C. Fairman

A Study of German-American Relations Prior to 1914
A STUDY OF GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS PRIOR TO 1914

BY

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A. B. University of Illinois, 1918

THESIS

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

IN HISTORY

IN

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

1920
I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Charles Faustman ENTITLED A study of German American Relations prior to 1814 BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts E. B. A. C. In Charge of Thesis Committee on Final Examination

*Required for doctor's degree but not for master's
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A STUDY OF GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS PRIOR TO 1914.

I.

BASIS OF THE "TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP".

1. Frederick the Great and the American Revolution.

The initial relations of the United States with the Kingdom of Prussia found their motive generally in self-interest, though behind the official attitude of the Prussian government there existed a sympathetic regard for the new republic. Philosophers and poets - Kant, Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, Klopstok - with a message of liberalism, marked with satisfaction the attempt of a new nation to emancipate itself from the sovereignty of a Monarch. Further, not all of the princes of German States were capable of bartering the peace of their subjects for British gold, and some were perhaps animated by sentiments of cordial interest for America. ¹ For General Washington the Prussian King conceived considerable respect.

The conduct of the siege of Boston he approved, and he wrote to his brother, Henry, to watch Washington's movements against Howe and Burgoyne.² In the two daily newspapers

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1. This is the substance of the case which Mr. Bancroft makes on Prussia's aid to America during the period of the Revolution. See History of the United States, v.10 chs. 2,3. The enthusiasm with which Mr. Bancroft wrote on this subject is criticised by Doniol, Histoire de la Participation de la France à l'Establishissement des États-Unis d'Amérique, v. 3 p. 117.

2. The story that he sent to Washington a sword engraved "From the oldest to the greatest General" is unfounded. See Sparks: Washington V.11, p. 169.
printed in Berlin in that day there appeared a strong note of sympathy for the success of the American cause. But the good wishes of dreamers and of those German princes who preferred to keep their military forces at home were not of any concrete value.

The attitude of the King of Prussia toward the revolting colonies was friendship of a negative sort - hatred for Britain. Frederick held that Lord Bute had not carried out the promise of subsidies made by William Pitt, and had made Prussian interests subservient to British policy. Then Frederick was not indifferent to the maritime possibilities of East Prussia. Emden was made a free port in 1751, and the Asiatic and later the Bengal trading companies were established. To such projects as these the British fleet was a menace. Until the outbreak of the war of the Bavarian Succession (January 1778), Frederick was cynically content to watch the progress of the war, and occasionally to fan the flames. He did not foresee any greatness for the new State, whose unlimited extent he considered an insuperable obstacle to a republican government, which might exist only in such small states as Switzerland and Holland. The promise which he saw in America was a source of intermittent rebellion against the


-2-
mother country.

On October 1, 1776, Silas Deane, at Paris, urged upon the Congress the advisability of sending an agent to the Court at Berlin, which was rumored to be susceptible to offers of trade. A month later the King of Prussia made known his desire for an American at Berlin, suggesting a commercial arrangement. In furtherance of this project, Mr. Deane, during November, sent Mr. Carmichael on what proved to be a fruitless mission. The following February copies of the declaration of independence were placed before the Prussian King, with a request for friendship and commercial intercourse. The reply was noncommittal, and in April 1777, Mr. Arthur Lee was sent to Berlin. American diplomacy was getting into action, and events were moving too rapidly. Mr. Lee was scarcely persona grata. It was contrary to Frederick's wish that he came, and he was permitted to remain only in an unofficial capacity. On June 26, Baron de Schulenburg declined to open Prussian ports to American privateers, urging that the King "cannot embroil himself with the court of London," but offering the hope that the attitude of France and Spain on the question might change the views of the King:  

5. Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution v.2 p.156.  
On this same day Lee's correspondence was stolen from his rooms by an agent of the English minister. Frederick, thinking it inexpedient to give England a rebuff, took no steps to punish the offender, or to secure the minister's recall. To his brother, Henry, he wrote: "Shan't fail, however, to write to England about it.... for they are importinent." Again he wrote: "I purpose to draw out this negotiation in order to fall in with the side for which Fortune shall declare herself."  

Mr. Lee withdrew in August, but negotiations were not broken off, for on October 8, Schulenburg informed Mr. Lee that "we must wait for more favorable circumstances to begin a commercial connection between the two people, which his majesty will receive great pleasure in seeing increase, whenever it will not engage him in measures contrary to his principles."  

On January 3, 1778, the War of the Bavarian Succession commenced, tending to throw Frederick on British mercy, and delaying any further commercial projects. Peace was finally made at Teschin on May 18, 1779. Early in that year Prussian ports were opened to American merchant vessels, and by June William Lee seriously considered applying to the King to ful-

7. Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence, v. 2, pp. 351-4  
fill his promise "that he would acknowledge the independence of the United States as soon as France had done so." During the summer these hopes were laid to rest, for Frederick was too astute to allow his promise to work to the disadvantage of his Kingdom. His minister replied that Prussian interests were not maritime and that the king was unwilling to direct any influence in this direction, recognition by Prussia would be not nearly so efficacious as the support of Spain and France, and would make war between England and Prussia inevitable, "without rendering the smallest service to your country." However, Prussian ports were open to the American trade.

After this time Prussia, with the other Baltic powers, became involved in the league of neutrality, which put an end to questions of recognition and aid. But when American independence was practically an accomplished fact, advances were again made. In September 1782, Mr. Carmichael wrote from St. Ildefonso that the ministers of Saxony and Prussia were disposed to urge upon their courts the advisability of opening trade relations with America. Early in 1784 negotiations were opened for a treaty of commerce, which was concluded September 10, 1785.

It remains to state that Frederick had frequent opportunities to permit the violation of Prussian neutrality by allowing German mercenaries to be transported through his ---

10. Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence, v. 3, p. 230
11. ibid. v. 3, p. 347.
12. ibid. v. 5, p. 785.
Kingdom. These he consistently refused, in conformity to his middle-of-the-road policy.\textsuperscript{13} Frederick spoke harshly of the German princes who sold their forces to England. But the fact that they had refused to make a similar transaction with him was at least partly the cause of his indignation. Some munitions were purchased in Prussia during the earlier part of the war - in at least one case with more advantage to the contractor than the purchaser, for the goods proved worthless, and the Prussian Government declined to use its officers to rectify the matter.\textsuperscript{14}

During the revolution "Hessians", with troops from Brunswick, Anspach, Bayreuth, Anhalt, and Waldeck, to the total number of over thirty thousand, were sent to America by the British Crown. This has always appeared to the American people as rather a blight upon the King who sent them and the princes who thus bartered their subjects than upon the soldiers themselves, who came most unwillingly in the main.

2. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1780.\textsuperscript{15}

There are two principles known to international law respecting private property on the high seas. The older rule, coming down from the Consolato del Mare, declared that goods of an enemy were subject to capture even though found on a friendly vessel, while an enemy vessel carrying a cargo belonging to a neutral was also subject to capture, though the

\textsuperscript{13} Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence v.2 pp.213,446.
\textsuperscript{14} Avery, v. 6, p.142.
\textsuperscript{15} Treaties and Conventions (1776-1873) p.707 et seq.
goods were released. The newer doctrine is embodied in the saying: "Free ships, free goods; enemy ships, enemy goods", implying that the flag under which it is carried determines the character of the cargo. The newer rule was first written in a treaty in 1650, and was adopted by the United States in its earliest treaties. The treaties of 1778 and 1800 with France, 17 of 1782 with the Netherlands, 18 and of 1783 with Sweden, 19 all provided for the newer doctrine of maritime capture. This view was also put forward by Frederick II in the Silesian Loan Case of 1752, but did not meet with the agreement of the British Commission which tried the case. 20

The Armed Neutrality of 1780 went farther than this principle, and endeavored to make the rule merely: "Free ships, free goods", without the converse: "Enemy ships make enemy goods". And when hostilities ceased in 1783 it was the accepted view of the principal continental powers. During the wars following the French Revolution they hastened to retire from the new principle. 21

So it is not peculiar that in the treaty of amity and commerce negotiated with Prussia in 1785 it was provided that

18. ibid. pp. 611, 614.
19. ibid. pp. 801, 803
21. Lawrence, p. 563.
free ships made free goods, with no mention as to the character of neutral commerce loaded on an enemy vessel. Did the converse regarding cargoes of enemy ships follow from inference? In the case of the "Nereide" & Chief Justice Marshall held that it did not.22 Thus the treaty of 1785 (and the treaty of 1795 with Spain, which makes the same provisions) are rightfully regarded as significant steps toward the recognition of a more liberal and just attitude toward private property at sea in time of war.

In still another respect the treaty of 1785 is remarkable. In general, the law of nations knows only one penalty for carrying contraband of war: confiscation of the goods, if not the ships also. But Article 13 of the treaty provides that not even arms, ammunition, and other military stores may be confiscated. Temporary sequestration is permitted, with reasonable compensation for time consumed; and such stores may be requisitioned in part or in whole, with payment to the owners at the price current at the destination; while if the master of a vessel chooses to deliver the military goods on board he shall be allowed to proceed freely.23

22 Scott: Cases, p. 884.

23 Article 13, Treaty of 1785. "And in the same case of one of the contracting parties being engaged in war with any other Power, to prevent all the difficulties and misunderstandings that usually arise respecting the merchandize heretofore called contraband, such as arms, ammunition, and military stores of every kind, no such articles carried in the vessels, or by the subjects or citizens of one of the parties to the enemies of the other, shall be deemed contraband, so as to induce confiscation or condemnation and a loss of property to individuals. Nevertheless, it shall be lawful to stop such vessels and articles, and to detain them for such length of time as the captors may think necessary to
This treaty expired in October, 1796, by virtue of its own provisions; but Article 12, containing the "Free Ships, free goods" rule, was revived by the treaty of 1828.

The fact that three Americans so distinguished as Franklin, Jefferson, and John Adams signed this notable treaty was frequently referred to with pleasure by diplomats of both countries.

3. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 1799. 24

It has been remarked above that while the continental powers came by 1783 to agree with the League of Armed Neutrality that the newer and more liberal rule toward maritime capture should be recognized, they hastened to revoke their consent when hostilities again broke out. Thus the treaty of 1799 recites that since the new rule has not been sufficiently prevented the inconvenience or damage that might ensue from their proceeding, paying, however, a reasonable compensation for the loss such arrest shall occasion to the proprietors. And it shall further be allowed to use in the service of the captors the whole or any part of the military stores so detained, paying the owners the full value of the same, to be ascertained by the current price at the place of its destination. But in the case supposed, of a vessel stopped for articles herebefore deemed contraband, if the master of the vessel stopped will deliver out the goods supposed to be of contraband nature, he shall be admitted to do it, and the vessel shall not in that case be carried into any port, nor further detained, but shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage."

respected in the wars since 1785, whenever the cessation of
hostilities permits, the two nations shall come to an agree-
ment, either between themselves or jointly with other powers,
to arrive at "such arrangements and such permanent principles
as may serve to consolidate the liberty and the safety of the
neutral navigation and commerce in future wars". (Article 12)

And in the meantime, if either contracting party should
become a belligerent where the other was neutral, the belliger-
ent was bound to "conduct themselves towards the merchant
vessels of the neutral power as favorably as the course of the
war then existing may permit, observing the principles and
rules of the law of nations generally acknowledged." (Article
12)

Article 13 contains the same provision as the treaty of
1785 to the effect that arms, ammunition, and other military
stores shall only be temporarily sequestered or requisitioned
with equitable remuneration, but adds moreover a clause to the
effect that "all cannons, mortars, fire-arms, pistols, bombs,"
etc. in excess of the requirements of the vessel, passengers,
and crew, shall be deemed articles of contraband.

This treaty expired by virtue of its own provisions on
June 22, 1810.


Probably no commercial treaty to which the United States
has been a part has been the grounds of more serious discus-
sion than the Treaty with Prussia of 1828. In theory this
treaty was in force when the United States declared war on the
German Empire in 1917.

The twelfth article of the treaty of 1785, providing that
free ships made free goods, was revived, as were certain articles
from the Treaty of 1799. Moreover, inasmuch as the intention
asserted in the latter (to the end of securing an agreement among
the maritime powers of Europe on the treatment of private prop-
erty on high seas) had never been carried into effect, it was
reasserted as the intent of the contracting parties.25 The
article on contraband in the treaty of 1799 was among the pro-
visions revived.

Important questions under this treaty arose from time to
time, and will be treated in later chapters.26

25. There were attempts made at various times to carry this into
effect: in 1823 Mr. John Quincy Adams invited the European
Powers to discuss the treatment of Private property on the
high seas, but the powers declined; President Pierce urged
such a declaration in 1856; the American delegates at the First
Hague Conference were instructed to propose the question for
discussion, but it was tabled; the Second Hague Conference in
1907 approved the theory, but did not put it into practice.
See Lawrence, p. 494, et seq.

26. For a very unusual supplement to Article 25 of the treaty of
1799 revived by the treaty of 1828, suggested by the German
Foreign Office after diplomatic relations had been severed
in 1917, see Scott, Treaties Between the United States and
Germany p. 202 et seq., and Gerard, My Four Years in Germany,
p. 378, et seq.
II.

RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE FALL OF BISMARCK.

1. Emigration from German to America.

From the foundation in 1682 of the first permanent German settlement in America, down through the nineteenth century, German emigration was prompted by a desire for peace. This fact is noteworthy, for if in later years German-Americans showed indifference to the great military accomplishments of the fatherland, it was largely because their very presence in America was a protest for peace. Dunkers, Amish, Moravians, Quakers, Mennonites, and other sects sought peace in the exercise of their religious convictions. Peasants who had been impoverished by the taxes in the principalities sought peace from the oppression of the petty princes. Farmers distressed by the failure of their meager crops sought a livelihood in a country abounding in cheap farm land. Later, workmen sought relief from the hardships attendant upon the industrial revolution in Germany by emigrating to the land where there was work for all. Liberal thinkers in the age of Metternich saw in America the realization of the political ideals which were anathema in Germany. And finally, the long series of wars, from the Thirty Years War down through the time of Napoleon and even the years from 1864 to 1871, and the weighty military duties resulting therefrom made thousands of German subjects emigrate to the land of peace and freedom. Almost five thousand German mercenary soldiers preferred the people they had been fighting to their

1. Faust, The German Element in the United States, gives a comprehensive treatment of the subject of German Emigration to America
native state, and remained in America after the Revolutionary War. Of the total immigration to the United States during the nineteenth century - over nineteen million souls - five million, or more than one quarter, came from Germany.

An inspection of the following table showing the number of immigrants from Germany after 1820, when records were first kept, brings out certain points for consideration. Many factors contribute to the result, but it appears that war, financial depression, and food shortage, as well as social reform and more inviting opportunities of settlement have had considerable bearing on the outcome.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conditions in America</th>
<th>From Germany</th>
<th>Conditions in Germany</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>Westward expansion</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>Unrest throughout German states; oppression of burschenschaft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1821</td>
<td></td>
<td>383</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1822</td>
<td></td>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1823</td>
<td></td>
<td>183</td>
<td>Obstruction to commerce between states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1824</td>
<td></td>
<td>230</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1825</td>
<td></td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td></td>
<td>511</td>
<td>Religious turmoil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827</td>
<td></td>
<td>432</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1828</td>
<td></td>
<td>1851</td>
<td>Burschen to be punished on suspicion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Rosengarten: American History from German Archives, p. 45
5. Faust, v. 1 p. 582 et seq. analyses these figures. The Annual Register gives contemporary material.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Conditions in America</th>
<th>Immigrants from Germany</th>
<th>Conditions in Germany</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1829</td>
<td>Advent of Jacksonian democracy</td>
<td>597</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>Land speculation; town building; cheap land; need of labor</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Reflection of revolution in France; riots over introduction of machinery and reduction in hand-labor; overpopulation; overcrowding in farm districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td></td>
<td>2413</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1832</td>
<td></td>
<td>10194&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1833</td>
<td></td>
<td>6988</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1834</td>
<td>General prosperity</td>
<td>17686</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td></td>
<td>8311</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1836</td>
<td></td>
<td>20707</td>
<td>Suppression of uprisings. Cholera epidemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837</td>
<td>Financial panic</td>
<td>23740</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1838</td>
<td></td>
<td>11683</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839</td>
<td></td>
<td>21028</td>
<td>Reaction and heavy taxation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td></td>
<td>29704</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td></td>
<td>15291</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>1842</td>
<td></td>
<td>20370</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1843</td>
<td></td>
<td>14441&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>1844</td>
<td></td>
<td>20731</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1845</td>
<td></td>
<td>34355</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td></td>
<td>57561</td>
<td>Failure in potato crop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>Railroads opening the West</td>
<td>74281</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td></td>
<td>58465</td>
<td>Rebellion, followed by reaction; flight of many Liberals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>Western states offer inducements to settlers</td>
<td>60235</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Period of 16 months.  
<sup>b</sup> Period of 9 months.
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Conditions in America</th>
<th>Immigrants from Germany</th>
<th>Conditions in Germany</th>
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<td>1850</td>
<td></td>
<td>78896</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td></td>
<td>72482</td>
<td>Failure of vintage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td></td>
<td>145918</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td></td>
<td>141946</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td></td>
<td>215009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
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<td>71918</td>
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<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td></td>
<td>71028</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>Financial panic</td>
<td>91781</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td></td>
<td>45310</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1859</td>
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<td>1860</td>
<td></td>
<td>54491</td>
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<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>31661</td>
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<td>1862</td>
<td></td>
<td>27529</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td></td>
<td>33162</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td></td>
<td>57276</td>
<td>War with Denmark.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>End of war</td>
<td>83424</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1866</td>
<td></td>
<td>115892</td>
<td>War with Austria.</td>
</tr>
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<td>1867</td>
<td></td>
<td>133426</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td></td>
<td>55851 (^b)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td></td>
<td>131042</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td></td>
<td>116225</td>
<td>War with France.</td>
</tr>
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<td>1871</td>
<td></td>
<td>82554</td>
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<tr>
<td>1872</td>
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<td>141109</td>
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<td>1873</td>
<td>Financial panic</td>
<td>149671</td>
<td>Financial panic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td></td>
<td>87291</td>
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\(^a\) Period of 15 months.  \(^b\) Period of 6 months.
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<th>Conditions in Germany</th>
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<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>1675</td>
<td>47769</td>
<td>Grain imports from America work hardship on farming classes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>1704</td>
<td>31937</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>Western land attract-</td>
<td>29298</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ive; cheap grain ex-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ported.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>29313</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>34602</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>1880</td>
<td>1878</td>
<td>84638</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>210485</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>1880</td>
<td>250630</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>1881</td>
<td>194786</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>1882</td>
<td>179676</td>
<td>German S.W. and S.E. Africa acquired.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>124443</td>
<td>Bismarck's social legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>1884</td>
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<td>1888</td>
<td>92427</td>
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<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1889</td>
<td>113554</td>
<td>Poor crops</td>
</tr>
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<td>1892</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>119168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>Financial panic</td>
<td>78756</td>
<td>Development of German colonies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>1893</td>
<td>53969</td>
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<tr>
<td>1895</td>
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<td>32173</td>
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<td>1896</td>
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<td>31885</td>
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<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>22533</td>
<td>Poor crops.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>War with Spain</td>
<td>17111</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Condition in America</td>
<td>Immigrants from Germany</td>
<td>Condition in Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Slavic and Italian immigrants</td>
<td>17476</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Work for low wages</td>
<td>18507</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>21651</td>
<td>Agricultural depression.</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>28304</td>
<td>Decline of birth rate</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>1904</td>
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<td>1906</td>
<td></td>
<td>37564</td>
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<td>1907</td>
<td>Financial panic</td>
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<td>1910</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. German-Americans.

Carl Schurz once remarked that a German looked much more manly in America than in Germany. The greater part of the German element, by industry and thrift, became sturdy citizens of the republic. More than three-fourths would take out naturalization papers within ten years. When the public school system developed, a good proportion of the children of German parentage were found in school. Education by the state had been one of the demands made by the Liberals in Germany during the era of
repression. And while the first generation in America might cling to the native tongue, the second generation would inevitably learn English. While repressive measures in Germany toward Poland kept alive the native speech, the absence of compulsion in America was happily attended by a desire to speak the language of the country.

It is worthy to note that while the early German immigrants were not conspicuously in the forefront of exploration, they followed the first wave and made permanent settlements where the pioneers had only paused. The outbreak of the Revolution round German farms dotting the frontier from Maine to Georgia. Well-cared farms and tidy enclosures marked the work of the sturdy German farmers, who were able by frugality and hard labour to prosper on the soil, while more restless settlers wore out one strip of land and then moved west to clear another. The Germans not only helped to hold the frontier, but gave their full share of support to the forces which drove out Howe and Cornwallis.

The systematic repression established by the Carlsbad Decree, and later the reaction which followed the revolts of 1848, expelled the most liberal element from Germany. While some of the leading "forty eighters" found refuge in European countries, the majority came to America. Dr. Francis Lieber, who came to America in 1827, and Carl Schurz, a "forty eighter", may be taken as conspicuous examples of these 'emigres, bringing an idealism in politics which made them valuable citizens. Their
loyalty to the republic, far from being divided because of foreign birth, was greater because of what they had suffered for their ideals.

Germans arriving later in the century found that farm land was becoming less abundant and hence more valuable, while the wave of Slavic and Italian immigrants, with lower standards of living, made more than successful competitors in the labor market. These later arrivals from Germany, lacking some of the hardihood of the early settlers and the vision of the 'emigres, were frequently less favorably impressed with America, and in the years 1908-10, when 89,132 immigrants arrived from Germany, 41,262 returned to the fatherland.

The differences and rivalries between North and South Germans, between Prussian and Saxon and Bavarian and the subjects of some twenty petty states, between Catholic and Lutheran - these and other distinctions were almost insuperable obstacles to German unification. In 1898 the Imperial Chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe, commented in his diary on the difference between the reactionary Junkerdom of Prussia and the liberalism of South Germany, and remarked that the Prussian landlords still gave their allegiance to the Kingdom rather than to the Empire.

And if such was the spirit of particularism within Germany, what could be expected of Americans who had left Germany before unification was accomplished? So far, in many cases, as they felt drawn to any state in Europe, it was to the kingdom or
duchy which had been their home, rather than to the New Empire. They did not forget the wars where German was arrayed against German, nor the struggle between Lutheranism and Romanism. And while many might recall fighting under a German flag, to many others a standing army was the bête noir from which they had fled to avoid service. In the face of these adverse circumstances enthusiasm for the new Empire and solidarity of German feeling never developed to the extent that was believed in Germany. It is only fair to add that many German-Americans recognized not a political, but an intellectual and moral allegiance to the fatherland. German university and home, culture, literature and art and music, the memory of the wars against Napoleon and the turnvereins perpetuating the name of Father John, all served to bind Germans to Germany. But the loyalty, be it noted, was not, in the main, political.

A few attempts were made, partly from Germany, to set up German states within the United States. The misapprehension that America was an asylum for the outcasts of Europe, composed of heterogeneous states which might sever the federal bonds at will - a misconception easily acquired before the Civil War - gave credence to such a proposal. Missouri (in 1834), Wisconsin (after 1836) and part of Texas were each the object of such intentions. A territory colonized by Germans, and admitted to the Union as a German State would have a considerable influence in Congress, and would later be in a good position to secede and

form an independent state if dissatisfied with the Union. These un-American attempts to direct German settlers helped to cause the German preponderance which still exists about St. Louis and Milwaukee - a condition which affects politics at the present time.

3. German-American Understanding.

With oppressed nationalities the American people are sympathetic almost to a fault. In particular, those who fought and suffered for unification and constitutional government in Germany made a strong appeal to Americans. And the refugees who fled to this country were eloquent for the cause they had represented. The German press in America did not forget the revolutionary forces across the water. Kinkel, whom Carl Schurz had rescued from imprisonment, called on the country to make an investment of two million dollars in a second German revolution, and for a time was popularly supported. 7

In 1789 the first American student matriculated in a German University. In the first half of the nineteenth century 116 followed his example, Bancroft, Motley, Longfellow, Ticknor, and Edward Everett among them. By the opening of the twentieth century this movement had increased to immense proportions. Beside, the presence of German instructors on American faculties, and the study of German literature, made another bond of sympathy - but again, the bond was not political. Then the

7. Faust, v.2,p.185
diplomats from the United States at Berlin were of a caliber to command respect - Wheaton, Bancroft, Bayard Taylor, Dr. White, and William Walter Phelps. With Bancroft, and also with Motley, Count Bismarck was on terms of intimacy.

German sentiment during the Civil War tended to strengthen the good feelings between the two nations. Foremost, the Germans in the great northwest supported the Union to a man. Salomon was one of the war-governors of Wisconsin; Schurz and Sigel were major generals; Dr. Lieber prepared the code of war for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field. In Germany, Federal bonds sold well and the American Consul General at Frankfort-on-the-Main shipped thousandsof pounds of lint and linen to Washington, the gift of the citizens of that city.

On the other hand, in the Franco-Prussian War Napoleon III was believed to have been the aggressor, and sympathy was with the Germans. General Sheridan was well received as American observer with the Prussians. Our minister, Washburne, at Paris was in charge of German interests, and was able to induce the French Government to adopt an extremely generous policy toward Germans in Paris - a service which the German Government appreciated.

In the years following there were numerous evidences of existing friendship. Ex-President and Mrs. Grant were received with marked attention while in Berlin. At the Yorktown Centennial seven descendants of Baron Steuben were guests of the United States. In 1883 the Rhine Valley was inundated, and gifts amounting 25,000 marks were received by the American Legation, while
other donations came through other channels. Many other straws showed a similar tendency of the current.

4. Extradition and Certain Other Treaties.

The droit d'aubaine was a relic of medieval times when the holding of land was connected with feudal obligation to an overlord, and hence where real property could not be allowed to fall into alien hands. This queer right provided that in case the heir to any property were not a subject of the state, the property should revert to the state. Similar to this was the droit de detraction, a usage which provided that a tax might be imposed upon the removal from the State of any property acquired by inheritance. Still another usage which had existed in Europe was a tax upon emigration. With a view to securing the removal of these obstacles, Mr. Henry Wheaton, United States Minister at Berlin, entered into negotiations with the various German Courts. The result was a series of treaties abolishing reciprocally these restrictions. The Hanseatic Republics had removed restrictions on inherited property in 1827, in a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. Mr. Wheaton signed treaties to remove some or all of these usages with Hesse Cassel and Wurtemberg in 1844, with Bavaria and Saxony in 1845, and with Hanover and Nassau in 1846.

In 1852 Daniel Webster signed with the minister resident of Prussia an extradition treaty between the United States on the one hand and the Kingdom of Prussia, and nineteen other German
sovereignties on the other. The treaty provided that other members of the Germanic Confederation might become parties to its provisions by formal accession. Within the next years five others acceded to the treaty. Similar treaties were negotiated with Württemburg and Bavaria in 1853, with Hanover in 1855, and with Baden in 1857. Since these German States followed the continental rule, whereby a state refuses to surrender its own citizens to face trial in a foreign country, these treaties provided that reciprocally the United States would not be considered to be under obligation to surrender its citizens to the German States. The crimes for which a person was to be given up were murder, assault with intent to murder, piracy, arson, robbery, forgery, utterance of forged papers, counterfeiting and embezzlement.

In 1871 Mr. Bancroft negotiated with the German Empire a convention respecting the rights and treatment to be accorded consular agents, and protecting trade-marks.

5. Naturalization.

The presence of so many German immigrants in America early gave rise to questions of naturalization and citizenship, especially since German citizenship carried with it compulsory military service. During the war with Austria Mr. Bancroft took the opportunity to press the need of a naturalization treaty. His overtures were successful, and resulted in the Treaty of 1868, with the North German Union. It provides that each party shall recognize as citizens of the other all persons who, after five years of uninterrupted residence, shall have executed naturalization
papers. Citizenship by naturalization was declared forfeited whenever a person returned to his native land with the intent not to return to the country where he had been naturalized. "The intent not to return may be held to exist when the person naturalized in one country resides more than two years in the other country." A naturalized citizen was declared liable, on return to his original country, to be tried and punished for offences committed before emigration, subject to the limitations established by law. In the same year Mr. Bancroft signed naturalization treaties with Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, and Württemberg, similar to that with the North German Confederation, save that the one with Baden provided for punishment of a naturalized citizen for desertion upon his return to his original country, and did not set any length of absence after which citizenship was held to have been renounced.

The existence of naturalization treaties did not prevent questions of citizenship from arising. From 1868 to 1897, 449 cases were handled by the American Minister at Berlin; of these, 326 cases were decided agreeably to the United States; 316 were cases of former German subjects who had emigrated between 16 and 22 years of age. The cases differed little save as to minor circumstances; a German emigrated to America at the age of sixteen or twenty, became naturalized, and returned for a visit to his former home. Within a few days he would be brought into court on a charge of evading military service. After 1871 it became a question as to whether the treaty with the North German Confederation extended to Alsace-Lorraine. The German Foreign Office main-
tained the negative. The question was of current interest, for Alsatians were for historical reasons more disinclined to this service than native Germans. The German point of view toward military service was entirely different from the American. An American is privileged to go when and where he pleases. But in Germany military service was considered the ordinary and reasonable service which every citizen owed to the state. One who attempted to escape this obligation was entitled to little sympathy. The minister of foreign affairs, Baron von Bülow, father of the later chancellor, once said to Dr. White, "Mr. Minister, don't allow cases of this kind to vex you; I had rather give the United States two hundred doubtful cases every year than have the slightest ill-feeling arise between us." So long as this was the spirit of the Foreign Office affairs went well.

Unfortunately this spirit did not always characterize the German Government. Antipathy for German-Americans frequently resulted in abrupt notice by the police to a naturalized American to quit the empire within a certain number of days, not as a result of any misconduct. The case of Dr. G.W. Geist is in point. In 1884 Dr. Geist was practising dentistry in Frankfurt-on-the Main. He was a naturalized American citizen, had fought in the Union Army, and was residing in Germany only long enough to educate his children, all of whom were under military age. He was suddenly given notice to leave the empire in two months, or become a German citizen.

The department of State did not deny the right of a State to expel undesirable characters from its territory; but it repeatedly pointed out that comity demanded that this right be used with moderation, and that good relations would inevitably be disturbed by indiscriminate expulsion. It also declined repeatedly to ex-


* * * * *

The said Nickelsen, shortly before the attainment of the military age, received, upon his request, a discharge from Prussian nationality, and the assumption seems justified that in making this application for discharge he was actuated solely by the purpose of withdrawing himself from the performance of the general military duty in Prussia.

A sufficient sojourn, one of more than two and one-half months, having been permitted him for a visit to his relations and for the purpose of attending to any business matters claiming his attention, it appears to be requisite in the interest of the state to carry into execution the expulsion decreed at the end of the period of respite expiring on January 1, next. The undersigned avails himself, etc.

H. von Bismarck.

Foreign Relations, 1886, p. 313.

Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, to Mr. von Alvensleben, German Minister at Washington, Department of State, Washington, March 4, 1887.

* * * * *

There is no disposition on the part of this Government to question the right of the Imperial Government to expel any foreigner who violates the laws or the policy of the Empire or whose misconduct may cause his presence to be productive of disorder.

In this respect all citizens of the United States, whether native or naturalized, are held to the same accountability and stand on the same footing. But to concede that the fact of being a naturalized citizen of the United States, with the rights and exemptions incident to such citizenship, may, irrespective of offence by word or deed or general course of misconduct, be held of itself as to a certain class of citizens of the United States a sole and sufficient ground for expulsion, would be equivalent to a deprivation of all right to sojourn
tend its protection to persons who attempted to enjoy the privileges of both nations while fulfilling obligations of citizenship in neither. Thus certain persons who left the United States to evade the draft during the Civil War, and then requested the good offices of the American Government to prevent military service in Germany were given no consideration whatsoever. The American Government also maintained that the test to be applied to a naturalized citizen abroad was not so much his length of residence, but his intention to return or not to return; that the two year period specified in the treaty of 1868 was only "a rule of evidence, establishing a prima facie presumption" which might be refuted by evidence. The German Government maintained the view that a residence of two years worked deprivation of acquired citizenship ipso facto.

Further mention of the significance of the visits of German-Americans to the fatherland will be made later. It was regrettable that on a question so frequently recurring the two Governments took such opposing views.

and peaceable residence in the German Empire except under the most precarious and arbitrary limitations.

The undersigned avails himself, etc.

T.F. Bayard.

Foreign Relations, 1887, p. 421.
III.

GERMAN-AMERICAN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.

1. German Economic History.

The opinion is frequently voiced that in advocating protection in 1879, Bismarck was steering into unknown waters; it would, as Mr. Dawson points out, be more correct to say that he was resuming an old course from which the state had been drifting. Frederick II was as crafty in finance as in war, and to build up agriculture and commerce he had decreed that no goods which could be produced within Prussia were to be imported, while no raw materials which would support industry were to be exported.

Early in the nineteenth century the Prussian Government saw that if accord in fiscal policy could not be secured and maintained among the numerous German States, trade would stagnate; United, the German states could protect themselves effectively. From 1817 it was the policy of Prussian diplomacy, headed by Motz, to work toward a customs union which would embrace the several states. For a time three such unions existed, in North, South and Middle Germany. The North and South Unions merged, and finally the middle group united in 1834. By 1852 practically all the German sovereignties had acceded to the Zollverein. This union was prolonged by agreement until after the war of 1866, when the North German Confederation was created. In 1867 a new Zollverein was formed by treaty; the Parliament of this Union consisted of the North German Diet plus deputies from the states of South Germany. In 1871 came the unification of Germany.

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1. An excellent discussion of the economic history of Germany is to be found in Dawson, The German Empire.
The trend of these events was more significant than the formation of a German Zollverein which could stand as an economic unit and protect German agriculture and industry from competition; it was also the ground over which Austria and Russia waged war for supremacy. In 1846 England had adopted Free Trade. France had fallen into line, and negotiated a commercial treaty in that sense with England in 1860. Agitation for a similar step was not lacking in Germany. For years an active Free Trade school had been preaching the new economic doctrine. In 1848 the agricultural societies petitioned the Frankfort Parliament for abolition of duties. While Austria was irrevocably protectionist, and Bavaria, Württemberg, and other South German States were strongly in favor of a tariff, the shipping, part of the manufacturing, and - of interest in later years - the agrarian interests were in favor of Free Trade. The question came to a focus over a proposed Free Trade treaty with France. In what seemed a hopeless tangle Bismarck saw an opportunity to gain two ends at a single stroke. In 1862 he made a treaty with France, and made ratification by the other states a requisite to a renewal of the Zollverein, which was about to expire. Thereby he eliminated Austria, and bowed to the Free Trade wishes of certain powerful elements, including the landed aristocracy and the bureaucrats. At the same time he departed from a traditional policy. 2

As early as 1838 Mr. Wheaton, United States Minister at Berlin, had endeavored to secure a reduction by the Zollverein of

the tariff on tobacco and rice, which would have benefited half our tobacco crop and a considerable amount of rice. The duty on rice was reduced, but our tariff of 1842 incited retaliation. In 1844 Mr. Wheaton made a new arrangement favoring tobacco, rice, and lard on a basis of reciprocal concession, but when President Tyler referred the treaty to the Senate, that body decline to ratify it. First, it held that such a treaty invaded the rights of the House of Representatives to participate in fixing duties - curiously enough setting a limit to its own authority in making treaties. Other motives were the Whig hostility to downward revision in any form, and the unpopularity of President Tyler. 3

The Franco-Prussian War was followed by pipimg times of peace. The French indemnity made the new government independent and impetuous and almost improvident in constructing public works. Money was more than abundant. Speculation in business became the order of the day. Agricultural property when sold commanded an unprecedented price. 4 Inflation characterized all branches of endeavor.

In the wake of speculation, over-capitalization, and over-production came the crisis of 1873. A cry for help went up to the government. But Bismarck was not an economist. Heretofore his attention had been directed upon political rather than economic questions. He was not a theorist. But as he viewed the situation, progress had existed side by side with protection, while the Free Trade departure of 1865 had, after the increased production

3. Fish: American Diplomacy, p 225.
made possible by spending the French indemnity, been followed by panic. He believed he saw a causal connection, and proposed to return to a protective tariff. The Tariff of 1879 came on a wave of protection which gained strength in practically every country save Britain.

Agriculture has always held a privileged position in Germany, due first to its importance as the activity which nourished the state and gave occupation to a larger number of subjects, and second to the close relation between the landed nobility and their feudal overlords, the numerous German sovereigns. While even in the second quarter of the nineteenth century the growth of organized industry began to presage an industrial revolution, agrarian

5. The view of the government is expressed in the speech from the Throne of February 12, 1879.

"At the same time I am of the opinion that our home industries in their entirety have a claim for as much assistance as can be granted to them by duties and taxes, an assistance which in other countries is given to similar industries, perhaps in excess of the individual requirements.

"I think it my duty to try to reserve at least the German home market to national production so far as that policy is compatible with our other interest. We shall, therefore, return to those principles which have been proved by experience, which have guided the Zollverein during almost half a century of prosperity, and which we have, to a large extent, deserted since 1865. I fail to see that that departure from protection has brought to us any real advantage."

interests remained predominant. In 1871, 64% of the population of the empire was rural, against 36% of urban population which included not only industrial workers but also those engaged in trade and commercial pursuits. Agriculture was so prosperous that, as we have seen, it was the landed interests which, preferring Free Trade to a tariff that would indirectly tax the entire population to support new industries, had demanded the Free Trade policy which Bismarck instituted in 1862-65. Grain was regularly exported to England, even when there was a scarcity in Germany, for it would bring on the English market a higher price than the poor among the urban population of Germany could pay.

Since that time the area cultivated has increased slightly; the yield per hectare has increased considerably; the number of farm laborers is greater; forced sales due to bankruptcy have diminished steadily. Superficially it would appear that agriculture has flourished. But relatively agrarian interests have been lagging far behind - relative, that is, to the growth of industry. Of the total number of dependents on occupations, the following table shows the percent dependent on agriculture and fishing, on the one hand, and on manufacture, mining, and building on the other?

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Dependent:</th>
<th>1882</th>
<th>1895</th>
<th>1907</th>
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<tr>
<td>On Agriculture, etc.</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Manufacture, etc.</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
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The percent of urban population increased as follows: 8

8. Ibid. p. 481
German industries developed to such proportions that by 1860 the predominance of agriculture began to be threatened. The ever-increasing population had previously served to increase emigration; after reaching a maximum in 1882, it gradually subsided, as American farm land became less cheap and as the increase in German industry caused the employment of greater numbers of workers. This made more mouths to feed, while farm hands became less plentiful. About 1890 industry took the lead, and agrarian interests dropped to second place in importance.


The central and western agricultural districts in Germany were largely owned by prosperous peasant farmers, while east Prussian was a region of large estates owned by the Junker Class. The latter had never felt the pressure of keen competition, and were unprogressive and improvident managers. Their social prestige made it possible to borrow heavily on their estates, a practice in which they indulged until these estates were mortgaged, on the average, for over half their value.

In competition with the products of these feudal estates came the grain and meats from the Mississippi Valley and the West. The development of transportation facilities made it possible to feed the industrial communities of Germany more cheaply from America than from Prussia. As Bismarck said, "It was the knowledge
of American competition, with which, without protective lines, we were unable to cope in our smaller and older and poorer lands, which dictated my agricultural policy in Germany." Bismarck was in close sympathy with the agricultural section of Prussia, from which he came.

In 1888 William II came to the throne, and two years later the first Chancellor was succeeded by General (afterward Count) Caprivi. Unlike Bismarck, the new Chancellor had not sprung from the landed nobility, and was derisively called "der Mann ohne Ar und Halen" - the man without soil or grass. Caprivi recognized the fact that industry had eclipsed agriculture, and that the need of the times was cheap food - cheaper than could be produced on German soil.

At this juncture trade relations with the United States were of considerable importance. By imperial decree of June 25, 1880, the admission of all kinds of pork except hams and sides of bacon had been prohibited on the ground that raw pork previously imported had frequently contained trichinae, which could not easily be detected except in ham and bacon. This worked great hardship on an important American industry, and the American Government was desirous of determining the facts. The Department of Agriculture made a careful investigation, and found nothing to substantiate the view that American pork was unhealthful. In reply to the invitation of the President to the German Government to

9. Von Schierbrand in Century 42:156, May 1902
send a commission of experts, came the telegram: "Government declines to investigate or suspend order."\textsuperscript{10} Circumstances made the imperial decree appear in the light of a measure to protect agrarian interests rather than public health.\textsuperscript{11} First, the meat was eaten in America with no untoward results. Then, the imperial Government showed no willingness to probe the allegations. Wherever sickness developed from eating pork it was found not to have been of American origin. It developed that many German laborers ate raw pork, usually of local origin, thereby increasing the danger from trichinosis. The pork from Russia was notoriously of poor quality, and yet by ordinance of March 6, 1883, the previous decree prohibiting the importation of pork in general was abolished, and in its stead pork of American origin was specifically excluded, while Russia and other countries were permitted to resume the trade.

By Section 3 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, the President was authorized, in the case of countries whose export of sugar to the United States was admitted free and which in

\textsuperscript{10} Foreign Relations, 1883, p. 355.

\textsuperscript{11} Mr. Sargent, the U.S. Minister at Berlin, wrote: "The pretense of sanitary reasons is becoming the thinnest veil ....... and is now apparently only insisted on as an excuse to the United States," and went on to give evidence of duplicity. The letter was carelessly allowed to be published, and made the recall of Mr. Sargent necessary. 

The United States imposed tariff upon American agricultural or other products, to enter into reciprocity agreements admitting American products free, or to proclaim against their sugar the same tariff rate which they imposed upon sugar from America. Now the fact that in 1890 the United States imported almost three billion pounds of sugar made it highly desirable for Germany to secure the admission of its sugar on this privileged basis. At this time, despite thorough government inspection, America was the only nation whose pork was prohibited in Germany. At once the Foreign Office came forward with a proposal to waive the sanitary restrictions on pork in return for the continued admission of sugar on the free list.

The Department of State properly took the view that if a sanitary restriction could be thus removed, it was not a health, but a protectionist measure, and in this case the singling out of America was scarcely in accord with the most-favored-nation provision of Article V of the treaty of 1828. An agreement was finally reached at Saratoga, New York, in the summer of 1891, whereby the German Government accepted the inspection certificate of the Department of Agriculture as to the microscopic examination of pork, and reduced duties on other agricultural products, while the President agreed not to avail himself of the retaliatory powers granted in the tariff act of 1890. The United States thereby gained the

15. General Foster represented the United States in these negotiations, and relates his experience in Diplomatic Memoirs, II, p. 12, et seq.
benefits of the lower grain rates of the Caprivi reciprocity treaties. 16

The crop failure of 1891 had driven almost all interests in Germany to support reciprocity, and at the moment some agrarians reversed their policy and voted for reciprocity. But sober second thought came quickly; the landed nobility soon saw the consequences of such a move. The Kaiser had supported Caprivi’s policy, and had made him a count as a recognition of his services. But the influences about the Kaiser were all against the free trade idea. Increased trade and lower prices spoke eloquently for the change in fiscal policy. But there was at work an influence more potent than reason.

Terrified at the trend of events, the agrarian interests banded together in 1895 to form the Bund der Landwirte, or Agrarian League. Its political strength was swelled by the numbers of the German Peasants’ League, making an organization 200,000 strong. Every method of propaganda known was employed to check the new fiscal policy. 17 The Russian nobility - the heart and soul of the opposition - were loud in their bitterness against the Imperial Chancellor. The Kaiser was shocked, and at Konigsberg in 1894 he took occasion to reprove them sharply: "Forward then, with God’s help, and shame upon him who leaves his King in the lurch:" But the Junkers were not thus to be mollified. They sent

a delegation to the Kaiser, addressing him as Landesvater—Father of his country—and poisoning the name of Caprivi.

In the fall of 1894 Caprivi was forced to retire— a victim of the Agrarian League. He had advocated a better understanding with nations, such as the United States, who were Germany's industrial superiors. He abandoned Bismarck's policy of keeping close to Russia, whose influence Caprivi thought to be deleterious. With his fall German-American relations suffered a blow.

3. Results of Agrarian Supremacy.

The press was one of the most potent implements in the hands of the Agrarian League. Of course public opinion had comparatively little weight in Germany. The Government could, for a time, pursue a policy unpopular with the country. But to make the nation support the protection of agriculture at the expense of cheaper food was a task indeed for the agrarian press. The sums which the Agrarian League had at its disposal and the influential position of the Junkers made a vigorous campaign possible. Of course, reciprocity was a fact, and would continue to be until Caprivi treaties expired in 1903-4.

The Agrarian League had two stock arguments. One was the necessity of making Germany economically self-contained. Britain might favor Free Trade, but in case of war the British fleet would safeguard the food supply. If Germany were isolated, could
she hold out? Only by protecting agriculture would this be possible. There was philosophic teaching to support this view which the Agrarians urged.

The second reason for protection was the contention that agriculture perpetuated the sturdy stock needed in the army. Men from mill and factory could certainly not fight so well as men who had led an out-of-door life. This argument passed unchallenged for want of evidence to the contrary until 1895, when the Bavarian Government classified its recruits. The population of Bavaria was about evenly divided between agriculture and industry; but of the accepted recruits 26.4% came from agricultural pursuits, against 28.4% from industries.

A corollary of this propaganda for protection was opposition to nations whose interests ran counter to agrarian interests. In this category the United States easily took first place. The most-favored-nation clause of the treaty of 1828, and the reciprocity agreement of 1891 were objects of attack. Of course, the free admission of sugar had been advantageous; but the concissions favoring American agriculture were naturally disadvantageous. But the press did not stop here; it proceeded to carry out a policy of blackmail seldom equaled among peaceful

18. Count Caprivi did not overlook this strong argument. In the Reichstag, December 10, 1891, he said: "The existence of the State is at stake when it is not in a position to depend on its own sources of supply.... It is my unshakable conviction that in a future war the feeding of the army and the country may play an absolutely decisive part." Dawson: Evolution of Modern Germany, p. 248.
nations, and boding no good for a continued understanding. The rolling of the almighty dollar was heard in every official act of the United States Government. At the outbreak of the War with Spain cowardice and inefficiency were said to be characteristics of the American army and navy. One journal referred to the Government as "an administration which is so corrupt and so completely at the mercy of the most pecuniuous personal influences". The Kaiser's gift of a statue of Frederick the Great was not erected with becoming promptness; the Kaiser's picture was hung in a dark corner of the Brooklyn Public Library; his gifts to the Germanic Museum at Harvard were housed in a barn. These were some of the mole hills which the Agrarian press made into mountains, in the effort to preclude any further trade relations which would work to agrarian disadvantage. Not all editors and public men took this view - Dr. Theodor Barth for example, - but they were in the minority. Dr. Barth was a Liberal leader in the Reichstag who had consistently opposed the restrictions on American products. In 1888 he founded Die Nation to voice his opposition to Bismarck, and had urged better relations with America. But gradually German feeling was becoming hostile to the United States. And while other factors entered, this state of affairs was largely the work of the Agrarian leaders, who, according to the Chancellor, Prince Hohenlohe, "would like nothing better than to embroil us with every nation that sends us foodstuffs."

4. Trade with the United States.

This hostile position would have been more tenable had Germany been less dependent upon America. But among the imports from America necessities bulked very large, with raw cotton comprising about 50% of the total. On the other hand, the exports to America consisted largely in beet sugar (until 1902) and chemicals, toys, textiles, and china. And the balance of trade became continually more unfavorable to Germany. The protection-

20. The following tables (I) from the U.S. Statistical Abstract for 1904, and (II) from the Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich 1904, ch. VII, compiled by Dr. Howard in The Cause and Extent of the Recent Industrial Progress of Germany, show to what extent this is true.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exports to Germany</th>
<th>Imports from Germany</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>$92,053,753</td>
<td>81,014,065</td>
<td>11,039,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>187,347,869</td>
<td>97,374,700</td>
<td>89,973,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>194,220,472</td>
<td>118,268,356</td>
<td>75,952,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>249,555,926</td>
<td>168,605,137</td>
<td>80,750,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>344,797,276</td>
<td>189,919,136</td>
<td>154,875,140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. From the U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1904, p. 98, 1914, p. 320
ists demanded a tariff war to bring America to her knees; but wiser heads realized that the United States held by far the more strategic position, that such rivalry would be suicidal, and that only by the give and take of reciprocal agreements could the two countries get on. From the German point of view the situation was an impasse, the realization of which did not contribute to German friendship for America. And the "American invasion" was threatening industry as well as agriculture.

One of the big issues in German-American diplomacy was the interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause of the treaty of 1628. Article V of this treaty provides:

"No higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importation into the United States of any article the produce or manufacture of Prussia, and no higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importation into the Kingdom of Prussia of any article the produce or manufacture of the United States, than are or shall be payable on the like article being the produce or manufacture of any other foreign country........"

Further, Article IX provides:

"If either party shall hereafter grant to any other nation any particular favor in navigation or commerce, it shall immediately become common to the other party, freely, where it is freely granted to such other nation, or on yielding the same compensation, when the grant is conditional."

From the time of Thomas Jefferson, the first Secretary of
State, and one of the American envoys who took part in drawing up the similar provisions of the treaty of 1785, down to the present it has consistently been held by the Department of State that in commercial treaties the provisions of Article IX modify the most-favored-nation clause. A reciprocity treaty is considered not a favor, but a bargain, and as Article IX states, another nation may make a similar bargain by making equivalent concessions. The only exception to this principle in American Commercial treaties is the treaty of 1850 with the Swiss Confederation, which placed no condition on the most-favored-nation clause; when a question of interpretation arose, these clauses were abrogated. Thus the American Government has maintained a consistent stand on the question.

The German Government held, on several occasions, that Article V was not restricted by Article IX, and that under the former any concession made by the United States under a reciprocity treaty, at the same time accrued to the benefit of a most-favored-nation without any compensation or concession on its part.

The interpretation of this part of the treaty of 1828 became a mooted point in 1894. The Wilson act of that year repealed the provisions of the McKinley Act of 1890 and took sugar from the free list. Further, in Schedule II-182\textfrac{1}{2} it pro-

vided for an additional duty for 1-10 cent per pound on sugar which was supported by a bounty in the country where it was produced; and this applied to German sugar. The German government protested to the countervailing duty both as a violation of the most-favored-nation clause and of the Saratoga Agreement. The American government held that the latter was only a bargain, and might be terminated by a change of conditions. The German government at the time, be it noted, held the Saratoga Agreement to be a permanent arrangement. Under the most-favored-nation clause however, Secretary Gresham considered the complaint to be well founded, and the President referred it to Congress with a recommendation that the countervailing duty be removed. Nevertheless, the repeal was defeated in Congress. But insurrection in Cuba cut down the supply of sugar from that quarter, and German sugar exports to the United States rose in spite of the duty.24

In 1897 while the Dingley bill was before Congress, the German Ambassador renewed the complaint which his government had been voicing since 1894. His argument was based on two points: (1) That a countervailing duty was contrary to the rights of a most-favored-nation, and (2) That such treatment was contrary to the exchange of notes of August 22, 1891, i.e. , the Saratoga

24. $6,099,213 in 1895
10,404,172 in 1896
27,636,433 in 1897

U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1904, p. 350
Agreement. In reply the Secretary of State, Mr. Sherman, held first, that not only had the American government consistently held such a countervailing duty to be an internal affair not connected with most-favored-nation relations, but the official German representative at the international sugar conference of 1888, who happened to be no other than Count Hazfeldt, had expressly committed himself to the same view, as had the British representative. In the second place, Mr. Sherman stated that the Saratoga Agreement had no connection with the question, having been only a bargain which was terminated by the act of 1894.

The Dingley bill became a law, not with an additional duty of 1-10 cent on bounty-fed sugar, as the act of 1894 provided, but it levied "an additional duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed." The value of beet sugar imports from Germany dropped from $27,636,430 in 1897 to only $2,656,135 in 1898. This, however, was partly due to the overstocking of the American market in anticipation of the new tariff, for in 1899 the figure was $13,808,655. The menace of an "American invasion" had been threatening Central Europe for some time. The Dingley tariff, coincidently with crop failures in Europe and good crops in America, produced

25. Foreign Relations, 1897, p. 175 et seq.
26. Ibid. p. 178, et seq.
27. U.S. Statutes 1897, 55th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 205
a loud anti-American uproar. Opposition to the growing dependence upon America was preached not only by the German agrarians, but by statesmen throughout Europe. Against what appeared a common danger even France and Germany took counsel together.

By this time the German foreign Office was almost inextricably involved in its attitude toward the most-favored-nation clause. In theory it maintained, in short, that a bargain with one nation must become a gift to every most favored nation. In practice it was less consistent, as the following cases go to prove. (1) In 1883, a concession was granted to Italy and Spain which was not extended to the United States. (2) In 1884 Spain and the United States entered into a reciprocity agreement which admitted free sugar from Porto Rico and Cuba. In 1885 Bismarck asserted in the Reichstag that the German Government was entitled to similar treatment as a most favored nation, and ten days later the German Government made a concession to Spain, and this time it extended the low rates to the United States gratis. (3) In 1891 the low grain rates of the Caprivi treaties did not accrue to the United States gratuitously, but, it will be recalled, in exchange for a concession, namely, to continue German sugar on the free list. At the time the German Government considered it a bargain. (4) In 1897, the German Foreign Secretary, realizing that the Saratoga Agreement was inconsistent with Germany's expressed views on Article V of the treaty of 1828, asserted in

the Reichstag that this agreement was merely explanatory of the treaty, that it created no new situation, and that the government was already obligated to extend the benefits of the Caprivi treaties gratuitously to America. (5) In 1898, when the French and American Governments entered a reciprocity arrangement under provisions of the Dingley Act, Germany claimed the same rights with no concession. But the American Government could not agree to this, and on July 10, 1900 the German Government made a commercial agreement on a basis of reciprocal concession, and thereby admitted American goods at the minimum tariff.

From the above it is seen that the opportunist policy of the Foreign Office in this respect was productive of no result satisfactory to the Agrarian League, for the upshot of every agreement with America was the granting of a favor in order to secure a favor in return.

Nor must it be thought that the American tariff worked hardship only on the farmers. The high tariff which protected American industry effectively closed our ports to many articles of German manufacture, and made the exportation of others possible only on a narrow margin. Mr. Arnold, better known as "Vigilans sed Aequus" of the Spectator, computed that the American tariff decreased the German textile operative's income by ten percent. 30

Trade relations between America and Germany might almost be said to resolve themselves into an intermittent controversy over German sugar and American meat. When the so-called sanitary restrictions were removed September 3, 1891 as a result of the Saratoga Agreement, the meat question was not permanently settled; for on October 31, 1894, Baron Saurma informed the Secretary of State that since Texas fever had been found to exist in two separate cargoes of American cattle, the further importation of cattle and fresh beef from the United States was prohibited. To this the American Government remonstrated, showing that American cattle had for years been free from this disease, and that from one to four thousand head of cattle had annually been shipped to Europe for fifteen years with no untoward result. In the fall of 1898 a meat inspection bill was drawn up in Germany which provided, in part, for the opening of packages of canned meat for examination. The North German Gazette of December 21, 1898, in referring to this bill said "It deals therefore with a matter which is purely German, and which imposes upon us a task in the accomplishment of which we alone are concerned," a remark which was conceded to be addressed to America. More favorable was the stand of the Vossische Zeitung (May 7, 1899) which regretted the motives of self-interest which prompted the Agrarians to support meat inspection only when applied to foreign meat, and said "We desire to retain control by the sanitary police, but we do not wish to have the sanitary police control discredited by using it for protective-tariff purposes." The bill was

a burning question for a year and a half. When referred to a committee it was amended by the Agrarians in a way calculated to protect their interests. The industrial elements in society, having little faith in the sincerity of the alleged reform, used their political influence to prevent any unreasonable restrictions while the Agrarian Party, in and out of Parliament, almost over-did their efforts to influence the Government. A compromise was finally reached between the two factions which also insured certain votes for the new navy bill, and the measure became a law after a purely party vote. The Act was promulgated May 22, 1900. In addition to many other restrictions, sausage and similar canned meats were prohibited unconditionally. American meats continued to suffer from these and other restrictions, as Mr. Gerard found when he went to Berlin.

American fruits comprise another class of articles which suffered heavily from German sanitary inspection. In 1894 the officials of various cities were taking steps to exclude American dried fruit which contained, it was asserted, an injurious amount of metallic zinc. In this, as in the case of American meats, the most obvious argument in favor of the article was that it was eaten in America with no harmful results. There was medical testimony to the effect that the small amount of zinc present was not injurious. On February 1, 1898, Mr. White, had to inform

32. Foreign Relations, p. 508.
33. Gerard: My Four Years in Germany, p. 269.
the State Department that a ministerial decree prohibited any further importation of American dried fruit. Simultaneously with this action against dried fruit from America it was discovered that the San Jose scale was being introduced by the importation of fresh fruit. Consignments of apples were opened and samples examined, with the result in general of finding them in satisfactory condition. Dried fruit was also found by the German Government to be infected, and was also made the subject of restrictions. This sanitary precaution was waived in the Reciprocity agreement of 1900. But discrimination against dried fruit was again an issue in 1913.34

Still another subject of unpleasant diplomatic correspondence was the action taken by the Prussian Government in 1895 to exclude American insurance companies maintaining branch houses in Prussia. From the point of view of these companies it appeared that for some time restrictions of ever-increasing severity had been put upon their operations under their Prussian concessions. One company was required to invest half of its receipts from Prussian business in Prussian consoles at low rates or interest. Finally a decree specifying the form for annual statement was issued, binding on both foreign and domestic companies, but working to the singular disadvantage of the former. A limited time was given to comply. At this juncture the aid of the Department of State was solicited. Negotiations progressed "dilatorily", as Bismarck used to say.

34. For the Correspondence see Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 307 et seq.
Several of the insurance commissioners in American States, through official channels and otherwise, threatened reprisals on the German companies in America. The American companies were excluded, and the threatened retaliation was carried into effect. Some time later the German Government sent agents to the United States to investigate the insurance companies, and in the fall or 1899 they were again admitted in Prussia.

There remain for consideration the reciprocity agreements entered into between 1900 and 1914. When Count von Bülow became Imperial Chancellor he was aware that it was agrarian opposition which had caused the retirement of Count Hohenlohe. Thus political expediency as well as his own predilections pointed the new chancellor to a policy of increased agrarian protection. The Caprivi treaties were soon to expire, and for several years there had been discussion favoring an upward revision of the tariff at the time. A long parliamentary contest ensued, in which the free traders under the leadership of Dr. Barth and Professor Brentano suffered a defeat by the passage of the new tariff act of 1902, providing for greater protection to agriculture. In February 1905, the German government concluded the last of seven reciprocity treaties with neighboring European states.

On November 29, 1905, Baron von Sternburg, the German Ambassador at Washington, gave notice that his government wished to terminate the reciprocal agreement of 1900 on March 1, 1906.

Shortly thereafter negotiations were undertaken, which developed into the commercial agreement of 1906, whereby the United States received the same favorable duties accorded by the recent treaties.
with Russia and other nations, and in return lowered in favor of Germany the American duties on certain liquors, crude tartar, oil paintings and water colors and a few other articles. Also, a change was made in the Consular Regulations at the request of the German Ambassador. This agreement was for a period of twelve months or longer.

Count von Bülow appeared to have come off empty handed, and loud was the outcry of the agrarian party. But since the United States was not dependent on German sugar its economic position was unassailable. The chancellor was given clearly to understand that he was on probation for twelve months in this matter, and must not again fail in his negotiations.

In 1907 another temporary agreement was made, containing an expression of a desire to execute at a later time a comprehensive commercial treaty. The concessions on the part of the United States were identical with those of the year before, save that champagne and all other sparkling wines were added to the list on which lower duties were to be allowed. Moreover, the Customs Regulations were amended by executive order in a way which made them more agreeable to German trade. In return for these concessions, the German Government again extended her minimum tariff to American goods. It appears that Baron von Sternburg, the German Ambassador, was also hopeful that the Customs Administrative Act would be amended in a way which would have favored German commerce, for on the day Sternburg signed the agreement, Secretary Root wrote that he was authorized to say that the
President would recommend such action to Congress. But there was clearly no obligation on Congress to do this under the agreement, and the desired action was not taken by Congress. This reciprocity agreement continued in force until February 7, 1910, when it expired under provisions of the new American tariff Act of August 5, 1909.

The tariff of 1909 introduced maximum and minimum provisions, the former being in all cases 25% in addition to the latter. Section 2 of the act provided that the President might by proclamation extend minimum rates to foreign nations whose tariff laws imposed no terms or restrictions which discriminated against American goods. The German government continued to comply with these provisions, and on March 7, 1910, the day when the agreement of 1907 expired, President Taft proclaimed that the minimum rates of the new act were to be extended to German goods.

On October 3, 1913, the underwood tariff became a law. Being a downward revision, it was, of course, to the advantage of Germany. However, some adverse criticism on particular provisions was made in Germany during the discussion which preceded its passage. The outbreak of the European war, and the consequent obstruction to German trade, brought to a close any further discussion of the American tariff and German exports. Owing to the peculiar conditions in both countries trade relations had never become stabilized.

The outbreak of the War in Europe, which cut off a large part of the German-American trade, soon showed that each nation had depended largely on the other. But an analysis of the articles of import and export for years previous shows that America was far less dependent on Germany than Germany had been on America. This fact, and the growing unfavorable balance of trade, created a situation that had long been a cause of dissatisfaction to the German people. To obviate it two plans had been urged. One, on the part of hot-headed agrarians, was a tariff war to bring America to her knees. But it was only necessary to recall that about half the German imports consisted of cotton, which was a necessity to the mills of Germany, to show that for Germany alone such an act would be suicidal.

A more feasible plan was for years discussed in Central Europe - namely, a Zollverein which would bind the several nations into a unit strong enough to storm the impregnable commercial position of the United States. At first, this was advocated by Free Traders, and for this reason, as well as the necessity it implied of lowering the bars to agricultural products from Austria-Hungary, made the agrarians frown on the proposal. But as the danger from America loomed larger, German agrarians made common cause with the agricultural interests in Austria-Hungary, and urged a union. Such a plan appealed to many Germans as only a

35. For a survey of the sentiment on this proposal up to 1898 see article by Prof. Risk in John Hopkins University Studies in Hist. and Pol. Sci. Series XX Nos. 11-12, Nov.-Dec. 1902.
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binding together the several iirovinces of which it

v/as

composed;

then the various ^jorman states were gathered in; A-LStria was ex-

cluded only to assure I'ruGsian hegemony; now what was more logical
than to complete this provincial-state-federal policy hy an inter-

national sequel?

Against the measure there were insuperahle obstacles. Tliere
were administrative difficulties,

such as an eqiitahle division

of customs receipts among the several states.

There were the

jealousies among the various states; if the Dual Monarchy got on

with such difficulty, wliat could be ex-pec ted of a Central

European Union?
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The agrarians, as

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So long as advantage to special

interests was regarded as more important tlian the good of the
whole, a Central iiluropean Zollverein was impracticable.
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It is the thesis of Dr. Uaujjiann' s "Llittel jjiuropa"

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-56-

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1. The Situation in Samoa Prior to 1885.

The recent era of colonization offers few if any instances where the "white man's burden" has been borne less capably than in Samoa during the period with which our study is concerned. The history of American interference in Samoa - a departure from the traditional policy of isolation and non-interference - is marked by no event more creditable than the diplomatic action by which the United States finally extracted itself from the muddle.

In 1872 Commander Meade, U.S.N., while on a cruise in the Pacific, sailed into Pago Pago on the island of Tutuila, one of the finest natural harbors of the Pacific. At the solicitation of the chief of the natives on the island, Meade entered into a treaty, whereby Pago Pago was ceded to the United States, while Meade agreed that the United States should extend its friendship and protection over the island. In doing this the officer acted with no authority from his government, and though President Grant transmitted the agreement to the Senate, it was never ratified. But of course, the provisions of the United States

1. The Samoan archipelago comprises fourteen islands with a population of about 39,000, of whom some 500 are whites. The natives rank high among the Polynesians, being simple, hospitable, and good fighters when provoked. The vegetation on the islands makes the task of finding food a simple matter for the natives. The archipelago is about 1600 miles from Auckland, New Zealand, and 4200 from San Francisco. Apia is by far the most important town.
Constitution relative to making treaties were wholly unknown to the Samoan chief, who considered the treaty to be in force.  

For years the United States had maintained a consular agent at Apia, and now, on account of a growing interest in the island group, it was decided to send a commissioner to investigate and report on conditions. Colonel A. B. Steinberger was selected, and in 1874 he visited the islands. On his return he rendered an enthusiastic report, and as he was desirous of returning he was authorized to do so at his own expense, carrying with him some presents and a letter to the chiefs from the President of the United States. This letter expressed the regard which the government entertained for the welfare of the people of Samoa, but committed it to nothing more tangible than friendship.

Now Mr. Steinberger returned to Samoa by way of Hamburg, where he placed himself in the service of Codeffroy and Company, a trading firm which operated a large plantation in Samoa. But Mr. Steinberger had not been in Apia long before remarkable events began to occur. For some years the leadership in Samoa had been disputed between the rival houses of Malietoa and Tupua, while the former was divided within itself. Mr. Steinberger, on his return, persuaded the people that two rival kings were a troublesome superfluity, and in 1875 a new constitution was drawn up, providing for a new system of government.

The kingship was to rest jointly in the two great houses of Matietoa and Tupua, and the two heads should alternate in the kingship for terms of four years. Matietoa Laupopa became the first King. A House of Nobles and a House of Representatives took the place of the two councils of chieftains by which the natives had carried on such government as they had had up to that time. Finally, the office of premier was created, to be filled by appointment of the King. The Premier was to act for the King in all matters, and had the privilege of addressing either house.\(^5\) Needless to say, Mr. Steinberger had himself appointed to this powerful office.

The Premier was the power behind the throne, the embodiment of the new government, and in the exercise of his power he became unpopular with the American and British factions. With the consent of the King, the American consul and the commander of a British man-of-war at Apia kidnapped Mr. Steinberger and deported him to Fiji. The parliament resented this unconstitutional action, and promptly deposed King Malietoa. Thus the artificially elaborate scheme of government collapsed, and the natives gave themselves over to the joys of civil strife.

Alarmed at the growing strength of the disaffected elements, the government sent a deputation of chiefs to Fiji to request the British Government to proclaim a protectorate and establish order. They returned without having accomplished their object.

\(^5\) Foreign Relations, 1889, p. 232 et seq.
and in the same year, 1877, one Mamea, was sent as Envoy to Washington to make a similar request of the American Government. The visit did not bring the desired result. But that it might not seem wholly oblivious to the honor paid it, the Government of the United States negotiated a treaty by which it was given exclusive rights in the harbor of Pago Pago, and most-favored-nation treatment throughout the islands, while in return it agreed to use its good offices to bring about a settlement of any international dispute in which Samoa might become involved. This treaty was signed at Washington on January 17, 1878. On January 24 and August 28, 1879, the German and British Governments respectively completed similar treaties with Samoa.

The parliamentary government became discredited and in May 1879 an uncle of the deposed King, known as Malietoa Telavou, was crowned King by the opposition. Renewed warfare was inevitable, and the consuls at Apia hastened to secure a joint agreement to respect the rights and property of neutrals. In August, the consuls recognized the de facto government of Malietoa Telavou.

The unanimous desire of the British, German, and American consuls at Apia was to prevent any nation other than their own to become predominant. At this time a British protectorate seemed quite possible, and the German and American agents felt called upon to maintain a balance of power. Hence in 1877 and again in 1878 the American flag was hoisted over the islands.
and a protectorate proclaimed. In both cases the action was repudiated by the American government.

Late in 1880 Malietoa Telavou died, and was succeeded by his nephew, Malietoa Laumea, the former king. His title was opposed by a chief named Tamasese. But the former gained considerable support, and on July 12, 1881, a series of conferences were brought to a successful conclusion, whereby Tamasese became vice-king, and Malietoa was universally accepted. This is known as the Lackawanna peace, having been reached through the efforts of Captain Willis, of the U.S.S. Lackawanna, then in Samoan waters. The peace thus established was respected until January, 1885.6

2. Renewed Unrest.

Since the summer of 1879 the government of the city of Apia had been left in the hands of three consuls by the warring factions. And if the consuls could have acted in accord, this policy would have produced tolerable results. But a new German consul, a Dr. Steubel, became closely allied with the manager of the large German trading firm which was by far the most important business concern in Samoa, and put himself at the Company's disposal in getting greater concessions. Thus in the latter part of 1884, we find the consul engaged in a heated

correspondence with King Malietoa over alleged injustices to
German subjects. Moreover, his overbearing manner in demanding
the signature of the King to a new treaty with Germany, which he
would not allow the King to read before signing, made the desire
of the Samoan Government for British annexation more strong than
ever. The treaty was unwillingly signed in November, 1884.
King Malietoa informed the British and American consuls of
this, stating that he was signing under compulsion, and reasserting
his desire of British annexation. It may easily be understood that the King may have been irresponsible, and that the
Imperial consul might have had some reason for becoming impatient.
But, especially in the absence of any considerable grievance,
there was no justification for his dragooning manner, nor for
the step which he next took. On January 23, 1885, he informed
the King that pending an agreement whereby the protection of
German interests would be insured, the municipality of Apia
would be occupied the morning by a force of German officers and
seamen from a vessel in the harbor. This action, of course,
infringed upon the rights of the other governments, and repre-
sentations were promptly made by the American Government to the
Imperial government. Early in February, 1885, the action of Dr.
Steubel was disavowed through the Imperial Foreign Office.
But the consul continued to carry out this policy throughout the
year. As a counter-demonstration, the American consul, Green-
baum, proclaimed an American protectorate. Again the Department

7. Foreign Relations, 1889, p. 300 et seq.
of State repudiated the act.

This situation was apparently one which came under the article in the treaty between the United States and Samoa which promised the use of good offices where necessary. Accordingly, the Department of State, in complaining against Dr. Steubel's conduct, went farther, and proposed that the British and German ambassadors be authorized to confer with Mr. Bayard, the Secretary of State, with a view to making some more satisfactory arrangement. The proposal was accepted with the suggestion that each power first send a commissioner to study and report upon conditions in Samoa. This was accepted.

In April, 1886, a German squadron under Admiral Knorr came to Apia. Malietoa petitioned the admiral for a relief from the arrogant conduct of the German consul. But that officer, taking the side of the consul, replied that he had not come to investigate the King's difficulties, and gave him a sharp reprimand. During this time the disaffected members of the island Kingdom had been congregating under the banner of Tamasese, the vice-King, who was in open revolt. Now the German admiral moved his squadron to the stronghold of Tamasese, where a band was landed and paraded and a conference was held with Tamasese. The insurgent was thus given encouragement in defying the government.

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The commissioners made an investigation in the summer of 1886, and then the ground was clear for a series of conferences, at Washington. In June and July, 1887, several meetings were held, in which two plans were proposed. Recalling the lack of political capacity on the part of the Samoans, the German Ambassador proposed that the interests of all concerned would be best served by the appointment, by that power whose commerce with Samoa was the most important, of an adviser to the King, who would in fact manage the government. This, of course, would place the Government of Samoa in the hands of the appointee of the German Government. The British Ambassador was also in favor of this solution. The American proposal was that the King should be assisted in executing the laws by a council composed of three foreign advisers, one to be named by each of the powers, and the King and Vice-King ex-officio; the salaries of these advisers were to be met by the Samoan Government, thereby making the advisers free from obligation to a foreign government. The German Ambassador thought this would not prevent friction between rival interests. On July 26, conferences were broken off, to allow the conferees to consult their governments. It had been the understanding that during the conference the status quo would be respected by all parties. The Government of the United States considered that, no expression to the contrary being made, this would continue to be the case during the summer. Far from abiding by this understanding, the German Government proceeded immediately to act independently in Samoa. For alleged
wrongs committed against German subjects by King Malietoa, all being events prior to the meeting of the conference at Washington, the consul in Apia was instructed to declare war "upon King Malietoa personally." The former vice-king, Tamasese, was proclaimed King. The German squadron was sent throughout the archipelago to carry native chiefs who landed at various points, and under the authority of the German commanders, proclaimed the new King. A chaplain on the H.I.G.M.S. Sophie wrote how one village, remaining loyal to the rightful King, refused to receive the representatives of Tamasese, and the village was "destroyed by fire for its disobedience, its inhabitants having fled precipitately to the bush before the landing of the armed boats." There is little wonder that the natives, upon a second visit of the Sophie hastened to manifest their entire loyalty." After a brief resistance, the Ex-King Malietoa, wishing to save further bloodshed, gave himself up to the Germans, and was deported on the cruiser. Adler, a former German artillery officer, Brandeis, who had been employed by the German firm in Samoa for some time, was made sole adviser to Tamasese, and the power behind the throne.

Five days after war had actually been declared upon Malietoa, and thus considerably after such action had been decided upon at Berlin, the German Ambassador informed Mr. Bayard that his

10. See article by Talcott Williams in World's work, 56:116 et seq
government intended to act alone to protect its interests, and might have to depose the present king. Thus the status quo was not observed as agreed, nor was the United States Government informed in time to protest. Mr. Bayard again took occasion to point out that the interests of the United States were not commercial but purely altruistic; that whereas the German Government urged the weakness of the Samoan government as an excuse for a high-handed policy, the American Government thought this all the more reason why the government set up in Samoa should be impartial and of such a character as to develop, not await, any political ability the natives might have.

The Tamasese-brandeis government which the Germans set up in Mulinuu, the Samoan capital, was too progressive to be popular. Being a rule set up and maintained for the advantage of the German trading firm, it began to develop the country. It lasted for one year. Again the outs banded together against the ins; the government which had been set up by the deportation of the acknowledged King could not long endure. And the British and American consuls, merely reflecting the consternation of their home governments at the outrageous conduct of the Germans, freely deplored the existing conditions, but advised the natives to bide their time and avoid bloodshed.

A new pretender became active in August 1888, a chief named Mataara. As a demonstration against renewed hostilities the Adler patrolled the coasts and opened fire upon villages known to oppose Tamasese. Mataara's forces took the field against the government at Mulinuu. The Adler attempted to interfere, and
and Captain Leary of the U.S.S. Adams, intervening to see fair play, took an attitude which left it only possible for the German commander to desist or fight a more suitable enemy than native insurgents. 12

In September, Mataafa attacked Mullinuu. The government forces under ex-Captain Brameis intrenched their position. Seamen were landed from the German ships. But Mataafa was successful in his attack. Martial law was declared by the German consul, asserting that it applied even to American and British citizens. The following telegram was sent to Washington: "Three war ships undertaken to disarm Mataafa. Landed at night force to prevent retreat. Mataafa's men fired on and forced to fight. Germans routed. Twenty killed, thirty wounded. Germans swear vengeance. Shelling and burning indiscriminately regardless of American property. Protest unheeded. Natives exasperated. Foreigners' lives and property in greatest danger. Germans respect no neutral territory. ... American flag—seized in Apia harbor by armed German boats, but released. Admiral with squadron necessary immediately." Americans who had not known of the existence of Samoa before this time became justly enraged. Congress appropriated $500,000 to protect American interests.


By March, 1889, a German, an American, and a British

squadron were riding in the harbor of Apia; hostilities seemed imminent. On March 16 a typhoon destroyed all save one of those ships, and put an end to the destruction of life on land by a greater disaster on the water. In the face of such losses all Samoa seemed insignificant.

In February, 1889, an agreement had been reached for a renewal in Berlin of the conference begun in Washington in 1887. The American commissioners were John A. Kasson, William Walters Phelps, and George H. Bates; the latter was perhaps an unfortunate choice, as he had been the commissioner to Samoa in 1886, and had subsequently expressed opinions not wholly flattering to the government which was to entertain the approaching conference. They were instructed to work for the restoration of the status quo ante, the organization of a stable government, a more definite adjustment of claims and titles to land, the prohibition of the importation of alcohol and firearms, and finally some peaceful settlement for the management of Apia.13

Negotiations were conducted from April 29 to June 14, 1889, and resulted in the General Act of Berlin. As the preamble sets forth, the plenipotentiaries arrived at the following results:14

First. A declaration respecting the independence and neutrality of the islands of Samoa, and assuring to their respective citizens and subjects equality of rights in said islands, and providing for the immediate restoration of peace and order therein. (Malietoa Laupepa was declared to be the recognized King).

Second. A declaration respecting the modification


of existing treaties, and the assent of the Samoan government to this act. (Any inconsistent provisions of any treaties, i.e., of Germany's treaty obtained by compulsion on November 10, 1884, were to lapse).

Third. A declaration respecting the establishment of a supreme court of justice for Samoa and defining its jurisdiction. (The chief justice of Samoa was given large judicial functions, such as decisions where the rights or succession of a King were concerned, or where one of the treaty powers was in disagreement with the government of Samoa. He also had advisory duties toward the native government.)

Fourth. A declaration respecting titles to land at Samoa and restraining the disposition thereof by natives, and providing for the investigation of claims thereto, and for the registration of valid titles.

Fifth. A declaration respecting the municipal district of Apia, providing a local administration therefor, and defining the jurisdiction of the municipal magistrate. (An impartial magistrate was to be appointed jointly by the three powers, or in case of disagreement from certain other nationalities, and was to try cases arising in Apia, to advise the Samoan government, to be custodian of state and municipal funds, and superintendent of the harbor.)

Sixth. A declaration respecting taxation and revenue in Samoa. (Revenue was to consist of import duties, export duties, certain annual taxes, occasional taxes, and income from licenses to engage in certain kinds of business.)

Seventh. A declaration respecting arms and ammunition, and intoxicating liquors, restraining their sale and use. (Natives were not to be allowed to purchase or acquire firearms or intoxicants.)

Eighth. General dispositions. (Providing for the execution of the foregoing, and for its amendment.

Malietoa Laupepa was again recognized by the powers as King of Samoa, and was chosen and acclaimed by all parties in Samoa, including Tamasese. On December 5, 1889, his flag was raised over the royal residence, and was saluted by the U.S.S. Adams.\(^{15}\)

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4. Tripartite Government. 16

The operation of the new government was not such as to encourage the American nation to again depart from its traditional policy. The taxes authorized by the General Act were unpopular with the natives. The warrants of the Supreme Court were scraps of paper to their untutored minds. A dispute arose over what coins should be authorized as legal tender, and when the Samoan Government did not include the German currency, the president of the municipal council undertook to coerce the Government. The president found himself quite out of harmony with the natives and the consuls, and resigned. The chief justice who should normally have stepped in to preserve peace was in Australia at the time. This official, on another occasion, abused his almost unlimited authority by setting aside one of the provisions of the General Act. Finally, both the chief justice and the municipal president resigned from such difficult tasks. Chief Mataafa, who had formerly been a partisan of Malietoa, and who had led the successful attack on Tamasese in 1886, now found the offices of king and vice-king filled by those two chiefs. Mataafa would

16. To call the governmental system provided by the General Act of Berlin autonomous is clearly applying a misnomer. For little power was left in the hands of the King; and the municipality of Apia, the only important community in Samoa, was in the hands of less than 200 qualified voters. The American government found itself more deeply involved than it would have cared to be. See Letter of Secy. Gresham, for. Kel. 1894, App. I. pp. 510-11.
not be reconciled and became the nucleus of opposition to the existing order. 17 During the summer of 1893 hostilities commenced between the government and Mataaфа. The insurgents were routed, and Mataaфа and eleven chiefs were captured by forces from the British and German vessels in Apia harbor aided by some thirty native warriors. The rebel leaders were deported by the agreement of King Malietoa and the three powers.

The general act had been considered as rather a trial, or at least as an arrangement which was subject to alteration after three years. Some of the residents of Samoa, including Mr. Robert Louis Stevenson, felt that considerable improvement might be made, and attempted to give expression to this hope. Only the American Government took kindly to these suggestions. In several messages to Congress, President Cleveland took occasion to comment upon the unsatisfactory condition of affairs in Samoa, and regretted that the nation was committed to an arrangement which might at any time lead to trouble. 18

Matters wore on, however, with only the usual amount of unpleasantness, until King Malietoa died in August 1898. The popularity he had formerly enjoyed had long since evaporated, and his rule of late had not been undisputed. The question of succession now arose. Contenders for royal honors were Mataaфа, who had been returned from banishment in 1898 on his promise to maintain

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18. Ibid. 1895, p. xxxii
the peace, Tamasese, the former King and vice-King under Malietoa Laupepa, and finally Malietoa Tanu, the young son of the dead King. At the customary election by the natives, Mataafa was easily chosen to be King. But Tamasese and Tanu combined forces and protested the election, on the ground that Mataafa was ineligible because of having been exiled. This was a case which, by the General Act, should be referred to the Chief Justice. Feeling ran high; the natives and, curiously enough in the light of their former conduct, the German interests favored Mataafa; while the English and Americans believed that this change of heart on the part of the Germans indicated a secret agreement with Mataafa which would prove inimical to their own welfare. The American Chief Justice reviewed the case faithfully for eleven days, and came to the conclusion that Mataafa was forever ineligible, and that by the Samoan customs Malietoa Tanu was the rightful successor to his father's throne.19

No decision would have been acceptable to all parties. The Mataafa forces were far superior to those opposed. The decision of Justice Chambers could never stand, and the friends of Mataafa, led, it was asserted, by German officers and the German president of the Municipal Council, stormed the forces of Tanu. The attack was successful, and Mataafa became de facto ruler.

A truce was effected in January 1899, and the provisional govern-

ment was recognized for the time being. American and British naval forces were used to maintain order, and seem to have acted with severity in putting down the renewed hostilities of the Mataafa forces.

In April, 1899, the powers agreed upon a joint commission which should go at once to Samoa with the dual purpose of establishing order and recommending action to the powers. The commissioners arrived at Apia on May 13, and at once set about their mission. They managed to bring about the disarmament of both factions. They acknowledged the legality of Malietoa Tanu's claim to the throne, but as that young chief resigned to complete his education, the commission abolished for the time at least the office of King. Mr. Tripp, the American commissioner, wrote to Mr. Hay that Napoleon's remark - better one bad general than two good ones - was very applicable to tripartite government in Samoa.

On July 18, 1899, the commission reported a proposed revision of the General Act of Berlin. The three powers agreed to confer at Washington on the proposal and the British and German ambassadors were given full powers, while Mr. Hay represented the United States. It was the view of the American and British governments that some amendments would be made to the General Act. But the German government advocated the partition of the islands, and this solution was adopted. A convention, signed at Washington D.C. on December 2, 1899, and ratified by the Senate January 16, following, divided the islands by the 171st meridian west, and all
Islands west of this line were given to Germany, while Tutuila, with the harbor of Pago Pago, and several smaller islands east of the meridian, was given to the United States. Britain was given compensation elsewhere in the Pacific Ocean by Germany.

In reviewing the checkered history of American participation in Samoan affairs there is little to commend the departure from precedent. On several occasions American interest in Samoa, far from keeping peace among the natives of the islands, came near to being the cause of hostilities between the United States and Germany. This is especially true during the outbreak of 1898-9, when, as will be remarked later, events in other corners of the globe had made Americans distrustful of German designs. By the final treaty the American Government gained the advantage of a naval station at Pago Pago and the greater advantage of freedom from a connection which was fraught with great danger.
V.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR.

1. Germany and the Joint Note to the American Government.

During the War with Spain there were two developments which showed a new and alarming tendency on the part of the Imperial German Government - a tendency, in its relations with the United States, to rush in where other European powers would have been reticent to tread. Eight years earlier the astute old pilot had been dropped, and by this time a more daring spirit seemed to pervade German diplomacy - a headlong eagerness to plunge into a situation before the consequences were canvassed.

It will be remembered that in the last decade of the nineteenth century American industrial and agricultural products were successfully competing in European markets, while the American tariff wall was lifted even higher in 1897. In the day, therefore, when hostilities between the United States and Spain were imminent, the western republic was scarcely a universal favorite. Then too, it seemed presumptuous for so young a nation to challenge the ancient power of Spain. Finally, between the reigning houses of Spain and Austria there were close ties of kinship, while between Spain and France were the bonds of similar language and friendly connections of long standing. Of German friendship for Spain we will speak later.

The American nation had for some time been deeply concerned
with affairs in Cuba. After the destruction of the U.S.S. Maine in Havana harbor in February 1898, events moved rapidly. Though warned of the gravity of the situation and the urgent need of reform, the Spanish government was inclined to temporize. Congress met and was in a threatening mood. The President hesitated to send his message on Cuba, realizing that it might provoke war.

At last, April 6 was set for the delivery of the message. But on that day came a diversion, namely a joint note from the British, German, French, Austrian, Russian and Italian Governments. The text was as follows:

Washington, April 6, 1898.

The undersigned representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, duly authorized in that behalf, address, in the name of their respective governments, a pressing appeal to the feelings of humanity and moderation of the President and of the American people in their existing differences with Spain. They earnestly hope that further negotiations will lead to an agreement which, while securing the maintenance of peace, will afford all necessary guarantees for the re-establishment of order in Cuba.

The Powers do not doubt that the humanitarian and purely disinterested character of this representation will be fully recognized and appreciated by the American nation.

1. Mr. Day to Mr. Woodford, For. Rel. 1898 p. 735
2. For. Rel. 1898, p. 740.
The President replied as follows to the Ambassadors: 3

The Government of the United States recognizes the good will which has prompted the friendly communication of the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, as set forth in the address of your excellencies, and shares the hope therein expressed that the outcome of the situation in Cuba may be the maintenance of peace between the United States and Spain by affording the necessary guaranties for the re-establishment of order in the island, so terminating the chronic condition of disturbance which so deeply injures the interests and menaces the tranquility of the American nation by the character and consequences of the struggle thus kept up at our doors, besides shocking its sentiment of humanity.

The Government of the United States appreciates the humanitarian and disinterested character of the communication now made on behalf of the powers named, and for its part is confident that equal appreciation will be shown for its own earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty to humanity by ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable.

President McKinley did not send his message on April 6, but not until April 11. This delay, however, was not because of the joint note, of which the government must have been aware for some time previous, but to insure enough time for the safe departure of American citizens from Havana. 4 Shortly after the joint note was

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4. Ibid. p. 743.
delivered to President McKinley a note was also presented to the Spanish government by the representatives of the six powers, advising the proclamation of an armistice in Cuba. The action taken by the powers can scarcely be called a common or usual proceeding, and Secretary Seward had even refused to entertain a joint note from two powers. And yet, as influence was exerted on Spain as well, it could scarcely be resented—provided that subsequent conduct bore out the expression of a humanitarian and purely disinterested attitude.

As the war progressed, however, the attitude of the powers grew less assuring. The continental press, especially in Germany, was unfriendly. The semi-official weekly, Die Grenzboten, regretted the shameless war, and asserted that German volunteers would have to do the fighting, since the "promiscuous mob of Englishmen, half-breeds, Irish, and negroes, is too incoherent and too unmilitary to show any soldierly qualities." Comment favorable to the United States was notable for its rarity. After the Spanish disaster at Manila and then at Santiago the press at Madrid expressed great expectations of joint intervention by the powers to prevent further conquest. The presence of a large German force in Manila may gave strength to this hope.

While the continental press was on the whole unfriendly, and frequently vitriolic in its condemnation, and the European Courts were coolly correct, the expressions of confidence and ap-

5. Mr. Cartelyou, secretary to the President, wrote in his diary for May 15: "The strain upon him is terrible.... the growing unrest and threatening character of the European situation make the burden upon the Executive's shoulders a heavy one". Olcott: Life of Wm. McKinley II, p. 54. See also the N. Y. Tribune for June 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 26, 1898; Le Temps for May 2, June 13, 1898; London
probation from across the channel were reassuring. Thus Mr. Hay wrote to the President on May 4, two days before the joint note was submitted: "If sympathy and approval from the outside is worth anything to you, I can assure you it is yours, to the fullest extent, from this country. There is certainly a very wonderful change in public sentiment since I came here, a year ago. All classes, from the throne to the man in the street, now wish us well. I hear evidence of this from most unexpected sources. Earl Grey, for instance, said yesterday, 'Why do not the United States borrow our navy to make a quick job of Cuba? They could return us the favor another time:' I had a serious talk with Mr. Chamberlain last night. He is extremely desirous of a close alliance with us, or if that is prevented by our traditions, for an assurance of common action on important questions"; and Mr. Hay goes on to quote Mr. Chamberlain as further saying: "I should rejoice in an occasion in which we could fight side by side." On June 10, Mr. Hay wrote to the President that he kept Lord Salisbury informed on the views of the American government, and that, without being asked, he had served the American desire for a speedy peace by sounding the court at Vienna on the attitude of the Spanish government toward an

Times for May 3, June 13, 1898; with quotations from the German press.

6. N. Y. Tribune May 12, June 14, 15, 1898.
7. Ulcott, II, p. 130

-81-
armistice, and received the reply that it was not ready to stop hostilities "on even the most reasonable terms." Finally, on August 2, Hay wrote "If we give up the Philippines it will be a considerable disappointment to our English friends." These contemporary expressions are mentioned for the light they throw upon later events.

The joint note was eclipsed by the tremendous occurrences of the following days and weeks, and would in all probability never have been revived had it not been for a series of interesting exposures in 1902. In February of that year the Kaiser's brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, paid a visit to the United States. For some time the press on the continent and in England had commented at great length on the approaching visit, and freely speculated as to its purpose. The bonds between the two English-speaking nations had been growing stronger in the five years previous, and in the royal visit the British press thought it saw an attempt to strengthen German-American relations at England's expense. Each of the two great European powers seemed to wish to monopolize America's friendship.

In January, 1902, there appeared in German newspapers articles, obviously inspired, to the effect that in the negotiations leading up to the joint note of April 6, 1898, the British Ambassador at Washington, Lord Pauncefote, had taken the lead, while Germany had been an unwilling accomplice. It was related how the Foreign

8. Olcott, II, p. 131
Office had not thought the measure advisable, and that the Kaiser had noted on the margin of a dispatch relating to intervention "Sie pfiffen darauf" - they would snap their fingers at it. The British press flared up at once, and the next month witnessed a conflagration to which the editors and diplomats on both sides were contributing fuel. The London Times for January 21 contained the following report of an interpellation in the House of Commons:

Mr. Norman asked the under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether any communication proposing or concerning joint or collective action by European States, in view of the outbreak or expected outbreak of the late war between the United States and Spain, was received from the Austrian or any other Government; and if so, what was the nature of the reply of her Majesty's Government.

Viscount Cranborne: No such communication as is suggested in the question was made after the outbreak of the war between the United States and Spain, but immediately before the war several communications were received from other Powers suggesting the presentation of a joint note to the President of the United States. Her Majesty's Government agreed to join with other Powers in a note expressing a hope that further negotiations might lead to a peaceful settlement accompanied by guarantees for the establishment of order in Cuba. But they first took steps to ascertain that the presentation of such a note, as well as its terms, would be acceptable to the President. Her Majesty's Government declined, however, to associate themselves with other subsequent proposals which seemed to them open to objection as having the appearance of putting pressure on the Government of the United States and offering an opinion as to their attitude. I am not able to lay on the ta-
ble any papers on this subject.

But the German papers were not thus to be silenced, and maintained the original statement that Lord Panncefote had proposed to embarrass the American Government. The Berliner Neueste Nachrichten naively added that this declaration should be accepted, and German officials spared from having to make the documents public. The Kreuz Zeitung stated that the Pope had urged Germany or the Triple Alliance to intervene, but had been refused.

Again the Times (February 12) reported an interpellation on the subject in the House of Commons:

Mr. Norman: ...... asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign affairs whether Great Britain, through her Ambassadors, ever proposed a joint note in which the Powers should declare that Europe did not regard the armed intervention of the United States in Cuba as justifiable, and whether, in consequence of the refusal of Germany, this step was abandoned; and whether he could make any further statement upon the subject.

Viscount Cranborne (......) No. Great Britain never proposed through her Majesty's Ambassadors or otherwise any declarations adverse to the United States in regard to their intervention in Cuba. (Hear, hear) On the contrary, her Majesty's Government declined to assent to any such proposal. (Cheers)

But the German press was evidently sure of its ground, for it did not retract a word, and on February 12, the Imperial Gazette published, in order to clarify matters, it explained, the text of the message the German Ambassador von Holleben had sent on this subject to Count von Bülow, the Imperial Chancellor. The argument
ran as follows: The British Ambassador had initiated an attempt to send a new note after the final concession of an armistice by Spain, perhaps on account of representations made to Queen Victoria by the Spanish Queen Regent to the effect that although the attitude of Congress made peace doubtful, the President had advocated American intervention only if such action would be justified by the world at large; hence a new note might with propriety be sent. If an identical note came from each power, the one which took the initiative would be cleared of blame. "Personally", Dr. von Holleben added, "I have not much sympathy with the idea of a declaration of that kind," to which the Kaiser had added the marginal note, "I consider that this would be altogether a mistake, futile, and therefore mischievous .... I am against this." The press added that Prince Henry would personally lay the documents in the case before President Roosevelt, to show him what European power was really friendly toward America in 1898. But it scarcely need be added that the American Government made it clear by its attitude that the visit of Prince Henry would not be allowed to acquire any diplomatic significance.

The London Times (February 15) pointed out three errors on the part of Mr. von Holleben: the statement that Lord Pauncefote had taken the initiative in proposing a joint note; the statement that the other five representatives telegraphed their home governments "at the request of the British Ambassador"; and finally
by sending the Foreign Office what he said was the text of a despatch prepared by Lord Pauncefote, while in fact it was written by the French Ambassador from notes taken down by Lord Pauncefote. The facts seem to have been that, owing to the strong dynastic ties between the courts at Madrid and Vienna, Dr. von Hengelmüller, the Minister from Austria-Hungary, had been instructed unofficially to propose such a joint note. As the Dean of the diplomatic corps, Lord Pauncefote had, on this request, invited and presided over such a conference at the British Embassy. He had then submitted the proposed draft to the Department of State, and on receiving the assent of the American Government, had stood firmly against any proposed alterations. And similarly when a second note was proposed in view of the eleventh hour proposal of the Spanish Government to grant an armistice, and the strong words "would not be justified" had been suggested, the British Ambassador was again acting only as Dean of the Corps. The later note was never presented. That the British Government had taken a course calculated to tie the President's hands was belied not only by the statements of Lord Cranborne, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, but by the repeated assurances of good will before and during the war, to which Mr. Hay had frequently borne testimony. And as to Lord Pauncefote's personal attitude toward the American people, the universal respect in which he was held by official circles in Washington spoke for itself. The press attack upon that gentleman was particularly regrettable because his position and training prevented a reply which might have set false reports at rest. Mr. Wayne MacVeagh, Ambassador to Italy and former
Attorney General, sent a letter to the American press in which he spoke in high terms of Lord Pauncefote. And General Foster, former Secretary of State and long an intimate friend of the ambassador, wrote to the Washington Post that any charges against that gentleman were certainly unfounded, and that "idle rumors or surmises of misinformed persons should not be permitted to cloud the reputation of such a distinguished diplomatist."  

The outcome of this episode was scarcely a pleasing contribution to the visit of Prince Henry. It did, however, demonstrate certain truths. It made it evident how high a value European nations had come to set on the friendship of the new world power. And it made the German diplomat concerned appear to put it charitably, rather amateur. To begin a press campaign on the strength of a mistaken report, and be defeated at their own game after having called on the world to witness, was a faux pas their imperial master would be slow to forgive.

2. The Manila Bay Episode.

A reason which had made the Foreign Office all the more anxious to precipitate such a controversy was the decidedly unfavorable impression which the actions of the German squadron at Manila in 1898 had aroused in America. Numerous versions of the story were published from time to time. But the final word came later. In 1913 Admiral Dewey published his autobiography, wherein

he told very plainly what had occurred at Manila between himself and the German admiral, von Diederichs. When the book reached Germany it evoked questions in the Reichstag, while Count Nevenlow issued a vigorous denial. Later Admiral von Diederichs contributed a long article to the Marine Kundschau, giving his version of the episode. He denied any culpability, and wrote with an air of injured innocence. Beside these statements by the two admirals immediately concerned, numerous references to the episode have appeared from time to time. These have frequently been highly colored, and too chauvinistic to be reliable.

A thorough discussion of the points of law and fact involved in the Manila Bay affair would expand to undue proportions. However, a few important points may be considered critically. First, to account for the fact that the German squadron at Manila was stronger for a time than even that of Admiral Dewey. This is one of the most labored points in Admiral von Diederichs' reply. It appears that the transport Darmstadt was expected at Kiao Chau, where the

13. Thus the Spectator (90:167) prints a report of an after-dinner speech wherein Dewey was credited with saying that if the British ships should act in concert with the German, "the jig was up."
German Asiatic Fleet was to rendezvous while supplies were taken on and the sick and those about to be discharged were transferred to the Darmstadt for return to Germany. Fourteen hundred men were brought as relief. The outbreak of the war with Spain made it necessary to send two German vessels to Manila to protect German interests there, and then, the admiral was ordered to the scene, and thus had to take a third ship. This interfered with his plans to such an extent that he had the other vessels of the squadron come to Manila and effect the transfer of men and stores there. At a time when rumors of German intervention were rife, it is scarcely to be wondered that Admiral Dewey inquired the reason for the presence of so large a force. The reply of the German admiral was "I am here by order of the Kaiser, sir." Admiral Dewey got the impression that his question was not altogether welcome. Admiral von Diederichs explains, however, that he used merely a customary expression to show that his presence was not due to any desire on his part to embarrass the American squadron, but to orders from higher authority. And indeed it need not be thought that the presence of the German admiral and his entire squadron was due to any personal wish in the matter; whatever he said and did was pursuant to orders, for no German officer would have dared to incur the consequences of taking action of such international importance without being sure of his ground. The excuse, however, that Manila Bay was selected as the best rendezvous for his squadron under the circumstances seems trivial. Naval officers will con-

concede that a blockaded port is the last place in which to effect
a transfer of men and property by a neutral squadron. Nor could
the presence of so large a force be excused on the grounds of pro-
tection to commercial interests; for in 1896, Germany ranked sixth
in amount of imports and fourth in exports. While the British force
was never greater than three ships to protect interests several
times as great as those of Germany. 15

But the mere presence of the men-of-war was less disconcerting
to Admiral Dewey than their actions. Neutral warships are frequent-
ly permitted to enter blockaded ports, but their status is clearly
that of a guest; the commander of the blockading force is privileged
to exclude them. 16 And it follows by inference that while in the
blockaded harbor neutral men-of-war are obliged by the situation to
conform to the wishes of the blockade commander. But Admiral von
Diederichs did not subscribe to this view, for he writes: "The
belligerents blockaders and blockaded, have the right in any ef-
fective blockade to stop any traffic within the blockaded zone,
and also to turn back war vessels, even by force. But, if a
neutral warship is admitted within the zone, then the belligerents
have no more authority over this ship than during peace; but an
effective blockade can at any time be again established." If this

15. See London Times, June 28, 1898.

16. For expression of the rights of neutral warships in blockaded
harbors, bearing out Admiral Dewey's views, see Walker: The
Science of International Law, pp. 522-4; Lawrence: Principles of
International Law, p. 688; Benton: International Law and Diplo-
macy in the Spanish-American War, p. 217; Gallo: Le Droit In-
ternational 5:108, section 2834; Perels, sometime lecturer at
the Imperial Naval Academy at Aiel: Manuel de Droit Maritime
International, p. 298.
view were general there would be very few neutral warships admitted to blockaded ports. "And curiously enough, the German admiral writes as if a blockade were a sort of cooperative affair in which the blockaded party had some authority over the blockade:

Admiral von Diederichs quotes Dewey's blockade proclamation to the Governor General in Manila, "... A blockade of this port will be at once established ...", and finds it inadequate in that it fails to define the limits, time of commencement, or period of truce for neutral ships to leave. Yet the limits are clearly expressed in the word "port", the time is "at once", and the third point is covered by international law. The objection is also raised that a copy of the proclamation was not delivered to the German consul by the American commander; but this is the duty of the authorities of the port, not of the officer imposing the blockade, who could communicate with the land only under flag of truce. 17

When warships of other nations entered the port they reported to the commander-in-chief and asked where to anchor. 18 The German ships, however, steamed in without formality and dropped anchor where they chose. Admiral Dewey resented this, and on one occasion had a shot fired across the bows of the Cormoran, when, on coming into the harbor one night for the first time, she had failed to respond to the hail of the steam launch sent to board her. 19

There followed after several such events a correspondence in which

17. Lawrence, p. 688
19. For statement of the commander of the German ship, see N.Y. Tribune, March 5, 1914.
Admiral Dewey expressed the necessity of having the identity of each vessel entering the bay determined, probably by sending an officer on board. It will be remembered that at the time a second Spanish fleet, stronger than that of Dewey, was on the way from Spain; hence it would have been criminal negligence to have been in the slightest degree careless about identifying in-coming men-of-war, especially at night.

Admiral von Diederichs, on the other hand, professed to believe that the American admiral claimed the "droit de visite", which would include even the examination of the ship's papers—a procedure no naval officer would tolerate. Dewey promptly disclaimed any such demand, but again asserted the necessity of sending a boarding officer, which might easily be for the purpose of designating an anchorage out of the blockaders' proposed line of attack. While agreeing that a Spanish warship might easily enter the bay under the German flag to deceive the enemy, the German admiral held that this would be regrettable for the defenders, but did not give any justification for the visit of an officer. The assertion that, once admitted, a neutral warship was under no obligation to the blockade commander, might be carried to the most ridiculous extremes.

While Admiral Dewey made no alliance with Aguinaldo it was his policy to allow the insurgent forces a free hand in fighting the Spaniards. On July 6, it was reported that the German cruiser Irene had interfered with insurgent operations against the Spanish.
forces on Isla Grande. Two ships were sent to investigate, and found the report to be correct. On their approach the Irene had moved away. Admiral von Diederichs denies any such unneutral action, and explains that the Irene had been sent to find a German subject whom the consul in Manila had missed, and to find a suitable place in which to lie during the monsoons.

When the Baltimore and Charleston steamed into Manila Bay convoying the first Army Detachment, the greater part of the German fleet was anchored at the entrance. On the approach of the American ships they got underway and formed column at a few hundred yards, with guns and field glasses apparently turned on the Americans. The American ships went to general quarters at once and prepared for action, and thus they steamed up the bay until the German squadron sheered off and anchored across the harbor. This is only an example typical of the relations between the two squadrons.

An officer who heard the conversation vouches for the oft-repeated story of Admiral Dewey's stormy conversation with the German flag-lieutenant, ending with the threat that "you may tell Admiral von Diederichs that if he wants a fight I will be ready for him in half an hour". Admiral Dewey writes that after this"there was no further interference with the blockade or breach of etiquette which had been established by the common consent

20. riske: War 'ime in Manila, p. 108.
of the other foreign commanders."  

Much has been written in England and America of the support which the British commander, Captain Sir Edward Chichester of the H.M.S. Immortalité, gave to the American admiral. Dewey writes of this as a fitting sequel to the "blood is thicker than water" incident in 1859, when the American flag-officer Tatnall went to the assistance of British forces being destroyed by the Chinese forts on the Pei River.  

While the British and American commanders were on particularly intimate terms during the days of the blockade, the most spectacular demonstration of an understanding was given when the naval and land forces made the almost bloodless attack on the City of Manila on August 13. On August 9, the foreign men-of-war and refugee steamers had been warned to take up positions out of the proposed zone of hostilities. It happened that while the British and Japanese moved over to Cavite, the base of the American squadron, the French and German vessels anchored north of the City - the direction of attack. On the 10th they closed to within a mile of the breakwater at the mouth of the Pasig River, and opposite the center of the City. Here they remained until Manila fell.  

This move seemed to menace Admiral Dewey's freedom of action. When the American squadron got under way to bombard the city, the guard on the British Immortalité was paraded while Dewey's favorite march was played. Then the British ships moved ---

22. Ibid, p. 31  
across the bay and took up a position between the foreign men-of-
war and Dewey's squadron. The bombardment proved to be a farce,
for the commander at Manila merely wished to save Spanish honor
by a brief demonstration of resistance.

There is room for speculation as to the reason for the German
attitude at Manila. No naval officer - least of all in the Imperial
German Navy - would have dared to act so irregularly without
instructions from the home government. And if, as Admiral von
Diederichs professes, the series of unpleasant occurrences at
Manila were the result of a chain of peculiar circumstances and
the work of busy-bodies who circulated malicious reports, it is
difficult to reconcile the fact that when the German flagship left
Nagasaki for Manila it was commonly reported that the Germans would
try to raise the blockade, and this rumor was not denied. And it
is difficult, too, to reconcile the admiral's version of German
aims in the Philippines with the view of the German press that the
fall of Spanish power would be a signal for a "new grouping of inter-
ests", as the Deutsche Zeitung expressed it.

The view of a close observer of German diplomacy is that
the Foreign Office was pursuing a policy which might be character-

24. Dewey, p. 277. See also statement of Sir Edw. Chichester,
son of the captain at Manila, N. Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1914. He
confirms the story that Captain Chichester replied, when asked
by von Diederichs what he would do in case the German squad-
ron intervened, that it was "a secret known only to Admiral
Dewey and myself."
ized as "tertius gaudens" or "tertius expectans" at Manila, eager to pick up any bone that might fall from the two contestants.  

Then it must be remembered that this was the time when a large navy was being urged so vehemently in Germany. The presence of a German squadron at Manila was pregnant with suggestions of new acquisitions in the Orient, and gave the navy an excellent advertisement. The international concern over the presence of the squadron was a gratifying admission of German imperial power. And the Kaiser doubtless felt that his prestige abroad was enhanced by occasionally assuming some striking pose. He is said to have remarked: "If I had had a larger fleet I would have taken Uncle Sam by the scruff of his neck". He expressed the same idea when he said (July 3, 1900): "The ocean bears witness that, even in the distance and on its further side, without Germany and the German Emperor no great decision dare be taken."

Mr. Hay's letters from London contribute to the diplomatic side of the question of German aims in the Philippines. On July 14 he wrote that the German Ambassador had sought an interview. "What he said, as you will see, amounted to this: the German Government are most anxious that we shall be convinced of the friendliness of their attitude and intentions; they also want us to understand that they wish a few coaling-stations in the Pacific that they think we may give them; they would like a free hand in

25. O. Eltzbacher, i.e. J. Ellis Parker, Ninetenth Century, 52:194 Aug. 1902.
27. Smith: Militarism and Statecraft, p. 34.
Samoa at the same time I judge from what Hatzfeldt said, as well as what Lascelles, the British Ambassador in Berlin, told me, that whatever we do or refuse to do, so that our action and our words are pitched in diplomatic tones, - not pulling any affront on them which they shall be forced to take up, - they will not quarrel with us. They cannot afford to force a quarrel upon us."\(^{28}\) And on August 2, he writes: "I have no doubt that Germany has been intriguing both with Aguinaldo and Spain. They are most anxious to get a foothold there; but if they do it there will be danger of grave complication with other European powers."\(^{29}\) Dr. Talcott Williams has recently written on the authority of the late Charles E. Smith, Postmaster General, under Mr. McKinley, that a personal letter from Lord Salisbury to the President warned him that, if the Philippines were not acquired by the United States, Germany would seize them and a general war would follow.\(^{30}\) While from Mr. Hay's correspondence it is quite probable that some such message was sent verbally, it seems likely that Mr. Smith misunderstood. For Mr. Day, the one most apt to be informed of such a letter, and other members of the cabinet are not aware of its existence, nor does Olcott's Life of William McKinley refer to such correspondence.

Another reason sometimes assigned as the cause of German

\(^{28}\) Olcott, II p. 133 et seq.

\(^{29}\) ibid. p. 135, et seq.

\(^{30}\) Talcott Williams in World's work, 56:168; quoted in Latanè: From Isolation to Leadership, p. 85.
aspirations in the Philippine is the alleged fact that the American Ambassador, Dr. Andrew D. White, said: "We don't want the Philippines; why don't you take them?" This statement has never been substantiated. Not only did Dr. White deny any such speech, but it is incongruous with the views expressed in his writings and addresses, which are now carefully preserved at Ithaca, New York. It would seem not only charitable but merely just to lay this libel to rest.

No record of the Manila Bay episode would be complete without

31. Mr. Whitman, formerly a correspondent in Berlin, in Things I Remember, p. 78 et seq., states that he heard this on good authority. Mr. Rish in Path of Empire p. 127 and Mr. Thayer in John Hay II, p. 280, accredit these words to "an American official."

32. Reference in this connection is frequently made to the Washington Post of April 17, 1907, stating that certain remarks of Dr. White were therein printed. The editor of that paper, however, refers to the issue of the preceding day, in which the Post quoted the N.Y. Staats-Zeitung, which in turn quotes Dr. White "on July 4, 1899, at Leipzig" as saying that the German Government "have never disclosed the authoritative suggestion made to them that we did not want the Philippines, but would be glad to have them take them". The Staats-Zeitung is unable to find where it made the statement, but writes that it "is undoubtedly authentic and in accordance with the series of statements which the Ambassador made."

Prof. Burr, custodian of Dr. White's papers, has been good enough to examine the manuscript of the speech of July 4, 1899. It was not delivered at Leipzig, but at the International Peace Conference, and contained no mention of the Philippines. On July 4, 1898 and 1900, Dr. White spoke at Leipzig. On the former occasion he did not mention the Philippines. On the latter he said: "I feel certain .... that had Mr. McKinley mauled down the American flag in Cuba, in the Philippines, and in Porto Rico, - had he left their populations to anarchy and endless internecine war; had he left them in the hands of their old rulers, or deserted them and left them to the tender mercies of any other great power ambitious to extend its dominions, these very men who now denounce him as a tyrant and a usurper would have denounced him as a traitor and a coward."

Finally, in reply to a question on this subject from a correspondent of the Sun, Mr. White sent to the N.Y. Times a complete denial of ever having uttered any suggestion that German acquisition of the Philippines would be tolerated. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1914
a passing reference to Captain Coghlan and the "Mineself und Gott" song. In 1899, when a number of naval officers returned from the Philippines, they were tendered a banquet in New York. Toward the last of the evening Captain Coghlan sang a selection wherein the American squadron at Manila had paid their respects to the Kaiser and the Imperial Navy. The song was extremely apropos, and was printed throughout the country. Both Mr. Hay and Mr. McKinley expressed to the German Ambassador their regrets that the captain should have committed such an indiscretion. But the song was apparently a case of the truth that hurt, and is said to have been keenly felt by his Imperial Majesty.33

An interesting sequel to German activity in the Philippines was the purchase in 1899 of the Caroline and Marianne Island groups in the Pacific. The Imperial Chancellor, von Bülow, tells the story in his book on Imperial Germany. "The end of the Spanish-American War in 1899 gave us the opportunity to acquire the Caroline and Marianne Islands, and thus win a point of support in Polynesia. A year later we succeeded in bringing to an end the long quarrel over Samoa by a settlement with England and America that was to our advantage. Both acquisitions ... had been the subject of diplomatic efforts lasting for many years and going back to the very beginning of our colonial policy ... Our friendly relations with the Spanish nation found expression in the understanding regarding the Caroline Islands...."34 From this interesting admission it can scarcely be doubted that the prospect of

33. von Schierovrand: The Kaiser's Speeches, p. 119 et seq.
34. Von Bülow: Imperial Germany, p. 119 et seq. These islands had been desired by Germany in Bismarck's time. See Henderson: Short History of Germany, 2nd ed. II p. 475; Forzel.1886, p.333; London Times, Feb. 15,1902.
acquiring those islands, along with the "tortius expectans" policy and the blundering self-assertiveness which was coming to characterize the German Imperial policy, go far toward explaining the German attitude toward America in 1898.
VI.

THE OPEN DOOR AND THE BOXER REBELLION

1. Europe in China - the Growing Importance of the Orient.

In discussing the stand Mr. Hay took on Chinese territorial integrity, Mr. Thayer writes: "After the Japanese had decreed the Chinese in 1894, China lay like a stranded whale apparently dead or dying, and the chief Powers of Europe came, like fishermen after blubber, and took here a province and there a harbor, and were callous to the fact that their victim was not dead."¹ There is no brighter page in the history of American diplomacy than the story of the attitude of the United States Government toward China in her days of distress. And the statement and execution of this policy in the face of opposition by the powers and the press were the work of John Hay.

On September 6, 1899, Mr. Hay sent letters to the American diplomatic representatives at the capitals of the various powers claiming spheres of influence in China. These notes expressed the desire of the United States Government that the various nations:

First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called sphere of interest" or leased territory it may have in China.

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such

ports as are within said "sphere of interest" (unless they be "free ports"), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese government.

Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any port in such "sphere" than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its "sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects or other nationalities transported through such "sphere" than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals transported over equal distances. Acquiescence by each power was requested, subject to the agreement of the others.

Lord Salisbury was the first to reply, on November 30, 1899. Count von Bülow agreed orally on December 4, and in writing on February 19, 1900. The French, Russian, Japanese, and Italian Governments acceded in that order. In the case of Russia at least, it seems that the agreement was given with the expectation that failure would be met at some other capital. But on March 20, 1900, Mr. hay addressed identical notes to each of the governments, enclosing copies of the notes from all the powers, and stating that the American government would "therefore consider the assent given to it by the ________ as final and definitive". Thus Mr. hay led the way to the establishment of the open door in

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2. For, Rel. 1899, pp. 128-43, gives the correspondence with the several governments.
China, though it was surely a self-denying ordinance to which the various powers would have been slow to subscribe on their own initiative.


The seizure of Kiao Chau in 1897 and the lease of the Shantung Peninsula for ninety nine years was the penalty the German Government imposed for the murder of two missionaries in China. Though the deed demanded reparation as suitable as possible, this excessive demand placed, it was remarked, the highest quotation yet known on two missionaries. This particular murder was only one of a number of hostile and cruel acts by members of a Chinese society popularly known as Boxers, acts which culminated in the murder of the German Minister at Peking, and the outbreak of a terrible rebellion which kept the foreigners in the capital besieged within the British Legation for over a month. A general massacre was narrowly averted. The various powers rushed troops to the rescue, and larger detachments were sent to occupy rebellious districts and restore order. To command the joint forces

4. In his Imperial Germany (p.117) von Bülow speaks of this as "one of the most significant actions of Modern German history ..... which secured for us a 'place in the sun' in the Far East." Bismarck said that Kiao Chau was "big enough for all sorts of foolishness."
the German Marshal von Waldemar was selected. During this crisis the Kaiser indulged in several flights of invective, in which he gave such advice as: "Scare nobody, make no prisoners. Use your weapons in a manner to make every Chinaman for a thousand years to come, forego the wish to as much as look askance at a German."

On another occasion he bade his troops to act as ruthlessly as the Huns. Later, when some German soldiers wrote of cruel excesses in China, their letters were printed under the heading "Letters from the Huns."  

After a triumphal trip through Germany to his port of embarkation, Count von Waldemar arrived in China after Peking had been occupied. There remained only police duty in various localities. The relentlessness with which the German troops carried out punitive expeditions to different places made it appear that the Kaiser's advice had not fallen on stony ground. It seemed as though trouble was being stirred up in order to justify the present of a German field marshall. Thus on one occasion German troops were so reckless as to drive away and plunder a force of Chinese troops who had been engaged in capturing Boxers. Then they opened a jail and released a number of prisoners, who happened to be

Boxers'. On other occasions the German troops, at no risk to themselves, killed wantonly in retaliation for the murder of a German citizen in the town.

When, in February 1901, it seemed that the Chinese peace commissioners were becoming dilatory, Count von Waldersee declared that "renewal of operations on a large scale may become necessary". All this was extremely repugnant to American generals and to humane people the world over. Several governments protested and hostilities were not resumed. Using the Kaiser's words as a reproach, the American second-in-command, General Wilson, remarked to Count von Waldersee that some European troops acted more like Huns than civilized soldiery, the truth of which the German Marshall admitted.

3. After the Rebellion.

The rebellion had scarcely subsided before some of the powers began to "feather their nests" in China. Russia claimed a large tract in Tientsin by right of conquest. Belgium laid claim to an

7. Read China in Convulsion, Chapter XXVII, by A.H. Smith, for an account of needless severity practiced by the Germans. They had acted in this way prior to the outbreak of the rebellion — see Foreign Relations, 1899, p. 168.

adjoining concession. Mr. Conger, the United States Minister, wrote: "The several armies came here, as they have all declared, for a general purpose, and not to gain any special advantage for individual governments. This 'grab game', therefore, in which they are indulging, is neither fair nor consistent." 9

Mr. Hay was anxious for a prompt settlement and return to normal conditions, and in the attitude of Germany and Russia he saw a constant incitement for the Chinese to again cause trouble. On July 3, Mr. Hay issued a note setting forth the American attitude toward China; this was a bold but effective stroke in checking European ambitions. On October 16, 1900, he wrote: "The success we had in stopping that first preposterous German movement when the whole world seemed likely to join in it, when the entire press of the Continent and a great many on this side were in favor of it, will always be a source of gratification ... The moment we acted, the rest of the world paused, and finally came over to our ground; and the German government, which is generally brutal but seldom silly, recovered its senses, climbed down off its perch, and presented another proposition which was exactly in line with our position." 10

After the Chinese government had appointed Li Hung Chang to negotiate a settlement with the powers, work was delayed because the Chinese commissioner had not full powers acceptable to the

German and other governments. After he presented credentials which were in proper form, it caused some embarrassment when, after making such a point of the matter, only one of the commissioners with whom he was to treat was able, in turn, to show his full powers.

Then on September 18, the German chargé at Washington presented a note wherein it was said to be the decision of the German Emperor that as a preliminary to any negotiations he considered it expedient that the ministers at Peking be instructed to designate the principal offenders, and that these be executed by the powers. To this Mr. Hill, the Assistant Secretary of State, replied that it was the view of his government that the trial and punishment of the many offenders should be left to the Chinese Government, imposing upon it by a provision of the treaty the obligation of punishing in a commensurate degree the various offenders. He expressed the determination of his government to enter into negotiations as promptly as possible. On October 2, after the Chinese government made a move toward punishing the guilty leaders, the German chargé presented a new memorandum which met the American position squarely. Thus the incident was closed and instead of treating the Chinese government as incompetent to carry out justice, that government was obligated to do so even though it carried the death penalty to high places in the court.

Throughout the negotiations the American government stood firm for justice to China and the maintenance of the open door.

And though the uprising had apparently swept away the good promises of the previous year, Mr. Hay's diplomacy was at length successful in preventing further partition of the Chinese coast. On November 21, 1900, he wrote to Henry Adams: "What a business this has been in China. So far we have got on by being honest and naivé - I do not clearly see where we are to come - one delayed cropper? but it will come. At least we are spared the infamy of an alliance with Germany. I would rather, I think, be the dupe of China, than the chum of the Kaiser. Have you noticed how the world will take anything nowadays from a German? Sulow said yesterday in substance - 'We have demanded of China everything we can think of. If we think of anything else we will demand that, and be d...d to you' - and not a man in the world kicks."  

A last diplomatic triumph for the United States in China came when, after signing a protocol in which the indemnity was fixed in harkewan taels, a silver coin, at a specified rate of exchange for each country. The value of the coin became debased, and some nations, notably Russia and Germany, were unwilling to accept them at the rate of exchange specified in the protocol. The United States government took the opposite view, and carried its point.  

Thus closed German-American relations in this quarter of the globe, after clearly vindicating the wise and just diplomatic policy of Mr. Hay.

13. Foreign relations, p.248. For another letter - Mr. Hay to Mr. Adee, the second assistant Secy., see Ulcott II p.238. He writes: "If we leave Germany and England in Peking, and retire with Russia, who has unquestionably made her bargain already with China, we will not only seem to have been beaten, but we run a serious risk of being really frozen out...England and Germany being left in Peking, Germany by superior brute selfishness will have her way, and we shall be left out in the cold."

VII.

AMERICA AS A WORLD POWER.

1. Results of the Spanish-American War.

The American republic emerged from the war with Spain as a world power. The war in itself was only one of a number of causes; the products of American industry and agriculture had for some years constituted a serious economic problem in European countries, and commercial rivalry already existed. Then when the United States suddenly abandoned her splendid isolation and became established in the Philippines and West Indies, Guam and Tutuila, and assumed a leadership in China, colonial nations took particular notice. Thus, as we have seen, in 1902, the American people were privileged to witness a controversy between the press and diplomats of the European powers over the question of which nation had been most friendly to America. While not unconscious of these universal protestations of friendship, the United States Government did not evince any desire to be on terms of better understanding with one of the powers at the disadvantage of another.

For some time, however, the two great English-speaking nations had been growing nearer to one another. The known friendliness of the British Government during the recent war, manifested both in London and at Manila Bay, seemed almost to portend some closer understanding. During the early years of the twentieth century frequent allusions were made to a proposed Anglo-American alliance; no European power could be oblivious to the advantage, economic and naval, of the friendship of America in time of a great war.
In England Mr. Chamberlain worked for the proposal, with the enthusiastic support of the British press. But while the Government of the United States considered the friendship of Great Britain invaluable, it could never justify itself in entering a European alliance; thus Mr. Chamberlain's endeavors produced nothing tangible.

2. The Attitude of Germany.

The Imperial German Government was not the last to realize the significance of the growing cordiality of Britain for America. Nor was it unconscious of the fact that German diplomacy had made matters worse during the Spanish war and again in Samoa. It was doubtless the Kaiser's policy to utilize his personal charm to bridge over just such gaps in brusque German diplomacy. Thus the Emperor's public professions were frequently not in accord with public opinion in Germany, for where the public and press were hostile he must be particularly cordial.

1. Thus on September 9, 1899, Mr. Hay wrote to Henry White: "Our relations with Germany are perfectly civil and courteous. They are acting badly about our needs and cannot help bullying and swaggering. It is their nature ... we are on the best of terms about Samoa; Sternberg backed up Tripp in everything.... The Emperor is nervously anxious to be on good terms with us - on his own terms, bien entendu." Thayer II p. 220

2. von Bülow writes (Imperial Germany p. 4b) that German-American relations were clouded "by the way in which part of the English and American Press had interpreted certain incidents which had occurred between our squadron and the American fleet off Manila," and that this misunderstanding "reached its height in February, 1899, so that it seemed desirable strongly to advocate preparations for a better understanding between the two nations of kindred race."

3. O. Eltzbacher, i.e. J. Ellis Barker, in Nineteenth Century and After. 52:195, Aug. 1902.
To the German mind the emigration of so many German subjects to America was a regrettable loss. British subjects who migrated from England had added dominions, an empire, and a continent to the crown; German emigrants had merely become a part of that great hodge-podge called America. Yet the situation seemed not wholly without compensation; for with one-fifth of the American population of German blood, would not the United States be particularly susceptible to influence from Berlin? This was a new idea. For years the German-Americans who returned to their native land had been the objects of hatred and official persecution—witness how large the communications on this subject bulk in the correspondence of the Department of State with the Imperial Foreign Office. The German-American who had emigrated, frequently to escape military service, and returned later to flash the evidence of his prosperity before his old schoolmates was persona non grata in Germany. He stirred up envy rather than friendship. Then the vituperations of the agrarian press had maligned America and Americans, and created an adverse public opinion. This became evident to tourists, who found that the German officials—soldiers, railway employees, and other functionaries—were at no pains to hide their contempt for citizens of the United States.  

4. For an aggravated case which led to a warm expression of resentment by the State Department, read the case of the arrest of Louis Stern at Kissingen, Savaria (Foreign Relations, 1895, pp. 454-88) Mr. Stern used resentful language to an officious individual who proved to be a baron, whose official capacity was that of assistant Badekommissar (literally, bath commissioner) at a health resort. The judgment imposed for this serious offence was two weeks imprisonment and a fine of 600 marks; bail was set at 80,000 marks. See also Gerard: My Four Years in Germany, p. 320 et seq.
On the other hand, American tourists sometimes felt called upon to discuss in public the Kaiser and the German Government in a manner more candid than complimentary. For various reasons, then, Germany was the least friendly of European states.

Suddenly, however, in the Americans of German origin who were so shabbily treated in Germany, whose forefathers had emigrated to escape oppression and even imprisonment, the German Government found a strong bond of sympathy between the two countries. The Kaiser's generosity found numerous opportunities to cultivate this discovery. Decorations were presented to deserving German-Americans; German colors were sent with the greetings of the Emperor to organizations of former German soldiers; autograph portraits of His Imperial Majesty found their way to the halls of various Germanistic societies. Exhibitions of books, paintings, and medallions might also be secured through the graciousness of the Kaiser. It was rather a task, however, to bring natives of the smaller German states to feel bound to the new empire over which the King of Prussia presided. Historical incongruities occasionally appeared, as when the Germanistic Society of America unveiled a monument of Carl Schurz, who had fled from Germany, and at the same time received a portrait of the Kaiser from Count von Bernstorff.

The Kaiser's crusade for better relations was aided by the numerous German-American organizations. For example, the Germanistic Society of America, whose membership included such men as J. Pierpont Morgan, Joseph Pulitzer, August Belmont, John W. Burgess, Nicholas Murray Butler, Augustus Busch, Seth Low, and James Speyer, reported for the year 1910 over fifty lectures on German
subjects, given by eleven speakers under the auspices of the society. It also maintained a chair in Deutsche Kulturgeschichte in Columbia University. The German-American press, headed by the New York Staats-Zeitung, labored faithfully for better relations.

An unusual bid for American friendship was made in 1902, when the Emperor sent his brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, on a mission to this country, ostensibly to be present at the christening of a yacht constructed for the Emperor by an American firm. President Roosevelt's daughter was invited to christen the yacht. During his tour Prince Henry was well received in New York, Washington, St. Louis, and Chicago. After his return to Germany he confessed that he had not met many Americans except those of German descent. It was doubtless with some misgivings that the Hohenzollern prince came to this republic. But save for the undignified controversy which the press had carried on just before his departure from Germany, and one unkind speech in the House of Representatives, all went happily. The general effect of the visit upon the American people was rather to satisfy their curiosity than to command their awe.

The British proclaimed the visit an attempt to gain an ally, or to injure Anglo-American friendship. But the event took no such turn. Prince Henry announced that he was sent for the single purpose of promoting friendly relations. To the newspaper men in New York he said: "Should you be willing to grasp a proffered hand,
But when one of the most prominent of his hearers was in Germany some time later, and called to pay his respects to the prince, he overheard while in a waiting room the prince speaking of him in insulting language. And when ushered into the presence of the prince he showed his resentment by immediately excusing himself. German professions of friendship were frequently in the nature of lip-worship — prompted by wisdom rather than genuine regard.

In the wake of Prince Henry's visit came a gift to the American people from the Kaiser. On May 14, he telegraphed to President Roosevelt:

I am still under the strong impression which the brilliant and cordial reception of my brother, Prince Henry, by the citizens of the United States of America has made on me. In the speeches in which he was welcomed, mention was made repeatedly of the fact that my ancestor, Frederick the Great, consistently assumed a friendly attitude towards the young American Republic at the time of its formation, laying thereby the foundation for those amicable relations which have ever since existed between the two countries. The example thus furnished me by the great King I will follow. I should like to perpetuate the memory of the visit of Prince Henry by a gift to the American people, which I beg you will accept in their name. I intend to present the United States with a bronze statute of Frederick the Great, which might be erected in Washington in a spot which I leave it to you to select. May this gift be looked upon as a permanent token of the intimate relations which

our two great nations have so successfully nursed and developed.

The fact that the statute of Frederick the Great put in its appearance just at the time when the Rochambeau Mission from France was in this country was not altogether fortunate, and it was remarked in some quarters that after Prince Henry's cordial reception the Kaiser wished to spoil the French visit. It was also announced that some three hundred Americans who had shown attention to the Hohenzollern prince were to be awarded decorations or other mementoes from the Emperor. In commemoration of the gift of a statue of the Kaiser's warlike ancestor, an act was passed by Congress to tender a statue of General Steuben to the German Emperor and people.

Still another evidence of the imperial good will was the proposal to exchange professors between German and American universities. In the year 1905-6 Harvard availed itself of the Emperor's offer, and the next year Columbia also sent and received a professor. The Kaiser gave to the German Museum at Cambridge a valuable collection illustrative of German culture and development. There seemed to be no limit to the Kaiser's good will.

It may be said to the credit of the American people that while these evidences of a desire for better relations were gratifying, the attentions of the Kaiser were received very casually; the average citizen was interested but not greatly impressed when Miss Roosevelt christened the yacht Meteor; and a royal prince

was after all only a curious sort of creature.

3. The First Hague Conference.

When Ambassador White went from Berlin to The Hague to be the American first delegate at the Peace Conference of 1899, he had the assurance of Count von Bülow, then Foreign Secretary, that the German delegates would act in accord with those from the United States. But the promised support was not realized, and on May 26 it seemed that an impasse had been reached. On that day Lord Pauncefote, for the British delegation, proposed a plan for a permanent court of arbitration. Proposals on the same subject were made by the Russian and American delegations also. The Russian scheme was rather general in terms. Both delegations agreed to favor the British plan in general, in order to facilitate the adoption of the idea in some form. The French and Belgian delegations expressed themselves as favoring the proposal, and the plan for a permanent tribunal seemed well launched when Professor Zorn of the German delegation rose to address the conference. He recognized the desirability of such a court, and looked forward to the day of universal peace. But at this time it was impractical; greater preliminary experience was needed; occasional tribunals in special cases would give an opportunity to judge better the desirability of a permanent court; in short, the German Government was not in favor of the proposed action.


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In reply, Count Rigla of Italy delivered an eloquent appeal in which he dwelt upon the disappointment which would ensue in all civilized nations if the conference "returned a curt non possumus to the proposal." Other delegates urged the arbitral court, and finally Dr. Holls of the American delegation made an appeal to the German delegate, in which he pointed out the effect which such a refusal would have upon public opinion, and recalled the futility of good resolutions if no concrete, permanent result was achieved.

It was quite possible to constitute a permanent tribunal without the acquiescence of Germany - but what would be the security in such a pact if some of the powers were not represented? And here was a threatening aspect of the situation. Not only had the German Emperor instructed his own delegates to work against a permanent court, but it soon became evident that he was influencing his neighbors and allies - Austria, Italy, Turkey, and Roumania - to follow his example. This was a disappointment to Count Rigla of Italy, who had at first argued so strongly for a permanent court. Even the German delegates, except Count Münster, were loath to carry out the imperial orders. In a private conversation with Dr. White, Count Münster urged that arbitration was necessarily injurious to Germany, because of her superior preparedness; any postponement would aid her enemies. The conference seemed to have struck a rock.

That the obstruction was at last removed was in a large measure

due to the influence of Dr. White. He realized that whatever might be the Emperor's view on arbitration as a check on his sovereign power and a disadvantage to Germany, he would hesitate to incur the obloquy which a refusal would entail, and would be loath to allow France and the Tsar to reap commendation at his expense. On his own responsibility, and against the advice of his colleagues, Dr. White wrote candidly to Count von Bülow and pointed out some of the results which would follow if the Kaiser did not relent. He represented that a minister who would permit his sovereign to be put in so unhappy a position would be negligent. This letter he sent to Berlin by Dr. Holls. Dr. Zorn of the German delegation was sent at the same time by Count Münster. The effort was successful, for at a later meeting Dr. Zorn announced that his government cordially adhered to the permanent tribunal and "fully acknowledged the importance and grandeur of the new institution." Thus in 1899 American diplomacy was triumphant for right in Europe as well as in Asia.

11. White: Autobiography II, p. 309, et seq. DR. WHITE added an interesting postscript: "Think how easily, if some such tribunal existed, your government and mine could refer to it the whole mass of minor questions which our respective parliamentary bodies have got control of, and entangled in all sorts of petty prejudices and demagogical utterances: for instance, Samoa, the tonnage dues, the sugar-bounty question, the most-favored-nation clause, etc., etc., which keep the two countries constantly at loggerheads. Do you not see that submission of such questions to such a tribunal as is now proposed, so far from being derogatory to sovereignty, really relieves the sovereign and the Foreign office of the most vexatious fetters and limitations of parliamentarianism."

12. Holls, p. 257
VIII.
INTERVENTION IN VENEZUELA.

1. Germany and the Monroe Doctrine.

Eight years after he was retired, Bismarck, privileged at last to say what he thought, asserted that the Monroe Doctrine was "a species of arrogance peculiarly American and inexcusable." And many of his countrymen, when they came to think of it at all, held the same view. While German ambitions were confined to Europe, the cornerstone of American foreign policy was of only academic interest. But with the coming of imperial ambitions German thinkers were much concerned with the doctrine. On examination it appeared to them that the Monroe Doctrine was as much a self-denying ordinance on the part of the United States as a prohibition addressed to Europe; and that when America became interested abroad, in Samoa and in the Philippines, it could not longer expect Europe to stay out of America. Then it was asserted that the doctrine was justified only when American sovereignty was endangered, and was not accepted, but only tolerated, in Europe.

Soon the Monroe Doctrine became a vital question. For Germans conceived foreign commerce to be a bone over which nations fought; it was impossible to share it, but the stronger one would take all. And in this light the doctrine appeared an unjust handicap imposed to enable the United States to monopolize South and


2. Dr. Kraus in Die Monroedoktrin (pp.360-1) expressed this view as late as 1913. Comment in Tower: Essays, pp.34-5.
Central American trade by denying to European powers any spheres of influence or trade centers. And yet to support German industry manufactures must be sold on foreign markets.

German imperial aims have in recent years received sufficient airing. It is common knowledge that Germany felt a burning need for a port in the West Indies or Venezuela. One ill-informed imperialist suggested 1898 as a good time to purchase the Danish West Indies, because the United States needed German sympathy and would not have enough money to make the purchase themselves. It took more than words to break bones, however, and such coolly calculating articles were considered as merely the opinion of some more German professors. Ideas could do no damage.

But when German diplomacy began to put ideas into action the case was different. The Foreign Office commenced to show a willingness to fish in troubled waters: Americans believed that Germany was preventing the sale of the Danish West Indies to the United States, and had eyes upon them herself; in 1897 America was rather shocked at the haste with which Germany sent gunboats to Port-au-Prince in Haiti to protect a German subject; it was reported that Bismarck had endeavored to acquire Cuba. But these petty rumors were as nothing in comparison with the announcement

3. Arnold (Vigilans sed Aequus) reviews a number of the most alarming of these writings in the Spectator for 1903 - see for example 90:369; also his book "German Ambitions". See also Smith: Militarism and Statescraft, p. 240.

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made by the German Ambassador on December 11, 1901, to the effect that in the collection of war debts and indemnities owed by the Venezuelan government to German citizens it might be necessary to proclaim a blockade of the principal ports, and even to resort to temporary occupation or the levying of duties. Mr. Hay replied that the President was confident that no permanent occupation would be attempted by the German forces.

2. The Blockade of Venezuela.

The German proposal was not carried into effect until a year later, when the German and British governments acted in pursuance of a joint agreement, followed by Italy. On December 7, 1902, the British and German Ministers at Caracas presented identical ultimatums stating that in the event that the Venezuelan government did not make immediate payment of the war debt up to 1900, and suitable assurance for the payment of more recent debts, each government would, to its regret, be compelled to take measures for the satisfaction of the claims of its citizens.

In 1901 Germany had contemplated a so-called pacific blockade, which, according to its note of December 20 "would touch likewise the ships of neutral powers, inasmuch as such ships, although a confiscation of them would not have to be considered, would have to be turned away and prohibited until the blockade should be raised". No reply was made, but when in 1902 the German government came forward with the same intentions, Mr. Hay replied that his

government did "not acquiesce in any extension of the doctrine of pacific blockade which may adversely affect the rights of states not parties to the controversy." The British government held this view, to which the German government agreed, and the blockade of Venezuelan ports which followed was admittedly an act of war, though declarations of war were never made.

The notes served on the Venezuelan government on December 7, 1902, did not specify any time limit. But while preparing its reply the government very unwisely proceeded to arrest German and British citizens in Caracas, though after representations by Mr. Bowen, the United States minister, they were released.

On December 9, the Venezuelan government wrote to Mr. Bowen that it believed its difficulties with Great Britain and Germany could be settled by arbitration and asked Mr. Bowen to represent Venezuela. He telegraphed these facts to Washington with a request for the proper permission. On the same day all Venezuelan war vessels which could be found were seized. On December 12, Mr. Hay cabled to Berlin and London the information that the Venezuelan government proposed to arbitrate, and had named Mr. Bowen as its representative. On the 17th Bowen received his full powers.

During the first days of the embroil a mob at Puerto Cabello had stormed a British merchant vessel and driven the crew through the streets. The British and German commanders before the harbor demanded an apology from the city authorities, and on

5. For this and other communications see For,Rel. 1903 under Venezuela; Germany; Great Britain.
receiving no reply, proceeded on the 13th to reduce the fortifications of the harbor, and on the following day they completely demolished them. The thorough way in which the European forces were carrying out the policy of their governments made a speedy agreement to arbitrate seem desirable in Washington. On the 16th Mr. Hay again cabled to London, Berlin, and Rome to the effect that Mr. Bowen was now fully empowered to negotiate. The governments took the question of arbitration under advisement without committing themselves, and on the 20th they proclaimed a blockade of seven Venezuelan ports. The offer to arbitrate did not seem in the least to check the activities of Britain and Germany.

On the 23rd Ambassador Tower cabled from Berlin that it was suggested that President Roosevelt act as arbitrator, and in the event that he declined, then the Hague Tribunal would be acceptable. On the following day the President was formally invited to arbitrate.

From Mr. Thayer's biography of Roosevelt it appears that there was another chapter to the Venezuelan affair. No evidence of this phase of the negotiations is to be found in the published correspondence, and it was unknown even to Mr. Hay. Being brought to the conclusion that while the motives of the British and Italian Governments were bona fide, the German Government was attempting to turn affairs in Venezuela into a demonstration against the Monroe Doctrine, and hence did not want a prompt settlement of the

of the difficulty, *Mr. Roosevelt informed the German Ambassador, Dr. von Holleben, that if this government did not accept arbitration within ten days, the American fleet then assembled under Admiral Dewey would be ordered to Venezuelan waters. A week later the ambassador called again, and rose to leave without delivering any answer. On being questioned by the President, he asserted that the Emperor could not consider arbitration. Mr. Roosevelt is said to have replied: "Very well, you may think it worth while to cable to Berlin that I have changed my mind. I am sending instructions to Admiral Dewey to take our fleet to Venezuela next Monday instead of Tuesday." Within thirty-six hours the ambassador returned to say that his government accepted arbitration. 7 There was considerable delay in securing from Venezuela the guarantees which were demanded and the blockade was not raised until February 14-15-16. But after Venezuela had recognized certain principles and claims as agreed without arbitration, the plenipotentiaries proceeded to sign a protocol on May 7, 1903, which provided for arbitration of the remaining questions by the Hague tribunal. Later Mr. Roosevelt commented favorably on the ready willingness of the German Kaiser to arbitrate. On this as on other occasions he forced a course of action on the Kaiser, and then made it appear that the Kaiser had taken the initiative.

The press brought out a number of important points where the diplomatic correspondence is silent. The big question involved was, of course, the attitude of the powers toward the Monroe Doctrine. Some papers pointed to the blockade as a demonstration against the doctrine, while others cited the understanding which each of the powers had reached with the American Government before any warlike measures were taken. The Spectator pointed to the retirement of Lord Salisbury as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, followed by a visit to England by the Kaiser, during which he conferred with the cabinet, followed finally by joint action which might estrange American sympathy for England, and saw in it a case of German treachery. For days Venezuelan affairs commanded headlines in the British press. Such queries as "Why are we tied to Germany?" were frequent. There was no doubt as to the unpopularity of the government's course in acting with Germany. Lord George Hamilton replied for the cabinet to the general effect that after having broached the proposal at Washington and becoming committed to intervention, His Majesty's Government had been approached from Berlin with a proposal for joint action, and, in short, could not gracefully decline to act in conjunction with Germany. Lord Cranborne tried to explain that Germany had not always been particularly friendly, and that the Government was glad for a chance to bring better feeling by agreeing to act jointly - but this was an unsatisfactory explanation.

The Spectator remarked that "fortunately America seems to understand that we have been 'hypnotised' by Germany into a foolish scheme of joint action." Kipling's poem on the occasion, the Rowers, seemed to express British feeling.

"In sight of peace - from the Arrow Seas
O'er half the world to run
With a cheated crew, to league anew
With the Goth and the shameless Hun!"

The British and German Governments had strongly urged that the President act as arbitrator. Possibly this was because it was thought that his award would be more certain to be executed than that from the Hague. It was said in America that the chief argument against arbitration by Mr. Roosevelt was that Germany wanted it. Mr. Roosevelt, however, took this opportunity at once to escape what would doubtless have been a thankless task, and perhaps have led to bitterness, since the award would probably have been far less than the powers asked. And at the same time he gave this important case to the tribunal at The Hague, thus making another precedent for referring disputes to that court. Beside, the fact that American citizens had claims against Venezuela would have made it unwise for the President to act as judge.

3. Results of the Venezuela Embroglion.

The obvious result of intervention in Venezuela was a final settlement of the claims of citizens of several nations against the South American republic.

But there were other, and more significant results. One was

the widespread appreciation of the capable statesmanship which
President Roosevelt had exhibited in the difficult controversy.
Again American diplomacy had accomplished big things, and Europe
was deeply impressed. Moreover, the Monroe Doctrine had been on
trial, and was now more strongly established than ever. If,
as was generally said, Germany had been trying to shatter the
great ordinance, the attempt had only worked to her disadvantage.
For in backing down after the President’s threat it had tacitly
admitted America’s right to interfere.

Moreover, strange as it seems, Anglo-American relations
were strengthened. The spontaneous resentment with which the
English received the news that England and Germany were acting
in concert showed beyond a doubt how highly they valued the re-
gard of America. Better, they said, let the debts go unpaid
than to take the chance of offending the Government of the United
States. While pointing out that the conduct of affairs by the
greatest naval and the greatest military powers was certainly
not impressing the world at large at all favorably, the English
could not say enough for the attitude of the government at Washing-
ton. The Kaiser would never have dared to provoke a misunder-
standing in America with the British fleet at his back. But even
after he had secured British cooperation, the censure all fell upon
Germany. Clearly, German diplomacy was making matters worse in
the United States. Samoa, the Pauncefote affair, Manila Bay, and
finally Venezuela recalled incidents where Germany had come off second best, while England took the palm. Obviously, the German Government must improve matters.

Early in January, 1903 it was announced in the press that his excellency the German Ambassador, Dr. von Holleben, had been compelled to return to Germany on account of ill health. But the reported illness brought only expression of amusement. It was known that the ambassador had gone for good, and so suddenly that he had even omitted to call upon the President to say his farewell. His imperial master had set him the difficult task of improving German-American relations, and he had repeatedly failed. The hopelessness of his task could not be pleaded as an excuse in Berlin. In the choice of Baron Speck von Sternburg as the new ambassador the Kaiser made a much more judicious selection. In the following years Sternburg had a happy influence upon German-American relations.
IX.

THE LAST DECADE.

1. The Second Hague Conference.

In addition to the ever-recurring questions arising over American meat and the tariff - which were as vital in the days of Mr. Gerard as in those of Dr. White - the years following the Venezuela embroglio are marked by several events which had an important bearing on the relations between the United States and Germany. One of these was the Second Peace conference at The Hague in 1907.

The American delegation, as well as those from a number of other nations, went to the Second Conference with the confident expectation that a measure for the compulsory arbitration of international disputes with such exceptions as questions of national honor would be adopted. And it was a hopeful sign that Germany, the source of the opposition in 1899, had in the meantime negotiated arbitration treaties, and came to the conference pledged to support the measure. Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, the German first delegate, early in the proceedings, delivered a speech favoring compulsory arbitration. While he expressed reservation on certain points, he professed a willingness on the part of the delegation to enter the discussion without bias.

But the satisfaction thus aroused was short lived. For it developed that while the German delegation professed their

1. For an interesting account showing how sensitive the German Government came to be on the matter of international peace, see Roosevelt to Trevelyan in Scribner's 67:268-9, Mar.1920.
attachment to the principle of compulsory arbitration in the abstract, they were not in favor of an international treaty on the subject. Germany would enter into arbitration treaties with certain powers; but a general act to which all civilized nations were signatory was quite another thing. When the question came up for discussion, Dr. Kriege of the German delegation spoke in a way that made it evident that his government was opposed to any step which would make arbitration obligatory. Dr. James Brown Scott tells how Mr. Drago, after hearing this speech, wrote on a slip of paper, "This is the death of arbitration." Mr. Choate, the chief of the American delegation, paid his respects to Baron Marschall's attitude in the caustic remark that "Indeed, while the Baron admires obligatory arbitration without reserve in the abstract form, he does not want it on earth, but prefers it in Heaven. He even dreams about arbitration, but immediately after waking up he turns toward the wall in order not to see it." As a result of this opposition, the Conference contented itself with merely a high-sounding resolution commending the principle of compulsory arbitration of international disputes.

It is interesting also to note that Mr. Choate introduced for the American delegation the old principle of the immunity of private property from capture at sea. The favor with which this measure had come to be regarded was shown by the vote of twenty-five to eleven. But since the minority included Great

Britain, Russia, France, and Japan, the project to add this new provision to international law was a failure.

Dr. David J. Hill, who was the American Minister to The Hague, and also a delegate to the Second Conference was transferred to the Embassy at Berlin immediately thereafter. Dr. Hill writes that he thoroughly understood the policy which the government had set for his conduct at Berlin - he was to urge in and out of season the proposal of compulsory arbitration, carrying the campaign from The Hague to the very center of opposition. The German and American Governments had negotiated a treaty providing for compulsory arbitration in certain cases in 1904, but after the memorable fight between President Roosevelt and the Senate the treaties were all scrapped. Now Dr. Hill proposed to use his utmost endeavor to negotiate another treaty. He tells of the reception he met. "In the Foreign Office the temperature was chilly when the arbitration treaty was discussed. The bankers of Frankfort had been in communication, and out of dusty drawers had been recovered musty papers, yellow with age, old securities, probably bought for a song by speculators, but represented by their owners as valid debts owed by some of the American States. One lot in particular was made specially impressive. A venal legislature had passed a bill making a state liable for the payment of an issue of bonds by a Southern railroad. The next legislature, placed in power by the indignation of the taxpayers, had declared the indorsement by the State to be illegal. As the railroad was bankrupt, the bonds were found to be worthless.

"Unless the government of the United States was ready to
assume responsibility for these 'sacred obligations' an arbitration treaty, it was held, would be regarded as valueless in Germany. The Frankfort bankers would condemn such a treaty if they did not receive full payment."

It takes two to make a treaty, and in Germany, where the victories of war were so greatly magnified, the idea of compulsory arbitration had never taken firm root. In Bismarck's time and later, particular disputes had been arbitrated. But a treaty which made arbitration not discretionary, but obligatory, was certainly not in line with public policy.

2. America, Germany, and World Peace.

A more favorable report may be made on the Kaiser's attitude toward peace in the Russo-Japanese war. Something was known at the time of the vigorous diplomacy by which President Roosevelt finally induced the two nations to appoint plenipotentiaries to discuss terms and negotiate a peace, and by which he urged upon Japan the wisdom of moderation and at the same time tried to make the Tsar appreciate the hopelessness of the Russian position. When a treaty was finally signed it was universally recognized as a tribute to the skill and energy of the President of the United States. On the authority of a portion of the Willy-Nicky correspondence, it has been asserted that the Kaiser, in order that both Japan and Russia might be crippled in the war, was urging the Tsar to fight on at the very time that President Roosevelt was advising peace.6


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Whatever the motives of the German Emperor, it appears from a careful reading of the Willy-Nicky Correspondence, reinforced by Mr. Roosevelt's correspondence on the subject of the Portsmouth Peace recently published in Scribner's Magazine, that the Kaiser did, after he was approached by the President, use his good offices to induce the Tsar to consent to Japanese terms. The Kaiser's notorious apprehension of the "Yellow Peril" doubtless made him anxious to see hostilities cease before Japan could claim Vladivostok, just as at the beginning of the war he had been voluble in encouraging the Tsar to use his utmost endeavor to defeat Japan.

Still another interesting episode in the relations of President Roosevelt and the Kaiser is the Algeciras Conference. It will be remembered that the French Government (acting in pursuance to an African agreement with England, in which Germany had not been consulted) had in 1905 demanded of the Sultan of Morocco a thorough program of reform which would considerably limit that potentate's sovereign power. As a counter-demonstration

J. Hill was evidently only partially informed when he spoke of the Kaiser as "missing every chance to be a peacemaker" and went on to imply that he continually urged the Tsar to hold out against Japan (Impressions of the Kaiser, pp. 59-60). In this case the Kaiser saw that his own interests for once demanded peace, and advised the Tsar in this sense.

7. Willy-Nicky Correspondence (pp. 103, 122 et seq., 128) indicate this, while other telegrams of similar import appear to have been omitted. No other view could be entertained after reading Roosevelt-Peacemaker, in Scribner's 66:257-75, Sept. 1919.

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the Kaiser made a spectacular trip to Tangier, where he landed and made a speech which encouraged the sultan to resist the French demands, and asserted the determination of Germany to play a leading role in Morocco. The French government held its position, while the German government became more insistent in its tone. The situation seemed to point toward war.

At this point Mr. Roosevelt wrote personally to the Kaiser, condoning the German threats of war, and suggesting an international conference as a solution of the difficulty. The French naturally had misgivings as to the outcome of a conference, and hesitated to commit their interests in Morocco to the tender mercies of European diplomats. It was, then, through the efforts of Mr. Roosevelt that the powers came to agree to a conference. It was not suspected at the time what a strong hand the President had taken.

American aims in Morocco were strikingly similar to those in China - the open door and equal opportunity to all nations. And American diplomacy - Roosevelt's diplomacy of soft speech and a

8. Thayer: Theodore Roosevelt, p. 228. Moreton Brewen, m.P. (Spectator, June 12, 19, 1920) states that he does not agree with Mr. Thayer, but affirms that it was the Kaiser who requested that American representatives be sent to the conference. The Spectator points out that there is no need for disagreement; that the President urged that a conference be called, and may at a later time have been persuaded by the Kaiser to send American diplomats to attend it. Mr. Thayer had the Roosevelt correspondence when he wrote the biography. Tardieu, in La Conférence d'Algesiras 2nd ed. p. 65, says of Mr. Roosevelt "c'est lui qui avait le plus vivement insisté pour que la France acceptât la conférence."

9. For French reservations upon their acceptance of the "invitation" of the Sultan of Morocco, see For. Rel. 1905, pp. 668, 9, 70.

10. Acknowledgement of the influence of the President made in telegram from Berlin. For. Rel. 1905, p. 669.
big stick - followed the same tactics as in the negotiation of
the Portsmouth Treaty. The sending of American representatives
to a conference of European powers was a new departure which many
Americans did not approve. A number of senators, for whom
Mr. Bacon was spokesman, protested against the proposal, and
the instructions which Mr. Root sent to Ambassador Henry White and
minister Gummeré seemed to anticipate for them an unassaying
course of action. An open door policy, impartial benevolence
toward Morocco, unbiased friendship for all the powers con-
cerned, and complete dissociation from all motives which might
tend to thwart a perfect agreement were the principles which
Mr. Root laid down. Mr. White was also urged to use his in-
fluence to mitigate the intolerant restrictions which the
Shereefian Government imposed upon Jews. The American
representatives were apparently destined to take only a casual
interest in the negotiations.

But this was far from the case. For the cable between
Washington and Algeciras was kept busy throughout the confer-
ence. Just as he had forcefully persuaded Russia and Japan in
the Portsmouth Conference, so Mr. Roosevelt proceeded to act
as mediator in Morocco. "Then the French took a moderate posi-
tion offering a sane and equitable solution to the deplorable
conditions in Morocco, the German Government, with its Austrian
ally, refused to acquiesce. "The Kaiser had weekly pipe dreams"

(as Mr. Roosevelt wrote about this time) and pictured his government playing a much more important part in Morocco. When the American delegates at Algeciras stood firm on their instructions, the Kaiser appealed to the President for support. But the President did not budge. Instead, he pursued a course so daring that a mistake would have been a calamity. For Mr. Roosevelt proceeded to call upon the Kaiser to recede from his demands, and was finally successful. Like the Treaty of Portsmouth, the General Act at Algeciras was a tribute to the firm and upright policy of President Roosevelt. And in the final signature, Mr. White wrote in the reservation that his government, having no political interests in Morocco, incurred no responsibility for the enactment of the regulations and declarations of the settlement.

Admiration for the success is mixed with wonder at the audacity with which President Roosevelt, with Secretaries Hay and Root, carried on American diplomacy. The country at large had no idea of how potent a factor was the President in the international events of which they read.

Mr. Roosevelt wrote the following to Mr. Henry White in 1906, concerning his relations with the Kaiser: "I have always been most polite with him, and have done my best to avoid our taking any attitude which could possibly give him legitimate offense, and have

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12. For a detailed account of the conference see Tardieu: La Conférence d'Algeciras.

13. State Papers, 1905-6, pp. 1000-1
endeavored to show him that I was sincerely friendly to him and to Germany. Moreover, where I have forced him to give way I have been sedulously anxious to build a bridge of gold for him, and to give him the satisfaction of feeling that his dignity and reputation in the face of the world were safe." 14

CONCLUSION - WHY THE "TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP" WAS SO WEAK.

It remains only to consider the scattered fragments to see why the German-American friendship was so unsubstantial a structure. For although the Kaiser once cabled to President Roosevelt: "The friendship of Germany and the United States, of which Frederick the Great laid the first foundation, rests on an unshakable granite foundation," it is evident that only trivial difficulties sufficed to strain relations.

The reasons why the friendship was so prefunctory and empty are, first, the failure of the two nations to understand one another, and back of that their utter irreconcilability even if they had understood.

Germany could never understand American colonial policy - or rather the utter absence of a policy. By an inevitable course of events the original states had been drawn across the Alleghenies into Louisiana and Florida, Texas and California and Oregon, and finally Cuba and the Philippines. At each succeeding step opinion was sharply divided; the American People were, on the whole, unwilling to extend their borders. Opportunities to expand came, in general, unsolicited. But the fact remains that the republic experienced a rapid territorial growth.

Beginning a century later, when the German Empire - deliber-

1. Thus Bismarck said to Mr. von Schierbrand, of the Associated Press, in speaking of the Spanish-American War: "This war is indefensible on grounds of international equity - spoils, spoils, - all else is pretense." Century 42:155, May 1902.
ate, calculating - tried to follow as similar policy, conditions were not so favorable. The story of German imperialism is notorious. The point in this connection is that it was conscious, in contrast to the unconscious, inevitable expansion of the United States. This fact was never appreciated in Germany. According to European - in particular, German - standards of national conduct, the American attitude was impossible. We perceive the conditions of the present in the light of the experiences of the past.

How could Germans, bred on the traditions of Frederick the Great and Bismarck, understand the altruism which prompted McKinley to take the Philippines? They saw the facts - and interpreted them on the basis of their own historical experiences. They read American professions of lofty motives, and again misunderstood; these generous sentiments could not be sincere, any more than the words of Frederick II or of the Iron Chancellor were sincere. Beautiful phrases were only the cloak with which the American Government clothed its naked ugliness. And once accepting this apparently rational belief, the German was characteristically unable to discard the erroneous theory, however untenable.

And as in colonial policy, so in other matters, the Germans misunderstood. American ideals - in business, politics, education - were totally different from German ideals, - as distinct and mutually unintelligible as two languages with no roots in common.

These differences in essentials were, as was remarked, made much of by the agrarian press. News of America was literally "made in Germany". Freedom of the press, and the untrammeled distribution of all manner of facts and opinions, were unknown
in Germany. In that country the journals were closely scrutinized, associated press service was practically non-existent, and comparatively few papers pretended to maintain correspondents in every corner of the globe. Under such cases it was particularly easy for the Agrarian party to be sure that only evil reports were published about America.

What, in turn, was the reliability of the news from Germany printed in America? The American press was ably represented in Berlin, and should have received accurate reports. And within limits this was the case. But a correspondent who was sent to Germany to report the news would become persona non grata and hence defeat his own purpose by reporting all the news. Witness the case of Mr. Wolf von Schierbrand: during the war with Spain he reported to the Associated Press the actual state of public feeling - which did not tend to strengthen mutual regards. "I was approached time and again, both at the Foreign office and outside, with hints, veiled threats, or direct requests to color my reports so as to give the impression that there was no ill-feeling for America on the part of the German people .... Two chief government organs .... went even to the lengths of threatening me with expulsion."

2. Prof. R. W. E. in The German Empire Between Two Wars (p. 363) remarks: "... the readers of such high-class journals as the Kölnische or Frankfurter Zeitung or the Berliner Tageblatt are often uninformed as to the real condition of public affairs and public feeling in France, England, and America. The result has been that each succeeding international crisis has found the German reading public living in a fool's paradise of misinformation...."

In his book, Imperial Germany, Count von Bülow tells the following incident: "Once, during the Boer War, standing in the lobby of the Reichstag, I remonstrated with one of the members on account of his attacks on England, which did not exactly tend to make our difficult position any easier. He worthy man replied in a tone of conviction: 'It is my right and my duty, as a member of the Reichstag, to express the feelings of the German nation. You, as Minister, will, I hope, take care that my feelings do no mischief abroad.' This was characteristic of German methods — the attempt to think one thing at home and profess something else abroad, to act one way through the foreign office while the Kaiser made voluble protestations in the opposite sense.

A most unfortunate misunderstanding was that so common in Germany, to the effect that the United States was devoid of any homogeneity. This led the Kaiser to rely upon the millions of American citizens of German birth or parentage. He really came to believe that they would be glad to take up arms at his behest, either to flock to his armies or to revolt against the American Government. Occasionally a political party in this country, to capture the votes of certain elements, would attack the other party for being too friendly to this or that European nation. Such nonsense was regrettable enough on principle, for America should


5. Thus von Macht in Germany’s Point of View (p. 330) quotes Bismarck as saying: "I should dearly like to see the United States of America, which of all foreign countries is the one which we intuitively like best".
stand united against other nations; but it was particularly unfortunate when it caused Germany to think less of the United States, and hence hold her friendship cheaply bought.

On their part the American people did their best to feel kindly toward Germany. But the things in Germany with which they sympathized were the very things to which the government was opposed. For example, when a Liberal member of the Reichstag, Dr. Lasker, died in this country, the House of Representatives passed a resolution expressing their regret at his death. But owing to political differences between himself and Dr. Lasker, Bismarck treated the resolution with contempt, and sent it back without laying it before his government.

While a subservient press in Germany made understanding more difficult by maligning America, so a section of Americans went to the other extreme by offering to the public inaccurately fulsome accounts of the German government, overlooking the autocratic features with which we have since become so familiar, and making the Kaiser appear whiter than snow. Now much better to call a spade a spade, than to mince matters, and try to avoid the plain truth that America and Germany were irreconcilable in politics as well as in other matters! It therefore prevokes a smile when Dr. Burgess contrasts the "United States of Germany"

7. For comment on this tendency, especially in text books to be read in American schools, see Gerard, Face to Face With Kaiserism, ch. 21.
with the United States of America, and arrives at the conclusion that "the difference between the German system of government and our own in fundamental principle is thus really reduced to the one point of the difference in the executive tenure." This overlooks the fact that a constitution is only the skeleton of the Government, and is trivial in comparison to the spirit by which the government is animated.

As Mr. Roosevelt found when he visited Germany, there was no other country on earth where Americans were so cordially hated. The situation was tragically unfortunate, but under exciting conditions, inevitable. And after the most impartial consideration it is impossible to avoid the verdict that the utter hollowness to German-American friendship was due to causes peculiarly characteristic of the late Imperial German government.

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