THE EXTERNAL COMMERCIAL POLICIES OF RICHELIEU

BY

FRANKLIN CHARLES PALM

A. B. Oberlin College, 1914.

THESIS

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

IN HISTORY

IN

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

1915
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

May 28, 1915

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

Franklin Charles Palm

ENTITLED

The Internal Commercial Policies of Richelieu

BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF

Master of Arts in History

Albert F. Lybyer

In Charge of Major Work

Evarts B. Greene

Head of Department

Recommendation concurred in:

Committee

on

Final Examination
I

The Ideas and Accomplishments of Richelieu as Regards a War Marine

Richelieu appointed to the position of "Grand Master, Chief, and Superintendent General of the Navigation and Commerce of France" used this office as a means for carrying out his ideas in regard to creating a great war marine.

The French navy was very weak up to Richelieu's time.

The main causes which influenced Richelieu to take action along this line were (a) depredations committed against France by the Barbary pirates, (b) unfriendly foreign relations, (c) the rising colonial trade of France and her growing commerce as a consequence of it.

Richelieu had investigations made as to the state of the marine in 1629 and 1633. A deplorable state of affairs was reported.

Steps taken by Richelieu to build up the war marine.

The growth of the navy from 1630 to 1634.
Chapter

Importance of Richelieu's work so far as it concerns the war marine of France .............. 21

II The Ideas and Accomplishments of Richelieu in

Regard to Colonization.................................................... 25

Little accomplished before the Cardinal's time...25

An unprecedented growth in French coloniza-
tion under the direction of Richelieu........... 25

The articles of agreement granted to a com-
pany called "La Nacelle de Saint Pierre fleur-
delisée" by Richelieu indicate the main idea
of his colonial policy.............................................. 26

The accomplishments of the Cardinal's colo-
nial policy in North America............................... 30

The colonizing work as carried on in the

East Indies ............................................................ 32

In Africa................................................................. 34

On the Island of Madagascar ......................... 36

The result of the efforts of Richelieu along

this line .............................................................. 37

III The Ideas and Accomplishments of Richelieu as

Regards Commerce ..................................................... 43

The value of commerce and industry just begin-
ing to be appreciated when the Cardinal came
into power .............................................................. 43

The ideas of Richelieu as to the value of com-
merce in general.................................................... 44
Chapter

His ideas as to the value of commerce to France in particular ........................................ 45
His ideas as to the advantages of trade with the East, with Persia, etc. ......................... 48
The means of developing it................................................................. 50
The actual accomplishments of Richelieu in regard to building up the commerce of France...

In the East ......................................................... 51
With England ......................................................... 57
With Holland.......................................................... 60
With Spain ........................................................... 61
With the Baltic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and Norway)........................... 63

The importance of his work so far as it concerns commerce........................................ 65

IV Richelieu's Relation to the Mercantile Doctrine and his Economic Importance ....................... 68

His relation to the mercantile doctrine......... 68
His economic importance........................................... 71

Appendix A, Bibliography..................................................... 1
Appendix B, Note on Richelieu's Testament Politique................................. 1v
The External Commercial Policies of Richelieu

Introduction

The age of Richelieu, although recognized as being one of the most important periods in the political development of France, has up to the present, been more or less neglected on the economic side. Many writers in the past and in the present have carefully and indeed most vividly characterized Richelieu as a statesman, diplomat, and patron of art and learning of the first rank, but have paid little attention to the economic phases of his administration, and especially to his external commercial policies. For example, M. Caillet in his book on "The Administration of Richelieu" (1) says that most writers do not give him the proper amount of attention on the administrative side. "Voltaire", he goes on to say, "in his Siècle de Louis XIV, simply mentions the fact that he made it flourishing without but not within. The History of P. Griffith contains almost nothing about the most important administrative acts of that period." He then concludes by pointing out the fact that his treatment of the Cardinal will include not only his administrative activities, but the ideas he had on this phase of his career as well. But Richelieu has been neglected by economists as well as by historians. One writer on political economy covers the period of Louis XIV in a brief paragraph (2). "Between the administration of Sully and that of

(1). Caillet, L'administration en France sous le ministre du Cardinal Richelieu, Introduction, p. VII.
(2). Blanqui, History of Political Economy, p. 279.
Colbert, he says, "was that of the two priests Richelieu and Mazarin, both wasteful of their means though from different motives. Colbert was, in fact, the only minister who had a system settled, complete, and consistent in all parts." He then goes on to relate the various contributions of this man, paying absolutely no more attention to the cardinal. But the author of the above quotation is not the only writer who has slighted that period on the economic side; it is a charge which can be brought with more or less justice against most writers who deal with the period. Such being the case, because of the failure to bring out Richelieu's ideas and actual accomplishments in regard to his external commercial policies, the present thesis is going to try to bring out the ideas and activities of the cardinal so far as they concern part of the economic phase of his career. In other words, an effort will be made to find out if authors in the past have been justified in slighting Richelieu on the external commercial side (1).

Now, in taking up the side of Richelieu's economic ideas and accomplishments, one finds that a study must be made of what he thought and did as regards a war marine, colonization, and commerce in general. These three phases of his external commercial policies are to a certain extent related. For example, the cardinal desired a war marine because he wanted to aid and protect colonization and commerce. Further, there was a general influence (1). It is hoped that the internal phase of his economic policies can be treated likewise in the near future.
abroad which caused Richelieu to pay no small amount of attention to those phases of his administrative duties, and that was the economic conditions of Europe at the period when he came into power.

According to one writer on political economy (1), the age of Richelieu is found in the record of the three phases of the modern period as interpreted by economic history. In this second phase, he says, "which opens with the beginning of the 16th Century, the spontaneous collapse of the medieval structure is followed by a series of systematic assaults which still further disorganizes it. During this phase the central temporal power, which has made a great advance in stability and resources, lays hold of the rising elements of manufacture and commerce, and seeks, while satisfying the popular enthusiasm for their promotion, to use them for political ends, and make them subserve its own strength and splendour by furnishing the treasure necessary for military use. With this practical effort and the social tendencies on which it rests, the mercantile school of political economy, which then obtained a spontaneous ascendancy, is in close relation. Thus we find that Richelieu came into power just at the time when the mercantile theory was at its zenith, when nations were beginning to realize their individual strength, and when the value of centralization of power and wealth was almost overemphasized. But before taking up the effect of this doctrine on the important nations of Europe, just a word as to what the mercantile theory really was.

It was a doctrine "whose essence", says Schmoller, "lies not in the tariff barriers, but in something far greater, namely, (1). Ingram, The History of Political Economy, pp. 32-33.
the total transformation of society and its organization, as well as of the state and its institutions; in the replacing of a local and territorial economic policy by that of the state"(1). Another writer, reviewing the system so far as it affects nations in their relations to each other, maintains that under it, "each nation, as a whole, worked for its own power. The entered into a competitive struggle in the economic no less than in the political field, success in the former being, indeed, by the rules, regarded as instrumental to preeminence in the latter. A national economic interest came to exist, of which the government made itself the representative head"(2). Thus one sees that the doctrine, in general, was one which is followed even to the present day. Furthermore, it was an economic theory which has been followed by a great many political and administrative leaders down to the present time, and so far as concerns this part of the mercantile system, Richelieu is no exception, as this thesis will try to prove. However, there existed at that time an extreme mercantile doctrine, which the cardinal did not follow, even though it was the common belief of the time. The upholders of this form of the mercantile system believed that gold was wealth, that the balance of trade should always be favorable, and that a nation could only be strong and powerful by obtaining and keeping a large supply of gold within the confines of its own territory.

The policies of the governments of England and Spain presented striking examples of this extreme theory. At that time the former country was just beginning her colonizing expeditions to America. Now one of the predominating causes of these enterprises

(2) Ingram, History of Political Economy, p. 39.
was the desire to get gold, and while religious motives played an important part in causing the different expeditions to America, nevertheless the extreme economic doctrine had a great and increasing influence on the settlements in the new world and their relations with the mother country. Adam Smith and his "Wealth of Nations" had not appeared as yet to influence the English nation. Gold was wealth to the Englishman of that age, and the belief comprehended all his economical activities. However, England was not so ardent an exponent of this doctrine as was Spain, for all the latter's commercial and colonial activities were influenced by the single ambition, "to get gold".

The most interesting illustration of this mercantile theory in action is found in a study of the discovery, conquest, and settlement of South America by the Spanish. The deeds of Cortez in Mexico and Pizarro in Peru are two excellent examples of the mad scramble for gold at that time. Also, the commercial relations of the Spanish colonies in the south with Spain, as controlled by the former's council of the Indies, reveals the narrow economic doctrines of the day, and well illustrates the policy of exclusion carried on by countries which had colonies in other continents. It was held that the Spanish colonies could trade with Spain alone, and that the balance of trade must always be in favor of the home country.

This extreme economic theory was common to all European nations at that time, and was a part of the natural development out of the past. "The development of the universe", says Mr. Bridges (1), "was destined to supersede and replace the old system (1). ... Bridges, Richelieu and Colbert, pp. 5-10."
based on individual activity and scientific conviction as opposed to activity and supernatural beliefs of the middle ages. It was thus a gradual change from one to the other, industry being substituted for warfare" (1). Thus one concludes that the particular development of early modern commerce and the resulting economic mercantile doctrine was the natural outcome of the breaking down or rather the evolution of the different practices in the past; also that the extreme theory was the natural product of the new age of commercialism and colonization. As a result one finds that during this period there began a great commercial and colonial development which, although it was handicapped to a certain extent by many mistaken economic ideas, yet greatly influenced the history and development, in all directions, of all the important European nations of that time.

The discovery of America opened an avenue of industrial development to all countries. This resulted in an intensive stimulation of commercial and colonial projects, which in time affected them all. France in common with these other lands saw the great field open to her. She had begun to find herself internally, why not externally also? Richelieu had this problem to solve when he came into power, and what he did and intended to do in developing the external commercial power of France is, as before stated, the purpose of this thesis.

Accordingly, besides trying to find out Richelieu's economic accomplishments and ideas in regard to building up a war marine, colonization, and general commercial relations, the attempt (1). Bridges, Richelieu and Colbert, pp. 5-10.
will also be made to determine as results of the investigation, his actual relations to the mercantile doctrine, and his economic importance.
Chapter I

The Ideas and Accomplishments of Richelieu as Regards a War Marine.

The keynote of Richelieu's position in regard to a war marine for France is found in the following quotation taken from his Testament Politique. "The sea is an object of dispute among all sovereigns, for they all claim that they inherit the right to control it. Therefore, the factor which does so is force and not reason. It is indeed necessary to be powerful in order to have a recognized claim in that heritage" (1). The cardinal then takes up the maritime organization of England, Spain, and the Barbary States, compares the naval forces of these, and shows briefly how he wished to make the French strong and active enough to be able in times of war to contend with advantage against the fleets of their enemies, and in time of peace, to defend their commerce, ships, and shores from the aggression of pirates.

Richelieu was given the opportunity to carry out his ideas along this line when, in 1627, he was offered the position of "Grand Master, Chief, and Superintendent General of the Navigation and Commerce of France". The duties of this office had been carried on by several officials in the past, and were now put under the control of the cardinal, as a further move toward the centralization of power which was going on at that time. Some of the duties of this position were as follows: "To give and furnish all orders which will be useful and necessary for navigation, in conservation of the

(1). Richelieu, Testament Politique, V. 2, pp. 48-50.
rights of France, the advancement and establishment of the commerce and security of her subjects at sea, in the ports, harbors, and nearby islands" (1). Thus we perceive that the powers which Richelieu was to possess were very extended; indeed, the appointment placed under his control the merchant as well as the war marine. The duties of the cardinal were defined more definitely than were those of his predecessors, and furthermore, they were broader in so far as they concerned the necessary field, so that he was able to decide as a sovereign ruler, all questions relating to the sea, even to disputes arising over the capture and the disposal of the contents of wrecked vessels. That he took his office seriously and tried to realize vast plans for the maritime and commercial development of France is the final conclusion of most students of his life.

The way in which Richelieu carried on the duties of his office will illustrate both his impartiality and his honesty. Numerous extracts from his letters show that he looked upon the position as a sort of sacred trust. Indeed the cardinal considered the appointment as being one which was not conferred upon him as a regular part of his official position, but was given to him with the idea that its great importance to the welfare of the nation and its king required every loyal Frenchman not only to obey its precepts but to aid in carrying out its functions if he was ordered to do so (2). This explains why the cardinal refused to accept

(1) (Isambert t. XVI. p. 194) Quoted in Callot, pp. 288-290.
(2) Callot, pp. 288-90.
money for his work in this particular office(1). One of his letters illustrates very well the spirit in which he took up his duties and some of the problems he had to face at the very outset(2). He says "that the king, knowing for some time how his vessels were preyed upon, was determined to put a stop to it. So he sent out escorts with the various merchant vessels and fortified all the ports. Also, his majesty ordered me to take charge of commerce and navigation, and has sent forward a general order that clearance was to be taken from me rather than from Montmorency (his predecessor)............."

He then goes on to cite cases in which his authority was not recognized. (Indeed, there existed at that time provinces where local governments exerted almost unrestricted rights, and thus conflicted with the central authority, which was at that time the "superintendent of navigation and commerce".) In regard to Brittany, one of the more or less independent provinces, he says that he does not seek to make innovations there, but only tries to give aid and the means to all those who wish to trade, and to do so in pleasing and favorable ways. Many other letters indicate his great interest in the office(3). And so one finds that after this, he begins to introduce important plans in regard to forming a war marine, which was to be of great importance to France in the future. But first a few words in respect to the war marine of France.

Francis I and Henry II had attempted to build up the navy, but since then it had dwindled to nothing. In 1603 Sully, as an

(1). Richelieu's Letters, V. 2, p. 346 (Collection Documents inédits 1'Historie de France)
ambassador of France, was obliged to be carried to England in an English vessel. Indeed naval affairs remained in about the same state up to the time when the firm and well-trained hand of Richelieu gave a new and vigorous impulse to all departments of the government. "This great minister," says Garland, "who wished to found the political preponderance of France, did not fail to work for the development of the natural and commercial power of our country. The execution of his great project necessitated some new resources which could only come from an increase of national riches.
The restoration of foreign commerce was one of his most vital preoccupations. It opened to him a great path which Henry IV had foreseen but which he had not been able to enter .... " Thus one must conclude that with Richelieu began the real war marine of France, as nothing of importance had been accomplished before his time.

But Richelieu was influenced by other more direct causes than simply the fact that when he received the office of superintendent of navigation and the powers that went with it he was impelled to take action along the line of developing a war marine. It is generally conceded that his main purpose in building up a navy was to defend France from her enemies. Several causes, however, brought about this more general idea, and one of them was the depredations committed against France by the Barbary pirates.

The inhabitants of Northern Africa had for many generations followed piracy as a profession, and at that time dominated the Mediterranean Sea. They had been so strong that it was almost impossible for a French vessel to venture out of a Mediterranean port without running the risk of being captured and its crew (1). (Ch. Garaud, Hist. de France, p.1907) Caillet, p. 287.
taken to Africa as slaves. Indeed these daring individuals had even attempted recently to loot French ports. On account of these raids, Richelieu, in the second year of his ministry, made a "reglement pour la mer," in which he brought out the necessity of a strong war marine for France. "In order to guarantee to our subjects who trade in the East safety from the losses which they have received from the pirates, and to maintain the reputation and dignity of our crown among foreigners, we wish that in the future there will always be in our ports forty galleys, prepared to go out quickly and scour our coasts" (1). As a result, Richelieu did all he could to make France able to resist the pirates on the high seas and force them to respect the flag of France. But he had to meet other enemies on the waters besides the Barbary pirates.

During Richelieu's entire administration the relations between France and England were extremely unfriendly. Also, Spain was feared by Richelieu as a nation opposed to the progress of the French nation. As a result of this enmity, common to all three nations, the cardinal found himself conducting a desultory warfare with the other countries most of the time. Now to meet them on equal terms, he realized that a strong war marine was a necessity. He knew that this was the weak spot in the French power, and was the cause of her rather unfortunate foreign relations. Now if she was to be politically and commercially strong, she must be able to protect herself on the sea, against the attacks of all her enemies. France has always built up her war (1). The Letters of Richelieu, Vol. 2, pp. 163-166.
marine with the idea of protection on the sea in view. In fact, though it
the policy of a strong navy instituted by Richelieu, dwindled away
after his death, was revived again during the age of Louis XIV,
and at various periods since then. It is being strongly agitated
at the present time. France has indeed found out after many re-
verses that if Richelieu's ideas on the subject had been uniformly
carried out it might have changed her entire political and commer-
cial career.

The best source of his ideas on the particular subject
is found in his "Political Testament" (1), where, after discussing
the advantage of certain types of ships on the ocean and the Medi-
terranean sea, he goes on to say that a great state should be in
such a position that it had to receive an injury without taking a
just revenge. He points out the supremacy of the English over the
French at sea. "This," he says, "works as an injury to the com-
merce of France, especially to her fisheries". He then comments
on the fact that England and not France can fix the duties on com-
modities because of her strength at sea. The latter in her
state of weakness could do nothing. He goes on to relate an in-
cident in which the British flag had to be saluted in preference
to the French standard because of the naval inferiority of the
latter. In conclusion, he says that only force will make England
recognize France.

He then takes up the naval strength of Spain, pointing out
the fact that the utility of the Indies to Spain compelled her to
have a large sea force. "We should be able", he says, "to oppose

and put a stop to any of these enterprises against us. If your majesty is powerful at sea, you will be able to attack Spain on her lengthy coast, and they will consume most of their revenues in an effort to guard their territory. This will keep them from troubling their neighbors as they have done up to the present, for they will need all the power they have to protect themselves ......"(1). He closes this section by describing the excellent location of France in respect to harbors, emphasizing the fact that she has ports on the ocean and the sea as well. This is an immense advantage. Then he comments in more detail on her excellent ports. "Brittany alone," he says, "contains the best harbors on the ocean, and Provence has better ones than England and Italy together. Spain has to have a large navy in order to keep her many separate ports under control. Just as the sea divides Spain from Italy, so France separates her from the rest of her territories" (2). Thus we see that Richelieu realized very clearly the importance of a war marine to France because of her weakness on the political and commercial side in her relations with foreign countries. These quotations taken from his Political Testament give his final ideas on the subject, and on account of this are of double importance, because they are the thoughts of a man who had spent twenty-five years of his life in attempting to solve the political and economic problems of his native land.

(2). The Spanish Netherlands, Luxemburg, and the Franche Comte were the important territories separated from Spain by the French nation.
There was yet another cause which influenced him to build up a war marine. This was the rising colonial trade of France and her growing commerce as a consequence of it. Richelieu realized that in order to develop and protect colonies a strong navy was a necessity. Now as he wanted France to be a powerful colonizing nation, it was natural that he should turn toward the development of a navy as one of the first steps in the promotion of this idea. The Cardinal seems also to have felt that the entire commercial development of the nation depended on the increase of her war marine. "If the king," he says, "endures the injuries, violence, and depredations which are every day committed upon his subjects by foreigners, and if we continue to have a fleet in the condition in which it is at present; if it is necessary to endure the heavy duties which foreigners place upon the merchandise which we ship them and that which they ship to us, the actual power of France will be ruined." (1) As a remedy he advises that a strong naval marine be built up for the perpetual protection of commerce. He seemed to realize from the first the advantage of a war marine to France, and the siege of La Rochelle in the early years of his administration brought out most emphatically its value on the political side. Indeed, continual wars with the different foreign nations and with the Barbary states kept what fleet he did have busy from the start, and on account of this, he was not able to carry out all the commercial plans he had in view, so that this fleet really benefitted him more on the political than on the commercial side. But, the dire need of a navy was really brought to his attention during the siege of La

Rochelle. He realized that a strong war marine was the thing which France lacked but really needed. Then came the unfriendly relation with Spain; and finally colonization projects, all of which emphasized to him the desirability of a strong navy.

It was during the years 1629 to 1635 that Richelieu first began seriously to consider this phase of his administration(1). He looked over the faults and the strong points of other foreign nations, and then began to consider steps to be taken in order to place France in control of the sea. He decided that conditions in the land in so far as they affected the creation of a war marine, should be investigated. Accordingly, in 1629 and 1633, he ordered two of the best trained men in the kingdom, Messrs Leroux d'Infreville, commissioner of the marine, and Henri de Seguiran, Seigneur de Bonc, knight and councillor of the king, to carry out this project. The former was to inspect the coast bordering on the ocean, and the latter that bordering on the Mediterranean. They were to make a report upon everything which concerned the marine and were also to reestablish the right of anchorage, which Henry IV had yielded to foreign vessels. "These duties, executed with rare intelligence, cast a rather depressing light upon the deplorable situation in which they found all the forms of sea activities, a situation rendered still worse by the conflicts of jurisdiction which were being continually brought up by the governors of provinces or the admirals or the nobles whose feudal estates bordered on

(1) Caillet, p. 292.
the oceans and rivers". (1). These men reported that the ports were without garrisons, that the coast of the ocean was harried by the pirates from Africa and Spain, and that the harbors and the castles built around them, both on the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, were in a very unfortunate state of neglect. In addition to all this, there were "river rulers" who exacted tolls from travelers who went up or down the rivers which passed through their territories. They reported in detailed fashion as to the condition of the coast of France in regard to the duties collected, armaments, boats, the means of defence in the ports, the spirit of the inhabitants of the coast towns, the number of ships occupied in navigation, and the number of their sailors, carpenters, pilots, and captains. Finally they gave an exact analysis of the different claims of the dukedoms, syndicates, and corporations in France, and recommended as a result, that his majesty provide war vessels to protect the commercial ships as well as the ports.(2).

As a result of these reports, Richelieu became aware of the fact that trade was at its lowest point; that other nations because of the weak marine of France could do what they wanted so far as concerned their relations with France; and that the position of France both in the East and in the West was becoming worse. He came to the conclusion that something must be done to build up its weak and almost rotten fortifications and its small and almost useless navy, if France was to command the respect of foreign nations and even of the pirates.

(2). Sue, Le correspondance de Saurdis, V. 1, pp. XXXI-XXXII.
One cannot but admire the immense activity of this great man, who, in the midst of many physical ills and petty political troubles, was able to suppress numerous abuses, to overcome countless differences of opinion, and to rebuild the fighting and merchant marine of his country. How he went about the task can best be explained at this point.

The work of Richelieu in regard to a war marine might be broadly classified in the following manner(1): (1) laws relating to maritime authority and accountability (the bureau of accounts); (2) the formation of a "personal marine"; (3) the restoration of dilapidated coast fortifications and the creation of new ones; (4) the creation of a war marine and of naval equipment. A brief consideration of the above is justifiable.

Richelieu in taking up that part of his work which was concerned with the passing of laws governing affairs on the sea, displayed not only his fairness to all other sea powers, but his knowledge of matters pertaining to the marine. He soon placed the control and conduct of all acts relating to it in the hands of definitely assigned officials. The latter formed what was called his "personal marine", and they conducted and managed affairs relating to the sea according to fixed rules and regulations imposed by him. In other words, he tried to put an end to the conflict of authority existing in France in respect to the control of military affairs. Seven Bureaus of Admiralty were established, to be composed of officials already appointed by certain individuals and in the future to be nominated by the Cardinal himself and his

successors, who were "grand masters of France" (1). They were to have under their control all criminal and civil affairs and all acts connected with the state government and navigation on the high seas. Also they were to have charge of the proper disposal of wreckage.

In carrying out his schemes relating to the formation of a marine, we find that Richelieu even went so far into details as to change the method of getting sailors, which had hitherto been one of the great causes of the weakness of the French on the sea. He had a census taken of the number and addresses of sailors and carpenters in every harbor in France. He ascertained the number of vessels and their equipment and the number and size of the harbors, and from that information as a basis he determined the number of sailors to be furnished by each province, and the amount of money that might be levied for ships and their equipment. In addition to all this, he established schools for pilots, put the coast in a state of defense, created new ports and enlarged others, and finally established three large naval arsenals. "He spent over 359,000 livres in 1635 for the fortifications of Brouage d'Orléans and the Island of Ré. He wanted to make the former the center of maritime power upon the ocean. He strengthened the ports on the Mediterranean in a similar fashion, especially Toulon, which he desired to make the war center of the nation on that coast" (2). However, the crux

(1) Recueil d'ordonnances tant manuscrites qu'imprimées, 2 vol. in-40, t. 1, p. 280 (Bibliothèque du ministère de la marine), quoted in Caillet, pp. 303. 
(2) États statistiques de la marine de France pour l'année 1635 corresp. de Sourdis, I, III, p. 523.) Caillet, 308.
(3) Caillet, p. 30.
of his efforts in building up the power of France on the sea, lay in the increase of the number of war vessels and the enlarged equipment.

Henry IV had realized the necessity of a fleet, but it was left to Richelieu to carry this idea into execution. "He resolved," says Caillet, "to endow France with a military marine, that is to say a military force truly belonging to the state, and not furnished by cities as had previously been the case"(1). Up to this time there had existed the custom of allowing particular individuals or certain interests to put out vessels and rent them to merchants for their protection, or to use them to prey on the enemies of the French people. But Richelieu saw that this was not a good thing, so that after he had triumphed over the Huguenots, he took great care to hold all ports accountable to himself, and to make himself master of all the magazines and of all the cannons and other war materials. Lastly he forbade all vessels to bear arms unless they had royal permission.

Under the orders of the council of notables in 1626, which had really been called and conducted under the direction of Richelieu, the fleets of war vessels were greatly increased. But it took time before the maritime service was really well organized(2). When As late as 1626/ France wished to put an end to the ravages which were being made by the Barbary pirates on the ocean, they could not find enough vessels to carry out the task and had to get twenty from Holland. It was particularly during the siege of La Rochelle

(1). Caillet, p. 310.
as has been said before, the Richelieu felt the inferiority of the French war marine. After that he set aside a certain sum each year for the creation of a navy.

From 1630 to 1634, the naval power of France gradually increased, and finally consisted of three large squadrons. As a result the pirates were suppressed for the time being, and Spain was thrust aside so far as her claims on the sea were concerned. "It was to be for France and for the great minister who had increased his country's reputation so much, a just subject of pride when their fleet of eighty-five vessels passed triumphantly across the sea, where some years before she had possessed a fleet less powerful than that of the smallest city of Italy"(1). He must have realized that he had now in his possession the implement by which he could carry out many of his political and economic plans to the glorious ends which his fertile brain had assigned to them.

Thus the Cardinal saw his plans reach what seemed to be a successful conclusion. But death took him away just at the time when he was most needed. The splendid fleet, like a flower nipped by an unexpected frost, dwindled away almost to nothing after his departure. The good fruits of his work along this line were mostly temporary. No one took up this task which he had so well begun, until the age of Colbert, and then it was too late.

But before we conclude, let us consider briefly the importance of his work so far as it concerns the navy of France. L. P. Forinier in the preface of his great work entitled "Richelieu" writes with much enthusiasm concerning the progress of the maritime

(1). Caillet, p. 311.
power under Louis XIII. "Favored with the admiration of the world," he says to Louis XIII, to whom he dedicated the book, "France now finds herself famous thru your victories. She now sees the great navy and the harbors open to receive and fortified to protect them. Well supplied magazines are established on both coasts. All of which is equally useful in the promotion of commerce as well as warfare..... Your majesty's fleets have controlled things on the Mediterranean. Indeed Spain has been forced to acknowledge the power of the French fleet and thus future glory must be approaching"(1).

As a result, one must conclude that so far as developing a war marine is concerned, Richelieu was able to give it a start which, if it had been continued and enlarged as he had planned, would probably have had a strong influence on French history on the political and still more on the economic side. That he was influenced by his ideas on commerce, colonization, and other development, is quite evident, if one studies his letters and his other writings.

M. Masson, in his "Histoire du Commerce Francaise en XVIIe Siecle dans le Levant", continually emphasizes the point that it was the development of a navy under the Cardinal that kept up the Eastern trade of France with the Levant, which was on the decrease at that time because of the lack of protection(2). M. Sue also sums up the work of Richelieu very appropriately when he

(1). Caillet, p. 315.
(2). Masson, p. 117.
points out that when the great Cardinal built up the navy, he laid the foundations of a great and beautiful system of military marine, which would serve as an offensive arm to combat the enemies of France, and as a shield or protection to aid her commerce, and thus by making transportation of goods safer he made them cheaper, which in turn aided in keeping up the cost of the war marine(1). The Cardinal's economic turn of mind is very well illustrated in the above passage. He evidently intended to pay for the marine by an increase of taxes on the objects whose prices were lowered through cheaper transportation. These taxes as a rule were born by the merchants themselves. "His system," says Sue, "was a marvelous exposition of thought, force, and solidarity" (2). It was carried to extremes by those who came after him, so that not being sufficiently supported by maritime commerce, the sea power of France died from lack of sailors, finances, defenses, and good harbors. Indeed France has recently adopted again an active policy of building up her war marine, and in doing so has been influenced by the same motives which compelled Richelieu several centuries ago to do likewise (3). What might have been the economic history of France after Richelieu's time if his policy had been carried out along the conservative lines indicated in his "Testament Politique" is purely a matter of conjecture. However, one must give the Cardinal

(2). Ibid.
(3). It is very interesting to note the recent attempts to enlarge the French war marine. Indeed the government has taken such an interest in this part of her administration that she offers extensive bounties to fishermen, most of whom would be available in time of war. The same motives that caused Richelieu to
due credit for being the first actual founder of a war marine in France, built up with the purpose of aiding France not only politically but economically; and if his efforts in this part of his administrative field came to very little in the years to follow, it was not his fault and he really deserves praise not only for the temporary relief his work in this line afforded, but because his ideas on the development of a war marine in France have existed down to the twentieth century and have been put into actual execution at the present time.

build up a war marine has influenced the people of France to do likewise during the last few years. She has strengthened her navy so as to be strong politically and meet her rivals on equal terms, and also in order that she can be strong economically and thus can protect her commerce and her colonies from the possible insults of rival powers. (See Bracq, France under the Republic, p. 34.)
Chapter II

The Ideas and Accomplishments of Richelieu in Regard to Colonization.

Before the age of Richelieu, France had accomplished a little along the lines of colonial development. Indeed the period in which he came into power was really the time when the settlement of North America was in its infancy, so that France had really not considered very seriously, up to that time, the opportunity of carrying on colonization projects in the new continents. Outside of the beginning made by Champlain in North America in 1608, very little had been accomplished in that line. Furthermore, internal troubles, religious wars, and unfriendly foreign relations all tended to prevent the predecessors of Henry IV from sending any expeditions of importance outside of the vicinity of France and Italy. Their desires for territorial expansion were limited to some possessions in the latter country, and conquest in any other direction or place was thought to be of little importance. Then, in the seventeenth century, came the age of Richelieu and with it a great change in the colonial activities of the nation.

Colonial commerce underwent a growth which was unprecedented in the history of France. Inspired by the colonial activities of England and Holland, the cardinal tried to create ideas in regard to the foundation of great colonization companies which were more or less new to the French people. "In order to make ourselves masters of the sea, and to form great companies, encourage merchants to enter and give great privileges to these companies as they come into existence, just as foreigners have done(1)". (1). D'Avenel, Richelieu et la Monarche Absolue, V. 3, pp.209-10.
Thus one sees that the Cardinal, perceiving the commercial and colonial expansion of nations like Holland and England, and realizing the great gains that they would make along this line, decided to do likewise, and so immediately after he received the office of head of navigation and commerce, he began to plan commercial companies and aided their establishment in various ways. Many men who lived at that time have left written accounts which throw much light upon Richelieu's work in this field.

"The Cardinal," says Mathieu Malipontont in his memoirs, "wished to present to the assembly of notables in 1627 some new edicts concerning the state of the marine, trade, and navigation, in order to justify his position as head of the kingdom. He established by means of an edict a perpetual navy of forty-five vessels, which he said would return the French war marine to its former state of splendor. He also wished to create some important companies to which he would grant privileges. He then appointed me to examine the first proposition which was made by Nicolas Witte, Jean de Meurier, esquire, and other French and Flemish merchants, who had formed a company called 'La nacelle de Saint Pierre fleur-delissee with the purpose of establishing in France an immense trade in all merchandise which enters into commerce, of introducing fisheries, of building vessels, and other uncommon duties, and finally of increasing in value many lands and colonies which have not returned much profit hitherto"(1).

The text of the agreement adopted by the Cardinal with respect to this company is found in the notes or memoirs of Mathieu Mole; and as it gives a correct idea of all that relates to (1). (Mathieu Mole, Memoirs, Bk. 1, pp.424-48) Caillet, pp. 333-
the external or internal commerce of the great industries, it seems best to give the principal articles of this treaty(1), especially as all the companies formed by Richelieu conformed more or less rigidly to this type.

The provisions of this document were as follows:

I. The heads of the company were to take over 400 families within a month of the day of negotiating the agreement. These families were to be composed of persons suitable for commerce, fishing, manufacturing, and agriculture. Besides this, there were to be sent no less than twelve vessels completely equipped for the expedition. By so doing, the aforesaid company would be allowed to trade both by the seas and rivers and by land, to establish fisheries upon the sea, and manufacturing concerns of all sorts, to plant sugar cane and refine sugar, to work mines, to make porcelain vessels and crockery by the method of the Indies and of Italy, and finally, to use all other resources and manufactures which they recognize.

II. All Flemings, Hollanders and others who went over to the colonies were to be regarded as Frenchmen and enjoy all their rights.

III. Rewards were offered to those who invested money in the company or worked in behalf of it. The crown intended to honor those who took up the work more than ever before in order to attract persons who were capable of aiding the proposition in any way. People of every condition, clergy, nobles, and officials, could enter and put their money into the company without injuring their position or endangering their privileges. Indeed, in order to aid industry and colonization, his majesty was to ennoble thirty-two persons,

whether they were Frenchmen or foreigners, who would enter the company during the first year of its establishment and put at least 5000 pounds into its funds, without having the power to withdraw the money for six years, and also to those who did not put any capital in the enterprise but who placed all their ability and energy into the advancement of the aforesaid company.

IV. His majesty was to give to the company two sites, not occupied as yet. One was to be on the ocean, the other on the Mediterranean. They were to have the power to build houses of business in those places. In each of these a market was to be established with fairs (two yearly fairs of eight days each), etc. All inhabitants of said places should be exempt from the payment of the aides tailles, etc. which fell upon the other ports.

Articles V and VI provided for the government and the working of the mines in these territories, in which the colonies were to have supreme rights, subject only to the final decision of the grand master of commerce, who was Richelieu.

VII. All vagabonds, beggars, petty criminals, etc. were to be taken by his majesty's orders into the employ of the company.

VIII. His majesty was to allow the company to undertake voyages abroad, to establish colonies at advisable places, even in Canada and New France, to conquer lands beyond those which were under the control of his majesty, to use them for the profits of the aforesaid company, to which full and entire possession was given, on condition that they should be faithful and swear homage to his majesty. The latter also permitted them to trade with all companies which were not declared enemies of the kingdom, even countries
like Russia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Hamburg.

The articles of agreement which were made with the latter nations had to be communicated to Richelieu as superintendent of commerce and navigation. Finally, "if the directors of the company should discover new lands, they could enjoy the fruits of them separate from any other colonies".

The principal articles of this agreement have been given because they seem to indicate the main ideas of the Cardinal's policy toward colonization. It first shows that he desired to develop the colonies. It illustrates the fact that he desired to found possessions, which were to be almost self-governing with this one exception - they were to be responsible to the chief of commerce and navigation in France. In fact, Richelieu put himself at the head of almost all commercial companies founded at that time.

Masson criticizes Richelieu because he made the colonial companies too centralized, and forced them all to depend on the government of France as a final authority. Yet the agreement cited above seems to give the colonies plenty of leeway to develop without the interference of the home power.(1)

However, one must not forget to credit Richelieu with having a knowledge of the value not only of colonization, but also of commercial manufactures, as illustrated by the passage which says that the king would ennoble those who first enter the company. Even though D'Avenel(2) believed that Richelieu made a mistake in his co-

colonial policy and simply issued his pompous "edicts" in order to create companies and guarantee for them by decree a long prosperity, one must recognize the fact that his economic policies were on the whole far in advance of those of his contemporaries and that there were many other elements entering into French colonization which account for its failure.

But before one generalizes very much concerning Richelieu's colonial policies, it would seem best to look into the actual accomplishment of the Cardinal in that particular field of his administrative duties.

The company whose charter has just been quoted failed simply because of the lack of credit and funds to maintain it. Furthermore, the directors did not carry out their promises and only sought to profit by the monopoly which they possessed and from which they derived temporary gains. They kept up the project with one purpose in view, namely to sell to the colonists who had been sent over goods at a high price, and to buy furs from them as cheaply as possible. Champlain never ceased to protest against the attitude of the directors toward the colonists (1). He himself wanted to found a colony which would take up the three fold purpose of colonization, namely, agriculture, conversion of the savages, and commerce. The only result of his plans was the establishment of new fur trading stations in North America.

The company of Morbihan was the next to be formed. It got its name from a port in Brittany in which its counting offices were established. A group of men called "the Hundred Associat-

signed the agreement, so that it was ever after called "The Hundred Associates Company". Its articles provided for a perpetual fund to be used for the building of vessels and for the purchase of land. Richelieu, in the name of his Majesty, the King, gave to them the use of the harbor of Morbihan. They were to be exempt from taxes and were to have their own police rights, and they could follow their own ideas in regard to the defense of the port. The other articles were very much like the ones quoted above for the "New France" agreement.

This company did not last long and also failed completely and for much the same reasons. But the Cardinal, not to be stopped by these reverses, began at once to consider plans for the formation of a new company, which was to establish colonies in North America. Here they were to have a perpetual monopoly of furs and pelts and of all other merchandise for five years, and their goods were to be exempt from all duties upon entering France. The company on its part agreed to carry over 4000 people in five years to the new settlements, and make arrangements for their maintenance during the early period of their colonial existence. As a result a good class of people were just beginning to come into the land around Quebec when the English in 1629 threatened the territory and took it.

In 1632, Champlain pointed out to Richelieu the necessity for the restitution of New France to the mother country(1). As a result, the Cardinal sent six armed vessels across the Atlantic and compelled the English to cede it back. Thus, in 1633, the

(1). Caillet, 343-5.
company of New France reentered upon all its former rights. Champlain as head of the French colony built up the settlement and companies to a degree never before attained. In 1640 Montreal was founded, and a fort called Fort Richelieu was established just above where Quebec is at present, so that by the time of Richelieu's death, the French possessions in North America had a good start, and it was not due to any direct fault of his that they failed in the end.

M. Caillet (1) in accounting for the decline of the colonies places the blame on the cupidity of the merchants, who neglected agriculture for a selfishly conducted fur trade. Furthermore, religious influence had a tendency to injure the economic development of the colonies. Too much emphasis was placed on religion to the neglect of agriculture. The competition of the English and Dutch for the Indian trade, and internal dissensions among the Indians, the governors, and the colonists, coupled with an increasing neglect of the colonies by the home government, after Richelieu's time, all tended to ruin the bright future of the French possessions in America. Some writers maintain that the centralized colonial policy of the Cardinal was instrumental in bringing about the failure of the French colonies. However, the success of Spain under a similar system would seem to indicate that this was not the case. A brief consideration of the colonizing work of the French in other continents will bring out more clearly the true causes of the failure of that nation in this particular field of advancement.

About the time the French were colonizing America, they began the foundation of their first settlement in the East Indies. (1) Caillet, pp. 343-5.
The island of St. Christopher was the first to be discovered and occupied in 1625. Then Richelieu authorized on October 31, 1626, another company to take up work in this new field. The articles of agreement were like those contained in former grants. However, one must note that the Cardinal invested some of his own personal money in this enterprise. The history of this settlement on the island of St. Christopher is of no special interest, with one exception, namely, the rivalry of the French and the Dutch as it existed in this colony. The latter had begun to carry on a trade with the French possessions at that place, which injured the commerce which the colony was supposed to carry on with the mother country alone. As a result, in 1634, the government of France passed a law requiring this settlement to trade with the company which established it. This ended the matter as the colonists obeyed it.

In 1635 another organization was created for the purpose of settling in the West Indies, which in turn did not amount to much. In fact at the time of Richelieu's death one finds that very little had been accomplished, yet a start was made and that was something. Thus during the year 1635 one finds that settlements were made on the islands of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Saint Dominique(2). Various privileges were offered these colonies, but in spite of all the rights granted to them, they had

(1) Caillé, pp. 349-50
only mediocre success. The main cause of this was the same as that of the other settlements, being the egoism and cupidity of the associates, who exploited the settlements for private profit and did nothing for their direct benefit.

It was also under the administration of Richelieu and by means of his guiding hand that the first settlement was made in Guiana. This was undertaken in 1626, and by 1640 various attempts were being made to spread and favor colonies near by(1). However, nothing further was accomplished there until much later, after the death of the Cardinal.

Settlements were established even in Africa. Senegal especially attracted the attention of the French. In 1621-26, a colony was formed which was under the protection of the Cardinal and which had as its purpose the colonization of the land in that territory(2). To carry this out, Richelieu even sent Admiral de Razilly with a squadron to aid in the work, but it was of no avail, for the company had to be replaced in 1633 by a new one, composed of the merchants of Rouen and Dieppe, who obtained permission to trade for ten years at Cape Verde and upon the rivers in Senegal. Various other similar organizations were formed, but nothing of especial importance can be obtained from a study of French colonization in Africa at this time, except that a foundation for


French influence in that continent was laid, which might have amounted to more than it did in the past and only recently has been largely built upon. However, one colony settled at this time seems to have been more or less permanent, and that was the one established on the island of Madagascar. Many attempts had been made during the reign of Henry IV and during the first years of the rule of Louis XIII to found settlements on this and neighboring islands. Indeed there was another purpose involved in the establishment of a colony here besides mere colonization. The French intended to establish a trade with the East Indies, using this possession as a base, and this made them all the more persistent in their attempts to possess the island. On March 2, 1611, Louis XIII granted permits to several men which gave to them the exclusive right to settle these lands and begin trade. They had, besides, a monopoly on all commerce carried on with the East Indies for the next twelve years. But as they made use of that privilege, the merchants of Rouen resolved to try to take it from them. They offered to carry on that trade and develop it to its fullest extent, as they had the facilities to do so if they had the chance(1). However, the first company opposed any interference with their rights and claimed that they were doing the best they could, considering the obstacles which were opposed by the foreign neighbors of France. As a result of it all, the various companies and claimants to their rights were united by the government into one concern.

(1) (Dufreni de Francheville, Hist. de la compagnie des Indies, p. 15) Caillet, pp. 353-5.
The interesting thing about this is the fact that it illustrates the direct control of the government over the various companies. Whether it was for the best is a matter about which all are not agreed. The chief argument against this centralized form of colonial government is the assertion that this system curbs individual initiative among the settlers and among the various communities. They leave everything for the government to carry out, and indeed they must do so for they are given no chance to exercise very many important duties. On the other hand, the supporters or Richelieu's colonial policy maintain that it was not because of the centralized government that the French colonies failed to become a success. The inherent weakness of the French along colonial lines and the many political difficulties which involved France in rather unsatisfactory foreign relations, were two of the important causes for the failure of the French colonization projects at that time.

The grants establishing this united organization stated that its members should undertake the navigation of the East Indies, maintain its protection, and enjoy its privileges. The fleet of Montmorency was to defend all the subjects of the king, as well as the interests of the company, and to undertake any necessary trips from the coast to the Cape of Good Hope during the space of twelve years, in order to aid commerce. However, in spite of this liberal charter and the various attempts made to settle the East Indies, the plan failed in 1620 because of the pressure of the Dutch in that part of the world.

Finally, the company decided to place a colony on the
island of Madagascar, in the hope that if they could found a powerful settlement there, it would serve to aid them in further expeditions to the Indies. So they went back to the original plan which had been changed when the different colonizing organizations had been united. However, the civil war in France, which took place in 1631, prevented them from carrying out this plan.

In 1638 another attempt was made by a man from Rouen to found a colony in Madagascar, and he left a very interesting account of a voyage to that island (1). Finally, a new company was formed January 24, 1642, which obtained from the Cardinal the exclusive privilege of sending into the island of Madagascar and other adjacent islands the members of the organization, to establish colonies and take possession in the name of the king (2). As a result in the month of May a ship was sent to the islands, and they took formal possession. Thus Madagascar was at last a real possession of France and a way was prepared for further settlement. "This was the last colonizing project started by Richelieu."

The question naturally arises as to what was the general result of all the efforts of Richelieu and others along this line. Was it worth the trouble?

"Geographical knowledge was extended if nothing else," says M. Caillet (3) in relating the results of the colonial efforts of France during this period. "Richelieu himself," he says, "aided a man named Samson to found a geographical school at that touchant.

(1). (Discours/l'établissement d'un compagnée française pour le commerce de Indies orientales), Caillet, pp. 355-57.
(2). (Histoire de grande Isle de Madagascar, composée pour le sieur de Flacont, director générale de la compagne Français ), Caillet, pp. 357-8.
(3). Caillet, p. 358.
time". But there were other gains more important than these, especially on the economic side.

When one looks over the field of colonial activities undertaken during Richelieu's time he must conclude that very little had been accomplished on the material side. It seems as if all the efforts of the Cardinal were in vain, and while Holland, England, and Spain were forging ahead in their colonial development and commercial activities, France was doing scarcely anything along these lines. Yet on the other hand she had really done something worth while, for she had at least made a start which was not too late and would have amounted to much more than it did if the Cardinal had lived to carry out his plans to their final conclusion. He deserves great credit for the part he played in the colonial development. In spite of the many internal troubles, such as the relations of the government and the nobles, and his complicated foreign policies, he was always interested in planting new French settlements in great unoccupied continents, and he not only aided in the different colonization enterprises during the first part of his rule but also up to the very last.

Finally, one must not forget that this great man died before he could carry out his ideas as regards this part of his administration. His Testament Politique clearly indicates the fact that he realized the advantage of colonial development as keenly as French statesmen do at the present day. Furthermore, he knew that there was at hand a period in which England, Holland, and France were to be rivals for commercial and colonial supremacy. Surely he shows sound economic thinking in so far as he realizes the gen-
eral value of new French settlements, and great persistence in the way in which he set about the accomplishment of his ideas.

However, a good many writers criticize Richelieu's colonial policy. Masson thought that it was entirely too centralized, and D'Avenel, referring to one of his edicts concerning the formation of a colonial company says "that it is a source of profound astonishment to me to see a mind as clean and practical as Richelieu's in diplomatic and military organization attempt to carry out his dreams of that most peculiar economic despotism which modern people call state socialism. 'The edict of Morbihan is one which all France seeks,' says the Cardinal, 'whose execution is alone capable of putting the kingdom in a state of splendour. The proclamation,' he continues, 'alarms already the English and the Dutch, who fear that the king will make himself the master of the sea. Spain is afraid of us also, for she fears the loss of her Indian possessions' "(1). This would indicate that Richelieu realized the competition which would arise between England, Holland, and France for new lands and command of the sea, and also the value which new possessions would add to the mother country. But M. D'Avenel draws from the above quotation the conclusion that Richelieu seems to have forgotten that colonization was due to individual initiative rather than to royal plans. In other words, it is not the general economic policy of the Cardinal relating to this branch of his administration which is at fault, but the method he used of carrying them into execution by means of granting monopolies to certain companies, responsible only

(1). D'Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchie absolue, V. 3, pp. 208-17.
to the central power of France. "His colonial policy," says one writer, "was marred by the practice, common to all statesmen of that day, of intrusting colonial enterprise entirely to exclusive companies. These corporations, by which privileged individuals were protected at the expense of the general body of consumers, were extremely unsuccessful in French hands, partly through their excessive dependence upon state parentage and control, and partly through their total neglect of agriculture, and the consequent failure to form permanent and prosperous French settlements"(1). However, a study of the Spanish and English colonial policies will convince one that they were more or less of the same type and that monopolies were granted to various individuals or companies in a manner similar to the French method(2). It must, however, be admitted that this manner of establishing settlements was a hindrance to all colonies, but the provisions of charters in the case of England were not carried out because of English internal troubles which took the attention of the home government from the settlements and let them shift for themselves.

The same thing would probably have happened to the French colonies if the mother country during these years had had her hands full in meeting her European troubles without giving attention to her new settlements. But there were other causes which brought about the failure of the colonies, and these were not due to any fault of Richelieu's. They may be stated as follows:

In the first place, the French warrior was not well

(1). Lodge, Richelieu, p. 173.
adapted or fitted for commercial activities and as the first colonies combined war, commerce, and sea-service, they failed because of the lack of men capable of carrying on all these different activities (1).

In the second place, numerous internal troubles, financial and industrial for instance, as well as Richelieu's involved foreign policies, prevented the proper amount of attention being given to colonization. The French did not stand around and let the other countries settle the new lands, as M. D'Avenel says, but the Cardinal's thoughts were always the same as regards this field of activity. Whenever there was a lull in political and internal affairs, or when he was offered any favorable opportunity, he did his best to found successful colonies in the new lands.

M. Seely, in one of his books, points out that the failure of French colonization was due not only to the fact that the colonists were subject to a multitude of strict regulations from which they would have been free if they had remained in France, but also because France lost a large part of her population in wars and the expulsion of the Huguenots, and came to be on the verge of financial ruin, so that as a result she had not the means to develop colonization(2). "One might say that France lost her colonies in a series of unsuccessful wars, but like Spain she had too many irons in the fire" (3). Thus one can readily see that

France failed because of the fact that she was always involved in wars and divided between a policy of colonial expansion and European conquest.

However, Richelieu should not be censured for his part in the development of French settlement. As was said before, his general economic ideas as to the value of colonies was correct. The persistent manner in which he went about carrying out his ideas illustrates the fact that he realized the importance of this side of his administration. Finally, the failure of the colonies was due not to him but to the general weakness of the French people and the faults of those who administered the government after him. Richelieu had made a good start, which, if carried out, would have made France possibly into a great empire, other things being equal. If the Cardinal had even lived a few years longer, things might have been different; but this is a matter of conjecture. However, it is interesting to note that it is only within the last century that France has been able to do anything in regard to colonization. And thus, the general policies of Richelieu have been revived at the present day and so are doubly important as constituting a force which is living at the present time. That Richelieu deserves more credit than he has obtained for his work in behalf of French colonization, that whatever weaknesses existed in his charters granted to colonists were of minor importance, and finally, that the foundation laid by this man, which would have resulted in the erection of a strong and powerful imperial edifice, was ruined by the inaptitude of the French people and the faults of those who came after him, have been the main conclusions arrived at from a study of this phase of the great man's career.
Chapter III.
The Ideas and Accomplishments of Richelieu as Regards Commerce.

"When Richelieu came into power," says Mr. Bridges, "his task was two fold: (1) The internal process of crushing the French aristocracy and founding the French monarchy upon its ruin. (2) The external work of humbling the retrograde powers of Austria and Spain, and of carrying out the policy, which found its issue in the treaties of Westphalia and of the Pyrenees(1)" These were his political plans, but behind this phase of his administration there existed an economic background which influenced him more than most modern writers would indicate in their works concerning his life. "To Richelieu as well as Cromwell and other great people of his time," continues Mr. Bridges, "war and foreign conquest was no longer the primary occupation of rulers. When they engaged in it they saw, dimly indeed, and inconsequently, but still they saw, the two grand tendencies of the modern world; peaceful industry in the temporal sphere and morality based upon the unfettered thoughts in the spiritual"(2). Thus one finds that when Richelieu came into power, the value of commerce and industry was just beginning to be appreciated, and because of this a study of the ideas and actual accomplishments of the Cardinal in respect to trade in general will be of especial interest.

Richelieu in his "Political Testament" constantly refers to the value of commerce, and is fond of citing Holland as an ex-

(1) Bridges, Richelieu and Colbert, p. 43.
(2) Ibid, p. 63.
ample of a country built to a high state of efficiency by means of commerce (1). "It is a common saying," he says, "but true as well, that as nations often increase their territory by means of war, they enrich themselves ordinarily in times of peace by means of commerce. The wealth of Holland, which country properly speaking has only a handful of people, limited to a small bit of earth, which is mostly water or low marshy lands, is an example and a proof of the utility of commerce. Indeed that nation not only supplies itself with butter and cheese, but furnishes nearly all the countries of Europe with the greater part of what they use. Navigation has made her very celebrated and powerful all over the world, so that after having made herself mistress of commerce in the East Indies to the disadvantage of the Portuguese, who had been established there for some time, she has been able to give some attention to Spanish colonies in the West Indies .............."

This quotation indicates that Richelieu realized the importance of commerce more clearly than did the majority of statesmen at that time. It is really an economic exposition concerning the value of trade, in itself. And the author not only supports this idea which he is trying to bring out by citing Holland as an example, but points out various other countries and cities which have gained very much through the pursuit of commerce (2). In particular he mentions Genoa as an illustration of a city grown strong through trade.

The Cardinal next turns to France "who," he says, "in order to be self-sufficing has up to the present time neglected

(1). Richelieu's Testament Politique, Vol. 2, pp. 64. 
commerce, which indeed she can carry on as well as her neighbors." In fact he believed she would gain more than they in the pursuit of trade. He points out the opportunities in the fishing industry and finally asserts that France has a great number of sailors who at present seek employment under foreign flags. In other words, he infers that France, having the opportunity, the products, and the men, ought to take her place as a strong commercial nation. In regard to supplying work for the French marines, he has the following to say, "we must have employment for them in order to keep our sailors busy instead of allowing them to aid foreign countries because of our neglect. We can take from Spain and the other lands that which they have gained up to the present by means of our men who serve them"(1). In other words, Richelieu recognizes the economic principle that to keep all the available labor supplied with work would strengthen the nation. He knows that every man is of economic importance to France, although, of course, he did not formulate this according to the modern point of view.

As to the economic wealth of France and its influence on commerce, Richelieu made the following statement,"It is fertile," he says, "in grains, wines etc., which Spain, England and other lands have need of. When we comprehend the resources and advantages which nature has provided us with, we will then obtain and be able to make money from those who wish our merchandise, because they are absolutely in need of our surplus products, and because this excess of produced wealth is of little use to us. The cloth of Spain, England, and Holland are luxuries and are not (1). Richelieu, Testament Politique, V. 2, pp. 65.
necessary for us." France is constantly foremost in his thoughts. How can he benefit her? By what economic means can he make her a powerful, self-supporting nation? It is a rather selfish commercial policy, but one which all men of his position have followed and will follow more or less closely. They all desire to make their own countries strong, and the Cardinal is no exception. Indeed his ideas at this time have a tinge of the extreme mercantile doctrine as illustrated in his desire to have the exports of France greater than the imports.

Richelieu also possessed that economic idea which maintains that a person or a nation is not benefited or does not aid others by a large consumption of those things which are luxuries. This saving turn of mind was a trait which predominated throughout his entire life, and indeed is characteristic of the true economic thinker. He wanted France to avoid all luxuries and depend on her own goods to supply her wants. She could get her raw wool from Spain, manufacture it herself and then buy more wool with the proceeds. In other words, he believed that France could best manufacture the raw wool of other nations. This is a good example of his desire to aid manufactures, and would seem to indicate that he was tending toward that economic principle which would have each nation specialize in the line it is best fitted for. The care with which he took stock of the resources of France tends to increase the probability that he did wish to follow out that idea.

At any rate, one can be sure that he desired the French people to patronize home industries. Thus he seems to fit into (1). Richelieu, Testament Politique, V. 2, pp. 66-67.
the protectionist camp better than that of the free traders. "If the king is satisfied with the cloth of Bearn, why cannot the people use it also?(1)". In other words, the Cardinal wants them to patronize home industries as being just as good if not better than others in the quality of goods turned out. In fact he claims that the east likes the cloth of France. If they do, why shouldn't his fellow countrymen use it? "France is industrious enough", he says, "to dispense with some of the best manufactures of her neighbors if she desires. They make at Tours plush so beautiful that it is sent to Italy and other countries"(2). He then goes on to argue in favor of home made against foreign made cloth. "Thus it will pay us to dispense with commerce", he says, "which can only serve to increase our laziness or sloth and increase out taste for luxury, in order to take up that which can increase our wealth, keep our mariners busy, and thus keep them at home". One can well wonder if he had not Spain in mind when he wrote the above quotation. At any rate his constant fear of France's becoming weak through her taste for luxury would serve to indicate that he was moved by the examples of the decline of other nations because of this. The above passage would also tend to aid in establishing the fact that the Cardinal did wish to develop manufactures.

Now Richelieu realized that in order to have and develop the various industries, one must establish an extensive commerce.

(1). Richelieu, Testament Politique, pp. 67-68.
So he goes on in his "Political Testament" to relate the gains which would occur to France if she paid more attention to this side of her development. He mentions the advantages which would occur to France if she undertook commerce with Canada and Africa. She could get furs from the former and gold from the latter in exchange for her products. "If the subjects of the king had plenty of ships," he says, "they would be able to carry on all the traffic with the north which the Flemish and Dutch had control of at that time. Because all of the north had an absolute need of wine, vinegar, spirits, prunes, etc., all commodities in which the kingdom abounded and of which it had a surplus. It would be easy to carry on commerce in that they could bring back wood, copper, and things not only useful to us but to our neighbors also, who must get it directly from us" (1). Thus he wants France to trade with the north as well as the east, in order to get control of the products of those countries and in turn sell them to other lands. An idea of monopoly then enters into his plans. The value of getting complete control of certain commodities is quite clear to the Cardinal, and he sees wherein France will gain by means of this commercial practice.

He next proceeds to mention the advantages of trade with the East, with Persia, China, and the East Indies. However, in regard to the latter (2), he realizes that little can be done until the power of Spain is broken by means of a successful war. Trade with the Mediterranean, however, received due consideration. In regard to the city of Aleppo he notes that they get from France a great quantity of money and merchandise, and send back silks, rugs,

cotton goods, etc. "Before the English and Dutch settled in the Indies, France," he says, "was the center of all the distribution of eastern merchandise in the west. Now the very same English and Dutch have deprived us of this commerce .... .... It is necessary that we get back this trade .......(1) The Cardinal realized that France was losing in the fight for commercial control and must do something to advance its position(2).

He also realized that he had been mistaken in regard to his past views concerning the value of commerce and the free exchange of goods. "I admit," he says, "that I have for a long time been deceived as to the commerce which the people of Provence founded in the East. I believed, as many others did, that it was prejudicial to the state. This idea was based on the common opinion that it wasted the money of the kingdom to bring back merchandise not necessary at all and only useful for the ease of our nation. But after having made a more careful study of the subject of trade, which was condemned by the voice of the public, I have changed my mind, which, if any one will examine the question carefully, was done after very deep thought. It is certain that we could not get along without most of the merchandise which is obtained from the east, such as silks, cottons, oils, rhubarb, and many other drugs and spices which are necessary to us(3)."

This is undoubtedly one of the most important of Richelieu's economic utterances. It shows that while he might have followed the narrow mercantile doctrine in regard to the evil of commerce in early life, yet before his death, he realized (3) Richelieu's Testament Politique, pp. 75-76. (1). Richelieu's Testament Politique, V. 2, pp. 73-75. (2). Venice during the age of Richelieu was on the decline, so was not a rival of France.
that trade founded on the free exchange of goods was economically sound. But to go back to his relations with eastern trade

He goes on to say that so far as money was concerned France came out ahead in her commerce with the Levant. He then points out the fact that France was a natural center of distribution of goods from the East. "Some advantage must be obtained from the commerce on the seas," he says, "the French will never undertake anything with eagerness unless they are made to see that it is useful and that the means are as easy as the ends"(1). One of the best expedients that could be adopted, he goes on to say, would be for the government to sell old vessels to the people of France at a fair price on condition that they be used for trade and not be sold outside the kingdom. The advantage of this would not only be on the commercial but on the military side as well, it would furnish a secondary means of defense in case of need. In addition, more ships can easily be built to replace the ones sold, as France is well supplied with the materials for building them.

Furthermore, as another aid to commerce, he recommends that his majesty give ranks or stations to the merchants instead of giving them to persons who are good for nothing and to whom the honor is simply an event which increases their idleness and flatters their wives. This recognition of commerce, he believes, will reestablish trade upon such a firm basis that the public and the individual will derive from it a great advantage. Finally he advises those who follow him to watch the pirates and keep them thoroughly suppressed. This would greatly aid commerce.

(1). Richelieu's Testament Politique, V. 2, pp. 75-76.
Trade occupied an important place in Richelieu's thoughts at this time, and as these quotations are extracts from one of his last writings it gives us the final beliefs of this great man on the subject. That he had different views before this, he admits, and thus it must be conceded that he didn't accomplish as much as if he had been able to follow out these later thoughts from the very start of his administration. On the other hand, the fact that he believed this before he died must have been an important factor in directing the activities of those who were to follow along lines of economic endeavor which tended to turn away from the old narrow mercantile doctrine. But before carrying this discussion further it seems best to look into the actual accomplishments of this great man and the problems he encountered in his efforts to build up commerce. The trade of France in the East and conditions there during that period will be taken up first.

Commerce in the east was greatly hindered not only by the new settlements made by Holland and England, but also because of the depredations committed by the pirates of North Africa who ever-ran the entire Mediterranean and captured many French vessels, taking their crews to serve as slaves. "Piracy," says M. Masson, "was very bad before Richelieu's time, and directly after his death and it diminished in power/effect during the administration of the Cardinal, who did all he could by means of treaties and a strong fleet to put down these fierce people from Africa."(1).

In addition to the trouble caused by the ravages of the pirates, France was at "swords' points" with the Turks most of the

time, so that affairs on the Mediterranean were very interesting during Richelieu's rule. Indeed the trouble with the Ottomans almost resembled a war in 1660 as a culmination of all past events. This would have been a very bad thing for both parties. But what were the causes of this unfortunate state of affairs?

The chief one was the fact that the ambassadors of France lacked credit and the power to aid commerce effectively. This situation was not remedied, although Richelieu in a letter to an ambassador to the East advised him to do two things, first to arrange with the Sultan a suitable treaty whereby the Christian religion would be observed, and to conclude with the East suitable trade relations, which would be of great importance to both parties concerned(1). At this point he adds the following note, that all subjects of other powers and rulers, who have no ambassador at Constantinople, could trade under the said banner of France, if they followed the terms of her treaties and observed the French consul's orders. It seems that the Cardinal at this time was afraid of the British and Venetian influence in the East, and, as a result, was anxious to do everything he could to keep up favorable relations with the Turks. But he was unable to do so very successfully as there were other causes which prevented relations of friendship with the East.

The fact that the individual cities had charge of commerce accounted for a great part of the trouble in the trade with the Levant and also the extreme oppression of the pirates. When Richelieu came into power, and especially when he received the office of superintendent of navigation and commerce, he made the (1). Masson, p. 322.
centralized system more effective in that he tried to do away with the local powers and the corruption which resulted from their efforts in this field of administration. He was able to do so to a certain extent in so far as concerns commerce in the East, and his system of government was indeed of much benefit because it did not suppress the local powers (1).

The extreme mercantile doctrine was another factor in injuring trade relations between France and the East. The idea that the exportation of money was detrimental to the prosperity of the kingdom caused the western followers of that belief to neglect many of the benefits of the trade of the Levant in order not to have to send gold and silver from home, and in order to bring those precious metals into their own lands. As a result of these different unfortunate ideas and circumstances, the French Levantine commerce was in a very bad situation. "Indeed up to Richelieu's time," says Masson, "trade relations were in great confusion; the central government and the local city authorities were constantly interferring with each other and thus nothing was accomplished." But when the Cardinal came into power things were changed. "To discover a real mind," says Pugeonneau, a political reasoner and a master of it, "one must pass by these mediocre attempts and this time of anarchy and examine the rule of Richelieu. Instead of confining economic questions to a secondary place, he has studied them with passion. Indeed he has concerning commerce, the sea, and colonies not the vague views with which political thinkers of the second order are content, but has

definite ideas, and these he has formulated in his Political Testament, a work genuine in thought and style(1). In other words, Masson regarded Richelieu as having a very beneficial influence upon eastern commerce. He points out the fact that the Cardinal had clearer ideas on this subject than did those who worked with him in this part of his administration. Indeed most of the other men confronted with the Eastern situation believed in the specie theory, that the exportation of gold was harmful to the nation. But Richelieu did not share the belief, and Masson seems to think that the Cardinal opposed this idea for some time before his death.

There were other men who exerted some influence on the eastern trade situation. One of them was Father Joseph who, by means of the missions he established there, aided not only the Church but also French commerce in the Levant.

Richelieu during his administration was greatly interested in the matter of trade with Persia (2). Hearing that this country was trying to arrange a commercial treaty with Russia, in order to send goods that way, he sent agents in 1627 to conclude similar agreements. These representatives were aided by other people in Persia who advised that country to trade with France and keep away from the English who were trying to bring about favorable commercial relations with the Ottomans. As a result the trade agreement between Persia and England was broken up, and the commerce of France with Persia saved from ruin for the time being. But this was not all that the Cardinal tried to do.

In a vain attempt to stay the decline of commerce in the East, he tried to open up routes for the commerce of France through Egypt. He was especially interested in trade conditions in Africa, but death prevented him from carrying out projects in that continent. These intentions were, however, taken up and completed during the reign of Louis XIV. A memoir of that period contains the Cardinal's proposal to restore the commerce of the Indies to the Mediterranean ports by means of a canal just about where the Suez Canal is now (1). This, it was hoped, would revive industry in the East. However, try as he might, commerce with the Levant continued to fall rapidly, as had been the case since the death of Henry IV.

At this time, when France was trying to retain her place in the East so far as commerce was concerned, the English and the Dutch began to build up their trade with the East and thus assumed places as active competitors of France. They won their way into the good graces of the Sultan, while the French lost in his respect. This, coupled with the fact that the French sold inferior goods, greatly injured their eastern commerce. "Also," says H. Masson, "it was the solidarity of their organization, so different from the French state of anarchy, which gave them the advantage"(2).

But in spite of the rapid progress of the foreigners, beginning with the year 1620, the French still carried on an important trade with the East and it continued up to 1635. Then the war with Spain accentuated its ruin/these causes, together with the


hindrance encountered from the war vessels of the English, the Dutch, and the pirates, the general wars, the heavy taxes, and the break down in manufactures, diminished greatly the French trade in the Levant from 1635 to 1648. "In addition to this," says M. Masson, "our fleet decreased rapidly during this period so that it was almost a thing of the past when Colbert began his administration." (It might be added that the chief decline in Eastern trade and an armed marine took place after 1642, and thus after the death of Richelieu.)

All this could have been averted. M. Masson says that even though Holland and England did try to turn a great amount of commerce from the Indies; yet there was a place for the trade of the Mediterranean if France could have taken advantage of it(1). Indeed it was a great mistake to let the English and the Dutch penetrate into the Mediterranean where they would ever be masters.

Finally, one must conclude that the administration of Richelieu, in spite of his ardent desire to aid commerce and in spite of the interesting projects which his fertile originality invented, really accomplished very little of importance in the East so far as trade was concerned(2). About the only thing he did of very great importance was to put down piracy for the time being. The slowness and the entire lack of activity displayed by the officials under him, the fact that they were susceptible to corruption, which caused them to get into trouble in the Levant, all tended to ruin trade in the East, so that Richelieu, occupied with western foreign relations and other matters, was not able to do as much as he would have liked, though he realized just (1). Masson, pp. 134-135 (2).See Caillet, pp. 326-27.
what was the difficulty and what remedies were needed. However, one must admit that the Cardinal displayed a remarkable keenness of economic thought in his relation with Eastern commerce. He realized the advantage of trade between France and the Levant, by which they should exchange their products. Thus the inferences drawn above (1), that Richelieu was moved by the modern economic ideas of free exchange of products, and that he thought every nation should raise and manufacture those things for which the natural resources of the country were most useful, and finally that he believed and saw through the fallacy of the extreme mercantile doctrine quite a while before his death, seem to be borne out in his dealings with the Levant.

From the East, which has been considered more in detail than its present importance would warrant, it seems best now to turn to a brief consideration of the relations between England and France during the time of Richelieu. The former country was just beginning the great colonial projects which were to make her so powerful all over the world. She was building up a large navy at this time, and thus was rapidly beginning a great sea-power. On this account, the economic relations between the two countries were not very close during the Cardinal's administration, in spite of the fact that various political events caused more or less shifting of political friendliness. For instance during the Thirty Years' War, England and France were allies, but in matters concerning commerce in the East, they were bitter rivals. Numerous letters of Richelieu relate the injury committed upon French commerce by English pirates, and throughout the entire colonial world, France

(1). See supra, pp. 49-50.
and England are seen beginning that opposition and rivalry for territorial supremacy which was to culminate in a great struggle in the next century. However, so far as actual war in concerned, Richelieu after the peace of 1629 was not at all anxious to become involved in any dispute with Great Britain which might lead to hostilities. He had Spain on his hands and thus we find that during his entire rule he tried to maintain terms of peace with England. But the commercial rivalry which was springing up at that time caused the two countries to be more or less distant toward each other during the entire period.

However, various letters of the Cardinal have been published whose contents are filled with matters relating to the proposed treaty of peace which he was trying to arrange. Other letters are found which deal with reprisals, and plans to prevent the depredations committed on French commerce. One of the most interesting of this letters contains a project for a series of commercial laws (1). Another points out clearly the fact that he wanted peace to exist between the two countries, which was to be carried out all over the world wherever their interests met.

This communication consists of instructions sent in 1630 to Baillee A.M. De Fontenay-Mareuil, upon his going to England as an ambassador from France. "The said Marquis de Fontenoy will recollect," he says, "that his majesty sent the Sieur de Chasteaneuf to England to try to carry out four things: (1) To receive the oath which the said king must take to observe the treaty of peace. (2) To make a good law for commerce by which a perfect union could be arranged between the subjects of the two lands and all differ-

ences could be adjusted between them. The first point has been accomplished, but as to the matter of commerce, the Sieur de Chasteaneauf has interviewed the consul of England many times in regard to it. But the question, being very complicated, has not been settled as yet. Like Sieur de Chasteaneauf, he should follow the same directions and try to obtain the restitution of Canada, and the merchandise and vessels taken from the French since the peace was arranged. Let the laws of the sea judge such events as the return of vessels and lastly, reason and justice must rule in their relations in the future" (1). This letter clearly shows that the Cardinal desired peace between the two countries and also wanted commercial relations subject to definite rules established between the two countries. His ideas seem almost modern in this respect.

Other letters may be found in which Richelieu further reveals his ideas in regard to commercial relations with Great Britain. One of them refers to the fact that the English have a custom of stopping all French vessels bound for Spain and examining their cargoes to see what merchandise they are carrying. "This practice," says Richelieu, "ought to be stopped at once" (2). It might be all right for England to capture French ships in time of war, but this was not the case during intervals of peace. If Great Britain refused to desist from this unfair custom, then all commercial relations should be broken between the two. This shows that the Cardinal did not intend to be imposed upon by England in any way including commercial relations. However, his desire to be a political ally to Great Britain in borne out in another letter in

which one discovers the interesting fact that he wanted France to stand behind England in her efforts to win the Palatinate and that a good treaty of commerce should be arranged between the two nations(1). Thus the Cardinal in support of his desire points out that while Great Britain was willing to violate her neutrality and stop French vessels on the way to Spain, yet she was willing to carry contraband goods to that nation herself. Evidently there existed at this time a commercial struggle between France and England, both on the theoretical and practical side. This became worse as time went on. But no actual warfare resulted, and Richelieu stood for peace with that nation and a commercial policy that was wise and just. But political events prevented his idea from being carried out. It would seem to be the case that the economic questions influenced Richelieu to a greater extent than previous works or writings on his life have brought out. He realized that both nations were rivals over trade as well as colonization, and in order to prevent their disputes over commerce from coming to a head, he tried to arrange treaties which would settle and prevent any further disputes on that score. This is a modern practice which the more civilized countries try to carry out.

Another nation which the French encountered in their commercial and colonial operations was Holland. That country was reaching her prime in Richelieu's days. He realized this, and while he knew that the Dutch were the opponents of France so far as colonization was concerned, yet he tried to arrange good commercial relations with them as against Spain in their political disputes, and as a result attained very friendly relations.

Indeed he states in a letter that all countries, including Holland, can dispose of their merchandise in France, with the exception of England (1). Richelieu favored Holland as against Spain and also to protect France. "There is not a sensible man but knows," he says, "that the aid which the king gives to Holland is the means by which the kingdom is kept most powerful" (2).

Evidently the Cardinal did not fear Holland politically. Indeed the main source of opposition to that nation was in the East, where commercial rivalry prevailed between it and France. Thus while they were friends politically, the economic phase of national difficulties was arising and would lead to more definite results in the course of time. Richelieu was aware of this great power of Holland, which affected his nation especially upon the sea. In one of his letters he says that it is necessary for the king to plan either to concede everything to the English and Dutch, who are powerful at sea, or that his majesty must make himself so powerful in a short time that they can undertake nothing against him (3). In other words, the Cardinal believed that it would be a better plan to have a navy large enough to meet all enemies without being forced to borrow ships from other nations as France had been obliged to do during the siege of La Rochelle.

In regard to the relation of France and Spain during this period, little need be said. They were bitter enemies both politically and commercially. The Cardinal realized that the political and commercial safety of France lay only in the decay of the power

(2). Hanotaux Maximes d'état et Fragments Politique, p. 737.
of Spain, so that he was a deadly enemy of that nation during his entire administration. He opposed that nation for the most part in Italy, where the conflict was based on political disputes. It was in the East and in other colonial possessions that we find the commercial question arising. In the Levant, for example, Richelieu opposed the extension of Spanish trade into that territory (1). Other letters of his demonstrate the fact that the interference of Spain with French trade on the high seas was one of the main causes of his opposition to that country (2). Therefore, one must conclude that commercial rivalry was one of the important factors of the constant struggle between the two nations.

This rivalry in the East was not only one of the main causes of his opposition to Spain, Holland, and England, but also greatly influenced him in carrying out his plan of sending an agent in 1629, to arrange treaties of commerce with Denmark, Sweden, and Russia. By reading the report of Richelieu's envoy, one can obtain a very clear insight into the purposes of these treaties (3). In it he shows why he was sent out and what he did. The reason for going he gives as follows: First, trouble between Turkey and Persia, and second, pirates on the Mediterranean. The French traders on this account wanted to get the permission of Russia to allow the caravans to go through their territory instead of taking the old route, the cost of conveyance either way being about the same. "It is a question," he says, "of finding out from the kings of Norway, Russia, and Sweden whether they would make an impost greater than Turkey desired for letting the goods go across

(2). Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 489-90
(3). (Les voyages de monsieur Des Hayes) Caillet, pp. 328-32.
Accordingly, on the 18th of July, 1629, a treaty was concluded between Denmark and France. It was a commercial agreement and was very advantageous to the French, for in place of paying 5 to 6 per cent duty for goods passing the "Sund", being brought into the country and taken through to Norway, they paid only 4% while all other foreigners paid the first amount. Furthermore, they could get pure salt from those countries, when before they had to use the impure product which the Hollanders sold to them. They would have a better market for the purchase of such things as masts for boats, hemp, etc., which were useful to France. Thus she would gain by obtaining the products she needed from Denmark and selling hers at low import rates. Furthermore, she would have command of the Eastern spices, drugs, etc., for herself and for the use of the northern nations at a low import rate because of this treaty.

On the twelfth of November, 1629, a treaty was drawn up with Russia. Information concerning this affair is obtained from the French agent to the Tsar (2). One finds out from a study of it that the negotiations succeeded only in part, for the Tsar refused to authorize the foreigners to carry on the trade in silks from Persia across Russia, promising only to procure the merchandise from the East and Persia and bring it across Russia at a cheaper rate. In other words, French merchants were to be allowed to trade with the Russians but not across Russia with the Persians. Freedom

(1). (Les voyages de Monsieur des Hayes, baron de Courmesmin, en Denmark, 1664, in -12, p. 99 et seq.) Caillet, pp. 328-32.
of trade was granted to them in that respect. But any cases of disputes between the traders of both nations should be tried by a Russian judge. As a result, even though they couldn't send their caravans from the East through Russia, the Tsar promised to have the goods from the East distributed to the French dealers very cheaply, and indeed they were to be favored in all things in order that trade should be fostered between the two countries. This was the first treaty of commerce between France and Russia, and it is important on that account if for nothing else. It would indicate not only the commercial activities and aims of Richelieu, but also the fact that other nations were beginning to look upon France as a strong country, economically, whose commercial friendship would be an asset to any nation.

Another treaty of importance was that arranged between France and Sweden(1). In it an alliance was agreed upon which was to last six years, and in compliance with it they agreed to defend oppressed friends, to assure freedom of commerce from the north to the Baltic Sea, etc. The rest of this treaty is of no especial interest.

Thus one sees that France during this period tried to arrange favorable treaties with all the northern nations who controlled the Baltic Sea at that time, and with all lands interested in Eastern trade or connected with it. Richelieu was the instigator of this policy and thus deserves credit for what he accomplished along that line, and especially when one considers the many political troubles which attracted his attention at that time.

Indeed it was the Cardinal who sent the traveller, Taverrier, a worthy successor to Marco Polo, to negotiate the treaties with the Tsar and the king of Denmark, which gave to France the freedom of commerce with Russia and the right to pass through the "Sund" (1). This agent of Richelieu also signed in 1631 a treaty with Morocco which stipulated the restitution of slaves and the right to establish consuls in that land (2). The Bastions of France were given back for the second time in 1640 and trade was aided to a great extent thereby.

It is then evident that Richelieu carried out his idea of making France strong not only in the political, but also in the economic field. He seems to have realized that the ideal strong nation was the one which had definite national boundaries, and which had no fear of any lands on the political side. Therefore, he proceeded to oppose Spain in order to establish this so far as it concerned France. Then he proceeded to arrange or attempt to arrange favorable commercial relations with other countries. In doing this he was successful, and at his death he left France a strong nation with an extensive commerce which would have made her the greatest of all lands on the economic side if his ideas had been carried out. That brings up the question as to what were the real results of Richelieu's commercial policy and what was its importance so far as it concerned the development of the commerce of France.

His work so far as it concerns commerce is important in two entirely different ways or phases. First the value of his ideas as regards trade and secondly the actual worth of his commercial accomplishments. (The general ideas on trade as found in his (1): Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire Generale, Vol. V, p. 370. (2): Caillet, p. 316-21)
Political Testament might have had an important influence on the policies of men like Colbert. Indeed those last theoretical doctrines of his, which his untimely death prevented him from carrying out, would have proved an excellent guide for those who followed him. The present inquiry will not seek to ascertain what extent they did so. Possibly if Richelieu's ideas had been followed to the letter, France would be a different nation.

On the other hand, the practical effect of Richelieu's commercial policy was felt even during his period of rule. He aided eastern trade by suppressing the pirates. His commercial treaties with various countries gave France the chance of becoming a nation which would be the center of the distribution of goods between the East and the West. This had a beneficial effect on commercial conditions in France at that time which was more or less temporary, due to the changing political situation. In addition to suppressing the pirates he aided commerce by means of rebuilding the various dilapidated ports which had been neglected since the time of Louis XI.

Lastly, his theoretical ideas had a favorable effect on the trade conditions during his time as well as in the future. For instance, his "code Michau" prepared at the assembly of notables at Paris in 1626, contains, among other acts useful to commerce and navigation, the prohibition of exporting any merchandise from colonial France under a foreign flag, unless there should be no French vessel in port. The act was indeed helpful at that time because it encouraged the construction of a merchant marine, which would have been able to render great services to the East if other
unforeseen events had not prevented it from doing so. Taking everything into consideration, Richelieu had the right ideas in regard to commerce, and really accomplished more than one would expect when his many other political activities are examined in relation to their effect on this side of his administration, and their importance at that time as compared with the little attention given to economic questions. The Cardinal did pay attention to commercial problems and as a result, one cannot very well close a thesis on this side of the man's administration without a brief consideration of his relations to the mercantile doctrine, as derived from what has been written so far concerning his exterior commercial policies, and a final summing up of his importance from the economic point of view.
Chapter IV.

Conclusion.

Richelieu's Relation to the Mercantile Doctrine and his Economic Importance.

In the first part of this thesis, a definition of the mercantile doctrine was separated into two parts. One was the general idea of building up the state economically, socially, and politically. That is, it was the desire to make the state supreme over all smaller and inferior corporations, institutions, and powers. To accomplish this, a strong navy, extensive schemes of colonization, and great internal growth in population, industry, etc., was encouraged and almost required. The nation tried to make itself just as powerful and self-sufficing as possible. Richelieu believed in this doctrine and tried to follow it in his administration in spite of the many political affairs and internal troubles which tended to weaken his efforts along this line. At any rate, he tried to build up a strong navy, develop colonies, and make the state as strong as possible be means of encouraging industries in France itself. In other words, the Cardinal did all he could to make the nation strong internally as well as externally. His financial policy was a little weak, but this was due more to the unfortunate war than to any personal mistake made by him. On the other hand, he diminished the power of the Huguenots and nobles as well, and after he had put them in their proper position of subordination to the central power, he did all he could to encourage them to devote themselves to agriculture, industry, and commerce(1). This illustrates his efforts to (1) Rambaud, *Civilisation Francais*, p. 571.
make France strong within. One writer says the following in regard to his relations with the nobles: "Richelieu's razing of the fortresses of the nobility was one of the most important steps ever taken toward internal freedom of intercourse within France"(1).

The Cardinal's active measures as regards the creation of a French marine were among the most important contributions toward the development of an independent commercial policy in relation to other countries. In regard to colonization, one can easily see that he did all he could to develop this part of his commercial policies. Also his work in trying to arrange favorable trade relations with other countries aided greatly in carrying out this part of the mercantile theory and thus making France a nation capable of taking her place among the great powers of that age. Also, a study of his political policies will reveal the fact that they were strongly influenced by that doctrine, and were carried out in a manner calculated to make France a strong nation, and the king the center of her strength. This was done with the belief that the doctrine was correct and that by obeying its precepts France could develop her economic resources peacefully and without fear of the opposition of any other nations. To sum the matter up, one must conclude that Richelieu did follow out in a most enlightened way this part of the mercantile doctrine which is in use even at the present time.

However, this was not so in the case of the extreme mercantile doctrine, for here we find that Richelieu differs radically from the other people of his time. The extreme view held for its fundamental belief the idea that money is wealth. It follows that a nation should always have a favorable balance of trade in order (1). Schmoller, The Mercantile System, p. 54.
to keep gold and silver within its boundaries and should never let them go out of the land, because it is the possession of specie that makes the state strong.

When the Cardinal took up the work of his administration he believed more or less in this doctrine, which was commonly followed and obeyed at that time. But as he began to study the economic side of the question, as he was confronted with commercial conditions in which the following of the idea was brought to light in various ways, he gradually came to the conclusion that this theory was wrong and as a result he admitted it in his Political Testament. In referring to this change of economic doctrine, M. Masson says that the other French officials still believed in this theory, but Richelieu changed completely to the other side. This is a very important event in the economic history of that time, because it tends to locate the transitional stage of the development of the mercantile doctrine to the belief in free-trade, right in the age of Richelieu. Just what was the influence of the Cardinal's ideas on economic questions upon those who came after him, would afford an excellent historical and economical problem. That the Cardinal was not strictly a follower of either the old or the new school is quite evident from a study of his life. He did not believe in the most essential feature of the old mercantile system and yet was not a hearty exponent of the basic idea of the modern school of free trade.

One must place him, as was said before, in the transitional stage. In other words, he was one of the mediums whereby the old views finally became merged into the new ones. For example, one of his

Masson, p. 149.
letters illustrates very well the modern view he possessed in regard to duties on imports. "If one must endure," he says, "the heavy import duties which foreign lands put upon our goods which enter their lands and upon those which come to us, let us charge such duties on their goods and raise them in proportion as the foreigners raise their duties on us"(1). Thus he believed in the system of retaliation, which might have led to freedom of trade very easily if the proper conditions had been offered. As a result it might be asserted that Richelieu deserved more consideration on the economic side than has been given him hitherto, and more indeed than this brief thesis has been able to devote to him. The Cardinal may be regarded as a forerunner of the exponents of the modern school of political economy, an event which is worthy of study both from the historical as well as the economic point of view.

In conclusion just a word concerning the economic importance of Richelieu for his own age as well as for the future. When Richelieu came into power, he found a nation without credit, deeply in debt, and without an army or navy. In fact France was in the very depths of poverty and ruin. His keen analytical mind easily comprehended the economic necessities of the land and her resources both geographically and industrially(2). He believed that his nation was ideally situated so far as commerce was concerned, and that she was rich in natural resources which were necessary for the building up of the nation. He realized this and tried to take advantage of it. Everything was done with the

intention of making France strong commercially as well as politically. "His treaties with England, Holland, and Germany, and his defiance of Spain were all economic policies," says d'Avenel. "He extended the boundaries of France in order for her to be secure"(1). In other words, Richelieu did not take possession of territory because of an intense desire to create an empire, but simply because he wanted to strengthen the boundaries of France. One notable example of his desire not to own land is found in his treatment of Italy, where he took no territory(2). He desired to make France a strong commercial nation, and "in the spirit of reciprocity, he gave to foreign merchandise the same rights as they gave the French goods"(3). Thus, even though he left France financially poor, because of his many wars, he gave an impetus to the economic side of her development which would have placed her in the lead if other unforeseen events had not prevented the successful outcome of his plans.

But why has Richelieu been neglected on the commercial side? His political activities certainly deserve a prominent place in any account of his life. But why should not the economic traits of the man be given due consideration? He, who laid the foundations for the commercial supremacy of France and in doing so did away with such internal disturbances as the growing power of the Huguenots and Nobles, as well as the growing power of Spain and the pirates, surely deserves to be studied carefully from

(2). Bridges, Richelieu and Colbert, p. 137
that point of view.

Now all these accomplishments must have raised the general economic conditions of the people. In fact, the great force which kept the people back was the bad financial system, which, being broken down because of the wars, was a terrible strain on them. But it really had to be borne, as the Cardinal, looking into the future, realized that the present must suffer for the benefit of the ages to come, if France was to become powerful, and he acted accordingly. As a result, the people of modern France have gained more from his political and economic policies than did those of his day. After his death all his plans for the external growth of his nation dwindled down to almost nothing. Then came Colbert. He tried to restore the foundations laid by Richelieu and built upon by Mazarin. But it was of no use. The reckless ambition of his king, the splendour of the royal court, and the unfortunate outcome of the political affairs in which France was a party, all tended to ruin the building constructed by this worthy follower of the Cardinal, and left the work of the Cardinal again in a state of ruin and neglect (1).

A continual series of ups and downs has left France up to the present time in about the same position, so far as her external commercial importance is concerned, that she was in during the age of Richelieu. Nevertheless, the last few years have seen a great change in this phase of her administration. She has begun to pay more attention to her war marine and her colonization projects. Indeed up to the present war, it would seem as if the

(1). Bridges, Richelieu and Colbert, Parts 1, 2, and 3. This work treats of the accomplishment of Colbert as a logical outcome of the activities of Richelieu.
fundamental work carried out by Richelieu was to become a part of a much greater commercial structure than France has hitherto attained (1).

"The deeds of great men live after them". In other words, a man is truly great if he has accomplished something which has a living force at the present time. All accounts of Richelieu's life have brought out clearly the importance of his political side, but have failed to give similar attention to the economic phases of his career. This thesis has endeavored to take up the external commercial policies of the Cardinal and has thus limited itself to a part of the economic accomplishments of the man. But in dealing with this phase of the subject, it has tried to point out in general the fact that Richelieu as measured by his activities in this particular field of his administration, comes up to the requirement as to what constitutes a great man. Two general contributions to economic thought and practice have entitled him to this position. In the first place, the Cardinal made an addition to the theoretical side of economics by taking a stand in favor of trade and opposing the extreme commercial doctrine. This beginning made by the Cardinal finally developed into the modern doctrine of free trade. In the second place, his ideas in regard to a war marine, colonization, and commerce in general, have formed the basis, as has been said before, of all activities in this particular field ever since his time. Thus one sees in the economic policies of modern France traces of the ideas of Richelieu, a man who lived centuries ago, and for this reason he deserves a more important place in the

(1) Fracq, *France under the Republic*, pp. 30-74.
field of political economy than has been granted him in the past. Indeed he is a great man as measured by his accomplishments in both the political and economic fields of his administration.
Appendix A
Bibliography

The following works are the primary and secondary sources consulted in the preparation of this thesis.

I. Original Sources.


2. Journal de Monsieur Cardinal Richelieu, (1630-31), A. Amsterdam, 1864.

3. Eugene Sue, Correspondance de Henry D'Escoubleau De Sourdis, Vols. 1, 2., Ed. 1839.

   Mr. Sue has written an excellent introduction, dealing with the state of the marine under Richelieu.


   A wonderful collection, including practically all of Richelieu's correspondence. Unfortunately the letters left out seem to have been the ones pertaining to commerce. The editor remedies matters to a certain extent by listing these letters and summing up their main themes.

6. Richelieu, Testament Politique, 2 Vols. Londres, La Haye & La Febure, 1770. See Appendix B.
II Secondary Sources

A. Lives of Richelieu


This book is of interest especially because the author did not consider the Testament Politique of Richelieu as authentic and thus did not use it in the preparation of his book. See Appendix C.


B. Histories which cover the period.


C. Histories of Political Economy which deal with the period.


The main criticism of all these works would seem that they reveal universal neglect of the economic side of Richelieu's administrative career.

D. General Works on the Period.


A combined economic and philosophical survey of the age of

Richelieu and Colbert, which is of special importance because it brings our clearly the relation of that period with the events of the past and of the age which came after it as well.


3. Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire Generale, Vol. 5, pp. 325-75. M. D'Avenel, who writes the article on Richelieu in the Histoire Generale, has devoted his life to a study of the period in which the Cardinal lived. He is an authority on this particular field of history. Nevertheless, his treatment of that great man seems to be inadequate so far as it concerns the commercial side of his career. He evidently has failed to comprehend the economic importance of Richelieu.


A useful work because it brings out very clearly Richelieu's relations with eastern trade.


A very minute account of all phases of Richelieu's administrative accomplishments. M. Caillet had access to the archives in Paris, and as a result, had been able to bring to light much unused material relating to that phase of the man's career. Being a rather old book, its general economic conceptions are somewhat old fashioned.
Appendix B.

One of the best sources of information in regard to the commercial ideas and accomplishments of Richelieu has been his *Testament Politique*. In this work he devotes an entire chapter to the advantages of trade so far as it concerns France, and the rest of it brings out the final ideas of the Cardinal upon all the various phases of French government in which he was directly interested.

Many writers have doubted the authenticity of the work. From the age of Voltaire down to the present time, men have carried on rather sharp debates upon this subject. But it is generally acknowledged by all present day writers as being the last original record of that great man. Hamel, D'Avenel and Masson are a few of the modern historians who have relied to a great extent upon the material obtained from his *Testament Politique*.

A large part of this thesis has been based upon the material found in this last work of Richelieu's. One predominant reason for this has been the striking similarity existing between his letters and his Political Testament. This likeness is found not only in the matter of style, but in the ideas expressed in both. For example, one can find many references in his works which bring out the loyalty of the Cardinal to his king and state(1). They are all expressed in a certain characteristic manner peculiar to Richelieu which naturally impels one either to accept or reject both works in a discussion of their authenticity.
