Ludvik.

The French Rule In Spain And Portugal 1807-1813.
Return this book on or before the Latest Date stamped below.

University of Illinois Library
THE FRENCH RULE IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 1807-1813

BY

BENJAMIN EDWARD LUDVIK

THESIS

FOR THE

DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS

IN

HISTORY

COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS AND SCIENCES

OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

1916
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

May 29, 1916

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

Benjamin Edward Ludwik

ENTITLED

The French Rule in Spain and Portugal 1807-1813

IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF

Bachelor of Arts in

History in the College of Liberal Arts

Albert Howe Lybyer
Instructor in Charge

APPROVED:

E. W. Smith

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF History

343017
Contents

Introduction............................................. Page II

Chapter I
The French Occupation Of Spain And Portugal............. 1

Chapter II
Joseph Bonaparte And The War In Earnest................... 8

Chapter III
The English Enter The Peninsular War....................... 17

Chapter IV
Napoleon In Spain........................................ 20

Chapter V
The Two Sieges Of Saragossa................................ 26

Chapter VI
The Renewal Of The French Offensive....................... 29

Chapter VII
French Rule In Spain....................................... 37

Chapter VIII
The French Offensive In 1810............................... 55

Chapter IX
The Beginning Of The French Retreat....................... 63

Bibliography................................................ 69
Introduction.

Spain, after the settlement of the Visigoths in the fifth century, was the slowest of all the European countries in developing into a compact nation, a condition which was caused by the presence of the Moors from the eighth to the fifteenth century. In 1469 Spain was unified thru the marriage of Isabella of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon. In 1492 they succeeded in destroying the last remnant of the political authority of the Moors in Spain.

In 1516 Ferdinand died, and Charles I (later Charles V of the Holy Empire) became King. Charles had his heart in Germany, with the result that Spain was neglected. In 1556 he abdicated his throne, and his son Philip became King. Spain had by this time become a mighty power in Europe, feared by all nations. In 1588 Philip's aggressive career was checked by the English, who defeated his great Armada. His death in 1598 marked the beginning of the decline of Spain's great power in Europe, which continued with rapidity through the reigns of Philip III, Philip IV, and Charles III.

Up to the end of the fifteenth century Spain and France had had comparatively little to do with each other. During the reign of Francis I, an intense rivalry grew up between the two countries, a condition which lasted until 1659, when the Treaty of the Pyrenees was signed. According to this treaty Spain was forced to cede certain portions of territory, and Louis XIV was betrothed to the Infanta Maria Theresa.

A question of international importance came up in 1700 over the
succession of Charles II, a degenerate childless king. There were three claimants to the throne. Louis XIV of France upheld the claims of his grandson, Philip of Anjou, and as a result of the dispute, the War of the Spanish Succession began in 1702. The French were on the whole defeated, and by the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht, signed in 1715, Philip V was recognized as King of Spain, but was required to renounce his claims to the French throne forever.

During the next three quarters of a century, Spain was practically the tool of France, which made use of her in a policy of aggression against England. The result was that Spain lost most of her outlying possessions in Europe during this period. In 1788 Charles IV ascended the throne. Between his fears of irritating the French revolutionary governments and his desire to intercede for his kinsman, Louis XVI, he was promptly driven into a vacillating policy, which eventually made his country more than ever before the sport and tool of France. First an effort was made to exclude French ideas from Spain by suppressing all newspapers, and exacting the oath of allegiance from all foreigners in the country (1791); then an attempt was made to conciliate the National Assembly in France, which act isolated Charles IV and made him the ally of the men who had guillotined the head of his house. Thenceforth Spain was dragged at the tail of the French Revolution, and the finger of scorn of all the monarchical powers was pointed at the foolish vacillating king.¹

Manuel Godoy, a handsome intriguing courtier, was selected by Charles IV to become his minister. He was vain, foolish, and dazzled with his good fortune. To make matters worse, the sensual Queen fell

¹ Hume, The Spanish People, p. 497.
in love with him. Surrounded by adulators, and as by enchantment raised before he was twenty-five to the highest honours the King could bestow, with supreme direction of affairs—naval, military, and civil—it is not to be wondered at that he was befooled by the French revolutionary governments, and later by Napoleon. Already in 1792, when Godoy took the reins, the administration had fallen back into corruption and confusion. The financial inflation induced by the measures of Charles III had collapsed in the reaction, and poverty and distress were general. From motives of economy the army and navy were neglected, but the exactions of the French Revolution, together with the sacrifice of Louis in the face of the unwise protest of Charles, dragged Spain into war with her neighbor (1793). In this conflict she was beaten, and was forced to make a humiliating peace. Then Spain was driven by France into war against England, and with hardly a struggle to free herself, she became the bondslave of French politicians. Her armies were scattered throughout Europe at the bidding of Napoleon; her fleets were shut up in French ports or exterminated at Trafalgar; and yet the Spanish people themselves, who hated all that was French, went on admiring their weak monarch, and cursed only the upstart minister, whom they blamed for all their calamities.  

Napoleon's subsequent actions were no doubt based upon the conduct of the Spanish government during the campaign of Jena in the autumn of 1806. Believing that Napoleon must fall before the might of Prussia, Godoy issued a proclamation to the people, exhorting them to make war upon their common enemy. This report reached Napoleon and made him furious. But after the battle of Jena, Godoy hastened  

to send his submission and apology. Napoleon forgave him on the sur-
face, but inwardly resolved not to expose himself again to the danger
of a stab in the back at some moment when he might be busy in Central
Europe. The sequel will appear in the following chapters.

Chapter I.

The French Occupation Of Spain And Portugal.

The Emperor Napoleon in order to combat England was desirous to impose his "Continental System" upon every country on the European mainland, and to make this effective it was necessary that Portugal be included in the System. In the provisions of the Treaty of Tilsit, it was stipulated that Portugal should be compelled, by force if necessary, to adhere to the System and to adopt a policy of exclusion against British goods. The Prince Regent of Portugal, John, desired to maintain some semblance of neutrality, and his proposal to break off diplomatic relations with England did not satisfy Napoleon. On September 30, without declaring war, the French and Spanish ambassadors were ordered to quit Lisbon at once, and on October 18, the French army, which had been concentrating at Bayonne since the beginning of August under the harmless name of the "Corps of observation of the Gironde" crossed the Bidassoa at Irun and entered Spain.

Spain came into the affair in the following fashion. For some time Napoleon had had his eyes upon the destinies of Spain, and seeing a favorable opportunity, he made a secret treaty on October 27,

with 1807, the prime minister Godoy, the so called "Prince of the Peace." 

The main provisions of this compact are as follows. The King of Etruria, formerly Duke of Parma, who had married Maria Louisa, Infanta of Spain, daughter of Charles IV, was to be deprived of his Italian Kingdom, and in return to receive the northern provinces of Portugal, the city of Oporto, and the title of King of Northern Lusitania. Godoy was to receive the two southern provinces of Portugal, Alentejo, and the tiny ancient kingdom of Algarve, over which he was to reign with the title of Prince of the Algarves. The central part of Portugal was to be occupied by French and Spanish troops until the peace, when Charles IV and Napoleon would settle what should become of it.

According to a secret rider to this treaty, a convention signed by the same parties on the same day stipulated that French troops should have free passage thru Spanish territory on their way to effect the conquest of Portugal.

Napoleon lost no time in marching his soldiers, whom he had already concentrated at Bayonne, over the Spanish frontier. The main body was commanded by Junot, a mediocre general, selected for his previous knowledge of Portugal. His army proceeded thru the northern provinces of Spain on its way to Lisbon; two other bodies of troops poured also into Spain; one under General Duchesne, took treacherous possession of Catalonia, its cities and its fortresses; the other was divided into two corps d'armee, one of which was commanded by General Dupont, a distinguished soldier much esteemed

2. Latimer, Spain in the 19th Century, p. 29.
by Napoleon, while the other one, under Marshal Moncey, took the road, not into Portugal, but directly to Madrid.¹

The Spanish people offered no resistance whatever to the French, who behaved in a most friendly manner. Two circumstances warranted the actions of the Spanish people while their country was being invaded by foreign armies; the first was the universal hatred of Godoy, who was blamed for the disorders of the government, the humiliation of the monarchy, and the state of the finances; the second was the absorption of all public interest in the quarrel that was taking place between father and son at the Escorial and at Madrid.²

Ferdinand was undoubtedly popular with the people, who showed their unconcealed admiration for him, on account of his hatred against their enemy, the "Prince of the Peace," and they fixed their hopes upon him for future reform.

Meanwhile Junot had received orders to accelerate his march thru Spain, and to reach Oporto before the royal family of Portugal could embark for Brazil. Junot, therefore, hurried his troops by forced marches thru the mountain passes, where their sufferings from fatigue, hunger, and thirst were beyond description. Their efforts were in vain, for the Royal family was warned in time and was escorted to Brazil by a British squadron under Sir Sidney Smith.

Until the coming of the English, Junot's Portuguese campaign was a farce. His army having been thoroughly refreshed after its march thru the mountains, Junot issued a proclamation announcing to

1. Napier, Peninsula War, p. 13.
the people of Portugal, that the house of Braganza had ceased to
reign, and that the government of their country was to be adminis-
tered in Napoleon's name; that the taxes would be collected in the name
and for the service of the French, while their armies would be march-
ed off for foreign service under French officers. Resistance seemed
hopeless and the terror stricken people were left without any
initiative, because of their sovereign's desertion.

Godoy, who had forbidden opposition to the French, believing
that they entered Spain to further his personal motives, was thunder-
struck by Napoleon's actions. The Emperor believed that the interest
of France demanded the incorporation of the northern provinces of
Spain with the French Empire. In return Charles IV was offered the
whole of Portugal, and no mention was made of Northern Lusitania, or
the principality of the Algarves; the one promised to the King of
Etruria, the other to Godoy. All France was busy making preparations
for a Spanish campaign. That Napoleon did not intend to keep his
agreement may be readily observed. "This Prince of the Peace," said
Napoleon, "this mayor of the Palace is loathed by the nation; he is
the rascal who will himself open for me the gates of Spain." Godoy became alarmed and wrote to his agent Izquierdo, "the
treaty no longer exists; the kingdom is covered with French troops;
the entrances to Portugal are commanded by Junot; all is intrigue
and distrust. What will be the result of these uncertainties?"
Everything looked hopeless and Godoy advised his sovereigns to
imitate the example of the Royal family of Portugal. The flight was

1. Napier, Peninsula War, p. 40.
planned for the night of March 17; but the plans leaked out, the project was abandoned, and Godoy fell into the hands of the infuriated populace. On March 20 the King signed his abdication and Ferdinand VII was proclaimed everywhere.¹

Murat was appointed Napoleon's lieutenant-general in Spain, and on March 27 he entered Madrid without any opposition. The following day, the Emperor wrote to his brother Louis who was then King of Holland. "The King of Spain has just abdicated, the Prince of the Peace has been imprisoned, and insurrectionary movements have shown themselves at Madrid. The people demand me with loud cries to fix their destinies.....Being convinced that I shall never be able to conclude a solid peace with England till I have accomplished a great movement on the continent, I have resolved to put a French prince on the throne of Spain. In this state of affairs I have turned my eyes on you for the throne of Spain."

² Louis did not accept, for he feared the renewal of a puppet's role. Then Napoleon cast his eyes upon his elder brother Joseph, who was laboring to do good among his subjects in Naples.

Napoleon inquired of Izquierdo, Godoy's secret agent, whether a French prince would be acceptable to the Spaniards. "Sire," said Izquierdo, "the Spaniards would accept your Majesty with enthusiasm for their sovereign, but only in the event of your having previously renounced the crown of France." Napoleon said, "If I cannot arrange matters as I wish with either the father or son, I will make a clean

1. An excellent account may be found in Geoffroy de Grand-Maison, Napoléon et Espagne, p. 143-159.
sweep of them both."¹

Turning again to the Court of Spain, we find that Ferdinand was persuaded against his better judgment to go to Bayonne to meet Napoleon. There he was informed that the Bourbon dynasty was at an end, and that it was about to be succeeded by a prince of Napoleon's family, and that Ferdinand must renounce, for himself and for all the princes of his family, all right to the crowns of Spain and the Indies.²

The French aided the departure of the royal family from Madrid; the Spaniards, believing that force was being used, attacked the French escorts. Murat issued orders; grape-shot was fired upon the crowds. "But the roar of these cannons," says Alison, "resounded from one end of the Peninsula to the other; in its ultimate effects it shook the Empire of Napoleon to its very foundation; it was literally the beginning of the end."³

Murat was foolish and imprudent in his dealings with the Spaniards, but it must be kept in mind that he was acting under instructions. He ordered a public execution of over one hundred Spaniards who were caught upon the streets after the riots. The news of this act flashed throughout Spain, and from that time a ferocious and frantic guerilla warfare was waged against the French.

Of Murat's civil administration, one cannot say much in praise. He was too ignorant for a king, and was worthless in the cabinet.

The diplomacy of the battle-field he understood, and the management

2. Geoffroy de Grand Maison, Napoléon Et Espagne, p. 177-78.
of 20,000 cavalry was an easier thing than the superintendence of a province. He was not wanting in strength of courage and military skill, but he was utterly deficient in the administration of a province.¹

That Napoleon deemed the Spanish situation worthy of contempt may be seen in the following: "Believe me, Cannon, I have much experience in these matters. The countries where the monks are numerous are easily subjugated, and that will take place in Spain... Even if the people were to rise en masse I could succeed in conquering them by the sacrifice of 200,000 men."²

In the meantime Ferdinand was forced to abdicate, and a treaty was drawn up between Charles IV and Napoleon, by which the old King ceded, as he said, "for the happiness and prosperity of his dear subjects," all his rights over the dominions of Spain to his august friend and ally the Emperor of the French. Ferdinand was practically kept a prisoner until 1814.³

1. Headley, Napoleon And His Marshals, p. 24.
2. Latimer, Spain In The 19th Century, p. 48.
Chapter II
Joseph Bonaparte And The War In Earnest.

Joseph Bonaparte was born in Corsica in January, 1788. He was the eldest in the family and on account of his quiet character was destined for the priesthood. When Napoleon became a soldier, Joseph desired to adopt the same career. Napoleon, however, deemed him "too indolent, too self-indulgent, too luxurious" and desired that he should adhere to his profession.1 At his father's death in 1785, Joseph turned to the law. In 1787 he went to Italy and finished his law course at the University of Pisa. He sympathized with the French Revolution and in 1792 was sent as a deputy from Corsica to the National Convention, where he became a follower of Robespierre. After Napoleon distinguished himself at the siege of Toulon, Joseph received an appointment in the army as a commissary of the first class. In 1794 he married at Marseilles, Mlle. Julie Clary, the daughter of a wealthy merchant.2

When Napoleon became first consul, Joseph was employed in various diplomatic affairs. He had an active part in drawing up the treaties of Lunéville (1801) and the Peace of Amiens (1802). After Napoleon became Emperor, Joseph was made a prince, and the succession to the imperial throne of France was settled upon him and his descendants in case the Emperor should leave no heirs. In 1804 Joseph received his first military appointment, being made a colonel of

1. Latimer, Spain In The 19th Century, p. 59.
2. Atteridge, Napoleon's Brothers, p. 17-20
cavalry, and attached to the army waiting at Boulogne to cross over to England. In 1805 Joseph refused the Lombard crown and in 1806 he was sent to Naples to take charge of the French army. As commander-in-chief of the army, Joseph did not distinguish himself in his wars against the bandits and guerillas in the mountains of Calabria. Soon afterward Napoleon made him the King of Naples, with the understanding that if he refused, he would not only forfeit fraternal affection and imperial favor, but that he would be deprived of his chances of succession to the French throne.¹

During Joseph's brief stay in Naples, he commenced many important reforms in matters of taxation, destruction of feudalism, and finances. That Napoleon was displeased with Joseph's government may easily be seen. He was far too lenient to suit Napoleon, who wrote to him. "In a conquered country, clemency is inhumanity....It is only by salutary terror that you make any impression on an Italian population."

On May 21, 1808, Joseph was summoned to Bayonne, where he was persuaded to accept the Spanish throne. A constitution modelled on that of Naples was drawn up for Spain; and Joseph with the members of the hastily organized Junta swore solemnly to observe it. Joseph's accession to the throne was announced and acquiesced in by all the Powers of Europe except England. As King of Spain, Joseph did not feel himself secure, for he stated, "the fact is that there is not a Spaniard who has declared for me, except a few who are in some way connected with the Junta."²

¹. Atteridge, Napoleon's Brothers, p. 132.
². Latimer, Spain In The 19th Century, p. 67.
When Joseph arrived at Madrid, July 12, 1808, he found the people bitterly exasperated. He assembled a number of notables together and promised to call a Cortes, whose business it should be to decide the great question, "should he, or should he not, be King of Spain." He also said that he would not consent to any dismemberment of the Spanish Kingdom, and that the French troops should evacuate as soon as peace was declared.

Within a few days of the riots at Madrid, all Spain rose en masse for its deposed candidate Ferdinand. It was essentially a popular insurrection. The clergy was heartily in sympathy with the masses; preached resistance to French arms, and proclaimed the killing of a Frenchman a meritorious act. The war in Spain was never a regular war. Victories won in Germany would give opportunity for controlling the people and keeping up the commissary department; in Spain a victory meant nothing. The populace evacuated at the approach of French troops, and destroyed or carried off supplies; wells were filled up, springs were poisoned, isolated detachments massacred, and prisoners tortured; and the topography essentially favored this mode of guerilla warfare. ¹

Spain was an exceedingly bad country in which to manoeuvre troops in the Napoleonic style, and it took some considerable time before the Emperor's subordinates could assimilate the new mode of warfare. Spain is cut up by irregular mountain ranges, and moreover was ill-provided with roads, a factor which proved to be disastrous to the French arms, inasmuch as difficult communications prevented success or failure by armies in one place from affecting armies in

¹. Dodge, Napoleon, V. 3, p. 25.
in other places. When a marshal overran one province, his success in no wise aided his brother marshal, who was striving to subdue a neighboring one. This was caused by the fact that it took weeks to transport supplies across intervening ranges and rivers. The chief difficulty in campaigning in Spain was the question of food supply; armies could not live off the country and remain effective. As Henry IV had rightly said: "In Spain large armies will starve, and small ones will get beaten."¹

The paper strength of the Spanish forces was about 130,000. The officers were inefficient; while the men were brave, but lack of discipline made them weak as an efficient fighting force. Summing up the faults of the Spanish army, its depleted battalions, its small and incompetent cavalry force, its insufficient proportion of artillery, and its utter want of commissariat, we find that its main source of weakness was that while the long wars of the French revolution had induced all the other nations of Europe to overhaul their military organization and learn something from the methods of the French, Spain was still, so far as its army was concerned, in the middle of the 18th century.² The national temperament, with its eternal relegation of all troublesome reforms to the morrow, was no doubt largely to blame. To Godoy the carpet-soldier is due the military decadence of the Spanish army.

At the outbreak of the war, the French forces amounted to 101,000 men. They were distributed as follows: Corps of the Eastern Pyrenees, General Duhesme, 20,000 men; Corps of Aragon, General

2. Oman, The Peninsular War, V. I, p. 256.
Verdier, 16,000 men; Corps of Madrid, Marshal Moncey, 18,000 men; Corps of General Dupont, 25,000 men; Corps of the Western Pyrenees, Marshal Bessières, 22,000 men. The troops were for the most part conscripts; about 36,000 men were veterans. Junot had a large veteran force, Moncey and Bessières had few. Dupont's men had been drilled only in camp, a fact which in part explains the defeat at Faylen.1

At first the military outlook seemed bright. Junot was in Lisbon, Bessières with headquarters at Burgos; Duhesme was in Catalonia, and Dupont was on the Tagus, near Toledo. Napoleon wrote to Bessières, June 16, and said, "In civil wars it is the important places that one should defend. We ought not to go everywhere."2

A Spanish army was put to flight by Marshal Moncey at Cuenca. The victory was a mediocre one, inasmuch as the French were obliged to retire to Andalusia. Marshal Bessières had his hands full with the uprisings in Logroño, Valencia.

In Aragon, stiff resistance was encountered under the leadership of General Palafox who was eventually defeated by General Lefebre and shut up at Logroño. Events were rapid and successful and Napoleon was jubilant.

Meanwhile a storm was gathering in the Northwest. England had awakened to the fact that she could effectively foil Napoleon's continental system by taking possession of the Peninsula, which lay open to her fleets. She had promised aid to the various Juntas and

1. Confidential Correspondence Between Napoleon and Joseph, V. I, p. 332.
sent thousands of much needed muskets and other materials. Reinforcements under General Blake, a soldier of fortune, were on their way from Portugal. A junction was made with General Cuesta, commander-in-chief of the Spanish armies, who was a narrow minded and inefficient soldier. The two forces united at Astorga and advanced on the Esla. This array tempted Marshal Bessières and on July 14, he marched out with 14,000 men and met the enemy on the heights of Medina de Rio Seco. The Spaniards, some 22,000 strong, stood in two bodies under Cuesta on the right and Blake on the left; they were however too far apart for tactical cooperation. Bessières charged the centre with cavalry and turned Blake's flank. The total Spanish loss amounted to 5,000 men and a number of guns. The French losses were insignificant. "Bessières had put my brother Joseph on the throne of Spain," exclaimed Napoleon. On July 17, the Emperor wrote him, "Never was battle gained under more important circumstances. It had decided the affairs of Spain."  

In the meantime, Dupont started out with 12,000 men from Toledo late in May to join hands with the French fleet at Cadiz. General Dupont was a favorite of Napoleon because thru his personal efforts the victory of Ulm had been made possible. He was expected to win his marshal's spurs in Spain, but circumstances willed it otherwise. His troops, mainly conscripts, were trained in camp only, and ill-prepared to undertake the serious work at hand. To send a column of 12,000 men on a march thru 300 miles of hostile territory to Cadiz, presupposes the idea that the expedition was merely an affair of

policing. It was a military crime of the first order to send troops of such quality on such an important expedition. At first Dupont met with no opposition, but when he crossed the Sierra Morena and reached Andujar June 7, he learned the serious tidings, that the French squadron was captured, that Andalusia was in arms, and that he was surrounded on all sides by numerous guerillas. To sustain the irregulars, the Junta appointed General Castanos to raise a regular army in the rear of Dupont's army. The latter wished to make a trial of their strength and pushed on to within six miles of Cordova, and at Alcolea, he encountered 12,000 hastily drawn up peasants under General Echavarri. These were swept aside with ease and the next step was to take the city of Cordova. This place was the scene of horrible deeds, for Dupont's army of conscripts conducted themselves in the manner of Tilly's and Wallenstein's hordes. Cordova was sacked and pillaged and the inhabitants suffered innumerable injuries and horrors; for which the French throughout Spain were destined to pay dearly. Over 500 wagon loads of plunder were carried away.

It was not long until Dupont realized that he was utterly cut off from any help, inasmuch as his lines of communications were closed. He fell back very slowly. If he had only kept his wits about him, he would have had ample opportunities to extricate himself from the difficult position. Instead of acting with swift decision he wasted a whole month at Andujar with the result that he was soon surrounded by 40,000 regulars with good artillery under Generals Castanos and Reding, the latter being a capable Swiss

1. Oman, The Peninsular War, V. I, p. 129.
General Vedel sought to reinforce Dupont, but Reding seized Elaylen and kept the French forces from active cooperation. Instead of consolidating his position, Dupont resolved to cut his way thru the enemy. His failure cost him 2,000 men. The French conscripts became discouraged, and being tired out and thirsty, they would not fight any longer in the face of so many odds. Dupont demanded a truce, and rejected General Verdier's advice to fight. The enemy would not listen to Dupont's proposals and a surrender was arranged. It has been suggested that the French were more than desirous to surrender in order to preserve their ill-gotten booty.

Thus thru Dupont's inefficiency and stupidity, the Spaniards were enabled to beat and capture an entire French army in the field, a feat which no continental nation had accomplished since the wars of the Revolution began. It might be added that the Spaniards never carried out their promise concerning the safe passage of the French troops to France, partly because of England's refusal to convey the troops in her ships. Instead, the French were marched to Cadiz, and there they were confined in rotten hulks in the Bay of Cadiz, and the survivors were later interned in the Balearic Islands where a great portion perished before their release in 1814. Upon his arrival in France Dupont was imprisoned by Napoleon until 1814.

When Joseph, who had been king in Madrid just a week, heard of the disaster, he beat a hasty retreat on July 29. All the French troops in Spain were recalled, and shortly afterward the Spaniards

entered Madrid in triumph.

When Napoleon heard of Baylen, all his plans were upset, but with marvellous rapidity he formed new ones and ordered half the Grand Army towards Spain. Over 100,000 veterans under Marshal Victor, Soult, Marchand, and Mortier composed the new army and it seemed as if Baylen would be avenged in earnest. He made careful preparations, and stated, "I will leave in a few days to put myself at the head of my army, and with the help of God, crown myself in Madrid, the King of Spain, and plant my eagles on the forts of Lisbon."¹

The defeat of Baylen encouraged the Spaniards to a high pitch, and it proved that mere numbers could accomplish nothing in the Peninsula. Good troops were needed, and as we have noted, the Grand Army was weakened in order to strengthen the armies in Spain. Napoleon said, "I must go there myself to wind the machine up."²

1. Dodge, Napoleon, V. 3, p. 33.
2. Ibid, p. 35.
Chapter III

The English Enter The Peninsular War

In the beginning Junot found his Portuguese task a relatively simple matter, but now he found himself in a serious position, for after Baylen, his lines of communications with Spain were cut off; and in order to consolidate his perilous position Junot recalled scattered detachments and concentrated his army of 25,000 around Lisbon. All Portugal became hostile, and to make matters worse, the promised British reinforcements were at last on their way to participate in the coming struggle. Of the four divisions sent over, one was commanded by the future great Duke of Wellington.

Arthur Wellesley was born in 1769 and received his education at Eton. At the age of seventeen he entered the army as ensign; but pushed by family interests he soon rose as an officer. He was subsequently sent to India, where he distinguished himself at the battle of Assaye. For this victory he was made a Major General. In 1805 Wellesley went back to England, and after some inaction he was made a lieutenant-general in July, 1808, thru the political influence of his friends. Many of his enemies declared at that time that Wellesley was more of a politician than a general. Wellesley commanded 10,000 in the coming Portuguese campaign. The British expedition numbering 30,000 men landed at Mondego Bay, and advanced along the coast in order to keep in touch with the fleet.

Junot left Lisbon August 11 and sent General Delaborde ahead

to engage the British. Wellesley however, defeated Delaborde at Rolica and compelled him to fall back.\(^1\) Junot, being over-confident, decided to risk everything in one battle, and in accordance with his plans, he decided to attack the British, who held a strong position at Vimiero. On the day of the battle, Wellesley was superseded by General Burrard, a very timid and inefficient officer. Without him the British would undoubtedly have captured the entire French army. The English numbered 17,761 and the French about 20,000. Junot attacked at too many points, with the result that each attack was repulsed by the English, who were content to fight a defensive battle. After a few well organized charges, the French were forced to retreat in confusion. Wellesley said to his superior, "Sir Harry, now is your time to advance, the enemy is completely beaten, and we shall be in Lisbon within three days."\(^2\) His superior refused, saying that the English army had accomplished enough in one day. The battle was won by the use of superior tactics, in which the close Napoleonic formations were beaten by the English regiments, which were placed in a line two deep.

After the battle of Vimiero, Junot retired to Torres Vedras. Thru shrewd diplomacy on the part of Junot's subordinate, General Kellerman, a very favorable armistice was concluded with the English.\(^3\) According to the armistice, which was wrongfully designated as the Convention of Cinfra, Lisbon was to be handed over to the English, while the French were to be taken on board English ships.

1. Life of Wellington, V. I, p. 211.
and landed at La Rochelle, with all their baggage and equipment. The convention was ridiculed everywhere in England and Portugal, because its stipulations were too liberal. A court of inquiry was held in England, and Wellington testified, "that if General Hill's brigade had moved forward with the advance guard upon Torres Vedras, as soon as it was certain the enemy's right had been defeated by our left, and our left had pursued their advantage, the enemy would have been cut off from Torres Vedras, and we should have been at Lisbon before him. But Sir Harry Burrard still thought it advisable not to move from Vimiero, and the enemy made good their retreat to Torres Vedras." The court however acquitted the commanding officer; and Wellington in disgust and chagrin, left the army and entered politics.

1. Gurwood, Supplementary Dispatches, p. 123.
Chapter IV

Napoleon In Spain

After Napoleon made sure that the Treaty of Tilsit was a reality and not a pretense between France and Russia, he was enabled to devote himself to the Spanish situation, which looked dark indeed for the French cause. At the time that Napoleon took personal charge of the headquarters at Vittoria, the French armies had either capitulated to the English at Cintra or to the Spaniards at Baylen, or had retired beyond the Ebro.

Upon his arrival at Bayonne, Napoleon, the most provident, the most powerful of administrators, and the best obeyed of generals, found that his orders, both as to the preparations for the campaign and as to the management of the war, had been ill-followed. The army was without clothing, and instead of being kept together near Vittoria, the left had been sent as far as Lerida to the East, and the right under Marshal Lefebre and Marshal Victor, had marched to the West to attack the Spaniards under Blake, had defeated him, entered Bilbao, and pushed on towards Valmaseda. Lefebre in want of supplies fell back on Bilbao, and Victor, hearing of the Emperor's arrival, and anxious to return to headquarters, where he would be under Napoleon's eyes, marched towards Vittoria, leaving General Villate exposed to attack by superior forces. "Thus," says Thiers, began the series of faults, the results of selfishness and the jealousy of our generals, which lost the cause of France in Spain,

1. Confidential Correspondence Between Joseph and Napoleon, V. I, p. 353.
and by losing it in Spain, lost it also in Europe.\textsuperscript{1}

The army of Spain consisted of six corps under: 1. Victor, 28,000 men; 2. Soult, 26,000 men; 3. Lannes, 21,000 men; 4. Lefebre, 25,000 men; 5. St. Cyr, 36,000 men; 6. Ney, 32,000 men; with reserves of 34,000. Later two other corps came to Spain; 7. Mortier, 30,000; 8. Junot, 19,000 men, making in all about 250,000 men.\textsuperscript{2} The French were confident, as is brought out in General Berthier's letter to his wife of November 14. "Everywhere our armies are beating the Spanish rebels in English pay. . . . . The people come forward to meet us. We have already destroyed two armies. . . . . Here we are near Madrid, and soon this war will be finished."\textsuperscript{3}

In his campaign for Madrid, Napoleon elected as usual to live on the country. The Spanish lines were weak, especially in the centre, and at the battle of Espinosa, November 10, Victor defeated the Spaniards under Blake and La Romana. On November 23, General Lannes defeated General Castanos at Tudela, who escaped the carefully arranged trap which Napoleon had set. "If Marshal Ney had not let himself be deceived by the inhabitants, and had not remained till the 23rd and 24th at Soria, because he imagined that the Spaniards had 80,000 men, he would have arrived at Agreda as I had ordered, and not a man would have escaped."\textsuperscript{4}

By the defeats of the right and left wings of the Spanish

2. \textit{Confidential Correspondence Between Joseph and Napoleon} V. I, p. 377.
4. \textit{Correspondence De Napoléon}, V. 18, p. 84.
armies, Napoleon accomplished nothing; each wing was in a position to rally for a fresh effort. Napoleon was not accustomed to such campaigning; in order to reduce the country it was necessary to carry on isolated campaigns. As Oman said, "to endeavor to grasp a Spanish Corps was like clutching at a ball of quicksilver; the mass dispersed in driblets between the fingers of the manipulator, and the small rolling pellets ultimately united to form a new force."¹

Napoleon marched on Madrid with 40,000 men. At Somo Sierra, resistance was encountered, the mountain road being barred by a Spanish force. Without waiting for his guns, he hurled a company of Polish Lancers against the Spanish artillery. The men were needlessly mown down and sacrificed for Napoleon's love of display of the theatrical.² Within a few days Madrid fell without any fighting, and when the Spanish field forces heard of the surrender they turned back hastily; and their retreat was almost a rout. Napoleon endeavored to conciliate the people in Madrid, but they would not accept anything from a foreign conqueror.

Returning again to the English operations, we find that the British army was under Sir John Moore's command, with orders to march from Lisbon to Corunna. Now this meant a hard march of almost 300 miles, with only the half hearted cooperation of the Spaniards. Sir John Moore was given the following instructions: "You are authorized to give the most distinct assurances to the Spanish people, that his majesty in sending a force to their assistance, has no other object in view than to afford them the most unqualified

¹ Dodge, *Napoleon*, V. 3, p. 64.
and disinterested support;...that his Majesty's endeavors are to be
directed to aid the people of Spain in restoring and maintaining
against France the independence and integrity of their monarchy."

Moore committed a serious error by sending his army over three
different roads, a measure which was dangerous, for the French were
on the offensive. Moore reached Salamanca with his main body of
troops on November 20, and when he heard of the fall of Madrid, he
was undecided what to do. After some hesitation he made up his
mind to cut off the French lines of communication and cooperate with
the Spaniards under La Romana at Burgos. Lack of information de-
ceived Napoleon into Moore's activities, and not knowing that the
enemy was in his rear, he ordered Soult into Portugal. 2

By means of a captured army order, Moore was enabled to ascer-
tain the disposition of the French forces, and he also learned that
Napoleon knew nothing of his movements. 3 By a brilliant manoeuvre,
Moore got in front of Soult's army, which tried to hold him back.
By this time however, Napoleon learned of Moore's strategy thru es-
caped prisoners from Salamanca, and he conceived a scheme whereby
the enemy's retreat would be cut off. In order to accomplish this
it was necessary to send Ney across the Guadarrama Mountains. The
passage across the mountains was accomplished with great difficulty
and many men lost their lives on account of the cold weather. On
December 24, Moore was ready to attack and crush Soult at Sahagum,
but upon learning of Ney's strategy he beat a hasty retreat. Thus

2. Dodge, Napoleon, V. 3, p. 117.
Moore was enabled to escape from a deadly trap. The Emperor said, "If the English remain in their positions until Ney joins Soult, they are lost and not a man will escape." During these operations Napoleon took an active part, but upon receipt of serious news from Austria, he turned over the task of following up Moore to Soult and Ney. In a letter to Joseph of January 15, 1809, he wrote, "If you think it wise, you can keep my absence secret for a fortnight, saying that I have gone to Saragossa. The Court of Vienna is behaving very ill, but might repent. Have no disquiet, I have enough forces, even without touching my army of Spain, to go to Vienna in a month." Moore's retreat to Corunna was a tragic one. Everywhere the English were beset by the attacks of the French, and had it not been for Moore's cavalry, the retreat would have degenerated into a rout. The strain was so great that several regiments mutinied, as a result of having partaken of too much intoxicants. Over 4,000 men were lost during the retreat, and as Moore was about to embark his army at Corunna, he was attacked by Soult on the 15th of January. After a typical English defensive battle, the French were driven off. However, the English commander laid down his life on the battlefield, struck by a stray cannon ball. He was buried with military honors on the spot where he died, and later the French commander Soult placed a monument there in honor of the brave soldier.

2. Confidential Correspondence of Napoleon and Joseph, V. II, p. 31.
4. Ibid., p. 435.
Moore was severely criticized for not defending Corunna, which although not a strong place, could be aided by the fleet; in the worst extremity he could have embarked. The remnants of the English army sailed for England, where every observer was astonished at the shocking condition of the soldiers. Over half the expedition, numbering 26,000, had been rendered unfit for further service.

Summing up the situation at the close of February, 1809, we find that England had been driven out of Spain, and the resistance of the Spanish troops had become confined to the defence of a few towns and a guerilla warfare in the Southwestern provinces. Joseph was again in Madrid, and Napoleon forced him to call himself King of Spain, and commander-in-chief of the French armies; but in reality neither was his royalty recognized by the Spaniards, except within the country occupied by the French army, nor were his commands obeyed by the French.¹

¹ Confidential Correspondence Between Napoleon and Joseph, V. I, p. 368.
Chapter V

The Two Sieges of Saragossa.

While Dupont was on his ill-fated expedition into Andalusia, Lefebre and Verdier undertook to effect the conquest of Aragon. In order to accomplish this they had to take Saragossa, which was the key to the province.

Saragossa was situated on the right bank of the Ebro, and was ill-equipped to withstand a protracted siege. It boasted of an old wall, with a series of large and strong buildings, which could not be taken without making a breach. The city was commanded by Palafox, a brave officer, aided by a Belgian officer, Saint Mars. On June 29, 1808, 2,000 French troops made the first attack against the gate of El Carmen. They met with extraordinary resistance; men, women, and even children joined against the invader. Nevertheless the French could not be denied, and after an assault on August 4, the Portillo Gate was taken, and it was only a matter of time, until they gained the Centre of the town. To Verdier’s demand for a capitulation, Palafox replied by "war to the death." ¹ The street battles were carried on for a week, and the French were on the point of taking the city, but on account of Dupont’s surrender at Baylen, they were forced to retire.

After the French had left, Saragossa was strengthened considerably. The old walls were patched up; numerous guns were mounted, and earthworks were thrown up in front of the walls. The town was

¹ Dodge, Napoleon, V. 3, p. 122.
well provisioned to withstand a long siege, and England sent abundant ammunition.

Late in December, 1808, when Napoleon was campaigning against Moore, Mortier joined with Moncey and commenced the second siege of Saragossa, which was even more terrible than the first. The French had 30,000 veteran troops, 60 guns, and a corps of sappers and miners. Within the walls of Saragossa there were 32,000 regulars, 2,000 cavalry, 15,000 well armed peasants, and an equal number of inhabitants. On January 2, Junot superseded Moncey, and captured the Convent of St. Joseph on January 12. After a bombardment of twenty-four hours from fifty guns, the wall was taken. To take the wall however, was not to capture the town, which could not be taken by assault, inasmuch as every house was converted into a fortress, and was defended by unexampled heroism.

The fighting was incessant; a constant bombardment, the explosion of mines, the crash of falling buildings, clamorous shouts, and the continual echo of musketry deafened the ear, while volumes of smoke and dust, clouding the atmosphere, lowered continually over the heads of the combatants, as hour by hour, the French, with a terrible perseverance, pushed forward their approaches to the heart of the miserable but glorious city. The inhabitants resisted so valiantly that the French were exhausted from their efforts. In spite of all they had accomplished, Saragossa remained unconquered. "Before this siege," they exclaimed, "was it ever known, that 20,000 men should besiege 50,000? Scarcely a fourth of the town is won, and we are already exhausted. We must wait for reinforcements, or we shall

1. Napier, Peninsula War, p. 138.
perish among these cursed ruins, which shall become our own tombs, before we can force the last of these fanatics from the last of their dens.1

On February 2, Marshal Lannes arrived in the midst of these complaints, and from that time on the siege was prosecuted to the advantage of the French. By means of enormous quantities of powder, the principal churches and buildings were destroyed, and it was soon evident that the town must fall. The inhabitants were in dire straits, the daily deaths ranged from 400 to 500, and thousands of bodies were left unburied. Palafox was sick and most of the other chiefs were killed, so that there was no logical leader. A new Junta was chosen which proposed a capitulation with Marshal Lannes on February 20. After some negotiations it was agreed upon that the regular garrison was to be marched off to France as prisoners of war. The peasants were to be sent home; and religion and property were to be guaranteed.1 Over half the population and two thirds of the garrison, amounting in all to 50,000, perished during the siege. The French lost about 3,000 men.2

1. Dodge, Napoleon, V. 3, p. 123.
Chapter VI

Renewal Of The French Offensive In Portugal.

In order to repair Junot's disaster at Cintra, Napoleon resolved to undertake a new offensive. In accordance with his plans, Soult was placed in command of the French army of invasion. In the interval between the two invasions, Portugal was considerably strengthened. The whole male population from eighteen to sixty was in the ranks, and English officers drilled and organized them into regiments.

Soult began his operations in February, 1809, with 26,000 troops, and his immediate objective was Oporto which he desired to convert into a base of operations against Lisbon. At Braga, Soult defeated the brave but ill-disciplined peasants, and on March 26, Oporto was reached. There the progress of the French was barred by 50,000 Portuguese with two hundred guns. These were swept aside, and on March 28, the city was stormed and sacked. The French lost about 500 men, the Portuguese about 10,000; most of these were drowned when the Douro Bridge broke down.

Soult's further movements were handicapped by popular uprisings, and lack of communication with his colleagues. On the same day, March 28, Victor defeated the Spaniards at Mengabriel; the day before, Sebastiani had beaten the Army of Andalusia at Ciudad Real, and driven it into the mountains. These victories decided nothing;

1. Napier, Peninsular War, p. 167.
after each defeat, a fresh army would always appear to contest the victory. The people showed no signs of subjugation, and by the end of April, Cuesta had 30,000 men, with the result that Victor could not advance with such a formidable force in his rear. Ney was held at bay with 18,000 by the insurgents of Galicia, and as a result Soult was deprived of the aid which was promised him. The seat of the whole trouble was the jealousy among the marshals; one would not cooperate with the other; a leader like Napoleon could combine the operations to advantage, but as it was, Napoleon's lieutenants were left to their own devices. By May 2, Soult was in hard straits. He was shut up in Oporto by the Portuguese, and the English under Wellesley were making preparations to attack him.

When the English entered Portugal in 1807, everything was in confusion; the regular army consisted of about 12,000 men; the militia existed only on paper, every peasant was a guerilla, and the clergy had kept the land ignorant and savage. The English changed all this. Their officers organized and drilled fresh troops, and soon the Portuguese army under Beresford exceeded 50,000 men; while the territorial troops ordemanzas grew to be fairly efficient. 1 Wellington reached Lisbon on April 22. He was made Marshal General of Portugal and had 26,000 British and Hanoverian troops as a nucleus for his army.

After making preparations to cover Lisbon from Victor, Wellesley made ready to surprise Soult who was unaware of his movements. Soult being ignorant of what was going on, decided to make a flank movement into the Salamanca country, and in pursuance of his plans, he

1. Dodge, Napoleon, V. 3, p. 341.
scattered his troops most unwisely. In the meantime the English, numbering 16,000, marched towards the Vouga River and surprised the French. The latter were quickly defeated and retreated across the Douro after destroying the bridge. With treason and insurrection on all sides, Soult acted wisely. He ordered his subordinates to fall back with the stores and guns, and he himself made preparations to hold his position until his scattered detachments could join him. Being misinformed by conspirators, Soult's commands were not carried out, with the result that the English were enabled to concentrate unnoticed behind a rocky height opposite Oporto.

The negligence of the French pickets above Oporto was remarkable. Wellesley decided to cross the river in the face of a veteran army, and with the help of a native, he was enabled to obtain three barges. The English crossed the river and were among the French before they were discovered. After severe fighting the French beat a hasty retreat, having lost 500 men and large stores of supplies. The French retreat was so precipitate that Wellington sat down to the dinner which had been prepared for Soult.

Soult had depended upon General Loison to hold Amaranto, which would keep his line intact, but when the latter evacuated it, Soult

1. Napier, Peninsula War, p. 189-190.
   It is believed that Soult conceived an ambition to become King of Portugal; this caused a faction to hold communication with the enemy.


was placed in desperate circumstances. The situation was parallel to that at Baylen. The weather was beyond endurance, the troops complained bitterly and it seemed as if a capitulation would be demanded. Although wounded, Soult rose to the occasion and quieted the hostile murmuring of his troops. As a result of information received from a Spanish pedlar, who told him of a path by which he could escape, Soult destroyed his guns, abandoned his baggage, and with terrible difficulties he succeeded in crossing the Catalina Ridge, being joined by Loison at Guimaraens. Wellington followed closely, but Soult baffled him again by taking to the mountains. In order to prevent treachery, the army was reorganized at Braga. Loison was given the command of the advance, while Soult took command of the rear himself. The retreat was conducted in a masterly manner. Everywhere the guerillas blocked the French, the peasants tortured the wounded soldiers; the troops in revenge shot the peasants, and the smoke from burning houses traced the line of march. The retreat cost the French 5,000 men and all their artillery and baggage. Soult had been caught napping and on the whole, the French were extremely fortunate to escape. Napoleon was deeply chagrined at the turn of events and said bitterly: "Victor ought to have undertaken movements; instead of that, I see with lively pain that they let the enemy manoeuvre at his ease against Soult; and if this marshal meets a check, the loss of Spain will follow."  

Thinking that Soult's army was incapacitated for further campaigning, Wellesley undertook to join with the Spaniards under Cuesta

and Venegas upon Madrid. He relied too much upon Spanish promises; they boasted of their strength and successes against the French, with the result that Wellington was hoodwinked. The French held a strong position near Talavera under King Joseph, Victor, and Sebastiáni. Their combined forces amounted to 50,000 men. Wellesley had 18,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry; Cuesta was with 37,000 men at Almaraz, and Venegas was at La Mancha with 25,000. The Spaniards assured Wellesley of their heartiest cooperation; but as a matter of fact, the contracts for provisions were soon broken, and the English almost starved among their friends. Wellesley joined Cuesta on July 18, but the Spaniard was sullen, obstinate, and jealous of the English general. In order to deprive the English of any glory Cuesta marched against Madrid, and was severely beaten by Joseph at the Guadarrama.

The allies took their position at Talavera; the Spanish were placed on the left, while the English held the weakest part of the line. The first day's battle was favorable to the French, and Wellesley barely escaped capture. The French were foolish for attacking; Soult was coming with 50,000 men, and he promised to be on the scene within forty-eight hours. Had Joseph been only willing to wait, the fate of Spain would have been sealed. Instead, Joseph yielded to Victor's argument in favor of instant battle. The latter said, "I will give up war, if I cannot take that hill." Wellesley fought a defensive battle and won it in spite of repeated assaults by the French. Talavera was a battle of discussion and indecisive


3. Mémoires du Roi Joseph, V. 6, p. 239.
attack for the French. Had they only waited for Soult, the game was theirs. Napoleon described it best. On August 18 he wrote. "What a fine chance they missed; 30,000 English in front of 100,000 of the best troops in the world. My God, what is an army without a chief!"\(^1\) The English lost 6,264 men; the French lost 7,389 men and seventeen guns. The Spanish losses were not ascertained. Talavera principally shows able defensive battle-tactics on the part of the English, and gallantry ill-directed on the part of the French.

Joseph sent a false report of the battle to Napoleon, but the latter would not be duped, and criticized the whole operations severely. "State to the King my astonishment, and my discontent to Jourdon, that they should send me a song and dance report, and that instead of letting me know the true situation of things, they should present to me school-boy’s essays."\(^2\)

In the meantime Wellesley’s position was fast becoming dangerous, for Soult was marching towards Plascentia, a movement which threatened the English rear. Soult masked Ciudad Rodrigo, and reached Plascentia on August 2. Wellesley miscalculated his opponent’s strength, but by means of a captured dispatch, he was awakened to his danger and beat a hasty retreat. The hospitals with 5,000 English wounded were abandoned at Talavera. Wellesley was enabled to make good his retreat upon Badajoz, with the aid of Spanish peasants who mended the only practical road across the mountains.

Soult now proposed to march on Abrantes and cut off the English from Portugal, but Joseph would not consider such a move. With con-


siderable ill-judgment, Joseph sent Ney and Sebastiani against the Spaniards, retaining no considerable force with which to act decisively. Joseph is to be deeply criticized, for had he marched upon Badajoz with a sufficient force, he would in all probability have defeated the Anglo-Portuguese forces decisively. This was the most important moment of the Spanish war, for the chances are that if Wellesley had suffered a crushing setback, the English ministry might have decided to evacuate the Peninsula; and from a military standpoint, Joseph lost a golden opportunity to strike his opponents a telling blow.¹

Wellesley lost confidence in the Spaniards; they supplied him with scant provisions, and he made up his mind that he would be better off in Portugal. Furthermore he characterized the Spanish cavalry as being good play soldiers, and affirmed that the infantry was worthless against the French. "I have fished in many troubled waters but Spanish troubled waters I will never try again:"² thus said Sir Arthur Wellesley after the campaign of Talavera, by which he acquired the title of Viscount Wellington, and a thorough knowledge of Spanish character.

The Spanish Junta, dissatisfied with the failure of its armies, consolidated the armies of Cuesta and Venegas under Areizaga. Proud to command 50,000 men, Areizaga advanced upon Aranjuez, where he was confronted by Sebastiani on November 12.³ The latter kept the enemy at bay, until Soult and Mortier arrived, and although outnumbered

1. Dodge, Napoleon, V. 3, p. 370.
2. Napier, Peninsula Battles, p. 44.
by the Spaniards the French succeeded in winning a great victory.
The Spaniards lost 11,000 killed, 16,000 prisoners, 50 guns and 30
flags.

Wellington was content to defend Portugal and leave the Span-
iards to their fate. In order to make future operations as safe as
possible, he determined to create a powerful base. He desired ample
means of reinforcements and supplies to annoy and wear out the
French; and with this purpose in view, he constructed in absolute
secrecy, an enormous fortified camp on the heights of Torres Vedras,
extending from the mouth of the Tagus to the sea, which cut off from
the mainland the peninsula in which Lisbon is situated.¹

The operations in Spain, ending in 1809, were distinctly in
favor of the French. The English were driven out of Spain, and the
Spaniards were defeated everywhere, although their guerilla warfare
continued to offer much opposition to the French.

1. Napier, Peninsula Battles, p. 286.
Chapter VII.

The French Rule In Spain.

When Joseph arrived at Madrid on July 10, 1808, he issued a proclamation announcing his accession to the Spanish people, and declaring his intention to direct all his energies to securing their welfare. The very form of the proclamation asserted his intention to pose, not as a king set up by the Revolution, but as the legitimate successor of the old kings of Castile and Leon. He signed Yo el Re and described himself as Don Joseph, by the Grace of God, King of Castile, Aragon, the two Sicilies, Jerusalem, Navarre, Toledo, Valencia, Galicia, Majorica, Seville, Cordova, Murcia, Santiago, the Algarves, Gibraltar, the Canary Islands, the West and East Indies, the Islands of the Ocean and Terra Firma, Count of Hapsburg, Tyrol and Barcelona, and Lord of Biscay. It was the traditional roll of titles dating from the empire of Charles V, and Joseph placed it at the head of his proclamation without asking the advice of his brother, who thought it ridiculous.

A constitution had already been drafted for Spain, and Joseph took part in the final deliberations upon it. The King was to govern with the help of a Senate, a Council of State, and a Cortes. The latter was to represent all classes; it was to meet at least once in three years and vote a triennial budget. The colonies were to

1. Atteridge, Napoleon's Brothers, p. 187.
2. Ibid., p. 188.
send deputies to the Cortes, and all internal customs-houses on the borders of the old provinces were to be suppressed.¹

Joseph was a man of a kindly, easy disposition, somewhat of an optimist, and his optimism made him entertain a very high opinion of himself.² In spite of adverse opinions he was to all intents kindly disposed toward his subjects. Above all he desired to be considered a Spanish King and not a usurping French prince, placed on the throne by his brother's might. As an earnest of his intentions, Joseph gave most of the appointments to Spaniards. The cabinet was made up for the most part of the Spanish ministers who had formerly served under Charles.³ They were: Don Urquiçó, minister of foreign affairs; Don Azanza, minister to the Indies; Don O’Ffarill, minister of war; Don Jovellanos, minister of Interior; and Don Mazareda, minister of Marine.

Under Joseph's rule the following changes were made: All monasteries were abolished, the Inquisition was done away with; and all titles of Old Castile were abolished.⁴ In short, a complete revolution of the institutions and administration was accomplished, but unfortunately the men who were charged with the execution of the projects were themselves too much accustomed to the ancient system, to give the new projects any great help.⁵ It had been different in Naples, where Joseph had trained French ministers to help him. The coinage was improved, and Napoleon urged Joseph to

1. Atteridge, Napoleon’s Brothers, p. 189.
2. Ibid., p. 139.
4. Ibid., V. 6, p. 189.
5. Ibid., p. 265.
circulate his own coin, in order to produce a good political effect.\footnote{1. Confidential Correspondence, V. II, p. 42.}

However, the reforms that Joseph attempted were not well received by the people throughout Spain, and his promise to secure the independence of Spain and the integrity of its territory was laughed to scorn. A rival government was formed at Seville, to which most of the people outside of Joseph's immediate jurisdiction gave instant sanction. Throughout his short reign, Joseph was always financially embarrassed. It was Napoleon's policy that war should pay for war, and inasmuch as the open country was in the hands of the insurgents, he could raise neither imposts nor requisitions from it. The only regular income that he could procure for a long time was that which came in from the local taxes of Madrid, and a few other large towns of which he was in secure possession. And save in the capital itself, his agents and intendants had to fight hard with the military governors to secure this meagre sum. The King could not command a quarter of the amount which was required for the ordinary expenses of government. His ministers failed to receive their salaries, and the Spanish army, which he endeavored to form, could not be clothed or armed, much less paid. This vexed Joseph, for he wished to make himself independent of his brother's generals, by raising a large force which could be under his personal disposition. He formed the cadre of regiment after regiment, and filled them with deserters, and any prisoners who could be induced to enlist under his banner, in order to avoid transportation to France. Joseph was deceived in his expectations, for in a few weeks they would desert and join the guerillas. Napoleon declared that it was folly to arm the Spaniard, who would
carry off arms and desert to the rebels. "I cannot," he said, "have men serving in the royal Spanish army beside my own troops, after having reddened their hands with French blood."1 No amount of pampering would have turned the King's Spanish levies into loyal servants.

The only means by which Joseph could carry on the government was the confiscation of property belonging to the monastic orders, and to all persons who were connected with the Junta.2 This would have netted him a great amount of money, if only he could have found suitable buyers. It was not safe to pay much ready cash for lands overrun by insurgents, or for houses in towns which were practically in a state of siege. For that reason property of immense value was sold for insignificant sums. Joseph was looked at askance by the church-loving Spaniards because he decreed the abolition of the religious orders, with the result that he and his ministers worked in vain for the interests of the people.

Thus the financial and administrative affairs of Joseph's government went from bad to worse. No matter what he was willing to do for Spain, the majority of the people would not have anything to do with him, because he was a foreigner. Joseph believed that he could accomplish a great deal by making a campaign into Andalusia. A brilliant campaign, in which he would figure as commander-in-chief as well as king, might at last convince the Spaniards of his capacity. He was prepared to play the part of a merciful and generous conqueror. At the worst the revenues of wealthy Andalusia would be a godsend

1. Atteridge, Napoleon's Brothers, p. 251.
to his depleted treasury. As was noted in a previous chapter, Joseph invaded Andalusia with 61,000 men. The Junta, which claimed to govern Spain, had long been established at Seville, which had thus become a rival capital to Madrid. To drive out the Junta and conquer the cities of the kingdoms of Granada, Seville, and Cordova, would give Joseph much prestige.\(^1\) He believed that there existed a large party in Andalusia which was tired of the war and ready to rally to his government in case of victory, if they could only be assured of generous treatment. So sure was Joseph of triumphal entries into the cities of Andalusia that he took with him most of his ministers, his chamberlains and equerries, his carriages and plate, the ceremonial uniforms for his guard, and rich hangings for improvised halls of state.\(^2\)

Joseph was received with apparent enthusiasm by the people. He entered Seville on February first, where the inhabitants received him with open arms; the churches pealed their bells, flowers fell in showers from every window.\(^3\) A Te Deum was sung at the Cathedral, and the captured eagles and banners which Dupont had lost at Baylen were restored by the bishops and canons. Indeed, Joseph created a favorable impression upon the people, and many hastened to do him homage. Thus encouraged, he issued an amnesty to the people of Andalusia if they would desert the Junta.\(^4\) All political prisoners were to be liberated, and those who chose to serve in the royal army would retain

2. Ibid., p. 247.
their rank. All civil officers who took the oath of allegiance would be retained in their employments.

While Soult was besieging Cadiz, Joseph spent the months of February and March in a circular tour thru Andalusia, where he affected to notice nothing but friendly feelings among the people. He visited Ronda, Malaga, Granada, Jaen, hearing Te Deums, and giving bull-fights and banquets. It is certain that a sufficient show of submission was made to nourish his happy illusions as to the results of his conquests. It is believed that Joseph's friends took great pains to organize loyal demonstrations and that care was taken to prevent the occurrence of any unpleasant incidents.1 Joseph did his best to fulfill his promises to the inhabitants, and to all outward appearances everything promised well. But as soon as Joseph was gone, or had his back turned, the French troops misbehaved, and levied all sorts of contributions and exactions upon the inhabitants. The King was powerless to resist the open violations of the promises which he was giving daily. In despair he appealed to his brother, and begged that the worst offenders be disgraced and sent to France.2 But Napoleon disregarded his appeals, saying that Spain must be treated like a conquered country; and that the army must live off the land.3 The Emperor was not pleased that Joseph had undertaken an expedition without his permission, one which, moreover, did not materially aid the plans for the conquest of Spain. Furthermore he was displeased with Joseph's plan of conciliation; he wrote to his brother that it

1. Atteridge, Napoleon's Brothers, p. 272.
3. Atteridge, Napoleon's Brothers, p. 251.
was folly to release prisoners, who should rather be sent to French
fortresses.¹

Joseph wished to treat with the central Junta, but his deputa-
tion was not received: The Junta replied, "The City of Cadiz, faith-
ful to its principles, recognises no king but Ferdinand VII." ² He
then returned to Madrid where he was confronted by Napoleon's dis-
agreeable decree of February 8.

Napoleon had complained that he could not bear the expenses of
his army in Spain any longer. In order to carry out his project, the
administration of the conquered provinces was to be in the future in
the hands of military commanders, in order that all their resources
might be applied to the maintenance of the army. The six military
governments which were instituted as a result of Napoleon's decree
of February 8, 1810, are as follows:³ First government, Catalonia
(Duke of Tarentum, governor); second government, Aragon (General
Suchet, governor); third government, Navarre, (General Dufour, gov-
ernor, later replaced by General Reille); fourth government, the
provinces of Biscay (General Thouvenot, governor); fifth government,
Burgos, (General Dorsenne, governor); sixth government, Valladolid,
Placentia and Toro, (General Kellerman, governor).

The newly inaugurated military governments were under the abso-
lute control, civil as well as military, of the six French generals,
who corresponded with Napoleon and were virtually independent of

Joseph.\(^1\) In a letter to Berthier, Napoleon said "that the provinces under French occupation afford sufficient resources for the maintenance of French troops; that they must not trust to the French treasury, which is exhausted by the immense sums which it is obliged to send out; that Spain swallows up a prodigious amount of specie and thus impoverishes France."\(^2\) England took advantage of her opportunity and pointed out to the central Junta that the creation of the six military governments was a first step to annexation, and despite the contrary assurances of Napoleon, the Spaniards prepared to resist on a larger scale.\(^3\)

On May 29, 1810, Napoleon issued the following decree, dealing with the administration of the military governments.

**Article I.** There shall be receivers appointed by the French Minister of the Treasury in each of the six governments, who alone shall have charge of the revenues, arising from ordinary or extraordinary contributions.

**Article II.** In all the other parts of Spain, the ordinary and extraordinary contributions intended for the army shall be paid into the chests of the military paymasters.

**Article III.** The six receivers established in the six governments, and the paymasters acting as receivers in the other parts of Spain, will correspond with the receiver-general of the contributions, who will

1. *Confidential Correspondence*, V. 2, p. 104.
reside at Bayonne.

Article IV. All the generals, intendants, and civil and military officers in the armies, are expressly ordered to have the contributions paid only into the receiver's chests for the six governments, and into the paymaster's chests for the other parts of Spain.

Article V. The receivers appointed by any other authority than that of the Minister of the Treasury will cease their functions as soon as this decree is made public, and will repair to Paris, and carry all the papers containing accounts of their receipts and expenditures to the Minister of the Treasury.

Article VI. Our Chief of Staff, and our ministers of public treasury and war are charged with executing the decree as it concerns them respectively.¹

Upon the issuance of this decree, Joseph complained bitterly that his power was taken away from him. He wrote to Napoleon. "Let me either be a king in a way that befits a brother of your Majesty or let me return to Mortefontaine, where the only happiness I shall ask for is to live without humiliation and to die with a peaceful conscience."² Joseph was urged to resign the crown by his friend and adviser Count Miot de Melito, who said, "you should seize this opportunity to separate your fortunes before all Europe from the Emperor's, and cast upon their real author the responsibility for the misfortunes of Spain. Fortune herself seems to have arranged this favor-

2. Ibid. p. 306.
able opportunity for you. A brilliant campaign, the welcome given you in Andalusia, the brilliant and moderate policy you have pursued, would all combine to make your retirement appear to be an act inspired by reason of self sacrifice, and perhaps the people will do you the honour of expressing some regret for your departure, or at least give you their sincere good wishes.  

However, Joseph did not abdicate, for he clung to power in the hope that the Spanish resistance would tire itself out, and that the English would be driven away, so that civil government would replace martial law, and then he would be enabled to rule according to his own ideas. But he was sadly mistaken and his patience was soon at an end. The following is a summary of his complaints, written on August 8; it is absolutely reasonable, and confines itself to hard facts. "Since your Majesty withdraws Andalusia from my sphere of command and orders that the revenues of that province should be devoted exclusively to military expenses, I have no choice but to throw up the game. In the actual state of affairs in Spain the general who commands each province is its king. All its resources become inadequate, because what are called the wants of the army are indefinite, and the general increases them as he sees the means of supplying them. As a result, any province under the command of a general is useless for my budget. In Andalusia alone I hoped to find a few resources, after having assigned to the army what was supposed to be sufficient, if your Majesty continues to send two millions a month. But to give the command of the troops to a general who does not recognize my authority, is to give him the administration and the government of the country. It is

to take away from me the only province in which I could hope to live: it is to confine me to Madrid, which gives me only 800,000 francs per month, while my indispensable expenses exceed 4,000,000 per month. I am here surrounded by the ruins of a great nation. I have a guard, a depot, hospitals, a garrison, a household, a ministry, a privy council, refugees from all the other provinces, etc. This state of things cannot last. If the Army of Andalusia is taken away from me, what shall I be? The porter of the hospitals of Madrid and of the depots of the army, and the janitor of the prisoners!" Joseph then states his terms: (1) If the army is put under his control; (2) if he can send back uncontrollable officers; (3) if he can have his own way in governing the Spaniards: he will retain his crown, and pledge himself to reduce all Spain, "and make the country as profitable to the interests of France as it is now detrimental." If not, the only expedient is to retire across the Pyrenees and surrender his crown.¹

However, Napoleon could not give him any such promises: in the first place, Joseph's military attainments were distrusted, and men like Soult and Masséna would not obey his orders. Neither could Joseph be allowed to abdicate, at least not just at this moment. The fact is, that at this time Napoleon decided to dismember Spain. The following letter to his Foreign Minister Champagny, indicates his intentions clearly. "Herewith I send you back the Spanish documents with six observations, which are to serve as the basis for negotiation. But it is important that you broach the matter gently. You must at first state my intentions in regard to the Convention of Bayonne (viz. that the Emperor regards his promise of the integrity

¹ Mémoires du Roi Joseph V. 7, pp. 307-311.
of Spain as out of date and cancelled). Then speak of Portugal, and next of the expense that this country (Spain) costs me; let them reflect over that; and only after an interval of several days tell them that I must have the left bank of the Ebro, as an indemnity for the money and all else that Spain has cost me down to this hour. I think that, as in all negotiations, we must not show ourselves too much in a hurry."

In a letter to Laforest, the ambassador at Madrid, Napoleon gave his reasons for disregarding his oath made to Joseph at Bayonne, when he named him King of Spain. "When the promise was made, His Majesty had supposed that he rallied to his cause the majority of the Spanish people. This has not proved to be the case, for the whole nation took to arms. The King, chased from his capital by the people, had to be restored by French bayonets. Since them he has hardly rallied a recruit to his cause; it is the 400,000 French sent across the Pyrenees who have control of the provinces; therefore all the places belong to the Emperor by right of conquest. He therefore intends to regard the Treaty of Bayonne as being null; inasmuch as it was never ratified by the Spanish people. Let the King prevail upon the newly-assembled Cortes at Cadiz to acknowledge him as their sovereign, and to break with England. If that be done, the Emperor may revert to his first intentions, and ratify the Treaty of Bayonne, except that he must insist on a rectification of frontier sufficient to give him certain indispensable positions."2

Joseph was driven to despair by the brother's intentions. "The

1. Correspondence De Napoléon, V. 21, p. 95.
2. Ibid. p. 261-262.
Spanish nation," he wrote, "is more compact in its opinions, its pre-
judices, its national egotism, than any other people of Europe. There
are no Catholics nor Protestants here, no new or old Spaniards; and
they will all suffer themselves to be cut to pieces rather than allow
the realm to be dismembered. My only chance here is to be authorized
to announce that the promise that Spain should not be dismembered
will be kept. If that is granted, and the generals who have misbe-
haved are recalled to France, all may be repaired. If not, the only
honourable course for me is to retire into private life, as my con-
science bids me, and honour demands."¹

The crisis never came to a head. The annexation of the Ebro
provinces was to be published only on condition that the French army
was in secure possession of Portugal, after the complete defeat of
the English.² At the Lines of Torres Vedras, Masséna was brought to
a standstill, with the result that Joseph saved his crown, and Spain
was kept from dismemberment.

Joseph spent the winter of 1810-11 in a state of mental anguish,
every day to be forced to publish his abdication,³ and
meanwhile living a life of shifts and worries, - selling his last sil-
ver plate to feed his courtiers, and exchanging an endless correspon-
dence of remonstrances and insinuations with Soult and the other
commanders of the military governments of the North.⁴ In particular
King Joseph complained about Kellerman's government. He states that

2. Correspondence De Napoléon, V. 21, p. 262.
4. Ibid., p. 371.
the general has set up a criminal tribunal which is very partial and corrupt. Furthermore he complains that justice may be bought, and that prisoners are procuring their release by paying ransoms.

As a result Valladolid was a centre of anarchy because of Kellerman's corrupt government. Napoleon made a thorough inquiry into the charges, and punished numerous officers for peculations and trafficking in prisoners. Napoleon stated himself that there were more robberies in Kellerman's government than anywhere else in Spain.

Joseph wrote to his wife, "if this present system is not changed, Spain will soon be a blazing furnace, from which no one will be able to extricate himself with honour. They do not understand this nation; it is a lion which one can lead with a silk thread by acting reasonably, but which a million soldiers cannot reduce by force. Everyone here is a soldier, if one tries to rule by military force, but everyone will be a friend, if one speaks to them of the independence of Spain, the freedom of her people, the constitution, and the Cortes."

While Joseph always talked about abdicating, the following letter from his friend Miot de Melito will throw some light upon his reluctance to surrender the crown. "It was easy to see that the name of King had still a powerful attraction, from which Joseph could not escape, and I wondered at the glamour and intoxication which hangs about supreme power, since the mere shadow of that power could over-

2. Ibid., p. 326.
3. Ibid., p. 334.
weigh with him so many rebuffs and so much resentment."

Nothing was done for several months, till in April Joseph, taking the opportunity of a formal invitation to become one of the godfathers of the newly-born King of Rome, the heir of the Empire, made an unauthorized visit to Paris. He started from Madrid on April 23. He made great haste on his journey, lest he be stopped on the way by orders from his brother. Joseph arrived in Paris on May 15 and presented himself before his angry brother. Then followed a series of interviews in which Joseph declared that he would not go back to a country where he was so badly treated, and where the administration was so irregular. He said, "My first duties are for Spain, I love France as (I do) my family; Spain as my religion. I am attached to the one by the affections of my heart, and to the other by my conscience." Napoleon, however, talked Joseph out of his project of abdication and assured him that the military governments would soon cease; that they produced a good effect upon England, which offered to evacuate Portugal, if the French troops would evacuate Spain; that England would recognize him as King of Spain if the Spaniards would.

The military commanders were to be placed under Joseph's orders; the Cortes was to be assembled, and the French troops were to evacuate Spain as soon as possible. Furthermore a loan of 1,000,000 francs was to be made each month.

Joseph returned to Madrid on July 15, and busied himself with the work of administration. A committee of five was appointed to

1. Quoted from Oman, V. 4, p. 218.
3. Ibid., p. 433.
bring the Cortes together. This was an immense task. Joseph was willing to let the people regulate the right of succession, but all hope of peace vanished when it was announced that Catalonia was to be annexed to France on January 25, 1812. Thus Joseph's planning went for nought, for the people feared that the rest of Spain would be annexed at a convenient opportunity. In spite of the promises made to the King at Paris, the generals would not obey Joseph, and went on their ways as before. They regarded themselves at petty kings, and each resented any interference with his proceedings in his own district. They thought chiefly of enriching themselves and their favorites at the expense of the people.

Catalonia was divided into four departments, with a prefect for each department. A civil government was substituted for a military regime. However, the military officers put all sorts of obstacles in the way. M. Roujoux the prefect of the department of the Ter found out that the garrison was plundering the people, and complained to the commandant, General Prost. The latter entered Roujoux's office and threatened to kill him if he forwarded any accusations against his men. At Olot a drunken soldier fired a shot into a peaceful group of Spaniards, and was roughly handled. The troops were sent to sack the town for an hour, and the municipality was fined 60,000 francs. The French prefects were everywhere powerless to prevent such outrages, in what was now officially French territory.

2. Ibid., p. 435.
3. Atteridge, Napoleon's Brothers, p. 297.
4. Ibid., p. 297.
under regular civil administration. What could a Spanish official do to check a French general in a district under martial law? The generals defied even the King, and levied contributions on the money forwarded to him from Paris. From a convoy of 500,000 francs in gold and silver, which passed thru Northern Spain on its way to Madrid, a general requisitioned 120,000 francs for the immediate needs of his army.1

Let us now turn to the Spanish Cortes which met on September 24, 1810, at Cadiz. Early in 1811, a commission was appointed to draw up a fundamental political constitution for Spain. In January 1812, the Cortes adopted the new constitution, which was expected to regenerate Spain.2 The ideas in the main were borrowed from the French. The monarchy was to be hereditary under the parliamentary system. The legislative power was vested in one chamber; the King was to be controlled by ministers responsible to parliament. The latter was to be elected indirectly on a residential manhood suffrage. It was to meet yearly. Under the new constitution the King was practically powerless. But when Ferdinand had been restored, he made light of the constitution, and by a coup d'etat, the despotism of 1807 was restored.3

At the end of March, 1812, Joseph was appointed commander-in-chief of all the armies in Spain, with Jourdan as his chief of staff. All political and military affairs in Spain were to be in Joseph's hands.4 As a matter of fact, Joseph's power was purely nominal, for

1. Atteridge, Napoleon's Brothers, p. 297.
2. Hume, Modern Spain, p. 175.
3. Ibid., p. 179.
4. Confidential Correspondence, V. II. p. 298.
the marshals completely ignored him. They refused to cooperate with him and continued to send war reports to Paris. Joseph could not remove any officer, and all he could accomplish, while Napoleon was in Russia, was to send adverse reports to the War Office.¹

Napoleon endeavored to patch up a truce with England on the basis of mutual concessions in Spain. Joseph was to convocate a Cortes, and to invite delegates of the insurgent government at Cadiz to join it, and then secure a vote recognizing him as King of Spain. Catalonia was to be given back to Spain, and the House of Braganza was to be restored in Portugal. The British and French armies were to retire from the Peninsula. But the plan fell thru, for England would not countenance it.² Soon afterward Joseph was forced to abandon Madrid, and later Spain, as a consequence of the battle of Vittoria on July 8, 1813. From that time, the French rule was at an end.

Summing up the French rule in Spain, we find that the military governments on the whole were inefficient and corrupt, inasmuch as the generals sought to better their own personal welfare, instead of working together for the French cause. Nothing definite may be said about Joseph's own particular government, for he was not given a fair chance to conduct it as he desired. Judging from his previous experience in Naples, it is safe to assume that if he had been given more authority, Spain would have enjoyed a better government than under the military régime. For Joseph appears to have been a man, who even in the face of his brother's wrath, desired above all things to improve the condition of the Spanish people.

1. Atteridge, Napoleon's Brothers, p. 298.
2. Ibid., p. 299.
Chapter VIII.

The French Offensive In 1810.

There is no doubt that Napoleon needed and desired peace for his war-ridden empire, but England would not acquiesce unless France should give up most of his conquests. At this moment it appeared as if Napoleon disliked arduous work, for he was loath to leave the comforts of Paris; and after the Wagram campaign he had ample opportunity to return to his armies in Spain. Instead, he was so confident of ultimate success, that he left the task to his lieutenants. Numerous reinforcements were sent to Soult, who was later superseded by Masséna. The Army of Spain was thoroughly reorganized. It now consisted of eight corps: the Army of Catalonia under Augereau; the Army of Aragon under Suchet; the Army of Andalusia under Soult, with Victor, Sebastiani and Mortier; the Army of Portugal under Masséna, with Reynier, Ney and Junot; while Joseph had the Army of the Centre.

Joseph now enjoyed a few months of comparative peace. In order to bring his kingdom under control, he persuaded Napoleon against his better judgment to reduce the rich province of Andalusia. That was a bad move; Portugal should have been freed first, and the English army decisively beaten; until that was accomplished, Joseph could not afford to leave the main project in abeyance. It was Napoleon's original intention to send an army on Lisbon, with Soult cooperating from the South, but fate ordered it otherwise.¹

Speed and decision was needed to reduce Andalusia, but neither

was forthcoming. Soult set out with 50,000 men, and encountered faint resistance in the beginning. The Spaniards under Areizaga were signally defeated by Sebastiani on the heights of Montizon. Malaga, Cordova and Granada were all occupied, and it seemed as if the French would triumph everywhere. However Joseph tarried long enough to afford the Spaniards sufficient time to fortify Cadiz, which was the main objective of the invaders. Without Cadiz in their possession, the French expedition was a failure. Instead of marching on Cadiz, Joseph marched upon Seville and took it on February 1. Satisfied with his parade manoeuvres, he then returned to Madrid.

Soult marched upon Cadiz, but it was already too late. After long deliberations, the Spaniards permitted the English to land a division of troops under General Graham, who prevented the French from taking the city. This was a great blow to Napoleon's Continental system. What Napoleon desired was to make Spain anti-British; his main object was to close the Spanish ports to the English, and now this seemed further off than ever. Soult blockaded Cadiz, and bombarded the city with 300 guns, but it was of no avail, for the city could not be taken with the British fleet behind it. That the Spaniards were on the whole indifferent to the progress of the French may be seen in General Graham's remark: "They wished the English would drive the French away, that they might eat strawberries at Chilana." In the meantime, Napoleon divined the true situation and cautioned Soult. "There is in Spain nothing dangerous except the English....If you leave on the Tagus too weak a corps, you will

1. Dodge, Napoleon, V. 3, p. 384.
2. Napier, Peninsula Battles, p. 61.
compromise the campaign.\textsuperscript{1}

In the meantime Wellington was perfecting his plans in Portugal, while Soult was wasting his time in pacifying Andalusia. It was for the French, and not the English or the Spaniards to undertake an offensive, and if Napoleon believed that the Spaniards would be worn out eventually, he misconstrued the national character as well as the strength of the English. By April, Wellington had concentrated 30,000 British and Portuguese troops, all under British officers. Elaborate preparations were made to lay waste the land to oppose any French invasion.

Napoleon deliberated a long time before he could find a suitable leader for his new offensive. Masséna seemed to be the only logical candidate. Junot was brilliant but unsteady; Soult had shown lack of energy; Ney was a brilliant officer, but restless in temper. Masséna was a soldier of considerable worth and had seen much service under Napoleon. Although tired of war, he was finally persuaded by Napoleon to take the supreme command, with the understanding that he be furnished with a sufficient number of troops. Masséna reached Salamanca in May. He reorganized his army so that it soon became a vital force.

There was friction from the very start, for Masséna was disliked by Ney and Junot, who wished to march straight on Lisbon, contrary to Masséna's orders. By order of Napoleon, Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo were to be taken first. This task was left to Ney, who possessed great energy and boldness when left to himself. Great difficulty was experienced in procuring siege material, but when it be-

\textsuperscript{1} Dodge, \textit{Napoleon}, V. 3, p. 385.
came available, Ney proceeded upon his task with great rapidity and success. Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered on July 10, after its commander Herrasti made a spirited resistance to the French bombardments.¹ Ney then advanced on Almeida, which was defended by 6,000 Portuguese and a small British force. The garrison was forced to surrender on August 27, when the citadel was destroyed by an explosion of its magazine.² Thus Ney seized the most important door in the north of Portugal.

In accordance with his plans, Wellington preferred to maintain the defensive, rather than the offensive. Aware that French success depended not only upon good roads, but victual along these roads, he devastated the entire district in which they were to operate. Mills and bridges were destroyed, cattle were driven away, and all provisions were carried off by the populace, which retired towards the Torres Vedras lines. The orders of Wellington had produced a desert. Unhappy Portugal suffered much more from its allies than from the invaders, at least for the time being.

Masséna undertook his great advance in earnest during the month of September. His forces amounted to 64,000 men and 84 guns. Masséna however, moved too slowly to suit Napoleon, who wrote to Berthier on September 29. "Make him understand that it is my intention that he should attack and overturn the British. It is ridiculous if 25,000 English should hold in the balance 60,000 French. I am too distant, and the position of the enemy changes too often, for me to give counsel in the manner of delivering the attack, but it is

1. Napier, Peninsula War, p. 277.
2. Ibid, p. 298.
certain that the enemy is out of condition to resist.\(^1\)

In order to strengthen the morale of the British troops and his allies, which had suffered by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, Wellington determined to make a stand at Busaco. The position was well selected; it was suited for the defensive tactics which he had employed at Talavera. The position should have been turned, and not attacked, but the French were so eager to fight, that they had forgotten the lesson at Talavera.

Early in the morning of September 27, Reynier advanced in two columns up the San Antonio road. He delivered his assault fearlessly, but try as they would, the French could not live thru the storm of grape and canister which hurled them back, as they reached the summit all out of breath and in disorder. There was no time for any grand tactics, it was simply the assault of a fortified position, where fresh troops succeeded in checking their assailants by their heavy volleys.

Two hours later Ney delivered his usual impetuous attack; here again the English had the advantage in being fresh, and able to mass troops where it was necessary. The French were hurled back and suffered a total loss of 4,500; the allies lost but 1,300.\(^2\) Masséna found himself in a bad position, for his supplies were low, and the country was not suited for a advance. A retreat at this moment might have degenerated into a most disastrous rout. Luckily for Masséna, a peasant informed him of a road which led across the hills by the Boyalva Pass to the West. It tapped the main road from Oporto.

to Coimbra, and by some misadventure the allies had failed to secure it.\(^1\) To conceal his flanking movement, Masséna indulged in some skirmishing before Busaco on the next day, but Wellington made no reply. The latter perceived Masséna's object and retired upon Torres Vedras.

The French found no inhabitants; everyone has been forced to leave upon pain of death, and from Celorico to Lisbon there was not a mouthful, except what the fleeing Portuguese had been unable to carry away and had hidden or buried.\(^2\) Under these circumstances, Masséna's campaign could promise little success. It was evident that an army could not subsist in a desert. Masséna faced the enemy's lines but he did not dare to venture an attack. His forces were so arranged that they could be assembled within four hours; and in view of this his lieutenants counselled retreat, but Masséna would not listen until his orders were countermanded. Affairs went from bad to worse. In a few weeks Masséna had exhausted the entire country, and was at his wit's end. Every living thing was eaten up. Discipline almost ceased; it could not be enforced when men were dying of hunger. Under these conditions, it was hard to keep the men together, and many deserted.

In his haste, Masséna followed Wellington towards Lisbon, for he was entirely ignorant of the Torres Vedras lines, a secret which was not generally known even in England. Lisbon is situated on a peninsula between the Tagus and the sea. Back of the city, across this peninsula, rise two low ranges some twenty-five miles long. It

was on these that the lines were constructed, with a third one in the rear to protect an embarkation, should the other two be forced. These extraordinary works, the revival of an antiquated system, but well adapted to the conditions, consisted of eighty-seven connected redoubts mostly closed by palisades, held by 60,000 men and mounting 290 guns.¹ Hill was on the right, Crawford in the centre, Leith and Picton on the left. With the sea for base, sure of food and supplies, the allies within these lines could laugh the French to scorn. In Wellington's case discretion was the better part of valor. The French army had accomplished wonders in victualling; in a letter to Lord Liverpool, Wellington said that he could not have victualled a single division where the French had fed 60,000 men and 20,000 animals more than two months.²

Although Spain was cleared of the British by the end of 1810, Napoleon's situation in Europe was far from being satisfactory. The Continental System was not succeeding as well as the Emperor would like, and by this time, Russia became dissatisfied because of the Treaty of Vienna and the marriage with Maria Louisa. Russia could not purchase any manufactured goods, nor could she dispose of her surplus grain. Smuggling was resorted to on a large scale; and ill-feeling was increased by the seizure of Lübeck by Napoleon, and especially the provinces added to the Duchy of Warsaw. The Treaty of Tilsit was a dead letter, and at the close of 1810, Russia and France were antagonistic. Napoleon always deemed the Spanish situation as a minor operation, and instead of going to the Peninsula himself to

1. Dodge, Napoleon, V. 3, p. 393-94.
2. Ibid, p. 397.
bring matters to a definite conclusion, he was content to languish at Paris, and make preparations against Russia.
Chapter IX.

The Beginning Of The French Retreat.

By the end of March, 1811, Masséna had been five months before the Torres Vedras lines. Napoleon had already given him power to act as he deemed best. Conditions were unbearable and it was evident that he must retreat or suffer the consequences. The army was in no condition to fight; discipline was gone, and in order to get food the soldiers resorted to pillaging. On the other hand the allies were well-off and Wellington waited only for the retreat of the French before he would strike.

In the meantime Soult was advancing towards Masséna, who was totally unaware of the movement. On the way Soult captured Olivenza on June 2, after a siege of ten days. He then turned upon Badajoz, the most important place in Estremadura. Badajoz lay on the left bank of the Guadiana, and was well protected by a fort, and an entrenched camp. It was held by 10,000 men under Manecho, and possessed sufficient provisions and munitions for six months. In the night of February 19, Soult crossed the river and cut off a relieving force from the fortress. After a brave resistance, the commander Manecho was killed, and the command was taken over by Imas who surrendered the place in a most treacherous manner on March 11.¹ Had Soult left Badajoz alone for the time being, Portugal could have been saved for the French, but as Masséna did not know of Soult's operations, he was forced into retreat. What the Marshals should have done in the first

¹ Napier, Peninsula War, p. 330-1.
instance, was to concentrate their entire forces against Wellington, and not scatter their armies over the country.

Masséna was in full retreat by March 6. He felt a horrible desert behind him. Wellington pursued with rapidity and almost defeated the rear guard under Ney on the Ceira on the eleventh, and at Casal Nova on the fourteenth. Without Ney's superb defence, the French army would have been routed disastrously, and as it was, the army was sadly demoralized, and constantly diminishing in strength.

Ney desired to retire upon Almeida where provisions were abundant, and refusing to obey orders, he was superseded by Loison. Wellington followed closely, and defeated the retreating army at Sabugal on April 3. The French lost 300 killed and 1,200 wounded. Masséna was compelled to retire upon Ciudad Rodrigo, which was reached a few days later. Here the retreat ended, and after a short rest the troops were put into cantonments. That Ney was correct in his advice that Almeida should be occupied may be seen; for Wellington swooped down, and surrounded it before Masséna was aware of the movement.

However, Masséna did not intend to let Almeida slip out of his hands, and after a period of reorganization, he advanced with 35,000 men to relieve the beleaguered fortress. The English, numbering 30,000, took up a strong defensive position at Fuentes Onoro. Discord and lack of one head again prevented the French from reaping a victory. The French attacked the English positions for three days, and on the second day, it seemed as if the English would be turned.

1. Napier, Peninsula Battles, p. 75.
out of their position, but by superior concentration of troops, the French were finally defeated with a loss of 3,000 men. The English losses amounted to 1,800. Thus Almeida was abandoned to its fate. During the night of May 6, its brave commander Brennier cut his way thru the cordon of English troops, and joined the main army.1 After the battle of Fuentes Onoro, Wellington said that, "if Bony had been there, we should have been beaten."2

By this time Masséna lost the confidence of his army, owing to his quarrels with Ney, and was replaced by the much less able Marmont, who was to work under Soult's orders. Thus ended the military career of a famous general. He had accomplished everything he possibly could, but since the Emperor did not fulfill his part, nor his lieutenants either, the task assigned to him was impossible. Wellington's skillful management, added to his ability in employing Fabian tactics, had secured Portugal against the French. From now on, the English kept the country and it their base; and it is most probable that Russia was encouraged to rebel against French domination because of the failure in the Peninsula.

The year 1812 opened favorably for Wellington, because Napoleon recalled many of his best officers and troops from Spain, for service in Russia. As a result the French were considerably weakened, and Wellington took advantage of their weakness by taking Ciudad Rodrigo after a siege of twelve days.3 Marmont collected an army of 60,000 men, but made no effort to recapture Ciudad Rodrigo. Wellington took

1. Napier, Peninsula War, p. 347.
3. Napier, Peninsula Battles, p. 132.
advantage of Marmont's inactivity and besieged Badajoz. The French

garrison of 5,000 under Phillipson was well-prepared to withstand a
long siege, and for a long time it foiled all efforts to take the
fortress. However the French could not keep up their valiant efforts
without outside assistance, and on April 5, the walls were pierced
sufficiently to warrant a general assault. 18,000 British took part
in the assault. The garrison fought nobly, for they did not care to
be confined in English prison ships. The British encompassed the
walls and chopped down the gates; they entered the town and after the
fiercest of fighting, the remnants of the garrison were forced to
surrender. The victory although brilliant was costly; 5,000 British
fell, 3,500 of them falling in the final assault. The defence was a
compliment to French arms.

Wellington then proceeded to lay siege to the three forts at
Salamanca. Marmont and Soult united to relieve the forts with 40,000
men. After some manoeuvring back and forth, Marmont withdrew to a
distance and watched the attack upon the forts, which fell to Well-
ington on July 23. Then Marmont retreated. Instead of retreating
he should have offered instant battle to the English who were in des-
perate straits. Wellington said. "I have never been in such distress
as at present, and some serious misfortune must happen if the govern-
ment does not attend seriously to the subject and supply us regularly
with money. The arrears and distresses of the Portuguese government
are a joke to us, and if our credit was not better than theirs we
should certainly starve. As it is, if we don't find means to pay our
bills for butcher's meat there will be an end to the war at once." 2

1. Napier, Peninsula Battles, p. 168.
2. Ibid, p. 197.
Had Marmont only taken advantage of Wellington's plight, the French cause in Spain would have been different.

Although Marmont outmarched and outflanked Wellington, yet he would not take full advantage of his opportunities. At last the two forces met at Salamanca. They were almost equal in numbers, and to use a French officer's expression, "40,000 men were defeated in forty minutes by the English."\(^1\) The battle was hotly contested on both sides, but was won by the English because they possessed more reserves. Thus terminated the Salamanca operations, which produced the following results. On the 18th of July, Marmont's army of 40,000 men with seventy-four guns, passed the Duero to attack the allies. On the 30th it repassed that river in defeat, having in those twelve days marched two hundred miles, and fought three combats and a general battle, in which over 11,000 men were killed, wounded or captured. In the same period the allies with 46,000 men and sixty guns, marched one hundred and sixty miles, and lost 6,500 men killed and wounded.\(^2\)

After Marmont's defeat, Wellington entered Madrid on August 5, where he was gladly received by the populace. In the following year, June, 1813, the French were routed at Vittoria, with the result that French domination in Spain came to an end. Napoleon was not discouraged by these events, and desired to make peace with Russia and England on the basis of the integrity and independence of Spain under the existing dynasty, and the rehabilitation of Portugal under its old rulers. Murat was to keep Naples; the Bourbons Sicily; the rest

2. Ibid, p. 198.
to stay on the basis of "let him keep who can."\(^1\) In a way it was immaterial to him who ruled in Madrid. But the proposals would not satisfy England, for the victories during 1812-1813 encouraged the English, who wished to deprive Napoleon of most of his conquests. How their ambition succeeded, is well known. After Vittoria, events succeeded each other in rapid confusion. The French were driven out of Spain by Wellington, who followed them into France.

Bibliography.

1. Atteridge, Hilliard., *Napoleon's Brothers*. London, 1909. Mr. Atteridge has written an excellent work based upon authentic facts. His style is interesting and at the same time very critical.


5. Correspondence De Napoléon Ier. 32 vols. Paris, 1858-1870. Published by order of Napoleon III. It contains over 22,000 official letters, which reveal his activities in great detail.

6. Dodge, Theodore Ayrault., *Napoleon*. Boston, 1904. 4 vols. A critical work dealing with Napoleon's military activities. Although written from a French point of view, it is nevertheless of considerable value.

7. Du Casse, Mémoires Et Correspondance Politique Et Militaire Du Roi Joseph. 10 vols. Paris, 1855. Publié, Annotés et Mis en Ordre par Baron A. Du Casse. A very important work on this period. It is well written, but not as critical as to say it should be, probably having too much in favor of Joseph.
The work deals mostly with the military operations.


16. Latimer, Spain In The Nineteenth Century, Chicago, 1907. Not a very critical work. However, it has some excellent passages in the first three chapters.


19. Napier, Sir W. The Peninsula War. Oxford, 1836. One of the best sources of this period. Sir William was an eyewitness in the Peninsular War, and therefore his work is of primary importance. His style is admirably clear and concise. Although accused by Oman of being partial to the French, his work is critical and he analyses the situation
judicially, putting the blame where it belongs, and bestowing praise where it is merited.

20. Napier, Sir W. Peninsula Battles. London, 1869. This volume deals with several of the more important campaigns in great detail and precision.


22. Oman, Charles, A History of The Peninsular War, 5 vols. Oxford, 1902-1914. Oman's monumental work on the Peninsular War is by far the best of the secondary sources. However, it has not been used extensively in the preparation of this thesis, because it was deemed wiser to leave Oman alone as much as possible, and consult the sources and other secondary works.