THE DETERMINANTS OF
ETHNIC MINORITY PARTY FORMATION AND SUCCESS IN EUROPE

BY

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Abstract

Why do some ethnic minority groups in Europe form political parties of their own in order to obtain political representation, whereas others choose to work within the confines of established, mainstream political parties? Further, why do some ethnic minority parties (EMPs) achieve electoral success, whereas others fail?

In addressing these questions, I incorporate insights from history and social psychology to develop an original theory of EMP emergence and success. I argue that an ethnic minority group’s historical background influences its political engagement strategies through sociopsychological processes. I propose that native groups (those that inhabited the territory of the modern-day state in which they reside prior to that state’s establishment) and groups with historical experiences of autonomous self-rule are more likely to form ethnic minority parties, and that EMPs formed by such groups are more likely to enjoy electoral success. I argue that groups possessing one or both of these characteristics are more likely to exhibit the traits of positive distinctiveness and shared grievances, contributing to the development of a salient collective political identity. Ultimately, groups that perceive themselves as native to their state and that have enjoyed autonomy are more likely to feel entitled to the unique form of representation provided by an ethnic minority party, and more likely to generate sufficient electoral support to sustain such a party. In contrast, groups lacking these traits are likely to either have non-politicized identities or to approach the political process from an individual, rather than collective, perspective. This makes them more prone to seek participation in established, mainstream political parties. In addition to this original theory, I consider existing theories regarding the role of the political opportunity structure and the role of international organizations such as the European Union.

I test my predictions with a mixed-methods approach combining a large-N, cross-national quantitative analysis with a detailed case study focusing on Bulgaria. The quantitative portion of my analysis uses an original dataset of European elections in the period 1990-2012. I test my predictions regarding the determinants of EMP entry and success using generalized linear mixed models, finding substantial support for the influence of the two historical variables. For the qualitative case study, I performed a month of field research, conducting semi-structured elite interviews with leading Bulgarian political figures with expertise in the country’s ethnic politics. I sought to determine why the country’s Turkish minority has produced one of the most successful ethnic parties in Europe, whereas the country’s Roma population remains without a notable political party. The case study confirms many of the findings of the quantitative analysis and allows a deeper exploration into the complex causal mechanisms behind EMP emergence and success.
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I. Introduction

Contemporary Europe, Eastern and Western alike, is characterized by the presence of sizable ethnic minority groups living within otherwise ethnically homogenous nation-states. Although there is great diversity among these minority populations, one nearly universal trait they share is concern over the protection of their rights and interests within their host nation. This concern is motivated by an actual or perceived inequality of treatment between the majority ethnic group of the state and its ethnic minorities, and allegations of both *de jure* and *de facto* discrimination are commonplace.

In Western Europe, Muslim immigrants have objected to a number of legislative initiatives limiting freedom of religious expression, arguing that such laws discriminate against adherents of Islam in particular. In Eastern Europe, the fall of Communism introduced political pluralism into many states with unresolved ethnic tensions, and numerous governments have enacted laws regarding language, religion and citizenship that are argued to constrain the liberty of the ethnic minorities residing within them. Further, ethnic minorities in this region—particularly the Roma—suffer considerable *de facto* discrimination even in the absence of *de jure* discrimination.

To combat these real and perceived threats, ethnic minorities across Europe have sought to engage the political system of their state and influence government policy. The democratic systems of most European countries offer opportunities for minority groups to attempt to achieve their goals through electoral politics. However, different minorities have sought to accomplish these goals in strikingly different ways. At the most basic level, two broad models of ethnic minority political mobilization can be distinguished.
The first model is more prevalent in Western Europe and is epitomized by the case of the United Kingdom, where migrant minority groups (Indians, Pakistanis, Afro-Caribbeans) have sought to influence politics by working within the already existing party system of the state. Since the 1970’s, there has been a concerted effort by these groups to participate in the politics of the Labour party, and to use the party as a promoter of minority rights. As a consequence, the number of UK members of parliament (MPs) belonging to these minority groups rose substantially, and the political discourse of the state shifted from one generally dismissive or apathetic toward the rights of immigrants to one more accepting of multiculturalism (Garbaye, 2003). More recently, however, British Prime Minister David Cameron has advocated for a “muscular liberalism” entailing more restrictive and assimilative policies toward migrants, and the representation of ethnic minorities in the UK parliament still falls considerably short of their share of the general population.

Similar patterns of ethnic minority participation are present in much of Western Europe (Turks in Germany’s Social Democratic Party, Muslims in the Netherlands’ Labour Party), as well as parts of Eastern Europe (for instance, Russians in the Estonian Centre Party). The general pattern is one of ethnic minority participation almost exclusively within the most popular existing center-left or liberal party of the state. This entails a symbiotic relationship where on the one hand liberal and left-of-center parties solidify their support among certain sectors of the electorate, and on the other ethnic minorities obtain some (usually limited) parliamentary representation and government

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policy influence.

An alternative model of ethnic political mobilization is evident predominantly in Eastern (but also some Western) European states. In former Warsaw Pact states, many minority groups quickly adapted to the collapse of Communism. Making full use of the nascent political pluralism, they formed political parties that would exclusively represent their interests in government. Although the magnitude of electoral support ethnic minority parties (EMPs) enjoy is naturally limited by the size of the ethnic groups they represent, these parties have gained prominence as pivotal coalition partners for mainstream parties in states like Bulgaria, Slovakia and Romania. As such, they have seized control of numerous ministerial positions and have had substantial influence over government policy-making. Further, successful EMPs have enabled ethnic minority groups to achieve levels of parliamentary representation not generally observed in states without such parties. For instance, ethnic Turks control 14.6% of seats in Bulgaria’s 42nd National Assembly, well above their 8.8% share of the country’s population, whereas Turks in Germany control only 1.7% of seats in the 18th Bundestag despite comprising 5.2% of total population. Similarly, Swedes control 4.5% of seats in the 36th Finnish Eduskunta through the Swedish People’s Party, slightly higher than their 4.3% share of population, while ethnic Finns constitute only 1.5% of the current Swedish Riksdag.

despite constituting 4.5% of Sweden’s population. It appears that in some cases the EMP approach to ethnic political mobilization may produce superior results to working within mainstream political parties. Yet at the same time, many ethnic minority parties have failed to obtain a large following and to influence the politics of their state. For instance, Russian minority parties in Estonia such as the Russian Party in Estonia and the Estonian United People’s Party enjoyed some brief success in the late 1990s before their electoral fortunes declined, forcing them to merge with more viable, ideologically-based parties. The various parties representing Roma minorities in countries like Bulgaria, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia have fared even worse in national elections.

The questions I seek to answer are therefore as follows: first, why do some ethnic minority groups form ethnically-based political parties to represent their interests, whereas others do not? Second, why are some ethnic minority parties successful, whereas others are not?

These questions have not heretofore been extensively studied, yet they bear considerable real-world relevance. This relevance is particularly pronounced for Western Europe, where immigration and demographic trends have steadily amplified the salience of ethnic politics, and will continue to do so in the future. Exploring the determinants of ethnic party formation and success could be instructive not only to ethnic minorities themselves, but also to national and supranational statesmen concerned with political and societal stability. Existing literature reveals that ethnic minority parties can be highly influential actors in domestic politics (Jiglau and Ghergina 2011), boost political participation among the ethnic group they represent (Ishiyama 2009), prevent minority
ethnic conflict (Ishiyama 2009, Johnson 2002, Birnir 2007), help manage interethnic relations during democratic transitions (Mihailescu 2008) and help stabilize and sustain democracy (Chandra 2005, Birnir 2007). With so many studies pointing to the influence—on minority groups and on the broader society alike—of ethnic minority parties, it is imperative that we examine what factors contribute to their emergence and success.

There are two main bodies of literature to which my research speaks. The first of these is the literature on ethnic politics. Existing research on the subject is primarily concerned with the developing world, and understandably so. However, the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the rise in immigration to Western Europe has made the study of ethnic politics increasingly relevant for these regions of the world. The work which has been done on Europe so far deals primarily with violent ethnic conflict in regions like former Yugoslavia and Northern Ireland; relatively little attention has been paid to the more subtle and political forms of ethno-nationalism which have emerged on the continent in the past two decades.

Existing cross-national research on the emergence and effects of ethnic minority parties has focused either on Eastern Europe exclusively (Bernauer and Bochsler 2011) or on Eastern Europe in conjunction with regions other than Western Europe (Ishiyama 2009). There also exists a literature on ethnoregionalist parties in Western Europe (De Winter and Tursan 1998, Heller 2002), but it has thus far remained largely disconnected from work on Eastern Europe. My research bridges this divide and presents the first cross-national study of the presence and absence of successful ethnic minority parties in Europe as a whole.
The second relevant body of literature is that on parties and elections, and more specifically the emergence and success of niche parties. Niche parties are those parties which defy traditional class-based, left-right or liberal-conservative policy dimensions and instead focus on a specific issue (or narrow set of issues) which cross-cuts these dimensions. Such parties tend to be anti-establishment and critical of “major” political parties within their state.

Due to their tendency to emphasize a narrow set of issues which have high salience for only a small portion of the population, and which generally fall outside of traditional dimensions of political competition, EMPs can be considered to be a type of niche party. Labeling EMPs as niche parties is consistent with definitions of niche parties commonly found in existing research. For instance, Wagner (2011) defines niche parties as those which “compete primarily on a small number of non-economic issues.” Meguid (2005) similarly defines niche parties as those which defy traditional class-based politics and focus on a small group of issues. Both authors argue that ethno-regional political parties ought to be considered niche parties under these definitions of the term.

Within the context of European politics, most of the work on niche parties has focused on green (Müller-Rommel, 1985; Dolezal, 2010; Müller-Rommel and Poguntke, 2013) and right-wing populist (Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Golder, 2003; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Oesch, 2008; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Mudde, 2010; Luther, 2011) parties, while very little has been done on ethnic minority parties. The only quantitative cross-national study of EMP formation in Europe to date is the one conducted by Bernauer and Bochsler (2011). Although this study is commendable in many respects, it is hampered by its limited geographic scope and the flawed operationalization of key independent variables.
Thus, despite the fact that they fall under the niche party category, and despite their increasing relevance and influence in parts of Europe, European EMPs remain seriously understudied, and we know little about the conditions which facilitate their formation and electoral success.

My research builds on existing work on ethnic politics and niche parties as a starting point, yet makes a significant contribution by examining the role of historical experience and social psychology in ethnic groups’ political engagement strategies. I argue that a minority group’s historical background influences its political engagement strategies through sociopsychological processes. I propose that native groups (those that inhabited the territory of the modern-day state in which they reside prior to that state’s establishment), groups with territorial attachment (those that have been historically concentrated in particular regions of their state) and groups with historical experiences of autonomous self-rule are more likely to form ethnic minority parties, and that EMPs formed by such groups are more likely to enjoy electoral success. I argue that groups possessing these characteristics are more likely to exhibit the traits of positive distinctiveness and shared grievances, contributing to the development of a salient collective political identity. Ultimately, groups that perceive themselves as native to their state and region, and that have enjoyed autonomy are more likely to feel entitled to the unique form of representation provided by an ethnic minority party, and more likely to generate sufficient electoral support to sustain such a party. In contrast, groups lacking these traits are likely to either have non-politicized identities or to approach the political process from an individual, rather than collective, perspective. This makes them more prone to seek participation in established, mainstream political parties.
Additionally, I consider several alternative explanations for the emergence of ethnic minority parties. Drawing on Kitschelt (1985) and Bernauer and Bochsler (2011), I construct a formulation of the political opportunity structure theory which proposes that minority groups are most likely to form ethnic parties when mainstream political parties are hostile or apathetic toward the group’s concerns, and when the group believes it has the capacities (numeric size and human capital) to create and sustain such a party. I further consider the influence of international actors in domestic politics, proposing that we are more likely to observe EMP formation when the ethnic group in question has a valuable international ally—either a geographically proximal kin state or an international organization such as the European Union—interceding on its behalf and acting as a whistleblower for unfair barriers to electoral entry.

With respect to ethnic minority party success, I propose that the presence of a successful right-wing populist or nationalist party will contribute to an EMP’s ability to mobilize its base, and therefore maximize its electoral performance. Additionally, I suggest that political culture based on clientelistic (rather than programmatic) appeals tends to favor ethnic minority parties, as such parties often have access to built-in patron-client networks already existing within the ethnic communities they represent. Lastly, drawing on previous scholarship (Chandra 2004, Tavits 2012, Bolleyer and Bitzek 2013) I argue that three party organization characteristics—the professionalization of the party’s central organization, opportunities for intra-party advancement and connectedness to societal groups—enable ethnic minority parties to achieve electoral success once they are formed.
In order to test my theoretical expectations, I employ a mixed-method approach combining a large-N quantitative analysis and a detailed case study of ethnic politics in Bulgaria. The quantitative analysis utilizes an original dataset of European elections in the period 1990-2012 (N=409) containing several variables that have not been previously incorporated into the study of EMP emergence and success. Using various statistical methods, including generalized linear mixed models, I find substantial evidence for many of the proposed relationships. Most notably, I find that two of the three factors in my historical explanatory framework—historical presence and dominance/autonomy—are the two strongest predictors of ethnic minority party entry and success. The Bulgaria case study complements the quantitative findings by providing an in-depth analysis of the processes contributing to the emergence of successful ethnic minority parties. I examine the rise of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), a Turkish ethnic party that is among the most successful in Europe, and compare it to the feeble and futile efforts of the Roma community to establish a successful party of its own. I find that many of the proposed historical, international, political system and party organization variables have played a role in bringing about the MRF’s remarkable success.

My dissertation proceeds as follows.

In Chapter II, I develop a theoretical framework for the study of the emergence and success of EMPs. I first lay out the reasoning behind my central thesis regarding the role of history and social psychology in the political engagement strategies of ethnic minority groups. Next, I consider alternative explanations for the emergence of ethnic minority parties dealing with the political opportunity structure and influences from international actors. Lastly, I discuss a host of party system, political culture and party
organization factors I believe ought to influence EMP success, which I define as the ability to obtain legislative representation.

In Chapter III, I test the theoretical expectations developed in Chapter II on a large-N quantitative analysis of European elections in the period 1990-2012. Employing a variety of statistical techniques, I find substantial evidence that two of the variables in my historical framework—historical presence and dominance/autonomy—are the strongest predictors of EMP entry and success. Further, I find some evidence that candidacy for EU accession improves the likelihood of minority party entry in the candidate state, and that the presence of a strong right-wing populist party increases the probability that an EMP will achieve electoral success, although neither of these effects is especially strong. In contrast, I find no evidence that the attitudes of the major political parties in the state toward ethnic minorities influence those minorities’ decisions of whether or not to form an EMP.

In Chapter IV, I complement the findings of my quantitative analysis with a detailed case study of the emergence and success of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms in Bulgaria, as well as the failure of the country’s Roma parties to obtain the same level of success. This case study allows me to examine the emergence of EMPs on a deeper level and to perform process tracing in order to determine more precisely the mechanisms by which initial conditions favorable to EMP formation and success lead to the realization of these outcomes. I find that the Turkish minority’s historical heritage produced a sense of entitlement to fair treatment and cultural autonomy, which, when paired with the dehumanizing ethnic policies of the Communist regime, paved the path for the formation of the MRF following the country’s democratic transition. In contrast,
the Roma minority’s historical background did little to inspire a similar sense of group rights and did not instill a sense of pressing need for collective political action. I find little support for the notion that the contrasting political strategies of the two ethnic groups can be explained by the openness of mainstream parties to their input. On the other hand, international support for an ethnically Turkish party (and lack thereof for a Roma party) in the early 1990’s may help to explain why the MRF was allowed to contest elections while parties representing other ethnicities were initially deemed unconstitutional. I further find evidence that the MRF’s skillful employment of clientelistic networks, and the perceived threat posed by the nationalist party Ataka, have contributed to the party’s success. Lastly, I determine that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms has been aided in its electoral success by its extensive, professional and rigidly hierarchical organizational structure that nevertheless offers opportunities for intra-party advancement, as well as by the quality of its leadership.

Finally, in Chapter V, I offer a summary of this dissertation’s most important theoretical contributions and empirical findings, discuss the significance of these findings within the broader literatures on ethnic politics and niche parties, and suggest areas for future research.
II. Theory

I. Introduction

Why do some ethnic minority groups in Europe form parties of their own to contest national legislative elections, whereas others choose to participate in the politics of their state through established, mainstream parties? Further, why are some ethnic minority parties (EMPs) successful in obtaining legislative representation for the people-group they represent, whereas others fail to do so?

While the limited number of existing studies addressing EMP emergence and success have made some valuable theoretical contributions, they are ill-suited to adequately explain the ethnic minority party phenomenon in Europe, for two primary reasons. First, the focus of such studies has tended to be on the developing world, and they have consequently employed a theoretical framework tailored to the conditions and circumstances of these kinds of states. Second, and more importantly, previous studies have failed to take into account a crucial category of variables—those pertaining to the historical background of ethnic groups—that ought to hold significant explanatory power in addressing these questions.

In this chapter, I use insights from history and social psychology to develop a unique theory for the emergence and success of ethnic minority parties. I argue that an ethnic minority group’s historical background influences its political engagement strategies through sociopsychological processes. I propose that native groups—those that inhabited the territory of the modern-day state in which they reside prior to that state’s establishment—and groups with historical experiences of autonomous self-rule are more likely to form ethnic minority parties, and that EMPs formed by such groups are more
likely to enjoy electoral success. I argue that groups possessing one or both of these characteristics are prone to exhibit the traits of positive distinctiveness and shared grievances, contributing to the development of a salient collective political identity. Ultimately, groups that perceive themselves as native to their state and that have enjoyed autonomy are more likely to feel entitled to the particular form of representation provided by an ethnic minority party, and more likely to generate sufficient electoral support to sustain such a party. In contrast, groups lacking these traits are likely to either have non-politicized identities or to approach the political process from an individual, rather than collective, perspective. The absence of a salient collective political identity can render the ethnic party idea unappealing and/or unfeasible. Therefore, such groups are more likely to accept working within (and, in a sense, integrating into) established, mainstream political parties as the best strategy for advancing their interests. Major parties can lend an air of legitimacy to the concerns of a minority group with weak historical ties to its state, and they possess the influence and expertise necessary to address those concerns.

In addition to developing this original theory, I synthesize various existing theoretical approaches to the study of electoral politics, re-formulating them to the particular context of this study in order to develop a comprehensive framework addressing ethnic minority party entry and success in Europe. I adapt insights from theories regarding the political opportunity structure, the influence of international actors in domestic politics, the role of clientelism in electoral outcomes and the impact of party organization characteristics on electoral success. Ultimately, I argue that we are more likely to observe EMP entry for sizable minority groups whose concerns are not adequately addressed by the major political parties of their state, as well as for groups
that have valuable international allies in the form of the European Union and/or a bordering kin state. With respect to EMP success, I argue that the presence of a prominent right-wing populist party in the political system, the prevalence of clientelistic practices in the state, the existence of nearby kin state and the presence of an extensive organizational party structure with ample opportunity for intra-party advancement are all factors bolstering the electoral performance of ethnic minority parties.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In section II, I discuss some previous approaches to the study of ethnic minority party emergence and success, highlighting the valuable insights we can draw from them while simultaneously drawing attention to their limitations. In section III, I outline in broad strokes my approach to the two questions this dissertation is concerned with: 1) under what conditions are we likely to observe EMP formation and entry and 2) under what circumstances are EMPs likely to thrive in electoral politics? Section IV discusses my theoretical framework in exploring the question of ethnic minority party entry, whereas Section V deals with the question of minority party success. Finally, I conclude in Section VI.

II. Previous approaches to the study of ethnic minority party success

Chandra (2004) offers perhaps the best-known study on the determinants of ethnic minority party success. Chandra’s book is concerned specifically with EMPs in patronage-democracies, which she defines as those states that 1) possess a large public sector and in which 2) elected officials are able to appeal to voters on an individualized basis (p. 6). Chandra argues that in patronage-democracies, limited information forces most voters to use ethnicity as a cue in determining who to vote for. In such conditions, voters will vote for those parties that place a large number of their co-ethnics into
positions of power. They will do so because they either expect to benefit materially as state goodies are distributed through ethnic networks, or they derive some psychological benefit from seeing co-ethnics in power (p. 8). Thus, for a political party to capture the vote of an ethnic minority, it must incorporate more elites from that ethnic category than any other party (pp. 12-13).

Chandra further contends that in order for a party to attract elites from a particular ethnicity, it must offer them the promise of ascent within its party organization (p. 13-14). In order to credibly promise such benefits, a party must have competitive—rather than centralized—rules for party advancement (p. 14-15). In other words, the party must be fluid and flexible enough that those who join its ranks can have reasonable expectations about rising to positions of greater power in the future. Ultimately, Chandra argues that “ethnic parties are most likely to succeed in patronage-democracies when they have competitive rules for intraparty advancement and the ethnic group they seek to mobilize is larger than the threshold of winning or leverage imposed by the electoral system” (p.15).

While Chandra’s book is an invaluable contribution to the study of EMPs, it is also naturally limited in the scope of its analysis and in the applicability of its findings. First, its theory is derived exclusively from and for the framework of patronage-democracies. Most states in the world are not patronage-democracies, and although many European political systems exhibit some clientelistic practices, it is hard to consider any European state to be a patronage-democracy. Further, Chandra’s empirical findings are derived from a single patronage-democracy (India), rather than from a cross-national analysis of the collectivity of such states. Therefore, as valuable as Chandra’s work is, it
does not speak to EMP success in many states—and even regions—of the world.

That being said, we should not discount the possibility that some elements of Chandra’s theoretical framework could travel to non-patronage-democracies. In particular, the notion that intra-party rules matter for EMP success could easily hold true for European states. There is nothing inherent in this notion which suggests that it ought to be more true in patronage-democracies than in other political system. Cox (1997) also lends support to the thesis that opportunities for intra-party advancement matter, although it is the permeability of established mainstream (rather than incipient ethnic) parties that he is primarily concerned with. I explore the effect of intra-party advancement opportunities in greater detail later in this chapter.

Thus far, the only study to examine the formation and success of EMPs quantitatively and cross-nationally is that of Bernauer and Bochsler (2011), who examine the electoral success of 130 minorities in 19 post-communist democracies. The authors synthesize political opportunity structure and rational-choice party formation theories to inform their theoretical expectations, and elect to examine EMP formation and the electoral success of EMPs separately. On the question of EMP formation, the authors hypothesize that:

1. If demand for minority representation is low, restrictive electoral rules will reduce the probability of electoral entry.

2. Accommodative reactions by established political parties to ethnic minority demands will diminish the probability of electoral entry, whereas dismissive or adversarial reactions will increase this probability.

With respect to EMP success, Bernauer and Bochsler expect that:
1. If demand for minority representation is low, restrictive electoral rules will reduce the probability of electoral success.

2. Adversarial reactions by the political establishment will increase the probability of electoral success of EMPs, while dismissive reactions would decrease it.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the authors find that high electoral thresholds do inhibit both the electoral entry and the electoral success of EMPs, but only when the size of the ethnic minority group is small. In contrast, they find no evidence that the reaction of established political parties has an influence either on the formation of EMPs or on their electoral success.

Although Bernauer and Bochsler present a solid foundation for the study of the emergence and success of EMPs, their study has several limitations.

First, the operationalization of “electoral demand” is problematic. It is comprised of two variables—the first is the numeric size of the ethnic minority group, and the second is the average salience of nationalism for political parties in the state. It is this second measure that is problematic, since it measures the extent to which nationalism is important in the state as a whole, not the extent to which ethnicity is important for a particular ethnic group.

Second, there is also a problem with the operationalization of the reactions of established parties. The authors only consider the reactions (measured by content analysis of party manifestos) of one of the two largest parties in the state—the one which has the most “intense” overall reaction (the greatest sum of accommodative and adversarial reactions). This means that they are presumably measuring the response of the most popular anti-minority party in some states, and the response of the most popular pro-
minority party in others. It would have been more consistent to simply look at the more pro-minority of the two largest parties of each state, and to measure how favorable it is to minority claims.

Thus, it is unclear whether the null findings of the study with respect to the influence of mainstream parties is a product of flawed operationalization, or if there is simply no such relationship. Later in this chapter, I propose an alternative framework for incorporating political opportunity structure theory into the study of EMP entry and success that offers a more accurate test of mainstream party effects on the fortunes of minority parties.

III. The Determinants of EMP Success: Two Questions

Why do we observe EMPs for some ethnic minorities, but not others? In order to answer this question, we must break the question down into two components. We must first examine why members of some ethnic minority groups deem it necessary or advantageous to form political parties and contest national elections, whereas others choose to engage the political system of their state differently (or not at all). That is, we must establish what drives the demand for establishment of an ethnic minority party. The second question we need to answer is, what are the factors that enable a party, once established, to attract sufficient electoral support among the ethnic group it seeks to represent? Under what conditions will an EMP obtain sufficient support to become a politically relevant actor in its state?

We must, of course, not overlook how interrelated the answers to these two questions actually are. It seems intuitive that EMPs are less likely to be formed in states where they do not have the potential for electoral success and political relevance.
Therefore, many of the factors that determine the extent of electoral support for EMPs will also inevitably exert some influence on the decision of whether or not to contest an election through an EMP.

Having said that, there are factors pertaining uniquely to the *entry* of a particular type of party without which no such party would be formed at all, no matter how favorable the institutional conditions might be. After all, no one asks why we observe no political parties representing the interests of left-handed people, Mazda drivers or soccer fans. It makes no sense to ask such questions since there is no apparent reason why these groups should wish to organize politically. Likewise, there are other variables that exert an influence on the *success* of parties but cannot be used as explanations for their establishment.

**IV. Ethnic Minority Party Entry**

Under what conditions does demand for an ethnic minority party develop? Scholars since Lipset and Rokkan (1967) have argued that the types of parties generated in a state’s political system are to a great extent determined by the social cleavages within that state. In order for demand for a particular type of party to emerge, there must first be politically salient divisions in society along one or more dimensions. It is these social cleavages that shape the character of the political system. It seems straightforward then, that the first prerequisite for the electoral demand of an EMP is the presence of a clear ethnic cleavage. At the same time, we observe a multitude of ethnically heterogeneous societies which do not produce ethnically-based parties. If the presence of ethnic diversity is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for ethnic party demand, how can we distinguish between ethnic divisions that lead to such demand and those that do not?
1. A Historical-Social-Psychological (HSP) Approach

Existing research on the emergence of ethnic minority parties has ignored what I believe to be the most important set of variables accounting for this phenomenon. I propose here that the primary factors influencing EMP formation are historical in nature, and that the mechanism through which they bring about this effect can best be understood by utilizing concepts from social psychology. My central thesis is that the unique history of each minority group plays a significant role in shaping the political attitudes and behaviors of members of that group. I argue that there are certain historical legacies that motivate and empower minority groups to establish political parties of their own, while the absence of such historical legacies inhibits and discourages such a form of political engagement. I focus on three distinct (but often related) factors—historical presence, territorial attachment and past dominance/autonomy—to explain what drives the demand behind EMP formation.

The first important factor in my Historical-Social-Psychological (HSP) framework is the historical presence of ethnic minorities. Most broadly, I distinguish between two types of minorities—those that have deep historical linkages to the lands on which they currently reside, and those which do not have such a background. The first group is comprised primarily of those ethnic minorities whose inhabitation of the lands where they currently reside predates the formation of the modern state in which they live. One example of this would be the Basques, who lived in the geographic region of the Western Pyrenees known as the Basque Country for centuries before that region was incorporated into the modern Spanish and French nation-states.

In contrast, non-native ethnic minorities are those that emerged primarily as the
result of migration following the establishment of the modern nation-state in which they live. This includes not only first and second-generation members of the recent migration wave from Asia, Africa and the Middle East to various states in Western Europe, but also Russians who migrated to the Baltic states following those states’ incorporation into the USSR, and the 20th century migration of Finns to Sweden. It does not, on the other hand, include groups such as the sizeable Roma minorities currently residing in many Central and Eastern European states. While such groups remained semi-nomadic for centuries following their arrival on the European continent, historical records indicate that they were largely sedenterized—in part voluntarily and in part by force—well in advance of the emergence of the modern nation-state in the region (Crowe 1994).

What makes these two types of ethnic minorities different, and how does it influence the demand for EMP formation? Native minorities have a much stronger moral basis for resisting assimilation efforts and fighting for the preservation of their culture than do non-native minorities. It is clear in the consciousness of these minorities that they did not come to live in their current state of residence as a consequence of choice, but rather as the consequence of distant geopolitical events outside of their control. Indeed, they see themselves as preceding this state, and this fact both emboldens and legitimizes their desire for influence on its politics. Further, this desire for political influence is most likely to be pursued in the formation of an EMP. The other alternative—working within mainstream political parties—would be, in a sense, to surrender to assimilation into the titular ethnicity of the state. Since such communities are likely to possess a strong sense of group rights (e.g., the right of the community to be educated in its own language, or to exercise some degree of autonomy over its own affairs) in addition to individual rights,
political action that entails assimilation may be frowned upon and viewed as a problematic concession.

On the other hand, non-native minorities realize that the fact that they are minorities is the consequence of personal or family choice. Somewhere down the line, members of a certain ethnic group chose to migrate to a state with a dominant ethnicity other than their own. In their consciousness, this was a price they (or their parents, or even their grandparents) were willing to pay for the perceived benefits of migrating to this new state. Since such minorities do not have an extended historical presence in their state of residence, it is more difficult for them to make the case that they ought to be granted any level of autonomy as an ethnic group. They certainly believe in their entitlement to individual rights (e.g., protection against discrimination in employment and education, access to public and private services), but their claims to group rights are weak. This predisposes such ethnic minorities to working within the major political parties of their state in order to accomplish their goals, rather than forming particularistic and exclusivist parties of their own. Indeed, they may perceive that forming such parties will only further drive a wedge between them and the titular ethnicity, since its members already view them as “foreigners” and “visitors.” Since the primary goal of these ethnic groups is the protection of individual rights, and since individual rights are predicated on belongingness to (rather separateness from) the state, established major parties may be the best vehicles for accomplishing that goal.

To illustrate these differences in ethnic group mentality, it is instructive to compare the claims of native and non-native minority groups in the United Kingdom. An examination of the mission statements of organizations representing the country’s
migrant South Asian minority groups (Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) reveals concerns such as “establishing a safe, tolerant Britain in which Islamophobia and racism have no place,”\(^1\) enabling Muslims to “live as equal and valued citizens, free to practice their faith and free from discrimination and demonization,”\(^2\) and “[eradicating] disadvantages and forms of discrimination faced by Muslims.”\(^3\) Examining materials produced by such organizations reveals a focus on the protection of civil liberties of individual citizens, legitimated by those citizens’ belongingness to the state and equality with other residents.

On the other hand, organizations representing the native Scottish and Welsh minorities explicitly pursue independence and autonomy, grounded in a communal right to self-determination. Thus Alex Salmond, leader of the Scottish National Party (SNP), in urging voters to back Scottish independence in a 2014 referendum declares that “…it is fundamentally better for all of us if decisions about Scotland’s future are taken by the people who care most about Scotland—that is, the people of Scotland.”\(^4\) The SNP has invoked Scottish history to legitimize independence, describing the 1999 establishment of the Scottish Parliament as a continuation of the parliament abolished by the 1707 Act of Union with the Kingdom of England.\(^5\) Plaid Cymru (“Party of Wales”) declares in its constitution that among its primary aims is “to secure independence for Wales in Europe,”\(^6\) and to “create a bilingual society by promoting the revival of the Welsh

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1 Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism, http://www.asianecho.co.uk/?page_id=488  
2 Muslim Public Affairs Committee, http://www.mpacuk.org/about-mpacuk.html  
3 Muslim Council of Britain, http://www.asianecho.co.uk/?page_id=488  
5 Scottish National Party – About Us, http://www.snp.org/about-us  
language,”

drawing on Welsh history and culture to support its campaign for political and cultural autonomy. It is evident from examining the reasoning behind the objectives of both Plaid Cymru and the SNP that their claims are based on a sense of historically-grounded legitimate separateness from the United Kingdom, in sharp contrast to South Asian organizations, which base their claims on the belongingness of their members to the state.

A second historical factor that ought to play a role in creating demand for an EMP is the territorial attachment of the ethnic minority—a historical connection between the minority group and a particular territory (or territories) within the boundaries of the modern-day state. Territorial attachment can best be thought of as a special kind of historical presence that is characterized by a long-standing spatial concentration of the minority group. In other words, historical presence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for territorial attachment. There are ethnic groups that have a long-standing historical presence on the territory of a modern-day state, which, due to their nomadic lifestyle or simply their geographical dispersion, never formed a particular attachment to any one geographic region (or regions) within that territory.

The best example of such a group are the Roma, who have had an extensive historical presence in most of Central and Eastern Europe since the 15th and 16th centuries, yet do not closely associate themselves with any specific regions within the borders of the states that they currently inhabit. This is partly the result of the semi-nomadic character of this group during the earlier part of its historical presence in the region, as the reluctance to settle down precluded territorial attachment. Of course, the

\[7\] Ibid.
East European Roma did experience a gradual but steady sedentarization between the 15th and 19th centuries, with the nomadic lifestyle becoming nearly extinct by the beginning of the 20th century. However, throughout this process the Roma remained geographically dispersed, as they did not settle in specific regions but remained spread out across the territory of their states.

Why should territorial attachment lend support for the formation of an EMP? Once again, it is helpful to think of territorial attachment as a stronger case of historical presence. As such, the factors proceeding from the historical presence of the minority will play a role in its preferred mode of political participation. However, territorial attachment lends an even stronger support to an ethnic community’s belief in group rights and group autonomy. The attachment to a piece of land as the historical abode of a people-group promotes a sense that this group has a right to exercise self-determination at least within the boundaries of that region. If the ethnic group has historically comprised a majority, plurality or even a sizable minority within a particular region, this lends support to the idea that this region belongs at least as much to the group as it does to the modern nation-state, and that the group ought therefore to play a unique role in its governance. Ethnic groups with territorial attachment are more likely to conceive of themselves as a separate nation that demands the tools for some degree of self-governance—tools that an EMP can at least partially offer. Political participation within major mainstream parties would be a tacit denial of this separate nationhood.

In contrast, native but geographically dispersed people-groups are less likely to have a sense that they constitute a nation, or to hold the accompanying belief in group rights and the right to self-rule. Such groups may be more willing to compromise by
participating in the political process through mainstream parties that promise some benefits (the protection of individual rights, the improvement of socio-economic conditions, etc.) to members of the group, yet do not offer it a substantial role in the governance of the state. However, as these ethnic groups are nonetheless native, one would expect that some demand for an EMP would exist, though this demand is unlikely to be sufficient to sustain a political party, especially over the long run, as mainstream political parties may find a way to co-opt such support before it reaches critical mass.

A third historical factor contributing to EMP formation is a history of dominance/autonomy. I distinguish here between those ethnic minority groups that have had some historical experience with autonomous self-rule (within the boundaries of their present state) and those that have not. Such autonomy could have occurred in one of two possible contexts. The first involves the ethnic group having once constituted a separate, independent political entity where it was able to rule itself. An example of this would be the kingdoms of Ireland and Scotland and the corresponding minority groups in the present day United Kingdom. The second involves the ethnic group having once constituted the dominant people-group in an ethnically heterogeneous political entity. This arrangement is exemplified by the Turkish minorities in modern-day states that were once in the dominion of the Ottoman Empire, as well as Hungarian minorities in states once ruled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In both types of cases, the ethnic group in question has had some (even if limited, or temporally distant) experience in governing itself, whether through enjoying its own separate state or exercising political hegemony over a larger, multi-ethnic state.

The experience of autonomous self-rule encourages the formation of EMPs
through its influence on the political consciousness of the ethnic group in a similar manner to the other two historical factors described above. A previous experience of autonomy strengthens the notion of a right to some level of group autonomy in the present day. It encourages members of the group to conceive of themselves as a politically separate group, engaged in a struggle for group (rather than individual) rights. With such an historical background, attempts by mainstream parties to assimilate the group’s concerns into their broad political platforms may prove less palatable than forming a separate party asserting the separateness of the group and its right to some degree of self-governance.

Here again, one would expect that the interaction between this and the other two historical variables would shape the mode of political participation the group chooses. Ultimately, we ought to find the strongest demand for an EMP in ethnic groups characterized by the presence of each of the three variables; that is, those ethnic groups that are native to their state, attached to a particular territory within that state, and who have had some past experience with ruling themselves.

The case that most clearly illustrates my theoretical argument is that of the contrast between Swedes in Finland and Finns in Sweden. These two ethnic minorities are similar in just about every way. Finns make up 5.1% of the population in Sweden whereas Swedes make up 5.4% of the population in Finland. The two groups are quite similar in their demographic composition (education, income, etc.) and live in neighboring states which are quite similar to each other on just about any relevant variable one could think of (demographics, culture, politics, etc.). Both minority groups have a neighboring state in which they comprise the largest ethnic group. Both minority
groups are geographically concentrated in a specific region of their respective state—Finns in the southeastern part of Sweden, and Swedes in the southwestern part of Finland.

Yet despite all the similarities, Swedes in Finland have a successful EMP of their own, and Finns in Sweden do not. What could account for this difference?

The Swedes have had a sizable historical presence on the territory of modern-day Finland since medieval times, when they first colonized the region. Swedish settlement of the region far precedes the inception of Finnish nationalism and the formation of the modern Finnish state. Further, Swedish settlement was geographically clustered in particular regions, located in the southwest of modern-day Finland, along the Swedish border. Lastly, the fact that the Swedes have historically played the role of conquerors in the region means that they have enjoyed a rich history of autonomy and self-rule within its confines.

In contrast, the vast majority of Finns currently residing in Sweden came to the country as part of a migration wave originating in the middle of the 20th century, long after the formation of the modern Swedish state. Since the Finns cannot be thought of as native to Sweden, it makes no sense to ask the question of whether they exhibit a particular territorial attachment. Lastly, in contrast to Swedes in Finland, Finns in Sweden have no history of autonomous self-rule within the territorial confines of the modern-day Swedish state.

With all the overwhelming similarities between these two groups on other dimensions, it does not seem like a stretch to suggest that these crucial differences along the three historical dimensions—historical presence, territorial attachment and dominance/autonomy—account for the presence of an EMP in the case of Swedes in
Finland, and its absence in the case of Finns in Sweden.

1.1 Historical factors and social psychology

The causal mechanisms through which historical factors influence the formation and success of EMPs can be more clearly understood by incorporating insights from social psychology, and more specifically Social Identity Theory (SIT). Emerging from the work of Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986), SIT posits that salient group memberships steer people’s attention toward their collective, rather than individual, identities. It is then these collective identities that primarily shape the social behavior of individuals. The underlying cause for this human tendency toward social identity formation is the desire for a positive self-image; people derive self-esteem from making favorable comparisons between their in-group and the out-group.

Ethnic identities can be recognized as a form of collective (or social) identity that influences the social behavior of individuals, and since politics is inherently embedded in a social context, this influence must certainly extend to the political sphere. It is evident that the nature and salience of these social identities should exert an influence on the strategies employed by ethnic minorities in their pursuit of adequate political representation. What remains to be examined is how the history of a people-group shapes that group’s collective identity, in turn encouraging it to pursue specific political strategies.

I posit here that three variables outlined above—historical presence, territorial concentration and autonomy/dominance—exert an influence on the politicization potential of a group’s ethnic identity, as well as differences in its character, should it become politicized. These differences in the intensity and nature of politicization lead to
variation in the strategies ethnic groups employ in engaging the political system of their state. I argue that native groups with territorial attachment and experiences with autonomy will be more likely to form strong social identities. Further, the social identities of such ethnic minorities are more likely to become politicized and their politicization is more likely to provide the thrust for the formation of an ethnic minority party.

Under what conditions do strong ethnic identities form? Tajfel pointed to the need for positive distinctiveness as the driving force behind social identity. In identifying themselves with a group, individuals seek to improve their self-image and heighten their self-esteem. The implication of this theoretical insight is that we are more likely to observe social identity formation among members of high-status groups than among members of low-status groups. The former can use group membership to positively distinguish themselves from others; the latter, meanwhile, must work hard to improve the group’s negative image before they can reap the rewards of membership (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Members of low-status groups engage in what Tajfel and Turner termed “social mobility,” where individuals either reject their group membership or seek to identify with a higher-status group.

The implications of Tajfel and Turner’s argument for ethnic identity formation—that we should be least likely to observe strong ethnic identities among minority groups which occupy the lowest levels of the social hierarchy in their state—have received empirical support. For instance, Huddy and Virtanen’s (1995) study of Latino groups in the United States found that national identity was more prominent for Cubans than Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans. This difference was grounded in Cubans’ perceptions of their status in society as greatly exceeding that of other Latinos. Research
in sociology (Jackson et al, 1996; Taylor et al, 1987; Wright et al, 1990) has further confirmed the existence of social mobility among low-status groups. In the realm of ethnicity, this strategy is evidenced in the case of the Roma. One of the reasons why census figures of the size of Roma populations in Central and Eastern Europe are generally believed to be underestimated is that the Romani sometimes do not self-identify as such. They either reject any special group identity or assume an alternative identity (e.g., “Turks” in Bulgaria\(^9\) or “Egyptians” in Kosovo and Albania).\(^10\)

An ethnic group’s position within the social hierarchy of the state is very much contingent on its historical background. Even though factors such as educational attainment, income and discrimination experienced can be invoked to describe a people-group’s social status, these factors themselves have historical roots. It seems intuitive that ethnic groups with a historical and territorially-concentrated presence would be more likely to develop the tools to protect themselves from the social exclusion and systematic denial of opportunities for advancement that often befalls more recently arrived and geographically dispersed groups. A previous experience with autonomy ought to further strengthen a group’s capacity to fend for itself and ensure it does not significantly lag behind the majority ethnic group in socio-economic development.

However, history can influence a group’s perceived social status in a more fundamental and direct manner. An ethnic group’s conception of its position in society can have as much to do with the popular imagination as with the cold socio-economic

realities. One of the revelations in the SIT literature is that economically disadvantaged persons can engage in creative re-imaginings and re-framings of their collective identity in order to improve their social image. With respect to ethnic groups in particular, such efforts are most likely to be successful when grounded in history. Even an economically disadvantaged ethnic group can feel pride in its collective identity when it can call on some glorious (or at least respectable) past. Here the role of past autonomy or dominance plays a particularly important role in strengthening a group’s self-image, but a historical presence and territorial ties can also help enhance its status in its own eyes.

To summarize, I argue that the ethnic groups most likely to either possess, or to be able to engineer the positive distinctiveness necessary for a strong ethnic identity, will be the ones that possess the favorable historical background on the three dimensions presented here. Ethnic groups of a less favorable background will be more likely to have a low social status, and therefore less likely to enjoy a strong ethnic identity. The absence of a strong ethnic identity will in turn limit a group’s ability to act collectively and politically to accomplish its goals; it will be detrimental to effective political participation in general, but particularly to the strong group identification and unified political action required to support an EMP.

1.2 The politicization of ethnic identities

In addition to shaping the strength or salience of ethnic identities, historical factors could play a role in the extent to which these identities become politicized. Simon and Klandermans (2001) identify three steps leading to the politicization of collective identity. First, there must exist within the group an awareness of shared grievances—a sense that the group is suffering certain injustices or disadvantages compared to other
groups in society. Next, the group must find an external enemy to blame for its position of disadvantage. Finally, the group must appeal to a more powerful actor (such as national or supranational institutions, or the public at large) as an ally in its struggle. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss each of these steps in detail, and elucidate the role an ethnic group’s historical background could play in enabling or discouraging this progression toward politicization.

Within the field of social psychology, there exists a consensus that the presence of shared grievances is a necessary prerequisite for individuals to act on behalf of their group in a power struggle (Lalonde and Cameron 1994, Smith et al, 1994, Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986; Walker and Pettigrew, 1984; Wright et al, 1990). Shared grievances are most often present where there is 1) a sense of illegitimate injustice or inequality, 2) a sudden, dramatic and unexpected event that heightens the group’s sense of being aggrieved and 3) a perceived threat of the loss of privileges enjoyed by the group. Simon and Klandermans (2001) stress that these grievances must be perceived as communal and not individual in order to facilitate politicization.

Minorities with a primarily native background are more likely to experience shared grievances than those with a primarily migrant background. While it is true that both native and non-native minorities can suffer injustice and inequality, it is the former group that is more likely to perceive unequal treatment as unjust. Relative Deprivation Theory (Runciman 1996, Gurr 1970, Olson et al 1986) proposes that the driving force behind feelings of dissatisfaction (and the collective action such feelings inspire) is a sense of discrepancy between what the group feels entitled to and what it is currently experiencing. Members of minorities with substantial historical roots are more likely to
feel entitled to be treated as fully equal members of society, and are more likely to feel aggrieved by treatment that falls short of that. In contrast, immigration often entails a sense of trade-offs, where migrants are more likely to accept an unequal status in society (at least temporarily), recognizing that migration will nevertheless produce an improvement on their previous living conditions.

The different baselines of comparison for native and non-native groups will likely produce grievances that are of a different salience and intensity. Similarly, a past experience with autonomy may influence what an ethnic group perceives to be “the norm” regarding its position in society, setting a higher standard and provoking grievances if that standard is not met.

Minorities with a native and autonomous background are also more likely to have experienced a sudden, dramatic event impacting their standing in society. For most of these groups, that event was the establishment of the modern state in which they reside. For groups such as the Turks in Bulgaria and the Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, this represented a radical inversion of the hierarchy of ethnic relations and involved a sudden loss of power and status in society. Not all native/autonomous minorities have experienced dramatic events of a similar nature and magnitude, but the experience of suddenly finding oneself on “the wrong side of the border” is shared by many such groups. Since native/autonomous minorities were once “in charge,” their subsequent loss of power presents just the kind of dramatic and formative event that has been associated in the social psychology literature with a heightened sense of grievance.

Similarly, we ought to find that the fear of the loss of privileges is more powerful for minorities of native/autonomous backgrounds. In order to be concerned with the loss
of privileges, one must have enjoyed privileges to begin with. Migrant groups rarely experience a position of privilege, whereas native groups are likely to not only have enjoyed a privileged status (whether through autonomous self-rule or through a more favorable position in the social hierarchy) at some point in their history but also to feel entitled to it based on historical precedent.

Lastly, the grievances of native groups with territorial attachment are more likely to be perceived as *collective* in nature, whereas the grievances of non-native or non-territorially concentrated groups are more likely to be perceived as *individual*. A historical presence on the territory of a given state, particularly when accompanied by a geographic clustering in a specific region (or regions), ought to engender a sense of community and collective rights within an ethnic group. This sense of group belongingness and interconnectedness will then influence how the ethnic minority frames grievances.

In contrast, migrant groups may be less likely to view perceived mistreatment as a collective problem. Migration is primarily an individual or familial, not a collective act; the large-scale migration of a people group from one state into another is the result of an aggregation of a multitude of individual decisions. Migration is inextricably linked to individualism and the opportunity-seeking behavior of individuals. With such an historical background, an ethnic group’s members may be more likely to formulate their grievance at an individual, rather than collective, level.

In addition to fostering the development of shared grievances, possession of the three historical characteristics ought to aid in the identification of an external enemy responsible for a group’s disadvantages. For instance, a group that once enjoyed
autonomy but had it taken away can identify the people-group (or at least its governing elite) that perpetrated this as its enemy. Similarly, a group with deep historical roots can more legitimately identify the majority ethnic group of the state (or the government apparatus acting on its behalf) as a domineering adversary, since such a group never consented to living in a state dominated by that particular ethnicity. In contrast, a predominantly migrant group did consent to such an arrangement, and therefore cannot as credibly cast the majority ethnic group as its enemy. Instead, non-historical minorities are more likely to rally against social ills like “racism,” “xenophobia” or “Islamophobia.” But equating “the enemy” with a concrete people-group (the dominant ethnicity) or institution (the state acting on behalf of that ethnicity) appears to be a much more powerful resource than equating it with an ambiguous concept.

The last stage in the politicization of collective identity occurs when a group that believes it has been aggrieved by a particular adversary takes actions that involve an appeal to state institutions or the society at large to adjudicate the group’s grievances; in other words, the group adopts strategies (petitions, protests, acts of civil disobedience, etc.) which force these actors to “take sides”. I do not believe that there is anything about native minority groups that makes them inherently more likely to adopt such strategies than a migrant group in a similar position. Rather, I feel that the recourse to involving the state and society at large is nearly inevitable once a group with a strong ethnic identity has been able to identify both major grievances and a clearly defined “enemy”. Thus, it is simply because native minority groups are more likely to exhibit these characteristics (strong ethnic identity, shared grievances, common enemy) that they are also more likely
to seek to involve the state in their dispute, and consequently to give a distinctly political significance to their struggle.

2. Political opportunity structure

An alternative approach to answering the questions of why some ethnic minorities form their own parties is to appeal to concepts from political opportunity theory. Drawing on previous social movement scholarship, Kitschelt (1986) argues that the shape social movements in democratic states will assume is contingent on the political opportunity structure. He theorizes that the strategies employed by such movements are influenced by two factors—the open-ness or closed-ness of established political actors in the state to the input of the social movement, and the strength or weakness of the capacities of the state to implement the policies advocated by the movement. Characterizations based on these two dimensions lead to four possible pairs—open and strong, open and weak, closed and strong, closed and weak—each of which has implications for the strategies social movements adopt. Where the state is open to the social movement’s input, we are likely to observe an accommodative and cooperative relationship between the state and the social movement. However, when the state is closed to a movement’s input, the movement is likely to adopt a confrontational approach, particularly when the state’s capacities are strong (Kitschelt 1986: 66).

Although Kitschelt’s study focuses on the emergence of political movements, its theoretical insights shed light on the emergence of political parties as well. Kitschelt’s formulation of the political opportunity structure has been incorporated into studies of the formation and success of right-wing populist parties (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006) and ethnic minority parties (Bernauer and Bochsler 2011).
While Kitschelt’s framework is adaptable to the study of ethnic party formation, I amend it in one way. While I incorporate a similar idea of an openness-closedness dimension—in this case describing the willingness of existing parties to accommodate ethnic minority demands—I employ a somewhat different conceptualization of the strength-weakness dimension. Since my concern here is not policy implementation, instead of focusing on the capacities of the state to implement policies favorable to an ethnic minority group, I consider the capacities of the ethnic minority group to mobilize to gain access to the state. Factors such as numerical strength, the salience of the ethnic identity, the group’s human and financial resources should all substantially influence an ethnic group’s potential for political mobilization, and hence its “strength.”

What combination of these categories (open versus closed, strong versus weak) will produce sufficient demand for the formation of an EMP? If the attitude of mainstream political parties (or at least one mainstream party) is one of accommodation to an ethnic minority’s concerns, and this ethnic minority is “weak,” we can expect that it is likely not to form a party of its own, as it will feel that its interests are best served by working through an established party (or multiple parties). However, if a minority is strong, it may still be tempted to form a party of its own, even with an accommodative strategy employed by the political mainstream, because it believes it can make its presence felt more strongly and accomplish more of its objectives in this way. There is no clear theoretical expectation in this scenario.

What should we expect to observe if mainstream political parties are universally hostile or apathetic toward an ethnic minority group’s demands? In cases where the minority group is weak, we ought to see some limited demand for an EMP. While
members of the minority group may be dissatisfied at their exclusion from the political process, it is unclear whether the ambitious project of EMP formation will appear viable to them. However, if mainstream parties reject claims made by an ethnic minority group but that minority group is strong, we should expect to see substantial demand for an ethnic minority party. My theoretical expectations are summarized in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: The political opportunity structure and demand for an EMP.

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<th>Strength of Ethnic Minority Group</th>
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<td>WEAK</td>
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<td>Response of mainstream parties</td>
<td>ACCEPTANCE</td>
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<td>Little or no demand for an EMP.</td>
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<td>Moderate demand for an EMP.</td>
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<td>Moderate demand for an EMP.</td>
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<td>Strong demand for an EMP.</td>
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3. International influences

In addition to the domestic determinants of ethnic minority party formation, we must also examine the influence of international actors in encouraging the establishment of such parties. As Tarrow (1994) points out, the presence of influential allies outside of the state can alter the state’s political opportunity structure and enable the emergence of a particular social movement. The same argument can be extended to apply to political parties as well.
In what way could international influence encourage or hinder the formation of an EMP in a particular state? While a minority group’s historical experiences can shape its political consciousness in such a way as to make the formation of an EMP seem appropriate and necessary, and the failure of mainstream political parties to incorporate minority concerns into their platforms could allow such a party to carve out a niche for itself in the state’s political system, there may be other obstacles that prevent the minority party from coming to fruition. Entrenched political elites in the state can establish legal barriers to entry for parties intended to represent minority groups. Whether or not these elites choose to do adopt such prohibitive strategies may in turn be influenced by pressure from international actors such as foreign governments and the European Union.

An illustrative example of such international influence comes in the case of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) in Bulgaria. In the wake of the “Revival Process” undertaken by the Bulgaria’s Communist regime in the 1980s, which involved the forceful assimilation of Bulgaria’s Turkish and Muslim citizens, there was substantial and near-unanimous worldwide condemnation of the country’s handling of its ethnic tensions. As a consequence, during the process of Bulgaria’s democratic transition, the international community was hopeful that the newly established Turkish minority party would be permitted to contest national elections.\(^\text{11}\)

That Bulgaria’s political elite was opposed to such a possibility is evident from the fact that the country’s democratic constitution, adopted on July 12, 1991, prohibits political parties on “ethnic, racial and religious lines” (Article 11.4). Yet when Bulgaria’s

\(^{11}\) This was attested to by several scholars and politicians I interviewed in Bulgaria, and is also evidenced by the positive reactions of international institutions such as the Council of Europe to the Bulgarian Constitutional Court’s decision in favor of the MRF’s constitutionality. See, for example: Official Report of Debates of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Volume I. Strasbourg, 1993.
Constitutional Court took up the case of the MRF, a Turkish minority party in everything but name, it ruled the party to be constitutional. Curiously, when Bulgaria’s Roma minority attempted to establish a political party of their own—the Democratic Roma Union (DRU)—during the same period, they were denied. The Constitutional Court ruled the party to be in violation of Article 11.4, and Bulgaria’s Supreme Court concurred. The DRU was banned before it could contest any elections.

What accounts for the contrasting fates of the MRF and the DRU? While more than one factor was likely at play, most scholars of Bulgarian politics agree that the widespread advocacy (in the case of the MRF) and the complete absence thereof (in the case of the DRU) of international actors played a major role in shaping the affirmation of the constitutionality of the former party, and the preclusion from electoral entry of the latter. Appalled by Bulgaria’s treatment of its Turks, the international community (including numerous foreign governments, most notably Turkey, and international organizations such as the European Communities) pressured the country to permit the formation of a party protecting the rights of the Turkish community. No such international support was voiced in favor of a Roma EMP.

Drawing from the Bulgaria example, we can expect that we are less likely to see legal barriers to EMP entry, and more likely to observe unencumbered EMP formation whenever there is international support for the formation of such a party for a particular minority group in a particular state. It is important to stress that this support must be expressed with reference to a particular ethnic group, since a vague and general affirmation of the need for political representation of ethnic minorities is less likely to have sway over the politics of the state. There has to be concrete pressure to give a
particular ethnic group a vehicle for a political voice.

Which international actors can we expect to be the most relevant in facilitating EMP formation?

Since the region examined in this dissertation is Europe, we should expect the European Union (and prior to 1993, the European Communities) to be the most influential international actor in promoting minority party formation. The influence of the EU should be particularly strong in states that are either official candidates for membership in the organization or have serious ambitions of one day becoming members. Such states face incentives not to obstruct the formation and functioning of EMPs in order to demonstrate their commitment to the liberal and tolerant values espoused by the EU.

Existing theoretical and empirical research is divided on the extent to which the European Union has influenced politics at the national level. Mair (2000) finds that the process of European integration has had little tangible effect in either introducing successful new parties or altering the ways existing ones relate to and compete with one another. In contrast, Gabel (2000) finds that European integration has introduced a new dimension of political competition in the UK and France, and Hix and Goetz (2000) suggest a variety of ways in which the EU has altered the strategies of domestic political actors. Ladrech (2008) argues that while the EU has exerted little to no influence on the party systems of West European states, the organization has “been a significant factor shaping the transition to democracy in general, and indirectly the parties themselves, with

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12 Of course, we should also not underestimate the substantial influence that the Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights have had in establishing minority rights norms on the continent. However, as the higher-profile and more lucrative of the two organizations, we can expect that European Union’s conditionalities will be more impactful.
political conditionality an important factor driving change” (p.149). This lends support to the expectation that EU influence ought to be particularly strong in states striving for EU membership.

Additionally, we can expect that advocacy by a nearby kin state will increase the likelihood that a particular minority group remains unhindered in establishing a party of its own. States may be more likely to allow the formation of an EMP if they are afraid that by blocking such an attempt, they would be alienating a geographically proximate country. Bulgaria, for instance, may be more willing to allow the establishment of a Turkish party; Romania and Slovakia may be more willing to permit the formation of a Hungarian party. In contrast, ethnic minorities without a kin state (e.g. the Roma, Kurds) should not enjoy any such benefit, and their efforts to organize politically may be seriously challenged by the state.

Of course, it is possible that the proximity of a kin state may backfire by engendering suspicion about the loyalties of a nascent ethnic minority party. Such parties may be perceived as instruments for the kin state to exert an influence on the politics of the host state, and thus may be treated with hostility by that state, or at least by the more nationalist parties of the majority ethnicity. However, there are additional ways in which kin states can bolster the likelihood for the emergence of an EMP. They can act as whistle-blowers to the international community, pointing out excessive barriers to the electoral entry of ethnically-based parties that may have otherwise been overlooked. Thus, we can expect kin states to exert indirect, as well as direct, pressure on states to permit the formation of EMPs. Additionally, kin states can offer assistance to incipient ethnic minority parties by providing them with the logistical (and perhaps even financial)
resources necessary to establish a political party genuinely capable of competing for votes. On the balance then, it appears reasonable to expect that the presence of a nearby or neighboring kin state should provide a net advantage for the establishment of an EMP.

V. The Electoral Success of Ethnic Minority Parties

Many of the factors invoked in explaining the formation of ethnic minority parties ought to also influence the electoral performance of such parties, once they have been established. Factors pertaining to a minority group’s historical background, the party system of its state, and influences from international actors can have an impact on an EMP’s ability to attract and maintain electoral support over time.

In sections 1 through 3 below, I will briefly describe how variables from these three groups can be expected to influence EMP success. Then, in sections 4 and 5, I will introduce two other groups of variables—those pertaining the organizational characteristics of the minority party and the state’s political culture—that are necessary in supplementing the explanatory framework for EMP success.

1. Historical factors

The presence of the three historical factors—historical presence, territorial attachment and dominance/autonomy—ought to not only create the impetus for the creation of an EMP, but also to provide the conditions necessary for its sustained electoral success. An ethnically-based party will be more successful when making electoral appeals to a people-group whose psychology has been shaped by historical events so as to heighten and politicize the collective (ethnic) identity. Such ethnic

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minorities can more easily be persuaded to consistently back a party grounded in ethnic—rather than ideological—distinctions.

2. Party system variables

It is not clear whether the variables pertaining to the political opportunity structure ought to continue to influence the electoral fortunes of EMPs beyond their initial emergence. The strategies mainstream political parties adopt with respect to the demands of minority groups might influence the propensity of such groups to support ethnically-based parties over time. Attempts by one or more political parties in a state to make inroads with ethnic minority voters, if successful, would weaken an EMP’s monopoly over its target electorate and hurt its electoral prospects. The prospect of gaining the backing and protection of a major, influential political party could influence minority voters to switch their allegiances, while the opportunity to play an active role within the structure of such a party could prove tempting for members of the group who have personal political ambitions.

However, it is not clear how successful such after-the-fact initiatives at making inroads with minority voters are likely to be. Indeed, it seems that a mainstream party’s ability to credibly present itself as a defender of a minority group’s interests would diminish substantially following the formation of an EMP. The establishment of an ethnically-based party means that mainstream parties are not merely running as being for a people-group; they must also necessarily run against an existing EMP. This puts parties in a difficult position where overt criticism of an existing ethnic party could be seen as anti-minority rhetoric and actually damage a party’s chances of making inroads into that voting bloc. On the other hand, failing to criticize the EMP or the quality and
extensiveness of political representation it offers to its group means the party would fail to offer any reasons for members of the group to alter their allegiances. Additionally, efforts by mainstream parties to appeal to minority voters could themselves be presented as a consequence of the EMP’s emergence, and cited as evidence of its effectiveness. Thus, it is not clear that the political positions of major, mainstream political parties ought to have a significant effect on that party’s ability to achieve electoral success.

While the strategies adopted by mainstream political parties are unlikely to affect the electoral prospects of EMPs, we must also consider the influence of parties outside of the political mainstream. In particular, it seems intuitive that the presence of a strong right-wing populist (RWP) party in a state could bolster the vote share for EMPs. Like all parties, EMPs should be most successful when, in addition to communicating to voters what they are fighting *for*, they are able to clearly articulate what they are fighting *against*. The parties of the populist right, characterized by their nativist appeals against ethno-cultural pluralism, make the perfect foil for ethnic minority parties. The provocative pronouncements such parties frequently make with respect to ethnic minority groups can be used by EMPs as evidence for the need for a strong counter-mobilization of minority voters. Of course, in order for minority parties to utilize the rhetoric of RWP parties in mobilizing their own electorate, the latter must have achieved at least some level of success and recognition. We should then expect that the presence of a prominent, electorally successful RWP party in a state should strengthen the electoral support of ethnic minority parties in that state. Koev (2014) examines the other direction of this proposed relationship, finding that ethnic minority parties contribute to the success of the populist right; it seems plausible to expect that the reverse effect takes place as
well.

3. International influences

Can we expect the influence of international factors to go beyond facilitating the mere entry of an ethnic minority party and impact that party’s likelihood of electoral success? It seems that while there are good reasons to believe that support for kin states could contribute to bolstering the electoral performance of EMPs, it is unlikely that the European Union could offer the same level of assistance.

There are various ways in which kin states—especially bordering kin states—can contribute to the electoral success of an EMP. First, kin state residents sometimes include dual nationals who may be eligible to vote in the elections that the minority party is contesting. EMPs can gain an advantage by utilizing their connections in kin states to mobilize voters outside of the boundaries of their country and work around the logistical challenges to those voters being able to cast their vote. This effect can be particularly strong when the minority group the party represents has a kin state that shares a border with the state where the election takes place. For instance, Bulgaria’s Turkish-minority Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) party is well-known for organizing “electoral excursions” where Turkish residents with Bulgarian citizenship and transported to Bulgaria around election dates.\(^\text{14}\) The ability to obtain votes from outside the borders of the state can be a valuable asset in generating the necessary support to obtain legislative representation.

Second, kin states can provide a valuable informational and strategic advantage to EMPs that in turn could bolster these parties’ performance in elections. Ethnic minority

parties often establish connections with successful political parties in the relevant kin state, seeking to gain a strategic advantage by learning from these parties. The relationship is symbiotic, with the kin state party seeking to obtain visibility and influence in the state of the EMP, with a view toward increasing its own voter base by recruiting dual-citizenship expatriates. For instance, it is quite common for Russophile parties in former Soviet republics to work with Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party, and EMPs throughout former Yugoslav republics often go as far as to share the name of one of the dominant political parties in their ethnic group’s kin state (consider, for instance, the Bosnian-minority Party of Democratic Action parties in Serbia and Kosovo, or the Serbian Radical Party in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Third, connections established with co-ethnic business elites in the kin state could enable EMP leaders to attract foreign investment in regions where the party and its target ethnic group enjoy a significant presence, with the resulting economic gains being used to strengthen and expand the party’s control of these localities. Ethnic minority parties can tout their track record of attracting investment to present themselves as the champions of the people in the region, as well as distribute jobs generated by such investment on a clientelistic basis. For instance, Bulgaria’s MRF has been known to attract investment from Turkish businesses into parts of the country where Turks constitute a substantial share of the population and where the party enjoys control over local government, using the resulting economic benefits to strengthen its electoral monopoly.

It is important to note that none of the avenues for kin state influence described above necessarily imply the active involvement of the kin state government; rather, the mere existence of a nearby kin state appears in itself to provide EMPs with a host of
strategic advantages in successfully contesting elections. The state itself could also choose to intervene, of course, and there is evidence that this has happened in some cases—most notably in Hungary’s relationship with the Hungarian minority parties in Romania and Slovakia. But we need not posit that kin state governments pursue an active agenda of EMP empowerment in order to suppose that the existence of such states aids the electoral performance of minority parties.

In contrast to the quite plausible relationship between nearby kin states and EMP electoral performance, it is not clear that international organizations like the European Union ought to play a significant role in enabling such parties to attract support. While the EU may use its persuasive power to discourage existing and potential member states from banning or encumbering ethnic minority parties, or from otherwise disenfranchising ethnic minority voters, the organization has neither the scope nor interest to ensure the vitality of such parties. Not only is it hard to believe that the EU is particularly concerned with fluctuations in minority party vote share, but any efforts to improve the fortunes of such parties could be seen as unwelcome meddling in national politics.

If the European Union plays any role in bolstering EMP success, it is most likely one that is both passive in nature and minimal in its effects. For instance, the organization’s framework could provide opportunities for trans-national linkages between EMPs across the continent, enabling them to share information and gain new insights. However, it is unclear how beneficial such interactions would turn out to be in practice, as the recipe for electoral success can vary substantially from state to state and from target voting bloc to target voting bloc. Minority parties may also gain some legitimacy at

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home by becoming members of one of the major political groups of the European Parliament, but this seems unlikely to result in substantial or lasting electoral gains. In fact, Spirova and Stefanova (2012) find that in the Romanian case, the 2007 and 2009 European Parliament elections contributed to the weakening of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania’s monopoly over the ethnic Hungarian vote by encouraging intra-ethnic competition on ideological grounds.

Additionally, EU candidate states may seek to give such ethnic minority parties a more prominent role in national politics as a way of demonstrating tolerance and liberality. It can be noted, for instance, that EMPs in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia were included in coalition governments while their respective states were in the process of acceding to the EU. Participation in government may in turn have strengthened the ability of these parties to generate electoral support (all three recorded gains in vote share in the following election), as it may have allowed them to allocate state resources in a strategic and targeted manner. However, such instances of EU influence are relatively few in number and duration, and they are predicated on an indirect and inconclusive causal mechanism. There are a number of instances where EMPs have been included in coalition governments without the dangling carrot of EU membership, and where participation in government has not yielded subsequent electoral gains.

Overall, it seems that there are few avenues through which the European Union could directly or indirectly impact the electoral fortunes of ethnic minority parties, even though minority rights in themselves are more visibly on the EU agenda.

4. Political culture variables

An additional factor we ought to consider in explaining the electoral success of
Ethnic minority parties is the political culture of the state in which the party competes. In particular, I believe that EMPs ought to be most successful when they contest elections in states where clientelistic practices are more commonplace.

Ethnic minority parties are likely to benefit disproportionately from the presence and acceptance of clientelism because they are better suited than non-ethnic parties to develop a stable, reliable and effective network of patron-client linkages. Establishing and maintaining such a network among an ethnic minority population entails fewer costs because such groups tend to live in tight-knit, geographically-concentrated (at the neighborhood level) communities that are bound together by a common culture and a common status in society. The spatial clustering and shared characteristics of minority groups ought to make them more amenable to influence by a local patron. Additionally, social and religious institutions unique to the group may provide a supply of influential community leaders who can be recruited as patrons.

Once such ethnic patron-client networks are established, they are unlikely to be easily challenged by non-ethnic parties. Those local leaders who attempt to defect by throwing their support behind a different party can easily be discredited as “traitors” to their ethnic group and their local community, while clients who refuse to support the party can be easily identified and punished by the withdrawal on the benefits previously conferred upon them. The same tight-knit social structures that facilitate the development of clientelistic networks also make it more likely that these networks will survive challenges from rival parties.

In contrast, political systems primarily characterized by programmatic—rather than clientelistic—competition do not appear to entail a natural advantage for ethnic
minority parties. In such systems, political ideology tends to play a more significant role in voting choices, and thus non-ethnic, ideologically-based parties ought to stand a better chance of attracting support among ethnic minorities. That is not to suggest that minority parties could not be successful in making programmatic appeals to their electorate; rather, they simply do not seem to enjoy any particular advantage over non-ethnic parties under such competition. (In fact, a heavily programmatic focus could prove perilous for minority parties as it may exacerbate ideological tensions and divisions within the party, leading to the kind of factionalism and splintering that can be deadly for a party with a small electorate.) Further, EMP monopolies over the target electorate would be less likely to emerge or last, as supporters of the party could be persuaded to change their allegiance without the threat of economic loss and social ostracism.

Thus, I expect that ethnic minority parties will be more successful in states where parties tend to compete for votes by clientelistic practices, rather than by making programmatic appeals.

5. Party organization variables

In order to paint a complete picture of the determinants of EMP success, we must also consider which organizational characteristics contribute to the vitality of such parties. Three factors—the professionalization of the party’s central organization, its rules for intra-party advancement and its ability to rely on ties to societal groups—ought to be particularly important in producing strong electoral results.

As discussed earlier in this chapter and suggested by Chandra (2004), opportunities for intra-party advancement ought to play a role in ethnic minority party success. In order for a party to attract the support of an ethnic group, it must demonstrate
that it is capable of continually placing members of that community in positions of power and influence. If an EMP has a stagnant, set-in-stone leadership with few opportunities for upward mobility for rank-and-file members, aspiring politicians from the target ethnic group are more likely to join other parties or form parties of their own. As they do this, not only will they draw votes away from the EMP, but also deprive it of their competence and innovation. In contrast, ample opportunities for advancement within the party ought to produce loyal party members who are committed to working tirelessly for the organization, because they know that their turn will come and that their contributions will be eventually be rewarded. Thus, we should expect that EMPs with greater opportunities for intra-party advancement will be more likely to thrive.

Tavits (2012) finds that three variables pertaining to a party’s organizational structure play a major role in its ability to consistently attract electoral support—the professionalization of the party’s central organization, the extensiveness of its organizational structure, and its membership size. With respect to EMPs in particular, it seems that the latter two of these factors should not be adequate explanations of electoral success. This is because an ethnically-based party has a rigidly defined potential electorate, with limited room for expansion through cross-ethnic appeal. Party membership has a natural upper bound, and the geographical extensiveness of the organizational structure is likewise limited to the localities in which there is a substantial population of the target minority group. Variation among ethnic groups on these two dimensions would be largely influenced by variation in population size and geographic dispersion. In contrast, the professionalization of the party’s central organization could be a highly significant influence in EMPs long-term success. Regardless of whether they are
ethnic or not, parties with professional, permanent and specialized staff ought to be more capable of navigating the challenges of electoral politics, and ought to be better at helping their party avoid the missteps that imperil its very existence.

In their study of the causes of lasting success in newly formed parties, Bolleyer and Bitzek (2013) identify an additional organizational factor that ought to play a role in EMP success. The authors find that those parties that can rely on ties to societal groups that pre-date the formation of the party are more likely to enjoy success lasting beyond the party’s initial parliamentary breakthrough. In contrast, parties formed by individual entrepreneurs that cannot rely on such ties are less likely to experience sustained electoral success. This factor could very well be influential in EMPs’ electoral success, as those parties that have ties to established civil society organizations (for instance, religious institutions) ought to have an advantage over those for who no such support structure exists, and there is considerable variability on this dimension across different ethnic minority groups in Europe.

**VI. Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have drawn insights from history and social psychology to develop a unique theory for the emergence and success of ethnic minority parties. I have argued that an ethnic minority group’s historical background influences its political engagement strategies through sociopsychological processes, proposing that native, territorially attached and historically autonomous groups are more likely to form ethnic minority parties, and that EMPs formed by such groups are more likely to enjoy electoral success. Groups possessing one or more of these characteristics are prone to exhibit the traits of positive distinctiveness and shared grievances, contributing to the development
of a salient collective political identity. Ultimately, groups that perceive themselves as native to their state and region, and groups that have enjoyed autonomy are more likely to feel entitled to the particular form of representation provided by an ethnic minority party, and more likely to generate sufficient electoral support to sustain such a party.

In addition to developing this original theory, I have synthesized a number of existing theoretical approaches to the study of electoral politics, re-formulating them to the particular context of this study in order to develop a comprehensive framework addressing ethnic minority party entry and success in Europe. I have argued that we are more likely to observe EMP entry for sizable minority groups whose concerns are not adequately addressed by the major political parties of their state, as well as for groups that have valuable international allies in the form of the European Union and/or a bordering kin state. With respect to EMP success, I have argued that the presence of a prominent right-wing populist party in the political system, the prevalence of clientelistic practices in the state, the existence of nearby kin state and the presence of an extensive party organizational structure with ample opportunity for intra-party advancement are all factors bolstering the electoral performance of ethnic minority parties.

In the following two chapters, I test my theoretical expectations with a multi-method approach combining a large-N quantitative analysis and a detailed case study. Within the context of my quantitative study in Chapter III, I test all of my predictions with the exception of those pertaining to party organization variables. There is simply insufficient data to study the impact of these variables in a quantitative, cross-national setting. I do, however, examine these theoretical expectations, along with all others developed in this chapter, in my case study of Bulgarian ethnic politics in Chapter IV.
III. Quantitative analysis

1. Introduction

In order to test the theoretical expectations developed in the previous chapter, I perform a quantitative analysis on a large-N, cross-national dataset of European elections in the period 1990-2012. The questions I seek to answer are, first, what factors make minority groups more likely to use ethnic minority parties in contesting national legislative elections, and second, what factors contribute to the success of such parties once they have been formed?

I find substantial evidence that two of the variables in my Historical-Sociological-Psychological (HSP) framework—historical presence and dominance/autonomy—are significant predictors of EMP entry and success. Further, I find some evidence that candidacy for EU accession improves the likelihood of minority party entry in the candidate state, and that the presence of a strong right-wing populist party increases the probability that an EMP will achieve electoral success, although neither of these effects is especially strong. In contrast, I find no evidence that the attitudes of the major political parties in the state toward ethnic minorities influence those minorities’ decisions of whether to form an EMP or not.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section II describes my approach in classifying minority groups as “ethnic” and parties as “ethnic minority parties.” Section III provides a broad overview of the data used in the quantitative analyses in sections IV and V. Section IV tackles the question of why some ethnic minority groups contest elections with EMPs whereas others do not. Section V examines why some groups are successful in obtaining legislative representation through ethnic minority parties, whereas others are
not. Finally, I offer my conclusions in Section VI.

II. Defining the universe of cases

Before exploring the questions of why some minority groups choose to contest elections through ethnic minority parties, and why some of these parties fail while others succeed, we must first consider how to delimit the universe of cases used in the analysis. In order to do this, we must answer two questions. First, how do we define ethnicity and what makes a group \textit{ethnic} in nature? In order to study ethnic minorities’ political strategies, we must be able to distinguish between ethnic and non-ethnic minority groups. Second, how do we classify a political party as an \textit{ethnic minority party}? We have to be able to distinguish between ethnically-based and non-ethnically based parties. These questions are addressed in the sections that follow.

1. What is an ethnic minority group?

Social scientists have found ethnicity to be a frustratingly nebulous concept, one that does not lend itself to a simple, unambiguous and universally accepted definition. Nevertheless, most recent conceptualizations of ethnicity can be traced back to Donald Horowitz’s seminal work \textit{Ethnic Groups in Conflict} (1985). Horowitz espoused a broad definition of ethnicity, believing ethnicity to encompass identification based on multiple characteristics, including skin color, language, and religion. Horowitz advocated that a wide variety of groups—from races to tribes, from castes to nationalities—can be considered ethnic in nature.

With such an umbrella definition of ethnicity, perhaps the better question is what \textit{cannot} be considered an ethnic group. For Horowitz, the distinction between ethnic and non-ethnic groups lies in the fact that the former are defined by descent-based
identification whereas the latter are not. It is important to clarify here that what is necessary for the presence of an ethnic identity is the idea of common descent, whether or not this idea is grounded in reality. Thus, for Horowitz even imagined or constructed identities are ethnic if they appeal to the concept of common descent.

I espouse a conception of ethnicity very much in the Horowitz tradition. One might object here that adopting such a broad definition of ethnicity poses a challenge—particularly for performing cross-national research—in that it encourages the researcher to compare apples to oranges. While this is a valid concern, one must also consider the alternative. I believe that the implementation of the descent criteria does a sufficiently good job of distinguishing between ethnic and non-ethnic groups, in that any variation that may exist within disparately defined ethnic groups ought to be eclipsed by the more substantial differences between ethnic and non-ethnic groups. Further, breaking down ethnicity into its various components and studying each separately would seriously constrain the number of cases available for analysis, undermining both the empirical accuracy and the explanatory power of the resulting findings.

A number of scholars have built on the work of Horowitz to derive definitions of the term “ethnic group” specific to the context of their research. Among these definitions, the one which stands out for both its parsimony and its broad applicability, and the one which I shall henceforth adopt, is that developed by Chandra (2006, 2008, 2011). Chandra conceptualizes an ethnic group as a subset of the population of a state, membership in which is contingent upon the possession of one or more descent-based attributes. These attributes include “region, religion, sect, language family, language, dialect, caste, clan, tribe or nationality of one’s parents or ancestors, or one’s own
physical features” (Chandra 2011). Groups defined as ethnic must be sufficiently large that not all of their members are personally known or related to each other, excluding very small sub-groups such as the family. Further, if membership to an ethnic group can be attributed to one sibling, it should be attributed to all siblings; this allows us to exclude divisions on minor physical and genetic variations like eye or hair color as traits that signify membership to a separate ethnic group.

I see no need to further narrow down the criteria for what constitutes an ethnic group, as some scholars have elected to do. For instance, I do not make any distinction between “visible” and “invisible” minorities, as Bird (2005) does. While it is true that race-based ethnic differences may be more easily observable than those based on language and religion, this does not mean that they are more salient, and many ethnic groups whose defining characteristics are “invisible” in a literal sense are quite visible in a social sense.

With the bases for establishing the ethnic nature of a group in place, it is now time to examine which ethnic groups we ought to study. Since the focus of my dissertation is on the political mobilization of ethnic minorities, the largest ethnic group in each state cannot be considered. Beyond that, however, there is considerable latitude in determining the breadth of the sample of ethnic minority groups. Within the literature on ethnic minority parties, there is broad range of inclusiveness, from studies that consider only the largest ethnic minority group in a state (Kostadinova, 2007) to those that include virtually every ethnic minority group, no matter how small as a percentage of the population (Bernauer and Bochsler, 2011, Ishiyama, 2009).

I feel that the correct specification lies somewhere between these two extremes,
though it is difficult to pinpoint a precise threshold for inclusion. Limiting my analysis to only the largest ethnic minority group in a state would omit many sizable ethnic groups that have potential for political engagement and would severely diminish the size of my sample. On the other hand, some ethnic minority groups are so small in membership that they have virtually no potential to make an impact on national politics, whichever strategy they choose to engage their state’s political system.

For this reason, I consider only ethnic groups that constitute at least 1% of their state’s population. It could be argued that the threshold should be set higher, since thresholds of parliamentary representation are often more substantial than 1%. However, this ignores the diverse set of electoral laws of European states. Some proportional representation (PR) democracies have no electoral threshold, while others have special quotas for the parliamentary representation of minorities. Additionally, a small but geographically concentrated ethnic minority group could conceivably obtain representation under single member district (SMD) and mixed electoral systems. Lastly, an ethnic minority group can “punch above its weight” if its voter turnout is higher than the national average. For these reasons, I feel that while a 1% threshold is somewhat arbitrary, it does a reasonably good job of capturing those ethnic groups which could plausibly be capable of effectively engaging the politics of their state.

2. What is an ethnic minority party?

Much like defining what an ethnic group is, defining what an ethnic party is can be challenging. The two broad approaches taken in the ethnic politics literature are to classify parties as ethnic based on either their self-identification or their electoral basis of support.
One could define a political party as ethnic based on whether or not it has an explicit reference to an ethnic group in its name. However, not all parties which have an ethnic affiliation in their name are predominantly concerned with ethnic issues, and a closer examination of a party’s platform may be necessary to determine its ethnic or non-ethnic nature. Further, some parties that do not choose to officially label themselves as ethnic can be very much focused on defending the interests of a particular ethnic group, and can generate the vast majority of their electoral support from that group. Using the self-identification criteria alone would exclude parties which are ethnic in nature but avoid labeling themselves as such for fear of being antagonized or painted as radical, or simply because there are laws prohibiting the formation of ethnicity-based parties, as is the case with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms in Bulgaria.

The electoral support approach to identifying ethnic parties itself has been implemented differently by different scholars, with two approaches being most common. The first of these asks the question “Does the party in question receive a substantial majority of its votes from a specific ethnic group?” The second asks “Does a majority of a specific ethnic group vote for the party in question?” The first approach is therefore concerned with the extent to which the party’s existence and success hinges on support from a specific ethnic group, whereas the second approach is concerned with the extent to which members of an ethnic group identify themselves with, and show allegiance to, a certain party.

I believe that the first approach is more appropriate in gauging whether a party is ethnically-based or not. The problem with the second approach is that there are many successful parties with non-ethnic political platforms that nonetheless capture the
majority vote of several different ethnic groups. Consider, for instance, the Democratic Party in the United States—it consistently receives overwhelming support from both black and Jewish voters, yet few would consider it to be an ethnic party. Since this second approach would tend to categorize merely successful political parties as ethnic ones, I prefer not to utilize it. The first approach is more appropriate because it serves as an excellent proxy for the extent to which a party represents an ethnic group. If the vast majority of a party’s electoral base is concentrated in a single ethnic group, then that party must—for motives of pure self-interest—make that group happy in order to ensure its own survival.

I utilize an approach to classifying ethnic minority parties that combines aspects of both the self-identification and electoral support approaches mentioned above. Figure 3.1 describes the steps I take in determining whether a party is ethnic or not.
With these rules as a guide, I identify ethnic minority groups in all democratic states which received a rating of 3 or lower on both the “Political Rights” and “Civil Liberties” indices in the 2011 release of Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World.”
European\textsuperscript{2} states that meet the size requirement discussed earlier (they comprise at least 1% of their state’s population), along with any ethnic minority parties they have ever formed in order to contest national legislative elections. These ethnic groups and parties are presented in Table 3.1 below. Within the population of EMPs presented, I further distinguish between successful and unsuccessful parties, with the former being those that have consistently obtained legislative representation throughout their existence. (I discuss my operationalization of EMP success in greater detail in section V, which examines the determinants of such success.)

\footnote{2} I consider as European only those states to the west of the Caucasus, to the north of (or in) the Mediterranean Sea and to the east of (or in) the Atlantic Ocean.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>ETHNIC GROUP (% of population)</th>
<th>Ethnic minority parties (period contesting elections)</th>
<th>Successful?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Greeks (4%)</td>
<td>Democratic Union of the Greek Minority (1991)</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unity for Human Rights party (1992-present)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roma (1.4%)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Muslims (4.2%)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turks (3.2%)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and</td>
<td>Serbs (31.5%)</td>
<td>Serbian Democratic Party (1990-present)</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herzegovina</td>
<td></td>
<td>Serbian Radical Party (1996-2005)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Serbian Radical Party—VSB (2005)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croats (17.3%)</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (1990-present)</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New Croatian Initiative (1996-present)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Croats Together (2005)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Turks (8.8%)</td>
<td>Movement for Rights and Freedoms (1990-present)</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roma (4.9%)</td>
<td>Evroroma (2005)</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Serbs (4.5%)</td>
<td>Serb Democratic Party (1990)</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Serb People’s Party (1992)</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Serb People’s Party (1995, 2000)</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Moravians (4.9%)</td>
<td>Moravian National Party (1996)</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovaks (1.4%)</td>
<td>Moravians (2006-present)</td>
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One might object here to the absence of Belgian parties in Table 3.1. However, Belgium’s unique ethnic composition and political system preclude comparison to other European states on the dimension of minority political participation. Since the two major ethnic groups of Belgium are so similar in size, and since each of them constitutes a majority of the population in its respective region, it is difficult to conceive of Walloons as an ethnic minority group. Further, Belgium’s political system, which contains dual
Dutch and French-speaking parties of every major ideological affiliation, is fairly unique in Europe. Such parties cannot be conceived of as ethnic minority parties in the sense that I am considering here, but rather as conventional ideology-based parties in the proto-states of Wallonia and Flanders. For these reasons, I feel that it would be difficult to incorporate Belgium into a cross-national analysis of European EMPs.

One of the challenges in identifying European minority ethnic groups is how to classify Muslim immigrants in Western European states. Ethnicity can certainly be defined by religious affiliation, but only if it is socially and politically salient. A strong argument can be made that the religion of Muslim migrants in Western Europe is the primary characteristic that sets them apart—socially and politically—from the predominantly secular host populations. A number of scholars (see, for example, Koopmans, et al. 2005 and Statham, et al. 2005) have argued that Islam’s tendency to spill over from the private into the public sphere makes it exceptional among religions in Europe, and thus at greater conflict with the West’s secular values. Whether the cause of this cultural struggle genuinely lies with the nature of Islam or not, it is undeniable that the religious beliefs of Muslims have been publicized and politicized to a greater extent than other ethnic traits like language and national origin.

However, the notion that adherence to Islam is the sole ethnic identity of these populations overlooks the fact that Muslim migrants come from a number of different states and continents. These differences in national origin, as well as internal sectarian divides, make migrant communities in states like the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden appear fragmented and may undermine their potential for unified political or social action. Sociological scholarship has not thus far provided a clear answer as to whether
“Muslim” can be considered a singular and cohesive ethnic group in these (and other) states, or whether we should rather think of these migrants as Algerians, Moroccans, Indonesians and Turks.

Since there are valid reasons for adopting either approach to the ethnic group classification for Muslim migrants in Western Europe, I employ both of them in my analysis. In performing multivariate analysis of ethnic minority party entry in Section IV, I test all of my models on two datasets—one that adopts the religion-as-ethnicity approach to classification, and one that adopts the national-origin approach. I discover that the choice of operationalization does not in any substantial way affect the results.

III. The Data

In order to test my predictions about the influence of historical and other variables on ethnic minority party entry and success, I have assembled a large-N, cross-national dataset of all democratic legislative elections occurring between 1990 and 2012 in European states containing at least one ethnic minority group meeting the minimum size requirement. My dataset comes in two versions, with the first one (henceforth referred to as Dataset 1) considering Muslims in West European states to constitute a single minority group, and the second (henceforth referred to as Dataset 2) dividing them up into separate ethnic groups based on national origin.

I select the starting point of 1990 in part because it coincides with the onset of democratic elections in former Communist states in Europe. Examining East and West European states over the same time period protects against any temporal effects that could skew the results. An additional reason for selecting 1990 as the starting point is that it serves as a good approximation for the point in time at which Islam became politically

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3 In countries with bicameral legislatures, only lower house election results are included.
salient in Western Europe (see Jopke 2009: 108). Since one of the two versions of my dataset defines ethnicity in religious terms when it comes to Muslims in Western Europe, it is appropriate to exclude time periods during which the religious identity of Muslims was not sufficiently prominent in the political sphere.

The unit of analysis is minority ethnic groups, with only those groups that constituted at least 1% of the population of their state in a particular election year being included. The unit of observation is country/ethnic group/election year. There are a total of 409 observations in Dataset 1, and 404 in Dataset 2.

I choose to use the ethnic group, rather than the political party, as my unit of analysis because I am ultimately interested in which ethnic groups have managed to meaningfully engage their political systems through the vehicle of an EMP. A glance at Table 3.1 in Section II reveals that different ethnic groups exhibit vastly different patterns of EMP formation, survival and success. In some cases there are multiple successful parties representing a single ethnic group competing in the same election; in others initially successful parties fade out and are replaced by new ones. In other cases yet there is a single party that enjoys consistent support as the only representative of its ethnic group over the entire time period examined. While this diversity in patterns of party formation and performance is an interesting phenomenon that deserves attention, explaining it is neither possible nor necessary within the bounds of this analysis. The question I seek to answer here is what conditions encourage minority groups to seek and obtain political representation through ethnically-based parties. Explaining the various forms that this representation can take on are simply outside the scope of what my theoretical framework can account for.

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4 I do, however, address this question to some extent in my case study in Chapter IV.
IV. Analysis #1: Electoral Entry

The first question I examine is what factors encourage or discourage ethnic minority groups from forming a political party to contest national legislative elections. The dependent variable is therefore a dichotomous dummy variable coded as “1” when at least one EMP representing a given minority group contests a national legislative election, and “0” when a minority group has no EMP contesting a particular election.

There are three main groups of independent variables whose influence on the dependent variable I seek to determine—those which constitute my historical-social-psychological (HSP) framework (*historicity, territorial attachment* and *dominance/autonomy*), those that derive from political opportunity structure theory (*mainstream party response*) and those that pertain to international actor influences (*kin state, EU candidate*). Additionally, I include several control variables (*ethnic group population share, electoral disproportionality*). These variables, their operationalization and their expected theoretical relationship to the dependent variable are described in detail in the sections below.

1. HSP variables

In Chapter II, I identified three historical variables that I expected would, working through social psychological processes, influence an ethnic minority group’s demand for forming an EMP.

1.1 Historicity

The first of these variables is the *historicity* of an ethnic minority group. The expected relationship to the dependent variable is that if a minority group is predominantly native (as opposed to migrant) in origin, it will be more likely to attempt
to contest elections via an ethnic minority party.

In order to operationalize this distinction, I constructed a dichotomous dummy variable coded as “1” for native groups, and “0” for non-native groups. I categorized as native those minority groups that had an extensive and continuous historical presence on the territory of their present state of residence *prior* to the formation of that state. I consider ethnic groups with no such historical background to be non-native.

In categorizing ethnic groups according to their historicity, I consulted a variety of historical and contemporary sources pertaining to demographics. I focused on sources describing the extent of an ethnic group’s presence on the territory of a given state, *prior* to the formation of that state. I then compared the size of this historical presence with the share of the population the minority group represented at the point at which it entered the dataset. If it appeared sound to assume that, at the time the ethnic group entered the dataset, most of its constituent members could have traced their descent to a historically native population, the group was considered native. If, on the other hand, it appeared that most of the group’s members descended from migrants arriving following the establishment of the modern state, the group was considered non-native.

For most cases, this categorization was rather straightforward. Groups such as the Turks in Bulgaria, Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, and Catalans and Basques in Spain enjoyed an extensive historical presence on the territory of their present countries, and have few members who cannot trace their lineage to these historic populations. In contrast, other groups, such as Turks in Germany, Muslims in France or the Portuguese in Switzerland are almost entirely constituted of migrants or the descendants of migrants.

However, some cases are more difficult to code, with the former Soviet Baltic
republics being especially challenging. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia each contained a small Russian minority at the time of their emergence as independent states in 1918, with ethnic Russians constituting 7.8%, 2.5% and 8.2% of the population of each state, respectively. However, the occupation and incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union in 1940, and the subsequent widespread post-World War II Russian migration into the region dramatically increased the number of Russians in each country. At the point in time at which they enter the dataset, Russians constituted 34% of the population in Latvia, 30.3% in Estonia and 9.4% in Lithuania, or nearly four times their share of the population at the establishment of each respective state.

Cases like this require a difficult judgment call – does the fact that a number of an ethnic group’s members descend from a historically native population mean we ought to classify the whole group as “native”? Or should we rather classify it as non-native, given the fact that the vast majority of its members are migrants or descend from migrants? I choose the latter option and categorize Russians in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia as a non-native ethnic group. In reality, these groups may be best thought of as hybrid native-migrant entities, but I find that the introduction of such a category would needlessly complicate the analysis and would not necessarily improve operationalization. Ultimately, I feel that ethnic groups constituted predominantly by migrants or the descendants of migrants are best thought of as non-native; likewise, those constituted predominantly by the descendants of native populations should be considered native.

It bears mentioning, however, that it would be ill-advised to categorize groups as native or non-native simply by comparing their share of the population at the two measurement points (the establishment of the modern nation state and the point at which
they enter the dataset). What makes such an approach problematic is that the population growth of a people-group can be as much a function of high birth rates as of widespread migration. The case of the Roma in most Central and East European states illustrates this point very well. Let us take Hungary, where the Roma share of the population increased from 0.5% to 1.4% over the relevant time period. If we were to try to apply the same hard-and-fast classification rule to cases like this as well as to cases like the Russians in the Baltic states, we would have to conclude that the Hungarian Roma should be coded as non-native. Yet an exploration of the history of the minority group reveals this to be false; unlike the Baltic Russians, it is higher-than-average birth rates, not migration, that best explain the growth of the Roma population. Therefore, in coding this variable I was careful to consult not only the relevant demographic statistics but also historical sources that pointed to the likely causes for population size fluctuations.

A more comprehensive case-by-case breakdown of the coding decisions for this and other variables, including citations for all relevant sources, is included in Appendix A.

1.2 Territorial Attachment

The next variable from my HSP framework, territorial attachment, seeks to capture the extent to which a minority ethnic group has historically identified with a particular region (or regions) within the borders of the state in which it resides. The theoretical intuition is that a strong sense of territorial attachment will increase the appeal of the EMP model of ethnic minority political representation, and contribute to the likelihood of contesting an election through a minority party.

Whether a minority group is attached to a particular geographic area is first of all
contingent on the historicity of that group. I theorize that territorial attachment is something that occurs when a people-group was concentrated within a particular region (or regions) of its present-day state, prior to the formation of that state. Present-day territorial concentration within a certain region does not necessarily imply territorial attachment; there must be historical precedent in order for the attachment process to develop. Therefore, territorial attachment is best thought of as a subset of historicity; while it is possible for a minority group to be native but not territorially attached, it is impossible for a non-native group to be territorially attached, even if it is currently geographically concentrated within its state.

In order to classify ethnic groups as territorially attached or not, I first excluded all groups that I classified as ‘non-native’. For each remaining group, I examined present-day and (where available) historical maps demonstrating the population distribution of the group within its state, as well as other historical sources that speak to the spatial distribution of the group around the time of the formation of the modern state. Where present-day population maps revealed a strong geographic concentration I sought to identify whether this concentration was long-standing, or whether it had resulted from a recent migration pattern. Ultimately, I constructed a dichotomous variable where I coded groups that appeared to have been territorially concentrated by the time of the establishment of the modern state as “1” and those that were territorially dispersed as “0”.

The foremost challenge in coding this variable is determining the size of the region at which to look for ethnic population clustering. Virtually all ethnic minority groups in Europe appear to be clustered if one examines a small-enough area. For instance, an analysis at the level of city neighborhoods would reveal a high concentration
of Roma in most East European states, or of Muslims in much of Western Europe. However, examining geographical concentration on such a small scale does not capture the essence of the theorized effect, since it deals with regions that are far too small to be politically salient or significant in the consciousness of minority group members. The region(s) considered ought to be large enough to encompass a significant portion of the minority population in the state and to hold some political significance for that population. I therefore examined population distribution patterns at the level of the largest administrative regions in the state.

As with the coding of the historicity variable, and perhaps even more so, developing hard-and-fast objective criteria for classifying minority groups as territorially attached or not proved exceedingly difficult. Among the largest challenges encountered were the variable sizes and numbers of the largest administrative divisions in each state (complicating cross-national comparison) and the limited availability of historical population data at this level of observation. Therefore, as with historicity, coding sometimes required incorporating additional insights drawn from (non-quantitative) historical sources. Ultimately, I classified as territorially attached those ethnic minority groups that appeared to have enjoyed a significantly higher numerical presence in one or a handful of regions than in the rest of the state, around the time that the state was established.

1.3 Dominant/autonomous

The final explanatory variable derived from the HSP framework is experience with autonomy and self-rule. I expect that those ethnic minority groups which have enjoyed some historical experience governing themselves (either as an autonomous or
semi-autonomous political entity, or as a dominant ethnic group exercising rule over others) on the territory of their present-day state will be more likely to attempt to obtain legislative representation by contesting elections with an EMP.

Similarly to the previous two historical variables, I operationalize dominant/autonomous as a dichotomous variable with a value of “1” for ethnic groups that have historical experience with self-rule, and “0” for those without such experience. Once again, it is worth stressing that this dominance/autonomy must have been exercised within the confines of the borders of the state that the minority currently inhabits. Another restriction on what I coded as a genuine experience with autonomy is that it must have been sufficiently institutionalized and must have occurred over a non-trivial period of time (for instance, a few months of anarchy during a war or in between regime change does not count). There is no restriction for when the experience must have occurred other than that it took place prior the point at which the ethnic groups enters the dataset. Unlike the other two historical variables, dominance/autonomy takes into consideration the period after the formation of the modern state, as well as the period prior to that event.

The ethnic groups classified as having once been dominant or autonomous are quite varied in their historical experience. This category includes both those minority groups whose experience with independent self-rule is temporally distant (Basques and Catalans in Spain⁵) and those who have enjoyed such a period very recently (e.g., Russians in the Baltic states). It includes those groups that once ruled themselves in independent political entities that were later assimilated into larger ones (e.g., Scots and

⁵ While these groups have enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy since Spain’s democratic transition, they still function within a unitary state that is ultimately sovereign. I therefore do not consider Basques and Catalans to be currently autonomous in the same way that they were in their respective medieval kingdoms.
Irish in the U.K.), as well as those that exercised rule over the territory they currently reside on as a dominant or co-equal ethnic group within a larger polity (e.g., Turks in former Ottoman Empire-ruled states, Serbs in former Yugoslavia, Poles in Lithuania). Yet I hold that the common thread among all these cases—the fact that the ethnic group in question can recall a period in history in which it governed itself—is more important than the specific details of that experience. In other words, I feel that the Swedes in Finland and Russians in Estonia are more similar to each other on this dimension, than they are to the Roma in Romania, for example.

Table 3.2 below provides a complete list of the coding decisions for the HSP variables for every ethnic minority group used in the analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>ETHNIC GROUP (% of population)</th>
<th>Native</th>
<th>Territorial</th>
<th>Dominant/autonomous</th>
</tr>
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<td>Greeks (4 %)</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Roma (1.4%)</td>
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<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Muslims (4.2%)</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Turks (3.2%)</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
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<td>Croats (17.3%)</td>
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<td>✓</td>
</tr>
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<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roma (4.9%)</td>
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<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Serbs (4.5%)</td>
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<td>×</td>
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<td>Belarusians (1.1%)</td>
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<td>×</td>
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<td>Bosniaks/Muslims (2.2%)</td>
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<td>Lithuanians (1.2%)</td>
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### Table 3.2 (cont.)

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<td>x</td>
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<td>Surinamese (2.1%)</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>☑</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>x</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Portuguese (2.4%)</td>
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<td>x</td>
</tr>
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<td>Spaniards (1.2%)</td>
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<td>Pakistani (1.3%)</td>
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</table>

### 2. Political opportunity structure

In addition to the historical variables described above, I seek to test the influence of the political opportunity structure on an ethnic minority group’s likelihood to contest elections with an EMP. The political opportunity structure entails two variables—the response of mainstream political parties to the demands of the ethnic group, and the
capacities of that group to accomplish its goals.

2.1 Mainstream party response

Building on insights from existing scholarship, I theorized that the response of mainstream parties to the demands of a particular ethnic group could either encourage or discourage that group from forming a party of its own. I expect that ethnic minority groups will be more likely to form EMPs when their concerns are rejected by the political establishment, and when major political parties fail to incorporate those concerns into their platforms. This effect ought to be particularly strong in cases where the minority group possesses the capacities necessary to successfully organize and form an EMP. In cases where this capacity is limited, the attitude of mainstream political actors ought to play a more limited role, as minority groups may not have a choice but to try to work within non-ethnic parties.

While Bernauer and Bochsler (2011) find this variable to have little influence on EMP formation and success, the expectations appear to be theoretically sound, and deserves another test in a geographically and temporally expanded context, and with an alternative (and I would argue, superior) operationalization.

My data for the reaction of mainstream parties is derived from the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) dataset, which contains quantitative content analysis data on party programs and manifestos. Using five CMP indicators, I constructed a “favorability to ethnic minorities” index, seeking to capture parties’ attempts (or lack thereof) to appeal to ethnic minority groups. I first added three of the indicators—support for federalism or devolution, support for multiculturalism and negative or critical mentions of the “national way of life”—that seemed to suggest a favorable view toward minority groups. Next,
from the sum of these three I subtracted two others—opposition to multiculturalism and statements promoting a “national way of life”—that imply a more critical attitude toward ethnic minorities. The values of the resulting index initially ranged from -25 to 23.9, but I transformed the variable by adding 25 to each value in order to create a positive scale that more easily lends itself to interpretation. Thus, the transformed variable has values between 0 (indicating extreme hostility toward minorities) and 48.9 (indicating a highly favorable attitude toward minorities).

For each election in the dataset, I calculated the favorability toward ethnic minorities for the top two vote-getting parties. I then compared the scores of these two parties in order to determine which of the two was more supportive (or less hostile) toward ethnic minority concerns. I used the more-favorable party’s score as the “mainstream party response” value for that particular election. My reasoning here is that what is really important is how pro-minority the most pro-minority major party in a state is, since that will determine whether an ethnic minority has an opportunity to work and accomplish its goals within a major party. The attitude of the less-favorable major party does not play a role in this consideration. In this respect, my operationalization is superior to that of Bernauer and Bochsler (2011), who consider the response of the party with the more “intense” overall reaction, whether this reaction was predominantly positive or negative toward ethnic minorities, thus comparing the values for the more pro-minority of the two parties for some elections to the values of the more anti-minority party for others.

2.2 Minority group strength

As mentioned in the previous section, the effect that mainstream party behavior
has on the likelihood of EMP formation is also contingent on the capacity of an ethnic group to accomplish its political goals—something that I have crudely termed *minority group strength*. But what goes into determining the value of this variable?

First and foremost, a minority group’s numerical size, as a percentage of the population, ought to play a major role in setting the limits for its potential political influence. Larger groups, by nature of constituting a more sizeable share of voters, have a natural advantage in accomplishing their political goals, and thus are more likely to attempt to form an EMP in the absence of a mainstream party that caters to their interests. In contrast, smaller groups may be reluctant to engage in a party-building project, even in the face of antagonism or apathy from major parties, because they are doubtful of such a project’s viability.

The data for ethnic group population as a percentage of total population come from the Composition of Religious and Ethnic Groups (CREG) Project, produced by the Cline Center for Democracy at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The CREG dataset contains annual population share estimates for all ethnic groups in 165 countries in the post-World War II era. Population data for a particular year is assembled by comparing and reconciling multiple sources; statistical techniques are then used to estimate population size and share for years for which there is no available data. The primary advantage of using the CREG data is that it is able to capture and account for gradual shifts in population size that take place between official and authoritative measurements (such as national censuses), and thus paint a more accurate picture of an ethnic group’s numerical strength in any given year.

One problem with using minority *population share* as a measurement of ethnic
group strength is that the numbers used to derive this statistic are based on the number of residents belonging to a particular ethnicity within each country; it does not tell us how many of these residents are also citizens of that country, and therefore in possession of full voting rights. This is relevant to the analysis because one of the central arguments of this work is that predominantly native minorities enjoy an advantage over predominantly migrant ones, for reasons of historical background and resulting social psychology. Yet native minorities also possess an advantage in that they are more likely to be citizens of the states in which they reside. For this reason, it seems appropriate to adjust the CREG data so as to reflect the number of citizens for each group.

Unfortunately, accurate statistics regarding citizenship are not available for most—let alone all—of the ethnic groups in my dataset. I am therefore forced to approximate—based on the limited data that is available—what proportion, on average, of a migrant population can be expected to be citizens of the state in which they reside. I construct three alternative measurements of the population share variable which reduce the population of predominantly migrant groups by 25, 33 and 50 percent, respectively, while keeping native group population the same. The latter of these reductions seems excessive, yet I include it to protect against underestimating the effect of migrant-ness on citizenship status. I do not argue that any one of these numbers accurately captures this effect, but the broad range of alternative operationalizations serves as a sort of sensitivity analysis meant to prevent bias in the results for failure to capture the citizenship dimension. In fact, when I employ these citizenship-adjusted measurements of population share in my analysis later in this chapter, I discover that they very minimally

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6 It can be noted, for instance, that even in Latvia, which is known to have one of the most restrictive paths to citizenship in Europe, well over half of ethnic Russians are citizens. “Citizenship in Latvia”, Latvian Foreign Ministry, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.mfa.gov.lv/lv/latvia/integracija/pilsoniba/. 
alter the results.

Another component that might shed light on a minority group’s capacity for unified political action is the (political) salience of ethnicity, with the expectation that more salient ethnic identities provide a stronger basis of support for such action. The problem with a variable like this is that it is very difficult to operationalize. There are no precise ways we can gauge how politically salient an ethnic identity is without taking into consideration the collective political actions that group engages in. But to do this would be to conflate the independent and dependent variables, since ethnic group actions are what we are trying to explain. The distinctiveness of an ethnic group is not enough to determine salience of ethnicity; the differences between Serbs and Montenegrins or Czechs and Moravians appear so miniscule to the outside observer that it seems strange to consider them as separate ethnic groups, yet divisions along these lines have resulted in the formation of EMPs. When Beranuer and Bochsler (2011) attempt to operationalize this variable, they use a rather distant proxy—the salience of nationalism in each country—that appears to be measuring something different altogether.

Ultimately, I feel that the closest we can get to a measurement of political salience is the historically based HSP framework presented in this work. These variables have an advantage in that they are specific to each ethnic group, allowing for variation between different groups in the same state, and in that they measure something that is temporally prior to the observation of the outcome variable, and therefore not affected by it. (In contrast, our perceptions of the salience of ethnicity are inevitably influenced by ethnic groups’ collective political action.) Therefore, since the political salience of ethnicity is largely captured by the three variables in the HSP framework—historicity, territorial
attachment and dominance/autonomy—I feel no need to introduce a separate variable that tries to capture this effect.

This leaves ethnic group size as the only variable accounting for a minority group’s capacities to accomplish its goals. There are no doubt other factors that play into this variable (e.g., educational attainment, socio-economic status), but it is impossible to obtain accurate data specific to most of the ethnic groups in this dataset.

I therefore consider the simultaneous effect that population size and mainstream party response have on a group’s propensity to contest elections through an EMP. In my models, I do this by introducing an interactive term between population share and most favorable party response.

3. International influences

There are two international factors that I have suggested may play a role in ethnic minority party entry— influence from international organizations (most notably the European Union) and influence from kin states.

3.1 European Union influence

I theorize that European states may be more likely to provide the institutional conditions necessary for minority party emergence if they are actively seeking membership in a supranational organization such as the European Union that espouses and promotes the values of liberalism and tolerance. States have a variety of strategies at their disposal for thwarting or impeding attempts at ethnically-based party formation, ranging from setting high electoral thresholds to outright legal bans on ethnic parties (as in Bulgaria\textsuperscript{7} and Turkey\textsuperscript{8}). However, governments should be reluctant to enact or enforce

\textsuperscript{7} Article 11.4 of the Bulgarian Constitution prohibits parties organized along "ethnic, racial, and religious" lines. In practice, this article has been unevenly enforced by the courts.
such legal restrictions if they are seeking to attain membership in the European Union, for fear of jeopardizing the viability of their applications. It is possible that countries may even encourage minority voter participation, in order to demonstrate a commitment to multiculturalism and tolerance.

Therefore, I hypothesize that EU candidacy would favor minority party entry in the candidate country. In order to capture this effect, I constructed a dichotomous variable with a value of “1” for all elections in states that were candidates for EU accession at the time of the election, and “0” for all other elections. Countries were considered to be EU accession candidates if the election took place between the date the state submitted a formal application for EU membership and the date the state was admitted into the European Union.

3.2 Kin state influence

Additionally, I hypothesize that ethnic minority groups with a nearby kin state will be more likely to contest elections through a minority party, for two reasons. First, similar to the reasoning in the previous section, states may be more reluctant to block or frustrate minority party formation efforts if they believe they would be alienating other countries in the region in doing so. Second, kin states may act as whistleblowers to the international community, should such efforts at suppressing ethnic minority political participation persist. Finally, kin states themselves may feel the need to support in whatever capacity they can the formation of an EMP, either to improve the standing and welfare of their co-ethnics living abroad, or in the hopes of gaining leverage on the politics of the state in the question and advancing their own interests.

In operationalizing this factor, I constructed a dummy variable coded as “1” for ethnic minority groups with a kin state within Europe and “0” for groups without such a state. I consider a kin state to be any state in which the ethnic group in question constitutes a majority of the population. I also include an alternative operationalization of this variable that only considers neighboring kin states—those that share a physical border with the state in which the minority group resides. I include this operationalization in light of the possibility that kin state effects may only be significant if the kin state shares a border with the state in question, since neighboring states tend to be much more geopolitically and historically intertwined.

4. Control variables

In addition to the independent variables described above, I include a number of control variables in my analysis of ethnic minority party entry.

4.1 Population size

Although the interaction between population size and mainstream party reaction was examined as a predictor of EMP entry earlier in this chapter, we must also consider the influence that population size as a share of total population ought to exert in its own right. It seems intuitive that the larger an ethnic group’s share of the population is, the more confident it ought to feel about the viability of an ethnically-based political party, and that this factor ought to play a significant role in what strategy the group pursues in seeking to obtain political representation and influence. Therefore, I also include population share on its own as a predictor of electoral entry in all my multivariate models.
4.2 Electoral disproportionality

While most European states employ pure proportional representation (PR) electoral systems, not all do. Even within PR systems, there can be considerable variation in proportionality due to additional electoral rules such as minimum thresholds for parliamentary representation. Since proportional systems tend to favor the representation of minority groups, one would expect that greater disproportionality would impede the entry of EMPs. However, it is well established that parties with a strong territorial concentration of support can actually thrive in disproportional electoral systems. Since many ethnic minorities are territorially concentrated, it is important to take this fact into account. While it is ultimately not intuitively clear whether disproportionality ought to favor or hurt minority party entry taken as a whole, it is worth to include it as a control variable since it will most likely exert some influence.

In order to capture electoral disproportionality, I use the Gallagher Index, which takes the square root of half the sum of the squares of the difference between percent of vote and percent of seats for each of the parties in a particular election. The resulting number is an index with values ranging from 0 to 100, where higher numbers indicate elections with more disproportional outcomes.9

4.3 Federalism/devolution

In light of the findings of Bolleyer and Bitzek (2013), I include a measurement of federalism/devolution for every election in the dataset. The theoretical intuition is that federal or devolved systems provide greater opportunities for parties to develop at a regional level before contesting national elections. Such experiences can be stepping

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9 Where available, the values used were taken from Michael Gallagher’s online ‘Election Indices’ database (http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/EISystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf). In elections for which the values were not available, I calculated them myself.
stones for incipient ethnic minority parties looking to eventually enter national elections, and success at a regional level in a system where regional governments are empowered could provide a party with the resources and visibility needed to go on to contest statewide elections. In contrast, a party operating in a unitary system may not receive the same level of opportunity for gradual growth and development, and therefore never muster up the confidence to contest a national election.

In order to capture this factor, I constructed a dichotomous variable with values of “1” for elections taking place in states that are either federal or significantly devolved, and “0” for elections in unitary states.

5. Analysis

5.1 Descriptive statistics

Table 3.3 presents descriptive statistics for continuous variables in the dataset. Table 3.4 presents frequencies and percentages for dichotomous variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most favorable party score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral disproportionality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.4: Frequencies and percentages for dichotomous variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral entry</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant/autonomous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin state</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bordering kin state</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal/devolved</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU candidate</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 Bivariate correlations

Table 3.5 presents bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients between each of the independent and control variables in the analysis and the dependent variable. In order to assess statistical significance, P-values derived from a Wald’s Two Sample t-test are also reported.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Correlation Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant/autonomous</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most favorable party score</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population share</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU accession</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin state</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bordering kin state</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral disproportionality</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal/devolved</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several things jump out from examining Table 3.5. First, the historical variables (native, territorially concentrated and dominant/autonomous) appear to be the most strongly correlated with electoral entry. Second, *most favorable party score* is the only variable in the analysis that does not exhibit the expected relationship, suggesting instead that the more favorable parties are toward an ethnic minority group, the more likely that group is to contest an election with an EMP. Third, of the two variables seeking to capture kin state influences, only *bordering kin state* appears to be highly correlated with the dependent variable. Therefore, in the subsequent multivariate analysis, I elect to use the former variable to the exclusion of the latter.

5.3 Cross-tabulation

In order to examine the effect of the three historical variables working in
conjunction with each other, I next consider the incidence of electoral entry for each of the six possible combinations of the presence and absence of these characteristics. Table 3.6 reports the proportion of electoral contestations for groups possessing each of these combinations of historical traits.

Table 3.6: Proportions of electoral entry for combinations of the three HSP variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant/autonomous</th>
<th>Native</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Territorial</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Territorial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>0% (0 of 208)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46% (12 of 26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33.7% (23 of 61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>56% (14 of 25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>92.3% (133 of 143)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first thing that jumps out in this table is the complete absence of ethnic minority party attempts for groups that do not possess at least one of the three variables in the HSP framework—out of 208 such observations, no electoral entry attempt has been made. On the other hand, possessing even one of the dominance/autonomy and historicity traits substantially increases the likelihood of EMP entry. For instance, having experience with autonomy raises electoral entry from 0 to 56% for non-native groups, and more than doubles it for native groups. Similarly, a native background raises the incidence of EMP
entry from 0 to 40% for non-autonomous groups, and from 56 to 92.3% for groups with a history of dominance/autonomy. The influence of territorial attachment is somewhat more difficult to discern. In cases where experience with autonomy is lacking, territoriality only increases the incidence of electoral entry from 33.7% to 46%, a change that does not appear substantial and that a chi-square test reveals to be statistically insignificant (p=0.52). In cases where dominance/autonomy is present, there is simply no basis for assessing the influence of the territorial attachment variable, because there are no cases for which this trait is absent. Therefore, it is difficult to say whether territorial attachment in and of itself has any significant effect on party entry. What is clear however, is that for minority groups that are both native and have experience with self-rule, we observe a remarkably high (92.3%) incidence of electoral entry.

5.4 Multivariate models

I next proceed to model electoral entry using several generalized linear mixed effects models. I choose generalized linear mixed effects due to the dichotomous dependent variable (electoral entry) and the multilevel nature of the data. Some variables in the data (e.g., most favorable party response, EU candidate, disproportionality) are specific to the country in which the election takes place whereas others are specific to the ethnic group (e.g., the historical variables, bordering kin state, population size). Further, many of the variables measured at either level (e.g., EU candidate, disproportionality, population size) are time-variant. Since we cannot assume that multiple measurements from the same country, country-ethnic group or year are independent of one another, it is necessary to control for country, country-ethnic group and time. In order to do this, I use a generalized linear mixed effects model that incorporates both fixed effects (the
predictor variables) and random intercepts for each country and each country-ethnic group.\textsuperscript{10}

In order to test the various proposed explanatory paradigms for EMP entry, I begin by creating three models corresponding to the three groups of independent variables described in the previous section—historical, political opportunity structure and international. Model 1 thus contains the variables \textit{native}, \textit{territorial attachment} and \textit{dominant/autonomous}. Model 2 incorporates an interactive term between \textit{most favorable party score} and \textit{population share}. Model 3 consists of the variables \textit{bordering kin state} and \textit{EU accession}. In addition, each of the three models contains the three control variables—\textit{population share}, \textit{electoral disproportionality} and \textit{federalism}. The results from these three models are presented in Table 3.7.

\textsuperscript{10} An alternative logistic regression model with fixed effects for country, county-ethnic group and year did not produce substantially different results.
Table 3.7: Generalized linear mixed model analysis of EMP entry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>11.73 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9.62 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.65)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>territorial attachment</td>
<td>-2.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dominant/autonomous</td>
<td>7.66 ***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.09 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFP score x population share</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFP score</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.27 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population share</td>
<td>0.31 *</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.56 **</td>
<td>0.27 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bordering kin state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.12 **</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.71)</td>
<td>(2.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU candidate</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.75 *</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electoral disproportionality</td>
<td>-0.13 *</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>federal/devolved</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>-2.59</td>
<td>-2.39</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.19)</td>
<td>(2.81)</td>
<td>(5.23)</td>
<td>(5.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model 1 reveals that both historical presence and a history of dominance/autonomy are highly statistically significant predictors of ethnic minority party entry. Curiously, however, territorial attachment does not appear to be an influential factor; its coefficient even exhibits the opposite sign of the one predicted. This is most likely due to the fact that the variables native and territorial attachment are highly correlated, as the latter is a specific case of the former. Removing native from this model actually yields a statistically significant (at p<0.05) coefficient for territorial attachment, with the expected sign. However, the results of Model 1 seem to suggest that any predictive utility territorial attachment appears to have is primarily a function of the fact that all territorially attached minority groups also happen to be native to their states of residence; it is not clear that there is anything unique and particular to territorial
attachment that aids EMP entry.

Model 2 reveals that the interaction between mainstream party reaction and minority group strength is not a highly influential predictor of minority party entry. Indeed, while the other models attest to the statistical significance of population share as a variable in its own right, it appears to bear little influence on EMP entry when interacted with most favorable party score. Further, the latter of the two variables is not shown to be a statistically significant predictor of minority party entry, even though it does exhibit the expected negative relationship, in contrast to the results in the bivariate analysis. Overall, there appears to be little evidence for the hypothesis that the attitudes of major parties in a state toward an ethnic minority influence that minority’s likelihood of contesting elections through an ethnically-based party.

Model 3 appears to contain evidence for both of the proposed international influences on EMP entry. EU candidate is statistically significant at p<0.05, indicating that we are more likely to observe EMPs in states that are somewhere along the application process for membership in the European Union. Bordering kin state is even more influential (statistically significant at the p<0.01 level), suggesting that the presence of an adjacent kin state encourages the relevant minority group to adopt the minority party approach.

As a final step in this analysis, I combine several components of models 1 through 3 in order to present a more comprehensive examination of the determinants of EMP entry in Model 4. In this final model, I combine the historical variables (with the exception of territorial attachment, which appeared to have limited utility in Model 1), the two international variables and the three controls. I omit the interactive term between
most favorable party score and population share, since the previous models revealed that only population size in its own right seems to influence the likelihood of minority party entry.

The results confirm the impression that two of the three historical variables—historical presence and dominance/autonomy—are the strongest predictors of EMP entry. Additionally, EU candidacy remains a significant predictor, as it was in Model 3, albeit only at the p<0.1 level. In contrast, the presence of a bordering kin state loses the statistical significance it possessed in Model 3. One possible explanation for why this occurs is that similarly to territorial attachment, bordering kin state is highly correlated to historical presence. Minority groups that tend to have adjacent kin states are almost always ones that are native to their state, and groups that do not have an adjacent kin state are often of a predominantly migrant character. A similar relationship can be observed with the other historical variable, dominant/autonomous. Thus, the results of Model 4 suggest that the predictive influence that bordering kin state appeared to possess in Model 3 is a product of the variable’s relation to historical factors, rather than being due to some unique and intrinsic feature.

An examination of the control variables in the four models paints a fairly consistent picture. Electoral disproportionality has a modest effect in discouraging EMP entry. The larger an ethnic group’s share of the population, the more likely that group is to contest elections with an ethnically-based party. Finally, a federal or devolved government system does not appear to substantially increase the likelihood of EMP entry.

The above analysis was performed using the version of the dataset that operationalizes the ethnicity of Muslims in Western Europe according to national origin.
What happens if we define ethnicity according to religious adherence instead? Table 3.8 shows the results of the four multivariate models tested on a dataset using this alternative operationalization.

Table 3.8: Multivariate analysis on alternative (religion-as-ethnicity) dataset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>11.88 **</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.7 ***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.68)</td>
<td>(2.75)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>territorial attachment</td>
<td>-2.49</td>
<td>-2.49</td>
<td>-3.01</td>
<td>-2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.34)</td>
<td>(2.04)</td>
<td>(2.63)</td>
<td>(5.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dominant/autonomous</td>
<td>7.77 ***</td>
<td>6.16 **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.32)</td>
<td>(2.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFP score x population share</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFP score</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.27 *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>population share</td>
<td>0.31 *</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.50 *</td>
<td>0.27 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bordering kin state</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.85 **</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.14)</td>
<td>(2.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU candidate</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.82 *</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electoral disproportionality</td>
<td>-0.13 *</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>federal/devolved</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>-3.01</td>
<td>-2.45</td>
<td>2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.96)</td>
<td>(2.63)</td>
<td>(5.66)</td>
<td>(5.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A comparison of tables 3.7 and 3.8 reveals that the results of the two models are virtually identical. The only difference of note is that the control variable electoral disproportionality loses its statistical significance in Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.8. However, we observe no discrepancy between the results derived from the two datasets when it comes to the independent variables belonging to the three groups—historical, political opportunity structure and international—that this analysis is primarily concerned with examining.
I performed one additional sensitivity test by employing the three alternative measurements of ethnic group size described earlier in this chapter, reducing the size (as a percentage of total population) of predominantly migrant ethnic groups by 25%, 33% and 50%, respectively. The main purpose of this analysis is to determine whether variation in citizenship rates between migrant and native groups could account for the positive effect of historicity on ethnic minority party entry. If that were the case, then the advantage enjoyed by native groups may have nothing to do with their historical background, but be simply a product of their legal status and voting eligibility. However, in testing each of the models described above, I discovered that the alternate specifications for the population share variable do not affect the results in any substantial way. Even when reducing migrant groups’ population share by 50%, the statistical significance level for native remained constant across both Model 1 and Model 4. Nor were there any substantial effects on the coefficients or statistical significance exhibited by other variables (including population share itself). It seems, thus, that we cannot explain away the link between historicity and EMP entry as a mere product of citizenship status.

V. Analysis #2: Electoral success

Operationalizing electoral success is not as straightforward as operationalizing electoral entry. What does it mean for an ethnic minority party to be successful?

One way to approach this question is to look at the share of the vote the party receives in a particular legislative election, and to view parties that get a greater share of the vote as more successful. While this may be an appropriate way to measure success for ideologically-based parties, it has a serious drawback when used for EMPs. Unlike non-
ethnic parties, EMPs tend to have a built-in ceiling to how many votes they can attract. It is true that ethnic parties in Europe have occasionally attracted a modest number of votes from voters who are not members of the ethnic group in question, but for the most part electoral support for EMPs has been limited by the size of the group the party seeks to represent. Therefore, measuring success based on vote share would not do justice to smaller minority groups.

A better way to define success is to ask whether an ethnic group was able to obtain legislative representation by contesting a particular election with an EMP. The primary purpose of a minority party is to give its ethnic group a voice in the country’s law-making body. For this reason, it seems that asking whether the party obtained legislative representation is the best way to determine whether the minority party project can be considered a success. Therefore, I consider as “successful” those ethnic minority groups that were able to win at least one seat in the national legislative body as a consequence of the electoral performance of one or more EMPs representing that group.

Some might object here that this operationalization does not avoid the problem raised earlier, since parties representing larger groups are more likely to obtain the votes necessary to pass electoral thresholds of representation. However, this part of the analysis only considers minority groups that have formed parties. The entry of an EMP suggests that it is at least plausible that the party could have obtained electoral representation, since the desire to win seats in the national legislature is the primary reason parties contest elections. If the odds were completely stacked against a minority group, it is hard to understand why it would pursue the minority party strategy in the first place. Therefore, setting “legislative representation” as the requirement for success does not set
the bar too high. Nor does it reward EMPs representing larger ethnic groups that win many seats due to their numerical strength.

It is important to add that legislative representation must have been obtained without the help of special quotas reserved for ethnic minority representation. That is, if quotas for ethnic group representation do exist within a country, a minority party can be considered successful only if it obtained a sufficient number of votes so that it would have been able to win at least one seat even in the absence of preferential rules. If this is not the case, the wisest course of action is to remove the case from the analysis, since we cannot be certain how the party would have fared had there been no quota in place. We cannot consider such cases to be “failures” since the party may have obtained a greater share of the vote if it had not been assured of representation through the quota system.

In the sections below, I discuss the independent variables theorized to be predictors of ethnic minority party success in this analysis.

1. HSP variables

While I theorize that the three historical-social-psychological variables developed in Chapter II account primarily for an ethnic group’s decision to form and contest elections through a party of its own, the influence of these factors would seem to spill over into the area of electoral performance as well. After all, it is possible that some ethnic minority parties are formed as a consequence of the personal ambition of one or more political entrepreneurs, even if the social and political consciousness of the group it seeks to represent does not lend itself to the EMP model of representation. A casual examination of the cases in the dataset reveals that minority parties are sometimes attempted by groups that lack one or more of the historical factors theorized to aid
electoral entry. I expect that those parties that do not possess as many of the desirable historical characteristics will have a more difficult time generating sufficient electoral support among their target group in order to obtain legislative representation.

2. Party system variables

In Chapter II, I proposed that the presence of a strong right-wing populist (RWP) party in the state ought to improve an ethnic minority party’s likelihood of attaining success. The reasoning behind this is that EMPs and RWP parties tend to be polar opposites on issues that central to both parties, and that the latter group of parties often seek to capitalize on anti-minority and anti-pluralist sentiment in their country. Thus, the heated rhetoric right-wing populist parties advance in order to mobilize nationalist and anti-minority support also aids ethnic minority parties by creating a sense of political threat among minority voters. Minority group members are more likely to respond to EMP campaign efforts if they view such efforts as counter-mobilization against the far right.

For this reason, I include a variable in my analysis that corresponds to the share of the vote received by all right-wing populist parties in a particular election. I further include a lagged version of this variable in order to allow for the possibility of a delayed effect where RWP party performance in one election could influence minority party performance in the following election. My expectation is that the greater the share of electoral support for populist right parties, the more likely we are to observe a successful EMP.

I classify as “right-wing populist” those parties that exhibit all three of the characteristics that Mudde (2007) identifies as being foundational for the populist right in
Europe—nativism (the claim to representing the interests of the majority ethnic group of the state), populism (opposition to the political establishment on the grounds that if favors “other people” rather than “the people”) and authoritarianism (promoting a strictly ordered society where disobedience of authority is punished severely). In order to determine whether a party contains these features, I consulted party manifestos and, where manifestos were not available, press releases and academic and popular publications, to determine whether a certain party exhibited RWP traits. Although I favored primary sources (party manifestos and press releases) where they were available either in English or in languages I am proficient in reading (Bulgarian, Macedonian and Serbian-Bosnian-Croatian), I often had to rely on secondary but nonetheless trustworthy sources, authored by academic and non-academic experts on the politics of the relevant state.

Table 3.9 below presents all of the parties I classified as right-wing populist. (Note that this list is limited to countries where an EMP entered at least one election.)
Table 3.9: Right-wing populist parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>Right-wing populist parties (period contesting elections)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>National Front (1991-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Ataka (2005-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Croatian Party of Rights (1992-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatian Party of Rights - dr. Ante Starčević (2011-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estonian Independence Party (1999-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>True Finns (1999-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Hungarian Justice and Life Party (1994-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jobbik (2006-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>For Fatherland and Freedom (1993-1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For Fatherland and Freedom/LNKK (1998-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Order and Justice (2004-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lithuanian Nationalists Union (1992-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Young Lithuania (2012-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (1990-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – People's Party (2006-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Greater Romania Party (1992-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Serbian Radical Party (2000-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Slovak National Party (1990-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Nationalist Movement Party (1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (1994-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukrainian National Assembly (1994-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All-Ukrainian Union ‘Svoboda’ (1994-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>British National Party (1992-present)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Political culture variables

Another variable I theorize influences EMP success is a political culture of clientelism. In Chapter II, I argued that in states where clientelistic practices are a substantial source of electoral support, parties organized along ethnic lines have an advantage. This advantage is due to the fact that a common ethnic identification creates natural built-in networks for both the acquisition of votes and the allocation of rewards.
for votes received. I therefore expect that EMPs will tend to be more successful in states
where clientelism is more commonplace.

Clientelism and patronage are notoriously difficult phenomena to measure, as the
practices and exchanges involved do not usually happen out in the open. For this reason,
quantitative studies have tended to utilize proxies. I follow Manow (2002) in using
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) as a proxy for
clientelism. While it is certainly not an ideal way to measure clientelism, the CPI is one
of the best proxies for two primary reasons. First, much of the data contained in the
sources used to calculate the CPI has to do directly with clientelistic practices, since it
touches on issues like the misuse of public power for private benefit. Second, even the
indicators comprising the index that do not directly deal with clientelism or patronage can
be expected to be nonetheless highly correlated with the presence of such practices. The
values of the CPI range from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating lower perceptions of
corruption. (In order to avoid confusion, I label the variable as “absence of corruption” in
the following analysis).

4. International variables

In the previous chapter, I argued that a nearby kin state can help a minority party
maximize its electoral support. The existence of such a state can offer EMPs improved
access to citizens living abroad, give them an opportunity to form strategic partnerships
with established parties in the kin state and enable them to attract strategically targeted
foreign investment. Thus, we can expect the presence of a kin state to maximize an ethnic
minority party’s voteshare and therefore increase the likelihood of that party obtaining
legislative representation.
As in the previous analysis, I consider two alternative operationalizations of this variable—a broader one including all European kin states, and a narrower one limited to bordering kin states.

5. Party organization variables

Chapter II discussed three factors pertaining to party organization that can be expected to contribute to EMP success. However, testing these variables in the present quantitative analysis is unfeasible, for two primary reasons. First, obtaining accurate data for these variables, especially for a large dataset like this, would be extremely challenging and time-consuming. Second, incorporating such variables would necessitate examining the data at an ethnic party level of measurement, rather than an ethnic group level of measurement. Doing this would significantly complicate the analysis, since multiple parties from the same ethnic group competing over the same time period would be included. This would frustrate interpretation of the influence of ethnic group-level and country-level variables, since minority groups that produce successful ethnic parties are also likely to produce unsuccessful challengers to those parties. For these reasons, I elect not to examine party organization variables as part of this analysis. However, I do explore these variables in the case study in Chapter IV.

6. Control variables

The same control variables employed in the previous analysis—population, electoral disproportionality and federalism/autonomy—are utilized here. It seems straightforward that more numerous ethnic groups are more likely to produce an EMP capable of winning seats in the country’s legislature. Likewise, a federal or devolved state could enable EMPs to use regional politics as a laboratory in which to develop their
capacities before entering national contests, making it more likely that when they do so, they will achieve success. Finally, as with electoral entry, it is not clear what effect we should expect electoral disproportionality to have on electoral success, since it is possible that geographically-concentrated groups could actually benefit from a disproportional distribution of seats to votes. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to include disproportionality as a control variable to account for variation among states.

7. Descriptive statistics

The dataset used in this analysis a subset of the one used in the previous analysis, comprised only of cases where an ethnic minority group contested an election with an EMP. The total number of observations therefore falls to 180.

Table 3.10 presents some descriptive statistics for all continuous variables contained in this narrower dataset, while Table 3.11 presents frequencies and percentages for the dichotomous variables used in the analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>1st Quartile</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>3rd Quartile</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population share</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral disproportionality</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing populist vote</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged right-wing populist vote</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption Perceptions Index</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.11: Frequencies and percentages for dichotomous variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral success</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant/autonomous</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin state</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bordering kin state</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal/devolved</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One thing to note here are the relatively few cases of minority groups that do not possess the three favorable historical characteristics, and this is particularly true for historical presence. This is due to the fact so few minority groups that do not possess these characteristics even attempt to contest elections with an ethnically-based party. Also of interest is the significant overlap between *kin state* and *bordering kin state*. Of the 125 cases where a kin state was present, 116 were cases where that state shared a border with the country where the election took place. This suggests that in this version of the dataset, the two variables are nearly identical.

8. *Bivariate correlations*

Table 3.12 presents bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients between each of the independent and control variables in the analysis and the dependent variable. In order to assess statistical significance, P-values derived from a Wald’s Two Sample t-test are also reported.
The bivariate correlations between the three historical variables and the dependent variable are not as strong as they were in the previous analysis, owing to the fact that the cases contained in this narrower dataset are already heavily selected for the presence of these factors. Nonetheless, these characteristics do still appear to be correlated with minority party success. Both operationalizations of kin state effect also exhibit a substantial correlation with EMP success, with their coefficients being almost identical. As in the first part of the analysis, I elect to use *bordering kin state* in the multivariate analysis going forward. I found that substituting the broader operationalization does not alter the results, as suggested by the considerable overlap between the two variables highlighted in the previous section. While right-wing populist party vote does not exhibit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Correlation Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant/autonomous</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWP vote</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged RWP vote</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Absence of) corruption</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population share</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin state</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bordering kin state</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral disproportionality</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal/devolved</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
a strong correlation with the dependent variable in either its lagged or non-lagged forms, I am still interested in examining its influence in the multivariate analysis going forward. In the following section, I do this with the lagged version of the variable, since it appears to be slightly more influential.

9. Cross-tabulation

In order to examine the effect of the three historical variables working in conjunction with each other, I next consider the incidence of electoral entry for each of the six possible combinations of the presence and absence of these characteristics. Table 3.13 reports the proportion of electoral contestation for groups possessing each of these combinations of historical traits.

Table 3.13: Historical variable pairs and proportions of successful electoral entry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant/autonomous</th>
<th>Native</th>
<th>Territorial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>78.6% (11 of 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Territorial Non-Territorial</td>
<td>58.3% (7 of 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Territorial</td>
<td>21.7% (5 of 23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Territorial Non-Territorial</td>
<td>89.4% (118 of 132)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Territorial</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Because none of the cases where all the three HSP variables are absent produced EMP entry, there is also no EMP success to speak of. Once again, we observe that possessing even one of the three characteristics raises the incidence of electoral success dramatically. For instance, simply possessing the dominant/autonomous trait produces a 78.6% success rate, increasing to 89.4% in conjunction with the native trait. Similarly, native minorities that are not dominant/autonomous have successful EMPs in 34.2% of elections, growing to 89.4% for autonomous groups. However, in contrast with the equivalent analysis preformed with respect to EMP entry, it appears that the dominance/autonomy variable has a substantially larger influence than the historicity variable when it comes to EMP success. Being native only increases the likelihood of success from 78.6% to 89.4% for formerly autonomous minorities, a change that is not statistically significant according to a chi-squared test (p=0.62). On the other hand, being dominant/autonomous raises the likelihood of success for native groups from 34.2 to 89.4%, which a chi-squared test reveals to be a statistically significant difference (p=0.003). Another difference is that territorial attachment seems to play more of a role in EMP success than it does in EMP entry. In cases where dominance/autonomy is absent but historicity is present, territoriality accounts for an increase from 21.7 to 58.3% in the incidence of electoral success, which appears at first glance to be a substantial difference. However, the number of observations here is very small and a chi-squared test suggests the difference is not quite statistically significant (p=0.08), so it seems uncertain whether territorial attachment really is highly influential. What is clear is that historicity and dominance/autonomy seem to contribute to minority party success when working in conjunction, and that the latter of these variables seems to be rather powerful even on its
10. Multivariate models

I proceed to test the proposed predictors of ethnic minority party success using the same method (generalized linear mixed effects models) utilized in Analysis 1, again due to the dichotomous dependent variable and the multilevel structure of the data.

The first model I test includes the three historical variables, as well as the three control variables. The second model contains the factors pertaining to the party system and political culture of the state—right wing populist party strength (measured by lagged RWP voteshare) and pervasiveness of clientelism (proxied by the Corruption Perceptions Index). Model 3 contains the lone international influence variable in this analysis (bordering kin state), plus controls. The results from these three models are presented in Table 3.14.

**Table 3.14: Multivariate analysis of electoral success**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>13.39 *</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.58 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.52)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.79)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>territorial attachment</td>
<td>-1.22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.48)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dominant/autonomous</td>
<td>7.59 **</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.08 **</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.36)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.98)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWP vote (lagged)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1 .</td>
<td>0.09 .</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Absence of corruption</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.38</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
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<tr>
<td>population share</td>
<td>0.39 *</td>
<td>0.33 .</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.34 *</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
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<tr>
<td>bordering kin state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.15 **</td>
<td>0.78</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.31)</td>
<td>(1.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electoral disproportionality</td>
<td>-0.16 *</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.14 *</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
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<tr>
<td>federal/devolved</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.98 .</td>
<td>1.81</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.18)</td>
<td>(5.82)</td>
<td>(3.79)</td>
<td>(2.05)</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>180</td>
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<td>407</td>
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The results of Model 1 mimic those of the equivalent model in Analysis 1, in that they reveal that of the three historical factors, only *historical presence* and *dominance/autonomy* are statistically significant predictors of electoral success. A group’s territorial attachment does not appear to highly influence its ability to field a successful EMP. Once again, *territorial attachment*’s association with the dependent variable seems to be more a consequence of it being a subset of the historical presence variable. The same model with the latter variable omitted yielded a statistically significant coefficient for territorial attachment. However, the model presented here seems to suggest that historical presence is a better predictor of EMP success than the more narrow territorial attachment variable.

Model 2 reveals that the electoral strength of right-wing populist parties accounts for a modest improvement in a minority party’s likelihood of obtaining legislative representation. However, the coefficient is only statistically significant at the p<0.1 level. In contrast, the presence of a clientelistic political culture (proxied by corruption) does not appear to have any effect on the dependent variable. However, given the limitations of using an imperfect proxy variable to capture clientelism, we should not be too hasty in dismissing this theorized relationship. I revisit the question of whether clientelism aids minority parties in the next chapter.

The results of Model 3 reveal that a bordering kin state is highly correlated with a minority group’s ability to field a party that obtains legislative representation, with the coefficient being significant at p<.01. We should be cautious however, since a similar effect was present in the analysis of electoral entry, only to disappear when the historical variables were taken into account.
Model 4 (also presented in Table 3.14) combines the three approaches to explaining minority party success represented in models 1 through 3. All independent variables save for territorial attachment and absence of corruption are included. Three of the explanatory variables that appeared to be significant predictors of minority party success in the first three models—historical presence, dominance/autonomy and RWP vote—retain their statistical significance; the fourth—bordering kin state—does not. Similarly to the analysis of minority party entry, apparent influences exerted by the proximity of a kin state disappear when a minority group’s historical characteristics are taken into account.

VI. Conclusion

The results of the analyses performed in this chapter reveal that two of the three historical variables proposed in my theoretical framework—historicity and dominance/autonomy—are the strongest determinants of ethnic minority party entry and success. Having an historical presence on the territory of the state prior to the formation of that state, and possessing experience with self-rule significantly contributes to an ethnic group’s ability to establish a successful ethnic minority party. The influence of these two variables exceeds that of any other tested in this analysis, including the size of the ethnic group as a percentage of total population.

In contrast, the influence of the remaining historical variable—territorial attachment, capturing a group’s historical identification with a particular region(s) in its state—varies relative to the mode of analysis. While there is a strong bivariate association between territorial attachment and EMP entry and success, this association greatly diminishes once it is examined in conjunction with the effect of other variables (though
slightly less so in the case of EMP success). On the balance, it seems that the influence territoriality appears to exert on its own is a largely a product of that variable’s high correlation with historicity (the former being ostensibly a subset of the latter). We should keep in mind however, that there are relatively few cases of historical ethnic groups that lack territorial attachment, particularly in the analysis on minority party success. Thus, it may be hasty to draw conclusions about the role of this variable based on the results presented here.

I find little evidence to support the idea that the political opportunity structure influences an ethnic group’s decision of whether to contest elections with an EMP or not. None of the analyses performed indicated that the attitudes of mainstream political parties toward ethnic minorities, either on their own or interacted with the ethnic group’s size, influence the likelihood of ethnic minority party entry, confirming the null finding of Bernauer and Bochsler (2011). It appears that the political decisions minority groups make have more to do with the intrinsic character of those groups than with a reaction to the prevailing attitudes and strategies of major political parties. However, we should not be too quick to dismiss the influence of the political opportunity structure, as these null findings may be at least partly the result of the methodological challenges faced in accurately measuring party attitudes toward ethnic minorities, and especially attitudes toward specific minority groups.

In examining the influence of international actors, two main findings emerge. First, candidacy for European Union accession seems to slightly increase the likelihood of observing electoral entry for an ethnic minority party within the candidate state. Second, and somewhat surprisingly, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that the
presence of a bordering kin state aids in either EMP entry or success. In both cases, the variable appears to exert a strong influence when examining bivariate associations and multivariate models that do not include historical variables. However, once historicity and territorial attachment are taken into account, the influence of a bordering kin state vanishes. It appears that similarly to the territorial attachment variable, the perceived impact of a neighboring kin state has more to do with its association with other strong predictors of EMP entry and success (historicity and territorial attachment) than with any intrinsic quality. On the balance then, it seems that international-actor explanations of minority party entry and success are not as successful as those based on the historical characteristics of ethnic groups.

Lastly we come to the political culture and political system variables proposed to influence minority party success. I find no evidence in any of the analyses performed that a clientelistic political culture contributes to EMP success. However, we should keep in mind that the operationalization of the variable utilized (based on perceptions of corruption, rather than clientelism) is less-than-ideal, so it would be hasty to draw conclusions based on the null finding. (In Chapter IV, I discuss how the Movement for Rights and Freedoms party in Bulgaria has excelled at utilizing clientelistic practices to bolster its standing.) With respect to the political system of the state, I find that we are more likely to observe successful EMPs in elections that are also contested by a successful right-wing populist (RWP) party. Although the influence of such parties on minority party success is modest, it does suggest that the sense of threat instilled by the radical right does play some role in mobilizing support for EMPs.
IV. Ethnic Minority Politics in Bulgaria

I. Introduction

The cross-national, quantitative study of ethnic minority party emergence and success entails some inherent limitations. As with all large-N analyses, depth must be sacrificed in order for complex, multi-faceted processes and influences to be quantified, or reduced into neatly conceived categorical variables. In particular, historical-social-psychological factors, which are a central focus in this work, can be so unique and ethnic group-specific that it is impossible to do them full justice by employing such an approach. While my analysis in the previous chapter captures the primary determinants of EMP emergence and success, much remains to be said about how these relevant factors manifest themselves in the political participation strategies of particular minority groups.

In order to complement the quantitative findings of Chapter III, this chapter presents a detailed, qualitative case study of the factors contributing to EMP establishment and success in Bulgaria. Focusing on a single country allows me to dig deeper into the relationships between independent and dependent variables, and to examine the specific causal mechanisms through which the former influence the latter. It further enables me to closely examine the influence of variables—such as major party reaction to minority demands, or the presence of clientelism—whose operationalization in the previous chapter was less-than-ideal due to data limitations. Lastly, this study enables me to test some of the theoretical expectations—namely those pertaining to party organization characteristics—developed in Chapter II that I was unable to incorporate into my quantitative analysis.

Bulgaria is an excellent subject for a case study on the determinants of the
political strategies of ethnic minority groups, as well as the outcomes of those strategies. It contains two sizable minority groups—the Turks and Roma—whose efforts in the area of collective political action have taken different paths and resulted in widely diverging outcomes.

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms, a party representing Bulgaria’s ethnic Turks and Muslims, is one of the most successful and influential EMPs in Europe. Since the demise of Communism, the MRF has enjoyed a strong and growing electoral support (winning as much as 14.5% of the vote in the 2009 parliamentary election) and has consistently obtained parliamentary representation. It has successfully fended off challenges from both rival Turkish parties and mainstream, non-ethnic parties that have sought to make inroads into its electorate. The success of the party has allowed it to exert a tremendous amount of influence on Bulgarian politics. Prior to 2009, virtually no Bulgarian government existed without formal or informal MRF support. Bulgarian center-right and center-left governments of the 1990’s depended on the backing of the MRF in parliamentary votes of confidence. Between 2001 and 2009, the party was part of the governing coalition and controlled numerous portfolios, and it recently returned to power following the 2013 parliamentary elections.

In contrast, while there has been no shortage of attempts to form a Roma party, such efforts have generally failed or enjoyed only modest and fleeting success, with the group’s political participation remaining deeply fragmented and disorganized. Initial efforts to establish a Roma party in aftermath of Communist collapse failed, as the Democratic Roma Union (DRU) was banned on grounds of violating Bulgaria’s constitutional ban on ethnic parties. While later attempts at Roma party formation were
permitted by the Bulgarian courts, most of the parties established remained political minnows, content with contesting local elections and lacking the ambition or capacity to enter nationwide contests. Bulgaria’s most successful Roma party to date, Euroroma, won 1.3% of the vote in the 2005 parliamentary elections—enough to secure government funding but far short of the 4% electoral threshold for legislative representation. Another party, Civil Union “Roma”, has been part of the Bulgarian Socialist Party-led center-left electoral coalitions in every national legislative election since 2001, but none of its members have ever been elected to the parliament or appointed to posts of national influence. No Roma party has contested national legislative elections on its own since 2005.

Although the Turks and Roma have experienced vastly different levels of success in their efforts to obtain legislative representation through ethnic minority parties, the two groups share much in common. Both are of similar numerical size—the Roma constitute around 5% and the Turks around 8% of the country’s population\(^1\)—and both are large enough that parties representing them could plausibly pass Bulgaria’s 4% electoral threshold. Turks and Roma alike are characterized by low educational attainment and a low socio-economic status when compared to ethnic Bulgarians. While this is truer for the Roma than the Turks, the difference between the two groups is smaller than the difference between Turks and Bulgarians on these dimensions.\(^2\) Both groups tend to live in smaller cities and rural areas, and are less likely to be found in large cities. Although

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\(^1\) Numbers based on Bulgaria’s 2011 census. Unofficial estimates suggest a more substantial Roma population. Official census data across Europe is generally considered to underestimate the size of Roma populations, in no small measure because some Roma refrain from self-identifying because of fear of discrimination.

\(^2\) Minkov (2011: 359) examines 2001 Bulgarian Census data, showing that ethnic Turks are statistically closer to the Roma on measures of educational attainment (based on possession of secondary and post-secondary degrees) than they are to ethnic Bulgarians.
Christianity has made considerable headway into Roma communities in recent decades, Islam is still the predominant faith in the community (as it is, of course, for Turks). Members of both communities tend to speak a primary language other than Bulgarian. Lastly, both the Turks and the Roma experienced tremendous levels of repression, harassment and forced assimilation under Bulgaria’s Communist regime. While I do not claim that these similarities are sufficient to consider this a Most Similar Systems Design, they nevertheless ought to alleviate some concern about omitted variable bias, and allow a reasonably rigorous test of the explanatory framework proposed in this dissertation.

In order to determine whether the theoretical framework developed in Chapter II can account for the different levels of success enjoyed by Turkish and Roma efforts at political engagement, I performed extensive field research over the course of a month in Sofia, Bulgaria. I conducted twelve detailed interviews with former members of parliament, members, leaders and founders of various ethnic minority parities representing the Turkish and Roma communities, leading scholars of Bulgarian politics and members and leaders of non-governmental organizations concerned with promoting ethnic interests.\(^3\) The interviews had an average duration of about one hour, with subjects typically providing responses to between ten and twelve questions. The interviews were semi-structured, meaning that I sometimes deviated from my prepared list of questions in order to pursue ideas introduced by the person interviewed. In order to protect the reputations of all interview subjects and to elicit their honest and forthright responses, I guaranteed the subjects’ anonymity. In addition to conducting these interviews, I accessed valuable historical and sociological resources at institutions such as Sofia

\(^3\) The precise breakdown of the respondents’ occupations is as follows: six politicians, three scholars and three NGO representatives.
University and the American Research Center in Sofia. Both prior to and following my stay in Bulgaria, I consulted a host of both academic and non-academic sources in order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the country’s ethnic politics.

As in my quantitative analysis, my primary concern in this study was exploring the theoretical expectations developed in Chapter II—namely those pertaining to the Historical-Social-Psychological (HSP) framework, the country’s party system and political culture, the influence of international actors and features of party organization. However, the interviews I conducted were sufficiently open-ended so as to explore the role of variables outside of this theoretical framework, and I was careful not to intentionally steer the interview subjects toward confirming my predictions. As a consequence, while most of my theoretical expectations were confirmed, some were not, and several factors unique to Bulgarian ethnic politics emerged as important in explaining the success of the MRF, and the lack thereof of Roma parties (as well as rival Turkish EMPs).

Ultimately, I found that a number of historical factors have contributed to the political strategies employed by the Roma and Turkish communities and their respective levels of success. Both groups share an extensive historical presence on territories currently part of the Bulgarian state, making the idea of an ethnic minority party plausible and appealing for both. However, the greater historical capital possessed by the Turkish community as a product of its territorial concentration and former dominant status has helped generate mass-level support for a Turkish minority party far surpassing similar sentiment in favor of a Roma party. I further find that in addition to the three variables of the HSP framework, the repressive policies of forced assimilation carried out by
Bulgaria’s Communist government toward its ethnic minorities played a substantial role in galvanizing widespread support for a Turkish party, but not for a Roma party. I attribute this latter finding at least partly to the fact that the Roma community did not possess the vast historical capital of Bulgaria’s Turks.

I further find that a host of non-historical variables help explain the fates of these two minority groups in the political arena. I discover that Bulgaria’s major political parties initially made only feeble and misguided attempts at attracting the Turkish and Roma vote, allowing for the MRF to solidify its support among the former demographic, while the more systematic recent efforts to appeal to Turks are unlikely to break the MRF monopoly, since this monopoly was solidified and entrenched in the early 1990’s. I further find that the emergence of the nationalist party Ataka has improved the MRF’s electoral fortunes by helping the party mobilize its base. The Movement has also greatly benefitted from its ability to utilize clientelistic networks, exploiting such networks to a greater extent than the country’s major non-ethnic parties.

With respect to international influences, I determine that support from both Turkey and the European Union played a role in the emergence of the MRF in the early 1990s, and that the lack of such international support enabled the Bulgarian state to snuff out efforts at Roma party formation in the same period. However, I find no evidence that the EU contributed to the party’s strong electoral performance beyond this foundational period, and while the existence of a neighboring kin state has helped in this respect, this is due to reasons other than direct and intentional intervention by the Turkish state.

Lastly, I find that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms has been aided in its electoral success by its extensive and rigidly hierarchical organization structure that
nevertheless offers opportunities for intra-party advancement, as well as by the quality of its leaders. In contrast, parties of the Roma have suffered the consequences of a weak organizational structure, paired with serious deficits in the educational attainment and political acumen of their leaders.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In section II, I examine the historical background of Bulgaria’s two largest ethnic minority groups—the Turks and the Roma—and trace how the two groups’ experiences have impacted their social and political consciousness and shaped their strategies for engaging in the political process. In section III, I consider the influence of party system variables—namely the attitudes and strategies of mainstream political parties, as well as the rise of the nationalist party Ataka—on the emergence and success of EMPs in Bulgaria. In section IV, I examine the role Bulgarian political culture—and more specifically the proliferation of clientelistic practices—plays in the success of the MRF. In section V, I consider the party organizational features of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, as compared to other ethnic and non-ethnic parties, and how it has allowed the party to flourish in Bulgarian politics. Lastly, I conclude in Section VI.

II. Historical variables

What role did the historical experiences of Bulgaria’s Turks and Roma have in shaping the two groups’ strategies for political engagement in the country’s post-Communist electoral landscape? Further, do these respective historical backgrounds help to explain why the Turks managed to establish a highly successful party and the Roma did not?

To answer these questions, I first offer a broad overview of the history of
Bulgaria’s ethnic minorities and the development and politicization of the Turkish and Roma ethnic identities in section 1. Then, in section 2, I assess the applicability of the HSP framework in the Bulgarian case, and consider the influence of a historical factor outside of that framework—past repression and forced assimilation.

1. Bulgaria and its ethnic minorities: a historical overview

1.1 Bulgaria and its ethnic minorities, 1878-1913

In 1878, the Treaty of Berlin established the Principality of Bulgaria as a constitutional monarchy, and Eastern Rumelia as an autonomous Ottoman province. These two entities would go on to become unified in 1885 and would eventually declare independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1908, forming the modern Bulgarian state.

The creation of this new state led to an inversion of the hierarchical relations between the ethnic groups residing within it. Muslims, who had formerly enjoyed a privileged majority status within the Ottoman Empire, now found themselves as a sizeable minority group, accounting for almost a quarter of the population of the Principality of Bulgaria in the late 19th century. This group was comprised predominantly of ethnic Turks but also of Pomaks (Slavic Muslims) and Gypsies. In the following decades, Bulgaria’s Muslims would decline as a percentage of the population due to migration to the Ottoman Empire (and later Turkey), yet Turks and Roma remain Bulgaria’s two largest ethnic minority groups today.

The protection of Bulgaria’s Muslim minority was firmly enshrined in the 1879 Turnovo Constitution, one of the most liberal constitutions in the world at its time of adoption. Yet the policies of the Bulgarian state towards the Muslim minority from 1879

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to 1913 were unstable and did not work toward any long-term vision or goal, but rather served as temporary solutions to the various problems that arose during this period.\(^5\) There was a general apathy on the part of Bulgarian political elites toward the plight of the Muslim population, resulting in policies driven by short-sighted utilitarianism.

The political participation of Bulgarian Muslims in this period is difficult to evaluate. On the one hand, election results indicate that the Muslim community obtained considerable legislative representation. For instance, in 1882 ethnic Turks comprised 13 of the 56 deputies in the Third National Assembly\(^6\). Yet there is no evidence that political elites—regardless of their ethnicity—took to heart the concerns of ordinary Turkish Muslims. Rather, the dominant political parties in the state relied on clientelistic policies to win the support of the Muslim community. Party bosses purchased the allegiance of local Muslim leaders by offering certain rewards in exchange, and the Muslim community proceeded to vote uniformly for the party endorsed by the leader. Thus, no stable patterns of voting and political participation emerged during this period.\(^7\)

There was no sense of a coherent Muslim political agenda, and there were few efforts to organize politically in the hope of exerting an influence on government.

Bulgaria’s ethnic minorities took some time to transition out of the confessional Ottoman millet system, with no strong sense of ethnic identity emerging over this period for either Turks, Pomaks or the Roma. Instead, we observe the significant (though slowly waning) relevance of religious affiliation as an identity marker. The public’s overreliance on religious leaders and other Muslim elites for guidance on political decisions


discouraged independent thinking and political participation at the mass level. The traditionalism of these Muslim communities further restrained the educational advancement and ideological development necessary for effective political participation.

Thus, it would be naïve to expect to observe ethni cally-based political formations during this period. Not only was Bulgaria far too young a democracy for the politics of ideas to prevail over the politics of established hierarchical power relations, but there was no coherent ethnic minority identity to rally around—a “Muslim” identity was too broad, while Turkish and Roma identities were still in embryonic form.

1.2 Bulgaria and its ethnic minorities, 1914-1944

The first evidence of coordinated political action on the part of Bulgaria’s Muslims dates back to 1914. In the parliamentary elections held in February of that year, a vast majority of Muslim voters backed the Liberal Coalition, which won a plurality of the popular vote. It was a principled vote due to the liberals’ support for Muslim rights and their opposition to the Christianization of the Pomak population in Bulgaria’s newly acquired territories in the aftermath of the two Balkan Wars. Muslim representatives in the Bulgarian parliament proposed numerous legislative measures to improve the welfare of the Muslim minority, but these demands ultimately fell on deaf ears due to the government’s disinterest and preoccupation with wartime concerns. Thus, while Muslim Bulgarians made strides in their ability to engage the political system in an organized manner, this improved participation did not necessarily result in more favorable government policies.

The development of mechanisms for managing the affairs of Bulgarian Muslims was greatly influenced by the signing of two major international treaties. First, in the aftermath of the Second Balkan War, the Treaty of Istanbul (1913) established the office of the Grand Mufti (the leading religious official in the state) as central to the affairs of the Muslim community. The treaty also weakened the relation between the Grand Mufti and the Ottoman government and increased his subordination to the Bulgarian state, paving the way for the state to exercise a tighter control over Muslim community life.

Next, following its defeat in the World War I, Bulgaria signed the Treaty of Neuilly (1919), which imposed the League of Nations’ requirements regarding the protection of minority rights. Later in 1919, the Bulgarian government endorsed a Statute for the Religious Organization and Rule of Muslims in the Bulgarian Kingdom. The statute presented a detailed plan for how the group would govern itself democratically as a minority. It organized Bulgaria’s Muslim community into separate Muslim Confessional Municipalities (MCM’s) run by democratically elected Muslim municipality boards, which managed the municipality’s property and nominated local muftis. The Grand Mufti remained on top of the Muslim community hierarchy, serving an important role as an intermediary between the community and Bulgarian state institutions.

Although this institutional structure presented an opportunity for Bulgaria’s Muslim community to exercise some degree of self-rule, the internal dynamics of the community had by that point become increasingly complex. At the inception of the modern Bulgarian state, there was little sense of Turkish nationalism among Muslims.

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10 Ibid.
Turkish nationalism was predominantly exported to Bulgaria from Istanbul, and the rise of Kemalistic ideology greatly accelerated this process. Initially, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire collaborated to prevent the spread of Turkish nationalism in Bulgaria. Yet following the Young Turks’ takeover of the Ottoman Empire in 1908, Turkish nationalism began to make serious inroads in Bulgaria.

While most Bulgarian statesmen were comfortable with a non-Christian confessional minority which nonetheless pledged allegiance to the Bulgarian state, the presence of a national minority with a bordering kin state was troubling. The period from 1919 to the end of World War II saw efforts on the part of the Bulgarian government to prevent the Muslim community from becoming a Turkish one. As a consequence, the government went to great lengths to prop up and perpetuate the religion-based MCM structure, even as it came under attack from Turkish nationalists in Bulgaria. Turkish-speaking Kemalists in Bulgaria detested the MCM structure and the authority of the Grand Mufti, seeing them as backward and elite-favoring vestiges of the Ottoman system, and as obstacles to the improvement of the welfare of the Bulgarian Turks. The Bulgarian government saw Kemalists as dangerous and disloyal, and consequently threw its support behind conservative Muslim religious elites and institutions.

The rise of the Turkish national identity served to accentuate the already present ethnic divisions within Bulgaria’s Muslims. Distinctions between ethnic Turks, Pomaks and the Roma became more pronounced. In particular, negative attitudes toward the Roma on the part of both ethnic Turks and Bulgarians strengthened over the course of the 20th century. During the Ottoman Empire’s five-century reign, authorities were largely

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successful in sedenterizing the Roma, and the vast majority of the gypsies had adopted Islam as a means of improving their status in society (though they remained second-class citizens to other Muslims). However, as Bulgaria underwent a process of modernization in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} and early 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries, the Roma became increasingly distinctive from other ethnic groups. As demand for the goods and services they had traditionally provided declined, the Roma were increasingly viewed as a people useless to society, unable to cope with modern realities and parasitizing on the charity of the state and its citizens (Tomova 1996: 17-19). Meanwhile, the Pomaks found themselves in an ethnic no-man’s land, torn between their racial and linguistic similarity to ethnic Bulgarians and their common religion with ethnic Turks.

Despite these divisions, most Bulgarian Muslims backed Aleksandar Stamboliyski’s Agrarian Union in the early 1920’s, and Stamboliyski himself as Prime Minister was favorable toward Kemalism and the rights of Turks as a national minority. However, Stamboliyski’s reign proved short-lived, and subsequent governments became increasingly assimilationist and hostile toward the Muslim minority. This trend was exacerbated during Bulgaria’s far-right flirtations in the mid-to-late 1930’s and early 1940’s. The activities of many Turkish political, social and education organizations were initially limited, and eventually banned outright by the Bulgarian government.\textsuperscript{12} Bulgarian Turks’ opportunities for political participation became more limited than they had been at any point of the Bulgarian state’s existence.

To summarize, Bulgarian inter-ethnic relations in this period were greatly influenced by the transition of the Bulgarian Muslim community from a traditionalist

group with a predominantly religious consciousness to a modernizing group with a
secular, national consciousness. These developments led to increased participation by
Turks into the affairs of the Bulgarian state, as well as to lively and spirited political
discussions within the Muslim community itself. This evolution of the Muslim minority,
coupled with the newly created institutional structure for managing its affairs, appeared
to set the Turkish minority on a path toward effective political participation. This period
saw the emergence of the first exclusively Turkish political organizations, which if left
unhindered might have blossomed into successful ethnic minority parties. However,
increasing suspicion and hostility towards Turkish nationalism on the part of the
Bulgarian governing elites in the 1930’s and 1940’s halted and reversed the progress
made in Turkish political representation.

1.3 Bulgaria and its ethnic minorities, 1945-1989

Following the conclusion of World War II, most Muslims supported the
Communist Party and the Fatherland Front of which it was a member, with the hope that
it would offer an expansion of minority rights and freedoms. The Dimitrov
Constitution, adopted in 1947, acknowledged the existence of national minorities and
stated that such groups are “entitled to be taught in their mother tongue and develop their
national culture.” The period between 1947 and 1958 saw a dramatic increase in the
number of Turkish schools and Turkish-language periodicals and newspapers, as well as
the emergence of local Turkish literature. A number of Communist leaders praised the
development of Turkish literature and Turkish culture, and promised to support its future

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expansion.\textsuperscript{15}  

While the Communist government’s social and cultural policies were initially favorable to the Turkish, Pomak and Roma minorities, this began to change in 1958, when a special plenum of the Politbureau set the precedent for the slow erosion of minority cultural rights in the years to come. The initial change in policies affected only the Roma, prohibiting the publishing of the community’s newspapers in a language other than Bulgarian and forcing its Muslim members to change their names to Bulgarian ones\textsuperscript{16}. Such assimilationist policies would later be extended to other members of the Muslim community, including Turks. Starting in the 1960’s, the Bulgarian government gradually began to close down Turkish primary and secondary schools. It proceeded to close Turkish theaters and required that all newspapers be printed in Bulgarian.\textsuperscript{17} The Zhivkov Constitution, adopted in 1971, eliminated all references to minorities. In the early 1970’s, the government launched a campaign to change the Turkish/Arabic names of the Pomaks to their Bulgarian equivalents.\textsuperscript{18}

The political participation of Bulgarian Muslims during Communism occurred in the same and only way it could occur for any Bulgarian citizen—entirely within the confines of the Bulgarian Communist Party. The party initially actively recruited members of the Muslim community, and in the 1950’s a significant number of Turks and Pomaks joined its ranks, including tens of thousands who held public office and top managerial positions.\textsuperscript{19} Yet at the same time, few Turks were elected to influential organs

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
of the party like the Central Committee and the parliament, and none ever became part of
the Politbureau or held ministerial posts. The lack of influence exerted by Muslim
members on the policies of the Communist party is evident in the increasingly hostile
policies adopted by the party toward ethnic minorities over time.

The Communist government’s extreme assimilationist policies with respect to the
Turkish minority culminated in the so-called “Revival Process,” a 1984-85 campaign to
change the names of the Bulgarian Turks. The “incentives” the state offered for the
name-change ranged from economic sanctions to overt violence. The thousands of Turks
who refused to change their names were sent to prison or labor camps. Additionally, the
government banned expressions of Turkish and Muslim culture, such as the wearing of
traditional dress, performing traditional rituals and playing Turkish folk music. To
justify this campaign, the Bulgarian government sought to portray Turkey as a threat to
the territorial integrity of the Bulgarian state, and the Turkish minority as “terrorists” and
“separatists.” Actually, Turkish terrorist attacks were very rare prior to the Revival
Process, but increased dramatically during and after it—there were over twenty acts of

In addition to stimulating terrorist activity, the Revival Process spawned a number
of secret Turkish organizations dedicated to fighting for the group’s rights through
nonviolent means. Among these was the Turkish National Liberation Movement in
Bulgaria (TNLMB), founded and headed by Ahmed Dogan in 1985. At the time, Dogan
was a fellow at the Institute of Philosophy at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; he had

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also been working as an agent for the Committee for State Security (*Darzhavna Sigurnost*), the repressive apparatus of Bulgaria’s Communist party, since 1974. The TNLMB’s leading slogan was “War Without Arms,” and the organization focused on undermining the Revival Process through nonviolent means, including general strikes and the boycotting of elections. The authorities cracked down on the organization’s activity in the summer of 1986, throwing Dogan in prison.

Unlike the previous campaigns targeting the Roma and Pomaks, the campaign against the Turkish minority attracted a great deal of criticism from both the Turkish government and the international press. The policies of the Communist Party drove over 300,000 Bulgarian Turks to emigrate to Turkey when they were allowed to do so in 1989. When Petar Mladenov succeeded Todor Zhivkov in 1989 to become Bulgaria’s last Communist leader, he renounced Zhivkov’s policies toward the Turkish minority, and approximately half of the émigré Turks returned to Bulgaria.

To summarize, the initial stages of Communist rule saw improvements in the social and cultural life of Bulgarian Turks and Pomaks (and to a lesser extent the Roma). The Dimitrov Constitution for the first time recognized national minorities, and the Turks were allowed and encouraged to educate themselves and to develop and express their own culture. Thus, the transformation from a traditionalist Muslim to a secular Turkish community initiated earlier in the century was more or less completed. Although the Bulgarian state lacked genuine democratic institutions, a significant number of Turks participated politically by becoming members of the Communist Party.

Once again, however, the honeymoon between the political establishment and ethnic minorities did not last long, as the communist government engaged in the most
extreme assimilationist policies in the history of the Bulgarian state. The most vulnerable of the minority groups, the Roma, was first to suffer from these policies. Next were the Pomaks, who similarly to the Roma did not have the benefit of neighboring state like Turkey interceding on their behalf. Finally, the Communist Party, which had contributed to the last stage of the development of a Turkish identity in Bulgaria, now sought to erase it in the blink of an eye. Instead, the Party’s actions served primarily to energize and revitalize Turkish nationalism in both its violent and non-violent forms.

1.4 Bulgaria and its ethnic minorities, 1990-present

The collapse of Bulgaria’s Communist regime paved the way for the formation of the Movement for the Rights and Freedoms of Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria, a self-identified liberal party protecting the interests of Bulgaria’s Turks and Muslims. The party was founded in January 4th of 1990 by a group of Turkish dissidents who had opposed the Revival Process and headed by the recently released from prison Ahmed Dogan. Dogan emerged as the leader of the party due to his superior education and intellect; few of the other founding members appear to have been aware of his past work for State Security at this point. Dropping “Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria” from its name, the party contested the October 1990 elections for Constitutional Assembly, despite the fact that a law active at the time prohibited parties organized along ethnic or religious lines. The party was able to win 23 seats and thus became a participant in the crafting of Bulgaria’s new constitution.

Despite the MRF’s vociferous objections, the Constitution adopted on July 12th, 1991 contained language banning ethnically-based parties, with Article 11.4 reading “there shall be no political parties based on ethnic, racial or religious lines.” The fate of
the MRF, along with that of ethnic minority parties representing the Roma (Democratic Roma Union) and Macedonians (United Macedonian Organization-Illinden) was now in limbo. After a protracted legal battle regarding the MRF’s eligibility to participate in the October 1991 parliamentary elections, Bulgaria’s newly established Constitutional Court ruled in April of 1992 that the MRF is not in violation of Article 11.4 since the party does not prohibit membership based on ethnicity. In contrast, parties like the Democratic Roma Union and UMO-Illinden were banned, despite having charters nearly identical to that of the MRF. The leaders of the latter party subsequently applied to the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled in their favor, citing a violation of Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.\footnote{United Macedonian Organization Ilinden-Pirin and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59489/00, ECHR 2005}

Following the monumental decision of the Constitutional Court, the MRF was able to establish itself as one of the most successful parties in Bulgarian politics. To date, the party has never failed to obtain legislative representation and has been portfolio-holding coalition partner in three different governments. Despite the many revelations that have emerged regarding widespread corruption in the party and many of its leading members’ past work for State Security, the MRF has actually enjoyed rising popularity, having achieved its three strongest electoral performances in the last three parliamentary elections—2005, 2009 and 2013.

In contrast, Roma political parties have failed to make a dent in national politics. While a host of Roma parties have been formed, most remain marginal actors that only contest elections at the local level. To date, the most successful Roma party nationally has been Euoroma, which was able to win 1.3% of the vote in the 2005 parliamentary elections—the only legislative elections the party ever contested. No other party

\footnote{United Macedonian Organization Ilinden-Pirin and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 59489/00, ECHR 2005}
representing an ethnic minority group—including various Turkish parties rivaling the MRF—has ever come close to reaching the 1% threshold necessary to obtain government funding, to say nothing of the 4% threshold needed for legislative representation.

2. The Historical-Social-Psychological framework and the Bulgarian case

The preceding section examined the evolution of ethnic minority identities in Bulgaria, as well as developments in their politicization and political expression, revealing in the process the complexity of the historical processes that led to the present-day ethnic political landscape. I now move on to examine the role of historical factors in the present-day fortunes of Turkish and Roma ethnic minority parties in a more systematic manner. I first consider the role of the three factors in my Historical-Social-Psychological framework—historical presence, territorial attachment and dominance/autonomy. I then turn my sights to a historical factor outside of that theoretical framework that proved to be highly influential in the Bulgarian case—the experience of repression and forced assimilation.

2.1 Historical presence

Most of the Turks living in Bulgaria today are the descendants of settlers who came to the region following the Ottoman conquest of Bulgaria’s Second Kingdom at the end of the 14th century, although there is some evidence that there were even earlier waves of settlement. In any case, historical censuses suggest that Muslim settlers of various Turkic tribes constituted nearly 20% of the population of the Balkans as early as the year 1530 (Lapidus 2002: 252), with the lands of the modern Bulgarian state experiencing some of the highest concentrations of such settlers. Thus, groups that are today considered to be ethnically Turkish have enjoyed a significant historical presence
in the region for nearly 500 years.

Of course, for most of the length of this period, most Turks did not conceive of themselves as such, but rather assumed a Muslim identity under the Ottoman Empire’s confessional *millet* system. Other collective identities were likely to be based on tribal or clan allegiance, as opposed to a pan-Turkic ethnic identification. Turkish nationalism emerged only in the mid-19th century with the founding of the Turanian Society, and did not completely displace religiously-based identities until the first half of 20th century. Nevertheless, the modern Turkish ethnic identity is viewed—both by those who hold to it and those who do not—as a continuation of the Muslim identity that predominated among the various Turkic peoples in the region since the 16th century. While not every Muslim in the region exhibited the linguistic and racial characteristics today attributed to the Turkish ethnicity, a significant majority did, and despite the confessional nature of the millet system, both legal and social distinctions often existed between Turkic Muslims and those who were of a Slavic or (especially) Roma ethnicity.

The settlement of the Roma on the lands currently constituting the Bulgarian state possibly predates even that of the Turks, with first mass migration wave believed to have taken place between the 13th and 14th centuries (Marushiakova 2001: 19). A subsequent influx of Muslim Roma transpired over the course of the 14th and 15th centuries, following the Ottoman conquest of Bulgarian lands (Marushiakova 2001: 26). While there were smaller subsequent migration waves of Romani people, we can confidently state that they, like the Turks, had established a significant presence in the region by the mid-15th century. Although they were initially characterized by nomadism (as, indeed, were some of the Turkic settlers), most of the Roma were sedenterized prior to the
establishment of the modern Bulgarian state.

While they were technically part of the Muslim community under the millet system, the Roma took on a decidedly second-class status within it, enjoying few advantages over the Empire’s Christian subjects. Thus, although it appears that they sought to integrate into Muslim society as a means of improving their social standing, the Roma were never embraced by their Turkic and Slavic co-religionists. As the previous section discussed, the distinctiveness of the Roma ethnicity became even more accentuated with the transition to modernity and the rise of Turkish nationalism. Thus, while it may have taken a number of centuries for a “Roma” ethnic identity to fully emerge, holders of this identity have a rich history as a distinct people-group in the region upon which they can draw.

2.2 Territorial attachment

Although Turkish settlement following the Ottoman conquest affected virtually all regions of modern-day Bulgaria to some extent, the most numerous such settlements occurred in the southern Thracian valley and in what is today the northeastern portion of the country. These settlement patterns proved durable over the centuries, and on the eve of Bulgarian liberation from Ottoman rule in the 1870’s, it was these same regions that contained the highest concentration of Turks and Muslims. Subsequent to the establishment of the modern Bulgaria state, several migration waves took place as Turks moved to territories controlled by the Ottoman Empire (and later Turkey). However, northeastern Bulgaria and the southernmost portion of Bulgarian Thrace retained a substantial Turkish population. Many towns in these regions had been populated almost exclusively by Turks until Bulgarian refugees from other portions of the Ottoman Empire
settled in them to produce the current ethnically-mixed population (the surrounding villages, on the other hand, tended to retain their ethnic homogeneity). Thus, it is actually often the ethnic Bulgarians in these regions that are the late-comers.

Figure 4.1 presents a map of the share of the population represented by ethnic Turks in Bulgaria’s 28 provinces. As we can observe, the historical settlement patterns have resulted in a present-day concentration of Turks in the provinces of Kardzhali in the south and in Razgrad, Targovishte, Shumen and Silistra in the northeast. Not surprisingly, these provinces are also the major strongholds of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, with the party holding a near-monopoly of the vote in many of their villages, towns and municipalities.

Figure 4.1: Ethnic Turks as a percentage of total population

Source: 2011 Bulgarian National Census
In contrast to the Turks, the Roma did not settle in any geographically concentrated pattern. This was initially because they tended not to settle at all, as they were predominantly nomadic. However, over the centuries many Roma did take up permanent dwellings, either voluntarily or under compulsion by the governing authorities. Thus, by the end of the 19th century most Roma tribes were sedentary. However, even then the Roma remained spread across the country, with no significant number of them having settled in a particular region (or regions). This is reflected in this group’s present-day geographical dispersion, shown in Figure 4.2. As can be observed, the Roma do not constitute more than 15 percent of the population in any of Bulgaria’s provinces. Contrast this with the Turks, who comprise over 25 percent of the population in five provinces, and over 50 percent in two.

As a consequence both of the group’s nomadic heritage and its failure to concentrate its numbers into particular geographic areas, no Bulgarian regions are today identified with the Roma or are viewed as being centers of Roma history or culture. Instead, the Roma can be found in most villages, towns and cities in Bulgaria, but never in great numbers. While they do tend to be isolated into separate neighborhoods within the cities they inhabit, these neighborhoods lack the political or historical significance to build political appeals around.
2.3 Dominance/autonomy

Bulgaria’s Turks (and to a somewhat lesser extent, its Slavic Muslims) enjoyed a dominant status within the Ottoman Empire during its five century-rule over the territory of modern Bulgaria that not only afforded them cultural and political autonomy, but also numerous privileges over other confessional communities. This is of course due to the fact that the Ottoman Empire was itself established and ruled by Muslim Turks. It is true that under the millet system, the empire’s primary religious communities—Muslims, Christians and Jews—were to some extent allowed to govern their own affairs. However, the millet leaders themselves were subservient to the sultan and were required to demonstrate absolute loyalty to the empire. Additionally, there were significant taxes imposed on non-Muslim subjects that Muslims did not have to pay, and legal disputes between a Muslim and a non-Muslim were always judged under Islamic sharia law. Thus,
the Turks enjoyed a privileged status that not only enabled them to exercise self-rule, but to also rule over others in the region.

Although a vast majority of the Roma living in Ottoman Bulgaria were Muslim, they were not afforded the same privileged status as other (Turkic or Slavic) Muslims. Indeed, in their treatment of the Roma, the Ottomans in many ways broke with the millet system, governing the group not based on its religion but its ethnicity (Celik 2004: 5). While the Roma did enjoy some of the tax relief associated with the adherence to Islam, they were asked to pay significantly more than their Slavic and Turkic co-religionists. Additionally, there is evidence that the Roma were marginalized and antagonized by the Ottoman authorities throughout their reign in the region. For instance, some 16th-century registers of the Ottoman imperial assembly reference the Roma as “people of malice” and accuse them of perpetrating various crimes (Celik 2004: 20). And, perhaps needless to say, the Roma did not have any representation in the imperial court itself.

Overall, the status of the Roma prior to the establishment of the modern Bulgarian state appears to have differed dramatically from that of Turks. Whereas the latter enjoyed a status of autonomy and dominance afforded to conquerors, the former were largely subjugated and treated as second-class citizens.

2.4 Assessing the relevance of the HSP variables

We thus observe a commonality between Bulgaria’s Turkish and Roma ethnic groups in terms of their extensive historical presence on the territories of the modern nation-state, but also substantial differences in the areas of territorial attachment and dominance/autonomy. Does the similarity on the former dimension help to explain why there have been attempts at the ethnic minority party form of political representation for
both groups, and do the differences in the latter two dimension account for the disparity in the success enjoyed by parties representing the two groups?

Answering these questions is complicated by the fact that, due to the constitutional ban of ethnically-based parties in Bulgaria, parties representing minority groups are very reluctant to admit association with a particular ethnicity. Thus, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms’ charter does not so much as contain the words “Turk” or “Muslim,” let alone state that the party stands for these groups’ rights. Instead, the MRF presents itself as a liberal party committed to protecting the rights of all Bulgarians, regardless of ethnic identity. Similarly, a high-ranking member of the Euoroma party I spoke with was adamant from the outset that his is not a Roma party, despite the fact that the word “Roma” constitutes exactly 50% of the party’s name. Indeed, members of both the MRF and Euoroma that I interviewed were highly sensitive to any questions that even indirectly implied that the respective parties served as representatives of their ethnic groups. This (somewhat understandable) reluctance to identify with specific minority groups makes it difficult to assess the role of historical experience in these parties’ success, since the parties themselves do not officially base their appeals on such factors.

Nevertheless, it was evident from the interviews I conducted in Bulgaria, as well from various other sources I consulted, that both Turkish and Roma parties draw heavily on the historical and cultural heritage of their respective groups in order to generate electoral support. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms has been highly influential in the establishment and funding of Muslim religious and Turkish cultural institutions in Bulgaria since 1990, in turn using these institutions to raise its profile among its target
The party works very closely with the Muslim religious leadership in order to secure the support of the country’s Turks and Pomaks, and has funded the education of many promising young students at Turkish universities. Similarly, despite its claims to the contrary, Euroroma appears to be a party grounded in the culture and historical experiences of the Roma, as a simple examination of the party’s website reveals. For instance, the only video advertisement contained on the website is a music video where the party’s leader, Tzvetelin Kanchev, dressed in traditional Roma attire, sings a Romani folk song, accompanied by a similarly clad female performer (recording artist Sofi Marinova).\(^{23}\)

Bulgaria’s Turkish minority group exhibits all three of the favorable characteristics in the HSP framework, and has therefore not surprisingly produced one of the most successful ethnic minority parties in Europe. The combination of the group’s historical presence and its territorial concentration has provided a significant basis for demanding representation under the ethnic minority party model. It was evident from my conversations with scholars and various political actors that the Turks possess a strong and historically-grounded ethnic identity. Bulgarian Turks by and large do not shy away from their Ottoman heritage, but celebrate it in their cultural and religious activities, as is reflected by a number of books and other materials published by Turkish cultural organizations and NGOs.\(^{24}\)

This pride in the group’s heritage enables the formation of positive distinctiveness necessary for strong ethnic identities. Bulgarian Turks appear to have as much to be


\(^{24}\)See, for example: Georgieff, Anthony and Dimana Trankova, eds. The Turks of Bulgaria: History, Traditions, Culture. Sofia, Bulgaria: Vagabond Media, 2012.
proud of as ethnic Bulgarians. Not only have they inhabited areas of the country for over five centuries, but in many regions they constituted nearly all of the population prior to Bulgarian independence. In such regions, it was often the Bulgarians who were the late-comers, and this provided a basis for Turks to feel entitled to exercise self-rule within them. As one former MP pointed out, while the MRF behaves cautiously in Sofia, it is bullish and aggressive in areas of significant Turkish heritage. Lastly, the heritage of descent from the ruling ethnic group in one of the largest empires the world has ever known undoubtedly aids self-esteem and positive distinctiveness.

These three historical characteristics have further influenced the politicization of the Turkish ethnic identity. Much of the emergence and initial success of the MRF can be attributed to its ability to give a political voice to the grievances shared by the Turkish community, especially in the aftermath of the assimilationist policies of Communist Bulgaria. But in order for common grievances to emerge, there has to be an appropriate reference point, so that the status quo can be contrasted with a more favorable past. Assimilationist policies—even aggressive ones—may be viewed as a tolerable evil by a group lacking the appropriate reference point, but this was not the case for the Turks. For them, the reference point was (at the very minimum) equality with ethnic Bulgarians, since the state belonged just as much to them as it did to the Bulgarians, and the “normal” state of affairs entailed the ability of the group to govern its own affairs and maintain a unique ethno-religious identity. Thus, the excesses of the so-called Revival Process resulted not in servility and submission, but in the proliferation of both violent and non-violent political opposition, which was promptly channeled into political action with the transition to democracy.
Although the Roma possess sufficient historical capital in order to make the idea of an ethnic minority party plausible and attractive to at least some of the group’s members, this capital has proved insufficient to generate the widespread support necessary for such a party to obtain legislative representation. This is due both to the fact that the Roma ethnic identity does not appear to be as strong and cohesive as the Turkish one, and that it has not become equally politicized.

Like the Turks, the Roma lived on Bulgarian lands hundreds of years prior to the establishment of the modern state. They played a unique role in the Ottoman world and were actually valued for many of the services and goods they provided, often making a living as craftsmen and musicians, until modernity began to make their goods and services increasingly obsolete. The Roma were not only part of the Ottoman-era social fabric, but they also enjoyed some minor privileges due to their overwhelming adherence to Islam in the form of reduced taxes. Thus, despite their present-day position at the bottom of the social ladder, the Roma have a history and culture that they can look back on and drive some positive distinctiveness from, contributing to the emergence of something like a coherent and salient ethnic identity.

However, the consensus among the subjects I interviewed was that the Roma identity is not nearly as strong or cohesive as the Turkish one.25 This can be explained in part by the historical contrasts between the two groups. Although the Roma did enjoy some minor privileges during Ottoman rule due to their faith, their position in society was a far cry from that of Turkic Muslims, who were the group of the ruling elite.

Additionally, the Roma never formed a significant percentage of the population in any

25 Sociological studies corroborate this perception. For instance, Ladanyi and Szeleznyi (2001) find that only two-thirds of Bulgarian subjects interviewed in their study who were perceived to be Romani by the interviewers actually self-identified as such.
region they settled, precluding the development of major centers of Romani culture that could have engendered a stronger ethnic identity. Of course, we should not underestimate the challenges that linguistic and religious heterogeneity within the Roma community poses for the emergence of a prominent and unified ethnic identity.\textsuperscript{26} Yet this enduring heterogeneity itself is partly a product of a past less hospitable to the myth-making essential to the construction of a strong collective identity.

Another contrast between the Turks and the Roma can be observed in the politicization of their respective identities. As in most European countries where they are found, Bulgaria’s Roma have been perpetual victims of social exclusion and government repression. According to one Roma political leader I interviewed, the fate of the Roma under Communist-era forced assimilation policies was often far worse than that of the Turks or Pomaks; the historical record seems to support that assertion. Thus, if any group has a legitimate basis for shared grievances, it is the Roma. Yet the treatment of the Roma did not result in anything close to the level of politicization exhibited by the Turkish ethnic identity. This is largely due to the fact that the Roma did not have the same reference point as the Turks. For them, equal treatment had never been the norm: they had never been rulers, but always subjects; they had never had a territory to consider their own, but rather had the consciousness of visitors and outsiders. One might argue that repression was what they had come to expect, and thus the abhorrent policies of the Communist government did not prompt a sufficient mass-level demand for an ethnic minority party the way it had for the Turkish community.

\textsuperscript{26} Marushiakova, Elena, and Vesselin Popov. "The Bulgarian Gypsies–Searching their Place in the Society." \textit{Balkanologie. Revue d'études pluridisciplinaires} 4.2 (2000).
2.5 Government repression and forced assimilation

As indicated in the previous section, an overview of the historical determinants of ethnic minority party emergence and success in Bulgaria would not be complete without accounting for one key historical factor outside of the HSP framework—the experience of having suffered forced assimilation at the hands of the state.

There was a near-unanimous agreement among the subjects I interviewed that the Communist-led Revival Process played a major role in both the emergence and success of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. The Revival Process greatly heightened the sense of threat and maltreatment for Bulgaria’s Turks and thus enabled them to rally behind a political party like the MRF. One former MP remarked that even to this day, “the memory of the Revival Process is alive” in the Turkish community, and a valuable asset in helping the MRF generate support around election time. A political scientist I interviewed argued that the assimilationist policies of the Communist government in the 1980s contributed to the emergence of an ethno-religious cleavage in Bulgaria’s post-Communist electoral landscape, and the leader of a Turkish ethnic minority party echoed these comments.

However, we should be careful not to overstate the effect of these policies on ethnic minority party formation in the Bulgarian case. As the previous section mentioned, the evils the Roma community suffered under Communist rule at least matched, and probably exceeded those suffered by the Turkish community. Yet this treatment did not produce the same willingness and ability to rally behind a single political party as it did for the Turks. To explain this discrepancy, we must consider the experiences of government repression in the context of the factors from the HSP framework. We must
also consider the influence of various non-historical variables that will be discussed in the following sections.

III. Party System Influences

1. The political opportunity structure

1.1 Mainstream political parties and the Turkish minority

The attitude of mainstream political actors toward the Turkish and Roma minorities and their parties has evolved significantly since the introduction of democracy in Bulgaria. The one constant, however, is that until 2009, no Bulgarian political party made a concerted and systematic effort to attract either the Turkish or Roma vote.

1.1.1 Bulgaria’s first party system, 1990-2001

In the early years of Bulgarian democracy, Turkish voters appeared to be a natural electorate for the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). The UDF was a reform-oriented coalition of ideologically diverse political organizations (encompassing conservative, Christian democratic, social democratic, liberal, environmentalist, centrists and agrarian ideologies) that emerged as the only serious challenger to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) in the post-Communist electoral landscape. Since no people-group had suffered greater injustice in the final years of Bulgaria’s Communist rule than the Turks, and since the BSP was the successor of the Bulgarian Communist Party, it seemed natural for the Turkish electorate to back the UDF. Indeed, one MRF member remarked that the UDF came out “in strong support of ethnic minority groups” during this period and that the Turks “greatly sympathized with the UDF.”

While the UDF did enjoy some modest success in attracting certain types of Turkish voters in the 1990s, the overwhelming majority of the Turkish electorate was
quickly attracted by Ahmed Dogan’s Movement for Rights and Freedoms. The UDF did enjoy some electoral support from urban and integrated Turks, particularly ones living in Bulgaria’s largest cities. In fact, a number of Turks with political ambition, including the future leader of the MRF, Lyutvi Mestan, joined the coalition’s ranks and even contested legislative elections as UDF-backed candidates in the early 1990s. However, the vast majority of Turkish political leaders and voters were consolidated under the MRF in advance of Bulgaria’s first democratic elections in 1990, where the party captured an impressive 8% of the vote. Many Turkish politicians such as Mestan were successfully recruited into the ranks of the party by the mid-nineties.

The Union of Democratic Forces initially treated the MRF with cautious optimism, viewing it as a valuable potential ally. Indeed, all interviewed subjects agreed that the MRF gravitated toward the UDF between 1990 and 1993. In this period, the UDF appeared content with ceding most of the Turkish electorate to the MRF, since it believed it could count on the party’s support against the common enemy of the anti-reform BSP. Consequently, the UDF did not appear to have a concrete strategy at expanding its base of support beyond a handful of well-educated, big-city Turks (a small minority of Bulgaria’s Turkish population).

However, the era of warm feelings between the two parties would not last long. In 1993, the UDF government headed by prime minister Filip Dimitrov unexpectedly lost a confidence vote thanks to the loss of MRF support. The UDF, which was itself undergoing a process of transition from a catch-all reform-oriented party to a standard European Christian Democratic party, felt betrayed and began to view the MRF with

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28 Ibid.
increasing apprehension and suspicion. For the remainder of its prominence in Bulgarian politics, it made no substantial efforts to expand its appeal to the Turkish population outside the country’s major cities. According to one MRF member, the party even began to intentionally exclude Turks from its electoral lists and leadership positions.

While it may seem on the surface that the BSP and the MRF made strange bedfellows in the aftermath of the Revival Process, a closer examination of their respective electorates reveals striking similarities. Both parties derive a disproportionate share of their support from older, less-educated, poorer and rural citizens. The only difference between their electorates is that the BSP is backed by ethnic Bulgarians whereas the MRF enjoys the support of ethnic Turks. In Bulgaria’s emerging urban vs. rural political cleavage (which can also be thought of as an “economic winners of market reforms vs. economic losers of market reforms” cleavage), both parties occupy the “rural” side, advocating for greater government spending in less-developed parts of the country.\(^29\)

Due to these substantial similarities in both platform and electoral base, the BSP has been reluctant to encroach on MRF territory. Much like the UDF in the early 1990s, it has seen no need to try to make inroads into the electorate of a party whose support and cooperation it has come to count on. The combination of BSP accommodation and UDF neglect meant that the MRF’s near-monopoly over the Turkish electorate remained unchallenged throughout the 1990’s.

1.1.2. Bulgaria’s second party system (2001-2009)

The emergence of the National Movement for Simeon II (later National

Movement for Stability and Progress, or NMSP) and its tremendous showing in the 2001 parliamentary election signaled a transition to a new party system in Bulgaria. The first system, lasting between 1990 and 2001 was characterized by highly-polarized two-party competition primarily over market reforms, with a balancing third party (the MRF). By 2001, the question of market reforms had been more or less resolved. This enabled the emergence of a less-polarized, multi-party political system lasting between 2001 and 2009, characterized by cooperation among the three largest parties in this period—the NMSP, the BSP and the MRF.\textsuperscript{30} During this period, the MRF enjoyed its strongest spell of influence in Bulgarian politics and further consolidated its support among ethnic Turks.

The NMSP was established shortly prior to the 2001 parliamentary election as a vehicle for Bulgaria’s deposed king Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (Simeon II), who would go on to serve as the country’s prime minister between 2001 and 2005. Under Simeon’s guidance, the NMSP adopted a liberal and centrist ideology placing high value on inter-ethnic tolerance. These ideological leanings made partnering with the MRF an attractive proposition,\textsuperscript{31} and indeed the two parties would go on to rule jointly between 2001 and 2005, and as part of a three-party coalition with the Socialists between 2005 and 2009.\textsuperscript{32}

An interview with a prominent member of the NMSP revealed that Bulgaria’s Turks held the former king in high esteem and greatly respected him for his liberal and tolerant positions. They marveled, for instance, at the fact that one of his grandchildren bears the name “Hassan.” But this sympathy toward Simeon on the part of the Turkish


\textsuperscript{31} Indeed, both parties were members of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, the transnational alliance of Europe’s liberal political parties and one of the largest parliamentary groups in the European Parliament.
minority did not translate into any electoral gains for his party. Nor is it apparent that the NMSP had any clear strategy for attracting the Turkish vote, beyond simply advocating ethnic tolerance. Like the BSP and UDF before it, the party was reluctant to step on the territory of what it perceived as a valuable and like-minded political ally.

1.1.3 Bulgaria’s third (?) party system (2009-present)

The first party to make a serious effort to challenge the MRF monopoly over the Turkish vote was Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (known in Bulgaria under the acronym GERB, which translates as “coat of arms”). Although GERB contested the 2009 parliamentary elections “declaring itself against the MRF, riding the wave of nationalism,” in the words of one interviewee, the party did more than simply antagonize the MRF for the benefit of attracting ethnic Bulgarian voters. It actually fielded candidates in MRF-controlled constituencies and sought to introduce some measure of political pluralism in parts of the country where the Turkish party had previously been the only game in town. Following its victory in the 2009 parliamentary elections, the party even appointed Bulgaria’s first non-MRF Turkish minister when it made renowned sculptor (and outspoken MRF critic) Vezhdi Rashidov Minister of Culture.

While GERB’s strategy yielded some modest results, the MRF was largely able to maintain control over its electoral strongholds while making significant gains elsewhere. On the one hand, GERB was able to win a handful of seats in the MRF-dominated provinces of Kardzhali and Razgrad. On the other hand, it is unclear what role ethnically

Turkish voters played in these electoral victories, and Rashidov is the only ethnic Turk who is currently in the party’s parliamentary delegation. Ultimately, the 2009 election saw the Movement for Rights and Freedoms enjoy its highest vote share of any legislative election so far.

1.1.4 Conclusions regarding mainstream parties and the Turkish minority

The conclusion that emerges from the preceding discussion is that overall, efforts by mainstream parties to attract the Turkish minority vote have been feeble and unsuccessful. There are several reasons for this.

First, the parties that were historically in the best position to attract the MRF’s electorate were also the most reluctant to attempt to do so. The UDF (in the early 90s), the BSP and the NMSP each had an opportunity to build bridges to Bulgaria’s Turks at specific periods of the country’s history, but they elected not to do so. This was most likely because the certain costs of alienating a key political ally in the MRF outweighed any potential benefits in improved electoral performance among the Turkish electorate.

Second, where attempts to attract the ethnic Turkish vote have been made, they have been poorly thought out, unsystematic and short-sighted. As one prominent scholar of Bulgarian politics remarked, the country’s major parties “do not have a strategy toward their own electorate, let alone the Turkish electorate.” According to her, Bulgarian parties have shown themselves to be remarkably myopic, more concerned with extracting resources from the state while they remain in power than with developing and implementing long-term strategies to preserve their electoral viability. The failure of major parties to make inroads with Turkish voters is symptomatic of this general absence of strategic thinking.
One prominent political scientist suggested that a key reason attempts to attract Turkish voters have failed in the long term is that they are based on power politics rather than idea politics. Instead of making ideological appeals to the voters, major parties concern themselves with getting influential Turkish businessmen who have somehow become alienated from the MRF to switch their political allegiance so that they can deliver a certain amount of votes. Related to this, the same scholar pointed out the role that parties like UDF and GERB seem to have played in the emergence of the People’s Movement for Rights and Freedoms and People’s Party “Freedom and Dignity,” two right-of-center splinter parties established by former MRF members. Such unsystematic, ad-hoc, divide-and-conquer strategies have yielded very limited results in the short term, and virtually no results in the long-term.

A theme that emerged over and over again in my interviews with various scholars and political actors was that even in situations where mainstream parties sought to attract Turkish voters though ideological appeals, they made a crucial error in failing to nominate Turkish candidates in electable positions. Instead, they tended to include Turks and other minority candidates in positions on the party list that have little or no chance of winning a seat in parliament. Even rarer is the inclusion of minority candidates in leadership positions in major parties. One interviewee attributed this trend to prevailing ethnic stereotypes and a fear of alienating ethnic Bulgarians. Whether or not that is the case, actions speak louder the words, and mainstream parties’ reluctance to embrace Turkish candidates while seeking Turkish votes has severely limited their credibility with the ethnic group.

Ultimately, however, what the Bulgarian case reveals is that it is exceedingly
difficult for non-ethnic parties to make inroads into the electorate of a firmly established and successful ethnic minority party. As this analysis has revealed, an established ethnic minority party can be a crucial coalition partner that no one may wish to offend by encroaching on its territory. Additionally, as numerous interviewees pointed out, it is far too easy for the MRF to portray itself as the only legitimate defender of Bulgaria’s Turks, and to paint every Turk who defects to a different party as a traitor. Multiple scholars and political actors agreed that even if a party was to employ the “right” strategy in pursuing the Turkish vote, it would take a very long time—perhaps even a generational shift—for it to accomplish this goal. Therefore, we should not expect that a sudden shift toward policies accommodating an ethnic minority group will instantaneously boost a party’s performance with that electorate.

These findings seem to support the argument I made in Chapter II that if we expect the attitude of mainstream political parties to matter at all, we should expect it to matter prior to the establishment of an ethnic minority party. Once such a party becomes entrenched in its country’s political system, there is little that other political parties can do to sway its electorate. It is possible that a major, ideologically-based party can step in to meet the demand for ethnic minority representation and prevent the formation of an EMP. In Bulgaria, this did not happen, in part due to the fact that the only “mainstream” formation to back ethnic minority rights—the UDF—was just as new and inexperienced as the MRF, and its electoral prospects appeared almost as uncertain as those of the Turkish party. Once an EMP like the MRF is able to demonstrate political competence and electoral viability, it gains substantial credibility and makes it exceedingly difficult for other parties to undercut its support among the target ethnic group.
1.2 Major political parties and the Roma minority

Much of what can be said of major Bulgarian parties’ attitudes and strategies toward the country’s Turks can also be said of its attitudes and strategies toward the Roma. The only difference appears to be one of magnitude—Roma voters are treated with even greater neglect, their votes are obtained through even baser and more corrupt means, and their leaders are completely excluded from electable positions on major party lists.

The only consistent strategy (if it can be called a strategy) of Bulgaria’s major political parties in seeking to obtain Roma support is vote-buying. Whereas parties have attempted to attract the Turkish votes by penetrating clientelistic networks in the Turkish community, their strategy with the Roma is primarily to offer direct payments to individuals in exchange for their votes. This is usually accomplished through an intermediary—a neighborhood leader—who agrees to deliver a certain amount of votes for a certain price per vote, plus a fee for his services.35 The Roma’s weak political attachment, paired with their low socioeconomic status makes them highly susceptible to tactics such as this. A study conducted by the National Center for the Study of Public Opinion in 2009 revealed that 40% of the country’s Roma were willing to sell their vote, compared to only 12% of the general population.36 According to one former MP I interviewed, the Roma have even been known to vote for Bulgaria’s nationalist party Ataka given the right financial incentives. If this claim is true, it would not be surprising, given the success investigative reporters have had in purchasing votes in Roma

neighborhoods for a completely fictional party with an unknown platform.\(^{37}\)

If Bulgarian parties are reluctant to include Turks in high-ranking positions, the inclusion of Roma in such positions is anathema. I interviewed a young Roma political activist who is currently the only representative of the Roma community who is part of the leadership of a Bulgarian political party that competes in national elections. (His party received less than 1 percent of the votes in the 2013 legislative elections.) He revealed that there is a tremendous stigma associated with including ethnic minorities (especially the Roma) in prominent positions. He attributes this to the prevalence of ethnic stereotypes and fear that giving a more visible role to the Roma would alienate voters holding to such stereotypes. Indeed, it is exceedingly rare to find Romani candidates in electable positions on major party lists in legislative elections, let alone in major party leadership.\(^{38}\)

Just as Bulgaria’s major parties sometimes support splintering within the MRF in the hopes that an electorally viable and ideologically like-minded Turkish party would emerge, these parties have at times sought to raise up Roma EMPs in the hopes of controlling them and using them for their own benefit. One example of this is Civil Union “Roma”, the Bulgarian Socialist Party’s perennial electoral coalition partner as part of the center-left Coalition for Bulgaria. This small party has never contested national elections independently, and it is unclear how many votes it delivers for the Socialist-led coalition; what is known, however, is that none of its members have ever been elected to the

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Another example of this phenomenon is Euroroma, Bulgaria’s most successful Roma EMP to date. Although it is not formally associated with any other political forces, Euroroma is widely believed to be a client of the Bulgarian Socialist Party. One Roma interviewee recalled an incident where the party’s leader planned to contest elections in a particular locality that also happened to be a BSP stronghold, but then quickly and mysteriously changed his intentions to do so. The picture that emerged of Euroroma from multiple interviews is that of a party that is largely subservient to the Socialists, who use it to undercut the support of other parties in areas where the BSP is weak and preclude it from contesting elections where the BSP is strong.

To summarize, there appears to have been no significant effort by any major Bulgarian political party to attract Roma voters through the inclusion of Roma candidates for office or a commitment to addressing issues affecting the Roma community. Parties have been reluctant to be associated with the ethnic group in any way, and have instead opted to act surreptitiously, purchasing votes on an ad-hoc basis and using the group’s various ethnic minority parties strategically to gain an electoral advantage.

In response to this neglect by mainstream parties, Roma communities have formed a number of EMPs, although most of these have never advanced beyond the local and regional levels of political competition.40 In this we see confirmation of theoretical expectation that when ethnic minority concerns fall on deaf ears among a country’s political establishment, EMPs are more likely to emerge. However, the various

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limitations on the Roma’s capacities to accomplish their political goals have rendered these EMPs either impotent (at least at the national level) or subservient to stronger political parties, which simultaneously enable their continued existence and limit their opportunities for growth.

2. The Role of Ataka

What influence has the presence of a right-wing populist and nationalist party like Ataka had on the Movement for Rights and Freedoms’ electoral fortunes? For many years, the MRF enjoyed steady and substantial electoral support in the absence of any notable party occupying the far right of Bulgaria’s political space. But it is undeniable that the party has enjoyed its strongest electoral performances during the period in which nationalist and anti-minority sentiment was successfully mobilized and brought to the forefront of Bulgaria’s political discourse by Ataka.

Established in 2004, Ataka was the brainchild of journalist and TV host Volen Siderov. Prior to forming the party, Siderov had demonstrated himself to be quite the political opportunist. In the early 90s, he was a member of the Union of Democratic Forces and editor of the party’s official newspaper, Demokratziya.\(^41\) According to one politician I interviewed, Siderov also wanted very badly to join Simeon II’s NMSP party in the early 2000’s,\(^42\) but was rejected by the former king. Ataka grew out of Siderov’s popular nationalistic TV program of the same name, and enjoyed a meteoric rise to prominence in the mid-2000’s, fueled by a party platform stoking anti-minority and anti-European Union attitudes.\(^43\) The party enjoyed sustained success for the first ten years of

\(^{42}\) This desire of Siderov’s is also reported by media sources. See, for instance: Hristov, Hristo. “Волен Сидеров - новата ръка на хаоса.” Dnevnik. 30 Jun 2005.
it existence, consistently obtaining between 7 and 10 percent of the vote in national legislative elections, and as high as 12 percent in European Parliament elections. Only recently has Ataka’s popularity begun to erode, with the party winning less than 3% of the vote in the 2014 European Parliament elections.

A number of subjects I interviewed, scholars and political figures alike, pointed to the interplay between Ataka and the MRF as a key factor in the favorable electoral outcomes achieved by both parties over the past ten years. They suggested that Siderov and Dogan play off of one another, intentionally making controversial statements in the hope of provoking an equally controversial response from the other side which they can then use to mobilize their electoral bases. In the words of one former MP, “Ataka and Bulgarian nationalism is the best fuel for the MRF machine.” The anti-Turk rhetoric of Siderov and other members of his party are seen as creating fear in the Turkish community and encouraging unity and support for the party perceived as the defender of the community’s interests. Although the Turkish community is aware that Bulgaria is now an EU member and that most ethnic Bulgarians have a positive attitude toward Turks, the visceral response to Siderov’s heated rhetoric, paired with the still-fresh memory of the Revival Process, can overpower reason and encourage conformity to the MRF, despite the party’s numerous and well-catalogued shortcomings.

What evidence is there that Ataka has aided the Movement for the Rights and Freedoms’ electoral fortunes? Table 4.1 provides the results of the MRF in parliamentary elections prior to and after Ataka’s arrival on the Bulgarian political scene. The first thing evident from examining the table is that the MRF has enjoyed by far its strongest performances in the three elections which Ataka has also contested (2005, 2009 and

2013). It is worth noting that 2005 also saw the strongest performance by far for a Roma party, as Euroroma captured 1.3% of the vote. Admittedly, other factors contributed to the MRF’s outstanding results in 2005 and 2009. In the following section, I argue that much of these gains can be attributed to the party’s participation in coalition government and its improved ability to fund and expand its clientelistic networks. Additionally, changes to electoral law in 1998 (Özgür-Baklacioglu 2006: 327) and the expansion of polling places in Turkey throughout the 2000’s have made it easier for Bulgarian Turks living abroad to cast their vote. Yet it does not seem presumptuous to suggest that the emergence and prominence of Ataka also played a role in these improved electoral fortunes. Even in the 2013 election, when the MRF could not count on the benefits of being in office, the party enjoyed a voteshare nearly four points higher than what it had usually received prior to Ataka.

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Table 4.1: MRF vote share, before and after Ataka

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>MRF vote share, as % of total</th>
<th>Ataka vote share, as % of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. The role of clientelism

Do clientelistic practices play a significant role in deciding Bulgarian electoral outcomes, and does the Movement for Rights and Freedoms disproportionately benefit from such practices? One of the consensuses the emerged during my fieldwork was the weakness of “idea politics” and the predominance of “power politics” in Bulgaria. Virtually all Bulgarian parties engage in some sort of clientelism and vote-buying, although different parties do this to a different extent and with different levels of success. The MRF in particular has proven to be remarkably adept at utilizing patron-client linkages to obtain votes, bolstered in its ability to do so by its unique character as a Turkish minority party.

Although the subjects I interviewed exhibited some latitude in their opinion of the quality of Bulgarian democracy, most agreed that patron-client relationships are a significant source of votes for some parties. While the politics of values and ideas are not
powerless in Bulgaria, they are often eclipsed by voters’ purely economic short-term considerations. It is typical for Bulgarian parties to elicit the support of local businessmen (legitimate or illegitimate) and other notable residents, counting on these community leaders to deliver votes for the party among their employees and dependents. These patrons in turn receive protection and support from the party to ensure that business runs smoothly and that their local influence does not diminish.

To understand why the MRF would be better adapted to execute such clientelistic politics, we must first examine the party’s target electorate. Ethnic Turks are significantly more likely than the average Bulgarian citizen to live in a small town or village, to have low educational attainment and to be in a low-income household. The education data is particularly striking: according to Bulgaria’s 2001 census, only 2.7% of Turks had completed a college degree, compared to 23.5% of ethnic Bulgarians. The census further showed that only a quarter of Bulgaria’s Turks had graduated from high school, compared to over three fourths of ethnic Bulgarians.\(^45\) (Comparable data breakdowns are not yet available for the 2011 census.) Less-educated and less-skilled workers are an easier target for clientelism due to their low earnings and their dependence on local patrons for employment. Further, they are less likely to exhibit post-materialist values that would lead them to vote based on personal moral convictions rather than economic considerations.\(^46\)

Of course, Turks are not the only people in Bulgaria who are predominantly rural, uneducated and poor; there are plenty of ethnic Bulgarians who fit that description as well. Is there something unique about the Turkish minority group that makes it more


susceptible to clientelistic practices? A few of the scholars and politicians I interviewed pointed out the ethnic group’s deference to authority as something that sets it apart from ethnic Bulgarians. Turks simply tend to respect and obey authority figures of various stripes in their community. Although Bulgaria’s Turks may not be well-educated as a whole, they do have a small, well-educated elite (Dogan, for instance, holds a Ph.D.) that they greatly admire and look up to. In addition, Turks are more likely than Bulgarians to view religious leaders as authoritative figures, and they tend to be influenced by their local mufti (Islamic community leaders). In general, any Turk who excels in some sphere—whether learning (both secular and religious) or entrepreneurship—is held in very high esteem and treated with much deference by the community. When such figures speak, community members tend to listen and obey.

Capitalizing on these natural predispositions in their electorate, the MRF has established a formidable network of client-patron linkages that it has used to great effect in mobilizing voters. The Turkish leader of an ethnic minority NGO I interviewed contended that the party ostensibly has “33 feudal lords in 33 municipalities” with a predominantly Turkish population. A current MRF member who served as MP from the party for over two decades conceded that MRF rule in majority-Turkish cities like Kardzhali amounts to “a dictatorship” where dissent and independent thinking tend to carry dire consequences. The leader of a rival Turkish EMP and a former high-ranking MRF member, described at length the difficulty his party is encountering in attempting to run on ideas, rather than power in Turkish communities. He testifies to countless individuals who intended to run against the MRF in regions dominated by the party in the

2013 legislative elections, but who withdrew their candidacy following threats over the loss of their or their relatives’ jobs. With the party’s near monopoly over employment—whether in the public or private sectors—in certain localities, the only people who can afford to oppose the MRF are those who are independently wealthy (which is, needless to say, a tiny fraction of the Turkish community). Thus, it is not surprising that the Democratic Linkages and Accountability Project dataset, based on expert surveys in 80 electoral democracies, reveals the Movement for Rights and Freedoms to be not only the most clientelistic party in Bulgaria, but also one of the most clientelistic parties in all of the countries studied. This is remarkable given the fact that the dataset includes a host of countries in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia, regions far more closely associated with the presence of patronage and clientelism.48

What evidence is there that clientelism has played a major role in MRF success? One way to evaluate this claim is to compare the electoral performance of the party in elections in which it was in office versus its performance in elections where it was out-of-power. A party that derives much of its support through the distribution of material goods ought to be most successful in elections in which it enjoys control over the greatest amount of resources. Since Bulgaria is a unitary state where most resources are distributed by the national government, we should expect that participation in government at the national level would boost the MRF’s vote share.

Table 4.2 reports the average change in vote share for Bulgarian parties for elections in which they were part of the incumbent government. The numbers presented are calculated by subtracting the party’s vote share prior to its spell in government (ruling

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either by itself or in coalition with other parties) from its share of the vote in the election at the end of its spell in government. The net effect is totaled for each party and then divided by the total number of spells in government that the party has enjoyed.

Table 4.2: Average change in vote share following a spell in government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Average change in vote share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MRF</td>
<td>+6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERB</td>
<td>-9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>-16.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMSP</td>
<td>-39.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>-22.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The difference between the MRF and the other parties is striking. While the MRF appears to have benefitted from being in office, other parties seem to have suffered substantially. Of course, much of this latter effect can be explained by the fact that parties are more likely to become part of government when they have enjoyed an unusually strong electoral result; therefore, we ought to expect a certain regression to the mean in the subsequent election.

But while this may help to explain the surprisingly negative effect of incumbency for most Bulgarian parties, it makes the MRF’s ability to buck this trend even more remarkable. During the party’s two terms in government between 2001 and 2009, the MRF nearly doubled its electoral support. As pointed out in the previous section, one likely contributing factor to this improvement is the emergence of the nationalist party Ataka during this period. However, this factor cannot in itself account for such a dramatic change. Nor is there any evidence that the MRF and its platform have enjoyed increasing appeal among non-Turkish citizens; if anything, it can be argued that animosity toward the party among ethnic Bulgarians reached all-time highs during this period. As one prominent political scientist I interviewed suggested, the best explanation for this phenomenon is that the MRF’s position in power and its control over the distribution of
government largesse enabled it to attract a greater number of patrons—including some ethnically Bulgarian ones—who were in turn able to deliver votes for the party, even outside of its traditionally strongest constituencies. As could be expected, in the 2013 elections, where the party had been out of office for almost four years, it lost nearly a fifth of its previous vote share.

V. International Factors

1. Kin state effects

What role has Turkey played in the success of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms in Bulgarian politics? Does the presence of a neighboring kin state afford unique advantages for an ethnic minority party, as I theorized in Chapter II, or might the connection between kin state presence and EMP success be spurious and driven by other factors, as the analysis in Chapter III seemed to suggest? In Bulgaria’s popular political discourse, Turkey is often accused of meddling in Bulgarian politics and propping up the MRF, but how much evidence is there to support this?

There was considerable disagreement regarding Turkey’s desire to intervene in Bulgarian politics among the experts I interviewed. Many argued that Turkey has no sinister and grandiose ambitions of propping up the MRF and using it as its agent. One former (non-MRF) MP claimed that “Turkey is arguably Bulgaria’s best neighbor at the moment, because it does not have any irredentist claims toward Bulgaria; nor does Bulgaria have any toward Turkey.” He went on to dismiss claims that Turkey has any conspiratorial designs on infiltrating Bulgarian politics. This sentiment was confirmed by one of the founding members and longest-serving MPs of the MRF who, despite his willingness to level criticisms at the party in other areas, did not believe that Turkey was
seeking to use the MRF for its own interests.

Other interview subjects could not dismiss the idea that Turkey was actively seeking to influence Bulgarian politics through the MRF. One scholar argued that “since the mid-1980’s, [Bulgaria] has been pressured by very aggressive nationalist politics on Turkey’s part.” Another opined that “there is unquestionably a nationalist current in Turkey that dreams of restoring its old imperial influence,” later qualifying this statement by explaining that the goal is probably economic influence, not territorial gain. One political scientist I interviewed was hesitant to “wander into conspiracy theory territory” but nevertheless admitted that the “the Turkish state—like any other state—has an interest in its ethnic minorities [abroad] to be used as a bridge, as an opportunity for influence.” Given the Turkish state’s increasingly neo-Ottomanist foreign policy in the post-Cold War era (Murinson 2006), it does not seem far-fetched that such an influence has been sought, although this would not necessarily take place through the vehicle of the MRF.

While there was disagreement regarding whether Turkey has sought to support the MRF and use it for its own purposes, there was more agreement about whether such strategies—if they were even attempted—have been successful. Even the scholars who maintained that Turkey has sought to influence Bulgarian politics through the MRF were skeptical about whether it has actually been able to do so. One subject claimed that Turkey has never had any influence over the MRF, not because it has not attempted to do so, but because “[Bulgarian] Turks have not wanted to become dependent [on Turkey].” Another political scientist suggested that “there has always been a certain tension” between Ahmed Dogan and Turkish governments, either due to their awareness of
Dogan’s past in Bulgaria’s secret service, or due to his unwillingness to look like Turkey’s puppet. This tension became apparent in the 2013 elections, where the Turkish government backed the People’s Party “Freedom and Dignity” (PPFD), a rival Turkish minority party.

If the presence of a neighboring kin state has benefitted the MRF’s fortunes, this is mostly due to the large number of Turks with Bulgarian citizenship currently living in Turkey. There are around 500,000 Bulgarian citizens who currently reside in Turkey, a majority of whom are of Turkish ethnicity. The party campaigns for the votes of such individuals, and that it organizes “electoral excursions” where Turks with Bulgarian citizenship are transported across the border during elections in order to cast their vote.\(^\text{49}\)

These excursions have become highly controversial in the popular-level political discourse in Bulgaria, although they are perfectly legal. There is no evidence that Turkey is playing an active role in encouraging this practice. Indeed, the 2013 parliamentary elections demonstrated just how little influence the Turkish state exerts in Bulgarian politics. Despite opposition from the Turkish government, the MRF was able to obtain 11.3% of the vote, whereas the Turkey-backed PPFD failed to even reach the 1% threshold that entitles parties to government funding.

In Chapter II, I offered two additional explanations for how kin states may benefit EMPs. First, minority parties can attract foreign investment through their connections in the kin state and allocate it strategically to improve their electoral standing. Second, EMPs can form mutually beneficial partnerships with parties in the kin state. There was a general agreement among the interview subjects that the MRF has sought and been able to...

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to secure Turkish investment in towns where Turks make up a large portion of the population. The leader of a rival EMP lamented that such investments tend to be small and not transformative, sufficient to keep the residents loyal to and dependent on the party, but not large enough to help them rise above subsistence level. Thus, it seems that the Movement has benefitted from this strategy, although the magnitude of the effect is hard to quantify. On the other hand, I found no evidence for any strategic partnerships between the MRF and parties in Turkey.

To summarize, while the presence of Turkey as a neighboring kin state has played a modest role in the MRF’s success, this is mostly the consequence of geographic, rather than geo-political, factors. The fact that the two states share a border and that a substantial number of Bulgarian Turks live relatively close to this border has undoubtedly helped the MRF boost its vote tally, although it does not appear that this has been a decisive factor in electoral outcomes. Additionally, there is no evidence that the Turkey has encouraged this practice or has actively aided the party in any other way.

2. European Union effects

Have international influences, and more specifically the European Union, aided the emergence and success of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms? Is a lack of international support for a Roma party to blame for the disparity between the track record of Roma and Turkish parties in Bulgaria? In Chapter II, I proposed that influences from international organizations can enable the emergence—or, more accurately, prevent the suppression—of incipient EMPs. In contrast, I was not convinced that the EU or other international organizations would be able to influence electoral results once such a party had been established. Does the Bulgarian case support these predictions?
Following the forcible assimilation of Bulgaria’s Turkish and Muslim citizens as part of the “Revival” Process, there was substantial worldwide condemnation of the country’s handling of its ethnic tensions. The international community feared a potential outbreak of ethnic violence in a post-Communist Bulgaria and the implications that this would have for stability in the region. (The events transpiring in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s demonstrated that such fears were not unfounded.) Many of subjects I interviewed asserted that, as a consequence of such fears, during the process of Bulgaria’s democratic transition there was international support for the formation of a party representing the interests and defending the rights of Bulgaria’s Turkish minority. But while international support for Turkish minority rights in this period is evident from the historical record, I found scant evidence for the backing of a Turkish party. When pressed for specifics, some experts interviewed related anecdotes regarding foreign heads of state calling Bulgarian government officials to advocate for the MRF; such claims, while plausible, are difficult to confirm. I was not able to find records of any official pronouncements by international organizations or foreign governments regarding this issue.

Whatever the international attitudes may have been at the time, it is clear that Bulgaria’s political elite was opposed to the ethnic minority party concept. In April of 1990, the last Communist parliament passed a law that banned parties formed along ethnic lines (Ganev 2004: 70). In July of the following year, the democratically elected Constitutional Assembly crafted and adopted a new democratic constitution that prohibited political parties on “ethnic, racial and religious lines” (Article 11.4).

Despite the 1990 law and the 1991 constitutional prohibition, a number of

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50 See, for example: Resolution 917 on the situation of the ethnic and Muslim minority in Bulgaria, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 1989.
ethnically-based political organizations were formed in the early years of Bulgarian democracy. Among them were parties representing Turks and Pomaks (the Movement for Rights and Freedoms of Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria), the Roma (Democratic Roma Union) and Macedonians (United Macedonian Organization “Illinden”). In its effort to participate in Bulgaria’s first post-Communist democratic elections in June of 1990 for the Constitutional Assembly, Ahmed Dogan’s party dropped the “Turks and Muslims in Bulgaria” from its name, and was permitted by the electoral commission to register and win twelve seats. The other parties in the Assembly—particularly the Bulgarian Socialist Party—were not pleased by this development, and during the heated and protracted deliberations regarding Article 11.4 of the constitution, the Socialists were adamant that the MRF was precisely the kind of party that ought to have been banned under the 1990 law prohibiting ethnic parties (Ganev 2004: 71). Ultimately, 100 Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) representatives joined the BSP in adopting the Article 11.4 language in the form in which it exists to this day.

Following the adoption of the new Bulgarian constitution in 1991, the fates of the various incipient ethnic parties diverged dramatically. Both the Democratic Roma Union (DRU) and United Macedonian Organization “Illinden” (UMO-Illinden) were not allowed to register as political parties, being found to be in violation of Article 11.4, with the Supreme Court and Constitutional Court confirming these decisions. Neither party was ever allowed to contest elections. The MRF also initially appeared to be heading for the same fate, after a Sofia city court declined to register the party for the October 1991 elections, a decision later affirmed by the Supreme Court. Then the Central Electoral Commission intervened, granting the MRF the opportunity to contest the elections, with
this decision in turn being approved by the Supreme Court (Asenov 1996). Immediately following the election, 93 newly elected representatives—predominantly BSP members—asked the Constitutional Court to review the case. In April of the following year, after several months of deliberations, the court affirmed in a highly contentious split decision the constitutionality of the MRF. (Six of the twelve justices actually ruled against the party, but a qualified majority of seven was necessary for it to be declared unconstitutional.)

What accounts for the contrasting fates of the MRF on the one hand, and the UMO-Illinden and DRU parties on the other? There was a consensus among the experts I interviewed that these cases were fairly similar from a judicial standpoint, with one subject remarking that the disparate decisions of the various courts were “as much political as they were juridical.” Another subject attested that “the statutes of [the MRF and the DRU] were virtually identical.” While more than one factor was likely at play for the discrepancy of outcomes, international advocacy (in the case of the MRF) and the absence thereof (in the cases of the DRU and UMO-Illinden) may have played a role. This was certainly the thesis supported by most of the politicians and scholars I interviewed. They painted a picture of an international community which, appalled by Bulgaria’s treatment of its Turkish citizens under the Revival Process, and concerned about the geopolitical consequences of an MRF ban, pleaded with the country to permit the formation of a party protecting the rights of the Turkish community. As one scholar I interviewed attested, “Europe followed [Bulgarian politics] very closely” in the early 1990’s, and “sought to ensure stability and the absence of internal conflicts.” With these priorities in mind, there was “serious outside pressure” to affirm the MRF’s
constitutionality. Once again, however, it must be said that evidence for such pressure is largely anecdotal; although international organizations and foreign governments praised the Constitutional Court’s decision and cited it as evidence of the progress of Bulgarian liberal democracy,\textsuperscript{51} it is hard to judge what role they played in the decision’s crafting. Ganev (2004: 87) describes the notion that the court’s decision was driven by the anticipated Western response as “shallow and simplistic,” and views it as evidence of a pro-Western and anti-Balkan bias.

Yet the curious discrepancy in the treatment of the various ethnic minority political formations remains. While the case of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms received attention in the West, the cases of the DRU and UMO-Illinden did not even register as a blip on the international radar. The ethnic groups these parties claimed to represent were simply not as visible as the Turkish minority in that period, because they were—inaccurately—not perceived to have suffered during the Revival Process, nor were they viewed as potential sources of conflict. In fact, as a young Roma activist and member of the People’s Party “Freedom and Dignity” (PPFD) stressed in his interview, the Roma did suffer at least as much—and arguably even more—than the Turks during the Revival Process. After all, 90% of all Roma at the time were Muslim, and they were often treated with even greater contempt and even less dignity than Bulgarian or Turkish Muslims. Yet the international community, largely unaware of this fact, did not consider ensuring political representation for Bulgaria’s Roma to be a priority.

In the opinion of the same PPFD member, the asymmetry in international responses in the early 1990’s made all the difference in the world, setting Turkish and

Roma attempts at EMP representation on radically different courses. While other Roma parties were ultimately permitted later in the 1990’s, “you have to strike while the iron is hot… unfortunately, the iron was hot between ’89 and ’91.” According to this political activist, there was substantial demand for a Roma party during this formative period of Bulgarian politics, and a unified Roma EMP with lasting electoral success may have emerged had it been allowed to contest elections. Not only that, but Roma political input and influence in this period may have paved the way for the improved condition of the ethnic group, which in turn would have empowered it politically.

While international influences may have played some role in the diverging fates of Turkish and Roma political representation in Bulgaria, there is no evidence that such factors have played any direct role in bolstering the MRF’s subsequent electoral performance. Among the experts I interviewed, none believed that the European Union or other international organizations aided the MRF politically. As one scholar pointed out, European interest in Bulgarian politics waned substantially after the early 90s, when it appeared that both democracy and ethnic peace in Bulgaria had been consolidated. Of course, Bulgaria did come under greater scrutiny when it became a candidate for EU membership. One could hypothesize that the decision of the NMSP to include the MRF as a coalition partner was in part driven by the desire to please the EU, and that this participation in government in turn improved the MRF’s electoral performance. However, there were plenty of other considerations that played into that decision, and it is not clear that the MRF’s inclusion is something that Europe particularly wanted to see or expected.

Ultimately, the consensus among the experts interviewed appeared to be that
while international influences played a role in rescuing the MRF from an early demise in
the early 1990s, there is no reason to believe that such influences continued to play a
major role in its success later on.

VI. Party organization factors

1. Quality of leadership

One of the most commonly cited factors in the popular political discourse
regarding the success of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms is the quality of the
party’s leadership, and particularly its enigmatic and controversial leader for over two
decades, Ahmed Dogan. While we ought to be cautious about giving individuals too
much credit for the success of the parties they lead (such explanations often prove to be
overly simplistic), it is undeniable that Dogan has proven himself to be a very capable
politician who has steered his party through numerous challenges and obstacles to
establish it as one of major players in Bulgarian politics. It is equally evident that the
absence of such quality leadership has contributed to the fickle efforts of the Roma
community to create a strong EMP.

Virtually all of the experts I interviewed, including those who held an
overwhelmingly negative view of the MRF and its influence in Bulgarian politics, agreed
that the party is led by exceptionally capable and intelligent people. One former MP
representing the NMSP, the MRF’s coalition partner between 2001 and 2009 described
the latter party’s parliamentary delegation as “quality MPs” and “a very dependable
coalition partner, as long as they get what they want.” He credits the party with its ability
to craft an impressive, well-educated “managerial elite” over the years. These sentiments
were echoed by one scholar, who also added that the party’s members are “clever
politicians, with a much stronger political sense” than their Bulgarian counterparts.

Ahmed Dogan, the party’s emblematic founder and leader between 1990 and 2013, has an impressive educational background. In addition to obtaining his Ph.D. in philosophy, he graduated from Academy of Social Sciences and Public Administration (the premier academy for crafting future statesmen during the Communist era) and was a fellow at the Bulgarian Academy of Science.\textsuperscript{52} Along with his formal education, he undoubtedly received extensive training from the Committee for State Security, the Bulgarian Communist regime’s repressive apparatus, which he joined as an agent in 1974.\textsuperscript{53} It was largely due to his impressive resume that he emerged as the leader of a young MRF party in 1990. (His extensive work for State Security had not yet become public knowledge at the time.)

Whatever their opinions of his morals and ethics, the subjects interviewed painted Dogan as an intelligent party leader with a keen political sense and a remarkable (for a Bulgarian politician) foresight and ability to plan for the future. This latter quality—the willingness to forego immediate rewards in favor of building for lasting success—is what separates Dogan and the MRF from ethnically Bulgarian parties and politicians, according to one scholar I interviewed. Another scholar echoed these comments, arguing that the MRF was wise early in its existence to appear modest in its demands, showing no ambition to govern, yet gradually crafting out a role for itself as an influential balancing party in Bulgarian politics. Dogan was also smart to invest in the gradual development and expansion of the party’s regional structures, a strategy crucial to long-term electoral


success that few Bulgarian parties have followed, as well as in the education of many young ethnic Turks who would go on to serve as valuable and loyal cadres of the party.

“The only thing Dogan ever failed to predict,” remarked one political scientist, “was the [faux assassination attempt] against him” in 2013.

The difference between the quality of leadership enjoyed by the MRF and that enjoyed by even the most successful of Roma ethnic parties is striking. To date, the two most successful parties of the Roma in Bulgarian politics have been Euroroma and Free Bulgaria. The former party is led by Tzvetelin Kanchev, who holds a bachelor’s degree in international economic relations from the University of National and World Economy in Sofia—certainly nothing to sneeze at, but also no match for Dogan’s impressive pedigree. Kanchev’s only political experience prior to founding Euroroma was his participation in Bulgaria’s 38th national assembly, where he served as an MP for the marginal and short-lived Bulgarian Business Blok party. Kanchev failed to serve out his term, however, as he was arrested on assault and kidnapping charges, later convicted and sentenced to 6 years in prison.  

54 The Free Bulgaria party leader, Kiril Rashkov, is better known by the nickname “Tsar Kiro,” stemming from his self-proclaimed kingship over Bulgaria’s Roma. Rashkov received no higher education, and his profession can charitably be described as “businessman” or “entrepreneur,” though his and his employees’ prolific arrest and conviction records  have led some in the media  and politics  to refer to him

54 Kanchev was later pardoned after serving only several months in prison.
as an organized crime leader.

Clearly, there are many factors accounting for the divergent fates of the MRF and parties like Euroroma and Free Bulgaria, but the stark difference in the quality of leadership cannot be discounted as one of them. On the one hand, we have a gifted political elite trained at the nation’s highest institutions and possessing invaluable connections; on the other, we have a pair of leaders who have spent more time in prison than in college. And lest we assume that a successful Roma EMP is such a challenging proposition that no excellence in leadership could bring it about, we should bear in mind the Euroroma was able to attract 1.3% of the vote in the 2005 parliamentary election under the leadership of the fresh-out-of-prison Kanchev, passing the 1% barrier for receiving public funding. What might the party have achieved had it been helmed by someone of Dogan’s background and quality?

2. Extensiveness of party organization

As discussed in Chapter II, the extensiveness and professionalization of party organization has recently been demonstrated to be an important predictor for the success of newly established parties. Does the same hold true for ethnic minority parties, particularly those in Bulgaria?

Several of the subjects I interviewed addressed organizational structure (or the lack thereof) of Bulgarian parties in general as a key weakness. The leader of one ethnic minority NGO I interviewed revealed that he often receives calls from political parties seeking to use the NGO’s local structures for campaigning prior to elections, since the

parties themselves have not invested sufficiently in developing a local presence. More than one scholar commented that due to their short time horizons, Bulgarian parties rarely take the time to develop a serious local presence throughout the country, instead counting on a wave of popular sentiment to sweep them into power.58

The MRF departs from this standard model in a radical way. The party has invested in an extensive network of local structures that have enabled it to receive consistent electoral support. The leader of the PPFD, the MRF’s rival for the Turkish and Muslim vote, conceded that the latter party possesses “very well-developed party structures” in areas of the country where Turks hold a substantial share of the population. A former (non-MRF) MP remarked that the party’s MP’s “regularly visit their electoral districts and try to be of use to their districts.” Existing religious structures are also incorporated by the party in order to encourage voters to support the MRF, with the local mufti often being among the party’s strongest propagandists.59

One of the most remarkable aspects of the MRF’s organizational reach is its presence in the youth community. The party has invested significantly in the education of promising young Turkish students, providing numerous scholarships and other forms of financial support. As a consequence, the party has created a young Turkish elite that not only feels loyal and indebted to the MRF, but also possesses skills and abilities that the party can utilize to its advantage. With over 20,000 members, the MRF’s youth organization claims to be the largest youth party organization in Europe, and possibly the second largest in the world. This is an astounding accomplishment for an ethnic minority

58 On the other hand, it is worth noting that Spirova (2005) finds that, on average, Bulgarian parties exhibit stronger organization than those in other East-Central European countries.
party in a relatively small country, but it bears testimony to the party’s vast reach in society.

Needless to say, a party like Euroroma has nothing even remotely approaching the vast-reaching organizational structure of the MRF. While the party’s website lists a number of “regional coordinators” for different parts of the country, these are not full-time employees with a local structure operating underneath them. And despite the fact that the education of the Roma is central to the party’s platform, the party does not appear to possess either the resources or the willingness to provide scholarships for promising Roma students in the way that the MRF has. The party does not even have an associated youth organization.

3. Nature of party organization

Aside from its wide scope and its capable leadership, what about the MRF’s organizational structure makes it successful?

The MRF’s organizational structure can best be described as highly centralized and rigidly hierarchical. Two scholars I interviewed told me that their research into the charters of Bulgarian parties revealed that the MRF fares exceptionally poorly in intra-party democracy and the transparency of decision-making. This is confirmed by various political figures I interviewed, including former and current members of the party. One former (non-MRF) MP characterized the party as “strongly centralized,” and its members as “highly disciplined” with “leader worship” tendencies. He later referred to dissident voices within the party being silenced “by a system that works with the iron discipline similar to the military discipline of [the Committee for] State Security.”

I had the chance to interview one of these dissenting voices—a former high-
ranking party member who was once touted as a possible successor to Dogan as leader, but who was removed from the party for requesting transparency regarding Dogan’s and other party members’ past involvement with State Security and for calling for intra-party reform in various areas. He described party leadership as one utterly incapable of tolerating criticism or even entertaining the notion of debate on any significant question. When I asked one current MRF member how he was able to criticize Dogan and others within the party over the years, he explained that the only reason he got away with it was that he was popular in his electoral district and was able to carry a lot of votes for the party. (Needless to say, however, this member did not advance up the leadership ranks.)

With such anti-democratic intra-party decision-making attitudes, how is the MRF able to recruit aspiring politicians? The answer has to do with the fact that most people entering the ranks of the party are primarily concerned with personal advancement and career development, not with standing up for particular values and ideas. For them, the MRF is merely an instrument they can use to become wealthy and successful. Numerous observers—both inside and outside the party—agreed that those members who prove themselves to be both gifted and loyal are eventually rewarded with promotions up the ranks. (One example of this occurred during the course of my field research, as the leader of the Youth MRF was appointed as a Deputy Minister). While decision-making in the MRF may be a top-down affair, Dogan was careful to ensure some fluidity in appointments to high-ranking positions in order to offer rewards to those who prove themselves to be loyal and useful to the party. As pointed out by one former MP, the

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party has even committed to changing 20% of its parliamentary delegation after every
election cycle.

These two aspects of the MRF’s organizational structure—its strong-armed
suppression of dissenting voices and the possibility of advancement for loyal and
competent individuals—have contributed to the party’s success. The former strategy has
prevented any serious schisms and divisions like the ones that have plagued many
Bulgarian parties, and it has succeeded in preventing discussion of the party’s shady past
and corrupt practices among its target ethnic group. By limiting intra-party democracy,
the MRF has been able to perpetuate the myths that it tells about itself, regarding both its
origins and its current role in Bulgarian politics. However, in pairing this intolerance of
internal criticism with a tolerance of internal advancement, the party has ensured that its
best and brightest cadres remain with the party and work hard to prove themselves useful
to it.

Abandoning either one of these two components could have led to the party’s
demise. Had the MRF been hostile to both dissent and personal advancement, with high-
ranking positions perpetually occupied by a set elite, the party may have suffered from a
brain-drain, complacency, staleness and a failure to adapt with the times. Had the party
tolerated both criticism and personal advancement, it could have been torn apart as
rapidly-rising reformers clashed with the old guard. It appears that the genius of the party
lies in combining these two elements in its organizational structure.

VII. Conclusion

The analysis of Bulgaria’s ethnic politics presented in this chapter has yielded
several notable findings regarding ethnic minority party formation and success.
First, it is clear that we cannot begin to understand the nature of ethnic minority political engagement without first examining the historical backgrounds of the country’s main ethnic groups, and the effects of those backgrounds on their social identities. Both Turks and the Roma experienced tremendous persecution and repression at the hands of the country’s Communist regime. The Revival Process is widely believed by experts to be the single most important reason for the establishment of the Turkish and Muslim-minority Movement for Rights and Freedoms, and there is no reason to doubt its significance in this regard. Yet the fact that Roma parties have not even come close to approximating the success of the MRF suggests that government repression is not in itself sufficient to inspire ethnic party formation. Rather, it is evident that the Turkish minority’s historical heritage along the three dimensions proposed in this work—historical presence, territorial attachment and dominance/autonomy—produced in that group a sense of entitlement to fair treatment and cultural autonomy, which, when paired with the dehumanizing policies of the Communist regime, paved the path for the formation of the MRF. In contrast, the Roma minority’s historical background did little to inspire a similar sense of inherent group rights; since mistreatment had been the historical norm rather than the exception, government persecution did not generate the same level of outrage and indignation, nor did it instill a sense of the necessity of collective political action.

With respect to the influence of the political opportunity structure, the findings here are somewhat more ambiguous. On the one hand, it is clear that Bulgaria’s major political parties have generally adopted flawed and feeble approaches to make inroads with Turkish and Muslim communities. On the other, the experiences of parties
(including rival Turkish/Muslim EMPs) that employed a more concerted and systematic approach to attract such voters, suggest that breaking the monopoly of a successful minority party over its consistency is exceedingly difficult. The MRF was able to quickly consolidate support in the early 1990s as a consequence of the Turkish community’s pressing need for political representation in a post-Communist Bulgaria, and retained that support thanks to its competent leadership. It seems unlikely that Bulgaria’s major political forces in the transition period could have altered this course of events by making appeals to the Turkish and Muslim communities. Similarly, the total lack of effort the country’s major parties have exerted in attracting the Roma vote via programmatic appeals has not resulted in the formation of a successful Roma party.

I do, however, find evidence for the influence of two other domestic-level variables—the presence of a right-wing populist party and a clientelistic political culture—on the electoral fortunes of the MRF. While the party has enjoyed impressive electoral performances since its inception, it is no accident that it enjoyed by far its strongest showings in election years when it was 1) competing against the nationalist party Ataka and 2) coming off a spell in government. There was widespread agreement among the subjects interviewed that Ataka’s incendiary rhetoric has helped fuel voter turnout among ethnic Turks and Muslims, and that the MRF has been able to utilize its vast clientelistic networks to great effect as a consequence of its position as a pivotal partner in coalition government.

With respect to international influences, it appears that support from Turkey and international organizations may have helped the MRF survive constitutional challenges in the early 90s, and that the lack of such international support allowed the Bulgarian state
to snuff out efforts at Roma party formation in the same period; however, since the
evidence for such outside influences is largely anecdotal, we must take it with a grain of
salt and not overstate its significance. On the other hand, I find no evidence that the EU
contributed to the party’s strong electoral performance beyond this foundational period.
Additionally, I find that while the existence of a neighboring kin state in Turkey has
helped boost the MRF’s electoral performance somewhat, this a consequence of
geography rather than geo-politics. The Movement has simply benefited from the
proximity of a sizable group of ethnically Turkish Bulgarian citizens of residing in
Turkey. There is little evidence to suggest the Turkish government itself has assisted the
MRF in any significant way.

Lastly, I find that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms has been aided in its
electoral success by its extensive, professional and rigidly hierarchical organizational
structure that nevertheless offers opportunities for intra-party advancement, as well as by
the quality of its leaders. By simultaneously cracking down on internal dissent and
rewarding loyal and capable cadres, the MRF has been able to attract top political talent
while preventing fractionalization and splintering. In contrast, parties of the Roma have
suffered the consequences of a weak organizational structure with low
professionalization, paired with serious deficits in the educational attainment and political
acumen of their leaders.
V. Conclusion

This dissertation has made several significant contributions to the fields of ethnic politics and niche parties, and more specifically to the study of the determinants of ethnic minority party emergence and success.

First, I have developed and tested an original theoretical framework explaining the presence and absence of successful parties representing the interests of ethnic minority groups. Incorporating insights from history and social psychology, I have argued that the particular historical experiences of ethnic minority groups endow them with a group psychology that may or may not be favorable to the establishment and support of an ethnic minority party. I proposed that possession of three historical traits—historical presence, territorial attachment and experience with autonomy—should substantially increase the likelihood that an minority group will 1) seek to establish a party of its own to represent its interests and 2) be able to generate the electoral support necessary to obtain legislative representation.

In testing this theory via a large-N, quantitative cross-national analysis of European elections, I discovered that two of the historical variables—historical presence and dominance/autonomy—are the two strongest predictors of both ethnic minority party entry and success. Remarkably, these variables prove to be so influential that they even eclipse the influence of ethnic group size (as a share of total population) on the two dependent variables. In contrast, I found little support for the influence of the other historical factor, territorial attachment. However, as I pointed out in Chapter III, this null finding is less-than-conclusive, especially in the analysis of EMP success, due to the small number of observations of minority groups that possess historical presence but not
territorial attachment. What we can be fairly confident in is that historical background matters in minority groups’ political strategies, and their capacities to successfully execute those strategies. Groups that inhabited the territory of their present-day state prior to the formation of that state, and groups that have enjoyed a period of autonomy on the lands on which they currently reside, are more like to establish ethnic minority parties and to obtain legislative representation through them.

The case study presented in Chapter IV sheds additional light on the relationship between history and minority group political engagement in several respects. First, it serves as a sort of sensitivity analysis, revealing that historical variables outside of the framework presented in this work can play a role. In the case of Bulgaria, the omitted variable was a history of unjust repression at the hands of the state, which undoubtedly contributed to the emergence of a strong and unified Turkish minority party. However, the failure of the Roma community to establish a party with even a fraction of the success, despite the fact that it suffered similar (if not more severe) treatment from the Communist government, suggests that his cannot possibly be the only historical factor at play. Instead, I argue that the Turkish minority’s possession of the three favorable historical characteristics is what made that group perceive the Revival Process of the 1980’s as an outrage that demanded political action—in other words, there was an unmistakable sense in the Turkish community that based on their background, they deserved better treatment. In contrast, the Roma (who possess neither territorial attachment nor experience with self-rule) viewed government repression as the norm and were not moved to widespread collective political action. Thus, the second take-way from the Bulgaria case study is that historical variables—including those outside my
framework—can interact with one another in ways that can be especially favorable to ethnic minority parties.

In addition to my central thesis regarding the influence of historical variables, my work has contributed a rigorous and comprehensive empirical test of alternative explanations for the emergence and success of ethnic minority parties.

Following Bernauer and Bochsler (2011), I applied Kitschelt’s (1985) formulation of political opportunity structure theory to the study of EMP entry, making some important adjustments in operationalization to more accurately capture the expected effect. Ultimately, I found that there is no relationship between the attitudes of major political parties toward ethnic minorities and the likelihood of those minority groups forming a political party of their own to contest national elections, corroborating Bernauer and Bochsler’s earlier null finding. However, I am not entirely convinced that the failure of empirical tests to establish a connection between the two variables is indicative of the absence of such a relationship. As mentioned in this work, there are considerable methodological challenges in testing this thesis. Although I believe I have offered an improvement in this respect, the major challenge seems to be that we are limited in our ability to measure party attitudes toward *particular ethnic minority groups*; instead, we are forced to use attitudes toward *minorities in general*—itself a limited variable, since it is based on what parties say rather than what they do—as a proxy. It is possible that this imperfect operationalization may be masking an actual relationship. What the Bulgaria case study has demonstrated, however, is that major political parties have a limited influence on the fortunes of ethnic minority parties, especially once those parties have proven themselves to be electorally viable.
In addition to the influence of mainstream parties, I proposed and assessed the role of two additional variables measured at the country level. First, I argued that the presence of a successful right-wing populist (RWP) or nationalist party is likely to contribute to the electoral success of ethnic minority parties by stoking fear and apprehension among minority groups, driving them to turn out in greater numbers on election day to support their respective parties. My cross-national analysis confirms the existence—albeit of a modest magnitude—of such a relationship, while the case of Bulgaria reveals in greater depth and detail the psychological effect the nationalist party Ataka has had on the country’s Turkish voters, creating widespread unease and concern over the possible erosion of ethnic rights, and the ways in which the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) has capitalized on these moods to secure unprecedented electoral gains. Additionally, I proposed that a clientelistic (rather than programmatic) political culture is likely to be more beneficial for the electoral performance of EMPs due to their unique and almost exclusive access to built-in patronage networks within a particular ethnic minority group. While I did not find support for this hypothesis in my quantitative analysis, this may be partly due to the well-known challenge of accurately operationalizing clientelism. In contrast, my study of ethnic politics in Bulgaria revealed that no Bulgarian party has profited from clientelistic politics as much as the MRF. Overall, what my analysis reveals is that political culture and political system variables such as these can help tell part of the story of ethnic minority party success, even if they are not the primary drivers of it.

Another group of explanations tested in this work were those pertaining the influence of international actors. First, I examined the possibility that candidacy to the
European Union may increase the likelihood of minority party entry, as the accession candidates should be eager to signal commitment to the liberal values espoused by the organization, and therefore less likely to impose substantial barriers to entry for ethnically-based parties. In my quantitative analysis, I found only a very modest relationship between candidacy for EU accession and EMP contestation of national elections. When examining the question in greater detail in my Bulgaria case study, it appears that international influences may have played some role in Bulgaria allowing the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) party to contest national elections while initially banning other ethnically-based parties, although evidence of overt pressure on the part of international organizations is lacking. Second, I considered whether nearby or neighboring kin states can contribute to the formation and success of parties representing the ethnic group in question. Once again, there was limited support for this thesis in my quantitative analysis. In contrast, the case study in Chapter IV suggest that while the Turkish government itself has had no role in boosting the MRF’s success in Bulgaria, the party has benefited from the ability to mobilize dual-nationals living in Turkey to turn out in national elections. Overall, it seems that international organizations such as the European Union can play some limited role in easing barriers to entry for ethnic minority parties, and in some cases EMPs can get a modest boost in electoral performance from the presence of a nearby kin state. However, it does not appear that international influences play nearly as strong of a role in determining ethnic minority party outcomes as those factors pertaining to the group’s historical background.

Lastly, in Chapter IV I examined the role of several party organization variables that have been proposed to explain a party’s success. I found, as has been hypothesized,
that the high level of professionalization of the MRF has contributed to its success while the lack thereof has hindered Roma parties from accomplishing much in Bulgarian politics. But perhaps most interestingly, I found that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms has benefitted from a unique organizational structure combining low intra-party democracy and low tolerance for dissent on the one hand, and abundant opportunities for intra-party advancement on the other. This combination of organizational characteristics has enabled the party to simultaneously maintain unity and discipline under a rigidly hierarchical structure and at the same time recruit and retain exceptionally capable politicians to its ranks. It therefore seems to me that while Chandra (2004) is correct in stressing the role of intra-party advancement for ethnic parties, this may not be the whole story. It seems that a great amount of fluidity in party leadership positions on its own can result in internal disorder that can be destructive to an ethnic party’s fortunes, unless it is also accompanied by a rigidly hierarchical and highly disciplined approach to internal decision-making.

Ultimately, my work demonstrates that an ethnic group’s decision to form a political party of its own to contest national elections is primarily a function of that group’s historical background, as well as its size as a share of total population. Groups possessing a historical background entailing a long-standing connection to the territories they inhabit and experience with self-rule are significantly more likely to form ethnic minority parties, provided that the numerical size of the group in question is sufficient to make legislative representation seem achievable. Minority groups—even large ones—that lack this historical background are more likely to engage the politics of their state by alternative means. In contrast, the actions and attitudes of domestic political actors (such
as mainstream parties) do not appear to influence the decision of whether or not to form an EMP in any significant way. International actors (such as foreign governments and international organizations) may play a modest role in certain cases by persuading governments to permit the establishment of parties representing ethnic interests.

Similarly, the primary drivers behind the success of ethnic minority parties—measured as their ability to obtain legislative representation—are the historical background of the ethnic group and its share of total population, in that order. Larger groups with a more favorable historical background (along the two dimensions discussed above) tend to consistently win seats in their national legislatures via their EMPs. Additionally, the presence of right-wing populist or nationalist party in the country’s party system can aid minority parties in mobilizing their electoral base, leading to stronger performances in elections. As the Bulgarian case reveals, EMPs may also be more adept than other political parties at exploiting a political culture characterized by clientelism and patronage. While international influences play a modest role in minority party entry, they do not appear to affect the electoral fortunes of such parties. Lastly, based on the Bulgarian case study, there may be certain party organization characteristics that facilitate electoral success for such parties, with the Movement for Rights and Freedoms’ model of low intra-party democracy couple with ample opportunities for intra-party advancement proving to be a highly effective one.

These findings help to shed considerable light on the puzzle with which this work began—if ethnic minority parties have proven to be such effective representatives of minority interests in so many cases, why have many minorities either not availed themselves of the opportunity to form one, or attempted to form such a party but failed?
The answer in the first place is that the prospect of an EMP is simply more appealing to some groups than it is to others, as influenced by their social psychology, which is in itself influenced by historical factors. Ethnic minority parties offer a special form of political representation that is grounded in a well-developed sense of *group rights*, as opposed to merely *individual rights*. Groups that by way of their historical experience feel entitled to group rights are much more likely to opt to form EMPs, which simultaneously communicate the belongingness of the group to the state (its equal right to political representation) and its separateness from it (its unique character that developed separately from the development of the national idea). In contrast, predominantly migrant groups are willing to accept a certain degree of assimilation and are primarily concerned with the protection of their rights as individuals. To such communities, it makes little sense to establish separate political formations precisely because they communicate a “separateness” that runs counter to the group’s goals. Instead, it makes sense for predominantly migrant groups to assimilate politically into their states, just as they assimilate socially. Other structural factors will exert at best a modest influence on a group’s decision of which political strategy to pursue, so it is not a question of finding the “right conditions” to engender EMP emergence. The right conditions are largely determined by centuries of historical experience and cannot be easily augmented—some re-imaginings of history are possible, but not ones of this magnitude. It thus appears that the ethnic minority party strategy may not be useful for Western Europe’s burgeoning migrant communities. The primary reason we do not see parties representing such groups is that these minorities do not have a particularly strong interest in establishing them.

On the other hand, it is evident that merely possessing the right historical
characteristics is no guarantee of ethnic minority party success. There are many minority
groups—particularly the Roma—that are attracted to the ethnic minority party idea, but
fail in its execution. What is common to such groups is that they tend to either 1) lack one
of the two favorable historical traits or 2) are numerically small in size. The former of
these challenges seems plausibly—if not easily—surmountable by emphasizing the
favorable historical characteristics that the group does possess. The latter problem, it
seems at first, can only be remedied over time by demographic changes. But we should
not underestimate the role that an effective party organization can play in mobilizing
electoral support so as to overcome demographic challenges. We have in the Movement
for Rights and Freedoms a perfect example of a party whose highly effective
organizational structure has enabled it to “punch above its weight” in recent elections. If
the MRF can obtain 14% of the vote while having an electoral base comprising 8% of
total population, then it seems that a party representing a small minority group can, with
the right strategy, obtain legislative representation despite its demographic limitations.

Having outlined the main contributions of this work, I now turn to discuss the
opportunities it suggests for future research. First, it must be said that while empirical
tests have not been kind to the political opportunity structure explanation of EMP
emergence, we should not dismiss the possibility of such a relationship. The theoretical
reasoning behind this relationship—that the actions and attitudes of dominant political
actors in a state should influence the political strategies pursued by minority groups—is
sound, and it is possible that we have simply failed to accurately capture the independent
variable of interest. The focus therefore needs to be on how we can better operationalize
mainstream party attitudes. I have made here some contributions to this pursuit, most
notably the idea that what we ought to be concerned with is how favorable the most favorable “major” party in a state is toward a particular minority group. But actually measuring this favorability is difficult, and content analysis may not be best way of accomplishing this. Perhaps the employment of other, more time- and resource-intensive methods such as elite or mass-level surveys would allow us to get a better sense of which parties (if any) genuinely appeal to minority voters, and therefore provide a better test of the political opportunity structure thesis. For now, however, we must remain skeptical of the proposed effect.

My work has revealed that international actors may play some modest role in facilitating the electoral entry of ethnic minority parties. However, the precise channels through which this influence generally occurs are not clear. The only in-depth analysis presented here is of the Bulgarian case, which may be considered to be sui generis due to the country’s ethnic party ban, and even there we do not see any “smoking gun” that directly and unambiguously links international pressure with EMP emergence. But since the cross-national analysis suggests international influences (particularly by the European Union) may exist in Europe in general, it seems worthwhile to explore other cases qualitatively and with the proper level of detail.

Similarly, several of the factors my research suggests contribute to ethnic minority party success deserve to be studied more comprehensively, either cross-nationally or with the help of additional case studies. First, it appears that there are good theoretical reason to believe that EMPs ought to fare better in clientelistic (rather than programmatic) political seasons, and the Bulgarian case presents some compelling supporting evidence. Yet the null finding of the cross-national analysis suggest that a
more accurate means of operationalizing clientelism is necessary to capture this effect; the challenge, then, is to develop such an operationalization. Second, and perhaps more importantly, we still have a limited understanding of what party organization characteristics facilitate the success of ethnic minority parties. My study of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms suggests that a combination of low intra-party democracy and ample opportunities for intra-party advancement may be beneficial by allowing a party to remain unified while attracting top-level talent. This idea needs to be tested in other settings—either through cross-national quantitative analysis (which is challenging due to the scarcity of party organization data, especially for small parties), or, more plausibly, through further case studies.

It should be noted that the theoretical and empirical advances presented here bear a significance beyond the mere study of ethnic minority parties. For instance, my findings regarding party organization have relevance to the broader study of niche parties. Small parties can ill-afford internal dissent and splintering, as such developments can seriously threaten their ability to secure legislative representation. Therefore, all niche parties may benefit from adopting the organizational framework of the MRF, which strongly encourages and enforces conformity while keeping its members content and hopeful with the promise of internal advancement. Similarly, the idea that right-wing populist and ethnic minority parties play off of one another to their mutual electoral benefit could translate to other diametrically opposed party dyads as well.

Perhaps most importantly, I hope that my work has demonstrated that we cannot disentangle the broader study of ethnic politics from the study of the historical development of ethnic identities. It is evident that history and one’s perception of it play a
major role in establishing the character, claims and concerns of ethnic minorities, and in turn these groups’ political strategy. Here there is ample opportunity for further research. First, while an empirical relationship between history and political strategy has been established, we have much to learn about the precise process through which this relationship develops. We need to look more closely, on the one hand, at the influence of history on ethnic identity, and on the other, on the influence of ethnic identity on political action. I have merely theorized about this middle part of the relationship, I have not tested it empirically; it could well be that the relationship between history and political strategy operates through different or more complex channels than the ones I have hypothesized. Second, it is possible that there are other historical factors that play a role in a minority group’s political decisions. My case study of Bulgaria revealed one such factor—a history of extreme government repression of the ethnic group in question; there may be others.

Ultimately, my hope is that this work has communicated the necessity of taking into account historical factors in the study of political science in general, and especially into quantitative political research, where historical context is often ignored. This is certainly not the first study (quantitative or qualitative) to consider the role of history, yet it seems that many researchers today rush to treat political systems and attitudes as if they emerged ex nihilo at the point in time at which one’s dataset begins. I hope to have demonstrated the peril of this approach.
VI. Appendix A

This appendix presents a detailed account of the reasoning behind my coding of the three Historical-Social-Psychological (HSP) variables—*historicity, territoriality and dominance/autonomy*. I address here only those ethnic groups that I felt were the least straightforward to code on one or more of these dimensions, and whose coding would therefore be most likely to raise objections. Where necessary, I have included references to the historical sources informing my decisions.

The contents of this appendix are organized alphabetically by country and then by ethnic group within each country, from smallest to largest. I first state when I consider the modern form of the state in question to have been established, since this has bearing on my coding decisions for the historicity and territoriality variables. I then examine each relevant ethnic group residing within the state on the three HSP dimensions.

Table A.1 presents a summary of my coding decisions for each ethnic group in the dataset.

**Table A.1: Ethnic minority groups and their historical characteristics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>ETHNIC GROUP (% of population)</th>
<th>Native</th>
<th>Territorial</th>
<th>Dominant/autonomous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Greeks (4 %)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roma (1.4%)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Muslims (4.2%)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turks (3.2%)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Serbs (31.5%)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croats (17.3%)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Turks (9.4%)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roma (4.9%)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Serbs (4.5%)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Moravians (4.9%)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovaks (1.4%)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Muslims (4%)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turks (1%)</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Russians (25.6%)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukrainians (2.1%)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belarusians (1.1%)</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Swedes</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Muslims (9%)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Algerians (3.1%)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moroccans (2 %)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Muslims (5.4%)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turks (5%)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Albanians (4.3%)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Roma (5%)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germans (2.4%)</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>Arab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A.1 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Scots (9%)</th>
<th>Welsh (4.1%)</th>
<th>Irish (2.4%)</th>
<th>Blacks (2.8%)</th>
<th>Muslims (2.7%)</th>
<th>Indian (1.8%)</th>
<th>Pakistani (1.3%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. Albania

The modern Albanian nation-state was founded in 1913, with the establishment of the Principality of Albania.

A. Greeks

1. Historicity. Albania’s Greek population is concentrated in southernmost part of the country, which coincides with the northernmost part of the ancient Epirus region. Ethnic Greeks have inhabited Epirus since as early as the 19th century BC\(^1\) and the region was ruled by various Hellenic states until its conquest by the Ottoman Empire in the middle of the 15th century. The first reliable Albanian national census, conducted in 1945, reveals that Greeks constituted 2.5% of the state’s population. It appears highly unlikely that the ethnically Greek share of the population was any smaller three decades earlier, when the Albanian state was formed. The Greek share of the population declined over the decades following the 1945 census, with Greeks constituting 1.8% of the state’s residents in 1989, shortly before the collapse of Albanias’s Communist regime. It therefore appears safe to assume that Albania’s Greeks are of a native—rather than migrant—background.

2. Territoriality. Nearly all of present-day Albania’s Greeks reside in, and have historically inhabited, the northernmost part of the Epirus region that is today the southernmost part of Albania. The Albanian government even recognizes a Greek “minority zone” that encompasses only part of this region. Figure A.1 below presents both this zone (signified by a blue border) and the larger area of northern Epirus where Albania’s Greek population is heavily concentrated. With nearly 30 centuries of geographically concentrated presence on this portion of the territory of modern-day Albania, ethnic Greeks can clearly be viewed to possess the trait of territorial attachment.

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3. Dominance/autonomy. The territory of northern Epirus (today southern Albania) has been under some form of Hellenic rule for much of recorded history. In pre-Roman times, it was controlled by the Chaonians and later the Epirotic League, and in the middle ages it was part of the Byzantine Empire. More recently, the region was under Greek control in the Autonomous Republic of Northern Epirus in 1914, and during the Greek occupation of Albania during World War II. Since there are numerous historical examples of Greek autonomy and dominance within the territory of present-day Albania, I consider the country’s Greek minority to possess the trait of historical dominance/autonomy.
II. Bosnia and Herzegovina

The modern independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established in 1992, declaring independence on March 3rd and receiving international recognition in the following month.

A. Serbs

1. Historicity. The 1991 Yugoslav population census, conducted in the year prior to the establishment of the modern state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, reported that 31.2% of the future state’s population consisted of ethnic Serbs. Indeed, Serbs had constituted a plurality in the region as late as 1961, according to the census conducted that year. Therefore, ethnic Serbs are clearly native to the country.

2. Territoriality. Figure A.2 below is a map of ethnic Serbs as a percentage of total population by settlements, based on data from the 1991 Yugoslav census. Examining the map, it is evident that Serbs were heavily concentrated in the northwestern and eastern parts of the future state. Population maps produced as early as 1910 report a similar pattern of settlement. Therefore, ethnic Serbs can be considered to have territorial attachment within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3. Dominance/autonomy. Serbs experienced the privilege of being the most influential ethnic group within the territory of modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) that existed between the First and Second World Wars. Although the kingdom was a multinational state formed with popular support in almost all of its constituent territories, Belgrade held “the upper hand” in its creation and governance. The post-World War II Socialist Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia afforded Serbs living in the region what can at the very least be considered a status of equality and cultural autonomy. I therefore consider Serbs in the region to have a historical background of dominance/autonomy.

B. Croats

1. Historicity. The 1991 Yugoslav population census, conducted in the year prior to the establishment of the modern state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, reported that 17.4% of the future state’s population consisted of ethnic Serbs. Additionally, Croats had constituted upwards of 20% of the region’s population during the first half of the 20th century. Therefore, ethnic Croats are clearly native to the country.

2. Territoriality. Figure A.3 below is a map of ethnic Croats as a percentage of total population by settlements, based on data from the 1991 Yugoslav census. Examining the map, it is evident that Croats were heavily concentrated in the southeast, along the border with Croatia. Population maps produced as early as 1910 report a similar pattern of settlement. Therefore, ethnic Croats can be considered to have territorial attachment within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Figure A.3

3. Dominance/autonomy. The medieval Croatian kingdom controlled lands including modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina between the 11th and 12th centuries. Although Croatian dominance in the region was both brief and historically distant, we must keep in mind that what matters here is the influence of this historical period on the social psychology of the modern day population. The extent of the medieval Croatian kingdom is still viewed by some as a basis for Croatian irredentism. In any case, Croats certainly enjoyed considerable cultural autonomy and a co-equal status in the post-World War II Yugoslav state. I therefore consider Croats to have a dominant/autonomous historical background.

III. Croatia

The modern independent state of Croatia was established in 1991, declaring independence from Yugoslavia in October and obtaining international recognition in January of the following year.

A. Serbs

1. Historicity. The 1991 Yugoslav census, conducted in the year in which Croatia declared independence, reports that 12.2% of the future state’s population was comprised of ethnic Serbs. Earlier censuses reveal that the region’s Serb population was slightly larger (in the neighborhood of 15%) for much of the 20th century. Thus, it seems evident that Serbs should be considered a native minority group.

2. Territoriality. Figure A.4 below is a map of ethnic Serbs as a percentage of total population by settlements, based on data from the 1991 Yugoslav census. Examining the map, it is evident that Serbs were heavily concentrated along the borders with Bosnia Herzegovina and Serbia. Earlier population maps from the 20th century report a similar pattern of settlement. Therefore, ethnic Serbs can be considered to have territorial attachment within Croatia.

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3. Dominance/autonomy. Serbs experienced the privilege of being the most influential ethnic group within the territory of modern-day Croatia under the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) that existed between the First and Second World Wars. Although the kingdom was a multi-national state formed with popular support in almost all of its constituent territories, Belgrade held “the upper hand” in its creation and governance. The post-World War II Socialist Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia afforded Serbs living in the region what can at the very least be considered a status of equality and cultural autonomy. Additionally, the establishment of the war-time Republic of Serbian Krajina in 1991 offered the group a brief period of self-rule until its demise in 1995. Thus, it seems appropriate to classify ethnic Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina as dominant/autonomous.

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IV. Hungary

The modern Hungarian nation-state was established in 1918, following secession from Austria-Hungary and the formation of the first Hungarian republic, although this state did not assume its present territorial scope until it lost substantial territories in 1920 with the Treaty of Trianon.

A. Germans

1. Historicity. Ethnic Germans settled in land controlled by the Hungarian crown over the course of several migration waves from the 11th to the 18th century. Thus, Germans had become an established minority group on Hungarian territories well before the formation of the modern Hungarian nation-state. In 1910, the last census conducted before the emergence of modern Hungary reported that Germans constituted 7.3% of the population within the territory of present-day Hungary. The country’s German population would go on to decline substantially over the course of the 20th century, but those who remained can undoubtedly trace their origin to a native population. For this reason, I consider Hungary’s Germans to be a native minority group.

2. Territoriality. Although Germans enjoy a rich historical presence on Hungarian territory, they never settled in particularly concentrated geographic patterns, instead remaining largely scattered. Figure A.5 below is an ethnographic map of the territory of present-day Hungary in 1910. Areas in orange indicate a German-majority population. The map reveals that on the eve of the modern Hungarian nation-state, Germans were not concentrated in particular regions, and that German settlements existed in various parts of the country. I therefore consider Germans in Hungary to lack the trait of territorial attachment.

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6 It should be noted that this map includes substantial territories ceded by Hungary in 1920.
3. Dominance/autonomy. The German people have never exercised autonomous self-rule within the territory of present-day Hungary within peace-time. The only historical period that even approximates German dominance/autonomy within these lands was World War II, when Hungary was a member of the Axis powers and under strong influence from Nazi Germany. However, this alliance did not result in ethnic Germans ruling within Hungary, nor did it lead to German autonomy within its borders. Therefore, I do not consider Hungary’s Germans to possess the trait of historical dominance/autonomy.

V. Estonia

The modern state of Estonia was established in February of 1918 with a declaration of independence from Russia, and officially recognized by the international community two years later.

A. Russians

1. Historicity. The historical background of Estonia’s Russian population
is decidedly mixed. On the one hand, ethnic Russians had settled in the territory of present-day Estonia following its conquest by the Russian Empire in 1721. Thus, Russians enjoyed a presence in the region for the nearly two centuries preceding the establishment of the modern Estonian nation-state. The 1922 Estonian census, conducted shortly after independence, reveals that ethnic Russians comprised 8.2% of the state’s population. However, Estonia’s Russian population would explode in the aftermath of World War II and the country’s incorporation into the Soviet Union. Soviet policies of collectivization, industrialization and Russification motivated the deportation of a significant number of ethnic Estonians and the mass settlement of ethnically Russian people in the region. As a consequence of these population movements, Estonia’s Russian population increased from 91,109 in 1922 to 474,834 in 1989, two years prior to the restoration of Estonian independence. As a percentage of total population, Russians increased from 8.2 to 30.3%. Since this staggering increase was largely driven by migration, it is safe to assume that a majority of the Russians inhabiting Estonia on the eve of its independence from the Soviet Union were of migrant—as opposed to native—origin. I therefore code Russians in Estonia as a non-native minority group. Truthfully, the historical background of this group is most accurately described as mixed. However, the logistical complications involved in introducing such a category into my quantitative analysis imposes a cost exceeding that of the benefit from an increased accuracy of operationalization.

2. Territoriality. Since I categorize Russians in Estonia as a non-native ethnic minority group, I also do not consider them to possess the trait of territorial attachment. Even if we bring into question the coding of the historicity variable, Estonia’s Russians are not strongly geographically concentrated. Instead, they are (and for the second half of the 20th century, have been) found throughout the country’s largest cities, having migrated there to take advantage of the Baltic region’s burgeoning industrial centers.

3. Dominance/autonomy. Ethnic Russians have ruled the territory of present-day Estonia in two separate spells totaling nearly 250 years. These lands first came under Russian control following the conclusion of the Great Northern War in 1721, and remained under Russian rule until the Estonian declaration of independence in 1918. Over the course of World War II, Estonia came under Soviet occupation and was incorporated into the Soviet Union until its re-established independence in 1991. During both of these periods, the territory of present-day Estonia was governed by ethnic Russians. Both imperial and Soviet Russia introduced “Russification” policies that favored Russian residents to the exclusion of those from other ethnic backgrounds. I therefore consider Estonia’s Russians to possess a history of dominance in the region.

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8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, p. 29-30
10 Ibid, 53-67; 125-59
B. Ukrainians

1. Historicity. Ukrainians are not native to lands of modern-day Estonia. Although the 1922 Estonian census (the first following independence) did not include “Ukrainian” as an ethnicity or nationality option, the subsequent census of 1934 did. It reported that Estonia’s Ukrainian residents numbered 92 people in all, or less that 0.1% of the total population. Estonia’s Ukrainian population increased dramatically in the aftermath of World War II and the country’s incorporation into the Soviet Union. Soviet policies of collectivization, industrialization and Russification motivated the deportation of a significant number of ethnic Estonians and the mass settlement of Slavs from other Soviet republics (including Ukraine) in the region. As a consequence of these population movements, Estonia’s Ukrainian population increased to 48,271 in 1989, and the group comprised 3.1% of the republic’s population. Since this significant increase was clearly driven by migration, I classify Ukrainians as a non-native minority group.

2. Territoriality. Since Ukrainians are not native to the territory of present-day Estonia, they do not possess the trait of territorial attachment.

3. Dominance/autonomy. Ukrainians have never been able to exercise autonomous self-rule, and have never enjoyed a dominant ethnic group status on the territory of present-day Estonia. Throughout their presence in the region, they have either been part of a state dominated by ethnic Estonians (1918-1940; 1991-present) or ethnic Russians (1940; 1944-1991). I therefore do not consider Ukrainians to possess a history of dominance/autonomy.

VI. Greece

The modern Greek nation-state was established in 1830, when the First Hellenic Republic was officially recognized by the international community.

A. Albanians

1. Historicity. While ethnic Albanians had settled in the Greek region of Epirus as early as the 13th century, they were few in number and many of them fled from the region when the tides turned in World War II. Other smaller indigenous historical communities exist in Thrace and Northwestern Greece. However, the vast majority of Greece’s current Albanian population migrated to the country over the course of the past two-and-a-half centuries in pursuit of economic opportunity. Thus, the case of Albanians in Greece is similar to that of Russians in the former Baltic states, in that they are both of mixed, though predominantly migrant origin. As in the case of Russians in the Baltics, I make the judgment to consider Albanians in Greece to be a migrant ethnic group. Ideally, this group would be classified as being of “mixed” origin, but the logistical complications involved in introducing such a category into my quantitative

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analysis imposes a cost exceeding that of the benefit from an increased accuracy of operationalization.

2. Territoriality. Since I consider Albanians to be a non-native minority group, I do not consider them to possess the trait of territorial attachment.

3. Dominance/autonomy. Albanians have never been able to exercise autonomous self-rule, and have never enjoyed a dominant ethnic group status on the territory of present-day Greece. Although Albanians benefited from a somewhat privileged status during Ottoman rule when compared to the empire’s Christian population, there were very few Albanians living within the territory of modern-day Greece, and most of the country’s present-day Albanians do not trace their lineage to those settlers. Thus, it is difficult to argue that Albanians have enjoyed autonomy on what is currently the territory of Greece. I therefore do not consider Albanians to possess a history of dominance/autonomy.

VII. Kosovo

The modern state of Kosovo was established on February 17th, 2008 and subsequently obtained recognition from 106 United Nations members.

A. Bosnians/(Slavic) Muslims

1. Historicity. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census Bosniaks and other Slavic Muslims constituted 3.4% of the population of what would later become the Republic of Kosovo. Earlier censuses conducted in second half of the 20th century (when the category for Slavic Muslims was first introduced) reveal a similarly sized population. Therefore, we can consider Bosniaks/(Slavic) Muslims to be a native ethnic group.

2. Territoriality. Figure A.6 below is a map of the ethnic composition of Kosovo, based on data from the 1991 Yugoslav census. We can see that Slavic Muslims were heavily concentrated in the southernmost parts of the region. Earlier population maps from the 20th century report a similar pattern of settlement. Therefore, ethnic Bosniaks and Slavic Muslims can be considered to have territorial attachment within Croatia.
3. Dominance/autonomy. As part of the Muslim confessional community under the Ottoman Empire’s *millet* system, Slavic Muslims enjoyed considerable cultural autonomy along with privileged status among other conquered peoples within the empire. In my judgment, this fact provides a sufficient amount of historical capital to promote the legitimacy of self-rule for this people-group. I thus consider Bosnians/(Slavic) Muslims to have a historical background of autonomy.

B. Turks

1. Historicity. An ethnic Turkish presence in the lands currently comprising Kosovo has existed ever since the conquest of the area by Ottoman forces in
1389. The Yugoslav census of 1953 reveals that 4.3% of the region’s population was Turkish. By the last Yugoslav census of 1991, Turks had declined to 0.5% of the population, although they did grow in the following decades. Clearly, the Turkish minority is of a native—rather than migrant—background.

2. Territoriality. Kosovo’s ethnic Turks reside almost exclusively in the southern city of Prizren and its surrounding villages. Prizren is recognized as the historical, political and cultural center of Kosovar Turks. With no other significant historical Turkish settlements of note, I consider ethnic Turks to possess territorial attachment to the Prizren region.

3. Dominance/autonomy. Turks were the dominant ethnic group within the Ottoman Empire. Not only did they belong to the most favored confessional community in the empire, but they were also the ethnic group that dominated the Ottoman Porte. Thus, it seems reasonable to classify ethnic Turks as having a dominant historical background.

VIII. Latvia

The modern Latvian state was established in 1918 after declaring independence from Soviet Russia, and was internationally recognized in 1921.

A. Russians

1. Historicity. The historical background of Latvia’s Russian population is decidedly mixed. On the one hand, ethnic Russians settled in the territory of present-day Latvia following its conquest by the Russian Empire in 1721. Thus, Russians enjoyed a presence in the region for the two centuries preceding the establishment of the modern Latvian nation-state. The 1925 Latvian census, conducted shortly after independence, reveals that ethnic Russians comprised 10.5% of the state’s population. However, Latvia’s Russian population would explode in the aftermath of World War II and the country’s incorporation into the Soviet Union. Soviet policies of collectivization, industrialization and Russification motivated the deportation of a significant number of ethnic Latvians and the mass settlement of ethnically Russian people in the region. As a consequence of these population movements, Latvia’s Russian population increased from 193,647 in 1925 to 905,515 in 1989, two years prior to the restoration of Latvian independence. As a percentage of total population, Russians increased from 10.5 to 34%. Since this staggering increase was largely driven by migration, it is safe to assume that a majority of the Russians inhabiting Latvia on the eve of its independence from Soviet rule were of migrant—as opposed to native—origin. I therefore code Russians in Latvia

14 Kosovo Communities Profile, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2010)
as a non-native minority group. Truthfully, the historical background of this group is most accurately described as mixed. However, the logistical complications involved in introducing such a category into my quantitative analysis imposes a cost exceeding that of the benefit from an increased accuracy of operationalization.

2. *Territoriality.* Since I categorize Russians in Latvia as a non-native ethnic minority group, I also do not consider them to possess the trait of territorial attachment. Even if we bring into question the coding of the historicity variable, Latvia’s Russians are not strongly geographically concentrated. Instead, they are (and for the second half of the 20th century, have been) found throughout the country’s largest cities, having migrated there following the conclusion of World War II to take advantage of the Baltic region’s burgeoning industrial centers.\(^{16}\)

3. *Dominance/autonomy.* Ethnic Russians have ruled the territory of present-day Latvia in two separate spells totaling nearly 250 years. These lands first came under Russian control following the conclusion of the Great Northern War in 1721,\(^{17}\) and remained under Russian rule until the Latvian declaration of independence in 1918. Over the course of World War II, Latvia came under Soviet occupation and was incorporated into the Soviet Union until its re-established independence in 1991. During both of these periods, the territory of present-day Latvia was governed by ethnic Russians. Both imperial and Soviet Russia introduced “Russification” policies that favored Russian residents to the exclusion of those from other ethnic backgrounds.\(^ {18}\) I therefore consider Latvia’s Russians to possess a history of dominance in the region.

B. Belarusians

1. Similarly to Russians, the historical background of Latvia’s Belarusian population is mixed. The 1925 Latvian census, conducted shortly after independence, reveals that ethnic Belarusians comprised 2.1% of the state’s population, although that number dropped to 1.4 in the 1935 census. However, Latvia’s Belarusian population would grow significantly in the aftermath of World War II and the country’s incorporation into the Soviet Union. Soviet policies of collectivization, industrialization and Russification motivated the deportation of a significant number of ethnic Latvians and the mass settlement of Slavs from other Soviet republics (including Belarus) in the region.\(^ {19}\) As a consequence of these population movements, Latvia’s Belarusian population increased to a 4.5% share of the republic’s population by 1989. Since this significant increase was largely driven by migration, it is safe to assume that a majority of the Belarusians inhabiting Latvia on the eve of its independence from Soviet rule were of migrant—as opposed to native—origin. I therefore code Belarusians in Latvia as a non-native minority group. Truthfully, the historical background of this group is most accurately described as mixed. However, the logistical complications involved in introducing such a category into my quantitative analysis imposes a cost exceeding that

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\(^{16}\) Ibid.

\(^{17}\) Ibid, p. 29-30

\(^{18}\) Ibid, 53-67; 125-59

of the benefit from an increased accuracy of operationalization.

2. **Territoriality.** Since I categorize Belarusians in Latvia as a non-native ethnic minority group, I also do not consider them to possess the trait of territorial attachment. Even if we bring into question the coding of the historicity variable, Latvia’s Belarusians are not strongly geographically concentrated. Instead, they are (and for the second half of the 20th century, have been) found throughout the country’s largest cities, having migrated there following the conclusion of World War II to take advantage of the Baltic region’s burgeoning industrial centers.\(^{20}\)

3. **Dominance/autonomy.** Belarusians have never been able to exercise autonomous self-rule, and have never enjoyed a dominant ethnic group status on the territory of present-day Latvia. Throughout their presence in the region, they have either been part of a state dominated by ethnic Latvians (1918-1940; 1991-present) or ethnic Russians (1944-1991). I therefore do not consider Belarusians to possess a history of dominance/autonomy.

**C. Ukrainians**

1. **Historicity.** Ukrainians are not native to lands of modern-day Latvia. The Latvian census of 1925 reported that Ukrainian residents numbered 512 people in all, or less than 0.1% of the total population. Latvia’s Ukrainian population increased dramatically in the aftermath of World War II and the country’s incorporation into the Soviet Union. Soviet policies of collectivization, industrialization and Russification motivated the deportation of a significant number of ethnic Latvians and the mass settlement of Slavs from other Soviet republics (including Ukraine) in the region.\(^{21}\) As a consequence of these population movements, Latvia’s Ukrainian population increased to 92,101 in 1989, and the group comprised 3.5% of the republic’s population. Since this significant increase was clearly driven by migration, I classify Ukrainians as a non-native minority group.

2. **Territoriality.** Since Ukrainians are not native to the territory of present-day Latvia, they do not possess the trait of territorial attachment.

3. **Dominance/autonomy.** Ukrainians have never been able to exercise autonomous self-rule, and have never enjoyed a dominant ethnic group status on the territory of present-day Latvia. Throughout their presence in the region, they have either been part of a state dominated by ethnic Latvians (1918-1940; 1991-present) or ethnic Russians (1944-1991). I therefore do not consider Ukrainians to possess a history of dominance/autonomy.

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\(^{20}\) Ibid.  
D. Poles

1. Historicity. Ethnic Poles have lived on the territory of modern-day Latvia since the 16th century. In Latvia’s first post-independence census of 1925, Poles constituted 2.8% of the state’s population, and it seems safe to assume that they comprised a similar (if not larger) proportion prior to the emergence of the modern Latvian state. Over the course of the following nine decades, the Polish share of the population remained fairly constant, ranging from 2.2 to 2.9% according to census data. Therefore, it seems straightforward that Poles should be coded as a native ethnic group.

2. Territoriality. Figure A.7 below is a map of ethnic concentration of ethnic Poles within Latvia. There are two regions of the country in which ethnic Poles enjoy a substantial presence—the southeastern part of the state, along the Lithuania and Belarus borders, clustered around the city of Dugavpils, and in the central part of the state, along the Lithuanian border and clustered around the city of Riga. These concentration patterns are not recent developments, but a consequence of centuries-old settlement patterns and the proximity to formerly Polish-controlled territories. I therefore consider Latvia’s Poles to possess the trait of territorial attachment.

Figure A.7


3. Dominance/autonomy. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth controlled the Inflanty region, where present-day Poles are concentrated, between 1561

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and 1600. Thus, Poles in the region do have some (although distant) historical experience with autonomous self-rule. I therefore consider Poles in Latvia to have a dominant/autonomous background.

E. Lithuanians

1. Historicity. Ethnic Lithuanians have lived on the territory of modern-day Latvia since the 16th century. In Latvia’s first post-independence census of 1925, Lithuanians constituted 1.3% of the state’s population, and it seems safe to assume that they comprised a similar proportion prior to the emergence of the modern Latvian state. Over the course of the following nine decades, the Lithuanian share of the population remained fairly constant, ranging from 1.2 to 1.7% according to census data. Therefore, it appears straightforward that Lithuanians should be coded as a native ethnic group.

2. Territoriality. Although Latvia’s Lithuanians tend to live in the southern portion of the country, along the border with Lithuania, they are so few in number that they do not constitute a significant share of the population in any Latvian municipality. Further, an examination of history reveals no regions or territories within present-day Latvia that Lithuanians appear to be attached to or particularly associated with. I therefore do not consider Lithuanians to possess the trait of territorial attachment.

3. Dominance/autonomy. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth controlled part of the lands comprising modern-day Latvia between 1561 and 1629. Although the Commonwealth was formally to be a federal state with two distinct and equal components, in reality it was dominated by Poland, the larger of the two states. The fact that the region was predominantly under Polish rule (with a Polish monarch and Polish-dominated Sejm), combined with the temporally distant character of these events, leads me to conclude that Lithuanians in Latvia do not have a genuine historical experience as the dominant ethnic group in Latvia.

IX. Lithuania

The modern Lithuanian state was established in 1918, following the conclusion of World War I.

A. Poles

1. Historicity. Poles lived on the territory of present-day Lithuania for centuries prior to establishment of the modern nation state, dating back to the days of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In Lithuania’s first post-independence census in 1923,

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24 Ibid.
Poles constituted 3.2% of the state’s population. However, this census did not cover the Vilnius region, which was controlled by Poland in the interwar period but subsequently became part of the Lithuanian Sovereign Soviet Republic (SSR). In the Soviet census of 1959, Poles accounted for 8.5% of Lithuania’s population. Their share of the republic’s total population declined gradually over the course of the 20th century. Since most Poles in Lithuania live in the Vilnius region to which they have deep historical ties, I consider them to be a native ethnic minority.

2. Territoriality. As mentioned in the previous section, most of the Poles in present-day Lithuania have historically resided in the Vilnius region. Figure A.8 below is a map of the concentration of ethnic Poles in Lithuania, which confirms the notion that Poles are geographically clustered in this southeastern region of the country, along the Polish border. Since this clustering is not the consequence of recent migration patterns, but of centuries-old settlements, I consider Poles to exhibit territorial attachment.

![Figure A.8](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poles_in_Lithuania#mediaviewer/File:Poles_distribution_in_Lithuania,_2001_census.png)

3. Dominance/autonomy. The Vilnius region, which today is home to a majority of Lithuania’s Poles, was under Polish control in the period between World War I and World War II. Thus, ethnic Poles in the region have had an experience with autonomous self-rule in a state in which they constituted the dominant ethnicity. For this reason, I consider Poles in Lithuania to possess the autonomous/dominant historical trait.

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28 Ibid, 87.
B. Russians

1. Historicity. The historical background of Lithuania’s Russian population is mixed. On the one hand, ethnic Russians (mostly persecuted Old Believers) settled in the region as early as the 17th century. The 1923 Lithuanian census, conducted shortly after independence, reveals that ethnic Russians comprised 2.5% of the state’s population. However, Lithuania’s Russian population would increase substantially in the aftermath of World War II and the country’s incorporation into the Soviet Union. Soviet policies of collectivization, industrialization and Russification motivated the deportation of a significant number of ethnic Lithuanians and the mass settlement of ethnically Russian people in the region.29 As a consequence of these population movements, Lithuania’s Russian population increased from 50,460 in 1923 to 344,455 in 1989, two years prior to the restoration of Lithuanian independence. As a percentage of total population, Russians increased nearly four-fold, from 2.5 to 9.4%. Since this tremendous increase was largely driven by migration, it is safe to assume that a majority of the Russians inhabiting Lithuania on the eve of its independence from the Soviet Union were of migrant—as opposed to native—origin. I therefore code Russians as a non-native minority group. Truthfully, the historical background of this group is most accurately described as mixed. However, the logistical complications involved in introducing such a category into my quantitative analysis imposes a cost exceeding that of the benefit from an increased accuracy of operationalization.

2. Territoriality. Since I categorize Russians in Lithuania as a non-native ethnic minority group, I also do not consider them to possess the trait of territorial attachment. Even if we bring into question the coding of the historicity variable, Lithuania’s Russians are not strongly geographically concentrated. Instead, they are (and for the second half of the 20th century, have been) found throughout the country’s largest cities, having migrated there following the conclusion of World War II to take advantage of the Baltic region’s burgeoning industrial centers.30

3. Dominance/autonomy. Ethnic Russians have ruled the territory of present-day Lithuania in two separate spells totaling nearly two centuries. These lands first came under Russian control in the late 18th century, and remained under Russian rule until World War I. Over the course of World War II, Lithuania came under Soviet occupation and was incorporated into the Soviet Union until its independence was re-established in 1991. During both of these periods, the territory of present-day Lithuania was governed by ethnic Russians. Both imperial and Soviet Russia introduced “Russification” policies that favored Russian residents to the exclusion of those from other ethnic backgrounds.31 I therefore consider Latvia’s Russians to possess a history of dominance in the region.

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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid, 53-67; 125-59
C. Belarusians

1. Historicity. Belarusians do not have an extensive historical presence on the lands of modern-day Lithuania. The country’s first post-independence census reveals that only 4,421 were of Belarusian ethnicity, making up 0.2% of the total population. The Belarusian population increased dramatically in the decades following Lithuania’s incorporation into the Soviet Union, with the group growing to 63,169 people and accounting for 1.7% of the total population at the Soviet census of 1989. It is therefore safe to assume that a large majority of Latvia’s present-day Belarusian population is from a migrant—rather than native—background.

2. Territoriality. Since Belarusians are not native to Lithuania, no territorial attachment could have occurred.

3. Dominance/autonomy. Belarusians have never been able to exercise autonomous self-rule, and have never enjoyed a dominant ethnic group status on the territory of present-day Lithuania. Throughout their presence in the region, they have either been part of a state dominated by ethnic Lithuanians (1918-1940; 1991-present) or ethnic Russians (1944-1991). I therefore do not consider Belarusians to possess a history of dominance/autonomy.

X. Macedonia

The modern Macedonian state was established on September 8th, 1991 and officially recognized in April of 1993.

A. Albanians

1. Historicity. The 1991 Yugoslav census, conducted in the year that Macedonia declared independence, reveals that 21.7% of the future state’s population was ethnically Albanian. As early as 1948, Albanians in the region already constituted a substantial ethnic minority (17.1%) of total population. Therefore, it seems straightforward to classify Albanians as a native group.

2. Territoriality. Historical population maps throughout the 20th century reveal that the northwestern portion of the present-day state of Macedonia has long been an Albanian stronghold, with Albanians constituting upwards of 50% of the population in many settlements. This indicates that ethnic Albanians are territorially attached to that region of Macedonia.

3. Dominance/Autonomy. As a consequence of their conversion to Islam, Albanians enjoyed considerable privileges within the Ottoman Empire, becoming
entrenched in the Ottoman bureaucracy and army; they produced no fewer than 42 Grand Viziers over the course of the empire’s existence. Ethnic Albanians (including those in the region of Macedonia) clearly enjoyed not only cultural autonomy, but also privileges over and above what the empire’s Christian subjects received. I therefore consider Albanians to have a historical background of autonomy/dominance.

B. Turks

1. Historicity. An ethnic Turkish presence in the lands currently comprising the Republic of Macedonia has existed ever since the conquest of the area by Ottoman forces. According to the Yugoslav census of 1991, conducted in the year Macedonia declared independence, Turks constituted 3.8% of the population. Earlier censuses throughout the 20th century reveal an even more substantial Turkish presence in the region. Clearly, the Turkish minority is of a native—rather than migrant—background.

2. Territoriality. Classifying ethnic Turks on the territoriality dimension is somewhat difficult. On the one hand, it is clear that the strongest concentration of ethnic Turks is to be found in the West-central part of the state, where Turks constitute a majority in the municipalities of Plasnica and Centar Zupa. On the other hand, there is a smattering of Turks elsewhere in the country, most notably in the southwestern region. These present-day characteristics are representative of much earlier settlement patterns. While it is difficult to make a judgment in this case, ultimately I classify the Turkish minority as territorially attached, due its strongholds of Plasnica and Centar Zupa.

3. Dominance/autonomy. Turks were the dominant ethnic group within the Ottoman Empire. Not only did they belong to the most favored confessional community in the empire, but they were also the ethnic group that dominated the Ottoman Porte. Thus, it seems reasonable to classify ethnic Turks as having a dominant historical background.

C. Serbs

1. Historicity. Serbian settlement in the area predates the formation of the modern Macedonian state. Serbs constituted 2.1% of the region’s population at the last Yugoslav census in 1991, and had constituted as much as 3% earlier in the 20th century. Thus, Serbs can be viewed as native to the Republic of Macedonia.

2. Territoriality. Although Serbs can be found in other parts of the country, they are mostly clustered along the northern border with Serbia; almost all of the municipalities with a substantial Serb population either border Serbia or are within a very short distance from it. This concentration is a long-standing artefact of Serb settlement in the Black Forest of Skopje region. I therefore classify Serbs as exhibiting territorial

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32 The Grand Vizier was second-in-command after the sultan in the Ottoman Empire, and occasionally more powerful and influential than the sultan himself.
attachment.

3. Dominance/autonomy. Serbs experienced the privilege of being the most influential ethnic group within the territory of modern-day Macedonia under the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) that existed between the First and Second World Wars. Although the kingdom was a multi-national state formed with popular support in almost all of its constituent territories, Belgrade held “the upper hand” in its creation and governance. The post-World War II Socialist Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia afforded Serbs living in the region what can at the very least be considered a status of equality and cultural autonomy. I therefore consider Serbs in the region to have a historical background of dominance/autonomy.

XI. Montenegro

The modern state of Montenegro was established in 2006, as the results of a referendum held in May of that year which led to a declaration of independence from Serbia.

A. Bosniaks/Muslims

1. Historicity. According to the 2003 Montenegrin census, conducted three years prior to the formation of the Montenegrin state, 7.8% of the region’s population consisted of Bosniaks, with an additional 4% declaring themselves to be (Slavic) Muslims. Thus, the combined Slavic Muslim population of the state was 11.8%. On this basis, I consider Bosniaks and (Slavic) Muslims to be a native minority group.

2. Territoriality. Figure A.9 below is a map of the largest ethnic group in each of Montenegro’s municipalities in 2003, with predominantly Bosniak and Muslim regions colored in green. It is evident that this group is concentrated in the Plav and Rozaje municipalities which border Albania and Kosovo respectively. There are few Bosniaks/Muslims in regions outside of these two municipalities. Earlier (20th-century) ethnic structure maps reveal that this population concentration pattern is not the result of recent migration but a consequence of long-standing settlement patterns. I therefore consider Bosniaks/(Slavic) Muslims to be possess the trait of territorial attachment.

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3. Dominance/autonomy. As part of the Muslim confessional community under the Ottoman Empire’s *millet* system, Slavic Muslims enjoyed considerable cultural autonomy along with privileged status among other conquered peoples within the empire. In my judgment, this fact provides a sufficient amount of historical capital to promote the legitimacy of self-rule for this people-group. I thus consider Bosniaks/(Slavic) Muslims to have a historical background of autonomy.
B. Albanians

1. Historicity. According to the 2003 Montenegrin census, conducted three years prior to the formation of the Montenegrin state, 5.0% of the region’s population consisted of Albanians. On this basis, I consider Albanians (who currently comprise approximately 4.9% of the state’s population) to be a native minority group.

2. Territoriality. Figure A.10 below is a map of the largest ethnic group in each of Montenegro’s municipalities in 2003, with predominantly Albanian regions colored in brown. It is evident that this group is concentrated in the Ulcinj municipality in the southernmost part of Montenegro, bordering Albania. Other border areas with Albania and Kosovo also exhibit significant concentrations of this ethnic group. There are few Albanians in regions outside of these border regions. Earlier (20th-century) ethnic structure maps reveal that this population concentration pattern is not the result of recent migration but a consequence of long-standing settlement patterns. I therefore consider Albanians to possess the trait of territorial attachment.
3. Dominance/autonomy. As a consequence of their conversion to Islam, Albanians enjoyed considerable privileges within the Ottoman Empire, becoming entrenched in the Ottoman bureaucracy and army; they produced no fewer than 42 Grand Viziers over the course of the empire’s existence. Ethnic Albanians (including those in the region of Montenegro) clearly enjoyed not only cultural autonomy, but also privileges over and above what the empire’s Christian subjects received. I therefore consider Albanians to have a historical background of autonomy/dominance.

34 The Grand Vizier was second-in-command after the sultan in the Ottoman Empire, and occasionally more powerful and influential than the sultan himself.
XII. Romania

The modern Romanian state has its roots in the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1862. The union of the two principalities would later come to be known as Romania, and in 1881 it became the Kingdom of Romania. However, the regions of Moldavia and Wallachia constitute only a small portion of what is today (and was for most of the 20th century) recognized as Romania. Even more relevant for my purposes here, these territories did not include a substantial Hungarian minority, which was only added with the transfer of Transylvania from Austro-Hungarian rule. I therefore consider the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, in which Hungary ceded control of Transylvania, to be the starting point of the modern Romanian state.

A. Hungarians

1. Historicity. Magyar (Hungarian) tribes have lived within the borders of present-day Romania since the 9th century, and had settled the region of Transylvania, in which they would go on to enjoy their strongest territorial concentration, by the 10th century. Ethnic Hungarians maintained a continuous historical presence in the region over the centuries. In the 1930 census, the first conducted following the incorporation of Transylvania into the modern Romanian state, Hungarians constituted 7.9% of the country’s population. By 1948, this percentage had increased to 9.4 due to Romania’s less of several territories where there were few (if any) ethnic Hungarians. However, by 1991 the Hungarian share of the population had declined to 7.1%. Thus, it is clear that the Hungarians who live within Romania’s borders today can trace their descent to a historically native population.

2. Territoriality. As mentioned in the previous section, Romania’s Hungarian population has historically been heavily concentrated in the Transylvania region. Figure A.11 below is an ethnographic map of Romania based on 1930 census data. The regions colored in green are those where ethnic Hungarians constituted a majority of the population. It is evident from this map that Hungarians had a significant presence within Transylvania, and almost no presence in other parts of the country. For this reason, I consider Romania’s Hungarians to exhibit the trait of territorial attachment
3. Dominance/autonomy. The Kingdom of Hungary conquered Transylvania in several stages, concluding in the early 13th century. The Hungarian crown retained control of the region for the next few centuries, before Hungarian influence waned with the rise of the Habsburg Monarchy but increased with the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which established the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Hungary did not cede control of Transylvania until the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire following World War I. Thus, it is evident that ethnic Hungarians have centuries of historical experience in being the ruling ethnic group within the territories of present-day Romania that they inhabit. I therefore consider them to possess the trait of historical dominance.

XIII. Serbia

Determining when the modern Serbian state was established depends on the
criteria upon which statehood hinges. On the one hand, an independent Principality of Serbia existed and was recognized by the Ottoman Porte as early as 1815. On the other, the Serbian state did not obtain full international recognition until the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. I choose to view this latter date as the official beginning of the Serbian state, since it signifies the universal acceptance of the legitimacy of a fully sovereign and independent Serbian state.

A. Hungarians

1. Historicity. The Vojvodina region, which is today home to nearly all of Serbia’s Hungarian population, became a part of the Serbian-dominated Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Kingdom of Yugoslavia) in the aftermath of World War I. Hungarians had settled in the region as early as the 10th century and the territory had been a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire since it had been won back from the Ottoman Empire in 1683. Thus, it is evident. 19th-century censuses report the ethnically Hungarian population of the region to range somewhere between 15 and 23% of the total. Thus, it is evident that Hungarians are native to the Vojvodina and consequently to the territory of modern-day Serbia.

2. Territoriality. As mentioned in the previous section, Serbian Hungarians have, and have always been, concentrated in the province of Vojvodina, encompassing the northernmost part of present-day Serbia. Presented below is the earliest-available demographic map of Serbia that includes Vojvodina, based on data from the 1961 Yugoslav census; Hungarian-majority and Hungarian-plurality areas are colored in dark and light yellow, respectively. It is clear that Hungarians are concentrated in the Vojvodina, and more specifically in its northernmost part, along the Hungarian border. There is no reason to suspect that this has not been the case historically. I therefore consider Hungarians in Serbia to possess the trait of territorial attachment.

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3. *Dominance/autonomy*. The Habsburg Empire seized control of Vojvodina from the Ottoman Empire in 1683\textsuperscript{36} and subsequently reigned in the region for most of the following two-and-a-half centuries. It was only with the demise of Austria-Hungary in 1918 that Vojvodina passed into Serbian hands. It is therefore evident that Hungarians within present-day Serbia have a long history of being the dominant ethnic

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
group within the region of Vojvodina.

B. Bosniaks

1. Historicity. Most of Serbia’s present-day Bosnian population resides in the Sandžak region, which itself was a part of the Bosnia eyalet (administrative division) of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the Sandžak region is historically and ethnically closer to Bosnia-Herzegovina than to Serbia. It is therefore appropriate to view Serbia’s Bosnian population as native to the state.

2. Territoriality. As mentioned in the previous section, Serbia’s Bosnian population is heavily concentrated in the Sandžak region. Figure A.13 below is the earliest-available demographic map of Serbia, based on data from the 1961 Yugoslav census; Muslim (that is, Bosnian)-majority areas are colored in green. The only majority-Bosnian municipality is that of Tutin, in the Sandžak region, and almost no Bosnians live outside of Sandžak. Also as mentioned in the previous section, Bosnian settlement in the area is centuries-old and clearly pre-dates the formation of the modern Serbian state. I therefore consider Bosnians in Serbia to possess the trait of territorial attachment.

3. Dominance/autonomy. As part of the Muslim confessional community under the Ottoman Empire’s millet system, Slavic Muslims enjoyed considerable cultural autonomy along with privileged status among other conquered peoples within the empire. In my judgment, this fact provides a sufficient amount of historical capital to engender the legitimacy of self-rule for this people-group. Additionally, the region of Sandžak, where Bosnians are concentrated, was long part of the Bosnia elayet (administrative
region) of the Ottoman Empire, which enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy than other parts of the Empire. I thus consider Bosnians in Serbia to have a historical background of autonomy/dominance.

XIV. Slovakia

The modern Slovak state traces its beginnings to the formation of the Czechoslovak state following World War I. However, since Czechoslovakia did not recognize separate “Czech” and “Slovak” nationalities, and since Czechs were the most numerous and influential ethnic group within it, it is hard to view 1918 as the beginning of Slovakia. Alternative dates for the state’s origin are 1939, when the First Slovak Republic was established (although this was a war-time state) and 1993, when Slovakia declared independence from Czechoslovakia. Ultimately, the choice of date is rather immaterial with respect to the state’s ethnic minorities, since it does not alter their coding on the historical variables.

A. Hungarians

1. Historicity. Hungarians settled in lands within Slovakia’s present-day borders as early as the 10th century, and retained a continuous presence in the region over the centuries. According to the Czechoslovak census of 1921, Hungarians constituted 5.5% of the state’s population, a percentage that was undoubtedly higher in Slovak lands, where vast majority of Hungarians were to be found. The 1950 Czechoslovak census reveals that Hungarians made up 10.3% of Slovakia’s population. Thus, is evident that ethnic Hungarians had a significant numerical presence within Slovakia even prior to its emergence as an independent state. I therefore consider Hungarians to be a native minority group in the state.

2. Territoriality. Figure A.14 below is an ethnic composition map of the territories of the present-day Slovak state in 1880. Territories where Hungarians constitute a plurality or majority of the population are colored in green. It is evident from the map that Hungarians were then (as they are today) geographically concentrated around Slovakia’s southern border with Hungary. I therefore consider Hungarians in Slovakia to possess the trait of territorial attachment.
3. Dominance/autonomy. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 placed the territory of modern-day Slovakia under the Hungarian part of the dual monarchy that it established. Thus, Hungarians enjoyed the status of a dominant and ruling ethnic group within the region up until the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in World War I. They exercised this status to great effect to stifle a fledgling Slovak nationalist movement. For this reason, I consider Hungarians in Slovakia to possess the historical trait of dominance/autonomy.

XV. Slovenia

The nation-state of Slovenia was established on June 25th, 1991, when it declared independence from Yugoslavia. However, Slovenia was also part of the multi-national Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) between 1918 and 1943. Since the Slovene people joined this state voluntarily, and since they constituted one of its titular ethnicities, I elect to use 1918 (rather than 1991) as the origin of the modern Slovene state.

A. Serbs

1. Historicity. Taking 1918 as the origin of the modern Slovene state, we must consider whether Serbs enjoyed a significant historical presence on Slovene territories prior to that year. Although it was conducted three years later, the first census of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes can shed some light on this question. The census reports that Serbs and Croats combined constituted only 11,898 residents of the 1,054,919 total for Drava Banovina (a province comprising most of present-day Slovenia), or 1.1% of the total. As late as 1948, Serbs only constituted 7,048 (0.5%) of the population of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. The vast majority of Serbs currently residing within Slovenia either migrated there over the second half of the 20th century, attracted by its higher economic development, or are descended from such migrants. By the last Yugoslav census of 1991, Serbs had increased to 47,401 persons, or 2.5% of the population. It therefore seems appropriate to view Serbs as a migrant, rather than native, ethnic group.

2. Territoriality. Since Serbs in Slovenia are a predominantly migrant ethnic group, no territorial attachment could have occurred.

3. Dominance/autonomy. Serbs experienced the privilege of being the most influential ethnic group within the territory of modern-day Slovenia under the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) that existed between the First and Second World Wars. Although the kingdom was a multi-national state formed with popular support in almost all of its constituent territories, Belgrade held “the upper hand” in its creation and governance. The post-World War II Socialist Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia afforded Serbs living in the region what can at the very least be considered a status of equality and cultural autonomy. I therefore consider Serbs in the region to have a historical background of dominance/autonomy.

B. Croats

1. Historicity. Taking 1918 as the origin of the modern Slovene state, we must consider whether Croats enjoyed a significant historical presence on Slovene territories prior to that year. Although it was conducted three years later, the first census of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes can shed some light on this question. The

census reports that Serbs and Croats combined constituted only 11,898 residents of the 1,054,919 total for Drava Banovina (a province comprising most of present-day Slovenia), or 1.1% of the total. As late as 1948, Croats only constituted 16,069 (1.2%) of the population of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. A majority of Croats currently residing within Slovenia either migrated there over the second half of the 20th century, attracted by its higher economic development, or are descended from such migrants. By the last Yugoslav census of 1991, Croats had increased to 52,876 persons, or 2.8% of the population. It therefore seems appropriate to view Croats as a migrant, rather than native, ethnic group.

2. Territoriality. Since Croats in Slovenia are a predominantly migrant ethnic group, no territorial attachment could have occurred.

3. Dominance/autonomy. Croats living in present-day Slovenia have no historical experience with autonomous self-rule in the region; nor have they enjoyed a spell in which they have ruled the region as a dominant ethnic group. I therefore do not consider Croats to possess a background of dominance/autonomy.

C. Bosnians

1. Historicity. Taking 1918 as the origin of the modern Slovene state, we must consider whether Bosnians enjoyed a significant historical presence on Slovene territories prior to that year. Unfortunately, the first census which reported Bosnian (then designated “Muslim”) citizens was not conducted until 1931. The census reports that Muslims constituted only 927 residents of the 1,114,115 total for Drava Banovina (a province comprising most of present-day Slovenia), or less than 0.1% of the total. There is no reason to believe that the extent of this population was larger in earlier years. A majority of Bosniaks currently residing within Slovenia either migrated there over the second half of the 20th century, attracted by the republic’s higher economic development, or are descended from such migrants. By the last Yugoslav census of 1991, Muslims had increased to 26,577 persons, or 1.4% of the population. It therefore seems appropriate to view Bosniaks as a migrant, rather than native, ethnic group.

2. Territoriality. Since Bosniaks in Slovenia are a predominantly migrant ethnic group, no territorial attachment could have occurred.

3. Dominance/autonomy. Bosnians living in present-day Slovenia have no historical experience with autonomous self-rule in the region; nor have they enjoyed any spell in which they have ruled the region as a dominant ethnic group. I therefore do not consider Croatians to possess a background of dominance/autonomy.

XVI. Spain

The modern nation-state of Spain was established in 1812, with the introduction
of Spain’s first constitution.

A. Catalans

1. Historicity. The first uses of the term “Catalan” to describe the inhabitants of what is today the Catalan region date from the late 11th century. Although the region initially inhabited by the Catalan people was more territorially limited than what is today known as Catalonia, conquest and settlement in the 12th and 13th centuries expanded Catalan presence to the lands that are today associated with this people group. It was also during the 13th century that Catalan began to replace Latin as the language of the court and the language of culture, suggesting a genuine cultural distinctiveness. Thus, it appears evident that the Catalan people are a genuinely native minority group, having settled territories of modern-day Spain well in advance of the establishment of the modern Spanish state.

2. Territoriality. Although the region initially inhabited by the Catalan people was more territorially limited than what is today known as Catalonia, conquest and settlement in the 12th and 13th centuries expanded Catalan presence to the lands that are today associated with this people group. To this day, ethnic Catalans in Spain reside primarily within the provinces of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Terragona in the country’s northeastern corner. I therefore consider Spain’s Catalans to possess the trait of territorial attachment.

3. Dominance/autonomy. The Catalan people have a rich—if temporally distant—history of autonomous self-rule. The first genuinely Catalan state was a feudal one established by Ramon Berenguer I, Count of Barcelona, around 1070. It was this state, unified with the crown of Aragon, that successfully re-conquered much of Spain from Muslim control. By the 13th and 14th centuries, the Catalan state was so developed that it may have been “the one country to which it would be least incorrect… to apply the apparently anachronistic [term] of… nation state.” Thus, we can consider Spain’s Catalan minority to possess historical experience with autonomy.

B. Basques

1. Historicity. The Basques were identified as a separate people-group possibly as early as the 1st century, and by the sixth century they had spread to most of the territories that today constitute the geographical region of the Basque Country. The

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42 Ibid, p. 8
44 Ibid, p. 4
Basque people continuously populated these territories from the 6th to the 19th century, which saw the emergence of the modern Spanish state. Therefore, I consider Basques to be a native minority group.

2. Territoriality. Although during early Roman times the Basque population was largely confined to the modern province of Navarre, a 6th-century expansion resulted in Basques settling in other areas in northern Spain and southwestern France that are today collectively recognized as the Basque Country. This region has been a historical stronghold for the Basque people from the and to this day remains the area within Spain that contains by far the largest number of Euskara (Basque) speakers. I therefore consider Basques to possess the trait of territorial attachment.

3. Dominance/autonomy. Although the Basque people’s experience with autonomous self-rule was brief and historically distant, it has proved sufficient to stoke the flames of Basque nationalism since the 19th century. Although the Basque-dominated Kingdom of Navarre came into existence in 824, it was not until the 11th century that all of what is today known as the Basque country came under the rule of a single Navarran king. This happened between the years of 1004 and 1035, during the reign of Sancho Garces III. The extent to which this was a genuinely “Basque” kingdom is debatable. On the one hand, Sancho was undoubtedly a Euskara (Basque) speaker, as were most of his subjects. On the other, he did not officially proclaim himself as the king of the Basques, but rather the king of Spain. But regardless of whether the Kingdom of Navarre was “Basque” in any meaningful sense, it is the way that the kingdom is viewed by the Basque people themselves that matters, since what we are concerned with here is the social psychology of the group. And when we put the question that way, it is clear that the historical experience of the Kingdom of Navarre has played a significant role in stoking the imagination of Basque nationalism. For this reason, I consider the Basques to possess the trait of historical autonomy.

XVII. United Kingdom

The modern state of the United Kingdom was established in two stages. First, the Acts of Union 1707 led to the unification of the Kingdom of England and Kingdom of Scotland into the single kingdom of Great Britain. Slightly less than a century later, the Act of Union 1800 united the Kingdom of Great Britain with the Kingdom of Ireland to produce the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Although the United Kingdom would cede a substantial portion of Ireland in 1922 to form the free Irish state, it did retain the northernmost portion (today Northern Ireland). I therefore use 1800 as the date for the establishment of the UK.

47 Ibid.
49 Ibid, p. 27
50 Ibid
A. Scots

1. Historicity. There is no doubt as to whether Scots are native to the territory of the United Kingdom. Proto-Scottish people-groups inhabited northern Britain in pre-Roman times, and a united Kingdom of Scotland was established in the 9th century AD.

2. Territoriality. The question of the Scots’ territorial attachment is also rather straightforward, as they have historically been centered in northern Britain, the territory of the Kingdom of Scotland and the territory in which Scots predominate until today. I therefore consider the Scottish people to possess the trait of territorial attachment.

3. Dominance/autonomy. A unified Kingdom of Scotland existed from 843 to 1707, when the Kingdom of Scotland united with the Kingdom of England to establish the Kingdom of Great Britain. While the Kingdom of Scotland’s territories expanded and contracted over time, it mostly ruled over the northern third of the island of Britain, the same territory in which today’s ethnic Scots are concentrated. I therefore consider Scots to have historical experience with autonomous self-rule.

B. Welsh

1. Historicity. Similarly to the Scots, there is no doubt about the native character of the Welsh in the United Kingdom. Celtic Britons settled the territory of modern Wales as early as the Iron Age. Following the retreat of the Roman Empire from Britain in the 5th century, linguistic and cultural splintering began to take place within Britain, with the Welsh constituting one of the largest sub-groups. By the 11th century, the Welsh were largely viewed as a separate ethno-linguistic group from other Britons. Therefore, it is clear that the Welsh should be viewed as a native minority group.

2. Territoriality. The Welsh have historically inhabited the western portion of central southern Great Britain, bordered by England to the east and by the sea in all other directions. Figure A.15 below presents the territory of Wales in 1688, 19 years prior to the establishment of the Kingdom of Great Britain. The territory very closely resembles that of modern-day Wales. I therefore conclude that the Welsh possess the trait of territorial attachment.
3. Dominance/autonomy. The Welsh people enjoyed autonomy under the Principality of Wales which existed between 1216 and 1536 and encompassed most of the lands of present-day Wales. This autonomy was most significant in the period from its foundation to its annexation to the English crown in 1284, when the Principality enjoyed a de facto independent status, similar to that possessed by the Kingdom of Scotland at the time.\textsuperscript{51} I therefore consider Wales to possess historical experience with autonomous self-rule.

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