The person charging this material is responsible for its return to the library from which it was withdrawn on or before the **Latest Date** stamped below.

Theft, mutilation, and underlining of books are reasons for disciplinary action and may result in dismissal from the University.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

JUN 4 1976

JUN 4 1976
[The text is not legible and cannot be transcribed.]
Copyright, 1924

By the University of Illinois
THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION IN THE RELATIONS OF ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA, 1832-1841

BY

FREDERICK STANLEY RODKEY

PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
URBANA
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. The Three Great Powers and the Problem of the Near East in 1832-1833</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Evolution in Near Eastern Relations, 1834-1838</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. The Question of Constantinople versus the Question of Alexandria</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. The Negotiation of the Treaty of July 15, 1840</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. The Isolation of France</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. The Turco-Egyptian Question Concluded: France and the Four Powers</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A. The French Bourse, January, 1840, to August, 1841</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B. France and the Eastern Question: An Extract from an Article</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>which was Published in <em>The Examiner</em>, August 23, 1840</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C. Extracts from the Conclusions drawn by Commodore Napier</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in his <em>War in Syria</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix D. Extracts from the Information and Opinions of American</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Agents Relative to the Turco-Egyptian Question</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix E. Bibliographical Notes</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PREFACE

A number of special works, in addition to general histories, which treat more or less extensively certain phases of the Turco-Egyptian question during the period 1832-1841, have been published heretofore, and a few of these perhaps deserve special mention. Sergi Goriainow’s valuable little volume on *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*, based almost exclusively upon archival material found at Petrograd, touches upon the question briefly, from the Russian point of view, in so far as it concerned the status of the Straits. Major John Hall’s *England and the Orleans Monarchy*, based largely upon similar material found at London and Paris, deals with the question primarily from the point of view of the relations of England and France. Adolf Hasenclever’s careful study on *Die Orientalische Frage in den Jahren 1838-1841*, which has been based to a considerable extent upon official records found at Berlin and Vienna, but also to some extent upon numerous published sources, treats the question during the most critical part of the period from the point of view of the relations of all the great European Powers. Furthermore, Vicomte de Guichen’s *La Crise de Orient de 1839 à 1841 et l’Europe*, which like Hall’s work has been based largely upon archival material found at Paris and London, treats, as does Hasenclever’s, the question during its later critical stage primarily from the point of view of the relations of the Powers. However, no work has heretofore appeared which deals exclusively with the Turco-Egyptian question in its entirety. It has been with the idea that the question to be best understood must be so presented—at least in its entirety so far as it affected the three great Powers most vitally concerned—that this monograph has been prepared.

The author is indebted to several members of the History Department of the University of Illinois for valuable suggestions and criticisms. He is indebted particularly to Professor A. H. Lybyer at whose suggestion the study was undertaken and under whose careful guidance and direction the whole of it has been carried to completion. The author, himself, is of course responsible for all errors, both in presentation and in interpretation of the facts.

Frederick Stanley Rodkey
INTRODUCTION

During the past century the question of the Near East, which has been primarily that of the disposition of the territories formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire, has proved particularly troublesome to European statesmen. It has been so first, because of the ambitions of certain Powers to gain control of the whole or of part of Turkey, while other Powers have worked to preserve its independence and its integrity; and secondly, because of the existence throughout the Ottoman dominions of what has been one of the most complex racial situations which has ever existed anywhere. Undoubtedly no question in European diplomacy in recent times has been more directly and more continuously at the root of the rivalries of the great Powers than this one of the Near East. On two occasions, notably—in 1854 and again in 1914—it certainly played a major role in bringing about conflicts most disastrous in their consequences, the last of which today even threatens the existence of European civilization. On other occasions, while not bringing on actual hostilities, it has come dangerously near to doing so and has at least profoundly affected the great Powers in their diplomatic relations with each other. Such was the case in the period between 1832 and 1841, when, perhaps, the question as we understand it today had its origin.

In the period just preceding 1832 the three Powers, England, France, and Russia, were in alliance to further the cause of Greek independence. Their general policies in regard to Near Eastern affairs, however, were by no means identical. Russia, since the time of Peter the Great, had been the traditional enemy of Turkey. Her rulers had acquired extensive territories and special political privileges at the expense of the Ottoman Porte, and it was well known that they entertained the hope of falling heir some day to the whole region of the Straits. France, on the other hand, since the time of Francis I had been the traditional friend of Turkey. She had quite uniformly shown sympathy and had on some occasions given active aid to the latter in her struggles with Russia and Austria. But, it must be remembered, she too had her own ambitions in the Mediterranean by 1832. Her occupation of Algiers was under way and her interest in Egypt, where the noted
Albanian, Mehemet Ali, with the aid of French experts\(^1\) had made himself virtually independent of the Sultan, dated back to the time of Napoleon. Many Frenchmen, it may be ventured, were beginning to look forward to the day when France would become "mistress of the whole south and east coast of the Mediterranean, from Ceuta to where the Taurus dips into the sea."\(^2\) England, like France, had at times befriended Turkey. However, her interests in the Near East had never been paramount. It was before the day when oil counted for much in the diplomatic affairs of nations, and the commercial route to India was still by way of the Cape of Good Hope.

The period between 1832 and 1841 saw many important developments both in the direct affairs of the Near East itself and in the resulting relations of the great Powers. It was the period when the forces of Mehemet Ali on two occasions threatened to

\(^1\)A number of French experts were in the employ of Mehemet Ali. Note the following extract from a footnote found in Vicomte de Guichen, *La crise d'Orient de 1839 à 1841 et l'Europe*, pp. 3-4: "Parmi les Français qui étaient alors à son service, nous citerons le colonel Varin, directeur de l'Ecole de cavalerie, Bruneau, sous-directeur de l'Ecole d'artillerie, d'Armagnac, chef d'escadrons du régiment de cuirassiers, Mary, chef d'état-major de l'armée d'Arabie, le commandant Haragly, chef de la comptabilité du ministère de la Guerre. Dans les autres services du gouvernement égyptien, on remarquait Monget, ingénieur des Ponts-et-Chaussées, Henry, directeur des Constructions maritimes, Houssard, capitaine de vaisseau, Koenig, directeur de l'Ecole des Princes, Em-Bey, directeur des Fabriques de produits chimiques, Linant, ingénieur en chef pour les travaux de canalisation, Lambert, sous-directeur de l'Ecole Polytechnique, le Dr. Clôt-Bey, fondateur de l'Ecole de médecine, inspecteur général du service médical, le Dr. Perron, directeur de l'Ecole de médecine vétérinaire, Hamont, directeur des Haras, Prince, directeur de l'Ecole de médecine vétérinaire, Chédufan, médecin en chef de l'armée d'Arabie, Bonmont administrateur des immenses propriétés d'Ibrahim Pacha, l'ingénieur de Cerisy, créateur de l'arsenal d'Alexandrie; enfin Besson-Bey, vice-amiral de la marine égyptienne et Jumel qui avait enrichi l'Egypte de la culture du coton." Other Frenchmen in the employ of Mehemet Ali were: Colonel Sèves (Suleïman Pasha), chief military adviser of the Pasha, Leroux, de Toron, and Baladin, under-officers in the Syrian army; and Galise and Mimaust, engineers. Other Europeans in the employ of Mehemet Ali were: Cherubini, probably an Italian, physician to the Pasha, Colonel Schultz, a Polish officer in command of St. Jean d'Acre, and Pacysel, another Polish officer in the employ of the Pasha.


\(^2\)See Appendix B.
destroy completely the Ottoman Empire; when Russia modified temporarily her policy with regard to Turkey from one of open hostility to one of professed friendship and peaceful penetration; when France continued to oppose Russia and to reveal more markedly her favoritism for Mehemet Ali; and finally, when England, awakening to a realization that through the development of steam navigation the Near East might furnish half-way stations on the road to India, stepped forward to oppose actively both the designs of Russia at Constantinople and those of France at Alexandria. Indeed, it was the period during which for the first time there was serious danger of a general European war as a result solely of the rivalries of the great Powers in the Near East.
CHAPTER I

THE THREE GREAT POWERS AND THE PROBLEM
OF THE NEAR EAST IN 1832-1833

The Sultan Mahmoud II, from the beginning of his reign (1808),
directed his policy toward "crushing the various forces within the
Ottoman empire, whether the Janissaries or too powerful Vice-
roys, which hampered the omnipotence of the central power." One
of the greatest obstacles to the success of such a policy was to
be found in the rapidly increasing strength of Mehemet Ali,
Pasha of Egypt. Under the circumstances a clash between the
Porte and its powerful vassal was inevitable. Mehemet Ali, well
aware of the feelings of his overlord, and dissatisfied with the
meager reward he had received in return for the important role
played by his army and navy which had assisted the Ottoman
forces in their attempts to subdue the Greek insurgents, de-
termined to strike the first blow. Consequently, in November, 1831,
after a period of deliberate and formidable preparation, a com-
bined land and naval force under the command of Ibrahim Pasha
was sent forth to lay siege to the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre.

Mehemet was anxious to conceal his real motives, and to the
commissioner of the Porte who remonstrated with him for thus
invading a neighboring pashalic, without the permission of the
Sultan, he loudly protested the loyalty of his intentions, declaring
that the presumptuous Governor of Acre, Abdallah Pasha, had
"insulted his beard whitened in the service of his sovereign," and,
in the interest of the Porte, he now proposed to chastise his ar-
rogance." The Sultan and his ministers placed little faith in these

1Cambridge Modern History, X, p. 548.
2C. C. Frankland, Travels to and from Constantinople, in the Years 1827
and 1828, II, pp. 146-149.
3The governorship of the Island of Crete. According to the Sultan's original
promises, "The reward of his [Mehemet Ali's] assistance was to be the Pashalik
of Crete, while his stepson Ibrahim was to govern, in the Sultan's name, the
reconquered Morea."—J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question, p. 188.
4A. Cahuet, La question d'Orient dans l'histoire contemporaine, p. 78.
5Barker to Abbott, Alexandria, June 2, 1831: "There is now no manner of
doubt that the formidable expeditions in Alexandria and Cairo are destined to
besiege Acre."—J. Barker, Syria and Egypt under the Last Five Sultans of
Turkey, II, p. 176.
assurances. They had no doubts that the Pasha was launched upon a career of conquest.⁶ Significant of this belief on the part of the Ottoman authorities is the fact that repeated advances were made by them to the British Ambassador, Sir Stratford Canning,⁷ both before and after the fall of Acre, to secure a close and inti-
mate connection between Turkey and England.⁸ Furthermore, M. Maurojeni, the Turkish chargé d’affaires at Vienna, was or-
dered to proceed to London to sound out the British government upon the subject.⁹ When it became known in Constantinople that practically every important position south of the Taurus moun-
tains had fallen before the victorious Egyptians, the alarm of the Sultan and his ministers became so great that Namic Pasha, a major-general of the Imperial Guard, was despatched to England "with a letter from His Highness to King William IV, praying for naval assistance on the coast of Syria."¹⁰ His Britannic Majesty’s government, preoccupied with other affairs and underestimating the seriousness of the situation in the Orient, refused to grant the assistance desired.¹¹ It will be remembered that at that time the

⁷In Nov., 1831, Canning had been sent to Constantinople on a special mission to secure the consent of the Porte to the conditions under which it was proposed that Greece should be separated from Turkey.
⁸F. O. Turkey 211, 212, Canning to Palmerston, May 17, Aug. 7, 1832, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 153. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, II, p. 164. Canning gave Mahmoud to understand that Great Britain might support the Sultan, and at the same time urged Palmerston to send a naval force to the Levant. Ibid. [footnote]. See also a “Memorandum on the Turkish Question sent by Stratford Canning to Lord Palmerston.” F. O. Turkey 211, Dec. 19, 1832, quoted in ibid., p. 638.
¹⁰F. O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, Oct. 18, 1832, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 153. A similar unsuccessful appeal was made to France at about the same time. See P. Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la monarchie de juillet, II, p. 364. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, II, p. 164.
¹¹On July 11, 1833, Lord Palmerston admitted in the House of Commons that the British government had not thought it fit to afford assistance to the Porte at the particular time when it had been requested. “No doubt,” he added, “if England had thought fit to interfere, the progress of the invading army would have been stopped, . . . ; but although it was easy to say, after events had happened, that they were to be expected, yet certainly no one could anticipate the rapidity with which they had succeeded each other in the East.” Parl. Deb., XIX, p. 579. See also ibid., XXII, p. 320.
question of Parliamentary reform was still of major importance in British politics. Moreover, as Lord Palmerston pointed out upon a later occasion, when the English “were embarking in naval operations in the North Sea, and on the coast of Holland, and were under the necessity of keeping up another naval force on the coast of Portugal, it would have been impossible to have sent to the Mediterranean such a squadron as would have served the purpose of the Porte, and at the same time have comported with the naval dignity” of Great Britain.  

Likewise in France where, it is true, public opinion was sympathetic to Mehemet Ali, almost no alarm seems to have been occasioned by the advance of the Egyptian forces through Syria.  

Even as late as January 15, 1833, the Journal des Débats, leading organ of the Doctrinaires, argued that it would probably be impossible for Ibrahim to make a successful advance into Asia Minor. After pointing out the difficulties to be encountered in such an undertaking, it concluded with the remark that the question was still far from appearing to be decided in favor of Egypt.

Of a far different character, however, was the attitude of Russia. At St. Petersburg the developments in the Near East were regarded in a serious light. “The Emperor,” Nesselrode declared on November 9, 1832, in a despatch to Boutenieff, the Minister of Russia at the Porte, “— s’est pénétré de l’idée of putting an end to the insurrection in the Orient; with this in view he has resolved to exert all of his moral influence upon the Viceroy of Egypt.”  

In order to promote a reconciliation between the contending forces Lieutenant General Muravieff was sent immediately on a special mission to Constantinople and Alexandria.

12Parl. Deb., XX, p. 900.  
13To judge from the absence of French and British Ambassadors at the Porte, and from the official silence maintained on the subject by the Governments connected with the Mediterranean, one would have supposed that the decisive battle of Koniah was the first event of the war, and that this dénouement of an extraordinary drama came upon Western Europe with all the surprise of novelty.”—The Times, May 7, 1833. This comment, found in the most prominent journal of the opposition party in England, is possibly overdrawn, but it is nevertheless significant. See another editorial in The Times, April 30, 1833.  
14Journal des Débats, Jan. 15, 1833.  
15S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, p. 29.
The Russian government, guided by the theory that no Power can have a better neighbor than a weak state, wished to maintain without strengthening the Turkish dominion. If Mehemet Ali should succeed in destroying the feeble régime of the Porte, he would most certainly build up in its place a strong and vigorous government of his own. Moreover, it was believed that the triumph of the Viceroy of Egypt would carry with it an augmentation of the influence of France. Accordingly, Russia regarded the situation as one of real and immediate concern. Unwilling to rely entirely upon the remonstrances which her representatives had been directed to make to Mehemet and Ibrahim, she determined that steps should be taken in preparation for an active intervention. With this in view Admiral Greigh was ordered to equip the Black Sea fleet and to place it in readiness to sail to Constantinople upon the first appeal of the Sultan.

The Russian Cabinet must have realized that the execution of such a policy as it had adopted would occasion jealousy and alarm on the part of certain other great Powers—especially England and France. It is not at all improbable that the explanatory note, forwarded on November 15, 1832, by Nesselrode to the Prince de Lieven, Russian Ambassador at London, was prepared with the deliberate intention of counteracting such feelings at the Court of St. James. In that document the Emperor's chief Minister, after pointing out that the seriousness of the insurrection of Egypt had led his august master to tender the moral aid of Russia to the support of the Grand Seignior, and after explaining the motives back of the Muravieff mission, hinted that the Tsar's government would favor the granting by England of naval assistance upon the coast of Syria as requested by the Porte.

Meanwhile, affairs were undergoing a rapid development in the Near East. The Turks, many of whom had lost all hopes of success even before the battle of Koniah, were panic stricken when

---


*Guizot, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps*, IV, pp. 43-44.

*Goriainow, op. cit.,* p. 30.


the results of that decisive engagement became known. Nothing, it seemed, could prevent the victorious Egyptians from marching directly upon Constantinople. It was at this critical moment that General Muravieff, the Russian Envoy Extraordinary, arrived in the Ottoman capital. Mandeville and Varennes, the British and French chargés d'affaires, were soon convinced that he brought from his court an offer of military assistance to the Porte. In fact M. de Varennes became so alarmed at the possibility of a Russian armed intervention that with the aid of some of the members of the Divan, he proceeded to exert his influence to prevent it. The suspicions of the British and French representatives undoubtedly were correct. It is certain that on December 23, only three days after the arrival of Muravieff, the Tsar's Ambassador, M. de Bouteinieff, definitely offered in the presence of both the Seraskier and the Reis Effendi to place the Black Sea fleet at the disposal of the Sultan. This generous offer was received with profuse expressions of gratitude. Nevertheless the Porte hesitated when it came to accepting the aid of its traditional enemy. After a brief delay the Ottoman authorities determined upon an attempt at a direct agreement with Mehemet Ali. As a result, early in the month of January, 1833, the former Capitan-Pasha, Halil, and the Ametchi Effendi, Reschid, were despatched to Egypt empowered to conclude an arrangement with the rebellious

[23Mouriez, op. cit., III, p. 219. L. Blanc, Histoire de dix ans, 1830-1840, IV, pp. 145-146. Commodore Porter, the American representative in Turkey, wrote to Secretary of State Livingston, March 25, 1833: "There appears to be two parties in the Government, one for, the other against accepting the aid of the Russians. At the head of this latter, it is said, is the Seraskier Pacha, whose hostility to Mohamed Alli has caused all the troubles between him and the Sultan. The Ulemas and most of the officers of the Divan are said to be of his party. The mass of the people are in favor of Mohamed Alli, and if it depended on them the Capital would be delivered to him without opposition."—U. S. Department of State Archives, Turkey, Vol. II, Porter to Livingston, No. 100, March 25, 1833.
[24The Seraskier was the Minister of War and the Commander in Chief of the armies. The Reis Effendi was the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
vassal. General Muravieff, who must have realized that much would depend upon the success of the projected negotiations, set out immediately upon his mission to Mehemet Ali.

Though the chief center of diplomatic activity was thus transferred from the Bosphorus to the Nile, at Constantinople, Mandeville and Varennes continued their endeavors to secure peace and prevent an armed intervention from the north. On January 9, 1833, M. de Varennes forwarded a letter to Ibrahim urging him not to persist in the march of his army upon Constantinople. Later, when it became evident that his first appeal had gone unheeded, a second was prepared and despatched to the Viceroy himself, as well as to the Commander in Chief of the army in Asia Minor.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian army had broken up camp at Koniah and had begun to advance in the direction of Constantinople. That movement, added to the uncompromising attitude of Ibrahim, so alarmed the Sultan that he lost hope in the pending negotiations and determined to avail himself of the aid which had been offered by the representative of Russia. Consequently, a direct application for the assistance of both land and naval forces was made to M. de Bouthienieff by the Reis Effendi. Both Mandeville and Varennes, who opposed such a move on the part of the Porte, exerted themselves in vain to induce it to withdraw its demand. "'A drowning man';" the Ottoman Minister of Foreign

26E. de Cadalvène et E. Barrault, Histoire de la guerre de Méhémed-Ali contre la Porte Ottomane, pp. 343-344. Mouriez, op. cit., III, p. 220. The Turkish representatives arriving in Egypt on Jan. 21, were received by the Viceroy "with the greatest marks of distinction." However, as they were instructed to offer him only the districts of Acre, Naplous, Jerusalem, and Tripoli, he was unwilling to conclude a definite settlement with them. See Barker, op. cit., II, pp. 193-195.
27Gorainow, op. cit., p. 31.
28Cadalvène et Barrault, op. cit., pp. 343-344.
31Gorainow, op. cit., p. 31. According to press reports, this application for aid was made on Feb. 2. See Journal des Débats, April 22, 1833. Letter from St. Petersburg, The Times, March 30, 1833.
Affairs informed them, "will clutch at a serpent." Nevertheless they did not abandon all hope immediately. A few days after the Sultan's request for aid had been communicated to the Russian Ambassador, Muravieff returned from Egypt announcing that Mehemet Ali had promised to refrain from further hostilities against his overlord. Also, Varennes received assurances from Ibrahim Pasha dated February 3, to the effect that the Egyptian forces would not advance, for the present at least, beyond the positions they had just occupied at Kutayyah. Thereupon the British and French chargés d'affaires renewed their activities, again endeavoring to persuade the Porte to ask that the despatch of the Russian succor might be delayed. On this occasion it seems their efforts were rewarded by a slight degree of success. At any rate, at a conference between the Russian and Ottoman ministers in Constantinople on February 8, the Reis Effendi, supported by certain other members of the Sultan's Cabinet, suggested that since the immediate danger which threatened the Turkish capital had disappeared, the arrival of the Tsar's fleet should be countermanded. Boutenieff replied that such a step could be taken only when the Sultan was willing to make a formal declaration in writing to that effect, and after he had placed at the

32 F. O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, Feb. 3, 4, 15, 1833, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 157. Porter, the American representative, wrote on January 2, 1833: "Great consternation prevails among the higher authorities of this Government. Their days are employed in labors to avert the impending evils which threaten the Empire, and their nights in consultations,—discontents prevail in the Army, the Navy and among the Mass of the people,—great indeed must be their terror when they can be induced to resort to the expedient of introducing foreign troops to quell their domestic enemies, and those troops Russians,—the future appears not to be thought of in the danger which now threatens."—State Dept. Turkey, II, Porter to Livingston, No. 85, Jan. 2, 1833.

33 Goriainow, op. cit., p. 31. Muravieff arrived at Constantinople on Feb. 6. Note—Most of the dates given by Goriainow are taken from the Russian calendar. Twelve days must be added to his dates to avoid confusion.

34 Cadalvène et Barrault, op. cit., p. 352.

35 F. O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, Feb. 11, 23, 1833, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 158. See also Metternich to Apponyi, Feb. 21, 1833, Aus Metternich's Nachgelassenen Papieren, V, p. 444.
disposal of the Russian legation a steamboat or a “batiment léger” to convey his counter request to the proper authorities. 38

Meanwhile, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Duc de Broglie, had learned that offers of assistance had been made to the Sultan by Boutenieff, and, on January 21, forwarded to M. de Talleyrand, the representative of France in London, a despatch directing that the question of joint intervention in the Near East should be proposed to the British government. 37 It was soon apparent that the Court of St. James refused to entertain such a suggestion and therefore Broglie, who was not willing to act alone, was forced to abandon the project. At the same time, in order to protect French influence in Ottoman affairs, he sent Admiral Roussin with the rank of an ambassador to Constantinople. 37

It so happened that on February 17, the precise date when Admiral Roussin arrived at his destination, the Ottoman authorities presented a memorandum to M. de Boutenieff requesting that if possible the sailing of the Tsar’s squadron should be prevented. 38 Just why the request was made at that particular time has never been clearly demonstrated. According to an account written by a correspondent of the Journal des Débats, it was due to the prompt and energetic remonstrances of the new French Ambassador. 39 However, as it is difficult to believe that Roussin could have exercised so great and immediate an influence with the Porte, such an explanation cannot be accepted without reserve. In answer to the French assertions the Journal de Saint Petersbourg contended that the Sultan’s request was no more than the natural result of the stand taken by Boutenieff at the conference held on February 8, between the Russian and Turkish diplomats. 38

Regardless of what may have been the true explanation of the origin of the Sultan’s memorandum, it is certain that it was issued too late to accomplish its purpose. For, on February 20, after the lapse of only eighteen days from the time that the

38 Extracts from the Journal de Saint-Petersbourg, copied in the Journal des Débats, April 22, 1833. Gorainow, op. cit., p. 32.
37 Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., II, p. 366. See also Hall, op. cit., p. 156.
36 Extracts from the Journal de Saint-Petersbourg, copied in the Journal des Débats, April 22, 1833.
Turkish request for assistance had been made, a Muscovite squadron under command of Rear-Admiral Lazareff made its appearance in the Bosphorus and anchored before Bujukdere. When Roussin learned of the arrival of the Russians he immediately instructed his dragoman to warn the Porte that, in case Admiral Lazareff was not promptly requested to depart he would consider his mission at an end.\textsuperscript{40} At the same time he attempted to induce the British Minister to make a similar representation. This Mandeville refused to do. The English Cabinet, its \textit{chargé d'affaires} declared, had given him no authority "‘to hold language of so high and energetic a character.’"\textsuperscript{41} After having had time for reflection Admiral Roussin must have realized that a withdrawal would not secure the result which he wished to attain. At any rate he decided to modify his tactics and on February 21 concluded with the Ministers of the Sultan an arrangement which made him responsible for the return of the Egyptian army and the conclusion of peace on the conditions already offered to Mehmet Ali by Halil Pasha. When the French Ambassador had thus bound himself to secure a settlement the Ottoman representatives in turn promised to make a request that the Russian fleet should depart from the Bosphorus.\textsuperscript{42} Yet Mahmoud, it appears, was still unwilling to depend entirely upon the efforts of Roussin to conclude for him a satisfactory peace with his rebellious vassal. According to the \textit{Journal des Débats}, he did actually present a note to the Russian legation, February 23, 1833, requesting that their ships of war "‘should return with the first favorable wind.’"\textsuperscript{43} Nevertheless, his attitude was vacillating and uncertain. Lazareff's fleet withdrew as far as the harbor of Sizopol, a little to the north of Constantinople, but the representatives of the Tsar never gave serious consideration to the question of quitting the Bosphorus.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{40}Ibid., Hall, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 158.
\textsuperscript{41}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42}"La sublime Porte, de son côté, s'engage à declarer et annoncer qu'elle renonce à toute espèce d'assistance étrangère qu'elle se trouverait avoir demandée en raison des circonstances."—\textit{Journal des Débats}, April 30, 1833. \textit{Annual Register}, 1833, p. [290].
\textsuperscript{43}The Times, April 6, 1833, and \textit{Journal des Débats}, April 4, 1833.
\textsuperscript{44}\textit{Journal des Débats}, April 30, 1833.
\textsuperscript{45}Goriainow, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 32.
On the day after the conclusion of the arrangement with the Sultan, Admiral Roussin despatched an officer, Monsieur Olivier, to the Viceroy to warn him that in case he did not consent immediately to terms on the basis of the four pashalics of Syria he would most certainly incur the hostility of France.\textsuperscript{46} Mehemet Ali, however, was too shrewd to allow himself to be frightened thus. He had taken considerable care to keep himself informed as to the attitude of the Powers,\textsuperscript{46} and must have known that there was little danger of any one of them attempting by force of arms to compel him to withdraw from the territories already occupied by his troops. As a result he remained unshaken in his resolve to extend his rule over the pashalics of Adana and Itcheli, including the seaports of Selefkeh and Alaya, as well as the whole of Syria.\textsuperscript{47} In answer to the representations of Roussin he returned a prompt and scornful rejection.\textsuperscript{48} At the same time he sent word

\textsuperscript{46}Note the following extract from a letter written by Roussin to Mehmet Ali, Feb. 22, 1833: \ldots Persister dans les prétentions que vous avez soulevées, ce serait appeler sur votre tête des conséquences désastreuses, qui, je n'en doute pas, éveilleront vos craintes. \ldots Il ne me reste plus qu'à espérer que vous ne nous forcerez pas à la cruelle nécessité d'attaquer une puissance, en partie, notre ouvrage, et de ternir une gloire dont je suis l'admirateur sincère, c'est mon premier aide-de-camp qui aura l'honneur de remettre ces dépêches à Votre Hautesse."—\textit{Journal des Débats}, April 19, 1833. See also, Cadalvène et Barrault, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 372-373, and Guizot, \textit{op. cit.}, IV, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{47}The Viceroy had given commissions to merchants at Leghorn and at Marseilles to charter vessels for the sole purpose of conveying to him at Alexandria any declaration in his favour by England and France (which he awaited with the greatest anxiety) the instant it could be known in those ports."—Barker, \textit{op. cit.}, II, p. 195.

\textsuperscript{48}Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833, \textit{British and Foreign State Papers}, XXII, p. 145.

\textsuperscript{49}Mehemet Ali to Roussin, March 8, 1833, quoted by Cadalvène et Barrault, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 375-377. \textit{Annual Register}, 1833, pp. [290]-[291]. Gliddon, the American consular agent at Alexandria, wrote to Porter, March 8: \ldots His Highness [Mehemet Ali] is said to have given a direct negative to the demands; and to have expressed surprise, that the French Government had changed its tone, adding that he was 'not a plaything.'

"Much solicitude appears to be felt for the arrival of the new English Diplomatic Agent, Col. Campbell; as it seems to be expected, that the British Cabinet will conduct its mediation with more steadiness and candor than have been displayed by the Power hitherto the most prominent in His Highness's favor. It is even said that Mon. Mimaut (to whose ill judged complaisance is ascribed much of the Pasha's now baffled expectations of support from France) was this morning refused an audience."—State Dept. Turkey II, Gliddon to Porter, March 8, 1833.
to the Sultan that he had directed his son Ibrahim, into whose hands he had put the negotiations, that if what he had asked was not granted immediately, the Egyptian army should be marched upon Constantinople. This intelligence, arriving at the Turkish capital on March 23, so alarmed the Sublime Porte that the Reis Effendi was directed to confer with the representatives of the three great Powers, "in order to ascertain from them their private opinions with respect to the best means of averting the dangers" which threatened with ruin the Ottoman Empire. On its part the Porte announced, through its Minister of Foreign Affairs, that it was willing to add to the concessions already granted to the Viceroy the governments of Aleppo and Damascus. It appears that the foreign envoys were so perplexed by the situation of affairs that they were not able to suggest a better alternative. After a brief delay it was decided that a Turkish plenipotentiary should proceed to the Egyptian headquarters in Asia Minor with authority to offer the additional concession which had been determined upon by the Porte. In order to facilitate the step about to be taken, Admiral Roussin directed M. de Varennes to accompany the Ottoman representative on his mission, and to inform Ibrahim Pasha that he could never expect France to acquiesce in the cession of the pashalics of Adana and Itcheli. Also with the aim of inducing Ibrahim to conclude peace upon the new conditions offered by the Sultan, Mandeville forwarded a letter to His Highness in which he pointed out that with respect to Great Britain, the sentiments of His Majesty's government were already too well known to leave any doubt of the sensation which a refusal of the Ottoman terms would cause to the British government, "and of the consequences which would inevitably ensue from it."

Regardless of the pressure which was thus brought to bear upon him, Ibrahim refused to entertain the idea of a settlement unless it embraced the cession of Adana as well as that of all Syria. Finding their efforts to be in vain, Varennes and the

---

49Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833, State Papers, XXII, p. 145.
50Mouriez, op. cit., III, p. 231.
51Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833, State Papers, XXII, p. 144.
52Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833, ibid., pp. 146-147.
53Mandeville to Ibrahim, March 29, 1833, ibid., p. 147.
Porte's representative at length determined to yield and to promise the granting of the Egyptian terms. Accordingly, on that basis, the well-known preliminaries of Kutayeh were agreed upon, April 8, 1833. Ibrahim Pasha, having added a diplomatic triumph to his string of military successes, was then ready to prepare for the retreat of his army to Syria. However, when the Sultan's list, designating the different persons on whom the governments of the Empire were to be bestowed for the following year, was published on April 15, it was seen that Mahmoud had omitted the Pashalic of Adana when he named the territories to be held by Mehemet and Ibrahim. Thereupon the retrograde movement of the Egyptian forces was promptly arrested. It is possible that the Sultan did intend to ignore the arrangement which had just been concluded. Be that as it may, the situation at Constantinople was too serious to permit him to delay a settlement for any considerable length of time. Finally on May 3, he decided to take notice of his former omission and graciously to concede the administration of the pashalic in question to Ibrahim Pasha.

In the meantime the Tsar Nicholas, becoming alarmed at the activities of the French representatives in Turkey, had despatched Count Orloff on a special mission to Constantinople. M. de Boutenieff was too moderate and of "too weak a character" to please the Tsar who was eager to be represented by an ambassador who would act with energy and resolution. The instruc-

---

64Mandeville to Palmerston, April 14, 1833, _ibid._, p. 148. Hall's story of the conclusion of the preliminaries of Kutayeh (see Hall, _op. cit._, p. 160) would lead one to believe that the Sultan himself decided to yield and that he gave his approval before the step was taken. Some evidence which has been found tends to indicate that that was not the case. See _Journal des Débats_, May 1, 5, 7, 10, 1833.

65Mandeville to Palmerston, April 15, 1833, _State Papers_, XXII, p. 148.

66G. F. Martens, _Nouveau recueil de traités_, XVI, pp. 18-20. The list given in _State Papers_, XXII, pp. 148-149, is not complete.

67F. O. Turkey 223, Mandeville to Palmerston, April 23, May 4, 1833, cited by Hall, _op. cit._, p. 161.

68Mandeville to Palmerston, May 4, 1833, _State Papers_, XXII, p. 149. This appears to be an extract of one of the despatches cited by Hall. See above, note 57. The firman granting Adana to Ibrahim was not proclaimed until May 6, 1833. For a copy of it see _Journal des Débats_, May 28, 1833.

69Goriainow, _op. cit._, p. 33.
tions given to Orloff, drawn up in that spirit, directed him to induce the Porte to confide absolutely in the support of Russia, to keep the Russian forces at Constantinople until the conclusion of peace between Turkey and Mehmet Ali, and, above all, to convince Mahmoud that in the support of the Tsar's government lay his only hope of salvation. Upon the arrival of Count Orloff at the Turkish capital, May 5, 1833, Russian influence with the Sultan and his ministers seems to have become supreme. The British Ambassador to Turkey, Lord Ponsonby, who had arrived at his post on May 1, was not long in coming to that conclusion. Admiral Roussin, true to his former policy, exerted himself in vain to destroy it. It was at this time that he tried every means to secure for the French military flag access to the Dardanelles. After he found that the Porte persisted in its refusal to permit such a movement, an attempt was actually made by the warship Mésange, to force a passage through the narrows leading to Constantinople. Although a few cannon shots from the forts located at the mouth of the Straits were enough to induce the French to abandon the project, Count Orloff was sufficiently alarmed by the incident to declare that if foreign ships of war entered the Dardanelles, he would be obliged to take every possible measure to defend the capital. In fact the rivalry at Constantinople between the representatives of Louis Philippe and the Emperor Nicholas soon became so acute that those repre-

"In order to reinforce the squadron under Admiral Lazareff, two additional detachments of the Russian Black Sea fleet had arrived in the Bosphorus on April 6 and 22 respectively. A camp was formed on the Asiatic shore at Unkdar Skelessi and several detachments of Muscovite troops were landed. For a contemporary explanation of the reasons for this move see extracts from the Journal de Saint-Petersbourg, copied in the Journal des Débats, April 22, May 14, 1833.

"See extracts from Orloff's instructions and from a letter written by the Tsar to the Sultan quoted by Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 33-35.

"Hall, op. cit., p. 162. In addition see an article copied from the Austrian Observer, and editorial comment thereon, in The Times, May 24, 1833.

"This incident occurred on May 14, 1833.

sentatives would undoubtedly have welcomed a resort to belligerent measures.  

As might be expected, when relations of such a marked character were developing in the Near East, lively reactions were occasioned elsewhere. It has already been noted that when Broglie, alarmed by Boutenieff's offer of Russian aid to the Sultan, suggested a joint Anglo-French intervention in the Turco-Egyptian question, his proposal had been rejected by the British government. Although the English Cabinet thus appeared to commit itself to inactivity, and although Lord Palmerston later declared in the House of Commons that "Great Britain did not complain of the assistance which Russia had afforded to Turkey, but on the contrary, was glad that 'Turkey had been able to obtain effectual relief from any quarter,'" it is obvious that the British ministers viewed the advances of Russia in the Orient with considerable apprehension. A glance at Palmerston's private correspondence will reveal that his attitude was not always in strict harmony with some of the arguments he advanced in the halls of Parliament when he was defending the past policy of the administration. Significant in this respect is the following extract from a letter written on March 21, 1833, by the Foreign Secretary to his brother, Sir William Temple: "'Roussin has settled capitally the Turkish dispute with the Egyptian, and has done well in sending back the Russian admiral with a flea in his ear." The Russians

---


66 Palmerston continued: "... Our government reposed perfect confidence in the assurances it had received from the Russian Government, that when the force so sent had effected the object for which it was despatched ... it would retire to the Russian dominions." These statements were made on March 17, 1834. Parl. Deb., XXII, p. 322. See also similar statements made on other occasions. Parl. Deb., XIX, p. 578; XX, p. 875.

67 It appears to have been believed in London at that date that the Russian fleet which had arrived at Constantinople on Feb. 20 would be forced to return immediately to Sevastopol. See T. Raikes, Journal, I, p. 168; also The Times, March 19, 1833.
will no doubt be very angry, but that will not signify.'

Also worthy of note is the fact that the British Cabinet was at last ready to send a considerable fleet to the Near East. Early in May, 1833, Palmerston announced that they were going to send Sir Pulteney Malcolm to the Mediterranean with "two three-deckers, two large 74's, and two 50-gun frigates, equal to 74's, and besides a large armed steam-vessel" carrying "four heavy 32-pounders."

At the same time, the French government did not fail to retain its interest in Turco-Egyptian affairs. Regardless of the vigorous protests made by Count Pozzo di Borgo, the Tsar's Ambassador in Paris, who was warmly supported by his colleagues from Austria and Prussia, the conduct of Admiral Roussin at Constantinople received the approval of his government. The alarm against Russian aggression in the Near East was proclaimed in the Chamber of Deputies, and even by the Doctrinaire press. In fact, for a brief period a war between Russia and France was considered by some observers to be altogether possible. However, it was soon apparent that neither the Cabinet of Louis Philippe nor that of the Emperor Nicholas had any desire to

---

89 Palmerston to Temple, May 7, 1833, ibid., p. 158. A French fleet also, under Admiral Hugon, had been sent to the Mediterranean. The two fleets were in each other's company for a considerable part of the summer of 1833. See The Times, June 17, July 25, Aug. 5, 1833. Journal des Débats, June 16, 1833.
91 Archives Parlementaires de 1787 à 1860. Second Series, LXXXIV, pp. 31-33, 36-37, 95-98. Similar sentiments were expressed in the Chamber of Peers. See ibid., p. 676.
93 Letters from Paris, March 23, April 28, 1833, in The Times, March 25, May 3, 1833. According to Thureau-Dangin, the Emperor Nicholas would undoubtedly have welcomed an opportunity to lead a crusade of the European Powers against the new régime in France. Nevertheless he was not willing that Russia alone should undertake such a project. See Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., II, pp. 373 ff.
provoke an immediate outbreak of hostilities. When the French King's message at the closing of the legislative Chambers appeared on April 25, it was found to be of a very peaceful character, and promptly thereafter it was reported from Paris that M. Pozzo di Borgo had lately held frequent conferences with the Duc de Broglie, "the alleged object of which was to convince the French Government of the disinterestedness of the motives of his court in sending an expedition to Constantinople."

Although it is obvious that the Russian government was not eager to enter into an armed conflict, it is equally apparent that it was determined to profit by the situation in the Near East and to make its influence predominant in Turkey. Having received reports from both Count Orloff and M. de Boutenierre to the effect that the Grand Seignior was anxious to enter into an intimate agreement with the Emperor Nicholas, Nesselrode, on May 20, 1833, forwarded to Orloff a despatch in which he instructed the Tsar's representatives at the Porte to conclude a defensive alliance to protect Turkey and the southern coast of Russia. Mention was made at that early date of a secret clause which should specify the part to be fulfilled by the Porte in consideration of Russia's promised services. At first, some of the Ottoman Ministers, who were unaware that advances had been made to the Russians by the Sultan, objected to the acceptance of such an arrangement with the traditional enemy of their native land. Nevertheless, when the English fleet suddenly appeared at the isle of Tenedos, their opposition faded away. A message was sent promptly to Orloff inviting him to join in a conference for the discussion of the proposed alliance, and an agreement as to terms was reached at a meeting between the Russian and Turkish

---

75 Archives Part., LXXXIII, p. 131.
76 The Times, May 6, 1833.
78 See ibid., pp. 38-40.
79 See ibid., pp. 40-41.
plenipotentiaries which resulted on June 26.\textsuperscript{80} Almost immediately thereafter the Tsar’s Ambassador was able to declare: “... la presque conclusion of the defensive treaty ... is a réponse sans réplique to Russian influence at Constantinople.”\textsuperscript{81} The terms of an arrangement having thus been agreed upon, were promptly embodied into a definite convention which was signed on July 8, 1833.\textsuperscript{82} This Convention of Unkiar Skelessi, as it was popularly called, was destined to play “a great part in the political vicissitudes of the Eastern Question.”\textsuperscript{83} Its first public article proclaimed the existence of peace and friendship between the two Emperors and provided that their Majesties engaged to come to an unreserved understanding with each other upon all the matters which concerned their respective tranquillity and safety. They would “afford to each other mutuallly for this purpose substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance.” The real significance of the treaty, however, was contained in a secret article which released the Sultan from any obligation to render such assistance to the Tsar and provided that Turkey should “confine its action in favor of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Strait of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any Foreign Vessels of War to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever.”\textsuperscript{84} As the Egyptian forces had, in the meantime, finally completed their evacuation of Asia Minor, the Russian troops in Turkey were re-embarked and on the second day following the conclusion

\textsuperscript{80}Ibid., op. cit., p. 41.
\textsuperscript{81}Orloff to Nicholas I, June 19/July 1, 1833, quoted by Schiemann, op. cit., III, p. 433.
\textsuperscript{83}C. Phillipson and N. Buxton, \textit{The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles}, p. 62.
\textsuperscript{84}Hertslet, \textit{op. cit.}, II, pp. 926, 928. The precise meaning of the stipulation in the secret article has been the subject of repeated controversy. As it was interpreted by Nesselrode it “legalized the armed intervention of Russia” in Turkey. According to a recent historian it did more. “It guaranteed to Russia a free passage for her warships through the straits, and it closed the door into the Black Sea to every other Power.”—Marriott, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 210. See also, Marmont, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 53.
of the famous treaty of alliance, sailed out of the Bosphorus on their way to Sevastopol.85

During the course of the Russo-Turkish negotiations, especially when the results began to be foreseen, the French Ambassador at Constantinople was tempted to announce to the Porte that, if it thus delivered itself into the hands of Russia, it would inevitably incur the hostility of France. It was only through the efforts of his colleague, Lord Ponsonby, it appears, that he was finally dissuaded from taking such a decided stand.86 The latter was intensely hostile to Russia but he believed the policy suggested by Roussin would only provoke a contest which they were not then in a position to sustain.87

When the terms of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi became known in western Europe, the French and English Cabinets resolved to instruct their representatives to urge the Sultan not to ratify the treaty. If the latter should disregard their advice and confirm the signatures of his plenipotentiaries, they were to warn him that France and Great Britain were resolved, in the event of an armed intervention of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey, to act as the circumstances might appear to require, "'equally as if the treaty above mentioned were not in existence.'"88

Great Britain, it seems, was particularly aroused by the famous arrangement. The Times, in commenting on the subject, declared that it was quite evident that such a convention could never be sanctioned by the great Powers of Europe. The mutual guarantee of the tranquillity and possessions of the respective parties was a mere pretext for the invasion of Turkey "whenever the Autocrat should deem the season favorable." "Both this article," the editorial writer of the journal pointed out in conclusion, "and the supplementary provision for shutting the Dardanelles contain such barefaced and impudent pretensions that they must be scouted with contempt, or resisted with vigour, or be ordered to be

86Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 49-50.
87Ibid., p. 50.
88F. O. Turkey 221, Palmerston to Ponsonby, Aug. 27, 1833, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 165.
Although Palmerston, upon being questioned about the treaty in the House of Commons, had refused to make any statements divulging the attitude of the British Cabinet upon the subject, the King’s speech, when it was read at the closing of Parliament on August 29, 1833, was found to contain the following significant declaration: "The hostilities which had disturbed the peace of Turkey have been terminated; and you may be assured that my attention will be carefully directed to any events which may affect the present state or the future independence of that Empire." Moreover, Palmerston in a letter written to his brother, William, five days after the final message had been delivered to the two Houses declared that "The King spoke the passage about Turkey with emphasis, and looked round at Lieven to see how he took it." Then turning to the question of the attitude of Austria upon the Eastern question the Minister for Foreign Affairs continued, "Metternich is delighted with the Russian treaty with the Sultan: He is easily pleased!"

At the same time, events destined to have an important influence upon the attitude of England and France were developing in another part of Europe. Early in August the crowned heads of Austria and Prussia had held, near Teplitz in northern Bohemia, a meeting which was regarded with considerable suspicion by both of the western Powers. It was only a month later when the famous Münchengrätz conference between the Tsar of Russia, the Emperor of Austria, and the Crown Prince of Prussia was assembled. The chief outcome of the latter meeting was the signing of a convention the aim of which was to provide for effective

"The Times, Oct. 16, 1833. The editorial quoted is typical of the attitude this journal had been maintaining for some time. See ibid., Jan. 26, 29, July 12, Sept. 5, 1833. See also, The Poor Man’s Guardian, Aug. 31, 1833, in A very Rare and Valuable Collection of Radical, Revolutionary, and Seditious Publications, pp. 279-280.

"The reference is to Palmerston’s reply to questions asked on Aug. 24, 1833. Parl. Deb., XX, p. 875.

"Ibid., p. 903.

"Lieven was Russia’s Ambassador to England.


"Metternich to Hugel, Aug. 16, 1833, Metternich, op. cit., V, p. 458. See also, ibid., p. 429."
opposition to the principle of non-intervention. That agreement, signed on September 18, 1833, included secret articles touching upon the question of the Near East. Thereby the contracting parties mutually pledged themselves to maintain the existence of the Ottoman Empire under the reigning dynasty; to oppose any combination which should menace the independence of the sovereign authority in Turkey, whether by the establishment of a temporary regency, or a complete change of dynasty; and finally, should their efforts to prevent dissolution fail, they would themselves act in accord in everything concerning the establishment of the new order of things.

Such an arrangement was of particular value to Austria. Alarmed by the spread of revolutionary ideas in Europe, the Cabinet of the Emperor Francis was eager to maintain a close alliance with the Court of St. Petersburg. At the same time it was also eager to preserve the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. According to a statement made by Palmerston on October 8, 1833, Metternich had even gone so far, six months before, as to declare to him through the medium of a chargé d'affaires, "'that if Russia attempted to appropriate to herself one inch of Turkish territory, it would be war with Austria.'"

Indeed, the positions of England and Austria on the Turco-Egyptian question were in many respects identical. As a prominent statesman of the period has pointed out, they had a simple and fixed idea; they were anxious only to support the Ottoman Empire, and to defend it against its enemies. The fact that they

---

The convention drawn up on Sept. 18, 1833, did not receive the signature of Prussia. After the conference of Münchgrätz had broken up, Counts Nesselrode and Ficquelmont received instructions from their respective Emperors to proceed to Berlin with the aim of persuading King Frederick William III to join in the said arrangement. According to Metternich, it was only after the most arduous labors, extending over more than three weeks, that they finally succeeded in effecting their object. By the resulting Treaty of Berlin, signed on Oct. 15, 1833, the Prussian Cabinet accepted with a slight change in form the convention which had originated at Münchgrätz. See Metternich to Hügel, Oct. 22, 1833, ibid., pp. 520-526. Also a copy of the treaty of Berlin, ibid., pp. 526-528.


*Guizot, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 43.
did not agree in their respective stands taken towards the developments in the Orient in 1833 was due, to a large extent at least, to their differing attitudes concerning Russia. Austria was willing to accept at their face value the explanations offered by her Imperial neighbor; England was not. With respect to Russia, the latter in 1833 was following a policy similar to that of France.

Hence it is natural that the secret deliberations at Münchgrätz tended only to increase the apprehensions of the British government. Palmerston believed even that an eventual partition of Turkey between Austria and Russia had probably been one of the topics of discussion. "'It is needless to say,'" he declared in commenting upon the question, "'that England and France would oppose this to the utmost of their means.'"101 In order to support the British position, it was determined immediately that the protest which had been made at Constantinople should be repeated at St. Petersburg and that re-enforcements should be sent to the fleet of Admiral Malcolm in the Mediterranean.102 Although no authorization was given to the commander of the fleet to pass the Dardanelles, Palmerston announced it as his opinion that if Turkey were again threatened by Russian intervention, the combined English and French squadrons ought to proceed to Constantinople and defend the Bosphorus. "'I think,'" he concluded, "'that when we have seven liners and the French six, the eleven or twelve Russians will never venture to face us, with a host of transports besides in their train; indeed, the English fleet alone would be enough to stop them.'"103

The government of France was also aroused by the proceedings at Teplitz and Münchgrätz104 and, although it was anxious not to take a step that might lead to war,105 was quite willing to join with England in repeating to the Russian Cabinet the protest which the two Powers had recently made to the Sublime Porte.

102Ibid., p. 170.
103Ibid., p. 171.
105Driault, op. cit., p. 143.
Accordingly, in the month of October, 1833, the British and French chargés d'affaires at St. Petersburg, Mr. Bligh and M. de Lagréné, were instructed from their respective capitals to communicate to Count Nesselrode notes almost identical in language to those presented at Constantinople by Roussin and Ponsonby to the Reis Effendi.  

In reply to the representations of the western Powers, the Russian Chancellor professed that he could not understand the deep regret which the conclusion of the treaty of July 8, 1833, had caused the British and French governments. That arrangement was purely defensive. It had been concluded between two independent Powers, exercising the plenitude of their rights, and it did no prejudice to the interests of any state whatever. It did, he admitted, change the nature of the relations between Russia and the Porte. It established relations of intimacy and confidence wherein the Turkish government would henceforth find a guarantee of stability, and, if need be, means of defense calculated to ensure its preservation. In concluding his remarks, Nesselrode warned the western Powers that the Emperor was resolved on faithfully fulfilling, should the occasion present itself, the obligations which the treaty of July 8, imposed upon him: "acting as if the declaration contained in the note of M. Lagréné [and Mr. Bligh] did not exist."  

Regardless of the fact that her chief Minister dared to use such high-sounding terms in answer to the equally bold communications made to him by the representatives of England and France, Russia was not eager to engage in a test of armed strength with her rivals in the Orient. A famine which existed in the southern provinces of the Tsar's Empire rendered the possibility of successful campaigning in those parts very doubtful.  

---

106State Papers, XXIV, pp. 1290, 1292.  
107State Papers, XXIV, pp. 1291-1292, 1292-1293.  
108Palmerston to Temple, Dec. 3, 1833, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 176. Letters from Constantinople, Oct. 10, 18, 1833. The Times, Nov. 11, 26, 1833. Clay, the American representative at St. Petersburg, wrote to Secy. of State McLane, Dec. 9, 1833: "The southern Governments of the Empire are in a most unfortunate state. The failure of the harvest has deprived the peasants of the means of supporting life, and estates which, during other years, yielded an ample revenue to their proprietors are now, not only unprofitable, but in most instances a heavy burden to the owners. A Prince Dolgorouki informed me, that his
Realizing that fact, Palmerston was able to write on December 3, 1833: "I trust we shall be able to keep the peace . . . Turkey is the most likely cause of collision; though I think they [the Russians] will hardly pursue their schemes of aggrandizement there at present." Thus at the end of the year 1833, although the status of the relations between England, France, and Russia resulting from the Turco-Egyptian affair was still far from reassuring, it was becoming apparent that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi would probably not occasion an immediate outbreak of hostilities among the great Powers.

Peasants usually payed him 20 Roubles each per annum; but this year he had been obliged to remit fifty thousand Roubles to buy bread for them. The Governments most afflicted are Voronet, Penza, and Tambov, though the inhabitants of many others in the south are nearly as necessitous. Want has driven the peasants of Voronet to commit acts which even the oppression of their masters has never excited. The roads are infested with armed bands of slaves who commit the greatest excesses. News of this was brought by Courier to St. Petersburg on Thursday last, and in less than three hours afterwards the Emperor had left the city, in order to restore tranquillity by his presence and punish the offenders."—State Dept. Russia, XII, Clay to McLane, No. 12, Dec. 9, 1833.

CHAPTER II

EVOLUTION IN NEAR EASTERN RELATIONS
1834-1838

Although England and France were able to unite in objecting to the terms of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi they were by no means agreed upon all that appertained to the question of the Near East. Especially did they differ in their respective attitudes toward the developing power of Mehemet Ali. It was natural, as a contemporary writer has pointed out, that France, whose protégé and pupil the Viceroy loved to call himself, should see in him only “un continuateur” of the work begun on the banks of the Nile by Napoleon.1 It was also natural that she should seek to consolidate her influence at Cairo and Alexandria, in order to extend along the southern shores of the Mediterranean that new sovereignty whose starting point and center had just been fixed by the taking of Algiers.2 Truly, Admiral Roussin, in February, 1833, had protested vigorously against Mehemet Ali’s pretensions. Nevertheless, his attitude at that time was due to a fear that if peace were not promptly concluded between the contending parties, Russia would profit by the situation in furthering her aggressive schemes against Turkey.3 After he had learned that the Viceroy refused to

1Blanc, op. cit., IV, p. 128.

2The conquest of Algiers had been begun by the government of Charles X in 1830. For a time negotiations to secure the cooperation of Mehemet Ali were carried on by Polignac. See ibid., I, pp. 141-159. Cahuet, op. cit., p. 77.


4Note the following extract from a letter which it was claimed Roussin wrote to Mehemet Ali, May 8, 1833: “I feel satisfaction in being one of the first to announce to you the happy conclusion of peace between the Grand Seignior and your Highness, on conditions equally advantageous and honourable to Egypt. . . . Your Highness will be just enough to recognize to which side France has constantly been inclined; attentive to the events of the East, she has felt that the immediate termination of war between the Mussulmans was the condition of their safety. She has desired this peace sincerely and ardently. Such was the object of the steps taken by me on the 23rd of February, in proposing terms
comply with his demands he turned to the opposite extreme and counselled a complete surrender on the part of the Porte. Likewise, the Consul-General of France at Alexandria, Monsieur Mimaut, as well as practically all of those who belonged to the "French Colony in Egypt," were very decided in their favoritism for the cause of the Sultan's ambitious vassal.

In the French Chamber of Deputies, Mehemet Ali was defended repeatedly, one speaker even going so far as to declare that it would, perhaps, be fortunate if the Egyptian army should take possession of Constantinople. The Arab race, he pointed out, better disposed towards civilization, more active, and more intelligent than the "Tartar race, would be able to rejuvenate that Empire, worn out and languishing, that Empire upon which even the spirit of innovation has exerted in vain its electric virtue." Then too, he maintained, a powerful barrier would be formed against Russia if Mehemet Ali should establish his power throughout Turkey. The Duc de Broglie was more cautious, and in his utterances took the position that the policy of France should be to maintain the Ottoman Empire as long as providence would permit it to exist. At the same time, however, he carefully avoided making any remarks which might be interpreted as being hostile to the cause of the Viceroy and he admitted that if it were "written

which circumstances rendered at that time suitable, and which your Highness from principle might have adopted, fully persuaded that France would not have withheld her endeavours to ameliorate them....

"What is passing in the Bosphorus [Russian intervention] has convinced her [France] of the necessity of strengthening Egypt still more; she has obtained for Egypt the whole of Syria, and can say that in that she has done for your Highness more than any other power...."—The Westminster Review, XXXV, Jan. 1841, pp. 203-204. It is apparent that Roussin was pleased greatly when the Sultan finally consented to grant the terms demanded by Mehemet Ali. See letters from Constantinople, May 7, 11, 1833, Journal des Débats, May 30, June 6, 1833. The attitude of many in France was quite similar to that of the Ambassador. See ibid., May 13, Aug. 1, 1833; Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., II, p. 370. Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 44-45.


Ibid., LXXXIII, p. 780.
in the designs of God that that Empire [Turkey] should some day succumb,” it would then be the aim of France to further the establishment out of the Ottoman territories of independent states which would take “naturellement” their place in the political balance of Europe.8

On the other hand, in Great Britain, the ambitious policy of Mehemet Ali was regarded with considerable suspicion. Indeed, the British government made so vigorous a protest at Alexandria, through its Consul-General, Colonel Campbell, that the rebellious Pasha was on the point of withdrawing his demands in regard to the district of Adana when the Sultan finally consented to invest Ibrahim with the administration of the territory in dispute.9 It cannot be doubted that Lord Palmerston entertained a decided opinion on the question. On March 21, 1833, he wrote: “‘... [Mehemet Ali’s] real design is to establish an Arabian kingdom, including all the countries in which Arabic is the language. There might be no harm in such a thing in itself; but as it would necessarily imply the dismemberment of Turkey, we could not agree to it. Besides, Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arabian sovereign would be.’”10

When the British Minister of Foreign Affairs referred to the question of “the road to India” he was calling attention to a phase of the problem which was of vital importance to Great Britain. The successful application of steam power to transportation by sea had opened up a vast store of possibilities for the future. Among the numerous projects which had received immediate attention was that of a direct line of communication, to be operated by means of steamers, between England and India.

8 "Archives Parl., LXXXIII, p. 781. Thiers, who was then minister of commerce and industry, made the following declaration in the Chamber of Peers, June 8, 1833: “Quelle devait être la direction de nos efforts? C'était d'empêcher que les grands voisins qui entourent l'Empire turc ne s'agrandissent a ses dépens; c'était d'empêcher que l'équilibre de l'Europe fut troublé dans l'Orient, de faire (ce qui était bon pour l'humanité et bon pour la France) que de nouveaux États indépendants et commerçants s'établissent dans la Méditerranée.” Ibid., LXXXIV, p. 678. See also, ibid., LXXXV, pp. 525-526.


10 Palmerston to Temple, March 21, 1833, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 145.
The idea was suggested as early as 1823, but it did not receive serious consideration from the British government until some ten years later. One of the earliest prominent supporters of the project was Lord William Bentinck who was Governor-General of India from 1828 to 1835. A statement which he made in India on the eve of his departure for England is of sufficient value to warrant its being quoted in full. It was as follows: “I have been a zealous supporter of the cause of steam communication with Europe, from the strongest conviction, confirmed by every day’s further reflection, of its vast importance to innumerable interests, both national and commercial. I cannot command the opportunity of forwarding its future success; but, if within my reach, you may depend upon my most earnest efforts to promote its progress, and to obtain for India an advantage so great in all its direct and indirect consequences, that in my opinion it would be cheaply bought at any price.” Another Englishman of note who was interested in establishing a direct line of communication between Great Britain and her possessions in the Orient, was Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Chesney. Chesney had travelled extensively in the Near East and in 1832, when he returned to England, was convinced that the projected steam route was entirely practicable. At that time two possible lines of communication were being considered—one by way of the Isthmus of Suez and the Red Sea, the other by way of the Euphrates river and the Persian Gulf. Chesney was interested particularly in the latter. He was anxious that the British government should test out its practicability and soon succeeded in interesting in the project a number of prominent individuals including Lord Palmerston and other members of the Cabinet then in office. After some delay the matter was presented to Parliament, on June 3, 1834, and a select committee was appointed “to inquire into the best means of

11See a series of letters dating from May 31, 1823, to Oct. 23, 1832, urging that measures be taken by the government to facilitate steam communication with India. Parl. Papers, 1831-1832, X, Part 2, pp. 675-766.
12Parl. Papers, 1839, XXXIX, Representations from the Presidencies as to Steam Communication, p. 3.
13F. R. Chesney, Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition, pp. 142-143.
14Ibid., p. 143. The interest of King William IV was aroused. See ibid., pp. 145-146. See also the account given in S. Lane-Poole (Editor), The Life of the late General F. R. Chesney, by his wife and daughter.
promoting the communication with India by steam.\textsuperscript{16} The committee made a detailed investigation of the problems involved and on July 14, 1834, presented in the House of Commons twelve resolutions which embodied their conclusions and recommendations.\textsuperscript{19} With respect to the Egyptian route, they stated in those resolutions that experiments made for five successive seasons by the Indian government had completely established the practicability of that line of communication during at least eight months in the year. Therefore, the committee suggested that measures should be taken to establish the route by the Red Sea, and they proposed that the expense incurred thereby should be divided equally between India and Great Britain. As to the Euphrates route, sufficient experiments to really test its value had not been made. There appeared to be no physical obstacles for eight months of the year, but during the other four months, when the river was low, it was not certain that the line was practicable. As the East India Company had expended between 60,000 and 70,000 Pounds on the communication by way of Egypt, it was recommended that the expense of ascertaining the practicability of the route through Syria and Mesopotamia, which was estimated at 20,000 Pounds, should be defrayed by the Home government.\textsuperscript{17} The suggestions of the select committee were well received by the House and a resolution for the granting of the sum stated was promptly passed.\textsuperscript{18}

The fact that a wide difference existed between the respective interests of England and France in the Near East was by no means unknown at the time. On February 15, 1833, Metternich wrote significantly to Baron Neumann, the Austrian chargé d'affaires at London: "Egypt has been for a long time considered by those different [French] governments as la conquète assurée de la France. . . . But the English Ministers have nothing to learn from us on this subject that they do not know better already. If

\textsuperscript{16}Parl. Deb., XXIV, p. 142.
\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., XXV, p. 930. Parl. Papers, 1834, XIV, Report of Select Committee on Steam Navigation to India (234 pages).
\textsuperscript{17}At that date some attention was given to the possibility of digging a canal to connect the waters of the Mediterranean with those of the Red Sea. See, Parl. Papers, 1834, XIV, Report of Select Committee on Steam Navigation to India, pp. 28-34. Archives Parl., LXXXII, p. 277.
\textsuperscript{18}Parl. Deb., XXIV, p. 932.
the question of Egypt is an Austrian question, it is undoubtedly in a still greater degree an English question.” As Metternich must have known, there had long been a disposition in England to regard French relations with Egypt with considerable suspicion. During the course of Ibrahim’s campaign in Syria, both Sir Stratford Canning and Mandeville had looked disapprovingly “upon Varennes’ efforts to persuade the Porte to allow France to mediate between the Sultan and the Pasha.” In Parliament attention was called to the activities of the French in Egypt and also in Algiers and it was intimated that the administration ought not to maintain too close an alliance with the government of Louis Philippe. Regardless of the fact that differences did exist between the interests of England and France relative to certain aspects of the Eastern question, the Cabinets of both those countries were particularly anxious to prevent such differences from becoming evident. As The Times pointed out, the July Monarchy instinctively believed that since its rising, there had been formed a northern coalition for its destruction and that an intimate understanding with England was essential to guarantee its safety. 

On May 20, 1833, M. Guizot, who was then the Minister of Public Instruction, declared that the English alliance was “une fait important” in the French political situation. “That alliance,” he continued, “is fortunate, favorable to the progress, to the good order, to the prosperity of the two countries.” At the same time, the British government, alarmed by the menace of Russian aggression towards Turkey and India, believed it was necessary, for the

---

19 Metternich to Neumann, Feb. 15, 1833, Metternich, op. cit., V, p. 478. For further comment on the policy of France, see Metternich to Prokesch, Feb. 23, 1833, ibid., p. 483.
20 Hall, op. cit., p. 155. Note the following: “The French Government would have wished to have seen Meh’med Ali at Constantinople; but the Russians were so quickly at the Bosphorus that of two evils the French chose the least, and supported the Sultan against their will.”—Barker, op. cit., II, p. 191. See also, The Times, Dec. 6, 1833, Journal des DÉbats, Apr. 15, 1833.
23 The Times, Dec. 6, 1833.
24 Archives Parlt., LXXXIV, p. 42.
sake of self-defense, to secure the support of France.\textsuperscript{26} These facts reveal the main reason why, during the Turco-Egyptian crisis of 1833, the two western Powers were so anxious to make it appear that they were in perfect accord concerning all questions of foreign policy. Before an open break between them could result from their rival interests in the Near East, it was necessary that radical changes should be evolved in their respective relations with Austria, Prussia, and Russia—especially with Russia.

In the beginning of the year 1834 the prospect for such a change did not appear to be very promising. At Constantinople the representatives of the Emperor Nicholas were endeavoring actively to conserve the preponderant influence which their master had so recently gained in the councils of the Sublime Porte,\textsuperscript{26} and at St. Petersburg a new arrangement between Russia and Turkey, relative to the execution of the Treaty of Adrianople, which had been concluded in 1829, was on the point of being signed by Achmet Pasha and Count Nesselrode.\textsuperscript{27} Those developments were naturally looked upon by the western Powers as conclusive evidence confirming their apprehensions in regard to the secret aim of Russia to profit at the expense of the helpless Porte.\textsuperscript{28} Indeed,

\textsuperscript{26}\textit{The Times, Dec. 6, 1833.} Raikes, \textit{Journal}, I, pp. 218-219. Note the following statement made by Palmerston on March 17, 1834: "...when two such states [as England and France] were bound together by the ties of interest, and the bonds of integrity, confidence, and honour, the House might well consider that they must form in Europe a power of no mean importance."—\textit{Parl. Deb.}, XXII, p. 327.

\textsuperscript{27}See a series of letters from Constantinople, Dec. 10, 1833, Jan. 28, Feb. 25, March 5, 19, April 1, 15, July 1, 8, 29, 1834, in \textit{The Times}, Jan. 13, Feb. 27, March 26, April 10, 18, 28, May 13, July 28, Aug. 2, 25, 1834.

\textsuperscript{28}By the treaty of Jan. 29, 1834, the Tsar gave up all but 4,000,000 ducats of what remained to be paid of the indemnities provided for in the Treaty of Adrianople, and in turn the Porte ceded to Russia a tract of country, from the Pashalic of Akhiskha, on its northeastern frontier. Turkey was to pay that portion of the indemnity which was not relinquished in annual payments of 500,000 ducats each, and until it was paid the important post of Silistria was to remain as a pledge in the hands of the Russians. See, \textit{State Papers}, XXVI, pp. 1245-1248.

the strained relations of England and France with the government of the Tsar were destined to continue for some time.²⁹

On April 21, 1834, Palmerston gave an excellent summary of the British Cabinet's attitude, relative to the Turkish problem, in a letter to his brother, William Temple. "With Russia," he wrote, "we are just as we were, snarling at each other, hating each other, but neither wishing for war. Their last communication on Eastern affairs is anything but satisfactory. However, there is nothing at present done by us, because there is no danger of anything being done by them. They cannot return to Turkey unless invited by the Sultan, and the Sultan will not invite them unless he is again attacked by Mehemet Ali; but Mehemet Ali will not stir as long as we beg him not to do so, because he knows that our fleet could effectually prevent him. . . . Our policy as to the Levant is to remain quiet, but remain prepared; time may enable the Turks to reorganize their resources, and the chapter of accidents is fertile in events."³⁰ The Viceroy, realizing the possibilities which such a condition of affairs might offer to him, ventured to suggest to the representatives of the western Powers at Alexandria that their respective courts should recognize his independence in return for the cooperation of his army and navy in a crusade against Russia.³¹ His offer was promptly rejected, but the situation was still further complicated by a revolt in Syria against the régime he had so recently established there under the author-

²⁹It was during the period of these strained relations in 1834, when the famous "Portfolio Papers," professing to reveal a Machiavellian policy on the part of Russia, first appeared in England. See, The Portfolio; or a Collection of State Papers, etc., edited by D. Urquhart. Series 1 (5 vols.). See also, L. C. Sanders, Life of Viscount Palmerston, p. 76. C. C. Greville, The Greville Memoirs. A Journal of the Reign of Queen Victoria from 1837 to 1852, I, pp. 102-104, 139.

³⁰Palmerston to Temple, April 21, 1834, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 182-183. Soon afterwards the Emperor Nicholas decided to recall his ambassador, Prince Lieven, from London and to appoint only a chargé d'affaires in his place. See, Palmerston to Temple, June 27, 1834, ibid., p. 199. The Times, May 23, 1834.

ity of his son Ibrahim. In 1832 the Syrians had welcomed the Egyptians as their deliverers, but they soon found the overlordship of the Pasha to be even more distasteful than that of the Porte which had preceded it. The Sultan, anxious to add to the difficulties which confronted his hated vassal, did what he could to encourage the insurgents. He even dreamed of recovering the dominions which he had lost the preceding year and, in order to avail himself to the utmost of any opportunity which might occur, sent considerable reenforcements to the army of Reschid Pasha in Asia Minor. A correspondent of The Times

"A. A. Paton, A History of the Egyptian Revolution, II, pp. 116-117. Annual Register, 1834, p. [465]. Although the Viceroy's proposal was rejected by the French Ministers, sympathy for the cause of Mehemet Ali still existed in France. Note the following: "...tous le monde sâit que les Turcs, livrés à eux-mêmes, sont incapables de résister aux forces régulières d'Ibrahim; le Sultan invoquera encore une fois la protection des Russes. D'un autre côté, que représente le pacha dEgypte, si ce n'est l'Angleterre et la France? Ces deux puissances prendront parti pour leur allié; de là le conflit qui paraît inévitables. Ce sera une guerre sous un autre pavillon. Nous sommes bien loin encore du désarmement."—Revue des Deux Mondes, June 14, 1834, XIV, p. 732. It appears that many believed at the time that England, as well as France, was favorably inclined towards Mehemet Ali. An American, W. H. Hodgson, wrote in a long report on Egypt, March 2, 1835, addressed to the State Department: "In the political and commercial relations of Great Britain with her East-Indian possessions, Egypt constitutes a link of primary importance. Every consideration of interest prompts her to desire the independence of Mohammed Ali... She desires the establishment of a strong Government on the Red Sea, and upon the Euphrates, to give security to commerce, and to control the uncivilized lawless tribes, existing on the lines of intercourse, between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

"France regards Egypt as a quasi colony, and aspires to its possession. Egypt looks to France, for science and art, and France anticipates a predominance in her councils, in the contingency of future wars in Europe or Asia.

"Russia secretly encourages the extension of Mohammed Ali's dominions, by which the Sultan's power may be reduced, and Turkey become an easier prey to herself."—State Dept. Turkey VI, Hodgson's Report on Egypt, March 2, 1835.

"The major part of the dissatisfaction was due to the attempts of Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim to introduce Egyptian systems of taxation and conscription into Syria. See, Paton, op. cit., II, pp. 121-122. Barker, op. cit., II, pp. 204-206. Annual Register, 1834, p. [465].


"Annual Register, 1834, p. [465]."
wrote from Constantinople on May 27, 1834: "A rupture between the Porte and Egypt appears inevitable. . . . What elements for Russia to act upon! . . . the circumstances of February last are reproduced under, if possible, aggravated difficulties; the crisis is momentous, and here [at Constantinople] our only hope is in the alliance of France and England."38

At the same time, the great Powers were all determined to prevent a renewal of the conflict in the Orient.37 Russia particularly, it appears, was anxious that the peace should not be broken. Baron Ruckmann, the Tsar's chargé d'affaires at the Turkish capital, declared in a note to the Porte that although his master would, true to his sacred engagements, hold himself bound to place at the Sultan's disposal any assistance he might demand for defense against an aggressor, he could not comply with his "best ally's" request in a case in which the latter engaged in hostilities of his own seeking.38 The Russian government had become aroused by the reactions which its Turkish policy had produced in western Europe and it must have realized that the Cabinets of England and France would never peacefully submit to a second active intervention, on the part of its army and navy, in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the Sultan was forced to refrain from the immediate execution of his hostile intentions.

Before the close of the year 1834, a governmental change destined to be of importance in connection with the relations of the great Powers in the Near East, occurred in Great Britain. The Whig administration, having lost the support of the House of Commons, resigned and was replaced in office by a Tory régime under the leadership of Sir Robert Peel. That was exactly what the Russians had been looking forward to for a considerable

38Letter from Constantinople, May 23, 1834, The Times, June 24, 1834. See also, Annual Register, 1834, p. [465].
39Hall, op. cit., p. 220.
period of time. They were alarmed especially, it seems, by the alliance which the Whig ministers had formed with the French, and they hoped that the Tories, led by the Duke of Wellington, could be won over to the cause of legitimacy. In a conversation with Thomas Raikes, at Paris on November 13, 1833, Count Pozzo di Borgo declared: “Your union with France will produce no benefit to England; they will make no treaty of commerce, they will only use you for their own purposes. Russia is your old ally, and under the Duke’s government, convinced as we are of the rectitude of his intentions, there are no facilities to commerce, no sacrifices, that we would not make to cement that alliance; but under your present rulers we are everywhere held up to odium and suspicion, as if the conviction that you have unjustly deserted an old friend only made you more anxious to injure and traduce her for your own satisfaction.” Indeed, when Wellington did become Foreign Secretary in Peel’s Cabinet, Anglo-Russian relations were improved perceptibly. The Duke proposed to restore normal diplomatic relations with Russia by the despatch of an ambassador to St. Peters burg and, believing that the evil which arose from the passage of Russian ships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean would not be diminished by the opening of the Dardanelles to the fleets of the Powers, maintained that

"Note the following statements recorded in the Journal of Thomas Raikes, under the date of Oct. 8, 1833: “I called on Count Pozzo di Borgo... all his questions seemed to tend to what means could overthrow the Whig government in England. He desired C——, who was with him during my visit, and who is going to England, to tell the Duke [of Wellington] that, if ever he returned to office, all the Four Powers [Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Holland] were unanimous to abide in everything by her [England’s] instructions;... but, added he, 'if she is still to be governed by her present rulers, let her beware of the consequences. Our plans are laid. We shall attack her in her most vulnerable point,—in her commerce. We have means in our power to destroy her; we will prohibit every species of manufacture or produce that can in the slightest degree affect her interests; we will shut up the Sound against her; we will offer such advantages to America, her rival, that the whole carrying trade of Europe, shall come into her hands; and we will do everything to accelerate that ruin which her own mad rulers are already eventually bringing on her head. ’”—Raikes, Journal, I, pp. 189-191. See also, Metternich, op. cit., V, pp. 561, 567. "See a memoir presented to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg in April, 1834, Martens, N. S. III, p. 743 ff. Also a letter from Constantinople, June 4, 1834, The Times, July 2, 1834. "Raikes, Journal, I, pp. 193-195.
England and France should endeavor to effect the closure of the Straits to the warships of all nations. Although his stay in office was too short to permit him to realize the complete triumph of his policy, when he was succeeded by Palmerston, in the spring of 1835, he had the satisfaction to see that the latter was impressed by the soundness of his opinion upon the question of the Dardanelles. Moreover, the Whigs also took over the idea of sending an ambassador to St. Petersburg. To fill that post they chose Lord Durham, a diplomat who in 1832, while on a special mission to Russia relative to both Belgian and Oriental affairs, had succeeded in winning the favor of the Tsar.

Durham, in 1835, anxious to place the relations of the two courts upon as cordial a basis as was possible, determined to become acquainted personally with Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Near East. Consequently, when he proceeded to the seat of his new position, he followed a circuitous route by way of the Mediterranean and the Black Seas, stopping long enough in Turkey to enjoy a visit with Lord Ponsonby and to obtain an interview with His Highness, Mahmoud II. When he traveled through the southern provinces of Russia he saw no symptoms of any preparations for war and he became convinced that the Tsar did not have the power, even if he had the will, to call suddenly into action a sufficient force to take Constantinople.

Arriving at St. Petersburg in the autumn of 1835, the British Ambassador found the Russian statesmen inclined to say that they had enough to do at home. The possession of the Turkish capital by their country, they professed to believe, would be a calamity instead of an advantage. The reply made by Durham

---

43F. O. Turkey 271, Palmerston to Ponsonby, June 20, 1836, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 223. Bourqueney to Soult, July 12, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 510.
45Reid, op. cit., II, p. 16. See a letter from Constantinople, Nov. 18, 1835, The Times, Dec. 15, 1835. See also No. 10, Appendix D.
46Reid, op. cit., II, p. 17.
47Ibid., p. 16.
to their declarations was friendly but, at the same time, firm. "I do not believe," he stated, "[that] you entertain the designs attributed to you because you are too wise and too clever to attempt impossibilities. The retention, nay, the occupation of Constantinople is an impossibility. We never could and never would permit it, while there was a shilling in our treasury, or a drop of blood in British veins."349

Early in the year 1836, in response to a request made by Palmerston for an exact account of the political situation at St. Petersburg, Durham prepared his "luminous and remarkable 'Report on the state of Russia.'"350 That document signified "an attempt to unravel a political problem which directly concerned the interests of England and the peace of Europe, namely, whether Russia was likely to make a hostile movement for her own security or for territorial expansion."350 Russia recognized, the British representative contended, that a fresh and formidable change had come over the Eastern question. She knew that it was no longer possible for her to measure swords with Turkey alone and that any hostile movement on her part against the Ottoman Empire would occasion a war with the English, who would probably be supported by both the French and the Austrians. But this, after all, was only one side of the question. Although the external difficulties of Russia were great, they did not stand alone. An analysis of the Empire's population, its military and naval resources, and its financial condition proved that there was not a single element of strength which was not counterbalanced by a corresponding degree of weakness.351 "In these circumstances and with the evidence of these facts before me," Durham pointed out in conclusion, "I humbly conceive that I am justified in reporting to his Majesty and to the Government my conviction that the peace of Europe is not likely to be disturbed by any ambitious or hostile enterprises on the part of Russia, for which she has neither the inclination nor the means."352

While Durham was thus occupied at St. Petersburg, important


*Ibid.,* p. 36. Others who were acquainted with conditions in Russia were of similar opinion. See Guichen, *op. cit.*, p. 95, particularly footnote 2.
developments, tending to increase. Great Britain’s interest in the Near East, were taking place. It will be remembered that in July, 1834, the British Parliament had granted a sum of 20,000 Pounds which was to provide the money for an experiment to test the practicability of a steam route to India by way of the Euphrates river and the Persian Gulf. After several months delay, during which time the government came near to abandoning the project because of the opposition of the Porte, an expedition for the purpose was equipped and placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Chesney. Chesney and his band departed from England early in the year 1835 and they arrived at the mouth of the Orontes river, on the coast of northern Syria, on April 3. Although the Sultan, three months earlier, had at last issued a firman granting permission to the English to navigate the Euphrates, the Colonel and his followers were destined to experience a second tiresome delay before they could proceed with the execution of their plans. Mehemet Ali had promised to give his assistance to the British government in favor of the undertaking but when the moment came to give a "bouyourldee" to the local governors to enjoin them to assist Chesney, he delayed signing the document, and hence the expedition could not proceed. The British commander, chafing under this inaction, obtained an interview with Ibrahim Pasha at Tripoli on April 24, 1835, but he could not prevail upon him to do otherwise than await his father’s orders. It was only after strong remonstrances were made by His Britannic Majesty’s government to the Viceroy that the latter finally consented to lend his cooperation to the project. However, by the close of the summer of 1835, all of the expedition’s equipment, including the parts of two iron steamboats—the Tigris and the Euphrates—had been loaded on wagons and transported from the mouth of the Orontes inland toward the

53Chesney, op. cit., p. 157-158.  
54Barker, op. cit., II, p. 216.  
55Letter from Constantinople, May 6, 1835, The Times, June 1, 1835.  
56Barker, op. cit., II, pp. 216-217. The Constantinople correspondent of The Times claimed that the hostile attitude of the Pasha was due to the influence at Alexandria of the Tsar’s representative, M. Duhamel. See, letters from Constantinople, May 13, 21, 26, 1835, The Times, June 8, 13, 20, 1835.  
58Ibid., pp. 199-200.
waters of that famous river, the commercial possibilities of which it was the aim of Chesney’s party to discover. The difficulties encountered were numerous but, as a contemporary periodical expressed it, the “resolute perseverance” of the commander and the “never failing exertions” of the officers and men triumphed over all obstacles. On May 21, 1836, soon after the two steamers had been launched upon the Euphrates, they encountered a hurricane which blew in from the desert with so much violence that the Tigris foundered, carrying down with her several members of her crew. Nevertheless, Chesney and the rest of the survivors, refusing to become discouraged, continued their journey in the one vessel which had successfully weathered the storm. They reached the Persian Gulf in June, 1836, and the following winter, after a delay occasioned by their waiting to effect a communication with India, steamed up the Tigris river to Bagdad, where the party finally was disbanded. That the expedition was a significant one cannot be denied. A fellow-countryman has paid the following tribute to its resolute commander: “Although neglected and overlooked by an ungrateful country, his name will live forever as the pioneer of the greatest work, in reference to India, of the nineteenth century, and one which will one day be seen in its true light as being the only real route to our Indian possessions.”

"Ibid., pp. 293-326. For a more detailed account of the Euphrates expedition see F. R. Chesney, The Expedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris, carried on by order of the British Government in the years 1835, 1836, and 1837. (4 vols.)
"Barker, op. cit., II, p. 222. Some others were not so enthusiastic. Lord Broughton recorded in his “Recollections” under date of Aug. 10, 1836: “A very numerous deputation, headed by Lord William Bentinck, waited on me at the Indian Board, to discuss a proposal for establishing a steam communication with India. The scheme met with many and serious obstructions, but was started at last. I heard no complaints, except from a very clever friend of mine, who said to me, The deuce take these projectors! Letters come from India now quite quick and quite often enough; I am sure many of them are not answered yet. What will it be when letters and despatches come from India once a week?” —Lord Broughton, Recollections of a Long Life, V, p. 60.
At the same time that Chesney was pushing forward through Syria and Mesopotamia, a growing British interest in Oriental affairs was marked at Constantinople by increased activity on the part of Lord Ponsonby. The English Ambassador, refusing to permit himself to be influenced by the convictions expressed by Lord Durham in regard to the policies of Russia, was absolutely convinced that the intentions of the northern court were Machiavellian in character. He was imbued with a violent hatred for Mehemet Ali. Hence it was natural that he should desire both to destroy the preponderance of Russian influence in Turkey and to limit the developing power of the ambitious Viceroy of Egypt. In his endeavor to realize the former aim progress was extremely slow, for he was handicapped by the opposition of the representatives of the Emperor Nicholas and by the feelings of gratitude which the Porte bore towards Russia because of the aid that Power had tendered to it when Ibrahim’s army was threatening Constantinople. In his efforts to accomplish the latter aim, aided by the Grand Seignior’s desire for revenge against the Egyptians, he was more fortunate. It is significant in this connection that when, in December of 1835, Ponsonby complained that the Pasha’s system of monopoly and trade restriction was in violation of the rights conferred upon English merchantmen by the treaties of commerce existing between the Ottoman Porte and Great Britain, Mahmoud promptly issued a firman to his powerful vassal ordering him to abolish within the territories under his

⁹⁴Hall, op. cit., p. 223. Ponsonby persisted in maintaining that view even in 1836 after the Russian Cabinet had consented a second time to remit a part of the indemnity due from Turkey and to evacuate Silistria. See, F. O. Turkey 273, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 14, 1836, cited by ibid., p. 224. Letter from Constantinople, Sept. 6, 1836, published in the Allgemeine Zeitung and copied in The Times, Oct. 6, 1836. Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 256-257, III, p. 4.


control all such restrictions as were not in conformity with the established Turkish practices.

Russia viewed with alarm the evidence of Britain's increasing interest in the Near East and, zealous in her efforts to guard the influences she had gained at Constantinople, looked suspiciously upon every advance made by the Porte to Ponsonby. After it became known that the British Ambassador had persuaded the Sultan to permit the undertaking of the Euphrates expedition, Count Nesselrode forwarded a long protest to the Turkish capital.

"His Imperial Majesty," the Russian Chancellor instructed M. de BouteiNeill to warn the Porte, "has remarked with surprise, that, deaf to his own interests and to every friendly suggestion, the Sultan had authorized the English Government to establish a steam communication on the Euphrates, and still favored the execution of its ambitious designs in Egypt, by delivering a firman, which, when the opportune moment has arrived, will serve to legitimate an attack on its governor. The Emperor, after having uselessly warned the Sultan of the dangers to which he exposes the empire by acceding to the demands of the English Cabinet, now considers himself bound to inform the Porte that should hostilities between England and the Governor of Egypt arise on his refusal to obey the firman of the Porte, Russia could not remain a passive spectator of so unequal a conflict, and might find herself drawn by the force of circumstances into a position which might render the continuation of the present friendly relations no longer possible."


Martens, N. S., III, p. 760-762. Letter from Constantinople, March 16, 1836, The Times, April 11, 1836. Gentleman's Magazine, May, 1836, Series 3, V, p. 541. The date of this document has not been found but it is apparent that the Russian government was openly hostile to the Euphrates project at a very early date. In "A Statement of His [British] Majesty's General Proceedings, and of the Principles by which he was guided from the period of his Accession, 1830, to that of the recent Change in the Administration," dated Jan. 14, 1835, mention was made of Russia's "recent opposition to the projected establishment of a steam communication with India, by the Euphrates." See L. J. Jennings, The Correspondence and Diaries of the late Right Honorable John Wilson Croker, p. 348.
Lord Durham realized that the anti-Russian activities of the British Ambassador in Turkey were a serious handicap to him in his efforts to improve the status of Anglo-Russian relations and he complained to Palmerston about the matter.\textsuperscript{69} The British Minister of Foreign Affairs thoroughly approved of the course followed by His Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador at the Muscovite Court but, being unwilling to trust Russia as far as the latter did, took a more cynical view of her assurances and refused really to condemn the stand which Ponsonby had taken in opposition to Russian influence in Turkey. In answer to Durham’s complaint he declared: “Ponsonby goes perhaps too far in his suspicions of Russia, and certainly is too warlike in his own inclinations; ... but Ponsonby has great merits and has done us good service at Constantinople, ... what you say about Russia very much coincides with our views. Whether we entirely believe or not that the Russian government has altered the policy which, certainly, at no distant period, it pursued as to Turkey, it would be unwise not to appear to give credit to acts which are in conformity with professions; ...”\textsuperscript{70}

It is obvious that in Great Britain Durham encountered innumerable obstacles in his efforts to quiet apprehensions in regard to Russian policies. In addition to the alarm occasioned there by Russia’s Near Eastern policy in 1833, and the Anglo-Russian rivalry at Constantinople in the period immediately following that year, strong sentiments were stirred up by the way in which the Rus-

\textsuperscript{69}The Duc de Barante, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported in May, 1836, that Durham had confidentially told him that if he were a member of the British Cabinet, Lord Ponsonby would not remain at Constantinople for twenty-four hours. See, Barante to Thiers, May 14, 1836, Barante, \textit{Souvenirs du Baron de Barante}, V, pp. 380-381.

\textsuperscript{70}Palmerston to Durham, May 31, 1836, Reid, \textit{op. cit.}, II, p. 43. Six weeks later Palmerston wrote to his brother William: “Russia is coquetting with Durham; and in order to cajole him, is obliged to be civil to us; so his appointment has answered. Metternich has taken a fling, as if bit by a horse-fly, and Ancillon has mimicked him as a donkey would do. ... ‘I have just got Ponsonby’s reports about Churchill, but have not been able to read them yet. I fear he may have gone a little too far; but all his colleagues, not excepting Roussin, are jealous of him, and would be too glad of an opportunity to throw him over if they could. I must support him to the full extent of propriety.’” —Palmerston to Temple, July 9, 1836, Bulwer, \textit{op. cit.}, III, pp. 13-14.
sians had suppressed the risings of the Poles, by the Tsar's part in the occupation of Cracow in 1836, and by his attempts to crush an insurrection which had broken out a short time before in southern Russia among the Circassians. The sympathy of the British nation was particularly aroused, it seems, by the efforts of the latter peoples to win their independence, and certain adventurous Englishmen even went so far as to join openly with the rebels. In December of 1836, the activities of some of these Britons came near to occasioning very serious and far reaching results. A schooner, the Vixen, which had been engaged in illicit trade with the Circassians, was captured in the Black Sea by a Russian brig of war. The owners of the vessel, Messrs. Bell and Company, complained loudly about their loss and appealed to the British government for support. Palmerston was inclined to sympathize with their cause but he had no wish "to begin fighting at the goodwill and bidding of Mr. James Bell, the bankrupt of Bucharest," as he called him. It is true that the affair served to increase English animosity against Russia, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs adopted the stand that there had been no violation of International Law and hence refused to insist that reparation should be made by the Court of St. Petersburg. Thus, this possibility of hostilities resulting between the two Powers was happily averted.

"Note the following: "The wrongs of the Poles at that time [the early 1830's] excited as much indignation in England as was afterwards evoked by the Bulgarian atrocities of the Turks."—Reid, op. cit., II, p. 4.

"In February, 1836, the little Republic of Cracow, the last stronghold of the Poles, was occupied by the troops of the three eastern Powers. At that time the indignation of the British was so great that the peace of Europe was seriously threatened. See Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire générale, X, p. 331. Reid, op. cit., II, p. 41. Blanc, op. cit., V, pp. 29-30. Parl. Deb., XXXII, pp. 403-426.


"George Bell to Palmerston, Jan. 27, 1837, ibid., p. 11. The appeal was repeated. See Bell to Palmerston, Apr. 4, 1837, Ibid., p. 33.


"Reid, op. cit., II, p. 67. Palmerston to Durham, May 23, 1837, State Papers, XXVI, pp. 40-41. For a more detailed study of the affair see additional papers in ibid., pp. 3-60.
The fear and hatred of Russia amongst the British people in 1835 and 1836 must have been intense indeed. At any rate a review of certain contemporary products of the press leads to that conclusion. Not only the publications of such radicals as David Urquhart, the editor of the Portfolio, but also the journals of the Conservatives were extremely bitter in their denunciation of the policies of the Muscovite state which, according to The Times, was "an ambitious, grasping, domineering, despotic, and most artful power." A few brief quotations will suffice to reveal the character of some of the sentiments which were expressed. The following is an extract from an anonymous pamphlet written in 1834, and entitled England, France, Russia, and Turkey: "Are not the remains of Turkey to be laid on the tomb of Poland, unless England and France, in their resistless twinship say no? . . . It is by the Dardanelles that we must reach the heart of the Ottoman Empire; it is from the Bosphorus that our fleets must issue, to arrest the invader. Invigorate Turkey, you not only save her but repair the disaster her weakness alone has brought about. The existence of Poland is bound to that of Turkey. One hand of iron is laid upon both; unlock that withering grasp, and both start simultaneously to life. The Dardanelles are the key to both; both are to be secured by its possession, or sacrificed by its loss." "Is it true that Russia deserves the soul and angry epithets which are heaped upon her?" questioned the Monthly Review for January, 1835, in commenting upon this pamphlet. "Yes; think of Poland! But is her appetite of ambition insatiate and unsated? yes; think of Turkey!" The editorial writer of The Times was always hostile to Russia and he was occasionally even quite militant. On February 21, 1836, after criticising the "flippant apologies" made by the British Minister of Foreign Affairs relative to the "insulting convention of Hoonkia Skelessi," he declared: "We all know quite as well as Lord Palmerston the

See above, Note No. 29. Urquhart was one of the most active and most bitter critics of Russia's policy at that time. See D. Urquhart, Le sultan et le pacha d'Egypte (a pamphlet).

The Times, Feb. 8, 1836.


intrinsic power of this great country [England]; we all know that if fairly pitted against Russia, and with her force efficiently directed, she would smash the head of the Tartar Emperor against the dockyard gate of Sevastopol, or the inmost defense of Cronstadt.\(^{82}\)

Such hostile articles as these, which were frequently reported to the Emperor Nicholas by Count Pozzo di Borgo, were a source of constant difficulty for Durham.\(^{83}\) Nevertheless, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg succeeded in improving greatly the diplomatic relations between England and Russia. On March 20, 1836, he wrote to a friend: "I have interposed a barrier between Russia and Turkish conquest, which they [the Russians] admit to be insuperable, and which therefore they disclaim. I have while asserting our own superiority and right and power to intervene, at the same time done it in such a way as to inspire confidence in our motives and determination, and never at any moment was English influence more powerful here [at St. Petersburg]. Excuse this 'vain glory'; it is only in private to you; it will never be conceded to me in public, but it is my consolation in sorrow and sickness."\(^{84}\) Lord Palmerston frankly admitted the value of Durham's success at the Russian Court. On December 14, 1837, after the Ambassador had returned to England, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs declared in the House of Commons that "it was impossible for any public servant at a foreign court to have served his country with more zeal and firmness" than

\(^{82}\) *The Times*, Feb. 22, 1836. See *ibid.*, June 4, Oct. 1, 1835; Jan. 5, 7, April 18, 19, 22, 1836. Aaron Vail, the American representative at London, wrote Jan. 22, 1836: "The European Press, without any material exception but that portion of it which is under Russian control, has not ceased to fan the embers of that anti-Russian feeling; and the Imperial Court has been galled by the severity and virulence with which its acts have been scanned, and its policy commented upon by the acknowledged ministerial organs of England and France, and even by some German journals, formerly advocates of the doctrines set up by the Holy Alliance of which the Emperor of Russia was the head and master. Rash and mendacious as portions of the Press may at times be found all the world over, still, when with all but an unanimous voice it utters the same sentiments, it must be acknowledged then unequivocally to speak the public mind."—State Dept. England, XLIII, Vail to Forsyth, No. 224, Jan. 22, 1836.

\(^{83}\) Reid, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 24, 46.

\(^{84}\) Durham to Parkes, March 20, 1836, *ibid.*, p. 80.
Durham had. Although Palmerston still believed that the British Cabinet ought not to “relax in any degree the vigilance with which [it watched] the proceedings of Russia,” he had become convinced that the Muscovite government had no intention of immediate aggression. “I think,” he wrote to Durham in November, 1836, “you would not demur to what I said about Russia in my conversation with Esterhazy [the Austrian Ambassador at London] upon his return here. I said our situation with respect to Russia is greatly improved, as compared with what it was two years ago. Then there was much personal irritation between the two governments and no preparation on our part to resist Russia if necessary; whereas now, by your good management at St. Petersburg the two governments are placed upon a perfectly good footing of mutual intercourse, while the vote of Parliament of last session has put into our hands the means of giving effect, if requisite, to any remonstrance we might be obliged to make.” Moreover, in the halls of Parliament Palmerston pointed out the absurdity of the fears of those who were alarmed lest Great Britain should be attacked by the Russians and he even declared that Russia gave “the world quite as much security for the preservation of peace as England did.”

While the British government’s fear of immediate aggressive intentions on the part of the Court of St. Petersburg was thus being allayed, its apprehensions in regard to the policies of Mehemet Ali were increasing. In 1834, soon after the Egyptian army had been withdrawn from Asia Minor, an expedition which the Pasha fitted out under the command of Kourchid Bey, the governor of Jeddah,

---

86 Parl. Deb., XXXIX, p. 1109. See also Reid, op. cit., II, pp. 39, 59.
87 Palmerston to Durham, Sept. 24, 1836, ibid., p. 63.
88 Palmerston to Durham, Nov. 1, 1836, ibid., p. 65. Palmerston appears to have had little fear of Russian power. On March 10, 1835, he wrote to his brother William: “The fact is that Russia is a great humbug, and that if England were fairly to go to work with her we should throw her back half a century in one campaign. But Nicholas, the proud and insolent, knows this, and will always check his pride and moderate his insolence when he finds that England is firmly determined and fully prepared to resist him.”—Palmerston to Temple, March 10, 1835, Bulwer, op. cit., III, p. 5.
crossed the Hedjaz country and advanced as far as the village of Kassim, about ten day's journey from Bassorah. Kourchid soon succeeded in occupying the isle of Bahrein in the Persian Gulf and in effecting a union at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab with a naval force which the Viceroy had sent around the Arabian peninsula. The road to Bagdad lay open before him but as the British government, alarmed by the advance of the expedition, protested vigorously to Mehemet Ali, the latter, who was already being troubled by the revolts in Syria, decided that the project should be abandoned. Accordingly, he ordered Kourchid to retreat with his troops to Egypt. Nevertheless, in the following year he again took up his aggressive policy and despatched an army against Yemen. While this particular undertaking failed, it was soon apparent that there was a real danger of the Viceroy's making himself master of all Arabia if he should be permitted to continue his activities against the Bedouin.

Great Britain had too many vital interests at stake to fail to become alarmed in such circumstances. She viewed with special concern the developments in Egypt, Arabia, and Syria, for, it will be remembered, she was beginning to realize that the bulk of the future European intercourse with India would flow through either the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf. It has been noted before that even in 1834, the special Parliamentary committee on steam navigation with India reported that the practicability of the former of those routes appeared to be certain and in order to develop it suggested that the government should proceed to take action in cooperation with the East India Company. The committee's

Annual Register, 1835, p. [499].
Hall, op. cit., p. 232. Note the following statement made by Sir John Hobhouse (Lord Broughton) in a British Cabinet meeting, June 15, 1838: "...I added that the continued encroachments of Mahomet Ali on the shores of the Persian Gulf rendered a collision between him and ourselves almost inevitable, unless, indeed, we had made up our minds to allow him to become master of Bassorah and perhaps of Baghdad." Quoted by A. Hasenclever, Die Orientalische Frage in den Jahren 1838-1841, p. 3 [footnote 10].

In order to continue investigation of the possibilities of steam navigation with India a second Parliamentary committee was appointed on June 9, 1837. This committee, which included Sir John Hobhouse and Lord William Bentinck among its members, considered various projects for rapid communication with the East and in a report on July 15, 1837, made the following suggestions:
report was received favorably in the House of Commons and the public press exerted itself to prevent the British people from losing interest in the question, but nevertheless over two years elapsed before appreciable results could be obtained. Three particularly serious, or supposedly serious, obstacles contributed to this delay. One arose from a problem of navigation. As Sir John Hobhouse, the chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, declared in the House of Commons on August 17, 1835, during two or three months of each year the south-west monsoons blew with so much violence in the Red Sea that it was then believed no steamship, of whatever size and power, would be able to face them. A second difficulty arose when it came to finding a method of transporting travellers and goods across the Isthmus of Suez. For a time the question of building a railroad was considered but it was finally given up as being impracticable. A third difficulty arose from the fact that the finances of the East India Company were, unfortunately, in a very dilapidated condition.

Fortunately, however, these obstacles did not prove to be insurmountable. They were all overcome eventually and, beginning

"Your committee feel bound to recommend a continued and zealous attention to the subject [of steam navigation to India] on the part of Her Majesty's Government and the East India Company.

"But strong as your committee are impressed with a sense of the advantages, Political, Commercial, and Personal, which would arise from the more extended system of communication [proposed], they would earnestly depurate any interruption of the valuable arrangements now in progress, with which it appears to them, from the Evidence adduced, to be perfectly compatible."—Parl. Papers, 1837, VI, Report of Select Committee on Steam Navigation to India [218 pages].

"Parl. Deb., XXV, pp. 930-932.

Ibid., XXX, p. 609. Other men expressed similar beliefs. See C. R. Scott, Rambles in Egypt and Candia, II, pp. 79-82.

"The idea of building a railroad across the Isthmus was suggested as early as 1833. In 1834 a road-bed was surveyed between Cairo and Suez by a certain Mr. Galloway who seems to have had considerable influence with the Viceroy. Rails for the proposed road actually reached Egypt but they were used for other purposes. See, Parl. Papers, 1840, XXI, Report on Egypt, pp. 61, 72. Gentleman's Magazine, Dec., 1833, Series 2, XXVI, p. 534. Scott, op. cit., II, p. 152. See also Galloway's map of the proposed railroad in Parl. Papers, 1837, VI, Report of Select Committee on Steam Navigation to India, Appendix No. 2.

"See statement made by Hobhouse, Parl. Deb., XXX, p. 609."
with the year 1837, regular communication with India by the way of the Red Sea was successfully established and maintained. 97 "Egypt is fast becoming of moment in the opinion of other nations," the editor of the Gentleman's Magazine wrote in September, 1838. "Five years ago there was not a single steam-vessel of any nation plying from her ports; now those of England, France, Austria, and Egypt number 18 regular opportunities to and fro every month from Alexandria. When will our Government build the 'Great Eastern' of 1500 tons, to go direct (both ways) between Plymouth and Alexandria in 15 days, with India mails and passengers and thus keep the French and Austrian lines from our Indian correspondence?" 98

The realization, on the part of the government of India, of the value of the Red Sea route was marked by its taking advantage, in 1838, of a quarrel it had formerly entered into with one of the native rulers of Yemen, in order to secure for England the strategic position of Aden. 99 The importance of this position as a coaling station on the road to India was well known at that time. "It would be needless my remarking on the position of Aden for a coal depot," Captain Haines, a prominent officer of the Bombay navy, declared, "It having been already considered on by abler heads than mine; but as a sailor who well knows the place from long experience, it will not be considered presumptuous in my

97Note the following statement made by Col. Campbell, in his Report to Bowring, Jan. 18, 1838: "...I now proceed to give you some details upon the steam communication between Europe and India by the Red Sea, and which is daily becoming an object of more and more importance. At present it is confined to letters and passengers, but may shortly be expected to include the conveyance of jewels and other less bulky merchandise.

"In regard to steam navigation between England and India by the Red Sea, this is a point which for some years past has been forcing itself upon the attention of [the] Government and the Court of directors [of the East India Co.], and has now commenced to be carried into full operation."—Parl. Papers, 1840, XXI, Report on Egypt and Candia. Appendix A., p. 189.


99On Jan. 14, 1837, the Doria Dowlut, a vessel flying the British flag, was shipwrecked near Aden. Her cargo was plundered and her crew and passengers were maltreated by the Bedouin. A year later the Sultan of Aden consented to the cession of the coaling station demanded as reparation by the British. Captain Haines, with an English force, took possession of the place in Jan., 1839.—Martens, N. R., XV, pp. 222-250.
observing, it is the best adapted port in existence for our over-land communication via the Red Sea; it is in fact perfect as such, and, if a pier were built, steamers could at all times and seasons lay along side of it and receive their coal.\textsuperscript{100}

In the very same year Lord Palmerston manifested his interest in the developments in the Near East by directing Sir John Bowring to make an extensive study of “the existing state and future probable situation of Egypt,” Candia, and Syria.\textsuperscript{101} After having spent a considerable period of time travelling through the various parts of Mehemet Ali’s dominion, where he carefully observed the existing conditions, Bowring returned to England and, in 1839, presented to the Minister of Foreign Affairs a series of three elaborate reports—one on each of the three provinces he had been directed to visit. In an introductory paragraph of his most famous report—that on Egypt—he pointed out: “The more attention is directed to Egypt and Syria, the more important and interesting will their position appear; for, in process of time, there can be little doubt that both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf will become the high roads to India, . . .”\textsuperscript{102} In another part of the document he stated: “It may be safely predicted that much of the European trade which now circumnavigates Africa, will in process of time, take the more direct course through Egypt and the Red Sea, but that trade will be of gradual growth, and its development will much depend on the facilities which are given to transit. As yet, the steam communications with India, have not led to any considerable increase of commerce, on or through the Red Sea. It is certain, however, that commerce will soon follow the track of travellers, but its extent will be greater or less according to the regulations of the Egyptian Government. The more costly and

\textsuperscript{100}Parl. Papers, 1839, XL, Correspondence relating to Aden, p. 96. Note also, the following extract from a “Minute by the Governor of Bombay, to which Mr. Farish subscribed,” March 26, 1838: “Undoubtedly the advantage of occupying Aden as a station convenient for the purposes of steam navigation, entered largely into the views of the Bombay Government; . . .” Ibid., p. 38.

\textsuperscript{101}Ibid., 1840, XXI. Bowring’s Reports covered a great variety of subjects. The author was anxious to reveal the true state of the resources of the territories under Mehemet Ali’s rule. See D. A. Cameron, Egypt in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 173-175.

\textsuperscript{102}Parl. Papers, 1840, XXI, Report on Egypt, p. 4.
less bulky articles will, in the progress of time, naturally be conveyed by the most direct and rapid channel. Already articles of jewelry, precious stones, some rich shawls, and bullion are conveyed from and to India by the English steamers."103 Bowring did not fail to realize the importance of finding an improved method of transit across the Isthmus of Suez. "Steam navigation will gradually alter the character of our intercourse [with India]," he remarked significantly; "the shortest and the cheapest channel will be reverted to; the difficulties which the monsoon presented to sailing vessels in the Indian Seas will certainly be mastered by the boundless powers of steam . . . The question still remains to be decided whether or not a canal is practicable from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea . . . improved as are the arts of labor and of navigation, and increased as is the importance of the question by the relative positions of India and Europe, it is to be desired that serious and detailed investigation should examine the extent of the impediments, and the means, if means there be of vanquishing them."104

Mehemet Ali must have perceived that the Red Sea route was destined to become of great importance in the future, for he exerted himself greatly in order to aid those who were endeavoring

103 Ibid., p. 67. By 1839, it was clear to many that no doubt could any longer be entertained relative to the merits of the Red Sea steam route to India. The editor of the Monthly Review, in January of that year, in commenting upon a pamphlet entitled, "Steam to India, via the Red Sea, and via the Cape of Good Hope," declared: "We agree fully with the author, and wonder, indeed, that doubt or hesitation can any longer attach to the matter. To us, as he eloquently shows, for all the grand interests concerned, the route via the Red Sea is not only by far the most advantageous line, but in fact the only line that can be called a 'Comprehensive Plan,' which is the title of that which he so warmly recommends."—Monthly Review, Jan., 1839, pp. 16-20.

104 The value of a canal across the Isthmus was realized by others. Note the following extract from a letter written at Cairo on Dec. 9, 1839: "I cannot leave Egyptian subjects (says Mr. D'Abbadie, in a letter to Capt. Beaufort, read at the last meeting of the Geog. Society) without mentioning the map of Upper, and particularly of Lower Egypt, made by M. Linant, who having been employed for nearly ten years as head engineer in the Delta, has had opportunities of adding many details to the topography of those parts. . . . Lower Egypt must, sooner, or later, by means of canals, become the high road for merchandise between Europe and India; and the map contains many notes explaining the construction of such a canal."—The Athenaeum Journal of Literature, Science, and the Fine Arts, Jan. 18, 1840, p. 53.
to develop it.\footnote{106} Some Englishmen, who believed that the Pasha was willing to cooperate with England in furthering her Indian interests, advocated that their country, like France, should ally herself with him instead of with Turkey.\footnote{106} However, the majority of Englishmen saw in the extension of his power a direct threat against their interests in the Orient.\footnote{107} Lord Palmerston, who agreed with the latter, was determined to prevent the ascendancy of Mehemet Ali. Realizing that if he contributed to the military and naval resources of the Porte, he would thereby add materially to the accomplishment of his object, he permitted officers from the English fleet to enter the service of the Sultan\footnote{108} and even despatched, under British pay, General Chrzanoski, a Pole, whom he considered "just the sort of man to be of the greatest use to Reshid Pasha," to Asia Minor to study the strategical situation there.\footnote{109} On the other hand, he directed Colonel Campbell, the British Consul-General at Alexandria, to complain to the Viceroy about the latter’s extensive system of conscription, his active military preparations, and his concentration of troops in Syria. Campbell was also instructed to warn the Pasha “against the evil consequences” which would result to himself, if he recommended an attack upon “any part of the Sultan’s forces.”\footnote{110}

\footnote{106}Note the following: “[The] Pasha is fully impressed with a sense of the value which public opinion attaches to a safe, speedy, and convenient intercourse with our Asiatic dominions. The subject has been one of frequent discussion with his highness; and he has continually shown not only the greatest willingness to lend his aid and protection but has on several occasions, made extraordinary exertions and sacrifices in order that the service should not suffer... he has frequently overcome difficulties which, without him, would have been insuperable;...”—\textit{Parl. Papers, 1840, XXI, Report on Egypt}, p. 72.

\footnote{108}\textit{Monthly Review}, Nov., 1837, III, p. 447. See a statement, which Bowring made at a later date, quoted by Hasenclever, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 4, [footnote 17].


\footnote{107}The most famous of these officers was Captain Sir Baldwin Walker. See, J. Reid, \textit{Turkey and the Turks}, pp. 48-50, 52-53. Bulwer, \textit{op. cit.}, II, p. 252.

\footnote{106}F. O. Turkey 271, Palmerston to Ponsonby; March 7, 1836, quoted by Hall, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 229.

\footnote{109}Palmerston to Campbell, Feb. 6, 1838, \textit{State Papers, XXVI}, p. 694. On March 29, 1838, Palmerston repeated his warning in the following terms: “I have to instruct you [Campbell] to state to Mêhémet Ali that you have been ordered by your Government seriously to warn him of the consequences to himself, which will follow any attempt on his part to extend his authority, by force of arms, in any direction.” \textit{Ibid.}, p. 695.
Later, when Palmerston learned that Mehemet Ali had announced an intention of throwing off his allegiance to the Sultan, he took a still more decided stand on the question. "The British Government," he wrote to the Consul-General at Alexandria, "... feels itself bound, in return for the frank and unreserved Communication which it has received from the Pasha, to declare to him, in a manner equally unreserved and explicit, that if he should unfortunately proceed to execute his announced intentions, and if hostilities should (as they indisputably would) break out thereupon between the Sultan and the Pasha, the Pasha must expect to find Great Britain taking part with the Sultan, in order to obtain redress for so flagrant a wrong done to the Sultan, and for the purpose of preventing the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire; ..." 112

While British interests in the Near East were developing, and while Lord Palmerston was taking such a decided stand against the pretensions of Mehemet Ali, the ties of alliance between England and France were tending to lose their hold. It has been pointed out upon a former occasion that even as early as 1833, when the Cabinets of the two western Powers were perfectly agreed in their opposition to Russian intervention in Turco-Egyptian affairs, evidence existed proving that they were not in accord upon all that appertained to the question of the Near East. As time progressed, and as rival interests between the two courts developed elsewhere, the Anglo-French estrangement became more serious and also more obvious. While Broglie was at Louis Philippe's foreign office he was particularly careful to avoid action which might incur hostility abroad. However, M. Thiers, who became Minister of Foreign Affairs on February 22, 1836, inaugurated a more aggressive policy. 113 Immediately after entering upon his official duties he set about consolidating French influence in northern Africa. With the aim of furthering the conquest of Algiers he planned to despatch an expedition against the Bey of Constantine. While protesting that he had no thought of extending French control over either Tunis or Tripoli, he refused to

111 Campbell to Palmerston, May 25, 1838, ibid., pp. 695-697. See also, Raikes, Journal, III, p. 289. Raikes, France since 1830, I, p. XXX.
112 Palmerston to Campbell, July 7, 1838, State Papers, XXVI, pp. 698-699. See also, Palmerston to Granville, June 6, 1838, Palmerston to Ponsonby, June 23, 1838, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 267, 269.
113 Lavisse et Rambaud, op. cit., X, pp. 392-393.
recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan over those territories and, in order to support his policy, sent a fleet under Admiral Hugon to Tunis to oppose, by force if necessary, the entry of the Ottoman squadron into the bay.\textsuperscript{114} In addition, a secret negotiation was initiated, both at Constantinople and at Cairo, for the purpose of establishing, under the guarantee of the French government, the relations of the Sultan and the Pasha of Egypt upon a more secure foundation.\textsuperscript{115} With the hope of eliminating the isolation of France on the continent, he engaged in an attempt to secure a marriage alliance between the Houses of Orleans and Habsburg. Louis Philippe was strongly in favor of such an arrangement but the prejudices of the Emperor of Austria, his family, and his court against a government born of the Revolution of 1830, proved too strong a handicap to permit the project to succeed.\textsuperscript{116}

Naturally, the aggressive policies adopted by Thiers aroused apprehensions in Great Britain. The time was particularly aus-


\textsuperscript{115}This negotiation was without important results. See Hall, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 226-227.

\textsuperscript{116}The proposed marriage alliance was to be between the Duke of Orleans and the Archduchess Maria Theresa. See, Guizot, \textit{op. cit.}, IV, pp. 143-144. Metternich to Apponyi, July 30, 1836, Metternich, \textit{op. cit.}, VI, pp. 155 ff. Louis Philippe had been anxious for some time to draw closer to the Eastern Powers. Austria and Prussia were inclined to favor his advances. Note the following extract from a message sent by the Prussian King, Frederick William III, to Rauch, his military attaché at St. Petersburg: "Ludwig Philipp hat zum Oefteren die Neigung gezeigt sich den Continentalmaechten zu nahern und in ihrem Sinne zu handeln. So lange indessen der Kaiser seine Antipathien gegen ihn nicht zu uberwinden im Stande ist und sich hieruber unverhohlen, ganz offen, ausspricht, so lange wird auch auf Ludwig Philipp wenig zu rechnen sein und er allerdings andere Alluerte suchen mussen. Wollte der Kaiser aber an seiner vorgesassten Meinung in etwas nachlassen, so ware es auch ein grosser Gewinn fur die conservative Partei."—Rauch's \textit{Report}, July 23, 1837, quoted by H. von Treitschke, \textit{Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert}, V, p. 62. See also, Blanc, \textit{op. cit.}, V, pp. 29, 33, 35 ff. Haussenville, \textit{Histoire de la politique exterieure du gouvemement francais, 1830-1848}, pp. 63, 81-85. Even as early as September, 1835, Barton, the American representative at Paris, was able to write: "This Govt. by the late laws against the press, appear to have sealed their peace with the three northern Powers, and it is probable that they are gradually detaching themselves from the English Alliance."—State Dept. France, XXVII, Barton to Forsyth, No. 17, Sept. 7, 1835.
picious for such apprehensions to develop, for in March, 1836, a serious disagreement upon the question of a joint intervention in Spain in favor of the young Queen Isabella, whose right to the throne was being challenged by her uncle, Don Carlos, had occurred between the Cabinets of the two western Powers.\[117\] The situation was not improved in September, 1836, when Thiers resigned his duties, and the direction of foreign affairs at Paris was taken over by Count Molé. Molé entered office on September 6, and just two weeks later Palmerston wrote to his friend, Lord Granville: "'France is putting herself in a false position, and at no distant time she will find her mistake. We have performed the duty of friendship in warning her; the fault will be hers if the warning is in vain.'"\[118\] Again, in a letter written on January 27, 1837, he stated: "'Our speech [to be delivered by the King on the opening of Parliament] will be moderate and short. On foreign affairs we shall say little, and especially not one word about France or [the] French alliance. We can say nothing in their praise, and therefore silence is the most complimentary thing we can bestow upon them.'"\[119\]

"At Constantinople, the growing coolness between England and France was marked by an augmentation of the influence of the former and by a corresponding decline in the influence of the latter. It will be remembered that Lord Ponsonby and the Porte were in perfect accord upon the question of opposition to the


\[119\] Palmerston to Granville, Sept. 20, 1836, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 241. Note also the following, Palmerston to Granville, Jan. 2, 1837: "'I do not like the French speech [delivered upon the opening of the legislative chambers] at all . . . In short, the speech is a thorough Molé speech; and all I can say is, I wish him a speedy and safe deliverance from the cares of office, for it is evident that the reports we heard of his anti-English feeling were by no means exaggerated, . . . '"—ibid., pp. 242-243. Bulwer did not agree with Palmerston. See a footnote in ibid., p. 243.

\[130\] Palmerston to Granville, Jan. 27, 1837, ibid., p. 243. The omission of a reference to France in the King's speech attracted attention. Note the following extract from the diary of the Earl of Malmesbury: "February 5th [1837].—French very indignant at no mention of them in King's speech. Their government paper calls the omission an insult. No doubt the Ministers are angry with Louis Philippe because he will not go the length they do about Spain."—Earl of Malmesbury Memoirs of an Ex-Minister, I, pp. 72-73.
developing power of Mehemet Ali. At the same time Admiral Roussin was inclined to be friendly in his attitude towards the Viceroy and even proposed under the excuse of "saving the dignity of the Sultan," the idea of holding out "to the Pasha the prospect of obtaining for his son the reversion of his Syrian possessions, in return for the abandonment of the other territories which he occupied."\(^{120}\) When, in 1836, the Sultan entertained the idea of renewing the struggle with his hated vassal it was to England that he looked for assistance. Although his appeal for aid was rejected, it is not probable that he failed to perceive that the hesitation of Palmerston was prompted from fear that the Porte's "Military resources would be unequal to the contest, rather than from any desire to see the status quo in Syria maintained."\(^{121}\) Also, it was apparent at the Turkish capital that the British government viewed with suspicion the aggressive policy which France was following in her relations with Algiers and Tunis.\(^{122}\) That fact was of particular importance in improving the influence of Ponsonby with the Porte, for the Sultan was alarmed by the French encroachments against his vassals in northern Africa.\(^{123}\)

In 1838, the developing cordiality in Anglo-Turkish relations culminated in the conclusion of a treaty of commerce and navigation which replaced the ancient capitulations. One provision in Article II of this treaty was of real significance. It read as follows: "... the Sublime Porte formally engages to abolish all monopolies of agricultural produce, or of any other articles whatsoever, as well as all Permits from the local Governors, either for the purchase of any article, or for its removal from one place to another when purchased; and any attempt to compel the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty to receive such Permits from the local

\(^{120}\) F. O. France 562, Granville to Palmerston, June 25, 1838, quoted by Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

\(^{121}\) F. O. Turkey 271, 274, Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 8; Palmerston to Ponsonby, May 7, 1836, cited by *ibid.*, p. 228.


\(^{123}\) Note the following extract of a letter from Constantinople, Sept. 14, 1836: "Admiral Roussin went yesterday to take leave of the Sultan. His reception was remarkably cool and formal. The Sultan, as well may be supposed, being highly incensed against the French Government in consequence of its late unprincipled proceedings at Tunis."—*The Times*, Oct. 7, 1836.
Governors, shall be considered as an infraction of Treaties, and the Sublime Porte shall immediately punish with severity any Viziers and other Officers who shall have been guilty of such misconduct, . . . . ”

It is obvious that this article was directed primarily against His Highness the Viceroy of Egypt. Henry Bulwer, who actively aided Ponsonby in bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion, later commented that “in the destruction of monopolies the astute and determined old Sultan saw—as Lord Ponsonby had expected him to see—the means of bringing Europe and his rebellious vassal into differences” and hence the “order was given to settle and sign without an hour’s delay.”

When Palmerston learned of the arrangement he wrote enthusiastically to Bulwer: “A thousand thanks . . . above all for your treaty, which as far as I can judge is a capo d’opera, and will be ratified without reserve; . . . We certainly shall not reject it from any concurrence in the French apprehension that it will be bad for Mehemet Ali, and drive him to declare himself independent in order to escape from its obligations.”

Count Molé, like Palmerston, professed anxiety to prevent a fresh outbreak of hostilities in the Near East, and he even joined with the latter in warning the Egyptian Pasha not to permit his forces to attack those of the Grand Seignior. In the Chamber of Deputies the French Minister of Foreign Affairs emphatically proclaimed his adherence to the alliance with England. Nevertheless, it was obvious that the sympathies of the people of France

---


125 Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 263.


were overwhelmingly in favor of the cause of Mehemet Ali. Frenchmen pointed with pride at the extensive improvements which had been wrought in Egypt, for they realized that the success of those improvements was due largely to the activities of the corps of their countrymen who were in the Viceroy’s employ. “For our part,” the Journal des Débats declared on September 17, 1838, “we believe that the interest of France in the Mediterranean is equally to applaud and assist the power at Alexandria as that of Constantinople.” The National, an organ of the radical “left” was willing to take a more decided stand. “Mehemet Ali,” it stated, “has detached at least two magnificent provinces from the tottering monarchy of the Osmanlis... Egypt and Syria, in which the Viceroy and Ibrahim may be said to have merely a life interest, will be exposed to all the perils of anarchy after the death of those two powerful personages, who will have no political descendants. But will France allow this newly created empire to be consumed in intestine warfare, or again to fall under the dominion of the Porte, or, in other terms under the yoke of the Autocrat [of Russia]? The neighborhood of Toulon, the possession of Corsica and Algiers, give to France, with regard to Alexandria and Cairo, advantages nearly equal to

129At that time French writers openly advocated that the independence of Mehemet Ali should be recognized by the Powers. See, L. P. D. D’Aubignose, La Turquie nouvelle, II, pp. 446-447. F. Mengin, Histoire sommaire de l’Egypte sous le gouvernement de Mohammed Aty, pp. 511-524. At the same time, French agents exerted themselves to increase the influence of their country with the peoples of Syria. These activities on the part of Frenchmen occasioned increased apprehensions in Great Britain. See E. H. Michelsen, The Ottoman Empire and its Resources, pp. 14-15.

130Note the following: “L’Egypte est la fille adoptive de la France; de son sein sont sortis les éléments précieux qui ont servi à éléver l’édifice qu’elle présente au monde civilisé.”—Mengin, op. cit., p. 512. “La France est regardée, en Orient, comme la protectrice naturelle de Méhémet-Alı; elle n’est point étrangère à sa grandeur; elle l’a constamment soutenu.”—Revue des deux Mondes, Oct. 1, 1838, XXII, p. 141.

131Journal des Débats, Sept. 17, 1838.

132Lord Palmerston entertained views diametrically opposed to those of the National. He believed that the Ottoman Empire would not fall unless some “‘Kind neighbours’” should forcibly tear it to pieces. See, Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 22, 1838, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 286-287.
those which Russia possesses with respect to Constantinople. France, therefore, ought to watch over Egypt and the neighboring regions as over a succession which Providence and the wishes of mankind may one day adjudge to her civilizing genius.\textsuperscript{133}

Lord Palmerston realized that such sentiments were entertained by the French. He undoubtedly believed as one of his trusted diplomats did that there was “a policy dating far back in the traditions of the French Foreign Office, which would assign to France the possession or patronage over Egypt.”\textsuperscript{134} That policy was natural for France when France was the enemy of England, but it was a policy impossible for her if there was to be a sincere alliance between the two countries. “... the mistress of India,” Palmerston’s diplomat declared, “cannot permit France to be mistress directly or indirectly of the road to her Indian dominions.”\textsuperscript{135} It is certain that before the end of the year 1838, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs had determined that he would act immediately, regardless of what the attitude of France might be if Mehemet Ali should again venture to attack the Porte. “‘My opinion is,” he wrote to Granville on June 5, 1838, “‘and has long been made up; it is that we ought to support the Sultan heartily and vigorously; with France if France will act with us; without her if she should decline.’”\textsuperscript{136} Thus, as England’s interest in the Orient increased, her anxiety to defend her position in that part of the world was augmented greatly. It was

\textsuperscript{133} Extract copied from the \textit{National}, in \textit{The Times}, July 6, 1838.

\textsuperscript{134} Bulwer, \textit{op. cit.}, II, p. 292. See also Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug. 28, 1838, \textit{ibid.}, p. 283. Palmerston and Bulwer were not the only Englishmen who were suspicious of the French. See, “Observations” by Lieut.-Col. Smith in Marmont, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 305. \textit{Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine}, 1839, XLVI, pp. 100-115. \textit{The Times}, Sept. 12, 1837, Sept. 13, 1838. Note the following extract from a pamphlet published in 1836 and entitled \textit{A few Remarks on Our Foreign Policy}: “Our most natural allies are the Germans, and our most natural enemies, or to use a less odious word, our natural rivals, the French and Russians.” The author even questioned whether a war with France would not have been better for Great Britain than the “quasi-alliance” which had existed “for the last five years.”—\textit{Monthly Review}, Sept., 1836, III, pp. 132-133. See \textit{ibid.}, July, 1836, II, p. 444.

\textsuperscript{135} Bulwer, \textit{op. cit.}, II, p. 293.

\textsuperscript{136} Palmerston to Granville, June 5, 1838, \textit{ibid.}, p. 266.
obvious, even at the time, that she would not again passively permit a rival Power to extend its influence there as Russia had in 1833. The Tsar Nicholas must have realized this fact, for in a conversation with Barante, which the latter reported to Molé on February 13, 1839, he declared: "Egypt! the English wish it. They have need of it for the new communication which they wish to open with the Indies. They have established themselves in the Persian Gulf and in the Red Sea. Vous vous brouillerez avec eux pour l'Egypte."

Anglo-Russian relations had improved while Durham was British ambassador at St. Petersburg. Nevertheless, the British were still determined that the Russians, as well as Mehemet Ali—the ally of the French—should not increase their power in the Near East. On June 8, 1838, Palmerston wrote to the Queen's representative at Paris: "What I should like, and what I should think I could get the Cabinet to agree to, would be a short convention between England and France on the one hand, and Turkey on the other, by which the two former should bind themselves for a limited time to afford to the latter naval assistance, in the event of his demanding it to protect his territory against attack; and the wording might be so framed as to include the case either of Russia or of Mehemet Ali....

"Now, all this I write to you on the supposition that France is honest and can be trusted...you will use your judgment as to the degree to which you will confidentially sound Molé on this matter. It must not be forgotten that one great danger to Europe is the possibility of a combination between France and Russia," which, though prevented at present by the personal feelings of the Emperor, may not always be as impossible as it is now; and it would be well to fix the policy of France in the right track with respect to affairs of the Levant while we have the power

---


188 The "Legitimists" in France favored such an alliance. See an editorial in The Times, Jan. 16, 1836.
to do so." 139 Undoubtedly Palmerston had in mind the danger of an attempted division of the Ottoman Empire on the part of the Tsar and Louis Philippe, the former taking Constantinople and the latter Alexandria.

In the very same year the situation of affairs came near being complicated by a threatened renewal of strained relations between England and Russia. 140 The British, for a considerable period of time, had been suspicious of the advances made by the Muscovites in the direction of Persia and India. Indeed, agents of the government of St. Petersburg were engaged actively in intrigues against British interests at Teheran, in Afghanistan, and even in India. 141 One of the most prominent of those agents, as the English government well knew, was Count Simonitch, the Russian Envoy to the Court of the Shah of Persia. Palmerston was alarmed by his activities, and in October, 1838, after Simonitch had influenced the Shah to lead an attack against Herat, drew up a long protest which was forwarded promptly to the Russian capital where it was presented to Nesselrode by Lord Clanricarde, the new British Ambassador to Russia. 142 Anxious to preserve friendly relations with Great Britain, the Tsar's Chancellor immediately directed his master's Ambassador at London to offer to

139 Palmerston to Granville, June 8, 1838, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 268-269. See also, Palmerston to Granville, July 6, 1838, ibid., pp. 270-272. Count Molé was unwilling to agree to Palmerston's proposals. See Molé to Louis Philippe, July 15, 1838, Taschereau, op. cit., p. 100. Henry Wheaton, the American representative at Berlin, reported that Palmerston likewise proposed in 1838 to Russia to draw up a concerted agreement between all the Powers for the protection of Turkey. See No. 12, Appendix D.


142 Parl. Papers, 1839, XL, Correspondence relating to Persia and Afghanistan, pp. 176-180.
Palmerton a conciliatory reply.\textsuperscript{143} The latter must have been entirely satisfied with this reply, for on December 20, 1838, he declared to Count Pozzo di Borgo: "The despatch from Count Nesselrode which your Excellency has communicated to me contains...assurances the most full and complete; and Her Majesty's Government accept as entirely satisfactory, the declarations of the Imperial cabinet, that it does not harbour any designs hostile to the interests of Great Britain in India;...and that in the future the Russian agents in Persia will unite themselves with those of Great Britain in earnestly dissuading the Shah from engaging again in any expedition similar to that which he has lately undertaken against Herat. ... The two cabinets being thus entirely agreed as to the future, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that no good could result from any controversial discussion as to the past."\textsuperscript{144} Hence, by the opening of the year 1839, the danger of an immediate break between England and Russia because of their rival interests in the Orient had again been dispelled and cordial relations had been restored. To be sure the Court of St. James was awake to the importance of its Near Eastern interests and it was not reconciled to the idea of permitting Russia or, in fact, any Power to attempt aggressions against either

\textsuperscript{143}Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, Oct. 20, Nov. 1, 1838, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 181-186. See also, Clanricarde to Palmerston, Nov. 20, 1838, \textit{ibid.}, p. 194.

\textsuperscript{144}Palmerston to Pozzo di Borgo, Dec. 20, 1838, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 192-193. See also, Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, Jan. 29, Feb. 21, March 5, 1839; Palmerston to Pozzo di Borgo, April 4, 1839, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 195-200, 204-205. Melbourne to Russell, Nov. 14, 1838, Sanders, \textit{Melbourne's Papers}, p. 455. The British government's fear of Russia, it should also be noted, tended to decrease in 1838 because of an improvement in Anglo-Austrian relations. The Emperor Francis II had died on March 2, 1835, and his successor, Ferdinand I, was less inclined to maintain a close alliance with his sovereign brothers—Nicholas I and Frederick William III. See a letter from Constantinople, Nov. 11, 1835, \textit{The Times}, Dec. 10, 1835. A commercial treaty which was concluded between England and Austria, July 3, 1838, was hailed as marking the triumph of British influence over that of Russia at the court of the Emperor Ferdinand. See, \textit{The Examiner}, Oct. 21, 1838, p. 660. \textit{The Times}, Oct. 29, 1838, Jan. 4, 1839. Letter from Constantinople, Nov. 7, 1838, \textit{ibid.}, Nov. 28, 1838. For copies of the said treaty see, \textit{State Papers}, XXVI, pp. 677-686. Martens, \textit{N. R.}, XV, pp. 626-659.
Turkey or the countries bordering on India. Nevertheless, real significance lay in the fact that the British government's apprehensions, in regard to the policies which the Tsar was expected to adopt in the near future, were to a considerable extent allayed. At the same time, it was evident that the rival interests which had developed between England and France in northern Africa, Spain, and the Orient would make an agreement between those two states especially difficult to maintain if the Turco-Egyptian conflict were ever to be renewed. In the year 1833, the Cabinets of the western Powers, alarmed by the Turkish policy of the Emperor Nicholas, had united in opposition to Russia. At the beginning of the year 1839, the possibility of such an alignment was not entirely removed but it was, to say the least, very improbable.

Perhaps it should be mentioned in this same connection that there was a tendency for Austrian interest in the Near East to increase because of the development of steam navigation on the Danube. A leaflet entitled “Information on the Trade of the Danube” by Charles Cunningham found in State Dept. Consular Letters, Constantinople, Vol. II, reveals the importance of the trade on the latter in 1837 and 1838. In 1837, 1,300 vessels entered the Danube from the Black Sea and 1,242 departed from the river. In 1838, 968 vessels were loaded at Galatz and Ibraila alone. This was an increase of 89 over the preceding year. The imports up the Danube into Galatz were valued at £86,674 for 1837 and £136,998 for 1838. Vail, the American representative at London, after calling attention to Austria's improvement of the Danube and mentioning that this brought her into contact with Russia at the mouth of the river, declared: “Thus industry, that great civilizer of nations and never ending source of universal prosperity, is now operating a change in the politics of those two nations;”—State Dept. England, XLIII, Vail to Forsyth, No. 214, Nov. 28, 1835.
CHAPTER III
THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE VERSUS THE
QUESTION OF ALEXANDRIA

When Mehemet Ali, in the spring of 1838, announced his intention to declare himself independent, the Sultan refrained from taking immediate action against him. Nevertheless, Mahmoud was so exasperated by the attitude which his hated vassal assumed that he at once surrendered himself completely to the views of the Turkish war-party and set about placing his army and navy in a condition which would warrant a more aggressive policy. He sent men, guns, horses, and supplies of all kinds to the forces of Hafiz Pasha in Asia Minor; he imported powder, to the amount of five schooner loads, from London; and he pushed forward the activities in the Ottoman navy yards "with all possible speed." When winter came on, although it was contrary to the established Turkish practice, he retained his sailors and his marines in active service. In January of 1839, he called together a great council of all his chief ministers and pashas to discuss the question of peace or war, he ordered a new levy of 80,000 men to be made, and he directed a subordinate, the Riala Bey, to proceed to Alexandria in order to secure for his master reliable information relative to the military and naval preparations which were being carried on by the Egyptians. Moreover, late in the year 1838, with the aim of securing foreign aid to further the accomplishment of his plans, he sent Reschid Pasha upon a special

---

1At that time the Turks who were about the Scaglio were divided into two parties. One, wishing for peace at all hazards, urged the Sultan to rely upon the protection of Russia. The other, imbued with a bolder and more patriotic spirit, preached incessantly a combination to destroy Mehemet Ali. See Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 256. Hafiz Pasha and his officers in the army were particularly anxious to measure their swords with the Egyptians. See Ponsonby to Palmerston, Jan. 27, Feb. 8, March 19, 1839, Parl. Papers, 1841, XXIX, Correspondence relative to the Levant, I, pp. 2, 3, 8.


mission to England. 4 In fact, according to one observer, it appeared as though he neglected nothing that was called for by the critical situation in which he was placed. 5 Although some, like the noted von Moltke who was then in the Ottoman service, must have realized that many of Mahmoud's preparations were more apparent than real, Europeans perceived more and more clearly, as time advanced, that he was set on adopting a bellicose policy. 6 "The lazy Turk," a contemporary wrote, "seemed determined for once to shake off his habitual sloth; and the best informed Franks at Constantinople began to speculate on what would be the result of the evident determination on the part of the Porte to settle its difficulties by an appeal to arms."

Early in the fall of 1838, Lord Palmerston suggested to Ahmed Fethi Pasha, the Ottoman representative at London, that "the Sultan ought to employ himself in organizing his army and navy, and in improving his revenue;" in order that he "should thus make himself strong enough to be able to beat Mehemet Ali by his own means." 7 It is obvious, though, that the British Minister of Foreign Affairs believed the time had not yet come when

4 Hall, op. cit., pp. 239-240. The Porte, it seems, was particularly anxious to win the cooperation of Great Britain. See a letter from Constantinople, Sept. 12, 1838, The Times, Oct. 4, 1838.
6 See the account of Turkish preparations for war as given in letters written by von Moltke between July, 1838, and June, 1839, published in H. von Moltke, Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei aus den Jahren 1835 bis 1839, pp. 286 ff.
7 John Reid, op. cit., p. 47. Note also the following extract from a letter from Constantinople, Oct. 3, 1838: "... unless the European Powers insist on the disarmament of both parties [Turkey and Egypt], all their efforts for the preservation of peace in the East are likely to prove but of temporary avail."—The Times, Oct. 25, 1838. Evidently Commodore Porter, the American, had a higher regard for Turkish character than Mr. Reid. In 1836 he wrote: "A Turk will prevaricate sometimes if necessary, and is skilful as a diplomatist and negotiator, in which characters he endeavors to gain every advantage, is always covetous, and perhaps sometimes may be corrupted, but in general no one respects truth more than he does, or holds it more sacred or inviolate;..."
8 Perhaps no people in any part of the world are generally so regardless of truth as the Franks, and Rayahs of the Levant."—State Dept. Turkey, VIII, Porter to Forsyth, No. 376, Feb. 5, 1836.
Mahmoud unaided could with a reasonable chance of success try conclusions with the Viceroy. "I strongly urged upon him [Achmet Fethi Pasha],'" he wrote on September 13, 1838, to Lord Ponsonby, "How expedient it is for the Sultan to abstain from attacking Mehemet Ali, because Mehemet's army is now probably better than, or at least as good as that of the sultan.'" At the same time Palmerston was unwilling, probably because of the danger of incurring the hostility of Russia and France, to promise that the British government would join the Grand Seignior in an attack upon the Pasha. Consequently, when Reschid Pasha arrived in London he found that it was impossible to persuade Palmerston to enter into any arrangement other than one which would provide for a strict maintenance of the status quo. Such an arrangement, however, was not the kind that the Porte desired, and when the terms which the British Minister of Foreign Affairs was willing to accept became known at Constantinople, Nouri Effendi, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, even went so far as to declare to Lord Ponsonby "that no Treaty would be of any use to the interests of the Porte, which had not for its object the destruction of Mehemet Ali..." The Ottoman government, he let the Ambassador understand, was resolved not to bind itself in any way so as to prevent it from taking advantage of some future opportunity to destroy its hated vassal.

When the governments of the great Powers perceived that there was danger of war being waged between the Porte and the Viceroy, they all manifested concern. The Russian government as on former occasions, was particularly anxious it seems to prevent an outbreak of hostilities in the East. The Tsar and his ministers must have feared that if, in conformity with the terms

*See a copy of the terms of the treaty which was drawn up at London, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 13-15.

"Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 22, 1839, ibid., p. 13.

"Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 6, 1839, ibid., p. 11. See also, Rechid to Palmerston, April 26, 1839; Palmerston to Rechid, May 6, 1839, ibid., pp. 9-11.

"See, Barante to Molé, Oct. 25, 1838, Barante, op. cit., VI, pp. 143-144. Note the following extract from a despatch, Clarinarde to Palmerston, April 1, 1839: "My colleagues here are firmly convinced that it is the sincere and earnest desire of the Emperor that Turkey should remain in perfect tranquility: and I see no reason to differ from them in that opinion."—Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 8-9.
of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, they should again send troops to the Turkish capital, a break would result between Russia and the two western Powers. At any rate M. Boutenieff was instructed to warn the Porte that the assistance to the Turkish government provided for in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi could not be claimed if the Turks were the aggressors in a war with the Egyptians, and Count Medem, the Russian Consul-General at Alexandria, was directed to urge the Pasha not only to withdraw his forces from the advanced positions they had occupied in Syria but also to promise that he would remain on the defensive, satisfied with merely repulsing the enemy, in case they were attacked. Metternich, who likewise was very anxious to preserve peace, believed that the united remonstrances of all the great Powers was necessary in order to put a stop to the “warlike ebulitions” in the Levant. In March, 1839, he urged Mr. Milbanke, the British chargé d’affaires at Vienna, to call the “earnest attention” of Her Britannic Majesty’s government to the matter, and he let it be known that he was about to send a messenger to Constantinople with instructions to Baron Stürmer, the Austrian Internuncio in Turkey, to state to the Sultan that if Mehemet Ali attacked him he might count on the assistance of the Powers to aid in repelling such attack, but if the Turkish army should be the aggressor he

3Granville to Palmerston, April 8, 1839, ibid., p. 5.

4Nesselrode to Medem, March 29, 1839; Boutenieff to Medem, April 12/24, 1839; Campbell to Palmerston, May 7, 1839; Clanricarde to Palmerston, May 14, 1839, ibid., pp. 59-61, 63-64, 18-19, 16. The situation of affairs in Russia, it seems, was such that the Tsar could not afford to risk his country’s being involved in a European war. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 95, 191-194. Henry Wheaton, the American representative at Berlin, wrote on January 9, 1839: “It is supposed by the best informed persons here that the checks which the invading policy of Russia has recently encountered at Constantinople, in Circassia, and on the frontiers of India, together with the seeds of dis-content which are thickly sown throughout the vast Empire, have contributed to multiply the embarrassments which its ruler constantly encounters in the restless ambition, corruption, and faithlessness of the nobles, who regard him and his family as strangers to their nation. . . . His recent tour in this country has only contributed to swell the contempt and hatred previously felt for the Russian name and race, notwithstanding the showers of gold, decorations, and other baubles which he scattered in his path.”—State Dept. Prussia, I, Wheaton to Forsyth, No. 93, Jan. 9, 1839. “Confidential.”
must not be surprised if the Powers should leave him to his fate.15 Lord Palmerston, who on that occasion was quite willing to cooperate with the Austrian Chancellor, sent similar instructions to Lord Ponsonby.16 Baron Werther, the Prussian Chief Minister, and Count Molé, the French Secretary of Foreign Affairs, also exerted themselves to prevent hostilities from breaking out between the Viceroy and the Sultan.17

Although the Powers were thus united in their efforts to maintain peace in the Orient, their representatives were unable to persuade the Sultan to abandon his determination to declare war.18

When it became apparent that their remonstrances were to prove of no avail the Cabinets of the five great nations awoke to the fact that they must agree upon some common course of action, or the peace of Europe even would be in serious danger. The securing of such an agreement, however, in 1839 as on many other occasions, involved great difficulty. At that time the Powers were confronted in the Near East by two fundamental questions which, in the Parliamentary language of the day, may be termed the “Question of Constantinople” and the “Question of Alexandria.”19 In connection with the former—but not the latter—of these questions the interests of England and France were identical and they were obviously in opposition to those of Russia. The Russian government, it will be remembered, had promised by the treaty of alliance with Turkey, signed on July 8, 1833, to afford to the Porte the “most efficacious assistance” in case its “tranquillity and safety” were again endangered. Hence, when it became apparent that that “tranquillity and safety” was being en-

15Milbanke to Palmerston, March 28, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 4-5. See also, Beauvale to Palmerston, May 8, 1839, ibid., p. 15.
16Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 15, April 12, 1839, ibid., pp. 4, 5-6.
17Russell to Palmerston, June 5, 1839; Granville to Palmerston, Feb. 15, 1839; Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 6, 1839, ibid., pp. 30, 1, 11.
18Inclosure in Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 1, 1839, ibid., pp. 21-22.
19M. d’Haussonville, referring to the two questions at issue in 1839, pointed out that “le premier [question], commun avec toutes les nations de l’Europe, la Russie exceptée, c’était la durée de l’empire ottoman et son indépendance absolue; le second, qui nous était particulier, c’était la consolidation, aux meilleures conditions possibles, de l’établissement égyptien. Cela s’appelait, dans le langage parlementaire du temps, la question de Constantinople et la question d’Alexandrie.”—Haussonville, op. cit., I, p. 148.
dangered the Cabinets of the Western Powers were alarmed lest Russian troops and Russian war vessels should repeat the intervention in Turkish affairs which they had effected with success six years earlier.

It is true that in the period between 1833 and 1839, Anglo-Russian relations had improved greatly. Nevertheless Lord Palmerston was as determined as ever in the latter part of that period that the Treaty of Unkia Skelessi should not result in a second Russian armed intervention in the affairs of Turkey.  

"The Cabinet yesterday agreed," he wrote, on June 8, 1838, to Lord Granville, "that it would not do to let Mehemet Ali declare himself independent, and separate Egypt and Syria from the Turkish empire. They see that the consequence of such a declaration on his part must be either immediately or at no distant time conflict between him and the Sultan [sic]. That in such conflict the Turkish troops would probably be defeated; that then the Russians would fly to the aid of the Sultan, and a Russian garrison would occupy Constantinople and the Dardanelles; and once in possession of those points, the Russians would never quit them." France, also, was determined that Russia should not profit at the expense of the Porte. Moreover, in 1839 there was considerable evidence which indicated that Austria was inclined to unite with and that Prussia was, at least, not ready to oppose England and France in their determination to prevent Russian aggression against Turkey. It was obvious, in fact, that if Russia

On Sept. 13, 1838, Palmerston declared, in a letter written to Ponsonby, that "it would be most important for the interests and independence of the Porte to get rid of that treaty [of Unkia Skelessi];"—Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 281-282.

Palmerston to Granville, June 8, 1838, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 267. See also, Barante to Molé, Dec. 17, 1838, Barante, op. cit., VI, pp. 159-163.

Note the following: "... the government of France and England, in particular, were apprehensive, lest the eventual discomfiture of the Turkish army, an event by no means improbable, should be followed by the arrival of a Russian force in the Bosphorus, in accordance with the stipulations of the treaty signed ... at Unkia Skelessi."—Annual Register, 1839, p. [408].

See Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 53, 60-61; Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., IV, pp. 12, 21-22. Russia and Austria had rival interests in the control of trade upon the Danube river. See letters from Constantinople, Feb. 16, March 21, 1839, The Times, March 18, April 15, 1839. Note also the following: "Austria preserved a sort of neutrality [in the East, according to the correspondence re-
should attempt to repeat the policy which she had followed in 1833 in her relations with Turkey she would be in great danger of encountering a strong and determined coalition which would be formed to oppose her.

At the same time, it was also apparent that if Russia should refrain from adopting an aggressive policy in regard to Turkey, and if the attention of the European Powers should be directed to the question of limiting the power of Mehemet Ali—in other words, if the so-called "Question of Alexandria" should become the most important subject of European diplomatic relations—an entirely different alignment of Powers would result. Under such circumstances England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, united by similar interests, would probably be able to agree upon a common course of action, and France, the friend and self-appointed protector of the Viceroy, would be the Power which would be in danger of finding itself isolated. Consequently it was to the interest of France to emphasize the danger of Russian intervention at Constantinople and to minimize the danger which would result from the aggrandizement of the power of Mehemet Ali. On the other hand, it was to the interest of Russia to play up the importance of the danger which would result from the latter and to exert herself in order to allay the fears which other European courts entertained relative to the former.

Count Molé must have experienced very little difficulty in seeing the true significance of the situation, for at a very early date he brought the matter to the attention of Lord Granville. He admitted that there were "shades of difference" between the interests of England and France in regard to Eastern affairs, and in order to prevent serious consequences resulting therefrom he urged that the two Powers should come to an understanding for concerted action. Their object, he pointed out, ought to be to gain time and thus stave off a crisis in the Levant. The best way

ported in the Toulonnais on May 8, 1839], determined, however, on opposing the new encroachments on the Ottoman Empire contemplated by Russia."—Ibid., May 14, 1839. Guichen accuses the Prussians of being very subservient to Russian policy. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 37-39.

"The four Powers named above, it will be remembered, were all unwilling to permit the Viceroy of Egypt to increase his strength at the expense of the Porte. See Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 23, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 15.
to attain that object, according to his opinion, was "to indulge" the Pasha in the expectation that England and France would employ their "good offices" at Constantinople to secure the succession of his son to the government of Egypt on the same conditions under which he held it himself.\textsuperscript{25}

Marshal Soult, who on May 12, 1839, succeeded Molé as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was also anxious that England and France should agree upon united action in the Near East. Unlike Molé, however, he and his colleagues in the Cabinet were unwilling to admit openly that there was a real difference between the interests of the two Powers. Lord Granville, after a conversation with M. Duchâtel, the new Minister of the Interior, and General Schneider, the new Minister of War, reported in a despatch written to Lord Palmerston on May 24, 1839, that both of those statesmen, impressed by the seriousness of the danger with which the Eastern situation threatened the peace of Europe, had expressed anxious desires for a cordial concert between England and France. "I may therefore, I think," he wrote in conclusion, "give your Lordship reason to expect that whatever may be suggested by Her Majesty's Government as most expedient to be done in the present alarming state of affairs in the East, will be most favourably attended to by the French Government."\textsuperscript{26}

In the meantime, the Porte was continuing actively its preparations for war. The Turkish Ministers, in answer to the inquiries made repeatedly by the European diplomats, gave assurances that the Sultan's troops would not attack the Egyptians, but the warlike activities at Constantinople and elsewhere in the empire bespoke differently.\textsuperscript{27} It is significant, it should be noted in this connection, that the Grand Seignior complained bitterly to Lord Ponsonby against the pretentions of Mehemet Ali. He even de-

\textsuperscript{25}Granville to Palmerston, Feb. 15, 1839, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 1-2. Count Molé, while speaking of the variation in the interests of the two nations, alluded to Egypt's affording a means of communication and transit between Europe and the British Empire in India, "which was an object of far greater importance to England than to France." Granville professed that he did not see why this should tend to a divergence in the measures to be adopted for averting a collision between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan.—\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{26}Granville to Palmerston, May 24, 1839, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 19-20.

\textsuperscript{27}Granville to Palmerston, May 27, 1839, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 20-21. Letters from Constantinople, March 27, 1839, commented on in \textit{The Times}, April 18, 1839.
manded that the Pasha should restore Adana, Damascus, Aleppo, Seyda, Jerusalem, and Naplous, and that he should reduce his forces to a figure which would be compatible with his condition as a subject. Furthermore, he sent orders to his forces in Asia Minor to move forward, thus demonstrating that he was determined to follow up his threats and his preparations by aggressive belligerent measures.

On April 21, 1839, the army under command of Hafiz Pasha effected a crossing of the Euphrates river near the village of Bir, but Mehemet Ali, who was probably influenced by the remonstrances against war which were made at Alexandria by the representatives of the great Powers, was too cautious to permit Ibrahim Pasha to accept immediately the Ottoman challenge and attempt to expel the invaders. He even promised in a despatch which the Consuls-General received on May 16, 1839, that in case the Sultan’s forces which had just crossed the Euphrates should retire to the other side of the river, he would order his own troops to execute a retrograde movement and he would recall his son Ibrahim to Damascus. If that pacific demonstration should be followed by a “retrograde movement on the part of the army of Hafiz Pasha, beyond Malatia, his highness would enjoin the generalissimo to return to Egypt.” In addition, the Viceroy suggested “that if the four Powers [England, France, Austria, and Russia] consented to guarantee the continuance of peace, and interest themselves in securing the hereditary reversion of the government [of his possessions] to his family, he would withdraw a portion of his troops from Syria and be ready to conclude a definitive arrangement conducive to the wants of the country, and calculated

---

28 See Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 1, 1839, and an “Inclosure” published with it. Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 21-23.
31 For comment on the remonstrances of the Consuls-General and the resulting attitude of Mehemet Ali, see a report which was prepared by Count Medem, May 3/15, 1839, quoted by Schiemann, op. cit., III, pp. 507-511. See also a letter from Alexandria, April 7, 1839, The Times, April 30, 1839. Annual Register, 1839, p. [409].
to guarantee its security." It was only after a body of Turkish cavalry had sacked a number of villages in the district of Anteb and after they had occupied the town of Ouront that the Pasha finally directed his army to adopt measures of an aggressive character. In answer to letters written in June, 1839, informing him about the above mentioned outrages, he ordered Ibrahim Pasha to despatch an officer to Hafiz Pasha to demand from him an explanation of his conduct, and during the interval while he waited for a reply, to send forward a sufficient number of troops to protect the province and the garrison of Anteb against a coup de main. If the Turks should persist in their aggressions and march against the latter, the garrison should retreat towards the main army, which should advance at the same time "à la rencontre [sic] de l'armée turque." Thus it should be made certain that the battle would be fought on Egyptian territory and that the Turks would appear to be the aggressors.

When Marshal Soult learned that the Turkish forces had crossed the Euphrates he became alarmed and determined at once to make a final effort to persuade Mahmoud and Mehemet to refrain from actual hostilities. With that in view, late in May, 1839, he sent two officers from his own staff, M. Caillé and M. Foltz, upon special missions to Alexandria and Constantinople. Furthermore, in order to be sure that the French diplomatic representatives in the Near East would lend their hearty cooperation he forwarded instructions outlining his views to both Admiral Roussin and M. Cochelet. According to a report written by Lord Ponsonby on June 16, he ordered the former "to apply in the strongest manner" to the Sublime Porte to prevent hostilities

"Martens, N. S., III, p. 872. The Times, June 27, 1839. Annual Register, 1839, p. [409]. See also a despatch from the French Consul-General in Egypt, May 15, 1839; and a declaration "made by Mehemet Ali to Colonel Campbell," [no date given], Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 53-54, 65.

"Mehemet Ali to Ibrahim, June 1839, Martens, N. S., III, pp. 874-875. See also, Granville to Palmerston, June 24, 1839; and a Minute of interview between the four Consuls-General and Mehemet Ali, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 95-96, 109-110. Thureau-Dangin quotes the following extract from a despatch which he maintains Mehemet Ali sent to Ibrahim: "'Au reçu de la présente dépêche, vous attaquerez les troupes ennemies qui sont entrées sur notre territoire, et, après les en avoir chassées, vous marcherez sur leur grande armée, à laquelle vous livrerez bataille. Si, par l'aide de Dieu, la victoire se déclare pour nous, vous passerez le défilé de Kulek—Boghaz, et vous vous porterez sur Malathia, Kharpout, Orfa et Diar békir.'"—Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., IV, p. 52.

"Granville to Palmerston, May 31, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 24.
and "to put an instant end" to them if they had begun. He also directed Roussin to communicate with the British Ambassador at the Turkish capital with the aim of inducing him to take a similar stand. This, however, Ponsonby refused to do, his excuse being that he had no instructions to that effect. Nevertheless, Roussin, unwilling to be discouraged by the attitude of his British colleague, did not hesitate to comply with the wishes of his superior. He informed the Porte immediately that it must, without delay, recall the army of Hafiz Pasha from the Egyptian side of the Euphrates or it would be considered to be the aggressor. M. Cochelet, whose despatch from Soult was similar in language to the one which the Marshal sent to the French Ambassador at Constantinople, made equally energetic representations to the Viceroy.

While Roussin and Cochelet were endeavoring thus to persuade the rivals in the Orient to refrain from hostile measures, Lord Ponsonby was actually encouraging the Porte to come to conclusions with its hated vassal. It was of course necessary for him in his official communications to the Ottoman ministers to follow the directions of Lord Palmerston and insist on a maintenance of the status quo, but in his unofficial transactions he assumed an attitude of an entirely different character. Indeed, the way in which he acted at Constantinople soon became so notorious that Marshal Soult complained to Palmerston about the matter, and

---

85 Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 16, 1839, ibid., p. 152.
86 Campbell to Palmerston, June 16, 1839, ibid., pp. 145-146. See also, Guichen op. cit., pp. 47-48.
87 Soult to Bourqueney, July 6, 1839, Bourqueney to Soult, July 9, 1839, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 333-335. In June, 1839, Roussin had written to Soult: "Votre Excellence a dû voir, depuis longtemps, dans ma correspondance, que j'ai perdu toute confiance dans mon collègue anglais et dans les vues de son gouvernement. J'ai ici des motifs immédiats qui justifient mes soupçons, et l'offre que lord Ponsonby a faite, à notre insu, d'employer les troupes de l'Inde pour empêcher l'invasion du territoire de Bassorah par les troupes égyptiennes." See Roussin to Soult, June 14 and 16, 1839, quoted by Guichen, op. cit., p. 61. See also, Barante to Molé, Jan. 31, 1839, Barante, op. cit., VI, p. 172. In July, 1839, Palmerston admitted to Bourqueney: "... je ne saurais vous nier que l'opinion personnelle de lord Ponsonby, opinion que je ne partage pas, a toujours été opposée au maintien du status quo de Kutaieh; il préférait même les partis extrêmes comme susceptibles au moins d'un denouement favorable; mais je suis fondé à croire que, dans les rapports officiels à Constantinople, l'ambassa- deur a fait passer ses opinions personnelles après ses instructions."—Bourqueney to Soult, July 9, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 505.
M. Metternich even claimed that Ponsonby was responsible for the warlike stand which the Sultan had taken. On May 20, 1839, Ponsonby himself wrote to Palmerston that "no one of the Great Powers would have continued in a pacific attitude so long as the Sultan did, had any one of them been exposed to even a small part of the danger and the provocations he had to bear with," and two days later he admitted openly in a similar despatch that after Nouri Effendi had informed him of the Porte's determination to attack the Viceroy he had said in answer that it only remained for him to hope that the Porte had taken the "best measures to secure success."

The French representatives in Turkey, handicapped by the effect which Lord Ponsonby's attitude had upon the Porte and by the hatred which Mahmoud bore against Mehemet, failed to secure, immediately at least, the results for which they strove. The Ottoman authorities became "excessively angry" when Roussin demanded that they should withdraw their troops from Syria and they promptly refused to grant an order for the suspension of hostilities. In Egypt, however, the French were more successful. Mehemet Ali, influenced it seems by the representations of Cochelet and Caillé, consented to instruct his son Ibrahim to halt his advance and await future instructions.

---

38 Metternich to Apponyi, May 21, 1839, Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 345-346. See also, ibid., p. 345, [footnote]. Vicomte de Guichen characterizes Ponsonby as "l'homme le plus dangereux qui ait jamais tenu une ambassade, ..., passionné, violent, brouillon, mû par une seule idée, sa haine contre le Pacha d'Egypte et contre la France." See Guichen, op. cit., p. IX.

39 Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 20, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 28-29.

40 Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 22, 1839, ibid., pp. 70-72.

41 Some evidence which has been found indicates that on June 28, just two days before his death, Mahmoud finally consented to grant an order for the suspension of hostilities. See "Telegraphic despatch from Strasburg," July 15, 1839, ibid., p. 172. Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 342.

42 Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 16, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 152.

43 Mouriez, op. cit., IV, pp. 49-52.

44 Mehemet Ali to Ibrahim Pasha, June 16, 1839, Martens, N. S., III, p. 875. Mouriez, op. cit., IV, pp. 30-32. Col. Campbell criticized Cochelet in a despatch written to Palmerston June 16, 1839, claiming he believed that if the Frenchman had "held out" a little longer the "united remonstrances" of the representatives of the great Powers might have led the Pasha to promise "to retire the Egyptian troops, in the event that they were ... in the Sultan's territory; but
At the same time when Marshal Soult set about adopting measures to prevent hostilities in the East, he and his colleagues also took steps with the aim of protecting the French position in case those measures failed to accomplish their purpose. On May 25, 1839, almost as soon as it was known at Paris that the Turkish troops had entered Egyptian territory, M. Duperré, the Minister of Marine, presented in the Chamber of Deputies a project of a law which provided for a grant of 10,000,000 francs to the government. With this amount, Duperré proposed to augment the French naval forces in the Mediterranean. Also, Soult, on whom the chief responsibility for the French foreign policy rested, moved to secure a definite understanding with the British Ministers relative to the alarming situation which was developing in the Levant. He professed to Lord Granville that he concurred in the opinions of Palmerston on the subject and he ordered Baron de Bourqueney, the French chargé d'affaires at the Court of St. James, "to communicate to the English Cabinet all the information which reached Paris, all the ideas which sprang up, and all the measures which were preparing in consequence of the new position, and to establish between the two governments the most frank and intimate cooperation." "In thus exposing to the Cabinet of London the entirety of our point of view upon the important circumstances of the moment,' the Duke of Dalmatia wrote, 'we tender to it an unequivocal pledge of our confidence, and of our desire to act with it in the most perfect accord.'

Palmerston was quite willing to cooperate with the French, but be it remembered, he was determined that such cooperation must be on the basis of British terms. Soult must have been well aware of what those terms were, but as it has been suggested before, instead of admitting that they differed from the terms which

M. Cochelet was . . . so glad that he had prevailed so far on the Pasha without the aid of his Colleagues, that he hastened to accept the Pasha's offer [to instruct Ibrahim to halt his advance], in order that he might be able to say that France had done everything, and that her voice was all-powerful."—Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 145-146.

"Granville to Palmerston, May 23, 1839, ibid., p. 19.
"Archives Par., CXXIV, p. 666.
"Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 335.
"Soult to Bourqueney, June 17, 1839, quoted by ibid., pp. 335-336.
France favored, he attempted to hide the fact that there were any real differences between them and the latter. "The necessity of conceding to Mehemet Ali the hereditary investiture of at least a part of his actual possessions seems now to be almost unanimously admitted," he wrote on June 17, 1839, to Bourqueney. "...[but] we cannot flatter ourselves with a hope that the Porte will consent to yield to him this increase of moral force unless, by way of compensation, some advantage is granted to itself which may furnish a material guarantee against the eventual enterprises of an enemy whose power it has thus augmented. The nature and the extent of this advantage are surely not easy to determine. Lord Palmerston thinks that it should not fall short of the entire restitution of Syria.

"At Berlin, they seem to admit that the Sultan should content himself with merely a portion of that province. For ourselves, Monsieur, we acknowledge that the Porte has a claim to a substantial compensation, but we think that the moment for fixing the exact proportion has not yet arrived, that such a question cannot be decided until after much important and complicated data has been considered, the appreciation of which cannot be the work of a moment...."

"You should wish, Monsieur, to permit Lord Palmerston to read the present despatch."

Since Soult did not attempt to oppose the British position, Palmerston assumed that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was willing to take a stand similar to it. "'We understand each other upon all points;'" he declared after reading the Marshal's despatch, "'our accord will be complete. Principle, end, means of execution, all is full of reason, simplicity, and clearness. This is not the communication of one government to another; call it rather an understanding between colleagues, between members of the same Cabinet.'"

In truth, during the early stages of the negotiations upon Turco-Egyptian affairs in 1839, England and France did succeed quite well in reaching an agreement relative to the important problems which were at stake. One of the first of those problems which

---

60Soult to Bourqueney, June 17, 1839, ibid., pp. 488-489. *Levant Correspondence*, I, pp. 77-79. Note—The translation follows Guizot.

61Bourqueney to Soult, June 20, 1839, Guizot, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 494.
confronted the two western Powers after Marshal Soult entered office was that of agreeing upon joint instructions to the naval forces which they were sending to the Mediterranean. Late in May, Granville suggested to Soult that a combined Anglo-French fleet, the commanders of which would have "identical" orders, should proceed to the East and that the object of such fleet should be "to arrest the progress of hostilities." The Duke of Dalmatia concurred readily in the idea and he even became impatient when Palmerston delayed following up immediately the suggestion made by the British Ambassador at Paris. Granville reported, June 17, 1839, that Soult was disappointed because he had received no official communication from the British foreign office. The French had seven sail of the line off Smyrna already. Louis Philippe's Minister of Foreign Affairs was going to send three more, and according to Granville, he was confident of the moral effect which the two allied fleets would have in the Near East if they would only cooperate. Marshal Soult, in a letter written on the same date, declared to Bourqueney: "We anxiously await an answer... upon the proposed instructions to Stopford." Two days later Palmerston complied with the wishes of the Marshal by forwarding to Paris a copy of the directions which he believed the Admiral of the British Levant fleet should follow. He suggested therein that the outbreak of war, or the continuance of it if it had already broken out, should be prevented. He was unwilling that any means other than those of persuasion should be employed in order to procure the consent of the Sultan to a suspension of hostilities, but he proposed that if the Viceroy should refuse to refrain from fighting, "the [British] Admiral should then employ such means of pressure, gradually increasing in their stringency," as he might find necessary, or might think "best calculated to accomplish the desired result." Palmerston also took into consideration, in the instructions proposed, the possibility of a Russian force entering "the ports and territory of Turkey with the professed object of protecting the sultan, and of

83Granville to Palmerston, May 31, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 24.
84Granville to Palmerston, June 17, 1839, ibid., pp. 76-77.
85Soult to Bourqueney, June 17, 1839, ibid., p. 79.
86Proposed Instructions to Stopford, ibid., p. 83 ff. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 453-457.
repelling the Egyptian invaders.” “In such a case,” he ventured, “and after the Admiral had obtained from the Pasha the order for the retreat of his troops, and after he had received certain information that such order had been obeyed, it would be extremely desirable that the British squadron should proceed to Constantinople, and should remain there, or in the Black Sea, until the Russian forces had evacuated the Turkish territory.”

After Soult had become acquainted with this document he intimated unofficially to Granville that he was satisfied with the “general statement” of it and he made remarks which led the latter to believe that he would send similar instructions to the French Admiral in the Levant. The British Ambassador reported those facts to Palmerston in a despatch written on June 22, and on the third day following that date the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, stirred to action by fresh reports of an alarming character from the Orient, directed the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send the instructions, which had been prepared, to Stopford. If further communications between the English and French governments should lead to a modification in them, he wrote to Granville, that modification could easily be provided for later. This, however, was not necessary for the instructions to the French naval forces which were prepared promptly by Soult were quite similar to those drawn up by Palmerston. The Admirals of the two fleets, the French Minister declared, “should act towards each other with all the confidence and frankness requisite to introduce into their operations the same unanimity” which subsisted between the two governments.

---

66Ibid., p. 456.
67Granville to Palmerston, June 22, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 89. See also, Granville to Palmerston, June 24, 1839, ibid., pp. 94-95.
68Palmerston to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, June 25, 1839, ibid., pp. 90-93, 93-94.
69Palmerston to Granville, June 25, 1839, ibid., p. 94.
70Instructions to French Admiral in Levant, June 26, 1839, ibid., pp. 101-102. Granville, in a despatch written to Palmerston on June 28, 1839, pointed out that the French proposed, in their instructions to Lalande, to cut off all communication by sea to the theatre of war. Palmerston, it will be recalled, had suggested that only those communications which were carried on between Syria and Egypt should be stopped. See ibid., pp. 104-105.
A more difficult problem for the diplomats of England and France was that of negotiating a settlement between the rival parties in the Near East. Palmerston and Granville, it will be recalled, had made it clear to the French Ministers that the British government believed Egypt should become hereditary in the family of Mehemet Ali under the sovereignty of the Sultan but that the Pasha should withdraw his troops from, and give up all his claims to, the other territories which were under his control.\(^6\) Soult, being unwilling to oppose openly the British position was in favor of leaving the question of terms to the decision of a joint conference at Vienna between representatives of the Powers. He believed, he declared in the latter part of May, 1839, that though a collision should be averted in the Levant for the time being, it would be necessary for the five great nations of Europe to concert together as to the means of definitely settling the future relations between the Sultan and the Viceroy.\(^6\)

A few days later he again referred to the question in a conversation with Granville and he expressed a desire that if a conference should take place the instructions issued to the English and French representatives should be identical.\(^6\) He hoped, undoubtedly, that at such a conference the accord between England and France would be maintained easily because of the danger of a Russian intervention in Turkey. "In the event of our resolutions and the attitude of our squadrons not being able to prevent the two contending parties [in the East] from having recourse to arms, the necessity of a common action would become evident;" he wrote on June 17, 1839, "and there is no reason to expect that we should then be able to induce Russia to abstain from material interference in a question in which her interests would be so directly engaged. What we ought to insist on, is that her action should be determined and limited, in concert with the other courts; that she should confine herself to the course adopted by France

---

\(^6\)See, in addition to statements made above, Granville to Palmerston, June 14, 1839, *ibid.*, p. 31.


\(^6\)Granville to Palmerston, June 14, 1839, *ibid.*, p. 31.
and England; and, in fact, that a European convention should replace the stipulation of Unkiar-Skelessi.\(^66\)

When Metternich learned of the French suggestion he immediately objected to the idea of a formal conference and suggested instead that each of the Cabinets should send its opinion to its representative at Vienna.\(^65\) A certain latitude for discussion should be permitted so that through a compromise of the five opinions one in which all could agree might be discovered. Such an opinion, when found, should form the basis of identical communications from the Powers to the Sultan and to the Pasha.\(^68\) Marshal Soult consented readily to this modification of his suggestion.\(^67\)

Palmerston, while discussing the French and Austrian proposals, declared that the latter was open to fewer objections but that it also held out "less advantages." He was willing to accede to it provided that Prussia and Russia did likewise. Consequently, he forwarded to Lord Beavvale, the British Ambassador at Vienna, a detailed statement of his own position upon Turco-Egyptian affairs.\(^68\) The outstanding feature of that statement was the emphasis placed therein upon the contention that Mehmet Ali should give up all Syria, retaining only Egypt in hereditary possession. He despatched a copy of the said statement to Granville on June 29, 1839, and in a note which accompanied it he emphasized that it seemed to the British government that the affairs of Turkey could never be secure until Mehmet Ali had evacuated

\(^{64}\)Soult to Bourqueney, June 17, 1839, Guizot, \textit{op. cit.}, IV, p. 488. Note also the following explanation of the French desire for a conference of the Powers: "Dans un congrès, tout l'avantage, pensait-on alors, serait pour nous [the French]. Appuyés sur la Prusse et l'Autriche nous pouvions faire successivement tête à l'Angleterre et à la Russie. Nous étions comme assurés d'avance de nous trouver presque toujours quatre contre un, et, dans la plus fâcheuse hypothèse, tout au moins trois contre deux."—Haussonville, \textit{op. cit.}, I, p. 150.

\(^{65}\)Metternich explained that the protocol of Aix-la-chapelle, signed by representatives of the Powers in 1818, read that no question relative to the rights of any state should be resolved upon unless the said state was invited to be represented in the conference. Turkey could not be invited, he believed, because she would not send a representative empowered sufficiently to allow affairs to advance. See Metternich to Apponyi, June 14, 1839, Metternich, \textit{op. cit.}, VI, pp. 347-348. \textit{Levant Correspondence}, I, pp. 120-121.

\(^{66}\)Beavvale to Palmerston, June 14, 1839, \textit{ibid.}, p. 88.

\(^{67}\)Granville to Palmerston, June 22, 1839, \textit{ibid.}, p. 89.

\(^{68}\)Palmerston to Beavvale, June 28, 1839, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 117-119.
Syria and recalled his troops to Egypt. If Marshal Soult still had doubts relative to the attitude of the British Minister of Foreign Affairs they must have been removed when Granville revealed to him the contents of this document. He declined at that time to assent to Palmerston’s proposition that no settlement would be satisfactory which did not restore the whole of Syria to the direct authority of the Sultan but, as before, he refrained from adopting a stand in opposition to the British contentions. Instead of doing so he continued to evade the issue. The Court of Berlin, he claimed, had suggested that the Egyptians should give up in Syria, only the Pashalics of Tripoli and Aleppo, thus leaving to them those of Acre and Damascus. Soult said he was not aware what the Austrian attitude was, and “the French Government had not yet formed any opinion” upon the question of a settlement between Mehemet and Mahmoud. He even contended to Granville, according to a report made on July 2, 1839, by the latter, that his hesitation to accept Palmerston’s proposal arose from his doubt of the possibility of obtaining Mehemet Ali’s acquiescence in it, rather than from any objection to the arrangement itself. Hence, it was only natural that Palmerston should become optimistic and look forward to the maintenance of a state of complete harmony in Anglo-French relations. “Soult is a jewel,” he wrote on July 19, 1839; “nothing can be more satisfactory than his course with regard to us, and the union of England and France upon these Turkish affairs will embolden Metternich and save Europe.”

Nevertheless, the accord between England and France was more apparent than real. Radical differences existed between the sentiments relative to Turco-Egyptian affairs entertained by the masses within the two countries. This fact is revealed very clearly by articles which appeared in the contemporary English and French newspapers. “There is one way of settling the question attended with little immediate difficulty, . . . by laying it down as a funda-

---

*Palmerston to Granville, June 29, 1839, *ibid.,* pp. 119-120.


*Palmerston to Granville, July 19, 1839, Bulwer, *op. cit.*, II, p. 295. Lord Palmerston declared on July 9, in the House of Commons “that the English and French governments perfectly understood each other, and were acting in concert with regard to these important matters [Turco-Egyptian affairs].” — *Parl. Deb.*, XLIX, p. 81.
mental law that the conflict shall not have a beginning;" an editorial writer stated in The Times. The views expressed in the Morning Chronicle, Palmerston's organ, were of a more pronounced character. The abandonment of Syria by Mehemet Ali, according to one of those views, was the "sine qua non" of the final solution of the Eastern question. The French press, on the other hand, warmly supported the cause of the Viceroy and revealed an attitude of suspicion in regard to the increased interest of Great Britain in the Levant. "Whether France declare in favor of England or of Russia, it must be on condition of obtaining in return her Rhenish frontier and the cession of her former province of Egypt, and perhaps something more," a correspondent of the National declared. Even the editors of the conservative Journal des Débats maintained that the hereditary right should be conceded to the family of Mehemet Ali, and one of them remarked in an article published on June 1, 1839, that while

"The Times, July 5, 1839.
Extract from the Morning Chronicle copied into the Journal des Débats, June 27, 1839.

Note the following extract from an article signed by Saint-Marc Girardin which appeared in the Journal des Débats on May 23, 1839: "Depuis qu'elle est maitresse de l'Inde, l'Angleterre a toujours eu les yeux ouverts sur l'Egypte et sur la mer Rouge. L'Egypte est, en effet, la route naturelle de l'Inde; . . . A l'aide de ses bateaux à vapeur, l'Angleterre semble en ce moment commencer, pour ainsi dire, une nouvelle conquête de l'Asie. . . La pris d'Aden et celle de Khareck, nous le répétons, . . . indiquent les plans de l'Angleterre, et comment elle cherche à se fortifier et à s'étendre pour résister à son adversaire [Russia]. La pris d'Aden et de Khareck fait encore partie de la question d'Orient à un autre titre; car, par cette conquête, l'Angleterre a un pris de plus contre l'vice-roi d'Egypte. D'Aden, elle le menace à l'entrée de la mer Rouge, et de Khareck elle surveille le progrès de ses armes en Arabie, et protège Bagdad et Bassora." Those Frenchmen who were alarmed at Britain's Levant policy were not all newspaper writers and correspondents. See, Campbell's report upon the attitude of Cochelet. Campbell to Palmerston, July 13, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 221.

Many Frenchmen believed that a war between England and Russia was inevitable. Some, at least, favored a union with the latter for the partitioning of Turkey—Russia taking Constantinople and France Alexandria. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

"Extract from the National, copied in The Times, June 7, 1839."
France had an interest in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, she also had an interest "à la grandeur de l'Egypte." 77

The views relative to Near-Eastern affairs which were entertained by the various factions existing within the Chamber of Deputies are also worthy of notice. They were revealed very clearly when Duperré's request for a credit of 10,000,000 francs was up for consideration, for that was the occasion of a great and solemn debate, in which the question of the Orient was examined, not only in its relations to the immediate quarrel between the governor of Egypt and his suzerain but also under its most general aspects. 78 One of the first speakers who took part in the debates was the legitimist orator, Valmy. After criticizing the government sharply for attempting to defend Mehemet Ali and bolster up Turkey at the same time, and after warning against the danger of an Anglo-Russian accord, he let it be understood he was willing that the Pasha of Egypt should be sacrificed to the Sultan. 79 However, the limited applause—it came from the right only it seems—by which his remarks were received indicates that a majority of the deputies were not willing to support him in the

"Journal des Débats, June 1, 1839. See other articles in ibid., May 17, June 8, 17, 24, 25, 28, July 1, 1839. See also an extract from the Siècle of June 14, 1839, copied in Guichen, op. cit., p. 44.

"Odilon Barrot, Mémoires Posthumes, I, p. 343.

"Note the following: "l'orateur légitimiste aurait voulu, en haine des révolutions, qu'on immolât le pacha d'Egypte au sultan."—Blanc, op. cit., V, p. 427. See also The Times, July 4, 1839. Valmy must be given credit, however, for seeing clearly that the Soult Administration was assuming a false position. In commenting on its policy he declared: "Il en résulte que nous divisons les éléments musulmans qu'il faudrait réunir, que nous détruisions à Alexandrie ce que nous faisons à Constantinople, que nous mécontentons le sultan et le vice-roi en voulant les épargner tous deux, et que nous n'avons de crédit ni sur l'un ni sur l'autre." "... je l'avoue," he stated later in conclusion, "rien dans le langage du ministère ne me fait croire qu'il ait adopté une politique qui le mette en mesure de régler sérieusement le statu quo dans lequel s'engloutit l'Empire ottoman et l'équilibre de l'Europe.

"Je le répète donc, je ne veux pas exposer un seul homme ni un seul vaisseau pour de périlleuses et impuissantes manifestations." Archives Parl., CXXVI, pp. 631, 636. Guichen, op. cit., pp. 76-78.
position which he had taken. M. de Carné, the next speaker to ascend the tribune, declared in a speech which was received by "marques nombreuses d'approbation" that modern Egypt was a French creation. France had important commercial and political interests at stake there which would be benefited by a recognition of the independence of the Viceroy. The Chamber of Deputies, therefore, ought to declare itself in favor of such recognition, and diplomatic Europe ought to recognize French influence in Egypt as being on a par with English influence in Portugal and the influence of Austria in Italy. Later in the day M. de Lamartine, who had traveled extensively in the Orient, revealed that he had little faith either in the suggestions made by Carné or in those advanced by Valmy. France, he maintained, should withhold her support from both the Viceroy and the Sultan. She should favor, instead, a partition of the territories which were held by Mehemet and Mahmoud between the four great European Powers—Eng-

80 Archives Parl., CXXVI, pp. 632-636. Vicomte de Guichen maintains in his Crise d'Orient et l'Europe, [p. 78] that "La Chambre, presque unanimité, applaudit Valmy," but the editors of the Archives Parlementaire have described the applause given Valmy as follows: "Voix à droite: Très bien! très bien! (Une légère agitation succède à ce discours, et la séance reste quelques instants interrompue.)" See ibid., p. 636. For Valmy's attitude towards England, note the following extract from his speech: "De son côté, l'Angleterre, fatiguée de tant d'impuissance, a cessé d'agir franchement de concert avec nous. Elle a songé à prendre sa part du statu quo; c'est l'Egypte qu'elle convoite et que le sultan est appelé aujourd'hui à conquérir pour elle."—Ibid., p. 634. Other deputies accused England of having designs against Egypt. See, in particular, the statements attributed to M. Denis and M. de Tocqueville, in ibid., pp. 643-649, 705-708.

81 Ibid., pp. 637-638. Carné also stated: "je dis qu'en face de l'avenir qui peut se produire, il est de l'intérêt de la France d'agir immédiatement, d'agir seule, se déclarer qu'elle protège l'Egypte; qu'elle est là dans son rôle légitime, dans son rôle naturel; qu'elle prend sous son abri une nationalité qui n'est menaçante pour personne, une nationalité qui importe à l'équilibre européen; qu'elle la protège contre le despotisme maritime, tout aussi bien que contre le despotisme militaire."—Ibid., p. 639.

82 See A. de Lamartine, Souvenirs, impressions, pensées, et paysages pendant un voyage en Orient, (1832-1833).
land, France, Austria, and Russia. His statements, like those of Valmy, did not receive the general approval of the deputies. Indeed, they were even followed by "Sensation," "Murmures," "Violents murmures," and "Vive agitation."

The most significant speech which was delivered on this occasion in defense of the Levantine policies of the Ministry was, undoubtedly, the one delivered by M. Guizot. According to him, Mehemet Ali's success in Egypt was due largely to French influence and cooperation. "We have protected it [Egypt] from its origin..." he explained. "We beheld there a natural dislocation of the Ottoman Empire, and perhaps a rising power destined at some future day to become independent and to play its part in the affairs of the world."

In calling attention to the policy which he thought France should follow he declared: "To maintain the Ottoman Empire for the maintenance of the equilibrium of Europe, and when, by the force of events, by the natural progress of facts, some dismemberment takes place, some province detaches itself from that Empire in decadence, to favor the transformation of that province into a new and independent sovereignty which may take its place in the family of nations, and assist at a future day in the new European equilibrium, destined to replace that whose elements will exist no longer; such is the policy suit-

---

84 Archives Parl., CXXVI, pp. 649-653. Note in particular the following extract from Lamartine's speech: "La politique de la France doit être tout autre; elle doit être française, elle doit être européenne. Son système, c'est le système européen; c'est l'équilibre maintenu par l'Autriche et par elle dans l'Orient comme dans l'Occident; non pas ce chancelant et faux équilibre qui repose aujourd'hui sur cette section d'empire à Constantinople, équilibre que n'est au fond que la domination russe en Orient, sous le nom de Mahmoud, sans compensation, sans sûreté, sans avenir pour nous, mais un équilibre fondé sur une part égale d'influence et de teritoires attribuée des aujourd'hui en Orient aux quatre grandes puissances qui y ont droit et intérêt, la Russie, l'Autriche, la France, et l'Angleterre. Voilà le système qui s'appelle le système occidental."—Ibid., p. 652. See also, Odilon Barrot, op. cit., I, pp. 343-344.

85 Guizot, although not a member of the Cabinet, was on the best of terms with those who did belong to it. See Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 314.

86 Ibid., p. 330. Archives Parl., CXXVI, p. 713. Note: The phraseology of the two sources is not exactly the same. The translation follows that of the Mémoires.
able to France; to this she has been naturally led, and in this, according to my opinion, she will do well to persevere.' In other words, the policy which M. Guizot advocated was that of the status quo ante bellum in 1839, and it was, he later claimed in his Mémoires, the policy which the Ministry and the great majority of the members of the Chamber of Deputies favored.

Meanwhile, as the Cabinets of England and France appeared to be in accord upon Turco-Egyptian affairs, "the Court of Russia looked on in silence and remained in suspense, visibly disturbed by the impending future and [doubtful] of the attitude it would have to assume." The Emperor Nicholas had no desire for war, and realizing that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi furnished a constant source of danger to the peace of his Empire, longed for the day to arrive when the term of that arrangement should expire. Nevertheless, he was resolved that he would not permit other Powers to violate the rules defined therein, nor would he consent to the merging of the said treaty into some more general compact of the same nature by which all of the great European nations would become obliged to defend the Porte. Hence when it was suggested that a conference of representatives from the latter should be assembled at Vienna to negotiate with the aim of discovering a policy upon which all could agree, Nicholas and his

---

"Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 330-331. Archives Parl., CXXVI, p. 713. Note the following contemporary comment upon Guizot's speech: "M. Guizot a noblement défendu ce qu'il appelle la politique séculaire de la France; il a félicité le ministre du 12 Mai de s'être rallié à cette politique; il a protesté avec énergie contre ces chimériques partages que l'on nous fait toucher au doigt, et contre ces alliances non moins chimériques qui nous feraient payer l'abandon de l'empire ottoman en un agrandissement territorial sur nos frontières du nord. La politique de M. Guizot, c'est le maintien de l'indépendance de la Turquie, c'est le statu quo."—Journal des Débats, July 2, 1839.

"The debates were closed on the day following, July 3, 1839, and a ballot was taken to determine whether the credit asked for by Duperré should be granted. The measure was passed, 287 to 26.—Archives Parl., CXXVII, p. 4. For a more detailed discussion of the French debates see Guichen, op. cit., pp. 71-84.


"Goriainow, op. cit., p. 53.

"Lord Palmerston, as well as Marshal Soult, had favored concluding such a compact. See Palmerston to Ponsonby, Sept. 13, 1838, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 282."
ministers opposed the idea. They probably would have agreed to it if they had been assured that at the proposed conference the concluding of a settlement between the Sultan and the Viceroy would be the only matter which would be considered.91 However, it was believed at St. Petersburg that the maritime Powers would insist upon the admission of their fleets into the Sea of Marmora and that they would demand the signing of a joint-convention to guarantee the integrity and the independence of the Ottoman Empire.92 "In any affair," Nesselrode wrote to Struve, the Russian chargé d'affaires at Vienna, "it is necessary first of all to know to whom one ought to speak. In the present situation we ought to speak to the Pacha of Egypt. Therefore, the allied war vessels ought to be sent to Alexandria. They [England and France] wish to send them into the Sea of Marmora. They would speak to the Ottoman Porte and I fear very much that they would then speak to it for the last time, car elle n'est plus de force à se tenir longtemps debout, si l'on en venait au point de tirer le canon devant les murs du sérail."

The Tsar's government preferred that instead of taking a part in a conference at Vienna, Russia and Austria should hold strictly to the stipulations of the con-

91See Granville to Palmerston, July 12, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 168.
92Goriainow, op. cit., p. 53. Note also the following extract of a letter written on July 24, 1839, by Count Nesselrode to Meyendorff, the Russian representative at Berlin: "Vous verrez, mon cher Meyendorff, que l'idée d'une conférence à Vienne, sur les affaires turco-égyptiennes, n'est pas de notre goût. Nous devons cette conception qui, certes, n'est pas une conception bienveillante pour la Russie, à notre bon prince Metternich qui, de gaieté de coeur, a embrouillé une affaire devenue très simple et placée sur le meilleur terrain, par la raison que tous les cabinets sont tombés d'accord, aussi bien sur les mesures à prendre pour préserver le trône du Sultan d'une chute inévitable dans cette crise, que sur les bases de l'arrangement à conclure entre la Porte et le pacha d'Egypte. Ce qu'il y avait à faire a été fait sans conférence et peut-être tout juste parce qu'il n'y a pas eu de conférence. Je ne sais, en vérité, ce que l'on pourrait faire de plus à Vienne, à moins qu'on ne veuille s'occuper des futurs contingents et lier les mains à la Russie, ce qui ne saurait nous convenir d'aucune manière. Notre refus de participer à cette conférence fera beaucoup de bruit dans le monde et excitera de nouvelles méfiances en Angleterre. Il m'a paru utile que vous fussiez informé des motifs qui nous l'ont dicté."—Nesselrode, op. cit., VII, pp. 285-287.
93Quoted by Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 54-55.
vention of Münchgratz. The thing to do, according to Count Nesselrode, was to take steps by diplomacy to prevent Ibrahim from marching upon Constantinople. If that was done it would not be necessary again for the Emperor to send a Russian fleet into the Bosphorus to protect the throne of the Sultan. The two rivals in the Levant could under such circumstances even be permitted to settle their difficulties without the aid of foreigners and, consequently, the danger of a break resulting between the European Powers because of conflicting views upon the Eastern question would be removed.

At the same time the Russian statesmen desired to avoid antagonizing England and France. The hereditary Grand Duke, who later became Emperor Alexander II, and Count Orloff were then at London. "Whenever I have met Count Orloff during the last five days," Bourqueney wrote on May 29 to Soult, 'he has denied with emotion the authenticity of the news of the resumption of hostilities between the Turks and the Egyptians. He founds his assertion on the last letters of the Emperor. ... He has held the same language to nearly all the members of the diplomatic body.' Some days later the French envoy continued: "The Russian Embassy listens, watches, but hesitates both in action and language. There have been many Russians in London during the last month ... and [amongst them] some enjoying the highest confidence of the Emperor. I venture with timidity an opinion hastily formed; but it appears evident to me that ... they [the Russians] are not prepared for extreme

*Ibid.*, p. 53. Metternich in some of his despatches defended Russia's policy in the Near East. See Metternich *op. cit.*, VI, pp. 345-351. Barante to Soult, July 13, 1839, Barante, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 256. However, in the words of M. Goriainow, "Quoique le prince Metternich ne manquat pas de protester de sa fidélité à l'alliance avec la Russie, il n'était pas étranger à l'idée de restreindre la trop grande influence que l'empereur Nicolas avait acquise sur la Turquie depuis le traité d'Unkiar-Iskélessi. Outre cela, il lui souhait de convoquer à Vienne une conférence de tous les représentants des puissances européennes, au milieu desquels il occupera la première place."—Goriainow, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

*See extract of a despatch, Nesselrode to Struve, July 4, 1839, quoted by *ibid.*, p. 54.

measures." This despatch was written on June 17, 1839, and just ten days later M. de Kisseleff, the Russian chargé d'affaires at the British Court, transmitted to Lord Palmerston a significant note which Nesselrode had addressed on June 15, 1839, to Count Pozzo di Borgo. In that note the Russian position relative to Turco-Egyptian affairs was explained carefully. Undoubtedly the Tsar's Chancellor hoped thereby to gain the confidence and cooperation of the British ministers. "The last despatches from Constantinople... and from Alexandria... apprise us that the Ottoman and Egyptian troops had approached so near to each other that a conflict between them appeared imminent," he declared. "... There remains but one task to us to fulfil, that is, to confine this struggle within the narrowest possible bounds, so that it may not compromise the maintenance of the general repose of Europe..."

"The real danger for Europe at large is not in a combat carried on in Syria between the troops of the Sultan and those of the Pasha of Egypt... The danger would not begin to become serious until in the event of the fate of arms, declaring against the Sultan, the Pasha of Egypt should profit by this advantage to place the safety of Constantinople and the existence of the Ottoman Empire in peril."

"... it has appeared to us essential to come to an understanding, frankly, with the Great Powers of Europe, who, equally with us, have at heart to prevent the danger which we have just pointed out. Among those Powers Great Britain is incontestably the one that can exercise the greatest influence over the fate of this question, and can cooperate in the most decisive manner in realizing the pacific intentions of our august Master.

"With this conviction his majesty desires you, Sir, to come to an explanation with the British Cabinet on this subject, without the least reserve. Have the goodness to submit to that Cabinet, that it is as much for its interest as for ours, to take care that the struggle between the Porte and Egypt shall not assume so..."

"Bourqueney to Soult, June 17, 1839, ibid., p. 493. Guichen quotes despatches to prove that the Russians were working even before that early date to destroy the Anglo-French entente. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 51 ff., 68.
serious a character as may ever place the safety of the capital of the Ottoman Empire in danger;

"That in order . . . to set due bounds to the action of the Pasha of Egypt . . . it would be necessary to declare to him in the most formal manner, 'That as long as he shall confine himself to the defence of the territories which have been assigned to him by the arrangement of Kutayla; as long as he shall not extend his military operations beyond the district of Diarbekir and Orfa, . . . so long will Great Britain in conjunction with the other Powers of Europe, remain a passive spectator of the struggle which is going on in Syria; but that from the instant . . . that he shall extend the theatre of war beyond the defiles of Taurus in order to carry it into the centre of Asia Minor, from that moment England would consider such act of hostility as if it were directed against herself, and would thenceforward act as if she were at open war with the Pasha of Egypt;' . . .

"If England came [sic] to an agreement with us to issue a declaration couched in these terms, the Emperor will authorize his Representative at Alexandria to hold precisely the same language. . . .

"For the moment," Nesselrode pointed out in conclusion, "we must confine ourselves to what is most pressing, that is to say, to guard against the ill-advised policy of the Sultan dragging us into a complication of a nature to bring on a chance of a European conflict . . . it is with this view that we have thought it indispensable to come to a frank explanation with England, by taking in London the step of which by the Emperor's orders, I have pointed out to you the plan and the object. It will prove to the British Ministry that, far from wishing to bring about a complication in the Levant, we are using all our care to prevent one; and that, instead of greedily availing ourselves of the stipulations of our Treaty of Alliance with the Porte, we are ourselves the first to desire to prevent the recurrence of a crisis which would compel us in spite of ourselves, again to take up a military attitude on the shores of the Bosphorus."98

Lord Palmerston must have been puzzled when he received the despatch from which the above extract has been quoted. The

98Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 96-98. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 457-460.
communication from Kisseleff, he wrote to Beauvale on the day after it was handed to him, was "generally speaking" satisfactory but the British could not agree with the Russian government when it stated that the Powers might remain passive spectators if the contest between the two rivals in the Levant was confined to Syria. Austria, France, and England seemed agreed that the existing relative positions of the Pasha and the Sultan were incompatible with the safety of the Ottoman Empire and therefore some different arrangement must be concluded. Some parts of Nesselrode's despatch, according to the views expressed by the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, might perhaps be construed to imply that Russia, instead of being of this opinion, was satisfied with the status quo. Other parts of the despatch, though, he admitted, indicated that Russia was "not disinclined" to take into consideration the possibility of making some more permanent settlement.99

While the advance made by Count Nesselrode to the British government must have had some influence upon the attitude of Lord Palmerston, it is certain that the latter did not abandon immediately all of his apprehensions in regard to the intentions of Russia. "I have to instruct your Excellency to state to the Porte," he wrote to Lord Ponsonby on July 5, 1839, "that if the course of events should lead the Porte to ask or to accept military or naval aid from any European Power, in the contest with Mehemet Ali, Her Majesty's Government trusts that the Porte will at the same time address itself to Great Britain to the same effect."100 Some days later, after having learned that the Sultan's health was in a critical condition, Palmerston wrote again to Ponsonby advising that if Mahmoud died and if consequently the presence of the British squadron at Constantinople should appear useful, he should in concert with the French Ambassador Roussin offer its assistance to the Turkish government.101 Furthermore, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs issued instructions to Admiral Stopford, dated July 18, 1839, directing that if a Russian

99Palmerston to Beauvale, June 28, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 117-119. Palmerston was less critical in a despatch in which he directed Clanricarde to reply to the Russian proposals. See, Palmerston to Clanricarde, July 9, ibid., pp. 156-158.
100Palmerston to Ponsonby, July 5, 1839, ibid., pp. 124-125.
101Palmerston to Ponsonby, July 13, 1839, ibid., p. 166. See also, Palmerston to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, July 13, 1839, ibid., pp. 166-167.
fleet entered the Bosphorus he should apply for the admission of his vessels through the Dardanelles.\textsuperscript{102}

While the representatives of the great Powers were negotiating and corresponding thus, events destined to alter the situation materially were occurring in the Near East. The Viceroy, in June, 1839, it will be remembered, had sent instructions to Ibrahim to avoid hostilities. The measure which he then adopted was too tardy to accomplish its object. On June 21, several days before the arrival at the Egyptian camp of M. Caillé, who carried the pacific instructions which Mehemet Ali had prepared, a decisive battle was fought between the forces of Ibrahim and those of Hafiz Pasha near the village of Nezib. The Ottoman army was routed, and when Caillé arrived on the scene it was only with difficulty that he was able to persuade the Egyptian commander to refrain from following up his victory by a vigorous offensive.\textsuperscript{103}

Fate was merciful on this occasion to the aged Mahmoud, for on June 30, 1839, before the news of the engagement at Nezib had reached Constantinople, he expired. After his death, Abd-ul-Mejid, his sixteen year old son, was proclaimed Sultan and a new group of ministers, headed by Reouf and Kosrew Pashas, took charge of the government. Nouri Effendi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced on July 3, 1839, that his young sovereign, willing to offer Mehemet Ali a full pardon for the past, was ready to concede to him Egypt in hereditary possession if he would agree to evacuate Syria, Adana, the Holy Cities, and the Island of Crete.\textsuperscript{104} In addition, Kosrew Pasha, the Grand Vizier, sent orders to Hafiz Pasha to suspend hostilities, and he directed Achmet Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman fleet, to retain his vessels within the Dardanelles.\textsuperscript{105} Achmet, however, dissatisfied with the new government, put to sea at once. Off the Island of Tenedos,

\textsuperscript{102}Instructions to Stopford, July 18, 1839; Palmerston to Ponsonby, July 18, 1839, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 167-168.

\textsuperscript{103}Mouriez, \textit{op. cit.}, IV, pp. 38-41. \textit{Annual Register}, 1839, p. [411]. For a contemporary account of the battle of Nezib see von Moltke, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 378, ff.


\textsuperscript{105}Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 3, 1839, \textit{ibid.}, p. 183. \textit{Annual Register}, 1839, p. [411].
July 5, 1839, he fell in with the French fleet commanded by Admiral Lalande. Osman Bey, the second in command of the Turkish squadron, who had formed an acquaintance with Lalande while he was in Tunis, obtained an interview with him on this occasion and declared at that meeting that Mahmoud had not died a natural death but had been murdered by Kosrew and Halil Pashas. The former, who had assumed the leadership of the government, he claimed was at the head of a Russian party which intended to surrender the country into the hands of the Muscovites. In order to prevent this from happening, his superior officer, Achmet, had resolved to sail to Crete in order that he might come to terms with Mehemet Ali. After that had been accomplished the fleet would return and in cooperation with the army of the Taurus under command of Hafiz Pasha would overthrow the pro-Russian Kosrew and his associates. Lalande, refusing to cooperate with Achmet Pasha and Osman Bey in their projects, advised that they should proceed to Rhodes rather than to Crete. Nevertheless, he took no steps to prevent them from executing their intentions. Instead of stopping at either Rhodes or Crete they sailed direct to Alexandria where they delivered up their squadron unconditionally into the hands of the Pasha.

News about these alarming developments in the Near East began to arrive at Paris about the middle of July. Soult, who must have been aroused greatly by the gravity of the situation,

---

106 Halil Pasha was the Seraskier in the new government. See Annual Register, 1839, p. [411].
107 Affaires étrangères. Turquie 278, fol. 44, Lalande to Roussin, July 5, 1839, quoted by A. Stern, in Revue Historique, CVII, pp. 325-326. Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 8, 1839, Roussin to Ponsonby, July 7, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 188. Paton, op. cit., II, pp. 138-141. See also an article written by the Prince de Joinville, who was with Lalande during the interview with Osman Bey, published in Revue des deux Mondes, Aug. 1, 1852, LXXXVII, pp. 425-482.
108 The indifference with which Lalande acted on this occasion did not fail to attract attention. Marshal Soult, who had been particularly anxious that the status quo should be maintained, despatched a sharp reprimand to him and in discussing the surrender of the Turkish fleet with Lord Granville, admitted that the Admiral's conduct appeared inexplicable. See Affaires étrangères. Turquie 278, fol. 182, Instructions to Lalande, July 27, 1839, quoted by Stern in Revue Historique, CVII, pp. 327-328. F. O. France, 584, Granville to Palmerston, July 29, 1839, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 244.
became active immediately. On July 17, 1839, having learned already that the Sultan was dead, he wrote to Bourqueney: “Although it is at present extremely difficult to anticipate the nature of the influence which this change of reign may exercise upon the destinies of the Orient, it is evident that a crisis has arisen which calls for the most serious and loyal concurrence of all the Cabinets to secure the continuance of peace. It seems to me that the moment has arrived to act upon the idea already suggested by M. de Metternich, of guaranteeing, by means of an interchange of diplomatic declarations, the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, and in order to prevent any delay, I have resolved to assume the initiative myself in the necessary steps to be taken for that object. . . . Lord Palmerston will no doubt reply to the communication which you will make to him in terms sufficiently precise to attain the end we have in view.”

Nine days later, after he had received additional information from the Levant, Soult continued: “I think . . . that it will be desirable to continue the course adopted up to this time, . . . which consists in subordinating as much as possible to an intimate and sustained concert between the Cabinets, the action which some amongst them are prepared to exercise in the Eastern question. As regards England and France, including also Austria, although she does not as openly proclaim her views, the principal, the veritable object of this concert, is to restrain Russia and to accustom her to treat in common on Oriental affairs. It is enough to say that under existing conjunctions there is more reason than ever for our strict unanimity, . . .”

On the same day Lord Granville reported in a despatch written to Palmerston that the French government was of the opinion that neither the disastrous overthrow of the Turkish army, nor the traitorous conduct of the Capitan Pasha, nor the prostrate attitude of the Divan ought to affect the course which the

---

109 Soult to Bourqueney, July 17, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 513-514. Palmerston replied favorably to Soult’s proposal. See Palmerston to Bourqueney, July 22, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 175. Soult was always anxious to make it appear that the most important question at issue was that of protecting Turkey against Russia. The question of the terms which should be enforced upon the two rivals in the Levant, he wished to have it believed, was a matter of only secondary importance. See Soult to Bourqueney, Aug. 22, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 545.

110 Soult to Bourqueney, July 26, 1839, ibid., p. 519.
great Powers of Europe should pursue. A declaration to that
effect, Soult believed, should be made to Mehemet Ali. He would
write to Vienna to let Metternich know the French opinion and
he would urge him to adopt a similar one.111

In the meantime some progress in the direction of securing an
understanding between the eastern Powers and Great Britain
relative to a settlement of Turco-Egyptian affairs was being made
by means of informal discussions which were promoted at Vienna
by the Austrian Chancellor. "Upon all the details," Lord Beauvale
wrote to Palmerston, July 11, 1839, "Prince Metternich agrees to
your Lordship's ideas without reserve, and is sure of their adop-
tion by Russia: so that, according to him, England, Austria and
Russia are placed exactly upon the same line, and there only
remains to induce France to relinquish her deviations from it."112

"The outline of the terms is already sketched," he stated in
another despatch written the same day, "and may be considered
as adopted by England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. . . . Prince
Metternich requests the British government to persuade France."
The only points which remained to be agreed on by the represen-
tatives of the four Powers, according to the British Ambas-
sador, were those relative to the possession of the east coast of
the Red Sea, the amount of tribute to be levied upon Egypt by
the Sultan, the "obligation of [Mehemet Ali to accept Ottoman] treatises," and the extent of disarmament to be required of the
Viceroy. He admitted that these points would yet occasion many
difficulties, but he maintained: "It is clear that Vienna in its
relations with that place [Constantinople] is nearly a month
ahead of London and Petersburg."113

The activities at the Austrian capital were intensified when it
became known there that the Sultan was dead and that the new
Ottoman government proposed to offer its pardon to Mehemet
Ali. Beauvale reported to Palmerston on July 19, 1839, that
events had totally changed the state of things, and it might be felt

111Granville to Palmerston, July 26, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 195.
112Beauvale to Palmerston, July 11, 1839, ibid., p. 180.
113Beauvale to Palmerston, July 11, 1839. Ibid., pp. 178-179. According to
Beauvale, Metternich was applied to by the Porte for advice and this, with the
proximity of Vienna to Constantinople, threw the negotiation very much into
his hands. " . . . nor," Beauvale commented, "considering the identity of his
objects with our own, can it be better placed." See ibid.
by Her Majesty’s government to require an alteration in their determinations. It was probable, he thought, that the Sultan and the Pasha would come to an agreement, for the latter would prefer closing at once rather than waiting for the interposition of the five Powers.¹¹⁴ Metternich’s views were of a similar character.¹¹⁵ Alarmed lest a direct settlement should actually be concluded between the two rivals in the Orient, he immediately despatched, probably with the consent of the Vienna representatives of the Powers,¹¹⁶ instructions to Constantinople for the Internuncio and his colleagues to adopt measures to dissuade, if possible, the Sultan from prostrating himself before Mehmet Ali, and to engage him to rely upon the European Powers for protection.¹¹⁷ These instructions sent from Vienna on July 16, arrived in the Ottoman capital on the 27th, and before the day of their arrival was spent the European representatives—Sturmer, Ponsonby, Roussin, Boute-nieff, and Koenigsmarck—had signed the famous collective note of July 27, 1839,¹¹⁸ framed in the following terms: “The undersigned

¹¹⁴Beauvale to Palmerston, July 19, 1839, ibid., p. 192.
¹¹⁵See an extract of a despatch, Metternich to Koller, Austrian representative in Berlin, July 26, 1839, Berlin Archives, vol. 3, quoted by Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 54 [footnote 115].
¹¹⁶See an extract of a despatch, Sturmer to Metternich, July 29, 1839, Vienna Archives, Turkey 50, quoted by ibid., p. 55 [footnote 118]. Metternich’s fear was well founded. Note the following extract of a despatch, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 29, 1839: “It [the collective note] was . . . most fortunately well-timed, for the Ottoman Ministers had actually resolved upon concessions to the Egyptian Pasha, which would have been at this moment on their way to Alexandria, and which would have mischievously complicated the affairs of this country.”—Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 292-293. Annual Register, 1840, p. 467.
¹¹⁸Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 53. Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 29, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 292-293. The issuance of the collective note, as Hasenclever points out, was provoked by Metternich alone, and it was perhaps the only outward result of the negotiations for the Vienna conference plan. Metternich’s chief interest was not in saving Turkey but in securing the unity of the Powers and their domination of the situation in the Near East. Hasenclever credits Maltzan with claiming that Metternich hoped to crown his career’s accomplishments with the settlement of the Near Eastern question. See Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 47, 50-55.
have received, this morning, from their respective Governments instructions, in virtue whereof they have the honor to inform the Sublime Porte, that agreement among the Five Great Powers on the Question of the East is secured, and to invite it to suspend any definitive resolution without their concurrence, waiting for the effect of the interest which these Powers feel for it.\textsuperscript{119}

Regardless of the profession which was made in the text of the collective note, it is evident that on that occasion the Russian government was still anxious to avoid entering into a conference for the settlement of the Near Eastern question.\textsuperscript{120} On the same day that Sturmer and the other European representatives at Constantinople signed the note quoted above, after he had learned that the Porte had offered to make peace with the Viceroy, the Russian Chancellor wrote to M. de Kisseleff: “These determinations [of the Porte to make peace], dictated by a genuine spirit of conciliation and wisdom, simplify greatly the question, the solution of which the Allied Cabinets have at heart. The Porte, induced by a just appreciation of its true interests, has anticipated the propositions which the Five Powers were on the point of making to it. . . . It has resolved to offer to Mehemet Ali the inheritance of Egypt in return for the cession of Syria. . . .

“The basis of negotiation has thus been laid down by the Porte itself. It has of its own accord opened the deliberation, and has virtually fixed its locality at Constantinople, the only place where it was fitting that interests, having direct reference to the future fate of the Ottoman Empire, should be discussed.”\textsuperscript{121} It is quite apparent that the cause for the persistent refusal on the part of Russia to join in a conference with the other Powers was the Cabinet of St. Petersburg’s time-worn fear that at such a confer-


\textsuperscript{119}See an extract of a despatch, Nesselrode to Struve, July 18/30, 1839, quoted by Goriainow, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 55-58. Nesselrode complained to the foreign Ambassadors at St. Petersburg but evidently was not greatly dissatisfied when he learned that the collective note had been signed. The note, it can be seen readily, did not in any way bind Russia to enter into a formal conference between the Powers. See Barante to Soult, Aug. 10, 1839, Barante, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 296. Hasenclever, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{121}Nesselrode to Kisseleff, July 15/27, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 257-259. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 463-466.
ence England and France—especially the latter—would insist on the conclusion of a convention to guarantee the integrity and the independence of the Ottoman Empire. On July 25, 1839, Baron Meyendorff, the Russian representative at Berlin, declared to Sir George Hamilton, the British chargé d'affaires, that the Muscovite Cabinet would be willing to sign at once a declaration of the independence of the Turkish Empire and that it would promise, along with the rest of the European Cabinets, not to seek to profit by the existing state of things, but guaranteeing the integrity of the Empire was something entirely different.

The persistent hesitation of Russia to unite in a conference with the other Powers for the settlement of the affairs of the East pleased the French most highly. "M. de Metternich has forwarded an answer in conformity with our declaration in favor of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire," Marshal Soult wrote on August 1, 1839. "According to what M. de Sainte-Aulaire [the French Ambassador at Vienna] writes to me, the Chancellor of Austria, who recently appeared to be quite satisfied with the intentions manifested by Russia, is now extremely uneasy on that point. It appears that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, far from continuing the assurances, otherwise sufficiently vague, which it had at first proffered of its desire to act in concert with the other Powers, now recedes, under frivolous pretexts, from all that might substantiate or reduce them to formal acts. I am surprised at the astonishment which M. de Metternich evinces at this proceeding. I never imagined that, in the actual question, Russia would be brought to associate herself frankly with the other Cabinets whose policy is so opposed to hers; ... It is

122 See an extract from Nesselrode's report to Nicholas, Aug. 3/15, 1839, quoted by Gorainow, op. cit., pp. 58-60.
123 Hamilton to Palmerston, July 31, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 236-237.
124 Note the following comment made by M. de Barante at a later date: "Il [the Tsar] en fut mécontent et presque irrité. Toute fois après quelque délai, après plus d'une conversation avec l'ambassadeur d'Autriche, il lui dit qu'un plénipotentiares russe se rendrait à la conférence de Vienne. Quelques heures après cette détermination, qui n'était encore ni officielle ni écrite, la mort du Sultan fut soudainement annoncée."—quoted by Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 46, [footnote 90]. See also Barante, op. cit., VI, pp. 261, 265. Russell to Palmerston, July 6, 1839; Granville to Palmerston, July 12, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 162, 168.
necessary . . . that the Powers, particularly France and England, should hold an absolutely uniform language towards the Cabinet of St. Peters burg and to address it only by measures identical in character." On another occasion he professed that he personally was disposed to think that the ground on which the Powers should propose to negotiate with Mehemet Ali should be the latter's obtaining the hereditary possession of Egypt and his giving up the other pashalics which he was then holding; "but," he continued, " . . . some latitude must be given to our Representatives at Vienna, to accede to terms more favourable to Mehemet Ali." 126

Although the Marshal did follow a cautious policy, the apparent accord between England and France was destined to be short-lived. When it became known at London that the Turkish fleet had been treacherously surrendered to the Pasha, Palmerston was aroused to action, and accordingly on August 3, and 5 and 7, he forwarded to Bourqueney and to Granville, respectively, for the approval of the French government sets of proposed instructions of a drastic character for the two Admirals in the Mediterranean. 127 Palmerston's plan was for the fleets of Stopford and Lalande to sail direct to Alexandria and demand the release of the Turkish vessels. If the Viceroy should refuse to do promptly as he was ordered, the allied squadron should then secure their ends by resorting to force. Such measures, however, were entirely too drastic to secure the endorsement of Marshal Soult. "The hostilities in the East are evidently terminated," he reflected in a despatch written on August 6, 1839. "Neither by land nor by sea have we any announcement of an intention to continue, or rather to resume them . . . In this state of things, the defection of the Ottoman fleet is an unfortunate and much to be regretted event, for which we must endeavor to provide a remedy; but it scarcely constitutes one of those cases of imminent danger which justifies such extreme measures as are

126 Soult to Bourqueney, Aug. 1, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 527-528.
127 Granville to Palmerston, Aug. 2, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 235.
128 See Palmerston's proposed instructions to the two Admirals, Aug. 3, 1839; Supplementary instructions to the Admirals, Aug. 3, 1839; Palmerston to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, Aug. 5, 1839; Palmerston to Granville, Aug. 5, 1839, ibid., pp. 233, 234, 238-239, 240. See also, Palmerston to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, Aug. 7, 1839; Palmerston to Granville, Aug. 7, 1839, ibid., pp. 255-256.
now proposed to us . . . an act of hostility against Mehemet Ali would not facilitate the plan proposed by England and France in concert. In destroying the Egyptian fleet we would not only add no strength to the Porte, but also we would not induce the Viceroy to abate his pretensions in the slightest degree . . . I do not hesitate to say that in ruining the Pasha of Egypt we shall bring about the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Our policy today, as from the commencement of the crisis, ought to be to take care above all other considerations that Constantinople receive no foreign protection without our common consent.\[128\]

Only a few days before the above quoted despatch was written, Soult received information from Cochelet which, it appears, influenced him to be more outspoken than he had been formerly in his favoritism for Mehemet Ali.\[129\] As Palmerston, influenced by news of the events which were taking place in the Levant, was at the same time becoming more determined in his hostility towards the Viceroy, it soon became apparent that England and France would very probably be unable to reach an agreement upon all that appertained to the question of the Near East. On August 13, 1839, Soult directed the French Minister of Marine, Duperré, to instruct Admiral Lalande that if the Captain Pasha's fleet was still outside of the harbor of Alexandria he should communicate with the captains of the vessels and try to induce them to return to Constantinople. No force should be used, though, unless it was necessary for self-defense. In case the Ottoman squadron had already entered Egyptian waters, and in case Mehemet Ali refused to give it up, the French Admiral should be satisfied with leaving a few warships to observe it and return with the remainder of his armament to his station off the coast of Asia Minor. Furthermore, when he first went to Egypt he

\[128\] Soult to Bourqueney, Aug. 6, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 532-535.

\[129\] Cochelet had reported that the Viceroy, conscious of the power he possessed, could not be induced to recede in any essential point from the conditions of a reconciliation which he had put forward in communication with the Consuls-General at Alexandria on July 14 and 15, 1839. At that time, the Pasha declared he would not be satisfied unless he received the hereditary possession of all the provinces and all the Sandjaks which he held. According to Cochelet he had more than 60 war vessels and an army of 200,000 men with which to enforce his demands. See, Granville to Palmerston, Aug. 5, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 256-257. See also, Brief Summary of two Interviews between Pasha of Egypt and Consuls-General, July 14 and 15, 1839; Mehemet Ali to Grand Vizier, July 16, 1839, ibid., pp. 244-246, 296.
should leave behind an adequate portion of his fleet to be ready to act if the Russians should appear at Constantinople or if an allied squadron should be summoned by the Porte to sail into the Sea of Marmora. "It must not be forgotten," Soult declared in conclusion, "that this [the latter], after all, is the principal question, and that consequently, watchfulness on this point should be incessant."

The instructions which Palmerston at length prepared for Stopford were of an entirely different character. "I am to acquaint your Lordships," he wrote on August 24 to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, "that it is Her Majesty's pleasure that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should not be precluded from executing any instructions given to him by Lord Beauvale, and arising out of the negotiations at Vienna, provided the measures to be taken shall be such as Sir Robert Stopford may think himself to have adequate means to execute, even though the French Admiral should not receive corresponding instructions from his own Government or from the French Ambassador at Vienna."

The divergence between the respective positions taken by England and France became most obvious after it was known in the west that the European representatives at Constantinople had issued a "collective note" to the Porte enjoining it "to suspend any definitive resolution" without the concurrence of the Powers, for the immediate danger of Russian intervention in Turkey, which had tended to hold the two western Cabinets together, was thereby removed. On August 20, 1839, the day after Palmerston to Duperré, Aug. 13, 1839, ibid., pp. 288-289.

130Lord Ponsonby was elated after the note of July 27, 1839, had been signed. See Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 29, 1839, ibid., pp. 292-293. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 467-468. Palmerston was also well pleased. See Palmerston to Ponsonby, Aug. 21, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 311. Note also the following extract of a despatch, Bourqueney to Soult, Aug. 18, 1839, which was written after Palmerston had learned from Austrian sources about the signing of the note of July 27, 1839: "Votre Excellence jugera, par ce qui précède, du changement qui s'est opéré depuis trente-huit heures dans l'esprit des membres du cabinet anglais.

"On n'admettait pas la possibilité du concours de la Russie: aujourd'hui, on l'espère.

"On espérait le concours de l'Autriche jusqu'au bout: on n'en doute plus."

—Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 542-543.
ston had received from Lord Ponsonby a copy of the collective note, he wrote to Henry Bulwer, the British chargé d'affaires at Paris in the absence of Lord Granville, stating that the five Powers were the friends and the allies of the Sultan. They, in fact, had declared spontaneously in the note of July 27, 1839, their intention to uphold the integrity and the independence of the Ottoman Empire. The British government felt, therefore, that they were bound to compel Mehemet Ali to return the Ottoman fleet. Moreover, because of the fact that the government of Great Britain believed that all future steps ought to be taken, if possible, collectively by the five and that a decision concerning such steps ought to emanate from Vienna, which was the central point of negotiations, it was about to send instructions to Beauvale to take up with the representatives of the Powers at the Court of the Emperor Ferdinand the question of instructing on the restoration of the fleet as an indispensable preliminary to any negotiation whatever upon any other point. The consular agents at Alexandria, according to Palmerston's view, should be instructed by the diplomats at Vienna to demand of Mehemet Ali the restoration of the Turkish vessels, and if he should refuse to obey, then they [the consular agents] should all withdraw. If that did not bring the Pasha to terms, Syria and Egypt should be blockaded, Egyptian merchant ships should be seized on the high seas and in Syrian ports, Candia should be occupied and restored to the direct authority of the Sultan, and finally, Mehemet Ali should be notified that the allied fleet would defend the Turkish Empire "against any attack on his part, as effectually as if it were a Turkish fleet." 188 "Her Majesty's government," Palmerston declared "will give instructions to Sir Robert Stopford to take any, or all, of these steps, if he shall be directed so to do by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna . . . and you are instructed to invite the French Government to send similar instructions and authority to their Ambassador at Vienna, and to their Admiral in the Mediterranean." 188

The British Minister of Foreign Affairs must have realized, however, that there was not much chance that the French Ministers would send such instructions to their representatives, for

in his despatch to Bulwer, which, by the way, the latter was
directed to communicate to Soult, he warned that Stopford
might act "either with, or without the co-operation of any one of
the other squadrons," and, on August 25, 1839, just five days after
he had written thus to Bulwer, he wrote as follows to Beauvile:
"Her Majesty's Government are most anxious to proceed ... in
concert with the other Four Powers and are ready to make some
sacrifice of opinion in order to arrive at unanimous action. But if
your Excellency should find it impossible to obtain an unanimous
assent of your colleagues to any course of proceeding on this mat-
ter which would be consistent with the principles upon which the
British government is acting, or which could be likely to attain
the objects in view, your Excellency is authorized to act in concert
with a less number than the Four, if you shall find that any
reasonable and effectual course of proceeding is assented to by
such a proportion of the Five as may give to that course adequate
moral weight and sufficient physical means."134

It soon became apparent that what Palmerston must have at
least suspicioned in regard to the intentions of the French govern-
ment was based on excellent grounds. Bulwer reported on August
26, 1839, that from a conversation he had had with Soult that
same morning he was induced to apprehend that the government
of France was resolved to throw obstacles in the way of the se-
lection of Vienna as the place for settling and agreeing upon the
affairs of the East. The cause for that resolution, Bulwer believed,
was to be sought in the difference which really existed between
the views of the French government and those entertained by the
other governments relative to the manner in which they should
deal with Mehemet Ali. "I fear," he added, "that no decided
measures of a coercive character will be employed by France for

134Palmerston to Beauvile, Aug. 25, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 315-
317. In another despatch written on the same date to Beauvile, Palmerston
pointed out that up to that time nothing had happened to alter the opinion of
the British government as to the nature of the final settlement which it would
be desirable for the five Powers to effect between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali,
not to change its belief that if the five should agree to press any given arrange-
ment upon the Viceroy, their union would carry sufficient moral weight to ob-
tain from him his acquiescence in their decision. Ibid., pp. 317-319. See also
Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 296.
limiting the ambition of the Viceroy, or for restoring the [Turkish] fleet to the Sultan."136

Meanwhile the Court of St. Petersburg, which from an early date, it will be remembered, had attempted to satisfy the other European Courts, and in particular the Court of St. James, that Russia was not desirous of effecting an armed intervention in Turkey under the provisions of the Treaty of Unkia Skelessi, realized that the seeming accord between England and France in regard to Eastern affairs was likely to disappear. Nesselrode had repeated more than once, Lord Clanricarde, the British Ambassador at the Tsar’s capital, wrote to Palmerston, July 18, 1839, that the Russian government was ready to accede to any proposal which was favorable to the Sultan. In addition, he had expressed great doubts whether the Powers could prevail upon Mehmet Ali to resign Syria immediately and he asked the British Ambassador if he believed France would press, "or even propose" to the Viceroy that he should make such a sacrifice.136 Again, on July 27, 1839, Clanricarde reported that Nesselrode had discussed with him the "probability" that France would desire better terms than those which were favored by the other Powers for Mehmet Ali and whether she would not insist especially that the Egyptian should retain the Pashalic of Acre. Of still more significance was the statement within this despatch which revealed that Nesselrode had told the representative of Great Britain that the precise terms of the final settlement to be imposed upon the hostile parties in the Levant “would virtually depend upon Her Majesty’s Government.”137

While Russia’s chief Minister was making advances thus to the

136Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug. 26, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 321.
137Clanricarde to Palmerston, July 18, 1839, ibid., p. 201. Metternich, also, became suspicious at an early date in regard to the intentions of France. See Metternich to Apponyi, July 14, 1839, Metternich, op. cit., VI, p. 351.
137Clanricarde to Palmerston, July 27, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 237. Nesselrode perceived very early that France was placing more emphasis upon the conclusion of a convention to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire than England was. Aug. 3, 1839, Barante quoted Nesselrode as follows: "‘Je doute qu’il convienne à l’Angleterre,’—me répondit M. de Nesselrode,—‘de voir l’état de l’Orient sous la garantie commune de l’Europe.’”—Barante to Sout, Aug. 3, 1839, Barante, op. cit., VI, p. 276. See also, Barante to Sout, July 20, 1839, ibid., pp. 265-266.
British through their Ambassador at the Muscovite capital he was, on the other hand, becoming less friendly with the French, objecting in particular against the attitude which Louis Philippe's government had assumed on the question of sending its fleet through the Dardanelles. "If, unfortunately, the hope which the Emperor has reason to found upon the moderation of the French Government," he wrote to Count Medem, the Tsar's representative at Paris, "should not be realized; if the appearance of a foreign fleet in the Sea of Marmora should come to aggravate the state of affairs at Constantinople, the course which Russia would have to pursue would not be doubtful. In the presence of a foreign fleet the Emperor's Minister [at Constantinople] would formally protest against the flagrant violation of the principle of the closing of the Dardanelles; a principle which the Porte has at all times considered as a fundamental rule of its policy, and which it has engaged itself to us invariably to maintain; he would declare that he regarded this violation as contrary to the independence of the Porte; he would immediately suspend his functions, and quit Constantinople. Then it would only remain for the Emperor to take such measures as he might consider necessary to re-establish the Porte in its entire independence, and to enable it to fulfil its engagements towards us, free from all foreign constraint."

As time advanced, the anxiety of Russia to come to an understanding with Great Britain increased. Clanricarde stated in a despatch written to Palmerston August 10, 1839, that Nesselrode had repeated to him the same assurances which he had formerly made that the Russian government was most desirous of avoiding any military demonstration, or any necessity for carrying into execution the main clause of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. August 22, 1839, less than two weeks later, the British Ambassador continued: "Count Nesselrode told me yesterday, that he had that morning received a courier from London; that the English Government took the same view of the affairs of Turkey

---


129Clanricarde to Palmerston, Aug. 10, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 299-300.
as that of Russia; that the French Government, in reply to a proposition made by your Lordship, had refused to be a party to coerce Mehemet Ali, who had become more and more insolent, and positive in his demands upon the Sultan.\textsuperscript{140}\textsuperscript{140} Finally, on August 27, 1839, the Russian Chancellor informed Clanricarde that the Emperor, having reason to believe that the British government was better disposed toward Russia and that it entertained a more favorable and just opinion of his views and policy than theretofore, was desirous of improving that disposition to the utmost and of strengthening the good understanding which “so happily existed” between the two Powers. Hence, His Majesty had resolved on sending Baron de Brunnow, one of his most favored diplomats, upon a special mission to London.\textsuperscript{141} The Emperor Nicholas and his ministers perceived, undoubtedly, that the most strategic position in the whole affair was that occupied by Lord Palmerston. If the latter agreed to unite with the Russians upon a definite program, it was practically certain that Austria and Prussia would do likewise\textsuperscript{142} and France would be forced either to conform with

\textsuperscript{140}Clanricarde to Palmerston, Aug. 22, 1839, \textit{ibid.}, p. 375.

\textsuperscript{141}Clanricarde to Palmerston, Aug. 27, 1839, \textit{ibid.}, p. 375. On the same date, according to Clanricarde, Nesselrode told him that the French government would “on no account” join in coercing the Pasha of Egypt by force of arms. It deemed it better that the Sultan should accede to Mehemet Ali’s demands than that armed interference should be effected to prevent the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. In answer, Clanricarde claimed, he said that he was sure that, even if the British government were to be alone in such a course, it would support the just rights and interests of the Sultan. Nesselrode replied “in a manner that showed it was a decision which had been maturely formed. ‘You may be sure that we shall not desert you in such a case.’” See Clanricarde to Palmerston, Aug. 28, 1839, \textit{ibid.}, p. 376. In the same despatch Clanricarde remarked: “On the whole, I found Count Nesselrode yesterday more at his ease upon the state of the Turco-Egyptian Question, than he had been, because, although it appeared more difficult than ever to settle without some act or demonstration of armed intervention, there appeared a chance of Russia and England acting in concert.” Note also the following statement which Barante reported Nesselrode had made to him: “Nous profitions du moment où lord Palmerston est aimable pour nous!”—Barante to Soult, Aug. 28, 1839, Barante, \textit{op. cit.}, VI, p. 311. See also, Schiemann, \textit{op. cit.}, III, p. 383 [footnote].

\textsuperscript{142}Austria and Prussia, it should be remembered, were inclined to favor the position taken by Palmerston, See Russell to Palmerston, June 26, 1839; Beauvale to Palmerston, July 11, 19, Aug. 1, 2, 1839; Hamilton to Palmerston, July 24, Aug. 14, 1839, \textit{Levant Correspondence}, I, pp. 122, 178-181, 192-193, 269-271, 272, 202-203, 302.
the wishes of the other Powers or permit herself to be isolated. However, if the British Minister of Foreign Affairs remained hostile to Russia, he would beyond question agree to some sort of union with the French. Under such circumstances Russia could not even count upon the active support of her eastern neighbors—Austria and Prussia. Hence her position would be one in which there would be real and immediate peril.

Thus at the close of the month of August, 1839, the diplomatic stage for the solution of the Turco-Egyptian question was almost set. The actors had been chosen and each was assuming his proper rôle. France, in her desire to alienate Russia from the Concert of Europe and to wind up the whole affair by a joint convention guaranteeing the integrity and the independence of the Ottoman Empire, was well on the road to failure, and Russia, anxious to avoid what France desired, was about to succeed. The destruction of the Turkish army and the surrender of the Capitan Pasha's fleet had caused the European Powers, excepting France apparently, to look with alarm upon the threatening position of Mehemet Ali, while on the other hand the engagement which M. Boutenieff had taken on July 27, 1839, binding his Court to act in cooperation with the other great Courts of Europe, had removed the fears which those Courts entertained lest Russia should attempt an independent intervention in Turkey under the provisions of the treaty of 1833. In other words, the triumph of the cause of those who wished to see the crisis in the Near East settled on the basis of the "Question of Alexandria" over that of those who wished to see it settled on the basis of the "Question of Constantinople" was imminent.
CHAPTER IV

THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF

JULY 15, 1840

When the Russian Cabinet ordered Brunnow, the Tsar's Minister at Stuttgart, to go on a special mission to London, it gave him instructions defining the limits within which his superiors were willing that he should negotiate. The courts of the maritime Powers, it directed therein, should be requested to abandon the idea of concluding a convention to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. They should also be asked to renounce the project of having their fleets enter the Sea of Marmora if Russian forces should appear there to defend Constantinople against the army of Ibrahim Pasha. If they so agreed, Brunnow should, in turn, announce that the Emperor was ready to consider as a permanent European principle that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles should be closed to the warships of all nations both in times of peace and in times of war. Furthermore he should then declare that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi would not be renewed, and that if it should be necessary to send a Russian detachment to the aid of the Porte it would be done not by reason of the said treaty, but because of engagements about to be contracted between the Powers of Europe and the Sultan.

The Russian Envoy Extraordinary arrived at London on September 15, 1839, and immediately began negotiating with Lord Palmerston. His Emperor, he was careful to explain to the British Minister, agreed entirely with the British views concerning the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, and would join in whatever measures

1During an interview at London, Brunnow declared to Palmerston: "Si vous consentez à reconnaître et à sanctionner formellement le principe que je viens de poser, je suis prêt à vous annoncer que sa majesté ne tient nullement à renouveler le traité d'Unkiar-Iskélessi. Cette transaction a toujours été mal comprise chez vous. L'empereur ne l'a jamais conclue dans l'intérêt exclusif de la Russie. Sa majesté a daigné la signer parce qu'elle l'a envisagée comme un moyen de salut pour la Porte... sa majesté est décidée à ne point faire durer ce traité, si nous parvenons à nous concerter entre nous et à nous entendre sur les moyens nécessaires pour assurer à l'avenir l'existence et le repos de l'empire ottoman." See Brunnow's report, Sept. 12/24, 1839, quoted by Goriainow, op. cit., p. 67.

2Ibid., p. 63.
might be necessary to carry those views into effect. Nicholas would unite with England, Austria, and Prussia, either with France or without her. Though politically speaking, he saw the advantage of having France one of the party, personally he would be better pleased if she should be left out. He felt that he deserved to be trusted and he hoped that the British government, trusting him unreservedly, would agree that if Mehemet Ali by belligerent measures should place Constantinople in danger and render any military or naval operations in the Bosphorus or Asia Minor necessary it would leave that to him, and that it would on its part undertake whatever was to be done in the Mediterranean and on the coasts of Syria and Egypt.

Palmerston must have foreseen that the French Ministers would be alarmed when they learned of the advances which were being made by the Russian representative to Great Britain and it is probable that he believed they would then be more inclined to make concessions in order to come to an understanding with Great Britain in regard to the Turco-Egyptian question. At any rate, he revealed the principal facts about the negotiations, "except the preference of the Emperor to leave France out," to Count Sébastiani, the French Ambassador, who early in September had returned to the British capital after a leave of absence. He let Sébastiani believe that he personally favored the Russian overtures. It seemed to him, he contended, that there was no wise medium between confidence and distrust. If England and France should tie up Russia by a treaty, they could trust her, and trusting her, they had better mix no evidence of suspicion with their confidence. Sébastiani reported promptly to his own government the opinions of the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. "It is evident to me, Monsieur the Marshal," he declared, "that the English Cabinet regards the abolition of the Treaty of Unkar Skelessi as an ample success for its policy in the East. Now this success it does not consider as too dearly purchased by its previous assent to the appearance of Russian forces in the Bosphorus; . . .

---

*Ibid.
*Sébastiani to Soult, Sept. 23, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 551.
*Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 24, 1839, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 301.
"I told Lord Palmerston that the convention [that Brunnow proposed], the basis of which he had just explained to me, would be looked upon in Europe as an act of weakness and of *pusillanimité* towards Russia. Lord Palmerston considers it as an able measure; the action of Russia, even at Constantinople, regulated, defined in advance by the concurrence of the other Powers, seems to him to be the action of the five courts and an abdication of the exclusive protectorate of Russia."

When Marshal Soult received notification of what was going on at the British capital he was aroused indeed. It was not without feelings of painful astonishment, he replied to Sébastiani, that he perceived a man of such "enlightened judgment" as Lord Palmerston entertain with so much complacency a project like the one proposed to him by M. Brunnow. After criticising bitterly the Russian advances and, after charging that the Tsar's government entertained most aggressive designs, he continued: "Whatever may be the consequences of a deplorable difference of opinion, should it effect the accomplishment of the favorite project of Russia, that of separating us from our Allies, we shall not have incurred the responsibility of it. We will keep our ground. It will not be our fault if we no longer find there those who at first placed themselves side by side with us."

Regardless of the attitude which the head of the French Cabinet assumed, Palmerston undoubtedly would have accepted the Russian proposal had the decision rested with him alone. Several

"Sébastiani to Soult, Sept. 23, 1839, Guizot, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 552-553. Sébastiani concluded his despatch as follows: "Lord Palmerston, à qui j'ai demandé où aurait lieu la signature de la convention qu'il venait de m'analyser, m'a répondu: 'Je n'y avais pas songé, mais à Londres si l'on veut.'"


"On Oct. 25, 1839, Palmerston wrote to Clanricarde: "... he [Brunnow] had several long conversations with myself, and with other members of Her Majesty's Government, upon various matters connected with the relations between Great Britain and Russia.

"The substance of all his communications on these different matters was extremely satisfactory; and nothing could be more conciliatory than his manner upon every occasion. He was frank and unreserved in his conversations; and his mission, whatever may be its results, as to the main point upon which it bore, cannot fail to produce beneficial effects upon the relations between the two Governments." *Levant Correspondence*, I, p. 438, *Annual Register*, 1840, p. 475.
members of the British Ministry, however, were unwilling to agree to his views, and at an important Cabinet meeting, held on October 1, 1839, at Windsor, they gained the upper hand.11 "'According to the unanimous opinion of the Council,'" Palmerston informed Brunnow on the following day, "'the military intervention of Russia, if it should become necessary for the protection and defence of Constantinople, ought to take place in such a manner as that it might be combined with a certain degree of cooperation and assistance on the part of the naval forces of England."

"'This co-operation,'" he explained, "'might be settled so as not to blend and not to bring in contact the forces of one Power with those of the other. . . . Each of the two Straits would be placed under the protection of the respective Powers, whose forces would in this manner remain separated, and would not find themselves in [the] presence of each other. You on one side, we on the other, would be there to prevent the Egyptian Army from crossing the canal of Constantinople. . . . All that would be necessary for us, would be to prove to the nation, that we have not consented to allow ourselves to be excluded from a common operation, having for its object to preserve the Capital of the Ottoman Empire; that we have not formally agreed to a principle by which Russia would be empowered to exercise that protectorate alone.'" Brunnow, believing that his instructions were too precise to admit of any deviation therefrom, answered, "'That the will of the Emperor,' being for him the sole rule of his conduct, it was necessary for him to stop at the point at which they had arrived. He would report faithfully to his court the observations which had just been imparted to him and would "'wholly reserve to the Emperor to pronounce upon them a decision which rested with himself alone.'"12

While Brunnow and Palmerston were negotiating thus the gap between the positions taken by the British and French governments in regard to the affairs of the Near East was widening rapidly. On August 30, 1839, Bulwer reported from Paris that he believed the French government would endeavor seriously to

12Brunnow to Nesselrode, Sept. 26/Oct. 8, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 442-446. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 482-483.
get the Pasha to abandon a portion of his demands, but that he feared it would be unwilling to resort to any other means than those of persuasion to accomplish that purpose.\(^1\) Five days later Palmerston had a long conversation with Sébastiani from which he gathered that France was disinclined to be a party to any active measures of coercion which might be employed against Mehemet Ali. The steps which the five Powers would be able to take for such a purpose, Louis Phillipe's representative claimed, would be unsatisfactory. Some of them would be insufficient; others were likely to overshoot their mark. The withdrawal of the consuls might be resorted to if it were done by the five jointly, but he doubted very much that it would produce any effect. A blockade would be ineffectual. Mehemet Ali, he believed, had very few merchant vessels which could be seized, and Ibrahim, even though his communications by sea with Egypt were cut off, could secure supplies by advancing.\(^2\) September 27, 1839, Palmerston conversed again on the subject of the affairs of the Levant with the French Ambassador. At that time the latter presented a plan of settlement which he declared his government was willing to accept.\(^3\) According to that plan Mehemet Ali would evacuate Adana and he would hold Crete in tenure for life only, but all the other territories which he occupied would be given to him in full hereditary possession. Mehemet Ali was becoming very strong and it was necessary to secure peace immediately, Sébastiani explained. The settlement proposed by the French, he argued, would

\(^{1}\) Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug. 30, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 354-356. Soult, it appears, did urge the Pasha to abandon part of his demands. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 140-141.

\(^{2}\) Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 10, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 366-370.

\(^{3}\) At an earlier date Sébastiani had suggested to Palmerston, on his own responsibility and without Soult's knowing of it, that Syria should be divided between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. The line of division, he suggested, should be drawn from the coast at Beyrout through Damascus. When Soult learned of the French Ambassador's suggestion he refused to agree to it. See, Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 23, 1839, Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 27, Oct. 4, 1839, ibid., pp. 395-397, 398-400, 412-414.
strengthen the Sultan, for Mehemet Ali would be satisfied and would always be ready to defend his overlord.¹⁶

The British Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the French should have foreseen, was not in a mood even to consider such a proposal as the one which was made to him by Sébastiani on September 27. On September 1, almost as soon as he perceived that France was unwilling to take steps of coercion against the Viceroy, he wrote to Bulwer: "‘... anxious as we are to continue to go on with them [the French], we are not at all prepared to stand still with them. ...

"They must therefore take their choice between three courses:—
either to go forward with us, and honestly redeem the pledges they have given to us and to Europe; or to stand aloof and shrink from a fulfilment of their own spontaneous declarations; or, lastly, to go right about and league themselves with Mehemet Ali, and employ force to prevent us and those other Powers who may join us from doing that which France herself is bound by every principle of honour; and every enlightened consideration of her real interests, to assist us in doing, ... ’"¹⁷ Instead of adopting
the plan which Sébastiani suggested to him, Palmerston replied with a counter project. The British government was willing, he announced to the Frenchman, to add to the hereditary investiture of Egypt in favor of the Viceroy, the possession equally hereditary of the Pashalic of Acre, exclusive of the fortress. But, he added, it must be on condition that the King's government will accept "its share of action in constraining Mehemet Ali should he refuse the conditions offered."¹⁸

Unfortunately, Sébastiani forwarded to Soult the facts concerning the proposal Palmerston had made to him in the same despatch in which he revealed that the British Cabinet had rejected the plan suggested by the Imperial Court of Russia. The Mar-

¹⁶Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 28, 1839, ibid., pp. 404-406. The French hoped to win the support of Austria to their views. See Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug. 30, Sept. 13, 1839; Beauvale to Palmerston, Oct. 3, 1839, ibid., pp. 354-356, 380-381, 424. Undoubtedly the French Ministers were led to believe by their reports from Cochelet that Mehemet Ali would not accept less favorable terms. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 143-144.


¹⁸Sébastiani to Soult, Oct. 3, 1839, ibid., p. 554.
shal, whose belief that the English government would never go to the extreme of allying itself in the Levant with Russia was thereby strengthened, and who was urged on constantly by the French press to defend Mehemet Ali, replied to Sébastiani, October 14, 1839: "The King's government, after having weighed maturely the objections of the Cabinet of London [to the French proposal], feels bound to persist in the views which I have already communicated to you on the basis of a settlement of the affairs of the East. If our own interests alone were concerned, we might make concessions in favor of our desire to bind more closely our alliance with England; but the question is not of that nature; it consists solely in determining conditions which, while combining in just measure the rights of the Sultan and the future security of his throne with the pretensions of Mehemet Ali, may tend to the pacification of the Ottoman Empire. We feel convinced that the proposals of the British Cabinet could not attain this end, and that, rather than submit to them, Mehemet Ali, who would see in them his ruin, would plunge into the chances of a resistance less dangerous to himself but more embarrassing and compromising for Europe. . . . We should decline driving him to this course, even though we felt absolutely certain that our refusal would be the signal for a close alliance between England and Russia. Fortunately this certainty is far from existing; the reasons which have once already caused the failure of such a strange combination subsist in all their strength. I do not believe they can escape the penetration of Lord Palmerston, and I know positively that some of his colleagues are very deeply impressed by them. Finally, if, contrary to all appearances, this combination should be realized, without doubt we should lament it as the rupture of an alliance to which we attach much value; but we should apprehend little from its immediate effects, because a coalition contrary to the nature of things, and condemned beforehand, even in England, by public


*Note the following: "The desperate fidelity with which the French press clings to its ancient possession—Egypt, should not be lost sight of in the arrangement of the dispute between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali."—*The Times*, Oct. 21, 1839. See also *ibid.*, Sept. 19, Oct. 23, 1839.
opinion,\textsuperscript{21} would necessarily be tainted with impotence.'\textsuperscript{22} Palmerston listened with the ‘most earnest attention’ when Sébastiani revealed to him the contents of this despatch and after the latter had finished speaking he replied: ‘I announce to you, in the name of the Council, that the concession which we had agreed to of a portion of the Pashalic of Acre is withdrawn.’\textsuperscript{23} It is evident that when Soult and his colleagues decided to favor openly the cause of Mehemet Ali they realized that such a course would tend to occasion suspicion at the other European courts in regard to their intentions. A report drawn up by Granville, October 25, 1839, soon after his return to Paris, is significant indeed in this connection. The French government, he wrote, stated that if it were supposed that it had any desire to aggrandize the Pasha of Egypt such supposition was groundless. France would be willing even, if it were possible, to restore ‘Egypt itself’ to the Sultan.\textsuperscript{24} The question, however, was not what was desirable but what was feasible. France did not see ‘the means of driving Mehemet Ali out of Syria.’ She could not furnish a military force

\textsuperscript{21} See, in this connection, editorials in \textit{ibid.}, Oct. 25, Nov. 14, 1839.
\textsuperscript{22} Soult to Sébastiani, Oct. 14, 1839, quoted by Guizot, \textit{op. cit.}, IV, pp. 365-366. See also, Bulwer to Palmerston, Oct. 7, 1839, \textit{Levant Correspondence}, I, pp. 417-419. It was significant of the divergent courses upon which the two governments were embarked that, almost at the same time, Admiral Roussin was recalled from Constantinople, and Colonel Campbell from Alexandria—the Frenchman because of his hostility to, and the Englishman because of his sympathy with Mehemet Ali. The former was succeeded by Admiral Pontois and the latter by Colonel Hodges. See, Hall, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 257. Palmerston to Hodges, Sept. 27, 1839, \textit{Levant Correspondence}, I, p. 401. Paton, \textit{op. cit.}, II, pp. 162-164.
\textsuperscript{23} Sébastiani to Soult, Oct. 18, 1839, quoted by Guizot, \textit{op. cit.}, IV, pp. 366-367. See also Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 29, 1839. \textit{Levant Correspondence}, I, pp. 458-462. At the same time when England and France were failing to agree upon a plan of solution for the Turco-Egyptian question, Mehemet Ali was being encouraged by Cochelet’s activities to persist in all of his demands, and the Ottoman ministers were being directly encouraged by the representatives of England, Austria, and Russia to persist in refusing to carry on any negotiations whatsoever with the Viceroy. See Guichen, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 167, 169 ff.
\textsuperscript{24} Soult, it seems, was always anxious to make it appear that his government entertained no partiality in favor of Mehemet Ali. See \textit{ibid.}, pp. 102-103, 176.
for that purpose; England was not prepared to send an army to the Levant; nor were Austria and Prussia able to do so. Therefore, measures of coercion could be undertaken by Russia only, and the moral power of the Sultan would be far more seriously impaired by having his Empire and his capital protected by the Muscovites than by the undue aggrandizement of his vassal. After the total rout of the Turkish army and the surrender of the fleet by the Capitan Pasha, Marshal Soult explained upon a later occasion, the position of affairs was entirely changed. "... we had to consider," he declared, "what it was possible to do, as well as what arrangement it was desirable to effect. The French Government is not disposed to deny, that the arrangement proposed by the British Government, if it could be carried into effect, affords a better security to the Turkish Empire than the arrangement proposed by France; but we have not the means of compelling Mehemet Ali to evacuate Syria, and we must not vouloir l'impossible." A naval blockade, he emphasized, could not effect that object. Russia alone could send troops, and her occupation of Constantinople and Asia Minor would be a "far more irrevocable blow" to the independence of the Sultan than if all the territories occupied by the Egyptians were conceded to the administration of Mehemet Ali.

Lord Palmerston, it appears, was unmoved by the French contentions. Influenced by the reports which he received relative to discontent existing within the domains of the Viceroy, he re-

25Granville to Palmerston, Oct. 25, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 457. On Oct. 21, 1839, Granville wrote to Palmerston: "[At the French foreign office] I found with regret, that the language of the Marshal manifested a less anxious desire to act in union and concert with Her Majesty's Government, than appeared in his communications with me on his first undertaking the duties of Minister for Foreign Affairs." Soult spoke, Granville reported, of Mehemet Ali as having an army 150,000 strong and a fleet of 20 sail of the line.—Ibid., pp. 436-437.

26Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 18, 1839, ibid., pp. 489-490.

27Note the following extract from a despatch, Ponsonby to Palmerston, Oct. 16, 1839: "The reports from the Consuls in Syria, which go home, and other information I have received all show how little solid power the Egyptians have; and a report from the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria to the Inter-nuncio, which I have read, ... , gives an account from Alexandria of a similar state of things."—Ibid., p. 473. See also Young to Palmerston, Aug. 19, 1839; Werry to Palmerston, Aug. 30, 1839; Ponsonby to Rechid, Oct. 25, 1839;
fused to believe that the latter could offer any serious resistance to a European force. On November 22, 1839, he wrote to Granville: "With respect to the notion, that the Five Powers acting in union with the Sultan, have not the means of compelling the Pasha of Egypt to evacuate Syria, that opinion is one which it can scarcely be worth while seriously to argue; the disparity of forces between the two parties... being so infinitely great, that resistance on the part of the Pasha must necessarily be vain." Furthermore, Great Britain could not agree, he continued, that Russian assistance to the Sultan, if given in pursuance of a concert between the five allied Powers, would necessarily occasion favors or concessions from Turkey to Russia that would be injurious to the former's independence. 28

In the meantime Baron Brunnow had returned to his former post at Stuttgart and had communicated to the Court of St. Petersburg the full particulars concerning his mission to the Court of St. James. 29 The Tsar and his Cabinet received Brunnow's reports with real satisfaction. "The Emperor has been well pleased," Nesselrode wrote to Meyendorff, October 8, 1839, "... If the plan of Lord Palmerston is adopted the Anglo-French alliance is ipso-facto dissolved and is replaced, in the affairs of the Orient, by an accord between the two Imperial Courts and England. ... For myself, I avow to you that I should like very much the plan of Lord Palmerston." 30 The letter from which this extract has been copied was written after Nicholas and his Chancellor had read the first despatch which Brunnow had forwarded to them after his arrival in England. When they received his final reports they were still far from being dissatisfied. They were aware that the kind of a settlement which the French

Laurin to Sturmer, Oct. 15, 1839, ibid., pp. 414-415, 415-416, 484-485, 486. The reports which the French government received from the East were contradictory to these. See, Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 25, Dec. 6, 1839, ibid., pp. 500, 514.

28Palmerston to Granville, Nov. 22, 1839, ibid., pp. 490-491.

29While Baron Brunnow was returning to Stuttgart, he met Metternich at Johannisberg, on the Rhine, and succeeded, it seems, in convincing him that the Russian plan for the settlement of the question of the Near East was sound. Goriainow, op. cit., p. 73. Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 102. King of Belgians to Victoria, Oct. 24, 1839, Queen Victoria's Letters, I, pp. 189-191.

government wished was not in conformity with their own desires. Seeing in the proposals of Lord Palmerston the means of realizing the essential parts of their program as well as an opportunity for the destruction of the troublesome Anglo-French alliance, they determined immediately to agree to them. Accordingly they so instructed Brunnow and ordered him to return to Great Britain where he should negotiate with the view of concluding a convention on the basis of the English conditions.

It would have been very difficult for the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to adopt a policy which would have been more satisfactory to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. "... The Russian government agrees," he stated on December 6, 1839, "to our proposal about the Dardanelles, and is willing that if a Russian force shall enter the Bosphorus, ships of war of all the other cooperating Powers shall enter the Dardanelles. ... This will give us a pull upon France, and will enable us to carry our own views into execution about Turkey and Egypt; for Austria and Prussia will side with us and Russia;—and France if she stands aloof, will be left to herself."

The French Cabinet, on the other hand, was both surprised and disturbed. Marshal Soult and his colleagues had not expected to see Russia abandon her privileged position in regard to Turkey by admitting that French, English, and Austrian ships of war might appear simultaneously with her own in the waters before Con-

---

31The Brunnow missions have often been explained as having been occasioned by Russia's desire to separate England and France. At the time Nesselrode claimed that his advances to England were made because of the similarity in British and Russian views upon Levant affairs. It is probable that some truth lies with each of these contentions. See Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Nov. 19, Dec. 20, 1839, ibid., pp. 292, 297. Claricarde to Palmerston, Oct. 18, Nov. 5, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 458, 482. According to Hasenclever, Nesselrode maintained in a report to the Tsar that the Brunnow mission was prompted by fear lest France, England, and Austria should unite in an alliance to guarantee the integrity and the independence of the Ottoman Empire. It is Hasenclever's contention that Brunnow was sent on his first mission to London merely to feel out the British position. If his mission was directed against anyone it was against Metternich. See Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 82-85.

32Claricarde to Palmerston, Nov. 22, 1839; Nesselrode to Kisseleff, Nov. 10/22, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 503, 504-505.

stantinople.

Less than two weeks before it became known in western Europe that Russia was ready to concede all that Lord Palmerston demanded, Marshal Soult had declared in a despatch written to Sébastiani that France had had in view principally the European side of the question. England, he complained, had been too much engrossed with considerations relative to the respective positions of the Porte and of the Viceroy. France had aimed, above all, to abolish the exclusive and predominant protectorship which Russia was beginning to impose upon the Porte, or at least to prevent that protectorship from finding in the current crisis a new occasion for its exercise and its legalization. England had at first appeared to pursue the same object, but, he feared, she had since "somewhat lost sight of these views." The news which soon arrived unexpectedly from the Muscovite capital seemed to prove that Soult's suspicions in regard to the intentions of Russia were without foundation. The French Cabinet thereby lost its leading argument against the ideas and plan of Lord Palmerston.

The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, adopting the only logical course which remained open to him, instructed Sébastiani, December 9, 1839, to convey to the English Ministers his satisfaction at the unlooked for concessions on the part of Russia. "We may now," he said, "at last hope for a return to the true path; . . . if the overtures of Russia are such as they have been described to you, if they contain nothing more, nothing at least that can change their bearing, I am ready to authorize you to accede to them formally. I even go farther; the King's government, acknowledging with its accustomed loyalty, that a convention entered into on such a basis would change materially the aspect of affairs, would find in it a sufficient motive to reconsider the whole of the Eastern question, even with regard to the points on which each of the Powers seemed to have formed its opinion so absolutely that pro-

---

*a*Guizot, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 369.


*a*Guizot, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 369.
longed debate appeared impossible.”37 The French, nevertheless, continued their extensive naval preparations in the Mediterranean,38 and “some days” after the despatch, a part of which has been quoted above, was written, the Marshal returned to the position of suspicion in regard to Russia which he had taken often before “to repulse the urgencies of the English Cabinet.” “‘I repeat it,’” he wrote to Sébastiani, “‘all these tactics resolve themselves into two words: They [the Russians] seek to break up the Anglo-French alliance to which Europe has owed for ten years the preservation of peace. It is impossible that the Cabinet of London cannot fail to see this as clearly as we do; and as I am certain it would deplore such a result equally with ourselves . . . I feel no hesitation in calling the most serious attention of Lord Palmerston and his colleagues to this state of things.’”389

In due course of time, Brunnow arrived at the British capital on his second mission, bringing with him an elaborately worked out plan of an arrangement, which was in harmony with British views, for the settlement of the Eastern question. The quarrel between the Porte and the Pasha, he proposed therein, should be settled definitely under the guarantee of Europe. Mehemet Ali

37Soult to Sébastiani, Dec. 9, 1839, ibid., p. 557. See also, Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, English Historical Review, Jan. 1903, XVIII, p. 126.
39Ibid., pp. 369-370. Barante accused Prussia and Austria, as well as Russia, of desiring to see the Anglo-French alliance destroyed. See Barante to Soult, Dec. 14, 1839, quoted by Guichen, op. cit., p. 180. It is certain that Metternich, at least, had no love for France. On April 27, 1840, he wrote to King Leopold of Belgium: “Your Majesty calls France a dangerous neighbour, and you add that what is happening there displeases you, and deserves general attention. I quite agree; but I extend the principle beyond the present to the past. France is a lost land (as far as lands can be) and a ceaseless source of misfortune for the whole of Europe. When the foundations of order are shattered in any empire, it will take more than a lifetime to restore it to equilibrium in itself and with its neighbours . . . Yet this State continues its baleful propaganda, based upon the impulse to communicate its own misery to others in order to have equality.”—Quoted by E. C. Corti, Leopold I of Belgium, p. 125.
should receive Egypt and Syria to the fortress of Acre, in hereditary possession. All the other territories which he held he should restore to the Sultan immediately. If he refused to accept such an arrangement, measures of coercion defined by the representatives of the Powers at London should be employed against him. In the event of Ibrahim Pasha advancing into Asia Minor, Russia would pass the Bosphorus with troops for disembarkation and would undertake the defense of Constantinople in the name of the concert. The other Powers might then pass the Dardanelles, each with two or three ships of war, to cruise in the waters of the Sea of Marmora “between Gallipoli and the Gulf of Moudania.” As soon as the object proposed was attained by the submission of Mehemet Ali, the Porte would resume full and immutable possession of the right of closing the two Straits against all the flags of Europe. Brunnow revealed his proposals to the British government early in January, 1840, and on the fifth day of the month Palmerston declared to Sébastiani: “Brunnow is empowered to negotiate with the object of bringing about a permanent and definite solution of the Turkish and Egyptian question, in order to ensure the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Baron Neumann has arrived from Vienna and has expressed to us that Austria is entirely with us and Russia in this important affair. I think I can say for certain that Prussia will look at matters in the same light. It only remains for us, therefore, to secure a European accord on a question which is incontestably the most important that we have had to deal with these last years. We sincerely hope that the co-operation of France will not be refused.


“Affaires étrangères, 654 Angleterre, Sébastiani to Soult, Jan. 5, 1840, quoted by Hall, op. cit., p. 258.
Matters, nevertheless, proceeded very slowly. The representatives of England, Austria, and Russia were able to agree upon the main points at issue, but the plenipotentiary of Prussia was without instructions, and the Ambassador of France was unable to announce what attitude his court would assume in case the other Powers resolved to employ coercive measures against the Viceroy. Furthermore, before the negotiations had proceeded very far it was resolved that the final arrangement which should be concluded should be in the form of a convention between the Powers on the one hand and the Porte on the other. Hence it was necessary to await the arrival of a representative from Turkey. This delay of affairs was intensely gratifying to Marshal Soult who believed that the Emperor of Russia would not author-

"Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Jan. 31, 1840, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 8-9. Palmerston to Ponsonby, Jan. 25, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 560. Beauvale reported to Palmerston, Jan. 12, 1840, that Metternich was willing even to go on without France if France refused "to go along" with the other Powers.—Ibid., pp. 559-560. From April until June, 1840, the Austrians, nevertheless, did hesitate to go on without France. This was occasioned perhaps by Austrian suspicion of Russian intentions. On January 11, 1840, Muhlenberg, the American representative at Vienna, wrote: "Under these circumstances [the physical weakness of Metternich] little business of any consequence can be expected to be transacted for sometime here, the Prince [Metternich] being the center from which alone light, heat and activity emanate. . . ."

"The Austrian Government, as you are no doubt aware, does not like the French people or the Government but there is no little jealousy entertained on the other hand towards Russia, a jealousy which is certainly not on the decline having been newly awakened by some rather imprudent publications in regard to Germany evidently emanating from Russian Agents."—State Dept. Austria, I, Muhlenberg to Forsyth, No. 10, Jan. 11, 1840.

"On Jan. 25, 1840, Palmerston wrote to Ponsonby that the Prussian envoy expected to receive instructions soon similar to those which had been received by the plenipotentiaries of Austria and Russia.—See, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 560.

"Soult maintained continually that the means of coercion which the Powers proposed to employ against Mehemet would be inadequate. He wrote to Sébastiani, Jan. 26, 1840: "A moins d'abandonner le sultan à sa faiblesse, ne seraient-elles pas forcées de souffrir qu'une armée impériale traversât l'Asie Mineure et la Syrie pour refouler jusqu'en Egypte les soldats du vice-roi? Je ne pense pas que cette extrémité pût convenir à l'Angleterre plus qu'elle ne nous conviendrait à nous-mêmes."—Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 569.

"The idea of having the Porte become a party to the convention was suggested by Palmerston. See Sébastiani to Soult, Jan. 20, 1840, ibid., pp. 564-568. Guichen, op. cit., p. 208."
ize Brunnow to bind his court by a treaty to which the Porte was a party.47 He calculated that it would be two months before an envoy of the Sultan could arrive in London, and he seemed to rejoice, Granville reported on January 31, 1840, that the French government would not be under the immediate necessity of refusing or assenting to sign a convention of the five Powers in regard to the affairs of the Levant.48

Although Louis Philippe's Minister of Foreign Affairs did not expect that the negotiators at the British capital would attain important results in the near future, he realized that the situation was a dangerous one for France.49 The position which Palmerston had taken "disturbed and wearied" him and his colleagues. They began to fear that their cause was not being defended properly at the Court of St. James. Because of Sébastiani's "antecedents" they looked upon him as "too favorable to Turkey," and so nearly in accord with the opinions of Lord Palmerston as to be ill fitted "for the vigorous support of opposite views." He appeared to them to be neither a true representative of the French government, nor an effective interpreter of the policy for which the debates [of June and July, 1839] in the Chamber of Deputies "had established a precedent."50 Therefore, they resolved to recall

"Granville to Palmerston, Jan. 27, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 564. The French Ministers continued to believe that an alliance between England and Russia was not practicable. See an extract taken from a speech delivered by M. Villemain, the Minister of Public Instruction, in the Chamber of Deputies early in Jan., 1840.—The Examiner, Jan. 12, 1840, p. 19. For additional remarks made by Villemain concerning Near Eastern affairs see Journal des Débats, Jan. 12, 1840.

"Granville to Palmerston, Jan. 31, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 573-574.

"It should be noted that on Jan. 27, 1840, Sébastiani reported that Palmerston had replied in the affirmative to Neumann's official inquiry as to whether, in the event of the four Powers arriving at an agreement, and France withholding her consent, the clauses of the treaty would be acted upon in spite of her abstention. See Affaires étrangères, 654 Angleterre, Sébastiani to Soult, Jan. 27, 1840, cited by Hall, op. cit., pp. 258-259.

"Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 370. Note the following extract from a letter, Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843: "...it did so happen that Sébastiani was sincerely anxious to maintain the integrity and independence of Turkey, and did not care a straw for Mehemet Ali; and that Guizot was heart and soul for Mehemet Ali, and did not care much about the dignity and independence of the Turkish empire."—English Historical Review, XVIII, p. 127.
him, and they chose as his successor, François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, who, it will be remembered, had argued eloquently on July 2, 1839, for the maintenance of the status quo in the Near East.

Before Guizot departed from Paris he received instructions from Marshal Soult which revealed clearly that the main object of his mission should be to obtain from the government of England great concessions to the advantage of the Egyptian Pasha. "The King's government," Soult explained in those instructions, "has believed and still believes that, in the condition in which Mehemet Ali finds himself, to offer him less than the hereditary possession of Egypt and Syria as far as Mount Taurus, would be to expose ourselves to a refusal . . . on his part which in case of need he would sustain by a desperate resistance the rebound of which would shake and perhaps subvert the Ottoman Empire; . . ." 51

Before Guizot had an opportunity to attempt negotiations on the basis of the Marshal's instructions, the Soult Ministry, having sustained a parliamentary defeat on the question of granting a donation of 500,000 livres per annum to the Duc de Nemours, resigned. 52 Soult and his colleagues went out of office on February 29, 1840, and their places were taken directly by a cabinet formed under the leadership of M. Thiers. In the Chamber of Deputies, January 13, 1840, Thiers had delivered a noteworthy address defending the Anglo-French alliance. 53 His remarks on that occasion

51 Instructions given by Soult to Guizot, Feb. 19, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 416.
52 Ibid., IV, pp. 374-375.

attracted much attention and were commented upon extensively throughout both England and France. An English press correspondent who heard the speech went so far as to declare: "It [Thiers' speech] . . . had as powerful an effect as any burst of eloquence that I ever witnessed. Thiers rose to warmth and eloquence only when treating of the English alliance. He had certainly for the moment the sentiments of the chamber against him, so much so that once or twice he raised an incipient murmur. He braved all, and overcame all, however, and none dared to lift up a voice against him. This speech is more than an effort of eloquence, it is a great and good act tending strongly to re-knit those bonds between the countries which foolish hands were daily loosening." Consequently, when Thiers entered office many expected that the two western Powers would come promptly to an understanding in regard to Turco-Egyptian affairs. Lord Palmerston even remarked that he did not despair of finding that the opinions of the new French Ministers would "approximate more


"The Examiner, Jan. 19, 1840, p. 35. Lamartine, who spoke in the Chamber of Deputies on Jan. 11, 1840, favored partitioning the Turkish territories, giving Constantinople to Russia, Egypt to England, Asia Minor to France, and the coast of the Adriatic to Austria. According to his opinion, Mehemet Ali was only an "ephemeral adventurer." "The high road from Asia to Europe, since the perfection of steam," he declared, "lay through Egypt and the Red Sea. Mehemet Ali posted himself as the gaoler of that sea, the obstacle to prevent the communication between East and West, which England would never suffer, if it took her a century's war to put it down. By supporting Egypt, France made herself the rival of England, whilst she might remain England's friend, with more advantage."—Ibid., J. Irving, The Annals of Our Time, p. 22. Journal des Débats, Jan. 12, 1840. Lamartine's ideas were condemned both by the Ministry and by the press in France. See a speech delivered by Villemain in answer to Lamartine and editorial comment thereon.—Ibid., Jan. 12, 13, 1840.

See a letter from Paris, March 25, 1840. The Times, March 27, 1840.
nearly than those of their predecessors, to the views of the Four Powers.”

Time soon revealed, however, that Thiers was no more anxious than Marshal Soult had been to defy the wrath of public opinion in France by joining those who wished to coerce the Viceroy. In instructions which he sent to Guizot he declared that it was essential to gain time, to say that the French Cabinet had formed no absolute opinion or resolution, to discuss the various lines of policy, to demonstrate the inconveniences of that which Lord Palmerston was anxious to see adopted, and thus to retard a final decision. It was necessary also to hold no official relations whatever except with the English Ministers, and in this way to disengage the French government from the ties imposed on it by the note of July 27, 1839. He did not mean that France should recede from the obligation which she had contracted when Roussin signed the collective note, but he hoped that in the presence of incessant difficulties attending a concert between the five Powers, the Sultan and the Pasha would come finally to an agreement between themselves, or rather, that from being tired of the question, the Powers would accept and guarantee to the Porte and its vassal, “the maintenance of the status quo; which, according to his [Thiers’] opinion, was the best of the combinations.”

87Palmerston to Beauvale, March 12, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 600-603. Annual Register, 1840, p. 491. On March 9, 1840, Granville had written to Palmerston: “M. Thiers then proceeded to say, that whatever turn affairs might take in the East, there was no danger of firing of cannon between our fleets; he hoped that the two Governments might arrive at a concordance of opinion in the Turco-Egyptian Question, but even should they not agree upon the measures to be pursued, such disagreement would not affect the friendly relations between the two countries.”—Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 598-599. See also, Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, English Historical Review, XVIII, p. 128.

88At a later date, June, 1840, the British suspected rightly that Thiers was secretly encouraging the Sultan and the Pasha to come to an agreement between themselves. See, Hall, op. cit., pp. 269-272. Letters from Constantinople, June 27, 1840, The Times, July 20, 30, 1840.

89Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 64. On April 25, 1840, Thiers wrote to Barante: “En résumé le gouvernement du Roi est prêt à négocier. Il ne consentira, il est vrai, à entrer dans aucune conférence, dans aucune délibération commune et formelle, parce qu’il croit qu’il pourrait en sortir de nouvelles complications. Il ne fait aucune proposition, il ne prend aucune initiative, mais si le projet de transaction qui avait été mis en avant, et qui consistait à donner à Mehemed Ali,
It did not take long for Lord Palmerston to perceive that the hopes which he had entertained in regard to the policies of Louis Philippe's new ministers would not be realized. They continued the naval preparations in the Mediterranean which had been begun while Marshal Soult was in office and that was particularly distasteful to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. "The truth is," the latter wrote on April 16, 1840, "however reluctant one may [be to] avow the conviction, that Louis Philippe is a man in whom no solid trust can be reposed. However, there he is, and we call him our ally; only we ought to be enlightened by experience and not to attach to his assertions or professions any greater value than really belongs to them; more especially when, as in the case of Egypt, his words are not only at variance with

moyennant la rétrocession d'Adana, de Candia et des villes Saintes l'investiture héréditaire de la Syrie et de l'Égypte, si ce projet qu'il croit réunir, plus qu'aucun autre, les conditions de succès, était agréé par les cours alliées, il n’hésiterait pas d'user de toute son influence pour décider Mehemed Ali à l'accepter."—Quoted by Schiemann, op. cit., III, p. 396, [footnote].

*In a conversation with Granville, March 13, 1840, Thiers took up the same line of argument which Soult had pursued. It was a matter of indifference to the French government, he claimed, whether or not Mehemet Ali retained Syria, but he was persuaded that the coercive measures which the Powers proposed to use against the Pasha would fail and that the attempt would entail evils of far greater magnitude than any that could be apprehended from Egyptian occupation of the disputed territory. At the same time he declared also that no ministry in France, however composed, could act hostilely against Egypt for the purpose of restoring the pashalic to the direct authority of the Porte.—Granville to Palmerston, March 13, 20, April 3, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 603-604, 605-606, 617. Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, English Historical Review, XVIII, p. 128.

*Palmerston to Granville, March 5, May 5, 1840; Granville to Palmerston, March 9, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 597-598, 644-646, 598-599.

*By the name "Louis Philippe," Palmerston probably meant the French government. It is true, however, that he was particularly hostile to the French King. See Palmerston to Granville, April 23, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 311-312.

*See also, Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 42-43. The attitude of France in regard to Egypt disturbed other Englishmen besides Lord Palmerston. The following is an extract from a letter published in The Examiner: "England holds rank as a first rate power by her Eastern empire, and quick and sure communication and connection with that empire has become an object of vital necessity. If France would deny us this, France is our enemy, our gratuitous and self-made enemy. War with her becomes inevitable, sooner or later, and it comes better when all the powers are leagued against her, than when she shall have had time to detach one of them from the group."—The Examiner, April 5, 1840, p. 212.
his conduct, but even inconsistent with each other. The Cabinet have determined that we must without delay bring the French to a clear and definite arrangement about their fleet; unless they will reduce their ships in commission to ten—the number which Soult stated to you in July last—as the intended amount of the French active force, we must go down to Parliament and ask for an additional vote upon the specific ground of the unexplained armament of France.'”

During the month of March, 1840, Guizot had conferences frequently with Palmerston and other members of the British Cabinet. The question of the Near East was often the subject of conversation at those conferences and, although some of Palmerston's colleagues were very anxious to avoid measures which might occasion a break between England and France, Guizot realized, ere long, that it would be difficult to induce the English Secretary of Foreign Affairs to modify his plans. "I am now convinced," he reported to Thiers, March 12, "that Lord Palmerston has no intention of doing or deciding anything until the arrival of the Turkish plenipotentiary. We have therefore time [before us]. But I must even now observe to your Excellency that this advantage would become a danger perhaps should we suffer ourselves to suppose that, because he does nothing now, he will do nothing later, and that we shall be definitely released from taking a resolu-

"Palmerston to Granville, April 16, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 310-311. Two days before Palmerston wrote this letter, Thiers declared in the Chamber of Peers: "La France croit que les provinces conquises par le pacha sont plus utilement, placées dans ses mains que dans celles du Sultan. Car la Syrie, par exemple, exposerait le Sultan à dépenser beaucoup d'hommes et d'argent pour administrer une province qui finirait par lui échapper, tandis que, laissée dans les mains du Pacha, celui-ci en tirera assez d'argent et d'hommes pour la bien gouverner."—Journal des Débats, April 15, 1840. See also Parl. Debates, LIV, p. 782. Granville to Palmerston, April 15, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 628.

"Guizot, in his Mémoires has described at length his early proceedings at London. See, Guizot, op. cit., V, chapters XVII and XVIII. Guizot learned at one of his early conferences with Palmerston about two drafts already prepared for an arrangement to conclude the Turco-Egyptian question. These two drafts, one of British and the other of Continental—perhaps Austrian—origin, according to Guizot, were similar except that the latter was to be signed by the representatives of the great Powers alone while the former was to be signed by the representatives of the Porte as well as by those of the Powers. In both, Mehemet Ali was to be denied the possession of Syria. See ibid., pp. 44-45.
tion because we are not pressed to do so immediately. The more I observe, the more I satisfy myself that the British Cabinet considers the circumstances as favorable for settling the affairs of the East, and wishes seriously to take advantage of them. It would much prefer to act in concert with us; [and] it is disposed to make concessions to establish that concert. Nevertheless, if, on our part, we do not decide on something positive, if we appear to desire only to adjourn and convert all difficulties into impossibilities, a moment may arrive, I think, when . . . the British Cabinet would act without us and with others rather than not act at all.'

Meanwhile, the Porte, conforming with the suggestion which Palmerston, in his despatch of January 25, 1840, had directed Ponsonby to make to it, ordered Nouri Effendi, the Turkish Ambassador at Paris, to proceed to London. It was not the intention of the Porte that Nouri should be its permanent agent at the conference of the Powers, for it was anxious to be represented by an abler person who, "coming direct from Constantinople, would be better informed as to the state of affairs in the East and more capable of enlightening the western diplomats as to the chances of success" which various proposals might have. The mission of the Turkish Ambassador residing in France was to continue only until such a personage could be sent to succeed him.

April 7, 1840, soon after his arrival at the British capital, Nouri forwarded to the representatives of the five great Powers notes similar in character, informing them that he had power to conclude a convention for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian question. The Sultan expected, he intimated, that such a convention would be drawn up on the basis of his [the Sultan's] offer to grant the hereditary possession of Egypt to Mehemet Ali provided that the Viceroy would restore to him the Ottoman fleet and evacuate all of the other provinces which he [the Viceroy]...
was then holding. Guizot replied the following day by a brief acknowledgment in which he stated to the Ottoman plenipotentiary that he would lay the note before his home government. Lord Palmerston and the envoys of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, on the other hand, answered the notes which Nouri had written to them by statements almost identical, expressing a willingness to concert with His Excellency in order to discover the best means of realizing the "friendly intentions" which the representatives of the five Powers had manifested in the name of their respective courts, by the collective note of July 27, 1839.

In the interval which had elapsed while the negotiations were being delayed because of the absence of a Turkish envoy, the government of Berlin had finally sent instructions to von Bülow, its minister at Queen Victoria's Court, ordering him to follow a policy in conformity with the one which had been adopted by Austria. Consequently, when Nouri Effendi arrived in London and announced that he was empowered to negotiate on the basis favored by Palmerston and Brunnov, it appeared as though France was the only Power which stood in the way of an immediate settlement.

""... all the world is at the feet of England,"" Guizot wrote to the Duc de Broglie, April 7, 1840; ""all the world offers to do what she pleases; we alone say no, we who call ourselves her particular friends. And it is in the name of our friendship, to maintain our alliance that we ask her not to accept what all the others offer. We are in the right, but we are not accommodating."

Thiers also, it appears, perceived that the four Powers were

69 Nouri Effendi to Palmerston, April 7, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 624-625. Nouri Effendi to Guizot, April 7, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 420-423. Ibid., p. 76.
70 Guizot to Nouri Effendi, April 8, 1840, ibid., p. 424. At first Thiers was so dissatisfied with Nouri's note that he ordered Guizot to make no additional reply. Later he permitted him to make an evasive one. See ibid., pp. 76-78.
71 Guizot to Nouri Effendi, ibid., p. 425.
72 Ibid., pp. 77, 424-425. Palmerston to Nouri Effendi, April 11, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 627.
73 See Ponsonby to Palmerston, Feb. 26, 1840, ibid., p. 605.
74 An extract from a letter quoted by Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 52-53. See also, Guizot to Dumon, April 7, 1840, De Witt, Lettres de M. Guizot à sa Famille et à ses amis, pp. 186-188.
united upon the principles involved in regard to the Turco-
Egyptian question and that France was in danger of being iso-
lated, for about the middle of April, when it was proposed to him
that there should be established in London a formal conference
of the five Powers to consider and determine what measures
should be adopted to settle the Eastern affair, he refused to be a
party to such a conference, stating that if it should be decided
there to drive Mehemet Ali out of Syria, France would refuse to
assist in carrying out such measures, and her refusal to join in
them after she had been a party to the conference would render
her separation from the other Powers a more marked step than
it would be if no conference of the five were to take place.74

Many writers have criticised Thiers for adopting such an un-
compromising attitude. Those criticisms are, to a large extent at
least, unjust. The policy followed by the administration of Mar-
shal Soult, to which Thiers fell heir, and the temper of the French
people placed him in a position from which there was no other
safe nor creditable escape.75 Because of the existing circumstances
it was imperative that he should refuse to cooperate with the other
Cabinets of Europe if they should attempt to coerce Mehemet Ali.
It is certain that if he had joined with Lord Palmerston and his
allies on the basis of the Anglo-Russian terms his official career
would have ended immediately. He maintained always that the
amount of territory which the Pasha should receive would matter
little to him if the latter would accept it willingly, and it is prob-
able that he was sincere in this contention. While he was declar-
ing to the representatives of the Powers that France would not
join them in coercing the Pasha, he was at the same time writing
to Cochelet directing him to warn Mehemet Ali to be more
moderate in his demands.76 Indeed, in one of his despatches to
the French Consul-General at Alexandria he even enjoined him
"to make it clearly understood by Mehemet Ali," that France

74Granville to Palmerston, April 17, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp.
628-629. Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, English Historical Review,
XVIII, pp. 128-129.
75See Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 315.
76Granville to Palmerston, April 20, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 630.
would not "sacrifice its alliance with England to the interests of the Pasha."  

Although in April, 1840, the governments of England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia were agreed upon the main principles which were involved in the question of the Near East, they were not ready to sign a convention to which France would not be a party. Austria and Prussia particularly were anxious that the concert of Europe should be complete. " 'All we desire,' " von Bülow declared to Guizot, early in April, 1840, " . . . 'is that France should not separate from the other Powers in this matter; this is nearly the only instruction I have received from my sovereign. Can we not find some middle course which may preserve to all parties their old engagements and personal situations, and form the basis of a pacific settlement between the Sultan and the Pasha? It is necessary to seek for varied combinations, for some trifling concessions on all sides, some modifications in the form or quality of the Pasha's dominion, in a word, a ground somewhat new on which we may unite.' "  

The attitude which Baron Neumann, the Austrian representative, assumed in his conversations with Guizot was of a similar character. On April 15, some days after von Bülow made the statement quoted above, he intimated to the Frenchman that even all Syria might be given to Mehemet Ali for life if France would join with the other Powers. When Guizot replied that the King's government, on its own account, attached little importance to the distribution of territory between the two parties; that it earnestly desired that the transaction should be acceptable to both; but that nothing authorized it to believe that the Pasha would be disposed to give way on the heirship of Syria, the Austrian continued: " 'My government is as anxious as yours for the maintenance of peace in the East; . . . what

"Granville to Palmerston, May 1, 1840, ibid., p. 644. At a later date, Thiers, while speaking to Bulwer of the attitude which he maintained in regard to Mehemet Ali, declared: " 'In short,' . . . 'to you I speak in his favour, but to himself I argue in favour of Turkey.' ",—Bulwer to Palmerston, July 17, 1840, ibid., II, p. 7.  

"Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 78-79. This statement was made by von Bülow during an interview which he had with Guizot "Dès qu'on avait su Nouri-Effendi arrivé à Londres, et avant la remise de sa note." See ibid., p. 78.  

"Two days earlier, April 13, von Bülow had likewise intimated that Syria might be left to Mehemet Ali for life. See ibid., pp. 79-81.  

"Ibid., pp. 81-82.
we consider important is, that there should be a really effective settlement, and this cannot take place unless we all fall into the same view. The Emperor, my master, and the King of Prussia equally, desire this."

In truth, the government of Austria was alarmed considerably by the situation of affairs. On April 25, 1840, Prince Metternich forwarded to Neumann a memoir in which he discussed the means that the four Powers would have at their disposal to coerce Mehemet Ali in case France refused to cooperate with them. He had no intention, he let it be known, of allowing Austrian troops to be employed in the East; Prussia was not interested sufficiently in the terms of the settlement to be enforced upon the Pasha to cause her to do so; and England, he believed, had no land forces which would be available for such an undertaking. Russia had both an army and a navy in the region of the Black Sea. The Emperor Nicholas might be willing to send them against Mehemet Ali and England and Austria could be counted upon to furnish their fleets, but it would be necessary to detach from these a naval force of considerable strength to watch the French squadron. Therefore, he concluded, it would be extremely difficult for the four courts to succeed without the cooperation of the fifth.82

81Ibid., pp. 82-83.
82Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 429-439. Hasenclever points out that in a secret note which accompanied this memoir, or memorandum, Metternich explained that Austria was not opposed to the use of forceful means, but the latter must take the Russian standpoint strictly into account. An agreement regarding everything must be reached first to assure final success. He sharply rejected a notion advanced by Palmerston that all might be left to chance. Undoubtedly Metternich was determined to take no chances of permitting further Russian aggression against Turkey. See Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 144-147. See also Metternich to Apponyi, May 1, 6, 1840, Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 404-408. Note in particular the following extract from the despatch of May 6: "Lord Palmerston a un travers dans l'esprit qui l'empêche toujours d'avoir complètement raison dans une affaire quelconque. Là où son esprit marche droit dans le principe, il oublie de scruter les moyens d'exécution, tandis que là où son attitude pêche par la base, il est fertile en expédients. Dans le conflit turco-egyptien, il est placé droit sur la base des principes, mais ses idées sur les moyens comminatoires n'ont pas le sens commun. Je crois le lui avoir démontré par ma dernière expédition." The attitude which Austria assumed worried both Palmerston and Nesselrode. See, Nesselrode to Meyendorff, April 13, 1840. Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 19-22. Palmerston to Beauvale, March 28, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 610-611.
With the aim of winning the assistance of France, the Austrian Chancellor promptly instructed Neumann to suggest that Syria should be divided into two portions. The southern portion comprising all of the territory south and west of a line beginning at Beyrouth and extending to the northern point of Lake Tiberias; that is to say, the greater part of the Pashalic of Acre, including the fortress, should be retained by Mehemet Ali, while the remainder of Syria, forming the second or northern portion should be surrendered to the Sultan. The Austrian envoy at London explained this proposal to Guizot, May 5, 1840, and remarked that if Mehemet Ali rejected it, Austria, though unwilling to furnish troops, would be disposed to unite her flag to those of England and Russia in the employment of means of maritime constraint... Lord Palmerston, whom he had interviewed on the preceding evening, appeared to be determined, he declared, to push matters to that end, even though the execution should be left to England alone. Three days later when Guizot himself conversed with Palmerston, he found him willing to agree to the Austrian proposal. "The surrender of the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre," Guizot wrote in his Mémoires, "he [Palmerston] evidently considered a painful sacrifice; for which he consoled himself by telling me, what I knew already, that, to effect this arrangement and in case of the Pasha's refusal, Austria agreed to participate in coercive measures by joining her flag to those of England and Russia. He then detailed his plan of compulsion, which consisted in a triple blockade of Alexandria, of the coasts of Syria and of the Red Sea. He seemed satisfied that such a blockade, obstinately prolonged, if requisite, would force the Pasha to submit, without any necessity of a campaign by land or of employing Russian troops. He was, he said to me, quite determined to follow up this plan rigorously if the new bases for an arrangement

84 Palmerston's opinion probably was based on the reports he had received from the British agents in the East. On Dec. 29, 1839, Ponsonby had written: "I have long believed that a British maritime force, acting in conjunction with the Sultan's flag on the coast of Syria, cutting off the communication with Alexandria, and closing that port, would paralyse the whole body of Mehemet Ali's power."—Ibid., I, p. 557. See also, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 3, 1840; Moore to Ponsonby, Feb. 21, 1840, ibid., pp. 609, 610.
were not accepted. . . . I confined myself to persevering in the system which I had previously advocated, saying that I already had transmitted these new overtures to the King's government, that I waited its answer, and that, under all circumstances, it would require time in order to consider whether the success of such an arrangement could be brought about by pacific measures, the only course of proceeding it considered practicable and effectual."

The government of France was destined to have ample time for debate as to the resolution which it should take in answer to the proposal just mentioned, for the approaching arrival of Chekib Effendi, the representative whom the Porte was sending from Constantinople, was announced directly at the British capital and as a result the deliberations upon Eastern affairs were suspended until his appearance.

While the diplomats waited thus, other affairs, much less weighty, but still of considerable momentary interest, became the principal objects of attention and negotiation between Paris and London. One of these was the so-called "sulphur dispute" between England and the Kingdom of Naples. In the month of March, 1840, the British government had protested against the monopoly of the trade in the sulphur products of Sicily which King Ferdinand was attempting to establish. Instead of complying with Great Britain's demands, Ferdinand began to make elaborate preparations for the defense of his realm. A camp was formed near Reggio, a general levy of the reserves was decreed, an army of over 10,000 men was ordered to be embarked for Sicily, and the King himself, it was said, was on the point of assuming personally the defense of that island. When the British government learned of the defiant attitude of the Italian Prince, it directed Admiral Stopford to blockade the coast and to seize and send to Malta such Neapolitan merchant vessels as he could capture. Thiers, seeing in this situation an opportunity to better the feelings which existed between England and France, resolved to

86 Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 86-87.
87 Ibid., pp. 87-88.
88 Hall, op. cit., p. 264.
89 The Times, April 15, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 89-90.
90 Ibid., p. 93.
suggest to the two parties that he should act as mediator between them. On April 12, 1840, he communicated his offer to do so to M. Guizot, who in turn presented it to Lord Palmerston. The latter accepted the interposition of the French without delay. King Ferdinand did likewise but approximately two and a half months elapsed before the affair was settled completely.

The question of the restoration to France of Napoleon's body was another matter which attracted the attention of diplomats at London and Paris in May, 1840. "The King consents to transport the remains of Napoleon from St. Helena to the Invalides, in Paris," Thiers wrote to Guizot, May 4. "He is as anxious on this point as I am, and that is not speaking lightly. The consent of the English Cabinet must be obtained. I do not know how it can be honorably withheld. If England gives us what we require, she will set the seal of her reconciliation with France; the entire past of fifty years will be abolished; the effect, in her favor, in France will be enormous. It is under this point of view that the matter must be proposed. A refusal on the contrary would produce an injurious impression. I do not, and I cannot expect it;..." Thiers was not destined to be disappointed on this occasion for when Guizot brought the matter to the attention of Lord Palmerston, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs granted his consent immediately.

While the attention of the diplomats in western Europe was being directed momentarily from Turco-Egyptian affairs, an event which was destined to have important consequences occurred at Constantinople. That event was the dismissal of the Grand Vizier, Kosrew Pasha. Kosrew always had been an uncompromising opponent of Mehemet Ali. When the latter, who had declared per-

---


*See, Thiers to Granville, July 5, 1840; Guizot to Palmerston, July 7, 1840; Palmerston to Guizot, July 7, 1840, Guizot, *op. cit.*, V, pp. 426-429.


*Ibid.*, pp. 111-112, Irving, *op. cit.*, p. 25. On May 13, Palmerston wrote to his brother William: "The French Government have asked us for leave to bring over from St. Helena the remains of Bonaparte, and we have given them permission to do so. This is a thoroughly French request, but it would have been foolish in us not to have granted it; and we have therefore made a merit of doing so readily and with a good grace."—Palmerston to Temple, May 13, 1840, Bulwer, *op. cit.*, III, p. 39. See also Broughton, *op. cit.*, V, pp. 265, 267.
sistently that he would not be satisfied unless he received Egypt, Syria, and Adana in hereditary possession\textsuperscript{94} and who must have foreseen that he would not attain his ends if he placed his trust in the mediatory efforts of the Concert of Europe,\textsuperscript{95} had exerted himself to persuade the Ottoman government to enter into direct negotiations,\textsuperscript{96} the Grand Vizier, seconded ably by Halil and Reschid Pashas, had refused to listen to his proposals. There was, however, a faction at Constantinople, headed by the mother of the Sultan, which advised that the Viceroy’s advances should be received favorably,\textsuperscript{97} and as the anxiety of the Porte to come to terms with its vassal had increased with the passing of time, the influence of this faction had increased in a corresponding manner. Consequently, many who were familiar with the situation at the Turkish capital looked upon the downfall of Kosrew as having been occasioned by the insidious intrigues of the Sultana Mother and her friends who were accused of being in alliance with the Pasha.\textsuperscript{98} Those suspicions may have been false\textsuperscript{99} but it should

\textsuperscript{94}See, \textit{The Times}, Oct. 24, 1839. Campbell to Palmerston, Sept. 26, 1839, Werther to Palmerston, Nov. 22, 1839, \textit{Levant Correspondence}, I, pp. 434-435, 491. Adana, Mehemet Ali maintained, was “the door to his house” which he never could be willing to surrender.—Campbell to Ponsonby, Oct. 19, 1839; Medem to Nesselrode, Oct. 8/20, 1839, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 479-480, 503.


\textsuperscript{96}See, Mehemet Ali to Grand Vizier [no date given. Rec’d. at Constantinople, Sept. 24, 1839], Feb. 23, 1840; Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 11, 1840, and an Inclosure, \textit{Levant Correspondence}, I, pp. 431-432, 611-613, 615. Letter from Alexandria, Oct. 17, 1839, \textit{The Times}, Nov. 8, 1839.


\textsuperscript{98}O. Turkey 405, Hodges to Palmerston, June 17, 19, 1840, cited by \textit{ibid.}, p. 272, \textit{Annual Register}, 1840, p. [189].

\textsuperscript{99}See an extract from a despatch written by Pontois to the French Cabinet, May 17, 1840, quoted by Guizot, \textit{op. cit.}, V, p. 204.
be noted, nevertheless, that when Mehemet Ali learned of the fall of his old enemy he declared at once to Cochelet, who had brought the first news of it to him, that the last obstacle to a satisfactory conclusion of his quarrel with the Sultan had been removed. He would, he announced, forthwith send back to his sovereign the Turkish fleet, and Sami Bey, his confidential Secretary, would proceed without delay to Constantinople to make the necessary arrangements.¹⁰⁰

Before the news of the overthrow of Kosrew Pasha reached western Europe Chekib Effendi arrived at London. While Chekib did not know that the Grand Vizier had been dismissed, he did know that the unsettled state of affairs in the Near East was very embarrassing to the Ottoman government. He had hoped, he wrote to the representatives of the five Courts on May 31, 1840, promptly after his arrival, to find the Turco-Egyptian question solved. It was with the deepest regret that he discovered it was not, for the Turkish Empire was in a very critical position and the necessity for a solution of this question was becoming daily more urgent. The Powers, he pleaded, should redouble their "generous efforts" in order to put an end to an evil which was increasing continually and which threatened the peace of the East.¹⁰¹

The diplomats at London, it appears, were convinced by Chekib's note that there was real danger in further delay. Guizot, on transmitting a copy of it to Thiers, stated: "'If your Excellency . . . judges it [Chekib's note] of a nature to require new instructions, I beg you to forward them at once . . . evidently the matter is about to receive an impulse which, without perhaps leading to a definite result, will for some days at least, be strong

¹⁰⁰See an extract from a despatch, Cochelet to Thiers, May 26, 1840, quoted by *ibid.*, pp. 205-206. No one perhaps was more alarmed by these developments in the Near East than Lord Ponsonby. He even threatened to resign if his advice regarding the coercion of Mehemet Ali was not followed, and he sent his Dragoman, Pisani, to London to make an oral report to Palmerston upon the extremely serious situation in Turkey. See Hasenclever, *op. cit.*, p. 153. See also F. O. Turkey, 394, Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 23, 1840, quoted in *Cambridge Hist. of Br. For. Policy*, II, pp. 639-640.

and pressing. Everyone is now convinced that there is, for the 
Ottoman Empire, danger in delay; . . . ’” 102

Thiers, however, who even hoped that the Sultan, because of his 
increasing embarrassments, at length would agree to conclude a 
settlement direct with the Viceroy, was not alarmed by the 
situation of affairs in the Levant and did not believe that the 
French government should alter its policy. “I see but one course 
to follow,” he wrote in reply to Guizot, “‘it is to answer this 
[Chekib’s] note as [you did] that of Nouri Effendi. Acknowledge 
its reception by saying that France is ready, as ever, to listen to 
the proposals for settlement that may be made, and to take the 
part in them to which she is in some measure compelled by the 
friendly interest she has everevinced towards the Porte. We 
must not seem to abjure the note of July 27, 1839; . . . But say 
nothing whatever of that deplorable engagement to terminate the 
Eastern question [by a concerted action] between the five 
[Powers].’” 103

Although the government of France did hold firmly to the 
position which it had maintained previously, the representatives 
of the four Powers did not abandon at once their hope of finding 
some plan of procedure in regard to Eastern affairs by which all 
of the five great nations of Europe might be united. Neumann 
and von Bülow, true to the policies which they had followed in 
April and May, 1840, were particularly active in their search for 
such a plan. The former had not received, as yet, an answer to 
the proposal he had made to Guizot on May 5, but he must 
have perceived that that proposal was doomed to be rejected. At 
any rate he was willing to make additional concessions. “‘If 
Mehemet Ali must have Syria, let him have it,’” he declared to 
the French Ambassador, June 12, 1840, “‘not hereditarily, no, 
that cannot be; it would be too much opposed to the principle of 
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Besides, Mehemet Ali must 
give up the district of Adana; the Porte requires it for its safety. 
But let us finish this business. I suspect that Lord Palmerston 
wishes to wait, to delay, that he expects that, at some later period,

102Ibid., p. 191.
103Ibid., p. 208. See also, Thiers to Guizot, June 11, 1840, quoted by ibid., 
pp. 194-195. Guizot’s reply to Chekib, June 21, 1840, conformed with Thiers’ 
instructions. See a copy of it in ibid., p. 443-444.
... he will conclude the affair in a manner more conformable to his views. Meanwhile the mischief increases, the danger presses; it is now clear that prolonged doubt injures the Sultan more than the Pasha, and all threatens a crisis which nobody desires.' 104 The Prussian Envoy adopted an attitude similar to that of his Austrian colleague. "'M. de Neumann and M. de Bülow,'" Guizot wrote to Thiers, June 15, 1840, "are again ready to leave to the Pasha Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life, provided that he restores Adana and Candia.' 105 Baron Brunnow, even, Guizot believed, being anxious that the affairs of the Near East should be regulated by the Powers in concert, was ready to be more conciliatory in his attitude towards France. 106

Thiers hesitated. The willingness of the German diplomats to make additional concessions and the conciliatory attitude of Brunnow seemed to prove to him that ultimately he would carry his point. 107 "'Certainly,'" he replied to Louis Philippe's Ambassador at London, June 19, 1840, "'if it were agreed to yield Syria, (comma) and Egypt hereditarily to the Pasha, the five Powers would then act reasonably, and we should make great efforts to succeed. But the Pasha's head is inflated,' 108 and we are sure of nothing with him.'" 109

104 Ibid., p. 198.
105 Ibid., p. 201.
106 See an account of an interview between Brunnow and Guizot, June 11, 1840, ibid., pp. 196-197. Brunnow, it seems, had received instructions from St. Petersburg urging him to speed up the negotiations. See Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 154.
107 Thiers was interested particularly in Brunnow's attitude, "'which could only be ascribed to disasters in Circassia.'" "'It was clear,'" he declared, "'that Russia was not ready to embark upon serious operations elsewhere.'"—Affaires étrangères, 655 Angloterre, Thiers to Guizot, June 16, 1840, quoted by Hall, op. cit., pp. 267-268. Thiers was probably influenced by the reports which he had received from Barante. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 290-292.
108 The Viceroy, determined that his demands should be conceded, was preparing actively for war. See, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 682-683.
109 Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 201. Guizot was troubled by the comma which Thiers inserted after the word "Syria" and wrote to him asking an explanation. Thiers replied, June 30, 1840: "'Ma virgule ne signifiait rien ... je voulais parler de l'Egypte héréditaire et de la Syrie héréditaire.'"—Ibid., p. 203. Thiers undoubtedly was led by his reports from Cochelet to believe that the Pasha would not accept less favorable terms. See Guichen, op. cit., p. 297.
Regardless of the fact that Baron Brunnow maintained a conciliatory attitude towards France while he was conversing with M. Guizot, he was determined that the final arrangement which the Powers should enter into for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian question should be on the basis of the Anglo-Russian terms. It was preferable even, according to his opinion, to do nothing at all rather than to conclude a bad arrangement like the one which was advocated by France.\(^\text{110}\)

Palmerston's views were similar to those of the Russian Envoy Extraordinary. When the Austrian and Prussian diplomats, alarmed by the reports which they had received concerning affairs in Turkey, had talked about further concessions, he had talked about delaying and had persisted in the belief that time was "'pour le Sultan.'"\(^\text{111}\) On June 12, 1840, after it was known at London that Kosrew Pasha had fallen and after Brunnow had received instructions from St. Petersburg ordering him to speed up the negotiations, Palmerston, who then must also have been willing that matters should be hurried to a conclusion, informed Guizot that he wished to know the "'positive opinion of the French government'" upon Neumann's proposal of May 5 to which he (Palmerston) had given his consent.\(^\text{112}\) Guizot, hesitating to reply on his own responsibility, transmitted this request to his superiors at Paris.\(^\text{113}\) Thiers, answering on June 16, declared: "'We could not suggest it [Neumann's proposal] to Mehemet Ali; he would refuse it, and we could not refute his arguments which we should ourselves consider to be sound and well founded.'"\(^\text{114}\) Palmerston, undoubtedly, was not surprised to learn that the French government rejected the Austrian proposition. On June 15 he had received a despatch written by Granville on the 12th which revealed that Thiers continued to insist upon a settlement

\(^{110}\)Vienna Archives, England 295, Neumann to Metternich, June 26, 1840, quoted by Hasenclever, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 157, [footnote].
\(^{111}\)Berlin Archives, vol. 11, Bülow to Frederick William III, June 5, 1840, quoted by \textit{ibid.}, p. 152, [footnote]. See also, Palmerston to Neumann, June 11, 1840, quoted by Treitschke, \textit{op. cit.}, V. p. 74.
\(^{112}\)Guizot, \textit{op. cit.}, V, pp. 199-200.
\(^{113}\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 200.
\(^{114}\)Affaires étrangères, 655 Angleterre, Thiers to Guizot, June 16, 1840, quoted by Hall, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 267-268.
which Mehmet Ali would accept willingly. "The arrangement which M. Thiers holds out," he remarked dryly, in his reply to Granville, . . . "is the very arrangement which has actually been in existence for the last six years." At the same time when it was becoming apparent that France would not abandon her demand for a settlement which would be acceptable to the Viceroy, news from the East which aided in bringing matters to a climax, arrived at London. The announcement of the downfall of Kosrew Pasha was made at the British capital early in June. About the middle of the month Count Apponyi, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, learned from French sources that the Viceroy had declared to Cochelet, when the latter announced the dismissal of Kosrew to him, that he would return the Ottoman fleet to the Sultan and that he would send Sami Bey upon a special mission to Constantinople. Apponyi reported this intelligence to Neumann on June 16, the same day on which Thiers forwarded to London his refusal to accept the Austrian proposal to divide Syria between Mehmet Ali and the Sultan. Its effect was immediate. Lord Palmerston and the three other plenipotentiaries, according to Guizot, saw in it nothing more, or at least they were determined that they had a right to see in it nothing more than an act long concerted between the Pasha and France. They looked upon the step which Mehemet Ali had taken, and its success,—first, as threatening the ruin of the note of July 27, 1839, and of the common action of the five Powers; and secondly, as the complete and personal triumph of France at Alexandria and Constantinople. " . . . those who, in the hope of obtaining the common action of the five Powers," he wrote to

116Granville to Palmerston, June 12, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 665.
117Palmerston to Granville, June 26, 1840, ibid., pp. 666-667.
118The Russians were alarmed greatly by the fall of Kosrew. See, Nesselrode to Meyendorff, June 27, 1840, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, p. 29. At London Brunnow declared to Neumann and Bülow: "qu'à la vérité, le moment pourrait prochainement arriver, où il aurait à annoncer que le cabinet Impérial—voyant que la négociation de Londres ne mène à aucun résultat et que la crise augmente en Orient—se réserve la faculté d'agir à elle seule, selon les circonstances."—Berlin Archives, vol. 11, Bülow to Frederick William III, June 19, 1840, quoted by Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 154, [footnote].
119Guizot to Thiers, July 11, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 212.
120Ibid., pp. 211-218.
Thiers, "'promoted a settlement founded on the concession of Egypt in hereditary sovereignty, and Syria for life [to Mehemet Ali], have paused in their endeavors, and seem to have renounced them entirely.'" The despatch from which this extract has been copied was written on July 11, 1840. It was not the first warning which Guizot had given to his government. As early as June 24, he had stated that "'Lord Palmerston, profiting by the disappointed hopes and discontent of his colleagues and the other plenipotentiaries, might suddenly reengage them in his system, and induce them to adopt, all four together, his project for withdrawing Syria from the Pasha, and the employment, if necessary, of coercive measures.'"

Thiers, however, believed that his hope of seeing a direct arrangement concluded between the Sultan and the Pasha was about to be realized. On June 30, 1840, after he received a telegraphic despatch from Cochelet122 which announced that Mehemet Ali, true to his former promises, had ordered Sami Bey to repair to Constantinople "'to offer to the Sultan the homage of his devotion, and to request his orders for the return of the Turkish fleet,'" the President of the French Cabinet wrote to Guizot: "'We must [appear to] infer from this intelligence, without too much zeal and without drawing too much attention to it, that a spontaneous arrangement . . . , between the sovereign and the vassal, would be the best of all solutions. The Pasha thinks that the impulse of feeling to which he yields will be reciprocated, and that a treaty will follow immediately. He believes . . . that the hereditary rule over Egypt and Syria will be granted to him; he says nothing with respect to Candia, Adana, [and] the Holy Cities, and when told he must make sacrifices in order to obtain an immediate [and] direct settlement, he replies: "Be at your ease, everything will be arranged." . . . at Constantinople, it was thought, at the date of the latest news, that the restoration of the fleet would produce a great effect upon the Divan, and that liberal concessions might ensue . . . Such a state of affairs ought to sug-

120Ibid., p. 213.
121Guizot to Thiers, June 24, 1840, quoted by ibid., p. 202.
122A telegraphic despatch from Cochelet, June 16, 1840, quoted by ibid., p. 208.
gest many arguments against any conclusive decision at London.’”

Nevertheless, Thiers did realize that it was necessary to act with caution. ‘I have written to Alexandria and to Constantinople recommending moderation on both sides;’ he mentioned in his despatch to Guizot; ‘but I have given advice only, and have been careful to restrain our agents from any participation on their own responsibility, and as a French undertaking, in a treaty having for its object this direct arrangement. Should such an attempt be imputed to us, you may deny it. Young Eugène Périer has been sent to Alexandria to remonstrate most urgently with the Pasha, if he should incline to pause, and if, after having offered the fleet, he should retract his word, and become unaccommodating in the general conditions of the treaty. I have even counseled him [Mehemet Ali] to accept Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life.’ In another despatch written on June 30, 1840, Thiers remarked hesitatingly: ‘I have consulted the Cabinet; they deliberate, they incline a little towards a concession. Meanwhile we shall see. Delay explaining yourself. We must wait for a short time. Nothing is decided.’

While Thiers and Guizot were corresponding thus the representatives of the four Powers, being alarmed by the reports concerning developments in the Levant, and, in addition, being dissatisfied because they believed Thiers had submitted Neumann’s proposal of May 5 to Mehemet Ali before he had answered it, were preparing for action. On June 21 and 28, two successive Sundays, they met secretly at Palmerston’s home and came to terms about the elements of a treaty, for the rescue of the Sultan,

**Ibid.,** pp. 208-209.


**Guizot, op. cit.,** V, p. 203.

On July 21, 1840, Palmerston wrote a long despatch to Granville in which he defended the policy followed by the four Powers. In that despatch he pointed out: ‘They [Neumann, Bülow, and Brunnow] said that this [the fact referred to above] seemed to them to render any further negotiation with France on these matters impossible, because it turned out that it was not France, but Mehemet Ali, with whom the negotiation was to be carried on.’—Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 8-10.
to which France would not be a party. Still, a formal decision was postponed.

Before the British Minister of Foreign Affairs could sign a treaty it was necessary that he should secure the consent to it of his colleagues in the Cabinet. Many of those colleagues were unwilling that England should enter into any arrangement which might occasion a break in the Anglo-French alliance. A close understanding with the government of Louis Philippe, they believed, was an essential element of Britain's foreign policy. Consequently, they balked when Palmerston proposed to the Cabinet that England should join with the three Eastern Courts without France to conclude with the Porte a convention for the pacification of the Levant.

Palmerston, exasperated because of the objections of his colleagues, determined that he either would carry his point or that he would resign. "The difference of opinion which seems to exist between myself and some members of the Cabinet upon the Turkish question, and the extreme importance which I attach to that question," he stated to Melbourne, July 5, 1840, "have led me, upon full consideration, to the conviction that it is a duty which I owe to myself and to my colleagues to relieve you and others from the necessity of deciding between my views and those of other members of the Cabinet on these matters, by placing, as I now do, my office at your disposal." The British Minister recapitulated, in his letter, the history of the Turco-Egyptian question, and furthermore explained why he was determined that his

128 Note the following extract from Guizot's Mémoires: "Parmi les collègues de lord Palmerston, lord Holland, lord Lansdowne, lord John Russell et lord Minto étaient ceux avec qui j'avais les relations les plus fréquentes et les plus libres. Lord Holland, d'un esprit charmant, d'un coeur généreux et d'un caractère aussi aimable que son esprit, était l'ami déclaré de la France, l'hôte bienveillant des visiteurs français en Angleterre, le partisan persévérant de l'alliance des deux pays, et il se plaisait à manifester, en toute occasion, ses sentiments... ce fut à Holland-House que j'allai chercher et que je trouvai les plus nobles plaisirs de la conversation et de la vie sociale. Lord Lansdowne et lord John Russell étaient moins expansifs, mais également sincères dans leurs libérales et bienveillantes dispositions envers la France:"—Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 50-51. See also, ibid., pp. 67-68, 191-193. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, April 13, June 27, 1840, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 19-22, 29.
policy should triumph. "The immediate result of our declining to go on with the three Powers because France does not join us," he declared, "will be, that Russia will withdraw her offers to unite herself with the other Powers for a settlement of the affairs of Turkey, and she will again resume her separate and isolated position with respect to those affairs; and you will have the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi renewed under some still more objectionable form. We shall thus lose the advantages on this point which it has required long-continued and complicated efforts on our part to gain, and England will, by her own voluntary and deliberate act, re-establish that separate protectorship of Russia over Turkey, the existence of which has long been the object of well-founded jealousy and apprehension to the other Powers of Europe.

"The ultimate results of such a decision will be the practical division of the Turkish empire into two separate and independent states, whereof one will be the dependency of France, and the other a satellite of Russia; and in both of which our political influence will be annulled, and our commercial interests will be sacrificed;...

Fortunately for the success of Palmerston's policy, several despatches from Colonel Hodges were received at London, July 5, 1840, the same day the letter, a part of which has just been quoted, was written, announcing that a revolt against the author-

*Ibid.*, pp. 359-360. See also Appendix B, and Palmerston to Melbourne, July 6, 1840, Bulwer, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 361-363. It is interesting, at least, that, a few days before Palmerston wrote these letters to Melbourne, an article appeared in the *Morning Chronicle*, Palmerston's organ, describing a project for the establishment of extensive steamship communications through Egypt to India. The following is an extract from a French translation of it which appeared in the *Journal des Débats*, July 4, 1840: "On parle de la prochaine formation d'une compagnie autorisée par une charte royale pour établir une communication, au moyen de navires à vapeur, entre l'Angleterre et Calcutta, Madras et Ceylan. Les expériences faites par la compagnie des Indes à Bombay ne laissent aucun doute sur la réussite du plan proposé qui serait d'une importance immense pour notre commerce avec l'Inde. . . . la compagnie de navigation à la vapeur avec l'Inde propose d'établir une ligne complète de communication à travers l'Egypte, de l'Angleterre à Calcutta, Madras et Ceylan; . . . Cette nouvelle compagnie se propose d'avoir un surintendant et des agens qui résideront en Égypte, pour expédier les passagers à travers l'Egypte."


ity of Mehemet Ali had broken out in Syria. The "Maronites, the Druses, and the Mutualis" of Mount Lebanon all had taken up arms. The Pasha had adopted measures to quell the disturbances. He was ready to offer concessions. The Maronites, Hodges believed, might be calmed for the moment, but the others "were still full of dissatisfaction." This news arriving at a most opportune time seemed to prove that Mehemet Ali would not be able to resist seriously the fulfillment of the terms which the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers proposed to enforce upon him. Ibrahim Pasha, the dissenting members of the British Cabinet must have foreseen, would not dare to march upon Constantinople, for with Syria in revolt and the Mediterranean dominated by an Anglo-Austrian fleet it would be impossible for him to advance and at the same time keep open his necessary communications with Egypt. At any rate, all excepting Lord Holland and Lord Clarendon, the two who were opposed most violently to risking a break with France, consented finally to agree to the conclusion of a treaty as outlined by Palmerston and the representatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

Guizot, it will be recalled, had realized, when it became known at London that Kosrew Pasha had fallen and that Mehemet Ali was preparing to carry on negotiations direct with the Porte, that

Hodges to Palmerston, June 17, 19, 20, 1840. Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 674-677, 678-679, 680-681, 681-682. See also, Guizot to Mme. Guizot, July 22, 1840, DeWitt, op. cit., p. 199.

These revolts, it appears, were occasioned by the attempt of the Egyptians to enforce conscription upon the Syrians and by the intrigues of British agents. See, Hodges to Palmerston, June 19, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 680-681. Armagnac, Nezib et Beyrouth, souvenirs d'Orient, de 1833 à 1841, pp. 223-269. A. Laurent, Relation historique des affaires de Syrie, depuis 1840 jusqu'en 1842, I, pp. 18-42. Letter from Constantinople, June 28, 1840, The Times, July 18, 1840.


Much credit for influencing the members of the Cabinet to agree to Palmerston's proposal was due to Lord John Russell. See, Palmerston to Russell, Dec. 4, 1840, S. Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, I, p. 362. J. Russell, Recollections and Suggestions, pp. 223-224.

On July 8, 1840, Palmerston announced to the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia that he had won the consent of the Cabinet to the plan of concluding a treaty without the concurrence of France. See, Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 160-163. Broughton, op. cit., V, pp. 276-277.
the envoys of the four Powers might abandon all hope of coming to an understanding with France and that they might agree to act without her. He saw that the affair was "'in a state of crisis,'" but he did not see that it was nearing a conclusion. "'Extreme reserve has been practiced for some days,'" he reported to Thiers, July 14, "'... I know that Chekib Effendi has had several long interviews with Lord Palmerston, particularly one on Sunday. Propositions are preparing, both as to the settlement of the affair and the mode of action, which will be communicated to us when all is arranged (should all be arranged) to obtain either our adhesion or refusal.'" It is evident that he was imbued with the erroneous belief that time was not pressing, that France ran no risk in further delay, and that if the four Powers did agree upon some course of action they at least would go through the form of presenting their plans to France for her "'adhesion or refusal'" before they entered into them formally.138

While Guizot was consoling himself with a false impression concerning the situation of affairs, the plenipotentiaries of England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, influenced by fresh news from the Levant139 and encouraged by the victory which Palmerston had won over his dissenting colleagues in the Cabinet, were pushing forward energetically their secret negotiations.140 Finally, on July

---

136 Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 216.
137 Ibid., pp. 219-220.
138 It appears that Guizot's friend, the Princess de Lieven, who had arrived in England June 22 on a mission "de vendre ses diamants et de voir ses amis" was misled in a conversation which she had with von Bülow to believe that there was no danger of a convention being concluded by the four Powers immediately, and that "a day or two before July 15," she passed this mistaken belief on to Guizot. See, De Witt, op. cit., p. 195. E. Daudet, Une vie d'ambassadrice au siècle dernier, pp. 305-314. Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, English Historical Review, XVIII, p. 129. Duchesse de Dino, Chronique de 1831-1862, II, pp. 347, 351-352.
139 On July 7, 10, 12, 1840, additional information about the revolt in Syria was received at London. See, Hodges to Palmerston, June 6, 16, 1840; Chekib to Palmerston, July 7, 1840; Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 23, 1840; Moore to Ponsonby, June 10, 1840; Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 671-674, 683-684, 686-687.
140 The following was Palmerston's explanation to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, for having kept these negotiations secret: "'... when at last we found it certain that she [France] would not act with us [the four Powers] we did not think it prudent to let her into our counsels, for fear she should thwart us by
15, 1840, their deliberations having proved successful, they signed, without consulting the representative of France, a convention for the pacification of the Levant. That convention, which in form was concluded between the representatives of the four Powers on the one part and the envoy of the Sublime Porte on the other, consisted of five articles and a “Separate Act,” and it was accompanied by a “Protocol” and a “Reserved Protocol.” The conditions which the Powers proposed to force upon the Viceroy were named in the separate act. “His Highness [the Sultan],” it was provided therein, “promises to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalic of Egypt; and . . . to grant to Mehemet Ali for his life, with the title of Pasha of Acre, and with the command of the fortress of St. John of Acre, the administration of the southern part of Syria, . . .

“The Sultan, however, in making these offers, attaches thereto the condition, that Mehemet Ali shall accept them within the space of 10 days after communication thereof shall have been made to him at Alexandria, by an agent of His Highness; . . .

“If within the space of 10 days, fixed as above, Mehemet Ali should not accept the above-mentioned arrangement, the Sultan will then withdraw the offer of the life administration of the Pashalic of Acre; but His Highness will still consent to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalic of Egypt, provided such offer be accepted within the space of the 10 days next following, . . .

“If, at the expiration of 20 days after the communication shall have been made to him . . . Mehemet Ali shall not accede to the proposed arrangement, and shall not accept the hereditary Pashalic of Egypt, the Sultan will consider himself at liberty to withdraw that offer, and to follow, in consequence, such ulterior course as his own interests and the counsels of his Allies may suggest to him.” The separate act provided also that the Pasha should surrender at once the Turkish fleet; that he should pay to his overlord tribute annually proportionate to the greater or less amount of territory intriguing in Europe and by sending information to Egypt.”—English Historical Review, XVIII, p. 130. See also, Metternich to Apponyi, Aug. 4, 1840, Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 410-411. For an account of the final negotiations see Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 163-170.
over which he might obtain the administration, according as he accepted "the first or the second alternative;" that all treaties and all laws of his sovereign should be applicable to the pashalics under his control; and that his military and naval forces, forming part of the forces of the Ottoman Empire, should "always be considered as maintained for the service of the State."\(^1\)

By Articles I, II, and III, of the convention of July 15, 1840, the Powers undertook to assist the Porte actively to reduce the Pasha to submission in case he should refuse to accept the terms which were to be communicated to him by the Sultan. Great Britain and Austria would, in the meantime, order the commanders of their fleets to assist the latter in cutting off the communication by sea between Syria and Egypt and to afford, "in the name of the alliance, all the support and assistance in their power to those subjects" of his in Syria who might "manifest their fidelity and allegiance to their sovereign." Furthermore, if Mehemet Ali "should direct his land or sea forces against Constantinople, the High Contracting Parties, upon the express demand of the Sultan, addressed to their representatives at Constantinople," would "provide for the defense of his Throne by means of a cooperation agreed upon by mutual consent, for the purpose of placing the two Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, as well as the capital of the Ottoman Empire, in security against all aggression."

Finally, by Article IV of the convention, the Powers agreed that, although in the existing emergency it might be necessary to send military and naval forces to defend Constantinople, in the future they would conform to "the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire," in virtue of which it had "in all times been prohibited for Ships of War of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus."\(^2\) Thus, almost a year after the European diplomats at Constantinople had issued their famous

---


collective note to the Porte, an arrangement for the solution of the Turco-Egyptian question was concluded. France, however, was not a party to that arrangement, nor was she aware even of its existence. Hence it still remained to be seen, not only whether Mehemet Ali would accept the conditions imposed upon him by the separate act of the convention of July 15, 1840, and whether the four Powers would be able to coerce him effectively in case he did not, but also what course the government of France would follow when it became aware of what had been done.
CHAPTER V

THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE

On July 17, 1840, Palmerston invited Guizot to call at the British foreign office, where he read to him a memorandum acquainting him with the convention which had been concluded. Palmerston claimed in that memorandum that the Courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia had given to the government of France throughout the whole course of the negotiations which had commenced in the autumn of the preceding year, "the most reiterated, manifest, and indisputable proofs," not only of their desire to arrive at a perfect understanding with it in regard to the arrangements necessary to effect the pacification of the Levant, but also of the great importance which they never had failed to attach to the moral effect accruing from the union and concurrence of the five Powers in a matter of such serious interest and so intimately connected with the maintenance of peace in Europe. They had seen, with the deepest regret, that all their efforts to obtain the desired end had proved fruitless. Consequently they had adopted the resolution of proceeding onward without the cooperation of France and had concluded with the Sultan a convention intended to solve in a satisfactory manner the existing complications in the Levant.

After Palmerston had finished reading, Guizot immediately objected to the arguments advanced in the memorandum in defense of the course followed by the concert of the four Powers. In reply to the Frenchman's objections the British Minister contended that the plan of the arrangement which the plenipotentiaries had signed was based on ideas suggested by Count Sébastiani in September, 1839. If Sébastiani had made such suggestions, Guizot maintained, he had done so in his own "individual capacity" without instructions or authority from his superiors at Paris, for no trace of them could be found in the records of the French embassy. They were made in a formal manner, Palmerston insisted.


2Sébastiani had suggested on his own responsibility, it will be remembered, that Syria should be divided between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. See above, footnote 15, Chapter IV.
The mere absence of evidence concerning them in the published records of the embassy did not afford conclusive proof that the Count had had no authority for making them. Moreover, he argued that it was impossible to separate the individual and the public character of an ambassador in the manner implied by M. Guizot, especially when that ambassador was speaking to a secretary of state in an official interview, and in a conversation arising over despatches which he had come to communicate from his court.  

The French Cabinet, on receiving intelligence concerning the Treaty of London, felt not only “discontented and vexed” but also “surprised and wounded.” Thiers, in particular, was aroused because of the famous arrangement and on July 20, 1840, in answer to a question that Henry Bulwer asked him concerning the French fleet which had just sailed for Tunis, he declared: “This is not the time to ask or to give explanations: the alliance between England and France is at an end. M. Guizot has received the official intelligence, that an agreement has been come to by the Four Powers, to which we have not even been asked to accede . . . I cannot understand an alliance on small questions, and a difference on great ones. Should England separate from us on the Eastern Question, such a separation will be a general one. France will, as I have already said, isolate herself: she is confident in her strength, and the more so as the Government has on this subject the whole population of France behind it. Should an occasion, therefore, arise on which the dignity or the interests of my country call upon me to act, I will do so without fear and with decision. I regret it deeply; but I cannot but see in the state of affairs, as now announced to me, eventualities which may disturb the peace of Europe.” A day later Thiers wrote to Guizot admitting that

*Palmerston to Bulwer, July 22, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 10-13.
*Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 228.
*Bulwer to Palmerston, July 20, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 7-8.
Annual Register, 1840, p. 498. On July 26, 1840, Bulwer conferred again with Thiers. Thiers asked the British chargé d'affaires on that occasion if England wished anything for herself in the Levant. In Syria, he declared, she “might have points to desire” for the “sake of the communication with the East Indies,” and therefore the suspicion of the French people concerning the intentions of Great Britain, though possibly erroneous, were more justifiable [than those which the English people entertained in regard to France].—Bulwer to Palmerston, July 27, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 37-40.
he was surprised greatly because of the turn which affairs had taken. The government, he stated, had expected that the agitation which for several days had manifested itself in the English Cabinet would end in a proposition, similar to the one which Neumann had suggested on June 12, leaving to France the choice of associating herself or not with the four Powers for the execution of that proposition. On the same date he forwarded to the French Ambassador a formal note in reply to Palmerston's memorandum of July 17, 1840. He enumerated in that note problems which he believed would arise when the four Powers attempted to carry out the provisions of the treaty of July 15, and he gave warning that henceforth France could not be influenced save by what she owed "to peace" and "to herself." The conduct which she would maintain in the serious circumstances in which the four Powers had just placed Europe would depend upon the solution which would "be given to all the questions which she had pointed out."

When it became known publicly in France that the four Powers had concluded a convention which they had kept secret from the Ministers of Louis Philippe a wave of indignation swept throughout the country. The excitement was intense particularly in the capital. "Anger and surprise run mountain high in Paris," a correspondent of an English journal wrote at the time. "That England should join hands with Russia, though but for a special purpose, and in a direct defiance of France, was an event that, from M. Thiers down to the shoe black at the corner of the street, no Frenchman could have believed." The Bourse was panic stricken and almost the whole of the public press, led by the

"Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 230. See also Affaires étrangères 655 Angleterre, Thiers to Guizot (undated) quoted by Hall, op. cit., p. 282.


"The rise and fall of the French Bourse were significant for those variations were due largely to the changes in public sentiment in France. See Appendix A.
Constitutionnel and the Courrier Français, both ministerial organs, maintained that the Treaty of London was an insult and an outrage put upon their nation, and they called loudly for war—"war to the knife"—with "perfidious Albion." Even the conservative Journal des Débats spoke defiantly. Although it did not despair for the maintenance of peace, it did not shrink back from the possibility of war. The French singlehanded, it believed, could carry on hostilities to advantage. If war did break out it would be terrible, but France, who had not provoked it, who had done "all that her honor would permit her to do to prevent it," would throw herself into the struggle "tout entière." Thiers and Louis Philippe, who must have been encouraged by the bellicose clamor which was raised in France, determined directly not only that they would follow a policy of isolation but also that they would make extensive preparations for war. "... it will be necessary to choose the moment to act in order to throw ourselves into a cleft and to break up the coalition," Thiers informed Guizot, July 21, 1840, "... we must assume our position and watch events with coolness. The King is perfectly calm; we [the Cabinet] too are the same. Without any stir, we intend to make preparations solid rather than apparent. We shall make them apparent if the situation requires it and if respect for public opinion renders it desirable." Soon thereafter an officer was appointed to draw up detailed plans for the fortification of Paris, an extraordinary credit of 8,120,000 francs for the marine was decreed and the men belonging to the classes of 1836 and 1839 were called into military service. Furthermore, steps were taken

"The Times, July 31, Aug. 1, 3, 10, 12, 13, 17, 1840. Annual Register, 1840, p. [172].


Note the following statement which was written Aug. 8, 1840: "On dit que, dans cette question [of the attitude of France to the Treaty of London], le Roi des Français est absolument d'accord avec M. Thiers, et qu'il a dit qu'il préférait la guerre à la révolution."—Dino, op. cit., II, p. 345.

Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 251.

Ibid., VI, pp. 25-26.

Royal Ordinance, July 29-Aug. 5, 1840, J. B. Duvergier, Collection complète des lois, decrets, etc., XL, pp. 263-264.

Royal Ordinances, July 29-Aug. 5, 1840, ibid., p. 264. Granville to Palmerston, Aug. 1, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, p. 60.
in diplomacy to persuade Austria and Prussia to refuse to ratify the treaty of July 15, 1840;\textsuperscript{18} Admiral Pontois, the French Ambassador at Constantinople, was instructed to make energetic representations to the Porte in order to influence it to grant to the Viceroy terms more liberal than those agreed upon by the representatives of the four Powers;\textsuperscript{19} and Count Walewski, a natural son of Napoleon, was sent on a special mission to Alexandria with the aim of inducing the Pasha, on his part, either to accept terms which it was thought Pontois would succeed in persuading the Porte to grant or to give to the government of France power to negotiate in his behalf with the concert of the four Powers.\textsuperscript{20}

Neither the threatening attitude of the French government nor the blustering of the Paris press had any noticeable influence upon Lord Palmerston. The warlike measures which the former had adopted were entirely uncalled for, he stated in a despatch to Granville, August 4, 1840. They could be looked upon only as a gratuitous affront to the four Powers. Nevertheless, Her Majesty’s government did not intend to take any notice of them. It would not ask for explanations; nor would it apply to Parliament for any additional vote of credit. To do either one or the other would be to give to the strange proceedings of the French government an importance which it did not deserve. The British naval forces in the Mediterranean, Palmerston believed, would be quite strong enough to do everything which could be required of them in pursuance of the engagements of the treaty of July 15, 1840. The

\textsuperscript{18}Bloomfield to Palmerston, Aug. 15, 1840, \textit{ibid.}, p. 89. See also No. 16, Appendix D.

\textsuperscript{19}The representations which Pontois actually made to the Porte were later the subject of a controversy between the French and allied diplomats. Ponsonby and the Austrian envoy Sturmer accused Pontois of having directly threatened the Porte that, in case the treaty of July 15 was carried into execution through armed intervention against the Pasha, France would “join its efforts” with Mehemet Ali to raise the populations of Asia and Europe against the existing administration of Turkey, of which the French government proclaimed itself “the enemy.” Pontois later denied that he had indulged in such threats, and both Guizot and Thiers, when questioned by British and Austrian Ministers, denied that he had been instructed to do so. See Sturmer to Metternich, Aug. 17, 1840; Palmerston to Ponsonby, Sept. 4, 1840; Palmerston to Guizot, Sept. 9, 1840; Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 7, 1840; Guizot to Palmerston, Sept. 18, 1840, \textit{Levant Correspondence}, II, pp. 116-117, 125-126, 130, 131, 192-193.

\textsuperscript{20}See Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 18, 1840, \textit{ibid.}, p. 198.
force of the fleet also would be "abundantly sufficient" to secure it against molestation or insult from any squadron which France might think proper to send to the Levant.21

Count Nesselrode and the Emperor Nicholas, who were pleased greatly when they learned of the conclusion, by the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers, of the famous Convention of London,22 entertained opinions very similar to those of the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. The former, in a letter to Meyendorff, written August 8, 1840, in which he announced that the convention had been signed, explained that it was only when she was supported by England that France was able to be truly formidable upon the continent. In the existing circumstances, he believed, once that she was convinced that she could not succeed in promoting division within the ranks of the allies, she would submit. It was his opinion, he declared, that she would hesitate when it came to declaring war upon four of the great Powers.23

21Palmerston to Granville, Aug. 4, 1840, ibid., pp. 62-63. See also, Palmerston to Hodges, July 16, 18, 1840; Palmerston to Ponsonby, July 25, 1840, ibid., pp. 3-5, 22.
22See an extract of a despatch, Thiers to Guizot, Aug. 23, 1840, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 292-293. Note also the following extract from a despatch, Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Sept. 25, 1840: "Dans mes dépêches, j'ai en plus particulièrement soin de faire ressortir les avantages immenses que nous offre, pour l'avenir, la rupture de cette funeste alliance anglo-française, avantages qui ne me paraissent pas encore assez sentis et appréciés à Berlin . . . C'est un grand service que nous avons rendu à l'Europe; on le comprendra avec le temps; on l'acceptera comme on accepte avec avidité nos secours dans les grandes crises sociales."—Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 39-40. Note also the following extract from Raikes' Journal, Aug. 12, 1840: "Kisseleff, the first Russian secretary, held high language to me about the treaty; he said, 'We must have the letter of the bond, and no tergiversation, else we shall march.'"—Raikes, Journal, IV, p. 42. Lord Broughton, describing a cabinet meeting of Aug. 9, 1840, wrote: "Palmerston also informed us that Brunnnow had told him the Emperor of Russia would not only send a squadron from the Black Sea to help us, but had offered to come in person, commanding his Baltic fleet, to defend the shores of England. At this we all laughed, and Palmerston added that he had only given civil thanks for this magnificent offer."—Broughton, op. cit., V, p. 290.
23Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Aug. 8, 1840, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 35-37. Nesselrode, like Palmerston, did not believe it would be necessary for Russia to send forces to the defense of Constantinople. See, Nesselrode to Titow, July, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 112-113. See also Guichen, op. cit., pp. 331-337.
At Vienna and at Berlin, on the other hand, the news of the warlike activities of the French occasioned alarm. Prince Metternich talked about the danger of a revolution in France and the new King of Prussia, Frederick William IV, who was determined that his country would not take part in a general European war if one should break out, had a definite declaration sent to all the Powers that he adhered firmly to his father's pacific policy and "demanded that the neutrality of his state should be guaranteed formally."28

Moreover, in Great Britain, although the public remained calm and refused to believe that Thiers would recommend war "to support the tyrannical and rebellious pasha of Egypt," there were many who doubted if it would be wise to ignore the French protests entirely. Even Lord John Russell who a few weeks before had exerted himself to persuade his colleagues to accept the policy advocated by the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Lord Melbourne, the Prime Minister, were disturbed by the situation and appeared to be inclined to make concessions. "'England has no wish to quarrel with France or to unsettle Europe,'" the latter stated to Guizot, July 28, 1840. "'Austria too has no such desire. This affair is unfortunate and might become extremely serious; but we can arrest it, and wish to do so. And France who has re-

28Note the following extract from a letter, Metternich to Apponyi, Aug. 20, 1840: "Le mal de la France, c'est la Révolution, et c'est parce que M. Thiers la représente que seul il est fort ... le parti conservateur et celui du progrès ont, depuis l'avènement de M. Thiers, chacun un chef [the King and Thiers]; la lutte entre ses deux partis a donc pris un caractère qu'elle n'avait pas antérieurement aux événements du 1er Mars, et la question qui reste à résoudre est de savoir auquel d'entre eux restera la victoire!"—Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 412-413.

28Treitschke, op. cit., V, p. 79. See also Guichen, op. cit., pp. 326-331, 348-349.

28The Times, Aug. 1, 3, 1840. Note the following extract from an editorial in The Times, Sept. 24, 1840: "With very rare exceptions, the English journals have treated the whole Eastern question in a mild and conciliatory spirit. The petulance of French presumption and asperity has been met throughout Great Britain by calm forbearance ... They have threatened us without retort, and as yet with impunity; and their press has borne down upon us, almost in line of battle, without even a signal being hoisted in any part of the British empire that there was an enemy in sight." Many Englishmen, it seems, believed Louis Philippe would not dare to begin a foreign war because of the danger of revolution at home. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 339-340.
fused to advance with the four Powers, may aid them to halt.’”

The government of France being aware that such sentiments were entertained in Great Britain and in Germany refused to despair for the success of its policy because of the obstinacy of Palmerston and the Russians.

July 31, 1840, Guizot was summoned to the Château d’Eu for a conference with Louis Philippe and M. Thiers. At that meeting, he has reported in his Mémoires, he found the King “animated in words,” but promising himself that, in the end, the peace of Europe would not be disturbed, and Thiers “also desiring the maintenance of peace, [but] much preoccupied with the chance of war and the means of meeting it,” if events should drive France to that alternative.

When Guizot departed from Eu on his return to London he carried with him two distinct projects for the settlement of the question of the Near East which would bring about the reconciliation of France with the concert of the four Powers. Both of these projects assumed the willingness of the latter to tear up the documents which they had mutually agreed upon July 15, 1840. The first provided for the guaranteeing of the status quo. According to that plan the five Powers would guarantee the existing state of the Ottoman possessions on the basis of the arrangement of Kutayah. The Pasha would have no hereditary rights and if he “or anyone else” should invade the states of the Sultan the five, including France, would employ their forces against the invader. The second project provided for the mediation of France, on behalf of Mehemet Ali, with the Concert of Europe. If that proposal should be accepted France would insist that her ally should receive the hereditary tenure of Egypt and the government for life of Syria. It, however, was not to be proposed unless there was a strong probability of its being accepted, for it had the inconvenience of depending upon the willingness of the Pasha to request that France should negotiate for him.

---

29 Ibid., pp. 255-256, 264-266.
30 Ibid., pp. 270-271.

---
In addition to these two proposals Guizot carried back to London a letter from Louis Philippe to King Leopold of Belgium, who at that time was at Windsor Castle, greatly alarmed by the thought of a war being declared between his niece and his father-in-law. "'The situation in which France finds herself,'" the King wrote, "'is neither of her choice nor of her creation.... The situation is particularly painful for me who have always scouted the notion that England could ever enter into an alliance without France. I find I am wrong. For the present we can only wait and see. But there is one thing we must do and that is to arm, and we are doing so vigorously. Our rôle must be one of expectation. We must see what England means to do, before deciding what France shall do, either in the way of restoring or preserving the balance of power.'"\(^{31}\)

The French Ambassador, very soon after his arrival in England, proceeded to Windsor, where he delivered Louis Philippe's letter and at the same time explained to Leopold the French project for the maintenance of the status quo. The latter, who previously had advocated that a "'great European measure'"—a treaty between the five Powers "'to guarantee against all enemies and dangers the existing state of the possessions of the Porte'"—should be concluded to supersede the Convention of London,\(^{32}\) readily sanctioned Guizot's suggestions and promised that he would urge them upon Lord Palmerston.\(^{33}\)

There were many at the British Court, including Melbourne, Neumann, and Bülow, who were willing to consider favorably the Belgian King's proposals.\(^{34}\) Palmerston, however, was not one of that number. "'King Leopold has mentioned his idea to me,'" he informed Guizot, August 21, 1840; "'a treaty between the five Powers which might guarantee the status quo of the Ottoman Empire... [That is] impossible at present. A treaty has been concluded between four Powers, not with a general and permanent aim, as would be that of which we are speaking, but with a special


\(^{32}\)It is probable that the idea of a "'great European measure'" was suggested first by Wellington. See Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 278-279.

\(^{33}\)Ibid., pp. 278-282. See also Guichen, op. cit., pp. 350-354.

\(^{34}\)Melbourne to Russell, Aug. 21, 26, 1840, Sanders, Melbourne Papers, pp. 462-464, 467-469.
and momentary view. This incidental treaty must follow its course, and when accomplished, the general treaty may well take its place. Today we must await events." 

Instead of agreeing to concessions which might have conciliated the French, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs prepared a note, in answer to Thiers' memorandum of July 21, 1840, in which he defended in a most elaborate manner the course which he had followed during the entire period of the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the Treaty of London. No one but the French government itself was to blame for the isolated position of France, he declared. France had no right to expect that when four out of the five Powers found themselves agreed upon one course and when the fifth had determined to pursue a course entirely different "that the Four should, in deference to the Fifth, give up opinions in which they were daily more and more confirmed, and which related to a matter of vital importance to the great and permanent interests of Europe." It was only in one of the concluding paragraphs that a vague hope was held out that, when the four should have brought about such an arrangement between the Porte and its subject as might be compatible with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and with the future peace of Europe, there could then be nothing to prevent France from concurring with them in such further engagements for the future as might appear to be necessary "in order to give due stability to the good effects of the interposition of the four Powers in favor of the sultan; and to secure the Ottoman empire from a recurrence of danger." 

It is evident that the British Minister's determination to make no concessions was due to the fact that he was convinced that the French would not dare to intervene in behalf of the Viceroy and that the policy which the four Powers had adopted would tri- 

---

"Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 287-288. Guizot did not present his second project to the British government. However, on Aug. 10, 1840, Granville reported to Palmerston that Thiers had suggested that the Pasha might request the intervention of France. Four days later Palmerston replied that it was needless for him to point out that in the situation in which affairs then stood it would be impossible for the five Powers to accept the interposition of France between them and Mehemet Ali. See Granville to Palmerston, Aug. 10, 1840, Palmerston to Granville, Aug. 14, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 76, 80-81. 

"Palmerston to Bulwer, Aug. 31, 1840, ibid., pp. 102-110. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 500-510."
umph speedily. He persisted in his opinions even in spite of the reports which his agents at Paris forwarded to him announcing that the French were continuing actively their preparations for war.37 "I am more than ever confirmed," he wrote to Bulwer, August 23, 1840, "in my belief that for the present at least the French will remain quiet, and that there will be no war. However inconsiderate the French nation may be, the French interests growing up every day will make them pause before they begin an unprovoked and aggressive war against the four Powers.

"Thiers, therefore, sooner or later will give the order to "cease firing;" the smoke will soon blow away from the eyes of the French people, and they will see more clearly the objects which have caused their false alarm; and both Thiers and Louis Philippe will take care to keep out of a quarrel which nobody means to force upon them.'"38

In the meantime news of the conclusion of the Convention of London had arrived in the Near East. The Ottoman Ministers who received this intelligence on August 3, 1840, proceeded without loss of time to carry out their part of the agreement.39 Rifaat Bey, accompanied by a Mr. Allison, of the British embassy, was despatched to Alexandria with the Sultan's ultimatum and measures were taken promptly for the sending of arms, ammunition, and troops to the aid of the discontented inhabitants of Syria.40

Rifaat Bey arrived at his destination on August 11, just one day in advance of Count Walewski, the agent whom Thiers had

37Granville to Palmerston, Aug. 7, 10, 1840; Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug. 21, 28, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 73-74, 76, 88, 93.
39Ponsonby to Palmerston, Aug. 5, 9, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 91, 100.
40"The revolts of June, 1840, had been put down ruthlessly. Nevertheless, the spirit of the rebels was not broken. On July 25, 1840, a British consul wrote: "Lebanon is a sleeping volcano, and its oppressed and exasperated inhabitants are only waiting a favourable moment to try once more the fortune of arms."—Moore to Ponsonby, July 25, 1840, ibid., p. 96. See also, Paton, op. cit., II, p. 179.
sent to persuade the Pasha to be moderate in his demands.\textsuperscript{41} Five
days later, on the 16th, he informed the latter officially of the
terms of the convention of July 15, 1840.\textsuperscript{42} During the twenty
days that followed immediately thereafter the Egyptian metropolis
rivaled even London and Paris as a center of diplomatic activity.
At first the Viceroy was defiant. He had at an earlier date, after
having received unofficial information concerning what had oc-
curred at the British capital, taken steps to withdraw all of his
regular troops from Arabia and had ordered that the preparations
for war in Egypt and in Syria should be pushed forward vigor-
ously.\textsuperscript{43} Being convinced that these measures would be adequate
for the defense of the territories under his control, he announced
forthwith that he had decided to resist the execution of the terms
of the famous convention and that all efforts to induce him to
change his opinion would be in vain.\textsuperscript{44} The Consuls-General of the
four Powers, in reply, remonstrated with him, warning him that,
if he did not accept the terms which Rifaat had offered, the allies

\textsuperscript{41} Hodges to Ponsonby, Aug. 16, 1840, \textit{Levant Correspondence}, II, pp.
147-148.

149-152.

\textsuperscript{43} Letters from Alexandria, Aug. 7, 1840, \textit{The Times}, Aug. 25, Aug. 26, 1840
Mehemet Ali was acting in accord with the advice of Thiers. Note the following
extract from a despatch, Thiers to Cochelet, July 29, 1840, quoted by Guichen,
\textit{op. cit.}, p. 359: "Le but que le Vice-roi et le gouvernement français doivent
se proposer, disait notre ministre, est d'annuler les effets que les quatre Cours
attendent de la convention qu'elles ont conclue. Le moyen le plus propre à
faire atteindre ce but est la soumission de la Syrie... La France, obligée de
veiller à son honneur et de pourvoir à ses intérêts, chercherait un champ de
bataille moins éloigné d'elle que l'Orient. Le Vice-roi qui est sur le premier plan
de la politique, cesserait d'y être. A côté des grands intérêts qu'elle serait appelée
da défendre et à faire triompher, celui de Mehemet Ali deviendrait bien secondaire.
Elle se trouverait réduite à l'abandonner à lui-même. Livré à ses propres forces,
serait-il en état de résister à toute la puissance anglaise, engagée sérieusement
dans une guerre qui anéantirait en Orient et en Occident tout ce qui est faible
et qui lui offrirait l'attrait d'une si belle et si utile conquête?" Cochelet even
got so far as to urge Mehemet Ali to stir up a holy war throughout the Near
East. See \textit{ibid.}, p. 360.

\textsuperscript{44} Minute of Interview between the Consuls-General and Mehemet Ali, Aug.
certainly would coerce him into submission.45 Count Walewski, on the other hand, refusing to advise Mehemet to surrender completely because of the demands of the Porte, urged all of the parties concerned to be moderate.46 At the end of the first period of ten days the Viceroy was still defiant. "'I repeat,'" he declared on the same day that he announced that he was determined to continue upon the course which he had been following, "'that I am only responsible to Providence.'"47 However, before the close of a second period of equal length he consented to follow the advice of the French.48 Although he persisted in refusing to comply with the provisions of the Sultan's ultimatum, he had it announced to Rifaat Bey and the Consuls-General of the four Powers that he would be satisfied if he received the hereditary possession of Egypt and the tenure for life of Syria.49


45Walewski urged Col. Hodges to use his endeavors to prevent hostile operations against Egypt and Syria on the part of the British naval forces. He was instructed, he declared, that in case his request was not granted he should go on board the English flag ship and present it direct to Admiral Stopford.—Hodges to Palmerston, Aug. 19, 1840, ibid., p. 157.

46Minute of Interview, Aug. 26, 1840, ibid., p. 185-186.

47On Aug. 24, 1840, Hodges reported that the Viceroy had made a formal application to France for its protection and mediation. That report, however, was probably incorrect. On the same day, Mehemet Ali declared to the Russian Consul-General that he had never reckoned on the assistance of France. "'It is true,'" he stated, "'that she offered it me three times, but I never trusted it; and I swear to you that my decision has in no wise been influenced by the declarations of the newspapers and the language of M. Thiers. M. Périer told me plainly that France would not interfere in my favour.'"—Hodges to Palmerston, Aug. 24, 1840; Minute of Conversation, Aug. 24, 1840; ibid., pp. 173, 178-180.

48Mehemet Ali announced his willingness to make concessions on Aug. 28, 1840. See a letter from Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1840, The Times, Sept. 19, 1840; ibid., Sept. 28, 1840. It is said that on Sept. 5, 1840, the twentieth day after the terms of the Treaty of London had been communicated formally to the Pasha, Sami Bey delivered the latter's final answer to Rifaat Bey and the Consuls-General of the four Powers in the following language: "His Highness, my master, accepts the treaty of the 15th of July to the letter. He accepts the hereditary title of Egypt, and with regard to Syria, he is about to petition the Sultan that that administration may be granted him in his old age, to cease at the expiration of his life. The fleet shall be restored, Arabia has been evacuated, and therefore all will depend on the Sultan's orders."—Letter from "on board
At the same time that the papers relating to the Treaty of London were sent to Constantinople, instructions were forwarded to Admiral Stopford, the commander of the British naval forces in the Levant, to the effect that all communications by sea between Egypt and Syria should be cut off. In order to execute these instructions Stopford divided his fleet into two divisions, sending one portion under command of Sir Charles Napier to operate along the coast of Syria and taking the other under his own direct control to cruise off the harbor of Alexandria. As long as it was doubtful whether Mehemet Ali would agree to accept the terms outlined in the separate act of the Convention of London the Admiral and the Commodore refrained from beginning actual hostilities, but after it became known that he had rejected them they at once adopted an aggressive policy. The two divisions of the fleet were reunited September 9, 1840, and on the following night a landing of troops was effected a few miles to the north of Beyrout in D’Jounie Bay. Two days later Admiral Stopford, in cooperation with Admiral Bandeira, who with two Austrian frigates had joined the British fleet, sent a flag of truce into Beyrout with a summons to Suleiman Pasha (Colonel Sèves), the commander of an army of 15,000 men stationed there, to withdraw his troops. Finding the latter’s reply unsatisfactory, the Anglo-Austrian squadron promptly opened fire upon the Egyptian fortifications within the town. No attempt was made immediately to occupy the place but other military and naval operations followed


*Admiralty (in letters) 5503 Syria, Palmerston to Admiralty, July 16, 17, 23, 1840, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 289. A. Jochmus, The Syrian War and the Decline of the Ottoman Empire, p. XXIX.

*Napier not only intercepted communications between Syria and Egypt but also cooperated with British agents who were encouraging the peoples of Mt. Lebanon to attempt a new revolt. See Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 200-207, 214-215. Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 15 ff. E. Napier, Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir Charles Napier, II, pp. 6 ff.


in rapid succession and it became apparent very soon that the allied forces were determined to compel the Viceroy to submit.\textsuperscript{64}

Reports concerning developments which resulted in the Near East after the terms of the Treaty of London became known there began to arrive in France late in August, 1840. The first of these reports, serving merely to confirm the belief which the French entertained in regard to the attitude of Mehemet Ali, did not occasion much alarm. Indeed for a time it even appeared as though that in spite of them the warlike feelings of the French were "dying away."\textsuperscript{78} The Bourse rallied a point and the tone of the Paris press became remarkably moderate.\textsuperscript{66} This period of comparative quiet, however, was only the calm before a storm. When it was announced early in September that the Anglo-Austrian fleet had cut off communications between Egypt and Syria and that it was preparing to engage in actual hostilities in case Mehemet Ali should not submit at the end of his twenty days of grace, a new wave of excitement swept throughout the country.\textsuperscript{67} The French government, as well as its subjects, was alarmed, and ordinances providing for the fortification of Paris,\textsuperscript{68} and for calling the classes of 1834 and 1835 to the colors were decreed in rapid succession.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{64}From the base at D'Jounie arms were distributed among the mountaineers and raids were made into the interior. On Sept. 26, 1840, Sidon was taken by storm and on Oct. 11 Beyrouth was occupied; see Napier, \textit{War in Syria}, I, pp. 61 ff. Napier, \textit{Correspondence}, II, pp. 38 ff. Jochmus, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{66}Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 4, 1840, \textit{Levant Correspondence}, II, pp. 128-129.


\textsuperscript{69}Faucher to Reeve, Sept. 13, 1840, Faucher, \textit{op. cit.}, I, pp. 97-98. See also, comment upon the attitude of the French journals, \textit{The Times}, Sept. 12, 15, 17, 19, 21, 29, 1840. Between September 1 and September 15 the French 3\%'s dropped from 80.10 to 73. See Appendix A.

\textsuperscript{67}Louis Philippe and the Duc d'Orleans were strongly in favor of the idea of fortifying Paris. It was said at the time that their attitude on this question was due to their fear of a revolution. See Duc d'Orleans to Marie-Amélie [his mother] Aug. 18, 1840, Flers, \textit{Le Roi Louis Philippe vie anecdotique}, pp. 378-380. Metternich, \textit{op. cit.}, VI, p. 390.

On September 18, 1840, Bulwer, who for several days past had been suspicious concerning the intentions of Louis Philippe and his ministers,40 called upon Thiers at his residence in Auteuil. He found the latter "walking up and down in a long room or gallery" evidently much disturbed. The President of the Council, it soon developed, had received despatches from Walewski announcing that Mehemet Ali, through Walewski's mediation, had consented to accept a settlement on the basis of his receiving Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life.41 "'France,'" Thiers declared after explaining this news to Bulwer, "'thinks these conditions reasonable and just. If your Government will act with us in persuading the Sultan and the other Powers to accept them, there is once more a cordiale entente between us. If not, after the concessions obtained through our influence from Mehemet Ali, we are bound to support him.' . . . 'Vous comprenez, mon cher, la gravité de ce que je viens de dire!'" "'You know,'" the Frenchman added later, however, "'what I have been saying to you' . . . 'is said as M. Thiers, not as President of the Council. I have to consult my colleagues, the King also. But I wish you to understand clearly the tendency of my own personal opinions.'"402 The same day Bulwer reported to Palmerston that he was convinced, that M. Thiers had wished him to understand that he was anxious that peace should be maintained; that with that in view he had done all in his power to persuade Mehemet Ali to be reasonable in his conditions; that he thought that the terms which the latter had agreed to accept were reasonable; and that if they were granted the impending struggle would be avoided. But if they were refused, and the execution of the treaty rigorously insisted upon, he, for his own part, without giving any pledge to the Pasha, still felt in a certain degree pledged towards him; and "that he was con-

40Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 11, 14, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 188-189.

41See a copy of a despatch Walewski to Thiers, Aug. 29, 1840, quoted by Haussonville, op. cit., I, pp. 303-307. This despatch must have been one of those which Thiers had received.

vinced, putting himself out of the question, that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to form any Government which would remain a perfectly passive and disinterested spectator of the measures to be pursued. Consequently, that without any decided act of immediate hostility, or any positive declaration of war, such a state of things would ensue, as must, ere long, disturb the peace of the world.”

The “mysterious threatening” in which Thiers had indulged failed to intimidate the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. “...if Thiers should again hold to you the language of menace, however indistinctly and vaguely shadowed out,” he replied to Bulwer, September 22, 1840, “pray retort upon him to the full extent of what he may say to you...convey to him in the most friendly and unoffensive manner possible, that if France throws down the gauntlet we shall not refuse to pick it up; and that if she begins a war, she will to a certainty lose her ships, colonies, and commerce before she sees the end of it;...we should very soon have nearly three times the number of ships that France could put to sea, and must, therefore, have the command of all their interests beyond sea; .... These considerations perhaps might weigh more with Louis Philippe than with Thiers, but I am inclined to think that they will weigh with somebody or other at Paris. However, I may be mistaken, and the French may either make war, in spite of their assurances, or commit some violent and outrageous act of aggression against the Sultan, which the four Powers will be obliged to resent; in that case France must take the consequences, and her Government bear the responsibility.”

*Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 18, 1840, *ibid.*, pp. 196-197. Bulwer, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 428-430. See also, an extract of a despatch, Thiers to Guizot, Sept. 17, 1840, quoted by Guizot, *op. cit.*, V, pp. 311 ff. Bulwer wrote several other despatches to Palmerston on Sept. 18, 1840. In one of these he mentioned that he had received “two or three visits from a French gentleman” who was anxious to arrive at some settlement of the Eastern question. “He came to me today,” Bulwer declared, “and said he had seen M. Thiers, and that he was convinced that the French Government would agree, moyennant some slight concession, to enter into the Treaty of the 15th of July, and to coerce the Pasha, if he did not accede to the terms proposed to him. ... As I know that he has seen many of the Ministers, and M. Thiers twice within these few days, I think it desirable to give your Lordship the substance of what has been passed between us.”—*Levant Correspondence*, II, pp. 197-198. See also, *ibid.*, pp. 199-200.

*Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 22, 1840, Bulwer, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 327-331.*
Many of Palmerston's countrymen, including even some of his colleagues in the Cabinet, did not agree with him. In the latter part of July, 1840, it will be remembered, many had doubted if it would be wise to ignore entirely the French protests against the Treaty of London. Their doubts increased with the passing of time, and when the excitement of the French became intense in September, 1840, they became so alarmed that they" demanded that the British government should make some concession in order to conciliate its former ally. "The more we consider the propositions which Mehmet Ali, by the advice of France, has been induced to make to the Porte," an editorial writer stated in The Times, "the more we are convinced not only that it would be madness to reject them, but that they would effect a more advantageous settlement of the Eastern question, even for Turkey herself, than could be obtained by the most complete success to the military operations of the allies, and the utter discomfiture of the Pasha. . . . What the real interests of Turkey require are security for her European provinces against Russia, and for her Asiatic [provinces] against Mehmet Ali, and none can be so complete as the solemn guarantee of all the other Powers, France included, and their united determination to defend her from all aggression. . . . No settlement which does not include France can be safe, satisfactory, or lasting. Despite the miserable insolence of the French press and of 'Young France:' accept the mediation of her Government, meet her half way, show a disposition, not to succumb to menace or defer to unreasonable pretensions, but to act in a fair spirit of compromise, with a frank and friendly consideration of the feelings of the French nation and we may once more return to those relations of amity, the cordiality of which

"Note the following extract from an editorial published in The Times, Aug. 31, 1840: "While we are awaiting the events in the East which may give a decided turn to the policy of England, Russia, or France, it can neither be denied nor concealed that this country is placed in the most unaccountable and ambiguous situation which was ever occupied by a Power of first rate magnitude. . . . in reality England has been placed by Lord Palmerston's acquiescence in M. de Brunnow's contrivance in the position of a second rate Power. . . . An accidental collision between a French and English brig in the Levant may suddenly bring down on us a declaration of war from France; or the slightest indication of a movement on the part of Russia may require the most decided and rapid measures to prevent the occupation of Constantinople." See also, similar editorials in ibid., Aug. 29, Sept. 8, 9, 1840."
ought never to have been interrupted, and on the continuation of which depend the peace of Europe and the happiness of man-kind." Lord John Russell, who entertained similar opinions, wrote to Lord Melbourne, September 26, 1840, that the whole aspect of affairs was changed "by the language of Thiers on the 18th." "We have now to deal," he stated, "not with the Pasha, but with the Pasha and France. . . . I have told Palmerston I think we ought in conference to tell our allies we are ready to accept Walewski's conditions, provided they (the allies) agree, and the Syrian insurgents have security against vengeance.

"If you and Palmerston are against this I had much better retire." 

Those who worked to secure a modification of the terms of the Treaty of London were aided greatly in their efforts by the attitude

"Ibid., Sept. 29, 1840. At an earlier date Guizot had induced Charles Greville to use his influence in getting Barnes, the editor of The Times, to adopt a pro-French attitude. See Greville to Reeve, Sept. 10, 1840, Johnson, op. cit., pp. 5-7.

"Russell to Melbourne, Sept. 26, 1840, Walpole, op. cit., I, p. 351. The opposition which Palmerston encountered in his "own camp" was formidable indeed. Note the following extract from a letter, Palmerston to Bulwer, March 14, 1846: . . . "We had indeed great difficulties to surmount in accomplishing our purpose [in 1840-1841]; but although that purpose was to rescue Europe from a perpetually-recurring danger of war, and to protect British interests from injury by the scarcely disguised encroachments of two great foreign Powers, yet, nevertheless, the greatest difficulties which I had to encounter in the whole transaction arose from the unprincipled intrigues in our own camp." Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 323 [footnote]. Palmerston blamed in particular Ellice, Holland, and Clarendon. On July 27, 1840, he wrote: "Thiers and Guizot are very angry, of course, because they had persuaded themselves that the English Cabinet never would be induced to separate itself from France on this question. Ellice had misled Thiers; and Guizot had been deceived by the foolish language held out by Holland and Clarendon, who went talking away in favour of Mehemet Ali. However, the French had some foundation for their mistake; for when it came to the point, I found such resistance on the part of Holland and Clarendon, and such lukewarmness on the part of some of the other members of the Cabinet, that I sent in my resignation. . . . The dissidents upon this withdrew their opposition, and the waverers came round to my views."—Palmerston to Temple, July 27, 1840, ibid., III, pp. 42-43. See also Broughton, op. cit., V, pp. 297-298.
which the Courts of Vienna and Berlin maintained. Prince Metternich, alarmed at the possibility of a European war, had forwarded to Paris on August 31, 1840, a note suggesting a plan whereby France might become reunited with the concert of the four Powers. According to that plan, France would declare anew her adhesion to the principles of the collective note of July 27, 1839; she would continue her refusal to agree to the measures of coercion which the other Powers had decided upon, explaining that she could not see in them the means of attaining with safety the desired object [the preservation of the Ottoman Empire]; and she would announce that in case of the failure of those means she then would be ready to join the four Powers and the Sultan in considering "the most fitting means" for assisting the Porte and that she would be willing to aid in carrying the latter means into execution "according to the circumstances of the moment." Metternich followed up this communication to the government of France by sending to it others which were also very conciliatory in character. Baron Werther, the Prussian Prime Minister,

"Thiers, who must have known of Metternich's alarm, and probably wished to encourage it, was particularly vivacious in his attitude towards Apponyi, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris. See Metternich, op. cit., VI, p. 390.

"Substance of a communication stated to have been made by Prince Metternich to the French government; Beauval to Palmerston, Aug. 30, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 243, 126-127. Greville, op. cit., I, p. 282 [footnote]. Thiers did not reply to Metternich's suggestion. See Granville to Palmerston, Oct. 9, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 275-276. Metternich was in a most difficult position it seems. His prestige both abroad and at home was damaged. Within the Hapsburg monarchy Count Kolowrat, Minister of the Interior, influenced probably by the sharp drop in the Austrian exchange and the bad financial situation in general, was leading the opposition to Metternich and the treaty of July 15. According to Hasenclever, Metternich spent his time in making violent tirades against Thiers, in warning against Russian land greed, and in defending conservative principles. See Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 206-208. See also Metternich to Leopold, Dec. 5, 1840, quoted by Corti, op. cit., pp. 135-136.

maintained a similar policy. He even appeared to be much pleased, as William Russell, the British envoy at Berlin, reported on September 23, 1840, by the news of the concessions which Walewski had persuaded Mehmet Ali to make, and seemed to think that a basis was laid thereby on which a final and satisfactory settlement of the Oriental question might be formed.

At a Cabinet meeting held on October 1, 1840, the members of the British ministry who were opposed to the complete execution of the July treaty, encouraged by the willingness of the Austrian and Prussian governments to make some concessions in order to conciliate the French, forced matters to a crisis, and it was only through the efforts of Lord Melbourne that a compromise between them and Palmerston was secured. In that compromise the latter consented to state to the representatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia that it appeared to Her Majesty’s government to be expedient that the four Powers should propose to the government of France such a course as was sketched out in Metternich’s note of August 31, 1840.

Although Palmerston did agree to take the step suggested by Melbourne it is certain that he still was determined to carry his policy into execution. It is probable, as Henry Reeve has stated, that he was aware at the very time when he consented to make

"Although the Prussian government was anxious to preserve peace it became so alarmed at the belligerent activities of Thiers that it also began preparing for war. Furthermore a distinct reaction to the warlike clamor in France took place throughout Germany. It was at this time that Schneckenburger composed the famous Die Wacht am Rhein and that Niklas Becker wrote the popular song:

"Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den freien deutschen Rhein,
Ob sie wie gier’ge Raben sich heiser darnach schrei’n,
So lang er ruhig wallend sein grünes Kleid noch trägt,
So lang ein Ruder schallend in seine Wagen schlägt."


"Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 23, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, p. 229.

"Walpole, op. cit., I, p. 354. For additional information concerning the opposition to Palmerston’s policy which was offered in Sept., 1840, by certain members of the British Cabinet, see ibid., pp. 348-349, 352-353; Sanders, Melbourne Papers, pp. 474 ff; Victoria, op. cit., I, pp. 231-232; Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 343-344; The Times, Oct. 2, Dec. 7, 1840; Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 261, 263, 265, 267, 271-273, 276, 278-283."
such a proposal to the representatives of the three Powers that at least Brunnow and the Emperor of Russia would not concur in it, and that he agreed to it merely for the purpose of gaining time.\textsuperscript{74} It is significant in this connection that on October 2, the very next day after the compromise in the Cabinet had been arranged, the \textit{Morning Chronicle}, a journal under Palmerston's influence, published an extremely violent article against the French.\textsuperscript{75} Furthermore, it is also worthy of note that on October 3, 1840, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs declared in a letter which he wrote to Bulwer that "'If the four Powers were to give way to the menaces of France, they would soon be compelled to go to war with her to resist her further encroachments, or they must be prepared to submit patiently to a succession of aggressions and insults.' "'In short,'" he stated in the same letter, "'without further argument, the thing [a modification of the terms of the Treaty of London] is impossible, unless, indeed (which I cannot suppose), Mehemet Ali was to turn out to be such a wonder of the world as to be able to beat the four Powers and the Sultan united.'"\textsuperscript{76}

It was known as early as the second day of October that the Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries would refuse to make a communication to France in conformity with the British Cabinet's suggestion "without reference to their Courts and authority from them."\textsuperscript{77} Nevertheless, on October 8, 1840, Palmerston sent to the

\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., p. 284 [footnote].
\textsuperscript{75}Walpole, \textit{op. cit.}, I, p. 354. See a French translation of the article which was published in the \textit{Morning Chronicle} on Oct. 2, 1840, in \textit{Journal des D\'ebats}, Oct. 5, 1840. The \textit{Morning Chronicle} rendered invaluable services to Palmerston. Note the following extract of a letter, Melbourne to Victoria, Jan. 17, 1842: "Your Majesty knows very well that Palmerston has long had much communication with the \textit{Morning Chronicle} . . . and has made great use of it for the purpose of maintaining and defending his own policy. . . . if Palmerston in the Syrian affair had not had as devoted an assistant as the \textit{Morning Chronicle}, he would hardly have been able to maintain his course or carry through his measures."—Victoria, \textit{op. cit.}, I, pp. 374-375. See also, extracts copied from the \textit{Morning Chronicle}, in \textit{The Examiner}, Sept. 6, 20, Oct. 11, 25, 1840, pp. 564, 595, 641-645, 673; and in the \textit{Journal des D\'ebats}, Aug. 1, 16, Oct. 9, Nov. 20, 22, 1840. See also, Laughton, \textit{op. cit.}, I, p. 122.
\textsuperscript{76}Palmerston to Bulwer, Oct. 3, 1840, Bulwer, \textit{op. cit.}, II, p. 332. See also, Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 5, 7, 1840, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 333-334, 337-338.
\textsuperscript{77}Melbourne to Victoria, Oct. 2, 1840, Victoria, \textit{op. cit.}, I, pp. 232-233.
three envoys of Austria, Russia, and Prussia formal notes identical in character in which he repeated the proposal he had agreed to make to them. Schleinitz, the Prussian representative, replied on the following day, and Neumann, the Austrian, returned his answer three days later. Both announced that they were without instructions concerning such a question, and both promised to bring it to the attention of their governments. Baron Brunnow, who also replied on October 12, promised likewise that he would refer the matter to his government, but the language which he used revealed very clearly that he was convinced that it would not be received favorably.

While these developments were taking place in London reports from the Levant were causing the excitement in France to increase. A telegraphic despatch which arrived at Paris on October 2 stated that "after a bombardment of nine days, which had reduced the town [of Beyrout] to ashes, the Egyptians had evacuated it at night and the allies had taken possession." Soon thereafter it became known that the Porte, dissatisfied with Mehemet Ali's answer to the Sultan's ultimatum and disregarding the representations of the French agents at Constantinople, had issued a firman, September 14, 1840, decreeing the deposition of his rebellious vassal and the placing of the ports of Syria and Egypt in a state of blockade. The Bourse thereupon experienced

*Palmerston to Neumann, Schleinitz, and Brunnow, Oct. 8, 1840, *Levant Correspondence*, II, p. 268.
*Schleinitz to Palmerston, Oct. 9, 1840; Neumann to Palmerston, Oct. 12, 1840, *ibid.*, pp. 293-294, 296.
*Brunnow to Palmerston, Oct. 12, 1840, *ibid.*, pp. 294-295. See also, Rauch to Nicholas, I, Oct. 13, 1840; Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Oct. 24, 1840, Nesselrode, *op. cit.*, VIII, pp. 51-53, 55-60. Nesselrode was uneasy about the attitude of Austria. On Oct. 10, he wrote to Meyendorff: "La nouvelle de la destitution de Méhémet Ali a été un coup de foudre pour Metternich; Il a commencé à faiblir et il n'a tenu qu'à un cheveu que l'Austrique ne nous échappât complètement.

"Les efforts de lord Beauvale et du comte Maltzahn l'ont, grâce à Dieu, maintenue dans nos rangs, n'est-ce pas curieux que ce soit le ministre de Prusse qui donne du courage au chancelier d'Austrie?"—*ibid.*, p. 49.
*Nouvelle des Détails*, Oct. 3, 1840. This report, of course, was exaggerated.
a terrible panic, during which the 3% sank as low as 65.25; enthusiastic crowds in the theaters sang the *Marseillaise*, and the "lower orders" exclaimed in the streets: "'Guerre aux Anglais, ils ont pris notre Beyrout,' which, from the rage expressed on the subject by the journals, they concluded must be some town in Normandy on the coast."  

The French government, on its part, was aroused particularly because of the deposition of Mehemet Ali. A royal ordinance was issued at once convoking the Chambers to meet October 28, 1840, and on October 8, Thiers forwarded to Guizot a note in which he declared: "In the opinion of France, the Viceroy of Egypt, for [par] the provinces which he governs, for the seas over which his influence extends, is necessary to secure the balance of power ... existing between the different states of the world.

"Impressed with this conviction, France, equally disinterested, with respect to the Eastern Question, as the four Powers who signed the protocol of September 17, considers herself called upon to declare, that the deprivation of the Viceroy, if actually

14, 1840, he sent instructions to Stopford explaining that the British ships of war should not enforce a commercial blockade of the ports of Egypt and Syria, and he wrote to Granville stating that the British government regarded the deposition of Mehemet Ali only as a measure of coercion which might be withdrawn if Mehemet should at an early date accept the conditions offered him. See Palmerston to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, Oct. 6, 1840; Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 2, 1840, *ibid.*, pp. 242, 238.


"Royal Ordinance, Oct. 7-10, 1840, Duvergier, *op. cit.*, XL, p. 405.

"On Sept. 17, 1840, the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers signed a protocol announcing that they, after having exchanged the ratifications of the convention concluded on July 15, had resolved "to declare formally—" That in the execution of the engagements resulting to the contracting Powers from the above mentioned convention, those Powers" would "seek no augmentation of territory, no exclusive influence, no commercial advantage for their subjects, which those of every other nation" might not equally obtain.—Martens, *N. R. G.*, XV, p. 488. *State Papers, XXVIII*, p. 348. *Annual Register*, 1840, p. 452.
carried into execution, would in her eyes be a blow to the general balance of power. The question respecting the limits which should separate in Syria the possessions of the Sultan and those of the Viceroy of Egypt might be left to the chances of the war actually begun; but France could not abandon to such chances the existence of Mehemet Ali as a vassal Prince of the Empire. Whatever may be the territorial limit which, in consequence of the events of the war, shall ultimately separate them, their two-fold existence is necessary to Europe; and France cannot allow the suppression of either one or the other. Disposed as she is to be a party to any acceptable arrangement, founded on the twofold guarantee of the existence of the Sultan and of the Viceroy of Egypt, she confines herself at present to declaring, that, for her part, she could not consent to the act of deprivation decreed at Constantinople, being carried into execution."

Guizot communicated Thiers’ famous casus belli note to Lord Palmerston on October 10, 1840. For the latter that communication was most opportune. “The Cabinet met this afternoon,” Charles Greville wrote on the date mentioned above. “Lord John Russell was to have taken the lead and developed his conciliatory notions, but a new turn was given to affairs by a note which Guizot placed in Palmerston’s hands . . . Palmerston brought it to the Cabinet, where it was read, and, to the extreme surprise of everybody, it was to the last degree moderate, and evincing a disposition to be very easily satisfied. . . . It would now appear that the French government would be well enough satisfied if the original terms offered to Mehemet Ali were still held out to him, . . . Palmerston began talking of leaving him Egypt for his life, which was, however, instantly put down by the majority. . . . On the whole the result was satisfactory; . . . ”


Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 291-292. See also, Melbourne to Victoria, Oct. 10, 11, 1840, Victoria, op. cit., I, pp. 237-239. Lord John Russell was at that time on the point of forcing a new crisis in the Cabinet. See Walpole, op. cit., I, pp. 354-357. Palmerston’s position then also was strengthened by the publication of his note of Aug. 31, 1840. See The Times, Oct. 7, 10, 1840.
Thiers’ note was copied promptly by the press and in both England and France the public interpreted it as signifying identically what the members of the British Cabinet had taken it to mean.89 “[It] indirectly announces,” The Times stated on October 17, 1840, “that the final requisition of France in favour of the Pasha will be limited to that of which none but the shallow brain of Lord Ponsonby would deprive him—viz., the possession of Egypt in hereditary sovereignty.”90

It soon became apparent, however, that the President of the French Council was imbued with far less pacific intentions than his note had led the British Cabinet and the public in the two countries to believe.91 If negotiations were reopened at once between France and the other Powers, he informed Lord Granville on October 15, 1840, he would ask of the Chambers when they met only their sanction of the expense which had been theretofore incurred in putting France into a state of defense, but if no such negotiations were entered into he would then request the granting of supplies sufficient for an additional increase of the army and for the putting the national guards “into activity;” he would recall a considerable portion of the forces in Africa; and he would assemble “several armies” ready to act on the frontiers. These statements Granville reported immediately to Palmerston, commenting that they evidently were intended to persuade him that war was inevitable if the four Powers should persist in refusing “to enter into negotiation with France relative to the conditions of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, and refuse to make

89 The radicals in France were highly dissatisfied with the apparent moderation of M. Thiers. See comment upon articles which had appeared in the Commerce, the National, and the Capitole in ibid., Oct. 16, 1840. Raikes, France since 1830, I, pp. LIV-LV.

90 The Times, Oct. 17, 1840. See ibid., Oct. 20, 1840.

91 In the Chamber of Deputies on Nov. 28, 1840, Thiers explained the meaning of his note of Oct. 8, as follows: “La note ne s’est nullement expliquée sur la limite territoriale. C’est avec intention qu’elle a gardé à cet égard le silence; et en vous l’adressant, je vous ai positivement dit que le cabinet, pour son compte, n’admettait pas les limites du traité du 15 juillet. Je ne prétends pas que cela doive déterminer aujourd’hui une autre conduite; mais il ne faut pas attribuer à la Note un autre sens que celui que je lui attribuais le 8 octobre.”—Journal des Débats, Nov. 29, 1840. See also, accounts of speeches made by Thiers before the Deputies, Nov. 10, 25, 1840, in ibid., Nov. 11, 26, 1840. Thiers declared on the 25th that if he had remained in office he would not have permitted the execution of the terms of the treaty of July 15, 1840.
concessions to obtain the concurrence of the French Government in a pacific arrangement."

Palmerston, as on former occasions, was not alarmed by Thiers' threats. It is true that on October 15, 1840, he wrote to Ponsonby stating that it was the opinion of the British government that the representatives at Constantinople of the four Powers should state to the Sultan that their respective courts recommended strongly "that if Mehemet Ali should at an early period make his submission to the Sultan, and should agree to restore the Turkish fleet, and to withdraw his troops from the whole of Syria, from Adana, Candia, and the Holy Cities, the Sultan should not only reinstate Mehemet Ali as Pasha of Egypt, but should also give him an hereditary tenure in that Pashalic." That step, though, probably was taken merely to satisfy the members of the Cabinet who entertained opinions different from those of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in regard to the danger of war with France. At any rate

Granville to Palmerston, Oct. 15, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 313-314. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 529-530. See also, Granville to Palmerston, Oct. 19, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, p. 319. On Oct. 12, Granville had reported that Admiral Hugon's fleet had been recalled from the Levant for the purpose of seizing one or more of the Balearic Isles. France would explain to Spain, he believed, that war with England appeared imminent and as Spain was not strong enough to protect the Isles, it was necessary that a French fleet should do so. See Granville to Palmerston, Oct. 12, 1840; Palmerston to Aston, Oct. 15, 1840, ibid., p. 298; Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 339-343. In pursuance of his plans Thiers attempted to draw the chief Italian states into an alliance with France. See Hall, op. cit., pp. 310-311.


Victoria to Leopold, Oct. 16, 1840, Victoria, op. cit., I, p. 242. Walpole, op. cit., I, p. 358. Melbourne wrote to the Queen on Oct. 12, 1840: "The worst is that Palmerston, and John Russell, with now the greater part of the Cabinet, proceed upon principles, opinions, and expectations which are entirely different from one another, and which therefore necessarily lead to a different course of action. We are anxious to finish the business speedily because we fear that there is danger of the Government of France being forced into violent measures by popular outcry. Palmerston, on the contrary, thinks that there is no danger of war, . . ."

"We should be too glad to see the matter settled, leaving Mehemet Ali in possession of Egypt.

"Palmerston has both the wish and the hope of getting him out of Egypt as well as Syria."—Victoria, op. cit., I, p. 240. See also, Palmerston to Bulwer, Oct. 3, 1840. Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 333.
on October 20 when Palmerston replied to Granville he was careful to make no statement in which hope that the allies would consent to grant Thiers’ demands could be founded. M. Thiers himself, he declared, could not but see that the threatening armament, which France without any apparent cause had already made, had caused the difficulties to be solved to increase instead of to diminish; “and if the course indicated by M. Thiers should be pursued, and if still more extensive armaments should be made by France,” it would “be impossible that Europe should not believe, that... the real intentions and designs of France” were similar to those which, during the Republic and the Empire, had arrayed Europe in resistance to her aggressions; and thence would follow a conviction that it would be necessary to meet those designs by the same combination of defensive means which was “then employed to protect the liberties of Europe.”

Fortunately for the preservation of peace among the great Powers the exchange of warlike sentiments between Palmerston and Thiers was not destined to be continued further.

King Louis Philippe, it will be remembered, had revealed to Guizot at the conference held in August, 1840, at the Château d’Eu that he was anxious to avoid war. During the early stages of the agitation in France he sanctioned the military and naval preparations advocated by his Cabinet, but he did so believing that the four Powers would be baffled by effectual resistance on the part of Mehemet Ali, that an arrangement between the contending parties in the Levant would be concluded, and consequently that the peace of Europe would not be disturbed. Furthermore he feared that if he should attempt to oppose the clamor for war he would thereby take the risk of stirring up a revolution.

Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 20, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 314-315. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 530-531. See also, Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 8, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 268-270.


Dino, op. cit., II, p. 345.
As time passed it became apparent that the allies were determined to see their policy succeed and it also became apparent that revolutionary ideas were spreading in proportion as the populace was becoming more and more aroused. The latter fact became particularly obvious early in October after it was known in France that the Anglo-Austrian fleet in the Levant had bombarded Beyrout. It was at that time that one of the radical Paris journals, the _National_, realizing that the King was opposed to war, stated: "Old men and babblers are the great scourges of a government. Old men wish everything to be stationary; babblers prevent everything from moving on. This double scourge has particularly afflicted France. . . . Elective governments are not subject to these grave evils. When a man has served out his time, or age has frozen or impaired his faculties, he is left in repose, which is for him at once a necessity and a duty." Moreover, in another column of the same issue, "in direct juxtaposition with this article," the editor of the _National_ took care to point out: "King Louis Philippe this day entered his 69th year." A few days later, on October 15, 1840, an attempt to assassinate the King was made by a revolutionist named Darmes. Louis Philippe, believing that it was "la paix qu'on a voulu tuer" in him, became alarmed thoroughly and resolved that the warlike policy of the government should be abandoned. Accordingly, when Thiers suggested to him, October 20, 1840, that he should deliver at the opening session of the legislative chambers an address breathing defiance and calling for additional means for pre-

---

89 An extract from an article published in the _National_ and copied in _The Examiner_, Oct. 11, 1840, p. 648. See also, Guizot, _op. cit._, pp. 391-392. On Oct. 7, 1840, Thos. Raikes wrote from Paris to Wellington: "The party of the National have now begun their usual mode of attack, as prelude to Revolution. The _Marseillaise_ is sung in the theatres, _êmeutes_ are predicted, and the United Societies are busy in sowing sedition. With external war on one hand, and internal war on the other, the chances are that we shall be involved in both."—Raikes, _Correspondence_, p. 159.


91 Reeve to Mrs. Reeve, Oct. 18, 1840, Laughton, _op. cit._, I, p. 132.

92 Dino, _op. cit._, II, p. 406. The attempt of Darmes to assassinate the King, which aroused others in France beside the latter, was followed by a reaction in favor of peace. See an extract of a letter, Duchâtel to Guizot, Oct. 19, 1840, quoted by Guizot, _op. cit._, V, pp. 402-404.
paredness, he refused to grant his consent. Thiers and his colleagues, who for some time had been on the verge of retiring from office, resigned immediately. The King, anxious to secure a ministry which would be willing to adopt a pacific policy in regard to foreign affairs, appealed again to Marshal Soult. The Marshal was not willing to resume full responsibility for the conduct of governmental affairs, but he did consent to become the nominal President of the Council of a new administration, the real head of which was to be M. Guizot, into whose hands Louis Philippe confided the portfolio of foreign affairs.

With the fall of Thiers and the rise of Guizot it became apparent that the government of France was resolved to make a serious effort to avoid an outbreak of hostilities between itself and the governments of the other four great Powers of Europe over the question of the enforcement of the Treaty of London. At the same time, all danger of war was not removed. The French and German peoples still were greatly excited; the Soult-Guizot Min-

[^103]: See a copy of the address proposed by Thiers, in *ibid.*, pp. 510-512.

[^104]: Louis Philippe may have been influenced to some extent at that time by a threatening remonstrance which Lord Melbourne sent to him through King Leopold of Belgium. See Sanders, *Melbourne Papers*, p. 487. At various times during the crisis of 1840, attempts were made by the Courts of both England and France to influence each other by means of communications carried on through the Court of Belgium. See Louis Philippe to Leopold, Oct. 10, Nov. 6, 1840, Taschereau, *op. cit.*, pp. 363-365. Leopold to Victoria, Oct. 2, 6, 17, 20, 1840; Victoria to Leopold, Oct. 13, 16, 23, 1840; Victoria to Palmerston, Oct. 12, 1840, Victoria, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 233-234, 235, 243-245, 241-243, 245, 239. Greville, *op. cit.*, I, p. 295. Corti, *op. cit.*, pp. 117 ff. King Leopold was very much alarmed by the Near Eastern crisis. On Nov. 5, 1840, he wrote to Metternich: "In view of the condition of social sickness from which Europe suffers, the Communists regarding the bourgeois as an intolerable burden, quite trivial things, alterations in the Treaty itself, might bring on a great war, which would turn into a war of opinions. To confine it to Mehemed would be impossible. I do not say it in order to strengthen my own proposals, but, as far as I know Europe, I believe that its entire social form and organization would be transformed and shattered by such a struggle."—Quoted by *ibid.*, p. 137. Two days later he wrote even more alarmingly to Bülow. See *ibid.*, pp. 133-134.

istry's tenure of office was insecure, and it remained to be seen what terms, if any, the Porte and its four allies would ultimately consent to grant to Mehemet Ali.

106 The Austrian Count von Beust was in Paris at the time of the formation of the Soult-Guizot Ministry. At a later date he stated, concerning the situation in the French capital on that occasion, that "the political excitement then prevalent in Paris was great; the French felt keenly the humiliation they had brought upon themselves, and Guizot . . . did not lie on a bed of roses." "I remember," he continued, "having heard it said more than once: Il en a pour trois semaines. But the three weeks became seven years."—Beust, Mémoirs of Frederick Ferdinand Count von Beust, I, p. 33. For additional information on public opinion in France, and England also, in October, 1840, see Johnson, op. cit., pp. 8 ff.
CHAPTER VI

THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED: FRANCE AND THE FOUR POWERS RECONCILED

The new Ministers in France did not abandon immediately all hope of being able to secure a modification of the terms of the Treaty of London. The Powers ought to modify those terms, Guizot intimated to Palmerston on the day of his departure from London, in order to satisfy French amour-propre and in order to assist the French government to maintain peace.¹ Later, after he had entered upon his ministerial duties, he made a similar advance to Lord Granville. He suggested then that the four Powers and France should agree to a suspension of hostilities in the Levant on a certain date. According to his plan the status quo in Syria at that particular time would be the basis of the arrangement which would be made between the Sultan and the Viceroy, and if the latter should be required to give up any Syrian territory which he still retained he would be compensated for it elsewhere—in Crete for example.²

Palmerston, however, was no more inclined to grant what M. Guizot pleaded for than he had been to grant that which M. Thiers had attempted to secure by threat of armed intervention. "We withstood the threats of Thiers," he wrote, October 29, 1840, "because what he asked could not be granted without great injury to the interests of Europe; and we cannot expose those interests to injury out of complaisance to Louis Philippe

¹Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 27, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 336-337.
²Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 6, 1840, Parl. Papers, 1841, Session 2, VIII, Correspondence relative to the Levant, III, pp. 1-2. See also, Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 13, 1840, ibid., pp. 24-25. Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 305, 309. King Louis Philippe made similar suggestions to King Leopold of Belgium. See Louis Philippe to Leopold, Nov. 6, 16, 1840, Taschereau, op. cit., pp. 364-366. The King was alarmed greatly by the situation of affairs. Note the following extract from a letter, Raikes to Wellington, Nov. 7, 1840: "His Majesty [Louis Philippe] is become such an ardent admirer of peace, that, if he were not withheld by certain cogent apprehensions, I believe he would now not only sacrifice Egypt and the Pasha, but even Toulon and Marseilles, if necessary to accomplish his desired object."—Raikes, Correspondence, p. 183. See also Raikes, Journal, IV, pp. 85-86.
or Guizot any more than out of fear for Thiers; ... if we were to give way, the French nation would believe that we gave way to their menaces, and not to the entreaties of Louis Philippe.’”

Four days later Palmerston forwarded to Paris a reply to the famous casus belli note of October 8, 1840. In that reply he went so far as to deny that the Pasha of Egypt was an essential element of the balance of power in Europe. It was the opinion of the Turkish government, he pointed out, that the continuance of Mehemet Ali in his existing state of military power and with his hostile intentions towards the Sultan was “incompatible with the internal peace and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and destructive of the independence of the Sultan as regards his relations with foreign Powers: ...” The extent of the limits within which it might be necessary to confine the delegated authority of Mehemet Ali, in order to make it probable that for the future he would be an obedient subject, was a point on which opinion might differ. Her Majesty’s government believed that whatever might be the views entertained on the subject by foreign Powers, such views could only serve to regulate the advice which those Powers might tender to the Sultan. It remained with the latter, as sovereign of the Turkish Empire, to decide which of his subjects should be appointed by him to govern particular portions of his own dominions, and no foreign state had a right to control him “in the discretionary exercise of one of the inherent and essential attributes of independent sovereignty.”

M. Guizot, who hoped that the British government would “do or say something to assist him” in his struggle against the war party in France, was greatly disappointed by Palmerston’s note of November 2, 1840. The new administration’s tenure of office, it should be remembered, was by no means secure, and among the Deputies who were finally convened on November 4, just one day before Granville delivered the British Minister’s note to the government of France, the effect produced by that commu-

*The first real test of the parliamentary strength of the Soult-Guizot Ministry came on Nov. 6, 1840, when its candidate, M. Sauzet, was elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. Sauzet received 220 votes while M. Odilon Barrot, his chief opponent, received 154. See Journal des Débats, Nov. 7, 1840.
nication was "markedly favorable to M. Thiers," the leader of the opposition.6 "The note of November 2nd," Guizot wrote to Henry Reeve, "has seriously injured my position and increased the difficulties which surround me. . . . I am engaged in a great struggle for the cause of peace, of civilization, of a straightforward and moderate policy. I am striving for the general good. Nothing shall discourage me. I do not know if I shall succeed, but if I do, I shall owe no gratitude to anyone; at least I have the right to say so, at present."7

Even the Conservatives in England believed that the position taken by Palmerston in his famous note was too uncompromising. "It is . . . a subject of great regret," The Times stated, November 13, 1840, "that in Lord Palmerston's first despatch to be laid before M. Guizot, his Lordship could put forward no more conciliatory and more straightforward principles for future agreement, . . . the publication of this document is certainly rather calculated to strengthen the suspicions we have already expressed of Lord Palmerston's wilful opposition to every species of concession than to encourage those hopes of an amicable arrangement, which are so warmly and generally entertained in this country."8

6Letter from Paris, Nov. 13, 1840, The Times, Nov. 16, 1840. Note also the following extract from the Journal of Thos. Raikes, who was then residing in France: "Nov. 14, 1840 . . . I am very much afraid that this unfortunate note of the 2nd, in the papers, will undo all the good that we had hoped to gain by the change of Ministry."—Raikes, Journal, IV, p. 90.

7Guizot to Reeve, Nov. 20, 1840, Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 138. See also, Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 44.

8The Times, Nov. 13, 1840. In the House of Commons Palmerston explained in the following terms why he sent to Guizot his reply to Thiers' note of Oct. 8, 1840: "All I can say is that circumstances prevented me from writing that answer sooner; and it did not appear to me that the fact of a change of Government in France was any reason for preventing me from putting an answer on record to arguments which I could not admit, and to which it was extremely important that there should be a recorded reply."—Parl. Deb., LVI, p. 113. See also, Palmerston to Bulwer, Aug. 17, 1841, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 380-381. Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 414-415. Guizot objected particularly because Palmerston permitted his note to be published by the public press. It is probable that Palmerston's purpose in so doing was to combat the ideas advanced by the "Friends of Peace" who were holding meetings in Manchester and other important British cities. See Palmerston to Fox Maule, Oct. 31, 1840, G. Douglas and G. Ramsay, The Panmure Papers, I, pp. 19-20.
Palmerston’s note caused many to doubt if the allies would really attempt to induce the Porte to reinstate Mehemet Ali in the governorship of Egypt. Those doubts, however, were not destined to be realized. On November 9, 1840, despatches from Vienna arrived at London, and in them it was intimated that Prince Metternich was in favor of leaving Egypt in hereditary possession to Mehemet Ali on condition that the latter should agree promptly to submit to his overlord. A day later Palmerston received a note from Bloomfield, the British chargé d’affaires at St. Petersburg, announcing that Count Nesselrode had decided to send to Titow, the Tsar’s representative at Constantinople, instructions similar to those which the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs had forwarded to Ponsonby, October 15, 1840. Soon after these communications reached the English capital, on November 14, 1840, the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers signed a memorandum in which they declared that their courts would advise the Porte to grant its pardon to Mehemet Ali and to reinstate him in the Pashalic of Egypt provided that he, on his part, should first offer his submission to the Sultan. Furthermore, on the same date that the memorandum was signed, Palmerston instructed the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that they should order Admiral Stopford to send a “competent officer” to Alexandria to demand from the Pasha the restoration of the Turkish fleet and the evacuation of Syria, Adana, Candia, Arabia, and the Holy Cities. The officer, he directed, should give the Viceroy three days in which to answer those demands, promising him that in case he submitted to them the four Powers would advise the Porte to reinstate him in Egypt. If the Viceroy should do as he was ordered and write an unsealed engagement to the Porte to that effect, the former should immediately carry it to Constantinople and present it to the Ministers of the Sultan, but he should decline to carry any message in which Mehemet did not comply with the above named conditions.

*Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 13, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 25.


*Bloomfield to Palmerston, Oct. 31, 1840, ibid., p. 17.

*Ibid., pp. 21-22. Documents Diplomatiques relatifs à la question d’Orient.

*Palmerston to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, Nov. 14, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 23. On the same date Palmerston forwarded two other communications to the Lords Commissioners. In one he explained that, in case
At the time when Palmerston and the representatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia were outlining conditions which they intended to enforce upon Mehemet Ali the allied military and naval operations were being carried forward rapidly in the Levant. "I believe history does not record such unexampled successes gained in so short a time by so small a force," Sir Charles Napier has stated with evident pride in his War in Syria. "We landed on the 10th of September at D'Joumie, with 5300 Turks, 1500 marines, and about 100 Austrians; by the 10th of October we had managed to storm and take Sidon, defeat the Egyptians at Ornagacuan, Ibrahim Pacha at Boharsof, and ... between prisoners and deserters, get possession of 10,000 men, had freed all Lebanon, and forced Ibrahim to withdraw his troops from Tripoli and Latakia, abandon the passes of the Taurus, and concentrate the whole of his army at Zachle and Damascus [sic]." 18

Soon after the successes in upper Syria, which Napier mentioned, had been achieved, Admiral Stopford received orders from England to the effect that the allied fleet should attack the famous fortress of St. Jean d'Acre. 15 Accordingly on the afternoon of November 3, 1840, a heavy bombardment of the place was begun. The firing of the British, Austrian, and Turkish gunners must have been very effective indeed. Great confusion resulted immediately among the defenders; at about 4 p.m., the fort's magazine blew up, and before nightfall practically all of the shore batteries were silenced. The Egyptians, realizing that they would not be able to continue successfully the defense of their positions, withdrew forthwith under cover of darkness, and on the morning of November 4, forces from the fleet took possession both of the fortress and of the town. 16

Mehemet Ali, in his written engagement to the Porte, should express a desire that he should be given the hereditary possession of Egypt, the officer should not on that account refuse to carry it to Constantinople. In the other he ordered that Stopford should push forward with vigor the military and naval operations on the coasts of Syria and Egypt until he heard from Constantinople that an arrangement had been made with Mehemet Ali. See ibid., p. 24.

14Napier, War in Syria, I, p. 173.
15Ibid., p. 186.
The victory of the allies at Acre was in reality the most important event of all the military and naval operations in the Levant during the war of 1840. Before the date of that victory Mehemet Ali had declared persistently that he would not submit unless his overlord granted to him, in tenure for life at least, the whole of Syria as well as the hereditary possession of Egypt. But, on November 11, 1840, two days after the fall of Acre had been announced at Alexandria, he wrote to the King of the French stating that he would "be satisfied" if he were granted, in addition to Egypt, only the Pashalic of Acre. Ten days later a British fleet of six sail of the line under command of Commodore Napier took up a position off the harbor of the Egyptian metropolis. This threatening move on the part of his opponents added to what had taken place previously must have convinced the Pasha thoroughly that any further resistance on his part would be useless, for when Napier suggested to him that he should agree to accept terms which would be in harmony with the ideas advanced by Lord Palmerston, in his note of October 15, 1840, to Ponsonby, he did not object to following such a course. In fact on November 27, 1840, he even signed with the British Commodore a convention in which he engaged to order his son Ibrahim to proceed at once to the evacuation of Syria and promised to restore the Ottoman fleet to the Sultan as soon as he should receive official notification that the Sublime Porte had granted to him the hereditary government of Egypt, which concession was to be and remain

38Letters from Alexandria, Nov. 9, 1840, ibid., Dec. 1, 1840.
39Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 92-93. According to an Austrian report from Alexandria, Nov. 15, 1840, Mehemet Ali was ready to offer his complete submission, but Cochelet and Walewski, who had returned to Egypt after his failure to induce the Porte to accept the Viceroy's terms, had influenced him to refrain from doing so. See ibid., pp. 98-100. See also Letter from Alexandria, Nov. 11, 1840, The Times, Dec. 1, 1840.
40Napier, Correspondence, II, p. 103. Napier, War in Syria, I, p. 249. A smaller British squadron had been stationed off Alexandria for some time. See The Times, Nov. 2, 11, 17, 1840.
41Napier received a copy of Palmerston's note of Oct. 15, 1840, on the day that he arrived off Alexandria. See Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 249-252. His correspondence with Mehemet Ali began on Nov. 22, 1840. For the letters which were interchanged see ibid., pp. 254 ff. Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 72-81. The Times, Dec. 15, 1840.
THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 201

"'guaranteed by the Powers.'" Napier, in turn, engaged "to suspend hostilities on the part of the British forces against Alexandria, or any other portion of the Egyptian territory,'" and promised that the Egyptian army should "have the liberty of retiring from Syria with its artillery, arms, horses, ammunition, baggage, and in general everything'" that constituted "'the stores of an army.'"22

It is true that Commodore Napier and Mehemet Ali were able thus to agree upon an arrangement which seemed to settle the most important problems at issue in the Levant. But Napier in his negotiations with the Viceroy had acted without instructions either from the British Cabinet or from Admiral Stopford, his superior in command.23 When Stopford learned of the existence of the convention of November 27, 1840, he was, to say the least, greatly dissatisfied. "'I am sorry'," he stated in a letter to the Commodore, December 2, 1840, "'to say that I cannot ratify, or approve of this measure: setting aside the unauthorized manner and the unnecessary haste with which so important a document was executed, with the Commander-in-Chief within two days' sail of you, the articles of that Convention, if carried into execution, in the present state of affairs in Syria, would be productive of much more evil than good, and occasion much embarrassment.'"24

On the same date when Stopford wrote to Napier disapproving of the arrangement of November 27 he also wrote similarly to Mehemet Ali.25 Soon thereafter, however, he received from London copies of the memorandum of November 14, 1840, and the instructions which Palmerston had directed the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to forward to him. The admiralty instructions, it will be remembered, provided for the sending of an officer to Alexandria with the purpose of persuading the Pasha to consent to accept terms which resembled, in some respects at least, those defined in the Napier convention. Hence it was necessary for Stopford to adopt a policy similar to the one which he had just condemned.

23For Napier's explanation of his conduct, see Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 253-254.
24Ibid., II, pp. 3-4.
25Ibid., pp. 11-12.
Captain Fanshawe, the officer whom the Admiral chose to carry out his instructions, set out on his mission December 6, 1840, and arrived at Alexandria two days later. He found the Viceroy dissatisfied because of Stopford’s refusal to ratify the convention of November 27, but unwilling, nevertheless, to refuse to comply with the modified British demands. Accordingly, on December 11, 1840, after a very brief period of negotiation, the Captain received from His Highness an unsealed letter to the Porte in which Mehmet Ali announced his “most humble submission” to his overlord and declared that on the receipt of a firman, making known in what manner it should please His Imperial Majesty that the fleet should “be delivered up and despatched” from Alexandria, he would hasten to conform to the sovereign will by carrying that firman into execution. Furthermore, as he was ready to withdraw all of the Egyptian authorities who were “in the Island of Candia, in the Hedjaz, and in the two Holy Cities, on the arrival of His Imperial Majesty’s firman in that respect,” the above mentioned places would be evacuated without delay. Fanshawe, believing that this letter met the demands outlined in the instructions which Stopford had passed on to him, returned immediately to the fleet, and “after delivering the Pacha’s reply

36See Instructions for Fanshawe on his Mission to Alexandria, Dec. 6, 1840, ibid., pp. 316-317. The most important difference between the terms which Napier had promised to the Pasha and those which Fanshawe was about to suggest lay in the fact that in the latter terms it was not guaranteed that the Sultan would grant to Mehemet Ali the hereditary possession of Egypt.


to the Admiral," proceeded with Mehemet Ali's submissive communication to Constantinople. 29

On December 18, 1840, soon after the British Captain arrived at the Ottoman capital, he had an interview with the Grand Vizier during which he narrated the chief events of his mission to the Egyptian metropolis, and delivered up Mehemet Ali's letter of December 11. In his reply the Turkish Minister avoided promising that the Viceroy would be pardoned and reinstated in the governorship of Egypt. The question at issue, he declared, was one of foreign policy, belonging entirely to the department of foreign affairs. The Porte would take it into consideration with the representatives of the allied Courts, and His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs would make known the intentions of the Porte. At the same time he did not hesitate to reveal the sentiments which he personally entertained. When Fanshawe spoke about the conclusion of peace he exclaimed: "'Peace is made between two Governments, and not between a Soverign and one of his rebel subjects.'" "'The fleet is ours;'" he declared on another occasion during the interview, "'Alexandria is our country; we are perfectly sure of having the fleet sooner or later.'" 30

Although the Ministers of the Sultan, encouraged by Lord Ponsonby, probably did hope to secure the complete ruin of the Pasha 31 they hesitated to take any further action without being assured of the cooperation of their sovereign's allies. Therefore, on December 20, 1840, in accordance with the Grand Vizier's promise to Captain Fanshawe, Reschid Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, called together the representatives of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, and after mentioning that the Porte had received copies of Mehemet Ali's letter dated December 11,

29Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 28. See also, Mehemet Ali to Stopford [no date given], ibid., pp. 20-21. Levant Correspondence, III, p. 130.
1840, and the memorandum dated November 14, 1840, asked them if the Pasha by his letter had complied with the spirit of the memorandum and if his submission ought to be considered as real. Lord Ponsonby replied evasively that it belonged to the Sultan alone to decide this point. "I have precise orders," he declared, "to advise the Porte to grant [the] hereditary succession to Mehemet Ali, so soon as it shall apprize us that the Sultan is satisfied with the submission of Mehemet Ali; but such advice can only be conditional; I have not the right to judge of the reality of the submission, and I must wait, before giving it, for the Sultan to pronounce himself on the fact of the submission." "I declare," he continued later, "that, in my opinion, Mehemet Ali has now no right; that the Sultan is master to take the course which he shall consider fitting, and that we can only afford him our advice." The representatives of the three eastern Powers, taking a different stand concerning the question, intimated that the Porte should trust Mehemet Ali and act with moderation towards him. "The letter is a commencement of submission," the Internuncio of Austria stated. "If the Sublime Porte demands the delivery of the fleet, if Mehemet Ali restores it, and if he evacuates the countries specified in the Memorandum, his submission will certainly be then complete."32

The difference of opinion existing between Ponsonby and the other allied diplomats, which was revealed at the conference held on December 20, must have encouraged Reschid Pasha and his colleagues, who wished to enforce severe terms upon the Viceroy, to hope for ultimate success. Nevertheless, they were careful to make it appear that the Porte was ready to act in accord with the policy outlined in the memorandum of November 14, 1840. "His Imperial Majesty," Reschid Pasha informed Ponsonby, December 27, "wishing to prove by a fresh act the moderation of his sentiments, is disposed to accept the submission of Mehemet Ali, and only awaits the fulfilment of the conditions imposed upon

---

32 Protocol of the Conference held at the House of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte, the 20th of December, 1840, between the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on one part, and the representatives of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, on the other, ibid., pp. 318-329. Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 140-144. N. Bordeano, L'Egypte d'après les traités de 1840-1841, pp. 47-55.
him by the Memorandum of the 14th of November, to consider that submission as complete, and to confirm Mehemet Ali in the Pashalic of Egypt.

"With the view of hastening that fulfilment, and of thus proving more clearly his desire to lend himself, as far as is in his power, to the views of his august Allies, the Sultan has decided that Yaver Pacha (Admiral Walker) and Mazloum Bey shall proceed immediately to Egypt as his Commissioners to receive the Ottoman fleet, and to ascertain that the places described in the Memorandum of the 14th of November are evacuated by the troops of Mehemet Ali."

In the meantime the danger of a war breaking out between France and the four Powers because of the execution of the treaty of July 15, 1840, had practically disappeared. It is true that the situation in France remained uncertain for some time after the resignation of Thiers and his colleagues. The press, with very few exceptions, continued its demand for the adoption of an aggressive policy, and in the Chamber of Deputies the radicals were able to carry on a formidable struggle with those who defended the policy of the Soult-Guizot administration. Nevertheless, it became apparent before the close of the month of

---


29 On Nov. 6, 1840, Henry Reeve, who was familiar with conditions in France, wrote to Lansdowne: "The French Government is on the slope of revolution; the silence, the morne attitude of the populace yesterday at the opening of the Chambers, is the most frightful of all symptoms in France; it accompanied Louis XVI from Versailles and from Varennes; it followed Charles X to Cherbourg."—Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 135. See also Reeve to Mrs. Reeve, Nov. 7, 1840, ibid., pp. 136-137.

30 See extracts copied from the National and Univers, in The Times, Nov. 2, 1840. See also ibid., Nov. 5, 6, Dec. 9, 1840. On Nov. 3 The Times stated: "... up to the present moment the Journal des Débats is the only newspaper published in Paris that defends the new Ministry."

31 For summaries of the exciting debates in the French Chambers during the latter part of November and the early part of December, see Journal des Débats, Nov. 19, 26, 27, 28, 29, Dec. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 1840. On Dec. 5, 1840, a pacific address to the King was adopted by the Deputies by a vote of 247-161. Summaries of the French debates will also be found in The Times. A discussion of them will be found in Guichen, op. cit., pp. 451 ff.
November that Louis Philippe's new Cabinet, supported mainly by elements determined to avoid war, was gaining ground. After news of the decisive engagement fought at Acre on November 3, 1840, reached western Europe, Palmerston's British critics even recognized that fact and admitted that the policy which the Queen's Secretary of Foreign Affairs and his allies had adopted, and which he and the Russian Ministers had refused obstinately to abandon, was sure to triumph. "From all that has now been said and published," Henry Reeve wrote to Charles Greville, November 24, 1840, "it results that I, for one, have been in great part mistaken; mistaken as to the danger of Russian interference, mistaken as to the result of the operations in Syria, and mistaken as to the real policy and feeling of France." Greville, who entertained opinions similar to those of Reeve, wrote in his journal, December 4, 1840: "In the course of the last three weeks, a mighty change has taken place; we have had the capture of St. Jean d'Acre and the debate in the French Chambers. Palmerston is triumphant; everything has turned out well for him. His colleagues have nothing more to say; and as Guizot makes a sort of common cause with him in the Chamber [of Deputies], and Thiers makes out a case for himself by declaring objects and designs which justify Palmerston's policy and acts, and as the Pasha is now reduced to the necessity of submission, the contest is at an end."

---

87See Reeve to Mrs. Reeve, Nov. 13, 1840, Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 137. The decline in the strength of the French war party became still more obvious in Dec., 1840. That party hoped to be able to make a great demonstration when Napoleon's body was brought to Paris. But their efforts to do so, when the event occurred, Dec. 15, 1840, failed miserably. See Journal des Débats, Dec. 16, 1840, The Times, Dec. 18, 1840. The Examiner, Dec. 27, 1840. Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 19. Malmesbury, op. cit., I, p. 128.


89Palmerston to Bloomfield, Nov. 26, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 35.

90Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 140. See also Reeve to Greville, Nov. 29, 1840, Johnson, op. cit., p. 48.

91Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 308-309. On Nov. 15, 1840, Palmerston wrote to Granville: "Remusat has let the cat out of the bag by declaring that France, in protecting Mehemet Ali, meant to establish a new second-rate maritime Power in the Mediterranean, whose fleet might unite with that of France for
The dangerous stages of the crisis of 1840, in fact, had been passed by. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, was not satisfied merely to prevent war from breaking out between his country and the four Powers which had signed the convention of July 15, 1840. In addition, he was anxious to discover some means by which France might escape from her isolated position and secure a reëstablishment of the concert of the five Powers. When he entered office, be it remembered, he had hoped to secure this end through a modification of the terms which the four Powers had taken steps to enforce upon the Viceroy. He clung to that idea for some time even after Granville had communicated to him Palmerston's note of November 2. Late in November, with that idea still in view, he sent Baron Mounier upon an unofficial mission to England to observe "la disposition des esprits," to talk freely with men of affairs, and to estimate thus without prejudice "the chances for the future." At London the Baron found "the most sincere partisans of peace" convinced that it would be necessary for Mehemet Ali to submit to the terms of the treaty of July 15.

After Guizot had received from Mounier reports concerning the attitude of the British and after he had learned of the fall of Acre, he finally gave up all hope of securing a modification in the terms

the purpose of serving as a counterpoise to that of England. That is plain-spoken, at all events.

"If the French scheme for the Levant had succeeded, we should infallibly have had war before long, and growing out of those very affairs on which we should have made concessions in order to preserve peace. The moral and diplomatic contest we have had with France now will probably tend to keep the two nations without war for some years to come." Twelve days later he wrote: "This is indeed glorious news from Syria; and our fleet has maintained its old reputation. This exploit [the capture of Acre] must settle the Eastern question, . . .

"This result will also render Guizot's task more easy; for nobody can think in France of going to war now to revive a dead man."—Palmerston to Granville, Nov. 15, 27, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 351, 365.


of the Treaty of London. He did not give up, though, his hope of finding means whereby France might reenter the Concert of Europe. The French government, he maintained December 18, 1840, in a letter to Bourqueney, who was still Louis Philippe's chargé d'affaires at London, had remained foreign to the treaty of July 15, 1840, that is to say it had taken no part in the adjustment of the relations of the Sultan and of the Pasha through the intervention of Europe, because it had not been pleased either by the territorial basis of that adjustment or by the methods of coercion employed to secure its success. It would not offer opposition "'au fait,'" but at the same time it would not associate itself with the four Powers in order "'to render homage'" to the arrangement which they were enforcing in the Levant nor would it guarantee the stability of that arrangement. It would remain therefore, "'en dehors du treaty of July 15 and of the coalition which had signed it.'" Nevertheless, after the purpose of that treaty had been secured there would remain "'the great question, the question of the relations of the Ottoman Empire with Europe.'" The relations of the Sultan and the Pasha formed, for the Ottoman Empire, an "'internal question'" upon which France and "'her allies'" had separated from each other. The relations of the Ottoman Empire with Europe formed an "'external question,'" general and permanent in character, which it would be impossible to regulate effectively or definitely without the cooperation of France with the other Powers. Besides this great question extérieure there would remain also the question of giving guarantees against oppression to the Syrians, especially the Christians of Mt. Lebanon, over whom the direct authority of the Porte was being reestablished.45

"'Far . . . from desiring to persist in our isolation,'" Guizot declared, "'we have always in view the reestablishment of the

45Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 54-55. On Dec. 13, 1840, Guizot wrote to Barante: "Nous n'avons nul dessein de rester étrangers aux affaires générales de l'Europe. Nous croyons qu'il nous est bon d'en être, qu'il est bon pour tous que nous y rentrons. La France est trop grande pour qu'on ne sente pas bientôt le vide de son absence. Nous attendons qu'on le sente en effet, et qu'on nous le dise. J'ai un dégoût immense de la fanfaronnade, mais la tranquillité de l'attente et la liberté du choix nous conviennent bien.'"—De Witt, op. cit., p. 217.
Concert of Europe, and we know by what openings, great and small, we are able to return to it.

"We know also that many desire us to return, and we believe that they are right. Our isolation does nothing for anyone. We are obliged, both for our safety and for the satisfying of the spirit [prevailing] in France, to maintain our present armaments. We have stopped those armaments at the limit which they had attained when the Cabinet was formed. The Cabinet précédent wished to push them further; we have declared that we will not do so; ... When a door conveniently opens before us for an escape from this situation, we shall not stubbornly insist on remaining [where we are]." 48

The course followed by Guizot pleased the Austrian and Prussian governments greatly. They had been alarmed, it will be recalled, by the situation of affairs in France and they were extremely anxious to escape from the critical position into which they had been drawn through their having signed the convention of July 15, 1840. 47 After the fall of Acre had been announced at Vienna, it is true, Metternich wrote to Neumann instructing him to prevent the French from being under illusions about Syria.

"Syria is lost irrevocably, lost tout entière," he declared.

"... there is not a moment to be sacrificed in persuading Mehemet Ali to submit." 48 But soon thereafter he took care to let Count Sainte-Aulaire, the French Ambassador at the Court of the Emperor Francis, understand that Austria would abstain from an attack upon Egypt and that she would do so because of her regard for the feelings of France. "If M. Guizot," he stated on that occasion, "should find some advantage in making this truth known in the [Legislative] Chambers, he may proclaim it [there] with the assurance that it will not be denied by me." 49 Further-

47 Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 55-56.
more, when he learned that the Porte, encouraged by Lord Ponsonby, had rejected the Napier convention, he became so aroused that he requested Beauvale, the British Ambassador at Vienna, to inform Palmerston that if the Porte hesitated to accept the recommendation of the allied Powers who had urged it to grant the hereditary government of Egypt to Mehemet Ali the Austrian Court could not admit that the allied Powers should allow themselves to be compromised by such hesitation. No less conciliatory were the utterances of Baron Werther, the Prussian Chief Minister. Indeed, he even maintained that "Upon no account would Prussia participate in the destruction of Mehemet Ali; [for] her aim must be to preserve the Osmanli Empire with the cooperation of France."

Although Lord Palmerston was less disturbed by the situation in the Levant than were the Austrian and Prussian statesmen, he did not intend, it appears, to adopt a policy which would prevent a reconciliation between France and the four Powers or an immediate termination of the Turco-Egyptian question. "It has been reported," he wrote to Ponsonby, December 17, 1840, "but upon what authority is not known, that the Porte was, towards the end

---

80Note the following extract from the diary of the Princess Metternich, Jan. 6, 1841: "Clemens erhielt Depeschen aus Constantinopel. Ponsonby will dur- chaus nicht, dass man sich mit Mehemed Ali verständigt, und steigert hiedurch die Verwirrung immer mehr." Ibid., pp. 486-487. Others were irritated by Ponsonby's conduct. Reeve wrote to Greville, Oct. 27, 1840: "Admiral Roussin told me such things of Ponsonby's behaviour to him, especially before the battle of Nezib, that my hair stood on end. Even now if one could but get him recalled all might go well: but Lord Alvanley is, or has been, at Constantinople writing the warmest letters to everybody in his favour."—Johnson, op. cit., p. 44.


82Treitschke, op. cit., V, p. 112. See also Guichen, op. cit., pp. 427-428, 449-450, 462, 465-466. Wheaton, the American, wrote from Berlin, Feb. 3, 1841: "The successful military execution of the quintuple treaty has left so many points of oriental policy unsettled, that the great German Powers probably begin to regret having supported the views of Great Britain, in becoming parties to the arrangement, which has brought upon them unforeseen perils without adequate equivalent advantages. Russia has also been disappointed in her expectation of being called on to assist in the consummation of the work; but she has at least the satisfaction of having produced a breach between France and Great Britain which leaves her more free to act in pursuing her own exclusive ends."—State Dept. Prussia, II, Wheaton to Forsyth, No. 169, Feb. 3, 1841.
of November, but before it had heard of the submission of Mehemet Ali, disinclined to revoke the decree which had deprived him of the Government of Egypt. It is not unnatural that such a feeling should have existed at that time in the mind of the Turkish Government, but Her Majesty’s Government hopes that subsequent events, and the unanimous advice of the Four Powers, will have removed these objections on the part of the Porte, and will have led the Porte to accept the settlement effected by Commodore Napier’s arrangement, or by the subsequent more ample submission of Mehemet Ali.”83 It is true that as long as Guizot had attempted to secure a reéstablishment of the concert of the five Powers on the basis of a modification in the terms of the Treaty of London, Palmerston had opposed his effort.84 But, when it became apparent to the British Secretary that the Frenchman had abandoned those attempts, he assumed a more friendly attitude in regard to the question at issue. On January 5, 1841, he received a despatch from Granville which revealed that Guizot on January 1, had made to the Queen’s Ambassador at Paris statements almost identical in meaning to those which he had written to Bourqueney, December 18, 1840,85 and, two days later, the French chargé d’affaires at London was able to write that, in his opinion, Palmerston “‘was really anxious to discover some way of bringing back France into the concert, although he was still undecided as to the manner in which it should be effected.’”86

83 Palmerston to Ponsonby, Dec. 17, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 88-89. Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 51-53. It should also be noted that on Dec. 15, 1840, Palmerston informed the Lords of the Admiralty that they should convey to Commodore Napier the approval by Her Majesty’s government of the steps taken by him on Nov. 27. The four Powers, he stated, could not guarantee to the Viceroy, as it was promised in Article I of the Napier Convention, the grant of the hereditary government of Egypt, but, he assured, they would “recommend to the Porte to make the concession specified in the communication” which Stopford had been instructed on Nov. 14, 1840, “to convey to Mehemet Ali.”—Palmerston to Lords of Admiralty, Dec. 15, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 87-88. Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 49-51.


85 Granville to Palmerston, Jan. 1, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 120.

86 Affaires étrangères, 657 Angleterre, Bourqueney to Guizot, Jan. 7, 1841, quoted by Hall, op. cit., p. 322.
Even the Court of St. Petersburg seemed willing to enter into an arrangement—if it was drawn up in accord with Russian views—whereby France and the four Powers would be reconciled. Such an arrangement, in which the principle of the closure of the Straits would be set forth, Brunnow pointed out in one of his despatches, would have the "‘advantage indubitable’" of inducing France to recognize explicitly that principle which, by Article IV of the Convention of London, the four Powers had agreed to accept.  

Nesselrode, like Brunnow, was willing that the concert of the five Powers should be re-established on the basis of the closure of the Straits. At the same time, however, believing that Russia had won a great triumph through the conclusion of the treaty of July 15, 1840, he was particularly anxious both to render permanent the friendship which had been established between England and the three absolute Courts, and to prevent the resurrection of the detested Anglo-French alliance.

On January 13, 1841, Guizot, encouraged by the willingness of the four Powers to enter into an arrangement to which France would be a party, wrote to Count Saint-Aulaire stating that while France remained foreign "‘après comme avant,’" to the treaty of July 15, 1840, she was ready to resume in Levantine affairs, which were of general interest for Europe, the place which belonged to her, and also to re-enter, through some convenient open-

---

57 Goriainow, op. cit., p. 83.
58 Claricarde to Palmerston, Dec. 22, 1840; Nesselrode to Brunnow, Dec. 10/22, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 121, 121-122.
59 Hall, op. cit., pp. 319-320.
60 On Dec. 28, 1840, Nesselrode wrote to Meyendorff: "Tout ce que nous demandons à ces deux cours [Prussia and Austria], c'est de ne pas rapprocher de nouveau l'Angleterre et la France, ce qui est bien plus encore dans leur intérêt que dans le nôtre. Au reste, je ne sais, en vérité, ce qu'il faudra attendre ou craindre dans l'avenir de la Prusse."—Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 102-106. On Jan. 27, 1841, Cambreling, the American representative at St. Petersburg, wrote: "It is understood here, altho I have no official information on the subject, that Prince Metternich has proposed to the late Min[ister] of Turkey, another conference—to which it was proposed to invite France—for the purpose of deciding upon ‘eventualities’ or the position and destiny of Turkey, Syria and Egypt, to which the Emperor has replied in his Iaconic style, ‘Pourquoi—c'est tres bien faite—et vite—c'est finie’—and that, not perceiving the necessity for any further interference, he has declined the proposition."—State Dept. Russia, XIV, Cambreling to Forsyth, No. 10, Jan. 27, 1841.
ing, into the Concert of Europe. In the same communication he outlined a series of five "points" which he believed should form the basis of a "general act" which the five Powers should sign "in order to terminate in common the affairs of the Orient."

Those five points in substance were as follows:

1. The declaration of the closure of the two Straits.
2. The recognition of the status quo of the Ottoman Empire, "in its independence and its integrity."
3. The securing of guarantees from the Porte for the Christian population of Syria.
4. "Certain stipulations in favor of Jerusalem."
5. Stipulations for the "general freedom, and perhaps for the positive neutrality" of the commercial routes both between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, across the Isthmus of Suez, and between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf by way of Syria and the Euphrates river.

The plenipotentiaries of the four Powers at London reassembled soon but they were not willing to state their views as clearly as had Guizot. Consequently negotiations for securing the return of France to the Concert of Europe progressed very slowly. "I firmly believe that they [the four Powers] will join with us upon the general question," Bourqueney wrote to his superior at

---

61 Guizot, op cit., VI, p. 72.
62 Ibid., p. 74.
63 Concerning this point Guizot stated: "Cette idée s'est élevée et commence à préoccuper assez vivement les esprits chrétiens. Je ne sais ce qui est possible, ni sous quelles formes et dans quelles limites l'intervention européenne serait en mesure de procurer à Jérusalem un peu de sécurité et de dignité ; mais les gouvernements, qui se plaignent avec raison de l'affaiblissement des croyances des peuples, devraient bien, quand l'occasion s'en présente, donner eux-mêmes à croyances quelque marque éclatante d'adhésion et d'intérêt. Que l'Europe et la politique de l'Europe reprennent la figure chrétienne; personne ne peut mesurer aujourd'hui tout ce que l'ordre et le pouvoir ont à y gagner."—Ibid., pp. 73-74.
64 Guizot spoke of those two routes, "qui sont pour toute l'Europe d'un grand intérêt, et qui poseraient, pour les relations si rapidement croissantes de l'Europe avec l'Asie, des principes excellents que jamais peut-être on ne trouvera une si bonne occasion de faire prévaloir."—Ibid., p. 74. The "road to India" was becoming a source of keen rivalry between England and France. See Guichen op. cit., pp. 490-491.
65 Guizot, op. cit., p. 74.
Paris, "‘but will they join upon ground as extensive as we desire? I am a little uncertain about this matter.’"\(^66\)

At the time when the negotiations at London were progressing slowly, the situation in the Near East was improving with varying degrees of rapidity. Mazloum Bey and Admiral Walker, whom, according to Reschid Pasha’s communication to Ponsonby, December 27, 1840, were to "proceed immediately to Egypt... to receive the Ottoman fleet and to ascertain that the places described in the memorandum of the 14th of November" were evacuated by Mehemet Ali, did not depart from the Ottoman capital until January 6, 1841,\(^67\) and even then they were not empowered to promise to the Pasha that he would receive Egypt in hereditary tenure, nor were they authorized to order a suspension of hostilities in Syria. Instead, they carried with them instructions for General Jochmus, the commander of the allied forces, to demand the surrender of the arms and guns of Ibrahim Pasha’s army.\(^68\)

Baron Sturmer, who probably had received instructions from Vienna similar in meaning to the language which Beauvale reported on January 3, 1841, that Metternich had used in a conversation with him, discovered directly that the Turkish commissioners had not been authorized to assure Mehemet Ali of his receiving the hereditary title to Egypt, and at once called the attention of the other diplomatic agents at Constantinople to the matter.\(^69\) Also, he wrote to Reschid Pasha "earnestly" proposing


\(^{67}\)Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 44. Palmerston claimed on Jan. 26, 1841, that the delay of the Turkish commissioners had been due to their failure to get a boat for passage. See Palmerston to Beauvale, Jan. 26, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 160-161. See also, a copy of a letter which the commissioners carried from the Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali, ibid., p. 182.

\(^{68}\)Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 44.

\(^{69}\)Ibid., pp. 44-45. Sturmer to Ponsonby, Jan. 7, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 183-184.
that he devise, as soon as possible, means to arrest the consequences which would surely result from the policy that the Porte had adopted and suggesting that a steamboat should be sent to Alexandria with additional instructions on this point to Mazloum Bey.\textsuperscript{70} Koenigsmarck and Titow, the Prussian and Russian representatives, supported Sturmer in his contentions.\textsuperscript{71} At first, Ponsonby refused to do likewise.\textsuperscript{72} When he heard that the Porte was fully satisfied with the submission of Mehemet Ali (as he repeated to Reschid, January 9, 1841) he would, acting in accordance with his instructions, recommend the granting of the hereditary possession of Egypt to the Pasha, but not before then.\textsuperscript{73} A day later, however, he received Palmerston’s instructions of December 17, 1840, and thereupon he too consented to advise formally in the name of his court that the Porte should grant Egypt hereditarily to Mehemet Ali.\textsuperscript{74}

Reschid Pasha, in a “message” which he gave on January 9, 1841, “late in the day,” to M. Pisani, the British dragoman, stated that if the Porte did grant Egypt in perpetuity to the Viceroy and his descendants it would be done only “conditionally” and not in “simple form.”\textsuperscript{75} But on January 12 after he was aware that Ponsonby had joined with the representatives of the absolute Courts, he forwarded to the four a Hatti-Sheriff announcing the definite intention of the Porte to confer the hereditary right to Egypt upon Mehemet Ali when his submission should be complete.\textsuperscript{76}

Although the Porte was not aware of the fact, the Viceroy had already adopted measures to make his submission complete. Two

\textsuperscript{70}Sturmer to Rechid, Jan. 7, 1841, \textit{ibid.}, p. 184.
\textsuperscript{71}Titow to Ponsonby, Dec. 27, 1840/Jan. 8, 1841; Konigsmarck to Ponsonby, Jan. 8, 1841, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 186-187, 192. The instructions which Nesselrode sent to Titow, Jan. 4, 1841, were similar to those which Palmerston sent to Ponsonby Dec. 17, 1840. See Nesselrode to Titow, Dec. 23, 1840/Jan. 4, 1841, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 152-154.
\textsuperscript{72}Ponsonby to Sturmer, Jan. 7, 1841; Ponsonby to Titow, Jan. 7, 8, 1841, Ponsonby to Konigsmarck, Jan. 8, 1841, \textit{ibid.}, pp. 185-186, 188-189, 192.
\textsuperscript{73}Ponsonby to Rechid, Jan. 9, 1841, \textit{ibid.}, p. 193.
\textsuperscript{74}Ponsonby to Titow, Sturmer, and Konigsmarck, Jan. 10, 1841, Ponsonby to Pisani, Jan. 10, 1841, \textit{ibid.}, p. 194.
\textsuperscript{75}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 193.
\textsuperscript{76}Hatti-Sheriff of Jan. 12, 1841, \textit{ibid.}, p. 195. See also, Grand Vizier to Mazloum Bey, Jan. 12, 1841, \textit{ibid.}, p. 196.
days before the above mentioned Hatti-Sheriff had been issued Mazloum Bey and Admiral Walker arrived at their destination.\textsuperscript{77} Even before that date Mehemet Ali had arranged for the surrender of the Ottoman fleet and for ordering the evacuation of Syria. He made those arrangements with Admiral Napier, who had been sent to Egypt on a mission similar to that of the Sultan's commissioners and who had preceded the latter to Alexandria by approximately forty-eight hours.\textsuperscript{78}

After the arrival of the commissioners at the Egyptian metropolis the arrangements for the Pasha's formal submission were put into execution immediately. In fact, on the very day of their arrival, January 10, 1841, Hamid Bey, one of Mehemet Ali's officers, and Lieutenant Loring, one of Napier's subordinates, departed from Alexandria for Syria carrying with them instructions addressed to Ibrahim Pasha directing him to retreat with his army to Egypt.\textsuperscript{79} Hamid Bey and Lieutenant Loring, it is true, failed to locate Ibrahim Pasha.\textsuperscript{80} The Egyptian forces, nevertheless, were in full retreat even before those agents started on their mission.\textsuperscript{81} Moreover, on January 20, 1841, Admiral Walker, in command of the Ottoman war vessels, which he had received formally from Mehemet Ali, January 11,\textsuperscript{82} sailed for Marmarice, a "beautiful landlocked anchorage on the coast of Caravana,"\textsuperscript{83} and three days later, after the provisions of the Hatti-Sheriff of January 12 were known at Alexandria, the Viceroy

\textsuperscript{77}\textit{Napier, War in Syria, II. p. 71.}
\textsuperscript{78}\textit{Ibid., pp. 61 ff. During his stay in Egypt Napier secured from the Viceroy his promise that in the future he would put in force in the territory under his control the terms of the Anglo-Turkish commercial treaty of Aug. 16, 1838. See \textit{ibid.,} pp. 74-75. \textit{Levant Correspondence,} III, pp. 190-200. In 1838, after that treaty had been signed, Mehemet Ali had declared that he would not object to its provisions. It seems, nevertheless, that he did not carry them into execution. See Larking to Palmerston, Jan. 21, 1841; Palmerston to Larking, Feb. 11, 1841, \textit{ibid.,} pp. 179-180, 181.}
\textsuperscript{79}\textit{Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 68.}
\textsuperscript{80}\textit{Jochmus to Stopford, Jan. 30, 1841, \textit{Levant Correspondence,} III, p. 298.}
\textsuperscript{81}\textit{Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 97 ff. On Jan. 31, 1841, Ibrahim Pasha arrived, with the major part of his army, at Gaza. Before the end of Feb., 1841, the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians was completed. See \textit{ibid.,} pp. 141, 191 ff.}
\textsuperscript{82}\textit{Ibid., p. 71.}
\textsuperscript{83}\textit{Paton, \textit{op. cit.,} II, p. 215.}
himself wrote to the Grand Vizier announcing that he had executed
"to the letter" the conditions required of him. "I wait," he de-
clared, "for the accomplishment of his [the Sultan's] sovereign
promise."84

Meanwhile, reports concerning the hesitation, late in December,
1840, of the Sultan's Ministers to grant to Mehmet Ali the hered-
itary possession of Egypt had reached Vienna, whereupon Prince
Metternich, becoming greatly aroused, declared that Austria would
remain firm in her pledge to obtain the hereditary title for the
Viceroy and that the refusal of the Sultan to grant it would cause
her to withdraw her moral and material support from him.85 Also,
he wrote to Sturmer ordering him to make known to his colleagues
the attitude of the Austrian Cabinet and to urge them to concur
in measures calculated to give effect to the steps taken at Lon-
don as stated in Palmerston's note of December 17, 1840, to
Ponsonby. If those colleagues did not all agree to concur in such
measures he (the Internuncio) should make independently a
statement to the Divan explaining the determinations of Austria,
leaving it open to the other ministers, should they think it fit, to
do likewise.86

On or very near the same date when Metternich wrote thus to
Sturmer, he complained, according to a report which Beauvale
forwarded to Palmerston, January 17, 1841, that the British gov-
ernment had not used the means in its power to induce the Sultan
to confer Egypt hereditarily upon Mehmet Ali.87 Palmerston,
replying to Beauvale, January 26, 1841, claimed that the Prince's
charges in regard to the policy followed by the Queen's govern-
ment in the past were unjust.88 Be that as it may, it is certain
that soon after the latter date the English Secretary of Foreign
Affairs intimated in a despatch written to Ponsonby that if the
Porte insisted on refusing to grant to the Pasha the hereditary
possession of Egypt, the four Powers would in turn refuse to

84Mehemet Ali to Grand Vizier, Jan. 23, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III,
1841, The Times, Feb. 6, 1841.
85Beauvale to Palmerston, Jan. 17, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 159.
Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 60.
86Beauvale to Palmerston, Jan. 17, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 160.
87Beauvale to Palmerston, Jan. 17, 1841, ibid., p. 160.
support its demands, thus forcing it to yield "with a bad grace."^89 It is certain, also, that on January 30 Palmerston joined with the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia in presenting to Chekib Effendi a note announcing it as the opinion of the four Powers that the Sultan should manifest clemency and generosity towards the Viceroy by revoking the "Act of deprivation" which had been decreed against him and by confirming him in the hereditary control of Egypt. "... his [Mehemet Ali's] descendants in the direct line," it was stated in the note, "shall be successively named by the Sultan to the Pashalic of Egypt, every time that that post shall become vacant by the death of the preceding Pasha."^90

At Constantinople, even before the date when the collective note addressed to Chekib Effendi was signed, plans were being laid by the Porte, in consultation with the representatives of its allies,^91 to name conditions on which the hereditary right to Egypt would be conferred upon Mehemet Ali. Those plans, after being completed, were embodied in the famous firman of investiture which was proclaimed on February 13, 1841, and which provided:

(1) That Mehmet Ali should receive the coveted right to Egypt but that the Sultan should retain permanently the privilege of choosing the successors to the governorship from among the viceroy's descendants in any of the direct male lines.

(2) That the person so chosen must repair to Constantinople to receive in person the investiture.

(3) That the viceroys of Egypt should be permitted to use no ceremonials, titles, etc., other than those which were permitted to the "other Viziers" of the Sublime Porte.

(4) That the provisions of the Hatti-Sheriff of Gulhané,^92 as

^89 Palmerston to Ponsonby, Jan. 29, 1841, _ibid._, pp. 169-170.

^90 Ibid., pp. 171-172. _Documents Diplomatiques._

^91 Lord Ponsonby was accused by his contemporaries of being responsible for the policy adopted by the Porte early in February, 1841. See Dino, _op. cit._, III, p. 47. _The Examiner_, March 14, 1841. _The Times_, March 11, 12, 13, 15, 19, 1841. It is obvious that Ponsonby did exert his influence at Constantinople to secure the enactment of harsh conditions to be enforced upon Mehemet Ali. See a series of letters and other documents which Ponsonby forwarded to Palmerston, Feb. 1, 4, 1841, _Levant Correspondence_, III, pp. 207-229.

^92 For a copy of the Hatti-Sheriff of Gulhané and a discussion of its terms see Ed. Englehardt, _La Turquie et le tanzimat ou histoire des réformes dans l'empire Ottoman_, I, pp. 257-261, 35 ff.
well as all laws and treaties, either past, present, or future, of the Ottoman Empire should be executed “en entier” in Egypt.

(5) That all imposts and revenues should be levied in the Sultan’s name, and that the “tenths, duties [droits], and other imposts” should be in conformity with the principles in force in the other provinces of the empire.

(6) That a quarter part of the gross revenue should be paid to the Porte.

(7) That coinage should be struck only with the permission of the Sultan, and that it should be identical [pareilles] “to that of Constantinople.”

(8) That the Egyptian army in times of peace should be limited to 18,000 men.

(9) That the governors of Egypt should appoint military officers up to and including the rank of kol aghassi (major), but that the superior ranks should be conferred by the Sultan, “sur la proposition des dits Gouverneurs.” And,

(10) That ships of war were to be built by the said governors only with the express permission of the Sublime Porte.93

On the same day that the firman of investiture was issued the Porte addressed to the French Ambassador, Admiral Pontois, and to the representatives at Constantinople of the four allied Powers a circular announcing, prematurely it is true, “the final settlement” of the Turco-Egyptian question.94

When Mehemet Ali learned of the terms which his overlord proposed to grant to him he protested loudly and called attention to important parts of those terms which he declared that it would be impossible for him to accept. “The first article [of the firman],” Commodore Napier wrote from Alexandria, February 23, 1841, “he [the Viceroy] considers quite inadmissible, as it would not be acceded to by Ibrahim Pacha, would cause discord


94*Ibid.*, p. 254. Also on Feb. 13, 1841, the Porte forwarded to the Inter-
in his family, and a civil war at his death. He also objects to the part of Article 6 which relates to the appointment of officers; hitherto they have all been appointed by him, with the exception of General of Division, and a sudden deviation from that system would disorganize the army, and bring his authority into contempt.’”95 In addition, there were two other parts of the firman which Mehemet Ali declared that he could not accept. The sentence in which it was stated that one-fourth of the gross revenue of Egypt should be paid to the Porte constituted one of those parts and the portion of an article providing that the Hatti-Sheriff of Gulhané and all treaties of the Ottoman Empire should be executed in Egypt constituted the other.96

The news of the refusal of Mehemet Ali to accept all of the terms of the firman of investiture reached Constantinople about the middle of March, 1841, and gave occasion there for a renewal of negotiations between the Ministers of the Porte and the envoys of the four Powers. Reschid Pasha, who had always favored the enforcement of severe terms upon the Viceroy, took the initiative in those negotiations, writing to Lord Ponsonby, March 15: “The hesitation of Mehemet Ali Pasha to accept these moderate conditions [named in the firman] is scarcely compatible with the character of a subject, and it is no less clear that to grant the demands as made by him, is a thing as injurious as it is opposed to the rights of the Sultan’s sovereignty.”97 Lord Ponsonby in his reply to the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that his opinion coincided entirely with the opinion expressed by the latter. The Porte, he advised, should remain inactive and consult its

95 Napier to Palmerston, Feb. 23, 1841, quoted by Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 236. See also ibid., pp. 233-234. Napier agreed with the Pasha that some of the provisions of the firman were unjust. See ibid., pp. 234-235. Napier, Correspondence, II, pp. 142-143.


97 Rechid to Ponsonby, March 15, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 352.
"faithful friend and Ally [Great Britain]." Sturmer, Koenigs-
marck and Titow, to whom Reschid forwarded communications
similar to the one which he sent to Ponsonby, were more cautious
in their replies. The Internuncio announced that he could not
reply in his "own name" to the note which he had received, the
Prussian claimed that he was not authorized to offer advice to the
Porte, and the Russian also found means of excusing him-
self. At the same time all three promised that the matter would
be brought to the attention of their "august courts."

While the Viceroy, the Porte, and the representatives at Con-
stantinople of the four Powers were debating and corresponding
in regard to the conditions which the Sultan should attach to his
grant to Mehemet Ali, of the hereditary title to Egypt, the diplo-
mats in western Europe were continuing their negotiations for the
conclusion of an arrangement whereby the Concert of Europe could
be reëstablished. In January, 1841, it will be remembered, negoti-
tiations to secure such an arrangement had been initiated by the
French but no appreciable results had been attained. The progress
made during the following month was more satisfactory, for it
was known in the west at that time that the Viceroy had surren-
dered the Turkish fleet and that the Porte had announced it would
grant Egypt hereditarily to Mehemet Ali as soon as his submission
was complete. But even then it was impossible to secure an
agreement upon the basis of the points which Guizot had sug-
gested in his despatch to Sainte-Aulaire, January 13, 1841. Guizot's
proposal relative to the Isthmus of Suez, Lord Palmerston claimed,
was "not a suitable subject for a provision in a treaty." The Brit-
ish Minister of Foreign Affairs objected also to the idea of including
in the arrangement to be signed by the five Powers, a stipulation
for the protection of the Christian subjects of Syria. This matter,
he declared, could be taken care of better in a special note urging

Ponsonby to Rechid, March 18, 1841, ibid., pp. 371-372. See also Ponsonby
to Palmerston, March 27, 1841, ibid., p. 371.

Sturmer to Rechid, March 18, 1841, ibid., pp. 372-373.

Koenigsmarck to Rechid, March 17, 1841, ibid., p. 374.

Titow to Rechid, March 7/19, 1841, ibid., pp. 374-375.

Both King Louis Philippe and Guizot were very anxious at that time
to secure the return of France to the Concert of Europe. See Louis Philippe to
the Sultan to declare for religious toleration. Furthermore, both he (Palmerston) and Brunnow were opposed to the Frenchman’s suggestion in regard to guaranteeing the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the only point concerning which the diplomats were able to agree was the one providing for a declaration of the closure of the Straits.

At length, late in February, 1841, a plan of an arrangement, which, it appeared, each of the five great Powers would accept immediately was perfected. According to that plan the representatives of the four Powers and the Porte would sign a protocol “de cloture” announcing that the Turco-Egyptian question had been solved, and inviting France to return to the Concert of Europe. After that had been done, the representatives of the allied Powers and the chargé d’affaires of France would in turn sign a convention proclaiming the closure of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to the warships of all nations. At this time, however, a new difficulty arose. Chekib Effendi declared that he could not affix his signature to the protocol de cloture until after he had been notified officially that Mehemet Ali had accepted the firman of investiture, and Guizot, on the other hand, refused to permit Bourqueney to accept the convention while the protocol de cloture remained unsigned.

Through the influence of the envoys of Austria and Prussia, who were extremely anxious to secure a final settlement of the question at issue, an attempt was made to secure a compromise. On March 5, 1841, the representatives of the four Powers signed a protocol listing the “desired events” which had occurred in the Near East and announcing that their consuls-general would at once return to Alexandria, thus implying that the Turco-Egyptian difficulties had been terminated. They offered, in addition, to

---

208 Rohan-Chabot’s report to Guizot (no date given); Bourqueney to Guizot, Feb. 21, 1841, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 75-78, 84-87. See also Guichen, op. cit., pp. 468-472.
209 On Feb. 12, 1841, Bourqueney was very much discouraged because of the situation of affairs. See Bourqueney to Guizot, Feb. 12, 1841, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 79-80.
210 Bourqueney to Guizot, Feb. 26, 1841, quoted by ibid., p. 89.
211 Ibid., pp. 89-90.
213 Guizot, op. cit., p. 91. Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 235-236.
sign a second protocol by which France would be invited to return to the European concert but in which no mention of the "question de clôture" would be made.\textsuperscript{109} Baron Bourqueney was in favor of accepting this proposed arrangement and he wrote to Guizot urging that he [Bourqueney] should be authorized to enter into it.\textsuperscript{110} Guizot, however, although he was anxious that France should escape from her isolated position, believed that his country should avoid a union with the four Powers until after the alliance of those Powers with the Porte had been dissolved through their having declared that the purposes of the treaty of July 15, 1840, had been realized, and hence refused to grant the powers which Bourqueney requested.\textsuperscript{111}

It is true that soon after Guizot refused to accept the compromise plan he authorized the French chargé d'affaires at London to "initial" a copy of the convention in which the closure of the Straits was declared.\textsuperscript{112} The German plenipotentiaries, it is also true, continued their search for a mode of procedure, by which the return of France to the Concert of Europe could be secured directly.\textsuperscript{113} Nevertheless, as Guizot persisted in his refusal to permit Bourqueney to enter formally into an arrangement with the representatives of the allied Powers before those representatives had announced that the Turco-Egyptian question was solved,\textsuperscript{114} and as Chekib Effendi, supported by Lord Palmerston,\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{109} Guizot, \textit{op. cit.}, VI, p. 91.

\textsuperscript{110} Bourqueney to Guizot (no date given), quoted by \textit{ibid.}, p. 91.

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 91-93.

\textsuperscript{112} Both the protocol \textit{de clôture} and the convention for the closure of the straits were "initialed" on March 15, 1841. See \textit{Levant Correspondence}, III, p. 321-323.

\textsuperscript{113} Guizot, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 103-104.

\textsuperscript{114} Granville to Palmerston, March 15, 1841, \textit{Levant Correspondence}, III, p. 328. On April 16, 1841, Bulwer reported to Palmerston that Guizot had made the following statement to him: "I do not wish to be mixed up in it [the settlement to be arranged between the Porte and Mehemet Ali], or to appear in any way in it. I have no conditions to make for Mehemet Ali; I have nothing to do with him or the conditions he may accept. I only say, that until the affairs in the East shall have been settled, I cannot sign a document which begins by declaring that they are so."—\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 382-384. Guizot, however, did intimate to Bulwer that he thought some of the Viceroy's objections to the firman of investiture were reasonable. See \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{115} Bourqueney to Guizot, March 1, 1841, quoted by Guizot, \textit{op. cit.}, VI, p. 89. Greville, \textit{op. cit.}, I, pp. 332-333.
persisted in his refusal to sign a protocol *de clôture*, a delay in the securing of a final settlement was inevitable.

Although Palmerston supported Chekib in regard to the "*question de clôture*"—especially after it was announced in western Europe that Mehemet Ali had rejected parts of the firman of investiture—he did not intend to aid the Porte in securing from the Viceroy his acceptance of all of the conditions which it wished to impose upon him. On March 13, 1841, he joined with the representatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia for the purpose of issuing to Chekib Effendi a formal communication. In that communication it was admitted that the new difficulty which had arisen between the Sultan and his vassal was one of internal administration, but at the same time care was taken to call the attention of the Ottoman Ambassador to the principles which had been set forth in the collective note of January 30, 1841. Three days later Palmerston wrote to Ponsonby stating that the Sultan should make it clear that in the appointment of the governors of Egypt the rule of primogeniture would always be followed unless in case of infancy or physical incapacity. Again on April 10, 1841, in a similar despatch to the British Ambassador at Constantinople he explained that it was extremely important that the matters in dispute between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali should be settled "as soon as possible." Furthermore, admitting that on some of the points at issue the Viceroy was in the right, he went so far as to instruct Ponsonby definitely to urge the Porte to modify such parts of the firman of investiture as were "open to reasonable objections."

The chief Ministers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia were likewise unwilling to support all of the demands of the Porte. Count

---


Nesselrode, as usual, "highly" approved of the attitude taken by the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. Prince Metternich, exasperated because of the delay occasioned by the dispute over the conditions which the Ottoman Ministers wished to attach to the grant of Egypt in hereditary possession to Mehemet Ali, assumed an attitude more aggressive than that of the British and Russian statesmen. In a despatch which he wrote to Sturmer, April 2, 1840, it should be noted, he ordered the latter to warn the Porte that if it did not adopt the modifications to the firman of investiture recommended by the Congress of London, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor would consider himself released from the obligation which he had contracted on July 15, 1840. Baron Werther's attitude was similar to that of the Austrian Chancellor. Since King Frederick William IV's Minister at Queen Victoria's Court had intimated the convention for the closure of the Straits, he informed William Russell, the British Ambassador at Berlin, that "the Government [of Prussia] looked upon the Treaty of July as terminated."

The fact that the four Powers favored a modification of some of the terms which the Porte had offered to Mehemet Ali, February 13, 1841, became known at Constantinople late in March, and so strong an impression was produced immediately among the Turks that Reschid Pasha and Achmed Fethi Pacha, two members of the Ottoman Cabinet who were extremely hostile to Mehemet Ali and who probably had had much to do with the

119 Clanricarde to Palmerston, April 6, 1841, ibid., p. 381. Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 102.
120 Metternich to Sturmer, April 2, 1841; Beauvale to Palmerston, April 9, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 378-380, 378. See also, Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 101. The Times, April 13, 1841.
121 Russell to Palmerston, April 14, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 382. On April 21, 1841, Palmerston, in reply to Russell, denied that a question could really be "finished" by merely declaring it so. Prussia, he stated, was bound by the treaty of July "to determine" Mehemet Ali to accept the arrangement specified in that treaty. By the last letter which Mehemet Ali had written to the Grand Vizier, he continued, it appeared that the Viceroy objected to some of the fundamental points specified in the treaty of July. See Palmerston to Russell, April 21, 1841, ibid., pp. 384-385.
preparation of the famous firman of February 13, were obliged to resign from their official positions.\footnote{Guizot, op. cit., p. 105. The Times, April 23, 1841. Brown, the U. S. Dragoman, referring to the dismissal of the two Turkish officials, wrote in a letter to Porter that it was "conveyed in very moderate expressions." "Rechid Pacha," he stated, "paid a visit a day or two after his dismissal to Rifaa Bey, now Pacha, and it is said that the Sultan has written him a letter of thanks for his services with his own hand. Report says that he is soon to be appointed Grand Vizier."—State Dept. Turkey, IX. Brown to Porter, April 7, 1841. Wheaton wrote from Berlin, May 5: "The ascendancy of Reschid Pasha in the councils of the Divan has been overthrown by Austrian influence in order to compel the Sultan to accord such conditions to the Pacha of Egypt as the latter would be willing to accept."—State Dept. Prussia, II, Wheaton to Webster, No. 180, May 5, 1841.}

However, even after the fall of Reschid Pasha and Achmed Fethi Pasha, the Porte hesitated to modify the terms of the firman of investiture. Reschid’s place at the Sultan’s foreign office was taken by Rifaat Pasha, a statesman who, indeed, was more inclined than his predecessor had been to make concessions in favor of the Viceroy.\footnote{Note the following extract from a letter “from the Turkish Frontiers,” April 12, 1841: “Ever since the dismissal of Reschid Pasha from his post, the state of feeling in the Divan has been very favorable to Mehemet Ali.”—The Times, April 28, 1841.} But on April 1, 1841, soon after Rifaat had been vested with ministerial power, instructions were forwarded in the name of the Porte to Chekib Effendi, directing him to lay before the British Cabinet arguments defending the parts of the famous firman which Mehemet Ali had declared he would not accept, and ordering him to forward to his home government “as soon as possible” the “official communications which the British Government” would make to him in reply.\footnote{Instructions transmitted by Sublime Porte to Chekib Effendi, April 1, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 389-390.} Nineteen days later, before those instructions had reached London, the Porte announced in a memorandum which was presented to the representatives of the four Powers at Constantinople, that it had decided that the succession to the governorship of Egypt should be regulated in accordance with the principle of primogeniture, that Mehemet Ali should have the right to appoint officers to any rank below that of general of brigade, and that the tribute should
be settled at a fixed amount. These concéssions, however, were not at once embodied in a new firman. The Porte on that occasion, it appears, had resolved to await an answer from Chekib Efendi before carrying its promises into execution.

It was not until the month of May, 1841, that events moved rapidly towards a final settlement of the Turco-Egyptian question. Chekib Efendi transmitted a copy of his instructions, dated April 1, 1841, to Lord Palmerston on April 27. The British government did not reply independently in "official communications," but the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers forwarded to Chekib, May 10, 1841, a formal note advising the Porte to make modifications, in the terms of the firman of investiture, almost identically the same as those which the Porte had itself suggested on April 19. Even before time sufficient for the advice of the allied diplomats to reach Constantinople had elapsed, the representatives of the four Powers at the Court of the Grand Seignior had succeeded in persuading the Ottoman authorities to agree to make the modifications, in the terms to be granted to the Pasha, which were favored by the allied diplomats, and finally on June 1, 1841, a new firman which embodied those modifications and which took precedence over the arrangement of February 13, 1841,

Memorandum from Sublime Porte to Representatives of Four Powers, April 19, 1841, *ibid.,* pp. 419-420. See also, Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 14, 1841, *ibid.,* p. 419. It seems that the action taken by the Porte on April 19 was due, to a large extent at least, to the influence of Austria at Constantinople. See Guizot, *op. cit.,* VI, pp. 108-110. Napier, *War in Syria,* II, pp. 267 ff.

Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 12, 1841, *Levant Correspondence,* III, p. 433. It is said that the Porte hoped to secure, in return for concessions in regard to the terms of the firman of investiture, an official guarantee from Europe of its independence and integrity. See Guizot, *op. cit.,* VI, p. 108. Not only Palmerston and the Russians, but also Prince Metternich was opposed to giving such a guarantee to the Porte. See Metternich to Sturmer, April 20, 1841, *Levant Correspondence,* III, p. 400-401.

Chekib to Palmerston, April 27, 1841, *ibid.,* p. 388.


Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 12, 22, 1841, *ibid.,* pp. 433, 435. See also *ibid.,* pp. 435-440.
was promulgated. “Henceforth,” it was declared in the new document, “Egypt shall descend in a direct line, from the elder to the elder, in the male race among the sons and grandsons. As regards their nomination, that shall be made by my sublime Porte.”

The fact that the Porte was ready to make the desired modifications in the firman of investiture was known at London on June 12. On the 8th of the following month it was announced officially at the British capital that Mehemet Ali had accepted the hereditary title to Egypt upon the revised conditions offered by his overlord. Consequently, as there was no occasion for further delay, the representatives of the allied Powers—including the Ambassador of Turkey—attached their signatures, July 10, 1841, to the protocol de clôture thereby acknowledging formally that the “difficulties in which His Highness the Sultan [had] found himself placed” had “been smoothed,” and stating that the British Minister of Foreign Affairs “in agreement with the Plenipotentiaries of the four Powers” undertook to invite the government of France “to share in the Act by which the Sultan, on the one part,” would declare his firm resolution to maintain in the future the

30 Parl. Papers, 1879, Egypt, No. 4, p. 36. T. E. Holland, The European Concert in the Eastern Question, pp. 110-113. In the firman of June 1, 1841, it was provided that the governor of Egypt should appoint “the officers of the land and sea forces up to the rank of Colonel.” Officers of higher rank were to be appointed by the Porte. A firman issued late in May, 1841, fixed the amount of the annual tribute at 80,000 purses (ca. £363,635). See ibid., p. 114. Martens, N. R. G., XV, p. 490. Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 444, 459-461, 463-464.

31Ibid., pp. 435-440. In May and June, 1841, after the term of the Porte’s memorandum of April 19 were known in western Europe the French, supported by the Austrians and Prussians, advocated that the protocol and the convention should be signed immediately. The British and the Russians, however, opposed such a move, contending that the Turco-Egyptian question could not be declared closed until after Mehemet Ali had announced that he would accept the new terms offered by the Sultan. See Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 108 ff. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, June, 1841, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 142-144. Bloomfield to Palmerston, June 19, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 471.

32Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 21, 1841; Chasseaud to Ponsonby, June 10, 1841, ibid., p. 472. See also, Rohan-Chabot to Guizot, June 12, 1841, Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 120-121. Unofficial news of the willingness of Mehemet Ali to accept the terms offered him in the firman of June 1, 1841, reached London June 30, 1841. See The Times, June 30, 1841. See also, ibid., June 28, July 5, 1841.
principle of the closure of the Straits "and the five Powers, on the other part, would announce their unanimous determination to respect this principle and to conform themselves to it."133 Three days later the French chargé d'affaires at the Court of St. James joined with the representatives of the allied Powers in signing the above mentioned "act," which has come to be known as the Straits Convention.134 Thereupon, the reconciliation of France with the Concert of Europe, as well as the termination of the Turco-Egyptian question, was complete.

The termination of the Turco-Egyptian question and the re-establishment of the concert of the five Powers were events of great immediate significance in European diplomatic relations.

The government of Louis Philippe had been taught a lesson, so to speak. In his Mémoires Guizot consoled himself by declaring that "Mehemet Ali, driven from Syria, [and] menaced even in Egypt, was established there [in Egypt] with the hereditary title and on equitable conditions, not because of his own strength, but through consideration for France and because the Powers which had signed the treaty of July 15, did not wish to run the risk either of being disunited or of seeing new complications arise."135 At the same time he admitted that after what he had seen and learned during his mission to England he had "reentered into affairs determined never to subject the foreign policy of France to the whims and to the mistaken ideas of the day."136 "'Evade nothing and seek nothing,'" he wrote to Count Sainte-Aulaire a few weeks after the signing of the Straits Convention. "'It has been our custom to be confident, vainglorious, [and] insistent. We have intoxicated ourselves by our desires as if they were always our right and our power; we have been fond of the appearance rather than of the reality. I am convinced that, in order to re-establish and to extend our influence in Europe, it is necessary to follow the opposite method. I am determined everywhere and on all occasions to

135Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 128.
136Ibid., p. 129.
sacrifice *le bruit au fait*, the appearance to the reality, the first moment to the last. We shall risk less and we shall gain more. And besides, *il n'y a de dignité que là.*”

Russia, on the other hand, was for the moment triumphant. It is true, she had given up the rights confirmed to her by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. But, according to Nesselrode, she believed she had lost nothing which was of any real value to her. She had secured from France, through the settlement of 1841, the latter’s recognition of the principle of the closure of the Straits, she had avoided entering into an arrangement guaranteeing the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and she had the satisfaction of knowing that the Anglo-French alliance, as it had existed formerly at least, had not been reestablished.

---

237Ibid., p. 129. Sainte-Aulaire had just received appointment as French Ambassador to England.

238Note the following extract from a memorial concerning the foreign policy of Russia during the years from 1825 to 1850, issued by Count Nesselrode to Nicholas I, Nov. 20 (old style), 1850: “Deux fois à six ans d’intervalle, assailli par l’ambition d’un vassal révolté, l’Empire Ottoman s’est vu menacé d’une dissolution presque inévitable. Deux fois il a dû son salut à l’intervention décisive de V. M. La première de ces deux crises a donné au monde un spectacle inouï dans l’histoire: ... La seconde, moins brillante peut-être, a produit des résultats plus solides. Elle a expulsé de la Syrie, pour la confiner désormais dans les limites restreintes de l’Égypte, cette nouvelle puissance Arabe que les ennemis de la Russie avaient un moment songé à substituer sur le Bosphore au pouvoir déchu de la Porte Ottomane, pour en faire dans l’avenir un têfe de pont contre nous. Le traité d’Unkiar-Skélessi, contre lequel avaient en vain protesté la France et l’Angleterre, annulé en apparence, a été perpétré réellement sous une autre forme. En interdisant l’entrée des Dardanelles aux vaisseaux de guerre étrangers, le nouvel acte qui l’a remplacé, reconnu par toutes les Puissances, nous assure dorénavant contre toute attaque maritime. Enfin, un résultat des plus importants pour nous à cette époque est sorti de cette complication d’Orient. C’est la dissolution de cette Alliance Anglo-Française, si hostile à nos intérêts politiques, si fatale pour la situation des gouvernements conservateurs. Rompue sous les Whigs en 1840, renouée plus tard avec effort par le Ministère Tory, elle n’a plus trainé dès lorsqu’une vie précaire et inoffensive et n’a végété quelque temps sous le nom spécieux d’entente cordiale, que pour se briser de nouveau avec plus d’éclat encore, contre la question des mariages Espagnols.”—Quoted by Treitschke, *op. cit.*, V, pp. 758-759.

239See Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Nov. 10, 1841, Nesselrode, *op. cit.*, VIII, pp. 147-150. Note also the following extract from a letter, Dmitri de Nesselrode [Chancellor Nesselrode’s son] to Meyendorff, Nov. 29, 1841: “La politique étrangère continue à être dans un état satisfaisant; tous les jours on se félicite
England also, it appeared, had triumphed, and indeed her prestige in Europe was great. A famous British statesman has even gone so far as to declare, concerning the Near Eastern policy followed by the Queen's Minister of Foreign Affairs during the period 1839-1841, that, "... it is difficult to fix upon a page in the history of this country [England] which records a superior instance of moral intrepidity. The bold conception and the brilliant performance were worthy of Chatham; but the domestic difficulties with which Lord Palmerston had to struggle place the exploit far beyond the happiest achievement of the elder Pitt."

Furthermore, a recent writer of history has stated that Palmerston's "rare skill and determination" in carrying out his plans "must command universal admiration."

B. Disraeli, Tancred, III, Chap. 6, quoted by Monypenny, op. cit., II, p. 95.

Hall, op. cit., p. 329. Hasenclever was also enthusiastic about the triumph of Palmerston. In his conclusions he declared in part: "Wenn wir jedoch die englische Politik als Ganzes überschauen, wenn wir die damals allerdings kaum geweckten imperialistischen Gedanken mit in Rechnung setzen, so müssen wir bekennen, das Palmerston die Bahn zur Grosse Englands richtig empfunden, vorausgeahnt hat. Den kürzesten Weg nach Indien hat er vor plötzlichen Überfällen durch die russische Flotte vom Schwarzen Meer aus freigehalten; durch die Verdrängung Frankreichs aus Ägypten, durch die Beschränkung Mehemed Alis auf das Pharaonenland hat er auch diese wichtigste Etappe auf der grossen, die Völker verbindenden Strasse nach Indien und dem fernen Osten dem englischen Einfluss offen gehalten.

"Palmerston's diplomatische Kunst mag hie und da wegen der von ihm angewandten Mittel anfechtbar sein; seine Politik war jedoch trotz scheinbarger Schwankungen durchaus folgerichtig; sie entsprach in jeder Hinsicht den Bedürfnissen und den Interessen seines Landes. ... Was ihn vorwärts trieb, was all sein Handeln einzig und allein bestimmte und leitete, war das Interesse Englands, die Grosse seines Vaterlandes: der unbezähm bare Drang, als Staatsmann in der auswärtigen Politik sich geltend zu machen und ungeachtet aller Widerstände sich durchzusetzen, über wiegt in ihm bei weitem die Freude an einer für das grosse Ganze oft nurzu unfruchtbaren inneren parteipolitischen Betätigung."—Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 311-312. Guichen, as one might expect, has not been so
must be admitted, had contributed greatly to the defeat of Russia’s policy of peaceful penetration in Turkey and he had contributed likewise to the defeat of French peaceful penetration in Egypt. In other words, he had defended Constantinople from the Tsar and Alexandria from Louis Philippe. *From the British Imperialist point of view,* it is true, he had accomplished much.

While the termination of the Turco-Egyptian question was of immediate significance, it by no means implied a permanent solution of the general question of the Near East. In less than a decade France was destined to return to an aggressive foreign policy in the Levant; in less than a decade and a half Russia was destined, not only to witness the reunion of England and France, but also to experience their open hostility and to lose much of what she had gained previously at the expense of the Porte; and within three-quarters of a century England, despairing perhaps of ever finding a permanent solution of the question of the Near East, was destined to abandon her attempts to preserve the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire and instead, in order to protect the route across the Isthmus of Suez to India, to secure under her own control, either directly or indirectly, Egypt, Arabia, and Palestine—the major part of the territory claimed by Mehemet Ali in 1839. Indeed the termination of the Turco-Egyptian dispute of 1832-1841 marked only the end of the first phase of a question which was destined—and may still be today—long to play a major rôle in the rivalries of the great Powers.

impressed by the triumph of Lord Palmerston. According to him one of the chief consequences of the crisis of 1839 to 1841, and particularly of the excitement which accompanied it in France, was the accentuation of the movement for German unity which was “pour le plus grand malheur de France, de l’Europe et du monde.” See Guichen, *op. cit.,* pp. 533-539.

142 There were Englishmen who advocated a similar policy in 1841. Note the following extract from a letter, Napier to Minto, Feb. 5, 1841: “I dined with the Pasha yesterday; . . . He looks to England to protect him, and if we do, he will become our vassal if we wish it; in fact, there is nothing we can ask in reason that he will not do. Next to Egypt being a colony of England, it is best that it should be an independent power, paying tribute to the Porte. Our commerce to India will become very extensive; and the facility of traveling become easier every day. He intends putting a lock from the canal into the Nile, to enable passengers to go from hence to Cairo without moving from the steam-boats that are to be established, and I have no doubt ere long a railroad will be made from Cairo to Suez;” —Quoted by Napier, *War in Syria,* II, pp. 179-180. See also Appendix C.
APPENDIX A

THE FRENCH BOURSE, JANUARY, 1840, to AUGUST, 1841

The figures given below, which are the closing quotations for the particular days cited, have been taken from the *Journal des Débats*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan. 2, 1840</th>
<th>Mch. 1, 1840</th>
<th>May 2, 1840</th>
<th>July 1, 1840</th>
<th>July 15, 1840</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3% F in courant</td>
<td>80.70</td>
<td>82.40</td>
<td>84.45</td>
<td>85.45</td>
<td>86.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% F in courant</td>
<td>111.90</td>
<td>113.95</td>
<td>114.40</td>
<td>118.30</td>
<td>118.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 25, 1840</td>
<td>85.70</td>
<td>82.00</td>
<td>79.35</td>
<td>80.10</td>
<td>73.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1, 1840</td>
<td>118.60</td>
<td>114.00</td>
<td>112.95</td>
<td>113.70</td>
<td>104.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 14, 1840</td>
<td>70.95</td>
<td>65.25</td>
<td>72.00</td>
<td>75.75</td>
<td>78.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1, 1840</td>
<td>104.50</td>
<td>100.50</td>
<td>106.00</td>
<td>108.85</td>
<td>110.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 15, 1840</td>
<td>79.60</td>
<td>76.80</td>
<td>77.50</td>
<td>78.80</td>
<td>77.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1, 1840</td>
<td>111.20</td>
<td>110.60</td>
<td>113.40</td>
<td>114.75</td>
<td>116.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 6, 1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1841</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1841</td>
<td>1841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 15, 1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1, 1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 14, 1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>1840</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B

FRANCE AND THE EASTERN QUESTION: AN EXTRACT FROM AN ARTICLE WHICH WAS PUBLISHED IN THE EXAMINER, AUGUST 23, 1840, P. 531.

(From our own Correspondent.)

"... Whichever country, France or England, really desires to have an open quarrel, there is cause and pretext enough. There has been a deviation from the alliance on both sides; and the true reason is, that the interests of the countries are diametrically opposite. France feels herself oppressed by the superior maritime force of Great Britain, and she is making a bold effort to be mistress of the whole south and east coast of the Mediterranean, from Ceuta to where the Taurus dips into the sea... She may talk of Mehemet being independent, of his making part and parcel of the Ottoman empire, and supporting its integrity; but this is all nonsense, and she knows it. The new joint empire of Egypt, Syria, and Arabia, exists by French support, and cannot refuse a French command.

Note.—The charges against the French made by the writer of this article were perhaps overdrawn. Nevertheless it appears that there was some foundation for them. Note, in this connection, the following extract from a summary of a speech delivered by Thiers in the Chamber of Deputies, April 13, 1841:

"... Un Ministre étranger, meilleur juge que nous-mêmes de nos intérêts, disait à l'ambassadeur de France:

"Nous voyons bien au fond quelle est la politique de la France dans la question d'Orient; cette politique n'est pas européenne. La France possède le nord de l'Afrique; elle y a une armée de 70,000 hommes. Tout près d'elle se trouvent le pacha de Tunis et le pacha de Tripoli; qu'est-ce? presque rien: de malheureux princes musulmans qui tremblent devant la France. Mais un peu au delà il y a le pacha d'Egypte, qui possède la mer Rouge et l'Euphrate. Ainsi, directement par le nord de l'Afrique, indirectement par son aïllance [sic] avec le pacha d'Egypte, la France domine depuis l'entrée la Méditerranée et du détroit de Gibraltar jusqu'à la mer Rouge et l'Euphrate; cela ne peut pas nous convenir.'

"Voila ce que disait un ministre étranger, parlant à un ambassadeur de France; et assurément vous m'accorderez bien que ces deux personnages étaient fort competens, que ces deux personnages n'auraient pas échangé entre eux des idées puériles.

"Ainsi, à l'étranger, nos intérêts en Orient etaient appréciés comme des intérêts considérables."—Journal des Débats, Apr. 14, 1841. See also, Bulwer to Palmerston, Apr. 16, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 382.
And this empire stands astride the Red Sea and the Euphrates, now the only modes of communication with the East. M. Lamartine said in January last, in the debate of the French Chamber, 'England will wage a war of a hundred years, and spend her last shilling, rather than suffer this.' M. Lamartine knows both England and the Levant. For my part, long as I have cherished the idea of a French and English alliance, I believe this alliance impossible as long as France holds the pretensions and the views she does in the Levant. As for the views of England, she cannot waive them, for they are identical with her very existence. And France not abandoning those views, then a war, and a fierce war, with a full trial of the maritime strength of the two countries, becomes inevitable, sooner or later. French Statesmen are fully aware of this, and no doubt regret it. They would willingly content themselves with preventing England or any Power from monopolizing the shores of the Mediterranean, without seeking to seize influence there for France, directly or indirectly. But public opinion in France has espoused the Pasha, seeing nothing less than a Frenchman in him; and Ministers and Chambers, in obedience to a general opinion so vaguely founded, have not only renounced the English alliance, but converted England into a foe.
APPENDIX C

EXTRACTS FROM THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY COMMODORE NAPIER IN HIS WAR IN SYRIA, II, PP. 277, 278-279, 280.

"... No power in Europe is so much interested in keeping well with Mehemet Ali as Great Britain, and no power is more aware of that than France; ... France had opened a considerable trade with Egypt, and she entertained great fears that English enterprise would supplant her; no wonder, then, that she should have befriended the Pacha in every possible way. France is as well aware as we are, that steam navigation having got to such perfection, Egypt has become almost necessary to England as the half-way house to India, and indeed ought to be an English colony. Now if we wished to weaken Mehemet Ali, with a view, in the event of the breakup of the Turkish empire, which is not far distant, to have seized Egypt as our share of the spoil, we were perfectly right in our policy; or even, had we not looked so far ahead, it might, perhaps, have been politic to have confined Mehemet Ali to Egypt, so that in the event of his stopping the road to India by Suez, we might have the road of the Euphrates open, one remaining in the possession of the Ottoman empire, and the other in that of the Pacha of Egypt. It is not, however, usual for a Government to quarrel with their own interests, and it is so decidedly the advantage of the Pacha of Egypt to facilitate by every possible means, the passage across the Isthmus of Suez, that on the whole I believe the soundest policy of Great Britain would have been to have supported Mehemet Ali, and I have not the smallest doubt that when France saw we were committed against him, she seized that opportunity of quitting the alliance in order to make the Pacha her firm friend. ...

"... By raising Mehemet Ali the Porte would have been strengthened; and indeed, the Pacha, in possession of Syria and Egypt, would have been as much interested in controlling the power of Russia as the Sultan himself. Who then was to gain by reducing the power of Mehemet Ali? Russia! and Russia alone."

Note.—France as well as England was interested in the establishment of steam communication through Egypt to the East. See an account of plans for the establishment of a steam line from Marseilles through Alexandria and Suez to the Isle of Bourbon, in the Journal des Débats, April 20, 1841.
APPENDIX D

EXTRACTS FROM THE INFORMATION AND OPINIONS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AGENTS RELATIVE TO THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION


"The great motive for the hostile array of the absolute Monarchies of Europe will never cease to exist as long as liberal principles and the constitutional forms of Government shall occupy, in France, the place of divine rights and legitimacy; but, within a short time, various causes have transpired to postpone the execution of military designs upon that country, and to draw the attention of the Powers by whom they were entertained to other matters more nearly affecting them. The cordial co-operation of England in effecting the organization of the new kingdom of Belgium:—the little prospect of neutralizing the former so long as that object is not accomplished:—the triumph of the liberal, over the Aristocratic party in Great Britain, as exhibited in the late elections:—the strength acquired by the French Administration through the harmony which subsists between it and the Chambers:—the failure of the Duchess of Berri, and other Carlists to excite internal disturbances, and the restoration of order, confidence and business throughout the Kingdom, have opened the eyes of the Northern Allies upon the ability of their intended prey to struggle for life, while they began to feel that their own weapons were too heavy to be borne much longer without using them. On the other hand, each of the three Powers has felt that there were causes at home likely to paralyze its energies. Prussia has to keep down liberalism among the German States: Austria has never been easy since the French have held, at Ancona, the brand which may set her Italian Provinces in a blaze; and Russia, though daily loading the Poles with new chains, needs her best army to curb the indignant spirit of that heroic people. But another cause seems to be growing out of very recent occurrences in the East, more powerful than all these together, to break that tyrannical influence which has been so perniciously extended over the communities of inferior rank: and that is, Discord among the members of the alliance.

"The rapid advance of the Egyptian Pacha to the conquest of Turkey and Constantinople seems to have opened the eyes of Russia to the danger, for her southern Provinces, of allowing an ambitious and powerful chief to substitute himself in the place of the humble and weak Sultan; and, if appearances are not misunderstood, Russian diplomacy has been busy in preparing the European Governments for the intervention of Russian arms in preventing the completion of the conquest of Turkey. Hence, perhaps, the visit of Pozzo di Borgo to London to confront the Turkish Ambassador Namik Pacha, whose mission cannot be supposed to have had any other object than that of craving British aid to supersede the necessity of Russian intervention, which is said to be unpopular at Constantinople, and the ultimate object of which is suspected, at Vienna, to be the possession of Moldavia and Wallachia,—perhaps of Greece; and, at London,
the establishment of naval stations and supremacy in the Mediterranean. These suspicions are authorized by the efforts known to be making to increase the Russian Navy, and by the organization of a military expedition at Sebastopol under General Mouravieff, who is said to have discretionary orders to move forwards. If these suppositions be correct—and many see in impending events, confirmation of their correctness—the consequences must be a separation of, perhaps Prussia, but certainly Austria, who, once before, arrested the conquering army of Diebitsch at the gates of Constantinople, from their great ally, and a combination of interests between them, France and England, and Bavaria who has lately undertaken to give independence and a Sovereign to Greece. Whether these speculations have any foundation in reality or not, it would be hazardous to affirm; but it is certain that they are the subject of much conjecture here and in the other Capitals of Europe; and it is equally certain that, although much time is devoted, in Downing Street, to the still and ever pending Belgian question, the Ministers hold frequent Cabinet Councils at which the domestic affairs of the Kingdom are understood not to be the exclusive subject of deliberation.”


“I enclose, by desire of Mr. Buchanan, an extract from the Journal of St. Petersburg containing an article upon the Russian interference in the affairs of Turkey. The papers have given news from Constantinople of a more recent date, from which it appears that the Russian fleet had actually anchored in the Bosphorus. The new French Ambassador, Admiral Roussin, who arrived about the same time, had persuaded the Sultan to decline the further aid of the Emperor, and engaged to arrest the advance of the Egyptian troops. But, in the meantime, the fleet remained, and the Russian Army of thirty thousand men was on its way from the banks of the Danube to Constantinople. Whether the Sultan will, in reality, place more confidence in the diplomacy of Admiral Roussin, unsupported as it is by any semblance of phisical [sic] power immediately at command, than in the combined naval and military force of Russia to save his crown, and perhaps his head, is, with reason, I think, doubted here: And, besides that the Czar and the Grand Turk have some pecuniary accounts, growing out of the peace of Adrianople, still left unsettled, many accidental causes may arise to afford a pretext for not immediately withdrawing the imperial protection from the Turkish Capital. In that case, conjecture will set itself at work to divine the effects of the delay upon the general politics of Europe, and reports are already afloat of a coolness between Russia and France, whose jealousy of each other in that quarter is now beginning to show itself more openly than it has hitherto done, in this seeming eagerness to save the tottering empire of the Ottomans from impending ruin. From the apparent inaction of Great Britain on this occasion it would appear that her diplomacy was caught asleep at Constantinople. Perhaps it may have been lulled into security, as to events abroad, by the presence at the Court of St. James, of Namik Pacha, who, during his stay here, seemed to divide his time between Downing Street and the Russian Embassy. That minister, who, as Prince Lieven informed me, was merely the bearer of a letter from the Porte to the British Government, with orders to take back the answer,
left England a few days ago, on his way home, leaving, as Resident here, Mr. Maurojeni, a Greek long employed in the diplomatic service of Turkey."


"I have lately in confidence been suffered to peruse the notes which were presented by the Ministers of France and England at St. Peters burg, to the Emperor. . . . The answer to these two notes expresses surprise. . . . When the notes were transmitted from St. Petersburg to this place, a conference was had by the Ambassador with one of the Ministers here on the subject, when the latter to excuse the peremptory language of the note, said it had not been so worded at first, but that it had been altered by the counsel as he supposed of the English Cabinet. This last circumstance shows the ascendency of England, and the avowal produced the natural but not very courteous reply, 'You ought not, Sir, to have made such a confession.' Although this was given to me in confidence, I had leave to communicate it to you in the same manner, and I pray you Sir, to take particular care that nothing contained in my despatches of this nature be made public, or what is the same thing, shall either confidentially or otherwise, be communicated to Congress."


"By my last, No. 15 I informed you of the contents of a correspondance which had been confidently communicated to me with leave to inform you of its tenour. I have now the honour to give you some of the results communicated from the same source, and on the same condition. It appears that the answer excited much higher feelings in one of the parties than in the other. France seems to consider the concluding phrase of the answer as a fair reply to the same phrase in the note, and is inclined to let the matter rest until Russia shall commit some act hostile to her interest in the East. Great Britain on the contrary takes the matter in high dudgeon, and it is believed, is now fitting out a strong reinforcement for her Mediterranean fleet. Talleyrand will leave this on Sunday for London: his object will be to allay the spirit that animates the English Cabinet, and prevent any measure that may lead to an immediate rupture. In the meantime another note is preparing here to be presented to the Emperor, asking for the explanation of his intentions, but in a more moderate form. Whether England will assent to this measure is considered as doubtful. If she should, the answer of the Emperor will be substantially the same; that his object is to defend the Sultan, and that none of the other powers have a right to make any objections to it, more especially those who profess to have the same object. If, however, the explanation should be demanded in the tone which the present feeling of the British Cabinet seems to indicate, I [have] been given to understand that no concession will be made, and that any event less 'untoward' even than the attack on the Turkish fleet at Navarino may bring about a war, which in the present state of Europe cannot fail to be a general one. If on the other hand the Emperor should find that he is not ready for the struggle, and amicable explanations should procrastinate the crisis, it cannot be for a long period. The
policy of Russia is apparent; She is extending her possessions on the Caspian, and approaching in that direction to India, not probably with any serious intention of undertaking so hazardous an attempt, but for the same purpose that Napoleon threatened the invasion of England. In the meantime she is creating a naval force on the Black Sea, which the late treaty with the Porte defends against the entrance of any other power who might interrupt them. All the territory of Turkey in Europe is within their grasp; and although it is not their intention to take any violent measure at present to secure this prize; yet the moment insurrection, assassination, or any other event shall take off their Good Ally, the Ottoman Empire is at an end. The powers whose interest it would be to prevent this aggrandizement, and whose united power might enable them to do it, will be bought off. Austria by an increase of dominion in Italy and in the East. Prussia by procuring its aggrandizement in Germany. Sardinia has been long subservient to Russian policy; Bavaria will be kept in check by its family interest in Greece, and the rest of Germany are distinctly powerless. The only powers then to stop these great strides to uncontrollable power are England and France. The debt of the one and the unsettled dynasty of the other may incline both to temporize. But still the ease with which England may shut up the entrance to the Black Sea and the Baltic may induce them to meet the contingency with their accustomed energy. I have thought it my duty to give you as well my impressions, as the facts which produced them, and to suggest the propriety of being prepared with a naval force to make our neutrality respected, if events should occur which are by no means impossible that may produce a general European war. It will be quite as necessary in such a conflict as it ever has been, and perhaps more so. In the discussions which have taken place on this subject, (and they have been very warm) the answer to an observation that the Russian commerce would be destroyed by the blockade I have mentioned; was, 'The Americans will carry on our trade.'"


"Looking now towards the East, it must be confessed that the political horizon there exhibits dark specks which, either accident or the jealousies and antipathies, for the indulgence of which that quarter of the Globe affords so wide a field, may blow into a tempest which would shake Europe to its foundation. The Pacha of Egypt, though induced to pause in his career of conquests, is not subdued, and has just shown, by his refusal to pay a stipulated tribute to the Sultan that his submission was but a measure of policy, his allegiance a mere matter of form, and that his independence from the Porte is absolute. The possessions he retains in Syria still open to him the road to all the Asiatic provinces of the Sultan, if not to Constantinople; and he does not relax in his warlike spirit or preparations. On the other hand, the Emperor of Russia, still holding the European districts of Turkey, and maintaining a large fleet on the Euxine, is equally ready, at, or even without, the call of the Sultan who is utterly powerless, for assistance under the late Treaty between them, to march to Constantinople on the least appearance, either real or pretended, of danger, overrun all the Turkish Provinces on both shores of the Euxine, line the Bosphorus with his
troops and fleets, garrison the forts along the Dardanelles, and, carrying into effect the secret stipulations of the Treaty which, under such a contingency forbid the entrance of foreign ships, make himself as completely master of all the strong points in the Ottoman Empire as if it were a Russian province. These are all events brought within the pale of possibility by the occurrences of this year, to which it might be practical, by some further partition of Poland, or other expedients to be discussed at Vienna, to reconcile Prussia and Austria, hitherto hostile to any Russian aggrandizement in that quarter; and if there be truth in the imputation of ambitious projects attaching to the Czar, the opportunity would seem a fit one for their easy and final accomplishment, were it not for the decided opposition they would have to encounter on the part of England and France who unite in watching the course of events with a determination not to allow them to add to the territorial or political power of the Russian Empire. That some apprehension of an attempt to effect this is entertained at Paris and London, is evident from the activity which prevails in the French and English arsenals and dock-yards. At Toulon, a fleet capable of carrying an army of thirty thousand men is nearly equipped, destined, it is said, for new conquests on the African coast; and orders have been issued to the different naval stations in Great Britain to put in commission a number of large ships which are now fitting out with great expedition. That the latter is intended to re-inforce the British fleet now collected in the Levant is not attempted to be concealed; nor can it be doubted that the French expedition may, on any emergency, be diverted from its original purpose and likewise sent up the Mediterranean. These, which are matters of fact, leave but little room for conjecture, and may serve to give confirmation to the reports, that Russia having, notwithstanding the representations of the British and French cabinets, avowed her determination to execute her Treaty with Turkey, in the event of the latter being menaced from without, has been given to understand that the stipulations of that Treaty shall, in no event be regarded, and their execution opposed by force. If all this be true, the peace of Europe would hang upon the contingency of the march of a few Egyptian regiments, which a word from any Power desirous to bring on the commencement of hostilities might easily set in motion. But this is not the first time, since the French revolution of 1830, that peace would have been preserved by a display of warlike preparations; and convinced that England and France are as anxious as ever that the repose of Europe should not be disturbed, I believe that it is with the same view that the expedient is resorted to on this occasion. The question, therefore, would, under this hypothesis, be, whether the Czar, even supposing him assisted by his German allies, would feel strong enough to meet the combined naval and military force of Great Britain and France. Their decided superiority by sea, and the ease with which France might, by flinging her tricolored flag amidst the discontented masses in Germany, Italy, and perhaps Russia, revolutionize the whole Continent of Europe, are obstacles which the Russian Monarch cannot but appreciate, and which, I would incline to think, would prevent his doing anything to provoke a contest likely to endanger the stability of his throne, and the existence of the domestic institutions of his own Empire and those of his allies. Reasoning thus, unprejudiced observers of events still withhold their belief of the immediate
approach of war, as inevitably to grow out of the state of things here alluded to; but there is always the chapter of accidents which no foresight can reach; and it should ever be borne in mind that, with so many elements of discord and strife, and so ready to be put in motion the general peace stands in constant danger of being interrupted. It is no doubt with a view to be prepared for such an event, as well as to avert, by showing themselves ready to meet, it, that most nations in Europe at all likely to be called upon to take an active part, preserve their military resources unimpaired, and, in some instances, are considerably adding to them.”

6. Porter to McLane, No. 235, Aug. 12, 1834, U. S. Department of State, Turkey, Vol. IV.

"The communications of a later date from Alexandria and Syria show a different state of things from that communicated by Boghos Bey to the foreign Consuls, and from the measures taken here to profit by the reverses which Ibrahim has met with, there can scarcely be a doubt that Syria ere long will be in the hands of its legitimate master, the Grand Seignor.

"We have information that the French force in the Levant is to be increased, and if this is the case it is hard to determine what will be the policy of France in this crisis, but as all her measures are directed towards the maintainance of her ascendancy in the Levant she will no doubt do that which is most likely to secure it. If it should be to her interest that Syria and Egypt should return under the Dominion of the Grand Seignor she will do all in her power to promote their subjection, but if not Mehemed Alli will receive the assistance of France, and as heretofore be excited to resist the efforts of the Grand Seignor to conquer them.

"The commerce of France with Egypt, as may be seen by the returns of our Consular Agent is immense. She has scarcely a competitor, and nearly the same may be said of other places within the limits of Mehemet Alli’s government, from which I have been able to obtain returns, and as this state of things, it is most likely, would not exist if Egypt and Syria were to return to their former master, there can scarcely be a doubt that every means will be resorted to by the French Government to prevent their return and thus secure to herself a commerce so very lucrative. Every article that France can produce from her soil, and manufactures, is imported in large quantities into Egypt, and every article produced in Egypt, and coming through it from other countries is imported into France, to the exclusion of almost all other nations from a participation in the commerce.”

7. Clay to Forsythe, No. 34, Sept. 3, 1834, U. S. Department of State Archives, Russia, Vol. XII.

"The news received here in the month of July, of the arrival of an English squadron at Napoli and a report, that France was also fitting out a fleet for the same destination excited the suspicion of the Imperial Cabinet so much, as to induce Count Nesselrode to demand explanations thereon from Mareschal Maison. The Ambassador replied, that his Government had no intention of sending a fleet to that part of the Mediterranean, and, that he supposed the
British squadron was placed there, more for the purpose of supporting the Whig Ministry in Parliament, than for any other motive. Sometime afterwards the Vice Chancellor asked for further explanations, when the Mareschal, after repeating what he had said before, assured him, that France considered the Turkish question as settled for the present, and, that if the Cabinet of St. James should create any difficulties, which he very much doubted since the commercial interests of Great Britain would be injured thereby, the French Ministry would certainly take no part in the affair.

"On the 14th of August, a Courier arrived from Constantinople, bringing the news, that the Sultan, having heard that all Syria was in open revolt and that Ibrahim Pacha had been defeated, determined to take advantage of the circumstances to diminish the power of the Pacha of Egypt. Orders were accordingly issued for the Turkish fleet to hold itself ready to put to sea. I am informed that the English and French Ambassadors at Constantinople protested separately against the resolution of the Sultan and declared, that if it were carried into execution, their governments, as the protectors, of the Pacha of Egypt, would consider it equivalent to a declaration of war.

"The report which had reached Constantinople, that Ibrahim had been made prisoner, only confirmed the Sultan in his design of recovering some of his lost provinces, notwithstanding the representations of the English and French Ambassadors.

"The Russian chargé d'affaires also used his influence to induce the Sultan to abandon this hazardous enterprise and finally made a formal protest against the measures. I am told, that Baron Rüchmann stated to the Divan, that, by the Treaty of Alliance of the 8 July 1833, the Imperial government had stipulated to support the Porte in case of an attack made upon it by a third Power; but that if the Sultan should seek to bring about a war by unreasonable conduct, Russia could not consider herself obliged to interfere and afford armed assistance. Count Nesselrode, it is said, not only approved of Mr. de Ruckmann's protest, but charged the Ambassador Mr. Bouténieff, who has returned to his post, to reiterate the declaration.

"The last news from Constantinople is, that Ibrahim Pacha has been obliged to shut himself up in Jerusalem to await the arrival of the troops sent to his assistance by Mehemet Alli.

"It appears from Mr. de Ruckmann's despatches of the 2nd August, that Lord Ponsonby and Admiral Roussin have altered their tone, and, instead of protesting against the expedition of the Turkish fleet, have told the Sublime Porte, that their Governments would not interfere if it succeeded in conquering the revolted provinces of the Pacha in a short time, (it is said one month was the period mentioned). Nevertheless, the Russian chargé d'affaires did not change his language, but renewed the declaration that the present was not a 'casus foederis,' and, that, consequently, Russia would not be bound to come to the assistance of the Porte, in case it involved itself in difficulties of its own seeking. These observations had not induced the Sultan to abandon his project; however his fleet remained at Constantinople at the last dates.

"It is thought, that France and England abandoned their policy in regard to the protests so suddenly, with the hopes that the Sultan might easily reconquer
his lost provinces and thus place his Empire in a condition to act independently of the Russian Cabinet."


"In the East, likewise, where events have, more than once, conducted the most powerful nations of Europe to the brink of violent contention, present appearances are of a more pacific character than they had been for some time before. Although the relative positions of the parties are not materially altered, some approximation is stated to have been made—if not towards a final adjustment of causes of dispute, at least, towards an understanding of each other's views. Private accounts of recent date, and well entitled to credit, have been communicated to me, and announce the removal of the difficulties which had hitherto stood in the way of an arrangement between the Sultan and the Pacha of Egypt, as the result of a Turkish Embassy to Cairo. The Pacha had agreed to evacuate those territories which had not been ceded to him, and to pay to the Sultan the stipulated tribute. Should this agreement prove a pledge of lasting friendship between the two rivals, it will remove all pretexts for the hostile attitude assumed and still preserved by England, France and Russia, and greatly diminish the chances of war in that quarter. It is confidently reported that the British Ambassador had addressed to the Porte a note requiring a categorical answer to the question, whether, in the event of a war between England and Russia, the Porte would allow the free passage of the Dardanelles to the fleets of both Powers, or confine that privilege to Russian ships, alone; declaring, at the same time, that, in the latter case, England would, if deemed necessary, enforce the extension of the privilege to herself, also. This declaration—the first so distinctly expressed by Great Britain, has created considerable alarm in the Turkish capital."

9. Porter to Forsyth, No. 293, March 20, 1835, U. S. Department of State, Turkey, Vol. V.

"The events of the most importance, are, that the Sultan is collecting in Anatolia, near Syria, a most formidable army, it is supposed and cannot be doubted for the invasion of Syria; Troops are drawn from every part of the Empire to reinforce it, and artillery and munitions of war are collected there in large quantities. The militia is organizing for the protection of the Capital during the absence of the regular troops; the entire fleet of the Sultan is ready for sea at a moment's warning; that the Emperor of Russia, with a large body of troops, on the Black Sea, are ready for whatever may be intended by him. On the other hand the fleet of Mehemet Alli, his main reliance, with him on board, is ready for sea, the advance squadron has arrived at Candia, and he has said publicly that he intends to command in person, and if he can bring that of the Grand Signor to action, he intends to attempt to carry it by boarding with his Arabs. Egypt is exhausted of its resources, and means of supplying troops, and Syria is in a state of great discontent from the cruel and violent measures pursued against the population by Ibrahim Pacha; the same discontent prevails in Yemen, where the army of Mehemet Alli, sent to subject the Arabs, has been destroyed by sickness, fatigue and frequent skirmishing."
"The avarice of France to engross all the advantages of the commerce of Egypt, and the desire of England to secure the advantages of a communication with India across the Isthmus of Suez, induce them to give support to Mehemet Alii against the Sultan, by furnishing him with the means of keeping up his fleet, while the desire of Russia to deprive France of these advantages and cut off the communication between England and her East India possession, induces Russia to keep a large fleet in the Black Sea, which both England and France wish to prevent passing the Dardanelles, but which with the Army assembled there, is ready to act in any emergency to assist the Sultan or further the views of the Emperor of Russia.

"England and France it would appear have no views hostile to the Sultan, or otherwise friendly to Mehemet Alli, than their respective interests are concerned, and the same may be said in regard to the Emperor of Russia in his relations with the Sultan and feelings towards Mehemet Alli, but the apparent, and indeed, undoubted design of Russia to extend her Empire far East, excites the apprehension of England for her India possessions, and the aid given by Russia, which may enable the Sultan to recover Egypt, and deprive France of her lucrative commerce, thence causes her to act in unison with England in all the affaires of the Levant. Russia in the meantime protected in the Black Sea by the strong castles of Dardanelles, from which she has free egress, is encreasing in strength without pledging herself to any party, and holds herself in readiness to act as her interest may prompt; a course which compels England and France to keep up large and expensive fleets in the Levant which the interests they have to protect will scarcely justify.

"These contending interests serve greatly to retard and embarrass the Grand Signor in executing his design of reannexing Egypt and Syria to his Empire, from which they have been separated by Mehemet Alli. A great effort is now about being made to recover these possessions, and a few months will determine whether Mehemet Alli and his son Ibrahim Pacha are to continue to rule in Egypt and Syria, which have been scourged so long by their cruelties and extortions."


"The mission of Lord Durham, the lately appointed Ambassador to the Court of the Czar, has supplied matter for endless speculation; . . . .

"As the political scenes enacting in the East are those which, at present, chiefly attract attention, and the only ones in which any germ of disturbance—remote as it be—can now be discerned, the circumstances to which I have alluded [regarding the Durham mission to Russia] appeared to me to possess sufficient interest to justify my seeking, for your Department, information respecting them on the correctness of which some reliance might be placed. With that view, I called upon Count Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian Ambassador here, who, on my mentioning the subject, expressed a desire that my Government should be possessed of the means of forming a correct estimate of the real state of the case. He said that no credit was to be given to the statements that had been put forth, either as to the pretended designs of Great Britain in sending Lord Durham to
St. Petersburg and Constantinople, or as to the jealousy with which the Russian Government is said to look upon that appointment: That, on the contrary, Lord Durham had, before his departure, freely conversed with him regarding his mission, the principal object of which was to secure a continuance of peace and harmony between the leading European Powers; particularly with reference to the affairs of the East; and that, under this conviction, the Emperor looked upon it with the most favorable eye, and had given orders that all facilities should be given it by his agents abroad. To show me that those dispositions had been properly seconded, the Count submitted for my perusal a despatch he had received a few days before from Mr. Butinium, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, from which it appeared that the visit of Lord Durham there was anticipated in the most friendly spirit; and that all measures to facilitate its object had been taken at the Russian Embassy. With reference to the addresses exchanged by Lord Durham and the Sultan, Count Pozzo said that both their spirit and language had been misrepresented: that they were a mere interchange of the civilities shown on all such occasions: that they contained nothing that could give the least umbrage to the Imperial Court; and that the Sultan, instead of inviting Lord Durham to become a mediator between him and the Czar, had merely expressed, in the usual diplomatic language, a desire that he might be, at St. Petersburg, the interpreter of the friendly sentiments of the Porte. He stated further that Lord Durham would be received at St. Petersburg with no other than friendly dispositions, and that nothing was anticipated from his mission but the means of consolidating the peace of Europe and mutual good understanding and confidence between its leading Powers. At the Count's request, I promised that I would communicate to you an account of our conversation.

"Whatever may be the secret or ultimate designs of Russia upon the Ottoman dominions, the times do not favor their execution; and her rulers cannot but see it. She is suspected of striving, by covert diplomatic approaches, to prepare the way for ulterior movements; and the suspicion is probably not altogether unfounded, notwithstanding the earnest disclaimer of all views of aggrandisement so often put forth by her Agents. But Russia is too well aware of the eagerness with which her conduct is watched, and of the determination formed to counteract all such views—not only by England, but by other Powers in closer friendship with her—to attempt anything calculated to justify the suspicions entertained of her designs. Her representative here does not conceal the solicitude with which the Emperor regards the condition of the Porte, nor his determination that she shall not become a prey to conquest, nor fall under influences inimical to his interests in the shores of the Black Sea. He says that with that view, alone, the invasion of the Pacha of Egypt was prevented; and that the Emperor proved the honesty of his intentions by withdrawing his forces after that object had been accomplished and the Sultan again placed in a situation to maintain his independence. In a word, that he had no desire of becoming the possessor of the Bosphorus; but that, at the same time, he could not consent to its falling into the hands of any Power by any means capable of controlling his establishments on the Black Sea. There are, perhaps, in that determination sufficient motives for the late Russian interference in behalf of the Sultan; and
if the other Powers could be convinced that the Emperor's policy stops there, they could have but little reason to object to it. The fact, however, cannot be concealed that every fresh instance of active friendship on his part towards Turkey has extended his influence in that quarter; and hence the jealous fear entertained by all the nations of Europe that the Porte is doomed to become a Russian Province. The no longer secret treaty of Unkia Skelessi, by which the Sultan bound himself to close the Dardanelles against the ships of foreign nations whenever Russia should deem such a measure necessary to give effect to her protectorship of the Ottoman dominions, could not but give umbrage to Great Britain; and a remonstrance against the provisions of that compact is believed to be one of the objects of Lord Durham's embassy. The Turkish question, as between Great Britain and Russia resolves itself, at present, into a common desire to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, with a view, on the part of the former, to prevent the Emperor from possessing himself of the means of opening the Mediterranean to his naval forces, and of disputing with her the supremacy in that sea; and, on the part of Russia, for the purpose of preventing the establishment at Constantinople of a Power which might prove a barrier to her views of aggrandisement beyond her present territorial limits, both in Europe and Asia. A permanence of the statu quo is probably all that either party seeks for the present. It is possible that the diplomacy of Lord Durham may prove successful in attaining such an object; but it cannot be disguised that the more efficient negotiator on the side of Great Britain is the large naval force kept up by her on the Mediterranean station."

II. Clay to Forsyth, No. 10, Aug. 1, 1836, U. S. Department of State Archives, Russia, Vol. XIII.

"Whenever an editor of a newspaper in Paris or London writes an article in which the name of the Emperor of Russia appears, or his policy is considered, it is generally to present him to the reader personally as a heartless Despot and politically as a grasping and crafty Sovereign, whose only aim, with regard to the Sultan, is to appropriate to himself as large a portion of Turkey as he can without disturbing the peace of Europe by an overt act of hostility; and who is constantly setting traps to catch his unfortunate neighbor [Turkey]—the exertions of France and England to the contrary notwithstanding.

"In my opinion injustice is done not only to the character of the Emperor Nicholas, but also to his views. There is no good reason to believe that his conduct towards Mahmoud is influenced by any hope of adding more territory to the Russian Empire, for the Tsar must be aware that his dominions are now as extensive as they can be for all the purposes of good government and that any increase of them would only create embarrassments—internal and external—without being productive of any corresponding advantages. What then are the intentions of Russia with regards to the Porte and what interest has the Emperor to endeavour to exercise an exclusive influence over the Turkish Cabinet? The answer is simple and would probably suggest itself to many could they but divest themselves of the idea that the policy of Nicholas I must naturally be the same as that of Catherine II. In the first place, Russia, under existing treaties enjoys particular commercial privileges in the Turkish dominions. Her commerce is
daily increasing and must continue to do so unless interrupted by a war between the two countries. This reason alone, would be sufficient to justify a wish to have a predominant weight in the Ottoman councils; at the same time, the knowledge of such a design cannot authorize the feelings of jealousy it has engendered in the West of Europe. Secondly—The relative positions of Russia and Turkey, bordering on each other, and the local interests which grow out of this contiguity must give birth to many transactions between them, that do not necessarily concern other states and which, surely, may be carried on without third Powers having the right, on any ground, of demanding explanations respecting the different measures that may be resolved on to promote the prosperity of the two Empires. Again, as the Bosphorus is the only outlet of the Black Sea, it is apparent that, unless Turkey be friendly, not only the commercial, but every other interest of the southern provinces of Russia must suffer. The agricultural especially, for the grain of the Tauride and the adjoining governments only find vent through that channel.

"The conduct of the Emperor therefore, in reference to Turkey, is founded on considerations of convenience, carried on with motives purely national and designed to redound to the prosperity of his Empire; not by encroaching upon the political rights of other Powers, or abstracting from them any commercial privileges, or lawful claims they may have in the eyes of the Divan: but by entering fairly into competition with them for such advantages as international transactions may yield.

"The residence of Lord Durham, the British Ambassador, in St. Petersburg has enabled him to appreciate the policy of the Emperor towards Turkey, and to see that His Majesty, so far from endeavoring to sow dissention, is desirous of peace and aware that the maintenance of it is necessary to the improvement of his Empire and to recruit the Imperial treasury. The efforts of Lord Durham to convey those ideas to Lord Palmerston and the success which has, up to the present time, attended his negotiations to bring about a good understanding between England and Russia have rendered him very popular at court, and no foreign representative is treated with as much favour as he is. Nevertheless, it seems as if his representations have not entirely convinced Lord Palmerston, that the designs of Russia are not hostile to British interests in Turkey, for Lord Ponsonby's acts at Constantinople betray a jealousy of the influence enjoyed by the Russian Minister in that capital, and it is more than probable that the case of Mr. Churchill was seized upon by his Lordship, rather as a pretext to obtain the dismissal of Akif-Effendi and thus to get rid of a Minister of Foreign Affairs unfavorably inclined towards England, than as an amends for injuries sustained by a British subject. This view of the matter, I may add, is taken by other Diplomatic Representatives in St. Petersburg."


"As the Eastern question still continues to attract the attention of the Governments and People of the old world as that on which its future destinies depend (although its solution seems to be momentarily suspended by the advantages obtained by British diplomacy over the Russian, and by the energetic
demonsictions of British naval and military power in the Levant and on the frontiers of India), I beg leave to communicate the following authentic information relating to that subject.

"Some intimation received by the British from the Russian Government that in case Mahomet Ali should openly throw off his allegiance to the Porte, Russia might think it necessary to intervene by force of arms, induced Lord Palmerston, some time since, to propose to the Russian cabinet a conference of the five great European powers in order to concert the measures they would jointly adopt in case the Pasha of Egypt should declare himself independent. Count Nesselrode returned an answer to this proposition, during the stay of the emperor at this Capital in September last, declining to accede to it upon the ground that the joint action of the five Powers to prevent Mahomet Ali from taking such a step was already secured by their actual correspondent conduct, and that the remonstrances of their agents having hitherto proved sufficient for that object, it was unnecessary to provide for a hypothetical case which might, and probably never would occur. Count Pozzo de Borgo communicated this reply to Lord Palmerston, who after reading it, observed that the necessity for such a mutual understanding among the five Powers was not obviated by the reasons stated by Count Nesselrode since the want of it would leave anyone of them force to act according to its own views of its own interests in the case supposed, which the others could not passively suffer as it might involve the undue aggrandisement of that one which should interefere by force of arms between the Sultan and his revolted vassal. Experience had already shown that a Power might enter upon such an intervention with the most sincere desire to avoid acquiring any selfish advantages for itself, and yet might be tempted by circumstances to accept of such advantages when in the course of events they presented themselves to view. Thus Russia had declared on the breaking out of the war between that Empire and Turkey in 1828, that she did not seek and would not accept any increase of territory as the object of the war. Yet it was notorious that the treaty of peace by which it was terminated embraced cessions of valuable territory by which the limits of the Russian empire were extended in Asia. So also when Russia came to the assistance of the Porte against Mahomet Ali in 1833, she professed the most disinterested views, yet her armed intervention ended by the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi the object of which was to shut the entrance of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus against the enemies of Russia. It therefore became necessary for those Powers which had a common interest in maintaining the independence of the Porte and the integrity of its territory to declare prospectively that they would not see with indifference any future separate intervention which might again lead to the aggrandisement of any one Power at the expense of Turkey and to the manifest injury of all the others. That Great Britain, above all, had the deepest interest in preventing any such intervention, but desired to prevent it by pacific means and had therefore proposed the intended conference.

"It is not stated what reply Count Pozzo de Borgo made to this declaration, but it may fairly be inferred from it that the British Government considers itself at liberty to concert separately with its allies who are interested in maintaining the national existence of Turkey the measures which may become necessary for
that purpose. Among these allies she may safely reckon on the cooperation of Austria, and I think even of France as any approximation between Russia and France for the purpose of dismembering the Turkish empire seems to be rendered nearly impossible by the invincible repugnance of the Sovereign of the one country and the People of the other to any close connection. We have recently seen in the adhesion of France to the commercial Treaty concluded by England with the Porte, an arrangement admirably adopted to develop the natural resources of Turkey, that whatever desire the French Government may feel to countenance the usurpation of Mahomet Ali with the ultimate view of extending its own establishments in Africa further east, it is inevitably compelled by the force of circumstances to unite in a measure adopted to give increased political strength to the Turkish Government, to enable it to grapple with its natural enemy, and at the same time entirely inconsistent with the notion of the independance of Egypt and Syria.”

13. Wheaton to Forsyth, No. 117, June 26, 1839, U. S. Department of State Archives, Prussia, Vol. II.

“Since my last Despatch on the Oriental Question, (No. 114,) I have had an opportunity of seeing a communication made on the 24th April to Lord Ponsonby by Nourri Effendi, which, although of a date much older than the other French and English Despatches which I have seen, throws considerable light upon the causes which have so suddenly disturbed the status quo in the East.

“In this communication Nourri Effendi recites at some length the answers which he had already given, by order of the Sultan, to the Austrian internuncio, remarking upon an insinuation of Prince Metternich that the Sublime Porte ought to endeavor to find out some mezzo termino, in its relations with the Pacha of Egypt, in order to avoid the certain evils and uncertain result of war. This answer stated that the Sultan did not desire war, nor was such a result to be apprehended unless from the continued encroachments of the person 'styling himself the Pacha of Egypt,' whose audacious pretentions the great Christian powers ought to unite in endeavoring to restrain.—That Prince Metternich was doubtless a very wise and benevolent man, but (intimating in pretty intelligible terms) that Austria would better manifest her friendship for the Porte by discountenancing the pretentions of Mehemet Ali who refused to perform the duties he owed to his lawful sovereign. That all the Turkish provinces, which he had seized and which had been secured to him by the treaty of Kuteyah, upon the express conditions that he should pay tribute, and confine himself strictly within the limits marked out by that treaty, had been inherited by the Sultan from his forefathers; and, Mehemet Ali having failed to perform these conditions, these countries might justly be considered as revertting from the vassal to his liege lord;—but that the Sublime Porte was willing to leave him in the possession of Egypt, provided he would evacuate Syria, the continued possession of which by him endangered the security of the other Turkish provinces in Asia Minor, Mehemet Ali having fortified the passes of the Taurus chain of mountains in such a manner as to keep the way always open preparatory to a fresh invasion of Anatolia, whilst the Porte had only recently thought of creating defensive works, which it had established far from the frontier at Koniah.
"The note from Nourri Effendi to Lord Ponsonby closed with a distinct proposition to the British government to conclude a treaty of alliance with the Porte, the object of which should be to compel Mehmet Ali to evacuate all the Pashalics of Syria and, in other respects, to perform his duties as a faithful vassal and tributary of the Ottoman Empire."


"The departure of Prince Metternich has produced no perceptible effect upon the affairs of the Empire and but little impression on the public mind; it is possible, therefore, that even his death would affect the condition of Austria and its relations with the other states of Europe only so far as to cause a slight fall in the Government stocks. The complicate question of arranging the matters in dispute between the Sultan and the Pacha of Egypt occupies the attention of the Austrian Cabinet almost to the exclusion of every other subject and the interest taken in it by the Ministry has been communicated to the public. It is astonishing to see the eagerness—to learn the last news from Constantinople—shewn by persons, of all classes except the lowest, who have no voice in the Government, who have not even a vote at the municipal elections and whose opinions would have not the least weight with any member of the Cabinet.

"The decisions made in the conference of the Representatives of the five Powers at Constantinople are probably communicated regularly to the Department by the Minister of the United States at the Sublime Porte. Those decisions, however, are influenced, in a great degree, by the negotiations which take place at Vienna, between the Austrian Cabinet, the Ambassadors of Great Britain, Russia and France and the Prussian minister under instructions received from their different Governments. Austria, in fact, appears to act the part of a mediator in the whole business and to use her influence to calm the jealousies and suspicion known to exist, in all matters relating to Turkey, between the English, French, and Russian Governments. It is this character which gives to Austria the great weight she possesses in the conferences and which has enabled her to make the Powers less distrustful of each other and to induce them to act with a certain degree of unity in the important and over-agitated question. That Austria will succeed in the endeavor to maintain the peace of Europe appears to me evident from two facts which have come to my knowledge. The first is that the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople has received instructions from St. Petersburg to act more in concert with the other Representatives and to consent to coerce the Pacha of Egypt if a resort to forcible means should become necessary. The second circumstance is that, after a conference held in this city a few days since, despatches were sent from the Department of Foreign Affairs to the Austrian Internuncio and by the Representatives of Great Britain, Russia, France and Prussia at this Court—each writing separately to their colleagues at Constantinople—instructing them to inform the Pacha, through the Consuls of their respective Governments at Alexandria, that unless he consented to the arbitrement of the questions, between the Sultan and himself, by the five Powers they were determined to compel him to come to terms and, if obliged by his refusal to resort to force, the guarantees which they had offered to give him
would be withdrawn and he would be left to contend with them single handed. Much will depend upon the answer of Mehemet Ali to these menaces. That able and wily Prince can scarcely be brought to believe that there will be any concord in the actions of Powers whose interests are so opposite and who have little confidence in each other. Under different circumstances the Pacha would be right in his conjecture but, at present, it would seem to be erroneous for reasons which may be briefly referred to.

The acquisitions of territory, from Turkey, made by Russia under different pretenses during the last half century have excited the suspicion of the other European Cabinets with regard to the ulterior objects of Russia and induced them to watch more closely her policy in connection with the Turkish Empire. They have at length discovered, that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and the occupation of the island of Soulima, give to Russia the complete control of the Commerce of the Black Sea and the navigation of the Danube at any moment she may choose to exercise it. Being unable, therefore, to remedy their past errors the other Powers of Europe seem for the moment resolved to prevent any further encroachments on the part of Russia. Her statesmen are aware that this feeling exists to a greater degree than at any former time and Russia is moreover occupied just now with the subjugation of Circassia which, together with the dissatisfaction prevailing among the Cossacks would render it dangerous for her to risk the chances of a war. She will consequently, rather than embroil herself with England and France, assent to the measures proposed in the conferences at Constantinople and make a merit of what in fact is the necessity of yielding to circumstances which she cannot evade. Whatever she consents to will, I am convinced, extend no further than is requisite to arrange the question between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali; Russia will make no treaty stipulations which will be binding on her for the future or which she cannot find a plausible pretext, at any time, to annul. She may cease apparently her machinations against Turkish independence for the moment and claim credit for her forbearance, but let other events take place in Europe to draw off the attention of the great Powers, or let war be declared between any of them and Russia remain neutral, the powerful machinery which is destined, in all probability, one day to overthrow the Ottoman Empire will be again set in motion and the nations most interest in upholding the 'integrity' of Turkey will be unable to arrest it.

"The Pacha of Egypt has little to hope for form dissensions among the five Powers and, if he refuse to submit to their arbitrement, they will force him to do so. But, although Russia may consent to such compulsion, the active part—the brunt—will be borne by England and France; not a Russian ship will be engaged, nor a Russian subject be injured in the contest. The settlement of the affairs of Turkey will not be final—it will not probably last more than five years. Such at least is my impression and it is founded on the fact that the policy of Russia is directed to the future whereas that of England and France is shaped to suit the present.

"The measures taken by England in relation to the Turkish question where not energetic until lately; the British Ministry appears to have relied, for some years, upon the moral power given by the remembrance of former greatness and to have left unheeded the important fact that the glory of past achievements is
fast fading whilst the Countries she once subsidized, some of which she even saved from destruction, have acquired strength sufficient to render them powerful rivals and dangerous enemies.”

15. Wheaton to [Forsyth], No. 153, July 1, 1840, Confidential, U. S. Department of State Archives, Prussia, Vol. II.

“Since my last on that subject the question of the East, and the East itself remain in statu quo. The Ottoman Empire is crumbling to pieces. The great Christian Powers after arresting the direct negotiation between the Porte and the Pacha of Egypt, have not been able to agree on any plan of settlement. The British Cabinet itself is divided on the question. Various projects of partitioning Syria by a line to be drawn between St. Jean d’Arce or Beyrut and the Persian gulf, leaving to the Pacha Egypt and Arabia with the southern part of Syria, have been suggested between Austria, Great Britain and Russia. But Mehmet Ali laughs at these plans, being certain of the neutrality, if not the support of France in case of any attempt to coerce him. Russia is very much weakened by her recent defeat in Circassia, and the demoralized state of her army—Austria by the deficit in her finances; and the Porte itself has nearly exhausted all its resources in men and money.—The conclusion would seem to be that this problem must at last be solved by time and the death of Mehmet Ali alone, unless indeed he should be unwilling to wait leaving such a precarious inheritance to his children. In that case he may at any time bring on the necessity of Russian intervention, and perhaps a general conflagration by ordering Ibrahim Pacha to march on Constantinople.”


“Count Bresson, the French Minister at this court, has remonstrated in the strongest manner against the ratification of the Convention [of July 15, 1840] by the Prussian Government. He has stated that Prussia was putting all at stake, as she had no direct interest in the question at issue, could gain nothing in the scramble for the spoils of the East which must ultimately arise between G. Britain and Russia (as it could not be supposed that these two powers would remain permanently united in policy and councils,) whilst Prussia might lose her newly acquainted Provinces of the Rhine where France must necessarily seek her indemnity for the further aggrandizement of the other Powers. He has urged the danger of kindling anew the passion for military glory and conquest which is characteristic of the French nation; and the honor which would redound to the Prussian monarch, at the commencement of his reign, from arresting the progress of this new source of discord among the Great Powers of Europe, by suspending his ratification in order to give further time for consultation on a matter on which the peace of the world might be said to depend. He has added that the King of the French perfectly concurs with his present ministry in resenting the course of the Plenipotentiaries of the four Powers in London as equally derogatory to the interests and honor of France, and that the nation would be ready to second its Government in arming upon an extensive scale in order to be prepared for any and every eventuality.
“The Prussian Cabinet has replied to these energetic remonstrances that however much Prussia regretted to see France separate herself from the other great Christian Powers on this question, she (Prussia) could not separate herself from her allies by refusing her assent to the decision of the Conference of London, although the King had given no special instructions to his minister authorizing him to sign this particular convention.”
I. Bibliographies and General Histories

1. Bibliographies

BENGESCO, GEORGES: *Essai d'une notice Bibliographique sur la question d'Orient* . . . 1821-1897. Bruxelles et Paris, 1897. An extensive list of French works dealing with the question of the Near East. It contains the titles of a number of contemporary French books and pamphlets not listed in this bibliography.


2. General Histories


Miller, William: *The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913*. Cambridge, 1913.


A detailed work but one which must be read very critically.


Paton, A. A.: *A History of the Egyptian Revolution, from the Period of the Memelukes to the death of Mohammed Ali*. 2 vols. London, 1870. Paton was private secretary to Col. Hodges while the latter was British Consul-General at Alexandria in 1839-1840. His account of the events which occurred in the Levant during that period is of value.


Thureau-Dangin, Paul: *Histoire de la monarchie de juillet*. 7 vols. Paris, 1888-1892. Thureau-Dangin has drawn conclusions in this work which are somewhat prejudiced in favor of the French. Nevertheless the work is both detailed and valuable.


II. Special Secondary Studies


GORLIAKOW, SERGI: *Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles*. Paris, 1910. An excellent monograph which has been based, almost entirely, upon Russian sources.

HALL, MAJOR JOHN: *England and the Orleans Monarchy*. New York, 1912. Hall bases his work, to a large extent, upon material found among the records of the British foreign office.

HASENCLEVER, ADOLF: *Die Orientalische Frage in den Jahren 1838-1841*. Leipzig, 1914. This is an excellent study which is based, to a large extent, upon the results of research carried on in the Berlin and Vienna record offices.


LATIMER, ELIZABETH WORMELEY: *Russia and Turkey in the Nineteenth Century*. Chicago, 1895.


———: *Diplomatische Geschichte der Orientalischen Frage*. Leipzig, 1858.

III. BIOGRAPHIES, MEMOIRS, RECOLLECTIONS, DIARIES, AND PRIVATE LETTERS

ARMAGNAC, BARON D’: *Nehib et Beyrouth, souvenirs d’Orient, de 1833 à 1841*. Paris, 1844.

BARANTE, BARON DE: *Souvenirs du Baron de Barante, 1782-1866*. Publiés par Claude de Barante. 8 vols. Paris, 1890-1901. Vols. V and VI cover the period 1832-1841. Barante was for a considerable period of time French Ambassador to Russia. Many of his letters throw light upon the policies followed by the Tsar Nicholas I and his chief ministers.
Barker, J.: Syria and Egypt under the last five Sultans of Turkey. Experiences, during fifty years, of Mr. Consul-General Barker. Edited by his son Edward B. B. Barker. 2 vols. London, 1876. Barker was the British Consul-General at Alexandria in 1833. Later he held a similar position at Aleppo. His account reveals many interesting facts concerning Mehmet Ali's régime in both Egypt and Syria.


Chesney, Francis Rawdon: Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition... carried on by order of the British government in 1835, 1836, 1837. London, 1888.


_________: Lettres de M. Guizot à sa famille et à ses amis. Paris, 1884.


Faucher, Léon: Biographie et correspondance. Vol. I. Paris, 1888. Faucher was a French journalist who corresponded frequently with Henry Reeve and other members of the "pro-French" party in England. His letters for the period between July, 1840, and December, 1840, reveal sentiments entertained in France at that time.


The Greville Memoirs; A Journal of the Reign of Queen Victoria from 1837 to 1852. Edited by Henry Reeve. 2 vols. New York, 1885. These memoirs constitute a valuable source but they must be read critically. Greville was strongly opposed to Palmerston's Levantine policy and at times he permitted his prejudices to influence his writing.

Guizot, François Pierre Guillaume: Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps. 8 vols. Paris, 1858-1867. Vols. IV-VI cover the period 1832-1842. Guizot quotes extensively from despatches which have not been published elsewhere.


Maxwell, Sir Herbert (Editor): The Creevey Papers. A selection from the Correspondence and Diaries of the late Thomas Creevey. London, 1904.


Prokesch-Osten, Anton von: Briefwechsel mit Herrn von Gentz und Fürsten Metternich. Edited by Count Anton Prokesch-Osten, the Younger. 2 vols. Vienna, 1881.
Raikes, Thomas: A Portion of the Journal kept by Thomas Raikes from 1831 to 1847. 4 vols. London, 1856-1858. Raikes spent much time in France during the period 1833-1841, and in his journal he comments frequently concerning the political situation there.

---: Private Correspondence with the Duke of Wellington and other distinguished Contemporaries. Edited by his daughter, Harriet Raikes. London, 1861.
Reid, Stuart J.: Life and Letters of the First Earl of Durham, 1792-1840. 2 vols. London, 1906. Reid quotes extracts from a number of letters which were exchanged between Palmerston and Durham while the latter was British Minister to Russia.


Taschereau, J. (Editor): Revue rétrospective ou archives secrètes du dernier gouvernement, 1820-1848. Recueil non périodique. Paris, 1848. A collection of some of Louis Philippe's private letters and other papers. His letters to King Leopold of Belgium, which are published in this collection, are of particular value for this study.

Victoria, Queen of England: The Letters of Queen Victoria. A selection from Her Majesty's Correspondence between the years 1837 and 1861. Edited by A. C. Benson and Viscount Esher. 3 vols. London, 1908.
Walpole, Spencer: The Life of Lord John Russell. 2 vols. London, 1889. In this work Walpole has quoted extensively from the letters of Lord John Russell.
Walsh, Rev. R.: A Residence at Constantinople, during a period including the Commencement, Progress, and Termination of the Greek and Turkish Revolutions. 2 vols. London, 1836.
IV. Contemporary Publications

1. Newspapers, Periodicals and Annals

The Annual Register, or a View of History, Politics, and Literature. 1832-1841. London, 1833-1842. Many of the important despatches published in the Levant Correspondence have been copied in the volume of the Annual Register for 1840.


The Examiner, A Sunday Paper, on Politics, Literature, and the Fine Arts. London. The volumes for 1838, 1840, and 1841 have been consulted. The Examiner was a Whig paper but it did not always support the policies of Lord Palmerston.


Journal des Détats, politiques et littéraires, 1832-1841. Paris. This was the leading organ of the Doctrinaires.


The Monthly Review, 1833-1844. Vols. CCXI-CCXLV. London. This source contains numerous reviews of current books and pamphlets. Many of these reviews are excellent.


Revue des deux Mondes. Paris. The issues for the years 1832 to 1841, and for Aug. 1, 1852, Nov. 1, 15, 1891, and June 1, 1895, have been examined.


The Times. 1832-1841. London. The Times has three features valuable for the present study: its editorials, its letters from correspondents in foreign countries—particularly France and Turkey—and its extracts copied from foreign journals.


2. Contemporary Books and Pamphlets


Cobden, Richard: Russia. "By a Manchester Manufacturer." Edinburgh, 1836.


Lagroix, Frédéric: *Question d’Orient*. Paris, 1839.


Napier wrote his work evidently for the purpose of justifying his conduct in the Near East in 1840 and 1841. Nevertheless, it contains much valuable material.


Turkey and Russia; or Observations on their Political and Commercial Relations with England. By a Merchant. London, 1835.


———: *La crise. La France devant les quatre puissances*. Paris, 1840.

———: *The Mystery of the Danube. Showing how through secret Diplomacy, that River has been closed, etc*. London, 1851.

V. Published Governmental Documents

1. State Papers, Treaties, Reports, etc.

British Parliamentary Papers. 1833-1841. London. One of the chief sources for this study. The Correspondence relative to the Affairs of the Levant, published in Parl. Papers 1841, XXIX, and 1841, Session 2, VIII, was found to be particularly valuable.


2. Parliamentary Speeches


VI. Unpublished Materials

United States Department of State Archives.

(1). Austria, Vol. I.

(2). England, Vols. XL—XLVIII. Aaron Vail frequently commented upon European affairs in his despatches for the period 1833-1835.

(3). France, Vols. XXVI—XXIX.


(5). Russia, Vols. XII—XIV.

(6). Turkey, Vols. II—IX. These volumes contain extensive material relative to the commercial affairs of the Near East.

(7). Consular Letters, Constantinople, Vol. II.
INDEX

A few Remarks on Our Foreign Policy, English pamphlet, on foreign policy, 70 n.
Abdallah Pasha, Turkish governor of Acre, 13.
Abd-ul-Mejid, Sultan, 104; firman of deposing Mehemet Ali (1840), 186.
Achmet Fethi Pasha, Turkish diplomat and Minister of Commerce, 76, 225-226.
Achmet Pasha, Turkish naval commander, 42, 104-105.
Acre, English capture of (1840), 199.
Adana, Turkish pashalic, 22, 23-24.
Aden, occupied by English (1838), 60, 60 n.
Adrianopole, Treaty of modified (1834), 42, 42 n.
Akif Effendi, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, 248.
Aleppo, government of granted to Mehemet Ali (1833), 23.
Alexander, Grand Duke (later Tsar Alexander II), 100.
Alexandria, question of, 79 ff, 79 n.
Algiers, French in, 36 n, 64.
Allison, English agent at Constantinople, 174.
Apponyi, Count Anton, Austrian Ambassador to France, 154.
Austria, Near Eastern policy of (1833), 27, 32-33; (1839), 80, 80 n, 118-119, 118 n; interest of in steam navigation on Danube, 74 n; public of interested in Turco-Egyptian question (1839), 251; appears to act as mediator, 251; financial conditions in (1840), 253; representatives of eager to secure settlement of Turco-Egyptian question (1841), 222-223, 228 n; influence of at Constantinople, 227 n.
Bandiera, Baron Franz, Austrian naval commander in Levant, 177.
Barante, Baron William Prosper de, French Ambassador to Russia, 71; on Tsar's attitude regarding Vienna conference (1839), 110 n; claimed Prussia and Austria were hostile to Anglo-French alliance, 132 n.
Barnes, Thomas, editor of The Times, 182 n.
Barton, Thomas P., U. S. diplomatic agent at Paris, on French policy (1835), 65 n.
Beauvale, Frederick Lamb, Lord, English Ambassador to Austria, on diplomatic conferences at Vienna (1839), 107-108, 107 n; report of on attitude of Metternich (1841), 217.
Becker, Niklas, German poet, 184 n.
Bentinck, Lord William, Governor-General of India, 50 n, 58 n; on steam communication between Europe and India (1835), 39.
Berlin, Treaty of (1833), 32 n.
Beust, Count Frederick Ferdinand von, Saxon (later Austro-Hungarian) statesman, on political situation in France (1840), 194 n.
Beyrouth, bombardment of reported at Paris (1840), 186.
Bligh, English chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg, 34.
Bloomfield, Lord John A., English chargé d' affaires at St. Petersburg, 198.
Bourqueney, Baron Adolf, French chargé d'affaires at London, on Russian policy at London (1839), 100-101; on attitude of Palmerston towards France (1841), 211; on diplomatic situation at London, 213-214; discouraged by diplomatic situation, 222 n; favored signing of Straits Convention in March, 1841, 223.
Boutenieff, Russian Ambassador to Turkey, 17, 19, 28, 52.
Bowring, Sir John, English diplomatic agent, report of on Egypt, etc. (1838), 61-62, 61 n.
Bresson, Count Charles, French Minister to Prussia, representations of to Prussian government (1840), 253.
Broglie, Duc Achille Charles de French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20, 28, 64; on policy of France in Turkey (1833), 37-38.
Broughton, John Cam Hobhouse, Lord, President of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, on policy of Mehemet Ali (1838), 58 n; on obstacles to steam communication with India, 59.
Brown, U. S. Dragoman at Constantinople, on dismissal of Reschid Pasha (1841), 226 n.

265
Brunnow, Baron Philip de, Russian diplomatist, mission of to England announced (1839), 118; instructions to on first mission to London, 120; negotiates with Palmerston, 120-121, 120 n, 123; reports to Russian government results of mission, 129; wins support of Metternich, 129 n; ordered to return to England, 130; plan of for settlement of Turco-Egyptian question (1840), 132-133; attitude of towards France and Near Eastern settlement, 152-153, 152 n; threatens Russian withdrawal from London conference, 154 n; opposed to modification of treaty of July 15, 1840, 185-186; favors return of Fance to Concert of Europe, 212; opposed to proposal made by Guizot (1841), 222.

Billow, Freiherr Heinrich von, Prussian Minister to England, instructions sent to (1840), 142; advances of to Guizot, 144, 144 n, 151-152; attitude of during crisis of 1840, 172.

Bulwer, Sir Henry, English diplomatic agent at Constantinople and later at Paris, 68; on Anglo-French rivalry in Egypt (1838), 70; reports of on attitude of French government (1839), 115-116, 123-124; negotiations of with Thiers (1840), 165, 165 n, 179-180, 180 n.

Caillé, Captain, French diplomatic agent, 84, 86, 104.

Cambreling, C. C., U. S. diplomatic representative at St. Petersburg, on Austro-Russian relations (1841), 212 n.

Campbell, Colonel Colin, English Consul-General at Alexandria, 22 n, 38, 86-87 n, 127 n.

Canning, Sir Stratford, English Ambassador to Turkey, 14, 14 n, 41.

Carné, Count de, French deputy, 96, 96 n.

Chamber of Deputies, sentiments expressed in favorable to Mehemet Ali (1833), 37-38; debates in (1839), 95 ff; (1840), 189 n.

Château d'Eu, conference of (1840), 171.

Cheik Effendi, Turkish Minister to England, 147, 150, 227; delays signature of protocol de clôture (1841), 222, 223-224.

Chesney, Lieut.-Colonel Francis Rawdon, English officer, 39; Euphrates expedition of (1835-36), 49-50.

Chrazowski, General Adalbert, Polish officer in English employ in Turkey, 63.

Churchill, English resident of Constantinople, 248.

Clanricarde, Marquis of, English Ambassador to Russia, on attitude of Russia relative to Turco-Egyptian question (1839), 116 ff, 118 n.

Clarendon, George William Frederick Villiers, Earl of, English Lord Privy Seal, opposition of to Palmerston's Near Eastern policy (1840), 157 n, 159, 182 n.

Clay, John Randolph, U. S. diplomatic representative at St. Petersburg and later at Vienna, on situation in southern Russia (1833), 34-35 n; on situation in Near East (1834). 242-244; on character and policy of Tsar (1836), 247-248; on policies of Powers relative to the Near East (1839), 251-253.

Cochelet, Adrien Louis, French Consul-General at Alexandria, attempts of to prevent war in Near East (1839), 85-86, 86-87 n; on attitude of Mehemet Ali, 112 n; encourages Mehemet Ali to persist in his demands, 127 n; urges Mehemet Ali to stir up holy war (1840), 175 n; influence of with Mehemet Ali, 200 n.


Commerce and navigation, Anglo-Turkish treaty of (1838), 67-68; Franco-Turkish treaty of, 68 n.

Constantine, Bey of, 64.

Constantinople, question of, 79 ff.


Courrier Français, Paris journal, 167.

D'Abbadie, on prospect for a canal across Isthmus of Suez (1839), 62 n.

Damascus, government of granted to Mehemet Ali (1833), 23.

Darmès, regicide, 192.

Dolgorouki, Prince, Russian nobleman, 34-35 n.

Don Carlos, Spanish pretender, 66.

Duchâtel, Count Charles Marie Tanneyguy, French Minister of the Interior, 82.

Duperré, French Minister of Marine, 87, 95.

Durham, John George Lambton, Earl of, English Ambassador to Russia, 47, 245-246, 247; on Russia's Near Eastern policy (1836), 48; handicapped in efforts to improve Anglo-
Russian relations, 53, 53 n; success of at St. Petersburg, 53 n, 56-57, 248; on Anglo-Russian relations, 56.

East India Company, 59.

Ellice, Edward, English politician, 182 n.

England, France, Russia, and Turkey, English pamphlet, on Russian policy (1834), 55.

England, general policy of in Near East, 10-11; Turco-Egyptian policy of in 1833, 32-33, 41-42; suspicion of French relations with Egypt in, 41; attitude of to Russian policy in Near East, 239-240, 241; suspicion of Mehemet Ali’s policies in (1833-38), 38, 57-58, 58 n; hostility to Russia in (1834-36), 53 ff, 54 n, 56 n; interest of in Egypt (1835), 245; gains influence at Constantinople (1836-38), 66-67; Near Eastern policy of (1838), 249-250; (1839), 252-253; opinion in on Turco-Egyptian question, 93-94; rejects proposals of Brunnow, 122-123; public opinion in during crisis of 1840, 170, 170 n, 181-182, 181 n, 182 n; prestige of in 1841, 231; views on Near Eastern policy of, 232 n, 234-235, 236. Euphrates route to India, 39-40, 213, 213 n. See also Chesney, and Steam communication with India.———expedition. See Chesney.

The Examiner, London Sunday paper, on Anglo-French rivalry over route to India (1840), 139 n, 234-235.

Fanshawe, Captain, English naval officer, mission of to Alexandria and Constantinople (1840), 202-203, 202 n.

Ferdinand I, Emperor of Austria, 73 n. Ferdinand II, King of Naples, 147-148.

Ficquelmont, Count Ludwig, Austrian statesman, 32 n.

Firman of investiture, Feb. 13, 1841, 218-219, 219 n; modified by firmans of May-June, 1841, 228 n.

Foltz, French diplomatic agent, 84.

France, general policy of in Near East, 9, 11; Near Eastern policy of (1833), 30-37, 36-37 n, 41-42, 41 n, 42 n, 239-240, 241; speculations on the Near Eastern policy of (1834), 242; policy of in Egypt (1835), 245; loses influence at Constantinople (1836), 66-67, 67 n; favoritism for Mehemet Ali in (1838), 68-69, 69 n; Near Eastern policy of (1839), 80 ff, 80 n, 119; opposition of to Vienna confer-
Greigh, Admiral, commander of Russian Black Sea fleet, 16.

Greville, Charles, English politician and writer, 182 n; on triumph of Palmerston in English Cabinet (1840), 188; on outcome of crisis of 1840, 206.

Guizot, François Pierre Guillaume, French statesman, on Anglo-French relations (1833), 41; speech on of Levant policy of French government (1839), 97-98, 98 n; appointed Ambassador to England (1840), 135-136; conferences of with Palmerston, 140, 140 n; on diplomatic situation at London, 140-141, 142, 150-151, 152, 154-155, 160; comments of on views of Palmerston, 146-147; on opposition to Palmerston’s policies in British Cabinet, 157 n; objects to Palmerston’s defense of treaty of July 15, 1840, 164; negotiations of for modification of July treaty, 171-172, 173 n, 182 n; communicates casus belli note to Palmerston, 188; appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in France, 193; plan of for modification of July treaty, 195; disappointed by attitude of Palmerston, 196-197, 197 n; advice of for Mehemet Ali, 202 n; eager for France to escape from isolated position, 207 ff, 208 n; abandons hope of securing modification of July treaty, 207-208, proposal of to secure return of France to Concert of Europe (1841), 212-213, 213 n; delays signing of Straits Convention, 222-223; authorizes Bourqueney to “initial” same, 223; comment of on outcome of Turco-Egyptian question, 229-230.

Hafiz Pasha, Commander of Turkish forces in Asia Minor, 75, 75 n, 83.

Haines, Captain, English naval officer, 60 n; on strategic position of Aden, 60-61.

Hall Pasha, Turkish statesman, 17, 149.

Hamid Bey, Egyptian officer, 216.

Hodges, Colonel, English Consul-General at Alexandria, 127 n, 149 n, 158-159, 176 n.


Holland, Henry Richard Fox, Lord, English Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, opposition of to Palmerston’s Near Eastern policy (1840), 157 n, 159, 182 n.

Hugon, Admiral, French naval commander in Mediterranean, 65.

Ibrahim Pasha, Egyptian commander, 13, 13 n, 18, 19, 49, 104, 243, 244.

India. See steam communication with, Suez route to, and Euphrates route to.

Isabella II, Queen of Spain, 66.

Itcheli, Turkish pachalic, 22, 23.

Jochmus, General, Baron August von, German officer in Turkish employ, instructions for (1841), 214.

Journal de Saint Petersbourg, French language journal of St. Petersburg, on diplomatic affairs at Constantinople (1833), 20.

Journal des Débats, Paris daily paper, on situation in Near East (1833), 15, 20, 21; on French interest in Mediterranean (1838), 69; on Turco-Egyptian question (1839), 94-95, 94 n; bellicose statements in (1840), 167.


Koenigsmarck, Count Hans Carl, Prussian Ambassador to Turkey, 215, 221.

Kolowrat, Count Franz Anton, Austrian Minister of the Interior, 183 n.

Koniah, battle of (1832), 16.

Konigsmarck, (spelling copied in notes from some of the sources). See Koenigsmarck.

Kosrew, Pasha, Turkish Grand Vizier, 104, 104 n; dismissal of (1840), 148-149; dismissal of announced at London, 154.

Kourchid Bey, Egyptian governor of Jeddah, 57-58.

Kutayyah, occupied by Egyptians (1833), 19; preliminaries of, 24, 24 n.

Lagréné, French chargé d’affaires at St. Petersburg, 34.

Lalande, Admiral, French naval commander in Levant, 103, 105 n.

Lamartine, Alphonse de, French deputy, favors partition of Turkey (1839), 96-97, 97 n; (1840), 137 n.

Lazaroff, Rear Admiral, commander of Russian fleet sent to Constantinople (1833), 21.

Leopold I, King of the Belgians, alarmed by crisis of 1840, 172; ef-
forts of to secure compromise settlement of Turco-Egyptian question, 172; fears revolution in Europe, 193 n.

Lieven, Christophe Andreievitch, Prince, 238.

--- Princes (Countess), 160 n.

Livingston, Edward, U. S. Minister to France, on the relations of England, France, and Russia (1833), 239-240.


Loring, Lieutenant, English naval officer, 216.

Louis Philippe, King of the French, 141 n; favors Habsburg marriage alliance, (1836), 65, 65 n; favors preparations for war (1840), 167, 167 n; 178 n; eager to preserve peace, 171, 191 ff, 193 n, 195 n; appeal of to King Leopold of Belgium, 172; forces Thiers to resign, 192-193.

Mahmoud II, Sultan, general policy of, 13; warlike policy of (1834), 44, 243; grants permission for Euphrates expedition (1835), 49; issues firman to Mehemet Ali, 51-52; preparations of for war, 244; desire of to renew war with Egypt (1836), 67; hostile to Mehemet Ali (1838), 68; prepares to renew war with Mehemet Ali (1838-39), 75-76, 79, 82-83; death of, 104.

Maison, Marshal Marquis, French Minister to Russia, on French policy in Near East (1834), 242-243.

Malcolm, Admiral, Sir Pulteney, commander of English fleet in Mediterranean, 27, 33.

Malmesbury, James Howard Harris, Earl of, English politician, on French opinion (1837), 66 n.

Maltzan, Count Mortimer, Prussian Ambassador to Austria, 108 n.

Mandeville, English chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, 17, 41; peace endeavors at Constantinople (1833), 18-19.

Maurojeni, Turkish chargé d'affaires at Vienna and diplomatic agent to London, 14, 239.

Mazloum Bey, Turkish diplomatic agent, 205, 214, 216.

Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, foreign experts in the employ of, 10 n; prepares for war with Sultan (1831-32), 13, 13 n; rejects Roussin's peace proposal (1833), 22, 22 n; designs of, 38; policy of (1834), 43; French sympathy for, 44 n; sends troops to Syria, 243; policy of in Arabia (1834-35), 57-58; policy of relative to Euphrates expedition (1835), 49; discontent in the territories of, 244; aids development of Suez route to India, 62-63, 63 n; moves to gain independence (1838), 64; promises of to Consuls-General at Alexandria (1839), 83; orders of to Ibrahim Pasha, 84, 84 n, 86, 104; defiant attitude of, 112 n, 127 n; (1840), 149-149, 149 n, 152 n, 175-176, 253; attempts of at direct negotiations with Turkish Ministers, 149-150, 155; revolts against the authority of, 159, 159 n; follows advice of French, 176, 176 n, 179; abandons defiant attitude and agrees to evacuate Syria, 200 ff, 200 n; final submission of to Porto (1841), 216-217; objections of to firman of investiture, 210-220, 220 n.

Melbourne, William Lamb, Viscount, English Prime Minister, attitude of during crisis of 1840, 170-171, 172, 184, 193 n; on services of Morning Chronicle to Palmerston, 185 n; on disagreement within British Cabinet, 190 n.

Memorandum of Nov. 14, 1840, 198.

Mésange, French warship, 25.

Metternich-Winneburg, Clement W. N. L., Prince of, Austrian Chancellor, 31, 32, 32 n; on French and English interests in Egypt (1833), 40-41; eager to preserve peace in Near East (1839), 78, 250; claims Ponsonby responsible for Sultan's policy, 86; opposes formal conference at Vienna, 92, 92 n; attitude of towards Russia, 100 n; promotes informal discussions on Turco-Egyptian question, 107, 107 n; initiates collective note of July 27, 1839, 108, 108 n; effect of his departure from Vienna, 251; opinion of relative to France (1840), 132 n; attitude of on Turco-Egyptian question, 134 n, 145, 145 n; proposal of for settlement of Turco-Egyptian question, 146; alarmed by bellicose French attitude, 175, 170 n, 183 n; suggests plan for reunion of France and four Powers, 183; favors leaving Egypt to Mehemet Ali, 198, 209; irritated by Ponsonby's conduct, 210, 210 n; threatens to withdraw Austrian support from
Porte (1841), 217, 225; complains about English policy, 217; opposed to guaranteeing independence and integrity of Turkey, 227 n.

Meyendorff, Baron Peter, Russian Ambassador to Russia, 110.

Mimaut, French Consul-General at Alexandria, 22 n. 37.

Minto, Gilbert Elliot, Lord, English First Lord of Admiralty, 157 n.

Molé, Count Louis Mathieu, French statesman, 66, 66 n, 68; admits "shades of difference" between English and French policies in Near East (1839), 81-82, 82 n.

Moltke, Major Helmuth von, Prussian officer in Turkish employ, 76.

Monthly Review, London Magazine, on Russia (1835), 55; on steam communication with India (1839), 62 n.

Morning Chronicle, London journal, on Turco-Egyptian question (1839), 94; on establishment of steam communication with India (1840), 158 n; article in hostile to France, 185; service of to Palmerston in "Syrian affair," 185 n.

Mounier, Baron, French diplomatic agent, unofficial mission of to London (1840), 207.

Münchgrätz, conference of (1833), 31-32, 32 n; apprehensions aroused in England and France, 33.

Muravieff, Lieut.-General, Russian diplomatist, on mission in Near East (1832-33), 15, 17, 18, 19, 19 n, 238.

Muhlenberg, H. A., U. S. diplomatic representative at Vienna, on situation in Austria (1840), 134 n.

Namic Pasha, Turkish major-general, 14, 237, 238.

Napier, Commodore, Sir Charles, English naval officer in Levant, 177, 177 n; on allied military and naval operations in Levant (1840), 199; negotiates convention of Nov. 27, 1840, with Mehemet Ali, 200-201, 200 n; arranges with Mehemet Ali for evacuation of Syria, etc. (1841) 216, 216 n; on attitude of Mehemet Ali regarding firman of investiture, 219-220, 220 n; ideas of on English Near Eastern policy, 232 n, 236.

Naples, Kingdom of, in dispute with England (1840), 147.

National, Paris journal, on French policy (1838), 69-70; (1839), 94; threatening comment in against Louis Philippe (1840), 192.

Near East question of defined, 9.

Nesselrode, Count Charles Robert von, Russian Chancellor, on Tsar's Near Eastern policy (1833), 15-16; proposes treaty of alliance with Turkey, 28; mission of to Berlin, 32 n; reply of to English and French protests, 34; negotiates with Achmet Pasha (1834), 42; demands explanations relative to French policy, 242-243; opposition of to English Euphrates expedition (1835-36), 52; friendly to England (1838), 72-73; opposes European conference on Egyptian question, 249; on Russian policy and Turco-Egyptian question (1839), 99-100, 99 n, 101-102, 109, 109 n; favors agreement with England, 116 ff, 116 n, 118 n; protests vigorously against French policy in Near East, 117; on results of first Brunnow mission to London, 129; claims of regarding Brunnow missions, 130 n; pleased with treaty of July 15, 1840; 169, 169 n; uneasy about attitude of Austria, 186 n; favors leaving Mehemet Ali in control of Egypt, 198; favors return of France to Concert of Europe, 212; eager to prevent restoration of Anglo-French alliance, 212 n; approved attitude of Palmerston (1841), 225; comment of on outcome of Turco-Egyptian question, 230 n.

— Dimitri de, son of Russian Chancellor, on outcome of Turco-Egyptian question (1841), 230-231 n.

Neumann, Baron Philip, Austrian Minister to England, proposals of for settlement of Turco-Egyptian question (1840), 144-145, 151-152; negotiations of with Guizot and Palmerston, 146; attitude of during crisis of 1840, 172; without instructions, 186.

Nezib, battle of (1839), 104.

Nicholas I, Tsar of Russia, sends Orloff to Constantinople (1833), 24; hostile to France, 27 n; character and policy of defended (1836), 247-248; on Anglo-French rivalry in Egypt (1839), 71; views of regarding Treaty of Unkia Skelessi, 98; Near Eastern policy of, 77 n, 118;
pleased with results of first Brunnow mission to London, 129-130; pleased with treaty of July 15, 1840, 169, 169 n; opposed to concessions to France, 185.

Nouri Efendi, Turkish diplomatist and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 77, 86, 104, 250-251; mission of to London (1840), 141-142.

Odilon Barrot, French deputy, 196 n.

Olivier, French diplomatic agent, 22.


Orloff, Count Alexis, Russian diplomatist, mission of to Constantinople (1833), 24-25, 28; attitude of in London (1839), 100.

Osman Bey, Turkish naval officer, 105.

Palmerston, Henry John Temple, Viscount, English Minister of Foreign Affairs, on English policy in Near East (1833), 14 n, 15, 26-27, 26 n, 31; opposition of to Russian policy in Near East, 31, 33; on Near Eastern situation, 55; on designs of Mehemet Ali, 38; interested in Euphrates expedition project, 39; on Anglo-Russian relations (1834), 43; did not fear Russia (1835), 57 n; on Russian policy (1836), 53, 53 n; on improvement in Anglo-Russian relations, 57; eager to strengthen Turkey, 63; dislikes French policy, 66; (1837), 66 n; position of on Vixen affair, 54; on Durham's success in Russia, 56; determined to defend Turkey against Egyptian attack (1838), 63-64, 63 n, 70; on Anglo-Turkish commercial treaty, 68; proposes Anglo-French treaty to support Turkey, 71, 72 n; fears Franco-Russian combination in Near East, 71-72; protests against Russian intrigues in Persia and India, 72; accepts Russian explanations, 73; favors Turkish reforms, 76; opposed to independence of Mehemet Ali, 80; proposal of for European conference on Egyptian questions, 249; eager to preserve peace in Near East (1838-39), 77, 79; Near Eastern policy of (1839), 87 ff; on Anglo-French entente, 88, 93, 93 n; instructions of for English Levantine fleet, 89-90, 103-104, 115; favors return of Syria to Turkey, 92-93; uncertain about Russian advances to England, 103; proposes plan for naval cooperation against Egypt, 111; becomes more hostile to Mehemet Ali, 112; favors coercion, 114-115; receives Brunnow's proposals favorably, 121, 122 n; makes counter-proposals, 123; criticizes French position on Turco-Egyptian question, 125; proposal of relative to Pashalic of Acre, 125, 127; not influenced by French contentions, 128-129; announces Russian acceptance of English counter-proposals to Brunnow, 130; on outlook for settlement of Turco-Egyptian question (1840), 133; on sympathies of Sébastiani and Guizot, 135 n; expectations of relative to Thiers, 137-138; hostile to Louis Philippe and French naval preparations, 139-140, 139 n; plans of for settlement of Turco-Egyptian question, 146-147; favorable to return of Napoleon's body to France, 148, 148 n; requests answer of France to Neumann's proposal, 153; conferences at the home of, 156; on reasons for keeping negotiations secret, 156 n, 160-161 n; threatens to resign, 157-158; wins support of English Cabinet, 159 n; defends treaty of July 15, 1840, 164-165; unmoved by threatening French attitude, 168-169, 174, 180; opposed to modification of July treaty, 172 ff, 173 n, 185, 195-196; comments of on opposition in English Cabinet, 182 n; attitude of on deposition of Mehmet Ali, 186-187 n, 190, 190 n; quiet opposition in English Cabinet, 188; answer of to Thiers' casus belli note, 196, 197 n; orders negotiations to be opened with Mehmet Ali, 198, 198-199 n; comments of on French policy, 206-207 n; favors return of France to Concert of Europe, 211; opinion of on Napier's convention with Mehmet Ali, 211 n; moves to influence policy of Porte relative to Mehmet Ali, 210-211; (1841), 217-218; reply of to Metternich's criticism, 217; opposed to proposals made by Guizot, 221-222; supports Chekib in refusal to sign protocol de clôture, 223-224; agrees to formal communication to Chekib, 224; views of relative to final settlement of Turco-Egyptian question, 224, 224 n, 225 n; estimates on Near Eastern policy of from 1839 to 1841, 231-232, 231-232 n.
Parliament, resolutions of, relative to steam communication with India (1834), 39-40; committee action in on same (1837), 58-59 n.
Peel, Sir Robert, English statesman, 45-46.
Pisani, English Dragoman at Constantinople, 150 n.
Ponsonby, Viscount John, English Ambassador to Turkey, 25, 30; attitude of on Turco-Egyptian relations (1834), 243; hostile to Russian influence in Turkey (1835-36), 51, 51 n, 248; influence of at Constantinople, 66-67; hostile to Mehemet Ali, 51; (1839), 85-86, 86 n; on French policy at Constantinople, 84-85; collective note of July 27, 1839, 108 n; reports unrest in domains of Mehemet Ali, 128 n; alarmed by situation in Near East (1840), 150 n; accuses Pontois of attempting to intimidate Porte, 168 n; advice of to Porte relative to Mehemet Ali's reinstatement in Egypt, 204; (1841), 215, 218 n, 220-221; conduct of criticized, 86 n, 210 n.
Pontois, Admiral Edward, French Ambassador to Turkey, 127 n; representations of to Porte against treaty of July 15, 1840, 168, 168 n.
Porter, David, U. S. Minister to Turkey, on situation in Near East (1833), 17 n, 19 n; (1834), 242, 244-245; on Turkish character (1836), 76 n.
Pozzo di Borgo, Count, Russian Ambassador to France and later to England, 27, 28, 56, 237, 249; on Anglo-Russian relations (1833), 46, 46 n; views of on Durham mission to Russia (1835), 245-246.
Press, of Europe hostile to Russia (1835-36), 55-56, 56 n.
Protocol de clôture, of July 10, 1841, 228-229.
— of Sept. 17, 1840, 187 n.
Prussia, supports Russian protests to France (1833), 27; Near Eastern policy of (1839), 80, 118-119, 118 n; (1840), 254; London representative of without instructions, 134; preparations of for war during crisis of 1840, 184 n; eager to secure Turco-Egyptian settlement (1841), 222-223, 228 n.
Raikes, Thomas, English politician, 46, 46 n; on danger of revolution in France (1840), 192 n; on attitude of Louis Philippe, 195 n; on public opinion in France, 197 n.
Rechid Pasha, (spelling copied in notes from some of the sources). See Reschid.
Red Sea route to India. See Suez route to India.
Reeve, Henry, English politician and newspaper correspondent, 184; on danger of revolution in France (1840), 205 n; on outcome of crisis of 1840, 206.
Reouf Pasha, Turkish statesman, 104.
Reschid, Mustafa, Pasha, Turkish diplomatist and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 17, 44, 149; mission of to London (1839), 75-76; negotiates relative to fate of Mehemet Ali (1840-41), 203-204, 220-221; announces willingness to reinstate Mehemet Ali in Egypt, 204-205, 215; resignation of (1841), 225-226, 228 n.
Rifaat, Bey and later Pasha, Turkish diplomatist and Minister of Foreign Affairs, mission of to Alexandria (1840), 174 ff; appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs (1841), 226.
Roussin, Admiral, Baron Albin, French Ambassador to Turkey and later Minister of Marine, opposes Russian policy in Turkey (1833), 20-21, 21 n, 25; moves to end Turco-Egyptian struggle, 21-22, 22 n, 23, 238; friendly to Mehemet Ali, 36-37, 36-37 n; (1834), 243; (1838), 67; attempts to prevent war in Near East (1839), 85-86; complains of Ponsonby's behavior, 85 n; (1840), 210 n.
Ruckmann, Baron, Russian chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, protests against Turkish threat to renew war with Egypt (1834), 45, 243.
Russell, Lord John, English Secretary of State for the Colonies, 157 n; favored concessions to France in crisis of 1840, 170, 182, 188, 188 n, 190 n.
Russia, general policy of in Near East, 9, 11; influence of supreme in Turkey (1833), 25; famine in southern provinces of, 34, 34-35 n; Near Eastern policy of (1832-33), 16, 237-238, 240-241; (1834), 42, 45; (1835), 245, 246-247; (1836), 57; not prepared for war (1835), 47; alarmed at English interest in Near East (1835-36), 52, 52 n; eager to pre-
vent war in Near East (1839), 77-78, 77 n; difficulties confronting the government of, 78 n; policy of relative to Turco-Egyptian question, 98 ff, 118-119; opposes conference of Powers to settle same, 109-110; not anxious to intervene in Turkey, 116 ff; views on the aims and policy of, 252; favorable to ending isolation of France (1840), 212; conditions in, 253; triumphant in 1841, 230.

Samit, confidential secretary to Mehmet Ali, 150, 155.

Sauzet, President of French Chamber of Deputies, 196 n.

Schleinitz, Freiherr von, Prussian chargé d'affaires at London, 186.

Schneckenburger, German poet, 184 n.

Schneider, General, French Minister of War, 82.

Sébastiani, Count Horace François, French Ambassador to England, on reception of Brunnow's proposals by English Ministers (1839), 121-122, 122 n; explains French opposition to coercion of Mehmet Ali, 124; presents plans for settlement of Turco-Egyptian question, 124-125, 124 n; unable to announce attitude of France (1840), 134; recall of from London, 135, 135 n.

Simonitch, Count, Russian envoy to Persia, 72.

Soul, Marshal Victor, Duc de Dalmatie, French statesman, Near Eastern policy of (1839), 82, 84-85, 87 ff, 106-107, 106 n, 111 ff; on Near Eastern policies of Powers, 88; proposes conference at Vienna, 91-92; on Russian opposition to Vienna conference, 110-111; criticizes Russian proposals, 122; rejects proposals for division of Syria, 124 n, 126; argues against employment of force in settlement of Turco-Egyptian question, 128, 128 n, 134 n; attitude of after Russian acceptance of English counter-proposals, 130 ff; pleased by delay (1840), 134-135; instructions of to Guizot, 136; withdraws from office, 136; return of to office, 193.

Steam communication with India, 38 ff, 44 n, 50 n, 58-59 n, 61-62, 61 n, 62 n, 82 n, 139 n, 158 n, 165 n, 232 n, 236.

Stopford, Admiral, Sir Robert, English naval commander in Levant, naval operations of (1840), 177; attack of on Acre, 199; disapproves of Napier's convention with Mehmet Ali, 201.

Straits Convention of 1841, 222-223, 239, 229 n.

Sturmer, Baron Bartholomäus, Austrian Intermuncio at Constantinople, accuses Pontois of attempting to intimidate Porte (1840), 168 n; advice of to Turkish Ministers, 204; urges Reschid Pasha to concede hereditary title to Mehmet Ali (1841), 214-215; unable to reply to Turkish note, 221.

Suez route to India, 39-40, 40 n, 59 ff, 59-63 ns, 213, 213 n. See also Steam communication with India.

Suleiman Pasha (Colonel Sévès), French officer in employ of Mehmet Ali, 177.

Syria, revolts in (1834), 43-44, 243; (1840), 174 n, 177 n; reports concerning revolts in reach London, 159, 159 n, 160 n; naval operations on coast of, 177-178, 178 n, 199.

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de, Prince of Benevento, French statesman, 239.

Teplitz, meeting at (1833), 31.

Thiers, Louis Adolphe, French statesman, on French policy in Near East (1833), 38 n; Near Eastern policy of (1836), 64-65; resignation of, 66; forms ministry (1840), 136; speech of defending Anglo-French alliance, 136-137, 136 n, 137 n; instructions of to Guizot, 138; Turco-Egyptian policy of, 138-139 n, 140 n, 143-144, 144 n, 151 ff, 152 n; opposed to formal conference of Powers, 142-143; request of for return of Napoleon's body, 148; rejects Neu mann's proposal for Turco-Egyptian settlement, 153; favors delay, 155-156; aroused by treaty of July 15, 1840, 165-166; questions England's policy, 165 n; policy of during crisis of 1840, 167-168, 171, 175 n; threatening attitude of, 179-180, 179 n, 183 n; casus belli note of, 187-188, 189 n; plan of for additional military preparations, 189-190, 192-193; resignation of in Oct. 1840, 193; comments of on French policy (1841), 234 n.

The Times, London daily paper, on French and English policies in Near East (1833), 15 n; hostile to Treaty of Unkia Skelessi, 30-31; on Russia
(1836), 55-56; on Turco-Egyptian question (1839), 93-94; on spirit of English and French journals during crisis of 1840, 170 n, 205 n; favors modification of treaty of July 15, 1840, 181-182, 181 n; on meaning of Thiers casus belli note, 189; criticizes Palmerston for being uncom- promising, 197.

Titow, Vladirimir, Russian chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, 215, 221.

Tunis, French fleet sent to (1836), 65.

Turkey, public opinion in (1832-'33), 16, 17 n, 19 n; negotiations of with Russia for military aid (1833), 18-19; opposition in to alliance with Russia quieted, 28; authorities of refuse to suspend hostilities (1839), 86, 86 n; same encouraged to refuse negotiations with Mehemet Ali, 127 n; Ministers of unwilling to pardon Mehemet Ali (1840), 203; views upon conditions in, 253; settlement of Turco-Egyptian question announced in (1841), 219; request of for support of Powers, 219 n; government of agrees to modify firman of investiture, 226-227, 227-228, 228 n.

Unkiar Skelessi, Treaty of (1833), 29; English and French opposition to, 30, 33-34; Nesselrode's defense of, 34.

Urquhart, David, English political writer, 55, 55 n.

Vail, Aaron, U. S. diplomatic representative at London, on international situation in Europe (1833), 237-239, 240-242; on effect of improvement of navigation on Danube (1835), 74 n; on situation in Near East, 244; on Durham's mission to Russia, 245-246; on Russian policy in Near East, 246-247; on hostility of European press to Russia (1836), 56 n.

Valmy, French deputy, 95, 95 n, 96 n.

Varennes, French chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, 17; peace endeavors of at Constantinople (1833), 18-19; mission of to Kutayah, 23-24.


Villemain, Abel François, French Minister of Public Instruction, 135 n.

Vicen, affair of (1836-'37), 54.

Walewski, Count Alexander, French diplomatic agent, mission of to Egypt (1840), 168, 174, 176, 176 n, 179, 200 n.

Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, English statesman, 172 n; suggests closure of Straits to all nations, 46-47.

Werther, Baron Wilhelm von, Prussian Minister, Near Eastern policy of (1839), 79; (1840), 183-184, 210; (1841), 225.

Wheaton, Henry, U. S. Diplomatic representative at Berlin, on Turco-Egyptian question in relations of Powers (1838), 248-250; (1839), 250-251; on difficulties confronting Russia, 78 n; on situation in Near East (1840), 253; on Franco-Prussian relations, 253-254; on views of three eastern Powers relative to Turco-Egyptian question (1841), 210 n; on Austrian influence at Constantinople, 226 n.

William IV, King of England, 39 n.

Yaver Pasha (Admiral Walker), English naval officer in Turkish employ, 203, 214, 216.
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES
IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES

Vol. XI
December, 1923
No. 4

THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION
IN THE RELATIONS OF ENGLAND,
FRANCE, AND RUSSIA, 1832-1841

PART II

BY
FREDERICK STANLEY RODKEY
A.B., University of Kansas, 1917
A.M., University of Kansas, 1918

PRICE $1.00

PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
URBANA

[Entered as second-class matter, July 27, 1915, at the post office at Urbana, Illinois, under the Act of August 24, 1912. Acceptance for mailing at the special rate of postage provided for in section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized July 31, 1918.]

(Copyright, 1923 by The University of Illinois)
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Vol. I, 1912
No. 3. Sources of municipal revenues in Illinois. By L. D. Upson.*
No. 4. Friedrich Gentz: an opponent of the French Revolution and Napoleon. By P. E. Reiff. 80 cents.

Vol. II, 1913
No. 1. Taxation of corporations in Illinois, other than railroads, since 1872. By J. R. Moore. 55 cents.
No. 4. The development of banking in Illinois, 1817-1863. By G. W. Dowrie.*

Vol. III, 1914
Nos. 1 and 2. The history of the general property tax in Illinois. By R. M. Haig. $1.25.
No. 4. Church and state in Massachusetts, 1691-1740. By Susan M. Reed.*

Vol. IV, 1915
No. 2. The defeat of Varus and the German frontier policy of Augustus. By W. A. Oldfather and H. V. Canter.*

Vol. V, 1916
No. 1. The enforcement of international law through municipal law in the United States. By Philip Quincy Wright.*
No. 2. The life of Jesse W. Fell. By Frances M. Morehouse. 60 cents.
No. 4. Mine taxation in the United States. By L. E. Young. $1.50.

Vol. VI, 1917
Nos. 1 and 2. The veto power of the governor of Illinois. By Niels H. Debel. $1.00.
No. 3. Wage bargaining on the vessels of the Great Lakes. By H. E. Hoagland. $1.50.
No. 4. The household of a Tudor nobleman. By P. V. B. Jones. $1.50.

Vol. VII, 1918
No. 3. The American municipal executive. By R. M. Story.*

Vol. VIII, 1919

Vol. IX, 1920
Nos. 1 and 2. War powers of the executive in the United States. By C. A. Berdahl. $2.25.
No. 3. English government finance, 1485-1558. By F. C. Dietz.*
No. 4. The economic policies of Richelieu. By F. C. Palm.*

*Out of print.
ILLINOIS BIOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS

Vol. III
No. 1. Studies on the factors controlling the rate of regeneration. By Charles Zeleny. $1.25.
No. 2. The head-capsule and mouth-parts of Diptera. With 25 plates. By Alvah Peterson. $2.00.
No. 4. Color and color-pattern mechanism of tiger beetles. With 29 black and 3 colored plates. By Victor E. Shellford. $2.00.

Vol. IV
No. 1. Life history studies on Montana trematodes. With 9 plates. By E. C. Faust. $2.00.
No. 2. The goldfish (Carassius carassius) as a test animal in the study of toxicity. By E. B. Powers. $1.00.

Vol. V

Vol. VI
No. 2 and 3. Revision of the North American and West Indian species of Cuscuta. With 13 plates. By Truman George Yuncker. $2.00.
No. 4. The larvae of the Coccinellidae. With 6 plates. By J. Howard Gage. 75 cents.

Vol. VII
No. 1. Studies on gregarines. II: a. A synopsis of the polycysted gregarines of the world, excluding those from the Myriapoda, Orthoptera, and Coleoptera; and b. An annotated list of the new gregarines described from 1911-1922. By M. W. Kamm. $1.00.
No. 2. The mollusk fauna of the Big Vermilion River, Illinois, with special references to the Naides or fresh water mussels. By F. C. Baker. $1.25.
No. 4. A classification of the larvae of the Tenthredinoidea. By Hachiro Yuasa. With 14 plates. $2.00.

Vol. VIII
No. 1. The head capsule of Coleoptera. By F. S. Stickney. $2.00.
No. 2. Comparative studies on certain features of nematodes and their significance. By D. C. Hetherington. $1.00.
No. 3. Parasitic fungi from British Guiana and Trinidad. By F. L. Stevens. $1.25.
No. 4. The external Morphology and Postembryology of Noctuid Larvae. By L. B. Ripley. $1.25.

Vol. IX
No. 1. The calciferous glands of Lumbricidae and Diplocardia. By Frank Smith. $1.25.
Nos. 2 and 3. A biologic and taxonomic study of the Microsporidia. By Roksabor Kudo. $3.00.

Vol. X
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

Vol. IV
Nos. 2, 3, and 4. Index verborum quae in Senecae fabulis nee non in Octavia praetexta repeririuntur. By W. A. Oldfather, A. S. Pease, and H. V. Canter. Part I, $2.00. Parts II and III, $1.50 each.

Vol. V
No. 3. Spenser's defense of Lord Grey. By H. S. V. Jones. $1.00.

Vol. VI
No. 1. La Colección Cervantina de la Sociedad Hispánica de América. Ediciones de Don Quijote. By Homero Seris. $1.50.
No. 4. De Fragmenti Suetoniani de Grammaticis et Rhetoribus Codicum Nexu et Fide. By R. P. Robinson. $2.00.

Vol. VII
No. 2. The sepulchre of Christ in art and liturgy. By N. C. Brooks. $1.50.
No. 4. The significant name in Terence. By J. C. Austin. $2.00.

Vol. VIII
No. 1. Emerson's theories of literary expression. By E. G. Sutcliffe. $1.50.

Vol. IX
No. 2. The Ms. tradition of Plutarch's Actia Graeca and Actia Romana. By J. B. Titchener. $1.00.
No. 3. Girolamo Pracastoro Naugerus, sive de poetica dialogus. With translation by Ruth Kelso and introduction by Murry W. Bundy. $1.00.
No. 4. The text-tradition of Pseudo-Plutarch's Vitae Decem Oratorum. By C. G. Lowe. $1.00.

Vol. X
No. 1. Rhetorical Elements in the Tragedies of Seneca. By H. V. Canter. (In press)

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Vol. X, 1922
Nos. 3 and 4. Workmen's representation in industrial government. By E. J. Miller. $2.00.

Vol. XI, 1923
Nos. 1 and 2. Economic aspects of southern sectionalism, 1840-1861. By R. R. Russell. $2.00.
Nos. 3 and 4. The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France, and Russia, 1832-1841. By F. S. Rodkey. $2.00.

Requests for exchange for the Studies in the Social Sciences, the Biological Monographs, and the Studies in Language and Literature should be addressed to the Exchange Editor, Library, University of Illinois, Urbana, III. All communications concerning sale or subscription, or of an editorial nature, should be addressed to the Editor of the University Studies, University of Illinois, Urbana, III. The subscription price of each series is three dollars a year. The prices of individual monographs are shown in the lists given above.