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THREE TO TANGO: EXPLAINING EXPANSION OF MILITARIZED INTERSTATE
DISPUTES

BY

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DISSERTATION

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Abstract

Why do some international conflicts diffuse and expand beyond its initiators? This dissertation answers this question by identifying the potential third party states to a conflict and focusing on their decisions to join (or not) in an ongoing conflict. Why do some third parties intervene in militarized conflicts, while others do not? The potential joiner's decision to join an ongoing dispute is influenced by two factors – (1) the degree of affinity i.e. the level of shared strategic, economic and political interests it shares with *both* sides of the dispute, and (2) the level and nature of its interactions with other potential joiners to the dispute, and other states in international politics, which provide opportunities or places constraints on its decision to join.

This paper uses social network analysis to test its logic. Affinity is measured by the 'structural equivalence' between a potential joiner and the dispute initiators on both sides of the dispute. It is the extent to which they have the same allies, trade partners and are members of the same international government organizations (IGOs). This project posits that a potential joiner is constrained in its decision to join an ongoing dispute by its position in network spaces of rivalries, international trade, and IGO affiliations. The hypotheses are tested using data on potential joiners to Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) between 1816 and 2001. Empirical tests support many of the theoretical propositions. A potential joiner is highly likely to intervene in disputes when it has asymmetric levels of affinities induced by having common allies and shared international organizations with the dispute initiators. A potential joiner's decision to enter an ongoing dispute is constrained by their centrality in rivalry and international government organization networks.

For my parents, with love and gratitude

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1. Introduction

Between October 1992 and January 1994, Iraq and Kuwait engaged in a militarized dispute. Hostilities had been lingering between the two countries since the end of the Persian Gulf War two years earlier. During the war, Iraq had established police posts on Kuwait side of their shared border, and the latter wanted them removed. The Iraq-Kuwait border was a point of contention for Iraq because it had had to cede some territory to Kuwait in 1992, after the war. Iraqi and Kuwaiti soldiers exchanged fire across the border, and Iraq also sent troops and non-military incursions into Kuwait. The United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and France joined the dispute in support of Kuwait against Iraq.¹

India and Pakistan have engaged in forty-three disputes (four of which have been wars) since both of them became independent states in 1947.² The primary issue of contention between the two countries is over the governance of Jammu and Kashmir. That territorial issue has led to clashes over border demarcations, an arms race, cross-border support for terrorist activities, and so on. A diverse range of countries and actors such as the US, Russia, Iran, the United Nations (UN) and Yasser Arafat have offered to mediate the conflicts, but no third party state has ever intervened in any confrontation between India and Pakistan.³

The Iraq-Kuwait dispute (1992-1994) was one of 10% of interstate conflicts that expanded beyond its initial belligerents.⁴ Why did that dispute ‘expand’ to include additional states when most conflicts, (such as those between India and Pakistan), remain restricted to their original participants? Why do some disputes expand while most conflicts do not? Disputes that

¹ Rivalry Narratives, <http://dingo.sbs.arizona.edu/~ggoertz/rivalry/cmv6/cm645690v6.txt>

² Those disputes have been recorded from 1947 to 2001.

³ Rivalry Narratives, <http://dingo.sbs.arizona.edu/~ggoertz/rivalry/cmv6/cm750770v6.txt>

⁴ 224 out of 2334 disputes that occurred between 1816 and 2001, as recorded in the Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset, expanded beyond their initiators.

expand to states beyond those that initiate it are more likely than bilateral disputes to escalate to war (Petersen et al 2002). Multi-party disputes also tend to last for a long time (Jones, Singer and Bremer 1996). When any new actor is brought into the conflict it complicates the dynamic of that dispute. Arguably, the more the number of states involved in a conflict, the more difficult the bargaining process, which in turn discourages resolution of that conflict. Therefore, there is a real need to engage with the question of why and how some disputes expand to incorporate additional states.

It was not foreordained that the Iraq-Kuwait dispute (1992-1994) or any of the ‘expanded’ disputes, would evolve the way they did. Conflict is a political process and its initiation, evolution (expansion in this case) and termination are dependent on the sequence of actions and choices made by states (Bremer 1995a). How a conflict expands is a function of whom the initial disputants are, who the potential third parties to the dispute are, the temporal sequence in which they decide to get involved, and how potential joiners are related to the initial disputants and other potential third parties. To understand why some conflicts expand after initiation (and some do not), we have to focus our attention on identifying the potential third party joiners to a conflict and on their decisions to participate (or not) in an ongoing conflict. In that particular dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, the coalition against Iraq comprised major powers-allies of Kuwait such as the United States and the United Kingdom (both of whom were also military rivals of Iraq), and an ally of the US and UK – France. Why do some third parties join militarized conflicts? What determines whether a potential third party state will join a dispute?

Joining Behavior in Existing Literature

Scholarly literatures on diffusion of wars, and third party interventions, have tried answering these questions. The diffusion of wars scholarship treats war as a disease that ‘infects’ any country in contact with those fighting the war, thereby making them susceptible to joining the war as well (Most and Starr 1980, Yamamoto and Bremer 1980, Most et al 1989, Siverson and Starr 1991). “Warring alliances” and “warring borders” are the primary points of contact through which the disease spreads (Siverson and Starr 1991). Interventions literature shifts the focus of inquiry to the third party and seeks to identify the states that commonly join conflicts, and uncover their motivations for doing so (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Werner and Lemke 1997; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2003).

Both these literatures collectively suffer from some important conceptual and methodological flaws, which undermine the explanatory power of their findings. Scholars who study diffusion of wars conceptualize third party joining taking place through a contagious process in which those third parties have little choice to abstain from the conflicts. Those who examine third party interveners and their reasons for joining conflicts assumed that those states perceive wars and lower level disputes similarly and have the same decision-making calculus for both types of events.⁵ Scholarship on the diffusion of wars and interventions adopt a dyadic framework to investigate joining decisions. Scholars in these research programs only consider interactions (or absence of) between original disputants and third party joiners.

They also assume that the context, based on the conditions at the immediate onset of the dispute or war, in which potential joiners make the decision to militarily intervene, is fixed. That implies that the dispute does not change as it evolves and expands, and that a third party’s decision to intervene is not influenced by other interventions in the dispute. Conceptually and

⁵ I expand on these points in the next chapter.

with respect to research design, they end up treating a third party's decision to join a conflict as independent of other third parties relevant to the conflict. Therefore, they do not consider other actors who are militarily uninvolved in the actual dispute to be relevant to the conflict. These are unrealistic assumptions to make, considering the empirical realities and recent theoretical insights in the literature about the multilateral nature of conflict processes (Croco and Teo 2005).

Extant scholarship on diffusion of wars, and interventions, also only consider third parties that have joined a dispute and overlook potential joiners who did not intervene (Siverson and Starr 1991, Werner and Lemke 1997; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2003). Notable by their absence in the Iraq-Kuwait dispute (1992-1994) were countries such as Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Iran. These countries were either rivals of Iraq or at the very least were regional neighbors who would presumably have a vested interest in the conflict. Why did they not join the dispute? Why have none of the potential joiners to disputes between India and Pakistan ever intervened in them? For example, although China has historically had close ties with Pakistan, and an ongoing rivalry with India, it has never joined a dispute between the two countries. The 'war as a disease' metaphor is not accompanied by an immunization metaphor in the war diffusion literature. Consequently, war diffusion and intervention literatures have generated 'false-positive' findings and have over-predicted joining behavior in interstate wars and disputes. Siverson and Starr (1991) find support for their hypotheses that exposure to warring borders and warring allies increases the likelihood of a third party to join an ongoing war, but also find that a very small percentage (2.5%) of these war-prone joiners actually end up joining in the hostilities. As important as enquiring why some states join ongoing disputes, is examining why some states do not do so.

In this dissertation project, I argue that the joining behavior by potential third parties that leads to the expansion of a militarized dispute is an outcome of two processes. A potential joiner may end up joining an ongoing dispute out of a conscious choice to intervene because it calculates that its interests are too tied up with the ongoing dispute and/or its participants. The potential joiner feels that it will be worse off if it does not join the dispute and therefore chooses to intervene to support the initial disputant(s) with which it shares mutual interests. The potential joiner also considers its interactions with other potential joiners relevant to the dispute. Its position vis-à-vis those interactions further exacerbates or moderates its willingness to choose a path of military intervention in an ongoing dispute to support a disputant with which it shares common interests. If a potential joiner does not share any mutually interdependent interests with the initial disputants of a conflict, and if its position vis-à-vis other politically relevant actors to the conflict increases the benefits of being a bystander to the dispute, the potential joiner decides not to join that dispute. Under certain circumstances, however, that potential joiner might get pulled into a dispute, even when it has decided that it is not in its best interests to intervene in that dispute. This is the second process by which a potential joiner can get involved in an ongoing dispute.

A potential joiner's decision to join an ongoing dispute, and whether it gets pulled into it despite choosing to refrain from participating in the dispute, is influenced by two factors – (1) the degree of affinity i.e. the level of shared strategic, economic and political interests it shares with both sides of the dispute, and (2) the level of its centrality in its network of interactions with other potential joiners to the dispute, and other states in the system that provides opportunities or places constraints on its decision to join. States have multiple and simultaneous interactions and relationships with other states in international politics. They are linked to one another as allies,

trade partners, military rivals, common members of international organizations, and so on. In the context of an interstate military dispute, potential third party joiners have multiple and simultaneous ties with the original disputants, states that have already joined the conflict (if any), and other potential joiners. The networks of relationships that these states form with each other create “network spaces” across which the ongoing dispute can expand (Flint et al 2009). How a potential joiner state is positioned in its various networks of relationships vis-à-vis states already in the dispute reflects its degree of affinity with both sides of the dispute. How the potential joiner is positioned vis-à-vis the network as a whole affects the opportunities and constraints on its willingness to join an ongoing dispute. Therefore, a potential joiner’s position in the network spaces of its different relationships is the context within which it perceives the salience of the dispute, benefits of joining, opportunities for joining, and constraints on its decision-making. The potential joiner’s positionality in its networks of relationships is influenced by other actors in those networks. Therefore, the potential joiner’s decisions are interdependent with the decisions of other states in the same network.

I argue that a potential joiner simultaneously considers its affinity with both sides of the ongoing dispute. A high level of affinity implies that the potential joiner and a given dispute initiator share the same security preferences (from being allied to the same countries and possibly to each other), are economically interdependent (from trading with the same countries and possibly with each other), and are exposed to the same norms of behavior (from being members of the same international organizations). A potential joiner conceives its interests as being intertwined with the well-being and interests of an initiator with which it shares high levels of affinity. Low level of affinity indicates low levels of strategic, economic and ‘ideational’ similarity to the extent that the potential joiner and dispute initiator might be in competition with

each other. I hypothesize that potential joiners are motivated to eschew their bystander policy towards disputes that break out between states with which they have differing levels of affinity. Those disputes present a threat to their mutually held interests with initiators with which they enjoy strategic, economic and ideational affinity.

The reason why potential joiners are more likely to intervene in disputes between Iraq and Kuwait, and North Korea and South Korea is because they have higher levels of affinity with Kuwait and South Korea, than with Iraq and North Korea respectively. The larger the difference in affinity, the more likely the potential joiner is to enter that dispute. Empirical analyses, for the most part, support the hypotheses. Potential joiners value their strategic and 'ideational' affinities with the dispute initiators, and the closer they are to one side than the other on those two indices of affinity, the more likely they are to join the conflict. In all other scenarios, potential joiners do not have a sufficiently strong incentive to take coercive action vis-à-vis the disputants. If the dispute is between states with which it shares low levels of affinity, it can benefit from them battling it out without having to undertake the costs of joining. If the dispute is between states with which it shares high levels of affinities, then it is more prudent for the potential joiner to not join the dispute in support of one side at the risk of antagonizing the other.

A potential joiner's policy to abstain from a dispute until the costs of not joining outweigh the benefits is further reinforced by its visibility as a focus of attack by other potential joiners, and the extent to which it is steeped in international organizations. Both these factors constrain a potential joiner's ability to intervene in an ongoing dispute, even when asymmetry in affinity levels incentivizes it to do so. If a potential joiner is so located in the rivalry network vis-à-vis other potential joiners, such that it is the common foe that links those rivalries together, then its fear of retaliation increases the benefits of being a bystander. It makes the potential

joiner more circumspect about joining a dispute because that might provoke a chain reaction of retaliatory responses from other potential joiners. This expectation passes the empirical tests. Strong affinity inducements notwithstanding, a potential joiner that links other potential joiners through rivalries is less likely to intervene in an ongoing conflict than a third party that is more marginally located. Israel has been a joiner in only four interstate disputes, in a region that has experienced several conflicts. Whether that is a result of its own wariness to join a dispute, or because of external (American) pressure to not intervene, it can partly be explained by its position as the common enemy among rivalries in the region.

Additionally, if a potential joiner is members to a number of international organizations, it is possibly socialized into appropriate norms of state behavior. It also has access to numerous international forums and can potentially connect member states, even those whose direct ties have been disrupted. A potential joiner so located is a conduit between other member states, and may use its ability to facilitate communication and information flows to manage the conflicts in a non-militaristic fashion. It is less likely to join an interstate dispute than a potential joiner not located so advantageously. This expectation finds support in the empirical analyses as well. Potential joiners that are members of numerous international organizations, or are strategically located to ensure smooth information transfers, are less likely to join ongoing disputes. This finding holds strong, when the incentives to join are present.

1.1 Contributions of the Dissertation

I have briefly previewed the main theoretical predictions and summarized the findings of this dissertation. In the following sections, I shall highlight the theoretical and empirical contributions of this dissertation to research on international conflict, and to policymakers. I shall conclude this chapter by outlining a roadmap for the dissertation ahead.

1.1.1 Theoretical Contributions

Theoretically, my dissertation project seeks to contribute to four strands of literature on international conflicts – (1) diffusion of wars, (2) interventions, (3) dynamics of multiparty disputes, and (4) network narratives of power.

Diffusion of wars

Diffusion of war scholars questioned the assumed spatial independence in the observation of wars around the world and proved that outbreak of war affected the conflict-proneness of states that were either neighbors of, and/or allied with countries involved in the war. Comparing war to a disease, they argued that states that were in contact with warring parties, got infected by those vectors, which made them increasingly likely to either join that ongoing war, or initiate a new one (Most and Starr 1980, Most et al 1989, Siverson and Starr 1991).⁶ Diffusion of wars scholars conceptualized joining behavior as culmination of a fairly passive process of contagion, whereby states in contact with the warring states had no choice to join or abstain from that war. War was a disease and states that were neighbors or allies of belligerents had no immunity to it.

This dissertation has the potential to contribute to and improve this literature in two ways. Firstly, it re-conceptualizes conflict as a political process – a sequence of events and choices by states who decide to involve themselves in the conflict (Bremer 1995). Whether a dispute expands or not is a result of that sequence of decisions and choices. This project suggests that rather than viewing diffusion as a passive process wherein countries get infected by war taking place in countries they are in contact with, diffusion should be conceptualized as having a more active dynamic. This dissertation outlines two processes by which joining behavior can occur in ongoing disputes – (1) potential joiners can seek to be party to the conflict or purposively resist the diffusion, and (2) they may also get pulled into the conflict because they are targeted by one

⁶ The literature review in the next chapter covers this literature in greater detail.

of the disputants. Empirical analyses in Chapter 5 provide evidence of the first process⁷ For reasons summarily spelt out earlier in the chapter (and in detail in Chapter 3), states join disputes only when the costs of being a bystander outweigh the benefits of that policy. As per the theoretical predictions of this dissertation, I find that although a potential joiner eschew their bystander role to join disputes when they have a higher level of affinity (driven by having common alliances and shared IGO memberships) with one side of dispute than the other, their embeddedness in rivalry and IGO networks dampens their likelihood of joining. This finding proves that potential joiners are not just passively getting infected by an ongoing conflict; they actively decide to join or abstain depending on their affinity to dispute originators, and their own interactions with other states relevant to the conflict⁸.

Secondly, the theoretical framework and empirical analyses can offer insights into what restrains potential joiners from entering ongoing conflicts. In ‘war as a disease’ parlance, this project identifies factors that immunize potential joiners from getting infected, and lowers their likelihood of entering dispute. A potential joiner’s embeddedness in the rivalry network, and its position and role in the network of IGO memberships, constrains its likelihood of joining. A third party that is the common enemy linking ongoing rivalries among other potential joiners to the dispute is conscious of the possible negative repercussions of any militaristic action on its part. It, therefore, is constrained in its ability to join an ongoing conflict and statistical analyses demonstrate that it is highly unlikely to do so. A third party’s embeddedness in the IGO network has a pacifying effect on the likelihood of joining as well. A potential joiner that is a member of

⁷ The next step for this dissertation is to model the “pulled into conflict” process. Chapter 6 describes how that can be done.

⁸ Modeling the conditions under which potential joiners get pulled into an ongoing conflict is one of the ‘next steps’ in developing this dissertation.

international organizations and/or is in a position to facilitate communication between other member-states is unlikely to join ongoing conflicts.

Interventions

In contrast to diffusion of wars scholarship, interventions literature conceptualized all joining behavior as being the outcome of rational calculations by third parties. Third parties intervene in conflicts to assure victory for the combatant(s) they support because that outcome would benefit the joiners. This implies that (a) the intervener's calculus center on the benefits of joining, and (b) the intervener's likelihood of joining is tied to the dispute initiators. This dissertation takes issue with, and contributes to scholarly understanding of why interventions occur.

The proposition that a third party intervener's decision to join an ongoing dispute is geared towards expected benefits from a victorious outcome for the side it supports is driven by explanations of war onset and joining. Although intervention scholars have diversified beyond wars to study disputes as well, their theoretical rationale for what motivates joiners to intervene in disputes is extrapolated from their suppositions of why third parties join wars. Most disputes, however, do not end with a clear victory or loss for one side. There is considerable uncertainty attached to a dispute at its onset and a potential joiner does not have clear expectations of how that dispute might evolve. Rather than considering the benefits of intervention, the potential joiner calculates the benefits of staying out of the dispute. In the rare event of a dispute occurring where a potential joiner's interests conjoined with a given dispute initiator are jeopardized by an opponent with which it shares a low level of affinity, that third party considers the costs of abstention to be higher than the benefits, and joins. This prediction empirically holds true, as is

demonstrated in Chapter 5. The baseline probability of joining, even when the motivation to join is high, is quite low at approximately 1.5%.⁹

This dissertation builds on and adds to findings by scholars studying intervention about what motivates joiners in ongoing disputes. Existing literature notes that potential joiners are motivated by their direct interactions with dispute initiators (such as alliances, trade, regime similarity). The dissertation contributes to this literature by arguing and demonstrating that potential joiners (a) are driven not only by their direct ties to the dispute originators but by the notion that they are similar to each other in the ways they perceive international politics, and (b) also consider their interactions with other potential joiners, and their place in the international community, when making their intervention decisions. I find that a potential joiner considers its affinity with dispute originators, which is the extent to which they are similar to each other by virtue of having similar patterns of ties to other actors. The more similar it is to a given dispute initiator than the other in alliance and IGO networks, the more likely a potential joiner is to join that dispute. The statistically significant findings for a potential joiner's position in the rivalry network vis-à-vis other potential joiners, and in the international network of IGO memberships, push the interventions literature into accounting for other effects on their decision to join, apart from their ties with the dispute initiators.

Dynamics of Multiparty Disputes

The project also contributes to the incipient literature in international conflict research that focuses on disputes with more than two participants, or multiparty disputes. For the most part, existing literature on conflict diffusion focuses exclusively on wars, or disputes in conjunction with wars. The scholarship on multiparty disputes rightly argues the need for studying conflicts at sub-war levels. It has examined the effects of multiparty disputes on

⁹ Please refer to Chapter 5.

different conflict characteristics and shown that multiparty disputes are likely to be of a long duration (Jones, Singer and Bremer 1996) and are also more likely to escalate to war (Cusack and Eberwein 1982, Gochman and Maoz 1984, Petersen et al 2002).¹⁰ The literature posits that one of the reasons why multiparty disputes tend to last longer than dyadic disputes, and are more prone to escalation, is because there is larger aggregation of capabilities that makes it easier to sustain the conflict (Gochman and Maoz 1984).¹¹ Borrowing from bargaining literature, Vasquez (1993) argues that adding more participants to a dispute affects its probability of war because it is more difficult to negotiate among several parties, and harder to reach a settlement that satisfies all of them.

To the extent that scholars have found that multiparty disputes last longer and have a high probability of escalating to war, it is important to take a step back and understand how these disputes have multiple belligerents. The MID's literature has not directly engaged with the question of why and how some disputes incorporate additional states. Disputes can either become multiparty because two or more states “collude” or cooperate with each other in initiating a conflict against one or more states, or by third party joining (Bremer 1992, Petersen et al 2002). Between 1816 and 2001, the MID's dataset recorded that 140 disputes were initiated as multiparty conflicts and 224 disputes (both dyadic and multiparty) expanded to include additional states beyond the initiating belligerents. The “collusion” process is implicated in the process of war or dispute initiation and has to be modeled separately (Bremer 1995).

This dissertation contributes to scholastic understanding of how third party joining leads to a dispute increasing in number of participants. It offers a theoretical framework to explain how and why some disputes expand via third party joining. A dispute might be fought at lower

¹⁰ Cusack and Eberwein (1982), and Gochman and Maoz (1984) cited in Petersen et al (2002).

¹¹ Gochman and Maoz (1984) cited in Petersen et al (2002).

militarized levels than an interstate war but it also present a risky proposition for potential joiners because it is not entirely certain at the onset of a dispute, that the interests of the potential joiners will be affected. In contrast to a war, where the benefits and costs of participation are obvious and clear, the same cannot be said for a dispute. Potential joiners, therefore, have a different cost-benefit calculus when faced with an ongoing dispute as opposed to an ongoing war. The imperatives of dispute expansion are different from that of expansion of war. The empirical findings show that potential joiners are likely to enter disputes occurring between dispute initiators with which it has different levels of affinity. Those disputes have a high probability of expanding, and those disputes are most in danger of eventually escalating to war.

Network Centrality as Source of Power

This project also engages with the traditional conceptions of power in realist international relations scholarship as well as emerging conceptions of “network power” (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2010). Conventionally, power has been conceptualized in international relations as the ability to coerce and influence actors, originating from possession of material capabilities such as military and industrial capacity, important resources, and population. Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2010) re-conceptualize this traditional notion of power as material capabilities and argue that power may also be ‘relational’ and derive from “an actor’s ability to have access to, make connections between, or quickly spread resources to, other actors” (p.1). They would posit that an actor that is ‘prominently’ located in a network of international trade has access to the most trading partners or markets than any other actor, and that provides it coercive economic power over others. A state that is positioned in a network of IGO affiliations such that it has the ability to make connections between various member-states in various forums, has a lot of social capital to dispense (Dorussen and Ward 2008).

A third party's position within the different relationship network spaces is determined by its relationship ties with other states in the network, and those states' interactions with one other. The patterns of ties in the relationship network structure place some actors in more pivotal roles than others. Scholars using the network analytic framework, such as Wasserman and Faust (1997), Maoz (2007, 2010), and Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2010), assume that actors (states) that are positioned in any network such that they can engage with, connect and communicate with other actors, are 'relationally' powerful. Moreover, their positions as 'focal' actors in the network might not be necessarily related to its material capabilities (ibid).

This dissertation issues a substantive caveat to the notion that states that occupy pivotal positions in a network are necessarily powerful in the typical sense of being able to coerce and influence others in the network. That assumption may be an artifact of network analyses in international relations research having only considered states as a part of cooperative networks of reciprocated alliances, trade and shared membership in international organizations. It agrees with Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2010) that in certain networks, having a central position may enable the state to exercise its power through its relations. For example, in a Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) network, the most pivotal states are those that have the most number of PTAs in the network. This provides them opportunities to exercise coercion over others through economic sanctions (ibid). In other networks, however, being the most central actor can make that actor susceptible to power. This dissertation argues and finds evidence that a potential joiner's position in an adversarial network space of interstate rivalries subjects it to a lot of pressure from other actors in the network.

On the one hand, this dissertation challenges the conventional notion of power-as-material-capabilities in international relations scholarship. A potential joiner's 'central' position

in a network space is determined by the cumulative pattern of relationships and is not necessarily related to whether that country is powerful in terms of the resources it possesses. On the other hand, this research also pushes the incipient literature on the networks approach to power to diversify its focus beyond the ‘benefits’ of being a central actor in a network space (Maoz 2007, 2010; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2010) and engage with the different logics of power depending on the network space in question.

The findings of this dissertation show that a potential joiner feels vulnerable to influence and coercion because of the manner in which it is positioned vis-à-vis other potential joiners in the rivalry network. That mitigates its probability of joining a dispute. A potential joiner that is steeped in various international organizations similarly has low likelihood of joining a dispute. This project argues that unlike its vulnerable position in the rivalry network space, a potential joiner that is ‘centrally’ located in the IGO network space is able to marshal the social capital vested in its ability to connect members-states, and use it to manage conflicts non-militarily. Empirical analyses support that proposition. Overall, these findings hold true despite accounting for material capabilities of potential joiners. Therefore, a potential joiner derives its ability to influence and coerce from multiple sources, and is similarly susceptible to external pressures.

In the process of engaging with these four strands of conflict scholarship, this dissertation is able to marry two important innovations in conflict research that (1) recognize that conflict processes may not be strictly dyadic and it is important to get a handle on how potential joiners that may not be active participants in a presumably dyadic conflict can still affect the likelihood of conflict occurrence and/or expansion (Croco and Teo 2005); and (2) actions and decisions by states are interdependent.

1.1.2 Empirical Contributions

The previous section delineated the theoretical contributions of this dissertation to the study of international conflicts. Furthermore, this dissertation has theoretical implications for the way scholars conceptualize how states interact, and how that affects their decision-making, such as whether or not to join an ongoing conflict. In this section, I assert that this project also contributes to the way international relations research model interstate interactions, and empirically understand conflict processes such as third party joining behavior. It does so in three ways. First, it differentiates between wars and disputes as the focus of inquiry, arguing that third parties perceive these two events differently. Second, it explicitly incorporates the rarity with which third party states join ongoing disputes in its research design. That allows it to realistically capture the low probability of joining by potential third parties. Third, it builds on the “dangerous dyads” framework of ‘who is fighting whom’ or ‘who is interacting with whom’, to locate states in the entirety of their relationships with those involved in the conflict, and other states in international politics.¹² I use social network analysis that locates states in international networks of interactions, and therefore recognizes that a state’s relationships and decisions are affected by other states’ interactions with one another.

From Wars to Disputes

Empirically, this paper makes a shift from studying the diffusion of war to militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). The term “militarized interstate dispute” refers to historical cases in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state (Jones, Singer and Bremer 1996). These are cases of interstate conflicts that were serious enough to get militarized. Historically, we have been very interested in understanding

¹² Bremer (1992)

war but that has turned out to be a rare phenomenon. Even though states rarely fight wars they still initiate or experience conflicts that do not necessarily escalate to war. Most MIDs never reach the magnitude and severity of military interaction that characterize an interstate war. Existing literature on diffusion of wars has been persistent in its focus on understanding why and how countries join ongoing wars overlooking the real possibility that MIDs can expand to incorporate more and more participants and these disputes might be more prone to escalate to war than others.

Those scholars that have studied joining behavior in the interventions framework broadened their inquiry to include disputes. In doing so, however, they conflated the two events. Although both wars and disputes are militarized confrontations between states, they differ in terms of the level of hostility and severity, and their outcomes. Wars are more severe cases of militarized conflict and victory or defeat can change the status-quo for the concerned parties. Third parties know that joining a war is a risky proposition, but has benefits accruing from being able to assure a decisive outcome in their favor. Lower-level disputes represent states using coercive militaristic diplomacy against each other by threatening to and/or using force without declaring war.¹³ Most disputes end in stalemates so they don't have the same potential as wars to alter the existing status-quo. Third parties are unclear about how those disputes affect their interests. It is less costly for third parties to join disputes as opposed to wars, but they are uncertain about how or whether a dispute may evolve and escalate. Potential joiners prefer to be bystanders to ongoing disputes unless they are certain that their stakes may be compromised.¹⁴

Third parties or potential joiners, therefore, have a different decision-making calculus for wars and disputes. Conclusions about third party joining in wars may not transfer easily to our

¹³ These disputes may or may not escalate to war.

¹⁴ I explain this in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3.

understanding of why third parties join disputes. Moreover, dispute expansion is endogenous to the escalation to war and war onset process. Also, combining wars and disputes in the same study, as intervention literature does, confounds arguably distinct processes of joining those types of conflicts.

Rarity of Joining Occurrences

Approximately, 10% of interstate disputes that have occurred between 1816 and 2001 expanded to include additional states beyond the countries that initiated them.¹⁵ Out of all the countries that can potentially join a dispute happening somewhere in the world, only around 2% do so.¹⁶ International conflicts researchers commonly study rare events because states infrequently fight wars and engage in disputes. Although extant literatures on war joining and third party interventions acknowledge that states rarely join or intervene in conflicts, their results over-predict those outcomes. This dissertation empirically contributes to both those strands of joining-related scholarship by explicitly modeling the rarity with which potential joiners involve themselves in ongoing disputes. (i) I can empirically grapple with the factors that constrain potential joiners from entering a dispute, and (ii) I statistically correct for rare events in empirical analyses.

I consider all potential joiners to a dispute including those states that did not enter that conflict. In contrast, existing literature only focus on states that join disputes. Narrowly considering states that join, skews their predictions of the probability with which third parties actually intervene in ongoing disputes. By taking all potential joiners to disputes under consideration, I can empirically capture the reasons why states do not join disputes. My

¹⁵ 224 disputes out of 2334 disputes in the Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset have expanded.

¹⁶ I use the “politically relevant dyad” criteria set up by Maoz (1996) for identifying potential joiners for each dispute in my dataset. States that are either contiguous to at least one of the dispute initiators and/or are major powers at the time of dispute onset can potentially join that dispute. In Chapter 4, I explicate these criteria in greater detail and provide justification for using them.

empirical analyses find that not all states that have the potential to and the incentives to join disputes, do so. A potential joiner's position as linking rivalries among other potential joiners in the network, and in international organizations, reduces its likelihood of entering a dispute.

Their presence as a third party also affects other potential joiners' decisions to enter or abstain from that dispute. In Chapter 5, I find that a potential joiner's rivalry relationships with other third parties to the conflict, constrains its decision to join a dispute. Therefore, even if a potential joiner does not enter that dispute, it may also dampen the likelihood of joining by other third parties, and limits the extent to which that dispute can expand.

Another way in which this dissertation makes empirical progress, is by statistically taking cognizance of the rarity of joining events. King and Zeng (2001a, 2001b) find that popular statistical procedures in studies of international conflicts (such as logit) provide skewed coefficients and standard errors. Applied research in international conflicts has problems explaining and predicting rare events because they do not correct for those skewed estimates (*ibid.*). This dissertation takes heed of their warning and uses their modified "relogit" procedure in the empirical analyses.

Appropriate Measures for Interdependence among States

International relations scholars are looking for ways to grapple with the realization that interactions between states are not independent of each other in space and time. They are searching for new ways of understanding international interactions such as interstate conflicts that look beyond the box of who is fighting whom. In the previous section, I claim that this dissertation pushes theorization on international conflicts forward by conceptualizing conflicts as multilateral process, the initiation and evolution of which is influenced not only by states participating in the conflict, but also by those who may join the dispute. I also argued that the

context in which potential joiners make their decisions to enter a dispute, is not only shaped by their ties to the dispute initiators (as predicted by relevant scholarly literature), but also by their interactions with other potential joiners, and states in the system.

This dissertation makes an empirical contribution to the literature by employing social network analysis (SNA) to locate potential joiners in their multiple and simultaneous interactions with dispute originators, potential joiners, and other states in the system. SNA is particularly appropriate for modeling the theoretical imperatives of joining behavior outlined above and in Chapter 3. SNA enables this project to loosen the dyadic straightjacket by enabling us to get a handle on how potential joiners that may not be active participants in a presumably dyadic conflict can still affect the likelihood of conflict occurrence and/or expansion. This project uses network analysis to (a) build networks for relevant relationships such as interstate rivalries, alliances, trade and memberships to international organizations, and (b) create measures for potential joiner states' positions in these networks relative to dispute originators (structural equivalence), and the networks as a whole (centrality). Recent literature in international relations has realized the value of network analysis to model the interdependence among interstate interactions, and how a state's location in the emergent patterns of relationships affects its conflict proneness (Vasquez et al 2011, Maoz 2010, Flint et al 2009, Maoz et al 2006; 2007, Dorussen and Ward 2010; 2008, Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2010; 2009; 2006). This dissertation places itself in this incipient literature.

1.1.3 Policy Relevance

The analysis in the dissertation also has important policy implications relating to third party joining in ongoing disputes, and subsequent expansion of those conflicts. A third party state or potential joiner presumably has a repertoire of strategies to manage ongoing conflicts

that implicate their interests. Joining a conflict by threatening, displaying or using force in support of (and against a given side), is one option in the potential joiner's foreign policy toolkit. Although potential joiners are motivated to intervene in some conflicts to assure a favorable outcome or preserve the current status quo, their participation may further exacerbate those disputes. Numerous findings in international conflicts research inform that as additional states join an ongoing conflict, the conflict becomes more intractable. Some of those multiparty disputes may even escalate to war. Whether disputes escalate to war or not, there is sufficient reason to believe that the more the number of states involved in a conflict, the more difficult the bargaining process, which in turn discourages resolution of that conflict. One or more states are likely to be left unsatisfied by the outcome (stalemate or otherwise) leading to a prolonged dispute (Eberwein and Cusack 1982, Gochman and Maoz 1984, Vasquez 1993, Jones, Singer and Bremer 1996, Petersen et al 2002, Leeds 2003).

Possible intervention by third parties, and subsequent expansion of those conflicts are therefore of concern to constituencies of peaceful conflict management in institutions such as the United Nations (UN), national governments, and international and domestic civil societies. The findings of this dissertation can inform those concerned constituencies about when a conflict might expand, and how to limit the scope its expansion. By the same logic, this dissertation also has the potential to help conflict managers identify conditions that make it more attractive for potential joiners to use peaceful conflict management strategies instead of intervention. It also informs the discussion about conflicts off a third party state's radar that still need to be managed by the international community.

Joining an ongoing dispute is risky, or presumably costlier than doing nothing vis-à-vis that conflict. It takes a particular type of dispute, where a side with which a potential joiner

shares a high level of affinity, is clashing with a side with which it shares a low level of affinity, for a third party to join. Those disputes symbolize possible threats to a potential joiner's own stakes to the extent they are intertwined with a given dispute initiator. Conflict managers in the international community need to pay particular attention to preempting unilateral military action by states in these disputes, or to restrict the extent of expansion of those conflicts. Disputes between Iraq and Kuwait, and North Korea and South Korea are illustrative of disputes that are likely to expand.

It is difficult for the UN and similarly vested conflict managers to weaken the affinity between states stemming from their similar patterns of interactions with other states in the system, which motivates potential joiners to intervene in disputes. Those conflict managers, can however, facilitate the creation of conditions that reduce the likelihood of intervention in a conflict. This dissertation theorizes that a potential joiner that is an engaged participant in international trade has strong economic incentive in peaceful maintenance of those interactions. Furthermore, the extent to which it is steeped in international organizations has a pacifying effect on its proneness to join a conflict as well. Although, there are no short-term policies to strengthen these pacifying effects, these propositions encourages policymakers and constituencies that are concerned with the costs of joining behavior by states, to design policies or lobby governments to enhance those interactions. By striving to make states more economically interdependent on one another, making more peaceful conflict management opportunities available to them, and increasing the benefits of using the latter, concerned constituencies can limit the use of military intervention in ongoing interstate disputes.

This dissertation also identifies a potential trigger that may expand the size of an ongoing conflict – the entry of a potential joiner that links other rivalries to the conflict. This is of

considerable import to conflict managers concerned about disputes escalating to wars. Considering that scholars have noted that rivalry inter-linkages can cause multilateral wars to break out, policymakers have to be particularly concerned about the extent to which one ongoing rivalry ‘contaminates’ other ongoing disputes.

Considering that potential joiners only intervene in those conflicts that threaten their interests to the extent they are intertwined with a given dispute initiator, most disputes slip under their radar. Many of those disputes are of concern to the international community as a whole because of prior history of conflicts between those actors, the issues under contention and so on. Although the theoretical framework and findings of this dissertation does not directly identify which of those disputes that are overlooked by third party states should be of concern to conflict managers, they do help in calibrating expectations about the level of third party assistance in resolving those conflicts.

1.2 Roadmap for what is ahead

Why and how do some conflicts expand when most conflicts remain restricted to their original disputants? The goal of this dissertation is both to generate theoretical insights into third party joining in disputes, and consequent expansion of those conflicts, as well as to conduct empirical tests of those predictions. In this chapter, I introduced the research question and summarily laid out the theoretical framework, the empirical model, hypotheses and findings of the dissertation. I also highlighted the theoretical and empirical contributions of this project, as well as its policy relevance. Theoretically, this project seeks to contribute to four strands of literature on international conflicts. First unlike the war diffusion literature this project conceptualizes conflict as a political process – a sequence of events and choices by states who decide to involve themselves in the conflict (Bremer 1995). Second, it complicates the typical

decision-making calculus of third parties set up by interventions literature. Third, it contributes to the disputes literature by teasing out how the processes of expansion of a dispute may be different from war expansion. Furthermore, understanding dispute expansion allows us to sharpen our understanding about how certain disputes are more likely to escalate to war. Fourth, by identifying certain potential joiners as focal actors of the network irrespective of their material capabilities, this project engages with traditional conceptions of power. Empirically, this dissertation exclusively studies disputes that did not begin as wars, to understand expansion processes (relatively) untainted by war-joining expectations. It explicitly models the rarity with which potential joiners intervene in disputes. It uses novel methodology – social networks analysis to capture the interdependence between interstate interactions and the multilateral nature of (even seemingly dyadic) conflict processes. Policy-wise, it facilitates understanding of and the ability to predict which disputes might expand, and facilitate preventive diplomacy or restrict the expansionist scope of those conflicts.

Chapter 2 will describe and critique two bodies of work that are relevant to the study of expansion of militarized disputes – (1) war diffusion literature in the study of international conflicts, and (2) scholarship on military interventions. Diffusion literature treats war as a disease that ‘infects’ any country in contact with those fighting the war thereby making them susceptible to joining the war as well (Most and Starr 1980, Most et al 1989, Siverson and Starr 1991). Existing explanations over-predict diffusion-expansion of conflicts. Extant literature on intervention in interstate militarized conflicts disaggregates expanded wars and disputes into dyadic observations and enforces the untenable assumption that third parties make decisions independent of what other third parties are doing with respect to the ongoing conflict. This

chapter also reviews relevant literature on alliance reliability, and interstate rivalries to understand their insights into joining behavior.

Chapter 3 describes the theoretical model, which lays the foundation for the empirical tests in Chapter 4. Chapter 3 will, in detail, lay out the theoretical framework and specific hypotheses for how a potential joiner's position in the network affects both the degree of affinity it has towards parties involved in the dispute, and the level of constraints and opportunities it faces while making the decision to join an ongoing dispute. This dissertation project argues that the joining behavior by potential third parties that leads to the expansion of a dispute is the outcome of two processes. One process entails these states consciously making a decision to join or abstain from an ongoing dispute; the second process flows from potential third parties deciding not to join, but being pulled into the dispute anyway. Potential third parties make the decisions to join an ongoing conflict within the context of the myriad relationships within which they find themselves. States may be related to one another as rivals, alliance members, trade partners, and members of common international organizations. States have multiple and simultaneous ties with other states that are involved in the conflict, and other states in international politics. How states are positioned in these relationship-networks affects their calculations about how crucial it is for them to join the dispute, and whether they can afford to remain a bystander to it. Under certain circumstances, however, that potential joiner might get pulled into a dispute, even when it has decided that it is not in its best interests to intervene in that dispute.

Chapter 4 outlines the research design, which explains how I plan to empirically test the theoretical model. It describes in detail how the data was set up, the independent and dependent variables measured, and appropriate statistical procedures suited for rare events large-n data.

This chapter also spells out how social network analysis (SNA) is used to visualize different relational network spaces and locate potential joiners in them. SNA is used to create measures of the potential joiner's position in different network spaces, which can then be used for statistical analysis. This project uses network analysis to (a) build networks for multiple relationships such as rivalry, alliances, trade and IGO memberships, and (b) create measures for potential joiner states' positionality in these networks.

In Chapter 5, I carry out the empirical tests of the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 3. The results, for the most part, are consistent with the theoretical model. Potential joiners, as hypothesized, are highly likely to join disputes when they share a higher level of affinity with one given initiator as opposed to another. This is true of affinity induced by having common allies and similar affiliations to international organizations, as the given dispute initiator. As predicted, potential joiners are less likely to join disputes when they are embedded in rivalry network space, and in membership to IGOs. Moreover, their positions in these two network spaces as a whole, reduces the likelihood of joining when inducements by asymmetries in affinity are present. Trade related variables perform contrary to expectations. Potential joiners are not motivated to join a conflict on the basis of their economic affinity with the initiators; in fact they significantly unlikely to do so. The extent of a potential joiner's engagement in international trade with other states in the network does not have a statistically significant effect on its joining behavior.

In the final Chapter 6, I conclude by summarizing the findings and discussing them in light of existing literature. I evaluate the contributions of the dissertation and lessons learnt in the context of the findings of the previous chapter. I discuss a variety of possible extensions to the

theoretical model and empirical tests, with special attention paid to how intervention fits into the foreign policy toolkits of potential third parties.

2. Literature Review

This dissertation asks – why do some potential third party states join ongoing disputes, while others do not? That allows us to answer why certain ongoing disputes expand to additional states beyond the dispute initiators, but not others. A survey of the literature suggests that international relations research has predominantly focused on causes of conflict initiation. Joining behavior by third parties in interstate conflicts has not been paid much attention. Joining occurrences are treated synonymously with war/dispute onset such that the joining cases are just new onsets of conflicts. Two bodies of scholarship that have made joining behavior of states their primary focus of inquiry are the diffusion of wars and interventions literatures respectively. In the following pages, I shall review extant literature on diffusion of wars, and intervention (in disputes and wars), which have directly addressed joining behavior by third party states. I shall also survey findings in international conflict research that are relevant to my research question. Scholarly literatures on linkages between interstate rivalries, and alliance reliability have indirectly lent some insights into third party motivations for joining a dispute.

2.1 Diffusion of Wars

Scholars in this research program wanted to establish that war diffusion was a genuine phenomenon distinct from war onset – the causes and processes by which states initiated wars are different from what makes states join ongoing wars (Bremer 1995a). Subsequently, the diffusion of wars literature followed two lines of inquiry. The first set of studies focused on establishing that war diffusion does take place, and the second set of scholarship addressed the question of what caused wars to diffuse (Simowitz 1998).

According to Most et al (1989), war diffusion means that “war in one nation is affected by wars in other nations at prior time points.”¹⁷ Scholars in this program claimed that outbreak of a war changed the probability of other states in the system to either join that war or initiate a new conflict, thereby leading to that war diffusing to additional states. Initial analyses to prove that interstate conflict occurrences were not independent of each other suffered setbacks. Neither Richardson (1960) nor Singer and Small (1972) found strong evidence to refute the assumption at that time that prior wars had no effect on subsequent war occurrences.¹⁸ They modeled war occurrences over time as a Poisson process, which assumes independence of events. Most and Starr (1980) took issue with that approach and argued that “one new war participation will alter the probability of subsequent occurrences” (Most & Starr 1980, p.933). They found support for their hypothesis that outbreak of a war changes (1) the probability that other nations will experience war participation (by joining or initiating a war), and (2) the likelihood of the countries involved in the ongoing war to experience war participation again.

These findings were echoed and bolstered by parallel and subsequent studies on war diffusion. Davis, Duncan and Siverson (1978) conceived of multilateral wars as interlinked confrontations between states; disaggregated those wars into their warring dyads, and found that war within one dyad increased the probability of other warring dyads forming. Bremer (1982) found that distance mattered in whether the initiation of a conflict increased the likelihood of another conflict occurring – initiation of a militarized dispute increased the likelihood of a dispute occurring in the same region. Houwelling and Siccama (1985) found further evidence that conflict begets conflict. Wars, in general, were clustered in time and space, as were interstate and intrastate wars (*ibid.*). Additionally, there were some clues about which states are likely to be

¹⁷ Quoted in Simowitz (1998), p. 215

¹⁸ Quoted in Simowitz (1998), p. 215

prone to war diffusion. Major powers were particularly susceptible – one major power’s decision to join a war increased the probability of other major powers entering that war as well (Yamamoto and Bremer 1980) or participating in a new war (Levy 1982).

Overall, these studies showed that occurrence of a dispute might not be independent of other disputes and set the ground for future conflicts by changing the probability of subsequent occurrences (either by joining a war, or initiating a new war). A major weakness of the literature summarized above, is that it did not necessarily distinguish between the wars diffusing by means of additional states joining them, and initiation of a new conflict by the latter. Although scholars such as Most and Starr (1980) conceptually made a distinction between “spatial diffusion” (war changes probability of ‘new’ war participation by other states) and “reinforcement” (war changes probability of *subsequent* ‘new’ war participation by belligerent states), they conflated both joining behavior and conflict initiation into the same diffusion outcome of “new war participation” (Simowitz 1998). States join ongoing disputes for reasons different from why they initiate new conflicts. In this dissertation, I am only interested in what makes some third parties join ongoing disputes, thereby causing diffusion of those conflicts.

Having established that war diffusion is an empirical reality and needs to be examined; a number of studies were published that did exactly that. The second line of inquiry in this research program sought to uncover the causes of war diffusion. They primarily focused on the factors that led an outbreak of war to change the likelihood of other states in the system to engage in war as well (Most and Starr 1980, Most et al 1989, Siverson and Starr 1991). For the most part, their outcome of interest – likelihood of war proneness by states other than those that initiated the conflict, continued to treat war expansion as well as outbreaks of new wars as the same.

Rapaport (1960) had suggested that international conflicts may spread from one nation to another in ways similar to contagious diseases.¹⁹ Just as an epidemic diffuses to more people, so might war spread to more countries. Diseases spread across a population via contact with an infected person. Scholars studying diffusion of wars adopted the “war as a disease” framework, arguing that countries in contact with those fighting a war become susceptible to joining that war as well. They looked for ways in which states come into contact with one another (Most and Starr 1980, Most et al 1989, Siverson and Starr 1991). Those countries that most frequently interact with states that are involved in a war are most likely to experience war occurrences as a result of the ongoing war (ibid.). They identified contiguity and alliances as two transmission mechanisms by which wars diffuse.

In so far as a conflict is similar to a disease, spatial distance between dyads/countries matters for infection. Geographical proximity offers neighbors opportunities to interact with one another. Having shared borders with countries involved in a war, increases the opportunity for its neighbors to become involved in the war. Bremer (1982) found that when a dispute broke out between two countries, it led to new disputes being initiated in the same region. He concluded that that ‘coercion was contagious’ – it infected other nations within the region where the dispute broke out and made them behave aggressively as well. Contagious states are prone to diffusion (Hammarstrom and Heldt 2002). States that are in ‘physical contact’ with already warring states (“warring borders”) get infected and join the ongoing war (Most and Starr 1980, Most et al 1989, Siverson and Starr 1991). States that have “warring border nations” are confronted with greater risks and uncertainty than states that do not neighbor active disputants, and therefore are more susceptible to joining an ongoing war, or initiating a new dispute, or getting attacked by a belligerent neighbor. The finding that war is more likely to ‘spread’ to states with “warring

¹⁹ Quoted in Most and Starr (1980).

borders” than those without, dovetailed with the larger conflict literature that found that being neighbors made states more conflict-prone towards each other.

When Siverson and Starr (1991) solely focused on diffusion of war as expansion of that war to additional joiners, they found that in addition to “warring borders”, “warring allies” was also an important point of contact between the warring states (disease vectors) and other states in the system (susceptible population). Alliances are formal agreements between states indicative of their common security preferences and their obligations to protect them. A war is highly likely to diffuse to countries that are allied to a warring state because alliances signal their willingness to join a dispute (Most et al 1989, Siverson and Starr 1991). They were both loosely necessary conditions for wars to diffuse. States that both shared contiguous borders and had alliances with warring nations had the highest likelihood of joining an ongoing war (ibid.).

Although this scholarship attempted to solve the empirical problems of 'when, where, why, and how' wars spread, by identifying two agents of diffusion (contiguity and alliances), they did not explain (a) why they facilitated spread of war (Simowitz 1998), and (b) why they mostly did not. Geographical contiguity is constant and contiguous states do not fight all the time, and not all contiguous states fight each other. Hence, considering only contiguity as a mechanism by which war expands from countries that are in a war to additional states over-predicts third party joining. Considering that states carefully define the terms of intervention in alliance treaties, and that alliances are also linked initiation of conflicts²⁰, diffusion of wars scholarship did not delineate how alliances get implicated in the expansion process differently from the initiation stage.

By showing that outbreak of a war changes the probability of war-joining by states that are in contact with the belligerents, this research program bolstered the school of thought in

²⁰ Leeds et al (2000), Leeds (2004).

international relations research that argued that diffusion of wars needed to be examined independently of war initiation (see Bremer 1995). Factors that caused wars to break out between countries were different from those that led states to join ongoing wars. This scholarly literature also offered two ways in which states that do not initiate wars become likely to join it, when it occurs – if they have an ally and/or a neighbor at war.

Although conflict has been conceptualized as a contagious disease metaphorically to capture the notion of ‘infection’ or ‘contagion’ that linked multiple disputes to each other across time and space, it had its limitations. The story of expansion of “war as a disease” is relatively passive in that physical contact with a carrier of the disease causes infection.²¹ Diffusion scholars in the war literature have put forth a fairly passive explanation of diffusion of war hinging on contact between countries that causes the disease of war to spread in a smooth manner. States that were ‘exposed’ to “warring borders” and “warring allies” had a higher likelihood of war participation (Most and Starr 1980, Most et al 1989, Siverson and Starr 1991). The comparison of wars to diseases, and the diffusion of wars as contagion imply that (a) states do not have any agency or choice in joining an ongoing war that its neighbors and/or allies are involved in, and (b) wars are undesirable for the neighbors and/or allies of the belligerents. In contrast, militarized conflict between countries is a political process of actions and reactions of states, and joining (for the most part) a matter of choices that third parties make vis-à-vis that conflict. Joiners enter wars (and disputes) when they calculate that they may derive benefits (furthering or safeguarding their interests) from it. Diffusion of wars (and disputes) does not necessarily passively occur through the process of contagion. Rather, joining decisions have to be contextualized within the

²¹ The ‘war as a disease’ metaphor narrowed the search for diffusion mechanisms to points of contact between states. It was not entirely clear what “contact” meant in the context of international politics. Was every voluntary (alliance, trade, rivalry) and involuntary association (contiguity) “contact”?

relationships states have with each other. Militarized conflicts might not, therefore, spread across a smooth Euclidian surface of shared borders as contagion-infection implies.

Existing explanations of joining behavior, by overlooking that third parties may have some discretion in choosing to get involved in or abstain from an ongoing war, could not grapple with the empirical reality that a very small percentage of states deemed highly susceptible to diffusion of war actually joined those conflicts. Siverson and Starr (1991) found that high probability of war joining induced by contiguity and/or alliances, did not convert to actual war joining behavior. They recognized that not all states have an equal probability of conflict because not all states are in contact with each other, but the ‘susceptible’ states did nothing to resist the disease of war. ‘War as a disease’ metaphor is not accompanied by an immunization metaphor in the diffusion of conflict literature. After the outbreak of war, Siverson and Starr (1991) estimated a diffusion rate of 2.5% on a yearly basis. An explanation for why conflicts expand, and why third parties join ongoing conflicts, needs to account for why diffusion of wars (or conflicts in general) is so rare.

Potential joiners may not be equally susceptible to the diffusion of a particular dispute even if there is “contact” or interaction between them and the original disputants. The potential joiner’s decision to join the conflict or stay away from it is influenced by who is fighting the conflict and against whom it is being fought. For example, Angola’s decision to join the Second Congo War was a function of Congo’s involvement in the conflict. The Congolese government had supported anti-Angola government rebel factions in the Angolan civil war. The Angolan government’s motivation to join the war was reinforced by their worry that a power vacuum in Congo may allow anti-Angolan rebel groups to organize again. Along with their own motivation to join or stay away from a dispute, the probability of a potential joiner participating in an

ongoing dispute is also influenced by the sequence of states joining a MID or forming a coalition before onset (Croco and Teo 2005). The second Congo War involved eight countries (and several rebel groups) and each country's calculus of joining included the potential actions of other actors in the region, and the reaction of the international community.

Early analyses of diffusion of wars, in their attention to discovering the presence and magnitude of diffusion, had conflated diffusion as war expansion and diffusion as new war participation. Similarly, scholars that focused on identifying mechanisms of diffusion, did not distinguish between diffusion of war as a result of purposive decision by third parties to join and whether they join because they get pulled into the conflict. The diffusion-as-contagion framework for understanding third party joining in wars did not emphasize that states may choose to participate or keep themselves out of ongoing conflicts. In the same vein, Werner and Lemke (1997) also critiqued this literature for its inability to predict and model on which side the third party will join.

In contrast, this dissertation argues that there are separate processes of joining – purposive decisions to join ongoing disputes and wars, and getting pulled into conflicts despite their decision to abstain from them. Both these joining processes need to be considered in order to comprehensively explain expansion of disputes. Literature on third party interventions is another body of scholarship that has sought to explain joining behavior in ongoing disputes and wars. In contrast to diffusion of wars literature, this scholarship is grounded in rational choice and focuses on the conscious decisions by third parties to enter a conflict (Vasquez et al 2011). They primarily focus on the third party intervener, emphasize their motivations with reference to their ties to the disputants, and offer predictions on which side intervention takes place.

2.2 Intervention literature

Rational choice theorists explain conflict initiation as an outcome of strategic interactions between the attacking state and the third party joiner. The revisionist conflict originator initiates hostilities against a target state when it calculates that their chances of winning that conflict are high (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). It evaluates when third parties are least likely to join the opposition and/or adjusts its demands so as to discourage third party intervention against it (Werner 2000). By implication, expansion of a conflict is the result of the revisionist conflict initiator miscalculating the resoluteness of the third party to intervene. Motivation of third party to intervene in a dispute is strong when their expected utility toward the victory of a specific disputant is sufficiently high (Bueno de Mesquita 1981).

Although this dissertation theoretically agrees with the notion that a potential joiner considers the costs and benefits of its joining behavior vis-à-vis the dispute initiators, it argues that that decision-making calculus is more complicated than the rational choice theorists posit. There are three reasons for that. First, rational choice explanations of conflict initiation and third party intervention conflate the two types of interstate militarized confrontations – wars and disputes. I argue that for a third party, joining a war entails a different cost-benefit calculus, compared to joining a militarized dispute. Wars, in contrast to disputes, are potentially status-quo altering events and the probability that they will end in a decisive outcome for either side is high. It is not clear to third parties when a dispute occurs between two states, how it is likely to evolve. They factor in that uncertainty in their decision to join a conflict or not. Moreover, most disputes

end in stalemates. A third party's calculus has to consider not so much its utility from a victory in the dispute, but that the stalemated outcome does not adversely affect its interests.²²

Second, the resoluteness of joiners to intervene in a crisis is not just affected by practical concerns of assuring victory for a particular conflict initiator (especially when most disputes do not have decisive outcomes). A joiner's preferences of intervening, and with whom to align, are shaped by their sense of affinity (strategic, economic, and normative) with the dispute originators. There is sufficient evidence in international relations literature to suggest that states that are similar to each other, such as when they share the same regime type, or economic outlook, or are part of the same "in-groups" in international organizations, behave cooperatively with each other (Maoz and Russett 1993, Aydin 2008, Corbetta 2010, Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006). Joiners are motivated to protect that homophily with a given dispute initiator.

Third, the decision-making calculus of a third party to intervene in a conflict is also tempered by its relationships with other third parties to the conflict, as well as its interactions with other countries in the international system. States consciously decide their relationships with other states such as whom to ally with, whom to trade with, how to manage their disagreements and so on. They, however, may have little discretion over how other states in international politics interact with one other. All those interactions may cumulatively position states in such a way as to have unintended effects on their behavior. For example, India has historically maintained rivalries with both Pakistan and China. It, however, has little control over Pakistan and China's decision to cooperate with each other, or with the US' decision to ally with Pakistan, both of which impacted India foreign policy calculus during the Cold War.

²² As a dispute endures and evolves, the potential joiner's calculus also changes accordingly, perhaps making joining a more advantageous course of action. As more countries join a dispute, that dispute becomes more likely to escalate to war (Petersen et al 2002).

Overall, interventions literature has given us a list of factors that affect motivations of third party states to join ongoing conflicts and with which side to align themselves. Scholars contributing to this body of work argue that a joiner's incentive structure to intervene in a conflict is shaped in reference to the dispute initiators. They found that joiners tend to intervene in disputes and wars in support of the weaker side (Altfeld & Bueno de Mesquita 1979, Gartzke & Gleditsch 2003). Instead of bandwagoning with the stronger initiator, joiners tend to act in ways that realist balance-of-power propositions predict. In fact, intervention by a major power led to other major powers joining that conflict as well (Yamamoto and Bremer 1980, Corbetta and Dixon 2004). Huth (1998) further found proof that joiners tended to intervene on behalf of targeted states, in line with logic of extended deterrence. Scholarly literature on interventions also found that not only were states likely to join conflicts to aid disputants that were institutionally similar to them; they were also likely to intervene on behalf of their trading partners (Werner and Lemke 1997, Aydin 2008, Corbetta 2010). Echoing the findings of diffusion of wars literature, Leeds (2004) found that alliance ties (particularly defensive alliances) between joiners and dispute initiators motivate the former to intervene in that conflict.

This body of scholarship also detected that states that have intervened in conflicts over time share certain characteristics. They have found that joiners are relatively powerful (Altfeld & Bueno de Mesquita 1979, Yamamoto and Bremer 1980, Enterline 1999, Corbetta and Dixon 2004). Major powers have a large number of strategic and economic interests and are able to project their power outwards. They tend to enter ongoing disputes as third parties at a faster rate than other states (Enterline 1999). They appear to have a lower utility threshold regarding the option of entering ongoing wars (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979).²³ Joiners also tend to be

²³ Corbetta and Dixon (2004) found that having major power status affects the tendency of states to act multilaterally. That is because regardless of whether they are initiators or participants, the presence of major powers in militarized

geographically proximate to the original disputants (Siverson and Starr 1991, Corbetta and Dixon 2005), and allies of disputants at war (Leeds 2004). Scholars have provided contradictory findings for whether joiners tend to be democracies or not. On the one hand, Werner and Lemke (1997) and Enterline (1999) respectively find that democratic joiners intervene (on behalf of democratic belligerents) and do so at a faster rate than other joiners. On the other hand, Pickering (2002) provides evidence that democracies and non-democracies are not significantly different in their proclivity to intervene. Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) claim that democracies are unreliable allies and are unlikely interveners in conflicts (on behalf of their alliance partners).

Scholars of intervention behavior by adjusting the focus of inquiry to states that join conflicts, have thus provided a set of primary factors that motivate third parties to join ongoing disputes, and their common characteristics. This body of work has some limitations, which it shares with studies of war diffusion. Both focus on dyads (i.e. pairs of states) fighting at any given point of time. They deconstruct multilateral conflict processes into ‘joiner-original disputant’ pairs of states. For example, an expanded dispute between Iraq and Kuwait with the US, the UK and France as joiners is disaggregated into independent observations – Iraq-US, Iraq-UK, Iraq-France, Kuwait-US, Kuwait-UK, and Kuwait-France. This sort of dyadic structure makes data easily manageable, but it forces scholars to make certain assumptions that are theoretically and empirically unviable.

By disaggregating expanded wars and disputes into dyadic observations, intervention scholarship enforces the assumption that third parties make decisions independent of what other third parties are doing with respect to the ongoing conflict. Both literatures, therefore, myopically focus on single, short-term decisions by third parties to join a dispute, independent of

disputes increases the likelihood that other actors will intervene, and that such conflicts will become multiparty in nature (Gochman and Maoz 1990).

context. The proposition that joiners only consider their interactions with the initial participants, and not other states that are relevant but as yet uninvolved in the conflict, is untenable. States not only have ties with states already in the conflict, but also other potential third parties. Their interactions with all these states shape (in varying degrees) the potential joiner's decision to participate in an ongoing dispute.

By focusing narrowly on the presence or absence of ties between joiners and the original disputants, scholarship on diffusion of wars and intervention overlook an entire population of states relevant to the ongoing conflict. There is also a tendency in both these bodies of work to only consider states that joined the war. They do not consider the population of states that might have potentially joined, but did not. Why some potential joiners stayed away from the dispute despite being highly likely to participate is very much a part of the story of why some conflicts expand and most do not. Those potential joiners' decisions to stay away probably affected the decision-calculus of those states that did join, and how the dispute eventually evolved. Furthermore, by not considering potential joiners who did not participate in the conflict, scholarship on interventions and diffusion of wars is always in the danger of over-predicting joining behavior. Intervention and war diffusion literatures have to consider why potential joiners that have the characteristics that increase their likelihood of participation still do not. By making this a part of the story of dispute expansion, one can provide a more realistic explanation of why only a small percentage of disputes (and wars) expand beyond its initial participants.

Diffusion of wars scholarship, by definition, focuses only on expansion of wars beyond the states that initiated it. Much of intervention literature either similarly emphasizes intervention in wars or does not distinguish between disputes and wars when theorizing on third party motivations to join ongoing conflicts. Wars are conflicts on a large scale and very few potential

joiners have the ability to intervene in them. Nevertheless, states do participate in disputes of lower intensity and studies of intervention need to account for motivations and characteristics of third parties that have a high likelihood of joining those disputes. Although there are some conflicts that are initiated as all-out wars, most wars are disputes that escalate to war. Considering that multi-party disputes are more likely to escalate to war than dyadic disputes (Petersen et al 2002), understanding expansion of disputes enhances our understanding of the escalation process of a dispute to war. This imperative is related to the motivation at the heart of recent research that seeks to understand militarized interstate disputes that have not passed the war threshold. There is a growing body of research on disputes that investigates how and why disputes are initiated between states, how they evolve (if they do), and their termination (Bremer 1995; Gochman 1995).²⁴

MIDs literature that has investigated how a dispute evolves once it has been initiated, has predominantly focused on escalation dynamics. One way in which a dispute can evolve and escalate is by incorporating more parties than the original disputants. Scholars researching on MIDs have noted that this evolution phase of the dispute is important because disputes being fought by multiple states tend to last longer (Jones, Singer and Bremer 1996) and are also more likely to escalate to war (Cusack and Eberwein 1982, Petersen et al 2002). “The entrance of third parties into ongoing serious international disputes has been associated with the escalation of such disputes to war” (Cusack and Eberwein 1982).²⁵ These results are echoed by the International Crisis Behavior Project. Crises between three or more participants were of longer duration than conflict between two states (James and Wilkenfeld 1984, Brecher 1993).²⁶ Furthermore, multiparty disputes over certain issues such as territory are even more war-prone than multiparty

²⁴ Bremer (1995) and Gochman (1995) provide a good albeit dated summary of this literature.

²⁵ Quoted in Petersen et al (2002), p. 87.

²⁶ Quoted in Petersen et al (2002), p. 87.

disputes over non-territorial issues (Petersen et al 2002). MIDs-related scholarship, however, has not yet substantially engaged with why and how some disputes evolve to expand (and escalate). Diffusion of wars scholarship does not distinguish between joining as an outcome of rational calculation by a third party, and occurring despite the joiner's decision to abstain from intervening. Intervention literature, on the flip side, solely focuses on the first process, thereby providing an incomplete explanation of joining behavior by third parties. Both literatures on diffusion of wars, and interventions, emphasize the importance of contiguity as an opportunity for third parties to join an ongoing dispute or war, and the role of alliance ties between a joiner and a dispute initiator in shaping the motivation of the former to enter an ongoing dispute. They provide robust findings in support of those claims. There is also evidence that economic ties and similarity of regime type motivates a third party to intervene. Also, capabilities of the joiner have a positive effect on intervention. This dissertation takes these insights into account when outlining a theoretical explanation of joining behavior by potential joiner states. Simultaneously, it modifies the research design and introduces new measures and analytical procedures that avoid the weaknesses of current templates of modeling joining behavior.

Scholarship on war proneness of states and causes of war (and disputes) theoretically and empirically bolster those findings. Even though they do not directly study joining and/or intervention by third party states, their predictions and findings are relevant to explaining joining behavior.

2.3 Insights from related research on international conflicts

2.3.1 Reliability of Alliances

Alliances are “written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to

remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict” (Leeds et al 2002, p. 238). Alliances get implicated in the joining process of third parties when the latter actually follow through on their obligations vis-à-vis states involved in the dispute. Only if military alliances are reliable will they be a plausible mechanism by which a conflict expands beyond the initiating parties. Current findings in the alliance literature bode well for those scholars that claim that alliances are fairly reliable signals of [a state’s] future intentions (Morrow 1994, Smith 1995, Fearon 1997, Leeds 2004). Therefore, when the challenger state with allies initiates a dispute and/or if the target has military alliances at the time the dispute occurs, those disputes are unlikely to remain restricted the conflict originators.

Early analyses of alliances conceptualized them as security arrangements between countries to deter common threats. They argued that alliance partners failed as deterrence mechanisms because conflicts broke out despite their presence, and allies only assisted their partners during 25% of the wartime cases under consideration (Siverson and King 1980, Sabrosky 1980).²⁷ All that changed when Leeds et al (2000) opened alliance treaty documents and identified specific obligations enshrined in each alliance treaty. Whether it is specific clauses about consulting one’s allies in certain scenarios, or promising intervention under a very particular set of conditions, they found that between 1816 and 1944, states fulfilled their promised commitments 75% of the time.²⁸

Members of an alliance fulfill their obligations as spelled out by their alliance treaty. What makes alliances reliable security commitments (and allies trustworthy interveners in an

²⁷ Cited in Garztko and Gledistch (2004), p.778.

²⁸ Leeds et (2000) and Leeds (2003) posit that states only put those clauses in the alliance treaty that they can fulfill. Allies do not intervene to assist their allies in all conflicts because they have promised their support under very specific conditions.

ongoing conflict)? Two explanations abound in extant literature on alliance formation. The first set of explanations center around alliances as costly signals of a state's intentions (Morrow 1994, Smith 1995, Fearon 1997). As members of an alliance, states have the advantage of an increased capacity to fight (together). They, however, also have costs of maintaining that alliance in times of peace (Morrow 1994). Apart from costs of fighting on behalf of their allies, states may also experience that their decision-making has become more restricted because of the alliance. They also incur costs by way of coordinating policies and actions with their allies rather than carrying out their foreign policy unilaterally. Considering the costs of being in an alliance, only those states that are likely to fulfill the obligations are likely to be a part of the alliance. When countries suspect that either they themselves or their partners might be unwilling to carry out their commitment, they do not form alliances. For example, during the Second World War, mutual distrust between the Soviet Union, Britain and France prevented them from forming an alliance against Nazi Germany, even when the latter was a threat to all of them. The sunk costs of creating and maintaining alliances deter less sincere states from forming alliances (Leeds 2003).

The second set of explanations focus on the shared benefits of alliances.²⁹ These explanations conceive alliances as institutionalized security cooperation among its member states. States in alliances accrue a number of benefits from such cooperative arrangements. Alliances can allow states to combine their comparative military advantages into an enhanced joint security advantage. That may in turn improve the states' collective fighting ability. Alliances also allow its member states to delegate their security to each other thereby allowing them to reduce the burden of defense spending on their national budgets. Members of an alliance will only intertwine their security policy with one other and will collectively enjoy the

²⁹ For a more detailed summary of this literature, see Leeds (2003).

advantages of security cooperation when they can trust each other. The benefits accruing from being in alliance deters bluffing behavior by insincere states.

Alliances are both costly agreements for states to sign into, and produce joint economies of scale in defense matters. Only states that are committed to fulfilling their treaty obligations are likely to form alliances. Therefore, alliances are reliable security agreements between states that spell out the conditions of cooperation. A significant body of work on alliances led by Leeds (2002, 2003) has empirically established that allies can be depended on to follow through on the terms of their security agreements. When alliances fail to deter conflicts from occurring in the first place, potential joiners that are allies with (or have similar patterns of alliances as) states involved in the dispute can be reliably expected to be motivated to join that conflict.

2.3.2 Rivalry Inter-linkages

Most countries in international politics do not engage in conflict with one another. A small number of dyads are disproportionately responsible for the total number of interstate conflicts that have ever occurred. Rivalries basically indicate a competitive relationship between two or more actors (Colaresi et al 2008, Diehl and Goertz 2000, Hensel 1999). Rivalry literature has studied how the rivalry context shapes the initiation and evolution of interstate disputes in ways different from conflicts fought by non-rivals (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Colaresi et al 2008). The theoretical and empirical logic behind these studies is that disputes fought between the same pairs of states are temporally linked to each other; rival states learn from each dispute and each dispute affects how subsequent confrontations will take place.

Although the rivalry literature identified temporal dependence in disputes being fought between the same pairs of states, it has only started concerning itself with the interdependence between rivalries (Diehl and Goertz 2000; Chi et al 2012; Flint et al 2009). If one rivalry goes to

war, it changes the probability of other rivalries linked to it going to war as well. Diehl and Goertz (2000) argued that those effects are likely to take place in a hierarchical manner from major power rivalries to minor power rivalries. The most appropriate illustration for this is the Cold War wherein a dispute in the US-Soviet Union rivalry affected the war proneness of the regional rivalries linked to it as well.

Maoz and Mor (2002) and Kinsella (1994) investigated the role of third parties in shaping rivalry dynamics between two states. Kinsella (1994) explored the role of the US and Soviet Union as third parties in the ongoing rivalries in the Middle East. Maoz and Mor (2002) investigated the extent to which a third party can influence the expectations that rivals have of each other. Although both these studies show how third parties (mostly major powers) can affect rivalry dynamics between states, very few studies have empirically engaged with the way in which rivalries are linked to each other. In their study on the First World War, Vasquez et al (2011) found that the more rivalries that get implicated as the war progresses, the more it might expand.³⁰ Rivalry linkages can, therefore, affect third party joining decisions in ongoing conflicts, and their subsequent expansion. A state might be involved in numerous rivalries and that would affect its decision to join an ongoing dispute against its rival. Diehl and Goertz (2000) would describe this state as a “common enemy” linking the rivalries it is involved in.³¹

Interconnections between rivalries are relevant to dispute expansion but there is no literature on how they fit into the expansion process. The only published research that looks at rivalries as mechanisms of conflict expansion focuses on wars (Vasquez et al 2011; Flint et al 2009). Wars, however, are on a much larger scale than a militarized dispute and its outcomes are

³⁰ Thompson (2003) made this argument about the First World War though he did not test it. Vasquez et al (2011) empirically test the effects of rivalry inter-linkages and show them to be important.

³¹ Rival dyads can be linked to each other in various ways – they can have a common participant, a common dispute, shared borders or through alliances (Diehl and Goertz 2000).

more likely to be decisive in favor or against the two sides fighting. Potential joiners might decide that to join an ongoing war despite being implicated in a number of rivalries to not only harm its rivals, but also to make substantial gains for itself (including ending some of the rivalries in its favor). Rivalries might have a different effect on potential joiners to disputes.³²

In subsequent chapters, I lay out a theoretical framework of third party joining in ongoing interstate disputes, research design, and detailed findings of empirical tests that address the weaknesses of the literature mentioned above. In doing so, this dissertation also conceptually and analytically pushes research in this area forward. Extant literature informs us that the reasons for joining need to be examined separately from causes of onset (diffusion of wars literature); that joining is typically an outcome of purposive actions by third parties (interventions literature)³³; and that ties between joiners and dispute initiators influence the former's motivation to enter an ongoing dispute. This dissertation marries those theoretical insights with the realization that potential joiners simultaneously consider their interactions with both sides of the dispute, and their actions and decisions are interdependent with other potential joiners and actors in the system. All those interactions, cumulatively, form the context in which potential joiner's evaluate the feasibility of entering an ongoing dispute.

³² In the theory chapter, I argue that rivalries might have a constraining effect on a potential joiner's decision to enter an ongoing dispute.

³³ In the concluding chapter, I discuss the conditions under which I expect that despite their decision to abstain from a dispute, a potential joiner might still get "pulled into a conflict".

3. Network Explanation of Joining Behavior

In this chapter, I posit a network explanation of joining behavior by potential third party states to a dispute in progress. I argue that only those disputes where a side with which a potential joiner has a high level of affinity is involved, are salient enough for the latter to consider taking some action. Moreover, it is only when the potential joiner's shared interests with the dispute originator is threatened by a belligerent with which the former has little or no affinity, does it deem it worth the risk of military action. In those rare circumstances, the potential joiner is constrained by the reactions of its rivals; its economic self-interest in maintaining the trade relations on which it is interdependent; and its socialization into norms of appropriate conflict management through its membership in international institutions. A potential joiner's positions in various structures of relationships have different and competing implications for its joining behavior.

There are two lines of distinction that are immediately drawn between this dissertation and existing and current literature on expansion of wars. First, in contrast, to literature on military intervention that naturally concerns itself only with conscious decisions of third parties to intervene in disputes and wars, this project treats joining behavior of states as an outcome of two processes – one process entails these states consciously making a decision to join or abstain from an ongoing dispute in support of or against a side, whereas the other flows from potential third parties deciding not to join, but being pulled into the dispute because they are targeted by at least one of the disputants.³⁴ The question of why potential third parties join an ongoing dispute cannot only be answered by narrowly considering intervention decisions in ongoing disputes. We need to think about both processes that might lead a potential joiner to join a dispute. A theory of

³⁴I explain and model the first process of joining in this dissertation and describe the conditions under which potential joiners may get pulled into an ongoing dispute in the concluding chapter.

third party joining behavior in ongoing disputes has good explanatory power when it is not only able to explain the conditions under which potential joiners would actively choose to intervene (or not) and on which side, as well as when they might end up joining the dispute because they have been targeted by one of the belligerents.³⁵

Second, this project re-adjusts the research focus of diffusion of war literature from wars to disputes. In doing so it places itself as a part of the endeavor in broader conflict literature to tease out how theoretical explanations for processes of dispute expansion might or might not be different from processes of war diffusion. Militarized interstate disputes are cases of threat, display and use of force by one state towards another that falls short of war but may escalate to that severity (Jones, Singer and Bremer 1996). In contrast to a war, a dispute experience relatively lower level of conflict. Wars are at the extreme end of the hostility and fatality continuum of interstate conflicts and represent high levels of risk for potential joiner states. Potential joiner states undertake the risk of joining an ongoing war if they derive direct benefits from the outcome of the war that compensates for the costs of entering a war. Disputes, on the other hand, involving low levels of conflict, do not have the same status-quo altering potential of wars. Most disputes end in stalemates without much change in the existing status quo. Potential joiner states, therefore, at the beginning of the dispute, ask themselves if they can afford to stay out of the dispute. At the onset of the dispute, it is not necessarily clear to potential joiners of the dispute to what extent that conflict is going to affect their interests and what gains they might expect to derive from it. Potential joiners to ongoing disputes prefer to be bystanders until they decide otherwise. This is not to say that joining disputes is without risk. There is a considerable

³⁵ I implicitly explain a potential joiner's alignment choice in the process of theorizing about their joining behavior. I discuss it explicitly in the "next steps" of the dissertation in the concluding chapter.

uncertainty at the outset of the dispute about how the dispute might evolve and/or expand and third parties have to consider that.

In the following pages, I lay out a theory explaining joining behavior of potential third party states in ongoing disputes. A potential third party state becomes a joiner when it threatens to, displays, or uses force against a state that is already involved in an ongoing dispute. Note that joining is similar to what states that initiate the dispute carry out vis-à-vis each other, the difference being that joining happens after the first day of the dispute. A potential joiner state's decision to enter an ongoing dispute is made in the context of its interactions and relationships with the original disputants, other potential joiners, and actors in the international system at large. These ties between the potential joiner and other actors relevant to the dispute create 'network spaces' across which that dispute can expand.


Network spaces are emergent structures of ties within which potential joiners make their decisions of foreign policy. Their positions in these spaces affect their calculations about how crucial it is for them to militarily join the dispute, and whether they can afford to remain a bystander. These network spaces are akin to ConflictSpace (Flint et al 2009) that maps the physical and social space within which a conflict occurs. Extant literature on diffusion of wars has typically conceptualized the space across which a conflict expands as a smooth physical surface determined by shared boundaries. A war spreads across geographical neighbors. That is, however, only one type of network space determined by contiguity.

Network spaces, constituted by linkages between multiple actors in a particular relationship, are not smooth Euclidian surfaces across which a dispute might expand. These are relational spaces and therefore the structure of the network space depends on the pattern of interactions in that relationship. For example, a network space of military alliances may be

different from that of international trade because the same states that are allied with each other do not necessarily trade exclusively with each other as well. A network space of military alliances may have different implications for a state's joining behavior than a network space of international trade.

These network spaces that provide the context for decision-making for states is not exogenous to those states – they are created by prior decisions of states to interact with other states. Current actions by states are made in the context of their past decisions (Vasquez et al 2011). At the same time, however, that context is also affected by the patterns of interactions between other states constituting the network space. Let us imagine a scenario visualized in Figure 3.1. There are four potential joiners to an ongoing dispute between states E and F – states A, B, C and D. E and F might or might not be part of this network depending on whether they are rivals with each or with one of the potential joiners. For the sake of this example, we assume that neither are E and F rivals, nor do they have that relationship with any of the potential joiners. State B has rivalry relationships with A, C and D; states C and D are also rivals.

Figure 3.1: Hypothetical Rivalry Network of a Dispute



All these rivalries could have been formed by states for factors well documented in the rivalry literature, but the relative position of each of these states in the emergent structure of this rivalry network is a result not only of the choice of state A to engage in a rivalry, but of other states' choices as well. When one analyzes the position of state A vis-à-vis this rivalry network, we find that A's position in the network space is influenced not only by its conscious rivalry with state B, but state B's rivalries with C and D, and C's rivalry with D. A potential joiner state does not necessarily have a lot of discretion over creating a network of its choosing and its position in it. Within the same network space, each state has a different context within which it makes its foreign policy decisions. The network spaces across which a conflict expands are not smooth; the conflict expands to states that have more opportunities and fewer constraints to join the dispute than others. States are not equally positioned in these network spaces i.e. they do not all avail of the same opportunities nor are their behaviors similarly constrained. In Figure 3.1, state B has the most number of rivals than A, C or D. It has the most opportunities to engage in conflict in the network. B's behavior is also the most constrained of all states in the network because it can be targeted for attack by most number of rivals in the network. State A has only one rival in the network and its actions are the least constrained by its rivalry relationships.

There are two aspects to a potential joiner's position in a network space. One is the relative position of the potential joiner vis-à-vis positions of other actors in the network. Second is the position of the potential joiner vis-à-vis the network as a whole. The similarity or dissimilarity of the position of the potential joiner vis-à-vis other relevant actors to the dispute including the original disputants indicates whether they share the same friends and enemies, cooperate economically, and so on. It therefore illustrates whether they are 'close' to each other. The second aspect of locating the potential joiner in the network as a whole indicates how vested

the third party is in its network of interactions and the degree to which its actions are going to be affected by that network.

3.1 Affinity between Potential Joiners and Dispute Initiators

When potential joiner states consider if they can afford to remain uninvolved in the dispute, they consider how ‘close’ they are to the disputants. Two states – potential joiner and a given disputant, may consider themselves quite close to each other if they share similar political, economic, and strategic interests. This sense of ‘affinity’ between the two states does not necessarily need to arise only from direct ties between them, as has been assumed by much of the literature. States that do not share direct relations with each other can still be ‘close’ to each other. For example, India and Brazil have similar patterns of interactions with the same set of countries (which led the two countries to create and strengthen direct ties with each other).

Affinity between states can arise from the relationships they have with other states in international politics. If the two states have similar patterns of ties with the same states and other actors, (i.e. they have the same friends, they have the same enemies, they trade with the same countries and they are members of the same organizations) then they are likely to share similar goals and interests. An ally of an ally is a friend, as is the enemy of an enemy (Maoz et al 2007). Maoz et al (2006) argued that affinity “reflects the extent to which actors are similar to each other in terms of *their relations with other actors*, or in terms of the similarity of their traits, *in relation to other actors’ traits*” (p.665). They show that this kind of affinity produced by relational similarity between two states decreases the likelihood of dyadic conflict breaking out between those two states. When two states have negative affinity with each other, their relational profiles are radically different from each other – both states interact with mutually exclusive sets of states (Maoz 2010). During the Cold War, The US and former Soviet Union shared negative

affinity – none of the states they interacted with (were allied to) had ties to one another. When two states are neither tied to each other, nor are they tied to other states in the network, there is a complete absence of affinity between the two.

International relations scholars typically privilege one dimension of affinity more than others depending on whether they ascribe to the realist or liberal paradigm of the discipline. For realists, military alliances between states indicate a shared sense of “strategic affinity” (Maoz et al 2006; Maoz 2010). States are careful about the terms of the alliance they are committing to and alliance treaties delineate specific conditions under which allies are required to join (Leeds et al 2000). Most alliances are designed to be triggered in the event of war, and not lower level disputes. Nevertheless, an alliance represents an agreement between states about who their friends and enemies are, and a shared notion of how to deal with threats. That kind of strategic affinity does not necessarily need to be an outcome of a direct alliance between two states; it can be the outcome of a similar pattern of alliance commitments as well (Maoz et al 2006; Maoz 2010). A potential joiner is considered to have a high degree of strategic affinity with a disputant when the potential joiner and the disputant have similar patterns of alliances because it shows that they have the same friends with whom they share common security interests. The potential joiner and dispute initiator are likely to share common conceptions of foes, threats and security as well. The US and UK shared a high level of strategic affinity even when they did not have an official military alliance between them.

International relations literature in the liberal paradigm emphasizes economic cooperation and common subscription to international organizations as being the basis for affinity between states. States can be woven into a broader setting of interdependence when they trade with the same countries. Economic affinity between potential joiners and disputants can be reflected in

their interdependence in trade. Similar patterns of trade can either lead the potential joiner and the disputant to cooperate with each other in order to derive mutual gains, or it can lead to competition over the same markets. Initial findings hint at the pacifying influence of economic affinity on dyadic conflict, suggesting that having common trading partners makes states less likely to fight disputes and wars (Maoz et al 2006).

A potential joiner is also likely to share a high degree of affinity with a disputant with whom it has international government organization (IGO) memberships in common. If a potential joiner and a disputant have overlapping memberships in various IGOs, they probably share similar values and goals laid out by those IGOs. Scholarship on the effects of IGOs on conflicts theorize that IGOs are forums of communication for its member states and forge indirect links between states when direct ties are missing (Dorussen and Ward 2008). A potential joiner and a disputant with similar patterns of affiliations to IGOs forge links through these forums and are more amenable to using the IGOs methods of conflict management to resolve tensions. According to Maoz et al (2006) “International affinity is a multilayered concept that encompasses multiple dimensions of dyadic relations” (p.668). The affinity between a potential joiner and a disputant reflects the extent to which they share strategic, economic as well as broader interests tied to their roles in the IGOs of which they are members. This affinity or closeness is borne out of common interests and influences whether a potential joiner chooses to join an ongoing dispute or not.

When the potential third party is faced with the prospect of joining a dispute, it simultaneously assesses its affinity to all actors currently in the dispute. It considers who is involved in the dispute and whether it has mutually shared interests with any or all of them. The resulting (a)symmetry of affinity the potential joiner shares with the parties in the dispute

influences whether it joins an ongoing dispute and on whose side it joins. If it does not share any affinity with both sides of the dispute, then the potential joiner is fairly indifferent to that conflict and its outcome. The potential third party does not perceive that its interests will be affected. Considering that militarily joining a dispute is still relatively costly compared to non-intervention or peaceful conflict management, and that the potential joiner calculates deriving little or no benefits from the outcome of a dispute between states it does not share any interests with, the potential joiner will most likely decide to abstain from joining that ongoing MID.

If the potential joiner shares a high degree of affinity with the disputants of the dispute, then that implies it is facing a dispute between friends. The potential joiner's interests are tightly tied to the dispute because the level of affinity-induced interdependence is high between the potential joiner and the current belligerents. It is in the best interest of the potential joiner to resolve the ongoing dispute between its 'friends' but the potential costs of militarily intervening in the dispute is high because joining the dispute on either side will antagonize the state(s) it does not join. The potential joiner decides that the optimal way to resolve the conflict between its friends is to use non-military conflict management techniques such as mediation, or stay out of the dispute. States that are allies of both sides are popular choices for mediators because they have a vested interest in peacefully resolving the conflict between its friends (Owsiak and Frazier 2012).

Dorussen and Ward (2010) argue that lack of direct trade notwithstanding, a state that has similar trading relations to other states has strong incentive to prevent an escalation of conflict between the latter. A potential joiner that trades with the same countries as both sides of the dispute can serve as an intermediary and can facilitate peaceful conflict management. They may have access to both sides of the dispute and "they are motivated to maintain peace between the

opponents in order to avoid damage to their own trade activity” (p.32). East Asian countries are strongly embedded in both regional and international economic trade. Their concern for maintaining peace between states with which they share high levels of economic affinity is manifested in the security functions their regional economic forums such as the Asean Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF was formed in 1994 as a part of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and included countries such as India, the US and the European Union. It was established to preventively deal with security issues that might potentially disrupt trade ties among member countries.

As long as the potential joiner either cares equally for both sides or is equally indifferent to both sides, the benefits of not militarily joining an ongoing dispute will outweigh the costs of not joining that dispute. The decision-making calculus changes when there is an asymmetry of affinities between the potential joiner and the disputing states - when the potential joiner has a high degree of affinity with one side and a low level of affinity with the opposing side. Corbetta (2007) in a dyadic study of joining behavior in disputes and wars found that joiners intervened in ongoing disputes to support sides with whom they had a similar alliance, trade, and IGO affiliations profiles. If the potential joiner simultaneously shares little or no affinity with the states on the other side of the dispute, then the potential joiner is likely to consider that dispute worthy of its attention. This is because the potential joiner may worry that the ongoing dispute might be detrimental to the side with whom it shares a high degree of affinity, and therefore to their mutual strategic interests. Moreover, the very fact that the potential joiner shares limited affinity with one side implies that they have no common interests to protect and might even be in different strategic blocs (Chi et al 2012).

Potential joiners have a stake in the political, economic, and military well-being of states to whom they are 'close'. The incentives to join an ongoing dispute to preserve those strategic and economic stakes are strong because it may affect (if not sever) interactions in a network space. Aydin (2008) found that for the period between 1870 and 2001, states were highly likely to intervene in conflicts on behalf of their trading partners in order to protect their shared economic interests. Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2006) clustered member-states of IGOs on the basis of how close they are to each other. States that share "common material and ideational traits" (p.8), were in the same "in-groups" within IGOs. They found that members of the same cluster behaved less aggressively toward each other but the probability of militarized conflict reduced as the authors enlarged the clusters. Rephrased in terms of affinity, that is evidence that states that are in the same "in-groups" behave differently with each other than they would with states that they are not similar to.

States are even more concerned when the threat comes from states with which they have no shared interests. Potential joiners share higher levels of affinity with states they feel are similar to them reflected in their common allies, similar trading partners as well as shared membership in international institutions. Although international organizations generally reduce the likelihood of conflict, they are also indicative of the level of similarity between two states (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006). When a potential joiner is similar to a dispute initiator, it is likely to come to its defense when the former is being threatened by a state with which it has no affinity. When states that shares affinity with the potential joiner are involved in a dispute against states with which it does not have anything in common, then the potential joiner calculates that it cannot afford to sit out of the dispute. A potential joiner judges that that dispute is salient enough to jeopardize its shared economic, political, and strategic stakes with the

dispute originators. Although the benefits of not joining exist in terms of not having to undertake the military or diplomatic costs of threatening or undertaking military intervention in a dispute, the costs of not joining the dispute to support the side with whom they share strategic interests with is way too high for inaction. A potential joiner calculates that by joining the dispute it might at best engineer a favorable outcome for itself and the side it is supporting, and at least facilitate a stalemate that preserves the existing status quo.

H1: The larger the difference in affinity (alliance, trade, IGOs) between the potential joiner and both sides of the dispute, the higher the likelihood that the potential joiner will militarily join the MID.

3.2 Constraints on Potential Joiners

The hypothesis outlined above predicts that the times that a potential joiner calculates that its interests are going to be affected sufficiently enough for it to get involved, is when it shares affinity with one side of the dispute and lacks the same with the opposing side of the dispute. Even then, the potential joiner has to take into account not only its relationship with the initial disputants, but with other states relevant to the dispute. Network spaces across which a dispute can spread are constituted by the ties that the potential joiner has with the belligerent states and other states and actors relevant to the dispute. By placing potential joiners in a network of relations that include and move beyond dyadic relations, one can identify how a state's ties with other actors cumulatively position it in a particular network (or several simultaneously). Although most of these network spaces are created by choices of states to have the kind of interactions they do with each other³⁶, the emergent structure of relationships underlying the network spaces, and the potential joiner's cumulative position in it might be unintended unlike what rational choice theorists might argue (Maoz 2010).

³⁶ Contiguity relations are a non-voluntary association between states.

The potential joiner's position denotes its ability to connect different actors and the extent of its access to other states in the network. Its position in the network as a whole, therefore, is both a source of influence over others (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2010) as well as a cause of vulnerability. This type of influence/vulnerability may not be necessarily related to the material capabilities the potential joiner has, but emerges from the ties that connect actors in a network. Whether the position of the potential joiner in a network space is a source of influence or vulnerability depends on the interactions in question. The position of a potential joiner state vis-à-vis the network as a whole indicates the possibilities and constraints that state faces when making a decision to join or refrain from joining an ongoing MID. The political geography literature discusses an actor's "positionality" as reflecting its embeddedness, which is the extent to which that actor's actions are grounded in the relationship structure in which it finds itself (Hess 2004). The potential joiner's embeddedness in its network spaces, therefore, affects its strategic calculations about costs and benefits of abstaining or joining the ongoing dispute.

The only conditions under which a potential joiner decides that it is more costly for them to abstain from entering a dispute than joining it, is when that dispute is between a side with which it shares a high level of affinity, against opponents with whom they have no shared interests. A potential joiner is highly likely to join that dispute in support of the side with which they share a high level of affinity. A potential joiner, however, does not only consider its affinity with the states that initiated the dispute. Even when the benefits of joining the dispute are high because shared interests with one side of the dispute are at stake, the potential joiner also has to consider (a) the reaction of other relevant states to its decision to militarily intervene in a dispute, and (b) whether military action is preferable over other forms of intervention.

When a potential joiner considers conducting any coercive action, it has to be cognizant of how its enemies might react. The possible reaction of its rivals can increase the costs of joining a dispute and make the potential joiner think twice about that decision. The more vulnerable its position vis-à-vis its rivals, the more constraints on the potential joiner from entering a dispute to protect its interests. At the same time, potential joiners also engage in trade with countries and participate in various international organizations. This is not to assume that all states trade substantially with each other or that they are members of all existing international institutions. In fact, the varying level of participation of a potential joiner in international trade is indicative of its level of economic interdependence with other countries in the international community.

Although potential joiners are willing to join ongoing disputes to support their friends and protect their interests, in actuality, their intended or unintended position vis-à-vis their networks of relationships across interstate rivalries, international trade and international organization networks, might exacerbate or mitigate their ability to do so. The remainder of the chapter is divided into three distinct sections that theorize about the effects of a potential joiner's position in the rivalry, trade and international organization networks on their likelihood of joining an ongoing dispute.

3.2.1 Rivalry

The great powers of Europe, such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia and Austria-Hungary, repeatedly engaged in military confrontations against each other in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The last half of the twentieth century, of course, was dominated by tensions and crises between the United States and Soviet Union. These countries have simultaneously been involved in protracted military competitions with other countries, such

as the US against Iraq, and the former Soviet Union with China. Relations between India and Pakistan, Arab countries and Israel, Turkey and Greece and Cyprus have been similarly characterized by crises and wars over the last five decades. These countries perceive each other as enemies; privilege military action as a foreign policy strategy to deal with each other and have therefore engaged in frequent and multiple militarized confrontations with each other. In international conflicts research, these pairs of states are called rivalries.

Research on rivalries and interstate conflicts have found that rival states have engaged in majority of interstate disputes that have been recorded since the nineteenth century (Goertz and Diehl 2000, Colaresi et al 2008). Rivals are those pairs of adversaries who have not managed to settle their issues of contention either peacefully or through an isolated military conflict. Instead, rivals repeatedly use military means against each other as they fight over one or more issues they consider important. This gives rise to a peculiar dynamic between rivals wherein not only do their initial and present confrontations with each other influence their future interactions, but their expectation of future conflicts with each other affects the current tone of their interactions. These pairs of states have obviously failed to resolve their issues through peaceful means or through a single military encounter. Rivals learn how to deal with their enemy from each crisis (Maoz and Mor 2002) and/or “lock-in” strategies for the rivalries (Goertz and Diehl 2000), which affects how their relationship evolves (Hensel 1999). Therefore, rivals fight against each other with at least two motives (1) to achieve an outcome that is unfavorable to their rival, and (2) to show resolve for the future.

Such a conceptualization of a rivalry relationship suggests that a state will take advantage of opportunities it gets to cause harm to its rival. If its rival is involved in a separate ongoing dispute, that presents the state in question an opportunity to join that dispute against their rival

and facilitate an outcome detrimental to their rival. Even if the conflict does not directly concern the issues at stake in their rivalry, a state that is a rival to the disputing state may choose to intervene in that dispute to prevent it from benefiting from an outcome that will potentially impact their own rivalry dynamics. Potential joiners that are rivals to a belligerent are more likely to intervene in that ongoing dispute than those who are not.

Potential joiners, however, may be involved in more than one rivalry. For example, India has two rivals – Pakistan and China; Israel has maintained rivalries with multiple Arab countries simultaneously as did Turkey. The USA and former Soviet Union have been involved in multiple rivalries over the years as have the UK, Germany and France. If a potential joiner has more than one rival, then we can imagine it experiencing the type of dynamic described above with all of its rivals. The potential joiner's rivals have as much a vested interest in its actions as it has in theirs.

If a potential joiner A undertakes a military action against another state B (whether by initiating a dispute or by joining an ongoing dispute), it presents an opportunity to A's rivals C, D and E to intervene in support of state B. When potential joiner A enters an ongoing dispute, it creates a population of potential joiners C, D and E. C, D and E become more likely to join that dispute against their rival A, in support of B even though the issue at stake between A and B might not be of direct relevance to them. That is because they want to prevent a dispute outcome that strengthens A. If potential joiner A is successfully able to safeguard its interests by intervening in a dispute, it increases its ability to show similar resolve in their current and future interactions with C, D and E, thereby affecting A's rivalry dynamics with C, D and E. Israel's central position in the international rivalry network is an appropriate illustration. Israel is so located in the network space that its actions are closely watched by the rest of the network. If

Israel was to join a dispute, then it would trigger a chain reaction of responses by other rivals in the network.

Therefore, while making the decision to join an ongoing dispute, a potential joiner has to consider (1) whether it has any rivals and (2) its rivals' potential reactions to its decision to intervene in an ongoing dispute. Although states in a rivalry care more about hurting each other than about benefiting themselves (Colaresi et al 2008), they also attempt to strike a balance between preventing gains to their rival and minimizing costs of escalation to themselves. A military intervention by the potential joiner in an ongoing dispute can set off military actions by its rivals because they want to bring about an outcome that is unfavorable to the potential joiner.

The potential joiner's position in a rivalry network space represents its location as the common linkage between ongoing rivalries in the system. In network terms, this is called centrality (Wasserman and Faust 1997; Maoz et al 2007; Flint et al 2009; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2010). The more embedded or central the potential joiner in the rivalry network space the more rivalries it connects and the greater the risk that by joining a dispute it will provoke a chain reaction in the network as well. A potential joiner's centrality in the rivalry network space is indicative of its visibility as a potential target of attack. Being positioned as a linkage between multiple ongoing rivalries in the system means that the potential joiner has to factor in not only states who are already part of the conflict but also the potential reactions of rivals in the network. In this sense, a highly embedded potential joiner's entering the ongoing conflict 'activates' connected rivalries. The potential joiner has to evaluate the trade-off between the benefits of entering a conflict to protect its interests and the costs to itself as a visible target for its rivals. The potential joiner's costs of entering a dispute become expensive the more rivalries it connects to one another. For a centrally positioned potential joiner in the rivalry

network, the benefits of not joining the dispute seem to outweigh the costs of not joining that dispute.

Conversely, a marginally positioned potential joiner in the rivalry network is not the common linkage between multiple interstate rivalries. It does not have to bother about the reactions of its rivals when making the choice to join an ongoing dispute. A potential joiner that is marginally positioned in an inherently conflictual network of rivalries has fewer constraints on its decision-making to join/not join because it does not have to worry about triggering joining behaviors by other rivals presumably against itself.

A potential joiner at the periphery of the rivalry network, however, is not merely going to join an ongoing dispute because it does not have enemies to be concerned about. It is going to consider its affinity or lack thereof with states involved in the dispute. Potential joiners to an ongoing dispute typically prefer to stay on the sidelines unless the costs of not joining outweigh the benefits of abstaining from intervention. Only when they have strong motivation to protect strategic, political and economic interests they share with states similar to themselves, unfettered by constraints stemming from presence of rivals, do potential joiners intervene in ongoing disputes.

The potential joiner will have little motivation to join conflicts where it has low levels of affinity with both sides of the dispute, even when it has the positional advantage of being marginal to the rivalry network. Similarly, although a potential joiner has low rivalry centrality, it will have no motivation to join a conflict between two sides, if it enjoys a high level of affinity with both the opponents. Even if the potential joiner does not have to concern itself with the reactions of rival states, it will deem the cost of military intervention in a dispute between friends to be high. A move to join that dispute would likely antagonize one or both sides of the dispute.

Although the potential joiner is not constrained by the presence of multiple rivals, it has to be mindful of protecting the shared interests it has with states on both sides of the dispute. It marshals the strong impetus to manage a crisis between friends by choosing non-military means of intervention.

A potential joiner that is more centrally positioned in the rivalry network than the other states is likely to respond to disputes between states with which it shares similarly high levels of affinity in a manner similar to potential joiners that are marginally positioned in the rivalry network. In both scenarios, the presence or absence of rivalries would not matter to the potential joiner. It cares too much about both sides of the dispute and does not want to jeopardize that by using military means of resolving a conflict between friends.

Third party states have a strong motivation to eschew a bystander role to an ongoing dispute and join it when states with which they share a high degree of affinity are already involved against states with which they share little or no affinity. In this scenario, potential joiners want to protect the mutual interests they share with the side they have affinity with against a side with which they have no common or even opposing interests. The incentive to become a joiner in this kind of ongoing dispute becomes stronger or weaker depending on the degree of centrality of the potential third party in the rivalry network. The potential joiner in such cases of 'asymmetric affinity' calculates the costs of not joining the dispute to be higher than the benefits of not joining. This calculus is accentuated if the potential joiner is marginal to the rivalry network. When the potential joiner is not centrally positioned in the rivalry network, it is less concerned about the reverberations of its actions in the network. It is less constrained by the reactions of its rivals when making the choice to join the MID. When faced with an ongoing dispute between states that that potential joiner shares a high level of affinity with, against a side

that it does not share any interests with, a potential joiner with low rivalry centrality chooses to join the dispute.

A centrally positioned potential joiner in the rivalry network faces a more complicated political calculation when faced with an ongoing dispute between a side with which it enjoys a high level of affinity against a side with which it has low levels of affinity. On the one hand, that potential joiner also has a strong incentive to join the dispute to protect its interests that are tied to the state with which it shares positive affinity. On the other hand, however, as a central actor in the rivalry network, the potential joiner is the common link between rivalries in the network. It is the focus of that network but this is a source of vulnerability. Rivalries are long-standing zero-sum militarized competitions between states. A centrally positioned potential joiner is a visible and prominent target of attack by more states in that rivalry network than other less centrally positioned states.

Therefore, the potential joiner's central position in the rivalry network space poses a dilemma for that state in ongoing disputes in which it shares a high level of affinity with one side and low levels of affinity with the other. The potential joiner in this scenario on the one hand is highly motivated to join the dispute because it thinks the dispute affects the strategic interests it shares with one side of the dispute. On the other hand, its willingness to join the MID is mitigated by the potentially hostile reactions of its rivals. The potential actions and reactions of its numerous rivals in that network limit the autonomy with which that potential joiner can make certain decisions such as joining an ongoing dispute to protect its strategic interests. Its centrality in a 'network of conflict,' counter-intuitively, makes the benefits of not joining a conflict to support a side with which it shares a high level of affinity, higher than the costs of not joining that dispute.

H2: the more central the potential joiners in the rivalry network, the less likely they will be to join an ongoing MID.

The potential joiner in such a scenario is likely to play the waiting game as long as possible before joining the dispute. Its entry into the dispute in support of the side it shares a high degree of affinity with can trigger off joining behavior by its rivals against it, increasing the scope of the dispute and potentially escalating it to war.³⁷

Earlier in the chapter I argue that a potential joiner prefers to stand on the sidelines of an ongoing dispute unless given strong incentive to join. High centrality in the rivalry network makes an already wary potential joiner more reluctant to enter any dispute. It dampens likelihood of joining even when there is a strong incentive present by way of protecting dispute initiator with whom it has a high level of affinity, from countries with whom it has nothing in common.

All these propositions provide interesting insights into the way international relations scholars have traditionally dealt with the concept of power. Power in international relations has a material basis, meaning it is a way of coercion and influence over other's actions emanating from that state possessing important resources relative to others. Hafner-Burton et al (2010) engage this notion of power and argue that an actor's relative position in a network formed by ties provides another important source of influence over others. The propositions put forth here, however, complicate both the conventional as well as the network concepts of power. An actor's centrality in a network does not always have to necessarily be an origin of power. In adversarial networks, such as networks of rivalry and conflict, that very centrality of an actor actually makes it vulnerable vis-à-vis other actors in the network. A potential joiner that is central to the rivalry

³⁷ In a dispute fought between two sides both of whom share no affinity with the potential joiner, the latter does not care enough about the disputants to be bothered to intervene in that conflict. The potential joiner's central position in the rivalry network, however, may lead it being targeted and joining an ongoing dispute in which it would not ordinarily have any interest in joining.

network (common link between ongoing rivalries in the network) is more constrained in its decision to join an ongoing dispute even when its interests are at stake. It has to consider what its rivals might do if it were to undertake any military action. Joining a dispute is likely to trigger a sequence of joining by its rivals against it and would cause it more harm than benefit. Therefore, its centrality in a conflictual network like rivalry actually makes it more susceptible to influence by other states.

3.2.2 Trade

A trade network represents the presence (and/or volume) or absence of exchange of goods and services between states at a given point of time. A potential joiner's position in that structure of relationships is defined by its trading relationships with other states in the system. There are two aspects to the position that a potential joiner (or any state) occupies in the network of international trade. One describes the extent to which it has similar or dissimilar patterns of trading interactions with states that started the dispute that it is considering joining. As has been argued earlier in the chapter, if a potential joiner has the same trading partners as the dispute initiator(s) then that produces affinity between the two states. The more similar the pattern of economic ties between the potential joiner and the dispute initiators, the higher the level of affinity between them and the greater the former's stake in the dispute in progress. If that dispute is between a side with which it has high level of affinity against a side with which it has a low level of affinity, the incentive for the potential joiner to not be a bystander and intervene in the dispute is strong.

The second aspect of a potential joiner's position in the international trading network describes its position with respect to the network as a whole. It indicates the extent to which a potential joiner is embedded in international trading relations [its level of (inter)dependence on

international trade]. A potential joiner that is deeply embedded in the network space based on international trading relations has multiple trading partners and trades more than other countries in the network. In 1929, the UK and US had the most number of trading partners amongst all the countries in the trading network and were the most embedded actors in that network that year. How does a potential joiner's embeddedness or centrality in the international trading network space enable or constrain its calculus about joining an ongoing dispute? In other words, does it exacerbate or mitigate the imperative created by its affinity to one side of the dispute and lack of it for the opposing side?

There is sparse literature on the effects of a state's trading patterns on its likelihood to intervene in ongoing conflicts. Plenty of conflict research, however, has been devoted to examining the pacifying effects of bilateral trade, as well as a state's general economic openness to trading with different countries, on conflict initiation. We can make some inferences about how a potential joiner's level of embeddedness in the trade network affects its decision to engage in an ongoing dispute in the system. In liberal arguments, trade ties between countries are cooperative and lower the likelihood of dispute or war initiation within a dyad. Bilateral trade has this dampening effect on conflict because it makes countries that trade, dependent on one another. Countries that trade with one another derive mutual benefits from that economic interdependence and have an interest in protecting it from disruption. Trade creates an economic self-interest towards peace among trading partners, which makes them more likely to resolve any tension or disagreement between them peacefully (Russett and Oneal 2001, Doyle 1986; Oneal and Russett 1997). Not only does bilateral trade create an economic incentive to maintain peace and/or to resolve disagreements non-violently, but as states engage more with other states, trade also opens channels of communication and creates an understanding between states (Dorussen

and Ward 2010). Trade linkages create or facilitate conditions that make managing tensions or preventing conflicts peacefully easier. Economic interdependence engendered by bilateral trade between two countries not only makes initiation of a militarized dispute or war within that dyad unlikely, it also has a pacifying effect on conflict proneness of states. Barbieri (1999) found evidence of a pacifying effect of trade on a country's proclivity for participating in disputes.³⁸ Maoz et al (2007) confirmed that the more trading ties a country had in a particular year, the less likely it is to initiate a dispute -- states that trade with multiple countries are "more constrained and less inclined to break these ties by fighting other states." They were less prone to resolve problems by using military strategies. As a state becomes more central in the network of trade ties, the likelihood that it is involved in a conflict that year declines (ibid.).

With states engaging in trade in larger volumes and with a more diverse set of partners than ever before, their embeddedness in international trading networks have become more influential in tempering the conflict proneness of states (Dorussen and Ward 2010). That has important implications for a potential joiner's inclination to join an ongoing dispute. A potential joiner that is deeply embedded in international trading networks is an active trader such that it trades with several states, connects trading partners to each other, and might even be crucial to trade routes and flow of goods, services and information in the network. Some recent examples of countries so positioned in the international trading network are China, Japan, South Korea and India. A centrally located potential joiner in the international trading network has economic interests that are more widespread and therefore it has high stakes in protecting those interests. At the same time, the potential joiner's economic interdependence in that network creates an economic incentive to maintain peace in its network. A potential joiner that is central to the

³⁸ Cited in Barbieri and Schneider (1999). Even though Barbieri (1996; 2002) argues that at the dyadic level of analysis, trade interactions between two states do not guarantee peaceful relations between them, she finds a dampening effect of trade at the national level of analysis.

trading network is heavily invested in that network and would not want a dispute to disrupt it. That potential joiner simultaneously feels the need to manage any disagreement in the network that might jeopardize its trading interests while managing that conflict using non-military strategies. A potential joiner with high trade centrality would be very concerned that a conflict among countries in the network might create negative externalities including possible loss of trade or disruption of trading activities (Oneal and Russett 1999a; 1999b). By the same logic, it is also concerned about resolving that dispute peacefully and preserving the trade connections of the network. The occurrence of a dispute between countries in the network may not immediately jeopardize international trade but it has the potential to disrupt the network (a) if it escalates, and (b) by creating negative externalities that affects trading partners of the countries involved in the dispute.

The more a potential joiner trades with other countries, the more economically vested it is in that network of international trade. That makes the potential joiner an important economic player in the network. As the most engaged actor in the trading network, a centrally located potential joiner might wield economic power vis-à-vis other states in the system. It has access to more economic opportunities than other states in the network and that gives it several opportunities for coercion as well. It would have other ways of managing a dispute than by joining it, such as using its diplomatic ‘good offices’ or wielding its coercive economic power. Even when the dispute is salient enough for a potential joiner with high trade centrality to want to take action i.e. it is a dispute between two sides with which it shares high levels of affinity, or between states with which it simultaneously shares high and low levels of affinity, its position in the network incentivizes non-military conflict management.³⁹ If the potential joiner is marginal

³⁹ When the potential joiner has no shared interests with either side of the ongoing dispute i.e. it has low levels of affinity with both sides of the dispute, it is unlikely to join that conflict. If that potential joiner is also centrally positioned in the

to the trade network, it will accrue low benefits from international trade and it will be less constrained to use military action in an ongoing dispute. The probability of a potential joiner joining in support or against a side or refraining from an ongoing dispute will not change much if the potential joiner is not a focal state in the trade network.

On the one hand, I argue that a potential joiner's position in the network vis-à-vis the states that initiated a dispute produces differing levels of affinity between them. The larger the gap in affinities between a potential joiner and opposing sides of the dispute, the more likely the former is to join that dispute to protect its stakes. On the other hand, however, a potential joiner's embeddedness in the international trade network as a whole has a pacifying effect on its inclination to use coercive strategies to manage disputes in the trade network. Although, it is concerned about the disruptive effects of an ongoing dispute and its possible escalation, its central location in the international trade network gives it the power to use diplomatic or economically coercive resources to intervene without military force in that dispute.

H3: the more central the potential joiners in the trade network, the less likely they will be to join an ongoing dispute.

A potential joiner's centrality in a network of trade relationships has the same restraining effect on the likelihood of joining as its centrality in a network of rivalries, but for different reasons. Centrality in international rivalries network reflected the potential joiner's vulnerability as a target of attack. Centrality based on trade linkages between countries arguably bequeaths upon the potential joiner a position of prominence and network power (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2010). An actor that is central to the international trading network has a diverse set of trading partners; it has access to multiple markets, is crucial to trade routes, and links

trade network space, it is concerned about the negative effects of that conflict on international trade. It desires for that conflict to be managed but is not likely to do so militarily.

countries and facilitates the exchange of goods, services, and information. Its position in international trade not only makes it interested in minimizing disruption in that network but also inclines it to choose non-violent conflict management strategies that will not threaten trading connections. It can wield its economic power to that end through economic sanctions and so on and restrain conflict behavior in the network.

3.2.3 Memberships in International Governmental Organizations

Earlier in the chapter I theorized that the extent to which a potential joiner and dispute initiators are members of the same regional and international organizations (along with having the same allies and trading partners) shows the degree to which those states are similar. That homophily produces a high level of affinity between the potential joiner and the dispute originator, and therefore makes the former more likely to join a dispute in support of the latter in the event that that conflict is with a non-homophilous dispute initiator. A potential joiner's position vis-à-vis the dispute originators in a network space that maps out memberships of countries to the international institutions produces a sense of affinity that makes the potential joiner want to join a conflict to protect a similar state. How does a potential joiner's position in the structure of affiliations to IGOs as a whole affect their joining behavior in an ongoing dispute? This project argues that a potential joiner's centrality in this international organizations network that both indicates the number of international institutions it is affiliated to, and its position vis-à-vis the members of those institutions, creates constraints on the decision to join an ongoing dispute to support a similar side against an opponent.

Along with democracy and trade interdependence, liberal arguments in conflict research posit that international organizations temper the likelihood of its members to get involved in conflicts. They envision that as the world becomes more integrated and connected through

international trade and shared memberships in international organizations, states will be less inclined to carry out military action against other states (Russett and Oneal 2001). International organizations may have a direct impact on state behavior or it may create connections between states within which they can communicate, identify common interests and solve disagreements. By reducing uncertainty by facilitating information flows between its members, they facilitate bargaining and allow states to make credible commitments to manage a disagreement. They may even act as “norm entrepreneurs” by teaching states ‘appropriate’ values and behaviors, building trust among members and socializing them into defining their interests in terms of a shared identity (Pevehouse and Russett 2006). These institutions provide an alternative for military action to states and/or provide a peaceful means of resolving a conflict. IGOs have these effects because they provide opportunities for “mutual interaction, socialization, and information transfer” (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2010). IGOs may also promote trade and thus indirectly create interdependence between states that reduce their conflict proneness (Russett and Oneal 2001).

Arguably, not all international institutions can have such strong and direct effects on how a state shapes its interests and how it behaves vis-à-vis other states. In fact, Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom (2004) suggest that only institutionalized IGOs with an explicit security mandate might be effective in pacifying its member states. Dorussen and Ward (2008), however, show that *all* IGOs are able to offer ‘pacifying’ benefits to its member states.⁴⁰ They argue that more than direct effects, IGOs create ties between states that allow them to communicate effectively. Member states are able to use their linkages through the IGOs to transmit information about their intentions and resolve disagreements. IGOs enables members to form indirect links to each other

⁴⁰ They did not find the pacifying effects of indirect ties within IGOs with a purely security mandate to be stronger than the rest of IGOs.

through third parties, and these indirect links can substitute for direct links when there are none between two members, or can be brought to arbitrate when those direct ties are being disrupted (ibid.). Diplomatic efforts to manage military tensions between India and Pakistan at the margins of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) illustrate how an IGO can facilitate the exchange of information in the absence of direct ties. Even though SAARC is weakly institutionalized and does not have a security mandate, it provided a common forum for India and Pakistan. SAARC was not an official mediator but it had a latent confidence-building function in relation to the India-Pakistan conflict.

An IGO network represents memberships of states to different IGOs. The position of a potential dispute joiner in this sort of affiliation-based network space indicates the number of IGOs it is a member of and its ability to connect states within those organizations. Existing scholarship tells us that IGOs have pacifying effects on conflict by allowing member-states to communicate information and facilitate bargaining, providing them with mechanisms to resolve disputes, and define their understanding of identity and self-interest in a cooperative and non-military framework. Therefore, the more ties a state has to those organizations the more it will feel those effects. Potential joiners that are deeply embedded in the IGO network i.e. they have numerous ties to IGOs (and therefore to other member states) are socialized into norms of bargaining and reciprocity (instead of fighting and coercion) to achieve an outcome. The IGO network, therefore, manifests social capital that it can bring to bear on the countries in the network and especially on centrally positioned states (Ward 2006).

Moreover, If IGOs generate indirect links between disconnected states and providing opportunities for communication and mediation, as Dorussen and Ward (2008) claim, then the more central a potential joiner to the IGO network, the more it will be able to partake of those

opportunities. Its memberships in various IGOs will make it likely that it will be one of indirect links that is tapped to mediate or arbitrate a conflict between member-states. A potential joiner that is central in the IGO network will be able to use the social capital embodied in the structure of the network space to exert its influence over other states particularly those engaging in a dispute. A potential joiner with high IGO centrality is in a position to connect states and efficiently relay information between them. That makes them effective mediators for those states. That is especially crucial when parties to a conflict do not have strong direct ties to each other (Dorussen and Ward 2008).

When states are members of the same organizations, they encounter each other frequently and that gives them multiple opportunities to reach a mutual understanding of their identity and interests. A similar profile of affiliations to the same institutions produces a level of affinity between the potential joiner and the dispute initiator(s) that makes the former more likely to join a conflict to support the latter against a threat by a state with which it has no similarities. A potential joiner, however, is constrained by its positionality in the IGO network space on the whole. A potential joiner that is affiliated to multiple international organizations is exposed to the current 'appropriate' norms of reasonable behavior in the system. A conflict between states in the network can be disruptive to the network and a centrally located potential joiner is well positioned to wield the social capital inherent in the IGO network to either actively mediate that conflict or at least provide a channel of communication between the disputants. Considering that a potential joiner with high IGO centrality is socialized into bargaining than military action as a way of resolving a conflict, it is unlikely to threaten or use force and join a dispute in progress.

H4: the more central that potential joiners are in the IGO network, the less likely they will be to join an ongoing dispute.

Table 3.1 summarizes the predictions made in this chapter. The next chapter describes how to empirically test this explanation. I have to operationalize the outcome of interest (joining) and key explanatory concepts while keeping in mind that joining by third party states is a rare phenomenon and that states make decisions dependent on the actions and reactions of other states in the system.

Table 3.1: Summary of Hypotheses

Hypotheses	Likelihood of Joining
Difference in affinity between potential joiner and both sides of a dispute (alliances, trade, IGO memberships)	High
Centrality of potential joiners in the rivalry network	Low
Centrality of potential joiners in the trade network	Low
Centrality of potential joiners in the IGO network	Low

4. Research Design

In this chapter, I lay out a research design that operationalizes the key concepts integral to testing the theoretical model. It also employs the correct analytical method for modeling rare events for the type of (dichotomous) dependent variable used in this project (elaborated in a following section). This project also moves the level of analysis away from the dyad and is able to account for a potential joiner's decision to join being influenced by its interactions with the dispute initiators, joiners, and other potential joiners to the ongoing dispute.

Modeling Interdependence between Potential Joiners

Out of 2,332 recorded disputes in the MID dataset, only 224 disputes expanded beyond their initiators. Thus, only 9.6% of disputes experience joining by third party states. Clearly, MID do not expand often and joining ongoing disputes is a rare occurrence. A review of existing literature on diffusion of wars and intervention shows that scholars in this research area have not, theoretically and methodologically, been able to handle the rarity of dispute expansion and joining behavior.⁴¹ If regime type (democracy), regime similarity (democratic joiner joins democratic dispute initiator), relative power asymmetry, geographical proximity, and alliance with a belligerent, make a third party state highly likely to join that conflict then in actuality why do they rarely do so (Altfeld & Bueno de Mesquita 1979, Siverson and Starr 1991, Leeds 2004, Gartzke & Gleditsch 2003, Corbetta and Dixon 2005, Werner and Lemke 1997)?

The diffusion of war literature, as well as studies of interventions in disputes and wars, has over-predicted occurrences of joining behavior in interstate conflicts. The most common way in which these two bodies of scholarship have designed their research is to disaggregate each

⁴¹ King and Zeng (2001a; 2001b) proved that logit analyses in large datasets where non-events vastly outnumber events of interest do not provide accurate estimates of the probability of that event occurring. I review their prescription for estimating logits in rare events dataset later in the chapter and use their recommendations in my research design.

dispute into originator-joiner dyadic observations. Breaking down disputes in such a way makes the data easier to manage but it detracts from accurately capturing the multilateral processes of dispute expansion (Croco and Teo 2005). These studies only consider states that joined the dispute or war. They do not consider other states that did not join, but whose decisions about the ongoing dispute are relevant to the decisions of states that did join the dispute. This way of structuring data assumes that a joiner makes the decision to become part of an ongoing dispute by only referring to its relationship with states already in the conflict. This type of design also assumes that each joiner's decision to enter the dispute is independent of the decisions of other (if any) joiners of the dispute. Such a research design builds into it the assumption that a joiner makes its decision to enter an ongoing dispute independent of its interactions with the opposing side of the dispute.

In order to capture joining behavior in ongoing interstate disputes accurately, one has to explain why potential joiners enter the dispute when they do and why they rarely do so, while accounting for their joining behavior influenced by their interactions with other states relevant to that dispute. In the previous chapter, I outlined and developed a theoretical explanation for (a) why some potential third parties join ongoing disputes, while others do not, and (b) why potential third parties join certain ongoing disputes but not others. An interstate dispute is conceptualized as a political process dependent on the actions and reactions of not only the states fighting it but also other states relevant to the conflict that might not be actively involved in it. For example, a dispute between North Korea and South Korea is not just a result of their decisions to threaten or use force against each other. It is also influenced by how countries such as the US, China or Japan might react and their decision to participate in that conflict. These

states are third parties to an ongoing dispute and whether a conflict expands or not is influenced by their joining behavior.

In contrast to existing literature on diffusion of wars and intervention in disputes, I take into account that potential joiners consider not only their interactions with the dispute initiators, but with other potential joiners to the dispute as well. Conceptually, this research places the potential joiner in multiple and simultaneous networks of interactions with the originators of the dispute, other potential joiners, as well as the international community as a whole. These networks are the context in which the potential joiner assesses the salience of the ongoing dispute and the extent to which it can remain a bystander to the dispute without it jeopardizing its interests.

Identifying Potential Joiners to Disputes

A record of ongoing disputes can be found in the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) dataset. A MID is coded as any occurrence of threat, display, or of use of military force between two or more countries in the 1816-2001 time period (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004). The participant-level version of the MIDs dataset (MIDB v.3.1) breaks down each recorded dispute in the period between 1816 and 2001, into its ‘originators’/‘initiators’ and ‘joiners’ (if any). Countries that participate in the dispute on the first day of the dispute are the originators of that dispute (“orig” = 1). A MID is considered as having expanded if additional states join the dispute *after the first day* by undertaking militarized action against any of the originators of the dispute. These states are considered as joiners of that dispute (“orig” = 0). States that undertake militarized or coercive actions against countries that have already joined the dispute are also considered to be joiners of that dispute. For example, a dispute begins on 6th April 1863 by the United Kingdom (UK) using force against Japan. The UK and Japan are coded as the originators

of that dispute. This dispute continues until 17th August 1863. Meanwhile, on 20th July 1863, the US and France join Britain by threatening to use force against Japan as well. The US and France are coded as joiners of that dispute.⁴²

The primary research question motivating this dissertation is why some potential joiner-states join ongoing interstate conflicts leading those disputes to expand beyond their initiators. The MID dataset, however, does not contain information on states that could have joined the dispute but did not. That question cannot be answered by only identifying countries that joined an ongoing dispute. I also need to know the population of states who did not get involved in the dispute but could have. I need to identify those states and then test hypotheses about what makes them more or less likely to join that dispute. The unit of analysis is the potential joiner state to an ongoing dispute. This dissertation seeks to examine the likelihood of a potential joiner joining an ongoing dispute. Therefore, the dependent variable is binary – if a potential joiner joins an ongoing dispute, it is coded as join = 1; if the potential joiner does not join the dispute, it is coded as join = 0. Those potential joiners that appear as joiners in the participant-level MID dataset (“orig”=0) were coded as join = 1 and those potential joiners that were not recorded as joiners in the MID dataset were coded as join = 0.

It is unrealistic to assume that all countries in the international community are potential joiner states to a dispute occurring between two or more countries somewhere in the world. Most countries are too far away from the conflict and/or are too weak militarily to intervene in that dispute. Many also have very few serious interests in that conflict for them to plausibly join that

⁴² Disputes can begin as dyadic (i.e. having two originators) or as multi-party (i.e. with more than two originators). 93% of all disputes recorded in the MID dataset were initiated as dyadic disputes. Although the author realizes that the manner in which a dispute is initiated (i.e. between two states or multi-party) will potentially affect the way the conflict evolves (in this case how it expands), this project does not differentiate between the two. The focus of this dissertation is on how the potential joiner’s decision to join/not join a particular dispute is influenced by its interactions with the originators of dispute (no matter how many they are) and with other states relevant to the dispute. The manner in which a dispute is initiated is a question related to that but does not distract from it.

dispute (Maoz and Russett 1993). Mexico, for instance, would neither have any interest nor the capacity to be a potential joiner in a conflict occurring in South Asia between India and Pakistan. Mexico, however, would be a potential joiner for a dispute in its neighborhood. The US, on the other hand, has the capabilities and stakes in different parts of the world and is a potential joiner in any dispute going on in the world.

This project uses two criteria to identify potential joiners for each dispute – a potential joiner needs to be a major power for the year that the dispute is taking place and/or it is a neighbor to at least one of the originators of the dispute. The basis of identifying potential joiners for each ongoing dispute reflects the “politically relevant dyad” criterion made popular in international conflict research by Maoz (1996). There is considerable evidence establishing that major power status and contiguity are two strong correlates of war. States that are contiguous to each other or where one of the states is a major power, are more likely to experience conflict with each other than those that do not share those characteristics (Maoz 1996). Furthermore, Lemke and Reed (2001) found that measurement error and selection bias introduced by using the “politically relevant dyad” criteria is “relatively small and substantively unimportant.” Analyses of interstate conflicts using the major power and contiguity criteria do not lead to erroneous estimation. “Politically relevant dyads” have a non-zero probability of conflict breaking out between them. I can reasonably extrapolate from this finding that states that are major powers at the time of the dispute and/or that are neighbors with one or all of the originators of the dispute can plausibly join that conflict and are therefore “politically relevant” to that conflict.

First, I identify all the major powers who are potential joiners for each MID in the dataset. I identify those states that were designated as major powers by the Correlates of War (COW) in the year that the dispute started, as potential joiners. For example, the US became a

major power on 13th August 1898 and continues to be so till this day. The US is a potential joiner in all interstate disputes that have occurred from 13th August 1898 onwards. Germany, Italy and Japan lost their major power status after their defeat in the Second World War and ceased to be potential joiners to disputes that did not involve their neighbors.⁴³ China was designated a major power in the COW list of major powers in 1950 and transitioned from being a potential joiner in a dispute in its neighborhood to having stakes in disputes taking place across the world.

The next step is to identify potential joiner states that are contiguous to the originators of the disputes in the dataset. The participant-level MIDs dataset lists out originator states for all the disputes. Using the Direct Contiguity dataset (Stinnett et al 2002), I identify states that neighbor at least one of the originators of the dispute the year that the dispute started. The Direct Contiguity dataset has five categories of contiguity ranging from states sharing a land or river border to states separated by 400 miles of water. Potential joiners to an ongoing dispute are those states that either share a land or river border or are separated from at least one of the originator states by no more than 150 miles of water (contiguity types 1, 2, 3 and 4).⁴⁴

The “politically relevant” criteria for identifying potential joiners yielded 3,601 potential joiners for the 224 disputes that expanded beyond their originators. Out of 3,601 potential joiners, 463 states actually joined ongoing disputes (joining = 1). The “politically relevant” criteria of a potential joiner being either a major power or a neighbor of an originator state does not capture 118 acts of joining across forty-two disputes. The “politically relevant” criteria

⁴³ Germany and Japan regained their major power distinction in 1991. Italy lost its major power status at the end of the Second World War and has not regained it. The United Kingdom (UK) has maintained its major power status from 1816 onwards. France was a major power from 1816 onwards as well but temporarily lost its designation during the Second World War (1940-1945). The former Soviet Union was a major power from 1816 to 1917 and then from 1922 onwards. Austria-Hungary was a major power in 1816-1917 period. China has been designated as a major power by the Correlates of War since 1950.

⁴⁴ States that are separated from the dispute initiators by more than 150 miles of water (Contiguity type 5) are not considered as potential joiners to that dispute. Those states are far away and are unlikely to have interests in or capacity to intervene in the dispute in progress.

captured some of the joiners in those disputes, but third parties that were neither major powers nor neighbors of the originators joined those disputes as well. Considering that states rarely join ongoing disputes, exclusion of 118 observations of joining is potentially worrisome. A closer look at the data is warranted.

68 out of the 118 acts of joining that were not captured by the “politically relevant” selection criteria occurred in disputes that were initiated as wars.⁴⁵ Notably, the Korean War of 1950 is not included in our analyses because it began with a declaration of war. Fourteen out of the forty-two disputes were initiated as wars. Wars are the most hostile militarized confrontations between states. They arguably have more far-reaching regional or global repercussions than militarized disputes that are initiated at lower levels of hostility.

Wars, because of their magnitude and severity, may affect states that otherwise would not choose to get involved in a lower level dispute. States that are not major powers or contiguous to an ongoing dispute have no plausible stakes or capacity to threaten, display or use force against or in support of originators of a short-of-war dispute. On the other hand, war outcomes can alter the status quo or stakes not only for states fighting the conflict but their larger neighborhood, and therefore states that are indirectly connected to them (ally of ally; enemy of enemy and so on) and internationally. Even states that would otherwise not have any interest in a region or countries so far removed from them geographically and relationally may be likely to join an ongoing war to assure an outcome that would at best benefit and at least not adversely affect their interests. Some states may join to fight their own private wars against one of the states involved in the ongoing war (Vasquez 1993); they may derive some benefits from bandwagoning with a warring side and so on (Valeriano and Vasquez 2010). Disputes initiated as wars, therefore, may experience acts of joining by some states that would not join lower-level

⁴⁵ The first day of those disputes were wars.

disputes.⁴⁶ “Politically relevant” criteria of potential joiners to ongoing disputes do not identify some of those joiners.

Data Setup for Large-n Rare Events with Binary Dependent Variable

To summarize our data thus far, 9.6% of 2,332 disputes recorded in the MID dataset expand or experience at least one joining by a potential joiner. The 224 disputes that expand beyond their originators generated 3,601 observations of potential joiners in which a potential joiner is identified as a major power or neighbor of at least one of the originators. Out of 3,601 potential joiners to 224 disputes, 463 acts of joining actually took place (joining =1), which is 12.9% of potential joiner observations. There are 2108 disputes between 1816 and 2001 that do not experience joining by a third party state. If each dispute has approximately sixteen “politically relevant” potential joiners, then the remaining 2108 disputes that remain restricted to their originators will yield 33,728 observations of potential joiners.⁴⁷ The dependent variable shall be coded as joining = 0 for all those observations because none of those 2108 disputes expanded after their initiation. Consequently, the total number of potential joiners in this dataset will be around 37,321 (3,601 + 33,728) and approximately only 1.2% of those states (463) would have actually joined ongoing disputes.

The size of the dataset, the rarity of third party joining in ongoing militarized disputes and the scale of the dependent variable (binary, dichotomous) present a problem for data management and statistical analysis not altogether uncommon for international conflict research.

King and Zeng (2001a; 2001b) point out that although logistic regression is the only suitable

⁴⁶ The remaining 50 acts of joining that the “politically relevant dyad” criteria do not capture are from 28 disputes. Five of those disputes occurred between Spain, Peru and Colombia between 1846 and 1864. Chile joined all those disputes but because the Direct Contiguity dataset does not code Chile as a neighbor of any of the South American dispute initiators before 1883, the “politically relevant dyad” criteria does not identify Chile as a potential joiner for those disputes. Australia and Canada top the list of potential joiners not captured by the “politically relevant” criteria – they joined ongoing disputes six times each. For a complete list of acts of joining not identified by the “politically relevant” criteria, please refer to the Appendix.

⁴⁷ 224 expanded disputes generated 3,601 observations at an average of 16 potential joiners per dispute.

statistical procedure for analyzing data with binary dependent variable, it creates substantive problems in large binary rare events datasets. In logistic regression of rare events data, observations of dependent variable, joining = 0 will outweigh the small percentage of dependent variable, joining = 1 and will bias the logit coefficients. Logit coefficients cannot be neatly interpreted in terms of its effect on the likelihood of the dependent variable occurring. More importantly, in datasets such as the one I am working with in this project, where the number of non-events (joining =0) vastly outnumber joining events =1, logit underestimates the probability of the occurrence of that event (ibid). Considering that the research question motivating the dissertation demands that the dependent variable be binary and the use of logistic regression, I have to look for ways to correct the biases that logit modeling introduces in large dichotomously coded rare events data. King and Zeng (2001a; 2001b) suggest a three steps correction. First, I have to circumscribe the large data by using an appropriate sampling strategy. Second, I have to run a modified version of logit called “relogit” that allows correcting for selecting on the dependent variable. Third, I have to apply post-estimate corrections to the constant term after running the logit regression.

The ability of statistical procedures such as logit regression to estimate the probability of an event accurately decreases as that event becomes rare. King and Zeng (2001a; 2001b) recommend using case control or choice-based sampling method to limit the data. In this strategy, the researcher retains all the observations for which the dependent variable equals one and randomly selects observations for which the dependent variable is equal to zero. In order to avoid selection bias in the new dataset, King and Zeng suggest including two to five times more zeroes than ones. This method is appropriate especially when there is prior knowledge of the proportion of ones to zeroes in the actual dataset. That information allows the researcher to do a

correction to the new dataset while running “relogit” based on the true proportion of ones to zeroes in the actual dataset. Doing so fortifies the data against selection bias as well. This new dataset naturally has a higher proportion of one’s to zeroes than the actual dataset but the “relogit” regression corrects for selection bias on the basis of the true percentage of one’s in the actual dataset. The researcher is then able to apply a post-estimate correction to the constant term so that I get accurate probabilities of the occurrence of the dependent variable. Choice-based sampling and running relogit regression have the additional advantage of easier data management. King and Zeng (2001a; 2001b) show that choice based sampling and running relogit regressions give robust results on MID’s data. There is no loss of information from excluding a portion of dependent variable = 0 observations from a dataset with a few thousand and more observations, where the number of dependent variable = 1 observations is very small. As long as the number of observations where dependent variable =0 is approximately two to five times the number of ones, the researcher does not need to collect more non-event observations.

Such is the case in this dissertation project as well. I have already established that only a small percentage (9.6%) of interstate disputes expands beyond their originators. When I focus on the potential joiners only for those 224 disputes that expanded, I find that there were 3,601 potential joiners to all those disputes and only 12.9% of those states actually joined ongoing disputes. In a dataset of 3601 observations, there are 463 acts of joining and 3,138 observations of joining = 0. In order for the results of hypotheses-testing to be valid and reliable, I cannot just compare the potential joiners to expanded disputes with each other. The decision by a potential joiner to join an ongoing dispute is partly a function of the actions of other potential joiners to join/not join that dispute. I also need to identify the potential joiners to disputes that did not expand. There are, however, 2,108 disputes that remain restricted to their originators. Instead of

spending time identifying potential joiners for all 2,108 disputes (approximately 33,728 potential joiners) which might detract from the accuracy of logit analysis, I conduct choice based sampling. I randomly select 224 disputes that do not expand from the population of 2,108 disputes that remain restricted to their originators. Even though the ‘new’ dataset has observations of potential joiners from an equal number of restricted and expanded disputes (224 from each category), the number of zeroes is two-to-five times the number of ones (following the guidelines of King and Zeng (2001a; 2001b)).

I go on to identify potential joiners who obviously did not join the restricted disputes, on the basis of “politically relevant” criteria. Those states that were major powers at the time the dispute began and/or were contiguous to at least one of the originators are deemed to be potential joiners.

I am able to avoid bias of selecting on the dependent variable. The number of observations in which no joining occurred is still more than joining events. That is because in addition to the potential joiners who did not join disputes that expanded because of other states’ participation, there are also potential joiners to disputes that did not expand. In order to make sure that the data are corrected for selection bias before running “relogit”, I can do a “prior correction” of the data. I already have an estimate of the true proportion of joining = 1 to joining = 0 observations in the actual dataset (1.4% of potential joiners join ongoing disputes).

Summary of Dissertation Dataset

In summary, the resulting dataset has 6,357 observations of potential joiners across 448 MIDs in the period between 1816 and 2001. The dataset comprises of 3601 observations from the 224 expanded disputes and 2756 observations from disputes that were restricted to their initiators. The proportion of ones to zeroes in the new dataset is 7.3% (463 acts of joining). The

unit of analysis is the potential joiner and the outcome of interest is whether they join an ongoing dispute or not. This dataset contains information not only of states that actually joined an ongoing dispute, but third parties that could have done and did not. By making the potential joiner the unit of analysis, I can now more accurately model their likelihood of joining an ongoing dispute and capture the rarity with which they do so.

Modeling Network Approach to Joining Behavior

The primary impetus behind moving the analytic focus away from the dyad in this research design is that disputes, even when they start and finish between a pair of states, are in fact multilateral processes (Croco and Teo 2005). Dispute initiation and its evolution (in this case whether it expands or not) are not just a result of the interactions between a dyad of states; they are affected by the actions and reactions of third party states which are not yet involved in the conflict. Those third party states may be potential joiners of the dispute and their participation in the dispute (or lack thereof) will affect the way the dispute evolves and ends. Those potential joiners may simultaneously engage with the dispute initiators and other potential joiners in a variety of relationships that are relevant to the dispute.

This is particularly important to note considering the assumption built into the dyadic research designs of existing literature on joining behavior that third party states consider their relationship with the dispute initiator one at a time and in isolation of their interactions with other dispute initiator(s). It only provides a dyadic snapshot of the reality that potential joiners interact with multiple states (dispute originators, other potential joiners, other states in the world) and take into account all those relationships (in varying degrees) before making foreign policy decisions. Furthermore, potential joiners engage with all those states simultaneously.

Theoretically, a framework that locates the potential joiner in the context of its interactions and ties with other states in the dispute and the international system is going to be better able to explain its likelihood of joining an ongoing dispute. In the theory chapter, I posit a networks approach towards explaining joining behavior (and the rarity of its occurrence) that I argue has greater explanatory power and accuracy than pre-dominantly dyadic theories of conflict expansion. Potential joiners are related to initial disputants and other potential third parties in a variety of ways. Every relationship between those states creates “a network space” across which a dispute can expand (Flint et al 2009). How states are positioned in particular network spaces affects not only their degree of affinity towards originators of a dispute, but also the level of constraints on their choice to intervene militarily in an ongoing dispute in support of a side. I derive key hypotheses for how a potential joiner’s levels of affinity with both sides of the dispute influences that state’s likelihood of joining an ongoing dispute and whether its position in different network spaces (relevant to the dispute) vis-à-vis other potential joiners mitigates or exacerbates the likelihood of joining.

Such a network explanation of third party joining in ongoing disputes acknowledges that in the process of states creating and maintaining ties with other states in the system, a pattern of relationships emerges. Foreign policy decisions to interact with certain states and other states’ decisions to do the same create structures of relationships within which potential joiners are located. Their position in these networks of relationships can enable or constrain their behavior. Social network analysis (SNA) is the appropriate methodology to model the theoretical logic of third party joining outlined above and test the hypotheses derived from it. This project uses SNA to construct these patterns of relationships between states and locate states in those relational networks. I can then measure a state’s position in our networks of interest, which tells us the

extent to which that state's actions is going to be affected by the actions of other states in those networks. Specifically, SNA allows an analysis of how potential joiners are related not only to the dispute initiators, but also to other potential joiners and whether the way they are related to one another has an effect on their decision to join an ongoing dispute. It allows us to examine the broader problem of why disputes expand by situating potential joiners to a conflict within a perspective that sees its relative position in networks of relationships rather than in isolated pairs of states.

Although social network analysis is used widely in sociology and communication, its introduction into the study of international politics is fairly recent. Before I describe how I use network analysis tools to construct networks, visualize network spaces and measure a potential joiner's relative position on those spaces, it is important to have a short discussion on how the methodology deals with data. A network is a set of actors (in our case, states) that may (or may not) have ties with other actors in a particular relationship. A network is mathematically represented by a matrix with i rows and j columns. Each row and column represents an actor in the network. Conventionally, matrix data are recorded when the row actor 'sends' a tie to the 'receiving' actor in the column. For example, when X in row i exports goods to Y in column j , the cell value represents the occurrence of that transaction (or the value/volume of goods exported). If Y in row i does not export goods to X in column j , then that cell value will be 0.

Two types of matrices that are relevant for international relations scholarship broadly and for this project in particular are 'sociomatrices' and 'affiliation matrices'. A sociomatrix deals with relations between one entity of actors. In a sociomatrix, all actors are either people or states and so on. Typically, a sociomatrix has equal numbers of rows and columns in which each row and column represents a unique country. The same set of countries appears in both the rows and

columns and they are in the same order. The entries in each cell of the sociomatrix record the presence/absence, or density of ties between the row and column country in a given relationship.

An affiliation matrix, in contrast to a sociomatrix, captures the interactions between two different sets of actors such as people or states on one hand and clubs or organizations on the other.⁴⁸ Each cell, therefore, represents affiliation of the row unit with the column entity. Affiliation matrices can be converted into ‘co-membership’ sociomatrices to identify whether row actors share the same affiliation as actors in the array of columns. An affiliation matrix can therefore tell us about patterns of states’ memberships in international organizations and about which international organizations are the most ‘popular’.

A sociometric relational network records data into each cell of the matrix depending on who is tied to whom. Dyads are therefore the basic building blocks of networks in which I will finally situate our potential joiners. Cell values of a sociomatrix can be binary (whether dyad of row actor and column actor are tied or not) or valued (count of number of ties between dyad of row actor and column actor). For example, sociomatrices can either record the presence or absence of an alliance or a trading relationship or a shared membership in an international organization between two states (binary) or it can record the number of alliances, volume of trade or number of international organization memberships the two countries have in common. Also, the ties that the matrix cells are recording may or may not be symmetrical – an actor in row *i* might send a tie to an actor in column *j* but that tie might not be reciprocated. Military alliances, interstate rivalries and affiliations in international organizations are symmetrical ties i.e. if a country is allied to or rivals with a state, or a member of an international organization, then that state is also allied to or rivals with the former, and the international organization recognizes that

⁴⁸ This matrix does not need to be a square matrix. A square matrix has equal rows and columns.

state's membership. The network measures this project uses to calculate a potential joiner's position in a particular network are based on binary and symmetrical sociomatrices.

I first use network analysis to build networks that are relevant to the dispute within which potential joiners operate. Theoretically, military alliances, interstate rivalries, international trade and memberships in international and regional organizations are interactions relevant to dispute onset and evolution. The emergent patterns of ties are the "network spaces" for those relationships. The potential joiner's degree of affinity towards both sides of the dispute and the level of constraints on their decision to join the ongoing dispute is reflected by the relative position of potential joiners in these network spaces. I operationalize the degree of affinity between the potential joiners and the dispute originators and the level of constraints on the potential joiners by choosing appropriate network measures that substantively capture the relative position of the potential joiner in each network space.

Explanatory Variables – Affinity

Affinity is defined as "extent to which actors are similar to each other in terms of their relations with other actors, or in terms of the similarity of their traits, in relation to other actors' traits" (Maoz 2006). In network analysis language, the degree of affinity between a potential joiner and initial disputants is reflected in the degree to which the potential joiner is 'structurally equivalent' to the initial disputants. Structural equivalence is a mathematical property of a network. Two actors are structurally equivalent when they have identical ties to and from identical other actors (Wasserman and Faust 1997). Structurally equivalent actors in a network have the same profile of ties with all other actors in the network (Maoz 2010). Figure 4.1 visualizes a hypothetical network. In this network, both actor X and Y have ties with C, D and G and interact with no other actors in this network. X and Y are structurally equivalent actors in

this hypothetical network because they have the same patterns of relationships with the same actors in this network. The US and UK are structurally equivalent actors in the alliance network insofar as they are allied with the same countries.⁴⁹

Figure 4.1: Hypothetical Network I





Figure 4.2: Hypothetical Network II



In fact, X and Y are perfectly structurally equivalent because their relational profiles are a perfect match. In practice, however, perfect structural equivalence is highly unlikely. What is more likely happen in the real world is structural equivalence between C and D where they have ties to some common actors such as X and Y but they also interact with states that the other does not (C has a tie with E but D does not; D has a tie with F but C does not). One is also likely to find cases such as C and F who do not interact with the same actors and are perfectly structurally ‘unequivalent’.

X and Y are perfectly structurally equivalent even when there is no direct interaction between them (Figure 4.1). In international politics, affinity between two states is not just a function of direct and dyadic ties between them; it is also affected by indirect relationships such as an ‘ally of an ally is an ally’ (Maoz et al 2006). The equivalence between X and Y’s positions

⁴⁹ Mathematically, they would remain as structural equivalent even if they were not directly allied to each other.

in the network does not change even when there is a direct tie between X and Y.⁵⁰ This measure of affinity subsumes the affinity between them generated by a direct tie between X and Y (ibid.).

Table 4.1 shows the sociomatrix of the network in Figure 4.1. X and Y are perfectly structurally equivalent and have ties to the same actors. Rows X and Y are identical (diagonal cells notwithstanding). X and Y also ‘receive’ ties from the same actors. Therefore, columns X and Y are also identical. In a sociomatrix, the respective rows and columns for structurally equivalent actors are identical.

Table 4.1: Sociomatrix of Figure 4.1

	X	Y	C	D	E	F	G
X	-	0	1	1	0	0	1
Y	0	-	1	1	0	0	1
C	1	1	-	0	1	0	0
D	1	1	0	-	0	1	0
E	0	0	1	0	-	0	1
F	0	0	0	1	0	-	1
G	1	1	0	0	1	1	-

Notice that the matrix cells have binary values, 0 and 1 indicating that a relation is either present or absent.⁵¹ Structural equivalence is easier to calculate and define for dichotomous relations (Wasserman and Faust 1997). If the cell entries were valued (i.e. had ordinal values or frequency counts), structural equivalence between actors becomes harder to conceptualize and measure (ibid.). Those actors would not only have to identical ties to and from identical actors in the network but also would need to have identical values of those ties as well. The logic of affinity in this project as similarity in patterns of ties between the potential joiner and the dispute

⁵⁰ The correlation of X and Y’s patterns of ties remained unchanged (=1) between networks in Figure 4.1 and 4.2. The presence of another tie between X and Y in the network, however, made X and Y less equivalent with other actors in the network in Figure 4.2 compared to Figure 4.1.

⁵¹ The diagonal cells are undefined in this case to provide a simplified example but the researcher can input values in those cells if an actor having ties to oneself makes theoretical and substantive sense.

originators derives from whether ties exist between actors of the network.⁵² It makes sense theoretically and methodologically to calculate structural equivalence between the potential joiner and the dispute originators for dichotomously coded relational networks.

Network analysis provides a couple of options for calculating structural equivalence between two actors in a network – Euclidean distance and correlation. Euclidean distance ranges from 0 to a non-zero measure, with zero representing two perfect structurally equivalent actors. The less structurally equivalent two actors are, the greater the distance between them. Correlation, as the name suggests, measures the extent to which two actors have similar patterns of ties to other actors in a network. Correlation scores of structural equivalence between two states in a network vary between -1 and +1 with negative scores indicating a drastically different pattern of ties. The closer the correlation coefficient is to +1, the more structurally equivalent the actors are. Euclidean distance and correlation measures do not always give matching results (Wasserman and Faust 1997). According to Wasserman and Faust, if the researcher has to measure the extent to which patterns of ties of two actors in a network are similar, then correlation is the appropriate gauge of structural equivalence.⁵³ That is the case with our project.

Affinity between the potential joiner and the dispute originators stems from the notion that they interact (or do not) with the same set of states in a network. Operationally, affinity between the potential joiner and the dispute originators is the structural equivalence of their positions in a network. Considering that affinity between the potential joiner and dispute originators is conceptualized as the extent to which they have identical or similar relations with other states in a network, I am (for this project) only concerned with the presence (or absence) of

⁵² Affinity can plausibly be affected by the magnitude of those ties or how frequently those ties occur and that is a possible extension for fine-tuning the operationalization of the affinity idea in the future. It is sufficient for this project, if I show that structural equivalence as similarity in patterns of existing ties matter for joining an ongoing dispute.

⁵³ “If one desires a measure of the identity of ties, then Euclidean distance is preferable” (Wasserman and Faust 1997).

ties. Consequently, the sociomatrix of affinity-related networks contains binary data. Structural equivalence is measured as correlation ranging between +1 and -1. For example, the US and UK enjoy a high level of affinity with each other because they have similar allies, trade with the same countries and are members of the same organizations. Their positions in the alliance, international trade and international organizational networks are going to fairly structurally equivalent, with a correlation score close to +1 in all three networks.

In this project, I measure affinity as structural equivalence between the positions of potential joiner and dispute originators in three networks – military alliances, international trade and membership in regional and international organizations. In this project, I have three indices of affinity. When the potential joiner and dispute originator(s) have the same allies they have a high level of strategic affinity; when they are members of the same organizations, they have a high level of IGOs-based affinity; and when they have similar trading partners, they enjoy a high degree of economic affinity with each other. They share similar conceptions of friends and foes, have overlapping markets and trading partners, are likely socialized into similar international norms, which allows them to share common interests. Correlation-equivalence scores are calculated across the three networks using replication dataset from Maoz et al (2006) *Journal of Conflict Resolution* publication.

Alliances: alliance network space is constructed for every year from 1816 to 2001. All independent countries in the system are actors in the network and populate the rows and columns of the annual alliance sociomatrix. Alliance ties between states are reciprocal commitments (i.e. one state cannot be formally allied to another state without the latter being allied to the former). In networks language, alliance ties are symmetrical or non-directional. For example, if actor in row i of the alliance sociomatrix in 1954, USA ‘sends’ an alliance tie to actor in row j , Pakistan

then actor in row i Pakistan ‘sends’ an alliance tie to actor in row j , USA as well. The sociomatrix is binary and records the presence or absence of an alliance between two countries in a given year. Each entry, a_{ij} in the alliance socio-matrix gets a score of 1 if states i and j had a formal alliance, and zero otherwise (Gibler and Sarkees 2004; Leeds 2005). Each state is assumed to be committed to its own defense and the diagonals of the matrix are scored as 1.

Trade: trade network space is constructed for every year from 1816 to 2001. Maoz uses trade data from Barbieri (2002) and Barbieri, Khesk, and Pollins (2003), which covers the 1870-1996 period for most states.⁵⁴ All independent countries in the system are actors in the network and populate the rows and columns of the annual trade sociomatrix. Trade is directional in that countries do not import and export from the same countries and volume of trade between countries vary. In terms of affinity however, I am concerned with whether there is any level of trade between states in the system in a given year and whether potential joiner and dispute originators are vested in the same web of economic interdependence with their common trading partners. Each entry, a_{ij} in the trade matrix gets a score of 1 if states i and j traded with each other (direction of trade notwithstanding; at a level of 5% or more of the combined trade of both states), and zero otherwise. For example, to the extent that China and the US trade with the same countries, they are structurally equivalent in the international trade network and have a high level of economic affinity.⁵⁵

Regional and IGOs: this network space is structured differently from the alliance and trade networks because there are two sets of actors in this network – states and organizations. This network space describes membership of each state in the international system to the

⁵⁴ So there is a lot of missing data that might impact the results.

⁵⁵ Theoretically, I argue that this economic affinity might be constrained by their position in other network spaces such as rivalries.

organizations that existed that year. This affiliation network is constructed for every year from 1816 to 2001. The columns of the affiliation matrix denote all the organizations that were in existence in a given year and the rows (as usual) are all the independent states in the system that year. The Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke (2004) dataset on IGOs is used to populate the cells of the matrix and their dataset covers the 1815-2000 period.

In order to calculate structural equivalence between two actors in an affiliation network, the IGO matrix is transformed into a co-membership matrix. The IGO co-membership matrix shows whether potential joiners and initial disputants are members of the same organizations in a given year. For example, France, and Belgium have a high degree of structural equivalence because they are members of numerous political and economic organizations and avail of those forums to frequently interact with one another.

Structural equivalence scores of affinity borne out of alliances, trade, and IGO affiliation are not significantly correlated to each other and have independent effects on the dependent variable (Maoz et al 2006). This dataset is dyadic and it contains structural equivalence scores for our three networks of interest for all possible dyads in the international system from 1816 to 2001. The unit of analysis of the dissertation, however, is monadic potential joiner. The challenge for the researcher here is to identify useful data from the Maoz et al (2006) structural equivalence dataset and populate the affinity-related independent variables' columns with those scores. A potential joiner considers its affinity with dispute originators on both sides of the ongoing dispute simultaneously and only when its shared interests with one side are being threatened by a side with which it has less affinity, does the potential joiner decide to join the dispute. *Ceteris paribus*, the higher the degree of affinity between the potential joiner and one side of the dispute and the lower the degree of affinity between the potential joiner and the other

side of the dispute, the higher the likelihood that the potential joiner will enter the dispute. For each potential joiner in the dissertation dataset, I identify its structural equivalence score with the originator(s) on each side of the dispute (sides A and B), for all three network spaces (alliance, trade, IGOs) in the year the dispute started from the Maoz et al (2006) dataset, and record it in our monadic dataset. I then get the difference in potential joiner's affinity towards originators on sides A and B. The larger the gap in affinities between potential joiner-side A and potential joiner-side B, the more that potential joiner's shared interests with one side of the dispute is threatened, leading it to join that dispute. For example, in a dispute between India and Pakistan in 1998, Russia is a potential joiner. Pakistan is coded as side A because it initiated the dispute and India is side B. For each network space, I calculate the structural equivalence correlation between Russia and Pakistan, and Russia and India and then subtract the Russia-India score from the Russia-Pakistan score. *Ceteris paribus*, the greater the difference between Russia-Pakistan and Russia-India in each network space, the more likely Russia will be to join that dispute in support of the side with which it has a higher level of affinity.

In the process of identifying potential joiner- originator dyads in the Maoz et al (2006) dataset to get structural equivalence scores for the year the dispute started, I run into the challenge of disputes having more than two originators. Most disputes are initiated between dyads but there are some disputes that begin as multi-party. In those cases, I average the equivalence scores between the potential joiner and all the originators on one side of the dispute. For example, if there is a dispute between the USA and South Korea on one side against North Korea in 1994, and China is a potential joiner, I average the structural equivalence score between China and the USA, and China and South Korea for each network space. I get one equivalence measure each for China-USA/South Korea in alliance, trade and IGO network spaces in 1994. I

proceed to subtract the China-USA/South Korea equivalence score from China-North Korea equivalence measure for each network space. The greater the difference between the two, *ceteris paribus*, the more likely China will be to join that dispute.

Explanatory Variables – Centrality


A potential joiner is very likely to join an ongoing dispute if it enjoys a high degree of affinity with a dispute originator(s) in order to protect its shared interests from the opposing side of the dispute with whom it has lower levels of affinity. Only under those possibly rare conditions does the potential joiner deem the dispute salient enough to undertake the costly action of joining it. A potential joiner, however, also has to consider its relationships with states other than the dispute initiators. A potential joiner's cost-benefit calculus about whether to join an ongoing dispute or not, is also affected by its position vis-à-vis other potential joiners and in the network space as a whole. A potential joiner's position in the network as a whole reflects how vested it is in its network of interactions and therefore the extent to which its actions are going to be affected by other actors in the network. Depending on the network in which it is embedded (conflictual or cooperative) and depending on the extent to which it is embedded in that network, the potential joiner's likelihood of joining a dispute either increases or becomes constrained.

In network analysis, the level of centrality of an actor in its network captures the extent to which that actor's actions are constrained or enabled by its position in a particular relational network. This project examines three networks to generate centrality measures for potential joiners – interstate militarized rivalries, international trade, and membership in regional and international organizations. We know from the previous chapter that centrality has different substantive implications depending on the network space under consideration. Methodologically,

there are also different ways of measuring centrality and those measures capture a different aspect of an actor's position in a network space. Depending on the network, some variants of centrality are more meaningful for understanding joining behavior than others. Before I describe which centrality measure I use for which network, it is important to have a more general discussion on what centrality means in a network analytical sense and the different ways of measuring an actor's centrality in a network.

Centrality is a network property of an actor in the network and relates to the location of that actor in the network. Centrality measures describe different facets of an actor's location in a network (Wasserman and Faust 1997). Does an actor send or receive more ties than anyone else in the network? Does an actor connect other actors in the network that would otherwise be isolated? Does an actor provide access to other actors in the network? All these questions refer to different properties of an actor's location in a network and different variants of centrality mathematically measure them. I focus on three indices of centrality and all of them capture a different facet of an actor's location in a network – degree, betweenness, and closeness. I shall illustrate these centrality measures using the hypothetical network in Figure 4.3. Ties between actors in this network are non-directional (i.e. if an actor sends a tie to another actor; it receives a tie from that actor as well).

Figure 4.3 Hypothetical Network III



Degree centrality indicates the extent to which an actor is active in the network, that is, who has the most and least ties to other actors in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1997). Degree centrality is calculated by considering the number of ties sent and received by each actor in a network. In our hypothetical network, G has 4 ties, which is the most number of ties to/from other actors in the network. G is the most visible actor in the network because it is in contact with most actors in the network. C, D, X and Y interact with three other actors and E and F are the least centrally positioned in the network. Degree centrality is the ratio of ties an actor has to the maximum number of ties it can have in a network. So degree centrality is affected by the size of the network and needs to be normalized if I have to compare centrality of an actor across networks of different sizes. In the alliance network in 1913, Italy was one of the most central actors as measured by degree centrality because it had the highest number of alliance ties (five out of forty-six states in the system) or 11 percent of all possible ties in the network (Maoz 2010).

According to Wasserman and Faust (1997), closeness centrality captures how quickly an actor can interact with all other actors in a network. The more central an actor, the closer it is to all other actors and keeps the information flows going through the network. It is located in such a way that it facilitates efficient communication in the network. Mathematically, a central actor needs to go through the fewest actors in order to reach another actor. In our hypothetical network, G is the most central actor in this network and it can reach all other actors through the shortest paths. Closeness centrality is most suitable in the context of communication flows. For example, a legislator who is able to gather information from multiple groups quickly and is able to communicate to other actors efficiently, is more successful at getting amendments passed (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2010).

Betweenness centrality refers to the location of actors linking actors who are otherwise disconnected from each other (ibid.). The more actors it links to one another, the more central that actor is in the network. Actors scoring high in betweenness centrality find themselves as brokers of the network because of their location as a bridge between actors. Betweenness of an actor is measured as the proportion of ties between two actors mediated by the actor of interest (Maoz 2010). Actor G in our hypothetical network is the ‘broker’ of the network because it has the highest betweenness centrality score. For example, in the international rivalry network for 1990, Israel had a high betweenness centrality, which reflected its position in the network as the state that linked ongoing rivalries to one another.

Table 4.2: Different Measures of Centrality for Figure 4.3⁵⁶

Actors	Degree	Closeness	Betweenness
X	0.667	75	0.131
Y	0.667	66.7	0.131
C	0.667	66.7	0.116
D	0.667	60	0.116
E	0.500	60	0.036
F	0.500	54.5	0.036
G	0.833	54.5	0.302

In this project, I argue that despite a potential joiner’s willingness to join an ongoing dispute, which is motivated by its affinity for one side of the dispute and lack thereof for the other side, its position in the rivalry, trade, and IGO network spaces dampens the likelihood of joining. A potential joiner’s centrality in these network spaces, for different reasons, constrains

⁵⁶ Actor G is the most central actor in all three indices of centrality. This raises the specter of correlation between degree, closeness and betweenness centrality. It is entirely coincidental that the same actor (G) was the most central in the hypothetical network according to all indices of centrality. Whether degree, closeness and betweenness centrality are correlated to each other is entirely an empirical question. Even though in the hypothetical network in Figure 4.3, G is connected to most actors in the network and is also located ‘between’ most of them, it is not necessary that an actor have the highest degree centrality to be strategically located as a broker of the network.

the likelihood of potential joiners to join an ongoing dispute in support of a side with which it has affinity. I have to measure the position of each potential joiner in the dissertation dataset in the rivalry, trade and IGO network spaces for the year that the dispute began. I identify the indices I use to measure the centrality of a potential joiner in each network space, provide a theoretical justification for that choice, and explain how I build the sociomatrix to calculate the centrality score. All potential joiners to an ongoing dispute are a part of the rivalry network for that conflict, and all independent states in the international system in a given year are a part of trade and IGO networks. Just to be sure though, all the centrality measures are normalized scores so that they can be compared across different sizes of networks.

Centrality in Rivalry: Betweenness centrality is the most suitable measure of a potential joiner's centrality in a network of rivalries for a given year. Theoretically, I argue that when a potential joiner is located in a rivalry network such that it is the link between other rivalries in that network, then that state may start a chain reaction of getting the rivalries that it connects into the dispute as well. A potential joiner's position in the network as the common enemy that links other states together is best captured by the notion of betweenness centrality. If a potential joiner is centrally located in the network of rivalries in the year the dispute begins, then that tempers the potential joiner's likelihood to join an ongoing conflict. It is constrained by the reactions of its rivals to any military or coercive action on its part.

I construct a rivalry network for every dispute in our dataset. All potential joiners for the dispute are included in the rows and columns of the rivalry sociomatrix for each dispute. I create a rivalry sociomatrix for each dispute by identifying which potential joiners had ongoing rivalries with one another the year that dispute began. Rivalries are reciprocal ties and Klein et al (2006) have conceptualized and operationalized them as a dichotomous relationship. Therefore,

the sociomatrix for the dispute rivalry network is also binary and non-directional. Using the Klein et al (2006) rivalry dataset, each entry, a_{ij} in the rivalry socio-matrix gets a score of 1 if states i and j had a rivalry with each other, and zero otherwise. A betweenness centrality score of each state is calculated, which is a measure of the proportion of rivalry ties it connects in the network. I identify the betweenness centrality score of the potential joiners and include them in our dataset.

Centrality in Trade: a potential joiner that is centrally positioned in the international trade network is heavily invested in that network and would not want a dispute to disrupt it. The more trading partners a potential joiner has, the more economically vested it is in that network of international trade. Degree centrality is an appropriate measure of centrality for this logic because it measures the number of trading partners a country has. The more a country trades with other countries, the more invested it becomes in the smooth functioning of that network. If a potential joiner has high degree centrality then it is very active in the trade network either as an exporter or importer of goods and services. Degree centrality is reflective of the economic power it might wield from being the most engaged actor in the network. It would have other ways of managing a dispute (even if it is between states that it simultaneously has high and low levels of affinity for) than by joining it.

All potential joiners in the dissertation dataset are located in the international trade network for the year that their dispute of interest began. Similar to rivalry network sociomatrix, all independent countries in the system that year are included in the rows and columns of the trade sociomatrix. Theoretically, all we need to know is that the state is involved in trading; whether the centrality is it is the result of being an importer or exporter of goods and services is not so important. The sociomatrix is symmetrical, binary and non-directional. Using the

Correlates of War trade dataset (Barbieri, Khesk, and Pollins, 2003), each entry, a_{ij} in the trade socio-matrix gets a score of 1 if states i and j trade with each other, and zero otherwise (at a level of 5% or more of the combined trade of both states).⁵⁷ Degree centrality score of each state is calculated to give us the number of trade partners they have in a trade network. I identify the degree centrality score of states I am interested in, which are the potential joiners, and add them to our dataset.

Centrality in Regional and IGOs: this network space graphs membership of states to all regional and international organizations existing in a given year. I argue that IGOs socialize states into non-violent norms of conflict management and facilitate communication between their member states. Operationally, centrality of states in this two-mode affiliation network is best measured by (a) degree centrality, which captures the number of ties a state has, and (b) closeness centrality, which describes the potential joiner's position on the shortest communication paths between other states in the network. That is because theoretically I argue that the more regional and international organizations to which a country is affiliated, the more exposed it is to current international norms. A centrally located potential joiner in an affiliation network of IGOs has been socialized into certain international norms including non-military conflict management and is more likely to be a popular candidate to be a third party mediator or arbiter. The more organizations a state is a member of, the more (indirect) ties it forms with co-members. It has to engage with other states in diplomatic forums. Its position in the IGOs network also allows it to forge connections between member states and enables communication.

One affiliation network is created for each year in the 1816 to 2001 period. Columns of the matrix represent all the regional and international organizations existing in that year. All the

⁵⁷ Barbieri, Khesk, and Pollins (2003) trade data covers the 1870-1996 period for most states. Missing data is left blank.

independent countries in that year form the rows of the affiliation matrix. Using the IGOs dataset (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke, 2004), each entry, a_{ij} in the affiliation matrix gets a score of 1 if states i is a member of institution j , and zero otherwise. Degree centrality of a potential joiner in the IGO network calculates the number of IGOs that state is a member of. Closeness centrality of a potential joiner measures the extent to which that state links other actors in the network through the shortest paths.

Controls

National Capabilities: a potential criticism of the explanation of joining behavior laid out in this dissertation is that only those states that have the capacity to undertake military or coercive actions against other states join ongoing disputes. An unarticulated implication of the network explanation of joining behavior described in the previous chapter is that even when a potential joiner has substantial material capabilities, its actions and decisions can be constrained by its position in the overall network. In order to ensure that our networks argument survives this criticism, I use a country's national capabilities as a control variable.

The Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) is the most widely used indicator of a state's material capabilities and covers the 1816 to 2001 period for all states in the system. It is a unified measure of a state's material power based on that state's military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population (version 4, Singer et al 1972). For each year that a particular dispute began, I record the CINC score of the potential joiner.

Regime Type: international conflict research has popularly theorized that regime type is related to a state's propensity for conflict. Moreover, there are some findings in intervention literature that connect regime type (democracy) to high likelihood of joining (Gartzke & Gleditsch 2004,

Werner and Lemke 2007). Theoretically, I do not consider regime similarity as either creating affinity between potential joiner and dispute originators, or as a constraint on joining behavior. It is important to check if our explanatory factors will still hold true despite the potential joiner being democratic or not.

Using Polity IV dataset, I create a binary regime type variable that identifies whether a potential joiner is democratic or not. If the potential joiner scores a +6 or above in the Polity democracy scale it is coded as a democracy and not otherwise.

Analyses and Findings

I have determined our unit of analysis (potential joiner), limited our scope of inquiry (224 MIDs that expanded and a random sample of 224 disputes that did not expand between 1816 and 2001), identified “politically relevant” potential joiners and recorded observations for all relevant independent and control variables. The next chapter shall present results of hypotheses testing. I run both logit and relogit models to compare results. The first set of models includes only the three affinity variables and controls. The second set of models includes only the centrality variables and controls. The third and last analysis is the complete model with all the affinity and centrality variables to examine whether the latter does in fact dampen the likelihood of joining generated by the affinity variables (in the presence of controls). Considering that logit (and relogit) coefficients are hard to interpret by themselves, I calculate predicted probabilities for each model. That provides substantively meaningful results.

5. Statistical Analyses and Findings

In Chapter 3, I developed a network theory of joining by potential third party states in ongoing disputes. I have argued that a potential joiner's multiple and simultaneous relationships with states that initiated the dispute, other potential joiners, and other states in the system create network spaces across which a dispute can expand. Potential joiners' positions in those network spaces are the context of their decision-making within which they judge the salience of the dispute. Their decision to join a dispute is enabled or constrained by their positions in various relevant network spaces. This chapter provides a test of hypotheses outlining the effect of a potential joiner's affinity to both sides of the dispute on the likelihood of that state entering a dispute, and the extent to which the likelihood of joining is constrained by its position in international rivalry, trade, and IGOs networks. The results of the statistical analyses reported in this chapter offer insights into the behavior of potential third party states with respect to their joining behavior, and especially why joining behavior is so rare in interstate conflicts.

The following chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines the effects of affinity between potential joiners and dispute originators, which stems from the extent to which they have the same military allies, trade partners and membership in the same international organizations. The second section investigates the extent to which a potential joiner's probability of participating in an ongoing dispute is constrained by its centrality in the rivalry, trade and IGOs network spaces. The third and final section is a combined analysis of the effects of all affinity and centrality variables on the likelihood of a potential joiner entering a dispute in progress. In each section, I summarize the hypotheses to be tested and the theoretical logic driving them. I run both logit and relogit procedures to test hypotheses, compare results,

calculate predicted probabilities for statistically significant explanatory variables, and evaluate whether the results of the analyses are consistent with the hypotheses.⁵⁸

The main prediction of the project is that potential joiners prefer to be bystanders to an ongoing dispute. They only consider disputes between states with which they share a high level of affinity, against states with which they have a low level of affinity. A potential joiner is constrained by the reaction of its rivals, its vested interests in the smooth functioning of international trade network, and its socialization into non-violent norms of conflict management. Overall, the results support that theoretical prediction. Potential joiners are more likely to join a dispute the greater the difference in affinity that they enjoy with both sides of the dispute. Affinity stemming from having common allies and shared memberships to international organizations has that effect. Potential joiners' willingness to risk undertaking coercive or military action by entering a dispute, however, is constrained by its position in the rivalry and IGOs networks. When a potential joiner is the common link between other rivalries in the network, and/or it is centrally located in the network of IGO affiliations, its likelihood of joining an ongoing dispute is reduced. Neither trade-based affinity nor centrality in international trade network, however, has the predicted enabling and mitigating effects on joining respectively.⁵⁹

5.1 Affinity

Hypothesis 1 states that the greater the difference in affinity between the potential joiner and both sides of the dispute, the higher the likelihood that the potential joiner will join the dispute. Potential joiners simultaneously consider their affinity with both sides of the dispute and

⁵⁸ Both logit and relogit analyses give the same results. I therefore only report logit results in this chapter. "When the results make a difference, our methods work better than logit; when they do not, these methods give the same answer as logit" (King and Zeng 2001a).

⁵⁹ I shall discuss possible explanations of these results in the appropriate sections.

the larger the difference in affinity between them and dispute originators the higher the likelihood of joining.⁶⁰

Only when a dispute occurs between a side with which it has mutual interests (high level of affinity), and a side with which it has no or low level of affinity, does a potential joiner enter that dispute to protect its stakes. Theoretically and operationally, I identify three aspects of affinity between a potential joiner and dispute initiators – common allies and trading partners, and shared membership in the same international organizations. Hypothesis 1 predicts the larger the gap in affinity between the potential joiner and both sides of the dispute in all three relationships, the higher the probability of joining occurrence.

The results of the analysis, for the most part support Hypothesis 1. Table 5.1 displays the results of estimating the likelihood of a potential joiner entering an ongoing dispute when only the affinity variables and controls are included in the model. Models 1-3 estimate the likelihood of joining when each affinity variable is included one at a time along with the controls. Model 4 includes all affinity and control variables. The logit coefficients in Models 1, 3 and 4 for the alliance and IGOs covariates are statistically significant and are in the predicted (positive) direction. That shows that the difference in affinity driven by similarity in alliance patterns, and shared membership of international organizations significantly increase the probability of a potential joiner entering an ongoing dispute.⁶¹

⁶⁰ In Chapter 3, I argue that potential joiners are not interested in any dispute occurring between countries they have no common or shared interests with. Conversely, the potential joiner has strong incentive to intervene when a dispute breaks out between countries, both of whom it shares a high level of affinity with, but it prefers not to do so militarily. If a potential joiner was to enter that kind of a dispute in support of one side against another, it would risk jeopardizing its relationship with both sides.

⁶¹ When all three aspects of affinity are included in the same model (Model 4), the influence of asymmetry in IGO-induced affinity between the potential joiner and given dispute initiators is marginally statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval.

Table 5.1: Asymmetric Affinity and Likelihood of Joining

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Difference in Alliance Affinity	1.00***			.66***
Difference in Trade Affinity		-.65*		-.73*
Difference in IGOs Affinity			.57**	.49*
Capabilities	5.43***	5.34***	5.35***	5.38***
Regime	.23*	.02	.12	.064
Likelihood Ratio χ^2	79.11***	44.94***	53.78***	61.85***
N	4847	4387	5047	4385

*Significance Levels *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%*

Logit coefficients are difficult to interpret by themselves. Table 5.2 shows the accompanying predicted probabilities. Taken separately, difference in alliance-driven affinity increases the probability of joining by 147.4%, and difference in IGOs-based affinity increases the likelihood of joining by 81.36%. When all three aspects of affinity are accounted for and set to their mean values (along with the controls), the base level probability of joining is 4.9%. That probability increases to 8.8% when asymmetry in all three types of affinity is the largest. Table 5.2 shows that alliance-driven affinity and IGOs-based affinity increases the probability of a potential joiner entering an ongoing dispute by 82.5% and 69.9% respectively.

Table 5.2: Change in Predicted Probabilities of Joining in Models 1-4

Relative to Base	Difference in IGO Affinity	Difference in Alliance Affinity	Difference in Trade Affinity
Model 1	n/a	147.41%	n/a
Model 2	n/a	n/a	-59.89%
Model 3	81.36%	n/a	n/a
Model 4	69.93%	82.5%	-41.2%

These findings are similar to and thereby strengthen existing scholarship on alliance behavior and interstate conflict. Having an alliance has been shown to significantly increase the risk of conflict initiation within a dyad (Leeds 2004), increase the conflict proneness of states (Maoz et al 2007), and make a third party willing to be a joiner in a dispute (Siverson and Starr 1991; Corbetta 2007). Models 1 and 4 show that alliance ties matter beyond those effects as well. A potential joiner and the dispute originators may or may not have a direct alliance tie between them, but given that they share the same friends implies that they have common strategic interests that potential joiners consider worth safeguarding. That impetus is strong when those interests are being threatened by a side with which they have either no mutual security interests or may even have competing stakes.

Potential joiners believe that their allies' allies share their conception of threats and security, and are highly likely to enter a conflict motivated by that strategic affinity. A MID initiated by Iran against Saudi Arabia in May 1984 expanded when Bahrain, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, and Kuwait joined the dispute to support Saudi Arabia. Those states entered the dispute because all of them shared a higher degree of strategic affinity with Saudi Arabia than with Iran. That means that patterns of alliances of Bahrain, UAE, Oman and Kuwait were more similar to Saudi Arabia than with Iran. That indicates that those countries shared

similar security preferences with Saudi Arabia, than with Iran. The lower their affinity with Iran, the higher their motivation to join the dispute to preserve their strategic affinity with Saudi Arabia.

I find the same effect in the IGO network space. As the difference between the structural equivalence of a potential joiner and both parties of dispute originators increases, the probability of the potential joiner entering the dispute rises as well. In Chapters 3 and 4, I theorized that potential joiners decide to eschew their bystander role from an ongoing dispute only when it involves countries to which they are ‘close’. The extent to which a potential joiner and dispute originators are members of the same organizations is indicative of their similarity vis-à-vis those institutions’ goals and values. Furthermore, those international organizations provide them forums to communicate with one another and manage their disagreements. When a potential joiner is affiliated to the same organizations as a given dispute originator (they are structurally equivalent to each other) against a side that to which they are not ‘close’ (do not belong to the same international organizations), then that potential joiner is highly likely to enter that dispute. High level of IGO-induced affinity between a potential joiner and a given dispute initiator implies that (a) both countries could manage their own disagreements through the forums they had in common, and (b) they shared the same goals enshrined in the institutions of which they were both members. Low levels of affinity represented low levels of similarity and lack of forums for communication and resolution of conflicts.

The positive effect that affinity (produced by shared IGOs membership) has on the likelihood of joining supports the findings of Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2006) on the relationship between IGOs membership and likelihood of disputes occurrence. They had found that states that belong to the same structurally equivalent clusters of membership in IGOs rarely

fight with each other. That likelihood increases as states become less structurally equivalent to each other in terms of their IGOs memberships. The logit coefficients and predicted probabilities of Model 3 suggests that as long as potential joiners and dispute initiators belong to the same structurally equivalent cluster of IGO memberships, they do not behave aggressively towards each other because they share a high level of affinity stemming from “common material and ideational traits that will cause them to act in similar ways” (p.8). A potential joiner and a given dispute initiator, however, may engage in conflictual behavior the more they are structurally “unequivalent” such as joining a dispute against each other, especially when that dispute also involves a dispute initiator they are ‘close’ to.

Along with ‘asymmetric affinities’ in alliances and IGOs network spaces, I argue that difference in economic affinity between potential joiners and dispute initiators (represented by them having similar or different trading partners) also increases the likelihood of joining an ongoing dispute. In contrast, Model 2 shows that the likelihood of joining significantly decreases when a potential joiner has high trade affinity with one side of the dispute, and low affinity with the opposing side. Moreover, that negative coefficient is statistically significant even when we combine all three indices of affinity in Model 4.⁶² The greater the difference in affinities between a potential joiner and the dispute originators, then the former’s probability of joining decreases by 59.89% in Model 2, and 41.2% in Model 4 (Table 5.2).

These results indicate that potential joiners do not undertake coercive actions such as joining an ongoing dispute involving dispute initiators with whom they have simultaneously high and low levels of economic affinity. In 1948, Yugoslavia was a potential joiner to an ongoing

⁶² In both Models 2 and 4, the economic affinity variable is marginally statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval.

dispute between Greece and Albania. Despite having a higher level of economic affinity with Albania than with Greece, Yugoslavia did not join that MID.

This result can have numerous implications including the notion that potential joiners do not consider economic interests worth the risk of undertaking military action or that potential joiners have other ways of protecting their shared economic interests with a given dispute initiator. Dorussen and Ward (2010) find evidence that as more countries trade with each other, the importance of a third party's ability to forge links between countries in the trading network space has declined. Therefore, it is also possible that economic affinity forged out of direct and indirect economic links between countries might not matter unless that dispute threatens their economic interdependence. Structural equivalence in trade network might be capturing competition over the same markets rather than trade with the same set of states.⁶³ The mismatch between the predictions of the theoretical model and statistical analyses is symbolic of the lack of agreement on the effects of trade on conflict in the scholarly literature (Barbieri and Schneider 1999, Mansfield and Pollins 2001). Scholars such as Barbieri (2002) claim that trade and conflict are positively correlated, while Russett and Oneal (2001) find that economic interdependence is one of pillars of Kantian peace in international relations. Models 2 and 4 and the accompanying predicted probabilities for the negative effect of asymmetrical economic affinity between a potential joiner and dispute originators support the liberal paradigm in international relations that trade interdependence makes states less prone to aggressive behavior. Potential joiners do not take military action to protect their economic stakes against threats. The analyses, however, also provide support to realist arguments that shared economic interests are not as high a priority as shared security interests encapsulated in affinity by states having common allies.

⁶³ Maoz et al (2006), however, found that the more structurally equivalent two states were in international trade, the less likely conflict became between the two of them. That shows that structural equivalence is probably measuring economic affinity deriving from trading with the same countries (rather than competition over trade).

Of the two control variables, a potential joiner's capabilities have a positive and statistically significant effect on its likelihood of entering an ongoing dispute. That effect is consistent across all four models. The potential joiner's regime type does not have a statistically significant effect in any model, apart from Model 1; whether a joiner is democratic or not does not make a difference to its joining behavior.

5.2 Centrality

The second set of analyses tests predictions of the theoretical model about the restraining effects of a potential joiner's position vis-à-vis other potential joiners and the network as a whole. In Chapter 3, I argue that potential joiners tend to be initially wary of participating in a dispute when it occurs. They are not necessarily certain how a particular dispute might evolve and the extent to which it might affect their interests. Undertaking any militarized action with respect to the dispute is riskier than non-violent means of intervention or not joining that dispute at all. As long as the benefits of not joining a dispute outweigh the costs, the potential joiner prefers to be a bystander to that dispute. In the previous section, I found support for my theoretical prediction that a potential joiner is highly likely to participate in an ongoing dispute between sides, when it shares a high level of affinity with one side (common allies, shared membership in international organizations) and a low level of affinity with the opponent(s). The potential joiner considers the cost of not joining those disputes higher than the benefits of not joining. A potential joiner does not consider any other dispute salient enough to risk involvement.

Simultaneously, however, a potential joiner also considers its position vis-à-vis its interactions with other potential joiners and other states in the system. In Chapter 3 I theorize that a potential joiner's centrality in a rivalry (Hypothesis 2), trade (Hypothesis 3) and IGO

(Hypothesis 4) network spaces increase the benefits of not joining an ongoing dispute such that they outweigh the costs of being a bystander. A potential joiner's position in and across those three networks reinforces their default decision to sit out of the dispute and constrains its likelihood of entering an ongoing dispute. Moreover, a potential joiner's centrality in those network spaces affects their cost-benefit calculus to such an extent that it also mitigates the likelihood of joining in the presence of asymmetric affinity levels with the dispute originators.

For each network space, I run two logit analyses to model the effects of a potential joiner's centrality on the likelihood of it entering the conflict. The first model includes only the centrality variable in that network space and the control variables, and the second model includes all the affinity variables, the centrality measure of the potential joiner and the controls.

5.2.1 Rivalry Centrality

Hypothesis 2 predicts that the more central the potential joiners in the rivalry network, the less likely they will be to join an ongoing MID. Rival states have vested interests in bringing about outcomes that are unfavorable to each other. A potential joiner that is centrally located in a rivalry network populated by other potential joiners to the dispute, therefore, occupies a position of vulnerability. Its centrality implies that it links the rivalries in the network and is a visible target of attack in the network. When considering joining an ongoing dispute, that potential joiner has to account for the reactions of the rivals it links in the network. Any militarized action on the part of the potential joiner may provoke other rivals in the network to act similarly. Given the adversarial and zero-sum dynamic of rivalry relationships, other potential joiner-rivals in the network will react by joining the dispute against the given potential joiner. Such a situation decreases the benefits of entering a dispute for a potential joiner to the point where it is optimal

to not join the dispute. A potential joiner that is marginal to the rivalry network does not have such a complicated decision-making calculus.

Model 5 in Table 5.3 provides support for Hypothesis 2. The logit coefficient for rivalry centrality of potential joiner is statistically significant and in the predicted (negative) direction. The potential joiner’s capabilities make that state more likely to enter an ongoing dispute and its regime type has no significant effect on joining behavior.

Table 5.3: Rivalry Centrality and Joining

	Model 5	Model 6
Difference in Alliance Affinity		.62**
Difference in Trade Affinity		-.72*
Difference in IGOs Affinity		.58**
Rivalry Centrality	-.87*	-1.74**
Capabilities	5.49***	6.05***
Regime	.21	.03
Likelihood Ratio χ^2	52***	70.27***
N	4882	4182

*Significance Levels *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%*

The more a potential joiner is central to the rivalry network, the less likely it is to join that dispute. For potential joiners that connect the various existing rivalries in the system to one other, the decision to undertake military action in a dispute is not simple. Their actions provoke aggressive reactions by other states in the system such that the potential joiner may be targeted for attack. Rivalry centrality of a potential joiner substantively decreases its probability of entering an ongoing dispute by 49% (Table 5.4).

Table 5.4: Change in Predicted Probabilities of Joining in Model 5

Model 5	Rivalry Centrality
Relative to Base	-49%

A potential joiner to an ongoing dispute is either a major power or a neighbor to one of the dispute originators, and plausibly has the capacity and some interest in joining that conflict. Its position in the rivalry network as the common link connecting rivals to one another curtails that capacity and interest. For example, Turkey, as a neighbor of the conflict, was a potential joiner to a dispute between Yugoslavia and Austria-Hungary in 1913. It had a high rivalry centrality score that year implying that it linked other rivalries in the network to one other. Its actions would be followed closely by other states in the network and would likely provoke a response as well. Despite being “politically relevant” to the ongoing dispute between Yugoslavia and Austria-Hungary, Turkey did not join the conflict because its position in the rivalry network made the benefits of abstention greater than the advantages of joining.

In the theory chapter, I argued that not only does being centrally positioned in the rivalry network have a constraining effect on the likelihood of joining, that effect is present even when the potential joiner has strong incentive for joining a dispute. Hypothesis 2 states that high levels of rivalry centrality of potential joiner will lower the likelihood of joining when a potential joiner has asymmetric levels of affinity with both sides of the dispute. Model 6 tests Hypothesis 2 by including all the affinity variables, rivalry centrality of the potential joiner, and controls. Table 5.3 displays the results that support Hypothesis 2. The logit coefficient of the rivalry centrality variable is statistically significant and in the predicted (negative) direction. All three indices of affinity are also statistically significant and have the same directional effects on likelihood of

joining as they did in Model 4. A potential joiner’s capabilities continue to have a positive and statistically significant effect on its likelihood of entering a dispute.

The results of Model 6 prove that although a potential joiner is motivated to join an ongoing dispute, the greater the difference in their levels of alliance and IGOs-driven affinity, it is also conscious of and limited by their position in the rivalry network. The base level probability of joining when all the affinity variables, rivalry betweenness centrality, and controls are set at their mean value, is 4.9%. That probability declines to 2.4% when both differences in affinities and rivalry centrality are set to their maximum values. Table 5.5 shows the predicted probabilities of a potential joiner’s likelihood of entering a conflict when it has the strongest incentive to do so (all affinity variables are set at their maximum value) and when the rivalry constraints are the strongest (rivalry centrality is set to its maximum value).

Table 5.5: Change in Predicted Probabilities of Joining in Model 6

Model 6	Difference in Alliance Affinity (maximum value)	Difference in IGOs Affinity (maximum value)	Difference in Trade Affinity (maximum value)
Rivalry Centrality (maximum value)	-53.8%	-52%	-85.2%

A potential joiner’s rivalry centrality reduces the likelihood of joining by 53.8% (alliance driven affinity), 52% (IGOs based affinity), and 85.2% (trade driven affinity).⁶⁴ A potential joiner is constrained by its high rivalry centrality from entering an ongoing dispute to safeguard its shared interests with the dispute originators. Israel is typically in this situation wherein it is constrained from joining disputes even when it considers its interests to be at stake. It can be argued that Israel is constrained by the US from doing so, but the reason stems from the position that Israel occupies in the rivalry network space. In the first Persian Gulf War, the US dissuaded

⁶⁴ Rivalry centrality reinforces the negative effect of difference in trade affinity on the likelihood of joining.

Israel from joining the conflict despite provocation by Iraq, because Israel's entry would have provoked its Arab rivals to behave similarly.

5.2.2 Trade Centrality

Hypothesis 3 argues that potential joiners that are central to the network of international trade are less likely to join an ongoing dispute. Although those potential joiners are “politically relevant” to the dispute and have a non-zero probability of conflict with states that initiated the conflict, the former's embeddedness in international trade has a pacifying effect on their likelihood of joining. Bilateral trade creates interdependence between trading partners from which they can derive mutual (instead of relative) gains. States that trade with each other perceive conflict to be disruptive of the mutual benefits of trade because militarized conflicts can have negative economic externalities. Therefore, they become vested in maintaining peace in the network.

These pacifying effects are also felt at the monadic level – as states become more embedded in international trade and the more they trade, the less conflict prone they become (Barbieri 1999; Maoz et al 2007). Hypothesis 3 posits that a potential joiner that is central to the international trading network is exposed to these pacifying effects of economic interdependence the most. As the actor with the most number of trading partners in the network, it is not only vested in the smooth functioning of the network, but it also has the coercive power to non-violently manage an ongoing conflict in the network by using economic sanctions or denying trading access (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2010).

Model 7 (Table 5.6) does not confirm the hypothesis that potential joiners with high trade centrality are less likely to enter ongoing disputes. The controls are statistically significant, implying that a democratic state with the capacity to intervene has a high likelihood of joining an

ongoing dispute. The logit coefficient for trade centrality is in the predicted direction (negative), but is not statistically significant. The lack of significant results echoes the (weak) robustness of the effect of trade on conflict that Maoz et al (2007) and Dorussen and Ward (2010) found in their research. Trade centrality was the least robust covariate in explaining conflict proneness of states (Maoz et al 2007) and Dorussen and Ward (2010) found that the importance of third parties and indirect links in trade networks has been declining over time.

Table 5.6: Trade Centrality and Likelihood of Joining

	Model 7	Model 8
Difference in Alliance Affinity		.66***
Difference in Trade Affinity		-.73*
Difference in IGOs Affinity		.50*
Trade Centrality	-.0000539	-.0000466
Capabilities	5.29***	5.26***
Regime	.22*	.05
Likelihood Ratio χ^2	50.28***	61.99***
N	5140	4385

*Significance Levels *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%*

What might explain this contradictory finding? One explanation is that economic interdependence in the manner encapsulated in the pattern of trading ties, does not matter in their decision-making to take military action against another state. The second explanation is that most states have diversified their trading partners, meaning that as states have increased the number of their trading partners over time, the likelihood that one or few states are more central in the trading network has decreased. The effects of centrality in trade network are probably time-dependent because the trade network has grown and diversified since World War II. Dorussen

and Ward (2010) found that the probability of dispute occurrence reduced as dyads became more embedded in the post-World War II. We may find a similar pacifying effect of trade interdependence on the likelihood of joining in certain time periods than others.⁶⁵

Considering that trade centrality has no significant effect on the likelihood of joining in Model 7, it is not likely that it is going to have a pacifying effect on the likelihood of joining when the incentive to do is strong.⁶⁶ Hypothesis 3 implies that high trade centrality will lower the likelihood of joining in the presence of asymmetric levels of affinity between a potential joiner and dispute initiators. Model 8, which includes the affinity variables, trade centrality of the potential joiner and controls, does not support Hypothesis 3. Similar to Model 7, the logit coefficient of trade centrality of potential joiner is in the predicted negative direction, but it is not statistically significant. All the affinity related variables continue to have significant effects on the likelihood of joining. That likelihood is not constrained by the potential joiner's embeddedness in the trade network.

Asymmetric levels of trade-based affinity between the potential joiner and dispute initiators make the former less likely to join a dispute and that probability is not affected by the potential joiner's centrality in the trade network. The statistically significant *negative* effect of difference in trade-based affinity combined with the lack of a relationship between trade centrality on the likelihood of joining furthers the notion that either states do not manage their economic interests using military means, or that the economic interests captured in these models are not threatened by the ongoing dispute.

⁶⁵ This is one of the possible extensions of this research project.

⁶⁶ I do not calculate predicted probabilities for either Models 7 or 8 because trade centrality is not statistically significant.

5.2.3 Centrality in International Government Organization Memberships

Hypothesis 4 states that the more central that potential joiners are in the IGO network, the less likely they will be to join an ongoing dispute. A potential joiner's centrality in the network space of IGO affiliations indicates both the number of institutional affiliations it has, and its ability to facilitate communication between other states in the network. Liberal arguments about the importance of international organizations claim that international organizations reduce uncertainty amongst states (especially if direct ties between them have been disrupted) by facilitating information transfer between its members; this enables bargaining and enhances the credibility of commitments states make under their aegis. Membership into IGOs may also socialize states into considering their interactions with other member-states as mutually beneficial (rather than competitive) and makes peaceful strategies of conflict management preferable to military means. A potential joiner that is embedded in the IGO network space is more exposed to all these effects and is therefore less likely to join an ongoing dispute.

Operationally, a potential joiner's centrality in the IGOs network space is measured by two independent variables – closeness centrality and degree centrality respectively. For the IGOs network space, these centrality measures are positively correlated, and therefore cannot be used in the same model. Models 9 and 10 test the distinct effects of two aspects of a potential joiner's centrality in the IGO network on its likelihood of joining. Model 9 tests Hypothesis 4 using the potential joiner's closeness centrality, which is its ability to facilitate communication flows in the network. Model 10 does the same but uses the potential joiner's degree centrality, which is the number of international institution membership it has.

Table 5.7: IGO Centrality and Likelihood of Joining

	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Difference in Alliance Affinity			.68***	.69***
Difference in Trade Affinity			-.83**	-.85**
Difference in IGOs Affinity			.46*	.47*
IGOs Closeness Centrality	-.01**		-.01**	
IGOs Degree Centrality		-0.001853		-.0003**
Capabilities	4.77***	4.89***	4.86***	4.85***
Regime	.21*	.25*	.08	.15
Likelihood Ratio χ^2	59.69***	52.58***	70.04***	66.91***
N	5140	5140	4385	4385

*Significance Levels *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%*

Table 5.7 shows that Model 9 supports the prediction made by Hypothesis 6. Logit coefficients for IGO closeness centrality are negative and statistically significant at the 95% level. This means that potential joiners that are located in the network of institutional affiliations such that they can facilitate communication and information flows among other states in the network, are not very likely to join ongoing disputes. One can hypothesize that states so situated are able to use that position to resolve disputes peacefully. Instead of using coercive military tactics such as joining a dispute, they are able use to transmit information between disputing states through various international forums and possibly mediate that dispute peacefully. Table 5.8 shows that a potential joiner's closeness centrality curbs the likelihood of joining by 40%.

Table 5.8: Predicted Probabilities of Model 9

Model 9	IGO Closeness Centrality
Relative to Base	-40.02%

In contrast to Model 9, Model 10 does not support Hypothesis 4. The coefficient of a potential joiner's degree centrality is in the predicted negative direction, but is not statistically significant.⁶⁷ This means that, absent any affinity-driven inducement, merely being members of numerous international organizations does not make a potential joiner less likely to join an ongoing dispute. There is no incentive or opportunity for potential joiners to want to join a dispute, and therefore its embeddedness in terms of the number IGOs it is affiliated to has no relevance to how it wants to manage those conflicts. In contrast, a potential joiner with high closeness centrality is an enabler of communication and information transfers. Its locational ability to facilitate bargaining and negotiation between member-states makes it less likely to use joining as a means of managing a conflict (whether affinity motivations are present or not). The potential joiner's ability to forge indirect links between other states in the network through international forums is more influential on its decision-making process about joining a dispute than the sheer number of institutional affiliations it has.

The next step is to check whether a potential joiner's centrality in the IGOs network space affects its decision-making calculus of entering an ongoing dispute. If, as the findings of Models 1-4 suggest, a potential joiner is highly likely to enter an ongoing dispute when it is closer to one side of the dispute than the other, does its position in the IGOs network space make that decision more or less costly? Hypothesis 4 suggests that high levels of IGO centrality of potential joiner will lower the likelihood of joining even when affinity-based inducements are present. Models 11 and 12 support that hypothesis. Models 11 and 12 include all the affinity variables, controls and IGO closeness centrality and degree centrality respectively. Model 11 in Table 5.7 shows that the logit coefficient for the potential joiner's closeness centrality in the

⁶⁷ I, therefore, do not calculate the predicted probability for degree centrality of potential joiner in the IGOs network space.

IGOs network is negative and statistically significant. When a potential joiner is centrally positioned in the network of IGO affiliations, then it is more likely to support and facilitate resolution of disputes through those forums, even when their shared affinity with the dispute originators is at stake. All the affinity variables remain statistically significant, which indicates that potential joiners do, in fact, consider those disputes salient enough to want to join. Their embeddedness in the IGOs network, however, allows them to see that dispute managed and their interests protected without necessarily undertaking the military costs of joining. Countries like the US, China, Russia use the United Nations and/or regional forums to manage disputes. For example, a concerned international community used the 2002 Conference for Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) meeting as a forum to informally mediate between India and Pakistan even though the two countries were not directly talking to each other (Dorussen and Ward 2008).

Although the number of institutional affiliations a potential joiner by itself does not constrain joining behavior, Model 12 shows that it does have a significant mitigating effect when the incentives to join are the strong (when differences in affinities between potential joiners and dispute originators are the large). As a potential joiner becomes more central in the IGOs network (it is a member of several international organizations), its likelihood of joining a dispute decreases as well. The logit coefficient for degree centrality of a potential joiner in Model 12 is negative and statistically significant. As a potential joiner participates in more international and regional institutions, it becomes socialized into norms of non-violent conflict management, and calculates the benefits of not joining a dispute and managing it peacefully to be more than the costs of undertaking military action.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ It is possible that the more IGOs in which a potential joiner participates, the more likely that they will have more of those institutions in common with the dispute originators. Statistically, however, a potential joiner's is not correlated to

The base-level probability of joining when all three affinity variables, IGO centrality scores, and controls are set to their mean values, is 4.7%. When both incentives to and constraints over joining is strong, however, the probability declines. Table 5.9 displays the predicted probabilities of joining for a potential joiner that has high closeness and degree centrality in IGOs network. When the gaps in affinity between the potential joiner and dispute originators are the highest and the imperative to join the strongest, a potential joiner’s position in the IGO network space still has a dampening effect on its likelihood of joining that dispute. High degree centrality of a potential joiner reduces the likelihood of joining driven by gaps in alliance, IGOs and trade affinities by 41%, 26%, and 60% respectively. High closeness centrality of a potential joiner reduces the likelihood of joining driven by gaps in alliance, IGOs, and trade affinities by 17.9%, 4.6%, and 66.1% respectively.

Table 5.9: Change in Predicted Probabilities of Joining in Models 11-12

	Difference in Alliance Affinity (maximum value)	Difference in IGOs Affinity (maximum value)	Difference in Trade Affinity (maximum value)
IGO Degree Centrality (maximum value)	-40.8%	-25.7%	-60%
IGO Closeness Centrality (maximum value)	-17.9%	-4.6%	-66.1%

Section 5.3 Integrated Model of Joining Behavior

In this section, we test the entire theoretical model laid out in Chapter 3. Thus far in the chapter, we have run a series of analyses to examine the distinct effects of our explanatory variables on a potential joiner’s likelihood of entering an ongoing dispute. We have found that if

our IGOs affinity variable, which measures the difference in affinity between the potential joiner and both sides of the dispute.

potential joiners were to only consider their closeness to both sides of the dispute (whether they have common allies; whether they are members of the same organizations), they are highly likely to enter a dispute when they have a high level of affinity with one side and low level of affinity with the other (Models 1-4). If potential joiners only consider their interactions with other potential joiners to the dispute and to other actors that populate the rivalry, trade and IGOs network spaces (Models 5, 7, 9 and 10), then their likelihood of joining declines. Models 6, 8, 11 and 12 examine the individual and independent effects of a potential joiner's position in rivalry, trade and IGO networks respectively, on the likelihood of joining when affinity-related inducements are also present. Taken one at a time, centrality in rivalry and IGO affiliation network spaces have a constraining effect on the affinity-motivated likelihood of joining.

Theoretically and empirically, however, potential joiners and states overall interact and function in these different network spaces concurrently. Their position in these network spaces together are the context within which potential joiners make their foreign policy decisions such as entering an ongoing dispute. I therefore need to model the simultaneous effects of a potential joiner's position vis-à-vis dispute initiators, other potential joiners, and other actors in the network spaces. Table 5.10 shows the results of the integrated model of joining behavior by third party states. Model 13 tests the overall theoretical model using a potential joiner's closeness centrality in the IGOs network, and Model 14 does the same but by using a potential joiner's degree centrality in the IGOs affiliation network. Both models support the overall network explanation of why some third party states become joiners in ongoing disputes.

In both models, the logit coefficients in three out of the four network spaces (alliances, rivalries and IGO affiliations) considered relevant for a potential joiner's decision to enter an ongoing conflict are statistically significant and are in the predicted direction.

Table 5.10: Integrated Model of Joining Behavior

	Model 13	Model 14
Difference in Alliance Affinity	.64***	.65***
Difference in Trade Affinity	-.83**	-.85**
Difference in IGOs Affinity	.56**	.56**
Rivalry Betweenness	-1.82**	-1.77**
Trade Centrality	-.00007	-.00007
IGOs Closeness Centrality	-.01**	
IGOs Degree Centrality		-.0003**
Capabilities	5.73***	5.69***
Regime	.07	.13
Likelihood Ratio χ^2	77.85***	74.77***
N	4385	4385

*Significance Levels *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%*

A potential joiner's positions vis-à-vis dispute originators in the alliance and IGOs network spaces are important because those inform the former's evaluation of the salience of that dispute. When potential joiners have shared strategic interests with one side of the dispute (common allies; shared sense of threats and foes) and not with the other, they are highly likely to join that dispute. Potential joiners are also likely to join disputes to protect states that are in the same "in-groups" as them because they are affiliated to the same organizations (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006). When Egypt and Libya displayed use of force by issuing alerts against each other in August 1985, the US joined that conflict. The US had a higher level of 'strategic' affinity with Egypt than with Libya. Considering that the US had a higher level of IGO-driven affinity with Egypt than with Libya, it was likely that Egypt and the US belonged to the same in-group cluster in IGOs, and Libya did not. Asymmetries in affinity between the US and Egypt,

and the US and Libya motivated the US to join that dispute to protect its shared interests with Egypt.⁶⁹

Simultaneously, both models also find statistically significant evidence that potential joiners consider their interactions with other potential joiners to the dispute as well as the network on the whole. Specifically, the extents to which they are embedded in the rivalry network space and IGOs affiliation network have a strong constraining effect when they evaluate the benefits of not joining a dispute versus the costs of not joining. Potential joiners are cognizant of their vulnerable position in the rivalry network (if they are central actors) and are wary of joining a dispute that might provoke an aggressive reaction from other rivals in the network. Potential joiners that are embedded in a network of IGOs have access alternative forums to manage the dispute rather than undertaking the risk of military action.

For both models 13 and 14, when all the variables are set at their mean values, the base level probability of joining is 4.7%. When all the affinity and centrality variables are set to their maximum values, i.e. both the motivation to join and constraints on decision to join are the strongest, the probability of joining declines to 1.2-1.6%. Table 5.11 portrays that the likelihood of a potential joiner entering an ongoing dispute when all the three affinity factors are set at their maximum value, is reduced by 68-74% (alliance-driven affinity), 74% (IGOs driven affinity), and 90-92% (trade-based affinity).

⁶⁹ This illustration does bring up an interesting question – which type of affinity is likely to have a stronger impact on a potential joiner’s calculus about entering an ongoing dispute. Research on interstate conflicts has delivered strong findings suggesting that states take their alliances seriously and will safeguard the security preferences enshrined in them. There is an ongoing debate in the IGOs literature about importance of international organizations in state behavior. Libya and the US maybe members of the same organizations such as the UN, but the US’ strategic affinity with Egypt is likely to have a stronger effect on its joining behavior than affinity produced by shared membership in IGOs.

Table 5.11: Change in Predicted Probabilities of Joining in Models 13-14

	Difference in Alliance Affinity (maximum value)	Difference in IGOs Affinity (maximum value)	Difference in Trade Affinity (maximum value)
Centrality (Rivalry, Trade, IGO closeness at maximum value)	-74.02%	-74%	-92.49%
Centrality (Rivalry, Trade, IGO degree at maximum value)	-68.42%	-68.5%	-90.78%

As per our theoretical prediction, we find that even when alliance-driven strategic affinity and IGOs-motivated affinity increases the costs of not joining that dispute, a potential joiner's position in the rivalry and IGOs network spaces increases the benefits of staying away from that dispute. Contradictory to our theory, a potential joiner's economic asymmetric levels of affinity with both sides of the dispute reduces the likelihood of that third party joining that conflict. When that potential joiner is also constrained by its embeddedness in the rivalry and IGO network spaces, that dampening effect is magnified. That is the reason why the likelihood of joining motivated by economic affinity showed the largest reduction in Table 5.11. According to Models 13 and 14, however, a potential joiner's embeddedness in the international trade network has no relevance to its decision to enter an ongoing dispute. We have discussed in the previous two sections the reasons behind these contradictory findings in the trade network space.

Conclusion

In the concluding chapter, I discuss the findings of the statistical analyses in the context of the rarity of joining behavior by third party states. I believe that both the theoretical model laid out in Chapter 3 and the empirical findings of this chapter facilitate our understanding of not only why some states join ongoing disputes, but also why they rarely do so. After discussing the

findings, I will outline my next steps with regards to this project. I shall also discuss how the theoretical framework of this project can be extended to other foreign policy decisions, particularly dealing with how states manage ongoing conflicts. Joining a dispute is one strategy in a potential joiner's foreign policy toolkit. Implicit in the theoretical model of joining behavior are testable hypotheses for when potential joiners use non-military means of managing a conflict.

6. Conclusion

Over thirty years ago, Altfeld and Mesquita (1979) lamented that little was known about what led some nations to remain neutral and others to join ongoing wars. Some progress has been made in this line of research, but we still lack an integrated framework for explaining why some third parties join interstate conflicts, and therefore, why those conflicts expand. This dissertation outlines a network-based explanation of joining behavior that recognizes that potential joiners make their foreign policy decisions, such as whether to enter or abstain from an ongoing dispute, on the basis of their interactions with the states that initiated the dispute, other potential joiners, and other states in international politics. The emergent patterns of interactions form network spaces across which a dispute can expand. A potential joiner's position in such network spaces is the context in which it evaluates the salience of that dispute, the benefits of joining, and constraints on its decision.

The concluding chapter of the dissertation is divided into three sections. The first section summarizes the theoretical arguments and findings of this dissertation using empirical examples. The second section discusses the significant findings in terms of their theoretical and policy implications. The third and final section outlines the future research agenda associated with the dissertation.

6.1 Summary of Findings

Militarized interstate disputes are confrontations between states that are serious enough for military action to have been threatened, displayed or used, most of which have not crossed the war threshold. Potential joiners prefer to be bystanders when a dispute begins because they are not certain how their interests might be at risk. Furthermore, most disputes end in stalemates. The benefits of not joining outweigh the costs of undertaking military action vis-à-vis the

dispute. In contrast, when a potential joiner calculates that the ongoing dispute will jeopardize its interests, or that by joining it can facilitate an outcome (even if it is a stalemate) that benefits both itself and the country(ies) it is supporting, the costs of sitting out from the dispute are higher than the benefits of not joining. The probability that a potential joiner enters disputes in which it shares highly asymmetric levels of affinity with both sides, is 8.8% compared to 4.9% when it does not. For example, by frequently joining disputes between North and South Korea, and China and Taiwan respectively, the US protects its own stakes in the region, their shared security interests with South Korea and Taiwan, and shows its continued resolve in dealing with North Korea and China respectively.

When potential joiners, such as the US, calculate the costs of abstaining from an ongoing dispute, they consider their ‘closeness’ to belligerents on both sides. The closer they are to one side of the dispute, the higher are the costs of not joining that conflict. I conceptualize closeness between a potential joiner and given dispute initiator as affinity stemming from both parties occupying similar positions in the relevant network spaces. The high degree of affinity between the potential joiner and one side of the dispute reflects that they have a similar pattern of ties to the same set of states and therefore have common friends, foes and trading partners. The US and South Korea are an appropriate case in point. They have common security preferences with respect to North Korea and the ‘nuclearization’ of the East Asian region. They not only trade with each other, but they have common trading partners in Asia and Europe. The commonality of their goals and values are further manifest in the various agreements and institutions they are co-signatories of including the Republic of Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. In contrast, the US and North Korea have had extremely low levels of

affinity. Primarily originating from the Korean War of 1950, security interests of both countries have clashed. They have negligible levels of economic interdependence between them.

For potential joiners, disputes that occur between countries with which it simultaneously shares high and low levels of affinity, are salient enough to want to join. Potential joiners, such as the US in the given illustration, calculate the benefits of doing nothing to safeguard their shared interests, to be lower than the costs of undertaking coercive action by joining those disputes. The US, therefore, has strong incentive to join a dispute between South Korea and North Korea.

The US as a potential joiner to disputes between China and Taiwan, has to consider a similar calculus. The US and Taiwan, consider each other to be similar, and therefore, also share a common perception of shared strategic, political and economic interests. Historically, the US and China, for the most part, have had little or no affinity with each other, implying either lack of shared interests or competing stakes between the two sides.⁷⁰ The US is highly likely to join a dispute Taiwan and China, because it has simultaneously high and low levels affinity respectively with the dispute initiators.

Conversely, potential joiners prefer to sit out disputes between countries with which it has less or no shared interests, or disputes between countries wherein it enjoys high levels of affinity with all parties. In both kinds of disputes, potential joiners calculate the benefits of abstention to be higher than the costs of not participating in the conflict (albeit for different reasons). A potential joiner is extremely concerned when a dispute breaks out between two sides with which it shares high levels of affinity. That dispute jeopardizes its interdependence and stakes shared with both sides of the dispute. Although the potential joiner, in such cases, is keen

⁷⁰ That calculation becomes complicated as the economic affinity between China and the US increases as they continue to not only trade with each other but with the same countries.

to have the dispute managed, it is averse to doing so by joining that conflict. Entering the conflict in support of either side would antagonize its friend.

A potential joiner that has low levels of affinity with both sides of the dispute is also unlikely to enter that dispute. If a potential joiner has no ties to either of the dispute originators nor does it interact with the same set of countries, then that dispute is of little concern to the former. It has no stakes to protect and incentive to be a bystander to that dispute is strong; it is indifferent to the dispute and its outcome. For example, disputes between Thailand and Myanmar, although of considerable import to those two countries, have not ‘attracted’ potential joiners to intervene. Their confrontations range from competition over territory to cross-border insurgency and drugs trafficking. Thailand and Myanmar are so positioned in international networks of interaction (of alliances, trade, and IGOs) that none of the potential joiners “politically relevant” to their disputes, conceive of their interests being intertwined with them. On 12th January 1999, the Thai and Burmese navies were embroiled in an armed clash because of their competing territorial claims over three islands off the west coast of Thailand. As neighbors of the conflict and/or major powers that year, the US, China, Russia, UK, France, Germany, Japan, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Laos, Indonesia, Cambodia and Malaysia were potential joiners to that dispute. None of these potential joiners that were “politically relevant” to the dispute had stakes in the ongoing dispute that were worth safeguarding.

India-Pakistan disputes are another case in point. No potential joiner to a dispute between India and Pakistan has intervened in any of the conflicts the two countries have fought with each other. Both countries became independent during the Cold War. India’s foreign policy of non-alignment during the Cold War period and its economic protectionism offered limited scope for development of affinity between itself and countries that could have intervened on its behalf.

Although potential joiners such as the US had a military alliance with Pakistan, the level of affinity between the former and Pakistan was not very high as well. For potential joiners of India-Pakistan disputes during the Cold War, the disputes did not affect their interests sufficiently enough to want to undertake military action. The levels of affinity have increased over time (especially economic and strategic interdependence), and India-Pakistan disputes have become salient issues for the international community. Potential joiners share symmetric levels of affinity with both India and Pakistan and prefer to manage those conflicts in a non-military manner.

Along with their closeness or affinity to the dispute initiators, potential joiners also consider their relationships with other potential joiners to the dispute as well as other states in the system. Those interactions cumulatively position the potential joiner in ways that affect its decision-making calculus about entering an ongoing conflict. A potential joiner's position in the network space as a whole indicates the extent to which it is vested in that network of interactions, and the extent to which its actions are going to be affected by other actors in the network. A potential joiner's position vis-à-vis the network as a whole further reinforces that state's policy of refraining from joining an ongoing dispute by changing the costs and/or benefits of (not) joining that dispute. Furthermore, that effect is felt even when potential joiners are highly motivated to enter an ongoing dispute (stemming from asymmetric levels of affinity with the dispute originators). The probability of a potential joiner entering an ongoing dispute declines to 1.2-1.6% from 4.7% when that actor is constrained by its rivalries and affiliations to IGOs.

Israel as a potential joiner in a dispute in its region is conscious of, and is constrained by, its rivalries. The Gulf War of 1991 is a fitting example of how a potential joiner's position in the network can have a constraining effect on affinity-induced likelihood of joining. Israel was

motivated to join this war because it shared lower levels of affinity with Iraq than with Kuwait and the US. Its centrality in the rivalry network space, however, constrained it from joining the conflict because any military action on its part vis-à-vis an ongoing dispute was likely to provoke retaliatory actions by its rivals. That is clear from Iraq's actions towards Israel during the war. Iraq launched Scud missiles at Israel to provoke it into military retaliation to expand the Persian Gulf War of 1991. It was trying to 'link' the conflict with other ongoing Arab-Israeli rivalries because Israel's joining the war would have arguably led its Arab rivals to intervene in the conflict on the side of Iraq against Israel. The US on the other hand restrained Israel from taking military action against Iraq.

Typically, ongoing disputes are either of little concern to potential joiners, or they are between states with which they share high levels of affinity (arguably, they are managed peacefully). Potential joiners consider very few disputes as important enough for military intervention. Although a potential joiner has strong incentives to join disputes wherein it shares a high level of affinity with one side and a complete lack thereof with the opposing side, there are constraints on its ability to actually do so. A potential joiner's interactions with other potential joiners and its position in network spaces as a whole lower their likelihood of joining. Overall, this dissertation not only explains joining behavior of third party states, but also explicitly captures the empirical fact that potential joiners rarely enter ongoing disputes, and interstate conflicts rarely expand. Statistical analyses in Chapter 5 provide general support from the theoretical predictions of the dissertation.

Table 6.1 summarizes the statistically significant findings of the statistical analyses conducted in Chapter 5 that addresses the likelihood of joining by potential third party states. Apart from trade network measures, which behaved contrary to theoretical predictions or did not

have significant effects, the findings demonstrate that (a) potential joiners with asymmetric levels of alliance and IGO-based affinities with dispute originators consider the costs of sitting out of the dispute to be higher than the benefits of not joining, (b) absent any incentive to safeguard shared stakes with the dispute originators, a potential joiner's embeddedness in rivalry and IGO network spaces reinforces its calculus of the benefits of abstaining from joining an ongoing dispute, (c) the dampening effect of a potential joiner's position vis-à-vis its interactions with other potential joiners and states in the system is evident even when they have strong incentive to join an ongoing dispute to protect their interests.

Table 6.1: Summary of Findings

The higher the difference in alliance-based affinity between the potential joiner and the both sides of dispute originators the higher the likelihood of joining.
The higher the difference in IGOs-based affinity between the potential joiner and the both sides of dispute originators the higher the likelihood of joining.
The higher the difference in trade-based affinity between the potential joiner and the both sides of dispute originators the lower the likelihood of joining.
The higher the (betweenness) centrality of potential joiners in the rivalry network, the lower their likelihood of joining.
The higher the centrality of potential joiners in the rivalry network, the lower their likelihood of joining created by alliance/trade/IGO-based affinities.
The higher the (closeness) centrality of potential joiners in the IGOs network, the lower their likelihood of joining.
The higher the (closeness) centrality of potential joiners in the IGOs network, the lower their likelihood of joining created by alliance/trade/IGO-based affinities.
The higher the (degree) centrality of potential joiners in the IGOs network, the lower their likelihood of joining created by alliance/trade/IGO-based affinities.

6.2 Implications of the Dissertation

The theoretical framework and the empirical findings of this dissertation have implications both for how scholars study joining behavior by third parties in particular and international conflicts in general. This project also has a number of policy implications for identifying disputes that might expand, and conditions under which interventions occur.

6.2.1 Theoretical Implications

The analysis in this dissertation generates a number of theoretical insights. First, it revises existing notions in the literature about the processes of war joining taking place as an outcome of contagion. Early analyses of diffusion of wars had compared them to diseases and war-joining occurred as a result of infection. Wars were contagious and they expanded to additional states via contact with “warring borders” and “warring allies” (Siverson and Starr 1991). That implied that the diffusion process was fairly passive wherein wars diffused across physical space of shared borders to additional states, and the latter had no immunity to the disease of war. In contrast, this dissertation conceptualized conflict as a political process of actions and choices made by states involved in the dispute and potential joiners. Their networks of interactions with each other and the rest of the states in the system form the surface across which disputes may expand. Our overall findings of the dissertation validate this re-conceptualization. All the potential joiners to the disputes in my dataset are either contiguous neighbors and/or major powers (“politically relevant” to the dispute). The findings of the dissertation show that these potential joiners have some agency in being able to choose which disputes to enter. They may also be constrained in their decision-making and choose to abstain from joining a dispute.

Two of the key findings in the dissertation are that strong incentives to join a dispute notwithstanding, a potential joiner’s positions in networks of rivalry and IGO-related interactions with other potential joiners and states in the system respectively, constrain its likelihood of joining. Potential joiners, therefore, rarely intervene in ongoing disputes. These findings realistically portray the rarity of joining occurrence in ongoing disputes. Approximately 10% of militarized disputes expand and the probability of third party joining is 4.7%. That reduces to around 1.5% when both the incentives to join are the strongest and constraints over joining, the

most restrictive. Existing scholarly literature on diffusion of wars had recognized that states rarely join wars. Their conceptualization and modeling of war diffusion, however, did not explicitly examine the infrequency of third party joining in wars. By focusing on motivations of joiners to enter ongoing disputes, studies on war joining and intervention overlooked the barriers to diffusion of wars, or the constraints on a potential joiner that dissuade it from participating in a conflict. They offered important insights about the types of ties between dispute initiators and joiners that lead to intervention but offered no explanation for why even with those factors present, joining and/or intervention rarely occurred.

That is partly because they did not include observations of states (that had the characteristics they deemed important in an intervener) that could have joined but did not. Instead of only focusing on those states that joined disputes, this project identifies all “politically relevant” potential joiners to an ongoing dispute. That allows for more accurate inference of what makes some potential joiners enter ongoing disputes, while others do not. This dissertation supports and strengthens current findings in joining and intervention literature that ties between potential joiners and dispute initiators matter for joining.⁷¹ When potential joiners have higher affinity across alliances and IGO affiliations with a given dispute originator, they are likely to enter that ongoing dispute. This dissertation, however, also provides evidence that the likelihood of joining is constrained by the former’s embeddedness in rivalry and IGO networks.

The rarity of joining behavior is manifest in the relatively small changes in predicted probabilities of joining displayed in the previous chapter. The predicted probabilities of joining when setting the affinity-related variables to their maximum values are 82.5%, 69.93% and -41.2% for asymmetries in IGO, alliance, and trade-based affinities respectively. The relatively

⁷¹ Although it refutes the trade affinity hypothesis, empirical analyses suggests that economic affinity between potential joiner and dispute originators matters to the former in that it makes it less likely to intervene in that dispute.

small predicted probabilities compared to what is typically found in international conflict research, provides some support to the notion that absent constraints on decision-making and even when potential joiners are only considering their affinity with states that initiated the dispute, the likelihood of joining increases modestly. A potential joiner needs very strong motivation to undertake the risk of military action. The predicted probability of joining when both incentives and constraints to join are the strongest are approximately 68-74% for alliance-based and IGO-based affinities, and 90-92% for trade-based affinity. Although the incentives to join a dispute are high, if a potential joiner is also highly embedded in rivalry and IGO network spaces, the likelihood of joining is reduced. If war is a disease, as scholarly literature on diffusion of wars conceptualizes, then most states are immune to most conflicts.

Second, the findings of this dissertation demonstrate that potential joiners simultaneously consider their affinity to both sides of dispute originators. Affinity, as it is conceptualized in this dissertation, is a function of the extent of similarity between potential joiners and dispute originators (including the possibility of a direct tie between the two). Studies on joining behavior model a third party's motivation to join an ongoing dispute (or war) as originating from its relationship with a given disputant one at a time. As has been previously discussed, they find that joiners are likely to be major powers, neighbors, of similar regime type, and/or allied to states that initiated the conflict. This project conceives of a potential joiner as being motivated to enter a dispute when it is close to one side of the dispute, while simultaneously not sharing any or low levels of affinity with the other side of the dispute. It bolsters current findings in the literature that affinity born out of having common allies and shared membership in IGOs matter to potential joiners in their decision to enter a conflict. It contributes to that literature by finding

that a potential joiner does not just evaluate its ties to a given dispute initiator one at a time, and independent of other belligerents (as has been assumed by existing literature).

Third, the statistical significance of a potential joiner's centrality in rivalry and IGO network spaces has several implications for literature on joining behavior and networks analysis in international relations research. One, it shows that those states account for their interactions with other potential joiners and the international community as a whole. Along with dispute originators, the potential joiner also has ties with other states in the international system and those interactions influence the potential joiner's cost-benefit calculus, constraining it from joining an ongoing dispute. Its motivation to join an ongoing dispute to protect the disputants with which it shares a high level of affinity is weakened by whether and how that joining behavior might provoke retaliatory responses by the rivals in the network. In fact, a potential joiner with high rivalry centrality, despite their rational calculation to abstain from an ongoing dispute, might still be pulled into a conflict.⁷² Also, the extent to which potential joiners are involved in international organizational networks affects their evaluation of the usefulness of joining as a way of intervening in a dispute as opposed to non-military means of intervention. That realization leads to an inquiry about the conditions under which a potential joiner can substitute between military and non-military strategies of conflict management.⁷³

In all the models in Chapter 5 that combine the affinity variables with centrality measures, those covariates have independent and significant effects on joining (apart from trade-based measures). Therefore, a potential joiner's interactions and relationships with other states aside from those that initiated the ongoing dispute, influences its probability of joining that dispute. Although logit regression analyses that are carried out assume independence between

⁷² I go into this in detail in "Future Research Agenda" section.

⁷³ I go into this in detail in "Future Research Agenda" section as well.

potential joiner observations in the dataset, the explanatory variables represent different aspects of a potential joiner's position in a network of ties, which is interdependent on how other actors in that network interact with one other.

Two, it demonstrates the importance of considering rivalry relationships when examining joining behavior by third party states. Joining literature has largely overlooked rivalries as being relevant to joining decisions. This dissertation, however, finds that the extent to which a potential joiner links other rivals in the network, has a significant (mitigating) effect on its decision to participate in an ongoing dispute. A potential joiner that is marginal to the rivalry network has less constraints on its decision-making, and is more likely to join a dispute than a third party that is more centrally located in that network.

Three, it complicates the ongoing discussion among scholars who are engaging in network analysis in international relations research. It is assumed that an actor's centrality in a network, that is its location emergent from its ties with other actors in the network, makes it prominent and powerful (Wasserman and Faust 1997). It has access to more actors than anybody else in the network; it connects actors to one another, and without it that network might even collapse. The finding that a potential joiner's centrality in a network of rivalries may actually make it a visible target of attack and therefore the most vulnerable actor in the network, is counter-intuitive to current narratives of centrality as network power (Wasserman and Faust 1997, Maoz 2010, Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2010). The finding that a potential joiner's centrality in a network of IGO affiliations positions it such that it can tap into social capital manifest in that work and use its location to facilitate communication, is in tune with centrality as power. Cumulatively, these findings imply that the claim that 'central' positions in networks

‘empower’ those actors is not generalizable. The type of network matters to whether an actor’s centrality in that network is a source of vulnerability or influence.

6.2.2 Policy Implications

Several policy implications follow from the theoretical argument and empirical results of this dissertation. Potential joiners, when intervening in ongoing disputes, do not necessarily aim to resolve that conflict, but to manage it in such a way that it does not jeopardize their interests linked as they are to those of the dispute initiators. That impetus sometimes contradicts the goals of constituencies of conflict managers in national governments, international organizations, domestic civil societies and international social movements, who desire resolution of ongoing disputes. They are concerned about the detrimental effects of additional conflict participants on the termination of those conflicts. The findings of this dissertation are of relevance to the above mentioned constituencies because they can help conflict managers align their concern for resolving disputes with the motivation of potential joiners to safeguard their stakes in those conflicts. The attention of the international community, however, is typically on conflicts where intervention is likely to take place, to the point that other ongoing disputes are ignored. This dissertation also helps conflict managers and policymakers identify conflicts that are not likely to receive any attention from potential joiner states. To the extent, that those disputes still need to be resolved, conflict managers need to pay attention to them as well, and re-assess strategies to bring that about.

This dissertation finds that potential joiners are mostly concerned about those disputes wherein states with which they have a high level of strategic and ideational affinity, clash with states with which they share low level of alliance-driven and IGOs-induced affinity. Otherwise, states prefer to remain outside of ongoing conflicts. Disputes that expand, thus, tend to be

between states that have a number of cooperative interactions with third parties, and potential pariahs of the international community who are either fairly isolated or have a competing block of ties to third parties. That explains why disputes involving Iraq, North Korea, and the former Soviet Union were more likely to expand than others. The international community may use this finding as an early warning indicator of possible expansion of that conflict, and exercise preventive diplomacy so that the dispute might not arise at all. Conflict managers, therefore, need to be concerned about either preventing occurrence of those disputes, or limiting the scope of their expansion.

A key finding of this dissertation is that a potential joiner that connects other rivalries relevant to the conflict to one another, is wary of intervening. That is because it is conscious of possible retaliation against its actions by other potential joiners to the conflict. Incipient literature on rivalries and wars, however, find that as rivalries get interlinked to one another, the outcome is likely to be a multilateral war. Taking these two findings together, it is clear that rivalry interlinkages between and among dispute initiators and potential joiners are the trigger that may make a dispute expand and escalate to war. It is crucial for conflict managers concerned with limiting conflicts, to help terminate ongoing rivalries that may influence dispute expansion and escalation. Resolution of rivalries will also aid management of disputes, which deserve international attention but barely receive it, such as the Thailand-Burmese rivalry.

The findings of this dissertation show that potential joiners place a premium on affinity deriving from having common allies and being members of the same international organizations with a given dispute initiator. Policymakers vested in bringing about a peaceful resolution of conflicts can potentially channelize the potential joiner's interest in disputes in which it shares a higher level of affinity with one side than the other, into non-violently managing those conflicts.

A key finding of this dissertation suggests that potential joiners that are members of multiple international organizations are less likely to intervene in ongoing disputes. They are socialized into norms of peaceful conflict management, and have various forums available to them to manage conflicts non-militarily. Policymakers need to pay heed to these findings and strengthen such pacifying interstate interactions. Also, potential joiners have a strong incentive to peacefully manage (and even resolve) conflicts between two sides with which it shares high levels of affinity. Relevant constituencies have to design policies that facilitate the creation of cooperative ties between countries. The more integrated countries become to each other, the stronger will be the impetus to manage any disagreements peacefully.

A logical implication of the finding that potential joiners only tend to be interested in intervening in conflicts in which they share a higher level of affinity with one side than the other, is that they are indifferent to disputes between states with which they do not share much affinity. States in certain regions do not interact much with each other and/or with countries outside of their neighborhood. That limits the development of affinity between neighbors, or between them and the rest of the world. Potential joiners, who are typically neighbors and major powers, are not likely to consider disputes occurring in these regions or between such states as worth the cost of military intervention. Disputes in South Asia and South East Asia fit that description. Historically, states in these regions did not economically or strategically interact much with each other, and they were peripheral to the international community as well. As networks of defense-related and economic ties within these regions, and them and the world become denser, their disputes have also garnered more international attention.

6.3 Future Research Agenda

This dissertation situates itself along with other incipient scholarship in the literature that seeks to move beyond merely establishing the presence of diffusion of conflicts, to understanding the reasons why some disputes expand, and the processes by which they do so (see also Flint et al 2009; Vasquez et al 2011). I have focused on the joining behavior of potential third party states in ongoing disputes to explain expansion of those conflicts. As potential third party states join an ongoing dispute, that dispute expands and diffuses. Why do potential joiners join some ongoing disputes and not others? My dissertation answers this question (described in Chapter 3); outlines two processes through which joining can take place (purposive decision to join/target of attack); situates the potential joiner in the context of its interactions with other states in the network (dispute originators, potential joiners and so on), and recognizes the interdependence between relevant actors.

I need to, however, clarify some arguments. The first sub-section of the future research agenda lays out some of the ways in which I can do that. This dissertation also raises a number of avenues of research including extending the theoretical framework to studying non-military intervention by potential third parties. The second sub-section outlines that project.

6.3.1 Next Steps

Alignment Choice of Potential Joiners

The primary focus of this dissertation was discovering what makes potential joiners more or less likely to join ongoing disputes. Accordingly, the dependent variable is coded dichotomously – did a potential joiner enter an ongoing dispute (join =1), or not (join =0)? Empirical analyses in Chapter 5 summarized in the previous section, offer support for the theoretical predictions of this dissertation about joining behavior of potential third party states. A

potential joiner's decision to join an ongoing dispute, however, is intertwined with its decision about which side to support in a conflict.⁷⁴ When a potential joiner enters an ongoing dispute, it does so in support of one side against the other. The act of joining is a partisan gesture by a third party towards a given dispute originator (Corbetta and Grant 2010). The next step for this dissertation is to explain the alignment choice of a potential joiner with a given dispute initiator.

In Chapter 3, I argue that a potential joiner is likely to join an ongoing conflict when dispute initiator(s) with which it has a high level of affinity faces off against a side with which it has zero or low levels of affinity. This argument suggests that a potential joiner is not only highly likely to join that particular dispute, but it will do so in support of the side it has a high level of affinity with. Asymmetries of affinity between the potential joiner and a given dispute originator in all three indices (alliances, trade and IGO memberships) will motivate potential joiner to enter the dispute on the side of those with which it shares a high level of affinity. Findings in scholarly literature on intervention support that hypothesis. They find that a joiner's alignment choices are affected by its interactions with the dispute originators. States that join ongoing disputes are allied with the states that initiated the conflict (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2003; Siverson and Starr 1991); share the same regime type and economic outlook as the latter (Werner and Lemke 1997); and are geographically proximate (Siverson and Starr 1991). I also predict that although a potential joiner's centrality in the rivalry, trade and IGO network spaces will dampen the likelihood of joining, it does not affect their alignment choice.⁷⁵

Potential joiners simultaneously decide whether to join an ongoing dispute and which side to support. To test the hypothesis that a potential joiner is likely to join a dispute in support

⁷⁴ Joiners are motivated to join in support of friends, rather than against enemies (Kim 1991).

⁷⁵ Of course, if a rival enters the dispute on the opposing side, that will change the balance of affinities that the potential joiner has with both sides, and might make it more likely to join the dispute *against* its rival. Modeling the sequence in which potential joiners enter ongoing disputes is discussed later in the chapter.

of the dispute originator it has a higher level of affinity for than the other side, the current (binary) dependent variable needs to be recoded. Considering that our outcome of interest is not just joining but alignment choice of the potential joiner as well, the dependent variable is converted to three categorical variables – (1) joining in support of side A, or (2) joining in support of side B; or (3) not join dispute. Multinomial logit or probit analyses will be appropriate statistical procedures.

Sequencing Decisions to Join

Bremer (1995a) conceptualized evolution of a conflict as a sequence of events and choices by states who decide to involve themselves in the conflict. At the onset of a dispute, potential joiners consider their levels of affinity with states that initiated the conflict. The dispute expands if a potential joiner is motivated to intervene in that conflict. That state's entry into the conflict, however, changes the landscape of that dispute for the other potential joiners. Each successive entry (and exit) into (and from) a dispute changes the context within which the remaining potential joiners evaluate the salience of the dispute and feasibility of joining. In the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, the US is the first potential joiner to enter the conflict (in support of Kuwait). US' entry into the conflict changed the decision-making calculus of other potential joiners such as France and the UK. Those countries had high levels of strategic affinity with the US. Subsequently, they joined the war in support of the US and Kuwait. France and UK's entry into the war on behalf of the US and Kuwait affected the calculations of remaining potential joiners to the war.

Bremer (1995a, p.11) stated that "time ordering among the contributing events is generally critical for the outcome". Expansion of disputes (or wars) cannot be correctly understood without considering how each potential joiner's decision to enter or abstain from an

ongoing dispute changes the context of decision-making for other third parties. Bremer (1995b) regretted that “this dynamic and evolutionary, even organic, conception of war and conflict has [not] guided much of our empirical work” (p.268). Studies of joining behavior and diffusion of wars have to consider that each joining decision changes the dispute, which affects subsequent joining decisions.

Within the theoretical framework of this dissertation, the entry of a joiner into the dispute changes the level of affinity between the remaining potential joiners and countries involved in the dispute. The remaining potential joiners re-evaluate their decision to enter or abstain from that dispute. The first joiner only considers its affinity with a given dispute originator versus the other; the second joiner considers its affinity with a given dispute originator and the first joiner versus the other; and so on. The potential joiners that stay away from the dispute until its termination consider their affinity to a given dispute initiator and its supporting joiners, relative to the other dispute initiator and its supporting joiners. Every potential joiner that does not enter the dispute has to modify its decision-making calculus as other potential joiners get involved in the conflict.

The theoretical repercussion of considering sequence of joining decisions in understanding expansion of conflicts is recognizing that potential joiners take into account such changing strategic contexts as other states join or leave a dispute. That means research design of studies of joining behavior have to incorporate temporal dynamics of joining behavior as well. Most studies only model the motivation of joining decisions as being shaped by the ties between the potential joiner and dispute originators. That implies that the second, third (and so on) potential joiners only consider their interactions with the dispute originators and disregard states

that have joined the conflict before them.⁷⁶ Instead, the data set-up and research design needs to explicitly incorporate sequencing of joining decisions (if any) and the resultant changes in the ‘landscape’ of the dispute for potential joiners.

Joining from being targeted

Laos and Cambodia, as neighbors of North and South Vietnam, were potential joiners to the US-Vietnam war from 1964 to 1975. Although they had a “warring border” with the disputants (Siverson and Starr 1991), they did not join the conflict until 1968 (Laos) and 1970 (Cambodia). Neither Laos nor Cambodia had purposively calculated to join the war. In fact, it was the opposite – Cambodia and Laos did not want to join the war. The Cambodian government (with international endorsement) called on the US to respect its borders. The US, however, carried targeted attacks on both Laos’ and Cambodian territories. North Vietnamese supply routes ran through Laos, and Viet Cong troops would sometimes operate out of Cambodian territory. The US carried out aerial attacks and crossed international borders into Laos and Cambodia, thereby making the latter joiners of the Vietnam War.

In 1939, Belgium declared that it would officially be neutral in the Second World War. It did not want to involve itself in the ongoing conflict. Despite its decision not to join the ongoing war, Belgium was invaded by Germany as a part of the latter’s offensive in Western Europe. Even though Belgium had decided to abstain from the war, it still became a joiner of the conflict.

The Second World War and the Vietnam War expanded to Belgium, and Laos and Cambodia respectively, but that was not a result of those countries’ decision to join those conflicts. In fact, Laos and Cambodia, and Belgium, joined those wars despite their decision to be bystanders to those wars. Neither the scholarly literature on diffusion of wars, nor studies of

⁷⁶ Of course, more than half (52%) of dispute occurrences in the 1816-2001 period in the entire MIDs dataset experience only one joining.

intervention have captured the process that led to Laos and Cambodia, and Belgium joining the Vietnam War and the Second World War respectively. On the one hand, extant literature on diffusion of wars primarily focused on establishing the existence of diffusion and did not distinguish between different processes of diffusion (Vasquez et al 2011). On the other hand, interventions scholarship treated joining behavior as an outcome of third parties deciding that joining was more beneficial than abstaining from a dispute, and did not consider alternative processes of joining behavior.

In contrast, I outline two processes by which joining behavior may take place and conflicts expand. Potential third parties to a MID can join the dispute in two ways (1) they decide to militarily intervene in the conflict in support of or against a side, and (2) they get “pulled into” the dispute because they are targeted by at least one of the disputants. In the preceding chapters, I have primarily investigated the first process. Chapter 5 provided empirical evidence that potential joiners calculate and decide to join an ongoing dispute in support of the side with which it shares a high degree of affinity (indicative of a shared sense of interests and interdependence), against a side with which they have low levels of affinity.

How do potential joiners such as Laos, Cambodia and Belgium, get “pulled into” a dispute? A potential joiner prefers to be a bystander to the dispute unless the costs of doing so outweigh the benefits. When a potential joiner enters a dispute despite strong incentives to abstain, we can infer that it got “pulled into” that dispute. Neither Laos nor Cambodia had strong incentives to join the Vietnam War. On the contrary, those countries feared the negative spillovers of that war for themselves, and sought to avoid that. Belgium had been invaded by Germany in the First World War as well, and wanted to prevent that from happening again by declaring their neutrality in the Second World War.

A potential joiner gets "pulled into a dispute" when a country already involved in that dispute conducts military action against them. It may also occur when a conflict between two states 'spills over' into the potential joiner's territories. A dispute initiator may attack the potential joiner, and/or another third party may target the potential joiner while simultaneously joining the ongoing dispute. Laos and Cambodia were pulled into the Vietnam War because the US, which was one of the war initiators, attacked targets in their territories. North Vietnamese troops got supplies through Laos, and established bases across the border in Cambodia. The US air force and ground troops invaded those countries because of that. Belgium was pulled into the Second World War because the German army invaded it as a part of their war offensive.

There are at least two conditions under which a potential joiner is likely to get pulled into a dispute it did not intend to participate in. First, when a potential joiner is centrally positioned in the rivalry network, it is a visible target of attack. In Chapter 3, I theorized that a potential joiner accounts for its position in the rivalry network vis-à-vis other potential joiners and is constrained by it. If a potential joiner links other rivalries in the network, then the possible retaliations by those rivals weighs heavily on its decision calculus and the potential joiner decides not to enter an ongoing conflict. Nevertheless, it may still get attacked by a potential joiner who is its rival, and forced to join the dispute. Chi et al (2012) found that rivalries had a significant enabling effect on third party joining in the First World War in the later stages of that conflict. That suggests that a potential joiner that is highly embedded in the rivalry network gets pulled into a dispute in its later stages as well. As more rivalries get implicated in a conflict, it is likely that a potential joiner centrally (and vulnerably) positioned in the rivalry network, will get pulled into the conflict as well.

Second, a neighbor of the disputants may get pulled into the conflict as that dispute spills over across borders. Both scholarly literatures on diffusion of wars, and intervention found that joiners are likely to be neighbors. A potential joiner may get chaffed between the belligerents if its territory is needed for troop deployment by either or both sides of the dispute; if enemy insurgents are operating from its territory and so on. A potential joiner that is so located in the neighborhood such that it geographically connects actors in that physical space is vulnerable to conflict spillovers. Chi et al (2012) found that states that were centrally located in their region were more likely to join the First World War, and were likely to do so early. I argue that a potential joiner so located geographically, is likely to get pulled into disputes that it had no intentions of participating in.

Issues of Contention in Disputes

Currently, my dissertation explains joining behavior by third party states based on their relationships with states involved in the conflict, other potential joiners, and other countries in the system at the time of dispute. It has not considered the issues of contention in the dispute. States are more or less likely to compromise in negotiating with each other depending on the substantive cause of their disagreement. States attach varying degrees of importance to different issue types, which in turn expands or contracts the common ground for negotiation between them (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981, Diehl 1992). States are more likely to engage in militarized confrontations over issues that they consider salient than those that are less important.

In terms of explaining joining behavior of potential joiners, one can incorporate issues of contention in two ways – (1) issues as a characteristic of the dispute, i.e. what are the dispute initiators fighting about, and (2) issues of contention between the potential joiner and dispute originators, and between potential joiners and other third parties. Along with a potential joiner's

interactions with states involved in the dispute, and other states in the system, which is the context of its decision-making, a potential joiner's incentives to join or abstain from a conflict will also be affected by whether the issues it considers salient are at stake.

6.3.2 Extending the Dissertation: A Potential Joiner's Toolkit of Conflict Management Strategies

This dissertation suggests, though it does not test it explicitly, the conditions under which disputes are likely to experience non-military intervention by third party states. Non-military intervention includes but is not limited to mediation, arbitration and conciliation by third party states. The theory of joining behavior laid out in Chapter 3 argues that a dispute occurring between two sides, with which a potential joiner shares similarly high levels of affinity, is likely to experience non-military intervention by that third party. Conflict management techniques such as mediation and arbitration require the disputants to mutually agree upon a third party. Mediation is most effective when the disputants suffering from a painful stalemate mutually agree upon a mediator and invite it to manage their conflict (Touval and Zartman 2001; Frazier and Dixon 2006). A potential joiner that has high level of affinity with both sides of the dispute is likely to be the third party that both sides of the dispute find acceptable as a mediator.

Simultaneously, potential joiners are extremely concerned when disputes occur between countries with which they share similarly high levels of affinity. In those cases, they are witnessing a dispute between countries with which they share common strategic, economic and political interests. Potential joiners have a strong incentive to manage that conflict in order to safeguard those shared stakes. Joining that conflict in support of one side against another is not an option because that can jeopardize their affinity with the opposing side. They can encourage conflict management between their friends by either agreeing to mediate when invited, or by

encouraging their disputing friends to reconcile. Whether it is by their own impetus, or by invitation from their friends who are fighting, potential joiners in such scenarios want to channelize their concern about an ongoing dispute between states with which it has a high level of affinity. Corbetta and Grant (2012) find that in post-World War II period, when conflicts occur between two friends, non-partisan intervention is more likely to occur than military intervention.

The above mentioned proposition that disputes between two friends or allies are more likely to experience non-military intervention by third parties, is related to the notion that a mediator that has a vested interest in both sides of the dispute is likely to be effective. An ongoing debate in mediation literature centers on identifying the most likely candidates for mediators. A potential joiner that has high levels of affinity with both sides of the dispute is likely to offer or be asked to manage that conflict. Owsiak and Frazier (2012) find that states that are allied to both sides of the dispute are more likely to mediate that conflict.

Along with the high levels of affinity that it shares with the dispute originators, there are other characteristics that may make some potential joiners likely to engage in peaceful conflict management. An implicit argument in my theory of joining behavior is that potential joiners that are actively engaged in international trade and international organizations prefer other forms of conflict management rather than military intervention. They are more likely to engage in mediation and similar strategies than other potential joiners.

The deeper a potential joiner is embedded in the international trading network, the more vested it is in the unhindered functioning of the network. A potential joiner with high trade centrality is interested in protecting its economic interests from negative externalities caused by an ongoing dispute. By the same logic, it is also not likely to use military means to safeguard the

economic interests vested in the network. A potential joiner who is actively engaged in the trading network has access to several trading partners and markets. It can suspend transactions with one state and substitute it with another trading partner, potentially without much cost. That potential joiner can use non-violent coercive strategies to punish either or both the dispute initiators and to make them terminate the conflict.

Potential joiners that are central to the network of IGO affiliations (a) are more likely to be socialized into norms of peaceful conflict management such as concessionary bargaining and reciprocity, and (b) are in a position to link other member-states to each other, facilitate communication between them, and bring about peaceful management of conflicts between them. Empirical analyses in the previous chapter provide evidence that potential joiners' centrality in network of IGOs has a dampening effect on their likelihood of entering a conflict. It can be further hypothesized that a centrally positioned potential joiner in this network may also be a popular candidate for facilitating peaceful conflict management between belligerents because of its ability to facilitate communication (and therefore conciliation) between the latter.

The bigger conceptual insight behind the need to extend the logic of why potential third party states join ongoing disputes, to when they might prefer non-military forms of intervention, is that states have a number of strategies in their foreign policy toolkits. They choose which strategy to employ depending on the states that are engaged in a dispute and their own position vis-à-vis their interactions with other states in the system. When stakes are high and worth safeguarding, potential joiners consider the feasibility of managing the conflict one way or another. In certain situations such as when a dispute is being fought between two sides to which a potential joiner is 'close', it prefers to peacefully facilitate resolution of that conflict. Moreover, even in disputes where the incentive to militarily intervene is high, a potential joiner

that is centrally positioned in the trade and IGOs network is able to use the economic and social power vested in those positions, to non-militarily manage that conflict. In those cases, military and non-military strategies of conflict management are substitutable. For example, potential joiners such as the US, EU and China that are central to the trading and IGO networks, also use economic and other sanctions against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Syria and North Korea, rather than joining disputes against them every time.

In sum, this dissertation has made an attempt at providing an integrated theoretical framework to explain joining behavior by third party states by locating it in an interdependent network of interactions with states involved in the conflict, potential joiners and other states in the system. It has shed some light on why some disputes expand and not others, by focusing on what makes potential joiners consider some disputes as salient enough to get involved in. It has also described and investigated the processes by which potential third party states become joiners to a dispute. The network explanation is able to capture the factors that increase the likelihood of joining while simultaneously explaining the rarity of its occurrence.

Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

9.6% of MIDs i.e. 224 out of 2332 disputes that have occurred between states in the period of 1816-2001 has expanded to states beyond the original disputants. 91.4% of the 2108 MIDs that have never expanded are dyadic i.e. they are fought by the same two states from start to finish. The remaining 8.6% of disputes that never experienced any joining were multi-party disputes to begin with.

Table A.1 Percentage of Disputes that Expand

Total Number of MIDs (1816-2001)	2332	
Total Number of MIDs that experience joining (1816-2001)	224	9.6%
Total number of MIDs (dyadic) that do not experience joining	1968 (out of 2008 MIDs)	91.4%
Total number of MIDs (multiparty) that do not experience joining	140 (out of 2008 MIDs)	8.6%

Out of the 224 MIDs that experienced joining by third party states, 12.1 % were multi-party MIDs. 87.9% of MIDs that experienced military participation by third party states were dyadic disputes.

Table A.2 Type of Disputes that Expand

Total Number of MIDs that experience joining (1816-2001)	224	
Total number of MIDs (dyadic) that experience joining	197	87.9%
Total number of MIDs (multiparty) that experience joining	27	12.1%

More than half of MIDs (52.2%) that expanded beyond their original disputants experienced one joining throughout the entire duration of the dispute. 19.2% of ‘expanded’ disputes experienced two interventions, 19.3% of disputes involved 3-5 joiners, 5% of disputes experienced 6-7 joiners and 4% of disputes experienced 9 or more joiners.

107 disputes out of the 224 expanded MIDs experienced more than one joining. In 34 of these 107 disputes, all the joiners joined on the same day. In the remaining disputes, joining decisions were spread out over a day, two days, a week or a month after the onset of dispute.

Appendix B: Joiners and Criteria of Political Relevance

Table B.1: Joiners Not Captured by “Politically Relevant” Criteria For Identifying Potential Joiners

MID Start Year	Hostility Level of MID	MID	Original Disputants	Joiners Identified	Joiners not identified
1846	3	1498	SPAIN V/S PERU		CHILE
1961	4	27	US V/S USSR	UK, FRANCE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, POLAND	GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
1950	5	51	NORTH KOREA V/S SOUTH KOREA (KOREAN WAR 1950)	US, FRANCE, UK, CHINA	CANADA, NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA, PHILIPPINES, TURKEY, NETHERLANDS, GREECE, BELGIUM, THAILAND, ETHIOPIA, COLOMBIA
1853	5	57	USSR V/S TURKEY	UK, FRANCE, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY	ITALY
1961	4	122	IRAQ V/S KUWAIT	UK, IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, EGYPT	TUNISIA, SUDAN
1927	4	145	CHINA V/S UK	PORTUGAL, FRANCE, JAPAN, ITALY, USA	SPAIN
1870	3	220	FRANCE V/S CHINA	ITALY	USA
1960	4	253	USSR V/S USA	NORWAY, TURKEY, JAPAN	PAKISTAN
1914	5	257	AUSTRIA-HUNGARY V/S YUGOSLAVIA	USA, USSR, FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, JAPAN, BULGARIA, ROMANIA, GREECE	BELGIUM, TURKEY, PORTUGAL
1939	5	258	GERMANY V/S POLAND	FRANCE, UK, BELGIUM, NETHERLANDS, YUGOSLAVIA, ROMANIA, USSR, USA, ITALY	SOUTH AFRICA, CANADA, BRAZIL, AUSTRALIA, ETHIOPIA, SPAIN, CHINA, BULGARIA

Table B.1 (contd.)

1914	5	320	ITALY V/S AUSTRIA- HUNGARY	GERMANY	TURKEY
1968	4	346	CZEKOSLO VAKIA V/S USSR	POLAND, HUNGARY, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	BULGARIA
1964	5	611	USA V/S DEMOCRA TIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM	USSR, CHINA, REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM	AUSTRALIA, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, NEW ZEALAND, THAILAND, PHILIPPINES, CAMBODIA
1963	4	1002	DOMINICA N REPUBLIC V/S HAITI	UK, USA	CANADA
1966	5	1035	SYRIA V/S ISRAEL	EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA, IRAQ, JORDAN	KUWAIT
1967	4	1217	CAMBODIA V/S REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, USA		REPUBLIC OF KOREA
1962	4	1353	LAOS V/S DEMOCRA TIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM	USA, UK, CHINA, THAILAND	NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA
1972	4	1381	UGANDA V/S TANZANIA		LIBYA
1975	4	1441	CUBA V/S SOUTH AFRICA	ZAIRE	ZAMBIA, ANGOLA
1865	5	1482	SPAIN V/S CHILE	BOLIVIA	PERU, ECUADOR
1846	3	1498	SPAIN V/S PERU		CHILE
1852	3	1506	PERU V/S COLOMBIA	VENEZUELA	CHILE

Table B.1 (contd.)

1852	3	1523	COLOMBIA V/S PERU		CHILE
1885	5	1535	EL SALVADOR V/S GUYANA	MEXICO	USA
1864	4	1563	SPAIN V/S PERU		CHILE
1977	5	2069	ETHIOPIA V/S SOMALIA		CUBA
1978	5	2141	TANZANIA V/S UGANDA		LIBYA
1977	4	2150	CUBA, ANGOLA V/S ZAIRE	FRANCE, UGANDA, CONGO, CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	MOROCCO, EGYPT
1983	4	2231	USA V/S USSR	CZEKOSLOVAKI A	GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC
1954	4	2244	PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA V/S REPUBLIC OF KOREA	USA	TAIWAN

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