Ishnham

The Progressive Party of 1912
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INTRODUCTION.

Political history has two functions: to narrate and to interpret "past politics". This paper is an attempt to deal with a scarcely-closed chapter of American political history: the life of the Progressive Party of 1912. The aim throughout has been not so much to narrate the events in the life of the party as to interpret Progressivism: to show how it came to be, and what it has meant in American politics. Narration has thus been subordinated to interpretation. At times a detailed narration of events has seemed necessary to make possible intelligible interpretation; other periods and events have been passed over hurriedly, as not being of vital significance. Thus a large proportion of this whole study deals with the background, the beginnings, and the rise of Progressivism; because without an intelligent grasp of these factors the Progressive Party of 1912 can not be fully understood.

One digression has been made, in the intensive study of the text of the Progressive Platform; this seemed to call for somewhat detailed treatment, when the remarkable and all but unknown variations in the text of the Platform were accidentally discovered.

This effort to interpret the Progressive Party is, of course, by no means exhaustive; it is rather an attempt to place in proper perspective the main outlines of an important movement in contemporary American politics.
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CHAPTER I.

THIRD-PARTY PREDECESSORS OF THE PROGRESSIVES.

The Progressive Party of 1912 appeared as the youngest representative of a long line of American "third parties". Though the dual party system has ruled in America from the beginning (1), yet "third" or minor parties have entered the field in a majority of the presidential campaigns from 1789 through 1912. (2)

Ignoring those third parties which were too small or short-lived to be of any practical political importance, we shall see that the remainder of them fall naturally into two general chronological groups: the parties of the Middle Period, preceding the Civil War, and the more modern and recent parties that have sprung up in the new era following the War and Reconstruction.

The third parties of the Middle Period are pretty clearly of two distinct types: first transitory parties of protest, and second, the parties born of the growing Northern sentiment of opposition to slavery.

The first transitory party of protest -- and likewise the progenitor of the whole line of American minor parties -- was the Anti-Masonic Party, which in 1832 emerged from the political con-

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(2) Third parties participated in the campaigns of 1832, 1840, 1844, 1848, 1852, 1856, 1860, 1864, 1872 and in every election thereafter. No real minor party appeared in any national election before 1832, nor in 1836 or 1868. cf. McKee, National Conventions and Platforms; Stanwood, History of the Presidency, History of the Presidency, 1897-1909.
fusion of the period as a party opposed, as its name implies, to Freemasonry. This Party would seem to have given a sufficient guarantee of its early demise in the fact that its one candidate for the presidency was himself actually an announced Freemason; (1) at any rate, the Party seems to have been, throughout its brief existence, more or less allied to the National Republicans, and after 1832 the Anti-Masons gradually and quietly subsided into the Whig opposition to Jackson. (2)

Twenty years after the Anti-Masons came the second party of protest. Opposition to foreign (and particularly Roman Catholic) influence in American politics led to the establishment of a secret order which appeared in the national campaign of 1856 as the Native American or "Know-Nothing" Party. The peculiar conditions attending the disintegration of the Whig Party and the rise of Republicanism gave the Know-Nothings a momentary importance which was promptly eclipsed, after 1856, in the re-alignment of all political forces on the slavery issue. (3)

More important than these transitory parties of protest was the succession of anti-slavery third parties during the twenty years preceding the Civil War.

(1) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. I, 49 "Anti-Masonic Party" (MacDonald)
(2) ibid. I, 49-50.
(3) ibid. I, 37-38 "American Party" (MacDonald) II, 281 "Know-Nothing Party" (MacDonald.)
Abolitionist sentiment first found national political expression in the Abolitionist Party of 1840 and the Liberty Party of 1844. (1) In 1848 the Liberty Party was "swallowed up" by the organization of the Free Soil Party, with its slogan of "No more slave

(1) It is difficult to determine the exact status of the Liberty Party in the development of the Northern opposition to slavery. Were the Liberty men Abolitionists masquerading under another name, or are they rather to be identified in their beliefs with the later Free Soilers and Republicans? Obviously, there was a close connection between the Abolitionists of 1840 and the Liberty men of 1844, for in each case the same man (James G. Birney) was nominated for President. Stanwood refers to both parties as "Abolitionists" (Presidency 202, 216) and speaks of "the Liberty, or Abolition party" only in mentioning the final abortive Liberty nomination of 1848. (ibid. 233). Theodore Clark Smith, on the other hand, includes the Abolitionists of 1840 in the Liberty Party movement, and tends to regard the Liberty men primarily as precursors of the Republicans. Cyclopedia Am. Govt. II, 348, "Liberty Party" (T.C. Smith). Cf. also the somewhat non-committal statements in T.C. Smith, The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Northwest 4-5, 298-300. McKee treats these anti-slavery men as Abolitionists in 1840 and "Liberty-Abolitionists" in 1844. McKee, National Conventions and Platforms 43,51. The Liberty Party Platform of 1844 (contained in McKee, op. cit., 51-55) can not be said to go very far towards clearing up the matter. While most of its planks do set forth the later Republican doctrines, apparently"admitting the impregnable existence of slavery in the states" (Cyclopedia Am. Govt. II, 348 "Liberty Party" -- T.C. Smith), yet the platform also says "That the Liberty party has not been organized merely for the overthrow of slavery" (italics ours); and it later refers to the men of the Party specifically "as Abolitionists". Perhaps the best that we can say is that the Liberty Party was one important step in the transition from Political Abolitionism to Free Soilism and Republicanism, and that the inclusion by the Liberty Party of men of both shades of opinion was reflected in the self-inconsistent platform of 1844.
states; no slave territory". (1) The Free Soil Party was dominated largely by the Van Buren "Barnburner" (anti-Polk) Democrats of New York. In the "business truce" to slavery which followed the Compromise of 1850 (3), most of these Democrats returned to their former allegiance. The more radical anti-slavery men (probably the remnant of the old Liberty Party) nursed the Free Soil organization through the Democratic triumph of 1852, and in 1854 the movement was merged in the rise of the Republican Party. (3)

The Republican Party is the only American third party that ever succeeded in rising to the position of a major party. (4)

(1) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. II, 348 "Liberty Party"; 52, "Free Soil Party" (T.C. Smith)

(2) Muzzey, David Saville — American History 367


(4) The Whig Party (including under that term the National Republicans) is no exception to this statement, for the Whigs began life as a major party, opposed to the dominant Jacksonian Democrats; hence, they never served a third-party apprenticeship. The Republicans, on the other hand, began their history as a real third party. The Republican Party was organized in 1854, when life was not quite extinct in the Whigs — the traditional "second party" of the Middle Period. In the election of 1856, however, the Republicans received 114 electoral votes as against 8 cast for Fillmore, the Whig and Know-Nothing candidate. (Stanwood, Presidency 276). This completed the extinction of the Whigs, and the Republicans took their place as the major party opposing the Democrats; but we believe that from 1854 to 1856 the Republican Party, properly speaking, was a "third" party. For a similar use of the term, cf. Ray, who, writing (in 1913) of the campaign of 1912, calls the Progressive Party "a 'third' although not a 'minor' party." Ray, Introduction to Political Parties and Practical Politics 43.
Born in 1854, the new party ran second only to the Democrats in 1856, captured the presidency in 1860, preserved the Union of the States by conducting the Civil War to a successful conclusion, and has been successful in eight of the eleven presidential elections held since the close of the War. The Republican Party is of peculiar interest to the student of the Progressive Party of 1912, and in the latter part of this chapter we shall have occasion to examine the causes which led to the unique success of the Republicans.

We must not leave the ante-bellum third parties of the United States without a passing mention of the Constitutional Union Party of 1860. The Constitutional Unionists were not an anti-slavery party, but they were distinctly a product of the struggle over slavery.

The Whigs were almost annihilated by the Democratic triumph of 1852. In the inevitable period of confusion attending the disintegration of the Whig Party, the Know-Nothings assumed for the moment a formidable appearance, though they were able to make but little showing against the Republicans in 1856, -- the initial campaign for both of these parties. The Know-Nothing movement collapsed as quickly as it had expanded, and in 1860 the lines were sharply drawn on the slavery question.

The Constitutional Union Party represented the residuum of Whigs and Know-Nothings who even yet were unable to make up their minds upon slavery. The Constitutional Unionists were the last men "off the fence." With the firing upon Sumter, their pious reliance
upon "the Constitution of the country, the Union of the States, and the enforcement of the laws" (1) proved as chimerical as the desire of some of border states for "neutrality" in the coming conflict. In each case, flying shots caused the hopeful "neutrals" to drop on one side of the fence or the other, and thus brought to an abrupt end the existence of the Constitutional Union Party.(2)

Our second chronological division of American minor parties includes those third party movements which have arisen since the end of the Civil War, -- excluding, for the present, the Progressive Party of 1912.(3)

(1) McKee, National Conventions and Platforms, 117.

(2) In the campaign of 1864 the Democrats called themselves "Constitutional Unionists" but this seems to have no particular connection with the third party of four years earlier. It was a time of party pseudonyms, for in the same campaign the Republicans called themselves "National Unionists". Cyclopaedia Am. Govt. III, 193-194 "Republican Party" (Woodburn)

(3) We have spoken here of "third party movements" rather than of "third parties", because our principal concern in viewing the period since the Civil War is to take note of those political manifestations which seem to have some similarity to or bearing upon, the Progressive Party of 1912. From this standpoint, the Mugwumps and Grangers, though technically never organized as real third parties, are of more interest than the "Straight Democrats" of 1872 and the Gold Democrats of 1896, who would strictly have to be classified as real minor parties, but whom we have omitted to consider because they seem to bear little or no close relation to the Progressives.
Any classification of these modern American third parties is apt to be more or less arbitrary and unsatisfactory. (1) From our standpoint of interest in the Progressive Party, we may classify them as (I) Precursors of the Insurgents -- rebels against the dominant faction in the Republican Party; (II) Agrarian-Currency Dissenters; and (III) Social Reformers.

The Liberal Republicans were the earliest and most important precursors of the modern Republican Insurgents. "The Liberal Republicans of 1872 were organized as a protest against corruption in the administration of the National Government, and to secure civil-service reform and tariff-reform on free-trade lines....... The Liberal Republicans, therefore, stood for 'reform' and 'anything to beat Grant'! (2) The Liberal Republicans seem to have been largely a party of leaders, (3) and their nomination of Horace Greeley for President, though accepted by the Democrats, brought the movement to ignominious failure.

The "Stalwarts" and "Half-Breeds" of Hayes's time were merely two wings of the Republican Party (4), but twelve years after the Liberal Republicans came a second serious revolt against

(1) Beard's classification of these parties (Beard, American Government and Politics- 119) wholly ignores the Liberal Republicans, to say nothing of the later Mugwumps; and Macy's classification (Cyclopedia of Am. Govt. III, 533-534 "Third Parties") is likely to impress one as being based upon somewhat artificial distinctions and unnatural divisions.


(3) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. III,196 "Republican Party" (Woodburn)

(4) ibid. 196-197.
the Party. In 1884 the name "Mugwumps" was applied to that faction of the Republican Party which opposed the nomination of Blaine for President. The Mugwumps revived the idealistic attitudes or "reform" tradition of the Liberal Republicans; they advocated civil-service reform, and opposed Blaine as representing policies and practices inimical to the best interests of the nation. The Mugwumps, however, never formed a third party; when Blaine finally received the Republican nomination, some of them accepted him as the regular candidate of their party, (1) while the rest bolted to the Democrats and supported Cleveland, or else compromised by casting their ballots for the Prohibitionist, St. John (2).

It is interesting, then, to note that there were at least two important early revolts against the Republican "machine", each based upon opposition to alleged corruption in the Republican Party. In a true sense, the Liberal Republicans of 1873 and the Mugwumps of 1884 were "precursors of the Insurgents."

Among the "Agrarian-Currency Dissenters" we may mention, as of chief importance, the Grangers, the Greenbackers, and the Populists. The Grangers never formed a real third party. The Granger movement, based upon the activities of the secret and pro-

(1) This number included Theodore Roosevelt, then a young "Mugwump" delegate to the Republican Convention.

(2) On the Mugwumps, see Woodburn, Political Parties 216-217; Stanwood, Presidency 432-433, 446; Cyclopedia Am. Govt. II, 473-474 "Mugwumps" (T.N. Hoover).
fessedly non-partisan organization known as the Patrons of Husbandry, was a movement for agrarian organization, railroad regulation, and political independence. (1) Politically, the Granger movement found expression in various local independent parties, during the years 1873-1876 (2), after which time the agrarian agitation flowed over into new channels.

"In a few instances..... it is possible to trace a direct connection between the Independent parties of the Granger period and the Greenback party, but the main issues of the Independent parties were 'reform' and railroad regulation, while the Greenbackers demanded 'reform' and fiat money." (3) The Greenbackers existed as a national party from 1876 through 1884, and their name has identified them primarily with the agitation for the expansion of the currency, and especially for the issue of fiat money.

The People's or Populist Party, of 1892-1908, seems to have been made up of both Grangers and Greenbackers, with the addition of an important labor element. (4)

(1) Buck, Solon Justus- Granger Movement 308.

(2) ibid. 80-102: also, Buck, "Independent Parties in the Western States, 1873-1876", in Turner Essays in American History 137-164.

(3) Buck, Granger Movement 308-309.

(4) Buck, Granger Movement 309.
Various political labor movements were closely connected with the agrarian-currency parties of dissent. The Greenbackers had been foreshadowed by the Labor Reform Party of 1872, and in 1888 the Union Labor Party served (so far as its platform was concerned) as a transition from Greenbackism to Populism. [1] It is probable that many of these Union Laborites entered the People's Party, and that it was their adherence which gave to the Populists, in addition to their agrarian character, an interest in the laborer so marked as to raise the question, "Is the People's Party Socialist?" [2].

The radical leaven of Populism soon spread beyond the bounds of the People's Party. "Tillman Democracy" captured South Carolina; and a group of radical Democrats, led by such men as Bland, Altgeld, Bryan, Blackburn, and Turpie set to work to swing the Democratic Party from the policies of the Cleveland administration to an advocacy of the free and unlimited coinage of silver.

The year 1896 is one of the great landmarks in the history of American politics. The Democratic Convention assembled with two-thirds of its delegates friendly to Free Silver. A radical platform, embodying free silver, was proposed; and William Jennings Bryan, in one of the most remarkable political orations

(2) McVey, op. cit. 176-184.
ever heard in an American convention, carried the platform, stamped-ed the delegates, and brought to himself the leadership of the Free Silver crusade which he proclaimed. Mr. Bryan of course did not invent Free Silver as a political issue, nor was he the first to introduce it into the Democratic Party.Nevertheless, the "Cross of Gold" speech is significant as marking a dramatic precip-itation of Populism into dominant, major-party Democracy.

The Populists nominated Mr. Bryan as their candidate, and they accepted his characterization of Free Silver as the "para-mount issue" of the campaign. (1) The astute political generalship of Mark Hanna defeated Mr. Bryan and Free Silver in 1896, and confirmed the defeat four years later, in 1900. The "Middle-of-the-Road" Populists, never friendly to fusion, regained control of the People's Party in 1904 (2). But the day of Populism as a party was spent; and although, in 1908, the Populists solemnly affirmed "that never again will the party, by the siren songs and false promises of designing politicians, be tempted to change its course or be again drawn on the treacherous rocks of fusion," the announce-ment of this belated resolution proved to be the swan-song of the Populist Party.

(1) McKee, National Conventions and Platforms 310.
(2) Stanwood, Presidency, 1897-1909 114.
It is important, however, that we should note how agrarian-currency dissent culminated in the Populist Movement -- an agrarian-currency-labor third party which lasted through five presidential campaigns, and whose radical program was largely adopted, in at least one campaign, by one of the major parties.

Our classification of Grangers, Greenbackers, and Populists as "Agrarian-Currency Dissenters" leaves to the Socialists and Prohibitionists the title of "Social Reformers". Perhaps a word needs to be said to explain this classification.

The Grangers, Greenbackers, and Populists are certainly entitled to their name of "Agrarian-Currency Dissenters", for their platforms express the most vigorous dissent from the existing currency system and from other economic conditions which fostered (so they declared) irresponsible monopolies, and oppressed with intolerable burdens the "plain people" who toiled on the farms.(1)

As we have already intimated, the presence of a large labor element in the People's Party gave Populism and Socialism many points of contact. Nevertheless, the Populists were primarily Dissenters, while the Socialists were primarily Reformers. Populism, like the Granger Movement and Greenbackism, was essentially a

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(1) cf. the platforms of these Agrarian-Currency parties. The Grangers' curious "Farmers' Declaration of Independence" will be found in the Prairie Farmer 44: 217 (July 12, 1873). McKee, National Conventions and Platforms, contains all the Greenback platforms, and the Populist platforms of 1892-1904. The Populist platform of 1908 will be found in Stanwood, Presidency, 1897-1909, 159-161.
movement of protest against existing economic conditions; it was primarily negative and destructive. The Agrarian-Currency parties seemed never to be quite certain of their ultimate aim. They were anxious to tear down much that existed, and to try out some more or less disconnected political experiments; but the ever-changing program presented by their platforms seems never to have been based upon any constructive political, social, or economic philosophy, or system of thinking.

Socialism, on the other hand, has been not so much a movement of protest as a movement of reconstruction. The Socialist platforms present a positive philosophy; the Socialist desires to tear down the present economic and social fabric, but only to clear the ground, that he may re-form and reconstruct society upon the basis of his economic and social philosophy.

The Prohibitionists are "Social Reformers" of another kind. They have no objection to the general social organism as now constituted; but they believe that society would be immeasurably benefited by the adoption of one definite, specific policy -- the suppression of the liquor traffic. The issue is moral, and morality is itself a product of social evolution; so that the policy urged by the Prohibitionists is, in reality offered as a social reform.

For these reasons, then, we classify the Grangers, Greenbackers, and Populists as "Agrarian-Currency Dissenters", and the Socialists and Prohibitionists as "Social Reformers".

The American Socialist parties were foreshadowed by the
Labor Reform Party of 1872 and the Union Labor and United Labor parties of 1888. The Socialist Labor Party was organized in 1892; and in 1897 the Social Democratic Party was founded by Eugene V. Debs. In March 1900, the greater part of the Socialist Labor men united with the Debs Social Democrats, the result of this amalgamation being called simply the "Socialist" Party. At the time of the union, a small faction of the Socialist Labor men refused to join in this amalgamation, and continued the name and organization of the Socialist Labor Party. At the present time, this Socialist Labor Party "tends toward the more radical attitude of Syndicalism, or the Industrial Workers of the World".—(1) The Socialist Party is much the stronger of the two, having received 848,296 votes, as against 29,073 votes for the Socialist Labor Party, in the election of 1912. (2)

"The Prohibition party has been the longest-lived of all third parties in this country." (3) Organized as a national party in 1872, it has participated in every election since, though not

(1) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. III, 339 "Socialist Labor Party" (Woodburn)

(2) On the American Socialist parties, see Cyclopedia Am. Govt. III, 336 "Social Democrats"; 338-339 "Socialist Labor Party"; 339-340 "Socialist Party". (All three articles are by Woodburn.)

(3) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. III, 77 "Prohibition Party" (T.N.Hoover)
without suffering occasional bolts and divisions. In 1912 the Prohibition candidate, Mr. Chafin, received 207,965 votes. (1)

It will be noted then, that both these parties of social reform have been organized for a considerable number of years, both exist at the present time, and neither shows any immediate signs of rising to the position of a major party. On the other hand, the aims of both parties have been partially realized by the power of public sentiment, working through the agency of the dominant major parties.

Such, then, have been the most important third parties in American politics, from the foundation of the government in 1789 to the campaign of 1912. Such is the third-party line of descent from which has sprung the Progressive Party of 1912.

To the student of Progressivism, the Republican Party is of peculiar interest and importance. Not only was the Progressive Movement fathered in Republican ranks, but the Republican Party, in its earlier history, presents the only example of an American third party's succeeding in rising to the position of a major party. Why did the Republican Party succeed where other third parties failed? We believe that four principal causes of the unique and sudden success of the Republican Party may be found in the history of the period which brought it to birth. The first of these causes is to be found in the political setting of the years 1854-1856. A new major party was needed.

(1) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. III, 77-78
Since the days of Andrew Jackson, Whigs and Democrats had contended for political supremacy in a field devoid of other serious competitors. The Whigs "loved the Union as it was and sought sincerely to uphold it". (1) The Compromise of 1850 was the last desperate effort of the Whigs to preserve the status quo. But "the Union as it was" had become "a house divided against itself" and the eminently "conservative and respectable" (2) Party of the Middle Period was doomed to political death by its refusal to face the dawn of a new era. In short, the Whig Party was destroyed because it would not (or could not, on account of its geographical composition) take an open stand on the slavery question. Without leaders, without an issue, without the confidence of the people, the Whigs went down in 1852 to a defeat so crushing that it necessarily proved fatal.

The rout of the Whigs left the country with a desperately debatable question, but with only one debater. The Democratic Party had assumed the defense and protection of slavery, -- but who would take up the challenge? Obviously, there were two sides to the slavery issue; yet only one side was represented by a major party. A new major party was needed to join the battle with the Democrats; and the Republican Party was successful party because it met this need. Stated in economic terms, there was a demand for a new major party; the Republican Party supplied this demand, and hence found a market.

(1) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. III, 685 "Whig Party" (Schouler)
(2) ibid.
But the success of the Republicans was due not only to the fact that in the logic of events, a new major party was needed. There was also a psychological reason for the Republican success, and this is found in the fact that the Republican Party was generated by a spontaneous, common impulse.

North of Mason and Dixon's line, in 1854 and 1856, there was a strong and growing sentiment of hostility to slavery, — a belief that slavery was fundamentally wrong, and a determination that if it could not be driven back, it should at least halt where it was, and advance no further. The Republican Party was the organized political expression of this sentiment.

The origin of the Republican Party is a phenomenon of political psychology, not an exhibit of political technology; in its beginning, the Party was born of an unforced consensus of opinion, not laboriously fashioned by political artificers. "As when the seed is sown and the blades of grass spring up almost simultaneously now here, now there, in different parts of the field, so in the spring and summer of 1854 from the seeds of Abolition and Anti-Slavery Extension sprang the Republican Party in Wisconsin, Michigan, New York, Maine, Massachusetts, Iowa, Ohio and other Northern States."

(1) "The new party came into being from spontaneous movements in

various parts of the country," (1) and this was the great psychological cause for the success of the Republican Party.

But the success of the Republicans had a logical as well as a psychological basis. The Republican Party was founded upon a clear-cut proposed solution to a vitally important problem.

"It was organized for the purpose, primarily, of resisting the extension of slavery." (2) The Republicans "came together from various sources, representing varied dispositions and opinions, some radical, some conservative, some prompted by moral motives, some by political, their only common bond and tenet of faith being "No further extension of slavery."

(3) But this single article of faith made for the success of the Republicans. It was simple, — too simple to be misunderstood; it was an honest, open choice of position upon the one great question that menaced the peace of the Union; it avoided the unpopular extreme of Abolitionism, and expressed just that shade of hostility to slavery with which the mass of Northern men at this time were willing to agree.

Meeting a real need, generated by a common impulse, and based upon a clear-cut proposed solution to a vitally important problem, the Republican Party finally was guided to success by the able leadership of a group of men who brought to the Party gifts of personality, ability, and experience such as have seldom been laid at the feet of any new-born political movement.

(1) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. III, 190 "Republican Party" (Woodburn)
(2) ibid. III, 190.
(3) ibid.
Volumes might be -- and have been -- written to describe the influence of one alone of the Republican leaders: Abraham Lincoln, one of the major prophets of all American history; scarcely second to Washington himself in the estimation of succeeding generations, -- transcending the bounds of party in clearness of insight and breadth of sympathy, yet endowed at the same time with a rare and masterful genius for keen, practical political generalship. Lincoln was a host in himself; but associated with him in the Party were Seward and Chase and Sumner and a dozen other leaders scarcely less eminent, to say nothing of the encouraging and potent voices of "the teachers, the preachers, the prophets, the poets, the philosophers, the literary guides." (1)

Without denying, then, that other causes may have contributed to the same result, we may conclude that the rise of the Republicans to the position of a major party was due, very largely at least, to the fact that a new major party was needed; that the Republican Party was generated by a spontaneous common impulse; that its logical basis was to be found in a clear-cut proposed solution to a vitally important problem; and that it was commanded by unusually able leaders.

Political facts are difficult to measure and easy to manipulate; yet, without straining or distorting the truth, may we not say that just these four factors which gave the Republicans

(1) Cyclopedia Am. Govt. III, 189-190 "Republican Party" (Woodburn)
success have generally characterized the rise of the successful American major parties, while the absence of some or all of the same qualities has been characteristic of the comparatively unsuccessful movements which never became more than third parties.

There was a clear field for two major parties at the time when the Federalists and Jeffersonian Democrats came into being. The Federalists represented a widespread common desire for the establishment and preservation of law and order; they offered a clear-cut program for creating a strong central government, as the solution of the problem of governing the new federal Republic; and they were led by Washington, Hamilton, Adams, and their associates. The Democratic Party grew out of an equally intense desire for the preservation of individual liberty; they offered the governmental solution of State Sovereignty and loose federal government; and they were led by the brilliant and versatile Jefferson, and his confreres of the later "Virginia dynasty."

The Whig Party fulfills three of these conditions of major-party success, but not the fourth; it is the one real exception to the rule. The Whigs arose at a time when a new major party was needed; Federalism was dead, and the "era of good feeling" had given place to an era of intensely bitter and shamefully petty personal politics. A "party of opposition" was needed, and the Whigs met this need. Undoubtedly, too, the Whigs represented the strong conservative consensus of opinion in favor of curbing the will and power of Andrew Jackson and of the crude, if honest, frontier democracy which he typified. Nor were able leaders wanting to the Whigs, for Clay and Webster are among the most eminent names of the
whole Middle Period.

What the Whig Party lacked was a logical basis for its existence. The Whigs can hardly be said to have presented a clear-cut proposed solution to any vital problem. (1) We may suggest, without attempting to prove, that there may have been some connection between the lack of this logical basis of party existence and the fact that the Whigs were the least successful and least important of all American major parties, and that they were the only major party to make no great constructive contribution to American political history. (2)

Turning now to the third parties (excluding, of course the Republicans, whom we have already discussed in this connection, and suspending judgment on the Progressives), is it true that any one of them fulfilled these four conditions, — that it arose at a time when a new major party was needed, that it was generated by a spontaneous common impulse, was based upon a clear-cut proposed solution to a vital problem, and was commanded by able leaders?

(1) It is true that the Whigs generally followed the policy of national aid in the development of commerce and industry (e.g., internal improvements, a high protective tariff, and the United States Bank); but after all, the Whig movement, as its name indicates, was primarily a revolt against the personality and personal leadership of Andrew Jackson; that is, the psychological element of a spontaneous common impulse, (opposition to Jackson) overshadowed, if it did not exclude, the logical element of a clear-cut logical issue.

(2) Cyclopaedia Am. Govt. III, 685 "Whig Party" (Schouler) Croly, - Promise of American Life 67.
The Anti-Masons and Know-Nothings rose at periods when a new major party was more or less needed; but neither of them grew out of any great spontaneous impulse, and both were without important leaders; moreover, their proposals, though clear enough, have impressed most people as being fantastic rather than vital.

All of the other third parties, both before and after the Civil War, came into being when there were already two well-established major parties; and while these dominant parties may have needed reformation, yet the need for a new party was, to say the least, not self-evident.

The Abolitionists of 1840 arose before the slavery controversy had gone far enough to create any considerable common impulse against slavery, and before the issue of abolition was recognized as vital; also, the Abolitionists, as a political party, wanted great leaders.

Nor did the Liberty Party of 1844 represent any great consensus of opinion; besides, the Liberty men clouded their issues (1) and they also lacked able leadership.

The Free Soilers had the same clear-cut proposed solution to the slavery problem as was later enunciated by the Republicans; and they enjoyed the eminent, if doubtfully appropriate, leadership of Martin Van Buren. But even in 1848 the slavery question had not

(1) See footnote, page 3.
produced a clear consensus of opinion in the minds of Northern men. It was only after the Kansas-Nebraska Bill terminated the "business truce" and heralded the opening of the final phase of the slavery struggle that the thinking of the North crystalized, as it were, about the doctrine re-announced by the new Republican Party.

The Constitutional Union Party is the example, par excellence, of the absence of the four qualities which we have mentioned; it arose when no new party was needed; it was born of no great common impulse; it offered no solution to any problem, vital or otherwise; and it possessed no leaders of first importance.

The case is not otherwise with the parties which arose after the Civil War.

The Liberal Republicans and the Mugwumps raised a clear issue of governmental reform, and they did not want for leaders; but they represented no great spontaneous, common impulse.

The Grangers, Greenbackers, and Populists reflected general economic unrest rather than any definite common impulse or consensus of opinion; each of them presented a scattered series of economic and social measures, rather than any one clear-cut proposed solution of a vital problem; and none of them was particularly fortunate in its leadership.

The Socialists have presented a fairly clear and well-defined proposed solution of the problem (vital enough, to be sure) of the distribution of wealth; but they seem to represent no widespread common impulse; and their leaders have not shown signs of marked ability.
The Prohibitionists, finally, have offered a clear-cut proposed solution to the liquor problem (though this problem is one which most people seem not to consider of absolutely vital importance), but they represent a relatively restricted and unimportant consensus of opinion; and they, too, have been without extraordinarily gifted or able leaders.

From these considerations, it would appear that, in general, these four qualities -- the rise at a time when a new major party is needed, the generation from a spontaneous, common impulse, the presentation of a clear-cut proposed solution to a vitally important problem, and the leadership of able men -- have all been essential to the rise of an American political movement to the position of a major party; while the lack of any of these qualities has meant failure to become more than a third party.

A priori, then (and aside from other unique and important factors which must be considered), if we find the Progressive Party of 1912 possessing these four qualities, it will be an argument in favor of the probable success of the Progressives in attaining the position of a major party; whereas the lack of any of these qualities will constitute a presumption in favor of their inability to become anything greater than a third party.

In the light of this review of its third-party predecessors, what shall be said of the Progressive Party of 1912? Which one of its third-party ancestors does it most resemble? Is it a transient party of protest, like the Anti-Masons or Know-Nothings? Is it a deep-rooted movement destined to supplant the Republicans as the Republicans themselves supplanted the Whigs. Is it but an-
other temporary bolt from Republicanism, fated to go the way of the Liberal Republicans and the Mugwumps? Is it another incoherent expression of vague economic unrest? Is it a new party of social reform, but doomed to linger on, with the Socialists and Prohibitionists, in third-party impotence?

Or, on the other hand, is it true that the Progressive Party is not a re-incarnation of any former movement, or an example of political atavism, but that it is essentially new phenomenon in American politics, produced by unprecedented conditions, and pregnant with significance for the future?

The answering of these questions involves a somewhat careful study of the development of this most striking American political movement of recent years, and of the causes and tendencies which produced it.

In attempting a study of the Progressive Party, we shall have occasion to examine the background of Progressivism; the beginnings of Progressivism; the fight for the Republican nomination of 1912; the formation of the Progressive Party; the Progressive Platform; the election campaign of 1912; and the later history of the Progressive Party. The following pages, then, present an attempt to estimate and interpret, with as little partiality and prejudice as may be, the available evidence concerning the causes, the rise, the development, and the significance of the Progressive Party of 1912.
CHAPTER II.

THE BACKGROUND OF PROGRESSIVISM.

American history is a great drama of human progress. Upon the first two acts of this drama, the curtain has fallen. The third act is still in progress; how near it is to completion, what will be its outcome, how many acts are to follow, — all these are profound mysteries which only time can disclose.

The first act, or period of American history may be said to begin with the discovery of the New World by Columbus, and to end with the political separation of the English colonies from the Mother Country. In the progress of this period, discovery gives way to exploration, and exploration is succeeded by colonization; foot by foot, the wilderness is beaten back, and the frontier retreats farther and farther westward, away from the shores of the Atlantic. Many and varied are the events of these first decades of American history; yet never for a moment can we fail to see their central theme. The great overshadowing fact of the first period of American history is the physical Conquest of the Wilderness, -- the clearing of the ground for the white man's civilization, and the laying of those material foundations upon which is to rest the whole subsequent superstructure of American society.

The second period of American history may be said to begin with the Revolution, and to end with the completion of the Civil
War and Reconstruction. The motif of the first period is still apparent in the second: new commonwealths are carved out of the West; the frontier crosses the Rockies, and halts at last only on the shores of the Pacific; a policy of "Internal Improvements" opens inaccessible regions and binds distant communities in close relationships. But for all this, the Conquest of the Wilderness is no longer the dominant note of American history. As the great all-compelling movement of the first period was physical, so that of the second is psychical; for the theme of this second period of American history is the Development of a National Consciousness among the people of the new Republic. (1)

The seeds of American nationality were strewn through colonial days in those inalterable geographic conditions which made the citizen and the society of the New Worlds distinct and different from those of the Old. (2) The French and Indian Wars insured the domination of the Anglo-Saxon in America, and at the same time removed the last colonial need for British protection. (3) The Revolution gave the colonists political independence; the Articles of Confederation recognized the desirability of a policy of mutual co-operation among the States; the Constitution amalgamated the thirteen states and their possessions into one federal Republic.

(2) ibid. 45, 55.
(3) ibid. 74.
Still, the Americans were not, in any true sense, a nation; secession was threatened in New England, nullification attempted in South Carolina, and the doctrine of State Sovereignty became the cherished corner-stone of the dominant political creed of the South. A few leaders, here and there, dreamed of a united nation and a single American people; but their dream had never been translated into fact. At length, Webster, in his "Reply to Hayne", communicated this vision to the North; (1) Lincoln led the North to the realization of the vision, thirty years later. The Northern victory in the Civil War decided that North and South should settle their problems together; it determined the acceptance of the Northern view of union and nationality. With the passing of Reconstruction, and the restoration of the Southern States to their "natural, normal relationship to the Union", the great psychical process of the development of a national consciousness was essentially complete, -- the American Nation was born, and the American People, united by the spiritual bond of nationality, faced what might befall in the third period of American history.

So this third period of American history begins with the close of Reconstruction, and is still in progress. Is it possible yet to distinguish its trend? The task is difficult, for the actors are the men of the last generation and their sons, our own contemporaries; and the familiar tricks and gestures of well-known personalities are likely to divert our attention from the underly-

(1) Usher, Rise of the American People 225-227
ing significance of what is being done.

Nevertheless, we believe that one may distinguish in contemporary American history many signs which point to a new theme, seemingly destined to be the central fact of the third period of American history.

This theme of the third period is not the physical Conquest of the Wilderness which dominated the first period of our history. This physical conquest still goes on, though the old rough clearing away of the Wilderness has yielded to the more intensive exploitation of the material resources of the Continent, by economic units of increased size and power. But though the development of "big business" may be the most striking feature of recent economic history, yet it is not, we believe, the most important fact of contemporary American political history.

And if the theme of the third period is not the physical conquest of the Wilderness, neither is it the psychical development of a national consciousness which dominated the second period. Not that the spirit of American nationality has been quiescent since Reconstruction; on the contrary, the Spanish War, the acquisition of the island dependencies, and the emergence of "the United States as a World Power" (1) have emphasized and called for a larger restatement of the meaning of American nationality. But after all, these events are far from forming the general tendency or the most

(1) Coolidge, Archibald Cary - United States as a World Power v
important facts of the last four decades of American political history.

Another tendency, we believe, is increasingly revealing itself as the underlying theme and the central fact of the third period of American history. This new tendency is not primarily physical, nor psychical; it is fundamentally and essentially social, -- dealing with the relations of man to man, -- for it is the tendency toward the Attainment of Practical Democracy.

This is not a cant phrase nor a pretty ideal; it is an actual tendency whose reality we believe will be attested by a dispassionate examination of the facts of American history of the period since Reconstruction.

"Practical Democracy", in the political sense in which we use the phrase, means the possession of the supreme power by the whole body of citizens; that is, the possession by the whole body of citizens of the power actually to control and direct the government, either through elected representatives or by other methods. This concept of the real rule of the people implies also the securing of social and industrial justice, and the blotting out of whatever artificial inequalities unfairly restrict opportunity and prevent certain groups from being fitted for or from exercising an effective part in democratic government.

Let us examine, for a moment, the present condition of "democracy" in America.

The leveling conditions of the Wilderness early lent a democratic tinge to American development. Yet even the Revolution and
the founding of the new Republic did not secure actual and practical democracy. One great figure of the early Republic stands forth as an unmistakable believer in and advocate of democracy. By his hand the words, "All men are created equal," were written into the Declaration of Independence; and by the genius of his leadership the "Democratic-Republican" Party arose to power.

But the victory of Jeffersonian theories did not usher in a millenium of practical democracy. Not until the era of Jacksonian Democracy did even manhood suffrage for whites become the rule; and a bloody Civil War was necessary to establish the theory (and it is still largely a theory) that a black skin is not necessarily a disqualification from citizenship.

Since the Civil War and the passing of slavery, theoretical democracy has been practically unquestioned as the guiding principle of American government. No one is bold enough openly to deny that the whole body of citizens should actually control and direct the government; no one is eager to controvert the theory of Popular Sovereignty.

But as a matter of actual fact, it is perfectly obvious that the whole body of citizens has not in practice directed and controlled the government of the United States since the Civil War. Some 24,000,000 women are citizens of the United States (1) but

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(1) Abstract of the Thirteenth Census, 1910 118
only thirty-two states allow a limited franchise to females. (1) But not even the whole body of male citizens direct and control the government, rightly or wrongly, necessarily or unnecessarily, the negroes of the South are largely excluded in practice from the power to vote and to govern.

But we may carry the matter still further. Even according to the conventional tacit definition of "the people" as the body of white male voters, practical democracy does not obtain in the United States; for even this whole body of white, male citizens does not actually control and direct the government. A mass of evidence supports the truth of this statement. The ruling power of the "boss" the "ring" and the machine id fully recognized by every student of American politics. (2) Added to this is the corrupt liaison between "big business and politics"(3). Together these two phenomena - first the complicated system of party organization, with its long ballot, tiers of conventions, and other alliance devices of "hide and seek politics," and second, the corrupting

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(1) Eleven states have equal suffrage for men and women, while twenty-one other states have granted a limited franchise to women. World Almanac 1916, 710.


between business and politics -- produce the result that while the electorate goes through the motions of voting, yet during much of the time, if not most of the time, the whole body of white male citizens (to say nothing of the whole body of citizens, in the broadest sense) does not actually control and direct the government.

As we have already said, we believe that the marked political tendency apparent in American history since Reconstruction is the tendency toward the attainment of practical democracy. Let us examine our grounds for this belief.

In the first place, every third-party movement, from 1865 to 1913, with the single possible exception of the Prohibition Movement (2) has definitely tended in the direction of a fuller measure of practical democracy.

The Liberal Republicans aimed at the stronghold of machine politics when they attacked the spoils system and proposed a merit system of civil service. Both the Liberal Republicans and the Mugwumps protested vigorously against the subversion of practical democracy by the corruption of political leaders in alliance with business corporations.

The Agrarian–Currency Dissenters (Grangers, Greenbackers, and Populists) were above all things concerned with the reduction

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(1) Cf. White, W.A. - The Old Order Changeth pp. 10-30, for a summary of much of the material contained in the works already noted. For a view of Mark Hanna different from that of White, cf. Herbert Croly, Mark Hanna.

of the power of "trusts" and railroads, and the corresponding increase of the power of the farmers and other "plain people" (1)

That the Socialists too, aim at a fuller measure of practical democracy -- involving, among other things, the common ownership of the agencies of production -- is a sufficiently clear and well-known fact.

It is not very surprising that these movements toward the attainment of practical democracy should have found expression in third-party movements rather than through the medium of the two dominant parties. The Democratic and Republican parties of today were shaped in the struggle for nationality. They are archaic survivals of the second period of American history; they represent a division of men upon an issue that has been unmistakably decided and is no longer a true subject for political warfare. With the end of Reconstruction, the battle over nationality was ended, so from 1876 to 1896, there was no great continuing clear-cut division between Democrats and Republicans over any important question of policy. (2) The nearest approach to such a question was the tariff, yet a close analysis of the platforms and performances of the parties from 1876 to 1896 shows no clear alignment at all on the tariff (3). The new issues, raised by the cry for a fuller measure

(1) Cf. "Farmers Declaration of Independence", Prairie Farmer, v 44; 217 (July 13, 1873); also Greenback and Populist platforms in McKee, National Conventions and Platforms.

(2) Beard, Contemporary History 90-92; 108-116.

(3) Ibid. 112.
of actual democracy, found organized expression in third-party movements, and it was only in 1896 that the spirit of Populism was dramatically precipitated into the Democratic Party, and the old major parties were forced into a new alignment, on live issues involving judgment of the methods which the Agrarian Currency Dissenters proposed as necessary to the attainment of practical democracy.

(1) But the third-party movements of the last half century are not the only evidences of the modern tendency toward the attainment of practical democracy. Especially during the last two decades marked results have been achieved in many states and cities by local "reform" leaders, such as Governors Pingree of Michigan, Cummins of Iowa, Hughes of New York, Hiram W. Johnson of California, Folk of Missouri, John Johnson of Minnesota, Mayor Tom L. Johnson of Cleveland, and others.

(1) It was through no desire of the orthodox leaders of the major parties that the campaign of 1896 was fought over the tenets of Populism. Only with the utmost difficulty was McKinley persuaded to commit himself to a single Gold Standard (Croly Mark Hanna 193–204, quoted also in Beard, Contemporary History 167); while the victory of the Free Silver forces in the Democratic Convention involved a sharp break with the Cleveland conservative administration Democrats. It should be noted also that the old parties were so used to their traditional division over dead or momentary issues, that this forced re-alignment on vital questions resulted in actual secessions from both parties (the bolts of the Gold Democrats and Silver Republicans,) showing how far the major parties were from representing real divisions of opinion upon the questions of the day.
Beyond these leaders whose work has been more or less local, the same tendency to push on towards the attainment of practical democracy may be seen in a number of the most eminent national political leaders of recent years. Beneath all their personal and party differences, such men as Bryan, Roosevelt, Wilson and LaFollette possess this common element of devotion to the cause of practical democracy. Bryan's campaign cry of 1908, "Shall the people rule?" is typical of his consistent labors for the protection and welfare of "the producing masses," "the laboring interests", and "the people", as distinguished from the wealthy or so-called "privileged" classes.

Roosevelt's tremendous popularity with millions of his fellow citizens, during his presidency, was the reflex of his own sturdy confidence in American democracy and in the average man. (1) LaFollette's political utterances, and indeed his whole political career has been characterized by an almost passionate devotion to the "cause" of practical democracy. (2) And in the carefully wrought addresses of Wilson there breathes the same spirit of faith in the advance of practical democracy. (3)

(1) Rev. Revs. v 29:30 (Jan. 1904); 30: 643 (Dec. 1904); 34: 402 (Oct. 1906) Cf. also Roosevelt's own statements in his autobiography, 34, 420, 501, 519 etc.

(2) LaFollette's Autobiography, 24, 63, 304, 352, 369, 475, 521, 759, etc.

(3) Cf. the summary of Wilson's campaign speeches, in Beard's Contemporary History 367-370.
Occasionally, there is open recognition of the common ground possessed by such national leaders. La Follette recalls how Bryan once came to his aid in a Wisconsin campaign, with a warm speech of support. (1) An editorial writer not unfriendly to Roosevelt declares that "If Mr. Roosevelt had lived in Nebraska ... or .... continued in the ranching business on the Little Missouri, there is a very fair chance that he would have stood shoulder to shoulder with Mr. Bryan in the fight for free silver." (2) And Bryan himself, as he journeyed in 1912 from the birth of the Progressive Party in Chicago to the Democratic Convention in Baltimore, wrote: "I saw a lot of brave men at Chicago, fighting for the people. We have a lot of brave men here fighting on the same side. May their tribe increase." (3)

So among many of both the greater and the lesser political leaders of the last twenty years we may trace individual participation and sometimes non-partisan union in the movement toward the attainment of practical democracy.

As these leaders and others have met with the bitter opposition from conservative party men and defenders of the political status quo, there has gradually grown, in the minds of many political leaders, students, and voters, the conviction that certain new practical governmental methods are needed to facilitate the attainment of a

(1) La Follette's Autobiography, 342-345
(2) Rev. Revs. 34:259 (Sept. 1906)
(3) Bryan, Tale of Two Conventions 172. The italics are ours.
democracy. There has been much random experimentation, and plenty of "wildcat" measures; but it appears at the present time that there is beginning to be a consensus of opinion among many political leaders and students that certain modern proposals will be likely to secure a greater degree of practical democracy. Among this group of "reforms", we believe that some form of at least the following measures would naturally be included:

1. The Direct Primary, by means of which the voter may directly participate in the nomination as well as in the election of candidates for office.

2. The Short Ballot, which will enable the voter to cast his ballot more intelligently and effectively, by concentrating his attention upon the choice of a few important officials, leaving other positions to be filled by other means.

3. The Initiative, Referendum, and Recall, by means of which the voters may directly participate in legislation, or may remove certain officials from office.

4. Changes in the form of municipal government (Government by Commission, the City Manager Plan, etc.), designed not only to promote governmental efficiency but also to make the municipal government more responsive to the people of the city. (1)

(1) De Witt, in The Progressive Movement describes in detail the above and a considerable number of other measures which he includes in "the progressive movement" in Nation, State, and City. We have mentioned here only those proposals which have received fairly wide acceptance, and which would seem to aid directly in securing a fuller measure of practical democracy.
Along with the increasing adoption of these governmental methods has come the rise of a new group of more or less popular writers,—some of them men of much originality and force of thought,—such as Croly, (1) Weyl, (2) W. A. White, (3) Cleveland, (4) Ben B. Lindsey, (5) and others, who have striven to interpret the changing conditions of American political and social life, in terms that express or imply a faith in the gradual attainment of practical democracy.

Finally, the steady advance of the cause of Woman Suffrage bears striking testimony to the tendency toward the attainment of practical democracy. The "Woman's Rights Party" of 1884 and 1888 was not an organization that most people took seriously; yet in the year 1916 women exercise full voting power in eleven states and they possess a limited franchise in twenty-one other states. (6) Furthermore, in the national election of 1912, the platforms

(1) Croly, Promise of American Life, Progressive Democracy
(2) Weyl, New Democracy
(3) White, Old Order Changeth
(4) Cleveland, Organized Democracy
(5) Lindsey, The Beast. Lindsey's book is a reprint of series of articles contributed to a popular magazine, and is less expository and scholarly than the other books mentioned; but it is a serious attempt to advance the cause of practical democracy by arousing the people to the iniquities practiced by "big business" in politics.
(6) World Almanac, 1916 710
of the Progressive, (1) Socialist, (2) and Prohibition (3) parties contained equal-suffrage planks; and at the present time, a number of the most prominent opposing leaders in American politics - among them, President Wilson, (4) ex-President Roosevelt, (5) Col. Bryan, (6) and Senator La Follette (7) have all declared in favor of Woman Suffrage.

Whether one believes that Woman Suffrage is desirable or undesirable, one cannot fail to recognize that it is a step in the direction of the actual control of the government by a number that more nearly approximates the whole body of citizens; for Woman Suffrage means the extension of the right to vote to the millions of citizens previously disfranchised solely on account of sex. (8)

The advance of Woman Suffrage, then, is another evidence of the

(1) Stanwood, Presidency, 1879-1909 282
(2) ibid 255
(3) ibid 280
(4) St. Louis Globe-Democrat Sept. 9, 1916, p.1
(5) Roosevelt, Autobiography 177-180
(6) Literary Digest v 49:175-177 (Aug.1, 1914 )
(7) La Follette, Autobiography 317-318
(8) cf. Beveridge, Progressive-Republican Merger 14. "The second principle on which the Progressive Party is founded is a broader, purer Democracy .... So the Progressive Party believes that woman should have the right to vote precisely the same as men." The italics are ours.
tendency toward practical democracy.

If space permitted, it might be shown that all of these political evidences— the third party movements since the Civil War, the work of individual local and national leaders, the new governmental measures, the writings of the new political interpreters, and the advance of Woman Suffrage are, in reality, only a part of a wider and deeper social movement in the direction of the attainment of real democracy throughout the whole field of American life. In economics, the distribution rather than the production of wealth with all that this holds of social significance, is coming to be recognized as the supremely important problem; (1) and Socialism is treated with respectful consideration by reputable economists. In religion, writers like Rauschenbusch, (2) Peabody, (3) Strayer (4) and Mathews (5) are interpreting Christianity in social terms. Within the church and without, workers engaged in "social service" are laying great emphasis on the application of the principle of human brotherhood, with its implication of equal opportunity. Finally, these new social beliefs and habits of thinking are being

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(1) Hayes, Introduction to the Study of Sociology 4,95-139, and passim

(2) Rauschenbusch, Walter - Christianity and the Social Crisis; Christianizing the Social Order.

(3) Peabody, Francis G. - Jesus Christ and the Social Question

(4) Strayer, Paul H. - Reconstruction of the Church

(5) Mathews, Shailer - Social Teaching of Jesus
popularized by innumerable writers on social subjects, both within and without the popular magazines, and in some cases by the more serious writers of fiction. (1) So the political tendency toward the attainment of practical democracy is reflected in religious, economic, and other social fields of life.

The Progressive Party of 1912 ought not to be studied and cannot be properly understood apart from the background which we have been attempting to describe. Benjamin P. De Witt has written of a "progressive movement" which is "broader than the Progressive Party and, in fact, than any single party. It is the embodiment and expression of fundamental measures and principles of reform that have been advocated for many years by all political parties." (2) Whatever terms may be employed, the fact is certain: the Progressive Party of 1912 is merely one integral part of a much broader movement.

This broader movement we have described as the theme of American history since Reconstruction: the social tendency toward the attain-

(1) It is very interesting to note that in 1913 the "best-seller" among American novels was Winston Churchill's The Inside of the Cup, a book which distinctly attempts to interpret certain phases of the religious-social-economic situation of to-day, and in which the author makes the somewhat startling assertion that the Cause of modern Christianity is Democracy. (pp 361, 363, 366, 370.) The marked success of this book argues a decided interest in these questions and these views on the part of the American reading public.

(2) De Witt, Progressive Movement vii
ment of practical democracy. We shall, in general, use the terms "Progressive Movement," "Progressivism," and "Progressive" to refer only to the Progressive Party of 1912; but we shall bear in mind, as we study the life of this Party, that it is one part of the movement toward practical democracy. With this background in mind, we shall be in a position to approach intelligently the study of "The Beginnings of Progressivism."
CHAPTER III

THE BEGINNINGS OF PROGRESSIVISM

"When one enters on the search for the fountainhead of a great movement, one risks being tempted to go back and back until one reaches absurdity in the Garden of Eden." (1) Waiving the question as to whether Progressivism conforms to the requirements of a "great movement," we may accept Professor Van Tyne's dictum as a working maxim; and, conquering the temptation to search for the seeds of the movement in earlier generations, we may begin our study of the beginnings of Progressivism with the beginning of the first presidency of the man who was to become the founder, leader, and nominee of the Progressive Party of 1912.

When an anarchist's bullet put an end to the life of President McKinley, and when Theodore Roosevelt took the oath of office as President of the United States, on September 14, 1901, a new personality assumed a commanding position in American politics.

Theodore Roosevelt.

It would be futile to attempt a study of the Progressive Party of 1912 without making a serious effort to understand the character of Theodore Roosevelt. Not only is the history of the Party itself inseparably connected with his personality; but during eight of the

twelve years preceding the founding of the Party, he was the Chief Executive of the nation and the most important and conspicuous figure in American public life.

The difficulty of attempting such an estimate of a contemporary leader is well recognized. He stands so close to us that it is difficult to secure the proper perspective. (1) Then, too, the evidence is not all in. Every new day of the man's life adds new material for the formation of a judgment regarding his character; and the actions of a single day may be so important and revealing as to upset all previous conclusions. The best that we can do, then, is to try to approach the evidence at hand with the impartial attitude of a student of contemporary politics; to seek to avoid both partisanship and prejudice, and to blend appreciation and criticism in their just proportions.

When Theodore Roosevelt became President in 1901, at the age of forty-three, he had already attained to a broader and more varied experience than comes to many a man in a lifetime. From the first he was peculiarly fortunate in freedom from any tendency toward sectionalism or provincialism, and in the opportunity to know and sympathize with every great section of the country. Born in 1858 of a New York father, the descendant of Dutch ancestors, and of an "unreconstructed" Southern mother, Roosevelt received his university training in the East, graduating with honors at Harvard; and this was followed by a no less important preparation for life in the hardy school of the Western ranchman. Roosevelt early turned to

(1) Cf. Hallam, Constitutional History, II, 144.
politics and public life; and he successively rendered energetic and effective service as a member of the New York Assembly, United States Civil Service Commissioner, President of the New York City Police Board, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Colonel of the cavalry regiment of "Rough Riders" in the Spanish-American War, and Governor of New York. At length, in 1900, orthodox Republican politicians troubled by his increasing personal popularity and at his boundless and occasionally disconcerting energy, attempted to "shelve" him politically by forcing upon him the Vice-Presidency. (1)

Events played havoc with their plans; six months after the election, President McKinley was assassinated, and Theodore Roosevelt succeeded to the presidency of the United States.

In spite of Roosevelt's pledge, as he took the oath of office that it would be his "aim to continue, absolutely unbroken, the policies of President McKinley" (2), his administration was inevitably the expression of his own masterful personality. He rapidly attained a tremendous personal popularity (3); and in 1904 he was unanimously re-nominated, and overwhelmingly re-elected President for another four years.

What sort of a man is Theodore Roosevelt? To what did he owe his great popularity? And in what ways, if any, were his administrations connected with the events that led to the formation of the Progressive Party in 1912?

(1) Beard, Contemporary History, 227.
(3) Haworth, Reconstruction and Union, 228.
At the very start, it is necessary to realize that Theodore Roosevelt is a many-sided man, with wide and varied interests,\(^{(1)}\) but with none so overmastering as his interest in human nature.\(^{(2)}\) He is, moreover, an extremely versatile man,\(^{(3)}\) for he has shown ability and achieved success as a student, ranchman, military officer, author, political leader, and city, state, and national executive. As a writer, Roosevelt has been prolific. His presidential messages alone would doubtless fill hundreds of printed pages; and his collected speeches and addresses would require several volumes. Besides these political writings, Roosevelt has written also biography,\(^{(4)}\) history,\(^{(5)}\) essays "social and political",\(^{(6)}\) editorials and magazine articles,\(^{(7)}\) both popular and semi-scientific accounts of hunting expeditions,\(^{(8)}\) and other works.\(^{(9)}\)

\(^{(1)}\) Roosevelt, Autobiography, 355, and passim cf. also Douglas, Geo. Wm. - Many-sided Roosevelt, passim.

\(^{(2)}\) Roosevelt, Autobiography, 361, 364.

\(^{(3)}\) World's Work, v. 24:129 (June, 1912).

\(^{(4)}\) e. g., Gouverneur Morris and Thomas Hart Benton, in the "American Statesmen Series."

\(^{(5)}\) e. g., Winning the West.

\(^{(6)}\) e. g., American Ideals and Other Essays Social and Political; Strenuous Life.

\(^{(7)}\) In the Outlook and elsewhere.

\(^{(8)}\) e. g., Outdoor Pastimes of an American Hunter; African Game Trails; Life Histories of African Game Animals.

\(^{(9)}\) e. g., Roosevelt, Autobiography; Fear God and Take Your Own Part.
Another cardinal element in the character of Roosevelt is his tremendous store of energy. He has lived more fully and actively, and has enjoyed a wider reach of experience than almost any other American of his generation. He is a tremendous worker, and he has practised, as well as preached, the doctrine of the "strenuous life". (1)

This boundless and unceasing energy has a deepset physical basis. Roosevelt is intensely strong and virile. He is an athlete and a sportsman. His own personal courage is unquestioned, and he believes in courage (meaning, largely, physical courage) as one of the supremely necessary and important elements of character. (2)

This exaltation of courage joins easily and naturally with an active, practical, matter-of-fact patriotism. Roosevelt believes in patriotism as a present reality and necessity, and he is at least not enthusiastic over golden visions of universal peace. (3) He believes that patriotism - the advancement of the interests of one's own nation - is a virtue; that war is distinctly preferable to peace in certain contingencies; and that peace can best - and only - be secured by proper preparation and readiness to fight. (4)

In his views of foreign policy, as in his personal political life, Roosevelt has always been aggressive, if not belligerent; and

(1) Cf. Roosevelt, Strenuous Life.


(3) Roosevelt, American Ideals, 20, 251, 255.

(4) Roosevelt, American Ideals, 247 ff.; Fear God and Take Your Own Part.
perhaps this very quality has been responsible for a good measure of his popularity. (1) "Speak softly and carry a big stick" was one of the sayings which Roosevelt popularized; and he has ever consistently maintained that softness and gentleness will not avail, "if back of the softness there does not lie strength, power." (2)

Along with this personal aggressiveness, Roosevelt has shown a masterful, dominant personal leadership. He is restrained by no squeamish canons of retiring modesty; (3) and he seems to place supreme self-confidence in his own judgment, himself against all comers. (4)

It is true, nevertheless, that the judgment in which he trusts is essentially personal rather than judicial. He has no difficulty in determining "the truth" or "the right"; he can see no side of the question but his own; (5) he is capable of dogmatism (6) and unfairness in an argument, (7) and is intolerant and contemptuous of opposition; (8) his judgments of men are inevitably colored by

(1) Hart, (Albert Bushnell--) National Ideals, 360. One can hardly doubt that the writer of these sentences had Roosevelt in mind.


(3) Roosevelt, Autobiography, 421

(4) ibid., 583 and passim.


(6) American Ideals, 293, 303 ff.

(7) Autobiography, 627-628.

(8) American Ideals, 212; Autobiography, 550-551.
personal feelings of like or dislike,(1) and he unconsciously exaggerates the importance of events which are close at hand.(2)

Whatever faults may be urged against Roosevelt, one can scarcely study his career and his writings as a whole without coming to the conclusion that Theodore Roosevelt is personally and fundamentally genuine and sincere.(3) An unscrupulous schemer would hardly have written, said, and done so many things that were bound to raise up powerful opposition. Then, too, it is almost unthinkable that so large a part of the American people could have been utterly deceived in the character of the man whom they believed to be essentially sincere.(4) Whatever may be the explanation of the phenomena connected with the Progressive Party of 1912, it is not likely to be found in deliberate insincerity or betrayal of faith by the founder of the party.

Out of his own personal genuineness of life, Roosevelt has evolved and preached a gospel of plain morality and "sound living" which has probably had a real effect in tending to raise the level of American life. Even his enemy LaFollette admits that "Roosevelt is deserving of credit for his appeals made from time to time for higher ethical standards, social decency, and civic honesty. He discussed these matters strikingly and with vigor, investing every utterance with his unique personality. He would seize upon some

(1) Roosevelt, Autobiography, 298-299, 302, 303; 474.
(2) Autobiography, 513 ff.
(4) ibid., v 29:20 (Jan., 1904).
The implied irony of the last sentence is not wholly undeserved. His subjects are, indeed, the "old, commonplace virtues"; and there is nothing original and much that is prosy or repetitious in his statements of the doctrines of "sound living".

The more important of these theses, which Roosevelt has industriously upheld, may be summarized as follows:

1. Everybody should have a "square deal" - a fair chance. The will of the whole people should not be choked by privilege, nor violated by political or business corruption. (2) Carried to its logical conclusion, this is the doctrine of Practical Democracy; and it marks Roosevelt as fundamentally in accord with the prevailing tendency of contemporary American political history. (3)

2. We must be loyal to ideals, but also be practical and efficient.

3. In foreign affairs, a nation should behave towards other nations "precisely as a strong, honorable, and upright man behaves in dealing with his fellow-men". (4)

4. In private and public life we must practice the "old, common-

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(1) LaFollette, Autobiography, 479.
(3) Roosevelt, American Ideals, 36, 54, 55; Autobiography, 310.
place virtues" if we would keep sound "the core of our national being".(1)

5. "On the whole, we think that the greatest victories are yet to be won, the greatest deeds yet to be done, and that there are yet in store . . . . grander triumphs than have ever yet been scored. But be this as it may, . . . . the one plain duty of every man is to face the future as he faces the present, regardless of what it may have in store for him, and, turning toward the light as he sees the light, to play his part manfully, as a man among men."

Many who have come into intimate relations with Roosevelt have testified to the exceptional vigor, keenness, and power of his mind. Senator Cullom calls him "a marvellous man, a man of great resources, great intellect";(3) LaFollette speaks of the "quickness with which his mind grasps an important subject";(4) and Riis mentions his power of complete concentration.(5)

Nevertheless, Roosevelt has certain very distinct mental limitations and tendencies, and these mental traits have played a large part in moulding the history both of his administrations as President and of the Progressive Party.

In the first place, Roosevelt's mind is distinctly inductive. He does not start out with a carefully-reasoned, logical philosophy; he is "content to wait and see what method (may) be necessary in

(2) Roosevelt, op. cit., 302.
(3) Cullom, Fifty Years Public Service, 295.
(5) Riis, Theodore Roosevelt, the Citizen, passim.
each given case". (1) In view of this, it is not surprising that Roosevelt's whole attitude is essentially un-legal. (2) He is impatient of complex legal theories or restraints; (3) and his refreshingly naive attitude toward court opinions on difficult legal questions (4) are evidence that he is incapable of really entering into the legal attitude and its conceptions.

With the distaste for legal theory there is also an "absence of definite economic conception". (5) He has never been able to make any very important constructive contribution to the tariff history of his time; (6) his policies in regard to "big business" are so vague as to be difficult of clear formulation. (7) He instinctively assumes that "the prevailing system of production and distribution of wealth (is) essentially sound"; (8) and he distrusts and combats Socialism and Socialists, without ever deigning to attempt a serious refutation of their economic arguments. (9)

(1) Roosevelt, Autobiography, 421, 62. Roosevelt evidently began his career with no comprehensive political philosophy.

(2) ibid., 61.

(3) ibid., 188-189, 553.

(4) ibid., 503, 504.

(5) LaFollette, Autobiography, 478; Rev. Revs., v 43:16 (Jan., 1911); World's Work, v 24:129 (June, 1912).


(8) Beard, op. cit., 261.

Along with his inductive habits of thought, Roosevelt is supremely practical in all his mental attitudes. (1) Believing that "... conditions must be faced as they are, and not as they ought to be," he has constantly proclaimed the supremacy of concrete fact over abstract law or theory. (2)

This intense desire for practical efficiency and for getting things done, as well as his lack of deductive political philosophy, have led him to make compromises and to co-operate, many times, with men of different views and even of lower political ideals. (3) These practical compromises have at times given rise to considerable discussion as to where Roosevelt really stands in the field of political thought. LaFollette has charged that "... It is his political habit so to state and qualify his positions that you are never quite sure of him"; (4) and though he was widely thought of during his terms in the presidency as an innovator and a man of progressive, if not radical, ideas, yet there is considerable testimony to the belief that his character and administrations were really essentially conservative. (5)

But whatever may be our judgment as to the virtues and the faults of Roosevelt, there is one patent fact which no one can fail

(1) Roosevelt, American Ideals, 164-165.
(2) Roosevelt, op. cit., 46, 51; Roosevelt, Autobiography, 341, 503.
(3) Roosevelt, American Ideals, 120, 220; Autobiography, 340, 382; LaFollette, Autobiography, 388.
(4) LaFollette, Autobiography, 497.
(5) Rev. Revs., v 28:521 (Nov., 1903); 29:271 (March, 1904); 29,651 (June, 1904); 33,522 (April, 1906); 34,262 (Sept., 1906); 42,389 (Oct., 1910).
to recognize; and that is his tremendous personal popularity among the American people. (1) What is the reason for this popularity?

The real explanation of Roosevelt's popularity lies in the principle of Common Background; that is, the psychological fact that other things being equal, a common background of life, memory, and interests draws people together, and a different background repels them. Roosevelt has a common background of memory and interest with the people of every great section of the country. (2) The many-sidedness of his life, abilities, and interests gives him something in common with almost every class of Americans. "Independents liked him because they remembered his long struggle for civil service reform and his efficient work as police commissioner of New York. Westerners waxed enthusiastic over him because he had made himself one of them. Young men admired him because he had the vigor and enthusiasm of youth. Politicians supported him because of his ability to produce pluralities. Journalists approved of him because he afforded them abundant 'copy'. In him millions of Americans saw, or thought they saw, qualities or interests that they themselves possessed." (3) That is the crux of the whole matter: there was a real, genuine common background of life and interests between Roosevelt and the ordinary American citizen.

(1) Haworth, Reconstruction, 211, 228; Rev. Revs., v 26:259 (Sept., 1902); v 27:387 (April, 1903); v 34:261 (Sept., 1906); v 37:3 (Jan., 1909); v 39:135 (Feb., 1909).

(2) Cf. pp. of this chapter. Also, Rev. Revs., v 24:436 (Oct., 1901); v 24:517 (Nov., 1901).

(3) Haworth, Reconstruction, 211. The italics are ours.
Nor has Roosevelt ever minimized, but rather rejoiced in and exalted these essentially human interests. "At Sagamore Hill we love a great many things - birds and trees and books, and all things beautiful, and horses and rifles and children and hard work and the joy of life." (1) And again he awakens a thrill of response when he sets humanity first with the remarks that "Books are all very well in their way . . . . but children are better than books"(2) and that all men "need more than anything else to know human nature".(3)

Indeed, Roosevelt was not far wrong when he said, "I in my soul know that I am but the average man".(4) Rightly understood, there is no discredit in this statement. Roosevelt has started out with the background and capabilities of the average man, but he has made splendid use of his abilities and resources, so that he has been an efficient leader in many fields of action, in turn. Yet he has never lost his early faith in the common people,(5) his ability to strive with them for a broad "true Americanism",(6) nor his power to touch them through a common background and so to lead and influence them.

So we may leave as our tentative and incomplete impression of the man, what to his own mind would savor of the highest praise,(7)

(2) ibid., 364.
(3) ibid., 361.
(5) Roosevelt, Autobiography, 304.
(6) Roosevelt, American Ideals, 15-34; 41-42.
the judgment that Theodore Roosevelt is largely the American citizen intensified.

What, then, were the contributions of Roosevelt's administrations to the history of Progressivism?

It would seem that Roosevelt was eminently fitted for just the period in which he was called to the presidency. (1) The complacent materialism of the days of Mark Hanna was already disturbed by the great populist and free-silver movements which were "the organized expression of men's discontent" and of their determination to bring about a better adjustment of economic conditions. (2)

The Free Silver Movement was crushed in 1896 and 1900, but Populism did not die. No longer important as an organized national movement, "it began to work from the ground upward, attacking one piece of political machinery after another and pressing upon unwilling state legislatures new forms of agrarian legislation". (3)

So it happened that 'Mr. Roosevelt's Presidency coincided with a period of profound economic change and agitation in America'. (4) People were gradually becoming restless under the vaguely forming impressions that "American business was rotten at the core", (5) that the great combinations of capital were sorely in need of some sort of effective supervision, and that the traditional system of

(1) Rev. Revs., v 32:709 (Dec., 1905); Haworth, Reconstruction, 213.
(2) Rev. Revs., 36:3 (July, 1907)
(3) Beard, Contemporary History, 283-284.
(4) Rev. Revs., v 33:651 (June, 1906). Cf. also Croly, Mark Hanna, passim.
(5) Haworth, Reconstruction, 214.
American government was actually resulting, in many ways, in something other than the rule of the people.

The work which needed to be done was admirably fitted to the capabilities and qualifications of President Roosevelt. The time was not yet ripe for the construction of new forms of political and economic expression; it was necessary first to arouse the people to the iniquity and insufficiency of the old. It was precisely this thing that was President Roosevelt's greatest achievement: he awakened the public conscience, (1) and gave popular impetus to the yet unorganized movement toward the attainment of practical democracy. Coming into office without "any deliberately planned and far-reaching scheme of social betterment", (2) he gradually developed a social attitude which was in reality the spirit of the new tendency toward political democracy. As an average American citizen, intensified, Roosevelt sensed the drift of his day, (3) responded to it promptly and ably, and became a leader of the awakening public.

His most important work was that of agitation. (4) It was his task to furrow the ground in preparation for the sowing of later political leaders of less popularity but of more profound economic and political philosophy.

Briefly, then, we may thus summarize the contribution of Roosevelt's administrations to the beginnings of Progressivism:

(1) Haworth, Reconstruction, 234-235.
(2) Roosevelt, Autobiography, 420.
(3) Even his enemy, LaFollette, gives him credit (a little enviously, one may guess) for this ability. LaFollette, Autobiography, 388-389.
1. Roosevelt helped to arouse the people to the understanding that practical democracy was not a fact in the United States, and that much was to be done before practical democracy could be attained.

In this, his task was not that of a Prophet, with clear and far-seeing vision denied to the ordinary man; his work was rather that of an Agent of Expression, translating into words the struggling thoughts and feelings of his fellow-citizens.(1)

2. He exemplified and popularized the spirit of the quest for the attainment of practical democracy.

Roosevelt's adherence to the movement for practical democracy was emotional rather than philosophical. He felt that the movement was right, and he threw his great personality into the struggle, without reserve. But here his early contribution to Progressivism ended. Roosevelt was never able clearly to formulate the underlying principles or the methods necessary for the success of the movement for practical democracy.

LaFollette and Republican Insurgency.

On January 4, 1906, Robert M. LaFollette entered the United States Senate as junior Senator from the State of Wisconsin. LaFollette had served a twenty-five-year apprenticeship as a political reformer in his native state; and after three terms in Congress and four years as Governor, he was at length elected to the United States Senate in 1905.(2)

(2) The story of these years will be found in the early chapters of LaFollette's Autobiography.
LaFollette was a man of extraordinary power and great abilities. A university graduate and a lawyer, he was also a tireless, resourceful, and tremendously efficient worker, a powerful and convincing speaker, a shrewd politician, and a man of unimpeachable integrity and invincible determination. (1)

From almost his first entrance into politics, LaFollette seems to have realized the need for a movement toward political democracy. Of his first political contest, he says: "In refusing to acknowledge the authority of Boss Keyes at the outset I was merely expressing a common and widespread, though largely unconscious, spirit of revolt among the people, - a movement of the new generation toward more democracy in human relationships. No one had thought it out in sharply defined terms, but nearly every one felt it". (2)

As a matter of fact, LaFollette's political position has always depended largely upon the fact that he was one of the foremost leaders in "thinking out" the new movement "in sharply defined terms". His habits of thought were legally precise and accurate, and his attitude of mind was largely deductive, rational and philosophical in the best sense of the word. He keenly analyzed the situation in Wisconsin, and then reasoned out certain principles whose application he believed would secure more practical democracy.

He recognized and defined the political tendency of his generation far more clearly than did his contemporary, President Roosevelt. LaFollette possessed the faculty of seizing upon the essential

(2) LaFollette, Autobiography, 25. The italics are ours.
elements. "It matters little," he writes, "whether the particular question at issue is the tariff, the railroads, or the currency. The fight is the same. It is not a question of party politics. The great issue strikes down to the foundations of our free institutions. It is against the system built up by privilege . . . . that we must make increasing warfare". (1) And again: "... The supreme issue, involving all the others, is the encroachment of the powerful few upon the rights of the many. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . There never was a higher call to greater service than in this protracted fight for social justice". (2) It would be hard to find a clearer and more statesmanlike statement of the struggle and the tendency in contemporary American politics.

With such a personality and with such convictions, LaFollette entered the Senate. "No sooner had he entered that body than he began to propound his doctrines there. At first, he stood alone, but natural inclination soon drew to him such of the older Senators as the late Jonathan P. Dolliver, of Iowa, (3) and Moses E. Clapp, of Minnesota. . . . . . . With the incoming of Mr. Taft as President came also Albert B. Cummins, of Iowa, Joseph L. Bristow, of Kansas, and Coe I. Crawford, of South Dakota, all of whom joined heartily with Mr. LaFollette in his efforts to shape legislation." (4)

(1) LaFollette, Autobiography, 475. The italics are ours.
(2) LaFollette, Autobiography, 760.
(3) Cf. LaFollette, Autobiography, 428-436.
(4) Cullom, Fifty years Public Service, 420-421.
With this group of men, augmented by a number of later acessions, (1) began the Insurgent Movement in the Republican Party.

Republican Insurgency was the one definite political movement which specifically foreshadowed the Progressive Party of 1912.

LaFollette is right when he declares that "the Roosevelt administration came to a close on the fourth of March, 1909, without leaving to its credit a definite Progressive national movement (that is, a definite political movement for the attainment of practical democracy) with a clearly defined body of issues". (2)

After practically dictating the nomination and after witnessing the election of William Howard Taft as his successor in the Presidency, Roosevelt sailed for Africa on March 24, 1909, returning to America in June, 1910.

President Taft said at the beginning of his administration that the function of his administration would be "distinct from and a progressive development of" the work of his predecessor; (3) but few people believed that he would make any serious departures from the spirit or policies of President Roosevelt.

No sooner had the 61st Congress assembled in special session in the month of Taft's inauguration, than a bitter struggle broke out in the lower house between the regular and insurgent members of the Republican Party.

Joseph G. Cannon, the leader of the body of "regular" Repub-

(1) Cullom, op. cit. 424. LaFollette, Autobiography, 428.
(2) LaFollette, Autobiography, 483. The italics are ours. See also LaFollette's Weekly, v 4:3 (June 29, 1912).
(3) Rev. Revs., v 38:268 (Sept., 1908).
licans, was re-elected Speaker; but an attempt was made, by an
alliance of Democrats and Insurgents, to abolish the greater part
of the Speaker's enormous power of committee appointment, and to
depose him from his place on the Committee on Rules. (1) In the end
a compromise resolution prevailed, by means of which certain rules
were amended in the declared interests of democratizing the pro-
cedure of the House. (2)

As the session advanced, a number of Insurgents, especially
in the Senate, settled into an open course of hostility to the
Payne-Aldrich tariff program of the Republican majority, (3) and
the Insurgents succeeded in winning more and more favorable public
attention as the debate progressed. (4)

Again in March, 1910, the House Insurgents united with the
Democrats in a new revolt. This time, two appeals from the Speaker's
decisions were sustained by vote of the House; (5) the Committee on
Rules was made elective, and the Speaker was rendered ineligible
to a place on the Committee; (6) though a motion to declare the
Speakership vacant was lost. (7)

(1) Congressional Record, v. 41:21; Cf. Rev. Revs., v 39:396-398
(April, 1909).
(2) Congressional Record, v. 41:22-34.
(3) Beard, Contemporary History, 322-324.
LaFollette, Autobiography, 439-452.
(4) Rev. Revs., v 39:521 (May, 1909); v 39:653 (June, 1909);
(5) Congressional Record, v. 45:3428, 3451.
(6) ibid., v 45:3428-3426.
(7) ibid. v. 45:3438-3439.
Every move of the Insurgents was made against overwhelming odds, and in the face of bitter opposition. Aldrich and the other Republican Regular leaders made occasional attempts to outlaw them from the party; but such attempts did not impress either the people at large or the Insurgents. To one such attempt, Senator Clapp defiantly rejoined that the so-called Insurgents could justify themselves better than the Aldrich program to their States.(1)

At first, it was not apparent where President Taft would throw the great force of his influence in these factional struggles. At the beginning of his administration, to the dismay of the Insurgents,(2) he had declined to lend his aid in their opposition to Cannon's election as Speaker.(3)

Taft's first message to Congress caused further surprise and uneasiness among the Insurgents. The message was extremely brief; there was no trace of the expected "vigorous demand for downward revision of the tariff"; and "the one thing emphasized was the importance of disposing of the tariff as early as possible".(4)

Still the Insurgents were loath to give up their hopes of the President's friendship and help.(5) LaFollette earnestly sought to arouse Taft's opposition to the Payne-Aldrich Bill;(6) the

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(2) "To the dismay of everyone", LaFollette broadly describes it. LaFollette, Autobiography, 437.
(4) LaFollette, Autobiography, 438.
(5) ibid.
(6) ibid., 439-441, 448-450.
Insurgents continued to quote to the Regulars President Taft's campaign promise to work for downward revision(;1) and as late as the end of May, 1909, Senator Beveridge contended that Taft was a consistent advocate of downward revision.

Finally, however, it became evident to everyone that President Taft had definitely allied himself with the Regulars of the Party. During the tariff struggle he was charged with using the executive patronage to club the Insurgents into line;(2) he attempted to win over individual Insurgents;(3) and finally "five months after he was inaugurated he signed a bill that revised the tariff upward" and that was pronounced by an impartial review as "a most monstrous and iniquitous performance".(5)

After the passage of the Payne-Aldrich Bill, President Taft more and more went over to the leadership of the regular Republicans. He took up cudgels in defense of the Payne-Aldrich Bill;(6) he entered upon a legislative program which seemed to many people to be subversive of the interests of Practical Democracy;(7) and he used the full influence of his position to discredit and read out of the party the Insurgents.(8)

(1) LaFollette, Autobiography, 447.
(2) ibid., 452-456. Also cf. Rev. Revs., v 41:138 ff. (Feb., 1910)
(3) LaFollette, Autobiography, 450-451
(4) ibid., 476.
(8) Rev. Revs., v 41:396 (April, 1910); v 42: 4-5 (July, 1910).
The unpopularity of this attitude was evidenced by the Congressional elections of 1910, when the Democrats succeeded in electing a majority of the members of the House. The Insurgents, however, calmly held to their course, frequently allying themselves with the Democrats, and always exerting an influence out of proportion to their numbers.

But the climax of the Insurgent Movement came on January 21, 1911, when a group of Insurgents met at the home of Senator LaFollette, and founded the National Progressive Republican League. At last, Republican Insurgency was organized.

By every consideration of political principles, this Insurgent organization was the real predecessor of the Progressive Party of 1912. The League of 1911 affirmed its belief in five principles:

1. The direct election of United States Senators;
2. Direct primaries;
3. Direct election of national convention delegates, with a preferential Presidential primary;
4. The Initiative, Referendum, and Recall;
5. "A thoroughgoing corrupt practices act."

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(1) Rev. Revs., v 42:672 (Dec. 1910); v 43:261 (March, 1911)
(2) Rev. Revs., v 43:159 (Feb., 1911), 394 (April, 1911), 522 (May, 1911), 666, 673 (June, 1911); v 44:161 (Aug., 1911), 264, 288 (Sept., 1911). American Magazine v 72:59-64 (May, 1911).
(3) LaFollette, Autobiography. 494 ff.
(4) DeWitt, Progressive Movement. 70.
(5) LaFollette, Autobiography. 496.
All of these principles were expressions of the struggle for Practical Democracy; and the same principles can be found reiterated in the Progressive platform of 1912.

During Taft's administration Insurgency grew from the activities of a small group of Senators and Representatives to the position of a large wing of the Republican party, with the leaders banded together upon a platform demanding more Practical Democracy. This great growth of the Insurgent Movement during the brief span of one administration may be attributed to two facts:

1. The opposition of Taft. Taft's open espousal of the Regular Republican program "welded together the Progressive (i.e., Insurgent) strength of the country, and sharpened and clearly defined the issues". (1)

2. The preparatory work done by President Roosevelt, in awakening the public conscience to the need for more Practical Democracy. (2)

The next step in the evolution of the Progressive Party was the blending of the courses of Roosevelt and of Insurgency.

(1) LaFollette, Autobiography, 478. This is almost a self-evident fact, and can be appreciated from any reading of the political history of Taft's administration.

(2) This view is in consonance with the conclusions expressed in pages 58-59 of this chapter, and is in flat contradiction to some of the views of Senator LaFollette, as expressed in his Autobiography. LaFollette apparently believes that Roosevelt is fundamentally insincere, and that he was never an exponent of even the spirit of Practical Democracy. It seems to me that careful judgment upon Roosevelt's administration will not confirm the view of LaFollette, which seems to show the emotional warping of judgment due to his own unfortunate contact with Roosevelt in the presidential campaign of 1912.
CHAPTER IV

THE NOMINATION CAMPAIGN OF 1912

The Candidacy of Roosevelt.

On June 18, 1910, Theodore Roosevelt returned to the United States from Africa and Europe. He at once became a storm-center of political interest. Everywhere political leaders questioned what would be his attitude towards the constantly diverging factions in the Republican Party.

Roosevelt did not at once throw himself into the struggle nor ally himself with either side. He held amicable conferences with both Taft and LaFollette; (1) and "many, who did not know him" began to believe that perhaps he had definitely decided to refrain from all further entrance into politics. (2)

But his abstention from politics was brief. In New York politics, "the cleavage between the reformist Hughes wing of the Republicans . . . . and the 'regular' group headed by Mr. William Barnes had developed into an open breach". At the request of the Hughes men, "Roosevelt plunged into the state contest, defeated Vice-President Sherman in a hot fight for the chairmanship of the state convention, and secured the nomination of Mr. H. A. Stimson as the Republican candidate for governor". (3) The platform adopted was "colorless enough for the most conservative party member"; (4)

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(1) Rev. Revs., v 41:559-560 (May, 1910); v 42:394-396 (Oct., 1910); LaFollette, Autobiography, 487 ff.
(2) Beard - Contemporary History, 349.
(3) ibid., 349-350.
(4) ibid., 350.
and, indeed praised the Payne-Aldrich tariff and "enthusiastically endorsed" President Taft and his policies.\(^{(1)}\)

Roosevelt's course of action in the New York campaign did not of itself alienate him from the Taft administration. Taft was said to have repudiated the Barnes-Woodruff group, before the campaign; and such loyal followers of Taft as Root, Depew, Payne, and Fassett supported Roosevelt in the state convention.\(^{(2)}\) Moreover, the platform, which Roosevelt supported, or at least did not oppose, was, as we have said, an endorsement of the Taft administration.

But even during the New York campaign, Roosevelt made a tour of the West, proclaiming his belief in various radical principles and methods of governmental reform designed to secure more practical democracy. For example, in his widely-read address on "The New Nationalism," delivered at Ossawatamie, Kansas, on August 31, 1910, he advocated "Federal regulation of trusts, a graduated income tax, tariff revision schedule by schedule, conservation, labor legislation, the direct primary, recall of elective officers, and the adjustment of state and Federal relations in such a form that there might be no neutral ground to serve as a refuge for law-breakers".\(^{(3)}\)

At the formation of the National Progressive Republican League, Roosevelt was invited to join; but he disappointed the members of

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(1) LaFollette, Autobiography, 491.
(3) Thus summarized in Beard, Contemporary History, 350.
the League by withholding his name and prestige from the movement.\(^{(1)}\)

The Insurgents\(^{(2)}\) of the League went on with their plans. At a conference in Washington, on April 30, 1911, it was determined that the Insurgents should unite upon some one man who should oppose Taft for the Republican nomination. Senator LaFollette was recognized as the real leader of the Insurgent movement, and all or most of the men in this conference pledged him their support.\(^{(3)}\)

After assuring himself of financial backing for the campaign, LaFollette launched his candidacy in July, 1911. He quickly developed unexpected strength, especially in the Middle West; and in October, 1911, the first "national conference of Progressive Republicans" endorsed LaFollette's candidacy.\(^{(4)}\)

But in the meantime, a new factor had become prominent in the situation. Everywhere men were asking, "What will Roosevelt do?" and the answer was profoundly doubtful.

When Roosevelt had nearly completed his second administration, in 1908, there were many who desired to see him again become a candidate for the Presidency. But to all those who argued that the precedent of Washington, Jefferson, and Grant did not lie against Roosevelt, who had had but one elective term, he reiterated the

\(\text{(1)}\) LaFollette, Autobiography, 496-497.

\(\text{(2)}\) The term "Insurgents" is used in order to avoid confusion with the members of the Progressive Party of 1912. The "Insurgents" themselves called themselves "Progressives" or "Progressive Republicans", - a term more appropriate than "Insurgents", at this stage of their growth.

\(\text{(3)}\) Beard, Contemporary History, 345-346.
LaFollette, Autobiography, 516 ff.

\(\text{(4)}\) LaFollette, op. cit., 530-532; Beard, op. cit., 346.
statement which he had made after the election of 1904: "The wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form. Under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination". (1) Finally, to the continued cry for his renomination, he replied on December 11, 1907, by calling attention to his statement of 1904, and by adding, "I have not changed and shall not change the decision thus announced". (2)

When he returned to the United States in 1910, he of course gave no sign of any change in his purpose; yet many people refused to relinquish the conviction that Roosevelt might be induced to become a candidate for the Presidency in 1912. His entrance into the New York campaign was evidence of a continued and active interest in politics; and as early as January, 1911, a German writer spoke of "his seemingly renewed aspiration for the presidency". (3)

However, LaFollette was apparently assured by close friends of Roosevelt that Roosevelt would not be a candidate; (4) and on August 22, 1911, Roosevelt wrote: "I must ask . . . . every friend I have, to see to it that no movement is made to bring me forward for nomination in 1912. . . . . I should esteem it a genuine calamity if such a movement were undertaken." (5)

(4) Beard, Contemporary History, 346. LaFollette, Autobiography, 515 ff.
(5) Beard, op. cit., 351.
Nevertheless, he continued to discuss current issues from a point of view which seemed increasingly progressive and hostile to the Taft administration; and "friendly as well as unfriendly newspapers insisted on viewing his conduct as a distinct appeal for popular support for the Republican nomination". (1)

On December 21, 1911, steps were taken by certain Nebraska voters to have the name of Theodore Roosevelt placed on the ballot to be used in the State presidential primary. (2) A little more than a month later, Senator LaFollette, in a speech made on February 2, 1912, showed evident signs of physical weakness and nervous overstrain. (3) At once, Gifford Pinchot, who had been supporting LaFollette (though not with all the eagerness the Senator desired), declared that, "In my judgment LaFollette's condition makes further serious candidacy impossible". (4)

Pinchot and other men thereupon transferred their allegiance from LaFollette to Roosevelt, joining in the cry for Roosevelt to become a candidate; (5) and this, in spite of the fact that LaFollette’s recovery was rapid and apparently complete. (6)

(1) Beard, Contemporary History, 351.
(2) Rev. Revs., v 45:160 (Feb., 1912).
(3) DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 76-77.
LaFollette, Autobiography, 602-610.
(4) LaFollette, op. cit., 612.
Payne - Birth of New Party, 47.
The turning point to the Roosevelt "boom" came on February 10, 1912, when seven Republican governors signed an open letter to Roosevelt, calling upon him to become a candidate for the Republican nomination.

On February 21, after a progressive speech before the Ohio Constitutional Convention, Roosevelt characteristically declared, "My hat is in the ring!" (1) and on February 24, he formally replied to the Governors' letter, saying "I will accept the nomination if it is tendered to me by the Republican presidential convention." (2)

Was Roosevelt justified in entering the race for the Republican nomination in 1912? He has been violently criticized for his course, by two different groups of men and for two reasons:

1. William Jennings Bryan and others have emphasized Roosevelt's proposed violation of the "third term tradition" that no American president should have more than two terms in office. (3)

2. LaFollette and his friends have claimed that by entering the race, Roosevelt split the real progressive wing of the Republican Party, and that his action worked a profound injustice upon LaFollette and his candidacy.

How just and how important are these charges?

In the first place, the third-term tradition is fairly established in the political approval of the American people; though it would undoubtedly be promptly over-ridden if required by any na- 

(1) LaFollette, Autobiography, 619.
(2) LaFollette, Autobiography, 619; Rev. Revs., v 45:391.
tional emergency. In 1907 and 1908, many friends of Roosevelt made the point that his first term was by virtue of succession, and that he had therefore had but one elective term. But Roosevelt is stopped from this plea (which has, indeed, a certain evidence of the legal viewpoint which does not jump with Roosevelt's genius) by his own words in 1904, when he praised the third-term tradition as a "wise custom" and declared that it regarded "the substance and not the form". (1)

Yet Roosevelt's words in 1904 were a statement of intention, not a promise to any person or group of persons. It is difficult to see that he broke faith with anybody by changing his mind and deciding to run in 1916. The obvious charge is one of flat inconsistency, and from this Roosevelt cannot be defended. Most people would justify such inconsistency if they felt that Roosevelt's candidacy was demanded by a national crisis of some sort. But no one has ever satisfactorily answered Bryan's pointed question, "What emergency requires it?" (2)

As far as the third-term tradition is concerned, Roosevelt had an undoubted legal and moral right to enter the race for the nomination; but his inconsistency in upholding the third-term tradition in 1908 and braving it in 1912, without any justifying emergency, undoubtedly weakened his candidacy and cost him many votes.

The second charge, that Roosevelt split the progressive Republicans and broke faith with LaFollette, is more serious. The

(1) Cf. p. 71
(2) Bryan, Tale of Two Conventions, 307. The italics are ours.
events of 1912 confirmed LaFollette in a profound distrust of and hostility to Roosevelt. In his _Autobiography_, LaFollette makes an exhaustive effort to show that Roosevelt's friends - and by implication, Roosevelt - acted in bad faith toward LaFollette, in connection with the Republican nomination of 1912.

LaFollette's theory of the Roosevelt campaign is substantially as follows: (1) When Roosevelt left the White House in 1909, he already "had 1916 firmly in his mind". When he returned in 1910 he at first attempted to straddle, thus breaking with neither Taft nor the Insurgents. This policy "left him awkwardly stranded" in the New York election of 1910. In 1911, Roosevelt made a speaking tour which renewed his self-confidence so completely that "he began to think of 1912 for himself". However, he felt loath to enter the contest with Taft (for the sake of his "place in history"), unless victory seemed reasonably certain. Consequently, he pretended to favor the LaFollette candidacy, using LaFollette as a stalking horse to try out the progressive sentiment of the people. The LaFollette candidacy continued to gather strength. Finally, at an opportune moment (2) Roosevelt entered the lists as an avowed progressive Republican candidate, thus doomed LaFollette to failure.

While Senator LaFollette is undoubtedly sincere in proposing such an explanation of the facts, a fairminded observer cannot help but see that the great personal cost of the campaign to him has clouded his usually accurate judgment and has blinded him with prejudice against Roosevelt.

(1) LaFollette, _Autobiography_, 509-512.
(2) Cf., p. 72
In criticism of LaFollette's theory the following points may be urged:

I. The truth of the LaFollette theory as a whole involves the belief that Roosevelt is essentially insincere and unscrupulous, a view which is not borne out by his general course of actions in public life. (1)

II. There is not one iota of evidence that "when Roosevelt left the White House he had 1916 firmly in mind". This is pure surmise.

III. It is true that Roosevelt did not at once ally himself with either faction in the Party, upon his return to America; but this so-called "straddling" may easily have been through a sincere desire for party harmony, through his desire for being practical and getting things done, and through personal regard for Taft and personal distrust in LaFollette as an uncompromising radical. Roosevelt's position in the New York campaign was, indeed, somewhat illogical; (2) but nice differences of logic and economic thinking have never seemed as important to Roosevelt as to LaFollette. (3)

IV. A careful reading of the exhaustive evidence adduced by LaFollette, (4) does not show that Roosevelt ever personally assured LaFollette that he would support LaFollette and would not run himself; though there is strong evidence of duplicity and double-dealing on the part of friends of Roosevelt. But it is not proved that Roosevelt deliberately used or attempted to use LaFollette

(1) Cf. Chapter III. p. 50
(2) LaFollette, Autobiography, 491-492; DeWitt, Progressive Movement/
(3) Cf. Chapter III. p. 52-54
(4) LaFollette, Autobiography, 512 ff.
as a stalking horse, nor that he planned deliberate unfairness or injustice to LaFollette.

Roosevelt did enter the contest when he knew that his entrance would ruin the LaFollette campaign; but it is impossible to prove that he entered the race purely from personal ambition, and without sincere devotion to the principles which he advocated.

In the last analysis the situation which developed between Roosevelt and LaFollette is due to the fact that the two men are so different in some of their mental attitudes that they are incapable of understanding each other.

"Roosevelt, it is true, had never been a progressive in the same sense that LaFollette had. While LaFollette had been rigidly uncompromising in his relations with special interests, Roosevelt had yielded whenever it was possible to forge ahead by doing so. Roosevelt fought consistently for good government and human rights step by step, interpreting the cause in terms of existing needs and always keeping just a little in advance. LaFollette, on the other hand, laid down his program far ahead and stuck to it with savage persistence and heroic fidelity. It is because of these differences that the two men have never been able fully to understand each other. (1)

At any rate, the entrance of Roosevelt into the race for the nomination divided the progressive wing of the Republican Party, and brought LaFollette and his supporters into definite and continued opposition to Roosevelt.

(1) DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 78-79.
The Fight for the Nomination.

As soon as Roosevelt had announced his candidacy, Senator Dixon of Montana was chosen to manage his campaign for the Republican nomination. Dixon promptly challenged Taft's campaign manager to arrange for a nation-wide Republican preferential presidential primary.

The challenge was, of course, not accepted. The Taft forces were in control of the administration, and they had not the slightest intention of foregoing the immense advantage of the distribution of federal patronage.

According to orthodox Republican tradition, the Southern States began, early in 1912, to return "shadow" delegations instructed to support President Taft for the nomination. (1) Added to these were "the delegates selected in northern states by the power of patronage". (2)

But in some important states, presidential primary laws had already been passed; and these forced the candidates to join issue before the people. (3) In proportion to their former intimacy, the struggle between Taft and Roosevelt was now characterized by bitterness and recrimination, this personal element even obscuring, in many cases, the political principles upon which the contestants differed. (4)

(1) Beard, Contemporary History, 352; DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 80-81; Rev. Revs., v 45:264, (March, 1912).
(3) Beard, op. cit., 357.
(4) Beard, op. cit., 357; DeWitt, Progressive movement, 80.
Nevertheless, it was clear to all that Taft was the conservative upholder of conditions as they were; while many, if not most, Republicans saw in Roosevelt an available leader of progressive Republicanism, and a real champion of Practical Democracy. (1)

At any rate, Roosevelt swept the strategic states which employed presidential primaries, which seems to show that under conditions which afforded a real chance for expression from all Republican voters, Roosevelt would probably have been the choice of the Party for the nomination. (2)

However, when Roosevelt announced his candidacy, more than a hundred delegates had already been selected, - most of them from the South. As a Roosevelt paper said, "For psychological effect, as a move in practical politics, it was necessary for the Roosevelt people to start contests on these early Taft selections, in order that a tabulation of delegate strength could be put out that would show Roosevelt holding a good hand in the game. A table showing 'Taft, 150; Roosevelt, 19; contested, none', would not be very much calculated to inspire confidence. Whereas, one showing 'Taft, 23; Roosevelt, 19; contested, 127', looked very different. That is the whole story of the large number of southern contests that were started early in the game. It was never expected that they would be taken very seriously; they served a useful purpose, and now the National Committee is deciding them in favor of Taft; in most cases without any real division". (3)

(2) Beard, Contemporary History, 358, 361-362.
Other contests, with a more serious basis of evidence, were later initiated by the Roosevelt managers. The struggle over these contests soon became the absorbing center of the fight for the nomination. The contests were carried onto the floor of the Convention, and the decision of these contested cases was the immediate cause for the formation of the Progressive Party.

The Republican Convention met in Chicago from June 18th to June 22nd. There were 1078 seats in the convention, with 540 votes necessary to a nomination. There were 105 contests, involving 248 seats. (1) In accordance with the party custom, the first hearings of the contests were before the National Committee, (2) which was empowered to make up the temporary roll of the Convention.

The Republican Convention.

In the Convention, Governor Herbert S. Hadley of Missouri was the floor leader of the Roosevelt forces in the Convention; James E. Watson of Indiana was the Taft floor manager. As soon as the Convention had been called to order by Victor Rosewater, Chairman of the National Committee, Hadley moved that the temporary roll be amended, in favor of the Roosevelt contestants unseated by the National Committee. (3) Parliamentary law and Republican precedent were conclusively shown to be against such a motion; and Chairman

(1) The figures are taken from DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 81-82.
(2) This Committee of course "held over" from the previous convention, and was under the control of the Taft administration. Bryan declared that one of the chief lessons of the nomination fight was that no such power should be lodged in the hands of a hold-over committee.
(3) Proceedings of the 15th Republican National Convention, 1912, 32.
Rosewater ruled Hadley's motion out of order, refusing to allow an appeal, on the ground that the convention was not formally organized until the election of a temporary Chairman.(1)

The name of Elihu Root was presented by the National Committee for Temporary Chairman. This provoked the first open fight, the Roosevelt men opposing Root as a Taft supporter. The Roosevelt adherents made a shrewd effort to annex the strength of the independent LaFollette delegates, by nominating as the Roosevelt candidate, Governor McGovern of Wisconsin. But Houser, LaFollette's manager, declared, for his candidate, upon the floor of the convention, that "he refuses . . . . to be forced into such an alliance," - a somewhat refreshing departure from the political log-rolling which characterized most of the convention proceedings.(2)

Over the protests of the Roosevelt men, the vote was taken according to the temporary roll containing the names of the Taft contestants.(3) The vote was announced: Root 558, McGovern 501;(4) but in spite of Root's well-recognized personal ability and reputation, "when he stepped forward to deliver his address, the applause that greeted him was broken by cries of 'Receiver of stolen goods!''(5)

(1) Proceedings, 32-42.
(2) Proceedings, 54; Cf. LaFollette, Autobiography, 644-657.
(3) This, of course, followed as a necessary consequence of Rosewater's earlier ruling; and its parliamentary correctness can hardly be questioned.
(4) Proceedings, 61.
(5) Beard, Contemporary History, 362.
Proceedings, 88.
After the Chairman's address, Hadley renewed his motion for the seating of the Roosevelt contestants. The debate on this motion involved the detailed and bitter discussion of the various contests involved. (1) In the end, Hadley's motion was referred to the Committee on Credentials. (2) An attempt was made by the Roosevelt followers to exclude the contested delegates from voting; but it was overruled both by a clear parliamentary ruling of the Chair, and by the vote of the Convention, 567 to 507. (3)

A recess of two days was taken, while the Credentials Committee held its hearings. On June 21, the Credentials Committee began its reports upon the contests. The reports of the Committee, in favor of Taft contestants, and the minority reports, favoring the Roosevelt contestants, discussed the evidence presented in the contests.

The National Committee, favoring the administration, had placed most of the Taft contestants upon the temporary roll of the convention. Under the usual rules of parliamentary law, (4) each of these 72 contested delegates was allowed to vote in the case of every contest save his own. It soon became evident that this would assure a safe majority for Taft. The Roosevelt leaders offered

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(1) Proceedings, 106-143.

(2) Ibid., 162.

(3) Ibid., 160. Note the admission of a Roosevelt man that "... the ruling ... may be defended as a ruling on an abstract point of parliamentary procedure ... " Payne, Birth of the New Party, 22.

(4) Proceedings, 160.
dogged resistance to what they denominated the Taft "steam-roller"; but with methodical precision, "the motion of Mr. Watson, of Indiana, to lay on the table the motion of Mr. Hadley, of Missouri, . . . . . was agreed to", and "the report was agreed to". (1)

Finally, the contests were finished, the permanent roll was read; and, without debate or objection, the temporary officers were chosen the permanent officers of the Convention.

Just at this point came the dramatic climax of the fight for the Republican nomination. Henry J. Allen, of Kansas, mounted the platform and declared, for the Roosevelt delegates, that they would take no further active part in the Convention. Allen read to the Convention a letter from Theodore Roosevelt in which he said:

"The Convention has now declined to purge the roll of the fraudulent delegates placed thereon by the defunct National Committee, and the majority which thus endorsed fraud was made a majority only because it included the fraudulent delegates themselves, who all sat as judges on one another's cases. If these fraudulent votes had not thus been cast and counted, the Convention would have been purged of their presence. This action makes the Convention in no proper sense any longer a Republican Convention representing the real Republican party. Therefore, I hope the men elected as Roosevelt delegates will now decline to vote on any matter before the Convention. I do not release any delegate from his honorable obligation to vote for me if he votes at all, but under the actual conditions I hope that he will not vote at all.

(1) Proceedings, 190 and passim.
"The Convention as now composed has no claim to represent the voters of the Republican party. It represents nothing but successful fraud in over-riding the will of the rank and file of the party. Any man nominated by the Convention as now constituted would be merely the beneficiary of this successful fraud; it would be deeply discreditable to any man to accept the Convention's nomination under these circumstances; and any man thus accepting it would have no claim to the support of any Republican on party grounds, and would have forfeited the right to ask the support of any honest man of any party on moral grounds".(1)

With this indictment of the Taft majority, many of the Roosevelt delegates left the convention; and most of those who remained lapsed into an attitude of passive protest, refusing to vote on roll call,(2) - an attitude which differed very little from an actual bolt.

The Republican Convention followed out the regular order of business, re-nominated Taft(3) and Sherman, and adopted a platform of which Bryan wrote: "It points with pride to what he (Mr. Taft) has done and views with alarm all that Mr. Roosevelt stands for and threatens to do."(4)

(1) Proceedings, 333.
(2) Beard, Contemporary History, 361.
(3) The vote for the candidates for the nomination for President was as follows: Taft, 561; Roosevelt, 107; LaFollette, 41; Cummings, 17; Hughes, 2; present and not voting, 344; absent 6.
(4) Bryan, Tale of Two Conventions, 83-84.
The Taft forces retained the battlefield, "but they could not fail to recognize how forlorn was the hope that led them on."(1) The Republican Party had been split upon the issue of a "stolen nomination".

**The Merits of the Contests.**

Even if the time and space were available for an exhaustive examination of the merits of the contests, a definite and impartial decision would be impossible in many cases, because of the incompleteness of the evidence. The evidence presented in the Proceedings of the Republican Convention is little more than a summary of the main points involved. Numerous questions of fact are raised which are impossible of decision without the weighing of the testimony of witnesses; important exhibits, as of the Washington case,(2) are wanting; and a phenomenal knowledge of party rules and precedents would be necessary to decide the technical points of procedure involved.

The analysis of the contests issued by the direction of Roosevelt(3) and of Taft are not very helpful in forming an impartial judgment; for both are marked more by bitter partisanship, invective, intolerance, and unfairness than by reason and argument.

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(1) Beard, Contemporary History, 361.

(2) Proceedings, 116.

(3) Outlook, 101:571-576. July 13, 1912 (not July 12, 1913, as incorrectly given in DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 81).

(4) Printed in the Republican papers of July 29, 1912. e.g., St. Louis Globe-Democrat, July 29, 1912, p. 5.
But the question of the contests is important, for the termination of the contests was the immediate cause of the formation of the Progressive Party. Though a complete decision upon the contests is impossible, the following points should be noted as of real importance:

1. "Wherever the rank and file of the (Republican) voters had an opportunity to express themselves honestly, it was found that the Republican party was overwhelmingly opposed to the Taft administration. . . . "(1) The real strength of the Party lay with Roosevelt rather than Taft; for the Taft "majority" was composed largely of shadow delegates from the South; while most of the actual Republican states lined up for Roosevelt. Also, "in nearly every state where there had been a preferential primary Mr. Roosevelt had carried the day".(2)

2. On the other hand, the legal and parliamentary procedure of the Taft forces was, in general, unimpeachably correct.

3. The Taft men undoubtedly used the power of the administration in every possible way to gain their end. The shadow delegations of the South were welded into a compact machine to "steam-roll" all opposition. All this was inequitable; but it was only more obvious and important, and not more unjust in 1912 than it was in 1908, when Roosevelt had used the same methods in behalf of Taft.(3)

(1) Rev. Revs., 46:3 (July, 1912).
(2) Beard, Contemporary History, 361-2.
4. Probably a large number of the contests judged by the National Committee and Credentials Committee were decided on the basis of partisanship instead of on their merits; though the Roosevelt claims in this regard are probably greatly exaggerated.

5. "The conclusion of the whole matter seems to be that neither Roosevelt nor Taft had enough honestly elected delegates to nominate him". (1)

"The importance of the charge made by Mr. Roosevelt that the nomination was stolen from him, led LaFollette's Weekly Magazine to engage Mr. Gilbert Roe, of New York City, to analyze the evidence of all the proceedings bearing upon the seating of delegates whose title was in dispute". (2) This was evidently intended as a scientific and impartial examination of the contests; and, in spite of LaFollette's personal bias, there is no real reason for distrusting the accuracy of Mr. Roe's results. In brief, he decided, after analyzing the evidence and the votes, that even if all of the seventy-two contestants named in the Hadley resolution had been seated as Roosevelt delegates, still Roosevelt would not have had enough votes to nominate him. (3) All of this corresponds with the fact that "the burden of Roosevelt's argument is not that he (Roosevelt) was entitled to a majority of the delegates, but that Taft's majority ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . was not honest". (4)

(1) DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 82.
(3) LaFollette's Autobiography, 658-666.
(4) DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 82.
In equity and justice, Taft was probably not entitled to the Republican nomination of 1912. But it does not therefore follow that he "stole" a nomination which "belonged to" Theodore Roosevelt. The Progressive Party was founded upon the belief in a case that has never been proved.
Organizing the New Party.

The Republican National Convention adjourned on June 22, 1912. The same night, an enthusiastic mass meeting of Roosevelt's supporters was held in Orchestra Hall, Chicago, and the birth of a new political party was foreshadowed. The sentiment of most of the Roosevelt men was crystallized into a definite demand for a third party, with Roosevelt as its leader and candidate. Roosevelt accepted this call, but declared that a nomination at this time could be only an informal one. He therefore asked the delegates to go back to their constituencies and find out the sentiment of the people at home, and then to come together, by mass convention, to nominate "a progressive candidate on a progressive platform". In addition Colonel Roosevelt added: "The only condition I impose is that you shall feel entirely free when you come together to substitute any other man in my place if you deem it better for the movement, and in such case I will give him my heartiest support". (1)

This Orchestra Hall meeting was not a "rump convention", as it has been incorrectly called. There was no pretension that the delegates present possessed the powers or the organization of a convention. It was a mass meeting which approved of the formation of a new party, and which tentatively expressed its preference for

(1) Chicago Daily Tribune, June 24, 1917, p. 3.
the candidate of that party. It is scarcely proper to speak of this meeting as the beginning of the Progressive Party. It was rather the public expression of the determination to have a new party, - a transition step from bolting the old party to organizing the new.

From the point of view of party organization, the birth of the Progressive Party was accomplished at a smaller mass meeting of the Roosevelt delegates held in the Florentine Room of the Congress Hotel, Chicago, on Sunday morning, June 23, 1912.(1) This was essentially an organization meeting. Colonel Roosevelt was not present, and Governor Hiram Johnson of California, one of the chief Roosevelt leaders in the Republican Convention, presided.

James R. Garfield was recognized at this meeting, and he moved "that the chairman be given power to select seven men who, with himself, shall confer with Colonel Roosevelt for the purpose of devising a plan of action for the new organization".

The motion was adopted by a viva voce vote.

"There", said Governor Johnson, "is the birth of the new party". After considering one or two other questions of organization, the delegates dispersed to their homes.

Immediately after the Republican Convention, the Democratic National Convention met in Baltimore. Here there was the same bitter hostility of conservatives and radicals, though the lines had been less dramatically drawn. But here, the most popular leader of the party, William Jennings Bryan, had come to the convention to fight for the nomination of a progressive Democrat other than

himself. A few days earlier, Bryan had written to Roosevelt: "Had he espoused the cause of any other progressive and given to it the time and energy that he has devoted to his own candidacy he could have controlled the convention and made himself master of the organization of his party". (1) This Bryan did. He forced the fight from the outset, using "Roosevelt's prospective party as a club to bring the reactionaries into line". (2) Finally, by skillful political tactics, Bryan secured the nomination of Governor Woodrow Wilson, of New Jersey, who was considered a progressive, though he stood high in the estimation of almost the entire Party.

Had the Democrats nominated a thoroughgoing conservative, considerable secessions, of voters if not of leaders, would probably have been made to the proposed "new party" to be organized by the Roosevelt supporters. But since the Democrats had declared for an apparently progressive candidate, there was some doubt among independents as to the necessity of organizing a third party in the interests of progressive action or of Practical Democracy.

"Nevertheless, when the Roosevelt delegates accompanied by a host of followers who had been attracted to the movement since the convention in June, met in Chicago on August 5, they reported that a canvass of the sentiment of the voters in their respective districts indicated a demand for a third party". (3)

(1) Bryan, Tale of Two Conventions, 12.
(2) DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 83.
(3) DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 84.
The Progressive Convention of 1912.

The Convention of the new National Progressive Party was called to order at 12:30 p.m. on August 5, 1912, by Senator Dixon, the manager of Roosevelt's campaign. O. K. Davis read the call for the convention; then Senator Albert T. Beveridge was elected Temporary Chairman, and he opened the real business of the Convention by an able keynote speech, later reprinted under the title, "Pass Prosperity Around".

At the next session, during the afternoon of August 6, Colonel Roosevelt addressed the Convention with a long "Confession of Faith", in which he declared for the whole "progressive" program later adopted into the platform.

On the final day of the Convention, August 7, the temporary officers were made permanent, rules were adopted, and the Convention proceeded to its real business of nominating candidates and adopting a platform.

The nominating speech for Colonel Roosevelt was made by Wm. A. Prendergast of New York, and was the signal for a great demonstration. One of the notable events of the Convention was the seconding speech by Miss Jane Addams, of Hull House, which "marked the entrance of woman into national politics in a new sense". (1) After the other seconding speeches, the Progressive Platform was unanimously adopted as presented by the Resolutions Committee.

The choice of candidates was then made, and by acclamation

(1) DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 86.
Theodore Roosevelt was nominated for President and Hiram W. Johnson for Vice-President. Appearing before the Convention, the candidates accepted the honor and responsibility laid upon them, and pledged their devotion to the cause of Progressivism, so closing one of the most remarkable political conventions in American history. (1) "The convention, which had been made unusual by the singing of hymns and patriotic songs, adjourned at 7:24 on Wednesday evening with the singing of the doxology, and a benediction". (2)

Almost all who have written of this Convention have mentioned the replacement of the usual system of political manipulation by an almost religious fervor and intensity, - a sense of devotion to a new crusade for social and political justice and democracy. The presence of this feeling is not to be taken too seriously; the same high spirit of consecration to ideals breathes forth in the speeches of Alexander Stephens upon the outbreak of the Civil War, in the "Farmers' Declaration of Independence" written by the Grangers. (3)

(1) The proceedings of the Progressive Convention were never published. "The 'Proceedings of the Progressive National Convention at Chicago, 1912' was not printed. The only report we have is that of the official stenographer, who reported the Convention." Letter to the writer from O. K. Davis, Secretary, Progressive National Convention, October 9, 1914.

Brief mention of the Convention is made in Beard, Contemporary History, 370-372 and DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 84-86; but the best and most complete brief account is given in Bryan's Tale of Two Conventions, 247-249.

The description here given is based upon the Associated Press reports published in the Chicago Daily Tribune of August 5-8.

(2) Bryan, Tale of Two Conventions, 249.

(3) Cf. Chapter I, p. 12, footnote
in Bryan's "Cross of Gold" speech, and in the utterances of many another lost cause. Still, this spirit was so manifest in the Progressive Convention of 1912 as to impress itself strongly upon those who were present. Probably this spirit of idealism, taken with the platform of the Party, did more than anything else to attract to the ranks many social workers, thinkers, political and social reformers, and other idealists who were seeking for the concrete realization of some of their ideals.

The Platform itself is so important, and it raises so many special questions and problems that the discussion of it is reserved for a separate chapter.
CHAPTER VI.
THE PROGRESSIVE PLATFORM OF 1912.
The Text of the Platform.

It is somewhat startling to learn that the Progressive Platform of 1912 presents a considerable problem of textual criticism. The text of a document so well known as a modern political platform is usually definite and determinate, and not subject to controversy.

Yet in a careful word-for-word comparison of eight copies of "A Contract with the People" the Progressive Platform of 1912, it has been discovered that no two copies are exactly alike. One might expect to find many variations in punctuation, capitalization, paragraphing, etc. As a matter of fact, there are no less than 293 of such minor variations, (1) or an average of 41.9 for each of the seven variant copies (2).

But even this large number of minor variations is lost sight of when the number and magnitude of the major variations are discovered. None of the seven variant copies is without important major variations, such as omissions, changes in wording, re-arrangement of the order of paragraphs, etc. Changes in wording are

(1) The total number is really considerably larger, 293 represents the total number of paragraphs containing minor variations from the Standard, in all the eight copies of the platform. But one variant paragraph will often contain several separate variations from the Standard. I believe it would be fair to estimate such additional variations at not less than 100 to 150 more, bringing the total of minor variations up to something like 400, or an average of 57.1 for each variant copy.

(2) The Standard copy has, of course, no variations, which leaves seven variant copies.
obviously, typographical errors; sometimes they are variations of real importance. Four of the variant copies agree in an important re-arrangement of the order of the paragraphs. Omissions vary from one word to five paragraphs. No variant copy is free from important omissions; and over one of the omitted paragraphs, a considerable political controversy has arisen.

Let us examine the text of the Platform in detail. The following eight copies of the platform of 1912 have been used for comparison.

Copies Examined. (1)

1. Chicago Daily - Tribune, August 8, 1912, p. 3
2. Chicago Record - Herald, August 8, 1912, p. 3

(1) The attempt has been made to number these copies in something like chronological order, as far as that can be determined.
It is manifestly impossible to examine anything like all the publications containing the platform; but it is believed that this selection is fairly representative. Two of these (Nos. 5 and 6) are official publications of the Progressive Party; one (Payne) is a sort of unofficial Progressive campaign textbook; one (Stanwood) is a standard accepted work in the field of Political Science; two (Nos. 1 and 2) are newspaper copies published in the city and at the time of the Progressive Convention; one (No. 6) is a newspaper pamphlet summarizing the platforms, etc. of the campaign; and one (the World Almanac) is a popularly accepted annual handbook of reference. (1)

Selection of Standard Copy.

Of these eight copies examined, two were published by the Progressive Party itself; so one of these may fairly be accepted as the Standard. The principal difference in the title of these two copies is the place of publication. Each is published by the Progressive National Committee; but on No. 5 the place is given as

(1) The Republican Campaign Text-Book, 1912 does not contain the Progressive Platform. The Democratic Text-Book, 1912 contains the material of the "Third Term Platform," but not in such form that it can readily or profitably be analyzed for purposes of textual criticism, since much of the platform is placed in parallel columns with the other two platforms, under topics, instead of in regular order; and the rest of the platform is grouped under "Additional Third-Term Planks." Bryan's Table of Two Conventions contains the "Platform of the Progressive Party," but the text is much abridged, omissions being indicated by asterisks. Under such circumstances, the copy is not of much value for textual comparison, though even a cursory examination shows that the arrangement of the paragraphs, at least, does not correspond with the Standard.
"Manhattan Hotel, New York City", while on No. 8 it is "Forty-second Street Building, New York City". No. 5 was published before the election of 1912, for just above the place of publication there appears in blackface italics the paragraph; "If you want these things done ratify this contract on November 5, by casting your vote for Roosevelt and Johnson and the Progressive Party Candidates".

No. 8, published from the Forty-second Street Building, was not published until after the election of 1912; for the Progressive National Committee did not move to the Forty-second St. Building, until the spring of 1913. (1).

The text of No. 5 and No. 8 is precisely the same, save that No. 5 omits the two sentences which appear as paragraph 40 in No. 8. This is the anti-trust plank over whose omission the La-Follette platform controversy arose.

(1) ".....the Progressive Party had its headquarters at Hotel Manhattan in 1912 prior to moving to the 42nd Street Building, being with us (Hotel Manhattan) from July 1912 to March 1913." Letter to the writer, from Hotel Manhattan, J.E. Barrett, Asst. Manager, March 7, 1917. "All the information that I was able to obtain relative to the Progressive Party is that they had a lease with us in the Forty Second Street Building from the first of May, 1913 to April 30th, 1916." Letter to the writer, from Cross & Brown Co., Real Estate and Insurance, 18 East 41st Street, New York, March 6, 1917. I am unable to make out the signature of the gentleman by whom the letter was written. Heart thanks are due both to the Hotel Manhattan and to Cross & Brown Co., for courteous and prompt replies to letters of inquiry.
No. 8 may be accepted as the Standard Text of the Platform for these reasons:

1. It is the most comprehensive text of the platform. The other versions all have omissions, but not one has any important or considerable addition to No. 8.

2. As explained in the discussion of the LaFollette controversy (pp.108-111), No. 8, with its retention of paragraph 40, seems to be the deliberately and finally chosen form of the text, approved by the Progressive Party.

Textual Analysis of the Variant Versions.

For purposes of comparison, we have numbered each paragraph of No. 8. The following textual analysis and comparison of the seven variant versions with No. 8, the Standard, shows the arrangement and major variations in the seven variant versions of the platform.

The following is the key to the Analysis:

1. The paragraph numbers refer, invariably, to the paragraph numbers in the Standard. If paragraph 75 in a variant is opposite paragraph 17 in the Standard, it means that in the variant version the paragraph numbered 75 in the Standard follows directly the paragraph numbered 16 in the Standard.

2. A blank space in a variant indicates that the paragraph of the variant corresponds with the paragraph of the Standard in text.

3. A space marked "M" in the variant indicates that the paragraph of the variant contains minor variations only, from the Standard.

4. A reference to a footnote denotes a major variation which is given in the footnote.
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Notes on Textual Analysis.

NOTE PARAGRAPH LINE

(1)  6  6-7  No. 4 reads "alleging" for "acknowledging," apparently a typographical error.

(2)  11  1  Nos. 1, 3, and 6 insert "National" before "Progressive," No. 4 using the capital, Nos. 1, and 6 using the small initial letter.

(3)  13  3  No. 4 has "adapt" for "adopt," another evidence of hasty proof reading.

(4)  14  2  No. 4 inserts "it was" between "if" and "found".

(5)  Through paragraph 16, the arrangement of all the versions has been identical. With paragraph 17 begin the re-arrangement of paragraphs by Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

(6)  17  2  Nos. 1 and 2 read "enlarged" for "enlightened".

(7)  21  2  Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 read "living wage" for "living scale."

(8)  22  1  The same "arrangement variants" insert "general" before "prohibition".

(9)  50  5  Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 7 omit the modifying words "tend to", strengthening the assertion of the plank.

(10)  33  5  No. 4 omits "affairs."

(11)  33  6  No. 4 omits "that" before "control."

(12)  43  4  No. 7 reads "will" instead of "shall."
No. 4 changes the sense by substituting the adjective "public" for the noun "publicity".

NOS. 3 and 4 read "ill" for "evils."

No. 4 omits the qualifying clause, "or of such of them as are of public importance."

Nos. 1, 2, and 3 omit the words "of appropriate action for the improvement", reading instead "the promotion of vital statistics."

Nos. 2 and 7 read "corporate" for "corporation."

Nos. 2, 3, and 4 have this paragraph shortened to about half of that in the Standard. The paragraph in the Standard is as follows; the underlined words are omitted by Nos. 3, 3 and 4:

"It is imperative to the welfare of our people that we enlarge and extend our foreign commerce. We are pre-eminently fitted to do this because as a people we have developed high skill in the art of manufacturing; our business men are strong executives, strong organizers. In every way possible our Federal Government should cooperate in this important matter.

Any one who has had opportunity to study and observe first hand Germany's course in this respect must realize that their policy of co-operation between Government and business has in comparatively few years made them a leading competitor for the commerce of the world. It should be remembered that they are doing this on a national scale and with large units of business, while the Democrats would have us believe that we should do it with small units of business, which would be controlled, not by the National Government, but by forty-nine conflicting sovereignties. Such a policy is utterly out of keeping with the progress of the times and gives our great commercial rivals in Europe hungry for international markets—golden opportunities of which they are rapidly taking advantage.

No. 1 reads "banks" (a narrower term) for "hands."
The above Textual Analysis reveals an extraordinary amount of variation in the readings of the eight copies of the platform. However, some of the main lines of this variation may readily be traced.

The most glaring departure from the Standard is the radical rearrangement of paragraphs. Four of the copies (Stanwood, Payne, the Tribune, and the Herald) differ from the Standard in paragraph order; but these four variants correspond with each other in paragraph order, each having the following arrangement, with the omissions noted below: Paragraphs 1-16, 75-85, 17-31, (1) 84-86, 50-52, 87, 32-40, 88-89, 53-55, 41-42, (2) 56-61, 90, 70-74, 62-69, 43-49, 91-106.

(1) No. 4, Standwood omits Paragraphs 27-31. See on p. 100
(2) No. 1, Tribune omits paragraph 42.
It is significant that all of these arrangement variants were published soon after the adoption of the Platform. The Tribune and Herald published the text of the Platform the morning after its adoption. Payne's book is a tawdry, designedly popular, semi-official "campaign book", published for use in the campaign of 1912, and probably printed within a few weeks after the Progressive Convention. Professor Stanwood also seized upon one of the earliest copies available, as he had been delaying the publication of his book to include the Progressive Platform. (1)

At least three of the arrangement-variants show signs of hurried composition. No. 4 Stanwood, has many slight variations of words and phrases which may have been due to hasty proof-reading (see notes above). Indeed, it is probable that a proof-reader's error is responsible for the entire omission by Stanwood of para-

(1) "I am sorry that I can give you no information of value with reference to the Progressive platform of 1912. I cannot even tell you whence I obtained the copy I used. I am only sure that I took the most authentic copy available at the time. The case four years ago was similar to that at the present time. This year I am issuing -- in a week or two, I expect, -- a new edition, covering the election of 1912. I had to delay until after the Prohibition convention, in order to have all the platforms. It was so four years ago. As soon as the Progressive convention adjourned I inserted the nominations and the platform at the end of the appendix and the book was quickly printed. Of course no controversy had arisen then about the text." Letter to the writer from Prof. Edward Stanwood, The Mumbles, Squirrel Island, Maine, Sept. 7, 1916.
graphs 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, for Stanwood is in other respects in general agreement with the other arrangement-variants. More illuminating still is the agreement between the Tribune and Herald in the variation shown in note 33 above, reading, in paragraph 65 (dealing with the development of waterways) the phrase "water storage at the headquarters" instead of the Standard reading, "water storage at the headwaters." The substitution is of course, a laughable misprint; but does not the very obvious character of the error make it clear that the Tribune and Herald (which were simultaneously published, so that one could not have copied from the other) drew their copies from a common source which itself contained the incorrect reading?

There is not sufficient evidence to be sure of our conclusions; but it seems reasonable to suppose that, in regard to the arrangement-variants, one of the two following alternatives is true; 1. The less likely supposition is that the Standard arrangement was the original arrangement of paragraphs, but that some early copy of the platform contained the variant arrangement, and that this was widely copied as the authentic text. Probably this variant-arrangement source was given out as official or semi-official, since the newspapers would be likely to secure the text direct from some member or committee of the Convention. In this case we should have to suppose that the separate paragraphs or the typewritten sheets of some early copy of the platform were accidentally shuffled, producing the variant arrangement, and so this wrong order has been copied.

2. The more probable supposition is that the paragraph order of the four arrangement-variants was the original order of the platform,
as it was adopted in the Convention; but that afterwards the arrangement was revised, for official publication, and that this revised order is the one found in the Standard. Such a revision by a committee or group of Progressive leaders would, of course, be an unjustifiable usurpation of authority; but in the light of the LaFollette controversy, discussed in the following pages, it seems quite possible that some such thing may have happened.

The copies of the Platform which conform to the Standard in arrangement are in general the later or more carefully edited copies. No. 5 though a campaign document, was carefully prepared. It was probably intended for a large edition and for wide distribution as the official "campaign copy" of the platform. No. 8, the Standard, is a revised reprint of No. 5, issued after the campaign of 1912. No 6, the pamphlet of the New York Evening Post was published during the campaign, but it shows rather distinct signs of careful and unhurried publication. The copy in the World Almanac for 1916, while probably taken from previous issues of the Almanac, was published after the campaign, and was able to receive careful editing.

The Standard, No. 5, the Evening Post, and the World, show close agreement, in general, and are probably all taken from the unknown predecessor of No. 5, the deliberately and carefully edited copy of the platform published as official during the campaign. No. 5 and the Evening Post are identical, except for minor variations. Furthermore, No. 7, the World Almanac, agrees with No. 5 and the Evening Post except for minor variations and for two major variations noted in notes 22 and 9. Note 22 is of little importance; the World reads "open" for "opened" which does not change the sense, and which is scarcely more than a slight inaccuracy in proof-reading.
Note 9 is less intelligible, for here the World agrees with the Tribune, Payne and Stanwood in omitting the words "tend to" before the words "remove the artificial causes."

"Paragraph 40"

The most striking fact about the Tribune, Evening Post and World is that they agree with each other and differ with the Standard in the omission of paragraph 40. This paragraph is an "anti-trust" plank, containing a declaration in favor of "strengthening the Sherman law".

Shortly after the close of the campaign of 1912, the omission of paragraph 40 from copies of the platform was brought to light; and the matter was given as much publicity as possible by Senator LaFollette, as a political opponent of Col. Roosevelt and of the Progressive Party.

In LaFollette's Weekly for Dec. 7, 1912, (1), Mr. Macarthy of the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau presented his evidence concerning the "missing plank", as follows: Macarthy had been present at the meeting of the Progressive Committee on Resolution; and he declared that paragraph 40 was unanimously passed by the Committee; that it was included in the typewritten copies given to the Convention; and that it was adopted by the Convention. Macarthy said that paragraph 40 appeared in the early edition of the Chicago Tribune (2) but that on the night of August 7, Mr. O.K. Davis (later the Secretary of the Progressive National Committee) went to the

(1) LaFollette's Weekly, Dec. 7, 1912, p 3, 4-6, 12-14.
(2) As a matter of fact, our Textual Analysis shows that it appeared also in the Record-Herald.
Associated Press office and cut out the "anti-trust" plank, re-
placing it with a "pro-trust" plank(1) taken verbatim from Roose-
velt's "Confession of Faith" speech of August 12. (2)

It is interesting to note just here that the copy of the
Tribune used in this study, which contains paragraph 40, does in
fact, omit paragraph 42 entirely; and also that the Record-Herald,
Stanwood, and Payne have a very much shortened form of paragraph
42. (3) No recognition nor explanation of this short form of para-
graph 42 appears to have been printed.

In the next issue of his paper after the publication of
Macarthy's statement, (4) LaFollette presented further testimony
by a certain Chas. K. Lush, who said that he actually saw Davis
clip from a magazine the "pro-trust" paragraph from Roosevelt's
speech, paste or pin it on a sheet of paper, and take it to the Press
office. There Lush concludes it was "wired out as an insert along
with the Davis message killing the Sherman law plank..... I remember
when I saw the clipping I thought it very coarse work. Fot it is
in itself proof that no such plank was ever adopted by the committee

(1) Paragraph 42, as in the Standard.
(2) pp. 21-22, pamphlet, "Theodore Roosevelt's Confession of Faith." It agrees verbatim with the plank, save for the omission of one word which is not important.
(3) cf. p. 103
on resolutions..... But perhaps Davis will tell where he got it."

LaFollette's persistence in advertising what he regarded as a "platform scandal" was not helpful to the Progressive cause, and at a conference of Progressive leaders, held in Chicago in December 1912, the matter was taken up for discussion. LaFollette dryly recorded that Roosevelt talked with Macarthy; (1) that Roosevelt made a speech favoring the omitted plank; and finally that the leaders had agreed to "let the troublesome plank go back into the platform now for then". LaFollette also quoted Davis as saying that the "anti-trust" plank was adopted by the Resolutions Committee, but that when Dixon and Roosevelt objected, it went back to the Committee and was stricken out. It was then accidentally read in the Convention, and so adopted; but afterwards some leaders discovered the mistake and had this matter stricken out and the new plank inserted.

LaFollette evidently believed that the whole matter is a sinister affair and that it was purposely hushed up. He closed the discussion with two trenchant questions, which yet remain to be answered: First, Who were the "some leaders" for whom Davis acted? Second, Why did the Chicago conference, meeting in December, leave the "inserted" plank in the platform?

In the next issue of LaFollette's Weekly, (2) LaFollette replied to somewhat tardy Progressive denials of the facts alleged by

(1) LaFollette's Weekly Dec. 21, 1912, pp. 3-4
(2) LaFollette's Weekly IV. No. 52, 3, Dec. 28, 1912.
LaFollette. Nothing conclusive was established by either side, but LaFollette appears to have the better of the argument. Altogether, the affair does not reflect any credit upon the Progressive Party. A suspicion of unscrupulous trickery hangs over the whole transaction and arouses more critical wonder as to the textual variations of the copies of the Platform.

At any rate, the Chicago Conference of December 1912 apparently decided that both paragraph 40 and paragraph 42 (in its longer form) should be included in the canon of the platform. Hence, copy No.8, published from the Forty Second Street Building in 1913, contains the deliberately approved text of the Progressive Platform of 1912, and may properly be accepted as the textual Standard.

The Contents of the Platform

Granting that the Standard text of the Platform is established, what is the significance of its planks? In what did the Progressive Party of 1912 affirm its belief?

The Platform of 1912, more than any other one thing, identified the Progressive Party as an integral part of the great contemporary movement toward the attainment of practical Democracy. The following outline shows briefly the contents of the platform. The headings (except the first one) are those used in the Standard copy; and the numbers refer to the paragraphs of the Standard. In this outline an asterisk has been placed before each paragraph which contains an open or readily implied committal to the cause of securing more Practical Democracy. (1)

(1) Cf. Chapter II. p.30 ff
Declaration of Principles of the Progressive Party.

I. (Introduction)
* 1 Conscience of the people has created new party—dedicated to maintain government of, by, and for the people.
* 2 People are masters of their constitution.
* 3 Country belongs to the people and should be used and developed for general interest.
* 4 "It is time to set the public welfare in the first place."

II. The Old Parties
* 5 Parties exist to serve the people
* 6 Both of these old parties have turned aside from their tasks. Irresponsible "invisible government", rules.
* 7 "Dissolve the unholy alliance between corrupt business and corrupt politics".
* 8 New party necessary to express will of the people.
* 9 New party offers itself "as the instrument of the people".

III. A Covenant with the People
* 10 "This declaration is our covenant with the people".

IV. The Rule of the People
* 11 "Government by a self-controlled democracy expressing its will through representatives of the people"; "insure the representative character of the government."
* 12 Direct Government:
  Direct primaries for nomination of state and national officers.
  Nation-wide preferential presidential primaries
  Direct election of U.S. Senators.
State Reforms:
  Short ballot
  Initiative, Referendum, Recall.

V. Amendment of Constitution
* 13 Easier method of amending Constitution, "to adopt it progressively to the changing needs of the people".

VI. Nation and State
* 14 National jurisdiction over inter-state problems
* 15 Intolerable for states to "become competing commercial agencies"
* 16 Democrats archaic in insistence on states' rights

VII. Social and Industrial Justice
* 17 Supreme duty of nation is "the conservation of human resources through an enlightened measure of social and industrial justice." Progressive Party pledges itself to work for:
* 18 Prevention of industrial accidents and diseases, overwork, unemployment.
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* 19 Minimum industrial safety and health standards
* 20 Prohibition of child labor
* 21 Minimum wage for working women
* 22 Limitation of hours of work for women and children
* 23 "One day's rest in seven for all wage-workers"
* 24 Eight-hour day in continuous twenty-four-hour industries
* 25 Abolition of convict labor
* 26 Publicity of conditions of labor
* 27 Compensation for "death by industrial accidents and injury and trade diseases" - transfer burden of lost earnings "to the industry and thus to the community."
* 28 Social insurance
* 29 "Lifting the last load of illiteracy", encouragement of industrial education.
* 30 Industrial research laboratories; apply science to "the service of American producers"
* 31 Labor organization

VIII. Business

* 32 Secure "large measure of general prosperity"
* 33 Test of true prosperity, benefits conferred on all; test of corporate efficiency, ability to serve the public
* 34 "Strong national regulation of interstate corporations"
* 35 Eradicate abuses of big business
* 36 Federal Commission to supervise interstate industrial corporations
* 37 Duties of such commission; enforce publicity; attack unfair competition, false capitalization, special privilege; vigilance, etc.
* 38 Would benefit business,
* 39 And free it from confusion and uncertainty
* 40 Strengthen the Sherman law

IX. Commercial Development

* 41 Government "co-operate with manufacturers and producers in extending our foreign commerce"
* 42 National Government must co-operate with business, as Germany had done, to extend foreign commerce

V. Tariff

* 43 Protective tariff
* 44 "Benefit of any tariff should be disclosed in the pay envelope of the laborer"
* 45 Tariff revision downward- present tariff unjust to people
* 46 Non-partisan scientific tariff commission,
* 47 With adequate power. Immediate reduction of "schedule generally recognized as excessive"
* 48 Payne-Aldrich bill unjust to the people
* 49 Repeal Canadian reciprocity act
XI. High Cost of Living
* 50 Due to natural and artificial causes. Measures here proposed will tend to remove artificial causes
* 51 Other causes will remain; which
* 52 Must be remedied by full information and effective government supervision

XII. Currency
* 53 Improve currency system
* 54 Government control of currency - protect from special interests
* 55 Oppose Aldrich Bill as placing currency and credit system in private hands

XIII. Conservation
* 56 Conservation of natural resources
* 57 Agricultural lands remain open to genuine settler
* 58 Public control of remaining natural resources
* 59 Government retain control over natural resources
* 60 Require reasonable compensation to public for water-power rights hereafter granted
* 61 Lease public grazing lands under equitable provisions

XIV. Waterways
* 62 Rivers natural arteries of trade
* 63 Develop our rivers, especially Mississippi
* 64 Immediate plan of waterway development
* 65 Benefits of such action
* 66 Use experience and organization of Panama Canal for this purpose

XV. Panama Canal
* 67 Built and paid for by American - use for their benefit
* 68 Break transportation monopoly of trans-continental railroads. No tolls for American ships.
* 69 Develop co-operation with Latin-American nations

XVI. Alaska
* 70 Natural resources of Alaska open to development, under ownership of U.S.
* 71 No grants except under homestead law
* 72 Benefits of such a policy
* 73 Government prevention of transportation extortion or monopoly
* 74 Territorial government for Alaska

XVII. Equal Suffrage
* 75 "Equal suffrage to men and women alike"

XVIII. Corrupt Practices
* 76 Limitation on and publicity of campaign contributions and expenditures

XIX. Publicity and Public Service
* 77 Registration of lobbyists; public committee hearings, limit political activity of federal appointees
XX. The Courts
* 78 Restrict power of courts so that people "determine fundamental questions of social welfare and public policy"
* 79 Referendum on judicial decisions holding law unconstitutional, when passed under police power of state
* 80 Decision of supreme court of state declaring state act unconstitutional because of violation of federal constitution to be subject to review by United States Supreme Court

XXI. Administration of Justice
* 81 Reform of legal procedure and judicial methods, to secure better administration of justice
* 82 No issuance of special injunctions in labor disputes
* 83 Contempt cases in labor disputes subject to trial by jury

XXII. Department of Labor
* 84 Establish national Department of Labor

XXIII. Country Life
* 85 Development and prosperity of country life important
* 86 Develop agriculture and country welfare

XXIV. Health
* 87 Unified national health service

XXV. Patents
* 88 "Make it impossible for patents to be suppressed or used against the public welfare"

XXVI. Interstate Commerce Commission
* 89 Empower Commission to value physical property of railroads. Abolish Commerce Court.

XXVII. Good Roads
* 90 Extend good roads and rural free delivery

XXVIII. Inheritance and Income Tax
* 91 Graduated inheritance tax
* 92 Income tax, by constitutional amendment

XXIX. Peace and National Defense
* 93 Deplore warfare; attempt to substitute arbitration, etc.
* 94 Favor international agreement for limitation of navies. Pending such agreement, continue present policy, two new battleships a year

XXX. Treaty Rights
* 95 Protect American citizenship, in treaties and otherwise. Absolute right of expatriation.
XXXI. The Immigrant
   * 96 "Larger share of American opportunity" to the immigrant
   * 97 Denounce neglect of immigrants
   * 98 Governmental action to aid immigrants

XXXII. Pensions
   * 99 "Wise and just policy" of pensions. Approve Southern state pensions to ex-Confederates

XXXIII. Parcel Post
   * 100 Create parcel post

XXXIV. Civil Service
   * 101 Condemn use of patronage violations of civil service law by (Taft) administration
   * 102 "Enforcement of the civil service act in letter and spirit"; extension of civil service; equitable provisions for retirement; "continuous service during good behavior and efficiency"

XXXV. Government Business Organization
   * 103 Readjustment of government business methods, to secure economy and efficiency

XXXVI. Government Supervision over Investments
   * 104 People swindled through worthless investments
   * 105 Governmental supervision over investments

XXXVII. Conclusion
   * 106 "On these principles and on the recognized desirability of uniting the Progressive forces of the nation into an organization which shall unequivocally represent the Progressive spirit and policy we appeal for the support of all American citizens, without regard to previous political affiliations."

Several things are to be noted about this platform. In the first place, the "contract with the People" is, in the main, clear-cut and definite. There are fewer meaningless generalities and double faced planks and less ambiguity than in most recent American party platforms. (1)

(1) "Never before had an important political party taken up in its platform so many vital issues in such a definite way! DeWitt, Progressive Movement, 96."
In the second place, the platform is actually in accord with the tendency toward Practical Democracy. (1) We have marked 63 out of 106 paragraphs, or 59% of the whole number, as expressing, in our judgment, committal to the cause of Practical Democracy. The Progressive Party was the first large party to declare openly for Women Suffrage. Much of the platform deals with the necessity of insuring the rule of "the people", even though this term is nowhere defined. The methods and devices of "direct government" are approved; and other new measures are proposed with the ostensible purpose of protecting or aiding the people in general or such large groups as the farmers and the laborers (2).

But the platform is nowhere more unique and significant than in the emphasis which it lays upon "social and industrial justice." Political democracy, in the fullest sense, is dependent upon a democratic organization of society and industry; and the Progressive "social welfare" planks marked a new recognition of the overwhelming need of social reform and social democracy.

(1) Cf. Survey XXXVI: 304 (June 17, 1916.) "The common denominators of the party as an organic undertaking were three - a determination to get a greater measure of public control in the hands of the people, an ideal to make America again a land of opportunity for a growing industrial generation; and faith and enthusiasm in a leader......."

(2) It is not contended here that all these proposals of the platform are either necessary or advisable; but merely that they are definitely connected with the cause of Practical Democracy.
In the pioneering days of early Insurgency, LaFollette and his colleagues had necessarily fought almost entirely for political democracy. It remained for the Progressive Party to be the first important political party to exalt the ideal and magnify the necessity of social democracy; and this new social vision is one of the chief contributions of the Progressive Party to the great movement toward Practical Democracy.

The question has often been asked: "Is the Progressive Party Socialistic?" The answer depends largely upon one's definition of Socialism. Theoretically, the American Socialist Party still professes belief in most of the Marxian dogmas of class warfare, the economic interpretation of history, and the inexorable, replacement of capitalism by socialism. (1) Back of all these theories lies the real devotion of the Socialists to the ideal of the "Co-operative Commonwealth", and their inflexible opposition to the present "capitalistic" organization of society. With this, the Progressives have nothing in common. The Progressive Party advocates reform of the present industrial system; the Socialist Party demands the abolition of the present system. The Progressives believe in the present system, as a whole, but they wish to reform it; the Socialists do not believe in the present system and they wish to revolutionize it.

(1) See the Socialist platform of 1912, in World Almanac, 1916, 784-785.
But in the actual struggles of political campaigns, the Socialists have adopted a "working programme" of collective ownership, conservation, and other industrial and political demands; though it is frankly stated that all "such measures of relief as we may be able to force from capitalism are but a preparation of the workers to seize the whole powers of government, in order that they may thereby lay hold of the whole system of socialized industry and thus come to their rightful inheritance." (1)

Many of the demands of this Socialist working programme are identical with or very similar to planks of the Progressive Platform; for instance, the expressions regarding conservation, a weekly rest day for all workers, the abolition of child labor, the abolition of convict labor, minimum wage, income and inheritance taxes, the initiative, referendum and recall, amendment of the Constitution, strengthening of a national health service, and the creation of a Department of Labor.

Thus in their practical working programmes, the Progressives and Socialists have so much in common that it has been rightly said that "the most extreme of these (larger) parties, the Progressive, is not very different from the Socialist party in many of its beliefs. Radical Progressives and conservative Socialists, therefore, could almost meet on common ground." (2)

(1) DeWitt, Progressive Movement 97-98.
CHAPTER VII.

THE ELECTION OF 1912 AND AFTERWARDS.

After the prolonged and exciting battles over the nominations, the campaign of 1912 settled down into comparative quietness. After all, there was no one great paramount issue to stir men deeply. Indeed, in the unusual three-cornered fight for the election, it is difficult to understand just what were the principal issues. Probably the trusts received the greatest amount of discussion, with the tariff coming in for a good share, while other governmental proposals received varying degrees of attention.

As for the Progressive Party, its greatest issue was its own existence. The manner of its formation challenged men to think and judge, to approve or condemn. Aside from this, some of the more radical planks, such as the one on Woman Suffrage, on the recall of judicial decisions, and on direct government, received considerable debate.

President Taft was obviously the defender of conservatism; Wilson was yet untried, but seemed to be promisingly progressive; the Progressive Party was the avowed champion of Practical Democracy, but men's attitude towards it was modified favorably or unfavorably by the conditions of its birth and by its leadership. The most startling incident of the campaign nearly put a tragic end to the career of the Progressive candidate. At Milwaukee, an insane man fired upon Col. Roosevelt, intending to assassinate him. The wound, however, proved not to be serious; and Col. Roosevelt was soon able to get back actively into the campaign.
The Election Of 1912.

At the election in November, Woodrow Wilson was elected President by a plurality of 2,235,289. The Progressive Party ran second, securing a popular vote of over 4,000,000 and an electoral vote of 88, as shown by the following table: (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Popular Vote</th>
<th>Electoral Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prohibitionist</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Labor</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Heavy as the Progressive vote was, the Party did not succeed in appealing equally to progressive men of all parties. By far, the great bulk of the Progressive vote undoubtedly came from former Republicans. "Taft's vote in 1908 had been 7,678,908; that of Roosevelt and Taft combined in 1912 amounted to very nearly the same, 7,604,463.(2) Many Republicans of Progressive sentiments, including La Follette, Cummins, Hadley, Borah, and others, refused to enter the new party. Some believed that a new party was inexpedient, and that the victory of progressivism could best be won within Republican lines. Others bowed to the fetish of party regularity and shrank from being classed as bolters.

(1) World Almanac 1916, 727
(2) De Witt; Progressive Movement 86
Still others sympathized with the fundamental aims of the Progressive Party, but remained out of it because of personal distrust or dislike of Roosevelt. Of these progressive Republicans who refused to enter the Progressive Party, some enthusiastically supported Taft and others declared for Wilson. Other Republicans, of course, voted for Wilson on the strength of his record and personality; and there were others who favored Taft, but feeling that Taft's cause was hopeless, voted for Wilson in order to insure the defeat of Roosevelt.

On the other hand, Roosevelt's personality drew some votes which would not otherwise have gone to the Progressives. However, the extent of Roosevelt's popularity and the drawing power of his personality was probably over-estimated both by himself and by his friends; for apparently he drew but few men away from the Democratic ranks. Wilson's vote in 1912 was only 116,085 less than the Democratic vote for Bryan in 1908. One writer suggests that the Progressive Party probably cost Socialism a good many votes; (1) but even so, the Socialists practically doubled their vote of four years before.

In the presidential election, the Progressives carried the states of Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Washington, splitting the victory with the Democrats in California.

(1) De Witt, Progressive Movement 87
(2) World Almanac 1916, 726
In addition to this, the Progressives elected 18 members of Congress (1), and they elected also a number of state tickets. After the election, the progressives began to lay their plans to insure the permanency of the party.

"After that campaign... which cut the Republican hold down to two states and put the minority wing of a minority party in power at Washington, the movement left competent forces in the saddle in certain states..... a small congressional group which dwindled in the off-year elections, a Progressive Service to push the ideas the party stood for (which was elaborately schemed but briefly died); and a central party organization which lacked coherence, which economically never stood on its own legs, the divergent elements of which were held together by a single welding force, Mr. Roosevelt's personality." (2)

At a national conference of Progressive leaders, held in Chicago on December 10th, 1912, Roosevelt emphasized that there must be no fusion" with the Republicans. (3) He reiterated this statement a month later, in reply to a plan of amalgamation proposed by Frank Munsey. The Republicans continued to discuss the possibility of a merger, but without awakening much enthusiasm among the Progressives. "It is plain," said Beveridge in June 1913, "that our merger-promoting friends have undertaken an impossible task."(4)

(1) World Almanac 1916, 490
(2) Survey, XXXVI, 304 (June 17, 1916)
(3) Rev. Revs.v 47: 19-20, 54 (Jan. 1913)
(4) Beveridge, Albert J.- The Progressive-Republican Merger 16.
Recognizing that the Progressives were in earnest, the Republicans at length undertook a "counter-reformation." In December 1913, the Republican National Committee laid plans for a re-apportionment of delegates to the national convention, eliminating more than 80 Southern delegates, and basing the apportionment partly on voting strength; and the adoption of this plan was announced on October 28th, 1914.\(^1\)

In the congressional elections of 1914, the Progressives played a small part. They elected but seven congressmen, and in general, ran behind the Democrats and Republicans.

About this time foreign affairs and military preparedness began to loom large in politics. Col. Roosevelt threw himself into the extreme wing of the preparedness advocates; "little was thereafter heard of such collaborators as Miss Addams and Dean Kirchwey; ... the elimination of Wilson rather than the breaking of the bosses became the combative personal issue," \(^2\) and the Progressive program of 1912 was swallowed up in the new issues of "preparedness" and "Americanism."

The Progressive Party movement subsided as rapidly as it had arisen. Progressives receded from their former aloofness from the Republicans and in both parties the talk of harmony continued to increase.

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\(^1\) Rev. Revs. v 50: 672 (Dec. 1914)

\(^2\) Survey XXXVI, 304 (June 17th, 1916)
A long practical step to this end was taken when both Progressives and Republicans decided to hold their conventions at Chicago on June 7th, 1916. (1)

The conventions of 1916 saw the end of the Progressive party as an important political party. The Progressives awkwardly prolonged their convention in an evident effort to give opportunity for a merger; when this was not accomplished, they nominated Col. Roosevelt and John M. Parker of Louisiana.

The Republicans also attempted to secure harmony by nominating Charles Evan Hughes, who, as a Justice of the Supreme Court, had been removed from the factional strife of the last few years.

Upon the nomination of Hughes (who was not allied to the "Stand-patters," and who had a record of practical reform in New York State), Roosevelt gave notice of his determination to return to the Republican Party. Consequently, he declined the Progressive nomination, "conditionally." (2)

On June 26th, 1916, the Progressive National Convention accepted Col. Roosevelt's declination, and adopted his recommendation that the Progressive Party endorse Charles E. Hughes, Republican candidate for President. (3) This act effectively closed the life

(1) Rev. Revs.v 53: 143 (Feb. 1916)
(2) The conventions of 1916 are reviewed in Rev. Revs.v 54:3-12 (July, 1916).
(3) Rev. Revs. v 54: 153 (Aug. 1916). Two days later, Col. Roosevelt conferred with Mr. Hughes regarding campaign plans and issues, thus emphasizing his "return" to the Republican Party.
of the Progressive Party. An insignificant minority of the Party protested against the merger, and attempted to reconstruct the shattered organization of the party (1) but they have had as little practical importance as the last of the Populists, a decade earlier.

As a vital force in American politics, the Progressive Party had just four years of life, from the summer of 1912 to the summer of 1916. The Progressive Party of 1912 is now a memory; with its removal from the field of active politics, it is now possible for men to look back and to seek to estimate the significance of this remarkable political movement.

(1) A call for a National Convention of Progressives, to meet in St. Louis during April 12 - 14, 1917, is mentioned in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch of March 12th, 1917. The accounts of this convention appear in the St. Louis papers of April 12 ff.
CHAPTER VIII.

THE MEANING OF THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY.

What is the meaning of the Progressive Party of 1912? What is its significance, if it has any, as a political phenomenon in contemporary American history?

To answer this question (as far as it can be answered at this early day) is to summarize the immediate and ultimate causes (1) which led to the formation of the Progressive Party, the reasons for its lack of permanence, and the results of its existence.

The Causes of The Progressive Party.

It is sufficiently obvious and equally unenlightening to say that the immediate cause of the Progressive Party was the Republican nomination campaign of 1912. The statement is true, but it is too general to be of much value. However, two factors in the nomination campaign can be picked out as having a definite part in causing the formation of the Progressive Party at this particular time.

The first of these factors is the reaction of the Roosevelt delegates against the Taft "steam-roller."

(1) The ultimate causes are those things which would eventually have brought about the formation of the Progressive Party: the immediate causes are those things which caused its formation at the particular time when it was formed.
As the Republican convention proceeded, the Roosevelt felt more and more indignantly that they were being unfairly deprived of their just dues. When the Republican convention adjourned, the Roosevelt delegates came together with a nearly unanimous desire for some kind of radical action. Most of them were in the frame of mind to accept the idea of a new party, which had already been proposed more than once during the convention week.

Just at this point entered the other factor which was an immediate cause of the formation of the Progressive Party. This second factor was the personality of Col. Roosevelt. His prestige and reputation were at stake, his ambition was aroused, and all his love of a fight cried out against "quitting" the battle after what he believed was an unfair action by his opponents. Ambition and pugnacity outweighed patience and foresight; and when the suggestion of a third party was made by the over-wrought delegates, it was translated into action by Col. Roosevelt's readiness to become the leader of the new party.

One of the best pieces of critical writing during the campaign of 1912 was a characterization of Roosevelt that appeared in the World's Work for June 1912. (1) It fits in closely with what we have already said: and it contains so much truth, so compactly and aptly stated, that it is worth quoting in full:-

(1) World's Work 24: 129 (June 1912)
"Mr. Roosevelt - the foremost political personality of his time, whose vigorous and dictatorial of the Presidency gave the office a new meaning and gave the nation a new impulse; whose prodigious success bred in him a prodigious impatience, and has misled him into sacrificing the dignity of his position; willing to risk defeat for great principles of social justice that are somewhat too vague for clear political formulation, but so fierce in their hold that they drive him into compromising pugnacities and contradictions and associations; the idol of the impatiently active; he is an impulse rather than a well-ordered force; a man of the most varied knowledge and accomplishments, but strangely lacking in economic grasp; capable of mistaking his wishes for his principles; the probable destroyer of his party in his zeal to lift it up; incapable of retirement and lacking the patience to harvest and to use the great influence of his prodigious activities; if he should become President again, why not still again? That is the rock that he is in danger of, for he is going recklessly over uncharted waters. The pity of it is that he is running at all. It was a great enough violence to the real rule of the people that he dictated his own successor in the Presidency. It would be somewhat too dictatorial if he should become successor to that successor."

The ultimate causes of the formation of the Progressive Party are perhaps less obvious but they are more important than the immediate causes.

The first of these is undoubtedly the contemporary social tendency toward the attainment of Practical Democracy. It must never be forgotten that Progressivism is merely one phase of this movement;
so the existence of the movement was one of the ultimate causes for the organization of a new party.

A second cause is found in the administrations of President Roosevelt, when his vigorous leadership and skillful agitation put the people in a mood for new adventures in democracy. Through the achievements of his administrations, Roosevelt gained his hold upon the people; and this unusual popularity made him available in 1912 for the leadership of the new party.

The third ultimate cause of Progressivism is Insurgency. Under the leadership of La Follette and his colleagues, Insurgency continued the work of Roosevelt in awakening the people and in strengthening the popular demand for Practical Democracy; while at the same time it gave form and definiteness to the movement by beginning to define its aims and to formulate its policies. Logically Insurgency was the forerunner of the Progressive movement of 1912.

One further cause may be mentioned: the conservatism of President Taft. In the heat of reactionary opposition, the Insurgents were welded together. The Standpat-ism of the Taft administration put many people in a mood for a radical remedy, and made them disgusted with the Republican majority, and ready to try even the experiment of a new party.

The Failure Of The Progressive Party.

With all these reasons for existence, why did the Progressive Party fail as a permanent political party? It must be realized that we are speaking here of the failure of a party organization. As far as its essential cause (the fight for Practical Democracy)
is concerned, Progressivism did not fail; but as an organized political party it did fail to establish itself permanently. To understand the meaning of Progressivism, we must try to discover the causes for this failure.

In our study of previous American third parties, (1) it was suggested that, a priori a third party was likely to become a major party if it arose at a time when a new major party was needed, if it was generated by a spontaneous common impulse, if it was based upon a clear-cut proposed solution to a vital problem, and if it enjoyed able leadership. The applying of these tests to the Progressive Party will help us to understand its failure. The Progressive Platform of 1912 vehemently asserted that a new major party was needed; but an impartial judge would be likely to conclude the case "not proven." At the very time of the Progressive convention, the progressive Democrats were in control of their party, and had nominated a candidate for the presidency. And even within the Republican Party great progressive gains had been made by La Follette and other Insurgents, and even by Roosevelt himself. As Senator La Follette suggests, "In 1911 Roosevelt thought it would be a great calamity to divide the Republican party. It was a good party then. The only thing that made it so bad as to deserve being riven asunder was that

(1) cf. Chapter I, especially pp. 15-25
it would not nominate him for a third term in 1912" (1)

It is not the part of efficiency to abandon a well-developed party organization, with the traditions of a half century gathered about it; and the Progressives never conclusively proved that the Republican Party was useless as an agency to secure progress, and that Progressivism therefore filled the need of a new major party.

Again, the Progressive Party was hardly created by a spontaneous, common impulse. The method of its formation has already been described. The reasoning and the choice of the leaders was, after all, the determining factor; and the raising of the standard of Progressivism did not for a moment unite all the real progressives in a common party.

Nor did the Progressives present a proposed solution to any one vital problem. They outlined in their platform a suggestive and helpful program of work, but they had no paramount issue.

In the matter of leadership, the Progressives had, of course, in Col. Roosevelt, one of the foremost men in American politics. Yet it is none the less true that, under the circumstances, they were handicapped as well as helped by Roosevelt's leadership, and more especially by his candidacy. Roosevelt was not the leader of the already existing progressive movement which we have called Insurgency; the real leaders were La Follette and Cummins and other

(1) La Follette, Autobiography 749
somewhat less prominent men. Moreover, Roosevelt, in becoming a candidate, encumbered himself with necessity of meeting the "third term" criticism of his opponents. Besides this, Roosevelt was probably not the type of leader that was needed in 1912. The day of his most effective political service was past; the new conditions required not an intensified "average man" who could agitate and stir the people, but a political prophet and a constructive statesman who could voice the vague desires of the people, and who could transform rational ideals into political realities. Roosevelt's candidacy meant inevitable failure to unite all the progressive forces, even within the Republican Party. Those who disliked and distrusted Roosevelt would not enter "his" party. The candidacy of Roosevelt precluded the possibility of an ideal alliance of all progressives which might have commanded the working efficiency and the determination of La Follette, the broad knowledge and political insight of Wilson, the oratory and passionate conviction of Bryan, and the popular appeal and personal ability of Roosevelt.

Again, the conditions attending the birth of the new party militated against its success. The fact that it arose out of the fight for the Republican nomination obscured whatever high principles and disinterested striving were involved, and made many people regard the Progressives as a faction of dissatisfied Republicans.

Another reason for the Progressive failure was the outbreak of the European War, in 1914. As the war progressed, and as foreign relations became strained, the thoughts of the people gradually turned from social progress within the nation to national defense against possible aggression from without. Moreover, the new
preparedness propaganda led to the practical desertion of Col. Roosevelt from the party, in perfect consistency with his belief that "No triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumphs of war." (1)

Finally, we must name as an important cause of the failure of the Progressive Party "that which," says Professor Buck, "has caused the failure of every third party movement since the Civil War, the innate political conservatism of the bulk of the American people. Although recognizing that the issues which originally divided the old parties have largely passed away, they prefer, even though it may be a somewhat slower process, to bring forward the new issues and to work out the desired reforms in the established parties rather than to attempt to displace them with new organizations." (1)

The Results of the Progressive Party.
Granting that the Progressive Party was not permanent nor successful as a party, we may tentatively (because it yet too soon for true historical judgment) estimate the results of its existence somewhat as follows:

It had of course, a definite effect upon the election of 1912. The existence of the Progressive Party almost forced the Democrats to nominate a progressive candidate. Then, too, the Progressive

(1) Roosevelt, American Ideals 25.
(2) Turner Essays in American History 164 Buck, "Independent Parties in the West"
Party split the Republican vote, making impossible the re-election of Taft, and assuring the choice of Wilson.

From the viewpoint of the advocates of woman suffrage, the Progressive Party did a real service in popularizing equal suffrage. The Progressives were the first large party to have the courage openly to endorse woman suffrage, and they illustrated their attitude by the honor rendered to Miss Jane Addams and other women who assumed a high place in the councils of the Party.

Undoubtedly, the Progressive Party had a real effect upon national and state legislation, during the Wilson administration.

In accordance with the planks of the platform, the Progressives soon prepared a "Progressive Congressional Program" of bills to be presented in Congress. (1) Of course, few or none of these bills were adopted in the form in which the Progressives presented them; but they kept the issues alive in Congress, and tended to direct more attention to so-called "social" and other "progressive" legislation. The Progressives may be credited with some part in securing (either through propaganda or through actual advocacy and voting in Congress) such measures as the establishment of the Department of Labor, the Income Tax, the Parcels Post, the direct election of United States Senators, the establishment of a Federal Trade

Commission, the Clayton Law, the Child Labor Law, etc. (1)

In the sphere of state legislation, too, the Progressives and their campaigns "loosened the public mind to a range of ideas which had long struggled for a hearing;" (2) while "Progressive Law-making in many States" (3) furthered the adoption of social legislation regarding Child Labor, Vocational Training, Mothers' Pensions, Minimum Wage, Factory and Housing, Workmen's Compensation, and also laws providing for electoral reform and methods of direct Government. (4)

The Progressives made also certain constructive contributions to political procedure and methods. They created a new type of party platform, with its clear-cut statement of beliefs and policies, and with its timely, strengthening of the socialization of politics, by proclaiming social welfare as a proper object of political activity. The Progressives also carried into practice the idea of the "open caucus" in Congress (5); and they introduced the plan, though they did not demonstrate much of the practice of a

(1) The May, 1917 issue of the Political Science Review is said to contain a review of the legislation of the Wilson administration, but the journal has not been available in time for reference in preparing this chapter.

(2) Survey XXXVI, 304 (June 17, 1916)

(3) Rev. Revs. 48: 84-9 (July 1915)

(4) ibid.

(5) Rev. Revs. 47:545 (May 1913)
"service bureau" maintained by a political party. (1)

One important result of the Progressive Party was the counter reformation in the Republican Party, with the re-apportionment of national convention delegates, and the limiting of the number of Southern shadow delegates.

But the greatest result of the Progressive Party is, after all, intangible and not easily evaluated. Above all else, the Progressive Party was a convincing demonstration of the strength and depth of the popular sentiment in favor of the cause of Practical Democracy. The hurrying of so many social reformers, scholars, and others to the Progressive standard showed that a good many people had been merely waiting for a chance to express their Progressivism. A party which could organize in June, select its candidates in August, and poll 4,000,000 votes in November, had enough natural vitality to make it a force to be reckoned with. The Progressive Party was undoubtedly the means of awakening a large number of people to conditions and abuses that needed reform, and of demonstrating to them how many other people were working for the same reforms.

The Progressive Party seems to have been a transient organization, not destined to endure; but its influence has not been lost, and when the history of our contemporary movement for Practical Democracy is finally written, an important chapter will be given to the life of the Progressive Party of 1912.

(1) Progressive National Service, Progressive Congressional Program N. Y., 1914 is one publication of this bureau. It contains various "pledges" from the platform of 1912, and "the fulfillment" in bills introduced into Congress.
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