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MARK TWAIN'S DESPERATE NATURALISM

BY

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THESIS

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I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY
SUPERVISION BY PHILIP YATES COLEMAN
ENTITLED MARK TWAIN'S DESPERATE NATURALISM
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[Signatures]

Recommendation concurred in†

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CHAPTER I

THE MORAL DETERMINISM OF WHAT IS MAN?

Present-day apologists for Mark Twain have been forced into the position of saying that although he was inconsistent, shallow, materialistic, and afraid to attack the problems of his day, he wrote a great novel: *Huckleberry Finn* is a glorious accident. In other words, most Twain critics from Van Wyck Brooks on have argued or assumed that in terms of ideas he was inadequately prepared for novel writing. I believe that he was adequately prepared with ideas and that his world view, while not profound by a trained philosopher's standards, was both carefully thought out and in harmony with the philosophies of many of his better educated contemporaries. I further believe that his world view informed his early work as well as the late and gave the novels their strength. The weaknesses of his novels are evidence of his artistic rather than his philosophic shortcomings.

Twain's philosophy is most fully explicated in a work he referred to in his later years as his "gospel" -- *What Is Man?* This "gospel" has been ignored by some critics and variously interpreted by others, but in very few cases has it been carefully related to Twain's fiction. Three doctoral dissertations have given it more than passing treatment. Frank Flowers, in "Mark Twain's Theories of Morality," makes an extensive study of *What Is Man?* in order to derive its moral precepts. He emphasizes (over-emphasizes, it seems to me) Twain's function as a moralist. In so doing he establishes one important point, which should be more fully recognized, namely, that *What Is Man?* is
neither an immoral or an amoral document. Even when Twain uses the term "moral sense" as the characteristic which ranks man as the lowest of animals, he does so for a moral purpose and from a moral perspective. Flowers tends to deny and ignore Twain's deterministic statements rather than deal with the apparent inconsistency; however, in his study of the relationship of What Is Man? to The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, he shows rather effectively that Twain's "gospel" was central to his world view very early in his career.

Paul Carter, in "Mark Twain's Political and Social Ideas," summarizes What Is Man? concisely, pointing out the apparent inconsistency of moralism and determinism as he goes, and studies the social ramifications of such a theory by excerpting statements from many of Twain's later works. However, he does not discuss it as an element which shaped Twain's fiction. Since he quotes liberally from A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court (accepting the Yankee's statements as Twain's), he tends to overstate Twain's faith in training.

Thomas Bond Burnham, in "Mark Twain and the Machine," deals with the mechanistic terms of Twain's philosophy as one aspect of his interest in machines. He visualizes Twain's interest in the Paige typesetter and Szczepanik's Telelectroscope as an interest that led Twain to view the machine as an ideal and man as an inferior (because not ideal) creator of the machine. His account of Twain's connections with the typesetter and telelectroscope is good biography and his study of Twain's "rational-mystical dualities" is an interesting attempt to explain Twain's mind.

Of these three dissertations, only Flowers' attempts to study Twain's writing in terms of his philosophy, to apply the thought to the work rather
than derive the thought from it. As I have said, Flowers' restricted interest in morality puts severe limits on the scope of his study.

More recently, a brief study by Alexander E. Jones, "Mark Twain and the Determinism of What Is Man?", has summarized previous investigations, pointing out that What Is Man? antedates his period of despair and that Twain's determinism is not fatalism but is instead a "doctrine of hope.... An examination of this sweet and gentle 'gospel' is not without its rewards. For What Is Man? provides a key to Twain's philosophy during the years of his greatest literary achievement." Unfortunately, Jones does not proceed to relate the philosophy to the works.

In his discussion of Mark Twain's "Religious-Ethical Ideas" in Eight American Authors, Harry H. Clark cites Gladys Bellamy's Mark Twain as a Literary Artist (1950) as "one of the best over-all analyses" of Twain's thinking and calls attention to the four "bases" of Twain's mind -- moralism, determinism, pessimism, and "patheticism." Clark points out that Mrs. Bellamy "emphasizes the logical inconsistency of moralism and determinism" and concludes, after a survey of less successful studies, that "a full-length, carefully balanced book on Mark Twain's religious-ethical ideas... is much needed." I cannot supply the work that Clark asks for in the scope of this paper, but I do propose a study which leads in that direction.

Mrs. Bellamy's work is remarkably broad, but, disappointingly, it is not deep. For instance, in spite of her several references to What Is Man? there is no discussion of it which amounts to more than a summarizing sentence or epitomizing excerpt. Early in her book she says, "On the one hand,
he was the rabid reformer, eager to uplift, instruct, and purify mankind. On the other, he was the dogmatic determinist, preaching as the text of his 'Gospel' that the inborn disposition of mankind is 'a thing which is as permanent as rock, and never undergoes any actual or genuine change between cradle and grave' -- a doctrine which in effect renders useless all attempts to uplift, instruct, or purify mankind. She repeats the same excerpt in the middle of her book, as "the text of his 'Gospel,'" but towards the end of her book, she says "The philosophic nihilism of What Is Man? (in which the chief idea is that man cannot be blamed for his worthlessness, since the malevolent intelligence which created the universe controls his actions) contrasts sharply with Twain's rage at mankind." Her summarizing excerpts from What Is Man? are contradictory; furthermore, neither of them gets at the central point of What Is Man? -- a point that is not easily epitomized in one neat phrase. There were apparent inconsistencies in Twain's personality -- just as there are in any man. However, the inconsistency Mrs. Bellamy has chosen to emphasize is (1) much more apparent than real; (2) an inconsistency held in common by all determinists who write about it since their very effort to write shows that their determinism has not made them stop striving; and (3) is also an inconsistency of Calvinists who believe in predestination and of scientists whose every experiment has as its premise that the world is determined, but who hope to improve the lot of mankind by the results of their experiments. Mrs. Bellamy's method has been to look for inconsistencies, which she has found; I propose to look beyond the inconsistencies for the unifying basis which permitted Mrs. Bellamy's "bases" to exist in one man.
I intend to analyse *What Is Man?* in order to define and describe Twain's philosophical position. Following this analysis, I shall investigate his major works in chronological order, looking at each one first for evidence of Twain's philosophy as I have found it in *What Is Man?*, especially the notions of training, temperament, free will, master passion, and moral sense, and, second, applying Twain's philosophy to an explication of the novels. By so doing I hope to demonstrate that Twain held these views throughout most of his writing career -- that he was not unsympathetic to them as early as 1869 (when he published *Innocents Abroad*) and that he had clearly formulated them by the mid-1870's. Further, I hope to demonstrate that reading the novels in the light of his world view makes them more meaningful and helps to explain some of the artistic problems in them.

My approach to each novel will be basically but not entirely the same. While I shall treat the general problems of philosophic outlook in all the works, each work presents an opportunity for special emphasis on some related problem. For instance, Twain did not finish *The Mysterious Stranger* before he died. He left the story in several different manuscript forms. A. B. Paine took an ending from one version and tacked it on to another in order to publish it. The ending, which includes the notion that life is but a dream, doesn't fit the rest of the story. In terms of inconsistency of tone or approach in the story, we can blame Paine for the condition of *The Mysterious Stranger*, however, if the thought is inconsistent, we still have to reconcile the contradictory views to their single source. Similarly *Pudd'nhead Wilson* has been frequently misunderstood because the irony of the conclusion has been so frequently overlooked.
From his early career on, irony was one of Twain's basic writing tools, but he didn't have complete control of it and many of his ironic statements were taken seriously. A study of his method at one point where it has been misunderstood should help explain other such occurrences.

Although the most systematic exposition of Mark Twain's deterministic philosophy is What Is Man?, the essay presents several problems to critics who wish to use it as an approach to Twain's thinking. First, there is a problem in dating it: Does it represent the climactic expression of an old and disappointed man, or is it, as Twain implies, a product of his youthful inquiry which he suppressed until his later years? Second, the dialogue form of the essay requires one to decide whether the views of the speaker can be equated with Twain's views (similarly, is the voice of Mark Twain in such a work as Innocents Abroad to be equated with Sam Clemens?). Third, in view of the criticism What Is Man? has been subjected to, one must decide if it is worth studying at all.

Twain explained the genesis of What Is Man? in the short preface to the anonymous 1906 edition. "February 1905. The studies for these papers were begun twenty-five or twenty-seven years ago. The papers were written seven years ago. I have examined them once or twice per year since and found them satisfactory. I have just examined them again, and am still satisfied that they speak the truth..." If we take Twain literally he began to formulate, perhaps to systematize, his ideas as early as 1878. There is no evidence to refute this date. Indeed this figure is the sort of "fact" which is irrefutable because it is vague. There is no way of knowing whether "began these studies" implies that Twain began writing out a deterministic philosophy in 1878 or merely began to
speculate in philosophical terms. Minnie Brashear estimates that Twain's philosophical speculations started before 1874, Hyatt Waggoner claims "that 1885 would be nearer to the truth." Alexander Jones argues that *What Is Man?* has roots in an unpublished dialogue between Negroes which Twain wrote in 1882 and that Twain had presented one segment of *What Is Man?* as a talk to the Monday Evening Club as early as 1880. Waggoner also points out that passages in the Notebook dated as early as 1870 show an interest in science which might well be considered the beginning of an interest in determinism. Twain says in his *Autobiography* that his notion of the "moral sense" was derived from a Scotch job printer he met in Cincinnati in his pre-river pilot days. If this anecdote is not to be trusted, we might trace the source of the moral sense to Twain's reading of Lecky's *History of European Morals*. Whatever the date of its beginnings, *What Is Man?* cannot be dismissed as the work of Twain's last despairing years, there is too much evidence to the contrary. Though the serious tone of the essay may not fit the popular conception of the young Mark Twain as a humorist, it stands as a natural outgrowth of the thinking of a man who wrote after his first flush of literary success, "Fame is a vapor, popularity an accident, the only earthly certainty is oblivion."  

In a work of fiction which has a first person narrator, it is difficult to decide whether the commentary in the work represents the author's opinion or is merely the opinion of a persona -- a character distinctly separate from the author even though he may be wearing the author's name. Much of Twain's writing presents this problem. First, there is the problem of deciding whether Twain is to be identified with Clemens. The traditional approach has been that
"Twain" is only a pseudonym, that any statement made by Twain in *Innocents Abroad* or *Roughing It* can be excerpted and submitted as Clemens' opinion. There are many passages, however, which must be interpreted as dramatic irony, passages in which the narrator, Twain, says and does things which show his foibles. It is requisite for such passages that the author be more perceptive than the narrator. One such incident is the glove-buying scene, in which the narrator—Twain is persuaded to buy an ill-made and ill-fitting (even torn) pair of gloves because his vanity prevents him from admitting his ignorance. An even more obvious example of the problem of persona is *A Connecticut Yankee*. The opinions of hero Hank Morgan are frequently quoted as Clemens' opinions, in every case, it seems to me, unjustifiably. I shall handle this particular problem in some detail in a later chapter. The persona who speaks for Twain in *What Is Man?* is labeled "Old Man." He debates with and lectures to "Young Man." Here, too, there is a danger of too easily accepting the Old Man's views as Clemens', however, I think that the philosophical nature of the work and the dry matter-of-factness of presentation are clear implications that Twain is speaking for himself. Paul Carus has argued: "The book is published under Mark Twain's own name, Samuel Langhorne Clemens. This is significant, for here Mark Twain does not speak to us, but Mr. Clemens, not as humorist, but the man himself who has written under the pseudonym 'Mark Twain.'" It is my intention to accept *What Is Man?*, the letters, and the notebook as the work and the opinion of Samuel Clemens and to supplement these sources with other published fictional and nonfictional works with the reservation that any view in sharp contradiction to the views expressed in *What Is Man?* must be examined carefully.
before being accepted as "Twain's" opinion.

A third problem connected with the reading of What Is Man? might best be introduced with a quotation from Ludwig Lewisohn perpetuated by Richard Altick.

He [Twain] knew neither Plato nor Spinoza nor Kant; there is no evidence that he had ever read Emerson. He sat down to develop out of his own head, like an adolescent, like a child, a theory to fit the facts as he seemed to see them, and the only influence discernible in his theory is that of Robert Ingersoll! His ideas were 'quite literally the ideas of a village agnostic'.... He sought to solve problems which he did not know even enough to state.14

It is easy to introduce against Twain the charge that he was not a profound philosopher. He had not read basic treatises which would have made the formulation of his ideas easier. He was not familiar with the vocabulary or the methods of philosophic inquiry. Some of the problems he poses would not have played such important roles in the formulation of his thought if he had had a philosophical training. However, such charges as these do not vitiate the arguments for studying Twain's philosophical thought. First, as I have implied already, the ideas expressed in What Is Man? were ideas which he held through much of his creative career. Second, it is my belief that the thematic development of important works, such as Huckleberry Finn, A Connecticut Yankee, The Prince and the Pauper, Pudd'nhead Wilson, and The Mysterious Stranger, can be better understood in terms of Twain's philosophical opinions than in terms of his social and political opinions. I believe that his social and political opinions and his view of history are manifestations of his philosophical bias and that many of the apparent inconsistencies in his thought can be explained away if they are examined in the
light of his philosophy rather than in the light of each other. Third, to say that
the only discernible influence in Twain's philosophy is that of Robert Ingersoll
is to imply an inadequacy of intellect, a rashness of judgment, and a braggado-
cio of pronouncement which do not fit the facts. Twain may not have been ade-
quately prepared for his inquiries, but this is not to say that he was rash in the
formulation of them or that he hurried his views into print. Instead, he tried a
tentative exposition of his views before the Monday Evening Club at Hartford
in 1883, if not earlier, and, finding them rejected, he did not seek further
public audience for them for almost thirty years, at which time he published

What Is Man? has as its root the basic assumption of determinism --
that all present effects have antecedent causes. Twain begins by drawing an
analogy between man and a machine in order to point out that man is the sum of
the outside forces which have made him what he is. As the essay progresses,
Twain makes it clear that these forces can be put into two classes. those forces
antecedent to the birth of the man which influence the quality of the seed, forces
which Twain calls temperament, and those forces of environment which influence
the actions and beliefs and the success or failure of the man, forces which Twain
calls training.

It is unfortunate that Twain picked the machine as his basic analogy to
illustrate the condition of man. It was a convenient figure of speech, practically
unavoidable, to illustrate that man is something created by outside agents, but
Twain's interpreters have put too much emphasis on the metaphor. They have
read Twain as saying that man is a machine, whereas the emphasis should be
that man is like a machine. The difference is slight and subtle, but the emphasis on the machine metaphor leads to an interpretation of *A Connecticut Yankee* as a hymn to industrialism.¹⁶

Twain's metaphor leads to an equation in which primitive man equals a stone machine and civilized man equals a steel machine:

The original rock contained the stuff of which the steel one was built—but along with it a lot of sulphur and stone and other obstructing inborn heredities, brought down from old geologic ages—prejudices, let us call them. Prejudices which nothing within the rock itself had either power to remove or any desire to remove.... to get the best results, you must free the metal from its obstructing prejudicial ores by education—smelting, refining, and so forth.... Whatever a man is, is due to his make, and to the influences brought to bear upon it by his heredities, his habitat, his associations.¹⁷

The opinions which a man holds and which he considers to be his own "are odds and ends of thoughts, impressions, feelings, gathered unconsciously from a thousand books, a thousand conversations, and from streams of thought and feeling which have flowed down into [his] heart and brain out of the hearts and brains of centuries of ancestors" (p. 5). In using the machine metaphor, Twain has set up an equation which reads as follows: man is to the machine as God is to man. The result of the equation is that just as man takes the credit of the machine he creates, rather than giving the credit to the machine, and just as man decides the destiny of the machines he creates, so does the credit for the creation of man and the control of man's destiny rest in God. Twain did not always use a machine metaphor to make such a point. Once, upon being complimented on his "dramatic gift," Twain responded, "it is a gift, I suppose, like spelling and punctuation and smoking. I seem to have inherited all those...."
We don't create any of our traits, we inherit all of them. They have come down to us from what we impudently call the lower animals.... the several temperaments constitute a law of God, a command of God, and that whatsoever is done in obedience to that law is blameless. Man inherits certain "gifts" and limitations -- certain built-in laws which he must follow -- and credit or blame should go to the giver of the gifts -- God. Twain employs this Christian terminology often in What Is Man?

O.M. Take those others -- the elemental moral qualities -- charity, benevolence, magnanimity, kindliness, fruitful seeds, out of which sprung, through cultivation by outside influences, all the manifold blends and combinations of virtues named in the dictionaries: does man manufacture any one of those seeds, or are they all born in him?

Y.M. Born in him.

O.M. Who manufactures them, then?

Y.M. God.

O.M. Where does the credit of it belong?

Y.M. To God.

O.M. And the glory of which you spoke, and the applause?

Y.M. To God.

O.M. Then it is you who degrade man. You make him claim glory, praise, flattery, for every valuable thing he possesses -- borrowed finery, the whole of it, no rag of it earned by himself, not a detail of it produced by his own labor....

O.M. Who devised that cunning and beautiful mechanism, a man's hand?

Y.M. God

O.M. Who devised the law by which it automatically hammers
out of a piano an elaborate piece of music, without error, while the man is thinking about something else, or talking to a friend?

Y. M. God.

O. M. Who devised the blood? Who devised the wonderful machinery which automatically drives its renewing and refreshing streams through the body, day and night, without assistance or advice from the man? Who devised the man's mind, whose machinery works automatically, interests itself in what it pleases, regardless of his will or desire, labors all night when it likes, deaf to his appeals for mercy? God devised all these things. I have not made man a machine, God made him a machine. I am merely calling attention to the fact, nothing more. Is it wrong to call attention to the fact? Is it a crime? (pp. 103-105)

In each instance of Twain's illustration of the machine metaphor, though he says in the above passage, "God made him a machine," Twain is dealing with outside impulse or the unconscious and subconscious and involuntary actions of the body which he labels as being outside of man, or to put it differently, as being beyond man's control (he means by this, conscious control). The hand playing automatically, the circulatory system working through the night, and the restless mind which won't let its so-called master sleep are evidence to Twain that man does not have free will and that his mind is a collection of images collected in past experience which circulate by free association through his brain.

We can see in the above passages that Twain implies a dichotomy of outside influences: heredity and environment. In these two categories he finds everything that goes into the making of the individual. To the mid-twentieth century man, this is not a startling analysis, in fact it seems to be an explanation of the obvious. Only the terms are startling. Twain's machine metaphor strikes one as a gross oversimplification, the sort of thing one might expect of an amateur dabbling in metaphysics (who is impressed by the fact that all
he finds is physics). Indeed, the mid-twentieth century man is appalled at the logical dilemma in which Twain was embroiled, a dilemma which a good sophomore course in semantics would have turned into a phantom, a fog which appeared substantial only to the nineteenth century mind. To say that a man knows nothing a priori, that everything he is has come to him in the form of heredity or environment, does not lead necessarily to the conclusion that he has no personal merit or that he has no free will. To say that water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen does not deny that there is such a thing as water. To say that man is the gathering together of a multitude of materials, none of which he intended to bring together, is not in itself enough to deny that these materials, so brought together, constitute a man, an individual who acts as an individual, not as the sum of outside forces but as the alchemy of these forces, who, though he certainly does not have free will from the Twain point of view, still acts as if he has free will.

The inductive methods of nineteenth century science appear to the layman to be quantitative, the statistical approach leads one to think in numbers and numbers always require the presupposition that some absolutely equal quality is being abstracted from each unit. The variables of the units are necessarily lost in the first addition. It was just three years after the first publication of What Is Man? that John Dewey published his lecture, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought. In the title essay and later in The Quest for Certainty, Dewey demonstrates that the influence of Darwin ranged far beyond the facts that he popularized. One of the results of Darwinism was a new approach to knowledge, an approach that Twain attempted:
...the 'Origin of Species' introduced a mode of thinking that in the end was bound to transform the logic of knowledge and hence the treatment of morals, politics, and religion, ... the new logic outlaws, flanks, dismisses... one type of problems and substitutes for it another type. Philosophy forswears inquiry after absolute finalities in order to explore specific values and the specific conditions that generate them,... The conception of the physical object is, in considerable degree, the outcome of complex operations of comparisons and translation. In consequence, while the physical object is not any one of the things compared, it enables things qualitatively unlike and individual to be treated as if they were members of a comprehensive, homogeneous, or non-qualitative system,... the result are [sic] objects of thought stated in numbers, where the numbers in question permit inclusion within complex systems of equations and other mathematical functions.

By the quantitative method, if one added men he got men, but if he added the attributes of men or the constituent parts of men, the man disappeared and all that was left was the attribute or part. Twain failed to realize that his method of investigation, not man himself, was the source of the fragmented man he discovered.

Paul Carus, making the first serious analysis of What Is Man? in the 1913 Monist, states this point about Twain's thinking in somewhat different terms:

Like so many professional philosophers he falls into the trap of his own nomenclature. He personifies abstract ideas. His terms such as 'mind' and the 'ego,' become independent beings, and he has much to say of the task master, of the stern judge whose approval everyone seeks, But are not our mind and the stern master whose slaves we are, parts of ourselves? This stern master is the ultimate court of appeal which has originated in the course of the development of our humanity with unavoidable necessity, he is the climax of our moral evolution. Every man has his own master who is his better self, representing self-control, and the height thus attained is different in different persons. What the master decides is our own decision.
Twain added heredity and environment and got everything that went to make up the man, to him this led to the denial of individual responsibility — what he called "Personal Merit."

Y.M. I suppose, then, there is no more merit in being brave than in being a coward?

O.M. Personal merit? No. A brave man does not create his bravery. He is entitled to no personal credit for possessing it. It is born to him. A baby born with a billion dollars—where is the personal merit in that? A baby born with nothing—where is the personal demerit in that? The one is fawned upon, admired, worshipped, by sycophants, the other is neglected and despised—where is the sense in it?

Y.M. Sometimes a timid man sets himself the task of conquering his cowardice and becoming brave—and succeeds. What do you say to that?

O.M. That it shows the value of training in right directions over training in wrong ones. Inestimably valuable is training, influence, education in right directions—training one's self-approbation to elevate its ideals.

Y.M. But as to merit—the personal merit of the victorious coward's project and achievement?

O.M. There isn't any. In the world's view he is a worthier man than he was before, but he didn't achieve the change—the merit of it is not his.

Y.M. Whose then?

O.M. To start with, he was not utterly and completely a coward, or the influences would have had nothing to work upon. He was not afraid of a cow, though perhaps of a bull; not afraid of a woman though afraid of a man. There was something to build upon. There was a seed. No seed, no plant. Did he make that seed himself, or was it born in him? It was no merit of his that the seed was there.

Y.M. Well, anyway, the idea of cultivating it, the resolution to cultivate it, was meritorious, and he originated that.

O.M. He did nothing of the kind. It came whence all impulses,
good or bad, come—from outside. If that timid man had lived all his life in a community of human rabbits, had never read of brave deeds, had never heard speak of them, had never heard any one praise them nor express envy of the heroes that had done them, he would have had no more idea of bravery than Adam had of modesty, and it could never by any possibility have occurred to him to resolve to become brave. He could not originate the idea—it had to come to him from the outside. And so, when he heard bravery extolled and cowardice derided, it woke him up. He was ashamed. Perhaps his sweetheart turned up her nose and said, "I am told that you are a coward!" It was not he that turned over the new leaf—she did it for him. He must not strut around in the merit of it—it is not his.

This passage again creates the distinction between temperament and training and demonstrates by the emphasis it uses that training is more important than temperament. Twain's definition of training is broad

Study, instruction, lectures, sermons... That is part of it—but not a large part. I mean all the outside influences. There are millions of them. From the cradle to the grave, during all his waking hours, the human being is under training. In the very first rank of his trainers stands association.... The human being] is a chameleon, by the law of his nature he takes the color of his place of resort. The influences about him create his preferences, his aversions, his politics, his tastes, his morals, his religion. He creates none of these things for himself. He thinks he does, but that is because he has not examined into the matter. (p. 43)

Twain followed this statement with an illustration showing that religious faiths are arrived at by nationality, location, etc., rather than by "seeking after truth" (p. 45). He later reinforces his point by another example, a "Parable." He establishes a pair of twins of supposed common temperaments who go different ways in their youth, one becoming a sailor, the other a preacher, thus developing different sets of values. At this point, the sailor George comes to visit Henry his preacher brother.
One evening a man passed by and turned down the lane, and Henry said, with a pathetic smile, "Without intending me a discomfort, that man is always keeping me reminded of my pinching poverty, for he carries heaps of money about him, and goes by here every evening of his life." That outside influence -- that remark -- was enough for George, but it was not the one that made him ambush the man and rob him, it merely represented the eleven years' accumulation of such influences, and gave birth to the act for which their long gestation had made preparation. It had never entered the head of Henry to rob the man -- his ingot had been subjected to clean steam only, but George's had been subjected to vaporized quicksilver. (p. 62)

The twins had the same heritage, at birth, they were identical in every way, but the different environments they experienced, the "training" they received molded them differently.

Training is expounded and illustrated in many of Twain's later works. The autobiographical essay which he wrote for Harper's Bazaar (1910), "The Turning Point of My Life," is nothing more than an exposition of training and temperament. What is called the turning point "is only the last link in a very long chain of turning-points commissioned to produce the cardinal result; it is not any more important than the humblest of its ten thousand predecessors .... they were all necessary, to have left out any one of them would have defeated the scheme and brought about some other result." Twain expands his definition of influences to include Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon and adds "I should have to go back ages before Caesar's day to find the first one." Here he exemplifies the basic deterministic position. every event influences every later event. To change any one would be to alter the world, perhaps drastically. The concept of training becomes an environmental concept in the broadest meaning of the word. It includes not only those influences which
work directly on the individual, but also those which work on the influences — not only influences which present man with choices and which mold his values but also influences which are simply brute forces working on him. Twain proceeds to list some of the prominent turning points which moved him toward a literary career: a measles epidemic in his childhood, a book he read about South America, a fifty-dollar bill he found on a Keokuk street corner (which gave him the capital needed for his projected trip to the Amazon), a chance acquaintance with Horace Bixby, who offered to teach him the piloting trade, the outbreak of the Civil War which closed the Mississippi River, his brother's appointment as secretary to the Nevada Territory, the offer of a job with the Enterprise, and so on.

Concerning the offer of a job by the Enterprise, he says. "One isn't a printer ten years without setting up acres of good and bad literature, and learning -- unconsciously at first, consciously later -- to discriminate between the two, within his mental limitations, and meantime he is unconsciously acquiring what is called a 'style.'" When the opportunity came along, Twain was prepared for it, but he had not set about becoming a writer by any conscious method. He had not planned from his youth to become a journalist, as this essay tells us (in a fictionalized way), it was circumstance, and disagreeable circumstance at that, which had turned him into a printer.

Now what interests me, as regards these details, is not the details themselves, but the fact that none of them was foreseen by me, none of them was planned by me, I was the author of none of them. Circumstance, working in harness with my temperament, created them all and compelled them all. I often offered help, and with the best intentions, but it was rejected—as a rule uncourteously. I could never plan a thing and get it to come out the way I planned it. It came out some
other way -- some way I had not counted upon.\textsuperscript{24}

Although training is the most important force in the making of a man, Twain is always careful to recognize that other factor, heredity. Circum­
stance works "in harness with temperament." Even in "The Turning Point
of My Life," where Twain is attempting to emphasize the importance of cir­
cumstance, he is careful to allow for temperament. In relating that the chance
finding of a fifty-dollar bill enabled him to start on a journey to the Amazon,
he labels the circumstance "another turning point, another link," but he con­
tinues.

Could Circumstance have ordered another dweller in that
town to go to the Amazon and open up a world-trade in coca
sic on a fifty-dollar basis and been obeyed? No, I was the
only one. There were other fools there -- shoals and shoals
of them -- but they were not of my kind. I was the only one
of my kind.

Circumstance is powerful, but it cannot work alone, it has
to have a partner. Its partner is man's temperament -- his
natural disposition. His temperament is not his invention,
it is born in him, and he has no authority over it, neither is
he responsible for its acts.\textsuperscript{25}

Man has born in him certain seeds, potentialities and limitations be­
yond the range of which training may not take him. Although the parable I have
quoted shows that two men with identical seeds can have such opposite careers
as preacher and sailor-rowdy-thief, Twain is careful to make it clear that the
two operate from similar temperaments. Both men are jealous of the rich
man's wealth. The preacher's envy drives the sailor to accomplish an act
that the preacher's training wouldn't permit. Twain puts definite limitations
on the effects of training. These limitations are of two kinds first, the
limitation which would cause each man who finds a fifty-dollar bill to react differently, and second, a limitation which Twain's term temperament fits most accurately, a predominance of mood which changing circumstance can't alter. Earlier we have seen that Twain attributes creation of "elemental moral qualities" to God. These qualities can be blended by training, but the basic qualities themselves cannot be removed from the man. There are inherited limits beyond which circumstances cannot change him. Two points must be made about this aspect of What Is Man? first, Twain's determinism is not limited to environmentalism, as the determinism of later American naturalists tends to be, second, Twain denied man's individuality in spite of this concept. The first of these points is self-apparent and will come in for more discussion elsewhere, but the second point is the basis for two other aspects of Twain's philosophy and must be elaborated on. As has already been pointed out, Twain commits an apparent fallacy in reasoning that since all the attributes of man can be traced to outside sources, the man has no personal merit. The logic of this conclusion is tenuous. However, Twain links it with another notion of his -- that the individual man never achieves wholeness because different stimuli appeal to different parts of the man.

First, he distinguishes between the body and "the Me"; then he proceeds to dissect the Me. He divides mind into intellectual, moral, spiritual, and emotional impulses which frequently work at odds with each other, no one of them really being in control.

O.M. ... You perceive that the question of who or what the Me is, is not a simple one at all. You say "I admire the rainbow," and "I believe the world is round," and in
these cases we find that the Me is not all speaking, but only the mental part. You say "I grieve," and again the Me is not all speaking, but only the moral part. You say the mind is wholly spiritual, then you say "I have a pain" and find that this time the Me is mental and spiritual combined. We all use the "I" in this indeterminate fashion, there is no help for it. We imagine a Master and King over what you call The Whole Thing, and we speak of him as "I" but when we try to define him we find we cannot do it.... To me, Man is a machine, made up of many mechanisms, the moral and mental ones acting automatically in accordance with the impulses of an interior Master who is built out of born-temperament and an accumulation of multitudinous outside influences and trainings; a machine whose one function is to secure the spiritual contentment of the Master, be his desires good or be they evil; a machine whose Will is absolute and must be obeyed and always is obeyed. (pp. 97-98)

Man falls short of wholeness not only because he is nothing more than the sum of the outside forces which made him but also because he cannot unify these forces, he cannot bring them all to bear on any one stimulus. He thinks, he emotes, he feels; he sees, he hears, he smells, but he never does all at once. He is ruled by urges which are so loosely connected with his rational faculties that man frequently thinks one way and acts another without being able to control himself, often without even realizing what is happening. This logic leads Twain to two important subpoints: his notion of free will and the master passion, each of which will be discussed later. However, the primary point is that each man is born with a set temperament which is unalterable. Training can change the manifestations of his character, within the limits of his temperament, but his basic inherited potentialities cannot be altered. "For the temperament is the man, the thing tricked out with clothes and named Man is merely its Shadow, nothing more. The law of the tiger's temperament
is, Thou shalt kill... To issue later commands requiring the tiger to let the
fat stranger alone... would invite to violations of the law of temperament,
which is supreme, and takes precedence over all other authorities."

The second aspect of temperament is one which brings What Is Man?
to a close -- the notion that man has an inborn disposition, a tendency to be
happy or unhappy regardless of the circumstances of his life. When the
Young Man urges the Old Man not to publish his beliefs because they amount
to "a desolating doctrine" which would take away man's happiness, the Old Man
replies that nothing can change the amount of happiness or unhappiness in a
man's life. He illustrates his point with two men who have had similar ups and
downs in their careers. One has always been happy, through good days and
bad, the other always unhappy. "No political or religious belief can make
[the one man] unhappy or the other man happy. I assure you it is purely a
matter of temperament. Beliefs are acquirements, temperaments are
born, beliefs are subject to change, nothing whatever can change temperament"
(p. 107). This argument might be called reduplicating determinism. Twain
has established that the world is determined: the first cause has determined
all subsequent causes. It follows that one might as well not strive to accom-
plish things because he is destined to accomplish them, or not to, in spite of
himself. Twain adds to this notion man's temperament: if one should strive
for a desired result and should accomplish it, which he could do only if ex-
ternal forces determined that he should and would, even then the desired re-
sult would not alter his happiness because happiness and unhappiness are
born into the man and exist regardless of circumstances. These are the
ingredients of despair, however, they are not the ingredients frequently cited by Twain scholars, from DeVoto on, who attribute Twain's despair to the calamities that took his family from him. If we apply Twain's formula to Twain, we must look elsewhere -- to his temperament -- for an explanation of his state of mind.

Twain's position on the subject of outside influences leads him inevitably to the task of wrestling with the notion of free will -- a problem that has frustrated better philosophers than he. He resolves the problem neatly by making a distinction between free will and free choice. Man does not have free will: "His temperament, his training, and the daily influences which molded him and made him what he was" make the decisions for him. But he does have free choice:

Y. M. What is the difference?

O. M. The one implies untrammeled power to act as you please, the other implies nothing beyond a mere mental process, the critical ability to determine which of two things is nearest right and just . . . . . . . The mind can freely select, choose, point out the right and just one -- its function stops there. It can go no further in the matter. It has no authority to say that the right one shall be acted upon and the wrong one discarded. That authority is in other hands . . . . . In his born disposition and the character which has been built around it by training and environment. (pp. 90-91)

In 1902, Twain read Jonathan Edwards' Freedom of the Will and discovered it to be "an insane debauch . . . . . . . All through the book is the glare of a resplendent intellect gone mad." The point that seemed madness to him was Edwards' insistence that man was morally responsible to God.
Jonathan seems to hold (as against the Arminian position) that the Man (or his Soul or his Will) never creates an impulse itself, but is moved to action by an impulse back of it. That's sound!

Also, that of two or more things offered it, it infallibly chooses the one which for the moment is most pleasing to ITSELF. Perfectly correct! An immense admission for a man not otherwise sane.

Up to that point he could have written chapters III and IV of my suppressed "Gospel." But there we seem to separate.

To Twain, Edwards had conceded that man is but a machine completely dominated by "motive and necessity," and he felt that Edwards then "shirked" in order to enforce traditional Christian dogma. I must confess that it has always seemed to me, too, that Edwards backed down after dispensing with free will. However, it is remarkable that Twain was not disturbed by Edwards' distinction between will and choice, which is precisely opposite to Twain's; Edwards concedes inability to will as one wills but insists that one has the power to act as one wills. Twain insists that one has freedom to choose but not the freedom to follow his rational choice, instead being impelled by his master passion to answer its desires.

It is rather ironic that Twain, whose method of thought shows a marked resemblance to David Hume's, should approach the problem of free will in the same way Hume and Edwards did, by making a distinction between free will and free choice, but then reaches the very opposite conclusion. Hume demonstrated that as far as human action is measurable it appears to be determined -- necessary connections can be drawn between cause and effect. He proceeded to show that man is free only in having the freedom to act or not in situations where he has the power to act, thus Hume's distinction is close to Edwards'
though couched in empirical, positivistic terms. 28

Twain's position was bad philosophy, but as psychology it was remark-
ably modern. Without having sufficient vocabulary for such a purpose he was
groping towards a theory of the subconscious, toward a distinction between the
id and the ego and a recognition that the id frequently supplies the motive
power for man's acts.

Free choice is the ability to recognize by rational processes the differ-
ence between right and wrong. As such, it is a concept which tells us a great
deal about Twain's outlook -- a key to the relationship of the rational and emo-
tional in the man. It epitomizes the problem of understanding Twain's peculiar
brand of determinism. In terms of language used, this statement is a reaffirm-
ation that Twain's point of view was that of the Puritan, one who assumed with-
out the slightest doubt that there are right and wrong and that the individual man
can perceive these qualities. However, the logic of Twain's determinism im-
plies that not only free will but also free choice is an illusion, that man's per-
ception of right and wrong is shaped by his environment. 29 Just as he has said
that a man is a Presbyterian, or a Baptist, or a Hindu according to his training,
it would be logical to conclude that a man's training determines whether or not
he believes that it is good to help a woman stranded in a snow storm or wrong
to commit murder.

In order to approach this problem in its proper perspective, we need to
look at an apparent source of the idea, Lecky's History of European Morals
from Augustus to Charlemagne, a book which Twain read early in his career
and reread occasionally in his later years. 30
Conscience, whether we regard it as an original faculty or as a product of the association of ideas, exercises two distinct functions. It points out a difference between right and wrong, and when its commands are violated, it inflicts a certain measure of suffering and disturbance. The first function it exercises persistently through life. The second it only exercises under certain special circumstances. It is scarcely conceivable that a man in the possession of his faculties should pass a life of gross depravity and crime without being conscious that he was doing wrong, but it is extremely possible for him to do so without his consciousness having any appreciable influence upon his tranquility. There are multitudes to whom the necessity of discharging the duties of a butcher would be so inexpressibly painful and revolting, that if they could obtain flesh diet on no other condition, they would relinquish it forever. But to those who are inured to the trade, this repugnance has simply ceased. Nor can it be reasonably questioned that most men by an assiduous attendance at the slaughter-house could acquire a similar indifference. In like manner, the reproaches of conscience are doubtless a very real and important form of suffering to a sensitive, scrupulous, and virtuous girl who has committed some trivial act of levity or disobedience, but to an old and hardened criminal they are a matter of the most absolute indifference.

Lecky defines conscience as the ability to recognize right and wrong and demonstrates that man can act contrary to his conscience in much the way that we have seen Twain use the term. However, he follows this discussion with examples which demonstrate that man's attitude towards right and wrong is molded by his environment (or training).

Twain demonstrates his notion of free will and free choice with two examples. The first involves a man who gives his bus fare to a lady stranded in a snow storm even though it means that he will have to walk home.

O.M. We are constantly assured that every man is endowed with Free Will, and that he can and must exercise it where he is offered a choice between good conduct and less-good conduct. Yet we clearly saw that in that man's case he really had no Free Will: his temperament, his training, and the
daily influences which had molded him and made him what he was, compelled him to rescue the old woman and thus save himself -- save himself from spiritual pain, from unendurable wretchedness. (p. 90)

Twain's term "spiritual comfort" means something closely akin to peace of mind. Without better definition, his argument here appears tenuous. "Spiritual comfort" means the achievement of "self-approval." The man was presented with the alternative of refusing to help the woman and riding home or helping her and walking home. Riding home would have meant bodily comfort, but the man's opinion of himself would have given him spiritual discomfort, according to Twain, "spiritual" needs -- as he uses the term "spiritual" -- always dominate bodily needs.

The second example involves David and Goliath.

O. M. Wasn't it right for David to go out and slay Goliath?

Y. M. Yes.

O. M. Then it would have been equally right for anyone else to do it?

Y. M. Certainly.

O. M. Then it would have been right for a born coward to attempt it?

Y. M. It would -- yes....

O. M. You know that a born coward's make and temperament would be an absolute and insurmountable bar to his ever essaying such a thing, don't you?

Y. M. Yes, I know it.

O. M. He clearly perceives that it would be right to try it?

Y. M. Yes.
O. M. His mind has Free Choice in determining that it would be right to try it?

Y. M. Yes.

O. M. Then if by reason of his inborn cowardice he simply cannot essay it, what becomes of his Free Will? Where is his Free Will? Why claim that he has Free Will when the plain facts show that he hasn't. (p. 92)

Twain's examples are ironic. In the first, a man does the right thing in spite of himself, his self-approval demands it. In the second, a man fails to do what is right in a particular situation by being unable to kill. In other words, he has recognized as right an act that would be right only in his particular society and his particular situation. In his choice of examples Twain has severely qualified his statement that man is capable of distinguishing right from wrong. Man has the power to distinguish between the two, but his knowledge of them is limited by his training.

Up to this point, Twain has followed Lecky closely. However, Lecky concludes his discussion by denying that all of man's actions are basically selfish. "Right and wrong express ultimate intelligible motives...they carry with them a sense of obligation....We feel that man is capable of pursuing what he believes to be right although pain and disaster and mental suffering and an early death be the consequence, and though no prospect of future reward lighten upon his tomb. This is the highest prerogative of our being, the point of contact between the human nature and the divine." Twain did not adopt Lecky's psychology wholesale as has been suggested by Minnie Brashear. In fact, Twain's position has much in common with the Hartley-utilitarian position that Lecky attempts to refute -- the position that man is
motivated solely by self-interest. However, Lecky suggests an idea relationship which Twain has employed, he establishes man's awareness of right and wrong, and he equates this simultaneously with ultimate good and with the concepts of right and wrong as they exist in any particular society. Such an idea makes sense only to a man who assumes that the course of life (in particular the course of humanity) is determined and that at the same time humanity is moving towards perfection. This is a position which we might call Moral Determinism, or post-Darwinian Calvinism. Twain did not slough off the heritage of his past completely. His method was rational, even to a certain extent inductive, but the language of and his attitude towards the philosophy he created were securely couched in Calvinism.

In discussing the importance of training, Twain mentions "The good kind of training -- whose best and highest function is to see to it that every time it confers a satisfaction upon its pupil a benefit shall fall at second hand upon others" (p. 54). He continues with an "admonition," which will seem at first glance grossly inconsistent with his deterministic philosophy: "O. M. Diligently train your ideals upward and still upward toward a summit where you will find your chiefest pleasure in conduct which, while contenting you, will be sure to confer benefits upon your neighbor and the community." (p. 54) There is "good." Man can recognize the direction of good. Further, it would seem from this quotation, that man can train himself to do good. However, this excerpt placed once more in the context of the essay clearly insists that there is always an outside influence moving the individual towards good. The case of the apparent coward who resolved to develop courage and did so is an
example. Twain would insist here that the man who decides to train his
"ideals upward and still upward" is similarly impelled by outside forces. 33

Twain granted man free choice, the power to recognize right and wrong, but not the power to act on this distinction. Instead, Twain named another force as the impelling force behind all actions: the master passion -- self-interest.

O.M. The impulse which moves a person to do things.... [is] the impulse to content his own spirit--the necessity of of contenting his own spirit and winning its approval.... From his cradle to his grave a man never does a single thing which has any FIRST AND FOREMOST object but one--to secure peace of mind, spiritual comfort, for HIMSELF........ That mysterious autocrat, lodged in a man, which compels the man to content its desires....may be called the Master Passion--the hunger for Self-Approval....It is indifferent to the man's good, it never concerns itself about anything but the satisfying of its own desires. It can be trained to prefer things which will be for the man's good, but it will prefer them only because they will content it better than other things would. (pp. 12, 15, 98, 99)

Twain is once again dealing with the fractured man, the master passion is a force within the man which cannot be identified with the man. It forms a dichotomy with the thinking mechanism which can recognize right and wrong but cannot act. By Twain's terminology, the master passion satisfies its desires rather than the man's, and the man must obey its desires.

Y.M. It seems to be an immoral force seated in the man's moral constitution?

O.M. It is a colorless force seated in the man's moral constitution. Let us call it an instinct--a blind, unreasoning instinct, which cannot and does not distinguish between good morals and bad ones, and cares nothing for the results to the man provided its own contentment be secured, and it will always secure that. (p. 99)

Although man is capable of recognizing right and wrong, he acts always
to satisfy himself -- that part of himself which seeks its own contentment without reference to what is good for the man or for society. This strange paradox is what Twain calls the moral sense. "The fact that man knows right from wrong proves his intellectual superiority to the other creatures, but the fact that he can do wrong proves his moral inferiority to any creature that cannot" (p. 89). The "moral sense" does not receive full explication in What Is Man? In fact the term is used only once, and then by the Young Man, as a method of distinguishing man from the "lower animals." As Twain uses the term elsewhere, it has two basic meanings -- the one mentioned above -- the ability of the man to recognize good but not to act on it, and man's hypocrisy -- his tendency to justify selfish acts by attributing moral purposes.

What Is Man? stands as a rational philosophy rationally arrived at and systematically presented. It can be best described as deterministic, but there are certain elements which are not typical of deterministic thought. The elements which might be called vestiges of Puritanism -- the statement that man can distinguish right from wrong, the admonition to "train your ideals upward," the tracing of responsibility and merit to the maker named God. If we take into consideration these elements of Twain's thought and recognize the implications they impose, not just on his philosophy but also on his attitude towards his philosophy, we can discern in What Is Man? an attitude towards life consistent with that expressed in much of his fiction -- an attitude apparent at least as early as Huckleberry Finn. What Is Man? expounds moral determinism -- a position that recognizes that man is subject to his environment, that what he is is the result of antecedent causes, but a position which
seeks for and hopes for, at the same time it despairs of, a purpose in life: a state of perfection for which man can strive. It recognizes two facts simultaneously: that the outcome of life is predetermined and that the natural and necessary thing to do is to strive as if life weren't predetermined. It employs rational argument to prove that life isn't rational, to prove that man can think but that he cannot act according to the outcome of his thinking.

Twain's moral determinism encompasses five unique terms: Training—all the environmental influences that affect a man after he is born;

Temperament -- 1) man's inherited "gifts" and limitations and 2) man's capacity for happiness (or unhappiness),

Free Will -- the idea that man can make rational decisions but does not have the power to act on them;

Master Passion -- that subconscious motivating force which impels man, drives him to satisfy his need for self-approval, and

Moral Sense -- man's capacity to do evil and his tendency to rationalize his evil deeds.

Taken together these terms define a deterministic philosophy which insists rigidly that man is no more than the sum of outside influences but also recognizes that these outside influences can conspire to make men live useful lives, good lives, lives which in turn contribute towards the progress of human society.

Twain's thinking has been called inconsistent. Gladys Bellamy has pointed out the contradictory "bases" of his mind -- patheticism, moralism, determinism, and pessimism. Edward Wagenknecht has commented that "If
Mark Twain is anything, he is a moralist, yet there is no room for morality in his philosophy of life. "35 It is more to the point, however, to remark that *What Is Man?* is an honest intellectual attempt on Twain's part to work out the philosophical implications of his era. The so-called inconsistency of his thinking might be better termed conflict.

There has been so much written on the impact of Darwinism on late nineteenth century thought that extended analysis is hardly necessary, however, three specific aspects of Darwinism in particular and the scientific method in general play important roles in Twain's philosophy. First, there is the tendency of the scientific method to lead inevitably to certain types of results. This problem, which might be called by Dewey's term, The Supremacy of Method, has been mentioned earlier in connection with Twain's "fractured man" and can be restated most simply by saying that scientific methods which involve computation deal with data, not objects, with the result that the conclusions are true of data, and not necessarily of objects. Twain's analysis of man produced data that revealed distinct facets of man's make-up though the distinct facets do not exist separately in the man. Second, positivistic methods lead to positivistic results: a study of physical data cannot reveal anything beyond physical phenomena. Darwin's method of inquiry could not reveal man's soul even if man had one simply because the method measured physical data. Third, scientific investigation developed a tendency to talk about natural "law" as if natural laws were equivalent to man-made laws which had to be obeyed. Natural laws are descriptions of the way things are under certain specified circumstances and need not be obeyed except as they are obeyed. For instance, the "law" of
gravity is a description of the attraction of bodies, it is nonsense to talk of artificial satellites "breaking the law of gravity" merely because they demonstrate a new facet of it -- they show that attracted bodies collide only under certain given circumstances. In the nineteenth century, and to a certain extent today, however, people talked of the "law of survival of the fittest." A Popular Science Monthly article of 1889 said of William Graham Sumner that he "holds that men must do with social laws what they do with physical laws -- learn them, obey them, and conform to them."36

Men who were attracted to the subject matter of evolution came away not only with a new body of information about the development of mankind, information which in itself was sure to upset many of their traditional beliefs, but also frequently with a new way of looking at things, the scientific way, which, they assumed, could be applied with equal efficacy to other fields of knowledge. And so it could. The scientific method taught them to eliminate the unworkable, to distrust the a priori, to seek useful knowledge, to trust only the rational and the tangible, and to treat their feelings as suspect and invalid.

The scientific method in general and Darwin's theory of evolution in particular wrought a profound effect on such different people as Samuel Butler and Thomas Hardy in England and on William Graham Sumner and Henry Adams in the United States, to name only the most obvious. Butler and Hardy are interesting cases because they reacted similarly and yet with different results. Both fell under rationalistic influences at about the same time and both abandoned their traditional religious beliefs. Hardy took the position that the universe functioned without any plan, that events were the operation of blind
chance. He frequently stated that he wanted to believe that mankind was headed toward perfection, but he could never convince himself that this was so. He developed a deterministic philosophy which alternately pictured chance and a malignant "fate" ruling the world. Butler, on the other hand, became more directly concerned with the mechanistic implications of evolution and through his investigations of pre-Darwinian theories decided that Lamarck's theory of evolution, which attributed change to animal will, was more accurate than Darwin's (and much more attractive). He went beyond Darwin's empiricism to teleology and created a theory of a world which has semi-divine purpose, change was movement towards perfection.

Twain was aware of the theory of evolution and the raging debates on Darwinism in the late nineteenth century. His interest in astronomy had led him, as early as 1871, to comment on the insignificance of man in an infinite universe. He read The Descent of Man and C. W. Saleeby's Evolution, The Master Key. He also read and made marginal notes in James Mark Baldwin's The Story of the Mind, which traces the evolution of human mentality and concludes that "man himself is more of a machine than has been supposed...." He was aware of the purposelessness of life that Darwinism implied, much like Butler he resisted these implications without knowing how to deny them and without being willing to ignore them. Like Hardy, he found determinism to be the only answer, even though it was an answer he didn't like.

Although Twain's attitude is much like that of Butler and Hardy, there is an emotional intensity in his later work and even in much of his early work -- an attitude towards his philosophical position -- that takes a different direction
from the one these men took.

In his *History of American Philosophy*, Herbert Schneider devotes one chapter to four late nineteenth century figures he termed "desperate naturalists." The four were Sumner, Adams, Edwin A. Robinson, and George Santayana -- a remarkably diverse group in everything but the kernel of their thought. "The great stream of time and earthly things will sweep on... in spite of us.... the tide will not be changed by us.... That is why it is the greatest folly of which a man can be capable, to sit down with a slate and pencil to plan out a new social world." So says Sumner in *War and Other Essays*, but the writer might just as easily have been Mark Twain. He is as much a "desperate naturalist" as the four men Schneider discusses, and it might be profitable to recognize this similarity, appearing as it does in men of widely different educational backgrounds, as a cultural and intellectual phenomenon of the late nineteenth century. The basis of desperate naturalism is a recognition of determinism as the underlying assumption of scientific thought, analysis of all action, physical and human (which is just a more subtle form of physical action), is done most efficiently in terms of universal causality. In the area of science, Laplace expressed it thus:

> We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent state and the cause of the state that is to follow. An intelligence, who for a given instant should be acquainted with all forces by which nature is animated and with the several positions of the entities composing it, if further his intellect were vast enough to submit those data to analysis, would include in one and the same formula the movements of the largest bodies in the universe and those of the lightest atom. Nothing would be uncertain for him; the future as well as the past would be present to his eyes. The human mind in the perfection it has been able
to give to astronomy affords feeble outlines of such intelli-
gence. All its efforts in the search for truth tend to approxi-
mate without limit to the intelligence we have just imagined. 40

A literary definition can be excerpted from "The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam":

With Earth's first Clay They did the Last Man knead
And there of the Last Harvest sow'd the Seed:
And, the first Morning of Creation wrote
What the Last Dawn of Reckoning shall read. 40

To the desperate naturalist, universal causality applies to all actions,
physical and human, with one exception -- the "I," the individual thinker, Wil-
liam Sumner, Henry Adams, or Mark Twain, the individual had to act as a free
agent: he had to recognize that he made decisions and that even if these de-
cisions were caused they were still decisions, only when circumstances
thwarted him, when he could see the welter of forces combining to cause his
defeat, did he recognize the full force of his deterministic principles. Thus
Sumner in his preaching, his politics, and his teaching was an iconoclast and
a reformer, "he was forced into the championship of one lost cause after an-
other." 42 But at the same time his recognized norm was submission to, or
allegiance with, nature. "A morality that attempts to go counter to nature is
futile. The industrious, frugal, honest man, though he be forgotten by poli-
ticians, is the favorite of nature, he is still the norm of our culture, and his
ways should continue to be the folkways until a changed material environment
shall produce, by the methods of natural adaptation, a new body of mores." 43

There was created in such minds as Sumner's a duality of common-sense
thought -- a duality which only Santayana managed to resolve. The desperate
naturalists recognized determinism as the way and the truth, but they could
not accept it as a mode of action. Each came to it from a Puritan background which at once prepared him to accept determinism (as predestination in new terms) and gave him a rigid sense of purpose, moral principle, and the permanence of truth. The Calvinistic concept of predestination emphasized the notion of election -- the distinction between the predestined damned, who would inevitably fall to evil ways, and the predestined elect, who would thrive, would demonstrate their election in their works and actions. In other words, the elect, though they were predestined just as were the damned, would act forcefully and efficaciously -- in short, as if they were free. Twain once said, concerning his rejection of a job as postmaster in San Francisco, "It really seemed to me a falling from grace, the idea of going back to San Francisco nothing better than postmaster." The intention of the statement was humor, of course, but it implies a division of mankind into the elect and "the damned human race." A favorite literary device of Twain's was the mysterious stranger -- the outsider who is more perceptive and, in some instances, has greater powers (e.g. The Mysterious Stranger, "The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg," Pudd'nhead Wilson, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court) than the society in which he is placed. The dual psychology of such works makes a distinction between the way things are for the mass of people and the way they must be for the individual who recognizes that the world is determined but knows that he must act as if it isn't. To the desperate naturalists the past denied submission; the present demanded it. The culmination of past and present in these individuals created a tension which directed and supplied the energy for their creative bent. The literary naturalists of the
century's end, such as Norris, Sinclair, and Dreiser, ranged beyond this point of tension; they had no trouble denying the efficacy of morality and their work took the form of social document which was essentially tensionless. Not so with the desperate naturalist. E. A. Robinson, coming face to face with the enigma of life, wrote "The Man Against the Sky," which is almost pure tension and which finds its resolution only in identifying the tension.

Whatever the dark road he may have taken,
This man who stood on high,
And faced alone the sky,
Whatever drove or lured or guided him--
A vision answering a faith unshaken,
An easy trust assumed by easy trials,
A sick negation born of weak denials,
A crazed abhorrence of an old condition,
A blind attendance on a brief ambition--
Whatever stayed him or derided him,
His way was even ours,
And we, with all our wounds and all our powers,
Must each await alone at his own height
Another darkness or another light;


'Twere sure but weaklings' vain distress
To suffer dungeons where so many doors
Will open on the cold eternal shores
That look sheer down
To the dark tideless floods of Nothingness
Where all who know may drown. 44

The desperate naturalist was a determinist, convinced of the finitude of human thought, the insignificance of human will, suspecting scientific progress but overwhelmed by the implications of its method, he stood on the moral mountain of Puritanism observing the desert of scientific positivism, suspecting all the while that his mountain was but a shifting dune. He recognized the insignificance of mankind, but could not admit his own. Such a man was Mark Twain.
Although he had failings as a thinker and his philosophical dialogue is not the important work he thought it to be, he was more sensitive to the individual experience than any of Schneider's "Desperate Naturalists." He was a man disposed to see the world as they saw it and to report it in vivid terms. Although he did not publish What Is Man? until late in his life, he saw the world much as these men saw it very early in his career: Huckleberry Finn stands as the most complete perception of desperate naturalism.
Footnotes: Chapter I


5. Jones, p. 3.


14. Richard Altick, "Mark Twain's Despair," South Atlantic Quarterly, XXXLV (October, 1935), 365-366. Robert Ingersoll, "the silver-tongued infidel," was an extremely popular speaker, an agnostic, whom Twain knew at least as early as General Grant's reception in 1879. Writing to Howells after that occasion, Twain declared that "Bob Ingersoll's music will sing through my memory always as the divinest that ever enchanted my ears." He went on to say, however, that upon reading the speech in the newspaper, "the words looked like any other print, but, Lord bless me! he borrowed the very accent of the angels." In other words, Twain was enchanted by his rhetoric, not necessarily by his ideas. Discount the florid rhetoric, however, and Ingersoll's views


16. Burnham says of *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court* that "If the telelectroscope eventually becomes endowed with the power of salvation, here the Canonization of the machine takes its first large beginning . . . .

"Mark Twain seems to have believed, like the Greeks, in a Deus ex machine. Thirteen Gatlings can destroy the corrupt chivalry of England, enough technists can pull the peasantry up by their boot-straps." (pp. 107-108)

"Our protagonist, it is apparent, is to be an Innocent Abroad (or at least is to be what the Innocent very often protests that he is), he is also to be Ben Franklin, to be the village tinker and even, later, the village atheist, those types so familiar in American life and literature. And in so being, he is to become a David to the giants of chivalry and the church, and a Messiah to the 'laboring and defenseless poor.'" (p. 109)

Burnham echoes Van Wyck Brooks' misreading of *A Connecticut Yankee* which leads Brooks to say that "writer as Twain was, his enthusiasm for literature was as nothing beside his enthusiasm for machinery. he had fully accepted the illusion of his contemporaries that the progress of machinery was identical with the progress of humanity."(p. 146). Gladys Bellamy, on the other hand, has stated the case more judiciously, though not strongly enough: "The outcome of the book shows that so-called 'progress' has no real chance against superstition; but beyond that, it shows that if real progress is to be made, another sort of advancement must keep pace with technical advancement" (p. 314). Twain was interested in machines, he was fascinated by gadgets (such as his notebook which automatically opened to the right place), he lost a fortune in promoting the Paige type-setting machine. However, his faith in the machine was distinctly qualified, and the metaphor he used in *What Is Man?* is nothing more than a metaphor. For further discussion of Twain's attitude towards industrialism and progress, see my chapter on *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court*.


23. Cf. Paine, *Mark Twain*, pp. 80-81, for an example of how Twain twisted the facts of his life to suit his literary purpose. Paine reports that Twain considered his finding of a stray leaf of a book on Joan of Arc to be the "turning point."


25. Ibid., p. 133.

26. Ibid., p. 139.


29. See Chapters 3-8 of this thesis for an examination of Twain's struggle with this problem of perception.

30. Bellamy, p. 43, and Minnie M. Brashear, *Mark Twain, Son of Missouri* (Chapel Hill, 1934), pp. 243-244.


32. Lecky, I, 72.

33. I might point out that this inconsistency was also present in all scientific endeavor that had as its purpose the improvement of the lot of man. There is a paradox in the fact that a physicist who was operating on the basic deterministic assumption was nevertheless hoping to improve the world.

34. Jones calls it "inverted Calvinism," p. 4.


41. As quoted by Eddington, p. 142. (Quatrain 73).

42. Schneider, pp. 399-400.

43. As quoted by Flowers, p. 97n.

Minnie Brashear and H. H. Waggoner have made various estimates of two likely sources of Twain's deterministic ideas. Miss Brashear has observed the similarity of Twain's views to the mechanistic views which were prominent in the eighteenth century, largely as outgrowths of the philosophy of Locke and the mathematics and philosophy of Newton. She has further pointed out several possible sources for Twain's acquirement of such views. Waggoner has similarly treated nineteenth-century science as a possible source, and has made some valuable inquiries into Twain's reading in this field. Both critics show clearly that Twain had read major eighteenth- and nineteenth-century works which contributed to his ideas.

However, one other source -- Presbyterian doctrine and Presbyterian society -- seems to be an additional and earlier influence on Twain's thought. Predestination -- a deterministic position if there ever was one -- and other ideas current in Presbyterian circles might have influenced Twain's What Is Man? position. Presbyterians were extremely interested in "Manifest Destiny" and the related notion of Providence, in revivalism, benevolence, and, rather strangely, in geology. Even though it cannot be established that Twain read specific Presbyterian works or heard particular sermons, it can be demonstrated that these ideas were pervasive in frontier Presbyterian (and other) churches and that he hardly could have avoided them. There is in these views much that is similar to Twain's view. In the doctrine of predestination and depravity of man we find views, tones, and attitudes that are
more like Twain's than are the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century sources already studied.

At the close of the Revolutionary War, the American Presbyterian Church was one of the strongest and most wide-spread of the Protestant sects. There were Scotch-Irish communities — Presbyterian, if religious at all — in all thirteen of the colonies. Furthermore, the New England Puritan stock had become to a large extent Presbyterian, and the non-Presbyterian Congregationalists were sympathetic enough with the Presbyterian system to consider a plan of union. Presbyterians had been anti-British from the first of the Revolutionary War: they were fearful of British control of the church, and the Scotch-Irish element had more fundamental fears and prejudices. Therefore, with the close of the war, there was agitation to form a separate national church body. The Synod of New York and Philadelphia called for such a move in 1785, and the General Assembly came into being in 1788. At that point, it contained sixteen Presbyteries, 419 churches.

The same synod which formed the General Assembly in 1788 also amended the Westminster Confession of Faith "to be agreeable to the new American theory of the separation of church and state." The Confession, the completely revised Westminster Directory for the Worship of God, the Shorter Catechism, and the Form of Government and Discipline constituted the standard documents of the Presbyterian Church, as they still do today.

The General Assembly met and adopted its constitution in Philadelphia in 1789, a constitution which is in many respects similar to the United States Constitution.
The post-Revolutionary period was a time of westward expansion. An economic depression, the spirit of adventure, the quest for wealth, the steady influx of immigrants and other unmeasurable forces combined to lead men over the Alleghenies into Kentucky and the Ohio Valley. When Daniel Boone first moved to Kentucky there were only 170 known white men in the territory. By 1830 there were 700,000. The Protestant sects felt a need to set up churches in the newly opened territories to counter both infidelity and Catholicism. However, accomplishing such a task appeared to be a formidable problem, one that could not be overcome by the current small number of ministers. The Baptists and Methodists, whose educational standards for ministers were not so high as those of the Congregationalists and Presbyterians, established many churches. The Congregationalists and Presbyterians found that their missionaries were successful in setting up congregations only to see them languish because full-time ministers couldn't be assigned to them. Frequently missionaries of the two sects found that they were working against each other.

As a result of the need for more unity on the frontier and for a more educated ministry, the two sects drew up and accepted in 1801 a plan for union, which called for churches made up of both Congregationalists and Presbyterians to be conducted by either a Presbyterian or Congregationalist minister.

This plan for union, which was drawn up by Jonathan Edwards the younger, was possible because of the Calvinistic background the two sects had in common, but it did not find acceptance without opposition. There was a conservative element in the Presbyterian Church which objected to the revised Calvinism of the first Jonathan Edwards and suspected other elements
of the church of Congregationalist (and therefore heretical) leanings. This distrust was later to split the Presbyterian Church.

Another feature of the movement west was the camp meeting. Since the Great Awakening of the mid-eighteenth century, evangelistic revivals had been a feature of American Protestantism, but because of their emotionalism they had incurred protests from the more conservative Calvinistic elements. Camp meetings carried religious fervor even further than did revivals, culminating in "extravagances and disorders.... undue excitement of animal feeling; disorderly proceedings in public worship; too free communication of the sexes, the promulgation of doctrinal errors, and the engendering of spiritual pride and censoriousness." The meetings attracted "the dregs of frontier society," and, according to Sweet, the meetings were marked by sexual as well as religious enthusiasm which was evidenced by numerous bastard births. Even more fearful to conservative Calvinists, however, were the tendencies to accept the easy grace of Methodism -- a doctrine which de-emphasized total depravity -- and to accept as qualified ministers uneducated and semi-literate men. 8

The camp meetings led to greater numbers of converts, more converts led to more congregations, more congregations to more demands for ministers; demands led to a lowering of standards. Particularly in the Cumberland area of Kentucky was the trend so alarming that the General Assembly demanded that the Presbytery remove certain unqualified ministers. Rather than obey, the Presbytery seceded from the General Assembly and in 1809 established the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, a group which grew in spite of its
qualifications because it was pliable enough to meet the frontier situation. The Cumberland split did not remove camp meetings from the Presbyterian Church. It did, however, help to crystallize doctrinal differences growing within the church. As Lefferts Loetscher says, "the Cumberland Presbytery...ordained men whose education was unsatisfactory, and who frankly rejected part of the Westminster Confession of Faith as teaching 'fatalism.'" The doctrine of predestination was becoming an issue.

With the exclusion of the Cumberland Presbyterians and the later exclusion of a smaller splinter group popularly called the Shakers, the Presbyterian Church, officially the Presbyterian Church of the United States, found itself to be a growing, financially sound body. By 1837 it had 173,000 members (as compared to 20,000 at the turn of the century) and had eight theological seminaries. However, several issues had assumed a divisive force within the church. First, there was the Plan of Union with the Congregationalists. In New York state, especially, and to a lesser extent elsewhere, there were many mixed church bodies, some of the members declaring themselves to be Presbyterians and some Congregationalists. Furthermore, the Presbyterian ministers in such bodies were exhibiting signs of independence and freedom of doctrinal interpretation. The more conservative churchmen considered the Congregational connection to be akin to heresy. Even worse, however, was the direction which the freedom of doctrinal interpretation took. Some conservative Presbyterians found that even Jonathan Edwards' restatement of doctrine softened Calvinistic principles. Further changes of doctrinal interpretation by Samuel Hopkins and Nathaniel Taylor vitiated the Calvinistic
doctrines of total depravity and free will. Hopkins and Taylor both wrote in opposition to the Unitarian movement and thus were labelled by people outside the church as conservative theologians, however, their writings made concessions which the Old School ministers would not accept. Though the New School ministers argued that depravity was an essential part of their doctrine, it was not the total depravity that the Mathers, or even Jonathan Edwards, had preached. At the same time, they carried the Edwards' notion of free will another step. They argued that though man is predestined to be saved or damned, he has free will. Though his fate is already decided, he must act as if it isn't and, furthermore, his acting as if he has free will has efficacious results (if he acts for good) or deleterious results (if he acts for evil). The Old School men considered such arguments as contradictory, contrary to the Bible and the teachings of Calvin, and heretical.

The Old School "views of human depravity and divine grace more nearly conformed to the doctrine of Augustine and Calvin." The New School can be defined as "The Calvinism of Westminster and Dort modified by a more ethical conception of God, by a new emphasis upon the liberty, ability, and responsibility of man, by the restriction of moral quality to action in distinction from nature, and by the theory that the constitutive principle of virtue is benevolence." For instance, in the years 1835-1836, Rev. Albert Barnes of Philadelphia, who was tried for faulty doctrine, "was charged with holding. (1) That sin consists in voluntary action...(3) That unregenerate men are able to keep the commandments and convert themselves to God... (5) Also, with denying the covenant with Adam, (6) the imputation of Adam's sin to his
posterity, (7) that mankind are guilty, _i.e._ liable to punishment, on account of the sin of Adam..." (ten charges in all). In other words, Barnes' guilt consisted in believing that man had free will, that his actions were voluntary and that he would be saved or damned according to his actions, and that man was not totally depraved. In the trial that followed the accusation it was found that Barnes had qualified these assertions rather strenuously in his books and his sermons, but he was found guilty anyway and dismissed from his church.

Another minister charged with 'loose views' was Lyman Beecher, father of Henry Ward Beecher, Mark Twain's friend of fifty years later. Before he was selected as president of Lane Theological Seminary in 1832, Beecher had been active in the fight against Unitarianism. Upon his selection by Lane, the President of the Board, Joshua Wilson, examined Beecher's published sermons and decided that they expressed New School views. He tried to have Beecher ousted from the position and when both the Presbytery and the Synod found insufficient evidence for ouster, he took the case to the General Assembly, where he was persuaded not to prosecute.13

At the same time that this doctrinal dispute was going on an abolitionist movement within the church threatened to divide it along different lines -- North against South, and there was a continual pressure from the frontier to ordain more ministers who were inadequately trained and thus lower educational standards. This pressure tended to divide the church East against West.

Working jointly with the last controversy was the development of non-denominational missionary societies. The American Home Missionary Society, organized in 1826, was at first predominantly Presbyterian, but later was "greatly
augmented" by the Congregationalists. It became subject to the same attacks that the Old School men made against the Plan of Union.

In 1837, when the Old School faction found that it had a majority at the General Assembly, it voted to abrogate the Plan of Union and thus excise four synods from the church. Since the New School members found that a majority of their members were thus expelled, many left the General Assembly floor with the members of the excised synods, it being announced "in a loud voice" that the New Schoolers would hold their own General Assembly elsewhere. The Presbyterian Church remained divided into two almost equal factions, both calling themselves the Presbyterian Church of the United States, for the next thirty-two years -- a period that extends from Mark Twain's second to his thirty-fourth year, the crucial period for my study. The split was by no means a strictly geographical one, in fact, many synods found themselves divided on the issue. The South tended to be Old School territory, and New York and New England tended to be New School, however, many areas were caught in the middle without knowing which way to turn. In Ohio, the split became a vehicle for Lyman Beecher and Joshua Wilson to continue their feud. Beecher's New School sympathizers were in a slight majority. The St. Charles Presbytery in Missouri was the only one in that state to exhibit divided loyalties. As a slave-holding area and as one largely settled by Kentucky and Tennessee immigrants, Missouri leaned toward the Old School, as a frontier settlement, it leaned toward the New School. As it happened, the St. Charles Presbytery delegate to the 1837 General Assembly joined the New School walk-out, but upon his return home he received a reprimand from the Presbytery.
Gillett reports:

In the following year... it was represented in the other [Old School] Assembly, and for a time there was faint prospect of any division within the bounds of the Synod [Missouri]. Still, there was grave dissatisfaction with the 'Reform measures' of the Assembly of 1837, and in the fall of 1841 a convention of Presbyterian ministers and elders in Missouri was called to meet at Hannibal, and the result was the formation of an independent Synod, to which the First Church of St. Louis and its pastor adhered. After acting in an independent capacity for two or three years, the Synod connected itself with the Constitutional [New School] Assembly.

The comment by Gillett, a New School historian writing just before the reunion of the two groups, is interesting not so much for the obvious bias he demonstrates as for the fact that Hannibal would be a meeting place of Presbyterians two years before Dixon Wecter places a Presbyterian minister there.

The 1852 Presbyterian Casket has an item which demonstrates that at that time there were both an Old and a New School church in Hannibal, neither having a minister. Perhaps this serves as a clue to the Missouri dissatisfaction with the Old School church. Most of the first Presbyterian ministers in Missouri came there as agents of or receiving help from the American Home Missionary Society, the society formed by the Presbyterian-Congregationalist coalition. Many of them undoubtedly felt an allegiance to the society even after the Old School had withdrawn. Also at the time that records show the growing unhappiness with the Old School in Missouri, it was becoming apparent that the southern domination of that body was turning it into a pro-slavery group.

There can be no doubt that the people of Missouri were in favor of slavery, however, many of the ministers, as we shall see, had abolitionist leanings. This is especially true of the ministers sent out by the American Home
Missionary Society.

Missouri became a subject of interest for Presbyterian missionaries in the early 1820's. French settlements had arisen along the Mississippi many years earlier, and the Protestants feared the area would be predominantly Catholic. The immigration of many Scotch-Irish brought at once a demand for Presbyterian ministers and a fear that some Protestants would be lost to a faction worse than infidels. Records of early missionaries such as Salmon Giddings and Timothy Hill give indication of the resistance these men had to overcome as well as their staunch unwillingness to compromise. Hill, who preached in Hannibal on at least four occasions in one five-year period, was forced to quit his Paris, Missouri, congregation because of his uncompromising abolitionist views. His association with Joshua Tucker, the Hannibal minister who remembered Mrs. Clemens as he reports it in his diary, implies that Tucker was, though not necessarily an abolitionist, at least sympathetic with the anti-slavery cause. Such evidence seems to contradict or at least qualify the statements Twain made later in life about hearing slavery justified in church.

Dixon Wecter has remarked that Mrs. Clemens was an adept at changing her religion, and perhaps she was. However, his remarks don't take into consideration the condition of Protestant sects on the frontier -- especially the condition of the Presbyterians. Because of the educational standards of the Presbyterians, there were not nearly enough ministers to fill all the church openings. In 1840 Timothy Hill reported only 24 Presbyterian ministers in all Missouri. He was at that time trying to satisfy the needs of four
congregations spread fifty miles apart. It was a common thing for Protestants of many sects to attend the same service -- a service which took the form of the minister's belief. In addition, members of all sects attended Campbellite meetings. Mrs. Clemens' attendance at such meetings does not in itself prove that she did not consider herself to be a Presbyterian throughout this period. 19

The facts as we know them are these: (1) There was a Presbyterian church in Hannibal from 1841 on, some time before 1852 there were two, (2) Mrs. Clemens and her children were Presbyterians; (3) during this period the Presbyterian Church had split into the New School-Old School factions, Missouri being at first Old School in sympathies, then split, with the New School group growing in power, (4) the New-Old split was simultaneously a political, doctrinal, and slavery-abolitionist split, and (5) although the split in Missouri was probably made along slavery-abolitionist lines, the problem of doctrine undoubtedly was the subject of many sermons. I wish to infer from these facts that a certain body of ideas was made apparent to Sam Clemens very early in his youth. Chief among these is the doctrine of predestination. Closely related to this idea is the notion of Providence (with a related idea -- Manifest Destiny). Second is the notion of man's depravity -- the inherent evil of the non-elect and the inability of the damned to improve his lot without the Grace of God -- in short, the notion that man does not have free will. (Note that these ideas are not separable: both imply and derive from predestination, both arrive at man's lack of free will.)

The only way to establish Twain's exposure to these ideas conclusively would be to discover sermons preached on specific days when Twain was
present and in some way establish that he was paying attention instead of loos­
ing frogs or trading water bugs. Obviously this cannot be done. As an alterna­
tive, I am going to present an examination of Presbyterian publications of the
area and time of Twain's Hannibal days to indicate what he probably heard in
church and what he might well have read in his home or in the church, or even
in the town library which his free-thinking father helped to organize.

One such magazine is the Presbyterian Casket of Sacred and Polite
Literature, published monthly in St. Louis in 1851 and 1852 and perhaps later,
though the only extant copies are volumes three and four which comprise the
twelve 1852 issues. One purpose of the magazine is described by one of its
contributors: "There is a paper published in St. Louis, by Rev. S. A. Hodg­
man, entitled the Casket, one object of which is to supplant the reading of
novels in some measure, and I think is well calculated to answer the purpose."

The magazine is a compilation of poetry, essays, sermons, anecdotes, "lit­
erary notices" (being announcements of the publication of certain religious
books and some books of otherwise topical interest), and the "Monthly Chroni­
cler" (a page on the back of each issue presenting miscellaneous statistical
information, most of it with a religious or moral interest). Random titles give
an idea of the scope of the magazine. "What Is God?", "Practical Defects of
Blessing on the Party." Poetry ranged from extracts from Longfellow and
Bryant to the contributions of readers. The favorite subject was the death of
a loved one.

Such a magazine as this obviously represents interests and opinions
that were current on the frontier and in the church in the period of Twain's youth. I cannot assume that Twain read the Casket, though he well might have, but I can assume that the ideas expressed in it are ideas that he was exposed to, that the sermon topics were ones current in all Presbyterian churches, that the problems of doctrine were of interest to all Presbyterian ministers, including Joshua Tucker of Hannibal.

The doctrine of predestination was a doctrine held by both the Old and New School parties in the Presbyterian Church, even though the Old School people accused the New School of Arminianism. That this doctrine was central to the Old School can be seen by the sermon delivered by the outgoing moderator at the General Assembly of 1852 and printed in the Casket. Edward P. Humphrey summarized the Presbyterian position:

Few intelligent persons are ignorant of the doctrines which its faithful disciples deduce from the Scriptures, even those touching the sovereignty of God and the dependence of the creature, his purpose as the cause, and his glory as the end of creation, sin and redemption, the imputation unto all of the guilt of the first man, our federal head, the utter corruption of human nature, the election unto salvation of a certain and definite number; their redemption by the vicarious obedience and penal sufferings of the Son of God, the work of the Holy Spirit persuading and enabling them to accept of Christ, their justification by faith alone, and their infallible perseverance, secured by the immutability of the decree of election.22

Humphrey emphasizes man's "innate, total, and hereditary depravity" and continues by tying man's depravity in with his lack of free will. "He perceives that every one of his remembered sins deserves the wrath and curse of God for ever, and further that he can offer no atonement to a violated law. He is fully conscious, also, of his absolute want of power to change his evil
nature." (italics mine) Man's salvation springs not from his own doing or his own willing but "from the eternal purpose of God." The believer is "chosen in Christ from before the foundation of the world."\textsuperscript{23} In the course of his sermon, he cites Calvin as the father of Presbyterian theology and goes into a detailed criticism of Arminianism.

We have, for example, its flat denial of our doctrine of predestination; but has it, to this day, met, for itself, the problem of fore-knowledge infinite, by a more plausible solution than the celebrated sophism, that, although God has the capacity of fore-knowing all things, he chooses to fore-know only some things? We have, also, its notion of the 'freedom of the will,' wherein there was supposed to be the germ of a systematic Arminianism; but this budding promise was long since nipped by the untimely frost of Jonathan Edwards' logic.\textsuperscript{24}

Thus, in spite of the present-day notions of the decline of the Puritan movement and the degeneration of its theology, we can find that in the mid-nineteenth century the official theology of the Presbyterian Church had weakened only to the extent that it called on Jonathan Edwards as the bulwark against Arminianism, a point of view which it utterly rejected. The decline of Puritanism was largely a decline of power, a decline in its relative sphere of influence. For another view, the doctrinal decline must be traced through the New England Congregational churches and the slight freedom of doctrine admitted by New School Presbyterians. The Old School Presbyterians, to a large extent Scotch-Irish with a Middle Colonies heritage, carried on the theology of the New England Puritans, in spite of any vitiating influences that might exist in New England, itself.

The Casket includes many examples of the notion of predestination, both
explicit and implicit. One example will serve to introduce the direction most of these references take. A sermon on the importance of immigrants to the United States says at one point, "God, in writing out the pages of history with his own finger, when as yet they were imperfect, ordered that when the United States should be prepared for it, the shores of the Pacific should come under their dominion, and that such discoveries should be made as would precipitate a multitude of people upon them, carrying with them the institutions of the Gospel.... They are all parts of the same wise and Supreme Government of the World.... we behold a magnitude of influence and of destiny that can fulfill their true ends only by the power of the Gospel of Christ."  

In the magazines I have examined, I have yet to come across the terms "manifest" and "destiny" combined as a single phrase, but the recurrent use of the terms separately, the intense nationalism exhibited, and the frequent tying in of the ideas of national destiny and Providence are evidence that manifest destiny was a prominent idea on the frontier, an idea that took on particularly religious connotations in religious circles and harked back to the "New Eden" concept of the first Puritans. The idea took two inseparable directions: first, the continent was a promised land to be won by (Protestant) Christianity; it was to be the center of the new Christian culture, and second, the winning was fore-ordained by God, the winning of the continent for Christianity was to take place through God's providence as an inevitable outcome of his willing it to be. Even though church doctrine insisted on man's private acceptance of his depravity and his assumption of the attitude of humility before God, there was no public doubt but what the people of the frontier were
moving to Beulah Land.

In an essay entitled "God in the History of Our Country" the anonymous author states: "By readers of history, and too often by writers too, has the great fact been overlooked, that God is in history. Both his power and goodness are exhibited at times, in conducting the movements, and controlling the destinies of men, in lines too plain to be mistaken. The history of our own beloved country will furnish an illustration.... Even before its discovery in 1492, the great Designer and Dispenser seems to have intended it to become a great theatre, where to the world should be exhibited, in a higher degree than ever before witnessed, the happy influence of free religion, and equal political privileges."26

Another essay entitled "The Destiny of Our Country" says, "We live in an interesting period of the world's history, and in a highly favored land. Our country, indeed, stands as a landmark on the cliffs of fame.... Providence has given us a rich and glorious inheritance, a fertile soil, a salubrious climate, a free government, and a heaven-descended religion.... If we go on and prosper, a new era will have commenced in the history of the human family."27

Predestination, Providence, and Destiny seem to twentieth century secular minds to be inconsistent with vigorous individualism, with aggressive, self-assertive missionary work. They seem to be concepts that would encourage irresponsibility and laziness --"leaving everything to Providence" -- since what is destined to happen will happen anyway. However, nineteenth-century Presbyterians (and seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Puritans) took a very different view of the matter. To them their destiny was grace,
they were ordained to be among the elect; they were licensed to do the utmost for their cause.

Humphrey, for instance, argues that Presbyterian doctrine develops "an expanding and aggressive Christianity." A church which has "an intelligent faith in the fixed decrees of God, must become, by the necessity of its nature, a missionary church.... Indeed, our doctrines are, in a two-fold sense, divinely adapted to this work; as dwelling in the bosom of the church, they sustain an intense and exalted life, even the life of God, urging his people to spread the everlasting Gospel throughout the earth; as terminating on the world, they are clothed with a transcendent and mighty power, the power of God unto salvation." The elect perform God's works. The elect have God's warrant. Thus they are justified. This idea comes perilously close to the notion of moral sense which Twain criticized so caustically in The Mysterious Stranger (and other places). Randall Stewart has pointed out that predestination has not historically been a justification for irresponsibility; rather it has been a call to action. The Presbyterians had the warrant of God, when Presbyterians were divided both sides had the warrant of God -- as they demonstrated when they were split over doctrinal issues and slavery. They were not resigned to their fates; instead they were vigorously acting out their predestined fates -- proving their election by their deeds and finding sanction for their deeds in their election.

One of the most prominent St. Louis Preachers was Nathan L. Rice, a man of the Old School leanings who became nationally known for his debates on infant baptism and on slavery. Rice moved to St. Louis in 1852 and remained there until he was selected to be president of the Northwestern Seminary in
Chicago in 1857. The Reverend Mr. Rice was a prolific author. He wrote on an interesting range of subjects. *God Sovereign and Man Free*, *The Old and New School*, *Romanism*, *The Enemy of Education*, *Phrenology*, and *Signs of the Times*. For purposes of this study, the first and last titles are the most interesting. Dr. Rice set about early in his career (1850) to wrestle with the perplexing problem of rationalizing a theology which asserted at once that God was both all-knowing and all-powerful and at the same time that man was responsible for his actions. Rice's solution to the problem was to assert that the world can be divided into matter and mind -- the traditional dualism of earlier centuries -- and to follow this assertion with an acknowledgement that in the realm of matter God is all-powerful. At the same time he was careful not to assert that God was not all-powerful in the realm of the mind. Instead, he listed four ways in which God influences men's minds: "God, in order to fulfill his purposes, exerts upon the minds of sinful men a restraining influence, a softening influence, a directing influence, and a hardening influence."29 He then cites Biblical examples to establish his categories and documents abundantly that God does control men's destinies. However, his reasoning which leads to the conclusion that man still has free agency (and thus accountability) is more tenuous than Jonathan Edwards'. He quotes Proverbs 21:1. "'A man's heart deviseth his way: but the Lord directeth his steps.' If the Lord can direct the steps of men, and yet leave their hearts free to devise their way, it is clear that he can so control their conduct that his purposes will be accomplished without infringing their liberty."30 This is a most unsatisfying remark in that the liberty Rice describes as being left uninfringed is a very small liberty indeed.
It has a peculiar similarity, however, to Twain's distinction between free will and free choice, which I pointed out in Chapter One. Twain grants man the mental facility to distinguish right from wrong but not the power to act on his distinctions. Instead man is driven by the voice within him which always compels man to act according to his own selfish interests -- his own self-approval. Rice pictures man as being able to think independently but being required by restraining, softening, directing and hardening influences to satisfy the will of God -- a God which, according to Calvinistic doctrine, created the world and put man in it for "the manifestation of the glory of God." Twain's psychology and Rice's theology are certainly not the same, but they have remarkably similar categories. A man who knew the one doctrine would find himself thinking along lines which led to the other.

The emphasis in Rice's work is on God's sovereignty. Man's free agency is only necessary to demonstrate his depravity and his need for humility.

Again, according to the doctrine of Divine fore-ordination, God is the author of all that is pure in the Christian's heart. He saw him 'dead in trespasses and sins.' He purposed to renew his heart, not because of anything in the sinner moving him thereto, not because of any foreseen cooperation on his part, but simply of his sovereign mercy. So that the most devoted Christian, comparing his present condition and character with his former condition and character, must say emphatically with Paul. -- 'By the grace of God I am what I am.' And of all his good works he must say: -- 'I labored; yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me.' ...this doctrine humbles man in the very dust, as deserving of eternal misery, and exalts in the highest degree 'the grace of God that bringeth salvation.' Its language is: -- 'Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto thy name give glory, for thy mercy, and for thy truth's sake.' Human nature has ever exalted itself, but this doctrine humbles human nature and exalts the grace of God. It takes from man all the merit, and gives all the glory of his salvation to God.
This last sentence might come straight from Twain, who in several places in *What Is Man?* takes merit away from man and attributes it to God. (Who made the machine? God. Who deserves the credit? God.) It brings to mind again, the famous letter to Howells in which Twain breaks off in the middle of a scorching diatribe (against humanity) to remind himself that people cannot be other than what they are. Twain had high standards for human conduct and despaired of man's ability to live up to his standards. At times such as these the temper of his thinking was certainly closer to his Puritan heritage than it was to the rationalism of the eighteenth century or the scientific determinism of the nineteenth.

Rice's theological or philosophical attitudes might lead one to conclude that Twain's philosophy is merely rehashed Calvinism. However, this it was certainly not. For one thing, Rice, the good theologian, wrote on the apparent assumption that the Bible is the final court of appeal. All generalizations must be supported by chapter and verse, or several chapters and verses if possible. The unchanging word of God was to be found in a book some two thousand years old, describing an unchanging universe. Secondly, what was then thought of as science was considered to be the handmaiden of religion -- another method of revealing the eternal truths, one which could be misused by infidels, but which properly used proved a useful tool. As Rice said in *Signs of the Times*:

But the day has passed when any nation can safely ignore the discoveries of science, and reject the elevating influence of Christianity. Science, baptized, if I may say so, in the name of Christ, has ceased to be confined, as in pagan lands, or in the dark ages, to a few speculative philosophers. Its range is through the region of fact and experiment, and its discoveries are turned to practical use. From every department
It brings its contributions to the wealth as well as the intelligence of men. Christianity has taken it by the hand, and guided its investigations. The result is -- that the nations blessed with the light of Christianity and the resources of science, are immeasurably superior to all others.

Rice was a pre-Darwinian. Pre-Darwinian theologians faced with the implications of the new sciences, especially geology, but also evolutionary biology -- where the returns though not fully tabulated were already in -- were able to manage their own interpretations of the facts to make them fit Christian doctrine. The Presbyterian Casket reviewed The Foot-Prints of the Creator by Hugh Miller in its Literary Notices section.

In disproving the "Developing Hypothesis," he combats Infidel Geologists on their own ground, vanquishes them with their own weapons, and thus performs an important service for Christianity. He is one of the greatest living geologists. But we keep our judgment suspended, in regard to the merits of Geology as a science till we shall have opportunities to make as thorough an investigation as the nature of the case demands. Though we do not deny all the conclusions in reference to the antiquity of this globe, to which the students of this science appear to be led, yet, neither do we at once and implicitly yield our assent. The science is in its infancy, and the fact that Mr. Miller has demonstrated the falsity of the Development theory, heretofore regarded as fundamental to the science, shows a disagreement among geologists so great, that it is not safe to rely with too much confidence on its uncertain conclusions.

We have as little doubt as the most enthusiastic geologist, that a great portion, if not all that part of the earth's surface which is now inhabited, was once the bottom of the ocean. There are appearances, shells, fossil remains, &c. in the different strata beneath its surface, which demonstrate this. But why should we suppose that this earth existed and was inhabited millions of years before Adam, in order to account for these appearances? Does not the Bible account respecting the flood, afford a satisfactory solution concerning all such phenomena? Whether it does or not, we should be cautious about
receiving any theory that seems to undermine the authority of the Bible. When Moses says, "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," geologists make this word "beginning," refer to a period of duration, many ages prior, and not included in the six days work. Moses ought to be permitted to explain himself: In Exodus, he says -- "in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is." Here the creation of the heavens and the earth is a part of the six days work. We are satisfied with Moses' interpretation. We question none of the facts of Geology, but only some of its conclusions. 34

In the next issue, another writer for the Casket called science, "The Theology of Nature," an interesting topic, "...whether we confine our examination to the surface of our planet, with the naturalist, or, with the geologist, go deeper down to examine those other tables of stone, whose inscriptions were written by the finger of God, or, with the astronomer, wing our way through the immensity of space, to visit other worlds, and systems of worlds, far larger than our own. There is, however, another kind of evidence, less imposing, it may be..." 35

In a later Casket the editor came back to the development theory in an essay entitled "Who Is a Fool?"

There is still another class of men who think that in the science of Geology they have discovered the law of the universe, which, is in their view a law of gradual development. According to this theory, there was a period in the past history of our earth, when no living creature existed but the fish. This was the lowest order and the first form of life. Afterwards reptiles began to exist, and afterwards birds, and next quadrupeds, and last of all, after millions of ages had rolled away as they supposed, the race of man appeared. Or, to be a little more minute, the Zoophyte was the first form of life. This, in the lapse of ages, was improved into clams, and other shell fish. These, in the continuance of time, gave rise to fishy tribes of a more improved nature, as the dogfish, the hering [sic], the turbot, &c. Some of these were developed in the lapse of ages, into reptiles, a still higher type of life. Reptiles were succeeded by birds, even as we
have seen caterpillars transformed into quadrupeds. At last, the monkey appeared. The monkey was improved into the ourang outang; and the ourang outang, as other ages still revolved sic, was graduated into man. This was the progress -- and this is the development theory. Man was originally but an improvement on the ourang outang. And those who advocate this theory, claim for man the honor of being descended from the monkey. The ourang outang is their father, and the monkey is their grandfather. We give these statements, not as items of information, but to show how justly they are denominated as fools in the Bible, who deny the existence of a God. None but fools could believe such absurdities.

When we find ourselves talking about the Darwinian theory of evolution, we should remember that a Presbyterian minister could spell out the "development theory" in an obscure Presbyterian journal six years before the publication of Origin of Species. At the same time we should remember that he could comfortably pass it off as heretical and foolish. After Origin of Species, ministers could no longer consider evolution to be a crack-pot theory. In his childhood, Twain was exposed to a deterministic theory that was designed to fit a fixed world. As he grew up, he saw the fixed world crumble and shift. He saw the authority for the theory lose its authority as science made literal interpretation of the Bible more and more difficult. At the same time, it is quite possible that Twain's introduction to the sciences that interested him most -- astronomy and geology -- came through church connections -- through Joshua Tucker, his first Presbyterian minister, or through reading of miscellaneous religious journals. We can be sure that wherever he first heard of astronomy or geology or evolution, the context of the discussion was religious. His own discussions of determinism never freed themselves of religious terminology. To him, moralism, pessimism, and determinism were not contradictory terms.
Footnotes: Chapter II

1. Minnie M. Brashear, Mark Twain, Son of Missouri (Chapel Hill, 1934), p. 242, f.


3. Randall Stewart, American Literature and Christian Doctrine (Baton Rouge, La., 1958), p. 13, makes a distinction between determinism and predestination which at first glance is contradictory to the argument I have proposed in this chapter. "As a matter of taste in terminology, I prefer 'providence' to 'determinism' in speaking of the Calvinistic idea of predestination. Determinism is a modern scientific word, and does not involve the supernatural at all. There are various kinds of determinism -- climatic, environmental, economic, biological, and the like. These determinisms play a large part (as I shall attempt to show in a later chapter) in forming the modern concept of naturalism, and do, in effect, tend to absolve the individual of responsibility, exculpate him from his wrongdoing. And therein lies the insidiousness of the naturalistic philosophy. But no such exculpation resides in the doctrine of divine fore-knowledge. Moreover, it is an interesting fact of history that people who have held strongly to the doctrine of divine predestination have never been apathetic or irresponsible (as some adherents of the modern determinism seem in danger of becoming). Rather, they have taken hold of the successful alternative, as if to say, 'I am fated to succeed, I am predestined to victory, for if God be for us, who can be against us!' There is a vast difference, in short, between these two kinds of 'determinism,' which are sometimes mistakenly spoken of as if they were similar, and presented the same kind of problem."

To him determinism is a materialistic concept, dealing with material forces, and thus is incompatible with the spiritual concept of predestination. It is interesting that he deals only with the elect, with those who feel they are "fated to succeed" in describing predestination, for by his own theology the majority are fated to fail. Be that as it may, however, his description of predestination fits the psychology of Twain's moral determinism. Speaking of the necessity of Christian effort in a predestined world, Stewart says "It becomes... important...that, having done his utmost, [man] bow before the ultimate disposition of the All-Wise. This tension between effort and acceptance, responsibility and acquiescence, is a central paradox of the Christian faith." Such tension which is largely missing from the work of twentieth-century naturalists is a key feature of Twain's work, is indeed the feature which prompted Miss Bellamy to dwell on the contradictions in his writing, and, as I have already pointed out, is a feature of thinkers whom Herbert Schneider has termed the desperate naturalists.

5. Loetscher, p. 65.


7. Sweet, p. 33.


14. Loetscher, p. 73.

15. Sweet, pp. 886-888.


19. John B. Hill quotes Timothy Hill's report that he could not preach his regular sermon in Paris, Missouri, because "Alexander Campbell is here, and all must hear him." p. 7.

20. Presbyterian Casket, p. 258. Two other Presbyterian magazines of the area and time which I have examined are the Presbyterian Reporter, published in Alton, Illinois, from 1854-1870, and the Presbyterian Recorder (Missouri Presbyterian Recorder), St. Louis, 1855-1856. There were also magazines of supposed national circulation published in the East and innumerable tracts.
and pamphlets supplied by the American Home Missionary Society.

21. The suggestion by Hamlin Hill and Walter Blair that Twain's inspiration for the "Ode to Stephen Dowling Botts, Deceased" in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn was Julia A. Moore's The Sentimental Song Book ignores the fact that Twain must have been exposed to hundreds of sentimental "elegies" in his youth. For instance, the following from the Casket are clearly in the same tradition, p. 302 and p. 327, respectively.

MY BROTHER'S CHILD

By Miss C. W. Barber

The dying embers in the grate
Cast a red light thro' all the room,
For Twilight now has died away,
And Night has come, with duskier gloom.
I sit alone in pensive mood,
And watch the flickering shadows fall,
Fantastic figures flit and fade,
In groups, upon the parlor wall.

For hours my book has open lain,
The self-same page upon my knee,
In vain I now might strain my eyes,
No lettered line I here could see,
But thrust amid the leaves there comes --
I see it plain -- a dimpled hand;
I start -- a child with bright blue eyes,
Beside me, smiling, seems to stand.

Her mouth is like a rose-bud, pluck'd
Amid bright morning's balm and dew,
And golden curls sweep o'er a brow,
That mocks the lily's snowy hue;
Her fairy feet are now quite still,
Hush'd is her laughter, ringing wild,
I know the vision is but air,
And yet how like by Brother's Child!

Her bright young face is far away,
O'er mountain and o'er sea,
It must be months -- it may be years,
Before that golden head I see,
She is not in this shadowy room,
She stands not now beside my chair,
And yet in the thick gathering gloom,
I fancy she is smiling there.
My Brother's Child! O, God, how strong
Love's golden links are riven!
How many are the precious things
Wh'ch steal our very hearts from Heav'n!
O! heed to-night the yearning prayer,
Which, with an energy half wild,
I send unto thy "Great White Throne,"
"Guard well my Brother's only Child."

Madison, Ga.

OUR LOST ONE

"My head aches, mother;" so he oft did say,
Awakening from sleep in his low bed,
And press her hand upon his burning brow,
And ask her -- "Mother, do you love me now?"
Or say -- "I do love you," then sink away,
While yet the loving words were half unsaid,
To sleep again.

His bed is empty now.
And oft she thinks him by her side again,
And starts, awaking with a sudden pain,
To feel afresh that he is gone, to bow
Beneath the anguished thought that he is dead.
He is not dead! where he no more shall say
"My head aches." Mother, he doth live for aye.

R. R.

23. p. 196.
24. p. 205.
25. p. 6.
27. p. 229.
28. p. 204.
30. p. 69.

31. p. 25; I am quoting Rice to show that he emphasized this principle.

32. pp. 162, 164.

33. Rice, Signs of the Times (St. Louis, 1855), pp. 65-66.

34. Casket, p. 31.


36. pp. 243-244.
CHAPTER III

INNOCENTS ABROAD THE PERPLEXED EYE

In October of 1869, Mark Twain was invited to a dinner meeting of the New York Society of California Pioneers in New York City. Since he could not attend, he wrote a letter to be read at the dinner, a letter sprinkled with the western humor he could count on his audience to expect, concentrating on the follies of his mining career. His conclusion was not aimed at humor alone, however:

I... close this screed with the sincere hope that your visit here will be a happy one, and not embittered by the sorrowful surprises that absence and lapse of years are wont to prepare for wanderers. surprises which come in the form of old friends missed from their places, silence where familiar voices should be, the young grown old, change and decay everywhere, home a delusion and a disappointment; strangers at hearthstone, sorrow where gladness was; tears for laughter, the melancholy pomp of death where the grace of life has been.

If this passage had been written late in his career, critics would cite it as evidence of the despair of his last stage. But it was written four months before his marriage to Livy and three months after the publication of Innocents Abroad, at a time when his happiness and success seemed assured. In short, Twain was at the height of his powers -- healthy, happy, prosperous. Obviously his personal circumstances had nothing to do with the fact that his world view encompassed delusion, disappointment, and decay. Twain did not always write in such terms. In fact, he seldom gave them such explicit statement. However, most of his early writing, dealing as it does with one species or another of human folly, is not inconsistent with his so-called pessimism. The basic
ingredients of What Is Man? can be found in inchoate form in Innocents Abroad. The ideas of Training, Temperament, Free Will, Master Passion, and Moral Sense all receive some attention in Innocents Abroad. Though Twain had not developed his own peculiar terminology by 1869, his method of looking at things was already formed. Many incidents in Innocents Abroad suggest concepts of training and temperament. What Is Man? presents Twain's example of the well disciplined soldiers who perform bravely because they have been trained to and because they are expected to and sailors who remain on the sinking ship because they have been trained not to desert. Innocents Abroad records among other events Twain's visit to the ruins of Pompeii and his reaction to the remains of the Roman soldier who died at attention at his post. "We never read of Pompeii but we think of that soldier; we cannot write of Pompeii without the natural impulse to grant to him the mention he so well deserves. Let us remember that he was a soldier -- not a policeman -- and so, praise him. Being a soldier, he stayed -- because the warrior instinct forbade him to fly. Had he been a policeman he would have stayed also -- because he would have been asleep."

Here in a nutshell is the What Is Man? denial of personal merit, the insistence that man is what his environment makes him. Twain refuses to give the traditional credit of nobility to the soldier and reminds us that after all he was but a man who, if he had been trained differently, would have met his doom differently.

In any other context, the term instinct would imply temperament rather than training; however, in the above quotation it refers clearly to what the soldier has learned as a soldier rather than to what he was born with. Twain's
frivolous use of words suggests that he had not tried to systematize his ideas -- a step that would inevitably have led to more formal terminology. Nevertheless, the similarity of attitude and idea between the early work and the late is remarkable.

Most references to training in *Innocents Abroad* are coupled with the idea of inborn qualities. The *Quaker City's* first stop at Fayal in the Azores provides a scene to be repeated countless times: "The group on the pier was a rusty one -- men and women, and boys and girls, all ragged and barefoot, uncombed and unclean, and by instinct, education, and profession, beggars" (I, 36). Twain used the terms "instinct" and "education," and in other places the terms "nature" and "training" as a dichotomy which explained all human qualities. Though he was not to use his distinctive term "temperament" to take the place of "instinct" and "training" for almost thirty years, he had already found expression in a pair of terms which accounted for everything in man's makeup and made of him a determined being.

It should be noted that in most instances of Twain's expression of his deterministic outlook in *Innocents Abroad*, he was observing man in a state considerably below the ideal. His determinism was to a large extent environmentalism -- an attempt to explain backward nations. In Paris he had seen a parade featuring Napoleon III and the Sultan of Turkey. "Napoleon III., the representative of the highest modern civilization, progress, and refinement, Abdul Aziz, the representative of a people by nature and training filthy, brutish, ignorant, unprogressive, superstitious -- and a government whose Three Graces are Tyranny, Rapacity, Blood. Here in brilliant Paris, under this
majestic Arch of Triumph, the First Century greets the Nineteenth!" (I, 120). Unprogressive (the italics are mine) is the key word. There is such a thing as progress, and we must remember that Twain recognizes this fact in What Is Man? Even though Twain frequently despairs of nineteenth-century man, a contrast with the first century will still show that there is something in civilization which leads man away from filth, brutality, and ignorance. In the above passage the terms used to denote this "something" are nature and training instead of the instinct and education used in the previous passage, but the division is basically the same.

Later in the book the innocents travel through parts of Turkey and other nations dominated by the Ottoman Empire. In Turkey, Twain observed that "...morals and whiskey are scarce. The Koran does not permit Mohammedans to drink. Their natural instincts do not permit them to be moral" (II, 77). In Palestine, he referred again to the dominating influence of Turkish rule. Blaming the oppression of the Palestinians on the "inhuman tyranny" of the Ottoman Empire, he again distinguished between nature and education. "These people are naturally good-hearted and intelligent, and with education and liberty, would be a happy and contented race" (II, 164-165). Twain was to demonstrate later, in A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, he had serious doubts that education and liberty were by themselves enough to create happiness and contentment. However, he recognized ignorance and oppressive political corruption as two important aspects of environment which would inevitably work ill on a people. The importance of training, both formal and informal, conscious and unconscious, could not be overestimated.
Throughout the pilgrimage the innocents met beggars -- wretched, depraved, maimed, appalling beggars. They didn't measure up to Twain's concept of the human race, and to him they had to be accounted for. "As we rode into Magdala not a soul was visible. But the rings of the horses' hoofs roused the stupid population, and they all came trooping out -- old men and old women, boys and girls, the blind, the crazy, and the crippled, all in ragged, soiled, and scanty raiment, and all abject beggars by nature, instinct, and education" (II, 234).

Twain had traveled miles and months from the Azores, but the vision had not changed much. Before him still were depraved, appalling mankind. They still had to be accounted for if they couldn't be explained away, and Twain had already divided the "reasons" into two categories. The beggars were born with an inclination to beg; their environment made begging necessary and proper.

Aside from the ambiguously used instinct, Twain's term for what he was later to call temperament was nature or human nature. As we have seen above, temperament has two basic implications -- first, that man is born with certain inherited qualities, second, that different men have different dispositions to be happy or unhappy regardless of circumstances. Twain's use of human nature has a variety of meanings. Each of the following offers somewhat different shades:

But if he only [tries to keep a journal] of twenty-one days, he will find out that only those rare natures that are made up of pluck, endurance, devotion to duty for duty's sake, and invincible determination, may hope to venture upon so tremendous an enterprise. (I, 24)
The last hope of repairing the wrong that had been done his house was gone. What next? Human nature suggested revenge. (I, 140)

They... hurled curses, obscenity, and stinging sarcasms at our crew. It was more than human nature could bear. The executive officer ordered our men ashore -- with instructions not to fight. (I, 156)

We see visiting young ladies stand on the stoop, and laugh, and kiss good-by, and flirt their fans... Human nature appears to be the same, all over the world... Human nature is very much the same all over the world; and it is so like my dear native home to see a Venetian lady go into a store and buy ten cents' worth of blue ribbon and have it sent home in a scow. Ah, it is these little touches of nature that move one to tears in these far-off foreign lands. (I, 234-236)

With all respect for those ancient Israelites, I cannot overlook the fact that they were not always virtuous enough to withstand the seductions of a golden calf. Human nature has not changed much since then. (II, 207)

... no doubt the descendants of the woman of Samaria... still refer with pardonable vanity to this conversation of their ancestor... with the messiah of the Christians. It is not likely that they undervalue a distinction such as this. Samaritan nature is human nature, and human nature remembers contact with the illustrious, always. (II, 292)

We were approaching the end. Human nature asserted itself, now. Overwork and consequent exhaustion began to have their natural effect. They began to master the energies and dull the ardor of the party. (II, 332)

Rumors of war and bloodshed were flying everywhere.... But with the horses at the door and everybody aware of what they were there for, what would you have done? Acknowledged that you were afraid, and backed shamefully out? Hardly. It would not be human nature, where there were so many women. You would have done as we did. said you were not afraid of a million Bedouins -- and made your will and proposed quietly to yourself to take up an unostentatious position in the rear of the procession. (II, 334-335)

The use of human nature to denote a trait or traits that men hold in
common is not unusual, and I would guess that the frequency with which Twain uses the term is not much higher than normal for a travel book. Also there is nothing particularly deterministic about the concept. However, it is interesting that Twain uses the term almost exclusively to denote despicable or petty traits which men hold in common. Only the first use cited, which speaks of "rare natures," lists desirable characteristics. In the other passages, revenge, violent tempers, hypocrisy, thoughtlessness, avarice, vanity, ill humor, and cowardice are the universal characteristics pointed out.

Twain's first apparent use of human nature is in a letter to his brother Henry in 1856 and contains a similar implication of human frailty. In speaking of his proposed trip to South America, he reports that one of the alternative plans is for him to wait in New York while one of his confederates investigates the economic possibilities. "But that don't suit me. My confidence in Human nature does not extend quite that far. I won't depend on Ward's judgment, or anybody's else -- I want to see with my own eyes and form my own opinion." Though human nature never meant the same thing to Twain that temperament came to mean, it worked toward a similar end. It denoted human limitations and human shortcomings. Furthermore, since it dealt with traits (or limitations) held by all men, it implied inherited rather than acquired characteristics.

Twain's view of humanity naturally caused him to report aspects of the "damned human race" that other travel writers ignored. Gladys Bellamy has mentioned his comments on deformed beggars who displayed their malformations in order to beg more successfully. Twain noted not only the
deformities but also the diseases and filth. In one of the Alta California letters recording the trip from San Francisco to New York, Twain had Mr. Brown make a comment about the seemingly beautiful girls in Guatemala, who if "prospected with a fine tooth comb" proved to be infested with bugs, and the effect was largely humorous, however, when Twain saw a Syrian baby with its eyes covered by flies and its mother seemingly indifferent to the situation, his tone came much closer to annoyance and disgust. He could find humor in the houses "frescoed" with camel dung, but there were degrees of filth that could not be treated humorously.

Everywhere he turned he saw the inhumanity of man. In Italy he watched Italians berating an aging opera singer whose voice was faltering.

What traits of character must a man have to enable him to help three thousand miscreants to hiss, and jeer, and laugh at one friendless old woman, and shamefully humiliate her? He must have all the vile, mean traits there are. My observation persuades me (I do not like to venture beyond my own personal observation) that the upper classes of Naples possess those traits of character. Otherwise they may be very good people, I cannot say. (II, 16)

Later, in Syria, he noted the "wretched nest of human vermin about the fountain -- rags, dirt, sunken cheeks, pallor of sickness, sores, projecting bones, dull, aching misery in their eyes and ravenous hunger speaking from every eloquent fiber and muscle from head to foot" (II, 176).

Repeatedly, he wrote of the stupidity and dishonesty of guides. But not even his fellow pilgrims were above his notice and censure since they defaced shrines and carried off souvenirs wherever they could. He particularly described the pilgrims' habit of writing their names and addresses on monuments
and the walls of ruins wherever they went and hoped in a private rage that a wall would collapse on "some of these reptiles" to teach them a lesson. Because of such behavior he decided the patron saint "of all pilgrims like us" was Balaam's ass. Later his fellow pilgrims become more predatory, breaking souvenirs from the walls of mosques and treading on "praying carpets.... It was almost the same as breaking pieces from the hearts of those old Arabs.... Suppose a party of armed foreigners were to enter a village church in America.... However, the cases are different. One is the profanation of a temple of our faith -- the other only the profanation of a pagan one" (II, 279). Upper and lower classes, Europeans, Arabs, Americans, showed an inordinate capacity for villainy, selfishness, bigotry. Since these traits appeared in people from every walk of life, they had to be inborn and could be accounted for only by what Twain later called temperament.

There is nothing in *Innocents Abroad* to indicate conclusively whether by that time Twain had abandoned belief in free will. Two passages, however, suggest his later attitude. The first describes the reaction of the passengers to a storm.

Fear drove many on deck that were used to avoiding the night winds and the spray. Some thought the vessel could not live through the night, and it seemed less dreadful to stand out in the midst of the wild tempest and see the peril that threatened than to be shut up in the sepulchral cabins, under the dim lamps, and imagine the horrors that were abroad on the ocean. And once out -- once where they could see the ship struggling in the strong grasp of the storm -- once where they could hear the shriek of the winds, and face the driving spray and look out upon the majestic picture the lightnings disclosed, they were prisoners to a fierce fascination they could not resist, and so remained. It was a wild night -- and a very, very long one. (I, 48-49)
The situation is the sort that a literary naturalist would dwell on -- man at the mercy of the elements, with no control over his own fate. Beyond that, the "fierce fascination" or the irrational compulsion to remain and watch when there was no rational reason for it and only a soaking to be gained as a reward is an apt example of the distinction Twain makes between free will and free choice. Man is free to decide rationally what is best to do, but he is not free to act according to his rationally arrived at decision. Instead his decisions are made by an irrational tyrant within him, his master passion. Twain's notion that man is unable to act according to what he thinks is supplemented by the other half of Twain's theory of the will -- man is unable to choose what his mind shall think about. In *What Is Man?* Twain used the illustration of the jingle that one cannot shut out of his mind. In *Innocents Abroad* the only similar thing is the description of the close of one day of sightseeing. "Then to bed, with drowsy brains harassed with a mad panorama that mixes up pictures of France, of Italy, of the ship, of the ocean, of home, in grotesque and bewildering disorder. Then a melting away of familiar faces, of cities and of tossing waves, into a great calm of forgetfulness and peace. After which, the nightmare" (I, 200). One does not will the arrangement of disordered images that float through his semi-conscious mind. Neither does he will a nightmare. The definite article I have underlined indicates that Twain had a particular nightmare in mind, one which recurred regularly. There is a reference in his autobiography to childhood experiences that later haunted his dreams. Perhaps it was one of these, or perhaps it was any one of the possible guilt feelings about which numerous critics from Van Wyck Brooks on have conjectured.
Whatever it was, it was uninvited and stood as an early reminder to Twain that man's freedom of will has some stringent limitations.

The master passion, the doctrine that man's only motive is to satisfy his own selfish desires and to enhance his own self-approval, is the *What Is Man?* doctrine which seems most foreign to *Innocents Abroad*. There are instances of selfishness -- the prayers of the pilgrims for a trailing wind for the ship, even though the mate has pointed out that most ocean traffic is taking a course opposite to that of the *Quaker City* and thus profiting from its ill wind, the Sultan of Turkey who is charmed away from acting like a sultan by promises of "a new palace, a new ship" from advisers who are jealous of his power, the souvenir hunting of the pilgrims; the commercialism and pressure salesmanship of their guides. There are also examples of men being motivated by their desire for approval -- Twain himself being flattered into buying an ill-fitting and defective pair of gloves; and the citizens of Naples who try to outdo each other in dress and finery when they take part in their daily public processions.

In 1869 Twain's "Open Letter to Commodore Vanderbilt" developed a similar idea. He insisted that he felt sorry for Vanderbilt because he "need[s] money so badly." Not that Vanderbilt didn't have money. "No -- it is to be satisfied with what one has; that is wealth. As long as one sorely needs a certain additional amount, that man isn't rich." Vanderbilt is driven to con- nive, cheat, cajole, and hoard in order to fulfill his desire for wealth, wealth disproportionate to what he can possibly use. As Twain would have phrased it at a later time, money was Vanderbilt's master passion and he could do nothing but yield to that passion.⁵
Other aspects of *Innocents Abroad* develop similar ideas. Twain recorded many examples of self-righteousness. The pilgrims drove their over-worked horses unmercifully in order to make a three-day journey in two days so that they would not have to travel on Sunday. The Neapolitans let "every concern for public welfare [be] swallowed up in selfish private interest..." during a cholera epidemic (I, 269). However, Twain also recorded unselfish acts without feeling any need to explain them away. He noted the Dominican monks who worked courageously ministering to the sick and clearing away the dead during the cholera epidemic with no seeming thought for their own health or lives (I, 269-270). He praised St. Charles Borromeo, Bishop of Milan, effusively as a man generous in all ways (I, 175). Moses S. Beach, New York newspaper editor, gave $1500 to some stranded Jaffa colonists in order that they might return to the United States. "It was an unselfish act of benevolence, it was done without any ostentation, and has never been mentioned in any newspaper, I think. Therefore it is refreshing to learn now, several months after the [incident], that another man received all the credit of this rescue of the colonists" (II, 365n). Each of these acts could have been rationalized into a basically selfish one if Twain had applied his *What Is Man?* formula to them. The Dominicans and St. Charles Borromeo were acting to secure their salvation and at the same time winning the praises of those they helped. For them this was large reward. Moses Beach was purchasing the admiration of his immediate family and friends. He did not keep his deed so quiet that Twain would not hear of it. To a rich man, $1500 is cheap if it purchases self-respect. The fact that Twain did not scrutinize these acts in this light is
evidence that he had not yet developed such an interpretation of human conduct.

The idea of the moral sense as the basis of man's depravity gets little exposition in *Innocents Abroad*. Each example of hypocrisy and self-righteousness could imply such a notion, but no example is treated in such a way as to develop it along these lines. One incident comes close. As Twain and his companions are returning from their illicit nocturnal trip to the Acropolis, they stop in a vineyard to steal some grapes. Since their venture is successful, they stop at the next one to steal some more. This time they are chased away, as they are at each succeeding vineyard.

Every field on that long route was watched by an armed sentinel, some of whom had fallen asleep, no doubt, but were on hand, nevertheless. This shows what sort of country modern Attica is -- a community of questionable characters. These men were not there to guard their possessions against strangers, but against each other; for strangers seldom visit Athens and the Piraeus, and when they do, they go in daylight, and can buy all the grapes they want for a trifle. The modern inhabitants are confiscators and falsifiers of high repute, if gossip speaks truly concerning them, and I freely believe it does. (II, 60)

The irony here is unescapable. The thieves who find the fields guarded attribute the guards to the dishonesty of the natives and use as evidence of their reasoning arguments which their own presence belies. Thus they are able to maintain their own hypocritical self-deceptions and assume an attitude of moral superiority to the poor farmers whose fields they have plundered. Such treatment as Twain gives this incident is the forerunner of the idea of the moral sense; however, the tone has none of the bitterness which Twain poured into the moral-sense passages of *The Mysterious Stranger* and "The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg."
There has been a tendency in Twain scholarship, now almost a tradition, to treat anything Twain has said, whether it is ironic or not, whether it was said in the guise of a fictional character or not, as the thought (and the most serious thought, at that) of Samuel L. Clemens, alias Mark Twain. A. B. Paine committed this fallacy time after time in his biography, quoting fact after supposed fact about Twain's life when his only apparent source was a fictional incident in a Twain story. Even recent and sound scholars such as Gladys Bellamy commit this fallacy on occasion. Miss Bellamy quotes the obviously ironic passage from *Innocents Abroad* about Twain hiding his face in his hands when he sees the can-can (and then looking between his fingers) as evidence of his moral prescriptiveness. Later she quotes other passages where fictional characters are speaking and implies that the thoughts are Twain's. Some recent scholars have done their bit to correct this tendency. Franklin O. Rogers in his study of *Mark Twain's Burlesque Patterns* has discussed character types and attitudes traditional in burlesque as a feature of Twain's work. Kenneth Lynn, in *Mark Twain and Southwestern Humor*, has dealt with the idea of a persona in the travel books and the effect of a persona on the ideas presented. Lynn argues that Twain used several comic personae in his early writing until he stumbled on the one that best suited his purposes -- a cross between the Southern aristocratic type and the clown of the southwestern tradition. . . . the vernacular figure became the narrator, and the stories he told were not at the expense of other people, à la Longstreet, but on himself. This persona Mark Twain would some day describe as an 'inspired idiot.' John C. Gerber has taken issue with Lynn's analysis:
The implication... that 'Mark Twain' is not a persona for Samuel L. Clemens is intentional. Except in a few short works like "The Jumping Frog of Calaveras County" the pseudonym fails to operate with anything like the aesthetic force and consistency expected of a persona. It does not exert substantial control over the point of view, the material, the style of the literal values. The most that can be said for Clemens' famous pseudonym in this regard, it seems to me, is that it serves as a sign of a comic sensibility at work. To insist on more than this is to indulge in oversimplification that obscures the intricate and successful uses Twain does make of the comic pose or mask while narrating as 'Mark Twain.'

Gerber describes two types of 'Comic Pose' which Twain employs: (1) Superiority, such as the Gentleman, the Sentimentalist, the Instructor, and the Moralist; (2) Inferiority, such as the Sufferer, the Simpleton, and the Tenderfoot. The categories are useful and impressive. It should be pointed out, however, that they are first of all an elaboration of Lynn's description of Twain's persona as a mixture of the Gentleman and the Clown. Second, the categories as Gerber uses them cause embarrassment when applied to Twain's writing. For instance, Gerber's 'Inferiority' category of the Sufferer includes such passages (by Gerber's admission) as the Turkish bath section of Innocents Abroad even though the sufferer in this sequence is not the inferior but the gentleman, restraining himself, acting "with almost formal dignity." The problem of terminology involved in the difference between what Gerber means by pose and what Lynn means by persona is not much more than a problem of semantics; however, using either set of terms, one can set down some basic propositions all but the last of which both would agree to.

1. The narrator, whether he is clearly a fictional character such as Huck Finn or the narrator named Mark Twain, rarely speaks for or as Samuel
(2) If we may define persona as a clearly consistent character who remains unchanged or makes some sort of consistent and motivated change (or development) in the course of a book and pose as an assumption of a character or characteristics for the purpose of part of a book not necessarily consistent with the entire book, then the narrators of Twain's travel books are closer to poses than personae, while the novels which employ the first person point of view -- *Huckleberry Finn* and the *Connecticut Yankee* -- employ characters with the consistency of personae.

(3) The inconsistency which causes trouble in the travel books is not a problem of point of view or persona as much as it is a problem of shifting tone -- a tone which ranges from irony, through sarcasm and burlesque, to direct statement.

(4) Twain's irony is often clearly identifiable as irony simply from the tone used; however, in other passages, Twain's irony is coupled with understatement, a form of frontier or southwestern humor which gets its effect from the matter-of-fact report of the outlandish. This form of irony is occasionally misinterpreted (though an examination of the passages so misinterpreted makes one wonder why).

Twain was aware of this last point early in his career and was dismayed by its effects. Using the term "burlesque" rather than "irony," he complained that there were always some people who took anything he said literally. His report that his *Galaxy* column, "Memoranda," was to be an agricultural column was taken seriously by some people. "I have had a deal of experience
in burlesques and their unfortunate aptness to deceive the public, and this is why I tried hard to make that agricultural one so broad and perfectly palpable that even a one-eyed potato could see it, and yet, as I speak the solemn truth, it fooled one of the ablest agricultural editors in America!... To write a burlesque so wild that its pretended facts will not be accepted in perfect good faith by someone, is very nearly an impossible thing to do."

Twain found that frequently his most farcical writing would be taken seriously. His story of "The Great Beef Contract," which related the adventures of a man who tried to collect for a Civil War order of beef some time later, is clearly a take-off on governmental red tape, but at least one reader read it seriously. His petrified man story attracted hundreds of curiosity seekers to the supposed scene of the find, if we can take Twain's word for it.

Anyone reading these passages today would recognize their ironic intent immediately, however, there are many passages in such a book as Innocents Abroad which give trouble because of the combined problem of who is talking and how one is to take the tone. For instance, Van Wyck Brooks in The Ordeal of Mark Twain found serious weaknesses in Twain's aesthetic sense and labelled him as a typical American materialist. His method was to take every statement (or at least every damning statement) as a serious and straightforward exposition of Twain's ideas. When Brooks dealt with the Connecticut Yankee, he quoted the words of Hank Morgan as the words of Twain. As a result, his in many ways perceptive study gives a warped picture of Twain by presenting him as the American type Twain created.

(5) The inconsistencies of tone and approach which Gerber has noted
do not in themselves rule out Lynn's notion of a consistently portrayed character, a character who is distinguishable from Samuel Clemens. For instance, in the winter of 1962, I attended Hal Holbrook's remarkable performance, "Mark Twain Tonight." Without being able to verify the authenticity of the performance as an imitation of Twain beyond the texts of speeches and books, I feel assured that the remarkable attraction of Twain as a speaker was the character the actor portrayed -- the artfully artless, garrulous, whimsical, disorganized raconteur -- a fascinating study in humanity. Holbrook mixed many moods in the course of his two-hour performance, but his mixture consistently portrayed the same man. In other words, he presented a persona, not a series of poses. Furthermore, this characterization was not Samuel Clemens but Mark Twain. I feel sure that Twain accomplished the same thing in his lectures and attempted it in his travel books. In *Innocents Abroad* we have a similar presentation of a character, a character of different moods, a character who addresses us in different tones of voice, but still the same character throughout. To the extent that he is reporting the travels of Samuel Clemens he is not fictional, but to the extent that he is a fiction of those travels, to the extent that he sees things not as Clemens saw them but as Clemens would have us see him see them he is fictional -- a series of poses (closely related), a persona, or the protagonist of a novel.

(6) We can discuss *Innocents Abroad* as a consistent work embodying a consistent theme and presenting a consistent central character profitably. Even though a study of the book in terms of a novel would exaggerate its weaknesses -- its shifting tone, its looseness of plot, the flatness of the
characters, etc. -- a study in terms of a novel also brings out its strengths -- its underlying seriousness, its unity of theme, and its humanity, all of which transcend the travel-book tradition.

_Innocents Abroad_ makes it clear that Twain was beginning to think along the lines of his later philosophy before 1870. His basic ideas of training and temperament received recurrent treatment, and though the terminology was not consistent, Twain's basic treatment of these ideas was. At the same time it is clear that Twain's purpose and theme were not limited to the exposition of these ideas.

It has often been pointed out that _Innocents Abroad_ epitomizes the cultural dilemma of the American. He is simultaneously declaring his independence of European traditions and finding himself unable to replace them with adequate traditions of his own. He ultimately falls back upon these European traditions but, ironically, he is not equipped to use them profitably and the result is a sterile, artificial imitation, or a blind unfeeling worship which follows the lead of convenient guides. The innocent is shocked by a moral degeneration which his Puritan conscience seeks out. Certainly one can read parts of _Innocents Abroad_ in this light. The discussions of the "Old Masters," the mock horror at the sight of the can-can, the inability to appreciate architectural and sculptural ruins because of an uneasiness about what they are now point in this direction. However, the bulk of _Innocents Abroad_ focuses on a more general and more important problem -- the intellectual dilemma of nineteenth-century man. The problem which confronted Twain was not how an American should approach Europe but, instead, how man should approach cognition.
As I have demonstrated in Chapter One, one of the major problems that confronted man in the late nineteenth century was the influence of the scientific method upon the quest for knowledge. Twain's view of man as a composite of inherited and environmental sources was largely a result of his misunderstanding of the nature of evidence. We can see Twain dealing with the problem of truth and how to know it throughout *Innocents Abroad*, almost to the extent that it becomes a major theme of the book. The problem is treated largely by indirection, and one might argue that Twain's dwelling upon it was neither intentional nor important, but the problem is one that he returned to again and again. It cannot be ignored; if the treatment he gives it in *Innocents Abroad* is not intentional, then his unconscious preoccupation with it is still important.  

The first two chapters of the book set the stage for the quest for truth by presenting the gullible narrator who is willing to take literally anything he reads. His reading of the trip proposal leads him to expect "a picnic on a gigantic scale. The participants...were to sail away in a great steamship with flags flying and cannon pealing, and take a royal holiday." He naively expects the descriptions of the ship's facilities to be literally correct (only to be disappointed later when the ship's library consists of the Plymouth Hymnals and the musical instruments turn out to be a broken down melodion), he is thrilled with the announcement that General Sherman, Henry Ward Beecher, and "a popular actress" will be his fellow passengers (only to be slightly disappointed when it later turns out that none of them can make the trip). He is fearful when he reads that "Applications for passage must be approved by the committee."
lest he won't measure up to the standards (only to discover that he can escape "personal examination into my character, by that bowelless committee" and can pass himself off as one of the "select"). In Chapter Two he chronicles his first traces of growing doubt, up to the day of sailing when he boards ship and is shown to his cabin:

"It had two berths in it, a dismal dead-light, a sink with a washbowl in it, and a long sumptuously cushioned locker, which was to do service as a sofa -- partly, and partly as a hiding-place for our things. Notwithstanding all this furniture, there was still room to turn around in, but not to swing a cat in, at least with entire security to the cat" (I, 13).

Despite a storm at sea, the ship left its dock that day, but not the harbor. "...we were alone on the deep. On deep five fathoms, and anchored fast to the bottom. And out in the solemn rain, at that. This was pleasing with a vengeance....I soon passed tranquilly out of all consciousness of the dreary experiences of the day and damaging premonitions of the future" (I, 14-15).

Thus, from the very beginning there is a contrast made between the way things are represented as being and the way they are. The contrast embodies three different problems: (1) The authority of the written word or of important individuals cannot be trusted, (2) people will deceive in order to further their own interests; (3) an object (or situation) changes its appearance as the viewer's perspective differs. The narrator (and the reader with him) is prepared to doubt other people's opinions and to reject Biblical and travel book authority as the last word.

The Quaker City's approach to land supplies Twain with his first
experiment with perspective. When he is dragged from bed in the early morn-
ing to see the first sight of land, Horta appears as a pile of mud through the
town appears as "Snow-white houses which nestle cozily in a sea of fresh green
vegetation, and no village could look prettier or more attractive." But as the
Quaker City pulls closer still, it is met by "a swarm of swarthy, noisy, lying,
shoulder-shrugging, gesticulating Portuguese boatmen, with brass rings in
their ears and fraud in their hearts." And on the dock wait beggars whose un-
sightliness has already been described. A pile of mud has grown into a pretty
village but the viewer discovers that it cannot bear closer examination, for the
people who inhabit the "snow-white" houses are vermin who live in mud huts.
In an apparently innocent passage such as this, Twain has forecast in summary
form the work of Satan in The Mysterious Stranger, who shapes little people
out of mud and puts them to work building a castle. The castle they build
is quite an edifice, but the people are argumentative and petty and some of
them are deformed. They are a sad lot, and Satan does not hesitate to destroy
them. In Innocents Abroad, Twain is not the creator Satan. Instead, he is
an innocent, who merely reports what he sees, and is frequently surprised at
what he sees.

The twenty-page description of the "Ascent of Vesuvius" with its many
digressions and its seven subheadings, "Ascent of Vesuvius -- Continued,"
presents another situation which shows Twain's conscious development of
the perspective problem. The digressions, which summarize aspects of
Twain's Naples tour other than the ascent of Vesuvius, deal principally with
the undesirable aspects of Neapolitan humanity. The chapter begins with a description of the citizens of Annunciation:

In other towns in Italy, the people lie around quietly and wait for you to ask them a question or do some overt act that can be charged for -- but in Annunciation they have lost even that fragment of delicacy, they seize a lady's shawl from a chair and hand it to her and charge a penny; they open a carriage door, and charge for it -- shut it when you get out, and charge for it; they help you to take off a duster -- two cents, brush your clothes and make them worse than they were before -- two cents, smile upon you -- two cents; bow, with a lickspittle smirk, hat in hand -- two cents, they volunteer all information, such as that the mules will arrive presently -- two cents -- warm day, sir -- two cents -- take you four hours to make the ascent -- two cents,... They crowd you -- infest you -- swarm about you, and sweat and smell offensively, and look sneaking and mean, and obsequious. (II, 14)

This discussion is followed by the story of the opera crowd which baits the unpopular performer, next comes a discussion of "religious impostures." A discussion of the Neapolitan tendency to overcharge ensues. Finally the narrative wanders back to the ascent and Twain describes Naples from a high point on the mountainside. The gas lamps looked like "a necklace of diamonds glinting up through the darkness from the remote distance -- less brilliant than the stars overhead, but more softly, richly beautiful..." (II, 19). But the description is interrupted by one of the lazy guides getting kicked by a mule "some fourteen rods" much to everyone's satisfaction. Then follows a description of Naples as seen from higher up, in the morning sunlight, "a picture of wonderful beauty. At that distance its dingy buildings looked white." The sight is one that Twain recommends to everyone. However, he adds a caution: "But do not go within the walls and look at it in detail. That takes away some of the romance of the thing. The people are filthy in their habits, and this makes filthy streets and breeds disagreeable sights and smells" (II, 22).
Twain continues his ascent of Vesuvius with a discussion of prices and wages in Naples, a discussion of the Blue Grotto, a "study of human villainy," and finally gets back to the mountain and takes the weary reader to the top.

Miss Bellamy has used this section of *Innocents Abroad* as an example of the 'ugliness as reality, beauty as dream' theme in Twain, pointing out the human details as the features that destroy the natural beauty. Her point, of course, is well taken. People do not fare well under Twain's scrutiny. But neither does anything else which is subjected to critical analytical examination. It is not the subject which causes the disapproval, but the method of looking. When man is carefully scrutinized, he loses his nobility. Careful scrutiny inevitably reveals a different universe.

The rejection of written authority grows throughout the book. Beginning with an incident expressing boredom with an oft-told legend the travelers are subjected to at Gibraltar, and growing through the discussions of guide-book responses to the "old masters," this scepticism reaches a climax in the Holy Lands. Twain deals with the guide books by going into a detailed complaint about one of them, William C. Prime's *Tent Life in the Holy Land.* Prime, called Grimes by Twain, had a tendency to idealize and romanticize, to beautify everything touching on Biblical tradition. He transformed dirty villages into beautiful cities, beautified the Sea of Galilee, and turned hills into impressive mountains. Twain's fellow pilgrims tended to accept Grimes' statements as facts, and to see everything as he had seen it. A typical complaint of Twain's is the one he makes about the wholesale acceptance of Grimes' description of the women of Nazareth.
They are the most human girls we have found in the country yet, and the best natured. But there is no question that these picturesque maidens sadly lack comeliness.

A pilgrim -- the 'Enthusiast' -- said: "See that tall, graceful girl! look at the Madonna-like beauty of her countenance!"

Another pilgrim came along presently and said: "Observe that tall, graceful girl; what queenly Madonna-like gracefulness of beauty is in her countenance."

I said: "She is not tall, she is short, she is not beautiful, she is homely; she is graceful enough, I grant, but she is rather boisterous."

The third and last pilgrim moved by, before long, and he said: "Ah, what a tall, graceful girl! what Madonna-like gracefulness of queenly beauty!"

The verdicts were all in. It was time, now to look up the authorities for all these opinions. I found this paragraph which follows. Written by whom? Wm. C. Grimes:........ That is the kind of gruel which has been served out from Palestine for ages. Commend me to Fenimore Cooper to find beauty in the Indians, and to Grimes to find it in the Arabs....

I love to quote from Grimes, because he is so dramatic. And because he is so romantic. And because he seems to care but little whether he tells the truth or not... (II, 266-267)

Grimes was guilty of romanticism and of over emotionalism -- but principally of reading into things that which wasn't there. However, Twain the narrator was not without guilt. He set himself up as the authority -- as the judge of what "tall" is, what "graceful" is, etc. His standards were literal and matter of fact. At this point, Twain has adopted a pose which is directly opposed to Grimes', a pose which though it requires truth as a standard does not recognize the variability of truth, as some other passages do. As we shall see, the rejection of Grimes and his disciples is just part of Twain's message. At times his pose carries matter of factness to comic extremes. For instance,
upon being told that the bones in a cave he is visiting belong to men who "lived before the flood... as much as ten thousand years before," he passes off the report by saying that "as long as those parties can't vote any more, the matter can be of no great public interest" (I, 55).

Later in the second volume, Twain has Blucher -- the remnant of Mr. Brown -- turn practical in a rather unpractical way. Blucher collects "relics," various pieces of "worthless trumpery" which he labels as fragments of historic monuments to take home to his aunt. Twain comments, "I remonstrate against those outrages upon reason and truth, of course, but it does no good. I get the same tranquil, unanswerable reply every time: 'It don't signify -- the old woman won't know any different.'" When Blucher later collects pebbles on an Athenian beach and passes them off to shipmates as pebbles from Mars Hill where St. Paul preached, Twain considers exposing him but decides not to for practical reasons: "It is not of any use for me to expose the deception -- it affords him pleasure and does no harm to anybody" (II, 98-99). Narrator Twain is once again balked by the problem of whether a pebble is just a pebble or a memento of St. Paul, whether the impress of Paul's sandals imparts a value or whether the value must come from within. He finds it easy to chastise Grimes for his shams, but his own shams and Blucher's are more difficult.

Twain also sets himself up as the doubter. At the same time that his criticisms of travel books reject the authority of the printed word, they lead up to a more basic rejection -- the authority of the Bible and related religious cant. Early in the book the reader is informed that there are far too many splinters from the cross lying around in shrines and being peddled in the
street. The thorns from Christ's crown being to number in the thousands. The sanctified ornaments decorating various shrines are ugly gew-gaws to Twain. In the Holy Land, Biblical and guide book authorities conspire to mislead. Twain remarks on the smallness of the Holy Land and of the Sea of Galilee compared to what he had imagined them to be. Cities which he had expected to be immense, beautiful and intriguing turn out to be villages composed of squat, dirty, one-story hovels, "frescoed" with camel dung. The Bible stories have misled him; however, this is nothing compared to his distrust of Biblical history -- much of which turns out to be pseudo-Biblical history. The logic by which the "exact center of the earth" was established gives Twain a chance to show the Biblical scholars at their worst.

But the feature of the place is a short column that rises from the middle of the marble pavement of the chapel, and marks the exact center of the earth. The most reliable traditions tell us that this was known to be the earth's center, ages ago, and that when Christ was upon earth he set all doubts upon the subject at rest forever, by stating with his own lips that the tradition was correct. Remember He said that that particular column stood upon the center of the world. If the center of the world changes, the column changes its position accordingly. This column has moved three different times, of its own accord. This is because, in great convulsions of nature, at three different times, masses of the earth -- whole ranges of mountains, probably-- have flown off into space, thus lessening the diameter of the earth, and changing the exact locality of its center by a point or two. This is a very curious and interesting circumstance, and is a withering rebuke to those philosophers who would makes us believe that it is not possible for any portion of the earth to fly off into space.

To satisfy himself that this spot was really the center of the earth, a skeptic once paid well for the privilege of ascending to the dome of the church to see if the sun gave him a shadow at noon. He came down perfectly convinced. The day was very cloudy and the sun threw no shadows at
all, but the man was satisfied that if the sun had come out
and made shadows it could not have made any for him.
Proofs like these are not to be set aside by the idle tongues
of cavilers. To such as are not bigoted, and are willing
to be convinced, they carry a conviction that nothing can
ever shake. (II, 305-306)

In a similar passage, Twain deals with the discovery about three hundred
years after the fact of the three crosses on which Christ and the two thieves
crucified.

According to legend, this great discovery elicited extravagant demonstrations of joy. But they were of short duration.
The question intruded itself: "Which bore the blessed Saviour, and which the thieves?" To be in doubt, in so mighty
a matter as this -- to be uncertain which one to adore -- was
a grievous misfortune. It turned the public joy to sorrow.
But when lived there a holy priest who could not set so simple
a trouble as this at rest? One of these soon hit upon a plan
that would be a certain test. A noble lady lay very ill in Jeru-
salem. The wise priests ordered that the three crosses be
taken to her bedside one at a time. It was done. When her eyes
fell upon the first one, she uttered a scream that was heard be-
yond the Damascus Gate, and even upon the Mount of Olives, it
was said, and then fell back in a deadly swoon. They recovered
her and brought the second cross. Instantly she went into fear-
ful convulsions, and it was with the greatest difficulty that six
strong men could hold her. They were afraid, now, to bring in
the third cross. They began to fear that possibly they had
fallen upon the wrong crosses, and that the true cross was not
with this number at all. However, . . . they brought it, and be-
hold a miracle! The woman sprang from her bed, smiling and
joyful, and perfectly restored to health. When we listen to evi-
dence like this, we cannot but believe. We would be ashamed to
doubt, and properly, too. Even the very part of Jerusalem where
this all occurred is there yet. So there is really no room for
doubt. (II, 301-302)

This irony-sarcasm is followed by another example which puts the same prob-
lem of knowledge to a more graphic test. The pilgrims are shown a piece of
the pillar of flagellation behind a screen, though it is too dark for them to see
through the screen. Then they are given a baton with which to poke through
the screen and feel the pillar. "[The Pilgrim] cannot have any excuse to doubt it, for he can feel it with the stick. He can feel it as distinctly as he could feel anything" (II, 302-303).

Thus, throughout the book, Twain is conscious of the problem -- how to arrive at knowledge. He rejects the authority of past learning. He rejects second-hand perceptions. He rebukes authors of the guide books for seeing what they want to see, or for reading history into their perceptions. He castigates his fellow pilgrims for relying on their guide books for ready-made feelings and emotions, for letting the guide books do their perceiving for them. In short, he wants no romance, he wants the "truth." However, when he relies on his own vision, the view is unpleasant. His view sees things as they are. It sees things in the flat perspective of the here and now, unshaded by what may have been or might be.

The epitome of the problem comes in Twain's description of the Sea of Galilee and his comparison of his view with the views of the guide books. To Twain the scene is desolate: "...this cloudless, blistering sky, this solemn, sailless, tintless lake, reposing within its rim of yellow hills and low, steep banks, and looking just as expressionless and unpoetical..." (II, 239). But he proceeds to contrast his view with Grimes, quoting Grimes at some length. Grimes expatiates on "the beauty of the scene" and berates those "travelers who have described the lake as tame or uninteresting." He mentions "banks...of the richest green...and watercourses...forming dark chasms or light sunny valleys," and finds these to be.

scenes of glorious beauty. On the east, the wild and desolate
mountains contrast finely with the deep-blue lake; and toward the north, sublime and majestic, Hermon looks down on the sea, lifting his white crown to heaven with the pride of a hill that has seen the departing footsteps of a hundred generations. On the northeast shore of the sea was a single tree, and this is the only tree of any size visible from the water of the lake, except a few lonely palms in the city of Tiberias, and by its solitary position attracts more attention than would a forest. The whole appearance of the scene is precisely what we would expect and desire the scenery of Gennesaret to be, grand beauty, but quiet calm.¹⁴

Then he produces a quotation which is "the worst I ever saw," a description of the same scene by another author who begins trying to see in Grimes' manner but concludes that "it is a scene of desolation and misery."

...after a conscientious effort to build a terrestrial paradise out of the same materials... he spoils it all by blundering upon the ghastly truth at last" (II, 241-242).

Twain speculates upon reasons for the disparity of views and suggests that Presbyterians come to see things as Presbyterian, Catholics as Catholic, etc., and that his fellow travelers "have brought their verdicts with them" in their travel books.

Then Twain takes another look at the scene, this time at night, and the view is more pleasant:

Since I made my last few notes, I have been sitting outside the tent for half an hour. Night is the time to see Galilee. Gennesaret under these lustrous stars has nothing repulsive about it. Gennesaret with the glittering reflections of the constellations flecking its surface, almost makes me regret that I ever saw the rude glare of the day upon it. Its history and its associations are its chiefest charm, in any eyes, and the spells they weave are feeble in the searching light of the sun. Then, we scarcely feel the fetters. Our thoughts wander constantly to the practical concerns of life,
and refuse to dwell upon things that seem vague and unreal. But when the day is done, even the most unimpressible must yield to the dreamy influences of this tranquil starlight. (II, 244)

He has made a remarkable reversal, and if we are to attribute all statements of Twain as naive and straightforward statements, then we might accuse him of muddled writing (since in actuality all the verdicts were in -- he had seen both views and had read of daylight and nighttime visits by Prime -- before he started writing). Nevertheless, there are two influences that make the night view different from the day view. One is the absence of "the searching light of the sun." Twain has created a basic dichotomy which equates sunlight with the scientific, empirical, critical, even positivistic point of view, and starlight with faith, willful suspension of disbelief for the moment, and Emersonian "reason." The other influence brought on by the willful suspension of disbelief, is the influx of Galilee's "history and associations" which are "its chiefest charm." The Biblical legends which our traveler has been rejecting at every turn suddenly find their way into an eye temporarily uncritical and they mold its vision. Our daytime realist has turned into a starlight romanticist.

Twain leaves the disparity of views unresolved, but he comes back to this basic conflict often, trying to establish one view or the other as more valid. In the pillar of flagellation passage, his sarcasm-irony is all on the side of critical empiricism, but at the Sea of Galilee, while we still foresee victory for the critical empiricist, it is not without regret.

After leaving the Sea of Galilee, Twain and his fellow pilgrims travel
to Tabor over a particularly barren route: "A desolation is here that not even imagination can grace with the pomp of life and action" (II, 253). Arriving at Tabor, he turns to view the terrain they have just traveled. "Below was the broad, level plain of Esdraelon, checkered with fields like a chess-board, and full as smooth and level, seemingly, dotted about its compact borders with white, compact villages, and faintly penciled, far and near, with the curving lines of roads and trails." The contrast between the near view and the far view leads him to remember a past experience.

One must stand on his head to get the best effect in a fine sunset, and set a landscape in a bold, strong framework that is very close at hand, to bring out all its beauty. One learns this latter truth never more to forget it, in that mimic land of enchantment, the wonderful garden of my lord the Count Pallavicini, near Genoa. You go wandering for hours among hills and wooded glens, artfully contrived to leave the impression that Nature shaped them and not man, following winding paths and coming suddenly upon leaping cascades and rustic bridges; finding sylvan lakes where you expected them not; loitering through battered medieval castles in miniature that seem hoary with age and yet were built a dozen years ago; meditating over ancient crumbling tombs, whose marble columns were marred and broken purposely by the modern artist that made them; stumbling unawares upon toy palaces, wrought of rare and costly materials, and again upon a peasant's hut, whose dilapidated furniture would never suggest that it was made so to order;............. And verily, the chiefest wonder is reserved until the last,... You look through an unpretending pane of glass, stained yellow, the first thing you see is a mass of quivering foliage, ten short steps before you, in the midst of which is a ragged opening like a gateway -- a thing that is common enough in nature, and not apt to excite suspicions of a deep human design -- and above the bottom of the gateway, project, in the most careless way, a few broad tropic leaves and brilliant flowers. All of a sudden, through this bright, bold gateway, you catch a glimpse of the faintest, softest, richest picture that ever graced the dream of a dying Saint, since John saw the New Jerusalem glimmering above the
clouds of Heaven. A broad sweep of sea, flecked with carreeing sails; a sharp, jutting cape, and a lofty lighthouse on it; a sloping lawn behind it, beyond, a portion of the old "city of palaces," with its parks and hills and stately mansions.... The ocean is gold, the city is gold, the meadow, the mountain, the sky -- everything is golden -- rich, and mellow, and dreamy as a vision of Paradise. No artist could put upon canvas its entrancing beauty, and yet, without the yellow glass, and the carefully contrived accident of a framework that cast it into enchanted distance and shut out from it all unattractive features, it was not a picture to fall into ecstasies over. Such is life, and the trail of the serpent is over us all.

There is nothing for it now but to come back to old Tabor, though the subject is tiresome enough... (II, 254-257).

If we wish, we can take this description as a literal narrative of an actual experience in an actual garden in Genoa. Twain saw the garden in Genoa and gave bare mention of it in his Alta California letter that covers the Genoa stop, but he deferred description until the Holy Land letter which makes up Chapter XXII of Innocents Abroad. As Twain used the incident, it becomes much more than mere description, it becomes a view of history. The careful contriver-architect has led him through the contrived-to-look-uncontrived details of history, and now has prepared him for the conclusion, a brilliant summation with the illusion of truth in it; it obscures the details and diffuses a golden glow over everything. The result is an idealized view -- a view which the observer accepts as reality, but which is better than reality. Such a view would be William Prime's view of the Holy Land (or even Prime's view of himself). Such a view is the Bible. But also, this view is everyone's, and we can't escape it. We inevitably prefer the tinted view (especially when we are looking in a mirror), we want to shut out the ugly, the petty and the diseased,
and live comfortably with what is left. For "Such is life, and the trail of the serpent is over us all."

_Innocents Abroad_ describes the dilemma of nineteenth-century man. He has developed a new tool of knowledge, science, but the tool has turned on him. He can no longer be comfortable in the faith of his fathers because he has thrown blinding light on its murky and deceptive history. Only by glossing over the facts can he make it attractive, and scientific objectivity won't permit him to do that. The cosmic Toryism of a bygone age, with its belief in a beneficence which justified the high position of the aristocrat and the low but proper position of the poor, will no longer work. The deformed, leprous, depraved beggars can no longer be dismissed from the mind with a few "backsheesh." Lyell could be interpreted by Christians to fit Biblical lore, but not Darwin. And Higher Criticism has turned the Bible out of doors.

_Innocents Abroad_ does not exposit a deterministic philosophy; however, there is very little in it that is inconsistent with determinism. Twain revealed himself not only as a critic of Europe and America, of the Bible and travel books, of beggars and ships' captains, but also of human kind. He saw vice, degradation, and poverty, and he blamed them on environmental influences. He presented a narrator who was in the habit of seeing and thinking in the manner of a neo-positivist -- a materialist-realist-literalist -- though he frequently wished that he could see things differently. In _Innocents Abroad_ the narrator and the people he observes present a picture of mankind not much different from the picture Twain later presented in _What Is Man?_
Footnotes: Chapter III


2. Innocents Abroad, II, 41. Further references to this work in this chapter will be made parenthetically in the text.

3. Misuse and "new" use of terms was stock material for Twain's platform appearances, and the use of "instinct" in a passage such as this one may have been no more than an attempt at the same type of humor.


8. Neider, *Life As I Find It*, p. 55. See also, Neider, p. 67, and Pascal Covici, *Mark Twain's Humor* (Dallas, 1962), pp. 143-188, who treats the hoax as a literary device, particularly applying it to *Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*.

9. Perhaps the extent to which Twain wrote ironically and perpetrated hoaxes will never be completely established. All critics cringe when they read Twain's warning "Notice" which serves as a preface to *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*, but to my knowledge none of them have had the nerve yet to point out that the "Explanatory" note which follows is pure hoax, and the final sentence, "I make this explanation for the reason that without it many readers would suppose that all these characters were trying to talk alike and not succeeding," is the baldest of ironies.

10. Gladys Bellamy, *Mark Twain as a Literary Artist* (Norman, Okla., 1950), Chapter 12, touches on this problem and presents much of the evidence. However, Miss Bellamy's division of the material into only two categories is an over-simplification. Furthermore, she assumes that Twain was naively reporting with no effort to shape his material or give it thematic balance. "Ugliness as Reality, Beauty as Dream" does not satisfactorily analyze the relationship of the distant and close-up views as different methods of cognition, methods much like the Emersonian distinction between reason and understanding.
11. C. E. Shain, "The Journal of the Quaker City Captain," *New England Quarterly*, 1955, points out that when Twain charged Captain Duncan with slander in 1877, he also asserted that none of the three dignitaries ever intended to make the trip.

12. In this respect, Twain used a device remarkably similar to Melville's beginning chapters in *Redburn* and even *Moby Dick*. Like *Innocents Abroad*, these two novels introduce an innocent protagonist who approaches his coming voyage with mixed emotions and who finds that the circumstances of his sailing aren't quite those that were advertised.

13. Twain wrote this critique after his return from the trip, in the process of expanding the letters to book form. He changed Prime to Grimes and altered the title by changing *Tent* to *Nomadic*.


15. When Twain decided to eliminate Mr. Brown from his travels, he absorbed Brown's way of seeing and thinking into himself, as an occasional part of his own person (or persona, if you will). The result (and possibly the motive) was to recognize the duality in us all, to recognize that things affect us differently as circumstances differ. I might note in passing that this outlook is basically deterministic.
Soon after the publication of *Innocents Abroad* in 1869, Twain gave up his interests in newspaper and magazine writing and, although he lectured periodically, began to search for book materials and to think of himself as a writer of books -- though not yet a writer of fiction. By 1871, when he moved to Hartford, he was committed to the occupation of writer. In the next fifteen years Twain attempted a variety of forms and subjects, finding publishable material in whatever he tried, but without landing on an ideal combination. He collaborated with Charles Dudley Warner. He utilized experiences of his youth in writing *Roughing It* and a second trip to Europe in *A Tramp Abroad* -- both clearly imitations of the form of *Innocents Abroad*. He came closest to finding a suitable genre in "Old Times on the Mississippi" and its book form, *Life on the Mississippi*. He also experimented further with fiction, writing *Tom Sawyer* and *The Prince and the Pauper* as boys stories. As different as these literary efforts were in form and approach, they all show Twain's developing philosophy as it shaped his writing. *Roughing It* and *A Tramp Abroad* echo the problem of perception presented in *Innocents Abroad*. *Adventures of Tom Sawyer* is an early study of the effects of training. *Life on the Mississippi* re-focuses the problem of perception in terms of technological progress, and *The Prince and the Pauper* is one of Twain's early efforts to play pairs of characters against each other in order to see what makes them function.

In writing *Roughing It*, Twain relied heavily on material he had written for newspapers during his western years, frequently giving the material little
Many episodes are obvious attempts to exploit humorous situations for all they are worth. As its English title, *Innocents at Home*, indicates, it deals with the story of a neophyte exposed to experience much as *Innocents Abroad* did. Indeed, the innocent is younger, cruder, and more a tenderfoot than the protagonist of *Innocents Abroad* and is younger and probably more of a tenderfoot than Twain was when he made his maiden trip west. Twain was a twenty-six year old ex-river pilot (and ex-Confederate soldier) when he accompanied Orion Clemens to the Nevada Territory. The protagonist of *Roughing It* appears to be in his late teens. And even though Twain's main purpose in departing from fact may have been to create humor, the effect is to make *Roughing It* read not as a sequel to *Innocents* but, instead, as a prologue.

Henry Nash Smith has picked the coyote as the basic symbol of *Roughing It*. Twain introduces the coyote in Chapter Five as "a long, slim, sick and sorry-looking skeleton, with a gray wolf skin stretched over it, a tolerably bushy tail that forever sags down with a despairing expression of forsakenness and misery, a furtive and evil eye, and a long, sharp face, with slightly lifted lip and exposed teeth."

Smith says, "This is not at first glance an attractive portrait, but the moral universe of *Roughing It* is somewhat paradoxical, and the reader must be prepared to discover that the sad-looking coyote is really a triumphant figure, endowed with almost supernatural powers.... The [coyote] anecdote announces a reversal of values as the traveler passes from the accustomed life of towns to the strange life of the Far West. The attitudes brought from back home are shown to be ridiculous in comparison with the coyote's secret -- a secret that
seems actually to release him from the laws of nature."

In spite of Smith's comment, the coyote's meaning is ultimately much different from that. The coyote's secret -- the source of his success -- is his complete acceptance of the laws of nature. He "rolls with the punches" that are thrown at him because he has no misplaced pride in his freedom, or principles, or supposed superiority. His world is a determined one.

It is clear that a concept very much akin to environmentalism is central to the world Twain wrote of. The coyote is ideally suited to (and shaped by) the forsaken prairies he haunts. The frontier mining community permits only the fit to survive and warps those fit few into a special breed who have unique morals and social standards which suit only their unique situation. The tenderfoot's knowledge and values are suspect because they aren't based on experience of the world in which he lives. The tenderfoot knows enough of the fixed eastern society, a society implicitly genteel, puritan and sterile, to survive within that society, though he isn't described as over-competent in any situation. He is not, however, ready either for the rigors of the frontier west or for the subtleties of European culture of Innocents Abroad. He must learn to discard his book-learned values. His concept of the Noble Indian doesn't fit the facts, when he is lost in a snowstorm, he learns that the fiction about starting a fire with a blast from a pistol doesn't work and that his faithful horse isn't as reliable as the books have indicated. Similarly, "Slade the terrible," who according to the coach drivers' stories has killed thirty-five men, turns out to be mild and cordial when Twain meets him, and Twain doesn't know whether to rely on legend or personal experience.
Just as the recurring theme of *Innocents Abroad* was the problem of perception, we find situations in *Roughing It* demanding and receiving similar treatment. The tenderfoot in the West might be rephrased as "man's perception coming into conflict with his preconceptions." Many of the situations in *Roughing It* which lend themselves to this sort of treatment can be classed in the general category of western humor -- a genre which suits this situation perfectly. Twain's first known published story, "Dandy Frightening a Squatter," deals with a similar subject and is certainly in the tradition of frontier humor. The Dandy has visions of his importance which don't fit the facts, and it is only in the reality of experience that he learns what he truly is.

There is a difference between the earlier tale and similar situations in *Roughing It*, however, which is a difference in point of view. In "Dandy" the narrator sees the situation from the frontiersman's point of view. The dandy is the stranger. In *Roughing It*, Twain is the dandy and he experiences things much more intimately.

Smith complains that in *Roughing It* Twain was not fully committed to the "vernacular" viewpoint. Instead he wrote from above, already having taken a position of Eastern gentility. To establish this point, the critic examines in some detail the story of Buck Fanshaw's funeral, a conversation between a miner who speaks nothing but "frontierese" and a minister from back East who speaks formal eastern idiom. Smith's argument is that Twain does not tell the story from the miner's view. It seems to me that Smith is forcing a point. The narrator is the innocent, and though he does undergo an initiation, the initiation never fully "takes." It would be inconsistent of him to assume...
the miner's viewpoint, and the fact that Twain earlier told purely vernacular stories is not in itself proof that he began as a western humorist and later sold out to the East. Kenneth Lynn points out, quite properly, I think, "that as between the two Americas thus symbolized the narrator prefers Scotty Briggs'. 'Virginia City,' the narrator says flatly, 'afforded me the most vigorous enjoyment of life I had ever experienced." The eastern-bred preacher is also an innocent, but not quite the same kind as Twain, since he is identified much more clearly with eastern culture than Twain is. Furthermore, he is presented as a timid, ineffective man using an effete language to preach an inadequate doctrine.

It has been a commonplace to point out that *Innocents Abroad* and *Roughing It* are polar opposites in that the first took Twain into a highly civilized society and the latter took him into the wilds. Obviously this is true, but it doesn't make much difference in the form or the meaning of the books. Twain does not expand the situations in *Innocents Abroad* which bring him into contact with the formal and restrictive features of society. Instead, he spends much more time dealing with peoples and situations which are at least as primitive as the society he left behind. The central theme of both books is the problem of perception, especially when perception conflicts with preconception. It is this theme with which almost every episode in both books deals in some way.

*A Tramp Abroad* followed *Roughing It* by eight years but should be mentioned here because of its similarity. For all practical purposes it was a pot boiler, a watered down imitation of *Innocents Abroad* and *Roughing It*. In places it is funny, in others it is tedious. Even so, Twain dealt again
with the problem of perception (and once again found no sure answer to the dilemma he presented). The Swiss Alps gave him opportunities to study the problem of perspective -- one important aspect of perception -- viewing villages from far above as he had done in Innocents Abroad and seeing them as "toy villages" which had the appearance of "steel engravings" or "relief maps." He also mentioned the effect of the dappled sunlight in the Black Forest: "the weirdest effect, and the most enchanting." Nevertheless, except for the fact that it demonstrates the sameness of Twain's world view over a period of eleven years (1869-1880), A Tramp Abroad is not nearly as important as The Adventures of Tom Sawyer.

Published in 1876, Tom Sawyer is a landmark for two important new directions which Twain's writing took: his use of the omniscient, third-person point of view and his utilization of "the matter of Hannibal." With the adaptation of the omniscient, third-person point of view, Twain was writing his first pure novel. Even though incidents were autobiographical and the setting came even more directly from childhood experience, Twain had now selected a story which took its line of action from something other than a travel itinerary and which would have to rely to a greater extent on the unity of this line of action for its effectiveness as a story. The "matter of Hannibal" also gave Twain more freedom (or, perhaps, forced more freedom upon him). The events he remembered were sketchy and frequently his exposition of them resulted in much more fiction than history.

Tom Sawyer is important to this study in terms of its meaning. Under conditions where Twain had freedom to shape action to suit his theme, what
The answer to this question has been made difficult by the assertions of some critics that Twain was dissatisfied with *Tom Sawyer* and wrote *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* as an attempt to correct it or tell the story from a better angle. Henry Nash Smith, for instance, has commented that Tom Sawyer was too much a member of the "in group" to be the ideal vehicle for Twain's criticism of society, whereas Huck, as an outcast, was much better suited to Twain's purposes. "Even before he had finished the book he had recognized the solution for several of his technical problems. It lay in using Huck Finn as a narrative persona. The outcast Huck was far more alienated than Tom from conventional values."

I think that there is a thematic consistency between the two books which should be noted. Furthermore, there is consistency in conception of character. The one marked difference in the two is point of view, and while one might speculate that Twain used the first person in *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* because he felt a closer kinship to Huck, it is much more likely that he used the first person simply because it was easier to manage and suited his ability to write in the vernacular as well as his satiric inclination.

In one respect, *Tom Sawyer* and *Huckleberry Finn* are studies in contrasting perspectives: Tom, the romantic, Huck, the realist. This relationship will be investigated at some length later in this chapter but is important here as an introduction to Twain's treatment of heredity and environment in *Tom Sawyer* -- the crux of his determinism. For purposes of this theme in *Tom Sawyer* there are three important characters: Tom, Huck, and Sid. Huck is obviously an outsider with the outsider's values and ignorance. Sid is the
insider with an insider's values and education. Training has made Huck what he is, training has made Sid what he is. But Tom is not so simple a figure. In many ways he shows resistance to the rules of society. His fight with the new boy who is properly dressed, his attempts to play hooky undetected, his midnight adventures with Huck are all signs of a temperament which refuses to be tamed. However, the training Tom receives shapes his personality and channels his temperament in lines that Huck's cannot (and does not have to) take.

The incident which best epitomizes Tom Sawyer occurs not in his book but in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. As Huck and Tom come back to the Phelps farm house after their first visit with Nigger Jim, Tom decides that the way for him to get back to his bedroom is to shinny up the lightning rod. Huck relates it thus:

> Then we started for the house, and I went in the back door -- you only have to pull a buckskin latchstring, they don't fasten the doors -- but that warn't romantical enough for Tom Sawyer, no way would do him but he must climb up the lightning-rod. But after he got up half-way about three Urnes, and missed fire and fell every time, and the last time most busted his brains out, he thought he'd got to give it up; but after he was rested he allowed he would give her one more turn for luck, and this time he made the trip. 

The next night, Huck again takes the stairs.

> When I got upstairs I looked out at the window and see Tom doing his level best with the lightning-rod, but he couldn't come it, his hands was so sore. At last he says:

> "It ain't no use, it can't be done. What you reckon I better do? Can't you think of no way?"

> "Yes," I says, "but I reckon it ain't regular. Come up the stairs, and let on it's a lightning-rod." So he done it.
He "done it" by way of the stairs on subsequent nights, too, without the trying preliminaries.

Tom Sawyer's temperament led him to adventure. His training -- both education and the restrictive nature of his society -- led him to sublimate this adventure into romance. He was not the one to steal a slave, he was the one to plan elaborate escape details for an already freed man. He could enjoy running away from home for a day or so, but he recognized that there was a time for return. His grit and determination were more likely to be directed against a lightning rod than a real issue. His rebellion against his society never went beyond games.

The Adventures of Tom Sawyer is frequently misunderstood because of its relationship to the burlesques of boys stories which Twain wrote. "A Story of a Bad Boy" and "A Bad Boy's Diary" are burlesques with the intention of countering the theme of boys books: good boys make good, virtue triumphs in the end. As such they present boys who are bad, who scheme and lie and cheat and succeed while good boys take the blame. The theme of Tom Sawyer differs and is more subtle. In the first place, Tom Sawyer is a more complete character. He doesn't have the simple consistency of a burlesque type. Second, he is not bad in the same way that the burlesque figures are. His aunt chides him for his thoughtlessness at the same time that she recognizes his generous impulses. Tom receives more than his share of whippings at school, some of which he deserves. The two he receives in Chapter 20, however, should have gone to other people -- one to a "good boy" who spoils Tom's spelling book in order to get revenge, the other to Becky Thatcher, a good girl, who has
accidentally torn the school master's anatomy book. In the bad boy burlesques, the good boys are really good and are victimized by really bad, bad boys. In Tom Sawyer the good boys are just as bad as Tom, but their badness takes a different direction. The good boys work within the framework of society while Tom works without. The good boys are tattlers and framers. Sid exposes Tom's hooky playing to his aunt. Alfred Temple spills ink on Tom's book so that Tom will get the blame. In each case Tom is punished by the recognized authority in society -- his aunt and the school teacher. Tom on the other hand deals out his own punishment: he pelts Sid with clods for tattling, he whips Alfred Temple in a fair fight.10

Tom's natural impulse -- his temperament -- is toward societal individualism but he is a member of society and furthermore he seeks the rewards of society. As Pascal Covici points out, "Tom needs the 'gang' and society.... His growth is within the framework of village life and village institutions -- school, Sunday School, jail, and courthouse."11

The Adventures of Tom Sawyer is the story of his growing recognition that he must yield to society's demands in order to gain its benefits. The story is built around a series of episodes which begin in anti-social behavior and culminate in Tom's achieving glorious recognition. The first few episodes are minor, but they grow in significance as the book progresses. Tom's generalship at war which gains him recognition among the boys and his showing off before Becky which is rewarded by a flower demonstrate his innate desire for approval -- a desire which Twain was later to label as man's master passion. Tom next buys enough Bible-verse tickets to be awarded a Bible and
once again he is the center of attention, the glorious center, until he is called on to demonstrate his knowledge. From this point on, Tom performs a series of reprehensible acts which he manages to turn to his advantage. He sneaks out at midnight to join Huck on a graveyard wart-healing expedition. The expedition leads to his witnessing a violent murder and eventually to his testimony in court, where he becomes again the temporary hero. Later he and Huck and Joe Harper run away to play pirates on Jackson's Island only to return for a triumphant appearance at their own funeral. This excursion is followed by Tom's confession of guilt in school for the crime which Becky committed, even though Twain makes it clear that the accepted thing to do -- at least when guilty -- is to deny guilt. Here again, Tom's act gained recognition and approval -- especially from Becky Thatcher, the most important source. Ironically, when Tom has the opportunity to gain recognition through such an acceptable channel as reciting at the school graduation ceremony, he muffs it badly. But when unacceptable sources of entertainment present themselves, he turns them to his own profit. When the acceptable boy friends are unavailable for a treasure hunt, he falls in with forbidden Huck on confusedly romantic escapades which cause the boys to cross paths with Injun Joe and actually locate a treasure. This treasure is the source of Tom's final triumph when he one-ups the Welshman's surprise. In the meantime Tom has led Becky astray in a cave, has lured her from a protective society and endangered both their lives only to turn the fiasco to advantage when his perseverance (and considerable luck) helps him to save himself and her and become once more the hero, the center of attention, the idol of society.
All these episodes fall into a clear-cut pattern of misbehavior supplemented by natural goodness followed by triumph. We might state this differently as episodes which show Tom falling away from society, falling out of grace, and then coming back again.

Closer examination of two of the episodes might help to make my point a little clearer.

The first paragraph of Chapter 13, "The Pirate Crew Set Sail," as it appears in the table of contents, shows clearly that Tom's motive for going off to Jackson's Island is not to get away from society, but instead is just the opposite: he has been forsaken and he wants to draw attention to the fact.

Tom's mind was made up now. He was gloomy and desperate. He was a forsaken, friendless boy, he said; nobody loved him; when they found out what they had driven him to, perhaps they would be sorry; he had tried to do right and get along, but they would not let him; since nothing would do them but to be rid of him, let it be so; and let them blame him for the consequences -- why shouldn't they? What right had the friendless to complain? Yes, they had forced him to it at last: he would lead a life of crime. There was no choice. (p. 133)

Having been punished by his aunt for feeding the cat his medicine and having been rebuffed by his school mates, especially by Becky Thatcher, he feels cut off from society and for once outside the group rather than stage center. His reaction is to escape from society, but from the very first his motive is to attract attention. Even in the act of withdrawal there is time for Tom and his two conspirators to spread some rumors that the townspeople will "hear something" if they will be "mum and wait." Tom is performing before an audience, doing it in style as always.
In laying their plans, Joe Harper and Tom disagree as to what they should do. It seems to Joe that since they are leaving as unwanted outcasts, they should become hermits "living on crusts," and "dying, some time, of cold and want and grief" (p. 112). But Tom's social inclinations lead him in a different direction -- the pirate life. As Tom describes it, pirate life has all the social advantages with none of the obligations. A pirate leads a life of adventure at sea and on shore without anyone to restrict his freedom. "You don't have to get up, mornings, and you don't have to go to school, and wash, and all that blamed foolishness" (p 117). In contrast to a hermit who "don't have any fun, anyway, all by himself," the pirate leads a happy social life, minus society's restrictions, inhibitions, responsibilities. And "a pirate's always respected."

Pirate life is a pleasure, but not enough of a pleasure to keep the boys, especially Tom and Joe, from getting homesick, and only Tom's plan for a glorious return can keep them for the full six days they must wait for their funeral.

By temperament Tom is a wild, untamed being, but his training betrays him. He is, after all, in spite of his spirited misbehavior, his hooky playing, and his escapades with the outcast Huck Finn, a social being, one who seeks the rewards of social recognition without the sacrifices such recognition requires. And though the book is organized around a series of episodes that show Tom moving away from society, each return brings him even closer to the center, to the inescapable responsibilities of impending manhood. Tom's moral obligation to Muff Potter compels him to break a blood oath with Huck Finn, and to align himself with society against the real outcast Injun Joe. His later discovery
of the treasure makes him a man of means, a capitalist even. But the central images of society are Aunt Polly and Becky Thatcher.

Aunt Polly is the source of love as well as punishment, and Tom well knows it; however, the innocent flirtation with Becky Thatcher takes on rather serious overtones towards the end of the book. Indeed, a symbolic exegesis of Chapter 31, "Found and Lost Again," makes this child-love a foreshadowing of adult marriage. As Tom and Becky wander into the cave, they come to "a laced and ruffled Niagara" -- a place that recalls to mind the epitome of honeymoon sites. It is beyond Niagara that they get lost and stop to share a piece of wedding cake which Tom has saved from the picnic. (Notice that Twain's use of wedding cake can hardly be an accidental turn of the plot. The picnic was in no way connected with a wedding celebration. The cake is introduced to show childish puppy love pretending adulthood or as a symbolic foreshadowing, or both.) It is as though Tom's last act of irresponsibility -- on the plot level getting lost in a cave, on the symbol level getting irrevocably entwined with Becky -- has doomed him to oblivion or responsibility. His final desperate search for light, his final triumphant return to stage center takes place in such a way as to doom him to life within society rather than without, to an acceptance of social (middle class) values rather than rejection. At this point in the story Tom seeks out Huck Finn and tries to bring him into the fold, too. At this point Tom acquires a bank account. Here, Tom is closer to Aunt Polly than Sid is.

Tom Sawyer is the story of an independent soul, an adventurous spirit, caught in the workings of society. Like a fly in a web, his very struggles to escape enmesh him more tightly. He is a free spirit in a determined world.
An examination of *Life on the Mississippi* along the lines of that of *Innocents Abroad* reveals a striking similarity of approach and outlook, and serves to show the consistency of Twain's thinking in the period between 1870 and the publication of *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* in 1885. Part of *Life on the Mississippi* was published serially in the *Atlantic Monthly* in 1874 and 1875 as "Old Times on the Mississippi." Twain reconsidered the material at periodic intervals as he planned a trip back to the river to gather material for expansion to book length. Though the book suffers (as most of Twain's non-fiction books do) from lack of revision in this expansion process and though it appears that a more careful revision was called for, we must assume that Twain reconsidered the earlier portion of the narrative as he prepared it for final publication and found it acceptable -- or, at the very least, not unacceptable -- in substance. Thus his outlook had not undergone cataclysmic changes in the decade between serial publication and final book appearance.

The first section (approximately Chapters IX through XXI) deals with his cub pilot days and supplies another step backward in the narrative of his innocence to a point in his real life age of 20 to 25. In the narrative treatment, once more, he seems much younger than he was at that period in his life, however, in terms of the parts of his life dealt with he ranged backward from traveling correspondent to Nevada days to river days, getting ever closer to the boyhood era of Huck Finn, Joe Harper and Tom Sawyer. In the cub pilot section, he accomplishes the initiation of an innocent in a much more direct fashion than he had managed in *Innocents Abroad* or *Roughing It.* As a result, the contrasts and the basic theme are more succinctly stated. Once again
evidences of the five basic ideas of *What Is Man?* appear in the text, though still not systematically stated or put into a special vocabulary.

The ideas of temperament and training are frequently treated, usually together. At one point Twain uses the term "human nature" as a description of traits common to all men. "I was sorry I hated the mate so, because it was not in (young) human nature not to admire him" (p. 40). Later he has a perpetual borrower explain his apocryphal desire to repay his debts by exclaiming, "'It's my nature, how can I change it?'"(p. 160). (Italics are Twain's.) The remark is so constructed that the general "human nature" of the previous quotation has been narrowed to a specific individual 'nature,' one man's trait. The remark is interesting for the emphasis Twain has supplied in italics by defining 'nature' as that in a man which he himself cannot change -- an important deterministic distinction. Change must occur from the outside, from environment, education, chance. Twain later comments again on this fact. In discussing the improvements that have come about in the twenty years he was absent from the river, he contrasts the old and new methods of handling the "stage," or boarding platform.

... instead of calling out a score of hands to man the stage, a couple of men and a hatful of steam lowered it from the derrick where it was suspended, launched it, deposited it in just the right spot, and the whole thing was over and done with before a mate in the olden time could have got his profanity-mill adjusted to begin the preparatory services. Why this new and simple method of handling the stages was not thought of when the first steamboat was built is a mystery which helps one to realize what a dull-witted slug the average human being is. (p. 198)

I have quoted this passage in full because it has relevance again later in this chapter.
The 'average human being' is human nature -- the generality of mankind -- a dull-witted slug! Much that we call progress is not planned. It happens. And we dull-witted slugs are barely bright enough to perceive the improvement.

"Human nature" is often used to denote even less desirable characteristics of man. Twain portrays a cold-blooded conscienceless undertaker who explains the methods of his trade. He can describe sixteen different methods of embalming, "though there ain't only one or two ways," so that the prospective customer will take the highest priced because he wants the best for his deceased loved one. "It's human nature -- human nature in grief," explains the undertaker. "It don't reason, you see."

Human nature is also the chill-racked, flooded-out red neck who lives a sub-human existence for weeks at a time, huddled in a wood flat or perched atop a rail fence simply enduring the flood and the yellow fever chills knowing that both will subside eventually, as surely as they will come again.

These examples put more emphasis on the generally miserable condition of man than on nature as temperament, or inborn traits. It is in the contrast between temperament and training, however, that the inborn-traits feature appears. Commenting on qualifications for a pilot, Twain remarks that in addition to memory a pilot must have judgment and courage. "Give a man the merest trifle of pluck to start with, and by the time he has become a pilot he cannot be unmanned by any danger a steamboat can get into, but one cannot quite say the same for judgment. Judgment is a matter of brains, and a man must start with a good stock of that article..." (p. 113). Twain's estimate of courage as a learned trait is strikingly close to his example in What Is Man? of
the man who learns to be brave, so impelled by outside circumstances. Neither the pilot nor the *What Is Man?* example has an auspicious beginning, the *What Is Man?* example being brave enough not to fear a cow. However, Twain consistently assumes that judgment and intellect are matters of inheritance more than of training. Speaking again of his pilot experience, Twain provides a doubled example of his basic point.

> I am to this day profiting somewhat by that experience, for in that brief, sharp schooling, I got personally and familiarly acquainted with about all the different types of human nature that are to be found in fiction, biography, or history. The fact is daily borne in upon me that the average shore-employment requires as much as forty years to equip a man with this sort of an education. When I say I am still profiting by this thing, I do not mean that it has constituted me a judge of men -- no, it has not done that, for judges of men are born, not made. My profit is various in kind and degree, but the feature of it which I value most is the zest which that early experience has given to my later reading... (p. 163)

Twain goes out of his way to establish not only the efficacy of training, but also the limits -- the temperament of the individual which will make the results of the same training vary in kind and degree as individuals vary. Thus, it is not surprising to hear Twain speak of a successful lecturer, "He was an orator -- by nature in the first place, and later by the training of experience and practice" (p. 464), or of a converted criminal, "his early training asserted itself with power, and wrought with strong influence upon his mind and heart. He put his old life behind him and became an earnest Christian" (p. 415).

As Twain remarks in *What Is Man?* education is only half of what he calls training; the other half is circumstance -- the action of social and natural forces to make a man what he is regardless of his temperament or what he
intends to become or thinks he is becoming. Twain toys with an idea such as this in dealing with his return to Hannibal and learning the fates of his childhood companions. One boyhood chum who "'graduated with honors in an Eastern college'" has since "'succeeded at nothing... and is supposed to have gone to the dogs'" (p. 430). Of another bright boy with similar education -- "the brightest in our village school" -- Twain learns that "'life whipped him in every battle, straight along, and he died in one of the territories, years ago, a defeated man'" (p. 430). Another studied medicine and law, "'fell to drinking, then to gambling behind the door,... went from bad to worse... died... without a cent to buy a shroud'" (pp. 430-431). A former girl friend has gone through three husbands. "'She's got children scattered around here and there, most everywheres'" (p. 431). Other friends were killed in the war.

Not all of Twain's friends turned out so badly. One bright boy "'is a success, always has been, always will be, I think'" (p. 430). Another friend has become "'the first lawyer in the state of Missouri,'" but not from such an auspicious beginning. "'... that boy was a perfect chucklehead, perfect dummy, just a stupid ass, as you may say. Everybody knew it, and everybody said it'" (p. 431). When Twain inquires how such a thing can be, he is told, "'There ain't any accounting for it, except that if you send a d----d fool to St. Louis, and you don't tell them he's a d----d fool, they'll never find it out. There's one thing sure -- if I had a d----d fool I should know what to do with him: ship him to St. Louis'" (p. 432). Later, "'After asking after such other folk as I could call to mind, I finally inquired about myself. 'Oh, he succeeded well enough -- another case of d----d fool. If they'd sent him to St. Louis,
he'd have succeeded sooner'" (p. 433).

This four-page section is typical of much of Twain's travel-book prose. In the bulk, it is straightforward treatment of a subject reaching a humorous climax. The passage is not tedious, but it is dry. Much of the interest in and the unity of the passage is attained by the humorous tag line, which the reader realizes retrospectively was being prepared for throughout. However, the passage also gets its unity from the consistency of outlook. Twain consistently saw man as the sum of his inherited and acquired characteristics -- his temperament and training -- and incapable of changing himself or the rest of the world by exerting his will.

Shortly after "Old Times on the Mississippi" finished its serial run, Twain answered a letter from Frank E. Burrough, with whom he had shared a room for a few months in 1854. Responding to Burrough's recollection of him, he wrote, "You have described a callow fool, a self sufficient ass, a mere human tumble-bug, stern in air, heaving at his bit of dung, imagining that he is remodeling the world and is entirely capable of doing it right. Ignorance, intolerance, egotism, self-assertion, opaque perception, dense and pitiful chuckleheadedness -- and an almost pathetic unconsciousness of it all." Twain, of course, exploited his view of himself as a damned fool, for the humor it entailed, but his specification here of the kind of fool he was is interesting. He pictures himself as having the arrogance to believe he can shape the world and the "opaque perception" -- the addlebrained romantic outlook -- which enabled him to think he knew how the world needed to be shaped. Twain implies by what he says that he has changed, that his confidence in his ability
to reform the world has diminished, though, as we have seen, he was never slow to point out aspects of it which needed changing.

The reference to St. Louis as a haven for damned fools is ironic at one level and has its meaning enriched by the naming of Twain as another damned fool. In addition, it has been prepared for in another direction by a passage twenty pages earlier. Twain tells the story of an apprentice blacksmith in Hannibal who became stage-struck upon seeing some scenes from Richard III acted "in cheap royal finery" and with "maniac energy" in an amateur performance. The blacksmith went to St. Louis to become an actor where Twain encountered him a few years later. Upon hearing that the fellow was appearing that night in Julius Caesar, Twain was "stupified with astonishment, and saying to myself, 'How strange it is! we always thought this fellow a fool, yet the moment he comes to a great city, where intelligence and appreciation abound, the talent concealed in this shabby napkin is at once discovered, and promptly welcomed and honored" (p. 410).

It then develops that the blacksmith's part is the most trivial walk-on bit as a Roman soldier, that the fool is indeed still a fool living in the vain hope of playing Hamlet. "What noble horseshoes this man might have made" if a chance circumstance had not led him astray. At the same time that Twain gives us one more example of training, he prepares us to question the accuracy of a later witness. Seen superficially, any damned fool who goes to St. Louis is successful, we are told, or, looking at it differently, perhaps a damned fool who becomes a lawyer is still a damned fool, after all. Throughout we are reminded to doubt what we perceive, to distrust any judgment not based on
experience. Throughout, we are also reminded with inescapable frequency that man is the sum of his temperament and training; regardless of how we perceive, whether a damned fool sent to St. Louis is successful or remains a damned fool (or both simultaneously), he is still nothing more than the sum of outside influences -- temperament and training.

Other ideas of What Is Man? are also touched upon in Life on the Mississippi. We have seen the willful suspension of moral sense in the portrait of the undertaker. The subject is developed more explicitly in the Napoleon, Arkansas, episode. Twain tells his two friends the story of a dying man's request to him to recover a hidden treasure of $10,000 and send it to the descendant of a wronged friend. The friends show an avaricious interest.

"Are you going to send it to him right away?"

"Yes," I said. "It is a queer question."

No reply. After a little, Rogers asked hesitatingly:

"All of it? That is -- I mean --"

"Certainly, all of it."

I was going to say more, but stopped -- was stopped by a train of thought which started up in me...

The desire for the money grows in all three men and their moral sense creates justification for their keeping half of it.

"Just look at it -- five thousand dollars! Why, he couldn't spend it in a lifetime! And it would injure him, too, perhaps ruin him -- you want to look at that. In a little while he would throw his last away, shut up his shop, maybe take to drinking, maltreat his motherless children, drift into other evil courses, go steadily from bad to worse -- "

Progressively, they reduce the amount of the treasure the shoemaker should
have: three thousand, two thousand, fifteen hundred dollars. Even this is too much.

"Why put upon ourselves this crime, gentlemen?" interrupted the poet earnestly and appealingly. "He is happy where he is, and as he is. Every sentiment of honor, every sentiment of charity, every sentiment of high and sacred benevolence warns us, beseeches us, commands us to leave him undisturbed. That is real friendship, that is true friendship. We could follow other courses that would be more showy, but none that would be so truly kind and wise, depend upon it."

Having decided to keep all the money, the three have misgivings of another sort. The moral sense has gone too far, and now their desire for self-approval reacts. They decide they can't leave the man with nothing, so they agree to buy him a dollar watch.

The men then argue about how to split the money -- their inborn selfishness not yet satisfied. At this point the story has clearly demonstrated that men are motivated by selfish urges within them that they cannot control and tend only to rationalize through their moral sense. Now, however, an outside force plays its part and makes the petty struggles of men seem even less significant. Twain asks the river boat captain to let him off at Napoleon so that he can recover the treasure and is told that the mighty river washed away the entire town years before. "'Just a fifteen minute job, or such a matter. Didn't leave hide nor hair, shred nor shingle of it, except the fag-end of a shanty and one brick chimney.'"

A river altering its course alters many lives and makes of free will a mockery of good intentions.

Yes, it was an astonishing thing to see the Mississippi rolling between unpeopled shores and straight over the spot where I used to see a good big self-complacent town twenty years ago. Town that was county-seat of a great and important county, town with a big United States marine hospital, town of innumerable
fights -- an inquest every day, town where I had used to know the prettiest girl, and the most accomplished, in the whole Mississippi valley, town where we were handed the first printed news of the Pennsylvania's mournful disaster a quarter of a century ago, a town no more -- swallowed up, vanished, gone to feed the fishes; nothing left but a fragment of a shanty and a crumbling brick chimney!

Avariciousness defeated, self-approval reasserts itself; the men chip in to buy the shoemaker his dollar watch (pp. 281-287).

Critics who still repeat the myth that Twain's despair derived from his personal losses in the 1890's should compare this tale with "The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg," one of the so-called products of that pessimism. In storyline and theme this tale is a remarkably similar prototype. An outside agent reveals an apocryphal fortune in such a way as to incite greed in a group of friends. The members of the group exercise their moral sense in order to justify their greed and quarrel and fight among themselves in their attempts to get the fortune. "The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg" is a more completely developed, isolated artistic unit and spells out the extremes of greed and moral sense in more detail and in harder language, however, it adds nothing to the view of humanity that wasn't already expressed in the Napoleon, Arkansas, episode. The patterns of Twain's thought were set and consistent throughout his writing career.

The moral sense always acts in conjunction with those two interrelated (and intricately related) terms of Twain's -- self-interest and self-approval. As we have seen in Chapter I, man's ultimate motive for all acts is a somewhat inadequately discussed combination of these two desires. Both desires are at work in the Napoleon episode: self-interest is exemplified by the
simple desire for the money, and self-approval by the moral-sense justification of the desire and the contribution of fifty cents for a "chromo" at the end of the episode.

The problem of perception gets full treatment in Life on the Mississippi, in some ways more explicitly than in Innocents Abroad. In Life on the Mississippi Twain expands the problem to encompass not only a study of the romantic vs. scientific view but also a study of historical perspective. In Innocents Abroad many passages contrast the distant view with the close examination, the distant view always being more attractive but at the same time suspect. The close examination which revealed fly-infected sores on dirty beggars and which turned "frescoes" into camel dung had to be the more accurate, the more scientific, the more useful way of seeing things. The sunlit view had to be more correct than the moonlit or tinted glass perspective.

The key passage in Life on the Mississippi (one that is often partially quoted) makes the chief distinction between the romantic and the scientific one of training. As a cub pilot learning every "chute" and "reef" on the Mississippi, Twain finally advances his knowledge to the point where Horace Bixby is ready to teach him to read the river -- to tell by the ripples on the surface and the color of the water what the depth and condition of the bottom are. He learns to spot hidden logs, to tell deep water from shallow, quiet from swift, he learns to tell a "bluff reef" (which could tear the bottom out of a boat) from a "wind reef" (which has nothing to do with the depth at all). Twain then comments on this new-found knowledge at some length. "The face of the water, in time, became a wonderful book -- a book that was a dead language to the uneducated
passenger, but which told its mind to me without reserve." Training has developed a method of seeing which opens areas of knowledge not available to the untrained.

In truth, the passenger who could not read this book saw nothing but all manner of pretty pictures in it, painted by the sun and shaded by the clouds, whereas to the trained eye these were not pictures at all, but the grimmest and most dead-earnest of reading-matter.

Now when I had mastered the language of this water, and had come to know every trifling feature that bordered the great river as familiarly as I knew the letters of the alphabet, I had made a valuable acquisition. But I had lost something, too. I had lost something which could never be restored to me while I lived. All the grace, the beauty, the poetry, had gone out of the majestic river! I still kept in mind a certain wonderful sunset which I witnessed when steamboating was new to me. A broad expanse of the river was turned to blood; in the middle distance the red hue brightened into gold, through which a solitary log came floating, black and conspicuous, in one place a long, slanting mark lay sparkling upon the water, in another the surface was broken by boiling, tumbling rings, that were as many-tinted as an opal, where the ruddy flush was faintest, was a smooth spot that was covered with graceful circles and radiating lines, ever so delicately traced, the shore on our left was densely wooded, and the somber shadow that fell from this forest was broken in one place by a long, ruffled trail that shone like silver, and high above the forest wall a clean-stemmed dead tree waved a single leafy bough that glowed like a flame in the unobstructed splendor that was flowing from the sun. There were graceful curves, reflected images, woody heights, soft distances; and over the whole scene, far and near, the dissolving lights drifted steadily, enriching it every passing moment with new marvels of coloring.

I stood like one bewitched. I drank it in, in a speechless rapture. The world was new to me, and I had never seen anything like this at home. But as I have said, a day came when I began to cease from noting the glories and the charms which the moon and the sun and the twilight wrought upon the river's face, another day came when I ceased altogether to note them. Then, if that sunset scene had been repeated, I should have looked upon it without rapture, and should have commented upon
it, inwardly, after this fashion: 'This sun means that we are
going to have wind to-morrow, that floating log means that
the river is rising, small thanks to it, that slanting mark on
the water refers to a bluff reef which is going to kill some­
body's steamboat one of these nights, if it keeps on stretching
out like that, those tumbling 'boils' show a dissolving bar and
a changing channel there; the lines and circles in the slick
water over yonder are a warning that that troublesome place
is shoaling up dangerously; that silver streak in the shadow
of the forest is the 'break' from a new snag, and he has
located himself in the very best place he could have found to
fish for steamboats, that tall dead tree, with a single living
branch, is not going to last long, and then how is a body ever
going to get through this blind place at night without the friendly
old landmark?'

No, the romance and beauty were all gone from the river.
All the value any feature of it had for me now was the amount
of usefulness it could furnish toward compassing the safe
piloting of a steamboat. Since those days, I have pitied doc­
tors from my heart. What does the lovely flush in a beauty's
cheek mean to a doctor but a 'break' that ripples above some
deadly disease? Are not all her visible charms sown thick
with what are to him the signs and symbols of hidden decay?
Does he ever see her beauty at all, or doesn't he simply view
her professionally, and comment upon her unwholesome condi­
tion all to himself? And doesn't he sometimes wonder whether
he has gained most or lost most by learning his trade? (pp. 77-80)

The narrator is clearly torn between two possibilities. Through his pre­
cise knowledge gained by training he learns to read the river like a "wonderful"
book. Moreover, the information he derives is "useful." At the same time,
however, his new knowledge robs him. The language Twain uses reminds one of
the "fortunate fall." The American Adam has lost his innocence and in the pro­
cess has lost grace, beauty, and poetry. And his new-found method of acquiring
useful knowledge is to blame. There is no question that this new method repre­
sents science in Twain's mind. The passage immediately following the one just
quoted begins by admitting that "I deal so minutely with piloting as a science....
what a wonderful science it is" (p. 81). However, the varieties of romantictism with which science is contrasted are not so easily labelled. First of all the romantic view represents innocence; it also represents the over-view or 'reason' of the transcendentalist. In its sweeping looseness of diction it represents the American literary romantic tradition which Twain frequently took to task.

The contrasting descriptions the passage presents show one other important difference in the two types of perspective. The romantic description is static, in spite of the temporal limitations of a beautiful sunset, the sunset is described as a fixed scene. Opposed to this the scientific description dwells on change and decay. Perhaps this last point is merely coincidental conjecture, but the nostalgia for the past displayed in other parts of Life on the Mississippi is unmistakable, moreover, there is in 'useful' technology a tendency toward change, a fetish for progress, the sort of accelerating build up of momentum which led Henry Adams after the turn of the century to predict the ultimate destruction of the world by 1921. At least, there is in the pilot's description of the sunset a deep foreboding that all is not right with the world, just as the doctor's description of the beautiful woman is based on awareness of the inescapability of death -- his words are "the signs and symbols of decay."

If a passage such as this were an isolated example, it might be explained away as mere pontification, however, it stands clearly as the climactic passage in the "piloting" section (the original serialized section) of Life on the Mississippi. It has been carefully prepared for; moreover, the organization of the book form retains it as the central passage. It occurs a little early to be considered climactic, but it gives the book thematic unity.
For instance, a passage already quoted in full comments on the utilization of steam power and a winch to handle the gangplank, using Lt as an example of an improvement that should have been thought of long before. However, this passage is not as straightforward as it seems, having been prepared for earlier by an oft-quoted passage which depicts the quiet river town awakening as the steamboat approaches. The passage describes in detail the ornate, gaudy decorations of the boat and then focuses on the landing procedure.

...the broad stage is run far out over the port bow, and an envied deck-hand stands picturesquely on the end of it with a coil of rope in his hand... (p. 34)

I could not help contrasting the way in which the average landsman would give an order with the mate's way of doing it. If the landsman should wish the gangplank moved a foot farther forward, he would probably say; "James, or William, one of you push that plank forward, please!"; but put the mate in his place and he would roar out: "Here, now, start that gang-plank forward! Lively, now! What're you about! Snatch it! snatch it! There! there! Aft again! aft again! Don't you hear me? Dash it to dash! are you going to sleep over it! 'Vast heaving. 'Vast heaving, I tell you! Going to heave it clear astern? WHERE're you going with that barrel! forward with it 'fore I make you swallow it, you dash-dash-dash-dashed split between a tired mud-turtle and a crippled hearse-horse!"

I wished I could talk like that. (p. 41)

The pomp and circumstance of the river-boat landing filled a void in the lives of the townspeople, the landsmen who led otherwise drab lives; the fully mechanized boat of a later generation left the void unfilled. The steam powered winch could dispatch its duty in record time, but it was low on entertainment value.

In another example, Twain lifts a passage from his *Huckleberry Finn*
manuscript to illustrate the glorious life of a raftsman. In the process of doing it, of course, he shows the effect of the romantic view on two raftsmen who puff themselves up with excessive and grandiose bragging only to have their heads knocked together by a scrawny realist. However, the over-all picture of a raftsman is of a rugged and free individualist enjoying his booze and riotous rampages in Napoleon, Arkansas, or Natchez, Mississippi. The raftsman of the later era is a tamer breed.

Up in this region [Iowa] we met massed acres of lumber-rafts coming down -- but not floating leisurely along, in the old-fashioned way, manned with joyous and reckless crews of fiddling, song-singing, whisky-drinking, breakdown-dancing rascallions, no, the whole thing was shoved along by a powerful stern-wheeler, modern fashion, and the small crews were quiet, orderly men, of a sedate business aspect, with not a suggestion of romance about them anywhere. (p. 476)

The modern method is hyper-utilitarian and gets the job done with the least expended energy and as quickly as possible. However, not only does it offer less entertainment, but it also makes the lives of the raftsmen colorless drudgery without nearly as much freedom. The development of modern technology is not an unmixed blessing, for it has stolen some of man's stature from him and in many cases subordinated him to a machine.

The above passage seems to tip the balance in favor of the romantic and by-gone, pre-science days. However, Twain's method is never so simple as is frequently supposed. The immediately following paragraph ties together another body of material.

Along here, somewhere, on a black night, we ran some exceedingly narrow and intricate island chutes by aid of the electric light. Behind was solid blackness -- a crackless bank of it, ahead, a narrow elbow of water, curving between
dense walls of foliage that almost touched our bows on both sides; and here every individual leaf and every individual ripple stood out in its natural color, and flooded with a glare as of nooday[sic] intensified. The effect was strange and fine, and very striking.(p. 476).

This paragraph stands in direct counterpoise with a passage some four hundred pages earlier, which features Bixby lecturing to cub pilot Twain.

"A clear starlight night throws such heavy shadows that, if you didn't know the shape of a shore perfectly, you would claw away from every bunch of timber, because you would take the black shadow of it for a solid cape, and you see you would be getting scared to death every fifteen minutes by the watch. You would be fifty yards from shore all the time when you ought to be within fifty feet of it. You can't see a snag in one of those shadows, but you know exactly where it is, and the shape of the river tells you when you are coming to it. Then there's your pitch-dark night; the river is a very different shape on a pitch-dark night from what it is on a star-light night. All shores seem to be straight lines, then, and mighty dim ones, too, and you'd run them for straight lines, only you know better....Then there's your gray mist....Well, then, different kinds of moonlight change the shape of the river in different ways. You see --"

"Oh, don't say any more, please! Have I got to learn the shape of the river according to all these five hundred thousand different ways?"

"No! you only learn the shape of the river, and you learn it with such absolute certainty that you can always steer by the shape that's in your head, and never mind the one that's before your eyes." (pp. 64-65)

These two passages are a parable on knowing. In the pre-science days, one trusted his belief, not what he saw darkly. With the advent of science, however, one puts his faith in the clear perception and in improving his method of seeing. Everything outside his view becomes darkness as a result, and things are not seen in their natural light. However, the perception is useful for getting the job done. So it is with the empiricist who is concerned only
with what he can perceive clearly, can measure, weigh, run experiments on. He assumes that anything not felt, seen, smelled, tasted, or heard is nothing at all. By the nature of his method he banishes spirit to the realm of darkness.

The bright-light paragraph serves as a final statement which ties together all the river-pilot lore. All the romantic pomp and glory, all the wrecks, all the memorized details of the river, everything that made piloting a grand and glorious profession is reduced by advanced technology to charts, lights, and automation which make the river trip faster and safer. And this paragraph tips the scale in favor of science. Twain expressed a duality which seems shallow and sentimental when hastily summarized but which encompassed a real dilemma of his day. The advances of technology were undeniable; the shams of the past were undeniable. Still the new technology was based on a set of deterministic, materialistic, positivistic assumptions which argued away the dignity of man, further the new technology created conditions which undermined the freedom of man. The fortunate fall was not entirely fortunate, it created a man unable to go back, afraid to go on.

Although it does not deal as specifically and completely with temperament and training as Pudd'nhead Wilson, The Prince and the Pauper presents an early study of an idea that haunts Twain's later work. The two protagonists come from opposite backgrounds. the prince from Westminster Palace. Tom Canty from Offal Court. Tom has lived a life of harassment and beatings at the hands of a vicious father and a shrewish grandmother. Only his mother and sisters have saved him from worse treatment. He has experienced hunger, filth, and humiliation. Prince Edward, on the other hand, has had the best food and
clothing, the finest of tutors and a whipping boy to take his beatings for him. In training the boys are almost complete opposites. Only in education is there a shred of similarity. Tom Canty is not the illiterate we might expect a pauper to be. A priest has supplied him with a rudimentary reading knowledge and his interest in romance, developed through books, is shown early in the novel:

No, Tom's life went along well enough, especially in summer. He only begged just enough to save himself, for the laws against mendicancy were stringent, and the penalties heavy; so he put in a good deal of his time listening to good Father Andrew's charming old tales and legends about giants and fairies, dwarfs and genii, and enchanted castles, and gorgeous kings and princes. His head grew to be full of these wonderful things, and many a night as he lay in the dark on his scant and offensive straw, tired, hungry, and smarting from a thrashing, he unleashed his imagination and soon forgot his aches and pains in delicious picturings to himself of the charmed life of a petted prince in a regal palace.... He often read the priest's old books and got him to explain and enlarge upon them. His dreamings and readings worked certain changes in him by and by. His dream-people were so fine that he grew to lament his shabby clothing and his dirt, and to wish to be clean and better clad. He went on playing in the mud just the same, and enjoying it, too, but instead of splashing around in the Thames solely for the fun of it, he began to find an added value in it because of the washings and cleansings it afforded. (pp. 5-6)

It is apparent that Twain the novelist realized that a pauper without such training could not begin to pass for a prince -- even a demented one. Arranging Canty's background in this way Twain the novelist was consistent with Twain the philosopher-author of What Is Man?

In temperament, the prince and the pauper are much alike. We have noted Tom's interest in romance. He is a leader among his crowd of boys and organizes a royal court. While such activity provides the minimal training
he will need as a prince, it also reveals a Tom Sawyer-like temperament.

Young Prince Edward displays a similar temperament in his first appearance in the novel, dashing to the defense of Canty. Thus, Twain has a test case set up. Given boys of similar temperament but very different training, each successful in his own environment, what will happen if they are transposed?

In one respect their transposed careers are much alike, but in another they are very different. Both Canty and Edward are caught off guard in their new surroundings to the extent that they are considered demented. There are matters of protocol which Canty is not at all prepared for, such as being dressed by a company of servants and having another company of servants help him eat. He is frightened and uncomfortable as a result. Prince Edward has the notion of royalty so thoroughly trained into him that he cannot unbend. He unthinkingly expects obedience of his every command and he is unable to beg even when the alternative is a beating.

In another way, however, their careers are very different. Canty begins very sorry that he has been made prince -- uncomfortable, anxious to get back to Offal Court. Even though he is unhappy about the situation, however, he is afraid to do anything to change it. Then, as time passes, he gradually becomes acquainted with his new surroundings and satisfied with his lot, so much so that on the coronation day he denies his mother. Edward, on the other hand, acts with the assurance that he can rectify the mix-up. He announces that he is the Prince, later the King, and he conducts himself accordingly. He stands up for principles he believes in, refuses to beg even though his refusal means beatings and derision. As a result everyone thinks he is demented and his
situation goes progressively from bad to worse.

Two key episodes in Edward's adventures occur in the hermit's shack and on the way to prison. In the first, the mad "archangel" ties and gags Edward securely in his sleep and stands waiting for the proper moment to kill him.

Then he struggled again to free himself -- turning and twisting himself this way and that; tugging frantically, fiercely, desperately -- but uselessly -- to burst his fetters, and all the while the old ogre smiled down upon him, and nodded his head, and placidly whetted his knife, mumbling, from time to time, "The moments are precious, they are few and precious -- pray the prayer for the dying!"

The boy uttered a despairing groan, and ceased from his struggles, panting. The tears came, then, and trickled, one after the other, down his face... (p. 174)

A situation finally presents itself to Edward where he cannot but realize that he is not master of his own fate -- that he is completely helpless (and, indeed, he is rescued by pure chance). After this occurrence he accepts his lot more easily, but his years of training cannot be entirely undone. He is happy to be "rescued" back into John Canty's cruel protection, to again be "'King Foo-foo the First'... a butt for their coarse jests and dull-witted railleries..." But he cannot accept his fate and, when he is about to be thrown in jail, rebukes Hendon: "'Idiot, dost imagine I will enter a common jail alive?!' And it is up to Hendon to remind him that he has little choice. "'Will you trust in me? Peace! and forbear to worsen our chances with dangerous speech. What God wills, will happen; thou canst not hurry it, thou canst not alter it, therefore wait, and be patient -- 'twill be time enow to rail or rejoice when what is to happen has happened'" (p. 191). Ironically, Hendon pleads that they resign
themselves to fate when he has the situation well under control, only to be
thrown in prison a few chapters later when he thinks he is in the bosom of his
family. His situation is identical to Edward's -- he asserts his real identity
only to be declared an impostor.

The Prince, both by temperament and training a Prince, unbends very
slowly when he is thrown into the pauper's world. At the same time, training
does affect him. As Edward travels he comes upon injustice after injustice
which he sees for the first time. Most of the injustices are matters of law,
matters which a King could change. Edward sees the conditions inside a prison
first hand. He learns of slave laws. He meets a man who has had both ears
hacked off in punishment for a "libelous" book. He learns that the offense of
stealing goods valued at 13 1/2 pence is punishable by hanging. He sees Pro­
estant martyrs burned at the stake. All this is striking training for a king,
and the training bears fruit when he finally ascends to the throne.

It is interesting that the Prince's experience has not made him an entirely
good king. It has just changed his outlook in certain areas. As the title of the
final chapter, "Justice and Retribution," indicates, Edward has learned hate
as well as justice. He has Hugo thrown in prison, he offers to have John Canty
hanged. Basically, though, the lesson he has learned is of the injustice of
English laws, and it is here that he shows compassion towards his people
which other monarchs have not shown.

The Prince and the Pauper is not a satisfying book. Not only does it
lack the complexity and fullness of development that insures the greatness of
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, but also its happy ending is
disappointingly contrived. In terms of the development of the book, in terms of everything that has gone before, and also in terms of Twain's deterministic philosophy, young King Edward has neither the power nor the insight to save himself. Event after event has demonstrated that he has no such power. It seems that this is Twain's one dishonest book. He worked out a happy ending to satisfy his reading audience. As we have seen, the happy ending of Tom Sawyer was symbolically satisfying. As we shall see, the ending of Huckleberry Finn is disappointing, but for a very different reason: Twain contrived an ending, but in doing so he managed to deny Huck the power to be master of his own fate.

Twain's story of the Prince and the pauper, two boys of similar temperament but different training, was an early exercise in showing what man is. The boys are rather clearly and simply drawn with the focus on the Prince -- the insider rather than the outsider. At the same time that Twain was developing this pair, however, he had another pair of boys in manuscript. Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn are more complex but show essentially a similar dichotomy.
Footnotes: Chapter IV


2. *Roughing It*, I, 32; *Roughing It* is in vols. 17 and 18 of the Collier edition. Further page references will be made in the text.


6. Twain's collaboration with Charles Dudley Warner, *The Gilded Age* (1873), was written from a similarly omniscient point of view, however, because it was a collaboration, the two aspects of omniscient narrative which are important here -- freedom of plot line and freedom to exploit the "matter of Hannibal" -- were missing from that work. Twain had an assigned character (Sellers) who indeed did derive from his Hannibal days, though not his own childhood experience. The restrictions of working with a collaborator inhibited freedom of plot development.


10. Franklin R. Rogers, *Mark Twain's Burlesque Patterns* (Dallas, 1960), pp. 106-107, suggests that *Adventures of Tom Sawyer* may have been begun as a Model Boy burlesque, "but from Chapter VI to the end of the book it disappears."

11. Pascal Covici, Jr., *Mark Twain's Humor* (Dallas, 1962), p. 79.

12. Lewis Leary, "Tom and Huck: Innocence on Trial," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, XXX (1954), 417-430, supplies a very helpful discussion of the organization and chronology of *Adventures of Tom Sawyer* which enumerates phases of Tom's moving away from and back to society. I have not
followed his organization precisely, but the debt is obvious.

13. I'm playing free and loose with publication dates here, since The Adventures of Tom Sawyer was published in 1875. However, there is a general movement backward up to the point of "Old Times on the Mississippi."

14. Life on the Mississippi, p. 40, Life on the Mississippi is volume VIII of the Collier edition, subsequent page references will be made parenthetically in the text.


16. "The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg" is clearly an "isolated artistic unit", however, it could be argued that the Napoleon, Arkansas, episode is too. Charles Neider has included it in his Complete Short Stories of Mark Twain (New York, 1958), pp. 225-239, under the title, "A Dying Man's Confession."


18. Chapter III, "Frescoes from the Past."
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn epitomizes Twain's philosophy in its thematic development at the same time it displays the five basic principles of What Is Man? in more explicit terms. In a novel which employs a semi-literate boy as narrator, of course there is not going to be extensive exposition of philosophic ideas. There are, however, turns of the narrative which exemplify or, in other cases, show consistency with Twain's views. An examination of such situations will show how Train applied his ideas to narrative.

Temperament and training are handled most fully through the characters of Huck and Tom in the first five and last eight chapters of the book. As I've shown in my discussion of Tom Sawyer, Tom becomes in the course of that book a member of society, in many ways tied down by its rules, in spite of his basically restless, adventuresome temperament. Although the pirate gang episode is much like episodes in Tom Sawyer in that Tom misbehaves in order to take part in such an adventure, it is clearly artificial, contrived to avoid violating society's rules too much. Indeed, Kenneth Lynn says: "When Huck is sworn into Tom Sawyer's gang and introduced to Miss Watson's and the Widow Douglas's piety, he is in both cases being shown how a respectable St. Petersburg boy is expected to behave, and in both initiations he resists the mysteries." Although Tom, with a temperament much like Huck's, has been able to become a member of society, Huck cannot even though he tries; his failure convinces him he is a misfit. Proper clothes make him "sweat and sweat and feel all cramped up." He doesn't like civilized meals because
they are eaten on schedule and prayed over. He wants to smoke but can't because the Widow Douglas considers it "a mean practice." He barely tolerates school. At one point he gives up his attempt to be civilized and goes back to his old life -- "into my old rags and my sugar-hogshead again, and was free and satisfied. But Tom Sawyer he hunted me up and said he was going to start a band of robbers, and I might join if I would go back to the widow and be respectable" (p. 2). Being civilized is not easy for Huck and at best his progress toward becoming civilized is erratic, however, there is a possibility that enough training might eventually pull him through.

Not so with Pap. In Pap, Twain repeats an attitude that recurs regularly in his writing -- the foolhardiness of expecting great changes, the ridiculous romance of the notion of conversion. When Pap first gets into trouble, Twain creates a "new judge" who becomes concerned with Pap's welfare. He is a young idealist who believes in the natural goodness of man. He tries to cure Pap with kindness. Inviting Pap into his home and supplying him with good food and better clothes, the judge "talked to him about temperance and such things till the old man cried, and said he'd been a fool" (p. 30). Pap undergoes an on-the-spot conversion, "takes the pledge," and convinces the judge of his sincerity with a speech. Holding out his hand, he says: "'Look at it, gentlemen and ladies all; take a-hold of it; shake it. There's a hand that was the hand of a hog; but it ain't so no more; it's the hand of a man that's started in on a new life, and'll die before he'll go back. You mark them words -- don't forget I said them. It's a clean hand now, shake it -- don't be afeard, '"'

The conversion lasts for half the night. Then Pap sneaks out of the
judge's house, trades his coat for whiskey, returns to get roaring drunk, wrecks his bedroom so badly "they had to take soundings," and falls off the porch roof, breaking his arm. The episode is not without its good effects since it teaches the judge a lesson. "He said he reckoned a body could reform the old man with a shotgun, maybe, but he didn't know no other way" (p. 31).

The story is a thematic preparation for the King's revival meeting conversion later in the novel, which again involves pseudo-conversion in order to exploit a situation. At the same time, it recalls Twain's first story, "Dandy Frightening the Squatter." The "new judge" is in his own way as much of an innocent as the Dandy with a misplaced confidence in his ability to shape the world. In both cases the confidence is based on total lack of experience and the single lesson involved in the sketch is an effective educator. This theme gets much fuller treatment in A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, but, as we shall see, it is basic to The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn as well.

Tom Sawyer's training is to a large extent book-derived while Huck's has come from shifting for himself; thus, their values often conflict. The result is a problem in perspective much like those examined in earlier chapters. In setting up pirate-gang procedure, Tom announces that some of their prisoners will be brought to the cave to be "ransomed." Huck wants to know what the word means and when Tom can't tell him he wants to know how they can "do it" if they "don't know what it is." Tom can only reply that they've got to do it because "it's in the books."

Tom has a capacity to believe much more than he can understand but Huck must put things to a test.
Then Miss Watson she took me in the closet and prayed, but nothing come of it. She told me to pray every day, and whatever I asked for I would get it. But it warn't so, I tried it. Once I got a fish-line, but no hooks. It warn't any good to me without hooks. I tried for the hooks three or four times, but somehow I couldn't make it work. By and by, one day, I asked Miss Watson to try for me, but she said I was a fool. She never told me why, and I couldn't make it out no way. (p. 15)

Another contrast can be made in their methods of escape. In escaping from his father, Huck works out an elaborate deception. However, he works it out as an opportunist, taking advantage of each fortunate break. Furthermore, none of his plan exceeds what is necessary. Tom's plan to free Jim, on the other hand, is a fantasy of pointless elaboration. He rejects Huck's suggestions as being "as easy as playing hooky" in favor of a method that is "real mysterious, and troublesome, and good" (p. 326). It includes making a rope of bedsheets though there is no need to climb up or down, sawing through a bed leg to free a chain which can already be lifted off, and keeping a prisoner's diary though Jim can't write.

Tom's reading and, as Huck learns later, his knowledge that they are just playing a game combine to create a fantasy escape, the absurd and impractical details of which flabbergast Huck. The difference in training -- both in formal education and in "home life" (in the fact that Huck has had to scrabble for basic comforts which Tom could take for granted) -- results in vastly different outlooks.

As in nearly all of Twain's fiction, the notion of training is treated so extensively that it hardly needs elaboration. The notion of free will, on the other hand, does not receive nearly as much treatment, though nothing
in the novel is inconsistent with the idea. The best extended example of free
will occurs the first time Huck tries to decide what to do about Jim. Huck
wrestles mightily with his conscience.

I begun to get it through my head that he was most free --
and who was to blame for it? Why, me. I couldn't get that
out of my conscience, no how nor no way. It got to troubling
me so I couldn't rest; I couldn't stay still in one place. It
hadn't ever come home to me before, what this thing was
that I was doing. But now it did, and it stayed with me, and
scorched me more and more. I tried to make out to myself
that I warn't to blame, because I didn't run Jim off from
his rightful owner, but it warn't no use, conscience up and
says, every time, "But you knewed he was running for his
freedom, and you could 'a' paddled ashore and told some­
body." That was so -- I couldn't get around that no way.
That was where it pinched. Conscience says to me, "What
had poor Miss Watson done to you that you could see her
nigger go off right under your eyes and never say one single
word? What did that poor old woman do to you that you
could treat her so mean? Why, she tried to learn you your
book, she tried to learn you your manners, she tried to be
good to you every way she knewed how. Tha't's what she
done." (pp. 122-123)

The contest is between what Huck feels and what he knows he ought to do. His
intellect, in What Is Man? terms, his free choice, sees his clear duty to turn
Jim in. Every way he reasons it, he comes to the same conclusion, until at
last he determines to act according to his reason. "I'll paddle ashore at the
first light and tell. ' I felt easy and happy and light as a feather right off. All
my troubles was gone. I went to looking out sharp for a light, and sort of
singing to myself!" But Jim's display of loyalty and appreciation, as Huck is
about to leave, cools Huck's enthusiasm.

Well, I just felt sick. But I says, I got to do it -- I can't
get out of it. Right then along comes a skiff with two men in
it with guns, and they stopped and I stopped. One of them
says:
"What's that yonder?"

"A piece of a raft," I says.

"Do you belong on it?"

"Yes, sir."

"Any men on it?"

"Only one, sir."

"Well, there's five niggers run off to-night up yonder, above the head of the bend. Is your man white or black?"

I didn't answer up prompt. I tried to, but the words wouldn't come. I tried for a second or two to brace up and out with it, but I warn't man enough -- hadn't the spunk of a rabbit. I see I was weakening, so I just give up trying, and up and says:

"He's white."

Huck can think a problem through and come to a decision about what is right and what is wrong, but having done so does not make him capable of acting on his decision. He is still controlled by some part of his being other than his rational faculty. Furthermore, the irony of this passage makes it clear that man's capacity for rational thought is seriously limited. Huck's logic would put Jim back into slavery -- a position that we today would consider wrong -- though in the St. Petersburg society which Huck knew, it certainly wasn't. Thus, man's limited knowledge makes right thinking difficult if not impossible. There is a further irony involved in this passage. Huck and Jim have unknowingly floated down beyond Cairo, and Jim's imminent freedom is merely an illusion; thus regardless of the conclusion Huck reaches, he does not have the power either to set Jim free or to enslave him. Indeed, further irony, if Huck had carried out his intention to report Jim as a slave, Jim would have been
returned to St. Petersburg to learn he was a freedman -- the opposite outcome from what Huck expected. Once more, free will becomes a mockery of good intentions.

The deficiency of reason not backed up by information gets occasional treatment by Twain. Chapter XIV, "Was Solomon Wise?" is perhaps one of the most hilarious examples. Huck, who has received most of his information second-hand from Tom Sawyer, is explaining the ways of a king to Jim. In mentioning that the "dolphin" might possibly have escaped the French Revolution and have come to the United States, he reveals that Frenchmen don't speak English. This fact amazes Jim, who demands an explanation. When Huck explains by analogy, saying that neither a cat nor a cow talks like a man because it's "natural and right for a cat and a cow to talk different from us," Jim responds in a similar vein.

"Is a cat a man, Huck?"

"No."

"Well, den, dey ain't no sense in a cat talkin' like a man. Is a cow a man? -- er is a cow a cat?"

"No, she ain't either of them."

"Well, den, she ain't got no business to talk like either one er the yuther of 'em. Is a Frenchman a man?"

"Yes."

"Well, den! Dad blame it, why doan' he talk like a man? You answer me dat!"

"I see it warn't no use wasting words -- you can't learn a nigger to argue. So I quit." (p. 111)

With cool syllogistic reasoning, Jim forces Huck into a position where he must
admit defeat or change the subject. Whether this chapter was intended as a satire of rationalistic processes or not, its basic point, reinforced throughout Twain's work, is that people from different environments looking at the same thing will see it differently. It follows that if man acts according to what he perceives and if what he perceives is determined by environmental influences, his act, once again, is a determined act. Free will is an illusion.

Moral sense, like free will, is treated only by incidental exemplification in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. A good example of moral sense can be found in a continuation of the episode in which Huck sets out to turn Jim in as a slave and ends up lying to protect him. When Huck protests that there are no slaves aboard his raft, the men insist on searching it. Huck pretends gratitude that the men are coming to the raft because his family is sick.

"Say, boy, what's the matter with your father?"

"It's the -- a -- the -- well, it ain't anything much."

They stopped pulling. It warn't but a mighty little ways to the raft now. One says:

"Boy, that's a lie. What is the matter with your pap? Answer up square now and it'll be the better for you."

"I will, sir, I will, honest -- but don't leave us, please. It's the -- the -- Gentlemen, if you'll only pull ahead, and let me heave you the headline, you won't have to come a-near the raft -- please do."

"Set her back, John, set her back!" says one. They backed water. "Keep away, boy -- keep to looard. Confound it, I just expect the wind has blowed it to us. Your pap's got the smallpox, and you know it precious well...." (p. 126)
The fear of smallpox overrides any sense of charity the men might have. They are quite willing for Huck's sick (and apocryphal) family to float on down the river and infect some other region; they even tell Huck how to get help next time without revealing the nature of his family's sickness, but they won't so much as throw a rope to him themselves. Then, to ease their consciences and to regain respect in each other's eyes, they each put a twenty-dollar gold piece on a plank and float it to Huck. The example is very much like the Napoleon, Arkansas, episode in Life on the Mississippi and the man giving up his car fare in What Is Man? In all three cases, the money is given not because of the genuine need of the recipient but because the giver must maintain the illusion of his own right-heartedness (benevolence) in his and others' eyes. Similarly, the Dauphin bulks the Parkville revival meeting because he knows that all present will feel compelled to show their benevolence and contribute to his cause.

There is no explicit treatment of the master passion in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn; however, the Shepherdson-Grangerford feud touches on it closely. According to Buck Grangerford, the feud has lasted more than thirty years, so long that no one can remember the cause of its beginning. It has become a way of life for the two families. A code has been developed around it. They are driven to kill people whom they admire, they carry their rifles to the church they share and listen to a sermon on brotherly love, but all the time they follow an irrational command to hate and kill. This is their master passion and they must obey because without it they would not have that all-important item, self-respect.
In the many pages of debate over the suitability of the ending of *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* there is, unfortunately, no completely satisfactory analysis of the shift in tone from the earlier chapters of the book. Kenneth Lynn, who should have felt an obligation to go into the problem more competely than he does, touches on it briefly but leaves it undeveloped.

Twain prolonged and prolonged the final sequence into by far the longest -- and the least successful -- in the book. Even the humor is not up to par. In certain moments, as Huck (masquerading as Tom Sawyer) and Tom (masquerading as his half-brother Sid) go cavorting through Aunt Sally's house, it is possible to believe that we are back once again in the high-spirited, comic world of *The Adventures of Tom Sawyer*.

Leo Marx also has pointed out the slapstick nature of the Phelps Farm episode. Pascal Covici, taking a slightly different approach, has studied the hoaxes in these chapters. The distinct shift in tone occurs after Chapter XXXI, a shift which must be a beginning point in understanding the significance of the book and Twain's method (perhaps unconscious) of conveying this significance. A contrast of two types of humor -- one highly controlled irony, the other slapstick comedy -- must be studied. To make such a contrast, I am going to examine Chapters XXII and XXXVII in some detail. Chapter XXII, "Why the Lynching Bee Failed," lumps together three seemingly unrelated episodes. The first is a continuation of Chapter XXI, with no break in time between the close of one chapter and the opening of the next. In XXI, Colonel Sherburn has shot Boggs and a lynch mob gathers to seek revenge, tearing down clothes lines as it moves towards Sherburn's house. As Chapter XXII opens, the mob arrives and the scene is set for Sherburn's contemptuous
speech, a speech that summarizes succinctly Twain's analysis of man's bravery and the motive behind mob action which he was later to develop in *What Is Man?* and *The Mysterious Stranger*.

"You didn't want to come. The average man don't like trouble and danger. You don't like trouble and danger. But if only half a man -- like Buck Harkness, there -- shouts 'Lynch him! lynch him!' you're afraid to back down -- afraid you'll be found out to be what you are -- cowards -- and so you raise a yell, and hang yourselves onto that half-a-man's coat-tail, and come raging up here, swearing what big things you're going to do. The pitiful thing out is a mob, that's what an army is -- a mob; they don't fight with courage that's born in them, but with courage that's borrowed from their mass, and from their officers. But a mob without any man at the head of it is beneath pitifulness. Now the thing for you to do is to droop your tails and go home and crawl in a hole. If any real lynching's going to be done it will be done in the dark, Southern fashion, and when they come they'll bring their masks, and fetch a man along. Now leave -- and take your half-a-man with you!" -- tossing his gun up across his left arm and cocking it when he says this.

The crowd washed back sudden, and then broke all apart, and went tearing off every which way, and Buck Harkness he heeled it after them, looking tolerable cheap. I could 'a' stayed if I wanted to but I didn't want to. (pp. 203-204)

This episode has been singled out as the only shift in point of view in *Huckleberry Finn*, though technically Huck is reporting what he sees and hears, he seems to be reporting from a vantage point outside of the action, describing the crowd as well as Colonel Sherburn as entities separate from himself. Then at the very last sentence, the reader is shocked by the sudden identification of Huck as part of the mob. Except for that final comment the episode takes place without any subjective molding or interpretation by Huck, and in this respect it stands in stark contrast to the seemingly unrelated episode which follows. The Colonel's speech, which develops an idea Twain had expunged
from his Life on the Mississippi manuscript, is strikingly consistent with Twain's What Is Man? position.

Huck shifts from the lynch scene to the circus, an episode which does not appear to advance the plot at all. The circus is seen through Huck with his presence and subjective interpretation of the action very clearly felt, and the "real" view of the circus is presented through dramatic irony. To Huck the circus is magnificent, but the reader is completely aware of its shams and inadequacies. When the bareback riders are described as "sure-enough queens and dressed in clothes that cost millions of dollars, and just littered with diamonds," the overstatement is clear and the word littered which more normally would be applied to trash makes Twain's attitude apparent. Huck's innocence is established in his acceptance of the dialogue between ringmaster and clown as impromptu wit. Thus, we are prepared for the principal circus scene which follows. A bareback rider dressed as a bum and acting drunk climbs out of the audience and stops the show, demanding of the ringmaster that he be permitted to ride. Finally the ringmaster lets him proceed. He climbs on a horse, and after some preliminary floundering, stands up and sheds his rags revealing his true identity much to the astonishment of the crowd. Twain's use of the first person narrative is under perfect control as he permits the dramatic irony to reveal Huck's gullibility as clearly as the hackneyed act being described.

He shed them so thick they kind of clogged up the air, and altogether he shed seventeen suits. And, then, there he was, slim and handsome, and dressed the gaudiest and prettiest you ever saw, and he lit into that horse with his whip and made him fairly hum --
and finally skipped off, and made his bow and danced off to the dressing-room, and everybody just a-howling with pleasure and astonishment.

Then the ringmaster he see how he had been fooled, and he was the sickest ringmaster you ever see, I reckon. Why, it was one of his own men! He had got up that joke all out of his own head, and never let on to nobody. Well, I felt sheepish enough to be took in so, but I wouldn't 'a' been in that ringmaster's place, not for a thousand dollars. I don't know, there may be bullier circuses than what that one was, but I never struck them yet. Anyways, it was plenty good enough for me; and wherever I run across it, it can have all of my custom every time. (pp. 206-207)

The reader is permitted to see action at several levels and to see it much more fully than the narrator who describes the action.

At the same time that the dramatic irony gives the passage fullness and depth of meaning, cosmic irony gives it tension. The drunk barely hanging onto the horse is a reincarnation of Boggs (who when he first appears in Chapter XXI is described as "drunk, and weaving about in his saddle"). The ringmaster is Colonel Sherburn, who once again restrains a murderous mob with a cool, well-timed speech. The difference between this miracle play and the real-life drama, though, is in the transformation of the drunk, who not only stays on the horse, but also stands up and sheds his cocoon. He goes through what is for Huck a miraculous metamorphosis and turns out to be a more handsome figure, and greater gentleman, than the ringmaster. Taken a step further, the drunk and Boggs are to Huck representatives of Pap Finn. The delusion under which Huck is operating takes on a meaning important for the book as a whole. The seemingly innocent by-plot becomes a crucial feature of the theme and we can understand why it is part of a larger chapter and does not
stand alone.

Huck sees Sherburn's murder of Boggs honestly and reports honestly without attempting interpretation or explaining his feelings. He is confronted with a brutal fait accompli which he cannot alter or ignore. However, in the circus, Huck can see and interpret for himself, and he picks this act as the bulliest act in the bulliest circus because it pictures life in the way he wants to picture it. He sees the drunken clown, the outsider, Pap Finn, what H. N. Smith calls the vernacular hero, staying outside the rules of society and still rising above society. Such is the life Huck wants to lead. Such is the nature of his attempt to escape.

In contrast to the circus episode, the tone of the last eleven chapters is tensionless. Instead of irony, the vehicle is slapstick comedy. Chapter XXXVII is in its own way very funny. The caricature of Aunt Sally raging at her inability to keep track of shirts, sheets, or soup spoons is overdone to the point of being unbelievable. (pp. 353-354) The caricature of absent-minded Uncle Silas is better done.

...here comes the old man, with a candle in one hand and a bundle of stuff in t'other, looking as absent-minded as year before last. He went a-mooning around, first to one rat-hole and then another, till he'd been to them all. Then he stood about five minutes, picking tallow-drip off of his candle and thinking. Then he turns off slow and dreamy towards the stairs, saying:

"Well, for the life of me I can't remember when I done it. I could show her now that I warn't to blame on account of the rats. But never mind -- let it go. I reckon it wouldn't do no good." (pp. 352-353)

It shows Twain's usual interest in well-wrought diction and imagery. But it
does not contain the ironic depth or tension which the circus passage creates.

What has happened to bring about this shift? Did Twain, as Leo Marx suggests, simply tack on an expedient ending in order to get his protagonist out of an impossible situation? Or is the ending in some way a fitting conclusion, bringing the story full circle as T. S. Eliot and others have suggested? Is there some other alternative?

Though I feel that Leo Marx ultimately goes astray, he makes in his criticism of Eliot and Lionel Trilling one basic and important point. "The idea of freedom,... takes on its full significance only when we acknowledge the power which society exerts over the minds of men in the world of Huckleberry Finn. For freedom in this book specifically means freedom from society and its imperatives." As we have seen earlier, the difference between Huck and Tom is not a matter of temperament but of training. They are both by temperament adventuresome, seeking to avoid the fetters of society, however, Tom is by training a member of society while Huck is by training an outcast. The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is the story of a boy who considers himself to be free coming face to face with social and natural limitations of his freedom.

Marx goes astray from this basic point almost as soon as he lands on it. "...evil in Huckleberry Finn is the product of civilization, and if this is indicative of Clemens' rather too simple view of human nature, nevertheless the fact is that Huck, when he can divest himself of the taint of social conditioning... is entirely free of anxiety and guilt." The fact that Huck equates guilt with social restrictions does not mean that Twain does (Huck, as
narrator, frequently demonstrates the inadequacies of his own vision), however, Marx's basic point, that this is a story about a boy's search for freedom, is a very important point. Lynn Altenbernd has pointed out that one basic theme of the book is Negro freedom -- Jim's flight from slavery. At the same time that Huck's decision to help free Jim reveals the delusion which motivates him -- the very idea that he has the capability to help Jim -- it also reveals that he identifies himself with Jim. When Huck returns to Jackson's Island with news that a posse is bringing dogs to hunt Jim down, he shouts "Git up and hump yourself, Jim! There ain't a minute to lose. They're after us!" (Italics mine) (p. 86). Although they are searching for Jim, Huck feels a threat to his freedom, too, and he makes his plans accordingly as if he were a slave.

Jim's flight involves delusion just as Huck's does. The river, the great good god which Huck celebrates, the vehicle of their escape, flows South ever deeper into slave territory. It flows to the very territory where Jim feared he would be sent if Miss Watson sold him. At first Huck and Jim hope to turn up the Ohio River after they pass Cairo, Illinois, but that hope is shattered when they float by in the fog. Their raft becomes Jim's prison; he cannot leave it for fear of detection, and at one point he surrenders his freedom even more by submitting to being bound by a rope so the King and the Duke can travel South more comfortably.

Twain is consistently ironic in his treatment of Huck's struggles with conscience over freeing a slave. As we have seen, Huck thinks the right
thing to do, the socially acceptable thing, is to return Jim to slavery, but he comes to realize that he cannot do this. However, until the very end he is shocked by the attitude of Tom, whom he correctly identifies as a member of society.

Well, one thing was dead sure, and that was that Tom Sawyer was in earnest, and was actually going to help steal that nigger out of slavery. That was the thing that was too many for me. Here was a boy that was respectable and well brought up; and had a character to lose; and folks at home that had characters, and he was bright and not leather-headed; and knowing and not ignorant; and not mean, but kind; and yet here he was, without any more pride, or rightness, or feeling, than to stoop to this business, and make himself a shame, and his family a shame, before everybody. I couldn't understand it no way at all. It was outrageous, and I knewed I ought to just up and tell him so, and so be his true friend, and let him quit the thing right where he was and save himself. (p. 324)

Huck does not see, as Twain's audience must, that wanting to free a slave is an act of natural goodness. However, Huck makes a further mistake, in Twain's eyes, in thinking that he is capable of freeing Jim. Altenbernd, who reads the final section of *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* as an allegory of the Civil War, says, quite properly I think:

Tom's scheme... does not really free the slave. He has fallen back into captivity because of his loyalty to a wounded South. Even if Jim had struck out for free territory, his chances of reaching it through hundreds of miles of hostile country infested by slave-hunters and bloodhounds are almost worthless. So, too, the Southern slave has not gained his freedom by being turned out of doors in a hostile post-Civil War society. What actually frees Jim, and what will actually free the nominally emancipated slave, is a voluntary act of human love. Huck, in his gradual recognition and acknowledgment of Jim's human condition (his acknowledgment that Jim is not 'menial' and 'alien'), and Miss Watson in her voluntary gesture of freeing Jim in her will, have achieved the changes of mind and heart that will recognize the Negro as
Huck and Tom exhibit different attitudes towards Jim throughout the novel. Kenneth Lynn has pointed out that it is Huck who persuades Tom not to tie Jim to a tree on their way to the pirate cave. But Huck's vision of Jim early in the novel leaves a great deal to be desired. "Miss Watson's big nigger" is the source of wild imaginative tales, of superstitions and fears. As the story progresses, however, some of Jim's superstitions turn out to be premonitions, others are just good sense. Even so, Jim doesn't belie his slave training; in the course of the novel Huck discovers that a slave can be superstitious, illiterate, and naive and still a human being capable of loyalty and love.

When the two are together on Jackson's Island, Huck still plays tricks on Jim, one of which gets Jim bitten by a rattlesnake. When they are reunited after being separated in the fog, Huck once again fools Jim only to be struck by Jim's humanity. Huck demonstrates a growing awareness of Jim time and again as their journey progresses, until finally when Jim is sold into slavery by the King he itemizes what Jim has meant to him.

[I] got to thinking over our trip down the river; and I see Jim before me all the time: in the day and in the night-time, sometimes moonlight, sometimes storms, and we a-floating along, talking and singing and laughing. But somehow I couldn't seem to strike no places to harden me against him, but only the other kind. I'd see him standing my watch on top of his'n, 'stead of calling me, so I could go on sleeping; and see him how glad he was when I come back out of the fog; and when I come to him again in the swamp, up there where the feud was, and such-like times; and would always call me honey, and pet me, and do everything he could think of for me, and good he always was; and at last I struck the time I saved him by telling the men we had smallpox aboard, and he was so grateful,
and said I was the best friend old Jim ever had in the world, and the only one he's got now... (pp. 296-297)

It is at this point that Huck decides to damn his own soul to hell in order to free Jim. From this point on, however, until the last episode, Jim loses his humanity and becomes the victim of Tom Sawyer's quixotic escape plans. The Phelps Farm episode vitiates the effectiveness of Huck's decision. Huck has learned a great lesson of human love, but unfortunately love is not enough.

As important as Jim is to The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, he is not the center of the story. Instead, he is the most important symbol in that story -- a symbol which helps us to understand Huck. Huckleberry Finn is caught between society -- civilized man -- and a primitive, uncivilized existence. To him the principal meaning of society is loss of freedom. As I have already pointed out, he is inhibited by proper clothes, restrictions on his smoking and by attending school. He also rejects the shams of society. Chief among these is religion which is at once impractical in terms of the world Huck knows and dishonest in its pretensions. Huck, as well as Christianity, is the subject of Twain's irony when Huck misinterprets Miss Watson's declaration that if he prays every day he can get whatever he wants. Miss Watson's "spiritual gifts" are meaningless to Huck. Though "spiritual gifts" is an empty phrase which conceals the sterility of Miss Watson's religion, Huck's vision, also, is not completely satisfactory. When he loses interest in Moses and the bulrushes because Moses has been dead "a considerable long time," he demonstrates hyper-utilitarian shortsightedness. At the same time that Twain reveals an hypocrisy on the widow's part, his irony clearly demonstrates
Huck's wrongheadedness.

Pretty soon I wanted to smoke, and asked the widow to let me. But she wouldn't. She said it was a mean practice and wasn't clean, and I must try to not do it any more. That is just the way with some people. They get down on a thing when they don't know nothing about it. Here she was a bothering about Moses, which was no kin to her, and no use to anybody, being gone, you see, yet finding a power of fault with me for doing a thing that had some good in it. And she took snuff, too; of course that was all right, because she done it herself. (pp. 2-3)

On his voyage down the river, every contact Huck has with society somehow turns sour. When the Shepherdson-Grangerford feud turns into all-out war, Huck must leave. He runs instinctively for Jim and the raft and returns to a way of life which is markedly different. Huck celebrates the contrast between "other places" he has lived which "seem so cramped up and smothery" and a raft where "you feel mighty free and easy." His drifting in the easy society of Jim is the ideal life. He glorifies a morning sunrise, a cool swim, a casual smoke, and breakfast equally casual, floating at night, drifting free under a star-lit sky. The river-raft worship has prompted Lionel Trilling to say:

Huckleberry Finn is a great book because it is about a god -- about, that is, a power which seems to have a mind and will of its own, and which, to men of moral imagination, appears to embody a great moral idea.... Generally the god is benign, a being of long sunny days and spacious nights. But like any god, he is also dangerous and deceptive. He generates fogs which bewilder, and he contrives echoes and false distances which confuse. His sandbars can ground and his hidden snags can mortally wound a great steamboat. He can cut away the solid earth from under a man's feet and take his house with it.... Huck himself is the servant of the river-god, and he comes very close to being aware of the divine nature of the being he serves.
Trilling has cogently assessed the qualities of Huck's river — a usually benign, but sometimes capricious and sometimes malignant being. However, how close Huck comes to understanding this god is subject to question. As Huck terminates his description of his idyllic river life, he reports a metaphysical conversation with Jim.

"It's lovely to live on a raft. We had the sky up there, all speckled with stars, and we used to lay on our backs and look up at them, and discuss about whether they was made or only just happened. Jim he allowed they was made, but I allowed they happened, I judged it would have took too long to make so many. Jim said the moon could 'a' laid them, well, that looked kind of reasonable, so I didn't say nothing against it, because I've seen a frog lay most as many, so of course it could be done. We used to watch the stars that fell, too, and see them streak down. Jim allowed they'd got spoiled and was hove out of the nest. (pp. 165-166)"

Huck seeks to see things honestly, but, like Jim, he sees in terms of the tangible and the immediate. He must interpret the universe in terms of frogs' eggs because he is not capable of a larger vision.

The river as a symbol "is a strong brown god," it is the benign, capricious, malignant god Trilling describes with one additional attribute -- drift. Whether the night is foggy or starlit, raining or quiet, a raft on the river is always floating downstream. To Jim downstream means floating even farther into slave territory. To Huck it means degeneration. Immediately after Huck and Jim have their metaphysical discussion the raft is invaded by the Duke and the King, two bad eggs who have been "hove." The royalty are rogues who live outside society except in their forays into towns to bilk people. They are a pirate gang much like Tom Sawyer's, getting what they can by whatever extra-legal means they can. They are also what Huck Finn can expect to
grow into. If Huck stays outside society and lives free and easy on his raft, if he continues to enter towns only under assumed names and disguises, if he does not become responsible to a job, if he continues to "lift" chickens (as Pap recommended), if he continues to live by his wits, with all his adaptability and cunning, then he will develop (or degenerate) into a rogue. It is this fact which Huck must become aware of if he is to be "saved." The idyllic raft life cannot last. Adam must leave his paradise. The river does drift, and the drift is overwhelming, implacable, irresistible: the force which washed away Napoleon, Arkansas, in fifteen minutes cannot be conquered, or dented, by a boy. Only on land, with society, does a boy have a chance. Freedom is freedom to be washed away, to be overwhelmed. Even though society is full of shams, hypocrisies, dishonesties, and even though its progress has been slow and erratic, it has progressed a long way from Pap Finn and from the despicable Boggs; it is better than the degenerates, the worst frauds of all -- the Duke and the King. Huck's glorification of his river idyll is another of his delusions. His idyll is not all bad because it does encompass love. The love of Sophia Grangerford and Harney Shepherdson was the one good thing to come out of the feud (even though their impulse to escape, which of course Huck sympathized with, was irresponsible and resulted in mass blood letting). The brotherly love of Huck and Jim makes their trip worth while. The thing that Huck must learn is the lesson of Harry Morgan, a twentieth-century pirate, that one man alone ain't got, and that two men alone on a raft can know what it means to have and have not. Only by rejecting escape and by striving for positive values within society, even if that society is repressive and inhibiting
can man or men achieve that slow and erratic but substantial progress which is called civilization.

The final portion of The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is unsatisfactory simply because Mark Twain tried to create a happy conclusion and be true to his material at the same time. Rather than contrive a way for Huck to conquer his problem -- as he had done for Edward in The Prince and the Pauper -- and rather than succumb to the other alternative which would restore Jim to slavery and overwhelm Huck with defeat, Twain called on outside forces -- a nineteenth century intervention by the gods. Tom Sawyer, the darling of society, reappears and restores Huck to boyhood games. At the same time the workings of society free Jim. Huck's decision to go to hell can be forgotten now.

Surely no one, even the critic who exclaims that the ending brings the novel full circle, has ever been happy with the conclusion of Huckleberry Finn. The body of the book has been too rich, too brilliant, and too full of tension for us to be satisfied with the comic ending, but the conclusion does not deny the theme or vitiate Twain's world view.
Footnotes. Chapter V


2. Lynn, p. 244.

3. Leo Marx, "Mr. Eliot, Mr. Trilling, and Huckleberry Finn," *Mark Twain's 'Huckleberry Finn,'* ed. Barry Marks (Boston, 1959), pp. 53-64.

4. Pascal Covici, pp. 159-188, has made an extensive study of the Phelps Farm episode as a "hoax," pointing out that hoaxes operate at several levels throughout the episode. He demonstrates that the central hoax is perpetrated by Tom and is played on everybody else, including the reader. Tom conceals the secret that Jim is free until the final chapter. Unfortunately, Covici does not try to develop the idea of hoax in terms of tone and he does not relate it to *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* as a whole. Nonetheless, his emphasis on Huck's delusion has left its mark on my study.

5. Marx, p. 61.

6. Ibid., p. 61.


One could argue that moral determinism is not the prime motivating force of Huckleberry Finn, even though the deterministic and naturalistic symbols at work in the book can hardly be denied. In A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, however, we come to a work that is undeniably a product of Twain's What is Man? philosophy. For the first time, Twain uses his own terms for heredity and environment -- temperament and training -- and supplies exposition to define the terms fully. Furthermore, the theme is explicitly deterministic. The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn presents the story of a relatively weak and friendless boy operating under the delusion that he is master of his fate. Connecticut Yankee presents a much stronger character who believes not only that he is master of his own fate but that he can change the course of civilization. Whereas Huck learns that one man alone can't fend for himself, the Yankee discovers that in his fight to change humanity, he himself is altered.

In order to establish this meaning in the novel, I shall have to destroy several (well documented and generally accepted) misconceptions about the book.

First is the problem of point of view. Some critics quote from Connecticut Yankee as though they were quoting from Mark Twain, as if the Yankee were equal to Twain or at least a character Twain was completely
sympathetic with. Such an equation presupposes that Twain had no proper
notion of the function of fiction and could not express his ideas in any way
other than exposition through the mouth of one of his characters. There is
evidence within the *Connecticut Yankee* to support such a view. According
to H. N. Smith:

Mark Twain's growing rage against titled and royal oppressors could not be confined within the limits of humor and
imaginative satire; it burst out again and again in passages of invective attributed to Hank Morgan but actually expressing the author's own opinions.

The identification of author with narrator destroys the kind of fictional integrity Mark Twain had been able to confer on Huck Finn and thus rules out the kind of ironic effect that is so powerful in the earlier novel. In the Yankee's harangues addressed directly to the reader he resembles instead the narrator of the second part of *Life on the Mississippi*, who is not identified, as Huck is, with the society being criticized, but enters it as an observer from a distance endowed with absolute moral authority.¹

Unfortunately, few passages (and a scant few at that, fewer than ten pages in
the entire novel) seem to bear out Smith's claim. For the most part, Hank
Morgan is a narrator-protagonist who operates under a few very basic delu-
sions which he reveals to the reader much as narrator Huck Finn did through
cosmic and dramatic ironies.² One section in which Twain seems to be
using Hank Morgan as a mouthpiece for his own views is the chapter entitled
"Sixth-Century Political Economy," in which Hank espouses the free trade
cause and supports it by demonstrating that working men have more buying
power in Arthur's kingdom than in that of King Bagdemagus. "They had the
'protection' system in full force here, whereas we were working along down
toward free trade, by easy stages, and were now about half-way" (p. 323).
Louis J. Budd has pointed out that Twain apparently shifted to the free trade cause when Grover Cleveland "ignored safe politics for the coming election and lambasted the protective tariff in 1888," although he had favored protective tariffs in 1880. Whether Twain supported free trade because Cleveland did or because he had a strong faith in it is not at all certain. Budd assumes that he was without reservation in favor of free trade, but for evidence he relies on *A Connecticut Yankee* and some comments Twain made at a political rally. Whether Twain was for or against, and without further evidence we must assume that he was for, it would have been most unnatural for the Yankee to be anything other than for free trade. He was a working man's democrat. However, the peculiar aspect of his free trade arguments is the use Twain makes of them. A few pages earlier the Yankee has commented on another of his pet projects, the introduction of American denominations of money -- "lots of milrays, lots of mills, lots of cents, a good many nickels, and some silver; all this among the artisans and commonalty generally.... Our new money was not only handsomely circulating but its language was already glibly in use, that is to say, people had dropped the names of the former moneys, and spoke of things as being worth so many dollars or cents or mills or milrays now. It was very gratifying. We were progressing. that was sure" (pp. 305-306).

Although the Yankee equates the new form of money with progress, he turns around in the next chapter to demonstrate the efficacy of free trade by arguing that money is meaningless; the significant measure of comparative economies is buying power. He argues that because prices are more than
twice as high the citizens of Bagdemagus' kingdom have less buying power even though they have double the salaries of similar artisans in Arthur's kingdom.

"Look here, dear friend, what's become of your high wages you were bragging so about a few minutes ago?" -- and I looked around on the company with placid satisfaction, for I had slipped up on him gradually and tied him hand and foot, you see, without his ever noticing that he was being tied at all. "What's become of those noble high wages of yours? -- I seem to have knocked the stuffing all out of them, it appears to me."

But if you will believe me, he merely looked surprised, that is all! He didn't grasp the situation at all, didn't know he had walked into a trap, didn't discover that he was in a trap. I could have shot him, from sheer vexation. With cloudy eye and a struggling intellect he fetched this out:

"Marry, I seem not to understand. It is proved that our wages be double thine; how then may it be that thou'lt knocked therefrom the stuffing? -- an I miscall not the wonderly word, this being the first time under grace and providence of God it hath been granted me to hear it."

Well I was stunned, partly with this unlooked-for stupidity on his part, and partly because his fellows so manifestly sided with him and were of his mind -- if you might call it mind. My position was simple enough, plain enough, how could it ever be simplified more? However, I must try:

"Why, look here, brother Dowley, don't you see? Your wages are merely higher than ours in name, not in fact."

(pp. 325-326)

The Yankee, who has earlier used his money denominations as a sign of progress, cannot convince his opponents that money is not the real sign of progress. His inability to win an argument where he is obviously right echoes Jim's refutation of Huck on the subject of why Frenchmen don't speak English, but he refuses to leave the field as Huck did and repeats his argument, concluding,

"Now I reckon you understand that 'high wages' and 'low wages' are phrases that don't mean anything in the world
It was a crusher.

But, alas! it didn't crush. No, I had to give it up. What those people valued was high wages, it didn't seem to be a matter of any consequence to them whether the high wages would buy anything or not. (p. 328)

The Yankee is caught in an irony which typifies his every attempt at reform. He can get people to change in superficial ways, such as switching their form of money, but he can't alter their basic convictions and deep-set beliefs. This problem is basic to the meaning of A Connecticut Yankee. Still, excerpted from context, it is used as evidence of Twain's blatant faith in progress and nineteenth century industrial democracy. Certain of the Yankee's speeches seem to be establishing positions which are very close to Twain's position. For instance, the monologue on Morgan Le Fay's training is almost an exact duplicate of the same subject in What Is Man? I say "almost" because there is a slight difference. The old man in What Is Man? says that training and heredity add up to everything. The Yankee reserves one atom for himself. "We have no thoughts of our own, no opinions of our own, they are transmitted to us, trained into us. All that is original in us, and therefore fairly creditable or discreditable to us, can be covered up and hidden by the point of a cambric needle, all the rest being atoms contributed by, and inherited from, a procession of ancestors that stretches back a billion years to the Adam-clam or grasshopper or monkey from whom our race has been so tediously and ostentatiously and unprofitably developed" (p. 150). The passage is somewhat out of character for the Yankee, who has expressed a great belief in his own free
will and independence of being and who has set out to become the "Boss" of King Arthur's realm. However, in its context it fits the Yankee's condition of mind and reserves an atom for the Yankee's free will to operate on.

If this is an intrusion on the point of view of the story, we must remember that it is one of a very few intrusions and that for the most part the Yankee acts as a character distinctly different from Mark Twain. He is the character who describes himself very early in the book. "So I am a Yankee of the Yankees -- and practical; yes, and nearly barren of sentiment, I suppose -- or poetry, in other words!" (p.5). This is the same character whom Twain described to illustrator Dan Beard as having "neither the refinement nor the weakness of a college education; he is a perfect ignoramus, he is boss of a machine shop; he can build a locomotive or a Colt's revolver, he can put up and run a telegraph line, but he's an ignoramus nevertheless."

Another problem of point of view presents itself in A Connecticut Yankee. Is the narrator, as the frame of the story indicates, looking back on his adventures having learned from them, or is he the innocent narrator relating the experiences as he lives them without the opportunity of looking back and passing judgment? By the framework of the story we are led to believe that he wrote a "book" out of his adventures as he waited in Merlin's cave for the final battle; however, in actual practice he operates as the naive protagonist, acting under a delusion, learning as he goes. Thus many of the Yankee's statements must be taken ironically -- showing the Yankee's weaknesses as well as being criticism of sixteenth century England.

The most noticeable feature of the Yankee's make-up is his commercial
spirit, which permeates the idiom of his speech. From the very first, when he still hasn't decided whether he is in a nineteenth century lunatic asylum or sixth century England, he determines that regardless of which it is, he shall become "Boss." He says of an eclipse of the moon not due for two years, "I would have given a good deal for license to hurry it up and use it now when there was a big market for it" (p. 55). One of the Yankee's first projects is to set up a patent office, another is the telegraph. He also works to remove trade barriers because he is in favor of free trade. He decides to promote cleanliness and debase knight-errantry simultaneously by fitting out knights in sandwich boards for soap and tooth paste slogans. Burnham has tended to equate this business idiom with Twain's interest in business and patentable gadgetry; however, Twain's exaggeration and humor are clear evidence that he was consciously lampooning the Yankee business type. Commerce is as much a part of Hank Morgan's training as Morgan Le Fay's cruelty towards slaves is part of hers.

Hank is honest and generally perceptive in seeing the shams, hypocrisies and evils of sixth century England, but his solution to these evils is largely gadget-ridden and over commercial to the point of being ludicrous. A situation which epitomizes the Yankee's attitude develops in the "Valley of Holiness." The Yankee goes to view a particularly famous "anchorite" who pays homage by standing atop a pillar and bowing "ceaselessly and rapidly almost to his feet.... I timed him with a stop-watch, and he made twelve hundred and forty-four revolutions in twenty-four minutes and forty-six seconds. It seemed a pity to have all this power going to waste. It was one of the most useful motions
in mechanics, the pedal movement, so I made a note in my memorandum-book, purposing some day to apply a system of elastic cords to him and run a sewing-machine with it. I afterward carried out that scheme, and got five years' good service out of him; in which time he turned out upward of eighteen thousand first-rate tow-linen shirts" (pp. 205-206). The Yankee, like Huck Finn, is incapable of seeing the efficacy of prayer if it does not produce fish hooks. While Huck's reaction was to give up prayer, the Yankee's is even more grotesque -- find a business use for it; then advertise. The shirts were "advertised as such by my knights everywhere, with the paint-pot and stencil-plate, insomuch that there was not a cliff or a boulder or a dead wall in England but you could read on it at a mile distance: 'Buy the only genuine St. Stylite: patronized by the Nobility. Patent applied for'" (p. 206).

Hank exploits the project to its limits and follows through in good nineteenth century cut-throat, free-enterprise fashion. "But about that time I noticed that the motive power had taken to standing on one leg, and I found that there was something the matter with the other one; so I stocked the business and unloaded, taking Sir Bors de Ganis into camp financially along with certain of his friends, for the works stopped within a year, and the good saint got him to his rest" (p. 207). Though the Yankee is shocked to hear of Morgan Le Fay's inhumanity, his own particular brand doesn't bother him a bit.

Not only is he motivated by big business ethics, but he sees in them a sort of ideal, the acquirement of which makes a man a man. One of his proudest accomplishments is the change he effects in Launcelot. Launcelot is first pictured as having "a fine manliness...majesty and greatness...and high
bearing" (p. 22), though naive and simple minded. But after the Yankee has conquered knight errantry and brought changes into the land, Launcelot becomes president of the stock board -- "a bear, and he had put up a corner in one of the new lines, and was just getting ready to squeeze the shorts..." (p. 403). He retains his personal loyalty and honesty (but also his love for Guenever); however, in his business dealings he is calculating and ruthless.

The Yankee's commercial spirit is the (primary) basis for his ridicule of the quest for the Holy Grail.

The boys all took a flier at the Holy Grail now and then. It was a several years' cruise. They always put in the long absence snooping around, in the most conscientious way, though none of them had any idea where the Holy Grail really was, and I don't think any of them actually expected to find it, or would have known what to do with it if he had run across it. You see, it was just the Northwest Passage of that day, as you may say; that was all. Every year expeditions went out holy grailing, and next year relief expeditions went out to hunt for them. There was worlds of reputation in it, but no money. (pp. 74-75)

A search for the ideal means nothing to a shortsighted materialist. If he could not see the ultimate gain for civilization that resulted from search for a nonexistent Northwest Passage, then, of course, the quest of the Grail would seem the apex of ridiculousness. Similarly his mission to free the forty-four princesses whose imprisonment Sandy reports to the Round Table strings together a series of misadventures, climaxd by the "freeing" of a herd of pigs. Clyde Grimm has commented on this scene. "...the castle is wholly imaginary. Sandy's explanation is an elaborate evasion of the Yankee's intrusive literalness and at once reveals the intangibility of the castle yet preserves the romantic illusion of its actual existence. The 'castle' must, of course, remain
undiscoverable to the Yankee precisely because the seeker must be oriented to it not rationally but imaginatively, not geographically but spiritually. It is a mythic goal, the determined and sustained quest for which, rather than the literal attainment, is of primary significance. The Yankee wrestles with the problem of "Sandy's curious delusion."

Here she was, as sane a person as the kingdom could produce; and yet, from my point of view she was acting like a crazy woman. My land, the power of training! of influence! of education! It can bring a body up to believe anything. I had to put myself in Sandy's place to realize that she was not a lunatic. Yes, and put her in mine, to demonstrate how easy it is to seem a lunatic to a person who has not been taught as you have been taught.... Everybody around her believed in enchantments, nobody had any doubts, to doubt that a castle could be turned into a sty, and its occupants into hogs, would have been the same as my doubting among Connecticut people the actuality of the telephone. (pp. 177-178)

The basic contrast between her spiritual beliefs (which must remain "enchantment" to him) and his belief in technology is clear. Hank Morgan and Mark Twain convince us that Sandy is operating under a delusion; however, Twain makes it clear that Hank Morgan is also operating under a delusion.

One of the devices Twain uses to show the progress of Hank Morgan's uplifting of the sixth century is the newspaper which Hank introduces. "The first thing you want in a new country, is a patent office; then, work up your school system; and after that, out with your paper. A newspaper has its faults, and plenty of them, but no matter, it's hark from the tomb for a dead nation, and don't you forget it. You can't resurrect a dead nation without it" (p. 70). Hank has complete assurance not only that he can civilize Arthur's Kingdom but also that he knows all the steps involved. He has no doubt that reason and education will overcome feeling and superstition. The first newspaper account he supplies...
is a report of a tournament lifted from Malory's *Morte Darthur*[sic] (Book VII, Chapter XXVIII). A sample of it will be sufficient to catch the flavor.

And then Sir Galahault the noble prince cried on high, *Knight with the many colors, well hast thou justed, now make thee ready that I may just with thee.* Sir Gareth heard him, and he gat a great spear, and so they encountered together, and there the prince brake his spear; but Sir Gareth smote him upon the left side of the helm, that he reeled here and there, and he had fallen down had not his men recovered him. Truly, said King Arthur, *that knight with the many colors is a good knight.* Wherefore the king called unto him Sir Launcelot, and prayed him to encounter with that knight. *Sir, said Launcelot, I may as well find in my heart for to forbear him at this time, for he hath had travail enough this day.* (p. 72)

The Yankee considers this a good beginning.

He got in all the details...in a local item...And he had a good knack at getting in the complimentary thing here and there about a knight that was likely to advertise -- no, I mean a knight that had influence; and he also had a neat gift of exaggeration, for in his time he had kept door for a pious hermit who lived in a sty and worked miracles.

Of course this novice's report lacked whoop and crash and lurid description, and therefore wanted the true ring; but its antique wording was quaint and sweet and simple, and full of the fragrances and flavors of the time, and these little merits made up in a measure for its more important lacks. (pp. 70-71)

Later the Yankee turns the newspaper project over to Clarence, who "talked sixth century and wrote nineteenth" and whose journalistic style progressed rapidly "to the back settlement Alabama mark," which was hardly distinguished, as we shall see.

The birth of a full fledged newspaper occurs just after the Yankee has brought off his miracle in the Valley of Holiness. *The Camelot Weekly Hosannah* and *Literary Volcano* contains such headlines as "THE WATER MORKS
"CORKED!" and "UNPARALLELED REJOICINGS!" and presents a text replete with bad typography and the worst of frontier journalese. It occasions the Yankee's first admission that things aren't going quite as neatly as he had planned and that he, as well as sixth century England, may be changing. "Yes, it was too loud. Once I could have enjoyed it and seen nothing out of the way about it, but now its note was discordant. It was good Arkansas journalism, but this was not Arkansas. Moreover, the next to the last line was calculated to give offense to the hermits, and perhaps lose us their advertising. Indeed, there was too lightsome a tone of flippancy all through the paper. It was plain I had undergone a considerable change without noticing it. I found myself unpleasantly affected by pert little irreverencies which would have seemed but proper and airy graces of speech at an earlier period of my life" (p. 256).

The next newspaper sample supplies an editorial on the approaching challenge-tournament between Sir Sagramore and the Yankee. Coming as it does after approximately some seven years of the Yankee's rule, it shows remarkably little progress in typography or grammar. It is also marked by superficiality and cynicism on the part of the editor Clarence. The Yankee makes no comment on the quality of this journalistic effort, perhaps because he is too absorbed in the event it announces, for he looks upon the contest as his final challenge to knight errantry. As champion of "common sense and reason" he planned complete defeat for the central symbol of things romantic and impractical.

However, as a manifestation of what the Yankee means by common sense and reason, the newspaper demonstrates once again the faultiness of
his vision. Watch out for speculators! Free list suspended! The pie is tough, the lemonade diluted. Just as the Yankee was capable of seeing through Sandy's quest, but incapable of seeing it, the newspaper's account of the joust is quick to land on the shams while the crucial issue of the deadly battle which is to take place is glossed over with an admonition to "give the lads a good send off." So far the newspaper samples have shown progress away from the quaint style of Malory to something approaching, let us say, Hannibal, Missouri, journalism. The Yankee has trained Clarence to deal in the superficialities of journalistic style and thinks thereby that he has made real progress, just as he thinks that his "man-factories" have turned out thousands of loyal followers.

The final newspaper account which Clarence reads to the Yankee after the overthrow of his regime, is a throwback to the earlier, pseudo-sixth century style. It is another direct quote from Malory's *Morte Darthur*.

For now, said Arthur, I am come to mine end. But would to God that I wist where were that traitor Sir Mordred, that hath caused all this mischief. Then was King Arthur ware where Sir Mordred leaned upon his sword among a great heap of dead men. Now give me my spear, said Arthur unto Sir Lucan, for yonder I have espied the traitor that all this woe hath wrought. Sir, let him be, said Sir Lucan, for he is unhappy, and if ye pass this unhappy day, ye shall be right well revenged upon him. Good lord, remember ye of your night's dream, and what the spirit of Sir Gawaine told you this night, yet God of his great goodness hath preserved you hitherto. Therefore, for God's sake, my lord, leave off by this. For blessed be God ye have won the field: for here we be three on live, and with Sir Mordred is none on live. And if ye leave off now, this wicked day of destiny is past. (pp. 418-419)

All the nineteenth century journalese is gone, replaced by the pseudo-sixth century idiom which the Yankee berated three hundred pages earlier. Yet, the Yankee's only comment takes the form of praise. "That is a good piece
of war correspondence. Clarence, you are a first-rate newspaper man" (p. 419).

Though the Yankee approached his intended conquest with nothing but disdain for sixth century ideals and with complete confidence that he could educate sixth century humanity up to his nineteenth century level, the outcome is very different. It remains for Clarence to tell him that he can't hope to change men "born in an atmosphere of superstition and reared in it. It is in their blood and their bones. We imagined we had educated it out of them, they thought so too, the Interdict woke them up like a thunderclap! It revealed them to themselves, and it revealed them to me too" (p. 422). Strangely enough, the significant change that has taken place is within the Yankee himself, who can now look at sixth centuryese and recognize something of value.

The Yankee learns a similar lesson on his underworld trip with King Arthur. Before the two start "the Boss" is quite aware of the King's inadequacies. In appointing army officers and acting as judge, the King has shown his aristocratic bias.

The king's judgments wrought frequent injustices, but it was merely the fault of his training, his natural and unalterable sympathies. He was as unfitted for a judgeship as would be the average mother for the position of milk-distributor to starving children...Men write many fine and plausible arguments in support of monarchy, but the fact remains that where every man in a state has a vote, brutal laws are impossible. Arthur's people were of course poor material for a republic because they had been debased so long by monarchy, and yet even they would have been intelligent enough to make short work of that law which the king had just been administering if it had been submitted to their full and free vote. (pp. 234, 237)

The Yankee's confidence in democracy is obviously more complete than Twain's. 9 The Yankee, though, is convinced that King Arthur is basically evil and that
this evil can be traced to his aristocratic environment.

As the two start out dressed as peasants the Yankee's first problem is that the King is absolutely unable to act like a peasant. "He looked as humble as the leaning tower at Pisa. It is the most you could say of it. Indeed, it was such a thundering poor success that it raised wondering scowls all along the line" (p. 265). The Yankee sets out to educate the King to peasant ways, an attempt that is symbolic of his master plan of bringing democracy to Arthur's England. Once again, the Yankee is confident that his training is sufficient to overcome inborn and long practiced habits.

"Sure, as between clothes and countenance, you are all right, there is no discrepancy, but as between your clothes and your bearing, you are all wrong, there is a most noticeable discrepancy. Your soldierly stride, your lordly port -- these will not do. You stand too straight, your looks are too high, too confident. The cares of a kingdom do not stoop the shoulders, they do not droop the chin, they do not depress the high level of the eye-glance, they do not put doubt and fear in the heart and hang out the signs of them in slouching body and unsure step. It is the sordid cares of the lowly born that do these things. You must learn the trick; you must imitate the trade-marks of poverty, misery, oppression, insult, and the other several and common inhumanities that sap the manliness out of a man." (pp. 274-275)

He drills the King in an empty field, but with imperfect success. "Now, then -- your head's right, speed's right, shoulders right, eyes right, chin right, gait, carriage, general style right -- everything's right! And yet the fact remains, the aggregate's wrong. The account don't balance. Do it again, please... now I think I begin to see what it is. Yes, I've struck it. You see, the genuine spiritlessness is wanting" (p. 275). The Yankee drills the King over rough ground with a heavy pack until he is confident that the King has learned his
lesson. Arthur looked "as little like a king as any man I had ever seen. But it was an obstinate pair of shoulders, they could not seem to learn the trick of stooping with any sort of deceptive naturalness. The drill went on" (p. 278). In normal situations the King can pass as a peasant, but on three occasions the King shows that for all his practice he is still a king.

The two wanderers come upon a hut with a family dying of smallpox left helpless by their fearful neighbors. The Yankee is astounded that the King shows no fear of the dread disease. "Here was heroism at its last and loftiest possibility, its utmost summit, this was challenging death in the open field unarmed, with all the odds against the challenger, no reward set upon the contest, and no admiring world in silks and cloth-of-gold to gaze and applaud, and yet the king's bearing was as serenely brave as it had always been in those cheaper contests where knight meets knight in equal fight and clothed in protecting steel" (p. 284). The King passes off such "heroism" by commenting, "it were a shame that a king should know fear, and shame that belted knight should withhold his hand where be such as need succor" (p. 282). Later as they leave the hut, the King contemplates the sin of not turning in the two sons of the family who are escaped prisoners and gives the Yankee occasion once again to comment on the King's training. "He could see only one side of it. He was born so, educated so, his veins were full of ancestral blood that was rotten with this sort of unconscious brutality, brought down by inheritance from a long procession of hearts that had each done its share toward poisoning the stream" (p. 291). The King is what he is because of his heredity and environment, forces which are not going to be undone overnight.
Later, when the two are sold as slaves the Yankee sees how difficult it is to really change a man. The slave driver tries to break the King's spirit in order to make him more marketable and the Yankee looks on as the King is regularly beaten, realizing that the slave driver is faced with an impossible task.

I had found it a sufficiently difficult job to reduce the king's style to a peasant's style, even when he was a willing and anxious pupil, now then, to undertake to reduce the king's style to a slave's style -- and by force -- go to! It was a stately contract. Never mind the details -- it will save me trouble to let you imagine them. I will only remark that at the end of a week there was plenty of evidence that lash and club and fist had done their work well; the king's body was a sight to see -- and to weep over; but his spirit? -- why, it wasn't even phased. Even that dull clod of a slave-driver was able to see that there can be such a thing as a slave who will remain a man till he dies; whose bones you can break, but whose manhood you can't. This man found that from his first effort down to his latest, he couldn't ever come within reach of the king, but the king was ready to plunge for him, and did it. So he gave up at last, and left the king in possession of his style unimpaired. (p. 355)

The King has grown in the Yankee's estimation. Whereas before the Yankee judged that "the King certainly wasn't anything more than an average man, if he was up that high" (p. 353), he now must admit that Arthur is "a good deal more than a king, he [is] a man" (p. 355). In fact his opinion of the King continues to grow. When he sees Arthur stand bravely at the gallows and then receive recognition from the crowd after he is rescued, he admits his changed attitude. "As he stood apart there, receiving this homage in rags. I thought to myself, well, really there is something peculiarly grand about the gait and bearing of a king, after all" (p. 382).

The Yankee is not by any means sold on monarchy as a result, but he
has been forced to recognize the possibility that a king can be noble, that all monarchs are not completely corrupt.

From this point on, his plan for a switch to democracy is slowed down; the change is to take place after Arthur dies, by his calculation some thirty years hence. It is also after this point that he is taken in by Clarence's jesting proposal that a hereditary royal family of cats be established in order to satisfy the nation's non-rational worship of a royal family. At the same time, he admits to an inclination which has been obvious from the first. His plan still calls for "unlimited suffrage" and a democratic republic upon Arthur's death; however, he begins to think in terms of having himself made the republic's first president. This is as close as he comes to recognizing the irony of his ambitions, from the first he has asserted his desire to be the boss, to run the country the way he sees fit, to turn it into his ideal even though that ideal, as fuzzily as he states it, admits of no boss, king, or dictator. Clyde Grimm has pointed out the irony of the "Boss" appellation which "is unequivocally damning, for Boss Tweed, Boss Quay, Boss Croker, and others had made the term an anathema during the post-war era. 'Boss' stood for greed and despotism and epitomized the corruptness of democratic politics."10 The Yankee who can discover sham, hypocrisy, stupidity, and cruelty in every aspect of the sixth century can speak of democracy only in glittering generalities which ignore the hard facts of nineteenth century American politics.

The framework of A Connecticut Yankee is such that we get two distinctly separate views of the Yankee. Principally we see him as he narrates the story, we see him through his own eyes and through the ironies Twain
supplies. We also see him in a prefatory chapter and a closing note, titled respectively "A Word of Explanation" and "Final P. S. by M. T." through another narrator's eyes -- ostensibly Twain's. The Yankee seen in these two chapters is a very different man. "As he talked along softly, pleasantly, flowingly he seemed to drift away imperceptibly out of this world... into some remote era and old forgotten country" (p. 1). He has none of the brash cocksureness of the younger Yankee and his interests, rather than being focused on nineteenth century devices, incline toward ancient armor, knights of the Round Table, and a loved one named Sandy. In other words something has brought about a drastic change in the Yankee, something, perhaps in Merlin's spell, that has made him wake up to the sixth century while falling out of sympathy with, but back into, the nineteenth. The story of Hank Morgan, the Connecticut Yankee, the boss, is one of ultimate defeat. As foreman at the arms factory he had learned to impose his will on others, to think of himself as controller of others' destinies as well as his own, only to be laid out "with a crusher alongside the head by a fellow named Hercules" and knocked for a thirteen-century loop. There again his transmigrated will asserts itself and he plans to be the boss and make for himself what to his way of thinking is the best of all possible worlds, a nineteenth century technological democratic wonder. Replete with telegraph, railroads, electric lights, advertising, newspapers, man-factory schools, and Persimmons soap, it is to be a brave new world, rid of sixth century shams, hypocrisies, quests for holy grails, and the naive capacity to believe. It is to convert the round table into the stock market, knight-errantry into traveling salesmanship, the tournaments into baseball
games, dukes and earls into dishonest railroad conductors, the Catholic Church into forty Protestant sects, faith into reason. It will have democratic elections, fixed so that the boss becomes president.

In the land of Bagdemagus, the Yankee meets a blacksmith named Dowley who is his ideal type, a self-made man. The Yankee admires Dowley and prods him to tell the story of how he rose from nothing to a position of one of the richest men in the village, how Dowley had worked long hours, had eaten poor food, how "his faithful endeavors attracted the attention of a good blacksmith." Dowley comprises everything the Yankee admires, he is a man who has risen because of his merit, and it is only in passing that the Yankee mentions that Dowley married the boss's daughter. Dowley owes everything to a kind boss and an available daughter, but to the Yankee he is a self-made man. The Yankee's delusion warps his vision; he talks glibly of a society where men succeed according to their merit, but frequently he glosses over the equation of merit with success, and success with wealth, and wealth with inherited or dishonestly come by fruits of capitalism.

It was in the 1880's that Twain began work on criticisms of Vanderbilt, Morgan, et al. In the illustrations for *A Connecticut Yankee*, he had Dan Beard model the slave driver after a photograph of Jay Gould, who made his millions on railroads. Twain was aware of the evils as well as the advantages of capitalism; the irony of the self-made man passage is obviously an irony which Twain intended.

It is also typical of the irony of *A Connecticut Yankee* as a whole. Hank Morgan glorifies himself as self-made. He thinks that he is master of his
fate though he had little to do with his transition from the nineteenth to the
sixth century. In spite of his discourse on training and his comment that man
is nothing more than the sum of inherited and trained influences -- except for
one small atom he can call his own -- he believes in his ability to put nature
to his uses, to change men, to put them, too, to his uses, and to civilize them.

Instead, in spite of his temporary and superficial victories, in spite of
the battle he wins over knight errantry, but not the war, in spite of his thou-
sand of supposed converts, he has not touched the basic constitution of the
real men -- their superstition and their belief (symbolized in part by the
church). After the interdict it remains for Clarence to explain the situation
to the Yankee.

"Save your breath -- we haven't sixty faithful left!"

"What are you saying? Our schools, our colleges, our vast work-
shops, our --"

"When those knights come, those establishments will empty them-
selves and go over to the enemy. Did you think you had educated the
superstition out of those people?"

"I certainly did think it."

"Well, then, you may unthink it. They stood every strain easily --
until the interdict. Since then, they merely put on a bold outside --
at heart they are quaking. Make up your mind to it -- when the
armies come, the mask will fall." (p. 420)

Even the sixty faithful boys whom Clarence has kept have a time of doubt
and send forward a spokesman to address the Yankee. "We have tried to for-
ger what we are -- English boys! We have tried to put reason before sentiment,
duty before love, our minds approve, but our hearts reproach us.... all England
is marching against us! Oh, sir, consider! -- reflect! -- these people are our
people, they are bone of our bone, flesh of our flesh, we love them -- do not
ask us to destroy our nation!" (p. 431).

The Yankee, who still hasn't learned his lesson, heads them off, persuades them to stay and fight, because he cannot concede defeat while he can maintain the delusion of victory. The Yankee can change men's reason, but not their hearts. By Twain's concept of Free Will, man can reason and make right decisions in the light of his own limited knowledge, but his actions are not governed by his reason, by his right decisions, by his free will. Instead they are governed by his master passion, by that unreasoning being, that heart, that feeling which controls a man. It is no wonder that all England rises against the Yankee. It cannot do otherwise. It is no wonder that the Yankee is defeated in his attempt to change men's minds. It is also no wonder that his technological magic ultimately defeats itself and that he is overcome by Merlin's magic. The supposed humbug, the poet, defeats the honest, nonpoetic Yankee and sends him back whence he came.

Even as the Yankee fails in his attempt to change others, he undergoes a change himself. I have pointed out some aspects of this change -- his evolving attitude towards nineteenth century journalese and Malory's poetic prose and his growing respect for Arthur. The basic symbol for this changing attitude is Sandy, the "Demoiselle Alisande la Carteloise." Upon his first interview with her, at which he asks matter-of-fact questions and she gives mystifying answers, he is completely befuddled. He asks the direction of the castle where her princesses are imprisoned, and she answers:

"Ah, please you sir, it hath no direction from here, by reason that the road lieth not straight, but turneth evermore, wherefore the direction of its place abideth not, but is some time under the
one sky and anon under another, whereso if ye be minded that it is in the east, and wend thitherward, ye shall observe that the way of the road doth yet again turn upon itself by the space of half a circle, and this marvel happening again and yet again and still again, it will grieve you that you have thought by vanities of the mind to thwart and bring to naught the will of Him that giveth not a castle a direction from a place except it pleaseth Him, and if it please Him not, will the rather that even all castles and all directions thereunto vanish out of the earth, leaving the places wherein they tarried desolate and vacant, so warning His creatures that where He will He will, and where He will not He -- ." (pp. 85-86)

At which point the Yankee impatiently interrupts. "It may be that this girl had a fact in her somewhere, but I don't believe you could have sluiced it out with a hydraulic, nor got it with the earlier forms of blasting, even, it was a case for dynamite. Why, she was a perfect ass" (p. 87).

As he starts on his quest, Sandy riding behind him, he discovers another facet of her character, one not necessarily reserved for sixth century women. She prattles incessantly, relentlessly with nothing whatsoever to say, so far as the Yankee can judge.

She could grind, and pump, and churn, and buzz by the week, and never stop to oil up or blow out. And yet the result was just nothing but wind. She never had any ideas, any more than a fog has. She was a perfect blather-skite, I mean for jaw, jaw, jaw, talk, talk, talk, jabber, jabber, jabber, but just as good as she could be. (p. 98)

Sandy's prattle turns out to be further borrowings from Malory, this time from Book IV, Chapters XVI through XXV, the tale of the wanderings of the exiled Gawaine and Uwaine. The tale provides opportunity for the Yankee to again demonstrate that he is out of sympathy with the sixth century. The Yankee complains about the simplicity of the language and the steady flow of
knightly battles (though he loses track of the story when Sandy comes to a section that deals with peaceful friendship and love. He drifts into a reverie about the misdirected strength of knights on a quest. Such ability to endure hardship and perform feats of strength ought to be put "to some useful purpose." The Yankee reads into Sandy's prattle the thing he is interested in -- utilitarianism and technology, putting nature to work. As the Yankee proceeds, out of sympathy with Sandy and the culture she represents, he gradually begins to recognize her usefulness. At moments when he is at a loss what to do, her simple faith in his superhuman powers pulls him through. When Morgan Le Fay is about to have a woman burned at the stake, the Yankee is hesitant to interfere, but Sandy, seeing that he wishes to, is up and facing toward the queen in a moment. She indicated me, and said:

"Madame, he saith this may not be. Recall the commandment, or he will dissolve the castle and it shall vanish away like the instable fabric of a dream!"

Confound it, what a crazy contract to pledge a person to! What if the queen --

But my consternation subsided there and my panic passed off; for the queen, all in a collapse, made no show of resistance but gave a countermanding sign and sunk into her seat. (p. 140)

When the utility of simple faith is clearly demonstrated, the Yankee is in favor of it, nevertheless he tries to indoctrinate Sandy by lecturing to her in business terms.

"A successful whirl in the knight-errantry line -- now what is it when you blow away the nonsense and come down to the cold facts? It's just a corner in pork, that's all, and you can't make anything else out of it. You're rich -- yes --
suddenly rich -- for about a day, maybe a week; then somebody corners the market on you, and down goes your bucket-shop; ain't that so, Sandy?"

"Whethersoever it be that my mind miscarrieth, bewraying simple language in such sort that the words do seem to come endlong and overthwart -- "

"There's no use in beating about the bush and trying to get around it that way, Sandy, it's so, just as I say. I know it's so. And, moreover, when you come right down to the bedrock, knight-errantry is worse than pork; for whatever happens, the pork's left, and so somebody's benefited anyway; but when the market breaks, in a knight-errantry whirl, and every knight in the pool passes in his checks, what have you got for assets? Just a rubbish-pile of battered corpses and a barrel or two of busted hardware. Can you call those assets? Give me pork, every time." (pp. 164-165)

Ironically enough, when Sandy finds her princesses, they are porkers -- at least enchanted so the Yankee will see them that way; when the Yankee rescues the pigs by overpaying the swineherds for them, Sandy flings herself upon them and floods them with kisses, an action which makes the Yankee "ashamed of her, ashamed of the human race" (p. 175).

Just as Huck had to learn that the only thing which could free Jim was human love and understanding, so must the Yankee learn. However, at this point, Sandy's love, her faith, her loyalty only embarrass him.

After his conquest in the Valley of Holiness, the Yankee leaves with King Arthur, secretly without letting Sandy know. While he wanders the countryside and is finally made a slave, Sandy starts on a quest of her own to find him. He is her liege; her loyalty demands that she search, and, indeed, she finds him at the "hanging-bout" where Clarence effects his rescue. The Yankee marries her, not out of love, but from a prudish fear that he might
compromise her. But the marriage effects a change in him that nothing else could. He confesses his growing "friendship," which evolves into worship. The Yankee discovers love, and though he still talks in his sleep occasionally and yearns for as sterile a love as was ever conceived -- the voice of a telephone operator -- Sandy soon has a child which replaces even that yearning.

In short, to maintain his love, to save his child, he ultimately sacrifices his "kingdom." The Yankee, vacationing in Gaul, can no longer rule with his accustomed heavy hand. He returns to fight his last battle and to meet his ultimate defeat.

It is no wonder that the Yankee, sadder but wiser and on his deathbed, yearns for his sixth century family. In his delirium he calls out:

"Sandy!...Yes, you are there. I lost myself a moment, and I thought you were gone....Have I been sick long? It must be so, it seems months to me. And such dreams! Such strange and awful dreams, Sandy! Dreams that were as real as reality -- delirium, of course, but so real! Why, I thought the king was dead, I thought you were in Gaul and couldn't get home, I thought there was a revolution; in the fantastic frenzy of these dreams, I thought that Clarence and I and a handful of my cadets fought and exterminated the whole chivalry of England! But even that was not the strangest. I seemed to be a creature out of a remote unborn age, centuries hence, and even that was as real as the rest! Yes, I seemed to have flown back out of that age into this of ours, and then forward to it again, and was set down, a stranger and forlorn in that strange England, with an abyss of thirteen centuries yawning between me and you! between me and my home and my friends! between me and all that is dear to me, all that could make life worth the living! It was awful -- awfuller than you can ever imagine, Sandy. Ah, watch by me, Sandy -- stay by me every moment -- don't let me go out of my mind again; death is nothing, let it come, but not with those dreams, not with the torture of those hideous dreams -- I cannot endure that again....Sandy?" (p. 449)

The Yankee has learned too much, too late. He has learned that the
sixth century contains something of value, even as the nineteenth does. He has learned that he can't impose his will on a people and expect it to take. Neither can he expect to remain unaffected by long-time contact with them. The Yankee learns the real meaning of training -- not merely the education of that conscious brain which knows it thinks, but the myriad of forces at work upon the whole being that make it feel, that move it to be what it is.
Footnotes: Chapter VI


2. James M. Cox, "A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court: The Machinery of Self-Preservation," Yale Review, L (Autumn, 1960), pp. 89-102, offers the most complex counter argument. According to his view, Twain identified himself with Hank Morgan and even more strongly with the Paige typesetter, which project he was underwriting at the time that he was writing A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court. Cox compares A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court with Melville's Pierre, saying that in both cases the novel says more than the author intended it to say and is a failure as a result. Cox, like so many others, begins with the premise that Twain was not capable of intentionally writing as good a novel as A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court. Using The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn as evidence, I reject that premise.


4. Paine, Mark Twain, p. 887.

5. Thomas B. Burnham, "Mark Twain and the Machine." See especially pp. 140-146, though this point is basic to his entire dissertation.


9. Twain had published "The Curious Republic of Gondour" fourteen years earlier (October, 1875), in Harper's Monthly, reprinted in Life as I Find It, pp. 168-172. In the curious republic a man may cast votes according to his fitness -- his education and wealth, thus diminishing the power of the "ignorant and non-taxpaying classes." Twain blames all political corruption on universal suffrage and the fact that anyone may run for office, regardless of qualifications.

10. Grimm, p. 112.

11. Budd, unnumbered insert between pp. 120-121.
12. Beard modelled his illustrations of Merlin after Tennyson, then the English poet laureate. See Budd, insert between pp. 120-121.

13. For a complete investigation of Twain's use of Malory, see R. H. Wilson, "Malory in the Connecticut Yankee," University of Texas Studies in English, XXVII (1948), 185-205.
was too lightsome a tone of flippancy all through the paper. It was plain I had undergone a considerable change without noticing it. I found myself unpleasantly affected by pert little irreverencies which would have seemed but proper and airy graces of speech at an earlier period of my life. There was an abundance of the following breed of items, and they discomforted me.

Local Smoke and Cinders.

Sir Launcelot met up with old King Vignance of Ireland unexpectedly last week over on the moor south of Sir Balmoral le Merveilleuse's hog pasture. The widow has been notified.

Expedition No. 3 will start about the first of next month on a search for Sir Sagramour le Desirous. It is an unusual Knight of the Red Lawns, assisted by Sir Persant of Inde, who is competent, intelligent, courteous, and in every way a brick, and further assisted by Sir Palamides the Saxon, who is no huckleberry himself. This is no pic-nic, these boys mean business.

The readers of the Hosannah will regret to learn that the handsomely and popular Sir Charolais of Gaul, who during his four weeks stay at the Bull and Halibut, this city, has won every heart by his polished manners and elegant conversation, will pull out today for home. Give us another call, Charley!

The business end of the funeral of the late Sir Dalliance the duke's son of Cornwall, killed in an encounter with the Giant of the Knott.. Bludgeon last Tuesday on the borders of the Plain of Enchantment was in the hands of the ever affable and efficient Mumble, prince of undertakers, than whom there exists none by whom it were a more satisfying pleasure to have the last sad offices performed. Give him a trial.

The cordial thanks of the Hosannah office are due, from editor down to devil, to the ever courteous and thoughtful Lord High Steward of the Palace's Third Assistant Vizir for several sacks of ice cream, a quality calculated to make the eyes of the recipients humid with gratitude; and it done it. When this Administration wants to chalk up a desirable name for early promotion, the Hosannah would like a chance to suggest.

The Demoiselle Irene Jewlap, of South Astolat, is visiting her uncle, the popular host of the Cattlemen's Boarding House, Lower Lane, this city.

Young Barker the bellows-mender is home again, and looks much improved by his vacation round-up among the out-lying smithies. See his ad.

Of course it was good enough journalism for a beginning; I knew that quite well, and yet it was somehow disappointing. The "Court Circular" pleased me better, indeed its simple and dignified respectfulness was a distinct refreshment to me after all those disgraceful familiarities. But even it could have been improved. Do what one may, there is no getting an air of variety into a court circular, I acknowledge that. There is a profound monotonousness about its facts that baffles and defeats one's sincerest efforts to make them sparkle and
now that the great lord and illustrious knight SIR SAGRAMOUR LE DESIROUS having condescended to meet the King's Minister, Hank Morgan, the which is surnamed The Boss, for satisfaction of office anciently given, these will engage in the lists by Camesot about the fourth hour of the morning on the sixteenth day of this next succeeding month. The battle will be a piece, with the said offence was of a deadly sort, admitting no composition.

DE PAR LE ROI.

It will be observed, by a glance at our advertising columns, that the community is to be favored with a treat of unusual interest in the tournament line. The names of the artists are warrant of good entertainment. The box-office will be open at noon of the 13th; admission 3 cents, reserved seats 5; proceeds to go to the hospital fund. The royal pair and all the Court will be present. With these exceptions, and the press and the clergy, the free list is strictly suspended. Parties are hereby warned against buying tickets of speculators, they will not be sold at the door.

Everybody knows and likes The Boss, everybody knows and likes Sir Sag.; come, let us give the lads a good send-off. Remember, the proceeds go to a great and free charity, and on whose generosity silent hands, warm with the blood of a loving heart, to all that suffer, regardless of race, creed, condition or color—the only charity yet established in the earth which has no politico-religious stopcock on its compassion, but says Here flows the stream, let all come and drink! Turn out, all hands! Fetch along your doughtnuts and your gum drops and have a good time. Be for sale on the grounds, and rocks to crack it with; also circuses-lemonade—three drops of lime juice to a barrel of water.

N. B. This is the first tournament under the new law, which allows each combatant to use any weapon he may prefer. You want to make a note of this effect:

Illustration B:

HANNIBAL JOURNALISM
Pudd'nhead Wilson appears to be a narrative "working out" for Twain's What Is Man? philosophy, even though his own explanation denies intention to write a deterministic story. Chapter One of "Those Extraordinary Twins," the story of Luigi and Angelo Capello in one two-headed body, begins with an explanation of Twain's method.

A man who is born with the novel-writing gift has a troublesome time of it when he tries to build a novel. I know this from experience. He has no clear idea of his story, in fact he has no story. He merely has some people in his mind, and an incident or two, also a locality. He knows these people, he knows the selected locality, and he trusts that he can plunge those people into those incidents with interesting results. So he goes to work. To write a novel? No -- that is a thought which comes later; in the beginning he is only proposing to tell a little tale, a very little tale, a six-page tale. But as it is a tale which he is not acquainted with, and can only find out what it is by listening as it goes along telling itself, it is more than apt to go on and on and on till it spreads itself into a book. I know about this, because it has happened to me so many times....Much the same thing happened with "Pudd'nhead Wilson." I had a sufficiently hard time with that tale, because it changed itself from a farce to a tragedy while I was going along with it -- a most embarrassing circumstance. But what was a great deal worse was, that it was not one story, but two stories tangled together; and they obstructed and interrupted each other at every turn and created no end of confusion and annoyance. (pp. 207-208)

This is itself a deterministic explanation. Rather than pretending that he has carefully manipulated and organized his materials around a theme or central idea as Poe did in his "Philosophy of Composition," Twain overstates the opposite case, pretending that he has no control over his material. His method of taking up and putting down manuscripts as his inspiration came and
went lends credence to such a line. However, if he did not plan his story with the intention of working out an exemplification of his ideas of temperament and training, he surely must have had his *What Is Man?* text well in mind as he wrote, for he follows these ideas carefully and consistently. This point is generally recognized. Gladys Bellamy calls *Pudd’nhead Wilson* "perhaps the most effective treatment of determinism Mark Twain ever wrote." H. N. Smith said, "It contains the gist of Mark Twain's 'gospel,' the philosophical treatise called *What Is Man?* he had been gestating for years."2

It is apparent that Twain's original plan for the story changed radically when he read Sir Francis Galton's *Finger Prints* in 1892 and that this is probably an important reason for the radical changes he made.3 However, in the course of revision, many of the passages Twain cut out were expository treatments of his *What Is Man?* ideas which impeded the "flight" of the narrative.4

In *Pudd’nhead Wilson* Twain plays two pairs of characters against each other in order, apparently, to work out the implications of his *What Is Man?* philosophy. The primary pair, of course, consists of Valet de Chambre and Thomas a Becket Driscoll, the two babes who are exchanged in the cradle so that they become "Tom" and "Chambers," respectively. Another pair frequently opposed is the detached siamese twins, Luigi and Angelo Capello, former two-headed freak.

"Tom" and "Chambers" are utilized for commentary on both training and temperament. First of all, Chambers, although he is entirely white, grows up to be the ideal Negro slave. Because he is treated sternly by Roxy,
he learns discipline at an early age. On the few occasions when he rebels against Tom's tyranny, he is caned severely by Percy Driscoll. Percy "told Chambers that under no provocation whatever was he privileged to lift his hand against his little master. Chambers overstepped the line three times, and got three such convincing canings from the man who was his father and didn't know it, that he took Tom's cruelties in all humility after that, and made no more experiments" (p. 29). Chambers becomes Tom's bodyguard and fights Tom's fights for him, learning full well how to defend himself. Because he is exposed to hard work and "coarse," wholesome food, he grows strong and agile -- a better marble player, fighter and swimmer than Tom. In every physical way he becomes the superior, but he remains the mental slave. Untutored, illiterate, speaking the Negro idiom, learning Negro manners, he learns his simple and clearly drawn duty to obey and protect Tom regardless of how he is treated, his mental potential remains undeveloped.

Tom is in most ways the opposite. Twain makes it clear that his temperament provides the seed for his evil. "'Tom' was a bad baby from the very beginning of his usurpation. He would cry for nothing, he would burst into storms of devilish temper without notice, and let go scream after scream and squall after squall, then climax the thing with 'holding his breath'.... He was indulged in all his caprices, howsoever troublesome and exasperating they might be, he was allowed to eat anything he wanted, particularly things that would give him the stomach-ache" (pp. 26-27).

His training encourages his bad disposition to develop. "Tom got all the petting, Chambers got none. Tom got all the delicacies, Chambers got
mush and milk, and clabber without sugar. In consequence, Tom was a sickly child and Chambers wasn't. Tom was 'fractious,' as Roxy called it, and overbearing, Chambers was meek and docile" (p. 28). Because Tom is not only the master's apparent child but also the nursemaid Roxy's actual child, he is doubly indulged by Roxy who with "all her splendid common sense and practical every-day ability... was a doting fool of a mother." Tom learns not only that he can get what he wants but also the pleasure of wanting what he isn't supposed to have -- and getting that too. "What he preferred above all other things was the tongs. This was because his 'father' had forbidden him to have them..." In contrast to Chambers, Tom grows up sickly, spoiled, and perverse. Since Chambers fights his battles, he learns to seek battles, further, since Chambers wins admiration for his abilities, Tom learns to hate Chambers, to play tricks on him, finally, even to stab him, all of which Chambers has learned he must take in stride. Tom comes to despise his mother because she is a "nigger."

It had been many a day now since she had ventured a caress or fondling epithet in his quarter. Such things, from a 'nigger,' were repulsive to him, and she had been warned to keep her distance and remember who she was. She saw her darling gradually cease from being her son, she saw that detail perish utterly; all that was left was master -- master, pure and simple, and it was not a gentle mastership, either. (p. 33)

In contrast to Chambers' illiteracy, Tom's formal education includes two years at Yale, where he learns manners, tippling, gambling and fancy dress, but little else. At young manhood, Tom is a lazy, shiftless, spoiled dandy, dissipating his supposed uncle's fortune on drinking and gambling trips to
St. Louis. When Roxy comes back from her river boat chambermaid travels, Twain creates a scene which brings Tom and Chambers together, Chambers approaching Tom to ask that Tom let Roxy speak to him.

Tom was stretched at his lazy ease on a sofa when Chambers brought the petition. Time had not modified his ancient detestation of the humble drudge and protector of his boyhood; it was still bitter and uncompromising. He sat up and bent a severe gaze upon the fair face of the young fellow whose name he was unconsciously using and whose family rights he was enjoying. He maintained the gaze until the victim of it had become satisfactorily pallid with terror, then he said:

"What does the old rip want with me?"

The petition was meekly repeated.

"Who gave you permission to come and disturb me with the social attentions of niggers?"

Tom had risen. The other young man was trembling now, visibly. He saw what was coming, and bent his head sideways, and put up his left arm to shield it. Tom rained cuffs upon the head and its shield, saying no word, the victim received each blow with a beseeching "Please, Marse Tom! -- oh, please, Marse Tom!" Seven blows -- then Tom said, "Face the door -- march!" He followed behind with one, two, three solid kicks. The last one helped the pure-white slave over the door-sill, and he limped away mopping his eyes with his old ragged sleeve. Tom shouted after him, "Send her in!"

Then he flung himself panting on the sofa again, and rasped out the remark, "He arrived just at the right moment; I was full to brim with bitter thinkings, and nobody to take it out of. How refreshing it was! I feel better." (pp. 61-62)

Training has ruined both boys because it has encouraged their temperaments to develop in bad ways. We can recall the What Is Man? example of the two brothers, one a preacher, one a rowdy sailor. Both had covetousness in their temperaments, but the preacher's training had taught him to inhibit his
desires while the sailor's training had taught him to turn his covetousness to theft. Tom's natural surliness and brusqueness have been given some polish by his college experience, but his jealousy of Chambers has continued to grow. Chambers' natural docility has made him the complete slave.

Twain goes out of his way to make one point clear: it is not his Negro blood (he is just 1/32 Negro) which has given Tom his temperament. When Tom is kicked by Luigi, his First Family of Virginia code of honor demands that he challenge Luigi to a duel. Instead, he appeals to a court of law. At this point, Judge Driscoll, in order to uphold family honor, fights Tom's duel for him, a duel which Roxy watches. She berates Tom for not upholding his honor.

"En you refuse' to fight a man dat kicked you, 'stid o' jumpin' at de chance! En you ain't got no mo' feelin' den to come en tell me, dat fetched sich a po' low-down ornery rabbit into de worl'! Pah! it makes me sick! It's de nigger in you, dat's what it is. Thirty-one parts o' you is white, en on'y one part nigger, en dat po' little one part is yo' soul. 'Tain't wuth savin', 'tain't wuth totin' out on a shovel en throwin' in de gutter. You has disgraced yo' birth." (p. 123)

Roxy thinks the Negro portion must account for Tom's cowardice since all the rest of him is F. F. V. She can't understand what has happened to the Essex blood in him. But the conversation turns to Roxy's part in watching the duel and the fact that she was so near to the line of fire that one shot has grazed her nose. To Tom such cool bravery is incredible.

"Did you stand there all the time?"

"Dat's a question to ask, ain't it! What else would I do? Does I git a chance to see a duel every day?"
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"En you refuse' to fight a man dat kicked you, 'stid o' jumpin' at de chance! En you ain't got no mo' feelin' den to come en tell me, dat fetched such a po' low-down ornery rabbit into de worl'! Pah! it makes me sick! It's de nigger in you, dat's what it is. Thirty-one parts o' you is white, en only one part nigger, en dat po' little one part is yo' soul. 'Tain't wuth savin', 'tain't wuth totin' out on a shovel en throwin' in de gutter. You has disgraced yo' birth." (p. 123)

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"Did you stand there all the time?"

"Dat's a question to ask, ain't it! What else would I do? Does I git a chance to see a duel every day?"
"Why, you were right in range! Weren't you afraid?"

The woman gave a sniff of scorn.

"'Fraid! De Smith-Pocahontases ain't 'fraid o' nothin', let alone bullets." (p. 126)

Without realizing it, Roxy has exonerated the Negro blood, which is twice as strong in her as in Tom and has fixed the blame elsewhere, either in his Essex blood or in his training, or in a combination of the two. Although Twain has not used a first person narrator in Pudd'nhead Wilson and thus had no opportunity to develop the kind of ironies I have treated in Huckleberry Finn and A Connecticut Yankee, this passage is developed ironically. He does not correct Roxy's delusion except by implication, but he makes it clear that she is wrong.

The twins Luigi and Angelo demonstrate the difference of temperament in a case where training is identical. We might expect that twins would be born with similar temperaments and that upon being separated their training would be different. However, Twain's twins in their original form were inseparable. Luigi is darker complexioned than Angelo and has a more voluble temper. It is he who has killed a man (protecting Angelo), it is he who kicks Tom and has a duel while Angelo is his second. He is a free-thinker, Angelo a Baptist. He drinks, Angelo does not.

Twain makes much more of their differences in "Those Extraordinary Twins," the story he extracted from Pudd'nhead and published in the same volume with it. In this story, the "twins" are two heads (with four arms) on a common, two-legged body. Twain makes the twins even more fantastic by having Luigi explain that they are not "twins" because he is six months older
"But how in the world can it be? If you were both born at the same time, how can one of you be older than the other?"

"It is very simple, and I assure you it is true. I was born with a full crop of hair, he was as bald as an egg for six months. I could walk six months before he could make a step. I finished teething six months ahead of him. I began to take solids six months before he left the breast. I began to talk six months before he could say a word. Last, and absolutely unassailable proof, the sutures in my skull closed six months ahead of his... Friends, we would not have it known for the world, and I must beg you to keep it strictly to yourselves, but the truth is, we are no more twins than you are." (pp. 244-245)

In this way Twain can make it clear that the two differ in temperament rather than in training. The two take turns being "in command" of their body for a week at a time. While Luigi is in charge, he leads a life that makes Angelo uncomfortable, and while Angelo is in charge, though it is not in his nature to be unpleasant, he makes things difficult for Luigi. Luigi drinks and smokes, two habits which show their harmful effects on Angelo. He gets a headache and a cough as a result. Religious Angelo is baptized in the river and Luigi nearly drowns. When they read in bed at night, Luigi reads Paine's Age of Reason, Angelo reads The Whole Duty of Man. Luigi gets involved in a duel and Angelo is twice wounded before, as the final shot is about to be fired, it becomes Angelo's turn to control the body and he runs from the field of honor. Angelo sings "From Greenland's Icy Mountains" in his plaintive tenor voice, but Luigi drowns him out with "a rude and rollicking song delivered in a thundering bass." The two are unchangeably different, though they both attend the Baptist Church and the Free Thinkers society. Though they both
get baptized and feel the effects of the whiskey they drink at the anti-temper­
ance meeting -- in short, though they both have the same training -- they are
irrevocably different. As two separate twins in the final form of Pudd'nhead
Wilson, their differences are necessarily moderated. However they remain
distinct opposites who still wind up incongruously together at meetings where
only one wants to be.

Master passion, free will and moral sense get some treatment in
Pudd'nhead Wilson, though nothing like the extensive treatment of temperament
and training.

The master passion in its various forms -- ruling interest, self-love,
self-interest and desire for self-respect -- receives considerable exposition.
Pudd'nhead's calendar, beginning in Chapter XI, says "There are three
infallible ways of pleasing an author, and the three form a rising scale of
compliment: 1, to tell him you have read one of his books; 2, to tell him you
have read all of his books, 3, to ask him to let you read the manuscript of
his forthcoming book. No. 1 admits you to his respect, No. 2 admits you to
his admiration; No. 3 carries you clear into his heart" (p. 83). This advice
on how to win friends and influence people is directly based on Twain's argu­
ment that man's primary motive is to enhance his own image of himself, one
of his primary methods of doing so being to see in other eyes that he is well
thought of. The calendar message takes on ironic significance when we find
in the first paragraph of the chapter that Luigi and Angelo work their way
into Pudd'nhead's good graces by asking to see the manuscript of his calendar.

Another aspect of master passion (actually very closely related) is
the desire to be the center of attention. Aunt Patsy and Rowena have their greatest moment when the arrival of the twins makes their house the most interesting place in town. As each becomes the object of inquiries and flatteries as she has never before been, "she knew now for the first time the real meaning of that great word Glory, and perceived the stupendous value of it, and understood why men in all ages had been willing to throw away meaner happinesses, treasure, life itself, to get a taste of its sublime and supreme joy. Napoleon and all his kind stood accounted for -- and justified" (pp. 48-49).

Even Tom, whose indolence and cowardice make self-approval difficult, is the sort of garrulous but gregarious being who must continually seek company. He lives in fear that his inheritance will be cut off, because without it he would be left in the cold socially. When it is cut off for the second time, Twain says, "His appetite was gone with his property and his self-respect...[he wondered] if any course of future conduct, however discreet and carefully perfected and watched over, could win back his uncle's favor...He would set about it...would score that triumph once more, cost what it might to his convenience, limit as it might his frivolous and liberty-loving life" (pp. 106-107). And when he manages to straighten out his affairs in the eyes of Judge Driscoll so as to get the will reinstated, the judge says, "'You have restored my comfort of mind, and with it your own; and both of us had suffered enough!'" (p. 139). Comfort of mind is what man desires, a condition which he can hardly achieve if he can't maintain his own conviction that he is respected. Thus, when the twins are nominated for positions on the town council, they throw "'themselves into it with their whole heart, for their self-love [is] engaged"
Similarly, Wilson explains Judge Driscoll's hate for the twins as a simple irrational allegiance to Tom. Because Tom is, as he thinks, the last of the Driscoll line, the Judge is blinded, "infatuated with him." He must just as blindly hate what Tom hates.

Moral sense, the rationalizing of selfish acts, is explicated at various points in *Pudd'nhead Wilson*. The first quotation from "Pudd'nhead Wilson's Calendar" preceding Chapter XVI makes the basic distinction between men and animals which Twain was so fond of in later years. "If you pick up a starving dog and make him prosperous, he will not bite you. This is the principal difference between a dog and a man" (p. 142). Man with his ability to rationalize and his willingness to label acts as moral or immoral is quite capable of thinking up justifications for immoral acts. Roxy's moral sense is an attitude she recognizes as one she puts on when she "gets religion." When she sees two dollars left on a desk two days after a Methodist church revival, she resists the temptation, but not happily.

"Dad blame dat revival, I wisht it had 'a' be'n put off till to-morrow!"

Then she covered the tempter with a book, and another member of the kitchen cabinet got it. She made this sacrifice as a matter of religious etiquette; as a thing necessary just now, but by no means to be wrested into a precedent; no, a week or two would limber up her piety, then she would be rational again, and the next two dollars that got left out in the cold would find a comforter -- and she could name the comforter. (p. 15)

Twain discusses the tendency towards petty theft among slaves.

On frosty nights the humane negro prowler would warm the end of a plank and put it up under the cold claws of chickens
roosting in a tree, a drowsy hen would step onto the comfortable board, softly clucking her gratitude, and the prowler would dump her into his bag, and later into his stomach, perfectly sure that in taking this trifle from the man who daily robbed him of an inestimable treasure -- his liberty -- he was not committing any sin that God would remember against him in the Last Great Day. (p. 16)

When Roxy trades babies, she has qualms of conscience which keep her awake until she finally remembers a tale she has heard in church of royal baby switching. '"'Tain't no sin -- white folks has done it! It ain't no sin, glory to goodness it ain't no sin! Dey's done it -- yes, en dey was de biggest quality in de whole bilin', too -- kings!'" (p. 22). Later when Tom sells Roxy down the river -- "a fate worse than death" -- he also has qualms. "For a whole week he was not able to sleep well, so much the villainy which he had played upon his trusting mother preyed upon his rag of a conscience; but after that he began to get comfortable again, and was presently able to sleep like any other miscreant" (p. 145). A whole week is a long period for one of Tom's make to worry about someone other than himself. He does no rationalizing until he comes face to face with Roxy again, at which time he lamely attempts to justify himself to her by saying he meant it for the best. The chapter in which this meeting takes place is headed by an excerpt from Pudd'nhead's calendar which says, "Gratitude and treachery are merely the two extremities of the same procession. You have seen all of it that is worth staying for when the band and the gaudy officials have gone by" (p. 150).

Free will is left undiscussed in Pudd'nhead Wilson except as it is treated as an aspect of master passion, the idea that man makes his decisions
according to a non-rational rather than a rational impulse. However, the twins Luigi and Angelo in "Those Extraordinary Twins," act out a sort of allegory of man -- one at a time, first Angelo, then Luigi -- being forced to do things contrary to his will and beliefs. Also, and this is more important, Roxy in Pudd'nhead Wilson is treated thematically as a study of free will.

Except for the fact that she does not perform the same narrative function, Roxy's place in Pudd'nhead Wilson is similar to Huck's in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and Hank Morgan's in A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court. Since she is not the narrator, she is not developed as fully and the meaning of her delusion is not as clear; however, in spite of the fact that her vernacular is different, she is a vernacular hero (as H. N. Smith points out) just as fully as either Huck or Hank. Like Hank Morgan she sees herself outside of society and thinks that she is capable of meaningful independent action. The novel begins with and centers around her attempt to "free" her son and to enslave another.

The idea to exchange babies comes to her in steps, rather than out of the blue as a uniquely original idea. She begins by mourning that her baby, though he is identical to the master's baby, is damned to a much harder life. She addresses Thomas à Becket Driscoll. "'What has my po' baby done, dat he couldn't have yo' luck? He hain't done noth'n'. God was good to you; why warn't he good to him? Dey can't sell you down de river," an idea much like Twain's notion of personal merit. She concludes that her son would be better off dead and plans to drown with him. She then decides to dress her baby in fine clothes for his drowning and upon seeing his striking resemblance to the
white baby lands on the idea of "saving" her own son and damning her master's son to slavery. H. N. Smith has pointed out that in her rationalization for the act, Roxy "usurps the divine prerogative of arbitrarily conferring free grace on her child."\(^6\) "...dat ole nigger preacher... said dey ain't nobody. kin save his own self -- can't do it by faith, can't do it by works, can't do it no way at all. Free grace is de on'y way, en dat don't come fum nobody but jis' de Lord, en he kin give it to anybody he please, saint or sinner -- he don't kyer!" (p. 22). In making such a comparison Twain points up Roxy's deluded sense of her own power, a notion that by a willful act of her own she can change, even improve, society.

Roxy is as much a rogue as Huck Finn, living on the fringes of society, stealing without feeling moral qualms, unless she has just got religion, living by her wits.

The first reward Roxy gets for her action comes from the son she has saved who teaches her "her place." "She saw herself sink from the sublime height of motherhood to the somber depths of unmodified slavery....She was merely his chattel now, his convenience, his dog, his cringing and helpless slave, the humble and unresisting victim of his capricious temper and vicious nature" (p. 33). In her attempt to uplift her son she has lowered herself.

Her second reward is to realize the sad results of her exchange. Tom's temperament is such that his white training helps him to grow bad in every way. And though she has made him free, he is not free to be happy simply because happiness is not in his temperament. Chambers, on the other hand, exhibits strength, loyalty, and docility. His training makes him
a slave in every way.

Roxy must live with what she has done, and when she learns that Tom's inheritance is in danger because of his gambling debts, she tries to perpetuate her deed by helping him steal to repay the debts and later by letting him sell her back into slavery in order to bail himself out once again. But Tom is Tom, no better than his temperament, and although she is obviously wrong when she blames his cowardice on the Negro in him, she has at the same time reached a sad truth which she cannot ignore but isn't able to admit. Though nothing could be worse than being a slave, Tom is little better for being white.

It is no wonder then that Pudd'nhead Wilson's unveiling of her crime at the end is symbolically a personal revelation to her alone.

"The murderer of your friend and mine -- York Driscoll of the generous hand and the kindly spirit -- sits among you. Valet de Chambre, negro and slave -- falsely called Thomas a Becket Driscoll -- make upon the window the finger-prints that will hang you!"

Tom turned his ashen face imploringly toward the speaker, made some impotent movement with his white lips, then slid limp and lifeless to the floor.

Wilson broke the awed silence with the words:

"There is no need. He has confessed."

Roxy flung herself upon her knees, covered her face with her hands, and out through her sobs the words struggled:

"De Lord have mercy on me, po' miserable sinner dat I is!"

(p. 200)

The spirit in her eye, her belief in her freedom to alter events, to act as a free agent, outside of society, her willingness to alienate herself from her son in order to give him a better life, is quenched by the realization that one
Pudd'nhead's revelations which work ill on Roxy work ill on Tom, too. He is pardoned for his murder and sold down the river as a slave, the very outcome Roxy had hoped to thwart twenty years before, and, as Roxy says, a fate worse than death. Roxy's will has been completely negated.

Chambers, the true heir, is restored to the clothes and home and pew of Thomas a' Becket Driscoll, to be miserable for the rest of his days in clothes he doesn't know how to wear, in society he doesn't know how to respond to, banned forever from the "nigger gallery" for which he has been trained, the only place where he can be happy.

The agent for the unhappy turn of events at the end of the story, the titular hero, is the most dissatisfying character in the book. According to H. N. Smith, who has examined the extant manuscripts, "Wilson remained a minor character" through the first two drafts of the story. "Not until later, when Francis Galton's Finger Prints (published in 1892) provided a sound scientific method for establishing the identities of Tom and Chambers and for proving Tom guilty of the murder of Judge Driscoll, did Mark Twain undertake the revision that made Wilson the 'chiefest' figure." He quotes Twain in a letter to his wife: "I have never thought of Pudd'nhead as a character, but only as a piece of machinery -- a button or a crank or a lever, with a useful function to perform in a machine, but with no dignity above that. Wilson is incarnate analytical intelligence, the personification of science." There is good reason for Twain not to have thought of Pudd'nhead as a person, for Twain endowed him with several traits he did not concede to humanity as a whole. First,
Pudd'nhead is a rational being who thinks things out and comes to right decisions. Secondly, he is a circumspectly proper, moral and unambitious being, who will do the right thing before the profitable. When Pudd'nhead tells Tom that he would not have taken his first and only lawsuit to court if he had known the circumstances, Tom exclaims:

"You would?... And it your first case! And you know perfectly well there never would have been any case if he had got that chance, don't you? And you'd have finished your days a pauper nobody, instead of being an actually launched and recognized lawyer to-day. And you would really have done that, would you?"

"Certainly."

Tom looked at him a moment or two, then shook his head sorrowfully and said:

"I believe you -- upon my word I do. I don't know why I do, but I do. Pudd'nhead Wilson, I think you're the biggest fool I ever saw."

"Thank you." (pp. 110-111)

Third, he is misunderstood by the mass of humanity -- the people of Dawson's Landing. In this respect, David Wilson is an allegory of Mark Twain. He is labelled a fool because of a remark he makes upon his arrival which the audience is not capable of appreciating.

... when an invisible dog began to yelp and snarl and howl and make himself very comprehensively disagreeable,... young Wilson said, much as one who is thinking aloud:

"I wish I owned half of that dog."

"Why?" somebody asked.

"Because I would kill my half."

The group searched his face with curiosity, with anxiety
even, but found no light there, no expression that they could read. They fell away from him as from something uncanny, and went into privacy to discuss him. One said:

"'Pears to be a fool."

"'Pears?" said another. "Is, I reckon you better say."

(p. 6)

The audience cannot understand irony, whether the audience be citizens of Dawson's Landing listening to a Pudd'nhead or Twain's readers mistaking irony for comedy and taking his hoaxes seriously.

Wilson embodies Twain's philosophy in one respect only. His failure has little to do with his personal merit. He is eminently superior to the people who have judged him a pudd'nhead, but because of the label he must exist with his talents unrecognized for twenty years until as chance would have it his avocation and considerable luck bring him the recognition he deserves. Even then, success means nothing more than success as a lawyer and a local politician in a town where the only other member of the Free Thinkers society has just died.

Wilson is more the embodiment of science, to use Smith's term, than he is a person. He is a cool thinking-machine dressed up in lawyer's clothing. He is Roxy's nemesis. He is the defeat of free will. When Roxy's Providence meets up with science -- a science that reduces men to the tips of their fingers -- then she and mankind are defeated.

In order to understand the sort of super-human character that David Wilson is, we must look outside of Pudd'nhead Wilson to discover a development in the problem of perception which Twain was dealing with at the same time.
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In the early stages of his struggle with Pudd'nhead Wilson in the summer of 1892, Twain laid aside the manuscript to write Tom Sawyer Abroad. Although the story was, according to his account, a boys' book, it is not a boys' story even to the extent that Adventures of Tom Sawyer is. There is adventure -- a trip in a balloon that must have seemed as miraculous then as a rocket trip today, a pitched battle on the Sahara Desert, a sand storm, and the pyramids. However, the adventure is not in any way central to the story. Instead, Tom Sawyer Abroad appears to be an intensive reworking of the problem of perception. Situation after situation is set up in order that Tom, Huck, and Jim can debate on the differences in their views, with Tom usually opposed to the other two. Huck and Jim are frequently wrong, but Tom in his effort to correct them often loses the argument.

As morning comes after the first night of their balloon flight, Huck declares that the balloon isn't going as fast as the professor claimed it would go because they are still over Illinois. When Tom asks how he knows they aren't over Indiana instead, Huck answers that the territory below them is green and Indiana is pink.

"Indiana pink? Why, what a lie!"

"It ain't no lie; I've seen it on the map, and it's pink."

You never see a person so aggravated and disgusted. He says:

"Well, if I was such a numskull as you, Huck Finn, I would jump over. Seen it on the map! Huck Finn, did you reckon the states was the same color out-of-doors as they are on the map?"

"Tom Sawyer, what's a map for? Ain't it to learn you facts?"
"Of course."

"Well, then, how's it going to do that if it tells lies? That's what I want to know."

"Shucks, you muggins! It don't tell lies."

"It don't, don't it?"

"No, it don't."

"All right, then; if it don't, there ain't no two states the same color. You git around that, if you can, Tom Sawyer." (pp. 23-24)

Jim congratulates Huck for getting the best of Tom in an argument, no mean feat in Huck and Jim's opinion, however, Tom tries to explain what he means to Huck, the result being a comic monologue on the difference between art and reality.

"Suppose there's a brown calf and a big brown dog, and an artist is making a picture of them. What is the main thing that that artist has got to do? He has got to paint them so you can tell them apart the minute you look at them, hain't he? Of course. Well, then, do you want him to go and paint both of them brown? Certainly you don't. He paints one of them blue, and then you can't make no mistake. It's just the same with the maps. That's why they make every state a different color; it ain't to deceive you, it's to keep you from deceiving yourself." (p. 26)

Even this argument is not enough for literalists like Huck and Jim who put their complete faith in their unimaginative, common-sense, materialistic view of the world. Jim counters Tom's argument with a nineteenth century American indictment of art.

"Why, Mars Tom, if you knowed what chuckleheads dem painters is, you'd wait a long time before you'd fetch one er dem in to back up a fac'. I's gwine to tell you, den you kin see for yerself. I see one of'em a-paintin' away, one
day, down in ole Hank Wilson's back lot, en I went down to see, en he was paintin' dat old brindle cow wid de near horn gone -- you knows de one I means. En I ast him what he's paintin' her for, en he say when he git her painted, de picture's wuth a hundred dollars. Mars Tom, he could 'a' got de cow fer fifteen, en I tole him so. Well, sah, if you'll b'lieve me, he jes' shuck his head, dat painter did, en went on a-dobbin'. Bless you, Mars Tom, dey don't know nothin'," (p. 26)

The comic basis of Jim's statement is most certainly not original with Twain, but it establishes a line which Jim is to follow throughout the story.

This episode is followed immediately by another which develops the parochial nature of Jim's world view. Tom notices that his watch is an hour slower than a court-house clock their balloon is cruising by, and he surmises that they are in the eastern time zone. This upsets Jim, who has always assumed that it is the same time all over the world, especially when Tom continues to explain that it can be Tuesday in England while it is still Monday in the United States. Jim can only reason in terms of things he knows and none of them helps him accept such an idea.

"How you gwine to get two days inter one day? Can't git two hours inter one hour, kin you? Can't git two niggers inter one nigger skin, kin you? Can't git two gallons of whisky inter a one-gallon jug, kin you? No, sir, 'twould strain de jug. Yes, en even den you couldn't, I don't believe. Why, looky here, Huck, s'posen de Choosday was New Year's -- now den! Is you gwine to tell me it's dis year in one place en las' year in t'other, bofe in de identical same minute? It's de beatenest rubbish! I can't stan' it -- I can't stan' to hear tell 'bout it .... Den dat Monday could be de las' day, en dey wouldn't be no las' day in England, en de dead wouldn't be called. We mustn't go over dah, Mars Tom. Please git him to turn back ...." (pp. 29-30)

If Huck and Jim are overly literal and materialistic in their outlook, Tom is over-romantic. It is he, early in the story, who talks of going on a
crusade to take the Holy Land away from the "paynín." Huck objects because such an adventure doesn't seem profitable, but it is Jim who defeats the plan by suggesting that since they haven't had any experience massacring defenseless people, they ought to practice by using axes on "dat sick fam'ly dat's over on the Sny, en burns dey house down." It's also Tom who signs his letter home "'From Tom Sawyer, the Erronort...In the Welkin, approaching England,'" only to be forced to admit, under Huck's penetrating examination, that he doesn't know what the welkin is.

I see in a minute he was stuck. He raked and scraped around in his mind, but he couldn't find nothing, so he had to say.

"I don't know, and nobody don't know. It's just a word, and it's a mighty good word, too. There ain't many that lays over it. I don't believe there's any that does."

"Shucks!" I says. "But what does it mean? -- that's the p'int."

"I don't know what it means, I tell you. It's a word that people uses for -- for -- well, it's ornamental. They don't put ruffles on a shirt to keep a person warm, do they?"

"Course they don't."

"But they put them on, don't they?"

"Yes."

"All right, then; that letter I wrote is a shirt, and the welkin's the ruffle on it." (p. 39)

Tom's metaphor is revealing; his world view deals with what to Huck and Jim are the frills of reality. He could go on a crusade in his imagination only and he could be fond of making the welkin ring even though he hasn't the faintest idea what a welkin is. He is guilty of dealing in fantasy just as Sandy was (in
A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court), but Huck and Jim are even more
guilty than Hank Morgan in their insistence on the realistic, common sense,
unimaginative view.

When the Erronorts are sailing along over the Sahara, Tom spots a caraván some distance from them and yells:

"Camels! -- Camels!"

However, when Huck looks he is disappointed.

"Camels your granny, they're spiders."

"Spiders in a desert, you shad? Spiders walking in a procession? You don't ever reflect, Huck Finn, and I reckon
you really haven't got anything to reflect with. Don't you know
we're as much as a mile up in the air, and that that string of
crawlers is two or three miles away? Spiders, good land!
Spiders as big as a cow? Perhaps you'd like to go down and
milk one of 'em. But they're camels, just the same." (p. 49)

Huck's reliance on common sense leaves him unable to cope with new situations. Since he has never had to adjust his view to balloon travel before, he is likely
to make mistakes. In the next chapter, Tom gives some instructions to his
fellow travelers. First he tells them about the marvels of the flea -- if it is
just looked at in perspective. The speed it can travel, the distance it can jump,
the weight it can carry in relation to its size are marvels Huck and Jim hadn't
reflected on. Next Tom tells an even more pointed story from the Arabian
Nights, but Huck and Jim miss the point. The tale is about a camel driver
hunting for a lost camel who asks a man if he has seen it. The man asks if it
was lame, blind in one eye, carrying millet seed and honey and missing a tooth,
to all of which questions the camel driver answers "yes." Then the man
announces that he hasn't seen the camel but has deduced these features of it
by examining its track. "...when a person knows how to use his eyes, every­
thing has got a meaning to it, but most people's eyes ain't any good to them"
(p. 59). After Tom makes his point, Jim says:

"Go on, Mars Tom, hit's a mighty good tale, and powerful interestin'."

"That's all," Tom says.

"All?" says Jim astonished. "What 'come o' de camel?"

"I don't know."

"Mars Tom, don't de tale say?"

"No."

Jim puzzled a minute, then he says:

"Well! Ef dat ain't de beatenes' tale ever I struck. Jist gits to de place whar de intrust is gittin' red-hot, en down she breaks. Why, Mars Tom, dey ain't no sense in a tale dat acts like dat. Hain't you got no idea whether de man got de camel back er not?" (p. 60)

When Huck, too, says he doesn't see the point, Tom replies, "'Some people can see, and some can't -- just as that man said. Let alone a camel, if a cyclone had gone by, you duffers wouldn't 'a' noticed the track.' I don't know what he meant by that, and he didn't say, it was just one of his irrulevances, I reckon ...") (p. 61).

There is an interesting shift in the problem of perception noticeable between Innocents Abroad and Life on the Mississippi and this story of the early nineties. Whereas in the earlier books the usual dichotomy was between romance and science, Tom Sawyer Abroad opposes romance and science united in one person, Tom, against a duller view. Tom's method is to deduce
from evidence (science) through the medium of imagination (romance). (While his view is far from perfect, it is much more perceptive than Huck's and Jim's.)

On a variety of subjects, Twain makes it clear that Tom is the possessor of scientific knowledge as well as romantic lore. He demonstrates a complete knowledge of time zones; he reads maps well, he knows all about the Sahara. At the same time, he has the mark of nobility, though it cannot be traced to First Family of Virginia blood, and he shows bravery and cool-headedness in moments of stress, while Huck and Jim are practically cowards. In pointing out the ability of fleas to discriminate among people, he demonstrates that while fleas will crawl all over Huck and Jim, they won't touch him. It's interesting to note that the other representative of science in the story, the mad inventor of the balloon, is described by Huck as "a lean pale feller with that soft kind of moonlight in his eyes" (p. 13). In both Innocents Abroad and Life on the Mississippi, Twain used moonlight as a symbol of the romantic outlook, and, indeed, just a few pages later, in Tom Sawyer Abroad, he has Huck say, "...the moonshine made everything soft and pretty, and the farmhouses looked snug and homeful...," using moonlight again to put a romantic cast on the view.

In uniting science, nobility and romance, Twain makes all three more attractive, though not totally attractive. We must remember that the scientist is mad and that Tom, too, is capable of delusions.

The most fully developed problem of perception in Tom Sawyer Abroad appears in Chapter VIII, "The Disappearing Lake." The Erronorts run out of water and start on a search for a new supply. After several hours of aimless cruising, Tom "raises a whoop" and they see what appears to be a lake.
It was a long ways off, but that warn't anything to us, we just slapped on a hundred-mile gait, and calculated to be there in seven minutes; but she stayed the same old distance away, all the time, we couldn't seem to gain on her, yes, sir, just as far, and shiny, and like a dream; but we couldn't get no nearer; and at last, all of a sudden, she was gone!

Tom's eyes took a spread, and he says:

"Boys, it was a mirage!" Said it like he was glad. I didn't see nothing to be glad about. I says:

"Maybe. I don't care nothing about its name, the thing I want to know is, what's become of it?" (p. 65)

Huck and Jim have not heard of a mirage; furthermore Tom's explanation does not satisfy them.

"It ain't anything but imagination. There ain't anything to it."

It warmed me up a little to hear him talk like that, and I says:

"What's the use you talking that kind of stuff, Tom Sawyer? Didn't I see the lake?"

"Yes.-- you think you did."

"I don't think nothing about it, I did see it."

"I tell you you didn't see it either -- because it warn't there to see."

"... Why, [Tom] seen it himself! He was the very one that seen it first. Now, then!"

"Yes, Mars Tom, hit's so -- you can't deny it. We all seen it, en dat prove it was dah."

"Proves it! How does it prove it?"

"Same way it does in de courts en everywheres, Mars Tom. One pusson might be drunk, or dreamy, or suthin', en he could be mistaken; en two might, maybe; but I tell
you, sah, when three sees a thing, drunk er sober, it's so. Dey ain't no gittin' aroun' dat, en you knows it, Mars Tom."

"I don't know nothing of the kind. There used to be forty thousand million people that seen the sun move from one side of the sky to the other every day. Did that prove that the sun done it?"

"'Course it did. En besides, dey warn't no 'casion to prove it. A body 'at's got any sense ain't gwine to doubt it. Dah she is now -- a-sailin' thoo de sky, like she allays done."

Tom turned on me, then, and says:

"What do you say -- is the sun standing still?"

"Tom Sawyer, what's the use to ask such a jackass question? Anybody that ain't blind can see it don't stand still."

"Well," he says, "I'm lost in the sky with no company but a passel of low-down animals that don't know no more than the head boss of a university did three or four hundred years ago." (pp. 66-67)

Here again, Tom represents new learning and science while Huck and Jim stand for superstition and common sense. Common sense tells them that the sun is moving, passing overhead, while science, ironically wrong, tells Tom it is standing still. Tom labels a mirage imagination; Huck and Jim insist that perception equals reality and that the lake indeed exists. When they spot the mirage again only to have it again disappear, all Jim can do is blame such an affair on ghosts, however, Tom, seeing a flock of birds in flight, follows them and finds water.

Jim got the first glimpse, and slumped down on the locker sick. He was most crying, and says:

"She's dah ag'in, Mars Tom, she's dah ag'in, en I
knows I's gwine to die, 'case when a body sees a ghos' de third time, dat's what it means. I wisht I'd never come in dis balloon, dat I does."

He wouldn't look no more, and what he said made me afraid, too, because I knowed it was true, for that has always been the way with ghosts, so then I wouldn't look any more, either. Both of us begged Tom to turn off and go some other way, but he wouldn't, and said we was ignorant superstitious blatherskites. Yes, and he'll git come up with, one of these days, I says to myself, insulting ghosts that way. (p. 69)

Twain has devised a situation in which Tom's view is not only more nearly right but also much more useful.

The vision of Huck and Jim appears at its worst, so bad in fact that one who has recently read The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is appalled at the apparent degeneration of Huck. It should be noted that all three principal characters are much less fully developed in Tom Sawyer Abroad. The novel's primary failure as fiction derives directly from the flatness of characterization. (One cannot accept the three as characters already fully established in the earlier two stories because they are not consistent with the earlier characters.) Except for a few specific areas Twain wants to treat, they take on little substance. Huck's sympathy for Jim is reduced to a few superficial displays of friendship and Jim is truly hardly deserving of sympathy. Whereas in The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn Tom's pseudo adventuresomeness and bravery paled beside Huck's heroic proportions, in Tom Sawyer Abroad Huck is cowardly and Tom is brave. When they are chased by lions, Tom runs, climbs a rope ladder and guides the ship up high enough to get Huck, who is clinging paralyzed at the bottom of the ladder, out of danger. When they are
threatened by the mad professor, Tom does something about it while Huck and Jim cower in the front of the balloon. Later at the Oasis, when they are again threatened by lions, Jim loses his head and pulls the balloon up so quickly that Tom and Huck are left in danger and only Tom's pluck and cool head save them. Such simple opposition of good and bad traits would not produce good fiction even if it were not so easily and directly comparable to the subleties of *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*. However, it is clear that in this sequel Twain was more interested in working out ideas than in writing fiction.

Tom, who knows the realm of imagination, can enjoy a mirage as imagination because imagination is a form of reality for him. He has taken the better part of Sandy, but not her superstition, and the better part of the Yankee, but not his materialism, and has forged from them a satisfactory world view.

The balloon, drifting East, inevitably comes upon Egypt and the pyramids, one of the few areas that Huck knows as myth and story rather than reality.

It made my heart fairly jump. You see, I had seen a many and a many a picture of them, and heard tell about them a hundred times, and yet to come on them all of a sudden, that way, and find they was real, 'stead of imaginations, 'most knocked the breath out of me with surprise. It's a curious thing, that the more you hear about a grand and big and bully thing or person, the more it kind of dreamies out, as you may say, and gets to be a big dum wavery figger made out of moonshine and nothing solid to it. It's just so with George Washington, and the same with them pyramids. (p. 103)

His unborn cynicism has prepared him to disbelieve because he places all knowledge in a dichotomy of imagination and reality and equates imagination
with lies. However, the pyramids stand solid and loom large. They live up to the stories he has heard about them.

To Jim, the land of Egypt means "Moses and Joseph and Pharaoh and the other prophets," because he "was a Presbyterian, and had a most deep respect for Moses, which was a Presbyterian, too" (p. 105). To Tom Egypt means "Noureddin, and Bedreddin, and such like monstrous giants...and a raft of other Arabian Nights folks, which the half of them never done the things they let on they done, [Huck] don't believe" (p. 105). But to Huck, reality is stone. He is awed by the dimensions of the pyramid, but untouched by myth. When he goes into the pyramid he finds "a room and a big stone box in it where they used to keep that king, just as the man in the Sunday-school said; but he was gone, now; somebody had got him" (p. 115). His matter-of-fact materialism contrasts with Tom who "dripped history from every pore," when Tom stands atop a pyramid recalling the story of Pegasus, "a bronze horse with a peg in its shoulder," who could "fly...like a bird" (p. 111). This tale, too, occasions a clash between Tom's and Huck's world views.

When he got done telling it there was one of them uncomfortable silences that comes, you know, when a person has been telling a whopper..."Tom Sawyer, you don't believe that, yourself."

"What's the reason I don't? What's to hender me?"

"There's one thing to hender you: it couldn't happen, that's all."

"What's the reason it couldn't happen?"

"You tell me the reason it could happen."

"This balloon is a good enough reason it could happen, I should reckon." (pp. 111-112)
Tom is satisfied that if an object called "balloon" can fly, then an object called "bronze horse," also can fly. "Ain't this balloon and the bronze horse the same thing under different names?" (p. 112). Tom is making an argument on semantic grounds which goes counter to Huck's common sense, so, of course, Huck is convinced that Tom is wrong. "Next you'll be saying a house and a cow is the same thing." Tom counters with his reasonable explanation. "Look here, Huck, I'll make it plain to you, so you can understand. You see, it ain't the mere form that's got anything to do with their being similar or unsimilar, it's the principle involved; and the principle is the same in both" (p. 112). Huck and Jim will have none of it, however, so Tom belabors his argument again and again until Huck finally counters with an argument of his own.

"All right, then. What is the [principle] that's in a candle and in a match?"

"It's the fire."

"It's the same in both, then?"

"Yes, just the same in both."

"All right. Suppose I set fire to a carpenter shop with a match, what will happen to that carpenter shop?"

"She'll burn up."

"And suppose I set fire to this pyramid with a candle -- will she burn up?"

"Of course she won't."

"All right. Now the fire's the same, both times. Why does the shop burn, and the pyramid don't?"

"Because the pyramid can't burn."

"Aha! and a horse can't fly!"
"My lan', ef Huck ain't got him ag'in; Huck's landed him high en dry dis time, I tell you! Hit's de smartes' trap I ever see a body walk inter -- en ef I --"

But Jim was so full of laugh he got to strangling and couldn't go on, and Tom was that mad to see how neat I had floored him, and turned his own argument ag'in him and knocked him all to rags and flinders with it, that all he could manage to say was that whenever he heard me and Jim try to argue it made him ashamed of the human race. (p. 114)

This passage echoes Huck's and Jim's famous debate on why Frenchmen don't speak English which concludes with Huck's decision that "you can't teach a nigger to argue." However, Huck's wrongheadedness here is even clearer than Jim's there, and the sympathy is largely with Tom, who has tried a reasonable approach only to have common sense throw it out of court. The passage also recalls Hank Morgan's disgust with Sandy's deluded affection for a herd of pigs in *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court*, with the twist that the shoe is on the other foot. It is now Tom, with a capacity for belief, who is ashamed.

When the balloon almost bumps into the Sphinx, Tom uses the occasion for a study in perspective. He lands Jim on top of the head and sails off to get "what Tom called effects and perspectives and proportions."

The further we got away, the littler Jim got, and the grander the Sphinx got, till at last it was only a clothespin on a dome, as you might say. That's the way perspective brings out the correct proportions, Tom said, he said Julius Caesar's niggers didn't know how big he was, they was too close to him.

Then we sailed off further and further, till we couldn't see Jim at all any more, and then that great figger was at its noblest, a-gazing out over the Nile Valley so, still and solemn and lonesome, and all the little shabby huts and things that was scattered about it clean disappeared and gone, and nothing
around it now but a soft wide spread of yaller velvet, which was the sand. (p. 108)

Once again, Twain sets up a situation which can contrast the near view with the far, and once again the distant view, even to realist Huck, is more pleasing. It puts the Sphinx in proper proportion and puts mankind out of mind. When Huck picks up a telescope and sees people swarming over the Sphinx after Jim they appear to be bugs at first until he adjusts his thinking, for in comparison to greater things men appear to be insignificant. Gladys Bellamy has pointed out that Tom Sawyer Abroad marks the first fictional use Twain has made of his "device of diminishing the human race to microscopic proportions," though in non-fiction -- if that is how we must classify Innocents Abroad -- he managed the same effect much earlier. However, it is interesting that, as she points out, Twain used the device along with "an example of Nature's cruelty," a sand storm that wipes out an entire caravan. The combination of the man as bug motif and the sand storm as exterminator does an effective job of pointing up man's insignificance and the degree to which he is at the mercy of, rather than controller of, his environment.

It is evident that Twain was still concerned with the problem of perception and the implication derived from it that man's vision is 1) frequently faulty and 2) largely determined by his environment and point of view. At the same time, his previous dilemma over the relative merits of the romantic and the scientific views has been largely resolved into a forging of the two so that his man of vision takes the best of both and rejects the worst. The best can be summarized as science and imagination.
worst can be summarized as superstition, traditional religion, materialism and common sense. Huck Finn and Hank Morgan had mixtures of good and bad qualities; their views were honest but not reliable and they operated under the delusion that their views were right. Though the Tom Sawyer of Adventures of Tom Sawyer and The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn was clearly also operating under a faulty world view -- and excessively romantic one -- and though he begins Tom Sawyer Abroad acting similarly, he becomes an exemplar of right vision before the story gets under way. As such, he represents a type that is to take over much of Twain's later fiction -- the mysterious stranger.

To be sure, the notion of an outsider moving into an environment had been Twain's method in his earliest stories. However, the outsider in the early works is an innocent. The narrators in Innocents Abroad and Roughing It (and to a certain extent in A Tramp Abroad, Prince Edward and Tom Canty in The Prince and the Pauper, Huck Finn in Tom Sawyer and The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and even Hank Morgan in A Connecticut Yankee) are innocent strangers, to a greater or lesser degree deluded with a sense of their own power. In Pudd'nhead Wilson, The Mysterious Stranger, "The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg," "Letters From Earth" and even Joan of Arc, our stranger takes on new powers which sometimes amount to supernatural powers and in all cases involve a much clearer world view than earlier strangers have had. When Twain put down his Tom Sawyer Abroad manuscript, he went back to his struggle with Pudd'nhead Wilson and developed the character of Pudd'nhead into the full blown fixture that he became.
It is no wonder then that Pudd'nhead became his first super-human, a man blessed with better-than-human perception and not cursed with man's two weaknesses -- master passion and moral sense.

Until recently, critics of The Mysterious Stranger have been working under the misapprehension that the version A. B. Paine edited was a more or less completed story as Twain meant it to be published. However, thanks to John S. Tuckey, the author of Mark Twain and Little Satan, we have new information that the published version is far from what Twain intended as his final manuscript. Tuckey's basic discoveries are. (1) The first ten chapters constitute the first of three forms Twain gave the story. (2) The conclusion was intended to go with the third form of the manuscript -- a radically different story. (3) The version we have was freely pared, revised and amended by Paine, with absolutely no acknowledgment of such action (for instance, Paine split Father Adolf in the first chapter into two characters -- Father Adolf and "the astrologer"). (4) Chapters 1-10, representing what Twain foresaw to be half of a novel, were written between October, 1897, and August, 1900. (5) The concluding chapter was written in 1904. (6) The title, The Mysterious Stranger, was used only on the third form of the manuscript.

Tuckey points out that when Bernard De Voto became executor of the Mark Twain papers, he gave the Mysterious Stranger manuscripts a cursory examination and arrived at the erroneous conclusion that the version Paine published was the final form, written about 1905, and that it was "the final outcome of Twain's many earlier attempts to create in terms of his 'symbols
of despair': it was the work 'that came through to triumph at the last... to achieve the completion denied its many predecessors...'. By writing it, De Voto theorized, Twain had 'saved himself in the end' and had come 'back from the edge of insanity.' 'The dream' had been 'the answer and the proof': 'Or, if I may so phrase it, we see the psychic block removed, the dilemma solved, the inhibition broken, the accusation stilled, and Mark Twain's mind given peace at last and his talent restored.'

Subsequent critics, assuming that De Voto was correct, have followed the line of his interpretation. Gladys Bellamy, for instance, arrived at the same conclusion. Seeing the dream ending as Twain's way out, for "anything can be endured in a dream," she finds fault because he was "forced... to close the arc of his artistic circle by the emptiness of a dream."

H. N. Smith, whose *Mark Twain: The Development of a Writer* was published late in 1962, appears to have been caught with his manuscript down. In that work, he says, "The ending does not unequivocally belong with the version Paine chose: in the manuscript of the chapter as he found it Satan is called by the curious name '44' borne by a cognate figure in a quite different version of the story. The question is however not crucial, for in all the versions Mark Twain clearly intends to adopt the perspective of a transcendent observer in order to depict human experience as meaningless." He discusses the work as a unified whole. This statement clashes rather strangely with his endorsement of Tuckey's work which appears on
the cover. "In my opinion, his demonstration makes possible a fresh start in the investigation of Twain's later work..."

Similarly Kenneth Lynn, who read the unpublished manuscripts but followed De Voto's chronology for them, praises A. B. Paine and says that "his contribution to The Mysterious Stranger shows that there were times, at least, when he genuinely understood the mind of the man to whom he was so devoted." He then proceeds to interpret the book entirely in terms of the concluding chapter.

The one job of Twain scholarship most clearly called for is the publication of at least the two principal versions of The Mysterious Stranger manuscripts, if not all three, so that a better estimate of the thematic implications of the apparently very different stories can be made. In the meantime, criticism of The Mysterious Stranger can be little more than a search for ideas and the establishment of tentative conclusions.

I am going to restrict my study to the first ten chapters (and thus avoid at least the pitfall of accusing Twain of writing an inappropriate conclusion), using the title The Mysterious Stranger to refer to these chapters only.

It seems to me to be as serious a mistake to identify the super-human characters of Twain's later work with Twain as it is to identify Huck Finn and Hank Morgan with him. However, this has been a common practice. H. N. Smith, for example, who points out that "the most significant trait of Satan in The Mysterious Stranger is his lack of a moral sense and of sympathy for mere human beings," attributes this lack of sympathy also to Twain. "Satan's destruction of the mimic world he has
created is the symbolic gesture of a writer who can no longer find any meaning in man or society. Mark Twain's only refuge is to identify himself with a supernatural spectator for whom mankind is but a race of vermin, hardly worth even contempt. "Twain had developed in his early career a narrative method which relied heavily on the character of the narrator and the use of irony to demonstrate the narrator's deficiencies. Through the years he had seen such irony fail, or rather suffer misinterpretation from the vast majority of his readers. I have pointed out that the fate of Pudd'nhead's attempt at irony might well be a form of complaint about Twain's own fate as an ironist. The basic difference between the pre and post-Pudd'nhead Wilson writing is not a matter of changed philosophy but is instead a matter of narrative approach. In order to express the sort of criticism of humanity that Twain wanted to make, and having given up the ironic mode, Twain needed a character who could see and discuss the foibles of humanity. Such a character necessarily had to be free of mankind's delusions and free of the limitations to freedom of thought and action which a deterministic philosophy attributes to man. He must be super-human, in short -- the mysterious stranger.

Philip Traum, the nephew of Satan, but an unfallen angel nevertheless, spends his time in Eseldorf lecturing and demonstrating to three boys that humanity is much less significant than they had assumed and operates in a completely determined way, cursed, moreover, by the moral sense. From the start, he shows the three, Theodor Fischer, narrator, and his two friends, Nikolaus Bauman and Seppi Wohlmeyer, that his estimate of
the worth of humanity is not very high. He creates some toy size humans out of clay and sets them to work building a castle. When two of the toy workmen quarrel, he pinches them between his fingers as if they were ants. Later he creates a storm and earthquake in order to destroy the whole group and the castle as well. Even as he toys with the miniature people, his conversation ranges over civilized history showing that full-size humanity is no better, being "dull and ignorant and trivial and conceited, and so diseased and rickety and such a shabby, poor, worthless lot all around" (p. 644).

The boys are shocked because their common sense seems to belie his statements, to themselves they amount to more. However, Satan proceeds to develop his ideas and when Theodor asks him how he differs from men, he compares the difference to the difference between a woodlouse and Caesar. "'Man is made of dirt -- I saw him made. I am not made of dirt. Man is a museum of diseases, a home of impurities; he comes today and is gone tomorrow, he begins as dirt and departs as stench; I am of the aristocracy of the Imperishables. And man has the Moral Sense. You understand? He has the Moral Sense. That would seem to be difference enough between us, all by itself!'" (pp. 649-650).

Nikolaus and his friends don't know what moral sense means, and later when they ask the good priest, Father Peter, the answer they receive doesn't help them understand. "'Why, it is the faculty which enables us to distinguish good from evil...it is the one thing that lifts man above the beasts that perish and makes him heir to immortality!'"
"It is like your paltry race -- always lying, always claiming virtues which it hasn't got, always denying them to the higher animals, which alone possess them. No brute ever does a cruel thing -- that is the monopoly of those with the Moral Sense. When a brute inflicts pain he does it innocently, it is not wrong, for him there is no such thing as wrong. And he does not inflict pain for the pleasure of inflicting it -- only man does that. Inspired by that mongrel Moral Sense of his! A sense whose function is to distinguish between right and wrong, with liberty to choose which of them he will do. Now what advantage can he get out of that? He is always choosing, and in nine cases out of ten he prefers the wrong. There shouldn't be any wrong, and without the Moral Sense there couldn't be any. And yet he is such an unreasoning creature that he is not able to perceive that the Moral Sense degrades him to the bottom layer of animated beings and is a shameful possession."

Satan's reference to the "higher animals" is an indication of how closely this portion of *The Mysterious Stranger*, probably written early in 1898, parallels ideas Twain presented in "The Lowest Animal," an essay written in 1897 but not published until 1962 in *Letters From Earth*. This essay itemizes the bases on which man can be classed as lower than the so-called lower animals. Man is the Animal that Blushes, the Cruel Animal, the Slave, the Patriot, the Religious Animal, the Reasoning Animal -- all derogatory phrases as Twain uses them. Man's lowliness stems from his moral sense -- "the quality which enables him to do wrong."

In this essay Twain draws a picture of man that plays on all his infirmities. "For style, look at the Bengal tiger -- that ideal of grace, beauty, physical perfection, majesty. And then look at Man -- that poor thing. He is the Animal of the Wig, the Trepanned Skull, the Ear Trumpet,
the Glass Eye, the Pasteboard Nose, the Porcelain Teeth, the Silver Windpipe, the Wooden Leg -- a creature that is mended and patched all over, from top to bottom. If he can't get renewals of his bric-a-brac in the next world, what will he look like?" He lists man's diseases, his uglinesses, and the many talents other animals have which man lacks. He also relates several apocryphal experiments he has performed to demonstrate man's evil. He reports an English earl's hunting expedition which left seventy buffalo carcasses to rot after killing the buffalo for pleasure and compares it with his experiment of putting seven young calves in a cage with a hungry anaconda. The anaconda ate one and left the rest unharmed. "The fact stood proven that the difference between an earl and an anaconda is that the earl is cruel and the anaconda isn't; and that the earl wantonly destroys what he has no use for, but the anaconda doesn't. This seemed to suggest that the anaconda was not descended from the earl. It also seemed to suggest that the earl was descended from the anaconda, and had lost a good deal in the transition." It is clear that Twain's primary target is not so much mankind as it is man's high opinion of himself. He was always adept at spotting hypocrisy and sham and putting them in a new light that shows them for what they are. So it is in The Mysterious Stranger, where Father Peter's view of moral sense is so widely different from Satan's.

Satan, exhibiting his amazing powers, takes Theodor on a trip through space and time to a French village in order to demonstrate the
oppression of the poor by the comfortable rich and attributes such action to the moral sense, which permits the rich to justify their acts. "Then he dropped all seriousness and just overstrained himself making fun of us and deriding our pride in our warlike deeds, our great heroes, our imperishable names, our mighty kings, our ancient aristocracies, our venerable history -- and laughed and laughed till it was enough to make a person sick to hear him." Satan laughs because he cannot take anything as insignificant as humanity seriously, and he soberes only to remind himself that there is "'a sort of pathos about it when one remembers how few are your days, how childish your pomps, and what shadows you are!'" (p. 671).

On another occasion Satan takes Theodor on a tour of China. He pauses at one point to expound another of Twain's What Is Man? ideas -- the second aspect of temperament, the notion that man's temperament determines how happy or unhappy he is regardless of the circumstances of his life.

"Every man is a suffering-machine and a happiness-machine combined. The two functions work together harmoniously, with a fine and delicate precision, on the give-and-take principle. For every happiness turned out in the one department the other stands ready to modify it with a sorrow or a pain -- maybe a dozen. In most cases the man's life is about equally divided between happiness and unhappiness. When this is not the case the unhappiness predominates -- always, never the other. Sometimes a man's make and disposition are such that his misery-machine is able to do nearly all the business." (p. 692)

Twain proceeds to develop his What Is Man? ideas rather specifically throughout Satan's talk with Theodor. He begins with an example that
follows deterministic premises more specifically than any single statement in *What Is Man?*

"Among you boys you have a game: you stand a row of bricks on end a few inches apart, you push a brick, it knocks its neighbor over, the neighbor knocks over the next brick -- and so on till all the row is prostrate. That is human life. A child's first act knocks over the initial brick and the rest will follow inexorably. If you could see into the future as I can, you would see everything that was going to happen to that creature, for nothing can change the order of its life after the first event has determined it. That is, nothing will change it, because each act unfailingly begets an act, that act begets another, and so on to the end, and the seer can look forward down the line and see just when each act is to have birth, from cradle to grave." (p. 695)

This echoes very closely the definition of determinism by Laplace previously quoted and which Twain may very well have been aware of.

Satan proceeds to illustrate what he means by telling Theodor that he is going to improve the lives of two of Theodor's friends by changing one small circumstance. He arranges that Nikolaus Baumann will awaken and close a window in the middle of the night and thus sleep two minutes later in the morning, this setting off a chain of events that will make him "some seconds too late" to save Lisa Brandt from drowning. Instead, both will drown. Theodor, who has been dreaming of a grand life for Nikolaus upon hearing that Satan will improve his lot, is appalled that Satan would consider such an early death to be an improvement, but Satan explains the pre-ordained alternative -- that Nikolaus live forty-six years, "a paralytic log, deaf, dumb, blind and praying night and day for the blessed relief of death" (p. 698). Ironically, Satan's gift of
a happier life almost always involves a shorter life. He makes Mrs. Brandt's life happier by having her burned at the stake. And he makes Father Peter's life happier by driving him mad so that he will live out his days under the delusion that he is Emperor. Satan sees life from a very different point of view, which does not begin with the premise that humanity is the highest form. In fact, to Satan, human life is invariably a hard life. When Theodor reproaches him for turning Father Peter mad, he exclaims that Theodor is still an ass. "Are you so unobservant as not to have found out that sanity and happiness are an impossible combination? No sane man can be happy, for to him life is real and he sees what a fearful thing it is. Only the mad can be happy, and not many of those. The few that imagine themselves kings or gods are happy, the rest are no happier than the sane" (p. 735).

Man is born with a temperament that limits his capacity for happiness. The circumstances of his life and environment -- his training -- heap infirmities, disease, and sorrow on him and make him the sort of being he is in spite of whatever potentialities there might be in his temperament. He has the capacity to think of, carry out, and justify cruel and immoral acts, thus, his moral sense makes him despicable.

Satan takes Theodor on a Cook's Tour of the "progress" of civilization, a sweeping panoramic parade of corruption, evil, killing. As they watch a procession of all the great wars, Satan points out that never was war started for a "clean purpose", always some selfish desire has motivated the aggressor. He then shows Theodor the wars of the future.
"You perceive," he said, "that you have made continual progress. Cain did his murder with a club; the Hebrews did their murders with javelins and swords, the Greeks and Romans added protective armor and the fine arts of military organization and generalship; the Christian has added guns and gunpowder, a few centuries from now he will have so greatly improved the deadly effectiveness of his weapons of slaughter that all men will confess that without Christian civilization war must have remained a poor and trifling thing to the end of time." (p. 719)

It is fortunate for our complacent souls that Mark Twain died before the development of the atomic bomb, for his "future" has come to be in our time, and what future he might now predict would be unbearable to think about, or possibly to endure when it comes. From Satan's point of view, the only progress man has made has been in his ability to destroy. It develops, as the panorama continues, that Twain, through Satan, is making an indictment specifically of monarchical and empirical despotism.

"For a million years the race has gone on monotonously propagating itself and monotonously reperforming this dull nonsense -- to what end? No wisdom can guess! Who gets a profit out of it? Nobody but a parcel of usurping little monarchs and nobilities who despise you; would feel defiled if you touched them, would shut the door in your face if you proposed to call, whom you slave for, fight for, die for, and are not ashamed of it but proud, whose existence is a perpetual insult to you and you are afraid to resent it, who are mendicants supported by your alms, yet assume toward you the airs of benefactor toward beggar, who address you in the language of master to slave and are answered in the language of slave to master, who are worshiped by you with your mouth, while in your heart -- if you have one -- you despise yourselves for it." (p. 720)

However, in view of his many criticisms of capitalism (especially big business) and corruption in the democratic United States, we cannot
assume that Twain was consciously-leveling his criticism at the past only. John Tuckey has pointed out allusions to contemporary events in Austria and China in which Twain was interested. And though the context of The Mysterious Stranger does not permit a discussion of democracy, the novel does mention Twain's contemporary culture in terms of religion.

"... only the Christian civilization has scored a triumph to be proud of. Two or three centuries from now it will be recognized that all the competent killers are Christians, then the pagan world will go to school to the Christian -- not to acquire his religion, but his guns!" (p. 720).

It should be pointed out that the language Satan uses comes from a Christian context which recognizes heaven and hell. Satan himself is an angel and speaks jokingly of his uncle in the tropics. Satan even tells Theodor when he changes Mrs. Brandt's life to an early death that she will go to heaven and that the informer who is responsible for her death will live a long and prosperous life but go to hell. In other words, Satan's philosophy (or theology) dwells on the pain and sorrow and insignificance of life but does so in terms of rewards and punishment in an after life. Twain never admitted the possibility of after-life except as he used it for fictional purposes. His view was perhaps more tellingly epitomized when he wrote to Mary Rogers of a charade he had planned for "life-like."

**First Division -- "Life" (human)**

An oriental well; procession of Arabic pilgrims arriving, silent, worn, weary, sad, a halt, they drink, pass on, and disappear -- a voice chanting -- (the chanter not visible) -- A moment's Halt, a momentary Taste (and the rest of
The quatrain is from the *Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam*, Number XLVIII:

"A Moment's Halt -- a momentary taste / Of Being from the Well amid the Waste / And Lo! -- the phantom Caravan has reach'd / The Nothing it set out from -- Oh, make haste!"

The quatrain combined with Twain's stage directions reminds us of the caravan in *Tom Sawyer Abroad*; in the midst of enjoying a wedding celebration it suddenly comes to nothing, buried by sand. Indeed, critics who equate Satan's view with Twain's certainly won't go so far as to say Twain espoused Satan's theology.

So far, Satan's description of humanity has been totally bad, admitting of no saving graces and describing the progress of civilization entirely as the progress of evil. However, Satan finally admits one saving quality which mankind has, in small quantities -- "a mongrel perception of humor..."

"This multitude see the comic side of a thousand low-grade and trivial things -- broad incongruities, mainly, grotesqueries, absurdities, evokers of the horse-laugh. The ten thousand high-grade comicalities which exist in the world are sealed from their dull vision. Will a day come when the race will detect the funniness of these juvenilities and laugh at them -- and by laughing at them destroy them? For your race, in its poverty, has unquestionably one really effective weapon -- laughter. Power, money, persuasion, supplication, persecution -- these can lift at a colossal humbug -- push it a little -- weaken it a little, century by century, but only laughter can blow it to rags and atoms at a blast. Against the assault of laughter nothing can stand. You are always fussing and fighting with your other weapons. Do you ever use that one? No, you leave it lying rusting. As a race, do you ever use it at all? No, you lack sense and the courage." (pp. 736-737)
Pascal Covici has made an important point in dealing with this passage. Beginning with Van Wyck Brooks' perceptive comment, "It was satire he had in mind when he wrote these lines, "Covici proceeds:

Simply, literature that explores the discrepancy between what people-in-general think themselves to be and what they really are certainly criticizes the spirit of its age. And it is precisely this discrepancy that Twain in The Mysterious Stranger articulately and consciously explores.... The laughter that will correct this part of the human condition is laughter that leads to self-awareness rather than to the debunking of something external to the self."

Implicit in Covici's statement is the recognition that Satan's statement is not to be identified precisely with Twain's, that when Satan deals with the evils of mankind and knocks the wind out of man's puffed up sense of dignity by saying that civilization has made and will make no progress except in its capacity to destroy, this does not mean that Twain has accepted such an absolutely defeatist position. If Satan's statements are taken as Twain's, then The Mysterious Stranger is a far more pessimistic book than What Is Man?, for although What Is Man? describes man in machine metaphors, denies the existence of personal merit, and says that man is no more than the sum of his temperament and training, it does allow for progress, progress brought on by outside (social) forces, certainly, but progress just the same. As a satirist, believing as he did in the ability of satire to bring about change, Twain was committed to uncover shams, hypocrisies, evil. He believed that such satire could "blow [humbug] to rags and atoms," and though he sometimes expressed disappointment at the public's misinterpretation of his own work, and though he shifted in his last phase, in
The Mysterious Stranger itself, from the form of irony he had used earlier to a form that dealt in direct statement, he still maintained a hope that mankind would come to see itself, and change.
Footnotes: Chapter VII


5. Smith, p. 177.

6. Ibid., p. 178. Cf. Leslie A. Fiedler, "As Free as any Cretur..., " *New Republic*, CXXXIII (August 15 and 22, 1955), Nos. 7-8, Issues 2125-2126. In his typically wild manner Fiedler makes some gross misstatements and lands on some important points. Establishing the irony of Tom Sawyer's statement that Jim is "free as any cretur," he finds the same theme in *Pudd'nhead Wilson*. Roxy's act dooms her son and herself to being sold down the river. Unfortunately, Fiedler, like everyone else, wants to find such meaning without giving credit for it to Twain.


8. Ibid., p. 181.


11. Note, however, there is another tendency in Twain's later work, his preoccupation with dream as reality, which embroils man in a double delusion and pictures him as unable to tell what world, if any, is real. Bernard DeVoto, in his note on "The Great Dark," lists three or possibly four different story ideas (including "The Great Dark," ) which have the dream delusion as their basis. In "The Great Dark," Twain repeats his estimate of the inadequacy of man's perception: "We are strangely made. We think we are wonderful creatures. Part of the time we think that, at any rate. And during that interval we consider with pride our mental equipment, with its penetration, its power of analysis, its ability to reason out clear
conclusions from the confused facts, and all the lordly rest of it, and then comes a rational interval and disenchants us. Disenchants us and lays us bare to ourselves, and we see that intellectually we are really no great things; that we seldom really know the thing we think we know; that our best built certainties are but sand-houses and subject to damage from any wind of doubt that blows." Letters from the Earth, ed. Bernard De Voto (New York, 1962), p. 258.


16. Smith, p. 188.


18. Letters from the Earth, pp. 228, 231.

19. Ibid., p. 224.


The recent publication of such volumes as *Letters From Earth*, *Mark Twain on the Damned Human Race*, *Life As I Find It*, and *King Leopold's Soliloquy* has made Mark Twain's social criticism generally known. Combined with *Mark Twain in Eruption*, these works have done much to dispel the image of Mark Twain as a shallow funnyman. They have also contributed to the knowledge we have of his so-called period of despair. There can be no doubt that Twain's later years were more deeply concerned with works of the "damned human race" variety than earlier years were. DeVoto's thesis that Twain's personal losses contributed to this despair strikes a note too clearly in tune with human nature to be ignored. However, these recent volumes contain works which antedate the despair period and all Twain's work shows the seeds of his philosophy.

*Life As I Find It* contains much of Twain's criticism of American treatment of the Chinese (as Twain wrote it for the *Galaxy* in 1870-1871) and of the legend of "The Noble Red Man" (also from the *Galaxy*, 1870) -- two members of the damned human race he identified very early. *Letters From Earth* contains "Letter to Earth," written in 1887 and "From an Unfinished Burlesque of Books on Etiquette," written in 1881. "Letter to Earth," with its contrast between "Public Prayers" and "Secret Supplications of the Heart," establishes the selfishness of the master passion and the hypocrisy of man as ideas Twain had already formulated by that time. *Mark Twain on the Damned Human Race* uses material from *Innocents Abroad* and articles...
written for the *Galaxy* to document Twain's view of man. In short, it is now possible to examine a wealth of writing from Twain's last phase and recognize samples of similar ideas as they appeared in earlier work.

Twain did not publish his most outspoken stories and essays during his lifetime, though he did publish "The Man That Corrupted Hadleyburg" in 1899, *What Is Man?* (privately) in 1906, and parts of the *Autobiography* in 1905 (though not the outspoken parts). Indeed, he published more social criticism in his early years, up through his *Galaxy* days, than he did from 1875-1895. There is a good chance that his wife's influence inhibited him, as Van Wyck Brooks suggested. However, it is even more important to point out that Twain was a man of his times, trying to satisfy (and make a living from) a reading public that considered W. D. Howells a realist. Critics of Twain's prudery must remember that in doing so they are criticizing an age as well as a man. "Respectable" authors, especially ones who sought to publish through the subscription book trade, were very much restricted by the lingering influence of the Genteel Tradition. After reading Zola's *La Terre*, Twain wrote a short essay pointing out that though it was a revolting book, the human material for such a work existed in any American town. He noted in passing, "If there is a single page that would bear translation into English without the use of blanks, I must have skipped it. The book calls a spade a spade, all the time, and that is death to translation, of course." Twain wrote from the conviction that there was an English literary tradition which such a book would violate, but at the same time he demonstrated a philosophical kinship to Zola -- a willingness, almost a compulsion, to examine human depravities and point out hypocrisies.
The bulk of Twain's writing published during his lifetime develops his philosophy by implication rather than by explication. As I have demonstrated, *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* and *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court* find their thematic unity in desperate naturalism. Furthermore, Twain's preoccupation with the problem of perception, taking the many forms we have seen it take, was central to the problem of his age and is directly connected with his and others' philosophy. Henry Adams, working from an analogy with physical phenomena, developed his theory of the dynamo as the symbol and spirit of his age. Edwin Arlington Robinson developed characters like Miniver Cheevey and Eben Flood, caught between an old age and a new without being fit for either. In the summer of 1887, Twain wrote a letter to William Dean Howells reporting that he had reread Carlyle's *French Revolution* and this time "I have read it differently -- being influenced and changed, little by little, by life and environment (and Taine and St. Simon)." In the course of the years he had changed from a Girondin to a Sansculotte. "Carlyle teaches no such gospel: so the change is in me -- in my vision of the evidences." In this letter Twain has epitomized his world view. First, man is shaped by his environment; second, man's "vision of the evidences" determines what he sees.

People pretend that the Bible means the same to them at 50 that it did at all former milestones in their journey. I wonder how they can lie so. It comes of practice, no doubt. They would not say that of Dickens' or Scott's books. Nothing remains the same. When a man goes back to look at the house of his childhood, it has always shrunk: there is no instance of such a house being as big as the picture in memory and imagination call for. Shrunk how? Why, to its correct dimensions:
the house hasn't altered, this is the first time it has been in focus.

Well, that's 'oss. To have house and Bible shrunk so, under the disillusioning corrected angle, is loss -- for a moment. But there are compensations. You tilt the tube skyward and bring planets and comets and corona flames a hundred and fifty thousand miles high into the field. 3

The central contrast, the central change, was between religion with its fixed world of belief and science with its ever-changing world brought into better focus by new means of perception. Twain was caught between these worlds, at times quite comfortabably caught, but caught just the same.

One man whom Herbert Schneider classifies as a Desperate Naturalist could have shown Twain the way out of his dilemma, but this man was of a later generation. George Santayana's approach of "animal faith" resolved all difficulties by applying an even more rigorous skepticism than that of Hume or Descartes and then doing an abrupt about face. "Nothing is ever present to me except some essence, so that nothing that I possess in intuition, or actually see, is ever there.... [however] If I now turn my face in the other direction and consider the prospect open to animal faith, I see that all this insecurity and inadequacy of alleged knowledge are almost irrelevant to the natural effort of the mind to describe natural things." 4 Santayana transcends despair early in his metaphysical progress. However, he does so by em­bodying naturalism. Knowledge arrived at by animal faith is based on materialism -- the aspect of his philosophy which distinguished him from his American contemporaries in philosophy. It led him in his analysis of ethics to analyze Christianity, as a system of natural (and rational) desires rather than a system of spiritual desires (which the "post-rational" approach would
have put in a proper context). "Christianity is thus a system of postponed rationalism.... Its moral principle is reason.... its motive power is the impulse and natural hope to be and to be happy.... Post rational systems accordingly mark no real advance and offer no real solution to spiritual enigmas.... Faith in the supernatural is a desperate wager made by man at the lowest ebb of his fortunes: it is as far as possible from being the source of that normal vitality which subsequently... he may recover." 5

Schneider summarizes Santayana's position by saying:

Undistracted and in solitude, he surveyed the realms of being and constructed a systematic ontology to serve as a natural home for a free spirit. He abandoned his Jamesian "common sense," his belief in the empirical mixture of "intent" and "flux," of will and stream of consciousness, and reverted to a Humean psychology. The intuition of discreet essences, he claimed, could be completely divorced from "animal faith" in objects. Nothing given need exist, for knowledge is not derived through intuition of the given, but by interaction of organisms with other material objects. The play of imagination or intuition is emancipated by the discovery that science has a pragmatic, animal foundation. 6

Santayana found himself confronted by the same conflicts that bewildered his American contemporaries but in such a way that he was also given the tools to resolve the conflicts. The despair of Sumner, Adams, Robinson, and Twain was in him intellectual rather than emotional, he managed to objectify it and give it distance. His astute philosophical analysis, supplemented by a source of income which enabled him to remove from public life -- whereas Sumner, Adams, and Twain were very much involved in the economics and politics of their country -- gave him a perspective and a tone which belied the desperation impelling his thought. Philip Blair Rice
If Santayana's detachment, after all this is said, seems notwithstanding excessive to some of his readers in a world horrified by new vistas of evil and new apocalypses of destruction, we can take this element in his philosophy as pointing us toward one possibility of life. . . . There is small danger that American philosophy as a whole. . . . will lead us into excessive detachment, the danger is rather . . . that our concern with the immediately practical will cause us to miss that tincture of speculative disinterestedness and its product, gentle irony, which can make action itself wiser and more rewarding. 7

Santayana was at once a product of the American situation and a thinker capable of removing himself from it. He epitomized the desperate naturalists and pointed out the error of their thinking. He solved dilemmas that Twain could hardly define. However, to say that he was more profound than Twain casts no disrespect on Twain, for Santayana solved problems his contemporary philosophers avoided.

We can have no doubt that had Twain been able to solve the problems as Santayana did he would no longer have been the novelist he was. If he had not been caught between the past and the present, if his work had lacked the tension created by an unsolved dilemma, his narrative would have taken less vital form. He would not have written Huckleberry Finn, placing a boy against the world, a boy who seeks answers but discovers only himself, who learns that the moral struggle is in vain, and the natural struggle is in vain, too, but inevitable.

Most of Twain's ideas can be traced as they evolve through his work, and though his letter to Howells quoted above comments on his changing beliefs and attitudes, we can see that it might be more accurate to speak
of changing tones rather than ideas.

For instance, Twain's essay on the "Death of Jean" expresses a striking nihilism, a death wish that he in part attributes to his loneliness in old age.

Would I bring her back to life if I could do it? I would not. If a word would do it, I would beg for strength to withhold the word. And I would have the strength; I am sure of it. In her loss I am almost bankrupt, and my life is a bitterness, but I am content: for she has been enriched with the most precious of all gifts -- that gift which makes all other gifts mean and poor -- death. I have never wanted any released friend of mine restored to life since I reached manhood. I felt in this way when Susy passed away; and later my wife, and later Mr. Rogers.8

This passage, written just four months before his death, has been singled out as primary evidence of Twain's despair. However, in Idea it recalls a maxim from "Pudd'nhead Wilson's Calendar": "Whoever has lived long enough to find out what life is, knows how deep a debt of gratitude we owe to Adam, the first great benefactor of our race. He brought death into the world."9 Even earlier it was used as the expression of a peasant woman in A Connecticut Yankee, who wants to hasten death of her daughter because death is release: "I snatched my liquor flask from my knapsack, but the woman forbade me, and said: 'No -- she does not suffer, it is better so. It might bring her back to life. None that be so good and kind as ye are would do her that cruel hurt. For look you -- what is left to live for?'"10

But for the seed of such an idea, we must go back even further, at least to an 1870 Galaxy article criticizing a jury for judging a man insane instead of finding him guilty of murder, Twain saying that the merciful
The idea takes different forms as it is applied to different situations and is given different literary contexts, but it is the same idea nevertheless. Twain's literary approaches varied widely, went through many phases. He wrote in the folk humor tradition, he wrote literary burlesques, he wrote hoaxes. He frequently wrote irony. Though he used the omniscient point of view on occasion in his early work, he more often adopted the first person point of view, employing a comic pose, a narrative persona, or a fictional character. He used this character's delusion to great effect, not just for humor but also to expand an idea through implication. In his later career Twain tended to give up the first person narrative for direct statement or omniscient narrative and developed a central figure for purposes of statement who was essentially omniscient (and undeluded) -- the mysterious stranger. Critics who have not taken into account the difference between Huck Finn and Satan, or Hank Morgan and Puddinhead Wilson, have found inconsistency in Twain's view. Certainly before such inconsistency can be established, more extensive treatments of Twain's use of irony and hoax to match Franklin Rogers' excellent study of his use of burlesque and Kenneth Lynn's and Pascal Covici's useful studies of his humor are necessary. In addition, the problem of perception needs extensive investigation. Until these studies are made, a full understanding of Twain's literary accomplishment is not possible.

Twain was a determinist who denied personal merit but insisted on individual responsibility. He was born in a dissolving Christian world, and
like many of his contemporaries he was too honest to deny the importance of science or the implications (as he understood them) of its method. Unlike twentieth century man, he had no guidepost to resolve his dilemma, a dilemma that the best philosophers of his day were just defining.
Footnotes: Chapter VIII

1. Cf. Chapter IV, "Solid Citizen," of Mark Twain, Social Philosopher, with Chapters I-III.


5. Ibid., p. 313.


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