

THE 1981 KOSOVAR UPRISING: NATION AND FACEWORK

BY

ZACHARIAH HENRY CLAYBAUGH

THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2013

Urbana, Illinois

Adviser:

Professor Maria Todorova

ABSTRACT

The following work is an examination of the 1981 Uprising in Kosovo, a watershed moment in the history of Yugoslavia. The story of this event will be detailed in the following pages through a narrative history of the uprising and the incidents that surrounded it. Along with the historical description, the uprising will be analyzed within the framework of Rogers Brubaker's theory on nation as form, category, and event and through his triadic relational nexus. Using this view of the nation as a shell within which the discourse of the events took place, articles from Albania's *Zëri i popullit* and Yugoslavia's *Borba* will be analyzed using Ruth Wodak's negative out-group qualities from her discourse-historical approach and Tae-Sop Lim's and John Bower's analytical framework for facework. Through these methods, a more robust and variegated understanding of the 1981 Kosovar Uprising, its place in the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the growing destabilization of the region in the 1990s can be reached.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I would like to thank Charlos and Freyja for keeping it real. Thanks to the Russian, East European, and Eurasian Center; the EU Center; and the Center for Global Studies for their support in my gaining the knowledge necessary to produce this work. Thanks to Dr. Maria Todorova for her guidance and inspiration. I would also like to extend my appreciation to my former instructors at West Texas A&M University's Department of History and to Dr. Elizabeth Morrow Clark, in particular, who introduced me to the history of Southeastern Europe and helped guide me on this track. Thank you to my family and friends.

Finally, none of this would have been possible without the love and support of my wonderful partner, Megan J. Osfar. You're the best!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS.....	1
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	2
1.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	3
CHAPTER 2: THE UPRISING.....	14
2.1. PRELUDE.....	14
2.2. THE DEATH OF TITO.....	24
2.3. THE UPRISING.....	25
2.4. AFTERMATH.....	33
2.5. CONSEQUENCES FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND ALBANIA.....	35
CHAPTER 3: THE UPRISING AS CONTINGENT EVENT.....	39
CHAPTER 4: THE UPRISING AND THE PRESS.....	47
4.1. THE POWER OF JOURNALISM.....	47
4.2. SOURCES.....	49
4.3. METHODOLOGY.....	51
4.4. <i>ZËRI I POPULLIT</i>	59
4.5. <i>BORBA</i>	72
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION.....	84
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	87

GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS

CK SK	Centralni Komitet Saveza Komunista Central Committee of the League of Communists
KPJ	Komunistička partija Jugoslavije Communist Party of Yugoslavia (1919-1952)
PKSh	Partia Komuniste e Shqipërisë Communist Party of Albania (1941-1948)
PPSh	Partia e Punës e Shqipërisë Party of Labour of Albania (1948-1991)
RPSSH	Republika Popullore Socialiste e Shqipërisë People's Socialist Republic of Albania
SAP Kosovo	Socijalistička Autonomna Pokrajina Kosovo Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo
SFRJ	Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SKJ	Savez Komunista Jugoslavije League of Communists of Yugoslavia (1952-1990)
SR Srbija	Socijalistička Republika Srbija Socialist Republic of Serbia
UÇK	Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës Kosovo Liberation Army
UDB	Uprava Državne Bezbednosti State Security Administration

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The following work is an examination of the 1981 Uprising in Kosovo, then an autonomous province of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and nominally attached to the Socialist Republic of Serbia. 1981 represented a watershed moment in the history of Yugoslavia. The uprising in Kosovo showed the first significant cracks in the foundation of the state, which would eventually lead to its dissolution in the 1990s, following the death of its longtime leader, Josip Broz Tito. Significant reforms in the 1960s and 70s resulted in the devolution of power from the central government to the republics and provinces. These reforms were designed to satisfy local and ethno-national interests while maintaining the “brotherhood and unity” of Yugoslavia’s nations and nationalities and the supremacy of the League of Communists. Despite a significant level of self rule and ethnic Albanians populating government ranks, economic disparities and a continued feeling of inferiority pushed the Albanians of Kosovo to take part in a series of demonstrations that rocked the state and changed the trajectory of Kosovo’s development within the Yugoslav system.

The demonstrations and riots in 1981 also marked the end of over a decade of positive relations between one-time bitter adversaries, the People's Socialist Republic of Albania and the SFRJ. Internal and external environmental changes had brought the two states to a reconciliation of sorts. Relations began to improve for the first time since 1948 following the Prague Spring and continued with Kosovo acting as a bridge between the two countries throughout the 1970s. Though never able to come to terms ideologically, Albania and Yugoslavia had found a path to associate with each other amicably through mutually beneficial avenues. The events in Kosovo in 1981 and the treatment of the province’s predominantly Albanian population drove a wedge

between the two states that would see the end of their cooperation in Kosovo and a dramatic reduction in their economic relationship.

The story of this watershed event will be detailed in the following pages through a narrative history of the uprising and the events that surrounded it. Along with the historical description, the uprising will be analyzed within the framework of Rogers Brubaker's theory on nation as form, category, and event and through his triadic relational nexus. Using this view of the nation as a shell within which the discourse of the events took place, articles from Albania's *Zëri i popullit* and Yugoslavia's *Borba* will be analyzed using Ruth Wodak's negative out-group qualities from her discourse-historical approach and Tae-Sop Lim's and John Bower's analytical framework for facework. Through these methods a more robust and variegated understanding of the 1981 Kosovar Uprising and its place in the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the growing destabilization of the region can be reached.

1.1. Historical Background

The territory of Kosovo has served as a bone of contention in the Balkans during much of its recent history. The kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro during the early 1900s sought union with Kosovo, the seat of the medieval Serbian Empire, and possession of Kosovo Polje, site of the famous Battle of Kosovo in 1389. Acquisition of the then Ottoman province was laid down as a major reason for the formation of the Balkan Alliance and initiating hostilities against the Ottoman Empire leading to the Balkan Wars from 1912-1913. Kosovo was captured in late 1912 by Serbian and Montenegrin armies and partitioned between them, from which Serbia received the lion's share of the territory. Serbia and Montenegro began concerted efforts to colonize the territory and encouraged Kosovo's non-Serb population to emigrate.¹ This process was stalled,

¹ John Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country* (1996; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 94-96.

however, when Kosovo was lost to Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary less than three years later during the First World War.

During the Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian occupations, circumstances changed drastically for the Albanian population of the territory. Austria-Hungary occupied the northern half of Kosovo and was greeted by the local Albanian population as liberators. Communiqués with the War Ministry in Vienna reported that Albanians had joined the fighting against Serb troops in the Kosovar towns of Mitrovica and Peć and celebrated the Austro-Hungarian victory against the Serbian army on December 2, 1915.² Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities installed Albanians into local government positions, permitted the use of the Albanian tongue in official discourse, encouraged the creation of Albanian-language schools, and promoted Albanian cultural and educational development.³ Austria-Hungary, following its occupation of portions of northern and central Albania during the war, even considered unifying their occupied sections of Albania with Kosovo in the future.⁴

Bulgaria's occupation zone was quite different. The population was forced into compulsory labor service and faced famine conditions in 1916 and 1917, due to the extensive requisitioning of foodstuffs by the Bulgarian military.⁵ Kaçak bands, Albanian guerrilla forces, were formed and fought against the Bulgarian occupation authorities with some success.⁶ Ultimately, though, it was the internal dissolution of the Central Powers, war weariness, and a renewed offensive by Serbian, French, and British troops in the Macedonian Campaign that led to the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian occupiers, buttressed by German forces.

² Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: a Short History* (New York: NYU Press, 1998), 260.

³ *Ibid.*, 261.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 262.

They were evicted from Serbia's pre-war territories two weeks before the armistice that ended the First World War was signed on November 11, 1918.

Kosovo's recapture in 1918 saw it reabsorbed into Serbia and Montenegro as part of the newly formed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The Albanians attempted to fight back. Kaçak raiders fought against government troops throughout the Albanian-populated areas of the state and were supplied with arms by leading members of the government of Albania.⁷ Aid from Albania was sporadic and never official, though, as Belgrade continuously intervened in the country's politics and prevented Tirana from backing their co-nationals across the border in a stronger fashion.⁸ In fact, according to Ivo Banac, it was not Yugoslav forces that effectively ended the kaçak's actions in the mid-1920s, but it was instead Ahmet Bej Zogu who as premier of Albania, sponsored by Belgrade, assumed leadership in Tirana and pursued a "self-contained policy" that disarmed the kaçak's supply line in the northern highlands of Albania and eliminated their influential supporters in Tirana.⁹

During the interwar period, Kosovo was splintered into, at first, four counties—three attached to Serbia and one to Montenegro—and then, after the institution of the Royalist Dictatorship, three distinct Banates. Also in this period, the Yugoslav government encouraged the assimilation or emigration of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo territory. Albanians in the Kingdom were forced to add Serbian suffixes to their names and were required to conduct official business in the Serbo-Croatian tongue.¹⁰ Estimates of Albanian emigration from Yugoslavia during the interwar period differ wildly, from as low as 35,000 to as high as

⁷ Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell Paperbacks, 1988), 302-303.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., 305

¹⁰ Julie Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1999), 285.

500,000.¹¹ In place of the departed Albanians arrived Serb and Montenegrin colonists from Montenegro, Hercegovina, and Lika, who took up residence on the lands they vacated.¹²

Researchers estimate that as many as 600,000 Slavs colonized the territories of Kosovo during the Royalist period.¹³

The Axis invaded on April 6, 1941, bringing the Second World War to The Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Under Axis rule, the state was dismantled. Kosovo was carved into three sections. The Mitrovica region was placed under the Nazi occupation authority, due to the importance of the Trepca mines, along with the districts of Lab, Vucitrn, and Dezevo.¹⁴ Eastern districts of Gnjilane, Kacanik, and Vitin were allotted to Bulgaria.¹⁵ The largest portion of Kosovo, though, along with the towns of Debar, Tetovo, Gostivar, and Struga were attached to the Italian-sponsored Greater Albania.¹⁶

For many Kosovar Albanians, the Axis were seen as liberators. A largely unified Albanian state had been created, the Albanian language was put into use in schools and as the language of local administration, and it was permissible to fly the Albanian national flag across Greater Albania.¹⁷ Albanians and their Italian sponsors encouraged the emigration of thousands of Slavs from the territory of Greater Albania, with estimates varying greatly—much as the emigration of Albanians during the Royalist period had—from 10,000 to as many as 100,000.¹⁸

In their place, the Italians promoted a settlement program that saw 72,000 Albanians from the

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: a History of Kosovo* (New York: Columbia Univ Pr, 1998), 121.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 122.

¹⁸ Mertus, *Kosovo*, 287.

territories of the pre-war Albanian state being resettled within the confines of the newly attached Kosovar territories.¹⁹

Despite their eventual victory over the Axis powers occupying Yugoslavia, the KPJ faced significant obstacles in encouraging popular resistance to the occupation from Slavs and Albanians within the territories of Kosovo. Albanians were uneasy regarding the future of Albanian-inhabited lands in a post-conflict Yugoslav socialist state. KPJ activists like Fadil Hoxha²⁰ attempted to assuage their fears by emphasizing the likelihood of unification with Albania, under KPJ auspices, should socialism prove victorious in Albania, as well as in Yugoslavia.²¹ Despite these veiled assurances, Kosovar Albanians failed to join the Partisans in any appreciable number.²² For Kosovar Serbs that remained to fight in Kosovo, the majority linked up with the Chetniks led by Colonel Draža Mihailović.²³

The 1944 Partisan victory over the Axis liberated Yugoslavia. Consolidating power in the newly liberated territories proved difficult, however, particularly in Kosovo. While led to believe that the KPJ would allow Kosovo to join with Albania, which had also enjoyed a Partisan victory against the Axis, the reality was that the territory would once again become an appendage of Serbia.²⁴ Tito believed that to separate Kosovo from Serbia would damn a communist victory

¹⁹ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 123.

²⁰ Hoxha was later a member of the collective presidency of the SFRJ during the 1981 Uprising.

²¹ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 136-137.

²² According to Philip Cohen, by late 1944 troops from Kosovo numbered an estimated 20,000 of the roughly 648,000-strong Partisan force, while never exceeding 6% of the total force (late 1941). See: Philip J. Cohen, *Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996), 96. Radošin Rajević estimated that as many as 15,000 Kosovar Albanians were members of the National Liberation Army at the close of the war of a total of roughly 800,000 total members. See: Radošin Rajević, "Emergence and Development of the Autonomy of Kosovo within Serbia and Yugoslavia," in *Relationship between Yugoslavia and Albania*, ed. Ranko Petković (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska Stvarnost, 1984), 54.

²³ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 122.

²⁴ Mertus, *Kosovo*, 287.

amongst the Serbs.²⁵ This decision by the KPJ was a significant factor in the Kosovo Uprising from 1944-1945.

The Kosovo Uprising at the close of the Second World War set the stage for two decades of poor relations between Kosovar Albanians and the KPJ (later the SKJ beginning in 1952). The conflagration erupted when word reached the Partisan National Liberation Army base in Podujevo, Kosovo of a massacre that had occurred in the town of Drenica²⁶ west of Prishtina.²⁷ Troops from the 7th Brigade, which was populated by Kosovar Albanians from the Drenica region, stationed in Podujevo were dispatched as a commission to investigate the allegations and report back.²⁸ When the commission arrived in the town, they found the bodies of an estimated 250 men, many of which had been hacked to death by axes, in the Klina River.²⁹ The commission then presented their findings to the Staff of the Yugoslav detachments of the National Liberation Army in Kosovo.³⁰ In response to the report, Yugoslav detachment troops executed the commission members, which led to an eruption in hostilities between KPJ troops and Kosovar Albanians in the Drenica region lasting for six months.³¹ The rebel fighters were brutally suppressed and the Albanian population paid a heavy price with an estimated 48,000 killed during the uprising.³²

Consolidating power in Kosovo was also aided by the lack of interference from Albania. Though often characterized as a “Stalinist” regime or later as “Maoist,” the Albania that emerged from the Second World War under the leadership of Enver Hoxha and the Partia Komuniste e

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Drenica later was the scene of massacres in 1998 and 1999

²⁷ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 142.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid., 143.

Shqipërisë (PKSh) was founded and developed early on along the Yugoslav model.³³ The KPJ helped to organize and arm the national liberation movement in Albania and served as its sponsor with the Allied camp. Pro-Yugoslav factions were firmly entrenched in the PKSh until the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948, at which time Hoxha purged them from the ranks and consolidated his own powerbase.³⁴ Following the war, though, Albania was clearly a satellite state of Yugoslavia, firmly tied to its neighbor economically, militarily, and politically.³⁵ As it relates to Kosovo, Partisans from Albania played a role in the liberation of the territory from Nazi control, as support troops for Yugoslav Partisan forces. Bernd Fischer equated this to an accurate belief by Tito that the Partisans would face far less opposition with an Albanian presence involved in the takeover.³⁶

Ultimately, though, Enver Hoxha's attitude toward Kosovo during the war and in the post-war era is difficult to discern. Hoxha was believed to have been opposed to unification with Kosovo due to Gheg dominance within the territory.³⁷ Hoxha and the vast majority of the PKSh were Tosk from southern Albania. By adding the Gheg population of Kosovo to those in northern Albania, an overwhelmingly Gheg-dominated state would emerge, which could have proved to be an unfavorable environment for PKSh-Tosk hegemony. Hoxha, though, did sign an agreement in 1943 with representatives of Balli Kombëtar that supported the retention of an ethnic-based Greater Albania following the war, which would include Kosovo.³⁸ Hoxha was later forced to renounce the agreement by the Yugoslavs.³⁹ While it is not clear what Hoxha's true

³³ For a discussion of the development of the communist movement in Albania see: Bernd Fischer, *Albania at War, 1939-45* (London: Hurst & Company Publishers Ltd., 1999).

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 253.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 240.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Bernd Fischer, "Enver Hoxha and the Stalinist Dictatorship in Albania," in *Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of Southeast Europe* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2007), 246.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

feelings were vis-à-vis Kosovo, what is clear is that the RPSSh before 1981 rarely took a hardline stance regarding treatment of their co-nationals in Yugoslavia, and instead saved the majority of their post-1948 vitriol for ideological quarrels.

The Kosovo that emerged from the ravages of the Second World War faced very similar circumstances to the one that emerged from the First World War. Vasa Čubrilović—a member of the group that plotted the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 and later an influential figure amongst the KPJ and a member of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts—advocated for the mass expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo. In an address to the KPJ leadership, which included Tito, Milovan Djilas, and Aleksander Ranković, Čubrilović expounded on the need to cleanse Kosovo of Albanians as a way to secure a direct ethnic border between Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia linked by a strategically vital and ethno-nationally favorable Kosovo-Metohija.⁴⁰ Čubrilović found an eager listener to his ideas in UDB chief and future vice president of Yugoslavia, Aleksander Ranković.⁴¹

Due to the Tito-Stalin Split and Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in 1948, Yugoslavia's close relationship with Albania came to an end. This turn of events added another level of suspicion toward Yugoslavia's Albanian population, who were already viewed as potentially pro-fascist and now had their loyalty to the regime questioned due to ethnic ties with the neighboring RPSSh. To combat this potential danger, Belgrade pursued a policy of "Turkification" to weaken the national consciousness of the state's Albanian population.⁴²

Albanians were to be educated in Turkish and were encouraged to emigrate to the Republic of

⁴⁰ Klejda Mulaj, "A Recurrent Tragedy: Ethnic Cleansing as a Tool of State Building in the Yugoslav Multinational Setting," *Nationalities Papers* 34, no. 1 (2006): 34.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

Turkey.⁴³ By 1966, more than 230,000 Albanians had been forced to leave Yugoslavia, most of them fled to Turkey.⁴⁴

Ranković was part of Tito's inner circle, headed the Yugoslav secret police, and led the assimilationist-conservative wing of the KPJ/SKJ.⁴⁵ In Kosovo, he encouraged a Serb-centralist policy, due to his deep distrust of non-Serbs, one that was predicated on surveillance and Serb dominance of the Kosovar politico-security apparatus.⁴⁶ His methods of repression, though, began to come to light in the 1960s. He was accused of pursuing policies and practices that were antithetical to Yugoslav constitutional law, and that his pursuit of Serbian hegemony in the region had encouraged the growth of Greater Albanian separatism and nationalism.⁴⁷

Ranković's opposition to Edvard Kardelj's push for reform through devolution led him to, allegedly, orchestrate an attempt on Kardelj's life in 1959. Along with Kardelj and the liberal wing of the party, Ranković had drawn the ire of many through his use of intimidation and surveillance. Matters reached a head in 1966 when the liberal bloc persuaded Tito that Ranković and his cronies needed to be removed. In a session of the Brioni Plenum, Tito accused Ranković "of deviating from party policy as early as 1964 and of forming a political clique with the objective of taking power."⁴⁸ Ranković and several of his compatriots were expelled from the party and stripped of their posts, opening the door for the rise of the liberal wing and the development of workers' self management. Within a few years the status of Kosovo and its Albanian population within the Yugoslav Federation was drastically changed from one of Serb domination to a period of Albanian ascendancy.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Sabrina Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana Univ Pr, 1992), 84.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 188.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 189.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 90-91

Following the fall of Aleksander Ranković in 1966 and the subsequent demonstrations in Kosovo in 1968, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began a decade-long period of compromise and the devolution of power to its ethnic-Albanian population in the province of Kosovo. In addition to the improvement in relations between the Yugoslav government and its ethnic-Albanian populace, bilateral relations between Yugoslavia and neighboring Albania reached their most cordial level since prior to the Tito-Stalin split in 1948. The 1970s can very well be described as a time of considerable advancement for the Albanians of Kosovo and a period of collaboration between the RPSSh and the SFRJ.

Patrick Artisien ascribed this spirit of cooperation and renewed interest in the formation of a Balkan Pact by Tirana and Belgrade to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and their mutual interest in preserving their own independence in a time of growing external pressure in the region.⁴⁹ What aided in maintaining this spirit, however, was the atmosphere of cooperation being fostered in Kosovo and the improvement in the status of the Albanian population of the province. Albania and Yugoslavia's relationship deepened, as a result, leading to educational and cultural exchanges, trade agreements, the opening of cross-border travel between the province and the RPSSh, and the re-appointment of ambassadors in Belgrade and Tirana. This did not lead to ideological agreement, though, as both states continued to criticize each other's political programs, although this was not a serious impediment to increasingly beneficial ties between the two countries.⁵⁰

Despite positive developments in Kosovo and growing cultural, educational, and economic cooperation between Albania and Yugoslavia, all was not well. Josip Broz Tito's health had deteriorated during the late 1970s, leading to his death in May 1980. With the death

⁴⁹ Patrick Artisien, "Yugoslavia and Albania in the 1970s," *Co-Existence: An International Journal* 15, no. 2 (1978): 219.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 222-225.

of Yugoslavia's great wartime and post-war leader, the state now lacked the unifying figure that had maintained a level of cohesion between its disparate republics and provinces and nations and nationalities. Economically, the SFRJ stood on the edge of the precipice, which set the stage for the tragic events that followed in Kosovo in 1981.

CHAPTER 2: THE UPRISING

2.1. Prelude

The first two decades of communist rule in Yugoslavia saw the Albanian minority of Kosovo—and in other regions of the Federation—facing many of the same issues that had been present in the interwar Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The province was still linked to Serbia, as was Vojvodina. The period from 1949-1965 was termed the era of “Serb Domination” by Petrović and Stefanović, as a time when Kosovar Albanians faced institutional domination by Serbs who were overrepresented in Kosovo in the state sector, the SKJ, and the UDB.⁵¹ Furthermore, Serbs possessed higher rates of employment in the industrial sector of the economy.⁵² Albanians confronted symbolic domination in Yugoslavia, as well, through their categorization as a “nationality,” or minority group, within a state dominated by its “nations” and through the widespread official usage of Serbo-Croatian as the *de facto* language of the state.⁵³ The labeling of Albanian irredentism as the “Greatest Danger” confronting the Province also marked the period of Serb domination, as well as the encouraged outmigration of Kosovar Albanians to Turkey.⁵⁴ The institutional and symbolic domination of Kosovo’s Albanians by the Serb minority was justified politically and ideologically through Kosovar Serb overrepresentation in the wartime Partisan forces.⁵⁵

Slavs populated most government positions, dominated the province’s security forces, and Albanians faced persecution and suspicion related to their position as a national minority in Yugoslavia with a neighboring national homeland in the RPSSh that, after 1948, was hostile to

⁵¹ Aleksander Petrović and Đorđe Stefanović, "Kosovo, 1944-1981: The Rise and Fall of a Communist 'Nested Homeland'," *Europe-Asia Studies* 62, no. 7 (2010): 1078.

⁵² Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned* (New York: Oxford Univ Pr, 2000), 35.

⁵³ Petrović and Stefanović, "Kosovo, 1944-1981," 1078

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

the SFRJ. This fact was highlighted by a show trial in Prizren in 1956 where leading Albanian communists were accused of being part of a spy network infiltrating Kosovo from Enver Hoxha's Albania, which led to them being imprisoned for lengthy sentences.⁵⁶ These issues, along with underdevelopment and a lack of public investment in the province, relative to the rest of the Yugoslav Federation,⁵⁷ left Kosovo languishing behind the rest of the SFRJ, while condemning the province's majority-Albanian population to the status of second-class citizens.

However, during the latter half of the 1960s, the Albanians of Yugoslavia were greeted with two significant events, which changed their status within the state. First, the Brioni Plenum in 1966 led to the ouster of UDB head and previously trusted lieutenant of Tito, Aleksander Ranković. Ranković's security apparatus had been responsible for much of the institutionalized repression of Albanians in Kosovo and had been accused of pursuing centralist and hegemonistic policies favoring Serbs and Montenegrins in the province.⁵⁸ The fall of Ranković signified a "second liberation" for many Kosovar Albanians and, as was reported by *Radio Free Europe*, "gave the green light to an urgent and stormy development toward full Albanian self-government in Kosovo."⁵⁹ In the ensuing two years, Albanians established themselves in numbers across every sector of public life in Kosovo.⁶⁰ Kosovar Albanians became such a numerically strong segment of the public sector that by 1968 Serbian officials in Kosovo began to feel the effects of discrimination pointed their way.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Louis Zanga, "Belgrade Position Vis-à-vis Albanians Hardened [Country Series: Albania]," 07 February 1969, [Electronic Record], HU OSA 300-8-3:2-7-182, Background Report, Publications Department, Records of the Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Institute, Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest: <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=47304> [accessed 14 March 2013], 2.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid., 3.

Seen as another significant conciliatory gesture, Tito made his first visit to Kosovo in sixteen years in March 1967. He offered pointed criticism regarding conditions in the province: “[o]ne cannot talk about equal rights...when Serbs are given preference in the factories...and Albanians are rejected although they have the same or better qualifications.”⁶² An additional attempt at appeasement by federal authorities was the elimination of the Serbo-Croatian term “Šiptar,” a variation of the Albanian word “Shqiptar,” which means “Albanian,” as the official term used by the SFRJ to denote an individual of Albanian origin.⁶³ The word had taken on a derogatory connotation and was replaced by the term “Albanac.”⁶⁴ Of note also was the decision in September 1968 to permit “the free use of Albanian national symbols such as flags,” but with the warning to nationalist elements “that misuse of this right would be strongly disapproved.”⁶⁵

While the elimination of Ranković’s repressive security apparatus and other subsequent measures represented significant victories for the Albanian population of the province, for many Kosovars the reforms did not go far enough. Albanians within the SKJ coalesced into two factions concerning the substance and scope of the reform program in Kosovo-Metohija. The hardliners, who later became associated with the University of Prishtina, pushed for Albanians to be immediately elevated to the status of a “nation” within the SFRJ and called for the establishment of an Albanian national republic that would have complete equality with the other republican, national units of the state.⁶⁶ The second group, termed the “gradualists,” were supporters of the reform program proposed by Aslan Fazlija, the future president of the Central

⁶² Quoted in: Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 324.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Louis Zanga, “Nationalist Manifestations in Kosovo-Metohija with Grave Political Connotations [Country Series: Albania],” 29 October 1968, [Electronic Record], HU OSA 300-8-3:2-6-54, Background Report, Publications Department, Records of the Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Institute, Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest: <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=47089> [accessed 17 March 2013], 1.

⁶⁶ Petrović and Stefanović, “Kosovo, 1944-1981,” 1090.

Committee of the SK Prishtina during the 1981 Uprising. The gradualists supported a program that called for Kosovo to remain an appendage of the SR Srbija, but with far greater autonomy than previously existed. Essentially, Fazlija's plan called for Kosovo to remain "a Serbian province in form, but an Albanian ethnic republic in content."⁶⁷ Fazlija drafted a report in 1967 that articulated the means to achieve the gradualists' goal for Kosovo. In the report he outlined the need to eliminate the differences between the status of the state's nations and nationalities.⁶⁸ This would be achieved by allowing the direct representation of nationalities on all three levels (federal, republican, and provincial) of the state and by changing the Yugoslav Chamber of Nations to the 'Chamber of Nations and Nationalities.'⁶⁹ He argued that representation of nationalities would reinforce the SKJ's decision to pursue decentralization.⁷⁰ While calling for significant change to the status quo, Fazlija and the gradualists proposed and supported a path that would essentially elevate the provinces to the status of republics and nationalities to the status of nations, but without altering the vocabulary associated or modifying the territorial limits of the existing federal system of provinces and republics to carve out an Albanian Republic within the SFRJ. At the close of 1968, the plan proposed by Fazlija and the gradualists would be adopted by the SKJ and forever change the constitutional structure of the SFRJ, but supporters of the hardline approach to reform would have their day first.

The most provocative attempt to force the state to create an Albanian national republic and eliminate the second-class status of the nationalities within the Federation by Kosovar Albanians was the protests and riots that occurred in October and November of 1968. In October, reports emerged detailing incidences of anti-Serbian protests in the Kosovar cities of Peć,

⁶⁷ Ibid., 1091.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

Prizren, and the town of Suva Reka in the district of Prizren.⁷¹ Participants numbered in the hundreds and Yugoslav authorities blamed the incidences on RPSSh intelligence services fomenting discord in the province.⁷²

Though small in number, these “anti-socialist” demonstrations were taken seriously by Yugoslav authorities with Tito himself calling a meeting with provincial leaders.⁷³ Tito had shown increasing interest in the status of the Province, in general, meeting with the Kosovar leadership again on the 24th of October.⁷⁴ Discussions of the social, economic, and political issues were allegedly “presented to Tito in a very frank, open and objective manner, as [Tito] had requested,” according to Ismail Bajra, a member of the six-member Kosmet⁷⁵ delegation.⁷⁶ Tito urged the quick implementation of measures focused on reversing Kosovo’s decades-long economic problems, while also offering his complete support in the adoption of constitutional changes that would grant Kosovo-Metohija greater autonomy.⁷⁷

Despite the positive momentum being generated toward monumental reforms in the Province’s status, tensions increased and the region exploded in chaos on November 27th, only days before the November 29th celebrations of Albanian Independence Day, Kosovar Liberation Day, and the anniversary of the proclamation of the Yugoslav federal state, all of which landed on the same day. Hundreds of demonstrators destroyed property in Prishtina, while the rioting spread across the Province, and by December to the Albanian-dominated cities of Gostivar and

⁷¹ Pedro Ramet, "Problems of Albanian Nationalism in Yugoslavia," *Orbis* 25, no. 2 (1981): 374.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Zanga, “Nationalist Manifestations in Kosovo-Metohija,” 2.

⁷⁴ This meeting, though, was held by request of the Kosovo leadership. See: Louis Zanga, “Tito Shows Personal Concern Over Kosmet [Country Series: Yugoslavia],” 12 November 1968, [Electronic Record], HU OSA 300-8-3:78-2-91, Background Report, Publications Department, Records of the Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Institute, Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest: <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=32633> [accessed 18 March 2013], 1.

⁷⁵ This was the shortened form used by Yugoslav authorities at the time for “Kosovo-Metohija.”

⁷⁶ Zanga, “Tito Shows Personal Concern,” 2.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

Tetovo in neighboring Macedonia.⁷⁸ Demonstrators allegedly could even be heard chanting, “Long live Enver Hoxha!”⁷⁹ Leaders of the protest in Prishtina drew up a list of demands that called for the removal of the word “Metohija” from the Province’s name, the designation of Kosovo as a republic within the SFRJ, the extension to Kosovo of the right of self-determination, and the establishment of a university.⁸⁰ In all, 37 people were injured in the demonstrations in Prishtina—13 of which were police officers—and one person died.⁸¹

According to Julie Mertus, Tirana maintained a largely silent stance regarding the plight of its co-nationals across the border during the 1968 protests, a striking contrast to the vociferous response to similar circumstances in 1981.⁸² To underscore this, in early November 1968 an editorial in *Zëri i popullit* strongly criticized Yugoslavia ideologically—something that happened with relative frequency throughout the Cold War—but made no mention to problems in Kosovo, nor criticized Yugoslav treatment of the Albanian minority in the state.⁸³ They did however specifically mention a firm commitment to “non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, respect for the independence and national sovereignty of the peoples and non-violation of their territorial integrity.”⁸⁴ Although, this likely had more to do with maintaining a stable relationship with Yugoslavia in the wake of the upheaval in the Communist Bloc created by the Prague Spring than condoning the SFRJ’s actions in Kosovo.

This is not to say, however, that Tirana was completely silent regarding the situation in Kosovo and the issues facing Albanians across the Yugoslav Federation. In a *Zëri i popullit*

⁷⁸ Ramet, “Problems of Albanian Nationalism,” 374.

⁷⁹ Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 191.

⁸⁰ Ramet, “Problems of Albanian Nationalism,” 374.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Mertus, *Kosovo*, 36.

⁸³ Louis Zanga, “Albania Renews Anti-Yugoslav Polemics [Country Series: Albania],” 07 November 1968, [Electronic Record], HU OSA 300-8-3:78-2-100, Background Report, Publications Department, Records of the Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Institute, Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest: <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=32635> [accessed 17 March 2013], 2.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 3.

editorial preceding the outbreak of violence in late November, the RPSSh responded to the post-Brioni status of developments in Kosovo-Metohija for the first time.⁸⁵ Tirana criticized Yugoslavia for implementing only token gestures of expanded rights, such as the new law allowing the display of the Albanian national flag.⁸⁶ Emphasized was the need for more wide-reaching measures that would lift “the general state of oppression and national discrimination” experienced by Albanians in Yugoslavia, which Radio Free Europe implied meant that the RPSSh was calling for republican status for Kosmet.⁸⁷ Radio Free Europe also questioned the timing of the editorial’s release, implying that Tirana may have expected demonstrations to erupt close to the time of publishing, as evidenced by the following quote:

“We tell the present-day leaders of Kosovo to be more realistic, to study more deeply the glorious history of the Albanian population of Kosovo which has never bowed before oppression, however brutal and merciless it may have been. If they do this, it will become obvious to them that every repressive and discriminating measure and any persecution which they may undertake with regard to the population of Kosovo will bring to them only new, successive and all-out defeat.”⁸⁸

While the 1968 protests resulted in the imprisonment of the demonstration’s leadership for periods of up to seven years and the purging of 37 members of the SKJ,⁸⁹ it did lead to the second major milestone in the late-1960s transition of Kosovo: the revision of the 1963 Yugoslav Constitution in 1968.⁹⁰ Under new amendments, adopted from Fazlija’s gradualist program, judicial and legislative authority devolved from Belgrade to the Provinces (Kosovo-Metohija and Vojvodina), and both units were given representation in the federal parliament—a privilege that

⁸⁵ Louis Zanga, “Inflammatory Albania Editorial Precedes Nationalist Demonstrations in Prishtina [Country Series: Albania],” 29 November 1968, [Electronic Record], HU OSA 300-8-3:2-6-27, Background Report, Publications Department, Records of the Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Institute, Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest: <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=47081> [accessed 17 March 2013], 1.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁸⁹ Ramet, “Problems of Albanian Nationalism,” 374-375.

⁹⁰ Zanga, “Albania Renews Anti-Yugoslav Polemics,” 3.

had been previously granted only to the republics.⁹¹ Of particular importance to the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (Autonomna Pokrajina Kosovo i Metohija) was the removal of the name “Metohija,” a Serb-geographic designation looked at as a symbol of Serbian colonization, from the Province’s official title and the addition of the term “Socialist,” thus rechristening the Province as the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo (Socijalistička Autonomna Pokrajina Kosovo).⁹² Kosovo and Vojvodina were also granted the right to establish their own constitutions separate from Serbia, giving them political autonomy from the SR Srbija, while Kosovo was also given priority over the other regions of the state in the disbursement of central funds for internal development.⁹³ These two events signaled the end of Kosovo as merely an appendage of Serbia, a state that had existed almost without interruption since the conclusion of the Balkan Wars from 1912-1913, and ushered in a period of rapid social, cultural, educational, and economic change in the newly renamed Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo.

Following the era of Serb domination, an era of Albanian domination over Kosovo was ushered in after the 1968 riots, stretching to the 1981 Uprising. Kosovar Albanians dominated the institutions of the state in the Province, holding overwhelming majorities in state security, the SKJ, and the state sector.⁹⁴ Symbolic domination by Albanians was highlighted by the promotion of Albanian to the status of *de facto* official language of the SAP, as well as the Albanian flag taking position below the SFRJ banner as the official symbol of Kosovo.⁹⁵ The ideological justifications for the emergence and maintenance of Albanian ethnic domination over the Province stemmed from the vast numerical majority Albanians held in the SAP Kosovo and from

⁹¹ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 169.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Petrović and Stefanović, "Kosovo, 1944-1981," 1078.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

the “Greatest Danger” that was now posed by Great Serbian Nationalism.⁹⁶ The emergence of an Albanian-dominated Kosovo also caused an outmigration of Serbs and Montenegrins to areas deemed “safe” for their people in other areas of the SFRJ.⁹⁷

Its cultural institutions further defined the new Albanian-dominated Kosovo, the prime symbol of this being the University of Prishtina.⁹⁸ Established in 1969, the University of Prishtina was the first institution of higher learning in Yugoslavia to offer Albanian as an official language of instruction. Although the RPSSh and the SFRJ never appeared able to come to terms regarding ideological differences, the post-1968 adjustments to Kosovo’s status, the push for stabilization and development in the Province, and the establishment of the University of Prishtina ushered in a period of fruitful relations between Albanian and Yugoslavia.

Marko Nikezić, newly elected Chairman of the SK Srbija, supported the pursuit of normalization of relations with Albania as a means to create a more stable atmosphere for Kosovo’s development already in December 1968.⁹⁹ To that end, trade increased 77% from 1968 to 1969, with a further increase projected for 1970.¹⁰⁰ Also of note was the expansion of tourism between the two states.¹⁰¹ The major breakthrough, though, was in the educational realm. Announced on November 19, 1969, coinciding with the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the liberation of Prishtina and the official announcement of the creation of the University of Prishtina, was the signing of a contract with the RPSSh to provide textbooks and educational

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Louis Zanga, “Serbian and Kosovar Officials Examine Kosovo’s Problems [Country Series: Yugoslavia],” 16 December 1968, [Electronic Record], HU OSA 300-8-3:78-2-13, Background Report, Publications Department, Records of the Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Institute, Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest: <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=32611> [accessed 17 March 2013], 3.

¹⁰⁰ Zdenko Antić, “Improvement in Yugoslav-Albanian Relations [Country Series: Yugoslavia],” 20 November 1969, [Electronic Record], HU OSA 300-8-3:78-4-94, Background Report, Publications Department, Records of the Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Institute, Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest: <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=32774> [accessed 18 March 2013], 2-3.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 3.

materials for the new university.¹⁰² The University of Tirana also signed a contract with Prishtina to provide more than 200 teachers to set up Albanian-language courses during the first five years of the new university's development.¹⁰³ University of Tirana faculty and cultural groups also became a regular presence as collaborators and advisors at the University of Prishtina during the course of the 1970s, as the SAP Kosovo took advantage of new rights encapsulated in the 1974 Constitution that allowed it to engage in contact and negotiate agreements with "organs and organizations" of foreign countries.¹⁰⁴

By the pivotal year of 1981, 36,000 full-time students were enrolled at the university, and an additional 18,000 were enrolled in extension programs.¹⁰⁵ The university had been built to accommodate only about 12,000 students.¹⁰⁶ The authorities had allowed the university's student population to grow unchecked as a temporary means to alleviate chronic unemployment, rationalizing "that it was better to have the youth in the classroom than roaming the streets."¹⁰⁷ Kosovo had a ratio of 274.7 students per 1,000 inhabitants, which outpaced the national average by almost 80 students per inhabitant.¹⁰⁸ Overcrowding, poor facilities, and lack of future employment opportunities made the student body of the University of Prishtina ripe for extremist activity. It was out of this situation that a canteen at the university served as host to the first action of the 1981 Kosovar Uprising.

¹⁰² Louis Zanga, "Cooperation Between Tirana University and the New University of Prishtina [Country Series: Yugoslavia]," 03 December 1969, [Electronic Record], HU OSA 300-8-3:78-4-59, Background Report, Publications Department, Records of the Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Institute, Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest: <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=32768> [accessed 17 March 2013], 1-2.

¹⁰³ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 326.

¹⁰⁴ Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 77.

¹⁰⁵ Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 197.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

2.2. The Death of Tito

Josip Broz Tito died on May 4, 1980, following more than 36 years as the leader of Socialist Yugoslavia. Tito led the Yugoslav Partisan resistance to victory over the Axis Powers in the Second World War. He served at varying times as the President of Yugoslavia, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Federal Secretary of the People's Defense, Secretary-General of the Non-Aligned Movement, and Chairman of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. He survived defying Stalin in 1948. In addition and most notably, he was the principal architect of the post-World War II Yugoslav state, deftly reinventing himself and the state as circumstances changed. Socialist Yugoslavia transitioned through four constitutions under his leadership, while Tito morphed from soldier to celebrity statesman. However, while change did occur, the one constant was the unifying personage of Josip Broz, whether clad in military regalia or a suit and dark sunglasses.

With Tito's death, Yugoslavia entered a period of mourning. Although the population had been prepared for the Marshall's passing by regular medical bulletins describing his declining health, grief and shock gripped the country. A pivotal soccer match between Belgrade's Crvena Zastava and Zagreb's Dinamo was immediately suspended upon announcement of Tito's passing; players exited the field with tears in their eyes. The people of Yugoslavia gathered in massive crowds to pay their respects as Tito's body crisscrossed the country via train. Ultimately, nearly half the population visited the gravesite in Belgrade. Representatives from 122 states attended the funeral; of the major world powers, only the United States failed to send its head of state to attend the somber event.¹⁰⁹

Less than a year after the death of Tito, on March 11, 1981, the federation that he spearheaded began a dissolution that would lead to a series of bloody wars that eventually

¹⁰⁹ Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 318.

divided Yugoslavia into seven independent states, states that were once joined in “brotherhood and unity.” Yugoslavia under Tito had been able to weather storms before 1981. Uprisings had been put down successfully in the past by the regime;¹¹⁰ however, the 1981 Kosovar Uprising came at a time of extreme economic distress that lacked the unifying figure of Tito.

2.3. The Uprising

The Yugoslav wire service, Tanjug, reported on March 12, 1981, that a small demonstration had taken place the night before at the university in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo. The report stated that this “violation of public order and peace” had occurred as “individual enemy elements tried to draw on the discontent of students with meals at the student canteen.” The account went on to state that after the intervention of students and the university’s instructional staff, “the [remaining activists] scattered and departed to their homes.” It was claimed that students, workers, the university, and the local populace “condemned” the incident, and that work at the university had returned to a state of normalcy.¹¹¹

Noel Malcolm identifies an incident at a university-eating hall as the catalyst for the first demonstration. While eating lunch, a student found a cockroach in his soup. After hurling his food tray to the floor in disgust, he was joined by other students present in voicing their displeasure with the conditions at the university. The unrest moved outside of the main administrative building, and a crowd quickly grew to roughly 500 individuals. Police were called in and began making arrests, which further enraged the protesting students. The number of protestors continued to expand with the ending of a nearby soccer match: the city center filled with spectators who began joining the demonstration *en masse*. Malcolm puts the number of demonstrators at this point at between 3,000 and 4,000. The protestors, emboldened by their

¹¹⁰ The successfully quelled uprisings include those in Kosovo in 1945 and 1968, intermittent student demonstrations from 1973-1975, demonstrations in Croatia in 1968, and the Croatian Spring of 1971.

¹¹¹ “Izgrad Grupe Studenata,” *Borba (Belgrade)* (March 13, 1981): 5.

numbers, became more overt in their criticism of the authorities. Police again attempted to disband the demonstrators, but the crowd had turned violent and began hurling rocks at police. Rioting continued through the night of the 11th, and order was not restored until police used tear gas to disperse the crowd on the morning of the 12th.¹¹²

At the time, Aslan Fazlija, president of the Presidium of the SK Prishtina, had a far different interpretation of the events that unfolded on March 11th. He stated that “speculations are transparently malicious...in some reports from foreign countries that allege the existence of a large number of participants, injuries, and detainees in the demonstrations from March 11th” and further elaborated “that not one of the students on that day was injured or detained.”¹¹³ Fazlija did not discuss the actions of police or the breadth of the demonstration.

Although likely initially driven by student discontent with university facilities, the main impetus behind the expansion of the first protest actions in Prishtina was rumored to be economic in nature: high cost of living and the economic benefits afforded to government bureaucrats.¹¹⁴ The economic realities were likely augmented by the national issue, which Louis Zanga labeled as “a real aspect of the Kosovar dilemma.”¹¹⁵ Factors affecting the national issue were described as follows: Kosovo’s relative poverty compared to the rest of Yugoslavia, compounded by high population growth; the history of oppression of the Albanian majority in Kosovo; and its proximity to Albania.¹¹⁶ As the protest movement gathered momentum in the following weeks, all signs pointed to these elements being significant factors in the Uprising.

¹¹² Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 334.

¹¹³ M. Antić, “Neprijateljka Akcija Bez Podrške i Rezonancije,” *Borba (Belgrade)* (March 29, 1981): 3.

¹¹⁴ Louis Zanga, “Why New Unrest in Kosovo? [Country Series: Yugoslavia],” 23 March 1981, [Electronic Record], HU OSA 300-8-3:85-1-98, Background Report, Publications Department, Records of the Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Institute, Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest: <http://osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/pdf/85-1-98> [accessed 09 March 2013], 2.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

Immediately following the events of March 11th, discussion of the episode in the Yugoslav press was muted. *Borba* presented a brief account produced by the *Tanjug* wire service on page 5 of its issue from the 13th of March.¹¹⁷ More of note, though, was *Rilindja*'s¹¹⁸ account of the event. According to *Radio Free Europe*, the same *Tanjug* account was buried on page six of the daily, though the newspaper was typically not shy about generating their own reports of similar matters in other regions of the state.¹¹⁹ The provincial committee also met as scheduled the day after the protest, seemingly with the air of business-as-usual, only belied by the presence of Fadil Hoxha¹²⁰ and the grim countenance of the political leaders in attendance.¹²¹ This outward reaction to the disturbances of March 11th likely point to an attempt by the Yugoslav leadership to minimize the actual scale of the protest, which the foreign press presented as very significant.

A new round of demonstrations ensued on the 25th of March, as protests erupted in the southern Kosovo town of Prizren. The very next day, University of Prishtina students occupied residence halls. Sources stated that the protestors demanded that Kosovo be given the status of a republic and continued calls for improvements in facilities and conditions at the university. 23 students and 12 policemen were injured, and 21 students were detained after police stormed the residence halls and used tear gas to end the student occupation.¹²²

Protest actions continued on the 1st and 2nd of April, with the Prishtina students being joined by striking workers from Pudgevo. Protestors, allegedly in the thousands, stormed through

¹¹⁷ "Izgrad Grupe Studenata."

¹¹⁸ Prishtina's Party daily.

¹¹⁹ Zanga, "Why New Unrest in Kosovo?" 2.

¹²⁰ Hoxha was a member of the SFRJ Presidency and resided in Belgrade.

¹²¹ Zanga, "Why New Unrest in Kosovo?" 5.

¹²² Reuters, "35 Injured as Police in Yugoslavia Break Up a Protest by Students," *New York Times* (March 29, 1981): 3.

the center of the city, destroying factory equipment and breaking shop windows.¹²³ According to Artisien and Howells (1981), at this point, “[t]he disturbances thus took on overt symptoms of Albanian nationalism and irredentism, in the form of slogans and demands for the elevation of Kosovo to the constitutional status of a republic and, in some extreme cases, for the unification of the Albanian population of Yugoslavia with neighboring Albania.”¹²⁴

On the 2nd of April, Yugoslav authorities imposed emergency measures to suppress the demonstration movement.¹²⁵ These measures banned all public gatherings and mobile groups across the province.¹²⁶ Army units were posted to protect public buildings. This strong reaction by the government was in response to the actions of what official numbers pegged at around 10,000 protestors who marched through Prishtina on April 1.¹²⁷ Police attempted to disperse the crowd with tear gas, and according to sources of *The Washington Post*, several hundred people were injured in the melee.¹²⁸ Of note were the accusations that some of the protestors were armed with guns and had used children as human shields in the face of security forces.¹²⁹

Reports also pointed to incidents occurring in at least a half dozen towns across the province over the preceding three weeks.¹³⁰ This included in the city of Peć, home of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate, which was reported to have been heavily damaged by fire on March 16th.¹³¹ This proved untrue, as it was actually the convent of the Sisters at Peć that was damaged,

¹²³ “News Summary: International; Anti-Government Rioting in Yugoslavia,” *New York Times* (April 4, 1981): 25.

¹²⁴ Patrick Artisien and R.A. Howells, “Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo Riots,” *The World Today* 37, no. 11 (1981): 419.

¹²⁵ Michael Dobbs, “Yugoslav Take Emergency Steps in Face of Ethnic Disturbances,” *Washington Post* (April 3, 1981): A17.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ Marvine Howe, “Sacred Serbian Site Damaged by Blaze,” *New York Times* (April 21, 1981): A9.

a relatively new building located a good distance from the Patriarchate.¹³² Albanian protestors were originally accused of starting the blaze, but a court investigation concluded that an electrical issue caused the fire.¹³³ Despite the findings that arson was not the cause, Serbian public opinion had been formed during the earlier reports, and they were enraged by the perceived lack of action by authorities against the alleged Albanian perpetrators.¹³⁴

The next day, both *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* reported that the Yugoslav government had dispatched tanks and troops to Prishtina.¹³⁵ There they were to take up positions in the Kosovar capital and put down any further incidences of public dissent by the populace.¹³⁶ The Interior Ministry also augmented the emergency measures enacted on April 2nd by imposing an 8:00 pm to 5:00 am curfew in Prishtina and four other towns in the province.¹³⁷ On April 4th, troop levels were increased further with the arrival of extra militia from Belgrade.¹³⁸ Yugoslav authorities denied that troops had been sent to Kosovo and dismissed rumors that two individuals had been killed during clashes with security forces on April 1st and 2nd.¹³⁹

While claiming that life had begun to return to its pre-uprising state in Kosovo on April 5th, Yugoslav officials advised the population on evening state television that “things are not yet normal” and warned the population to be mindful of “the enemy.”¹⁴⁰ Further evidence of a lack

¹³² Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 198.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Michael Dobbs, “Yugoslavia Uses Army to Quell Nationalist Unrest in One Province,” *Washington Post* (April 4, 1981): A17 & UPI, “Belgrade Sends Tanks to Rebellious Region,” *New York Times* (April 4, 1981): 4.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ UPI, “Belgrade Sends Tanks.”

¹³⁸ AP, “Around the World: Belgrade Reported to Send More Troops to End Unrest,” *New York Times* (April 5, 1981): 7.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Marvine Howe, “Belgrade Sees Peril of Minority Unrest,” *New York Times* (April 6, 1981): A3.

of a return to normalcy was the cancelation of a soccer match in Prishtina.¹⁴¹ Authorities also nixed appearances by two ethnic Albanian teams in matches outside of Kosovo.¹⁴²

By April 6th, the Yugoslav authorities began to admit the obvious. Stane Dolanc, a senior official in the Party Presidium and a member of the Federal Council for Protection of the Constitutional Order, made it known to the world that authorities had been caught off guard by the uprising.¹⁴³ He acknowledged that thousands had taken part in the demonstrations, but that actual activists only numbered around 200, and that incidents had occurred in Kosovar towns outside of Prishtina.¹⁴⁴ The perpetrators were labeled as “pro-fascist” groups that were operating out of Albanian-expatriate communities across Europe, noting those in Brussels and Stuttgart in particular.¹⁴⁵ Dolanc confirmed that military units had been dispatched to Kosovo, emphasizing that they were present solely to guard critical installations, not to take place in putting down the riots.¹⁴⁶ He did not rule out their potential use in the future if the situation deteriorated once again.¹⁴⁷ Also of note was his report that 11 individuals had perished during the course of the riots (including two police officers), 57 had been wounded¹⁴⁸, and that 22 protestors were currently in custody.¹⁴⁹ Several more were arrested at the time, but had since been released.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Marvin Howe, “Yugoslav Official Calls Riots a Surprise,” *New York Times* (April 7, 1981): A3.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Viktor Meier, *Yugoslavia: a History of Its Demise*, trans. Sabrina Ramet (London: Routledge, 1999), 23.

¹⁴⁶ Howe, “Yugoslav Official Calls.”

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ These numbers are greatly disputed. Sabrina Ramet noted that according to numbers from *The Times* (London), *The New York Times*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, Radio Belgrade, the Hamburg DPA, and the book *Die Albanier in Jugoslawien* that those killed in the chaos of early April alone was perhaps as many as one thousand, with a further one thousand injured: Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 196.

¹⁴⁹ Howe, “Yugoslav Official Calls.”

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

On the night of April 8th, the curfew in Prishtina was lifted.¹⁵¹ The following week, officials relaxed the state of emergency and reopened grade schools in the province.¹⁵² Journalists were allowed to visit the province on “official tours” on the 18th and 19th of April (for the first time since April 2nd), and the University of Prishtina reopened on April 20th.¹⁵³ Although normality had returned to an extent, a ban on public gatherings still remained in force, and a heavy army and police presence continued in the province.¹⁵⁴

Other towns affected by the demonstrations included Istok, Obilić, Podujevo, Leposlavić, Vučiturn, Vitana, Glogovac, Mitrovica, and Uroševac.¹⁵⁵ Incidents took place outside of Kosovo, as well. Members of the Albanian minority in the Montenegrin capital of Titograd vandalized shop windows.¹⁵⁶ Anti-Yugoslav pamphleteering and sloganeering cropped up in the cities of Tetovo and Ohrid in Macedonia.¹⁵⁷ Albanian nationalists were also accused of making trouble in the southern towns of Bujanovac, Presevo, and Medvedja in the SR Srbija.¹⁵⁸ Tensions were even felt as far away as Zagreb and Ljubljana, where police halted an Albanian demonstration at the last minute.¹⁵⁹

Two weeks after the demonstrations of April 1st and 2nd, Mahmut Bakali, leader of Kosovo’s Communist Party, announced that 28 people would be tried for inciting the riots.¹⁶⁰ Bakali himself was forced to resign on May 5th, after an official report “accused the province’s

¹⁵¹ AP, “Around the World: Belgrade Lifts Night Curfew in Province Struck by Riots,” *New York Times* (April 9, 1981): A6.

¹⁵² David Binder, “One Storm Has Passed but Others Are Gathering in Yugoslavia,” *New York Times* (April 19, 1981): E4.

¹⁵³ Marvine Howe, “Roots of Yugoslav Riots: Vague ‘Enemy’ Blamed,” *New York Times* (April 20, 1981): A2.

¹⁵⁴ Marvine Howe, “Yugoslavs, Shaken by Riots, Fear Plot,” *New York Times* (April 27, 1981): 3.

¹⁵⁵ Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 196-197.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Reuters, “28 to Be Tried for Rioting, Kosovo Official Announces,” *Washington Post* (April 18, 1981): A10.

leaders of responsibility for the separatist riots.”¹⁶¹ The exodus of officials continued as student center managers were dismissed in the Kosovar capital.¹⁶² Local officials in nearby Obilić were also dismissed from their posts as a result of the demonstrations in their town.¹⁶³

After the incidents in early April, mass demonstrations ceased in Prishtina. Small-scale actions, though, were still occurring. An account from *Radio Free Europe* described a disturbing incident that took place on the night of April 29th.¹⁶⁴ According to the report, vandals in the Serbian-populated village of Bresje, in the Prishtina commune, damaged 19 graves and dug up a 17 others.¹⁶⁵ While emphasizing that no suspects had been identified, Radio Free Europe noted that incidents like this had reportedly never occurred in the village previously, and that “[t]here have never been complaints regarding the cohabitation with Albanians and members of other ethnic groups who live in this village and nearby villages, and even today they do not doubt that this act is the work of someone else and of hostile elements who reject this cohabitation.”¹⁶⁶

Kosovo Party Presidium member Ali Sukrija also stated that further “hostile activity” was still taking place, including distributing leaflets and efforts to encourage further demonstrations.¹⁶⁷ These efforts led to a small demonstration, despite the ban on public gatherings still in force, in the second full week of May, which garnered very little press attention.¹⁶⁸ A much larger demonstration occurred on May 18th. Around 1,000 students at the university gathered in front of a dormitory building, calling for an improvement in conditions at

¹⁶¹ UPI, “Yugoslav Quits Over Ethnic Riots,” *New York Times* (May 6, 1981): A3.

¹⁶² Reuters, “Around the World: Yugoslav School Officials Dismissed Over Riots,” *New York Times* (May 14, 1981): A11.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Louis Zanga, “Desecration of Serbian Graves in Kosovo [Country Series: Yugoslavia],” 21 May 1981, [Electronic Record], HU OSA 300-8-3:85-2-173, Background Report/150, Publications Department, Records of the Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Institute, Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest: <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=34368> [accessed 11 March 2013], 2.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Reuters, “Yugoslav School Officials.”

¹⁶⁸ AP, “Yugoslavs Close Regional College,” *New York Times* (May 20, 1981): A3.

the university and, according to Tanjug, “demanded that the province become a republic and unite with neighboring Albania.”¹⁶⁹ Yugoslav security forces allegedly did not engage the protestors, and the students eventually dispersed on their own accord.¹⁷⁰ The students reconvened on the morning of the 19th at the campus student center, but no further details were disclosed.¹⁷¹ These protests once again resulted in the closing of the University of Prishtina and institutions of higher learning across the province.¹⁷² Ten journalists from the Prishtina radio and television station participated in the demonstrations with the students; they were expelled from the Communist Party the next day.¹⁷³

2.4. Aftermath

On June 13th, Belgrade announced plans to increase Kosovar security forces. Interior Minister Franjo Herljević stated that, in addition to a doubling of the number of plainclothes officers, 1,000 uniformed police would be added.¹⁷⁴ The expansion came as a result of what Yugoslav authorities believed had been an inadequate number of security forces to combat the rioting of the previous months.¹⁷⁵ The Interior Minister also expressed anger at Kosovar officials, whom he believed had misled the central government concerning the actual conditions in Kosovo.¹⁷⁶ As evidence of this, he made it known that Belgrade had offered to help when the demonstrations first broke out, but that Prishtina rejected this as an unnecessary measure.¹⁷⁷ Federal security forces eventually were dispatched, along with members of the armed forces, when the disturbances spread across the province. As well as a woeful lack of security personnel,

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Dessa Trevisan, “Unrest in Kosovo: Student Protests Close University,” *Times (London)* (May 20, 1981): 6.

¹⁷⁴ Reuters, “Yugoslavia Adds Police in Troubled Albanian Area,” *New York Times* (June 14, 1981): 24.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

Herljević also “cited as major problems a steady migration of Slavic peoples from Kosovo and also what he called a passive resistance to authority in the region.”¹⁷⁸

The exit of high-ranking Kosovar officials continued with the resignation of SAP Kosovo President Xhavid Nimani on July 17th, a little over a month after the resignation of party chief Mahmut Bakali, who was facing disciplinary action by the party.¹⁷⁹ While pledging his loyalty to the Communist Party, Nimani stated, “top provincial leaders... were politically responsible for outbursts of nationalism and separatism.”¹⁸⁰ He also added that “intensive political action was necessary to establish responsibility of cadres on all levels,” which *The Washington Post* believed indicated a purge of the Kosovar leadership was on the offing.¹⁸¹ By August 1981, 500 Party members were expelled during what was termed a “differentiation process” that ultimately failed to address the serious economic and social problems of the province, which many believed had led to the demonstration movement and the extreme underdevelopment of the region.¹⁸²

During March and April, more than 2,000 people were arrested for offenses connected with the demonstrations.¹⁸³ Their crimes included aiding in the organization of the demonstrations, belonging to extremist groups that encouraged anti-state activities, producing and distributing counterrevolutionary materials, agitation, and engaging in a variety of dissident activities.¹⁸⁴ Most served sentences of up to 60 days for a variety of minor offenses.¹⁸⁵ Several individuals, though, were sentenced to prison terms that stretched as long as 15 years.¹⁸⁶ By early

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Reuters, “Around the World: Chief of Yugoslav Region Is Out in Apparent Purge,” *New York Times* (July 18, 1981): 5.

¹⁸⁰ Reuters, “Province Chief Quits After Yugoslav Riots, Hints at Party Purge,” *Washington Post* (July 18, 1981): A19.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 336-337.

¹⁸³ Reuters, “12 Ethnic Albanians Are Sentenced in Yugoslavia,” *Washington Post* (August 3, 1981): A12.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 335.

June, a reported 479 people had been sentenced, and further arrests continued through the ensuing months.¹⁸⁷ According to 1986 estimates in *NIN*, a Belgrade magazine, ultimately 1,200 people were sentenced to lengthy prison terms, and an additional 3,000 spent up to three months incarcerated for actions that occurred during the period of the uprisings.¹⁸⁸

2.5. Consequences for Relations Between Yugoslavia and Albania

The uprising in Kosovo had significant consequences for the relationship between post-Tito Yugoslavia and Enver Hoxha's Albania. Almost immediately following the initial protests in Prishtina, the RPSSh began releasing a string of lengthy and scathing editorials and reports in the pages of the PPSH daily, *Zëri i popullit*, which spanned the remainder of 1981.¹⁸⁹ Tirana strongly accused Belgrade of using excessive force against peaceful protestors, in the form of police and Yugoslav military units dispatched from Belgrade.¹⁹⁰ While advocating the right of Albania to voice support for their suffering co-nationals in Kosovo, the RPPSh emphasized their indignation at being accused as a fomenter of discord amongst the protesting masses, instead laying the blame for creating the circumstances that birthed the uprising at the doorstep of the Belgrade authorities.¹⁹¹ The RPPSh also staunchly supported the right of Kosovar Albanians to have their semi-autonomous province raised to the equitable level of republic within the Yugoslav Federation, the denial of which was tantamount to "Great-Serb and anti-Albanian chauvinism."¹⁹²

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ See: *About the Events in Kosova: Articles from "Zëri i popullit" and other press organs* (Tirana: The "8 Nëntori" Publishing House, 1981).

¹⁹⁰ "Why Were Police Violence and Tanks Used Against the Albanians of Kosovo?" in *About the Events in Kosova: Articles from Zëri i Popullit and Other Press Organs* (Tirana: The "8 Nëntori" Publishing House, 1981), 11-12.

¹⁹¹ "Who Incites Hostility Amongst the Peoples of Yugoslavia?" in *About the Events in Kosova: Articles from Zëri i Popullit and Other Press Organs* (Tirana: The "8 Nëntori" Publishing House, 1981), 20-41.

¹⁹² "The Status of a Republic for Kosova is a Just Demand," in *About the Events in Kosova: Articles from Zëri i Popullit and Other Press Organs* (Tirana: The "8 Nëntori" Publishing House, 1981), 42.

Yugoslavia, though, was Albania's principal trade partner. As the alliance with the People's Republic of China waned in the late 1970s, the dollar amount of Yugoslav exports to the RPPSh increased drastically from \$11.9 million in 1972, to \$28 million in 1978 (the year of Albania's break with Beijing), and topping out at \$60 million in 1979.¹⁹³ That number was projected to double within five years.¹⁹⁴ Also of note was Albania's tenuous position within the international system after the termination of the Sino-Albanian partnership. After having received and then rejected partnerships with the Yugoslavs, Soviets, and the Chinese during the period from the Second World War to 1978, Enver Hoxha resolved that Albania would set its own course and emphasized a policy of "maximum self-sufficiency," which was coupled with self-imposed seclusion in foreign affairs.¹⁹⁵ Having a secure and friendly Yugoslavia next door was in Albania's best interests. In a world divided into Soviet and American camps, Albania and non-aligned Yugoslavia had cultivated a mutually beneficial relationship. As the external national homeland, Albania had to adopt a stance that recognized and sought redress for issues with co-nationals across the border, but did not press too forcefully and upset the delicate balance in relations with the SFRJ.¹⁹⁶ In this case, the RPPSh failed to achieve this aim and the relationship was damaged, though not severed.

It was not the inflammatory articles and editorials emanating from the Albanian press, though, that set the relationship permanently on a downward path. On the night of May 23, 1981, two small explosions were set off on the grounds of the Yugoslav Embassy in Tirana.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ Stefanos Katsikas, "A Comparative Overview On the Foreign Policy-Making of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia During the 1980s," *Bulgarian Historical Review* 34, no. 4 (2006): 131.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁵ Miranda Vickers, *The Albanians: a Modern History*, Revised ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 203.

¹⁹⁶ The concept of external national homeland is explained in: Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 66-67.

¹⁹⁷ Louis Zanga, "Steady Deterioration in Yugoslav-Albanian Relations [Country Series: Yugoslavia]," 09 June 1981, [Electronic Record], HU OSA 300-8-3:85-2-145, Background Report/163, Publications Department, Records

The RPSSh denied involvement in the incident, while Belgrade officials accused Albania of “irresponsible behavior.”¹⁹⁸ A *Radio Free Europe* researcher went so far as to suggest that Belgrade or Tirana might have engineered the incident to intensify hostilities between the two countries.¹⁹⁹ Needless to say, the Embassy explosions further exacerbated a tense situation.

Relations between the SFRJ and the RPSSh regarding SAP Kosovo would continue to suffer for the remainder of the 1980s. The educational and cultural cooperation over Kosovo that had been fostered between the two states during the late 1960s and 70s came to an end as a result of the demonstration movement. Fearing Tirana’s ideological penetration of Kosovo, Belgrade abrogated cooperative agreements between Tirana and Prishtina television and radio in May 1981.²⁰⁰ Marash Ajati, director of Radio Tirana, claimed that the abrogation occurred without merit, while ascribing the decision to suspend cooperative media activities to an attempt to obstruct the artistic and cultural development of Kosovo by “certain Serbian chauvinistic circles.”²⁰¹ It must also be noted, though, that Radio Tirana and Radio Kukes broadcasting stations received a significant boost in power by the construction of a new transmitter that allowed broadcasts to be received within 60% of SAP Kosovo’s territory, which made it possible for many Kosovar Albanians to still receive educational and cultural broadcasts from across the border.²⁰²

Belgrade also made the decision to suspend the RPSSh’s cultural exchange with Prishtina and ceased using Albanian textbooks published in Tirana for Kosovar schools and universities,

of the Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Institute, Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest: <http://fa.osaarchivum.org/background-reports?col=8&id=34362> [accessed 10 March 2013], 1.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 2.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Ibid., 5.

replacing them with books published in the SFRJ and translated from Serbo-Croatian.²⁰³ Though Yugoslav authorities clearly sought to isolate Kosovo from Albania, they did not sever all cultural and educational ties with Albania. As a means to improve relations with ethnic-Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro, the SFRJ actually encouraged the expansion of educational contact between the University of Tirana and the Universities of Skopje and Titograd.²⁰⁴

²⁰³ Patrick Artisien "A Note On Kosovo and the Future of Yugoslav-Albanian Relations: A Balkan Perspective," *Soviet Studies* 36, no. 2 (1984): 270.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 3: THE UPRISING AS CONTINGENT EVENT

As Rogers Brubaker stated in his seminal work, *Nationalism Reframed*, “[n]ationalism has been both cause and effect of the great reorganization of political space that framed the ‘short twentieth century’ in Central and Eastern Europe.”²⁰⁵ This is mirrored in the tremendous upheaval experienced by Kosovo during this prolonged period of restructuring in the last century, which has continued into the present one as well. Nationalism served as a cause to many of the great changes. The quest for national unity was the driving force behind Montenegro and Serbia’s 1912 conquest of Kosovo, and its inclusion as a territory of Serbia and Montenegro in the first and of the SR Srbija in the second manifestations of Yugoslavia. The structure of the SFRJ itself was based on the multinational federal framework of the USSR, following the Soviet principle of “socialist in form but national in content.” Though antinationalist in policy, Yugoslavia, much like the Soviet Union, institutionalized “territorial nationhood and ethnic nationality as fundamental social categories.”²⁰⁶ Thus, the structure of the federal framework viewed the “nation not as substance but as institutionalized form.”²⁰⁷

The 1946 Constitution of Socialist Yugoslavia was closely modeled after the 1936 Soviet Constitution. The constitution established six separate republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia) that received the same formal right to secede as the Soviet republics did, but were granted more far-reaching fiscal authority within six regional bureaucracies.²⁰⁸ Within the federal structure, SR Srbija was linked to two autonomous sections, the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija (Kosmet). Vojvodina was granted significant autonomy, a separate governmental structure that

²⁰⁵ Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 4.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

²⁰⁸ Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 230.

possessed independent decision making powers and an independent Supreme Court.²⁰⁹ Kosmet, on the other hand, was denied the independent powers granted Vojvodina.²¹⁰ Both appendages were allowed representation on the federal legislature, but both had their internal affairs strongly guided by Serbia and were denied the right of secession.²¹¹

The Fundamental Law of 1953, so sweeping it is sometimes considered a new constitution altogether, moved the state towards a more centralized system.²¹² Sovereignty was no longer housed in the guise of the republics, which were now denied the right of secession, but was instead granted to the proletariat.²¹³ The social consciousness of the working class would evolve into a single Yugoslav one that supplanted prior national identities.²¹⁴ The push towards centralization greatly impacted the fates of Kosmet and Vojvodina by removing their federal representation, which devolved to the Serbian Republic.²¹⁵ The Fundamental Law, though, did express “for the first time the whole concept of socialist self-management based on direct social democracy and the assembly system,”²¹⁶ which would become hallmarks of the Yugoslav socialist system as it progressed through the coming decades.

A new constitution was put into place ten years later, in 1963. The new constitution introduced the theory of *rotacija*, which denied delegates the ability to serve on worker’s councils and assemblies simultaneously and restricted delegates to two terms.²¹⁷ The new structure also encouraged specialists, economists, and managers to serve as delegates, thus

²⁰⁹ Mertus, *Kosovo*, 288.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid., 289.

²¹³ Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 257.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Mertus, *Kosovo*, 289.

²¹⁶ Smilja Avramov, “The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Foreign Policy,” *International Problems* 1, no. 15 (1974): 5.

²¹⁷ Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 280.

creating a more representative atmosphere that encouraged decentralization.²¹⁸ Increased pressure to decentralize also led to increased powers for the republics, while the centralist “Yugoslavism” of the 1953 Constitutional Law gave way to “de-étatization.”²¹⁹ For Kosovo, the new constitution meant a promotion from an autonomous region to autonomous province, giving it equal status with Vojvodina. This was window-dressing, though, as both were reduced to existences birthed by decision of the Serbian Assembly, completely eliminating their constitutional status at the federal level.²²⁰

As previously mentioned on pages 20-21 of Chapter 2, the constitutional revisions in 1968 brought to an end SR Srbija dominance in Kosovo and Vojvodina, until the rise of Milošević in the late 1980s. The final SFRJ constitution was drafted in 1974 and reaffirmed the quasi-republican status achieved by the two autonomous provinces in 1968. While the first Yugoslav constitution had accorded sovereignty and the right to secede to the republics, by the 1974 version, these rights were accorded to “the peoples of Yugoslavia.”²²¹ The “peoples” meant the “nations” of Yugoslavia (Bosnian Muslims, Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs, Slovenes). The Albanians and Hungarians of the state were “nationalities” and were not accorded the same right to secede. While on the surface Yugoslavia appeared to be a federal state, in actuality, the 1974 Constitution established a largely semi-confederal structure that portended the withering away of the state and bureaucratic management to that of social management in a “socialist self-governing community of working people and citizens.”²²² The republics and autonomous provinces were linked by a common monetary policy, customs, transport, communications, and the underdevelopment fund, with Tito holding sway over foreign policy

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Malcolm, *Kosovo*, 324.

²²¹ Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 73.

²²² Quoted in: Avramov, "Constitution of the Socialist," 6.

and the military.²²³ The republics had near-total veto power over any federal decision, with only Tito holding the power to override a veto; republican leadership was represented and controlled the main federal decision-making bodies: the state presidency and the federal cabinet.²²⁴

For Yugoslavia, throughout the course of the constitutional history of the socialist state, the republics (and, for a time, the autonomous provinces) were essentially “defined as quasi-nation states, complete with their own territories, names, constitutions, legislatures, administrative staffs, cultural and scientific institutions, and so on,”²²⁵ linked by their membership in the SFRJ and the one-party rule of the SKJ. While vociferously opposing manifestations of what it viewed as nationalism, the state defined itself through the *nation* in the guise of the republics, which served as the national homelands for the constituent peoples. In Yugoslav terminology, the constituent people were referred to as “nations”: the Bosnian Muslims, Montenegrins, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Macedonians.

Sabrina Ramet astutely posited that the SKJ’s long-standing claim to possessing a nationalities policy could be seen as evidence that the Yugoslav government, potentially, believed the multiethnic composition of the state to be problematic and that involvement in this realm was politically legitimate.²²⁶ The SKJ also laid claim to having resolved the national question in the SFRJ. Prior to 1964, this claim was based on the belief “that nationalism, as politicized ethnicity, had been by and large eliminated.”²²⁷ This belief was highlighted in the 1953 Fundamental Law, which stressed centralization and Yugoslavism. The 1963 Constitution moved away from unitarist Yugoslavism, which too closely mirrored the Greater Serbian

²²³ Aleksandar Pavković, *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans*, 2nd ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 69.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed.*, 18.

²²⁶ Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 39.

²²⁷ Ibid.

centralism of the pre-war Royalist Period. Thaddeus Gasinski believed that, at this point, it had become obvious that the nationality problem had not been resolved, but had been “swept under the rug” by communist officialdom.²²⁸ To remedy this issue, the SKJ’s Eighth Congress moved the state firmly away from ignoring nationality as a an issue to achieving resolution of the problem through “institutionalized patterns of cooperation and mutual accommodation [that would] become a stable part of the political landscape, allowing nationalist excess to be contained, defused, or even bypassed.”²²⁹ The 1963 Constitution laid the groundwork for this, while the 1968 constitutional changes and the 1974 Constitution cemented the idea of “nation as institutionalized form”²³⁰ and firmly moved the state away from viewing the nation as “collectivity but as practical category.”²³¹

The conditions that preceded the events of 1981 created the circumstances that encouraged “sudden fluctuations in the *nationess*”²³² of Kosovar Albanians. By comprehending the 1981 Uprising as what Brubaker termed a “contingent event,” we can better understand its “transformative consequences.”²³³

The over-arching conflict between the SFRJ, SAP Kosovo, and the RPSSh in 1981 can best be understood as an event-based national conflagration. Using the triadic view presented by Rogers Brubaker,²³⁴ the complexity of the relationships between these territorial units can be more clearly understood. The triadic relational nexus is represented by the interplay between a national minority, a nationalizing state, and an external national homeland. As Brubaker

²²⁸ Thaddeus Gasinski, "The National Minority Policy of Today's Yugoslavia," *Nationalities Papers* 8, no. 1 (1980): 30.

²²⁹ Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 39.

²³⁰ Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 18.

²³¹ *Ibid.*

²³² *Ibid.*, 20.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 21.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 55-76.

discussed, however, these terms are “not fixed entities but variably configured and continuously contested political fields,” which specifically establish these as dynamic concepts.²³⁵

In the context of the 1981 Uprising, the ethnic-Albanian population of Kosovo played the part of the national minority in Brubaker’s triadic relational nexus. Within Yugoslavia, the ethnic-Albanian population (the majority of which were concentrated within the SAP Kosovo) represented the fifth most populous national group in 1981, a number greater than the populations of the nations of Macedonians and Montenegrins and possessing only 23,000 fewer people than the Slovenes.²³⁶ As a nationality within the SFRJ, the Albanian population was denied many of the fundamental rights of Yugoslavia’s constituent nations: Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian Muslims, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins. Since the end of the Balkan Wars from 1912-1913, except for a brief period during the Second World War when it was fused to an Axis-sponsored Greater Albania, Kosovo was an appendage of Serbia, despite outnumbering Serbs in the territory by a number greater than 5 to 1.²³⁷ Under the communist government of the SFRJ, Kosovo existed as a province of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, along with Vojvodina.

The SFRJ, in many ways, fits the criteria of the nationalizing state in Brubaker’s analysis. The status of Yugoslavia in 1981, as a nationalizing state, was one that was not an “avowed or expressly articulated”²³⁸ national stance by the state. Instead, it is the perception of being “nationalizing” as interpreted by the national minority and the external homeland that marks it as such.²³⁹ In itself, the SFRJ sought to eliminate nationality and nationalism as a factor in political life. To this end, prior to the mid 1960s, Yugoslavia held to the belief “that nationalism, as

²³⁵ Ibid., 60.

²³⁶ Michele Lee, "Kosovo between Yugoslavia and Albania," *New Left Review* 140 (1983): 66.

²³⁷ Ibid.

²³⁸ Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 63.

²³⁹ Ibid.

politicized ethnicity, had been by and large eliminated.”²⁴⁰ Following the Eighth Congress of the SKJ in 1964 and the enshrouding of Yugoslav political life under the mantle of self-managing socialism, the Party came to believe “that institutionalized patterns of cooperation and mutual accommodation had become a stable part of the political landscape, allowing nationalist excesses to be contained, diffused, or even bypassed.”²⁴¹ Simply put, the existence of a system of federal republics and provinces, which were—in the case of the republics—granted equitable powers and allowed high levels of autonomy from the political center, was the vehicle that solved the national problem in the SFRJ. Though a novel idea and one that held a tremendous amount of promise, the reality was that the SFRJ had institutionalized the nation, not eliminated it or pushed it further along the road to oblivion. The shared equality of the republics bred resentment, and the codified inequality of the state’s nationalities and provinces created bitterness.

While the constituent republics of the SFRJ represented the homelands of the nations of Yugoslavia, the ethnic-Albanian homeland resided outside of the Federation. As such, Kosovo could not achieve the status of a republic, nor could the Albanians of Yugoslavia achieve the status of a constituent nation of the Federation. Despite tremendous advances in the status of the province and the expansion of rights enjoyed by the Albanian population of the SFRJ during the course of the late 1960s through the 70s, the SFRJ’s leadership and policies remained entrenched in the belief that an Albanian-dominated federal republic could never be created within Yugoslavia. Also, regardless of the largely *de facto* status of SAP Kosovo as a separate entity from SR Srbija, Kosovo would continue to exist as an appendage of the Serbian republic. This perception was fueled by the existence of policies that marked SAP Kosovo and the ethnic-

²⁴⁰ Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 40.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*

Albanian minority as occupying a lesser status than the constituent republics and their corresponding nations within the Yugoslav Federation.

The RPSSh occupied the position of the external national homeland for the Albanians of Yugoslavia and SAP Kosovo. The homeland stance occupied by Albania in the drama of the 1981 disturbances was the position of the state that felt a sense of responsibility for the welfare of the national minority, due to a feeling of shared nationhood that transcended boundaries of state and citizenship.²⁴² The drama surrounding the protest movement forced Albania to carefully walk a fine line in pressing for an improved position for its co-nationals in neighboring Yugoslavia, while not completely alienating its principal trading partner and potential territorial guarantor.

²⁴² Ibid., 67.

CHAPTER 4: THE UPRISING AND THE PRESS

4.1. The Power of Journalism

While this work has focused largely on nationalism and the history of the 1981 Uprising, it also deals with language use and attempts to influence the discourse of a society. Under authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, centralized authority tightly controls the production and dissemination of information. State ownership and direction of the media, along with strict limitations on press freedoms, allows the state to dictate the content, tone, and tenor of the news broadcast over the radio, on television, and through periodical literature, such as newspapers.

In Norman Fairclough's seminal work, *Language and Power*, he ascribes to the mass media a "hidden power" that is derived from "hidden relations."²⁴³ The relationship between producer and consumer is significant, "in that they [the producers] have sole producing rights and can therefore determine what is included and excluded, how events are represented, and...even the subject positions of their audiences."²⁴⁴ While Fairclough attempts to peel away the layers of hidden power to reveal who the producers are,²⁴⁵ in authoritarian and totalitarian states, the actual person or people exercising power over media content is less hidden than in states with greater press freedoms: all roads lead to the centralized authority.

This effect of media control can be immense. It has the potential for manipulative effects through its handling of causality and agency. This level of control also grants the state the ability to exert a tremendous influence in social reproduction of discourse through the homogenization of media output.²⁴⁶ The centralized authority is able to exert this discursive power over the media consumer through a system of constraints that have significant structural effects that permeate

²⁴³ Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power* (London: Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1996).

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 49-50.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 54-55.

society. As Fairclough explains, “[i]f therefore there are systematic constraints on the contents of discourse and on the social relationships enacted in it and the social identities enacting them, these can be expected to have long-term effects on the knowledge and beliefs, social relationships, and social identities of an institution or society.”²⁴⁷ As history has shown in the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, state media has historically had a tremendous influence on popular attitudes toward the Kosovo issue, which helped to foster the tensions that eventually led to the bloody confrontation between Yugoslav troops and irregulars and Kosovar guerilla forces, most notably the UÇK, from 1998 to 1999.²⁴⁸

This work, however, will focus on the images that communist Albania and Yugoslavia projected to their people, their region, and the world through state-run media during the Kosovar Uprising of 1981. Through their respective media outlets, the states sought to define in- and out-groupings, notions of solidarity, levels of competence in response to the demonstrations, and their own freedom of action. To examine these ideas further, we must first establish the function of and approaches to journalism, then determine how they were applied in the cases of Yugoslav and Albanian media during 1981.

Simply put, the function of journalism is “to enable citizens to better understand their lives and their position(s) in the world.”²⁴⁹ Its success or failure rests solely on achieving this goal. The three approaches to journalism, as outlined by Richardson, are: “journalism as entertainment, as a loudhailer for the powerful and privileged and as a commodity produced by a

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 74.

²⁴⁸ Mertus, *Kosovo*.

²⁴⁹ John Richardson, *Analysing Newspapers: an Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 7.

profit-seeking business.”²⁵⁰ In regard to the subject matter under discussion in this work, the selections from the newspapers *Borba* and *Zëri i popullit*, the Yugoslav and Albanian sources we will focus on, clearly were intended to help citizens and interested parties better understand the issues at hand in Kosovo, as well as the wider implications, but they were also loudhailers for the powerful. The dissemination and promotion of solely the central authority’s views, in this case, was intended to manipulate the discourse surrounding the events of 1981 and influence the perceptions and interpretations of the incidents to suit the agendas of each state. For the SFRJ, in particular, this was a significant departure from the media agenda surrounding the last major demonstration movement in the Kosovar Province in 1968. The Yugoslav press had run independent, on-the-spot stories of the events as they happened, eschewing the role of simply loudhailer to the SKJ.²⁵¹ In 1981, the press took a far more cautious approach to the demonstrations, printing only official statements supplied by provincial, republic, and federal authorities.²⁵²

4.2. Sources

Borba, typically translated as “struggle” from Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, began publication in 1922 as a pamphlet under the guise of an independent newspaper, but in fact as the organ of the outlawed Yugoslav Communist Party in Royalist Yugoslavia. Before being forced by government order to cease publication in 1929, *Borba* was edited by communist intellectuals in Zagreb who advocated for a free press, encouraged disobedience toward the monarchy, and fought against political persecution. *Borba* reemerged in 1941 as the newspaper of Tito’s partisans in the Second World War. Following the German expulsion from Yugoslavia in 1944, it became the official organ of the ruling Communist Party. It was hailed by *The Times*, among

²⁵⁰ Ibid.

²⁵¹ Mertus, *Kosovo*, 31.

²⁵² Ibid.

the daily newspapers in Eastern Europe, as “the obvious choice for anyone who wishes to be informed of what is happening in the world outside” and for being “almost objective by comparison with the rest.”²⁵³ In the 1950s, following a series of dissonant exposés by Milovan Djilas²⁵⁴ which were denounced as revisionist and anti-Marxist by the Party’s central committee, *Borba* exercised a stronger level of self-censorship on national topics.²⁵⁵ This changed the tenor of the journalism and was described as “evidently the reason why such reporting is the dullest and least imaginative of all.”²⁵⁶ *Borba* ceased publication after the fall of communism in Yugoslavia, but briefly resurfaced on the scene in 2008 before permanently closing its doors in 2009.

Zëri i popullit, translated as *The People’s Voice*, was the official newspaper of the Albanian Party of Labor. It was founded in 1942²⁵⁷ and continued as the “propaganda voice”²⁵⁸ of the Party until the end of one-party rule in Albania in 1991. It has since continued publication as the official media voice of the Socialist Party of Albania, the reformed progeny of Enver Hoxha’s Party of Labor. *Zëri i popullit*, much like the Soviet Union’s *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, was strictly a vehicle for the dissemination of Party propaganda and featured heavily censored and politicized foreign and domestic news articles.

One way both *Borba* and *Zëri i popullit* manipulated popular perceptions and interpretations of the 1981 events were through face and facework: respectively, communicative concepts that establish an identity projected to the world and the ways in which that identity is

²⁵³ “Newspapers of the World-XXII: БОРБА,” *Times (London)*, April 22, 1965, 11.

²⁵⁴ Djilas, one of the principle ideologues of the League of Communists, began writing articles in *Borba* in late 1953 that criticized the communists’ monopoly on power and pressed for reform to a two-party system. He was expelled from the party by January 1954 (Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 257-259).

²⁵⁵ “Newspapers of the World.”

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Partia e Punës së Shqipërisë and Instituti i Studimeve Marksiste-Leniniste, *1941-1948*, vol. 1 of *Dokumenta Kryesore Të Partisë Së Punës Të Shqipërisë* (Tiranë: Instituti i Studimeve Marksiste-Leniniste pranë KQ të PPSH, 1971), 94-96.

²⁵⁸ Robert Elsie, *Historical Dictionary of Albania*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 368.

fashioned and sustained. Another way images were fashioned was through the establishment of clear in-groups and out-groups through referential/nomination strategies, which we can analyze using the discourse-historical approach of Ruth Wodak.²⁵⁹ Through delineating carefully-crafted and projected images of the self during the crisis and by ascertaining and defining clear fellow group members and requisite outsiders in the national news, both states sought to influence events and their fallout by appealing to a need, internally and externally, for victims and perpetrators in the saga of 1981.

4.3. Methodology

The methodological framework used in this study is based on the multidisciplinary approach of critical discourse analysis (CDA). CDA, generally speaking, “is a theory and a method of analyzing the ways that individuals and institutions use language.”²⁶⁰ CDA assumes that discourses are heavily influenced by the time and location in which they occur and, as a result, can only be understood within their historical contexts.²⁶¹ Therefore, taking into account the centrality of the historical contexts of the events under examination, I have employed the referential/nomination strategy in the construction of out-groups developed by Ruth Wodak²⁶² in her discourse-historical approach to CDA in analyzing the material presented in this study.

The next concepts under discussion in this work are those of face and facework. Face, in the words of Stella Ting-Toomey, “is a claimed sense of self-respect in an interactive situation.”²⁶³ It is, in essence, the identity projected to the outside world through

²⁵⁹ Ruth Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach,” in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Ltd., 2001).

²⁶⁰ Richardson, *Analysing Newspapers*, 1.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁶² Wodak, “The Discourse-Historical Approach.”

²⁶³ Stella Ting-Toomey, “Face and Facework: An Introduction,” in *The Challenge of Facework* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 1.

communication.²⁶⁴ Facework, on the other hand, is how that identity “is created and maintained in communicative interactions.”²⁶⁵ While face and facework have long been applied in the case of the individual in communicative interaction, scholarship in the past decade has utilized these concepts in the analysis of a variety of communicative situations between groups and entities.²⁶⁶ The current work proposes that facework concepts can be carried over into the realm of national discourse. In particular, when examining the discourse employed under totalitarian and dictatorial systems, the face presented by the state to the inside and outside world exhibits markedly similar face wants to that of an individual. Just like an individual, most governmental and political groups want to appear competent and able, be respected, and seek to form or strengthen alliances with others. Also just like an individual, they choose their language and communication strategies in an attempt to secure these wants. To analyze the face wants of the state expressed in newspaper coverage, I have used Lim and Bowers’ notions of fellowship face, competence face, and autonomy face from their “Communication Model of Facework.”²⁶⁷

While Lim and Bowers theorized that facework “refers to ways in which people mitigate or address... face threats,” such as face threatening acts (FTAs) like “accusing, rejecting, criticizing, or requesting,”²⁶⁸ the current work posits that facework and expressions of face wants are not solely the repository of conflict mitigation. These ideas, instead, can be used in all communicative situations.²⁶⁹ Face wants are also not solely reciprocal in nature, but can instead be used as mechanisms for projecting self-reflective images that are beneficial only to the

²⁶⁴ Katherine Miller, *Communication Theories: Perspectives, Processes, and Contexts*, 2nd ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages, 2005), 299.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Of particular note: Kathy Domenici and Stephen W. Littlejohn, *Facework: Bridging Theory and Practice* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2006).

²⁶⁷ Tae-Sop Lim and John Bowers, "Facework: Solidarity, Approbation, and Tact," *Human Communication Research* 17, no. 3 (1991): 415-50.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., 420.

²⁶⁹ A view shared by: John Oetzel, Stella Ting-Toomey, and et al., "A Typology of Facework Behaviors in Conflicts with Best Friends and Relative Strangers," *Communication Quarterly* 48, no. 4 (2000): 399.

producer's prerogatives. The case of Albania's and Yugoslavia's media campaigns during the course of the Kosovar Uprising exemplifies this fact.

According to the Lim and Bowers' model, fellowship face is a face want that expresses the desire to be included.²⁷⁰ Fellowship face is enacted through expressions of solidarity, which are "oriented toward the fellowship face of the other."²⁷¹ It conveys the acceptance of the other as an in-group member through expressions of commonality in identity, historical cooperation, personal understanding, and empathy.²⁷² Levels of solidarity are determined by the degrees "of 'in-groupness' and 'interpersonalness' of a message and the directness with which the in-groupness is expressed."²⁷³ Table 1 is an adapted scale of the solidarity categories and example items from Lim and Bowers' analysis.²⁷⁴ Categories toward the top of the scale express no to little solidarity, while those at the bottom express the highest levels of solidarity. Bold and underlined categories are present in the analysis of selections from *Borba* and *Zëri i popullit*.

Table 1. Scale of Solidarity

<i>Category</i>	<i>Example Items in Category</i>
Exclusion (to exclude from an in-group)	It's none of your business. We decided to kick you out of the group. You don't deserve my friendship.
Small talk (to talk about something that has no implications for the relationship)	Did you read John's paper? It's raining outside. People are working hard these days.
Impersonal similarity (to emphasize impersonal or generalized similarity)	Wow, isn't that a beautiful vase? We're both Americans, aren't we? Are you also from Texas?
<u>Attitude similarity</u> (to emphasize similarities in attitudes, wants, and hobbies)	We are both pro-choice people, aren't we? Do you like that music? It's my favorite. Don't you want to get good grades like me? I like your sweater.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., 421.

²⁷¹ Ibid.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Ibid., 428.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., 429-431.

Table 1 (cont.)

<i>Category</i>	<i>Example Items in Category</i>
Informal address	Hi, pal. Hey, buddy. Hi, Jimmy. Hey, dude.
Agreement (to agree or seek agreement)	I had a similar thought. Do you agree with me? I think so, too. You are right.
Social acknowledgement (to appreciate work-related aspects of the other)	You are a good colleague. I know you have been busy. You are really enthusiastic. You won that scholarship, it's great.
Presupposition (to imply we are in a close relationship)	You are going to help me, aren't you? You had a date last night, didn't you? We are buddies, aren't we?
Character appreciation (to appreciate the general personality of the other)	You are really valuable to us. That's very kind of you. You are very nice.
Empathy (to show understanding of the other's emotional state)	I appreciate what you did for me. You look so sad. I understand what you are trying to say. I'm so happy for you.
Cooperation (to emphasize the necessity to cooperate with each other)	I'll help you. We have to work on the problem together. We gotta help each other.
Friendship reaffirmation (to express intimate emotions toward the other)	I know I can trust you. You are a good friend. I like you a lot. Let's work it out together
<i>Source: Tae-Sop Lim and John Bowers, "Facework: Solidarity, Approbation, and Tact," Human Communication Research 17, no. 3 (1991): 429-431.</i>	

Competence face, on the other hand, expresses the speaker's desire for his or her abilities to be respected by others.²⁷⁵ According to Lim and Bowers, competence face is accomplished through Leech's maxim of "approbation," which is depicted through a minimization of blame and a maximization of praise of others by way of complimentary language toward abilities

²⁷⁵ Ibid.

and/or understatement of inabilities.²⁷⁶ This can also be expressed self-reflectively, as the speaker compliments or understates personal abilities. Table 2 is an adapted scale of the approbation categories and example items from Lim and Bowers' analysis.²⁷⁷ Categories toward the top of the scale express no to little approbation, while those at the bottom express the highest levels of approbation. Bold and underlined categories are present in the analysis of selections from *Borba* and *Zëri i popullit*.

Table 2. Scale of Approbation

<i>Category</i>	<i>Example Items in Category</i>
Ridicule (to belittle the other by exaggerating the problem)	It's ridiculous. You screwed it up. You completely failed to do it.
Blunt disapproval (to disapprove without understanding the problem)	It's weak. I don't think it's done right. It needs a lot more work. It needs to be redone.
Focused disapproval (to shift the focus of disapproval from the whole to the major part)	I think it needs a lot more evidence. I think you missed some major elements. I think your arguments are not clear. The evidence you provided seems to be irrelevant.
Comparative disapproval (to compare the whole performance with certain desired states)	It's not up to par/standard. I think it's not strong enough. I think it has to be improved.
Moderation (to compare the major part with certain desired states)	You didn't prove your arguments with evidence. I think it lacks evidence. There isn't enough evidence to support your claim.
Resentment (to resent the other's lack of effort)	I think you could have done a much better job. I don't think that you've given it your full efforts. I hoped you'd do a better job.

²⁷⁶ Geoffrey Leech, *Principles of Pragmatics* (London: Longman Group Limited, 1989), 135-136.

²⁷⁷ Lim and Bowers, "Facework," 433-435.

Table 2 (cont.)

<i>Category</i>	<i>Example Items in Category</i>
Aspiration (to aspire to a better performance)	I think you can do better. I feel it's not the best work you can do. I think it can be improved.
Diminutive (to trivialize the problematic area)	I know I'm asking for a lot, but it needs a little more research. I found a few problems in it. You need to work on finding some more evidence. I think it needs a few more things added. I think you missed a few important points.
Suggestion (to suggest ways to make the performance even better)	I think you gotta do a little more research to make it better. Could you find more relevant evidence to support it? Do you think you could do a little more research? You need to make the paper flow more naturally. You need to add more evidence to strengthen your arguments. I think you need to support your ideas with more evidence. It needs a little more work to be really good.
Contradiction (to approve of some other aspects without understanding the problem)	I know you put a lot of time and effort into it, but it just doesn't have the focus you need. I really like the structure and style, but the information you provided is not relevant.
Support (to approve of some other aspects with minimization of the problem)	It has good potential but needs to be reorganized a bit. You have some good ideas, but you need to support them with evidence. You're an excellent writer, but I think you need to add a few more facts.
Admiration (to approve of the other without any reservation)	It is an excellent paper. You did a very good job.
<i>Source: Tae-Sop Lim and John Bowers, "Facework: Solidarity, Approbation, and Tact," Human Communication Research 17, no. 3 (1991): 433-435.</i>	

Finally, autonomy face is addressed by Leech's maxim of "tact," which expresses the speaker's respect for the other's freedom in action and autonomy.²⁷⁸ As with competence face, autonomy face can also be expressed in a self-reflective manner that emphasizes the speaker's own freedom of action and its need to be respected. Tact, in this case, is depicted by attempts to maximize (or minimize the loss of) freedom of action through presenting options or through indirectness and tentativeness.²⁷⁹ Table 3 is an adapted scale of the tact categories and example items from Lim and Bowers' analysis.²⁸⁰ Categories toward the top of the scale express no to little tact, while those at the bottom express the highest levels of tact. Bold and underlined categories are present in the analysis of selections from *Borba* and *Zëri i popullit*.

Table 3. Scale of Tact

<i>Category</i>	<i>Example Items in Category</i>
Order (to demand forcefully)	Write the group paper. Write the paper again.
Obligation (to invoke the other's obligation)	You have to write the group paper. You owe it to me to write the group paper. You need to rewrite the paper. I know it's imposing a lot, but you gotta write the paper again.
<u>Need</u> (to state one's desire)	I need you to write the group paper. I want you to rewrite your paper.
Please (to use a conventional politeness marker "please")	Write the paper on behalf of the group, please. Please write your paper again.
Advice (to advise the other what to do)	It'll be a good idea for you to rewrite the paper. Why don't you write the group paper? I suggest that you write the paper again. Maybe you can write the group paper. Our group paper has to be good to impress the teacher. I hope you would write the paper again.

²⁷⁸ Ibid.

²⁷⁹ Leech, *Principles of Pragmatics*, 135-136.

²⁸⁰ Lim and Bowers, "Facework," 437-439.

Table 3 (cont.)

<i>Category</i>	<i>Example Items in Category</i>
Indicative-mood conventional indirectness (to use a conventional form of indicative-mood indirect request)	Can you write the paper again? Will you write the group paper?
Subjunctive mood conventional indirectness (to use a conventionalized form of subjunctive mood indirect request)	I would like to ask you to write the group paper. Could you write the paper again?
Indicative mood possibility inquiry (to ask possibilities using indicative mood conventional indirectness)	What do you think about writing the group paper? Do you think you can rewrite the paper?
Subjunctive mood possibility inquiry (to ask possibilities using subjunctive mood conventional indirectness)	I was wondering if you could write the paper again. Is there any way you could write the group paper? Do you think you could work on the paper again? I would like to ask you what you think about rewriting it.
Debt incurrence (to imply that the other will do one a favor by accepting the request)	I'd greatly appreciate it if you could write the paper on behalf of the whole group. Could you please write the paper again?
Unconventional indirectness (not to state the imposition explicitly)	I think you are the best candidate to write the group paper. As you know, we need to do well on this project to get good grades. Is there anything I can help you with? Would it be too much to ask you to write the group paper? Would you mind working on the paper a bit more?
Experimenting (to explore the possibility for the other to volunteer)	Do you think you can take time to write the group paper? Do you have time to write the paper again? Would you be willing to work on the paper again? Would you consider writing the group paper?
Imposition sharing (to share the responsibility)	I think we should write the group paper together. Could we sit together and work on the ways to improve it?
<i>Source: Tae-Sop Lim and John Bowers, "Facework: Solidarity, Approbation, and Tact," Human Communication Research 17, no. 3 (1991): 437-439.</i>	

4.4. *Zëri i popullit*

4.4.1. Negative out-group qualities

The focus of *Zëri i popullit*'s out-group characterizations fell not on the non-Albanian populations of Yugoslavia, who we will discuss shortly, but instead on the collective leadership of the SFRJ. They highlighted this separation between the leaders and the led by appealing directly to the in-group Yugoslav population and singling out the leaders for censure. An article from the 23rd of April stated,

“You, Messrs. Yugoslav politicians, need not listen to us if you do not wish to do so, but we are convinced that the peoples of Yugoslavia will listen to us and will understand our opinions, our sincere feelings, the fraternal feelings of Albanians.”²⁸¹

To underscore their negative qualities, the Albanian press used historical associations to label Yugoslav government officials. One article harkened back to the days of Serb-centralist policies in Kosovo during the early and mid twentieth century. It stated that current government officials had brought forth “[n]ot only the shades of Ranković, but also the old ghosts of the Karageorgevićes.”²⁸²

Zëri i popullit also made an association between the Yugoslav regime and that of the genocidal Ustaša from the Second World War: “In the history of the Albanians, one does not find barbaric acts like those of the Ustaše, old and new.”²⁸³ This statement clearly constructed an image of a government that carried on the extremist-exclusionary ideals of Ante Pavelić's fascist, terrorist organization, bent on eliminating those from political life who did not conform to ethno-national standards and eliminating the undesirables of the state. This assertion also excused the Albanian people from any linkage with brutal or, as they stated, “barbaric” actions like those

²⁸¹ “Who Incites Hostility Among the Peoples of Yugoslavia?” in *About the Events in Kosova: Articles from Zëri i Popullit and Other Press Organs* (Tirana: The “8 Nëntori” Publishing House, 1981), 39.

²⁸² “Why were police violence and tanks,” *About the Events in Kosova*, 5.

²⁸³ “Who Incites Hostility,” *About the Events in Kosova*, 28.

perpetrated by the extremist groups that emerged in Yugoslavia in the early to mid twentieth century.²⁸⁴

While recognizing the horrific past of groups like the Ustaša, *Zëri i popullit* also recognized the bravery of the Yugoslav peoples who fought for and reclaimed their country from the Axis Powers in 1944: “The heroic struggle of the peoples of Yugoslavia could not fail to arouse justifiable pride.”²⁸⁵ This pride, which was a positive motivation for change in the Yugoslav people, was said to have manifested differently in the current Yugoslav leadership, leading to

“Yugoslav megalomania and chauvinism, claiming that virtually only they fought, only they made sacrifices, that it was only thanks to them that the other peoples followed their example and fought too. All this was transformed into a ‘feeling of superiority’ which has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism.”²⁸⁶

The writer carried the anti-Marxist ideological argument further by stating that the Yugoslav leadership’s “feeling of superiority” was

“[t]he worm...implanted in the ‘core of the red apple.’ It gnawed away, weakening the revolution and to justify this the blame was laid on Stalin, the Soviet Union, its genuine Leninist system and the ideology which had guided that system---Marxism-Leninism. Tito and company were made the anti-Stalinist and anti-Soviet heroes of the day by the international bourgeoisie. Their megalomania was increased ten-fold.”²⁸⁷

These accusations make clear that Yugoslav officialdom, in the estimation of the Albanian leadership, was ideologically incorrect in their beliefs, having turned away from the ideological core of what they believed to be true Marxist-Leninism: Stalinism and the pre-Khrushchev

²⁸⁴ Balli Kombëtar, an Albanian nationalist group that was allied with the Italian Fascists and Nazi Germany during the Second World War, organized the SS “Skanderbeg” Division and the notorious *Vulnetara* irregulars, which regularly attacked and killed members of the Slav population in Kosovo. See: Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian*, 121-143.

²⁸⁵ “Who Incites Hostility,” *About the Events in Kosova*, 35.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 35-36.

Soviet system. Officials gripped by narcissism, which was only increased by their acceptance in the anti-communist world, fueled this turning away from ideological correctness.

These connotations cast the Yugoslav leadership in a decidedly negative light to the audiences in Albania, Yugoslavia, and abroad. By associating the current Yugoslav leadership with Axis-affiliated extremist groups from the Second World War, the authors played on fears of nationalism and cycled back to visions of the violence that had gripped the Balkans forty years ago. The Albanian press asserted that the Yugoslav leadership's arrogance had led the people of the SFRJ to a repeat of the same festering nationalisms of that era. In their view, this had been driven by the rejection of true Marxist-Leninism though Soviet-style Stalinism and led to Tito's embrace of counterrevolutionary, self-management socialism.

Zëri i popullit also made use of historical writings of the SKJ and their sponsored media arms to render an image of a government which had betrayed its own principles in denying the demands of the protesting Albanians in Kosovo. They quoted Tito's pre-war words in *Proletar* as stating that the Albanians of Yugoslavia "'were enslaved and earmarked for extermination' by the 'nationalist policy of the Great-Serb hegemonists'" in leadership positions of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.²⁸⁸ Tito further specified in *Proletar*, in regard to the communists' struggle against the royalist government of Regent Prince Paul, that "the aim of this struggle in which the masses of the people will strive with all their might, has to be the urgent solution of the national question in conformity with the principle of the democratic right of self-determination..."²⁸⁹ This was followed in the article by an extract from 1942 in which the Communist Party of Yugoslavia made known its stance that they had

²⁸⁸ "The Status of a Republic for Kosova is a Just Demand," in *About the Events in Kosova: Articles from Zëri i Popullit and Other Press Organs* (Tirana: The "8 Nëntori" Publishing House, 1981), 44-45.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 45.

“not renounced and never will renounce its principle, which was established by our great leaders and teachers Lenin-Stalin, the principle of self-determination up to the right of secession...The question of Macedonia, the question of Kosovo-Metohia, the question of Montenegro, the question of Serbia, the question of Croatia, the question of Slovenia, the question of Bosnia and Hercegovina will be easily solved to everybody’s satisfaction.”²⁹⁰

Despite these initial pronouncements, Yugoslavia’s leaders denied Kosovo the right of self-determination following the Second World War, and according to *Zëri i popullit*, the current Yugoslav leadership continued to deny the people of Kosovo their constitutional right to self-determination.²⁹¹ These statements aided the Albanian media in making it clear that the Yugoslav leadership from Tito to the present, following the Second World War in which Yugoslavs and Albanians fought side by side, had rejected the founding principles upon which the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had based its nationalities and territorial policies and, instead, followed the anti-Marxist nationality policy of the pre-war Yugoslav state. This was made clear by stating, “The status of Kosova (after the Second World War) was decided under the dictate of the Great-Serb chauvinist ideology, which was inherited from the Yugoslav Kingdom and preserved in post-war Yugoslavia.”²⁹²

As the Albanian press presented the Yugoslav leadership as the out-group in the Kosovar imbroglio, they accused Yugoslav authorities and the state-run media of casting the demonstrators in a negative light, as labeling them as villains in the chaos that had engulfed Kosovo. *Zëri i popullit* stated that they believed “the brave Kosova students” had been erroneously accused of “acting like the gangsters of Chicago and putting little children in the

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ Ibid., 57.

²⁹² Ibid., 52.

front of the demonstrations.”²⁹³ This gave the impression, in the view of the Albanian media, that the protestors were behaving like common criminals.

They also charged that the media in Yugoslavia had ignored the real reasons behind the revolts and had instead painted “the people of Kosova” as “counterrevolutionaries, chauvinists and irredentists,”²⁹⁴ further stating that “[t]hese people [Yugoslav authorities] have learned nothing from history. Only the Albanians, who have been their prey, are allegedly ‘chauvinists’ and ‘irredentists’.”²⁹⁵

4.4.2. Fellowship Face

Despite the clear portrayal of the Yugoslav leadership as the out-group in the Kosovar Uprising, the Albanian press focused their attention on conveying a feeling of acceptance towards the Yugoslav peoples, often citing the fraternal bond they felt toward all the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia. The fraternal relationship that was described emphasized a strong historical connection, particularly cooperation between Albanians and Yugoslavs during the Second World War, and expressed solidarity in defending against possible future threats to Yugoslavia.

“The history of the Albanians through the centuries and that of the National Liberation War have shown that the sons and daughters of our people have shed their blood to help the fraternal neighboring peoples. The lofty spirit of sacrifice and profound internationalist feelings characterize our people. We have always wanted good neighborly relations with Yugoslavia. Our stand is unalterable. If anyone, imperialism or social-imperialism attacks Yugoslavia, our people, socialist Albania will fight shoulder to shoulder with the peoples of Yugoslavia. This is what we have said and this is what we shall do.”²⁹⁶

Zëri i popullit again spelled out the Albanian desire to aid their neighbor, and the brotherly feelings that had toward the Yugoslav people, by stating,

²⁹³ “Why were police violence and tanks,” *About the Events in Kosova*, 12.

²⁹⁴ “Who Incites Hostility,” *About the Events in Kosova*, 21.

²⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 31.

²⁹⁶ “Why were police violence and tanks,” *About the Events in Kosova*, 17.

“we are ready to give sincere assistance with all the forces of our noble hearts and minds to preserve the friendship with the fraternal peoples of Yugoslavia, to safeguard the good neighborly relations which have been established, to assist our Albanian brothers in every direction as before, to develop commercial relations and cultural exchanges with them, as we do with the other peoples of Yugoslavia.”²⁹⁷

Both of these statements articulated the desire on the part of the Albanian leadership, through the press, to present a vision of solidarity between Albanians and the people of Yugoslavia, with whom they had shared a history of mutual cooperation and a sense of fraternity.

As fellow members of the Albanian nation, the Kosovar protestors were described as part of a people “who have always fought with sword in hand,”²⁹⁸ and who have “always defended [themselves] heroically and...triumphed over...enemies because [they have] always been in the right.”²⁹⁹ According to the article, the demonstrations against what the Kosovars saw as injustice and oppression was their embracement of the historic fighting spirit of all Albanians. In the protestors’ struggles, they were described as not alone, but as

“the grandsons and daughters of the heroes of our people, Isa Boletini, Bajram Curri, Abdyl and Naim Frashëri, Sulejman Vokshi, Ymer Prizreni, Azem and Shote Galica, Çerçiz Topulli and Selam Salaria, the brothers and co-fighters of Hajdar Dushi, Hysni Kapo, Miladin Popović, Emin Duraku, and thousands of heroic Albanian, Montenegrin, and Macedonian partisans who fought and shed their blood together, as brothers in Yugoslavia for the freedom, independence and self-determination of the peoples of Yugoslavia.”³⁰⁰

Thus *Zëri i popullit* presented an image of these groups (Albanian, Montenegrin, Macedonian, and Yugoslavian) as linked through their determination to fight for what was right, of the Kosovars’ membership in the pantheon of Albanian heroes, and of the struggle for self-determination which all of the above groups shared with those who fought for the liberation and self-determination of the peoples of Yugoslavia during the Second World War.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 18.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 12.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., 17.

³⁰⁰ Ibid.

Though often showing these heroic visions of the Albanian nation, many of the pronouncements espoused by *Zëri i popullit* present a fellowship face that instead uses expressions of commonality in victimhood to link the Albanian people of the Socialist Republic of Albania with co-nationals in Yugoslavia. An article from April 8th, 1981, in decrying the oppression being meted out against the Albanians of Kosovo, explained that “[n]ever have they [the Albanians] attacked and partitioned the territories of other peoples. These things have been done to the Albanians.”³⁰¹ This position is extrapolated over the breadth of Albanian history: “The capitalist and imperialist world has perpetrated many evils against the Albanian people at all times.”³⁰² By emphasizing the suffering of the Albanian people throughout their history, *Zëri i popullit* not only presented a “face” that had experienced unjust treatment to the audience beyond Albania, but it also created a bond of communal suffering with co-nationals in Kosovo.

The goal of projecting fellowship face is to establish “levels of solidarity: the degree of ‘in-groupness’ or ‘interpersonalness’ of a message and the directness [bluntness] with which the in-groupness is expressed.”³⁰³ Categories and examples of solidarity levels can be found in Table 1 from pages 53-54. In the context of examining newspaper discourse in Albania, we see clear and direct statements of solidarity professed, establishing visible boundaries of inclusion.

In the case of Albania and the state-news organ *Zëri i popullit*, the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia were clearly established as an in-group, independent of the Yugoslav political leadership. *Zëri i popullit* expressed their connection with the Yugoslav peoples through examples of “friendship affirmation,” which shows a high level of solidarity and of interpersonalness.³⁰⁴ A clear example of this was expressing intimate notions of fraternity

³⁰¹ Ibid., 16.

³⁰² “The Status of a Republic,” *About the Events in Kosova*, 63.

³⁰³ Lim and Bowers, “Facework,” 428.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

between Albanians and the peoples of Yugoslavia. The Albanian press also established fellowship with the peoples of Yugoslavia through examples of “cooperation..., which show strong interpersonalness,” but less directly than friendship affirmation.³⁰⁵ *Zëri i popullit* authors acknowledged past cooperation in the Second World War between the two groups and pledged future cooperation in armed defense of Yugoslavia should the need ever emerge again.

At the same level of solidarity and directness as cooperation, *Zëri i popullit* described fellowship between Albania and the protestors through “empathy.”³⁰⁶ They showed identification with the plight of the demonstrations’ participants by expressing strong communal feelings of victimhood. The injustice and oppression that the protestors were feeling was something that all Albanians had experienced throughout their common history. “Character appreciation, which is direct and not limited to any specific level of interpersonalness,” was also expressed, although character appreciation is not considered by communications theorists to be as face-supporting as the previous categories.³⁰⁷ Examples of this occurred when notions of a characteristic fighting spirit were communicated.

4.4.3. Competence Face

Zëri i popullit expressed its view of the competency of the Kosovar Albanians by complimenting their ability to sift through the misleading information emanating from across Yugoslavia. These inflammatory articles and reports, encouraged and sometimes authored by the Yugoslav leadership, sought to label the Albanian protestors as extreme nationalists, while promoting the brotherhood and unity of the nations and nationalities of the SFRJ, which *Zëri i*

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

popullit labeled as “jingoistic.”³⁰⁸ An article titled “Who incites hostility amongst the peoples of Yugoslavia?” from April 1981 stated,

“[i]t is not easy to deceive a brave and mature people like the Albanian people who live in various parts of Yugoslavia with such ruses, to deceive the workers, peasants, students and honest intelligentsia, who are conscious about the existence of their nation and concerned about its future.”³⁰⁹

The Albanian press also voiced praise for the expertise of the Albanians of Kosovo in skillfully negotiating multiple levels of deception, using this as further proof of their competence. With this, they focused on the Kosovar Albanians’ ability to recognize actual Albanian agents of the government versus those who were simply coerced into betraying their people by the UDB.

“They [the Kosovar Albanians] know how to differentiate the lackeys from the honest sons and daughters of the people, whom the UDB tries to compromise by forcing them to speak and to send telegrams for propaganda purposes.”³¹⁰

Albanians in Yugoslavia were further lauded for the constructive manner in which they had conducted themselves, drawing a picture of a people who were competent as citizens, measured and thoughtful in their social and political actions. They were noted to have been a positive element in Yugoslavia since the end of the Second World War, despite the constant oppression they faced from the state.

“The only positive and unbiased factor in this Federation is the Albanian factor. The Albanians in Yugoslavia were treated with contempt, politically, economically and from the cultural-educational aspect. At the same time however, they have been the most tolerant and realistic factor in the political-economic chaos into which post-World War Two Yugoslavia was plunged, a chaos which was a burden especially on the Albanians.”³¹¹

While the Yugoslav state may have oppressed their co-nationals in Yugoslavia, the Albanian press did recognize changes that had improved life in Kosovo, focusing on the opening

³⁰⁸ “Who Incites Hostility,” *About the Events in Kosova*, 25.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 27-28

³¹¹ *Ibid.*, 36-37.

of Albanian schools and the integration of Albanian culture and sciences into existing institutions' curricula. In this way, *Zëri i popullit* also labeled the people of Yugoslavia as competent, at least in their more recent pro-Albanian actions.

“We have asserted and we assert again that during the past decade Albanian education and culture in Kosova (and to a lesser extent in Macedonia and Montenegro) have taken a laudable step forward. The opening of Albanian schools and the important University of Prishtina, the use of the Albanian literary language, the development of Albanian songs, dances and folklore, and elaborated music, of Albanian literature and Albanological sciences, etc. along with the culture of the peoples of Yugoslavia, have received an impulse such as has not been seen for a considerable time. The reasons for this are known and we do not want to dwell on them here. Hence, we look and compare the past with the present and we see the positive changes made in these fields.”³¹²

Praise and the construction of an image of competence for the University of Prishtina and its students (Albanian and non-Albanian) continued in an article from the 26th of May that was written by a group of Albanian academics who had spent time in Kosovo. They declared, “[w]ith pleasure and admiration we have closely followed the persistent and very fruitful efforts of the University of Prishtina,” and acknowledged, “the scholars of Kosova have made giant strides forward.”³¹³

Zëri i popullit emphasized that they were quite willing to praise the achievements of the Yugoslav people and regime in Kosovo, but also reserved the right to criticize when the situation warranted it.

“The Yugoslav press accuses us of ignoring the positive changes which have been made in Kosova. But this is not so. Whatever is right we admit and defend, whatever is unjust we denounce and condemn!”³¹⁴

Though largely concentrating on issues of competency within the confines of Yugoslavia, the writers of *Zëri i popullit* also focused their attention on the role of the People's Socialist

³¹² Ibid., 22.

³¹³ Sotir Kuneshka and et. al., “The Voice of Science and the Wind of Chauvinism,” in *About the Events in Kosova: Articles from Zëri i Popullit and Other Press Organs* (Tirana: The “8 Nëntori” Publishing House, 1981), 87.

³¹⁴ Ibid.

Republic of Albania. Of particular note, they heaped praise on the state for being a major factor in promoting peace and stability.

“Because it pursues a principled, correct and unwavering policy, because it sticks to its course consistently and with determination, Albania is an important factor of peace and stability, security and defence in the Balkans and Europe, as has been its tradition throughout its long history.”³¹⁵

The article asserted this stance, while decrying Yugoslavia’s courting of the Cold-War Powers as a dangerous game for the region and the continent.

Projections of competence face have the aim, through levels of approbation, of approving of “the other if at all possible, and if not, to minimize both the quantity and quality of the problem.”³¹⁶ Categories and examples of levels of approbation can be found in Table 2 from pages 55-57. The strongest competence face technique that offers the most face saving is “‘admiration,’ which approves of the other without reservation.”³¹⁷ *Zëri i popullit* used “admiration” to express approbation for their co-nationals in Yugoslavia. They used this technique to offer unqualified praise for the Albanians of the SFRJ, who they stated had successfully negotiated through the deceptive and misleading information presented by the Yugoslav press and authorities.

Unsurprisingly, *Zëri i popullit* did not extend these statements of admiration to the Yugoslav authorities. However, weaker qualified statements of “support” were offered by *Zëri i popullit* to the Yugoslav regime in praise of the educational, cultural, and artistic advances made in regards to the Albanian population over the previous ten years, particularly in Kosovo. The qualifications were presented by noting the length of time it took for those advances to be made and the problems associated with the regime’s reaction to the demonstrations in the region. In a

³¹⁵ “The Status of a Republic,” *About the Events in Kosova*, 63.

³¹⁶ Lim and Bowers, “Facework,” 432.

³¹⁷ Ibid.

similar vein, academics from Albania gave praise to the recent positive developments in higher education, while acknowledging similar problems.

4.4.4. Autonomy Face

A consistent theme in the Albanian press's coverage of the Kosovar demonstrations was their emphasis on autonomy: their right and freedom to express judgments, feelings, and opinions on the matter. When accused by the Yugoslav leadership of interfering in the internal affairs of SAP Kosovo and the SFRJ, *Zëri i popullit* responded,

“Albania has not interfered and is not interfering in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. This is a basic principal of our policy. In expressing our views about the recent events in Kosova, we are not interfering in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. But we are raising our voice, and we have the right to raise it, when injustices are done to our brothers, when violence and repression are used against them, when such slogans as Albanian chauvinism, irredentism etc. are used to discredit the Albanian youth and people of Kosova. We have this right, just as Yugoslavia and any other state has the right to defend and demand justice for its own national minorities.”³¹⁸

In expressing their absolute right to maximize their freedom of action in responding to developments in Kosovo, the Albanian press further stated,

“Socialist Albania and the newspaper ‘Zëri i popullit’ have greater right than anyone else to express their opinion about the situation in Kosova, about the murders and savage tortures which are committed by the UDB and the Serbian army against the Albanians of Kosova.”³¹⁹

At the same time, they made it known, rhetorically, that it would be senseless to assume that the Albanian leadership and press would have nothing to say in relation to attacks on co-nationals in a neighboring state, particularly when media sources around the globe had already joined in the discussion.

³¹⁸ “Why were police violence and tanks,” *About the Events in Kosova*, 18-19.

³¹⁹ “Who Incites Hostility,” *About the Events in Kosova*, 23.

“Did the Yugoslav leadership expect the Albanian press to say nothing about the tragedy which that leadership caused in Kosova, when for weeks on end the entire world press has been talking about and condemning the ferocity displayed?”³²⁰

The Albanian press did not limit their expression to discussions of the attacks themselves, but also commented on underlying political issues. The influence of a heavy debt burden to Western creditors and dependence on industrial trade with the Soviet Union³²¹ made the SFRJ suspect in the eyes of the Albanian communists. They asserted that the Yugoslav leadership was corrupted by their reliance on imperial capitalists and Marxist-Leninist revisionists (i.e. the United States and the USSR, respectively). As a means to convey their autonomy by asserting their ability to conduct themselves free of any outside control, *Zëri i popullit* aired the following:

“We Albanian communists are masters in our own house, and we pursue the policy which we consider the best and most correct. Others may not accept it. That is their right. Our people supervise and judge us. The facts, life, work, all show that the Albanian people support and defend the correct line of the Party and their state with all their strength.”³²²

Albania, having split with past sponsors in the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, considered itself independent of Great-Power influence.

In expressions of autonomy face, the focus of analysis is on the use of “tact.”³²³ The goal of tact is to “minimize the actual amount of imposition” portrayed.³²⁴ Categories and examples of levels of tact can be found in Table 3 from pages 57-59. In the case of *Zëri i popullit* expressing autonomy, they did so using a self-reflective vision of the “need” category of tact measurement, in which one simply states one’s desire to do something, out of necessity, while

³²⁰ Ibid., 26.

³²¹ *Zëri i popullit* published a story on June 5, 1981 accusing the Soviet Union and Great-Serb elements in the Yugoslav government of working together in an anti-Albanian plot. See: “The Events in Kosova and the Secret Soviet-Great-Serb Collaboration,” in *About the Events in Kosova: Articles from Zëri i Popullit and Other Press Organs* (Tirana: The “8 Nëntori” Publishing House, 1981), 104-112.

³²² “Who Incites Hostility,” *About the Events in Kosova*, 39.

³²³ Lim and Bowers, “Facework,” 432 & 436.

³²⁴ Ibid., 432.

acknowledging a moderate level of imposition.³²⁵ In the case of press coverage The Albanian press clearly professed the desire and their right to state their opinions regarding the incidents in Kosovo, which Yugoslavia challenged as interfering in the internal affairs of the state. By professing their opinions on the causes and conduct of the protests while exclaiming their innocence in interfering in Yugoslavia, Albania could project to their people, the peoples of Yugoslavia, and the outside world that they felt strongly about the injustices being perpetrated against their co-nationals in Kosovo, but had nothing to do with aiding in fomenting the discord that occurred in the province.

4.5. *Borba*

4.5.1. Negative out-group qualities

The focus of *Borba* and the Yugoslav authorities' use of referential/nomination strategies was to create images of otherness and criminality in the demonstrating groups. They achieved this by clearly and concisely constructing the image of the "other" with qualities that branded it negatively as an out-group separate from the law-abiding norm of Yugoslav society. One method they used to signify the offending out-group of demonstrators was by labeling them as Yugoslav outsiders or people foreign to Kosovo and Yugoslavia.

In a late-March issue of *Borba*, Aslam Fazlija, president of the Presidium of the SK Prishtina, called the demonstrators from the March 26th incidents "foreign groups of students."³²⁶ By labeling them as such, Fazlija consciously separated the offending party of protestors from the "good" Kosovar students that did not participate in disruptive and harmful actions against the state. Instead, he implied it was the foreigners, who had been allowed to enter the country and pursue their education, that were the source of the problems.

³²⁵ Ibid., 437.

³²⁶ Antić, "Neprijateljka Akcija."

Other Yugoslav leaders accomplished this branding by painting the protestors as members of alien groups dedicated to the overthrow of the Yugoslav system. Following the confrontations of early April, SAP Kosovo President Xhavid Nimani described a portion of the demonstrators as being “part of an entity representing an integral part of the organizations and agencies of an internal and external enemy.”³²⁷ While acknowledging an external enemy threat present in the protests, he highlighted a belief that a portion of these enemies were part of an established and known series of outside groups that posed a tangible threat to Yugoslavia and were capable of stirring up resistance in Kosovo. In essence, he was asserting that these people were part of a covert invasion. He further stated that these “enemies internal and external have always aimed to break the brotherhood and unity of our nations and nationalities.”³²⁸ With this, he attached a timeless quality to the intentions of the enemies of Yugoslavia whose focus was to destroy the ideological underpinnings of the state.

While Nimani characterized the enemy groups as ones capable of acting on foreign soil under orders from outside entities, Fadilj Hoxha, member of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists, stated that “[t]he student demonstrations and several other transgressions were only a pretext for an organized attack by an outside enemy of self-government, socialism, and Yugoslavia’s non-alignment.”³²⁹ This means that the demonstrations, in the estimation of Hoxha, were possibly only the opening salvos of an invasion or other coordinated action directed at Yugoslavia. This enemy, because it was outside of and hostile to Tito’s non-aligned movement and opposed to Yugoslavia’s ideological commitments, would likely either be from the alliance system of the United States or the Soviet Union.

³²⁷ “Neprijatelj Nije Uspio i Neće Uspjeti,” *Borba (Belgrade)*, April 3, 1981, 3.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*

³²⁹ “Razvoj Kosova Smeta Kontrarevolucionarima,” *Borba (Belgrade)*, April 4, 1981, 3.

Enemy demonstrators were identified in these sources as opponents of Yugoslavia's ideological and territorial unity who possessed counterrevolutionary designs against the state. Fazlija, again in reaction to the March 26th demonstrations, said that the enemy forces were focused on "destabilizing and breaking the unity of our country."³³⁰ Nimani believed that the enemy had "goals against socialism, self government, autonomous and non-aligned Yugoslavia."³³¹ The enemies had "counterrevolutionary designs that work to smash our socialist self-governing system, jeopardizing our territorial integrity and the sovereignty of our country."³³²

The presidents of the Serbian Party Presidium and the Socialist Republic of Serbia echoed this sentiment, releasing a joint statement positing that the enemy's goal was to smash "the brotherhood and unity of the nations and nationalities of Kosovo and encourage the disintegration of the political system of socialist self-government."³³³ Fadil Hoxha claimed that these acts of protest were "counterrevolutionary."³³⁴

Specific vocabulary aimed at promoting the idea of the protesters as liars and criminals was also present in these newspaper selections. Fazlija made reference to the character of the enemy by stating that he/she "stealthily demonstrates,"³³⁵ which gives the impression that the protesters were sly and secretive, hoping to avoid detection like an average criminal. Nimani labeled them as "deceitful masses"³³⁶ that used lies and manipulation to achieve their goals.

Yugoslav authorities made appeals to the Albanian people by feeding on their fear of nationalism, a fear shared with the other peoples of Yugoslavia. The enemy demonstrators were

³³⁰ Antić, "Neprijatelj Akcija."

³³¹ "Neprijatelj Nije."

³³² Ibid.

³³³ "Narod Oštro Osudio Nerede," *Borba (Belgrade)*, April 3, 1981, 3.

³³⁴ "Razvoj Kosova."

³³⁵ Antić, "Neprijatelj Akcija."

³³⁶ "Neprijatelj Nije."

stated as coming from an “Albanian nationalistic position,”³³⁷ while professing “extreme Albanian nationalistic and irredentist mantras.”³³⁸ They “identified with nationalistic groups”³³⁹ and identified with “Albanian nationalism, irredentism, lies and demagoguery.”³⁴⁰ As for appeals to the Albanian people, Nimani identified the demonstrators as being “against the Albanian nationality itself.”³⁴¹ Fadilj Hoxha expressed that the demonstrators intended “no good for, above all, the Albanian people.”³⁴²

Through pronouncements such as these, the Yugoslav leadership sought to clearly define the out-group of demonstrators in terms that would carry weight with the peoples of Yugoslavia, while potentially influencing opinions outside of the country as well. With the well-known experience of the Second World War and the Partisan victory, Yugoslav leaders etched a vision of invading forces from abroad acting through the protest movement, thus harkening to visions of invading forces from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The fear of hostile forces from the camps of the superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, was also played upon, a trope that had remained alive and well since the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948, when visions of Soviet invaders seemed likely to become reality.

The out-group, as constructed, rejected the ideological pillars upon which the state was supported: brotherhood and unity, self-governing socialism, neutrality, and non-alignment. They lied and acted like common criminals. These enemies were nationalists who, like groups such as the Ustaša or Četniks from the World War II era, sought the destruction of Yugoslavia through potentially violent means. Much like a protective parent, the Yugoslav leadership purported to

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ “Narod Oštro.”

³³⁹ “Narod Odbacuje Svako Miješanje Sa Strane,” *Borba (Belgrade)*, April 16, 1981, 3.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ “Neprijatelj Nije.”

³⁴² “Razvoj Kosova.”

know what was best for the Albanians of Kosovo and sought to advise them against participation in protests that were in the worst interests of their own people.

4.5.2. Fellowship Face

Notions of fellowship face were expressed in a variety of ways by Yugoslav authorities via the media. One face that articulated was that of communal distress. In describing the dire economic state of Kosovo that helped lead to the demonstrations in late March, Aslan Fazlija expressed that “currents in economic inconsistency affect the whole front in our country, and in Priština.”³⁴³ In this statement, the state official made clear that the economic issues plaguing Prishtina and Kosovo were evident across the country. By creating an image of shared suffering, it presented the readership with the notion that they were not alone and that their neighbors in the federal republics felt the same burden.

While this burden was something that all peoples of Yugoslavia shared, the peoples of Kosovo and Yugoslavia were working toward communal prosperity for all, according to leaders of the SAP Kosovo and the SR Srbija. Aslam Fazlija assured the people of Kosovo that all possible means were being utilized to improve their lot and to improve the situation for the entire country. He stated,

“[I]n this moment, a great degree of mobilization of our socialist forces are in the execution of real works of economic stabilization and strengthening, in the continued construction of the system of defense and communal self-help, in the continued strengthening of brotherhood and unity in the community of all nations and nationalities, and in the struggle against Albanian, Serbian, and all other nationalist and enemy movements.”³⁴⁴

Fazlija may have been confident in the work that was being done to improve life for all, but the party and republic-level executives of Serbia called for all parties in the republic to increase efforts in promotion of communal prosperity. In a joint statement, they called for “all citizens of

³⁴³ Antić, “Neprijatelj Akcija.”

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

our republic to pursue full vigilance in organization and to employ emphatically in their daily action for the further prosperous development and universal advancement of our whole community.”³⁴⁵

A major component in media projections to the populace and wider world was the view that a vast number of individuals across the province were fundamentally opposed to the actions of the demonstrators. The day after the initial protests on March 11th, *Borba* reported, “local student and worker political organizations, the university, and citizens condemned this transgression as a local detriment.”³⁴⁶ The rioting that occurred during the demonstrations of April 1st and 2nd was reported to have been “met with the disapproval of the working people and all Kosovo’s organized political forces”³⁴⁷ after interfering with economic activity and the free flow of traffic in the educational districts of Prishtina.

Workers of the Trepča Lead and Zinc Works in Mitrovica, in a telegram directed to the Presidency of SAP Kosovo and the Presidium of the League of Communists of Kosovo, stated that they “pointedly condemn these enemy actions,”³⁴⁸ in reaction to the demonstrations that occurred on the 1st and 2nd of April. In a similar telegram directed to the executives of the League of Communists, the SFRJ, and the SAP Kosovo, workers from thirteen companies in Trbovlje, Slovenia, pronounced their backing of the government. The workers, represented by the unit “Rudis,” stated their “full support for bold actions in decisively opposing all who prey on the inheritance of our revolution.”³⁴⁹

Political leaders also made a point to emphasize the lack of support amongst the population for the actions of the demonstrators. Following the rioting, the two chief executives

³⁴⁵ “Narod Oštro.”

³⁴⁶ “Izgrad Grupe Studenata.”

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

³⁴⁸ R. K., “Radnici Spretni da Brane Tekovine Revolucije,” *Borba (Belgrade)*, April 3, 1981, 3.

³⁴⁹ *Borba (Belgrade)*, April 10, 1981, 3.

of the province, SAP Kosovo President Xhavid Nimani and CK SK Kosovo President Mahmut Bakali, asserted that “local-political organs and all working people and citizens of Kosovo flatly oppose the carriers of these enemy activities.”³⁵⁰ A few weeks later, at a meeting that included the CK SKJ President Dušan Dragosavac, Nimani and Bakali again expressed their belief that most people did not support the protest movement or interference in the internal affairs of the state by outside entities:

“In the meeting, it was asserted that the widest majority of the masses of the working people, citizens and youth of Albanian, Serbian, Montenegrin, Turkish, Muslim and other nations and nationalities of Kosovo, together with all nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia, decisively condemned and dismissed the pretensions towards our country as interference in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia.”³⁵¹

During the same meeting, they further described “the Kosovar nations and nationalities’ determination to oppose the misuse of the Albanian people’s real interests with the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia for the further development of good, neighborly cooperation.”³⁵² Tahir Nalbani, Prizren Municipal Party Committee Secretary, also commented on the prior demonstrations and reacted to media attacks from Albania: “[I]n all forums, an expression of unified condemnation of counterrevolutionary irredentist and enemy forces in Kosovo had emerged.”³⁵³

Not only did an allegedly significant segment of the population oppose the demonstrations, but many individuals and groups offered to directly aid in putting down the uprising, according to *Borba* reports. In an article from the 3rd of April, it was stated, “in the local-political organizations of the province, numerous telegrams from the worker collectives and from the community/district level have arrived, pledging assistance in the efforts to oppose

³⁵⁰ “Narod Oštro.”

³⁵¹ “Narod Odbacuje.”

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ J. Marković, “Nove Neistine Iz Tirane,” *Borba (Belgrade)*, April 25, 1981, 3.

further enemy demonstrations.”³⁵⁴ The proletariat from the worker organization Metaljik in Đakovica pledged to the League of Communists of Kosovo and Yugoslavia “their readiness to defend the inheritance of the revolution and the development of our socialist self-governing system.”³⁵⁵ Workers from the Trepča Lead and Zinc Works, in reaction to the demonstrations, expressed their “full readiness through [their] means to defend against this and like actions.”³⁵⁶

An ideologically correct front was also presented in *Borba* opposing the counterrevolutionary currents of the demonstrations. According to the joint meeting of the Kosovar executive leadership following the disturbances of the 1st and 2nd of April,

“[C]ommunities, worker collectives, and schools expressed their readiness and determination, as the working people of Kosovo, to maintain the inheritance of our great liberation struggle, the socialist revolution, the brotherhood and unity of the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia, minted in the War of Liberation and the socialist construction of our country, and to persist consistently in Tito’s way of the socialist development of our society.”³⁵⁷

Nalbani of Prizren further stated,

“[A] manifestation of brotherhood and unity of our nations and an awareness regarding the joint inheritance of the national revolution emerged in parallel, . . . In the entirety of this period, the working class of Prizren has expressed a larger class awareness, a commitment for manufacturing and production, and a belief in the greatness of the internal works of the worker’s organizations.”³⁵⁸

Through this, the leadership of Kosovo presented the image of an ideologically-pure society that was aligned with the attitudes and decisions of the Party, committed to the ideals of the Revolution, the path of Tito, and the worker’s movement.

³⁵⁴ R. K., “Radnici Spretni.”

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ “Narod Oštro.”

³⁵⁸ Marković, “Nove Neistine.”

Much like *Zëri i popullit*'s presentation of the "empathy" level of solidarity,³⁵⁹ the Yugoslav press presented a similar fellowship face. In this case, *Borba* portrayed an environment of communal economic distress, where the residents of economically disadvantaged Kosovo were linked with the nations and nationalities across the country. The Yugoslav authorities expressed notions of "cooperation" that were focused on the people and government working communally to extricate the country from economic distress.

Borba indicated that different groups projected support for the governments' actions against the demonstrators through expressions of "attitude similarity," which portrays "mild levels of solidarity by expressing common ground or informality very indirectly,"³⁶⁰ and by giving print space to groups of citizens showing an alliance with the government. This was exemplified by letters to the government printed in the newspaper from worker group "Rudis" and workers from the Trepča Lead and Zinc Works, who expressed their condemnation of the demonstrations and their support for government actions to halt the wave of protests. *Borba* also added to the projection of fellowship through attitude similarity in its depiction of opposition to the protest movement as widespread: according to *Borba*, citizens throughout Yugoslavia disagreed with the protestors' methods, at the very least.

Strong waves of "cooperation" accompanied expressions of "attitude similarity" in the Yugoslav press through statements of cooperative efforts between civilians and the government in putting down the protest movements. These were largely expressed through groups' desire to volunteer aid to government authorities. Groupings like the Metaljnik workers organization in Đakovica, as well as those from the Trepča Lead and Zinc Works and the Kosovar proletariat, all pledged assistance in the common cause with Prishtina and Belgrade officials.

³⁵⁹ For solidarity levels, see Table 1 on pages 53-54.

³⁶⁰ Lim and Bowers, "Facework," 432.

4.5.3. Competence Face

Yugoslav authorities sought to cement proof of their competency through the media by continuously depicting a vision of success in dealing with the protest movement. Projecting an image of local elements silencing the demonstrations highlighted these attempts. Aslan Fazlija said in regard to the March 26th demonstration, “Student demonstrations from the 26th of March were organized and initiated by enemy forces, but efforts that misguided a wider circle of students did not succeed. The students and working people of Priština already have pointedly condemned the enemy action and its perpetrators.”³⁶¹ He went on to state that local elements even took an active role in suppressing the protests, “[o]wing to the political action of the communists, instructors, and students of the University, as bodies of protection and self-defense, the demonstrations were dispersed.”³⁶²

Following the protests and riots of early April, Xhavid Nimani echoed similar sentiments by stating that “the enemy did not succeed due to the ample masses of citizens, youth, Albanians, and members of other nations and nationalities of Kosovo and Yugoslavia who enthusiastically [opposed] the enemy forces.”³⁶³ He also held that “[e]nemy elements did not succeed nor will they succeed to implement their aims in Kosovo, nor anywhere in our country,” and a few lines later stated, “Enemy elements and their demonstrations did not succeed.”³⁶⁴ These statements were spoken in regard to the demonstrators’ attacks on the ideological and territorial integrity of Kosovo.

Another key way in which the Yugoslav leaders attempted to deflect responsibility for the poor conditions at the university that precipitated the demonstrations of the 11th and 26th of

³⁶¹ Antić, “Neprijatelj Akcija.”

³⁶² Ibid.

³⁶³ “Neprijatelj Nije.”

³⁶⁴ Ibid.

March was by emphasizing the unprecedented expansion of university as an achievement, while minimizing the negative consequences of the uncontrolled growth. Aslam Fazlija stated,

“Our students...know that within only ten years and with extraordinary efforts by our society, according to the needs of the overall development of Kosovo and the enrichment of national equality, we developed a university with so many faculty and students that it now belongs amid the three largest universities in the country and which offers instruction in the mother tongue of the students; so quick, ample, and efficient an expansion is not noted in the history of the university.”³⁶⁵

With this statement Fazlija implicitly acknowledged issues existed with the conditions at the university, but deflected those issues by emphasizing the community’s understanding of the complexities that accompanied the rapid growth of the university.

Using the highest level of approbation,³⁶⁶ “admiration,” Yugoslav authorities, via *Borba*, espoused a consistent theme of “success” by workers, university personnel, students, youth, Albanians, and the other nations and nationalities of the region in halting protest actions. These pronouncements of success were offered without further negative or positive qualification.

Although high in approbation, instances of “support” are less face saving than those of “admiration.” “Support” statements, which Yugoslav authorities also utilized in *Borba*, offer approval “of certain aspects of the other’s performance despite a certain problem.”³⁶⁷ For Yugoslav authorities, the problem they faced was the reality that the University of Prishtina had grown well beyond its capacity, thus contributing to the conditions that precipitated the initial demonstrations. The Yugoslav authorities acknowledged this; however, they emphasized that these problems were side effects of the popularity, growth, and excellence of the university that they had created. With this depiction of the situation, the Yugoslav officials presented the

³⁶⁵ Antić, “Neprijateljka Akcija.”

³⁶⁶ For approbation levels, see Table 2 on pages 55-57.

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

qualifier of “support” and appreciation of the students for the creation and expansion of the university.

4.5.4. Autonomy Face

Unlike the RPSSh, the SFRJ did not vocalize expressions of autonomy face through the press to justify their freedom of action in the Kosovar demonstrations, which was for good reason. Emphasizing their autonomy in dealing with the protests would be tantamount to admitting that they felt pressured internally or externally to modify tactics or change course in the way they were handling the situation. Though they surely did feel that pressure at multiple levels, admitting it would have projected a level of weakness that the Yugoslav regime could ill afford to acknowledge at that juncture in the post-Tito world.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

As Robyn Penman surmised, the concepts of facework “are features that concern identity and relationships.”³⁶⁸ The relationships that have been recounted in the previous chapter have distinct features. For the Albanian press and leadership, it was important to emphasize a relationship that was non-adversarial and fraternal to the peoples of Yugoslavia. It allowed them to express a face want that sought a strong personal connection of friendship, bound in past cooperation in the face of aggression and committed to providing assistance in the future. This did not, however, include the leadership of the state, who were clearly excluded as aggressors in the vein of pre-war nationalists and World War II-era fascist extremists.

In projecting this face to audiences within Albania, Yugoslavia, and around the world, Albania presented a common identity of its state and the Albanian people, regardless of geographic location, as non-nationalistic. It showed a people and country that wanted only justice and what was right for their co-nationals in Yugoslavia, who had experienced the injustice and suffering that all Albanians had felt throughout their shared history. It asserted that the Yugoslav leadership, who had painted their co-nationals as aggressive nationalists working toward the destruction of Yugoslavia through the protest movement, was actually the chauvinistic, extreme nationalist. In particular, it was the nationalistic policies and practices of the SFRJ, not the Albanians or the Albanian state, that created the conditions for revolt.

The leadership of Yugoslavia and *Borba* expressed an identity of a state that was unified in its condemnation of the demonstrations. Yugoslavia’s citizens of all nations and nationalities were presented as professing the same attitude as the state toward the protests; furthermore, it stressed that the citizenry expressed support for the regime’s policies and practices and was

³⁶⁸ Robyn Penman, “Facework in Communication: Conceptual and Moral Challenges,” in *The Challenge of Facework: Cross-Cultural and Interpersonal Issues*, ed. Stella Ting-Toomey (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 17.

offering cooperation in successfully putting down the uprising. Yugoslav officials painted themselves as realists that acknowledged the economic sufferings of their peoples and the less-than-ideal conditions present at the University of Prishtina, but emphasized a communal cooperative spirit: the people and their government were working together to improve the situation.

In regard to the protestors, the Yugoslav leadership through *Borba* presented them as a group of Albanian-nationalist criminals, who were either foreign or under the influence of foreign groups. By projecting these images to audiences within and outside of Yugoslavia, it pinned guilt for the demonstrations on an outside party and expressed the solidarity and like-mindedness of all patriotic Yugoslavs. It showed that it was not their people that were protesting against them, but foreign elements that were working toward the destruction of the state. Most importantly, though, the Yugoslav leaders clearly pronounced that they were competently handling the problems of the country successfully, and that they still enjoyed the support of the nations and nationalities of the federation in the post-Tito era.

The 1981 Kosovar Uprising represented a watershed moment in the history of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Following the death of Josip Broz Tito, it showed that the systems put in place to carry Yugoslavia forward without his leadership were lacking. The creation of a semi-confederal structure, within which the constituent republics and autonomous provinces were treated as quasi-nation states, could not satisfy the needs of the nations and nationalities. For SAP Kosovo, economic issues coalesced with the lack of true equality within the SFRJ to create an untenable situation for many Kosovar Albanians. Using Rogers Brubaker's vocabulary, a triadic relational nexus between nationalizing state, an external national homeland, and a national minority had come together within a period of uncertainty and stress to erupt into

nationness as an event. Although many observers at the time, including Dennison Rusinow, believed that the “nationalistic excesses” within Yugoslavia were banal in nature and did not signal the onset of a period of perpetual crises leading to the end of the Federation,³⁶⁹ what came to be true was that future contingent events, again shrouded in increasing economic distress and international upheaval, lead to the disintegration of the multinational republic.

³⁶⁹ Dennison Rusinow, “Nationalities Policy and the ‘National Question’,” in *Yugoslavia in the 1980s*, ed. Pedro Ramet (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1985), 132.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Media

Borba

New York Times

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Background Reports

The Times

The Washington Post

Zëri i popullit

Books and Articles

About the Events in Kosova: Articles from "Zëri i popullit" and other press organs. Tirana: The "8 Nëntori" Publishing House, 1981.

Artisien, Patrick. "A Note On Kosovo and the Future of Yugoslav-Albanian Relations: A Balkan Perspective." *Soviet Studies* 36, no. 2 (1984): 267-76.

_____. "Yugoslavia and Albania in the 1970s." *Co-Existence: An International Journal* 15, no. 2 (1978): 219-27.

Artisien, Patrick, and R.A. Howells. "Yugoslavia, Albania and the Kosovo Riots." *The World Today* 37, no. 11 (1981): 419-27.

Avramov, Smilja. "The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Foreign Policy." *International Problems* 1, no. 15 (1974): 5-13.

Babuna, Aydin. "The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia: Ethnic Identity Superseding Religion." *Nationalities Papers* 28, no. 1 (2000): 67-92.

Banac, Ivo. *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics.* Ithaca: Cornell Paperbacks, 1988.

Baykal, Nazlı. "The Discursive Construction of Ethnic Identity: Sulukule Case, Turkey." *The Linguistics Journal* 4 (2009): 121-54.

Bieber, Florian, and Zidas Daskalovski, eds. *Understanding the War in Kosovo.* LONDON: Routledge, 2003.

Brubaker, Rogers *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

- Cohen, Philip J. *Serbia's Secret War: Propaganda and the Deceit of History*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1996.
- Domenici, Kathy, and Stephen W. Littlejohn. *Facework: Bridging Theory and Practice*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, Inc, 2006.
- Elsie, Robert. *Historical Dictionary of Albania*. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2010.
- Fairclough, Norman. *Language and Power*. London: Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1996.
- Fischer, Bernd. *Albania at War, 1939-45*. London: Hurst & Company Publishers Ltd., 1999.
- _____, ed. *Balkan Strongmen: Dictators and Authoritarian Rulers of Southeast Europe*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2007.
- Gasinski, Thaddeus. "The National Minority Policy of Today's Yugoslavia." *Nationalities Papers* 8, no. 1 (1980): 29-51.
- Glenny, Misha. *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999*. New York: Penguin Books, 2001.
- Independent International Commission on Kosovo. *The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned*. New York: Oxford Univ Pr, 2000.
- Katsikas, Stefanos. "A Comparative Overview On the Foreign Policy-Making of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia During the 1980s." *Bulgarian Historical Review* 34, no. 3/4 (2006): 106-44.
- Lampe, John. *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*. 1996. Reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Lee, Michele. "Kosovo between Yugoslavia and Albania." *New Left Review* 140 (1983): 62-91.
- Leech, Geoffrey. *Principles of Pragmatics*. London: Longman Group Limited, 1989.
- Lefort, Claude. *The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986.
- Lim, Tae-Sop, and John Bowers. "Facework: Solidarity, Approbation, and Tact." *Human Communication Research* 17, no. 3 (1991): 415-50.
- Machin, David, and Andrea Mayr. *How to Do Critical Discourse Analysis: a Multimodal Approach*. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2012.
- Malcolm, Noel. *Kosovo: a Short History*. New York: NYU Press, 1998.

- Meier, Viktor. *Yugoslavia: a History of Its Demise*. Translated by Sabrina Ramet. London: Routledge, 1999.
- Mertus, Julie. *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1999.
- Miller, Katherine. *Communication Theories: Perspectives, Processes, and Contexts*. 2nd ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages, 2005.
- Mulaj, Klejda. "A Recurrent Tragedy: Ethnic Cleansing as a Tool of State Building in the Yugoslav Multinational Setting." *Nationalities Papers* 34, no. 1 (2006): 21-50.
- Oetzel, John; Stella Ting-Toomey; and et al. "A Typology of Facework Behaviors in Conflicts with Best Friends and Relative Strangers." *Communication Quarterly* 48, no. 4 (2000): 397-419.
- Partia e Punës së Shqipërisë, and Instituti i Studimeve Marksiste-Leniniste. *1941-1948*. Vol. 1 of *Dokumenta Kryesore Të Partisë Së Punës Të Shqipërisë* Tiranë: Instituti i Studimeve Marksiste-Leniniste pranë KQ të PPSH, 1971.
- Pavković, Aleksander. "Anticipating the Disintegration: Nationalisms in Former Yugoslavia." *Nationalities Papers* 25, no. 3 (1997): 427-40.
- _____. *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans*. 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.
- Pervan, Ralph. *Tito and the Students: the University and the University Student in Self-Managing Yugoslavia*. Nedlands, W.A.: University of Western Australia Press, 1978.
- Petković, Ranko, ed. *Relationship Between Yugoslavia and Albania*. Belgrade: Jugoslovenska Stvarnost, 1984.
- Petrović, Aleksander, and Đorđe Stefanović. "Kosovo, 1944-1981: The Rise and Fall of a Communist 'nested Homeland'." *Europe-Asia Studies* 62, no. 7 (2010): 1073-6.
- Pipa, Arshi. "The Political Situation of the Albanians in Yugoslavia, with Particular Attention to the Kosovo Problem: A Critical Approach." *East European Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (1989): 159-81.
- Ramet, Pedro. "Problems of Albanian Nationalism in Yugoslavia." *Orbis* 25, no. 2 (1981): 369-88.
- _____, ed. *Yugoslavia in the 1980s*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.
- Ramet, Sabrina. *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991*. 2nd ed. Bloomington: Indiana Univ Pr, 1992.

- Reisigl, Martin, and Ruth Wodak. *Discourse and Discrimination: Rhetorics of Racism and Antisemitism*. New York: Routledge, 2000.
- Richards, Jack, and Richard Schmidt, eds. *Language and Communication*. London: Longman Pub Group, 1983.
- Richardson, John. *Analysing Newspapers: an Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Rogel, Carole. "Kosovo: Where It All Began." *International Journal of Politics and Society* 17, no. 1 (2003): 167-82.
- Stamova, Mariana. "Kosovo in the Period between Tito and Milosheвич in the Official Yugoslav Documents." *Etudes Balkaniques* 43, no. 3 (2007): 3-15.
- Ting-Toomey, Stella, and Atsuko Kurogi. "Facework Competence in Intercultural Conflict: An Updated Face-Negotiation Theory." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 22, no. 2 (1998): 187-225.
- Ting-Toomey, Stella, ed. *The Challenge of Facework: Cross-Cultural and Interpersonal Issues*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
- Veljović, Mile. "Yugoslav-Albanian Relations." *Review of International Affairs* 37, no. 874 (1986): 15-19.
- Vickers, Miranda. *The Albanians: a Modern History*. Revised ed. London: I. B. Tauris, 2006.
- _____. *Between Serb and Albanian: a History of Kosovo*. New York: Columbia Univ Pr, 1998.
- Wodak, Ruth, and Michael Meyer, eds. *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2002.