ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN ASIA BEFORE THE CRIMEAN WAR

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ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY IN ASIA BEFORE THE CRIMEAN WAR

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Introduction.

"A Road to India!" This slogan has often aroused the Europeans to supreme efforts. Alexander of Macedon, with dauntless courage, opened the way in ancient times, yet it was not until the beginning of the modern era that men were actually able to follow. However, from the days when Columbus ventured forth on an unknown sea, until the present time when we see the Germans ambitious to extend their control as far as India, all European nations having great commercial interests, have vied with each other, not only to control a highway thither, but also to possess this land which Nature has so uniquely endowed.

Three well-known highways, leading directly from Europe to India, seem to have been laid out naturally, one via Suez and the Red Sea, a second over the ancient road through Aleppo, Bagdad and the Persian Gulf, and a third from the Caspian across Turkestan and Afghanistan. Many accounts have been written concerning the keen rivalry that has developed between Russia and Great Britain since the middle of the nineteenth century, to control all or even one of these routes, — a rivalry checked only by the preparation for the present World War. These writers use various dates, including 1839, 1853, and 1864, as the time of the beginning of the real struggle. However, long before the earliest date, both of these countries were strong Empires and had long held Asiatic possessions. Moreover, in European

5. Foulke, W.D., "Slav or Saxon", p.49.
politics we find a long list of events in which the Anglo-Saxons and the Slavs were on opposite sides. The question arises as to how far this rivalry existed in connection with their Asiatic interests, and its investigation down to the beginning of the Crimean War is the purpose of this Study.

Chapter I.

THE RUSSIANS AND ENGLISH IN ASIA BEFORE 1880.

The early Russians and English were alike in that both had commercial instincts and also individual ambition. Yet as to race, religion, mode of thought, and form of government they were natural opponents.1 Another contrast was in the geographical endowments of their countries. Russia's area was much more extensive, which tended to keep her population scattered. Again, the lack of seaports that were not blocked in winter, or under the military control of some other nation, served as a great handicap. Krausse says; "This want of seaboard forms a very prominent factor in Russian history and is largely responsible for the dearth of intercourse between Russia and other nations, with its accompaniment of lack of progress, as well as serving as an incentive to the constant seizure of new territory with the view of practically working a way toward a maritime outlet which will serve to put the country on a parity with other nations."2

A glance at the map will show that Russia belongs geographically to Asia, the only real barrier being the Caucasus mountains. The rivers flow southward and eastward so that it is not strange that the people with their nomadic instincts naturally drifted from the ice-bound coasts toward sunnier climes.

Very soon after the Russians were freed from the fear of Mongol domination in the latter half of the fifteenth century, they began to look toward Asia. During the reign of Vassilli III (1505-1533)

1. Krausse, Alexis, "Russia in Asia" 298
2. Ibid., 3
a pillaging race of Cossacks annexed the Western Urals. Part of this range is so low-lying that soon many raiders crossed to attack the Asiatics. The first marked success was in 1581, when Strogonooff, who was sent by Ivan the Terrible to search for gold, took Sibir, the capital of Kirghiz, with the help of these Cossacks. Meantime some farming folk were pushing down the Volga in search of new lands. The Tsar supported them with his army and in 1552 Kazan was taken and soon the Russian forces were in Astrakhan.

These victories led the Russian traders to push on and on, enduring many hardships as they traversed the Siberian steppes or made their way from oasis to oasis in Central Asia. In 1587 Tobolsk was founded, in 1604 Tomsk marked their progress, and by 1638 some had pushed on to Okhotsk. This advance was not unopposed. Especially were the Chinese alarmed, for they claimed the suzerainty of that section. In 1684, they demanded immediate evacuation, but the Russians decided to try to defend their holdings. However, in 1689 the Tsar sent representative to fix the boundaries by a formal treaty. This treaty of Nerchinsk shut off Russia from the Pacific for over a century and marks one of the few instances when Muscovy gave up foreign territory she had once occupied.

About the same time the Cossacks made a desperate effort to instigate trade relations with the Khivans in Central Asia but due to the strength of the latter and the unfavorable climatic conditions this was, for a time, a failure.

3. Skrine, F.H.R. and Ross, E.D., "The Heart of Asia." 238. 4. Ibid., 236. 5. Krausse, Alexia, "Russia in Asia." 323. 6. Ibid., 34, 37, 40. 7. Ibid., 41. For text of this treaty see Appendix 330-331. 8. Ibid., 55.
In 1689, Russia came under the rule of that ambitious Tsar who wished to extend its influence both east and west. Rumors of the wealth of Asia led Peter the Great to send envoys in 1715 to find which rivers flowed into the Caspian, by which they could get to the sea, and whether any rivers rising in India flowed into the sea. They concluded that the Oxus formerly flowed into the Caspian and planned to restore its course so that they could get to Khiva by boat from Astrakhan. To do this Prince Bekovitch was sent, but he allowed the Khan of Khiva to deceive him and the whole army was either killed or enslaved.  

In his designs on the regions west of the Caspian, Peter had better success. In 1722 by demanding compensations from the Shah of Persia because Russian merchants had been robbed, he made a "pretext for war to seize Derbend, and himself commanded the expedition which descended the Volga." The result was that the Russians occupied Derbend and Baku and took possession of Daghestan and other provinces of the Caucasus. Ten years later Persia regained these provinces for a time but this did not quiet Russian ambition.

During the remainder of the eighteenth century the Muscovites were almost wholly engrossed in either European conflicts or domestic problems. Only in the reign of Catherine II do we find any trace of Asiatic designs. It is related that when the commerce of Bengal was disturbed by the advance of Hyder Ali beyond the Orixa, 

11. Ibid., 36.

During the rest of the century Georgia is alternately controlled by Russia and Persia. In 1800 under the latter. Ibid., 44-49.
some merchants from that country went to Siberia seeking new markets. Here they came in contact with some Russians who learned from them of the wealth of India. Consequently in 1783 an expedition was sent down the Caspian with the hope of reaching that country. The account further states that altho this attempt failed the plan was not abandoned.  

Then in the latter part of her reign, Catherine sent an army of about 40,000 men to avenge the loss of her subjects in Georgia. They overran the region south of the Caspian and camped for the winter on the plains of Mogam. Catherine's death in the midst of these ambitions defeated this plan also, for her successor immediately recalled the army from Persia.  

While the Slavs were making these invasions into northern and western Asia, we find that the Anglo-Saxons were getting a hold in the southern part. Like the other peoples of Europe who bought goods from India, the English were not satisfied to stay at the "Western terminals." Therefore in the sixteenth century we find them endeavoring to establish their own trade routes.  

Whatever may be said of Anglo-Russian rivalry later, in the middle of the sixteenth century the leaders of the British-Muscovy Company bound for India went via Russia with not only the Tsar's permission but with his "safe-conduct" for the journey to Central Asia. Of these Jenkinson went the farthest, but his limits were Bokhara in 1558, and Kasvin in 1562. His turning back was due to disappointment in the trade profits in those cities. India was to be reached by a different route and at a later time.

Not until 1579 did the first Englishman, Thomas Stephens, arrive in India. Then by 1600, the East India Company, rounding the Cape, began its well known career of commerce and conquest. In 1612 they secured their first settlement on the mainland of India at Surat. By driving out the Portuguese who had been there a century before and by contending with the French who came just a few years after them, as well as by subduing the natives, the English trade and control gradually developed. In 1690, they held the three important ports of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. In 1745, the rivalry with the French developed into a war. The decisive battle fought by Clive at Plassey, June 23, 1757, is said to mark the beginning of the British Empire in the East. In 1774 Warren Hastings, as the first governor-general, began to organize the empire Clive had founded. "In 1798, Lord Mornington, better known as the Marquis Wellesley, arrived in India, already inspired with imperial projects that were destined to change the map of the country. From the first he laid down as his guiding principle that the British must be the one paramount power in the peninsula and that the native princes could only retain the insignia of sovereignty by surrendering the substance of independence."

Thus before 1800 both the Russians and the British were endeavoring to extend their trade facilities by getting footholds in the eastern continent. Yet miles and miles of deserts interspersed with oases and mountains so separated the two sections that there was little real concern on the part of either over the advance of the other.

Chapter II.

ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN THE NAPOLEONIC PERIOD

The dawn of the nineteenth century found Europe in a state of wonder and alarm over the activities of Napoleon Bonaparte. After a brilliant campaign in Italy, he had conquered Egypt, and in 1799 advanced into Syria, seeming to intend to make his way to India. Here however, he was checked by the British and the Turks and presently went back to France, leaving his army in Egypt. The extent of European concern is seen in the unusual alliance of Russia. Turkey, England, and Austria, made against the powerful leader.

Plans were laid to surround France with their forces but soon Paul became disgusted with his treatment both by Austria and by England.

Napoleon took advantage of this by using measures to widen the breach. First, when the English refused to exchange French for Russian prisoners, Napoleon sent the Russians back to Paul, newly clothed and armed, without exchange, and second, he offered to recognize Paul as "Grand Master" in Malta. The Tsar, moreover, "with his usual impetuosity, was possessed by a daily increasing passion for Bonaparte; he surrounded himself with his portraits, drank his health publicly, and abruptly ordered Louis XVIII to quit Mittau."

Among the schemes of this new alliance in 1800, we find evi-

3. Ibid., 197. Austria had failed to aid the Russian general, and the English who were about to take the island of Malta, where Paul claimed rights, said they were going to keep it.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., 198. Paul had given Louis XVIII an asylum at Mittau, 187.
6. Waliszewski, in his "Life of Paul I," 369-371, states that while there may have been secret communications between Paul and Napoleon, he can find no documents in the archives to prove that the two "concerted an expedition against India." Yet in referring to Paul he writes: "No doubt he decreed and put in execution an expedition to India;" and concerning his ally: "Bonaparte certainly had such an expedition in his mind and did not require Paul's suggestion."
dence of one to overthrow the British in India. As the French still occupied Egypt and were influential in several Indian states the time seemed favorable. The plan, which appears to have been made entirely by Paul, provided that a Russian army should go via Khiva and Bokhara to the Upper Indus, and that another made up of French and Russians should go thru Persia via Herat and Kandahar. When instructing his officers, Paul said: "India, to which I send you, is governed by a supreme head called the Great Mogul, and a number of small sovereigns. The English possess commercial establishments there, which they have acquired by means of money or conquered by force of arms; my object is to ruin these establishments, and to put the oppressed sovereigns in the same state of dependence on Russia as they are at present towards England. Be sure to remember that you are only at war with the English and the friend of all who do not give them help." When Napoleon questioned how the troops were to cross the deserts of Asia, Paul replied that caravans crossed every year in 35 or 40 days, and so could they, since the men were so brave.

The Tsar endeavored to carry out his part of the plan by starting off "despite the inclement season," an army of 40,000 men, and making preparations for the joint army. The band of Cossacks had only gone as far as the plains of Orenburg, when it was recalled because of the assassination of the Tsar (March 23, 1801). Krausse says: "Thus ended the first scheme for the invasion of India, one which, while it was built up on supposition, and included many absurdities, served nevertheless as the groundwork of all those which

have followed it."

Napoleon was greatly disappointed, and vainly tried to insinuate that the English were responsible for the crime. The fact was that Paul's fluctuating foreign policy was very unpopular with his own subjects. One of the first acts of the new Emperor, Alexander I, was to make peace with both England and France, for the people were clamoring for the restoration of their commercial relations. But while such an aggressive leader as Napoleon was in Europe there could be no peace. After an attempt to settle the struggle at Amiens in 1802, it broke out again the next year. Much as Alexander desired peace, he entered the Third Coalition against Napoleon in 1805, with the special agreement with England, arranged by Pitt, whereby subsidies were promised to Russia by the British Government, if she would put a certain number of men in the field.

Very soon Napoleon showed his favorite policy of cunningly making separate agreements with his enemies. After his victory at Friedland, June 14, 1807, over those Russians and Prussians he "dazzled and flattered" Alexander until the latter consented to make peace at the expense of England. The two men met on a raft on the Niemen river and made agreements which led to the Treaty of Tilsit, July 7, 1807. This treaty shows that the Tsar consented to join Napoleon's "Continental System" directed expressly against England. It is thought that a secret treaty was made at the same time whereby the two Emperors arranged to divide the world, giving the West to Napoleon and the East to Alexander. Bonaparte may have regarded

11. Ibid., 276.
much of this as only a scheme to bring the Tsar on his side, nevertheless, in his diary under the date of Feb. 2, 1808, he wrote addressing the Emperor of Russia: "General Savary has just arrived and I have spent many hours with him talking about your Majesty.

"An army of 50,000 men, made up of Russians, of French, perhaps even with a few Austrians marching by way of Constantinople on India, would no sooner reach the Euphrates than England would tremble and be on her knees to the Continent."15 But the campaigns in Spain so absorbed Napoleon's attention that any designs he may have had on India had to be dropped.16

The first article of the secret treaty as later given out is: "Russia shall take possession of European Turkey and shall extend her conquests into Asia as far as she may deem proper."17 The Tsar seemed to consider the agreement seriously and proceeded to act on its authority. On Oct. 31, 1807, he issued a proclamation annulling "forever, every preceding convention between England and Russia."18 There was much speculation in England as to the real projects of Napoleon and Alexander. The Edinburgh Register announced the possibility of a co-operative march thru Persia to strike a "mortal blow" at the English in Hindustan.19

Just what Alexander hoped to accomplish is hard to determine. While no definite plan like Paul's is related, nevertheless we find that the Russians were by no means inactive in Asia during the Napoleonic Period. As has been already noted Alexander recalled

18. "Declaration of Emperor of Russia"-Annual Register, 1807, 761.
Paul's expedition, but his policy in Persia was one of aggression. On Sept. 21, 1801, he issued a proclamation annexing Georgia to his dominions. A month later the English Ambassador at Constantinople warned Mr. Harford Jones, the Ambassador at Teheran, that the Russian advance at Tiflis and Kars seemed to be aimed against their interests in Persia. Also, on July 2, 1803, Mr. Jones wrote to Lord Castlereagh that a report, generally accepted, indicated that the Russians had taken Erivan and Nakitchevan.

Then on April 18, 1804, Mr. Manesty reported to Castlereagh that "notwithstanding the late appearances at Paris and St. Petersburg", he believed there existed "some secret political connexion between the Russian Emperor and the First Consul." He further stated that it was his judgment that the Russian forces in Georgia and Armenia could conquer all Persia. Then it would not be difficult to get control of Afghanistan's inefficient government and to "penetrate the fertile regions of Hindostan." In much this same way the struggle between Russia and Persia dragged along until 1813, "attended with events in which the Asiatic inferiority in military affairs has been conspicuous."

Meantime the situation had changed in Europe. In 1809, Napoleon called on Alexander to fight against the Austrians, which was not to his liking. Moreover, in that same year, still relying on 20. Krausse, A, "Russia in Asia", 110.
22. Lord Castlereagh was Head of the Board of Control, 1802-1805, and afterward served as Sec'y. of War and Colonies.
23. Ibid., 179.
24. Ibid., 252-256. Mr. Manesty was in Persia under the command of Wellesley.
25. Annual Register 1813, 198.
the Tilsit Treaty, the Tsar had attempted to seize the Danubian provinces of Turkey. This led to a war in which Napoleon not only refused to help, but diplomatically hindered his former ally.  

This war finally ended with the Treaty of Bucharest (May 28, 1812). The gains that came to Russia from this agreement were due to British and not to French diplomacy.  

These and other experiences had shown Alexander that Bonaparte was only using him for his own interests. Added to this was the dissatisfaction of the mercantile classes of Russia because their trade had been cut off with England.  

So, once again, on Aug. 1, 1813, a treaty of alliance was made between Russia and Great Britain.  

This put the English in an awkward position in Persia, for they had heeded the Shah's request to allow British officers to lead her troops against the Russians, who now were their allies. Consequently Sir Gore Ouseley, one of these officers, proceeded to act as a mediator to arrange a Treaty. Russia's demands on Persia were so great that only a Secret Article promising satisfaction would induce the Shah to sign.  

This Treaty, known as the Treaty of Gulistan was concluded Oct. 12, 1813. By it Russia gained many rights, including the holding of conquered territory and the exclusive right to have war-ships on the Caspian Sea.  

27. Ibid., 21.  
28. Urquhart, David, "Progress of Russia in West, North and South," 293.  
30. Annual Register, 1812, 381.  
31. Krause, "Russia in Asia", 111.  
33. State Papers-British and Foreign V, 1109-1113 (French) Krause, A., "Russia in Asia", App. 332-335 (Trans.)
The activities of Napoleon so dominate the period 1800-1815 that other events are overshadowed. Neither England nor Russia had much energy to give to Asiatic affairs, yet their interests in that continent were not forgotten. The Russians, in their non-demonstrative way, so made their gains that few Englishmen, except those on the ground, were alarmed. The people in England based their views on the open plans of Bonaparte and Paul. Perhaps the most radical of these were represented in the Quarterly Review, which declared that these Emperors thought of striking the British in India as a war-measure, but on account of the English strength in the East and the difficulties of the frontier countries, "no wise government can ever meditate an expedition to India for its own sake." 34

Chapter III.

THE EASTERN QUESTION AND THE ASIATIC STRUGGLE 1815-1841.

The Treaty between Russia and Persia in 1813 marked the beginning of a period of several years in which there was comparatively little European strife in Central Asia. This was probably due, in part at least, to the controversies in the Levant. The Napoleonic wars had brought the Russians into contact with western civilization, and so developed their foreign trade that the desire for commercial highways was stronger than ever. Since her earliest days Russia had longed to control the Straits to the Mediterranean and her history includes almost a chain of conflicts over these with her neighbor the Turk.

Since making the Treaty of Bucharest in 1813, both parties had failed to keep some of their promises, so another conflict was pending. When, however, in 1821 the Greek patriots arose against the Ottoman Empire, Alexander, influenced by Metternich, at first offered to aid the Sultan. But it was not long until he repented. Some atrocities of the Turks and the Russian sympathy for their co-religionists, added to the traditional enmity, resulted in the Tsar's sending an ultimatum to the Porte, in which he demanded a number of privileges. To this the Sultan made no reply, so on July 27, 1821, diplomatic relations were severed. War would have resulted immediately had not Alexander realized that "he would be opposed by Europe, which might unite to wrest Turkey from his grasp." The most interested observer was England, whose ambassadors used every effort to stay the Tsar's hand.

1 Skrine, F.H., "Expansion of Russia," 51.
2 Ibid., 68.
3 Ibid., 69-70.
February 17, 1826, Wellington wrote to Bathurst that from the Greek insurrection there would probably come a "general war" in which Russia and France would expect gains. "I cannot understand", he observed, "the meaning of the benefit which we are to derive from the establishment in the Mediterranean of an efficient naval Power which is likewise Continental.----Can naval affairs in the Mediterranean be better for us than they are? The Turks, powerless in themselves, close that sea to all who might have the means or inclination of using it, and we are, in fact, the masters of its navigation." Yet because he doubted Parliamentary support for active hostility at that time, the Duke urged an attempt to arrange a settlement between Greece and Turkey as the best solution of the situation.

In keeping with this suggestion the new Emperor of Russia, Nicholas I, departed from the resolution made by Alexander just before his death in 1825 to declare war on Turkey, by making proposals to Great Britain for "common action." The result was the Treaty of London made by Great Britain, Russia, and France on July 6, 1827, whereby the three nations agreed to stand for the autonomy of Greece within the Turkish Empire. A combined fleet was already in the Levant and on Oct. 20th answered the Sultan's refusal, albeit irregularly, with a defeat at Navarino, which saved the Greeks.

4. Despatches and Correspondence, III, 113-115. Wellington was then Envoy to St. Petersburg and Bathurst was Sec'y of War and Colonies.
6. Ibid., 99.
7. State Papers, XIV., 632ff; Annual Register, 1827, 405; "Map of Europe by Treaty"; Edited by Hertslet, I, 769-774.
8. Annual Register, 1827, 317.
Meantime a war had developed in Asia. Russia's frontier, though undefined, roughly followed the river Aras west of the Caspian and a line from Astrakhan via Orenburg east along the southern boundary of Siberia. The greatest advance in recent years had been in the Caucasus and it was there that the Shah claimed that the Russians occupied Persian territory. When Nicholas came to the throne he tried to fix the boundary but Abbas Mirza, heir to the Persian crown, played a double part with the Russian representative, Prince Menzikoff. Relying on the discontent of Russia's new subjects and the loyalty of all Mohammedans, he invited revolts while pretending to negotiate. Therefore on Sept. 28, 1826, when Menzikoff perceived the real situation, Russia issued a declaration of war.

Another resource on which the Persians had depended was help from the British. On Nov. 25, 1814, a "Treaty of Friendship and Alliance" had been signed at Teheran, by which, if a European Power were at war with Persia, the English were to use their "good offices to bring peace, or if this failed, to help with arms or with a subsidy. Yet when the appeal for aid reached England the ministers were greatly puzzled. On Nov. 21, 1826, Wellington wrote to Canning: "I have perused the papers in the box regarding the dispute between the Emperor of Russia and the King of Persia and it appears to me that, although the original provocation was given by the Emperor by seizure in time of peace of the districts of Gochelee and Balickdoo, avowedly belonging to the King of Persia, the existing

10. Annual Register, 1826, 284-287.
hostilities are to be attributed to the latter." Yet Wellington felt that they were bound to take some action on account of the provision of the Treaty and also the fact that the Persians had suffered because of the failure of the British to do more for them when mediating in 1813. Furthermore, Wellington declared, "we have a real interest in the preservation of the independence and integrity of the Persian monarchy: It will not answer, then, to allow the Persian monarchy to be destroyed, particularly upon a case of which the original aggression and injustice is undoubtedly on the side of the Russians." His recommendation was to mediate but not to give aid or money.

The English were not willing just then to be led into a war with Russia to save Persia, so they proceeded to put their own interpretation on the Treaty and replied that since the disputed territory was "uninhabited ground" the case was not one of "aggression contemplated in the Treaty of Teheran." Thus, "Persia rushed into war without a sufficient motive: and, as she brot to it neither adequate resources, nor sufficient preparation, she could not promise herself that the result would be favorable. The Persian army was trained by British officers; but when it was marched to attack the Russian frontier, the British charge'd'affaires forbade them to follow it." In the first days

13. Ibid., 466.
14. Ibid., 539.
16. Annual Register, 1836, 287.
of the war the Persians were victorious but as they were left to
themselves this was soon over and by Oct. 15, 1826, the Russians
were winning. Success continued with the latter for over a year
when the Shah begged for peace. On Feb. 28, 1828, the Treaty of
Turkomanchai was concluded, whereby Russia gained that "for which
she would make war on all mankind, increase of territory, and
payment of her expenses." 18

The settlement of the Persian War again allowed Russia to give
her undivided attention to her differences with Turkey. The rival-
ry between these two countries was evident on every hand. Vis-
count Strangford suggested early in 1828 that the "true fears of
the Turks point to Asia, their 'own soil'—and that of the Prophet
and the Faith". The fears have been powerfully excited
by the progress of the Russians on the side of Persia. Let the Porte be assured that if she agrees to the Treaty (Of July
6, 1827) as it now stands, the Allies will be satisfied, and that
they will guarantee her Asiatic dominions from any aggression on
the part of European Powers." 19

On the other hand Nicholas accused the Turks of offering aid
to the Persians in the recent conflict. So, in spite of the Treaty
of London, these inimical feelings, added to the usual hostilities,
resulted in a declaration of another war on April 26, 1828. 20

The cunning of the Russians is obvious from the claim that this
step was not a departure from her agreement in the Alliance of

17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 1828, 218.
1827. The English statesmen were again alarmed. Peel noted that the Russian admirals were neutrals or belligerents just as it suited their purposes, and Ellenborough wrote: "I feel very anxious on the subject of the progress of the Russians in that quarter (Eastern shore of Black Sea). I feel a presentiment that, step by step as the Persian monarchy is broken up, they will extend their influence and advance their troops -------- till, without quarrelling with us, they have crept on to Cabul, where they may at their leisure prepare a force for the invasion of India."

As the declaration of war caused apprehension on the part of the English, much more did the Treaty of Peace signed at Adrianople Sept. 14, 1839. Especially Article IV by which the Porte gave Russia all she claimed in Asiatic Turkey and Article VII giving Russian merchant vessels free use of the Straits, were regarded with deep concern. Oct. 31, 1829, the Earl of Aberdeen wrote to Count Nesselrode pointing out how Nicholas had broken faith in making such a treaty. Among the charges we find that his promises denying his ambition for conquest and his wish to endanger the independence of Turkey, certainly did not correspond with his territorial acquisitions, or the commercial privileges secured. He also stated, that "the cession of the Asiatic Fortresses with their

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21 Annual Register, 1838, 410. In the official declaration of war it was stated that; "Lastly Russia though at war with the Porte, for reasons which are independent of the Convention of the 6th of July, has not departed, and will not depart, from the stipulations of the act." Ibid.

22 Despatches and Correspondence of Duke of Wellington, V, 598.

23 Ibid., VI, 100.

24 State Papers, British and Foreign, XVI, 647 ff., Hertslet's "Map of Europe by Treaty", I, 813-831; Annual Register, 1829, 475-483. By Art. IV the Porte gave up islands of the Danubian delta together with Poti, Anapa, Akhalzikh and Akhalkali in Asiatic Turkey.
neighboring districts, not only secures Russia the uninterrupted occupation of the Eastern Coast of the Black Sea, but places her in a situation so commanding as to control at pleasure the destiny of Asia Minor."

One armed conflict after another is the history of the Levant during this period. In all of these Russia keenly seized any opportunity to further her policy, while her rival Great Britain was by no means a passive spectator. In 1832, Constantinople was in immediate danger of an attack by an army sent by Mehemet Ali of Egypt, one of Turkey's own vassals. In his plight the Sultan turned to England. However, when the appeal came Palmerston was unwilling to send help lest the French should ally themselves with Mehemet Ali. Besides this the British fleet was preparing to blockade the coast of the Netherlands, so no aid was sent. But just then the Tsar, not willing that any power stronger than the Porte should rule in Constantinople, offered his assistance, which the Sultan in his dire need could not refuse. This alliance soon succeeded in checking the on-coming army. The European Powers were now aroused, for with Russia as an actor the plot was decidedly changed. The British, French, and Austrian ambassadors begged the Sultan to offer Mehemet acceptable peace terms and arranged to bring the British and French fleets to the Eastern Mediterranean. Finally on May 15, 1833, such a settlement was reached. Concerning this, Palmerston explained the policy of his nation in a letter dated March 31, 1833. "The terms", he wrote "to be imposed on the

25. State Papers, British and Foreign XXVI, 1297-1299.
27. Broderich and Fotheringham, 393.
28. Ibid., 394.
Pasha are good, inasmuch as he does not get Damascus or Aleppo, and so has not the avenues of Mesopotamia--------. His real design is to establish an Arabian kingdom, including all the countries in which Arabic is the language. There might be no harm in such a thing in itself; but as it would necessarily imply the dismemberment of Turkey, we could not agree to it. Besides, Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to India as an active Arabian sovereign would be. We must try to help the Sultan in organizing his army, navy and finances: and if he can get those three departments in good order he may still hold his ground."

Moreover, Russia's real design was manifested in the reward claimed for her services in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, July 8, 1833. Its provisions included, first, the closing of the Dardanelles to the Warships of other nations, and second, a defensive alliance of Turkey and Russia that was to last eight years and then to be renewed. As usual the British were displeased and the following word was sent to St. Petersburg, "That treaty appears to His Majesty's Government to produce a change in the relations between Turkey and Russia, to which other European States are entitled to object; and the undersigned is instructed to declare that, if the stipulations of that Treaty should hereafter lead to the armed interference of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey, the British government will hold itself at liberty to act upon such an occasion, in any manner which the circumstances of the moment may appear to require, equally as if the Treaty above mentioned were not

29. Letter to Hon. Wm. Temple (British Minister at Naples) in Bulwer's "Life of Palmerston", II, 145.
in existence."

In Circassia, where the Russians were carrying on campaigns, a minor incident took place in 1838 which served to augment further in the minds of some Englishmen, suspicions of her rival's designs. The Russians seized an English merchant vessel, known as the "Vixen," with a cargo of salt. The charges were that the owner had not paid the custom's duty and also that he had brought ammunition for the revolting Circassians. A firm denial was made of the latter charge, and as to the former, the claim was that Russia had no authority on that coast as the Circassians were independent. In the House of Commons, Mr. Atwood asked if Russia was to receive Circassia as a gift from Turkey, under the Treaty of Adrianople, after having contracted with England to receive "no separate advantage" from Turkey. He further inquired if England was to allow Russia to exterminate the Circassians and thus get possession of a country which would increase her influence in Persia and the East, or if they were to endure the "arrogance" of Russia in the Vixen affair. However, then as on a former occasion when Palmerston had concluded that the government need take no action, the matter was dropped.

As time went on the British became more and more concerned over the Russian control of the Dardanelles. Lord Dudley Stuart declared that it affected (1) national honor, (2) naval supremacy, (3) commercial interests, (4) English influence in Europe, and (5)

32. Annual Register, 1837, 352.
34. Ibid., 1162, June 3, 1837.
35. Ibid., 1913.
security of the possessions in India. Palmerston agreed with him and in June, 1838, wrote to Granville, then ambassador to Paris, that he favored an agreement between England and France for a limited time, to protect Turkish territory against either Nicholas or Mehemet Ali, for he was convinced that such a plan would save Turkey and the peace of Europe. Consequently in 1839, when the Turks, who had attempted to regain Syria, were seriously defeated, the Western Powers sent their fleets into the Dardanelles, Nicholas then saw that the only way to avoid war was to take sides with the other Powers. Even in doing this the Tsar resorted to a bit of diplomacy to separate England and France. "Nor was this difficult, for while France was anxious to make Mehemet Ali independent of the Sultan, Great Britain was resolved to do nothing to break up the Turkish Empire." The English were satisfied when Russia promised to annul the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, but the French still held their ambitions concerning Egypt.

Palmerston urged that for the sake of England's commercial and political interests they should decide whether the four Powers, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England, having failed to persuade France to join them, would or would not unite to protect Turkey. The triumph of Palmerston's policy came in the London Treaty of July 15, 1840, whereby Turkey was put under the protectorate of Europe instead of being a vassal of Russia. Thus we see that England was willing to alienate herself from France to carry out her Eastern

36. Ibid., XXXI, 614, In House of Commons Feb. 19, 1836.
37. Ibid., 647.
40. Ibid.
42. State Papers, British and Foreign, XXVIII, 342-347.
Hertslet's "Map of Europe by Treaty", II, 1008-1012.
policy. Yet France did not care to oppose all Europe, so she returned to the "European Concert," and on July 13, 1841, all five Powers signed the "Convention of the Straits" which gave the Sultan their promise to conform to the ancient Rule of the Ottoman Empire in reference to the passage of the Straits.

"The Times," commenting on this arrangement, said that to have left Russia in control of Constantinople would have been very foolish, for "our trading interests in the Levant would at once be paralyzed by the hostile and prohibitory commercial systems of Russia; our naval influence in the Mediterranean would be opposed by a new and ambitious power, ---------; our Indian empire would be menaced, not from the distant steppes of Khiva, but by the sudden and dreadful downfall of moral influence and the high renown of England throughout the west of Asia."

On Russia's side we find that while the English were aroused over her aggressions, she like her rival was bent only on carrying out her natural policy. Whenever an opportunity presented itself, Russia was not slow to make use of it. "There is a tide in the affairs of nations, as well as of men, and Russia surely took it at the flood; or her course may be compared to that of the gamester, who, finding himself in luck, stakes high and wins all. No human foresight could have prepared for her such a train of success."

43. Ibid., 1024-1026.
State Papers, British and Foreign, XXIX, 703-705.
"So long as the Porte is at Peace, His Highness will admit no Foreign Ship of War into the said Straits." Art.I.
44. August 20, 1840, 4a.
45. "The Times" Jan. 9, 1839, 5d.
Chapter IV.
THE CONTEST IN ASIA 1828-1844.

In 1838, Russia made a great advance toward the goal of her ambition in the Treaty of Turkomanchai. From this time she began to dominate Persian affairs much as the great syndicate controls the small corporation. Not only were the two Khanates, Erivan and Nakitchevan, ceded to her with "full rights and property" and with them the right to navigate the Caspian, but also Persia agreed to pay a large indemnity and to allow Russia a voice as to the succession to the throne.\(^1\) True, Persia went on with her own enterprises and once in a while, as in the massacre of the Russian legation at Teheran in 1829, saw a vision of her former power, only to have it vanish in the reparation demanded at St. Petersburg. Soon, seeing that hostility was only a losing deal, the Shah decided to assume an obliging attitude and thus Russia was doubly favored, as this made it possible to carry out her intrigues.

Persia's would-be guardian in Western Europe was not blind to her new domination. In 1831 Wolff, the missionary, visited Merv and in the following year, Lieutenant Burnes came to Bokhara and both reported that these places were "advanced posts of the panic-mongers."

The long-distance view from Britain gave varied notions as to whether Russia still clung to the ambition for which her Emperor had sought an alliance with Napoleon. Judging from Conolly's

3. Krausse, Alexis, "Russia in Asia", 112.
4. Ibid., 222.
"Overland Journey to India" a writer stated; "India can never be taken by a coup-de main - and it will require a succession of years before Russia could sufficiently advance into the 'bowels of the land' to master any secure position from which to direct ultimate operations." Others thought there was little danger of a march on India as the distance was too great and the country too barren.

Yet we have already noticed how the English zealously guarded the Russian power in the Near East lest her way to India be cut off, and that as early as 1814, the same policy was shown by Article I in the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between Great Britain and Persia. This and other articles of the Treaty still formed the basis of relationship between the two countries. The most striking provisions cited the mutual obligations in time of war. In 1829, to redeem herself for not aiding the Persians in their war with Russia and to relieve Persia's dire need, England paid 200,000 tomauns to the Shah, who in turn annulled two articles of the

5. Quarterly Review, LII, 57.
7. Article I. "The Persian Government judge it incumbent on them after the conclusion of this Definite Treaty, to declare all Alliances contracted with European Nations in a state of hostility with Great Britain null and void, and hold themselves bound not to allow any European army to enter the Persian Territory, nor to proceed toward India, nor to any of the Ports of that country; and also not to allow any individuals of such European Nations, entertaining a design of invading India, or being at enmity with Great Britain, whatever, to enter Persia." State Papers, British and Foreign, Vol. I, Part I, 262. Nov. 25, 1814.
8. Ibid., 263 Arts. V-IX.
9. Webster's Dictionary gives present value of 1 tomaun as $1.78. Formerly worth more.
This was supposed to help pay Persia's indemnity.
When corporations wish to control the affairs of weaker ones a very usual beginning is to secure control of the election or appointment of officials. We have noted that in the Treaty of 1828 there was an article whereby Russia recognized Prince Abbas Meerza as the heir to the throne. Therefore the death of that Prince naturally attracted attention in Russia. Count Nesselrode was too wise not to realize that England was concerned in this too, so he sent word to Viscount Palmerston that he thought it would prevent civil war in Persia if the two nations would agree in reference to Persia's next ruler. On June 16, 1834, Palmerston sent word to St. Petersburg that he had communicated with Persia and now agreed that the choice made by the Russian Envoy of Mohammed Meerza, son of Abbas, was agreeable to His Majesty's Government and that he thought it was fortunate that they could thus agree.

We shall now investigate whether the purposes of this Anglo-Russian concern in the Persian succession were due to general in-

10. State Papers, British and Foreign I. Part I, 262. Articles annulled were:
   Art. III. "The limits of the Territory of the two States of Russia and Persia shall be determined according to the admission of Great Britain, Persia, and Russia."
   Art. IV. If Persia were engaged in a defensive war, England was to pay her 200,000 tomauns annually to equip the army.
11. See Note 1 above.
12. State Papers - British and Foreign, XXIII, 860.
13. Ibid., 861.
Urquhart blamed Palmerston for acting with Russia in this and complained that he was silent as to why England should support a Russian candidate. This, Urquhart claimed, was evidence that Palmerston was co-operating with the enemy. Urquhart, D. "Diplomatic Transactions in Asia 1834-1839", 22. Quarterly Review, LXXVII. 259. An explanation is given that Palmerston had very indiscreetly taken Urquhart into diplomatic service at Constantinople with the result of a recall and a personal quarrel. Also that "by dint of exaggeration of statements, and misrepresentation of facts" Urquhart then tried to prove that Palmerston was a tool of Russia and a traitor to England.
terests only. Herat, the chief city of Afghanistan, was then ruled by Prince Kamran, who without acknowledging Persia's sovereignty, had been paying an annual tribute to the Shah, whenever the Governor of Khorassan, under Persia's control, was strong enough to threaten his dominion. Just before his death, Abbas Meerza had successfully fought in Khorassan, and advancing toward Herat had made a contract with Kamran Meerza (1) to raze the Fort of Ghorian, (2) to return certain families to Persia, and (3) to pay annually 10,000 tomauns to the Shah. These requirements had not been met and so when Mohammed Meerza came to the throne on Jan. 1, 1835, anxious for military glory, it is not strange that he was easily persuaded to carry on his father's campaign.

The English had hoped that the new ruler would desist, for the British policy had been opposed to foreign aggressions by Persia. When Mr. Ellis as minister from England arrived in Persia in 1835, he felt a suspicion of Russia's influence, and on Nov. 13 of that same year, he wrote to Palmerston; "it is unsatisfactory to know that the Shah has very extended schemes of conquest in the direction of Afghanistan and, in common with all his subjects, conceives that the right of sovereignty over Herat and Kandahar is as complete now as in the reign of the Suffavean Dynasty. This pretension is much sustained by the success of his father, Abbas Meerza, in the Khorassan campaign, and by the suggestions of Colonel Borowski." Then on Jan. 8, 1836, Mr. Ellis stated that he had reliable authority that the Russian minister was urging the Shah on, so he had plead-

14. State Papers, British and Foreign, XXIII, 865.
16. State Papers, British and Foreign, XXIII, 864. Colonel Borowski was from Poland but now an officer in the Persian army.
ed with the Persian officials for the second time to refrain from the attack. He reminded them that he was an official of the Indian Board and was sure that the British Government would look "with great dissatisfaction on the prosecution of any schemes of extended conquest in Afghanistan. The Persians asked Mr. Ellis if he did not consider that they had a grievance against the Afghans and he told them he did, but that the matter could be settled without war. He suggested that if he sent an Englishman to Herat the differences could be adjusted. To this the Prime Minister consented at the time.

Meanwhile to hasten matters Ellis urged Prince Kamran to send a representative to the Shah with the promise to meet without further delay all his obligations. However, the English minister was ready for the Persians to change their minds and was not surprised when told that they would only consent to have a letter go to Herat through Persian authorities as they did not want to appear unable to force Prince Kamran. Ellis agreed to this but the plan was frustrated by Prince Kamran's killing some Persian residents of Herat and driving others out of the city. Upon this the Shah remarked that the English protected their individual citizens, so he should look after his, and this was emphasized as a cause of his expedition.

17. Ibid. The first interview had been on Dec. 30, 1835.
18. State Papers - British and Foreign, XXV, 1218-1219. Mr. Ellis further writes to Palmerston: "I hope there will be less disposition to listen to the encouragement of the Russian Minister, now that they cannot plead the excuse of having been ignorant of the objections entertained by the British Government."
19. Ibid., 1221.
20. Ibid., 1220- Mr. Ellis suggests that Kamran may have heard of a Persian conspiracy.
Shortly after this Ellis noted that the motive of the Russian minister, who was advising the Shah, was clear, namely, that if Herat came under Persia, a Russian consular agent could push Russian interests in all Afghanistan. Also he realized that the Russians knew that Great Britain was bound by Article IX of the Treaty of Teheran not to interfere unless requested by both sides. Because of this, Mr. Ellis declared, "as long as this Treaty remains in force, the British Government must submit to the approach of Russian influence, through the instrumentality of Persian conquests, to the very frontier of our Indian Empire." However, on June 2, 1836, Palmerston sent word to Mr. McNeill, who had succeeded Mr. Ellis, that it was his duty to discourage foreign conquests, to show the Shah that it was to his advantage to be friendly with his neighbors, and to keep in mind Article IX of the Treaty of 1814, but at the same time to tender constantly the "good offices" of the British.

As to how far the Russian power was responsible for the Persian aggressiveness is rather hard to determine. Like the English it had officers in the Persian army and its minister was watching out for Russian interests. Some evidence indicates that there was more than a passive interest manifested by such officials. On April 13, 1836, when Mr. Ellis had called on the Governor of Khorassan, Count

21. State Papers-British and Foreign I, Part I, 263. Treaty of 1814. Art IX: "If war should be declared between Afghanistan and Persia, the English Government shall not interfere with either party, unless their mediation to effect a peace shall be solicited by both Parties."
22. Ibid. XXV, 1220.
23. Ibid., 1231.
24. By Article V of the Treaty of 1814: If Persians wish they may employ European officers to drill troops if they are not from England's enemies, State Papers I, Part I, 263.
Simonich, the Russian minister, was present. After talking about the good road from Teheran to Herat, the Count promised that he would accompany the Shah to Herat, Kandahar, and Cabool if his health permitted and if he could go in his carriage. Again while in a conference with Simonich a few days later the English minister said to him: "Afghanistan must be considered as a frontier to our Indian Empire; that no European nation had relations either commercial or political with that country; and that accordingly I could not conceive that the British Government would view, otherwise than with jealousy, any interference, direct or indirect, in the affairs of Afghanistan."

Simonich was then asked if the Russian government had offered troops or other aid to the Shah. He replied that the minister at London and St. Petersburg could answer better as the subject was not talked of in Persia. Later he said that his purpose in going to Herat was to give such advice to the Shah as he felt would vitally help His Majesty. A suspicion of further evidence came in a report to Mr. Ellis that the advance pay of the Persian soldiers was taken "with the consent of the Russian Minister from the first instalment of the crore, kept under the seals of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of the Russian Missions."

The problem in Afghanistan concerned other cities as well as Herat. Each had its own particular enemy and was ready to make the alliance that would help its own interests. Uzeez Khan, a Kandahar nobleman, told Mr. Ellis that all Afghanistan except Herat and its

26. Ibid., 1225.
27. Ibid.
28. Persia's debt to Russia. "Crore" is an Anglo-Indian term for ten million.
29. Ibid., 1228.
dependencies was ready to come under feudal relations with the
Shah - their object being to protect Kandahar from Kamran Meerza
and the Seiks. Later Dost Mohammed, King of Cabool, appealed, by
boasting of his own military strength, to the Shah as "King of
Islam," to ally with him against their enemy on the east. At the
same time he threatened that if the Persians did not send help they
would combine with the English who would then get Afghanistan. The
Shah replied to this with a present of a "diamond-hilted sword" and
an explanation that the bad weather had checked their plans at
Herat.

After a similar appeal to St. Petersburg, Dost Mohammed asked
help of Lord Auckland who had just arrived as governor of India.
The latter answered by sending Captain Burnes on a commercial mis-
sion to Cabool in Sept., 1837. Burnes found the Khan pretending to
be friendly but soon discovered that at the same time he was in-
timate with Persia and Russia, receiving from Captain Vicovitch
presents sent by Count Simonich. The Englishman tried to make the
Khan decide with whom he would cast his lot, but failed. So the
struggle went on. Those in far-off Europe realized little of the
strife but the representatives of the two great corporations and of
these smaller Asiatic companies could easily imagine that vast
destinies were in the balance.

Following Palmerston's instructions, Mc Neill had induced an
Envoy from Herat to write out the precise terms on which he would
make an agreement with the Shah. Then he told the Persians that if
troops were again sent toward Herat the English government "might

30. Ibid., 1233.
31. Ibid., 1239-1240; Letter from Dost Mohammed to the Shah.
32. Annual Register, 1839, LXXXI, 325.
suspect that Persia had in view other objects than those
which she had avowed." Furthermore, "if the Ministers of this
(Persian) Court declare that their fears of another Government
prevent them from acceding to the wishes of the British Government
such a pretext would destroy the hopes of the British
Government and its hopelessness will be increased in proportion to
the weakness of Persia." The result was that the offers of Prince
Kamran were very generous but the Shah's acceptance named one con-
dition – that Herat surrender her sovereignty. This was asking too
much, and so on July 23, 1837, the Shah started to renew his attack
on the besieged city.

Out of the peace negotiations came an incident that later de-
layed the settlement of differences between England and Persia.
When the Peace Envoy returned to Herat, Mr. Mc Neill sent Ali Mo-
hammed Beg, who had been thirty years in the English service, to
follow the Envoy and to report if he were molested. All went well
until the messenger had started back to Tehran when on Oct. 16,
1837, the caravan with which he travelled met General Borowski, who
recognized him. Soon after horsemen were sent dragging him to camp
and taking his clothes partly from him in order to get the letters
he carried. Mc Neill felt that this was a violation of the Law of
Nations and also an effort to show to the Afghan and Persian Armies
"an apparent contempt for the English." He therefore demanded an
apology from the Persian Government and the dismissal of the Per-
sian officer who made the arrest, with the provision that he be
not put back until given permission by the British Government.

34. State Papers – British and Foreign, XXV, 1254–1269.
35. Ibid., 1277–1279. From letter of Mc Neill to Palmerston, Nov.
25, 1837.
Although McNeill had taken this step on his own initiative, on Feb. 12, 1838, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs wrote him that the Queen's Government had approved the course he had taken.

On Oct. 10, 1837, Captain Vicovich of the Russian service and Aid-de-Camp of the General at Orenberg passed through Nishapore on his way to Cabool and Kandahar. Much speculation was made as to his real purpose. The Tsar claimed that he was a commercial envoy. On Oct. 20, 1837, McNeill wrote to Palmerston; "I beg to say that Vicovich had everywhere announced that he was sent to intimate the arrival at Asterabad of a large Russian force destined to co-operate with the Shah's army against Herat." Again on Dec. 16, he wrote that it was reported to him that Captain Vicovich said that his Government intended to release Persia from her obligation to pay the rest of the debt due her if Herat were taken, as the Emperor wished to contribute that amount to the campaign. Just a short time later the Count seemed so highly elated over the fall of Ghorian that it was easy to believe that he was vitally interested in the conquest.

On April 11, 1838, the English minister sent word to both Palmerston and Lord Auckland that a treaty had been made between Kandahar and the Shah by the mediation and guarantee of the Russian minister which purported to give Herat to Kandahar if the latter would serve the Shah "truly and faithfully." It further provided that agents and merchants of both Persia and Russia were to be well

36. Ibid., 1289.
37. Ibid., 1276. Letter from Col. Stoddart to Mr. McNeill.
38. Krausse, A., "Russia in Asia", 64.
39. State Papers, British and Foreign, XXV, 1277.
40. Ibid., 1289.
41. Ibid., 1297.
treated by the Chief of Kandahar. This advantage to Russia resulted from Vicovitch's visit, as well as the similar alliance of Kabool and Persia. Russia's influence seemed to be triumphing but there was an important contingency - Herat had not yet been taken.

When the Shah started on his expedition to Herat, Mc Neill purposefully remained behind publicly to announce his opposition to the plan, but in May, 1838, he decided to follow in order to make another effort toward reconciliation. On the very night of the proposed attack on the city the Shah consented to let the English minister make any arrangement that he saw fit. But when Mc Neill returned with favorable terms from Prince Kamran, he found that Count Simonich had arrived with a sum of money and also that the Shah had changed his mind, so within a few hours the battle was on.

All summer Mc Neill watched for a chance to intercede but on Aug. 3, 1838, he declared: "Persia has no provocation to complain of. The course pursued by the British Government toward this Government has been one of uniform friendship and forbearance and it appears to me, that it would be an inefficient, as well as hazardous and costly line of policy to adopt, were the British Government any longer to permit Persia under shelter of her Treaty with England to open the way to India for another and far more formidable Power."

42. Ibid., XXVII, 35. Terms of Treaty on p. 113-114. Guarantee: "I, who am the Minister-plenipotentiary of the exalted Government of Russia will be a guarantee that neither on the part of His Majesty, the Shah of Persia, nor on the part of the powerful Sirdars shall there occur any deviation from, or violation of this entire Treaty and these agreements." "Count Simonich."
43. Ibid., 110; Indian Officer, "Russia's March Toward India," I, 99-102.
44. State Papers - British and Foreign, XXV, 1269.
45. Ibid., XXVII, 44-47. A further reason was that the Shah had a message from Kandahar promising aid and assurance that the Afghans of Cabul or elsewhere would not relieve Herat.
46. Ibid., 115.
Just a week before this was written, the Foreign Secretary had arrived at the same conclusion when he instructed Mc Neill to state to the Shah that the British Government expected Persia to cooperate in maintaining a defensive barrier for India, but that it seemed "he has openly connected himself with a European Power, for purposes avowedly unfriendly, if not absolutely hostile to British interests" and therefore England would feel at liberty to disregard the Treaty as far as her interests demanded.

It cannot be conceived that Great Britain would receive from her ministers these reports of Russian intrigue without demanding an explanation from St. Petersburg. In fact, early in 1837 Palmerston asked Nesselrode through the English minister at the Russian capital, if Simonich was acting according to his instructions, and suggested that the Government put a stop to his actions. On Feb. 24, 1837 Nesselrode replied; "if Count Simonich acted in the manner stated by Mr. Mc Neill, he had done that which was in direct opposition to his instructions. The Count had been distinctly ordered to dissuade the Shah from prosecuting the present war at any time and in any circumstances." Furthermore when the head of the Eastern Department offered to show the English minister the original book of instructions, Durham said he did not doubt these orders but it was to the inconvenience of the Russian Government to be represented by a person who either "would not or could not act according to his Instructions."

47. Ibid., 42. Letter dated July 27, 1838.
49. Ibid., Durham to Palmerston.
50. Ibid., 1235.
This disavowal seemed to satisfy the British Government for over a year, when they awoke to the fact from the minister's reports that Russian intrigues continued as before in Asia. So again in November of 1833 the matter was presented to the Russian Government. Nesselrode protested that Russia did not intend to interfere with British possessions in Asia but he acknowledged that "Count Simonich had certainly acted in a manner of which we had a right to complain; and therefore that functionary had been recalled." Again, though Russia did not disavow the Kandahar Treaty nor the acts of her officers, Palmerston accepted the explanation and hoped that the matter was settled.

Meantime the British influence had only been losing ground in Persia. On June 4, 1838 a memorandum of England's demands was presented to the Shah. The point in reference to satisfaction over the insult to the British messenger proved to be the stumbling block. So on June 25, McNeill announced to Palmerston that because of this and his ill treatment in camp he had broken diplomatic relations with Persia pending the Shah's meeting his terms, and on Aug. 34 he received the approval of the Government. Although the Ministry hoped that the differences would soon be adjusted, over three years passed before reconciliation was made. Many members of

51. Ibid., XXVII, 186. Date Nov. 20, 1838.
52. Annual Register, 1839, 336.
53. State Papers—British and Foreign, XXVII, 184.
   On April 4, 1839, Palmerston stated to the Russian Minister at London that the British were satisfied and grateful that the first act of Colonel Duhamel at Teheran was to recall Captain Vicovich from Afghanistan.
   Ibid., 194.
54. Ibid., 93.
55. Ibid., 103-105.
Parliament complained, as they felt that an alliance with Persia was necessary for the commercial interests of Great Britain.

When the Indian Government heard of the Shah's intention to besiege Herat, they sent Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, Military Secretary of the British Legation, to aid the defense of the "Key to India." With his leadership the city of Herat was able to withstand the siege, which the Persians gave up on Sept. 9, 1838. Lord Auckland, however, had become greatly alarmed over these Persian aggressions. From the reports that came to him it was easy to imagine that the Russian hosts would soon be at the frontier of India.

So lest Herat, then Kabool and Kandahar get into Persia's hands and ultimately into Russia's, and also to thwart rumors of a Moslem invasion into India, Lord Auckland, in 1838 decided to promote against Dost Mohammed the claims of one more pretender, the exiled ruler Shah Shuja. Although successful at first, Shah Shuja was not popular, and besides, the British army lacked reinforcements. So after a two year military regime, a general insurrection at Kabul in 1842 restored the former ruler. "The first Afghan enterprise, begun in a spirit of aggression, and conducted amid disagreements and mismanagement, had ended in the disgrace of British arms."

Just as the British were active in Afghanistan during this period, Russia, "while playing the part of adviser behind the scenes, had not neglected either her interests or her opportunities."

56. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates: LII, 345; LIV, 74; LVI, 374, 766ff. "Then, too, just at this time a gigantic operation beyond the Indus needed our help in Persia. One of the many grounds on which the expedition was undertaken was to meet certain assumed dangers arising out of alleged intrigues and designs on the part of Russia." Earl of Ripon: LVI, 767.
57. State Papers - British and Foreign, XXV, 1378.
58. Ibid., XXVII, 125.
60. Hunter, Sir W.W., "The Indian Empire", 478-479.
In 1838 or 1839 (the exact period is not known) Russia had occupied the island of Ashurada in the Caspian off Astrabad. Moreover, on June 18, 1839, General Pervoski was despatched from Orenburg toward Khiva in order to release some Russian subjects from prison and also to establish trade relationships. He found many obstacles. The intense heat and scarcity of water caused so much delay at first that winter snows hindered them before reaching their destination. In desperation, Perovski turned back with his few survivors. As soon as he reached Orenburg he learned that an Englishman, Captain Abbot, had been at Khiva and by diplomacy had released the Russian prisoners.

On the face of this account it seems that the English were working for the welfare of their rival. The Edinburgh Review explained the circumstance in this way. After the relief of Herat certain Englishmen decided to go to Central Asia to learn the real situation. They were aware that an extensive slave traffic in Russian and Persian subjects was carried on there, and reasoned that as the English were trying to establish themselves in Afghanistan it was well to be sure that these states were secure from foreign aggression and therefore it was not wise for them to hold in bondage subjects of near-by governments. Thus the "dictates of humanity and of prudent policy" alike sent the independent mission to the Khanates.

As soon as the Bokharian Amir learned of the British defeat in Afghanistan he no longer treated their envoys so well. For sometime he had been suspicious that they had caused the Khokan-
dians to attack him and he then took revenge by putting two of them, Stoddart and Conolly, to death on June 24, 1842. It has been said of them that they "went cheerfully into unknown lands and there laid down their lives in their endeavor to add to the glory of their dearly-loved country and to thwart the designs of England's enemies."

Perovski's failure did not stop the activity of the Czar. Persistent communications were maintained with Khiva until in 1842 they were able to make a treaty whereby the Khan promised "never to engage in hostilities against Russia or to permit acts of robbery to go unpunished."

Russia's encroachments were so remote from England that very little was known concerning them. When on Aug. 6, 1840, Mr. Hume asked in the House of Commons if the report of Russia's expedition against Khiva were true, the reply was that it was, "improbable, unless troops and cannon had dropped down from the skies." That no nation-wide rivalry existed is also shown by the royal reception given Tsar Nicholas when he visited London in 1844. He had, however, on this visit several conversations with the prominent statesmen relative to Anglo-Russian affairs both in Turkey and in Central Asia. As to the latter section it was finally agreed "to leave the Khanates of Central Asia to serve as a neutral zone interposed between Russia and India, so as to preserve them from dangerous contact.

64. An Indian Officer, "Russia's March on India", I, 136.
65. Ibid., 137.
70. Krausse, A., "Russia in Asia", 66.
Chapter V.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN RIVALRY OVER ASIATIC POSSESSIONS, 1844-1854.

"The Convention of the Straits" served its purpose by ensuring comparative quiet in the Near East for over a decade. Added to this was a memorandum issued by the Russian Government in 1844, purporting to state that for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, England and Russia should agree not to interfere with the Ottoman Porte. But by 1849 clouds, "scarcely larger than a man's hand, arose in the East" foretelling a coming conflict.

Problems had arisen between France and Turkey over their respective rights in the Holy Places. As usual, Russia was aroused over the activity of this Western Power at her gate. Early in 1853 the Tsar told Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, that he considered the Turk to be "very sick" and that his Empire was falling to pieces. He then suggested that England and Russia should arrange to act together. But Nicholas could not get the English to move. They admitted that the Turk was a "sick man", but they believed he would recover.

Meanwhile as protector of the Greek Church, the ambitious Emperor planned a definite course of action for himself which included the sending of the Russian army and navy into Turkish territory. Had Palmerston been at the head of Foreign Affairs, this probably would have been considered an act of war; but under the influence of the pacifist Aberdeen, the British Cabinet took no definite action except to send Stratford de Redcliffe to Constantinople. Very soon this charge'd' affaires became chief adviser:

1. Annual Register, 1854, 482-483.
3. Ibid., 7-10.
to the Sultan and his influence together with the popular sentiment in England forced the Government to take action. On March 12, 1854, an alliance was made with Turkey and on the 27th following, a formal declaration made Great Britain, along with France, a participant in the Crimean War.

The question arises as to why general feeling in Christian England should favor the backing of a Mussulman State. Indeed, it was rather difficult at first for England and France to assign reasons formally for their steps. Kinglake, in a work published soon after the Crimean War, described England's attitude as simply following what he termed "The Usage." "In Europe" he stated, "all States except the five great Powers are exempt from the duty of watching over the general safety; and even a State which is one of the five Great Powers is not practically under an obligation to sustain the cause of justice unless its perception of the wrong is re-inforced by a sense of its own interests. Moreover, no State unless it is combating for its very life, can be expected to engage in a war without a fair prospect of success. But when three circumstances are present - when a wrong is being done against any State great or small, when that in its present or ulterior consequence happens to be injurious to one of the five Great Powers and, finally, when the great Power so injured is competent to wage war with fair hopes - then Europe is accustomed to expect that the Great Power which is sustaining the hurt will be enlivened by the smart of the wound, and for its own sake, as well as for public weal, will come forward in arms, or labor for the formation of such leagues.

5. Ibid., 152-154.
as may be needed for upholding the cause of justice."

What then was the "wound" that caused Great Britain to be so uncomfortable? Doubtless, many and varied injuries combined to make Liberals and Conservatives, in fact all except the Ministry, ready to fight the Russians. But among them we find that fear of losing their Asiatic possessions as well as the control of the buffer States caused the Anglo-Saxons much unrest. Indeed, the same policy that had governed the English in former struggles in the Levant still prevailed; namely that "the safety and the policy of all Europe require a barrier against Russia; and it is a maxim of permanent interest to the British Empire that she should not extend her territorial jurisdiction over the East, or acquire a maritime power continually threatening the Mediterranean States and the road to India."

Again, at a public meeting at Leicester, held to discuss the "Turkish Question", it was declared that the Russian fleet was not to be feared so much as their armies, for if Russia conquered Turkey she could then conquer Persia and threaten the Indian possessions. Furthermore, a London editor, referring to the noticeable results of Russia's aggressions in Europe, said, "the same policies are pursued with equal activity in Asia and there it is obviously directed against the interests of the British Empire. Persia has fallen under her yoke ————. In Afghanistan we hear of a renewal of the intrigues of 1838, with which we had to contend when first we encountered the hostility of Russia in Central

Asia, and even the distant expedition to Khiva is reported to be renewed."

Reviewing the events in Central Asia during this period we see that the agreement of 1844 seemed to check open hostilities for some time. Another factor tending to stop the strife was the accession in 1848 of a Persian ruler whose Prime Minister, Amir Nizam, strove to keep clear of both English and Russian influences; and when he was compelled to grant rights to either, gave equal privileges to the other in order to remain independent. Yet, just the same, slowly but surely the Slavic host advanced into Turkestan. To the strongholds already held both west and east of the Caspian, they added one at Aralsk in 1848, two in the region just south in 1849, and by 1853 Fort Perovski marked the important position of Ak Musjid on the Syr Darya river.

Moreover, in her relations with China, Russia had been more fortunate than her rival. Back in 1827 Nicholas had gained by treaty "the right to establish at Pekin a place of education, where young men might study the language and customs of China." Furthermore he had been very careful not to allow his subjects to enter extensively into the opium traffic, while trade disputes over this commodity cost England a two years' war with the Celestial Empire and the ill-will of that nation. Then in 1852, Russia was able to arrange a commercial treaty with the Chinese which not only opened a market on the Irtych but brought them nearer to Central Asia. Still other advantages were seized by the Russians, such

11. Ibid., Dec. 28, 1853, Gb.
13. Ibid., 66.
15. Low and Sanders, "Reign of Queen Victoria", 40. The Opium War was fought in 1840-1842.
as the smuggling of goods across the long Chinese frontier, and
the securing of a monopoly of "brick tea" much demanded by the
tribes of Western Asia. By using these advantages, legal or il-
legal, the Russians were able to establish themselves on the Amur
and to lay a solid foundation for their Empire in the East.

While the British boasted in all their diplomacy up to the
Afghan struggle that they were trying only to defend their posses-
sions, we now find that they, too, were assuming an aggressive
line of action; annexing Sind in 1843, a tract between the Sutlej
and the Beas together with Lahore in 1845, the Punjab in 1849, and
Burma in 1852.

And so with little conflict, Russia in Northern Asia and Great
Britain in the South were each adding territory and gaining in-
fluence wherever and whenever they were able. This of course
could not go on indefinitely without their coming into contact with
each other. The cessation of open rivalry was partly effected
when Amir Nizam, who had stood for strict Persian neutrality, was
condemned to death by the jealous Shah in 1853. About this time
Said Mahomed succeeded to the Afghan throne, and finding himself
unpopular, offered to ally himself with the Persians. This re-
called the situation of 1838, and both St. Petersburg and India
were aroused. For the moment at least, Great Britain gained her
point by compelling Persia in 1853 to agree to a Convention where-
by she was not to send troops to Herat unless that city was invad-

ed by an army from the direction of Cabul or Candahar. Furthermore, whenever the foreigners went back to their own territory, the Persian troops were to return at once to Persian soil. That same year the entire attention of these two rivals was centered in the Crimean War and this necessarily produced an interval in, though it did not bring to an end, the Anglo-Russian contention in Asia.

21. State Papers - British and Foreign, XLV, 726-729. This agreement was broken by Persia in 1855.
Conclusion.

Rivalry in the sense of open warfare, we have found, did not exist in Asia between the Slavs and Anglo-Saxons before the Crimean War. Yet from the time of Peter the Great the Russians were constantly endeavoring to make their way across Asia in the direction of India, and just as steadfastly were the British trying to check this advance.

Russia's first gains resulted from her desire to continue the aggressive policy whereby she threw off the Tartar influences. Soon her ambition knew no bounds and was ready to seize every opportunity that presented itself. When Napoleon strove to reach India the Russians were ready to go with him. If there seemed to be a chance to conquer Turkey, Persia, or other intervening States, she did not halt at a declaration of war; or when these weaker States were in trouble, Russia was ready to ally with them, hoping to gain from the obligations thereby created.

It was clearly economic aspirations that led the English to establish themselves in India and to defend in the Levant the highway thither. For a long time the events in Asia, being so far from the homeland, attracted little attention. But the statesmen who were kept constantly informed by representatives in the far-off lands and travellers in those parts finally opened the public mind to the real situation. The English policy appeared to be to extend as far as possible her own power in India proper, and then to keep Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan as independent buffer States; or else to bring them under British domination, thus pro-
tecting her direct possessions from the danger of a Russian invasion.

And so it seemed inevitable that the two great Powers, with such persistent ambitions, should come into conflict. Nor perhaps is one to be blamed more than the other. Russia certainly had as much right to extend her territory in Northern Asia as Great Britain had to gain control in the South. On this point we quote from an English writer in the Quarterly Review of 1840. "Have those gentlemen, who are so indignant with the Russian invasion of Circassia and Khiva, not heard of our operations in Cabool and Afghanistan? Do those who complain so loudly of finding Russian agents at the court of Persia forget that they were so found by British agents sent on a similar errand?-------------------------. The plain truth is that whenever, from local circumstances, civilization comes in contact with barbarism, war inevitably ensues, and civilization thinks it is justified, and in some cases is really forced in self defense, to make successive acquisitions of territory; and when two Powers have begun like England and Russia, on opposite sides of a great cake, like Central India and have eaten their way into the vicinity of each other, there will be jealousy and apprehensions, and each will be inclined to think the other an 'interloper,' who is, in fact only an 'imitator!' ----------- Let us be assured that such results, though they may be modified, delayed, or accelerated by the accident of moderation or ambition in individual rulers, are essentially attributable not to the wiles or weakness of a Nesselrode or a Palmerston but to the necessity of things and to the passions and interests implanted in human nature."  

1 Vol., LXVII, 260-261.
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