THE FAILURE OF SCOTTISH REALISM

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The epistemological turn given to British philosophical thought by Locke's misunderstanding of what Descartes meant by innate ideas led to a development of theories of consciousness that has even now not ceased. The great transformation scene from the empiricism of Locke through the subjective idealism of Berkeley to the associationist scepticism of Hume is one of the classic spectacles of modern philosophy. The ringing down of the curtain left many spectators dissatisfied and prompted some to write revised versions for future performance. The answers to Hume comprise a large portion of succeeding thought.

Kant, who had yawned through the earlier acts, was roused to tremendous and ponderous activity by Hume's dénouement, and people are still wondering what modern philosophy would have been if Kant's slumbers had not been disturbed.

Hume had some friends who attempted to defend and elaborate his position. The writings of Hartley and the Mills are not only further statements of Hume's doctrines but contain also vigorous onslaughts on his critics.

Among the keenest British opponents were the succession of writers comprising the Scottish realists, who elaborated what they styled the philosophy of common sense. Hume's conclusions were intellectually and morally repugnant. They held that he ignored principles which we are forced to believe, by reason of our nature and because we assume their operation in the daily business of living. If Hume's logic led to conclusions that subverted these principles, the trouble was evidently in his premises. But these premises Hume held in common with Berkeley and Locke. Hence the new school was a reaction against the dominant British thought of the time.
Thomas Reid (1710-1796) laid the foundations of the new movement. He had accepted the current Berkeleyanism in college, but became in time deeply suspicious of its tendencies, finally convincing himself, with the aid of Hume's analysis, that it was "a hypothesis which, in my opinion, overthrows all philosophy, all religion and virtue, and all common sense" (96.a). "And the opinion of the ablest judges seems to be", says Reid, that Berkeley "hath proved by unanswerable agreements what no man in his senses can believe" (101.b), namely, that "all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind, that their being (esse) is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit" (Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge. Part I. sec. VI).

Reid drew up a heavy indictment of this subjectivism: "Thus the wisdom of philosophy is set in opposition to the common sense of mankind. The first pretends to demonstrate apriori that there can be no such thing as a material world; that sun, moon, stars, and earth, animal and vegetable bodies, are and can be nothing else but sensations in the mind, or images of those sensations in the memory and imagination; that, like pain and joy, they can have no existence when they are not thought of. The last can conceive no otherwise of this opinion, than as a kind of metaphysical lunacy, and concludes that too much learning is apt to make men mad; and that the man who seriously entertains this

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1 Throughout this essay, a mere number and a letter in parenthesis are a reference to page and column respectively of Reid's Collected Writings edited by Sir Wm. Hamilton. 6th ed. Edinburgh. 1863.
belief, though in other respects he may be a very good man, as a man may be who believes that he is made of glass; yet surely he hath a soft place in his understanding, and hath been hurt by much thinking" (127.a).

The battleground Reid selected was consciousness. He aimed to show that the mind is not shut in to knowledge of ideas, and that there is a material world accessible to the mind and existing even when the mind is for the time unconscious of it. His method was simple and direct. In the first place he rejected the theory that reality is represented in the mind by ideas. This destroyed Locke's theory of knowledge and left Berkeley with a mind devoid of content. It destroyed also Hume's bundles of impressions and ideas. In the second place Reid insisted on the independent reality of the external world. Locke's mind could therefore know this world directly without the intervention of ideas, Berkeley's had to know the world if it was to know anything at all, while Hume's metaphysical lunacy was too aggravated to make a cure likely of success.

Reid regarded the doctrine that the mind has representative ideas as the citadel of the system he had resolved to overthrow. This essay is largely a study of Reid's assaults on the 'ideal hypothesis' and of his realistic reconstruction of the phenomena of knowing. It seeks to point out that Reid's failure to establish realism is due in the main to his acceptance of the hypothesis of mind as a thing or agent. This is the bulwark of subjectivism that must be destroyed if the dominance of the school is to cease.

In the spheres of sensation and perception, of memory and of imagination, Reid's procedure is essentially the same. He loudly denounces the subjective position, vehemently proclaims the realistic substitute, and then settles down to support his contention in a manner that inevitably leads back to subjectivism again, if it is pressed but a few points beyond the situation in
which he leaves it. This surprising result is traced in this essay to his failure to reject the mind-substance hypothesis. The implications of this doctrine are set forth in a separate chapter and held to be responsible for the inability of his successors to remedy his fundamental contradictions. Finally the attempt is made to sketch the pragmatic reaction against subjectivism, in order to see whether rejection of the mind-entity conception can not lead to a tenable doctrine of consciousness which shall embody Reid's two leading stipulations, that representative ideas do not intervene in the knowing of external reality, and that the external world exists independently of the knowledge of it.

Should the pragmatic reconstruction be deemed sound, it would then be evident that the Scottish realists failed, not because they were too radical in their onslaught on idealism, but because they were not revolutionary enough. They were unable to shake off all the unverifiable assumptions foisted on them as part of their education. Their common sense, like all other common sense, was fatally uncritical of its own position. But they led the advance. Their unsuccessful attack revealed the central stronghold of idealism and helped to make possible the renewed assault of the present day.
CHAPTER II
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION

Theories of consciousness afford a convenient means for classifying philosophical systems, just as theories of obligation permit one to distinguish fundamentally between moral systems. What are we conscious of? Probably to no other question in philosophy have so many divergent answers been given. It is asserted that we are conscious of matter and mind, of matter only, of mind only, of matter through mind, of mind through matter, of many minds, of our mind alone. It is also held that the very question, 'what are we conscious of?' makes assumptions that invalidate any possible answer. Consciousness far from being a power within ourselves that plays on objects or ideas at our will, is really a grouping, togetherness, pattern, or cross section of things, one of which is the body. In this view, the relevant question is not, 'what are we conscious of?' but rather, 'by what principle of selection do some things appear in the grouping while others do not?' Philosophers that unite in ignoring the first question divide in answering the second. In some way or other the body is an essential factor in the selective process. Explanations range from the blank statement, that the body is a unique center of reference, through various descriptions of bodily response, to the position, that consciousness is the name given to any situation in which an organism responds to anticipated results as foreshadowed in the objects to which it responds. If philosophy is to deal with reality, it must show how reality can be reached, and this is the problem to be met by theories of knowledge or of consciousness.

Since every philosopher either adopts explicitly or assumes an epistemology he thereby classifies himself much more conclusively than by a formal labeling of his other doctrines. A man who ranks himself as a natural
realist and holds to the immediate knowledge of matter, for example, will not
save himself from unwilling fellowship with the subjective idealists if his
tory of sense perception, as actually worked out, shuts off the mind from
all direct contact with matter, leaving only an indirect relation through
subjective things called sensations or ideas. On the other hand, an idealistic
philosophy that rejects everything non-mental, and yet makes use of a brain
and nervous system outside the mind in an endeavor to put everything within
the mind, classifies itself by virtue of its theory of sense perception and
not by its invalid general conclusions.

Reid is a representative of the first type. His pages ring with
the firm conviction that subjective idealism and its inevitable sequel in
scepticism have been refuted and supplanted by the common sense doctrine of
immediate awareness of the external object. He pours scorn and pity upon
his predecessors in modern philosophy because of their attachment to the
'ideal hypothesis', by which he means a representative theory of sense per-
ception. They had supposed that the only way in which the non-extended mind
could perceive an extended object was by means of ideas that represented the
extended object to the non-extended mind.¹

The successive thought of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume had made evident
the solipsistic or else sceptical nature of this doctrine. The ideas were
present, to be sure, but who could guarantee that they represented truly,
or at all? Isolated from external reality, the mind was at the mercy of its
possibly inaccurate, nay perhaps unscrupulous, ideas.

This was a ridiculous and intolerable situation to Reid. He solved
it, in Alexander's fashion, by declaring flatly that the mind does perceive
external reality directly, and that it is not hemmed in by impenetrable ideas.

¹See Holt: Concept of Consciousness. p. 136-149. N.Y. 1914.
cians, a philosopher, if he is true to his faith, must patiently undo the tangle step by step. When Reid came to this part of his task he experienced the greatest difficulty in avoiding the very 'ideal hypothesis' that he had summarily rejected. In fact, it is demonstrable that this wolf, in a new suit of sheep's clothing furnished by Reid, reentered the fold and worked his sceptical and solipsistic havoc on the author's choicest lambs. This chapter is, accordingly, an attempt to show that Reid's philosophy of common sense, though a natural realism in its claims, is, at least with regard to its theory of sense-perception, an unqualified subjectivism of the same crude type as that of Locke.

"An inquiry into the human mind, on the principles of common sense" undertook the explanation of the phenomena of sense perception, as Reid viewed them. Eight "Essays on the intellectual powers of man" covered the same ground and much more, but without essential change in doctrine. From these works, by quotation and summary Reid's theory will be presented and then examined.

We all know roughly what is meant by experiencing a smell. Even though we can not describe what is going on, we are aware of the difference to our nostrils between a pea cannery and a florist's rose greenhouse, between a lady who perfumes and a gentleman who smokes. Some we like and some we do not like, but all of them we smell.

With this appeal to common experience Reid launches his theory. Whatever else we may believe, we must grant, he thinks, that the smell-sensation is "a simple and original affection or feeling of the mind...... It is, indeed, impossible that it can be in any material body: it is a sensation, and a sensation can only be in a sentient thing" (105.a). This important point is made several times, until it is evident beyond a doubt that Reid believed a sensation to be a something in the mind and nowhere else, dependent on the mind
for its existence, and having a real existence only under those conditions.

"This is common to all sensations, that, as they can not exist but in being perceived, so they can not be perceived but they must exist" (105.b). "It is certain, no man can conceive or believe smelling to exist of itself, without a mind, or something that has the power of smelling, of which it is called a sensation, an operation, or feeling" (108.a). The position may be consolidated by an absolutely unequivocal quotation from his later essays: "When I smell a rose, there is in this operation both sensation and perception. The agreeable odor I feel, considered by itself, without relation to any external object, is merely a sensation. It affects the mind in a certain way; and this affection of the mind may be conceived, without a thought of the rose, or of any other object. The sensation can be nothing else than it is felt to be. Its very essense consists in being felt; and, when it is not felt, it is not. There is no difference between the sensation and the feeling of it - they are one and the same thing. It is for this reason that we before observed, that, in sensation, there is no object distinct from that act of the mind by which it is felt - and this holds true with regard to all sensations" (310.a).

The first result secured by analysis of sense-perception is, therefore, the purely subjective or mental character of sensations.

The next step should lead us to the external world, the realm of things outside the mind, in short to matter, or, as Reid terms it, body. But since the path from a subjective sensation to an objective reality is so difficult that Locke, like Columbus, never realized his failure to reach the goal, while Berkeley and Hume roundly maintained that no such path existed, we must not expect Reid to guide us without much faltering and retracing of steps, ending, perhaps, despite his sincerest efforts, in evident failure to carry
out his undertaking. He begins:

"We have considered smell as signifying a sensation, feeling, or impression upon the mind; and in this sense, it can only be in a mind, or sentient being; but it is evident that mankind give the name of smell much more frequently to something which they conceive to be external, and to be a quality of body: they understand by it something which does not at all infer a mind; and have not the least difficulty in conceiving the air perfumed with aromatic odors in the deserts of Arabia, or in some uninhabited island where the human foot never trod. . . . I am apt to think that there is really something in the rose or lily, which is by the vulgar called smell, and which continues to exist when it is not smelled: and shall proceed to inquire what this is; how we come by the notion of it; and what relation this quality or virtue of smell hath to the sensation which we have been obliged to call by the same name, for want of another" (112.a-b).

The results of this inquiry are in brief these: (1) the something-in-the-rose has a permanent existence independent of the mind; (2) we come by the notion of it through 'suggestion' on the part of the sensation, of which (3) it is the cause (114.a).

The second conclusion is of fundamental importance for the theory of sense-perception, and requires careful statement before it can be fairly criticized. The problem is very much complicated by Reid's lack of clearness and consistency in his remarks on this topic. Hamilton has collected the principal relevant passages and divided them into two groups, the first supporting the position that Reid was a representational perceptualist, the second that he was, as he constantly proclaimed himself to be, a new leader in the school of direct or immediate perception (819.a-824). In spite of Hamilton's attempt to minimize the force of the first group in the interests of "natural realism", 
quotation will quickly show Reid's inability to free himself from the current representationism. This oscillation is evidently due to the struggle within him between his early idealistic training and his realistic program. He saw the promised land but knew not how to reach it. Throughout his work is evident the shifting from a 'suggested' reality to one actually present to the mind, according as he was occupied with the means to his end or with the end itself.

The immediate question is not so much what is the external reality, as how do we get our knowledge of it. We are interested for the moment in the actual working of the knowing process, rather than in the nature of its product. Whenever Reid tries to explain the process he resorts to statements like these:

"How a sensation should instantly make us conceive and believe the existence of an external thing altogether unlike to it, I do not pretend to know; and when I say that the one suggests the other, I mean not to explain the manner of their connection, but to express a fact, which everyone may be conscious of - namely, that by a law of our nature, such a conception and belief constantly and immediately follow the sensation" (131.b).

"Perception has always an external object, and the object of my perception, in this case, is that quality in the rose which I discern by the sense of smell. Observing that the agreeable sensation is raised when the rose is near, and ceases when it is removed, I am led by my nature to conclude some quality to be in the rose, which is the cause of this sensation. This quality in the rose is the object perceived; and that act of my mind by which I have the conviction and belief of this quality, is what in this case I call perception" (310.a). Hamilton remarks in a footnote, "This paragraph appears to be an explicit disavowal of the doctrine of an intuitive or immediate perception" (310.b*).

"......there are natural suggestions: particularly, that sensation
suggests the notion of present existence, and the belief that what we perceive or feel does now exist" (III. b).

"....our constitution leads us to consider it [the sensation] as a sign of something external, which hath a constant conjunction with it" (I14. b).

"The sensations of heat and cold are perfectly known; for they neither are nor can be anything else than what we feel them to be; but the qualities in bodies which we call heat and cold are unknown. They are only conceived by us as unknown causes or occasions of the sensations to which we give the same names" (119. b). This account applies to all secondary qualities and their corresponding sensations (314. b).

The following applies to all primary qualities and their corresponding sensations, except the quality of visible shape, which has no peculiar sensation: "Hardness of bodies is a thing that we conceive as distinctly and believe as firmly as anything in nature. We have no means of coming at this conception and belief, but by means of a certain sensation of touch to which hardness hath not the least similitude; nor can we by any rules of reasoning infer the one from the other..... What shall we say then of this conception and this belief which are so unaccountable and intractable? I see nothing left but to conclude that by an original principle of our constitution a certain sensation of touch both suggests to the mind the conception of hardness and creates the belief of it: or in other words that this sensation is a natural sign of hardness" (121. a).² "All these [primary qualities], by means of certain corresponding sensations of touch, are presented to the mind as real external

²The distinction between primary and secondary qualities, drawn by Locke on the basis of resemblance or non-resemblance between the idea (sensation) and its external cause, has been redrawn by Reid on the basis of our knowledge or ignorance of the external cause of the sensation (123. a; 313. b). That this boundary is neither fixed nor of practical importance though denied by Reid is being constantly demonstrated by the progress of physical and chemical analysis.
qualities; the conception and the belief of them are invariably connected with
the corresponding sensations by an original principle of human nature" (123.b).

"I know this also, that the perception of an object implies both a
conception of its form and a belief of its present existence. I know moreover
that this belief is not the effect of argumentation and reasoning; it is the
immediate effect of my constitution" (183.a).

"There is no reasoning in perception, as hath been observed. The belief
which is implied in it is a kind of instinct" (185.a).

"....though we never before had any notion or conception of the thing
signified, [sensations] do suggest, or conjure it up, as it were, by a natural
kind of magic, and at once give us a conception and create a belief of it"
(122.a).

"We know nothing..... of the machinery by means of which each sensa-
tion exhibits its corresponding perception. We are inspired with the sensation,
and we are inspired with the corresponding perception by means unknown. And
because the mind passes immediately from the sensation to that conception and
belief of the object which we have in perception, in the same manner as it
passes from signs to the things signified by them, we have therefore called
our sensations signs of external objects" (187.b- 188.a).

"When a primary quality is perceived, the sensation immediately leads
our thought to the quality signified by it, and is itself forgot" (315.b).

"The external senses have a double province - to make us feel and
to make us perceive. They furnish us with a variety of sensations, some pleas-
ant, others painful, and others indifferent; at the same time they give us
a conception and an invincible belief of the existence of external objects.
This conception of external objects is the work of nature. The belief of their
existence which the senses give is the work of nature; so likewise is the sensa-
tion that accompanies it. This conception and belief which nature produces by means of the senses we call perception" (314.b).

"Nature has connected our perception of external objects with certain sensations. If the sensation is produced the corresponding perception follows even when there is no object and in that case is apt to deceive us. In like manner nature has connected our sensations with certain impressions that are made upon the nerves and brain; and when the impression is made, from whatever cause, the corresponding sensation and perception immediately follow" (320.b).

The essence of these numerous quotations appears to be that sensations, 'by a natural kind of magic', conjure up a belief in the existence of the external objects that correspond to the sensations. The sensation is said to suggest, to exhibit, to signify, to lead to, to make us conceive and believe the existence of the object. Knowledge of how this is accomplished is expressly disclaimed. The process is instinctive, non-rational, 'natural', in accordance with original principles of the human constitution, and so on. The question, how do we get our knowledge of external reality, is overborne by the triumphant assertion that, in any case, get it we do.

However, Reid's gropings toward an explanation are not entirely vain. Every time he attacks the problem his procedure reveals assumptions of great importance for the discovery of his implicit, as distinguished from his avowed, theory of knowledge. Its discovery and construction, which will now be attempted, almost unequivocally affiliates him with the subjective idealists, leaving his realism in the dreamer's paradise of unsubstantiated wishes, or at most as a faint indication to the pragmatic philosophy of the terms in which a convincing answer to Hume must be framed.

The entire idealistic apparatus is produced in his argument piece by piece, and needs only to be assembled. At the outset we are furnished with
purely subjective sensations. These are then placed where they belong, in a mental thing distinct from the body, a substantial mind, itself an active entity. The fatal implications of this factor in Reid's system are exhibited in a later chapter. The existence of the external world as immediately known, Reid presumes, will save him from scepticism or solipsism. But at this point he is indistinguishable from the subjective idealist, except in his bare assertions that he is completely different. The machinery of 'suggestion' is useless for effecting the transition from the sensation in the mind to the perceived object without, because it works just as smoothly and produces the same result when the object is not 'there', as when it is (320.b). The idealist cites this as proof that the object is, under the law of parsimony, never really there, and that our perceptions are, not simply in a few cases but in all cases, subjective. Reid is content to observe that the senses are sometimes "apt to deceive us", forgetful of his stout defense elsewhere (334.a) of the veracity of the senses.

Apart from the uncertainty produced by the fact of error and hallucination, what is 'suggestion' in its normal working? Although the subject is wrapped in obscurity owing to Reid's reiterated professions of ignorance, it nevertheless appears that the subjective sensation possesses an attribute capable of inducing in the mind the conception and belief of the external object. If this function were one of leading the mind to the object itself, and if it were another object instead of a sensation that performed this function, then Reid would have to be considered as an astonishing forerunner of the pragmatists. As the case actually stands, however, he is badly enmeshed in the idealist's net, for after the 'suggesting' is accomplished, the mind is advanced only to the conception and belief of the object, not to the object itself. 'Suggestion' seems to be a name for a special association of ideas, the association of ideas of qualities with ideas of causes of these qualities and with
ideas of the external existence of these causes. But the whole operation is purely subjective none the less.

Reid's inquiry into the relation of the subjective smell of a rose, which is a sensation in the mind, to the external quality or virtue of smell in the rose itself had the triple result that the quality in the rose, though independently existing, was suggested to the mind by the sensation it had produced. The second conclusion has been examined, the first and third still demand consideration.

The propositions that there is an external something and that this causes sensations in the mind are closely connected. The first would scarcely be entertained by anyone holding Reid's real theory of perception but for the last. This in turn arises, according to Reid, because "the mind begins very early to thirst after principles which may direct it in the exertion of its powers" (112.b), and because of "an eager desire to find out connections in things" (113.a), or, in Hume's words, because of the intemperate searching after causes.

If we look into Reid's treatment of this phase of perception we shall find a very pretty begging of the question which deserves to be exposed. He says (112.b), "Let us therefore suppose, as before, a person beginning to exercise the sense of smelling; a little experience will discover to him, that the nose is the organ of this sense, and that the air, or something in the air, is a medium of it. And finding by farther experience that, when a rose is near, he has a certain sensation, when it is removed the sensation is gone, he finds a connection in nature betwixt the rose and this sensation. The rose is considered as a cause, occasion, or antecedent of the sensation, the sensation as an effect or consequence of the presence of the rose; they are associated in the mind, and constantly found conjoined in the imagination" (see also 310.a).
There is an ancient recipe which begins, First catch your rabbit. This should remind us that we must first have our rose before we can go on and find a connection in nature betwixt it and the sensation. How does the rose come into our possession? It is necessary to consider what is meant by 'having a rose near'. It may mean having the actual external rose as an object in consciousness, or having a group of subjective sensations of color, smell, shape, touch, temperature, etc., usually appearing in conjunction and known collectively by the name rose. The realist is compelled to uphold the first meaning, the idealist of course takes the second. If it can be shown that Reid, while verbally supporting the first, gives no grounds for believing any but the second interpretation, it will be evident that he assumes what he set out to prove, namely the existence of the external world, and that he is once more, though ostensibly in opposition, fundamentally allied with the idealist in his theory of sense perception.

His common starting point with the idealist of Berkeley's kind is the subjective smell-sensation. Berkeley connects it with other subjective sensations, Reid with the real rose. He appears to know that there is a real rose because various sensations 'suggest' the conception and belief of it to him. This position has already been criticized. It simmers down to an association of ideas only, not an association of object with idea.

There remains his contention that the sensation is referred to an external cause on account of the mind's eager desire to find out connections in things. Granted this longing, why should the mind establish the relation with something outside? Because the thing happens to be there waiting to be connected to the sensation, and when it is not there, there is no sensation dangling unrelated either. But this begs the question shamelessly. Something is there, to be sure, but is it external or simply other sensations? We are
given no evidence for the first alternative while everything points to the second. To specify: The rose, apart from the smell sensation, 'produces' also other sensations. But there is no reason to believe that an external unknown 'produces' them. It is more reasonable to hold that the rose is these sensations. A sensation, besides, is more easily connected with other sensations than with something else. And there are all the facts of relativity of perception helping to put the rose in the mind, rather than 'out there'.

So far, accordingly, from having led us out of the world of subjective sensations into the world of objective reality, Reid has exhibited sensations guaranteeing each other without further apparent support, like two amazing acrobats, each holding the other up in mid-air. The smell sensation is referred to the group of remaining rose sensations, the color sensation in turn likewise, the weight sensation in its order, each one being singled out for the moment to be undergirded by the others, then itself subsiding into the group to help bear up its successor. This is the subjective maze from which we hoped to emerge under Reid's guidance. He has expended much energy, but done little work.

Some good results remain nevertheless in the midst of much futility. The pragmatic reconstruction of Scottish realism will be attempted in the last chapter, but a brief anticipation of it follows naturally from all the foregoing criticism. The two exceptional features in Reid's account, marking it as a departure in spirit at least if not in execution from the 'ideal hypothesis', are his insistence that the external object is present to the mind directly, and his suggestion-theory to make this plausible.

These features the pragmatist can utilize as cornerstones in the rebuilding. He retains the claim of immediate awareness as valid, he remodels the machinery of suggestion, and he rejects the entitative or substantial mind
to which, Reid thought, the external objects appeared. Objects are present to the responsive body. If the response is of a kind involving 'suggestion' it is known as conscious or mental. Mind is therefore a function, not a thing. Sensations do not 'suggest' the presence of objects to the mind. The object itself, present in some form from the start, suggests possibilities to the body. When the body responds to these suggestions of the future it functions consciously. The external object leads the body on in a way that is not mechanical, but due "to the original constitution of our nature", as Reid rightly says. Response to the future is a quality definitely belonging to some things, absent in others.

The reconstruction of perception must be postponed until Reid's views of other mental phenomena have been presented and examined.
CHAPTER III
MEMORY AND IMAGINATION.

While many a realist makes a brave start toward his goal when he frames his theory of sense perception, he often meets unusual difficulty in proceeding to account for memory and imagination. There is first of all the general problem, dismaying to philosophers irrespective of school, of finding any explanation for the pastness of memory-objects on the one hand, and the apparent datelessness of imagination-objects on the other. Then the realist suffers an aggravation of the general problem from the special necessity he is under of explaining these operations in a way that will not undermine the independence of his external world. He must beware lest a facile theory be extended to include objects of sense perception which by the realistic hypothesis are immediately present at the same time that they are independent. Any account of memory-objects must scrupulously preserve sense-objects from the infection of subjectivity; against imagination the quarantine must be even more vigilant. From the consideration of objects that have been, but are no more, and of objects that never were, though they may yet be, the descent to abysmal representationism is easy and the return desperately hard.

Having failed grievously to establish his doctrine of sense perception, Reid rather exceeds expectations by proposing a drastically realistic theory of memory. So uncompromising is it that Hamilton refuses to accept it. The evidence, as usual, does not point all in one direction, but is divisible into two main groups, one indicating Reid's realistic desires, the other his implicit ineluctable subjectivism. It is unfortunate for his doctrine that his wish is generally impotent to be the father of his thought.

Passages showing his strong and earnest realistic bias follow:

"Suppose that once and only once I smelled a tuberose in a certain
room where it grew in a pot and gave a very grateful perfume. Next day I relate what I saw and smelled. When I attend as carefully as I can to what passes in my mind in this case, it appears evident that the very thing I saw yesterday, and the fragrance I smelled are now the immediate objects of mind, when I remember it..... Upon the strictest attention, memory appears to me to have things that are past, and not present ideas, for its object..... I beg leave to think, with the vulgar, that when I remember the smell of the tuberose, that very sensation which I had yesterday and which has now no more any existence is the immediate object of my memory..... there was a smell, is the immediate testimony of memory" (106.a).

"The immediate object of perception must be something present, and not what is past. We may remember what is past, but do not perceive it" (222.a). This carries the implication that the immediate object of memory is what is past, for otherwise it need not be distinguished from the immediate object of perception.

"If we compare the evidence of sense with that of memory, we find a great resemblance, but still some difference. I remember distinctly to have dined yesterday with such a company. What is the meaning of this? It is that I have a distinct conception and firm belief of this past event, not by reasoning, not by testimony, but immediately from my constitution. And I give the name of memory to that part of my constitution by which I have this kind of conviction of past events. I see a chair on my right hand. What is the meaning of this? It is that I have by my constitution a distinct conception and firm belief of the present existence of the chair in such a place and in such a position; and I give the name of seeing to that part of my constitution by which I have this immediate conviction. The two operations agree in the immediate conviction which they give" (329.b). While this quotation is not crucial, it
has this contingent force, that memory is in the same relation to its object as is perception, and therefore if perception is immediate, so in the same degree is memory.

"It is by memory that we have an immediate knowledge of things past" (339.a). A more explicit statement of the position is impossible. It excited the annotative wrath of Hamilton, who remarked in a footnote: "An immediate knowledge of a past thing is a contradiction. For we can only know a thing immediately, if we know it in itself, or as existing; but what is past cannot be known in itself, for it is nonexistent." This stricture must be considered later.

"The faculties of consciousness [the modern self-consciousness] (222.b) and memory are chiefly distinguished by this, that the first is an immediate knowledge of the present, the second an immediate knowledge of the past" (351.b). This exhausted Hamilton's patience. He subjoined a note reading: "As already frequently stated, an immediate knowledge of the past is contradictory. This observation I cannot again repeat." Hamilton seemed not to share Reid's apparent opinion that reiteration of a conviction is equivalent to demonstration.

"The testimony of memory, like that of self-consciousness is immediate; it claims our assent upon its own authority" (444.b).

The perplexing feature of Reid's treatment of memory is the fact that his utterances giving ground for a representative doctrine often occur in the same context as those quoted above in favor of immediacy. Let us reproduce passages tending toward representationism and therefore, ultimately, subjectivism:

"...memory suggests the notion of past existence, and the belief that what we remember did exist in time past" (111.b).

"The object of memory or thing remembered must be something that is
past...... What now is cannot be an object of memory.... Memory is always accompanied with the belief of that which we remember,...... every man feels that he must believe what he distinctly remembers, though he can give no other reason of his belief but that he remembers the thing distinctly.... This belief which we have from distinct memory we account real knowledge" (340.a). Here, in the belief that accompanies memory, is the entering wedge of representationism. To remember a thing is not enough, there must be a belief in the past existence of what is remembered. The belief is held because the thing is remembered, though that, as Reid admits, is no reason at all, since the connection is not necessary, but arbitrary and unaccountable (341.b).

"The belief which we have in perception is a belief of the present existence of the object, that which we have in memory is a belief of its past existence" (198.b).

"I find this also, that the sensation compels my belief of the present existence of the smell, and memory my belief of its past existence..... If you ask why I believe that it existed yesterday, I can give no other reason but that I remember it" (106.b).

These passages and the one from 329.b quoted in the other group (p. 20) make it appear that memory and perception are on the same operating basis. In perception there is a suggested belief that a thing exists in the world of external realities. In memory there is a suggested belief that a thing exists in the world of past and bygone realities. The belief in both operations accompanies them as a result of the constitution of our nature, arbitrary and unaccountable. If, therefore, the criticism of the suggestion-machinery of perception, as developed in the preceding chapter, is sufficient to show the subjective character of that process in the form presented by Reid, this criticism is equally valid when applied to the suggestion-machinery of memory.
In some mysterious way, to be investigated next, memory lays hold of a no longer existing object and then suggests to the mind a belief in that object’s past existence. Again the suggesting is not a leading of the mind to the real object; it is a working on the mind in such a way that belief in the real object is produced. And again there are admittedly circumstances when a belief that has no corresponding real object is aroused (340.a; 362.a). Could anything be more completely ‘in the mind’ than a belief suggested by a mental operation and duly appearing whether there is really anything to be believed or not?

Discarding those of Reid’s remarks that lean toward representationism, we are left with those in which, much to Hamilton’s annoyance, the immediacy of memory is vociferated.

Reid’s realistic instinct was altogether correct in the demand it made for the presence in some manner of the object remembered. But unaided instinct is a poor pilot through the tortuous channels of epistemology. Hamilton is justified in maintaining that what is past cannot, since it is non-existent, be known immediately, and that Reid’s doctrine as it stands is a contradiction in itself. It was Reid’s business to show that the contradiction is merely apparent, not real, that the object is actually present, though absent. No amount of asseveration, however, could take the place of explanation. That the needed demonstration is available will be shown in the last chapter. That Reid could not possibly have furnished it while burdened with the incubus of an entititative mind will be made plain in the next chapter. Meanwhile the subject of imagination requires consideration.

Imagination involves the same kind of danger for the unwary realist as memory. The temptation to explain it subjectively, at the expense of the objective character of perception, lies on the surface. The peril is magnified
by the circumstance that imagination may deal with things that, unlike remem-
bered things, have no place in the time continuum apart from the brute date
of their being imagined.

Reid defines and describes imagination clearly, but explains it not
at all:

"Conceiving, imagining, and apprehending are commonly used as synony-
mous in our language, and signify the same thing which the logicians call
simple apprehension [denied by Hamilton (106.b)]. This is an operation differ-
ent from all those we have mentioned. Whatever we perceive, whatever we re-
member, whatever we are [self-]conscious of, we have a full persuasion or con-
viction of its existence. But we may conceive or imagine what has no existence,
and what we firmly believe to have no existence. What never had an existence
cannot be remembered; what has no existence at present cannot be the object
of perception or of [self-]consciousness; but what never had nor has any exist-
ence may be conceived. Every man knows that it is as easy to conceive a winged
horse or a centaur as it is to conceive a horse or a man. Let it be observed
therefore that to conceive, to imagine, to apprehend, when taken in the proper
sense, signify an act of the mind which implies no belief or judgment at all.
It is an act of the mind by which nothing is affirmed or denied, and which
therefore can neither be true nor false" (223.a. See also 105.b; 106.b; 361.a;
368.a).

What is imagination? "It is an act of the mind, a kind of thought.
This cannot be denied. But does it produce any effect besides the act itself?
Surely common sense answers this question in the negative; for everyone knows
that it is one thing to conceive, another thing to bring forth into effect....
Conceiving[ or imagining], as well as projecting or resolving, are what the
schoolmen called immanent acts of the mind which produce nothing beyond them-
Here is impregnable subjectivism. Imagination is purely an act of the mind and one that has not the least effect outside the mind. Precisely what this active mind is must be considered later. It is evident at any rate that is is a power capable of acting independently of and non-reciprocally with the material world.

In this light may be examined a passage, already quoted in part, comparing and contrasting three distinct acts of the mind:

".....When I remember the smell of the tuberose, that very sensation which I had yesterday, and which has now no more any existence, is the immediate object of my memory; and when I imagine it present, the sensation itself, and not any idea of it, is the object of my imagination. But though the object of my sensation [perception], memory and imagination be in this case the same, yet these acts or operations of the mind are as different and as easily distinguishable as smell, taste and sound. I am conscious of a difference in kind between sensation and memory, and between both and imagination. I find this also, that the sensation compels my belief of the present existence of the smell, and memory my belief of its past existence. There is a smell, is the immediate testimony of sense; there was a smell, is the immediate testimony of memory. If you ask me why I believe that the smell exists, I can give no other reason nor shall ever be able to give any other than that I smell it. If you ask why I believe that it existed yesterday, I can give no other reason but that I remember it. Sensation and memory therefore are simple, original and perfectly distinct operations of the mind, and both of them are original principles of belief. Imagination is distinct from both, but is no principle of belief. Sensation implies the present existence of its object, memory its past existence, but imagination views its object naked, and without any belief of its existence or nonexistence" (106.a).
The points of importance are two. First, the distinguishing features of the three operations are the presence or absence of particular varieties of belief. Given a sensation in Reid's strictly subjective meaning, and we can serve it up as perception if we season it with a belief in the present existence of the object, or we can offer it as memory if we add a belief in the past existence of the object, while it appears as imagination if brought in au naturel without any dressing of belief. And what is this condiment of belief? "Every man knows what it is, but no man can define it" (107.a). "I conclude then that the belief which accompanies sensation and memory is a simple act of the mind which cannot be defined" (107.b). By a species of mental alchemy a subjective sensation becomes objectified either in the present or the past by mixing it with a mental act called belief. If imagination is subjective, the classification of perception and memory appears obvious.

The second point is the assertion that imagination has an object, not represented by an idea. Thus in the case of the tuberose, the smell which is actually present in perception, is also itself the object of the imagination. This position is reinforced in another passage of considerable length, but great importance:

"If now it should be asked, What is the idea of a circle? I answer, It is the conception [or imagination] of a circle. What is the immediate object of this conception? The immediate and the only object of it is a circle. But where is this circle? It is nowhere. If it was an individual and had a real existence, it must have a place; but being a universal, it has no existence and therefore no place. Is it not in the mind of him that conceives it? The conception of it is in the mind, being an act of the mind; and in common language a thing being in the mind is a figurative expression signifying that the thing is conceived or remembered."
"It may be asked, Whether this conception is an image or resemblance of a circle. I answer, I have accounted for its being in a figurative sense called the image of a circle in the mind. If the question is meant in the literal sense, we must observe that the word conception has two meanings. Properly it signifies that operation of the mind which we have been endeavoring to explain; but sometimes it is put for the object of conception or thing conceived.

"Now if the question be understood in the last of these senses, the object of this conception is not an image or resemblance of a circle; for it is a circle, and nothing can be an image of itself.

"If the question be - Whether the operation of mind in conceiving a circle be an image or resemblance of a circle? I think it is not; and that no two things can be more perfectly unlike than a species of thought and a species of figure. Nor is it more strange that conception should have no resemblance to the object conceived, than that desire should have no resemblance to the object desired, or resentment to the object of resentment.

"I can likewise conceive an individual object that really exists, such as St. Paul's Church in London. I have an idea of it, that is, I conceive it. The immediate object of this conception is four hundred miles distant, and I have no reason to think that it acts upon me, or that I act upon it; but I can think of it notwithstanding" (374.a).

The force of this extended quotation lies in its sturdy insistence on the existence of some object of the imagination, even though that object be nonexistent. So stated, we have a contradiction like the one that irritated Hamilton in Reid's discussion of memory. Here again it was Reid's business to show that, though verbally a contradiction, the fact nevertheless remains that in imagination the object, even when nonexistent, is still in some manner
present. But Reid simply let the contradiction stand, repeating his contention without supporting it. He could not do more with a substantial mind on his overburdened shoulders.

Had Reid lived to benefit by the pragmatic revelation he might have resolved his two contradictions somewhat in this wise:

Both memory and imagination are special forms of consciousness. Both, therefore, are types of bodily response to future consequences displayed by the stimulus to which the body responds. It is correct, consequently, to speak, as Reid does, of perception, memory, and imagination having on occasion the selfsame object, and correct furthermore to regard this object as immediate and not as represented by ideas. Reid's difficulty lay in his inability to explain how any response was possible to an object no longer existent or to one that was possibly entirely nonexistent. In other words his task was to distinguish memory and imagination from perception, and this he could not carry further than the dogged declaration that they were patently different and must not be confused.

In all three cases the object is present, but not to the 'mind'. It is present to the body in the form of a control to which the body responds. How the different types of consciousness that go by the names perception, memory, and imagination, are to be distinguished is the content of the final chapter.
Scottish realism was committed to the conception of mind that makes it a substance, or entity, or thing, existing in its own right, and not dependent for its reality, as a process or function must be, on the continued existence, in dynamic relation, of independently existing things. An apple, for example, is a thing, but the process of rotting can exist only when there is an apple to decay. Reid held that mind existed as a thing, not simply as a process. After the necessary quotations in support of this assertion, the whole position will be examined and criticized as either intrinsically representationistic or else untenable in the face of the facts of relativity and error. Then, for good measure, the original constitution of our nature, as revealed to Reid, will be considered, mainly along the lines initiated by Priestley. In conclusion a brief statement of the historical development of the school through Stewart and Hamilton, with some remarks on Mills' treatment of the problem will be formulated.

For once Reid is perfectly unambiguous in his utterance. Apparently it was an unquestionable selfevident truth that the mind is an entity, and no other possibility was conceivable. Hence little space need be wasted in establishing the position.

"I take it for granted, upon the testimony of common sense, that my mind is a substance - that is, a permanent subject of thought; and my reason convinces me that it is an unextended and indivisible substance" (210.b).

"We define mind to be that which thinks" (220.b).

"But the mind is from its very nature a living and active being. Everything we know of it implies life and active energy" (221.a).

"The thoughts of which I am conscious are the thoughts of a being
which I call myself, my mind, my person" (443.b).

What Reid conceived mind to be is perfectly clear; how he arrived at his conception was as mysterious to him as it remains to us.

"We cannot prove the existence of our minds" (130.a) - "our notion being not direct, but relative to its operations" (513.b).

"It appears, then, to be an undeniable fact that, from thought or sensation, all mankind constantly and invariably, from the first dawning of reflection, do infer a power or faculty of thinking, and a permanent being or mind to which that faculty belongs; and that we as invariably ascribe all the various kinds of sensation and thought we are conscious of to one individual mind or self. But by what rules of logic we make these inferences, it is impossible to show; may it is impossible to show how our sensations and thoughts can give us the very notion and conception either of a mind or of a faculty.... Yet the sensation suggests to us both a faculty and a mind; and not only suggests a notion of them, but creates a belief of their existence, although it is impossible to discover, by reason, any tie or connection between one and the other" (110.b).

'Suggestion', Reid's good fairy has intervened once more in the interest of his philosophy of common sense. Instead of the usual resulting obscurity, however, obvious absurdity ensues. Suggestion is useless unless there is some one to whom the suggestion can be made. Now, if our mind be identical with our self, or person (443.b), then Reid, in saying that a "sensation suggests to us both a faculty and a mind", manifestly holds the marvelous doctrine that an act of the mind (115.a) suggests to that mind the conception of that mind, and then makes the mind believe that that mind exists. This is representationism gone mad. It was reasonable, if not consistent, for Reid to hold that a sensation could, by its power of suggestion, cause the mind
to conceive of the existence of external objects and to believe in them. In such a situation the three terms involved in suggestion are all present: the suggester, the thing suggested, and that to which the thing is suggested. Suggestion of the kind Reid utilizes can be made only to a conscious being, or, in Reid's language, to a mind. To know the mind solely in a representative way through the medium of suggestion necessitates another mind that shall do the knowing in that way. Each human being would then be of two minds, the first mind knowing inferentially that there is a second mind. The second mind is the mind that feels, imagines, remembers, and thinks. Its acts suggest to the first mind that the second mind exists. But the first mind is not known directly either. Its existence is a logical necessity to permit knowledge of the existence of the second mind. If the first mind is not known directly, another mind is needed to make the inference to the first mind. The additional mind may be the second mind or a distinct member. If distinct, an infinite series of minds has been started. If it be the second mind we find ourselves arguing in a circle and caught in the most bewildering maze of representation and re-representation that a realist in a solipsistic nightmare could possibly imagine. His lost soul is condemned to wander with the introspectionist who explicitly sets his mind to work observing what itself is doing.

There are difficulties in Reid's view of mind quite apart from its flagrantly non-realistic reduplicated representationism.

Having inferred a mind in order to make his system work, he ought to be sure that it does work. Instead, he is quite sure that it does not.

"But how are the sensations of the mind produced by impressions upon the body? Of this we are absolutely ignorant, having no means of knowing how the body acts upon the mind, or the mind upon the body.... the manner of their correspondence and intercourse is absolutely unknown" (187.a).
Philosophically this is not quite fair. While it is a duty to acknowledge and face facts, even though they upset the lamps of our theories and leave us in darkness, it is an imposition to make assumptions intended to explain facts but actually productive of utter theoretical confusion. Assumptions are legitimately made to relieve difficulties, not to aggravate them. The assumption of a substantial mind, however, transforms our perplexity into absolute ignorance, by Reid's own admission. We are left in worse than simple ignorance, since we are plunged into unreal problems which, but for this assumption, need not have troubled us.

There is in the first place the gratuitous perplexity about the relation of this mind to other entities, and in particular to external objects. As was shown in the second chapter, Reid has fallen into elementary representationism by bringing in sensations and thoughts, which are not external objects and yet represent or suggest them to the mind. Suppose the mind to be not a thing that must be related to other things, but itself a special relation between the living body and other things, and this particular problem disappears.

A special phase of this problem, ever present to dualistic realists, is the fact of relativity in sense perception. The idealist is not obliged to hold that there is any underlying identity in the different appearances of what is regarded as the same object, for he is free to maintain that the appearances are separate and distinct things in themselves. The sceptic is of course irresponsible. The realist, however, is bound to explain how the mind's awareness of external objects varies not only from individual to individual, but also from time to time in the same individual. Why should not a mind equipped for knowing real things really know them as they are. Yet it seems as if the mind knows nothing more than mutilated representatives of real things.

A number of baffling questions immediately spring up: Which variant of the
object is authentic? Is any one of them the object as it really is? Is there a real object after all? When perceptions are interpreted as incipient bodily responses to the environment, all these puzzles, which depend for their legitimacy on the hypothesis of a knowing or mirroring mind-substance, may be added to the long list of foolish questions which need not be answered because they presuppose absurdities.

Error and illusion cause further hardships to the realist. His mind perceives and remembers incorrectly at times, and occasionally sees what isn't there and recalls things that didn't happen. His mind, which should have been in direct contact with reality and actually thought it was, deceived itself completely until later experiences permitted correction and revision. From one point of view, error and illusion are but pathological forms, so to speak, of the general phenomenon of relativity, and do not therefore occasion fresh difficulties for theory. But in another aspect they show how dangerously close the mind-substance theory carries its adherents to solipsism. Hallucinations and dreams reveal the entitative mind acting in a solipsistic parallel to the conduct of such a mind in the real world.

Reid's attempts to explain some of the objections raised are found in chapter 22 of the second of the "Essays on the intellectual powers of man" (334-9).

The relation of the mind to other entities he has already declared an ultimate mystery.

Relativity is admitted, but ascribed to "rash judgments" (336.b). And these are due to "disorders of the understanding", such as deference to authority, false analogizing, over-simplification, misapplication of genius, rushing into opposite extremes, perversion by passion and affection, tradition, professional prejudice, ambiguity, false education (468-475), in short, rela-
tivity is evidence of the imperfection of the mind. Since relativity is a ubiquitous element in our experience, there is a radical inconsistency between the explanation Reid has offered of it, and his assertion that, while our senses, memory, and reason are liable to accidental disorders, "we have no reason to think that God has given fallacious powers to any of his creatures: this would be to think dishonorably of our Maker, and would lay a foundation for universal scepticism" (335.a). But a power is essentially fallacious if it is designed to mirror things as they really are, and succeeds only in delivering more or less imperfect representatives of them. Passive perception must be accurate; otherwise it is useless and misleading.

This consideration disposes of Reid's explanation of error, illusion, and hallucination, which are phenomena too familiar in our mental life to be treated as accidents. Realistic systems of the mind-substance type find as much difficulty in accounting for the fact that we do see things as they really are, as for the fact that we don't.

Reid's scapegoat in periods of exegetical muddling and disgrace is the original constitution of our nature. Joseph Priestley, his most severe contemporary critic, undertook to destroy this refuge. In his Works, volume III, are included three essays and an appendix, all directed against Reid and his followers, Oswald and Beattie. Priestley's remarks are high spirited throughout and sometimes offensive. After a few passages have been quoted, a list of Reid's instinctive and original principles of the constitution of our nature will be subjoined, to close the criticism of the founder of common-sense philosophy.

In the preface to the three essays Priestley remarks that

".....such a theory of the human mind as that of Dr. Reid, adopted by Dr. Beattie and Dr. Oswald (if that can be called a theory which in fact explains nothing), does not, indeed, require much study; but when you have given
all possible attention to it, you find yourself no wiser than before. Dr. Reid meets with a particular sentiment or persuasion, and not being able to explain the origin of it, without more ado he ascribes it to a particular original instinct, provided for that very purpose. He finds another difficulty, which he also solves in the same concise and easy manner. And thus he goes on accounting for everything, by telling you, not only that he cannot explain it himself, but that it will be in vain for you or any other person to investigate it farther than he has done. Thus avowed ignorance is to pass for real knowledge" (p. 11).

When Priestley wrote, Reid's Inquiry only had been published. The critic's benediction is very tart:

"......if so many new and important truths have occurred to our philosopher and guide in the examination of the five senses only, this small corner of the human mind, what may we not expect from his farther progress?......
Instinctive principles will then be as common and as cheap - but I forget the proverb - and as many distinct independent laws of nature will be found in this microcosm of man only, as have by others been thought necessary for the system of the universe" (p.67).

From the Inquiry Priestley gleaned a dozen or more instinctive principles (III.28) for which he gives the proper references (III 29-34). But a list from the whole of Reid's collected writings with the page references may be preferable.

1. Perception is a simple, original and inexplicable act of the mind (105b)
2. Memory likewise (105.b).
3. Imagination likewise (105.b).
4. Existence of our minds is a belief immediately inspired by our constitution (110.a).
5. Idea of space is given by original constitution of our nature (124.a).
7. Belief in uniformity of nature (337.a; 451.a).
8. Belief in existence of other minds (441.a).
9. Belief in existence of everything of which we are conscious (442.b).
12. Belief in freedom of will (446.b).
13. Belief in causation (455.a).
14. Psycho-physical interaction (528.a).
15. A number of moral and esthetic principles which are irrelevant here.

These with others that may have escaped our notice are the fundamentals of common sense, as Reid states:

"If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them - these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them is what we call absurd" (108.b).

Let us add the confident comment of Reid's greatest French commentator, Victor Cousin, in conclusion:

"Il reste, grâce à Dieu, beaucoup à ajouter à cette philosophie, mais il y a peu à retrancher; il y a lacunes à combler, il n'y a plus d'hypothèses à détruire. Ni Reid ni Kant n'ont mis dans le monde une seule hypothèse qui fasse obstacle au XIX°siècle" (Cours p. 108).

But the nineteenth century was more tolerant of unverifiable hypotheses than the twentieth.

Dugald Stewart, who succeeded to Reid's position as head of the common
sense school of philosophy, "gave a very clear and scholarly restatement of the principles of the Common-Sense Philosophy. A man of great erudition and much personal charm, and easily the foremost philosopher of the day in Britain, he did more than any one else not merely to popularize that philosophy, but to secure for it the respectful, and in some cases, the admiring, attention of other philosophers".1

Stewart is Reid in a Sunday suit of clothes, instead of workshop attire. The founder's distinctive doctrines, the independent existence of external objects, and the substantiality of mind, are accepted and reiterated in more pleasing, but hardly more convincing form. In some respects there is a departure from the original position, without noticeable improvement.

In the account of perception he refers his readers to his master, promising that they "will find ample satisfaction in the writings of Dr. Reid" (Works.2 I.48). But a large part of the realistic position is jeopardized in his subsequent contention "that, even on the supposition that certain impressions on our organs of sense are necessary to awaken the mind to a consciousness of its own existence, and to give rise to the exercise of its various faculties, yet all this might have happened, without our having any knowledge of the qualities, or even of the existence, of the material world" (Works. I.74). What is this but Berkeley's denial of 'matter'?

In his account of memory Stewart finds difficulty in explaining the quality of pastness which is inseparable from it. Reid had definitely stated that the past object was in some sense present to the mind. This does not meet

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with Stewart's approval. Instead of considering memory a simple act of the
mind, he divides it into two parts: "the mind first forms a conception of the
event, and then judges from circumstances, of the period of time to which it
is to be referred; a supposition which is by no means a gratuitous one, invent-
ed to answer a particular purpose, but which, as far as I am able to judge, is
agreeable to fact: for if we have the power, as will not be disputed, of con-
ceiving a past event without any reference to time, it follows, that there is
nothing in the ideas or notions which memory presents to us, which is neces-
arily accompanied with a belief of past existence" (Works I. 299).

Stewart begs a considerable portion of the issue when he assumes it
will not be disputed that we can conceive past events without any reference
to time. It is no doubt possible to conceive past events and yet be unable
to date them specifically, but that the event is past is a fact inseparable
from the conception. The reference to past time is an invariable concomitant,
even though the reference be inexact or simply nothing more than past. The
pastness must be an integral part of such a conception, for otherwise there is
nothing to prevent the 'mind' from judging the event to be in the absent
present or in the future or entirely out of the time series of real events.

Where Stewart tries to patch he succeeds as a rule in making evident
the need for repairs without showing technical skill adequate to the problem he
has discovered.

Sir William Hamilton, the editor of the definitive edition of Reid's
collected writings, appeared to regard himself as the thinker in whom the
philosophy of common sense found its complete and unimpeachable statement.
In this opinion he was supported by John Stuart Mill:

"Sir W. Hamilton's is the latest form of the Reidian theory; and by
no other of its supporters has that theory been so well guarded, or expressed
in such discriminating terms, and with such studious precision. Though there are a few points on which the earlier philosopher seems to me nearer the truth, on the whole it is impossible to pass from Reid to Sir W. Hamilton, or from Sir W. Hamilton back to Reid, and not be struck with the immense progress which their common philosophy has made in the interval between them." (Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy. (1889.6 p. 137).

The progress made by Hamilton seemed more immense to Mill than it really was. Had he been able to solve his own fundamental difficulties, the Scottish school, even in all its later glory, must have remained in the state of grand futility to which Reid had led it. Its essential weakness was Mill's own weakness, while its apparent strength was easily resolved into Mill's weakness. Both common sense and association philosophers found mind a stumbling block, and the realist's ostensible externality of matter was easy game for the subjectivist. Accordingly, any marked improvement from Reid to Hamilton must be one of form and statement, not of material doctrine. Reid already had the cardinal doctrines of Scottish realism. Mill faced the same insuperable difficulty of accounting for consciousness. Short of a revolution in the theory of mind, there could be no progress except clearer presentation and more extensive support from the history of philosophy.

It is commonly agreed that Mill has abundantly justified in the rest of his Examination the estimate he gives of Hamilton in his concluding remarks as a philosopher whose merits "chiefly consist in his clear and distinct mode of bringing before the reader many of the fundamental questions of metaphysics; some good specimens of psychological analysis on a small scale; and the many detached logical and psychological truths which he has separately seized, and which are scattered through his writings, mostly applied to resolve some special difficulty and again lost sight of. .I can hardly point to anything he has
done towards helping the more thorough understanding of the greater mental phenomena, unless it be his theory of attention (including abstraction), which seems to me the most perfect we have" (p. 633).

Before passing to the next chapter, which will endeavor to present in connected form the pragmatic suggestions intended to relieve Scottish realism of its false hypothesis and consequent gratuitous difficulties, let us look at Mill's own supreme problem and indicate a solution of it. This is in the nature of a parenthesis or appendix to the remarks on the Scottish realism and is made more because it illustrates the pragmatic method than because of any special relevance to the main subject.

In his effective criticism of the realists' mind-substance doctrine, Mill set up, as a more valid hypothesis, the associationist view of Hume and his successors that mind is simply a succession of feelings. With his incomparable candor he also called attention to the weakness of his own position in these words:

"If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself as a series.

"The truth is that we are here face to face with that final inexplicability at which, as Sir W. Hamilton observes, we inevitably arrive when we reach ultimate facts...... The real stumbling block is perhaps not in any theory of the fact, but in the fact itself. The true incomprehensibility perhaps is that something which has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be, in a manner, present: that a series of feelings, the infinitely
greater part of which is past or future, can yet be gathered up, as it were, into a single present conception, accompanied by a belief of reality. I think by far the wisest thing we can do is to accept the inexplicable fact, without any theory of how it takes place: and when we are obliged to speak of it in terms which assume a theory, to use them with a reservation as to their meaning" (p. 248).

These words are in effect an abandonment of his previous support of Hamilton who had criticized Reid for holding that in memory and in the perception of distant objects the things so known are immediately present to the 'mind' (p. 140-141). Reid had insisted "that something which has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be, in a manner, present". Hamilton denied this. Mill considered Hamilton's remarks "correct, and a great improvement upon Reid" (p. 141), and then confessed the necessity of acknowledging as an 'inexplicable fact' what Reid had attempted to incorporate in his theory (p. 248).

Pragmatic theory agrees with Reid, and with Mill in his second view, that the past and the distant present are in some manner present. It rejects Reid's pseudo-explanatory dogmatism; it also refuses to be satisfied with Mill's surrender to inexplicable facts. Mill's mental-state or stream-of-thoughts theory of the mind could not account adequately for the phenomena of memory, identity, anticipation, and imagination. Had he regarded mind as a name for the body while it is responding to the future, he need not have regarded matter as an inferred possibility of sensation, nor elementary conscious operations as inexplicable facts. The slowly changing body accounts for personal identity, its repeated and related responses to external objects permit us to regard the remembered and the distant and the expected object as in a manner present. The detailed explanation follows in the next chapter.
CHAPTER V
PRAGMATIC RECONSTRUCTION

Throughout the preceding chapters, whenever the theory under consideration was found wanting, a few suggestions indicating a more adequate doctrine were advanced and a promise of fuller exposition in the concluding chapter given. The time to redeem that promise is now come, and every effort will be made to satisfy the patient reader who has been lured on by hope of better things.

Nevertheless it must be stated in advance that the criticism of the older position derives whatever force it may have from considerations independent of the validity of the pragmatic position. The reconstruction is tentative, plausible perhaps, but not essential to the overthrow of Scottish realism.

The point has been consistently urged throughout this essay, that no radical departure from the lines laid down by Locke is possible unless the conception of mind as a thing distinguishable from the body is surrendered. Reid and his followers attacked the 'ideal hypothesis', but unsuspectingly accepted the mind-substance doctrine, though that was an equally dubious hypothesis. The logical outcome in subjectivism and scepticism is apparent when the 'common-sense' dogmatism that obscures it is ignored. Accordingly, the first requisite for reconstruction is a denial of mind as a thing or entity. When this has been established, it will be possible to apply the new conception in turn to the phenomena of perception, memory, and imagination, and to discard a host of assumptions. Finally, the abyss of subjectivism will be left on one side, and a rehabilitated modified realism may be attained.

We may contrast, by example, the behavior of the human body when it is conscious, with its behavior when unconscious. If, while I am lying in an upper berth in a Pullman car reading, my hat hung precariously above me is dislodged by a violent jolt, I probably will duck my head or put up my hand in or-
der to prevent the hat from hitting me in the face. I respond before I am actually struck, anticipating what is about to happen and organizing my behavior accordingly.

The unconscious body responds in quite a different manner. Had I been asleep when the hat began to descend, it would have fallen down all the way and actually touched my face, before there was any bodily response. Then a turning of the head might have followed or a movement of the arm and hand to brush away the hat, as a sleeping baby brushes off a fly.

The outstanding difference between conscious and unconscious action lies, therefore, not so much in the actual movements constituting the response - for these may be the same - but in the time of executing them with reference to their causes. In consciousness the response is made to an expected cause, portended but not yet present in the same sense as is the cause to which the unconscious body responds. Behavior is controlled by the future acting in the present. That is the distinguishing feature of conscious response. The real dispute between pragmatists and the adherents of a mind-substance theory arises over the localization of that control. The older view places the control in the 'mind'. But if the mind is rather a condition or process than a thing or agent, the control must be sought elsewhere. The pragmatist puts it in the object.

There are a number of objects exercising mysterious control over other objects, and the hypothesis that a spirit within them performed the unusual functions was once very popular. In the inorganic world, for example, is the phenomenon of magnetism, operating seemingly at a distance and interfering with the ordinary gravitational behavior of iron. Magnetic force was at one time attributed to the control of a thing or spirit residing within the magnetized body. We have now, as it seems, discarded this entitative concep-
tion; perhaps the mind-substance notion will go the same way.

When iron first solidified in the course of cosmic development, and responded to magnetic influence, a new form of behavior made its appearance. Whether this novelty was 'contained' or 'implied' in the previous situation seems an idle question. Implication is a useful concept where purpose is involved, for then the question how an event has happened enlarges into the problem why it has taken place. Otherwise, we need but be reasonably persistent in order to find ourselves asking what the universe was implied or contained in. If the answer be, in the mind of God, the truly faithful disciple of philosophy must remain loyal to his creed and respectfully inquire what in the name of creation 'contained' the mind of God.

This conveniently opens the subject of the human mind and its relation to antecedent conditions. Is mind implied in a preexisting mindless situation? Manifestly there is this previous question: What do we mean by 'mind' and 'mindless'? The answer has already been given in part. Mind is always in some sense a factor in situations in which an organism responds to those qualities of an object which portray results not yet present but to come. So the question of implication must mean: Can a situation in which there is no response to future qualities develop into one in which such a response does occur? It is therefore a question of the same sort as that concerning magnetism, namely, Can a situation in which there is no response to magnetic qualities develop into one in which there is such response? The answer is the same in both cases. Either the universe exhibits the constant novelty insisted on by Heraclitus, or there is an infinite regress of implication.

The original problem of the chapter now reappears. Whether control by the future is localized in the 'mind', or is a characteristic of the whole conscious situation is the matter in dispute. In eliminating the question of
implication, the issue narrows to the point of deciding whether the mind-sub-
stance or pragmatic view is the more satisfactory. Having noted the extraor-
dinary difficulties in which Reid and other supporters of the older view
became involved, we should now be inclined to a more tolerant considera-
tion of the pragmatic proposals.

Mind is a name for a mode of behavior, just as instinct is. Neither
is a thing or agent, but simply a condition or process. Assuming then that
we have a mind-situation when an organism responds to control by those quali-
ties in an object which reveal to the organism the results of carrying out
incipient responses, let us see how this works out in the case of perception,
memory, and imagination.

If pragmatism be old enough to possess classics in its still meager
literature, Dewey's criticism of Bergson combined with exposition of the prag-
matic doctrine of perception\(^1\) must occupy an undisputed place. The fragmen-
tary sketch which now follows is based mainly upon that article.

While perception always involves bodily response to an object, not
every bodily response is of the perceptual kind. During sleep, for example, there
are countless responses made by the body, yet by hypothesis not one is perceptual.
The principal reason for this is that the stimulus is all readymade before
it stimulates, and the response works out mechanically and predeterminedly.
The response on the perceptual level is tentative and indeterminate, directed
toward a stimulus that changes in the process. This is because the stimulus
is, at the outset, insufficient or unsuited to the calling out of an adequate
response. Where response is prompt and decisive, we have complete action, not
the preliminaries to action that are the essence of perception. When the pro-
cess of interaction between incomplete stimulus and incomplete response works

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\(^1\) John Dewey: "Perception and Organic Action" in Journal of Philosophy, Psychology
and Scientific Methods. IX. 645. (1912)
toward the development of a complete response through the emergence of a complete stimulus or object, bodily action is on the perceptual level.

The manner in which this takes place is possibly as follows. The body, organized to adjust itself mechanically in many ways to the constantly changing environment, meets at times with situations to which prompt adaptation is impossible because the machinery of response has not been organized to meet such occasions directly. Two results are then possible. Either there is a continuance of direct responses but in a futile incoherent way issuing in waste and harm to the organism unless luck be with it, or these responses may become organized through the mediation of a system that supplements the direct-action mechanisms. The responses set off by a baffling stimulus on the second supposition, to the higher brain centers to be made up into an adequate organic response. But this is impossible unless the character of the stimulus begins changing at the same time into one adequate to the final response.

What, therefore, is an object? It is not an unchanging immutably perduring entity, it is an invitation to the body to act in a particular way. Usually the invitation is accepted, but when it asks the impossible, the invitation must be modified. The incipient partial responses that reach the higher centers are anticipations of the results that complete response would bring. A perceived object is a display of what will happen in case certain responses are carried out. This display will vary manifestly with the nature of the response, and the response varies point by point with the nature of the display.

Accordingly Dewey can say, "this functional transformation of the environment under conditions of uncertain action into conditions for determining an appropriate organic response constitutes perception". Luther Locke's notion of

\[2\] op. cit. p. 659.
copying or mirroring has gone. Reid's 'suggestion' is more accurate, but not in his sense of merely indicating the existence of external things. It is a suggestion to act, made by the object to the body in successively more compelling forms, and not an invitation to believe made by a subjective sensation to a mind.

Two paragraphs from Dewey (p. 666-7) will indicate the workings of the organizing system:

"Let us suppose the disturbance reaches the brain by way of the visual organ. If directly discharged back to the motor apparatus of the eyes this results not in a perception, but in an eye-movement. But simultaneously with this reaction there is also a dispersal into the areas connected with tasting, handling, and touching. Each of these structures also initiates an incidental reflex discharge. But this is not all; there is also a cross-discharge between these cortical centers. No one of these partial motor discharges can become complete, and so dictate, as it were, the total direction of organic activity until it has been coordinated with the others. The fulfilment of, say, eating, depends upon a prior act of handling, this upon one of reaching, and this upon one of seeing; while the act of seeing necessary to stimulate the others to appropriate execution can not occur save as it, in turn, is duly stimulated by the other tendencies to action. Here is a state of inhibition. The various tendencies wait upon one another and they also get in one another's way. The sensori-motor apparatus provides not only the conditions of this circle, but also the way out of it.

"How can this be? It is clear that if, under the condition supposed, the act of seeing were overtly complete it would then furnish the needed stimulus of reaching, this to handling and so on. The sensory aspect of the apparatus is, in its nature, a supplying of this condition. The excitation
of the optical area introduces the quality of seeing, connected (through the simultaneous excitation of the areas of reaching, tasting, and handling) with the specific qualities of the other acts. The quality of movement, or action, is supplied by the sensory aspect, is in effect, an anticipation of the result of the act when overtly performed. With respect to determining the needed stimulus, it is as if the overt responses in question had been actually executed."

The immediate presence of the object and the functioning of an apparatus of suggestion, the two novel elements in Reid's account of perception, find their place in the pragmatic reconstruction. But the mind as an entity disappears. Mind is the condition or process obtaining when the body responds to control by the foreshadowed consequences in the object. It is a conscious situation, which means that the control is not mechanical and predetermined but emerges and develops in the situation itself.

Memory is a complicated case of perception, owing to the presence in the object of a quality we may call 'pastness'. In plain words this seems to mean that in the object now before us there is something which shows us that the object is not now before us but was so previously. This absurdity arises out of a copy or mirror-theory of consciousness, adapted to the special needs of the memory experience. It is a view that will hold no better here than elsewhere.

The distinguishing feature of consciousness being bodily response to future-revealing qualities, memory must be regarded as a particular form of this kind of behavior. Fundamentally memory is a forward-looking process, analytically it is looking backward for the sake of looking ahead. "If the remembering is efficacious and pertinent, it reveals the possibilities of the present; that is to say, it clarifies the transitive, transforming character
that belongs inherently to the present".3

The actual problem is to show how the past can function in the present to guide the organism for the future. None of the older schools is very eager to approach the memory puzzle, or very happy in dealing with it. For absolute idealists, time is a problem for finite minds only, and consequently not worth prolonged consideration. For some realists, explanation is declared impossible; for others, the present is supposed to be transcended in some way considered ultimate or unique; still others abolish time by regarding the past as real in a sense that is indistinguishable from the real present, exactly as they make error real and not to be discriminated from truth. If pragmatists can offer nothing more than a moderately plausible theory, that in itself will be an advance on the current doctrines.

Memory is a special form of interrupted consciousness. It is an unexpected rerouting of the ordinary process of remolding the environment and organizing the tangled bodily responses for suitable organic action. Pastness is the quality revealed in an object when it resists the habitual transformation into a more adequate stimulus and demands a different remaking if satisfactory adjustment is to follow. This summary account requires elaboration.

In ordinary perception, to repeat the pragmatic thesis, a situation in which automatic or unconscious response is unsatisfactory remodels itself along two lines, the object becoming a more and more suitable stimulus, the responses becoming more and more appropriate for organic action. This twofold process depends for its development and completion on the reciprocal action of both sides. Neither can proceed very long without the other. The environment will not change into a more satisfactory stimulus unless the responses

continue to tend in the direction of greater organization. On the other hand, this organization proceeds only in conjunction with the corresponding transformation of the environment.

In a memory-situation the environment fails to carry out its part. The ordinary perceptual start is made, the remodeling continues for a time, and then a hitch or break occurs on the environmental side, throwing the organization of the response out of gear. The response is not supported in the usual way by the corresponding phase in the environment. There is a gap which is not filled in by anything else, but occupied in a way by the object-as-absent. Its presence in this sense controls the subsequent procedure. The customary smoothly reciprocating support, however, is wanting. This particular lack of present support is the quality of pastness in an object. When the environment is sufficiently plastic to help reorganization along more or less habitual lines of response, the whole perceptual process goes through to its appropriate completion and the object emerges finally as a proper stimulus owing to its display in present form of the results that will ordinarily follow on organic action. But when this development is checked because of a refractory environment, the object emerges, not as a final stimulus, but still as a guide to conduct with reference to the future. It must be present to the organism in some form in order to control behavior. It is present in a different way from that in which objects are mechanically present. It is, to use Dewey's scheme of expression, present-as-absent-though-formerly-present. Pastness has its future value, as significant as that of present perception, though the control leads to different organic action.

Let us consider an example. Suppose I walk into a certain university building and proceed down the corridor and enter my office. So far my actions are in large part the automatic sequences of habitual behavior. On opening
my desk, however, a situation demanding more than automatic responses succeeds. Letters invite opening and reading, periodicals suggest perusal, blanks suggest being filled out, books being returned to the library, pictures being looked at, drawers being opened, pencils being sharpened. To obtain some reasonable stimulus for calling out a satisfactory organic response, organization is imperative. As this proceeds, the situation begins to offer more competent guidance. The elements fall into some kind of order. The blanks to be filled out assume the right of way. They suggest peace with the dean, students put at rest and so on. As this stimulus becomes more definite and the incipient responses less inchoate, the actual procedure becomes mapped out. The blanks to be filled out become in greater detail blanks for which pen is to be taken up, class cards to be consulted and the rest. Before actual organic action takes place it is rehearsed, as described above in the quotation from Dewey regarding the machinery of perception.

Now suppose the rehearsal comes to a sudden stop because the habitual development from class-cards-to-be-consulted does not take place. The cards are not 'there' to help in the reconstitution. The momentum of the perceptual process had carried the organization of the responses on to the point where the usual support from the class-cards was needed if the operation was to be completed. This was not forthcoming and the response to the cards in its original form therefore breaks down. The situation had begun to point to the cards in their customary place, but only to reveal them as present in the sense of controlling conduct by their former presence. Their failure to stimulate response in their accustomed way calls forth other responses. The situation points in new directions. The break in the transformation is made a part of the reconstitution of the stimulus. The cards originally pointed to as cards to be consulted are now pointed to perhaps as cards to be brought from my desk.
at home and then consulted, or less definitely as cards to be found somewhere
and then consulted. Precise dating and locating is a further development.

The analysis of memory finds its corresponding descriptive elements
in the account just given. The chief features are, that the remembered object
was present in a certain sense and is now not present in that sense. The prag-
matic theory covers the first in calling attention to the shaping up of the
situation and the organization of response as though the object were there.
This could not happen unless in some way or other it already had been there,
or specifically somewhere, once before, since the pointing is largely a habit-
phomenon dependent on past experience. The second point is provided for
when the temporary breakdown of the environmental reconstitution is emphasized.
If the pointing were correct the object would function as anticipated, but
this is not the case. Hence we arrive at the conception of memory as a special
form of interrupted consciousness, and of pastness as that quality in the
object which turns perception in a direction abruptly different from that in
which it was proceeding when the normal transformation of the stimulus came
to a stop.

The merit of Reid's account of memory lies in its insistence that
somehow the remembered object is actually present at the time of remembering.
The revised version attempts to show how this is possible by virtue of the
control which the object as absent now exercises over the organism.

The radical weakness of Reid is attributable once more to the mind-
substance hypothesis which should have been discarded when the far less vicious
'ideal hypothesis' was thrown overboard. An original faculty of the 'mind'
is held to suggest belief in the past existence of an object, and there the
matter is supposed to end. This kind of suggestion is obviously part and parcel
of the machinery of subjectivism. The mind is at the mercy of suggestions.
The pragmatic doctrine tries to avoid the snare by refusing to deal with an entitative mind. Subjectivism is thus impossible.

The difficulties of the static picturing theory are also circumvented. Relativity and error are accounted for in memory as in perception by regarding these functions of consciousness as factors in the control of the organic adjustment to the environment for the safety and progress of the organism, not as faculties of a mind exercised for their own sakes or for the sake of the mind itself. People remember differently because they have built up different habit cycles or patterns which lead up to different anticipations of the object that is remembered. And the same person does not always remember the same thing in the same way because the memory-object is called upon to function in different situations and because the habit cycle is modified by the different environments in which it operates. Relativity and its extreme phase of error are facts that strengthen the pragmatic theory as much as they damage other doctrines of knowing.

A theory of memory is put severely to the proof when it is examined in the light of the phenomenon of imagination. It is much easier to keep memory-objects distinct from objects of perception than from objects of imagination. Imagination has several characteristics in common with memory. No complete organic action, for example, is possible toward either remembered or imagined objects. They control ultimate action by helping to determine the organization of the final response, and they play a part, therefore, in the environment that is being reconstituted in perception; but in neither case is there the direct bodily contact and actual material rearrangement that is the mark of complete organic action. Remembered and imagined objects are alike, further, in being beyond the reach of impersonal devices for learning more about
them. They can not be measured, weighed, photographed, electrified, made to enter chemical combinations, as 'real' objects in the popular sense can be.

The differences between memory and imagination are much more significant for our present purpose than the points of similarity. The remembered object is one that has suffered, or has been immediately liable to suffer, organic action. The imagined object is ipso facto out of the range of complete organic response in the situation in which it is being imagined. Were it liable now, it would be an object within the scope of perception; had it been liable previously, it would be subject to memory. Remembered objects, furthermore, were at one time accessible to camera, or meter or scales or testtube or electric current; imagined objects as such are at no time available for such impersonal investigation of them.

Like all other forms of consciousness, imagination is a form of control exercised over the organism by the future. The future results are embodied in the imagined object, and it is therefore essential for effective control that the object be in some sense present to the organism. Two main points must be accounted for; first, how the imagined object comes into being, second, in what sense it is present as a controlling factor to the organism. And each must be kept clearly distinct from the corresponding points in memory.

Conscious behavior arises from the breakdown of automatic or reflex adjustment of the organism to the environment. When the problem is purely the reciprocal building up of a satisfactory stimulus out of the material environment and a satisfactory organic response, the conscious behavior is perceptual. When the steady stream of conscious behavior is interrupted by the conflict arising between habitual response and a suddenly non-reciprocating environment, so that the object, to judge from the response, is 'there', but
to judge from the environment is not, the process is memory. But when there is a breakdown of adjustment, whether automatic or conscious, such that the material environment does not aid in reorganization or such that no habitual response tends to become dominant in conflict with environmental pressure, then the stage is set for imagination.

This frequently occurs when there has been a general lowering of the tension between body and material environment although adjustment is still incomplete. There is, to be sure, a great difference in degree between gross elementary imaginings and the subtlest refinements of a highly sensitive organism; none, it would seem, in kind. Certain bodily needs failing of immediate satisfaction are responsible for the existence of imagined objects that control further response by projecting the object that would satisfy into consciousness. The material environment is present ponderably enough to prevent complete organic response to the imagined object, but not emphatically enough to secure this response to itself. This failure to stimulate complete organic response toward themselves distinguishes imagined from perceived objects. To distinguish them from remembered objects is more difficult. But first an illustration.

The sphere of nutrition may provide an example of the genesis of imagined objects. In order to exist at all, the body must be nourished. The metabolic circuit is fundamentally very simple, and it makes little difference where we start. Food is converted into energy, which is expended in action,

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4For the application of this doctrine to philosophy, art and religion, see H. M. Kallen: "Value and Existence" in Creative Intelligence by John Dewey and others. N.Y. 1917.
making imperative the consumption of more food to be converted into more energy. Anabolism leads to catabolism, which again necessitates anabolism, and so on until death. Each link in each step touches off the next. "An act of swallowing, performed unconsciously, may start the complicated process of digestion, but it is merely the first act of a series. There is no evidence that the movements of the stomach and of the other organs concerned in digestion must be presupposed before the act of swallowing can take place. The swallowing may start the other processes, but we can not say that these other processes react back upon the first act and make it one of swallowing rather than of something else."^5

Now suppose that for some reason a link does not function. Anabolism should follow upon protracted catabolism, but the ordinary sequence does not take place because, let us assume, there is no food. For a purely automatic organism the failure of any link ultimately means death. For conscious organisms there is another way out. The continued maladjustment produces unsatisfactory responses that go to higher centers for organization. But if the material environment is not ready to take its part in securing a better situation, the abortive responses bring about some sort of felt quality of what the fully adequate response would be under conditions suitable for proper adjustment. In this way hunger may produce a feast as the imagined object, balked sex reflexes may bring forth imagined loves, and frustrated activities of various kinds call out their normal complements in imagination. But always the material environment stands heavily in the way of complete organic response to imagined

^5B. H. Bode: "Consciousness and Psychology" in Creative Intelligence (p. 233).
objects. The direct control of bodily behavior is as much dependent on the material environment as on the special bodily needs that help to give direction to organic activity. The imagined object is not 'real' because of the brute veto on complete response to it that is interposed by the material environment.

The human being is so interminably complex in organization that organic needs incredibly remote from the elementary ones of food and sex have their share in the determination of his adjustment to his surroundings. It is apparent that their satisfaction must be encompassed largely if at all by the indirect route of imagination. The fancies of classical mythology and the concepts of present day religion are imaginings of this kind. It is not unreasonable to hold that dinner and deity as objects of imagination are generically identical in genesis and function, but the need embodied and projected in the notion of God arises at a more complicated stage of bodily organization than that incorporated in a meal.

"My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? Why art thou so far from helping me, and from the words of my roaring?" laments the psalmist. Pragmatically interpreted this means that the organism we designate as the psalmist was so constituted that the failure of certain adjustments for protection and furtherance caused a rerouting of the futile responses to the higher centers of the nervous system. Here their activity resulted in an incipient bodily set, suitable to start complete organic response toward an environment in which some agency had provided the protection and furtherance. But the actual material environment precluded the complete response. The agency was therefore projected as the link necessary but for the time inoperative in bringing about the desired adjustments. When conditions changed favorably, the unknown factors in the transformation were definitively personified as God, and the psalmist was able to sing, "The Lord is my strength and my shield; my heart
trusted in him, and I am helped." The psalmist is in the mood for edification, the pragmatist for analysis and explanation.

The mode of control exercised by the imagined object over the organism now becomes manifest. The object is a projection into consciousness of the specific thing needed for promoting a satisfactory disposition of the needs of the organism. This projection advances direct readjustment to the material environment by helping to modify organic action in the direction indicated by the ineffectual responses. It defines the destination but not the means of arriving there. Imagination is instrumental in influencing perception. The quality of the responses already involved in the reconstitution of the environment and the organization of adequate organic action is changed in accordance with the imagined goal.

The special quality of imagined objects, their datelessness in the real time series, results from the nature of their origin in the failure of the material environment to cooperate for bodily adjustment. They are not, and they were not, 'out there'. The organism needs them somewhere but fails at the time to obtain them.

The specific difference between memory and imagination is traceable in the end to the different roles played by the material environment in each case. In memory a hitherto favorably reacting environment suddenly leaves the conscious process in the lurch. The customary responses are met by a gap that interferes with the usual flow of cooperation. The memory-object is a compound of organism acting as if the object were present and of the material environment suddenly showing that the object is absent. The pastness of memory is the conflict between habitual response leading in one direction and the environment leading in another. The composition of these two forces, one
making for presence of the object, the other against presence, results in pastness of the object, that is, present-as-formerly-present. In imagination the material environment is not so ready to cooperate but is armed with a pocket veto on complete organic response toward the imagined object. The memory-object is a definite and immediate control, playing its essential part in the guidance of the organism. The object of imagination does indeed control conduct, but more as does a hill toward which we bend our steps than as the paths and gates that constitute the route. Memory-leading is of the nature of means, imagination-leading of ends. The first is a vital element in the material environmental stimulus, the second is rather in the world than of it.

Reid steadily insisted that the imagined object is in some sense present. The account now offered may give his assertion some consistent meaning. The object is present in the sense of controlling conduct, making the future, as displayed in the environmental present, actually different as a guide to the organism. Reid's conception of the mind as a substance or agent made it difficult to regard imagined or remembered objects as present and difficult to distinguish them from one another. The proposal to treat mind as a general name for behavior controlled by the future-revealing qualities in the environment permits the conception of objects as present whenever they exercise such control. The presence is of different sorts varying with the nature of the control. Thus we have objects controlling in the ways we call perception, memory, and imagination. In the generic sense they are present in any of these ways, but an object may be absent in one specific way although present nevertheless in some other.

Priestley vigorously assailed Reid and the Scottish school generally
because of the large number of undemonstrable assumptions that were found necessary for the successful operation of the realistic theory. A partial list of these was made in the preceding chapter (p.35). Pragmatism works with one fundamental concept, that of response to the future. Each of the various 'faculties' and 'beliefs' is a variant on this dominant theme, whose ever-recurring note is functional transformation, guidance for organic action, control by display of the future in the present.

"I wish", wrote Hume to a friend after looking over some of Reid's philosophical sketches, "that the parsons would confine themselves to their old occupation of worrying one another, and leave philosophers to argue with temper, moderation, and good manners." Perhaps our common-sense Scotch parson would have had the same feeling about this attempt to worry him, had he survived into the era of the pragmatic revelation.

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6Quoted by Dugald Stewart from a letter to Dr. Blair. (Collected Writings of Thomas Reid. p. 7b.)
APPENDIX

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