MESSANGER

Cicero's Correspondence as an
Evidence of his Political Sympathies

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CICERO'S CORRESPONDENCE AS AN EVIDENCE
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## Cicero's Political Position

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CICERO'S CORRESPONDENCE AS AN EVIDENCE OF HIS
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INTRODUCTION

(a) General statement.

Cicero's politics have long been a matter of discussion. From this discussion opinions widely divergent have resulted. Not only among his contemporaries are comment and criticism frequent, but the historians and biographers of modern times have considered his public career from every standpoint. The available sources have been carefully examined and in his correspondence and speeches material has been found to support the most diverse conclusions. Those who find admirable qualities in his public life, have, as a rule, been warm in praise of his principles. Those who detect weakness and inconsistency have been correspondingly bitter in their condemnation of his official acts. By each class, however, too great consideration given to partial facts has led to a one-sided estimate. Between the two classes of critics there are a number of authorities who have expressed opinions covering every phase of criticism from one extreme to the other.

If it be at all possible to secure a just and accurate view, it is reasonable to suppose that Cicero's private and unstudied correspondence furnishes the proper basis for such a view. Distributed as it is over a period of twenty-five years, from 68
to 43 B.C., it records not only his settled convictions but each temporary expression of opinion evoked by the changing aspect of affairs. In order to trace and weigh his political thought and activity, a detailed examination of the letters has been made. This study has yielded certain results which appear below. To the actual account of Cicero's political views and acts it has seemed appropriate to prefix a brief discussion of the letters as historical evidence, the comparative value of speeches and letters, as indicating Cicero's point of view, and a brief summary of the estimates of Cicero's character and politics as found in the authorities mentioned above. The citations given are from Mueller's (1896) Teubner Edition.

(b) The Letters as Historical Evidence.

The value of Cicero's correspondence as historical evidence was emphasized by Nepos, whose well-known comment upon the subject appears in his life of Atticus (16.3). Quae qui legat non multum desideret historiarum contextam corum temporum - omnia de studiis principum, vitiiis duum, mutationibus rei publicae scripta sunt. Perhaps no better summary of the historic facts included in the letters could be found than this, but it must not be supposed that the evidence is scientific or organized. The very nature of the case made it impossible. Cicero was not giving an historic estimate of himself or of his times as he wrote freely to Atticus from day to day his impressions of current events, his perplexities in the face of personal or national problems, and his hopes for their ultimate solution. Moreover, in matters requiring decision on his own part Cicero was apt to debate the question with himself, showing forth its various aspects. Quis autem est, he says, tanta quidem de re quin varie scoum ipse disputet? (A. 8.
14. 2). This process, however, did not tend to bring into sharper outlines the events of which he wrote, or give a clearer apprehension of the forces at work. To say, as Schanz does, that the mighty transition in the government taking place at that time, was reflected in Cicero's consciousness, is to give a fair expression of the history to be found in the letters. It is hardly necessary to say, under these circumstances, that the reader's mind should be open to impression in going over the correspondence, rather than prejudiced in favor of any particular view, or in opposition to any particular theory.

When it is granted that the letters were not intended as scientific evidence, it must also be acknowledged that they were never written for public examination. This, while it applies primarily to those addressed to Atticus is equally true of practically all the rest. Cicero's own statements on this point are both numerous and conclusive. In 67 B.C. a letter to Atticus sent from Rome to Athens, which Cicero fears will not reach its destination contains this statement: Nolebam illum nostrum familiarem sermonem in alienas manus devenire. (A. 1. 9. 1.). Again, in referring to his consulship, he says: De me apud te loquor in ea prassertim epistula, quam nolo aliis legi (A. 1. 16. 8). The lack of a trustworthy messenger is a source of anxiety, so great is the necessity for secrecy (A. 1. 13. 1, 4; 2. 19. 5). During that crisis in Cicero's life when the threats of Clodius were becoming alarming in spite of Pompey's assurances, we have recorded the following: De re publica breviter ad te scribam; iam enim, charta

1 Schanz: Rom. Litt. vol. VIII. 1,2. § 157.
ipsa ne nos prodat, pertimesco. Itaque posthac, si erunt mihi
plura ad te scribenda, ἀλληγορίας obscurabo. (A. 2. 20. 3).
The exact method employed to secure the necessary "obscurity" has
been the subject of considerable speculation. To some, a cipher
is the obvious explanation. In this connection Louise Dodge
offers an interesting theory, namely, that the cipher consisted in
transposing the letters of the alphabet a certain number of times
forward or back, and that this device was used in Books 3 and 11
of the letters to Atticus. These books represent two periods when
such precautions were most needful, that of the exile, and the in-
terval between June 48 B.C. and Cicero's pardon by Caesar. The
absence of Greek words in Books 3 and 11 points to such a cipher,
since they would not suffer transposition in the same fashion.

The danger of interception appears to have been ever
present to the mind of the writer, but it did not prevent him from
expressing himself to Atticus with the utmost freedom, a freedom
that makes the historic evidence all the more reliable. Perfect
frankness, as well as perfect confidence in his friend characteriz-
es the account from beginning to end. If publication had been con-
sidered, the story might have been told, it is true, with greater
care and more logical arrangement, but hardly with a closer ad-
herence to the facts. The difference appears most striking where
Cicero mentions the same subject in a letter to Atticus and in one
for public reading or to another person. Although the statements
may be substantially the same, one feels that Atticus had the
preferable version.

(c) Comparative Value of the Speeches and Letters as Evidence.

So valuable in the estimation of the historian are

Cicero's letters that after the year 63 B. C. they become the main guide for the history of the period. Of course they contain erroneous statements, but in these cases Cicero was himself deceived. For example, he believed that Clodius was seeking the tribuneship in 59 B. C. in order to rescind the acts of Caesar through that office, while his real purpose was to ruin Cicero himself (A. 2.12. 1 & 2; 2.15.2). In that same year he apparently never detected that the real head of the triumvirate was Caesar and not Pompey (A.4.18.2). The latter he calls dominus; Caesar and Crassus are termed advocati (A. 2.19.3). Another conspicuous instance is his misapprehension of Antony's real intentions after the Ides of March, 44 B. C. Antony, he thinks, is too busy with his feasts to be planning any harm (A. 14.3.2). This in April, while there is every reason to believe that Antony's hostility began with the dictator's funeral, at least.

Making reasonable allowances for mistakes, the value of the letters as historical sources may best be measured by the blank in our information which would exist if they had been lost or never written. They are, in fact, the main authority for Roman affairs from the conference at Luca to the outbreak of the Civil War, 55-49 B. C., particularly in the years 54 and 53 B. C. They furnish the most trustworthy evidence as to the chronology of events in that period; they contain important references to affairs in Gaul and Britain; they show Cicero in his province and make clear his relations with the provincials, July 51 - July 50 B. C.; they portray the confusion in Rome 54 B. C. with the breakdown of the constitution, the conditions among the Pompeians upon their withdrawal with Pompey to Capua, 49 B. C., Caesar's clemency
and his virtual kingship.

From still another point of view the historic value of the letters is made evident, that is, when the importance of letter-writing in ancient times is considered. As a means of communicating the events of the day, their significance can hardly be overestimated, for they bear the same relation to official records that the press does in our own time.

Even greater than the value of the correspondence as historic evidence, is its biographical value. To say nothing of the actual autobiography therein contained, with all its details of public and private life, the personal point of view is of foremost interest. It is this feature that makes the study of Cicero's political sympathies from the letters, so obvious as to be almost unavoidable. The man's own relation to the movements and institutions of his day is constantly emphasized, often at the expense of other information that might naturally have been included. For example, Pompey's exploits in the East during the year's 66 to 60 B.C. are entirely passed over, while Cicero's personal relations with Pompey during that time are made quite clear. Moreover, in any consideration in the letters, of Roman politics, principal reference is found to the city itself, rather than to any great national movements, a perfectly logical result of the writer's intense interest in his immediate surroundings, in the considerations that affected him the most closely, and the part he himself played in the city's history and life.

Notwithstanding the peculiar value of the letters in this connection, the speeches of Cicero are often looked upon as exhibiting his political opinions with equal certainty. It is
tempting, indeed, to depend upon their definite statements without regard to their partisan character. The orations, however, in many cases cannot be held to contain reliable evidence upon the matter of Cicero's political views, from the very fact that in them Cicero was speaking as a lawyer. Bennett states the case thus: "Like most orators he is essentially an advocate, pledged to a cogent presentation of one side of the case at issue. His aim was to persuade - Hence we can seldom look to his utterances for a temperate and judicial statement of facts; he gives us the side which conviction or expediency suggests to him as the better and defends this with all the resources of his rhetorical art."

Cicero himself acknowledged that this was the case in his speech for Cluentius. (50.139). The opposing advocate had brought forward Cicero's statements in another case in order to prove his point, but these were disclaimed by the great orator at once. Sed errat vehementer si quis in orationibus nostris, quas in iudiciis habuimus, auctoritates nostras consignatas se habere arbitratur. Omnes enim illae causarum ac temporum sunt non hominum ipsorum aut patronorum. Nam si causae ipsae pro se loqui possent nemo adhiberet oratorem. Nunc adhibemur, ut ea dicamus, non quae nostra auctoritate constituuntur, sed quae ex re ipsa causaque ducantur.

In spite of the confessed ex parte character of the orations, the bearing of those written previous to 63 B.C., on Cicero's political tendencies has lately been a matter of dispute between the German scholars, Heinze and Bardt. The former

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3 Selected orations of Cicero, Introd. p. xiv.
5 Review of above in Berliner Philologische Wochenschrift, 2 April, 1910.
claims that the speeches in question represent a consistent ad-
hesion to the principles of the moderate optimates, while the
latter in his review attempts to show that they represent an
equally consistent support of the popular party.

If any other justification were necessary for the state-
ment that the letters are more valuable than the orations, as re-
vealing Cicero's convictions, his utterances in both upon the same
subject might be placed side by side. M. Pupius Piso, consul 61
B. C. is characterized in the speech for Flancius - homini nobilis-
simo, innocentissimo, eloquentissimo (Pro Planc. 5.12), while
Atticus hears that - Consul autem ipse parvo animo et pravo tamen
cavillator genere illo moroso, quod etiam sine dicacitate ridetur,
facie magis quam factiis ridiculus, nihil agens cum re publica,
seiunctus ab optimatibus, a quo nihil meres boni rei publicae,
quia non vult, nihil meres mali, quia non audet (A. 1.13.2).
During his defense of Sestius, he explains his failure to oppose
Clodius with arms, after the decree of banishment had been pub-
lished, by declaring that the security of his fellow-citizens was
his only motive for refraining from forcible resistance (Pro Ses-
tio. 20.45). This was written after returning from exile, but two
letters to Terentia during the exile tell a different story. In
one Cicero acknowledges his fear as a reason for having left the
city without opposition (F. 14.2.1); in another the persuasion of
friends who were neither far-sighted nor sincere (F. 14.1.2).
Another conspicuous instance of a discrepancy between letters and
speeches is found in Quintus Cicero's communication to his brother
regarding his (Cicero's) canvass for the consulship, and in
Cicero's plea for the extension of Pompey's command in the East;
The familiar words of the latter are easily recalled. Testor omnes deos - me hoc neque rogatu facere cuiusquam, neque quo Cn. Pompei gratiam mihi per hanc causam conciliari putem, neque quo mihi ex cuiusquam amplitudine aut praesidia periculis aut adiumenta honoribus quaeram (De Imperio 24.70). Again: Quam ob rem, quidquid in hac causa mihi susceput est, Quirites, id ego omne me rei publicae causa suscepsisse confirmo (De Imperio 24.71). The understanding between the brothers as to Marcus' relation to Pompey is evidently somewhat different. Si quid locuti populariter videamur, id nos eo consilio fecisse, ut nobis Cn. Pompeium adiungeremus, ut eum, qui plurimum posset, aut amicum in nostra petitione haberemus aut certe non adversarium (De Pet. Cons. 1.5). Iam illud tute circumspicitio, quod ad Cn. Pompeii gloriam augendam tanto studio te dedisti, num quos tibi putes ob eam causam esse amicos. (De Pet. Cons. 4.14).

(d) Estimates of Cicero's Character and Politics found in Modern Historians and Biographers.

Cicero's critics fall into three distinct classes: those whose criticism is extremely unfavorable, those whose praise is immoderate, and those whose estimate is a judicial mingling of praise and blame. While it is not intended that the opinions of ancient authorities be included in this review of Cicero's critics, Dio Cassius must always stand out as the father of those holding an unfavorable view, and his words as typical of their opinions.

(Eπημψοτέρισε τε γραφε, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν τὰ τούτων ἔστι δὲ δότε καὶ τὰ ἐκείνων ἵνα ὑπ’ ἀμψοτέρων ἐπουδάκται ἐπιρράττε) (Dio Cass. 36.43). "He was accustomed to fill a double role and espoused now the cause of one party and again that of the other, to the end that he might be
sought after by both." The great historians, Mommsen and Drumann, have ranged themselves on this side, as well as a number of lesser authorities, among whom are E. P. Beesly, De Quincey and Alfred Pretor. To the minds of this class of critics, Cicero was weak, timid, unprincipled, vain, egotistical, self-seeking; a short sighted politician who sold himself to successive interests. However, they fail to advance sufficient evidence to support such a position. Citations appear infrequently and are particularly scanty in Mommsen, whose arraignment is the most severe. Beesly considers the speeches, In Toga Candida 64 B.C., De Lege Agraria, and Pro Rabirio, 63 B.C. sufficient proof that Cicero had sold himself to the nobles, and was thereby earning his wages. Pretor finds in the letters evidence that he had undertaken conflicting obligations in trying to please both the optimate and popular parties. But in the great majority of cases no references are given to maintain the author's position. In considering the unfriendly attitude of the great German critics, Boissier attributes it to their lack of experience in public affairs. He thinks that isolation in academic pursuits has unfitted them for any sympathetic outlook upon political life, so that they judge Cicero as a politician, while themselves out of touch with public activities.

An estimate marked by immoderate praise is that of Middleton, Niebuhr, Strachan-Davidson, John Lord and others. It is their general conviction that Cicero was patriotic, honorable, firm, not envious, that his power to see many sides of a question was the cause of some inconsistency, that his love of glory arose

7 Boissier: Ciceron et ses Amis, p. 25 f.
from a noble ambition, that his failings were those of genius. They regard his support of the senate and optimates as the act of a constitutionalist, and do not admit motives of self-interest to be attributed to their hero, Boissier has an explanation of this view corresponding to that given above. The English and French critics in general approach Cicero's career with greater sympathy, arising from a more intimate knowledge of political life and its exigencies, than that possessed by the Germans.

To the names listed as admirers of Cicero, must be added those of Abeken and Heitland, who, while not extravagant in their praise, are yet sympathetic. They lean to the more favorable view, however, and for that reason can hardly be included with those who maintain a middle position.

This latter position is the common ground of the majority of historians and biographers. It is held by How and Leigh, Schuckburgh, Pelham, Forsyth, Ward Fowler, Trollope, Boissier, and Tyrrell. The last is easily the most important of the group, having a special claim to attention from his long and exhaustive study of Cicero's life and writings. The moderate estimate given by several of the above seems to have been the result of a reaction from the extreme criticism of Drumann and Mommsen. To summarize their conclusions: Cicero lacked resolution since he saw good and bad in every party. He constantly aimed to do right, but was often self-deceived. Circumstances were in most cases beyond his control, so that he was apt to attempt the impossible. Finally, in spite of corruption in the state and his own knowledge of its existence, he was unwilling to give up his service for the commonwealth. With regard to special issues, it

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8 Boissier: Ciceron et ses Amis, p. 25 ff.
seems more appropriate to discuss the views of this third group in connection with the questions themselves, as they come up for consideration in the letters.

One rather important question, however, is not there included, the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators. Many writers pass over this point without comment, but those who discuss it have reached widely divergent conclusions. The death sentence is approved by Niebuhr and Strachan-Davidson. It is condemned by Mommsen on the ground of tyranny, by Forsyth and Beesly on that of illegality. Bennett thinks Cicero's interpretation of the law both arbitrary and unjust. Abbott considers the sentence unconstitutional, because appeal was made to the senate as a judicial body, while it might have been justified by the senatus consultum ultimum. The character of the evidence upon which the conspirators were condemned is treated by Max Radin and H. C. Nutting in recent articles, one claiming that it would carry little or no weight in a modern court, the other showing it to be perfectly regular. Doubtless no problem of Cicero's career has been discussed at such length as this and by so many writers, apparently without any prospect of establishing the truth. If Cicero had not had Atticus with him in Rome during the eventful year of his consulship, letters upon the subject would probably have come down to us, but his silence here adds another difficulty to a question that is practically insoluble.

Turning now to an estimate of Cicero's character in the

9 Bennett: Selected Orations of Cicero. Introd. p. x.
letters, particularly as affecting his public life, we find there a frank and unguarded expression of the man's self. Quintus Cicero realized it when he wrote, *Te totum in litteris vidi* (F. 16.16.2). It is not surprising, under the circumstances, that the writer's faults should stand out prominently. His weakness is nowhere shown so clearly as in the letters written from exile (A. Book 3), almost all of which contain bitter railings against fortune and the deepest despondency in the face of trial. Inconsistency appears frequently, a fault which Cicero acknowledges in one of the letters from Thessalonica (A. 3.8.4). Perhaps the most striking instance of inconsistency in the whole correspondence is afforded by the conflicting statements about Appius Claudius Pulcher, Cicero's predecessor as governor of Cilicia. In a letter to the ex-magistrate (F. 3.8) Cicero addresses his correspondent in the most flattering terms. *Illud quidem scio, meos multos et illustres et ex superiore et ex alquo loco sermones habitos cum tua summa laude et cum magna sollicitudine et significatione nostrae familiaritatatis ad te vere potuisse deferri.* At the same time, after seeing the traces of Claudius' destructive rule in Cilicia, he described conditions to Atticus, *monstra quaedam non hominis, sed ferae nescio cuius immanis* (A. 5.16.2). Although it must be granted that such weakness and inconsistency exist, yet these faults lie on the surface of his character, often appearing as a result of impetuosity and quick imagination. Look beneath the surface, and observe for example, a personal loyalty to Pompey of nearly twenty years duration, in order to place it by the side of individual incidents in his career. It is a common thing to draw erroneous conclusions from a correspondence, especially one that reveals so many chang-
ing moods in a man quick both to think and feel.

Vanity and selfishness comprise two other serious charges against Cicero, both of which must be admitted frankly. The former, often innocent, is expressed many times, as in one of the letters from exile, in which Cicero contrasts his state in Rome with his present misfortunes (A. 3.10.2). In a remarkable letter to the historian Lucceius, 56 B. C., he asks for a favorable verdict on his political career, betraying a vanity that is nothing short of astounding. He recommends his own history as the most interesting of material, pleading for a version even more flattering than truth would admit (F. 5.12). Selfishness is most clear from indirect evidence, particularly from the relative absence of reference to the affairs of Atticus in the sixteen books addressed to him. That Cicero could carry on a correspondence with one man for more than twenty years and scarcely mention the events and interests that affected his friend in all that time, to us seems almost incredible. During the last years it is true, several letters are concerned with Cicero's efforts to save the property of his friend at Buthrotum, which Caesar's veterans were threatening. But with this exception, in three hundred and ninety-seven letters there are only four eighty-references to the affairs of Atticus. In twenty-seven letters written from exile, there are only two. Moreover, many of these references include only a word or two, and a number of them are brief messages to members of the family. Surely, no further proof is required that the writer was unusually self-centered. Although this was true in personal relations, there were crises in national affairs that aroused him to unselfish devotion. His oppo-

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13 Teuffel: Geschichte der Römischen Litteratur, § 187
osition to Antony in the last two years of his life was an exhibition of courage in maintaining a position where he had nothing to gain and everything to lose.

Self-interest was often a confessedly strong motive of action. As praetor Cicero condemned the historian C. Licinius Macer, later declaring that he had received a greater return in the approval of the people than he could have received from Macer, had he acquitted him (A. 1. 4. 2). Self-interest again played an important part in the support of Pompey (F. 1.8.2), and of Caesar (F. 1. 9.18). It undoubtedly appears in Cicero's proposed defense of Catiline for extortion in Africa 65 B. C. To Cicero's mind Catiline's guilt was perfectly evident (A. 1.1.1). Yet if he defended the guilty man and secured his acquittal, he counted on Catiline's alliance in his canvass for the consulship (A. 1.2.1).

If self-interest had a prominent place among Cicero's failings, he was no less guilty of self-praise. This is shown particularly in references to his consulship, the glories of which he never tired of extolling on every possible occasion. One may be quoted as typical of all, his protest to Pompey (62 B. C.), who had failed to congratulate him upon his administration. Res eas gessi quarum aliquam in tuis litteris et nostrae necessitutinis et rei publicae causa gratulationem exspectavi, - Sed scito ea, quae nos pro salute patriae gessimus, orbis terrae iudicio ac testimonio comprobari (F. 5.7.3). Cicero shares with many another writer of the day this fondness for self-praise, characteristic as well of all ancient heroes beginning with the chiefs about Troy. To modern taste it is not acceptable, but to the readers or auditors of the past it must have seemed a matter of course. Quintilian, however, justifies Cicero's praise of his own acts, as not so much for glory
as for defense. Reprehensus est in hac parte non mediocriter Cicero, quamquam is quidem rerum a se gestarum maior quam eloquentiae fuit in orationibus utique iactator. Et plerumque illud quoque non sine aliqua ratione fecit. Aut enim tuebatur eos, quibus erat adiutoribus usus in opprimenda coniuratione, aut respondebat invidiae. Cui tamen non fuit par servatae patriae poenam passus exilium, ut illorum, quae egerat in consulatu, frequens commemoratio possit videri non gloriae magis quam defensione data. (Quint. II. 1; cf. 12.1.15).

The charge of timidity, like all the preceding, has some foundation in fact. Cicero's fear of Clodius when he hastily left Rome after the decree of banishment, has been cited in another connection. Actual cowardice is manifest in his letter to Atticus written from exile, in which he is anxious that his oration against Curio be suppressed, or proved not to be his work, in order that he may not suffer from Curio's hostility (A. 3.12.2). To the minds of the critics timidity was often associated with vacillation in public affairs, perhaps the most serious of all the charges brought against Cicero. Nor can it be denied. In the year of the first triumvirate, 59 B.C., his conduct was marked by neutrality, friendship for Pompey preventing him from declaring against the coalition, and principle preventing him from going over entirely to their side (A. 2.19.2). The same thing is true of the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the Civil War, when a tangle of conflicting motives kept him from a bold decision for either party.

Although Cicero's vacillation can hardly be excused, it is simple of explanation upon a number of grounds. In the first place he was a man of literary temperament thrust into public affairs and neither a statesman nor a politician by choice (F. 1.8.3).
Upon several occasions he expresses his fondness for the literary life and ideals, notably when national problems seem overwhelming. Such a crisis occurred in 59 B.C., causing him to write to his friend, Qua re incumbamus, o noster Tite, ad illa praecelara studia et eo unde discedere non oportuit, aliquando revertamur (A. 2.16.3). In 55 B.C., as he looks forward to supporting the triumvirs, he again deplores his forced participation in public life. Malo sedere — quam in istorum sella curuli tecumque apud te ambulare quam cum eo (Pompey) quocum video esse ambulandum (A. 4.10.1).

Another explanation of his indecision is to be found in the fact that he often faced an impossible situation and that his choice was generally between two evils. This was the case in 59 B.C., when he sums up the situation under the triumvirs in these words: Neque enim resisti sine interneecione posse arbitramur nec videmus qui finis cedendi praeter exitium futurus sit (A. 2.20.3). Again, in November 44 B.C., the future absolutism of Octavian is his only alternative for the insufferable rule of Antony (A. 16.14.1). In the face of difficulties like these, it is not surprising that he was drawn now to one side, now to the other. Yet, through it all, he made an honest effort to choose the right side as he saw it. A comment of the "noble Brutus," is here unusually just — Omnia fecisse Ciceronem optimo animo scio (B. 1.17.1).
I. Cicero's Political Position 68 - 59 B. C.

Cicero's political career as indicated in the letters, may for convenience be divided into five periods. The first from 68 - 59 B. C. includes his early connection with the popular party, the gradual crystallizing of his political creed, and the year of his consulship, which represents the culmination of his theory and practise. Between 59 and 56 B. C., the first triumvirate marks the disappointment of his political hopes, and the exile his personal downfall. On returning from exile, 56 B. C., Cicero attempts to adapt himself to new conditions. Thereupon follows his friendship with the triumvirs, and, after the breach between Caesar and Pompey, a long mental struggle lasting until the outbreak of the Civil War in 49 B. C. The period between January 49 and the battle of Pharsalia is notable for his final decision in favor of Pompey. Lastly from August 48 to his death in December 43 B. C., we have his reinstatement by Caesar, his relations with the dictator up to the time of his assassination, and lastly his vigorous opposition to Antony resulting in his own proscription and murder.

That a very definite connection existed between Cicero and the populares during the early part of his public life can hardly be doubted. But the extent to which this is true, is disputed by the critics. Tyrrell traces his sentiments toward democracy through the early speeches, but considers his attitude merely that of an advocate. Still, a man born at Arpinum could not help being imbued somewhat with the spirit of its great hero, Marius. Evidence upon this point, unfortunately, does not appear to any extent in the letters, since they begin rather late and then for

14 Correspondence of Cicero - vol. 1. Introd.
the first few years, are infrequent. One reference, however, is significant, where Quintus is anxious that Cicero disclaim his popular adhesion, when seeking the consulship (De Pet. Cons. 1.5).

Whether the motive in so doing was personal ambition, or disgust with the violence of democratic leaders, or a belief that popular control would be a menace to the constitution, or whether these were all present to Cicero’s mind, may be uncertain. But there can be no doubt that he took a decided stand with the optimates at the time of the consulship, and, in spite of many vicissitudes, remained loyal to them until his death. As an optimate, he formed a very definite political creed, the watch-words of which were senatus auctoritas and concordia ordinum (A. 1. 18.3).

His relations with the senate during the early period were characterized by loyalty and faith. There is confident hope when the trial of Clodius first comes up. Senatus Ἀρεός πάγος; nihil constantius, nihil severius, nihil fortius (A. 1.14.5). Loyalty appears even when the party has disappointed him. A curia autem nulla me res divellet (A. 1.20.3). At this time the senate seems to have held their champion in considerable respect, since they declined to allow him to leave the city in accordance with the lot by which the consulars were chosen for duty in Gaul, on the plea that his services at home were indispensable (A. 1.19.3). It is only natural that greater devotion to the state should have proceeded from confidence so justifiable (A. 1.20.3). Any line of demarcation between the senate and nobles as a class was practically non-

16(Boissier: Cicéron et ses Amis, p. 50 f.
(Fowler: Life of Caesar, p. 73.
17 Heitland: Roman Republic, vol. III. p. 70.
existent, so that Cicero's support of one or the other points to the same principles. Accordingly, from the first he is anxious to secure the good-will of the nobles, primarily to further his chances for the consulship (A. 1.1.2; 1.2.2). Later, after the death of Catulus, their party leader, he himself takes the helm in service of the class that had helped to raise him to a position of the highest honor. Had it not been for the Clodian scandal, which now came prominently before the public, it is possible that Cicero might have maintained the senatus auctoritas to which he had pledged himself. But this whole trial proved to be a powerful instrument in destroying his cherished plans. During the progress of the trial the optimates were indifferent (A. 1.13.3); the voting was conducted illegally (A. 1.14.5); the acquittal was unjust (A. 1.18.3). Of course the nobles as a clan viewed the matter from the personal standpoint, and were disposed to rally around one of their number who had been accused. But, we are surprised to find Cicero lukewarm. His first indignation had soon become negative, although he appreciated the real crisis (A. 1.13.3). Finally, awakening to his responsibility, his invective was as tardy as it was ill-judged (A. 1.16.9,10; 2.1,5). No sooner was the trial over than he became apprehensive of Clodius' hostility, a fear in which he was by no means disappointed (A. 1.18.2; 2.1.4).

The nobles not only failed to take a decided stand against Clodius (A. 1.13.3), but showed such indifference to the general crisis that Cicero condemns them bitterly for greater interest in their fish ponds than in the welfare of their order (A. 1.18.6; 20.3; 2.1.7).

As a result of indifference, selfishness and exclusive-
ness on the part of the senatorial class, his efforts to maintain the senatus auctoritas proved futile. On this point the opinions of those critics who take a middle position and the evidence from the letters are agreed. With regard to the other important tenet of his creed, the concordia ordinum, the letters show very clearly a consistent policy looking to the union of senate and knights, but there is little or no comment as to motives. In accordance with the Lex Aurelia of 70 B.C., the two classes shared equally the duties of iudices. Consequently, a strong bond of union was created in common interests, which might be further served by the new policy. The addition of a wealthy class, moreover, would tend to strengthen the senatorial position and thus create a powerful combination against the popular party and the violence of its leaders. How necessary it had become to provide such a defence was amply proved during the Catilinarian conspiracy, when for a brief period actual harmony existed between senate and knights in the face of a common peril. But the harmony was short-lived. In 61 B.C. two sources of disagreement arose, the promulgation of a decree in the senate to investigate cases of bribery among jurors, and the refusal of the senate to annul the tax contracts in the province of Asia. It appears that the farmers of revenue had been deceived as to possible gains, according to their original contract, and were anxious to make more favorable arrangements with the home government. Upon both questions Cicero sided with the knights, although convinced that their position was untenable (A. 1.17.8,9). Seeing that a breach between the orders could not be avoided without concessions from the senate, he upheld the class to which he himself belonged, in order to preserve peace; but to no
avail. Cato, leading the senate, exerted an influence more powerful than his own, and the concordia ordinum was destroyed (A. 1.18. 3; 19.6; 2.1.8).

The year 63 B.C., in which Cicero held the consulship, was, as has been said, the most important of the period under consideration. Mention has also been made of his early connection with democracy - a connection which he was anxious to sever upon being elected consul. Catiline, with whom his name was ever after to be associated, was a competitor for that office (A. 1.1.1; 2.1). To review their previous relations: Cicero had thought of defending him in 65 B.C., in order to secure his alliance, as has been shown already (A. 1.2.1). Although the actual defense cannot be proved, his evident willingness to undertake the case was discreditable, as it points to a fear of Crassus and Caesar, Catiline's friends, and a desire for political support regardless of its character. Cicero was under no misapprehension as to the kind of man with whom he was dealing. A long account of his career with a full catalogue of his crimes appears in Quintus' letter (De Pet. Cons. 64 B.C.). Doubtless from previous knowledge he was prepared for the conspiracy when it was finally formed. As the correspondence was suspended during this year, accounts of the many activities which occupied his attention are lacking, but references are abundant in later years. He never tired of boasting of his achievements and publishing the glories of his administration. For example, in February 61 B.C. a meeting of the senate is described in which Cicero indulged in his favorite themes. As he tells Atticus, Etenim haec erat ἐν τολμηρότητι, de gravitate ordinis, de equestri concordia, de consensione Italicae, de internortuis reliquis consi...
rationis, de vilitate, de otio. Hostiam in hac materia sonitus nostros (A. 1.14.4). Other references to the consulship, previous to 59 B. C. are not wanting (F. 5.7.3; 2.1.6; A. 1.19.6).

Antonius, Cicero's colleague in office, appears several times in the letters, but the transactions between the two seem to have been principally financial (A. 1.12.1). The exact character of these, however, is unknown. As in the case of Catiline, Antonius' questionable career was known to Cicero (De Pet. Cons. 1.8). In 62 B. C. he defended him in the senate, probably on some minor charge (F. 5.6.3).

An administration as vigorous as that of Cicero could not be other than provocative of hostility, especially on so important a decision as the death sentence upon the Catilinarian conspirators. This was, in fact, the first point of attack. For this reason Metellus Nepos refused to allow the retiring consul to make the customary speech on laying down his office (F. 5.2.7). Plutarch supposes that Metellus was here acting in concert with Caesar to overthrow the great enemy of the democratic party (Life of Cic. 23). At any rate Cicero soon became involved in very serious difficulties, arising not only from the Clodian affair, but from an opposition on the part of the nobles, more intangible but fully as determined.

Turning from the events of 63 B. C. it is interesting to trace Cicero's early relations to the three men who in 59 B. C. were to form the first triumvirate, Pompey, Crassus and Caesar. The oration for the Manilian Law in 66 B. C. marks the beginning of a political connection which lasted until Pompey's death, interrupted, it is true, by distrust, obscured by failure, but never en-
tirely severed. Trollope goes so far as to say that Cicero's political life from this point was governed by that of Pompey. In 65 B.C. Atticus is asked to secure the support of Pompey's friends for Cicero's candidacy. Illem manum tu mihi cura ut praestes, quoniam propius abes, Pompei, nostri amici (A. 1.1.2). In the following year, Cicero's popular allegiance seems to Quintus a bid for Pompey's support (De.Pet.Cons. 1.5), and the friendship existing between the two is mentioned (ibid. 4.14). It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Cicero needed Pompey first of all to support his candidacy, but the personal need was soon merged in the party's need of Pompey to support the senatorial position. The optimates were threatened by unrest, conspiracy and popular violence. At the same time a strong leader was in the East, at the height of his military career, and as yet unattached to either party. It was Cicero's hope to secure his influence for the optimates side (F. 5.7.2). But Pompey held off, expecting to become head of the state without any effort on his own part, and missing the opportunity to establish his own power. Time soon showed his unfitness, which Cicero keenly realized (A. 1.15.4; 14.1; 18.6; 20.2). Another difficulty in securing Pompey's allegiance to the senate was their refusal to ratify his acts in the East, thereby alienating him at the time of their emergency (F. 1.8.4).

Even if the possibility of union between Pompey and the senate was slight, Cicero still foresaw a tremendous advantage, both to the state and to himself, in their personal harmony. The support of the orders was weakening. He needed new resources. Who could be a firmer defense than Pompey? Sed tamen, quoniam ista sunt tam infirma, munitur quaedam nobis ad retinendas opes nostras tuta, ut
spero, via (A. 1.17,10). Putavi mihi maiores quasdam opes et firma-ora praesidia esse quaerenda (A. 1.19.6). And the republic, too, would be the gainer. Quod non tam interfuit mea - quam rei publi-cae, quod erant quidam improbi, qui contentionem fore aliquam mihi cum Pompeio ex rerum illarum dissensione arbitrarentur (A. 1.19.7). Not only would the state and Cicero benefit by their friendship, but he needed Cicero also. (A. 1.20.2; 2.1.6). Accordingly he gave his support to the Lex Flavia, Pompey's Agrarian measure of 60 B.C. The intimacy became marked (F. 5.2.6; A. 1.12.3), so much so that Pompey received the nickname of "Guæus Cicero." Looking back over the early period of their friendship, Cicero wrote to Lentulus in 54 B.C. Cuius ego dignitatis ab adolescentia fautor, in praecitura autem et in consulatu adiutor etiam exstitissem (F. 1.9.11).

Cicero's connection with Crassus was never very close. A speech in favor of Cicero delivered in the senate during the Clodian excitement, secured the ex-consul's loyalty (A. 1.14.3,4), susceptible as he was to praise of his consulship. As the trial pro-gressed, however, Cicero was convinced that Crassus was active in bribing the jurors (A. 1.16.5). Again, he mentions his desire for popular favor (A. 1.18.6). Neither consideration was likely to recommend him to Cicero's regard, although his firm support of the knights in their preposterous demands might have done so (A. 1.17.9).

Early mention of Caesar is infrequent. The first is in connection with the rites of the Bona Dea, celebrated in his house. But so far as political matters are concerned, he does not figure in the letters until his return from Spain, when he is heralded thus: Quid? si etiam Caesarem, cuius nunc venti valde sunt secun-
Little did Cicero realize how favorable those winds were which should bring Caesar to the haven of his ambition, and how futile his hope of shaping Caesar's course in any other direction.

Caesar's first object seems to have been to reconcile Pompey and Crassus. This accomplished (A. 2.3.3), he won Pompey over to his side by promising the ratification of his acts in the East, although Cicero states clearly that he warned his friend against the union (F. 6.6.4). Overtures were then made to Cicero himself, who might have been a member of the coalition (De Prov. Cons. 17.41). But acceptance of Caesar's offer meant, first of all, to support Caesar's agrarian law. If he did not support the law he might remain neutral, or oppose it. Support meant personal safety. (A. 2.3.3). Opposition, the loss of Caesar's aid. Loyalty to principle triumphed, and he came out boldly on the optimate side, renouncing, as he himself phrases it, reditus in gratiam cum inimiciis, pax cum multitudine, senectutis otium. (A. 2.3.4).

In summarizing the tendencies of this first part of Cicero's career, due credit must be given for his effort to unite conflicting elements in the state. The ideal party of senate and knights, with Pompey as its champion, was well-conceived, although it proved impracticable. Here, as later in his life, Cicero endeavored to emphasize grounds of peace and harmony, rather than throw his influence on one side of a question, when that meant hopeless rupture. The very earnestness with which he devoted himself to reconciliation proved that he was well aware how diverse the various national interests were becoming. No one realized more keenly than himself the necessity for compromise, or deplored more sincerely the attitude of the senate in their acquittal of Clodius
and in the alienation of the knights (A. 1.18.3). It is only natural, under the circumstances, that he should have incurred the charge of trying to please all parties and of negotiating with all. It was inevitable when canvassing for the consulship (A. 1.14), and is abundantly proved when seeking Pompey's alliance (A. 1.19.8). The maintenance of the constitution and the survival of the commonwealth, to his mind, depended upon the loyal cooperation of the best elements in the state, as represented by the senatorial and equestrian orders. Peaceful and diplomatic means of saving the state were always better than violent ones, and nothing exemplified the point better than the case of the knights (A. 2.1.7). There might be times when even a sacrifice of principle was justifiable (A. 2.1.8). Cato, here as always, perfectly consistent, did more harm than good by his rigidity (A. 1.18.7). Thus the situation appeared to Cicero's point of view, and in one important feature at least, time showed the wisdom of his attitude. The concessions refused by the senate to the tax farmers, Caesar gladly made, and in this way, gained for his own party a powerful and wealthy class.
II. Cicero's Political Position 59 - 56 B.C.

The years from 59 to 56 B.C. include the rule of the first triumvirate and Cicero's exile, both of great political importance. Early in January 59 he left Rome, remaining until June at his estates, where we find him despondent at the condition of the commonwealth and bitter toward the triumvirs. Weary and heartsick, he seems to have had little realization of Clodius' actual intentions in seeking the tribuneship. It was not until his return to Rome, in the middle of the year, that he awoke to the situation, when we find him turning to Pompey for support and receiving from the public tardy expressions of favor.

The attempts made by Caesar in the preceding year, to bring Cicero over to the coalition were renewed as soon as the triumvirs assumed control. An opportunity presented itself almost immediately in an embassy to Egypt, where Ptolemy Auletes was involved in difficulties with his subjects (A. 2.5.1). This was offered to Cicero, possibly with a double motive. It was a position of honor that might well conciliate a rival, and it would take that rival away from Rome at a most opportune time. Caesar himself expected to be absent in Gaul and doubtless regretted leaving Cicero in the city free to influence Pompey and Crassus. A visit to Egypt seems to have appealed strongly to Cicero, but he felt that in loyalty to principle he could not accept favors from such a source.

An me aliquo praemio de sententia esse deductum? (A. 2.5.1).

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18 Tyrrell: Correspondence of Cicero, notes to A. 2.5, interprets sententia as follows: "my design of opposing the coalition and carrying out the old policy of the optimates."
Caesar's next overture came in the form of a libera legatio (A. 2. 18.3), an unofficial embassy, the holder of which was entitled to visit one or more provinces on private affairs, enjoying the privileges of an ambassador without performing his duties. The freedom consisted in being able to return to Rome and leave again without resigning the office. This favor was likewise declined, because it did not afford sufficient protection against Clodius, while it took Cicero away from his brother, upon whom he was just then relying for aid (A. 2.18.3). Caesar's final offer was that of a lieutenanty in Gaul (A. 2.18.3; 19.5). Over this Caesar hesitated but finally refused, preferring to oppose Clodius rather than have security from him upon such terms. Like the first proposal, both of the latter ones were aimed to remove Cicero from Rome. This should be borne in mind, when Caesar's apparent indifference to the exile is considered. That Cicero was moved later to regret his refusal; appears in a letter to Terentia, written in the despondency of the exile (F. 14.3.1). It seems probable that Caesar became offended at Cicero's consistent policy of refusal, although his attitude toward the close of 59 B. C. is not clearly known, owing to a break in the correspondence.

Cicero might well have hesitated to join the triumvirs, when he saw the evident confusion and dissatisfaction of his friend Pompey. Pompey's position was manifestly far from enviable. In traveling from place to place, Cicero could not help observing the man's unpopularity, which he mentions particularly in writing from Formiae, Quanto in odio noster amicus Magnus! (A. 2.13.2), and again (A. 2.14.1). When he reached Rome, the same conditions prevailed (A. 2.19.3; 21.3 & 4), and were apparently a source of re-
greet to himself (A. 2.21.4. cf. 2.19.2). At one time Cicero thinks that Pompey pretends to approve Caesar's acts (A. 2.16.2). At another he is convinced that the marriage between Julia and Pompey points only to tyranny (A. 2.17.1). Perhaps Pompey is influenced by fear to uphold the coalition, rather than by any voluntary loyalty (A. 2.19.2). Whatever the true state of affairs, Cicero was certain that Pompey was disappointed. His former place of honor and popularity as victor over the pirates and conqueror in the East, was lost forever. If he had expected to maintain preeminence as Caesar's associate, that hope was destined not to be fulfilled. On the contrary, he found himself tiring of his position, and regretting the loss of influence that could not be restored (A 2.22.6; 23.2).

It has been noted that Cicero spent the first half of 59 B.C. on his estates, leaving Rome in disgust with the proceedings of the triumvirs, and with the state of public affairs. From Antium he writes, Statui enim nihil iam de re publica cogitare (A. 2. 4.4), and cupio istorum naufragia ex terra intueri (A. 2.7.4). To become a mere observer of the country's ruin, which he thought inevitable, was hardly consistent with the determination announced the previous year. But that exalted mood of patriotic devotion had been followed by a reaction almost of indifference (A. 2.17.2). One might have expected to find him active in opposition against those in power, but as a matter of fact, he remained neutral. His neutrality is explicable upon a number of grounds. Friendship for Pompey, first of all, prevented him from taking a stand, although he thoroughly disapproved of the situation. Ego autem neque pugno cum illa causa propter illam amicitiam neque approbo, ne omnia improbem, quae antea gessi; utor via (A. 2.19.2). Moreover, he
thought that the triumvirs would work out their own destruction if they met with no interference (A. 2.9.2). It is extremely likely that fear of Clodius afforded another reason for temporary retirement, in spite of the fact that such a motive is nowhere stated expressly. Still, after returning to Rome, he speaks of seeking the people's favor in connection with Clodius' hostility (A. 2.22.3), and mentions his inactivity in public affairs in connection with Clodius' threats (A. 2.23.3).

It is difficult to say just what form of resistance Cicero might have offered, if he had attempted opposition. His word to Atticus upon this point is somewhat vague. Quodsi in eam me partem incitarem; profecto iam aliquid me perirem resistendi viam (A. 2.16.3). Abeken's theory is that a resort to arms was impossible, failing which, he saw no other feasible means, and lost courage. He was, indeed, practically helpless at this juncture. Without resources from senate or knights, his friend Pompoy, a triumvir, threatened by the hatred of a strong personal enemy, he stood alone.

The sense of helplessness must have increased his bitterness, as he deplored a state of affairs which he was powerless to alter (A. 2.20.3; 21.1; 25.2). Scito nihil umquam fuisse tam infame, tam turpe, tam peraeque omnibus generibus, ordinibus, aetatis bus offensum quam hunc statum, qui nunc est, magis mehercule, quam vellem, non modo quam putarem (A. 2.19.2). He was oppressed by a great weariness of public life (A. 2.6.2; 7.4). He was apprehensive of the future (A. 2.18.3; 19.1; 24.4). As for the triumvirs themselves, they are designated by terms indicative of supreme control. Cicero calls them reges superbos (A. 2.8.1), his dynastis (A. 2.9.1), and tris homines immoderatos (A. 2.9.2). Still, there were elements of encouragement even at the worst. Bibulus; Caesar's
colleague in the consulship, took a decided stand, issuing edicts against Caesar's acts and conducting an opposition against the triumvirs that deserved success, even while failing of it (A. 2.19. 5; 20.4; 21.4). The youth of Rome also had been roused against their masters (A. 2.8.1), while Curio, a fair representative of the class, was their declared opponent (A. 2.18.1 & 2). He is known, however, not so much for his attitude during 59 B. C. as for his activities in Caesar's behalf nine years later. It is interesting to conjecture what might have happened, if Cicero had relied on these elements in Rome to uphold him in any determined policy. Handicapped as he was, by personal difficulties, success could hardly have been assured, but his prestige might have been increased by the attempt, while he could not have been crushed more completely than by the exile which he suffered in spite of neutrality.

We have now to trace the steps by which the designs of Clodius against Cicero developed, leading up to the exile itself. It will be recalled that Cicero's evidence at the trial proved the falseness of the alibi of Clodius, who, although he was acquitted, never forgave the ex-consul for this testimony or for the invective that accompanied it. The death sentence upon the conspirators was a convenient pretext for attack, the tribuneship a powerful instrument of revenge. Securing adoption into a plebeian family, he stood for this office in 59 B. C., and was elected. As has been noted already, Cicero, writing from his estates, seemed entirely unaware of the real nature of Clodius' designs, supposing that he intended as tribune to nullify the acts of Caesar (A. 2.12.1 &2; 15.2). Once in Rome, the truth was only too apparent (A. 2.18.3;
He trusted with the aid of the better class of Romans to make successful resistance (Q. F. 1.2.5). A reaction in his favor, on the part of the people, showed that such an expectation was not altogether groundless. The memory of the consulship returned, bringing with it some measure of the old popularity (A. 2.22.3).

Throughout the months of suspense, Cicero was disposed to rely on Pompey to befriend him, but without much actual satisfaction. In April he was inclined to distrust him (A. 2.9.1). But Pompey kept assuring him that there was no danger (A. 2.19.4; 20.2; 21.6; Q. F. 1.2.5). In October, Pompey had an interview with Clodius, pleading with him upon Cicero's behalf, pointing out the treachery of an attack when he, Pompey, had placed the weapon in his hands (A. 2.22.2). Pompey, it will be recalled, had been present at the adoption of Clodius into the plebeian ranks. In spite of Cicero's reliance, the tide was evidently too strong for Pompey, and his domination by Caesar was complete (A. 10.4.3).

Clodius, having entered upon the tribuneship, lost no time in securing Cicero's banishment. The decree published, Cicero made no forcible resistance, but left Rome at once. Afterwards he said, when writing to Lentulus in 54 B. C., that he preferred to show the power of his friends in recalling him rather than in defending him with arms (F. 1.9.13). With regard to Caesar's indifference to Cicero's fate and his support of Clodius (De Domo 41), it seems probable that Caesar saw in the exile his only means of securing Cicero's absence from the city at a period so critical in his own career. Both Heitland and Abeken support this view, Heitland adding that Cato as well as Cicero was too dangerous a leader.
to be left in Rome.

The exile lasted from April 58 to September 57 B.C., and was spent chiefly at Thessalonica and Dyrrachium. It is without doubt the most painful period of Cicero's career. The letters during that time reflect a point of view so intensely personal as to exclude all mention of men or events not affecting himself. Caesar's exploits in Gaul, for example, are not referred to, although the great general's deeds were then filling the public vision. An atmosphere of the deepest gloom pervades Cicero's spirit, while he makes no effort whatever toward optimism or even tolerance of the situation. Letter after letter is concerned with a rehearsal of his anxieties, especially one written from Brundisium in April 58 B.C., which contains an unparalleled catalogue of misfortunes and expressions of the deepest dejection (A. 3.7). Even Atticus loses patience at last and adds his reproaches (A. 3.15.1). At times suicide seems to be the only means of relief (A. 3.7.2; Q. F. 1.4.4). His burning desire to return to Rome appears more than once, but nowhere expressed with greater feeling than in a letter addressed to his wife (F. 14.4.2).

Just as many important matters affecting the state are passed over without comment, so those actually appearing have some direct personal significance. A prospect of rupture among the triumvirs is referred to as possibly resulting in his restoration (Q. F. 1.4.2). At the same time comes the realization that his unfortunate position is due to his refusal to uphold the coalition (F. 14.1.1). Pompey figures only in a personal relation, and that most discouraging to Cicero. In July 58 B.C. he failed to aid him in the comitia (A. 3.13.1; 14.1). His disloyalty is lamented not only to Atticus but to Quintus (A. 3.15.4; Q. F. 1.4.4). In fact,
almost ten years afterward, in 49 B.C., Cicero remembered his defec-
tion as an additional reason for turning from him to Caesar
(A. 9.5.2). His attitude on this point throws light on the ques-
tion of his original motive for seeking Pompey's friendship. Had it been purely patriotic, Pompey's disloyalty might have been re-
gretted as affecting the state. But so personal a view point seems to indicate an original selfish motive in desiring his alliance.
In spite of discouragements from this quarter, Atticus was most anxious that Cicero continue his efforts to win Pompey over, as well as Hortensius, with whom he is associated as a powerful aid (A. 3.22). But Cicero was dubious about the attempt, having reached the conclusion that his confidence in both was misplaced (Q. F. 1.4.1). There was a slight possibility later that Pompey might use his in-
fluence to have Cicero recalled, but this was the most that he could reasonably expect (A. 3.18.1; 23.1; F. 14.2.2).

Friends at Rome finally came to the rescue and after re-
peated attempts, succeeded in securing Cicero's restoration, where-
upon he returned to Rome immediately, reaching Brundisium August,
57 B.C. As he looked back over the three years just passed, he must have realized that they had seen the complete failure of his political ideals. Had any lingering hope of rehabilitating his party remained after the disappointments succeeding the consulship, even that was crushed by the entrance of the triumvirs upon the scene. The senate no longer boasted its auctoritas, for that had passed over to the coalition (A. 2.9.1). The optimates no longer looked to Cicero as leader, but were openly hostile (F. 14.1.1). The concordia ordinum was nothing but a political dream. Lastly, Pompey, instead of becoming the champion of the optimates, was a firm adherent of Caesar (A. 10.4.3).
III. Cicero's Political Position 56 - 49 B.C.

The journey from Brundisium to Rome, as described to Atticus, was a personal triumph for Cicero. He was welcomed to Italy in a manner that seemed to indicate a return of popularity as grateful as his misfortune had been cruel (A. 4.1.4 & 5). It reminded him of the days when his position at Rome had been altogether enviable. Nos adhuc, in nostro statu quod difficillime recuperari posse arbitrati sumus, splendorem nostrum illum forense et in senatu auctoritatem et apud viros bonos gratiam magis, quam optamus, consecuti sumus (A. 4.1.3). He realized, however, that he had left those experiences behind him and must face the problems of the future. Alterius vitae quoddam initium ordinur (A. 4.1.8). It was inevitable, since the old hopes were gone and new conditions met him on every hand. To Lentulus, consul 57 B.C., a man who had been active in promoting his recall, Cicero unburdened himself in this perplexing situation. It is hard, he writes, to relinquish old principles. Sed te non praeberit, quam sit difficile sensum in re publica praesertim rectum et confirmatum, deponere (F. 1.8.2). It is equally difficult to decide between new alternatives. Should he, at the expense of his own honor, defend Pompey, which meant the coalition, or take the opposite stand in vain? There was also another course which appealed strongly, the literary life, but this was not seriously considered. Harrowing the possibilities to two, he expresses them thus: nam aut adsentiendum est nulla cum gravitate paucis aut frustra dissentiendum (F. 1.8.3). That he finally chose the former is well-known.

The critics have much to say regarding this particular
crisis. Warde Fowler holds the opinion that Cicero attached himself to Pompey, hoping to guide his political policy, and, through him, to influence Caesar; that he thought of reconstituting an optimate or republican party along new lines. Strachan-Davidson agrees with this estimate, believing it to be quite clear that Cicero's main object was to regain Pompey for the constitutional position, confident that the triumvirs were on the verge of rupture. Cicero's conduct is approved by Forsyth as the part of wisdom, in that he hesitated to ally himself with the triumvirs, because under them he foresaw the state's destruction; or to break with them entirely, because he was powerless to offer resistance. Niebuhr sees Cicero yielding at this time to harsh necessity, while Trollope attributes his conduct to a desire to save his party, by conciliating Caesar rather than opposing him.

The considerations leading up to his support of the triumvirs are quite fully expressed in the letters, and should be noted at this point, in order to determine the extent to which the critics are justified in their views. It must not be supposed that Cicero approved of the high-handed policy adopted by Caesar, Pompey and Crassus, particularly in securing for themselves extraordinary provincial commands. He tells Atticus that he does not regret his absence from the senate when such proposals came up, since he would have defended a measure of which he did not approve, or failed to support a man to whom he was under obligation (A. 4.13.1). Again, he refers to the promulgations in Caesar's interest as monstrous (Q.F. 2.4.5). But in spite of all this he did actively up-
hold the triumvirs.

Loyalty to Pompey was clearly his prime motive. For the time being, he seems to have forgotten Pompey's defection, and as early as 57 B.C. expresses approval of his friend's election to the office giving control of the corn supply (A. 4.1.6 & 7), a position of great influence. In the affair of Ptolemy Auletes, while he could not use his influence to secure the embassy for Pompey, yet he was most anxious not to offend him (F. 1.1 & 2; 5 b. 1). The Romans, it will be recalled, had conducted negotiations with "The Flute Player," in 59 B.C. Now it became necessary to send an ambassador to Egypt, to settle the kingdom. Lentulus and Pompey were rival claimants for the honor, while to both Cicero was bound because of services to himself. For Pompey, the special significance of the embassy was the military power that accompanied it. As it happened, neither candidate was successful, a circumstance that saved Cicero from committing himself finally. Pompey's defense of Milo became the next claim upon Cicero's loyalty, in view of the fact that Milo had been his champion while tribune in 57 B.C. (C. F. 2.3.2 & 3; F. 1.5 b.1). Another cause for gratitude to Pompey was the advice and help given in his behalf during the hostility of Clodius (F. 1.9.11). In addition to motives of friendship and gratitude, Cicero regards an alliance as proper on the ground of utilitas as well as pietas (F. 1.8.2). Here, as at an earlier time, he looked to the advantage that might accrue to himself, and did not base his support entirely on personal obligation. Pompey's policy, moreover, received its share of approval (F. 1.8.2; 9.10), although the approval was colored by friendship, and although a most unsatisfactory interview with Pompey at Cicero's Cumaean estate, April 55 B.C., had given him the impression that
Pompey was far from sincere in his professions as to public affairs (A. 4.9.1).

Friendship, gratitude, personal advantage and approval of Pompey's acts, all drew him to the side of the coalition, but reasons equally cogent made him a partisan of Caesar too. He frequently testifies to the friendship which existed between Caesar and himself, at this time, in letters to Quintus, very naturally, as the brother was serving under Caesar in Gaul (Q. F. 2.11.1; 13.1; 3.1.18). But Atticus also, is made aware of the new relation in November 54 B.C., when Cicero writes of Caesar's attitude toward himself: Cum Caesare suavissimam coniunctionem (haec enim me una ex hoc naufragio tabula delectat); (A. 4.19.2). Various powerful agencies had brought him to the place where he was willing to acknowledge that Caesar, a man whose advances he had frequently repelled, was his only hope of safety in the general shipwreck. That his rescue was to be brought about at the expense of principle, he knew well. It amounted to a practical recantation for him to join Caesar, but he did it, bidding farewell, as he writes Atticus, to what he had formerly held admirable. Sed valeant recta, vera honesta consilia (A. 4.5.1).

Ill-will, neglect and actual hostility on the part of the nobles, operated most strongly in driving Cicero over to Caesar's side. Their attitude after the exile had been unfriendly in the extreme (F. 1.9.5). They had failed utterly to rally to his support (F. 1.9.14 & 15), giving him no choice but to adopt the stronger side. Quoniam, qui nihil possunt, ii me nolunt amare, demus operam, ut ab iis, qui possunt, diligamur (A. 4.5.2). The agency of Quintus had contributed to draw his brother into the ranks of Caesar's friends, for Quintus had been treated by his
general with every mark of consideration and regard (F. 1.9.10 & 12). Just as this was bound to secure Cicero's loyalty, so the military exploits commanded his respect (F. 1.9.12). It was necessary, besides, for him to have a defense against Clodius and other enemies, in case their activities should be renewed (F. 1.9.21). Fortunately, the murder of Clodius in 52 B.C. put an end to threats from that quarter. It might be interesting to notice, in passing, that Cicero afterward considered his long strife with Clodius to be identified with the cause of the republic, and Clodius' hatred for him to be merely personal. This is the opinion expressed in a letter to Antony 44 B.C. (A. 14.13 b. 4).

The relation with Caesar was by no means one-sided. On his part, he met Cicero more than half way, showing the same desire to gain his friendship, that he had already manifested so often. Nothing proves more conclusively that he looked upon Cicero as a force to be reckoned with than the manner in which he repeatedly sought his favor, or forbore to crush him entirely (F. 1.9.10; 7.7.2; 7.5). Cicero refers in no uncertain terms to his good-will, in writing to Lentulus, calling it divina Caesaris in me fratremque meum liberalitas (F. 1.9.18). For some time Caesar kept up a correspondence with his friend (Q. F. 3.1.25; A. 4.17.6), making his regard for Cicero perfectly evident (A. 4.17.6; Q. F. 2.13.1; 3.1.9).

Once established as the friend both of Pompey and Caesar, reconciliation with Crassus alone remained to be accomplished. Ever since the conspiracy of Catiline a coolness had existed between the two, interrupted it is true, by a brief interval of good feeling during the early part of Clodius' trial. Now, as Crassus was on the point of departure for Syria, friendly relations were
resumed, without much sincerity on Cicero's part, it must be confessed. He not only defended Crassus in the senate, but in an elaborate letter of January 54 B.C., he makes every protestation of friendship and loyalty (F. 5.8). No doubt the influence of Pompey and Caesar was strongly exerted in both cases. At least the letter is so exaggerated as to lack every semblance of real feeling.

In following the development of Cicero's relations with the individual members of the triumvirate, frequent reference has been made to the famous letter to Lentulus, written in December 54 B.C. (F. 1.9). This letter is the chief evidence for Cicero's position at the time, a long and detailed explanation of his political attitude, in which he attempts to justify his adhesion to the triumvirs. He reaches the conclusion here, that the commonwealth is wholly changed from what it had been upon his entry into public life. In 63 B.C. aristocratic rule had been maintained; in 59 B.C. it was overthrown, and after a brief restoration in 58, was completely abandoned (F. 1.9.17). It is unreasonable, under these circumstances, to maintain allegiance to what no longer exists. Opinions must change with the times, and in practical application of the theory, he espouses the cause of the triumvirs. Itaque tota iam sapientium civium, qualen meesse et numerari vole et sententia et voluntas mutata esse debet (F. 1.9.18).

Once an active partisan of the coalition, his services as an advocate were in immediate demand to defend such of their friends as were prosecuted. Cicero, apparently, had no freedom in the matter whatever (Q. F. 3.5 & 6.4). Neque enim fructum ulla laboris exspecto et cogor non numquam homines non optime de me meritos rogatu eorum, qui bene meriti sunt, defendere (A. 7.1.4). Crassus,
Messius, Gabinius and Vatinius were all defended on these terms. With regard to the last, Vatinius, much hostile comment has resulted from Cicero's acceptance of the case. Vatinius had figured as one of the worst adventurers in Roman politics for some years.

While tribune of the plebs in 59 B.C. he had sold his services to Caesar, who was offended when Cicero exposed the character of his tool, in the trial of Milo and Sestius. His attack upon Vatinius during this trial, was one of the most bitter of all Cicero's arraignments. In spite of this, Vatinius secured the praetorship, 55 B.C., by the most corrupt methods. Consequently, upon laying down the office, he was at once accused of bribery in the election. This was the man whom Cicero was called upon to defend, and whose defense he attempts to justify to Lentulus. Tracing his connection with Vatinius from the beginning he reiterates his hostility at the trial of Sestius, as being perfectly unequivocal. Pompey, however, had been the instrument of a reconciliation with Vatinius during the latter's praetorship. Caesar was responsible for his taking the stand in defense of the accused. He acknowledges, however, another reason, namely, the determination to play off Vatinius against the nobility, in revenge for their support of Clodius at his expense (F. 1.9.19). This may be an explanation of his conduct, but it does not justify it. Taken by itself, it forms one of the most serious charges against Cicero's political integrity, and considered even as an incident in a long career, it weighs heavily on the side of blame.

In considering Cicero's alliance with Caesar, Pompey and Crassus, it is well to remember that he did not consider them a formal triumvirate. Tyrrell has pointed out that he never uses the word at all, and that his feelings about each of the three men were
very different. Crassus aroused his contempt. Pompey repelled him by his arrogance. Caesar fascinated him by his generosity. 

(24) Trollope expresses the situation thus: "Caesar and Pompey had come together and Crassus had joined them." This goes far to disarm the critics who accuse him of deserting a well-defined optimate party, to take sides with a formal coalition in control of the government.

In 51 B.C., Cicero's activities at Rome were interrupted by his provincial administration, Cilicia falling to his lot. Leaving the city in May, he did not return again until January 49 B.C. This period of Cicero's career is an interesting one, but not within the scope of the present discussion. Brief mention might be made, however, of the justice and clemency of his rule and his military activity. A large part of the correspondence from Cilicia is concerned, not so much with matters of provincial interest, as with his distaste for provincial service and his intense desire to return to Rome. A letter to Rufus Caelius voices this longing, and is significant as showing the relative importance in Cicero's mind, of service at home and beyond the sea. Urbem, urbem, mi Rufe, cole et in ista luce vive; omnis peregrinatio, quod ego ab adolescentia indicavi, obscura et sordida est iis, quorum industria Romae potest industris esse (F. 2.12.2).

During his stay in Cilicia, events of the greatest importance to Rome had taken place, so that Cicero found, on his return, an entirely new aspect of affairs. The confederacy that had been preeminent since 59 B.C. was practically destroyed. The rupture had not come about suddenly. Two causes had contributed largely to the dissolution, even before Cicero's administration abroad, namely, ——— Life of Cicero, vol. II.
the fall of Crassus at Carrhae in 53 B.C., and the death of Julia in 54 B.C. With regard to the latter, the marriage of Pompey to Caesar's daughter, had been a means of strengthening the political union of the two men. So now, a succeeding marriage to Cornelia, the daughter of Scipio Metellus, had allied him to an optimate house. A more fundamental source of disagreement, however, was the growing influence of Caesar himself, whose ten years of triumph in Gaul, had raised him to a position of great power. In these circumstances, Pompey was drawn to the optimates as offering his only resource against a rival mightier than himself. His efforts to limit Caesar's command in Gaul to March 1, 50 B.C. (F. 8.9.5; 8.4 to 8), and again to November of the same year, were put forth as much for the sake of his own place, as for the good of the state.

In addition to other attempts to strengthen his position, Pompey had aimed at the dictatorship in 52 B.C. This is evident from a number of references (F. 8.4.5; Q. F. 3.4.1; 7.2; 8.4 & 6; 9.3). Rumors of the rupture had reached Cicero in his province, through Caelius, who kept him informed of Roman affairs during his absence (F. 8.8.9). One of the later letters from Caelius had indicated that the breach between Caesar and Pompey might result in open warfare. Sic illi amores et invidiosa coniunctio non ad occultam recidit obtrectationem sed ad bellum se erupit (F. 8.14.2).

If Cicero's position had been a difficult one, when he returned from exile, the present situation was immensely more embarrassing. He sums it all up in a letter to Curio of August, 50 B.C. Res publica me valde sollicitat. Faveo Curioni, Caesarem honestum esse cupio, pro Pompeio emori possum; sed tamen ipsa republica nihil mihi est carius (F. 2.15.3). He felt obliged to up-
hold Pompey, yet he knew Caesar was the stronger (A. 7.1.2). Formerly his alliance with both had seemed perfectly consistent since they were themselves allied (A. 7.1.3). But as enemies, the public would demand that he adhere to one or the other (A. 7.1.4). No wonder he despairs of doing right, as he exclaims in a letter to Atticus, Quam non est faci1is virtus! quam vero difficilis eius diuturna simulatio! (A. 7.1.6).

At this crisis the deplorable condition of the state is reflected in the correspondence. The old republic is now a thing of the past (F. 1.8.4). Amisimus, mi Pomponi, omnem non modo sucum ac sanguinem, sed etiam colorem et speciem pristinam civitatis (A. 4.18.2). Corruption and irregularity in elections and trials, are the rule and not the exception (A. 4.17.2; F. 7.11.1; 8.4.3; 6.3). It is said that the year 51 B. C. was the only one of the period when the elections were perfectly regular. Pre-election bribery was so extensive, that the rates of interest rose (Q. F. 2.15.2; A. 4.15.7). In addition to all these, Cicero saw clearly that the life of the commonwealth was endangered by so selfish a strife for power as that maintained by the great leaders (A. 7.3.4).

The period now closing had brought about a great change in Cicero's life. He had returned from exile, broken and dispirited, forced to adapt himself to new conditions, and to make the best of an impossible situation. He was disappointed in the nobility as a basis for a new constitutional party, and in Pompey as a supporter of the cause. In the reaction he went over to the triumvirs, who welcomed him gladly and employed his services to good purpose. Then came the dissolution of the confederacy, with Cicero at the parting of the ways. It remained to be seen, whether his alliance
with democracy was but temporary, or whether it indicated any funda-
mental change in the principles to which he had originally 
pledged himself.
IV. Cicero's Political Position 49, 48 B.C.

The year 49 B.C. opened with affairs at a crisis. Caesar was at Ravenna with his army, having offered to resign his magistracy and military power, provided Pompey did the same. Failing of this compromise, he threatened to proceed to Rome. Up to this point, his conduct had been marked by strict legality and by that remarkable faculty for placing his opponents in the wrong, which he displayed throughout his career. Pompey was at the capital, acknowledged by the senate as its champion, and invested with military authority. The optimates had resorted to his power as their only safeguard against Caesar's control, while he had accepted the responsibility in the hope of establishing himself as head of the state. Between the two parties, Cicero hesitated long, weighing every consideration and struggling honestly to decide for the right.

Among all the causes of his vacillation, the desire for peace appears most prominently, the same motive that had led him in the early years, to make a fruitless effort to reconcile conflicting interests. Again and again the letters tell of his hope that Caesar and Pompey may be brought together and that something, he cares not what, may prevent open warfare (F. 16.12.2; 4.2.3; 2.16.3; A. 8.11d.7; 11d.8; 12.4; 9.11a.2). In explaining his failure to leave Italy with Pompey, he writes Atticus: Pacem putavi fore. Quae si esset, iratum mihi Caesarem esse, cum idem amicus esset Pompeio, nolui. Senseram enim, quam idem essent. Hoc verens in hanc tarditatem incidi (A. 10.8.5).

So much for a general motive. There were special causes of vacillation as well. He had, for instance, definite reasons for not joining Caesar. One was personal, a dissatisfaction with him
for his failure to assist in securing Cicero's triumph (A. 7.3.3). Cicero, it will be recalled, had requested a triumph in honor of his military exploits in Cilicia, but had been refused. Still, the personal reason was the least, after all. A sense of duty and honor forbade the alliance (A. 7.12.3; 22.2; 8.15.2; 10.8.5). There is no doubt whatever in his mind, of the baseness of such an act, as he enumerates to Atticus the motives that influence him strongly to join Pompey, Turpitudo coniungendi cum tyranno (A. 7.20.2). So far as Caesar's party and their aims are concerned, his estimate is low in the extreme, looking upon them as he does, in the light of criminals and rascals (A. 7.3.5; 9.18.2; F. 16.11.3; 12.2). If they gain the ascendancy a reign of terror will be inevitable (A. 7.7.7). In any case their cause is evil (A. 7.9.3).

As for their leader Caesar, no one is more dangerous. He is a man of audacity (A. 7.13.1), a veritable madman (F. 14.14.1). The tyranny of his rule is assured (A. 10.4.2), no matter whether it resemble that of Phalaris or Pisistratus (A. 7.20.2). In this connection a letter of Caesar to Oppius and Balbus, dated March 1, 49 B.C. is interesting as containing an expression of his own policy — quoniam reliqui crudelitate odium effugere non potuerunt neque victorian diutius tenere praeter unum L. Sullam, quem imitaturus non sum. Haec nova sit ratio vincendi, ut misericordia et liberalitate nos muniamus (A. 9.7c.1). A reign of terror was, of course, far from his intention, but to the Romans supreme power had become synonymous with proscription and cruelty. Cicero, moreover, considers Caesar corrupt (A. 7.18.2; 13.1; 8.2.3). That the man possesses great talents he acknowledges, but they are being exerted in an unworthy cause (A. 8.9.4; 9.18.2). Num quam maiore in periculo civitas fuit, numquam improbi cives habuerunt paratiorem ducem (F. 16.
Such a man is his own worst enemy and must necessarily come to destruction. At least, this is the conclusion to which Cicero comes in May and expresses to Atticus. Corruat iste necesse est aut per adversarios aut ipse per se, qui quidem sibi est adversarios unus acerrimus. Id spero vivis nobis fore (A. 10.8.8). Herein Cicero prophesied more accurately than he knew, living to see the dictator's downfall, as he desired. Lastly, Cicero not only feared Caesar himself, but considered his demands unreasonable, when the arrogant reply to the Roman embassy was received in January (A. 7.9.4). To summarize, then, the reasons for not joining Caesar, there are definite statements to prove that he felt a personal grudge because of aid withheld; his sense of duty and honor stood in the way; he estimated Caesar's party at the lowest; he considered their leader a dangerous enemy and his demands unwarrantable.

On the other hand, the weaknesses of Pompey and his party, made him hesitate to cast his fortunes with them. In the first place, he realizes that their preparations for war are totally inadequate (A. 7.15.3). As for the Pompeians, weakness and irresolution characterize their acts (A. 7.20.1; 21.1; 8.3.4; 11.4). Pompey himself displays glaring faults, frankly indicated in many references. Although he is his friend, he cannot praise him, as he writes to Atticus. Et mehercule quamvis amemus Gnaeum nostrum ut et facimus et debemus, tamen hoc, quod talibus viris non subvenit, laudare non possum (A. 8.9.3). In specifying particular faults, timidity is emphasized (F. 16.11.3; A. 7.13.2), inadequacy to the task set before him (A. 7.12.1) and indecision (A. 7.21.1). Pompey's flight from Rome and withdrawal to Capua with his party, seems inexcusable, fugam ab urbe turpissimam, as Cicero terms it
The justice of this last criticism is questioned by the critics, who maintain that Cicero displayed ignorance of the situation from a military point of view. This, however, does not alter the fact that he was influenced strongly by Pompey's desertion, as it appeared to him. Doubtless he takes other things into consideration when he blames Pompey for lack of military ability, for his term ἀγροτήν ἄρην is a sweeping one (A. 7.13.1; 8.16.1). Lastly he fears a reign of terror on the part of the Pompeians too, should they be successful in the struggle (A. 8.16.2; 9.6.7; 7.3; 10.3).

The above are in brief his criticisms of the respective parties and their leaders. There is one ground of condemnation, however, against both. They aim for supreme power at the expense of the state (A. 8.11.2; 10.4.4). De sua potentia dimicant homines hoc tempore periculo civitatis (A. 7.3.4).

In addition to Cicero's desire for peace, and his objections to both the opposing factions, another element in his vacillation was his connection with Caesar at this time. As in 60 B.C. and again after the exile, so in 49 B.C., Caesar once more sought Cicero's alliance. In April he requested him to come to Rome that he might have him near for advice and consultation, Cicero being absent on duty in Campania (A. 7.17.3; 9.6a; 9.16.3). To gain Cicero's actual support was his object, but in case this were withheld, he asked for neutrality at least (A. 9.8.2; 8.11.5). If he went to Rome, Cicero saw an opportunity to effect a reconciliation between the rival leaders, and for that purpose, he declares his willingness to accede to the request (A. 9.11a.1). But it was too late for compromise. A personal interview was Caesar's next request, an interview that took place at Arpinum in April, briefly
recorded in A. 9.18.1. Cicero's stand was firm. He refused to go to Rome, since Caesar was unwilling to have him defend Pompey there. Their conversation was short and to the point, in part as follows: 'multaque, inquam, 'de Gnaeo deplorabo'. Tum ille: 'Ego vero ista dici nolo: 'Ita putabam' inquam, 'sed ego eo nolo adesse, quod aut sic mihi dicendum est multaque, quae nullo modo possem silere si adessem, aut non veniendum (A. 9.18.1).'' This interview marked Cicero's final decision for what he thought right and honorable. After the long weeks of vacillation and uncertainty, he came out boldly in defense of principle and friendship.

Ever since the first of the year, while many forces had been at work to cause dissatisfaction with the Pompeians, strong motives were operating to draw him over to their side. Cicero still felt a serious obligation to Pompey, mainly for his services, though tardy, in securing the recall from exile. It seems quite evident that Cicero overestimated his indebtedness both on this and other occasions, but the fact remains that it influenced him constantly (A. 8.1.4; 9.7.3; 19.2; F. 3.10.10). Atticus is reminded that he had persuaded him to embrace the cause of Pompey, quia de me erat optume meritus (A. 7.1.2). Moreover, the long-standing friendship for Pompey remained unbroken, a friendship that had proved superior to disillusion in so many respects (A. 8.2.3; 3.2; 9.10.2; 7.20.2), a loyalty that was greater, as Abeken suggests, than his reason and discretion. Aside from the personal relation, he saw in Pompey the leader of the optimates (A. 8.3.2), and with them Cicero had resolved to take his place (A. 7.7.7; 9.4.2). There was the conviction, moreover, that Pompey was about to restore the republic (A. 8.14.2); Quando Pompeius rem publicam recuperarit (A. 8.3.2). Furthermore, the cause of the republic, so dear to
Cicero, was identified with that of his friend. Ipsa rei publicae causa me adducit (A. 8.3.2). To join the Pompeians was the only consistent and possible course (A. 7.6.2; 26.3; 10.8.5). Mihi σκοφός unum erit, quod a Pompeio gubernabitur (A. 7.3.5).

In common with other prominent men, Cicero was assigned various official duties in the civil disturbance. He was sent to enlist soldiers in the district including Capua, Campania and the coast, but he was not very active in performing the duty. Most of the time was spent at his estates (A. 7.11.5; F. 16.11.3; 12.5). Evidently he did not consider this function important as indicating his real sympathies, but rather his remaining in Italy or leaving the country with Pompey.

Over this question he deliberated for months. His proper place was doubtless at Pompey's side. Nevertheless, he hesitated to go while there was the slightest hope of peace, or while perplexed by the conflicting motives already recorded. He changed his mind from day to day, until Atticus asked impatiently Totiensne igitur sententiam mutas? (A. 8.14.2). Self-interest urged him to remain; honor required him to go. Cautior certe est mansio, honestior existimatur traiectio (A. 8.15.2). Matters were brought to a crisis by Caesar's orders that Antony should allow no one to leave Italy. At once Cicero resolves to flee (A; 10.10), sailing for Greece June 7, 49 B. C. (F. 14.7.2). As he looks back upon this event five years later, he is uncertain as to the actual motive which led him to make the decision. At least, he writes as much to Matius. Secutum illud tempus est, cum me ad Pompeium proficisci sive pudor meus coegit sive officium sive fortuna (F. 11.27.4).

Throughout the period in which Pompey had virtually been at the head of affairs in Rome, including the years of Caesar's
absence, Cicero was moved several times to express his opinion of the administration. As a whole, he considered it a failure, acknowledging to Atticus, Erat enim ars difficilis recte rem publicam regere (A. 7.25). To his mind, Pompey is not a statesman, but ἡ τεχνή τοῦ τελευταίου (A. 8.16.1). Of all the charges he brings against him, that of increasing Caesar's power is the most serious (A. 7.3.4; 5.5). A letter to Atticus written in February 49 contains an enumeration of Pompey's mistakes. Omitto illa vetera, quod istum in rem publicam ille aluit, auxit, armavit. Passing to particulars he mentions Pompey's support of the various measures by which Caesar's power has been increased and maintained (A. 8.3.3). In this passage, Cicero seems to have recognized one of the salient features of the situation, but does not realize that Caesar had forced Pompey into playing the part of a political tool.

For the sake of a clearer understanding of the year and its significance to Cicero, it might be well to review briefly the events of the first half of 49 B.C. In January Caesar marched into Italy, while Pompey was made commander of the republican forces. During Caesar's progress to Rome, Cicero was on duty in Campania, Pompey had withdrawn to Capua. Pompey, who intended to sail for Greece, was anxious to have Cicero join him, but for various reasons mentioned above, he failed to do so. Caesar, in the meanwhile, had gone over to Spain, leaving Rome in the hands of his associates. In June Cicero left Italy to join Pompey in Greece. Information as to his movements and plans, during the last half of the year, is lacking in the letters, as they are discontinued from this point to February 48 B.C.

The six months which had just passed were among the most
difficult of Cicero's life. Returning from his province, he had found Caesar and Pompey at variance. To both, he was bound by obligations of the most serious nature. The strength and also the weakness of each were perfectly evident to him. His first impulse was to prevent the approaching struggle, but when this proved impossible, he made his decision for Pompey. In deciding for Pompey, it must be granted that he achieved a great moral triumph, and proved true to himself in the most crucial test of his career. No act could be a more convincing proof of patriotism, for he knew Pompey's failures, yet joined him as representing the cause of the republic against a determined enemy. Moreover, as a defender of the constitution he could not sympathize with Caesar, who was manifestly endeavoring to destroy that constitution. This crisis is discussed at great length by Tyrrell, who is enthusiastic in his praise, presenting complete evidence from the letters to show Cicero's integrity. We are now in a position to answer the question raised at the close of the period ending January 49 B.C. Was Cicero's alliance with democracy after the exile, a temporary one, or did it indicate any fundamental change in his original principles? There is only one possible reply. At heart, Cicero had never been anything but a republican. His support of democracy had been not only temporary but forced and unsatisfactory to himself as well. The fact that the old republic was still his ideal, made it impossible for him to uphold Caesar. The fact that the optimat cause represented his political sympathies, made it inevitable that he should turn to Pompey.

27 Tyrrell: Correspondence of Cicero. Appendix vol. I.
V. Cicero's Political Position 48 - 43 B.C.

In October 48 B.C. we find Cicero in Brundisium once more, where he was obliged to stay until September of the following year. He had joined Pompey in Greece, remaining in the camp but taking no part in the military life. He was not present at the battle of Pharsalia. After the battle, by which the contest between Caesar and Pompey was decided, Cicero returned to Italy at some risk, since the consent of the conquerors was necessary before he could proceed to Rome or even remain at Brundisium in safety. A mood of deep despondency took possession of him, like that of the exile. The letters of Book 11 to Atticus are full of the spirit of despair. His brother Quintus, for whom he had constantly shown such affection, had betrayed him, trying to bring him into disfavor with Caesar (A. 11.10,11,13,15,16; 11.8.2). This alone was a great source of uneasiness, but even without Quintus' treachery, his position in relation to Caesar was sufficiently embarrassing and uncertain (A. 11.16.3). As for his attitude toward the Pompeians, he feared that his return to Italy had been a mistake, involving, as it did, desertion of their cause (A. 11.11.1; 15.2).

Now that the cause had failed, Cicero was most anxious to secure Caesar's clemency, nor was his anxiety without hope of relief. He heard of Caesar's good-will (A. 11.7.5), and was eager to sue for his kindness (F. 15.15.3). Antony, at Rome, was at first disposed to put obstacles in the way of his reinstatement, but after some disagreement, finally consented to his remaining in Italy (A. 11.7.2). The matter was decided, however, by Caesar himself, who arrived at Brundisium in September 47 B.C., greeted
Cicero with great cordiality and assured him of pardon.

In reviewing his relation with the Pompeians, Cicero found occasion to regret their conduct and aims, although he does not for one moment regret his adoption of the cause. Quare voluntatis meae numquam paenitebit, consilii paenitet (A. 11.6.2). Later, in 46 B.C., in giving a brief account to Marius of his connection with the party, he expresses the same dissatisfaction (F. 7.3.1, 2 & 3). There can be no doubt that he was keenly disappointed when he discovered how far they fell short of his ideal party, that was to be the bulwark of the constitution. The unwelcome truth was impressed upon him that their object was purely selfish, their warfare cruel, and considering the common safety a victory more to be feared than defeat. To the last, his feeling for Pompey, their leader, was a mingling of criticism and esteem. When he heard of Pompey's murder near Alexandria, September 28, 48 B.C., it is not surprising to find his letter to Atticus expressive of both. De Pompeii exitu mihi dubium nunquam fuit. Tanta enim desperatio rerum eius omnium regum et populorum animos occuparat, ut, quocumque venisset, hoc putarem futurum. Non possum eius casum non dolere; hominem enim integrum et castum et gravem cognovi (A. 11. 6.5). This is his final judgment on Pompey, the man whose fortunes for twenty years had been most intimately connected with his own.

Soon after Caesar's arrival in Italy, Cicero returned to Rome, where his complete reinstatement took place. He enjoyed the favor, not only of Caesar, but that of Caesar's friends (F. 4.13.2; 6.12.2; 9.16. 2 & 3; 6.10.5), perhaps because he took care not to offend those in power (F. 9.16.5), when his own position was so uncertain. One of Caesar's practises, mentioned in a letter
to Plancus at this time, is interesting as showing the power which he actually exercised. According to Cicero, Caesar was accustomed to pass decrees of the senate that had been written at his own house without consulting the senate. To these, as custom required, he prefixed names of senators but without their knowledge. Cicero's name had been used in this way, and thereafter he had received thanks from foreign potentates for favors which it was supposed he had secured for them. While conditions like these prevailed, Cicero determined to secure Caesar's permission to devote himself to study (F. 7.33.2). For more than a year, by virtue of forbearance on Caesar's part, and discretion on Cicero's side, the most friendly relations existed between the two. It might not be too much to say that actual admiration for Caesar, as well as a desire to strengthen his own position, lay at the foundation of his strongly expressed approval, during this period. At any rate, he writes that he was sincere in his speech for Marcellus, which he delivered before the senate in October 46 B.C., breaking the silence of many months to declare his commendation of Caesar's acts (F. 4.4.4). Disarmed by Caesar's clemency, and ignorant of Caesar's intentions, he may have supposed that the constitution was not imperilled after all, or cherished a vain hope that under Caesar, the republic would revive again (F. 6.10.5).

As a result of his influence under Caesar, Cicero made successful efforts in behalf of exiled Pompeians (F. 4.13; 4.8; 6.13). Through his agency pardon was extended to several of them, although it was quite in line with Caesar's own policy, aside from Cicero's exertions. In this way, he had favored Cicero himself, and in addition, Cassius, Brutus and Sulpicius (F. 6.6.10). Cicero was anxious that the prominent members of the party should
follow his own example in yielding to necessity and surrendering themselves to the man in power. This is his advice to Marcellus, particularly. Primum tempori cedere, id est necessitati parere, semper sapientis est habitum (F. 4.9.2). In one case, Cicero made an exception to the rule, that is, when he wrote the panegyric on Cato. The death of that great optimus, the only thoroughly consistent leader of his party, moved him to admiration and praise, an act that called forth Caesar's disapproval almost immediately in his "Anti-Catones" (cf. Sust. Iul. 56). Cicero's attitude is also expressed in a letter to Paetus, in which he compares the death of Pompey with that of Cato, saying, Pompeius - foede perierunt. At Cato praecclare (F. 9.18.2).

The speech for Marcellus of October 46 B.C., represents the climax reached by Cicero's approval of Caesar. Thereafter his sympathy declines, as he comprehends more fully Caesar's ambition and gains a clearer insight into his real plans. The first note (28) of distrust appears in a letter to Atticus about this time, during Caesar's absence in Spain, when it was feared that he would nominate magistrates from abroad. Actual dislike of Caesar is soon manifested (A. 12.45.2; 13.44.1). A proposed letter of counsel to Caesar, on matters of administration, not sent however, is interesting here. It was doubtless of a flattering nature and for that very reason unsatisfactory to the writer, whose real position was becoming clear, even to himself. Quam enim turpis est adsentatio, cum vivere ipsum turpe sit nobis! (A. 13.28.2).

The time soon came when Caesar appeared to Cicero in his true light, not as the founder of a new republic, but as an absolute ruler (A. 13.37.2). He calls him rex both here, and again, 28 Tyrrell: Correspondence of Cicero, notes to A. 12.8.
after the Ides of March (A. 14.11.1; F. 11.27.8). A rumor that Caesar is going over to the optimates is ignored (A. 13.40.1). Mention is made of a dinner at which Caesar is Cicero's guest, where the subject of politics is carefully avoided. Relations, if not strained, were evidently very formal, and Cicero's comment on the occasion is, Hospes tamen non is, quoi diceres: 'Amabo te eodem ad me, cum revertere' (A. 13.52.2). Distrust, dislike and apprehension were all increased by Caesar's appointment of Caninius as consul for part of a day, an act that roused Cicero's indignation (F. 7.30.1). During the first two months of 44 B.C. his feeling against the man must have developed rapidly, for otherwise, it is difficult to account for the exultation over Caesar's murder. The letter to Basilus, one of the conspirators, written on the very day of the assassination, is a hurried note of congratulation, in full as follows: Tibi gratulor, mihi gaudeo; te amo, tua tueor; a te amari et, quid agas, quidque agatur, certior fieri volo (F. 6.15).

The gradual growth of Cicero's friendly admiration for Caesar, has been traced throughout the first year after leaving Brundisium for Rome, then, throughout the second year, his slow but certain realization of Caesar's designs, and his corresponding hatred. He must have been aware that such a feeling was shared by a definite body of nobles, and that plans were being made to overthrow Caesar's power. There is conclusive evidence, however, that he had no part in the conspiracy to kill Caesar, for he later de- plores the fact that the conspirators had not taken him into their confidence. Quam vellem ad illas pulcherrimas epulas me Idibus Martiis invitasses! (F. 10.28.1). It is quite possible however, that he was present at the assassination (A. 14.14.4). His approval
of the deed is unmistakable (A. 14.6.1; 4.2). In Brutus and his cause, he sees the only hope of tranquillity for the state (A. 14.2.3), and in the conspirators, a band of heroes (A. 14.4.2). It was most characteristic of the man that he should seize upon the new combination of Caesar's enemies as a national safeguard. Twice in his career, his enthusiasm had risen at the prospect of a constitutional party, during his consulship, and before the Civil War. Twice he had been disappointed. Now, for the third time, he looked forward to a restoration of the old regime, and henceforth devoted himself to that end. Events immediately following the Ides of March, and resulting from the assassination, were most unsatisfactory. The conspirators seemed to have no definite plans (F. 11.1). They failed to take prompt action, when their deed was once accomplished (A. 14.10.1), and neglected to assemble the senate. This is a point upon which Cicero is most insistent. Measures should have been taken immediately to provide for the public emergency and to legalize the acts of the conspirators. Only three days later, Cicero writes, - iam pridem perieramus (A. 14.10.1). It will be noted that he identified himself at once with the cause and shared the responsibility of the situation. An informal meeting held in the Capitol after the murder seemed inadequate to the needs of the time and was not approved by him (A. 14.14.2); neither was the public funeral of Caesar, which, in his estimation, should never have been permitted (A. 14.14.3). In spite of so radical an act as murder, in spite of the fact that Caesar

29 Abeken: Life and Letters of Cicero, p. 405.
"It is obvious that the cherished vision of Cicero's mind had been the reversal of all the late dictator's obnoxious decrees and the reestablishment of the republic in the same condition precisely as during his own consulship and the period immediately following."
was no longer living, the course of affairs as inaugurated by him, was uninterrupted. The man was dead, but his policy and acts were still in force (F. 12.1.1; A. 14.6.2; 14.2). Strange as it might seem, the assassination had proved fruitless (A. 14.12.1; 18.4; 21.3). Scarcely two months had passed before Cicero was forced to acknowledge to Atticus that Caesar's murder, from which he had expected so much, had been ineffectual. Excisa enim est arbor, non evulsa. itaque quam fruticetur, vides (A. 15.4.2).

It is not surprising that Cicero was somewhat at a loss as to his own position at this juncture (A. 14.13.2; 6.2; 11.1). His connection with Caesar's friends had been so intimate that he could hardly adopt the cause of the conspirators without feeling great apprehension in case of civil war (A. 14.22.2). His hopes were placed in Brutus, Cassius and D. Brutus, upon whom the public welfare seemed to depend (F. 12.1.1). This was in May. Meanwhile negotiations took place between Brutus and Cassius who had left Rome, and Antony who was in power at the capital, pretending to carry on the government in accordance with Caesar's wishes. Their first letter to Antony declared that they had always sought peace and liberty (F. 11.2.2). Their second letter in August was a warning to Antony but also an announcement of peaceful intentions (F. 11.3). Finally, taking matters into their own hands, they proclaimed a full senate for September first.

Conditions in Rome, were indeed hard to endure (F. 10.11; 12.22.2). The state was utterly shattered (F. 5.13.3), and the subservience which had been shown to Caesar, the victor, was now extended to his friends in power, the common experience during peace after civil war (F. 12.18.2).

While the plans of Brutus and Cassius were taking shape,
and Antony was flourishing in Rome, Cicero, who had obtained a legation, was meditating departure into Greece. Proficiscor, ut constitueram, legatus in Graeciam: caedis inpendentis periculum non nihil vitare videor, sed casurus in aliquam vituperationem, quod rei publicae defuerim tam gravi tempore (A. 14.13.4). It meant, indeed, a desertion of the cause, but Antony was a dangerous enemy. At length, fearing an ignoble death if he remained, he determined to leave the country in the hope of a better fate, in behalf of his party; ex hac nassa exire constitui non ad fugam, sed ad spem mortis melioris (A. 15.20.2). He set sail from Vibo, July 25, 44 B. C., but was destined never to see Greece again. Hardly had he gone, when unfavorable winds prevented his voyage, and he learned that his absence was regretted. Repenting of his decision to flee, moved by patriotism (F. 10.1.1), he turned back (A. 16.7.1), further influenced by Atticus (A. 16.7.2) and by Brutus (B. 1.10.4).

In August he was in Rome again, to take his place at the head of the state, summoned to this duty by the better elements of society, the acknowledged leader of senate and optimates. The year which follows vies with that of the consulship as the annus mirabilis of his political career, just as the preceding year had marked the climax of his literary activity. It is necessary at this point to retrace his connection with Antony during the first part of 44 B. C., since the mighty duel between the two began here and terminated only with his death. At first he was deceived as to Antony's intentions, thinking that he had given himself over so completely to luxury, that no harm from him was to be feared. Quem quidem ego epularum magis arbitror rationem habere quam quic-
quam mali cogitare (A. 14.3.2). This was in April. In May he was resolved to maintain friendly relations with him as long as possible, although his hostility was becoming noticeable (A. 14.13b. 1 & 5; F. 11.5.2; 16.23.2). Cicero knew, furthermore, that his official acts showed a high-handed policy, quite unjustifiable. Citizenship, for example, was granted to the Sicilians (A. 14.12.1), in accordance, as he said, with Caesar's wishes, which he pretended to follow in this as well as other measures (A. 14.13.6). During the latter part of the year, Cicero was forced to recognize Antony's enmity as a serious matter. His attitude became unendurable (F. 10.1.1), and not satisfied with threats, he went so far as to plot against his life (F. 12.2.1). A convenient charge of complicity in Caesar's murder was next trumped up (F. 12.2.1), while in general he displayed throughout these months an untiring malignity (F. 12.3.1).

With a man of such characteristics at the head of affairs, cruel, overbearing and tyrannical, it is no wonder that the state suffered sorely. Cicero describes its condition in September 44 B.C., to Plancus thus: Quae potest enim spes esse in ea re publica, in qua hominis impotentissimi atque intemperantissimi armis oppressa sunt omnia, et in qua nec senatus nec populus vim habet ullam, nec leges ullae sunt, nec judicia nec omnino simulacrum aliquid ae vestigium civitatis? (F. 10.1.1). At such a crisis, Cicero assumed the leadership in an opposition to Antony that was marked by the most patriotic and unselfish devotion. Against the military power wielded by his enemy he matched all the resources of his oratorical art. Fourteen Philippics delivered between September 1, 44 and April 23, 43 B.C., contain the record of the
struggle, a contest contra arma verba (F. 12.22.1). The courage of his long strife commands both respect and admiration, for he lived in constant fear of Antony's power (A. 16.9). In addition to the warfare he himself had declared, he urged D. Brutus and Plancus against their common enemy (F. 11.12.2; 10. 19.2).

In the meantime Antony had left Rome and was at Lutina in command of his forces. Refusing to comply with the senate's injunction to raise the siege of that town, he sent back counter demands to Rome (F. 12.4.1). The battle of Mutina took place April 21, a victory over Antony, but followed almost immediately by the death of both consuls, Hirtius and Pansa. After this defeat, Antony set out to join Lepidus, with whom he united his army May 29, 43 B.C.

Cicero's activities had been by no means restricted to speeches in the senate. There were conflicting elements among the constitutionalists, which he sought to harmonize in order to strengthen his party. Several letters, for instance, consist of appeals to various prominent men for their support and loyalty. L. Plancus, mentioned above, an administrator in Gaul, was one of them (F. 10.1.2; 3; 5; 6); also D. Brutus, governor of Cisalpine Gaul (F. 11.5), and in addition to these, Cassius, Trebonius, and Cornificius. His chief reliance however, was on Brutus and Cassius, his virtual lieutenants, to whom he had looked the previous year for protection in behalf of the state.

Brutus and Cassius were now the military defenders of the republic. For Brutus, Cicero had long cherished a sincere regard, expressed in the letters as early as 50 B.C. (F. 2.13.2). Ad-
miration for him is also evident (A. 14.15.2; 17a. 5), and there is no doubt that he considered him their party leader (A. 14.20.3); in which connection, his name is, of course, coupled with that of Cassius (B. 2.1.3). Brutus, who had gone over to Greece for the purpose of recruiting an army, was now at the head of a considerable military force, which Cicero was anxious to have at his disposal in Italy. In June he writes to Brutus, urging him to return. Quam ob rem advola, obsecro, atque eam rem publicam, quam virtute atque animi magnitudine magis quam eventis rerum libera-visti, exitu libera. Omnis omnium concursus ad te futurus est (B. 1.10.4). After the loss of the consuls and the union of hostile armies in the north, the constitutionalists looked to Brutus and Cassius as their chief dependence (F. 12.6.2; 8.1). Cicero, almost despairing of the republic’s life, believed that it could survive only by their efforts: Aut nulla (res publica) erit aut ab isto istisve servabitur (A. 14.20.3).

The weak points in their position were painfully clear, the need of money and a larger military force (F. 12.3.1; B. 2.4), yet he was hopeful of the result, having roused the senate and people (F. 10.28.2). Here, as on several other occasions, his characteristic change of mood is reflected, as he siezes eagerly upon the slightest indication for the better, and magnifies it out of all proportion to the reality. Still appearances were actually more favorable for a short time after the battles at Forum Gallorum and Mutina (F. 12.28.3; A. 15.13.4; B. 1.3.1). Cicero received honors after the latter (Phil. 14.5), and a letter from Cassius Parmensis, written in June, shows the estimation in which he was held by his countrymen. Est enim tua toga omnium
armis felicior; quae nunc quoque nobis poene victam rem publicam ex manibus hostium eripuit ac reddidit. (F. 12.13.1). As head of the state, Cicero was vested with the chief military authority, to which the honors just mentioned bear witness. Brutus, moreover, referred to him for orders (B. 2.3.2); and other generals, Galba, Plancus, D. Brutus and Lepidus, sent frequent reports of operations to their superior in Rome. The first place in the senate, as well as in the army, was also accorded to him, a position which he had always coveted. Up to this point, his belief in the senate as a governing body had never been shaken, in spite of more than one practical demonstration of its inefficiency. Under the proper conditions, he thought, the senate would be quite adequate to all the exigencies of the times, failing to see that the fault lay quite as much in its own organization and methods, as in attacks from forces without. Cicero, during these months, realized that the senate was hampered (F. 11.7.2), but thought it was responding nobly to the demands made upon it (F. 12.4.1; 10.28.3; 12.5.2). It was not until June that the conviction of its powerlessness was brought home to him, ὅργανον enim erat meum senatus; id iam est dissolutum (F. 11.14.1), and that, in spite of its courage, other resources were required. To Cassius he writes the truth that has been forced upon him. Fortis sane senatus, sed maxime spe subsidii tui (F. 12.10.1).

There remains only to consider Cicero's relations with the future emperor Octavian, before bringing this last period to a close. When he first appeared in Italy, a mere youth, the adopted son and heir of Caesar, Cicero thought him of little or no importance. In April 44 B. C., he expresses this opinion, shared by
Romans in general at that time. Nam de Octavio musque deque (A. 14.6.1). He declined absolutely, to greet him as "Caesar" (A. 14.12.2). It was not long, however, before he began to see possibilities in Octavian (A. 15.12.2), especially after the young Caesar was charged with an attempt against Antony's life. Magna spes est in eo (F. 12.23.2). It must be acknowledged, however, that his motives in seeking Antony's death, were probably personal, due to frauds practised upon him in connection with his inheritance, and not patriotic. He further commended himself to Cicero by recruiting an army among his father's veterans, and seeking the great leader's advice (A. 16.8). Furthermore, he requested the senate's authority for his acts (A. 16.9). In all this the guiding force of his own ambition is perfectly evident, as he laid the foundations of future influence. His first attempt against Antony, the acquisition of an army, the senate's support, all these tended to increase his personal power, and at the same time, to disarm Cicero. There was a lurking fear, however, in Cicero's mind, that this growing power might mean the confirmation of Caesar's acts (A. 16.14.1), but his faith in Octavian as a new champion of the republic finally triumphed (F. 11.8.2). The fifth Philippic declares his confidence in enthusiastic terms. Ita enim ad rem publicam accessit ut eam confirmaret, non ut everteret (Phil. 5. 18. 49 & 50). His faith in Octavian never reached a higher point than on this occasion. Within a few months, doubt and suspicion returned (B. 1.3.1; 18. 3 & 4), contributing doubtless, to his desire that Brutus set out for Italy to lead the republican forces, since, in successive letters, he summons Brutus, and voices his lack of confidence in Octavian. Hoc adulescentis praesidium equi-
In drawing conclusions from the events of the last few years of Cicero's life, it must be remembered that after Pharsalia, as previously on returning from exile, he faced new conditions. The death of Pompey, and the revelation of his party's policy, had completely destroyed every hope of defense for the state, from that quarter. Nothing apparently, remained for him to do, but to secure Caesar's pardon, avoid further offense, and devote himself to literature. Even then, he thought he saw in Caesar and his plans, possibilities for a free republic. Disappointed once more, he became his enemy, and this time did not abandon the cause for any reason, but remained loyal to senate and constitution until his death. The reality of his devotion to patriotic ideals, during these years, cannot be questioned. It contributed more than a little to his approval of Caesar, as has been remarked. It explains his cooperation with Octavian, to whom he resorted at the last. But more than all, it accounts for the long disinterested struggle with Antony. Here, as in every preceding period, he endeavored to remain true to his principles as a loyal republican, sometimes with indifferent, but, more often, with conspicuous success.

At this point Cicero's correspondence closes. The events immediately following are too well known to require more than a passing reference; the union of Antony and Octavian, the formation of the Second Triumvirate in November, the revival of proscriptions, and the final battle at Philippi in the following autumn. Among the prominent Romans proscribed, Cicero was included, as a con-
cession to Antony's hatred. The murder took place near his Formian villa, December 7, 43 B.C., the inevitable result of his loyalty to republicanism. The manner of his death was cruel, but as Livy points out, it was no more so than he would have wished for Antony (Fragm. apud Senec. Suasor. 6). A description of the murder is given by Plutarch, (Cic. 47. 48) who concludes his account by saying, that when Antony heard of it, and knew that Cicero's head and hands had been brought to Rome, "he cried aloud that the main object of the proscriptions had been attained. He ordered Cicero's head and hands to be fixed above the rostra - a sight at which the Romans shuddered, for they seemed to see there, not the face of Cicero, but the image of Antony's soul."
Conclusions

1. Cicero lacked political intuition.

It is apparent from a study of the letters, that Cicero failed utterly to understand the times in which he lived. Nothing is more obvious in the many references made to the deplorable condition of the state, than that he was unable to see the causes that had given rise to such a condition. He felt that the old forms were weakening and the old ideals losing their force, but the new era was beyond his vision. The republic was indeed, a thing of the past, but the empire never occurred to his mind as a thing of the future. A sentence from a letter to Caelius, written in 51 B.C., is significant, in which Cicero confesses his inability to forecast the issue of events. Neque enim fuit, quod tu plus providere posses quam quis nostrum in primisque ego (F. 2.8.2). Another reference (De Divinatione, 1.24) bears witness to the fact that Cicero did not always comprehend the times, where Quintus says, Aut num propterea nulla est rei publicae gerendae ratio atque prudentia, quia multa Cn. Pompeium, quaedam L. Catonem, non nulla etiam te ipsum sefellerunt?

As for the great influences that were affecting the very life of the republic and leading to a strongly centralized control, they were hidden from him completely. The significance of the proconsular command, so dangerous an instrument in the hands of Caesar and Pompey, was not understood. The administration of a province from Rome, conducted by Pompey, when he ought to have gone to Spain, gave no hint of the privileges later assumed by the emperors. The extension of the franchise was a question that never
affected him, except as he disapproved of Antony's granting citizenship to the Sicilians. The tribunici-an power, a source of contention since the days of the Gracchi, and the foundation of imperial prerogative, appeared to him merely as a means to accomplish a personal revenge. That he thought lightly of provincial duties, has been remarked already, in the case of his own administration, but the whole relation of Rome to her provinces he did not see, nor did he understand that the vitality of the nation was no longer restricted to Italy, but that the center of gravity was shifting to the extra-marine possessions. It seems incredible, moreover, that he could have supposed a restoration of the republic along the old lines was possible, when senate and assemblies had not for many years performed their original representative function. One fact, however, seems to have been clear, namely, that the preeminence of any person or party in the state, depended chiefly upon military resources. This was brought home to him when an army was so much needed by the constitutionalists in order to oppose Antony. It must be borne in mind, in explaining Cicero's narrow outlook, that the limits of Rome practically bounded his point of view. He was a true citizen of Rome, the city, as opposed to Caesar or Octavian whose interests extended as widely as the empire. So much for negative conclusions.

2. Cicero's great desire for peace led him to action prompted by political expediency.

On the positive side there is, first in importance, a life-long desire for peace. This was, to be sure, partly temperamental, for his tastes were never warlike; but more than that, he
deemed a policy of peace the best for the state. He endeavored constantly to remove causes of variance and emphasize common sympathies. This is especially evident in his first scheme for the public welfare, in which the concordia ordinum played so prominent a part, and again in his attempt to reconcile Caesar and Pompey before the Civil War.

The desire for peace was closely connected with his doctrine of expediency in public affairs. There were occasions when he was willing to purchase peace at the expense of principle, yielding to the necessity of the times. Such an instance, which he considered perfectly justifiable, was his approval of the knights' demands in Asia. Failure to oppose the triumvirate in 59 B.C. is accounted for on the grounds of expediency, since he thought they would work out their own destruction, if undisturbed. Support of the triumvirs after returning from exile, and lastly his relations with Caesar after Pharsalia, came about partly as a result of this doctrine. He constantly impressed upon his friends the necessity of a changing policy, in which he set the example. Writing of the approval he had given to the decree authorizing Caesar's acts, May 44 B.C., he says Fecimus id quidem temporibus cedentes, quae valent in re publica plurimum (F. 12.1.2).

3. Cicero was no political spoilsman.

Another prominent feature of his public life was his abstention from the spoils of office, and his freedom from material aims. This is proved most conclusively in the record of administration in Cilicia, where he not only refused to plunder the citizens, but even left part of the allowance granted to carry on the government. Wealth was never the object of his ambition, and he was
engaged in no great enterprises that required fortunes like those squandered by Caesar. It is evident that he received considerable sums as legacies from time to time, probably as a result of professional activities. Due credit must therefore be given him for an exceptionally clear record, in a day when corruption and bribery were rampant.

4. Cicero's career consistently that of a constitutionalist.

In politics, Cicero was a constitutionalist throughout his career. He early became an adherent of the optimates as representing that party, and formulated his political creed, with the defense of the constitution in view. The year 63 B.C. stands out as the period of his first great success along this line. The principal object in attempting to gain Pompey, after the latter's return from Asia, was thereby to strengthen the senatorial position. It may be asserted that the Clodian affair and the exile severed his connection with the optimates, but a more accurate examination of the facts, proves that it was only interrupted. Their ill-will and indifference drew him from the nobles into Caesar's party, a temporary relation only. The fact that he was willing to join the Pompeians after their treatment of him, and support them so loyally, goes far to prove the strength of his allegiance (A. 8.16.2). Ut bos armenta sic ego bonos viros aut eos, quicunque dicentur boni, sequor, etiamsi ruent (A. 7.7.7). During the last two years of his life, he offered the final proof of his sympathy for the constitutional cause, all the more unmistakable because he defended it at the expense of his leisure, his authorship, and, finally, his life.

It is interesting to view Cicero's relations to Pompey,
Caesar and Octavian, in the light of his connection with the optimates. His fidelity to Pompey is quite explicable on this ground, while it is puzzling on any other. In 61 B.C. he looked upon Pompey as the chief supporter of the state, clinging to him desperately until he joined the triumvirate. In spite of Pompey's union with Caesar, Cicero was willing in 49 B.C., to believe in him once more, and regard him as the bulwark of the republic. Caesar himself, for a brief period, awakened in Cicero the vain hope that even he might be about to restore the former state, and Cicero, as an optimate, gave his approval. Lastly, Octavian inspired his loyalty, as long as he supposed his motives were patriotic, and that he had come "to establish and not to overthrow" the republic.

5. Cicero's ideal was the republic of earlier days.

When Cicero referred to the republic, which was so significant to him, he looked back to old conditions that had prevailed in the time of Scipio. He himself would like to have played the part of Laelius to Pompey's Scipio, as he expresses it (F. 5.7.3). In this connection it will be recalled how many of the persons figuring in Cicero's dialogues belong to this period. It was an ideal which he was anxious to impress upon the younger generation, a desire to which a letter to Curio testifies. Tu tamen, sive habes aliquam spem de re publica sive desperas, ea para, meditare, cogita, quae esse in eo civi ac viro debent, qui sit rem publicam adflictam et oppressam miseric temporibus ac perditis moribus in veterem dignitaten et libertatem vindicaturus (F. 2.5.2). At the best, however, he looked to the past and not the future. His hopes were for the restoration of conditions that had disappeared,
and not for some glorious new commonwealth of the future. This was the reason for his failure to understand Caesar, and for the "gulf which separated, the man whose eyes were ever on the past from the man who stood at the helm and looked far into unknown seas." (30)

6. **Final estimate of Cicero as a public man.**

Such are the political sympathies which the letters reveal, agreeing by no means with the extreme estimates of favorable or unfavorable critics. They afford a point of view which resembles that of the writers who maintain a moderate position, combining praise and blame. An effort has been made to present the evidence without prejudice, looking rather to the larger estimate and not over-emphasizing individual incidents. The result has been that Cicero has appeared a man of peace, too much given to expediency but free from political corruption, a devoted adherent of the optimate party, a leader whose ideals, looking rather to the past than to the future, obscured his vision of the Rome that was to be. In the light of the correspondence, Nepos' criticism has been proved false, but for it, there may be substituted the more accurate estimate of Augustus, borne out by every page of the letters. "My child," said Octavian to his grandson, many years after Cicero's death, "this was a man of great intellect and a lover of his country" (Plut. Cic. 49).

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30 Fowler. *Life of Caesar*, p. 362
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