The Origin of the First Dutch War of the Restoration
THE ORIGIN OF THE FIRST DUTCH WAR OF THE RESTORATION

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THESIS FOR DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS IN HISTORY

IN THE

COLLEGE OF LITERATURE AND ARTS

OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

1906
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

June 1, 1906

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

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OF Bachelor of Arts in History

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CONTENTS

Introduction

Part I.
Period of the Commonwealth and Protectorate.

Part II.
Period of the Restoration.

Chapter I.
Commercial and Foreign Policy of the Restoration.

Chapter II.
Development of the War Policy in England.

Conclusion.
THE ORIGIN OF THE FIRST DUTCH WAR OF THE RESTORATION

Introduction

The study of the conditions and forces which led up to the First Dutch War of the Restoration 1665-7, seems to have been neglected by historical writers and, so far as I know, no satisfactory account of the origin of the war has been written.

Lister\(^1\) has devoted some space to the subject, basing his account principally on the letters of Clarendon, Downing, and D'Estrades. As he did not have access to the Dutch Records, he failed to see the question from the Dutch point of view and was ignorant of some facts which could be learned only from that source. His general attitude toward the Dutch was somewhat influenced by Downing's letters, although he believed Downing and the Duke of York were the chief promoters of the war. He believed that the ostensible unsettled grounds of dispute were trifling, but that "private interests and private pique, the malign influence of powerful individuals concurring in the direction of popular feeling" prevented a settlement between the two countries.

Von Ranke\(^2\) believed the war was a great national movement, desired by the nation and undertaken from both political and merchantile motives; that it was an attack on the Dutch government, whose position depended on its Anti-Orange and aggressive Protestant attitude as well as an attack on the Dutch commercial monop-

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1 Lister's Clarendon II., 240-269.
He believed that Charles was at one with Parliament and the nation; also, that one of the chief objects of the war was the restoration of the Prince of Orange. Von Ranke believed the Dutch also were eager for war, and spoke of the obstinacy of DeWitt in the negotiations for a settlement, as he hoped that the war against the uncle of the Prince of Orange would draw popular hatred upon the Prince himself.

Airy believed the chief causes for the war were commercial rivalry and the irritation among the Dutch caused by the conditions of the Peace of 1654, aggravated by the re-enactment of the Navigation Act; also that the private interests of Charles were an important factor.

Lavisse devoted only a paragraph to the subject, but believed that the war was favored, in fact, urged on by the English nation.

Gardiner, the greatest English historian, believed the hostility of the two nations was due to commercial rivalry, which was increased by the refusal of the Dutch to deliver Pularoon to England according to treaty of 1654. He, also, mentioned Charles's personal ill-will against the Dutch because of the exclusion of the Prince of Orange from power.

These writers are about the only ones who discussed the origin and causes of the war, while the last three devoted only a few lines to it. These writers represent several nationalities and probably had access to different sources. While each presented his own ideas, which differ in some respects, they are unani-

1 Airy's Burnett's History of My Own Times I., 389.
2 Lavisse et Rambaud Histoire Generale VI.
3 Gardiner's Student's History of England, 589.
mous (with the exception of Airy and Gardiner who say nothing about it) in the belief that the war was popular in England, while von Ranke believed it popular with Holland. A study of English and Dutch records will not substantiate this statement.

PART I.

PERIOD OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND PROTECTORATE

The English Dutch War of 1665-7 was the first war which England waged from motives predominately commercial. She now became an aggressive candidate for a share in the world's commerce, which had been practically monopolized by the Dutch for more than half a century. After the destruction of the Spanish Armada, England was too much occupied with internal problems of Church and State to take advantage of her victory, and the supremacy of the sea fell to Holland. During the first half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch were leaders in trade and commercial enterprises, and had the carrying trade of the world. With the control of the seas and at war with Spain and Portugal, Holland gained colonial possessions and trading posts in all parts of the world, Africa, India, the East and West Indies, and the Americas. They conflicted with the English in the East Indies, which ended in the expulsion of the English in the massacre of Amboyna, 1623. In North America, they established a colony on the Hudson, although this territory was claimed by the English, who strongly resented this intrusion into their territory. Thus, by the middle of the seventeenth century, Holland was primarily a commercial country, ruled by men whose primary interests were trade. Her ships were to be seen on all seas, and she was growing wealthy from her colonial
possessions and carrying trade.

The English merchants had made a few trading expeditions to the African coast during the first half of the seventeenth century but, as they were unprotected by an English fleet, their losses from the attacks of Portuguese and Dutch were discouraging to further attempts. An English factory was established on the African coast in 1632, but was soon captured by the Dutch, who controlled a large part of the coast. By 1651, the English possessed two factories, Cormantin and one near Sierra Leone, and had invested about seventy thousand pounds for trade on that coast. England, also, had valuable possessions in India, the West Indies and North America, but had been so engrossed in internal affairs that she had given little attention to these possessions.

In 1651, England's ambassadors returned from Holland, indignant over their reception and the refusal of the Dutch government to accept their proposition for a treaty. Soon after their return England passed the Navigation Act of 1651. This act provided that no goods or commodities from Asia, Africa, or America, should be brought into any part of the English dominions, after December 1, 1651, except in English ships, whereof the master and most of the mariners were English; or in ships belonging to the people of the nation in which the goods were grown or produced. Salt-fish was also to be imported into or exported out of England only in English ships.

1 Calendar of State Papers Colonial 1574-60, 20.
2 Ibid, 383.
3 Ibid, 398.
4 Ibid, 1574-60, 8 67.
5 Scobell's Ordinances, II., 176.
This act, if carried out, must obviously have a most disastrous effect on the trade of the Dutch who were dependent on the carrying trade of other nations for a large part of their wealth. The profitable trade in slaves and other commodities with the English West Indies would be annihilated, and the gains of the Dutch fisherman legally ended as far as the English market was concerned. England further complicated the matter by issuing grants of reprisal against the French, then seizing Dutch ships and depriving them of their French cargoes. Thus, the Dutch trade with both the French and English received a heavy blow.

While there is no doubt the law was often evaded, the seizure of Dutch ships and their cargoes, and the refusal of the English government to negotiate with the Dutch embassy, created such a tension of feeling that only a slight provocation was necessary to bring about an open rupture. This occurred in the encounter of Tromp and Blake off the coast of England, which issued into the war of 1652-54. The English-Dutch hostility was fought out not only in English waters, but on the High Seas wherever the interests of the two conflicted; in the Baltic, 1 West Indies, 2 on the Atlantic and Mediterranean. A battle was fought between the English and Dutch fleets, which were stationed in the Mediterranean for the protection of trade. The English lost a ship and were finally blocked up in two ports by the Dutch fleet. Aggressive preparations were made on both sides for the possession of the African coast.

1 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1651-2, 425.  
2 Ibid, 374.  
3 Ibid, 391-3.
After two years of rather indecisive warfare a Treaty of Peace was drawn up in April, 1654. By this treaty, friendship and peace were established between the two nations. Neither country was to give aid to enemies or rebels of the other, but to use all power against them. Dutch ships must dip their flags to the English on British Seas. The States promised in a secret article that the Prince of Orange should not be elevated to the position of Stadtholder or Captain General. A board of arbitration, composed of an equal number of men from each nation, settled the questions in dispute. The English were adjudged Pularoon. 85, 000£ were to be paid to the English East India Company and 3,615£ to the descendants of the victims of Amboyna. Just recompense was to be made to the English who had lost ships and property in Danish waters. Equitable compensation was also adjudged the Dutch for losses in the East Indies and in European and Indian waters.¹

The hostility toward the English was none the less bitter and in the war which Cromwell waged against the Spanish in 1657-8, Dutch ships were frequently found carrying Spanish goods or Spanish soldiers.² Although the policy of the Dutch seems to have been outward respect and civility to the English ships,⁴ open conflicts sometimes occurred. An English merchant ship trading in the Mediterranean in 1658, met a combined fleet of Spanish and Dutch men-of-war, and was attacked, burnt, and sunk by one of the Dutch ships on which were many Spanish mariners. Many of the

¹ Dumont's Corps Diplomatique XII., 422.
² Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1657-8, 135.
³ Historical MSS. Commission V., 164.
⁴ Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1657-8, 144.
English sailors were killed and the rest taken prisoners.\textsuperscript{1}

The evasion of the Navigation Acts by the Dutch, also, kept alive the English-Dutch hostility. Although frequent reports were made of the seizure of Dutch ships in the West Indies\textsuperscript{2}, the merchants of St. Christopher complained that the Dutch had been allowed to engross the trade of the island to the discouragement of the English.\textsuperscript{3} The commanders of ships in and about London complained that the Navigation Act had been so eluded through various devices, that their trade was chiefly carried on by alien and foreign built ships, so that many English ships were laid aside and English seamen sought foreign employment\textsuperscript{4} (1658). In a petition to the Protector the merchants said, "the Dutch eat us out of our trade at home and abroad; they refuse to sell us a hogshead of water to refresh us at sea and call us 'English dogs' (which doth much grieve our English spirits). They will not sail with us, but shoot at us and, by indirect courses, bring their goods into our ports."\textsuperscript{4} The Customs Commissioners, to whom this petition was referred, admitted that Hollanders and other foreigners, under color of English bills of sale, had lately carried on most of the European trade with this nation, but that it was very difficult to obtain evidence to lead to conviction.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{1} Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1658-9, 122.
\textsuperscript{2} Ibid, 1656-7, 451.
\textsuperscript{3} Ibid, 1658-9, 473.
\textsuperscript{4} Ibid, 7.
\textsuperscript{5} Ibid, 1658-9, 8.
PART II.

PERIOD OF THE RESTORATION

CHAPTER I.

FOREIGN AND COMMERCIAL POLICY OF THE RESTORATION

So matters stood when in May 1660, Charles II. was restored to the throne of England. The new regime soon announced its commercial policy in the Navigation Act of 1660. This act confirmed and further developed the Act of '52 by more prohibitive and stringent measures, and was an open avowal of hostility to the leader of trade and commerce, Holland. Charles recognized the value of the commercial policy of the Protectorate and its popularity with the Londoners, whose interests were largely commercial. By adopting a policy which was favored by London, the center of power in England, Charles was strengthening his own position.

This act provided that no goods or commodities whatsoever should be imported into or exported out of any part of English possessions except in English ships, whereof three fourths of the mariners were English. Goods of foreign growth or manufacture were to be imported only from the places of their growth, production or manufacture or from ports where they could only or usually had been shipped. After February 1, no alien could exercise the occupation of merchant or factor in any of the English dominions or possessions. After April 1, all sugar, tobacco, cotton, wool, indigo, ginger and fustic from any of the English plantations must be shipped only to English dominions and laid on shore. All ships sailing from England, Ireland, and Wales, to the English plantations must bring their goods there loaded into England. The

1 Statutes of the Realm V., 246.
violation of any of these measures was to result in confiscation.

As England now openly assumed a position of aggressive hostility to the Dutch, the relations between the two countries became more strained. Holland had been supreme on the sea and carried the world's trade for more than half a century. As her colonial possessions and wealth, even her existence, depended on maintaining the control of the sea, she guarded it with all her strength. England had settled in the Puritan Revolution, the problems of Church and State which had occupied her attention so long and now sought a share in the world's trade and commerce. Her commercial interests and opposition to the Dutch brought about the adoption of a definite commercial policy, by which she would monopolize all trade into or out of any part of her dominions. As this legislation, if enforced, would make serious inroads into the trade so long enjoyed by the Dutch, it is not surprising that they not only disregarded but resisted it, and especially when encouraged by the English colonies.

Charles appreciated the value of the African trade and the necessity of supplying the plantations in the West Indies with slaves. He soon took under consideration means by which this trade could be secured to the English. On December 18, 1660, he granted to James, Duke of York and Lord High Admiral, the regions of Guinea, Binney, Angola and South Barbary, stretching from Cape Blanco to Cape of Good Hope, for the sole use and trade of the Company of Royal Adventures in Africa, which was on this date incorporated. The interests of the English and Dutch traders on the

1 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-3, § 408.
African coast soon conflicted and Sir Robert Holmes, who had served in the Protestant Revolution in the squadron of Prince Rupert, was sent out to the Guinea coast by the Duke for the protection of the trade of the company. Holmes aggressively interfered in the Dutch trade on the African coast, seizing Fort St. Andrew which was then held by the Dutch, and greatly hindering "the freedom of trade they had long enjoyed". The cause for Holmes's aggressive attitude does not seem clear. It may have been in retaliation for the seizure of the English fort years before, or for the resistance of the Dutch to English merchants who attempted to trade on the African coast.

The Dutch bitterly opposed these English interlopers (as they regarded them) in the territory which they had won from the Portuguese by conquest and treaty. The English quite probably desired to trade peaceably on the African coast and there was no apparent reason why the two could not trade in this long stretch of territory without coming into conflict. The national antagonism of the two peoples and the stubborn resistance of the Dutch to any encroachment on their commercial rights made this impossible. The Dutch protested to the English government against Holmes's actions on the African coast. The King of England disclaimed the proceedings of Captain Holmes, but promised to look into the matter and order that from henceforth nothing should be done to the prejudice of the West India Company. Nevertheless, conflicts contin-
ued on the African coast and the Royal African Company, in spite
of grants of ships and money from the state, did not prosper, and
was unable to supply the plantations with the necessary slaves.
Complaints were made of the Governor of Jamaica, who received in
the harbor a Dutch ship laden with negroes, which he bought con-
trary to the Navigation Act and wishes of the Council because
they were much needed. The English attempted to monopolize all
English and colonial shipping but found themselves unable to meet
the demands made upon them, and to compete with Holland with her
great fleets, skilled seamen, and superior trading capacity. The
English merchants and seamen were unable to supply the needs of
the mother country and her colonies, yet refused to allow the
Dutch a share in this trade. As a result, there was distress in
many parts of England's dominions, and complaints of a sudden de-
cay in trade came from all directions.

The King's attention was soon occupied with the complicated
foreign and international matters into which he was drawn. Port-
tugal had been struggling for several decades against the aggres-
sions of the Dutch in her scattered colonial possessions, and was
gradually losing one after another, which deprived her of her main
source of revenue. She was also threatened by Spain and turned to
England for an alliance. This plan presented several strong in-
ducements to Charles. It offered an advancement for trade, an en-
largement of dominions, and an opportunity to check the conquests
of the Dutch, who had secured control of Ceylon, Goa in India,

1 Calendar of State Papers Colonial, 1661-8, 5 205.
2 Ibid, 5 106.
3 Lister's Clarendon III., 112.
4 Historical MSS. Commission V., 151.
and "possessions of much greater value than all Brazil."\(^1\) As such an alliance might involve England in a war with Spain and Holland, Charles sought to eliminate some of the disadvantages before committing himself. He sent word to the Dutch, asking that he might mediate between the two countries. His aggressive championship of Portugal checked for a time, the Dutch aggressions on Portuguese trade.

The alliance between England and Portugal sealed by the marriage of Charles II. and the Portuguese princess, Catherine, was strongly opposed by the Dutch and Spanish.\(^2\) A treaty was finally drawn up by which Charles was to receive Tangiers, Bombay, and the sum of two million Portuguese crowns\(^3\) as a wedding dower, while he was to send troops to Portugal to assist in the war against Spain.

In May, the Dutch and Portuguese consented to refer their business to the King of England as umpire, and negotiations for a treaty were begun in The Hague. Sir George Downing, an able but proud, insolent, and unscrupulous\(^5\) man was sent over as Ambassador to The Hague in June, 1661.\(^5\) He found the two powers dispatching their business with extraordinary haste, probably to settle the matter before his arrival. He said "had I stayed two days longer, it had been dispatched before my coming".\(^6\) Downing soon intimidated the Portuguese ambassador with threats that if he did anything without the consent of England, the treaty would be disallowed by his home government\(^6\) and the negotiations between

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1 Lister's Clarendon III, 153.
2 Historical Mss. Commission, V., 158.
3 Historical Mss. Commission, Heathcote, 30.
4 Historical Mss. Commission, V., 170.
5 Lister's Clarendon III., 134 n.
6 Ibid, 134.
England and Portugal broken off. In this way, Downing secured almost complete control over him and postponed the settlement until the following year.

Downing objected to two provisions in the Portuguese-Dutch treaty. The Dutch were given the right of preemption in obtaining from Portugal all their salt. They were also promised all commercial and trading rights which the English or any other nation enjoyed in any of the Portuguese possessions. "It is past all doubt", Downing wrote to Clarendon, "that any privilege which the English shall have in common with the Dutch would be of little benefit to the English for the Dutch would out-trade them". He based his remonstrance on the claim that it was contrary to the treaty between Cromwell and Portugal, which gave England the monopoly of Portuguese trade. Downing's interference and aggressive insolence were resented by the Dutch, but their resentment was greatly increased when he attempted to replace the treaty by various substitutes which would frustrate or check, as would a treaty of peace, their conquests in the Portuguese dominions, and yet secure them none of the trade concessions of the proposed treaty.

Clarendon began to fear the Dutch might declare war on the Portuguese, which would also involve England, and as time went on he urged more and more insistently that Downing should adopt a more conciliatory policy. He was not sure but that the Portuguese could grant the Dutch equal commercial privileges without violat-

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1 Lister's Clarendon III, 137.
2 Ibid 157.
3 Ibid 147.
4 Ibid 235.
5 Ibid 157 & 162.
ing the treaty, but believed they should make some other recompense to the English. ¹ Finally he advised that the Portuguese ambassador should be allowed to sign the treaty if the Dutch were determined upon it. These pacific instructions were unwelcome to Downing and he neglected to execute them. Clarendon was forced to reprimand him and impress on him the necessity of preventing a war.² Downing was an unfortunate representative of the English government, for instead of conciliating the Dutch, he only alienated them by his intrigues, suspicions, and uncompromising attitude.

Other matters, also, made the relations between the English and Dutch more strained and it was difficult for De Witt and Downing, each distrustful of the other, to best further the interests of his own country. Holland, especially Rotterdam, was the refuge and meeting place of the religious fanatics, who were forced to flee from England and here they plotted against the English government. The English spies frequently wrote back to England that these fanatics were receiving aid and encouragement from the people of Holland ³ and even mentioned De Witt ⁴ as implicated in their plans. Whether there was any truth in these charges or not, they increased the tension and hostility between the two nations.

Charles's personal antipathy to the Dutch was probably increased by their ridicule and personal attacks on his life and character.⁵

¹ Lister's Clarendon III., 175.
² Ibid, 189.
³ Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1663-4, 405.
⁴ Ibid 1664-5, 140.
⁵ Pepys II., 68.
When Charles first came to the throne of England, he showed a good deal of interest in placing his nephew, Prince of Orange, in power in Holland. He sought the aid of France, who expressed a willingness to assist him, but probably had no intention of doing so. When Charles became more insistent, D'Estrades, French Ambassador in London, said the prince was too young now (being but ten years of age) but when the time came, the King of France would gladly co-operate in his behalf. Downing recommended that a provision in favor of the Prince should be included in the treaty with the Dutch, as they "would not hazard their trade upon that point only", but Clarendon refused to consider this. This question soon dropped into the back ground as more important and urgent questions engrossed the minds of Englishmen.

The mutual enmity of the two states was fostered by Louis XIV. through D'Estrades, "for", said he, "as long as they live in mutual jealousy and dissatisfaction, I shall be of more importance to each." Clarendon, however, was anxious to bring about peace between the two nations, for England needed peace at home and abroad until the new government was placed on a firm footing. Largely through his influence, a treaty of peace was drawn up between England and Holland, September 14, 1662.

This treaty provided for peace and friendship between the two countries, who were to aid each other against any enemies or rebellious subjects by land or sea. The King and States-General or their subjects were to do nothing contrary to the interests of the

1 Lister's Clarendon II., 241.
2 Lister's Clarendon III., 143.
3 D'Estrades I., 158 (Lister's Clarendon II., 244).
4 Dumont's Corps Diplomatique XII., 422.
other, nor would they aid, favor, or harbor fugitive rebels. They were to have freedom of trade and access to each others ports in Europe. The treaty and friendship were not to be dissolved by the aggression or breach of faith of the subjects of either nation, but such should be punished and full justice rendered, within a year if committed on this side of the Straits and Cape of Good Hope, in eighteen months, if beyond. Pularoon was to be restored to the English. All actions and claims for damages committed in India before January 10, 1659 were to cease (with the exception of the case of the Bona Aventura and Esperanza which was to be continued as already begun). In all other parts of the world, those cases which had arisen before March 4, 1654, were to be ended. All cases which had arisen after these dates were to be submitted for settlement to commissioners appointed by each nation.¹

The cession of Tangiers by the Portuguese had given England an added interest in the Mediterranean and during these first few years of the Restoration, she laid the foundation for her control over this sea. In 1660, a royal fleet was sent out under the Earl of Sandwich ² to protect English trade in the Mediterranean against the Algiers pirates. The Dutch were very suspicious and fearful of Sandwich's motives ³ and also prepared a fleet for the Mediterranean under Tromp.⁴ In 1661 England and Holland, in spite of their strained relations, joined in an enterprise against these pirates. Each sent out from twenty to thirty men of war to the

¹ Dumont's Corps Diplomatique XII., 422.
² Lister's Clarendon III., 156.
³ Ibid 139-144.
⁴ Historical Mss. Commission V., 170.
The two fleets, mutually jealous, thus kept watch over each other. England increased the tension by insisting that Portugal should not admit Holland to the same trading privileges as herself, because of her alliance with Portugal.

Sandwich was unable to gain control of Tangiers until January, 1662, when the Portuguese governor of the fort was forced to call on him for aid against the Moors. January 12, Sandwich secured the coveted port and England gained her first foothold in the Mediterranean. In the fall of 1662, Sir John Lawson arrived in the Mediterranean just in time to prevent its being blocked up by Spain in league with Guylan, leader of the Moors, and with Holland. All three resented England's entrance into Mediterranean affairs. The Spanish denied the English pratique at all their ports, but granted it to the Dutch with a good deal of ostentation. Nevertheless, Lawson had concluded a peace with Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis, by the end of the year.

In the meantime the Royal African Company had not proved a financial success. The Dutch considered the African coast, especially Guinea, as their own through conquest and prior occupation. They took an aggressive stand against all English traders in this region, and used various means and subterfuges to secure their end. They frequently declared the harbors of important trading posts closed, on the ground that they were at war with the natives for insubordination or destruction of Dutch property, and hence could not allow trade with these natives.

1 Historical MSS. Commission V., 150.
2 Ibid., 19.
3 Corlett, England in the Mediterranean II., 30.
4 Historical MSS. Commission, Heathcote 39.
5 Ibid., 150 and 165.
6 Ibid., 51.
until they had made reparation and submission. When English traders tried to break the siege (sometimes maintained by the presence of warships, sometimes merely a paper blockade), their ships were seized or fired upon, although in some of these ports the English as well as the Dutch owned lodges or trading posts.\(^1\)

It was seen that unless the King established the company on a firmer basis with a larger stock and stronger government, the English would be driven out of the African trade. Petitions came in from the planters of the West Indies complaining that if the Company did not supply them with the necessary negro servants, "the plantations will either be useless or they must take their slaves from the Dutch, which will utterly divert English shipping from these parts."\(^2\) Thus, the profit of the trade in negroes and African commodities, the development of the plantations, and the antipathy to the Dutch led to the reorganization of the Royal African Company.

January 18, 1663, the Royal African Company was reorganized, the debts of the old company paid and a new management formed with a joint stock of one hundred twenty thousand pounds, "for the furtherance of trade and encouragement in the discovery of golden mines and settling of plantations".\(^3\) The government of the company was vested in a Court of Assistants, consisting of the Governor, Deputy Governor and seven assistants, who had the management of all the affairs of the company. The company was granted the exclusive trading privileges (i.e., excluding all other English traders) in the territory from Port Galle in South Barbary to the

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1 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, 6 383.
Lister's Clarendon III., 279.
3 Ibid, 902.
4 Ibid, 408.
Cape of Good Hope, with power to confiscate the ships and cargoes of those infringing on their rights. ¹ Most of the grantees of the new charter were great nobles and powerful state officials, among whom were the Duke of York as governor, the Queen and various relatives of the King, Prince Rupert, Earl of Sandwich, Buckingham, Sir Richard Ford, Sir Nicholas Crispe and others. ¹ While the company was not exactly a state enterprise, most of the grantees were men of high position, who could use their influence to make it a profitable enterprise. The King, Queen, ² and Duke of York ³ held a large number of shares in the company and were personally interested in its success.

The Royal African Company began to prosper under the new management and during the year of 1663 employed more than forty ships and established about eighteen forts and factories on the African coast. ⁴ The whole trade, if unmolested, would yield as great a profit as any managed by English traders. ⁵ The King gave aid and encouragement to the Company by loaning them royal ships and showing them special favor in various ways. ⁶ This grant, however, included territory and trading posts in which the Dutch claimed the exclusive right to trade. The development of a large and active trade in this region on the part of the English was certain to result in trouble between the two nations and was a step toward the conflict between England and Holland for commercial supremacy.

¹ Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, § 408.
² Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1663-4, 184.
³ Ibid 1664-5, 7.
⁴ Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, § 903.
⁵ Ibid, § 554.
⁶ Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1663-4, § 389, 250, 314.
CHAPTER II.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR POLICY IN ENGLAND

In the summer of 1663, the mutual enmity of the Dutch and English found expression in actual warfare on the African coast. The Dutch resented this interference in their trade and determined to maintain their rights by force. ¹ When their protests and blockades were disregarded by the English, they followed their ships from port to port and prevented them from landing. They incited the natives against them, seized their boats, goods, etc. They blocked the ports of Cape Corso and Commenda with warships, although the English held trading posts there. At Cape Corso, which was one of the most important trade centers, the English and Danes each had a trading post. The Dutch gained possession of the Danish fort, ² and, as it was impossible for the two peoples to trade in the same ports, conflicts soon arose. The Dutch attacked Cormantin Castle, which the English had owned since 1651 and it was only saved by the timely arrival of Captain Stoakes, head of the English forces in Africa. ³

Valchenburg, Director General of the Dutch forces on the African coast, issued protests on behalf of the States General and West India Company, making it an affair of state as well as of the company. He complained that the Royal African Company was disturbing the Dutch in their lawful possessions which undisputably belonged to them (June, 1663). The English considered the

¹ Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, § 618 & 383.
² Lister's Clarendon III., 364.
³ Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, § 507.
⁴ Ibid, § 553.
rights which had been granted them in the charter of 1663 equally
infringed on, and instructed Downing to demand full satisfaction
from the States General. 1 The conflicts between English and Dutch
traders, came in time to be grievances of state and greatly in-
creased the national antagonism.

Downing had little sympathy with this method of trying to
settle the differences between the two trading companies. He said,
"this trick (of closing up harbors on pretense of war with the
natives) has not only been the ruin of numbers of the King's sub-
jects, but beaten them out of many mighty trades and will certain-
ly in conclusion utterly overthrow the English East India and Af-
rican Company if nothing be applied for remedy but 'words'. There
is nothing makes them here so proud as to have the English come
hither eternally with complaints, while their people are unmolested
and advance their trade. Better make no complaints at all, than
complain and have nothing follow. This is not the means to hinder
a war, but bring it on, by making them so far to presume to add
one injury to another. Pay them in their own kind and set their
subjects crying as well as his Majesty's and you will have a very
fair correspondence, and his Majesty will be as much honored as he
has been despised, for they love or honor none but them they think
can and dare bite them." 2 In this way, he increased the antagons-
ism between the two countries when a conciliatory attitude might
have settled the points at issue in a peaceable manner.

The news of the refusal of the Dutch East India Company to
deliver the island of Pularoon added to the hostility of the Eng-

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1 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-3, § 545.
2 Lister's Clarendon III., 249.
lish. This island had been awarded to them in the Treaty of 1654 and the necessary documents and despatches for taking possession of the island had been sent to England by the Dutch government. The East India Company neglected to take possession during the Protectorate and, after the Restoration, they again desired new documents for its delivery. Their request was granted on the condition that the King would assure the Dutch by proper act that the terms of the treaty with Cromwell would be observed, but until such provision was made, the Dutch refused to restore the island. This was provided for in the Treaty of 1662, and the Dutch then sent orders to England for its delivery. ¹ De Witt claimed that the Dutch East India Company and their servants had always been ready, since the treaty, to deliver the island. ¹ The Dutch governor in Pularoon, however, refused to deliver the island to the representatives of the English East India Company, who were sent out to take possession.

News, also, reached London in the fall of 1663 that the Dutch had seized two English ships in India, the Hopewell and the Leopard, which was a royal flagship. ³ The Dutch justified their action on the ground that these ships were bound for ports which had submitted to Dutch control and were closed to the trade of others. The question of the five ships (the Hopewell and Leopard, taken in Indian waters, the Charles, James, and Mary, seized on the African coast) and of the two ships (the Bona Aventura and Esperanza) were grievances for which England demanded restitution in the negotiations for a settlement between the two nations.

¹ Brieven de J. De Witt, 412-3.
² Lister's Clarendon III., 256.
³ Ibid 292-8.
The Bona Aventura and Esperanza dispute was a heritage of the Commonwealth and Protectorate. These ships had been seized by the Dutch in 1643, while on a trading voyage to India. Pindar, to whom they had been assigned by the original owners, sued the Dutch East India Company for damages before the Court at Amsterdam (1645). While the case was before the court, Courten, the heir of the original owner, compromised with the company, notwithstanding the assignment, and indemnified the company against other claimants. On Pindar's death, his executor brought his claims before the English and Dutch Commissioners, who were appointed in 1654 to arbitrate questions of dispute. The commissioners were unable to settle the question within the three months required by the treaty, and it was referred to the Swiss cantons. In 1662 the question was still unsettled and the treaty of that year provided that the case should be continued as already begun. Certain legal technicalities and the proper interpretation of the clause in the treaty which referred to the question were matters of dispute and so the case was prolonged.

In 1663 the English found their commercial ventures on the African Coast and in the East a failure with prospects of being driven entirely out of this trade. They now turned their eyes westward to the Dutch colony in America, which lay between the Connecticut and Delaware Rivers. This little colony had managed to maintain itself for more than half a century, in spite of the constant opposition of the English colonists. The first Dutch on the ground were probably the crew of Henry Hudson, an Englishman in the service of the Dutch in 1609. During the years 1609-14, Dutch traders came to the Hudson River to trade with the natives,
although this coast was claimed by the English in virtue of the Cabot's discovery, the charter granted to Raleigh, and the Virginia Charter of 1606. There is a tradition that Samuel Argall in 1613 secured from the Dutch under threats, a promise that they would come there no more, but whether true or not, it was not carried out. Before 1614, one or more forts were built and in that year the States General granted to a company of merchants for three years, the exclusive trade on the American coast from 40°-45°, which had been discovered by them and which was to be called New Netherlands. The States General must have known these merchants were not the discoverers of this region, which from the time of Verrazano to Pring had been visited by the French and English explorers. This grant was also a breach of international law which gave possession to the sovereign of an explorer, new land not formerly claimed by any Christian prince or inhabited by any Christian nation. In 1621 the King, on complaint of Argall, Mason and others, who had intended to take a colony to this disputed region, requested his ambassador at The Hague to protest to the States General against this intrusion into Virginia. They replied that they knew nothing of the enterprise.

In 1621, the Dutch West India Company was formed and the Dutch colonists spread over a large territory, to the Connecticut River on the East, the Delaware River on the West, and Fort Orange on the North. This expansion of trade and territory brought the Dutch into conflict with the English colonists and during the years 1620-40

1 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, § 177.
2 New York Colonial Documents I., 10.
3 Ibid, 27.
4 Ibid, 58.
there were continuous local feuds over boundary lines, trade, customs, and relations with the Indians. These disputes sometimes reached the States General and King in Europe. The Dutch, in memorials to the States General based their claim to this territory on Hudson's discovery. In a memorial drawn up in 1632, they spoke of the first discovery, by the Dutch, of the river "commonly called Rio de Montaigne or North River", unconsciously conceding their predecessors by the use of the French and English names.¹

It is significant that the Dutch in their complaints to the King of England did not base their claims to Manhattan or to trading privileges in this region on prior discovery, but on the purchase of the island from the Indians and long continued trade there.² The king denied that the Indians were bona fide possessors and able to dispose of the land,³ and considered the Dutch usurpers in this region. In 1632, he declared that "if the Dutch remained there without his license, they will impute it to themselves if hereafter they suffer".⁴

When in 1663, the English government began to seriously investigate the matter, they found that the Dutch colony of New Netherlands was a serious menace to their trading interests. The Farmers of Customs stated that over 10,000£ a year in customs were lost by the traders of the Southern plantations carrying their tobacco to the Dutch plantations and eluding the Navigation Act.⁵ The New England colonists claimed that their trade had been wrest-

¹ New York Colonial Documents I., 51.
² Ibid, 56.
³ Ibid, 58.
⁴ Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, 1574-1600, § 62.
⁵ New York Colonial Documents III., 47.
       Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, 177.
ed from them by the Dutch, "the miserable state of English interests crying aloud for remedy". The Dutch prevented the execution of the Navigation Acts by disobeying the law themselves and encouraging the English colonists to do the same.

Thus, in 1663, England saw her merchants and traders driven out of their trade by the Dutch in Africa and in India in the East, and in America and the West Indies in the West, while the royal income was seriously affected by the losses of the Royal African Company and the evasion of the Navigation Acts. The Government now made one great effort to revive her commercial interests in the East and the West.

The Council for Plantations, July 6, ordered that a statement should be drawn up of (1) the English title to the territory on the Hudson River, (2) the intrusion of the Dutch, (3) their deportment, strength, and trade and (4) means to make them acknowledge or submit to his Majesty's Government. A flourishing trade was set up with the Spanish in the West Indies. The King gave free license to Spanish traders and planters in America to trade with Jamaica, Barbadoes and the Caribee Islands. The Spaniards bought great numbers of slaves and "filled the islands with money". Dutch trade in this region was seriously affected by the competition in the slave trade with the West Indies, and by the frequent confiscation of their ships.

1 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, p. 622.  
2 New York Colonial Documents III., 46.  
England made one more attempt to revive her trade on the African coast and sent Captain Holmes out again in the fall of 1663 to protect the property of the Royal African Company and preserve their freedom of trade with the natives.¹

Constant rumors of war began to float about in the early spring of 1664, and Downing wrote in March that the Dutch "were beginning to take alarm at the great talk in England of wars with this country; but it is needful that they be quickened a little for they regard not words."²

The two countries maintained a very different attitude toward the prospect of war. Downing wrote from Holland, April 18, 1664, that "those who govern here have neither design nor desire to fall out with his Majesty. On the contrary, it is the thing in the world they dread most."³ "Already, the common people here begin to cry out, What! must we have a war for the East and West India Companies? We would rather pull them by the ears."⁴

In England, however, as early as February, "all the court were mad for war",⁵ though Pepys thought it a thing to be dreaded rather than hoped for. He said April 1, "the Duke called me to him and talked of the Dutch and I perceive do much wish that Parliament would fall out with them".⁶ A few days later he "discussed with the Duke on the condition of the fleet in order to a Dutch war, for that I perceive the Duke hath a mind it shall come to".⁷

The Committee for Trade gathered together the complaints of

¹ Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1663-4, 235.
² Lister's Clarendon III., 299.
³ Ibid, 305.
⁵ Pepys II., 98.
⁶ Ibid, 113.
⁷ Ibid, 114.
the merchants and commercial companies against the Dutch and drew up a report of their injuries, which "they resolved to report very highly". This report was read before the House of Commons by Mr. Thomas Clifford on April 21, and the House of Lords the following day. In this report were set forth the losses of the East India Company, Turkey, and Royal African Company, caused by the blockades of the harbors, seizure of forts, ships, and goods, and refusal to deliver Pularoon. Their total loss was estimated at 714,500£, "while a compensation of 4,000,000£ would be just for the loss of Pularoon". In view of these losses and the failure of the Dutch to make any satisfaction, both houses agreed that the "wrongs, dishonors, and indignities done to his Majesty by the subjects of the United Provinces . . . are the greatest obstruction to our foreign trade and that his Majesty be moved to take some speedy and effectual courses for their redress and prevention of the like in the future. Both houses unanimously pledged their lives and fortunes against all opposition. The King expressed his satisfaction with the action of the two Houses and said that he would have his minister at The Hague demand reparation from the Dutch, but if justice were denied, he would then rely on the promises of both houses to stand by him. It might be noted here that while the House of Commons consisted of over four hundred members, only about one hundred fifty were voting in April of 1664, which might indicate that those not in sympathy with the policy of the leaders were staying away.

1 Pepys II., 119.
2 Lord's Journals, 599.
3 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1663-4, 571.
The career of Mr. Thomas Clifford is significant, because of his rapid rise in royal favor from this time on. Previous to his appearance before Parliament in April 1664, he seems to have been a comparatively unknown man. He was chosen by the Committee of Trade to lay the grievances of the English merchants before Parliament, probably because he was a good speaker, and could present the matter effectively. The unanimous vote of Parliament may testify to his success. October 11, Pepys said he heard one Sir Thomas Clifford speak that day, "whom yet I knew not, but do speak very well and neatly." Clifford, then within six months after his appearance before Parliament, had been knighted by the King, though he was still comparatively obscure since Pepys did not know him yet. He rose rapidly into prominence after this. In December 1664 he was Commissioner for the Sick and Wounded and in August 1665, he was sent as an envoy to Denmark.

With the assurance that he was backed by Parliament, Charles now began to aggressively assert English claims and interests. On March 12, 1664, he had granted to the Duke of York that territory lying between the St. Croix River and Pemaquid, and that between the Connecticut and Delaware Rivers with Long Island, Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Island. April 23, two days after the vote of Parliament, he sent out a commission under Colonel Nicholls, with secret instructions to secure possession of New Netherlands and reduce the inhabitants to obedience to the King, that the whole

1 Pepys II., 174.
2 Calendar of State Papers,Domestic 1663-4, 112.
3 Ibid, 535.
4 Calendar of State Papers,Colonial 1661-8, § 685.
trade might be carried on by the English.¹

The news of the action of Parliament on April 21, created consternation in Holland,² and De Witt with several of his leading men immediately provided for a conference to adjust past and future questions. By May 6, the States General had resolved to settle the matter of the five ships under dispute, (the Hopewell and Leopard seized on the coast of India and the Charles, James, and Mary on the African coast) and were willing to accept a plan drawn up by De Witt and Downing for the future regulation of trade in Africa, India, etc.⁴ They could come to no agreement, however, concerning the Bona Aventura and Esperanza. Downing insisted that no agreement could be reached between the two countries unless satisfaction were made for these two ships.⁴ It too nearly touched the King's honor, he said, and the persons concerned had such influence upon him, and his Majesty had so engaged his word to them, that it was impossible to retreat in this matter.⁵ The treaties of 1654 and 1662 had left this question to be decided as it had been begun, a process between the two parties concerned. Downing now took it up and made it an affair of state. De Witt claimed that the matter was in a fair way to be settled in the summer of 1664; that Cary, acting for Courten's executors, had confessed to his friends that he had resolved to accept the Dutch offer of thirty thousand pounds rather than let the dispute continue any longer. Before he had done so, however, Downing interfered and

² Lister's Clarendon III., 314-8.
³ Ibid, 316.
⁴ Ibid, 319.
⁵ Ibid, 316-7.
forbade him to make a treaty without his consent. Downing, then made extravagant demands with his characteristic insolence toward the Dutch. He probably expected that the Dutch would be willing to make great concessions, rather than be drawn into a war with England. De Witt said it was impossible to yield to these demands which not only they, but the English also, knew were not just.  

Preparations for war now went on rapidly in both countries. Coventry, Secretary to the Duke of York was "now full of talk of a Dutch war", and with Pepys, Secretary to the Admiralty, began to lay in stores for the approaching conflict. Ormond returned from Ireland to supervise the equipment of the fleet of thirty vessels, and an order was issued for the impressment of ten thousand men. A good deal of enthusiasm seems to have been shown in the preparation of the fleet. The seamen offered themselves in such great numbers that the required number would soon be secured and the fleet was almost ready for use by the end of May. Most of the twenty-five new captains appointed to take charge of the ships, had served under Cromwell.  

In Holland quite a different spirit was shown. The Province of Holland worked with might and main to prepare a suitable fleet and by the middle of May had sixteen men-of-war ready for use. The other provinces refused to take part in the preparation for defence. Although "those of Holland solicited them mightily, they refused to engage themselves and spend their money to maintain the insolvencies of the East India Company". They "still hoped no

1 Temple's Works III., 91.
2 Pepys II., 119.
3 Lister's Clarendon III., 318.
4 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1663-4, 596.
breach would or could fall out; if the dispute was with the East and West India Company and violences done by them, they should be ranged to reason and give satisfaction, and not be maintained in their evil deeds at the cost and hazard of the country."^1

In April, Holland recalled Tromp from the Mediterranean and sent out De Ruyter in his place. In June, he met Lawson and "struck his flag and saluted with all demonstrations of friendship and was answered with the like in point of salute but not in the flag".^2

In April, news of Holmes's aggressions on the African coast began to reach Europe. His instructions had been to protect the property of the Royal African Company and preserve their freedom of trade, but he had far exceeded his orders. He first seized Cape Verde,^3 a strong Dutch fort, and replaced the Dutch by an English garrison. At Sestor, he met the Dutch general, Valchenburg and tried to reach a friendly settlement of differences, but failed. As he went down the coast he was continually opposed by the Dutch. Angered, perhaps by this opposition and the factors' stories of Dutch oppression, Holmes seems to have completely forgotten the purpose for which he was sent and begun a wholesale capture of all Dutch property he was strong enough to take. In January, 1664, he captured the island of Goree, the chief Dutch factory in Northern Guinea, and which controlled all the trade in this region. He captured the Dutch fort at Cape Corso, where he left a garrison, and also seized several other Dutch forts. He seized the Golden Lion, the chief Dutch ship on the African coast,

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1 Lister's Clarendon III., 322.
2 Historical Mss. Commission, Heathcote, 37.
3 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, § 954.
   Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 170 & 235.
and several others. The Dutch losses were very great, while Holmes returned in December with a cargo worth from two to three thousand pounds. News of Holmes's aggressions gradually reached Europe as ship after ship arrived from Africa.

The English government probably realized that a strong fleet would be a valuable possession when the news in full reached Holland. A fleet of twelve ships was almost ready for Sandwich and June 13, the King issued another order to the Duke of York for the preparation of a fleet of ships with others to second it; also an order for the impressment of two thousand mariners and the necessary workmen. Already a change in the attitude of the people of England was evident. In May, the sailors had responded to the call with enthusiasm and in great numbers. In June, Pepys informed the Duke that it would be necessary to impress the men to man this fleet.

About this time, the news of the loss of Cape Verde reached Holland. June 19, 1664, Van Gogh was sent over to England by the Dutch government to demand the restoration of Cape Verde, to settle the question of the two ships, and to keep the Dutch authorities informed of the naval condition of England.

About the middle of June, Morice, Secretary of State, and Downing expressed to Cunaeus, the Dutch Secretary at London, their concern over the fleets which were being prepared by both nations. If they were sent to sea, there might arise hostilities without

1 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, § 954.
2 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 170 & 235.
3 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1663-4, 614.
4 Pepys II., 128.
5 Brieven de J. de Witt, 365-7.
the consent or orders of the government. 1 When De Witt received this news from Curraeus, he at once wrote a letter to the English King and assured him that he would detain the Dutch fleet at home, if England would do the same. He requested an immediate reply from Charles in writing, promising that he would detain the English fleet at home on these conditions, for if he did not, he (De Witt) would be forced to send the fleet to sea to protect the fisheries and returning East India merchantmen. If the two fleets should meet, hostilities might break out contrary to the wishes of either side. 2 He assured the King that the ships already sent to the North were only to defend the fishing trade and to stay near at home - not to annoy the King's subjects. 3 Although the English first expressed concern over the meeting of the two fleets and De Witt immediately promised to restrain his fleet if England would do the same, there is no evidence that Charles sent such a promise. On the contrary "the King only laughed at this proposition, but yet was troubled that they should think him such a child to suffer them to bring home their fish and East India Company ships and then they would not care for us". De Witt insisted that peace could not continue unless immediate reparation were made for the attack on Cape Verde. The King began to be alarmed at the warlike preparations of the States and remonstrated against the naval preparations of both countries. Still he gave no indication that he would accept De Witt's proposal, although De Witt insisted that it was absolutely necessary

1 Brieven de J. De Witt, 305-7.
2 Ibid, 308.
3 Pepys II., 136.
that the King should assure him he would keep his fleets at home, for otherwise public opinion would force him to send the fleet to sea. On the contrary, there was every indication that the English would send their fleet to sea as soon as it was prepared. Van Gogh believed it was to be sent out for trade purposes with no intention of attack on the Dutch. Many of the nobles, the King, Clarendon, and others as well as the merchants, he said, were desirous of peace because the credit was poor, treasury was empty and the people were opposed to war.

July 1, De Witt declared that the failure of the English king to reply categorically on the matter of the detention of the English fleet, would lead one to believe that it was to be used. The States could not permit the English to have open field for an attack on their merchantmen, therefore the moment that the English fleet started for the North, that moment the Dutch fleet would sail. In case of hostilities, the Dutch believed they could show the world that they had attempted to avoid the conflict.

De Witt again demanded a written statement from Charles that he would restore Cape Verde and ships, if it were discovered that they had been taken by his subjects. The English government frankly admitted that the capture of Cape Verde was a great breach of orders, but "the Duke seemed inclined to pardon it on account of the courage and success of the attempt". The King refused to grant this request, as he desired to first hear what Holmes had to

1 Brieven de J. De Witt, 308.
2 Ibid, 309.
3 Brieven de J. De Witt, 311.
4 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 92.
say for himself.

By July 8, the King declared he could not keep his fleets at home because his honor was engaged. Van Gogh thought he seemed to be influenced by persons who for peculiar reasons did not want peace. The Duke assured Van Gogh that he had given orders not to attack the Dutch fleets and that there was no intention of injuring the subjects of the Provinces.

The French King, who in April 1662, had made a treaty of alliance with the Dutch, now began to be seriously concerned at the warlike preparations of both states. By this treaty, each had engaged that in case either should be injured or attacked by another country, the ally, which was not involved in the rupture, should break with the aggressor within four months after the first requisition. During this period, her ambassadors should do all in their power to mediate between the two hostile nations and give powerful aid to her ally.

France had no desire to become involved in a war with England, so on July 7, the French ambassador offered mediation to the States. By July 15, all the states of Holland except Zealand (which acquiesced later) had accepted the mediation of the French king. The French Ambassador at London then offered Charles II. the mediation of Louis XIV. for the settlement of the question of the two ships, which was supposed to be the bone of contention. He suggested that the question should be decided by four lawyers appointed by each side, and if they could not agree, it should be

1 Brieven de J. de Witt, 317-8.
2 Ibid, 313.
3 Dumont's Corps Diplomatique XII., 412-6.
4 Brieven de J. De Witt, 316.
referred to the Parlement of Paris. Charles is reported to have said the matter would solve itself without intervention. Thus, Charles refused every proposition which was made to prevent the outbreak of war. He would not agree to keep the fleets within their harbors; he would make no promise that he would restore Dutch property illegally taken; he would not accept the mediation of a third person on a question which it seemed impossible to settle between themselves.

In the latter part of July in 1664, there was no reason why the peace should not be preserved between the two nations, provided England desired to have it so. The Provinces asked for the return of Cape Verde (the news of Holmes' capture of their other forts in Africa had not yet reached Europe). Since it was admitted that it had been taken without orders, there was no reason why it should have been allowed to prevent the maintenance of peace. England had demanded reparation for her ships. Holland had agreed to make restitution for her five ships and accept the agreement for the settlement of future disputes. As for the two ships, Holland had tried by several means, as had also France, to settle this old dispute and England had refused to agree to any of them. Albermarle summed up the true state of affairs very well when he said it was not a matter of adjustment of differences but of larger trade for England.

July 29, Van Gogh wrote De Witt that all hope of securing restitution of Cape Verde must be practically abandoned, but added

1 Brieven de J. De Witt, 324-5.
2 Ibid, 327-8.
that if one could check the work going on on the African coast, the Royal African Company would be ruined. De Witt firmly believed the English fleet was to be sent out to Guinea to maintain their new as well as their old acquisitions. This letter may have suggested to De Witt the idea of secretly sending out a fleet to Guinea to regain the Dutch possessions on the African coast before the English fleet arrived. Or, some plan to avenge the losses inflicted by Holmes may have been forming in his mind during the months of June and July, and when he found it impossible to secure justice by diplomacy, but one means remained. As early as January, 1662, Clarendon had expressed the fear that De Witt might send such orders abroad as to produce war before England was aware of it.

August 16, 1664, a messenger from Holland passed through Madrid with orders for De Ruyter to go with his fleet to Guinea. So secretly and so well was this managed, that no one, except those concerned in the expedition, had the slightest intimation of De Ruyter's intentions until after his departure from the Mediterranean, September 27. From the sources at hand, there is no positive proof that De Witt gave these orders, but his later actions seem to justify this conclusion. Whether the plan was devised and executed by De Witt alone, or with his Junto or the whole States General is a question. When the news of De Ruyter's expedition became public, Coventry thought De Witt, alone, was re-

1 Brieven de J. De Witt, 332.
2 Lister's Clarendon III., 180.
3 Historical Mss. Commission, Heathcote, 163 & 170.
4 Ibid, 166.
5 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 88.
sponsible. Downing insisted that no such deliberation had been heard in the Estates, much less any resolution taken. Later orders for De Ruyter were decided on by De Witt with his Junto. Downing said that if his spy, which he had in the Junto, had been in The Hague in July, he would have known of De Witt's plan of sending De Ruyter to Guinea.

The Dutch continued the preparation of the fleet with apparently as much zeal as ever, but gave orders that the ships destined for Guinea were not to attack English trade, so long as the Dutch West India Company was not disturbed or attacked. This seemed only to anger the English more and they declared such a provision was not in accordance with the late treaty, so, the relations between the two countries became more and more strained. In response to a petition for protection, the King fitted out a fleet of twelve ships for Prince Rupert to convoy the ships of the Royal African Company to Guinea. A Dutch fleet of twenty-two men-of-war cruised off the coast near Ostend, and Sandwich hastened back into the Downs with only eight ships.

The Duke seems to have shown an unnecessarily aggressive attitude, especially since he knew nothing yet of De Ruyter's expedition. About September 1-6, he had an audience with the Dutch ambassador. He told him that, "whereas they think us in jest, he believed Prince Rupert, who goes in this fleet to Guinea will soon tell them that we are in earnest and that he himself will do the like here at home".

1 Lister's Clarendon III., 358.
3 Ibid, 367.
4 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1663-4, 66.
5 Pepys II., 162.
6 Ibid, 164.
In the early part of September, it was rumored in Amsterdam that De Ruyter had been privately ordered a month ago to go with his fleet to Guinea, but by September 9, the report began to die down again. When Downing heard the report, he asked De Witt where De Ruyter would go when he had cleaned his ships. De Witt said he would go back to Algiers and Tunis to ransom their people there.  

Downing suggested that Lawson should be ordered to keep a close watch on De Ruyter and wrote, "what if Sir John Lawson should have an order to meet Prince Rupert, thereby to make sure work, and to give out that he was returning home and not let anybody about him know the contrary till off all land? that would put an immediate end to that business". Whatever may have been the motives of the English government in the preparation of the fleet in the early summer of 1664, their motives were evident in September.

De Witt once more tried to form an agreement between the two states. He proposed that the Dutch should yield in regard to the five ships and that England should give full satisfaction for the Dutch losses on the coast of Guinea, in case it were found that Holmes had not been incited to take Cape Verde by the attacks of the Hollanders. This offer, he said, could not well be refused without openly announcing an intention to take the coast away from the Dutch by force of arms. The English government, directed by three or four persons, so Van Gogh said, refused the offer.

1 Lister's Clarendon III., 343.
2 Ibid, 352.
3 Ibid, 345.
4 Brieven de J. De Witt, 353-4.
We might surmise who were these three or four persons, who directed the English government and obstinately opposed and rejected all overtures for peace. Pre-eminent was the Duke of York, Lord High Admiral and Governor of the Royal African Company, who in April was determined on war, Coventry, Secretary of the Duke and Assistant of the Royal African Company, Bennet, Secretary of State, and the Duke of Albermarle. Several of these men were members of the Royal African Company and were interested in its success. Whether their private interests influenced their public position or their attitude toward the questions now arising between the English and Dutch is an open question.

In October, Clarendon again intimated to Van Gogh that, if the Dutch fleet were kept at home, a good settlement for the future could be made on the question of commerce. He said nothing, however, of retaining the English fleet at home. The Dutch still had trouble in raising their fleet, due to the lack of unity. Some of the towns objected to the necessary tax and some of the provinces refused to give the required number of ships.

October 13, Lawson returned to England from the Mediterranean and brought the news that De Ruyter had taken in a great supply of provisions, and with a fleet of ten or twelve ships had probably departed for the coast of Guinea, September 27. Three days later, October 16, news arrived that Holmes had captured Cape Corso on May 7. Van Gogh immediately forwarded these news to

1 Pepys II., 113.
2 Parliamentary History IV., 303-5. Clarendon says in 1664 that Bennet and Coventry brought the war on the nation.
3 Brieven de J. de Witt, 327-8.
4 Ibid, 270.
5 Historical Mss. Commission, Heathcote, 167.
6 Ibid, 166.
7 Brieven de J. de Witt, 375-6.
De Witt, who wrote that he considered the apprehension that De Ruyter had gone to Guinea miraculous and as having appeared at a proper time, for Prince Rupert was still detained and an accommodation might yet be made. ¹ De Witt, thus, shrewdly kept his own ambassador in ignorance of the truth, that he might be better able to negotiate for peace.

News of the capture of New Netherlands reached Europe in October, 1664. De Witt said "we hope here to avoid war but the failure of the King to declare categorically for the restitution of forts and ships in Africa, together with New Netherlands, will force us to hostilities." ²

About the middle of August, four English men-of-war had appeared off the Long Island shore and demanded the surrender of the "King's territories, at present usurped by the Dutch". Every Dutchman who submitted was assured of his life, liberty and estates, but those that opposed must suffer the consequences. Stuyvesant remonstrated and cited the Dutch claims to this territory. It is significant that he made no claim on the ground of prior discovery or possession, but based their right to this region on the various grants and commissions issued by the States General and on long continued occupancy. But the right of the States General to make these grants was questionable. Stuyvesant saw the futility of resistance in the presence of force from without and dissension within the town and was compelled to sign the Articles of Surrender, August 29. New Amsterdam then passed into the hands

¹ Brieven de J. de Witt, 375-6.
of the English without the use of force. The terms of surrender were very liberal. No change was to be made in the life, customs or possessions of the inhabitants except a transfer of allegiance to the King of England. This was followed by the capture of the Dutch Fort Aurania on the present site of Albany and of the Dutch forts on Delaware Bay, some of which did not give up until taken by force. The divided sentiment of the American colonies is shown in the fact that while the people of New England were pleased over the suppression of the Dutch, who were a serious menace to New England trade, the people of Maryland were much displeased, as it put an end to their profitable, but illegal sale of tobacco to the Dutch.

After Lawson's return, it was generally accepted in the streets of London that De Ruyter had gone to Guinea. The King called a council of the principal nobles and discussed the question whether to break with the Hollanders but no decision could be reached. The King and particularly the Duke of York were much offended over the De Ruyter rumors. Van Gogh wrote that he had "assured them it was amusing to suppose De Ruyter had gone to Guinea, ordered either by the States General, a particular province, or an individual," but added, "but this is not much for I know nothing." Two months, then, had passed since De Witt ordered De Ruyter to go to Guinea, yet his ambassador in England had not the slightest intimation of the truth. He ordered Van Gogh to make use of the rumor about De Ruyter to reach a settlement.

1 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, 6788.
2 Ibid, 6794.
5 Brieven de J. De Witt, 379-80.
6 Ibid, 383.
Clarendon refused to believe the report that De Gruyter had gone to Guinea, but the Duke of York accepted the popular sentiment. "It is a marvelous thing," Clarendon said, "that they can think that our apprehension that he has gone, can dispose us to anything but indignation, so they are not wise in letting us believe it, if it is not true." Clarendon was still disposed towards peace and wished the Dutch had "entertained a disposition towards peace sooner. They have too insolently provoked the king to such an expense that fighting is thought the better husbandry." In spite of his peaceful inclinations, he refused to consider the idea of returning New Netherlands which "had been usurped by the Dutch, who had no color of right to it, and the recapture of which was no violation of the treaty. As for Cape Verde, although it was taken without the least shadow of justice, the imperious way of the Dutch demanding it was not to be endured. If they sincerely desire peace, they will keep their fleets in the harbor, for if they come out, nothing short of a miracle can prevent fighting."¹ So, peace might be maintained if the Dutch made no protest against the seizure of their possessions, whether legally or illegally taken, and kept their fleets off the seas. There was not much choice for the Dutch between the two alternatives.

October 13, news came from Holland that Opdam's fleet was victualed and, as soon as the wind was right for the ships to get out of the Texel, Opdam was to convoy the Guinea fleet through the Channel,² in defiance of the small English fleet stationed there.

¹ Lister's Clarendon III., 346.
² Historical MSS. Commission, Heathcote, 167.
to prevent it. Accordingly, the preparation of the English fleet of sixty vessels was energetically pushed by the Duke of York, who decided to take command-in-chief of the fleet.\(^1\) Sandwich and Teddiman were sent to the Channel to stop the Dutch men-of-war.\(^2\) Penn was to join the Duke,\(^3\) Lawson went to Portsmouth,\(^4\) and Rupert set sail for Guinea, October 7.\(^5\) It is noticeable that the fleet was officered by men who had gained their experience and training during the Protectorate and were confident of English superiority on the seas.

The unfortunate Rupert was soon in disfavor with the home government. October 24, news came that he was windbound at Portsmouth and that there was much opposition and discontent among the men about going to Guinea.\(^6\) Rupert himself, was afraid to proceed on his journey because of the great Dutch fleet under Opdam and wrote to headquarters of the danger to which he and his fleet were exposed. Clarendon was much displeased with him, but ordered him to lay up the fleet at Cowes.\(^7\)

October 28, 1664, the King issued a "declaration for the encouragement of seamen" by which all seamen, whether on the King's ships or merchantmen, should receive 10s. per ton on all prizes taken by them, 6\(\text{f}\), 13s. 4d. for each piece of ordnance and 10\(\text{f}\) a gun for every man of war sunk or destroyed.\(^8\)

From September, there was a change in De Witt's attitude in

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1 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, 1664-5, 56.
2 Historical Mss. Commission, Heathcote, 170.
3 Pepys II., 173.
4 Ibid, 175.
5 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 27.
6 Ibid, 45.
7 Pepys II., 178.
8 Lister's Clarendon III., 348.
the negotiations between the two countries. Hitherto, De Witt had been an eager suppliant for peace, and had presented one plan after another by which the differences between the two nations might be settled. All his advances had resulted in failure. In November, when Downing tried to reach an agreement, De Witt said he would give satisfaction if it were done as he said. When regulations for the future finally seemed satisfactory to both sides, De Witt demanded that it must include regulations for matters in Europe, also. Downing had no orders to arrange for matters in Europe and protested against this demand, but in vain. It is quite probable that De Witt insisted on this provision because of the attitude of France at this time. France was bound by the treaty to aid Holland only in case hostilities broke out over the violation of rights in Europe, and the other country were the aggressor. Her ambassador now began to throw out doubts whether they would be bound to aid the Dutch in this case, since the quarrel was over matters outside Europe. For this reason De-Witt demanded that the agreement should include regulations for Europe as well as the outlying parts of the world. De Witt, however, seemed to desire to prolong negotiations. He may have desired to know the outcome of De Ruyter's expedition before committing himself. Or he may have believed that if De Ruyter were successful, he could dictate his own terms.

Downing pressed De Witt for the truth of the De Ruyter rumors, but he replied "that as to that he would say no more than he had done; that if we did believe it, that notwithstanding what

1 Lister's Clarendon III., 348.
Downing had said to the contrary, he did not think the belief could do any hurt.¹ De Witt would surely have tried to pacify the English by either denying this rumor or by saying he knew nothing of it, if he could have done so. Instead, he refused to discuss the matter at all, so that his silence seemed to indicate the truth of the rumor.

November 4, the King called Parliament and laid before them an account of the events of the last few months (April-November). He told of the naval and military preparations for the war which he was compelled to declare for the "protection, honor and benefit of his subjects." He related the English grievances and losses in all parts of the world, but failed to present some things in their true light. He said he had promised satisfaction to the Dutch, yet Van Gogh had tried for two months to secure a promise for the return of Cape Verde, which all admitted had been taken without orders; as for Cape Corso and New Netherlands, they had been taken by the King's order² and need not be considered.

The King also gave the impression that the Dutch first made the proposal that the fleets of both countries should be maintained in the harbors and said that "at the same time they made this plausible overture, they sent orders to their fleet in the Straits under the command of De Ruyter, to make all possible haste to Guinea to execute those instructions which they had given to their fleet here." The proposition to keep the fleets in the harbors was made June 17 in reply to a suggestion first made by the English, and De Ruyter was not ordered out to Guinea until

¹ Lister's Clarendon III., 348.
² Brieven de J. De Witt, 387.
August after the failure of Van Gogh or De Witt to secure the slightest concessions or assurance of satisfaction. The King at this time had no positive proof that De Ruyter had gone to Guinea, but merely that he had left the Mediterranean in September. So, he cited the many points of dispute and when he had finished, both Houses enthusiastically pledged themselves to assist his Majesty in the preservation of the honor, safety and trade of the nation, and expressed their thanks for his preparations for their defense against the Dutch.  

Parliament, however, according to Van Gogh was "composed largely of members devoted to the King and Court, eighty being dependent on the Court and many of the nobles having suffered with the King. Many of the other side absent themselves and Parliament will vote what the King desires."  

Rapin called it the "Pensionary Parliament, elected by the influence of the court and many of its members receiving pensions from the Court. The question arises whether this unanimous vote in favor of war was an expression of the will and sentiments of the people.

As early as June, a change was noticeable in the attitude of the people, in their unwillingness to co-operate in the preparation of the fleet. This developed into open opposition as the relations between England and Holland became more strained. Orders were issued for the impressment of shipwrights, caulkers, rope-makers, sailors, etc., but those pressed either did not appear or ran away. The Duke of York complained that two hundred had left the service within a few days, and every ship missed

1 Lord's Journals XI., 625.
2 Brieven de J. De Witt, 394.
3 Parliamentary History IV., 194.
4 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 52.
from twenty to one hundred men. Coventry and Middleton declared that nothing short of hanging would man this fleet, and sent a list of some fit to be used as an example in the several counties where they were pressed. Most of those who did appear, so the commissioners said, never saw a ship before and were more fit to keep sheep than sail in such great ships.

Complaints came in of mutinies among the workmen in the navy yard at Portsmouth and Deptford where the "shipwrights and caulkers worked very slowly whereby the service is much impeded where most expedition is required." Commissioner Middleton complained that he "met with very different husbandry in the King's service from what he was accustomed to in his youth." The boat-swains used "any rope, however unfit it be for service, the more masts lost the more profit for them". Complaints came in of the equipment of the ships. One ship lost all her masts through defect of her shrouds; the anchors broke and proved to be made of broken iron beaten over. There were many complaints of the rigging of the ships in general.

Delay was caused by waiting the leisure of "the base cross-grained watermen" employed in carrying the timber, and the commissioners met with no encouragement from the justices of the

1 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 52.
2 Ibid, 68.
3 Ibid, 66.
5 Ibid, 181.
6 Ibid, 189.
7 Ibid, 1663-4, 530.
8 Ibid, 1664-5, 204.
9 Ibid, 192.
10 Ibid, 25.
11 Ibid, 81.
peace in forcing these men to do their duty. In Gloucestershire, the men openly refused to carry any more timber and when the commissioners applied to the Judge, he refused to give an opinion. In Harwich, a list of able seamen in the town was sent to the Mayor but he would not cause them to be impressed. The mayor of Liverpool allowed nineteen vessels to sail from the port before the order for impressment was issued and then "the fifty seamen ordered from that town were chiefly taken from the plow". No help could be secured from the Mayor of Liverpool or the Earl of Derby, Vice Admiral. These instances show the attitude of men of various callings and stations in life, and display quite a different spirit toward the preparations for war from that expressed by Parliament.

In the Court, also, which had maintained an aggressive attitude toward the Dutch during the year of 1664, there were men strongly opposed to this policy. Clarendon had so strongly opposed the war "that the King . . . laughs at him for a dull fellow and in all this business of the Dutch War does nothing by his advice, hardly consulting him". The Lords of Northumberland and Leicester, members of the Privy Council, and Sir Robert Long, who held a high office at court, were strongly opposed to the war. Ormond, also, was opposed to the war policy. So, Parliament and the Court pushed on the preparations for war, although there was strong opposition to it among all classes.

In the early part of November, the Dutch stopped a Swedish
ships of masts bound for England as contraband, and refused to give it up. England claimed this was the first act of hostility\(^1\) and on November 15, issued orders to seize all ships belonging to the United Provinces.\(^2\) Large numbers of ships were soon brought in as prizes.\(^3\) November 25, an order was issued that dispatches should be sent to all foreign parts, especially Africa and America, announcing the seizure of all Dutch ships and that letters of reprisal should be speedily sent.\(^4\)

November 24, Coventry wrote Bennet that if the confiscation of the Swedish ship of masts were given as the reason for seizing the vessels of the Dutch, it might blind them a little longer and very good reprisals were taken. "De Ruyter's going out is the cause of the taking of ships," he said, "and therefore of war." England had no positive proof yet that De Ruyter had gone to Guinea, so the order could not be justified on either basis. The English government showed a lack of good faith in its dealings with Holland. Coventry said he could not see "why the Dutch ambassador should be told the King had resolved to set upon them; his ignorance might have been very fortunate."\(^5\) Downing thought it advisable that the King should do all the mischief he could but not declare war.\(^6\) Pepys was "at his office all morning (November 25), to prepare an account of the charge we have been put to extraordinary by the Dutch already, and brought it to appear 852,700\(^7\),

1 Pepys II., 185.
2 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 70.
3 Heathcote MSS., 170. Pepys, II., 186.
4 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 90.
5 Ibid., 88.
6 Lister's Clarendon III., 357.
but God knows this is only a scare to Parliament to make them give the more money".

The King commanded Clarendon and the Treasurer, Southampton, to meet with some members of Parliament and others, on whom he could depend, to decide on the necessary sum for the war and the manner of proposing and conducting the matter before Parliament. They decided that a large sum must be advanced to overawe the Dutch and any who might be inclined to aid them. They finally decided on two and one half millions and induced Sir Robert Paston, a Yorkshire gentleman, who was not a frequent speaker, and would not be suspected of being influenced by the Court, to propose this sum to the House of Commons. Accordingly, at an opportune time, Paston proposed that the sum of two and one half million pounds should be voted to the King for the war. The silence of the House was unbroken for a time, and they sat as in amazement. Another member then arose and, disregarding the former motion proposed a much smaller sum. Two men, who had promised to second Paston's motion, renewed and seconded the first proposal. After a short silence, the Speaker asked whether they would give the King two and one half millions for carrying on the war. "The affirmative made a good sound and very few gave their negative aloud but it was notorious very many sat silent." So the vote was drawn up into an order. When they met the next day to consider the manner of raising it, "they did not agree so well, but parted late in the evening with great heat". On the following day, it was concluded peaceably that the House should proceed to consider the

1 Pepys, II., 187.
2 Parliamentary History IV., 303-6.
raising of the 2,500,000£.  

November 30 and December 16, the King granted letters of marque and reprisal against the Dutch, and large numbers of Dutch ships were brought in. The Dutch fleet drew back into the harbors and refused to fight, though their ships were taken daily.

Van Gogh remonstrated to the King, who said he had ordered it because it was understood De Ruyter had gone to Guinea to disturb English ships and trade, and he had seized as many as he could to be held till further news from De Ruyter.

De Witt, again in December, tried to secure the mediation of France and hoped that a settlement might be made between the two nations. Louis XIV., through his ambassador at London once more offered mediation to the English Government, but his proposition met with the same reception as before.

An actual battle was fought between the English and Dutch fleets in the Mediterranean, although war had not yet been declared. In accordance with his instructions to seize Dutch men-of-war or the Smyrna fleet, Captain Allin of the English squadron gave chase to a Dutch fleet, December 13, but in the darkness ran aground and lost two ships. On the 19th, he again attacked a Dutch merchant fleet, sunk two and captured two ships.

December 6, Downing's spy in De Witt's Junto informed him

1 Parliamentary History IV., 303-6.
2 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 95.
3 Pepys II., 190.
4 Ibid, 189.
5 Brieven de J. De Witt, 411.
6 Ibid, 407.
7 Ibid, 410.
8 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 70.
9 Ibid, 106.
10 Ibid, 123.
that orders were to be sent to De Ruyter to go to the English colonies in America, when he had done all the damage he could on the African coast.\(^1\) December 22, 1664, the first news of De Ruyter's devastation of English property on the African coast reached England.\(^2\) In December, then, Europe had the first positive information that De Ruyter had actually gone to Guinea. The news of De Ruyter's actions and English losses created great indignation in England. He had retaken not only all the forts captured by Holmes, but had seized all English forts, ships and cargoes within his power.\(^3\) His expedition along the African coast dealt a heavy blow to English commercial interests and seriously affected, as well, the financial interests of the King, Duke of York and other influential Englishmen. Preparations for war were hastened and the King resolved to have one hundred and thirty ships before spring.\(^4\)

The French King was also offended\(^5\) when he learned that De Ruyter had actually gone to Africa, for De Witt had officially denied these rumors. Louis XIV. was very desirous of keeping out of the quarrel, and this seemed to furnish a good excuse. The French Ambassador now began to speak more dubiously of what the States General might expect from France.\(^6\) He began to investigate the matter to see if it lay within the treaty which bound France only in case England were the aggressor and the rupture were over matters in Europe.\(^7\)

1 Lister's Clarendon III., 352.
2 Pepys II., 193-4.
3 Calendar of State Papers, Colonial 1661-8, 6 986.
4 Pepys, 199.
5 Historical MSS. Commission, Heathcote, 174.
6 Lister's Clarendon III., 359.
7 Ibid, 358.
January 9, 1665, Holmes, who had returned from his African expedition, was sent to the Tower. The Dutch may have hoped even yet that their actions might be justified in the light of Holmes's testimony. His trial was made a "mere matter of jest," and it appeared plain to his hearers that he had done no hostility or damage except when first provoked by the Dutch and for aggressions which he could not but resent. 1 January 15, Williamson declared that there was no ground whatever for the false rumors that peace was intended, which were being circulated by the Dutch. 2

The last hope of the Dutch was gone, and in February many capers began to put to sea with letters of marque against English ships, 3 while a fleet of twelve or thirteen ships set out for the West Indies to exploit English possessions there. Letters of marque were also sent to Cadiz and Italy. 3 In February, England issued special reprisals against the Dutch to Sir Edward Turner, Speaker of the House, and George Carew until they had recovered the value of the Bona Aventura and Esperanza. 4 February 18, however, Sandwich with a fleet of twenty-five ships, returned from a cruise and could not meet with a Dutchman. 5

February 9, the Bill for the appropriation voted by Parliament was presented to the King for his assent. 6 The King now had plenty of money and a large fleet and pushed the war vigorously. February 22, he ordered that a formal declaration of war

1 Pepys II., 199.
2 Historical MSS. Commission, Heathcote, 174.
3 Ibid, 176.
4 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 231.
5 Pepys II., 212.
against the Dutch should be drawn up. This declaration was approved by twenty-two of the Privy Councillors, but Clarendon and Southampton refused to take any part in it. 1 March 4, 1665, a formal declaration of war was proclaimed in London "amidst the shouting and rejoicing of the people." 2

CONCLUSION

A survey of this period shows that the war of 1665-7 was a commercial conflict between the two nations, one seeking to gain, the other to maintain the supremacy of the sea. The beginnings of this conflict may be seen when England formulated the commercial policy expressed in the Navigation Acts of 1651 and '60. She first attempted to maintain a monopoly of all the commerce of England and her colonies. The attempt to realize this policy and the persistent evasion of the law by the Dutch resulted in conflicts and losses which produced a strong national antagonism between the two countries.

During the years 1661-2, England went a step farther and attempted to secure a monopoly of Portuguese trade in the East Indies and in Europe. She insisted that the Dutch should not be given equal trading privileges with the English in Portuguese dominions.

In 1663, she sought a still larger share of the world's commerce by vigorously developing her commercial interests on the African coast, West Indies, and America. This persistent attempt

1 Parliamentary History IV., 308.
2 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic 1664-5, 242.
of England to monopolize more and more of the world's trade, brought her into conflict with the Dutch in all parts of the world, for they strongly resented the encroachment on their trade supremacy.

The constant friction of the two peoples on the seas, finally issued into actual warfare on the African coast, where the trading interests of the Dutch West India and Royal African Companies clashed. The losses of the merchants and trading companies were taken up by the mother countries and became grievances of state. These differences might easily have been settled had England so desired. Her aggressive and uncompromising attitude prevented a settlement and war became imminent.

In Holland, there was unanimous opposition to the war. Both the government and the people were strongly opposed to it. The Province of Holland with difficulty equipped a fleet for the defense of Dutch possessions and trade, but could secure little help from the other provinces. The Dutch sought to avoid war by offering to restrain their fleet if England would do the same. England insisted that the Dutch fleet should remain within the harbors but refused to restrain her own. Holland then sought to settle the disputed questions of ships and trading posts which had been seized by the subjects of both countries. England demanded full restitution for her own losses but refused to recognize or promise satisfaction for those of the Dutch.

France then offered to settle the questions of dispute. Holland eagerly accepted mediation on these questions, which could not be settled by the two nations involved. England refused it twice. The "ostensible unsettled grounds of dispute" were trif-
ling, but the real difficulty could be settled only in a conflict, in which superior strength and resources must decide the result. It was not a question of settlement of differences but of larger trade for England.

In England public opinion was divided. The Government as well as the nation was divided on the question of war. The radical leaders of the English government, the Duke of York, Coventry, Bennet, and Downing assumed an aggressive attitude for the increase of English trade and were uncompromising in their negotiations with the Dutch. There were powerful men in the Court strongly opposed to a war with Holland, but the war party carried Parliament, the Court, and the King and repelled all overtures of the Dutch for peace. It is quite probable that personal interests and financial losses influenced the leaders of this movement in their attitude toward the Dutch. The war party quite probably represented the sentiments and public opinion of London but not of the nation, which was opposed to a war with Holland. Thus, England was drawn into a war with the Dutch by an aggressive minority for the increase of English trade and humiliation of Holland.
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