

## The Migrants

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IN EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II, a form of migration was practiced which was beneficial both for the migrant workers and for the countries of origin and reception, but has remained controversial because of its contradictions and social consequences. On the other hand, this specifically European pattern of migration decisively changed not only the existing traditional ideas about immigration but, very probably, immigration itself.<sup>1</sup>

Before and during the standardization of European migration policy by the European Economic Community (EEC), all the participating countries experienced considerable demographic shifts which contributed to ethnic and racial variations in the dominant societies, and introduced the present cosmopolitan physiognomy of European society. Despite the immigration and integration of millions of refugees and expellees (e.g., the Federal Republic of Germany) or "nationals" from a colonial heritage (e.g., the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Netherlands), the stabilization of postwar societies in Europe can be attributed to the attractive opportunities for immigrants for both economic and free personal development. Europe's flourishing industries created an insatiable need for labor and attracted, and at the end actively sought, laborers from less-developed or partially developed countries.

The European countries receiving migrant workers had only recently ceased sending emigrants themselves; and had, within a few centuries (especially in the nineteenth century) helped to populate

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almost four continents. Now they suddenly became host to millions of foreign people from neighboring countries and southern European countries on the Mediterranean. They thereby found themselves in a role which neither they nor others before them had experienced.

The migration was one of the largest in history. According to official statistics of the EEC, millions of foreign workers live within its member states (see tables 1 and 2). The figures have remained roughly the same but must be increased to approximately 12-15 million if family members, as well as migrants in Switzerland and Sweden, are included. The presence of these migrants in the west and north of Europe is an enormous challenge to the traditional multinational fragmentation of the European states.

Opinions vary widely on the cause of migration and its complex motivations. It could have been a dynamic force for European cooperation and enriched both the sending and receiving countries in the area of educational and cultural cooperation, had not this specifically European form of migration been determined exclusively by economic considerations. The EEC was in its initial stage a "common market," that is, a primarily economic entity without cultural ambitions. The policy of free movement of manpower followed the then-current notions of economic development.<sup>2</sup> Because of their functional and quantitative concept of development, the theorists tended to view human labor abstractly and to consider it much as they did economic growth rates, that is, as freely disposable quantities.

Sociologically, the occupation of migrant workers in western and northern Europe is both a function of employment policy in the receiving countries and a function and expression of the modernization and development of the economic and social systems of the sending countries. This point will be considered further in discussion of the special tasks of public libraries.

This model of modernization finds its clearest expression in the so-called principle of rotation. This means that workers merely rotate between the sending and receiving countries according to a determined plan. An individual remains in the receiving country for no longer than three to five years. Viewed over the short term, this rotation is intended to export those social tensions caused in the sending countries by the inner migration of people from country to city and by lack of jobs. The migrant workers can use their savings either to support their families at home or as an investment after their return to their home country. In addition to the economic function, however, this pattern of migration also has a long-term socialization function. The migrant worker abroad

TABLE 1  
MIGRANT WORKERS IN EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION COUNTRIES, 1977

Country	Total Population	EEC Countries	Migrant Workers Nonmember States	Total
Belgium				
Absolute	9,890,000	169,500	135,500	305,000
Percentage	100	1.71	1.37	3.08
Denmark				
Absolute	5,070,000	14,001	28,866	42,867
Percentage	100	0.27	0.57	0.84
Federal Republic of Germany				
Absolute	61,480,000	407,401	1,481,184	1,888,585
Percentage	100	0.66	2.41	3.07
France				
Absolute	52,920,000	300,000	1,600,000	1,900,000
Percentage	100	0.57	3.02	3.59
Ireland				
Absolute	3,160,000	801	1,974	2,775
Percentage	100	0.02	0.06	0.08
Italy				
Absolute	56,190,000	23,915	35,123	59,038
Percentage	100	0.04	0.06	0.10
Luxembourg				
Absolute	360,000	31,500	17,600	49,100
Percentage	100	8.75	4.89	13.64
Netherlands				
Absolute	13,770,000	55,000	126,262	181,000
Percentage	100	0.40	0.91	1.31
United Kingdom				
Absolute	55,930,000	632,000	1,033,005	1,665,005
Percentage	100	1.12	1.85	2.97

Source: Commission des Communautés Européennes. "Main- d'oeuvre étrangère occupée dans les Etats membres répartie par nationalité—1977" (COM(79) 115). Brussels, March 23, 1979; and *Fischer-Welt-Almanach 1978*. Frankfurt, 1977.

TABLE 2  
MIGRANT WORKERS IN EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION COUNTRIES, BY NATIONALITY, 1977

Countries of Origin	Countries of Employment							United Kingdom	Total General EEC	
	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	Italy	Luxembourg			Netherlands
EEC Member States										
Belgium	700	176	25,000	9,192	13	771	7,500	17,368	7,500	68,500
Denmark	39,000	1,013	1,000	3,065	59	360	100	180	2,000	7,500
France	10,500	5,320	25,000	43,630	188	5,763	7,900	2,000	16,500	118,000
Germany (F.R.G.)	600	408	1,000	1,170	225	8,955	4,200	12,887	71,000	138,000
Ireland	89,200	955	230,000	281,224	217	177	10,800	12,000	452,000	456,000
Italy	2,000	5	2,000	1,228		41		60	500	6,000
Luxembourg	17,500	1,005	5,000	42,645	99	1,543	700		10,500	79,000
Netherlands	10,000	5,119	11,000	25,247		6,305	300	10,000		68,000
United Kingdom	169,500	14,001	300,000	407,401	801	23,915	31,500	55,000	632,000	1,634,000
Totals										
Nonmember States										
Algeria	3,000	191	440,000	1,400					600	445,000
Greece	9,500	404	5,000	162,495	9	963		1,949	50,000	230,000
Yugoslavia	2,800	4,459	50,000	377,206		4,354	600	8,040	4,000	451,000
Morocco	29,000	999	130,000	15,244				29,154	2,000	206,000
Portugal	5,700	169	475,000	60,160	12	1,493	12,900	5,198	10,000	570,000
Spain	29,300	698	265,000	100,311	34	2,286	2,200	17,492	37,000	454,000
Tunisia	4,200	88	70,000	10,000				1,081	3,200	85,000
Turkey	17,000	6,440	25,000	517,000	8	384		42,365	3,000	612,000
Others	35,000	15,418	140,000	236,901	1,911	25,623	1,900	20,983	926,205	1,406,000
Totals	135,500	28,866	1,600,000	1,481,184	1,974	35,123	17,600	126,262	1,033,005	4,459,000
TOTALS	305,000	42,867	1,900,000	1,888,585	2,775	59,038	49,100	181,000	1,665,005	6,093,000

Source: Commission des Communautés Européennes. "Main-d'œuvre étrangère occupée dans les Etats membres répartie par nationalité—1977" (COM(79) 115). Brussels, March 23, 1979; and Fischer-Welt-Almanach 1978. Frankfurt, 1977.

## *The Migrants*

becomes acquainted with developmental values which will eventually enable him to act as a link between his homeland and the outside world.<sup>3</sup>

This concept of modernity and development which initially found emphatic favor continues only in Switzerland. In the countries of the EEC it has been replaced by the reality of *de facto* immigration. Migrant workers no longer stay temporarily, but permanently; their ties to their homeland weaken; the seductions of a consumer society become stronger; and they are faced with a decision either to return to their homeland or to bring their families abroad. When this happens, the sending country loses a source of regular payments, and the receiving country gains an ethnic or racial minority. If the minorities cannot be assimilated, ghettos develop. In Western Europe's welfare states, the social institutions of the migrants soon demand equal social treatment and ultimately equal political rights. Pressure for cultural assimilation grows, though the sending countries continue efforts to strengthen the national and cultural ties of their citizens. Above all, the children are torn between these divergent loyalties. They are caught between cultures and become, to use a common phrase, illiterates in two languages.

This accumulation of tension between the theoretical model of modernization and the actual situation as it has developed over twenty years has led to the so-called migrants' question, that is, the challenge to a society which has always accepted the usefulness of migration and has not avoided the cost of the social consequences, but refuses to do justice to an altered social situation through a comprehensive political concept. The development of such a political concept is delayed by the fact that the receiving countries do not view themselves as countries of immigration according to the traditional pattern. They absorb migrant workers according to the needs of the labor market, but in their view, the workers have neither a natural nor an acquired right to immigrate.

The 1957 Treaties of Rome,<sup>4</sup> by which the EEC was founded, already limited the workers' freedom of movement by allowing member states to take steps based on police powers according to international law. This limitation applies all the more to workers from associated and third countries, whose work and residency permits are dealt with as domestic affairs according to the administrative judgment of the authorities. Such regulations which depart entirely from classical immigration policy were universal after World War II both within the EEC and in countries such as Switzerland and Austria. Only Sweden, not a member of the EEC, departs from this general European practice. In the mid-1960s Sweden declared itself an immigration country offering free language training, active and passive suffrage after a three-year

stay, and free choice of the degree of integration, and calls all foreign nationals "immigrants" even if the length of their stay is uncertain.<sup>5</sup>

The granting of residency permits to migrant workers in the European countries was flexibly regulated to meet the needs of a comprehensive international labor market in which the migration of workers should not be tied to continuous demographic shifts. Since, however, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, formerly the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OECD/OEEC) and the EEC labor markets developed legal regulations of freedom of movement and of social security of migrant workers, in accordance with the successive policies of the Marshall Plan, a distinction between classical immigration and temporary migration after the European pattern can no more be made than a distinction between the emigration and temporary employment abroad.<sup>6</sup> For this reason it is difficult to describe this European migration model in ordinary terms.<sup>7</sup>

To this day, within the EEC the fiction is retained—not least out of consideration for the sending countries and their development expectations—that the migrant workers are living only temporarily in the industrial states. Ray Rist, in an analysis of the paradigmatic German situation, has considered this "collective denial," this ignorance of the European countries regarding *de facto* immigration, and has questioned the political and social pluralism of modern Europe against the background of contemporary European history.<sup>8</sup> When Rist compiled his material, immigration had already peaked, that is, the process had been halted. The official policies of the EEC had until then met the economic interest of the countries involved, which had granted each other preferential status as member of the community. However, the social damage caused by immigration was becoming all the more manifest and was penetrating gradually the consciousness of broad segments of the public.

Since the EEC could no longer cover its labor needs from the reserves of workers in the member states, the common doctrine of mutual benefit soon aroused the interest of other countries which through bilateral treaties had entered the European labor market. This expansion of the EEC betrays at once the weakness of its migration policy: the labor demand can only be met by drawing on resources outside the nine member states.

The third countries today supply the largest contingent of migrant workers—73 percent. They come from Turkey, Yugoslavia, Portugal, Algeria, and Spain.<sup>9</sup> For socio-cultural reasons these migrants pose additional problems, since almost 2 million of them are Moslems: many

## *The Migrants*

migrants to France come from several North African countries; the Turkish migrants to West Germany. The employment policy of the EEC tends to impose on member states several constraints by establishing varying stages of admission to the community: full membership, applicants for membership, associated countries, and third countries. This sequence of stages toward a closer relationship to the EEC yielded a freedom of movement for additional workers in what might be termed an immigration spiral, that is, an automatic and unavoidable demographic shift in the affected countries.<sup>10</sup> But even the normal flow of migrant workers within Europe soon grew out of control, became anarchical,<sup>11</sup> irregular, and as speculative as the industrial growth rates themselves. In the second wave of immigration, after the recession of 1966-67 and until the 1973 oil crisis, this foreign population amounted to 6.6 million migrant workers within the community.<sup>12</sup> In order to consolidate and stabilize the immigration and to hold off the masses of new migrants at the borders, migration policies had to be bilaterally revised and comprehensive employment policies for foreign workers had to be developed in the receiving countries.<sup>13</sup>

The governments of the sending countries learned that their development problems could not be mitigated by the doctrine of mutual benefits of labor migration. The structural problems of these countries could not be resolved over the short term. These countries faced the problem of nonreturning nationals in widely varying ways. At the time, only the declining numbers of Greek and Spanish migrants reflected development trends in their home countries. The only advantage remaining to the sending countries—namely, a temporary and partial improvement of the balance of payments caused by massive transfers of workers' earnings for future investment in the home country—diminished drastically during the recession years from 1974 to 1977, when Turkish migrant workers lost their jobs en masse. Transfer funds dropped by over 60 percent, and in 1978 by an additional 23 percent. The sudden absence of these funds in Turkey contributed to an unprecedented financial and economic crisis and a political standoff, which taken together heightened Turkey's dependence on international credit conditions.<sup>14</sup>

The first wave of emigration in the 1960s consisted in part of trained but unemployed skilled workers. Uprooted country people accounted for subsequent mass emigration, which caused the desolation of many rural regions of such countries as Turkey and Portugal. Castles and Kosack began their classic work on immigrant workers in Europe in 1973 with the hypothesis that "labor migration is a form of development

aid given by poor countries to rich countries," and they succeeded in demonstrating the truth of their contention.<sup>15</sup> In a retrospective report, the OECD later argued:

In the post-war climate of European reconstruction, there was a certain measure of agreement between the ethical and legal principles and the practical interests of the international community, that manpower shortages which were holding up the repairs to the productive apparatus should be alleviated by improving the use of human resources and transferring these from "surplus" countries to "deficit" countries.<sup>16</sup>

But, since about 1975, there has been a growing body of opinion which no longer regards the emigration of manpower from underdeveloped countries to the industrial hot-spots of Europe as a "necessary evil"; it might instead turn out to be a "trap set by history."<sup>17</sup>

The migration of workers has by now become a principal characteristic of the world economic system. Some 20 million people now hold jobs as migrant workers in countries throughout the world. The problem of growing dependence proves to be even greater in terms of the "North-South discrepancy" and the Third World. The Worldwatch Institute estimates that the growing number of those who will flee misery at home and seek work in foreign countries will increase to hundreds of millions by the end of this century.<sup>18</sup>

This trend will change much of what has been associated with immigration and emigration. If classical immigration and the specifically European migration described above are contrasted, the following distinctions appear. Immigration countries have traditionally possessed medium- or long-term immigration policies, and have thus been prepared for new influxes of population in both their social policy and their infrastructure; immigrants know before they arrive what awaits them and what problems they will face. They possess the right of permanent residence from the moment they immigrate, and no one can dispute this right under normal circumstances. Except for the most fundamental adaptation to the society they are entering, they are given a free hand in planning their personal affairs. Since they are accepted from the start as members of a dynamically developing society, they are granted every possibility for social and political involvement.

The migrant workers in Europe are representatives of a modernization process and a socialization initiative in their countries of origin, which develops further outside their home societies. Usually, they are from rural regions and thus manifest all the characteristics of an urbanization process in its early stages.

## *The Migrants*

Since this process confronts those people with new stages of development, the urbanization process is accelerated in their new homes and they experience cultural shock. They still possess close ties to the extended family, the roles of the sexes are fixed in their minds, and hierarchical structures remain unbroken and dependent on religious traditions. The receiving countries are capable of channeling only a part of this modernization process by means of legal and social regulations, when they admit the migrant workers to the labor market. Such regulations, however, fail to take into consideration the human and family side of the migrant's existence and the roles these play in the new society.<sup>19</sup> For modernization means not only industrialization, but also processes of vertical and horizontal mobility, historical change, secularization, rationalization, bureaucratization and many other things.<sup>20</sup> As in every migration, security in material things or a general improvement of the quality of life are the decisive motivations. The personal biographies of migrants usually begin with migration into the urban centers of the home country. The migrant worker of this sort has therefore already been uprooted in his homeland. This rudimentary stage of modernization becomes in the receiving country a lasting though "temporary" condition.

The discrepancy between the typical forward orientation of the migrants and its possibilities for realization becomes manifest in the light of the fact that the industrial nations of Europe developed no immigration policies, but rather clung to traditional forms of policy regarding aliens. The legal regulations concerning foreigners must be seen as decisive indicators of the migrants' opportunities for cultural assimilation and integration. The essential object of these laws is the regulation of residency in connection with the work permit, settling-in and language training. The various alien acts and foreigner policies in Europe naturally include the option of acquiring citizenship in the receiving country. Such transition from foreign to native status characterizes the typical process of an immigration country, but must be viewed theoretically as definitive, in order to include or conclude cultural conversion. It is remarkable that this option has until now been exploited very hesitantly by the migrant workers; the rate of naturalization, even among those who have been abroad for over ten years, is far below 10 percent.<sup>21</sup>

It was initially considered a moral advantage for the foreign workers to be viewed as "guests" to whom no right of residence was granted. However the status as a guest declines with the length of his stay. The host country must decide where and how he will be lodged.

The European industrial nations avoided the difficulty of having to make such choices by rejecting the political decision of selection according to certain racial, national and qualifying quotas, and by accepting "guests" only according to the priorities of the labor market. This "temporary residency" of the migrants is the problem. It has been extended beyond all expectations and has become a permanent form of life that both appeals to the will of both sides to allow integration, and takes into consideration the peculiar right of the migrants to an identity, especially in terms of their desire to return to the country of origin. The receiving countries are therefore caught in a considerable dilemma, and their policy toward foreigners determines the extent to which they can abide by the duties they have assumed toward the sending countries. France, for example, in principle shows hospitality to all foreigners,<sup>23</sup> while West Germany has opted for "temporary integration" with a present tendency toward immigration.<sup>24</sup> Despite the regulations of international organizations, policies regarding foreigners of all countries have been provisional in character, since they were always outlined *post factum*. The policies of the receiving countries had to be implemented at a time when the initial motivations of the migrants to stabilize their existence in the receiving country had already begun to diminish as a result of negative experiences. Thus, the new tendencies in policy are an adaptation to changed conditions.

Following the oil crisis of 1973 and the immigration halt, a restrictive treatment of residency was introduced in all countries by altering bureaucratic conditions or by appropriate direct measures, e.g., in France.<sup>25</sup> Obviously, the resulting permanent insecurity regarding residency not only objectively diminishes acculturation and integration, but also reduces the subjective willingness of the migrant to remain mobile, to participate and to adjust. The consequences of this "permanent provisionality"<sup>26</sup> have only recently been recognized. They have become particularly obvious in the second generation of migrant workers. The result is that in the efforts of all states to neutralize this damage by further development and adaptation of their policies regarding foreigners, school problems, problems of vocational training and job preparation, and also of housing and political participation, form the focal point of migrants' efforts and demands. All socially relevant forces in these countries share in this process of adaptation. This process is aided by the fact that economic developments in almost all western countries are exhausted, slowed or in a state of reorganization, since the excessively simplistic concepts of the early postwar years have increasingly lost their *raison d'être*.<sup>27</sup>

## *The Migrants*

The process of liberalization in the developed countries has today turned inward and has made participation, equality of opportunity and pluralistic equality central values. The inclusion of the migrant workers and their families in this process is still too new and unproven for results to be discerned. Nonetheless, certain points of agreement among the EEC member states, and certain trends in priorities with which the states have approached questions of cooperation in the cultural sector, can be recognized.<sup>28</sup> Since the EEC has had until now little or no competency in cultural affairs, such a trend within the framework of Europe's present multicultural orientation is particularly remarkable. The carefully agreed upon treatment of the migrant question in Europe in connection with the establishment of parliamentary responsibilities in the Council of Europe would entitle that body to draw additional authority from these problems.

The total integration of the migrant workers in the labor market, described above, leads to the question of whether the European countries in the future will wish to establish a separate, possibly segregationist, social system out of this integrated labor market. A considerable number of citizens already participate with the migrants in economic life, but not in cultural, social and political life. Thus, the migrants from countries in Europe's periphery remain, even in the central states of Europe, on the outskirts of society with the single exception of the way in which they offer their labor.<sup>29</sup> Sociologically, the migrants form a new stratum<sup>30</sup> which allows the host country to facilitate vertical mobility for its own workers, while the ethnically distinct group remains below existing social structures and possesses neither the right nor the opportunity to participate in the development of the society with an identifiable image and voice. In this way the social gaps within the society increase, while the society finds itself confronted with problems characteristic of a stage of development through which the society has already passed.

Earlier research assumed that foreign nationality and varying customs and mores were the causes of such deformations.<sup>31</sup> Today it is doubtful that the cultural values of the migrants and their host societies are the reason for their acceptance or lack of it.<sup>32</sup> Rather, the reason is seen as the result of heightened expectations regarding vertical mobility in a milieu of limited opportunities.<sup>33</sup> The acceptance of migrant workers, who are recognized as uprooted, by a host society is less a problem of the migrants than of that society. Using the example of Switzerland, Hoffmann-Nowotny theorized that the exclusion or hindrance of vertical mobility is a result of the status lines and the prevalent

neofeudalism of the developed industrial states.<sup>34</sup> Social positions are ascribed according to "foreign" nationality and as a result of a lack of social prestige, and are not acquired competitively. Recent empirical studies within a federal project clearly describe the substitution function, or the complementary function, of the employment of foreign workers, but do not even mention a competitive function.<sup>35</sup> Only when they have acquired language ability do they have the opportunity, even in immigration countries, to compete with the domestic population for certain status positions. According to this view, it is not essential for processes of assimilation and integration that the host society accept cultural differences, but rather that it must open central status lines for the immigrants, offer them access to material (income) and immaterial (education) goods, and assure them participation in the offerings of the entire infrastructure.<sup>36</sup> It must therefore remain questionable whether the treatment of the immigration problem can concentrate on the cultural aspect and thereby overlook the connection between cultural and social problems.

In examining the complex conditions, as they relate to the library, of migrant or guest workers in postwar Europe and their orientation in the societies of their host countries, historical, legal and sociological interdependencies and aspects must be included in order to gain an accurate concept. By what peculiarities of this innovative and dynamic concept of migration have challenges to the systems of public libraries become manifest? These challenges demand orientation of all involved toward the major tendencies in the various foreigner policies in Western Europe. This "politics of migration policies,"<sup>37</sup> as a continuing process of adaptation to bilateral and national interests and as a recognizable trend toward sociocultural change of the societies involved must be of particular interest to libraries as the most appropriate agents of innovation and socialization.

Due to the dominant impression or temporality associated for years with the migrant question, the recognition of library use by foreign workers and their families, as well as by the domestic population, dawned only with some delay. After many years of half-reflected and provisional service, libraries have begun to formulate initial policies or to apply pilot projects for the use of migrant workers, which are intended also to explore the receptivity of the minorities and their peculiar needs and desires. Published policy statements betray characteristic differences. It is assumed here that the policy statement of the British Library Association and the results of their inquiry are known.<sup>38</sup> In France the tasks which devolve upon libraries within the framework

## *The Migrants*

of the "*nouvelle politique d'immigration*"<sup>39</sup> can be viewed as part of a pluralistic though initially experimental policy. Foreign-language libraries are to be established in which "*animateurs*," that is, lay personnel familiar both with the library holdings and with the specific needs of the users, explain the library and its possibilities to patrons. The German library policy statements<sup>40</sup> were vehicles of social-liberal reform which sought out in particular underprivileged classes, among them the migrant workers, in order to introduce them as "special groups" to library service. This program has not yet led to a recognizable multicultural library policy, since, in the view of the German Library Institute, such a decision would presuppose that Germany is a country of immigration.

Today libraries throughout the countries of the EEC are developing successful library services for foreigners. These separate efforts are, however, excessively time-consuming and ineffective for all. For this reason, the Council of Europe voted in favor of the Council for Cultural Cooperation's project on the education and cultural development of migrants to eliminate this lack of information.<sup>41</sup> The European trend is toward bilateral and multilateral cooperation in a system of community work which is intended to further the socialization function of the family and the preservation of cultural independence. In England the community approach is customary, while on the Continent this approach will have to be developed because of the varying legal structures of the countries. This approach seems to be the best adapted to include pragmatic library work concretely in its social points of reference.

Although libraries do not have to share the political-legal fiction described earlier regarding de facto immigration and its social implications, they are nonetheless dependent on this "permanent temporariness." This situation affects primarily the budgets; library budget planners have only hesitatingly taken into consideration the demands of foreigners. That does not mean, however, that librarians have neglected their tasks. Services for foreigners have depended on the personal involvement of some librarians, on many unorthodox directors and on creative social workers, who for years have taken extraordinary labors to meet the obvious needs of these visitors. It seems that this will remain so for some time to come, for that which hinders integration also hinders the work of libraries, publishers and booksellers, namely, the provisorium.

Since recognition is not a question of integrating population groups, or immigrants, into the society, the demand which has arisen

will not be met in two respects. In the libraries, problems of rationalization and budget cuts now demand primary attention following the boom years, but these do not involve structural or conceptual changes. In addition, there are problems with employers and labor unions in setting new wage scales for activities for which there was previously no course of preparation. Domestic booksellers have not yet discovered this market, but rather have left it to the foreigners. The temporary character makes all calculations uncertain. On the other hand, the booksellers who operate in the receiving countries, either directly or from abroad, are either unfamiliar with the conditions of the libraries, or understand nothing about their customers' needs regarding library use. Publishers of foreign-language literature are even more reluctant to enter this uncertain market. (There are, nonetheless, hesitant attempts at production, and the results are offered at all conferences to experts on the migrant question and may be found in numerous libraries.)

Foreign users, as the other side of this connection, are gradually discovering libraries. In fact, the library itself has even gone to them.<sup>42</sup> Today it is above all the children of migrants who are the bookworms. This process took years. It demanded the gathering of information about these citizens and their desires, and led to broadened library horizons by means of what was admittedly a difficult learning process. Like the social services, libraries are now suddenly confronted on the social level with facts with which they did not deal previously because these facts were not familiar to the rest of society, either.

The role of the public libraries, as they traditionally view themselves and their personnel, is certainly not directly confronted by these problems. Libraries cannot create just societies, nor a logical and uncontradictory foreigner policy. But they can exercise influence, because their social role in the future will be that of accompanying informational and educational processes of domestic and transnational or transcultural socialization. Proven means to this end exist, and are considered in other articles in this issue.

In practice, this role implies a redirecting of the library system away from its middle-class orientation to a comprehensive approach to the social aspects of immigration as represented in a wide range of groups and cultures. Since national societies are constantly changing demographically, structurally and socially, libraries must offer the relevant informative and educational material to counter misunderstanding, prejudices, ignorance, and fear, which are the enemies of integration of minorities. Malfunctions arise particularly where there are no concrete experiences through contact with immigrants. For this reason, librar-

## *The Migrants*

ians are not only confronted with the problem when dealing with minorities, but also in principle. One service to the majority of the population consists of making them sensitive and responsive to continuing social change.<sup>43</sup> This would, to be sure, presuppose national policies which establish such tasks.

If the endless procession of migrant workers to Europe led in fact to "a trap set by history," as M. Messmer feared, into which all society has fallen with the fiction of a common interest, then society must attempt everything together in order to free itself.

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## JOHANNES FEST

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