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THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF EXTERNAL THREAT

BY

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DISSERTATION

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Abstract

This project focuses on domestic political pressures in response to different kinds of international threat. In explaining the domestic politics of external threat, I seek to answer why states choose to escalate conflicts over some issues and not others, against rivals at certain times and not others, and choose to abuse human rights during some conflicts, but not others. I focus specifically on the interaction between the external threats of territorial competition and interstate rivalry with domestic political institutions to predict outcomes in interstate conflict such as escalation to war and rival conflict severity, as well as the propensity to repress human rights. I argue that democratic states, which are driven by popular support, are more likely to engage in conflict and repression when public goods issues such as symbolic territory (e.g. Jerusalem, Kashmir) are contested. In contrast autocratic states, which are dependent on elite support, are more likely to engage in conflict when they threaten private good distribution, or when land such as resource rich territory, is on the line. In three empirical chapters, I explore the domestic politics of threat in three arenas. First, I examine how domestic considerations affect when and over what kinds of territory that state go to war; examining militarized territorial conflicts and territorial claims from 1816-2001. The second empirical chapter explores how domestic political concerns affect the escalation of conflict between international rivals from 1816-2001. Finally, the last empirical chapter explores how territorial conflict, rival conflict, and domestic politics intersect to alter states tendencies to abuse human rights from 1977-2001.

Dedicated to the memory of Steven C. Poe, 1960-2007.

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Completing a dissertation is a lengthy process, and no one accomplishes it entirely on their own. Over the past five years at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, as well as the six years at the University of North Texas before it for college and a master's program, a number of people were extremely helpful and kind to me, and I would like to use this space to express my gratitude. I write about a number of people here, but there were others along the way that I may forget to mention, and for this I apologize. On the whole, I've always been lucky to be surrounded by professors who cared greatly about mentoring students, as well as graduate students who have been extremely capable and motivated. Whether I mention them here or not, these people's dedication has always been an inspiration to me, and I thank them for it.

Before anyone else, I must thank my family. Some of my earliest memories of politics are from when I was very young and would ask questions of my parents, John and Lana Wright, about the news. My parents would often discuss politics around the dinner table, and as a result, I took an early interest that never went away. This early interest in politics would later manifest itself in my choice of a college major—a choice I may not have made if my parents had not so patiently allowed me to listen and participate in their discussions. I would like to acknowledge my twin sister, Dawn Wright Calvert, and my older brother, Lloyd Wright, for being supportive throughout this long endeavor. My grandparents, John Pershing Wright (Granddad) and Opal Lucille Wright (Granny), my father's parents, and Theresa Martin

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The University of North Texas' political science department, from the time I entered college until I went away to Illinois for my Ph.D. program, was my home. There are a number of people I met and got to know along the way that were full of good advice and kind to me. In the fall semester of 2001, my freshman year, I had the privilege of taking an honors course in American government and politics taught by Frank Feigert. On September 11, the purpose of the course shifted away from a traditional survey of topics in American politics toward an attempt to understand the context of the most significant political event of our lives thus far. Feigert was comforting in a period of shock and confusion. At the same time, he offered a unique perspective on the issues at stake. I will never forget that class or the way he approached it.

In that class, I met a couple of classmates who, over the years, have become two of my closest friends. Frank Barczykowski started that class with another major and was not terribly engaged in current events, but after that class, he shifted gears considerably and is now a labor lawyer, working to expand the rights of workers. He and I have remained close over the years and I have enjoyed our vigorous discussions of politics from, what grew to be, very different perspectives. The other classmate was Christopher Fariss. Although we were not close at the time, we were later assigned to be officemates our first year in the master's program at UNT. We shared an office for two years and then we both went on to study for a Ph.D., Chris at the University of California-San Diego and myself at the University of Illinois. Chris and I have maintained contact for feedback on each other's work and I've found point

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The master’s program at the University of North Texas is where I learned some of the most basic and foundational lessons about pursuing academic political science as a career. It is a wonderfully collegial and supportive department, and I am very lucky to have started there. My thesis committee members, T. David Mason, John Booth, and J. Michael Greig, were always helpful in their feedback. John forced me to clarify my ideas and my resulting masters thesis was greatly helped by his demands for precise language. Dave is one of the best people I know to go to for advice on how to manage a career in political science and for thoughtful feedback on theoretical ideas. He’s also just a fantastic guy to converse with about politics. Michael Greig, who also completed a Ph.D. at the University of Illinois, taught me how to write a research paper. When I was a second year master’s student, we began a long co-authorship that taught me more about how to pursue a research question than any

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I cannot write about my time at the University of North Texas without discussing the vital role Steven C. Poe played in my intellectual development. It is impossible to properly express with words the contributions he made to my thinking, as well as countless other students, the UNT community, and human rights scholarship. Others have written more eloquently than I do about him as a person, mentor, and colleague, but I feel I need to add my own thoughts at this moment. I had the privilege of being Steve's student in two different contexts, first as an undergraduate in his course on international human rights, then two years later in his graduate seminar on the same topic. He is the only professor I had at both the undergraduate and graduate level at North Texas. I was also fortunate to work for him as editorial assistant at *International Studies Quarterly* from August 2006 until early August 2007. Some of the earliest ideas that are now present in the human rights chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 5) began in a seminar paper for his graduate human rights course. At that stage, the paper was admittedly not very good, but he encouraged me to keep pursuing the question. His advice on the early stages of this project contributed greatly to what is now. He was, quite simply, a wonderful man. He was always friendly, patient and kind to me, and everyone else I know. Whether it was a friendly golf game or a long chat in the *ISQ* office, it was wonderful to be his colleague. I last worked with him the week before moving to Illinois in early August of 2007. Later that month, Steve passed away suddenly. I cannot properly express how big of loss this was for the UNT community. Personally, it was the loss of a mentor and great role model. I would have, without a doubt, benefitted from more of his feedback. He is and

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In the fall of 2007, I began working toward my Ph.D. at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Since then, I have been lucky to be surrounded by an outstanding faculty. My committee members in particular have been excellent. I took a course early on from Xinyuan Dai on the intersection of domestic and international politics that theoretically informed this work in many ways. On a personal level, she has always been very encouraging. From Milan Svobik, I have gotten some of the sharpest questions about the implications of the theory underlying my research and about the causal mechanism at work. John Vasquez has been very supportive of the goal of this project to link the research agendas concerned with territory, rivalry, and the domestic politics of conflict. In addition, his insights on the territorial path to war and how domestic politics might play a role in territoriality have been invaluable. He has also been supportive of me as a developing scholar, and for that I am grateful. Derrick Frazier, although no longer at UIUC, gave some great advice in the very early stages of this project as well.

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Chapter 1

The Internal Politics of External Threat

Do domestic political concerns lead states to evaluate external threats differently? Although there is a plethora of research on the conflict propensity states based on regime type, as well as a fruitful research program devoted to the salience of threats over different issues, most research has not tried to integrate domestic politics into a study of issues. This dissertation project attempts to answer whether and how domestic politics influences states' decision to escalate conflict in different issue contexts. Furthermore, I investigate how this interaction between conflict context and domestic politics leads states to alter their repressive strategies during international conflict. I argue that similar motivations that lead to conflict escalation drive repression dynamics and that democracies and autocracies are fundamentally different in how they evaluate external threats. I begin with an empirical illustration of the United States' entrance and domestic conduct during World War II.

Until the very end of the year in 1941, the United States remained only informally involved in World War II. Nazi Germany had invaded Poland in 1939, which formally launched the war in Europe. In the Pacific, Imperial Japan had been at war with China beginning in 1937 and had been involved in economic crises with the Allied powers. Although the United States government felt threatened by the Axis powers and sensed war was coming, it remained out of the war. Domestic opposition and reluctance to America's entrance toward the war were seen as the primary reasons for remaining out of the war in the 1930s. Although the situation in Europe and the Pacific were considered threatening, neither conflict seemed to be directly

targeted against the United States and its inhabitants. Thus, the American public was reluctant to become involved (Vasquez, 1998b; Vasquez and Gibler, 2001; Kimball, 2003).

After the attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, a direct strike on U.S. territory and citizens, the United States response was much clearer. The threat posed by the Axis powers had now clearly been directed at the United States' territory and people, and it immediately responded by declaring war against Japan. This declaration of war was met with public support. Once Imperial Japan attacked U.S. territory and targeted American citizens, the American audience was no longer reluctant and in fact demanded action (Vasquez and Gibler, 2001).

Only a few months after entering the war, the U.S. government also began systematically repressing Japanese Americans by forcing them to live in so-called internment camps throughout the country (Ng, 2002). Democratic governments are known to be the most respectful of the human rights of its citizens, upon whose support they depend on to maintain office (Davenport, 2007). Why would a democratic government at its peak of popularity choose to repress some of its own electorate? Human rights research has consistently shown that democratic states are significantly less repressive than dictatorial regimes (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita, Downs, Smith and Cherif, 2005), and yet during World War II, the United States in systematic repression that was sustained throughout the war. In the context of the war it was facing, the U.S. public was supportive of such extreme abuses to human rights.¹

¹Even though the United States was at war against Japan, Germany, and Italy, repression of this scale was focused on Americans of Japanese descent and not nearly as much on German or Italian Americans. Over 100,000 Japanese Americans were detained (Zinn, 2003 [1980]) while nowhere near as many German or Italian Americans (either proportionally or in gross numbers) were moved into camps (Fox, 1988). A major part of the reason behind this decision might not be because Japanese Americans somehow represented a bigger threat to national security, but because public sentiment was more fearful of Japanese Americans than of German or Italian Americans. Thus, American leadership was responding to a very publicly driven sense of insecurity.

What aspects of domestic politics drive states to escalate international conflicts and shift repression at home during those conflicts? External threats are potentially menacing contexts in which states sometimes operate. They can represent contentious issues, such as disputed territory, maritime, or policy disputes, or dangerous relationships with other states, such as international rivalry, or when a state is on the receiving end of potentially damaging economic sanctions. When facing such threats, states can choose to act belligerently or peaceably, by engaging in militarized conflict or attempting to settle. In the context of these external threats, governments can choose (or not) to repress portions of the domestic population in order to shore up political support. I contend that the interplay of two major factors influence both of these decisions: the type of threat the state is facing and domestic political considerations. For an explanation of these two decisions to make in the context of external threat, to choose to escalate militarized conflict (or not) abroad and repression (or not) at home, the answer is the same. In the case of American entrance into World War II and the subsequent repression of Japanese Americans, both decisions were made with domestic support in the context of the conflict with Imperial Japan.

My explanation is rooted in the assumption that the chief goal of state leaders is to maintain office, the logic of political survival (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow, 2003). Thus, responses to external threat such as escalating conflict, going to war against a rival, or domestic repression are chosen, in part, to build or maintain political support domestically. Certain types of threat, or threats across issue areas, will affect different regime types in contrasting ways. External threats experienced by states may range from seemingly minor, economic issues such as fishery rights all the way to war over territory or against ruling regimes. Threats can affect the general public, such as contesting symbolic territory, or may only affect small portions of a population, such as a dispute over mineable resources. Depending on the domestic politics of states, certain threats are considered more important

than others.

Escalating conflicts may be very costly for states, in terms of military resources, political capital, and human cost. Leaders, sensitive to the wishes of their key domestic audiences, are more likely to choose potentially costly foreign policy options if they feel they have to in order to maintain support. For my explanation, the key distinction among states' domestic politics is how leaders are chosen, which in turn determines their key constituency. Whether states are democratic or autocratic matters most for understanding the domestic politics of international threat.

For democratic states, leaders depend on support from the general public to maintain office. When faced with an external threat, the government must determine the salience of the threat. If the threat affects the general public, or is over a good that has broad public attachment, such as symbolic territory, then such a threat is more likely to have high salience for the democratic government. In this scenario, a democratic state is more likely to act belligerently. Failing to consider the more violent path might make the leader appear weak on an important security issue and may present a risk to losing office. If the threatening context concerns a private good, such as mineable resources that enrich the elite, then a democratic government might do better domestically by choosing a more peaceful path. Escalating a conflict over an issue that affects only a small group of the public can create substantial political costs by risking the significant material and human costs associated with conflict. In such scenarios, the best political strategy might well be to come to some sort of peaceful arrangement or compromise with the opposing state.

For autocratic states, the story is more complicated. Unlike democracies, which have a unifying characteristic of electoral accountability—the mechanism that ultimately drives the public good orientation in policy-making—autocracies vary greatly in terms of support coalitions.

tions. Autocratic states generally rely on the support from a subset of elite more than the general public. Although some governments make appeals to the public occasionally, their base support comes from the elite (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Svoboda, 2009). In terms of assessing which threats they might view as so salient to pursue violence internationally, it is more likely to be those threats against elite interests.

In addition to the decision to escalate international conflicts, the government must choose strategies to maintain support with their key domestic audience. One possible strategy is through the use of political repression domestically. Repression is generally used as a strategy to boost domestic political strength relative to a level of threat to the government (Poe and Tate, 1994).² In dictatorial political systems, repression is normal and routine policy used to maintain control, and is often conducted through the use of the military rather than the legal system. In democratic states, the norm is to not be repressive, relying instead on the legal system to manage potentially violent domestic threats and the electoral system to regulate political opposition. In periods of international conflict, however, democratic leaders make decisions regarding repression based on what they expect the public will respond to positively. When democracies are involved in salient interstate conflicts, domestic security becomes a public “good” in its own right, and the general public may become more supportive of repressive actions by the government. When employing their militaries to external conflict, autocratic regimes could face the trade off of pursuing the conflict abroad and maintaining repression at home.

²Poe and Tate (1994) view threat to the government and external threat in much the same way. External threat in the form of an interstate war threatens the state, which in turn can threaten the regime. A civil war is more regime specific threat. This leads to an argument in which all threats tend to be conflated as conceptually the same. In this project, and contrary to prior works in the structural correlates of Human Rights abuse (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999; Davenport, 2007) I focus exclusively on the role that international conflict plays.

1.1 Theoretical and Empirical Developments and Contributions

The general expectations of this explanation are that in the context of external threats to the public good, democratic states are more likely to choose violence, both abroad and at home. Conversely, autocratic regimes will, in general, be more likely to act belligerently when elite interests are being threatened. Turning inward, the involvement in conflict alters the repressive tendencies of regimes, leading to crack downs by democratic governments, but an easing of repression by autocratic regimes. From these general expectations, I develop and test several empirical implications in this project.

In order to draw out specific expectations, I explore theoretically and analyze state behavior in response to two different arenas of external threat: territorial conflict and international rivalry. External threat is conceptualized as the competitive context between states, which can be issues of contention or general competition between states over a long period of time. These two arenas of disputed territory and rivalry were chosen because they have consistently been shown to be among the most conflict prone threat environments (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Senese and Vasquez, 2008). Furthermore, territory is a specific issue threat, while rivalry offers a broader issue context, as well as a longitudinal one, in which to derive empirical implications.³ They are by *no* means the only threatening environments that one could examine. They are simply the ones in which I expect the domestic political dynamics described above to most clearly take hold as both have been shown to have high domestic salience (Huth and Allee, 2002; Colaresi, 2005). Territorial competition and interstate rivalry are thus the laboratories in which I expect the relevant processes driving belligerent policy

³Other possibilities include alliance conflicts, arms race contexts, or economic coercion. Nevertheless, these threatening environments are also often occur as the result of territorial competition or rivalry (Rider, 2009). Territorial threat is generally considered a underlying cause of interstate violence (Vasquez, 1993), and thus important to be examined for this study.

choices to occur.

Within the threatening environment of competing territorial claims, there are several important empirical implications. I expect that democratic states will escalate conflicts (militarized interstate disputes) over territory when the territory is of “public” value. Public attachment when land has symbolic, historical, or homeland ties to a state. Conversely, I expect that autocratic states are more likely to find territory salient when it is of largely “private” value, such as territory that is resource rich, the taking of which would be mostly of benefit to the elite.

Interstate rivalry, periods of repeated militarized conflict between two states, is a threatening context that becomes normalized in the state policy making process (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Colaresi, 2005). I expect that democratic states will escalate hostilities against rivals when public demand is most relevant, during election cycles. I further expect that autocratic rivals will be most escalatory when the elite is most challenged, during periods of domestic unrest.

Finally, these two threatening environments can alter the repressive tendencies of the state. During peaceful periods, states reach an equilibrium of repression. Democracies are typically not repressive, whereas autocratic states use it as a policy tool to maintain control for the elite against opposition elements among the general public (Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 2007). The participation of the state in an external conflict may act as an exogenous shock to the system of state repression. When engaged in territorial conflict, democratic states will have the public backing to mitigate dissent and therefore are more likely to increase repression in order to provide public security. Autocratic states, which typically provide security to the elite through broad use of repression, may face the dilemma of putting military resources abroad at the expense of employing repression at home. Counterintuitively then, autocratic states may decrease repression during periods of territorial conflict. In international rivalry,

because conflict is a normal part of the policy-making process, rival conflicts may not act as an exogenous shock, and repression may not be altered by states.

In this project, I develop a multifaceted explanation of the choices that governments make under external threat. Behaviors such as conflict escalation, rival dynamics, and domestic repression are all explained by understanding the interplay between the type of threat states face and domestic politics. This research brings together several different research programs in a new way. By examining how different domestic political systems contextualize international threats, this explanation offers new insights for both the research programs focus on domestic politics as well as on the role of issues in conflict. Although there is some research that focuses on the domestic politics of territorial competition (Huth and Allee, 2002) it does not focus on how democracies and autocracies will vary in the way they value certain types of territory. Conversely, even though there is research on how multiple aspects of territory are valuable (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005), it does not focus on how those value orientations are affected by domestic politics.

This project introduces new findings that add our understanding of domestic politics role in conflict behavior, and links to research on issue conflicts and rivalry. In addition, this explanation offers a theory of human rights abuses during international conflict that is integrated with theories of conflict, rather than being included as just a control as it so often is in studies of repression. Prior work in explaining the repressive tendencies of states has produced mixed findings regarding the role of international threat (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Rost and Carey, 2006; Davenport, 2007). Theoretically, past approaches have largely treated international threat as a simple variable (or control) in a model accounting for variance in repression, with little conceptual attention paid to it. By contrast, I explain domestic repression during international conflict as a function of the conflict process, based on the way domestic politics influences the handling of issues of contention.

1.2 Previous Research on Territorial Threat, Rivalry, and Repression

In this section, I briefly outline the major works that relate territorial competition and rivalry to domestic politics. I also outline the literature that focuses on the role international threat plays in domestic repression. Although the research program that focuses on the role that territoriality plays on war and rivalry dynamics is progressive and robust, the literature that explicitly links the role that domestic politics plays in territorial conflicts and rivalries is relatively scant.

1.2.1 Domestic Politics and Territorial Competition

Territorial competition and the role it plays in the outbreak and escalation of international conflicts have become the foci of a robust and growing research program over the past two decades (Vasquez, 2009). Unsatisfied with the dearth of empirical support for realist explanations of conflict, researchers sought out to find an explanation of conflict onset and escalation that did not rely solely on the role of power. Vasquez (1993) provides the first systematic explanation of war occurrence in which territorial competition is the central component. Vasquez (1993) explains that territorial competition is an underlying factor for war, further developing an explanation that expanded upon findings provided by researchers such as Bremer (1992), who found that neighboring states are more likely to go to war. In his explanation, known as the Steps-to-War model (Vasquez, 1993; Senese and Vasquez, 2008), dyads that repeat territorial disputes with each other are more likely to engage in what Vasquez describes as “power politics” behaviors such as arms racing and the formation of alliances. Although realists (Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987; Mearsheimer, 2001) tend to see alliance formation (external balancing) and arming (internal balancing) as security-seeking behaviors

that stabilize relations between states, the steps-to-war perspective contends that they do the opposite.

Empirically, there is substantial evidence to support the claim that territorial conflicts are the most dangerous of issues. Vasquez and Henehan (2001) conduct a study in which they compare militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) based on the issue at stake for the revisionist state. There are four categories of issues in the Correlates of War MID dataset (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004): territory, policy, regime, and other. Among these four categories, territorial disputes are shown to be the most war prone. Further evidence provided by Senese (2005) shows that territorial competition, not merely contiguity, is the key underlying factor that leads dyads to enter into militarized disputes and escalate those confrontations to war. Indeed, if contiguity represents Most and Starr's (1989) "opportunity" concept, and territorial competition represents their "willingness" concept, then clearly willingness is what drives states to war.

But what makes states so willing to fight over territory? Huth (2000) outlines four major reasons for why territorial disputes so often lead to militarized conflict. Territory is seen as a highly salient issue, but Huth contends that this is open to question, relative to other issues. Another reason that militarization of territorial disputes is more likely because it is easier to mobilize domestic support because of populations associated with the territory. Further, Huth notes that militaries are trained to take territory and hold it, providing a better opportunity for militaries to get involved in resolving territorial disagreements between states. Finally, he points to the proclivity of authoritarian leaders to escalate territorial conflicts. His argument, in line with the arguments by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), is that the private good distributional aspect of territorial acquisition is appealing to authoritarian leaders. This argument fits with later work by Huth and Allee (2002) that authoritarian leaders, able to withstand public opposition, are more willing to "risk it" when it comes to territorial conflict.

There are a number of differing explanations of why territorial competition becomes so salient that states go to war over it. This project adds yet another. Among the most common rationales of why territorial competition becomes violent are that the material value of land leads to states to attempt to seize territory from other states, that the symbolism or intangible salience of territory essentially makes settling over it more difficult, or that humans are inherently territorial and that competition over physical space is naturally more violent. None of these explanations is inherently contradictory, although the theories behind them may be seen as competing and sometimes predict different outcomes. Many of the publications that focus on the relationship between territory and war actually do not favor one explanation over another, noting that any of these reasons may drive states to war (Vasquez, 1993). It is incumbent upon researchers, however, to find the most common path from territorial competition to war and to delineate when which root of territorial war is at work at which time and within specific dyads. This project's explanation of the way that domestic politics can help drive territorial competition into violent outcomes fits best within the second category of explanation (the intangible salience explanation, which I also describe as the indivisibility argument).

The role of domestic politics in these explanations of territorial importance and proclivity to violence is usually implicit at best. Vasquez (1993) emphasizes the role of hard-liners in state leadership roles. He notes that as territorial disputes repeat, hard-liners become more powerful through outbidding processes (later theorized about by Colaresi (2005) and by Goddard (2006)) and pull states along the war path. Huth and Allee (2002) examine the effects of the democratic peace in territorial disputes. They find that democracies are less likely to launch disputes, but also less likely to back down in negotiations. They find that although autocratic states are more willing to gamble by launching claims against other

states, they also are less intransigent in bargaining over territory. Furthermore, autocracies are the most likely to launch militarized disputes against other states over territory. Bueno de Mesquita and his coauthors (2003) frame territorial disputes as purely about resources and private gain. Small selectorate states (autocracies), whose leaderships stay in power through the distribution of private goods to an elite, seek out territory solely for its material value in order to split the spoils of victory.

Regarding how democracies deal with territorial conflicts, two works are especially prominent. Using a dataset that focuses on territorial claims in Western Hemisphere and Western Europe, Mitchell and Prins (1999) find that democracies, in general, are significantly less likely to have militarized interstate disputes with each other over territory. In developing an explanation for such a finding, Gibler (2007) notes that when states have settled borders, there is greater security from invasion and less of a need to centralize the state and militarize. This, in turn, leads states to democratize. Thus, when states have settled borders (no territorial competition), they are more likely to become democratic, and thus more likely to have peace between each other. What neither of these studies do, however, is provide for an explanation of democratic behavior in militarized territorial disputes that they do have. Although we know that democracies do not have wars against each other, territorial conflicts are fought by democracies against autocratic states. These conflicts often become violent and can lead to rivalry and war.

In the years since the release of the original version of *The War Puzzle*, Vasquez (2009) notes that there have emerged three empirical patterns about territorial competition and war: that 1) territorial competition makes the outbreak of militarized disputes more likely, 2) that these disputes are likely to repeat, and 3) that these repeated disputes are more likely to lead to fatal conflicts and war. Yet, although the empirical patterns and findings that have emerged since 1993 confirm that the territorial explanation of conflict and war has merit, the research

only provides an implicit (at best) explanation of the role of domestic politics in territorial competition. Domestic political concerns often play a role in the explanations provided above, but never in a clear or systematic fashion.

1.2.2 Rivalry and Domestic Politics

International rivalry is a context in which states find themselves, rather than a simple exogenous factor that influences the decision to go to war. Although there are a number of different operational definitions of rivalry (see for example Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) and Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson (2008)), there is conceptual agreement that rivals are states that view each other as enemies (over one or a series of issues) and expect future confrontations. Some past research has focused on what makes rivals more likely to go to war, what makes rivalry more likely to terminate, or rivals' conflict dynamics. Typically, such research focuses on the role that rivalry plays (as an independent variable) on levels of violence, escalation to war, or conflict initiation (Diehl and Goertz, 2012). The role of domestic politics in rivalry is often mentioned, but is under-theorized as a factor in rivalry development and dynamics.

Interstate rivalry is a particularly complicated threatening environment. For one, it is not a one-time threat, but rather a long-term competition between states that can create a cycle of policy-making. Second, it is often the most violent of threat environments. Diehl and Goertz (2000) note that over half of wars in the international system from 1816-1992 were fought between "enduring" rivals. Rivals also fight over high salience issues, such as territory. Tir and Diehl (2002) note that the vast majority (81%) of enduring rivals have at least one militarized interstate dispute over territory. Vasquez (1996) contends that rivals who fight over territory are the most likely to go to war.

Major works on rivalry focus on rival *dynamics*, which is how hostility or other factors change over time within a rivalry. Diehl and Goertz (2000) argue for the *punctuated equilibrium* perspective on rival dynamics. This theoretical approach, adapted from the punctuated equilibrium theory of evolutionary biology, emphasizes the relative stasis of rival behavior; over time, rivalries maintain a similar level of hostility toward one another. Sometimes there are periods of rapid escalation or de-escalation that interrupt these periods of stability. Factors associated with rapid shifts in hostility include external “shocks”, such as a global war, or internal “shocks”, such as joint democratization. The emergence of a jointly democratic rival dyad is associated with the end of a rivalry. This implies a domestic component to the rivalry process.

In a similar fashion to the research on territorial competition, studies on interstate rivalry implies a domestic mobilization story as well as implications for domestic politics (Hensel, 1999; Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Colaresi, 2005). Beyond the major finding that the occurrence of joint democracy among a pair of rivals is sufficient for the end of the rivalry (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Conrad and Souva, 2011), there is very little explicated in rivalry theories to give a fuller understanding of the domestic politics-international rivalry relationship. For example, Hensel (1999) explicitly incorporates domestic mobilization into his explanation of rivalry development, but the domestic processes described in the theory are never tested empirically. Thus, a more focused effort to bring domestic politics into the explanation of rivalry must be taken.

Colaresi (2005) develops a theory of rival escalation and maintenance based on domestic political concerns. He argues that rival *outbidding* processes drive whether rival states choose to escalate the rivalry or maintain typical levels of hostility. Outbidding occurs when domestic actors compete over which takes a more hard-line position against the rival state. An example of this might be both Republicans and Democrats in the United States competing over who

was tougher on communism during the US-Soviet rivalry. When outbidding levels are high, as when the stakes of rival competition are high, states are more likely to escalate hostilities against a rival (Colaresi, 2005, 23). Although this story is compelling, there is little about the potentially intervening contextual role of domestic institutions. For instance, it could be that democracies and autocracies have different experiences with outbidding that affect their conflict decision making. Democracies have regular elections, which is a public and institutionalized forum for outbidding to occur. Autocratic outbidding may occur privately and for very different reasons than to gain public support. This project seeks to rectify this shortcoming by explicitly incorporating the role of domestic institutions into the explanation of rivalry dynamics.

1.2.3 International Threat and Human Rights

When compared to the number of studies linking civil war to repression, studies focused on international conflict and domestic human rights abuse are few. Research with some deep roots on the relationship between how international conflict shapes domestic institutions sheds some light on the linkage between interstate conflict and human rights. Research by Rasler and Thompson (1985), Tilly (1992), and more recently by Thies (2005; 2007) and Gibler (2010) emphasizes the role that external threat plays on state centralization and development. They contend that states centralize, form large militaries, and increase taxation in order to deal with threats from other states. These states tend to be less likely to be democratic. Gibler (2007) argues this is why neighborhoods of democratic states (and by extension, less repressive states) emerge in neighborhoods that also have more secure and settled borders. The implications of this line of reasoning is broadened to suggest that the democratic peace is actually an extension of this phenomenon. In thinking about domestic repression specifically, this logic suggests that when states are involved in an international

conflict, they are likely to centralize (however briefly) in order to deal successfully with the external threat, and may increase repression at home to address internal threats or to quiet opposition.

Lebovic and Thompson (2006) examine the relationship between involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and domestic repression. They outline the general logic that prevails in most studies, seemingly derived from the war making and state making literatures. When states experience external threat, the best way to tackle it is with a unified response at home, and attend to internal threats as well. They also test the reverse hypothesis, which focuses on a rallying effect; when states are threatened externally, their domestic audiences rally to support the government, thus reducing the need to repress the opposition, or internal threats. They generally find support for the argument of the former hypothesis, that repression increases during periods of conflict.

There are a number of empirical studies that incorporate some proxy of external threat (usually whether a state participates in an interstate war in a given year), but there is typically little theoretical focus on the precise relationship between international conflict and domestic repression. The theoretical logic underpinning the path-breaking studies by Poe and Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate and Keith (1999) is based on the concept of the “strength/threat” ratio (this is further explicated by Poe (2004)). The idea is that repression occurs when a government’s political strength is lower relative to the level of political threat. Although interstate war poses an indirect threat to a government’s domestic strength, it should provide some impetus to repress domestically in order to ensure the regime’s stability. The strength/threat ratio logic is more straightforward with respect to other factors in their models, such as economic development and democratic institutions (which strengthen domestically, thus lessening repression) or involvement in civil war (which directly threatens, and leads to an increase in repression).

Davenport (2007) offers the most far-reaching research project on the linkage between conflict, domestic politics, and domestic repression. Theoretically, Davenport posits that domestic politics exerts pressure from two sources: voice (the people) and veto (institutional players). These two pressures can work together in different ways to lessen the state's ability to repress. During periods of conflict, which Davenport uses to mean either international or civil conflict,⁴ the ability of these domestic political forces to prevent repression is lessened. He finds, in general, that conflict, both civil and international, leads to an increase in repression.

Empirically, prior research has produced mixed findings with respect to involvement in international conflict and domestic repression. Findings in the war-making and state-making literatures are suggestive that there is a link, but focus on different dependent variables. Lebovic and Thompson (2006) find a link between the Arab-Israeli conflict and repression, but their focus is limited to one region. The major cross-national quantitative studies (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999; Poe, Rost and Carey, 2006; Davenport, 1995; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Davenport, 2007; Davenport, 2007a) suggest mixed findings. Some of these studies find a statistically significant, but substantively weak, positive relationship between international war involvement and domestic repression, while others (Poe, Rost and Carey, 2006) find no significant link at all. Of these, the work by Davenport (2007) stands out as the research that attempts to integrate our understanding of domestic politics, with violent conflict, and repression. Two other recent studies (Caprioli and Trumbore, 2006; Sobek, Abouharb and Ingram, 2006) examine international conflict and domestic repression, but their causal direction is reversed from my study. Both of these studies find that more repressive regimes are more likely to be involved in or launch international conflicts.

⁴While the book separates the two types of conflict empirically, much more of the focus is on civil conflict. The major reason given for this is that there are a dearth of international wars, the indicator he chooses, during the period of the data, which is from 1980 onward.

Prior research that examines the cross-national correlates of repression tends to emphasize the role that domestic institutions play in the repressive behavior of regimes (Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). Their empirical models tend to test the *additive*, and individually independent, aspects of different factors surrounding repression, without examining how the presence of one factor might play a role in the effect of another on human rights. One reason why interstate conflict as an explanatory variable may not show the same impact as civil conflict or democracy, is that its impact may be *conditioned* by domestic politics. Much of the research in the past twenty years has been focused on the role of domestic politics on conflict behavior, exemplified in the democratic peace research program. It could be that the motivations for repression during international conflict are conditioned by similar motivations that influence decisions for conflict differently across regime types. Davenport's (2007) research goes the furthest toward contextualizing conflict through domestic politics, but that study does not contextualize the international conflicts themselves.

Research on international conflict and human rights abuse often lacks attention⁵ of the *context* of the conflict. Cross-national research on repression (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999; Davenport, 2007) typically include a variable to represent "interstate war," usually employing the Correlates of War definition of a conflict that incurs 1000 or more battle deaths (Sarkees, 2000),⁶ but wars only represent a small number of the interstate conflicts that occur (Bremer, 1992). Furthermore, some of these conflicts are more salient than others. Repression may occur in much lower intensity conflicts if the conflicts are important domestically, even if the conflicts do not escalate to war. In recent years, there is

⁵Lebovic and Thompson (2006), writing on the Arab-Israeli conflict, do note that rivalry (and linked rivalry across the region) is part of the story to understanding the relationship between conflict and repression.

⁶Poe, Rost and Carey (2006) use a different indicator, employing the Uppsala conflict variable, which incorporates lower fatality conflicts. They also include interventions into civil wars within their international conflict variable.

a thriving research program that focuses on the *issues* of conflict, such as territory (Vasquez, 1993; Hensel and Mitchell, 2005; Gibler, 2007; Senese and Vasquez, 2008), as well as the actor-context of conflict, such as international rivalry (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson, 2008). These studies have consistently shown that these contexts matter for understanding why conflicts escalate to war (Senese and Vasquez, 2008), which actors dominate war-fighting (Diehl and Goertz, 2000), as well as how the salience of issues can impact when states fight (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005). In this study, I attempt to link how the salience and context of conflicts operate within the context of domestic political institutions to influence decisions on whether states alter their repressive strategies.

1.3 Outline of the Dissertation

In this dissertation, I explore how the internal politics of external threat affects propensity for conflict abroad and repression at home. In Chapter 2, I develop the theory first at an abstract level, focusing only on the concepts of external threat as public or private goods and how democratic and autocratic systems respond to such threats. From this discussion, I derive two general expectations about conflict behavior: that democracies are more likely to choose violent policies in response to threats to the public good and that autocratic regimes are more likely to respond to threats against the private goods of the elite. In order to draw out empirical implications, I then examine how this explanation applies in two arenas of external threat: territorial competition and international rivalry. I examine the public and private good aspects of territory to generate some general expectations regarding when conflicts are more or less likely to escalate to wars. I then focus on international rivalry in order to generate predictions about how domestic political considerations affect different regime types propensity to escalate rivalries. Finally, I discuss how these two types of international threat alter the repressive tendencies of regimes, thus providing an explanation of repression during

international conflict that is tied to an explanation of conflict behavior.

In Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I take the general expectations developed in Chapter 2 and derive several testable hypotheses and analyze them. Chapter 3 tests the hypotheses on dyadic territorial conflict, testing the predictions for escalation to war. Chapter 4 focuses on how domestic political considerations affect rival dynamics such as escalation of the rivalry to war and the severity of disputes. In the final empirical chapter, Chapter 5, I analyze the hypotheses for domestic repression during periods of territorial conflict and rivalry. Empirically, then, this project employs several tests of the central argument at the dyadic level (Chapter 3), from a longitudinal perspective (Chapter 4) as well as at the monadic domestic level (Chapter 5). This contribution provides new and progressive findings across several conflict research programs. I conclude the dissertation in Chapter 6 by discussing potential future research projects that stem from this research.

Chapter 2

Regime Type, External Threat and Violence

How does domestic politics influence how states evaluate the importance of external conflict? At the heart of this explanation is the assumption that government leaders make policy decisions to respond to external threats with considerations for how such decisions affect their prospects for maintaining power. The most important factor in understanding how domestic politics affects how states react to threat is the method for selecting governments. How government leaders are selected helps to determine which domestic groups must be satisfied in order for governments to stay in power. Although across states, there are many different political systems, from parliamentary and presidential democracies to elite based one party systems, military regimes, and monarchies, there is one distinction that is key for my explanation. Whether a government is elected or not is the most important factor in determining the key constituencies within the domestic population.

In this chapter, I begin my theoretical explanation by broadly defining the concept of external threat. I then state some assumptions about state-leader motivations, drawn from the logic of the Selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), and from these assumptions, I create a general story about threat and domestic politics. I then break down domestic politics in a more nuanced fashion, examining different domestic political arrangements and their effect on responses to threat. Finally, I explore the ways in which different kinds of threat will interact with different domestic arrangements to generate some general expectations about the policies that states pursue in response to the external threats of territorial competition

and international rivalry.

2.1 External Threat and Internal Political Pressure: Core Assumptions and Summary

At the outset, I must define what is meant by “external threat.” Threat can signify anything from the use of force by a state (or what might be considered a low level militarized dispute) to a full-scale war, or it may simply be an issue of contention between states that may someday arise into a crisis or conflict. I prefer a broad definition of threat, rather than to assume a certain level of hostility or importance. As the explanation will make clear, the more salient the threat, the more likely a state will pursue violent foreign policies to deal with the threat. Because my theory is as much an explanation of threat salience as of anything else, I prefer to leave the concept of threat with a minimal threshold, one that will encompass a range of threats. Thus, I define “external threat” as any issue or context in which two or more states are in competition with each other. In this space of this project, I will focus on two types of threat: territorial competition and interstate rivalry. In later chapters, these threats are operationalized as interstate conflicts. Nevertheless, I develop a theoretical backdrop that can be further developed to make predictions regarding how states deal with other types of threat, whether they be economic, regime oriented, or those emerging from a non-state actor.

I argue that as the domestic salience of a threat increases, states are more likely to pursue violent policies to deal with it. This claim has empirical support, as Hensel and Mitchell (2005) find that as the salience level of territorial claims increases, states are more likely to become involved in fatal militarized interstate disputes and war.¹ The domestic salience of

¹The authors also found that states are more likely to negotiate over territory when salience is high, leading

threats is explained by leader motivations to stay in power. Thus, my first assumption is that state leaders are motivated [largely] by a desire to maintain office. Other policy (foreign or domestic) preferences that may motivate a leader are secondary to this one as without maintaining power, a leader is not in a position to deliver on any other policy preferences. This is not an unusual assumption in research that focuses on the domestic sources of international behavior (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).

My second assumption is that every leader, regardless of how authoritarian, has to answer and satisfy some domestic constituency in order to maintain office. This key domestic audience, conceptually similar to a “selectorate” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), has the power to remove the leader and replace the government, through some mechanism.² Unlike the Selectorate approach, I have no expectations about the size of the selectorate, per se, except that democratic states will have larger ones than autocratic states. The key distinction among domestic audiences for my theoretical approach is not coalition size so much as the method through which the audiences select the leader. Given this, it is thus the chief policy preference of a leader to maintain office through keeping support of the relevant domestic audience.

I argue in my general framework that not all international threats are equally relevant to a state. The relevance, or salience, of international threats is determined by the domestic audience. This line of reasoning goes against the realist (Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 2001) grain that dominated international relations research for nearly half a century. Realism argues that domestic politics plays, at most, a role at the periphery of decision-making regarding interna-

to the inference that as salience increases, states are more likely to seek settlement over the issue, whether peacefully or violently. My explanation focuses solely on the violent policies of conflict escalation and repression, but could also be extended I believe into more peaceful forms of conflict management.

²The mechanism of removal, whether through coup, leader death, party or national elections is important to my theory, but not for the general framework that I am building presently. What is important for understanding the general relationship between external threat and domestic political pressure is that there is a key domestic audience without whose support the leadership cannot maintain government control.

tional threats. The major motivating factor for foreign policy behavior is the maintenance of a power balance in the international system. By achieving this balance, states create a stable system. Because of this motivation, the major goal is to gain power, relative to other states. In contrast, I contend that states are motivated by domestic concerns, and whichever threats they deem in the “national interest” are, at least in part, determined by political ambitions at home. This contention requires some justification. A thought experiment should prove useful for making the case that this is at least a reasonable conjecture.³

If a leader is faced with a threat that is vital from an international perspective, but not important from a domestic perspective, why would the leader pursue such a conflict? Suppose State A could gain a strategic advantage (however defined) within its region by taking territory from its neighbor, State B. Now also suppose that the territory is essential for State B’s economy, but not for State A. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that State B will not give up the territory without a fight.⁴ The question is, then, does State A go after the neighboring State B’s territory, which will provide a strategic advantage? Given State B’s attachment to the land, this would mean a militarized conflict. Even though the land offers a strategic advantage, attempting to take it risks conflict, so State A’s constituency may not place a high value on taking the territory. If State A were to launch a conflict over that territory, the domestic audience might be more likely to replace the government. Therefore, it is more prudent (Morgenthau, 1993 [1948]) for the leader to not seek out the territorial conquest and the potential strategic advantage, relying instead on the preferences of the key domestic audience. Suppose instead that State A had historical attachment to part of State B’s territory, it might then become prudent for State A to engage in a conflict over that territory,

³The reasonableness of this logic is actually tested throughout this project in various ways, and I believe the empirical record more clearly and starkly justifies this argument than the thought experiment or any other abstract language.

⁴In this thought experiment, the neighboring state has both international (strategic) and domestic (economic) reasons for valuing the territory, and therefore the distinction between “realist” and “liberal” motives is unnecessary.

because it is more salient to the identity of State A's audience, rather than just provide a strategic advantage.

My general contention of this dissertation is that states are more likely to respond violently to external threats when such threats are considered more salient domestically. The thought experiment above is meant to illustrate that this argument is empirically plausible, not that it is true for most states most of the time. It will thus be subject to thorough empirical testing in this project. Empirically, it can be shown to be false if all states, regardless of domestic political differences, tend to place the same amount of salience on external threats. Regarding contested territory, for example, if states, regardless of domestic political differences, only valued it for its "intrinsic" or objective (economic or strategic) value (Goertz and Diehl, 1992), then a realist depiction of threat salience is more accurate. If states do alter valuation of territory according to differences in domestic politics, however, then my general line of reasoning has some scientific merit.

How, exactly, do domestic political concerns shape responses to external threat? First, the salience of a threat must be determined. As I further elaborate below, the salience of an external threat corresponds to the interests of the key domestic constituencies of a state. All governments must provide a mix of "public" and "private" goods to their constituencies in order to maintain office (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). I argue that different external threats, the issues and contexts in which states compete, correspond to a conception of public or private goods.⁵ The salience of threats in different contexts is thus conditioned by how domestic politics are organized. As I further elaborate below, how the leader is selected

⁵This contention is notably different from that of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003). They contend that victory in war is a *public* good, as the entire nation is protected through such victory, which I contend is conditional on both the issue of the conflict and the domestic arrangement of the state. They also contend that the conflict issue of territorial revision is a private good, as states with small winning coalitions are interested in it for its resource wealth. I argue that there are number of different reasons that states, both democratic and autocratic, choose violent policies over territory, which can often take on a very public-good orientation.

is key to understanding the conditional effect that domestic politics have on threat salience. In contrast to the Selectorate theory, developed by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), I contend that rather than think of regimes as dealing with a continuum of a winning coalition and selectorate, the key difference among states is whether their leaders are elected or not (democratic/not democratic). These categorizations of regimes determine whether states must rely primarily on public goods to maintain office, primarily on private good distribution to the elite, or on some mixture of the two.

When faced with a threat over a salient issue or in a salient context (such as rivalry), states are more likely to engage in violent policies abroad to settle the issue (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005). Escalation to war (by extension) should be more likely. Because if a threat is particularly salient to a key domestic audience, the government of a state could risk losing power if it does not react in a strong fashion.⁶

Once engaged in a conflict over a salient issue, the goal is to win as well as maintain support domestically. From the war-making and state-making literature (Tilly, 1992; Rasler and Thompson, 2012), it is thought that states become more centralized internally to deal with threats externally. This leads to greater bureaucracy and taxation, as well as repression by governments against their own citizens. Recent work has found that territorial conflict, makes citizens less tolerant (Hutchison and Gibler, 2007) and that territorial threat can lead to some bureaucratic centralization (Gibler, 2010). Regarding the act of repressing the citizenry, research results have been mixed. Work has generally shown a statistically significant, though substantively small, relationship between involvement in an interstate war and increased domestic repression (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999;

⁶This logic runs counter to some recent theoretical work in the democratic peace by Debs and Goemans (2010). These authors argue that autocratic states are more sensitive to the costs of war and war failure than democracies. This project does not contend any differently with respect to war loss, but failure to attempt to settle or stand strong on a particularly salient issue may also hold consequences for both regime types.

Davenport, 2007). My explanation of this relationship, more fully developed below, makes the claim that variation in repression during international conflicts is conditional on the salience of the threat in the conflict as well as on domestic politics. Counterintuitively, when states are faced with threats to the general public and are sensitive to their will, they are more likely to increase repression in order to provide security. In contrast, the states that are typically repressive (autocracies), may have use military resources to pursue the conflict that they would ordinarily use for repression, and thus are more likely to decrease repression in salient conflicts.

In order to justify fully the above predictions, I begin with an exploration of how the salience of external threats is conditional on domestic political arrangements. This makes certain regime types more likely to respond violently when the issue at stake is important to their key constituency. I follow up this examination of regime type and threat salience by turning inward and discussing the ways in which domestic politics and threat salience in turn affect variations in domestic repression during international conflicts.

2.2 Domestic Differences and Threat Salience

There are fundamental differences between democracies and autocracies and these are important (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 1996). The chief among these is that democratic governments are elected by the public, which ensures that the key audience in a democratic state *must* be sufficiently large to necessitate public good distribution as the norm. The winning coalition in a democracy may vary according to institutional arrangements. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) note that in proportional representation parliamentary systems, minority coalitions exist such that a winning coalition is less than half of the

selectorate.⁷ Suffrage rules for a modern conceptions of democracy mean that the electorate is essentially the whole of the general public. Furthermore, when considering the dilemma of public versus private good distribution, a leader must look to the general population in a democracy because a support coalition may shift considerably between elections. In other words, leaders must attempt to win support from as many voters as possible and not necessarily from the exact same voters that supported them in the prior election. The defining and unifying characteristic of democratic regimes is that they are susceptible to public pressure and being ousted as a result of the public will through regular elections. It is this mechanism of electoral accountability that will make certain external threats more salient for democratic governments than other threats.

Autocratic governments, which I conceptualize here as all non-democratic regimes (Przeworski et al., 1996), have a wide array of support coalition sizes.⁸ According to the selectorate logic, autocratic leaders' survival depends on the distribution of private goods to the elite.⁹ The size of this support base will condition how much each member of the elite receives. Furthermore, depending on how credible a potential leadership challenge is to a dictator, s/he may be willing to get away with less good distribution to the elite and not be seriously threatened. There are two major autocratic types according to Svoboda (2009), leaders who are "established" and regimes that are "contested." Established leaders, who do not have any legitimate fear of being overthrown from within the elite, have much more freedom in terms of policy making.

⁷Furthermore, in a majoritarian system that does not have compulsory voting, a portion of a portion of the voters (general public) that showed up to vote are the winning coalition. In the United States, for example, if roughly half of eligible voters and the winner wins just over 50%, then the winning coalition is roughly 25% of the selectorate.

⁸There are many different ways to compare different autocratic regimes. Geddes (2003), for instance, breaks them apart according to whether they are military, personalist, or single-party regimes. Svoboda (2009) conceptualizes autocracies according to the degree of contestation leaders experience. Weeks (2012) employs a modified coding of the Geddes data.

⁹By *elite*, I mean a support base that is not the general public. For example, in the Soviet Union, although the number of party members who had a role in selecting leadership was very large, one could still consider them elites.

They also be able to draw on legitimacy claims that appeal to those outside of the elite, such as territorial claims tied to the homeland. Contested regimes are ones in which the elite constituency can credibly threaten to oust the leader. Such autocratic leaders may rely solely on the distribution of private goods to an elite class in order to stave off would be replacements. Whether a regime is contested or established helps determine which types of external threats are particularly salient and more likely to go to conflict.¹⁰

In an international environment that is threatening, a leader must determine a course of action for the state. To militarize and pursue conflict requires support domestically from the winning coalition. This does not necessarily mean *public* support as it is conventionally treated in the literature on domestic politics and international conflict (Fearon, 1994). When facing a threat from another state, governments can respond (in general) either belligerently through the use of force or militarizing hostilities or they can act more peaceably, either through acquiescing to the other state or negotiating a settlement on the contested issue.¹¹ Choosing belligerent policies is potentially very costly, in terms of resources, human costs, and political capital. Thus, it seems logical that a government whose chief priority is retaining power domestically, will only choose such costly policies when it is in its primary constituency's interest.

¹⁰Although I explore this conceptualization of contested leaderships in autocratic states theoretically in this chapter, I only empirically delve into the major differences between democracies and dictatorships. I discuss how one might explore the spectrum of autocratic states in the conclusion chapter.

¹¹This project is interested in determining why states choose the more belligerent path. As previous research has noted (Huth and Allee, 2002), a complete understanding of conflict should teach us something about peaceful conflict resolution as well. In explaining the decisions to go down a more violent and militarized path, there are some implications for why states choose more peaceful courses of action in the context of external threat.

2.2.1 International Threat as Public or Private Goods

When facing a threat by another state, governments must determine the salience of the issue over which they are being threatened. I assume, based on prior work (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005), that states are more likely to choose potentially costly policies such as conflict when threatening issues are of the highest salience. Salience is determined the domestic audience to which the threat is most important. Does the threat pose a challenge to the existence of the state, or to vital interests of the general public or the ruling class? If a threat is determined to be of vital interest to those that determine who leads the state, then it is more likely that a government will choose potentially costly courses of militarized action over such a threat. As noted above, I conceptualize threat as the issue in contention, rather than exclusively as actions by another state. The issue dimension is important because it represents the policy and bargaining space over which states compete. As such, certain issues over which states threaten each other can correspond to the notion of public or private goods. Viewing threat as disputed issues and examining them through the lens of public or private gives a context for understanding when a threat will be viewed as salient. Certain actions by other states may only be considering threatening if the issue in contention is salient. By placing threats within an issue context, one can determine whether belligerent policy choices become more likely as domestic salience increases. Threats can concern a number of different issues, each with varying salience to states. Governments determine the salience of the threat by whom it affects the most domestically. According to Engerer (2011),¹² the conventional view of public goods is that they are non-rival and non-excludible. That is, if one person partakes in the good, it does not take away from another person's ability to enjoy it. There is enough to go around, so no one has to compete for access to the good, as opposed to a

¹²Engerer's work concerns security as an economic good. My conception is different in that I contend that the security provided by pursuing violent policies approaches "public" or "private" status, but do not conform strictly to such definitions.

common good, such natural resources (see Ostrom (1990)), which may dissipate over time. “Public good” threats occur over issues that will effect the public as a whole. If a state’s national identity or sense of security is on the line, then a threat against that identity or security can be viewed as a threat to a public good.

Private goods are those that in which actors compete over access and there is a limited amount. “Private good” threats will concern issues for which the elite or ruling class is most concerned. Because elite-based dictatorships are based in private good distribution, an international threat constitutes a private-good oriented threat. Depending on the domestic political arrangements of a state, “public good” threats will be more salient than “private good” threats, and vice-versa.

Once a government determines what kind of threat it is facing, whether it primarily concerns a public or private good issue, it must choose how to respond. When engaged in a threatening situation with another state, governments choose between two types of policies. They can choose belligerent policies, which include militarization, engagement of militarized conflict, or war. Alternatively, they can choose more peaceable ways of handling the threat, which include acquiescing to the other state or engaging in negotiations. Each course of action could be potentially be politically costly. The likelihood of either set of actions is conditional on the type of threat a state is facing and the domestic political considerations that governments must make.

For democratic states, if a threat concerns the general public, or is over a good that has broad public attachment, such as symbolic territory, then such a threat is more likely to have high salience. In this scenario, a democratic state is more likely to act belligerently. To not at least consider the more violent path might open up the leader to appear weak on a salient security issue and risk being ousted from office. If the threat concerns a private

good, over an economic issue such as oil-rich land, then a democratic government might do better domestically by choosing a more peaceful path. Choosing conflict over an issue that affects only a small group of the public can create significant political costs by risking the high material and human costs associated with conflict. In such scenarios, the best political strategy might well be to come to some sort of peaceful arrangement with the opposing state.

For autocratic states, the story is less simple. Unlike democracies, whose unifying characteristic is electoral accountability—the mechanism that ultimately drives their public good orientation in policy-making—autocracies vary greatly in terms of their support coalitions. Autocratic states generally rely on the support from the elite more than the general public. Although some governments make appeals to the public occasionally, their base support comes from the elite (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Svoboda, 2009). In terms of assessing which threats they might view as so salient to pursue violence internationally, it is more likely to be those against elite interests. Thus, external threats that affect the private good distribution of autocratic governments make the use of violent foreign policies more likely. Pursuing threats to public goods by engaging in conflict could divert resources and attention away from maintaining the elite regime through the distribution of private goods, leaving the government open to domestic threat.

From this abstract discussion, I have two general expectations about the interaction of external threat and domestic politics. First, democratic states, whose key characteristic is reliance on public support, are more likely to find threats that primarily affect the general public to be of the highest salience. Conversely, I expect that autocratic states, whose key constituency is the elite, will find external threats to private good distribution the most salient. This is summarized in Figure 2.1 below. The task now remains to explore these general and abstract expectations in two different issue contexts: territorial competition and rivalry.

Figure 2.1: Salience by Threat and Regime Type

	Threat to Public Good	Threat to Private Interest
Democracy	Highest Salience	Lower Salience
Autocracy	Lower Salience	Highest Salience

Under highly salient threat contexts, states are more likely to choose violent foreign policies and alter repressive behavior at home. Providing security of the public welfare for democracies and private good distribution for autocracies are vital for governments to maintain support and power domestically. In these threat contexts, states become more likely to choose high cost policies such as escalating conflicts. Domestically, they become more open to altering policy practice with respect to repression in order to secure the home front politically or provide more resources for the conflict abroad. The following three sections focus on how to take this abstract explanation of threat salience to draw out expectations for conflict behavior and domestic repression in the context of territorial competition and international rivalry.

2.3 The Internal Politics of Territorial Threat and Conflict Escalation

The role of domestic politics in explanations of territorial importance and proclivity to violence is usually implicit at best. Vasquez (1993) emphasizes the role of hard-liners in state leadership roles. He notes that as territorial disputes repeat, hard-liners become more powerful through outbidding processes (later theorized about by Colaresi (2005) and by Goddard (2006)) and pull states along the war path. Huth and Allee (2002) examine the effects of the democratic peace in territorial disputes. They find that democracies are less likely to launch disputes, but also less likely to back down in negotiations. Although autocratic states are more willing to gamble by launching conflict over claims against other states, they also are less intransigent in bargaining over territory. Furthermore, autocracies are more likely to launch militarized

disputes against other states over territory. Bueno de Mesquita and his coauthors (2003) frame territorial disputes as purely about resources and private gain; small selectorate states (autocracies), whose leaderships stay in power through the distribution of private goods to an elite, seek out territory solely for its material value in order to split the spoils of victory.

Hensel and Mitchell (2005) (see also Hensel, Mitchell, Sowers and Thyne (2008)) focus on the importance of territory and its role in conflict onset. Employing the Issue Correlates of War dataset, which focuses on issues of contention between states, they categorize territory according to tangible and intangible salience. Tangible salience means that a territory is rich in resources or material value, or holds some strategic value. Intangible salience indicates that the land serves as a historic homeland or has symbolic value for a state. They find that overall salience leads to a higher likelihood of MIDs and fatal MIDs. Even though tangible salience leads to higher likelihood of all kinds of militarized disputes, intangible salience is positively associated with only the most severe disputes (fatal MIDs and war). They also find that intangibly salient territory is positively associated with peaceful settlement of territory. This could mean that the most salient territory is very likely to be either settled or militarily contested. Understanding when one action is chosen over the other is key in understanding MIDs over disputed territory. One reason for why territory can become indivisible is that by rallying around the issue, the domestic public might make it impossible for leaders to back down (Vasquez, 1993; Goddard, 2006). Perhaps certain domestic political arrangements lend themselves to conflict over territory more easily than others.

Huth and Allee (2002) and Gibler (2007) take on the intersection between disputed territory and domestic politics. Huth and Allee seek to explain how states settle or resort to force over disputed territory. They do not look at MIDs per se, but more often lower level (in terms of hostility) interactions. Their major findings are that autocrats are more likely to resort to force over disputed territory, while democracies are least likely to give in during negotiations

over disputed territory. They explain that autocracies have leaders that have more secure terms of office and are thus more willing to gamble by resorting to force. By contrast, democracies are more constrained and more likely to be punished for poor performance (also put forth by Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson and Smith (1999)), and thus are less willing to risk using force and losing territory. In negotiations, however, democracies also attempt to avoid losing territory that may have value with the general public and are thus less willing to compromise.

Gibler (2007) turns the democratic peace argument on its head. Rather than focus on the role of domestic institutions' influence on conflict, he focuses on the conflict (or settlement of conflict) and its role in institutional selection. He explains that when states have settled territory and borders, they have less need to centralize, mobilize, and militarize their state in order to deal with external threats. Because of this, states become more open and democratic. Therefore, the democratic peace exists because of settled territory. The causal arrow is that settled territory leads to democratic states, which then leads to peaceful regions. When controlling for stable borders, Gibler finds no dampening effect of joint democracy on MID onset. The major problem with Gibler's theory is that it does not deal with what happens when democracies do have disputed territory (as Huth and Allee 2002 clearly show that they do). A fuller theory of the role of territory and MIDs should engage how the interaction between domestic politics and contentious issues lead to different likelihoods for conflict.

How does the abstract framework developed above apply to territorial conflict? As Hensel and Mitchell (2005) clearly show, territory is not valued for the same reasons by every state. If states value territory differently, then understanding when territory is a salient issue that leads to conflict is important. For understanding the contexts in which territory might be valued in such a way as to lead to violent conflict, I believe the answer lies in domestic politics.

Certain territory lends itself to being treated in a public or private fashion. It is not from a straight examination of the land itself. If we are to follow the logic of Goddard (2006), then the symbolic, indivisible characteristics of territory are constructed by political leaders in order to promote hard-line elements within the domestic political realm. That territory as a public goods issue is something that can be constructed via domestic political process is in line with both Vasquez (1993) and Colaresi (2005). Applying the idea of tangible and intangible salience developed by Hensel and Mitchell (2005), it appears that intangible territory would lend itself to this kind of salience construction. Territory that has primarily tangible salience, such as resource wealth, seems to be less apt to have this public appeal. Nevertheless, contested territory may have numerous salient aspects, and does not always lend itself to a clear dichotomization.

Goertz and Diehl (1992) discuss two types of territorial value: intrinsic and relational. The intrinsic value of territory conforms to the resource or strategic importance of territory. The resource value of territory, such as mineral wealth, would be the same for either state that competes over it. The relational context of valuing territory leads states to regard territory differently. Homeland territory is relational. One state may consider territory as a homeland, and therefore very valuable, while the other does not consider it this way. Thus, the context of a territorial claim is more relevant for the intangible aspects of territory (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005). From the viewpoint of my explanation, the relational aspects (less tangible or more public) aspects of territory are most salient for democracies because homeland claims are more likely to resonate with the general public. The intrinsic value of territory, such as its resource wealth, is more likely to resonate with elite interests in autocratic states because acquisition and control of such territory can increase the private good output of a government.

Generally, democracies are more willing to be involved in conflicts and war over territory when the territory that has symbolic or intangible value, making it more like a public good.

Because of the public orientation of such territory, backing down can become very difficult for leaders who rely on mass support to maintain office. This could lead to elections based on outbidding over contested territory and lead to it becoming seemingly indivisible (Goddard, 2006). In general though, and taking from Gibler (2007) and other research on jointly democratic disputes (Mitchell and Prins, 1999), we should expect such conflicts involving democracies to be fought against autocracies (Huth and Allee, 2002). Mitchell and Prins find that democracies may be involved against each other in disputes, but usually they are over maritime issues, not landed territory, or economic issues such as fishing rights, and these disputes are not particularly severe.

Although democracies attach a higher salience to territory of a certain kind, once violence over territory occurs and repeats, territory is more likely to become framed as a public good. Research on democracies in conflict (Reiter and Stam, 2002; Huth and Allee, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003) indicate that once democracies enter into a conflict over a high salience issue, winning the conflict becomes a good to deliver in its own right. Territory is an issue that is vulnerable to “outbidding” domestically, making it more likely to lead to escalation (Vasquez, 1993; Goddard, 2006). Thus, once violence occurs over territory, war is more likely when a democratic state is involved. Because territorial violence is unlikely between jointly democratic states, such wars over territory are most likely to occur when a democracy is fighting an autocratic state.

Autocracies, on the other hand, are more likely to focus on the tangible qualities of territory. For their relevant domestic audiences, the material value of territory may be more important than the symbolic qualities of it, because the material value of territory can directly impact private good distribution. Therefore, we can expect that, in general, territorial conflicts between jointly autocratic dyads to be fought over tangibly salient land, rather than symbolic or intangible territory. These also may be less likely to escalate to war, however, as over the

course of pursuing a conflict, the states find a way to divide the stakes. It is conceivable that it may be less costly to find a way to divide the material aspects of territory than to go to war over it.

If some states value the material qualities of territory more than the symbolic aspects, or vice versa, it is possible that two states contesting territory may place different value upon it. The most hostile territorial conflicts may be those fought between democracies for whom territory has intangible value and autocracies who value the tangible aspects of it. The negotiation over the issue may be very difficult because both states find themselves in a scenario in which their domestic audience demands the good. When an autocracy is attempting to negotiate over the tangible (potentially divisible) aspects of disputed land, but a democratic state is holding a hard-line position over the intangible (and potentially indivisible) aspects of it, negotiation may become more difficult. In other words, mixed regime dyads may have issue incongruity, and thus conflicts over that issue may be more likely.

War may also occur between democracies and autocracies over tangible territory, although it seems less likely than over intangible territory. Autocrats may indeed be more willing to gamble for victory through conflict (Huth and Allee, 2002) because they might believe that the democracy lacks enough resolve (similar logic to Fearon (1995)). A democracy may be more willing to compromise on such territory, however, because it may not carry with it the public demand that symbolic land would. This should lead to more negotiation and a greater likelihood of a settlement over the issue, at least compared to contested territory that holds symbolic value for the democratic state.

2.4 The Internal Politics of Interstate Rivalry

The rivalry context (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson, 2008) reflects a long-term dyadic engagement and is the most dangerous state-to-state relationship. The most enduring rivalries can come to dominate the foreign policy-making process; the relationship with the Soviet Union was paramount in American foreign policy-making throughout the second half of the twentieth century. As noted before, however, very few researchers explicitly attempt to link domestic political processes to rivalry dynamics Colaresi (2004; 2005). Drawing from the logic elaborated above, I am able to draw out implications for rival dynamics from the interaction of issues and institutions.

Rivalries can arise over a number of different conflict issues. Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson (2008) classify strategic rivalries within two major types: hierarchical and spatial. Hierarchical rivals are concerned largely with their relative power distribution and their place in the international system. The clearest example of such a rivalry is the Cold War rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union. A spatial rivalry chiefly concerns competition over territory between rivals. A prime example of such a rivalry is the competition between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir region. Both types of rivalries can be especially contentious and violent. The key difference is the issues at stake.

Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) classify rivalries according to the number of conflicts they have, rather than the chief issues at stake. Their dispute-density approach codes rivals as isolated conflicts or rivalry.¹³ Contentious issues have a way of bleeding over into other arenas in the rivalry context, so even minor issues may take on greater importance. It is expected that this type of issue contamination will be more extreme as the rivalry endures. Furthermore, according to (Tir and Diehl, 2002), most rivalries have some territorial component. Vasquez

¹³This classification requires three or more militarized disputes within a fifteen year period.

(1996) contends that territorial conflict between rivals is what drives them to war.

Neither of these major conceptualizations of rivalry classify rivalries according to domestic politics. The strategic rivalry approach, by breaking down by issues of contention, potentially offers an avenue of theoretical integration with the issue/domestic politics logic described above. The dispute density approach, however, perhaps offers an idea of how intense the rivalry context has become for policy makers, in terms of how much fighting occurs between states. Employing a framework that takes into account the view of policy-makers is important for analyzing when rivalries escalate.

When considering how the rivalry context conditions leader behavior with respect to domestic politics, the most useful concept from the rivalry literature is *outbidding* (Colaresi, 2005). Colaresi describes a process through which domestic politics leads rivals to escalate conflicts. Outbidding occurs when competing domestic factions attempt to gain domestic support for their leadership (or overturning of leadership) by advocating more hard-line against a rival state. Goddard (2006) describes this process as key for understanding how contested territory can become indivisible. It also can explain how issue competition can evolve into rivalries, thus becoming intractable over a very long period of time. I thus try to explain *when* outbidding occurs within different regime types involved in rivalry. In doing so, I focus on two major outcomes: the development of a rivalry and the escalation of rivalries by individual states.

For my purposes, the key is understanding which domestic institutional contexts lead to the kind of domestic outbidding that produces escalatory behavior within rivalry. In democratic states, I should expect to see the kind of outbidding that might lead to rival escalation to occur when governments are most sensitive to public opinion, during election periods. A democracy may become hostile against a rival in an attempt to shore up hardline support. For autocratic states, escalatory behaviors against the rival are most likely when the elite is

at risk, during periods of domestic unrest.

I also anticipate that disputes between rivals are the most escalatory when one state is democratic and the other is autocratic. Democratic states who are locked in to hardline positions are much less likely to settle a contentious issue against an autocratic state than a democratic state. Furthermore, when rivals are most domestically sensitive (either elections for democratic states or periods of unrest for autocracies), the opposing state may attempt to take advantage of the other's domestic weakness.

2.5 Territorial Conflict, Rivalry, and Domestic Repression

The above abstract discussion, as well as the more focused explorations of territorial competition and rivalry, focus on the interaction of external threat and domestic politics and how they make certain foreign policy choices more or less likely. How do these factors in turn alter the government's calculations with respect to domestic policies regarding political repression? Political repression, in the form of human rights abuses to physical integrity.¹⁴ Explanations of political repression tend to use an additive approach applied to all states, generating expectations with respect to structural correlates of abuse, such as economic development or democratic institutions (Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 2007). This explanation focuses only on how external threat alters the propensity to repress by states. Similar to the explanation of conflict escalation above, the key interaction for my explanation is how domestic political considerations affect the handling of conflict, but in this section, I focus on a domestic policy output: the abuse of human rights by governments—political repression.

¹⁴These represent a specific kind of politically motivated human rights abuse that includes the practices of unlawful and political imprisonment, the use of torture, and politically motivated murder by the government against its own citizens (Poe and Tate, 1994).

Poe and Tate (1994) explain the decision to repress as a function of a government's domestic strength relative to the amount of threat that exists to its rule. The politically stronger a government is, relative to the amount of political threat it experiences, the less likely it will be to use repression as a tool to maintain office. Democratic governments, who rely on popular support to maintain office, are less likely to be repressive because it risks alienating voters and makes governments weaker politically. Furthermore, the opposition is regulated through institutions, so both the leadership and opposition can adequately check each other without resorting to violence or repression (Davenport, 2007). In construct, autocratic governments employ repression as a way of keeping potential opposition from arising within the general public. Repression protects the interests of the elite, the key constituency for dictatorships. In terms of the public and private good distinction discussed above, domestic security via the rule of law (without repression) is a public good for democracies, while domestic security via repression is a private good for the elite in autocratic regimes. Thus, in general, we expect that democracies will use very little repression, year in and year out, while autocratic systems maintain a higher level of repression in the operation of the state. This is hardly a profound conclusion, and has always had strong empirical support (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005).

External conflict can act as an exogenous shock to the repressive system in place during peacetime. Autocratic states involved in an international conflict may now be in a position where they must pour military resources, that might ordinarily be used for domestic repression, into fighting abroad. These leaders may face a dilemma between repression at home and winning the conflict. If the conflict is salient or dangerous enough, this may mean that an opening up of the system becomes more likely and repression likely to decrease.

When involved in an international conflict, democratic states must provide the public good of security both at home and abroad. Especially if the conflict is salient to the public, democratic

citizenries may feel they have more at stake in winning the conflict—that it is tied to their own security. In order to feel more secure, such publics will become more supportive of the use of repression domestically. This expectation has supported with survey research that finds that democratic publics are likely to become more intolerant during periods of external threat (Hutchison and Gibler, 2007). Other research indicates that democratic states embroiled in civil wars may seek to gain support by acting more harshly toward rebels (Heger and Salehyan, 2007).

For democracies, conflicts over higher salience issues are those in which threats affect the general public. Higher salience not only makes conflict engagement more likely, but also increases in repressive behavior domestically. The reason for these is the mechanism of public demand/pressure. Conflicts salient to the general public are most important because they generate the greatest insecurity for the electorate. Providing the security of its subjects is the first responsibility of government, and to the general public the first responsibility of a democracy. Thus, anything that is perceived to be a hindrance to the provision of that security can become part of the threat presented by the external conflict itself. Therefore, elements of the general public may become more willing to accept increases in repression during conflicts. The targets of such repression are most likely to be potential fifth columns—groups related to the opposing state, vocal or extreme opposition, or protest groups. Repression is thus seen as a policy tool to provide security to the general public in times of external crises. It seems most likely to be used only in the most salient of conflicts. It does not seem likely that there would be such an increase in repression that the major opposition party (or parties) are targeted, because they are elements of the public that the government must protect as well.

Of the two types of conflicts I examine, territorial and rival, I expect that territorial conflicts will be most likely to lead to changes in repressive behaviors. Territorial conflicts are the most war prone and potentially domestically salient (Vasquez, 1993; Hensel and Mitchell, 2005).

Rival conflicts, however, are frequent and have a consistent amount of hostility associated with them over time (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Goertz, Jones and Diehl, 2005). On account of this consistency, rival conflicts may not present as much of an alteration of domestic policies as territorial conflicts.

2.6 Expectations and Refutations

This section outlines how three empirical chapters are constructed and designed. Chapter 3 examines the escalation of militarized conflict in the context of contested territory. Chapter 4 the dynamics of conflict escalation in the context of rivalry. Chapter 5 tests how the threat environments of territorial and rival conflicts affect repression dynamics.

The major argument of the theory is that states are more likely to choose violent policies when confronted with high salience issues, and that domestic political considerations are instrumental in determining the salience of external threat. Democratic states will find threats to the general public more salient than threats that would effect primarily elite interests. Autocratic states, who maintain elite support through private good distribution, will find threats to economic interests the most salient. From this framework of expectations about threat salience and domestic politics, I explore the threat contexts of territorial competition and interstate rivalry.

In the context of territorial competition, I make a series of empirical predictions. Some of these are in line with prior work in research on domestic politics and issue conflict. Monadically, I expect that democratic states will find threats to “publically” valuable territory, which I envision as symbolically or intangibly valuable, as more salient and are therefore more likely to escalate such conflicts. Autocratic states are most responsive to “privately” valued territory,

such as resource rich land.

The empirical reality is that all conflicts work in dyadic contexts and not monadic. Therefore, some caveats must be introduced. From the research on the democratic peace and territorial conflict (Mitchell and Prins, 1999; Huth and Allee, 2002; Gibler, 2007), jointly democratic dyads are unlikely to go to conflict or war over territory of any kind. Therefore, the dynamics described above about democracies are expected when facing an autocratic state. Thus, if there is evidence that when democracies have a “public claim” escalating against an autocratic state and conflict is more likely, then there is support for my theory. If mixed dyads are not more likely to escalate MIDs when the democratic state has a publicly valued claim, then I will accept that as evidence against my explanation.

I expect that once violence has begun, democracies find it more difficult to back down because of domestic political considerations. The expectation is that mixed regime dyads fighting over territory are more likely to escalate to war, in part because of the domestic processes in the democratic state, but also because of issue incongruity between democracies and autocracies when fighting over territory. This expectation is not as clear-cut as the others. I certainly expect these dynamics to exist if my expectations on territorial claims are also confirmed, but other dynamics could also be at work to produce this outcome. Therefore, evidence on this claim does not represent any kind of critical test for the explanation, but would provide some supplemental evidence to support the explanation’s take that democratic processes can drive escalation to war when it is fought over a high salience issue.

With rivalry, I now expand expectations from conflicts on one issue to one in a dangerous context that might encompass many issues. The rivalry context allows me to account for dynamics of domestic politics to affect the likelihood of conflict. Thus, I try to answer “when” questions as well as “why” questions. The ideas of “public” and “private” sensitivities to

external threat are expanded in this context. The focus on election timing for democracies is to show when outbidding might peak, demonstrating a strong publicly driven sensitivity to the rival threat. For autocracies, periods of domestic unrest will make leaders the most vulnerable, because they are targeted specifically against the elite leadership. If neither elections nor unrest lead to escalation between rivals, then my explanation will be clearly lacking.

Finally, for the hypotheses on repression, I expect democratic states to increase repression during salient conflicts and for autocratic states to either maintain or decrease repression. If democratic states do not increase their repression during some conflicts, then the explanation for repression I present will fall short. Public pressure to allow for an increase in repression under periods of threat is the key factor, and without it, this explanation based on the interaction of conflict and regime type may not apply to human rights. If democracies and autocracies both significantly increase repression during salient international conflicts, then this explanation will also prove unsatisfactory. Such a result indicates that the more straightforward relationship explained by a “strength/threat” approach is more correct (Poe and Tate, 1994). It could also indicate that international conflict simply weakens all institutions’ abilities to prevent repressive behavior (Davenport, 2007). As my explanation is about the conditionality of threat and regime type, democratic and autocratic states *should* display different repressive dynamics during some conflicts in order for my theory to be correct.

Chapter 3

Territorial Salience, Regime Type, and Conflict Escalation

Territorial disputes are more dangerous than those conflicts over other issues; the former are more likely to involve violence and escalate to war. This relationship has been repeatedly affirmed by international conflict research over the last thirty years (for overviews, see Tir and Vasquez (2010) or Hensel (2012)). Although such findings have been among the most enduring and important in international conflict research, the impact of territorial issues on conflict behavior is not as dramatic as joint democracy, and we know considerably less about the causal logics involved. The presence of joint democracy is a virtual sufficient condition for peace, whereas territorial disputes only have a probabilistic impact on the likelihood of war; territorial disputes are neither guarantees of war nor are their absence sufficient for peace. The democratic peace literature is also more highly developed in terms of theoretical explanations (see Chan (2010)), even as there might be limited empirical support for some of them (Lektzian and Souva, 2009).

In Chapter 2, I explained how domestic political arrangements can influence evaluations of external threat in a general and abstract way. This chapter seeks to make this explanation more concrete by examining a specific issue threat: territorial competition. I begin with the observation that although territorial disputes have a significant impact on conflict, certain territorial disputes are more hazardous than others. This is frequently obscured in research that includes only a dichotomous variable (territorial dispute: yes/no); such a variable is almost always statistically significant, but there is no attempt to discern which subset(s) of

territorial disputes is driving the relationship. To the extent that this has been addressed, the focus has largely been on the salience of the different territorial disputes, focusing on the tangible and intangible characteristics of the territories in question (e.g., Goertz and Diehl (1992);Huth (1996);Newman (1999);Hensel and Mitchell (2005)). Building on the general argument developed in Chapter 2, I argue that domestic political dynamics have an important role in driving states to escalate conflicts over territory. Specifically, regime type plays a crucial role because different leader selection mechanisms alter the priorities of those leaders once in office. Using a theoretical logic incorporating outbidding, and leaders' selectorates, I argue that territorial disputes between democratic and autocratic states should involve more serious conflict than territorial disputes between institutionally similar dyads. I test several propositions by looking at the escalation of territorial claims to different levels of conflict, as well as the escalation of conflict to war over territory in the period from 1816-2001.

This chapter distinguishes between different kinds of territorial disputes, and thereby assists in unpacking when and how territorial disputes are dangerous. Territorial competition, because it is so conflict and war prone, is a fitting empirical domain to first explore the implications of my explanation. Furthermore, the results here might encourage scholars to move away from the undifferentiated treatments of territorial issues in research design and thereby better reflect the improved theorizing and complex character of territorial issues in conflict dynamics. This involves greater attention to the characteristics of territory (such as correlates of its salience), but also on how territory and its characteristics interact with the contextual conditions of the dispute. Finally, this chapter contributes to the growing literature of the impact of different regime types on international conflict behavior (e.g., Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002); Debs and Goemans (2010)).

3.1 Territory, Domestic Politics, and International Conflict

The Steps to War theory (Vasquez, 1993; Senese and Vasquez, 2008) describes a path to war in which territory is the underlying cause. Other empirical work has territory among the key factors associated with the onset of violent conflict and its escalation to war (Tir and Vasquez, 2010). As noted above, few works distinguish between different kinds of territorial disputes. Highly salient territorial disputes are thought to be present the greatest risks, but determining salience can easily become tautological if the coterminous willingness to use military force is used as a surrogate indicator of salience. A few studies have focused on territorial characteristics as indicative of salience; these include its strategic location, the size and characteristics of the population living there, and other attributes that can be tangible or intangible (Goertz and Diehl, 1992; Huth, 1996; Hensel and Mitchell, 2005).

The role of domestic politics in most territorial treatments of conflict and war, including those related to salience, is implicit, but not specifically elaborated. Vasquez (1993) notes that domestic mobilization is essential for states to fight wars over territory, but he does not specify the conditions for such mobilization. Furthermore, he argues that repeated disputes over territory permit hard-line domestic elements (e.g., political parties, military, and the like) to gain more influence over domestic political processes, making wars more likely as disputes recur. The specific mechanisms through which hard-line elements become entrenched in power domestically and at which point we might expect escalation of conflicts as a result, however, is not fully developed. Analyses of territorial salience rely on the unstated assumption that domestic audiences are more interested in, and will hold leaders more accountable for, conflicts over pieces of land that are more valuable, whether for their intrinsic or symbolic (e.g., Jerusalem, Kashmir) worth. Nevertheless, such ideas are underdeveloped theoretically and not tested empirically in any case.

To incorporate domestic politics properly in the narrative about territory and militarized conflict, as well as to connect territory specifically to the general explanation presented in the previous chapter, I build on two key ideas in the field: the selectorate and outbidding. The selectorate theory Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999; 2003) began as a way to explain how states with different regime types behaved in war. Broadly, democracies have large domestic winning coalitions made up of multiple segments of the general public, and therefore they rely on the provision of public goods to stay in power. Because they depend on small coalitions made up of elites, autocracies rely more on private goods distribution in order to stay in office (for a critique of this simple distinction and the attendant measures, see Kennedy (2009)).

Outbidding occurs when groups compete over the legitimacy of a stance on a relevant issue, in this case, contested territory. Colaresi (2005), who focuses on rival outbidding, contends that domestic players within rival states compete over the rivalry as an issue space, similar to other domestic political issues. Goddard (2010) (see also Goddard (2006)) uses the concept of outbidding to explain why it becomes difficult for political actors to compromise over territory. Focusing on the cases of Northern Ireland and Jerusalem, she explains that political leaders are elected in part because of their hard line rhetoric over disputed territory (outbidding). Territory can *become* indivisible over time, due in larger part to how actors legitimize themselves to their key audience with respect to a territorial claim (see also (Hassner, 2006/2007)). There are a couple of key ideas to take from Goddard's argument. First, not all positions on a territorial claim are legitimate. Stances must resonate with a large enough coalition of actors (or networks) within a constituency, and actors must be esteemed within the network. Once a legitimation strategy is successful, the territorial claim may be repeatedly framed in this way. If a country chooses a hard line on a claim, it becomes difficult to back down from such a stance, otherwise a leader risks losing her own legitimacy with the key audience. This can make negotiation over territorial claims intractable for long

periods, especially if both states focus on different aspects of territory to make their claims resonate domestically.

One limitation of Colaresi's work is that he implies that states are similar with respect to this type of behavior: that is, autocrats are just as likely as democrats to engage in outbidding, *ceteris paribus*. I believe that democracies and autocracies will behave differently in the context of disputed territory precisely because of the differences in the outbidding process. Goddard's work is based only two cases and does not bring in the domestic institutional context in which leaders operate.

Domestic political arrangements may influence the legitimation strategies that states choose when dealing with disputed territory. Building on the theoretical development of Chapter 2, I argue that democracies will orient themselves toward the "public good" aspects of disputed territory, while autocratic states will orient themselves toward the private good aspects of it. Given democratic dependence on the general public's support, legitimate claims on disputed territory are more likely to be ones regarded as having the public's interest in mind. I expect that this will mean territorial claims that are seen as legitimate to the general public are one's that correspond to some national characteristic, such as territorial claims based on national identity, symbolic heritage, or national security in the broadest sense. It may be easier to mobilize the general public to support a hard line claim when the nation as a whole is at stake, rather than the particular intrinsic characteristics of the land itself. Autocratic states, on the other hand, may focus upon different kinds of territory for their claims. A piece of land that is rich in resource value, for instance, it may appeal to the autocratic elite that keeps a leader in power. A more appropriate legitimation strategy for contested territory may then be to appeal to the elite's financial interests.

3.2 Monadic Motivations and Dyadic Conflict

With respect to conflict, democracies are likely to be punished for making false threats, losing a conflict, or going to a war with a low level of public support. Thus, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) predict that democracies will frame war efforts as benefitting society as a whole and try harder to win conflicts by pouring in more resources and showing more determination. They might also be more selective in initiating conflicts, with an eye to choosing those confrontations in which the chances of success are greater (or at least the risks of failure less); this logic has been used to account for democratic success in wars (Reiter and Stam, 2002).

Territorial disputes can involve a public good issue that is a central part of domestic politics for democratic states; for example, the status of Cyprus is a key political issue in both Greece and Turkey. Leaders who make concessions, or even offer compromises, are vulnerable to outbidding from hardliners and their political coalition is at risk for fragmentation. Prime Minister Olmert of Israel suffered this fate following his willingness to negotiate with the Palestinians over withdrawal from occupied territories. The symbolic value of territory enhances the prospects for outbidding because backing down or making compromises might be viewed as representing concessions to national heritage, a betrayal of ethnic brethren, and the like. It becomes much harder to take a coherent middle position in such situations, and thus territory is not viewed as divisible. Thus, I anticipate, *ceteris paribus*, that a democratic state will negotiate harder and longer, be more willing to escalate a confrontation, and go to war over a territorial dispute.

On the other hand, autocracies do not necessarily gain resources to distribute privately by fighting in a war, and therefore might not try as hard to win. Nevertheless, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 413) contend that autocracies are more likely to seek territorial gains

in international conflicts. Pressure from elites for private gain opportunities that flow from the resources that territory encompasses prompt leaders to start conflicts according to this argument. A major flaw, however, is that territory is always said to have material and divisible value to states. Territorial acquisition only provides private goods if there is some material value attached to it and such value (or proceeds from the value) can be easily distributed to the governments winning coalition; oil or diamonds are obvious examples. Nevertheless, territorial theories of conflict not only focus on territory's symbolic value (Vasquez, 1993), but also note that these qualities might be more escalatory because the stakes are less divisible (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005). Most territorial claims do not necessarily center on land with these resources (Huth and Allee, 2002). Over modern history, however, fewer conflicts have been over resources and other sources of wealth contained therein (Holsti, 1991). The decline in *terra nullius* and the death of colonialism has meant that states are less inclined to fight for land with tangible value. Furthermore, trade (licit and illicit) is a substitute source of acquiring material wealth, and authoritarian leaders therefore have alternative paths to conquest in deriving spoils. Furthermore, authoritarian leaders face fewer leadership challenges (at least on a regularized basis) than democratic ones, and have less need to engage in outbidding on territorial disputes. They also don't necessarily require the political legitimacy or approval that comes with nationalist appeals and uncompromising positions on territorial conflicts. This is not to imply that they avoid territorial confrontations. Yet, the costs of losing or backing down in a territorial confrontation are limited for an autocratic state, as their leadership tenure would not be jeopardized.

With respect to dyadic characteristics, two democratic states might be expected to be the least hostile in territorial disputes. First, pairs of democratic states largely settled their borders decades ago (see Latin America) and there is little territorial basis for their conflict (Gibler, 2007; Owsiak, 2012). It is unlikely that such outbidding processes could escalate a

democratic-democratic dyad over territory. Indeed, there are few democratic dyad rivalries (Hensel, Goertz and Diehl, 2000; Conrad and Souva, 2011) and therefore few opportunities to exploit such enemies for domestic political gain (Mitchell and Prins, 2004). A recent study, however, found no reduction in territorial conflict, in the context of a rivalry, between a pair of democratic states (Lektzian, Prins and Souva, 2012).

Of the remaining two combinations, I expect that territorial disputes between democratic and autocratic states to be the most likely to escalate to war. This is consistent with a general finding that political dissimilarity between states might be associated with greater conflict-proneness (Quackenbush and Rudy, 2009). First, that democratic states and autocratic states value disputed territory for different reasons might make negotiations more difficult. Furthermore, when facing off against an authoritarian state, a democratic leadership is expected to press its country's claims, motivated by the domestic political gains that might result as well as fearful of the audience costs that result from backing down. Facing a dissimilar state, there is no expectation that disagreements will be settled peacefully. Leaders are also vulnerable to critiques from hardliners whenever standing down in the face of an authoritarian threat. Mixed regime dyads are therefore the ones most likely to go to war and experience multiple militarized disputes (Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry, 2002). One of the most well-known examples of this kind of mixed regime competition is the longstanding Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, who have been, for most of its life span, a mixed dyad rivalry whose primary issue is territorial. This dyad has had four wars in its lifetime and been well-known for its intensity (see Paul (2005)).

In jointly autocratic dyads, territorial conflicts should be less likely to escalate to war. Because maintaining private good distribution is preferred to putting too many resources into a conflict (even at the risk of losing that conflict), two authoritarian states should shy away from escalation, be more willing to back down, and be more acceptant of stalemate out-

comes. Authoritarian leaders might also be less likely to lose their offices as a result of such confrontations and therefore under such conditions should be more willing to make concessions in the dispute (Debs and Goemans, 2010). Expending resources (financial and others) for the conflict takes away potential tools to reward or pacify those in the authoritarian leaders' coalitions. Such incentives might explain, in part, why scholars have found evidence that authoritarian dyads are less conflict prone (Werner, 2000; Souva, 2004; Bennett, 2006). Considering only the institutional makeup of states, I develop the initial, baseline hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 *Territorial disputes between institutionally mixed dyads are more likely to escalate to war than disputes among institutionally similar dyads.*

The first hypothesis represents an initial modification of the traditional expectations about the conflict propensity of territorial disputes. This chapter seeks to unpack further the relationship between territory and conflict by making distinctions between different kinds of territory, and in particular their interactive effects. I now turn to unpack further the relationship between territory and war by making distinctions between different kinds of territory, and in particular their interactive effects with regime type.

First, I draw a distinction between the public/private values that a disputed territory might have for the antagonists. Such a distinction is important for my argument about regime types, as the behavior of democratic and authoritarian regimes will vary according to the kinds of goods represented by the territory in dispute. Hensel and Mitchell (2005) envision territorial claims as being intangibly or tangibly salient. Tangible salience includes whether or not a territory includes resource wealth, has strategic value, or is home to a permanent population; generally these are material aspects that are divisible and might be considered as involving private goods. Disputed oil rich territory could be an example. In contrast, when a country makes a homeland claim, an identity claim (whether ethnic, religious, or linguistic), or has held the land in question in the past, the value is intangible, the stakes not divisible,

and therefore can be said to represent public goods. For example, Israeli claims to all of Jerusalem are based on that city's religious and historical value rather than any resource or economic worth.

I contend that territorial conflicts escalate because of domestic political processes such as outbidding, and that more intangibly salient territories are most susceptible to outbidding behaviors by democracies. Democratic states have public forums in which political actors compete for attention, popularity, and office over salient issues. When an externally relevant issue, such as a territorial claim, is framed to be a threat to the homeland, its people (in an identity claim), or a country's historical ties, it will be perceived as highly salient, if not existential. Because of popular sovereignty, democracies are more likely to engage in conflict when contested territory exhibits these kinds of intangible salience. As noted above, I expect that these kinds of outbidding processes over territory with public goods value will occur most often when territory is contested between a democratic state and an autocratic state. I expect that the key driving force will be the intangible salience for the democratic state.

Hypothesis 2 *Territorial disputes between institutionally mixed dyads are more likely to go to war when public goods are involved as opposed to private goods.*

3.3 Research Design

The above hypotheses focus on whether states escalate their conflicts to war in different domestic and issue contexts. The first hypothesis is concerned with the characteristics of the conflicts in which states fight, and thus I focus on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) (N=1,898) as the unit of analysis over the period 1816-2001. Militarized interstate disputes are conflicts between states that range from the threat of the use of force, all the way up to war (which is coded as a conflict that reaches 1,000 battle deaths) (Ghosn, Palmer and

Bremer, 2004). All dispute-level data for this chapter was taken from the dyadic interactions dataset employed by Senese and Vasquez (2005). My second hypothesis hypothesis is concerned with the characteristics of the territory over which states compete. After accounting for some missing data on the independent variables, my data for that test covers 5,443 territorial-claim years, from the Issue Correlates of War dataset, which contains data for directed dyadic (challenger-target) territorial claims in the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe from 1816-2001 (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005).

Dependent Variables and Methods for Testing. The dependent variable for the first hypothesis is the onset of war. Wars are identified using the Correlates of War criteria of 1,000 or more battle related fatalities (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). In addition, I also test for whether or not a dyad escalates to war within five years of a particular MID. This dependent variable is included because often territorial conflicts repeat before ultimately escalating to war (Vasquez, 1993; Senese and Vasquez, 2008).

For the second hypothesis, I focus on the the escalation of claims to a particular level of conflict within a given territorial claim-year, taken from the Hensel and Mitchell (2005) data. Hensel and Mitchell (2005) employ three different dependent variables for conflict: onset of an MID, onset of a fatal MID, and onset of war. This allows me to test whether the characteristics of the claim, the regime combination, or an interactive effect leads to different levels of hostility in conflicts when territory is contested.

Because all of my dependent variables are binary, I employ logit analyses for all tests in this chapter. To account for temporal dependence in the claims analysis, I cluster the standard errors on the claim dyad.

Independent Variables. The foci of the analyses are so-called mixed institutional dyads, consisting of one democracy and one non-democratic state. For the dispute level analysis,

distinctions between regime types are determined by reference to the Polity IV data set (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2010), in which states are scored on a -10 - +10 democracy-autocracy scale. Democratic states are designated as those scoring greater than or equal to +6, with all others coded as non-democracies. For the claims level analysis, because I am comparing results to that of Hensel and Mitchell (2005), I follow their conventions, and code democracies as a 6 or higher on Polity's democracy scale (which is a 0-10 score, as opposed to the democracy-autocracy scale), where mixed dyads only have one democracy.¹

Territorial issues in militarized disputes are key elements in the analyses. The MID data (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004) codes disputes as involving territory, policy, regime or other issues. In order to test my hypotheses, I interact whether or not the MID is territorial with whether or not a dyad is a mixed regime dyad.

The final analysis is focused on the role that the perceived value of a territorial claim plays in conflict escalation. I predict that the public good aspects of territory are likely to lead to more hostility in mixed dyads because of outbidding processes in democracies. In order to capture this, I employ the intangible salience measure provided by Hensel and Mitchell (2005). I record the intangible salience level of the territorial claim for democratic states, in order to gauge the impact it has on the likelihood of them going to war against autocratic states. Hensel and Mitchell capture the intangible salience levels of each state in the claim. The monadic measure is on a 0-3 scale, indicating how many of the following elements are part of the territorial claim for the state involved: a homeland claim, an identity claim (whether ethnic, religious, or linguistic), or the territory held by that state at some time in the past, respectively. These qualities, I argue, are more susceptible to the symbolic politics of outbidding. If the claim dyad has two democracies, then the intangible salience of the

¹I have also attempted to use the combined democracy-autocracy scale for the claims analysis, but that resulted in a large loss of observations.

challenger state is recorded. The intangible salience of jointly autocratic dyads is scored a zero. Because my hypothesis is focused on public goods in mixed dyads, I interact this variable of the intangible salience of democratic states with the dummy variable for whether a dyad is institutionally mixed. A positive and significant coefficient on this variable indicates that as the public orientation of a territorial claim increases, the likelihood that a mixed dyad will engage in conflict also increases.

Control Variables. For the analyses of militarized disputes, I include relevant control variables found to be related to territorial conflict in previous studies. In the analysis of militarized disputes, I control for contiguity, which is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the two states share a land border and zero otherwise. Contiguity is thought to be a confounding variable for territorial issues (Senese, 2005), and therefore I need to account for the effects of proximity separate from those of territorial claims. I also include a control for the power distribution between dyads, taken from the Correlates of War CINC scores (Singer, 1987), considering the capability ratio of the weaker state to the stronger state in the dyad for both sets of analysis. In the analysis on MID escalation to war, I also control for whether a MID was fought over a “regime” issue. I do this to provide a issue contrast to territory, rather than a simple territorial vs. non-territorial distinction. This allows me to better gauge by how much territorial conflicts are more war prone than other types of conflicts. Because I am testing the effects of mixed regime dyads vs. similar regime dyads, the reference category on regime type for all dispute level analysis is similar regime dyads.² In the claims level analysis, I also control for joint democracy, which is coded as both states reaching 6 or higher on Polity’s democracy scale, because I also test the effects of intangible salience for democracies. For

²I have attempted to control for joint democracy as well in the dispute level analysis, but that led to joint democracy being dropped as a perfect predictor and a loss of observations. Controlling for joint autocracy led to difficulty in calculating robust standard errors. Regardless of which model was tested or whether robust standard errors are used, the results on the key independent variable, the interaction between territorial MIDs and mixed regime dyads, remains positive and statistically significant.

those analyses, then, the reference category is joint autocracies. All data was taken from the dyadic interactions replication data used by Senese and Vasquez (2005), for the MID level analysis, or through the Issue Correlates of War Data (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005), used for the claims level analysis.

For the analysis of territorial claims, I also control for the tangible salience of a claim on a 0-6 scale indicating how many of the following elements are part of the territorial claim for the each of the two states involved: resource wealth, permanent population, or strategic value respectively (Hensel and Mitchell 2005). I further control for the intangible salience of the territorial claim (as opposed to just the democratic state), which is also a 0-6 scale; this is measured as above but now for both states in the dyad. I do so in order to control for the possibility, which is counter to the prediction, that the intangible salience of both states, regardless of whether they are democratic, may drive a claim to go to war.

3.4 Empirical Results

In the first set of analyses, I consider the likelihood of war from a given dispute as well as the likelihood of war within five years of a given dispute as distinguished by the regime makeup of the dyad and the issues at hand.³ Table 3.1 displays logit results on war of MIDs from 1816-2001. Institutionally mixed dyads are not necessarily more war prone than similar regime dyads (the reference category) across all disputes. The first and third columns, which displays the analysis without the interaction term, reveals that territorial MIDs are more war-prone overall, like many previous studies. If one were to stop with these models, we would know that territory leads to war, but we would be no closer to understanding which territorial disputes are the most dangerous. Furthermore, we would have an incomplete understanding

³All analyses performed using *STATA*, version 11.2.

of the potential interaction between domestic politics and territorial conflict. Based only on models 1 and 3, one might interpret that the domestic differences between states matter very little when territorial conflicts are concerned. Therefore, well-known territorial wars between democracies and autocracies, such as the Falklands War or the wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors might be explained solely by the presence of contested territory and not from any domestic political pressure that those states experienced. As the interaction models (models 2 and 4) show, however, this interpretation would be incomplete, if not misleading.

Table 3.1: Logit of Mixed Regime Dyads and Territory on War

	(1) War	(2) War	(3) War/5yrs	(4) War/5 yrs
Mixed Regime Dyad	0.097 (0.177)	-0.477* (0.288)	0.242* (0.131)	-0.441** (0.192)
Territorial MID	1.105*** (0.197)	0.688*** (0.250)	1.017*** (0.136)	0.395** (0.187)
Territory X Mixed		0.939*** (0.363)		1.285*** (0.261)
Regime	0.114 (0.405)	0.103 (0.403)	-0.220 (0.301)	-0.254 (0.300)
Contiguity	1.347*** (0.316)	1.313*** (0.314)	0.511*** (0.166)	0.472*** (0.168)
Peace Years	0.017*** (0.004)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)
Constant	-4.295*** (0.342)	-4.029*** (0.342)	-2.602*** (0.195)	-2.255*** (0.192)
Observations	1,898	1,898	1,898	1,898

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** $p < |0.01$, ** $p < |0.05$, * $p < |0.1$

The second and fourth columns contain the more theoretically relevant analyses. As expected, when institutionally mixed dyads fight over territory, war becomes more likely, especially if one look five years out from the current MID. The difference between when mixed dyads are fighting over territory compared to other dyads fighting over a non-territorial issue is dramatic. Model 4 shows that when such dyads fight over territory they are significantly more likely to do so. This suggests, in line with the theoretical logic, that it is not only domestic factors,

or only territory, but also the interaction between the two that contributes to states fighting wars. Although outbidding processes might occur in any issue context, the results (particularly in model 4) suggest that territory is an issue arena in which these processes might lead more difficult negotiations such that war becomes likely between democratic and autocratic states.

Table 3.2 displays the predicted probabilities generated from models 2 and 4 in Table 3.1. First, war is an unlikely phenomenon, even during militarized conflict. Mixed regime dyads on their own, with no territorial dispute, are less likely to fight wars either from the present MID or within five years of it. Territorial conflicts for all states are significantly more likely to go to war, both from the present MID or within five years. When territorial MIDs are fought between mixed regime dyads, the increase in the likelihood of war is greatly increased over the other categories. When such dyads fight over territory, as compared to non-mixed dyads fighting non-territorial MIDs, they increase their chances of going to war in the current MID by roughly 204 percent. The likelihood of a mixed dyad going to war over territory within five years of the current MID is a little more than 1 in 4, which is 177% greater than for non-territorial MIDs fought by similar regime dyads.

Table 3.2: Predicted Probabilities on War

	War	% Δ from Base	War/5 yrs	% Δ from Base
Base	0.0214		0.0982	
Mixed Regime Only	0.0134	-37%	0.0656	-33%
Territory Only	0.0424	+98%	0.1394	+42%
Terr. X Mixed	0.0650	+204%	0.2718	+177%

Predicted probabilities generated from Models 2 and 4, Table 3.1. Base model is a zero on all variables, except for peace years, which is held at its mean. Probabilities calculated using the *CLARIFY* package in STATA (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000).

The above results establish a general relationship between mixed dyads and territorial conflict consistent with the explanation. I now move to consider the impact of different kinds of territorial value on that relationship. The findings in Table 3.2 show that the territorial

orientation of democratic and autocratic states *might* drive such dyads to war. My theory goes further to explain that it is not only the domestic processes that escalatory conflict more likely, but also the kind of territory in dispute. Outbidding processes in democratic states are more likely to lead to escalatory outcomes when the territory in dispute is most in line with a “public good” orientation, such as when it has a symbolic or homeland tie. I test this logic in a series of models for different levels of conflict escalation. These results are displayed in Table 3.3. The hypothesis predicts that more escalatory conflicts become more likely when democratic states in institutionally mixed dyads are competing over more intangibly salient territory.

Table 3.3: Salience of Territorial Claims and Conflict Onset

	MID	Fatal MID	War
Tangible Salience (claim)	0.363*** (0.071)	0.311*** (0.109)	0.282** (0.125)
Intangible Salience (democracies)	-0.382 (0.455)	-0.045 (0.598)	-1.313 (0.859)
Capability Ratio	1.217*** (0.382)	0.257 (0.612)	-0.475 (1.063)
Joint Democracy	-0.306 (0.868)	-1.029 (1.195)	0.227 (1.796)
Mixed Regime Dyad	-0.022 (0.664)	-2.525* (1.405)	-3.042 (2.083)
Mixed X Dem. Intan. Sal.	0.081 (0.367)	1.025 (0.765)	2.617*** (0.925)
Intangible Salience (claim)	-0.036 (0.230)	0.212 (0.246)	0.237 (0.416)
Constant	-4.653*** (0.814)	-6.401*** (0.951)	-6.810*** (1.387)
Observations	5,443	5,443	5,443

Standard errors clustered on dyad in parentheses. *** $p < |0.01$, ** $p < |0.05$, * $p < |0.1$

In Table 3.3, the most theoretically relevant variable is the interaction term of intangible salience and the democratic state in an institutionally mixed dyad. For the onset of militarized disputes or fatal conflicts, the intangible salience of a territorial claim for democratic states has no statistical impact. If democracies in mixed dyads have claims with high intangible

salience, however, war becomes much more likely. This finding conforms to my theoretical explanation. High levels of intangible salience in democratic states prevent governments from backing down, thus driving dyads to war. Substantively, the interaction coefficient in Table 3.3, Model 3 leads to an over four times increase (from 0.005 probability to 0.0265 probability) in the likelihood of going to war, from a mixed dyad in which the democracy has no intangible salience to full intangible salience for the democratic state. Compared to a base model of similar dyads with a mean level of intangible salience for the claim, but no salience for a democratic state, the mixed dyads with high democratic intangible salience are over sixteen times more likely to go to war (an increase from 0.0015 probability to 0.0265 probability). This finding suggests that despite the presence of disputed territory, democratic states are more likely to respond and escalate conflicts when more publicly oriented issues are at stake. An example in the data of this kind of war includes the Falklands war between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The Falklands islands have an identity and historical tie to the U.K., according to the data, as most of its inhabitants are of British descent. Oakes (2006) notes that the Argentinian military regime did not count on British resolve when launching the conflict, which escalated to war. Furthermore, domestic motivations may have played a role, as Lai and Reiter (2005) note that the Thatcher government received a domestic boost in support following the British victory. A Thatcher government, which was experiencing domestic unpopularity at the time, when confronted over territory that had intangible salience, responding strongly and swiftly against an invasion by Argentinian forces (which was experiencing domestic problems of its own) conforms well to my argument. In this case, a democratic state experiencing outbidding at home, when confronted over intangibly salient territory, responded by swiftly escalating the conflict.

3.5 Summary and Conclusions

I took as a starting point that some territorial disputes were more dangerous than others. I sought to account for this variation by reference to the domestic political incentives facing leaders in territorial disputes, most notably the differences between democratic and authoritarian leaders, and kinds of values attached to territory by those regimes. Drawing insights from the ideas of outbidding and a selectorate, I argued that those territorial disputes involving a democratic pitted against an authoritarian state (mixed dyads) were more dangerous than others, and thereby would account for much of the relationship between territory and violent conflict. Consistent with the theory developed in Chapter 2, I extended this point by arguing that the mixed dyad relationship was a function largely of cases in which the authoritarian state and the conflict was over a territory that the democratic state regarded as having intangible salience.

The findings generally supported my expectations. When mixed dyads fight over the territory, the likelihood of escalation to war is great. This interactive effect is not evident if one includes only regime type and territorial issue variables in the equation, as most conventional studies do. In addition, the public goods value of the territory for democracies was the driving force for escalation of territorial claims. Previous research has indicated that territorial disputes are more likely to escalate to war than confrontations over other issues. By analyzing the predicted likelihood of war, this combination of mixed dyads and territorial conflict is much more likely to go to war than territory on its own. To understand which territorial disputes are most dangerous, one must account for the domestic political contexts of the competing states and the salience attached to the territory in dispute.

A next step for this project concerning the role of domestic politics of territorial conflict is to examine the differences within democratic and autocratic states. This chapter has

taken a binary approach to regime types, and the findings presented are a useful first step. Nevertheless, future iterations of this project should more fully explore how variation within a state's selectorate affects motivations of states with respect to contested territory. Especially within autocratic states, there is wide variation among them in terms of coalition size.

Empirically, Peceny and Butler (2004) found that single party regimes, which presumably have larger selectorates, are generally less conflict prone. This is suggestive that the relationships uncovered above could be moderated or exacerbated depending on the kind of authoritarian regime involved. Specifically, I believe that the autocratic states most likely to go to war against democracies are those with smaller selectorates, such as military regimes or personalist dictatorships. Such states are the most likely focus on how territorial gain may improve their private good distribution to the elite, in line with the logic developed by Bueno de Mesquita and his coauthors (2003).

Autocracies with larger selectorates should be more likely to incorporate a mixture of public and private good distribution in order to maintain office. The larger the coalition, the smaller the portion of private goods can be distributed. Thus, the potential payoff of territorial revision to enhance private good distribution seems unlikely to be very useful for larger coalition autocracies. Single party regimes have a much larger winning coalition than do personalist autocracies (such as monarchies or civilian dictatorships) or military regimes. Indeed, Peceny and Beer (2003) find that personalist and military regimes are most likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes against democracies, consistent with my predictions about escalation to war.

Among the personalist dictatorships and military regimes, the former are, I believe, less likely to seek to escalate territorial conflict to war. Military regimes may also have an elite that may be largely based within the military establishment. Thus, some of the private goods that are

distributed to maintain office are defense-related. In the context of territorial conflicts and in periods of rivalry, such regimes may ramp up military spending, justified by the rivalry, while simultaneously providing the private good distribution to maintain political support from their key constituencies. Such states may be more willing to escalate conflicts to the point of war, because there is less of a chance that it would be as costly domestically. The use of military force as a preferred policy option to resolve disputes might also be greater in military regimes, given the backgrounds and policy orientations of key decision makers. Again, the example of Argentina and the Falklands War seems to conform to this line of reasoning. Personalist regimes, on the other hand, may not have the ability to use military force and spending as a way to pay off the elite. Furthermore, to do so would take away from domestic private good distribution. This may make wars over territory, even if the targeted land is resource rich, an unattractive option or at least one with limited domestic political payoffs.

Chapter 4

Domestic Politics and Rivalry Escalation

What role does domestic politics play in the escalation of conflicts by rivals? Rivalry is a context in which two states compete militarily over a long period of time (Diehl and Goertz, 2000). Because the two states fight repeatedly over multiple issues, the bones of contention are not necessarily specific issues, such as territory, but the actors themselves (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson, 2008). Furthermore, because conflicts between rivals are many and repeat over short periods of time, research has focused less on why they fight, but when and under what conditions they will fight or go to war. This chapter is concerned with what role domestic political characteristics play in the decision to engage in more hostile conflicts and escalate those conflicts to war. The hypotheses developed are anchored in the logic, developed in Chapter 2, of public and private good demands that are placed on democratic and autocratic leaders. Because their leaders' tenure in office is determined by public support through elections, democracies are more willing to engage in conflict when the general public feels threatened. Autocratic states, on the other hand, rely on the support of the elite and war should be more likely when the regime feels threatened from within. The escalation of conflicts is more likely when rival states feel threatened domestically not only because the states themselves are domestically vulnerable, but also because their rivals seek such opportunities to gain an advantage in pursuit of the rivalry.

This chapter argues that domestic political concerns can drive rivals to war. The basic argument for why democratic and autocratic states escalate conflicts is that their domestic

political arrangements make certain conflict contexts more salient than others. Chapter 2 establishes this abstractly, that when democratic states are involved with an external threat over “public goods” issues or contexts, they are more willing to escalate a conflict. Autocratic states are more likely to find external threats salient when private goods issues are on the line, or when elites are particularly challenged. This logic can be applied to specific issue areas, such as territory as shown in Chapter 3. It can also be applied more broadly, beyond the specificity of an particular issue, to the threatening context of interstate rivalry. Because rivalry is a context that is especially war prone (Diehl and Goertz, 2000), a conflict over *any* issue may escalate, although conflicts within individual rivalries tend to have similar severity levels over time (Goertz, Jones and Diehl, 2005). On account of this, it is useful to understand *when* conflicts between rivals are most likely to escalate into war or produce more severe conflicts. Building on the logic presented in Chapter 2, as well as the rival outbidding concept developed by Colaresi (2005), I develop three expectations. First is that mixed dyadic rivals experience the most severe conflicts and are most likely to go to war. Second is that mixed rivalries will have more severe conflicts or be more likely to go to war during a year when a democratic state is experiencing an election. The third hypothesis is that when autocratic states are experiencing domestic unrest, rival conflicts are more severe and more likely to escalate to war. These hypotheses are tested using the Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) sample of dyadic rivals from 1816-2001. The chapter concludes with a discussion on how more precise data and research design might yield a better understanding of the relationship between interstate rivalry and domestic political concerns.

4.1 Mixed Regime Rivalries, Elections, and Domestic Unrest

Some research has focused on what differentiates rival conflicts that escalate to war from those that do not (Vasquez, 1996), but little focus has been placed on the role of the domestic political events and the escalation to war. One notable exception is developed by Colaresi (2005). His theory employs the concept of rival outbidding to explain when rival states might escalate conflicts against each other. Outbidding occurs when competing domestic factions attempt to gain domestic support for their leadership by becoming more hard-line against a rival state. With frequent outbidding, and when the stakes of a rival competition are at their highest, escalation is expected. Although all states have domestic competition in which outbidding may occur, the form that outbidding takes and the context in which it is mostly likely to develop may be conditional upon domestic political arrangements or institutions.

Specifically, the form outbidding takes may differ depending on whether a state is democratic or autocratic. For democratic states, elections are an institution that can normalize outbidding. Because elections are the primary method of removing leaders from office, it may be during election periods that outbidding occurs at its highest levels. For autocratic states, elections are not the primary method of replacing leaders. Chiozza and Goemans (2011) build a theory of the differences between democratic and autocratic leaders in international conflict. They explain that the method of leadership removal is particularly important for understanding conflict decisions. They note that when democratic leaders lose or step down from office, they tend to have a comfortable retirement. Autocratic leaders, on the other hand, face more dire prospects after leaving office. Chiozza and Goemans (2011) further note that autocratic leaders, once deposed, often face retirement prospects of jail, exile, or death. Given such prospects, autocratic leaders might be more willing to risk survival of

their office on risky policies such as war, because so often it is tied to the leader's *personal* survival. If they feel that the best option to staying in office is to risk an international conflict, autocrats are more likely to do so, because the prospects of life outside of office are so grim. Furthermore, if they feel that victory in war is required, they are more willing to risk escalating a conflict to war in order to try and achieve victory. Because democratic leaders do not face such dire post-office prospects, they are less willing to take such a dangerous gamble, according to the argument by Chiozza and Goemans (2011).

Outbidding processes in autocratic states might occur at irregular times for different reasons. When an autocratic state experiences domestic unrest, whether in the form of riots, demonstrations, or coup attempts, the elite coalition around which a leader builds his or her support feels threatened. Under those conditions, extending the logic of political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), the leader will feel his or her tenure in office or life is at risk. Thus, such leaders may be more willing to risk escalating a conflict to shore up domestic support.¹ For democratic states, such outbidding incentives are most likely to occur when they are also the most sensitive, which is during election periods.

The argument above outlines monadic incentives for why certain periods of time might be more politically sensitive for leaders in democratic or autocratic states. Nevertheless, rivalry is between two states. Any war or escalatory conflict between them may occur with possibly two outbidding processes occurring simultaneously. It is helpful to think broadly about which combination of domestic regime types should be the most likely to have wars during rivalry, and then discuss which specific domestic processes might contribute to war. As with wars over territory, outlined in the previous chapter, I expect that *mixed regime dyads* are likely

¹This has been referred to as “diversionary” behavior. I am *not* attempting to engage the debate as to whether diversionary conflict behavior exists, but am putting forth an argument that at certain times, domestic vulnerabilities make escalatory conflicts between rivals more likely. I am not making predictions on which state starts such conflicts, which explanations of diversionary conflict often do.

to have the most escalatory behavior. Jointly democratic dyads are much less likely to experience militarized rivalry, for reasons relating to the democratic peace (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Jointly autocratic dyads within rivalry will likely have a higher probability of war than jointly democratic dyads, but there may be reasons for that lower likelihood. Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry (2002) and Peceny and Butler (2004) describe a possible autocratic peace. Extending the logic of private good incentives related to conflict developed in Chapters 2 and 3, it may be that autocratic states may risk low-level conflicts against one another, but not a full-scale war. I believe that mixed regime dyads, with one democratic state and one autocratic state, will be the most war prone. In Chapter 3, I contended that the divergent incentives democracies and autocracies have with respect to territory might make negotiating over territory more difficult. Essentially, democracies value the public aspects of territory and autocrats the private aspects of territory such that when the two states contested the issue, war was more likely. As with territory, this mutual misunderstanding of the other's motivations may spill over into multiple issue areas as in rivalry (Dreyer, 2010),² potentially making these rivalries more escalatory than those of jointly autocratic dyads. Some of the most well-known rivalries in history are of this mixed regime type, such as the US-USSR or the rivalries between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Hypothesis 3 *Mixed regime rivals will have more severe conflicts and be more likely to go to war, compared to institutionally similar dyads.*

Building on the monadic incentives based on domestic outbidding, I believe that election periods in democratic states as well as periods of domestic unrest in autocratic states may contribute to more escalatory conflicts between mixed regime rival dyads. For democratic leaders to be especially vulnerable, the conflict context needs to correspond to a “public goods” incentive. Elections themselves are not a public good per se, but they are when the

²Although Dreyer does not interact issues in rivalry with domestic politics, he does find that more complicated issue dimensions of rivalry can more war more likely.

public as a whole evaluates the government, and as a result, leaders are the most vulnerable to the whims of the public during those periods. During election periods in particular, outbidding on the rivalry issue is more likely to be tied to the security of the nation as a whole. Autocrats experiencing domestic unrest may feel especially vulnerable because the elites themselves may be the target of the unrest. Outbidding on rivalry provides an opportunity for those outside the ruling coalition to present an issue of security for the state (rivalry) as an issue that the current leadership is unable to deal with because they are weak domestically, or vice versa. Thus, leadership and elite competition may outbid on the rivalry, potentially leading to escalation.

Periods of outbidding represent not only opportunities for leaders to strengthen their own domestic position by pursuing a hard line, but also an opportunity for the rival state to exploit the domestic weaknesses of its opponent. As a result, and because the rivalry context is just as much about trying to seek advantage in the relationship as it is about winning over a particular issue or gaining domestic support, it is difficult to distinguish theoretically which rival might initiate such conflicts. It could be a state experiencing domestic outbidding, or it might be its rival seeking to take advantage. Theoretically, I do not distinguish between which rival initiates conflicts. Furthermore, rival dynamics may also be dominated by reciprocity (McGinnis and Williams, 1989; Goldstein, 1991). This dynamic is such that rivals escalate based on how the other rival behaves and much of the hostility within rivalry can be explained mostly by this tit-for-tat, back and forth, behavior by the rival states. Because reciprocal processes are ongoing concurrently with outbidding, it is difficult to distinguish conceptually or empirically who initiates conflicts based on domestic outbidding. Thus, I contend that either state may choose to try and escalate a conflict based on either state's domestic vulnerabilities, and that reciprocal processes may then take over, leading states down the path to more severe conflicts and war. Tremblay and Schofield (2005, 233-34) point out an

example from the India-Pakistan rivalry. They point out that although India actually launched the 1971 war against Pakistan, it was taking advantage of unrest within Pakistan's autocratic regime. The military government in Pakistan reacted to a legislative election that did not go its way with a crackdown, and the authors note that this presented an opportunity for Indian intervention.

Hypothesis 4 *Conflicts fought during election periods for democratic states will lead to more severe conflicts and are more likely to go to war, especially in mixed regime dyads.*

Hypothesis 5 *Conflicts fought during periods of domestic unrest for autocratic states will lead to more severe conflicts and are more likely to go to war, especially in mixed regime dyads.*

4.2 Research Design

The hypotheses in this chapter posit that conflicts between rivals are more escalatory (more severe or war prone) when rival states experience periods of domestic vulnerability. The domain of these tests are annual disputes between 615 dyads and 225 interstate rivals from 1816-2001, as defined by Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006). The Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) data contains information on severity and escalation to war for militarized interstate disputes³ between all dyads that have experienced at least one dispute. Because of this, I analyze the effects of domestic political events on two samples, one that includes all conflict dyads and the other that includes only rival dyads. I further restrict each of these samples in the analysis to include only mixed regime dyads, because my theory emphasizes these dyads throughout this project. I do so to understand if the domestic factors I predict will influence conflict (elections and unrest) have a differential effect within mixed dyads vs. the

³Militarized interstate disputes are conflicts between states in which the actions range from threats of the use of force all the way up to a full-blown war of 1,000 or more battle deaths (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004).

full sample of dyads or full sample of rivals. Rival dyads are pairs of states (dyads) that have experienced three or more militarized interstate disputes. The unit of analysis is the annual MID. I chose to include the most severe annual MID between states because the key independent variables, periods of autocratic unrest, and election years for democracies are made available in a cross-national, time-series format. The analyses first include all annual disputes (N=1,525 for the full sample, 1,085 for the rival sample), but I also run tests only on mixed regime dyads (N=722 for the full sample, 530 for the rival sample).

Dependent Variables. The dependent variables for this chapter are dispute severity and war onset. Dispute severity is measured on a 0-200 scale reflecting a combination of the levels of military force (e.g., show of force vs. actual use of military action) and fatalities for each rival (Diehl and Goertz, 2000). At the top end of the severity scale are wars, identified using the Correlates of War criteria of 1,000 or more battle related fatalities (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). After accounting for missing data on the independent variables, the data includes 65 observations of war, with 43 between rivals. The average severity of a dispute is 49.87 for the full sample, and 52.95 for rivals. Because severity is measured as a scale, I employ OLS regression, and because war is a binary variable, I employ logit analysis. All analyses have standard errors clustered on the rival period, in order to account for non-independence among observations.

Independent Variables and Controls. The key independent variables are whether or not a rival dyad is a mixed regime dyad, elections in democracies, and unrest in autocracies. Similar to the prior chapter, mixed regime dyads are coded as one democratic state and one autocratic state. Democracy is coded as a 1 if the state reaches a 6 or higher on the Polity scale (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2010), with a state having anything less than a 6 being coded as autocratic.⁴

⁴There are discrepancies between the country codings in the Correlates of War coding (which the rivalry

The other two independent variables are whether a democratic state experienced a national election that year, and the amount of domestic unrest experienced by an autocratic state the year of a conflict. Both of these variables are drawn from the *Cross-National Times Series* dataset (Banks, 2011a).⁵ The CNTS data include a variable for the number of votes cast in states when there is a national election. From this variable, I generated a dummy variable for whether or not a state experienced an election. No variable in the CNTS data distinguishes between whether the election is for a country's chief executive or for the legislature. Although this is slightly problematic, making such a distinction would arbitrarily introduce an empirical distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems, whereas my theoretical approach does not do so.⁶ Because so many democratic states use legislative elections to then in turn determine their chief executive, I chose to code any national election.

The final independent variable is the amount of unrest experienced by an autocratic state in a given year. The CNTS dataset provides a number of variables that may fit this concept. It includes data on the number of assassination attempts, coups, riots, anti-government demonstrations, as well as purges. My theory does not attempt to distinguish between any one of these forms of domestic unrest, and any one of these behaviors may threaten the ruling elite in some form or fashion. Because of this, I employ the *weighted conflict index* provided by the CNTS data. This variable assigns a weight to each type of unrest, producing a continuous variable with a very large range.⁷ The index ranges from 0 to 26187. Because of

data uses) and the Polity data. I have attempted to correct for this discrepancy to conform the polity codes to COW codes where the polity codes did not match the COW codes in the rivalry master dataset, but there may still be some observations left as missing due to the discrepancies.

⁵The CNTS data does not have the same country codes as the Correlates of War data. I attempted to manually reassign country codes in the CNTS to conform to COW country codes before merging the data, but there may yet be some errors in my recoding that led to some observations being left as missing.

⁶In future iterations of this project, I would like to be able to distinguish between whether the election was for a chief executive or not.

⁷From the CNTS user's manual (Banks, 2011b): "As of October 2007 the values entered were: Assassinations (25), Strikes (20), Guerrilla Warfare (100), Government Crises (20), Purges (20), Riots (25), Revolutions (150), and Anti-Government Demonstrations (10)."

this variance, I took the natural log of the variable in order to derive more easily interpretable results and to suppress potential outliers.⁸

Because my theory emphasizes elections for democracies and unrest for autocracies, elections are only included for democracies and unrest is only coded for autocracies. Furthermore, because the variables are measures on a country-year basis, they had to be transformed into dyadic variables. In order to accomplish this, I generated dyadic variables based on the following rules. For elections, jointly democratic dyads receive a 1 if either state experiences an election in a given year, for mixed dyads, it is coded a 1 only if the democratic state has an election. For jointly autocratic dyads, the variable for elections is always zero. For autocratic unrest in mixed regime dyads, only the value of weighted conflict is included for the autocratic state. For joint democracies, the value is always zero. Finally, for jointly autocratic dyads, the variables takes on the maximum value of either state in the dyad. I chose the maximum amount of unrest, because my theory expects that as unrest increases in an autocratic state in the dyad, more hostile conflicts should be more likely. Thus, the maximum amount of unrest is more theoretically sound than a weak-link specification or an average. Finally, I interact both democratic elections and autocratic unrest with whether a dyad was a mixed regime dyad, to explore further the implications of the first hypothesis in this chapter that mixed regime dyads are the most war prone of rivals.

Finally, I include only a few control variable for the analyses. I control for jointly autocratic dyads, in order to differentiate the effects of similar dyads and mixed regime dyads, as well as to distinguish between the differences in joint autocracies and joint democracies. Furthermore, because my independent variables have implications for both joint autocracies and joint democracies, including these variables as controls is prudent. Jointly democratic dyads rep-

⁸In order to preserve the zero values, I added 1 to the entire variable before taking the natural log. That way all variables with a value of 1 have a logged value of 0. I did this to avoid losing observations while gaining interpretability.

represent the reference category for all analyses. I also include the ratio of each state's military capabilities. This is calculated by taking the CINC score of the higher capability as a fraction of the capabilities for the entire dyad (Singer, 1987). I do this to control for the power balance between the dyad. For the severity analyses, I include a variable to represent the basic rivalry level for states (Diehl and Goertz, 2000). I calculated this by taking the average severity score all MID's fought by a dyad over their rivalry's history. I chose to not include more control variables because these tests represent a first attempt at establishing whether domestic political events affect rival escalation. Including only a few control variables also follows more recent methodological guidelines (Achen, 2002; Ray, 2005). Thus, the tests provide the simplest models possible. Other potential control variables that might be included in a future version of these tests would be the issue at stake in the conflict, alliance patterns, and the history of war in the rivalry itself.

4.3 Empirical Results

The results of this chapter only provide very modest support for the hypotheses. Table 4.1 presents the results for conflict severity for both rival and non-rival states. I employ simple OLS regression models on dispute severity.⁹ The first two columns present tests on the sample of all annual rival MID's, while the third column presents results on the sample of mixed regime dyadic disputes only. The first column presents a purely additive model, examining the individual effects of mixed regimes, democratic elections, and autocratic unrest, while controlling for the effects of the other independent variables. The second column presents a multiplicative model that interacts mixed regime dyads with elections and unrest. The third column presents the effects of elections and unrest on only the mixed dyadic sample, which is another way of testing for interactive effects.

⁹All analyses performed using *STATA*, version 11.2.

Table 4.1: OLS on Dispute Severity

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	All Dyads	All Dyads	Mixed Regime Dyads
Mixed Regime Dyad	-5.289 (3.320)	-10.502** (4.758)	
Election (in democracies)	-0.391 (3.183)	-9.700* (5.212)	2.448 (3.789)
Mixed X Election		12.132* (6.551)	
Joint Autocracy	-3.426 (3.576)	-7.065 (5.389)	
Domestic Unrest (ln, in autocracies)	0.943*** (0.332)	0.865 (0.644)	1.035** (0.413)
Mixed X Unrest		0.153 (0.792)	
Capability Ratio	-1.044 (4.784)	-1.466 (4.798)	-6.179 (8.071)
Basic Rivalry Level	0.983*** (0.015)	0.981*** (0.015)	0.955*** (0.025)
Constant	2.223 (4.438)	6.814 (5.035)	1.251 (7.455)
Observations	1,525	1,525	722
R-squared	0.443	0.444	0.434

Standard errors clustered on rivalry in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Only some of the theoretical variables perform as expected, albeit with some caveats. Model 1 of Table 4.1 presents the additive model, without any interactions terms. Mixed regime dyads do not appear to have more severe MIDs than dyads with similar regimes. Elections in democracies also do not appear to have an impact on the severity of conflicts. Supportive of my theoretical expectations, domestic unrest in autocratic states does appear to have a significant impact on the severity of MIDs. This variable is the natural log of the weighted sum of unrest events. For every logged unit increase in unrest events, the severity of a particular MID increases almost one unit.

When one examines the multiplicative and split sample models, however, the interpretation

of domestic political events and regime type changes somewhat. Mixed regime dyads appear to have significantly less severe MIDs than even jointly democratic dyads, according to Model 2. Of course, this model includes interaction terms that interact mixed dyads with elections in democracies and the level of unrest in autocracies. Accordingly, the coefficient on the variable for mixed regime dyads shows the severity of mixed dyads when there is no unrest in the autocratic state and no election in the democratic state. Nevertheless, only the coefficients on the interaction term for democratic elections and mixed dyads indicate that these domestic political events cause mixed regime dyads to have any more severe MIDs than similar regime dyads. Although that coefficient is significant, it does not hold in Model 3.

In Model 3, Table 4.1, I present the results for mixed regime dyads. My theoretical chapter as well as the expectations of this chapter suggested that when mixed regime dyads fight, domestic pressures might be especially high. Although elections for democratic states is not statistically significant, the coefficient on autocratic unrest is positive and significant. This shows that for every logged unit increase in domestic unrest, there is about a point increase in severity of a MID in a mixed regime dyad. At least within mixed dyad sample, there is some indication that domestic unrest in autocratic states may contribute to the severity of international conflict.

Finally, with respect to the control variables, the coefficient on basic rivalry level shows an almost one to one relationship between expected severity (based on the average severity of all MIDs in the rival's lifespan) and actual severity, which is not surprising. Jointly autocratic disputes are not likely to have more severe MIDs than the reference category, while capability ratio also has no significant effect. This trend holds across all models.

In Table 4.2, I display the same models as for Table 4.1, but in this case, I apply them only to the sample of rival states. Model 4 displays the additive model on the full rival sample, Model

displays the interaction model, and Model 6 displays the results restricted to the sample of mixed regime rival dyads.

Table 4.2: OLS on Dispute Severity: Rival Dyads

	(4)	(5)	(6)
	All Rival Dyads	All Rival Dyads	Mixed Rivals
Mixed Regime Dyad	-7.273 (5.069)	-14.854** (7.082)	
Election (in democracies)	-0.120 (4.495)	-13.912* (7.989)	3.763 (5.169)
Mixed X Election		17.596* (9.700)	
Joint Autocracy	-4.826 (5.523)	-11.057 (8.132)	
Domestic Unrest (ln, in autocracies)	1.403*** (0.464)	1.372 (0.946)	1.427** (0.567)
Mixed X Domestic Unrest		0.073 (1.147)	
Capability Ratio	-1.880 (7.184)	-2.750 (7.117)	-6.641 (11.321)
Basic Rivalry Level	0.977*** (0.031)	0.969*** (0.031)	0.943*** (0.044)
Constant	2.890 (6.633)	10.476 (7.865)	0.046 (10.616)
Observations	1,085	1,085	530
R-squared	0.272	0.274	0.276

Standard errors clustered on the rivalry in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

In all, Table 4.2 displays results similar to Table 4.1. First, mixed regime rival dyads do not have significantly more severe MIDs than similar regime rival dyads, with one caveat. In Model 5, the interaction term between mixed regime dyads and elections is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. This is supportive of my argument. I am hesitant to draw any firm inference from this particular model, however, because the finding does not hold in the samples restricted to just mixed dyads. Again, like in Table 4.1, the strongest finding is that autocratic unrest does lead to more severe conflicts. In Model 5, the interaction term

between mixed dyads and unrest is not significant, but in Model 6 the variable is significant within mixed dyads. This means that domestic unrest does lead to more severe MID's for mixed regime rivals, but that these MID's are not more severe than those fought between jointly autocratic dyads experiencing domestic unrest. At best, the results on dispute severity only show very modest support for my arguments regarding either elections or unrest.

In Tables 4.3 and 4.4, I display the logit results for the escalation of MID's to war. Table 4.3 displays the results for the full sample of dyads, while Table 4.4 displays the results for the rival sample. Overall, these results are similar to those for dispute severity. First, the results displayed in Table 4.3 show that mixed regime dyads are no more likely to go to war than similar regime dyads. Elections in democratic states do appear to make war more likely, but I should note that this finding does not hold if the standard errors are not clustered.¹⁰ In Table 4.3, there is a finding that increasing domestic unrest in autocratic states makes MID's more likely to go to war. This finding occurs in the additive model (Model 7), but not the interaction model (Model 8). When the sample is restricted to just the mixed regime dyads, the coefficient on unrest is again statistically significant. This means to me that unrest may contribute to mixed dyads going to war, but it will make them no more likely to go to war than similar regime dyads (as shown by Model 8).

Table 4.4 displays results of the same models as Table 4.3, but restricted on the sample of just rival dyads. The results on rivals are consistent with those for the full sample. Again, elections appear to have an effect, but this finding is sensitive to modeling choices (see

¹⁰I did test these models without clustered standard errors as well. If one does not include robust standard errors, the significant findings on elections for war drop out. Furthermore, the significance of domestic unrest in Model 12 is only significant in a one-tailed test. Given the stark contrast between the non-clustered models and the ones presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, I am skeptical of any significance. Clustering the standard errors is more theoretically appropriate, given the non-independence of repeated conflicts. Preferring to take a conservative approach to hypothesis testing, I do not make any firm inferences regarding elections based on Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Doing so yields the most consistent results across the models, even though they are largely made up of null findings. In future developments of this project, I may look into this issue further.

Table 4.3: Logit on Escalation to War: All Dyads

	(7)	(8)	(9)
	All Dyads	All Dyads	Mixed Dyads
Mixed Regime Dyad	1.346 (1.072)	0.440 (1.087)	
Election (in democracies)	0.023 (0.423)	-12.114*** (0.971)	0.175 (0.428)
Mixed X Election		12.235*** (1.042)	
Joint Autocracy	1.156 (1.110)	1.018 (1.139)	
Domestic Unrest (ln, in autocracies)	0.129*** (0.048)	0.061 (0.081)	0.175*** (0.057)
Mixed X Domestic Unrest		0.108 (0.099)	
Capability Ratio	-0.988 (0.944)	-0.975 (0.945)	-2.504** (1.142)
Constant	-4.319*** (1.127)	-3.707*** (1.107)	-2.133** (0.957)
Observations	1,525	1,525	722

Standard errors clustered on rivalry in parentheses

*** $p < |0.01$, ** $p < |0.05$, * $p < |0.1$

footnote 10). Domestic unrest in autocratic states does have the positive relationship to war as expected. In both the additive model (Model 10) and in the model restricted to just mixed regime rivals (Model 12), domestic unrest is positive and significant. In order to try and get a better sense of the relationship between domestic unrest and escalation to war, I calculated predicted probabilities.

Table 4.5 displays predicted probabilities of the occurrence of war generated from Model 12 in Table 4.4. These show the likelihood that mixed regime dyads will fight a war when the key independent variables are allowed to vary. The base probability of 0.0220 is calculated from all variables being held at zero, except for capability ratio, which is held at its mean value. As expected from my hypothesis, the occurrence of war is more likely when the democratic state experiences an election, but that finding only holds in analyses employing clustered standard

Table 4.4: Logit on Escalation to War: Rival Dyads

	(10)	(11)	(12)
	All Rival Dyads	All Rival Dyads	Mixed Rivals
Mixed Regime Dyad	1.171 (1.116)	0.319 (1.100)	
Election (in democracies)	0.255 (0.480)	-13.275*** (0.966)	0.462 (0.487)
Mixed X Election		13.651*** (1.050)	
Joint Autocracy	0.863 (1.169)	0.115 (1.325)	
Domestic Unrest (ln, in autocracies)	0.101** (0.051)	0.094 (0.118)	0.109** (0.055)
Mixed X Unrest		0.011 (0.130)	
Capability Ratio	-1.277 (1.145)	-1.302 (1.130)	-3.920*** (1.341)
Constant	-3.826*** (1.162)	-3.009*** (1.135)	-0.792 (0.953)
Observations	1,085	1,085	530

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < |0.01$, ** $p < |0.05$, * $p < |0.1$

errors (see footnote 10). When the value for autocratic unrest is increases to its mean value for the mixed dyad sample, the likelihood of war increases to 0.0359, which is a fifty-two percent increase in probability. When that value is increased to its maximum value, however, the likelihood increases to 0.0605, a roughly one hundred seventy-five percent. The finding for unrest is not consistent across all models. Thus, I am skeptical that any firm inference should be taken, based on these results. At the most, I believe these findings indicate that there could be something to the relationship between domestic unrest and conflict escalation, but that as currently tested, such a relationship is not readily apparent. Furthermore, it is difficult to infer that there is any large substantive impact of domestic unrest. The likelihood of war in the base model is very small, and while increasing unrest to its maximum value more than doubles the likelihood of war, it only increases the likelihood to about 0.06. The more reliable inference to take from my analysis on the escalation of rivals to war is that there is

Table 4.5: Predicted Probabilities on War in Mixed Regime Rival Dyads

	War	% Δ from Base
Base	0.0220	
Election (in Democracy)	0.0334	+52%
Unrest (in Autocracy), Mean Level	0.0359	+63%
Unrest (in Autocracy), 75th Percentile	.0480	+118%
Unrest (in Autocracy), Max Level	0.0605	+175%

Predicted probabilities generated from Model 12, Table 4.4. Base model is a zero on all variables, except for capability ratio, which is held at its mean. Probabilities calculated using the *CLARIFY* package in STATA (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000).

a null relationship, rather than a clear link between domestic unrest and war.

4.4 Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, I developed three hypotheses. First, that mixed regime dyads consisting of one democracy and one autocracy would have more severe conflicts and be more likely to go to war. Second, that election years in democracies would contribute to more severe disputes as well as a greater likelihood of war. Finally, I predicted that as domestic unrest increases in autocratic states more severe disputes and war become more likely. I tested these hypotheses across 12 statistical models on disputes from 1816-2001, on the full sample of conflict dyads as well as just rival dyads.

The findings yield only modest support for my predictions. First, there is no indication that mixed regime dyads will have more severe disputes than similar regime dyads. Second, elections in democratic states appear to have little to no impact on the rival relationship. Third, there is mixed evidence to suggest that autocratic unrest does lead to an escalation of conflict, especially so in mixed regime dyads. This finding on unrest is stronger than for elections, but substantively small overall. When taken together, these findings only provide

weak support for my theoretical logic.

It is worth examining the results on elections and unrest both empirically and theoretically. First, with respect to elections, as Chiozza and Goemans (2011) argue, democratic leaders, whose prospects for life after losing office are much rosier than the post-tenured life of their autocratic counterparts, are less willing to risk conflicts in an attempt to shore up domestic political support. They are further less impacted domestically by conflict outcomes. Thus, conflicts may not be worth the risk, given little chances of major rewards or punishments. Domestic outbidding may not be as intense from the opposition if there is little chance of punishing a leader, vis-a-vis the rivalry. As a result, democratic states may not be playing the same game of domestic political risk that autocrats may be playing. One potential empirical reason that the election variable does not behave as expected is because it is coded to include both legislative and executive elections. A large number of democracies elect their chief executives from legislative elections (in parliamentary regimes), however, others have separate elections for executives, as in presidential systems. A more careful coding should attempt to distinguish the two, allowing for a more precise understanding of when the executives of states, who typically make foreign policy decisions, are most politically vulnerable.

That domestic unrest in autocratic states has some influence on rival conflict behavior bolsters the notion that autocracies are particularly sensitive to domestic concerns in making foreign policy decisions. This idea has been at the theoretical roots of a number of recent studies (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Pickering and Kisangani, 2010; Debs and Goemans, 2010; Chiozza and Goemans, 2011; Weeks, 2012). Drawing again from the theoretical development of Chiozza and Goemans (2011) and Colaresi (2005), autocratic leaders who experience unrest run the risk of intense outbidding processes during a rivalry and may be much more willing to risk an escalatory conflict against a rival. Because their prospects for life out of

office may be dire, such leaders are more risk acceptant of a war. Winning a war against a rival may turn the tide on the rivalry and secure them at home, while failing to confront a rival in the wake of domestic outbidding and domestic challenges may raise the likelihood of death, jail or exile if ousted. The evidence provided here only lends some weak support that these motivations may be part of the rivalry maintenance process as well. Furthermore, the findings on unrest in mixed regime dyads suggests that democratic states may wish to take advantage of such vulnerabilities in their autocratic rivals and escalate conflict to gain an upper hand in the rivalry as a whole. The findings I have on unrest are only a weak link, and future work on this question will require more analytical rigor to better test the relationship.

In the future development of this portion of the dissertation project, more empirical precision is required. Because rivalry is a long term condition states find themselves in, the question of 'whether war?' is less important than 'when war?'. Thus, a more dynamic approach to understanding rivalry is required. Some classic studies of superpower rivalry (McGinnis and Williams, 1989; Goldstein, 1991) employ precise time series analysis of particular rival dyads. More recent work on macro-conflict dynamics, such as that by Brandt, Colaresi and Freeman (2008), incorporates not only the dyadic conflict series, which accounts for reciprocity among rivals, but also the impact of domestic-level influences. Ideally, this project would take the empirical approach of employing domestic political event time series and regress them on the series of conflict and cooperation levels within the rivalry. Although this approach to time series analysis has some drawbacks, specifically it leads to shorter coverage in terms of years (so an 1816-2001 range is unlikely) as well as smaller cross-sections (they will typically analyze one conflict dyad or conflict triad), the approaches are much more precise in terms of time units, typically a week or a month. This approach would gain empirical leverage as to how the specific timing of domestic political events affects the timing of rival conflict events. Currently, my approach is to account for the weighted number of unrest events or

note whether there is an election in given year. The election or unrest may take place after a conflict has begun, and therefore have no way to influence the onset of a conflict. My current empirical approach would have no way of distinguishing this. Although the results may not be generalizable to all rivals across the 19th and 20th centuries, it would do much better in trying to test the more specific implications of my theoretical approach. This chapter, as it currently stands, gives some evidence to these implications, particularly with respect to domestic unrest, but it is analyzed in broad-strokes, where in the future more precision is required.

Chapter 5

The Human Rights Effects of Interstate Conflict

In the previous chapters, I have explained that the escalation of international conflict over territory and in rivalry is influenced by domestic political concerns. My explanation rests on the interplay between the differing political pressures that democratic and autocratic states experience and the salience of the issues at stake in conflict. By relying on the support of the general public to maintain power, democratic governments find issues that are related to the general public good, such as intangible territory or conflicts during election cycles, are more salient. On the other hand, autocracies are more likely to respond violently when private good distribution is threatened, either when the tangible aspects of territory are being contested or when the regime is experiencing domestic unrest. Chapter 2 explains this dynamic abstractly, while Chapter 3 tests the argument on territorial conflict and Chapter 4 tests the argument in the context of international rivalry.

In the opening paragraphs of this dissertation, I alluded to the example of American involvement in World War II. After the United States' entrance into the war, the government began systematically repressing Japanese Americans by forcing them to live in internment camps throughout the continental United States for the duration of the war (Ng, 2002). This presents an interesting puzzle for human rights research. Why would the United States, a pillar of the democratic world fighting a war to defend democratic states in Europe against a fascist invasion from Germany, pursue a policy such as internment at home? Human rights research has long found that *democracy*, with its emphasis on individual rights, use of elections,

and institutional checks on executives, is one of the best predictors of fewer human rights abuses (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Davenport, 2007). This leads to the question that guides this chapter: does involvement in international conflict affect repression dynamics? In this chapter, I extend the theory of Chapter 2 to focus on a different arena for violence: home.

I argue that when democratic states face salient conflicts abroad, the general public feels insecure. In order to provide the public good of security through victory in the conflict, democratic governments become more willing to repress in order to provide the public with security. As a result, repression increases. The focus of the repression might be toward potential fifth columns, such as Japanese Americans during World War II, or it might be focused on other groups perceived to complicate the conflict effort, such as opposition groups. In contrast, autocratic states are often very repressive in peace time, often employing the military to carry out repressive policies. When engaged in an international conflict, as conflicts become more hostile and approach war, autocratic states may have to devote more military resources into the conflict, leaving fewer available for repression domestically. As a result, autocratic states may either only seek to maintain or become less repressive during international conflicts, but are unlikely to increase repression. Furthermore, democracies and autocracies may focus their repression on different types of abuse. While democracies may increase repression, they are not likely to focus repression on the severest behaviors (e.g. disappearances and killings) but rather focus on lesser forms (e.g. imprisonment and torture), behaviors which can be carried out in the context of their legal and bureaucratic repertoire. Autocratic states may decrease abuse in the these more severe forms because they may not have the military resources to execute them.

I test these expectations on two human rights datasets, the Political Terror Scale (Gibney and Dalton, 1996; Wood and Gibney, 2010), from 1977-2001, and the Cingranelli-Richards

Human Rights Data Cingranelli and Richards(1999; 2010), from 1982-2001, in two types of conflicts: militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) fought over territory and those disputes fought between rivals. Similar to the contrast in findings from chapters 3 and 4, I find support for my argument in territorial conflict and little support for my argument in rival conflicts. Territorial conflicts are high-stakes competition which are the most likely to go to war, compared with other issues (Vasquez, 1993; Vasquez and Henehan, 2001). Because of this, they are the most likely to drive feelings of public insecurity that leads democratic governments to change their repressive tendencies to become more repressive. Furthermore, because they are war-prone, they are the most likely to lead autocratic states to push more resources into the conflict, leaving fewer available for repression. Rival conflicts, on the other hand, are regular conflicts that have an expected hostility level (Diehl and Goertz, 2000). Because of this regularity in both the occurrence and severity of conflicts, domestic systems may adapt to the rivalry process, making changes in repressive behavior less likely.

5.1 Domestic Institutions and Repression Dynamics

In much of the prior quantitative research on human rights, the continuity of policy choices over time is emphasized. Some research, such as Poe and Tate (1994) and more recently Wood (2008), emphasizes this continuity when incorporating the autoregressive portion (lagged dependent variable) of a particular statistical model. They note that repressive policies are a function of institutional choices and generally continue relatively unchanged. Empirically, this notion has always received much support, as autoregressive models are the norm. Although the focus of the empirical modeling has been on the degree to which repressive tendencies *change*, year to year, much of the prior theorizing does not focus on repression *dynamics* or changes over time, so much as the choice to use repression initially (see Poe (2004) for explicit theorizing along these lines). I contend that a preferable way to

understand repression during international conflict is to think in terms of repression dynamics. My focus in this chapter is thus not on whether states repress during interstate conflict, but rather on how repression changes during such conflicts.

Theories of policy dynamics often note that policies either shift gradually over time or change rapidly followed by periods of stasis. The latter approach, known as the punctuated equilibrium model, has been used to explain domestic policy shifts (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991) and international rivalry dynamics (Diehl and Goertz, 2000). Essentially, this model posits that changes in policy (whether they be about domestic outputs or conflict escalation) can occur suddenly, and shift policies temporarily or permanently. In international relations, this approach is best known as applied to international rivalry dynamics. Diehl and Goertz (2000) note that rivalries tend to go through similar levels of hostility, conflict after conflict, and rivalries tend to endure until some kind of endogenous (such as regime change or civil war) or exogenous shock (such as a global war) forces the rivals to end their competition.

Repression dynamics work in a similar fashion. Structural factors, such as economic development and (primarily) institutional arrangements such as democracy/autocracy, largely determine the level of repression a state employs. Institutional arrangements are the most important because they establish and help to maintain the political status quo domestically. Building on the logic of political survival, the typical amount of repression can be expected to be a function of domestic institutions. States that depend on a large, publicly-based coalition, such as democracies, employ very little repression because the protection of human rights is a public good. Smaller coalition states, such as autocracies, provide security for the elite (a private good) from those outside the elite through the use of repression (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).

There are many permutations of this logic when one tries to break down various sizes of the

selectorate and ratios of winning coalitions. Employing the selectorate theory heuristically, I draw two major conclusions. First, democratic states, which I believe can be safely claimed have large selectorates and winning coalitions, should be less repressive in order to provide the public good of human security to all of its voters. Second, autocratic states, which have smaller selectorates and winning coalitions, rely on the distribution of private goods. Security in such states is provided to the elites through the use of repression. From this simple claim, that democratic states need to rely on public goods and autocrats rely on private goods, I can derive expectations for whether states might alter their repressive behavior during salient international conflicts.

Autocratic states depend on the support of an elite class (whether the party, military leadership, or other elites) and maintain office through the distribution of private goods to such a class. Repression is a tool used to secure the elite class from the threats that emerge from outside the elite. It is part of the authoritarian status quo to maintain some positive level of repression in order to suppress dissent. By contrast, democratic governments must maintain the support of a broad coalition from the general public. Personal security is a public good, both in terms of protecting the nation from external sources of threat, such as conflicts, as well as protecting the masses domestically. Keeping repression low is a part of this public good provision. Thus, as the status quo for repression, democratic states should be less repressive compared to their autocratic counterparts. This finding, is of course, well-established (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) also find that repression levels decrease as winning coalition size increases. Thus, consistently, we can expect democracies to repress at low levels, and autocracies to repress at higher levels.

Given autocratic dependence on elite support, and democratic preferences for public support through public goods distribution, how does domestic repression change (or not change)

during interstate conflicts? Key to thinking about whether repressive tendencies shift during interstate conflicts is the the degree to which conflict alters the domestic political status quo of a state. Not all conflicts are equally salient to key domestic audiences. I argue that the salience of a conflict is a function of context and severity, and that shifts will be different for democracies and autocracies.

5.1.1 Territorial Conflict and Shifts in Human Rights Abuse

Repression should be fairly consistent, because of domestic structural conditions, and thus shifts in repression are most likely the result of some factor altering the domestic status quo. International conflict, which is exogenous to the domestic repressive system, may impact repression in such a way. To do so, a conflict would need to change the domestic political considerations with respect to repression, such that states change their typical courses of action. Such conflicts would need to be domestically salient. Research into the origins of conflict and war finds that territorial conflict can be particularly escalatory and salient. This type of international conflict presents challenges to the repressive status quo in both democracies and autocracies. Furthermore, the severity of territorial conflicts should magnify the effects of each conflict context.

As described in Chapter 3, territory is a leading cause of conflict and the most war-prone issue over which states fight (Vasquez, 1993; Vasquez and Henehan, 2001; Senese and Vasquez, 2008). Furthermore, multiple aspects can be salient to states domestically (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005). Because contested territory may appeal to both the masses, through identity ties or symbolism, or to the elite because of its resource wealth, it may be salient for both democratic and autocratic audiences, but for different reasons.

The intangible qualities of territory, such as historical ties or symbolic value, make territory

difficult to divide, but easy to rally the public. When democracies engage in conflicts over territory, it may therefore be highly salient to the domestic audience of state. Hutchison and Gibler (2007) examine the effects of external threat on tolerance levels within populations. Building on in-group/out-group arguments, they find that when states are threatened by other states over territorial issues, populations become less tolerant of minorities. Territorial threat is seen as likely to build internal cohesion against groups seen as potential threats. The public good aspects of territory, such as identity ties or symbolic value, make this kind of in group/out group dynamic especially likely in democratic states, where popular pressure and support determine electoral outcomes. Hutchison and Gibler (2007) note that this is consistent with Vasquez's (1993) arguments about territorial competition bolstering hardliners.

For understanding the relationship between democratic repression during territorial conflicts, it is useful to think of domestic security as a public good. When territory is contested, the state can provide security by winning the conflict. If there are groups that are either seen to be tied to the opposing state, such as Japanese-Americans during World War II, or groups that are seen to be a hindrance to the conflict effort, such as war protesters during the Vietnam conflict in the USA, such groups may be seen as not only a nuisance, but might also be considered as a threat to security (broadly construed). It may, therefore, be to the political advantage of a democratic government to increase repression, even slightly, against such groups. For example, Greece in 1996, during a territorial conflict against Turkey over Cyprus, increased the imprisonment of conscientious objectors and Amnesty International reports that there was also civilian led violence against members of the Turkish minority, with no police intervention (Amnesty International, 1997, 161-62). Although it seems unreasonable to think that democracies will increase repression against the entire population, given institutional pressures to maintain low levels of repression (Davenport, 2007), repression targeted at segments within the population that appear to impede the conflict effort could bolster the

public image of domestic security in the face of an external threat, and therefore be a political benefit to the government. Gibson (1988) suggests that this is an elite driven behavior, in which elites seek out repression as a policy in the context of an external threat, and the public may tolerate it. Because of the threat presented by the conflict, the general public becomes more tolerant of such behaviors, even though it might not be so during peace time. In these situations, the government can achieve domestic political benefits through the use of repression to provide security.

Hypothesis 6 (*Territory*): *When democratic states are involved in territorial conflicts, they become more likely to increase repression.*

Dictatorial regimes may also place a high value on contested territory, but potentially for different reasons. While democratic states may emphasize the nationalistic or symbolic orientation of contested territory, autocratic states may be more interested in the intrinsic and tangible (monetary) value of land. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 413) contend that territorial revision is primarily in the interest of autocratic states, as the resource wealth of captured land may provide very useful private goods provision to gain support of the elite. Because autocracies focus on policies that benefit the elite, repression is a tool that is often used as a means of protecting the elite from those outside of it. When attempting to contest land for its resource wealth, however, states must also spend human and material resources into the fight. This may leave them with fewer resources to distribute and they may thus face a dilemma regarding their typical repressive practices.

Wood (2008) examines the effect of economic sanctions on repression levels. Similar to external conflicts, economic sanctions may act as an exogenous threat to the repressive status quo. Wood generally finds that sanctions lead to fewer available goods to distribute, which leads to an *increase* in repression, especially for autocratic states. Economic sanctions and interstate conflict, while both exogenous, lead to different kinds of domestic tradeoffs.

Pursuing conflicts abroad or enduring economic sanctions at home can lead to fewer resources to distribute, they also lead to *different* resources being threatened. During periods of salient or intense interstate conflict, autocracies have to use military forces to fight abroad, which may also be a common tool for repressive behavior. During periods of sanctions, the military remains at home. Furthermore, if external conflict is driven by the need to grab land for private good distribution, the elite may be more supportive of the leader, whereas in sanctions, even the elite may be less supportive of the leadership. Finally, there may be a rallying effect from even those outside the elite during periods of conflict. If so, it may be that autocratic states do not increase repression during salient international conflicts, even over territory. At the very least, it seems that because repression is a regular way of maintaining order, such states would probably seek to maintain repression, but not necessarily increase it.

Hypothesis 7 (*Territory*): *When autocratic states are involved in territorial conflicts, repression will be maintained.*

Hypothesis 8 (*Territory*): *When autocratic states are involved in territorial conflicts, becomes more likely to decrease repression.*

Finally, I expect that the shift in repression for both autocratic and democratic states to be magnified as the fatalities countries experience increase. For democratic states, an increase in feelings of public insecurity should increase support for repression as salient conflicts become more likely to go to war, thus making increased repression more likely as countries experience more severe conflicts. For autocratic states, more military resources must be used to fight the conflict and less are available for repression as such conflicts become more severe, leading to a potential decrease in repression.

Hypothesis 9 (*Territory*): *Shifts in repression are magnified during periods of territorial conflict as fatalities increase.*

These expectations run counter to the logic of the war-making and state-building literature (Gibler, 2007; Gibler, 2010; Thies, 2005). That research has pointed out that external threat leads to state centralization. This should mean that states become more repressive during periods of conflict over particularly salient or threatening issues. My explanation does predict that this will occur, but only for democratic states. By contrast, the states that we should expect to be the most repressive and centralized, autocracies, may actually begin to decrease repression during territorial conflict. The underlying logic of domestic political gains presented by shifting repressive strategies is different in my explanation than in the state building research. Democratic states use repression for short-term political benefits through the provision of a public good—security. Autocrats, however (when fighting over territory that is likely of most interest to the elite), are not likely gaining support by increasing repression. Instead, they may become resource strapped when it comes to repression, especially as conflicts increase in severity. Therefore, autocratic states are not likely to increase repression and may actually decrease it, contrary to what state building theories imply.

5.1.2 The Rivalry Process and Repression

While both types of conflict are domestically salient, territorial and rival conflicts, which are not mutually exclusive, may have differing effects on repressive dynamics in democracies and autocracies. Rivalry represents a long-term shift in orientation toward conflict, in which states view each other as strategic enemies (Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson, 2008) and adapt their foreign policy making with the long-term in mind. Diehl and Goertz (2000), who adopt a punctuated equilibrium view of rivalry, note that because future conflict is expected, rival states develop what is called a “basic rivalry level,” in which the severity and duration of each particular conflict is relatively similar to prior conflicts. Absent an endogenous (such as domestic regime change) or exogenous shock (such as a world war),

rival conflicts become *normalized*, and states typically maintain similar levels of hostility, typically low, across conflicts. As described in previous chapters, Colaresi (2005) develops a theory that domestic political actors drive escalatory action in rivalry based on the concept of *outbidding*. When the rival stakes are high and there is a high level of outbidding, escalation becomes more likely. Thus, when conflicts are at their most severe levels, rival conflicts should also have high domestic salience. Most of the time, according to Colaresi, domestic actors seek out rivalry maintenance, rather than escalation. Outbidding can produce domestic political benefits without escalating the conflict. Thus, most rival conflicts are not likely to be escalatory, and therefore may not come as much of an exogenous shock to any political status quo, domestic or international.

Rivalry can encompass several contentious issues, including contested territory, over a long period of time. Because of the long time horizon in competition, however, rival conflicts become part of the domestic and international status quo. In line with the punctuated equilibrium theory of rival dynamics (Diehl and Goertz, 2000), states expect future conflicts with their rivals; it does not “shock” the repressive system in place. In autocratic states, the portion of the military devoted to the rival competition may not be used for domestic repression, and no new resources need be devoted to repression. Thus, there may be little change in repressive behavior, compared to peace time. Democratic audiences see rival conflicts in a long-term light as well. Conflicts do not represent new or necessarily grave threats to public safety and the public is less likely to be tolerant of new increases in repressive behavior. The in-group/out-group pressure that may drive decreases in tolerance during territorial conflicts (Hutchison and Gibler, 2007) may not be as stark during rival conflicts. Given this, most states would likely not expect most rival conflicts to escalate to war, leaving public feelings of insecurity lower than they might feel during an territorial conflict. Therefore, it is likely that unless a rival conflict deviates above the basic rivalry level, such conflicts

should not lead to significant shifts in domestic repression. It may be, however, that similar dynamics as for territorial conflict occur as conflicts experienced by states escalate, especially in autocracies since their repression calculation is a function of available military resources.

Hypothesis 10 (*Rivalry*): *States are not likely to significantly alter repression during conflicts against rivals.*

Hypothesis 11 (*Rivalry*): *Shifts in repression are more likely during periods of rival conflict as fatalities increase.*

5.1.3 Territory, Rivalry, and Repressive Choices

The above explanation examines *repression* as though it is a linear combination of a set of behaviors. This may be problematic for a comprehensive understanding of repression. There are several types of repression. Cingranelli and Richards (1999) focus on four sets of repressive behaviors associated with the repression of physical integrity rights: the use of imprisonment, torture, disappearances, and political killing. Rather than think of these behaviors as part of same phenomenon, in which one can put them together on a scale (as both the Cingranelli and Richards (1999) data do and I do later), one may also examine each set of behaviors separately. One reason to do this is that it is possible that the behaviors may be *substitutable*; that is, one behavior may be preferable by the state to employ at higher frequency than another in different situations Conrad and DeMeritt (2011a; 2011b). In this section, I focus on how the external threats of territorial competition and rivalry affect such choices. Thus, the focus is less on whether states repress, but *how* they choose to do so.

The above argument for autocracies, (once salient conflicts become severe, they will maintain or *decrease* repression) is counter-intuitive when one considers prior research on the subject. Because autocracies rely on repression so regularly to maintain domestic order, that they

would lessen its use when the state is facing a threat seems odd. It might be, instead, that rather than use the entire arsenal of repressive tactics, such states shift their practice to certain forms of repression. Thus, there may be a tightening of their repressive grip in one arena, but they might also loosen it in another.

For democratic states, I contend that of the four types of repressive behaviors against physical integrity, the most likely to be employed are imprisonment and torture. Relying on the logic above, when facing an immediate and potentially existential threat, democratic publics are likely to rally around the leadership in the name of security. When the public feels insecure, they are more likely to support some use of repression. Imprisonment and torture can be accomplished through well-established and developed institutions such as the police force and judiciaries. Furthermore, while democratic societies might become more supportive of imprisonment in the name of security, the more gruesome behaviors of disappearances and killings may not be supported. Therefore, I believe it more likely that democracies will increase repression by torture and imprisonment.

Hypothesis 12 (*Repressive Choices*): *Democracies are more likely to choose torture or imprisonment over disappearances and killing during salient external conflicts.*

Autocracies are more likely to use a diverse approach toward repression in general. Because autocracies likely employ all types of repression at various levels, it is difficult to think of one type they might systematically prefer certain forms over others. If, as the logic above suggests, that autocrats may decrease repression during international conflicts because they become resource-strapped, they may shift away from repression that typically employs the military as agents and focus instead on maintaining repression that employs different agents, such as the police (although specific agents of abuse likely vary by country). Disappearances and killings seem the most likely to involve the military apparatus, while imprisonment and torture seem most likely to involve the police. Therefore, it may be likely that autocracies

while decrease repression at the more violent end of the spectrum (disappearances and killing), while maintaining the other forms of repression (torture and imprisonment).

Hypothesis 13 (*Repressive Choices*): *When autocracies are involved in international conflicts, they are likely to decrease the use of disappearances and killing, but maintain torture and imprisonment.*

5.2 Research Design

In order to test the above hypotheses, I conduct analyses on repression employing two ordinal measures of physical integrity rights.¹ The Political Terror Scale (Gibney and Dalton, 1996; Wood and Gibney, 2010) (PTS hereafter) is a five point ordinal scale that measures the *scope* of repression, with 1 representing the least repressive states, and 5 corresponding to the most repressive states. The data are coded from two sources, Amnesty International country reports or U.S. State Department reports. I have chosen to use the AI version of the data, with State Department codings filling in where the AI data are missing.² This is a scope measure, which focuses not on the specific behaviors (torture vs. imprisonment), but rather the degree to which all of society is a focus for that repression. A state measured at a 2, for instance in experiencing repression that is rather limited in focus to certain groups, whereas a 3 or 4 is more severe and widespread. For example, in 2003, the United States, involved in Afghanistan and starting the Iraq War, and which was known at the time for increased use of imprisonment, was scored a 2, while Iraq, well-known as very repressive under the Hussein regime, scored a 5.³ In this study, taking into account missing data on

¹Abuses of this right take on the form of unlawful imprisonment, torture, disappearances, and political murder.

²I have also conducted analyses where I use the State Department coding, replacing the AI values where the State Department data are missing and the results are substantively similar.

³From <http://www.politicalterror scale.org/countries.php?region=Eurasia&country=Iraq&year=2003> and <http://www.politicalterror scale.org/countries.php?region=NorthAmerica&country=United%20States&year=2003>.

the independent variables, I examine the PTS scores of 153 countries (3,088 country-years) from 1977-2001.⁴

The other measure of repression I employ is the *Cingranelli-Richards* indicator (CIRI hereafter) Cingranelli and Richards (1999; 2010). Similar to the PTS, it is an ordinal measure, but with a broader scale. It ranges from 0-8, with 0 being the *most* repressive and an 8 being the *least* repressive, the opposite of the PTS. CIRI is measured according to event counts of four repressive behaviors: disappearances, incidents of torture, imprisonments, and murders. If a state has no repressive events in a particular category, it scores a 2, if they have between 1 and 50 repressive events, it is scored a 1, and if they have more than 50 events in a category in a year, it scores a 0. In order to test hypotheses 12 and 13 on repressive choices, I employ the same model on each category. For the analysis of repression as a whole, I employ the full physical integrity measure. The measure for respect for physical integrity rights is summed across all 4 categories. In this project, the analysis using CIRI is conducted on 145 countries from 1982-2001, for a total of 2,505 country-years, after accounting for missing data in the independent variables.⁵ To make the CIRI results more comparable to the PTS results, I reversed the CIRI data so that 0 represents the least repressive score and 8 the most repressive. I similarly reverse the scale for the categorical analysis.

I employ an ordered logit analyses, which estimates the likelihood that states shift into a different category from the previous year. Because I am testing across time, I deal with temporal dependence by clustering the standard errors on each country and include a series of binary lags for each category in the dependent variable.⁶

⁴I replaced missing values from the PTS data I got from the PTS website with the PTS data from the Poe, Rost and Carey (2006) replication file, from which I obtained the data for control variables and democracy. Doing so does not alter the results in any substantive way, but did slightly increase my number of observations.

⁵The number of observations varies when for the components analysis because of variance in the available data on each component.

⁶This approach, also employed by Hafner-Burton (2005), Davenport (2007), and Wood (2008) is more appropriate than a simple lag of the dependent variable, given the categorical data. For the PTS analysis, I

My independent variables in the analyses are whether a state is involved in territorial conflict or rival conflict in a given year. These variables are included to gauge the salience of the conflict for the domestic audience, as some conflicts over some issues are less escalatory or important than conflicts over other issues (Hensel and Mitchell, 2005; Hensel et al., 2008). For territorial conflicts, I code whether or not a state was involved in a militarized interstate dispute over territory in a given year, using the MID 3.10B (participant) data (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004) from the Correlates of War project. The MID participant data codes the primary revision types, which are categorized as territorial, regime, policy, or “other.” They only code revision type for the participant that is considered a “revisionist state.” Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer (2004, 138) note that “Identification of the revisionist state is not based on judgments regarding the aggressor in the dispute or the state that raised the political issue under discussion, but is based on the behavior of the states in the related militarized incidents. Both sides in a dispute can be coded as revisionist states. However, for each state to qualify as a revisionist state it must openly attempt to challenge the predispute conditions by (1) making claims to a specific territory, (2) attempting to overthrow a regime, or (3) changing or not abiding by another states policy (JBS, 178).”⁷ Thus, the revisionist states are those for whom territory is clearly at stake in the conflict.⁸ There are many other states that might be involved in a particular dispute for whom the territory is not a factor, if they join in a dispute through alliance ties for example. From the MID participant data, which is the dataset best arranged to use for a country-level analysis, it is not directly possible to know which of the other disputants, besides the revisionist, have territory at stake in the conflict. Thus, territorial MID participation is only coded for revisionists. There are 209 territorial MID-years in the PTS analysis and 170 in the CIRI analysis.

include 4 extra dummy variables to represent the lagged dependent variable, one representing a category of the PTS in the previous year, with one of them receiving a 1 and the rest zero. One category is omitted as a reference category. For the CIRI data, it requires 8 binary lags.

⁷In the quotation, Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer (2004) are citing Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996).

⁸Revisionist states also do not mean “Side A” in a conflict. Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer (2004) note that in the period of 1816-1992, revisionists are Side A in 61% of the MIDs and only 49% of the MIDs from 1993-2001.

In order to further capture conflict, I include the highest fatality level for any MID in which state is involved in a given year (territorial, rival, or not). This measure of conflict severity is an ordinal scale of battle deaths, ranging from 1-6, with 1 being 25 or fewer deaths and 6 having at least 1000 (which is what constitutes a war according to COW measures).⁹ This allows me to compare whether the intensity of conflict experienced that year, the issue, or a combination of the two contributes to an increase in repression.¹⁰

My theory contends that the issue is the prime mover when it comes to repression. Conflict intensity also plays a role in the level of conflict salience. Even a conflict that begins as initially low-salience might become more salient to the domestic audience as conflict experienced that year intensifies. By controlling for the fatalities of deadliest MID over any issue in a year, I am controlling for issues in MIDs other than territory or rivalry. In the analysis, when territorial MID is interacted with fatalities, the lower order term represents all fatal MIDs (at increasing fatality levels) fought in years in which there was no territorial revision sought. The same is true for the rival analyses.¹¹

For rival conflicts, I include a dummy variable if a state was involved in a MID against a rival in a given year. I employ the Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) definition of rivalry, which are states that engage in 3 or more conflicts over a connected set of issues. Similar to territorial MIDs, I also interact this variable with the Correlates of War fatality variable. There are 746

⁹The measure works as follows. 0 is no fatalities, 1 is between 1 and 25 battle deaths, 2 is between 25 and 100 deaths, 3 is between 100 and 250, 4 is between 250 and 500, 5 is between 500 and 1000, and 6 is 1000 or more. Some of these data are coded as "-9" to indicate that there are no accurate estimates of battle deaths. Not wanting to lose observations on conflict, which are relatively scarce during the time period, I coded all as 0.

¹⁰I include fatality levels for the most fatal MID in a given year, regardless of whether the MID is territorial or rival. By including non-territorial and non-rival fatality levels, I am essentially controlling for non-territorial and non-rival MIDs at different levels of severity. This is important for understanding whether or not the fatality effect is relevant for years in which there was also a territorial or rival conflict or not.

¹¹Fatalities, unlike revision type is not distinguished by whether a state is revisionist or not in the MID 3.10B (participant) dataset, so all MID participants are coded as having some level of fatalities.

rival MID-years in the PTS analysis¹² and 603 in the CIRI analysis.

Finally, whether or not states alter their repressive strategies during conflicts is also a function of domestic politics. Key to my explanation is whether or not a state's government depends on popular consent to rule, and thus the provision of public goods to maintain that public support. Therefore, the most appropriate measure of regime type is a dichotomous measure of whether a state is democratic or not. I employ a binary measure of democracy, scored a 1 if a state has scored a 6 or higher on the Polity scale (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2010), taken from the Poe, Rost and Carey (2006) replication file.¹³ Because I am primarily interested in the shift in repression, from a year in which there was no conflict compared to conflict years, I lag whether or not a country was democratic.¹⁴ There are 1,349 democratic observations in the PTS data and 1,749 autocratic observations. In the CIRI data there are 1,167 democratic country years and 1,338 autocratic country years.

In order to test my hypotheses, which predict that democracies and autocracies have different reactions to conflict with respect to repression, I employ interaction terms to examine different regime types in and out of territorial and rival conflicts and years with different severity levels. In my first set of models, I interact whether a state was involved in a territorial or rival MID with whether a state was a democracy. Following those analyses, I include a broad set of

¹²Because rival conflicts encompass multiple issues and involve a large number of repeated conflicts, it is not surprising that there are more than triple the number of rival conflicts as compared to territorial conflicts.

¹³Conceptually, this is similar in view to the definitions offered by Przeworski et al. (1996) and Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), who offer a dichotomous measure of democracy. I chose the Polity measure because of its wide use within conflict research. In a study on the compatibility of democracy measures, wherein the authors generate a new, unified measure of democracy, Pemstein, Meserve and Melton (2010, 444), note that a 6 on polity is comparable to the Przeworski et al. (1996) measure. Furthermore, while several human rights articles use the cutoff of 7 or higher on polity (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005), I chose 6 because it becomes more comparable to conflict research.

¹⁴This is common practice among human rights studies that employ ordered logit analysis, both to control for temporal dependence as well as to account for the continuity of policy-making over time. For example, in Wood (2008), most of the independent variables are lagged at least one year. The conflict variables can act as a sudden threat. Because I am primarily interested in the way that conflict affects repressive practices, both the civil war and interstate conflict variables are not lagged.

interaction terms to understand the distinct effects that conflict intensity has during the years of territorial, rival, and non-territorial and non-rival conflicts, as well as the different effects in democracies and autocracies. I also interact the democracies in territorial MIDs or rival MIDs term with the highest fatality level experienced by a state that year. By comparing these terms to the lower order ones, I can separate the effects of territory or rivalry, the severity of conflict experienced by states that year, or some combination of the two. The interaction term generated between territorial or rival conflicts is thus an interaction between the highest level of fatalities experienced in a year and whether the state had a territorial or rival conflict, not necessarily the fatality level of the particular territorial or rival MID. Because my observations are country-year, I want to account for the yearly environment of conflict severity and issue. If I were to match the fatality level to the particular rival or territorial MID, then the lower order term on fatalities might have little meaning. The full interaction model thus includes three two-term interactions and one three term interaction. Because most of these multiplicative terms (except for fatalities) are binary, they each represent different categories of the data. To make interpretation simpler, I also chose to test split sample models. For these, I split the samples according to whether a country was democratic or autocratic. In order to make the analysis of repressive choices as simple as possible, I employ a model with only one interaction term on the CIRI data, based on a best fit from the overall regression models (see Tables 5.3 and 5.7 below).

As a control, I include the level of GDP (natural log, lagged one year) as well as annual GDP growth. Economic development has consistently shown an inverse statistical relationship to repressive behavior, similar to democracy (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999). Also included are the lagged, natural log of a country's population, as well as yearly population growth. Larger countries tend to be more repressive (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999). These data were taken from the World Bank development indicators

(WorldBank, 2004), via the Poe, Rost and Carey (2006) replication file. I also include a control variable for whether or not a state was involved in a civil war. Civil conflicts are situations in which the government is repressive, almost by definition, because it requires to government to engage their own citizens-as-rebels militarily. These data are from the Uppsala armed conflict dataset (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand, 2002), from the Poe, Rost and Carey (2006) replication file. I also control for participation in any MID, to account for non-fatal conflicts. This variable was taken from the MID 3.10 B (participant) data (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004).

5.3 Empirical Results: Territorial Conflict and Overall Repression

In Table 5.1, I present the ordered logit results for territorial revisionist conflict and domestic repression using the Political Terror Scale on the full sample of country years.¹⁵ Model 1 has no interaction terms, displaying only the additive effects of territorial conflict participation and democracy. Model 2 has minimal interaction terms, testing the effects of territorial MIDs and democracy. Model 3 presents the full interaction model on the whole sample. If one were to look only at Models 1 and 2, one could infer that territorial conflict has little influence on domestic repression. By examining Model 3, however, one could infer that it does influence conflict, albeit conditionally on MID severity. As years in which democracies fought territorial MIDs become more deadly, democracies are more likely to increase repression. In Model 3, the term “Terr. X Fatalities” in this model represent the interactive effect of territorial MIDs and fatalities for the reference category, autocracies. In line with the theoretical logic, the results show as fatalities increase in a year in which there was also a territorial MID, autocratic

¹⁵All analyses performed using *STATA*, version 11.2.

states become more likely to reduce repression. Finally, all control variables perform largely as expected. Growth in population and GDP are not significant, but GDP per capita and population are both correlated in the expected directions across all samples and models. Civil wars, not surprisingly, exhibit a strong positive impact on increases in repression. Participation in any MID exhibits a positive and significant impact on repression for the full sample. All lagged dependent variables and constants have been suppressed in the tables for the purposes of clarity.

In an effort to simplify the interaction modeling, I display models in Table 5.2 for which I split the samples according to whether or not states are democratic. In Model 4, the democratic sample, the effects of Model 3, Table 5.1, are mirrored. As fatalities increase during years in which there are also territorial MIDs, democratic states become more likely to increase repression. One somewhat unexpected finding from Model 4 is that as fatalities increase in non-territorial MID-years, increases in repression become *less* likely, but this finding is not consistent with the test of the full sample. This indicates that a combination of issue salience and conflict severity that contribute to repression, and conflict severity alone may not be crucial. As in the full sample analysis, Model 5, like Model 3, does provide some support for the idea that as territorial conflicts years have increasing fatalities, autocratic states *decrease* repression. On the whole, the results of the significance tests, in both the full and split sample models, show moderate to strong support for my hypotheses. Democratic states become more likely to increase repression during years that have territorial conflicts as those years have more fatalities, while autocratic states become more likely to decrease repression. The controls perform as they did in Table 5.1, with the exception for democracies involved in any MID, which no longer has significance.

Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present the same models as Tables 5.1 and 5.2, but employ the Cingranelli-Richards physical integrity rights scale. The results are similar to the tests of the Political

Table 5.1: Ordered Logit of Territorial Revision on Repression: Political Terror Scale, 1977-2001

	Full Sample (1)	Full Sample (2)	Full Sample (3)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.428*** (0.117)	-0.439*** (0.123)	-0.411*** (0.124)
Territorial Conflict	0.146 (0.160)	0.093 (0.236)	0.423 (0.286)
Dem. X Terr.		0.126 (0.312)	-0.324 (0.365)
MID Fatalities			0.071 (0.102)
Dem. X Fatalities			-0.209 (0.129)
Terr. X Fatalities			-0.378** (0.160)
Dem. X Terr. X Fatality			0.650*** (0.223)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.147*** (0.039)	0.147*** (0.039)	0.151*** (0.039)
Pop. Growth (t-1)	0.062 (0.049)	0.062 (0.049)	0.063 (0.049)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.239*** (0.039)	-0.239*** (0.039)	-0.240*** (0.039)
Econ. Growth (t-1)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.005)
Civil War	1.283*** (0.166)	1.278*** (0.167)	1.311*** (0.175)
Any MID	0.168* (0.097)	0.169* (0.097)	0.163* (0.097)
Observations	3,088	3,088	3,088

Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses

*** $p < |0.01$, ** $p < |0.05$, * $p < |0.1$

Terror Scale, with some noteworthy differences. First, the multiplicative effect of territory and fatalities for democracies does not exist for the CIRI analysis. Democracies are more likely to increase repression when engaged in conflicts over territory, but the effect is independent of fatalities. Model 8 shows that autocracies do decrease repression as territorial conflict years have more fatalities. The control variables perform similarly to those in the the PTS

Table 5.2: Ordered Logit of Territorial Revision on Repression: Political Terror Scale, 1977-2001

	Democracies (4)	Autocracies (5)
Territorial Conflict	0.036 (0.284)	0.301 (0.272)
MID Fatalities	-0.238* (0.132)	0.077 (0.106)
Terr. X Fatalities	0.350** (0.177)	-0.353** (0.165)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.223*** (0.066)	0.155*** (0.044)
Pop. Growth (t-1)	0.136 (0.086)	-0.022 (0.036)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.360*** (0.071)	-0.108** (0.053)
Econ. Growth (t-1)	-0.001 (0.014)	0.001 (0.006)
Civil War	1.639*** (0.505)	1.217*** (0.146)
Any MID	0.004 (0.171)	0.361*** (0.113)
Observations	1,339	1,749

Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses

*** $p < |0.01$, ** $p < |0.05$, * $p < |0.1$

models.

Table 5.4 displays the results of the CIRI analysis on the split samples. The key results from Table 5.3 are echoed here, but only in one-tailed tests. Because my theoretical approach emphasized the direction of shifts in repression during territorial conflict, with democracies increasing repression and autocracies decreasing repression, one-tailed tests are adequate. Furthermore, because they echo the findings from the full sample, these findings still provide support for my explanation. Again, the controls perform similarly to other tests, but the coefficient for participation in any MID is not significant for democracies. The results of the CIRI models show that repressive *events* are more likely to increase, regardless of conflict

Table 5.3: Ordered Logit of Territorial Revision on Repression: Cingranelli-Richards Scale, 1982-2001

	Full Sample (6)	Full Sample (7)	Full Sample (8)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.419*** (0.114)	-0.495*** (0.116)	-0.506*** (0.117)
Territorial Conflict	0.037 (0.141)	-0.378* (0.203)	-0.166 (0.214)
Dem. X Territory		0.827*** (0.206)	0.538** (0.232)
MID Fatalities			-0.046 (0.063)
Dem. X Fatalities			0.090 (0.132)
Terr. X Fatalities			-0.150* (0.085)
Dem. X Terr. X Fatalities			0.186 (0.142)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.196*** (0.033)	0.202*** (0.033)	0.200*** (0.033)
Pop. Growth (t-1)	0.022 (0.054)	0.015 (0.052)	0.016 (0.053)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.317*** (0.040)	-0.320*** (0.040)	-0.320*** (0.040)
Econ. Growth (t-1)	0.002 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)
Civil War	1.375*** (0.190)	1.357*** (0.194)	1.374*** (0.193)
Any MID	0.230** (0.094)	0.234** (0.094)	0.241** (0.096)
Observations	2,505	2,505	2,505

Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses

*** $p < |0.01$, ** $p < |0.05$, * $p < |0.1$

severity, while the PTS models display the the *scope* of targeting in repression is more likely to increase as fatalities increase during years with territorial MIDs for democracies. Autocratic states on the other hand, are more likely to *decrease* repression as fatalities increase in years where they also have a territorial conflict.

Ordered logit coefficients do not directly display any marginal effects of the variables on

Table 5.4: Ordered Logit of Territorial Revision on Repression: Cingranelli-Richards Scale, 1982-2001

	Democracies (9)	Autocracies (10)
Territorial Conflict	0.316+ (0.200)	-0.219 (0.233)
MID Fatalities	-0.065 (0.115)	-0.028 (0.066)
Territory X Fatality	0.128 (0.130)	-1.47+ (0.091)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.264*** (0.052)	0.214*** (0.044)
Pop. Growth (t-1)	0.037 (0.068)	-0.035 (0.040)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.485*** (0.062)	-0.181*** (0.052)
Econ. Growth (t-1)	0.013 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.011)
Civil War	1.852*** (0.603)	1.189*** (0.153)
Any MID	0.239 (0.150)	0.323*** (0.120)
Observations	1,167	1,338

Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses

*** $p < |0.01$, ** $p < |0.05$, * $p < |0.1$, + $p < 0.1$

the dependent variable, and because coefficients of interaction terms can be particularly confusing (Braumoeller, 2004; Berry, DeMeritt and Esarey, 2010), I display some predicted probabilities of certain levels of repression under different conditions. In Figure 5.1, I display the predicted probabilities that a state will increase *at least* one category of the Political Terror Scale, relative to the prior year. I display the likelihoods when states experience no territorial MID and then a territorial MID as well as the different fatality levels experienced in the same year as a territorial MID. The probabilities are drawn from Model 4 (Table 5.2) for democracies and Model 5 (Table 5.2) for autocracies. The graphs show the pattern indicated in Table 5.2's significance tests. For democracies, there is a clear multiplicative impact for territorial conflict and MID fatalities. As fatalities increase during years in which there was


also a territorial MID, democratic states become more likely to become more repressive. By contrast, there is the opposite effect for autocratic states. Although there is a slight increase in likelihood of an increase in repression when autocracies enter into a year in which there is a territorial MID but no fatalities, as those conflict-years become deadlier, autocratic states become more likely to decrease repression. An empirical illustration of both of these kinds of shifts in repression is the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. Armenia was engaged in a territorial conflict with Azerbaijan from 1992-1995. According to the PTS codings, Armenia, a democracy, increased repression in 1994, while Azerbaijan, an autocracy, decreased repression in 1995. The Amnesty International country report that examines 1994 notes that although the ongoing conflict made it difficult to track what exactly was going on in Armenia, there was evidence to suggest that Azerbaijani minorities were being targeted privately, with complicity from the government (Amnesty International, 1995, 61). In Azerbaijan, Amnesty reports the government released prisoners of Armenian ethnicity (Amnesty International, 1996, 83-85).

In order to check the robustness of the above findings on territory, I also conducted other statistical analyses of different measures of democracy. I conducted robustness checks on the split sample models presented in Table 5.2 and Table 5.4 employing a stricter definition of democracy of seven or higher on the Polity scale, as is standard in the human rights literature. I also conducted a similar robustness check employing the binary democracy measure from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010). The results are substantively similar to those displayed above, albeit some of the theoretical variables are only significant and the one tailed level.¹⁶

Therefore, I can be reasonably confident in the inference that the mechanism of shifts in

¹⁶The result of democracy increasing repression as territorial MID-years have deadlier MID-years is only significant in a one-tailed test using the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) measure when testing on the PTS scores. Robustness checks using the CIRI scores also largely conform to those displayed above, but the finding on democracies in territorial MID-years is significant at the one-tailed level using the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) measure and the autocratic finding for decreasing repression as territorial MID-years have more fatalities is only significant at the one-tailed level using the Polity 7 standard.

Figure 5.1: Effect of Territorial Revision and Fatalities on Increasing Repression by at Least 1 Category from Previous Year



Note: From simulations of Table 5.2, Models 4 (Democracies) and 5 (Autocracies). The values are set as follows. Prior year PTS set at the mode (Democracies=1, Autocracies=3), with control variables held at their mean or modal categories. This figure displays the predicted probability that a state will reach at least level 2 on the PTS scale and an autocracy will reach at least a level 4 on the PTS. Predicted probabilities were generated using *CLARIFY* software (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000).

repression shown by my analysis is driven, at least in part, by the salience of the stakes of the conflict experienced in a given year. The results of these robustness checks indicate that territorial conflict is a particularly salient issue because it has shown to lead to shifts in the repressive tendencies of both democratic and autocratic states.

5.4 Empirical Results: Rival Conflict and Overall Repression

Tables 5.5 and 5.6 display the results of involvement in rival conflicts on repression for the full sample (Table 5.5) and the split samples (Table 5.6) utilizing the PTS. The major difference between the results on territorial conflict and rivalry is that there are no consistent findings

across the analyses of rivalry. In Table 5.5, there exhibits a significant increase in repression by autocratic states involved in non fatal rival MID-years, but it is not robust to the split sample models. Table 5.6 shows that democracies decrease repression during years in which there are rival MIDs as those years also have deadlier MIDs, but it is not robust to the full sample model in Table 5.5. The general lack of findings for rivalry are in line with the theoretical logic that because states domestically adapt to rivalry, and there should be little to no change in repression as a result of such conflicts. Control variables perform in a similar fashion to the prior tests, except for involvement in any MID, which shows no effect.

Tables 5.7 and 5.8 display the results of rival conflict on the CIRI human rights scale. Similar to the results on the PTS, there are no findings that are consistent across the samples. In Table 5.7, Model 18, the coefficient on the interaction between fatalities and democracies, which is for non-rival conflict years, show democracies increasing repression, but this finding is not consistent with the split sample model in Table 5.8. The controls generally perform as they do in prior tests, although, contrary to the PTS results, participation in any MID does lead to an increase in repression by democracies.

The findings on rivalry conform largely the theoretical framework, despite the findings being largely null. The explanation contends that rivalry is a condition states experience that becomes embedded in domestic politics, becoming an aspect of the status-quo. A conflict against a rival is considered normal and expected behavior. Therefore, it is unlikely to alter the repressive status quo. My findings on rivalry conform to this view, as the results show that generally, when conflicting against a rival, democratic and autocratic states behave largely as they do in peace time. This is supportive of a punctuated equilibrium view of rival behavior (Diehl and Goertz, 2000), which emphasizes the consistency of rival relations over time.

Table 5.5: Ordered Logit of Rival Conflict on Repression: Political Terror Scale, 1977-2001

	Full Sample (11)	Full Sample (12)	Full Sample (13)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.428*** (0.117)	-0.381*** (0.127)	-0.392*** (0.125)
Rival Conflict	0.117 (0.129)	0.198 (0.167)	0.301* (0.159)
Dem X Rival		-0.189 (0.195)	-0.201 (0.200)
MID Fatalities			0.049 (0.078)
Dem X Fatalities			0.134 (0.165)
Rival X Fatalities			-0.157 (0.180)
Dem X Rival X Fatalities			-0.137 (0.213)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.147*** (0.039)	0.147*** (0.039)	0.148*** (0.039)
Pop. Growth (t-1)	0.061 (0.048)	0.063 (0.049)	0.062 (0.049)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.239*** (0.039)	-0.237*** (0.039)	-0.237*** (0.039)
Econ. Growth (t-1)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
Civil War	1.271*** (0.165)	1.282*** (0.168)	1.301*** (0.169)
Any MID	0.122 (0.115)	0.118 (0.116)	0.076 (0.122)
Observations	3,088	3,088	3,088

Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses

*** $p < |0.01$, ** $p < |0.05$, * $p < |0.1$

Table 5.6: Ordered Logit of Rival Conflict on Repression: Political Terror Scale, 1977-2001

	Democracies (14)	Autocracies (15)
Rival Conflict	0.140 (0.202)	0.201 (0.175)
MID Fatalities	0.123 (0.158)	0.032 (0.087)
Rival X Fatalities	-0.298** (0.131)	-0.110 (0.173)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.210*** (0.066)	0.155*** (0.044)
Pop. Growth (t-1)	0.121 (0.086)	-0.021 (0.037)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.364*** (0.072)	-0.102* (0.053)
Econ. Growth (t-1)	-0.003 (0.013)	0.002 (0.006)
Civil War	1.541*** (0.466)	1.238*** (0.144)
Any MID	-0.067 (0.215)	0.287* (0.148)
Observations	1,339	1,749

Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses

*** $p < |0.01$, ** $p < |0.05$, * $p < |0.1$

Table 5.7: Ordered Logit of Rival Conflict on Repression: Cingranelli-Richards Scale, 1982-2001

	Full Sample (16)	Full Sample (17)	Full Sample (18)
Democracy (t-1)	-0.417*** (0.114)	-0.441*** (0.117)	-0.465*** (0.119)
Rival Conflict	-0.056 (0.124)	-0.106 (0.164)	-0.021 (0.165)
Dem. X Rival		0.103 (0.192)	0.000 (0.202)
MID Fatalities			-0.085 (0.086)
Dem X Fatalities			0.228** (0.100)
Rival X Fatalities			-0.045 (0.116)
Dem. X Riv. X Fatalities			-0.016 (0.148)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.197*** (0.032)	0.197*** (0.033)	0.197*** (0.032)
Pop. Growth (t-1)	0.022 (0.054)	0.021 (0.054)	0.022 (0.054)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.319*** (0.040)	-0.320*** (0.040)	-0.319*** (0.040)
Econ. Growth (t-1)	0.002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)
Civil War	1.376*** (0.192)	1.373*** (0.191)	1.388*** (0.189)
Any MID	0.270** (0.115)	0.273** (0.116)	0.268** (0.119)
Observations	2,505	2,505	2,505

Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses

*** $p < |0.01$, ** $p < |0.05$, * $p < |0.1$

Table 5.8: Ordered Logit of Rival Conflict on Repression: Cingranelli-Richards Scale, 1982-2001

	Democracies (19)	Autocracies (20)
Rival MID	-0.149 (0.180)	0.045 (0.177)
MID Fatalities	0.038 (0.072)	-0.061 (0.089)
Rival X Fatalities	0.000 (0.103)	-0.047 (0.112)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.261*** (0.053)	0.205*** (0.043)
Pop. Growth (t-1)	0.038 (0.070)	-0.030 (0.041)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.491*** (0.063)	-0.178*** (0.053)
Econ. Growth (t-1)	0.011 (0.013)	-0.000 (0.011)
Civil War	1.789*** (0.557)	1.219*** (0.152)
Any MID	0.384** (0.167)	0.262* (0.149)
Observations	1,167	1,338

Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses

*** $p < |0.01$, ** $p < |0.05$, * $p < |0.1$

5.5 Empirical Results: Territorial Conflict, Rivalry, and Repressive Choices

Finally, I analyze the different repression types and how they are affected by territorial conflict involvement. These results are displayed in Table 5.9. First, for the most part, several factors have a similar effect across the repressive categories. When examining the theoretically relevant factors, however, such an impression changes. In general, democracies are less likely to imprison or torture.¹⁷ As shown by the interaction term, they become significantly more likely to engage in both behaviors when fighting over territory. This is in line with the prediction of Hypothesis 12. Autocracies seem not to increase repression along any category during conflict, and appear to decrease disappearances during territorial conflict. These findings are consistent with the above results presented for repression as a whole, as well as the logic behind Hypothesis 13. There is no clear decrease in all repressive behaviors, but there is some suggestion that autocracies become less likely to engage in one of the more extreme types of repression: disappearances. Among the control variables, only the one for "any MID" is a significant predictor of just a single category: imprisonment.

In order to gauge the substantive impact of territorial conflict on repressive choices, I calculated some predicted probabilities based on Table 5.9. These probabilities are displayed in Table 5.10 and show the likelihood of a one category increase for each type of repression by democratic and autocratic states. Table 5.9 shows that when democratic states are involved in territorial conflicts, they become much more likely to increase the use of torture and imprisonment. They are seventy-one percent more likely to increase torture and one hundred and forty-six percent more likely to employ imprisonment as a tactic of repression. On the

¹⁷There appears to be little to no effect of regime type on disappearances or killings outside of conflict, according to the lower order term on democracy. I believe this has more to do with the fact that disappearances and killing are much less common repressive choices across all states (see for example Conrad and DeMeritt (2011b)).

Table 5.9: Ordered Logit of Territorial Revision on Repressive Choices, 1982-2001

	Disappearances	Killings	Imprisonment	Torture
Democracy (t-1)	-0.240 (0.191)	0.074 (0.139)	-1.101*** (0.139)	-0.323*** (0.125)
Territorial Conflict	-0.576* (0.313)	-0.084 (0.186)	0.101 (0.319)	-0.425 (0.309)
Dem. X Terr.	0.418 (0.317)	0.291 (0.321)	0.816* (0.461)	1.000*** (0.358)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.144*** (0.055)	0.175*** (0.049)	0.213*** (0.052)	0.234*** (0.042)
Pop. Growth (t-1)	-0.011 (0.040)	0.039 (0.045)	0.087 (0.085)	0.005 (0.037)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.269*** (0.058)	-0.399*** (0.053)	-0.216*** (0.052)	-0.315*** (0.049)
Econ. Growth (t-1)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.010 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.008)
Civil War	1.518*** (0.186)	1.287*** (0.213)	0.928*** (0.227)	0.737*** (0.190)
Any MID	0.213 (0.159)	0.176 (0.120)	0.303** (0.120)	0.156 (0.119)
Observations	2,523	2,513	2,516	2,518

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < |0.01$, ** $p < |0.05$, * $p < |0.1$

other hand, autocratic states become twenty-seven percent less likely to increase the use of disappearances to deal with domestic opponents.¹⁸

Finally, I ran similar models to gauge the impact of rival conflict on the choice of certain repressive behaviors, which are displayed in Table 5.11. Similar to the models on overall levels of repression, there is no clear link between rival conflict and repression dynamics.

Again, I attribute this to the regularity of rival conflicts. Because democratic and autocratic

¹⁸I also conducted similar analyses employing the Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) and Polity 7 standards of democracy. The results are substantively similar as those presented in Table 5.9, with some exceptions. For the Polity 7 analyses, democracies are shown to be more likely to increase disappearances. In the analyses with the Cheibub measure, the imprisonment finding for democracies drops out, while autocracies are shown to be likely to decrease torture. Similar to employing Polity 7, democracies are also more likely to increase disappearances. I believe that the Polity 6 standard is the best measure to employ, given its comparability to other work on international conflict, but future pursuit of this research question should more carefully explore these results.

Table 5.10: Predicted Probabilities of Increase in Repressive Choices, 1982-2001

	No Terr. MID	Terr. MID	% Δ
Democracies			
Torture	0.2044	0.3490	+71%
Imprisonment	0.1525	0.3756	+146%
Autocracies			
Disappearances	0.0912	0.0669	-27%

Note: Predicted probabilities and changes calculate the likelihood difference of a 1 category increase from the modal dependent variable value for democracies (0 for imprisonment and 1 for torture) and a 1 category decrease from the mode for autocracies (0 for disappearances). Calculated using *CLARIFY* (King, Tomz and Wittenberg, 2000) from models in Table 5.9.

states normalize their repressive routines in the context of rivalry, such conflicts do not provide the domestic shock necessary to alter their repressive strategies. Democratic publics do not seem to feel the same sense of insecurity that territorial conflict provides, and instead are less willing to support increases in repression when conflicts are against a rival, rather than over territory. Autocratic states do not appear to alter their tendencies at all. In rivalry, their domestic military apparatus likely maintains repression despite rival conflicts because such conflicts are expected.

5.6 Conclusion

Does international conflict lead to changes in how states repress? The answer, in short, is yes. I have shown that the way in which international conflict affects repression is conditional on two sets of factors: the salience of the conflict itself and domestic political considerations. In order for repression to be affected by international conflict, the conflict must be salient or dangerous enough to present an alteration of the political status quo. How the conflict manifests itself in terms of repression is a function of domestic politics. Democracies, whose government must rely on public support to maintain office, and which are typically not repressive, are more likely to find conflicts tied to the general public or public good to be the

Table 5.11: Ordered Logit of Rival Conflict on Repressive Choices, 1982-2001

	Disappearances	Killings	Imprisonment	Torture
Democracy (t-1)	-0.158 (0.209)	0.141 (0.145)	-1.029*** (0.136)	-0.282** (0.129)
Rival Conflict	-0.367 (0.254)	0.116 (0.188)	0.219 (0.205)	0.073 (0.213)
Dem. X Rival	-0.136 (0.282)	-0.185 (0.247)	-0.030 (0.266)	0.116 (0.236)
Population (ln, t-1)	0.140*** (0.054)	0.175*** (0.049)	0.215*** (0.052)	0.225*** (0.042)
Pop. Growth (t-1)	-0.006 (0.042)	0.042 (0.047)	0.090 (0.087)	0.009 (0.036)
Econ. Development (ln, t-1)	-0.272*** (0.057)	-0.397*** (0.054)	-0.218*** (0.053)	-0.312*** (0.049)
Econ. Growth (t-1)	0.004 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.010 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.008)
Civil War	1.581*** (0.185)	1.299*** (0.213)	0.917*** (0.226)	0.748*** (0.185)
Any MID	0.400** (0.202)	0.160 (0.153)	0.254* (0.154)	0.085 (0.133)
Observations	2,523	2,513	2,516	2,518

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

most salient. In terms of territory, this could mean nationally symbolic territory. Therefore, democracies should try to deliver the public good of security by winning the conflict. When the state is engaged in such salient conflicts, and they become more supportive of increases in repression.

On the other hand, autocracies rely on elite support and maintain that support through the provision of private goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Because they must secure the elite, they are generally repressive. When involved in particularly salient conflicts, autocracies may become resource strapped, as one of their peace-time tools of repression, the military, is now involved in fighting a conflict abroad. Therefore, such states may actually decrease their repression during territorial conflicts.

When fighting against rivals, states may not shift their repressive practices. Rival conflicts are certainly salient, but the rivalry process leads states to adapt their domestic political processes to rivalry. As a result, such conflicts do not present the exogenous shock to the status quo required for repression to shift.

In future developments of this project linking interstate conflict to human rights, I would like to better account for the role territorial conflict plays for non-revisionist states. I have attempted a preliminary test on the Political Terror Scale of just the non-revisionist participants of territorial MIDs, which may include allies or other participants that have no territory at stake, and these preliminary results are a reversal of the empirical pattern in this chapter has for revisionist states. This suggests that the human rights effects of territorial conflict may vary greatly depending on how important the issue at stake is to the participants. That being said, I need to develop a systematic way to account for those non-revisionists who have territory at stake in order to best account for the effects of territoriality, which these preliminary tests do not do.

The findings presented in this chapter confirm some of the theoretical logic developed. First, for years in which democratic states are involved in territorial MIDs and as those years are also increasingly fatal, they become more likely to increase repression. This confirms the idea that when a publicly valued good, such territory, is contested, democratic publics feel more insecure and are more likely to support repressive behaviors. The second major finding is that autocracies actually become less repressive in years that they contest territory as those years become more deadly. This supports the idea that as more military resources have to be poured into the pursuit of a conflict, that autocracies might have to become less repressive to make up for it. Years in which there are high fatalities as well as territorial MIDs may thus present a challenge to the repressive status quo for dictatorships. Furthermore, I also found that democracies focus their increase in repression on the use of imprisonment and

torture, while autocratic states decrease the use of disappearances, but not other behaviors. My findings for repression during rival conflicts also conforms to the theoretical logic. States do not alter their repressive practices during rival conflicts.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Does domestic politics influence the way states evaluate external threats? This major question has motivated this dissertation project. In attempting to answer this broad question, I have concentrated on several smaller questions that focus on two contexts in which interstate conflicts occur, contested territory and international rivalry, as well as the differing political pressures that democratic and autocratic states experience. Chapter 1 introduced this question, as well as the questions of how issues and domestic factors contribute to the escalation of international conflict as well as how states repress during those conflicts. While prior research has emphasized the role of contested territory, rivalry, or the institutional characteristics of states on international conflict, most research does not attempt to integrate these factors.¹ Throughout this project, I have attempted to provide a coherent, overarching explanation that gives some insight into all of these questions of how states evaluate threats, escalate conflicts, or alter repressive strategies.

Chapter 2 introduced an general explanation, grounded in the logic of political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). I argue that depending on the conflict context and domestic politics, the provision of security may be a “public” or private good. Because democratic states rely on the provision of public goods to maintain office through elections, they are more prone to escalate conflicts when “public goods” issues are on the line. Autocratic states must rely on the support of an elite through the provision of private goods. Due to this reliance on

¹The major exceptions include works by Colaresi (2005), Goddard(2006; 2010), and Davenport (2007)

the elite, the conflicts that they will find the most salient are those that present opportunities to increase private good distribution or that threaten it. From the theoretical approach in Chapter 2, it is possible then to develop specific theoretical frameworks for understanding how states go to war over territory and rivalry, and then in turn how their domestic political arrangements influence decisions to become violent domestically. In the subsequent chapters, I drew out some of the empirical implications for understanding how democratic and autocratic states escalate territorial conflicts and rival conflicts. In Chapter 5, I linked how democratic and autocratic orientation toward territory and rivalry would impact repression during international conflict.

In Chapter 3, I derived two hypotheses about the role that domestic institutions play in territorial conflict. Democracies should find the intangible aspects of territory more salient, because it appeals to the general public via nationalism or symbolic identity ties. Autocratic states would find the the more tangible aspects salient, because those aspects may be linked to private good distribution. Democracies and autocracies might therefore have trouble negotiating contesting territory. I thus predicted that territorial conflicts between so-called “mixed” dyads, with one democratic state and one autocratic state, would be the most war-prone. I further argued that when the contested territory had a high intangible value for the democratic state in a mixed dyad, war would be more likely. Empirically, there was support for these predictions. Mixed dyads are more likely to go to war over territory, both during a current dispute or within five years of that dispute. Furthermore, when mixed dyads contested a claim with high intangible salience for a democratic state, war was also more likely.

Chapter 4 deals with how domestic political events might shape escalation of conflict in international rivalry. Rather than view external threat as a single issue, such as territory, I argued that the public and private good motivations that democracies and autocracies experience

might be extended to a threatening context such as rivalry, which may encompass several contested issues. Because rivals expect future conflicts between them, periods of domestic pressure on regimes might influence *when* more severe conflicts might occur. Election years for democratic states represented a period of public pressure and that rival outbidding might be most intense. Periods of domestic unrest might be when autocratic states felt the kind of domestic pressure that would lead to more escalatory conflicts. Domestic vulnerability might lead to more severe conflicts not just because one state might seek conflict as a way of increasing domestic support, as in diversionary theory, but also because its rival might seek to take advantage of another state's domestic weaknesses. I also predicted that mixed regime dyads, similar to territorial conflict, would be the most war prone. Across twelve statistical models, there was very little support for my argument overall. Domestic unrest in autocratic states did lead to more severe disputes, but to war only in some models.

In Chapter 5, I placed the focus back on the domestic arena. Repression dynamics for states involved in international conflicts are conditional on similar motivating factors that led them to conflicts over territory and against a rival in the first place. When democratic states fight over territory, the public pressure to deliver the good of territory and security through victory makes democracies more inclined to increase repression. Autocratic states tend to use repression as a regular tool of political order during peace time. When faced with a salient conflict abroad, such as one over territory, these states may have to pour military resources that might otherwise be used for repression into the conflict effort, thus becoming less repressive. Furthermore, autocratic and democratic states will differ with respect to which types of repressive behavior they will choose. Democracies are more likely to increase the use of torture and imprisonment, as opposed to killing and disappearances, because these practices already exist within their legal repertoire. Furthermore, although democratic publics might become more supportive of repression, they are not likely to become supportive

of outright killing. Autocratic states might be more likely to decrease the more severe forms of repression, killing and disappearances, because these kinds of behaviors might require the military and may require the most resources to carry out.

For repression during rival conflicts, I argued that there may not be much of a shift in repression dynamics, either in overall levels of repression or in the choices of repressive behavior. Because conflict between rivals is expected, repressive apparatuses in autocratic states should adapt to this expectation. For democratic audiences, rival conflicts may not represent the immediate salient threat that territorial conflict does. Nevertheless, I expected that given the resource constraints that conflicts present as they approach war, autocrats may lessen repression as rival conflicts become more deadly. Empirically, there was some strong support for these predictions. Democratic states are more likely to increase repression overall during years of territorial conflict as those years also have increasingly deadly conflict. They also increase the use of torture and imprisonment in territorial MID years. Similarly, autocratic states decrease repression in years in which there are territorial MIDs as those years have more deadly conflicts. Autocratic states decrease the use of disappearances during territorial conflicts. The findings were strongest for territorial conflict, as I found no comparable findings for rival conflicts, in line with the idea that domestic politics adapts to rivalry and it therefore does not act as an exogenous shock.

6.1 Major Lessons

Taking the argument and findings as a whole, there are a few major lessons to take away from this dissertation project. The first is that democratic and autocratic states have some fundamental differences in the ways that they approach external threats. The general argument presented in Chapter 2 has empirical support, particularly in the arena of territorial conflict.

My argument, based on the findings in Chapter 4 and 5, does not apply nearly as well to the arena of international rivalry. Although I expected that rivalry would not have the same impact as territory on repression dynamics, that finding, combined with the findings of Chapter 4, indicates that perhaps the causal mechanism outlined in Chapter 2 is more appropriate as an explanation for conflicts over specific issues, rather than long-term contexts such as rivalry.

This project attempted to link four research programs together: the democratic peace research program exemplified by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), the territorial conflict program (Senese and Vasquez, 2008), the rivalry program (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Colaresi, 2005), as well as the repression research program, exemplified by Poe and Tate (1994) Davenport (2007). Building from the wisdom of the democratic peace research program that emphasizes the major differences between democracies and autocracies, I built an explanation of conflict in different issue contexts to understand the way that issues and domestic politics interact. I further attempted to link the logic of this integrated explanation into an explanation of human rights abuses during international conflict, which had been heretofore under-theorized. Although my predictions did not hold in the empirical arena of international rivalry, this project nevertheless represents an increased accumulation of knowledge and progress (Lakatos, 1970) for all of the programs upon which it draws.

Regarding the territorial research program, this project shows that it is important to understand how different states find territory salient in different ways. That program, especially the Steps-to-War model, has displayed the importance of territory as a cause of war, but does not tell us much about why territory is important and when territory may be more salient than at other times and in other cases. This dissertation presents a progressive step to that end. Democracies and autocracies may simply find different aspects of territory more important, and because of this, our understanding of why states fight wars over territory should take this

into account. By further breaking down the components of territorial salience and examining whether democracies are more likely to be involved in wars when intangible saliences increase, this study has increased our understanding of why democracies go to war.

This project has less to say about international rivalry, and my findings tend to reinforce the punctuated equilibrium model (Diehl and Goertz, 2000). An aspect of rivalry that is crucial is that because it is a long term process with expected conflicts, domestic political processes become *endogenous* to the rivalry process. Territorial conflict and war might come as a surprise when it happens, as it did for Britain when Argentina invaded the Falklands. For an enduring rivalry such as the India-Pakistan rivalry or the American-Soviet rivalry, it might be more realistic to think that domestic politics are constantly adapting itself toward the rivalry. As a result, the rivalry process itself is dominant in determining when conflicts escalate to war than many domestic factors. Although some factors have been shown to “shock” the rivalry, such as both states becoming democratic or a full-fledged civil war (Diehl and Goertz, 2000), the more common domestic political events that I describe, such as elections or unrest, may not have the same impact. Nevertheless, it is important to know when domestic politics will matter and when it will not. This study, although limited in its ability to explain rival processes, the exploration of rivalry nevertheless highlights an important limitation of the theory. By knowing when and where the theory does not apply, future research can be guided accordingly.

With respect to our understanding of how human rights is impacted by international conflict, this project has generated several interesting findings. Although research on repression has almost always incorporated international conflict in some form, it has received much less theoretical attention than civil war or domestic institutions as a causal factor. My theoretical approach incorporates what we know about how domestic institutions influence human rights with how domestic institutions influence the salience of certain types of international

conflict. The issue-based approach I have taken shows that some conflicts may influence human rights abuse, while others may not. Because of this, we now know that democracies may become more repressive under certain circumstances, and autocracies may become less repressive in certain contexts. This is an important finding because one could infer from prior research that democracy is a panacea for human rights protection (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005). Some prior research, most notably the work by Davenport (2007), tackles this generalization, because from both a scholarly and normative perspective, it is important to understand when democracy benefits human rights and under what conditions the mechanism of popular sovereignty might actually hinder human rights protection. My study shows that in territorial conflicts at least, that democratic institutions and processes might be the very processes that drive increases in abuse.

Furthermore, knowing when dictatorships might be less inclined to maintain high levels of repression is also important. This is not to say that in some circumstances, democracies are worse for human rights than autocratic states. If one looks at the average level of repression in democratic and autocratic states during territorial conflict, autocracies are still more repressive, on the whole. What the findings in Chapter 5 show is how conflict affects changes in repression by the two types of states. International conflict, when it happens for autocracies, may represent an opening for pro-democracy activists and opposition to push for regime change. Argentina's military regime, in the wake of the loss of the Falklands war, collapsed and democratized.² By identifying a condition when democracies might become more repressive and autocracies might become less repressive, this study sheds further light on our understanding of democracy and autocracy.

²Oakes (2006) contends that even before the invasion, the Argentinian regime was losing its ability to maintain the extreme levels of repression it was known for. The data I employ shows this drop in repression and the Falklands war happening concurrently.

6.2 Implications for Future Research

This project has answered some questions about the intersection between the salience of an external threat and domestic politics, but it leaves many questions unanswered and raises other ones. What emerges from this project is a potentially fruitful research agenda that progresses research on conflict issues, human rights and the interaction between domestic politics and international relations.

Chapter 3 introduces some new findings that further our understanding of how territory is influenced by domestic political institutions. It broadly shows that democracies and autocracies may place different amounts of importance on certain types of territory, and that may in turn drive them to war against each other. What the chapter does not do is more fully explore the differences within democracies and autocracies. As Selectorate theory suggests, the larger a government's winning coalition, the more it must rely on the provision of public goods to maintain power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). The conception of autocracies used throughout this dissertation project is a one size fits all approach that assumes all dictatorships rely on a small winning coalition and assumes that they all rely solely on the provision of private goods. This assumption leads to the expectation that the public goods aspects of territory play no role in territorial conflicts for autocratic states. Although this simplification made deriving hypotheses easier, it may be a limiting simplification to better understand territorial conflict. Future work should seek to break down autocracies, according to some schema of selectorate size. Some work on autocracy (Svolik, 2009; Weeks, 2012) has already done this. By attempting to understand the relationship between the degree of contestation in autocracies (Svolik, 2009), autocratic regime type (Weeks, 2012), and how they differ with respect to domestic outbidding processes over territory, a more detailed understanding of how territorial conflicts become territorial wars is possible.

Another extension of this dissertation project lies outside of the arenas of territory and rivalry. My abstract explanation of domestic politics and conflict may be applied to other issue areas as well. One potentially fruitful avenue is explore economic threat and domestic politics. Democratic states often employ economic sanctions against autocratic states. According to my explanation, being the target of sanctions should place internal pressure on an autocratic leader's ability to distribute to his elite, as noted by Wood (2008). The aim of such policies is to pressure a regime into changing its policies or to topple them. Yet, it might also lead states to lash out. By hurting their ability to distribute private goods to the elite, sanctions may lead autocratic leaders to look abroad for sources of revenue to distribute, such as territory. Therefore, it might be that sanctions make autocratic leaders more likely to initiate international conflicts. Economic threats such as sanctions, because they target a government's distributional capacity, may present an existential threat to autocratic regimes and leaders might be much more willing to gamble on the outcome of an international conflict (drawing on the logic of Chiozza and Goemans (2011)) in order to survive.

Although the portion of this dissertation devoted to repression dynamics sheds light on the influence that international conflict may have, it is by no means a complete understanding. As with territory, I do not attempt to disaggregate democracies and autocracies. Some research (Davenport, 2007a) has done this in a general fashion to see the impact that different autocratic styles of government affect human rights. In the future, it would be beneficial to see how international conflict affects different aspects of democratic and autocratic regimes. Furthermore, the findings on repressive choices indicate that democracies and autocracies may repress in fundamentally different ways. Is the finding that democracies increase torture and imprisonment more general than just for conflict? Does this mean that rather than choose the more severe forms of physical integrity violations such killing or disappearances, democracies choose instead to restrict other rights, such as civil liberties? From my argument

and findings, such expectations seem reasonable. Another avenue would be to see if there are differences among democracies when their executive is elected independently from the legislature, as in presidential systems, or from within the legislature, as in parliamentary systems. These two types of democracy differ according to what Davenport (2007) refers to as the “veto” mechanism, which is the ability for institutions to check executives. Although he finds that the “voice” mechanism, which is popular accountability, is stronger for curbing human rights abuse, this may vary during international conflict.

Some autocratic regimes are less repressive than others (Davenport, 2007a). Furthermore, not all autocracies are equally conflict prone (Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry, 2002; Weeks, 2012). Is the finding that autocratic states decrease repression as territorial conflict years become more deadly generalizable to all forms of dictatorship? I think that the level of repressive decrease will vary according to how repressive the state is during peace time as well as how prone it is for conflict. More theoretical development is required to understand how these regimes will approach conflict (over territory and other issues) and then in turn how they might approach shifts in repressive practices. The finding that autocrats become less repressive during territorial conflicts raises another question. Does this lessening of repression lead to an opportunity for rebellion? If autocratic governments are no longer able to repress to the great degree that they do during peace time, does this lead to an opening for political violence, and possibly civil war, aimed against the state to occur? Because of the link between international conflict and repression dynamics that is established by this dissertation, new questions on the linkages between civil and international violence have emerged.

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