THE SECURITY-IDENTITY NEXUS IN EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION:
RETHINKING MULTI-SCALAR GOVERNANCE

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation presents a multi-faceted and nuanced study of the multi-level governance of the Euro-Atlantic arena, or the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. Using various methods of qualitative data collection and analysis, including documentary analysis and extensive fieldwork, the research is presented in three empirical essays and offered as a contribution to understandings of the state and governance in political geography and its cognate disciplines of international relations and anthropology. The first essay examines the practices of governance in the European Union’s process of security and defense integration. The second essay investigates how the security-identity nexus is central to the Euro-Atlantic accession process in an analysis of the multi-scalar geopolitical discourses mobilized by Croatian political elites. The third and final empirical essay analyzes the linkages between multiple ‘levels’ of European governance in an investigation of the process of European subject formation. The three pieces of research together document how the reproduction of the state and processes of governance rely profoundly on spatially-informed articulations of power, scale, and subjectivity. Moreover, the ‘levels’ of multi-level governance are much more fluid and ephemeral than political-economy and legal frameworks of analysis have indicated. The dissertation concludes with discussion of future avenues for research that would build on the findings presented herein.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

How relevant is Euro-Atlanticism today? Some may be tempted to ask this question as, at the time of writing (mid-2013), NATO’s post-Cold War rationale remains a matter of debate, the European Union’s leadership finds itself navigating one banking system crisis after another, and American college students are increasingly incentivized to learn Arabic, Farsi, or Mandarin rather than French, German or even Bosnian. And yet, the realm of European Union studies continues to grow as scholars seek ever more sophisticated ways of theorizing and systematically studying Europeanization, supranationalism, and collective security. The EU and the transatlantic arena are believed to constitute unique geopolitical phenomena as well as an opportunity to glean general understandings about governance, ‘new’ state spaces, and the relationship between globalization and territoriality (Moisio, et al., 2013).

Political geography provides an obvious intellectual arena within which these themes may be subject to thorough investigation. And indeed, the breadth and depth of political geographic scholarship on the spatialities of Europeanization has already produced extensive treatment of, inter alia, European spatial policies (Luukkonen, 2011; Moisio, 2011), European geopolitical discourses (Kuus, 2007a; Bachmann and Sidaway, 2009), and the identity politics emerging from the interactions between regionalism, nationalism, and supranational cosmopolitanism (Popescu, 2008; Beck, 2009; Bialasiewicz, 2009; Jones, 2011; Western, 2012). Additional political geographic work has joined international relations in conceptualizing the EU as a ‘multi-level’ form of
governance, producing new scalar politics and networks, while also contending with a persistent metageography of Westphalian nation-state territoriality (Murphy, 2008; Mamadouh and van der Wusten, 2008).

Multi-level governance has been defined as “a political concept that interprets contemporary political relationships within the EU, Europe as consisting of overlapping authorities and competing competencies at the supranational, national, and subnational levels” (Scott, 2009: 649). In a poststructural understanding of scale, a better framing of the concept would be that these diverse policy actors and bodies of authority construct new scales of governance through their relations and activities. But the particular manifestations of the practices of multi-level governance, and the further refinement of scale, the state, and other pertinent theoretical concepts, are matters to be taken up in additional research, with fresh empirical applications. It is just such an intervention that this dissertation aims to make in the fields of political geography and EU studies. In particular, surveying the various political geographic contributions to the study of Europeanization, Moisio, et al. (2013: 10) call for deeper engagement with “the actualization of ‘EU’rope in national public policy discourses” and EUropean space-making in the context of broader, capitalist processes of globalization.

**Research Problem**

The present work seeks to accomplish this goal, but with a multi-faceted approach to the multi-level governance of the Euro-Atlantic arena. With an eye toward the empirical foci of security, identity, and the Western Balkans, the project has materialized under the assumption that EU studies must maintain a substantial concern with the
'Atlantic' half of Euro-Atlanticism. Hence, NATO and its relationship to the EU figures prominently in parts of the dissertation, particularly Chapter Four. A second assumption under which the project has unfolded is that multi-level governance can be more fruitfully explored and analyzed through critical geographic engagement with power, scale, and subjectivity. Each empirical essay engages with these concepts in its examination of the broader theoretical issues of the state, society, and governance. The goal is not simply to document and analyze what is happening at particular, fixed levels of governance (e.g., the EU level, the national level, and the sub-national level). Rather, the research has endeavored to understand how diverse practices of governance, located in multiple centers of power, emphasize different scalar constructions and mobilize different spatial assumptions in order to bring about particular policy outcomes.

The nucleus of theoretical inspiration for this work hails not from political geography primarily, but rather from the very heart of integration theory in international relations. The need to consider governance and security as a key component of integration has roots in the very beginning of integration studies. Wæver (1995: 391-2) identifies a conceptual triangle which encapsulates the fundamental dynamics of concern to scholars of integration studies, specifically EU studies. The so-called security-identity-integration triangle underscores the centrality of security and identity to the process of integration, and provides a framework within which to explore the basis for political communities and the relationships between states, societies, and inter- or supra-national bodies. On the vanguard of constructivist international relations, the early integration theorists made a significant contribution by taking security and identity,
which up to that time had been treated axiomatically, and viewing them as malleable phenomena, as dynamic variables that shape the integration process.

Understandably, the preoccupation with security in the integration process from the 1960s until the 1980s revolved mainly around the economic, and later, political integration of Europe as a mode of preventing another world war (Keukeleire and McNaughton, 2008). Throughout the 1990s and onward, the focus has gradually shifted to the EU as a security actor in its own right, and to the enlargement process itself as a guarantor of security as the EU expands to absorb instabilities on its periphery (Duke, 2009; Gordon, 2009). Alongside these empirical considerations, theoretical innovations on security were advanced by the Copenhagen Research Group in the 1990s. Their concept of securitization addresses how issues are dramatized as existential imperatives, an advancement which took security studies well beyond the realm of military concerns (Wæver, 1995a). This theoretical shift has since prompted exploration of myriad seemingly non-security issues which have been framed as matters of survival, warranting extraordinary measures, usually to be taken up by the state. In short, the cultural production of social insecurities became the object of analysis (Weldes, et al., 1999).

While in the last decade and a half, as security studies has been rediscovering culture, another key development adding nuance to the security-identity-integration triangle has been renewed focus on the co-constitution of insecurity and identity (Campbell, 1998; Neumann, 1999; Sharp, 2000; Kuus, 2007a). I refer to this phenomenon throughout the dissertation as the security-identity nexus. And finally, as these developments took place in security studies and identity studies, anthropology, political geography, and political sociology have revisited the state with constructivist
and ethnographic approaches (Mitchell, 1991; Jessop, 2001; Mountz, 2004; Megoran, 2006; Sharma and Gupta, 2006; Kuus and Agnew, 2008).

All of these advances in theorizing the state, governance, security, identity, and integration will be reviewed and analyzed in detail in the next chapter. I mention them briefly here in order to locate the present work within the multiple intellectual veins that have inspired it. In order to thoroughly examine the understudied relationship between multi-level governance and emergent identity politics and the impact of this relationship on Euro-Atlantic space as a meaningful socio-political unit, (Murphy, 2008; Mamadouh and van der Wusten, 2008) the main part of the dissertation comprises three distinct research projects presented in three empirical essays. Each essay examines a different aspect and a particular ‘level’ of multi-level governance. However, the suite of essays as a whole eschews the notion of discrete scales or ‘levels’ of governance. Rather, the emphasis is on governance as a process that is profoundly intertwined with the political construction of scale, an idea that will be elaborated upon in the concluding discussion (Chapter 6). In building toward that discussion, the individual empirical investigations bring thorough theoretical reflections on power, scale, and subjectivity to bear on the security-identity-integration relationship.

**Organization of Dissertation**

The dissertation is organized into six chapters: the present, introductory chapter; Chapter Two, which provides an overview of the various bodies of literature that have inspired this project; three empirical chapters structured as stand-alone empirical essays (Chapters Three through Five); and Chapter Six, which reviews the findings of the
empirical essays, discusses the implications for multi-level governance, and offers a sketch of subsequent questions to be taken up in future research.

The first empirical essay, Chapter Three, presents research on the process of securitization of the European Union, or the deepening of European integration in the realm of security and defense policy and capabilities. The essay begins from the premise that the EU’s particular brand of security governance must be reconceptualized with spatial understandings of geoeconomics and sensitivity to the contingent nature of securitization. In the existing literature, recent assessments of the EU’s prospects for further security and defense integration have focused more on the member states’ willingness to find political consensus and cede sovereignty on sensitive security and defense matters to the supranational level. Chapter Three departs from such assessments and looks instead to the ways in which the construction of will and ability are deeply intertwined in the security and defense integration process. The essay uses a textual analysis of EU security and defense documents in order to explore the question of whether a distinctly EU brand of security governance is emerging via the forging of a European defense industrial base.

At the heart of securitization, I contend, is the inseparability of ‘hard’ (e.g. military) and ‘soft’ (e.g. economic) power, despite both theoretical and practical attempts to decouple these forms of power in discussions of the EU as a security actor. The assemblages of interests, imperatives, and relations at the supranational level and fluidity of the boundary between the ‘supranational’ and ‘member state’ levels of governance are the focus of the analysis. The emergence of a supranational security arena is located within the broader process of neoliberal globalization. Thus, this research responds to the
dearth of analyses of how policymakers and state elites are negotiating the relationship between Europeanization and globalization (Moisio, et al., 2013).

Chapter Four incorporates an explicit use of scale theory in its analysis of the discursive strategies of Croatian state elites who, from 2007 to 2012, created the dominant self-representations of Croatian government in the Euro-Atlantic integration process. The texts analyzed demonstrate how agents of geopolitical representation operate within a metageography\(^1\) of nested scales that compel them to package particular representations for audiences at particular ‘levels’—hence the term ‘multi-scalar geopolitics’ in the chapter title. The sense of hierarchical scale is altered and reified by the integration process, which provokes multiple imaginings of the ‘regional,’ the ‘international,’ and their relationship to the ‘national.’ In the Croatian case, this has meant a careful deployment of Balkanism as a discursive strategy, with different uses of Balkan identity targeted to audiences ostensibly located at different scales. Here, again, attention is paid to geoeconomic logics that connect the integration process with broader processes of neoliberal globalization. The crucial interplay between security and identity is uncovered here, with consideration of how perceptions of security and identity importantly construct the Euro-Atlantic as a scale of governance for actors both within, and on the margins of, Euro-Atlantic ‘membership.’

The third and final empirical essay, presented in Chapter Five, combines documentary analysis with fieldwork in order to provide a more contextualized examination of the implications of identity politics for multi-level governance. The

\(^1\) Metageography is defined as the “spatial structures through which people order their knowledge of the world,” Lewis and Wigen, 1997: ix.
research aims to document and analyze Croatia’s process of becoming an accession society. This occurs through the construction of what I term the ‘EUro-aspirant subject.’ The project constitutes an ethnography of the state, but distinguishes itself from previous ethnographies of the state in political geography (notably Mountz, 2003, 2004 and 2007) by deploying an inclusive definition of the state (both governmental and non-governmental actors) in the empirical investigation. Hence, this work seeks to illuminate the how of multi-level governance by uncovering the relations and linkages between EU representatives, higher-level Croatian political actors, and the rank-and-file members of Croatian governmental bureaucracy and civil society groups. The focus of the analysis is the production of knowledge, however strategic and partial, that aims to inform and persuade citizens about European integration. The process of negotiating this knowledge is largely mediated by the historical legacies and national traditions that profoundly shape sense of self in relation to the metageography of ‘higher’ scales of authority and belonging.

The three empirical essays outlined above are each based on distinct research projects and therefore will each elaborate upon their own theoretical framings and methodological approaches. Therefore, before moving on to the empirical section of the dissertation, the chapter immediately following this one will explore the various bodies of knowledge on which this work rests. While the complex subject of multi-level governance was best explored in a series of discrete investigations, there are certainly common intellectual threads tying these projects together, and the dissertation as a whole is offered as an intervention into the debates on governance and reproduction of the state through the security-identity nexus. In the next chapter, a broad survey of the literatures
on these overarching themes will serve as the entry point into the finer analyses of power, scale, and subjectivity taken up in the three empirical essays.
CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHIC STUDY OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE

This chapter reviews several bodies of literature that are foundational to the themes explored in this dissertation, providing a synthesis of the various veins of scholarship to which the present work aims to make a contribution. As noted in the introduction, the empirical part of the dissertation constitutes a suite of stand-alone essays, each of which contains its own theoretical framework and review of the most pertinent literature. Therefore, this chapter is not intended to be a comprehensive review of every work drawn upon in the empirical essays, but rather a broad conceptual sketch linking together the multiple bodies of work that have inspired the empirical explorations that follow.

Introduction

This dissertation is, at its core, a study of the reproduction of the state in the context of multi-level governance. This chapter sets up the conceptual and disciplinary milieu for the task by reviewing several bodies of scholarship from which the research foci have emerged. A few starting assumptions guided the choice of literatures within which I have situated this work. One is that the state is kept viable by the perceptions of identity and threat which pervade nearly every corner of social and political life, whether we are aware of them or not. Another is that identity and (in)security are not, and have never been, solely within the purview of the state proper (read: government bureaucracy), but rather underpin—and are shaped by—the vast array of state and nonstate actors and
practices collectively referred to as ‘governance.’ Finally, given the increasing attention in the social sciences to new kinds of state spaces, including the supranational state space of the European Union, the empirical essays seek to explore shifting roles and perceptions of the state in the context of a transnationalizing and globalizing process, that of Euro-Atlantic integration.

The dissertation constitutes a political geography study oriented toward the cognate disciplines of anthropology and constructivist international relations; hence, this chapter connects literatures covering several key concepts and multiple fields of study. The two major objectives are: firstly, to explore the ways in which these fields have contributed to the evolution of the key concepts employed in the analysis; and secondly; to identify the remaining lacunae in existing approaches, unresolved theoretical debates, and unexploited opportunities for synthesis and dialogue between several concepts and strands of inquiry. The chapter unfolds in five sections. The first section provides a brief review of the last several decades of theorization of the state. The second and third sections review the literatures on the concepts of security governance and the security-identity nexus, noting the intersections between these concepts and contemporary thought on the state. The fourth section reviews what may only loosely be referred to as a body of work, a collection of literature that has examined security and identity in the process of Europe’s Eastern enlargement. A brief concluding section recaps the remaining gaps and tensions in these literatures, suggesting some ways forward that will be taken up in the empirical section.
Theorizing the State in Political Geography: Influences and Recent Trends

Recent theorizing on the state, both within and beyond the subdiscipline of political geography, has left this fundamental concept in a rather weakened position. Where it was once, in its incarnation as the nation-state, the unquestioned unit of analysis for all manners of political geographic research—political economic analyses, studies of war, peace, and resistance, and so on—the latest infusions of postfoundational social theory have made it impossible to think of the state’s operation in these social-political phenomena in a taken-for-granted or straightforward way. This development has vast consequences for explorations of security and security governance—phenomena which quite clearly implicate the state, but also conjure complex questions of how the state is positioned within such processes from the outset. Much of the political geographic work on securitization and militarization has avoided explicit engagement with the state; and understandably so, because such engagement comes with complications that have the potential to co-opt the focus of the entire study. The result has often been under-theorized and lopsided accounts of how marginalized groups are pushed and pulled by the machinations of the security apparatus, at the hand of some monolithic power center. Presumably this alludes to the state in most cases, but many current inquiries neglect to fully unearth the ‘other side(s)’ of these scenarios.

This section will examine contemporary theories of the state, and their heritages, and say a bit about what they seem to imply for notions of security. It will also briefly identify the key tensions lingering today, and how they beg the need for richer understandings of the positioning of the state within the practices and relations of security governance.
Contemporary Theories of the State

After waves of theorizing in political geography which saw views of the state generally grouped into Marxist, society-centered conceptions (Harvey, 1976; Poulantzas, 1980; Johnston, 1982) and state-centered conceptions which maintain that the state holds power autonomously from the economy and civil society more broadly (Mann, 1984; Clark and Dear, 1984), there has been a general push away from these theorizations. The strength of state- and society-centered theories of the state lay in their attempts to unearth the causal mechanisms giving rise to the multiple forms and functions states may assume. However, post-foundational political and social theory fundamentally questioned the possibility of identifying precise borders between the state and society, or the state and capital. Both state-centered and society-centered views made claims to this practice of demarcation.

Alongside post-foundational approaches, neo-Marxist thought on the state has continued in political geography under the guise of the regulation approach throughout the 1990s (Tickell and Peck, 1995; Peck and Tickell, 1994; Jessop, 1998), as well as more recent theoretical concerns with the ways in which state power and governance are being reorganized upward to the global scale, downward to the local, and ‘outward’ to the private sphere/capital (Brenner, 1997, 1998; Brenner, et. al, 2003; Swyngedouw, 1996, 2000; Glassman, 1999; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999). In addition to the problems inherent in ‘bounding’ state and society, neo-Marxist approaches to the state, taken to their logical conclusion, may equate state security and market security, reducing what are actually diverse and complex security concerns and objectives to simply (or, at least, ultimately) economic ones (Varro, 2010).
In part against these more structural\(^2\) conceptualizations of the state, another wave of theorizing including Foucaulidan, feminist, and ‘stateless’ state theories, which actually saw its roots in the late 1970s and early 1980s, has fomented with several different aims. These literatures warrant more detailed discussion, as their legacy largely shapes conceptions of the state predominant in political geography today. Foucauldian approaches to the state, countering earlier theoretical concerns with state form and apparatus, eschew ascribing any pre-given or inherent characteristics to the state, striving instead to disrupt the traditional dialectics of government/governed and the binary of sovereignty/obedience (Huxley, 2007; Coleman and Agnew, 2007; Burchill, et al., 1991). In contrast, others, particularly Hardt and Negri (2000), have interpreted Foucault’s thinking on the state to insist that his theorizations actually require us to conceive of overlapping constellations of spatialities of power, rather than temporalized shifts from centered power to diffuse power. Perhaps the most crucial conceptions of ‘state power’ that political geographers have gleaned from Foucault’s work have been his ideas of governmentality (the micropractices of surveillance and discipline deployed within society) and biopolitics (the more diffuse disciplinary techniques resulting from the formation of ideal subjects) (Scott, 1998; Hannah, 2000; Huxley, 2007).

These insights compel reconsideration of security in relation to the state, if indirectly. One way to reexamine this relationship is to trace it back to biopolitics, with the security of the state/society deriving from the constraint of the very norms governing

\(^2\) Although I identify the works cited in the previous paragraph as still more or less structural in their orientation, it is important to point out that they have been produced with poststructuralist pretenses, intending to break with structural Marxism.
what it is to be human (Dillon and Reed, 2001; Corbridge, 2008; Crampton and Elden, 2007; see also Hannah, 2000 and Häkli, 2001, for discussion of the construction of society via cartographic and statistical knowledge in state-centered discourses). A second vein of thought seems to derive understandings of security from the concept of governmentality and the surveillance of some humans by other humans. This approach accounts for how the logic of panopticism rests upon strategies of politics, the military, technology, and science, which construct as ‘other’ those who are to be surveyed in order to reduce the uncertainties and complexities of everyday life down to the most simplified truisms (De Certeau, 1984).

Early feminist approaches to the state attempted to synthesize Marxist thought with feminist theory, as in Cynthia Cockburn’s work (1977) investigating gender, race, and class in the workings of the local state. This effort was later mostly abandoned as feminists began to see better prospects for unearthing the effects of patriarchy by exploring relations outside of those of labor and capital (Marston, 2004). A smaller group of liberal feminist theorists such as Bryson (1992) theorized the state at this time as a neutral institution which held the potential to equalize gender relations in society. Today, as Chouinard (2004) notes, feminists looking at the state have started to back away from Foucault’s legacy, which, they maintain, neglects the material implications of race, class, and gender. Further, the dismantling of a government/governed dichotomy, which gives way to a wholly participatory conception of the state and state power, for many feminist scholars fails to explain the interventions of state violence and oppression in everyday life. It might be argued that the Foucauldian conception of security, outlined above, explains how a particular kind of stability and security are achieved within
society, but is silent on the question of why, exactly, some human beings are overwhelmingly the targets of ‘panopticism’ while others are on the side of surveillance. Feminist geographers, such as Hyndman (2004, 2007) and Mountz (2003, 2004, 2007) have sought solutions to insecurity beyond that of the nation-state’s physical-territorial-military understandings of it, though there is crucial disagreement over whether more human-centered concerns should be considered under the rubric of security at all (Krause and Williams, 1996; Kuus, 2007a; Kuus and Agnew, 2008).

Finally, ‘stateless’ state theories, owing much to the political sociology conceptions of the late 1980s and early 1990s, completely eschew any ontology of the state—realist/foundational or otherwise—in favor of conceiving of a ‘state effect’ or ‘state idea’ (Abrams, 1988; Mitchell, 1991). This, they insist, is the only way to completely overcome the problematic state/society binary which continues, both explicitly and implicitly, to undergird analyses of the political that rely upon a concept of state for explanatory power. The stateless notion of the state explicates power as deriving from the ability of particular groups’ and individuals’ practices to maintain popular belief in separate spheres of state and society, as well as in a view of the state as imbued with subjectivity, intents, goals, plans, and decision-making capacities (Mitchell, 1991 and 1999; Painter, 2005; Painter, 2006).

The notion of state security here, too, seems to derive from the ability of these coteries of actors and assemblages of practices and representations to continuously reproduce a robust ‘state idea,’ which may remain fairly stable over time, buttressed by the performance of security (and other) discourses (Krause and Williams, 1996; Migdal, 2001; Sharp, et. al, 2007; Bialasiewicz et.al, 2007; Dalby, 2008a). Importantly, in the
post-structural state literature, theorists vary in their acceptance of the materiality of the state. For example, Abrams remains more amenable to a sense of materiality to the state, embodied in the institutions which comprise the ‘state system,’ while Mitchell denies even the utility of a ‘state system’ concept. Painter (2006) has been the most enthusiastic proponent of Mitchell’s conception of the state in political geography, drawing upon a Bakhtinian notion of prosaics in order to explore how society is ‘statizized’ in the most mundane aspects of life. However, the very notion of ‘statization’ seems to be predicated upon an assumption of separate spheres, with the society sphere becoming increasingly integrated into (or co-opted by) the state sphere. Painter’s study is arguably illustrative of the supreme difficulty of fully committing to a stateless conception of the state in empirical investigations.

The tensions in the literature over materiality versus ontology and the difficulty, in practice, of destabilizing the state/society binary, have given way to increased calls for anthropological approaches to studying the state and implications of state power (Megoran, 2006; Gupta, 2006; Sharma and Gupta, 2006; Mountz, 2007; MacLeavy and Harrison, 2010; Kuus, 2011). These recent works emphasize the importance of gathering ethnographic accounts of everyday individuals’ encounters with institutions and agents of the state who profoundly shape countless aspects of daily life. Alongside this development, a growing focus has emerged upon governance, rather than government, as a fruitful approach to ‘knowing’ the state without reifying it in a structuralist, foundational, or Westphalian sense (Jessop, 2001; Brenner, et. al, 2003; Bialasiewicz, 2008). As the next section will detail, scholarly and practical understandings of governance have evolved to emphasize the multiplicity of actors who embody ‘state’
power. Further, the concept of governance, particularly in the context of supranational processes of securitization, has been fused with understandings of security in order to account for emergent modes of identifying and managing security issues in contemporary political and social life.

**States, Societies, and Security: From Government to Governance to Security Governance**

As the preceding section on theorization of the state demonstrates, the remaining tensions in the literature have led to arguments for ethnographic approaches to the state, as well as inclusive approaches which recognize that a variety of actors and relations, in fact, wield ‘state power.’ Hence, much of what may be identified as the work of the state is, in fact, located or conducted outside of the formal state apparatus (or governmental bureaucracy). Growing recognition of the futility of delineating neat spheres of ‘state’ and ‘society’ has resulted in an increased scholarly focus upon ‘governance’ over ‘government,’ which necessitates consideration not only of ‘non-state’ actors and activities, but also of the varying scales and transnational nature of these phenomena. For the purposes of this dissertation, which investigates the reproduction of the state in the context of a transnationalizing and securitizing process, governance is considered in several ways. This section will first review key general perspectives found in the literature on governance, then move on to consider the ways in which this concept has been merged with that of security. Finally, it will provide an overview of the literature on international and supranational institutions who participate in the phenomenon of security governance.
Governance: Key Definitions and Perspectives

The notion of governance, at its core, and across varying veins of thought, denotes assemblages of actors (both individuals and groups), practices, and relations spanning both the governmental and non-governmental realms, that come together to order daily life for members of a particular collective, be it a community, national society, or supranational entity. This contrasts with common understandings and usage of government, which refer to the formal state apparatus and its preeminence in maintaining public order and facilitating collective action (Stoker, 1998: 17). Governance has proven an important concept in (or at least tangentially to) the theorization of the state.

Throughout each wave of state theory, there have been challenges to the state as the container of society (Wallerstein, 1984; Taylor, 1995; Häkli, 2001; Corbridge, 2008). Given the difficulties identified above in theorizing the state, the problem is not simply a scalar one in which nation-state-centric views of society limit possibilities of identifying other important ways of organizing political and social life. It is also one of dichotomies, which are a stubborn legacy of modernist, foundational, and structuralist thought. For this reason, Jessop (1998) points out, governance is a crucial concept that facilitates moving beyond common, simplistic dichotomies in the social sciences, including market versus hierarchy in economics; market versus plan in policy studies; anarchy versus sovereignty in international relations; and, central to the present study, state versus society.

For Jessop (1998, 2001) and others (Brenner, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Brenner, et. al, 2003) who conceive of governance from the perspectives of neo-Marxism and regulation theory, shifts occurring from markets and hierarchies to
networks and from government to governance, in fact, reflect real-world shifts in fundamental political-economic structures, and not simply shifts in the way policy-makers or intellectuals plan, conceive of, or analyze these phenomena. The current ‘reality,’ according to this perspective, is governance defined as *heterarchy*: “self-organized steering of multiple agencies, institutions, and systems which are operationally autonomous from one another yet structurally coupled because of their interdependence” (Jessop, 1998: 29). Due to the element of interdependence, the system is dialogic, driven by a reflexive rationality in which individual economic actors exchange some autonomy for political influence and the state exchanges some top-down authority for influence over economic agents (Jessop, 1998). The conceptual decoupling of the political and economic spheres of activity has been identified as problematic by opponents to regulation theory, for much the same reason that the state/society binary more generally has been identified as untenable: even direct participants in the formal state apparatus hold stakes (personally and professionally) in the economy. In other words, agents of the state proper are also capitalists (Cox, 2002). In this sense, the political economists have weakened their own arguments for the utility of the governance concept, by remaining committed to a notion of economic and political spheres that are separate and interact with one another.

Moreover, due to the reliance upon economic transitions to ultimately explain shifts in governing processes, scholars in this particular subfield of geography may overstate their case for the dwindling importance of the nation-state. While on one hand, they are correct in arguing against the reification of the nation-state as a pre-given and natural container of society or preeminent scale of political authority and activity, they
neglect the possibilities of dealing with the nation-state in a post-foundational or post-structural manner. Instead, they insist upon the ‘reterritorialization’ of the state, in which ‘new’ scales of subnational and supranational state spaces become crucial to regulatory activity. Much of the governance literature in geography, then, has been preoccupied with a theoretical and empirical concern for changing scales of politics and the expansion of international and supranational governance regimes, as well as more localized networks of governance (Brenner, 1997; Jessop, 2001; Häkli, 2001; Brenner, et al., 2003; Trudeau, 2008). Wilson (2012) updated some of the thinking on scale and governance to emphasize the very active role that local governances play in engaging capital, as well as the continued importance of nationalist ideologies in processes of economic development.

An empirically demonstrated rise of governance may certainly be associated with parallel neoliberalizing processes (a stepping back of the state from traditionally ‘governmental’ responsibilities and increased emphasis on the non-governmental sector and the individual citizen in shouldering those responsibilities) and the emergence of a geoeconomic order (Stulberg, 2005; Cowen and Smith, 2009). However, perspectives on governance have been offered by a number of literatures beyond those of political economy and economic geography. Among others, international relations, development studies, and Foucauldian analyses have employed the governance concept for their respective purposes. With recently popularized language of ‘active citizenship’ linking the notion of governance to discussions of community and family life, this phenomenon clearly carries implications beyond the immediate realm of economic relations and regulatory practices—though such discourses often betray, at their core, a concern for
effective economic and political participation (Putman, 1993; Stoker, 1998). Nevertheless, the concept has gained traction in multiple fields. Given the substantive focus of this study, the usage of ‘governance’ in international relations is of particular interest here.

The utility of recognizing and theorizing governance—whether as a system, practice, or process—has featured prominently in international relations literature over the last twenty years or so. In what is now regarded as a seminal work on governance in international relations, James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (1992) produced an edited volume which laid out an agenda for approaching governance analytically, identifying it as a set of mechanisms of regulation in a given sphere of activity imbued with informal, rather than juridical, authority. In this view, governance is distinguished from other terms such as regime or government in that it encompasses a broader spectrum of actors and interests (public and private) and extends beyond well-defined physical spaces. Additional attempts in international relations to provide an analytically useful concept of governance have conceived of it as an activity rather than a system of rules or mechanisms; as just another regime, albeit one that incorporates private actors and agendas; as a process; or as a normative goal of the policy establishment (Finkelstein, 1995; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Commission on Global Governance, 1995).

In sum, early treatment of governance in international relations saw little agreement over how to bound the concept, but a number of catchy terms often peppered the discussion: intersubjectivity, participation, negotiation, dialogue, strategic interaction, and so on. Such terms point to a growing recognition that non-governmental organizations, transnational peace movements, multinational corporations, and other non-
state actors are also loci of power and activity in the global arena. However, important problems remain in international relations over how to adequately address the issues of subjectivity, intentionality, and agency in systems, processes, or activities of governance. While there is broad agreement that governance (vis-à-vis government) features heterarchy over hierarchy and informal over formal authority, it is still largely treated as an intentional, monolithic, and purposeful thrust toward particular policy outcomes, an idea that warrants interrogation and a rethinking of the operation and spatialities of power (Allen, 2003; Mitchell, 2007).

Despite the difficulties identified in defining a usefully analytical or testable formula of governance, the development of this concept in international relations was significant because it challenged realist and neorealist privileging of interstate interactions as the sole or primary basis for the management of international affairs (Smouts, 1998). The challenge to state-centrism is two-fold: On one hand, it aids scholars in thinking beyond a crude state/civil society binary on a global scale. On the other hand, it provides a framework (however loose or imprecise) for thinking about practices and relations in the management of human affairs at scales beyond the nation-state. This has been particularly useful in the field of European Union studies, which has long struggled for appropriate language to describe an entity that is much more than an international organization, but certainly not commensurate with the nation-state (Jönsson, Tägil, and Törnqvist, 2000). Rather, in tracing modes of managing social and political life in this supranational state space, scholars have often analyzed the activities and practices of the EU as functions of a complex, multilevel brand of governance (Pagoulatos, 1999; Webber et al., 2004; DeBardeleben and Hurrelmann, 2007; Gorenflo,
Further, this conceptualization has been applied to specific issue areas, including security, as the next subsection details.

Security Governance: Blending Governance and Securitization

The bulk of writing on the topic of security governance has proliferated in the field of European Union studies, although a number of other veins of scholarly inquiry, it could be argued, have investigated this phenomenon while not conceptualizing it as security governance per se. The merging of security issues with the concept of governance has resulted from a realization that even in the security sphere, which has traditionally been viewed as firmly within the purview of the state proper, non-state actors have increasingly wielded influence in the management of policies and agendas (Webber et al., 2004: 5-6; Kirchner and Sperling, 2007). The growing participation and recognition of a variety of security actors has occurred alongside an evolving concept of security, which has broadened from physical-military and state-centric conceptions to include human, environmental, societal, and other forms of security (Buzan, et al., 1998; Barnett, 1999; Wæver, 1995a; Weldes et al., 1999; Roe, 2005; Moustakis, 2005; Gheciu, 2008). With that, scholars in the subfields of constructivist international relations and political geography have emphasized the ways in which security perceptions, policies, and agendas are culturally informed (Lipschutz, 1995; Wæver, 1995; Weldes et al., 1999; Kuus, 2002 and 2007a).

‘Security governance,’ as defined by Webber et al. (2004: 8), is a loose concept comprising five features:
heterarchy; the interaction of a large number of actors, both public and private; institutionalization that is both formal and informal; relations between actors that are ideational in character, structured by norms and understandings as much as by formal regulations; and, finally, collective purpose.

It would be fair to say that this definition is nothing more than the dominant view of governance currently proffered in the international relations literature, applied to the sphere of security activity, which may imply that it inherits the same problems and limitations identified in the previous subsection. A more recent attempt by Kirchner (2006:948) to improve upon this conceptualization gives us an equally vague conceptualization, in which security governance is defined as an “intentional system of rules” and interventions of both state and nonstate actors, “purposefully directed towards particular policy outcomes” in the realm of security. Kirchner emphasizes the structure and process of governance, an approach which may overcome some of the earlier disagreements over whether governance is best viewed as a practice, system, or process.

While the strength of the above definitions may lie in their flexibility and accommodation of many different types of security and security actors, this may also make security governance difficult to utilize as an analytical concept. Moreover, collective purpose and intentionality are again central to the concept, which seems to assume that all of these diverse institutions, agencies, and individuals who participate in security through assorted modes and mechanisms, are constituted as security actors in uniform ways and with uniform objectives uniting their agendas. Finally, existing investigations of security governance betray an elite or institutional bias, in which entities such as the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization are imbued with subjectivity and ‘actorness’ rather problematically, and inquiry rarely extends beyond the
realms of formal politics and powerful groups and individuals. Nevertheless, the existing work on security governance in international relations valuably demonstrates the ways in which blending these two phenomena—security and governance—both conceptually and empirically, can shed light on the constructions of (in)security and threat that underpin security agendas and reproduce the state effect. This is an aspect of security and securitization that policy-oriented analyses tend to neglect (e.g. Cornish and Edwards, 2001; Gordon, 2009; Ilievski and Taleski, 2009; c.f. Gheciu, 2008).

Examples of work that may be characterized as investigating security governance (if not by name) abound in the fields of international relations, security studies, and EU studies. Much of this has focused on major inter-, trans-, and supranational institutions such as NATO and the European Union and their participation in the management of security issues (Baran, 2004; Archick and Gallis, 2005; Ethnopolitics, Fall 2009; Trauner, 2009; Sasse, 2005; Sebastian, 2009; Ilievsky and Talesky, 2009; Gordon, 2009). The overall approach in much of this work is largely descriptive or evaluative, although it usefully documents many of the institutional, legal, and political mechanisms of the EU’s approach to security. For example, Gordon (2009) assesses the EU’s Stabilization and Association Process in the Western Balkans as a tool for post-conflict management, noting that while the program correlates with an absence of resurgent violence, it suffers from overly technocratic and top-down implementation of policies. Scholars focusing on NATO’s role in the post-Cold War security landscape have observed that the military alliance has fundamentally shifted its raison d’être by broadening its activities to democratization, norm-shaping, and peace-making (Baran, 2004; Kuus, 2007a; De Nevers, 2007; Gheciu, 2008).
The growing body of work within human geography and anthropology that investigates securitization (the process that embeds security-oriented beliefs, cultures, activities, and agendas deeply within non-security realms of society) has arguably provided the most grounded examinations of security governance (again, while not actually invoking the term). The bulk of this work has entailed embodied investigations of the social relations and practices of militarization, a constituent process of securitization involving the military apparatus specifically (Lutz, 2001; Kuus, 2007b and 2009; Bernazzoli and Flint, 2009; Loyd, 2010). While these studies in no way make claims to investigating ‘security governance’ as such, they reveal the ways in which practices and relations of securitization are not confined to elites, to the national and supranational scales, or to individuals and groups who see themselves as directly involved in security. Kuus (2007b) demonstrates this by documenting the participation of schools and postal services in Central and Eastern European countries who sought to sell NATO accession to their publics by making NATO a part of everyday life. This included children’s drawing competitions and high school essay competitions with titles such as “Secure World” and “Loyalty of the Soldier.” Additional work on securitization does look at broader-scale and less embodied processes, though this is generally not in dialogue with the more grounded approaches (Dalby, 2008b; Morrissey, 2008 and 2010).

In sum, the literature on security governance per se has not engaged with the literatures on militarization and securitization, which emanate from different disciplinary traditions. For their part the militarization and securitization scholars do not conceive of their substantive focus as ‘security governance,’ despite a general acceptance in the social sciences that governance must be recognized as a more ideational and cultural
phenomenon than its past conceptualizations have allowed for. As is evidenced from the preceding overview of the literature, key questions remain to be resolved. While the concept of security governance is somewhat agreed-upon, how it relates to securitization is less clear. Additionally, the literature lacks thick examinations of the practices and relations of security governance that would synthesize notions of scale and subjectivity and aim to get to ‘the bottom of’ the ostensible cohesion and intentionality found in existing analyses. Finally, this section has demonstrated that the fields of international relations, security studies, and political geography lack a coherent approach to (and body of work on) these issues. However, the cultural underpinnings of security governance comprise the basis for another strand of literature to be reviewed here. These underpinnings, which I refer to as the security-identity nexus, are the subject of the next section.

The Security-Identity Nexus

The literature on the security-identity nexus investigates, in a number of ways, the mutual constitution of perceptions of security and sense of self and other. From a political-geographic standpoint, this means that the forging of geopolitical spaces is always and everywhere intertwined with the forging of geopolitical identities. The nature of geopolitical space—whether by this we mean regions, nations or states—is generally regarded in contemporary geographic thought as highly discursive. This is not to say that political-geographic constructs such as identities and borders do not engender particular materialities—or that they do not have profound material implications for everyday life. But it is important to recognize how geopolitical identities and spaces fundamentally
shape the ways in which we envision world political space, and how, as a result of these geopolitical visions, we recognize salient threats to ourselves and the relevant collectives with whom we identify (Dijkink, 1996). This section will review the considerable literature which has shed light on this central aspect of social and political life and will unfold in two subsections. The first looks at the ways in which scholars in international relations, anthropology, history, and political geography have treated the delineation of self and other, a construction that undergirds virtually all geopolitical practices and relations. I then turn to the abundance of work on the role of the security-identity nexus in producing and reproducing the state.

*Self and Other: The Basis for Material and Discursive Boundaries*

The prevailing contemporary thought on security and identity assumes that the links between these discursive constructions begin with the delineation of self and other. This is an active and ongoing process, as these categories must constantly be reaffirmed. Moreover, this delineation is a necessary, a-priori ingredient of identity formation, rather than a consequence of it. Iver Neumann’s (1999) seminal work on the significance of identity in the shaping of nations, states, and regions recognizes identity as an exercise in inclusion and exclusion, but in a manner that departs somewhat from traditional, modernist views of the categories of self and other. After reviewing the Continental Philosophical conception of self/other demarcation, which maintains that self and other represent discrete, bounded categories, he forgoes this line of thought in favor of what he terms the Eastern Excursion, which he bases on a Nietzschian (and, I would add here, Foucauldian) notion of dialogics. In the former, modernist conception, as bounded
categories, self and other are thought to tangle with each other in a Marxian dialectical fashion. In the latter, self and other are unbounded, contingent, and continuously engaged in dialogue with one another—leaving open much greater possibility that the lines between the two will be transgressed.

In the post-modern or, in Neumann’s language, “Eastern Excursion” view of identity, liminality and ambiguity are the watchwords of self/other identification. Even categories of identity that have typically been treated as essential, particularly race and ethnicity (but also gender), have proven fluid, contingent, and context-dependent (Geertz, 1973; Searle, 1995). This case has been made by multiple scholars who have examined the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, in which large numbers of people did not behave and act as expected based upon their ethnic identity (Donia and Fine, 1994; Gagnon, 2004). Further, the unboundedness of the self/other categories has been demonstrated in the oft-cited ‘in-betweenness’ of Balkan identity, as Europe’s constantly becoming, partial ‘other’ (Bakić-Hayden, 1995; Todorova, 1997). However, even in this post-foundational phenomenology of the self, many scholars are compelled to acknowledge that identities quite often concretize and remain fairly stable over time, creating profound material implications for social and political life, including conflict and violence (Taylor, 1994; Searle, 1995). Otherwise, they could not become the object of contestation and deconstruction. As Howe (1998: 17) pointed out, “although social categories have no essence independent of what humans have constructed, they, like money, are no less real for that” (emphasis in original).

This approach to identity formation abandons the notion that there is some foundation for ‘knowing’ the world from which the self is formulated. Rather, it inverts
that proposition by recognizing how sense of self creates conditions of possibility for the production of particular strains of geopolitical knowledge. In this view, what we ‘see’ or ‘know’ about the world is shot through and through with our own positionality, an idea that forms what is perhaps the key theoretical starting point for most of the work produced under the mantle of critical geopolitics (Dodds and Sidaway, 1994; O’Tuathail, 1996; O’Tuathail and Dalby, 1998; Sharp, 2000; Hyndman, 2004). Critical geopolitics and its cognate sub-field of constructivist international relations have built on these now widely-accepted propositions about sense of self and ‘knowing’ the world in order to further theorize the ways in which security and insecurity are co-constituted with identity, asserting that these are mutual cultural productions (Weldes et al., 1999; Sharp, 2000). A corollary to this is the mutual production of security threats and the objects targeted by them. As Connolly (1991:64) noted, “Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty,” a process that underpins the very act of social recognition. Put another way, the security-identity nexus produces identity and threat recursively because, “as each subject seeks to perform its identity, it threatens others, whose identities are consolidated in response” (Weldes et al., 1999:15).

Neumann’s work (1993, 1994, 1996, 1999) led off this section because his theorization of self and other in international relations has influenced much of the subsequent work on identity and security in constructivist IR, political geography, and other fields (e.g., Krause and Williams, 1996; Todorova, 1997; Buzan et al., 1998; Campbell, 1998; Kuus, 2007a and 2011). This is not to say that his writings provided a starting point for this line of theorization; indeed, the question of how to theorize the self
(and, by extension, the other) has long been a problem of anthropology and social theory (see Hegel, 1977; Geertz, 1979; Mauss, 1985; Sampson, 1989; Strong, 1992). However, Neumann and those who built on his efforts to bring a philosophy of self and other to international relations have demonstrated how these fundamental building blocks of identity are essential to the analysis of how geopolitical spaces are forged. It is on this basis that geographic partition and segregation become not only acceptable, but ethical, and upon which geographies of inside/outside and normal/pathological are then founded, providing the very modalities of foreign policy (Walker, 1993; Campbell, 1998; Sharp, 2000).

Security, then, at a fundamental level, may be viewed in terms of the perceived need to guard these material and discursive boundaries—between political-spatial entities, to be sure, but also between identities. Indeed, the formation and maintenance of both manners of boundaries are wholly interrelated processes (O’Tuathail, 1996; Lewis and Wigen, 1997). The next subsection looks at the ways in which these intertwining constructions have been treated in several fields by reviewing a body of literature that takes seriously the above propositions about security and identity, connecting them to the post-foundational views of the state outlined previously.

**Security and Identity: (Re)Producing the (Nation-)State**

As the section on contemporary theories of the state demonstrated, the key tensions currently characterizing political geographic theorizations on the state relate to the issues of materiality versus discursivity, as well as the related problem of how to treat the separation of state and society (however constructed that separation may be). This
has led to a mystification of what really constitutes security, how the state operates ‘in security,’ and how questions of security might be pursued systematically, given the various economic, physical-territorial, human, and societal conceptions of it that have proliferated over the last several decades. Given the current mode of theorizing the state, the problem with any study aiming to explain how the state operates ‘in security’ is that it inevitably must take the unified ‘actor’ view of the state as its starting assumption, because it endows the state with subjectivity, goals, and actions of its own. In response to this dilemma, recent developments in security studies have occurred alongside those in constructivist international relations, anthropology, and political geography, which have updated thinking on the state to accommodate post-structuralist, constructionist orientations.

What this has meant is that the starting point for investigations into security and the state has been inverted. States are now widely held to be constituted by their participation in the international system, rather than existing prior to it (Campbell, 1993; O’Tuathail, 1996; Kuus and Agnew, 2008; Sharma and Gupta, 2006). In this view, states do not construct and act upon security concerns; rather, security concerns are key mechanisms actively constructing the state (Kuus and Agnew, 2008). Those in positions of relative power, with the ability or responsibility to construct widely-consumed narratives about security and threat, most often do so in the name of a particular state. In everyday or popular understandings, this practice is equated with the state acting upon security concerns, which reifies the notion that the state is a subject, akin to an individual who can be threatened (Migdal, 2001).
As with other discursive formations, then, the construction of (in)security and threats results from the practices and decisions of particular groups and individuals that actively construct the state as a political effect (Mitchell, 1991; Weldes et al., 1999). Hence, discourses of state security are neither strictly objective assessments nor analytical constructs of threat, but rather the products of historical structures and processes, of struggles for power within the state, of conflicts between the societal groupings that inhabit states and the interests that besiege them (Lipschutz, 1995:8).

Lipschutz’s statement about the content and formation of security discourses, at first blush, appears to fit well with the notion of security governance, in the sense that it recognizes a multiplicity of groups, individuals, and agendas who participate in the identification of threats. With that, it seems to highlight the substantial role that representatives of civil society—or those who are not participants in the formal state apparatus—play in the formulation of security agendas. However, the language of struggles within the state, from the standpoint of constructivist approaches, reinforces the notion of a state as a unit that stands apart from an exterior, international state system. This is not, of course, unique to one particular author, but is rather representative of the extreme difficulty of problematizing several key working concepts simultaneously—in this case, security, the state, and society. Given this, I wish to argue that an intersection of the security governance concept with newer views on the post-structural state in a transnational and supranational context would be profitable, an idea that is brought to fruition in the empirical essays.

The relationship between the construction of security concerns and their attendant identity questions on the one hand, and the reproduction of the state on the other, also
underscores the importance of nationalism and nation/state identity (Kuus and Agnew, 2008). While statist discourses position states as subjects with intentionality and agency, they do so with the aid of nationalism, which presumes homogeneity and thus posits states as sovereigns of particular territories, and populations as sovereigns of particular states (Yack, 2001). Importantly, just as states are produced and maintained through the security-identity nexus, so, too, are nations (Anderson, 1991; Penrose and Mole, 2008). Because of this, the frequent incongruence between states and nations, so fervently downplayed—or altogether ignored—by the doctrine of nationalism, intensifies the links between security, identity, and nation, as has been observed in scores of nation-states with histories of ethnic tension (Kristof, 1967; Cohen, 1995; Kelley, 2003; Roe, 2005; Mulaj, 2006).

The above observation about security, identity, and the problem of the nation-state is certainly not a new one, but it has been examined of late in new contexts and with fresh perspectives about the various forms of security, particularly in the post-socialist and supranational contexts of Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union. As has been pointed out in a number of recent works on this topic, the processes of NATO and European Union expansion have fostered a return to classical geopolitical thinking, a harmful refocus on ethnic nationalisms, and invoking of old historical antagonisms, all of which has reified the security-identity link with reworked discourses of threat and risk (Kuus, 2007a, 2009; Gheciu, 2008).

More specifically, the literature examining how Euro-Atlantic integration has impacted national politics and minority rights has produced several prominent debates. Roe (2004) and Jutila (2006), advancing opposing conceptualizations of minority
identities, advocated differing approaches to the issue of minority rights. Roe (2004), positing that it is the very security-ness of minority concerns that lies at the heart of these collective identities, argued that the desecuritization of minority rights is a logical impossibility. Instead, he argues, we should focus on replacing ‘emergency politics’ with ‘reasonable security.’ Jutila (2006) directly responded to Roe by asserting that to even assume monolithic minority identities with accompanying collective concerns is deterministic and essentializing.

This debate, which is not confined to Roe and Jutila, raises the question of whether we can ever view any identity or any politics as decoupled from security concerns. Many scholars of critical security studies and constructivist international relations would be inclined to assert that while the very delineation of self and other is a securitizing practice which fundamentally (re)produces states and nations, it is possible to conceive of security in ways that emphasize human lives over economic and military concerns. Others would argue that challenging state security with ever more conceptions of security will inevitably reproduce alienating notions of ‘us and them,’ ‘inside and outside.’ Perhaps Sasse’s (2005) concept of a security-rights nexus, as applied to the cases of Russophone minority populations in Estonia and Latvia, offers a way of transcending the debate. Particularly as she is careful not to deny the relative cohesiveness and stability of certain minority identities (which Jutila seems quick to dismiss); but at the same time remains conscious of the potential pitfalls of either/or approaches which pit state-centered and political-military solutions against more humanized ones.
This section has presented several threads of inquiry that I have loosely grouped together as a literature on the security-identity nexus. The overview of this literature makes clear that the disparate approaches do not really constitute a coherent and linear progression of thought on the relationship between security and identity. Further, there have been many unrealized opportunities for this body of work to enter into dialogue with scholars of multi-level security governance. This is a key task of the present work. Further, I would argue, if we are to take seriously the notion that governance, security, and culture are co-constitutive, and that aspects of culture are not epiphenomenal to the ‘form and function’ of states, we must also apply this idea to other subjects that are produced through the security-identity nexus. Of concern here are key institutions, such as NATO, and emerging supranational state spaces, namely, the European Union. The fourth and final section of this chapter reviews the ways in which the security-identity nexus has been fundamental to the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, as examined in the existing literature on this process.

**Security and Identity in Euro-Atlantic Integration**

The preceding sections traced the evolution of several key concepts: the state, security governance, and the security-identity nexus. The security-identity nexus, in particular, has been discussed as an intersection of discourses that (re)produce both the nation and the state; undergird practices of security governance; and play a key role in the reconfiguration of geopolitical space. Further, the processes of Euro-Atlantic integration that serve as the substantive focus of this dissertation constitute a major instance of the reconfiguration of geopolitical space in contemporary international affairs, bringing into
play the major concepts framing the empirical investigations. This final section of literature review will examine the various scholars and works that, since the mid-1990s, have shed light on the security-identity nexus as a crucial mechanism for the swift changes that have swept Central and Eastern Europe toward its “Euro-Atlantic” present and future. Lastly, it will look at this topic in the narrower context of Croatia, the specific geographic focus of the latter two empirical essays.

*Europe’s Eastward Enlargement*

The Euro-Atlantic integration of Central and Eastern European Countries has underscored the centrality of the security-identity nexus to this process. As a number of scholars note, in the period immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall and accompanying transitions in former communist countries, Central and East Europeans did not necessarily perceive themselves as navigating an especially grave security landscape (Baran, 2004; Kuus, 2007a). And yet, the embrace of a history characterized by centuries of being located in a ‘geopolitical battlefield’ between Russia and Germany proved crucial to the discourses that propelled Central Europe toward EU and NATO candidacy (Neumann, 1999). As Kuus (2007a) has observed, Central Europe’s insecurity soon came to function as a truism in the post-Cold War context—despite the lack of a physical-military threat.

The sense of needing to ‘rejoin’ Europe was, at this time, a major facet of Central European identity shaping the course of events. Neumann (1999) asserts that for Central Europeans, the integration project has not been one of forging a new regional geopolitical space. Rather, they see themselves as fully realizing a moral, attitudinal, and cultural
brotherhood—in other words, they are simply observing the ‘reality’ of cultural traits and common history that bind them with Western Europe. One can find, in the elite political narratives of the 1980s and 1990s, many examples of how Central European statesmen and public intellectuals mobilized these discourses for Western European and American consumption. Pronouncements can be attributed to figures such as Vaclav Havel, for example, who paint Europeanness as a spiritual sort of identity (Kuus, 2007a). Indeed, as Czech writer Milan Kundera’s (1984) impassioned appeal to ‘the West,’ The Tragedy of Central Europe, illustrates, the trope of Central Europe as “the kidnapped West” was a deliberate scripting of Central Europe’s communist experience as a civilizational struggle for Central Europeans to preserve their cultures and languages, all of which are essentially Western, in the face of an Asiatic brand of socialism imposed from outside. As narratives of essential Europeanness proliferated, ‘persuasive’ cartography projects emerged in which newly independent governments provided the U.S. and other Western governments with maps which aimed to redefine Central and East European Countries’ (or, CEEC’s) characterizations and relative locations within Europe (Zeigler, 2002: 672).

Paradoxically, scholars have pointed out, the post-communist stigma also compelled these states to buy into policies that frequently had the unforeseen effect of compromising aspects of economic security. Poland, for instance, had many able economists, but their skills and expertise were sidelined in favor of Western economists such as Jeffrey Sachs, whose gravitas was needed to guide populations whose sense of self had been shaped for so long by the denial of economic gains. Unfortunately, this led to the exclusion of local officials from decision-making and to unfulfilled promises of foreign direct investment (Wedel, 1998; see also Bockman, 2011). Indeed, the crucial
operation of regional identity and culture can be seen in this way to interact with the
perceived economic realities dominating the region at that time to produce a number of
undesirable outcomes that have had lasting impacts. Ultimately, this gave way to a
situation in which Western influence was viewed with suspicion and negotiated with an
element of deceit, predicated upon the idea that ‘you pretend to help us, and we’ll pretend
we’re being helped’ (Wedel, 1998; Kuus, 2007a).

Throughout this period of transition, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
came to be perceived in terms of their placement along a spectrum of Europeanness,
Westernness, and amenability to democracy and capitalism. The upshot was that security
and identity discourses were deployed intra-regionally as the prospect of Euro-Atlantic
integration became a reality for post-communist states. ‘Nesting Orientalisms’ (Bakić-
Hayden, 1995) allowed Central Europe to distinguish itself against an Eastern Europe
that has overwhelmingly been viewed as significantly less ready to ‘rejoin’ Europe: This
points again to the ambiguity and unboundedness that mark categories of self and other
(Todorova, 1997; Neumann, 1999). Central Europe could be constructed precisely
because of the politically expedient construction of Europe/Eastern Europe. In other
words, the East-West binary has been reconfigured into a sliding scale of more
European/less European. This has frequently been reproduced by academics who study
transitology and democratization in post-communist Europe, and who often utilize
categorizations based on speed of reform and amenability to western-style, liberal and
free-market democracy (e.g. Way and Levitsky, 2007; Kuzio, 2008).

Moreover, the European Union, in its official decoupling of the Balkan states
from other CEECs, deployed a discourse of ‘Balkan exceptionalism’ in order to
differentiate the accession processes for Romania, Bulgaria, and the Western Balkans from those followed by their Central European predecessors (Papamanditriou and Gateva, 2009; Gordon, 2009). This strategy gained traction with policy-makers because the region, especially the Western Balkans, was perceived as an ‘unstable’ or ‘insecure’ area to be stabilized and eventually absorbed by the Euro-Atlantic community (Bartlett and Samardžija, 2000; Zielonka, 2006; Jeffrey, 2008). Perhaps unsurprisingly, this discourse has also been appropriated by parties within the candidate countries themselves, allowing them to construct ‘Balkan exceptionalism’ as a factor that should accord them leeway in meeting the EU’s benchmarks of accession. For example, Romania can claim the ‘Ceausescu’ factor and the fact that Communism lingered in their country well after it had been eradicated from other societies (Papamanditriou and Gateva, 2009). Balkanist discourses have also fostered some contention and competition between the Western Balkan states, where politicians are eager to shed the stigma of the violent wars that marked the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia (Trauner, 2009; Razsa and Lindstrom, 2004; Jeffrey, 2008).

Importantly, scholars also cite the ‘upward’ influence that engagement with this part of Europe has exerted on the inter- and supra-national organizations. The Western Balkans are often credited with serving as a catalyst for deeper political and security integration, and as a ‘testing ground’ for the EU’s rapidly evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (Keukelaire and McNaughton, 2008: 261). In fact, insofar as it has been credited with contributing to regional stability and the realization of European Union (EU) security objectives, enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe, to include the current expansion into the
Western Balkans, has been called the EU’s most successful foreign policy to date (Gordon, 2009).

Despite the EU’s and NATO’s stated goal of stability and democratic consolidation by way of Euro-Atlanticization (See Delanty, 2007; Fink-Hafner, 2007), some scholars assert that overall, these developments have fed into a renewed emphasis on ethnic nationalisms, with security constructed in light of deeply rooted historical animosities and the ubiquitous possibility of national violence (Kuus, 2007a; see also Chatterjee, 2004 for discussion of this in the post-colonial context). This may be compounded by the post-communist context, where the weak tradition of civil societies combined with an ethno-nationally-based conception of citizenship, are often proffered as obstacles to the cosmopolitan, ‘European’ conception of citizenship and identity based on diversity and inclusion (Verdery, 1996a; Verdery, 1996b; Bauböck, 2002; Delanty, 2007; Bialasiewicz, 2009; Beck, 2009). As existing scholarship has demonstrated, these dynamics have played a key role in Croatia’s recent history, the subject of the following subsection.

Croatia’s ‘Return’ to Europe

When Croatians first declared themselves an independent state by way of a referendum (largely boycotted by Croatian citizens of Serb ethnicity) in May 1991, they were optimistic about their prospects for a smooth and speedy ‘return’ to Europe (Lindstrom, 2008). However, within two years, Franjo Tudman’s policies, including involvement in combat operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ensured that the fledgling Croatian state would be haunted by a dubious international reputation for some time after
the conflict. The legacy of the war, which became associated with ‘Balkanism,’ explained in terms of backwardness, lawlessness, and primordial ethnic hatreds, would prove difficult to overcome (Kaplan, 1994). Consequently, the onus was on Croatians to demonstrate to the Euro-Atlantic community they hoped to join that they were progressive, tolerant, civilized, and capable of meeting the various formal and informal accession criteria required by NATO and the EU, as well as the more intangible and less formal criterion of embracing a cosmopolitan, European sense of citizenship and social-political life.

Scholarship on Croatia’s post-communist period has discussed how the events of the so-called ‘War for Independence’ of 1991-1995 were in many ways tinged with the memory of Croatia’s troubled World War II history. In the decade following Tito’s death in May 1980, Serb popular culture and political rhetoric reassessed the Yugoslav experience during World War II as an instance in a long history of national suffering. Memories of the Croatian Ustaša state, officially known as the Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (NDH), or the Independent State of Croatia, a puppet state of Nazi Germany, were invoked in poems, plays, novels, and music during this time (Ramet, 2002). The Ustaša regime had granted political rights only to ethnic Croats and engaged in forced conversions (from Orthodoxy to Catholicism), expulsions, and mass killings of Serbs and other citizens who were not ethnically Croatian (Mulaj, 2006; Goldstein, 1999). In addition to reliving the tragic past, some of these works of popular culture leveled criticism at the League of Communists of Yugoslavia for not constructing a post-WWII society in which the “prejudices of the internecine struggle of World War II” could be sufficiently managed and overcome (Ramet, 2002: 155; see also Duijzings, 2008). It is
unsurprising, then, that the conflict of the 1990s resurrected epithets such as ‘ustaša’ and ‘ćetnik’ (the latter referring to Serb nationalist and royalist fighters operating before and during the World Wars), along with potent constructions of threat and mistrust between ethnic groups.

In the realm of Slavic studies, much of the work on the former Yugoslavia has taken into account how the historical forces noted above had produced particular relations between the republics and their diasporic communities. These external relations had important implications for the 1990s conflicts and continue to influence socio-political-economic affairs within the former Yugoslav republics. The Croatian diaspora has been of particular interest because pockets of it, especially in South America, have consisted of participants in the NDH regime who escaped Croatia in 1945 (Bellamy, 2003). The high degree of nationalism among members of the Croatian diaspora as a whole made this group important in the breakup of Yugoslavia, manifesting in electoral support for Franjo Tuđman and, in some cases, physical support for the war effort as people of Croatian descent, some who had never even been to Croatia previously, traveled there to fight in the Croatian armed forces (Carter, 2005). But the most prominent diaspora group was the Hercegovinian Croatians. Often regarded within Croatia as "extremists and criminals," the Croatian community of Hercegovina played a key role in the campaign to create an ethnically pure Croatian territory within Bosnia (supported by Tuđman's regime) (Bellamy, 2003: 93). The post-conflict years were marked by strained relations between Croatia and Bosnia, and difficult adjustments for those left behind in communities whose ethnic composition was profoundly changed by the war (see, for example, Kolind, 2007). Another key relationship in the region, that between Croatia and Serbia, began to
improve after 2000, but has faced continuous challenges due to issues such as the return of Serb war refugees to Croatia and the prosecution of war criminals on both sides (Lukić, 2009).

For Croatia and the other Western Balkan countries, the post-conflict phase has been characterized in the EU studies literature (which neglects the deeper history outlined above) as a straightforward story of post-conflict stabilization by way of Euro-Atlantic integration. This work often assumes a congratulatory tone on behalf of the EU and NATO, attributing enhanced regional stability to conditionality, which produces disciplining effects in candidate countries by compelling them to implement crucial political, economic, and social reforms in order to gain entry into the organizations. Many of the largely positive assessments of the efficacy of EU conditionality take an instrumental view of the process. From this perspective, there are clear benchmarks for candidate countries to meet, and when the countries make progress based on these (usually) tangible and quantifiable criteria, they successfully move forward in the integration process. However, this mode of evaluation tells only part of the story. As noted above, some research has found that conditionality can produce unintended adverse effects in candidate societies (Innes, 2001; Vachudova, 2006; Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2009). In the case of Croatia, this has led to some rhetorical battles with neighboring countries, in which government officials strive to present an image of the country as more ‘Western’ and less ‘Balkan’ than the other former Yugoslav republics (Rasza and Lindstrom, 2004; Lindstrom, 2008). Recent tensions with Slovenia over disputed maritime borders and with Serbia over the prosecution of war criminals serve as concrete examples of these rhetorical practices.
While the challenges facing Croatian society have been well-documented in the above-cited literature, and the ‘Eastern’ experience of European integration has been examined from competing perspectives (both congratulatory and critical), pivotal questions remain. Firstly, what are the specific ways in which Croatian leaders have wielded some measure of agency in negotiating the Euro-Atlantic integration process? This is examined in Chapter 4. And secondly, in what ways is the wider Croatian public able to participate in the process of integration, and what impact does this have on how they view their state, society, and role in the international community? This question is taken up in Chapter 5. Given the centrality of historical independent statehood to Croatian national identity (Bellamy, 2003), it would seem that common understandings and experiences of state, society, and governance should be brought to light in an exploration of this fundamentally transnationalizing process. However, due to the lacunae identified above, as well as a lack ethnographic approaches to these questions in Central and Eastern Europe broadly, and in Croatia specifically (c.f. Obad, 2010), they remain as fruitful avenues of future inquiry.

**Conclusions and New Directions**

The aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate how several fundamentally political-geographic phenomena—reproduction of the state, security governance, and the mutual construction of security and identity—intersect to provide the basis for a multi-scalar exploration of the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. This is a process that is simultaneously transnationalizing and constitutive of the state, as existing scholarship has pointed out. However, the preceding analysis of this scholarship has also shown the
various gaps, remaining tensions, and missed opportunities for synthesis and dialogue between various literatures and strands of inquiry.

The key remaining tension in theorization of the state is how best to ‘know’ and study the state in the wake of post-foundational developments in our conception of it. This is a crucial question even in disciplines that do not count themselves as constructivist. For example, even most scholars of international relations, a discipline still widely influenced by neorealist thought, would now agree that it is problematic to treat the state as a ‘black box’ or as a unitary actor endowed with ‘personhood.’ And yet, because of the nature of data and common methodological approaches utilized in IR, this is typically how the state continues to be treated. This problem extends to EU studies, where member states and candidate countries are treated as individuals operating within and vis-à-vis the EU and other inter- and supra-national organizations. Alongside this tendency continues another conceptual tension which is arguably more difficult to overcome: that of reproducing the troublesome state/society binary when incorporating a concept of the state into research—or when directly studying the state. I propose that the antidote to both tensions may well lie in taking seriously the recent calls for anthropological approaches to the state. This is all the more important in an era of intensely transnationalizing processes, which raise many fundamental questions about sovereignty, identity, and the viability of the (nation-)state.

With that, I argue that contemporary developments in state theory emanating from political sociology, geography, anthropology, and constructivist IR could lead to richer understandings of security, securitism, and processes of securitization. In order for new insights to be achieved, however, I aim to synthesize recent theorizations of the state,
governance, security, and identity. This is where I have identified significant, but as of yet unrealized, openings for ground-breaking dialogue between several traditions of scholarship. For example, the rapidly-expanding body of work on securitization in political geography has yet to make use of new insights into the governance of security (a rather important task, given the problem of reifying the twin state/society and military/civilian dichotomies). Further, the growing literature on security governance would benefit from deeper and more explicit theorization of the security-identity nexus, which undergirds both the state and institutions and drives the very practices and activities associated with securing political collectives. The study of multi-level governance in the context of Europeanization and Euro-Atlanticism requires engagement with identity studies, as the EU and Euro-Atlantic spaces increasingly raise questions of citizens’ loyalties to multiple political collectives (Murphy, 2008).

Finally, the conglomerate of social scientists and their scholarship broadly referred to as ‘EU studies’ has taken a largely instrumental, policy-oriented, and evaluative tack in exploring the relationships between the European Union, NATO, and their areas of operation and influence. As discussed in the final section above, research demonstrating how the post-communist European context has been profoundly shaped by forces that are simultaneously democratizing, privatizing, transnationalizing, and globalizing has quite fruitfully analyzed these developments and their impact on domestic political and economic systems. Yet, the everyday experience of Euro-Atlantic integration—and its interaction with processes of state maintenance—have yet to be understood through grounded research that ventures beyond the formal state apparatus and economic and cultural leaders.
As a result, the integration project continues to come across as an activity of the international organizations and candidate country elites, and candidate countries continue to read as monolithic entities moving toward a common goal of membership in the Euro-Atlantic community. Bialasiewicz, et al. (2009: 80) assert, however, that European integration and enlargement are neither inevitable nor unidirectional, but rather “prone to institutional and ideational reflexivity.” It is the multi-directionality and contingency of these processes that this dissertation aims to capture, with three essays examining different facets and different ‘levels’ of Euro-Atlantic governance. With the work now situated within several key literatures and disciplines, the next three chapters will present the empirical analyses of the concepts outlined above.
CHAPTER THREE

NOT WHETHER BUT HOW: CONSIDERING THE SECURITIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION THROUGH THE LENS OF CONTINGENT SECURITY GOVERNANCE

A first step in the task of investigating the securitization of Euro-Atlantic integration is to address the question of whether the European Union can become an autonomous global security actor, an issue that has occupied the field of EU studies for some time. The discussion typically coalesces around the willingness of the member states to coordinate on foreign policy, relying upon a conceptual decoupling of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power. This essay questions the utility of that distinction, arguing that sensitivity to contingency, as well as attention to the centrality of geoeconomic logics, offers helpful insights into the sort of security actor the EU is becoming. A textual analysis of EU documents explores modes of securitization frequently neglected by observers focusing primarily on political cohesion. I conclude that when these issues are viewed through the lens of contingent security governance, a pivotal facet of security integration is illuminated: the forging of a European military-industrial complex. Hence, the relevant question about the EU’s securitization is perhaps not whether it is happening, but rather how it is proceeding.

Introduction

Before the current debt crises captured the attention of observers of the EU, one of the key debates regarding European integration concerned the prospects for a robust and autonomous European security and defense apparatus. The term “security and
“defense apparatus” refers to the collection of policies, institutions, individuals, equipment, and capabilities that together comprise the European Union’s capacity to secure and defend itself without the need to rely on non-European assets or external alliances. Apparently, the debt crises and security integration are related; as recently as 2008, Andrew Moravcsik, a prominent scholar of the EU, noted, “A truly independent European defense policy, including the development of European transport, air and space resources, would cost some two percent of European GDP—a political impossibility at a time when budget cuts are critical,” (Moravcsik, 2008: 27). Moravcsik is far from alone in this skepticism about an independent security and defense apparatus for Europe, as evidenced by a substantial body of work on the matter (Bailes, 2006; Salmon, 2005; Mottola, 2005; Koskenniemi, 1998; Salmon and Shepherd, 2003; c.f. Posen 2006).

Likewise, practitioner positions often range from the unfavorable to the scathing, such as Margaret Thatcher’s characterization of the UK’s contribution to the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) as “a piece of monumental folly that puts our security at risk [presumably, by undermining US-dominated NATO] in order to satisfy political vanity” (White and Norton-Taylor, 2000).

Amongst the array of scholarly and practitioner assertions that the EU could not or should not become more autonomous in its security and defense capabilities, one finds lack of political will, budgetary resources, common foreign policy, and so on. Indeed, the many compelling arguments drawing upon political, economic, and cultural factors are both accurate and worthy of consideration. However, the discussion typically relies upon a conceptual decoupling of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, and thus an incomplete picture of how securitization, and its constituent process of militarization, unfolds. This essay
questions the utility of such a distinction, arguing instead that the latest theorizations of
security and the state, brought together within a framing concept of ‘contingent security
governance,’ can offer deeper insights into the sort of security actor the EU is becoming.
I focus mainly on the European Defense Agency (EDA), exploring the question of
whether distinctly EU norms can be forged regarding the building and use of military
power.

A textual analysis of EU documents and publications explores the modes of EU
securitization that often fly under the radar of observers who focus primarily on the
ability of the member states to coordinate on foreign policy, or on the success or failure
of EU security and defense missions (Gordon, 2009; Ilievski and Taleski, 2009; Duke,
2009; Fischer, 2009). I conclude that when these issues are viewed through the lens of
contingent security governance, which includes economic neoliberalization, an important
facet of security and defense integration is illuminated: the forging of a European
military-industrial complex. Hence, the relevant question about the securitization of the
EU is perhaps not whether it is happening, but rather how it is proceeding.

Reconceptualizing the Securitization of the European Union

Despite relatively swift progress toward a European security and defense
apparatus (see Salmon and Shepherd, 2003), it is commonly concluded that a fully
autonomous EU defense is an unlikely or distant outcome due to weak cohesion on
foreign policy, budget cuts, and lack of political will to pool national sovereignty and
resources on security and defense matters (Bailes, 2006; Moravscik, 2008; Koskenniemi,
1998; Salmon and Shepherd, 2003). Within this vein are scholars, such as Smith (1998),
who contend that regardless of the degree of coherence and autonomy observed in the EU, it is the organization’s external economic relations, rather than its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), that constitute the EU’s role as an international actor. With that, it is activity in the economic sphere, rather than the security and defense sphere, that will likely serve as the causal mechanism for a coherent EU foreign policy (Smith, 1998).

Moreover, the literature tends to largely concern itself with normative questions, such as whether a securitized EU is a positive development and whether Europe would do better to wield its comparative advantage: ‘soft power’ (Bailes, 2006; Gorenflo, 2008; Mottola, 2005; Hettne and Söderbaum, 2005). The hard power/soft power dichotomy is meant to distinguish between more coercive measures (usually involving the military) and more persuasive ones (economic, ideological, or norm-shaping measures) in pursuit of policy agendas. Yet this central binary must be problematized, particularly where scholars may be tempted to draw conclusions about the relative benevolence of the EU’s foreign relations. Situating the EU’s external policy within a broader context of economic neoliberalization and globalization (as well as former colonial relations perpetuated through new economic agreements), we may find that notions of ‘soft persuasion’ become less meaningful. Even relations solely economic in focus, or relying on ‘soft power,’ have proven asymmetrical and coercive, placing ‘partners’ in the developing world in disadvantaged positions vis-à-vis the EU (Meyn, 2008; Nwobike, 2006). This is one manner in which the soft/hard power distinction is untenable. Another manner, which underpins my view of security governance, is that it is difficult to disentangle the sources and uses of soft and hard power, especially in the context of a
military-industrial complex. Rather, many agencies, actors, and modes of economic livelihood rely on the twinning of soft and hard power.

My aim is to show that existing perspectives are neglecting a key facet of the process because they either rely upon the tenuous hard/soft power binary, or—related to this—take a limited view of what securitization means. My expanded concept of ‘contingent security governance’ usefully frames the analysis by highlighting the fluidity and constructed nature of this process and the forms of power implicated within it. In the debate over what must come first in security and defense integration—the functional or the political (Salmon and Shepherd, 2003)—I posit, in distinguishing against a crude functionalism, that it is not so much one following the other as a thorough intertwining of the two. Thus, it is misleading to view the ‘economic’ and ‘political’ spheres as completely separate realms, with activity in one being independent of, or ‘following from,’ activity in the other. Rather, any ‘state’ space (nation-state, supranational, or otherwise) comprises a dense entanglement of individuals and institutions with converging (and often opposing) interests and goals.

Increased scholarly focus upon ‘governance’ over ‘government’ follows from an increasingly complex and poly-scalar arrangement of actors and interests who shape political and institutional courses (Zürn and Leibfried, 2005; Jessop, 1998). Security governance, as a specific instance of these reconfigurations, has been defined as an “intentional system of rules” and interventions of both state and nonstate actors, “purposefully directed towards particular policy outcomes” in the realm of security (Kirchner, 2006: 948, emphasis added; see also Webber et al., 2004). Security governance has been reconceptualized repeatedly over the last decade and half, with
Webber et al. noting in 2004 that the concept, though “not fully developed,” provides a framework for incorporating functionalist and constructivist perspectives on norms, ideas and culture (pg. 25). One crucial contribution to this field of study, Kirchner and Sperling’s *EU Security Governance* (2007), goes further in developing security governance as a framework within the context of the EU. Kirchner and Sperling incorporate the notion of securitization as a highly discursive process, as well as the notion of the post-Westphalian state, in which security comprises economic welfare, and transnational, non-state risks and threats.

This work, however, misses a critical opportunity to think more fundamentally about what it really means to abandon a strict hard/soft power binary in light of an emergent geoeconomic order. This is not to assert that a geoeconomic order is replacing a geopolitical order in a tidy progression over time, as Luttwak (1990) argued. Rather, I concur with Cowen and Smith (2009: 22) that a geoeconomic perspective helpfully informs our study of the “spatial reconfiguration of contemporary political geography.” This adds an explicitly spatial angle to the study of EU security governance, which is ultimately the forging of a supranational security arena, located within the broader process of neoliberal globalization. Geoeconomics is understood as the growing tendency to reframe territorial security in terms of supranational and transnational issues and to rethink security matters in terms of market logics (Cowen and Smith, 2009; Rozov, 2012). The emergence of geoeconomic calculation raises the question of whether we should speak of the EUropeanization of security, or the (further) neoliberalization of the EU’s security apparatus. This is not an issue I aim to resolve here, however, as I argue: 1. Both the former and the latter phenomena may well be underway; and 2. Due to
1., it is perhaps more interesting and important to recast the concept of security governance (and dismantling of the hard/soft power binary) with contingency in mind.

Hence, I wish to further develop the security governance concept to account for the frequent lack of ‘purpose’ and intentionality contained in Kirchner’s definition above, highlighting instead the incoherence in the path toward security policy outcomes. I therefore conceive of ‘contingent security governance’: a complex system blending various modes of power (soft/hard) and the convergence of diverse actors and agendas (state/nonstate; security/nonsecurity) which often have contradictory goals, yet come together in contingent ways to produce particular security policy outcomes. Contingency exists because of diverse political, economic, and cultural contexts shaping policy courses, but also because entities that do not operate in the interest of security or defense frequently become implicated in ‘hard power’ agendas due to paradoxical alignments of objectives (Kuus 2009). While my empirics largely focus on security actors, they also show how entities opposed to securitization have contributed to the process in various ways.

The hard/soft power dichotomy is, itself, a driver of securitization, as it reifies ostensibly separate military and civilian spheres, and economic and defense interests. However, viewing these seemingly disparate realms and agendas as part of a larger phenomenon of contingent security governance allows us to recognize the inseparability of these things and the ways in which securitization is multi-tracked and incoherent.

3. This view of securitization takes it as the process that embeds security-oriented beliefs, cultures, activities, and agendas deeply within non-security sectors of society through political, economic, and cultural processes, related to Enloe’s concept of militarization. This differs somewhat from the common
(Enloe, 2004; Bernazzoli and Flint, 2009). Indeed, agendas are not neatly compartmentalized into particular institutions or corners of government or the market. Moreover, even within a particular institution or corner of government or the market, it is impossible to cleanly delineate which activities are ‘military’ and which are ‘civilian;’ which are ‘economic’ at their core and which are purely ‘security.’ In other words, as the perspective of geoeconomics would envisage, it is the very untidiness that makes securitization a viable process. My empirical focus on the European Defense Agency as a key site of the practices of contingent security governance aptly illustrates this facet of the contemporary state. It also provides the opportunity for both a theoretical and empirical contribution to the literature. Empirically, the EDA is still somewhat neglected in the study of EU security governance, as it was only founded in 2004 (for instance, it does not even merit an entry in the index of Kirchner and Sperling, 2007). Theoretically, an examination of the EDA as the latest manifestation of geoeconomic thinking in the EUropean security apparatus imparts insights into how the practices and discourses shared between policy makers and market actors aim to foster both the will and the ability to ‘securitize’ further.

understanding of securitization in international relations as explicated by the Copenhagen School, which holds that issues become securitized through the discursive practices of security agents (Wæver, 1995; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998).

4. References to ‘the state’ or ‘state spaces’ in this essay are not to argue that the European Union should be viewed as an entity commensurate with contemporary nation-states, but to make the point that in many policy areas, the EU faces the same coherence issues as nation-states, who themselves only give an illusion of cohesive, unified ‘actors’ (see Kuus and Agnew, 2008, for a comprehensive account of current theorizations of the state).
The challenge of investigating securitization is to tackle an exceedingly complex and multifaceted phenomenon in a systematic manner. Bernazzoli and Flint (2009) approach this in part by recognizing securitization as being comprised of numerous constituent processes, including militarization, which imbibes the seemingly non-military spaces of social life with military culture, imperatives, and values. In the context of the EU, the term militarization denotes the shift from an overwhelmingly economic raison d’être to one that includes common European military structures and activities. Most often in the present study, I have found it appropriate to utilize the term ‘securitization’ rather than militarization, given the broad European scope of security—including the pooling and development of military capabilities, but also of functions such as civilian crisis management. Therefore, I use the term securitization somewhat interchangeably with security and defense integration, referring to the drive toward a distinct European security and defense identity.

Finally, contingent security governance accounts for the importance of culture and identity in analyses of securitization, a process seemingly devoid of these ‘softer’ considerations. The security-identity nexus, or the intersection and mutual construction of security and identity, has heretofore been neglected in studies that take a solely instrumental or policy-oriented view of security governance (though it has received attention in work on security cultures more broadly; see Kuus 2007 and Weldes, et. al 1999.). This neglect belies the vast discursive power of ostensibly ‘dry’ and straightforward texts such as policy documents and institutional bulletins. In fact, such materials are laden with assumptions of security and threat predicated upon—and justified by—notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Campbell, 1998; Sharp, 2000; Walker, 1993).
Security, then, is fundamentally about the perceived need to guard the material and discursive boundaries between identities—and with that, between geopolitical spaces (Neumann, 1999).

This facet of securitization is all the more interesting in the context of the EU, which is commonly characterized as lacking a unified identity and demos (Delanty, 2007), yet has always had an explicit security rationale to its existence (Wæver, 1995). Among the various challenges to security and defense integration in the EU, oft-cited factors include the differing histories, security/threat perceptions, and strategic cultures across the member states. In response to this, key security institutions such as the EDA have demonstrated awareness of the importance of culture and identity to security, and of the potential of security and defense integration to play a constitutive role in the forging of a distinctly European identity. On this score, the European brand of contingent security governance is unique in demonstrating an increasingly overt awareness of the fuzzy line between the realms of military and civilian, though in a pragmatic, rather than a conceptual, way. The task of this essay is reconciling the practical European experiences with the way in which I conceptualize these processes.

**Data and Methods**

Given the vast wealth of materials accessible through the EU online portal ([http://europa.eu/](http://europa.eu/)), it was essential to bound the collection of data both temporally and in terms of substance. I analyzed documents and publications from the year 2000, when the ESDP (now called the Common Security and Defense Policy [CSDP] as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon) was created, to the end of 2010, which allowed me to capture
developments post-Lisbon Treaty and to include the more recent bulletins of the European Defense Agency. While it is a dubious exercise to try to disentangle the web of documentary materials in terms of policy area (there is no neat separation between internal and external affairs, or between economic, political, and security/defense matters), I have focused my analysis on the pool of strategy documents, policy memos, and bulletins most closely associated with security and defense matters as they related to the ESDP/CSDP.

The European Defense Agency, whose bulletins are drawn upon most heavily in the empirical sections, features prominently in the empirical analysis due to its central role in managing the security and defense capabilities of the EU, including the development of a common defense technology industrial base (DTIB\(^5\)). Additionally, I have identified a relative lack of attention accorded to the EDA and its activities thus far in studies of the EU and securitization. While the documents analyzed herein are accessible to the public, and speak to citizens of the European Union on some level, these materials primarily comprise a discussion *within* the institutions of the EU. My concern, then, is with what Bailes (2008) refers to as ‘practitioner discourse.’ In particular, the EDA bulletins perform two major purposes: 1. to promote the activities of the EDA and related actors; and 2. to serve as a forum for advancing key agendas of European security and defense integration. In this sense, these materials do not simply and passively report on the process of securitization, but are also constitutive of it by urging other institutions and actors of the EU into the EDA’s objectives.

\(^5\) This is the term commonly used by the EU institutions and officials themselves (see European Defense Agency, 2007a).
I subjected the documentary data to a themed textual analysis which unfolded in several phases\textsuperscript{6}. Early in the analysis, conceptual themes emerged out of the theoretical framework and guided a cursory investigation of data sources. Subsequently, empirical themes were determined following close and repeated scrutiny of the materials within the framework of the conceptual themes. Thematic categories were formed using a process of coding that linked the specific activities and utterances documented in the texts with the theoretical themes of concern to the study (Maxwell, 2005). The subsections of the analytical portion of the essay represent the key empirical themes that emerged out of this engagement with the texts: constructing moral responsibilities around securitization; foregrounding neoliberal imperatives; and eroding the military/civilian distinction through policy dialogues. A concluding section summarizes the major findings and poses some additional questions that follow from the analysis, suggesting avenues for further research.

**The Language and Practice of Securitization in the European Union**

The findings presented in the following subsections construct a picture of European security and defense integration that is somewhat at odds with many conventional interpretations of this phenomenon. By shedding light on efforts toward a European military-industrial complex, and the discourses undergirding those efforts, I will underscore the ways in which security and defense integration has been spurred

\textsuperscript{6} Textual analysis of government documents is highlighted by Sharma and Gupta (2006) as a fruitful way to study the discursive reproduction of the state. See also Dalby (2007) and Espeland (1993) for examples of work that employs this type of analysis.
along while public debate has persisted over whether such integration is even likely or imminent. While the question of whether or not to further securitize the EU is often publicly represented and debated in largely geopolitical terms (such as concerns for nation-state sovereignty), the security and defense policy discourses analyzed here demonstrate the profoundly geoeconomic logics at the heart of security and defense integration. As these developments are traced through the European Defense Agency bulletins (2005-2010), *European Security Strategy* (2003), and other relevant documents and publications, a broad pattern emerges of progression from moralizing language emphasizing the need for a common security and defense toward more overt discussion of an eroding civil/military binary. The articles of the bulletins, contributed by key security and defense figures such as Javier Solana, as well as by prominent individuals from other EU institutions and industry representatives, are clearly aimed at forging a sense of European unity, identity, and independence in the realm of security and defense. And perhaps most importantly, they seek to convince their audiences that the development of these capabilities is as important for the EU as an economic union as is it for the EU as a major political actor in the global arena.

*Moralizing Securitization*

Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history

(Council of the European Union, 2003: 1).

The above quotation appears in the introduction to the European Union’s security strategy document, which was produced for the first time in 2003. Ironically, despite the
assertions of the ‘unprecedented’ security and peace Europe was experiencing at the time, the security strategy signals a major step toward a progressively more securitized EU. The strides made in security and defense integration, then, were certainly not an inevitable outcome, despite the fact that they are discussed this way in a multitude of EU documents and speeches. Rather, they occurred in spite of budgetary deficiencies, an absence of a commonly-perceived physical security threat, and the strident objections of a number of influential member states. The relevant question is how this progress was facilitated through the language and practice of various actors both within and outside of EU institutions. One of the primary ways in which this has unfolded is via the construction of a moral discourse about the responsibilities bound up with the EU’s role as an economic powerhouse. The Common Foreign and Security Policy and subsequent policy developments (ESS, ESDP, CSDP, and so on) have transpired on the wings of this discourse, which compels EU institutions and the citizens they serve to live up to political-security obligations within the bounds of the EU and abroad.

The morality of securitization has been asserted in light of political, security, and economic responsibilities, which are overtly discussed by proponents of security and defense integration as inseparable from one another. This discussion has come not only from EU officials themselves, but also from representatives of industry, as when the president of the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD) urged, “if Europe does not act, others will act in our place, and we will come to regret that” (European Defense Agency, 2007a: 8). The intertwining of moralities culminated in the statement of Günter Verheugen, the Vice-President of the European Commission for Enterprise and Industry, who noted in February 2007 that Europe “must” raise its
political profile in order to make it more commensurate with the EU’s vast global
economic role. The obvious way to do this, according to his comments, is to build up the
EU’s defense capabilities and military-industrial complex, as he noted at the 2007
European Defense Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) Conference:

If you ask me what the most important challenge is for the EU in the 21st century,
it is to fully accept our global responsibility and maintain our capacity for
independent decision-making...if you believe we can continue to be an economic
giant and political dwarf, then sooner or later the dwarf will not be able to defend
the giant, and we will become an economic dwarf too. A strong defence
industrial base is a critical part of it.

(European Defense Agency, 2007a: 7)

It is significant that this declaration came not from a representative of the EDA, or even
of the CFSP more broadly, but rather from a representative of the European Commission
responsible for developments in enterprise and industry. Further, Verheugen’s comments
linked several different modes of moral responsibility together under the imperative of a
common defense industry. Amid the urgings to build up Europe’s defense industry was
an overt—yet vague—concern about Europe’s capacity for independent decision-making
as the key to fulfilling the EU’s global responsibility.

Verheugen did not specify whether he meant independence, in a supranational
sense, from the member states or from the USA as a domineering ally (or perhaps both),
but his comments buttressed the position of many key players within the EU who feel
that an integrated and sophisticated military-industrial complex is essential to realizing
this independence. What is significant in this quote is the way in which Verheugen’s
words urge EU security actors to recast their view of independence in a collective way—
Europe’s independence—as opposed to the independence of member states to act on
security in the 21st century. This de-linking of ‘freedom to act’ from nation-state
sovereignty illustrates one facet of geoeconomic thinking. Another facet of geoeconomics illustrated in this quote is the assertion that a strong defense industrial base (a major market development) is the chief mechanism linking economic prowess with political maneuverability.

Is it precisely the de-linking of independence from nation-state territorial bounds that characterizes the more recent EU security policy dialogues. What emerges is a sense that the potential for an integrated defense industrial base must win primary allegiance from policy makers and security actors. While earlier EU security documents and publications tended to contain justification for having a common foreign policy and security identity at all, over time, the discussion shifted toward a sort of economic moralizing, with the supremacy of the markets being leveraged against ‘selfish’ concerns for national sovereignty. This is not to say that the language of political responsibilities ceased, but rather that as this facet of European integration became more widely take-for-granted by parties within the EU, the more recalcitrant opponents to it were chided by the ostensibly ‘pure’ economic concerns at stake. When it comes to armaments policy, there is exceptional unwillingness to pool national sovereignty (Salmon and Shepherd 2003, 181). However, when the coordination of defense industries is characterized as the economically ‘right thing to do,’ those who would prefer to see the EU remain a primarily economic project may find their arguments against security integration imperiled. As the EDA’s Long Term Vision of 2006 contends, member states must accept that “the DTIB in Europe can only survive as one European whole, not as a sum of different national capacities” (European Defense Agency, 2006c: 24).
In the same year that the Long Term Vision was drafted, the July issue of the EDA bulletin ran an article written by Ulf Hammarström, then the Industry and Market Director for the EDA, extolling the significance of the Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement. The article warns member states about what is at stake for European companies if the national fragmentation of defense markets continues to hinder their competitiveness internationally. Stressing the importance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), “the key” to European industry and innovation, he urges that market forces alone cannot be relied upon to “create the industrial base needed for the future military capabilities of the EU.” Rather, member state governments, in their unique role as both the regulators and sole customers of this industry, “have a responsibility in their own right for the structure of the industry” (European Defense Agency, 2006a: 8). In this sense, despite Cowen and Smith’s (2009) objection to a Luttwakian conceptualization of geoeconomics, EU policy elites appear much more amenable to Luttwak’s (1990) notion that in response to globalization, geoeconomics requires states to function in the interest of economics (growing and integrating markets) rather than territory.

This message has been taken up by the representatives of a number of member states themselves. The Greek National Armaments Director observed during the European DTIB Conference held in Brussels in February 2007 that it was no longer realistic for member states to cling to their nationally-bounded defense industries: “pure sovereignty,” he noted, “exists in few areas today, and industry wants a level playing field at a European—not national—level” (European Defense Agency, 2007a: 14). Hence, through these pressures of economic moralizing, security and defense integration is framed as an important responsibility that member state governments hold to the
defense industry. This is illustrated rather conspicuously in the stated concern for what industry wants—a concern that subordinates member-state desires for sovereignty to the needs of the market.

However, this trend does not constitute a simple story of the economic trumping the political in the moral rationalizing of defense integration. Both conceptually and practically, contingent security governance involves the inseparability of these concerns. Hence, the importance of political will has not gone away, but is achieved through language of economic moralizing that connects the importance of a viable European defense industrial base with the imperative of force protection. The safety of European troops is an imperative that few, if any, politicians and government officials would argue with. Of course, the EU is not unique in this, but it serves as a pivotal argument for the pooling of member states’ security and defense assets and capabilities. As the Research and Technology Director of the EDA noted in a bulletin article entitled “Facing the Facts,” “the imperative to do everything possible for the safety of our troops on operations is of course a top capability priority” (European Defense Agency, 2006a: 4).

Yet even this politically compelling objective has been viewed through the lens of industry viability, as when Javier Solana (then head of the EDA) referred to the Defense R&T Joint Investment Program on Force Protection as “an innovative and practical example of European countries investing more together in R&T” (European Defense Agency, 2007c: 2). These examples further demonstrate the ways in which the architects of European security and defense integration have deftly woven together multiple imperatives in order to advance a compelling case for forging a common European security and defense apparatus. By blending political, security, and economic senses of
responsibility to a ‘greater good,’ actors both within and beyond EU institutions have sought to create a moral discourse about the imperative and virtual inevitability of security and defense integration.

“Spend More, Spend Better, and Spend More Together”

A major contention of this essay is that the securitization of the EU may well be marching forward not because security concerns reign supreme, but rather because they are part of a larger context of contingent security governance, which brings a variety of actors and practices into the drive toward security-related policy outcomes, despite contradictions and conflicts between them. The impetus bringing these actors together is an apparent commitment of EU political and economic elites to a Luttwakian form of geoeconomic reasoning, in which state territorial interests are subordinated to the needs and imperatives of an increasingly powerful market. This section explores another key theme in the picture of contingent security governance that emerges from the EU: When political and security agendas converge with the economic, the tendency in policy dialogues is toward neoliberal sensibilities. Thus, where economic priorities were emphasized by politicians and industry representatives alike, they promoted the constituent tenets of neoliberalism: efficiency, competition, and privatization, a theme which remains consistent across the temporal range of the data examined.

One of the stated reasons for the European Defense Agency’s creation was to place the forging of a common defense industry officially within the purview of EU institutions and policies. An integral part of this, for the EDA and for members of the defense industry, has been the research and technology sector. As early as the inaugural
edition of the EDA Bulletin, efficiency in this sector was stressed as a major concern for EU governments (European Defense Agency, 2005). On this point, the president of the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe, as well as Javier Solana, broached the need for a “paradigm shift” within the European Union. Since then, the substance of this shift—“spend more, spend better, and spend more together,” has been repeatedly invoked in the publications and activities of the EDA (European Defense Agency, 2006a: 3). These calls have been leveled in the face of the persistent aversion of some member states to increasing their defense spending levels. However, the message has been rendered more palatable when coupled with language of efficiency and the streamlining of research and development (R&D) in the defense sector. As several analysts have concluded, such practices would actually boost, rather than further strain, tightening budgets (Salmon and Shepherd, 2003). This point was exploited by former EDA Chief Executive Alexander Weis, who touted European cooperation on security and defense as the solution, rather than the problem, in wake of the financial crisis (European Defense Agency, 2009c: 1). Whether or not developments ‘on the ground’ will ultimately bear out these analyses, the key point is that these claims have bolstered the evolving neoliberal discourse within EU policy circles on the economic gravity of security and defense integration.

Early in 2009, the EDA held a conference on helicopters, the proceedings of which were published in a special edition of the EDA Bulletin in March of that year. After an opening address from then EDA Chief Executive Alexander Weis and a series of keynote speeches from various EU and defense industry officials, two discussion panels were held, addressing topics such as “aviation interoperability” and “coherent strategies.”
Solana insisted that reducing duplication of defense efforts between member states would exploit economies of scale and lower overall costs (European Defense Agency, 2009b). The appeals to economic efficiency continued throughout the conference, with particular focus on how better-integrated approaches could alleviate the helicopter shortages that have hindered EU security capabilities. Once again, the aerospace and defense industries were represented by the ASD president, who suggested in response to the problem—and the underlying unwillingness of member states to invest more—that stakeholders collectively “sanctuarize” defense spending (European Defense Agency, 2009b”11). While he did not elaborate on his use of the term “sanctuarize,” it would seem to point to the establishment of defense budgets as off-limits to questions, scrutiny, and reductions.

Improved efficiency in defense spending and capabilities development, according to the prevalent policy dialogue, is essential to enhancing the competitiveness of European companies in the global marketplace. This is not to say that the dialogue is free of language about enhanced security for EU citizens, troops, and parts of the world in which the EU is engaged, but most often in the documents and publications, the imperative of competitiveness achieved through efficiency was spotlighted. This was made all the more pressing with repeated references to increasing international competition in defense industries. The emphasis is not only on international competitiveness, but also on public procurement opportunities within a Europe-wide defense market (previously lacking due to the security exemptions from internal market rules in the Treaty establishing the European Community). Again, ‘SMEs’ were highlighted when an industry and market report in the first EDA Bulletin noted, “An important part of this is the expansion of opportunities for small- and medium-sized
companies from across Europe to sell into a continental-scale market” (European Defense Agency, 2005: 5).

Over time, attention was increasingly focused upon two additional principles of neoliberalization within the security and defense apparatus: those of privatization and outsourcing. These were expressed by both EU and industry representatives as important objectives in the process of integrating member states’ defense industries and capabilities, as during an EDA conference held in Brussels in February 2008 entitled “Commercializing Logistics.” Citing news articles about the conference, the March 2008 EDA Bulletin signals a shift in the EU’s approach to logistics, to a more US-style model of outsourcing to private logistics contractors (European Defense Agency, 2008b: 16).

At the outset of the conference, the bulletin reported, a representative from Argus Media Group (an energy market analytics company based in London) touted the savings to be gained through outsourcing, according to a report the EDA had issued (European Defense Agency, 2008b). Later in the conference, the Head of Logistic Processes for Finmeccanica (an Italian high-tech industrial group serving multiple fields including defense, aerospace, security, and energy) suggested that the defense industry could remedy gaps in information sharing between national and multinational operations, asserting, “we need an integrated logistics solution” (European Defense Agency, 2008b: 10). Again, geoeconomic reasoning presents an integrated market solution to the difficulties of multi-level security governance, with multinational assemblages of companies easing cooperation between authorities located at various scales.

The conscious transition to a more neoliberal model of privatization and outsourcing of security and defense services such as communications and other tasks
traditionally covered by military units has brought with it a development that may be troubling to those who view a military-industrial complex (or perhaps more accurately, a defense and technology industrial base) as a potential threat to the democratic process. It has meant that by according the representatives of defense industrial companies a prominent seat at the table when EU institutions meet to discuss security integration, these events provide corporations a privileged platform from which to dictate the needs and desires of industry to policy-makers and military officials. Industry representatives not only from European companies, such as Argus Media, Finmeccanica, and Eurocopter, but also from the ‘usual suspects’ in the United States, such as Kellogg, Brown and Root (a private military contracting firm), have maintained a presence at EDA events.

The ability of these interests to exert influence in the circles of EU policy-making was clearly demonstrated at the EDA’s 2009 conference on helicopters, when the CEO of Eurocopter outlined his company’s vision for how procurement in an integrated European DTIB should function, with a “well identified customer leading party (versus unanimity rule), as well as industrial prime (versus consensus-driven Joint Ventures), for the benefit of users, governments and industries” (European Defense Agency, 2009b: 22). While laden with business jargon in need of deciphering, this statement appears to sketch out a procurement system in which decisions come about in a more ad-hoc manner, with stakeholders and their interests coalescing around particular ventures, and without the burden of reaching agreement between all member states participating in the European Defense Agency. If adopted, these pointers would constitute a significant shift away from the principle of consensus among member states on matters of security and defense, which remains important to many national governments (and publics) in the EU. The
vision of an ad-hoc approach to procurement is indicative of how the profoundly contingent nature of EU security governance suits the geoeconomic proclivities of EU policy and economic elites. If realized, it would further contribute to an amorphous tangle of relations and activities that align around particular opportunities for profit and increasing market share rather than around territorially-defined (in a nation-state sense) security needs and concerns.

As this section has shown, a process of neoliberalization, of the embedding of principles such as efficiency, competition, and privatization, has occurred concomitantly with the process of securitization in the European Union. Or perhaps more accurately, the neoliberalization of security and defense matters seems to be a driver of the securitization of the European Union. The activities and discourse documented above also demonstrate the flimsiness of the oft-cited (in both academic and practitioner dialogues) distinction between hard and soft power, as economic and security agendas are thoroughly intertwined when a DTIB is actively pursued. The following section will examine this idea with greater depth as it investigates the evolving dialogue within the EU about the eroding civil-military distinction.

“The Separate Worlds Don’t Exist Anymore”: Eroding the Civil-Military Binary

The concept of contingent security governance, as a frame for examining securitizing processes, highlights ever more binaries in need of complication: war/peace; combat/crisis management; security/defense and so on. Somewhat in contrast to defense professionals in the United States, which has been characterized as a thoroughly securitized society (Lasswell, 1962; Bacevich, 2005; Bernazzoli and Flint, 2010),
officials of the European Union seem, on a pragmatic level, to be acutely aware of the untenability of these neat distinctions. This awareness is, perhaps, an outcome of the integration experience as a whole, which has been rife with reminders of how difficult it is to contain different agendas (political, economic, security) within their respective ‘pillars.’ In this regard, it could be argued that the integration project has always been, at its core, driven by a geoeconomic precept: political stability and collective security via economic interdependence. However, while the discussion in EU security and defense texts has increasingly spoken of the ‘eroding line between military and civilian,’ on a theoretical level, contingent security governance implies that the distinction was always highly constructed. Thus, while both representatives and scholars have seen the complex web of categorized interests (political, economic, defense) as a complication for securitization, my analysis demonstrates how it is this complexity that gives momentum to the process. Nevertheless, the increasingly overt discussion of the intertwining of military and civilian needs and objectives (a shift perceptible in the texts since 2008) points to an important discursive strategy which seems to be driving security and defense integration in the European Union. As the head of the EDA Planning and Policy Unit noted in July 2008, “the separate worlds don’t exist anymore” (European Defense Agency, 2008c: 18).

Building a coherent defense identity by “moving the boundaries” in the conduct of defense business has been a vital component of the EDA’s core mission since its inception in 2004 (European Defense Agency, 2007c: 6). In more recent publications, the discussion has turned to developing a defense identity that complements what is already purported to be the EU’s forte: ‘soft’ or ‘civilian’ approaches to foreign and
security policy. I view this as a particularly EU-style brand of contingent security governance. In one sense, this has always been the tenor of European security and defense integration: as the *European Security Strategy* demonstrates, the EU sees pivotal relationships between security and development (Hughes, 2009). For example, in citing persistent poverty and malnutrition in the developing world, the document stresses that “security is a precondition of development” (Council of the European Union, 2003). Moreover, the EDA’s *Long-Term Vision* document declares that over the next twenty years,

> the EU will increasingly utilise a comprehensive approach combining its hard and soft power instruments and coordinating civilian, military, governmental and non-governmental bodies to collectively achieve the necessary political effects (European Defense Agency, 2006c: 13).

These earlier, foundational documents indicate that EU institutions always placed the intertwining of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ modes of power at the heart of their distinctive approach to security and defense. However, the most recent discussions within the EDA’s activities and publications have merged ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ concerns and agendas in ever more explicit and conscious ways, a development referred to herein as the erosion of the civil-military binary.

One fundamental way in which this is accomplished is through the building of institutional linkages, drawing from every corner of political, social, and economic activity. Hence, present in virtually all EU security and defense dialogues and activities (such as the annual EDA conferences) are representatives not only from the military establishment, policy circles, international aid agencies, and the defense industry, but also from the academe. In fact, the inauguration of the European Union Institute for Security
Studies (EUISS) in 2002, with the stated goal of finding a “common security culture” for the member states and enriching “Europe’s strategic debate” (European Union Institute for Security Studies, n.d.), has brought researchers and academics directly into the security and defense integration process—both as full-time staff and as external contributors from universities across Europe. With the apparent emergence of a military-industrial-academic complex at the European level, the reach of contingent security governance is both wide and deep.

For defense industry representatives and the EU officials who interact with them, the aims and benefits of eroding the civil-military binary in an explicitly economic sense are captured in buzz words such as ‘synergies,’ ‘interfaces,’ and ‘cross-fertilization.’ What this has meant, in practical terms, is the sharing of ideas and technologies between civilian and military activity in order to efficiently grow security and defense capabilities. As a European security expert asserted in 2009, “Europe has the potential to be militarily independent, but only when barriers between national defence establishments are broken down and military R&D plugs more fully into the civilian European R&D base, which is already competitive worldwide” (European Defense Agency, 2009a: 11). Some of the chief areas in which civil-military technological cross-fertilization is being pursued include communications systems, satellite capabilities, and maritime surveillance services. The burgeoning discourse of eroding the civil-military binary was manifested in the EDA 2010 annual conference, “Bridging Efforts: Connecting Civilian Security and Military Capability Development.” Interestingly, despite the repeated insistences over the preceding years that boundaries were being eroded, then-EDA Chief Executive Alexander Weis asserted in his keynote speech that the aim was not to merge the two
sides (civilian and military) or to blur the lines of responsibility, but rather to increase the
dialogue between them (European Defense Agency, 2010b: 4). However, it is unclear
how strict distinctions between security and defense, and combat and crisis management,
might be maintained in the array of ‘complex security threats’ so often invoked by the
security and defense establishment.

This question has proven especially vexing for the neutral member states of the
European Union, most of whom have been pulled into security and defense cooperation
despite the mechanisms established to allow them to ‘opt out’ (not to mention Norway, a
non-EU member who has cooperated closely with the EDA, as well as Great Britain, an
EU member who has resisted a lockstep march toward security and defense integration,
though the British position has softened considerably in recent years). Significantly, the
creation of the EDA itself occurred during the 2004 Irish Presidency of the EU, which is
somewhat counterintuitive, given the Irish public’s notable resistance to defense
integration and distaste for the arms industry. Nevertheless, the EDA was readily
embraced by the Irish government at the time, a position which some observers found
disturbing, given the lack of parliamentary debate over the matter (Peace and Neutrality
Alliance, 2008). Language in the Irish Department of Defence Statement of Strategy
2008 – 2010 implicated the influence of defense industry lobbyists and the lure of
economic gains via a more cohesive, efficient, and robust military-industrial complex:

We will continue to support Irish participation in EDA Programmes on a case by
case basis, supporting those programmes that contribute to capability
development in the Defence Forces and provide opportunities of interest to Irish-
based enterprises and researchers. We will work closely with Enterprise Ireland to
exploit potential research and commercial opportunities arising
(Department of Defence and Defence Forces, 2008).
This contradictory development exemplifies the contingent nature of security governance: it is the powerful culmination of the factors explored above—sometimes foreseen and ‘intentional,’ other times contradictory and unexpected—that has brought about the policy outcomes we witness today. When, in 2006, the EDA’s armaments director spoke of the “jigsaw of political desire, military desire, industrial desire and money that is often hard to bring together in one nation, let alone among a number of nations in a cooperative program,” he was summarizing what are typically viewed as hindrances to security and defense integration (European Defense Agency, 2006a: 10). On the contrary, I argue, my analysis shows that the ‘jigsaw’ itself makes the securitization of the European Union a viable (though not inevitable) outcome. The pervasiveness of geoeconomic logics throughout EU security and defense policy dialogues during the years studied is what compelled the multifarious desires and agendas to come together at particular times and around particular ventures, spurring development of a EUropean security and defense apparatus.

**Concluding Thoughts and New Directions**

In this essay I have endeavored to shed light on some previously under-studied aspects of security and defense integration, specifically the dialogue and practices of the European Defense Agency. By reconceptualizing the securitization of the European Union through the lens of contingent security governance, the analysis has underscored some key themes that build upon previous conclusions about this topic. I found that an array of discursive strategies have been employed by actors located both within and outside of EU institutions in order to advance the goals of security and defense.
integration. The earlier discussions manifested in EU publications emphasized a discourse of morality—not only regarding the EU’s security obligations to its citizens and the rest of the world, but also an economic morality that prioritized the vitality of EU industry and markets over national self-interest and sovereignty. Over the years, the focus shifted to explicit assertions that ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ could no longer be viewed as separate realms, whether in terms of security activities or in the research and development sector. This was highlighted as a conscious effort to ‘erode the civil-military binary.’ Constant over time was the discourse of neoliberal imperatives, which stressed the objective of enhanced competitiveness for EU defense industry achieved through privatization, outsourcing, and other strides toward economic efficiency.

These themes demonstrate that securitization, as a multi-tracked process, requires that many sorts of actors and agendas are taken into account when considering the sort of security actor the European Union is becoming. Many of these actors are outside of the formal (supranational) state apparatus, yet exert considerable influence over policy. Increasingly, pronouncements about the EU’s potential as a ‘soft power’ versus a ‘hard power’ hold little conceptual or practical value, because on both counts (conceptually and practically), these forms of power cannot be neatly decoupled. Rather, participants in the security and defense apparatus are progressing toward their objectives by identifying and capitalizing on the ways in which the political, economic, and security/defense are not neatly delineated spheres or separate sets of goals and resources. The exemplars presented in the empirical sections illustrate the deeply geoeconomic rationales at the heart of the securitization process. While Cowen and Smith (2009) caution against a Luttwakian concept of a neat historical progression from a geopolitical order to a
geoeconomic order, my analysis shows how the practices and relations of EU security governance are tinged with a straightforwardly Luttwakian flavor of geoeconomic thinking. The actors and institutions of EU security and defense must make a convincing case for abandoning nation-state sovereignty concerns in favor of the security and prosperity of a supranational whole. Thus, it is in their interest to present a view of the world that emphasizes the supplanting of territorial threats and security solutions with supra- and trans-national threats and security solutions. Moreover, their imperative is to present a view of the world in which larger, integrated, and increasingly powerful markets can and should dictate to nation-state governments on the intertwined matters of security and economic well-being.

Finally, the process of securitization, as shown above, is sometimes incoherent and riddled with conflict between actors and agendas, advancing in spite of resistance from numerous parties within the EU. The findings lend support to my development of the contingent security governance concept, which holds that this system of actors, agendas, and practices does not operate in a simple, top-down manner, and lacks the sort of centralized intentionality others have assumed it to possess. As the example of Ireland shows, there are various centers of authority and multiple ‘intents,’ at times producing policy outcomes that are counterintuitive.

Perhaps the key question following this analysis is, “what are the costs and benefits of a robust European military-industrial complex and security and defense apparatus?” The actors examined in this essay clearly see a number of benefits: to European defense industry, to be sure, but also to the agenda of forging a unified identity both amongst EU citizens and as a ‘political actor’ on the world stage. However, it is
worth asking, in light of the US experience of the last fifty or so years, whether the increased influence of the defense industry in the circles of policy-making could one day allow the “tail to wag the dog.” Given Bailes’ (2008: 121) observation that “treating others badly in the non-military field and dodging security challenges are both tactics that risk building up greater animosity and a more hazardous environment in the longer run,” it would seem that the EU’s current approach to external relations, coupled with a growing military-industrial complex, could potentially lead in the direction of a more militarily active EU.

Moreover, is there more reason to fear the military-industrial complex in the European Union versus in the United States? An important consideration on this point is what is commonly referred to as the democratic deficit in the EU, and the oft-cited lack of accountability to EU citizens. Many EU institutions wielding significant power and influence over numerous aspects of everyday life are not subject to election (DeBardeleben and Hurrelman, 2007: 2). Even where representatives are directly elected, as in the European Parliament, the lack of public participation in these elections is striking (LeDuc, 2007). Although the Lisbon Treaty provides some mitigating factors for the so-called democratic deficit, many observers remain skeptical, and citizens of the EU are often characterized as uninformed about the function and reach of this body of institutions. All of this raises the question of whether the prominent place of defense industry representatives and other ‘outside’ actors at the policy table makes the forging of a military-industrial complex more problematic than it would otherwise be. On the other hand, the military-industrial complex implies a sort of ‘democratic deficit’ that, as demonstrated by the example of the US, afflicts nation-states as much as it afflicts the
supranational state space of the EU—that is, the growing influence of corporate interests in the making of policy. This is not to make a normative judgment about such influence, but to underscore its relevance to other ways in which many citizens and observers have viewed the problems of accountability within the EU (Bailes, 2008).

In light of the conclusions about contingent security governance, these questions point to a need for continued investigation into the process of securitization of the EU, particularly where citizens’ views are concerned. Future studies should utilize more grounded and ethnographic methodologies in order to examine everyday perceptions of security culture, identity, and threats, and how they constitute and shape one another. Particularly as EU-NATO and EU-US relations have been strained under the War on Terror (Posen, 2006; De Nevers, 2007; Ray and Johnston, 2007), it is worth considering whether an autonomous security and defense apparatus would allow Europeans to avoid military misadventures via a US-dominated North Atlantic Alliance. At the time of writing, violence and political instability persist in Northern Africa and the Middle East; disputes remain unresolved in the Western Balkans and the Caucasus, and the world continues its long recovery from financial and economic crisis. All of these factors have vast implications for European security, making this a vital pathway for sustained inquiry.

This chapter has presented one facet of multi-level governance in the European Union, focusing specifically on the governance of European security. The analysis illuminated the links between differing ‘levels’ of this security governance, particularly between the supranational level and the nation-state level. However, these levels are not
viewed as fixed scales; rather, the object of the analysis was the way in which a security arena at the supranational scale has been—and continues to be—forged through the geopolitical and geoeconomic strategies of various governmental and non-governmental actors that span the national, multinational, and supranational realms. The following chapter presents a more direct theoretical engagement with the concept of scale in its analysis of the multi-scalar discursive strategies of Croatian political elites undergoing the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. The essay adds another facet to the study of multi-level governance, by revealing how the scalar metageographies of nation-state elites shape political strategies for managing and bridging the needs and expectations of multiple audiences, at home and abroad.
CHAPTER FOUR

BALKANISM REVISITED: THE MULTI-SCALAR GEOPOLITICS OF CROATIA’S SELF-REPRESENTATION IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION PROCESS

This essay explores the ways in which the Croatian government sought to represent itself in discussions of Euro-Atlantic integration in its website content in the years 2008 - 2012. Using a critical geopolitics approach and qualitative content analysis, I examined speeches, press releases, official bulletins, and policy documents from the main Croatian government website, the Ministry of Defense website, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration website. In the three key empirical themes that emerged from the analysis, Croatian leaders have selectively engaged with the discourse of Balkanism, intertwining it with the security imperatives both of the Euro-Atlantic community and of Croatian citizens. Firstly, the government constructed an image of Croatia as both a key regional leader for stability and peace, as well as a glowing international example of reform; secondly, tropes of secular morality and national sacrifice were deployed to construct Croatia as a virtuous society who, due to the Homeland War experience, is uniquely deserving of full Euro-Atlantic membership; and thirdly, an emphasis on geoeconomic reasoning was often featured in order to present Croatia as a rational and pragmatic global actor who has fully internalized the neoliberal logics of marketization perpetuated by the United States and European Union. The findings suggest that political elites creatively deployed particular representations shaped by a logic organizing audiences into domestic and international scales. Hence, while political-geographic theories of scale have abandoned the notion of pre-given scales,
security-identity constructions reflect that policy makers’ rhetoric is nested in a scalar hierarchy.

Introduction

On April 5th, 2008, U.S. President George W. Bush gave a momentous speech from famed St. Mark’s Square in Croatia’s capital city of Zagreb, the purpose of which was to tout the offer of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership to this former Yugoslav republic. His two-day trip to Croatia coincided with the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Romania, during which several important decisions were reached regarding the accession of new members to the world’s largest military alliance. In response to President Bush’s invitation, then Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader said:

When I look back today on Croatia and our dream on the life in a free, democratic country, on the life in ordered and civilized country, of equal citizens, of equal opportunities, then I see how it is precisely America, together with others, that helped for us to realize our dream, as well…with the invitation of our country to join NATO, and with the new energy in our negotiations to accede to EU, this visit by American President means that the aspirations of many Croatian generations have been fulfilled.

(Croatia in Focus, May 2008: 10)

The language in this excerpt reflects a now commonplace narrative on the ‘Euro-Atlantic community’: that is, it conflates membership in NATO and the European Union (EU), brought about by partnership with the United States and other ‘Western’ international actors, with order, civilization, and democracy. This construction in itself is not surprising or unusual, as previous work (notably, that of geographers Merje Kuus, Alex

7 ‘West’ and ‘Western’ are admittedly contested and problematic terms; however, their usage is helpful in this discussion in order to refer collectively to the United States and countries commonly thought of as comprising Western Europe.
Jeffrey, and Luiza Bialasiewicz, among others) has uncovered its pervasiveness in the post-1989 Central and East European experience. However, Sanader’s equation of Euro-Atlanticism with peace, freedom, democracy, and prosperity is highlighted here because it serves as a fitting entry point into further insights about the intersection of securitization and Balkanism undergirding the Euro-Atlantic integration process in Croatia.

A growing literature on Balkanism, inspired anew by Maria Todorova’s highly influential work *Imagining the Balkans* (1997), has thoroughly investigated the Western constructions of the countries and societies comprising the Balkan peninsula, as well as the ways in which these constructions have been negotiated and, at times, internalized by the peoples of the region. Building on Todorova’s insights, further literature, discussed below, has examined the implications of Balkanist discourses for European accession (e.g., Lindstrom, 2003 and Krajina, 2009). In this essay, I argue that it is time to revisit Balkanism in the context of Euro-Atlanticism, but through the critical geopolitics lens of securitization and the security-identity nexus. Hence, rather than simply documenting the deployment of Balkanist discourses in the Euro-Atlantic integration process, this essay will demonstrate the ways in which the Republic of Croatia, positioned to accede to the EU and having acceded to NATO relatively recently, utilizes a strategy of multi-scalar geopolitics in its official governmental website content in order to creatively wield Balkanism—and its attendant security implications—for international and domestic audiences simultaneously. In short, the empirical focus is on the ways in which discourses of security and identity are mobilized in government website material and key policy documents posted on the official websites.
The analysis seeks to unmask how representations of ‘self,’ ‘other,’ ‘risk,’ and ‘threat’ have been used in order to construct careful representations of Croatia for international audiences—particularly those in Europe and the United States—by providing English language versions of key documents and other web-accessible material. With that, we can see how these tropes are employed to ‘sell’ the project of Euro-Atlantic integration to the wider Croatian society. While the materials consulted for this project are aimed largely at international audiences, many, if not most of them, are also available on the websites in the Croatian language as well as in English. As the title implies, the larger focus in this essay is on the former goal—that of exploring practices of self-representation; however, the account would be incomplete without also addressing the appeals made to everyday Croatians by state elites. Indeed, many of the data sources drawn upon for this project indicate that demonstrated success in bringing Croatian society on-board buttressed the government’s constructions of Croatia as being prepared for NATO and EU membership.

I follow a critical geopolitics approach to this endeavor of unmasking, and frame my analysis with theories of discourse and self-representation. Previous work in political geography and related fields such as international relations has investigated the mechanisms of Western influence in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) by focusing on how civil society in these states has come to reflect the priorities of ‘Euro-Atlantic’ values and structures (Jeffrey, 2008; Kuus, 2007a, 2007b, 2009; Wedel, 1998). This essay will add the dimension of how the practice of self-representation in government internet content has aimed to present Croatia as a ready and willing partner in the future of the Euro-Atlantic community. The analysis reveals the
creative/selective/competing uses of Balkanism in this content and the intersections of Balkanism with security discourses and agendas, which defined elite political discourse in Croatia for the years studied. Unlike in the years immediately following the wars of Yugoslav dissolution, when Croatian and Slovenian leaders clamored to exhibit their 'exit' from the Balkans and 'return' to Europe (Lindstrom, 2003), I demonstrate that in more recent years, the Balkan legacy has been at times derided and downplayed, and at other times positively invoked as a characteristic that makes Croatia a particularly desirable member of the overarching Euro-Atlantic security regime.

However, these discursive strategies have required an artful balance on the part of political elites, as they need to carefully package their messages for multiple audiences, domestic and international, simultaneously. This is what is meant by the idea of “multi-scalar geopolitics” invoked in the title of this essay. Rather than investigating the representations of a country’s foreign policy solely as offered by the government to its public, the focus is on the ways in which a government entity undergoing a transnationalizing process, such as Euro-Atlantic integration, must repackage aspects of its country’s history, culture, economy, and so on, in order to persuade multiple audiences at once. Notably, despite the mutuality involved in the social construction of the relevant scales, policy makers tend to invoke a nested and reified sense of scale that drives how security and identity discourses are wielded for particular audiences at particular times. Moreover, given the explicit security imperative for the integration of the Western Balkan countries into NATO and the European Union, the intersection between identity discourses (Balkanism) and the practice of defining security agendas (securitization)—something I refer to as the security-identity nexus—warrants explicit attention. Thus, the
empirical scope of the essay includes website text and online documents from entities overtly involved in security (the Ministry of Defense and the various branches of Croatia’s armed forces), as well as from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration and the main government web portal.

**Discourses of Identity and Security**

The attention to specific discourses of identity and security in government website materials on Euro-Atlantic integration follows from the assumption that the two notions are inextricably linked in the profoundly geopolitical process of joining these institutions. This process has involved both political and cultural mechanisms that work in concert to establish the necessity and morality of NATO and EU membership, as well as their location on the ‘right’ side of the new, post-Cold War discursive divide in Eurasia (Kuus, 2007a; De Nevers, 2007; Dawson and Fawn, 2002). At the heart of these discourses is a constant (re)construction of the Self/Other nexus, which both compels governments to include Euro-Atlantic membership in their foreign policy imperatives, and allows them to make the case to their publics that this membership is an obvious and necessary objective. As a concept, the Self/Other nexus encapsulates the notion that a nation-state’s sense of ‘self’ is in large part formulated against the foil of an international arena rife with threatening ‘others.’ Thus, the politics of forming one’s own state or national identity are facilitated by the formation of policies and actions toward other actors, which delineate a ‘normal’ inside and a ‘pathological’ outside (Campbell, 1998). These ideals of normal/pathological and inside/outside are justified to the public through political
speeches, the mass media, and popular culture, and often become “taken for granted” while alternative views are frequently excluded (Sharp, 2000).

Poststructural approaches to understanding collective identities in Eastern Europe are rooted in the assumption that we formulate our sense of self through the internalization of significant others’ objectification of ourselves (Neumann, 1999). In Croatia and the other countries of Southeastern Europe, sense of self is overwhelmingly characterized by the oft-cited liminality of Balkan identity, as Europe’s constantly becoming, partial ‘Other’—at once both a part of and somehow separate from European identity (Todorova, 1997). The cultural, political, and economic implications of ‘Balkanism’ have received ample treatment in recent social science work (Dodds, 2003; Lindstrom, 2003; Rasza and Lindstrom, 2004; Lindstrom, 2008; Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2009; Krajina, 2009).

Examining the political discourse of Tuđman’s Croatia in the 1990s, Rasza and Lindstrom (2004) found that Balkanism was a political tool that Western leaders and journalists wielded against Croatia, but Croatians also deployed Balkan stereotypes in order to differentiate themselves against regional neighbors further southeast. Using official government documents, they found that “Europe always stands outside the nation, as an identity to be achieved” (pg. 630). By revisiting this issue, but through the lens of security-identity constructions in the context of the Euro-Atlantic integration process, I am shedding light on how the status of ‘candidate country’ created a greater need for self-representations of Croatian elites to challenge the binary of inside/outside Euro-Atlantic space, with growing emphasis placed on how selected aspects of Croatia’s ‘Balkan-ness’ are actually assets—rather than threats—to the Euro-Atlantic community.
Slightly later work on Balkanism has taken up analyses of how Balkan identity plays a direct role in the Euro-Atlantic processes of the countries of the Balkan peninsula (Hammond, 2005 and 2006; Lindstrom, 2008; Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2009; Krajina, 2009). For Papadimitriou and Gateva (2009), the EU accession process of Romania and Bulgaria produced a two-fold phenomenon of Balkan exceptionalism: 1. Political elites in the candidate countries themselves may seize upon historical and external factors such as the particularly traumatic communist experience under Ceausescu in order to account for their failures to catch up to the “frontrunners” of European integration; and 2. The EU treated Bulgaria and Romania differently than the other accession countries at the time, both by creating extra conditions for them to meet and by bending certain criteria in order to let them in, arguably before they were ‘ready,’ in order to avoid instabilities and insecurity potentially created by their exclusion. From the perspective of discourse analysis rather than policy analysis, Hammond (2006) and Krajina (2009) found that the ‘Balkanist’ discourses imposed upon the countries of the region by Western entities were as much about the insecurity of a unified European identity as they were about the candidate country itself.

The fruitful body of work already produced on Balkanism and integration begs further analysis of how the security imperatives and identity discourses deployed by accession country elites must simultaneously appeal to the structure of expectations dominant within the accession society and exhibit a proper adoption of Euro-Atlantic ‘values’ and imperatives. An analysis of government web materials on integration provides an ideal mode by which to do this, because it exhibits the geopolitical practices aimed at multiple scales: to the international community and to the domestic audience.
Such multi-scalar geopolitical practices reflect the strategic thinking of high-level political officials, who are nested in a hierarchy of, for them, taken-for-granted scales: domestic and international, or domestic and supranational. Recent contributions to the scale debate in human geography (notably, Marston et al., 2005 and Delaney and Leitner, 1997) have questioned the utility of scale as a theoretical concept, as scholars frequently default into taking scales of analysis as pre-given and hierarchical in a way that does not reflect social-political life. While I join these voices in opposing an ontology of hierarchical, absolute scales (e.g., local, national and global), I agree with Corey Johnson (2008: 87) in his assertion that a concept of scale is still useful in a conceptualization “that emphasizes its constructed, produced and political natures” (see also Jonas, 2006).

Although we, as human geographers, largely reject the notion of pre-given scales, political elites operate in everyday life within just such a metageography, consciously deploying geopolitical representations for audiences ostensibly organized in a hierarchy of scales—in this case, individual, national/domestic and international or supranational. In essence, the larger enterprise here is to understand how contemporary processes of European integration and reterritorialization, or the reorganization of boundaries and territories within newly constructed scales of political authority, (Jessop, 2001; Brenner, 1997; Häkli, 2001; Brenner et al., 2003) prompt practices of self-representation that both shift and entrench collective identities in the face of ongoing Euro-Atlantic integration. This is part and parcel of the agenda identified by Mamadouh and van der Wusten (2008) and Murphy (2008) for the geographic study of EU governance: to go beyond the realm of the legal and the formal, of policies and treaties, in order to understand the Euro-Atlantic as a “meaningful social unit” (Mamadouh and van der Wusten 2008: 30). I
contend that because the realm of the legal and formal corresponds with a hierarchical scalar logic, it is important to comprehend the ways in which policy discourses mirror this logic in constructing a Euro-Atlantic social unit. Investigating these constructions at the margins (that is, within a country in the process of ‘becoming’ Euro-Atlantic) yields important insights on this matter.

The implications of Balkanist discourse for Croatia’s place in the Euro-Atlantic sphere have as much to do with security as they do with identity. My concept of a “security-identity nexus” indicates that the two—security and identity—are mutually constructed, with neither being prime in the relationship. Rather, they are linked recursively. The process of securitization, or the practice of defining issues as matters of risk and threat, is wholly driven by assumptions about who is ‘Self’ and who is ‘Other.’ This perspective owes much to the field of constructivist international relations, which, beginning in the 1990s, has placed growing emphasis on how ideas about security develop, enter the realm of public policy debate and discourse, and eventually become institutionalized (Lipschutz, 1995; see also Wæver 1995a and 1995b; Weldes et al., 1999). Kuus (2007a) has pioneered the application of these perspectives in her work on Central Europe’s integration into NATO. Building on this work, I contend that the Croatian case can be used to demonstrate the ways in which the post-socialist and post-conflict designators are creatively engaged by political leaders in order to represent Croatia to the international community as ready for—and deserving of—full inclusion in the Euro-Atlantic organizations, while simultaneously representing this inclusion as an imperative of Croatian security and identity to Croatian citizens.
Self-representation has been defined as the “process by which individuals attempt to control the impressions others have of them” (Dominick, 1999: 647). As the definition suggests, this concept has traditionally referred to how individual people have chosen to present themselves to others. However, Volčič (2008) has recently used the concept to explore the self-representational constructions of the former Yugoslav republics on their government websites in neoliberal processes of nation-branding. I follow Volčič’s use of the term in my exploration of how Croatian government websites are utilized as sites of self-representation in their discussions of Euro-Atlantic integration. The availability of particular speeches, news releases, and policy documents on the government websites is the outcome of a rigorous process of selection and omission. Certain texts are selected, perhaps even featured, to be viewed by the public. While a large swath of the general public may not regularly read such texts, they are intended to inform the community of journalists, who will digest, condense, and synthesize the contents of national security strategies, legislative transcripts, and other texts and then disseminate them to the broader public in the form of mass media articles and broadcasts. They also are clearly aimed at the policy communities (governments, think tanks, and academics) in other countries. Some materials are translated into English, while others are not, reflecting deliberate decisions about the messages policy elites wish to convey about the Republic of Croatia to the European Union, NATO, United States, et cetera, while other bits of information remain muted to audiences outside of Croatia.
**Investigating Self-Representations: Websites as Data Sources**

The data used to critically analyze the Croatian government’s self-representations in the Euro-Atlantic integration process were drawn from three primary websites: the main government web portal, the website of the Ministry of Defense, and the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. Volčič (2008) notes that while much research has illuminated the ways in which the former Yugoslav states have historically been the object of Balkanist and orientalist discourses constructed by the West, important contributions remain to be made by investigating the ways in which these states construct counter-images of themselves for the rest of the world. In an increasingly digital world, where a growing number of individuals and groups inform themselves and gain ‘knowledge’ about others utilizing online information outlets, website content has become a crucial source of data for anyone wishing to study the construction and mobilization of geopolitical narratives and images.

Self-representation as a practice of governing elites is nothing new, but as Jackson and Purcell (1997) argued earlier in the internet age, the added communication and presentation technologies available via the World Wide Web yield greater power to define geopolitical spaces. Internet sites provide interactivity and transmit multiple cues, rather than simply provide information or data. Government websites have become increasingly adept at this, using mixes of standard press releases, multimedia features, and visually stylish periodic bulletins to package the particular representations they wish to convey. In a process such as Euro-Atlantic integration, which requires the nimble management of representations both to a domestic audience and to international audiences simultaneously, government websites allow political elites to publish vast
amounts of material in multiple languages, making some texts front-and-center on homepages, while necessitating searches for others. All told, this enhanced communication, and smoother management of self-representation via internet technologies, enhances actors’ ability to construct political geographies.  

My use of official government websites afforded me the ability not only to explore the text of web pages themselves, but also to peruse the selection of documents and bulletins available for download from these pages. Given the overwhelming volume of information available on a single site, it was necessary to delineate a temporal scale within which to collect the texts that would be used as data. The text of the websites themselves was monitored over the course of the study, which encompassed Croatia’s invitation to NATO in April 2008, as well as key moments in Croatia’s EU accession process, such as the conviction of the Croatian generals at the ICTY and completion of accession negotiations. However, in the case of press releases and news articles on the three sites, material was available dating as far back as 2001. I chose to include materials from mid-2007 to January 2012, which captured the discussion leading up to Croatia’s invitation to NATO in 2008, and covered the key moments of Croatia’s EU accession

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8 It is important to note the limitations of this approach, however. As Dodds (2006) has pointed out, the ways in which audiences consume the geopolitical narratives constructed by elites is a crucial factor in the negotiation of political-geographic knowledge. This essay cannot make any claims about audience reception or the impacts of the narratives proffered by Croatian elites. However, the issue of audience is tangential to the principal aims of the present analysis, which explores how a multi-scalar metageography was central to elite geopolitical rhetoric in the Euro-Atlantic integration process. The process of audience consumption and negotiation of knowledge is taken up in Chapter Five.
process. Because of the very large volume of press releases available for this time period, the content was narrowed by conducting a keyword search using “NATO” and “EU.” In the case of the main government web portal, the large volume of featured news stories, mostly from the HINA news agency, was further narrowed by including articles that had relevance ratings of fifty percent or higher in the keyword search results.

Finally, a number of downloadable materials, in the form of pdf documents, were included in the dataset. The first of these is a set of English-language bulletins called *Croatia in Focus*, which aims to inform non-Croatian audiences (and members of the Croatian diaspora) about the activities of the Croatian government. In order to maintain consistency with the temporal scale for press releases, I looked at issues of the bulletin dating from 2007 to January 2009 (which, at the time of writing, is the most recent edition). Additionally, I examined two key strategy documents. One, the *Strategic Defence Review*, is featured in English on the Ministry of Defense website. This document, which is fifty-two pages in length, was released in November 2005. Although this is outside of the temporal scale established for the data collection, this was the most recent incarnation of the *Strategic Defence Review*, and it was included due to its centrality to the government’s preparation for Euro-Atlantic integration. Similarly, the

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9 Additional keywords, such as “Atlantic” and “integration” were tested, but produced mostly overlapping search results.

10 HINA (Hrvatska izvještajna novinska agencija) is a news agency that produces a large amount of information, for Croatian audiences, as well as audiences outside of Croatia, including foreign governments, NGOs, and business interests. Services include daily English-language news digests and bulletins (http://websrv2.hina.hr/hina/web/index.action).
Croatian Armed Forces Long-Term Development Plan 2006 - 2015 (ninety-nine pages in length and also available from the Ministry of Defense website) was released in June 2006, but was meant to guide the drive toward NATO membership and subsequent military activity through 2015. The content of these documents, and the choice to present them in English, is strongly indicative of the Croatian government’s aim of using them to demonstrate key aspects of Croatia’s military and foreign policy preparedness in the context of impending Euro-Atlantic membership.

The materials were screened for relevance to the research topic, and then subjected to a thematic analysis which identified commonly occurring themes in the dialogue (Maxwell, 2005). Three major themes emerged from the analysis as particularly significant: Firstly, the government website content constructed an image of Croatia as both a key regional leader for stability and peace, as well as a glowing international example of reform; secondly, tropes of secular morality and national sacrifice were deployed in order to construct Croatia as a virtuous society uniquely deserving of membership in the Euro-Atlantic community; and thirdly, an emphasis on geoeconomic—rather than geopolitical—reasoning was often featured in order to present Croatia as a rational and pragmatic global actor who has fully internalized the neoliberal logics of marketization perpetuated by the United States and the European Union. The manner in which Balkanism and securitization intersected in various ways in the self-representations illustrates that policy makers’ discursive practices are shaped by a metageography of scales as a nested hierarchy, with particular security-identity constructions aimed at audiences at particular scales as perceived by political elites.
**Croatia as a Regional Leader and International Example**

The self-representation of Croatia as a key promoter of stability within the Southeastern European region, as well as an example of modernity, progress, and reform, was the most prominent theme to emerge from the analysis. This image was constructed in a number of ways, with several sub-themes comprising it. Among these sub-themes were an emphasis upon Croatia’s recent contributions to global security; the ways in which “Homeland War” (the name used by Croats to refer to the 1990s war of secession from Yugoslavia) experiences have prepared Croatia for Euro-Atlantic integration; and the usage of ‘nesting Balkanisms,’ in order to send pointed messages about what Croatia is not, to be juxtaposed with positive notions of what Croatia is. The sub-themes demonstrate the ways in which self-representations are packaged for audiences perceived as existing at particular scales, with the intersections of Balkan identity and security imperatives forming differing strategies for the ‘domestic,’ ‘regional,’ and ‘international’ communities. All of these ideas were mobilized, often within a single text, in order to highlight the various aspects of Croatia’s collective history and identity that make the country particularly well-suited to NATO and the EU, and that make integration into these institutions an obvious ‘next step’ in the evolution of Croatia’s foreign policy since it gained independence in 1991.

The language about Croatia’s military, economic, and foreign policy progress, and its unique standing in Southeastern Europe, appeared frequently throughout all of the data sources. News stories and speeches from Croatian leaders and from U.S. and European leaders were used repeatedly to construct Croatia as an indispensible player in ‘Europe’s new south.’ One way in which this was done was to point out how rapidly
Croatia has evolved from being a customer of security to a provider of security. The focus of the international community a mere fifteen years ago as a site of violence and instability, Croatia now deploys hundreds of its soldiers to places such as the Sudan for EU peace missions and Afghanistan for NATO operations. This was often highlighted by Gordan Jandroković, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, who noted that “within a relatively short time, from being a country where peacekeeping missions were deployed, Croatia has become a country that participates in peacekeeping missions throughout the world.”

However, Croatian governmental actors do not simply present these activities as Croatian military units doing the bidding of arguably more powerful global actors (which is a criticism often leveled at the government from those in Croatian society who oppose NATO and/or EU membership); rather, such discussions typically present Croatia as figuring prominently in the very policy that directs these activities. As Jandroković asserted elsewhere in the same speech, “Croatia, from its position as an object of world policy, has taken a great stride forward and put itself in the position of a country which co-decides on the most important issues of world policy.” While the emphasis on Croatia’s contributions to global security appear to be aimed at international audiences, as markers of Croatia’s indispensability to the Euro-Atlantic community, the assertions that Croatia is a key ‘decider’ simultaneously aim to persuade domestic audiences that Croatia will maintain its sovereignty as a part of that community.

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12 Ibid.
Another common focus was that of Croatia’s position of leadership in the Southeastern European region (one prominent notion of regional scale in these rhetorics), with Croatian government representatives taking every opportunity possible to promote Croatia’s purported role in bringing stability to the region following nearly a decade of conflict. Carefully sidestepping discussion of persistent problems in Croatia, some (such as corruption and organized crime) that have at times threatened progress toward Euro-Atlantic integration (Hendrickson, 2006), state elites instead emphasized Croatia’s efforts toward favorable relations between the states of Southeastern Europe. This was evident as Jandroković noted that

Regional cooperation is one of the pillars of Croatian foreign policy. Our Euro-Atlantic integration process sets a good example and encourages all the countries in the region of South-East Europe. Croatian membership in the Alliance will present a strong additional impetus to promote good and open neighborhood relations, ensuring further regional stability and prosperity as well.  

Such points were often reinforced with press releases featuring praise from foreign governments. A large number of stories in the Croatia in Focus bulletins, for example, were headlined with titles such as “Strong Czech support for Croatia’s membership in NATO and EU.” In this particular story, it was noted that former Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek and former Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader shared their views on the political situation in the region, concluding that Croatia “was a true leader and a factor of stabilisation in the region.” These pointed references to external validation elucidate the deeply scalar thinking involved in matters of international integration.

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13 Quote from speech posted at


14 Croatia in Focus, April 2008, pg. 9.
Jandroković, for his part, accords the requisite acknowledgement of regional responsibilities within Southeastern Europe. At the same time, the Croatian government bulletins’ copious inclusions of praise from other European leaders indicate the need for recognition from the broader Euro-Atlantic region. Validation at one scale, it would seem, is required in order for Croatia to become a viable member in a broader-scale political collective, according to the nested scalar logic of integration.

Also within this theme, Croatia’s actions in the Homeland War were drawn upon frequently in English-language government website content in order to enhance the image of Croatia as a country with many important qualities to offer the security remits of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the European Union. The uniqueness of Croatia’s wartime experiences were invoked throughout the speeches, press releases, strategy documents, and bulletins in order to highlight important assets and capabilities that Croatia can bring to Euro-Atlantic institutions. As Ivo Sanader stated in an interview for *Croatia in Focus*,

> Since we are one of the very few countries that has experienced war on its own territory in recent times, I think that this mentality of decisiveness in defending of territory is something that we can bring to the alliance …we have a lot of experience in trying to reconcile people and bringing them together in a peaceful way.\(^{15}\)

Where the war crimes and wrong-doings of other entities, particularly of Serbia, were often pointed out, for Croatia’s part, past conduct in conflict was represented with language such as “mentality of decisiveness in defending of territory.” Similar ideas were found in the text of the Ministry of Defense homepage, which stated that

\(^{15}\) *Croatia in Focus*, April 2008, pg. 13.
the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia have grown into a respectable and well-organised armed force during the Homeland War of independence. Many military analysts consider that the defence of the Croatian territory was successful, resulting in final military victory. Military tactics and strategy were carried out directly in practice and that is unique in the world.\footnote{Found at \url{http://www.osrh.hr/data/about_en.html}.}

Hence, while certain Croatian actions during the Homeland War could be construed as a liability for an international military alliance (and indeed constituted a key issue in EU accession), Croatian political elites have re-presented them as valuable exercises in defense operations that endow Croatia with the experience necessary to actively participate in the security mandates of the Euro-Atlantic institutions. As the text from the Ministry of Defense website makes clear, Croatia’s qualifications as a military power are represented as being unique within the Euro-Atlantic community precisely because of the scale at which the Croatian armed forces were tested during the 1990s conflict—that is, the scale of their own nation-state territory. However, the way in which territorial defense uniquely qualifies Croatia for broader-scale, extra-territorial operations is never explicitly spelled out. Rather, the novelty of a European country having fought on its own territory in the post-World War II era is meant to speak for itself.

A final way in which Croatian government website content worked to construct Croatia as a vital international and regional force for reform, peace, and stability was alluded to in the previous paragraph. That is, many texts employed ‘nesting Balkanisms’ (Bakić-Hayden, 1995) as a political tactic by juxtaposing positive constructions of Croatia with negative constructions of Croatia’s regional other, neighboring Serbia. This was sometimes achieved with sharp references to the Homeland War, such as “we are
looking towards the future, but we know very well who was the aggressor, and from where the war was initiated.\textsuperscript{17} With this clear reference to Serbia’s actions in the war, former Minister of Foreign Affairs Jandroković presented Croatia as eager to progress beyond past differences and less ‘enlightened’ moments in regional history, precisely by portraying Serbia as acting erratically—both in the past, and possibly in the future. Indeed, the notion that Serbia has not been able to ‘move on,’ particularly when accompanied with references to the ongoing dispute with Kosovo, was used in order to allow Croatian elites to make prescriptive statements such as: “If it wants to go forward, Serbia must face the legacy of Milošević’s regime.”\textsuperscript{18} The notion of nesting Balkanisms is, in itself, a fundamentally scalar concept, as it evokes a geography of progressive scales at which a country or culture is more or less Balkan than its neighbors, depending upon the ‘granularity’ with which ones views them.

The deployment of nesting Balkanisms served to buttress Croatian political elites’ constructions of Croatia as the most progressive, enlightened, and benign presence in the region, sustaining an image of Croatia as more ‘Western’ and less ‘Balkan’ than the other former Yugoslav republics (Rasza and Lindstrom, 2004). As this signifies, Balkanism, a discourse the West has historically aimed at the countries of Southeastern Europe (Todorova, 1997), is sometimes wielded as a political weapon between the countries of the region. This is particularly important in light of the scalar implications of Euro-

\textsuperscript{17} Quote from speech posted at http://www.mypei.hr/custompages/static/hrv/templates/frt_govori_en.asp?id=322.

\textsuperscript{18} Quote from speech posted at http://www.mypei.hr/custompages/static/hrv/templates/frt_govori_en.asp?id=322.
Atlantic integration for Croatia. While the process has essentially reified the Western Balkans as an entity to be “dealt with” via the accession processes, it has required Croats to imagine how they would break with the negative legacies of ‘belonging to’ this region in order to be worthy of membership in the broader-scale Euro-Atlantic and European entities. Ultimately, though, there has been recognition that the regional-scale belonging (to the Western Balkans) will not wane in importance once Croatia becomes a fully Euro-Atlantic state, as regional leadership will remain an imperative. Speaking about NATO accession in 2008, former Prime Minister Sanader explicitly employed ‘Balkanism’ in suggesting a way forward for the region: "Our common goal must be the integration of the entire southeast of Europe with the frameworks of a new undivided Europe .... Everything else would be a waste of time and going back to the unwanted Balkanisation that has recently been overcome with great difficulty^19^" (emphasis added for this essay).

This quote from Sanader exhibits a rare, explicit use of the term "Balkanization" in this period, citing it as the key threat to the region. Without elaborating on the meaning of the term, Sanader invokes a taken-for-granted understanding adopted from international usage: backward, ethnic divisiveness. The label of "Balkan" is in official discourse a perjorative term and signals to Croatian society the un-desirability of remaining in the past, a past without NATO or EU membership. The integration of the entire region into Euro-Atlantic frameworks is again represented as the only sane, civilized, and peaceful way forward for Southeastern Europe. At the same time, the

quintessential Euro-Atlantic moral principle of "unity in diversity" is the only vision that can save the Balkans from further, violent confrontations.

By the time current President Ivo Josipović addressed the Council of Europe in June 2010, the rhetoric surrounding Serbia had softened considerably. This is likely due, in part, to the fact that Josipović himself has embodied a more conciliatory stance toward the region (for example, he formally apologized to Bosnia for Croatia’s actions in the Bosnian conflict shortly after taking office in 2009). The softer language also seems to signal growing awareness on the part of Croatian political elites that directing accusations of Balkanism at their regional neighbors could only produce so much political mileage.

At the Council of Europe, Josipović asserted,

We are intensively promoting cooperation with our neighbours in order to close the painful chapter of recent history and ensure lasting peace and security in the region. This is a condition of our progress, but also of the progress of our neighbours with whom we share an increasing number of interests and with whom we are gradually closing open issues.\(^{20}\)

More than just another instance of a Croatian official asserting the importance of Croatia's example in guiding the other Western Balkan countries toward Euro-Atlantic integration, Josipović’s speech also alludes to the idea that leaving behind the region’s ‘Balkan-ness’ (i.e., the “painful” history explicitly mentioned) is the overarching security imperative for Croatia and its neighbors. This notion of shedding Balkan identity in order to gain security exhibits acceptance of the rationale underlying the Euro-Atlantic community’s absorption of the Southeastern European region.

In cultivating an image of Croatia as a pillar of peace, stability, and progressiveness both internationally and in the Southeastern European region, the Croatian government has utilized language that seeks to both persuade the Euro-Atlantic community that they (Croatians) have internalized the lessons of a difficult recent past and to convince domestic audiences about the virtue of leading the Southeastern European region into a Euro-Atlantic future. Simultaneously, decisive action and leadership at the nation-state and regional (Western Balkan) scales are presented to international audiences as evidence of Croatia’s considerable preparedness to participate in governance and the provision of security at the broadest (most global) scales. A primary component of this tactic has been for Croatian elites to draw upon the Homeland War experience and represent it as a positive aspect of Croatian history and identity, providing Croatia with important assets to offer its Euro-Atlantic partners. As the next section will detail, the Homeland War has also been invoked in a distinct but related theme: tropes of morality and sacrifice in Croatian government discussions of Euro-Atlantic integration.

**Tropes of Secular Morality**\(^\text{21}\) and National Sacrifice

\(^{21}\) The word “secular” is used here to distinguish the present topic from religious, and specifically, Catholic morality. As has been noted by previous scholars (Ramet, 2002; Bellamy, 2003; Bremer, 2008), the Roman Catholic Church is an extremely prominent and influential institution in Croatia and thus plays an important role in shaping notions of morality in Croatian society. The sort of morality under analysis here, however, is a secular one that has to do with conceptions of loyalty (both to the nation and to Europe) and the justness of the 1990s conflict.
In contrast to the previous theme, in which Balkanism (in its pejorative understanding of violent divisiveness) was constructed as an identity to be left behind in order to enjoy the security of Euro-Atlantic membership, memories of the Homeland War have also been selectively invoked in ways that make positive use of Balkanist discourse. Whereas the wars of Yugoslav dissolution have largely been viewed by Western actors as synonymous with ‘Balkan’ identity: irrational, backward, and volatile (representing a persistent threat to European stability), Croatian political elites have also creatively framed the war for independence as moral, just, and consistent with past Croatian sacrifices on behalf of the West.

This section illuminates how the war memories were woven, along with other facets of the collective Croatian national experience, into tropes of (secular) morality and national sacrifice in government website content. Ideas of both national suffering and national victory were commonly utilized in order to present Croatia as particularly virtuous and deserving of membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Importantly, in carving out an outward identity of morality, state elites ostensibly sought a balance in portraying Croatia as unique in its collective national experience, and yet, in its values and goals, an integral part of Europe, and a society that has always embraced ‘Western’ norms of modernity. As in the previous theme, the evidence presented here suggests a scalar hierarchy of characteristics. Sacrifices at the individual scale in the Homeland War create a collective, national-scale virtuousness that makes Croatia particularly suited to the ubiquitously-cited yet amorphous scale of the Euro-Atlantic or ‘Western’ space.

In one news article featured on the main government portal, former P.M. Sanader was quoted in underscoring Croatia’s self-reliance during the war, while also carefully
acknowledging the contributions of its allies. Nevertheless, he emphasized, Croatia had fought hard for its achievements and for its ‘rightful’ place in Europe, fending off those (read: Serbia) who would threaten Croatian territorial integrity: “Croatia has succeeded. Croatia will never be the object of others' territorial aspirations,” Sanader said, adding that none of the modern European countries had gone through a more difficult path towards independence than Croatia.22” At the same time, however, Sanader repeatedly emphasized that in terms of its values and vision for the future, Croatia was just like other European or Western countries, asserting that “freedom, peace, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, national minority rights, a free and responsible market economy - these are the values our citizens have opted for when Croatia gained independence.23” Consistent with the notion of Croatia ‘coming home,’ as quoted from Sanader in the introduction to this essay, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration also characterized Euro-Atlantic integration as a natural next step for his country because, “as is well known, Croatia has always – in terms of history, culture and values – belonged to the community of western democracies.24”

The simultaneous self-representations of Croatia’s uniqueness in Europe and fundamental alignment with European/Western culture have their roots in some of the


23 Ibid.

commonly-cited convictions about Croatian history, identity, and security. These tenets can be found in the introduction to a Croatian history book entitled *Hrvatski ratnici kroz stoljeća* (*Croatian Warriors through the Centuries*), written by Croatian historians Tomislav and Višeslav Aralica. The introductory chapter itself may be read as an exercise in self-representation, as it is presented in Croatian, German, and English (while the remaining chapters are presented only in the Croatian language), suggesting that it is directed at Western audiences as well as at Croatian readers.

The security-identity constructions presented in the book connect with those in contemporary representations of elite Croatian political discourse. Asserting that Croatian history is, in essence, a military history, the authors emphasize that the warrior role has repeatedly been forced upon the Croats (who are never the aggressors) as Western European powers have relied on Croatia as a buffer against Eastern incursions (most notably from the Ottoman Turks). In this struggle, they note, “Croatia earned and bore, with every right and in all honor, the epithet it had won in blood, an epithet admitted by the whole of Europe: *antemurale christianitatis*, the Bulwark of Christianity” (Aralica and Aralica, 1996: 20). To many, this role has demanded of Croatia significant political and cultural sacrifices: while large numbers of Croats were pressed into military service for, among others, the Venetians, Hungarians, and Austrians, these more powerful entities enjoyed adequate security to develop wealth and culture. This, the authors claim, explains contemporary Croatia’s ‘backwardness.’ At the same time, they note, Croatians have historically demonstrated a great capacity to learn, adapt, and innovate, embracing Western European values and cultures, but also developing their own artistic, philosophical, and architectural traditions (Aralica and Aralica, 1996).
The narrative of sacrificing national security and development for the benefit of Western neighbors has also tinged relations with Slovenia, the country to Croatia’s immediate West. This has been particularly evident throughout the Euro-Atlantic integration process, in which the Slovenians, who historically were spared much of the ‘buffer’ role and more recently avoided the worst of the violence in the 1990s, outpaced Croatia to both NATO and EU accession in 2004. On the one hand, the two countries have shared an affinity of common historical closeness to Western political and economic structures due to their location in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Woodward, 1993).

However, Slovenia’s speedy integration process has created some political and cultural distance between it and Croatia, as Croatia has, at times, joined the other Western Balkan states in a pattern of simultaneously resenting and aiming to emulate Slovenia (Lindstrom, 2008). For their part, Slovenian political elites acted to shed their ‘Balkanness’ by promoting their country as the crucial interlocutor between Europe and the Balkans, yet from a position unquestionably within Europe (Rupel, 2001).

In the Slovenian-Croatian border dispute, which temporarily blockaded Croatia’s accession negotiations with the EU, Croatian political elites sought to contradict such Slovenian self-representations by defining Croatia’s position and actions as more in line with European values and culture. In June 2009, just three months prior to a breakthrough in Croatian-Slovenian relations which finally unblocked Croatia’s entry talks, Croatia’s then Prime Minister Sanader made a statement during a government session (publicized in a press release on the government web portal) that characterized
Slovenia’s behavior as “using its EU member status as blackmail.” Sanader went on to assert that this is “unacceptable and non-European behavior,” calling on Slovenia to “stop with it and lend a helping hand to Croatia in its membership talks.” In this rather overt effort to cast Slovenian practices as ‘non-European,’ Sanader was, of course, simultaneously casting Croatia’s practices as ‘European.’ These characterizations of the situation made rather pointed, albeit implicit, equations of European-ness with behavior that is moral, ethical, and civilized.

Another key sub-theme within the tropes of morality and national sacrifice was the way in which the individual and national scales were linked in Croatian government website content. Within this sub-theme, the actions of soldiers, firemen, police officers, and other ‘heroic’ figures in the Homeland War were frequently held up as examples of ideal behavior for all Croatian citizens, and a key factor in Croatia’s successful invitation (and eventual accession) to NATO. On March 31, 2009, just one day before Croatia’s official joining of NATO, a ceremony was held to memorialize the eighteenth anniversary of the Plitvice Action, in which Josip Jović became the first officially recognized victim of the Homeland War. A press release on the Ministry of Defense website reported on the memorial ceremony, explaining,

In their addresses all speakers emphasized the dimension of the sacrifice of the first Croatian policeman and the importance of preserving the value of the Homeland war, and memories of all Croatian victims...If there were not their deeds, Croatia would not achieve its goals,’ Jadranka Kosor said, adding that the sacrifice of Jović proved that the Homeland War was just, defensive and

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26 Ibid, emphasis added.
liberating….Noting that Jović was one of about fifteen thousand of Croatian victims fallen in the war, [Defense] Minister Vukelić concluded that they were merit for the upcoming Croatia's joining NATO.²⁷

In this way, government actors overtly connected the sacrifice of individuals’ deaths in the Homeland War to the integrity of Croatia’s conduct of the hostilities, using the image of victimized bodies to vindicate the actions of the state. Moreover, all of this is intertwined with notions of Croatia’s rightful place in NATO, and NATO membership as the ultimate way to make sense of the deaths of individual Croatians. As Defense Minister Vukelić concluded at the memorial ceremony that day, “Joining NATO is our debt to knights who have built their lives in the foundation of the Croatian freedom.”²⁸

Here, NATO accession is represented by Vukelić as an act of national gratitude and reverence for the long-ago sacrifices of Croatian knights. This constructs Euro-Atlantic integration as the natural and obvious culmination of Croatia's 'centuries-old dream' (Bellamy, 2003) of independence, sovereignty, and a deservedly strong position on the international stage. The narrative of brave Croatian knights (historically) and selfless contemporary Croatian soldiers emphasizes the idea that at a national scale, Croatia has always comprised individuals who possess the needed values to strengthen the relations of international security governance at the Euro-Atlantic scale.

Finally, messages about values such as selflessness were connected to the individual scale in discussions of Croatian national identity. This mutual construction of morality between the national and individual scales of identity was evident in a Croatia in Focus story about a speech Sanader made to a group of Croatian-Americans in New

²⁷ Found at http://www.osrh.hr/arhiva_en.asp.

²⁸ Ibid.
York City. The speech, and its prominent positioning in the official government bulletin, seemed to be aimed as much at audiences within Croatia as it was at members of the Croatian diaspora. In discussing “a new paradigm of being Croat,” Sanader said that it “transcended historical divisions in the Croatian nation, was oriented towards the future and always put national interests above party interests and politics.” In this way, individual Croatians—whether within the Croatian state or within the diaspora—were encouraged to support the government’s goals and imperatives of Euro-Atlantic integration to raise its international profile.

Also in these explicit overtures to the Croatian Diaspora, the above news story featured Sanader’s expressions of gratitude to Croatian Americans for their help to Croatia during the Homeland War, stressing that Croatia would not be in the UN Security Council or on its way to NATO and EU membership if it had not been for the unity of Croats living in Croatia and the emigrant community. Such overtures to the Croatian diaspora in the United States constitute a key aspect of the multi-scalar geopolitical practice of self-representation, as they provide a platform for reaching an audience that is at once both international and domestic, as many members of Croatian communities outside of Croatia retain strong ties to political processes in the country. At the same time, these active communities also provide a link to a key Euro-Atlantic partner, the United States. The diaspora, in this sense, makes the Croatian nation itself multi-scalar, which shapes the discursive strategies of elites of the Croatian state when conjuring representations for the international community.

29 *Croatia in Focus*, January 2009, pg. 12.
While the support of Croatian Americans does not necessarily present a fraught issue, the sacrifices of veterans of the Homeland War (literally called “branitelji” or “defenders” in the Croatian language) have constituted a particular challenge for Croatian political elites throughout the Euro-Atlantic integration process. As a group, these veterans have occupied a special place in society in general, and in rhetoric about Euro-Atlantic integration more specifically, where they are held up as heroes of the nation who have made Croatia’s Euro-Atlantic moment possible. For example, Josipović stated in his 2010 Council of Europe address that the achievement of full Euro-Atlantic membership would fulfill “the hopes of all the citizens who invested everything they had into the process of creation of our state, from their ideals, strength and physical strength to their most valuable resource - their own lives.” This statement connects the morality of the Homeland War, or the fight for an independent Croatia, to the morality of the Euro-Atlantic imperative itself, in a way that seeks to obscure international misgivings about Croatia’s conduct in the war, while also convincing Croatians at home that a Euro-Atlantic Croatia is, indeed, the sort of Croatia they or their loved ones fought for.

However, this narrative was complicated by the fact that a key condition for accession both to NATO and to the EU was to turn the famed war generals Gotovina and Markac over to the ICTY in the Hague. When the generals received a guilty verdict in 2011, Croatian leaders were put in the difficult position of responding in a way that would not anger the Euro-Atlantic community, but would satisfy outraged Croatian citizens—that is, a multi-scalar discursive strategy was quite clearly needed in addressing this outcome. Hence, Josipović quickly assured the Croatian public that the verdict

30 Found at http://hub.coe.int/address-by-ivo-josipovic.
would not “bring into question the legality of Homeland War, or Operation Storm\textsuperscript{31},” while Jadranka Kosor asserted, “We are not afraid. We are proud of our victory.”\textsuperscript{32} Over time, the convictions of Generals Gotovina and Markac came to be viewed as another national sacrifice necessary to secure Croatia’s place in the Euro-Atlantic community\textsuperscript{33}, though their subsequent, successful appeal has overturned the ICTY’s original decision. The common tropes of morality and sacrifice around Homeland War veterans continue to feature prominently in official government documents and rhetoric, as the current “Government Program” released by the newly elected government in December 2011 asserted: “The government has determined the Homeland war was a defensive and just war …We will not repeal or even diminish a single right [accorded] to the participants and victims of the Homeland War” (author’s translation).\textsuperscript{34}

Thus far, the essay has focused upon the more cultural, identity, and values-oriented aspects of self-representation in Croatian government narratives of Euro-Atlantic integration. These may all be viewed as constituting geopolitical logics that reflect, on the one hand, the ways in which the integration process reifies a metageography of hierarchical scale; and on the other, the multi-scalar strategies that guide the rhetoric of political elites in the accession process. The third and final theme presents a more pragmatic and ‘rational’ side to the self-representations found on government websites, that which I will refer to as geoeconomic logics. The geoeconomic reasoning employed

\textsuperscript{31} This was the major military operation that returned Serb-occupied territory to the Croatian state in 1995, but has also been the primary focus of war crimes trials resulting from the Croatian conflict.


\textsuperscript{33} Based on conversations during fieldwork in Croatia.

\textsuperscript{34} Found at http://www.vlada.hr/naslovnica/novosti_i_najave/2011/prosinac/program_vlade_obrazovanje_i_znanost_kljenije_su_za_razvoj_drustva
in discussions of Euro-Atlantic integration certainly does not exist in isolation from the geopolitical reasoning, and indeed the two can be seen to converge to produce the representations explored in the following section. Moreover, as with the above themes, the geoeconomic logics are tinged with a pervasive sense of hierarchical scale, not only with regard to security regimes, but also with regard to a concept of nested economies—nation-state, regional, and global.

**Geoeconomic Logics Underlying Security Integration**

The apparent ongoing shift from geopolitical reasoning to geoeconomic reasoning in international affairs (Cowen, 2010; Cowen and Smith, 2009; Mercille, 2008) has meant a decreased emphasis on exclusively geopolitical concerns, such as the creation and defense of nation-state territories, and a growing emphasis upon the marketization and neoliberalization of national governments’ activities—both within their borders and in international affairs (Cowen and Smith, 2009). Many aspects of Euro-Atlantic enlargement in general, and Croatia’s Euro-Atlantic integration in particular, which is taking place in a post-conflict and post-communist context, may be viewed through this lens. While this phenomenon is most striking in discussions of NATO accession (as NATO contains a much less overt economic remit than does the EU), the online texts repeatedly pointed out that the security and stability fostered by NATO membership are crucial to the increased economic activities (tourism, trade, and foreign direct investment) that accompany EU candidacy and accession. Moreover, geoeconomic reasoning is highly relevant to the idea of EU expansion as a securitizing process, as the original rationale behind the EU was security and stability achieved through economic
interdependence. Given the representations highlighted in the previous sections, Croatian political elites have readily sought to demonstrate to the international community that the logic of intertwining economic and security imperatives has been thoroughly internalized at the national scale. Hence, Croatia is presented as a ready and responsible player in the broader security regime of Euro-Atlantic institutions, but also in global neoliberal capitalism.

Many of these ideas were evident in the military and security documents found on Croatian government websites. The Strategic Defense Review, as well as the Croatian Armed Forces Long-Term Development Plan, both discussed the decreasing importance of what they called “the individual, territorially-based self-defense concept” in favor of a collective, multinational notion of security. Moreover, the newer, collective notion of security was promoted alongside admissions that the security environment for Croatia and for the rest of Europe is quite favorable at this time. However, an expanded notion of security recognizes the contemporary nature of global capitalism, in which any potential member of the Euro-Atlantic security regime must be competitive. In the context of NATO and EU accession, this has meant demonstrating that from the scale of the individual citizen to that of the nation-state, Croatia has adopted the necessary geo-strategic thinking in order to maintain stability in the Western Balkan region and to fulfill the promise of security via integration. Thus, what I found in discussions of NATO on Croatian government websites was an overriding emphasis of the economic gains associated with a multinational security apparatus.

I do not wish to argue that this is, at its core, an economically-driven process, with the cultural appeals used solely to build and maintain support for geoeconomic strategies.
Rather, the geoeconomic reasoning that featured prominently in much of the web content consulted for this project suggests that the lines between political and economic rationales (which have never been distinctly separate considerations, anyway) are increasingly blurred in the political rhetoric surrounding integration. In keeping with the scope of this essay, I will explore this reasoning as a significant part of the multi-scalar practices of self-representation on the part of the Croatian government. These practices have tailored messages for both domestic and international audiences and exhibit the sort of worldview that international and supra-national integration entrenches: a security landscape in which practices at “lower” scales must complement and support the needs of “higher” scales, such as the EU and the broader Euro-Atlantic community. In short, this seemed to be a way in which the government demonstrated that it can now reason and speak in terms of the neoliberalization and marketization that continue to transform the conduct of international relations. As has been pointed out, this transformation has, in large part, involved the marketization of military and security apparatuses (Cowen and Smith, 2009).

Interestingly, much of the discussion of the intersection of economic prosperity and military or physical security echoed similar discussions found in European Defense Agency bulletins posted on the European Union website. The key similarity is the way in which a circular logic seems to be applied to defense integration in both cases, where economic development is presented as being integral to military security, but at the same time, military security is set up as the indispensable precursor to economic development. For example, the Strategic Defense Review lists among Croatia’s security objectives “the establishment of an economically well-off, stable society that will in the long-term be
able to build and sustain effective security mechanisms,\textsuperscript{35} suggesting that economic stability and prosperity must precede new mechanisms for physical or military security.

At the same time, however, when aiming to persuade the Croatian public that NATO accession was a good and proper goal for Croatia, government leaders would often deploy arguments such as: “Croatia's admission to NATO would mean that the national economy is considered to be in line with leading world economies and safe for doing business and making investments,\textsuperscript{36}” and “Apart from their mutual trade, member-countries can engage in trade with NATO as an organization.\textsuperscript{37}” This latter statement is also significant in that it seems to indicate that Croatia may seek to develop a more robust military-industrial complex as part of its new defense identity within NATO and eventual membership in an increasingly securitized European Union. The June 2010 military cooperation agreement signed with Serbia, which largely hinges on potential cooperation between the countries’ military industries, also speaks to this development. These arguments highlight the scalar logic of a competitive national economy nested within the broader regional and global economies, but they also recognize the Euro-Atlantic community (embodied in NATO as an organization) as a new, regional scale of economic activity.

\textsuperscript{35} Strategic Defense Review, 2005, pg. 9.

\textsuperscript{36} Found at http://www.vlada.hr/en/naslovnica/novosti_i_najave/2008/ozujak/predsjednik_vlade_ulazak_u_nato_priznanje_je_pouzdanosti_hrvatskoga_gospodarstva.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
Ultimately, it seems that the reframing of NATO’s *raison d’être* at a supranational scale—from a purely military alliance into a movement associated with peace, democratization, and legitimate European-ness (Kuus, 2009; Baran, 2004; Gheciu, 2008)—has prompted shifts in the self-representations mobilized by the Croatian government. Such shifts were evident in various online texts which repeatedly pointed to the ubiquitous role of NATO in Croatian everyday life: a guarantor of security, a force for modernization, and a mechanism for economic growth and stability. In much the same way, Croatia’s transformation for NATO was represented in very sweeping terms, with the online government bulletin noting, “Croatia’s reform achievements are irreversible. Not only have the defense and national security sectors undergone reforms, but the whole of Croatian society has been deeply changed as well.\(^\text{38}\)"

The reference to the deep changes in Croatian society implies shifts in values and behavior at the individual scale—in other words, that individual Croatians have internalized and accepted the new, vital role that the alliance was to play in their lives. The need for individuals to embody the new Euro-Atlantic principals in everyday life has remained a key part of Croatian political rhetoric, as when President Josipović observed in 2010,

Transition of a society based on planned economy into a democratic and free society distinguished by rule of law and the free market is a project of major scale and distant horizons. It calls for the effort of all social structures, all citizens and of every individual regardless of his position on the social ladder.\(^\text{39}\)

\(^{38}\) *Croatia in Focus*, April 2008, pg. 16.

\(^{39}\) Found at http://hub.coe.int/address-by-ivo-josipovic.
Josipović was, in this quote, connecting the task of establishing these 'Western' principles of security, freedom, and free market capitalism to individuals at all scales and all sectors of society. This can be read as an effort to instill a sense of responsibility and ownership over economic reforms in individuals; in other words, constructing a neoliberal notion of citizenship within Croatian society.

As an update on the status of the NATO accession process, published in the April 2008 *Croatia in Focus*, noted, “so far, there have been numerous activities across the country to inform and educate the public, which have reached out to all groups within the Croatian society.” Additional sources noted that the public has been continuously made aware of how NATO membership would enhance their country’s status as a prime tourist destination and recipient of foreign direct investments. Hence, it seems that the process of NATO accession has included the attempted construction of a new kind of neoliberal subject in Croatia, one who views the goal of economic security as being inextricably linked with the imperative of membership in the world’s most powerful military alliance. Further evidence of neoliberal subject formation can be seen in an economic initiative presented in the June 2008 edition of *Croatia in Focus*. The article explained:

> The Department for Bilateral Economic Relations, International Economic Co-operation Board of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration estimated that the experience and knowledge gained in mine clearance of the Croatian territory could be used for starting the project "Mine Clearance as export product"…This Counseling on mine clearance as Croatian export product was welcomed as a step forward in defining Croatian economic diplomacy needed for Croatian companies for moving into a foreign market.\(^{41}\)

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\(^{40}\) *Croatia in Focus*, April 2008, pg. 18.

\(^{41}\) *Croatia in Focus*, July 2008, pg. 7
This initiative is interesting in that it takes a security issue that quite clearly connects with an aspect of the ‘Balkan’ legacy—that is, the problem of land mines remaining in the country in the post-conflict era—and re-envisions it as the sort of economic opportunity that would be applauded by the Euro-Atlantic community. The scalar underpinnings to this project are clear: what was previously a regional and local problem is now an added opening into the global economy for entrepreneurial Croatians.

In sum, the “Mine clearance as export product” initiative, as well as the other exemplars in this section, indicate the intertwining of Balkanism, security imperatives, and neoliberal subject formation, as the Croatian government voices the importance of finding market value in security and humanitarian activities, as well as the need to think entrepreneurially about Croatia's recent war experience. The inclusion of geoeconomic logics in Croatian elites’ discursive strategies in the Euro-Atlantic integration process further illustrates the importance of multi-scalar geopolitical practices in an accession country. The quotes captured in this section point to a heightened awareness on the part of Croatian political leaders that they must prove their society’s readiness for the neoliberal security regime of the Euro-Atlantic community, while at the same time demonstrating to the domestic audience the multiple benefits of membership in the community: enhanced freedom, security, and prosperity for all.

Conclusion

This essay demonstrates that a key aim of Croatian elites’ discursive strategies has been to represent Croatia as already straddling the boundary between the Euro-Atlantic community and ‘everyone else’ by virtue of an historical legacy of defending ‘Western’
values, which was reprised in the recent war for independence. This challenge to a rigid inside/outside metageography of Euro-Atlantic space is especially possible for the Croatian government, given the central characteristic of Balkanism or Balkan identity: the Balkans as Europe’s *partial* other, situated in a liminal space that is neither fully European, nor fully un-European. However, unlike the cases of Bulgaria and Romania expounded upon by Papadimitriou and Gateva (2009), the Western Balkan countries have had to contend with the added challenge of an ongoing post-conflict reconciliation process.

The three empirical themes identified: Croatia as a regional leader and international example; tropes of morality and national sacrifice; and the intertwining of geoeconomics and security imperatives, all reveal the close relationship between Balkanism and securitization that has undergirded the self-representations of the Croatian government throughout the Euro-Atlantic integration process. Diverging from the Balkanist discourses of the 1990s, the new strategies of self-representation borne out of the Euro-Atlantic integration process rarely directly use the terms “Balkan,” “Balkans,” or “Balkanist.” However, rather than signifying a new cultural repertoire, the themes identified in this study show that Balkan-ness remains present in Croatian political elites’ discursive strategies, but is invoked only implicitly. It is alluded to in the ways in which contemporary Croatia is represented vis-à-vis both its former self and its neighbors, as a foil against which the Croatian government can now showcase its new, responsible international role and ‘lessons learned’ from its not-so-distant ‘Balkan’ past.

The thematic analysis demonstrates how multi-scalar geopolitical representations require a delicate balancing act between discursive strategies. On the one hand, Croatian
political elites must persuade their citizens that full Euro-Atlantic membership is a worthy goal through which they will strengthen their security (national, economic, and otherwise) and identity. On the other hand, they must do so in ways that occasionally run the risk of displeasing ‘Western’ governments, as when Croatian political leaders reacted to the convictions of Generals Gotovina and Markac. Interestingly, while moderate Croatian political actors from all major parties have tended to be pro-EU/NATO and draw upon moments in Croatian history such as the Homeland War experience to make their case, these same factors are key to certain brands of Euroskepticism found within the more right-wing and nationalistic political parties and interest groups (Stojic, 2006). Also, it should be noted that despite the constant barrage of messages from the government about the necessity of full membership in the Euro-Atlantic community, there has been substantial skepticism amongst Croatian youth about the costs—economic and otherwise—of Euro-Atlantic integration (Kersan-Škabic and Tomić, 2009).

Given Krajina’s (2009) findings, we may speculate that the discursive strategies of elites in Croatia and other countries in Europe’s liminal spaces are profoundly affirming for EU officials who fret over the perpetual instability of a European identity. It must be quite helpful, in the face of constant challenges to a concretized European identity, to have aspirant ‘members of the family’ continually and adamantly proclaim, in very positive terms, what it means to be ‘Euro-Atlantic’ and to be ‘European.’ My findings, in some respects, show the exercise of agency on the part of political leaders in an accession country, but this agency is, of course, only partial. While the elites are finding their own strategies for coping with the ‘Balkan’ legacy that has dogged their country throughout its accession process, they are always negotiating their security and
identity imperatives within the parameters of what is acceptable, important, and required in the eyes of the Euro-Atlantic community. Because they are ostensibly embedded in a hierarchy of political scales, and ever more so with increasing Euro-Atlantic integration, they are continually compelled to see their own practices and rhetorics as consequential to relations with “broader scales” of political and economic organization, be it NATO or the EU.

Through the lens of the security-identity nexus, we can see that Croatian leaders guiding the country through NATO and EU accession have selectively engaged with Balkan identity, alternately mobilizing it in both positive and negative ways. It remains to be seen how future leaders will wield this carefully crafted image in order to influence international affairs once full Euro-Atlantic membership is achieved. But perhaps in light of this pending Euro-Atlantic status, a question that is more theoretical in nature should be raised. Specifically, to what extent is it helpful to conceptualize the geopolitical practices of political elites in an accession society as multi-scalar? While the analysis clearly suggests that political elites undergoing the accession process operate as everyday realists when it comes to hierarchical, vertical scales, there is also a sense that the accession process reinforces a metageography of inside and outside Euro-Atlantic space. Whether these are competing or complementary conceptualizations of geopolitical practices in the Euro-Atlantic integration process is a compelling theoretical question to be taken up in subsequent research, particularly when the goal is informing policymakers who are navigating these dynamic political geographies.

The findings of this essay also suggest additional implications for the forging of new political identities, and the interplay between existing and emerging subjectivities.
The extent to which elites, and the everyday citizens at which their rhetoric is targeted, continue to operate within a scalar metageography, almost certainly shapes their nested sense of memberships in various political collectives. In one sense, there is the less-defined conception of a Euro-Atlantic community in which Croatians have gained membership, and with which they are meant to identify, in order to support, among other things, the use of their troops in NATO missions abroad. In another sense, there is the (largely) supra-national collective of the European Union, with which Croatians, along with all other EU citizens, are intended to identify increasingly both as they gain full membership, and as European integration deepens over time.

But as the analysis above shows, the international community has required a continued sense of identification with a regional collective—that of the Western Balkans—in order for Croatia to successfully integrate into the broader-scale entities. Indeed, the integration process, which has called on Croatia to be a leader to its region, has profoundly reified the regional scale in this way. And finally, there is the continued sense of identification with the Croatian nation-state, the prism through which all of the other memberships and identities have been represented to Croatians. Thus, for an “accession society” such as Croatia, the embrace of multiple, scalar political identities is deeply important. Additional, ethnographic research is required to investigate the ways in which this construction and reification of nested identities is shaping an emerging “EUropean” subjectivity in Croatia. Particularly at a time when the EU’s cohesion is continually threatened by the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, the interplay between identity, subjectivity, and governance in existing and future member states will be increasingly important to understand.
This essay has illustrated the important ways in which political elites’ discursive strategies bolstered the imperatives and agendas of Euro-Atlantic security governance in the course of Croatia’s Euro-Atlantic integration process. The dominant security-identity discourses analyzed in this research illustrate how the Euro-Atlantic is actively constructed as a key scale of geopolitical belonging, while at the same time, the commonly taken-for-granted scales of national, regional, and global are often reified. The following chapter, which presents the third and final empirical essay, provides a more grounded view how multi-level governance and identity intersect in Croatia’s accession process.
CHAPTER FIVE

“GEESE IN THE FOG”: CONSTRUCTING THE EURO-ASPIRANT SUBJECT IN CROATIA

This essay presents a “peopled” investigation of the European Union accession project in Croatia. Utilizing semi-structured interviews, participant observation, focus groups, and document analysis, the research traces a process of political subject formation that recreates Croatian citizens as citizens who aspire to membership in the EU. Of central concern are the contested processes of knowledge production and consumption that aim to inform and persuade citizens about the imperative of EU accession. The work bridges the body of political geographic literature on the everyday geographies of the nation-state with the burgeoning literature on identities and cosmopolitanism in Europe. The findings highlight the relations of governance in Croatia’s EU accession, revealing how the process of subject formation, which is part and parcel of the process of accession, relies on the deployment of potent identity binaries, primarily that of Balkan vs. Cosmopolitan. The essay concludes by reflecting on the fraught relationship between power/knowledge and political subjectivities, and the implications of this relationship for the multi-level governance of Europe’s Eastern enlargement.

Introduction

In the years 2010 to 2012, during which the research for this essay was conducted, conversations with people in Croatia would occasionally include the expression “like geese in the fog.” It was used to evoke the sense that Croatian society was barreling
toward something rather blindly. That something, of course, was the key foreign policy goal to which Croats were told they, as a society, were aspiring: accession to the European Union. As with any other major policy outcome, the responsible institutions (those of the EU and of Croatian government and civil society) were hard at work for roughly a decade informing and persuading individual citizens about the importance of this project. In practice, this meant taking the notion of Croatia joining the EU and reframing it as the notion of the Croatian citizen becoming an EU citizen. However, as this essay reveals, this was far from a straightforward process of disseminating facts to the public. It instead unfolded as a profoundly contested process of negotiating knowledge, with pervasive and dichotomous conceptions of identity shaping the production and consumption of information about the EU. From this process, we learn how European integration, a profound reconfiguration of political geography, requires the practices and relations of governance to shape sense of self for citizens of an accession country.

The process of European Union enlargement over the last several decades provides a surfeit of evidence that within any given candidate country, multiple positions exist within governments and across public opinion regarding EU accession. Yet, the mere prospect of EU membership, however likely or unlikely it may be for a particular country, or how distant a possibility, inevitably makes that country into a “candidate,” “potential candidate,” “accession,” or “EUro-aspirant” country. Although media coverage of EU affairs, along with statements from the EU itself and from the government of the country in question, make it seem as though the progression from country to “candidate country” occurs instantaneously, with a meeting of EU leaders, or
with the signing of an accession agreement, a country must be constructed as an accession country. More fundamentally, the construction is not of a *country* but of an accession *society*. As the existing literature on EU enlargement shows, the process of constructing the accession society unfolds in a number of ways: through the Europeanization of political party systems, (Innes, 2001; Vachudova, 2006; Fink-Hafner, 2007; Kuzio, 2008) through policy debates amongst political elites and within the media, (Lindstrom, 2008; Obad, 2008; Krajina, 2009) and through efforts of subject formation aimed at everyday citizens (Kuus, 2004, 2007a, and 2009; Jeffrey, 2008 and 2011).

A society is composed of individuals and their group affiliations. Hence, an accession society requires the construction of a particular form of political subject. It is the process of subject formation that is of central concern to this essay, in ways that are, as of yet, relatively neglected in the afore-cited scholarship. As with previous work (especially Kuus, 2004, 2007a and 2009), the present project is interested in how the process of informing everyday citizens about the European Union is carried out. It pays careful attention to the ways in which the EU and candidate country government communicate the meaning of the accession project and its relationship to the needs and interests of candidate country citizens. This essay builds on the existing literature by exploring how knowledge and information about the EU are negotiated by the very citizens who are the target of EU and government messages. The essay seeks to answer the question of how the process of European subject formation is carried out and achieved (or partially achieved) by deploying multifaceted conceptions of identity. It does so through an ethnography of the state, in which both governmental bureaucracy and civil society are observed in carrying out the work of subject formation in Croatia, the
country that is next in line to join the European Union. However, the participants included in the study are not elites, but rather the everyday citizens who comprise the agencies and organizations of the state and civil society. While these individuals were often involved in the work of informing the wider public about EU accession and membership, they were also themselves negotiating the information and debating Croatia’s European future through the lens of identity.

Through ‘peopling’ Croatia’s accession process, the study finds that beneath the perpetual debate about the reliability and completeness of knowledge about the EU, citizens are located between the promise of cosmopolitanism and the legacies of Balkanism. In the end, it is this potent binary of identities that comes to the fore in the (re)construction of Croatia as an accession society. In this way, the essay adds to the existing literatures on ethnography of the state and Europeanization by tracing the ways in which bureaucratic knowledge intersects with historical layers of identity in the latest, and dynamic, spaces of Europe’s Eastern enlargement. It is not so much promises of the future that drive the accession process, but specters of a European, or in this case specifically Balkan, past.

The State, Governance, and Integration

The recent focus in both academic and policy spheres on the reorganization of geopolitical space, has led to the oft-cited assumption that the nation-state is declining in importance, while supra-nationalism and international integration are viewed as phenomena that will increasingly characterize relationships between individuals and their socio-political collectives in the coming decades (Popescu, 2008; Jönsson, Tägil, and
European Union enlargement is frequently noted in the literature as the case *par excellence* of such reorganizations of geopolitical space (Beck, 2009). But just what is happening to the individuals who are supposedly undergoing these tectonic shifts in their socio-political collectives? What, fundamentally, mobilizes potential citizens of the EU to identify with—and feel connected to—the accession project? The pursuit of these questions requires a deep theorization of the state and of governance in the contemporary experience of globalization, supra-nationalism, and cosmopolitanism.

Political geography, broadly speaking, is presently dominated by the constructivist approaches to the state hailing from political sociology. ‘Stateless’ state theories hold that the state arises as a political effect (the ‘state idea’) from institutional practices and relations (Abrams, 1988; Mitchell, 1991). This conceptualization offers a non-foundational mode of theorizing state power in social-political phenomena. State power, in this line of thought, derives from the activities of, and linkages between, diverse institutions and individuals that align to (re)produce the popular notion that there is a state, which stands apart from, and acts upon the sphere of society. The corollary to this belief in a separate state sphere is that we tend to imbue it with the trappings of personhood or ‘actorness,’ such as an identity, intentionality, and ability to act (Mitchell, 1991 and 1999; Painter, 2005; Painter, 2006).

The growing tendency in the literature to disrupt the state/society binary has led to anthropological approaches to the study of state power, with a focus on how the state is lived and experienced (Megoran, 2006; Sharma and Gupta, 2006; Mountz, 2007; Kuus, 2011). These approaches advocate documenting the everyday interactions between
ordinary people and the institutions and actors who ostensibly represent a distinct state sphere. With this trend has emerged fresh emphasis on governance over government, in ways that aim to examine state power while avoiding reproduction of structuralist, foundational, or Westphalian notions of the state (Jessop, 2001; Brenner, et. al, 2003; Bialasiewicz, 2008).

In contemporary EU studies, this increasing focus on governance has led to conceptualizations of ‘multi-level governance.’ Political economy investigations of multi-level governance consider the ways in which new scalar forms of governance arise with the deepening of EU integration. More broadly, the theorization of governance in the neo-Marxist tradition, including regulation theory, sees a shift from scalar hierarchies of authority to networks as a key historical progression at the heart of the shift from government to governance (Jessop, 1998 and 2001; Brenner, 1997; MacLeod and Goodwin, 1999; Brenner, et. al, 2003). This shift is viewed as an actually occurring change in the form and function of political-economic structures. In this perspective, the current ‘reality’ of governance is that of heterarchy: “self-organized steering of multiple agencies, institutions, and systems which are operationally autonomous from one another yet structurally coupled because of their interdependence” (Jessop, 1998: 29). However, as Murphy (2008: 12) notes, the crucial interplay of these new forms of multi-level governance with conceptions of identity has so far merited far less attention, a lacuna that this essay seeks to address.\footnote{See also Wilson (2012) for discussion of the importance of ideology at the national scale to the relationship between poly-scalar govenances and economic development.}
Governance is particularly important as a framing concept for this study, as the project seeks to break with the notion that European integration is something that states ‘do’ to societies. Building upon the dominant conceptualization of the state in contemporary international relations and political geography, we can no longer be satisfied with viewing the integration process as something that governmental bureaucracy, or the ‘state proper,’ enacts. As the introduction notes, there can be no “candidate country” without the successful construction of a society that ostensibly desires accession, what I term the “EUro-aspirant society.” In many cases, as in Croatia, the case explored in this essay, that aspiration is manifested in the official instrument of the referendum on accession to the EU. But as recent developments in Croatia show, this outcome was the culmination of a long process of informing and persuading Croatian citizens about the importance of EU membership.

As the empirical sections below demonstrate, many diverse actors within a particular country carry out the hard work of reconstructing it as a “candidate country,” or, more accurately, an “accession society.” These actors may be located anywhere on the spectrum of state/society space. Indeed, in democratic systems, policy outcomes are achieved because many actors beyond governmental bureaucracy share the vocabularies and understandings of policy makers (Sharma and Gupta, 2006). What emerges from the fieldwork is a telling narrative of the debate over what counts as “information,” who is

43 I wish to emphasize “spectrum” here so as to avoid reproducing the hard binary of state and society. While I contend that the delineation of state/society spheres is itself an effect of political power, I do not deny that we can point to more or less governmental and nongovernmental arenas, whose boundary is unstable and fluid and requires constant maintenance (Abrams, 1988).
responsible for “informing,” and how various identities influence where individuals locate themselves in this process of information and persuasion. As the empirics show, the identities are largely shaped by the legacies of the distant and recent experiences of Croatia and the former Yugoslavia. Further, these identities provide an object around which the practices and relations of governance (a phenomenon riddled with internal incoherence and contradiction) can coalesce. Hence, the dynamic governance process, involving heterogeneous actors, leads toward the formation of particular subjectivities and beliefs that draw upon existing and emerging identities.

**Information and Subject Formation**

This essay synthesizes questions of governance with questions of subject formation in a critical examination of the policy process—or more specifically, the aspect of the policy process whereby the policy is promoted, debated, and contested amongst those who will be affected by it. In this conceptual schema, multi-level governance is examined as the mechanism by which a particular policy outcome (in this case, EU accession) is achieved. A particular strategy of this governance is that of subject formation. In order to construct the properly EUro-aspirant society, citizens must be constructed as EUropean subjects who are capable of identifying as citizens of both Croatia and the European Union.

Much like the study of multi-level governance, the bulk of scholarship on policy mobilities and transfers has taken a rather instrumental approach, in which producers and consumers of policy ideas engage in a process of rationally choosing between clear policy choices, with the best option winning out (Peck and Theodore, 2010). But with a
new strain of critical policy studies emerging in political geography and related fields, the orthodoxy is ebbing in favor of more anthropological approaches to the study of policy making, in which policy makers are seen as complex actors straddling multiple arenas, and policy consumers are not passive, but rather active interpreters, negotiators, and contributors to policy dialogues themselves (Dunn, 2007; Kuus, 2007; Jeffrey, 2008; Larner and Laurie, 2010). The aspect of the policy process documented in this essay, in which the wider public is “informed about”—and persuaded to accept through referendum—a particular policy outcome, involves a large degree of contradiction and contestation, and ultimately relies upon a degree of consensus. Documentation and analysis of this requires one to venture beyond the “level of programmatic announcements, official discourse, and expert interactions” (Peck and Theodore, 2010: 172).

Once the façade of official discourse is cracked, what lies beneath is the relationship between rationality and power (Flyvbjerg, 1998). By illuminating the power-rationality relationship through empirical work, we can connect the discourses of elites with the everyday experience of negotiating these discourses. Without making such connections, this essay would simply report on what the EU delegation to Croatia and what Croatian political elites have to say. But it would not be capable of shedding light on the ways in which everyday citizens interpreted and negotiated those elite messages and then made choices about their own political behavior. In other words, what is needed is inquiry into the formation of a EUropean subjectivity.

Subjectivity is a relational mechanism by which individuals are interpellated by ideologies and discursive constructions—more specifically, by the powerful discourses of
identity that are ever-present in our socio-political lives (Probyn, 2003). In the context of this study, understanding subjectivity entailed a close examination of the practices and rhetorics through which Croatian citizens were re-made into EUro-aspirant subjects, the building blocks of the EUro-aspirant society. Just such a process is part and parcel of the enterprise of reorganizing geopolitical space, of taking a country and making it an “accession country,” and eventually a “member country” of the European Union.

In the contemporary geopolitical condition, virtually no one is untouched by the power of the state, by the doctrine of nationalism and nation-state identity, and finally, by the role of ‘citizen,’ which is the key subjectivity that the powerful nation-state metageography compels us to accept. But because the European Union is a wholly new political-geographic phenomenon—neither nation-state nor international organization; neither entirely intergovernmental nor entirely supra-national—constructing the EUropean subjectivity involves encouraging individuals to think of themselves as possessing multiple identities, multiple citizenships. In any accession society, of course, this has meant a careful deployment of national identity, in ways that convince citizens that EU membership is the natural course for their nation-state, while simultaneously reassuring that national identity will thrive in the supra-national political collective. The Croatian case is no different. However, Croatia provides a unique case through which to understand the complex interplay of identities and policy process in European enlargement. Its imminent accession (slated for July 1, 2013) represents a key milestone in the EU’s external policy objective of absorbing the “troublesome” Western Balkan region, which is still in many respects recovering from the recent wars of Yugoslav dissolution.
The centrality of the discourse of Balkanism (which characterizes the Balkans as discordant, backward, corrupt, and violent, possessing an unharmonious and problematic mix of cultures and identities) in Europe’s Eastern enlargement has been thoroughly investigated (Lindstrom, 2003; Hammond 2005 and 2006; Papadimitriou and Gateva, 2009; Krajina, 2009). In the European accession processes of Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovenia, Balkanism has been held up as an undesirable identity to be left behind as those countries “exited” the geopolitical space of the Balkans and “entered” the geopolitical space of the Euro-Atlantic community (Lindstrom, 2003; Papamanditriou and Gateva, 2009; Obad, 2010).

Much has been written about the deployment of Balkanist discourse in the Euro-Atlantic accession process, and I do not aim to reproduce such findings here. Rather, I am building on this work by demonstrating the ways in which the construction and consumption of EU-related knowledge was guided by the deployment of identities. Specifically, a powerful binary of Balkanism/cosmopolitanism was mapped onto the binary of Euro-skeptic/Pro-EU in Croatia in order to construct the EUro-aspirant society that ultimately voted in favor of accession in the referendum on EU membership. In fact, I argue, the Balkan/cosmopolitan binary is the chief identity binary under which subsidiary identity binaries were mobilized to profoundly shape discussion and debate about Croatia’s major foreign policy goal of joining the European Union. These binaries of identity, wielded in the process of EUropean subject formation through the production and consumption of knowledge, motivated the desired political behavior. In a very concrete sense, this behavior meant voting ‘yes’ in the referendum on EU accession, but
in a less defined way, it also meant espousing a pro-accession stance in one’s everyday life.

Whereas “Balkan” is viewed as synonymous with being backward rather than progressive, inward-looking (in a retrograde, nationalist sense) rather than outward-looking (in a progressive, globalist sense), and emotional rather than rational, “cosmopolitan” is held to be the inverse of all of those qualities. In the earlier cosmopolitanism literature, the term was defined simply by Hannerz (1990) as an outlook requiring robust intellect and cognition. Although current inquiry into cosmopolitanism has noted and broken the limitations of this very elite-and Western-centric conception of the term, those early connotations have stuck, particularly as the term is deployed on the ground (for example, amongst EU policy elites) (Rovisco and Nowicka, 2011). For example, Beck (2004) has endeavored to break with the dichotomies of East/West, local/global, and internal/external in conceptualizing cosmopolitanism. Yet, as I point out above, cosmopolitanism itself can easily become one half of yet another dichotomy: the Balkan/Cosmopolitan binary central to this study. Importantly, both policy practitioners and academics alike have tended to reinforce the notion that cosmopolitanism = desirable, and Europeanism = EUropeanism = cosmopolitanism (Bauböck, 2002; Beck, 2009; Western, 2012). In this view, cosmopolitanism combines the “appreciation of difference and alterity, with efforts to conceive of new democratic forms of political rule beyond the nation-state” (Beck, 2009:

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44 The notion of “cosmopolitan” presented here is distinct from that associated with anti-Semitic views, historically present in Central and Eastern Europe (see, for example, Ablovatski, 2010).
3). In this sense, the construction of knowledge about what it means to be cosmopolitan emphasizes embracing multiple identities and subjectivities simultaneously.

Moreover, the identification of cosmopolitanism with steadfast commitment to Enlightenment ideals such as equality and rationality is held to represent a crucial break with Europe’s violent past, constituting another pivotal reason for which ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ is equated with a united Europe. Hence, the notion of a “federation of states” in need of defending themselves against supra-national mission creep, or the notion of the EU as neo-colonialism by way of economic domination, is set against a peaceful Europe of diversity and equality (Beck, 2009). This narrative of united Europe makes any critique or skepticism of the European Union necessarily opposed to what is ‘good’ and ‘rational.’ But herein lies the problematic of power and rationality: the problem is not the Enlightenment or modernist ideals themselves, but that the ways in which they are defined and made dominant in a particular socio-political context can often be exclusionary and contentious. The power—the agency—to define what rationality means in a specific context relies upon the ability to determine what constitutes knowledge and information (Foucault, 1991; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Huxley, 2007). However, this power is diffuse and partial and the process is fraught with contestation. As I found in this work, this contested process of determining what is information lies at the heart of the accession process. Through fieldwork over an extended period of time, I was able to diverge from simple, top-down accounts of the EU leading the candidate country government, and the government leading the citizens, through the accession process. The following section briefly details the research design, data and methods used in this work.
The choice to explore Croatia’s EU accession process was based upon its unique position as the next candidate in line to officially accede to the EU, and also a relatively young state still undergoing processes of post-socialist transition, post-conflict reconciliation, and the building of civil society (characteristics which purportedly make Croatia ‘Balkan’). While Croatia does provide an exceptional case through which to explore the phenomenon of integration, it still offers the possibility for general insights into the state and governance because, as it often pointed out in international relations literature, regional integration is increasingly viewed as an avenue to stability and prosperity in areas of the world undergoing processes of development, democratization, and post-conflict reconstruction. As Kuus (2002: 398) noted of Estonia, the simultaneously occurring processes of post-independence re-establishment of the state and international integration produced crucial understandings of how geopolitical narratives underpin notions of sovereignty in a post-Communist society. However, I aimed to take advantage of the unique moment in the regional developments currently underway in order to produce critical insights into the everyday, situated practices and social relations of governance. In other words, there is much more to this story than simply geopolitical narratives proliferated by statesmen and cultural elites, and an ethnographic study was essential in order to illuminate this.

However, differently from existing ethnographies of the state in which the researcher is located within a specific agency of the state for the duration of the fieldwork (see Mountz, 2004 and 2007), I extended the data collection beyond the agencies and representatives of the state proper. Such an “inclusive ethnography of the state”
### ‘Governmental’ Bureaucracy
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration
- Ministry of Defense
- Ministry of Internal Affairs
- Ministry of Justice
- Ministry of Economy, Labor, and Entrepreneurship

### ‘Nongovernmental’ or Civil Society
- Civic organizations
- Academic community
- Minority organizations
- Veterans’ community
- Media

Figure 1: Groups and sectors included in fieldwork

The inclusive ethnography of the state may also be described as multi-sited ethnography (Gille, 2001), in which the sites are the socio-political locations of governance. This approach makes the researcher better able to examine governance rather than government, tracing the ways in which actors spanning the governmental and non-governmental realms played a role in the promotion, discussion, and occasionally contestation that are integral to the shaping of policy outcomes. Indeed, many of the participants straddled both governmental and non-governmental institutions and activities, crucially illustrating the practices and relations of governance.
‘government’ and ‘civil society.’ This constitutes a particularly suitable type of case study method when the researcher wishes to explore situated relations and practices by contextualizing them in a wider ‘system’ of macro-constructions (Marcus, 1995). Rather than conceiving of ethnography as taking place in a closed-off or insular site, as in classical anthropology, the practitioner of multi-sited ethnography looks for the connections to wider processes as well as possible exogenous explanations for the phenomena under study (Burawoy, 2000). Hence, it has been cited as a particularly useful case methodology for those interested in processes such as globalization and supranational integration (Burawoy, et al., 2000).

The various methods of data collection were carried out in Zagreb, Croatia’s capital city, over ten months, allowing the researcher to experience the various policy dialogues and debates similarly to an average Croatian citizen. In addition to the formal interviews and focus groups that I conducted, I also engaged in participant observation at various public debates and information sessions regarding EU membership. I attended many of the protests and demonstrations that occurred in Zagreb during that time, including some that were not explicitly or directly linked to EU accession, such as Zagreb’s “Occupy” protest on Ban Jelačić Square and the Zagreb Pride Parade. I also attended and participated in one graduate and one undergraduate seminar at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Zagreb. The theme of these seminars, each a semester in length, was Southeastern European politics and Euro-Atlanticism. And finally, I watched Croatian television programming, engaged friends, colleagues, and even new acquaintances in discussions about the European Union, and, as every Croatian household did, I received the official mailings about the European Union. The
informational pamphlets, along with various flyers and organizational documents, were collected and analyzed in conjunction with the other forms of data. Fifty semi-structured interviews were conducted, roughly two-thirds of which were completed in the Croatian language (see Figure 1 for the broad categories of groups included in the interviews, observations, and documentary data). The conversations were transcribed and translated in consultation with native speakers. Additionally, two student focus groups were conducted, which provided a valuable complement to the interview data by combining the methods of interviewing and participant observation. Thus, the unit of analysis in the focus groups was neither the group nor the individual, but rather their combination and interaction, which produced an entirely unique dataset for analysis (Goss, 1996). Ultimately, the goal in conducting this ethnography of the state was to examine how knowledge is created and consumed, and how some knowledges rise to the distinction of ‘rational’ at the expense of other knowledges. The interplay between knowledge production/consumption and identity reveals much about the power-rationality relationship in contemporary Croatia. This knowledge interacted with a historical layering of geopolitical identity that provided the context of the accession debate while also, as we will see, enabling the construction of the “EUro-aspirant society.”

**Defining and Communicating Rationality**

Given the central enterprise of this study, to document how subjects are constructed, and construct themselves, via the process of informing and acquiring knowledge, it was necessary to first uncover the ways in which the European Union itself
went about crafting and communicating its self-representations within Croatian society. Perhaps the most telling example can be found in a communications strategy document obtained from a Zagreb journalist. This document, from the European Union Delegation to Croatia, was distributed to potential local contractors who would aid the EU Delegation and the Croatian government in carrying out the public information activities relating to European Union membership. The text has much to say about the sorts of Croatian citizens who are deemed necessary to construct the properly EUro-aspirant society, and those who stand to threaten this outcome.

The language in the document is noteworthy first because it makes the crucial equations of being pro-EU with being educated, informed, and rational. Which is to say, to be pro-EU is to be that ideal, cosmopolitan citizen who is well-educated, outward-looking, and open to the new kind of subjectivity: identifying with multiple political collectives. The inverse is that the Euro-skeptic or anti-EU citizen can only be the opposite; there is no allowance here for the well-informed citizen who has reasoned arguments for exhibiting apprehension or skepticism toward EU membership. As the document asserted at the time it was written, Croatia was harboring too many of the wrong kind of citizen, a situation which needed to be mitigated in the years leading up to the referendum:

45 The use of irony here is not dismissive of the fact that there was considerable (if fluctuating) “Euroskepticism” in Croatian society throughout the accession process. A substantial literature on the subject of Croatian Euroskepticism notes that levels were particularly high in the last stages of accession negotiations and a point of concern for Croatian political elites and EU officials as the referendum on accession approached (Balkanalysis, 2011). On the whole, the literature supports the assertion in this essay
Croatian citizens are rather poorly informed about the EU and do not have sufficient knowledge about the EU. They acquire most of the information from the mass media. Their perception of the EU is often based on misinformation. The less educated people are, the smaller area they live in, and the lower their income is, the less they tend to favor the EU.


As is clear from this quote, in the EU Delegation’s view, no one could possibly be opposed to entry into the EU unless they are ‘poorly informed,’ ‘less educated,’ ‘low-income,’ and, in essence, provincial.

Being provincial, occupying too small an area, is most certainly the antithesis of being cosmopolitan, and quite possibly equatable with being Balkan, a mode of identification that EU and Croatian government officials alike have openly declared is not compatible with being European. But the document goes on to pinpoint an even greater offense: that of continuing to embrace rightist, nationalistic sentiment, which again threatens the construction of the cosmopolitan EUro-aspirant society:

The most important causes of the existing citizens’ negative perception of the EU is derived from several prejudices, powered mostly by lack of proper and accurate information on the matter, that obviously creates a kind of convinced ignorance; media simplifications, that – instead of clearing certain issues – contribute to wrong conclusions and false beliefs and intentional misinterpretation of specific regarding Croatian Euroskepticism. First, there have been heterogeneous factors contributing to Croatian Euroskepticism, most of which fall into the categories of “symbolic” (e.g., exclusive nationalism) and “utilitarian” (e.g., pragmatic concerns over a lack of transparency in the EU institutions, inequality among members, and so on). Moreover, there has been considerable ambiguity in individuals’ and groups’ positions: Most (but certainly not all) Croatian ‘Euroskeptics’ are not ‘Eurorejectionists,’ but rather ‘Eurocritics’ and ‘Europragmatists’ (Štulhofer, 2006; Ashbrook, 2010). This point relates to the weak leftist opposition to the EU noted on pg. 160.
features of the EU policy, usually by rightist (nationalist) political parties or citizen groups.

This association of opposition to EU policy with ignorance and rightist/nationalist politics has permeated the rhetoric of Croatian political elites, as well as the rest of Croatian society (which surfaced time and again during the fieldwork). Similarly to the declarations about misinformation and lack of education, this excerpt demonstrates the EU delegation’s view that only backwardness, prejudice, and ignorance could lead to a Euro-skeptic stance. And, just like being provincial, being reactionary and nationalist is frequently linked, overtly and implicitly, with a negative Balkanist identity. Thus, the position of EU institutions is clear in this text: aligning the Euro-skeptic stance with the negative legacies of Balkanism (as perceived by many Croatians) was viewed as pivotal in bringing about the desired political subjectivity and its accompanying political behavior, support for EU accession.

Observable in the document, as well, is a series of value judgments about the Croatian public vis-à-vis previous accession societies, as the text notes that “the current low support is a rather unique situation amongst recent EU candidates,” but that with “better knowledge and mature reflection,” the majority of Croatian citizens should be able to come around to the ‘correct’ point of view: that completing the accession process and becoming a full member of the European Union is the necessary and proper course of action for the country (pg. 6). In the meantime, the information campaign strategy must seek to convince immature, “pessimistic,” low-information Croatians that they are wrong to harbor any concerns about a decline in standard of living, higher prices, lower salaries, and loss of sovereignty (pp 4-5). In the framing of the argument, the EU’s negative
conception of rationality crystallizes: to be pessimistic or apprehensive about Croatia’s economic well-being inside the EU, to worry about a loss of sovereignty or democratic deficit within the EU, is held to be based on prejudices and other negative emotions rather than on informed deliberation. In other words, being anti-EU or Euro-skeptic is irrational.

The document moves on from these observations about Croatian society to outline the EU Delegation’s plan for combating the ignorance and irrationality believed to be holding back many Croatians from the perceived proper, rational, pro-EU perspective:

The ECD [European Commission Delegation] wishes to approach a number of target groups that could play a substantial role in the debate of the EU…The field of education (schools, universities, technical schools, etc.) especially at a regional level is a “fertile” field for the development of such information activities. Local authorities, where the level of information is very low are called to play a significant role in this phase, by creating the appropriate administrative structures and information activities for their citizens. Civil society also has a crucial role to play. Special economic and social groups, such as farmers, youth, women and children, professional unions (SMEs, traditional professions etc.) are a further focus of attention.”


This excerpt demonstrates that in the EU Delegation’s view, the education, civil society, and media sectors are not there to provide neutral, balanced, or unbiased information about the EU, with which Croatian citizens can weigh pros and cons and come to informed decisions. Rather, they are to be used to convince the Croatian public of a pro-EU stance. This puts into practice the policy maxim that being “informed” is synonymous with being pro-EU. The key words of this strategy—“synergy,” “coordination,” “collaboration,” and “multipliers of information”—are, in effect, the very watchwords of the process of constructing EUropean subjects.
Crucially, all forms of organization in Croatian society have a role to play in this process, as the crafters of the strategy clearly recognized that in order to be effective, the transfer of knowledge and information could not happen in a top-down or authoritarian manner. Hence, the responsibility to be informed about EU accession was taken up by relevant elements of the ‘state proper’ and of civil society, while being presented to the wider public as a duty of each individual citizen. In order to be the proper EUro-aspirant subject, then, one must take the responsibility for their own informed-ness and preparedness.

Responsibility to Inform

In the years and months leading up to the referendum on accession to the European Union, which took place on January 22, 2012, the Croatian public was certainly bombarded with EU-related information in a variety of forms. The information came from various groups and agencies: the EU Delegation to Croatia, the Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, public libraries, schools, civil society groups, and political parties. The most noticeable feature of this onslaught of information was that the vast majority of it adhered to the vision of the EU Delegation laid out in the communications strategy document analyzed above. Every public library contained a small information display with pamphlets and brochures explaining the fundamentals of the organization of the EU, the various policy fields in which it possesses competencies, and the benefits citizens could expect in areas such as gender equality and youth employment opportunities.
The major television stations ran numerous advertisements that ostensibly aimed to “inform” the public about what membership in the European Union would bring. Sometimes, between TV programs, short videos would be played that explained ‘fun facts’ about the twenty-seven existing EU member states. One such video, using cartoons, gave basic information about Finnish government and society and pointed out the number of saunas per capita in Finland. Other short video spots explained, in the most general terms, what certain EU terminology, such as “Schengen Zone,” means, with help from Croatian government officials and academics. And, perhaps most frustratingly for many Croatian citizens, a series of commercial spots featured Croatian celebrities, such as popular culture figures and the world-famous champion skier Ivica Kostelić, explaining why they were pro-European Union. The library information displays provided information that was similarly basic and general in nature.

With the variety of informational activities taking place in Zagreb and around the country, it would be difficult to claim that the EU Delegation, Croatian government, libraries, academe, and other entities had not done their part in attempting to arm the Croatian citizenry with knowledge about the European Union. However, whether these activities or materials constituted ‘real’ or quality information, or conveyed “everything you wanted to know about the European Union,” as the official information booklet
mailed by the government claimed, was a matter of vociferous debate throughout
Croatian society. But the debate was not only about whether the information provided by
the EU, Croatian government, and civil society sector was sufficiently detailed or
sophisticated; there was also discussion of whether those entities were responsible to do
anything more than what they had done in promoting knowledge about the European
Union. As illustrated in Figure 2, many of the informational and promotional materials
were punctuated with phrases such as “inform yourself!” and urged citizens to decide
“independently.” Paradoxically, while the notion of being a Croatian citizen who was
prepared for—or worthy of—becoming an EU citizen was articulated in terms of being
eager to absorb knowledge about the EU, many citizens felt that asking probing or critical questions was off-limits, as revealed in interview responses below. What this meant in practice was that Croatian citizens were encouraged to deny, or be informed by, past layers of knowledge or information that could be a foundation for debate. To many participants, this worked to stem much of the debate, so as to ensure smooth accession to a new, rational and cosmopolitan society.

**Between Cosmopolitanism and Balkanism: Negotiating Knowledge about the EU**

As Croatia underwent the final months of accession negotiations and approached the date of the referendum—indeed, even after the referendum had been held—Croatians positioned in many different sectors of the government and civil society remained uncertain about the level of knowledge with which the citizenry had cast their votes in the referendum. This topic almost inevitably came up in the interviews, focus groups, and observations. What became interesting was that so many people who would count themselves among the highly-educated and well-informed of Croatian society, the very sorts of individuals who, according to the EU communications strategy, should support EU membership enthusiastically and with eyes wide open, would admit behind closed doors that not only did they not think there was enough knowledge ‘out there,’ but often that they did not feel they possessed enough knowledge themselves. In fact, roughly eight in ten participants in the project reported that they did not feel the public had been adequately informed about the EU and/or felt that criticism or skepticism (i.e., discussion of potential negatives outcome of EU membership) about the EU was not given sufficient
space in Croatian society throughout the accession process, especially in the run-up to the referendum.

Regarding the quality of the EU-related information disseminated to Croatian society, representatives of some of the very NGOs who participated in the public conversation about accession expressed doubts about the level of informed-ness with which citizens were making up their minds about EU membership. And they would often count themselves amongst the dubiously-informed. As someone from a non-violence activist organization pointed out, “it is still unclear to us at the moment, you know—that agreement with the EU has over 1000 pages. I still haven’t read it. I cannot know whether it will reduce unemployment in Croatia, I cannot know whether Croatia will develop evenly” (interviewed February 21, 2012).

A representative of a well-regarded democratic citizenship NGO expressed a similar concern, noting that there were precious few voices publicly asking the difficult questions about the decision Croats were making on the future of their country:

this rather small percentage of public people, public figures, people who can speak publicly, they said, OK, yes, we have to enter the EU. But, do we have to enter right now? Are we ready? Or, do we have to enter under these conditions? Shutting down our shipyards, for example. Or, not protecting the Adriatic Sea from Italian fishing multinational companies. Yes, we have to, but do we have to go like geese in the fog? Should we perhaps protect ourselves first, build our state, because the state-building process is not finished yet... But, these questions were not welcomed in the public sphere. Whoever started asking such a question, it was immediately like, you’re an enemy of the state, you’re a freak, why are you questioning this?

- Interviewed March 16, 2012

Similarly to the non-violence activist, this woman represented an organization that was, on paper, pro-European Union. According to some calculus, she had concluded that
despite the unknowns or the heavy-handed manner in which Croatia’s accession process had been conducted (and, perhaps most importantly, despite the ongoing debt crisis and draconian handling of Greece that many respondents had been following closely), it was better for Croatia to enter the EU than to remain outside of it. Thus, of particular note here was the weak showing of leftist opposition to the EU. To be sure, such sentiment exists in Croatia, as was illustrated in the anti-EU signage at Zagreb’s anti-capitalism protest. However, in what is a testament to the considerable coalescing power of governance, the NGO sector, while employing many individuals who personally harbored reservations about the EU, largely fell into step with the government’s accession agenda.

      The more that these sorts of statements were made in interviews, the more apparent it became that one did not have to be anti-EU or Euro-skeptic (in the commonly understood sense of the term) to harbor these feelings about the information process. In fact, on the whole, the concerns and objections over the public information process did not seem to stem from the fact that people feared there was some damning information about the EU that was being purposely withheld from them (there was plenty of negative press coverage about the ongoing sovereign debt crisis, after all). Rather, it seemed to stem from a sense that the public’s intelligence was being insulted by the very one-sided ‘information’ campaign. Further, due to the one-sided-ness of the information and the lack of an “honest and open” dialogue about what EU membership would bring, citizens felt disempowered and frozen out of a process that, according to the vast majority of interview and focus group participants, was already quite distant from everyday citizens. As one interviewee said with a sneer,
what, the European Union, this land of milk and honey? There are no problems there?! Everything is perfect, just dandy?! OK—they put those idiotic, moronic commercials on TV…oh my God, I feel sick sometimes, really I do. But, OK—you’re doing propaganda for the European Union, but why don’t you set aside some time to say OK, there are some problems there, and say it publicly.

- Ministry of Internal Affairs Employee
  (interviewed January 20, 2012)

It was a sentiment repeated frequently. “What bothers me,” a young tourism worker told me, “is that absolutely anything negative that could come of this process was put off to the side, what could or couldn’t happen [with EU accession], it didn’t matter” (interviewed on January 24, 2012). During a focus group, one university student declared, “if you start from the premise that it’s a pro-European Union campaign, that it is logical for the pro-European campaign to provide only good information about the EU, then it’s not called information, it’s called indoctrination.”

This point was recognized even by interviewees representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI), the very component of the government primarily responsible for conducting the public information activities. As one MFAEI recognized during his interview,

I am sure that there isn't enough information and that the government didn't do enough to inform people and what was on TV, etc., that was more propaganda and not actually communication with people that would explain to them what the advantages are, why Croatia should be in the EU.

- Interviewed February 16, 2012

It would seem, then, that the process of constructing the EUro-aspirant society had unfolded in accordance with the vision laid out in the EU Delegation communications strategy. The various government and civil society entities that were meant to spread the ‘good news’ of European Union membership had done so. The referendum was
‘successful’ in that it ended in a vote in favor of EU accession. One could conclude then, in the conceptual language of the study, that the EUro-aspirant society had been successfully constructed.

And yet, it was abundantly clear from the fieldwork that there was vast awareness of the notion that EU membership may, indeed, have its disadvantages. Perhaps that didn’t matter. As one political science professor noted, after Croatians had witnessed the role of the Euro-Atlantic organizations (NATO and the EU) in the Western Balkans from the time of the 1990s conflicts, many people seemed to feel that they had no real say in the future of the region: “If [the EU] wants us, they’ll take us.” This statement illustrates the sense that, for better or for worse, Croatia and its neighbors must continue to look to the Euro-Atlantic community for geopolitical guidance. They are not fully ‘Euro-Atlantic’ enough to go it alone. And it is this point which strikes at the heart of the matter. The proper EUro-aspirant society may well have been constructed in Croatia not because the public, as a whole, was convinced of the information campaign’s message—that the EU is a prosperous land of saunas and fun academic exchanges—but rather, because the process of EUropean subject formation has effectively wielded potent binaries of identity that mobilize particular modes of political behavior. In other words, the knowledge was being constructed in a partial way in order to create the cosmopolitan EUro-aspirant subject. The strategy only worked by mobilizing these binaries of identity, constructing the specter of Balkanism as the thing to fear in Croatian society, as opposed to fearing the unknowns of EU membership.
Binaries of Identity

In January 2012, several days before the referendum on EU accession, the Polish Ambassador to Croatia gave a presentation at Croatia’s Pan-European Union offices (a civil society group that has branches across Europe) entitled “Poland in the EU: Seven Years of Experience.” The content of the presentation was standard fare for this sort of public information event: numbers on foreign direct investment, tourism, satisfaction among farmers, the overall financial balance of EU membership, Poland’s participation in decision-making, and the importance of the EU as a mechanism for peace, and a collective body to tackle important global challenges.

It was the question and answer portion of the event where things became more revealing with regard to identity and subject formation in Croatia’s European integration process. There were some predictable and superficial questions about the economic crisis gripping the EU. But then the few Euro-skeptics in the audience revealed themselves. An older man got up and registered his dissenting viewpoint in an elevated voice, which the moderator and ambassador allowed to press on for a surprisingly long time. A lone audience member applauded him. The commenter proceeded to argue with and talk over the Polish ambassador, who did his best to remain patient and cordial. He responded to the man’s concerns calmly: “Poland has the cheapest food prices in the EU now,” “there is growth in salaries…” The moderator started to look nervous and uncomfortable at this point. Then an unkempt and slightly crazy-looking man in shabby, worn clothing, whom I recognized from an earlier debate, got up to ask an extremely aggressive and long-winded question (which quickly became more of a diatribe); the organizers of the event looked embarrassed and other audience members started to visibly show their frustration.
The exchanges and group behavior were quite telling, as once again the Euro-skeptics emerged as a group of impolite, irritating, and even fanatical people who embarrass the decent, rational, educated, and well-behaved pro-EU citizens in the crowd (Participant observation, January 18, 2012).

This scene, which was quite typical of the public information activities at which I conducted observations, illustrates the overarching binary of identity that framed public engagement over the topic of EU accession. Despite the prevalent sense, demonstrated in the previous section, that there may well be much to be apprehensive about when it comes to EU membership, and the associated frustration that any expression of this apprehension was squelched in public conversation, at the end of the day, no one wanted to be that slightly crazy-looking person expressing fear or dissent around Croatia’s EU accession. This, I contend, was more important to constructing the EUro-aspirant society than actually convincing the majority of Croatians that membership in the EU would bring unparalleled benefits and well-being to their country. Ultimately, the EUropean subject was someone who accepted certain identity binaries and embraced the “good” sides of those binaries while shunning the “bad” sides. The overarching binary was that of cosmopolitan/Balkan, which seemed to provide the foundation on which Croatian society was constructed as a proper accession society. Contained within that cosmopolitan/Balkan binary are several constituent binaries that profoundly characterized stances regarding the EU. The EU’s brand of cosmopolitanism was constructed as desirable and necessary on the foundation of these intersecting binaries, all of which bear a connection to the underlying, fraught relationship that Croatian identity has with
negative conceptions of Balkanism. They also echo the binaries set out in the EU communications strategy document.

The first of these binaries constructs Euro-skepticism as being irrational, while the pro-accession stance is constructed as rational. The rational/irrational binary was reproduced repeatedly by study participants across the categories of people and groups interviewed. It was reflected in the many conversations in which, while many well-founded reasons for apprehension about the European Union may have been cited, in the end, only an irrational individual would actually exhibit Euro-skepticism, let alone cast a ‘no’ vote in the referendum on accession. As one student focus group participant stridently insisted,

regarding the Euro-skeptics, I mean, when you say on TV that your biggest fear is that you’ll lose your sovereignty or national identity, I mean, it’s insane. What can you say to that person who is not pro-EU that they might believe you?

Interestingly, when a respondent was pressed on this common viewpoint, or when concrete, observable scenarios were raised, such as the course of action taken with Greece and Italy in the sovereign debt crisis, they would often concede that there may, in fact, be rational questions to ask about sovereignty.

Moreover, during this student focus group, what eventually emerged was a vague sense that it wasn’t the rational or valid ‘Euro-skeptic’ questions that were given space in the public conversation, but rather that incoherent or embarrassing people always seemed to represent that viewpoint in public (as happened at the Polish ambassador’s presentation at the Pan-European Union). Why ask the difficult questions about EU membership if you will risk being associated with such people? At the Croatian Journalists’ association
debate prior to the referendum, only one panelist, a left/progressive scholar from the Humanities Faculty at the University of Zagreb, openly declared that he would vote ‘no’ in the referendum. The remainder of the panelists, even when noting the risks of accession, or the inadequacy of information about it, declared that they would vote ‘yes.’

As the MFAEI representative, Hrvoje Marušić noted, “I will this time decide rationally and decide ‘for [the EU]’. This is a decision which I think must be made rationally rather than emotionally.” This was powerful rhetoric, indeed. While political dialogue in any society nearly always involves efforts from each side to paint its opponents as behaving irrationally and emotionally, this tactic carries particular connotations in Croatian society due to the discourse of Balkanism. Importantly, Western constructions of the Balkans have historically painted the image of an emotional, spiritual, and visceral culture in contrast to self-conceptions of Western, Enlightenment rationality and reason. As various scholars have noted, these are constructions that have been largely internalized by the peoples of the region (Bakić-Hayden, 1995; Todorova, 1997; Obad, 2008).

The second constituent binary constructs Euro-skepticism as an uneducated and uninformed position, while those who are pro-accession are held to be educated and informed. As if scripted by the EU Delegation’s strategy itself, the majority of respondents echoed the notion that being educated or well-informed could only lead to a pro-EU stance; and, conversely, Euro-skeptics were necessarily poorly educated or ill-informed individuals. And, as the EU’s communications strategy document asserted, being poorly educated and ignorant were often associated by interviewees with being from a ‘smaller area’: “all of this rural [population] is very uneducated…maybe it's because of that that such a large percentage were against the EU in the referendum…out
of that ignorance, they circled 'no'” (Financial security specialist, interviewed May 10, 2012).

Interestingly, nearly every person I spoke to, regardless of their level of education, their occupation and economic background, or their social location, considered themselves amongst the educated and the informed, despite the wide recognition that there was incomplete or inaccurate information about the EU available in Croatian society. As one student focus group member asked of her fellow participants,

do you really think that most of the people in Croatia are as well-informed as we are? They only see what is on TV, and that is European funds, the human rights, it’s all so beautiful, it’s all so great.

On the other hand, there was a sense amongst the group that it was possible for a Euro-skeptic position to be based on educated-ness and informed-ness, but the problem was that this was never the side presented in public forums:

I think that the Euro-skeptics didn’t get a lot of space in the media, and even if they did get as much space as the Euro-cheerleaders, they were not as educated or as informed as the Euro-cheerleaders were, and the Euro-cheerleaders had a lot of clever people, and had a lot of professors actually, being pro-European Union, and Euro-skeptics had a lot of fools who were brought on TV and radio shows and such, that didn’t really say even one thing that was constructive about why Croatia should not enter the EU. And also, I think campaigning is not only led through the media. It is also led through projects you have in all high schools—the Euro quiz, the EU youth parliament and such, which I think project one beautiful side of the European Union, but it isn’t always so. And also, I think the pro-European Union campaign had a lot more financiers than the Euro-skeptics did.

These utterances, emerging from interactions between students in a focus group, illustrate an important dynamic in Croatian society observable during the fieldwork. This particular part of the conversation had devolved into an argument between two students
who demonstrated the central contradiction between acknowledging the partiality of knowledge about the EU on the one hand, and their own ultimate identification with the informed, pro-EU camp on the other. When the student quoted immediately above went too far in questioning the wisdom of accession, she quickly pulled back after drawing an unpleasant response from the group. After the session, though, and away from the others, she admitted to voting ‘no’ in the referendum. This illustrates the importance of citizen-to-citizen pressure in constructing the conventional or accepted knowledge about the EU, and its relationship to the dichotomous identities bound up with those knowledge constructions.

A third and final constituent binary constructs Euro-skepticism as necessarily reactionary, nationalist, and right-wing, while a pro-accession outlook is held to be progressive and outward-looking. This binary proved a particularly potent one in the context of pro-EU and Euro-skeptic stances. Even the rare respondents who were overtly Euro-skeptic or anti-accession were quick to distance themselves from what Dr. Andelko Milardović, the writer on Croatian Euro-skepticism, cited during a public debate as “the tendency of xenophobia, racism, and Euro-skepticism to intersect.”

This, of course, is not to say that those identities or leanings never intersect, as even a casual familiarity with ultra right-wing political movements in current EU member states would indicate that they often do. However, the power of the equation of Euro-skepticism with right-wing nationalism was strong enough to diminish the leftist, anti-neoliberal, and other non-nationalist critiques of EU policy. The simple narrative that emerged was that to harbor any questions at all about the Croatian government’s continued ability to look out for the socio-economic well-being of Croatians post-
accession was necessarily a hopelessly reactionary attachment to old-hat conceptions of national territoriality. That narrative was pervasive. As the president of one Croatian Euro-skeptic political party carefully pointed out at the start of our interview, he had attended the anti-EU protest the day prior, but kept his distance from most of it, as “the right-wing nationalist stuff is not really my flavor” (interviewed January 25, 2012). Another interviewee had noted that he was hesitant to exhibit his apprehensions about EU membership amongst, for example, his work colleagues for fear that he would be associated with the dominant Euro-skeptic voices heard in public. He noted,

As much as I am against entering the European Union as it is right now, I’m disgusted, I’m absolutely disgusted with the public opponents of entering the European Union. I’m absolutely disgusted. Because, their reasons have nothing to do with my reasons. And they’re only trying to appease the masses, you know? And their arguments are childish at best. You know? They have nothing to do with the real facts. And, I think those vocal public opponents of the European Union are the greatest asset to the pro-European Union side.

- Ministry of Internal Affairs employee, interviewed January 20, 2012

From the standpoint of someone such as this interviewee, the problem was the lack of “real facts,” or of officially sanctioned knowledge, on their side of the public conversation about EU membership. This individual, like many others I spoke with, found it important to emphasize that he recognized the ultra-nationalist bent tingeing much of the anti-accession crowd. However, there was very little he could draw upon in the public conversation that counted as dispassionate, mature arguments against accession.

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46 Emphasis apparent in audio recording of interview.
“That’s the Thing of Mentality.”

The three dominant identity binaries demonstrated in this section together support the overarching binary of cosmopolitan/Balkan discussed in the conceptual section at the outset of the essay. As noted earlier, the cosmopolitan outlook, equated with Europeanism and therefore Europeanism (Beck, 2009), is characterized by progressiveness, by the ability to evolve beyond nation-state territoriality and sovereignty concerns, to shun anything capable of resembling xenophobia, and to enthusiastically embrace multiple political identities simultaneously: nation-state and supra-national, among others. The dichotomies and characterizations of pro-EU and Euro-skeptic stances documented here are not fundamentally different from those identified in current EU member states, including Central and East European countries such as Hungary and the Czech Republic. However, the discourse of Balkanism, when set against that of cosmopolitanism, provides a particularly potent impetus to fall in line as a ‘good’ European subject.

This is especially effective in light of the legacy of the recent war in Croatia. In the context of the oft-cited threat of ‘renewed violence’ in the former Yugoslavia (a key factor undergirding the EU’s enlargement policy toward the Western Balkans), the conservative, reactionary, ultra-nationalist mentality is something that needs to be left in the past. These are the sentiments, after all, that lead to political unrest and brutal conflict in this corner of Europe in recent memory, and which continue to stymie the political process in the region. Perhaps for this reason, the officially sanctioned knowledge about accession sought to avoid allowing any credible, non-nationalist alternatives to EU membership to un-seat pro-accession as the rational stance.
The data show that this power-rationality relationship successfully maintained pro-EU knowledge as preeminently credible in Croatian society. Some respondents explicitly drew connections between the need for EUropeanization, on the one hand, and on the other, the legacy of the 1990s wars, which have so often been designated “the Balkan wars” in U.S. and European media, rather than the wordier, but more specific, “wars of Yugoslav dissolution.” As an employee from a democratic citizenship NGO reflected, “politically, rationally, we as a country need to enter the EU, because of the war thing. The [threat of] future wars. Because of Dayton, Kosovo, you know?"47 In this sense, due to unresolved tensions in the region, Croatia’s EU accession is needed in order to demonstrate that Croatians have fully evolved past posing their own threats to the stable, cosmopolitan European space. Even younger respondents, with few clear war memories of their own, embraced the notion of needing to formally accede into EUropean structures in order to exorcise the violent, Balkanist legacies from Croatian society. One student focus group participant reminisced, “the first song which I remember in my whole life was ‘Stop the war in Croatia.’ And one of the sentences in the song was ‘let Croatia be one of Europe’s stars.’” In order to be one of Europe’s ‘stars,’ then (a symbolism that literally invoked the ring of yellow starts on the EU—then EEC—flag), a thorough reconstruction of Croatian citizens as EUropean subjects had

47 It is important to note that Croatians’ views on these issues are profoundly shaped by Croatia’s history and ongoing relations with the other former Yugoslav Republics, as well as the role of the Croatian diaspora in Bosnia and around the world. These topics came to light frequently throughout the fieldwork, but a full analysis of this aspect of the accession process is beyond the scope of the present essay and will be taken up in future work.
begun in earnest in the early 1990s. As the lyrics of this song seem to imply, there was no alternative to the post-war aspiration for newly independent Croatia; namely, a change of association from Balkan space to Euro-Atlantic space.

Yet another facet of the Balkan/Cosmopolitan binary implicates the legacies of socialism and all of the attendant ‘Balkan’ qualities this system is believed to have nurtured in Croatian society. An idea that frequently surfaced throughout the fieldwork was that of the need for Croatian citizens to adopt the “proper” attitudes toward capitalism and its logics of marketization and efficiency. Placing the responsibility for obtaining a desirable standard of living with individual citizens, one man remarked

I think that only unprepared people are living below their expectations. They expected, OK, we’ll get the independent state, now we’ll find all solutions by ourselves, in our interests, not in the interests of capital or capitalists. But you know, what’s real life? You have property, private property, private interests, private companies. You have a market, you have relations, production, trade, everything on the market. YOU are on the market, every one of us is every day on the market as well. And eighty percent of our citizens were not prepared…they didn’t prepare themselves to have a proper attitude for all challenges of living in capitalism…and that’s the thing of mentality as well.”

- Department of Civil Protection and Rescue employee, interviewed April 11, 2012

This quote is revealing of much more than the supposedly straightforward process of transition from one economic system to another. Perhaps Euro-Atlantic technocrats and local government officials would have everyday citizens believe that transforming from a socialist to a capitalist state is a matter of following the “right” formulas and adopting the “best” practices of market economies. However, the respondent above is representative of a large contingent that recognized the deeper reconstruction of subjectivity that was apparently needed: the adoption of the required market mentality, which is the
responsibility of each and every citizen. This was repeatedly portrayed as a Sisyphean task, though, in the face of the persistent socialist legacy of depending on the state rather than succumbing to a market mentality.

This would necessitate, as well, the trading in of another apparently ‘Balkan’ quality for the desired ‘European’ ones. The financial security specialist quoted earlier, as well as other respondents, articulated this as “the assumption of certain standards, norms of behavior in a regulated world.” “Procedurally,” he noted, “we are a very disorderly state, here no one actually knows who drinks, who pays, everyone does everything and no one is accountable for anything. That is the worst combination.”

Thus, letting go of the old, ‘Balkan’ standards in order to gain the new, ‘European’ standards was viewed as a direct link between characteristics of the ‘Balkan’ state and characteristics of the ‘Balkan’ society—one in which everyone has a good time, but the settlement of the tab is never quite sorted out. Another respondent also cited this aspect of Croatian culture, contrasting it with German and American cultures, where, in her view, everyone is concerned about correctly allocating costs down to “every ice cube.”

Interestingly, these cultural comparisons came across in the interviews as frank reflections on how ‘disorder’ and lack of accountability are present in Croatian society from café life up to the highest levels of government, rather than social observations as metaphors for the inefficient or corrupt Central/East European state.

While many people appreciate certain of these aspects of Croatian social life, such reflections seemed to indicate a sense that these cultural characteristics may indeed be a necessary sacrifice in the ongoing construction of the EUro-aspirant society. In this way, skepticism about EU membership, or fear about what accession may bring, co-existed
with a deep internalization of negative conceptions of Balkanism, the sense that the Balkan legacy in Croatia meant disorder, lack of accountability, and the ever-present threat of violence. For this reason, I argue, the construction of a EUropean subjectivity, an accession society populated by properly EUro-aspirant subjects as outlined in the EU strategy document, was successful. Ultimately, the legacies of Balkanism (in this case, violence and a nagging socialist mentality) were successfully mobilized to construct EU accession as the only choice that would verify the individual as progressive, informed, and rational. The paradox is that despite the wariness and criticism of the information, it provided a terrain of institutionalized knowledge, which was difficult for participants to reject without identifying themselves as someone resolutely Balkan. Recognition of the partial or biased nature of the knowledge being disseminated ironically still led most of the subjects toward the cosmopolitan, EUro-aspirant subjectivity, precisely because it was seen as a binary opposite to what they wanted to leave behind.

Conclusions

The power of the East/West or Balkan/cosmopolitan identity binaries is that they create an either/or for the process of subject formation that maps neatly onto the either/or of the EU and the Croatian state’s policy objective, which is to say that one can only be pro-accession or anti-accession. However, as the data demonstrate, there are many nuanced positions between pro-EU and anti-EU, and Euro-skeptic does not necessarily mean anti-accession. It is important to note that for some, Balkanism can be
cosmopolitan\textsuperscript{48}, which further highlights the power of either/or conceptions of identity to marginalize alternative perspectives. In the end, these nuances remained largely in personal reflections and informal conversations, as the majority of citizens opted to fall on the ‘right’ side of the cosmopolitan/Balkan binary. The process of EUropean subject formation succeeded in giving rise to the EUro-aspirant society.

This occurred despite broad recognition that the interplay between power and rationality in Croatian society yielded, at best, incomplete or imperfect knowledge about what EU membership means for Croatia. Most tellingly, both members of the governmental bureaucracy and members of the civil society sector—individuals who played some role in the public conversation about EU accession—acknowledged the one-sidedness of the public information campaign. But in the end, the quality of the information, and the completeness of citizens’ knowledge about the EU, came across as immaterial when the ‘real’ matter at hand was the need to prove one’s successful shedding of Balkanism in favor of European cosmopolitanism.

On the one hand, the study demonstrates that the EU’s influence in a particular society rests on its ability to define what is rational. But this is a very partial agency: Far from being top-down, it is a contested process, located in multiple centers of power, and via considerable pressure exerted citizen-to-citizen, as well as between government agencies and citizens, or civil society organizations and citizens. What the empirical findings also demonstrate is that this very diffuse power derived from the legacies of

\textsuperscript{48} For example, the left-progressive view that the former Yugoslav countries should opt out of EU accession in favor of a new Southeastern European regionalism based on market socialism rather than neoliberal capitalism (Grubačić, 2010).
identity in Croatia, the associations with discord, disorder, and violence, as much as it did from the power of EU and government institutions. Thus, I conclude, we need a ‘long view’ of identity in a particular place in order to understand why certain knowledges win out over others as ‘rational.’ The EU’s and Croatian government’s efforts to define rationality as a desire to join the EU would not be successful were it not for a prevailing notion within society that wanting otherwise is “Balkanist” and therefore backward—and this seemed to drive the positive referendum, regardless of the level of informed-ness amongst voting citizens.

What this implies for the multi-level governance of the EU and its Eastern Enlargement is that practices and activities are not neatly delineated between levels. Rather—as the process of subject formation presented in this essay demonstrates—there is a fluid and continuously negotiated sense of how “informing” should happen, who has responsibility to inform or transmit knowledge, and what the outcome should be. Hence, the EU’s strategy is not one of authoritarian control over information, but instead one that makes use of existing identities, and of anxieties and prejudices about those identities, around which there is some sort of consensus within the accession society. This also clearly demonstrates the intertwining of the practices of governance and the (re)shaping of identities for which Murphy (2008) has argued increased scrutiny. In short, the process of EUropean subject formation exploits fears amongst citizens about being viewed as being in the ‘wrong’ camp. In this way, the knowledge-power relationship that creates cosmopolitanism ironically, but perhaps deliberately, utilizes these binaries of identity. Further, contestations of knowledge and ‘truth’ have the potential to provide alternatives to—but also to reinforce—the hegemonic ‘Euro-Atlantic subject.’ Due to the
successful deployment of identity binaries, it was the hegemonic Euro-Atlantic subject that delivered a positive referendum on EU accession in Croatia, manifesting the goal of the EUro-aspirant society.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS

The preceding empirical essays have each, in their own way, explored the various arrangements and processes of multi-level governance in the Euro-Atlantic area. Taken together, the three pieces provide a view into how perceptions of security and identity are intimately bound up with the very mechanisms and functions of governance. Given the centrality of security and identity to the arrangements and meanings of the state, it was crucial to make the security-identity nexus central to any investigation of newer and emerging state spaces, particularly the emergent supranational state space of the European Union and the more transnational policy sphere of the Euro-Atlantic arena. The larger theoretical concerns with the state, governance, and the security-identity nexus intersected with deeper interrogations of power, scale, and subjectivity in the three empirical essays, in what I hope has been a useful intervention into the literatures on the multi-level governance of Europe and the trans-Atlantic relationship.

Discussion of Findings

Chapter Three, with its investigation of security and defense integration in the European Union, offers a reconceptualization of what securitization means for a body that is both intergovernmental and supranational in nature, adding political-geographic insights on the state and securitization to the considerable body of knowledge on this topic. The essay grapples with the overwhelming tendency—both in the academic literature and among practitioners—to view the EU’s capacity to act in international
affairs in an either/or manner. This is to say that there has been a tendency to view the EU’s maneuverings in its neighborhood and around the globe as wielding either hard power or soft power. While this issue has been thoroughly contended with in theorizations of the state and state power, Chapter Three argues that in the arena of EU studies, there are further insights to be gained.

The task, at its core, was to open up the ‘black box’ of EU governance in the same manner that the ‘black box’ of the state has been dismantled in constructivist international relations, political geography, and anthropology. In other words, in order to understand the EU as a security actor, I found it necessary to deconstruct the ‘actorness’ of the European Union as a central goal of the project. Of course, given the dense institutional landscape of the EU, even an examination of one policy area—in this case, security and defense policy—necessitated a choice of empirical focus on a particular agency. But the choice of the European Defense Agency as the major empirical focus also had a theoretical motivation: the EDA, as the most recent institutional manifestation of European security and defense integration, is now the primary site of the entanglement of multiple rationales for the EU’s very existence. The agency carries out the twinned imperatives of security and prosperity, which always lay at the heart of the EUropean project. The importance of the EDA in the current milieu of Euro-Atlantic relations seems to stem from, on the one hand, the conviction that the EU must raise its security profile in order to further safeguard its prosperity; and on the other hand, the pervasive sense that prosperity can be further ensured with an increasingly neoliberal approach to security and defense.
The essay finds that there are, indeed, deeper insights to be gained about the securitization of the European Union with a reconceptualization of EU security governance. The hard/soft power binary is problematized anew through a spatial lens using the perspective of geoeconomics. As the empirical analysis demonstrates, the securitization of the European Union is not occurring merely through the growth of new institutional mechanisms and their assumption of increasing competencies in the policy fields of security and defense. Nor do we achieve a complete picture of the process if we focus primarily or exclusively on the aspect of political cohesiveness among the member states. Instead, I argue, the securitization of the EU is best understood in relation to broader processes of neoliberal globalization and the recasting of security agendas as resolutely supranational, aligned with the constructions of an interdependent, supranational sphere of economic well-being and prosperity. A Luttwakian brand of geoeconomic reasoning undergirds both state and nonstate actors’ rhetorics and interactions, reconfiguring their notions of sovereignty as increasingly detached from nation-state territoriality, much as the metageography of markets has been reconfigured from that of the nation-state-bound economy to the single economic area. The forging of a single security area is presented in the policy dialogues as a natural and inevitable accompaniment to the EU’s achievement of a single market. However, the analysis also shows how the process is neither natural nor inevitable, but actually riddled with contingency and contradiction.

The significance of the European Union as a security actor in the broader Euro-Atlantic security arena is demonstrated in Chapter Four, though the object of analysis is not the EU’s policies and actions per se, but rather their operation and negotiation as
exercised through the agency of political elites in the candidate country of Croatia. Taking the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union together as the overarching security regime into which Croatia has integrated over the last several years, the essay utilizes a deep theorization of the concept of scale in order to frame the analysis of elite political rhetoric regarding Euro-Atlantic integration.

Several concepts intersect in the investigation of the discursive strategies of Croatian political elites. First, the constructivist orientation of state theory is put into practice by making the reproduction of the state via government website content the central object of analysis. Secondly, the research aims to demonstrate the ways in which security and identity mutually construct one another, in a pivotal relationship I term the security-identity nexus, as a key dynamic in the reproduction of the state. And finally, the essay explores the operation of a scalar metageography in the discursive strategies of state elites who are undergoing the Euro-Atlantic integration process. These analytical concepts come together to provide deeper insights into how high-level policy actors exercise their partial agency in order to locate their state’s shifting security-identity concerns within, on the one hand, a changing global security regime and on the other hand, the deep historical legacies of identity and security concerns entrenched in the national psyche of the Croatian experience. Fundamental to Croatia’s integration process, then, are the twinned agendas of securitization and neoliberalization that have aimed to deliver Croatia from a ‘Balkan’ past that includes socialism, conflict, and an outmoded perception of security as tied to territorial defense.

What has consequently been required of Croatian political elites is a repertoire of discursive strategies that respond to the structures of expectations held by diverse
consumers of integration policy dialogues. The specific language mobilized in these strategies indicates that political elites undergoing the accession process are responding to a spatial imaginary of nested, hierarchical scales, in which messages are tailored and packaged for consumption by perceived domestic, regional, and global audiences. The historical legacy of ‘Balkanism’ in Croatian society adds the dimension of a selective use of ‘Balkan’ identity in the policy dialogues, with political elites strategically deploying both positive and negative aspects of the identity depending on the audience or ‘scale’ to which they are speaking. Hence, the findings demonstrate that no matter how pervasive the constructivist view of scale has become in human geography, the fixed, hierarchical notion of scale continues to profoundly shape socio-political relations in a world that is, in a phenomenological sense, continually reconfigured into ‘levels’ of political authority and activity.

The third and final empirical essay, presented in Chapter Five, departs from the analysis of elite policy dialogues in order to highlight the linkages between the discursive strategies of EU and Croatian elites and the ‘everyday’ or rank-and-file members of the Croatian government and civil society sectors. The inclusion of both of these sectors was essential, in a methodological and a theoretical sense, to elucidating how practices of governance bring about the accession process. The research in this chapter focuses principally on the identity side of the security-identity nexus, building upon the insights about Balkanism highlighted in Chapter Four. Whereas Chapter Four takes Croatia’s ‘accession society’ status as a starting point, showing the interactions between the candidate country and its poly-scalar geopolitical audiences, Chapter Five delves more deeply into the construction of the accession society. The term ‘EUro-aspirant subject’ is
developed in order to analyze the process by which a society is remade into an ‘accession society,’ or a society that collectively aspires to become a member of the European Union.

The additional theoretical concept that comes to the fore in the final empirical essay is that of subject formation. The successful construction of the European accession society requires a process of subject formation that successfully (or partially successfully) re-creates nation-state citizens into citizens who embrace multiple loyalties and multiple modes of belonging simultaneously, a key facet of popular conceptions of cosmopolitan identity. In the case of Croatia, though, cosmopolitanism is set in opposition to the legacy of Balkanism. This identity binary is not entirely new, but it is reified and made newly relevant through the mechanisms of governance that work to bring about European accession.

The essay analyzes several instances of these mechanisms of governance. First, emanating from the ‘EU level,’ is a strategy document that outlines the way in which the European Delegation to Croatia defines rational subjects and rational political choices in Croatian society. The language is laden with implicit constructions of a problematic ‘Balkan’ subject who lacks a mature and responsible perspective on Croatia’s future. What is needed, the strategy asserts, is a concerted effort from Croatian government and civil society in order to bring about the well-informed, forward-looking (read: cosmopolitan) subjects who will secure Croatia’s EUropean future. The analysis then turns to the ways in which this rigid identity binary percolated through the relations of governance linking the Croatian government and civil society sectors to the broader
Croatian public. Ultimately, the essay concludes, the EUro-aspirant subjectivity prevailed, at least insofar as the referendum on EU membership was positive.

While at first glance, the findings of the three empirical essays may seem to illustrate a tidy schema of hierarchical levels of governance, which are relatively fixed and interact with one another, I contend that there are more complex and nuanced insights to be gained from this body of work. I turn to these insights in the following section as I reflect on the contribution the suite of essays makes to the literature on multi-level governance.

**Implications for Multi-Level Governance**

The 2008 special issue of *GeoJournal* (volume 72, no. 1/2) edited by Virginie Mamadouh and Herman van der Wusten took stock of the existing work on “Geographies of Governance in the European Union” and put forth an agenda for continued geographic inquiry into this complex and many-faceted topic. Murphy’s (2008: 8) contribution to the issue urges geographers to advance the literature beyond the “current institutional-cum-political-economic emphasis” and accord more attention to the significance of Europe as a geographical construct that is continuously re-negotiated in everyday spatial imaginings. Elsewhere in the issue, Mamadouh and van der Wusten’s contribution beckons geographers away from the tendency to reify the ‘European level’ of EU governance, favoring a variable spatial perspective with sensitivity to overlapping scalar constructions and policy networks. More recently, Moisio, et al. (2013) called for deeper examination of how the relationship between Europeanization and globalization is negotiated by the policy actors of EUropean governance.
The findings of the three research projects presented herein are offered as an intervention in the agendas briefly outlined above. The common theoretical assumption weaving the essays together is the idea that the security-identity nexus that is central to the reproduction of the state is also pivotal in the geographic reconfigurations of state space brought about by Euro-Atlantic integration. This is supported in the findings in several ways, and carries with it implications for how we should ‘rethink’ multi-level governance, as the dissertation’s title implies.

In the first empirical essay, Chapter Three, the process of securitization in the European Union raises fundamental questions about power, sovereignty, and their spatial articulations in the security and defense dialogues of the EU. The analysis brings in the element of contingency in order to add fresh insights to the existing, top-down notions of EU security governance. Perhaps what is most interesting about the findings of this work, in light of the phenomenon of multi-level governance, is that the rhetoric of policy elites indicates powerful mechanisms of governance that are ‘beyond’ the level of the EU. The dominant discourses of the European Defense Agency demonstrate a policy community (consisting of both governmental and non-governmental, or industry, actors) that very much sees itself as responding to an increasingly global security and defense market in which the EU ‘level’ must re-strategize in order to remain competitive, secure, and prosperous. But in order to do so, their language must effectively persuade member state officials that the relevant scale of security governance is no longer that tied to nation-state territory or sovereignty, but rather to the supranational realm. Meanwhile, ostensible ‘private’ actors, such as national and multi-national firms, as well as particular nation-state governments, come together in contingent ways to construct the
supranational security and defense arena, with differing motivations. What, at one level, may appear to be contradictory goals and agendas can often, at another level, work as a coherent policy course. Ultimately, though, it may well be the forces of neoliberal globalization that contribute most to the construction of a ‘supranational level’ of security governance.

Chapter Four approaches integration in a different manner, and thus offers additional insights about multi-level governance. Less about the construction of new levels of governance than about the reification of seemingly pre-given scales, this essay demonstrates that for the countries of the so-called Western Balkans, the significance of multi-level security governance is articulated very much in terms of a broad Euro-Atlantic arena in which citizens are meant to identify closely with NATO and the European Union as an expansive space of belonging. While this is not entirely unique to the Western Balkans, it has a particular meaning amongst these countries due to the recent conflicts that broke up the former Yugoslavia, and the dominant role that NATO and the United States played there. Keenly aware of this, Croatian political elites have endeavored, through their discursive strategies, to emphasize the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ as the key level of security governance at which Croatia can be assured a voice in global security affairs (as opposed to remaining outside of this arena). At the same time, the security-identity discourses employed by Croatian government officials have acknowledged the many relevant constructions of the regional scale in their Euro-Atlantic integration process: the transatlantic, the European, and the enduring notion of the Western Balkans, which is at once resisted and embraced as the identity of ‘Croatia as regional leader’ continues to shape Croatians’ sense of their role in the world.
And finally, Chapter Five uses a more grounded, ethnographic approach to the state in order to analyze the process of multi-level European governance. The aim in this essay was to demonstrate the crucial links between goals and agendas emanating from various centers of authority in the complex web of practices and relations conceived as multi-level governance. While the empirics do, to some degree, highlight activities that might readily be pointed to as ‘European,’ ‘national,’ and ‘subnational,’ I wish to emphasize the way in which agency at each of these ‘levels’ is exposed as partial and incomplete. While the EU delegation to Croatia and high-level Croatian political officials may, in some respects, enjoy a power preponderance in the process of knowledge production, the rank-and-file members of government bureaucracies and civil society organizations (in other words, ‘everyday’ citizens) still play an important role in negotiating and frequently contesting the official knowledge. The analysis lays bare perhaps the most fundamental practice of governance: the process of subject formation. However, the activities and relations of subject formation are not neatly distributed between levels, as the findings certainly do not illustrate a straightforward process of ‘higher’ levels of governance creating subjectivities at ‘lower’ levels. Rather, deep-seated and historically layered senses of identity profoundly shape these subjectivities, with crucial citizen-to-citizen relations playing a pervasive role in the process.
Avenues for Future Research

The findings of the empirical essays present several fruitful pathways for subsequent research. Firstly, the study of EU security governance presented in Chapter Three should be extended to include an institutional ethnography within the European Defense Agency, if possible. While documentary analysis provides important and telling insights about the dominant discursive strategies of EU governance, these are in many ways partial and limited. As with any other documents, the publications of the EDA contain carefully crafted language and strategically selected quotes that are intended to convey particular messages for particular audiences. Hence, the conclusions of that research must be built upon by observing the institutional practices and behaviors that occur within the EDA and between representatives of the agency and those of member state governments, multinational defense companies, and so on. Additionally, as the sovereign debt crisis persists in key EU member states, it will be increasingly important to investigate securitization while directly engaging with the impacts of austerity upon defense budgets.

A second pathway identified for subsequent research would address some of the more theoretical questions that emerge from the dissertation as a whole. Future work should endeavor to answer these specific questions: To what extent has heterarchy supplanted hierarchy in the governance of international relations (if it indeed has) and if heterarchy truly rules the day, what of collective intentionality? And how do collective intentionality, identity, and metageography intersect? Building on my work here, a more focused analysis on collective intentionality would provide further insights into processes of governance and relations of power. This would make further connections with the
field of political science, which has in its own ways explored collective intentionality. However, political geographic ways of thinking about space would make this a more theoretically rich endeavor. Such work would also connect the dissertation’s findings to anthropological studies of the post-socialist context and European integration. New geographical insights into the interaction between discursive spaces and material, institutional spaces would make a unique contribution on these themes.

And finally, as the other Western Balkan countries follow their own paths toward NATO and EU membership, I hope to expand the fieldwork from Zagreb, Croatia to the other former Yugoslav republics, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. The goal would be to incorporate these other accession societies in a relational, rather than comparative, way. Given the important relationship between Bosnian Croats and Croatian society, as well as the pervasive ties between the Croatian and Serbian societies (via diasporas, refugees, familial ties and formal political relationships), a full understanding of the creation of Euro-Atlantic space in Croatia can only be gained through exploring the ways in which notions of identity, belonging, security, and inside/outside are shaped in interaction with these other communities. This will provide a more fully developed view of how the Western Balkans is continuously (re)constructed as a region, both by Euro-Atlantic security governance and by the metageographies of everyday citizens who undoubtedly still conceive of themselves and of their societies (in part) in relation to their regional neighbors.
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