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THE POLITICS OF ACCESSION TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

BY

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DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

Why do some states have a seemingly easy path to joining international organizations while other states find the process nearly impossible? What implications do the variation in accession paths have for the domestic politics of the acceding state? Increasingly, scholars recognize that the process of accession to international organizations is critical to understanding how international organizations influence states, including whether or not membership has an influence on domestic or international politics. This project contributes to these discussions by focusing on the yet unanswered question of why there exists such extreme variation in the accession process from state to state and how that variation impacts domestic politics.

I argue that variation in the terms of accession is explained by factors at both the domestic level of the acceding state and the level of the international organization. The quality of the domestic bureaucracy and the level of public support for accession are the factors that matter most from the applicant state. From the level of the international organization, the factor that matters most is whether there is an objecting state, a challenger, blocking the membership of the acceding state. I test these arguments using quantitative and case-study analysis using original data on accession to the World Trade Organization from 1950-2008 and on accession to the European Union from 1973-2004. My findings confirm that states with a highly professional bureaucracy and strong public support move more easily through the accession process, unless that state faces a challenger in the accession negotiations. My findings also confirm that states will make more meaningful domestic political changes when they face a challenger during accession negotiations.

More broadly, my dissertation demonstrates a unique way that international organizations have leverage over states by forcing changes to the domestic political structure of a state. In this way, my research answers the question of whether international organizations “matter” by offering a perspective previously unexplored in academic research. My dissertation also shows how states can use the cover of accession to international organizations as a way to bring about and secure domestic political and economic reforms. Thus, policy-makers may wish to consider pursuing accession to international organizations as a means to bring about reforms that would otherwise be impossible to do given bureaucratic limitations or domestic opposition.

For Mom and Dad

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO ACCESSION

On 23 July 2008, the World Trade Organization (WTO) welcomed Cape Verde as its 153rd member. With thirty other states in line to join the organization, the WTO is currently one of the fastest growing international organizations. The WTO, however, is certainly not alone in its growth. Four countries¹ have just completed the process of joining the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with six more countries in line to begin the process.² Five countries³ are also negotiating membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In the European Union (EU), one state⁴ has been officially named an acceding country, five states⁵ are considered official candidate countries, and three others are in line as potential candidate countries.⁶ In all, dozens of states all across the world continue to follow the trend of joining international organizations (IOs) that has grown exponentially in the last seventy years.

¹ As of 7 May 2012, these countries are Chile, Estonia, Israel and Slovenia.

² As of 7 May 2012, Russia is currently undergoing talks for accession, and the OECD is strengthening its relationship with five countries (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa) in anticipation of beginning the accession process.

<http://www.oecd.org/document/57/0,3343,en_2649_201185_45159737_1_1_1_1,00.html>

³ As of 7 May 2012, these countries are the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Georgia and Ukraine.

<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm>

⁴ As of 7 May 2012, this state is Croatia. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/acceding-country/index_en.htm>

⁵ As of 7 May 2012, these states are Iceland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/index_en.htm>

⁶ As of 7 May 2012, these states are Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/potential-candidates/index_en.htm>

While a multitude of states have joined and continue to join international organizations at an ever-increasing rate, important questions remain unanswered regarding the role of international organizations in world politics. One of the central guiding questions in International Relations (IR) has been whether and how international organizations matter in world politics. Many scholars continue to be divided on this question. Some contend that international institutions are epiphenomenal and inconsequential to states (Mearsheimer 1994/1995). Others argue that international institutions have a significant influence on world politics in general and states' policies in particular (Keohane and Martin 1995; Pevehouse 2005). Recent empirical scholarship continues to fuel this debate by producing contradictory findings regarding the influence of international organizations in world politics. In this project, I step into this debate by turning the focus on one of the most important ways international organization matter—through the process of accession. By using accession as a lens for examining this question, I highlight a new approach to studying the relationship between states and international organizations, and I uncover surprising answers to some of the key questions in IR.

Accession, or the process by which states join international organizations, has been largely overlooked in the debate over whether international organizations matter. The dominant approach has been to view membership in international organizations as a simple dichotomous characteristic – either a state is a member of a given organization or it is not.⁷ This conceptualization, while widely used in the literature, is based on a flawed understanding of the real *process* of accession by which states become members of an international organization.⁸ In

⁷ See for example Rose 2004; Milner and Kubota 2005; and Ehrlich 2007; but Gray 2009 is a notable exception to this trend.

⁸ In some cases, states must only sign on to a charter to become a member of an international organization, meaning there is no process of membership and the terminology of accession is not applicable in these cases (see Simmons 2000, von Stein 2005, and Simmons and Hopkins 2005

many of the most important international organizations in world politics, states seeking membership in the organization are required to participate in a more formal process of accession, where states must meet specific criteria for membership and negotiate those criteria with representatives of the international organization. The process of accession in these cases is far from simple, and many states can find themselves somewhere between non-member and member status for many years.⁹ Thus, the dichotomous conceptualization of membership completely overlooks these processes of joining and thus completely misses the extensive variation in accession requirements across applicant states in many international organizations. If we more closely examine the formal processes of joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) and the European Union (EU), for example, we find significant variation beyond that which is expected by the dominant conceptualizations of membership.

When we take a closer look at accession, we find unexpected variation on a number of dimensions, which raises some interesting puzzles to consider. First, we find considerable variation in the duration of the accession process among even very similar states seeking to join the same organization. Take, for instance, the accession of several central and eastern European states to the GATT/WTO and the EU beginning in the mid-1990s. At the end of the Cold War, nearly all of these states became eligible to join both the GATT/WTO and the EU. Current conceptualizations of membership would have anticipated similar processes for all of these states, since these states all applied to the GATT/WTO and EU under very similar domestic and

for a discussion of the procedure for joining the International Monetary Fund). Thus, these international organizations and international treaties are excluded from the current research project.

⁹ Turkey is a remarkable example as it has been in the process of joining the European Union for over fifty years.

international conditions. However, in reality, we find that the duration of the process from application to full membership varied significantly. In the case of the GATT/WTO, for example, Estonia, Lithuania, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia applied for membership in the organization in 1994, prior to the transition to the WTO. However, Estonia was granted membership in only five years, whereas it took seven years for Lithuania to become a member and nine years for Macedonia to become a member of the WTO (WTO Accessions Gateway). In the case of the EU, for example, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia completed their accession processes in 2004, and Romania and Bulgaria joined later in 2007. However, Croatia will complete the process of accession in 2013, and Macedonia has yet to begin its accession negotiations (EU Commission Enlargement Website). In all of these cases, delays in joining the organizations also mean delays in receiving the benefits of membership, such as increased levels of trade, foreign direct investment, or security (Allee and Scalera 2012; Kaljurand 2012). Therefore, the time it takes to complete the process of accession is critical. What explains this variation in the duration of the process of accession to international organizations?

Beyond the variation in the duration of accession, we also see that the accession process can vary in terms of the difficulty of the negotiations themselves. In both the GATT/WTO and the EU, applicant states and representatives of the international organization negotiate over the terms of membership. In some cases, these negotiations prove to be quite difficult. In the GATT/WTO, for instance, both Cambodia and Vietnam started their accession negotiations in the mid-1990s. While both of these states had similar economies and negotiated their accessions during the same years, the content of these negotiations varied in unexpected ways. As part of its negotiation process, Vietnam was required to sit for seventeen different rounds of questioning

and answered over thirty-four thousand questions on its domestic trade policy, which is currently a record in the WTO (WTO document WT/ACC/VNM/47). Cambodia, in contrast, only had to sit for twelve rounds of questioning and answered only four hundred sixty-one questions (WTO document WT/ACC/KHM/21). Those questions directly affect the extent to which Vietnam and Cambodia were required to make changes to domestic law and therefore have significant, observable consequences. The differences between Vietnam and Cambodia are only one example of the many meaningful differences in the content of the accession negotiations among applicant states to the same international organization that the extant literature cannot currently explain.

Finally, we see unexpected variation in the extent to which domestic changes are required as part of the accession process. In the case of both the EU and the WTO, applicant states are required to satisfy a number of criteria for membership. In the case of the EU, these changes often consist of the adoption of the ever-evolving *acquis communautaire* by domestic legislative bodies and the establishment of domestic bureaucratic agencies to implement these policy changes (Jacoby 2004). In the case of the GATT/WTO, domestic changes often include legislating changes in tariff rates and establishing new bureaucratic agencies to monitor sanitary standards (Michalopoulos 1998). Thus, while some scholars continue to doubt the impact of membership on domestic politics, recent evidence suggests that domestic political changes are an important component of the accession process toward membership.¹⁰

¹⁰ Recent scholarship demonstrates that states that are required to make domestic changes as part of their rigorous accession processes to the GATT/WTO are more likely to experience higher levels of trade flows post-accession (Allee and Scalera 2012). Given these findings, explaining the extent to which applicant states make domestic policy and institutional changes is a key component to understanding the accession process itself as well as state behavior post-accession.

Still, there is surprising variation in the extent to which states make domestic changes. In the GATT/WTO for example, both Bolivia and Costa Rica negotiated their accessions from 1987 to 1990. While both of these states had similar economies, these two countries were required to reduce their tariff rates by unexpectedly different percentages. Bolivia committed to a goal tariff rate of 10% during its accession whereas Costa Rica was allowed to maintain a tariff rate of 40% (GATT documents L/6542 and L/6589). In addition to these variations, some applicant countries are also granted extra time to phase-in requirements at the domestic level, which often extends well beyond the official membership date (Michalopoulos 1998). For example, the WTO granted Ecuador three additional years beyond its membership date to implement its final tariff reductions (GATT document L/6794). However, the same leniency was not granted to Croatia as its accession to the WTO was delayed for over a year to allow for full implementation of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement (WTO document HRV/38). These variations are important, because they speak to the influence international organizations have on states and the lasting impacts of accession on membership behavior.

Judging from these examples, we find a great deal of interesting puzzles when looking at accession to international organizations. These puzzles have inspired two key research questions that guide this project. First, why do some states have a seemingly easy process of joining international organizations while other states find the process nearly impossible? Second, how does accession change the internal laws and governing institutions of applicant states?

Ultimately, explaining the variations in accession and the implications that the process of accession has on domestic politics will help to fill in a significant gap in the literature on international organizations as well as contribute to a number of broader debates on the impact of international institutions in global politics. First, explaining variation in accession to

international organizations will reveal another way that international organizations have leverage over states. Second, this project will answer questions about how states can use accession to international organizations to bring about and secure domestic political and economic reforms. Finally, this project will open the door to future questions about how accession conditions state involvement in international organizations once membership is conferred.

In addition to contributing to a number of debates in the current literatures on international organizations, I also offer an original theory and empirical study that makes a contribution to these literatures. The theory presented here links domestic politics with international politics showing the influence that these two political arenas have on each other. Additionally, the theory offers a general view of accession that is not specifically tied to one international institution. Finally, I test my theory in multiple empirical contexts using original data that has yet to be considered in other research projects. In these ways, this project makes a number of important contributions in bringing to light an otherwise unexplored—but significant—process in international relations.

To accomplish this project, I begin by reviewing the relevant literature on international organization accession and membership, making note of the places where my research will make a contribution to many of the most important debates in International Relations. Next, I briefly outline the process of accession as a prelude to my theory, highlighting in particular the GATT/WTO and the EU. Then, I propose an original theory to explain the variation in the accession process and the extent of domestic policy and institutional changes required as a part of the accession process. I argue that the variation in these outcomes of accession depends on the level of domestic capacity and the level of support in the applicant state and the composition of gatekeepers, or veto players, in the international organization. When these factors interact in

the context of accession negotiations, states will experience variation in the process of accession. Finally, I derive empirical expectations from this theory and propose a plan to test these expectations using a quantitative and qualitative approach for accessions to the GATT/WTO and a qualitative approach for accession to the EU. I conclude by highlighting the contributions of this project and avenues for future research.

Literature Review

In the 1980s and 1990s, International Relations (IR) scholarship was dominated by the debates between neorealism and neoliberalism. Of the many questions that characterized this debate was whether and how international organizations matter in world politics. Neorealists have long argued that the anarchical nature of the international system makes international cooperation improbable unless that cooperation is facilitated by a hegemonic power (Krasner 1976; Kindleberger 1981). Where international institutions do exist, many neorealists contend that they are only extensions of the most powerful states in the system and thus do not actually represent interstate cooperation (Mearsheimer 1994/1995).

On the other side of this debate, neoliberals have argued that the anarchical nature of the international system does not preclude the possibility of order and cooperation among willing states (Axelrod 1981; Powell 1994). Instead, neoliberals argue that international cooperation is possible through international regimes and institutions that provide information and consistent expectations about state behavior (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Martin 1995). Thus, under neoliberalism international cooperation is not only possible, it is also a significant phenomenon in world politics.

More recently, this debate has taken on a more concretely empirical nature in evaluating the successes and significance of specific international institutions in various policy realms. Among the most prolific of these research areas has been the literature on the GATT/WTO and the EU. In both of these cases, scholars have narrowed debates over the successes of the institutions to issues of membership, which I argue are really issues of accession.

One of the most important debates in recent scholarship on international organizations has focused on the GATT/WTO and the extent to which this institution has an impact on its member-states. While the GATT/WTO had long been regarded as the ideal case in the international organization literature, serious doubts about its success and significance were raised by Rose (2004) who found that variables measuring dyadic membership in the GATT/WTO were not significant predictors of bilateral trade flows. His conclusion that the GATT/WTO has not increased trade flows between states is seemingly supported by a number of quantitative analyses covering most states from 1948-1999. While Rose (2004) did find some evidence that the GATT/WTO has increased trade in conducting some sensitivity checks, he ultimately determined that these findings do not reflect the overall reality of bilateral trade under the GATT/WTO. These conclusions were further supported by other research, such as Milner and Kubota (2005) and Kono (2006), which found that membership in the GATT/WTO is associated with higher tariff rates. If these findings hold, it is difficult to see how the GATT/WTO can be regarded as a successful international institution.

Still, a number of scholars continue to be critical of these conclusions on the grounds that conceptualizations of membership are misguided. In one of most damaging critiques thus far, Goldstein, Rivers and Tomz (2007) contend that Rose's (2004) findings are the artifact of his incorrect measurement of GATT/WTO membership, which is limited to formal membership.

Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz (2007) instead argue that the definition of membership must be expanded to include colonial members and other observers, as these states were participants in the GATT/WTO system even though they did not have the standing of formal membership. Once this broader definition of membership is applied to the empirical analysis, the authors find a positive impact of the GATT/WTO on trade volumes.

Many critiques of Rose (2004) have also come from a perspective that argues that the effects of the GATT/WTO on trade are found on only sub-samples of the population of members. For example, Englebrecht and Pearce (2007) divide the sample of WTO members into differences in factor-intense and capital-intense commodities and find that the GATT/WTO has promoted trade in capital-intense states. Similarly, Gowa and Kim (2005) and Subramanian and Wei (2007) divide the sample of member-states by level of economic development, and in both cases the authors find that the GATT/WTO has generated greater trade for industrial states. In each of these studies, the authors are able to reject Rose's assertion to a degree and do so based largely on an argument about looking more closely at the characteristics of individual member-states.

In both of these perspectives, then, we see a clear movement toward looking at membership as the key to understanding the success and significance of the GATT/WTO—and perhaps of international institutions at large. More recently, Allee and Scalera (2012) address this connection by arguing that membership must really be defined by the type of accession process states undergo to join the organization. The authors divide the member-states into a typology based on the way the states joined the GATT/WTO and find that the type of accession directly determines the extent to which states will experience higher levels of trade flows in the GATT/WTO. However, even this study—and those like it—that directly address the connection

between accession and the significance of international institutions by-and-large continue to black-box the process of joining international organizations. For instance, while Allee and Scalera (2012) recognize that states join the GATT/WTO in different ways, an explanation for why this difference exists is beyond the scope of the authors' argument. Thus, it is the goal of this project to open up this otherwise black-boxed process of accession not only to examine the process directly but also to offer an original explanation for the variation in that process.

A few scholars have recently begun the difficult task of unpacking the process of accession to international institutions, and one vital area of research focuses on accession in the context of the European Union.¹¹ Jacoby (2004), for instance, examines the accession of the central and eastern European states to the EU to determine what domestic policy and institutional changes were required as part of the process. He notes that the most significant of those changes was the passing of the EU's over 80,000 page *acquis communautaire* and the establishment of new government bureaucracies to oversee EU required services in areas such as transportation and healthcare (Jacoby 2004: 43). Thus, while Jacoby (2004) demonstrates that accession to the EU had a meaningful impact on the domestic politics of the applicant states, he fails to discuss how the required changes were agreed upon or why some states made more changes than others.

Gray (2009) also looks at accession to the EU in an effort to determine at what state in the accession process are states more likely to receive an increase in foreign direct investment (FDI). She notes that levels of FDI increase in states well before membership in the EU is granted, which shows that investors recognize the power of accession to transform states. Gray (2009) makes this point directly by stating that that the EU has the most leverage over a state during this accession process, because it can hold out the benefits of membership as an incentive

¹¹ While scholarship on the EU typically refers to the process of accession as enlargement, these terms will be used interchangeably.

to reform. Nevertheless, Gray (2009) still omits a thorough examination into the process of accession itself, choosing once again to focus on the impact accession has on a perceived benefit of membership in the EU.

These two examples are certainly not exhaustive representations of the literature on accession in the context of the EU. However, these examples do demonstrate two of the most significant shortcomings of the accession literature to date. First, we have yet to see a study address accession in a general, systematic, and direct manner. Most research to date notes its importance but overlooks the details of the process. Second, in the cases where the process of accession is addressed, most of this research remains narrowly focused on singular or small-n case studies (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002: 502). Still, scholars of the EU are not alone in contributing to this problem, as the overwhelming majority of scholarship on the details of accession to the GATT/WTO is also largely descriptive or narrowly focused on small-n case studies.

With a few notable exceptions, such as Forsberg's (1998) study on Japan, most of the literature on accession to the GATT/WTO typically emphasizes the particular difficulties facing lesser developed countries or recently acceded countries. For example, both Michalopoulos (1998) and Drabek and Bacchetta (2004) focus on the challenges facing lesser-developed countries (LDCs) in joining the WTO. Additionally, even Wong and Yu (2008) who look at the differences in the timing of accession between democracies and non-democracies have a particular focus on China's accession as the guiding case for their research.

As these examples suggest, much of the literature on GATT/WTO accession often places too much emphasis on the WTO period. While these cases are important to the overall story of accession in the GATT/WTO, the literature to date is far too specific and not generalizable

across time or space. Thus, these examples further illustrate that the problem of narrowness in the EU literature is truly characteristic of the accession literature more broadly.

While we clearly see a move toward recognizing accession as the key to understanding broader questions about the role of international institutions in world politics, the literature on these topics to date is still inadequate. Future research must begin opening up the black-box of the accession process to understand how it works and how it varies across organizations and acceding states. It is impossible to have an understanding of the ways that accession impacts behavior and outcomes post-membership without understanding the process of accession itself. For instance, a number of scholars continue to assert that domestic liberalization happens as a part of accession and even base their research on these claims, but to date, few scholars have actually documented or explained these patterns of liberalization that the literature assumes may be associated with accession.

Additionally, future research needs to have a general and systematic approach to studying accession in international organizations. To be sure, there are several rich examples of literature that emphasize accession, as noted above, but most of these examples are too narrow in scope. Thus, future research must find a way to bridge the gaps between these literatures as there is much to be gained by observing the similarities and differences across multiple states and multiple international organizations.

Therefore, my project will address both of these goals by offering an original theoretical and empirical study on the variation in accession. By focusing on the variation in accession across two of the most important international organizations in contemporary world politics, my project sheds light on an otherwise unexplored process in international relations. Furthermore, my study offers a new foundation for current research on many topics within the international

organizations literature, including questions of whether and to what extent international organizations fulfill their mandates and have an influence in domestic politics. Finally, my project opens the door to future research on the relationship between states and international organizations in such areas as implementation and compliance. In short, the literature on international institutions continues to suggest the importance of the topic of accession, and my study aims to fit the yet unanswered demand.

Organization of the Project

In this project, I focus on accession to answer the question of whether and how international organizations matter in world politics. Specifically, my research is guided by two puzzles. First, why do some states have a seemingly easy process of joining international organizations while other states find the process nearly impossible? Second, how does accession change the internal laws and governing institutions of applicant states? I argue that applicant states with a high level of domestic bureaucratic capacity and domestic public support for accession will have an easy accession process unless they face a high number of international organization gatekeepers. Additionally, applicant states will make more domestic policy and institutional changes when they face more scrutiny from international organization gatekeepers during accession negotiations.

In the following chapter, Chapter Two, I develop an original theoretical approach to answer the guiding questions of my dissertation project. To do this, I first discuss why states join international organizations. Then, I develop my theoretical approach while outlining the process of accession, highlighting in particular the GATT/WTO and the EU. I argue that applicant states with a high degree of bureaucratic capacity and public support for accession will

have an easy accession process unless they face a high number of international organization gatekeepers. Additionally, applicant states will make more domestic policy and institutional changes when they face more scrutiny from international organization gatekeepers during accession negotiations.

In the next three chapters, I use my original data to test the empirical implications of my theoretical approach in multiple contexts using a multi-method approach. In Chapter Three, I focus on the accession process in the GATT/WTO context and use statistical and case-study analysis to test my theory as it applies to the outcomes of the accession process. I first apply my theory directly to the GATT/WTO context. Then, I discuss my original dataset on all accessions to the GATT/WTO from 1950-2008. These data include unique measures that I coded after reading the accession documents for all states that joined the organization from 1950-2008. I then perform a statistical analysis on these data, which I follow up with a case-study analysis on China's accession to the WTO. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the ongoing accessions to the WTO.

In Chapter Four, I extend my empirical focus on the WTO to examine the implications of accession for the domestic political and economic environments of applicant states. I identify three categories of domestic changes that states make when joining the WTO: changes to trade policy, changes to the organization of their domestic trade or political system, and changes in domestic governance practices. I argue that states make domestic policy and institutional changes as a direct result of the level of scrutiny they face from international organization gatekeepers during the accession negotiations. Furthermore, I argue that states facing high levels of scrutiny will make deeper changes, particularly changes in the area of domestic governance. I test this argument with original data on the GATT/WTO accession process from 1950-2008. I

first use statistical analysis to examine how differing levels of scrutiny result in different numbers of domestic changes. I then complement this analysis with two comparative case studies of (1) Albania and Ukraine and (2) Cambodia and Vietnam. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the future of the WTO.

In Chapter Five, I turn my focus to the European Union context. In this chapter, I first outline the key stages in the process of accession to the European Union. Then, I put forward empirical expectations based on my theoretical approach as it applies to the EU. Next, I employ qualitative analysis to examine the variation in both the process and domestic implications of accession for several EU member-states, including Estonia and the ongoing accession of Turkey.

In my final chapter, Chapter Six, I summarize the empirical results from both the GATT/WTO and the EU as they relate back to my original theoretical approach on accession to international organizations. I conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and policy implications of my study as well as avenues for future research.

CHAPTER TWO

A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ACCESSION

The goal of this project is to open up the previously black-boxed process of accession to international organizations to explain how accession influences the relationship between states and international organizations. My project seeks to answer why the process of accession to international organizations varies among states and how the accession process affects the domestic politics of the acceding state. In this chapter, I offer a theoretical explanation for why the process of accession varies among states, even very similar ones.

Why Do States Join International Organizations?

For over a decade now, scholars have debated how being a member of an international organization affects the domestic and international politics of a state without coming to any firm conclusions. Yet, while scholars remain undecided about the positive effects of membership in international organizations, states continue to apply to join international organizations. In fact, the growing membership in many international organizations has been one of the most significant trends in international politics in the last sixty years (Pevehouse et al 2004).

The motivations for joining international organizations are as varied as the organizations themselves, and often depend on the specific mandates of the organization; still, states make the decision to join an international organization based primarily on the anticipation of future benefits from membership. For example, states may seek to join security organizations, such as NATO, to strengthen their domestic militaries and to gain international support in the face of a potentially threatening state (Solingen 1994; Kydd 2001). Similarly, states may apply to join

international organizations for reputational benefits or to make their domestic commitments more credible, especially with respect to democratic transitions and domestic liberalization (Russett and Oneal 2001; Pevehouse 2005). Finally, many states apply for membership in international organizations for the anticipated economic benefits—either for trade, foreign direct investment, or domestic economic stability (Christoffersen 2007a). Given these motivations for joining international organizations, the decision to apply for accession is often a relatively simple and low-cost decision for states to make. While it may be true that some states strategically time their applications to international organizations,¹ the reality is that most states recognize the multiple benefits to joining international organizations and apply as soon as the opportunity presents itself.

The move to apply to certain international organizations is a low cost signal that states have moved from closed economies and autocratic political regimes toward increasingly open, liberal, democratic states. In the case of the EU, for example, Landaburu (2007) suggests that Spain and Portugal applied to the Union in an effort to demonstrate that their economies had been re-launched and their recent democracies were consolidated (Landaburu 2007: 11-12). Furthermore, as Gruber (2000) suggests, the decision to join international organizations may also be an attempt by states to signal a willingness to participate in the international status-quo rather than remaining outliers in the international system. For these reasons, states are eager to apply for membership in international organizations as soon as it is possible.

We continue to see evidence of this fact in the recent waves of applications to international organizations. In the 1960s, many newly independent African states began applying to join international organizations; in the 1970s, many newly democratic states in

¹ See von Stein (2005) for example.

Central and South America began applying to join international organizations; and in the 1990s, many newly independent central and eastern European states began applying to join international organizations. Given these regional trends, then, it is unlikely that the decision to apply to an international organization is as strategic as some literatures suggest.²

Therefore, I make the assumption here that states apply to international organizations for non-strategic reasons and thus that the decision to apply has little bearing on the process or outcomes of accession. That is not to say, however, that I do not take into account characteristics of both the applicant state and the international organization that might also have a bearing on the decision to apply. The decision to focus on accession once the application process has begun is simply for the sake of simplicity.

How Does Accession Work?

Accession refers to the process of joining an international organization from the starting point of application to the conclusion at the conferring of membership.³ The accession process involves two key actors – the applicant state and the representatives, or gatekeepers, of the international organization. During accession, an applicant state completes a set of procedures and requirements, established by the international organization, all in an effort to meet the terms of accession.

² Simmons (2000) and Simmons and Elkins (2004) show a strong link between regional effects and behavior in international organizations and domestic liberalization. Given the strong findings presented in these studies, it is reasonable to assume that a similar link exists in the act of joining international organizations.

³ In some cases, states must only sign on to a charter to become a member of an international organization, meaning there is no “process” of membership and the terminology of “accession” is not applicable in these cases (see Simmons 2000 and von Stein 2005). Thus, these international organizations are excluded from the current research project.

In most international organizations, the terms of accession are defined prior to the beginning of the accession process, as in the case of the European Union's Copenhagen Criteria.⁴ However, as I illustrate in the previous chapter, the process of accession is not nearly as straightforward as these criteria would suggest. Take, for instance, the accession of the central and eastern European states to the EU beginning in the mid-1990s. At the end of the Cold War, nearly all of these states became eligible to join the EU. However, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia completed their accession processes in 2004, and Romania and Bulgaria joined later in 2007. Croatia has recently completed the process of accession, and Macedonia has yet to begin its accession negotiations (EU Commission Enlargement Website).

Throughout the accession process, applicant states are required to complete a number of requirements and a series of procedures, which are laid out by the international organization and enforced by the gatekeepers of the international organization. I identify four key stages in the accession process that I detail below: (1) application, (2) submission of a memorandum by the applicant state, (3) multilateral negotiations between the applicant state and the international organization, and (4) finalization of the accession deal by both parties. Even though the process is relatively straightforward, it can take several months, or even years, for states to complete this process. Membership in the international organization is only conferred once acceptable terms are reached on each of the issues under negotiation *and* once the member-states of the international organization is satisfied with the implementation of domestic reforms required for the acceding state (Evenett and Primo Braga 2005).

⁴ See the EU's website for details about the Copenhagen Criteria (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accesion_process/criteria/index_en.htm)

When the accession process is laid out from beginning to end, the most important component of the accession process involves the multilateral negotiations between the applicant state and the gatekeepers of the international organization. It is within the context of the multilateral negotiations that the two actors officially meet to express their positions and to set a course for the outcomes of the accession process. Moreover, the sets of policies agreed upon during the negotiations become the final terms of accession for the applicant state. Therefore, the key to understanding the variation in accession lies in understanding how the two actors enter the bargaining phase of the multilateral negotiations.

A Theory of International Organization Accession

Japan's Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

On July 18, 1952—only months after signing the Treaty of San Francisco, which officially ended World War II—Japan gave notice to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that it would like to enter into negotiations for accession (GATT document L/29). The decision to seek membership in the GATT was championed by the United States who saw this as an opportunity to fully solidify Japan's commitment to a set of liberal, democratic post-war trade policies. In his statement, the US representative to the GATT said of Japan's decision to seek accession:

The inclusion of Japan in the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade would contribute to the political stability of the Pacific area and of the world. It will do this by increasing the scope of a mutually beneficial expansion of trade under fair methods of operation. The contrary course with all its implications may breed serious resentment and political dissatisfactions. (GATT document GATT/CP3/WP10/2/3)

To be sure, Japan had made a number of significant changes to its domestic economy even in the short time after the end of hostilities in World War II. Due in part to the involvement of the

United States in Japan's economy and also to the Korean War, Japan's economic capacity had increased dramatically prior to 1952 making it a desirable trading partner for the US. Moreover, the conservatives in the Japanese government enjoyed the strong support of many Japanese business leaders—particularly from within the textile industry—in their efforts to proceed with membership in the GATT (Forsberg 1998). The goal was simple: to secure the maximum economic concessions from the member-states of the GATT, such as the coveted most-favored nation (MFN) status, in exchange for the minimum number of concessions possible (Forsberg 1998: 189).

Reaching this goal, however, would not be as easy as the Japanese and the Americans had hoped. Almost immediately, the Japanese faced resistance from several prominent members of the GATT, including the United Kingdom, who continued to request that discussions over Japan's possible accession be delayed until future meetings (GATT document L/29). Still, Japan pressed forward with accession, continually offering additional documentation regarding the changes it was willing to make in exchange for membership in the GATT. In all, Japan made more than six submissions of documentation regarding the status of its domestic economy, including specific information detailing its pricing policies at the request of France, Italy and Austria (GATT document W.7/50/ADD.3).

In addition to these submissions, Japan participated in multilateral and bilateral negotiations with several member-states including: Burma, Sri Lanka, Chile, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Germany, Italy, Norway, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, the United Kingdom, and the United States (GATT document L/225/ADD.1). As a result of these negotiations, Japan agreed to pass new legislation regarding tariff rates, anti-dumping regulations, and the

enforcement of fair competition in exchange for membership in the GATT (GATT document W/7/29).

Despite these concessions, for many of the member-states, Japan's efforts to cooperate with their demands were not satisfactory and a record fourteen states opposed Japan's accession by invoking the non-application clause in Article XXXV of the GATT charter (GATT Document L/403). By 1953, however, Japan had essentially completed all requirements for accession, including lengthy negotiations with the United States. Still, these fourteen states refused to sign the final documents agreeing to Japanese accession thereby unnecessarily stalling Japan's impending accession for nearly twenty-six months. In fact, the delays caused by these states become so embarrassing for the organization that the Secretariat intervened on behalf of Japan demanding that the accession documents be signed (GATT document IC/W/13). In the end, Japanese accession to the GATT was finalized, and Japan officially joined the organization on September 10, 1955.

In the case of Japan's accession to the GATT, it is painfully obvious that accession to international organizations is not as simple as completing a check-list of requirements. Instead, accession is a highly political process involving negotiations between the applicant state and the representatives of the international organization.

Accession's Actors

The two actors, the applicant state and the international organization gatekeepers, come into an accession negotiation with two basic options: let the accession process fail or let the applicant state join the organization. The applicant state clearly prefers to join the organization rather than allowing the accession process to fail, but this preference is conditional on the costs

of completing accession. Since most governments have relatively short time horizons, the preference is always to join the organization as quickly and as easily as possible while extracting the most concessions from other states.

In contrast, the representatives of the international organization have much longer time horizons that alter their preferences. I refer to these representatives as gatekeepers, because these are the actors that determine which states gain entrance into the organization and which do not; these actors hold the keys to the gate. The gatekeepers, thus, prefer that the applicant state's accession process be as long and as difficult as possible.

A more difficult accession process can accomplish two goals for the gatekeepers. First, a more difficult process allows the gatekeepers more time to screen the applicant state to ensure that the state will comply with the rules of the international organization once it is admitted (Kydd 2001). Second, a more difficult process allows the gatekeepers more time to extract more concessions from the applicant state. This was clearly seen in the case of Japan's accession to the GATT, since the longer process allowed more gatekeepers time to extract information about Japan's economy. Even the United States, who was a supporter of Japan's accession, benefited from a longer process, which allowed more time for bilateral negotiations.

Given these divergent preferences, at least one of the two actors must compromise to achieve the desired outcome of completing the accession process. However, as the accession process unfolds, it becomes clear that there are certain characteristics of the two actors that limit each actor's ability to compromise. These factors constrain the actors in ways that not only determine whether accession will end in success or failure, but also the range of terms that still result in a successfully completed accession process. At the level of the applicant state, the factors that matter most are the governing capacity of the domestic bureaucracy and the level of

public support for accession. At the level of the international organization, the factors that matter most are the number of gatekeepers and whether there is an objecting state within the gatekeepers to block the membership of the applicant state. Thus, I argue that the variation in accession is explained by the influence of these factors on the actors as they negotiate over the terms of accession throughout the process.

Negotiating Accession

Variation in accession is the result of factors at both the domestic level of the applicant state and the international level of the international organization gatekeepers. To see these factors play out, we must follow the negotiations throughout the accession process. While the details of the accession process vary across international organizations and among individual applicant states, many of the procedural features of the process are common across international organizations. In this case, I highlight in particular the accession process for the GATT/WTO and the European Union.

The first stage of the accession process that I identify is the *application* phase. In both the GATT/WTO and the EU, the accession process begins with the submission of an application for membership by a state. Then, the international organization makes a decision whether or not to open the process of accession.⁵ If the international organization decides to consider the application of the state, a separate group of member-states is established to oversee the accession as representatives of the international organization at-large. In the GATT/WTO, member states voluntarily represent the entire organization in a group called the working party, which is responsible for negotiating the terms of accession on behalf of the General Council (Williams

⁵ Very few states are ever rejected from joining an international organization. The most notable exception to this rule was the EU's rejection of Morocco's application.

2008). In the EU, the Commission negotiates on behalf of the Council, who makes the final decisions on EU membership (Christoffersen 2007a). In both of these cases, these representatives of the international organization serve as the gatekeepers to the organization, meaning they are responsible for determining which states complete the accession process in a manner worthy of membership and which states do not.

At this stage in the accession process, we see the establishment of the first factor that determines the variation in accession. Once the international organization decides to consider the application of the state, the group of gatekeepers is formed to oversee the accession process. The number of gatekeepers an applicant state must satisfy during the accession process has an impact on the outcomes of accession, because the gatekeepers directly determine the terms for membership and how strictly those terms will be applied to the applicant state. In this sense, the gatekeepers serve as veto players and must be satisfied for the accession process to be complete. The power of the gatekeepers was clearly seen in the application stage of Japan's accession. The representatives of the US knew it would be difficult to convince the gatekeepers of the GATT to agree to Japan's membership in the GATT, so they felt it necessary to immediately advocate Japan's accession before the entire organization (GATT document GATT/CP3/WP10/2/3). As this example shows, the more gatekeepers that decide to oversee the accession process, the more difficult it will be for the applicant state to complete the process of accession.

Over time, the number of potential gatekeepers will continue to increase as more states continue to join the organization. At the same time, the basic criteria for membership that the gatekeepers must enforce will also become stricter as the international organization continues to

gain autonomy from the original members.⁶ Therefore, states joining the organization later into its lifespan should expect that the number of gatekeepers will be an increasingly important factor determining the variation in accession.

Once the international organization has established its representatives, or gatekeepers, the accession process moves into the second stage, which is *the submission of a memorandum*. For both the GATT/WTO and the EU, the government of the applicant state is required to submit documentation detailing all domestic policies and institutions that are relevant to future membership in the organization. In the case of the GATT/WTO, this document is known as the memorandum, and it is produced solely by the applicant state (Williams 2008). In the EU, however, this document is produced under the supervision of the Commission and may require that the Commission visit the applicant state to complete this document (Christoffersen 2007a). In many cases, the preparation of this document is often a time-consuming process because of the range of issues and degree of detail required in the document (Michalopoulos 1998: 5-6). Consequently, this document serves as the starting point for the accession process as all future negotiations and domestic changes are applied in light of the details presented in the document.

At this stage in the accession process, the first factor at the level of the applicant state—the governing capacity of the domestic bureaucracy—comes into play. The preparation of the memorandum is largely the responsibility of the government of the applicant state. Since the domestic government bears the burden of preparing this costly document, governments must be sure that they have a sizable level of bureaucratic capacity to provide the resources needed

⁶ See Barnett and Finnemore (2004) for a thorough discussion of this evolution. Additionally, Tallberg's (2010) study on the influence of the formal chair in international organizations suggests that criteria that are established under the direction of these offices, such as the WTO Secretariat, can become stricter as these offices seek to extend their power relative to other actors in the organization.

before and during the entire accession process. Human capital resources are clearly important at this stage of the process, as the domestic state needs officials trained in international law, economic policy, and institutional-legal procedure to gather the necessary information and compile it into a document for submission to the international organization (Christoffersen 2007a: 28). Financial resources are also necessary and are used for expenses as basic as paying the officials to compile the memorandum and to travel to the international organization to deposit it. As seen in the case of Japan's accession, the US worked alongside the Japanese to grow their economy and re-establish a stable government bureaucracy in the very early stages of its accession to the GATT. Thus, having a bureaucracy with a sizeable capacity is critical to the success of the earliest phases of the accession negotiations.

Once the memorandum is submitted by the applicant state, the accession process moves into the third and most important phase, which are the *multilateral negotiations*. During the negotiations, the applicant state and the international organization discuss the terms of accession and come to an agreement on the finalization of those terms (Drabek and Bacchetta 2004). Typically, the representatives of the international organization begin the process by outlining the criteria for accession and their recommendations for how the applicant state should proceed to fulfill those criteria. Then, representatives from the applicant state—be they former heads of state or current foreign ministers—are given an opportunity to respond to the criteria and to offer their own suggestions for how that criteria should be applied to their home state (Christoffersen 2007b). In the majority of cases, the two parties do not reach an agreement in their first meeting, so the negotiations often involve several rounds. In the cases of the ongoing accessions to the WTO, for example, Algeria has already experienced ten rounds of negotiations and Russia has been through more than thirty (Williams 2008).

Simultaneous to the multilateral negotiations, applicant states often engage in bilateral negotiations with individual member states that have a particular interest in one aspect of the negotiations. These bilateral negotiations often supplement the multilateral negotiations by providing a forum for more nuanced—and often contentious—issues to be resolved. One well-known example of these negotiations is found in the EU where Austria and the Czech Republic participated in extensive bilateral negotiations over nuclear energy policy—in particular the operations at Czech power station in Temelin—as part of the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU (Christoffersen 2007d: 96). Another example of these bilateral negotiations is found in the GATT where Argentina and the European Economic Community (EEC) negotiated for several rounds over issues of the trade and production of bovine meat during Argentina’s accession (GATT document TN.64/110). Thus, it is during the bilateral negotiations that these issues, that could be stumbling blocks for some states, are worked out so as not to stall the process of accession altogether.

At this phase of the accession process, the gatekeepers again become important in determining the outcomes of the accession negotiations. Having more gatekeepers to satisfy can make the negotiations longer and more difficult for the applicant state, since there are simply more opinions to account for and to satisfy. Moreover, accession can also become more difficult for the applicant state if there are gatekeepers that are vocally against the membership of the applicant state and are willing to take steps to block that membership; I refer to these states as challengers.

A challenger is a gatekeeper who stands to block negotiations or at least make the negotiations more difficult for the acceding state. Challengers can surface within the gatekeepers

for a variety of reasons, including differences in preferences regarding the functions of the international organization, economic competition, or political differences (Michalopoulos 1998).

The influence of the international challenger over the accession process can vary by international organization; in some cases the challenger has equal weight to all other gatekeepers, but in other international organizations the challenger has the power to veto the negotiations altogether. A well-known case of such a veto occurred when France blocked the United Kingdom's entrance into the European Union. President Pompidou eventually waived the veto on British candidacy after he replaced General de Gaulle as the leader of France (Landaburu 2007: 17).

Even without veto powers, challengers can make the process of accession extremely difficult for the applicant state. As seen in the example of Japan's accession to the GATT, the fourteen challengers who refused to sign off on the conclusion of the multilateral negotiations stalled the final stage of accession for nearly twenty-six months. At the very least, then, having even one challenger is enough to make the accession process longer and more difficult for the applicant state—if not stall the process all together.⁷

In some cases, the effects of a challenger can be mitigated by the presence of a state that is willing to support the applicant state through the accession process. This state, which I call an advocate, helps to ensure that the gatekeepers look favorably on the preferences of the applicant state during the negotiation process. In the case of Japan's accession to the GATT, the support from the United States helped Japan finalize the negotiations when no other state was in favor of doing so (Forsberg 1998). While an advocate is typically not as decisive as a challenger, having an advocate can make the accession process easier for the applicant state.

⁷ It has been suggested that the demands requested by the United States in the case of Vanuatu's accession to the WTO were one of the leading causes for its failed accession attempt (Gay 2005).

In addition to the importance of the gatekeepers, the bureaucratic capacity of the applicant state is also important. In some cases, applicant states simply do not have the capacity to fully implement all of the requirements put forward by the international organization gatekeepers or to even sustain the costs of participating in the accession negotiations. In the case of Vanuatu's accession to the WTO, for example, the costs of attending multiple rounds of negotiations were a leading cause of its stalled accession attempt. With only five members on staff to deal with the accession and no permanent mission to Geneva, the trips back and forth for negotiations were simply too much for the small state to handle (Gay 2005).⁸ Therefore, having a low level of bureaucratic capacity can limit the extent to which applicant states are able to agree to certain requirements of accession, thereby increasing the difficulty of the accession process and reducing the number of domestic changes these states make in exchange for accession.

At the same time, a second factor at the level of the applicant state becomes critical at the negotiation phase of accession, which is the level of domestic public support for accession. Accession requires domestic policy and institutional changes, such as reductions in tariffs on certain goods, and these changes can have divergent effects on different sectors of the domestic population. While some sectors of the general public will benefit from membership in the international organization, other groups are certain to face negative consequences from membership. For this reason, there must be a sizable population in the acceding state that prefers membership in the international organization to remaining outside the international organization *and* that is willing to demonstrate this preference through support for the domestic leadership who negotiates accession.

⁸ It has been reported by the WTO that Vanuatu's trips to Geneva for negotiations were costing upwards of VT 20 million or US\$150,000 (Gay 2005).

Domestic leaders will often look for support from those constituents who will likely be the first-winners in the accession process, meaning those who stand to receive the benefits of membership in an international organization before they are dispersed throughout the population. Thus, these groups are likely to take the shape of concentrated economic sectors or interest groups with export-oriented interests that are competitive under the mandate of the international organization (Krueger 1998: 5). For example, in the case of Czech accession to the EU, particular attention was paid to the domestic beer-making industry, whose support was necessary to sustain negotiations on this issue (Christoffersen 2007d: 97). In the example of Japan's accession to the GATT, the support that the conservative government received from many Japanese business leaders was essential in making the concessions necessary to complete the multilateral and bilateral negotiations (Forsberg 1998: 189).

When the applicant state does not have strong public support for the accession process, additional time and resources are required to constantly sell the changes required during accession to the domestic audience. One way domestic leaders can guarantee support for accession to an international organization is to buy off key sectors of the domestic population.⁹ In the case of Costa Rica's accession to the GATT, for instance, special attention was paid during the negotiations to the textile industry. In order to guarantee the support from this critical sector, Costa Rica not only secured a bilateral trade deal with the US but also secured an extra two years to phase-in the forty percent tariff rate on clothing and footwear (GATT documents COT/151 and L/6589). However, the ability to make these types of deals is not guaranteed, and

⁹ The need for domestic support for reforms is not limited to acceding countries. Even in the United States, domestic support is key to implementing WTO rules. One American official notes the importance of guaranteeing support for the implementation of WTO policies in 1994 through the use of side deals to such industries as citrus farmers in Florida, corn farmers, and cattle ranchers (Odell and Eichengreen 1998: 202).

devoting resources to these endeavors can take away from the time and resources needed to efficiently and effectively complete the accession negotiations. Therefore, having public support for accession frees the domestic government to comply more freely with the requirements for accession thereby completing the process more quickly and with less difficulty.

Once all parties agree that the applicant state has implemented legislation and institutional changes in conformity with the criteria set forward by the organization, the bilateral and multilateral negotiations are concluded (Evenett and Primo Braga 2005). From here, the accession process moves into the final stage, which is the *finalization of the accession deal*. In the final stage, then, the gatekeepers formalize the terms of accession in a document that represents the formal offer of membership from the international organization to the applicant state. Both parties then sign this document, and in many cases the applicant state submits it to the domestic legislature for ratification. Once this final stage is complete, membership is officially conferred on the applicant state.

Variation in Accession

As demonstrated in the previous discussion, factors at both the domestic level of the applicant state and the level of the international organization working together or against each other result in variation in accession. In my project, I focus on two broad categories of variation that can occur during accession. The first category is the *process* outcomes, which include how long the process took from start to end and how difficult the process was to complete. This category captures the indicators that distinguish different types of member-states, which then

have an impact on their subsequent international behavior.¹⁰ The second category is the *domestic effects* outcomes, which emphasize the domestic policy and institutional changes that are made as a requirement for accession. This category captures the terms of accession that show how an international organization directly impacts the domestic politics of a member-state.

There are several outcomes that fall within the *process* category, including the duration of the accession process and the difficulty of the accession negotiations. Duration captures the time between the start and completion of the accession process. Scholars have recently pointed to duration as an important element of the accession process, seeing it as a first-step in indicating the complexity of the accession process (Wong and Yu 2008). To be sure, the variation in accession duration is striking in the GATT/WTO, with some states like Bolivia taking as few as three years to accede to the GATT and other states like Cambodia taking ten years to accede to the WTO. These variations are significant and reveal that the accession process is quite different for many applicant states.

The second outcome within the *process* category is the degree of difficulty of negotiations. In these cases, difficulty is a continuum of the degree to which negotiations are intractable or hard-fought. Thus, like duration, difficulty provides an insight into the specifics of the accession process and, especially, into the otherwise inaccessible multilateral negotiations. Evidence of difficulty can be seen in a number of different ways depending on the accession process for each international organization. In some cases, the negotiations over the criteria of accession are very efficient, avoid indivisible issues, and require few iterations. In other cases, the two parties fight hard in the negotiations, which leads to more exchanges of documentation, more discussions over contentious issues, and more meetings between the two parties.

¹⁰ Allee and Scalera (2012) demonstrate the link between these indicators and the positive effect of WTO membership on trade.

As an example, we can compare the difficulty in Japan's accession to the difficulty in China's accession. Japan was required to submit a few more than six different documents detailing its domestic economy, including answering specific questions from at least three different gatekeepers (GATT document W.7/50/ADD.3). In contrast, China was required to submit documentation to answer over one thousand questions from its gatekeepers (Feng 2006). Additionally, difficulty can be evidenced by the discussion of particularly contentious issues in the negotiations. In the EU, for example, scholars have noted that there were heated negotiations in the accessions of Estonia to the EU over issues as specific as the hunting of lynxes and brown bears (Christoffersen 2007d: 91). Clearly, then, these indicators of difficulty reveal important insights into the accession process, especially into the otherwise closed and confidential negotiations. Thus, the variation in the degree of difficulty of the accession negotiations is the second aspect of the accession process that I seek to explain in this project.

I also explain the variation in the domestic political changes that are required as a component of the accession process and that result from the accession negotiations, which I classify as the *domestic effects* outcomes. Some scholars have been skeptical that domestic policy and institutional changes happen as part of the accession process; however, the reality is that domestic changes do occur, even if they vary among members.

Examples of domestic policy changes can range from changes in tariff rates to changes in inflation targets to new consumer product safety standards, and examples of domestic institutional changes often involve the expansion of domestic bureaucratic agencies to manage the new policy changes. For instance, as part of Japan's accession to the GATT, its government agreed to pass new legislation regarding tariff rates, anti-dumping regulations, and the enforcement of fair competition in exchange for membership in the GATT (GATT document

W/7/29). Here, then, we see that domestic political changes are a central requirement of the accession process.

While many states have made significant changes to their domestic political and economic environments, these changes can be difficult to define in general terms since they are often specific to the mandates of the international organization. Still, I identify three general categories of domestic changes to explore. First, I identify domestic changes in terms of policy changes. In the case of the GATT/WTO, for instance, these might be changes in tariff rates, quotas or intellectual property standards.

Second, I identify changes in the domestic political organization or in the organization of the domestic economy. Examples of these changes might include bureaucratic changes, such as establishing an independent central bank, which is a common requirement for many applicant states to the EU.

Finally, I identify general domestic governance changes, which might indicate a change in levels of good governance. For instance, these domestic changes might include increased transparency or accountability in the domestic political organization. In the case of the EU, for instance, we might find that accession leads states to increase their provisions for the protection of minorities. While these domestic changes might not be consistent across time and state, they are often important components or implications of the accession process.

Thus, I argue that all of these outcomes of accession—both the *process* outcomes and the *domestic effects* outcomes—can be explained as a function of the levels of domestic bureaucratic capacity, domestic public support, and the composition of the international organization gatekeepers.

Research Design

In the following chapters, I test the empirical expectations derived from my theory in the contexts of both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization and the European Union. Both the GATT/WTO and the EU are widely recognized in the literature as two of the most important international organizations in contemporary world politics. These two organizations are consistently strong global actors and both continue to attract new members even as the level of cooperation deepens. Additionally, the lifespan of these organizations is spread over multiple decades and the diversity of member-states allows the sample to cover a wide geographic and socio-economic range. Thus, focusing on these two international organizations allows my research to make a strong substantive and theoretical contribution to several already established literatures.

Moreover, both of these organizations are appropriate first tests for the theoretical approach presented here. The GATT/WTO and the EU have a similar process of accession that includes negotiations between the applicant state and a representative party from the international organization. Additionally, there exists observable variation in accession among the members in both of these organizations. Finally, both organizations have standards for membership that require domestic changes on the part of the applicant state, both with respect to policy and institutional changes. Thus, given the similarities between the GATT/WTO and the EU as well as their prominence in global politics and in the international organizations literature, it is logical to focus on these two organizations as the first test of the theory presented here.

Clearly, however, using the GATT/WTO and the EU as the first empirical contexts within which this general theory of accession is tested is not without flaws. These two organizations have marked differences including the scope of their membership, the scope of

their mandates, and the overall patterns of membership. Thus, given these differences, I do not intend to treat these organizations as perfectly comparable case studies in the typical sense. Rather, I will be conducting distinct empirical analyses of each organization to see if my theory can translate even with the variation. Such a test is important not only for this project but also for the broader international organizations literature, since there are countless examples of theories that are built on only one international organization and tested in the context of only one international organization. In contrast, my project aims to present a general theory of accession and to test that theory in multiple empirical contexts.

I test my theory using original data on accession to the GATT/WTO from 1950-2008 and on accession to the European Union from 1973-2004. To collect these data, I read all of the accession documents for the current WTO and EU member-states and created unique variables that capture various indicators of accession. I also conducted extensive research from a number of primary sources on the domestic implications of accession for the majority of the member-states in both organizations. Together, my original datasets represent a significant contribution to research on accession to both the WTO and the EU that will have numerous applications for this project and future projects.

In the following three chapters, I use my original data to test my theory in multiple empirical contexts using a multi-method approach. Chapter Three emphasizes the accession process in the GATT/WTO context and uses statistical and case study analysis to test my theory regarding the accession outcomes in the *process* category. Chapter Four is also focused on the GATT/WTO, but, in this chapter, I use both statistical and case study analysis to examine the variation in the *domestic effects* of accession. In Chapter Five, I turn my focus to the EU and use case study analysis to examine the variation in the *process* and *domestic effects* of accession.

Finally, I use Chapter Six to conclude my project and discuss the theoretical and policy implications of my study.

Conclusion

While scholars continue to debate whether and how international organizations influence states and global politics in general, few scholars have seriously considered the importance of accession in answering this question. To date, no theory has offered a satisfactory answer to why the process of accession to international organizations varies among states or how the accession process affects the domestic politics of the acceding state.

I develop a theoretical approach to answer both of these questions by emphasizing factors at both the domestic and international levels that materialize to shape the accession outcomes at various stages of the accession process. At the domestic level, I highlight the importance of the governing capacity of the domestic bureaucracy and the level of public support for accession. At the international level, I highlight the importance of the number and composition of gatekeepers that oversee the process of accession. Based on these factors, states will experience different outcomes of accession in terms of both the process and the domestic effects.

My study represents an important first step to a critical, but previously underdeveloped, research agenda. First, my theory opens up the often black-boxed process of accession. I not only outline the process of accession, but I also offer an original theoretical explanation for the unexpected variation in the outcomes of accession.

Second, my theory emphasizes accession to two of the most important international organizations in contemporary world politics—the GATT/WTO and the EU. In so doing, I shed

new light on two organizations that have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. Here, I also lay the foundation for future research on other international organizations.

Next, my theory contributes to a broader set of debates on the impact of international institutions in global politics. My theory shows how international organizations can have leverage over states through the accession negotiations. Specifically, I show how states can use the accession process as an opportunity to secure domestic political and economic reforms.

Finally, my theory opens the door to future questions about how accession conditions state involvement in international organizations once membership is conferred. In these ways, this project makes a number of important contributions in bringing the process of accession to light.

CHAPTER THREE

THE POLITICS OF ACCESSION TO THE GATT/WTO

A primary goal of this project is to open up the previously black-boxed process of accession to international organizations to explain why the accession process varies among states. As I have previously suggested, the accession process can vary significantly in length of time and difficulty among states, including states with very similar domestic characteristics. This chapter, therefore, focuses on explaining the first set of questions within the broader dissertation project: why do some states have a seemingly easy path to joining international organizations while other states find the process nearly impossible? And why do even similar states experience such different processes of accession?

I argued in the previous chapter that the variation in the outcomes of accession is a reflection of the multilateral accession negotiations. At the domestic level, the factors that matter the most to this process are the capacity of the applicant state's domestic bureaucracy and the level of public support for accession in the applicant state. At the international level, the key factors are the composition of gatekeepers and the strictness of the criteria for membership. When these factors interact in the context of accession negotiations, states will experience variation in the process of accession.

In this chapter, I test the hypotheses derived from this theory using original data on accessions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) from 1950-2008. The GATT/WTO¹ serves as a critical test case for the

¹ In the remainder of the chapter, I will use the term GATT/WTO to refer to the organization in its entirety from 1948-present. The term "GATT" will refer only to the organization as it existed prior to 1995, and the term WTO will refer only to the organization as it has existed since 1995.

theory proposed in this project for a number of reasons. First, the GATT/WTO has long been regarded as the “*beau ideal*” of the international institutions and, as such, has attracted a great deal of attention from scholars interested in the relationship between states and international organizations (Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz 2007: 38). Since this project looks at the relationship between states and international organizations through the process of accession, it makes sense to begin with the GATT/WTO.

Furthermore, the GATT/WTO requires applicant states to complete one of the most difficult and comprehensive accession processes of any international institution. This process falls under Article XXXIII of the GATT and Article XII of the WTO, and it is the standard method of joining the organization (Wilson 2008). Over fifty states have completed this process between 1950 and 2008, and these states cover the entire spectrum of levels of development and geographic regions. For these reasons, then, it is appropriate to use the GATT/WTO as a first step in testing the arguments put forward in this project.

Explaining GATT/WTO Accession

When the accession process to the GATT/WTO is laid out from beginning to end, it becomes clear that the multilateral negotiations are the core of the process.² During the multilateral negotiations, the applicant state and representatives of the international organization officially meet to express their positions and to set a course for the entirety of the accession process for the applicant state. Moreover, the sets of policies agreed upon during the negotiations become the final accession packages for each applicant state, thereby establishing

² For a detailed outline of the accession process to the GATT/WTO, see Table 3.1.

the terms of membership. Thus, the outcomes of accession that are the focus for this project are clearly reflected in the negotiations.

Outcomes of GATT/WTO Accession

Here, I have chosen to focus on two of the most important variations in the GATT/WTO accession process, which are the duration of the process and the difficulty of negotiations. Both of these outcomes are key characteristics of the accession process and are likely the most important outcomes for influencing the post-accession behavior of the applicant state.³

The first variation I seek to explain is accession duration, meaning the years between the start and completion of the accession process. Scholars have recently pointed to duration as an important element of the accession process, seeing it as a first-step in indicating the complexity of the accession process (Wong and Yu 2008). To be sure, the variation in accession duration is striking in the GATT/WTO with some states like Bolivia taking as few as three years to accede to the GATT and other states like Cambodia taking ten years to accede to the WTO. These variations are significant and reveal that the accession process is quite different for many applicant states.

The second variation in accession is complementary to duration as it narrows the focus to the negotiations themselves; this variation is the degree of difficulty of negotiations. In these cases, difficulty is a continuum of the degree to which negotiations are hard-fought. Thus, like duration, difficulty provides an insight into the specifics of the accession process and, especially, into the otherwise inaccessible multilateral negotiations.

³ See Allee and Scalera (2012) for a discussion of this link.

Evidence of difficulty can be seen in a number of different ways in the GATT/WTO. In some cases, the negotiations over the criteria of accession are very efficient. In the case of Israel's accession to the GATT/WTO, for instance, the working party only asked twenty-six questions of the applicant state (GATT document L/992). In this case, then, the negotiations were relatively easy.

In other cases, the two parties fight hard in the negotiations, which leads to more exchanges of documentation, more discussions over contentious issues, and more meetings between the two parties. In the case of Saudi Arabia's accession to the GATT/WTO, for example, the working party asked over one thousand questions before agreeing to complete Saudi Arabia's accession process (WTO documents WT/ACC/SAU/2 and WT/ACC/SAU/61). In this case, and those like it, the negotiations were quite difficult. These differences in the difficulty of negotiations are significant to the GATT/WTO accession process, because they reveal details of the scrutiny states face before accession is complete.

I argued in the previous chapter that these outcomes of accession are explained as a function of the levels of domestic bureaucratic capacity and domestic public support in the applicant state and the composition of the gatekeepers in the international organization. These moving parts of the international organization and the applicant state set the pre-conditions or the framework for the negotiations, so as these parts move we will see variations in the outcomes of accession. Here, I will briefly illustrate how each of these parts of the theory apply to the context in the GATT/WTO. I will also discuss the testable hypotheses for the GATT/WTO context that are derived from my theoretical approach.

Domestic Bureaucratic Capacity

The first factor of interest concerns the domestic bureaucratic capacity of the applicant state. Undergoing the process of accession is a costly task for any state, since it requires a great deal of resources in time and money to see the process through (Michalopoulos 1998). Thus, a high level of bureaucratic capacity is needed to engage in the process of accession, and this capacity can encompass a range of resources including both financial resources and human capital resources.

Financial resources can be used for expenses as basic as travel between the domestic state and the location of the negotiations, and thus are critical to the success of the accession negotiations. Human capital resources are equally as important, however, as the domestic state needs both negotiators abroad and implementers at home with adequate knowledge of international law, economic policy, and institutional-legal procedure (Christoffersen 2007d). For some states, the bureaucracy simply does not have resources in these two areas to meet the demands of negotiating accession to the WTO, which can put a strain on the state causing the process to stall or become more difficult.

In the case of Vanuatu's initial accession to the WTO, for example, these burdens were a leading cause of its decision to suspend its accession bid in 2001. With only five members on staff to deal with the accession and no permanent mission to Geneva, the trips back and forth for negotiations were simply too much for the small state to handle. In fact, the WTO reports that Vanuatu's trips to Geneva for negotiations were costing upwards of WT 20 million or US\$150,000, which is a high financial burden for such a small bureaucracy (Gay 2005). In these ways, applicant states with a higher level of bureaucratic capacity will be better equipped to handle the demands of completing the accession process to the GATT/WTO.

H1: Applicant states with a high level of bureaucratic capacity will experience a shorter and less difficult accession process, *ceteris paribus*.⁴

Domestic Public Support

In addition to bureaucratic capacity, the acceding state must also have the support of a sizable percentage of the domestic population to engage in the process of accession. In other words, there must be a sizable number of citizens who support accession in the acceding state who are willing to demonstrate this support for the domestic leadership who negotiates accession.

Public support for accession can change before or during the accession negotiations through the use of side payments or sector-specific agreements. Domestic leaders can guarantee support for accession to an international organization by “buying off” key sectors of the domestic population to compensate for low levels of general support.⁵ In the case of Costa Rica’s accession to the GATT, for instance, special attention was paid during the negotiations to the textile industry. In order to guarantee the support from this critical sector, Costa Rica not only secured a bilateral trade deal with the US but also secured an extra two years to phase-in the forty percent tariff rate on clothing and footwear (GATT documents COT/151 and L/6589). However, the ability to make these types of deals are not guaranteed, so the level of public support for accession in the applicant state must be high enough at the beginning of the accession negotiations to ensure that the process has at least a reasonable chance of a successful outcome.

⁴ For a summary of all of the empirical expectations, see Table 3.2.

⁵ The need for domestic support for reforms is not limited to acceding countries. Even in the United States, domestic support is key to implementing WTO rules. One American official notes the importance of guaranteeing support for the implementation of WTO policies in 1994 through the use of side deals to such industries as citrus farmers in Florida, corn farmers, and cattle ranchers (Odell and Eichengreen 1998: 202).

H2: Applicant states with a high level of public support for accession will experience a shorter and less difficult accession process, *ceteris paribus*.

International Organization Gatekeepers

The next set of factors that determine variation in GATT/WTO accession come from the vantage point of the international organization. In the GATT/WTO, the parties that negotiate accession on behalf of the organization at large are composed of representatives from the individual member-states; in the GATT/WTO, these representatives are known as the working party. The member-states who serve on the working party are thus the gatekeepers of the organization as they determine which states become members and the specifics of how each process of accession unfolds.

The number of gatekeepers an applicant state must satisfy during the accession process has an impact on the outcomes of accession. The gatekeepers directly determine the terms for membership and how strictly those terms will be applied to the applicant state. For the GATT/WTO, there is a standard procedure for accession that all states are expected to follow as well as some general standards for membership that often come out of the general organization-wide negotiations, known as rounds (Williams 2008). These standard procedures and criteria serve as the baseline standards for the accession process from which specific requirements can be subtracted or added depending on the preferences of the working party. Thus, having fewer members to satisfy as part of the accession process is to the benefit of the applicant state.

H3: Applicant states that must satisfy fewer gatekeepers during their accession processes will experience a shorter and less difficult accession process, *ceteris paribus*.

While the working party members are assumed to be neutral, the reality is that these gatekeepers often represent their own national interests in addition to the interests of the GATT/WTO at large. Thus, the members of the working party must strike a balance between representing these two, sometimes opposing interests.

In each working party, challengers can emerge. A challenger is a member of the working party who prefers that the applicant state remain outside of the international organization, or at the very least that the applicant state have a difficult accession process. Challengers can surface within the gatekeepers for a variety of reasons, including differences in preferences regarding the functions of the international organization, economic competition, or political differences (Michalopoulos 1998). Having a gatekeeper that challenges the membership of the acceding state in the negotiation process can make the negotiations more difficult and increase the length of the accession process.

The impact challengers can have on an accession process can clearly be seen in the case of Japan's accession to the GATT. Japan faced fourteen challengers in its working party whose demands and delays were significant enough to extend the duration of Japan's accession from twelve months to thirty-eight months (GATT document L/225/ADD.1). In fact, the delays caused by the challengers' refusal to sign the final accession documents were so unnecessary that the Secretariat intervened on behalf of Japan (GATT document IC/W/13). Thus, the ability of the challenger to shift the preferences of the gatekeepers away from the preferences of the acceding state is enough to make the accession process longer and more difficult for the applicant state—if not stall the process all together.

H3a: Applicant states that have a challenger on their working parties will experience a longer and more difficult accession process, *ceteris paribus*.

International Organization Criteria for Membership

Over time, the need to satisfy the gatekeepers of the international organization will become more difficult for the applicant state. The criteria for membership will become more restrictive as the international organization continues to gain autonomy as an actor distinct from its member-states, in ways such as creating its own bureaucratic agencies (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Tallberg 2010). When applying my theoretical approach to the GATT/WTO context, it is imperative to consider the impact of the criteria for membership on the accession process.

In the case of the GATT/WTO, the organizational transition in 1995 to the WTO was one in which the organization not only gained more autonomy but also become more restrictive. This transition is often referred to as a shift in criteria from at the border regulations to behind the border regulations, meaning that the scope of the organization and the requirements for membership extend past concerns over trade barriers to concerns over tangible domestic liberalization efforts (Barton, Goldstein, Josling, and Steinberg 2006). In the case of the GATT/WTO, then, the shift in the standard criteria for membership have given even more power to the gatekeepers to extract additional concessions and thus make accession more difficult. Therefore, those states that accede under the WTO should expect a more difficult process as the strict criteria for membership give more leverage to the WTO gatekeepers during the accession negotiations.

H4: Applicant states that apply for accession under strict criteria for membership will experience a longer and more difficult accession process, *ceteris paribus*.

Data

As a first test of my theory, I conduct a quantitative analysis on data from the GATT/WTO. This dataset is an extension of an original dataset collected for Allee and Scalera (2012), and its use is one of the main contributions of this project. My dataset is unique in that nearly all of the indicators are taken directly from the original accession documents found in the GATT and WTO document databases.

Up to now, many scholars who study the topic of membership or accession to the GATT/WTO have made reference to these GATT/WTO documents, but few have translated them into quantitative measures. The use of primary-source, archival data is becoming increasingly important in a number of areas of political science (Moravcsik 2010). In my project, these sources not only contribute to qualitative research but also to quantitative research.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables for these tests come directly from my original dataset on accession to the GATT/WTO. I use several original measures of the accession process, which are compiled from primary sources available through the GATT Digital Library and the WTO Accession Gateway.⁶

For *duration*, I use a count measure of the number of years from the date of application to the date of membership. I code the number of accession years by examining the date stamp on the application document and the date stamp on the membership document, both of which are made available for each accession that takes place under the standard procedures. On average,

⁶ See <<http://gatt.stanford.edu/page/home>> and <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm>.

the accession process lasts seven years, but the length of time can range from one year to sixteen years.⁷

For *difficulty of negotiations*, I use two different measures that span several steps in the accession negotiation process. The first of these is a count of the number of *rounds of questions and answers* that take place during the accession process. I code this measure by counting the question and answer documents for each acceding state. This measure is important, because a high number of question and answer rounds is a signal that the negotiations were difficult. The rounds of questions and answers are the heart of the accession process for the GATT/WTO and serve as the time in which applicant states are subject to scrutiny by the international organization gatekeepers. Applicant states on average sit for anywhere from one to eleven rounds of questions and answers.

Complementary to this measure is a count of the *number of questions* that each applicant state had to answer as part of its accession process. I construct this measure by counting the individual questions listed in all of the question and answer documents for each acceding state. The number of questions and answers serves as a measure of the number of issues or concerns an acceding state must address during the process of accession. These issues can range from further clarification on an aspect of the domestic trade regime to requests for commitments on a new trade policy. Again, the logic is similar with more questions equating to a more difficult process.

Independent Variables

For the independent variable that captures the level of domestic *bureaucratic capacity*, I use a measure of bureaucratic quality taken from the International Country Risk Guide (Political

⁷ See Table 3.3 for a summary of the variables in my quantitative analysis.

Risk Services 2010). This measure captures the institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy with highest points given for politically independent bureaucracies that have the strength and expertise to govern without interruption during times of political transition. For all cases, I use the level of bureaucratic quality from the year prior to the application date as the measure of this variable.

For the independent variable that corresponds to *domestic public support*, I use a measure of public opinion on trade taken from the 1990s wave of the World Values Survey (Inglehart et al 2000). Since accession to the GATT/WTO requires acceding states to lower their barriers to trade, public opinion on this issue is comparable to public opinion on joining the GATT/WTO. Therefore, I use a measure of public attitudes on importing foreign goods as a proxy measure for public attitudes on joining the GATT/WTO. While the actual survey dates vary for each state, I use only those measures that are captured prior to the application date in my analysis. Consequently, all states without public opinion data prior to the date of application are excluded from the analysis.

For the independent variable that captures the concept of *gatekeepers*, I use a count measure of the maximum number of GATT/WTO member-states who serve on the working party for the applicant state's accession. These members are the representatives of the GATT/WTO and thus are the states that must be satisfied before the accession process is complete. I code this measure by counting the states listed in the original documentation available for each applicant state through the GATT Digital Library or the WTO Accessions Gateway.

As a complement to this measure, I also include a separate measure of *challengers*, which are those gatekeepers that signal an official opposition to the applicant state's membership.

Under both the GATT and the WTO, gatekeepers have the right to invoke a non-application clause that excludes those states from conforming to the rules governing relations between members. In other words, the relationship between the challenger and the applicant state is not governed by the rules of the GATT or WTO. Therefore, when a gatekeeper invokes this clause toward an applicant state, the gatekeeper—or challenger—is making a public statement of their opposition to the applicant state’s membership. Thus, I construct this measure by counting the number of gatekeepers that invoke the non-application clause against the applicant state. This measure is taken from the original documentation available to each applicant state through the GATT Digital Library or the WTO Accessions Gateway.

The final independent variable is an indicator of the *WTO era*. This is a dichotomous measure that captures whether a state’s accession process began or ended after the 1995 transition to the WTO. It is widely accepted that the criteria for the GATT/WTO have become stricter over time thus suggesting that states whose accession process spanned the transition to the WTO would experience a more difficult accession process.

Control Variables

Finally, I will use several control variables to account for competing explanations of variation in accession. First, I use a measure of *regime type* (Marshall and Jaggers 2005). Scholars have argued that the level of democracy determines the difficulty of the accession process, so I control for the level of democracy of each applicant state to determine the effect of democracy on the outcomes of accession (Wong and Yu 2008).

Next, I include a measure of *GDP per capita* (Gleditsch 2002). I include this control variable to ensure that bureaucratic capacity and not general levels of economic development

drive the variation in accession (Finger and Winters 1998; Engelbrecht and Pearce 2007; Basu 2008).

Finally, I include a measure of *population* as a control variable (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005). Including population as a control variable is useful to control for the argument that larger countries will have a more difficult accession process (Evenett and Primo Braga 2005).

Estimation

All empirical tests of my hypotheses are conducted using the state as the unit of analysis from 1950-2008. Due to data availability, however, some models are more comprehensive in coverage than others. I have noted these differences and the impact of data limitations in the discussion of my empirical results below.

All models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with fixed effects for time and standard errors clustered by country. Additionally, all domestic-level explanatory variables are coded for the years preceding accession to control for any temporal inconsistencies.

Finally, separate models are used for each of the four dependent variables and three of the four independent variables. I have chosen here to include separate models for the dependent variables to control for concerns over multicollinearity and over-estimation due to the small sample size. Moreover, I have chosen this strategy in order to maximize the total number of cases possible for each estimation. The results of the statistical tests are discussed below, and the results are also depicted in tables that are found at the end of the chapter.

Empirical Findings

The results of the quantitative estimation show strong support for several hypotheses, particularly those from the international level.⁸ On the other hand, the results only moderately support the hypotheses from the domestic level. All of the quantitative results are discussed below, and the full tables for the models are found at the end of the chapter.

The results of the quantitative estimation show no support for *H1* regarding the impact of bureaucratic capacity on the variation in the accession process. The sign of the coefficient is negative for three of the four dependent variables, as was anticipated by *H1*, but none of the coefficients reach the standard levels of significance.

There are a few plausible explanations for this finding. The first is that the variable measuring *bureaucratic capacity/quality* only covers a portion of the population of the GATT/WTO cases. In fact, my use of this measure restricts the sample size to just twenty-five countries out of the total population of fifty countries. Therefore, this operationalization of bureaucratic capacity alone is probably an incomplete measure of the concept. In future research, I plan to find other complementary variables to measure this concept.

I conjecture that the second reason for the lack of findings is substantive in nature. With the increased interest in membership among lesser-developed states, the WTO like many international organizations has become increasingly supportive of offering technical assistance (Williams 2008). In fact, China applied to be considered for special status as an LDC to receive technical assistance; this request was later denied (Buterbaugh and Fulton 2007). Technical assistance is often given to supplement the extremely low levels of bureaucratic quality in an effort to help these states through the process. For this reason, bureaucratic capacity might have

⁸ See Tables 3.4 through 3.7 for the results for each model.

been of greater importance for countries acceding under the GATT, which is something future research should take into account. Therefore, while the bureaucratic quality of an acceding state might be a critical factor in determining the outcomes of the accession process, other factors—like technical assistance—might be to blame for null results found here.

Next, my results show mixed support for *H2* regarding the influence of domestic public support on the outcomes of accession. The coefficient predicting the total number of questions is in the predicted direction and reaches standard levels of statistical significance. The coefficient in the model predicting duration has the predicted sign but does not reach standard levels of statistical significance. Finally, the coefficient for the model predicting the number of question and answer rounds is positive but also insignificant. Thus, it appears from these models that high levels of public support for trade liberalization are moderately significant predictors of less difficult accession negotiations—meaning fewer total questions are asked of the acceding state.

However, as was the case for the tests of bureaucratic capacity, small sample size for public support could have an effect on these findings. Due to the operationalization of the variable, only ten cases out of fifty are included in these estimations. Therefore, these results could change if other measures for public support are used in the future like levels of higher educated population or export-oriented sectors (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006).

The evidence in support of *H3* is much stronger than that of the previous two hypotheses with two of the three models all exhibiting positive and statistically significant coefficients. Only the model predicting accession duration fails to meet the standard levels of statistical significance. These results confirm the logic that the need to satisfy more gatekeepers during the accession process makes the negotiations more difficult for the acceding state.

The evidence in support of *H3a* is not as strong as that for the previous hypothesis. While the number of gatekeepers is a strong predictor of accession outcomes, the number of official challengers does not strongly predict accession outcomes.

As with the other independent variables, the number of challengers is not a good predictor of accession duration. While the coefficient is in the predicted positive direction, the coefficient is very small and statistically insignificant. These results again confirm that there are multiple factors that predict the duration of the accession process. As for the other outcomes of accession, the presence of an official challenger is not a statistically significant predictor of either the total questions or the total rounds of questions.

There are a number of plausible explanations for these results. First, the presence of an official challenger is quite rare. Therefore, the data for this variable are not evenly dispersed among the cases.

Second, the presence of an official challenger might actually lead to an easier accession process, since the challenger essentially abstains from participation in the negotiations. This conjecture needs further explanation, but it is possible that the presence of an official challenger can be very different from an unofficial challenger that remains a participant in the accession negotiations. Thus, these results suggest that the logic of challengers might work similarly to that of gatekeepers, but there is still room for additional investigation of this relationship.

Finally, all of the models show consistent support for *H4*. Even accounting for all other independent variables, acceding under the WTO consistently produces longer and more difficult accession processes.

This logic makes sense given that the requirements for joining under the WTO have consistently become stricter over time. For many states, these strict criteria have resulted in such

long and difficult negotiations that the process of accession had to be abandoned altogether. This unfortunate scenario also explains why many of the states currently undergoing accession have been engaged in the process for years.

Finally, the results concerning the control variables are at best mixed across all of the models. As predicted, higher levels of democracy in the applicant state seem to be a good predictor of shorter and easier negotiations. However, the results for the other two control variables are at best mixed. These findings are likely the result of incomplete measures and a small sample size for some of the models, which can be more fully addressed in future research.

In the end, the results of the empirical investigation presented here are supportive of the theoretical logic presented here as an explanation for the variation in the outcomes of accession to the GATT/WTO. While the domestic explanations do not perform as well as hoped, the explanations involving the role of international organization gatekeepers and the strictness of criteria under the WTO are strongly supported by the current estimations.

However, given the limitations presented by the scope of some of the data used in the models, further exploration of the relationships presented here will be essential. Still, these results suggest that this project is on the right trajectory for explaining the variation in accession to the GATT/WTO.

Empirical Illustration: China's Accession to the GATT/WTO

China's accession to the WTO in December 2001 remains one of the most important moments in the history of the organization. For the WTO, China's membership solidified the global influence of the organization and took the organization one step closer to universal membership.

For the Chinese, membership in the WTO was the last remaining step in an effort to take their place among the leaders of the global economy. Membership meant the end of an arduous process of accession and the turning point in a relationship that dated back to 1947. Today, the case of China's accession to the GATT/WTO serves as an important lesson in the difficulties of accession, particularly for a country facing domestic challenges and international opposition.

China's relationship with the GATT/WTO existed since the beginning of the organization. The Republic of China (RoC) was one of the original negotiating parties to the Final Act of Geneva and was consequently one of the founding members of the GATT. From 1948 to 1950, the Republic of China acted as a full participant to GATT negotiations, including efforts to reduce tariffs and bring new members into the organization (Feng 2006).

However, China's involvement in the GATT came to a standstill when the Republic of China moved its government to Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) established itself as the government in Beijing in October 1949. The PRC found membership in the GATT incompatible with its socialist, anti-Western view of government and thus never made a formal attempt to claim membership in the organization (Feng 2006). Unfortunately for the RoC, international pressure and domestic confusion forced the government to officially withdraw its membership in the GATT in 1950.

Until the late 1970s, relations between China and the rest of the world, including the members of the GATT, remained tense. However, pressure from both international and domestic sources to open the Chinese economy to trade and investment forced the PRC government to once again reconsider its relationship with the GATT (Feng 2006: 69). On 10 July 1986, China officially applied for the resumption of its membership status in the GATT.

As my argument demonstrates, China had all of the right factors to predict a long and difficult accession process—low domestic support for accession, a lack of domestic capacity in human and financial resources, and serious opposition from the GATT/WTO gatekeepers. First, not all members of the Chinese government—let alone the general Chinese population—were in agreement with the decision to apply to the GATT. Many Chinese remained focused on concerns over Taiwan and its influence in the international community, not on the potential benefits from reinstating membership in the GATT (Feng 2006). To be sure, the challenges presented by Taiwan’s relationship with the international community were a distraction for those seeking membership in the GATT/WTO as leaders were forced to contend with domestic concerns over Taiwan on top of all the other requirements for accession. Given this challenge, officials in the Chinese government that supported membership in the GATT sought support from relevant bureaucratic agencies to see the accession process through to completion (Feng 2006).

In addition to low public support for accession to the GATT, the Chinese also had to bear the burden of limited resources for accession. In anticipation of the costs of accession, China initially applied for special consideration as a lesser-developed country (LDC). Special consideration as an LDC would have meant fewer demands placed on China in addition to technical assistance for implementing the necessary policy and institutional changes. However, China’s request for LDC status was declined on the grounds that China’s economic size and successful economic transition made the benefits of LDC status unnecessary.

Still, participation in accession negotiations required enough resources to send a team of trained negotiators to Geneva, which was a burden for the Chinese at the time. In an attempt to circumvent these demands, China initially participated in the Uruguay Rounds in an effort to

secure membership simultaneous to the general negotiations, as many states did in the 1950s and 1970s. However, an accession deal could not be reached during the Uruguay Rounds, so again, the Chinese turned to its many bureaucratic agencies to find the capacity necessary to complete the accession negotiations (Feng 2006).

Certainly the greatest source of China's difficulty in completing its accession process came from the opposition it faced from the gatekeepers. Citing concerns over China's economic size, the geostrategic conflict with Taiwan, and human rights atrocities such as the incident at Tiananmen square, an unprecedented number of states joined China's working party. By the time negotiations ended in 2001, sixty-two states had served on the working party, with many acting as vocal challengers to China's accession.

The United States and the member-states of the European Union were certainly the most notable challengers, but even smaller states like El Salvador stood in opposition to China's membership in the GATT/WTO (WTO documents WT/ACC/CHN/2/*). In fact, El Salvador was the only state to officially oppose China's membership by invoking the non-application clause in Article XII of the WTO charter. In so doing, El Salvador was not bound to treat China as a member of the WTO. Eventually, El Salvador withdrew the non-application clause, and the trading relationship between these two countries once again fell under the guidelines of the WTO agreements.

Furthermore, with the transition from the GATT to the WTO in 1995, these gatekeepers had even more leverage to place demands on the Chinese (Ostry 2002). Fortunately, Japan materialized as an advocate for China's accession, due in large part to the potentially lucrative trading relationship that Japan anticipated once China joined the WTO. Japan's advocacy helped to ensure that the process of accession was expedited as much as possible, especially once the

United States and the European Union concluded their bilateral negotiations with China (Buterbaugh and Fulton 2007).

Given the aforementioned difficulties China faced, it is no surprise that China's accession remains one of the most difficult to date. First, China's accession spanned one hundred eighty-five months, which is a record to-date in the WTO (WTO document WT/L/432). Of course, not all of this time was spent in intense negotiations over the terms of accession. In fact, there were significant delays in China's negotiations as a result of domestic unrest in 1989 and controversies over Taiwan's⁹ continued involvement in the GATT and WTO (GATT document L/6635). Many scholars and policymakers believe the transition from the GATT to the WTO was a significant cause of China's lengthy accession, but a careful investigation of China's accession documents reveals no significant delay due to the transition to the WTO. In fact, the documented activity on China's accession process actually becomes more frequent in the period between 1994 and 1997 when the WTO transition was in full effect.

The primary cause of the length of China's accession period seems to stem from the difficult accession negotiations between 1996 and early 2000. These difficult accession negotiations were a direct function of the number of gatekeepers China faced and, to a more limited extent, China's limited domestic capacity. During this time period, China was required to sit before the working party for over one thousand questions and to submit over twelve

⁹ In October 1971, the United Nations officially recognized the PRC as "China" thereby forcing the RoC government in Taiwan to abdicate its membership in both the UN and the GATT. However, on 29 September 1992, Taiwan began its own efforts to rejoin the global economy under its own name (GATT document L/7097). Due to the conflict with China and the fact that China had officially begun its accession bid before Taiwan, an agreement was reached that would allow Taiwan to join the GATT/WTO but only after China and under the name "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu" or "Chinese Taipei". Therefore, in January 2002, Taiwan finally rejoined the WTO as the 144th member (WTO document WT/L/433).

additional documents of information relating to these questions to its working party (Feng 2006). Under the WTO, it has not been uncommon for states to sit for hundreds of questions as the scope of the organization's mandate significantly increased in 1995.

As a point of comparison, for example, the two other countries that joined the WTO in 2001, Lithuania and Moldova, were asked 640 questions and 861 questions respectively (WTO documents WT/ACC/LTU/* and WT/ACC/MOL/8). However, few states have been required to sit for targeted questions from specific working party members as was required of China.¹⁰ In fact, China had to answer approximately 419 specific questions from individual gatekeepers on top of the other questions it was asked by the working party, including: Australia, Canada, Norway, the United States, Japan, Switzerland, Argentina, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Thailand, and the members of the European Union (WTO document Spec(88)13/Add.3). In fact, so much activity was taking place during this time that China submitted two revised memoranda to its working party detailing these changes, which included an updated Schedule of Specific Commitments on Trade and Services and a comprehensive list of newly implemented domestic laws and regulations (WTO documents WT/ACC/CHN/4 and WT/ACC/CHN/17). This activity and the extent to which it required China to go above and beyond the standard requirements for other acceding states directly show how a high number of gatekeepers, and vocal challengers, can increase the difficulty of the accession negotiations.

Finally, as I will discuss in more depth in the next chapter, China was required to make an unprecedented number of domestic policy and institutional changes. As I previously

¹⁰ This practice, for example, was not required of Lithuania or Moldova. Panama stands as another notable example of a country required to sit for specific questions at the request of some members of its Working Party. During its accession from 1991 to 1997, Panama answered 227 additional questions at the request of Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States (GATT document L/7426).

mentioned, China was forced to make domestic changes throughout its accession process as a result of the questions it faced from its gatekeepers, which were detailed in the last two memoranda it submitted. In addition to these changes, China made a record eighty-two specific concessions to the GATT/WTO members in exchange for its membership in the organization (WTO documents WT/L/432). While some of these changes have been standard across all member-states, such as a reduction in tariffs and non-discriminatory treatment to all WTO members, China's changes in areas of legal transparency and consistency in judicial authority reflect unique changes required for a state lacking in domestic capacity that faced such vocal challengers in the WTO.

Clearly, the case of China's accession to the WTO illustrates how beginning the accession process with limited domestic support and limited bureaucratic capacity and facing a large number a gatekeepers can make the process of accession much more difficult. To date, China's accession represents one of the most challenging on a number of indicators, including length of accession, the number of questions, and the number and depth of domestic changes. In these ways, China's experience demonstrates the influence of international organization gatekeepers on states and the lengths that an applicant state will go to in an effort to gain entry into an international organization.

Conclusion

Contrary to conventional assumptions, states often experience very different paths to membership in international organizations. In this project, I offered an explanation for the differences in the GATT/WTO accession process that draws upon original insights into the accession process itself. I argued that the variation in the outcomes of accession depends on the

level of domestic public support and domestic capacity in the applicant state and the composition of gatekeepers, or veto players, in the international organization. Through a quantitative and qualitative empirical investigation into the accession process to the GATT/WTO, I show strong support for my argument.

Consequently, my project makes a number of contributions to the field of International Relations (IR). First, my project opens up an otherwise black-boxed process in IR by focusing squarely on the process of accession. In so doing, my project sheds light on a number of related questions including how international organizations have leverage over states and how states can use accession to international organizations to bring about and secure domestic political and economic reforms. Second, the theory presented here links domestic politics with international politics showing the influence that these two political arenas have on each other. Finally, I make use of primary-source documents to create original quantitative and qualitative data on the GATT/WTO accession process.

In the next chapter, I turn my empirical focus to the domestic effects of the WTO accession process and investigate what domestic political and economic changes applicant states make in exchange for membership in the WTO. Specifically, I show that states make meaningful changes to domestic policy and domestic institutions when faced with scrutiny from gatekeepers during the accession negotiations. In this way, I show that variations in the accession process have real effects on the domestic political environments of applicant states.

Tables

Table 3.1: Detailed Outline of the Accession Process to the GATT/WTO

1	State sends application for accession to the GATT/WTO Secretariat.
2	The Secretariat sends a notification of the applicant state's request to the member-states, which includes an invitation to join the Working Party (WP) to oversee the accession of the applicant state. The WP is consequently established and a Chairperson is selected.
3	The applicant state prepares and submits a Memorandum to the WP. The Memorandum outlines all information relevant to the applicant state's foreign trade regime.
4	The WP meets to receive the Memorandum and to submit questions on the Memorandum or any items deemed relevant that were excluded from the Memorandum. The applicant state replies to the questions. (This step is repeated to the satisfaction of the WP.)
5	Bilateral negotiations begin between the applicant state and any or all of the members of the WP.
6	Once steps four and five are completed, the WP meets to prepare a draft report summarizing the outcomes of the negotiations, including a preliminary schedule of concessions and commitments made on the part of the applicant state.
7	Pending no further objections, the WP finalizes the draft report, adopts the final report, and submits the final report to the General Council and applicant state. The final report is referred to as the Protocol of Accession.
8	The General Council approves the Protocol of Accession, and member-states are invited to sign the document.
9	The applicant state approves the Protocol of Accession, and if necessary, submits it for ratification by the domestic legislature.
10	The applicant state notifies the Secretariat that it has completed all steps necessary to adopt the Protocol of Accession.
11	The Secretariat releases a declaration stating that the applicant state has become a member of the GATT/WTO.

Source: World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_e.htm.

Table 3.2: Empirical Expectations

Hypothesis 1	Applicant states with a high level of <i>bureaucratic capacity</i> will have a shorter and less difficult accession process, <i>ceteris paribus</i> .
Hypothesis 2	Applicant states with a high level of <i>public support</i> for accession will experience a shorter and less difficult accession process, <i>ceteris paribus</i> .
Hypothesis 3	Applicant states that must satisfy fewer <i>gatekeepers</i> during the accession process will experience a shorter and less difficult accession process, <i>ceteris paribus</i> .
Hypothesis 3a	Applicant states that have a <i>challenger</i> on their working parties will experience a longer and more difficult accession process, <i>ceteris paribus</i> .
Hypothesis 4	Applicant states that apply for accession under strict <i>criteria for membership</i> will experience a longer and more difficult accession process, <i>ceteris paribus</i> .

Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Minimum	Maximum
Length of Accession (years)	6.68	1	16
Number of Gatekeepers	24.4	12	62
Total Number of Questions	452	10	3476
Total Number of Q & A Rounds	4.22	1	21
Public Opinion on Accession	37.55	20.6	57.5
Bureaucratic Quality	1.66	0	3

Table 3.4: The Effect of Bureaucratic Quality on Accession

	Duration	Total Questions	Q&A Rounds
Bureaucratic Quality	-0.399 (0.694)	-18.366 (65.779)	0.072 (0.489)
WTO Era	3.655** (1.473)	496.426** (214.254)	4.207** (1.427)
Polity	-0.018 (0.019)	-2.121 (1.704)	-0.021 (0.013)
GDP per capita	0.000 (0.000)	0.029 (0.030)	0.000 (0.000)
Population	-0.000 (0.000)	0.004 (0.007)	0.000 (0.000)
Observations	837	837	837
Clusters	25	25	25
R-squared	0.363	0.342	0.455

Table 3.5: The Effect of Public Opinion on Accession

	Duration	Total Questions	Q&A Rounds
Public Opinion	-0.083 (0.057)	-6.722* (4.772)	0.001 (0.065)
WTO Era	-0.832 (1.136)	500.983*** (58.792)	5.486*** (0.893)
Polity	-0.029** (0.012)	-5.108*** (1.074)	-0.058*** (0.011)
GDP per capita	-0.001** (0.000)	0.003 (0.021)	0.000 (0.000)
Population	0.000*** (0.000)	0.056*** (0.001)	0.000*** (0.000)
Observations	172	172	172
Clusters	10	10	10
R-squared	0.871	0.974	0.925

Table 3.6: The Effect of International Organization Gatekeepers on Accession

	Duration	Total Questions	Q&A Rounds
Gatekeepers	0.008 (0.013)	4.364* (2.959)	0.027* (0.020)
WTO Era	4.292** (1.418)	449.622*** (123.935)	3.818*** (0.907)
Polity	-0.015 (0.020)	-2.283 (1.802)	-0.018 (0.014)
GDP per capita	0.000 (0.000)	0.002 (0.009)	0.000 (0.000)
Population	-0.000 (0.000)	0.003 (0.004)	0.000 (0.000)
Observations	1275	1259	1259
Clusters	37	36	36
R-squared	0.377	0.421	0.480

Table 3.7: The Effect of International Organization Challengers on Accession

	Duration	Total Questions	Q&A Rounds
Challengers	0.002 (0.209)	-42.167 (27.511)	-0.225 (0.217)
WTO Era	4.373** (1.455)	516.123*** (152.672)	4.214** (1.117)
Polity	-0.015 (0.020)	-2.147 (1.844)	-0.017 (0.014)
GDP per capita	0.000 (0.000)	0.007 (0.011)	0.000 (0.000)
Population	-0.000 (0.000)	0.003 (0.004)	0.000 (0.000)
Observations	1275	1259	1259
Clusters	37	36	36
R-squared	0.374	0.387	0.452

CHAPTER FOUR
THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION

On 26 October 2011, the General Council of the World Trade Organization (WTO) approved Vanuatu's accession package, thereby signaling the end of its very difficult accession process. While it seemed that membership in the WTO was out of reach for Vanuatu, particularly after a suspension of the negotiations in 2001, Vanuatu is finally within reach of becoming the 154th member of the WTO. WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy praised this event by stating:

With Vanuatu the WTO receives a least-developed country into the family. Its membership will strengthen the multilateral trading system and provide this country with a stable and predictable trade environment. Vanuatu's accession brings the WTO one step closer to our goal of universal membership (WTO 2011).

Few would disagree with Director-General Lamy's statement that Vanuatu's accession is a sign of success for the WTO, but many scholars would question whether accession to the WTO will really provide Vanuatu with "a stable and predictable trade environment." Will membership in the WTO bring about positive changes to Vanuatu's domestic political and economic environment?

In this chapter, I shed new light on how international institutions matter by examining the domestic political and economic implications of accession to the World Trade Organization. With the upcoming accession of Vanuatu, the WTO moves one step closer to universal membership. Yet, there remains a great deal of uncertainty in both academic and policy circles as to the effects of membership in international organizations. I provide a unique perspective on

this question by turning the focus to accession. By looking at the domestic implications of accession, I highlight how international organizations have a direct and meaningful effect on the domestic political and economic environment of acceding states and member-states.

How Do International Organizations Affect Domestic Politics?

For the last decade, the question of whether and how international organizations matter to states has occupied a place of prominence in International Relations (IR) scholarship. Key to this question has been the focus on membership as the primary mechanism by which international organizations matter. According to Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001), membership has “important consequences for interactions” because “membership rules determine who benefits from an institution and who pays the costs” (783). Thus, many scholars have focused on membership—as either a monadic characteristic or a joint characteristic of a dyad—as the answer to how international organizations matter.

Still, the effects of membership in international organizations remain inconclusive at best. On the one hand, scholars have noted that membership in international organizations can have democratizing effects on the domestic politics of states (Pevehouse 2005; Simmons 2009). Similarly, joint membership in international organizations has been seen to have pacifying effects on relationships between states (Russett and Oneal 2001; Boehmer, Gartzke, and Nordstrom 2004). In these cases, membership has positive effects on states.

However, in many issue areas, such as human rights and economic liberalization, the effects of membership have been less positive. Scholars have argued that membership in international organizations has not had the anticipated positive effects in these areas since states are unlikely to fully comply with the mandates of the international organizations (Hafner-Burton

2005; von Stein 2005). One of the most prominent scholars in this camp has been Rose (2004) who found that variables measuring dyadic membership in the WTO weren't significant predictors of bilateral trade flows. Thus, his results suggest that the WTO has had no positive impact on the policies of its member-states. While many scholars have attempted to find new ways of measuring membership to prove Rose (2004) and others wrong, the fact remains that the impact of membership in international organizations is still inconclusive at best.

More recently, some scholars have chosen to shift the focus on membership to a focus on accession, which is the process by which states join international organizations. By examining accession, we see that international organizations have leverage over states during this process by holding out the reward of membership in exchange for concessions (Kydd 2001; Jacoby 2004). Moreover, we see that the changes made during accession, especially during rigorous accessions, can have lasting impacts on states (Allee and Scalera 2012). These studies demonstrate that the impact of international organizations on states is best viewed through the lens of accession.

Here, I focus on the impact that accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) have on the domestic politics of the acceding state.¹ I demonstrate that international organizations have direct influence on states by requiring policy and institutional changes during the accession process in exchange for membership. In the WTO, I show how scrutiny during the accession process leads states to make meaningful commitments to domestic changes in three different areas: trade policy, political and economic organization, and domestic governance. By showing that states make domestic changes during

¹ Here, I use the term GATT/WTO to designate the entire organization from 1950 to the present. Otherwise, the term GATT refers to the organization from 1950-1994, and the term WTO refers to the organization from 1995 to the present.

accession, I clearly show the importance of accession as a mechanism by which international organizations affect states.

WTO Accession Impacts Domestic Politics

While some scholars remain skeptical that accession has meaningful domestic effects, I demonstrate in this chapter that states make important domestic changes through the accession process in the GATT/WTO.

Accession is a multi-step process that requires acceding states to make domestic policy and institutional changes in exchange for membership. I identify four key stages in the GATT/WTO accession process. The first stage is the *application* stage where the applicant state submits a request to begin the accession process to the Director-General of the GATT/WTO. At this stage, the Director-General then convenes members of the GATT/WTO to oversee the accession process in a group called the working party. I identify these working party members as the gatekeepers of the organization; gatekeepers are the representatives who oversee the entire accession process from this first stage to membership. Once these gatekeepers have convened, the accession process moves into the *memorandum* stage where the applicant state provides a document to the gatekeepers that details all domestic policies and institutions related to the GATT/WTO mandate. Once the gatekeepers receive the memorandum, the applicant state moves into the *multilateral and bilateral negotiation* phase where the gatekeepers ask questions and negotiate concessions based on the memorandum. Once all parties have agreed to the terms of accession that come out of the negotiations, the fourth stage of accession begins. In the *final accession package* stage, the gatekeepers draw up a final document that is signed by both parties and is known as the accession protocol in the GATT/WTO.

Domestic changes are specified in the GATT/WTO accession protocol, which is the key component of the fourth and final step in the accession process. In the accession protocol, the domestic policy and institutional changes are outlined as commitment paragraphs. All states that accede to the WTO under the standard accession procedures outlined in Article XII are required to make domestic policy and institutional changes that are codified in these commitment paragraphs.

In all, there are several broad categories for these commitments that include: broader macroeconomic policies, frameworks for making and enforcing policies, policies affecting trade in goods and services, import and export regulation, transparency, and trade agreements (Williams 2008). Commitment paragraphs thus designate the specific liberalization efforts that each applicant state agrees to make in exchange for membership in the GATT/WTO.

While all states are required to commit to domestic changes, not all states make the same number of commitments. When we compare accession protocols among recent members of the WTO, for example, we find unexpected differences. Among some of the Middle Eastern countries that have recently joined the WTO, for instance, Saudi Arabia made a record number of commitments in 2005 totaling 59 in all (WTO document WT/ACC/SAU/61).² This is a surprisingly high number, particularly when compared to the 29 commitments Jordan made in 1999 or the 26 commitments Oman made in 2000 (WTO document WT/ACC/JOR/33; WTO document WT/ACC/OMN/26). Still, these differences are not limited to states in the Middle East. We also find significant variation among eastern European states with Ukraine making 63 commitments as compared to the much smaller numbers of Bulgaria at 26 commitments or Estonia at 24 (WTO document WT/ACC/UKR/152; WTO document WT/ACC/BRG/7; and

² All WTO documents (WT/*) are available online through the WTO's Documents Online page: http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_home.asp?language=1&_=1

WTO document WT/ACC/EST/ 20). Clearly, then, even very similar states make very different commitments on domestic policy and institutional changes.

Every state that joins the organization under the standard accession procedures outlined in Article XXXIII for the GATT and Article XII for the WTO will be forced to make concessions in exchange for membership in the organization. However, not all states will be forced to make the same number of changes in exchange for membership. The factor that varies for each state that accedes to the GATT/WTO under the four-stage process is the same factor that determines the number of concessions it will make—scrutiny.

Domestic Changes in the GATT/WTO

All states face some degree of scrutiny by design in the accession process. At the *memorandum* stage, applicant states are required to be fully transparent about all domestic policies and institutions relating to foreign trade. States are asked to include information that can be viewed as sensitive, including preferential trade practices, the mandates of regulatory agencies and information detailing their most important economic sectors.

This information is then made available to all gatekeepers who use the memorandum as the basis for the *multilateral and bilateral negotiations* stage. The purpose of the negotiations stage is to force the applicant state to make adjustments to domestic policies and institutions to bring them into alignment with the standards in the GATT/WTO. By design, then, gatekeepers place the applicant state under scrutiny in rounds of questions and answers to determine which changes must be made before membership can be conferred on the applicant state.

Therefore, domestic changes are the result of the scrutiny from international organization gatekeepers faced by the acceding state during the accession negotiations. Domestic changes are

only made as a result of the scrutiny that comes by design from the international organization gatekeepers. As the intensity of scrutiny increases in the accession process, states will make more domestic changes.

H1: Applicant states that face higher levels of scrutiny during the accession process will make more domestic political and economic changes, *ceteris paribus*.³

In the GATT/WTO, I capture scrutiny by examining five key indicators: length of accession, number of questions, number of rounds of questions and answers, the number of gatekeepers, and the presence of challengers. As any one of these indicators increases during the accession process, thereby increasing the level of scrutiny, states will expect to make more domestic political and economic changes.

The first three measures of scrutiny are more general indicators. Length of accession, measuring years from application to membership, serves as the most general indicator of scrutiny as longer accession periods typically correspond to more scrutiny. The number of questions and the number of rounds of questions both directly capture the scrutiny an applicant state faces in the third stage of the accession process.

However, the presence of gatekeepers captures exactly *who* is responsible for the level of scrutiny. Therefore, I identify the gatekeepers as the most important indicators of scrutiny. In the GATT/WTO, the gatekeepers are known as the working party members. As the number of working party members increases, the applicant state must satisfy more gatekeepers before membership is conferred. Therefore, an applicant state that faces more gatekeepers will certainly face more scrutiny.

³ Table 4.1 also includes this hypothesis.

Moreover, an applicant state that faces a challenger as one of its gatekeepers will face an even higher degree of scrutiny during the accession process. A challenger is a member of the working party who prefers that the applicant state remain outside of the international organization, or at the very least that the applicant state have a difficult accession process. By nature, therefore, a challenger will be more likely to scrutinize the applicant state more closely thus requiring more domestic changes be made in exchange for membership. Therefore, an applicant state that faces a challenger will certainly face more scrutiny.

As any one of these five indicators increase during the accession process, thereby increasing the level of scrutiny, states will make more domestic political and economic changes.

Quantitative Estimation

As a first test of my argument that scrutiny during accession results in changes to the domestic political and economic environment, I conduct a quantitative analysis of data from the GATT/WTO. This dataset is an extension of an original dataset collected for Allee and Scalera (2012), which is one of the main contributions of this project.

My dataset is unique in that nearly all of the indicators are taken directly from the original accession documents found in the GATT and WTO document databases. Up to now, many scholars who study the topic have made reference to these GATT/WTO documents, but few have translated them into quantitative measures or used them directly in case-study analysis. The use of primary-source, archival data is becoming increasingly important in a number of areas of political science, particularly as the discipline moves toward more careful analysis of precise mechanisms. In my project, these sources contribute to both quantitative and qualitative research.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for this investigation comes directly from my original dataset on accession to the GATT/WTO, which is compiled from primary sources available through the GATT Digital Library and the WTO Accession Gateway. The dependent variable *commitment paragraphs* is a measure of the number of concessions included in each state's accession protocol.

For states that acceded under the WTO, the commitment paragraphs are explicitly listed at the end of the protocols of accession. In these cases, I identify the paragraphs by counting the list found in the conclusion. In the GATT, however, these paragraphs are dispersed throughout the accession protocols. Thus, I identify these paragraphs by searching each document for the relevant phrasing and tallying the individual paragraphs.

Independent Variables

For the key independent variable that captures the concept of scrutiny, I use a count measure of the maximum number of GATT/WTO member-states who serve on the working party for the applicant state's accession, which I call *gatekeepers*. These members are the representatives of the GATT/WTO and thus are the states that must be satisfied before the accession process is complete. This measure is taken from the original documentation available for each applicant state through the GATT Digital Library or the WTO Accessions Gateway.

As a complement to this measure, I also include a separate measure of *challengers*, which are those gatekeepers that signal an official opposition to the applicant state's membership. When a gatekeeper presents itself as a challenger to an applicant state, the challenger signals a

strong desire to push the applicant state beyond the standard levels of scrutiny. Therefore, I include a measure of challengers by counting the number of gatekeepers that invoke the non-application clause of Article XXXV against the applicant state. This measure is taken from the original documentation available to each applicant state through the GATT Digital Library or the WTO Accessions Gateway.

Control Variables

I also include several key control variables in my analysis, which are predicted to influence the number of domestic concessions an acceding state is likely to make. First, I include a variable is an indicator of the *WTO era*. It is widely accepted that the criteria for the WTO are much stricter than the GATT, thus requiring states to make more domestic commitments under the WTO (Barton, Goldstein, Josling, and Steinberg 2006). Therefore, I include a dichotomous measure that captures whether a state's accession process ended after the 1995 transition to the WTO. I predict that accession under the WTO will result in more commitments made in exchange for membership.

Next, I include a measure of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (Gleditsch 2002). For all cases, I use the level of *GDP per capita* from the year prior to the application date as the measure of this variable to control for time dependence. I include this control variable to account for the argument that suggests more developed countries make fewer domestic changes. Consistently, scholars have suggested that the GATT/WTO is a club for richer states, noting how much more difficult accession is for less developed countries (Finger and Winters 1998; Gowa and Kim 2005; Engelbrecht and Pearce 2007; Basu 2008). Therefore, I control for the level of development to account for this argument that less developed states are held to higher levels of

scrutiny than more developed states. Contrary to these arguments, I expect GDP per capita to not be a significant predictor of commitments made in exchange for membership.

Finally, I include a measure of *GDP* as a control variable (Gleditsch 2002). For all cases, I use the level of GDP from the year prior to the application date as the measure of this variable to control for time dependence. I include GDP as a control variable to account for the argument that larger countries will make more domestic changes (Evenett and Primo Braga 2005). In many ways, the relationship between size—particularly economic size—and the number of domestic changes seems to be evident in many of the key examples used in the literature on WTO accession (Feng 2006; Kim 2010). Even here, my examples seem to suggest this relationship exists. However, I do not assume that this relationship holds across all GATT/WTO cases from 1950-2008. In fact, I expect GDP to not be a significant predictor of commitments made in exchange for membership.⁴

Estimation

All empirical tests of my hypotheses are conducted using the state as the unit of analysis from 1950-2008. Due to data availability, however, my sample size is reduced to thirty-four cases down from the total population of fifty cases that have acceded to the GATT/WTO under the standard procedures.

All models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors. Additionally, all domestic-level explanatory variables are coded for the years proceeding accession to control for any temporal inconsistencies. While the results of the

⁴ See Table 4.2 for descriptive statistics of the variables included in my quantitative estimation.

models are discussed below, the results are also depicted in tables found at the end of the chapter.

Quantitative Results

I first run a series of correlations as an initial investigation into the relationships between the variables in my analysis.⁵ In keeping with my theoretical approach, I predict that the presence of gatekeepers and challengers will be strongly correlated with the number of commitment paragraphs a state agrees to make in exchange for membership.

The correlation coefficient for *gatekeepers* confirms my prediction showing a strong, positive correlation with the measure of commitment paragraphs. The correlation coefficient for *challengers*, however, is very small. Therefore, while it shows a positive relationship between the two variables, this coefficient does not strongly confirm my predictions.

The correlation coefficients for my control variables also confirm my predictions. The correlation coefficient for the *WTO* shows a strong, positive relationship between accession under the WTO era and the number of commitment paragraphs. Conversely, the correlation coefficient for *GDP* shows a weak, positive relationship between the size of the state and the number of commitment paragraphs. Additionally, the correlation coefficient for *GDP per capita* shows an even weaker, positive relationship between the level of economic development and the number of commitment paragraphs. Therefore, these results suggest strong support for my predictions and very limited support for any counter arguments.

⁵ I report the correlations between my primary variables in Table 4.3.

To further test these predictions, I employ an OLS regression. In all, I use six different models to explore the relationships between my key variables.⁶ As predicted, the results of all six of the OLS regression models show strong support for my argument that increased scrutiny during accession results in more domestic concessions.

In particular, the coefficient for *gatekeepers*, the primary measure of scrutiny, is consistently positive and statistically significant. Since these models are all generated using OLS regression, the coefficients can be read directly to determine the substantive effects. According to the coefficients, states should expect an increase of about one commitment paragraph for each additional gatekeeper on the working party. These results offer strong support for my prediction that states facing more scrutiny from international organization gatekeepers during accession will make more domestic policy and institutional concessions as expressed in the commitment paragraphs.

The secondary measure of scrutiny, *challengers*, does not perform as well as expected. All of the coefficients are consistently positive, which is in the expected direction. However, the coefficients fail to reach standard levels of statistical significance. I expect that these results are a function of the fact that the presence of an official challenger is a rare event. Therefore, in future research, I will consider other less official ways of measuring the presence of a challenger to better determine the impact challengers have on commitments to domestic changes.

The results concerning the control variables are also consistent with my predictions. In all of the models, accession under the *WTO* era is a strong, positive predictor of the number of commitment paragraphs. On average, completing accession after 1995 will add between eight

⁶ A summary of the results of these six models is found at the end of the chapter in Table 4.4.

and twenty-five additional commitment paragraphs for each applicant state. Thus, as predicted, accession under the WTO requires more domestic concessions than accession under the GATT.

Next, the results for *GDP* are largely insignificant as predicted. Therefore, according to these models, the size of the applicant state is not a strong predictor of the number of commitment paragraphs. Similarly, the results for *GDP per capita* are also insignificant as predicted. Here again, the level of economic development of the applicant state is not a strong predictor of commitment paragraphs. All of these results, therefore, lend strong support to my argument that scrutiny during accession negotiations is in fact the key predictor of domestic concessions.

The results of the quantitative investigation presented here are supportive of my theoretical logic. However, given some of the limitations presented by the coverage of data, further exploration of the relationship between scrutiny and domestic concessions is essential. Therefore, I turn to case-study analysis to more carefully examine the effect scrutiny has on domestic political and economic changes made in exchange for membership in international organizations.

Exploring Domestic Commitments Further

Here, I have argued and demonstrated using original quantitative data that acceding states will make commitments to domestic changes as a direct result of the scrutiny they face during the accession process from international organization gatekeepers.

Still, some scholars have been skeptical that states make meaningful domestic changes during accession to the WTO (Rose 2007). However, in the WTO, like other international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union

(EU), acceding states do in fact make meaningful domestic changes. These changes are evident in the extensive documentation available for each accession that shows explicitly how each acceding state has made adjustments to domestic laws and institutions according to the requirements of the gatekeepers (Williams 2008; WTO Documents Online). Furthermore, a number of scholars have pointed to the remarkable reductions in tariff rates made by states seeking membership in the WTO, which is one of the most basic types of changes states can make (Pelc 2011; Allee and Scalera 2012). Finally, numerous examples of qualitative literature on the WTO demonstrate how membership in the organization directly impacts the domestic politics of acceding states (Feng 2006; Bugajski et al 2009). Thus, while the domestic changes are called commitments in the WTO, states actually implement considerable domestic policy and institutional changes in exchange for membership.

As already mentioned, these domestic changes can encompass nearly anything from changes in tariff rates to changes in inflation targets to new consumer product safety standards, and examples of domestic institutional changes often involve the expansion of domestic bureaucratic agencies to manage the new policy changes. In all, there are several broad categories for these changes that include: broader macroeconomic policies, frameworks for making and enforcing policies, policies affecting trade in goods and services, import and export regulation, transparency, and trade agreements (Williams 2008). States seeking to join the WTO will expect to make changes to trade policy, particularly in areas relating to tariffs and non-tariff barriers. These issues have long been within the scope of the mandate of the WTO—and even the GATT. However, particularly in the WTO era, states will also be expected to make changes in other trade-related areas and some areas that are not specifically linked to trade.

In all, I identify three categories of domestic changes states make during the accession process to the WTO. First, states will be expected to make changes to *trade policy*. Changes in this category include changes to tariff rates, changes to non-tariff barriers such as quotas, and changes to policies affecting subsidies. These changes are the most basic changes states are expected to make and have thus received a great deal of attention in recent literature on the WTO (Pelc 2011; Allee and Scalera 2012). Nevertheless, changes to trade policy are critical as they are at the heart of the WTO mandate and have lasting impacts on the trading relationship between member and non-member states.

Second, under the WTO, states will be expected to make changes to their domestic *economic or political organization*. In other words, states will be required to make changes that directly impact how their domestic economic and political environments are organized in trade-related areas. For example, states will be expected to adopt policies on trade-related issues such as taxation, privatization, and the regulation of goods and services. States will also be expected to make changes to trade-related institutions such as customs agencies and the banking sector. More recently, these changes have been called “behind the border” changes or “WTO plus” changes, and they are increasingly becoming one of the hallmarks of the WTO era (Barton et al 2006; Cattaneo and Primo Braga 2009).

Finally, and perhaps unexpectedly, many states will be expected to make changes that fall under a category I call *domestic governance*. While officially outside the mandate of the WTO, many gatekeepers require acceding states to make changes that are related more to issues of domestic governance and less to trade policy. For instance, these domestic changes include increased transparency in the way laws are passed or accountability in the domestic judicial

system. Even though these changes might not be anticipated by acceding states, gatekeepers often find them necessary to ensure full implementation of WTO rules and future compliance.

Given these three categories, I argue that states that face intense levels of scrutiny during the accession process should expect not only to make more domestic changes overall but also to make deeper changes. In other words, as the scrutiny during the accession process increases, states will make more changes that fall into the categories of *economic or political organization* and *domestic governance*. Therefore, states that face more scrutiny during the accession process, particularly at the hands of the international organization gatekeepers, will also make deeper domestic changes.

To illustrate this argument at work, I use case-study comparisons of two sets of cases restricted to the WTO era of 1995-2008. In the first, I compare the accessions of Albania to Ukraine, and I compare Cambodia to Vietnam in the second. These two sets of cases are clear illustrations of one of the puzzles I explore in this project, which is why the accession process can result in very different outcomes even among similar states. Moreover, by looking more closely at the accessions of these countries, I am able to more clearly demonstrate how different levels of scrutiny impact the domestic policy and institutional changes states make during accession. Finally, in case-study analysis, I am able to show the direct effect of the gatekeepers on the quantity and types of domestic changes states make.

These four cases are particularly helpful when exploring this argument for a number of reasons. First, these cases are rich in data. All four of these countries have had accession experiences that have drawn a great deal of attention from policy and academic sources, so there are an unusually high number of sources to draw upon when studying these cases. Second, these comparisons allow me to control for similarities in historical background and level of

development while allowing variation in my key independent variable, which is scrutiny. Finally, these four cases are representative of the broader population of states that have joined the WTO from 1995-2008. Cambodia, for instance, represents the lesser and least developed countries that have joined the WTO; Albania represents the newly independent states that have applied for accession immediately after independence; and the accessions of both Vietnam and Ukraine are representative of the powerful regional actors who have joined the WTO. In all, these four cases are especially useful illustrations of my argument that accession to the WTO directly affects domestic politics of acceding states.⁷

Empirical Illustration: Albania vs. Ukraine

A comparison between Albania and Ukraine is particularly useful since the two states are very similar yet experienced very different levels of scrutiny during the accession process. For instance, both states share a similar history of being former Communist or Socialist states prior to the early 1990s. Albania was a formerly communist state with a centrally planned economy (Kaminski 2003). Similarly, Ukraine was a former Soviet Republic also with a centrally planned economy (Bugajski et al 2009).

After the fall of the Soviet Union, both states became democratic republics and set on a course for joining the global economy. However, both states suffered from low levels of bureaucratic capacity in their new governments, which was a direct product of their history (Michalopoulos 2003; Burakovskiy et al 2004). Moreover, public opinion toward joining international organizations was only moderately supportive, in large part due to the general distrust for foreigners that came as a result of the influence of the USSR (Kaminski 2003;

⁷ For a summary of the comparisons between these two sets of cases, see Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 at the end of the chapter.

Burakovskiy et al 2004). In addition to these similarities, both Albania and Ukraine applied for membership to the GATT/WTO in the 1992-1993 wave of applications from other central and eastern European States (GATT document L/7120; GATT document L/7333).

However, the similarities between the two states ended once both submitted their applications for membership as each faced very different levels of scrutiny. Albania experienced a much easier accession process compared to Ukraine, which in many ways is a direct result of the support it received from Italy and Greece (Kaminski 2003). Albania's entrance in the WTO represented a new opportunity for trade with its neighbors who were more than willing to advocate for an easier accession for Albania.

In the end, Albania's accession lasted only nine years from 1992 to 2000 (WTO document WT/ACC/ALB/52). Albania was required to sit for five rounds of questions and answers where it answered 514 total questions at the hands of twenty-five gatekeepers (WTO document WT/ACC/ALB/21; WTO document WT/ACC/ALB/29; WTO document WT/ACC/ALB/52).

The accession experience for Ukraine was quite different from Albania. For starters, Ukraine did not receive the support from its gatekeepers that Albania did from Italy and Greece. Ukraine did face opposition from states that we might consider the usual suspects such as Georgia, Latvia, and Slovenia. However, there were a number of other gatekeepers that voiced opposition to Ukraine's membership including India, Canada, Mexico, Uruguay, South Korea, and New Zealand. In total, Ukraine had almost twice as many gatekeepers as Albania with forty-eight in all (WTO document WT/ACC/UKR/20/*).

Beyond the differences in the total number of gatekeepers, Ukraine also was forced to sit for twenty-one rounds of questioning where it answered 3046 questions (WTO document

WT/ACC/UKR/141). In all, the level of scrutiny for Ukraine was much higher than the level for Albania.

The differences in the level of scrutiny between Albania and Ukraine translated directly into differences in the domestic changes each state made in exchange for membership, as is predicted by my theoretical approach. Albania, who faced less scrutiny during its accession process, made a total of twenty-nine changes whereas Ukraine, who faced a high level of scrutiny, made more than twice that number with sixty-three commitments. Albania made seven commitments in the *trade policy* category, twenty commitments in the *economic or political organization* category, and only two commitments in the *domestic governance* category (WTO document WT/ACC/ALB/51). These numbers are remarkably different from Ukraine who made thirteen commitments in the *trade policy* category, thirty-four commitments in the *economic or political organization* category, and sixteen commitments in the deepest category of *domestic governance* (WTO document WT/L/718). Clearly, Ukraine made a far higher number of commitments and many more in the later two categories than did Albania, as I predict based on their differing levels of scrutiny at the hands of international organization gatekeepers.

To see the direct effect of the gatekeepers on the domestic changes each state made, I also compare the number of domestic changes specifically requested by the gatekeepers. In each acceding state's final accession protocol, a comprehensive list of commitments is provided in the conclusion. In most cases, the commitments are written as a general request from the WTO working party members. However, for a few countries, there are some paragraphs that are written as a specific request from a working party member, even though that member is typically not identified by name. The appearance of these paragraphs shows the direct effect that gatekeepers have on the domestic changes acceding states make.

Albania's accession protocol only includes one paragraph specifically requested by a gatekeeper, but Ukraine's accession protocol includes four paragraphs specifically requested by gatekeepers. Therefore, the increased level of scrutiny that Ukraine faced during its accession at the hand of its gatekeepers resulted in many more domestic changes made, particularly when compared to a similar country such as Albania. In this case, then, we see strong support for my argument that increased scrutiny results in more—and deeper—domestic economic and political changes.

Empirical Illustration: Cambodia vs. Vietnam

Cambodia and Vietnam share a history that is important to their WTO accessions. Both countries are former French colonies, which means that under GATT Article 26:5(c) both of these countries were eligible for de facto membership (GATT document L/900; GATT document L/927; GATT document L/2271; GATT document L/7490). So, had France supported their membership in the GATT, neither state would have had to undergo a rigorous accession process. Unfortunately, France did not support the membership of its former colonies. Therefore, both Cambodia and Vietnam were forced to accede to the WTO under the standard procedures in Article 12 (Basu 2008; Copelovitch and Ohls 2009).

In addition to sharing this common colonial background, both Cambodia and Vietnam were poor countries with low bureaucratic capacity when they applied to join the WTO in 1994 and 1995 respectively (Povarchuk 2004; Sauve 2005). However, Cambodia was a constitutional monarchy/democracy when it applied to join the WTO. When coupled with a very high level of public support for accession, the circumstances in Cambodia provided a different domestic backdrop for accession than Vietnam (Povarchuk 2004). For Vietnam, a communist/socialist

state with low public support for accession, the domestic backdrop suggested a difficult accession was waiting (Copelovitch and Ohls 2009). The similarities and differences between Cambodia and Vietnam leading up to accession were no match for the differences in the level of scrutiny each state faced during accession.

Cambodia experienced a much easier accession process compared to Vietnam. Cambodia's accession took eleven years to complete from 1994 to 2004 (GATT document PC/W/19; WTO document WT/MIN(03)/18). During the accession negotiations, Cambodia was required to sit for only four rounds of questions and answers where it answered a total of 461 questions at the hands of twenty-five gatekeepers (WTO document WT/ACC/KHM/3; WTO document WT/ACC/KHM/6; WTO document WT/ACC/KHM/12; WTO document WT/ACC/KHM/20; WTO document WT/ACC/KHM/1/*).

In contrast, Vietnam had a very difficult accession experience. Vietnam's accession was two years longer than Cambodia's totaling thirteen years from 1995 to 2007 (WTO document WT/L/1; WTO document WT/L/662). The starkest differences between the two countries, though, are found in the numbers of questions and answers. Vietnam sat for seventeen rounds of questions and answers and responded to 3476 total questions (WTO document WT/ACC/VNM/*). Moreover, Vietnam faced forty-three gatekeepers compared to a much smaller number for Cambodia (WTO document WT/ACC/VNM/1/*).

These differences in the level of scrutiny between Cambodia and Vietnam translated directly into differences in the domestic changes each state made in exchange for membership. Cambodia made a total of twenty-nine changes whereas Vietnam made more than twice that number with seventy commitments, which clearly fits my theoretical predictions. Cambodia made twelve commitments in the *trade policy* category, fourteen commitments in the *economic*

or political organization category, and only three commitments in the *domestic governance* category (WTO document WT/ACC/KHM/21; WTO document WT/MIN(03)/18). These numbers are remarkably different from Vietnam who made nineteen commitments in the *trade policy* category, twenty-five commitments in the *economic or political organization* category, and twenty-six commitments in the deepest category of *domestic governance* (WTO document WT/ACC/VNM/48; WTO document WT/L/662). Clearly, Vietnam, who faced a high level of scrutiny during its accession process, made a far higher number of commitments—and many more in the later two categories—than did Cambodia.

To see the direct effect of the gatekeepers on the domestic changes each state made, I compare the number of domestic changes specifically requested by the gatekeepers. Cambodia's accession protocol has no paragraphs specifically requested by a gatekeeper, but Vietnam's accession protocol includes eighteen paragraphs specifically requested by gatekeepers (WTO document WT/ACC/KHM/21; WTO document WT/MIN(03)/18; WTO document WT/ACC/VNM/48). Therefore, the increased level of scrutiny that Vietnam faced during its accession at the hand of its gatekeepers resulted in many more domestic changes made, particularly when compared to a similar country such as Cambodia. In this case, as in the comparison between Albania and Ukraine, we see strong support for my argument that increased scrutiny results in more—and deeper—domestic economic and political changes.

Conclusion

For well over a decade, scholars have continued to question how international organizations matter with ample evidence supporting competing views on the topic. In this chapter, I have taken a unique approach to answering this question by focusing on the domestic

implications of accession to the GATT/WTO. By turning the focus to accession, I have illuminated a key mechanism by which international organizations have leverage over states.

I argue that states make meaningful domestic changes during accession as a result of scrutiny from international organization gatekeepers. As the level of scrutiny increases during accession, so will the number, and depth, of domestic political and economic changes states make in exchange for membership. I have shown support for this argument through both quantitative and qualitative empirical investigations of accession to the GATT/WTO from 1950-2008. Consistently, my findings demonstrate that states make deeper and more meaningful domestic changes when they face higher levels of scrutiny from gatekeepers during their accession processes.

Future research on this topic will help to solidify the arguments and findings I present here. First, I plan to further consider the relationship between economic size, scrutiny, and domestic concessions. I expect the heart of this relationship to lie in the preferences of the gatekeepers themselves, which is something I plan to address in future research. Second, I plan to examine the relationship between the commitments made during accession and the extent to which states comply with those commitments after membership. A robust, and important, literature on compliance with international organizations already exists but the added focus on accession will bring an interesting perspective to these ideas. Finally, I will continue to expand my examination of the three types of domestic changes states make during WTO accession by adding additional quantitative and qualitative investigations of these changes. The extent to which states make deep domestic changes in exchange for membership in the WTO can speak to broader literatures on the domestic effects of international organization membership in such areas as human rights and democratization.

By turning the focus on accession and showing its effect on the domestic political environment of applicant states, I have overcome a key difficulty in the international organization literature. Here, I reveal a direct link between the scrutiny states face and domestic changes, which highlights accession as a key mechanism by which international organizations matter. Moreover, I show conclusively that international organizations have meaningful leverage over state behavior during the accession process. Finally, in linking international organizations with domestic politics through the mechanism of accession, I open the door to further investigation of how this mechanism works in numerous other research avenues.

Tables

Table 4.1: Empirical Expectations

Hypothesis 1	Applicant states that face higher levels of <i>scrutiny</i> during the accession process will make more domestic political and economic changes, <i>ceteris paribus</i> .
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Minimum	Maximum
Number of Commitment Paragraphs	22.1	0	82
Number of Gatekeepers	25.5	12	62
Number of Challengers	0.1	0	1
GDP	36985400000	909600000	370800000000
GDP per capita	2189.6	199	9469

Table 4.3: Correlations

	Commitment Paragraphs	GDP	GDP per capita	WTO	Gatekeepers	
Commitment Paragraphs	1					
GDP	0.36	1				
GDP per capita	0.07	0.26	1			
WTO	0.69	-0.05	-0.04	1		
Gatekeepers	0.89	0.53	0.25	0.52	1	
Challengers	0.23	0.15	-0.26	0.20	0.11	1

Table 4.4: Quantitative Analysis of WTO Effects

	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>
Gatekeepers	1.21 *** (0.17)	1.17 *** (0.12)		1.17 *** (0.13)	1.24 *** (0.17)	1.27 *** (0.17)
Challengers			1.52 (5.76)	4.79 (3.40)	5.27 (3.53)	4.05 (3.68)
WTO	10.49 ** (3.24)	10.92 ** (2.84)	25.04 *** (4.06)	10.23 ** (2.89)	9.25 ** (3.280)	8.98 ** (3.28)
GDP	-0.00 (0.00)		0.00 ** (0.00)		-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
GDP per capita						-0.00 (0.00)
Constant	-14.33 *** (3.36)	-13.95 *** (3.03)	4.78 (3.13)	-14.27 *** (2.99)	-15.12 *** (3.33)	-14.28 *** (3.412)
N	34	34	34	34	34	34
R-squared	0.86	0.85	0.63	0.87	0.86	0.87

Table 4.5: Empirical Illustration of WTO Effects Comparing Albania and Ukraine

	Albania	Ukraine
Accession Length	9 years	16 years
Total Questions	514	3046
Q&A Rounds	5	21
Gatekeepers	25	48
Total Commitments	29	63
<i>Trade Policy</i>	7	13
<i>Economic or Political Organization</i>	20	34
<i>Domestic Governance</i>	2	16
<i>Number of Commitments Requested by Gatekeepers</i>	1	4

Table 4.6: Empirical Illustration of WTO Effects Comparing Cambodia and Vietnam

	Cambodia	Vietnam
Accession Length	11 years	13 years
Total Questions	461	3476
Q&A Rounds	4	17
Gatekeepers	25	43
Total Commitments	29	70
<i>Trade Policy</i>	12	19
<i>Economic or Political Organization</i>	14	25
<i>Domestic Governance</i>	3	26
<i>Number of Commitments Requested by Gatekeepers</i>	0	18

CHAPTER FIVE
THE POLITICS OF ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

Political leaders all over Europe were busy during the year 2011. In Greece, leaders were busy working hard to reform the government and keep peace among the people as the effects of the sovereign debt crisis were in full swing. In Croatia, leaders were busy making the final preparations to sign a treaty to join the European Union (EU). In Brussels, leaders worked diligently to mitigate the perceived failures of the EU to prevent the crisis in Greece and to promote the successes of the completion of Croatia's bid to join the EU. While these two events—the crisis in Greece and Croatia's enlargement bid—do not seem related on the surface, they both share a common thread.

The common thread between these events from 2011 is enlargement, or the process of accession whereby new members are added to the EU. In many ways, these two events highlight both the successes and shortcomings of the EU in general and also of enlargement in particular.

For many scholars and policymakers alike, the sovereign debt crisis in Greece came as no surprise. Political elites have long viewed Greece as the “black sheep” of the EU for its failure to fully implement the political and economic changes required of EU member states, a process known as “Europeanization” (Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008). The process of Europeanization is at the heart of the EU accession experience where states are required to fully transform their domestic political and economic environments according to the EU's *acquis communautaire* (Jacoby 2004).

Many scholars recognized that Greece had failed to fully implement these changes, and moreover, that the EU had conferred membership on Greece even with full knowledge that these

changes had not been made (Jacoby 2004). Therefore, it was not surprising when policymakers, such as French President Nicolas Sarkozy, spoke out in 2011 saying it was “an error” to allow Greece to join the eurozone as it simply was not prepared to take on those demands (Telegraph 2012). Clearly, for Greece, the sovereign debt crisis highlights the shortcomings of an easy accession to the EU.

By contrast, the events in Croatia in 2011 highlight the successes of enlargement to the European Union. Croatia applied for membership in the EU in 2003 and was made an official candidate country in 2004 (EU Commission Website). However, in 2005, the negotiations over Croatia’s accession to the EU were halted due to concerns by many EU member states that Croatia was implicitly failing to comply with the conviction of Ante Gotovina. General Gotovina had been convicted of war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) but had escaped arrest as of 2005, many believing by hiding in Croatia.

Several EU member states, including the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, refused to proceed with Croatia’s accession negotiations until Gotovina was arrested on the principle that Croatia must demonstrate a reformed government that acted in compliance with international law (Bowley 2005). In other words, many EU officials saw the arrest of Gotovina as a sign that Croatia fully intended to implement the principles of the EU, such as democracy and the rule of law. Finally, thanks to a joint effort by Croatian and Spanish police, Gotovina was arrested in the Canary Islands in 2005 (Bowley 2005). After this event, objecting member states in the EU allowed the accession negotiations to proceed. At the end of 2011, these accession negotiations were finally concluded and Croatia is set to become the 28th member of the EU in 2013.

In the case of Croatia, the hard-line stance taken by many EU members seems to have been beneficial for both Croatia and the European Union. Croatia made significant efforts to show its intent to comply with EU principles in exchange for membership. These efforts stand in stark contrast to the accession experience of Greece where a more accommodating approach by EU states resulted in a failure to fully adopt EU principles, which has had disastrous effects only ten years later. Clearly, then, the differences in the accession experiences of Greece and Croatia highlight the contrast between states that join the EU making very few domestic changes and others that go to great lengths to reform their domestic political and economic environments in exchange for membership.

In this chapter, I argue that the variation in accession experiences to the EU is explained by three key factors—domestic capacity in the applicant state, domestic support for accession, and the presence of gatekeepers at the level of the international organization. My findings demonstrate that states have a longer and more difficult accession process when they lack a high level of domestic capacity and public support and when they face challengers among the EU gatekeepers. Additionally, my findings demonstrate that the more difficult the accession process is for an acceding state, the more domestic political changes the acceding state will make in exchange for membership.

More broadly, my findings demonstrate how international organizations, and specifically the European Union, have leverage over states during the accession process. In so doing, my results suggest that policymakers may wish to consider accession as a way to provide political cover for the implementation of difficult domestic political and economic changes. Finally, my findings also suggest that accession is the key mechanism by which international organizations directly impact states.

The Process of Accession to the European Union

Accession is the process of joining an international organization from the starting point of application to the conclusion at the conferring of membership. Two key actors are involved in the accession process – the applicant state and the representatives, or gatekeepers, of the international organization. During accession, an applicant state completes a set of procedures and requirements, established by the international organization, all in an effort to meet the terms of accession. In most international organizations, the terms of accession are defined prior to the beginning of the accession process, as in the case of the European Union’s Copenhagen Criteria (EU Commission Website).¹ However, as I illustrated in previous chapters, the process of accession is not nearly as straightforward as these criteria would suggest.

Take, for instance, the accession of the central and eastern European states to the EU beginning in the mid-1990s. At the end of the Cold War, nearly all of these states became eligible to join the EU. However, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia completed their accession processes in 2004, and Romania and Bulgaria joined later in 2007. Now, Croatia has completed the process of accession and will join the EU in 2013. Macedonia, however, has yet to begin its accession negotiations (EU Commission Enlargement Website).

Furthermore, not all of these states were held to the same standard in their accession negotiations. States in the first wave of eastern enlargement, such as Poland, were generally given a pass on some of the more difficult standards for EU membership whereas other states in this group were held to much higher standards (Christoffersen 2007a). Clearly, these examples

¹ See Table 5.1 for a summary of the Copenhagen Criteria.

illustrate the unexpected differences in the accession experiences between states, even very similar ones.

Variation in accession experiences to the EU can be explained by three key factors that emerge as the accession process unfolds: domestic capacity in the applicant state, domestic support for accession, and the presence of gatekeepers at the level of the international organization. Throughout the accession process, applicant states are required to complete a number of requirements and a series of procedures, which are laid out by the international organization and enforced by the gatekeepers of the international organization. Of particular importance are four key stages in the accession process: (1) application, (2) submission of a memorandum, (3) multilateral negotiations between the applicant state and the international organization, and (4) finalization of the accession deal by both parties. The importance of the three key factors I identify—domestic capacity, domestic support and international organization gatekeepers—emerges as the accession process unfolds. Therefore, the variation in the outcomes of accession is a direct result of the presence of these factors during the four key stages of accession.

The Stages of EU Accession

Accession to the European Union is composed of four primary stages.² In the first stage, the *application* phase, states seeking membership in the European Union notify the Council of their intent to become a candidate country, which is the official terminology for states undergoing accession to the EU. At this stage, the Council must agree with a unanimous decision to open the accession negotiations (Christoffersen 2007b). Often, the Council seeks

² For a detailed outline of the stages of EU accession, see Table 5.2 at the end of the chapter.

input from the Commission regarding the likelihood that the applicant state will successfully complete the requirements for accession. Upon positive recommendation from the Commission, the Council will vote to open the accession negotiations, and the applicant state officially becomes a “candidate” country.

From here, the accession process moves into the second phase, which is the *memorandum* stage. In this step, members of the Commission meet with government leaders in the candidate state, and often visit the state themselves, to uncover the current political and economic environment in the candidate state (Christoffersen 2007b). In other words, the candidate state opens itself up to inspection by the Commission in an effort to determine where the negotiations should begin and how far the current domestic policies, institutions, and practices are from the EU standards. In EU terms, this is often referred to as the “screening” stage, and it culminates in a “screening report” that is released by the Commission (EU Commission Website). This report not only details the current state of affairs in the candidate country but also the EU’s common position on negotiations. The screening report serves as the guidelines for the third step of the accession process.

Additionally, during the second stage in the EU accession process, candidate countries can request technical assistance from the EU to aid them in preparing for membership. In some cases, this assistance is referred to as a “pre-accession strategy” as it can include a number of different forms of assistance ranging from financial assistance to temporary treaties to more frequent progress reports. For instance, in 1996, the EU established the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX) instrument to offer short-term assistance in implementing EU law (Christoffersen 2007b: 38). For the more recent enlargements, assistance programs were expanded into the PHARE programme that offers more comprehensive assistance on all

accession-related issues (Christoffersen 2007b). In the case of the most recent accessions, nearly all candidate countries received some sort of technical assistance.

Once the second stage is complete, EU accessions move into the third stage of *negotiations*. Negotiations take place between representatives of the EU member states and representatives of the candidate countries, often at the highest levels of government (Christoffersen 2007b). Negotiations are focused around the thirty-five chapters of the *acquis*, which are the EU rules and laws already in force in current member states.³ All thirty-five of these chapters are addressed in the negotiations, although in any particular order depending on the preferences of the two negotiating parties.

The ultimate goal of the negotiations is to come to an agreement on “the conditions and timing of the candidate’s adoption, implementation and enforcement of all the EU rules already in force” (European Commission Website). While the ultimate goal for the EU negotiators is to see all 80,000 pages of the *acquis* fully adapted and implemented into domestic law, the results of the negotiations are not always as final (Jacoby 2004). In many cases, limitations on the part of the candidate country force the negotiations to conclude with promises to implement changes in laws or policies at an agreed-upon later date. If the Commission and Council agree that these promises will turn into compliance with EU law, such extensions will be granted in an effort to move the negotiations through to completion (Christoffersen 2007c).

Once the accession negotiations are concluded, the process moves into the final stage, which I term the *final accession package*. At this stage, the Commission writes a text that will serve as the Accession Treaty or the Adhesion Treaty, which finalizes the terms of accession and serves as the agreement for membership (Christoffersen 2007c). The Council, the European

³ Table 5.3 contains a list of these chapters.

Parliament, representatives from all member states, and the candidate country must then approve the draft of the Accession Treaty before all parties sign it.

When all parties sign the accession treaty, it is submitted to all member states and the candidate country for ratification. At this point, the candidate country officially becomes an “acceding state” and is entitled to nearly all privileges of a member state until the ratification process is complete (EU Commission Website). The timing of this process varies depending on the legislative rules for each country, but once it is complete the accession process officially closes, and the acceding state becomes a member state.

Explaining EU Accession

According to my theoretical approach, variation in accession to the EU is the result of factors at both the domestic level of the candidate country and the international level—namely, domestic bureaucratic capacity, domestic public support for accession, and the presence of gatekeepers in the international organization. When these factors emerge during the accession process, states can expect different levels of difficulty in the accession process.

Here, I focus on two outcomes in the European Union accession, or enlargement, process. The first is accession duration, meaning the years between the initial application to join the EU and the completion of the accession process. Many scholars have pointed to duration as an important element of the accession process, seeing it as a key measure of the complexity and difficulty of the accession process (Wong and Yu 2008). In the case of the EU, where the difficulty of the accession negotiations is not easy to quantify, duration is an important indicator of the complexities of accession.

In addition to duration, I also focus on the differences in the domestic political and economic changes made in exchange for membership. In the EU, candidate countries are required to make a number of domestic policy and institutional changes in accordance with the Copenhagen Criteria and the *acquis communautaire* (Jacoby 2004). However, these changes are not always consistently implemented across all candidate states, even those countries that join in the same wave of enlargement. For example, some candidates are granted extra time to “phase-in” the requirements while others are pushed to make as many domestic changes as possible (Jacoby 2004; Christoffersen 2007c). Therefore, I also demonstrate to what extent the process of accession to the EU requires domestic changes and why some candidates make more domestic changes than others.

I have argued in previous chapters that these outcomes of accession can be explained as a function of the levels of domestic bureaucratic capacity and domestic public support in the applicant state and the composition of the gatekeepers in the international organization. Here, I will briefly illustrate how each of these factors result in different accession outcomes in the context of the European Union.⁴

Domestic Bureaucratic Capacity

Undergoing the process of accession is a costly task for any state, and the successful completion of accession requires financial and human capital resources from within the domestic bureaucracy. Financial resources are needed for expenses as basic as travel between the domestic state and Brussels, not to mention the cost of paying lawyers and interpreters to ensure that the negotiations run smoothly (Jacoby 2004; Hille and Knill 2006). Human capital

⁴ For a summary of the three empirical expectations, see Table 5.4 at the end of the chapter.

resources are equally as important; the candidate state needs both negotiators abroad and implementers at home with adequate knowledge of international law, economic policy, and institutional-legal procedure (Christoffersen 2007b: 28). At home, financial resources and human capital resources are critical to the full implementation of domestic changes, which is one reason the EU has been so generous in providing technical assistance during the accession process (Christoffersen 2007a).

At each stage of the accession process, candidate countries must prove to the EU negotiators that they possess “efficient and reliable administrations and judiciaries which would be able to ensure correct implementation and application of the many rules” (Christoffersen 2007b: 47). Given the structure of the accession process, the Commission retains the right to stall or effectively end the progress of accession if it feels that the applicant or candidate fails to demonstrate an adequate level of bureaucratic capacity. Therefore, given the demands of the accession process and the priority of bureaucratic capacity for the Commission, I expect that states with low levels of bureaucratic capacity will have a more difficult accession process, which in turn will result in more domestic changes made.

Hypothesis 1: Candidate states with a low level of bureaucratic capacity will experience a longer accession process and will make more domestic changes, *ceteris paribus*.

Domestic Public Support

In addition to bureaucratic capacity, the candidate state must also have the support of the domestic public to see the process of accession through to completion. The European Union requirements for accession are both comprehensive and detailed, and therefore these requirements have an impact on many areas of life for every citizen. Nearly every issue-area

imaginable is addressed in the acquis from healthcare to education to commerce to defense, so it is unlikely that any citizen in a candidate country would avoid feeling the effects of the EU for very long (Jacoby 2004). Moreover, since making these changes are a requirement for joining the EU, government officials must be concerned with how the public will react to these changes.

Democratic leaders are accountable to their constituents through the electoral process, and so these leaders must be sensitive to the opinions of their constituents. Therefore, a leader takes great personal risk in pushing forward accession-related reforms that are unpopular. Consequently, many leaders will sacrifice progress in accession negotiations to ensure success in the next election. Moreover, adoption and implementation of EU regulations are often the responsibility of everyday citizens who come in contact with the affected sectors (Jacoby 2004). Therefore, officials in the candidate states need the cooperation of their citizens to effectively demonstrate compliance with EU regulations. In these ways, then, high levels of domestic public support are critical for ensuring that the accession process moves forward without delays to its full completion.

Hypothesis 2: Candidate states with a high level of public support for accession will experience a shorter accession process and will make more domestic changes, *ceteris paribus*.

International Organization Gatekeepers

The final factor that determines variation in European Union accession comes from the vantage point of the international organization. In the European Union, both the Commission and representatives of the individual member states negotiate the terms of the accession on behalf of the EU at large. Working in tandem, these two bodies of EU negotiators are responsible for enforcing the requirements of membership. These negotiators are thus the

gatekeepers of the organization since they determine which states become members and the specifics of how each process of accession unfolds.

While gatekeepers are assumed to be neutral, particularly in the case of the Commission, the reality is that these gatekeepers often represent their own national interests in addition to the interests of the EU at large. Thus, the gatekeepers must strike a balance between representing these two, sometimes opposing interests. Of particular importance are gatekeepers that challenge the membership of the candidate state. A challenger is a gatekeeper who prefers that the applicant, or candidate, state remain outside of the EU, or at the very least that the candidate state have a difficult accession process. Challengers can surface within the gatekeepers for a variety of reasons, including differences in preferences regarding the functions of the international organization, economic competition, or political differences (Michalopoulos 1998). Having a gatekeeper that challenges the membership of the candidate state in the negotiation process can make the negotiations more difficult and increase the length of the accession process.

Hypothesis 3: Candidate states that face a challenging gatekeeper will experience a longer and more difficult accession process, which will also result in more domestic changes made, *ceteris paribus*.

Analyzing Accession to the European Union

Here, I have chosen the European Union as a key context for demonstrating how my theoretical approach explains accession outcomes. As a complement to my earlier analyses in previous chapters, I have chosen to focus on the EU as it is widely recognized as one of the most important international organizations in contemporary world politics.

The European Union represents an important empirical context for illustrating my theoretical approach for a number of reasons. First, the EU continues to grow in both depth of

cooperation and breadth of cooperation. The European Union continues to test the limits of cooperation and pooled sovereignty, making the requirements for membership more difficult and the benefits of membership more attractive (Verheugen 2007). Additionally, membership continues to grow in the EU, thereby incorporating even more diverse members from different historical backgrounds and socio-economic statuses. Finally, accession to the EU requires one of the most demanding processes of all international organizations and requires that applicant states make policy and institutional changes on one of the widest scope of issues (Jacoby 2004). Thus, focusing on the European Union allows my research to make a strong substantive and theoretical contribution.

Still, using the EU as one of the empirical contexts for my theory has its limitations. As a regional organization that also acts as a supranational government, the European Union is unique in its institutional structure, the scope of its mandates, the geographic constraints of membership, and the overall patterns of membership. Thus, given these particularities, I have chosen to conduct distinct, qualitative empirical analyses of accessions to the European Union.

Here, I have chosen to focus on two cases: Estonia and Turkey. These cases were chosen for a number of reasons. First, both of these cases are representative of important stages in EU enlargement—to the northeast and to the southeast. Consequently, these cases are rich in data. Second, these two cases exhibit variation in the independent and dependent variables in my theoretical framework, in addition to some other variables that I do not consider in my framework. For example, each case is different in terms of the level of bureaucratic capacity, the presence of challenging gatekeepers, accession duration, and accession difficulty. Additionally, these cases differ in terms of historical background and the time period of accession. For these reasons, I have chosen to examine both of these cases in this analysis.

Estonia: Uncertain Hope

On 17 September 1991, after years of occupation by Nazi and Soviet forces, the people of Estonia officially became citizens of a free nation again (Laar 2009). Remarkably, the people of Estonia had secured their freedom without the loss of one life by standing together in nonviolent protest through song. The “singing revolution,” as it is called by Estonians, had left the people united and hopeful for the future (Tusty 2006).

The leaders of the newly independent Estonia were quickly faced with the difficult reality of creating a domestic government from scratch while simultaneously securing Estonia’s place in international politics. Fortunately for the Estonians, Tilt Vahl’s transitional government administration in 1992 made three key decisions—currency reform, the adoption of a new Constitution, and the organization of democratic elections—that set Estonia on a firm foundation for international politics (Laar 2009).

These good decisions, and many others, paid off when Estonia applied for EU membership on 24 November 1995. At that time, the EU was only considering opening accession negotiations with a few states in the central and eastern European regions. Estonia was not initially considered in the early wave of eastern enlargement, particularly since its application came in just hours before the deadline set by EU officials (Christoffersen 2007a; Kaljurand 2012). However, Estonia’s domestic capacity was impressive, and EU officials felt confident that Estonia could fully implement the *acquis* (Sillaste-Elling 2009).

Estonia’s high level of domestic capacity is largely the result of its long-time orientation to the West. Even during the occupation years, Estonia’s proximity to Finland provided a unique opportunity for the Estonians to continually receive radio and television transmissions from the

West that served to both educate the Estonians and solidify their resolve to Westernize as soon as possible (Tusty 2012). Once independence was secured, Estonia took great steps to implement the reforms it learned from its Western allies, in particular the Nordic states, the United States, and Canada (Kull 2009; Kaljurand 2012). Chief among these reforms were the freezing of unemployment benefits, the reorientation of trade to the West, the elimination of energy dependence on Russia, and the implementation of a single-rate flat income tax (Laar 2009). The result of these reforms was a steady improvement in the Estonian economy and government structure, all of which provided Estonia with the necessary financial and human capital resources to successfully complete accession to the EU (Streimann 2007).

Estonia's efforts to orient itself toward the West also paid off during its accession negotiations. Unlike many other central and eastern European states at the time, Estonia had no real challengers among the EU gatekeepers. Despite its support from the Commission, there was a sense of uneasiness among many EU member states, however, regarding the extent to which Estonia was ready for accession and whether Estonia would revert back to its Soviet past (Steinmann 2007; Sillaste-Elling 2009). Consequently, the Estonians set off on an extensive public relations campaign throughout the EU with the goals of educating Europeans on Estonia's domestic achievements and demonstrating Estonia's enthusiasm for membership (Halliste 2009; Sillaste-Elling 2009; Kaljurand 2012).

Furthermore, the Estonians adopted two other strategies that created friends among the EU gatekeepers. The first was to distance themselves from their Baltic neighbors—Latvia and Lithuania—in an effort to look more like their wealthy, peace-loving Nordic counterparts. These efforts helped to ensure the support from Finland and Sweden during the accession negotiations (Kull 2009; Kaljurand 2012). Secondly, the Estonians made it clear that the chief goal of

membership in the EU was to guarantee its security, particularly in the face of an uncertain Russia. These efforts, partnered with the support of the United States and Canada in Estonia's bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), helped convince EU members that Estonia was serious about separating itself from its Soviet past (Sillaste-Elling 2009; Kaljurand 2012). Consequently, Estonia faced no serious challenges from EU gatekeepers thereby ensuring that the accession process went forward without any reservations on the part of EU members.

Even though Estonia enjoyed the benefits of high domestic capacity and no challenges from EU gatekeepers, government leaders did face opposition from their own domestic constituents. Surprisingly, the Estonian public was not very supportive of efforts to join the EU; in fact, public support for accession was one of the lowest among all central and eastern European states at the time (Kaljurand 2012). The reason for this low public support was simple—the Estonians had only recently secured their freedom from Moscow and did not want to turn it over to Brussels (Streimann 2007; Tusty 2012; Kaljurand 2012). For the government leaders, membership in the EU was a way to guarantee their freedom, not lose it, and so they set about on the difficult task of selling accession back home.

As one negotiator put it, “ninety per cent of enlargement negotiations happen at home” (Christoffersen 2007c: 43). So, the Estonian officials went to work educating their publics on the benefits of joining the EU and the process of accession, taking help again from the experiences of Finland and Sweden (Palk 2009). In 1998, the government created the European Union Information Secretariat to coordinate the distribution of EU-related information to the people. One of the primary goals of the Secretariat was the translation of EU information into Estonian; the inability to understand foreign languages, other than Finnish, left many Estonians uneasy about the impact the EU would have on their everyday lives (Streimann 2007).

Additionally, the government established a phone line for EU information at the National Library that would answer as many as 2,000 EU-related inquiries per day during the height of the accession negotiations (Palk 2009). In the end, these efforts to increase public support for accession worked, and sixty-seven per cent of Estonians voted in favor of EU membership in the referendum on accession that took place on 14 September 2003 (Streimann 2007; Kaljurand 2012).

In many ways, Estonia's accession was about as smooth as it could be, particularly when compared to the other accession negotiations taking place at that time. Negotiations for accession were completed with relative ease in less than four years, which is consistent with my theoretical predictions. I argue that states with high levels of bureaucratic capacity that do not face challengers in the negotiations will have an easy accession process, which is exactly what happened in the case of Estonia.

Inconsistent with my theoretical predictions, however, is the extent to which Estonia made domestic policy and institutional changes in exchange for membership. Estonia made a remarkable number of changes that led to one of the most complete implementations of EU law to date (Kaljurand 2012). Even in areas of concern for the Estonians, such as taxation and security, government officials were careful to abide by EU law. Here, my theory fails to explain this outcome as I expect changes to come as a result of scrutiny from international organization gatekeepers.

What I fail to anticipate in the case of Estonia is a highly valued cultural norm that rules are meant to be followed (Tusty 2012; Kaljurand 2012). For the Estonians, the desire to comply with EU requirements for membership came from within—not as a result of an outside challenger (Kull 2009). In fact, Estonia probably could have gotten away with making even

fewer changes than its central and eastern European counterparts because it enjoyed support from the Nordic states. Finland, in particular, might have provided Estonia with the cover to avoid making unpleasant domestic changes (Kull 2009). However, Estonian cultural norms would not allow for these exceptions. Consequently, the experience of Estonia demonstrates the importance of political culture when predicting the likely compliance of acceding states.

Estonia's accession to the EU is an important one, because in many ways, it was rather uneventful. In sharp contrast to the nine other states that joined the EU in 2004, Estonia was the most prepared and faced the least opposition from within the EU. Whereas many other states struggled to complete the requirements for EU membership in 2004, Estonia's accession moved forward with very few setbacks. Much of the credit for this accomplishment is owed to the Estonian leadership who viewed the full implementation of EU regulations as a matter of national pride. Even today, Estonia stands out as one of the "A plus" students of EU politics (Kaljurand 2012). In these ways, then, Estonia's accession to the EU stands as confirmation that high bureaucratic capacity and the lack of a challenging gatekeeper can result in a swift, efficient, and easy accession process. Additionally, Estonia's accession to the EU demonstrates the power of public opinion to present challenges to beginning accession as well as strengths in completing it.

Turkey: The Long and Winding Road

According to the official website of the European Union, "the European Union is a family of democratic European countries, committed to working together for peace and prosperity" (European Commission Website). Consequently, in order to join the EU, applicant states must meet political criteria to ensure peace as well as economic criteria to ensure

prosperity. These criteria, known as the Copenhagen criteria, emphasize these two dimensions as the only official requirements necessary for applicant states to meet before they can be granted membership (Hurd 2006: 404). In the case of Turkey's accession to the EU, however, meeting these criteria have not been easy resulting in one of the longest and most difficult accessions to the EU to date.

As of 2012, Turkey is still on the road to EU membership having only recently been added to the list of candidate countries. Since Turkey has not completed its accession process, I examine how my theoretical approach explains Turkey's accession *to date*, noting in particular how my theoretical approach might explain when—and if—Turkey will complete its accession process.

Turkey's long road to membership in the EU first began in 1959 when it applied for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). Four years later, Turkey entered into the Ankara Treaty with the EEC, which laid out the future promise of full member status in the EU (Bulbul 2006). With this agreement signed, Turkey proceeded forward with successful economic and political reforms to ensure its steady progress in meeting accession requirements.

However, in 1980, the military coup in Turkey brought all progress with the European Union to a halt. Turkey re-submitted its application to join the EU in 1987, but this time it was met with much more hesitation. The military coup had raised doubts in the minds of the Europeans about Turkey's readiness to become a full member in their effort at democratic cooperation.

Since 1987, however, Turkey has continued to show progress in making reforms and meeting accession criteria. In fact, the Helsinki Conference in 1999 and the Copenhagen Council of 2002 were important confirmations of Turkish success as its candidacy was finally

approved and a timetable for accession was finally set. However, progress reports since 2004, including the most recent Enlargement Strategy Report from 2011-2012, reveal that there are still many requirements for membership that Turkey is struggling to meet (EU Commission Website).

Concerns over democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in Turkey remain one of the most important barriers to Turkish accession. The EU has strict policies to protect human rights, particularly the rights of women and minorities, many of which have yet to be implemented in Turkey. For example, EU policies prohibit the death penalty and torture of prisoners, both of which are still prevalent in many parts of Turkey today (Casanova 2006; Pahre and Ucaray 2009). The problems in fully implementing domestic policies and institutions that meet EU standards in the areas of democracy and human rights really highlight the deficiencies in domestic capacity and public support at the domestic level.

In Turkey, as my theoretical framework predicts, problems with low domestic capacity and low public support for changes in the areas of democracy, human rights and the rule of law have greatly slowed progress. Since 2001, the Turkish government has made great efforts to increase domestic capacity. Among the many indicators of this increase are the growth in GDP and increases in modernization as measured by the Human Development Index, both of which rose steadily from 2002 to 2007 (Gerhards and Hans 2011). Still, the deficiencies in domestic capacity are a noted problem for Turkey.

In particular, the Council notes several areas in which domestic capacity must be improved, including: the judicial system, public procurement, intellectual property law, illegal migration, and education (European Union Council 2008). To assist Turkey in overcoming its problems with domestic capacity, the EU has authorized financial assistance to Turkey in the sum of €540 million from the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) in 2008 (EU

Commission Website). Clearly, then, domestic capacity is a recognized problem for Turkey that must be addressed to allow full implementation of EU rules regarding democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. In this case, my theoretical predictions about the power of low levels of bureaucratic capacity to stall an accession process find support in the case of Turkey.

Even if domestic capacity were higher in Turkey, government leaders would still face serious hurdles in public support for these changes as many of the concerns that fall under the title of human rights are directly linked to religion (Casanova 2006). For instance, strict cultural rules about the roles of women in society have been a hindrance to the furthering of women's rights, and the violence against the Kurds has long been a part of Turkish culture (Benhabib and Isiksel 2006: 223). Therefore, Turkish leaders will have to work hard to convince more conservative religious groups that these changes will be beneficial for Turkey's future before real progress can be made in these areas. Here again, the influence of low public support for accession-related reforms in Turkey is evidence in support of my theoretical predictions. Therefore, until these issues at the domestic level are resolved, it is unlikely that Turkey will make satisfactory progress in the areas of democracy and human rights that would ensure the quick and successful completion of Turkey's accession.

The other most critical barrier to Turkey's accession into the EU concerns Turkish foreign relations with Greece and Cyprus. This barrier clearly demonstrates the power of gatekeepers in the accession process. Of all the countries in Europe, Turkey has probably had the most violent relationship with Greece and Cyprus. Given this history, Greece has long been opposed to Turkey's entrance into the EU. Now that Cyprus is also a member of the EU, Turkey faces serious opposition from two gatekeepers (Christoffersen 2007b).

The presence of these two gatekeepers with an animosity toward Turkey that is so tied to their historical identity is a powerful barrier to Turkish accession. On the one hand, the potential for opposition from Greece and Cyprus is a powerful force on Turkey's accession, because EU gatekeepers have the power to veto any vote on accession. Consequently, either the Greeks or the Cypriots could vote no to Turkish accession and effectively end the process, simply because of national preference.

On the other hand, the potential opposition from Greece and Cyprus can serve as a cover for other EU member states who may have other less popular political or economic reasons to deny Turkey membership (Müftüler-Bac 2002). Already, some member states have taken advantage of this cover by pushing through changes to decision-making procedures and other regulations at the EU level (Pahre and Ucaray 2009). By making these changes, gatekeepers are not only adding to the burden of fully implementing the *acquis* but also preemptively limiting Turkey's influence in the Union should it ever become a member (Pahre and Ucaray 2009). In this case, then, the presence of gatekeepers who have strong reasons to challenge Turkish membership are a powerful barrier to preventing Turkey from joining the EU.

Even though Turkish officials remain committed to the process of EU accession, Turkey must still overcome many obstacles before it can be seen as a legitimate member of the EU. Turkey must continue to find ways to increase its level of domestic capacity and domestic support for accession to ensure that progress continues on the economic and political reforms required for membership. At the level of the international organization, Turkey must also strive to find allies in the EU to ensure that the threat of veto by some gatekeepers does not continue to unnecessarily delay its accession. As long as these deficiencies are allowed to plague Turkey on its road to membership, Turkey will continue to find itself on the outside of the EU.

Conclusion

Since its creation in 1957, the European Union has undergone seven successful waves of enlargement. From 1973 to 2007, twenty-one states have joined the original six thus making the European Union one of the most important international organizations in international politics today. Even now, four additional states are considered official candidate countries, and five others are in line for consideration (EU Commission Website).

However, the experience of joining the EU has not been the same for every state that joined, or tried to join, the EU in the last forty years. In fact, some states have found the process of accession extremely difficult, or nearly impossible, while others have joined the EU with relative ease.

Questions about accession, in particular why it varies from one state to another, are in many ways the products of much larger questions about the extent to which international organizations matter to world politics. Many scholars continue to be divided on this question and much empirical evidence exists on both sides of the divide. Among the most prolific of these areas has been research on the European Union, particularly the effects of accession to the EU on post-membership behavior.

Still, most research to date on EU accession overlooks the details of the process and explanations for the variation in the process. My project aims to build on the successes and overcome the shortcomings of extant literature by offering an original theoretical and empirical study on accession to the EU.

In this chapter, I argued that the variation in accession experiences to the EU is explained by three key factors—domestic capacity in the applicant state, domestic support for accession,

and the presence of gatekeepers at the level of the international organization. Then, I demonstrated how this argument explains the variations in accessions to the EU from 1973-2007, focusing in particular on the accessions of Estonia and Turkey. My findings demonstrate that states have a longer and more difficult accession process when they lack a high level of domestic capacity and public support and when they face challengers among the EU gatekeepers. Additionally, my findings demonstrate that the more difficult the accession process is for an acceding state, the more domestic political changes the acceding state will make.

As such, my approach to EU accession contributes to a broad set of debates on the impact of international organizations in global politics. I demonstrate conclusively that international organizations have leverage over states through accession negotiations. I also show that states can use accession as an opportunity to secure unpopular domestic political and economic reforms.

Tables

Table 5.1: Copenhagen Criteria for EU accession

Criterion 1	Candidate states must have achieved the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.
Criterion 2	Candidate states must have achieved the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.
Criterion 3	Candidate states must have achieved the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

Source: European Union, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm.

Table 5.2: A Detailed Outline of the Accession Process to the European Union

1	State and European Union sign an association agreement to prepare the state for accession.
2	State formally applies for membership in the EU.
3	The Council asks the Commission to prepare an opinion regarding the applicant state's readiness to begin negotiations.
4	The Council decides to accept or reject the Commission's opinion. If the Council accepts the opinion, the accession negotiations begin. The applicant state is now referred to as a candidate country.
5	The Commission and the candidate country prepare a "screening report" to serve as the basis for the negotiations.
6	The candidate country submits its negotiating position to the Council, and the Commission submits its negotiating position (known as the draft common position) to the Council. The Council finalizes the EU's common position.
7	Negotiations take place on each chapter of the acquis between permanent representatives for the EU countries and chief negotiators for candidate countries.
8	Each chapter of the acquis is negotiated on an individual basis and closed when both parties agree to the terms of implementation. Yearly reports on the progress of negotiations are submitted by the Commission to the Council.
9	Once all chapters are closed, the parties prepare the Treaty of Accession. The treaty must then be approved by all EU institutions before it is signed by the negotiating parties. Once the treaty is signed, the candidate country becomes an acceding state.
10	The Treaty of Accession is submitted to the candidate country and all member-states for ratification.
11	If all states ratify the treaty, the treaty enters into force on the scheduled date, and the acceding state becomes a member state.

Source: European Union, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm.

Table 5.3: A Summary of the Thirty-Five Chapters of the Acquis

1	Free movement of goods
2	Freedom of movement for workers
3	Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
4	Free movement of capital
5	Public procurement
6	Company law
7	Intellectual property law
8	Competition policy
9	Financial services
10	Information society and media
11	Agriculture
12	Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
13	Fisheries
14	Transport policy
15	Energy
16	Taxation
17	Economic and monetary policy
18	Statistics
19	Social policy and employment
20	Enterprise and industrial policy
21	Trans-European networks
22	Regional policy and coordination of structural adjustments
23	Judiciary and fundamental rights
24	Justice, freedom and security
25	Science and research
26	Education and culture
27	Environment
28	Consumer and health protection
29	Customs union
30	External relations
31	Foreign, security, defense policy
32	Financial control
33	Financial and budgetary provisions
34	Institutions
35	Other issues

Source: European Union, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/index_en.htm.

Table 5.4: Empirical Expectations

Hypothesis 1	Candidate states with a low level of <i>bureaucratic capacity</i> will experience a longer accession process and will make more domestic changes, <i>ceteris paribus</i> .
Hypothesis 2	Candidate states with a high level of <i>public support</i> for accession will experience a shorter accession process and will make more domestic changes, <i>ceteris paribus</i> .
Hypothesis 3	Candidate states that face a <i>challenging gatekeeper</i> will experience a longer and more difficult accession process, which will also result in more domestic changes made, <i>ceteris paribus</i> .

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

Over the last twenty years, dozens of states have experienced the difficult journey that is accession to international organizations. From 2012 to 2014 alone, both the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the European Union (EU) will admit new members whose accessions have been particularly monumental for the respective organizations. Two of the poorest countries in the world, Samoa and Vanuatu, are expected to join the WTO in 2012, as is one of the newest independent states in the world, Montenegro. Most impressive, however, is the impending membership of Russia who has undergone one of the most difficult accessions to date in the WTO. The EU will also experience a landmark enlargement in 2013 as its borders finally reach the heart of the Western Balkans with the admission of Croatia. Without question, the growth in membership over the next two years will bring remarkable change to both the EU and the WTO.

Simultaneous to the growth in membership in international organizations has come a growing interest in scholarship on the effects of membership in international organizations. In many ways, however, the debates of the 1990s over the extent to which international organizations matter still haunt the contemporary literature as ample evidence continues to support contradictory perspectives.

What we are left with then is an inconclusive understanding of the effects of membership in international organizations. In this project, I show that our understanding is not only inconclusive but also incomplete. By only focusing on the effects of membership, extant

scholarship has overlooked the process of accession, which may actually be the more important mechanism by which international organizations matter.

When we take a closer look at the process of accession, we find unexpected puzzles. First, we find considerable variation in the accession experiences of even very similar states. While all states must complete the four common stages of accession, not all states experience those stages in the same way. For some states, completing these stages comes much quicker and with greater ease than for others. Secondly, we also find considerable variation in the domestic effects of accession. All states are required to make domestic changes as part of the accession process, but the number and depth of those domestic changes vary considerably across states.

In this project, I offer an original explanation for these puzzles that links international politics to domestic politics while highlighting the actual process of accession. I argue that applicant states with a high degree of bureaucratic capacity and public support for accession will have an easy accession process unless they face a high number of international organization gatekeepers. Additionally, applicant states will make more domestic policy and institutional changes when they face more scrutiny from international organization gatekeepers during accession negotiations.

I test these arguments using a multi-method approach in two empirical contexts. I first focus on the accession process in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs in Trade and the World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO). In Chapter Three, I focus on the variations in the outcomes of the accession process highlighting in particular the differences in accession duration and the degree of difficulty of the accession process. I formulate original empirical expectations based on my theoretical approach and then test these expectations using an original dataset on all accessions to the GATT/WTO from 1950-2008. These data include unique measures that I

coded after reading the accession documents for all states that joined the organization from 1950-2008. I follow up with a case-study analysis on China's accession to the WTO.

In Chapter Four, I extend my empirical focus on the GATT/WTO to examine the implications of accession for the domestic political and economic environments of applicant states. I argue that states make domestic policy and institutional changes as a direct result of the level of scrutiny they face from international organization gatekeepers during the accession negotiations. I then identify three categories of domestic changes that states make: changes to trade policy, changes to the organization of their domestic trade or political system, and changes in domestic governance practices. I first use statistical analysis to examine the impact of differing levels of scrutiny result on the total numbers of domestic changes states make when acceding to the GATT/WTO from 1950-2008. I then complement this analysis with a comparative case study of Albania and Ukraine followed by Cambodia and Vietnam.

Then, I turn my focus to the European Union context. In Chapter Five, I employ qualitative analysis to examine the variation in both the process and domestic implications of accession in the EU context from 1973-2004. I show how my general theory adapts in the EU context and highlight key elements of the EU accession process. Next, I focus on two key case studies to show my theory at work, including Estonia's accession and the ongoing accession of Turkey.

My theoretical predictions hold in both the context of the GATT/WTO and the EU. My findings confirm that a state with a high level of bureaucratic capacity and strong public support moves easily through the accession process, unless that state faces opposition from international organization gatekeepers in the accession negotiations. My findings also confirm that states will

make more meaningful domestic political changes when they face scrutiny at the hands of international organization gatekeepers during accession negotiations.

By shifting the focus to accession in this project, I accomplish two key goals. First, I show definitively that international organizations have meaningful leverage over states' policies and institutional arrangements. I do this by highlighting the multistage process of accession and the role of the international organization gatekeepers in this process. My findings in both the WTO and EU context confirm that the presence of international organization gatekeepers makes the accession process more difficult for acceding states, which in turn results in more and deeper domestic changes made in exchange for membership.

Second, I provide the theoretical and empirical foundation for demonstrating how accession to international organizations can have a lasting impact on state behavior. I not only show meaningful ways that accession changes states, but I also provide an explanation for how and why that change takes place.

Contributions and Future Research

My project makes a number of unique contributions to the study of international organizations as well as to the field of International Relations (IR) more broadly. First, and most importantly, my project opens up an otherwise black-boxed political process by focusing squarely on the process of accession. While there is a voluminous literature on the effects of international organization membership on a number of behaviors and outcomes, few of these studies test the effects of accession. However, as made clear in this project, the accession process varies in meaningful ways among states that cannot be taken into account by simple dichotomous conceptualizations or measurements of membership.

Instead, if we conceptualize membership based on accession, we might come to a clearer picture of how membership in international organizations impacts certain issue-areas.¹ My approach will provide fruitful results in other areas where the effects of membership have been inconclusive, such as whether membership in international organizations affects democratization, human rights compliance, economic growth, or the reduction of conflict. By opening up the black-boxed process of accession, my project starts to shed light on a number of important questions in the international organizations literature.

Second, I offer an original theoretical perspective that directly links domestic politics to international politics. The connection between domestic politics and international relations is not new, and there is extensive literature that demonstrates the influence of these two political arenas on each other.² However, the extent to which international organizations directly influence states has been debated in the current literature, with an overwhelming preference given to the principal-agent approach where the state is the principal and the international organization is the agent.³ In my study, however, I concretely show that international organizations have a direct effect on states as autonomous actors, which is a perspective that is still relatively new to the literature.

By simply exploring this side of the relationship between states and international organizations, new research on international organizations might be born. For instance, if we begin to see international organizations as autonomous actors, we might begin to study their

¹ Already, Allee and Scalera (2012) have used this approach to provide unique insights on the question of whether the WTO has increased trade and in so doing have provided a new, and more convincing, answer to this question.

² For an important study on the link between domestic politics and international relations, see Dai (2007).

³ For a comprehensive look at the principal-agent approach, see Hawkins et al (2006).

leadership, bureaucracies and preferences all of which might produce additional insights into their effects and general role in world politics.

Third, my project makes a unique contribution in that I test my theoretical approach in multiple empirical contexts using original data. Specifically, I make use of primary-source documents to create an original quantitative dataset on the GATT/WTO and to perform several comparative case studies in both the GATT/WTO and the EU contexts. These accession documents are publically available but have rarely been used in the extant literature that focuses on GATT/WTO and EU accession.⁴ Therefore, by turning to primary-source accession documents as the foundation for the empirical tests in this project, I open the door to new and fruitful data for this and many other questions.

Finally, my project makes an important contribution to the field by opening the door to several new avenues for research. On the one hand, there are a number of new avenues to explore that directly concern the accession process. One very important extension will be to determine why international organization gatekeepers emerge. For the purposes of simplicity, I have chosen not to investigate this question here. However, as is made clear by this research, the presence of international organization gatekeepers is critical to the accession process and its outcomes. My initial expectations are that international organization gatekeepers emerge when there is a potential gain to be had for one of two audiences—either the domestic audience or the international organization audience. For instance, the United Kingdom might act as a challenger to Turkey's accession to the EU to protect its domestic labor market or to reinforce its general position as an outsider in the EU. In future research projects, it will be important to identify these gatekeepers and their preferences to flesh out their role in the accession process.

⁴ See Allee and Scalera (2012) for a notable exception to this trend.

Another obvious extension of this project is to examine more carefully why states seek membership in international organizations and if they learn from the accession experiences of their neighbors. Given the strong regional patterns of joining in both the GATT/WTO and the EU, I have argued here that the decision to apply for membership is a non-strategic choice that bears little weight to the actual accession process. Still, there might be important issues to consider regarding the timing of applications, particularly since we do see a few cases where states begin the process of accession only to withdraw at a later date.⁵ This behavior might also be important if states are learning from the accession experiences of their neighbors. If learning does take place, it would be interesting to note how information on accession is shared and what effect learning has on subsequent accessions.

Additionally, my study opens the door to research on how accession conditions state involvement in international organizations once membership is conferred. Some research has already been done that attempts to bridge accession to post-membership behavior, but there are a number of additional questions worth exploring. Most importantly, future research should consider how accession predicts compliance. Already, some scholars have suggested that accession is one tool international organizations have to screen states that are more or less likely to comply in the future (Kydd 2001). So, it would be important to consider first if experiencing a more difficult accession processes makes states more likely to comply with international organization rules once they are members.

Also, it would be important to know whether domestic changes made during accession last. In the EU, there is a robust literature on Europeanization that examines the extent to which EU members have fully adopted EU policy. However, few of these studies consider how the

⁵ Examples of this behavior have been seen in the EU, for instance, in the cases of Ireland, Denmark, Malta, and Norway.

adoption of EU policy ties back to accession or the presence of international organization gatekeepers during the accession process.

Finally, it would be interesting to consider how the relationship between acceding states and gatekeepers changes once the acceding state becomes a member. Does an antagonistic relationship persist, and if so, what are the lasting impacts on the prospect for cooperation in the future? In these ways, future research should consider the lasting effects of accession.

As is the case for many studies, my project has only scratched the surface of a very important topic in International Relations. By focusing on the process of accession to international organizations, I have only begun to open up an otherwise overlooked political process and to determine its impact on international politics. The task now is to build upon the foundation laid here and to continue to see how my unique approach will further enlighten our understanding of the relationship between states and international organizations, as well as international politics more broadly.

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