MONCRIEFF

The two-fold movement in British Philosophy of the eighteenth century

Philosophy

A. M.

1910
THE TWO-FOLD MOVEMENT IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

BY

JESSE EDWIN MONCRIEFF

B. S. Shurtleff College, 1909

THESIS

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN PHILOSOPHY

IN

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

1910
I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

JESSE EDWIN MONCRIEFF

ENTITLED THE TWO-FOLD MOVEMENT IN BRITISH PHILOSOPHY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.


B. H. Bode
In Charge of Major Work

B. H. Bode
Head of Department

Recommendation concurred in:

Committee on Final Examination

168305
PREFATORY NOTE.

These comments on British Philosophy of the Eighteenth Century are largely the outcome of the work done in Professor Rode's course bearing that name. The general standpoint of treatment was developed in that course. The treatment of the subject naturally does not pretend to be exhaustive or even to cover all the principal points of doctrine. Its aim is simply to consider some of the better-known passages and to show how they are not entirely consistent with each other nor with the fundamental empirical basis of the authors.

May 27, 1910. J. E. M.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table of Contents</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prefatory Note</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Introduction</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part I John Locke</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I Introduction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II Ideas of Sensation: The Lockian Doctrine of Sense-Perception</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III Ideas of reflection</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV The definition of truth</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V The doctrine of substance</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VI The doctrine of causation</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part II George Berkeley</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I Introduction</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II Berkeley's Theory of Knowledge</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III Berkeley's later trend toward rationalism</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part III David Hume</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I Introduction</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II The external world</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III The Self</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part IV Thomas Reid</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I Introduction</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II Sensation and Perception</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

Seldom indeed does the turn of a century happen to coincide exactly with the beginning or the end of a great epoch of history, either political, religious, or philosophical; and the period under our consideration is no exception to the rule. That period of British philosophy which is referred to in a general way as the eighteenth century begins virtually in the year 1690 with the publication of Locke's famous Essay concerning the Human Understanding and is brought to a close in 1785 with the appearance of Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.

The type of philosophy represented by Locke, Berkeley, Hume and Reid is usually known as Empiricism, because their doctrine is that the data of intelligence are all derived from experience. Experience, however, is a very ambiguous word, and it is largely due to conflicting interpretations of the connotation of the term that we have the two-fold movement. What might be called the dominant type of interpretation, since it forms the principal thesis of all four of our philosophers, is the interpretation of experience known as Sensationalism. "Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu."

Locke's statement of the problem may be taken as typical of the whole group. "How comes (the mind) to be furnished?...... Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself."(1) Such is the presupposition of the whole group, but the strictness of their interpretation, and the consistency with which they adhere to it can be shown only by a somewhat detailed analysis of some of their fundamental doctrines.

--------

(1) Essay, ii, 1: 2.
JOHN LOCKE.
CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

It is a very significant fact that while the leading philosophers of Germany were men who breathed continually the air of the universities, and who looked upon the problems of life from the academic point of view, the leaders of English philosophic thought were for the most part practical men of affairs; and of no man was this more true than of John Locke. To this fact is to be attributed many of the glaring inconsistencies of the Essay, which was written in snatches during eighteen years of a busy public life.

Locke himself tells us of the immediate occasion of the Essay in his epistle to the reader. It appears that when he was about the age of forty, five or six of his friends meeting in his room and discoursing on a very remote from that of the human understanding "found themselves quickly at a stand by the difficulties that rose on every side." Locke continues: "After we had awhile puzzled ourselves without coming any nearer a solution of these doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that before we set ourselves on inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, and were not, fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first inquiry. Some hasty and undigested thoughts, on a subject I had never before considered, which I set down against
...
our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this discourse; which having been thus begun by chance, was continued by intreaty; written by incoherent parcels; and after long intervals of neglect, resumed again, as my humour or occasions permitted; and at last, in a retirement where an attendance on my health gave me leisure, it was brought into that order thou now seest it."
IDEAS OF SENSATION: LOCKE'S DOCTRINE OF SENSE-PERCEPTION.

Under the circumstances which attended the production of the Essay we can but expect to find inconsistencies, repetitions and defects of arrangement; and when we also take into consideration the fact that he had "never before considered" this subject, we are not surprised to find in addition to the aforementioned defects, inconsistencies of doctrine. These are especially noticeable in the doctrine of sense-perception, which it is our purpose to consider in this chapter.

Locke's general doctrine of sensation is that "our Senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions." (1)

While the main tendency in the Essay with regard to sense-perception is that known as the Copy Theory, in which it is maintained that some of our 'ideas' are copies of external things, while others are not, ourselves being hemmed in all the while to the realm of ideas; we find here and there traces of a more rudimentary view of sense-perception, namely, that the senses directly lay hold on the external quality without the mediumship of copies. We find various expressions of this view, e. g., Essay, ii, 1: 3.
sensation "is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses." (1) There is no standing room for a 'copy' in this definition; the idea actually enters the understanding from the external world. The senses are the doorway through which ideas enter, not a screen upon which their shadows or copies are cast. Not only are simple ideas thus received, but even such a complex idea as that of solidity enters by the same portal. "The idea of solidity we receive by our touch; and it arises from the resistance which we feel in body to the entrance of any other body into the place it possesses, till it has left it. There is no idea which we receive more constantly from sensation than solidity....... If anyone asks me, what this solidity is, I send him to his senses to inform him." (2) This doctrine of direct apprehension of the object serves Locke's purposes very well till it encounters the variations in taste, color, sound, etc., which it is powerless to explain; Locke is then driven to the conclusion that "most of those (ideas) of sensation (are) in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us." (3) His argument for this conclusion is as follows: "Flame is denominated hot and light; snow, white and cold; and manna, white and sweet, from the ideas they produce in us. Which qualities are commonly thought to be in those bodies the same that those ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror, and it would by most men be judged very extravagant if one should say otherwise. And yet he that will consider that the same fire that at one distance produces in us the sensation of warmth, does, at a

nearer approach, produce in us the far different sensation of pain, ought to bethink himself what reason he has to say - that this idea of warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, is actually in the fire; and his idea of pain, which the same fire produced in him the same way, is not in the fire. Why are whiteness and coldness in snow, and pain not, when it produces the one and the other idea in us; and can do neither, but by the bulk, figure, number, and motion of its solid parts?" (1) Yet Locke maintains that "the particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire and snow are really in them, - whether anyone's senses perceive them or no: and therefore they may be called real qualities, because they really exist in those bodies." (2) And as he later declares that "it is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them" (3) he here definitely commits himself to the tender mercies of the Copy Theory in connection with the so-called primary qualities, maintaining that these are the "same in those bodies that their ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror" (1) while at the same time denying the resemblance in the case of what he terms secondary qualities and powers. In taking this position, Locke involves himself in two difficulties, one in adopting the Copy Theory at all, and the other in applying it in the case of 'primary' qualities while withholding it in the case of 'secondary' qualities. We will consider these difficulties in the order named.

The difficulty involved in Locke's Copy Theory is - How are we to know that the copy corresponds to the archetype? On Locke's basis this question is unanswerable, and he simply sidesteps

the problem by reverting to his alternate doctrine of sense-perception as immediate apprehension of the external quality. Furthermore, how are we to know whether or no the sense-impression so much as has an archetype? In the case of the 'primary' qualities Locke maintains that it has, and in the case of the 'secondary' qualities that it has not, but his proof of this statement is utterly inadequate. "A piece of manna of a sensible bulk is able to produce in us the idea of a round or square figure; and by being removed from one place to another, the idea of motion. This idea of motion represents it as it really is in the manna moving: a circle or square are the same, whether in idea or existence, in the mind or in the manna. And this, both motion and figure, are really in the manna, whether we take notice of them or no."(1) This is really no argument at all, and is the only proof which Locke offers for his doctrine. We simply have his word for it that "this everybody is ready to agree to."(1) But Berkeley was not ready to agree to it, nor are we. The same argument that demonstrates the anti-copy character of color, taste, and sound, serves likewise to repudiate the doctrine of copyism for size, motion and figure. Do the former vary with individuals, and from time to time with the same individual? So do the latter. Berkeley's contention, that extension, figure and motion abstracted from other qualities, are inconceivable, is unanswerable. "I desire anyone to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged

---

(1) Essay, ii, 8, 18.
to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must these be also.\(^{1}\) To be sure, we do not paint our atoms and molecules lurid reds and vivid greens, but the dull drabs or grays with which we endow them are just as fatal to Locke's boundary line between primary and secondary qualities. Furthermore, all our ideas of extension, motion and figure are just as full of reference to human reaction and appreciation as are our ideas of color, taste, and sound. Great and small, swift and slow, are as entirely relative, changing with the variation of frame or position of the organs of sense, as are hot and cold, sweet and bitter. Locke's own illustrations are no exception to the rule. Is the size of the flame any more constant as we approach it than the heat which we feel from it? Does it not occupy more and more of the field of vision?

Why, then, does Locke cling so tenaciously to his doctrine of primary qualities? In the first place, being a plain man of affairs and a pioneer in the field of theory of knowledge as well, he seems not to have perceived that his criticism of the naive realistic view of secondary qualities applied with equal validity to primary qualities.

The primary qualities are those having a spatial character. The others might be denied without abolishing our spatial world, but to common-sense Locke, if the spatial qualities were denied there would seem to be nothing 'tangible' left at all, and that would never do. So by standing first on one foot and then on the other, he is able to keep the semblance of the common-sense world and is satisfied therewith.

\(^{1}\) Berkeley, Principles, sec. 8.
CHAPTER III.
IDEAS OF REFLECTION.

We have found in our consideration of Locke's doctrine of sense-perception that he vacillates between two views of what he terms the 'idea of sensation', namely, the view that the object of perception is directly and immediately apprehended, and the view that it is known only through its copy. We find an analogous bifurcation in his treatment of 'ideas of reflection.' The more primitive view, and the one corresponding to the direct-apprehension doctrine of sensation, is that the occurrence of a mental state is identical with knowing it. "It is the first act of the mind, when it has any sentiments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas; and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary, that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no imagination, no distinct thoughts at all. By this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself, and to be what it is; and all distinct ideas to disagree, i.e. the one not to be the other: and this it does without pains, labour, or deduction; but at first view, by its natural power of perception and distinction." (1) The attitude taken in this view is very much like that of Spinoza in the proposition: "If a man knows anything, he, by that very fact knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to infinity." (2)

A very different doctrine is presented in other passages, in which we do not have an immediate intuition of our mental states,

(1) Essay, iv, 1: 4. (2) Spinoza: Ethics, Book ii, prop. 21, Note. "Simulac enim quis aliquid scit, eo ipso scit, se id scire, et simul scit, se scire, quod scit et sic in infinitum." Cf. also Ethics, Book ii, prop. 43.
but know them only after they have occurred. As we can thus contemplate them only when past, it is obvious that we must do so by means of some sort of copy of them, hence this doctrine corresponds to the Copy Theory in sense-perception. "Though he that contemplates the operations of his mind, cannot but have plain and clear ideas of them; yet, unless he turn his thoughts that way, and consider them attentively, he will no more have clear and distinct ideas of all the operations of his mind, and all that may be observed therein, than he will have all the particular ideas of any landscape, or of the parts and motions of a clock, who will not turn his eyes to it, and with attention heed all the parts of it. The picture or clock may be so placed, that they may come in his way every day; but yet he will have but a confused idea of all the parts they are made up of, till he applies himself with attention, to consider them each in particular. And hence we see the reason why it is pretty late before most children get ideas of the operations of their own minds; and some have not any very clear or perfect ideas of the greatest part of them all their lives."(1)

"The mind receiving the ideas mentioned in the foregoing chapters from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own actions about those ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it received from foreign things."(2) "The mind very often sets itself on work in search of some hidden idea, and turns as it were the eye of the soul upon it."(3) In these passages is related the second theory of reflection; but just what does the mind do when it 'turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own actions about those ideas it has'? Locke nowhere explicitly tells us. By the 'operations of the mind' does he mean

---

merely a shuffling and rearranging of its contents as does Hume in his philosophy, or does it involve something more; and in the latter event, what else is it that is involved? Upon strictly empirical grounds the former connotation is all that can be allowed him, and Locke not only submits to this connotation with good grace, but in the chapter on Complex Ideas, he quite definitely maintains that shuffling and rearranging of simple ideas is exactly what constitutes complex ideas. It would be difficult indeed to state this more clearly than Locke himself does in these words: "As the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its simple ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, whereby out of its simple ideas, as the materials and foundations of the rest, the others are framed. The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas, are chiefly these three: (1) Combining several simple ideas into one compound one; .... (2) ... Bringing two ideas, whether simple or complex, together, and setting them by one another, ... without uniting them into one; .... (3) ... Separating them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real existence: .... All that man can do is either to unite them together, or to set them by one another, or wholly separate them."(1) Locke here insists that all the operations of the mind can accomplish is a mechanical rearrangement of its ideas. Yet if thus restricted he could not have established his doctrines of causation and substance, to say nothing of the other respects in which his philosophy would have suffered.

Locke takes for granted that the second "fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas, is the perception of the operations of our own minds."(2) Since he regards it as a self-evident fact, we will let him have it for what

it is worth, and simply ask what he means by it. One interpretation is to be found in the passage above quoted from the chapter on Complex Ideas, in which we have an active mind, whose activity is confined, however, to a mere rearrangement of its materials. Hume's statement of the process eliminates the mind altogether. The perceptions, being independent entities, do the shuffling themselves, or rather just are shuffled. Nowhere in the Essay, however, is Locke so rigorous in his logic as to take this extreme position. In the position he does assume we find quite an ambiguity in the statement of what the mind observes. Does it observe merely the passive 'being-shuffled', or its own active 'doing-the-shuffling' as well? The former is all that Locke's statement of the process warrants, and yet he must have the latter, too, to make good his case.

It is just because Locke allows himself at his convenience to vary the connotation of such terms as 'operations of the mind' and 'perception' of those operations that his doctrine is at once so plausible and so hollow. By playing fast and loose with his terminology Locke seems to disguise the dilemma even from himself; but the equivocation is there none the less.
CHAPTER IV.
THE DEFINITION OF TRUTH.

In Book IV Locke comes to the crux of his problem. The ideas with which he has been concerned in Books II and III are now to be transformed into knowledge. The process of this transformation Locke at first defines as one of combining these ideas according to their "connection and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy." (1) However in the statement of the kinds of agreement and disagreement which Locke at once makes, namely, identity or diversity, relation, co-existence, and real existence, he introduces in the last category a kind of agreement and disagreement which cannot be subsumed under the general statement. For the agreement or disagreement of 'actual real existence' is the agreement or disagreement, not of ideas with one another, but with things "without the mind." (2) To be sure, Locke has said that he will use the term 'idea' as meaning either "perceptions in our minds" (3) or "qualities in the objects." (4) But, as Green observes, (5) this confession of the equivocation does not prevent its consequences, which are nothing less than the entire web of difficulties in which Locke is later entangled.

We have then to consider these two definitions of truth. To get them more clearly before us I shall quote at some length from the Essay. The following passages argue for the general statement that truth consists in the agreement or disagreement of ideas with each other as they are in the mind. "Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them. Knowledge then seems

to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion of and
agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In
this alone it consists." (1) "When we pronounce concerning gold,
that it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more
but this, that fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire uncon-
sumed, is an idea that always accompanies and is joined with that
particular sort of yellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness,
and solubility in aqua regia, which make our complex idea signified
by the word 'gold'." (2) "The different clearness of our knowledge
seems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind has
of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas." (5) "Wherever
we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas,
there is certain knowledge." (4)

That Locke champions a sort of agreement and disagreement
that cannot be brought under the general statement is obvious from
the following extracts from the Essay: "If our knowledge of our
ideas terminate in them, and reach no further, where there is some-
thing further intended, our most serious thoughts will be of little
more use than the reveries of a crazy brain; and the truths built
thereon of no more weight than the discourses of a man who sees
things clearly in a dream, and with great assurance utters them.
But I hope, before I have done, to make it evident that this way
of certainty, by the knowledge of our ideas, goes a little further
than bare imagination: and I believe it will appear that all the
certainty of general truths a man has lies in nothing else. It is
evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the
intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore,
is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas
and the reality of things. But what shall be here the criterion?

(1) Essay, iv, 1: 1, 2. (2) Ibid., iv, 1: 6. (3) Ibid., iv, 2: 1.
(4) Ibid., iv, 4: 18.
How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves? This, though it seems not to want difficulty, yet, I think, there be ...... ideas that we may be assured agree with things."(1)

We have brought out in these passages two opposing definitions of knowledge, and their relation to each other; and upon them turns the whole of the fourth book of the Essay. We see how Locke starts with the conception that truth is the agreement or disagreement of ideas with each other, is driven to the other conclusion, then is forced back again to the first, and ultimately emerges with what is practically an eternal division of territory between the two conceptions, though each continues to deny the other.

Taking the definition of truth with which Locke begins the book, namely, - the agreement or disagreement of ideas with one another, let us inquire just what is meant by this expression. It does not seem, at first blush, to be a very illuminating definition. Locke illustrates it as follows:"When we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive, that these two ideas do not agree? When we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive, that equality to two right ones does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from, the three angles of a triangle?"(2)

In our examination of this passage, let us bear in mind Locke's doctrine of judgment. I use 'judgment' not in the restricted sense in which he uses the term, but in the more usual meaning in which every affirmation or negation, certain or probable is designated judgment. According to Locke every such judgment involves two ideas. Consequently, if in this passage, disagreement means only that the idea 'white' is not the idea 'black', but

(1) Essay, iv, 4: 2, 3. (2) Ibid., iv, 1: 2.
simply that they are two different ideas, then every possible judgment would have to express this much and this kind of disagreement, or be mere tautology. (1) Even the triangle judgment, given by Locke as an example of agreement, has in it this much disagreement: for unless the ideas 'triangle' and 'two right angles' are different ideas, there would be no judgment at all. Apparently, then, this is not what Locke meant, for it does not get us beyond tautology.

An examination of Locke's definition of truth from a standpoint suggested by the first illustration, that of perception, does not prove much more illuminating. A perception of 'white' may be said to agree with another such perception, and to disagree with one of 'black' in some intelligible sense, but this fact is not at all helpful in attacking the problem of knowledge. Perceptions are just what they appear to be. It is in their immediate content that we are interested. The word 'truth' has significance only when that which is immediately present is symbolic or representative of something else. In the white-black example there is no judgment, no belief, involved; hence it sheds no light on our problem. Really, Locke had no right to either of these illustrations, for as just shown, one of them is an example of immediate perception, and not of judgment, whereas the other is in the field of mathematics, which, as will appear later, Locke claims to be a special kind of knowing, not bound down by the same laws as ordinary facts.

What, then, does Locke's definition of knowledge mean? It seems to be a very crude way of defining knowledge as 'belief based on evidence', but without giving any criterion for belief, or the least inkling as to what constitutes sufficient evidence. The uncritical character of this definition is responsible for the

(1) See quotation on p. 9. "The mind ... perceives ... all distinct ideas to disagree, i.e. the one not to be the other."
vacillation of Locke between the two kinds of agreement.

In the first place, Locke's general statement of the definition hems him in to the narrow circle of his own ideas. That Locke himself realizes this is evident in the conclusion which he is not long in reaching, that this sort of agreement, (except in the supposed case of mathematical and moral judgments, which we will consider later,) yields only trifling knowledge. It is very 'certain' knowledge, to be sure, but it is as useless as it is certain. All judgments about substances (and these are the judgments which, says Locke, 'have most to do with the affairs of life') must consist not simply of a reference of ideas to each other, but of a reference to 'real existence', to 'things.' "All gold is malleable...... is a very certain proposition, if malleableness be a part of the complex idea the word gold stands for. But then here is nothing affirmed of gold, but that that sound stands for an idea in which malleableness is contained: and such a sort of truth and certainty as this it is, to say a centaur is four-footed." (1) "It will be altogether as true a proposition to say all centaurs are animals, as that all men are animals, and the certainty of one as great as the other. For in both the propositions, the words are put together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds: and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear and visible to the mind, as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of man; and so each of these two propositions are equally true, equally certain." (2) This is true enough, but these are all analytic propositions, as Kant would say. If this were the only kind of judgment we could form, we would cry out with Locke, "But of what use is all such truth to us?" (2)

Having never distinguished between the analytic and the synthetic judgment, in answer to his own question Locke is forced to

---

his second definition of truth which is as follows: "Wherever we are sure ... ideas agree with the reality of things, there is certain real knowledge." (1) Although our idea of 'reality' is the most important of all our ideas, Locke says little about its nature and origin. What do we predicate of a subject when we predicate real existence of it? What is the precise connotation of the term 'really existing thing'? These are questions which Locke does not touch upon.

It is not my aim to point out all the inconsistencies and difficulties in which Locke is involved by his second definition of truth. Some of them are the same as those involved in the Copy Theory of Sense-Perception. (Cf. pp. 6-8.) My present purpose is sufficiently accomplished, if I succeed in pointing out some of the problems involved in this time-honored definition of truth as the correspondence between the idea and its object. By this definition, an idea, to be true, must have an object. But what constitutes the relation known as 'having an object'? When is an object the object of any given idea? In the second place, the idea must correspond, or as Locke says, agree with its object. But what is the relation called correspondence or agreement? How much must an idea resemble its object in order to be true? A photograph resembles the person whom it portrays: must an idea be a sort of photograph of its object? Here our problem is the same as in the doctrine of sense-perception in which Locke made some perceptions photograph their objects and others not. On the other hand, may an idea be very unlike an object, and still be a true idea thereof? Are not the figures in the ledger utterly unlike the transactions which they are employed to represent? And yet may they not be true? The character and degree of agreement between idea and ideate which Locke intends when he talks about

(1) Essay, iv, 4: 18.
'the truth of an idea' or 'real knowledge' is a doubtful matter. As to the other problem it seems plain that an idea can have an object without rightly corresponding to it. For how else would error be possible? To have an object, and to correspond to it are therefore different relations. What then is the character of the relation which makes a given idea have a given object, whether it properly agrees with that object or not? These are problems which are readily suggested by Locke's theory of knowledge, but which he nowhere attempts to solve. Here, as elsewhere, his system is valuable, not for its positive contribution to philosophy, but because he raises problems which are vital issues at the present day, and furnishes an excellent point of departure in the consideration of these problems.

We found, (on p. 16.) that Locke made special claims for our knowledge of mathematics and formal ethics, but deferred consideration of this topic, and will now examine more particularly Locke's doctrine in this connection. "All the discourses of the mathematicians about the squaring of a circle, conic sections, or any other part of mathematics, concern not the existence of any of those figures: but their demonstrations, which depend on their ideas, are the same, whether there be any square or circle existing in the world or no. In the same manner, the truth and certainty of moral discourses abstracts from the lives of men, and the existence of those virtues in the world whereof they treat: nor are Tully's Offices less true, because there is nobody in the world that exactly practises his rules, and lives up to that pattern of a virtuous man which he has given us, and which existed nowhere when he writ but in idea. If it be true in speculation, i. e. in idea, that murder deserves death, it will also be true in reality of any action that exists conformable to that idea of murder."

(1) Essay, iv, 4; 8.
While this is not the only passage in which Locke expresses this preposterous doctrine, (1) it is representative of them all. It would seem that the very example which he employs would be sufficient to show him that murder 'in idea' means nothing morally. Let us define murder as the intentional killing of one human being by another. Now what is the significance of 'deserve' and of 'death' in pure speculation? How can we tell by abstract speculation that to kill a fellow being intentionally does not confer a great blessing and merit a great reward? The very terms 'murder', 'deserve', and 'intention' have their significance because of their application in the world of fact and not simply in the world of speculative theory; it is because of their actual existence that they can be speculated upon, and even then only in so far as they have a definite reference to things real. The same is true of mathematics, as the simplest instance will suffice to show. In mathematics we are concerned with quantity. For our illustration let us take the number two. What possibly can this number mean without any reference to actual real existence? Mathematics is not a different kind of knowing from that of ordinary experience, but like all the other sciences, is a generalization based ultimately on sense-experience. The terms in the relation 2 plus 2 equals 4 or of any other mathematical relation are meaningless except as they are capable of sensuous verification, either directly or indirectly.

The fact which seems to have led Locke astray at this point is one which has led many others as well to conclude that in mathematics we have a different kind of knowledge; namely, the fact that in mathematics we cannot possibly imagine an exception to the general law, whereas in physics, we can imagine bodies gravitating

(1) Other places are - Essay, iii, 11: 16; iv, 3: 18-20; iv, 4: 7.
upwards, in chemistry we can imagine water ignited upon the application of a lighted match, etc., etc. Instead of critically analyzing this difference between mathematics and ordinary knowledge to ascertain its nature and cause, Locke seems to regard it as a difference in kind; whereas the difference is really due to the fact that an imagined exception in this field is a real exception. Mathematics deals with quantity, and imagined quantity, being just as capable of being measured and counted, and consequently as real for the purposes of mathematics as any other, must submit to its laws: but this does not render it independent of sensuous experience, nor change its qualitative character, though it does give it a pre-eminence over the other sciences in the extent of its scope. Mathematics and abstract morality have then for criteria of their validity the same sort of standards as any other sort of knowledge.
CHAPTER V.

THE LOCKIAN DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANCE.

When Locke approaches the problem of the nature of substance we find that he makes a radical departure from the preliminary and fundamental empirical principles upon which he had proposed to work out his theory of knowledge. Here, in the main, he takes his stand upon rationalistic ground. For, according to him, the idea of substance is not derived from sensation and reflection, as simple ideas are derived. His account of the origin of the 'complex ideas of substances' is as follows: "The mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name; which, by inadvertency we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple idea, which indeed in a complication of many ideas together: because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call substance." (1) In this passage, our aptness to consider a complication of simple ideas, which we notice to go constantly together, as one simple idea, is accounted for as the result of a presumption that they belong to one thing. That it is pure presumption is brought out in the following passage in these words: "If any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he knows not what support of

such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist *sine re substante*, without something to support them, we call that support *substantia*.

In still another connection we are told that "the idea of substance... we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection." In

Unsophisticated common-sense ordinarily shifts between two contradictory doctrines of substance; namely, first, that the substance consists in and of the qualities of the object; and second, that the substance has these qualities but is not identical with them. Although Locke confesses that the former doctrine is all that experience substantiates, that "colour, ... weight, ... fusibility, ... fixedness, ... ductility and solubility in *aqua regia*, ... these, or parts of these, put together, usually make the complex idea in men's minds of that sort of body we call *gold*," he seems to feel that such a doctrine is inadequate to account for permanence through change, as for instance the identity of gold in solid and molten condition. So he gladly seizes on the scholastic doctrine of a *je ne sais quoi* standing behind the qualities and supporting them, without realizing, apparently, that this doctrine not only fails to offer a satisfactory solution for the difficulties of the first doctrine, but furthermore involves its adherent in yet other difficulties. Here Locke's sophistication gets him into trouble, and the abandonment of his empirical principles fails to relieve the situation. Nor is this the only particular in which Locke abandons his empirical tenets in the doctrine of substance, for he also in this case makes the general idea precede the particular, which is against the whole tenor of his doctrine of

---

abstraction as an operation whereby "the mind makes the particular ideas, received from particular objects, to become general."(1)

In his doctrine of substance Locke lays himself open to three searching criticisms.

I.- In adopting his definition of substance as the "support of those qualities we find existing which we imagine cannot subsist without something to support them"(2) we have the substance 'supporting' the qualities; in calling it the 'substratum' wherein the qualities do subsist, we have them 'inhering' is the substance. Now whether we look at the problem from the side of substance or the side of quality, we have 'support' or 'inherence' both of which are terms expressing a spatial relation. Now as our hypothetical substance is by definition out of space, since extension, position, and other spatial attributes are qualities quite as much as color and taste, the terms 'support' and 'inherence' are metaphorical, are unintelligible as an analogy and do not help us a whit in our conception of the relation between substance and quality. Furthermore, why may not the qualities inhere in each other just as well as in the suppositious substance?

II.- A second objection to our hypothetical substance is that it fails to accomplish another end for which it was invented; namely, to account for change. For by definition it is not only non-spatial, but non-temporal as well, time relations being qualities just as properly as those of space. Being, then, out of time, it can neither itself change, nor account for change.

III.- Lastly, being out of space and time, it cannot become known by us. Locke himself refers to it as "unknown."(3) Then if we cannot know it, and it fails to explain that for which it was postulated, why assume it at all?

We find traces of the more naive and empirical doctrine of

(1) Essay, ii, 11, 19. (2) Ibid., ii, 2; 2. (3) Ibid., ii, 23: 2.
substance in the Essay, but they are swallowed up in the other. For instance we read "It is the ordinary qualities observable in iron or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of those substances, which a smith or jeweller commonly knows better than a philosopher; who, whatever substantial forms he may talk of, has no other idea of those substances, than what is framed by a collection of those simple ideas which are to be found in them." (1) If Locke had taken his stand here, he would have remained true to his empirical principles, but we find him going on to say: "Only we must take notice that our complex ideas of substances, besides all those simple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of something to which they belong and in which they subsist," (2) and Locke insists with considerable uniformity upon this further consideration. Hence our statement at the beginning of this chapter that Locke's most radical departure from empiricism is to be found in his doctrine of substance.

--------
(1) Essay, ii, 23: 3. (2) Ibid., ii, 23: 3.
CHAPTER VI.

The Doctrine of Causation.

The conception of causation is notable among Locke's crucial instances, testing the sufficiency of 'experience' to explain the highest conceptions. This is among the most crucial, for it is under this category that the spatial and temporal universe is conceived as a unity. He seems to feel his duty as an empiricist to find it in experience. In his chapter on Cause and Effect he says that "in the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe that several particular both qualities and substances begin to exist, and that they receive their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of cause and effect." (1) Locke maintains that we are sensuously made cognizant of this 'application and operation.' Let us consider his own example. "Thus finding that in that substance which we call wax fluidity, which is a simple idea that was not in it before, is constantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat, we call the simple idea of heat, in relation to fluidity in wax, the cause of it, and fluidity the effect." (2) Locke nowhere explains why we do so, except in so far as he refers it to a 'constant' custom of our finite experience. Nor does he indicate how a limited experience can oblige us to predicate universality in the future to the causal connection. But no finite number of instances observed by an individual, or even by all mankind, can justify the inference of

---

(1). Essay, ii, 26, 1. (2). Essay, ii, 26, 1.
universal necessity. Consequently Locke has failed to derive our belief in universal causation from our custom of observing changes in external objects.

Let us then turn to his subjective derivation of the idea; he points here to self-consciousness as the root of the belief in causes. "The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves; where we find by experience, that, barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, which were before at rest."(1) But here no more than in the other instance do we have any rational grounds for attributing universality in the future to the causal nexus. The fact that in connection with my will to move my arm just now, my arm moved, is not in itself, nor are any finite number of such occurrences, sufficient to account for my belief in a like connection tomorrow.

So it is no great cause of astonishment to find Locke elsewhere abandoning empirical grounds and asserting boldly with the rationalists that our knowledge of causation is innate. In his first letter to Stillingfleet he writes, that "everything that has a beginning must have a cause is a true principle of reason which we come to know by perceiving that the idea of beginning to be is necessarily connected with the idea of some operation; and the idea of operation with something operating which we call a cause." A similar statement is made in the Essay, "Man knows by an intuitive certainty that bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles..........

(1) Essay, ii, 21, 4.
If therefore we know there is some real being, and that nonentity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration, that ... what had a beginning must be produced by something else. (1)

Here we have Locke's two antagonistic theories of our belief in the causal principle, and they illustrate as prettily as any one doctrine, the twofold movement in his philosophy, for he nowhere attempts to reconcile them, nor even acknowledges their contradiction of each other.

(1) Essay, iv, 10: 3.
GEORGE BERKELEY.
CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

There is a very close connection between Locke and Berkeley. While still a student at Trinity College, Berkeley came under the influence of the Essay and we find that his philosophy is based on the same empirical presuppositions, subject, however, to a more rigorous logic. In the Commonplace Book, written at the age of twenty-four, we find his empirical position voiced in no uncertain tone: "Mind is a congeries of perceptions. Take away perceptions and you take away the mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind..... We must with the mob place certainty in the senses."

In the opening paragraph of the Principles of Human Understanding, Berkeley lays down his fundamental principles, which are substantially a restatement of Locke's fundamental position. He says: "It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination - either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more or less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours the palate with tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signi-
fied by the name apple, other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things - which as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth."

Thus Berkeley starts with the same fundamental assumption as Locke, namely, that the elemental unit of all our knowledge is the particular concrete sense-experience. He represents an advance over Locke, however, in that he insists that this is the ultimate datum, whereas Locke tried to go behind this, and maintained that there was some external non-ideal object corresponding to the idea in the mind. Locke had taught that real bodies are without color, sound or odor: that they are merely masses of colorless, extended, solid, moving particles which in us produce two sorts of ideas; first, ideas resembling or copying these qualities, namely, the 'primary' ideas of extension, solidity and motion; and secondly, ideas utterly unlike any qualities of the object, namely, the 'secondary' ideas of color, sound, odor, etc.

Berkeley's point of departure from Locke is this distinction between qualities and ideas. He takes issue with Locke chiefly by teaching that primary qualities as well as secondary are purely ideal. We shall not here concern ourselves with a critical estimate of this doctrine as a whole, but will proceed immediately to that portion of it which involves the most glaring two-fold movement; and that is with regard to what constitutes the objective fact corresponding to our perception.

(1) Principles, sec. 1.
CHAPTER II.
BERKELEY'S DOUBLE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION: "WHAT IS THE OBJECTIVE FACT CORRESPONDING TO OUR PERCEPTION?"

In the second dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, we find Hylas, the opponent of Berkeleianism, arguing for the existence of 'matter' in this wise: "I find myself affected with various ideas, whereof I know I am not the cause; neither are they the cause of themselves, or of one another, or capable of subsisting by themselves, as being altogether inactive, fleeting, dependent beings. They have therefore some cause distinct from me and them: of which I pretend to know no more than that it is the cause of my ideas. And this thing, whatever it be, I call Matter." (1) With the premises Berkeley agrees, but the conclusion he denies since matter is conceded to be an "unthinking, inactive Substance": then, demands Berkeley, "how can that which is inactive be a cause; or that which is unthinking be a cause of thought?" (2) Making Berkeley a present of his contention, for his proof is not conclusive, let us examine his own doctrine of the cause of our ideas. This is perhaps best stated in the Principles of Human Knowledge: "Whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them." (3) In this passage it is maintained that the objective fact corresponding to our perception is a divine act. But let us consider some of the implications of this doctrine. When God affects the mind, there is perception; otherwise there is nothing. This

(3) Principles, sec. 29.
doctrine makes no difference between actual perception and dream experience. But surely there is a difference between a real dollar and an imagined dollar. Yet, if, as Berkeley here teaches, real dollar and the dollar of our dreams follow from the same act of God, there is no room left for the experienced distinction.

Now Berkeley realized as clearly as anyone the weight of this charge of destroying the distinction between real and unreal. He maintains that "there is a rerum natura, and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its full force." (1) But he cannot make good this distinction on the basis of this doctrine of perception, and we find him partially retracting even before he finally abandons the doctrine for another. "The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called real things; and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent." (2) These latter ideas, then, are not the result of a divine act. Even so, a further charge may be preferred against this theory of perception, which is so cogent that Berkeley is finally forced to substitute another theory for it. This objection is "that from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment annihilated and created anew." (3) His rejoinder to this objection is "If we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 will not be found reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so as in truth to make any objection at all to our notions. For, though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us, since there may be some other spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever bodies are said

---

(1) Principles, sec. 34. (2) Ibid., sec. 35. (3) Ibid., sec. 45.
to have no existence without the mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are annihilated and created every moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them."(1) Thus by a sort of metaphysical sleight-of-hand, Berkeley substitutes an entirely different doctrine of the objective fact corresponding to our perception. It is no longer a divine act but an idea in some other mind, especially the divine mind, as appears in the third dialogue between Hylas and Philonous: "When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all minds. Now, it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of it. There is therefore, some other mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation. And, as the same is true with regard to all other finite spirits, it necessarily follows there is an omnipresent eternal Mind, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view."(2) Let us now inquire as to how he exhibits them to our view. Obviously we must be either immediately aware of these perceptions in the divine mind, or be furnished with copies of them. We have exactly the same alternatives as did Locke in his theory of perception and no more.

Let us first examine Berkeley's conception of knowledge as the copy of something, for as was the case with Locke, we find him holding to both theories. In the first place, according to this theory we can have no idea of spirit, as is brought out in the following bit of dialogue.(3)

\[\text{Hyl. Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert}\]

---

beings? Or have they any agency included in them?

Phil. They are altogether passive and inert.

Hyl. And is not God an agent, a being purely active?

Phil. I acknowledge it.

Hyl. No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the nature of God?

Phil. It cannot..... I own I have properly no idea, either of God or any other spirit; for these being active, cannot be represented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are.

Berkeley therefore had recourse to the doctrine that one may have 'notions', though not ideas, of spirit. But in another connection he admits that notions are passive in exactly the same sense as are ideas, and thus a notion of spirit is as inherently impossible as an idea of spirit. "All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive - there is nothing of power or agency included in them."(1)

This is probably the most serious flaw in Berkeley's doctrine: for on his own showing he has no right to the knowledge of his own existence, upon which his whole system depends. In order to reach his conclusions it is therefore necessary to abandon this theory of knowledge, at least insofar as one's own spirit is concerned, and to admit that it at least is known directly, without the interposition of ideas.

This alternate conception of knowledge as direct and not mere copy encounters an insurmountable obstacle which renders it untenable upon Berkeley's doctrine of our relation to other 'selves' both God and our fellow finite spirits. I shall digress here just enough to sketch briefly this doctrine and shall then show how it is irreconcilable with this alternative theory of knowledge. Berkeley's conception of the interrelation of spirits is never clearly

(1) Principles, sec. 25.
outlined, but the implication is one of externality. God, for instance, is radically distinct from us, a God outside us, not organically related to us as is the 'Oversoul' or 'Transcendental Ego' of modern idealism. Likewise in the case of other limited spirits, "it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited in us." (1) With this conception of the relation of myself to other selves, the character and number of other selves are not matters of direct knowledge, but of inference. The difficulty in this conception is: How, if a self is other-than-I, am I directly and certainly to know it, since what gives my consciousness of myself its peculiar validity is the fact that it is myself, and no other of whom I am conscious?

This theory, as well as the other, must be abandoned, for on neither one is a knowledge of spirit, at least spirit other-than-I, possible; and the solipsism which is the logical outcome would no more prove satisfactory to Berkeley than to anyone else.

One very radical departure from his empirical foundation is to be found in connection with Berkeley's doctrine of causation. We find the empirical position presented quite strongly in this passage: "The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it: and if I were out of my study I should say it existed - meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch." (2) Let us proceed with the figure. There was a cause, that is, it was -- what? Hume with a more rigorous logic fails to find any sense-perception of causality such as Berkeley produces for smell, taste, color, figure, etc., and challenges the world to produce one:

(1) Principles, sec. 145. (2) Ibid., sec. 3.
so far as I can learn, it is yet to be produced.

This very uncritical assumption is at the very root of the first examined theory of knowledge, namely, that our perceptions are caused by an act of God. And is also involved in the second theory, so when it is undermined, the whole superstructure totters and falls. Whence does Berkeley derive this notion of causation with which his whole philosophy is so intimately bound up. It cannot be from the external world. He tells us expressly that there is no causation there. "When we perceive certain ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas, and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute power and agency to the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat, we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former."

As this is an 'absurd and unintelligible' notion, it is certain that Berkeley does not get his idea of causation thence. He seems to derive it from a consideration of the activity of the mind. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active."

Such is Berkeley's analysis of the psychology of ideation. From this, modern psychologists differ greatly, as is instanced by this passage from Miss Calkins: "In what sense, one may ask, do I create ideas? Is there

(1) Principles, sec. 32. (2) Ibid., sec. 28.
any trace in my experience of that 'making out of nothing' in which creation is supposed to consist? I call myself creative in certain moments of imagination and thought. But what do I actually experience in thinking out a mathematical demonstration, or in striking out the plot of a story? I turn my mind toward the general topic of my interest; I regard the topic steadfastly from all sides; idea after idea dawns upon me, and - of a sudden - there arrives on the that particular idea which I recognize as the solution of my problem or the satisfaction of my aesthetic impulse. Berkeley would say that I create the idea, yet it certainly is also true that I did not make it, that it merely appears suddenly here within my consciousness."

Such a creation or causation as this is not what Berkeley in endeavoring to prove for God, and as it is all we can discover in the workings of our own mind, we must conclude that he does not derive it from this source. As all possible sources have been exhausted, both the inner and the outer reality failing to yield the coveted causal principle, we must conclude that Berkeley's use of it is an assumption unwarranted by his own fundamental principles.

(1) Miss Calkins: Persistent Problems, pp. 143, 144.
CHAPTER III.

THE LATER TREND TOWARD RATIONALISM.

The idealism of Berkeley's later life, as contained in the essay entitled Siris, his famous 'tar-water treatise', shows a decided drift away from the professed empirical basis of his early philosophy, which considered the world simply a congeries of sense-impressions, towards a recognition and re-instatement of the constructive powers of the intellect. In fact, portions of this essay may be said to foreshadow the spirit, if not the letter, of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The mind is given a more central place than in the Principles of Human Knowledge and the Dialogues. "He recognizes a process of rationalizing our knowledge which transcends the empirical basis of the Principles. This distinction between sense and intellect and their several offices and functions is one which emerges in this later phase of his idealism, and is characteristic of a growing appreciation of the inadequacy of his earlier position." (1)

This distinction between Sense and Intellect is stated quite explicitly in the following passage in the Siris: "Sense at first besets and overbears the mind. The sensible appearances are all in all; our reasonings are employed about them: we look no farther for realities or causes; till intellect begins to dawn, and cast a ray on this shadowy scene. We then perceive the true principle of unity, identity, and existence. Those things that before seemed to constitute the whole of Being, upon taking an intellectual view of things, wrove to be but fleeting phantoms. From the outward form of gross masses which occupy the vulgar, a curious inquirer proceeds to examine the inward structure and minute parts, and, from observing the motions in nature, to discover the laws of those motions. By the way he

(1) Hidden: The Philosophy of Enlightenment, p. 80.
frames his hypotheses and suits his language to this natural philosophy. And these fit the occasion and answer the end of a maker of experiments or mechanic, who means only to apply the powers of nature, and reduce the phaenomena to rules. But if, proceeding still in his analysis and inquiry, he ascends from the sensible into the intellectual world, and beholds things in a new light and a new order, he would then change his system, and perceive that what he took for substances and causes are but fleeting shadows: that the mind contains all, and acts all, and is to all created beings the source of unity and identity, harmony and order, existence and stability."(1)

This office of the intellect is remarkably similar to that of the Kantian categories. Indeed, there are some passages in the Siris which read like passages from the Critique of Pure Reason itself, notably the following: "As understanding perceiveth not, that is, doth not hear, or see, or feel, so sense knoweth not: and although the mind may use both sense and fancy, as means whereby to arrive at knowledge, yet sense or soul so far forth as sensitive, knoweth nothing."(2) Compare with this a passage from the Critique: "Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, perceptions without conceptions are blind......Understanding can perceive nothing, the senses can think nothing."(3) In the last quoted passage from the Siris, taken with the last clause of the one quoted just previously, Berkeley, with Kant, appears to say: 'Upon the raw material of sensation the mind brings to bear its organizing and constructive activity, ordering all things according to the laws of its own nature. The mind is never

(1) Siris, sections 294, 295. (2) Ibid., section 305. (3) Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2nd ed., p. 75. (Watson, p. 41.)
passive, but is actively creative in every sense-perception, however simple and elemental it may seem to be. A merely receptive experience, therefore, may not be regarded as the beginning of knowledge, for experience is nothing without the thought which renders it intelligible.'

It is a far cry from the early conviction of the Commonplace Book that "mind is a congeries of perceptions"(1) to Berkeley's last word in philosophy that "sense or soul, so far forth as sensitive, knoweth nothing."(2) but we cannot conclude that in the latter he anticipated the Kantian theory of knowledge for the simple reason that he never seems to have fully appreciated the significance of his later philosophy and its utter inconsistency with the empirical foundation of his earlier idealism. Had he fully appreciated the significance of the argument of the Siosis, he would have felt the need of modifying his initial presuppositions and of correlating them with this later development. But this, unfortunately, Berkeley never attempted, so what might otherwise have been considered a remarkable contribution to philosophy and a decided anticipation of Immanuel Kant, must be regarded rather as an inconsistent departure from his avowed empirical principles. It is enough for us here to recognize the fact that Berkeley's philosophy may be developed in two different ways. He seems to have seen the inevitable consequences of mere Lockianism, and in consequence, whether consciously or unconsciously, to have shifted his ground, introducing into knowledge other elements besides bald sense data, which legitimated to his own satisfaction his constructive theory of the universe. But these other elements which are introduced do not simply add to our ways of knowing; they effect a revolutionary transformation of its character, so

(1) Commonplace Book, p. 27. (2) Siris, sec. 305. Cf also sec. 253.
that if Berkeley had followed up this new departure, he would probably have given them the office of the Kantian categories and have identified being and knowing. At least we may say that this is the direction of his movement. Thus knowledge would lose its representative character and possess an immediacy which it could not have on the old Lockian foundation. But inasmuch as these elements were left undeveloped by Berkeley in his influential works; (for the Siris seems to have been without influence upon philosophical thought, at least until recent years, when it 'has reaped the fruit of Professor Fraser's loving care'); and inasmuch as the necessity of their introduction was not convincingly worked out, they appear, therefore, rather as unauthorized assumptions - incongruous patches upon the unrepudiated fabric of Lockian principles.
DAVID HUME.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.

In the philosophy of David Hume we cannot help but recognize the logical development of Berkeley's youthful metaphysics. It was brought out in the last chapter that it was possible for Berkeley's philosophy to be developed in either of two directions, one of which he himself took in the *Siris*, but as he did so at the cost of an implicit repudiation of his basal empiricism, it is not surprising that Hume, ignoring these new and fragmentary constructive suggestions, should carry further that negative criticism of Locke, which commended itself to his passionless intellect. With Berkeley's individual philosophy he was not deeply concerned, but he was deeply interested in deducing the ultimate consequences of generally accepted philosophical principles.

These ultimate consequences are his doctrine of causation and his doctrine of perception, into which we shall not go in detail, but shall briefly state, as our interests in this paper are chiefly concerned, not with these doctrines themselves, but with his inconsistent lapses from their legitimate consequences into rational assumptions utterly untenable upon the basis of the doctrines which he with much labor defends.

We shall first consider his doctrine of perception. "All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves," says Hume, "into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions, and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such
as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present
discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and
touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may
occasion."(1)

This statement discloses the fact that Hume recognizes two
and only two kinds of perceptions, which he says are 'distinct'
and of which he offers two criteria for distinguishing them,
namely: (1) Impressions have more force and liveliness than ideas,
and (2) they occur prior to ideas. This latter criterion suggests
still a third difference, which is given later in the section:
"All our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd from
simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which
they exactly represent......

"The constant conjunction of our resembling perceptions, is
a convincing proof, that the one are the causes of the other; and
this priority of the impressions is an equal proof, that our im-
pressions are the causes of our ideas."(2) So much for an outline
of Hume's doctrine of sense-perception. How consistent he is in
maintaining it will appear later.

The other particular in which Hume departed radically from
his predecessors is the doctrine of causation. Never before had
the relation been subjected to critical scrutiny. Descartes and
Locke, and even Berkeley had assumed without discussion the prin-
cipal of causac connection. Hume's chief interest in the 'relation
of Cause and Effect' is due to the fact that "by means of that
relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and
senses."(3) When Hume proceeds to 'anatomize' this relation, he
finds it to consist of a customary conjunction of events which
involves a "determination of the mind ... to carry our thoughts

------------
from one object to another." (1) He has no place in his system for the necessity ordinarily predicated of the causal relation. Of this he says: "After a frequent repetition, I find that upon the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is determin'd by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the first object. 'Tis this impression, then, or determination, which affords me the idea of necessity." (2) "Necessity is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects, and from effects to causes, according to their experienced union." (3)

It is not our purpose in this connection to examine Hume's positive doctrine as to what causality really is, but simply to point out that upon his presupposition that isolated sense-impressions and their copies, and nothing more, constitute the elements of our experience, it is impossible to find a place for causation. It "evidently follows from our fundamental principle, that all ideas are copy'd from impressions." (4) In the supposed case of causality "we only find, that the one (event) does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second." (5) As this exhausts the content of the impression, the idea of causality can have no further meaning than customary conjunction; it can never mean necessary connection. Lapses from this conception will be indicated in later chapters.

(5) Enquiry, (Open Court ed.) p. 64.
CHAPTER II.
THE EXTERNAL WORLD.

Hume's doctrine of the external world is very easily stated. The substance of it is that there isn't any. What he understands by the term 'external world' is a "universe which depends not on our perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated." (1) Such a world, says Hume, cannot be known either through the senses or by reason. He requests us to "observe a few of those experiments, which convince us that our perceptions are not possesst of any independent existence. When we press one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all objects to become double. But we do not attribute ... exist- to both these perceptions, and as they are both of the same nature, we clearly perceive, that all our perceptions are dependent on our organs, and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits. This opinion is confirm'd by the seeming encrease and diminution of objects, according to their distance; by the apparent alterations in their figure; ... from all of which we learn, that our sensible perceptions are not possesst of any distinct or independent existence." (2)

Another line of argument of which Hume makes use is that employed by Berkeley to show that primary and secondary qualities are on the same footing, and as the latter admittedly have no external independent existence, neither do the former. The conclusion of this argument is thus stated: "Upon the whole, then, we may conclude, that as far as the senses are judges, all perceptions are the same in the manner of their existence." (3) Finally he adjures us to ascertain by introspection that "nothing can

(1) Enquiry, p. 160.
ever be present to the mind but an image or perception......
and no man who reflects," he adds, "ever doubted that the existen-
ces which we consider, when we say this house and that tree are
nothing but perceptions in the mind."(1) "Philosophy informs us
that every thing, which appears to the mind, is nothing but a
perception,... and dependent on the mind."(2)

The senses then cannot provide us with an external universe;
no more, says Hume, can reason. "Even after we distinguish our
perceptions from our objects,... we are still incapable of reason-
ing from the existence of one to that of the other: So that upon
the whole our reason neither does, nor is it possible it ever
shou'd, upon any supposition, give us an assurance of the continu'd
and distinct existence of body."(3) "The only existences, of which
we are certain, are perceptions...... The only conclusion we can
draw from the existence of one thing to that of another, is by
means of the relation of cause and effect...... But as no beings
are ever present to the mind but perceptions; it follows that we
may observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and effect be-
tween different perceptions, but can never observe it between per-
cections and objects. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that from the
existence... of the former, we can ever form any conclusion
concerning the existence of the latter."(4)

Granting Hume's con-
ception of causality as a mental relation, there is no escape from
this argument. But in this passage is implied a more fundamental
argument which is not dependent upon the validity of his doctrine
of causation. It is this: Objects inferred are none the less ob-
jects of consciousness, hence present to the mind. If present to
the mind they cannot be independent of it. Therefore it is im-

--------

(2) Treatise, i,4: 2, S.-B., p. 103, G.& G., p. 483.
possible to infer reality which is independent of mind, and it is self-contradiction to say that it can be done.

Notwithstanding the strength of this position of Hume, we find him implying on almost every page that objects do exist independently of the mind. The fundamental difference between impression and idea is that the former are occasioned by the stimulation of the organs of sense through external objects. This distinction surely loses its significance if sense organs and external objects are themselves simply perceptions of the mind. In many other places as well, Hume implies the independent existence of matter which he ultimately rejects. In the paragraph quoted above in which Hume asserts that "nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception" he defines perceptions to be "copies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent." Here conflicting statements are found within the same sentence. In another connection he remarks that "'tis universally allow'd by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions, or impressions and ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion." A sentence such as this is pretty sure to be misleading when used by a writer who holds that "the opinion of external existence ... is contrary to reason."

In quite a different connection Hume caters to the popular belief and seems in entire accord with it. "External objects .... require a continu'd existence, or otherwise lose, in a great measure the regularity of their operation. I am seated here in my chamber with my face to the fire; and all the objects, that strike my senses, are contain'd in a few yards around me. My

memory, indeed, informs me of the existence of many objects; but then this information extends not beyond their past existence, nor do either my senses or memory give me any testimony to the continuance of their being. When, therefore, I am thus seated, and revolve over these thoughts, I hear on a sudden a noise as of a door turning upon its hinges; and a little after see a porter, who advances towards me. This gives occasion to many new reflections and reasonings. First, I never have observ'd, that this noise cou'd proceed from anything but the motion of a door; and therefore conclude, that the present phaenomenon is a contradiction to all past experience, unless the door, which I remember on the other side the chamber, be still in being. Again, I have always found, that a human body was posset of a quality, which I call gravity, and which hinders it from mounting in the air, as this porter must have done to arrive at my chamber, unless the stairs I remember be not annihilated by my absence. But this is not all. I receive a letter, which upon opening it I perceive by the hand-writing and subscription to have come from a friend, who says he is two hundred leagues distant. 'Tis evident I can never account for this phaenomenon, conformable to my experience in other instances, without spreading out in my mind the whole sea and continent between us, and supposing the effects and continu'd existence of posts and ferries, according to my memory and observation. To consider these phaenomena of the porter and letter in a certain light, they are contradictions to common experience, and may be regarded as objections to those maxims, which we form concerning the connexions of causes and effects. I am accustom'd to hear such a sound, and see such an object in motion at the same time. I have not received in this particular instance both these perceptions. These observations are contrary, unless I suppose that the door still remains, and that it was open'd without my perceiving
Les conséquences de ce que nous avons dit se situent au cœur de notre système de pensée. Nous avons ainsi pu démontrer que la vérité est relative et que la réalité est fluctuante. Cela nous amène à nous demander si nous pouvons jamais être sûrs de quelque chose. La réponse est peut-être que nous ne pouvons jamais être vraiment sûrs, mais nous pouvons essayer de comprendre la complexité de la réalité et de trouver des solutions aux problèmes qui nous concernent.

En conclusion, nous pouvons dire que la vérité est relative et que la réalité est fluctuante. Cela nous amène à nous demander si nous pouvons jamais être sûrs de quelque chose. La réponse est peut-être que nous ne pouvons jamais être vraiment sûrs, mais nous pouvons essayer de comprendre la complexité de la réalité et de trouver des solutions aux problèmes qui nous concernent.
it. And this supposition, which was at first entirely arbitrary and hypothetical, acquires a force and evidence by its being the only one, upon which I can reconcile these contradictions. There is scarce a moment of my life, wherein there is not a similar instance presented to me, and I have not occasion to suppose the continu'd existence of objects, in order to connect their past and present appearances, and give them such an union with each other as I have found by experience to be suitable to their particular natures and circumstances. Here then I am naturally led to regard the world, as something real and durable, and as preserving its existence, even when it is no longer present to my perception." (1)

Here, certainly, unperceived events are postulated, and they cannot be referred to the Berkeleian divine mind, for, as we shall see presently, Hume has no place in his system for such a mind. Yet he is obliged to fill in these unperceived events in order to maintain his doctrine of causation, though he has no place to put them. Here is a dilemma indeed, his doctrine of perception precluding the existence of unperceived events, and his doctrine of causation demanding them. For to Hume causation means invariable sequence, and sequence is anything but invariable, in fact is usually the exception, unless unperceived events are postulated. A very few examples will suffice to show this. We believe that light and heat are causally connected. Yet how often do we find them associated in our experience? We have seen many a fire without feeling any heat, and we have warmed ourselves at many a stove without seeing the flame; in fact our experiences of the two together are far outnumbered by our experiences of them separately. Hume himself enumerates examples of this in the quotation above. The unseen stairs are postulated to account for the porter's mounting to his

(1) Treatise, i, 4: 2, S.-B., pp. 185-197, G. & G., pp. 485, 486.
room. Posts and ferries are postulated to account for the transmission of the letter. The creaking sound is referred to the motion of the door upon its hinges, though the door itself is outside the range of vision, etc. Thus we find Hume obliged to postulate the very thing he denies in order to give his doctrine any plausibility at all.

In another passage it is brought out quite clearly that Hume is guilty of a further inconsistency which some metaphysicians, even of today, v. g., Pearson and Strong, have not succeeded in avoiding, namely - the assumption of a physical percipient organism to prove that there is no physical body of any sort. Hume's statement of this inconsistency is: "An object that presses upon any of our members, meets with resistance; and that resistance, by the motion it gives to the nerves and animal spirits, conveys a sensation to the mind."(1) Yet the conclusion to which this leads is "that neither colour, sound, taste, nor smell have a continu'd and independent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities there remains nothing in the universe, which has such an existence."(2)

Hume's argument is so convincing because of his apparent concurrence with the everyday belief in supposedly 'real' external things, and when the reader sees that Hume doesn't believe in the existence of these 'real' things, confidence in Hume's integrity is shaken, for it looks very much like trying to gain the benefit of popular convictions, which properly oppose his doctrines.

However, although this bid for popular favor brings to light the fact that the distinction between impression and idea falls with the elimination of external things, it does not invalidate Hume's contention against a non-ideal reality which rests upon at least one argument (cf. p. 48, bottom) independent of his impression-idea theory of knowledge.

CHAPTER III.

THE SELF.

Thus far Hume's metaphysical doctrine parallels Berkeley's idealistic conception of the world in that it is a negation of non-ideal reality. To be sure he has greatly reinforced the argument at several points. But his chief claim to originality lies in his doctrine that the universe is non-spiritual as well; that it consists simply of 'perceptions' unattached to any spiritual, percipient self.

We will now consider his reasons for denying the existence of selves. By self he means that which is conscious, which is essential to its perceptions, and which retains its identity in the flux of ideas which it has. His arguments to prove such a self non-existent are fundamentally two: first he argues that a self need not exist, on the ground that our own perceptions, existing independently, have no need for a subject to which to be referred; his second argument that a self does not exist is based on the ground that our supposed self-consciousness is merely a consciousness of perceptions and not of an identical self at all. We will now consider these two arguments at some length.

The best argument, says Hume, which philosophers have to offer for the existence of a self, is that there must be some "material or immaterial substances, in which they suppose our perceptions to inhere." (1) But "what" asks Hume, "(do) they mean by substance and inhesion?..... As every idea is deriv'd from a precedent impression, had we any idea of the substance of our minds, we must also have an impression of it; which is very difficult, if not impossible, to be conceiv'd. For how can an impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it? And how can an impression resemble a substance, since, according to this philosophy

---

it is not a substance and has none of the peculiar qualities or characteristics of a substance? 

"If instead of answering these questions, anyone shou'd evade the difficulty, I shou'd observe, that ... whatever is clearly conceived may exist; .... This is one principle which has already been acknowledg'd. Again, every thing which is different, is distinguishable, and every thing which is distinguishable, is separable...... This is another principle. My conclusion from both is, that since all our perceptions are different from each other, and from every thing else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and may be consider'd as separately existent, and may exist separately, and have no need of anything else to support their existence." (1) This argument is not so far reaching as the second which Hume brings to bear against the Self, as at most it only proves that from the existence of ideas we are not obliged to infer the existence of a self in which they inhere.

The second argument is that if there were an I, I would be conscious of the fact. "Some philosophers," he says, "imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity...... Unluckily," he adds, "all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explain'd." (2)

As for himself, he says: "When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a per-

ception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are remov'd for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions remov'd by death, and cou'd I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the dissolution of my body, I shou'd be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If any one upon serious and unprejudic'd reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself, though I am certain there is no such principle in me. He then concludes that "mankind ... are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement...... The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations... There is no simplicity, ... nor identity..... The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind." In another passage he says: "We may observe, that what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and suppos'd, tho' falsely, to be endow'd with a perfect simplicity and identity." These, then, are Hume's arguments against the existence of the self. Yet in spite of his denial of its existence, he presupposes its existence on almost every page. For instance, while on one page we

(2) Ibid., S.-B., pp. 252, 253, G. & G., p. 534.
(3) Ibid., i, 4: 2, S.-B., p. 207, G. & G., p. 495.
read that the "mind is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions", and on the very next we are told that "the mind falls so easily from one perception to the other, that it scarce perceives the change." (1) He tells us of 'operations of the mind', which he amplifies in another place by saying that "the mind has the command over all its ideas, and can separate, unite, mix, and vary them as it pleases." (2) But how can a bundle of fleeting perceptions separate, unite, and mix ideas? This inconsistency comes out quite prominently if we substitute for Hume's personal pronouns, his definition thereof. Thus the passage quoted on page 54, (bottom of page) "When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception, etc." becomes "When a heap of perceptions enters most intimately into what it calls a heap of perceptions, it always stumbles upon some particular perception, etc." The passage isn't nearly so convincing when thus roasted of the implication of the self it professes to deny.

In his argument against what he calls "the confusion and mistake" of "the notion of identity" (3) Hume's explanation assumes the existence of the very thing his argument denies, namely - a continuous self. In the first place, he admits that we have a "great ... propension ... to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence" (4) which, while calling it a delusion, he explains as being due to the ready "transition of the mind from one object to another, ... the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the thought along a train of connected ideas." But this smooth and easy transition implies the very continuous mind against which the argument is directed. Thus we see that the

(1) Treatise, i, 4: 2, S.-B., pp. 208, 209, G. & G., pp. 495, 496.
implication of a self is not a mere unessential excrescence of
Hume's doctrine, but is vital and fundamental to his doctrine of
personal identity. The same is true of his definition of causa-
tion as being 'a determination of the mind'. But no mind, no de-
termination. Fleeting perceptions can 'pass, re-pass, and glide
away' but it is folly to speak of them in a way which involves a
degree of permanence, which according to Hume, they do not possess.

Thus it is evident that Hume's argument against the exist-
ence of the self, since it presupposes a continuous mind, is like
the similar argument against body in general which presupposes
a sentient, or as Hume would say, a percipient, organism. Hence
it refutes itself and is inconsequential. It will be remembered
that in the case of his negation of body or matter Hume had a more
fundamental proof, which did not rest upon the prestidigitation
which characterizes the two arguments just considered, and which
alone was capable of supporting his negation of non-ideal, non-
spiritual reality. He has no homologous argument in his assault
upon the self, so we must decide that his proof is inadequate,
and that he has not made out a case. Nevertheless he has shown
that the character of this self cannot be 'substantial' in the
Berkeleian sense, for the inhesion of perceptions in a substantial
mind is as incomprehensible as the inhesion of qualities in a
substantial body. The organization and identity of the Self must
be of a different type than this. Thus, far, I believe, Hume's
argument against the self is conclusive.
...
THOMAS REID.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION.

However unsatisfactory and inconsistent we may find Hume's skepticism to be as a permanent philosophy, yet it is very significant to one seeking to appreciate and understand the progressive movement in British philosophy of the eighteenth century. By furnishing conclusive evidence that the Lockian account of the sources of knowledge and the processes of its development lead inevitably to a position of unqualified skepticism, Hume incites in the inquiring mind a desire to seek a more profound and truer basis for the foundations of our knowledge.

This was precisely the effect which Hume's philosophy produced in the mind of his countryman, Thomas Reid. Originally, Reid had been a follower of Locke and Berkeley, but by a study of the Treatise, he had been aroused, like Kant, from his dogmatic slumber, and made to realize the disintegrating character of the Lockian presuppositions. In his principal work, the Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, Reid gives an account of the influence which Hume exerted upon his point of view.

According to Reid, Hume's analysis, in revealing the weakness and inadequacy of Locke's position, is a reductio ad absurdum of his principles, and consequently calls for a serious and careful re-examination of the ground upon which they rest. He asserts that Locke's explanation of the 'original of human knowledge' is not true to experience, and that consequently on purely empirical grounds it will not pass muster. Hence the system founded thereupon, which Reid calls the ideal skepticism, "is a rope of sand, and all the laboured arguments of the sceptical philosophy against a material world, and against the existence of everything but impressions and ideas, proceed upon a false hypothesis."(1)

(1) Inquiry, c. 5, sec. 7, (Works, Hamilton ed., 1863, p. 126.)
The text on the page is not legible and cannot be read naturally.
CHAPTER II.
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

Reid's philosophy has been much neglected, partly because of the appearance a little later of Immanuel Kant, whose system outshone that of his Scottish contemporary, and partly because his fondness of opposing the vulgar to the tribe of philosophers - to 'all philosophers, ancient and modern', as he says on one occasion - has led people to suppose his philosophy to be an unreasoned protest against the ideal system, an unanalyzed and somewhat gross assertion of the dual existence of mind and matter and of the immediate presence of the one to the other. And it is true, that notwithstanding his maintenance of a theory of immediate perception, in his zeal against subjective idealism, he has over-stated his case and maintained the independence of the material world in terms which imply the old two-substance doctrine: and that doctrine, as we saw in Locke, necessitates the theory of Representative Perception or Copy Theory which leads straight through to Hume, whose system Reid attempts to combat.

Let us then briefly notice the conflict between Reid's statement of the doctrine of Immediate Perception, and his analysis of it. In his analysis of the original concrete experience, Reid concludes, and rightly, too, that the elemental experience is not pure sensation, but judgment, where the term 'judgment' does not imply an articulate expression of the content of the experience, but simply that it has, besides the bald sensation, meaning, that it is, in modern terminology, a perception. To quote Reid:

"The ideal system ... teaches us that the first operation of the mind about its ideas, is simple apprehension - that is, the bare conception of a thing without any belief about it: and that, after we have got simple apprehensions, by comparing them together, we perceive agreements or disagreements between them; and that this
perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, is all that we call belief, judgment, or knowledge. Now this appears to me to be all fiction, without any foundation in nature; for it is acknowledged by all that sensation must go before memory and imagination; and hence it necessarily follows, that apprehension accompanied with belief and knowledge, must go before simple apprehension, at least in the matters we are now speaking of. So that here, instead of saying that belief or knowledge is got by putting together and comparing the simple apprehensions, we ought rather to say that the simple apprehension is performed by resolving and analyzing a natural and original judgment." (1)

Thus far, I doubt not, modern psychology and philosophy would agree entirely with Reid, that in adult life, at least, perception is immediate. But in holding the view that perception is in some way a copy of outer reality, Reid gets into difficulty. In order to understand Reid's doctrine, we must know the meaning of the word 'suggestion', which is an important one in his philosophy. He borrows the term from Berkeley, but gives it a somewhat different application. He uses it to denote those 'judgments of nature' which are implied in the existence of things, relations which are essential to the constitution of our experience, yet which cannot be said to be given in sensation as such, but only along with the data of sense proper. After having "considered, ... Extension, Figure, Solidity, Motion, Hardness, Roughness, as well as Colour, Heat and Cold, Sound, Taste, and Smell," he says, "We have endeavoured to show that our nature and constitution lead us to conceive these as qualities of body, as all mankind have always conceived them to be. We have likewise examined with great attention the various sensations we have by means of the five senses, and are not able to find among them all one single image of body, or of any of its qualities. From whence, then, come those images

of body and of its qualities into the mind? Let philosophers resolve this question. All I can say is, that they come not by the senses. I am sure that, by proper attention and care, I may know my sensations, and be able to affirm with certainty what they resemble, and what they do not resemble. I have examined them one by one, and compared them with matter and its qualities; and I cannot find one of them that confesses a resembling feature."(1) How, then, do we come to predicate the qualities Reid here enumerates, of bodies, if, as he says, our sensations from them do not copy them? Here is where 'suggestion' comes in. "Although colour is really a quality of body, yet it is not represented to the mind by an idea or sensation that resembles it; on the contrary it is suggested by an idea which does not in the least resemble it. And this inference is applicable, not to colour only, but to all the qualities of body which we have examined."(2) Here we have Reid's analysis of the relation between sensation and perception in a nutshell. That which bridges the gap between matter and mind, namely - sensation, does not in the least resemble that which it represents. In the mind, however, it provokes an instantaneous reaction, a sort of back-stroke, the perception, which does resemble the quality of the body to which it is referred. This is brought out strikingly in the case of our perception of hardness and softness: "by which words we always understand real properties or qualities of bodies of which we have a distinct conception.

"When the parts of a body adhere so firmly that it cannot easily be made to change its figure, we call it hard; when its parts are easily displaced, we call it soft. This is the notion which all mankind have of hardness and softness; they are neither sensations, nor like any sensation; they were real qualities before they were perceived by touch; and continue to be so when they are not perceived......

(1) Inquiry, c. 6, sec. 6, Works, pp. 140, 141. (2) Ibid., p. 140.
"There is, no doubt, a sensation by which we perceive a body to be hard and soft. This sensation of hardness may easily be had, by pressing one's hand against the table, and attending to the feeling that ensues, setting aside, as much as possible, all thought of the table and its qualities, or of any external thing...... (The) sensation which we have every time we feel a body hard ... hath not the least similitude ... to ... that quality of bodies which we call hardness."

"Extension ... seems to be a quality suggested to us by the very same sensations which suggest the other qualities named above. (Hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness, figure and motion.) When I grasp a ball in my hand, I perceive it at once hard, figured and extended. The feeling is very simple, and hath not the least resemblance to any quality of body. Yet it suggests to us three primary qualities perfectly distinct from one another, as well as from the sensation which indicates them. When I move my hand along the table, the feeling is so simple that I find it difficult to distinguish it into things of different natures; yet, it immediately suggests hardness, smoothness, extension, and motion - things of very different natures, and all of them as distinctly understood as the feeling which suggests them."(2)

"Let a man press his hand against the table - he feels it hard...... He hath a certain feeling of touch from which he concludes, without any reasoning, or comparing ideas, that there is something external really existing, whose parts stick so firmly together, that they cannot be displaced without considerable force. ..... The hardness of the table is the conclusion, the feeling is the medium by which we are led to that conclusion...... (They are) as unlike as any two things in nature. The one is a sensation

(2) Inquiry, c. 5, sec. 5, Works, p. 125.

(1) Ibid., c. 5, sec. 2, Works, pp. 119, 120.
A paragraph on page 146 of the document.

The text continues with a discussion on the subject matter, possibly involving statistical analysis or data presentation.
of the mind, which can have no existence but in a sentient being; nor can it exist one moment longer than it is felt; the other is in the table, and we conclude without any difficulty, that it was in the table before it was felt, and continues after the feeling is over......

"And as the feeling hath no similitude to hardness, so neither can our reason perceive the least tie or connection between them...... But ... all mankind are led by their constitution to conclude hardness from this feeling." (1)

We have now examined enough examples of the relation between sensation and perception to be able to understand what Reid's doctrine of the relation is, for he says that the same is true of 'all the qualities of body which we have examined.' Let us now ascertain its defects and antagonism to his avowed principle of immediate perception.

We find Copyism at the bottom of his difficulties just as in the case of the ideal system to which he was opposed. Although he discovers that sensations are devoid of resemblance to external reality he feels that perceptions must be. 'We have a distinct of real qualities or properties of bodies', and our conception of the quality copies the quality itself as is quite obvious from the above quoted passages. At bottom his 'Natural Realism' presupposed the same duality as did the theory of 'Representative Perception', and he was obliged in consequence to postulate some sort of copyism for the perception for it to be true to the thing perceived. This fallacy was inevitable under the older realism. The newer realism has escaped it by acknowledging the instrumental character of percept and judgment. Reid's renunciation of copyism being only so far as bald sensations are concerned, was not

(1) Inquiry, c. 5, sec. 5, Works, p. 125.
thorough-going enough to deliver him from the snare of representa-
tionalism. His instincts seem to have led him in the right direc-
tion, but he tried to lay hold of the doctrine of immediate percep-
tion without entirely letting go of representationalism, and in
trying 'to serve two masters' succeeded only in defeating his
own purpose.
CONCLUSION.

Our conclusion from this study of eighteenth century philosophy is mainly negative, but even thus it is far from worthless. It is said that after Edison had performed some five thousand experiments in an attempt to improve the storage battery, a friend consoled him on the great loss of time and expense. Edison's reply was, "It was amply worth while, for now I know five thousand things not to do." In like manner, we have learned several things not to do, for our study of these philosophers warns us that Representationalism or Copy Theory in whatever guise it appears, will afford us no thoroughfare.

Locke's statement of the dualism was by Hume's irresistible logic brought to a reductio ad absurdum. Reid's transfer of the copyism from the sensation to the perception, and reduction of the former to a sort of hair-trigger suggestion fails to save the theory. Knowledge, then, cannot be a photographic copy of externality. The only other theory which has been advanced is that it is instrumental in character. Until some other more conclusive theory has been advanced, this one would seem to indicate the true character of perception, especially as it will be found to be free from the inconsistencies of the Copy Theory. Let us consider for a moment Locke's and Reid's insistence on the existence of external things which were hard or soft, rough or smooth, in motion or at rest, etc., 'before they were perceived and will continue to be so when they are not perceived.' What do hardness, softness, etc. mean, what can they possibly mean, to a human being except in terms of human reference? Reid says a thing is hard 'When the parts adhere so firmly that it cannot easily be made to change its figure', a definition which is pragmatic enough, as you cannot tell how readily its parts are displaced unless there is a reference to the human organism in some way, directly or indirectly.
So in spite of himself, his definition of hardness does not show an absolute independence of a percipient organism. In a sense somewhat different from that intended by Protagoras, we find that "Man is the measure of all things." Thus one lesson which we have learned from our study is the instrumental character of our knowing.

Another 'moral, which the tale discloses' is with regard to the elemental data of experience which are seen to be not the bald ideas of sensation and reflection of Locke, or the fleeting, naked, discrete impressions and ideas of Hume; but living, pulsing, throbbing, meaningful experiences. Of course this is just another way of looking at the same truth disclosed by the statement that knowledge is instrumental, but as our philosophers seemed to regard as two distinct facts their belief that the elemental data are bare sensations, and the belief in their character as copy, it seems proper to state our outcome in such a way as to show its opposition to both views. It is only fair to Reid to say that his eyes were open to the falsity of the first theory specified, but he held as tenaciously as the rest to the other, and did not entirely renounce the first, but only modified it sufficiently to eliminate the most glaring inconsistencies.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.

John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.

George Berkeley: A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.

Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.

Siris: a Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Inquiries Concerning the Virtues of Tar-water, and Divers Other Subjects Connected Together and Arising One from Another.

David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature.

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.

Thomas Reid: An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense.


-----------

B. H. Bode: An Outline of Logic, chapters 15 & 16.

F. H. Bradley: Appearance and Reality, chapter 1.


A. C. Fraser: John Locke as a Factor in Modern Thought.

J. G. Hibben: The Philosophy of Enlightenment, chapter 3.


A. S. Pringle-Pattison: Scottish Philosophy.

E. H. Sneath: The Philosophy of Reid.

-----------

Italics are used above to designate that part of the title used in the foot-notes in references to those works.