The Reorganization of the State Government of Illinois in the Interest of Efficiency and Economy
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT OF ILLINOIS IN THE INTEREST OF EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY

BY

EARLE UNDERWOOD RUGG

THESIS

FOR THE

DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS

IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE

COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS AND SCIENCES

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

1915
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

Earl Underwood Rugg

ENTITLED

The Reorganization of the State Government of Illinois in the Interest of Economy and Efficiency

IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF Bachelor of Arts in

Political Science

James W. Farmer
Instructor in Charge

APPROVED:

James W. Farmer

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF Political Science

May 17, 1905
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Introduction.

Government is everywhere recognized as the most important agency through which certain phases of human welfare are secured to the community, and therefore good government is essential to progress. Of the various branches of government that of the state is by far the most important, because it touches more intimately the common, everyday life of the people.

In actual practice this branch of government has revealed certain underlying but inherent evils in the state administration. Such defects have been made evident to the electorate in the startling increase of public expenditures, and in the enactment of legislation that has enabled small groups to enrich themselves at the expense of the people. The first reforms were only superficial in the solution of the difficulty, in that the reform element merely replaced the corrupt officials by honest upright men. The attempts of the latter to give efficient and economical administration revealed the fact that the main cause of bad government lay in the defective machinery, and in the failure to replace an antiquated mechanism by an organization that would be fit to cope with the complex social and economic order of modern society. With reorganization of the

(1) Horack, F.E. Reorganization of State Government in Iowa, p11.
state government of Illinois as the main problem, the ends by which to achieve this aim are found in economy of state funds, efficiency of administration, and a simplification of the present organization, so that a direct location of authority and responsibility will result.

Although the title of this paper aims at a general reorganization of state government the scope of this discussion will in the main consider only the executive department, it being the point at which reform is most necessary. In the first place a brief consideration of the existing government in Illinois will suffice to show some of the defects in organization. A discussion of the remarkable tendencies toward centralization in this state and in other states as well as in the cities and in the Federal Government, should serve to illustrate from a comparative point of view the need for a more co-ordinated plan in Illinois. With this survey, then, the feasibility of reorganization will be apparent in which especial emphasis will be laid upon the executive department, but which will also contemplate the proper relation of the executive to the legislative department, and the importance of a state budget. In conclusion the proposed plan will indicate certain results to be gained in the way of increased efficiency through responsible government, economy through a budget, and authority through a centralized administration; with the Governor exercising supervision over the entire state government.
Chapter I.

Present Organization in Illinois.

The Constitution of 1870 provides that there shall be three main departments of government in Illinois—legislative, executive, and judicial. The judicial power is vested in an organized series of courts created by the Constitution and the statutes; the legislative power in a General Assembly consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives elected by the people; and the executive power in several elective officers. These officers are the Governor, the Lieutenant-Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor of Public Accounts, State Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Attorney General, and over one hundred other state officials, boards, and commissions. The latter in most cases are appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. The increase in the number of boards and commissions has been remarkable. Less than a fourth of the present number were in existence before 1870, and more than a third have been created since 1905. A glance at the number of state employees, as well as the expense necessary to maintain these boards and commissions, brings us to a realization of what has been called a fourth department of state government. The offices and institutions under the executive department employ in round numbers six thousand persons, and expend annually about nineteen million dollars.

(1) Constitution of Illinois, art. 4-6. sect. 1.
(3) , p. 11.
exercises a wide control not only over the boards and commissions created by it, but also over the numerous elective officers. For the latter the present organization has compelled the legislature to define in detail the powers and duties of these various boards and commissions. They are all independent of each other, in some cases have overlapping functions, and because they are intimately concerned with the life of the people it is absolutely essential that these offices, boards, and commissions should be efficiently and economically organized. (1)

The report of the Illinois Efficiency and Economy Committee sets forth five main reasons why there should be reform in state administration. 1. There is a lack of correlation in the various state departments that have similar functions, for example there are separate boards of trustees for the five Normal Schools. Functions properly belonging to one officer are often performed by another, thus the Attorney General has charge of the inheritance tax which is primarily a fiscal matter. 2. Offices for various state agencies, especially in Chicago are widely scattered; not only resulting in extra rent, but also making access to them by the public more difficult. 3. No standards of compensation are set up, for example the Commissioners of Labor get $150.00 annually, while members of the State Board of Pardons receive $3500.00, and the members of Board of Arbitration $1500. 4. The statutes delegate overlapping powers and duties to these boards so that work that could be done more effectively by one man is often performed through several agents; thus for purposes of inspection officials of the State Board of Health, State Food Commission...

and Chief Factory Inspector's office may visit a place, and even issue conflicting orders. 5. Finally the irregularity and uncertainty of the present system of reporting makes confusion in the progress of state administration, and increases the cost of state printing. The Illinois Committee in commenting on these defects says, "As a result of the absence of any systematic organization of related services there is no effective control exercised over the various state boards, commissions, and offices." (1)

It is evident, therefore, that the existing organization has too many independent offices, subject to no responsibility; with the result that waste and extravagance is not only possible but inevitable. Notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution empowers the Governor to present estimates as to the needs of the administration for the ensuing biennium to the General Assembly, no Governor except the present occupant of the executive chair has complied with this duty, and only through the aid of the Legislative Reference Bureau was Governor Dunne enabled to fulfill this provision. From the existing situation we can get only irresponsible government from the top to the bottom of the state administration. Still the public holds the Governor responsible for the administration. This point of view, however, understanding the position of the chief executive as it exists today, on the other hand this paper will attempt to point out the means by which the machinery of state administration can be so organized as to allow this popular conception of a responsible chief executive to be realized.

The present unconcentrated system has not been permitted to ex-

ist without some constructive efforts at reform. In recent years there has been a clear cut tendency toward centralization and concentration of state administration. In this state it has resulted in the consolidation of the twenty three charitable institutions under one central organ, the Board of Administration. The success of the experiment in this field well illustrates that concentration of responsibility and power into the hands of one board results in efficiency and economy. Other functions of more or less relation that have been reorganized in this manner are the Public Utilities and Railroad Warehouse Commisions, and the Fish and Game Commisions. (1) In other states the same centralization is evident, being particularly true of charitable institutional boards, commisions to control agricultural agencies, tax and labor administration. New York and Ohio have been most progressive in this direction; but Wisconsin, known for its pioneer work in reform, has also kept pace with the more advanced ideas. In the Federal Government administration comes closer to the type that this paper advocates, and is the underlying basis for the reorganization of the one hundred offices and boards in this state into eight departments. In municipal government concentration manifests itself in the rapid spread of the commision form of government, and in the city manager plan.

Perhaps the most definite, comprehensive, and thorough proposals looking to reorganization are the recommendations set forth in the reports of Efficiency and Economy Committees in the states of Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Minnesota, Iowa, and in Illinois. The Massachusetts and New Jersey plans are not so comprehensive as the others, being limited to certain fields, for example

Massachusetts has been principally concerned with changes in the administration of charitable and correctional institution. In Iowa, on the other hand, the Efficiency Engineers employed by the Committee on Entrenchment and Reform reported a radical reorganization including constitutional as well as statutory changes. They proposed the reduction of all offices and boards to within three departments. (1) Such a classification being too broad may be criticized as lacking co-ordination necessary for a harmonious working of the related departments. The Minnesota Committee proposes to place the sixty odd boards, commissions, and offices under six departments. (2) From the standpoint of immediate need this is a well planned reform, but no changes at this time should fail to strive for administration that will subserve the interests of efficiency and economy together with authority to the highest degree attainable.

It may be stated here that the proposals in this paper as to the reorganization of state administration agree in respect to the organization of the various departments with the changes outlined by the Illinois Efficiency and Economy Committee, but differs from them in the composition of the main executive officers. The Committee has proposed to the present General Assembly a plan which will permit immediate enactment into law. On the other hand, it is more desirable for changes outlined here to make the main executive officers; as the Secretary of State, Auditor, Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Attorney-General, appointive by the Governor. This will require constitutional changes. From a study of various authori-

(1) Horack, F. E. Reorganization in Iowa. p 65.
(2) " " " p 34.
ties to be cited on pages 9-12, it is the conclusion of the writer that any reorganization cannot fail to centralize power and authority in the hands of the Governor.
Chapter II
The Executive Department.

In the American colonial system the royal governor was the central figure, securing both the framing and the execution of the law. Being the King's representative and a Tory, he lost his pre-eminence during the early years of our history as an independent nation because the legislature through the development of standing administrative committees gradually superseded him. By the middle of the nineteenth century a reaction in his favor set in, shown in the disposition of the framers of new state constitutions to make the Governor somewhat more important. The increasing length of his term and the development of his veto power are evidences of this tendency. It should also be noted that the Governor in the development of party government assumed the position of leader, so that Horack concludes "that there is now promise that out of the pending reorganization of the executive functions of government, the Governor will emerge as the responsible head of state government and administration." (1)

At present there are elected every four years a Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Attorney General. A Treasurer is elected for two years. Each of these officers is on the same plane, and independent of the Governor in whose hands the Constitution places the "supreme executive power." (2) The result of this situation is that the Governor cannot effectively exercise the supreme executive power, because

(1) Horack, F. E. Reorganization in Iowa. p. 22.
(2) Constitution of Illinois. art. 5, sect. 6.
these elective officers are his colleagues, not his subordinates. His usual recourse for controlling the many boards and commissions appointed by him is the cumbersome process of removal after an open hearing on well founded charges of incompetency. Mathews in the American Year Book for 1914 says, "that the limited extent of the Governor's removal power over minor executive officers is the chief obstacle to efficient administration by the Governor." (1) Governor Ammons of Colorado ascribes the destruction of life and property in the recent Colorado strikes to his lack of power to remove unfaithful subordinates. (2) In administration we must delegate authority, however, this does not necessarily mean division of power, for the final decision must rest with the head of the executive department. (3). From the above it is evident that the executive officers in Illinois are not centralized, and lack harmony; the result being an inefficient administration.

To remedy this situation it is desirable to continue the Governor and Lieutenant Governor as elective officers, making the former central, responsible head of the executive department. This plan, however, demands that the Secretary of State, Auditor of Public Accounts, State Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Attorney General be removed from the ballot; and, instead, permit the Governor to appoint them. These officers would make up an advisory cabinet, similar to the cabinet formed by the ten executive officers of the Federal Government.

Three main reasons can be assigned for this step. First, it is

(1) The American Year Book. 1914. p, 197.
(2) " " " " . 1914. p, 197.
(3) Garner, J. W. Introduction to Political Science, p, 523.
advisable in the interests of the short ballot. President Woodrow Wilson has said, "that the short ballot is the key to the restoration of popular government in this country." (1) Ex-Presidents Roosevelt and Taft as well as the Governors of fourteen states in their messages to the legislatures in 1915 have given this principle their endorsement. It is useless to expect efficient administration even under the proposed plan, if the people are confronted with such a multitudinous list of candidates for offices on election day. Second, these positions are not properly policy determining offices, for they are chiefly administrative in character, and as such should be under the direct control of the chief executive. Third, numerous authorities agree as to the wisdom of executive appointment for higher officials. Alexander Hamilton says, "One man of discernment is better fitted to analyse and estimate the capacities of candidates for various offices." (2) Sedgwick says, "Popular election even to select the highest grade of subordinates seems undesirable, because it tends to give such men too independent a position, and electors are not capable of selecting such officials." (3) Garner observes, "that the wide extension of the elective principle to the appointment of officials whose duties are mainly administrative in character, and the performance of which requires qualifications that are difficult to obtain by popular election," (4) to be one of the chief weaknesses of state constitutions.

(1) Quoted by Horack, Reorganization in Iowa, p, 26.
(3) " Sedgwick, Elements of Politics. p, 275.
In regard to the formation of a cabinet, we find several executives in the Conference of Governors for 1911 advocating such a reform. President Wilson is in favor of it in order to secure responsibility of the chief executive over the state administration. Governor Oneal of Alabama points out a defect in the present system which only serves to make the argument for a cabinet more striking. Under the present form of popular government the minor state officers may be of the opposite political party to the Governor, thus setting up a deadlock in the administration. This has been the case in Massachusetts for five years, so that a Democratic Governor has been rendered powerless to carry out his campaign pledges. Governor Oneal then says, "to obtain efficiency the governor must have official control over the agents through whom his duties and responsibilities are discharged." (1) These officers should be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate, and removable by the chief executive as is the President's cabinet. No more successful operation of this plan is apparent than in the Federal Government and in the control of the executive over his subordinates, our chief aim, is realized.

Chapter III.

Relation of the Executive to the Legislative Department.

It is also of importance that the relation of the executive to the legislative department be strengthened. As constituted at present legislative bodies are not really efficient. A glance at such radical proposals as that of Ex-Governor Hodges of Kansas, who has suggested a small one-chambered legislature, reveals the fact that the legislative branch of state government is not fulfilling its functions. There is, then, an evident need for proposals which will advocate certain measures designed to promote a closer relationship between these two branches, making for better laws and a more efficient administration. Executive leadership like that of Ex-President Roosevelt, President Wilson, Governors Hughes, LaFollette, Folk, and Cummins offers ample proof of what a progressive executive can do for responsible government in promoting a better understanding between the framers and the enforcing agents of the law.

In the first place the Governor should have the right to initiate legislation, not in the present sense of sending a perfunctory message to be read to empty seats, but rather by having him appear before the General Assembly and give orally his recommendations, similar to President Wilson's procedure in Congress. (1) Still executive leadership must not cease at this point, so that his measures may be easily emasculated in the various legislative committees. The Governor should be allowed to introduce bills, and his agents, the cabinet officers, should be given seats in the General Assembly, in order that

they may defend the administration measures. In this manner alone can the Governor secure the adoption of legislation designed to carry out his campaign pledges. Such bills, being of primary importance, should have precedence over all other bills on the calendar. (1) Governor Norris of Montana asks that the chief executive in state administration be permitted to initiate legislation, so that when his bills are not passed in the manner that he desires, he can put the issue before the electorate, as the responsibility will be upon him. (2) The people look to the Governor to redeem the planks of the platform on which he was elected. Often, however, he is helpless in the grasp of the machine that has nominated him, and the latter is usually dominated by a small group of party leaders in the legislature. Prof. Ford in his book on the Rise and Growth of American Politics sets forth the theory that as long as the Constitutional system in vogue in America debars the administration from carrying out its chosen policies just so long will the party machine be a necessary intermediary between the people and their government. (3) It is agreed by most students of administration that when such administration is centralized all political functions are under the executive, and the execution of the law is equally centralized; if not consolidated the party will dominate.

Of greater importance is the fact that the non-policy determining officers like the Secretary of State, Auditor, and Treasurer should

(1) Proceedings of the Acad. of Pol. Science. vol.5. no.1. p, 139.
(2) " " " Conference of Governors. 1911. pp, 19-20.
(3) " " " Acad. of Pol. Science. vol.5. no.1. p,25.
be free from the influences of these party leaders, for as Goodnow says the more politics gets into the non-political side of administration, the less effective and impartial will be the work of the executive authorities. (1) Governor Mann of Virginia asks that the governor be given control over the department heads, and states that then we could him responsible, because his power is, "to govern the state over which he has supreme jurisdiction." (2) With such an administration the governor would be the responsible head of state government. He would not be burdened with unimportant details, but would be free to follow the progress of administration measures in the General Assembly. When bills came up for his consideration, he could give them an intelligent and careful scrutiny, and if satisfactory, would be enabled to approve them with promptness. Governor Oneal points to the fact that most of our best reforms have emanated from executive mansions, and concludes that to invest the governor with greater legislative power would increase his sense of responsibility and elevate the character of his office. All high-minded citizens desire to eliminate bossism and machine control from our public life," but we can hardly expect to develop an administration free from political control so long as state government remains in its present unconcentrated condition. (3)

A few words as to the importance of a strong political party, in relation of the legislature to the administrative branch are neces-

sary. Although the party is an extra-legal institution, it has dominated our government almost from the beginning of its history. Because of the inherent defects in organization it has yielded to the manipulations of politicians, the result being we have not had efficient government. This system of party government leads to frequent deadlocks, not only in the legislature itself, but also between it and the executive branch. Such a situation makes the location of responsible quite difficult. The political party is important to administration, and cannot be left out of consideration in the proposed concentration of administrative power in the hands of the chief executive. "Mere changes in the administrative system unaccompanied by a recognition of the function of the political party will not itself tend to secure responsible government." (1) Under a centralized administration political manipulation is still possible," for with a weak party a powerful governor could easily prevent efficient government."

(1) Goodnow. Politics and Administration. p, 255.
Chapter IV.

State Administration in Illinois.

Some consideration is now necessary of the main administrative department in the state government. This in Illinois consists of more than one hundred offices, boards, and commissions created by statute independent of one another and with little thought of any possible relation to the pre-existing offices. Most of them have been created since the Civil War. L. A. Blue in an article entitled Recent Tendencies in State Administration says, "the chief characteristic of modern state administration is the tendency to conduct the business of the state by means of appointive boards and commissions." (1) He ascribes their birth to the need for agencies to cope with the rapidly changing economic and social conditions. For our purposes there are three main classes of boards and commissions: 1. those possessing investigatory powers, 2. those of a quasi-judicial nature, and 3. those possessing executive duties. The result of such boards and commissions may be noted first in their relation to the Governor. Such commissions have seemingly increased his powers, in that they are appointed by him. In reality he has little authority over these boards, for once appointed they, from under his control and become irresponsible. (2) From the legislative point of view superior officers have little or no control over subordinate administrators, and therefore the General Assembly must determine in detail all of the powers of administrative authorities. This results in the legislature in part becoming an administrative agent, and makes inevitable a condi-

tion which should be prevented; namely, the entrance of politics into this branch of administration.

What shall be said as to the results of the boards and commissions themselves? In order to differentiate the varied functions of these boards separate treatment is necessary. 1. For boards consisting of many, unpaid members the duties should advisory, 2. for a single commissioner the work should be of an executive character, 3. for a medium size commission the duties should be both executive and advisory, even may such bodies exercise quasi-judicial functions. In regard to the first and the third the charges of a lack of correlation, ineffective supervision, and overlapping functions may be brought. A few authorities will point the way to a satisfactory conclusion for reforming the existing situation. The New York Committee of Inquiry in its report to Governor Sulzer depicts typical conditions in Illinois when it says of the New York boards, "the business of the state may be said to be run without any systematic plan whatever. Each department is run as a separate enterprise, and there is no effort at concentration of the administration of state activities." (1) The Minnesota Efficiency Committee think that boards tend to delay, dissipate responsibility, and advocates as a remedy single executives over the departments; still it feels that commissions and boards may made useful in quasi-judicial and sublegislative work, as well as acting in an advisory capacity. (2) Croly argues for the independence of such officers. (3)

(1) Quoted by Horack. Reorganization in Iowa. p,29.
Such commissions and boards have really created a fourth department of state government. On the other hand there are unmistakable tendencies, manifest in the investigations on centralization of state administration in the states of Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Indiana and Iowa, that there is strong sentiment in favor of a plan by which the numerous administration bodies now constituting this fourth department may be brought under the control of one executive. The result of this tendency is that at present the best arrangement for administrative business is to place someone of authority at the head of each body requiring executive work. Thus freedom from politics as well as efficiency can be secured, in that the offices and commissions would be grouped into well defined and closely related departments.

(2) Mill says in this connection, "where the object to be obtained is single, the authority to attend to it should be single. The entire aggregation of means provided for the end should be under one and the same authority." It is obvious that boards or commissions when in error can suffer only collectively, so that for executive work are decidedly unwise. Only in an advisory or quasi-judicial capacity can they be upheld.

The board system has decreased the Governor's power resulting in a diminution of that department at the expense of the other branches. Blue maintains, "that the right of the people can only be guaranteed them by a restoration of at least a part of this power to the chief executive." (3) Again it is evidently unfeasible to elect the

(1) See Columbia Univ. Studies. vol. 8-10, 16-18.
officers of state administration; indeed, the principles of the short ballot require that a minimum of officers should be elective. Therefore the department heads should be appointed in the same manner as the proposals for the main executive officers. In this way may they be held accountable for their acts, and so may the Governor be held responsible for a strict enforcement of the law. Under these department heads the various deputies, bureau, and division employees should be appointed through the Illinois Civil Service Commission, and must conform to the qualifications prescribed by that body. Then if the Governor is held responsible for the entire state administration, as he should be, the people would be possessed of an effectual check upon his conduct. (1) From the above discussion the following conclusion may be drawn. For work of an executive character a single commissioner acting as the head of a department, bureau, or division is the best, while for work of an advisory nature or quasi-judicial business, exercising functions similar to the Illinois Public Utilities Commission, a small board of three to five members is more feasible. Small boards devoting only part time to their duties, as well as as large boards are agreed by the Illinois Efficiency and Economy as unwise, in that their duties are usually of so perfunctory a nature that one executive could more easily do the work; (2)

Chapter V.

Reorganization of Executive Boards and Commissions.

In regard to the reorganization of the one hundred odd offices, boards, and commisions this paper proposes that they be brought under eight main departments as follows: 1. Finance. 2. Education. 3. Charities and Correctional Institutions. 4. Public Works and Buildings. 5. Agricultural Agencies. 6. Public Health and Safety. 7. Trade and Commerce. 8. Labor and Mining.

In the Finance Department reorganization should be thorough, in order that the present lax methods of finance may be superseded by a businesslike method. At the head of the department there should be a Finance Commission of three members to be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate, and to include as ex-officio officers the Auditor of Public Accounts and the State Treasurer.(1) The three members of this body would divide up the duties, so that there would be a state comptroller, Tax, and Revenue Commissioners. The main functions of the Finance Commission would be to review assessments, prescribe rules and regulations in regard to finance, decide appeals on tax rates, and install a system of accounting better suited to the business of the state. The State Board of Equalization, and the State Tax Levy Board should be abolished, because the former board of twenty six members is too unwieldy, and also because its duties together with those of the Tax Levy Board may be performed in a more satisfactory manner by the above Finance Commission.

The Comptroller would be the executive head of the department.

and his most important duty would be the preparation of the state budget. He would also supervise the installation of a modern accounting system, and make investigations into the business management of the various state institutions with a view to securing a closer economy of state funds. The Tax Commissioner would exercise supervision over local assessors, and would make original on railroad and other corporation property, subject to review by the Finance Commission. The Revenue Commissioner would have direct control over the inheritance tax, automobile licences, and other miscellaneous revenues. The Auditor of Public Accounts and the State Treasurer would continue their present functions; in addition, however, the Auditor should be given power to audit the accounts of all state officials and even county officers. (1)

In local finance administration county assessment and collection of property taxes would be more efficient than the present system of township collection. At present a township assessor's duties are so light and the pay so meagre that a poor type of officials perform functions that require considerable training and knowledge. Under a county assessor the duties would be enough to keep one man employed all of the time; consequently sufficient salary could be offered to attract men of the requisite qualifications. The county boards of review might be better supplanted by county boards of taxation, to consist of the chairman of the county board, the county clerk, and the county treasurer. Its duty would be to review local assessments. (2)

(2) " " " " " " " " " " . p, 36-37.
The result of these reforms should be far reaching. The increase in offices will be offset by the economy gained in abolishing useless boards. The cumbersome method for assessing railroads by the state board of equalization will be replaced by expert appraisal subject to board review, and should result in a more intelligent assessment of corporation property. The greatest gain, however, should be through the increased revenues that are bound to accrue to the state treasury under this plan, and under a careful budgetary procedure. (1)

The importance of Education is manifest by the fact that one-third of the appropriations of the General Assembly in 1913 were for educational purposes. (2) In the education department the executive work should be placed in the hands of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, who is to be appointed by the Governor with advice and consent of the Senate. To secure an expert for this position rather high qualifications should be prescribed, and the powers of the office should be made broad enough to attract the best men in the profession. With high qualifications and no elective restrictions the Governor may go to any place in the country for his appointee. The Ohio law, in effect January, 1914, is the model of a centralized system. There the Superintendent of Public Instruction is absolutely supreme, as for example in the hiring of teachers and in the planning of the course of study. The Illinois Superintendent should have such powers, and being an able educator could solve such problems as methods by which a closer articulation between the second-

(2) " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " p, 44.
(3) " " " Ohio School Survey. 1913.
ary and higher branches of education could be introduced.

The Illinois Committee after investigation observes that for this state certain unpaid, advisory boards seem well and proper. (1) Therefore an advisory board is created to assist the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and should consist of the Superintendent as chairman, the President of the University of Illinois, a representative of the normal schools, and two other unpaid members known for their interest in education. This board should be known as the State Board of Education, and would be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. Its powers should be merely advisory, because its composition would permit no executive work, indeed the Superintendent of Public Instruction would be best suited to perform the executive work.

In regard to the proposed changes in the administration of the University of Illinois and the five normal schools this paper agrees with the Illinois Committee's plan. (2) It is advisable that two unpaid boards should assist the Superintendent of Public Instruction in the management of these institutions; one body to supervise the five normal schools, and the other the State University. These boards consisting of eight members would be appointed for eight years by the Governor with advice and consent of the Senate, and no member from a congressional district in which one of these institutions is located would be eligible to serve. The latter provision is included to forestall local domination and pressure. The scientific surveys at the University of Illinois should be placed under the management

(2) " " " " " " " " " . p, 48.
of one commission styled the Commission on Natural Resources, and might well consist of the Governor, the President of the University of Illinois, and three other unpaid members appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. There should also be a similar board in charge of the various state libraries at Springfield.

As noted earlier in this paper the most striking tendency toward centralization in administration is in the reorganization of the twenty-three charitable institutions under one body, the Board of Administration. The success of this plan after six years is proved, and therefore the few proposals in the field of Charities and Corrections will deal with latter. In contrast to the former, in prison administration we have six independent boards exercising various functions, but all their duties could be performed more satisfactorily by one board. To remedy this condition the six boards should be combined to form one board of Prison Administration. It should be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate, and its duties would be similar to those that the Board of Administration exercises over Charities. (1) It might be proposed to place the correctional institutions under the management of the Board of Administration who would then administer both types of institutions. A consideration of this plan reveals the fact that such a step would be decidedly unwise. In one case the problem is that of aid to charities, and in the other case we are dealing with crime; so that the relief offered should be controlled by separate boards.

The above Board of Prison Administration would take over the functions of the existing six boards on prisons. One member of the propo-

sed board should be fiscal supervisor, for in prisons equally with
charities, it is very important that these institutions be run econom-
ically. Only under such a management is economy possible, especially
in the purchase of supplies. The proposed consolidation will result
in greater efficiency in administration. It is estimated by the Illi
Committee that a reduction of $200,000 annually should be made in
the cost of maintenance, basing this estimate on the same per capita
basis as the state insane hospitals. (1) With the Board of Administra-
tion and the Board of Prison Administration to manage the Charitable
and Correctional Institutions respectively, and an extension of the
inspectional powers of the Charities Commission over prison and re-
formatories, a thoroughly efficient and economical administration in
this field of state activity should result.

The Department of Public Works and Buildings should be under a
commission of three members appointed by the Governor with advice
and consent of the Senate; its members to have respective charge of
Highways, Waterways, and Fish and Game. (2) Minor offices would be
the Superintendent of State Parks and Monuments, the State Art Com-
mision, and the Superintendent of Public Buildings. At present there
are many separate offices in this field working out of harmony with
one another, and in some cases the work could be done more effective-
ly by combining offices performing functions of the same nature.
Thus, authorities undertaking engineering work should be grouped in-
to one office, as is the practice in France and Prussia. (3)

(2) " " " " " " " " . p,65.
(3) " " " " " " " " . p,64.
mision of Public Works should have power to prescribe rules and reg-
ulations, to determine larger policies, and to arrange for unity of
action in this department. The Commissioner of Waterways would com-
bine the functions of the Rivers and Lakes Commission with those of
the Canal Commission. The Superintendent of Public Buildings should
have charge of all state buildings in Springfield, and the rental
of all state offices in Chicago.

All agricultural agencies should be under an executive head, as
is the case in New York and Ohio, and this executive should be styl-
the Secretary of Agriculture. (1) He should be appointed by the Gov-
ernor with the advice and consent of the Senate, should be well
trained, and should possess ample powers to control the various ag-
icultural agencies under him. The department should be organized in-
to bureaus in charge of executive officers. (2) 1. There should be a
Superintendent of the State Fair to have general management of the
State Fair, assisted by a State Fair Commission consisting of the
Secretary of Agriculture, Superintendent of the State Fair, and three
appointive members. Its chief duty would be to adopt rules and reg-
ulations in regard to the granting of space concessions, and the
awarding of premiums. 2. There should be a Director of Farmers Insti-
tutes, with an advisory board to assist him in arranging for Insti-
tute meetings and in publishing their proceedings. 3. There should
be a Live Stock Commissioner to control and execute the law in re-
gard to animals, especially in prescribing quarantine and condemna-
tion measures subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agricul-
ture or the Governor. The State Veterinarian, the Board of Vetinary

(2) " " " " " " " " " p, 56.
Examiners as well as the Registrar of Pedigrees and the Humane Agents should be subordinates of the Live Stock Commissioner. There should be an Inspector of Apiaries and Nurseries to enforce the law in relation to trees, beehives, and plants. Private association receiving state aid should be required to report to the Secretary of Agriculture, and their requests for money should be made through this officer. Professor Garner in his report on Agricultural Agencies estimates a saving of $11,000.00 annually in salaries under the outlined plan, and should, as he points out, make for economy in a more efficient management of this phase of state activity. (1)

Health Agencies are in the same disconcentrated state as other branches of administration, and owing to the fact that they affect vitally the safety of the people it is necessary to introduce a more closely correlated system into this department. The various health agencies in this state should be brought under the control and direction of a Health Commissioner, who should be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. To assist him there should be a board of five members, partly physicians, to be likewise appointed by the Governor and the Senate. (2) Its powers would be advisory to the executive head, thus it would approve rules and regulations drawn up by him, and in certain cases it might decide appeals from bureau officials. There should be bureaus to care for such business as vital statistics, sanitary inspection, and laboratories. The State Board of Health should have supervision over the small licensing boards that would be provided for the examination and licensing of physicians, pharmacists, dentists, and nurses. The

(2) " " " " " " " " " " . p, 59-60-
clerical work having to do with the latter boards might more effectively be done in one office. To assist him in the reform of health administration the substantive health law of the state should be revised and amended.

To regulate corporations and other public service companies a Department of Trade and Commerce should be created. (1) It should include business having to do with general corporations, banks, insurance, building and loan associations, and public utilities. The chairman of the present Public Utilities Commission, being the most important officer and the best qualified agent in this field should be the executive head of the department, and should have supervisory powers over the commissioners of Banking, Insurance, and General Corporations. The result of this arrangement would be that harmony and co-operation among the various executive officers if this field would be secured. The Public Utilities Commission would continue its present functions. Banking control and supervision of corporations should be transferred from the Auditor and Secretary of State to the charge of the above named commissioners of Banking and General Corporations. The department should take more stringent measures to enforce the state law in regard to general corporations issuing capital stock and in filing reports. Many conflicting laws of this nature should be harmonized through revision and amendment. The method as outlined here for the Department of Trade and Commerce is not distinctly centralized, except to permit co-operation among the these related offices, and should for this reason give a better administration of corporations and public service companies.

To the end that the score or more labor and mining agencies

may be co-ordinated and centralized; the creation of a Department of Labor and Mining is recommended, its head being a single commissioner to perform the executive work. The commissioner with two others would comprise an Industrial Board, all three of whom would be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Industrial Board's functions would be quasi-judicial; thus it could hold hearings, decide appeals from bureau chiefs, and act as a court of arbitration or mediation in labor and mining disputes. The department should include bureaus for statistics, employment, inspection, workmen's compensation, and a division of Mining. Each of the above should be managed by an executive head except the latter which should be under the present State Mining Board. County mine inspectors should be abolished, and the number of state inspectors materially increased. The Miners Examiners Board is a feasible organization, but should be made a bureau of the Mining Department. Professor Dodd in his report on this subject, does not claim any economy; but says, "the most important advantage will be the greater efficiency secured in the administration of the labor laws." (1)

In the legal department the Attorney General is considered the chief law officer of the state. However centralization manifests itself here equally as much as in other phases of state activity. For example the Auditor of Public Accounts has power, no longer exercised, to bring suits in cases for which no other provision has been made. The State Board of Health, Chief Factory Inspector, State Food Commission, Insurance Department, and Public Utilities each have their own attorneys, independent of the Attorney General. The result is that conflicting opinion on legal points may easily arise, and may even

lead to unnecessary expense and litigation. Moreover the same lack of control on the part of the Attorney General in the relation of his office to the state's attorneys. For uniformity and harmony in this field it is quite essential, then, that these special attorneys be placed under the Attorney General, and be appointed by him. In case of need by any state official the request for an Attorney should be made to the Attorney General, and the assignment be made by him. There should be a somewhat more stringent law in the matter of permitting the Attorney General to remove recalcitrant states attorneys, so that a more thorough enforcement of state law will be possible.

In Military matters there is little that merits attention. The Illinois National Guard with the Governor acting as Commander-in-Chief is largely modelled upon the United States Militia Laws. Reports of inspecting officers show that in the main the militia of the state are in a satisfactory condition; though there is room for improvement in discipline and military knowledge.

In regard to elections a few changes are advocated. At present we have several commissions to regulate elections, all independent of one another so that confusion is inevitable. To remedy this condition it is desirable to consolidate the board of appeals that decides primary disputes, the board of canvassers for primaries, and the board of canvassers for general elections. All of their functions should be given a commission styled the State Board of Elections. It should consist of the Governor, the Secretary of State, and Attorney General. A somewhat shorter ballot will be obtained under the proposed changes in this paper in the removal from the ballot as elective offices the Secretary of State, State Treasurer, Auditor of Public Accounts, and possibly the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. For uniformity and harmony in this field it is quite essential, then, that these special attorneys be placed under the Attorney General, and be appointed by him. In case of need by any state official the request for an Attorney should be made to the Attorney General, and the assignment be made by him.

Public Accounts, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Attorney General as well as the State Board of Equalization and the Trustees of the University of Illinois. Perhaps one of the worst evils of this subject is the infinite number of elections of various kinds held each year. Not only is it a source of great expense to the people, illustrated by the fact that election expenses in Cook county alone amount to over a million dollars annually; but also the great number serves to deaden interest, so that only a small per cent of the registered voters usually take part in them. A large share of the extra expense could be saved and greater interest stimulated by holding various local and county elections on the same day. (1)

Chapter VI.
The Budget.

We come now to a consideration of one of the most important phases of state government; namely, the means by which the revenue necessary to maintain the state government should be raised, and the ways in which it should be expended. A glance into present conditions shows that the United States and its component parts, the States are the only civilized governments in which a budgetary form of finance is unknown. To this fact may the gigantic waste and profligate methods of American Legislatures be attributed. F. A. Cleveland, our foremost expert on the budget and chairman of the United States Efficiency and Economy Committee points out that the legislature has subverted control of the purse, and by means of "riders" and "jokers" has deprived the Governor of much of his power. He concludes, "thus business costing the country millions of dollars annually is conducted by an irresponsible bureaucracy operating under appropriations from an irresponsible legislature, and there can be only one result—irresponsible government." (1)

What measures can be taken to remedy this state of affairs? As a state budget is the remedy to be offered in this paper, it is first necessary to define the term. Adams in his Public Finance defines a budget as, "a report on the public finances designed primarily to show the legislature the condition of the public treasury and the fiscal means of the state." (2) Ex-President Taft has outlined the essential of a budget, as 1. a summary statement as to pro-

posed plans for financing the next years requirements, it must be a responsible document prepared by a qualified officer, it should state the actual and estimated expenditures and surplus or deficit, it should contain information for determining legislative action on money raising and spending, current expenses for upkeep should be distinguished from capital outlay. (1) Experience has demonstrated that the legislature is not an efficient budget making body; lacking the two requirements that it must be a well planned fiscal program, and submitted by a responsible officer. Therefore it is the work of the executive department, and should be submitted by the Governor. (2) The Illinois Committee comments on the lack of a budget in Illinois as follows, "under the present system the General Assembly has been compelled to act on these requests without sufficient time, opportunity, or means for adequate investigation. The result has been that unnecessary appropriations have been made, and also services of importance to the state have not been furnished with funds necessary to maintain them." (3) The introduction of a budget in Illinois would not be a startling innovation as the Constitution provides that at the commencement of each regular session the Governor, "shall present estimates of the amount to be raised by taxation for all purposes." No Governor except the present occupant of the executive chair has ever fulfilled this constitutional duty, very likely because he lacked the facilities to perform this function. Governor Dunne was enabled to do it with aid of the Legislative Reference Bureau. To this end this paper

(2) " " " " " " . vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 152.
suggests that proper facilities be placed at the disposal of the executive, so that the introduction of a comprehensive state budget would be possible. The actual preparation of the budget would devolve on the Comptroller.

The Comptroller would require on or before October 1st of each year preceding the biennium when the General Assembly is to convene estimates from the department heads showing in detail past expenditures and future needs. From these he would prepare the budget, setting forth in detail the receipts, expenditures, surplus or deficit for the last biennium, and the proposed estimates for the next two years. The State Finance Commission together with Governor would be a board of revision and equalization of the estimates. The Governor not later than one week after the opening of the General Assembly should introduce his budget. (1) At this time the cabinet members, who under this plan would have seats in the legislature would appear on the floor to defend the bill. No amendment except to reduce items should be permitted. In case the General Assembly refused to pass the administration budget, the various departments should be authorized to run on their appropriations for the past biennium. The Governor could appeal, then, to the people to decide the issue. As to results the Illinois Efficiency and Economy Committee says, "the careful preparation of such a budget would be a potent factor in securing economy and efficiency throughout the executive department." (2).

Chapter VII.
Civil Service.

Illinois is one of the few states that have made a beginning in Civil Service. The principle of the merit system should be further extended and strengthened. At present, the state laws on this subject are not unified, and in many respects are too rigid in their detailed provisions. Particularly should the Civil Service Commission be given a limited authority to make exemptions. It should be recognized in this connection that the Governor should not be restricted in certain appointive positions by requiring examinations. Positions of a technical nature and requiring administrative responsibility are of themselves so comprised that it is impossible many times to get able men to take an examination; indeed, their reputation in their profession should be a sufficient recommendation for the place. The beginning towards efficiency records should be further strengthened and extended so that the merit system in Illinois will come to mean recognition of ability and faithfulness through advancement and promotion. The Illinois Efficiency and Economy Committee in this connection rather questions whether such functions as pertaining to permanent efficiency of the state administrative agents could be best performed by the Civil Service Commission, but proposes that being in part financial should be required to co-operate with the Comptroller, similar to the procedure at present in the matter of certain positions and salaries in Charitable Institutions under the Board of Administration. Local civil service should be supervised by the State Civil Service Commission, in that it should approve the rules and regulations of the local commissions, and should be
permitted to remove incompetent local commissioners. (1).

Finally in the reorganization of the state government of Illinois some of the results to be expected should be pointed out. The proposed plan will produce a well correlated, closely unified, and more efficiently organized government through the elimination of waste and the unnecessary duplication of boards. It will produce a system of co-operation and permit a uniform system of reporting. Under this plan the Governor will not be loaded down with a mass of burdensome details, for the heads of the departments may decide very properly such matters. Thus the Governor will be left free to work out his larger policies, and take measures that will insure the enactment into law of his campaign pledges. Being head of the entire field of the execution of the law, the people may hold him accountable. Under this reorganization public business will be more in the open, so that responsible government will mean increased efficiency.

A comprehensive budget together with a modern system of accounting will tend to responsible government, because the General Assembly will hesitate to increase the demands of the Governor, knowing that he can put the issue before the electorate. It is difficult to estimate the exact economy in a financial way. The proposed consolidation of the various offices and boards into eight departments should reduce salaries $100,000 annually. A reorganization of the financial methods in tax and interest collections should amount to $500,000 a year, centralization of the inheritance tax should make a net saving of $100,000 a year, the transfer of school funds from township to county officers should add another $100,000 annually. Reorganization
of prison administration, and a closer supervision in the purchase of supplies, office rents, and printing will bring the total saving to over $1,000,000, of which $600,000 should be a direct gain to the state. (1) However with extension of state functions there is little likelihood that public expenditures will be reduced. This makes a wiser utilization of the state funds doubly important to the proposed reorganization of state administration.

In conclusion it is evident that there is an unmistakable and pressing need for a thorough reorganization of state government in Illinois. The best reorganization will be obtained by proposals that have as their object the concepts set forth in this paper: Namely, responsible government coupled with efficiency, economy, and authority.

THE END.

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