *Crain’s Chicago Business*, 2005; Chandler, 2007; *States News Service*, 2009; Liebenson, 2009; Olivo, 2009; Pevtzow, 2010; Kogan, 2010; Bowean, 2010, see Fig. 5.25, 5.26)\footnote{136} provide gentrifying populations with a growing source of *consumptively nourishing elite space* – spaces necessary for the constitution of upper-class identities (Bourdieu, [1979] 1984, 1993).

*The Hegemony of “Community Nostalgia”*

Keeping this assemblage of local and trans-local actors inter-twined and working together has meant the collective promotion of a unifying image: the nostalgic-inspired revival of Bronzeville. This vision is now widely accepted and embedded within the neighborhood’s social

\footnote{134} It should also be noted that the emergence of many of these new establishments have been greatly aided by TIF funding channeled through the QCDC (*States News Service*, 2009; Liebenson, 2009).

\footnote{135} Such as Zaleski & Horvath Market/Café, Chicago’s Home of Chicken and Waffles, Ms. Biscuit, Cecelia’s Southern Breakfast, Mejani 310, Bronzeville Fresh Produce, the Jerk Shack (specializing in Jamaican jerk chicken), Bronzeville Smokehouse and Grill, Blue 47 and the Spoken Word Café. However, it should be noted that Blu 47 and the Spoken Word Café were destroyed by fire in January, 2010 (see Bowean, 2010). The loss of these establishments was considered a tragic blow to Bronzeville’s revival and insult upon injury considering the Olympic aftershock hitting in October, 2009.

\footnote{136} These farmers markets also represent a new kind of city-funded recreational space as they occupy increasingly sanitized public spaces.
fabric. To one local business owner, “it’s [Bronzeville’s rich history] so embedded in the community, even to the extent that that’s what cab drivers talk about … the good old days of the blues when you’re riding through the neighborhood” (Interview, 8/17/2010). Bronzeville is also now increasingly portrayed and advertised as a tourist destination through local media outlets (see Hoekstra, 2006b). As a result, most news stories on Bronzeville now typically include a seemingly requisite short reminder (as opposed to forceful articulation) of Bronzeville’s early twentieth century history as a site of African-American culture and prosperity:

“With its stately mansions and historic landmarks, Bronzeville boasts a storied reputation as the center for African American creativity and innovation during the first half of the 20th century.” (N’Digo, 2006)

“Bronzeville always has been a portrait framed by African-American culture – and that culture is now reviving the historic community … is once again brimming with a renewed fellowship. African-American entrepreneurs are lifting up the community with their own hands.” (Hoekstra, 2006a)

“Bronzeville was once a thriving ‘black metropolis’ with hundreds of black-owned businesses and a booming night life. It’s population swelled during the great migration of Southern blacks seeking jobs after World War I.” (Cromidas, 2010)

“From the end of the southern sharecropping in the early 1900s, through the migration’s acceleration at the onset of World War I, Chicago’s growing Black population was housed within Bronzeville’s borders … In Bronzeville, Black music evolved. At Pilgrim Baptist Church under the tutelage of Thomas Dorsey, singing of Southern Black spirituals and the Delta blues became the style of the church gospel choir and band. In clubs throughout the area, Southern blues met the electric guitar for the first time while next door, New Orleans jazz met swing.” (Swint, 2007)

“This building [the Supreme Life Building] represents in its past what the future should be for the people of Bronzeville … It represents commerce. It represents intellectualism. It represents community organizing. Within this space is the spirit of the community in the bricks and the walks and the glass and the history.” (Phillip Jackson, Black Star Project, in Terry, 2009)

“A fresh new day is dawning … full of warmth and promise. This historic neighborhood is about to experience a long-awaited revival.” (*Park Boulevard*, mixed-income redevelopment of Stateway Gardens, 2011)

In short, this narrative essentially became the politically sanctioned and unifying rhetorical device propelling this post-2005 wave of development, as local organizations and investors routinely propagated it along with city officials and connected developers alike.

Reflecting this growing “community nostalgia” hegemony, many of the newer, post-2005 commercial spaces are also commemorative of Bronzeville’s rich cultural history: spaces inscribed with decorative murals, that showcase African and African-American art and history, and/or offer ethnic-African cuisine. In this context, these local businesses also qualify as spaces of *historical-preservation* (physical-absolute) and *community-nostalgia* (humanly-lived) in that they represent contemporary identity-constituting emblems of the neighborhood’s “selective” past. These spaces, including the continued renovation and landmark designation of nineteenth century graystones, are also made increasingly visible through a growing number of tours (offered through the Bronzeville Merchants Association and the Black Metropolis Convention & Tourism Council) now are available that promote and showcase the neighborhood’s increasing stock of landmark-status sites (Terry, 2009; Thompson, 2009).

Moreover, *historical preservation space* is now increasingly melded with *city-funded beautification space*. For instance, the Bronzeville Obelisk Project, now underway and funded by a $100,000 state grant, proposes the erection of ten obelisks that commemorate the first African Americans who migrated to Chicago from the south (Ihejirika, 2009; Thompson, 2010b). Two of the proposed obelisks have already been completed (located at the 35th and State Street intersection) and represent a fusing of these two types of spaces in that they exhibit concrete, streetscaping markers of this historical legacy. However, other established examples of this
hybrid, historical/beautification space, such as the Bronzeville Blues District, are now recognized as failed ventures. This Tillman spearheaded “community-nostalgia” tagging project along King Drive is now considered a joke (in addition to the now bankrupt Harold Washington Cultural Center) as it never attracted the desired entertainment-oriented businesses and tourists (Olivo, 2009). This investment-flop also favored largely in Tillman’s failed re-election.

The Olympic Redevelopment Trope and the Formation of Housing Bronzeville

This post-2005 evolving and wave of affluent development also incorporated a place-specific rhetorical manifestation of the increasingly entrenched global trope: the Olympic redevelopment trope. Akin to the “global city imaginary” commonly depicted by Olympic-chasing cities (Short, 2008), the global trope is here re-dressed and re-articulated in the context of bringing the 2016 Olympic games to Chicago, an international event:

“Daley spoke at the process conference, pointing out that Chicago is a global city with non-stop airline service to all parts of the world and is ‘well-equipped to handle Olympic-sized crowds.’” (Hersh, 2006)

“The Olympics would provide a platform to show off our city to literally billions of people … There would be strong benefits for tourism and economic development as well as new housing and other capital investments.” (Mayor Daley, in Bergen and Washburn, 2006)

“… a good thing to host the Olympics—a chance to showcase our city as a global center of commerce and culture.” (McCarron, 2006b)

Forcefully articulated by Mayor Daley and proponents (i.e., the Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce, Chicago Commercial Club, and city planners), the assertion is that the drive to land the Olympics should be supported because it would cement Chicago’s status as a “global city” and produce increased competitiveness. It would also, purportedly, aid in the nostalgic revival of
Bronzeville by using the Olympic bid to attract additional infrastructural investment and much needed jobs to the would-be epicenter for many Olympic facilities:138

“Proponents say the neighborhood has the potential to claim that title [as the Africa-American cultural capital] once again should the City of Chicago’s bid for the 2016 Olympics be successful.” (Wheeler, 2006)

This was the angle taken by city officials promoting the bid in the requisite rhetorical task of “selling the Olympics” (Short, 2008) to local residents. Bronzeville would have likely been the most affected neighborhood in the city had Chicago landed the bid, as the Olympic village, stadium, and a host of “infrastructural” projects would have significantly “accelerated” the neighborhood’s on-going redevelopment (discussion with local organizer 6/18/2009; also see Healey, 2009; Chalkley and Essex, 1999).139 In this context, the argument sought to normalize this redevelopment process as a rational endeavor, a necessity if Chicago were to follow its global aspirations by landing the Olympics.140 As a result, the Olympic bid significantly underpinned a speculative boom of investment in Bronzeville between the bid’s inception in 2006 and its loss in 2009.141

City and local officials also promoted the Olympic bid through the argument that increased speculative development will equate to jobs: “the alderman [Preckwinkle] says retail development in her ward will translate into jobs” (local organizer, interview 6/18/2009):

“We’ve got a real crisis here with jobs and economic development…So how can we say if we want jobs and economic development, yet not be for a vehicle that can help bring that to us.” (Leslie Hairston, 5th ward alderman, in Chinn, 2007)

138 For more examples of this argument, see Lynch (2007b), Chinn (2007), Russell (2009), Healey (2009), and Michaeli (2009).
139 For example, plans to move forward with establishing a “New Harbor at 31st Street, with over 100 boat slips” was significantly accelerated due to the Olympic bid (discussion with local organizer 6/18/2009).
140 In parallel with this rhetorical theme was the up-coming Burnham centennial celebration in the spring of 2009, another event accompanied by “global Chicago” articulations (see Kamin, 2009; Hinz, 2009).
141 It also established a new “Olympic TIF” near Washington Park where the Olympic stadium would have been constructed (Pletz, 2009).
But there is typically no mention, however, as to what kind of jobs are at stake (i.e., good paying jobs or dead-end service sector jobs) and whom these jobs would be created for, “economic development” for whom? These types of questions and concerns, as a result, politically charged a number of local residents as the bid gained momentum:

“The neighborhood will host the Olympic Village and after the games conclude, thousands of housing units built for the occasion will be sold at market rate, sparking concerns of some residents who don’t want working-class families pushed out of Bronzeville because of spiraling costs.” (Healey, 2009)

The Olympic bid here emerged as a symbol of gentrification and inevitable displacement of lower-income residents. Buttressed by the evolved post-2005 socio-political climate, this Olympic-fueled wave of what some have called re-gentrification (Lynch, 2008b) ultimately led to the political mobilization of a new “grass-roots” force against the city.

_Housing Bronzeville and “Go-Global” Resistance_

A coalition of local residents came together in 2004 to form the _Housing Bronzeville_ movement as a new source of resistance against the city, local aldermen, and even some past grass-roots organizers (i.e., the MSPDC) now perceived to be absorbed within city hall (see _Housing Bronzeville News, 2007_). Housing Bronzeville, led by activists Valencia Hardy and Kenneth Williams, initially formed after successfully placing an advisory referendum on a November 2004 ballot calling for the creation of a Bronzeville Affordable Housing Trust Fund (_Housing Bronzeville News, 2007; Hyde Park Citizen, 2010_). Although the referendum passed widely, it was ignored by Preckwinkle and Tillman, of which only fueled the fire of this movement and, eventually, led to a failed Tillman re-election in 2007.

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142 The term (re)gentrification typically refers to the upward gentrification of a previously middle-income gentrified neighborhood.
This “grass-roots” movement consisted primarily of existing middle-income homeowners, many of which were long-standing residents and original gentrifiers. At first, it was a response to housing prices ascending to levels beyond what was deemed affordable for some middle-income homeowners (Briggs, 2006):

“It’s all about money in Bronzeville these days. If you make $100,000 a year or more you can live here. If not, then you got to go, it’s just that simple.” (Local business owner, in Hutson, 2008a)

“You look around, and, to me, it’s mostly upper-class people moving in … I think it’s just a matter of time before I’ll have to move out. They talk about my building going condo. You can’t afford the prices.” (Local renter, in Reed, 2005)

In this context, it was a movement to protect “affordable housing” specifically by and for the black middle-class against an increasingly visible menace: the city’s “go-global” redevelopment agenda. These residents increasingly began to fear that gentrification was accelerating beyond the original nostalgic vision by threatening the coveted balance of mixed-incomes as well as catering to affluent whites (see Cottrell, 2008a; B. Anderson, 2009):

“I believe this area is slowly becoming the South Loop, meaning that there will be a lot of condos and high-priced homes … the middle and low income people will eventually be totally pushed out. People who have been here for generations.” (Kenneth Williams, in Cottrell, 2008b)

“We’re not going to sit back and let Daley and the aldermen run rough shot over our community … we should have a say about what’s going on here.” (Patricia Hardy, in Cottrell, 2008b)

These were the original gentrifiers and homeowners who pushed for redevelopment in the 1990s as gentrification initially gathered steam. But they were now ironically feeling the brunt of the very process they once championed.

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143 Since the area remains 98% black, this emergent fear of White gentrification, following Reed’s (2005) report, is largely illusory. Middle-upper income blacks continue to be the dominant gentrifying population.
The formation of Housing Bronzeville also re-engaged a conflict that previously pitted the MSPDCs vision (i.e., “community nostalgia”) against the city’s vision (i.e., “go-global”) for redevelopment. Again, the crux of this conflict was the charge that the promotion of Bronzeville’s revival by the city, Daley in particular, is and has been insincere. Despite the now hegemonic status of the “community nostalgia” narrative, these activists argued that what was actually happening was drastically diverging from the actual vision communicated through the narrative. For these activists, the nostalgic revival of Bronzeville, despite the city’s on-going promotion of it, was actually translating into an uncontrolled upward and affluent redevelopment and, inevitably, the neighborhood’s complete gentrification.

But this new wave of nostalgia-inspired visionaries departed from the MSPDC and other now city-connected local organizations (i.e., the QCDC) (see Table 6.3). In fact, Housing Bronzeville activists charged that many former MSPDC activists were now de-facto city-hall members and sell-outs to downtown city elites. Pat Dowell, former MSPDC director, bore the brunt of this accusation. Dowell, after signing an agreement with Housing Bronzeville and pledging to increased transparency during her aldermanic campaign, was initially reluctant to relinquish leverage to Housing Bronzeville since her election: “[Dowell] said she has yet to see a viable plan from the group [Housing Bronzeville]” (B. Anderson, 2009; also see Roeder, 2008). This subsequently fueled the notion that local activists and leaders are inevitably absorbed into city hall by Daley’s powers of co-optation as “many activists and religious leaders who were once outsiders are now inside City Hall cutting deals” (M. Mitchell, 2000).144

144 Following Dumke (2005), Mayor Richard M. Daley has now built an impressive record of co-opting black and Latino political figures and activists into his neoliberal agenda. By surrounding himself with racially diverse political aides and councilmen, disseminating monetary gifts to each (so long as they accept his visions), Daley is able to defuse charges of racism. However, Daley’s class-biased drive to resuscitate the city as a site for capital accumulation remains intact, as race is used as a cover for class.
In this context, this conflict’s post-2005 rendition represents a distinct division within the former MSPDC constituent base: between “newer activists” and “older sell-outs.” The formerly “grass-roots” MSPDC is now seen as increasingly incorporated into the city of which Dowell’s election is emblematic. Paraphrasing Valencia Hardy of Housing Bronzeville, “Dowell hasn’t kept her promise to help … the alderwoman is in on the city plan to redefine Bronzeville, which in turn would push people out of the community” (Russell, 2009). The neighborhood’s newer gentrifiers have also tended to resist participation in this activism. The neighborhood’s middle-income population is also here further divided between activist old-timers and non-activist newcomers. To Bowean (2010), paraphrasing Harold Lucas (President of the Bronzeville Visitor Information Center), “although the neighborhood has attracted a growing number of young professionals, too few are engaged in the kind of activism that makes the area better”:

“Take your bars down and come out of your houses … People come back to live in Bronzeville because it’s one of the oldest black communities They can’t sit behind gated doors and not fight the fights.” (Lucas, in Bowean, 2010)

But it was the city’s Olympic bid, proposed in 2006, that delivered a significant boost in media attention to the Housing Bronzeville cause. This conflict, although years in the making, was no longer a resistance merely to full-throttle gentrification. It was, now, with heightened media coverage, also a formidable barrier to the city’s chances of landing the Olympics. At this point, the debate shifted to who the Olympics would benefit: the city and mostly white developers or the local black middle-class and established neighborhood organizations:

“Bronzeville became the Ellis Island for newly arrived Blacks. Blacks were once confined to this area and ‘now all of a sudden it is a community where black people can’t afford to live in’” (Cheryl Spivey-Perry, director of Virginia Bums Hope Center, in Lynch, 2007c)

“We need to be people that are proactive not reactive … We want to make sure that if the Olympics does happen that there is a very solid community benefits
agreement. We don’t want to be the last one thought about.” (Rev. Stevie Powell, Centers for New Horizon’s, in Lynch, 2007b)

“We own the land … and if we don’t develop it, they are going to push us off and there won’t be no more promise land, because all the white folks are moving back into the city building million dollar homes.” (Lucas, in Lynch, 2007c)

“Their concerns echo those of other residents in South-side communities who have said they worry that an Olympic spotlight would lead officials and businesspeople in the city to gentrify historic black neighborhoods.” (Uribarri, 2009)

Boyd (2009), corroborating this accusation in a radio interview, noted that landing the Olympics would certainly make Bronzeville “more and more attractive to African-Americans with greater resources.” Thus, it would also make the neighborhood’s long-lasting low- and middle-income residents more vulnerable to displacement due to the accelerated gentrification that the Olympics would undoubtedly facilitate. In response to the city’s proposed 80,000-seat Olympic stadium for Washington Park, one local resident inquired “who is going to be looking at that stadium? I don’t think it will be any poor people.” (in Lynch, 2007c). This resident, as Lynch (2007c) reports, “believes vacant land in the Washington Park community will be gobbled up for half a million dollar homes – ‘homes that our people cannot afford to move back in’.”

Fueled by the Olympic bid as a hot-button issue, Housing Bronzeville was subsequently able to mobilize a good degree of political power against what they dubbed as the “city plan” for redevelopment. This plan would, according to Housing Bronzeville, redefine the neighborhood along the lines of the “go-global” vision of which, purportedly, has little in common with the local “community nostalgia” and identity-constituting vision. But the city and planning officials, however, countered that the Olympics would only aid in the very goals the Housing Bronzeville coalition is proposing, keeping the two narratives linked and mutually-supportive. Housing Bronzeville, however, has vehemently argued that this is a sham:
“Remember those twin boasts by the 2016 Spin Masters [Daley and Olympic organizers Patrick Ryan and Lori Healey]: ‘Chicago taxpayers won’t pay a penny’ and ‘not one person will be displaced.’ If you believe them, then give the Ryan, Healey, Daley triumvirate the Gold Medal for ‘spinning the public.’ Add the Silver and Bronze Medals, too. They will have earned them! (Housing Bronzeville News, 2007)

Central to this now Olympic-stimulated conflict remains the question of how to utilize the roughly “2,000 city-owned lots sitting vacant and unavailable to local residents” (Russell, 2009). The immense degree of vacant land that sill permeates Bronzeville is now increasingly viewed by these activists as a “land grab” (Patricia Hardy, in Roeder, 2008). The goal being the complete affluent (and white) gentrification of the neighborhood by driving up prices and selling lots strictly geared for affluent construction. As opposed to the less aggressive tactics of the MSPDC during the 1990s, this conflict culminated with Housing Bronzeville activists, in fact, protesting outside Mayor Daley’s home in 2009 (Uribarri, 2009).

“While Mayor Richard M. Daley and the 2016 Olympic committee are trying to impress the world, some Bronzeville residents have a few thoughts they’d like to impress upon them: ‘Don’t push us out of our homes’.” (Cottrell, 2008b)

“The Olympics are known for displacement … Our goal is to get these vacant lots set aside so we can get these homes built for moderate-income families.” (Hardy, in Uribarri, 2009)

This immense swath of open space remains mostly vacant despite this high demand for affordable housing. The lots that have been sold have generally been auctioned off at prices well-below market rate values to developers geared toward affluent construction (Hyra, 2008):

“… the Olympics could displace tens of thousands of residents in the historic Bronzeville neighborhood if the city does not commit the lots to homes for families making about $40,000 - $60,000 per year … they will end up as more

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145 This debate has been widely covered (see Housing Bronzeville News, 2007; Lynch, 2007b, c; Cottrell, 2008b; Roeder, 2008; Klein, 2008; B. Anderson, 2009; Russell, 2009; Healey, 2009; Hyde Park Citizen, 2010).
146 According to Housing Bronzeville News (2007), “the City is now in the process of selling these lots to the top bidder – pushing housing costs in Bronzeville to astronomical levels - $300,000, $600,000, or even $900,000 – well out of the reach of most local residents or their families.”
homes that are unattainably priced for the community’s existing residents.”
(Uribarri, 2009)

It should be stressed, however, that city officials and developers have struggled to be persuasive against these accusations in the context of the post-2005, “humanist-friendly” rhetorical battleground. This evolved socio-political climate, no doubt, has favored Housing Bronzeville in its “affordable housing” quest. In fact, after securing an exclusive meeting with International Olympic Committee members in April, 2009 to discuss the local impacts of the city’s plan and to express concerns of impending displacement, Housing Bronzeville claims to have actually contributed to Chicago losing the bid in 2009 (Housing Bronzeville, 2011):

“The bid failed in Copenhagen on October 2, 2009, in no small part owing to City officials’ turning a deaf ear to the stated wishes of Bronzeville residents. Mirroring fifty years of intentional neglect, the City was prepared to leave residents to the whims of the frenzied development, overheated real estate markets, and skyrocketing housing prices associated with every Olympic Games – an unacceptable rejection of their wishes that residents resisted at every turn” (Housing Bronzeville, 2011).

This evolved climate also effectively brought an end to two of Bronzeville’s long-standing aldermen in April, 2007: Madeline Haithcock and Dorothy Tillman in the 2nd and 3rd wards, respectively. Tillman, whose ward constitutes the majority of Bronzeville, was voted out after twenty-two years by challenger Pat Dowell (after narrowly losing to Tillman in 2003). Coupled with mounting criticism of her monopoly control of vacant land, persistent charges of corruption (M. Anderson, 2007), and favoring city-connected developers (i.e., Eastlake Management), Tillman’s popularity rapidly eroded.147

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147 Tillman, an organizer for Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1960s and appointed alderman of the 3rd ward by Harold Washington in the 1985 has continued to adopt a black politics rooted in the civil rights political climate. However, the incoming young black gentrifiers, a product of Tillman’s drive to foster black gentrification, no longer identifies with this now outdated racial politics. In this context, Tillman’s stubborn adherence to this kind of politics is considered to have slowly alienated her transforming 3rd ward population base.
As the neighborhood’s increasing base of middle-income homeowners grew impatient and fearful of affluent gentrification, Dowell seized the moment and swept into office:

“Tillman’s performance … reveals she’s more focused on self-interest than redeveloping Bronzeville. She has a well-known habit of wielding her influence to the enrichment of cronies and family members, as is documented in contracts and employment records.” (Dowell, 2005b)

In fact, the moment Tillman may have sealed her fate was after an outburst in front of Housing Bronzeville protesters outside her aldermanic office in March, 2007. Tillman, reportedly, stormed out of the building, refused to discuss the issues (the reason why the protest occurred), and even used profanity directed against the protesters, “charging the group with infiltration by ‘gang bangers’” (Housing Bronzeville News, 2007). This “revanchist” public display, for many, “was the last nail in her electoral coffin” (Housing Bronzeville News, 2007); a reflection of how overt revanchist rhetorical strategies, following Keil (2009), no longer make sense in this evolved socio-political climate.

“Affordable Housing” and the Spatialization of the Humanist-Turn

The notion of “affordable housing” emerged as a “buzz word” in the post-2005 period. In fact, to one local planner, the use of the expression “affordable housing” has become a national phenomenon (Interview 2/8/2011). But the emergence of this notion of “affordable housing,” however, has led to its deployment in newspaper articles often without discussing what this understanding of “affordable” actually entails:

“We’re both [with Housing Bronzeville] working toward having mixed-income neighborhoods that have a substantial amount of affordable housing” (Alderman Preckwinkle, in Healey, 2009).

Although readers are often left with a sense of ambiguity, “affordable housing” usually signifies housing that is affordable to low-income residents, hence the strategic use of this expression by redevelopment agents. The CHA considers “affordable” to be families earning between $20,000
- $39,999, or individuals earning up to sixty percent of the “area median income” (Chicago Housing Authority, 2000). Less apparent, however, is that this figure is upwardly-skewed in that it includes outlying, wealthier suburban regions in the calculation (Lydersen, 2008). In Bronzeville, the QCDC and Housing Bronzeville both tend to refer to affordability here in the context of middle-income housing, particularly that of homeownership:148

“A South-side non-profit [Housing Bronzeville] may be one step closer to its goal of increasing middle-income homeownership in Bronzeville.” (B. Anderson, 2009)

“This gives me and others like me an opportunity to buy a home here without being priced out.” (Kenneth Williams, in B. Anderson, 2009)

They’re [Housing Bronzeville] goal is to have officials set aside the lots for middle-income families…making $40,000 - $60,000 per year.” (Uribarri, 2009)

It is in this context that the neighborhood’s vacant lots are, alternatively, conceived by Housing Bronzeville as a means of developing this new “affordable housing” for middle-income residents (B. Anderson, 2009). But, in a twist of irony, much of this proposed “moderate-middle income housing [by Housing Bronzeville] is leveraged against the neighborhood’s proximity to the would-be Olympic Village …” (B. Anderson, 2009). Here, the Olympic bid, although the object of disdain, was also, and curiously, being utilized by Housing Bronzeville activists to promote their own respective “affordable housing” development proposals.

Decent low-income housing, however, has seemingly all but vanished:

“It’s a real problem, they don’t have the housing here to put them in [displaced public housing residents], and with the economy the way it is, there aren’t jobs for people … There isn’t really low-income housing around here anymore. People are having to pay mortgages and taxes triple what they used to. If it continues this way, a lot of people are going to have to leave Bronzeville.” (Beauty Turner, local activist and Resident Journal assistant editor, in the Washington Post, Lydersen, 2004).

148 This use of “affordable housing” as a code for middle-income homeownership is further corroborated in Briggs (2006), Russell (2009), Healey (2009), and Olivo (2011).
Despite the heightened media attention this debate has garnered, the interests of the most marginalized, low-income residents most prone to displacement have been all but silenced; a reflection of the broader scale “sound of silence” that Johns (2004b) reported as increasingly coloring national political debate. If Bronzeville’s increasingly affluent development represents housing outside the “middle-income” range, then the “affordable” or “moderate” income housing promoted by Housing Bronzeville is similarly well outside the range of what’s affordable to the lowest income residents. Moreover, the rare case of “affordable housing” that is priced for low-income residents typically does not remain so very long (Hyra, 2008; Lydersen, 2008).

However, despite this persistent dearth of housing affordable for the lowest-income residents, Housing Bronzeville’s activism is beginning to translate into new housing policy as the group’s “affordable housing” quest is now recognized by the city and seemingly taken seriously: “the group [HB] has reached out to twenty developers, interviewed ten of them, and selected one to build a first phase of Bronzeville Affordable Homes on seventy city-owned vacant lots in the Bronzeville Community …” (Housing Bronzeville, 2011). Current Alderman, Pat Dowell, after initial antagonism with Housing Bronzeville, now supports the group’s proposal for vacant lots to be used for affordable housing (Housing Bronzeville News, 2011). In this context, this evolved discursive landscape (partially a response to HB activism) can be interpreted as stimulating the kind of “power realignment” characteristic of the roll-with-it transition as both Housing Bronzeville and MSPDC activists now dominate Bronzeville’s political landscape. And from a political insider in Tillman to a former MSPDC organizer in Dowell, it also coincides in a change in a key actor as well.

This has also coincided with not a small amount of a new type of low-income residential space. No doubt a reflection of this “affordable housing” debate (despite its “middle-income”
focus) and the broader humanist-turn, a small degree of *new construction* is now geared toward affordability for “moderate” and even “low-income” residents (for rent and homeownership alike). Although engulfed by the neighborhood’s ensuing affluent redevelopment, this new and emergent kind of *tenant-serenity residential space* should not be viewed as insignificant.

Indeed, as the mixed-income replacement sites are finally beginning to materialize, the spaces of tenant-serenity associated with these sites have also increased:

[In relation to Park Boulevard] “It’s beautiful over there … maybe by not being the high-rises, you know, they’ll value what they have over here and take care of it.” (Public housing resident, in Cottrell, 2008a)

But these spaces, characterized by new construction geared toward affordability to lower-income residents, are increasingly prevalent as implementation of mixed-income housing now extends beyond public-housing redevelopment sites to newer condominiums and apartment complexes:

“… After thinking at the greater community … Every single development that had 10 units or more had to be a mix … not just the transformation sites, but all the new sites …” (Interview, local organizer, 8/19/2010)

Much of the neighborhood’s residential landscape, particularly in North Kenwood and Oakland, entails a degree of lower-income units incorporated within larger “mixed-income” condo and apartment complexes. But more curiously, this spatial manifestation of this broader temporal transitioning has even led to the construction of new apartment/rental complexes that are *cooperative/co-owned* (see Fig. 6.13-6.15; Olivo, 2011).149 This emergent housing is not confined to just Bronzeville, according to this local planning assistant:

Oh yeah, you’re seeing more of this [new affordable housing] … I call ‘em pop-ups, and you can see them all over the place, not just here. This is what happens when people are pushed to the brink … nobody’s just gonna lay down … when people fight and work together, then you start to seeing those very people co-invest in these kinds of projects. Gentrification’s still in full force, but I think

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149 Such locally-sourced banks have included established local fixtures, Shorebank and Seaway Bank and Trust, and the newly formed Generation Community Bank (Hutson, 2008b; 2010a, b; Harris, 2010; Olivo, 2011a).
you’ll see a lot more of these kinds of developments especially since normal financing is dried up …” (Interview with local resident, 5/29/2011)

These spaces, although still relatively sparse and mostly located in the less invested sections west of King Drive, are typically financed by local financial and real-estate capital alike\(^{150}\); an emergent form of local capital crafted low-income residential space meant to fill the monumental local demand for affordable low-income housing. I suggest this new form of development is significant in that represents, at the very least, the potential materialization of new “life worlds” in this neighborhood and perhaps even beyond. It is also a reflection of the wider, grass-roots “co-housing” movement unfolding in the United States and beyond (see Soussa and Quarter, 2005; Jarvis, 2011).\(^{151}\)

**Bronzeville’s Evolved Social and Physical Landscape**

I now turn to a detailed empirical description and analysis of a small micro-section within the broader Bronzeville landscape: the MSPDC-defined “Quadrant 4” between Pershing Avenue, King Drive, 43\(^{rd}\) Street, and State Street (MDPSC, 1993). In what follows, a land-use map of this micro-space that details the current use and status of every single parcel is presented. The spaces that constitute this neighborhood’s spatial evolving (see Tables 6.4, 6.5) and continued balkanization are analyzed in the context of this micro-space and through the lens of “class monopoly rent.” The city’s aggressive land-banking of the neighborhood’s vacant lots has only

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\(^{150}\) Consultation with the Department of Buildings and Cook County Assessor’s Office revealed two waves of this lower-income affordable construction, in 2004-5 and 2008-9. While engulfed within the neighborhood’s ensuing affluent redevelopment, this new affordable housing should not be viewed as insignificant: 31 units out of 66 new construction sites were identified between Pershing Avenue, King Drive, 43\(^{rd}\) Street, and State Street.

\(^{151}\) The existence of “co-housing” has a much longer history in Europe and Canada, but is starting to become more common in the United States, particularly in response to affordable housing demand amid the crisis (Jarvis, 2011).
continued through the post-2005 period and particularly afflicts this particular section of Bronzerville. But first, a brief review of the concept of “class monopoly rent” is provided.

Class Monopoly Rent (CMR)

David Harvey (1974) originally presented the concept of “class monopoly rent” (CMR) in an influential and provocative article that empirically examined the inner-city housing markets of Baltimore, MD. Building off Marx’s (rather incomplete) understanding of absolute and monopoly rent, as developed in *Theories of Surplus Value, Part 2* (1968) and *Capital, Vol. 3* ([1894] 1981), the concept of CMR, following Harvey, rests on the notion that landlords and developer/speculators can be treated as a “class” of property owners. Indeed, these agents may act individually. But in aggregate, they are compelled by the same motives of profit maximization under capitalist conditions. It is this “coordinating” behavior that allows these agents to be treated as a class based on their collective position as individual property owners. Although not necessarily acting in collusion, the capitalist imperative renders collusion not necessary as similar outcomes are achieved. In fact, as Wyly, et al., (2009: 338) notes in relation to CMR, “it is entirely possible for abusive lending to flourish even when all of the individual actors involved have honorable intentions of providing fair treatment …”

Harvey is particularly concerned with the extraction of CMR by this property owning class through the production of “artificial scarcity” within urban housing markets: the active manipulation of supply by landlords and developer/speculators. This manipulation is executed through their existence as a “class of owners” who *legally* possess the monopoly power to *collectively* exert their “class interest”; that is, of achieving favorable returns on their capital investments. As Harvey (1974: 242) stresses, “the key concept here is class power.” And the proportion of ground rent that can be attributed to the imperatives felt by individual property
owners (i.e., profit maximization), collectively as a class, can be called CMR. Wyly, et al. (2009: 336) explains further:

“Class matters because, in all capitalist societies, the rights and privileges of ownership are central to power relations, political conflict and social inequality. Monopoly matters not primarily because, as Marx suggests, the supply of land is limited, nor because landowners can become price-makers, but rather because of the inherent monopoly associated with the legal status of ownership...Finally, rent is the simple yet crucial economic measure enabling owners’ claims on the use of any capitalizable asset with return …”

These insights, however, are strengthened when viewed in tandem with another article by Harvey (1975b). Harvey here argues that in advanced capitalist societies, urban landscapes have, by necessity, become increasingly segregated and differentiated along minute class variations. In this context, the potential realization of CMR is increased insofar as housing sub-markets are perpetually created, maintained, and (re)produced, that effectively (and spatially) trap particular populations of people who have no other option for housing. Here, as King (1987) reveals in his empirical exploration of Harvey’s (1975b) thesis, transformations in the spatial structure of the urban landscape essentially reflect transformations in the class structure of a particular metropolitan region. Thus, the spatial differentiation of residential sub-markets in capitalist societies can be viewed as the spatial manifestation of the restless pursuit of CMR by the suppliers and owners of residential property.

The higher income segments of the population, certainly, cannot be trapped as easily as lower-income segments. It is here that the cultivation of new modes of consumption and new social wants and needs (i.e., the augmentation of use-value through discursive production) becomes particularly important (Harvey, 1974, 1975b). In this context, the cultivated attractiveness of Bronzeville to the growing black middle-class via Bronzeville’s “community-nostalgia” narrative serves as an example. The desires, aspirations, wants, and needs (i.e., use-
value) of this population segment are here ultimately exploited in the sense that they are catered to in the form of highly-priced housing sub-markets.

It follows, then, that as long as housing markets can be chopped-up into minute “island-like” structures (Harvey, 1974), or sub-markets, they can be organized and controlled by speculator/developers operating through financial and state policies. Thus, CMR can be maximized through the active manipulation of available units produced within each “island-like” structure. It is in this context that Harvey concludes that the extraction of CMR represents a fundamental dimension to the operation of capitalist housing markets and the (re)production of the socio-spatially differentiated character of urban residential landscapes.

With the exception of King (1987, 1989a, b, c) and the more recent work of Aalbers (2007), Wyly, et al. (2006), and Wyly, et al. (2009), relatively little work has followed-up on the propositions that are made by Harvey (1974, 1975b). The extension of Marxian rent theory to the sphere of housing markets has primarily revolved around either re-conceptualizing the agriculturally-rooted rent categories (differential, absolute, and monopoly) deployed by Marx and Ricardo (see Ball, 1977, 1983, 1985; Edel, 1982; Lauria, 1984; King, 1987, 1989a, b, c; Haila, 1988) or through Neil Smith’s (1979, 1996) “rent-gap” thesis.152 Much less work, both theoretically and empirically, has explored the implications of CMR, reflecting the general loss

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152 Following Smith (1979, 1996), the rent-gap thesis holds that the result of massive disinvestment across many inner-city neighborhoods and real-estate markets in the US during the mid-twentieth century was the production of a “land-rent valley,” a sea of devalued urban land left from the flight of middle-class populations and jobs from the city to the suburbs. However, once the rent-gradient is sufficiently steep, capital investment is seen as profitable and gentrification ensues. The counter perspective, particularly argued by Ley (1986, 1996), holds that this economic-driven explanation is limited in that agency is completely absent, and that human beings, even driven by such structured capitalist imperatives, still possess a certain degree of decision-making capacity (not to mention place-specific issues of culture, race, ethnicity, political subjectivities, etc.) which tend to overwhelm the predictability of gentrification to such simplified economic mechanisms. Essentially a structure/agency debate in the guise of “economy versus culture” (see K. Mitchell, 1999; Lake, 2003; Hackworth and Rekers, 2005; Lees, Slater, and Wyly, 2008), the rent-gap has continued to be researched, argued, and elaborated (see Rose, 1984; Bourne, 1993a, b; Badcock, 1993, 1995; Lees, 1994, 2000; Clark, 1992, 1995; Hammel, 1999a, b).
of scholarly interest in recent years on the role of property in value creation under capitalism today (Blomley, 2005; Christophers, 2010).\footnote{See Jaeger (2003) and Wyly, Atia, and Hammel (2004) for more recent interrogations and applications of Marxian rent theory, although CMR is not explicitly considered in these accounts.}

The terms and conditions of CMR extraction have significantly evolved since the transition to neoliberal modes of urban governance. The consolidation of financial capital at the global scale through the erection of new regulatory configurations over the past three decades has been nothing short of monumental. But, to Wyly, et al. (2009: 338), although the institutional landscape has changed, it should be stressed that “the material relations of exploitation are the same.” For instance, the sub-prime mortgage penetration into low-income (often racialized and spatially-confined) housing markets (emergent in the 1990s) can be interpreted as an “institutional-fix,” a mechanism for channeling accumulated financial capital to new outlets for profitable investment: the production of local sites for global investment. As a result, global financial capital is now more than ever tied to the operation of local mortgage markets.\footnote{In addition to Wyly, et al (2006) and Wyly, et al. (2009), see Wyly (2002), Immergluck and Smith (2005), Immergluck (2008, 2011a, 2011b), Ashton (2008), and Newman (2009) for studies on this increasingly global-local linkage and the emergence of the sub-prime mortgage market.} In this context, financial capital is seen as “etching out” emergent multi-scalar landscapes of CMR extraction rooted in established racial-geographical inequalities (Wyly, et al., 2009).

The demands of global financial capital now trump the local saving/loan institutions and slum-landlords that once figured so prominently in, for instance, 1970s Baltimore. CMR now goes less to the landlord than to mortgage (particularly sub-prime) capital as the difference between owners and renters is increasingly opaque (Wyly, et al., 2009). However, as the landscape of CMR has indeed changed, Wyly, et al.’s (2009) analysis is situated at the macro-urban scale and focused squarely on the upward percolation of CMR through the national and
global financial system. For sure, the financial industry still sits at the top of the “institutional hierarchy” that Harvey (1974) posited, but the spatio-temporal contingency (as Wyly, et al. [2009] acknowledge as important) of local actors complicates this broader-scale picture.

The process of CMR extraction has deeply influenced the socio-spatial transformation of Bronzeville since redevelopment began in the early 1990s. I now examine the role of the local state in setting the terms and conditions for CMR extraction in Bronzeville. I specifically focus on and reveal the CMR implications of the city’s aggressive land-banking process and the related actions of local developers and property owners in appropriating a slice of the pie (in addition to global finance capital). A small sub-section of Bronzeville that I now describe provides the setting for this examination.

Quadrant 4 of the Bronzeville

Quadrant 4 in Grand Boulevard, bounded by King Drive to the east, Pershing Avenue to the north, State Street to the west, and 43rd Street to the south, offers a representative section of the broader Bronzeville landscape. However, primarily residential and west of King Drive, it is one of the less gentrified sectors of the neighborhood, only recently experiencing significant investment and new construction. Pockets of gentrified spaces are now littered throughout this sub-section of Bronzeville (see Fig. 6.1). These spaces, mostly renovated graystones (18 of which have received landmark status), renovated or newly constructed condominium complexes, and newly constructed townhomes or single-family houses (51 spaces registered as affluent residential), are interspersed alongside low-income single-family homes (i.e., lining the west side of the 4100 block of Michigan Avenue, see Fig. 5.9), multi-family apartment buildings (i.e.,

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155 Residential units with property value assessments at least $300,000.

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either renovated or un-renovated graystones or older apartment complexes), and low-rise subsidized rental units (only 8 structures).

The landscape is further differentiated by pockets of newly-constructed and affordable townhomes and/or rental apartments. A total of 31 residential spaces were deemed tenant-serenity and predominantly clustered in the southwest portion of this micro-space. Most residential structures date to the late nineteenth century (many of which have been renovated at various times over the twentieth century) with most new construction having taken place during two recent waves of development between 2004-5, and more recently, 2008-9 (City of Chicago Department of Zoning). The “rehabilitation of medium density apartment buildings as mixed-income residences” proposed in the Mid-South Strategic Plan (MSPDC, 1993) has also seemingly come to fruition as 17 residential buildings appear as mixed-income (determined from property assessments at Cook County Assessor’s Office). See Table 6.6 for a comprehensive statistical breakdown.156

In total, 318 structures stand in this Bronzeville sector (only 28 are zoned and/or currently used as low-income retail space). However, these structures are interwoven through the sector’s 239 vacant lots (58 zoned as manufacturing/retail). Thus, only 57 percent of this land is actually “developed.” Most of these city-owned vacant lots are the result of demolished residential structures (i.e., decrepit abandoned residential space and discord-producing ghetto

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156 Every single plot of land was inventoried and mapped within this micro-space as of 3/12/2011. This was made possible by the interactive mapping device publically accessible at the website of the City of Chicago Department of Zoning. Detailed property information was then obtained by the Cook County Assessor’s Office via their website and the City of Chicago Department of Buildings with respect to the number and locations of abandoned structures. Additional visual information and photographs was acquired by driving each street (driven on 1/7/2011) within this micro-space. See chapter 4 for a more detailed review of these methods.
retail space, see Fig. 6.17) produced at various points over the past three decades (9 structures are currently registered as abandoned).157

In 2006, of the registered 1,896 city-owned vacant lots in Bronzeville, most have been “taken quietly over the years from hardluck homeowners who were unable to pay their taxes” for “no cost” (Housing Bronzeville News, 2007; also see Briggs, 2006; Roeder, 2008; Craig, 2008). Additionally, the massive amount of vacant land left from the demolished Robert Taylor Homes, west of State Street (technically outside of quadrant 4), is now being developed as the sprawling mixed-income Legends South complex (see Fig. 6.10). But despite this neighborhood’s dramatic redevelopment, the current and roughly 2,000 city-owned vacant lots (over 3,000 vacant lots/properties in total) marks a substantial increase from the mere 756 reported in 1994.158 And compared to the 1,156 vacant lots reported in just 2005 (Briggs, 2006), the current tally marks a nearly 75 percent increase. It was in this context that Housing Bronzeville accused the city of acquiring and withholding this land with hopes of it paying for the Olympics rather than affordable housing (Russell, 2009). In fact, the city would’ve stood to reap over $200 million at the “going rate” of $100,000 per vacant lot (Housing Bronzeville News, 2007).

Instead, this “goldmine of value” (Weber, 2002) continues to be slowly auctioned off to profit-maximizing developers for as little as $300. The underlying assumption is that these agents, propelled by this imperative, will induce private capital investment through middle-upper income development whereas other purposes, such as affordable housing, will not (Russell, 2009). The individual residents that are sold vacant lots are typically at least middle-income and,

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157 As of 3/12/2011, a total of 153 abandoned structures are registered with the City of Chicago Department of Buildings, of which 100 are located in Grand Boulevard alone.
158 Not all vacant lots are owned by the city. The tally’s reported throughout this study, however, are just those that are owned by the city (unless otherwise specified).
most likely, similarly compelled by capitalist-oriented motivations. As a result, the ensuing affluent development – prices going for “$300,000, $600,000, and even $900,000” – is, consequently, “well out of the reach of most local residents or their families” (Housing Bronzeville News, 2007).

As of 2011, the average market value for properties assessed by Cook County in quadrant 4 was $265,084 (the figure for all of Bronzeville is undoubtedly higher). This figure, however, is skewed as just 18 percent of this sector’s residential structures were determined “affluent” (i.e., owner-occupied and over $300,000). Many rental apartment buildings are also valued above $300,000 but the area’s remaining low-income housing, including foreclosed properties, keeps this figure relatively low.

The average rent for a 2-bedroom apartment in the entire neighborhood was calculated at $1,082. This figure represents a steady increase in recent years as “rents in Chicago increased by 6 percent” in 2007 alone (Schmitz, 2008). Moreover, the rental vacancy rate in Chicago in 2006 was 9.6 percent, nearly double the figure in 2000 (Schmitz, 2008). To Phil Ashton, the sub-prime mortgage crisis (disproportionately affecting racialized Bronzeville) has channeled former homeowners into the rental market thereby increasing demand. But, however, the values of the decreasing stock of existing rental properties are no longer rising (in Schmitz, 2008). And with increasing property taxes and utility costs, landlords are often forced into precarious positions of raising rents and/or withdrawing units out of circulation (and usually into abandonment), accounting for the rise in both rents and vacancy figures above.

159 For instance, as Reed (2005) reports, a black couple, who’s “salary put them above the middle class,” were able to buy a city-owned vacant lot for $17,500 in North Kenwood, and built a three-story, red-brick house. Such individuals, as opposed to Housing Bronzeville organizers, only contribute to the neighborhood’s rising property values and have a personal stake in maintaining (and increasing) their investment.

160 This figure was determined from a Craigslist search that revealed a total of 36 Bronzeville 2-bedroom rental postings, performed 3/12/2011. Moreover, a hotpads.com analysis revealed an average of $975 for 2-bedroom Bronzeville rental units.
The CMR implications here should be clear. The systematic and increasing withdrawal of land in this neighborhood from circulation limits the supply of existing housing units in general, both rental and owner-occupier. Thus, it represents the manipulation of supply/demand conditions by two principle property owners: 1) the city through its land-banking, and 2) landlords (usually large-scale property management companies) by subsequently withdrawing units for reasons driven by profit maximization imperatives. In short, the steady rise in rents can be, in part, attributed to the constant manipulation of supply by these two agents.

In this context, the city (i.e., local state) can be seen as locally setting the terms and conditions for CMR extraction for landlords, homeowners, and developers alike. As a result, the total number of units for sale or rent at any particular moment (from single-family homes to condos) is typically limited. And since developers tend to concentrate the market-rate units in particular micro-scale pockets, the neighborhood’s population is further fragmented into minute “spatialized” housing sub-markets. Thus, it follows that supply/demand conditions and necessary class-based exclusion within each “island-like” structure can be practically managed and better controlled. “Market-rate” values and profits are then maximized by developers as opposed to a

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161 For the purposes of simplification, the distinction made between CMR and absolute rent by Harvey and Chatterjee (1974) is ignored here (Harvey [1974] ignores it himself, see Wyly, et al. [2006]). Technically, absolute rent corresponds to the proportion of ground rent realized that can be attributed to state intervention (i.e., interest-rate policy) that uniformly affects entire urban landscapes (also see King, 1987). This division is collapsed here as the land-banking process, although uniformly affecting supply/demand conditions across Bronzeville, is interpreted as an action devised by an “owner of property,” and thus, part of the “class of owners” described by Harvey (1974). Although a peculiar owner of property, the city here acts as a local agent with the (conscious or unconscious) objective of crafting conditions favorable for CMR realization for other individual capitalists (developers, builders, landlords, homeowners, etc.) and, in part, realized by the city in the form of property taxes.

162 The real-estate crisis is ambiguously felt in quadrant 4 as 4 units were assessed at lower market-rate values in 2010 when compared to 2009 while 5 units were assessed at greater values (most properties, however, did not provide sufficient information to allow for a similar comparison). Additionally, landlords typically don’t accept subsidies for low-income occupation in redeveloping neighborhoods where higher rents, i.e., CMR, can be realized (see Housing Bronzeville News, 2007).
uniformly developed mixed-income residential landscape. Such a landscape would presumably yield lower profits due to less manipulative supply/demand conditions.

The local state now operates in different ways than it did when Harvey studied Baltimore. In addition to this particular example of land-banking, referred to by Hyra (2008) as the “new urban renewal,” the terms and conditions for CMR are also constituted by an ensemble of now ubiquitous neoliberal policies and practices: TIFs and tax abatements (Weber, 2002; Ranney, 2003), historical preservation districts (Wilson, 2004b), and urban beautification projects (Smith, 1996; Wilson and Grammenos, 2005). Each of these practices can be interpreted as a form of income redistribution from low and even middle-income residents to the producers of the built-environment: developers, builders, and property management firms. They can also be interpreted as constituting a form of “corporate welfare” (Merrifield, 2002) associated with the broader neoliberal project defined by Harvey (2005) as the “restoration of class power.”

The TIF is the anchor of the process. Property taxes are essentially re-invested in development by a transfer of these funds to capital for developers (in addition to tax abatements). The increased property taxes realized as a result are typically then ploughed back into development via the same process. TIF funds also tend to finance other land-valorizing practices such as urban beautification projects and historical preservation efforts as well. Moreover, private capital increasingly flows through the city via, for instance, the Commercial Club of Chicago, and melds with existing TIF funds to be deployed as real-estate investment.

12 separate TIF districts are now instituted in Bronzeville. In 2007 alone, $28 million of taxpayer money was siphoned away by these TIFs from other public services and into privileged private hands (Housing Bronzeville News, 2007). In short, so long as the money and land ends up in the “right hands,” as opposed to Housing Bronzeville organizers fighting for “affordable
housing,” the conditions for CMR realization are optimized and property taxes, a portion of this CMR, maximized. Therefore, this now common use of property tax revenue can be interpreted as a kind of state capital: the employment of property tax revenue as real-estate capital (given to developers) for the purpose of augmenting that very revenue stream. The result is that remaining low-income residents end up financing their own displacement: an estimated 40,000 have been displaced since Daley took office in 1989 and the stock-piling of vacant land began.

The Use-Exchange Value Dialectic and the Role of Discourse

As Marx ([1894] 1981) observed, the treatment of the earth, divided into plots for private ownership, possesses both use- and exchange-values. Of course, the most basic utility of land is its ability to provide shelter, a necessity of life. However, under capitalist conditions, the earth can possess a multiplicity of use-value layers built upon this most immediate utility: it serves as sites for production, consumption, resource extraction, and exchange. In this context, cities, under capitalism, can be interpreted as “gigantic exchange-value entities wherein the process of urbanization” (i.e., gentrification, suburbanization) becomes inextricably linked to the internal dynamics of capital accumulation (Merrifield, 2002: 155).

Yet every piece of real-estate possesses both dimensions of value: a home for renters (use-value), profit for landlords and developers (exchange-value), or both (use and exchange) simultaneously for homeowners (Harvey, 1982; Logan and Molotch, 1987). Although the treatment of homes in the use-value sense is not recognized by orthodox neoclassical theory, a commodity must possess a use-value for it to possess an exchange-value, as Marx points out in the opening chapters of Capital, Vol. 1 (1867 [1976]). For Marx, a commodity’s “value”

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163 As Logan and Molotch (1987: 99) note, this would be simply “irrational.”
164 Although an object/product may have a use-value without exchange-value, an object produced for the purpose of exchange (i.e., a commodity) must have a use-value.
represents an internal and dialectical relationship between the components of use- and exchange-value; exchange-value merely representing the quantitative measurement of this dialectical unity.

From the capitalist perspective, however, cities are essentially equated to “large-scale agglomerations of fixed capital” designed to “lubricate circulating capital and enhance the accumulation of capital” (Merrifield, 2002: 161). In this context, exchange-value is ultimately prioritized over use-value even though the former requires the latter. It is here that the inherent use-value characteristics of urban environments – “as places where people live, establish communities, raise kids, and put down roots” (Merrifield, 2002: 156) – often confront exchange-value imperatives in antagonistic and contradictory ways (Logan and Molotch, 1987).

At the core of this contradiction are the qualities of “permanence” embedded in use-value considerations (i.e., community belonging and identity, the expectation of stability and security) on the one hand and the constantly in-flux spatio-temporal rhythms of capital accumulation (driven by exchange-value maximization) on the other. It is precisely through this contradiction that neighborhood-based politics – from Lefebvre’s ([1968] 1996) “right to the city” to that represented by Housing Bronzeville in the 2000s – emerge in response to evolving exchange-value conditions that invariably disrupt the use-value qualities – the qualities of “permanence” – that people attach to their homes and “communities” (Logan and Molotch, 1987).

The formation of growth-narratives centered on more affluent residential spaces can be interpreted as a means of cultivating the upper-income “social wants and needs” alluded to by Harvey. This is deemed absolutely necessary for matching particular residential landscapes with a corresponding (and produced) source of consumer demand via a strategically crafted “quality
of permanence.” In this context, to draw on the study’s CPE terms, the discursive encapsulation of identify-related meaning within the image of particular residential landscapes can be viewed as the augmentation of use-value as a means of maximizing exchange-value (i.e., the economic realm). Real-estate magnate Donald Trump (in Merrifield, 2002: 25) explains the process from the capitalist perspective all too well in the following and revealing passage:

   “First of all you don’t necessarily need the best location. What you need is the best deal. Just as you can create leverage, you can enhance a location, through promotion and through psychology…Location also has to do with fashion. You can take a mediocre location and turn it into something better just by attracting the right people.”

As Trump makes clear, the augmentation of use-value through discursive production (i.e., by virtue of appealing entirely to use-value sentiments and considerations) is an essential component of exchange-value maximization and, thus, for the realization of CMR.

In the context of Bronzeville’s gentrifying black population, the neighborhood’s “community nostalgia” narrative can be interpreted as a racially-sensitive discursive product that is often deployed for this very purpose: to augment the use-value of these newly constructed residential spaces. In this context, it maximizes demand within this emergent and racialized higher-income consumer base. As the demand increases for these spaces, so does their exchange-value (so long as supply is actively controlled). It is here that race enters into the workings of capital accumulation as a use-value augmenting semiotic resource. And it is also here that, to Weber (2002: 177), “discourse” is seen to mutate “in tandem with the changing market logics of real estate (dis)investment, as words take on new meanings and new themes shape spatial tactics.” In short, it is precisely through this restless pursuit of CMR and associated modes of

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165 For example, the “American Dream” in relation to the American suburban landscape (Anderson, 2010; also see Walker, 1977, 1978, 1981; Jackson, 1985; Fishman, 1987).
discursive production by the producers and owners of residential property that results in the increasingly balkanized urban landscape in Bronzeville. It is a place-specific manifestation of the spatial expression of capitalist uneven development at the micro-urban scale.

The Effects of the Post-2008 Global Crisis

Just as Bronzeville’s post-2005 affluent development gathered steam, it hit an obstacle: the US sub-prime mortgage crisis and subsequent global economic downturn. But despite this unfolding of destructive events, redevelopment in Bronzeville remained relatively strong. As the Olympic bid targeted Bronzeville as a central location for would-be Olympic facilities, continued Olympic-related speculative investment underscored the neighborhood’s escalating land values and housing prices despite the collapse of the wider real-estate bubble. In short, the Olympic bid figured as a source of insulation for Bronzeville’s redevelopment.

But with the loss of the bid to Rio de Janeiro in October, 2009, this redevelopment was delivered a painful period of mourning (Bowean, 2010):

“In the three months since the loss to Rio de Janeiro, Chicago has struggled with an array of bruising economic woes, among them governmental fiscal crises, the exit of two big trade shows, new stumbling blocks for the Loop’s Block 37 mall and spreading neighborhood devastation due to heightened levels of joblessness and mortgage foreclosures … And while some city residents saw the Olympic plans as a distraction from the real problems at hand, rather than a potential solution, the fact remains that its failure has left a void.” (Bergen, 2009)

“The neighborhood’s residential market took a severe hit, and developers have put off major investments. Few developers, it seems, can get serious about new projects in Bronzeville …” (Cromidas, 2010)
Housing prices tumbled, foreclosures dramatically increased (see Fig. 6.18), and real-estate, financial, and retail investment alike seemingly came to a grinding halt.\(^{166}\) African-American neighborhoods like Bronzeville, having absorbed a disproportionate degree of sub-prime mortgage capital, were particularly hit hard as lending in such areas was sharply circumscribed (Virella, 2008a; Virella and Young, 2009; Cromidas, 2010). To a local business owner, “this area has come to a screeching halt … we thought the business and the community would be much further along” (in Bowean, 2010).\(^{167}\)

As Bronzeville’s principle redevelopment agents, including Housing Bronzeville, all utilized the Olympic bid in their vision for redevelopment, the loss of the bid – referred to as the “Olympics aftershock” (Cromidas, 2010) – effectively took the wind out of their momentum. In short, the bid’s loss sounded the death knell for both the Olympic redevelopment trope and the media attention underpinning the Housing Bronzeville movement has all but vanished (c.f., Bergen, 2009; Cromidas, 2010). The city’s “go-global” ambitions also took a swift blow, leading one to question whether Chicago represents less of a legitimate “global city” and more of the desperate “wannabe” type that are, to Short (2008), fated to lose their coveted global-city realizing “Olympic” quests.

Residential development, however, has since slightly recovered, with the usual suspects leading the charge. The “would’ve been” Olympic village site (site of the now defunct Michael Reese Hospital) is now being redeveloped as a mixed-use complex with Draper & Kramer awarded the contract. The Allison Davis group has also acquired a number of now defunct developments and properties, such as the “historic” Overton Building in the Black Metropolis

\(^{166}\) Pam Dempsey, a local real-estate broker, stated “they’re now entering into a down market,” as prices for single-family homes have declined to $100,000 to $200,000 from $200,000 to $400,000 in mid-2007 (in Cromidas, 2010)\(^{167}\) Liebenson (2009), however, presents a distinctly less negative portrayal of the Olympic aftermath as others, leaving an overall ambiguous impression of how deeply Bronzeville’s redevelopment was stalled.
Historic District. Foreclosed by the MSPDC, the Davis group is now, ironically, attracting mainstream retail outlets such as Starbucks at this “historically significant” site (Cottrell, 2008a).

Large-scale retail investment, unsurprisingly, continues to lag behind the neighborhood’s residential development (Cromidas, 2010). Redevelopment agents have also struggled to attract a similar degree of visitors and consumers in comparison to other tourist-oriented gentrified neighborhoods that are less stigmatized by negative “racialized” perceptions. As M. Anderson (2007) reports, the push to remake Bronzeville into a cultural tourist destination has failed precisely because of these lingering negative “racial” perceptions.

_The Emergent Critique of Mixed-Income Development_

The post-crisis moment also coincided with increased local discontent and even mainstream criticism against the once celebrated Plan for Transformation regarding its associated displacement of low-income residents (see Dumke, 2005):

“Yes, I protested the transformation but I protested the process. I protested the exclusion of residents from the planning process. I protested the business deals that were privy to only a few. I protested the fact the Service Connectors were no more than a smoke screen and that it was also another tool for dependency. I protested the process that had families like mine moving every other year because the process was trial and error. We the families were the trial, and the process was the error.” (Stubenfield, 2008)

“Mr. Peterson [CHA CEO], y’all put all of those people [displaced public housing residents] down in Ickes [remaining public housing complex] and didn’t give us any social help. And we still haven’t gotten any. When are you going to give us some help? When you put all of those people down here, Mr. Peterson, you endangered everybody’s life. We had our problems to begin with. But when you start sending people who couldn’t live anywhere else but in public housing, you endangered every kid’s life in there . . . .” (Gloria Williams, Ickes Homes LAC President, in Turner, 2006)

“Mayor Richard Daley declared eight years ago that Chicago would end ‘the failed policies of the past’. Yet a Tribune investigation found that the city has pumped hundreds of millions of tax dollars into housing complexes that preserve
the very policies the plan was meant to reverse.” (Grotto, Cohen, and Olkon, 2008b)168

Fueled by the sub-prime mortgage crisis and consequent global economic crisis (see Virella [2008a] for a report on the disproportionate effects on black areas), the penetration of this criticism through mainstream media outlets, including former staunch supporter, the Chicago Tribune, only contributed to the necessity of this governance’s rhetorical adjustment.169

But this emergent mixed-income critique has been partial, limited to its role in the CHAs Plan for Transformation. In the context of Bronzeville’s “community nostalgia” narrative, the mixed-income theme has undergone no such critique. While the critique implicates Bronzeville’s mixed-income projects, it stops short of explicitly addressing the role of mixed-income housing within the vision of Bronzeville’s revival:

“… nowhere do hopes and worries surrounding the Plan for Transformation reach a higher pitch than along the State Street Corridor, once home to the largest concentration of public housing in the world … but it will be another eight years before all of the new units are finished, and tenant advocates worry that many families will drop out of public housing and that the social problems meant to be fixed by the redevelopment effort will fester elsewhere.” (Olivo, 2007a)

Indeed, the mixed-income links to both the Plan for Transformation and Bronzeville’s “nostalgic revival” represent rhetorical constructs on different objects. But they intimately intersect in that the majority of the Plan’s mixed-income redevelopment sites are situated in Bronzeville where

168 Following Johns (2006) and Turner (2007), public housing demolition, gentrification in Bronzeville, and stepped up police presence has not only helped bring a decrease in crime rates, but has led to rising crime, particularly in surrounding south-side neighborhoods (i.e., Woodlawn and Englewood) where demolition and gentrification has led to the displacement of crime as well as low-income people. This led to new draconian police initiatives across designated such “hot spots” (i.e., existing public housing complexes like Altgeld Gardens to combat this crime spike (Johns, 2006). This is supported by a report done by the Chicago Reporter (2007a) revealing increases in narcotics and crime at Harold Ickes Homes and Dearborn Homes despite the erasure of such incidents at the demolished Stateway Gardens and Robert Taylor Homes.

169 This criticism will be reported in detail in chapter 10 (see Olivo, 2007b; Grotto, Cohen, and Olkon, 2008a, b; Olkon, 2008; Dizikes, 2009).
the vast majority of the city’s public housing used to be located. This intersection is illustrated by
the following mixed-income projects at their promotional websites:

“‘It was the Gold Coast of the South-side’ … ‘it’s obvious in the housing stock. You had mansions with ballrooms. The construction and ornamentation tells you they were owned by people of means’ [Shirley Newsome, Chairman of the CCC] … the Chicago Housing Authority began tearing down its high-rise public housing projects and approved three mixed-income developments as replacements in North Kenwood and Oakland … So-called affordable units generally are indistinguishable from comparable market-rate products, but sold at discounted prices …” (Lake Park Crescent, 2011)

“Bronzeville is a neighborhood with a tale to tell – of social change, paradise found and legendary sons and daughters … Though home to a small population of African-Americans since the 1890s, by the 1920s the first wave of immigrants from the rural south firmly established the area as a Black Metropolis. For the next 30 years their city-within-a-city, now known as Bronzeville, served as the epicenter of an explosive renaissance in art, literature, music and politics … Central to this ambitious and comprehensive plan is the integration of the development site with the surrounding community. The area’s original city grid will be re-established and a wide variety of building types, none taller than four stories, will blend seamlessly with the neighborhood. The transformation of State Street into a boulevard and the development of new retail space along neighboring east-west corridors, in addition to the vital component of homeownership, sets the stage for long term private investments, physical and social improvements and the rebirth of one of Chicago’s most culturally rich districts” [my italics]. (Legends South, 2011)

“Extensively landscaped with shrubs, trees and lush greenery to produce a park-like setting reminiscent of turn-of-the-century Chicago, Jazz On The Boulevard boasts abundant open green space. The development’s courtyard is specifically designed to give the community a unique sense of place while providing a space for children to play and for residents to socialize … With Jazz On The Boulevard, the sounds of life, of culture and of style are once again being heard on the south-side, making Drexel Boulevard and Kenwood as celebrated as they were nearly 100 years ago” [my italics]. (Jazz on the Boulevard, 2011)

The discourse on mixed-income housing became the dominant vision for public housing reform during the 2000s. As a result, it no longer represents a critique of Keynesian-era public housing as it did during the 1990s. Rather, it has now become the dominant philosophy and practice under discursive assault. In this sense, this increased presence of critique reflects this
normalization. As no alternative has yet to emerge in opposition or in its place, it remains a dominant feature in the post-2005 period despite this stepped-up criticism. It is, for now, as one local planner put it, “the “only game in town” (interview 2/8/2011).

This narrative continues to feature the central neoliberal themes of “choice,” “self-sufficiency,” and “individual culpability,” which are now rolled-out in almost mechanistic fashion:

“As we closed all the buildings [Robert Taylor Homes], we worked with human services to find housing (for non-residents) … Residents made choices. There are families who chose to move all over the city” [my italics]. (Terry Peterson, in Mema, 2006)

“Flat rent [a rent option of public housing residents] was established to encourage self-sufficiency and avoid creating disincentives for continued occupancy of families that are self-sufficient or becoming self-sufficient …” [my italics] (CHA public statement, in Johns, 2008c)

But despite this persistent optimism from city hall, the Plan for Transformation is now widely scrutinized as a failed solution to the problem of concentrated poverty:

“Chicago’s grand experiment to transform public housing is lagging nearly a decade after Mayor Richard Daley’s administration turned to private developers to shape the future of housing the city’s poor … the sputtering effort also has translate into higher costs … and the plan has added to the growing housing crisis for the poor in Chicago, where more than 56,000 have been on a waiting list for years to get public housing.” (Grotto, Cohen, and Olkon, 2008a)

“You don’t want to create false hope that they’ll [displaced public housing residents] get a unit … the federal government has not made housing a top priority, and it needs to.” (Doug Schenkelberg, Mid-America Institute on Poverty, in Olivo, 2007b)

Following a two-day symposium on the Plan’s progress, it was reported that the city was accused to have “initially misled public housing residents about the pace of development, failed to plan for relocation of thousands of families, and did not provide effective social services” (Dizikes, 2009). Michaeli (2009) has even declared that “the CHA Plan is dead” (also see Lydersen, 2008).
And in the Plan’s ten-year review, “the CHA was in fact slammed for their bad job relocating residents” (discussion with city planner 2/8/2011).

The Plan is also increasingly recognized as establishing new patterns of socio-economic segregation as a means to, first and foremost, clear space for gentrification. In the process, it has made a bad affordable housing situation even worse (L. Bennett, et al., 2006). This is reflected in Madelyn Johnson’s (former Ida B. Well’s resident) endeavors to find a market-rate unit with her Housing Voucher:

“Johnson was told [by the CHA] is she didn’t find a market-rate apartment in-time [before the demolition of Ida B. Well’s Homes] the agency could move her and her family to Altgeld Gardens, a CHA development on Chicago’s Far Southside. But many CHA residents, including Johnson, say Altgeld is too far away and too isolated …” (Olkon, 2008)

Voucher failures such as these often leave residents to existing public housing complexes, such as Altgeld Gardens, far removed from the transformation sites in redeveloping neighborhoods like Bronzeville. Such targeted and strategic demolition has only displaced crime and drug-markets to these more marginalized public housing complexes (also see Grotto, et al., 2008a; Chicago Reporter, 2007a). In this context, as opposed to the purported goal of eliminating “the marginalization that has historically occurred in traditional low-rent housing projects” (Johns, 2008d), Daley is now increasingly charged with making the same mistakes his father made during the mid-twentieth century: both figures presiding over and facilitating metropolitan spatial-fixes of enormous scales.

For Chicago Tribune journalist Olivo (2011), gentrification was in fact a central goal of the Plan all along:

“The mixed-income developments going up in those neighborhoods are meant to be cornerstones for further growth, luring urban pioneers whose presence there would then attract new stores, restaurants, better schools and even more residential development.”
However, the inherent tension between fostering “further growth” and the goal of eliminating socio-economic marginalization within capitalist housing markets is now rendered increasingly visible. The displacement and exacerbation of racialized poverty to the fringes of the city and beyond should be considered testament to this tension (Malone and Little, 2011). This reality now effectively renders the following pro-demolition statements as dead on arrival:

“Even if you have some individuals who, for some reason, won’t be able to live in new mixed-income communities [which has proven to be most displaced residents], they’ll still be able to live in places that are physically much better than they have before [which has proven to be negligibly minimal at best].” (Kim Johnson, CHA spokesperson, in Garrett, 2003)

“We have better housing to move people to … there are a lot of options available.” (Linda Kaiser, Housing Choice Partners, in Olkon, 2008)

Although the “commitment the mayor made to public housing” continues to be honored, according to former CHA CEO Terry Peterson (in Mema, 2006), the following public statement from Daley’s office in response to this heightened mainstream criticism reveals the top objectives of the Plan in no ambiguous terms:

“We are pleased with the process and progress of the Plan for Transformation. The communities formerly blighted by the CHA high-rises are thriving with new homes, new residents, new schools, new businesses and jobs flocking to places that have become communities of choice” [my italics] (in Grotto, et al., 2008a).

Despite the avoidance of admitting the Plan’s failure (to do so would be, as Michaeli [2009] notes, politically problematic), this statement explicitly and astonishingly reveals what the Plan was originally designed to deliver: new homes, schools, businesses, and, most importantly, people.170 It is in this context that the Plan is increasingly criticized for being a “place-based solution” as opposed to a “people-based solution” (discussion with local planner 2/8/2011). For

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170 It should be stressed that despite this reluctance to admit the Plan’s shortcomings, city and Habitat officials have expressed “the need to reconsider some of their strategies,” by seeking “the advice of housing experts from across the country” and asking “developers to come up with new ideas” (Grotto, et al., 2008a).
instance, the term “community” deployed in this statement clearly refers to the physical space of
the neighborhood instead of its inhabitants.

But, for Daley and proponents, the presence of “new” people does not automatically
equate with the displacement of existing residents. Rather, the assumption is that existing
residents will be aided by the presence of these “new” people. Yet this purported goal of
“rebuilding lives,” stated numerous times by Daley since the Plan’s inception in 2000 (Grotto, et
al., 2008a), is ignored in this statement – perhaps an implicit acknowledgement of the Plan’s
failures. The statement also sits uneasily against McCarron’s (2006) assertion that Daley’s
revamping of the city’s public housing was the “right” and “moral” thing to do.

This is, of course, not to say that “rebuilding lives” was not a genuine goal. But as this
statement clearly illuminates, it was certainly was not the most important goal. The general
impression given is that if some residents did improve their living conditions, then great; if not,
then it’s an acceptable failure amid a greater success. However, and regardless of whether the
living conditions of those displaced had been improved or not (the evidence overwhelmingly
suggests it has not), the Plan has successfully facilitated the accumulation of capital in these
“communities formerly blighted by the CHA high-rises.”171 Based on this measure, the city is
correct in that the Plan has indeed been a success.

However, as Chicago Tribune reporters now readily acknowledge, the “rhetoric [of the
Plan] has collided with realities” (Grotto, et al., 2008a). The creative-destructive realities of
capital accumulation have now exposed the gap between what this rhetoric was designed to do
(and did) as opposed to what it said. For instance, many of the mixed-income redevelopment

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171 Following a study by the Chicago Reporter (2007b), the areas on and surrounding the former sites of Cabrini-
Green, Henry Horner, and South State Street have, to varying degrees, stimulated the development of new
residential construction and gentrification.
sites, most notably Park Boulevard and Legends South (replacing Stateway Gardens and the Robert Taylor Homes, respectively), have been stalled by the crisis due to either financial obstructions and/or declining demand for the market-rate units.\textsuperscript{172}

The success of these development projects has been entirely contingent on the success of the market-rate units.\textsuperscript{173} And since market-rate demand has soured, the economic viability of these projects has been up-rooted as well: “you can’t do the public housing any faster than the market-rate” (Katie O’Connell-Miller, CHA official, in Dizikes, 2009). The notion of “market-rate” can also be interpreted as code for “affluent,” as the goal of the market-rate units has been to bring in the desired affluent homeowners to the neighborhood. In this context, the success of these projects all along was predicated on the success of “affluent” consumption.\textsuperscript{174}

Consequently, many of the “moderate-income” and public housing units included within these projects remain un-built despite the growing demand for such units (Grotto, et al., 2008b; Dizikes, 2009; Michaeli, 2009).\textsuperscript{175}

\textit{Cultural Problems with Mixed-Income Developments}

The mixed-income developments that have emerged in Bronzeville tend to be troubled by persistent class-based “cultural” problems. These problems disrupt the previously held and uncritically-accepted assumption that lower-income residents will be motivated by the sheer presence of more successful, wealthier homeowners and follow in their footsteps. Time, it seems,

\textsuperscript{172} These two developments, Park Boulevard and Legends South, have also be criticized for the city’s involvement of a familiar cast of characters – the Allison Davis Group and other privileged firms – as well as nepotism, corruption, and favoritism (see Grotto, et al., 2008b).

\textsuperscript{173} Most mixed-income redevelopment sites are divided by one-third market-rate, “moderate-income,” and public housing units (Chicago Housing Authority, 2000; also see L. Bennett, et al., 2006).

\textsuperscript{174} Due to the lack of demand for middle-upper income housing (homeownership), there has been a shift toward addressing this growing demand in lower-income rental units, but this has been slow to emerge (see Olivo, 2011).

\textsuperscript{175} As a result, those displaced public housing residents hoping to return to the renovated buildings or mixed-income redevelopments have been forced to procure other accommodations on their own long ago (Michaeli, 2009).
has now exposed the inherent difficulties involved with this philosophy of development and housing (Chaskin and Joseph, 2010):

“… those types of economically-mixed neighborhoods, upon which the CHA is pinning its hopes for transformation, aren’t perfect as tensions can limit … and those mixed-income neighborhoods aren’t popular – as many people don’t live in them and the economic mix doesn’t always last for very long.” (Lydersen, 2008)

“… the social fabric of the high-rises – the kinships and circles of mutual support vital to poor families – are unlikely to be replaced in “fishbowl” circumstances among yuppie condo buyers.” (McCarron, 2006a)

In short, the relationships forged between people of different income groups have not only been less than forthcoming but are often “strained and hostile” (Lydersen, 2008): “I’m used to talking to people from the CHA … But people on the outside? I don’t know how to deal with that” (Former Stateway Gardens resident, in Olivo, 2007a). Chaskin and Joseph (2010) provide ethnographic evidence of three Chicago mixed-income sites that confirm this trend, two of which are Park Boulevard (formerly Stateway Gardens) and Oakwood Shores (formerly Ida B. Wells Homes). In response to the lack of interaction between different income groups:

“I do believe there’s a need [for an integrating mechanism] because just from the town hall meetings with the market-rate residents, there’s so many stigma. Like when the market-rate residents get together, they don’t blatantly say it but it’s the little comments like, you know, something happened in the building: ‘What’s the process for evicting public-housing people?’ It’s like, how’d you get from like there was trash in the elevator to what’s the process for – you know? Then when you get all the public-housing people together it’s ‘they don’t want us here. They’re trying to take over our neighborhood’” (Oakwood Shores resident, in Chaskin and Joseph, 2010: 313)

Moreover:

“You know who the condo people are and who’s been here forever … I hear it at community meetings – talk about ‘those kids.’ Well I love my (neighborhood) kids …” (Mixed-income public housing resident, in Lydersen, 2008)

“Higher-income people have a sense of entitlement … They don’t want kids on the basketball courts. And they are always out-maneuvering low-income people
“Higher-income new residents are afraid and annoyed with their low-income neighbors, blaming them for crime and failing to maintain their property. And lower-income residents are threatened by their wealthier neighbors who might force them out through higher property taxes and rents associated with the more valuable property.” (Lydersen, 2008)

This is further elaborated in the following remarks from two local business owners (both interviews conducted 8/17/2010):

“Mixed-income housing hasn’t really worked very well, it’s a very hard thing to do. We have gang-bangers, PhD students, people who work from nine to five, others who work night shifts, and fundamental lifestyle differences … those who accept noise, others who don’ … to have people who live off the government dole, sitting in the lawn all day, living next to middle-class people, it’s just inherently problematic…”

“You can take the boy out of the projects but not the projects out of the boy.”

The notion that low-income residents will suddenly adopt middle-upper class lifestyles overnight is clearly misguided (and should’ve been more widely recognized ten years ago).

Common perceptions of and among different income-groups remain rooted in normative cultural stereotypes, i.e., the understanding and fear of low-income people by wealthier residents as lazy, drug addicts, and/or involved in gangs – perceptions reminiscent of the revanchist-public housing trope (see Pattillo, 2007). Many of these developments, although mixed-income, are also racially homogenous (Lydersen, 2008), and segregated by income within the development (Chaskin and Joseph, 2010). Existing homeowners are also increasingly upset about the recent rise in number of rental units (due to the crisis) (discussion with local planner, 2/8/2011), a further reflection of their conflicting class-based interests. Moreover, the establishment of HOAs among the wealthier homeowners is additionally problematic as the lower-income renters and public housing residents who also live within these developments cannot directly participate,
another example of the very exclusion the “mixed-income” design was supposed to correct as well as the problematic role of homeownership in reviving a sense of racial solidarity and class-integration.\textsuperscript{176}

Returning public housing residents, after making it through the hyper-selective screening processes, are also subject to often strictly-enforced lease requirements:

“We’ve got to keep our commitment to our buyers and our tenants … We’ve got to enforce the terms of our lease.” (Terry Peterson, in McCarron, 2006a)

“Improved lease enforcement must be coupled with tougher screening procedures to insure that public housing communities are safe and desirable places to live. The CHA will require the professional property managers … to conduct screening to determine if applicants will make suitable residents” [my italics]. (Chicago Housing Authority, 2000: 31)

This reveals another class-based insensitivity toward low-income residents as many of these “terms” denote tasks that require a degree of disposable income in order to accomplish. In this context, avoiding lease violation often requires expenditures that public housing residents (and low-income residents in general) simply cannot afford, such as the covering of utility costs documented by Fennell (2011) and other basic household maintenance tasks. The structural constraints of poverty prevent many from maintaining lease compliance. But, of course, the neoliberal belief that poverty is a result of bad choices rather than structural conditions renders the “terms of the lease” fair and rational to all mixed-income tenants and buyers.

But while innumerable problems have been cited, these mixed-income developments, to one local planner (interview, 2/8/2011), aren’t necessarily “exploding with problems” either as some report examples of relative success (c.f., McCarron, 2006a):

\begin{footnote}{See Johns [2008c] for a discussion on how HOAs interact with neighborhood associations to address concerns formerly handled by public housing Local Advisory Councils.}
\end{footnote}
“It’s worked well, Preckwinkle bought into it, and took it to another level … we got what we wanted…After thinking of the greater community, every single development that had 10 units or more had to be a mix … not just the Transformation sites, but all the new sites, it has worked and we know it can. The formula has to be maintained, it’s important it has to be maintained. Single-family’s are market-rate, bringing additional taxes …” (Local organizer, interview 8/19/2010)

In short, the success of “actually existing” mixed-income development has been mixed (Woodridge, 2008; Joseph, 2008). And the degree and kinds of problems that have been reported expose the previously held and relatively problem-free assumptions of socially harmonious neighborhoods as delusional at best.

The Politics of Defining Gentrification

This emergent mixed-income critique has also emphasized a long-standing confusion and politics over the meaning of the word “gentrification.” Typically deployed by critics, proponents of continued demolition and mixed-income development have countered the charge of stimulating gentrification by appropriating the very definition of this term, particularly in ways that obliterate its traditional class-based understanding. For instance, nostalgia-inspired local organizers argue that gentrification is only problematic if it entails racial displacement: the displacement of blacks by affluent whites:

“I don’t want it to turn out like Lincoln Park … I’d like it to be mixed, like Hyde Park. So I wouldn’t want the homes to get priced to where no one else could buy them but upper-class Caucasians” [my italics]. (Local renter, in Reed, 2005)

The notion of “mixed” here refers more to “racially-mixed” than mixed economically. This understanding is usually marked by an implicit class-blindness, or reluctance to acknowledge the defining element of class-based displacement within the gentrification process (based on discussions with two local organizers, 6/18/2009). And if it is acknowledged, it is often perceived to be a good thing so long as it is affluent blacks who are doing the displacing.
In fact, the process of displacement itself is often detached from the definition of gentrification altogether. One perceptive resident remarked the following:

“It’s a paradox, you want to see it [the neighborhood] improve, but for you … people want it so bad, because they’re so sick of the terror of living in such a crime-ridden place … but a lot of people don’t realize or want to see that this means they’ll be out … if it’s all gone [public housing], then good … but they just see it on the surface … but that’s just phase one, then come the yuppies … people can’t see past this point” (Interview, 5/29/2011)

In this case, the class-based displacement that this process necessarily entails (racial or not) within capitalist housing markets is obscured (Boyd, 2008a), leaving little to no negative associations with the term. Gentrification can happen without displacement and is a good thing; displacement is what makes it a bad thing. Even a little displacement can and should be accepted, but “un-curbed” displacement (von Hoffman, 2003), in this perspective, should be avoided, as this is equated with disturbing the “balanced development” associated with the “mixed-income” paradigm (Roeder, 2008).

It should be stressed, of course, that this “mixed-income” belief in the supposed end goal of “balanced development” cannot be sustained without a drastic intervention within the process of capital accumulation. This is where this philosophy and practice ultimately fails. As Harvey (2000) has argued in the context of New Urbanism, mixed-income development entails a critique of existing spatial form with a proposed alternative. But this alternative rests on existing socio-temporal processes (i.e., capital accumulation) ill-suited to produce the desired utopian outcome. It also ignores the reality that not only was golden era Bronzeville never targeted for the kind of redevelopment that unfolds today, but displacement was never possible due to historically-specific legal structures (forced segregation) that quarantined all blacks in the neighborhood. Ironically, these conditions, it would follow, also need to be revived for the “Black Metropolis” to materialize in any way reminiscent of the early twentieth century.
“The formula [mixed-income housing] has to be maintained,” argued one local organizer, “it’s important it has to be maintained …” (Interview 8/19/2010). Yet how this formula is to be maintained outside of 1) the segregation tools that once made the “Black Metropolis” possible and 2) the very capitalist conditions that invariably disrupt it has not been even remotely considered. In this context, the Housing Bronzeville movement to preserve the neighborhood’s “mix of incomes” represents the manifestation of this contradiction and severance between spatial form and temporal process. It is a response to the “un-curbed” gentrification warned by von Hoffman (2003). But this is, however, not recognized as a structurally-rooted and inevitable outcome of capitalist uneven development.

Other organizers, officials, and developers, continue to argue that displacement (and therefore gentrification), in fact, has not actually taken place. One local organizer curiously (and absurdly) defined gentrification as “out with the old” and “in with the new” (Interview, 6/18/2009). For this individual, gentrification was not happening because “we’re going back to the way it was [Bronzeville’s golden years]” [my italics] (ibid), revealing a class-based colonization of the term through “community nostalgia” rhetoric. For another local planner, gentrification has become such a dirty word that it is now rarely ever uttered in institutional settings (Interview 2/8/2011). But perhaps the most prevalent argument deployed by proponents has been that displaced public housing residents, we are told, have not been displaced (and therefore gentrification has not occurred) because they have been given Section 8 vouchers:

“They’ve been given section 8 vouchers, so they have choices. They’ve not been displaced, because they can find affordable housing elsewhere” [my italics]. (Interview with local organizer, 6/18/2009)

The Housing Voucher is ultimately used as a rhetorical tactic to deflect responsibility on to the displaced. Because they’ve been given vouchers, it’s conveniently assumed that this low-
income racialized population will be inundated with unlimited options. Displacement is here equated with homelessness rather than simply being forced to move, the very definition of displacement. This is profoundly delusional in that the supply of affordable housing within existing private housing markets in the Chicago region, as discussed in chapter 5, is both well below the necessary quantity to fully absorb this displaced population and riddled with silent forms of discrimination. In effect, the historical legacies of a pre-existing socio-spatially segregated and discriminatory residential landscape funnel these residents back into their “rightfully” marginalized place while the city paints itself as morally responsible, caring, progressive, and benevolent in the process.

This “mixed-income” narrative, although entailing a profoundly morally-persuasive outward veneer, has been deeply revanchist and destructive in practice. As the city continues the “commitment the mayor made to public housing,” the result has actually been the erosion of public housing instead of its reform. But this is now posited by proponents, at least implicitly, as an acceptable failure (intentional or not) so long as redevelopment is stimulated in and surrounding the spaces formerly “blighted.” The narrative is here marked by a subtle but profound insensitivity to the most poor and marginalized urban inhabitants.

The material consequences of this post-2005 redevelopment governance remain just as revanchist despite its humanist surface-features. In this context, this narrative is no less revanchist than its roll-back correlative, just more clever and covert in rhetorical presentation. And while the addition of humanist portrayals move these historically demonized populations back into the national spotlight, they remain ignored participants in this local debate, where the notion of “affordable housing” tends to be just as attributed to what’s affordable for the middle
class. In short, the rhetorical treatment of the poorest black residents – whether continually
demonized, humanized, or silenced – can only be interpreted as hostile and draconian.

But according to one local organizer (Interview 6/18/2009), “nothing has been done with
malice intent.” A genuine belief pervades the mindset of many local city officials, developers,
and organizers that “when a blighted area is redeveloped it helps everyone” (Charles Huzenis,
CEO of Jameson Realty, in Diesenhouse, 2007). But this illusion, that capital accumulation and
poverty production are unrelated processes, functions as an incredibly “powerful ideological
weapon” (Merrifield, 2002: 47) as it produces results not too dissimilar than if there had been
genuine “malice intent.” Simmel (1955: 84), perhaps, best captures this troubling dilemma:

“By turning toward objects, competition attains the cruelty of all objectivity, a
cruelty which does not consist in the enjoyment of the other’s suffering but, on
the contrary, in the elimination of all such subjective factors from the whole
action. This indifference to the subjective element, characteristic of logic, law,
and money economy, makes people who are not at all cruel practice all the
harshness of competition – and with the certain consciousness of not wishing to
do anything bad. The subjection of personality to the objectivity of procedure thus
relieves moral conscience.”

In short, the best lies are always cloaked in truth as good and genuine intentions are rendered
irrelevant when rooted in ill-conceived assumptions and related modes of conduct.

In this context, for many of these redevelopment agents, displacement is not an objective
or even a desired outcome. It is to be avoided because there is often a genuine belief that it can
be avoided. As Harold Lucas (CEO, Black Metropolis Convention & Tourism Council) has
asserted, “we are talking about breaking the cycle of poverty and creating wealth” (in Lynch,
2007c). But what Lucas is missing is that the creation of wealth through what is often referred to
as “economic development,” necessarily entails the (re)production of this very poverty via
unavoidable displacement, a process which was ironically not possible in golden era Bronzeville.

This statement also serves as a prime example of Foucault’s ([2004] 2008) understanding of 231
classical liberal political economy operating as the principle form of knowledge driving neoliberal governmentality.

Yet, conversely, to Pattillo (in Reed, 2005), while affluent newcomers “have no desire to kick out poor people,” many actually “know that their presence is contributing” to this outcome. Here, this genuine belief is rendered more outward veneer than true inner conviction. Nonetheless, as long as capital accumulation in the name of “economic development” goes unquestioned, the harsh, human-inflicting consequences of this mindset and practice are either easily accepted or not understood to be related consequences at all.

Post-Daley Chicago and the Politics of Roll-With-It Neoliberalism

The post-2008 global economic crisis suddenly made transparent the contradictions of neoliberal capitalism (Harvey, 2010). The once celebrated virtues of government de-regulation and increased financialization now lay at the center of the crisis as continued social welfare austerity measures are criticized as exacerbating rather than alleviating poverty. Yet the policies and practices of roll-out neoliberalization, central contributing factors to the crisis, continue to operate in Chicago. The same neoliberal-capitalist mindset fueling urban political economies was in full-force behind the wall-street crash. But the crisis has been, in effect, chronicled entirely as an issue of national-scale financial policy rather than one of urban policy.

As a result, neoliberal urban politics has remained insulated from the critical backlash that continues to hit wall-street and the US government. The ideological and practical connection between these two scales of neoliberal governance has simply not been made. In the case of Chicago, roll-out neoliberal practices are now deployed as a means to combat the crisis-induced effects of the very same practices (Peck, 2010a). Although calls for “a renewed vision for
recovery and prosperity” (Terry Mazny, president of the Chicago Community Trust, in Bergen, 2009) are increasingly emerging, the same neoliberal policies and practices are being promoted:

“We will grow our way out of the recession only if the private sector starts to create jobs now” (Daley, in Bergen, 2009).

“We need to remain a competitive global city in the future … new ways to live … and new city planning … are perfect for Chicago” (Daley, in Shaw, 2007).

In short, much of the same is everywhere in evidence: the formation of a new task force to promote the city’s trade-show *competitiveness* (Bergen, 2009), the creation of “affordable housing by giving *private developers* incentives” [my italics] (Ibrahem, 2006; also see City of Chicago, 2010a, b), and continued (federal and city) financing and promotion of mixed-income redevelopment despite its now visible and documented failures (i.e., Park Boulevard):

“Our goal is to transform the old, isolated developments into vital communities where economically *self-sufficient* residents of mixed-income levels live together” [my italics]. (Daley, in Cottrell, 2008a)

Newly elected Mayor Rahm Emmanuel, however, explicitly seeks “change” from the “old ways and old divisions”:

“New times demand new answers; old problems cry out for better results … I am proud to lead a city united in common purpose and driven by a common thirst for change.” (Mayor Emanuel, in Piemonte, 2011)

Yet nothing has emerged to suggest these “new answers” will look like anything other than the same policies and practices of old:

“The City of Chicago's tax increment financing (TIF) program continues to make news. Even Rahm Emanuel … appears to be talking about the program, ostensibly getting a few pointers about how the system operates from TIF expert U.S. Rep. Mike Quigley.” (Maidenberg, 2010)

In fact, it was in the heat of this crisis that the city conjured up the ghost of Daniel Burnham, the great City Beautiful planner of a century ago. In the spring of 2009 the centennial of *Burnham’s 1909 Chicago plan* was celebrated in spectacular fashion in Grant Park. It
successfully deflected media attention (in addition to the high of the Olympic bid) away from the myriad problems related to the economic crisis and growing socio-economic polarization much in the same way as the City Beautiful Movement did over a century ago. One cannot help but recall Marx’s ([1852] 1996: 32) famous assertion that “tradition from all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living,” and it is in “such epochs of revolutionary crisis” that leaders “nervously summon up the spirits of the past, borrowing from their names, marching orders, uniforms, in order to enact new scenes in world history, but in this time-honored guise and with borrowed language” (i.e., the city’s promotion of a “Green Region” in the “thinking big” style of Burnham’s “White City,” see Kamin, 2009). This diversionary spectacle, however, proved to be fleeting.

Deepened poverty and disinvestment in large and emergent city pockets (i.e., Englewood and Woodlawn), sites of contemporary racialized CMR extraction (see Wyly, et al., 2009), are now set within the full-blown national and global economic crisis and continue to lurk as glaring failures of neoliberal capitalism. The role of Chicago’s redevelopment governance in producing this outcome has not escaped the anger and discontent of many local residents and “grass-roots” movements who hold the city accountable. In addition to Housing Bronzeville, the post-2005 period also ushered in new waves of protests against the city in response to a range of mounting issues: continued displacement of low-income people, the growing affordable housing crisis compounded by the mortgage crisis, and increased unemployment and homelessness.

Stimulating this post-2005 climate of activism was an aggressive take-over of a CHA board meeting in 2006 by more than 200 CPPH activists (Wilson and Sternberg, 2012). As a

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177 Daley is known to fashion himself as the second-coming of Daniel Burnham and the philosophy of “thinking big” (see Hinz, 2009).
result, a deluge of angry protests and press conferences have proliferated from local activist
groups and neighborhood organizations (i.e., The Renaissance Collaborative, the Kenwood-
Oakwood Community Organization, Action Now, and the Grassroots Collaborative, see Hughes,
2007; Roeder, 2008): “I had never remotely seen such activism from South-side folk … people
were angry ... and audacious” (local activist, in Wilson and Sternberg, 2012: 13).

Increasing public spectacles of defiance, in front of aldermanic offices and even in front
of Daley himself at city council meetings, led by the CPPH, Chicago Coalition for the Homeless
(CCH), and the formation of the Home Sweet Chicago Coalition, now place this governance
increasingly on edge:

“Sweet Home Chicago supporters have been packing the gallery at City Council
meetings for months. They also paraded to the microphone at one of Daley's
annual public budget hearings at the South Shore Cultural Center … pressing him
on the plan until he publicly agreed to let them meet with city officials to try to
hammer out an agreement.” (Byrne, 2011)

“Affordable housing advocates have spent two years trying and failing to get the
Chicago City Council to set aside money for their cause in the face of City Hall
opposition, so they're returning to their activist roots in an attempt to force the
issue … Members of the Sweet Home Chicago Coalition have started protesting
at the offices of aldermen who are holding up a vote on their proposal. The
change of tactic, they say, was born out of frustration over what they characterize
as ongoing obfuscation by Mayor Richard Daley's administration and his council
allies.” (Byrne, 2011)

The Plan for Transformation, mixed-income development, and revanchist roll-out policies (i.e.,
one-strike-and-you’re-out rules) are now increasingly under attack for their recognized material
failures (Johns, 2008e):

“It’s not about the people of the city of Chicago. It’s about the money of the city
of Chicago. This is a shame. There are people of color in desperate need of
housing. We have some good units here. There are not people in desperate need of
condos. There are desperate people in need of affordable housing.” (Juanita
Stephenson, LAC president of Lathrop Homes, in Johns, 2008e)
The rhetorical responses to this emergent activism from city officials have been less than impressive. For instance, after a heated confrontation by Home Sweet Chicago supporters at a city council meeting, Patrick O’Connor, 40th ward alderman, stated that “we're all supportive of the idea of affordable housing,” and that “labeling aldermen as not supporting affordable housing doesn’t help foster further dialogue in a meaningful way.” Although hiding under the ambiguous notion of “affordable housing,” O’Connor here channels the humanist-sensibilities of city hall as a defensive tactic, arguing that the activist charges are misplaced because “everyone” is now purportedly in favor of “affordable housing.” 27th ward Alderman Burnett went further by stating that “he gets why they have [activists] resorted to protests … they’ve been getting so frustrated, and I think it triggered their activism” (in Byrne, 2011). Rather than resorting to an outmoded revanchist rhetoric ala Dorothy Tillman, both O’Connor and Burnett here revert to more humanist-sensitive rhetorical stances toward this disenfranchised local population.

This activism also coincided with nation-wide criticism against HUD (Chicago Tribune, 2007; Johns, 2008a, 2010a). This was manifest locally as public protests in front of HUD’s Chicago office. Here, participants accused HUD and the CHA of “deliberate miscalculations” in the once celebrated Section 8 program (Johns, 2008f) and charged HUD with intentionally using the voucher as a means to displace public housing residents without having to accept responsibility for doing so:

“… protestors alleged mismanagement of Project Based Voucher Program by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development at a press conference and briefing outside HUD’s local headquarters in downtown Chicago on October 6, 2008 – International Housing Rights Day …” (Johns, 2008f)

“HUD clearly needs some help calculating its budget and we are here to help them do the right math. There is a $2.8 billion dollar shortfall in the HUD budget, and we need to make sure that this 2009 budget addresses that shortfall.” (Barbara Campbell, member of Lakeview Action Coalition, in Johns, 2008f)
Public housing residents are also increasingly “stifled” at local and central advisory council meetings (LAC and CAC) as complaints against the Plan for Transformation continue to rise (Cottrell, 2009a). In 2009, in recognition of their increasingly silent voices, existing public housing residents elected new leadership in the LAC’s and CAC’s (Cottrell, 2009a). These new leaders have since turned up the heat against the CHA for increased transparency and commitment to democracy (Cottrell, 2009b). The effectiveness of this institutional change remains an open question.

Increasing Homelessness

Increasing homelessness (even among seniors!) now riddles the Chicago metropolitan region and beyond:

“The number of homeless people over 50 is increasing at an alarming rate and they have limited resources for support … the first time tracks homeless individuals aged 50 – 64, found that a majority of people in this age group became homeless for the first time in middle age … between 2001 and 2006, Chicago-area agencies saw, on average, a 26 percent increase in older individuals needing services in the last five years.” (Chicago Alliance to End Homelessness, in Johns, 2008g)

“With the economy in the shape it is, I’m looking to see possibly more people becoming homeless.” (Reggie Harden, Matthew House, in Wang, 2009a)

According to the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless, roughly 21,000 people are homeless on any given night, with 73,656 for the entire year (much higher estimates than the low-ball counts released by the city) (Wang, 2009a, b). The city’s “Plan to End Homelessness” has effectively removed the city’s visible homeless and those in shelters to what are called “interim housing providers.” This housing, however, has struggled to absorb this growing population. For these providers, the plan’s implementation has not worked on account of an “insufficient affordable

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178 These councils are constituted by elected representatives of public housing residents to the CHA.
housing” situation which circumscribes any attempt to transition people into permanent housing (Wang, 2009a). They also have little recourse to make any effective changes themselves:

“Every single person in that room raised their hand [in support of a position statement criticizing the city’s homeless plan] … So everyone shared the same concerns, but different providers had different stomachs for taking on [the city], and most people don’t want to make waves because they’re worried about losing [their] funding.” (Julie Dworkin, Chicago Coalition for the Homeless, in Wang, 2009a)

As more government-issued vouchers are rendered glorified “IOUs,” displaced residents are increasingly forced to carve out informal living spaces further outside city centers where police security and surveillance is less ubiquitous (Beckett and Herbert, 2010). Since the fringes of cities and older disinvested suburbs now represent the depths of the land-rent valley, they are not considered defendable spaces by the interests of capital. Rather, the political-economic function of these emergent spaces is to absorb this afflicted population. This also allows the city to claim success in erasing homelessness in Chicago, lending the impression that homelessness is actually decreasing when in fact it is simply shifting to other declining places:

“What we have been able to do, and what we’ll say at the end of 10 years is, ‘Look, we’ve entirely transformed the system’ … (Nancy Radner, CEO of Chicago Alliance to End Homelessness, in Wang, 2009a)179

“I think the city’s numbers, and I hate to say this, are a little responsive to political demands they need to meet … It’s not a piece of interest to say that there’s this dramatic need that they’re failing to meet.” (Britt Shawver, director for Housing Opportunities for Women, in Wang, 2009b)

“There’s been an increased burden in suburban areas without the social service infrastructure being able to accommodate.” (Lee Deuben, Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning, in Wang, 2009a)

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179 The Chicago Alliance to End Homelessness is the non-profit charged with implementing the city’s 10-year plan (Wang, 2009a).
City officials also persistently cite lack of resources to fully address the homeless problem:

“‘The problem is that we don’t have the political will and we don’t have the funding to entirely do it . . .’ (Radner, in Wang, 2009a)

“[Daley] of his staff were reticent to go ahead and sign on, I think in part because they believed the scope of it [the city’s Plan to End Homelessness] was too large and it would require much more of the city . . .” (Paul Selden, Chicago Continuum of Care, in Wang, 2009a)

These statements register as slaps in the face to low-income residents as hundreds of millions of tax dollars continue to be annually generated through the city’s TIF programs only to be ploughed back into homeless-producing redevelopment schemes. In this context, the homeless problem (even if a genuine concern) is not treated as enough of a priority to justify the redirection of resources that do exist away from the more sanctified objectives of subsidizing developers and stimulating gentrification.

Concluding Remarks: The Dawn of a New Political Era in Chicago?

Chicago’s post-2005 redevelopment discourse is now constituted by an increasingly humanist-tailored rhetoric that is sensitive to the plight of the racialized poor. But this discursive-fix merely runs skin deep. Make no mistake, there is no benevolence here, as the discourse, paradoxically, also retains much of its previous revanchist characteristics. This humanization has in no way replaced revanchism, overtly communicated or not. Both opposing rhetorical threads are now uneasily situated within an increasingly hybrid redevelopment discourse.

Materially, this evolved post-2005 governance has only (re)produced the devastating socio-economic consequences that characterized its more overtly revanchist pre-2005 incarnation. This revisionary process, simply put, is merely designed to keep the neoliberal order alive. The deployment of this evolved discourse should be viewed entirely as an act of political
expedience: it is deftly crafted construct designed in response to emergent socio-political realities to mobilize and legitimate the same goals and agendas. These changing conditions, no doubt, represent a “formidable reality” for this governance to navigate. But it is not to be interpreted as in full crisis stage, but rather in, at least, “a preventative crisis stage, whose revisionist rhetoric reflects an acute reading of present and emergent obstacles to restructuring” (Wilson and Sternberg, 2012: 1-2, 3).

The cracks in the revanchist redevelopment discourse are uneasily repaired and recast in response to the fracturing effects of the neoliberal-induced crisis. The result is the rolling-out of a distinctly different neoliberal rhetoric. In this context, it can be understood as the crystallization of an emergent roll-with-it discursive formation: the rolling-out of an adjusted and revised neoliberal rhetoric to answer the manifest contradictions of its former self. But despite this rhetorical flexibility, the class-biased and malice-affects (intentional or not) of this governance’s contradictory actions are now increasingly and unapologetically called-out:

“Why is the CHA taking new steps to deplete the public housing stock in Chicago in the midst of a worsening affordable housing crisis? Why is the CHA reducing housing opportunities for poor families just one year after more than 200,000 people applied for 40,000 wait-list slots for Housing Choice Vouchers? Why is the CHA eliminating public housing units when families spend more than ten years on the waiting list for coveted vouchers?” [my italics] (Robert Davidson, LAC representative at Lathrop Homes, in Johns, 2010b)

“At a time when people are homeless, they are making more people homeless … The economy is horrible. They’ll tear it down, put us on the other side like we’re in some kind of encampment, and this will sit vacant for the next ten years.” (Lathrop Homes public housing resident, in Johns, 2010b)

“Housing is a human right, and at a time when we are talking about spending $700 billion to rescue banks and other private entities, we need to make sure that our government programs are in order and fully funded … We need to know about why our government agency does not have enough money.” (Barbara Campbell, member of Lakeview Action Coalition, in Johns, 2010e)
This increasingly organized and intensifying resistance, here, can be interpreted as a symptom of neoliberal roll-with-it, as neoliberal actors (i.e., the city, prominent developers) are now forced to adopt revised strategies to maintain the status-quo (another symptom of neoliberal roll-with-it).

In this context, this governance still has much to accomplish in terms of deflecting its criticisms and re-submerging its contradictions. Although the Plan for Transformation may have sounded great for many in the early 2000s, as William Willen has stated, “the devil is in the details … and the details have been disastrous” (in Dumke, 2005). Indeed, the Plan has succeeded in facilitating redevelopment. But based on all other measures it has been a monstrous failure. In retrospect, Andrew Cuomo’s (as HUD chief) once heralded mixed-income push to “focus on helping low-income families become homeowners” by “cutting the cost of mortgages in poor areas” now sits uneasily against the punitive effects of the sub-prime mortgage crisis (Starks, 1997). Low-income residents continue to be displaced to outlying neighborhoods, suburbs, and beyond by this governance’s unaltered redevelopment agendas.180

On September, 9, 2010, this governance suddenly lost its heart and soul to retirement: Mayor Daley. Although Daley’s motives for suddenly stepping aside as Chicago’s mayor after nearly 22 years remain somewhat elusive, the broader financial crisis, increased fiscal constraints, and on-going “grass-roots” activism against the city’s “go-global” redevelopment has undoubtedly contributed to this decision. The loss of the Olympic bid also figured as a hard symbolic blow to the city’s global aspirations, not to mention Daley’s formidable ego. One wonders if Daley would’ve retired so soon had Chicago landed the Olympics and, once and for

180 In the 15 precincts that made up the former Robert Taylor Homes and Stateway Gardens in the 3rd ward, 3 out of every 4 voters were no longer registered voters in Cook County as of September, 2007, once both legendary housing projects were completely demolished (Chicago Reporter, 2007c).
all, received coveted “global city” recognition. One also wonders if Daley’s departure, having ruled since the city’s neoliberal-turn, will represent the dawn of a new era in Chicago politics.

Current Mayor Rahm Emmanuel – strongly endorsed by Daley – now inherits this neoliberal-induced quagmire of problems as Daley seeks to go out on top and secure a long-lasting positive mayoral legacy.181 While Daley is certain to receive this warm embrace from the mainstream media, the dark-side to his “monarchical” tenure lurks in the shadows. Time magazine may attribute Daley’s “near imperial powers” as the source of his “success” for transforming Chicago from “graying hub to vibrant boomtown” (Dumke, 2005). But such accolades are now rendered increasingly insensitive and outdated as the crisis of neoliberal capitalism continues to unfold.182 After a crippling crime wave during the summer of 2010 (Chicago Tribune, 2010), relatively slow redevelopment, and persistent protests outside aldermanic offices (Byrne, 2011), a perceived weak city council now prepares for a new autocratic-like mayor as the very problems that neoliberalization was meant (at least rhetorically) to solve (i.e., budget shortfalls, concentrated poverty, crime, etc.) only continue to loom.

To what extent will Chicago’s post-Daley governance represent a departure or resuscitation of the neoliberal order? Will continued reliance on neoliberal policies and practices further aggravate or overcome (at least temporarily) the myriad neoliberal-induced obstacles this post-Daley governance now confronts? Will history render roll-with-it neoliberalization a fleeting, transitional phase away from neoliberal capitalism and toward some new regime of accumulation? Or will it represent the preliminary moments of something new and/or

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181 The fallout from Mayor Daley’s retirement, announced September 7th, 2010, has been a drastic restructuring of the city council, as new aldermen, supported by newly elected Mayor Emmanuel, take the place of many long-time Daley noblemen.
182 While Daley continued to win election after election by wider and wider margins, a systematic decrease in city-wide voter turnout has suggested increased voter apathy rather than consolidated support (Dumke, 2005): why vote if the conclusion has already been determined?
qualitatively different? And, finally, how will these potential temporal trajectories effect the ongoing socio-spatial transformation of Chicago’s Bronzeville? In the following and final chapter, I summarize and discuss the key insights revealed in this study, their implications for theory and practice, and explore these contemplative questions.
Chapter 7
Conclusion: What’s Next?

This study has empirically unearthed the fluid and evolving character of Chicago’s neoliberal redevelopment governance since its formation in 1989. In relation to the redevelopment of Chicago’s Bronzeville, the institutional content of this redevelopment governance has indeed evolved since 2005 in response to a complex of multi-scalar socio-political and economic forces. Certainly, this governance transition began before 2005 (around 2002-3) and is likely still unfolding. But the traits that characterize this evolved formation (i.e., new forms of rhetoric, institutional agents, and kinds of spaces), I suggest, reached a degree of salience to warrant 2005 as the point of demarcation between these two distinct periods.

The actors and institutions constitutive of this governance initially consisted of local activists and middle-income homeowners in the 1980s. The neighborhood’s socio-economic (low-income and black) and spatial (public housing concentration) stigmatization served as seemingly insurmountable barriers to redevelopment from the perspective of the city and prominent real-estate community. These barriers, however, were overcome in the late 1990s when 1) the neighborhood’s public housing was targeted for demolition, 2) sufficient speculative pressure emanated from the rapidly gentrifying South Loop, and 3) new outlets for real-estate investment were sought due to the saturation of other mostly white gentrified housing markets.

It was not until the coalescence of these conditions that the redefinition of Bronzeville (via the locally-endogenous “community nostalgia” narrative) was taken seriously by Chicago’s principal redevelopment agents (i.e., the city and connected developers). But the local activists, gentrifiers, and city officials that spearheaded this redevelopment in the roll-out period are no
longer the only actors constituting this evolved neighborhood-specific governance. New activist formations such as Housing Bronzeville now compete with older, 1990s era activists that have since been absorbed into positions of city power. The newer and younger gentrifiers have less interest in reviving the “days of old” or taking part in some sort of “racial uplift” as opposed to the original homeowners that ignited Bronzeville’s revival in the early 1990s. Longtime city officials that could not adapt to an altered post-2005 socio-political landscape – Dorothy Tillman and Madeleine Haithcock – have been replaced. Toni Preckwinkle, however, has ascended the political hierarchy as the chairman of the Cook County board. To date, Bronzeville’s three aldermanic offices are now occupied by new faces for the first time in decades. Moreover, Mayor Emanuel and a predominantly new city council now rule the city’s political structure as Daley and the remnants of Chicago’s roll-out neoliberal regime fade into the sunset.

After Bronzeville’s revival was sanctioned by the city in the late 1990s, developers, neighborhood organizations (i.e., MSPDC), and the city alike joined forces in promoting the vision of Bronzeville’s nostalgic revival. But as persistent displacement shifted the balance of the desired “mix” of incomes upward in the 2000s – the expected outcome of a gentrification fueled by capitalist imperatives – a new coalition of activists emerged. For Housing Bronzeville activists, the goal was to reign in what was perceived as an increasingly affluent and white-led “go-global” gentrification and betrayal of the original black-led, “mixed-income” vision.

As the neighborhood’s assemblage of redevelopment agents continued to expand and diversify, so did the rhetorical themes deployed by these agents to advance redevelopment. Initially a disjointed discursive complex, Bronzeville’s revanchist redevelopment discourse crystallized (along with the consolidation of the agents propagating it) during the late 1990s. But this discourse, a hybrid social formation, slowly evolved. The salience of the revanchist-public
housing trope receded as the neighborhood’s public housing was razed to the ground. This demolition rendered the function and explicit articulation of this narrative no longer necessary. Yet the increasingly hegemonic “mixed-income” narrative, the answer to the ills of public housing, intensified over the same period. This discursive evolution continued in the early 2000s as the “humanist” renderings of the racialized poor sprouted from within the soft-revanchist “mixed-income” and “community nostalgia” narratives. This portrayal, due to political expediency, is now articulated alongside the same revanchist articulations that previously dominated redevelopment discourses during the 1990s (they have not been replaced).

The neighborhood’s post-2005 revisionist discourse is also characterized by the re-articulation and promotion of the global trope, particularly under the guise of the now obsolete Olympic redevelopment trope. This has uneasily unfolded in parallel with the deepened normalization of the discourse’s two soft-revanchist narratives, of “mixed-income” development and “community nostalgia.” In short, it is an emergent and evolved redevelopment discourse that is constituted by new components interwoven through a re-working of the rhetorical themes inherited from its previous pre-2005 incarnation.

This post-2005 revisionist discourse also increasingly confronts rhetorical assaults in the form of criticism ignited from the post-2008 global crisis and its local manifestations (i.e., rises in foreclosures, joblessness, and homelessness). The revanchist and punitive effects of the now increasingly visible failure and transparent goals of the city’s Plan for Transformation now necessitate further discursive adjustment from this governance. But despite this apparent discursive revision, the rhetorical themes that constitute this emergent discursive complex remain anchored by the theological underpinnings of neoliberalism. It merely represents a politically pragmatic response to the convergence of forces this governance now confronts to
maintain the same redevelopment goals and agendas. Indeed, new activists, redevelopment agents, and city officials now compete or align with established actors to constitute this evolved post-2005 governance. But this has merely amounted to a superficial “facelift”; it has not been accompanied by a fundamental transformation of its core values and orientations. In short, the same neoliberal belief system continues to operate through these new agents nonetheless.

The spatial impacts of this governance’s actions have also evolved accordingly and represent the role of the local state and real-estate capital in the production of a new and emergent form of racialized space. It is a produced space that represents the imperatives of the agents driving the neighborhood’s initial and ongoing revival: the black middle-class. But as the speculative-rise of housing prices reached undesirable levels during the mid 2000s, the original middle-income homeowners and gentrifiers were suddenly threatened with the prospect of potential displacement. As a result, the neighborhood’s post-2005 landscape of resistance has translated into new construction (in addition to continued affluent redevelopment) aimed at securing an adequate supply of what I have called tenant-serenity residential space to meet local demand for decent affordable housing. Fueled by an emergent form of locally-sourced financing (see Hutson, 2010a, b), these newly formed spaces suggest the potential formation of a new and evolved “life world” taking root, and in relation to this governance’s post-2005 evolving.

Redevelopment, however, continues to unfold in an increasingly differentiated manner: the spatial and material outcome of housing markets driven by the capitalist imperative of CMR realization. But it should be stressed again that economic forces have not been the only driver of this temporal unfolding. Indeed, this neighborhood’s produced “racialized” spaces reflect the local racial-class identity formation that serves as the effective demand fueling this
For this population, Bronzeville’s revival has been just as much about identity realization as producing wealth and success through capital accumulation.

The imperatives driving developers and city planning officials also have as much to do with power (i.e., political) and prestige (i.e., identity) than with capital accumulation (i.e., economic). In this context, capital accumulation serves more as the means of securing these politically-inflected identity formations than just an end goal. For instance, building Chicago into a “global city” continues to play a driving force compelling these agents and the constitution of their identities. Mayor Daley’s decision to enter political retirement has had as much to do with preserving a long-lasting mayoral legacy, reasons of identity fulfillment and preservation, as it did, for instance, of evading the city’s intensified and crisis-induced economic burdens.

Yet the different identity configurations that constitute these redevelopment agents – new and old alike – are, nonetheless, collectively linked through the ideological underpinnings of neoliberal rationality. In this context, the neighborhood’s base of activists and middle-income homeowners, privileged developers, and city officials, each reflect “hybridized” neoliberal subject formations. The Housing Bronzeville coalition, despite its acute and trenchant criticism of Mayor Daley and the city’s “go-global” agenda, also exhibit adherence to neoliberal values through its promotion of “middle-income” homeownership and “pull-yourself-up-by-the-bootstraps” philosophy. In short, it is a movement by and for “deserving” members of society: it’s ok for the “real poor” to be displaced (as unfortunate as that may be) but not us!

In these ways, the CPE perspective deployed in this study has revealed a more nuanced and complex temporal unfolding than what the monolithic category of “semiotics” is capable of

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183 However, it should be noted that this identity formation emerged out of the dust of a transformed social-class structure intimately tied to the temporal rhythms of the metropolitan, national, and global capitalist economy.
producing. Its limitations is perhaps most apparent in the context of the dynamic “form/content” relationship between discourse and ideology illuminated in this study. While discursive change characterizes the post-2005 period, the same ideological prescriptions are transmitted nonetheless. This distinction has been vital for determining the extent of this post-2005 institutional evolution. And the ideological content flowing through both the global trope and “community nostalgia” discursive themes serves the function of another, third semiotic distinction: identity constitution. Albeit, both of these themes are associated with different identity configurations: entrepreneurial success and middle-class blackness.

I now return to the principle question posed in this study: has Chicago’s redevelopment governance experienced significant change since 2005? The answer is yes and no. As this study reveals, Chicago’s post-2005 redevelopment governance has indeed registered an evolved institutional content, particularly in its composition of actors and rhetorical tactics. Driving this evolving process has been a convergence of multi-scalar forces. The humanization of the city’s redevelopment discourse received an additional bolstering after the swift and sudden impact of Hurricane Katrina in August, 2005. It effectively resuscitated long-dormant welfare-state rooted arguments while fracturing the neoliberal-produced façade occluding the drastic social consequences of roll-out neoliberalization. These consequences and realities were then only further magnified by the global economic crisis erupting in late 2008, leading to negative critiques of redevelopment schemes in Chicago and beyond and stimulating persistent bouts of contestation (i.e., Housing Bronzeville, CPPH, and Home Sweet Chicago). As such, Chicago’s redevelopment governance responded accordingly as a means of self-preservation.

But in other respects this governance has not changed at all. Although an evolved ensemble of actors and institutions deploying a revised redevelopment discourse now marks this
neighborhood-specific formation, it remains guided by established ideological principles. The evidence suggests the potential for change, but it only points to the characteristics of a new and emergent phase of neoliberal politics akin to Keil’s notion of roll-with-it. Any change beyond this, to date, is far from conclusive. Indeed, the materialization of possible new “life worlds” could blossom into new and potentially non-neoliberal political subjectivities while growing local discontent and resistance to the city’s “go-global” motivations could lead to more fundamental change. But this is, however, far from a reality at present.

In terms of CPE, the post-2008 crisis can be interpreted as a multi-faceted crisis that spans across the cultural medium. It was, simultaneously, an economic, political, ideological, discursive, and identity-fracturing crisis. It was economic, clearly, in the manifestation of the typical structurally-rooted contradictions endemic to capitalist development. It was political in the sense of 1) Habermas’ (1975) “legitimation crisis” as the neoliberal dominated political sphere was placed in the spotlight as the harbinger of the crisis, and 2) that neoliberalism is itself a political ideology concerning the optimal role of state intervention in the supposed “free-market” economy. It was discursive in the sense that some existing neoliberal-anchored discourses were suddenly less politically-viable (i.e., overtly revanchist articulations). It was ideological in that it exposed the contradictions of neoliberal theology and its role in producing the crisis. And lastly, it forced a certain degree of self-reflection (i.e., identity) concerning these contradictions and underpinnings to the crisis.

However, a significant or substantial degree of self-reflection has seemingly not occurred. Similar to the present European context (see Oosterlynck and Gonzalez, 2011), since self-reflection regarding the structural causes of the crisis (at least beyond the typical superficial explanations of selfish financial investors and irresponsible homeowners) has generally not
occurred (which is not particularly surprising), the discussion has tended to focus on the best response to the crisis. It is in this context that, to Peck, et al. (2010: 102-3), the “crisis managers” are “flying blind,” the dominant objective to stabilize credit markets as a means “of restoring orderly accumulation and economic growth.” And this is, apparently, a task which can, ironically, “only be safely handled by the same elite of financial technocrats and bandits that brought us the crisis in the first place” (ibid). Indeed, as Hossein-Zadeh (2008) notes, Obama’s team of economic advisors primarily consist of individuals that have come from the previous Bush and Clinton administrations, individuals that “championed most of the policies of deregulation, privatization and outsourcing that gradually led to the current meltdown.”

These bandits are, essentially, unwittingly and uncaringly restoring the very elite-sponsored and self-beneficial conditions that lie at the epicenter of capital’s endemic collision with crises. The barrage of “bail-outs” that ensued in the immediate crisis aftermath has been nothing but a massive “temporal-fix,” the rescheduling of the same crisis tendencies to the future. This mode of crisis rescheduling, indeed, has become a proven neoliberal skill set. It is in this context that Lefebvre ([1981] 2005: 37-8) perceptively foresaw the post-1970s trajectory (after a decade-long crisis) as a period defined by constant as opposed to periodic crises:

“People always refer to the ‘end of the crisis’, a solution, a ‘way out of the crisis’. They talk about controlling it … it [crisis] is becoming the mode of existence of modern societies on a world scale … We must get used to the idea that a crisis of this order no longer has anything to do with ‘crisis’ in the classical sense; that constant invention is required to respond to such situations … We must get used to the paradoxical idea that this crisis [of the 1970s] is not some malady of society, but henceforth its normal, healthy state.”

This observation could just as easily be applied to the current crisis. Lefebvre certainly pinned the tail on the donkey as far as characterizing the coming neoliberal order as a persistent engagement with “responding” to perceived crises.
In fact, the neoliberal project, from its inception(s), has always been, first and foremost, a “response” to a set of denigrated alternatives (Peck, 2010b). The perceived crisis of these alternatives (i.e., Keynesian state management, socialism, etc.) is precisely what animated and enlivened the neoliberal “ideological-fix” post-1973. But driving the project forward, however, has been a very unclear, incoherent set of experimental policy prescriptions that have, by most measures, been utter failures when and where they have been deployed (Harvey, 2005; Peck, 2010b). But due to the lack of any coherent alternative, as Peck (2010b: 6) argues, the neoliberal project has tended to “fail forward.” And it will likely continue to fail forward as long as the very same neoliberal-inspired “solutions,” those that lie at the root of the present crisis, continue to be rolled-out as responses just as they were three decades ago.

But, as Peck (2010b) chronicles, as opposed to the promotion of a coherent, universal vision for the future, neoliberalism has been more a project of purging alternatives than anything else. Neoliberalism, in fact, had long been a set of predominantly critical, anti-state management ideas and values, lying dormant since the 1920s. But it took the crises of the very political-economic systems it denigrated in the 1970s – of Keynesian hegemony – to “charge” what was an already established alternative. Presently, however, no such alternative ideas and values have coherently mobilized against neoliberal hegemony. And, in concurrence with Brenner, et al. (2010a: 15), as long as neoliberalism goes unchallenged by an alternative regulatory strategy, criticism of its failures is likely, and unfortunately, to be “sharply circumscribed” in terms of ushering in a new and fundamentally changed mode of governance and regulatory apparatus.

As Peck (2010a) asserts, despite some necessary adjustments, institutional formations where neoliberal policies and practices remain unchanged have entered their “zombie” phase, a moment “animated by technocratic forms of muscle memory, deep instincts of self-preservation”
(Peck, et al., 2010: 105), and infected by the neoliberal penchant for engaging in a kind of perpetual “irritable intervention syndrome.” This moment seems particularly acute in Chicago as not even the new policies and practices that Keil (2009) cites as characteristic of this emergent phase are present. Rather, the same roll-out neoliberal agenda of now retired Mayor Daley is promoted by newly elected Mayor Emanuel. In his inaugural speech, all-the-while extolling Daley as a living legend, Emanuel (in Piemonte, 2011) stated the following:

“New times demand new answers; old problems cry out for better results … I am proud to lead a city united in common purpose and driven by a common thirst for change … It is time to take on the challenges that threaten the very future of our city. The decisions we make in the next two or three years will determine what Chicago will look like in the next 20 or 30 … I have been clear about the hard truths and tough choices we face. We simply can’t afford what we had in the past. And taxpayers deserve a more effective and efficient government than the one we have today … The old ways no longer work. It is time for a new era of responsibility and reform … The best way to keep people from leaving is to attract the jobs that give them a good reason to stay. The jobs of tomorrow will go to those cities that produce the workforce of tomorrow …”

Although Emanuel explicitly promotes change and a new way of doing things, this rhetoric also sounds eerily familiar: from the “hard truths” and “tough choices” to the more effective and efficient government and inter-urban competition for jobs. The following passage was delivered by Daley during his inaugural speech in 1989:

“… Make the special effort required to meet these challenges, or sit back and watch Chicago decline … Business as usual is a prescription for failure. The old ways of doing things simply aren’t adequate to cope with the new challenges we face. In times of limited resources, government must be more creative and productive than ever before …” (Daley, in Bennett, 2010).

The new way of doing things is clear: the further entrenchment of neoliberal practices to meet the demands of a new period of now “hyper” ominous global times. And this is exactly what

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184 Jamie Peck coined this phrase in a panel session entitled “The Limits of Neoliberal Natures: Debating Research Agendas” at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the AAG in Seattle, WA. Moreover, Hamnett (2011) has recently discussed the recent entrenchment of anti-welfare policies and programs in the UK as a typical recent neoliberal response to its own crises.
appears to be happening. Thus far, Emanuel has promised the expansion of police services – a total of ninety-two new patrollers (Walberg, 2011) – to meet growing crime and safety concerns (Chicago Tribune, 2010). Emanuel has also doubled the size of the Daley-formed World Business Chicago, an elite “civic group” that now consists of forty-eight corporate board members and CEOs (including many of the same figures as before) (Dardick and Mack, 2011). Emanuel has also “waged war against the teachers unions,” and even cites conservative-notorious Texas as an example to follow in terms of public education reform:

“Today, our school system only graduates half of our kids … And with one of the shortest school days and school years in the country, we even shortchange those who earn a diploma. By high school graduation, a student in Houston has been in the classroom an equivalent of three years longer than a student in Chicago even when both started kindergarten on the very same day” (Kass, 2011).

And further, despite increased activism against the city’s now scrutinized TIF program, Emanuel defiantly proposes its expansion (Ahmed-Ullah, 2011):

“… no way does Emanuel want to scrap a redevelopment program that generates hundreds of millions of dollars a year … Mayor Rahm Emanuel made it clear … the city will continue to rely on special taxing districts as an economic development tool, even as he tries to wash away the stain of public criticism that marred them in recent years … The city has to draw up both the economic plan and the benchmarks for goals like job creation, private investment, property value increases …” (Dardick, 2011).

Emanuel blames the TIF-related problems on internal-corruption during Daley’s tenure rather than the practice itself, such as using it as a means of tax-redistribution to connected developers instead of its primary purpose as an economic development tool. A task-force, ironically headed by Carole Brown, former Chicago Transit Authority chairman under Daley, is now charged with reforming the city’s TIF program and to alleviate “sour public sentiment” (Dardick, 2011). This regurgitation of neoliberal practices under the guise of something new, in fact, represents a current example of the reoccurring paradox noted by Lefebvre ([1961] 2002: 74) long ago: “the
intensification of ideologies at a time when they are being discredited … [and] at a time when pressing political problems demonstrate an urgency which nobody denies.”

Indeed, a radically evolved city council that consists of new political agents now supports Emanuel’s promotion of “new ways of doing things.” But make no mistake; it’s still business as usual in Chicago as “presentation and verbal packaging conceal the persistence and deterioration of the old in the allegedly new” (Lefebvre, [1981] 2005: 40-1). Emanuel’s comments can also be interpreted as a city-specific manifestation of the broader national-scale effort to “reboot” the same system through “reform”:

“… flamboyant denunciations of the follies of laissez-faire, delivered from right stage as well as left, coincide with desperate efforts to reboot some reformed version of the same system, by socializing financial (rather than social) risk, by attempting to pep up credit markets and consumer demand, by reimposing debt conditionalities on developing countries, by tamping down “protectionist” sentiments and talk of new entitlements, by facilitating the market disciplining of unionized segments of the workforce in order to “save” overproducing industries like automobiles, and so on.” (Peck, et al., 2010: 100)

Since neoliberalism as a mode of regulatory restructuring is based on and formed in response to conditions of crisis, it is well-suited to adapt to the present dilemma despite its own role in producing it (Peck, et al., 2010; Brenner, et al., 2010a). In fact, at least in the Chicago context, the crisis appears to have only forced a response in the discursive realm, a rhetorical-fix designed to recuperate a structured coherence fixed on the same goals and agendas of the previous order, that of roll-out neoliberalization.186

Chicago’s revisionist redevelopment discourse has not entailed a revision of the ideological tenets of its pre-2005 incarnation. It remains impregnated with the core beliefs of

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185 This statement delivered by Lefebvre in 1981 in relation to the emergence of what would be coined neoliberalism holds even more true today as not even an alternative has emerged to represent the “verbal packaging” alluded to.  
186 It should be stressed that this has not been unique to Chicago. Following Sheppard and Leitner (2010), this discursive-fix has transpired at a multiplicity of scales including global-scale neoliberal discourses.
neoliberal faith. In this context, it specifically represents a local “discursive-fix” designed to re-legitimize neoliberal modes of rationality and, ultimately, the same capitalist policies and practices. But this is nothing new, as the capacity for “adaptability” is firmly built into the neoliberal project. As neoliberal architect George Stigler (1975: 321, 315) once revealed, it is “intellectuals [who] sell their wares to customers [the public] … [it is] they – not the customers – [who] do most of the adapting.”

Thus far, nothing remotely close to a fundamental ideological revision has been reported in the US or beyond. Much more empirical research will be necessary to uncover the extent to which Chicago’s experience is reflective of broader-scale trends. For now, nothing suggests the Chicago experience has been anything other than the norm. How successful will this neoliberal resurrection project be, however, remains to be determined as criticism only increases and the neoliberal-roots of the crisis are made more transparent. In fact, continued reliance on neoliberal capitalist practices, following Jessop (2004), is likely to further aggravate crisis tendencies. Yet, as Peck, et al. (2010: 103) note, “the absence of a robust ideological counterweight to neoliberalism” suggests “another crisis-driven makeover of neoliberalism” is destined through continued dominant state and class-based “reformist restoration” efforts.

In this context, the hyper-adept, morphological capacity of this social formation has the potential to sustain itself “even after its moment of hegemony has passed” (Peck, 2010b: 29). But the degree of such potential aggravation – future crises in the short term – may indeed produce the alternative visions necessary to pave the way toward a more fundamental and substantive revisionary process away from neoliberal capitalism (also see Panitch and Gindin, 2009). The role of contestation may play a significant role in shaping this yet undetermined trajectory (Leitner, et al., 2007), particularly if continued and persistent eruptions of neoliberal-induced
crisis lead to fundamentally altered political/identity subjectivities. Such evolved conditions at the political/identity nexus could, at least potentially, lead to the abandonment of neoliberal doctrine through the formation of alternative political ideologies and regulatory practices.

Indeed, the emergence of newly constructed “affordable housing” and even “communal” forms of living in just this Chicago neighborhood suggest the possibility of a new form of potential non-neoliberal subjectivization. In fact, such new subjectivities may even be emerging, from city-based coalitions like CPPH, CCH as well as other neighborhood-based activist groups like the Protect Pilsen Coalition (Wilson, et al., 2004). Such anti-neoliberal movements can only continue to blossom in a post-crisis climate of stunted urban redevelopment that, as Ball (2010) asserts, might never return to the heights experienced during the booming 1990s.187

These forms of contestation represent distinct modes of resistance against the forces of neoliberal capitalism. But they have yet to form a coherent voice let alone a united intra-urban alliance: they resemble the kind of “disarticulated” counter-neoliberal movement discussed by Brenner (et al., 2010a). Yet, as Brenner, et al. (2010a: 12) asserts, despite their “disarticulation,” they form “a strategically essential frontier for exploring alternatives” to continued neoliberalization. Indeed, the post-2005 humanist-friendly discursive climate could provide the springboard for such an exploration. For this to transpire, however, such new and emergent subjectivities would have to become powerful enough to colonize the city’s political structure (not to mention across trans-urban scales as well): a claiming of the “right to the city” (Lefebvre, [1968] 1996) by the under-privileged and marginalized urban populations.188

187 Ball (2010) even proposes the uncomfortable possibility of a “suburbia redux,” where lower land values will again attract development to the urban peripheries in search for profitable places of long-term capital absorption; underpinning a possible emergent spatial-fix not too dissimilar from an re-established third “suburban solution” (Walker, 1977, 1981).

188 Much has been explored and written about this oft-cited phrase coined by Lefebvre ([1968] 1996), see Purcell (2002), Marcuse (2009), and Mayer (2009) for recent points of entry into this now vast literature.
This would, of course, necessarily entail a kind of “intersubjective communication” (Merrifield, 2002: 68) advocated by Habermas and designed to unite an otherwise diverse population along the lines of race, ethnicity, religion, and the like, through the formation of a unifying common-denominator: a class-based politics. Otherwise, such “disarticulated” movements are destined to “confront systemic constraints that may undermine their medium-to-long-term reproducibility” (Brenner, et al., 2010a: 12-3). The result would be an invariable limitation of their capacity to produce the kind of “interspatial generalization” necessary to confront an already well consolidated, transnational network of on-going neoliberal restructuring.

But at a much more fundamental (and sobering) level, the very existence of “neoliberalism,” as a coordinating political-economic system of rationality, barely exists in the public consciousness. Indeed, neoliberalism has become an almost ubiquitous object of analysis in many academic circles. But it is predominantly only recognized by critical opponents (Peck, 2010b). For neoliberal proponents and propagators, it is a term that is rarely used at all. In fact, many neoliberals, precisely because of the evasiveness of this ideological formation, are unwitting carriers of this ensemble of beliefs and values. As mainstream politics in the United States remains ardently and hopelessly fixed along party and sub-party identities, the overarching role of neoliberalism – the central thread tying together the totality of America’s political spectrum – is, for the most part, entirely obscured.

As a result, the colonization of neoliberal theology within most mainstream political divisions has gone nearly undetected. As neoliberalism refers to a set of beliefs that are treated as core truths across the mainstream political landscape, it has long seized to present itself as an

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189 See Dowling (2009) and Cumbers, Helms, and Swanson (2010) for recent expositions on contemporary formations of class-based politics.
object for debate. Consequently, it has yet to significantly present itself to potential resistance movements as an object to resist. For this resistance to form, knowledge of neoliberalism – that it exists – and its material consequences is a first step that, in many ways, remains only minimally completed. Only then can alternatives begin to form and gain the kind of momentum necessary to 1) identify neoliberalism as an ontological object, and 2) chisel away at its hegemony.

By all indicators, we have not experienced a terminal crisis of neoliberalism. Indeed, to Castree (2010), a post-neoliberal future currently seems way off the horizon. However, the dust of the crisis has yet to settle, and when it does, perhaps a radically different formation will emerge from its ashes (Harvey, 2010; Sheppard and Leitner, 2010). But if the history of capitalism and its crises is any indication, it may still be many years until the semblance of something qualitatively new begins to emerge. Even during the ascendency of neoliberal hegemony in the 1970s, the near-future was in no way immediately clear or apparent. Gamble (2006: 21) recalls the following in relation to the crisis of the 1970s:

“… a great convulsion in world capitalism – at once economic, political and ideological – a period of major restructuring, the contours of which were often hard to discern at the time, and frequently, misunderstood. This was particularly true of the role played by new forms of ideology in the crisis, and in particular of neoliberalism. The revival of doctrines of the free-market, both as ideology and as political economy, was a significant feature of the period, but there was little agreement at first as to what it meant, and whether it indicated any deeper change of substance.”

As of yet, however, no such alternative ideological promotion or revival has seemingly marked the present crisis-inflicted period. In this context, Chicago’s redevelopment governance, and the innumerable others like it, currently rests in a kind of “governance purgatory,” its final judgment yet to be made. And what the world will look like “when we emerge from the cellar,” following Wallerstein, for the better or for the worse, will ultimately be a “matter for political struggle” to
It is the task of academic scholarship to inform that political struggle in ways best suited to paving the way toward more socially equitable ends.

It would seem plausible that the perpetuation of neoliberal capitalist practices is likely to compound the current crisis much in the same way as four years of free-market principles failed to resolve the post-1929 crisis of laissez-faire capitalism; or Ford and Carter’s reluctance to part with failed Fordist-Keynesian programs to resolve the Fordist-Keynesian-induced recession of the 1970s. It would also seem that the current moment may reflect a similar transitional phase away from neoliberal capitalism toward some new regime of accumulation. Thus far, however, no technological, institutional, or spatial fixes seem to be emerging to point our attention to more specific, concrete possibilities beyond what the further entrenchment of neoliberalism immediately suggests: neo-conservativism or fascism. Needless to say, this very real and frightening possibility should be resisted at all costs.\footnote{The immense consolidation of state power with the military apparatus in the US during the second Bush administration has led to a US neoliberal state that now radically departs from the minimal state-intervention promoted by the original neoliberal ideologues, i.e., Friedman and Hayek (Peck, 2010b).}

For the moment, the social and economic consequences of neoliberal capitalism only continue to bludgeon not just the racialized poor but nearly everyone beneath the wealthiest segment of American society: the outcome of the neoliberal agenda of upward wealth redistribution (Harvey, 2005). In this context, a neo-Keynesian solution to the crisis may seem the most logical for the demands of capital: another chapter in Polanyi’s (1944) seemingly perpetual “double movement” or oscillation between social-welfare principles followed by “free-market” retrenchment and vice versa (also see Peck, 2001, 2010b; Sheppard and Leitner, 2010). However, whether neoliberal or Keynesian, both are still (albeit different) state-focused philosophies of guiding specifically capitalist-driven societies through their endemic cycles of
boom and bust. In recognition of the continuities between the Keynesian and then emergent neoliberal regime, Lefebvre ([1981] 2005: 40) wrote the following in 1981 of which, remarkably, could just as easily mark the present moment:

“Around the 1980, a rumor was doing the rounds that everything had changed, that we were entering a different era … There is indeed something new, but where and what? Illusion or reality? Potentialities, remote possibilities, or the consequences of decisions that have already been taken? There is indeed a neo-bourgeoisie, a new middle-class, but they bear a close resemblance to the old ones, with fewer tics and added idiocies. The allegedly new is often only a revival that is unconscious of the fact. Sometimes people also wittingly revive religious, metaphysical and political themes, renovated like old palaces in historic cities: the new tacked on to the old.”

The recovery of capitalist economic growth can only result in the same age-old story. Although the details may be (and likely will be) different, the contradictory structure of the story will necessarily remain unaltered:

“One of its most contradictory motifs, now coming to the fore rather too palpably for most people, is surging property prices (and rents) coupled with stagnating and shrinking household incomes. Rents go up, and landlords and developers make a killing; wages take a dip, worker insecurity grows and family tensions intensify. All of which is supposed to signify prosperous times, good business climate conditions.” (Merrifield, 2002: 77)

In short, capital accumulation, certainly not the one and only force compelling individuals in capitalist societies, nonetheless remains a central guiding logic that, invariably, leads to certain outcomes as Marx ([1867] 1976: 812) uncovered over 140 years ago:

“Improvements of towns, accompanying the increase of wealth, by the demolition of badly built quarters, the erection of palaces for banks, warehouses, etc., the widening of streets for business traffic, for the carriages of luxury, and for the introduction of tramways, etc., drive away the poor into even worse and more crowded hiding places.”

This passage, sadly, could have just as easily been written today, albeit with the replacement of technologically antiquated notions like “carriages” and “tramways.”
The means, strategies, and forms of how this process is facilitated have certainly changed, but as Wyly, et al., (2009) reminds us, the same class-relations that underpinned this process in Marx’s time remain in place today. The imperatives driving the realization of CMR in the built-environment still dictates the (re)production of a hyper-balkanized and differentiated urban landscape as both a by-product of, and necessary input into, the engine of accumulation. Despite the path-dependencies and idiosyncratic qualities of Bronzeville’s two-decade long revival, this story still represents something that Merrifield (2002: 13) notes as “merely a process of displacement and reconquest”: a reconfiguration of the spaces of luxury and, as Marx writes, the “driving away of the poor into even worse and more crowded spaces.” It also represents a new chapter of capitalist uneven development as formerly public-housing concentrated neighborhoods are restructured as sites for real-estate accumulation.

The vast majority of Chicago’s displaced public housing population has ultimately not been given much of a “housing choice” as most displaced residents have been relegated to deteriorating older inner-suburbs to the south and west of the city. This displacement has only reinforced existing patterns and degrees of racial-economic segregation as opposed to its alleviation. While some of these individuals have secured living conditions nominally better than what they experienced in the projects. The difference is ultimately rendered negligible at best (and usually temporally limited, Fuerst, 2005). This outcome hardly qualifies as a success as their current living conditions are only set to further decline (in part by virtue of their own increasing presence in these already deteriorating neighborhoods) as they ride the ensuing geographical wave of disinvestment associated with capitalist uneven development.

Only further capitalist-induced bouts of crisis and active and persistent trans-locally connected contestation against *explicitly capitalist practices* – the kind of “constant pressure”
advocated by Lefebvre (2002 [1961]: 40) – can lead this undetermined temporal trajectory into new unchartered territory and, ideally, toward the formation of a qualitatively new, untold, and hopefully more socially-equitable story.\footnote{Perhaps Harvey (2000) provides the most elaborated and detailed discussion regarding how this conversation should proceed (i.e., dialectically) and the kinds of questions it should pose.} Capital will \textit{absolutely never} give anything up without being utterly forced to (Merrifield, 2002). But such a story cannot begin without a broad agreement that the current state of affairs is simply unacceptable. It also cannot begin \textit{tabula rasa}: it must begin by negotiating the variegated social, political, and economic landscape that neoliberal capitalism has left (and continues to produce) in its wake (Harvey, 2010).\footnote{Just as neoliberalism formed in the unevenly-developed interstices of its inherited Keynesian predecessor, so will a potential neoliberal alternative necessarily form out of the uneven topography that is neoliberal capitalism.} And indeed, perhaps the end of capitalism has already begun, as bravely proposed by Merrifield (2010) in his exposition of “\textit{The Coming Insurrection},” an emergent neo-communist global political movement currently gathering steam (and emanating out of France).

In the meantime, the creatively-destructive dynamic of capitalism continues to savagely impugn lower-income people, driving them into ever marginalized pockets of society. “Urbanization under capitalism,” as Merrifield (2002: 104) succinctly puts it, “by the very logic of its own functioning, [can] only ever produce inequality and impoverishment.” Simply put, capitalism cannot produce wealth and prosperity without also (re)producing the impoverishment that necessarily supports it. The former fundamentally requires the latter. This is why, as de Certeau (1984: 95) observes, “[capitalist urbanization] repeatedly produces effects contrary to those at which it aims: the profit system [also] generates a loss … in the multiple forms of wretchedness and poverty outside the system and of waste inside it…” The perpetuation of such a dynamic and dialectic today, in short, should only vindicate Marx’s trenchant analysis of capitalism delivered in the infancy of its formation.
Urban planners, policy and decision makers must come to grips with this reality: that the problems produced by capital accumulation cannot be corrected or alleviated by more capital accumulation, no matter how it is advanced. As a result, much of urban politics has been, and remains, focused on how to manage this necessary poverty production, contain it spatially, and defuse it politically. As long as capital continues to serve as the dominant organizing societal force in the world, we can surely expect the continued impoverishment of larger proportions of the world’s population to make way for and fuel the other side to the dialectic: perpetual (and necessary) compound growth in wealth and consumption. Now, more than ever, at a moment of global crisis, is the time to critically dismantle, expose, and arrest the power relations operating behind the tyranny and wrath of capital and lead history in a less destructive and saner direction. As Lefebvre ([1961] 2002: 4) once poignantly asserted, “… as historical moments happen only briefly and infrequently, anyone who lets them pass by will pay dearly for his lack of impatience and imagination.” In this vein, let’s not let the madness continue!
Fig. 1.1 – Chicago Neighborhood Map (Bronzeville consists of Douglas, Grand Boulevard, Oakland and the north end of Kenwood). Image retrieved from http://www.thechicago77.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/chicago_community_areas_map.png
Fig. 1.2. This diagram represents the internal constitution of the conception of the culture in this study’s formulation of CPE: the “culture” of a given socio-spatial formation.
Fig. 2.1. The four official community areas that constitute the Mid-South area: Douglas, Grand Boulevard, Oakland, and North Kenwood. Also depicted are the prominent mixed-income redevelopment projects at the former CHA sites of Stateway Gardens (Park Boulevard), Legends South (Robert Taylor Homes), Ida B. Wells Homes (Oakwood Shores), and the Lakefront Homes (Lake Park Crescent and Jazz on the Boulevard). Map rendered by author.
Local-capital crafted affluent and middle-income real estate space. Smaller scale middle-income housing. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).
5.2. Locally-funded renovated homes, King Drive. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).
5.3. Late nineteenth century and early twentieth century renovated greystones, King Drive and 41st Street. Photograph taken by author (6/13/09).

5.4. The “Wall of Chicago,” featuring Stateway Gardens (in the forefront) and the Robert Taylor Homes. Photograph obtained from aaregistry.org.
5.5. Low-income residential space. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).

5.6. Standard, lower-income apartment buildings. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).
5.7. City-owned vacant land at the former site of the Ida B. Wells Homes. Photograph taken by author (2/23/09).

5.8. Example of crap residential space. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).
5.9. Small, older low-income housing. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).

5.10. Abandoned, boarded-up apartment complex. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).
5.11. Abandoned, boarded up apartment building with trash-strewn vacant lot in foreground. Photograph taken by author (2/23/09).

5.12. Vacant lots representative of desolate weedy space. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).
5.13. Desolate weedy space. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).

5.14. Desolate weedy space. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).
5.15. Desolate weedy space. Photograph taken by author (6/23/09).


5.18. Discord-producing ghetto retail space, Pershing Ave. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).
5.19. Discord-producing ghetto retail space, Pershing Ave. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).

5.20. Private property sign represents the criminalization of poverty and social exclusion of behavior typically associated with lower-income residents. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).
5.21. No loitering is now typical at upper-scale establishments. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).

5.23. City-funded beautification space at King Drive and 47th Street, featuring statue of jazz musician. Photograph taken by author (6/13/09).
5.24. Mandrake Park at Pershing Avenue and Cottage Grove Avenue. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).

Fig. 5.25. Local middle-income eatery in Bronzeville. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).
5.26. Upper-scale sports bar, Pershing Avenue. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).

5.27. Advertisement for renovated greystones in Bronzeville. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).
5.28. A block given the honorary designation of Dr. Lou Rawls Drive, signifying the historical significance of the neighborhood through the landscape. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).

5.29. New pizzeria featuring the Bronzeville designation in its name. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).
5.30. A new restaurant, Le Fleur De Li’s, featuring a mural of Bronzeville’s history as a “vibrant” African-American jazz and blues district. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).

5.31. King Drive north of 47th street branded as a Chicago Blues District. Photograph taken by author (6/23/09).
5.32. Lake Park Crescent, mixed-income housing developed by Draper and Kramer at the former site of the Lakefront Properties. Photograph taken by author (1/7/11).

5.33. Open, well-maintained green space near former site of Ida B. Wells Homes. Photograph taken by author (6/23/09).
5.34. Well-maintained vacant lot, State Street. Photograph taken by author (2/23/09).

6.1. Park Boulevard; the mixed-income redevelopment site under construction at the former Stateway Gardens. Photograph taken by author (2/23/2009).

6.3. Luxury single-family homes fueled by large-scale financial capital yet developed by local developers. Photograph taken by author (6/13/2009).
6.4. 3-4 bedroom condominiums fueled by local developers and 100% financing which suggests linkages to global (perhaps sub-prime) mortgage capital. Photograph taken by author (2/23/2009).


6.11. New development built on formerly vacant lot. Photograph taken by author (1/7/2011).
6.12. Chicago’s Home of Chicken and Waffles on King Drive. Photograph taken by author (1/7/2011).


6.15. More tenant-serenity residential space (rental apartment units), Grand Boulevard. Photograph taken by author (1/7/2011).
6.17. Abandoned structure tagged by the City of Chicago Department of Planning & Development. Photograph taken by author (2/23/2009).
Tables

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<td>- Forceful articulation of the global trope</td>
<td>- Normalization of the global trope</td>
<td>- Re-articulation of global trope through Olympic redevelopment trope (2006-2009); resisted from Housing Bronzeville coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Forceful articulation of revanchist-public housing discourse</td>
<td>- Normalization of revanchist public-housing discourse</td>
<td>- Rhetorical shift from overt revanchist to more humanist depictions of racialized poor</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Local emergence of nostalgic Bronzeville discourse</td>
<td>- Intensification of now city-sanctioned nostalgic Bronzeville discourse</td>
<td>- Normalization of nostalgic Bronzeville discourse</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Emergence of HOPE VI-inspired mixed-income development discourse as critique and alternative to Keynesian-style public housing</td>
<td>- Intensification of mixed-income development discourse</td>
<td>- Emergent critique of now normalized mixed-income philosophy and practice</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Remnants of Keynesian social-welfare rhetoric</td>
<td>- Emergence of humanist portrayals of racialized poor (~2001)</td>
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Table 6.1. The transition from Chicago’s revanchist to revisionist redevelopment discourse on Bronzeville.
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<tr>
<td>- Local city officials (i.e., Aldermen Tillman and Preckwinkle)</td>
<td>- Same city officials plus Mayor Daley and aiding local institutional structures (i.e., the Chicagoland Chamber of Commerce, the Chicago Commercial Club, and city planners)</td>
<td>- More city involvement in promotion of Bronzeville revival</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Prominent local voices/residents (i.e., the RRR and CCC)</td>
<td>- Same prominent local voices/residents plus new affluent homeowners</td>
<td>- Tillman replaced by Pat Dowell, former head of MSPDC</td>
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<td>- Local development corporations (i.e., the MSPDC)</td>
<td>- Same local development corporations (i.e., the MSPDC)</td>
<td>- More affluent local voices/residents</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Local (city/regional wide) financial institutions (i.e., Seaway National and Shorebank)</td>
<td>- Emergence of new local development corporations (i.e., QCDC)</td>
<td>- New middle-class activism (i.e., Housing Bronzeville)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Local individual black developers and rehabbers</td>
<td>- City sponsored redevelopment planning groups (i.e., the Blue Ribbon Committee)</td>
<td>- New local development corporations (i.e., Bronzeville Black Chamber of Commerce)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regional and national developer/builders</td>
<td>- Same local (city/regional wide) financial institutions</td>
<td>- Same local development corporations (i.e., QCDC)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- More local individual black developers and rehabbers</td>
<td>- Same local (city-regional wide) financial institutions plus new ones (i.e., Harris Bank)</td>
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<td>- Privileged Chicago developers (i.e., Allison Davis group, Walsh Construction, and Eastlake Management)</td>
<td>- Less local black individual developers</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- More regional and national developer/builders (i.e., Kimball Hill Homes and Mesa Development)</td>
<td>- Small-scale Chicago-wide developers (i.e., Sutherland and Peasall, see Mann, 2009)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Investment from global firms (i.e., Bank of America and Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, LLP)</td>
<td>- Same privileged Chicago developers</td>
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<td>- More regional and national developers/builders (until Olympic bid loss)</td>
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<td>- More investment from Global firms (i.e., Boeing) (until Olympic bid loss)</td>
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Table 6.2. The ensemble of actors and institutions that constitute Chicago’s neoliberal redevelopment governance in Bronzeville between the periods of roll-out and roll-with-it neoliberalization.
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<td>- Intra-racial class conflict between homeowners and public housing residents</td>
<td>- Intra-racial class conflict between homeowners and lower-income (public housing or renters) residents.</td>
<td>Intra-racial class conflict continues but in the following new ways:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Formation of MSPDC and political mobilization of neighborhood organizations to attract resources from the city</td>
<td>- Conflict between existing homeowners and incoming gentrifiers</td>
<td>- Conflict over redevelopment vision persists but now between Housing Bronzeville and the city/local aldermen with affordable housing at the center of debate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conflict between the MSPDC and the city over redevelopment vision</td>
<td>- Intensification of resistance against the city’s Olympic push to accelerate redevelopment led by Housing Bronzeville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Inter-racial conflict between competing factions of capital</td>
<td>- Increased public displays of protest aimed against the city and CHAs Plan for Transformation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3. The evolution of the Mid-South area landscape of conflict and resistance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Emergence of local capital crafted affluent and middle-income residential space</td>
<td>• More local capital crafted affluent and middle-income residential space</td>
<td>• More local capital crafted affluent residential space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Emergence of local capital crafted conspicuous consumption real-estate space</td>
<td>• Emergence of glocal capital crafted affluent and middle-income residential space</td>
<td>• More glocal capital crafted affluent, middle-income, and affordable residential space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Emergence of glocal capital crafted public housing space</td>
<td>• Glocal capital crafted public housing space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Emergence of local capital crafted affordable residential space</td>
<td>• More local capital crafted affordable residential space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• More local capital crafted conspicuous consumption retail space</td>
<td>• More local capital crafted conspicuous consumption retail space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pre-existing parasitic-economy space</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pre-existing low-income residential space</td>
<td>• Less parasitic-economy space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Low-income retail space</td>
<td>• Less low-income retail space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• More historical-preservation space</td>
<td>• More historical-preservation space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Emergence of city-funded recreational space</td>
<td>• More city-funded recreational space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Emergence of city-funded beautification space</td>
<td>• More city-funded beautification space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Less public housing space (Keynesian-era)</td>
<td>• More city-owned vacant lot space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• More city-owned vacant lot space</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4. The evolution of the physical-absolute spaces that constitute the Mid-South landscape, 1989-present.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Crap residential space</td>
<td>• Crap residential space</td>
<td>• <em>Less but Intensified</em> crap residential space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Decrepit abandoned residential space</td>
<td>• Decrepit abandoned residential space</td>
<td>• Decrepit abandoned residential space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Social isolation space</td>
<td>• Social isolation space</td>
<td>• Social removal space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ominous public housing space</td>
<td>• <em>Less</em> ominous public housing space</td>
<td>• Desolate weedy space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Desolate weedy space</td>
<td>• <em>More</em> desolate weedy space</td>
<td>• <em>More</em> potential community revival space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Emergence</em> of upper-class defended social exclusion residential space</td>
<td>• <em>Emergence</em> of potential community revival space</td>
<td>• <em>More</em> sanitized leafy-green space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Discord-producing ghetto retail space</td>
<td>• <em>Emergence</em> of sanitized leafy-green space</td>
<td>• <em>More</em> upper-class defended social exclusion residential space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Emergence</em> of consumptively nourishing elite space</td>
<td>• <em>More</em> upper-class defended social exclusion residential space</td>
<td>• <em>More</em> upper-class community safety space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• <em>Emergence</em> of community-nostalgia space</td>
<td>• <em>Emergence</em> of upper-class community safety space</td>
<td>• <em>More</em> tenant-serenity residential space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <em>Emergence</em> of tenant-serenity residential space</td>
<td>• <em>Less</em> discord-producing ghetto retail space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Discord-producing ghetto retail space</td>
<td>• <em>More</em> consumptively nourishing elite space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Consumptively nourishing elite space</td>
<td>• <em>More</em> community “nostalgia” space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• <em>More</em> community nostalgia space</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5. The evolution of the humanly-lived spaces that constitute the Mid-South landscape, 1989-present.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kinds of Spaces</th>
<th>Number of Spaces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Structures</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Vacant Lots</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant Manufacturing/Retail Zoned Lots</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail Spaces (All Discord-Producing Ghetto Retail Space)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandoned (City-Owned) Structures</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Construction (Condos, Townhomes, Single-Family, etc.)</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single-Family Homes (Owner-Occupier, From Low-Income to Affluent)</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental Apartments (From Low-Income to Affluent)</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nineteenth-Century Buildings (Residential and Commercial)</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condominiums (New Construction and Conversions)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-Income Subsidized Apartment Complexes</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-Nostalgia Space (Mostly Renovated Greystones)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant-Serenity Residential Space</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Owned Residential Complexes</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affluent Residential Space (Condos, Townhomes, Single-Family, etc.)</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.6. Breakdown of different kinds of spaces in quadrant 4 of the Mid-South area.
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