THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SATIRE:
EPICUREAN ETHICS IN HORACE’S SERMONES

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the role of Greek philosophy, specifically the ethical doctrines of the Epicurean sect, in Horace’s satiric poetry. It endeavors to highlight the important influence of one of Horace’s contemporaries and neighbor in Italy, the Epicurean philosopher and poet Philodemus of Gadara. This is done through considerations of Horace’s self-portrayal as a qualified moralist who meets Epicurean standards and employs their tools of investigation and correction. A large portion of the study is dedicated to the manner in which he incorporates Epicurean economic and social teachings as communicated and preserved by Philodemus, and to explaining the significance of this for his literary persona in the Sermones.
For Angela, sine qua non
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INTRODUCTION

Horace, in describing the unreservedness of his predecessor Lucilius, notes that he “entrusted his secrets to his books as if they were faithful companions” (2.1.30-1: *ille velut fidis arcana sodalibus olim | credebat libris*), with the result that “the old poet’s whole life is open to view, as if painted on a votive tablet” (ibid. 32-3: *quo fit, ut omnis | votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella vita senis*). The self-revelatory expression of one’s inner thoughts and convictions, which is at the heart of Roman satire, continues in Horace’s *Sermones* but with one important shift regarding intention: whereas the revelation of Lucilius’ character and disposition is a byproduct (32: *quo fit, ut . . .*) of his frank criticism of contemporary society, Horatian satire is consciously introspective and, as such, revolves almost entirely around the poet’s reflections—whether explicit or made through implied contrast—concerning the development and presentation of his own persona. This persona, which is informed by and responds to various literary traditions, is anything but simple, and it would be nearly impossible (if not rather misguided) to attempt to confine Horace to any one of these influences. At the same time, however, it is possible to identify certain themes that, as will be shown in the following chapters, nearly pervade the

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1All passages of Horace are from the 1970 edition of Friedrich Klingner, and all translations are taken from H. R. Fairclough’s 1991 revised Loeb text with minor alterations. Citations of the *Sermones* will henceforth be given by book, poem and line number(s), e.g., 1.2.1-3.

2Philippson (1911) 77 points to this very parallel between Horace and Lucilius at the outset of his study. Cf. Lejay (1915) xxxiii: “Le fond des Satires et des Épitres est identique. Horace en est le principal sujet.” Both scholars, however, tend to interpret Horace’s self-portrayal as genuine autobiography, whereas I view it as the expression of an artistic and literary persona.

3The best examination of the confluence of various literary, stylistic and philosophical aspects of the *Sermones* is still that of Freudenburg (1993).
Sermones and therefore provide overall unity, such as the poet’s moral purity, his relationship with Maecenas, his attitude regarding wealth, his place in society and the correct approach to applying criticism. One will immediately recognize that all of these easily fall within the realm of ethics, which is not surprising given that Horace is often distinguished from other satirists by his significant concern with moral correction.\(^4\) Insofar as the Sermones are largely introspective and deal with ethical issues, therefore, one may be justified in speaking of the “psychology of satire” with respect to Horace’s critical examinations, which are about his own mental health (\(\psi\upsilon\chi\upsilon\gamma\); cf. 1.4.128-29: teneros animos . . . ego sanus) as considered through prolonged and repeated conversations (\(\lambda\omicron\omicron\sigma\omicron\iota\); cf. 1.4.48: sermo merus). Although his informal, and, especially in Book 2, dialectical style has been linked to that of Plato,\(^5\) most commentators recognize the predominant role of Hellenistic ethics in Horatian satire.\(^6\) By highlighting the role of Epicurean ethics in the Sermones, this study aims to show how Horace shows consistency in developing a persona that is not only concerned with “saving face,” as Ellen Oliensis argues (1998), but with positively justifying his moral purity and defending his place in society, and that he accomplishes this largely within the framework of Philodemus of Gadara’s economic and social teachings, which would have been familiar to his closed-circuit audience of intimate friends and acquaintances.\(^7\)

\(^4\)Philippson (1911) 77 makes a vivid observation regarding Horace’s portrayal of himself (emphasis mine): “Und die Lebensanschauung, die er zur Darstellung bringt, ist getränkt mit Gedanken, die er der griechischen Philosophie, vor allem der epikureischen entnommen hat.”


\(^7\)Although I recognize that my views regarding the poet’s moral concerns likely reflect something about the historical Horace, I intend to apply them exclusively to one aspect of his
One finds a complex blend of ethical doctrines in the *Sermones*, although, in addition to expressing more general views such as Aristotle’s extremely influential concept of the virtuous mean (cf. 1.1.106: *est modus in rebus*), Horace also engages with the more specific teachings of other philosophical schools. These include various ethical paradoxes of the Stoics attributed to Chrysippus (expressed in 1.3, 2.3 and 2.7), the importance of decorum and consistency as emphasized by Panaetius (1.3.9: *nil aequale*; cf. 2.3.307-13 and 2.7.22-42), and, perhaps most prominent of all, Epicurus’ insistence on the withdrawal from public affairs (1.6.18: *a volgo longe longeque remotos*), the importance of meager fare (2.2.1: *vivere parvo*) and his doctrine concerning the pleasure calculus (1.2.77-9). As mentioned above, it is the purpose of the following investigation to enhance this appreciation of Horace’s engagement with Hellenistic philosophy by considering the influence of Philodemus’ ethical views, specifically as they pertain to the administration of wealth, the problem of flattery and the therapeutic application of frank criticism. There are various reasons for investigating such a connection, which, aside from a recent article dealing very briefly with Philodemus’ observations concerning flattery in the *Sermones*, has been completely overlooked in modern scholarship. One of the justifying literary persona, namely, that of self-revealing and self-justifying moralist. In this sense, I agree with Freudenburg (2010) 271, who, as part of a tradition beginning with Alvin Kernan (1959), regards any autobiographical details “not as documentary evidence for who [Horace] was, but as the first moves of a back-and-forth game played between reader and writer.” On the other hand, while I think persona theory has undoubtedly contributed to a more sophisticated (or at least less naïve) understanding of the *Sermones*, I maintain that, in addition to playing various roles and wearing different masks, Horace presents his audience with a persona that is consistently engaged with Epicurean ethics throughout the entire collection. This consistency may communicate something about the poet’s own convictions or idealisms, and I would align my reading of Horace with that of Suzanne Sharland (2009b), who posits the predominant role of a “second self,” which is the “overriding persona who is there in a sense throughout the *Satires*” (63).

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8Mayer (2005a) 141-44.
reasons for this study is purely historical: not only was Philodemus a contemporary of Horace as well as his Italian neighbor to the south of Rome, but he was also familiar and even on demonstrably friendly terms with the poet’s intimate friends Plotius, Varius and Vergil (cf. 1.10.81: *Plotius et Varius . . . Vergiliusque*). It is highly likely, therefore, especially given Horace’s playful fondness for Epicureanism (cf. *Ep. 1.4.15-16: me . . . Epicuri de grege porcum*), that, in addition to being familiar with Philodemus’ poetry (cf. 1.2.121: *Philodemus ait*), he would likewise have been familiar with, and, as I will argue, rather partial to his philosophical insights. Closely related to this reason is another, perhaps more compelling one involving Horace’s uniquely Philodemean engagement with certain ethical issues: his expression of the mean regarding wealth is, of course, inevitably linked to Aristotle’s *Ethica Nicomachea*, but Philodemus preserves the substance of Epicurean economic theory, which, in addition to promoting a similar doctrine of the “measure of wealth” (πλούτου μέτρον), also includes

9 Kemp (2010b) 65-76. There is also this scholar’s 2006 unpublished dissertation on the “philosophical background” of Horace, which deals with Epicureanism in the *Sermones*.

10 Körte (1890) 172-77, in a well-known and frequently cited article, presents the fragmentary evidence from two of Philodemus’ treatises dealing with flattery (PHerc. 1082) and avarice (PHerc. 253), in which the names of Varius and Quintilian are legible (I quote here Körte’s reconstruction of the second fragment): Ὁράτιε καὶ Ὀυάρι[ε] καὶ Ὀυεργι[λε] καὶ Κοϊντι[λε]. Parts of two other names also appear, one of which is likely that of Vergil (as suggested by the visible Ο in PHerc. 1082 col. 11.3). Regarding the ending –τιε in PHerc. 253, Körte’s restoration connects it to the name of Horace, although, as Della Corte (1969) 85-8 has argued, it probably refers to that of Plotius Tucca, who co-edited the *Aeneid* along with Varius after Vergil’s death. In addition to the passage from 1.10 quoted above, the same list of friends appears in *Sermones* 1.5.40 (*Plotius et Varius . . . Vergiliusque*), which closely resembles the dedications of Philodemus and has led Gigante (1998) to conclude that the philosopher, “che non cita mai espressamente Orazio, fu lettore delle sue satire” (48).

11 Despite the playful tone of this and other passages, a formal connection between Horace and Epicureanism was made even by the ancients, as Porphyrio reveals in his commentary on *Carm. 1.34 (ad 1): hac ode significat, se paenitentiam agere, quod Epicuream sectam secutus* (“In this ode he indicates his remorse for having been a follower of the Epicurean sect”). Cf. also pseudo-Acro (*in Serm. 1.5.101*), in which Horace’s “theology” is compared to that of Vergil, whom the commentator explicitly identifies as an Epicurean.
specific advice about patronage and poverty that plays an important role in the *Sermones*; Horace’s concern with disassociating himself from flatterers and emphasis on his persona’s trustworthiness is directly linked to his relationship with Maecenas, which also reflects the concern of Epicurean clients such as Philodemus, who, much like the poet, met accusations of flattery by attempting to distinguish the sage’s disposition from that of the self-serving adulator; finally, Horace’s approach to frankness, which he frequently differentiates from the harsher invective of the Stoics and Cynics, features many of the elements discussed by Philodemus in his methodological treatment of therapeutic criticism. The nature of these treatments and the specific contributions of Philodemus will be discussed below, but it may be helpful first to acknowledge his presence in Italy, give an overview of the broader scope of his works and consider their significance within the context of the present state of Horatian scholarship.

Little is known about Philodemus’ philosophical training and subsequent presence in Italy, most of which is gleaned from references in his own treatises or the works of contemporary Romans such as Cicero. Born in Syria around the beginning of the first-century BC, and, if not himself of Greek origin, then heavily influenced by Hellenic literature and culture, Philodemus studied in Athens under the Epicurean scholarch and his fellow easterner Zeno of Sidon.

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12 For sources detailing the life and works of Philodemus, see first and foremost the important *RE* study of Philippson (1938) 2444-447. This may be supplemented by Tait (1941) 1-23, who includes a useful overview that links Philodemus to the Augustan poets, and Gigante (1990), who examines his presence in Italy and, more specifically, his work at the library in Herculaneum. In addition to this, most modern editions of his treatises contain updated biographical information: see, e.g., De Lacy and De Lacy (1978) 145-55, Sider (1997) 3-24, Konstan *et al.* (1998) 1-3 and Tsouna (2013) xi. There is also the *ANRW* article of Asmis (1990) 2369-406, which also contains a summary of his life and works.

13 Cicero, who had heard Zeno’s lectures in 79/80 BC, describes him as “extremely sharp” even for an “old man” (*Tusc.* 3.38: *acutissimus senex*). His research interests appear to have ranged from physics and geometry to ethics, and he was involved in logical disputes with the
Sometime after his formal training in philosophy, Philodemus came to the Italian peninsula, although the date of his arrival has been the subject of some scholarly controversy.14 In any event, he settled in southern Italy and established an Epicurean community in the vicinity of Naples along with his fellow Epicurean Siro, whom Vergil fondly remembers for his “learned sayings” (Cat. 5.9: magni . . . docta dicta Sironis) and modest living conditions.15 While living in Italy, Philodemus appears to have formed a relationship with the aristocrat and politician Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (cos. 58 BC), whom Cicero, in a speech denigrating the latter’s character and drawing from comic stereotypes in order to do so, portrays as the patron of flattering Greeks and the recipient of lascivious poetry (Pis. 70-1), the latter of which is a playful reference to the Epicurean philosopher’s collection of thirty epigrams.16 Despite this rather negative portrayal of the subservient graeculus (which is nothing more than a means of discrediting his political opponent), Cicero, in his much more serious work De finibus bonorum et malorum (composed in 45 BC), is not shy about praising both Philodemus and Siro by name (2.119): Sironem dicis et Philodemum, cum optimos viros, tum homines doctissimos (“You mean Stoics. Aside from what Philodemus reveals in his treatises and recorded lectures, the extant fragments of Zeno are preserved in the collection of Angeli and Colaizzo (1979) 47-133.

14Relying on a reference in Cicero to Philodemus’ possible patron L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus as an adulescens when he met the Greek immigrant (Pis. 68), Philippson placed this event in the 70s. Conrad Chicorius (1922) 296, however, had proposed a later date that was based on another reference in Cicero to Piso as imperator in Macedonia (Pis. 70), which would have occurred in the 50s.

15Cf. Cat. 8.1-2: Villula, quae Sironis eras, et pauper agelle, | verum illi domino tu quoque divitiae (“O small villa and poor field, you who belonged to Siro, although to your master even you were rich indeed”).

16See Sider (1997) for an edition, translation and commentary of these poems. Piso, based on the evidence of Cicero and a certain reference in epigram 27, is often identified as Philodemus’ patron, although this connection has been challenged by Allen and De Lacy (1939) 59-65. For Cicero’s portrayal of Philodemus in the speech against Piso, see Gigante (1969) 35-53.
Siro and Philodemus, the best of men and most leaned human beings"). This laudatory
description, which for centuries had lacked any real justification, was eventually confirmed in
the eighteenth century BC by the discovery of and subsequent archaeological excavations in a
dilapidated villa which unearthed the remains of Philodemus’ works. The villa, which is
located in Herculaneum and probably belonged to the Pisones, houses a philosophical library,
the contents of which were immediately carbonized and thus preserved by the eruption of Mt.
Vesuvius in AD 79. Since its discovery, the development of new technology such as
multispectral imaging (MSI) has made it possible for scholars to read Philodemus’ treatises, and,
as a result, new interpretations of Horace—indeed, of Augustan poetry in general—have become
possible.

Philodemus’ literary output encompasses works on various topics including intellectual
history, rhetoric, literary theory, music, logic, theology and, of course, ethics. Major studies on
his treatises are ongoing and include efforts to detail their content, as far as this is possible, as
well as categorize them according to subject matter. Since their discovery, much progress has
been made in terms of systematically cataloguing the surviving rolls and fragments, which, in
accordance with an organizational method, are designated by the abbreviation PHerc. (papyrus
hercolanensis) and followed by a number. Most of the ethical treatises from which will be

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17Sedley (1998) has a useful discussion of Philodemus in Italy (65-8) and the discovery of
the Herculaneum papyri, with particular emphasis on fragments of Epicurus’ De natura (94-8).

18As Mommsen (1880) 32-6 has indicated in his study of the epigrammatic remains at
Herculaneum, there is no evidence linking Piso to the villa. See also Allen and De Lacy (1939)
63.

19Gigante (1990) 1-60 has copious references to works dealing both with the architectural
characteristics of the villa as well as the contents of its library.
drawn evidence linking Philodemus’ thought to the content of Horace’s *Sermones* come from two collections, one of which deals with manners and is entitled *Sermonum de vita et moribus compendiaria ratione excerptorum e Zenonis libris* (ἐπιτομὴ περὶ ἡθῶν καὶ βίων ἐκ τῶν τοῦ Ζήνωνος σχολῶν), the other of which bears the title *De vitii atque oppositis virtutibus eorumque subiectis et obiectis* (περὶ κακιῶν καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀρετῶν καὶ τῶν ἐν οἷς εἰσὶ καὶ περὶ ἄ). From the first collection are the following: PHerc. 1471, entitled *De libertate dicendi*, which was originally edited by Olivieri (1914) but has recently been republished by Konstan *et al.* (1998), whose translations I have borrowed throughout; PHerc. 182, entitled *De ira*, which was edited by Wilke (1914) but has been superceded by the edition, translation and commentary of Indelli (1988); PHerc. 1414, entitled *De gratitudine*, which is edited by Tepedino Guerra (1977); PHerc. 873, entitled *De conversatione*, which has an edition, translation and commentary by Amoroso (1975). From the second collection are the following: PHerc. 1424, entitled *De oeconomia*, of which the best critical edition continues to be that of Jensen (1907), although there is also the recent commentary and translation of Tsouna (2012); PHerc. 163, entitled *De divitiis*, which is edited with a translation and commentary by Tepedino Guerra (1978) and has been expanded recently by the publication of a substantial number of new fragments in Armstrong and Ponczoch (2011); the treatise *De adulatione* is dispersed among

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20 The catalogue, referred to as *CatPerc*, is in Gigante (1979) 65-400, to which must be added the supplements of Capasso (1989) 193-264 and Del Mastro (2000) 57-241 with expanded bibliography. This monumental work gives detailed profiles of the scrolls which have been unrolled and examined, including inventory numbers, dates of unrolling, states of preservation, references to editions etc.

21 The problems regarding the organization and layout of this text are discussed by Michael White (2004) 103-30, and Konstan is currently preparing a revised edition of the treatise.

22 A new edition of this treatise by David Armstrong is forthcoming.
various fragments, including PHerc. 222 (Gargiulo [1981]), PHerc. 223 (Gigante and Indelli [1978]), PHerc. 1082 (Caini [1939]), PHerc. 1089 (Acosta Méndez [1983]), PHerc. 1457 (originally edited by Bassi [1914] but later revised by Kondo [1974]) and, finally, PHerc. 1675 (De Falco [1926]). In addition to the fragments dealing with ethical topics, among which must be included PHerc. 1251 (named the “Comparetti Ethics” after the original editor but recently superceded by the edition, translation and commentary of Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan [1995]), the following study will also draw from Philodemus’ methodological treatise PHerc. 1965, entitled De signis and edited by De Lacy and De Lacy (1978). It will also take into consideration certain aspects of his literary theory as expounded in PHerc. 1425 and 1538, the fifth book of a treatise entitled De poematis and edited by Christian Jensen (1923), as well as his historical indices PHerc. 1418 and 310, entitled De Epicuro and edited by Militello (1997), PHerc. 1021 and 164, entitled Academicorum Historia and edited by Dorandi (1991) and PHerc. 1018, entitled Stoicorum Historia, also edited by Dorandi (1994).

The degree to which scholars have investigated the presence of Philodemus in Horace’s works has fluctuated over the decades, although it was particularly high soon after the Herculaneum papyri began to be published. As mentioned already, it was Alfred Körte who first considered the fragmentary evidence connecting Philodemus to Augustan authors, which inspired Philipsson, himself a scholar of and expert on Philodemus, to examine in more detail

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23There is also the newer edition of Mangoni (1993), which does not necessarily supercede that of Jensen but does include a helpful introduction, translation and commentary.

24A few references will also be made to PHerc. 1507, entitled De bono rege secundum Homerum and edited by Dorandi (1982). There is a newer edition forthcoming by Jeffrey Fish.

25Armstrong (2004) 5-9 includes a similar review of literature but dealing more broadly with the Augustan poets in general.
Horace’s relationship to Epicureanism.26 Such a connection had already been intimated by Richard Heinze in his revision of Kiessling’s commentary,27 and Giorgio Pasquali went further by connecting fragments of Philodemus to Horace’s views on sexual vice in *Sermones* 1.2.28 As Teubner editions of Philodemus continued to be published and made his philosophical and poetic works readily available, they inspired articles dealing specifically with the role of his poetry in Horace. One of the earliest of these articles is that of Hendrickson, which, drawing from Kaibel’s 1885 edition of Philodemus’ epigrams, investigates their possible connection to *Sermones* 1.2.29 Although determining that the original epigram of Philodemus to which Horace refers is no longer extant, he expresses restrained yet enthusiastic support of Körte’s identification of Horace as one of the dedicatees of the aforementioned Philodemean treatise, even asserting that “we are justified in concluding that a personal relationship of friendship existed between the two men.”30 This important article was followed a few years later by F. A. Wright’s short piece, which responds to Hendrickson’s thesis that the original source had been lost by proposing that Horace was in fact alluding directly to one of Philodemus’ surviving epigrams, thus strengthening the connection between the two.31 Around this time, the evidence regarding Philodemus’ poetic theory in general was being studied by Rostagni, who considered

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26 Philippson (1911) 77-110 and (1929) 894-96, who wrote his dissertation on Philodemus’ treatise *De signis* (1881) and also contributed the *RE* article cited above detailing the philosopher’s life and works.

27 Kiessling-Heinze (1910) xv, referring in the introduction to Horace’s “Bekanntschaft mit Philodemus,” which, for Philippson (1911) 78 n. 1, was too brief an observation and inspired his much longer study.

28 Pasquali (1920) 235.

29 Hendrickson (1918) 27-43.

30 Hendrickson (1918) 37.

31 Wright (1921) 168-69.
its influence on and challenges for Horace and the other poets. As the scholarship tradition clearly shows, in the early nineteenth century many Horatian scholars interpreted the evidence from Herculaneum as proof that the Augustan poets associated with Philodemus, an interpretation which is further confirmed by Clayton Hall in his short article supporting the view that these men, including Horace, were involved in the Epicurean school at Herculaneum. In the same year, classicist and philosopher Norman DeWitt published two studies that deal specifically with the influence of Philodemus on Horace. The first of these appeared in 1935 and, along with the work of Philippon, is one of the earliest attempts to show the influence of Philodemean ethics, specifically the role of Epicurean παρρησία, in the works of Horace. DeWitt shows how the therapeutic application of frank criticism, which is not mentioned by Epicurus but expounded upon in Philodemus’ treatise De libertate dicendi, is employed by Horace in the Carmina and Epistulae. Four years later, DeWitt published another study in which he lists parallels relating Horatian poetry to various Epicurean doctrines, many of which appear in the writings of Philodemus but cannot be identified as distinctively his. Along with DeWitt’s findings regarding παρρησία in Horace, one may include the study of Agnes Michels, which expounds on the former’s thesis and provides more supporting details. Perhaps one of the most significant achievements in the area of Philodemus’ influence on the Augustan poets during this time, however, is Jane Tait’s 1941 dissertation, which examines the importance of

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32 Rostagni (1923-1924) 401-34.
34 DeWitt (1935) 312-19
35 DeWitt (1939) 127-34.
36 Michels (1944) 173-77.
Philodemus’ literary theory on Horace’s *Carmina*. Related to this are the 1955 dissertation of Nathan Greenberg, which provides a detailed and systematic consideration of Philodemus’ poetic theory, and the article of Cataudella, in which *Sermones* 1.2 is read in the light of evidence from Philodemus’ ethical treaties and epigrams.\(^{37}\)

The following years witnessed important advancements in the appreciation of both the sophistication and artistic value of the *Sermones* as well as Horace’s engagement with the Epicurean tradition. This was undoubtedly facilitated by the monumental studies of Eduard Fraenkel, and, perhaps to a greater degree considering its more focused approach, that of Niall Rudd.\(^{38}\) Both acknowledge the role of philosophy in Horace’s satiric criticisms and were followed by more in-depth studies in this area, such as the article by Aroldo Barbieri, which examines the role of Epicurean ethics in *Sermones* 2.6,\(^{39}\) and the monograph of C. O. Brink, whose examination of literary debates in the Hellenistic period and their significance for Horace draws heavily from Philodemus’ criticisms in *De poematis*.\(^{40}\) Along with these studies should be included those of Alberto Grilli on *Sermones* 1.3 and R. L. Hunter on the importance of friendship and free speech.\(^{41}\) In the 1970s shortly before these essays appeared, however, major breakthroughs in the organization and promotion of the Herculaneum papyri (and therefore of Philodemus’ works) were made under the guidance of Marcello Gigante, who, in addition to becoming the successful director of the Centro Internazionale dei Papiri Ercolanesi (CISPE) in

\(^{37}\)Greenberg (1955); Cataudella (1950) 18-31.

\(^{38}\)Fraenkel (1957); Rudd (1966).

\(^{39}\)Barbieri (1976) 479-507.

\(^{40}\)Brink (1963).

Naples, also provided scholars with access to advanced technology and specialized venues for their scholarship, such as the Cronache Ercolanesi and La Scuola di Epicuro, both of which are series devoted to the publication of new scholarship and editions of Herculaneum fragments. These newer and more accessible editions, many of which have already been mentioned above, provide translations and insightful commentaries on difficult texts, thus inspiring scholars to revisit the literary climate in which poets like Horace lived and wrote. The fruits of such research are already visible in Gigante’s contribution, published at the outset of these advancements, of various papers dealing with Philodemus and his connection to authors including Cicero and Horace.\textsuperscript{42} This work, which includes a chapter that explores Philodemus in Sermones 1.2, was followed decades later by a full-length treatment of the same poem that explores further the connections between Horace and Epicurean ethics.\textsuperscript{43} In the same year, scholars like Kirk Freudenburg began to emphasize the complexity of Horace’s Sermones by underscoring the importance of persona theory and recognizing that “the speaker who delivers his criticisms in the first person is not the poet himself but the poet in disguise.”\textsuperscript{44} The main contribution of this groundbreaking study lies in its emphasis on the importance of interpreting the content of the Sermones, whether philosophical or otherwise, as relating to a largely fictional and self-consciously elusive persona that is not always to be taken seriously.\textsuperscript{45} Along similar lines, Rolando Ferri, whose study focuses on connections between Lucretius’ didactic poem to Memmius and Horace’s intimate and philosophical discourse in the Epistulae, recognizes

\textsuperscript{42}Gigante (1969).

\textsuperscript{43}Gigante (1993).

\textsuperscript{44}Freudenburg (1993) 3.

\textsuperscript{45}The impact of this theory, which was later expanded on in Freudenburg (2001), is easily detected in subsequent studies of Horace’s persona, especially those of Braund (1996), Oliensis (1998), Gowers (2003) 55-92 and Turpin (2009) 127-40.
parodic treatments of Epicureanism in the *Sermones*.\(^{46}\) Around the same time Pierre Grimal similarly attempted to highlight Horace’s philosophical eclecticism by pointing to the presence of distinctively anti-Epicurean sentiments in his iambic poetry.\(^{47}\)

Some scholars, on the other hand, continued to demonstrate the presence of Philodemus’ literary theory in Horace’s works in light of newer fragments of his treatise *De poematis*. These studies include David Armstrong’s long article on the dedicatees of the *Ars Poetica* and Anastasia Tsakiropoulou-Summers’ 1995 dissertation on Philodemean poetic theory in the same work.\(^{48}\) This research was subsequently consolidated and expanded in a volume edited by Dirk Obbink, which features chapters examining the role of Philodemus’ theory concerning the interconnectivity of poetic syntax with regard to Lucretius’ epic and Horace’s *Sermones* 1.4.\(^{49}\) To all of these advancements must be added the pioneering efforts of various Philodemean scholars who contributed their findings to a 2004 volume entitled *Vergil, Philodemus and the Augustans*. Among these individuals are Giovanni Indelli and Jeffrey Fish, who examine Philodemus’ sophisticated understanding and treatment of anger and explain how it relates to Vergil’s *Aeneid*, F. M. Schroeder, who considers the role of Epicurean pictorial imagery within the context of frankness in the works of Vergil, and David Armstrong, who draws connections between various Philodemean ethical treatises and Horace’s *Epistulae*.\(^{50}\) Returning to Horace’s earliest work, an essay by William Turpin appeared five years later, who, perhaps misapplying or


\(^{47}\)Grimal (1993) 154-60.


rather overapplying persona theory, considers Horace’s self-portrayal as a buffoon and morally bankrupt parasite in *Sermones* 1.3; this piece was met with a response in Jerome Kemp’s balanced article, reminding scholars not to overemphasize humor and self-parody to the complete exclusion of serious content.\textsuperscript{51} This was followed soon afterwards by a brief examination of the same scholar, this time dealing specifically with the influence of Philodemus’ fragmentary treatises *De adulatione* and *De libertate dicendi* on Horace’s *Epistulae* and *Sermones* 2.5 and 2.8.\textsuperscript{52} More recently, Jeffrey Fish and Kirk Sanders have edited a volume entitled *Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition*, which engages rigorously with Philodemus’ ethical works and their influence on authors such as Cicero and Seneca.\textsuperscript{53} Nevertheless, Horatian scholarship continues to lack a study that systematically investigates Philodemus’ moral presence in the *Sermones* as a whole. The following considerations will attempt to fill this gap, not by forcing parallels from an Epicurean point of view that pretend to unlock the historical Horace, but rather by considering the relevance of his teachings for a Roman *qua* poet dealing with difficult issues such as property loss, wealth administration, the corrupt patronage system and the proper manner to discuss these tactfully and frankly with one’s friends. In order to accomplish this, however, it will first be necessary to provide a brief overview of Philodemus’ interpretation of and contributions to the Epicurean tradition regarding economic theory, flattery and frankness.


\textsuperscript{52}Kemp (2010b) 65-76.

\textsuperscript{53}I should also mention here the recent commentary of Gowers (2012), who briefly mentions the influence of Philodemus and the Epicurean community at Herculaneum in her introduction (20).
Philodemus preserves the substance of Epicurean economic theory in his treatises *De oeconomia* and the fragments of *De divitiis*, the latter of which is completed by fifteen fragments (or rather *pezzi*) that do not bear his name but are probably his.\(^{54}\) Both of these works involve a critical analysis of rival economic theories, especially those expounded in Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus* and pseudo-Theophrastus’ *Oeconomica*,\(^{55}\) in contrast to which Philodemus reproduces, defends and carefully modifies the traditional doctrines of the founders Epicurus and Metrodorus of Lampascus.\(^{56}\) The intended audience of his treatise is the Epicurean sage (*De oec. col. 12.16: φιλοσόφωι*),\(^{57}\) who is urged to concern himself with the “acquisition” (*De oec. col. 12.8-9: κτῆσις*) and “preservation” (ibid. 9: *φυλακή*) of wealth rather than with its organization and use, which is more properly the domain of the professional manager (ibid. col. 7.2-3: *τεχνίτης*) as shown by preceding economic treatises.\(^{58}\) Central to this view of economics

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\(^{56}\)Philodemus also names the other two founders Hermarchus (*De oec. col. 25.1*) and Polyaeus (*De div. coll. 34.14* and *40.8*).

\(^{57}\)Ancient treatises on economics appear to fall into two categories with regard to audience: 1) those written for the expert manager (*δεσπότης*), such as the works of Xenophon and pseudo-Theophrastus and 2) those intended for the sage or philosopher (*σοφός*), such as Philodemus’ treatise. See Natali (1995) 101-2.

\(^{58}\)“Organization” (*κόσμησις*/*διακόσμησις*) and “use” (*χρήσις*) are the two other elements of traditional economics, with which Philodemus is not concerned. Tsouna (1993) 714 notes
is the emphasis placed on the sage manager’s disposition, which must always be characterized by
the observation of a proper “measure of wealth” (ibid. col. 12.18-19: πλούτου μέτρον).\(^5^9\)

Drawing from a lost treatise of Metrodorus for the most part (ibid. col. 12.25-7:
Μ[ητρόδωρον],\(^6^0\) in both of his economic treatises Philodemus draws an important distinction
between the Cynic practice of begging daily (De oec. col. 12.40-1: [τὸ καθ’ ἦμεραν
π]ροσέμεν
[νον]; De div. col. 43.1: πτωχείαν . . . πάντων), which is necessitated by their complete rejection
of all goods (De div. col. 45.16-17: στέρησιν . . . πάντων), and the Epicurean understanding of
poverty, which entails having and enjoying the few possessions required by nature (De div. col.

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59Cf. Arist. Pol. 1257b17-1258a14 for the concept of limited or “natural wealth” (ὁ πλούτος κατὰ φύσιν) within the context of economic theory. Philodemus implicitly contrasts this doctrine with his rival’s promotion of the seemingly unlimited acquisition of wealth (cf. Xen. Oec. 7.15): ἄλλα σωφρόνων τοὶ ἐστι καὶ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός οὕτως ποιεῖν, ὅπως τὰ τὸ ὄντα ὡς βέλτιστα ἐξει καὶ ἄλλα ὃτι τέλεσται ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ δικαίου προσγενήσεται (“But it is prudent, you see, for a husband and wife to act in such a way that their goods will be disposed in the best manner and that as many other goods as possible will be added to them properly and justly”). The suggested methods of acquiring wealth are not limited to Athenian practices: Xenophon’s Socrates, for instance, considers the Persian king a good example of the responsible manager (4.4-25) and pseudo-Theophrastus praises Persian and Spartan economic strategies (1344b29-34).

60This mention of Metrodorus’ teachings (which also occurs in De div. col. 37.11-15), has led to an ongoing discussion concerning the originality of Philodemus’ contribution and also the origin of this section of De oeconomia. Siegfried Sudhaus (1906), for example, refers to coll. 12.45-21.35 as “ein . . . Abschnitt, der nach Sprache und Stil unmöglich aus der Feder des Philodem stammen kann” (45). Another scholar who views this section as a verbatim copy of Metrodorus’ earlier treatise is Laurenti (1973) 108. Tsouna (1993), on the other hand, does not consider details such as the presence of hiatus significant enough to rule out Philodemean authorship or at least interpretation (n. 6). In any case, the columns following this section, which will be the most important for the present study, most certainly contain Philodemus’ own contemporary views regarding economics, for which see especially Asmis (2004) 149-61. For the fragments of Metrodorus, see Alfred Körte’s 1890 Teubner edition.
As Epicurus states elsewhere, the requirements of natural wealth are “easily met” (Arr. 5.144.1-2 = ibid. 6.8: εὐπόριστος), and Philodemus echoes the Master’s teaching when he emphasizes that the sage is “not bad at finding what suffices for himself” (De oec. col. 17.6-8: οὔτε καίκος εὐφέσθαι τὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἱκανά), with the result that he never fears poverty (ibid. coll. 15.45-16.4; cf. De div. col. 36.11-12: οὐ γὰρ ἄξιον φόβου). On the other hand, whereas Epicurus’ concept of natural wealth imposes strict limits on the acquisition of goods, Philodemus, either adopting the view of Metrodorus or possibly responding to the sensitivities of his Roman and aristocratic dedicatees, carefully notes that the sage “inclines in his wishes toward a more affluent way of life” (De oec. col. 16.4-6: ἐνεπεὶ δὲ τῇ βουλήσει μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀφθονωτέραν) and “accepts more whenever it comes easily and without harm” (ibid. 44-6: τὸ δὲ πλεῖον, ἂν ἀβλῶς καὶ [εὐ]πόρως γίνηται, δεκτέον). He recognizes, furthermore, that wealth has the power to remove difficulties and that it can provide the leisure necessary for philosophical study (ibid. col. 14.9-13), but, like an orthodox Epicurean, he notes that its acquisition should not be born out of empty fear or desire, and that one should be generous and share excess wealth with one’s friends (ibid. coll. 24.11-27.12). Finally, Philodemus identifies acceptable sources of wealth, among which the first and by far the best is “to receive gratitude

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61Cf. Arr. 6.25: Ἡ πενία μετρουμένη τῷ τῆς φύσεως τέλει μέγας ἐστὶ πλοῦτος· πλοῦτος δὲ μὴ ὀριζόμενος μεγάλη ἐστὶ πενία (“Poverty measured by the limits of nature is great wealth, but wealth that is not limited is great poverty”).

from a receptive person in exchange for philosophical conversation” (ibid. col. 23.23-36), which is precisely what happened to both himself and Epicurus.63

One of the difficulties immigrant philosophers like Philodemus had to overcome or at least address was the charge of flattery, which, in addition to being a vice the Romans generally associated with Greek clients (cf. Cic. *Pis.* 70: *ut Graeculum, ut adsentatorem*), was also easily attached to the Epicureans on account of their utilitarian view of friendship (Arr. 6.34 and 23).64 Indeed, Philodemus addresses this issue at length in the fragments of his treatise *De adulatione*, in which he notes that, despite certain similarities between the flatterer and the sage (PHerc. 222 col. 2.1-22), there are real differences in their dispositions as well as their behavior.65 Drawing much inspiration from the comic tradition and Theophrastus’ character portraits of the flatterer (*Char.* 2) and the obsequious man (ibid. 5), he describes the various tactics, motives, approaches and reactions typical of individuals suffering from this vice. For Philodemus, one of the major differences between the two is that the flatterer rarely speaks frankly (PHerc. 222 col. 3.27-8: παρρη[σιαζόμενον]), since his main objective is to say whatever will please his victim (PHerc. 1457 col. 1.9: [ὁ λέγων πρὸς χάριν]. This identification of frankness as the hallmark of a true

63Epicurus also identifies patronage as the best—in fact, the only—way for the sage to acquire wealth (Arr. 121b.4-6): χρηματισσεσθαι τε, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας, ἀπορήσαντα. καὶ μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν (”[He said that the sage] will be ready to make money, but only when he is in straits and by means of his philosophy. He will pay court to a king as occasion demands”).


65For flattery in Philodemus, see Longo Aurucchio (1986) 79-91, Glad (1996) 23-9 and Tsouna (2007) 126-42 in addition to the introductions of the various fragments cited above. There is also the comprehensive study of Ribbeck (1884) on flattery in antiquity, as well as the RE article of Kroll (1921) 1069-1070 and the modern commentary on Theophrastus’ *Characters* by Diggle (2004) 181-82. The topic of the similarity between flatterers and true friends is of course addressed at length by Plutarch in *Mor.* 4 (*Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur*). Other relevant ancient sources will be dealt as appropriate with in the chapters to follow.
friend developed toward the end of the Classical period, before which παρρησία generally referred to the public right of free speech within a democratic polis such as Athens. Afterwards, the political limitations consequent upon the formation of monarchical rule resulted in frankness becoming more of a private or moral virtue, and hence one that was of particular concern to Hellenistic philosophers. For the Epicureans, the application of frank criticism was largely pedagogical or rather psychogogical, and, exercised within the context of small communities consisting of pupils and sages, its purpose was to foster virtue through the therapeutic and purifying medicine of self-knowledge, which, in accordance with a long tradition going back to Socrates, is viewed as a prerequisite for moral correction. In his treatise De libertate dicendi (the only ancient tractate with that name), Philodemus explains the nature of frank criticism as a pedagogical method as well as its aims, the different kinds of pupils and their respective challenges and the proper disposition of the sage. As a method strictly speaking, frankness is conjectural and based on the sage’s extended observations of another’s behavior (cf. De lib. dic. fr. 1.9-8: στοχαζόμενος εύ[ν][ι]γίαις), to which he responds in a timely fashion (ibid. De lib. dic. fr. 1.9-8: στοχαζόμενος εύ[ν][ι]γίαις), to which he responds in a timely fashion (ibid. 66See Scarpat (1964) 11-57, Momigliano (1973-74) 2.258 and Konstan (1996) 7-10.

67The earliest reference to this understanding of παρρησία appears to come from the correspondence of Isocrates, especially Nic. 3: ἡ παρρησία καὶ τὸ φανερῶς ἐξεῖναι τοῖς τε φίλοις ἐπιτλήξαι καὶ τοῖς ἔχθροις ἐπιθέσθαι ταῖς ἀλλήλων ἁμαρτίαις (“. . . frankness, as well as the privilege of friends to rebuke and of enemies to attack each other’s faults”). This, as well as other noteworthy passages, are discussed by Glad (1996) 31-2. See also Scarpat (1964) 62-9 for Cynic παρρησία.


69For the structure and an overview of the treatise, see Konstan et al. (1993) 8-20. As mentioned already, however, White (2004) 103-27 notes there are still significant problems and confusion regarding the proper order of the fragments.
fr. 25.1: καιρόν) with a degree of harshness commensurate with the pupil’s needs.70 Although this is indeed a communal affair, extreme harshness and public embarrassment are avoided at all costs and, instead, constructive and well-intentioned—even cheerful—criticism is encouraged.71 The different levels of frankness required and their possible effects depend ultimately on the pupil’s disposition, which Philodemus categorizes in terms of sex (coll. 21b.12-22b.9), age (coll. 24a.7-24b.12), social status (coll. 22b.10-24a.7) and, above all, “strong” and “weak” tempers (fr. 7.1-5: τοὺς μᾶλλον τῶν ἁπαλῶν ἰσχυρούς).72 With regard to the sage, he emphasizes the importance of moral purity, perseverance, careful observation, patience and especially humility: the reason why sages do not criticize harshly, for example, is that they see their own faults and recognize their imperfections (fr. 46: γινώσκω [ν] ἀὑτὸν οὐκ ὄντα τέλειον). The following chapters will show how this Epicurean, or, perhaps more accurately, Philodemean, concern with distinguishing the flatterer from the sage, who accepts wealth cheerfully from a grateful patron in exchange for moral advice given in a gentle but effective manner, plays a significant role in Horace’s self-conception as a satirist and client-friend of Maecenas.

The first chapter of this study provides a somewhat preliminary consideration of the Epicurean aspects of Horace’s upbringing and moral formation as described in Sermones 1.4. More specifically, it will attempt to show how the poet justifies the moral credentials of his

70 Gigante (1969) 55-113 provides an extended consideration of Epicurean παρρησία as a way of life and a conjectural method that depends on correct timing.

71 Cf. De lib. dic. frs. 37 and 38, as well as 79, in all of which Philodemus condemns harsh and bitter frankness. Philodemus also condemns the ridicule employed by the Cynics (ibid. fr. 73.12-13) and the Stoics (De ir. col. 1.7-27, naming both Bion of Borysthenes and Chrysippus as part of a quotation of another Epicurean’s opinion). See Glad (1995) 117-20.

72 For the distinction between “strong” and “weak” pupils, as well as for the different types of students, see Glad (1995) 137-52.
persona by establishing connections to Epicurean ethical and methodological doctrines, which, given the programmatic nature of this satire, will have implications for the rest of the Sermones.

Having established the moral purity of his literary persona in terms of the Epicurean tradition, the next chapter examines how Horace attempts to portray his relationship with Maecenas within the framework of Epicurean patronage. Beginning with the encounter scene between the two in Sermones 1.6, it shows how he promotes himself as an Epicurean client-friend and economist, whose ethical virtue is communicated through salubrious advice, which, in the case of Horace, takes the form of satirical conversations directed toward Maecenas.

Chapter 3 continues to investigate Horace’s self-portrayal as a sage economist, who observes the “measure of wealth” doctrine and recognizes the requirements of nature, and is thus able to bear the loss of property with equanimity, just like his surrogate interlocutor Ofellus in Sermones 2.2. At the same time, however, his willingness to be content will little does not preclude his acceptance of greater wealth from a grateful patron, as he shows in Sermones 2.6. In fact, his acceptance of the Sabine estate is perfectly in harmony with Philodemus’ economic recommendations, since its bestowal makes possible the kind of philosophical withdrawal among friends advocated in De oeconomia.

The topic of patronage and friendship between Horace and Maecenas naturally leads to a consideration of the charges of flattery and subservience which were made by the poet’s rivals. Chapter 4 considers how Horace attempts to distinguish himself from the typical flatterer through character portraits such as the one in Sermones 1.9, which incorporates details also found in Philodemus’ De adulatione. An integral part of this effort is his self-promotion as a lover of frankness, which, having been taught to Horace by his father in Sermones 1.4, naturally
recurs in the satiric portraits of *Sermones* 1.1-3 and thus helps to confirm his identity as a true and honest friend.

The final chapter looks at the manner in which Horace exposes the flatterer’s arts in *Sermones* 2.5, which testifies to his candor and willingness to invite comparison in the eyes of Maecenas. At the same time, the poet cleverly recapitulates his moral purity and humility through self-imposed, self-deprecatory examinations at the hands of social inferiors in *Sermones* 2.3 and 2.7, thus illustrating—at the expense of the Stoics—how not to conduct frank criticism and further endorsing his own portrayal as a tactful critic and a man of integrity.
CHAPTER 1
EPICUREAN ASPECTS OF
HORACE’S UPBRINGING

Horace’s famous description of his upbringing in *Sermones* 1.4.103-29 is an extremely important scene, particularly because it serves to establish the poet’s ethical credentials and justify his role as professional critic. It is also one of the most complex and multifaceted passages in the entire collection, for in the process of constructing his ethical persona Horace synthesizes various literary and philosophical influences in a sophisticated and yet often parodic manner. Scholars have repeatedly shown the significant role of Roman comedy, especially Terence’s *Adelphoe*, in Horace’s serio-comic portrayal of his father’s training. Perhaps one of the least explored facets of Horace’s father’s pedagogical method, however, is the more serious role of Epicureanism, which, in conjunction with other traditions, has much to offer a satiric poet who is concerned with practical ethics and offers moral correction through the close observation of morally flawed individuals’ defects. The following chapter will consider how, in addition to contributing to the ethical content of the *Sermones*, Epicurean philosophy adds depth to the poet’s presentation and analysis of the many foibles of contemporary Roman society; the reliance on sensation, for example, grants the audience full access to the colorful (and often disturbing) details of Roman life, but its importance for Epicurean epistemology suggests a more profound engagement with contemporary doctrines. It will also explore the conventionality of the language Horace typically employs in the *Sermones*, which is certainly fitting for satire but also compatible with the semantic concerns of Epicurean language theory. Furthermore, it will examine Horace’s practical advice concerning choices and avoidances as motivated by a calculation of pains and foreseeable pleasures, which likewise reflects the Epicurean tradition. Finally, this chapter will
consider the possibility that Horace’s evaluation of vicious behavior, though containing elements derived from the comic and Cynic traditions, may also incorporate an Epicurean methodological approach to ethical investigation which was a topic of popular debate in Rome in the first century BC.

Horace frequently pays tribute to his father by identifying him not only as the source (1.4.129: *ex hoc*) of his moral purity, but also as the cause (1.6.71: *causa*) of his successful encounter with Maecenas. A proper understanding of his significance, therefore, is essential for an appreciation of the poet’s own literary persona and an accurate interpretation of the role of Epicurean ethics in the *Sermones*. His portrayal in *Sermones* 1.4 as the paternal source of Horace’s poetry and generic origin of his subdued, morally conscious style at once distinguishes the poet from his literary predecessor Lucilius and defines the principles informing Horatian satire:

\[
\begin{align*}
  \text{liberius si} \\
  \text{dixerò quid, si forte iocosius, hoc mihi iuris} \\
  \text{cum venia dabis: insuevit pater optimus hoc me . . . (S. 1.4.103-5)}
\end{align*}
\]

If in my words I am too free, perchance too light, this bit of liberty you will indulgently grant me. It is a habit the best of fathers taught me . . .

This description is carefully designed to emphasize the benign tone of Horatian satire, which criticizes “rather freely” and “jokingly,” while ostensibly severing the connection to Old Comedy and hence the *modus Lucilianus* (cf. 1-5),\(^1\) which criticizes publicly, caustically and by

\(^1\)Schlegel (2000) 95: “The satire will demonstrate that ultimately Horace and Lucilius have separate genealogies . . . Though Horace writes in Lucilius’ genre, they have no common ancestors.” It was Hendrickson (1900) 124, however, who argued early on that in 1.4 Horace completely severs the connection to traditional satire. Anderson (1982) 29 views Horace as a Socratic figure who is exclusively concerned with ethics while Fiske (1971) 277-80 considers Horace’s brand of humor as thoroughly influenced by Aristotle’s portrayal of the εὐτράπελος (“gentleman”), for which see *Eth. Nic.* 1127b34-1128a33. For the various philosophical
The reconfiguration of his literary parentage, however, is by no means absolute: Horace’s description of his own satire as directed toward those who are “worthy of being blamed” (25: *culpari dignos*), as well as his frequent criticisms of individuals by name (which has apparently caused a public reaction; cf. 70 and 78-9), plainly indicates that his works retain something of the Lucilian spirit. Nevertheless, the major differences between Horace and Lucilius, especially with regard to their distinct approaches to style and ethics, are widely recognized. These differences are primarily communicated by the poet’s shift from public criticism to the more private concerns and stock characters reminiscent of New Comedy (cf. 25-32 and 48-52), which suggests that Horatian satire will engage moral deficiency in a lighthearted manner but at a more sophisticated and personal level. Horace’s portrayal of his father within the context of this tradition, moreover, is particularly worthy of further consideration, since it has significant implications for the origin and character of Horatian satire itself.

The tradition of Roman comedy plays an important role in Horace’s creation of his father’s literary persona, but the complexity of this role and its programmatic significance have not been wholly appreciated. Horace clearly recognized Terence’s well-deserved reputation in antiquity for purity of diction and skill (*Ep. 2.1.59: arte*), and his willingness to employ specifically Terentian stock characters and scenes likely reflects his own concern for refinement influences related to Horace’s partial rejection of Aristophanic invective and preference for a more gentle tone, see Rudd (1966) 96-7. Freudenburg (1993) 55-108 argues for a “hybrid theory” of satiric humor that embraces both Aristophanic and Peripatetic elements. 


This is discussed by Rudd (1966) 91-2, Hunter (1985a) 486 and Freudenburg (1993) 100. Cf. also Leach (1971) 622: “Horace follows Lucilius in his verisimilitude, but rejects the Aristophanic spirit, thus casting off the last vestige of old comedy.”

The popularity of Terence’s language and style is discussed by Müller (2013) 366-70. Barsby (1999) 19-27 includes a useful introduction to its general characteristics.
and stylistic rigor.\textsuperscript{5} The exploration of intimate and familial affairs typical of Terentian drama, moreover, is closely paralleled by the domestic origin of Horatian satire and its concern with privacy.\textsuperscript{6} But Horace’s allusions to his father’s Terentian qualities do more than communicate the importance of stylistic refinement and poetic confidentiality; the comparison with Demea,\textsuperscript{7} who may be a comic embodiment of the traditional Roman \textit{paterfamilias},\textsuperscript{8} suggests that Horace’s father (and therefore Horatian satire itself) censures vice by promoting ancestral virtue

\textsuperscript{5}Fairclough (1913) 188-93. In addition to the “bumpkin father” of 1.4.109-26, Horace incorporates other Terentian stock characters into the \textit{Sermones}, such as the “self-tormentor” (1.2.20-2) and the “raging father” (1.4.48-52).

\textsuperscript{6}Cf. 1.4.22-3, 1.10.74-91 and \textit{Ep.} 1.19.35-49. Note that Horace’s proclaimed confidentiality regarding poetic recitation in these passages contradicts his claim in 1.4 to have offended a wider public. Courtney (2013) 92 n. 87 compares Horace’s reluctance to recite in public to Epicurus’ statement that the wise man will read in public, but only under compulsion (Arr. 1.121.7-8). Cf. Lucilius’ consideration of his intended audience (588-96 M) and Persius’ admission of a lack thereof (1.1-3).

\textsuperscript{7}Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 72. Leach (1971) provides the first extended consideration of the similarities between Horace’s father at \textit{Sermones} 1.4.109-26 and Demea in the \textit{Adelphoe}. She is followed by Hunter (1985a) 490 and Freudenburg (1993) 33-9. The notion that Horace’s portrayal of his father is a purely fictional creation and therefore devoid of any serious ethical content, however, is challenged by Schrijvers (1993) 50-2 and Schlegel (2000). The relevant passage from the \textit{Adelphoe} follows:

\begin{quote}
 fit sedulo, \\
 nil praetermitto, consuefacio. denique \\
 inspicere tamquam in speculum in vitas omnium \\
 iubeo atque ex aliis sumere exemplum sibi. \\
 hoc facito . . . hoc fugito. \hspace{1cm} (Ad. 414-18)
\end{quote}

One does one’s best. I never turn a blind eye. I teach him good habits. Above all I tell him to look into the lives of others as if into a mirror and to take from them an example for himself. “Do this,” I say . . . “Avoid that.”

\textsuperscript{8}See Traill (2013) 318-39 for the introduction of Roman customs into the \textit{Adelphoe}. Barsby (2001) 245 considers the possibility that Demea represents the typical Roman \textit{paterfamilias}, whereas Hunter (1985b) is more cautious about associating the \textit{Adelphoe} with “a very specific social and historical context” (109).
within a funny, harmlessly conservative context. On the other hand, this comparison rests on textual parallels that may overlook the broader context in which both Demea and Horace’s father are portrayed: poets like Menander and his Roman successors, who stage plays that center on the dynamics of the typical father-son relationship and its ethical implications and consequences, are likely responding to Aristotle’s teaching concerning the important role of education in forming a virtuous disposition. The portrayals of this relationship in Terence’s plays (especially the Adelphoe), however, are notoriously problematic on account of their overwhelming negativity: indeed, all of them revolve around a disobedient son’s amor turpis (to use the Horatian description), while the fathers are typically described as unstable and overly emotional authoritarian figures who give barking commands that ultimately provoke their children’s hatred (cf. Ad. 870-71). Perhaps a better parallel for Horace’s father can be found in a touching scene from Plautus’ Trinummus, in which the virtuous Lysiteles fondly attributes his moral purity to his father’s training:

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9 Freudenburg (1993) 33-9 reads Horace’s father as the doctor ineptus of Roman comedy, whose portrayal in 1.4 serves the programmatic function of characterizing Horace’s persona in Sermones 1.1-3 as comically inept.

10 The connection between παιδεία and a healthy disposition goes back to the sophist Protagoras of Abdera (cf. DK B3), who employs the “example method” in Pl. Protag. 325c6-d7. Aristotle discusses the relationship between a virtuous disposition (ἕξις) and training from childhood in more detail in Eth. Nic. 1103b20-25. For the Cynics’ incorporation of childhood training into their educational theory, see Dudely (1974) 87-8. The education of children is encompassed by Epicurus’ universal invitation to philosophy (Arr. 4.122.1-6), which Philodemus echoes in De electionibus et fugis col. 21.12-13. Cf. Ep. 1.1.24-26: id [sc. philosophia] quod . . . aeque neglectum pueris senibusque nocebit (“That task which . . . if neglected, will be harmful alike to young and to old”).

11 Hunter (1985b) 99-109 examines the four Terentian plays which include father-son relationships (i.e., Samia, Andria, Hauton Timorumenos and Adelphoe).

12 Traill (2013) 328-29 discusses the important presence of recognition scenes in Terentian drama, and how Demea (as well as the other fathers in the playwright’s works) fits into this by realizing his own ignorance as a father and failure as a moral guide.
I have always obeyed your commands and precepts, father, from my youth to the present day. I consider myself free with regard to my nature, and I deemed it proper that my mind should faithfully heed your precepts. These teachings of yours I have always considered a protection in my youth, and I have taken careful precautions, father, lest I should ever enter into any place where pernicious vice was intended, or go about strolling at night, or steal from another, or cause you grief: I have always maintained your precepts, which are a well-made protection, by means of my temperance.

In this scene, which is an extremely rare one in New Comedy,\(^{13}\) the mention of age (\textit{aetas}), intellect (\textit{animus}), precepts (\textit{praecepta}) and the abstinence from vicious behavior bears a significant resemblance to Horace’s description of his own upbringing (cf. 1.4.119: \textit{aetas}, 120: \textit{animum}, 121: \textit{dictis}). It is even possible that Horace’s healthy relationship with his father is intended as a success story that defies comic tradition and “corrects” the behavior of the typical adulescens. Either way, Horace’s portrayal of his father within the context of the traditional paterfamilias from Roman comedy (whether a pater durus like Demea or a pater lenis like Philto) is deliberate, and its significance is partly expressed by Donatus in his commentary on Demea’s pedagogical method (ad 418: \textit{non philosophice, sed civiliter monet} . . . \textit{ergo ut idioticus et comicus pater, non ut sapiens et praeceptor} (“He does not advise as a philosopher but as a

\(^{13}\)Duckworth (1952) 286.
layman . . . therefore [he advises] as a comic and unskilled father, not as a sage and a teacher”).

The advantage of this portrayal is twofold: first, it creates the illusion that Horatian satire is the pedestrian ranting of an ordinary, home-grown local rather than the educated expression of a mind suspiciously imbued with foreign doctrines; second, it advertises the *Sermones* as an unabashedly Roman creation that is committed to preserving “ancient tradition” (1.4.117: *traditum ab antiquis morem*). Regardless of whether or not Horace publicly recited his verses, the creation of a persona such as this not only complements the thoroughly Roman nature of satire, but it also provides ample opportunity for the contradictory distinctions so typical of Horace’s style: like his poetry, the bumpkin father’s humble exterior may conceal a more sophisticated core shaped by contemporary ethical doctrines.

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14Freudenburg (1993) 36, like Hunter (1985a) 490, applies Donatus’ evaluation to Horace’s father, whose modest deferral to the sage (*sapiens*) at 1.4.115-16 allegedly implies the same distinction.

15For Roman satirists’ ostensible rejection of foreign influences, especially philosophy, see Mayer (2005b) 146-59 and Jocelyn (1977) 323-66. Cf. also Lucilius’ famous criticism of Albucius (88-94 M) and Juvenal’s tirade against Greek philosophers (3.114-25). Cicero denigrates the Greeks as liars and flatterers at *Orat.* 1.11.47 and especially *Q. fr.* 1.5.16, as well as in his serio-comic speech *In Pisonem* (70), although the authenticity of this attack has been called into question by Nisbet (1987) 186 and Powell (1995a) 25.

16Leach (1971) 619 cites a similar passage from Terence’s *Adelphoe* (411-12) and notes that “the fathers are similar, both in their moral and educational convictions and in their reliance on ancestral virtue as a standard of perfection.” Cf. also Plaut. *Trin.* 295-296: *meo modo et moribu’ vivito antiquis, quae ego tibi praecipio, ea facito* (“Live according to my example and the ancient custom, and do whatever I enjoin upon you”).

17Freudenburg (2005) 1-7 offers a brief introduction to the history of Roman satire. Horace clearly promotes the *Sermones* as emphatically Roman at 1.10.31-5, where Quirinus appears in a dream vision and urges him to compose in pure, unadulterated Latin. See Gowers (2012) 307 for the relevant literary parallels, including Callimachus’ *Aetia* (fr. 1.21-4 Pf.) and Ennius (fr. 1.2-10 Sk.). Rudd (1986) 172-74 considers Horace’s Romanization of Greek words an expression of literary “purism.”

18For the multiplicity of Horace’s persona, see Martindale (1993) 1 and Oliensis (1998) 2. Zetzel (2009) 21 emphasizes the importance of considering the underlying significance of the
In some ways, Horace’s potentially self-effacing description of his father’s training resembles his disingenuousness regarding the literary pretensions of the *Sermones*. According to his own admission (38-65), another generic similarity between satire and comedy is that neither ranks as true poetry. Employing what Horace presents as a standard *pater ardens* scene at lines 48-52, the poet tells us that satire’s conversational tone likewise lacks the syntactical complexity and indissolubility of poetry: it is nothing more than versified, “informal speech” (48: *sermo merus*). In order to illustrate poetry’s unity, Horace introduces a passage from Ennius and declares that, unlike the *Sermones*, any transposition of these epic verses would result in dismemberment and utter destruction (62: *disiecti membra poetae*). Our poet, however, is not to be trusted: the insincerity of his modest claims is betrayed by the fact that he has carefully structured his satires in accordance with Philodemean compositional theory, and his description of the impossibility of transposition actually illustrates the application of this theory to his own work. Oberhelman and Armstrong explain:

To summarize what Horace is doing here. The text seems to state that Horace’s satire is poetry only because of meter and word-order. But we must beware of this surface reading in an author like Horace, where texts may at any one moment be undercut by humorous undertones and ironic slippage. In fact, Horace’s subtext (if we so choose to call it) may well assert that Ennius, at least in the lines quoted, lives up no better than Lucilius to Horace’s poetic ideal. If we transpose Ennus’ text, what have we left? Nothing more than the same pedestrian sentence with a different word-order . . . But the

“surface meaning” of Horatian satire. This is particularly true with regard to Horace’s origin, which the poet himself playfully describes as *anceps* at 2.1.34. See also Gowers (2003) 55-7. With regard to Horace’s father’s educational approach, Citroni Marchetti (2004) 17 examines the possibility of “una tradizione pedagogica-filosofica che può averlo influenza,” which she traces back to Plato.

19Cf. *Ars*. 93-4: *interdum tamen et vocem comoedia tollit | iratusque Chremes tumido delitigat ore* (“Yet at times even Comedy raises her voice, and an angry Chremes storms in swelling tones”). Leach (1971) 621, on the other hand, suggests that Horace’s reference to the *pater ardens* in this passage is consistent with his later allusion to Demea, and that both comic figures describe his father. This view is challenged by Schlegel (2000) 105 n. 15, who suggests that the *pater ardens* is a foil to the “real” father in the satire.
delicious humor is that Horace’s metathesized lines . . . are *poetic*—Ennius’ lines are not.\(^{20}\)

This modesty regarding literary sophistication, therefore, which necessarily extends to Horace’s deceptively simple description of his upbringing later on, is merely topical, whereas a more profound examination reveals the confidence of a skilled *vates*. Given Horace’s subtle yet stimulating disingenuousness regarding the literary merits of the *Sermones*, one wonders whether he plays a similar game with respect to its moral content.\(^{21}\) Of course, such an inquiry will require a consideration of Horace’s ethical training that extends beyond the function of humor (τὸ γελοῖον) and into the realm of philosophical thought (τὸ σπουδαῖον).\(^{22}\)

The simplicity of his father’s educational method, which emphasizes his portrayal as a conservative Roman interested in practical ethics, forecasts Horace’s concern with offering moral correction through useful advice elsewhere in the *Sermones*. This is communicated primarily by examples from everyday life and the abundance of purpose clauses, which underscore the importance of practicality:

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cum me hortaretur, parce frugaliter atque viverem uti contentus eo quod mi ipse parasset:
“nonne vides, Albi ut male vivat filius utque Baius inops? magnum documentum, ne patriam rem
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\(^{21}\)Schlegel (2000) 104: “Horace’s suggestion that in writing satire, he was not writing poetry, was not entirely serious . . . but the playful suggestion receives a lengthy treatment and has, I think, a true meaning in preparing the reader for the redefinition of satire and what to expect of the genre, which Horace accomplishes in the second half of the poem when he makes his father’s ethical training the basis, the equivalent, of his own satirical poetic activity.” Kemp (2010a) 61 and Cucchiarelli (2001) 109 similarly take Horace’s portrayal of his father in this poem as containing serious undertones and therefore not entirely comic.

\(^{22}\)Fiske (1971) 298: “[I]n lines 102-142 Horace lets us see τὸ σπουδαῖον, the earnest features of the satirist beneath the comic mask.”
Whenever he would encourage me to live thriftily, frugally, and content with what he had saved for me, “Do you not see,” he would say, “how badly fares young Albius, and how poor is Baius? A striking lesson not to waste one’s patrimony!” When he would deter me from a vulgar amour, “Don’t be like Scetanus.” And to prevent me from courting another’s wife, when I might enjoy a love not forbidden, “Not pretty,” he would say, “is the repute of Trebonius, caught in the act. Your philosopher will give you theories for shunning or seeking this or that: enough for me, if I can uphold the rule our fathers handed down, and if, so long as you need a guardian, I can keep your health and name from harm. When years have brought strength to body and mind, you will swim without the cork.”

This method closely reflects Horace’s own approach, which likewise involves practical advice intended either to produce or prevent a certain outcome: *Denique sit finis quaerendi . . . ne facias* (1.1.92-4: “In short, set bounds to the quest of wealth . . . lest you fare like . . .”); *quare, ne paeniteat te, desine matronas sectarier* (1.2.77-8: “Wherefore, that you may have no reason to repent, cease to court matrons”). The poet also tends to emphasize the practical reasons for his observations of everyday life: *ne te morer, audi, quo rem deducam* (1.1.14-15: “Lest I should delay you any further: listen, here’s where I’m going with this”); *si quis nunc quae quit ‘quo res haec pertinet?’ illuc* (1.2.23: “If anyone should now ask ‘what’s this got to do with anything,’ here’s the answer . . .”); 1.3.137: *ne longum faciam* (“‘Lest I should drag this on . . .’”).

Indeed, one of the major characteristics of the *Sermones* is the concern with offering real-life criticisms

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23Cf. also Horace’s practical advice to the miser at 1.1.73: *nescis, quo valeat nummus, quem praebat usum? panis ematur, holus, vini sextarius* (“Don’t you know what money is for, what is can provide? You may buy bread, veggies, a pint of wine”).
for the sake of correction rather than engaging in theoretical speculation; this, however, was
instilled in young Horace by his father, who promotes his own ignorance by casually
depreciating the complicated theories behind his son’s ethical decisions (1.4.115-16): *sapiens,*
*vitatu quidque petitu | sit melius, causas reddet tibi* (“Your philosopher will give you theories for
shunning or seeking this or that”).

As mentioned above, however, one must avoid taking
Horace at face value and overlooking the possibility of underlying themes: this incorporation of
an exclusively practical method, for example, has been linked to the Cynics’ preference for
*λόγοι χρηστοί* (“useful advice”) and their rejection of the theoretical pursuits associated with
formal education. Epicurus also rejected the alleged uselessness of theoretical speculation
(Arr. 38.1 and 82), which in his day included Platonic and Aristotelian elements, and instead

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24 Lejay (1915) 305 describes Horace’s father’s method as “éducation practise qui néglige les belles spéculations des philosophes, mais qui maintient le forte tradition nationale.”
Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 72 offer a similar evaluation. It is possible that this approach is an
intentional reversal of the Stoic method, which emphatically prescribes theory before practice.
Cf. Arr. Diss. Epict. 1.26.3 and Musonius Rufus Diss. 5. The concept of choices and avoidances
was already a philosophical conventionality by the time of Seneca (cf. Ep. 95.13), although
Philippson (1911) 127-34 argues that “vitare und petere . . . sind Grundbegriffe dieser Schule.”
See also DeWitt (1939) 127-34 for the prevalence of this notion in Horace’s works. It should
also be noted that Epicurus wrote a lost treatise entitled *De electionibus et fugis* (Arr. 1.27.9),
and it is likely that a treatise of the same name recovered from the Herculaneum papyri belongs
to Philodemus (mentioned above, p. 5 n. 10), for which see the 1991 edition and translation of
Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan.

25 Fiske (1971) 298-99. For an overview of the characteristics of Cynic *παιδεία,* for
which there is little evidence, see Dudely (1974) 87-9 and Desmond (2008) 128-29. Oltramare
(1926) 44-5 provides a collection of fragments detailing the Cynics’ rejection of formal
education, from dialectic to music. Gerhard’s 1909 edition and commentary of the Hellenistic
poet Phoenix of Colophon considers the role of *λόγοι χρηστοί* in the Cynic and comic traditions,
and his evidence includes various relevant quotations from Menander’s *Sententiae* (124-26).

26 DeWitt (1954) 44-9 and Rist (1972) 2 discuss Epicurus’ reaction to Platonism;
Nussbaum (1994) 121 describes the difference between Epicurus’ and Aristotle’s understanding
of practicality. See also Cic. Fin. 1.42 (an explanation of Epicurean practicality) and 1.72 (a
criticism of the Platonic curriculum and poetry as having *nulla solida utilitas*). A good treatment
of the Epicurean view of traditional *παιδεία* can be found in Chandler (2006) 1-5.
laid particular stress on the importance of efficacy with regard to his own philosophical teachings. In addition to this, he especially appreciated the pedagogical role of χρήσιμα διαλογίσματα (Arr. 3.85.1-4), and his willingness to provide followers with useful summaries of his doctrines (cf. Arr. 2.35.1-7) likewise reveals his concern for practicality and the preservation of moral virtue, which reflects Horace’s father’s understanding of philosophy as ancillary to the preservation of ancient mores (1.4.115-19). And while it is true that both the Cynics and the Epicureans employed pithy maxims for pedagogical purposes, it was the latter who placed more emphasis on the importance of brevity for the sake of memorization and usefulness, to which one may compare Horace’s advice regarding useful poetry in the Ars Poetica:

aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetae
aut simul et iucunda et idonea dicere vitae.
quiquid praecipies, esto brevis, ut cito dicta percipiant animi dociles teneantque fideles. (Ars. 333-36)

Poets aim either to benefit, or to amuse, or to utter words at once both pleasing and helpful to life. Whenever you instruct, be brief, so that what is quickly said the mind may readily grasp and faithfully hold.

27Us. 221: κενὸς ἐκείνου φιλοσόφου λόγος, ύψ’ οὗ μηδὲν πάθος ἀνθρώπων θεραπεύεται (“Empty is the argument of that philosopher by which no passion of humans is therapeutically treated”). As Chandler (2006) 4 and Erler (2011) 23-4 note, however, later Epicureans like Philodemus were not as critical as Epicurus regarding the potential educational value of outside sources.

28Hadot (1970) 347-54 discusses the importance of usefulness and memorization in relation to Epicurean pedagogy. For the Cynics’ use of pithy maxims (χρείαι), see Dudley (1974) 112.

29Cf. Ars. 343-44. Jensen (1923) 109, Tate (1928) 67-8, Brink (1963) 128-29 and Tsakirpoupolou-Summers (1995) 237-42 attribute Horace’s view that poetry should be both delightful and useful to Neoptolemus of Parium, whom Porphyrio identifies as one of Horace’s sources in his commentary on the Ars Poetica (ad 1-2). This is the same grammarian Philodemus opposes in his treatise De poematis (coll. 10.32-13.28 in Jensen’s 1923 edition). Armstrong (1993) 223-24, on the other hand, considers Horace’s poetic theory more in line with
The language in this passage strongly suggests that Horace, like Epicurus, understands the importance of practically communicating philosophical wisdom (334-35: idonea vitae, praeepta) in order that it may be quickly memorized (336: animi teneant); and although Epicurus himself rejected poetry as a suitable means of imparting moral truth or even philosophical instruction in general, his later followers seem to have been more receptive to the possibilities of poetic expression: Philodemus, for example, admits to the dangers of poetry but recognizes its potential usefulness for moral instruction, while Lucretius (not to mention other Roman Epicureans, such as Titus Albucius and Lucius Varius Rufus) wholeheartedly embraces that of Philodemus, who views good poetry as necessarily delightful and only potentially useful. Cf. especially De poem. col. 29.17-19: κἂν ωφελῇ, καὶ[θό πο]ήματ’ ὀυκ ωφελεί (“And if they [sc. poems] are beneficial, this is not by virtue of the fact that they are poems”). That Horace was familiar with Philodemus’ poetry and therefore with his poetic theories is obvious from 1.2.121, in which he mentions the philosopher by name and cites one of his epigrams. See Hendrickson (1918) 27-43 for this connection and Sider (1997) for an edition and translation of Philodemus’ epigrams, including the one mentioned above (138-41). As Cicero reveals in Pis. 70 and Fin. 2.119 respectively, both Philodemus’ poetry and philosophical views were known and well respected in the first century BC.

30 Of course, this is not to say that Horace actually envisioned his eclectic poetry as an Epicurean epitome, but rather as containing useful advice (often with Epicurean undertones) that could be easily interpreted and even entertaining. See Snyder (2000) 53-6 for Philodemus’ criticisms of many Epicurean “manuals” as shallow and based on a lack of learning.

31 Arr. 1.121.b3: ποιήματὰ τε ἐνεργείᾳ οὐκ ἂν ποιῆσαι (“[And he said that the sage] does not spend his life composing poetry”). Asmis (1995) 15-34, who provides substantial consideration of this passage, notes that the popular view that Epicurus rejected poetry wholesale may owe more to ancient polemical descriptions of his ignorance and boorishness than to anything else. Cf. especially Cic. Fin. 1.25-6 and 71-2; Plut. Mor. 76.1092c-1094e (Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum) and Mor. 4.58d (Quomodo adulator ad amico internoscatur).

32 This is obvious from the fact that Philodemus imparts politico-ethical advice to his friend Piso in his treatise De rege bono secundum Homerum, for which see Dorandi (1982) 15-21 and Asmis (1991) 1-45. Cf. also Indelli’s 1988 edition of De ira (col. 8.31-2 and col. 19.20-5, both quotations from Homer’s Iliad illustrating Achilles’ destructive anger). Horace likewise uses Homer’s poetry in order to impart ethical advise, for which see especially his letter to Lollius Maximus (Ep. 1.2).
the poetic medium in his philosophical epic.\textsuperscript{33} In addition to being practical, moreover, Epicurean doctrine is especially accessible because it transfers the source of knowledge from theoretical speculation to the familiar sense perceptions of everyday life.

Horace’s father’s concern for practicality is emphasized by his empirical method and reliance on sense perception, which involves exposure to the nitty-gritty details of life on the streets of Rome. This is communicated through the importance of observation (1.4.106: \textit{notando}), vision (109: \textit{vides}), exposure (123: \textit{obiciebat}) and hearsay (114: \textit{fama}) in relation to the various moral and social troubles of contemporary Roman life: abject poverty (110: \textit{inopia}), adulterous affairs (111: \textit{amor turpis}) and the latest gossip (125: \textit{rumor malus}). Indeed, the reliance on perception as a springboard for moral correction is a common feature of Horace’s approach. In \textit{Sermones} 1.6, for example, he communicates the burdens and many disturbances of political ambition by means of sense impressions: the glitter of Glory’s chariot (23), the color and constricting feel of the trappings of senatorial office (27), the sounds of envious gossip (29), the blaring of trumpets in the forum (43-4) and the sight of poor Tillius loaded down with more paraphernalia and responsibilities that he can calmly manage (107-9).\textsuperscript{34} At the same time, however, such descriptions are also one of the satirical characteristics of Old Comedy, and Horace’s father’s finger-pointing and identification of specific individuals like Baius (1.4.110) and Scetanus (112)\textsuperscript{35} owe much to the comic tradition ostensibly rejected by Horace at 1.4.1-5.


\textsuperscript{34}Other vivid examples of sensation related to vice abound in the \textit{Sermones}, especially in the introductory poems: sight (1.2.80: \textit{niveos viridesque lapillos}); sound (1.1.66: \textit{sibilat}, \textit{pludo}; 1.2.18: \textit{exclamat}, 128-30: \textit{latret canis}, \textit{streptu resonet}, \textit{clamet}; 1.3.7-8: \textit{summa voce}, \textit{resonat}, 18: \textit{stertebat}, 136 \textit{rumperis et latras}; 1.5.15: \textit{cantabat}; 1.8.46: \textit{displosa}); smell (1.2.27-30: \textit{olet}, \textit{olenti}); touch (1.1.38: \textit{aestus}, 39: \textit{hiems}, 80: \textit{frigore}; 1.2.6: \textit{frigus}).

\textsuperscript{35}See the \textit{Enc. Or.} 1.658-59 for the identity of Baius; virtually nothing is known of Scetanus. The identification of individuals by means of the demonstrative \textit{hic . . . ille}
and which thrived on the public criticism of perceptible behavior through the branding of
individuals by name. As G. C. Fiske notes in his important study, moreover, this method also
resembles the Cynics’ “empirical morality,” which often involves denouncing perceptible
behavior in a public setting through the character portrait (χαρακτηρισμός). All of these
influences are certainly important, but little attention has been given to the tradition of formal
epistemology and its close connection to ethics: that is to say, the emphasis on the primacy of
empirical observation as necessary for Horace’s education (cf. 110: magnum documentum)
resembles the epistemological doctrines of Hellenistic philosophers, who likewise attached great
importance to sensation. Aristotle’s lengthy treatment of this topic in the De anima (413b2-
429a9), for example, influenced the Stoic and Epicurean identification of sensation as a criterion
of truth and starting point of knowledge. It was Epicurus alone, however, who maintained that
all sense impressions are true and therefore absolutely foundational for the formation of
knowledge and ethical decisions. According to Diogenes’ account of Epicurean epistemology

combination, which is used by Horace’s father at 1.4.126 to introduce practical examples, occurs
numerous times in Sermones 1: 1.11, 29; 2.4, 7, 4; 3.57-8; 6.41-2; 9.6-7, 13-16, 41-4. Cf. also
2.3.50.

36Fiske (1971) 299. Cf. [Cic.] Rhet. Her. 4.65, where he refers to the positive moral
function of notationes, which are descriptions of another’s inner “nature” (natura) by means of
“clear and perceptible signs” (certis signis).

37Cf. also Aristotle’s subsequent treatment of sensation in De sensu. It is important to
note that Aristotle regarded perceptions as false only “very seldom” (De an. 428b2: ὅτι
ὀλίγιστον), whereas the Stoics only accepted the sense data from “cognitive impressions” (cf.
Diog. Laert. 7.54 = SVF 2.105: καταληπτικὴ φαντασία). For evidence for the role of sensation
in Stoic epistemology, see the text, translation and commentary of Long and Sedley (1987) 238-59.

38The primacy of sensation is expressed in Epicurus’ Epistula ad Herodotum (Arr.
2.38.3-8), in Diogenes’ biography (Arr. 1.32.3-6) and in Ratae sententiae 22-4 (Arr. 5.146.5-
147.8), to which cf. Lucr. 4.469-521. See also Striker (177) 125-42 and Taylor (1980) 105-24.
For the relationship between the Aristotelian and Epicurean understanding of sensation, see
(Arr. 1.31.3-4), “sensation” (αἴσθησις) was one of the three “interpretive tools” (κριτήρια) for engaging with and reacting to the visible world along with “anticipations” (προλήψεις) and “affections” (πάθη). As the starting point of knowledge, sense perception would have supplied young Horace with the information necessary to interpret his surroundings, as suggested by the Lucretian phrase nonne vides which introduces his father’s empirical method.

Furthermore, the pervasive use of the imperfect tense throughout this passage strongly implies that such sensory experiences occurred habitually and over an extended period of time:
hortaretur (107); deterreret (112); aiebat (115); formabat (121); iubebat (121); vetabat (124).

This raises the question: in what manner did Horace’s exposure to everyday life inform his understanding of the world around him and—perhaps more importantly—how did this effect the way in which he communicated this knowledge?

Horace would not have forgotten easily the multiple and repeated sensory experiences of moral corruption to which his father had exposed him at such an impressionable age; on the contrary, they would have been stored away in his memory and categorized as universal.

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39 For Epicurus’ own description, see the following: anticipations (Arr. 4.37.6-38.3); sensation and affections (Arr. 4.38.3-8). Useful introductions to Epicurean epistemology include Bailey (1964) 232-74, Long (1986) 21-30, Rist (1972) 114-40, Mitsis (1988) 19-45 (less accessible but contains useful observations) and Asmis (1984), which is an extended study of Epicurus’ “scientific method.”

40 Lucretius employs this phrase to emphasize the epistemological value of sensation, in particular vision, and the verb videre occurs quite often in book one alone (e.g. 175, 197, 208, 210, 224, 255, 262, 319, 358, 407, 450 and 465). Schiesaro (1984) examines Lucretius’ use of nonne vides as “un preciso segnale che indica al lettore il passagio ad una illustrazione esemplificativa” (145), which he connects to Horace’s father’s use of nonne vides as introducing a didactic digression into examples of moral vice (149). Cf. Verg. G. 1.56: nonne vides (used to introduces examples of the natural products peculiar to certain regions) as well as 3.103 and 3.250. Horace also quotes from Lucretius within the context of his Epicurean education at 1.5.101: namque deos didici securum agere aevum (“I have learned that the gods lead a care-free life”), to which cf. Lucr. 5.82.
concepts, eventually forming a kind of database for future reference and investigation. The Epicureans identify these categorized memories as “anticipations” (προλήψεις), which, in addition to being a reference point for scientific investigation, are also a prerequisite for successful communication. Diogenes offers the following definition:

Τὴν δὲ πρόληψιν λέγουσιν οἰονεὶ κατάληψιν ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν ἢ ἔννοιαν ἢ καθολικὴν νόησιν ἐναποκειμένην, τούτεστι μνήμην τοῦ πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος. (Arr. 1.33.1-4)

And they say that prolēpsis is either an apprehension, or a correct opinion, or thought, or stored, general idea; that is to say, a memory of that which has often appeared from outside.

Horace’s empirical training, for example, would have provided him with an acute cognitive awareness of the vices, challenges and temptations associated with living in contemporary Rome, of which his compatriots certainly would have been aware: political corruption (1.6.51-2: prava | ambitione), sexual promiscuity (ibid. 68: mala lustra) and insatiable greed (ibid.: avaritiam) in addition to the economic and sexual vices mentioned in Sermones 1.4. According to Horace’s description, however, it was his father’s verbal cues that allowed him to identify and ultimately communicate these realities by associating them with the corresponding Latin words early on

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41For the meaning of “universal” (καθολική) within the context of Epicurean epistemology as distinct from the Aristotelian tradition, see Asmis (1984) 63.

42The most useful modern treatments of πρόληψεις are the following: Kleve (1963); Long (1971) 119-22; Manuwald (1972); Asmis (1984) 61-80; Glidden (1985) 175-217. For a discussion of the scholarly debate regarding whether προλήψεις are acquired through multiple sensory experiences or inborn, the origin of which is an apparent discrepancy between the accounts of Diogenes (Arr. 1.33.1-4) and Cicero (N.D. 1.44 and Fin. 1.31), see Manuwald (1972) 3-39 and Asmis (1984) 66-72. More recent interpretations are the conflicting views of Sedley (2011) 28-52 and Konstan (2011) 53-71. Cf. also Lucretius 478-79 (= Arr. 1.32.9): Invenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam | notitiem veri neque sensus posse refelli (“You will find that it is from the senses in the first instance that the concept [i.e., προλήψεις] of truth has come, and that the senses cannot be refuted”). See Bailey (1947) 1239 for the identification of notities with προλήψεις.
(1.4.120-21): *sic me formabat puerum dictis* (“Thus he would form me with his words”). His father, therefore, is the origin not only of his moral integrity, but also of the moral vocabulary he so often employs elsewhere in his satiric portraits: *turpis* (1.2.85, 102; 1.3.39, 100 1.6.63, 84; 1.9.75; 2.1.65; 2.7.55, 59, 91); *honestus* (1.2.42); *inhonestus* (1.6.36); *inutilis* (2.8.12); *rectus* (1.1.107; 1.2.37, 74, 82, 90; 2.1.21; 2.2.100; 2.3.88, 162, 201; 2.6.75; 2.7.25). This is the language of traditional Roman ethics, but its presence in the *Sermones* is partly a conscious imitation of the conversational diction and plain style advocated by the Stoic philosopher Panaetius and put into practice by Lucilius, as well as the Roman comic playwrights and later satirists like Persius (cf. 5.14: *verba togae*). What makes this language traditional, however, is precisely the fact that it is the conventional, universally accepted means of communicating the moral and cultural values shared by all Romans. In some ways, this connection between concepts and words reflects Epicurus’ assertion that the use of everyday language, the utterance of which evokes the shared concept in a given society, is essential for proper communication, since one can only express common features of reality in conjunction with linguistic convention:

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43 Schrijvers (1993) 58-9 describes this language as corresponding to the conventionally accepted “éthique populaire” of ancient Rome, which reflects Horace’s father’s persona as a traditional *paterfamilias* concerned for his son’s moral purity. Cf. Lucilius’ definition of virtue (1329-330 M): *virtus, scire, homini rectum, utile quid sit, honestum, quae bona, quae mala item, quid inutile, turpe, inhonestum* (“Virtue is for a man to know what is right, what is useful and honorable, what is good, bad, useless, base, dishonorable”).

44 Cf. Cic. *Off*. 1.134-37 for a discussion of the characteristics of *sermo* as “easy and not at all dogmatic” (*lenis minimeque pertinax*). This definition is important, since it relates to Cicero’s distinction in *Fin*. 3.3 regarding Torquatus’ conversational style (*sermone*), which has allowed for a clear discussion (*dilucida oratio*), and the Stoics’ more complex and dialectical approach to philosophy, which is a “very subtle or rather thorny style of argument” (*subtile vel spinosum potius disserendi genus*). This may be compared to Cic. *Ac*. 1.5 (a criticism of the Epicureans’ conversational style): *Vides autem . . . non posse nos Amafini aut Rabiri similes esse, qui nulla arte adhibita de rebus ante oculos positis vulgari sermone disputant* (“You see, moreover, that we cannot be similar to Amafinius or Rabirius, who discuss things that lie open to the view in ordinary language”).
First of all, Herodotus, we must grasp the ideas attached to words, in order that we may be able to refer them and so to judge the inferences of opinion or problems of investigation or reflection, so that we may not either leave everything uncertain and go on explaining to infinity or use words devoid of meaning. For this purpose it is essential that the first mental image associated with each word should be regarded, and that there should be no need of explanation, if we are really to have a standard to which to refer a problem of investigation or reflection or mental inference.45

Diogenes notes that in his writings Epicurus was concerned above all with clarity of expression (Arr. 1.13.10-14.1: σαφηνείαν), so much so that the grammarian Aristophanes criticized his “conventional diction” (λέξις κυρία) as being “too pedestrian” (ἰδιωτάτη).46 With the obvious exception of philosophical vocabulary, which would have been out of place in a traditionally

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45 Cf. Arr. 2.75.1-76.7 and Lucr. 5.1028-90 for the Epicurean doctrine of the evolution of language. Other discussions of language theory in general are in Long (1971) 114-33 and Atherton (2008) 198-203. Not all scholars agree, however, on the precise relationship of anticipations to the words that signify them. See, for example, the conflicting views of Manuwald (1972) 111-14 and Glidden (1983) 221-24. Horace includes a parodic imitation of Lucretius’ account of the evolution of language at 1.3.103-4, for which see Ferri (1993) 38 and Freudenburg (1993) 26. Harrison (2007) 85, on the other hand, considers such imitation “no so much parody as a shift of generic framework.”

46 Cic. Fin. 2.15 acknowledges Epicurus’ concern for communicating clearly: Epicurus autem . . . plane et aperte . . . de re . . . iam in vulgus pervagata loquitur (“But Epicurus . . . speaks plainly and clearly . . . about things that are generally familiar already”). This is also one of the hallmarks of Lucretius’ style (cf. 1.136-45), as Bailey (1947) 623 notes: “[W]hereas Cicero invented Latin words to correspond to the Greek . . . Lucr. preferred to express the ideas in words for the most part already in circulation . . . Lucr. no doubt had in mind here Epicurus’ precepts as regards the use of words in their obvious meaning.” Cicero apologizes for inventing new words in order to express philosophical ideas in the introduction to his exposition of Stoic ethics (Fin. 3.1-5), which includes the following statement: verba parienda sunt imponendaque nova rebus novis nomina (“Words must be created and new terms invented for new concepts”). On Cicero as a pioneer in the philosophical vocabulary of Latin, see Powell (1995b) 288-97.
Roman genre, this hermeneutical approach could also be applied to Horatian satire, which, on account of having been informed by the teachings of a patēr idioticus, is presented as nothing more than “pure conversation” (1.4.48: sermo merus) that employs unadorned, everyday speech in order to communicate moral truth. Furthermore, the ostensibly prosaic, down-to-earth nature of the Sermones is perfectly consistent with Horace’s concern in the Ars Poetica for avoiding obscurity of expression (cf. 26: obscurus) and preserving syntactical clarity (256: lucidus ordo). The fact, moreover, that the obscurity traditionally associated with poetry is one of Philodemus’ major objections to viewing it as an ideal medium for communicating philosophical truth may be significant: perhaps in response to Epicurus’ views on language and Philodemus’ poetic theory, Horace designed his Sermones to be friendly chats, which are “closer to conversations” (1.4.42: sermoni propriora) than to poetry and therefore suitably communicate

47 One thinks of Horace’s rejection of hybrid and unusual words (1.10.23-30) and Quirinus’ injunction to compose in pure Latin (see n. 17 above). Cf. also Horace’s description of Satyr plays at Ars. 231-35, which implies that trivial poetry (231: levis versus), i.e., satire (cf. 1.4.53: leviora), employs the “usual and conventional words” (inornata et dominantia nomina). Fairclough (1991) 470 and Rudd (1989) 189 equate dominantia with κυρία, which recalls Epicurus’ writing style as described above. Horace’s concern for the use of conventional language is explicitly stated in the Ars Poetica:

\[
\text{multa renascentur quae iam cecidere, cadentque quae nunc sunt in honore vocabula, si volet usus, quem penes arbitrium est et ius et norma loquendi. (AP 70-72)}
\]

Many terms that have fallen out of use shall be born again, and those shall fall that are now in repute, if Usage so will it, in whose hands lies the judgment, the right and the rule of speech.

48 Lucretius attempts to justify his decision to communicate Epicurean doctrine through poetry by appealing to his clarity of expression (cf. 1.993-94: lucida carmina) and charm (cf. 1.28: leporem), for which see Asmis (1995) 33. Cf. also Cic. Orat. 1.94: quod eum statutebam disertum, qui posset satis acute, atque dilucide, apud mediocres homines ex communi quadam opinione dicere (“For I held up as a model of eloquence, the orator who can speak among average men about matters of common opinion with enough skill and clarity”).
moral wisdom through conventional language expressed in an ostensibly prosaic manner.\textsuperscript{49} In light of this, the simplicity and directness so characteristic of Horace’s expression in the \textit{Sermones}, which originates with his father’s training, may owe at least something to Epicurus’ and Philodemus’ concerns regarding clarity and the use of the obvious meanings of words for the sake of practicality.

The primacy of sensation and ability to express accurately the concepts which develop from sense experiences are prerequisites for knowledge and communication; as Aristotle points out in the \textit{Ethica Nicomachea}, however, the ultimate purpose of moral virtue is correct action (1103b30: \textit{πῶς πρακτέον \προακτέον}). Plato was perhaps to first philosopher to examine seriously the philosophical significance of pleasure (\textit{ἡδονή}) with regard to action,\textsuperscript{50} and both Aristotle and Epicurus recognize the role of pleasure and pain in motivating ethical decisions (cf. Arr. 1.34.7-9).\textsuperscript{51} Epicurus’ position, however, was controversial because it identified all pleasure as “inherently good and natural” (Arr. 4.129.1: \textit{ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν}),\textsuperscript{52} although he makes an important distinction regarding choices and avoidances:

\textsuperscript{49} Philodemus mentions the superiority of prose for communicating philosophical truth at \textit{De poem}. col. 28.26-32. See also Asmis (1995) 28.

\textsuperscript{50} The most extensive source of information comes from Socrates’ expression of hedonistic doctrines in \textit{Protag}. 351b4-358d5. For a detailed examination of Plato’s understanding of pleasure and the evidence from other dialogues, see Gosling and Taylor (1982) 45-192.


\textsuperscript{52} The notion that pleasure is naturally ingrained in all humans, which is known as the “cradle argument,” was also expressed by Aristotle at \textit{Eth. Nic.} 1105a2-4 and corresponds to the Stoic doctrine of self-preservation or \textit{οἰκείωσις}. It was, in other words, quite popular among philosophers in antiquity (see Cic. \textit{Fin.} 5.55). Epicurus does not refer to it explicitly, but the
But although [pleasure] is the first good and natural, we do not on account of this choose every pleasure; rather, there are times when we pass over many pleasures if more misery will follow as a consequence. And we reckon that there are many pains better than pleasures, whenever a greater pleasure will come to us after some time as a result of enduring those pains.

Ethical decisions, therefore, are sound if they ultimately result in more pleasure than pain, which will only be possible if such decisions are made in accordance with desires that observe the requirements of nature (cf. Arr. 4.127 and 5.149.1-8). Otherwise, the result will be overwhelmingly detrimental, as Philodemus explains in *De elect.* col. 5.7-14: ἕνεκα γὰρ τῶν ἄναγκαιοτάτων τὰ χαλεπώτατ' ἀναδέχονται κακά (“Men suffer the worst evils because of the most alien desires which they regard as most necessary.”) The reason for this suffering is that their pleasures will be outweighed by the pains that follow, whereas those who have grown accustomed (1.4.105: insuevit) to calculate pleasures responsibly and whose dispositions are morally sound (129: sanus) will likely escape this predicament. Horace, for example, will choose to avoid making unnecessary expenditures and indulging in illicit sexual affairs on account of the terrible consequences that often accompany such behavior; this reaction,

53 This is an expression of Epicurus’ threefold division of desires as follows: natural and necessary (e.g., food), natural but unnecessary (e.g., sex) and unnatural and unnecessary (e.g., fame). See Annas (1989) 147-52 for an explanation of the necessity of such a division. Cf. also Pl. *Rep.* 558d-559c and Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1148b15-1149a24 for discussions of necessary/unnecessary and natural/unnatural pleasures.
moreover, is described as the practical result (129: ex hoc) of his father’s training, which deterred him from social and economic failure:

\[ \text{avidos vicinum funus ut aegros} \]
\[ \text{exanimat mortisque metu sibi parcere cogit,} \]
\[ \text{sic teneros animos aliena opprobria saepe} \]
\[ \text{abserrent vitis.} \quad (S. 1.4.126-28) \]

As a neighbor’s funeral scares gluttons when sick, and makes them, through fear of death, careful of themselves, so the tender mind is oft deterred from vice by another’s shame.

As Horace implies, it is the dreaded prospect of suffering similar fates as individuals like Baius and Scetanus which motivates his decision to flee (128: absterrent). More likely than not, this abstinence from the transitory pleasures offered by material possessions and sexual gratification was a source of pain for young Horace, as the verbs “wish” (111: velit) and “enjoy” (113: uti) suggest. Nevertheless, the choice to avoid them is proportionately beneficial: it will ultimately contribute to the preservation of his patrimony and reputation (118: vitam famamque), which is a far greater pleasure indeed. This method of calculating the potential outcomes of ethical

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54 Epicurus distinguishes between “kinetic” pleasure, which is caused by the active motion of agreeable atoms in the sense organs (e.g., sexual gratification), and “katastematic” pleasure, which refers to the state of physical and mental freedom from all atomic disturbances (e.g., not being plagued by poverty and scandal). See Arr. 1.136.1-3. For detailed examinations of this division, see Rist (1972) 102-11, Gosling and Taylor (1982) 365-96, Giannantoni (1984) 25-44, Long (1986) 64-6 and Mistis (1988) 45-51. It should be noted that Horace’s father does not deter his son from sexual pleasure itself, which is inherently good, but from the pursuit of illicit pleasure, which will result in greater pain through the destruction of his reputation.

55 The preservation of one’s reputation was repudiated by the Cynics, as Fiske (1971) 317, who gives Teles’ record of Bion’s opinion concerning reputations, shows: πρὸς δόξαν καὶ ἀδοξίαν ἰσως ἐχοντα (“[He said that] he was equally disposed towards a good reputation or a bad one”). On the other hand, it was obviously of great importance to the Romans as well as to Philodemus, who was writing for a Roman audience and addresses this issue in his treatise De adulatione (PHerc. 222 col. 4.4-8): [ἡ] δόξα τοινυν χαριαν ἀσφαλειας ἐδιωχθη κατα φύσιν, ἢν ἔξεστιν ἐχειν και ἰδιωτη και φιλοσοφωι, κακια[ς δ´ ου] πάσης (”A good reputation, which
decisions in terms of foreseeable pleasure is an expression of the so-called hedonic calculus, which Horace clearly incorporates into his moral deliberations:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{neque enim, lectulus aut me} \\
\text{porticus exceptit, desum mihi: rectius hoc est;} \\
\text{hoc faciens vivam melius; sic dulcis amicis} \\
\text{occurram; hoc quidam non belle. numquid ego illi} \\
\text{imprudens olim faciam simile'?} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(S. 1.4.133-36)

For when my couch welcomes me or I stroll in the colonnade, I do not fail myself: “This is the better course: if I do that, I shall fare more happily; thus I shall delight the friends I meet: that was ugly conduct of so and so. Is it possible that I may ever thoughtlessly do something like that?”

The inclusion of the comparative adverbs \textit{rectius} and \textit{melius} effectively implies moral deliberation in terms of comparison or calculation, while the tense establishes futurity. Epicurus gives similar advice:

\[
\text{Πρὸς πάσας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας προσακτέον τὸ ἐπερώτημα τοῦτο· τί μοι γενήσεται ἂν τελεσθῇ τὸ κατὰ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐπιζητούμενον; καὶ τί ἐὰν μὴ τελεσθῇ;} \\
\text{(Arr. 6.71)}
\]

Let the following question be posed regarding all desires: what will happen to me if this desire is fulfilled? What will happen if it is not fulfilled?

Once again, the programmatic element of this passage alludes not only to the language Horace will employ throughout the \textit{Sermones}, but also to way in which he will evaluate his

\footnote{See Arr. 129.9-130.3 for the importance of “calculating” (συμμετρήσει), through careful “consideration” (τῇ βλέψει), the “advantages” (συμφερόντων) and “disadvantages” (ἀσυμφόρων) of ethical judgments. Cf. also Cic. \textit{Fin.} 1.32-33 for Torquatus’ description of the hedonic calculus. Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 30 recognize the “elementaren Sätzen epikureicher Ethik” in this passage; Gowers (2012) 180, on the other hand, refers to Horace’s deliberations as “hypercritical calculation,” which overlooks the philosophical undertones presently under discussion.}

both the philosopher and the layman can have, is pursued for the sake of security in accordance with nature, but not by means of every vice”). Gargiulo (1981) 103-27 provides an edition and translation of this text.
contemporaries’ ethical decisions with respect to the pleasure calculus. At *Sermones* 1.1.56-8, for example, Horace illustrates the detrimental effects of unnecessary desires (57: *plenior . . . iusto*) by employing a weather metaphor involving drowning, which recalls his father’s expression “you will swim without the cork” (1.4.120: *nabis sine cortice*) and may allude to the Epicureans’ predilection for such metaphors.57 The Epicurean calculus is also clearly invoked at 1.2.38-9, where “pleasure is marred by much pain” (*multo corrupta dolore voluptas*), and a similar example occurs later on at 78-9: *desine matronas sectarier, unde laboris | plus haurire mali quam ex re decerpere fructus* (“cease to court matrons, for thence one may derive pain and misery, rather than reap enjoyment in the reality”).58 Horace again contextualizes decisions by the calculation of pleasures and pains in *Sermones* 1.6, in which he states that he would “avoid” (99: *nollem*) carrying the distressful burden of political office (99: *onus molestum*) because it would result in comparatively more financial (100: *maior res*) and social (101: *salutandi plures*) responsibilities; rather, he intends to “live more pleasurably” (130: *victurum suavius*) by being content with his meager fare and life of leisure (111-31).59 It is important to note, moreover, that in the same poem Horace identifies the “cause” of his ability to make such decisions as his father’s moral training (71: *causa fuit pater his*), suggesting that the underlying foundation of

57 Horace describes the Aufidus River in *Sermones* 1.1.56-60 as bringing *turbatam aquam*, to which cf. *Lucr. 2.1: mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis* (“on the great sea the winds trouble the waters”). *Kiessling-Heinze* (1910) 73 describe Horace in *Sermones* 1.4.120 as a “gelernter rüstiger Schwimmer im Strome des Lebens,” obviously indicating a weather metaphor. This kind of language was a common feature of Epicurean ethics; cf. especially *Epicurus’ use of χειμάζων* (Arr. 1.137.4) and *χειμών* (Arr. 4.128.5-6). For similar expressions in Philodemus’ works, see *Voogs* (1934). Even the Epicurean identification of *ἀταραξία* as the *summum bonum* originates in an expression associated with weather, since it literally means “freedom from being stirred up.”

58 See Curran (1970) 223 for a similar interpretation involving the pleasure calculus.

59 Note the use of comparatives (*maior, plures, suavius*), as in 1.4: *rectius* (134); *melius* (125).
this evaluative method was laid by none other than the bumpkin father who had earlier
disavowed any knowledge of such philosophical “causes” (1.4.116: causas).

According to Horace’s description, this pedagogical method effectively provided him
with a virtuous disposition, which the poet describes in terms of contentment (108: contentus)
and health (129: sanus). The former is communicated through his exposure to examples of
economic failure, which was intended to emphasize the benefits of living frugally and content
with one’s possessions (107-8): parce frugaliter atque | viverem uti contentus eo, quod mi ipse
parasset (“he would encourage me to live thriftily, frugally, and content with what he had saved
for me”). Horace’s decision to use contentus is noteworthy, since its literal meaning suggests
that his desires will rarely exceed the limits of nature, as Cicero’s Epicurean spokesman
Torquatus explains (Fin. 1.44): ut sapiens solum, amputata circumcisaeque inanitate omni et
errore, naturae finibus contentus sine aegritudine possit et sine metu vivere (“Hence, only the
wise man, who prunes away all the rank growth of vanity and error, can possibly live untroubled
by sorrow and by fear, content within the bounds that nature has set”). He will not, for

60This positive outcome should be contrasted with Demea’s utter failure to educate
Ctesipho in Adelphoe, for which see especially Demea’s lamentation speech (855-81). Courtney
(2013) 94 ignores this obvious contrast and instead focuses on the “minor flaws” shared by both
Horace and Ctesipho.

61Cf. De oec. col. 16.1-12 for Philodemus’ discussion the importance of being content
and satisfied with little (τὰ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἱκανά) within the context of property management. This
treatise has recently been translated by Tsouna (2012), who, as mentioned in the Introduction,
also provides a useful commentary.

for a discussion of the limits of “natural wealth” (ὁ πλοῦτος κατὰ φύσιν). The “limits
of nature” doctrine was also of particular importance for the Cynics’ understanding of αὐτάρκεια.
See Oltramare (1926) 49-54 for the evidence as well as Desmond (2008) 150-61. For Epicurus’
qualification of αὐτάρκεια as the willingness to subsist with few possession rather than the
actual intention to do so (i.e., the Cynic practice), see Arr. 4.130.5-7. This will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter 2.
example, mistake the most unnecessary things (i.e., luxury goods) for the most necessary (i.e., a secure livelihood), as Philodemus warns in *De electionibus et fugis*:

> μετὰ δὲ ταύτα καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν περί τῶν ἁγιῶν καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ διαφοράς ἀναλόγως· ἐπειδὴ καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἀδιαληψίαν μεγάλα γίνεται δαιμόνια κατὰ τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ φυγάς. "(De elect. col. 5.4-11)

Having looked into these matters, one should also consider the differences among desires, both with regard to the pleasures and with regard to their causes. For it is on account of the failure to distinguish between them that important errors occur through them with respect to choices and avoidances.

The importance of being content with the requirements of nature and the understanding that these are “easily satisfied” (Arr. 4.130.9, 133.1-5; 5.144.1-2: εὐπόριστον), which Horace owes to his father’s training, forms the backdrop to many of his evaluations of vicious behavior in the *Sermones*. Aside from growing accustomed to live frugally, Horace also indicates that the ultimate result of calculating pleasure in accordance with correct desires is “health” (1.4.129: sanus ab illis). This allusion to the familiar medical analogy, which was enormously popular in ancient Greek philosophy, may also reflect Epicurus’ description of frugality and

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63 The important concept of being “content” occurs often in the *Sermones*: 1.1.3, 118; 1.3.16; 1.6.96; 1.10.60, 74; 2.2.110; 2.7.20, 97. For passages involving the “limits of nature,” see the following: 1.1.74-5 (to which, cf. Arr. 6.34), 1.2.111-13 and 1.6.127-28 (to which, cf. Arr. 4.130.9-131.1).

64 Cf. Horace’s parodic definition of the Stoic sage at *Ep.* 1.1.107-8: [sapiens est] liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum, | praeceps sanus (“[The wise man is] free, honored, beautiful, nay a king of kings; above all, sound”). For medical analogies among the Stoics, see Cic. *Tusc.* 3.1-21.

65 It was popular at almost every stage of Greek philosophy, beginning with the sophists (if not earlier) and extending into the Hellenistic period and beyond. Useful treatments of this rich subject include Wehrli (1951) 177-84, Jaeger (1957) 54-61 and Nussbaum (1994). Cf. Lucr. 4.510-11: *Et quoniam mentem sanari, corpus ut aegrum, | cernimus et flecti medicina posse videmus* (“And since we see that the mind, like a sick body, can be healed and changed by medicine”). Epicurean doctrine was commonly described in terms of medicine (cf. the
contentment as prerequisites of health and the bulwarks of a virtuous disposition (Arr. 4.131.2-7). Additionally, it may express the twofold Epicurean *sumnum bonum*, which is described in terms of health (Arr. 4.128.2: ὑγιεία) and includes the “katastematic” pleasures of freedom from physical toil (Arr. 7.2: ἀπονία) as well as from mental disturbances (Arr. 4.12.82-3, 7.2: ἀταραξία). It is perhaps not a coincidence, therefore, that Horace’s description of his virtuous upbringing and overall health is centered on the avoidance of prodigality and lust, both of which are clearly described as resulting in physical (1.4.110: *inopia*) and mental (114: *fama*) disturbances respectively. According to Epicurus’ explanation, moreover, the attainment of pleasures such as tranquility of body and mind originates in the ability to exercise “prudence” (φρόνησις), which indicates a connection to practical intent as opposed to theoretical wisdom:67

Τούτων δὲ πάντων ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν φρόνησις. Διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφίας τιμιώτερον ὑπάρχει φρόνησις, ἐξ ἧς οἱ λοιποί πάσαι πεφύκασιν ἄρεται, διδάσκουσα ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως.

(Arr. 4.132.7-12)

description of the first four Ratae sententiae as the τετραφάρμακος or “fourfold drug”). Juv. 10.356 includes a conscious imitation of Epicurean ethics: *mens sana in corpore sano* (“a healthy mind in a healthy body”). For medical imagery among the Epicureans, see Gigante (1975) 53-61, Kilpatrick (1996) 69-100 and Konstan et al. (1998) 20-3. Philodemus describes the sage as “pure” from vice in *De lib. dic.* col. 1b (7: καθαρός) and in *De grat.* col. 11 (18: καθαρούς).

66Cf. also Arr. 247. Gowers (2012) 179 translates sanus ab as “free from,” which resembles Epicurus’ description of the greatest goods in terms of the privation or lack of evil as defined by Horace at *Ep.* 1.1.41: *virtus est vitium fugere* (“To flee vice is the beginning of virtue”).

67See Bailey (1926) 338-39, who translates φρόνησις as “prudence” in contrast to the loftier and more detached σοφία. See also the LSJ s.v. φρόνησις, which offers “purpose, intention” (1) and “practical wisdom” (2) as meanings. Stob. 2.59.4 (= *SVF* 3.262) gives the Stoic understanding of this term: φρόνησιν δ’ εἶναι ἐπιστῆμην ὑπὸ ποιητέων καὶ υἱὸ ποιητέων (“[They say that] prudence is the knowledge of what ought to be done and what ought not to be done”).
Of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy: for from prudence are sprung all the other virtues, and it teaches us that it is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently and honorably and justly.

Horace suggests that such considerations motivate his ethical deliberations when he depicts them as concerned with prudent forethought (1.4.136-37): *numquid ego illi | imprudens olim faciam simile?* (“Is it possible that someday I may thoughtlessly do anything like that?”). If these self-conscious deliberations are read closely, the implication appears to be that for Horace, as for Epicurus, the life that is sweet (135: *dulcis*), beautiful (136: *belle*) and just (134: *rectius*) requires a practical sense of moral uprightness (*prudentia*).

Horace’s training, which combines sensation, communication and feelings for the purpose of moral guidance, also involves exposure to and observation of the patterns of perceptible behavior which reveal his contemporaries’ vicious dispositions. The approach to investigating invisible realities through sensory evidence is addressed by Epicurus, who states the following:

Εἶτα κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δεῖ πάντα τηρεῖν καὶ ἁπλῶς τὰς παρούσας ἐπιβολὰς εἴτε διανοιαίς εἰθ’ ὅτου δήποτε τῶν κριτηρίων, ὁμοιώς δὲ καὶ τὰ υπάρχοντα πάθη, ὅπως ἀν καὶ τὸ προσμένον καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἐχωμεν ὀίς σημειωσόμεθα.

(Arr. 2.38.3-8)

Whence it is necessary to observe everything in accordance with sensation and attendant contacts, whether of concepts or of the senses, and in accordance with the present affections, in order that we may be able to infer from signs what is currently invisible and what is invisible per se.

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68 The connection between φρόνησις and practical intent is suggested by Gowers (2012) 180, who translates *imprudens* as “unintentionally.”
According to this passage, Epicurus advocates close observation of perceptible signs through sensation, anticipations and affections, by means of which invisible realities may be inferred.69 As Philodemus explains in his methodological treatise De signis,70 however, in order to infer the presence of an imperceptible with consistent accuracy one must first gain experience by frequently “attending to the manifold variety of visible signs that accompany it” (col. 33.9-15: τὸ παντοδαπὸν ποίκιλμα τῶν φαινομένων κατοπτεύσας). After the careful observation of such signs, one appraises or “calculates the phenomena” (ibid. col. 27.22-23: ὁ τῶν φαινο[μένων] ἐπιλογισμός71), and, noting that these signs or phenomena have similarly coincided on many occasions, uses this as a basis for making the actual inference. Philodemus gives a useful

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69 Cf. Diogenes’ summary (Arr. 1.32.7-8): καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων χρὴ σημειοῦσθαι (“We must infer from perceptible signs what is imperceptible”). There are two classes of imperceptibles: that which is expected to become visible (e.g., an object blurred by distance) and that which is invisible per se (e.g., atoms and the void). Knowledge of both can be inferred through close empirical observation of the perceptible (τὰ πρόδηλα), and I follow Asmis (1984) 84-6 in translating Epicurus’ τηρεῖν as “observe,” thus distinguishing it from mere perception and linking it to this inferential method.

70 As Sedley (1982) 239-72 argues, this treatise is largely devoted to addressing criticisms from Stoic adversaries, against which Philodemus defends the inductive method of drawing conclusions based on similarity. For a more detailed analysis of the importance of the similarity method, see Allen (2001) 208-41.

71 Although references to this term in Epicurus’ extant remains are few and ambiguous, Philodemus describes ἐπιλογισμός and ἐπιλογίζεσθαι as the rational process by which an observer makes calculations, based on similarities or differences, in order to infer something regarding what is imperceptible. For the exact meaning of ἐπιλογισμός, see the contrasting views of Arrighetti (1952), De Lacy (1958, 1978), Sedley (1973), Asmis (1984) 205 n. 23, Schofield (1996) 221-38 and Tsouna (2007) 55. The reconstruction of this term in the passage quoted above is that of Philipsson and is justified by the same, better preserved expression in De sign. col. 22.37-9 (quoted again immediately below): διὰ τοῦ τῶν φαινομένων ἐπιλογισμοῦ.
example of this method in *De signis* which involves the inferential proof, based on observed similarity, that all men are mortal.\(^\text{72}\)

Nor shall I assume in advance the opposite of this statement [i.e., that all men are mortal]; but by empirical inference from appearances I shall arrive at the view that similarity must exist in this respect also. For since this property follows on the man among us, I shall assuredly judge that it follows on all men, confirming by empirical inference that the similarity must exist in this respect also.

This process of identifying external, perceptible signs as manifestations of invisible realities bears striking resemblance to the empirical methodology of ancient Greek medicine; indeed, this tradition significantly influenced the ethical approach of Epicurus’ followers, who considered the perceptible signs of vice analogous to the visible symptoms of a hidden disease, namely, the underlying disposition (διάθεσις).\(^\text{73}\) This method is of particular importance for Philodemus,

\(^{72}\)Cf. *De sign.* coll. 8.32-9.2 (a similar proof of the existence of void): Τὰ γοῦν παρακολουθοῦντα τῶι παρ’ ἡμῖν κινούμενοι, ὥν χωρὶς οὐδὲν ὀρθύμεν κ’ [νούμεν] ἐπιλογισμοῦ, τοῦτο παρὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητ’ ἀξιοῦμεν κινεῖσθαι, καὶ τὰ τρόπω τούτωι ἄνευ κενοῦ γίνομαι (“Thus we first determine empirically [ἐπιλογισμοῦ] all the conditions attendant on moving objects in our experience, apart from which we see nothing moved; then by this method we judge that all moving objects in every case are moved similarly [πρὸς τὴν ὁμοιότητ’ ἀξιοῦμεν] and this is the method by which we infer [σημειούμεθα] that it is not possible for motion to occur without void”).

whose ethical treatises often begin with a clinical description of the symptoms and signs that accompany certain vicious dispositions.\textsuperscript{74} He observes, for instance, that the presence of an individual vice such as anger can be inferred through the observation of signs that have regularly and similarly coincided with certain other phenomena:\textsuperscript{75}

\begin{quote}
\[\nu\nuει\ δ’\ \epsilonρούμεν\ \tauα\ \tauης\ \sigmaργης\ [συμπτώματα]\[α\ \epsilonινα[ι\ πως\ \ομοιότατα],\ \\kappaαν\ \περι[πτώτερον\ \τινες]\ \καταφρον[ούμενοι\ πως]\ \epsilonπι\ \πάσιν\ [σφυγώνται],\ \\kappaαι\ τα\ [συμμπτώματα\ του\ \πάθους]\ \epsilonιναι\ [πάσι\ \κοινά\ \οὐτε]\ \νέοις\ \οὐτε\ γέρουσιν\ \οὐσίων\ \εὐ[λαβεῖων.]}\ (De ir. coll. 7.26-8.8)
\end{quote}

But now we say that the symptoms of anger are very similar, even if some, being exceedingly scornful, get angry with everyone, and that the symptoms of this passion are common to all, there being safeguards for neither the young nor the old.\textsuperscript{76}

In the following section he describes, in a strikingly colorful manner reminiscent of Cynic character portraits, the symptoms of an irascible disposition in much detail (ibid. col. 8.21-38): flaring up (ἐκπυρώσεως), swelling (διοιδή[σ]εως), heaving of the lungs (διάστασιν [τ]ου πλεύμονος), redness (διερεθισμοῦ), the desire for revenge (ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ μετελθεῖν) and rapid breathing (μετεωρότερον ἄσθμα) among others.\textsuperscript{77} This method of “marking”

\textsuperscript{74}See Tsouna (2007), who discusses this method with regard to several treatises, including De adulatione (127-32), De superbia (145-51) and De ira (210-17).

\textsuperscript{75}This method is described in Epidemics 6.3.12, and Galen, for which see Deichgräber (1930) 48-49, notes that it was further developed by the Empiricist physicians, who made diagnoses by relying on the careful and frequent observation (ἐμπειρία) of visible symptoms (συμπτώματα) that often appear simultaneously in a syndrome (συνδρομή).

\textsuperscript{76}The damaged state of this passage, which Philippson (1916) 444 inserted after column 7, has been restored by the conjectures of Wilke (1914), which are consistent with Philodemus’ language and methodology in other ethical treatises.

imperceptible vices by means of drawing inferences based on similarity, which Philodemus consistently employs in his ethical treatments, was apparently a topic of heated debate in the first century BC, as the polemical tone of *De signis* and certain passages from Cicero reveal.\(^78\) It is not unreasonable to suggest, therefore, that such controversies might have contributed something to Horace’s portrayal of his father’s pedagogical method as well as his own approach to moral investigation in the *Sermones*.

In addition to reflecting an educational strategy traditionally employed by both Greeks and Romans, Horace’s father’s training may also engage with contemporary methods of sign-inference as elucidated by Philodemus in his ethical and methodological treatises. The use of visible examples for the purpose of moral instruction, which is described in passing by the sophist Protagoras and became commonplace among the Cynics,\(^79\) was also widely popular among Greek comic playwrights as well as their Roman counterparts, as the passage from Terence’s *Adelphoe* quoted above (p. 4 n. 7) clearly shows. In his treatise *De liberis educandis*, moreover, Plutarch identifies the use of “examples” (παραδείγματα) as one of the most basic and effective methods of childrearing,\(^80\) which closely resembles Philodemus’ use of the verb παραδείκνυμι in reference to the “manifestations,” “proofs” or “showings” of perceptible

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\(^79\) Pl. *Protag.* 325d2-5: διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι ὅτι “τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον,” καὶ “τόδε μὲν καλὸν, τόδε αἰσχρόν,” καὶ “τόδε μὲν ὅσιον, τόδε δὲ ἀνόσιον,” καὶ “τὰ μὲν ποίει, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ” (“By teaching and instructing them, saying that ‘this is just, that is unjust,’ and ‘this is admirable, that is shameless,’ and ‘this is pious, that is impious,’ and ‘do this, avoid that’”).

\(^80\) Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 1.16c, which bears many resemblances to Horace’s father’s method; his mention of “threats” (ἀπειλοῦντας), “prayers” (δεομένους) and the “fear of punishment” (φόβος τιμωρίας), however, strikes an admittedly discordant note.
phenomena (*De sign.* col. 27.16-17: τ[ὰ] φα[ι]νό[µενα] π[αράδειξ[ε]ς; cf. col. 28.33-34: αὐτὰ τὰ φαινόµενα παράδειξεν). With regard to Horace’s training, a similar introduction of paradigms of manifest behavior may serve as the proof or basis for an inference by similarity: that is to say, his father conducts ethical investigations by inferring (*notando*) each of the vicious dispositions (*quaeque vitiorum*) by means of manifest patterns of observable behavior (*exemplis*). The verb *noto*, in addition to establishing a connection to the Greco-Roman tradition of branding, may also mean “to infer by a sign;”\(^{81}\) thus, one may infer the time of year by observing the stars (Sen. *Ben.* 7.31.4: *notant*), just as Caesar inferred the Ides of March by means of the constellation Scorpio (*Plin. Nat.* 18.237: *notavit*), and the sun is wreathed in heat which cannot be inferred through visible signs (*Lucr.* 5.612: *notatus*).\(^{82}\) Returning to Horace’s training, inferences about hidden dispositions are made based on certain “manifestations of visible phenomena,” which, as Philodemus and Plutarch demonstrate, are expressed by the Greek *παράδειγμα* and closely correspond to the Latin *exemplum*. These phenomenal paradigms are “proofs” or “showings” of the observable symptoms and consequences which accompany particular vices, and which Philodemus identifies as being “very similar” and “common” in all victims (*De ir.* coll. 7.26-8.8: [ὁ]μοίωτατα . . . [κοινά]).\(^{83}\) The paradigms to which Horace’s father refers, therefore, correspond to the visible symptoms of individuals like Baius and Scetanus, who are “copies” or

\(^{81}\)Cf. the OLD s.v. *noto* (8), which lists the following: “to indicate by a sign; to be a sign or token of, mark.”

\(^{82}\)Horace clearly associates marks (*nota*) with signs (*signa*) in reference to conventionally accepted language at *Ars.* 58-9: *licuit semperque licebit | signatum praesente nota producere nomen* (“It has ever been, and ever will be, permitted to issue words stamped with the mint-mark of the day”). Cf. also [Cic.] *Rhet. Her.* 4.65, where he refers to the positive moral function of *notationes*, which are descriptions of another’s inner nature (*natura*) by means of clear and perceptible signs (*certis signis*).

\(^{83}\)For the reconstruction and relocation of this passage by Philippson, see n. 76 above.
“patterns” (i.e., παραδείγματα, exempla) in the sense that their actions show them to be typical representatives of their class: based on similarity, Horace learns to expect (or, more accurately, to infer) that other individuals, who, like them, suffer from lust or prodigality, will invariably display the same symptoms. As Philodemus explains, moreover, such an inference is based on the careful observation of phenomena, which, unless contradicted by other observable evidence,\textsuperscript{84} is a true and reliable conclusion:

\[ \text{ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμηριοῦσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν, μὴ' ἀπ' 
\text{τοῖς δι' αὐτῶν κατὰ 
\text{τὴν ὁμοιότητα παραδεικνυμένοις, ἀλλ' οὕτω πιστεύειν ὡς καὶ 
\text{τοῖς ἀφ' ὧν ἡ 
\text{συμπεισώσῃς.} \quad \text{(De sign. fr. 2.1-6)}}\]

[One ought not to stop with evident things] but from them make inferences about the non-apparent, and one should not mistrust the things exhibited through them by analogy but trust them just as one trusts the things from which the inference was made.

In other words, a careful inference based on similarity is as trustworthy as the initial sensory data, which is presented (in the case of ethical investigations) to the keen observer by manifest behavior and consequences. Based on his frequent exposure to his father’s empirical method, for instance, Horace can successfully “diagnose” avarice whenever he encounters a particular combination of “symptoms,” among which are included excessive toil (1.1.93: labor), universal abandonment (1.1.85: odium), squalor (2.2.53-69: sordes), envy (1.1.40: invidia), speechlessness (1.4.28: stupor) and greed (1.1.61: cupido).\textsuperscript{85} In a similar fashion, individuals who suffer from a sexual addiction commonly place themselves in dangerous situations (1.2.40: pericla), commit suicide (1.2.41: se praecipitem tecto dedit), suffer death (1.2.41-42: flagellis | ad mortem

\textsuperscript{84}Epicurus refers to a theory about phenomena as true whenever it is “not counter witnessed” (Arr. 2.50.10: μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρηθέρεσθαι) by other phenomena, and false whenever it is “counter witnessed” (ἀντιμαρτυρουμένου). See also Asmis (1984) 145 and 178-79.

\textsuperscript{85}These “symptoms” and their consequences will be discussed in Chapter 2.
caesus), buy their own safety (1.2.43: *dedit hic pro corpore nummos*), ruin their reputations (1.2.61: *famam*) and undergo tremendous toil (1.2.78: *laboris*). The irascible disposition is characterized by the inability to meet slight offenses with a calculated response (1.3.78: *ponderibus modulisque*), which results in egregious acts of violence such as beatings (1.3.119: *horribili . . . flagello*) and executions (1.3.82: *cruce*); in addition to this, the irascible individual may be detected by means of physiological changes in voice and appearance (1.3.136: *rumperis et latras*). Finally, the flatterer shows signs of a vicious disposition through his social interactions with wealthy or influential figures, which include accosting them in the street (1.9.3: *accurrit*), imitating or mimicking their usual behavior (1.9.23-5), constant and obsequious prattle (1.9.13: *garriret*) and a relentless desire to eliminate any competition for their victim’s favor (1.9.48: *summosses omnis*). By having recourse to the similarity method of sign inference as described above, Horace may safely conclude that such vicious behaviors will consistently accompany the presence of their corresponding dispositions in every instance and at all times.

Of course, it is highly unlikely that Horace had more than a rudimentary understanding of such logical controversies (or was even interested in the relevant details), but this reliance on empirical signs and observation would have appealed easily to a satirical poet with Epicurean tendencies: in addition to allowing Horace many opportunities for humorous depictions of moral deficiency, such a method would simultaneously facilitate his investigations by improving the accuracy of his conclusions. And while one can hardly suggest that the philosophical undertones of Horace’s training reflect anything about the poet outside of the fictitious world he constructs, within a literary construct, in which he endeavors to engage with contemporary society in the

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86 This disposition and that of the irascible individual will be discussed in Chapter 4.

87 The characteristics relating to the flatterer’s disposition will be examined in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
capacity of a trained moralist, it contributes to the justification of his ethical superiority and the creation of a quasi-philosophical persona. The preceding examination has considered in detail the Epicurean aspects of Horace’ father’s pedagogical method, which, as part of a programmatic poem, has implications for the poet’s methodology elsewhere in the *Sermones*. In addition to enriching the traditional interpretation of Horatian satire, moreover, these considerations have also attempted to explore (at least in part) the debates and issues relevant to Epicureanism in the first century BC, of which Horace was certainly aware. The next chapter will continue the investigation of Epicureanism in Horace’s *Sermones* by considering the significance of this quasi-philosophical persona for the poet’s social interactions and contributions to his relationship with his patron Maecenas. This will involve the introduction of parallels between Epicurean economic theory, as preserved by Philodemus’ treatises *De divitiis* and *De oeconomia*, and Horace’s portrayal of his patron-client relationship, his management of the financial benefits that resulted from it and his criticisms of wealth administration in the *Sermones*. 
According to Philodemus’ description in *De oeconomia*, the most appropriate source of income for the Epicurean sage is the generosity of a patron, who expresses his “gratitude” (col. 23.27: εὐχάριστον) for useful advice in the form of financial benefits. The following chapter will consider the ways in which Horace attempts to replicate the dynamics of this ideal relationship by presenting himself as the recipient of Maecenas’ generous gifts, which he earns by sharing moral advice through his poetry. A preliminary consideration of the patterns associated with patronage among Epicureans, including the primacy of philosophical discussion, the essential role of intimate friendship and the selection of a benefactor suitably receptive to Epicurean doctrine, will establish the context necessary for appreciating a similar relationship between Horace and Maecenas, particularly as portrayed in *Sermones* 1.6. More specifically, this will include examinations of how their respective roles as patron and client reflect the ideal Epicurean community as explained by Philodemus: as the morally pure client, for example, Horace dedicates to his patron satiric verses that are the equivalent of useful “advice” (1.4.133: consilium; 1.6.130: consolor); as the thankful patron, Maecenas expresses gratitude in the form of impressively generous remunerations. In the process of considering these roles it will also be important to demonstrate, on the one hand, the potential of poetry for moral instruction (which conflicts with Philodemus’ literary views) and, on the other hand, the lavishness of these gifts and Horace’s willingness to accept them (which are consistent with Philodemus’ economic views). The examination will conclude by investigating the actual content of Horace’s *consilia*
as expressed in *Sermones* 1.1, in which the poet invites Maecenas to consider the vulgar masses’ financial choices and (imitating his father’s method) presents him with examples of behavior typically associated with economic vice.

Horace’s portrayal of his relationship with Maecenas may owe something to the Epicurean identification of patronage as based on the exchange of philosophical advice for economic benefits, which occurs within the context of intimate friendship. According to Epicurus, patronage is the only acceptable means of acquiring wealth in order to provide for the necessities of life (Arr. 1.121b.4-6): χρηματίσεσθαί τε, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας, ἀποφήσαντα. καὶ μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν (“[He said that the sage] will be ready to make money, but only when he is in straits and by means of his philosophy. He will pay court to a king as occasion demands”). This statement reflects a system of patronage that developed in the Hellenistic period and involved the exchange of benefits for political advice or moral instruction (i.e., λόγοι, consilia), usually offered to a monarch or wealthy potentate.\(^1\) Antigonus Gonatas, for example, famously surrounded himself with philosophers like Bion of Borysthenes, who offered him ethical advice in exchange for financial benefits.\(^2\) With regard to Epicurus, fragmentary evidence from Philodemus reveals that he received substantial support from a

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\(^1\)For the origins of this system in the mobile *consilium* of companions that followed Alexander the Great and advised his royal Successors, see Plaumann’s *RE* article s.v. Ἐταῖροι, 1374-380. Other important sources are conveniently listed by Allen and DeLacy (1989) 59 n. 1. For a more recent study, see Gold (1987) 35-7.

\(^2\)Cf. especially Kindstrand (1976) F16A: καὶ σὺ μὲν εὔπορος γενόμενος δίδως ἐλευθερίας, ἐγὼ δὲ λαμβάνω εὐθαρσώς παρὰ σοῦ οὐχ ὑποπίπτων οὐδὲ ἀγεννίζων οὐδὲ μεμψιμοιρῶν (“You give freely out of your wealth, and I cheerfully accept without suspicion, boorishness or complaints about my lot”). Bion’s acceptance of money in exchange for wisdom, which would have been unacceptable to so-called “hard” Cynics like Diogenes, is due to his eclecticism (cf. Diog. Laert. 4.47: σοφιστὶς ποικίλος), for which see Desmond (2008) 33-6. For a discussion of Cynics as court-philosophers, see Dudely (1974) 69.
wealthy landowner and financial officer of Lysimachus named Mithres, with whom the philosopher had corresponded often and shared sage advice through an ethical treatise entitled *Sententiae de vitiis* (Arr. 1.28.9-10). Epicurus’ contempt for the vulgar masses (Arr. 6.29: τῶν πολλῶν), avoidance of public speaking (Arr. 1.121b7-8), encouragement of semi-private communal meals and gatherings and high regard for the value of friendship, moreover, suggests that his frequent exchanges with Mithres contributed to the formation of a close bond. In addition to this, Diogenes remarks on the philosopher’s practice of addressing friends and patrons with affectionate titles like “dearest” and “my lord” (Arr. 1.4.10-6.5), while Plutarch preserves anecdotes relating how Epicurus went so far as to ransom Mithres from the hands of Crates, a Macedonian general related to Antigonus Gonatas. All of this suggests that Epicurean

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3Diogenes mentions Mithres briefly at Arr. 1.4.10-5.1. See also Beloch (1926) 331-35. Castaldi (1928) 293-99 early on presented the evidence from the treatise *De Epicuro* (PHerc. 1418), in which Philodemus records Epicurus’ correspondence, mostly involving requests for financial support, with members and associates of the Garden, especially Mithres. For the evidence, see the edition of Militello (1997), in which the name of Mithres appears more frequently than that of even Epicurus.


5Arr. 5.148.9-10 (to which, cf. Cic. *Fin.* 1.20): Ὅν ἡ σοφία παρασκευάζεται εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου βίου μακαριότητα, πολὺ μέγιστὸν ἐστιν ἡ τῆς φιλίας κτήσις (“Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, by far the greatest is the possession of friendship”).

6Castaldi (1928) 299-300 rejects Diogenes’ record of Epicurus as a flatterer of Mithres (Arr. 1.4.11: αἰσχρῶς κολακεύειν) as “molto esagerata” and maintains that Epicurus considered his patron a “vero amico.” For the Epicurean practice of employing terms of endearment with members and associates of the school, see Philodemus *De lib. dic.* fr. 14.5-10. The issue of flattery will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

7Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 77.1126e (*Adversus Colotem*) and 76.1097b (*Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum*) for the accounts. It is also possible that Philodemus himself refers to this

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patronage was informed early on by the important role of philosophical friendship, which is corroborated by later evidence showing that Roman Epicureans in the first century BC regarded genuine friendship as possible within the highly formalized system of amicitia.

In *De oeconomia*, Philodemus advances views concerning patronage that define it as a most acceptable source of income that is strengthened and enriched by the bonds of friendship; in fact, friends are so important that they define economic decisions (col. 15.3-6) and are regarded as the “most secure treasures” (ibid. col. 25.4: ἀσφαλέστατοι θησαυροι). His acceptance of other sources of revenue such as agriculture and entrepreneurship (ibid. col. 23.11-22) probably reflects the sensitivities of wealthy Romans (ibid. col. 25.38: ἐν [ο]ϊ Ῥωμαίων) while faithfully adhering to Epicurus’ emphatic identification of patronage based on the exchange of philosophical discussions as the ideal economic state:¹⁰


(*De oec.* col. 23.22-36)

It is superior and better by far to receive gratitude and respect in return for wise discussions shared with receptive men, which is what happened to Epicurus. Moreover, these discussions should be truthful, free from strife, and, in a word, peaceful, since event in *De Epic.* coll. 28-9, for which see Militello (1997) 37-9. Beloch (1926) 331-35 considers the evidence in more detail.


⁹See also Asmis (1990) 2389 and Tsouna (2007) 182 (especially n. 36).

¹⁰Cf. Stob. *Ecl.* 2 (= *SVF* 3.686) and Plut. *Mor.* 75. 1043ε (*De communibus notitiis* = *SVF* 3.693) for the Stoic description of the three acceptable ways of life as “royal” (βασιλικόν), “political” (πολιτικόν) and “intellectual” (ἐπιστημονικόν).
holding discourse through sophistical and contentious speeches is no better than doing this through demagogical and slandering ones.

The primacy of philosophical discussion reflects Epicurus’ aforementioned injunction to earn a living “from wisdom alone” (Arr. 1.121.4: ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας), but it may also reflect the nature of Philodemus’ correspondence with the aristocrat and politician L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, to whom he had dedicated a politico-ethical treatise entitled De bono rege secundum Homerum. In addition to this, Piso was also the dedicatee of an epigrammatic poem, in which Philodemus addresses him as “dearest” (27.1: φίλτατε), refers to himself as a companion (ibid. 2: ἕταρος) and personally invites him (ibid. 7: Πείσων) to partake of the ritual festivities associated with “the Twentieth,” a semi-private celebration held monthly in honor of Epicurus. As David Sider explains, the dynamics of their friendship is communicated partly by the vocabulary Philodemus employs:

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11See Laurenti (1973) 164-66. According to Diogenes’ account, Chrysippus also recommended making money from wisdom (7.188 = SVF 3.685: ἀπὸ σοφίας), although Plutarch further defines this source as “sophistry” (Mor. 73.1043e = SVF 3.693: ἀπὸ σοφιστείας), which suggests the more formal and contentious speeches criticized by Philodemus above. See Natali (1995) 122-23.

12Tait (1941) 1-13 and Sider (1997) 5-14 (especially 14 n. 7) discuss the evidence in favor of the identification of Piso as Philodemus’ patron. As mentioned in the Introduction (pp. 6-7), Allen and DeLacy (1989) 59-65 question the view that Philodemus had successfully become Piso’s client and note that there is no evidence linking the latter to the Villa dei Papyri or even Herculaneum. This lack of archaeological evidence was pointed out early on by Mommsen (1880) 32-6.

13See Dorandi (1982) for an edition, translation and commentary. Asmis (1991) 4-13 discusses the treatise’s usefulness within the context of Philodemean poetic theory, which will be discussed below.

14Sider (1997) 157 gives the text along with a translation and commentary. Allen and DeLacy (1989) 64 describe the language of this epigram as “an attempt to establish firmly the relation of amicitia.” For Epicurean festival meals, see Clay (1983) 274-79. The use of superlative terms of endearment in the vocative within a philosophical context is characteristically Platonic; cf., e.g., Crat. 434e4 and Sym. 173e1 (ὦ φίλτατε).
Piso, the addressee of this poem, can be expected to understand the Epicurean connotation of friendship, but as a Roman statesman, he would know that the friendship alluded to in this poem could also evoke the patron-client relationship. For Philodemus quite clearly, if not shamelessly, is angling for reciprocal benefits from Piso in the future. In return . . . Piso will receive the combined pleases of poetry and Epicurean friendship. Piso, that is, will provide patronage, while Philodemus will provide both Epicurean ambience and poetic delights: Piso and Philodemus will be both amici—i.e. patron and poet—and φίλοι, i.e. two members of an Epicurean friendship.\footnote{Sider (1995) 47-8. For the differences between φίλοι and amici, see Gold (1987) 36.}

The intimate nature of this relationship, which Cicero easily manipulates for his own purposes in the political invective \textit{In Pisonem},\footnote{Nisbet (1987) 186 and Powell (1995) 25 have questioned the authenticity of this speech. Cicero mentions their intimacy numerous times, especially at 68: \textit{dedit se in consuetudinem sic ut prorsus una viveret nec fere ab isto umquam discederet} (“He [i.e., Piso] made it his custom to live with him thenceforth and never to depart from him”).} corresponds to Philodemus’ above emphasis on camaraderie and the importance of informal conversation that takes place in a relaxed and friendly setting.\footnote{Cf. \textit{De lib. dic.} fr. 28.3-10 for the importance of self-expression and intimate conversation within the Epicurean community. Philodemus also discusses the importance of intimate conversation (ὅμιλία, λαλία) that promotes friendship and virtue in his treatise \textit{De conversatione} (PHerc. 873), which will be discussed further in Chapter 4.}

Like Epicurus, moreover, Philodemus is accused of flattery (cf. Cic. \textit{Pis.} 70: \textit{adsentatorem}) and his friendship with Piso is deliberately misconstrued as founded on sensuality and other simple pleasures.\footnote{Cic. \textit{Pis.} 69: \textit{sic suos sensus voluptarios onmis incitavit, sic ad illius hanc orationem adhimmivit, ut non magistrum virtutis sed auctorem libidinis a se illum inventum arbitaretur} (“So much did he [i.e., Philodemus] insight all of his sensual appetites, so much did he enrapture him with this kind of rhetoric, that he fancied he had found for himself not a teacher of virtue but a source of sensuality”). Diogenes records similar accusations concerning Epicurus’ correspondence with his intimate friends (Arr. 1.5-7).} Despite Cicero’s intended misrepresentation of Epicurean pleasure as \textit{libido} (ibid. 69) and \textit{omnia stupra} (ibid. 70), however, the importance of pleasure for patronage is also communicated by Lucretius, who famously identifies his motivation in composing a
philosophical epic for Memmius as “the expected delight of your pleasant friendship” (1.140-41: sperata voluptas suavis amicitiae).\textsuperscript{19} Here again the usual patterns of Epicurean patronage emerge: the primacy of philosophical discussion, the engagement—or, in Lucretius’ case, the expected engagement—with receptive men, the role of pleasurable friendship and the concern with establishing intimacy.\textsuperscript{20} As will soon become evident, many of the characteristics of Horace’s persona’s relationship with Maecenas closely correspond to this pattern, thereby suggesting the influence of Epicurean patronage.

Horace’s correspondence with Maecenas highlights the intimacy of their relationship, which is most explicitly conveyed through introductory addresses and terms of endearment. Like Epicurus and Philodemus, many of Horace’s literary dedications to his patron are introduced by affectionate titles that communicate their friendship in Epicurean terms.\textsuperscript{21} In \textit{Carm}. 1.1, for example, he invokes Maecenas as his “bulwark and sweet glory” (2: praesidium et dulce decus meum; cf. Verg. \textit{G}. 2.40: \textit{o decus}), recalling Epicurus’ description of friendship as the strongest safeguard against evil (Cic. \textit{Fin}. 1.69: praesidium) and perhaps implying Philodemus’ declaration that one cannot live sweetly without friends (cf. \textit{De elect}. col. 14.1:

\begin{quote}

\textsuperscript{20}Cf. Lucr. 1.50-1: \textit{Quod superset, vacuas auris animumque sagacem | semotum a curis adhibe veram ad rationem} (“For the rest, ears unpreoccupied and keen intelligence detached from cares you should apply to true philosophy”).

\textsuperscript{21}Konstan (1997) 143: “Horace was disposed to prefer private friendships to public life, and his poetry is rich in tender expressions of affection.”

67
ἡδέως

He addresses Maecenas as “my dear” in *Carm.* 1.20 (5: care), which is an invitation poem that undoubtedly imitates Philodemus’ epigrammatic invocation to Piso (cf. φίλτατε, as discussed above). The sweetness of friendship is invoked once again in the *Epistulae* (1.7.12: dulcis amice), which recalls Philodemus’ advice concerning the role of terms of endearment among members of the Epicurean community mentioned above but worth quoting here (De lib. dic. fr. 14.8-10): οὐκ ἐπιλήσεται τοῦ φιλτάτου λέγω ν καὶ γλυκὰ τῶν ὁμοίων ("He [sc. the sage] will not, as he speaks, forget ‘dearest’ and ‘sweetest’ and such similar things"). The poet’s desire to celebrate festivities with his patron is similarly expressed in the *Epodi*, in which he invokes him as “blessed” (9.4: beate; cf. Arr. 82: μακάριε) and again in the *Carmina*, in which he affectionately expresses joy at the thought of celebrating the birthday of “my Maecenas” (4.11.21: Maecenas meus). According to Suetonius, moreover, Maecenas himself expressed his profound fondness for Horace by dedicating an epigram to him (Vit. Hor. 13-15):

Ni te visceribus meis, Horati,
plus iam diligo, tu tuum sodalem
†nimio videas strigosiorem.

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22 Nisbet and Hubbard (1970) 4 point out that praesidium is used of patrons whereas dulce is “naturally used of family and friends.” Cf. 1.4.135: dulcis amicis.

23 This is the consensus of all the ancient MSS. (i.e., ΞΨQ), which seems more appropriate than the “correction” offered by the codices recentiores and Bentley (i.e., clare). Cf. also Horace’s self-description as carus amicis at 1.6.70.

24 This is noted by Sider (1997) 153 and Nisbet and Hubbard (1970) 243-45, who add that here the “poet writes with affection to a more important friend.” Cf. also *Carm.* 3.8, in which Horace again invites his patron, this time addressed by name alone (13: Maecenas), to his Sabine estate in order to celebrate the anniversary of his escape from death.

25 Cf. Suet. Vit. Hor. 6, according to which Augustus requests from Maecenas the presence of “our Horace” (*Horatium nostrum*).
If I do not love you now more than my own innermost self, Horace, may you see your friend quite emaciated indeed [following here the MSS. reading].

Regardless of the poor quality of this specimen, which Fraenkel rightly calls “an exceedingly lame parody of one of the most beautiful poems of Catullus,” the fact that Maecenas dedicated and obviously shared poetry with Horace may indicate that their relationship eventually evolved beyond the level of utility and mutual exchange: indeed, what could possibly have motivated Maecenas to compose such verses aside from sheer friendship? In the Sermones, Horace’s addresses to his patron are characterized not only by a sense of privacy and exclusivity, but also by an informal tone that reflects their status as friendly conversations (they are, after all, sermo merus). Sermones 1.1, for instance, opens with an intentionally blunt and personal address (1: Qui fit, Maecenas), thereby emphasizing the patron’s prominence as financial supporter but also the client’s attachment to a friend who is receptive to moral lessons (and who can be addressed in such a direct fashion with impunity). Furthermore, Horace apparently valued his patron’s literary opinion and probably shared ideas with him, as revealed in his list of intimate friends in Sermones 1.10.81-90. Despite this attachment, however, Horace does not overlook or attempt to obscure the social disparity between himself and his patron: the extended address to Maecenas


27 As Brown (2002) 78 and O’Keefe (2001) 288 note, Cicero’s testimony at Fin. 1.69 reveals that later Epicureans accepted the possibility that friendship, although born out of utility, can eventually “blossom” (efflorescere) and exist “for its own sake” (propter se), even if “no practical advantage accrues” (etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia). This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.


29 DuQuesnay (2009) 52, who notes this connection, describes the relationship between Horace and Maecenas by citing Cicero’s quasi-Aristotelian definition of true friendship (Amic. 15) as the “complete consensus of wants, enthusiasms and of thoughts” (voluntatum studiorum sententiarum summa consensio).
in *Sermones* 1.6.1-4 is clearly intended to highlight his royal Etruscan ancestry,\(^\text{30}\) which also features prominently in *Carm.* 1.1 (1: *Maecenas atavis edite regibus*) and 3.29 (1: *Tyrhena regum progenies*).\(^\text{31}\) The overall effect of this correspondence underscores his patron’s noble pedigree while conveying a sense of intimacy that, though consistent with Epicurean patterns of patronage, surpasses and may even challenge contemporary Roman social norms.\(^\text{32}\)

In addition to acknowledging Maecenas’ social superiority, in *Sermones* 1.6 Horace also emphasizes his own social and economic “disadvantages,” which ultimately motivated his decision to seek literary patronage. To the extended four-line description of Maecenas’ greatness (1.6.1-4), for example, Horace juxtaposes a measly four-word reference to his own humble status as “son of an ex-slave” (1.6.6: *me libertino patre natum*),\(^\text{33}\) thus widening further the already

\(^{30}\)For Maecenas’ Lydian origins, see Scullard (1967) 34-57. As Gowers (2012) 200 observes, Horace more than once uses Lyde as a slave-name, and by invoking Maecenas’ Lydian origin in 1.6, which is a poem about social status, he may be leveling the playing field by playfully branding his patron with “potentially servile descent.” MacKay (1942) 79-81 has suggested that Maecenas’ father’s was nothing more than a *scriba* (like Horace), and it should be remembered that both Horace and Maecenas belonged to the rank of *eques*.

\(^{31}\)Cf. Arr. 1.5.1, where Epicurus refers to Mithres as “my king” (*ἄνακτα*). Like Epicurus and Philodemus, Horace was also accused of flattery. See Suet. *Vit. Hor.* 9-10: *ac primo Maecenati, mox Augusto insinuatus non mediocrem in amborum amicitia locum tenuit* (“And having insinuated himself first with Maecenas and soon afterwards with Augustus, he held an exceptional place in the friendship of both men”). Cf. also Nisbet and Rudd (2004) 348 (“flattery”) and Gowers (2012) 218 (“flattering publicity”). Of the opposite opinion, at least with regard to Suetonius’ account, is Fraenkel (1957) 16. This will be discussed in Chapter 5.

\(^{32}\)The traditional view of *amicitia* as a euphemism for *clientela* or *patrocinium*, which are terms the social elite avoided (cf. Cic. *De off.* 2.69), is given by the references in Allen (1938) 167, to which cf. Syme (1939) 157. This also reflects Seneca’s view, according to which clients were only nominally friends (*Ben.* 6.34). Konstan (1997), 122-24 on the other hand, following Brunt (1988) 360, examines the role of “true affection” within the context of Roman patronage. Cf. Philodemus’ description above (n. 15).

\(^{33}\)This claim, which Horace emphasizes repeatedly in 1.6, is strategically designed to highlight his personal merit and inherent worthiness (cf. 1.6.51: *dignos*). It is, therefore, a poetic
recognizable social rift between patron and client. The obvious disparity is confirmed by Horace’s pathetic description of his “poor father’s starveling little farm” (1.6.71: *macro pauper agello*), which, in conjunction with his self-proclaimed low status, reemphasizes the poet’s childhood poverty. In this short passage, the poet gives more information regarding the paternal inheritance mentioned in *Sermones* 1.4 (110: *patriam rem*), which his father had striven so eagerly to preserve. According to Horace’s later account in the *Epistulae*, however, these efforts were made in vain: the political chaos following the Battle of Philippi, at which Horace had fought on the losing side, undoubtedly resulted in the confiscation of his father’s tiny estate. The poet’s encounter with economic disaster is dramatically (and perhaps rather humorously) related in his later correspondence with Julius Florus:

\[
\text{unde simul primum me dimisere Philippi,}\\ 
\text{decisis humilem pinnis inopemque paterni}\\ 
\text{et laris et fundi paupertas inpulit audax}\\ 
\text{ut versus facerem: sed quod non desit habentem . . . (Ep. 2.2.49-52)}
\]

Soon as Philippi gave me discharge therefrom, brought low with wings clipped and beggared of paternal home and estate, barefaced poverty drove me to writing verses. But now that I have sufficient store . . .

According to this description, Horace’s decision to seek employment as a professional poet was essentially forced upon him by the barefaced poverty and destitution his father had earlier sought construct shaped by the author’s own agenda and has absolutely no basis in historical fact. See Williams (1995) 296-313.

Lyne (1995) 1-8 observes that this pathetic description is rendered suspect by the fact that Horace’s father managed to afford his son’s high-quality education in Rome among social superiors (described at 1.6.76-80). See also Armstrong (1986) 275, who notes that his ability to abandon the small farm and accompany his son to Rome “implied, on Horace’s father’s part, all the leisure in the world, and therefore a made fortune.” Horace’s description, however, may be intended to establish a connection to the Epicurean concept of poverty (Arr. 6.25: *πενία*) as the possession of few things that satisfy the requirements of nature. Cf. Verg. *Cat*. 8.1 (a description of the Epicurean Siro’s house): *Villula, quae Sironis eras, et pauper agelle.*
to prevent.\textsuperscript{35} The circumstances surrounding his motives for seeking financial assistance, therefore, while communicated in a rather playful and ironic manner, also perfectly satisfy Epicurus’ requirement concerning “dire straits” (Arr. 1.121.5: \textit{ἀπορήσαντα}); the identification of patronage as his only source of income, moreover, reflects Philodemus’ description of the ideal economic state, according to which financial security results from the patronage of a grateful friend. It is interesting to note, however, that Horace does not mention financial difficulty in \textit{Sermones} 1.6 as his motive for seeking literary patronage, although he certainly emphasizes his poverty and low status. This omission is likely intended to deflect the charge of ambition, which may also explain why he overlooks his acquisition of the lucrative post of \textit{scriba}: besides, the many obligations associated with this supposedly sinecure position\textsuperscript{36} conflict with his self-portrayal as a detached observer of the vulgar masses (1.6.18: \textit{a volgo longe longeque remotos}). Indeed, according to Horace’s description, his acceptance into Maecenas’ literary circle was the direct result of his moral purity—a claim that is rendered all the more

\textsuperscript{35}But cf. \textit{Carm.} 1.12.43-4, in which Camillus’ “cruel poverty” (\textit{saeva paupertas}) is equated with his “ancestral estate and suitable home” (\textit{avitus | apto cum lare fundus}). See also \textit{Enc. Or.} 1.658. Horace’s autobiographical account skips a chapter of his life by omitting to mention his acquisition of the post of \textit{scriba quaestorius}, for which see Suet. \textit{Vit. Hor.} 7-8: \textit{victisque partibus venia inpetrata scriptum quaestorium conparavit} (“After his faction had been defeated and he had obtained pardon, he purchased the post of treasury official”). For a description of the duties associated with this post, see Fraenkel (1957) 14-15, Armstrong (1986) 263-64 and especially Purcell (1983) 154-61. Armstrong (1986) 263 dates this event to “as soon as possible after Philippi, probably in 41.” The office was quite popular among individuals with literary aspirations, since it combined the possibility of \textit{otium} with an impressive salary. See DuQuesnay (2009) 50 and Mommsen (1887) 335, the latter of whom is the main source for the different salaries of the \textit{apparitores}, among which the office of \textit{scriba} is listed as the most lucrative (n. 1). Horace’s new income allowed him not only to match the property qualifications for the rank of \textit{eques} (valued at 400,000 sesterces), but also to able to afford a house in Rome.

\textsuperscript{36}Cf. 2.6.32-9 for Horace’s description of the manifold annoyances (\textit{negotia centum}) that come with civic duty, in particular with the post of \textit{scriba}. According to Gowers (2009) 305, in \textit{Sermones} 1.6 Horace “lives out an escapist fantasy, a dream of independence and unassailable integrity, which, though (or because) remote from notions of bureaucratic routine, can equally be regarded as ‘apparitorial’ in aspiration.”
impressive by the fact that it transcends the obvious social and economic barriers separating him from his patron.  

It is clear that Horace attributes this successful encounter with Maecenas to his freedom from “base ambition” (1.6.51-2: prava ambitione) and his moral purity (cf. 1.6.69: purus et insons). He certainly does not portray himself as actively seeking patronage; on the contrary, his poet-friends vouched for his personal merit and secured an interview on his behalf (cf. 1.6.55). In all likelihood, Horace’s passing mention of Vergil and Varius implies his poetic capabilities, but nowhere does he explicitly identify this as the reason for his initial meeting with Maecenas. Instead, he declares his personal worth and subordinates this relationship entirely to his virtuous disposition (55: quid essem; 60: quod eram). As many scholars have pointed out, this passage involves a conscious imitation of Bion’s audience with Antigonus Gonatas, by means of which Horace firmly situates his literary persona within the context of philosophical patronage.

Immediately following the encounter scene, the poet discusses his ethical credentials and identifies his father’s training as the direct cause of this virtuous nature, the description of which is fittingly introduced by philosophical terminology:

37Cf. 1.6.7-8: cum referre negas quale sit quisque parente | natus, dum ingenuus (“When you say it matters not who a man’s parent is, if he be himself free-born”). As Oliensis (1998) 30 observes, this view is cleverly placed in the mouth of Maecenas, thereby allowing the poet to avoid “making the self-promoting argument himself.” For the ambiguity of ingenuus, which may mean “freeborn” or “gentlemanly,” see Gowers (2012) 222-23.


40See Kindstrand (1976) F1A-C and F2 for the biographical account of Bion’s meeting with Antigonus, in which the Cynic declares to the monarch σκόπει δέ με ἐξ ἐμαυτοῦ (“Consider me for what I am”). This connection was noted early on by Rudd (1966) 49, Fisk (1971) 316 and Freudenburg (1993) 14-16. Moles (2007) 166 conveniently presents the many parallels and similarities between Horace and Bion in this passage.
Atque si vitiis mediocribus ac mea paucis
mendosa est natura, alioqui recta velut si
egregio inspersos reprendas corpore naevos,
si neque avaritiam neque sordes nec mala lustra
obiciet vere quisquam mihi, purus et insons,
ut me collaudem, si et vivo carus amicis,
causa fuit pater his . . . (S. 1.6.65-71)

And yet, if the flaws of my otherwise sound nature are but trifling and few in number,
even as you might find fault with moles spotted over a comely person—if no one will
justly lay to my charge avarice or meanness or lewdness; if, to venture on self-praise, my
life is free from stain and guilt and I am loved by my friends—I owe this to my father . . .

The word *natura* expresses the result of his father’s pedagogical influence, which made him
predisposed toward the virtuous mean and consequently able to resist the temptations associated
with political power and success. As common usage of the verb *nascor* reveals,\(^4\) moreover,
Horace’s disposition is the gradual product of a continuous and repeated formation (cf. 1.4.120:
*formabat*), which eventually encouraged the development of good habits (105: *insuevit*). His
moderate imperfections (130-131: *mediocribus vitiis*) reflect this temperate disposition, which is
straight (134: *rectius*) and neither overlooks nor transgresses the requirements of nature. By
living frugally, sparingly and content with his father’s modest wealth (cf. 107), he has become
content with his own status (1.6.96; cf. 1.4.108: *contentus*) and unaccustomed to bearing
distressful burdens (1.6.99: *onus molestum*).\(^5\) For these reasons, Horace is not plagued by
unnatural and unnecessary desires for limitless wealth (*avaritia*), meanness (*sordes*) or lewdness

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\(^4\)Konstan (2011) 67-8 gives many examples derived from comedy.

\(^5\)DuQuesnay (2009) 50: “It should be stressed that Horace’s underlying assumption is
that *cura rei publici* is an *onus* which requires considerable expenditure and is not simply an
*honos.*” Gowers (2012) 241 connects this passage to the image of Tillius weighed down by his
paraphernalia (107-11).
(mala lustra),\textsuperscript{43} and he once again identifies his distaste for such disturbances as physical and mental “health” (1.6.98; cf. 1.4.129: sanus).\textsuperscript{44} With regard to Maecenas, therefore, Horace’s nature rather than his poetry is the foundation of their relationship and the source of his wisdom, which he shares in the form of moral advice communicated through the Sermones.

It is significant that Horace viewed conversational poetry as a suitable medium for educating and transmitting moral advice, the ultimate source of which is philosophical wisdom.\textsuperscript{45} This is particularly evident in Horace’s epistolary correspondence with Augustus, in which he identifies the ideal poet as one who is “useful to the city” (Ep. 2.1.124: utilis urbi) and “nurtures the mind by friendly precepts” (ibid. 128: pectus praecptis format amicis).\textsuperscript{46} The power and authority of Horatian verse to communicate public consilia, moreover, is prominently featured in the so-called “Roman Odes,” where the poet, invoking the philosophical patronage of his

\textsuperscript{43}Cf. De oec. col. 23.42-6: οὐ[δ]ὲν γὰρ ἐκχεῖν [κ]αὶ ἄνατρέπειν εἰ[θ]ωστ|αί λαμπροτάτας καὶ πλούσια[ωτάς] ὁ[ικίας ὦ]ς πολυτέλι[αί τε] δι[αίτ]ής κα[ὶ] λαγνε[[αί καὶ] π[ερίβαλέψ|ις κτλ. (“For nothing is wont to drain and upset the most illustrious and wealthiest estates more than prodigality, salaciousness, envy” etc.). Cf. also Lucr. 4.1123-124 (a vivid description of the economic effects of lust): labitur interea res et Babylonica fiunt, | languent officia atque aegrotat fama vacillans (“Meanwhile, wealth vanishes, and turns into Babylonian perfumes; duties are neglected, good name totters and sickens”).

\textsuperscript{44}Cf. Lucr. 4.1073-76, where only “healthy” individuals (sanis) enjoy “pure pleasure” (pura voluptas). As Konstan (1973) 32 notes, the adjective here means “unmixed with pain,” and it is likely that Horace intends a similar meaning by referring to himself as purus at lines 64 and 69. In his treatise De gratitudine, Philodemus mentions the appreciation of those who receive moral advice from sages, who are “pure” (col. 11.18: καθαρούς) and “free from toil” (ibid. 7-8: ἐλευθερόμενοι ἀναισθησίας). See Tepedino Guerra (1977) 96-113 for the fragments.

\textsuperscript{45}Cf. Ars. 309: Scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons (“Of good writing the source and font is wisdom”). For the moral sense of this passage, see Rudd (1989) 202. As Tate (1928) 68 notes, the identification of the ideal poet as sage owes more to the Stoics than to any other Hellenistic tradition.

\textsuperscript{46}For the influence of the Augustan program on Horace, see the important studies of Newman (1967), especially the section on Horace (270-364), and White (1993) 123-33. Lowrie (2007) 80-85 provides a much shorter consideration.
Hellenistic predecessors, refers to his lyrics as “soothing advice” (Carm. 3.4.41: lene consilium) while emphasizing their indispensability and tempering effect (ibid. 65-6: vis consili expers . . . vim temperatam). In contrast to this, in the Sermones Horace dispenses private consilia (1.4.133: consilium proprium; 1.6.130: me consolor) directly to his patron through informal conversations that take place in an intimate setting (cf. 1.6.18: remotos). Perhaps in response to Philodemus’ preference in De poematis for the linguistic and syntactical clarity of prose (col. 28.27: σαφήνεια), these friendly chats are designed aptly to communicate moral wisdom through conventional language expressed in an ostensibly prosaic manner (cf. 1.4.42: sermoni propriora). Horace’s satiric exchanges with Maecenas, therefore, may replicate Philodemus’ “philosophical discussions” (De oec. col. 23.24-5: λόγων φιλο[σό]φων), which ideally take place with friends in isolation (ibid. 15-16: μετὰ φίλων ἀναχώρησιν); and while the poet’s

47See Nisbet and Rudd (2004) 69 for the political significance of these lines.

48But DuQuesnay (2009) 19-58 illustrates the many allusions to contemporary politics in these supposedly apolitical poems.

49Like Lucretius, who attempted to challenge the Epicurean view of poetry as obscure and unsuitable for communicating wisdom, Horace is concerned above all with clarity. Cf. Ars. 25-6: brevis esse laboro, | obscurus fio (“Striving to be brief, I become obscure”) as well as 40-41: cui lecta potenter erit res, | nec facundia deseret hunc nec lucidus ordo (“Whoever shall choose a theme within his range, neither speech will fail him, nor clearness of order”). Tsakiropolou-Summers (1995) 254-56 discusses the importance of luciditas within the context of Roman aesthetics.

50Horace’s claim that writing verse does not necessarily make one a poet (1.4.56-63) resembles that of Aristotle in Poet. 1447b16-20: οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν ἔστιν Ὀμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεί πλὴν τὸ μέτρον, διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλείν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μάλλον ἢ ποιητὴν (“Homer and Empedocles have nothing in common except their metre; so one should call the former poet, the other a natural scientist”).

51Cf. especially 2.6.71, in which Horace, perhaps with an additional nod to the otium and ambience of a Ciceronian villa, identifies the philosophical conversation which takes place at the Sabine estate as sermo.
concern with brevity (cf. *Ep.* 2.2.335: *esto brevis*) undoubtedly reflects the influence of Callimachean standards, his bluntness conforms to Philodemus’ description in *De oeconomia* of the best moral advice as pithy and, above all, particularly useful (col. 27.35-9): ἀ[λλ]ὰ δὴ καὶ [π]ανωτερὸς ἃν [ε]ϊναι δόξ[ε]ιν ὁ παντελῶ[ς ὁ]λίγα φήσ[ων] ἡμᾶς περὶ πρά[γ]ματος μ[ε]ιζόνως ὑφελή[σ]οντος (“Whereas the more trustworthy sage would seem to be the one who will give us advice about what is of greater benefit in few words”). The poet’s self-portrayal as a pithy advisor who shares moral advice with his friend, however, is admittedly one-sided: it remains to consider in what manner Maecenas is portrayed as the ideal Epicurean patron.

Horace’s depiction of his patron as withdrawn from society, unaffected by political ambition and involved in intimate friendships is in many ways consistent with Epicurean tradition. The ethical considerations Horace addresses to Maecenas in *Sermones* 1.6 suggests that, like the poet, the millionaire patron was likewise free from political ambition, which is apparently corroborated by the ancient testimony regarding his contentment with equestrian status. In the same poem, Horace describes both himself and Maecenas as “withdrawn from

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53Philodemus emphasizes the “limits of speech” in *De conv.* col. 5 (2: ὁμιλίας πέρας).

54See *Enc. Or.* 1.792-803 for the evidence concerning Maecenas vis-à-vis Horace. I do not intend to argue here that Maecenas was actually an Epicurean, only that Horace creates a persona for him that is in many ways consistent with Philodemus’ economic theory. The former view has been advanced by various scholars, including Avallone (1962) 111, André (1967) 15-61 and Mazzoli (1968) 300-326. But cf. Boyancé (1959) 334: “Mécène n’était pas homme à adhérer à une école, surtout à une école exigeante comme l’était l’épicurienne.”

55Cf. Vell. 2.88: *C. Maecenas . . . non minus Agrippa Caesari carus, sed minus honoratus—quippe vixit angusti clavi plene contentus—nec minora consequi potuit, sed non tam concupivit* (“Gaius Maecenas . . . was not less loved by Caesar and Agrippa, though he had fewer
the vulgar masses” (1.6.18: nos . . . a volgo longe longeque remotos), and elsewhere he mentions how Maecenas provides friends with a secluded venue within the city (1.9.49: domus) and a salubrious paradise (1.8.14: Esquiliis . . . salubribus) in which social gatherings and friendly discussions take place. In De oeconomia, Philodemus also describes the ideal patron as a wealthy landowner who offers his dwelling to friends as a tranquil getaway:

ήκιστα γὰρ ἐπιπλοκὰς ἔχει πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, ἐξ ὧν ἀνήδια πολλαὶ παρακολουθοῦσι, καὶ μετὰ φίλων ἀναχώρησιν εὐσχολον καὶ παρὰ τοῖς σώφροσι]ν εὔσχημον εὐσχημονεστάτην πρόσοδον. (De oec. col. 23.11-18)

For this [i.e., being a gentleman landowner] least of all brings involvements with men from whom many difficulties follow, since it offers a leisurely withdrawal with friends and the most fitting profit for those who are prudent.

The ideal host, therefore, offers a suitable retreat from the turmoil of politics and a safe haven for philosophical discourse among friends. One thinks especially of Horace’s identification in the Sermones of the private community of poets, who abandon political ambition (cf. 1.10.84:

honors heaped upon him, since he lived thoroughly content with the narrow strip of the equestrian order. He might have achieved a position not less high than Agrippa, but he had not the same ambition for it”). Lyne (1995) 135, however, convincingly argues that Maecenas’ decision to remain a knight was motivated by the desire to exercise “real power, interesting power, inside power” without the bureaucratic obstacles associated with senatorial office.

56 This is a reference to the horti Maecenatis, which were located on the Esquiline. Cf. Plin. Nat. 19.50: iam quidem hortorum nomine in ipsa urbe delicias agros villasque possident. Primus hoc instituit Athenis Epicurus otii magister (“Now in fact they possess delightful land and villas within the city, which they call ‘gardens.’ Epicurus, the teacher of leisure, was the first to establish this tradition in Athens”). Griffin (1984) 192-93, who is followed by Lyne (1995) 133-35, notes that Maecenas’ wealth was most likely the result of profits from proscriptions and evictions following the civil war (and which Horace identifies as the cause of his own poverty!). For the evidence suggesting that Maecenas probably took an active role in the battles of Philippi and Actium, see Evenpole (1990) 104-5.

57 For the importance of withdrawal and the notion of a safe haven from the turmoil of politics, see Wurster (2012) 86-9. As Roskam (2007) and Fish (2011) 72-104 explain, however, this negative view does not entail the complete rejection of political life, which, depending on the circumstances, could actually be the best option in terms of the pleasure calculus.
ambitione relegata) and gather with Maecenas in a venue that is pure and virtuous (cf. 1.9.49-50: domus pura). Further on in his economic treatise, Philodemus emphasizes the dangers of friendlessness and misanthropy regarding relationships based on economic exchanges (De oec. col. 24.19-33: ἀφιλία . . . ἀφιλανθ[ρω]πία); he also notes that in times of financial hardship property managers should be harder on themselves than on their friends (ibid. col. 26.1-9), and even recommends that they make provisions for them “as for children” (ibid. col. 27.5-9: οἰα τ[ε]κνα). In comparing patronage to fatherhood Philodemus probably had in mind the Roman designation patronus, which is etymologically related to pater and effectively communicates the similarities between the patron-client and father-son relationships. Horace likewise expresses this in Sermones 1.6, in which he underscores his dependency on Maecenas by virtually adopting him as a new father and source of financial stability. This is communicated by references to the poet’s “speechless modesty” (57: pudor infans) as well as the patron’s nine-month gestation period (61: nono post mense). Philodemus also notes that, like a good father, the ideal patron ensures that his friends are “economically provided for after his death” (De oec. col. 27.7-8: ἵνα ἔχωσιν καὶ τελευτήσαντος ὑ[δίον]). According to Suetonius, Maecenas made such provisions for Horace (Vit. Hor.): Maecenas quantopere eum [sc. Horatium] dilexerit . . . testatur . . . multo magis extremiis iudiciis tali ad Augustum elogio: “Horati Flacci ut mei esto memor”

59 Without, of course, rejecting or trivializing the important role of his biological father, of whom Horace was obviously quite proud. See Harrison (1965) 111-14.

79
(“And the degree to which Maecenas loved Horace is witnessed even more by the following plea made to Augustus in his last will: ‘Remember Horatius Flaccus as you have remembered me’”).

Of course, the most fundamental provision an ideal patron can make in response to a friend’s useful advice is the bestowal of various benefits during his lifetime, particularly financial rewards. Philodemus euphemistically refers to these benefits as “gratitude and honor” (De oec. col. 23.27-9: εὐχάριστον ἄμα μετὰ σεβασμοῦ παντ[ός]), and, if it can be assumed that the quantity and quality of such goods indicates something about a client’s worth, then one can safely conclude that Horace was especially “honored” by Maecenas.

The management strategy Philodemus recommends in his economic treatises appears in Horace’s charming account of his so-called “Epicurean day” in Sermones 1.6.110-28, which consequently reveals something about the philosophical convictions underlying his persona’s economic choices. The poet’s description of Maecenas and himself as far removed from the masses (18) is complemented by his quasi-psychological retreat into a safe haven within the heart of Rome. Similar to the “pure house” of Maecenas on the Esquiline (1.9.49: domus 61Cf. De gratitudine, in which Philodemus states that the mark of “genuine friendship” (col. 5.9-10: φιλίας . . . νομίμης) is the eagerness of a patron “to anticipate his friends’ needs” (col. 10.10-11: περὶ φίλων προνοεῖν).

62Cf. Saller (1982) 28: “the traditional rewards for poets were pecunia and honores.”

63Cf. Ep. 1.7.15: tu me fecisti locupletem (“you have made me rich”). For Horace’s mention of his patron’s “generosity” (benignitas tua) and his own “wealth” (me ditavit), which is probably a reference to the Sabine estate given to him around 33 BC, see Epod. 1.24. This will be discussed in relation to Sermones 2.6 in Chapter 3.

64Gowers (2012) calls this account an expression of “Epicurean contentment” (219) involving “perfect Epicurean otium” (245), but does not offer further details. Armstrong (1986) 277-80 refers to this passage as “pure convention,” but adds further observations concerning Horace’s “luxury” which will be discussed below.
Horace’s own “townhouse” (1.6.114: domum) is a place of mental health and refreshment, which, though situated in the midst of urban chaos, offers freedom (cf. De oec. col. 23.15-16: ἀναχώρησιν) from the distressful “interactions” (ibid. 11: ἐπιπλοκάς) and “many pains” (ibid. 13: ἀηδίαι πολλαί) associated with political ambition and avarice. And while ownership of a moderately sized townhouse in the middle of Rome indicates substantial wealth, this did not result (at least according to Horace’s account) from the ambitious effort to build a fortune, which would involve painful toil and anxiety (cf. De oec. col. 15.37-43). In order to emphasize his own freedom from ambition and the consequences of “success,” moreover, Horace introduces Tillius as the perfect contrast: the phrase “I go about alone” (1.6.112: incedo solus), for example, answers to “[one must] drag about all sorts of companions” (101-102: ducendus et unus | et comes alter); the declaration “I don’t worry about having to wake up early tomorrow” (119-20: non sollicitus mihi quod cras | surgendum sit mane) counters “[one must] greet many clients

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65This is most likely an expression of Epicurean maxim “live unknown” (λάθε βιώσας), for which see Roskam (2007) 33-44, who also considers the application of this saying to Horace’s Epistulae (166-79). Cf. Lucr. 1.50-1, which is a plea for Memmius to have a “mind removed from cares” (animum . . . semotum a curis) and 2.646-48, where the divine nature is said to be “separated and far removed from the affairs of humans” (semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe).

66Armstrong (2010) 17: “owning one’s house in Rome was as unusual as in modern New York city.”

67See Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 108. There is much disagreement among scholars regarding the identity of this Tillius. The scholiasts identify him as L. Tillius Cimber, one of Caesar’s assassins; Enc. Or. 1.917-18 conjectures that he was his brother; Armstrong (1986) 272-73 and DuQuesnay (2009) 47 interpret lines 38-41 as referring to Tillius, and therefore conclude that he was the overly ambitious son of a freeman father (a tempting theory, since it would provide the perfect contrast with Horace). Toher (2005) 183-89, who provides a more detailed summary of the debate, agrees that he was L. Tillius Cimber. According to Toher, the phrase sumere depositum clavum at line 25 refers to Tillius’ decision to withdraw from politics at some point, only to return later on account of his overwhelming ambition. Cf. Lucr. 3.60-1 for political ambition and greed as causing men to “transcend the limits of justice” (transcendere fines | iuris) and engage in “crimes” (scelera).
with the morning *salutatio*” (101: *salutandi plures*), which recalls Philodemus’ description of waking early in order to attend to household business as “wretched and unseemly for the sage” *(De oec. col. 7.30: ταλαίπωρον δὲ καὶ ἀνοί[κε]ιον φιλοσόφου)*. Furthermore, the fact that Horace’s restful withdrawal is largely the result of freedom from physical labor, which is performed exclusively by servants (1.6.116: *pueris tribus*), may similarly reflect Philodemus’ recommendation that managers transfer such mundane chores to their servants.68 In general, the language Horace uses to characterize his pleasurable existence at home is informed by Philodemus’ description of the ideal ἀναχώρησις εὔσχολος: he lives “more pleasantly” than Tillius (110: *commodius*), his own “pleasure” dictates his destination (111: *quacumque libido est*), he “lies abed until late morning” (122: *ad quartam iaceo*) and wanders about (122: *vagor*), he is “not troubled” by business (119: *non sollicitus*) and, taking into account the positive results of his calculated choices and avoidances, he lives “more sweetly” (130: *victurum suavius*) than the general population. According to Horace, moreover, his pleasurable existence is largely the result of choices made in accordance with the requirements of nature, some of which are economic in the modern sense: his food purchases, which consist of “greens and wheat” (112: *holus ac far*) as well as “leeks and chickpeas” (115: *porri et ciceris*), reflect actual physical needs rather than the overindulgent choices of a glutton (cf. 1.6.127: *pransus non*

68Cf. *De oec.* col. 23.7-11. As Armstrong (1986) 278-79 rightly notes, this modest description certainly does not imply that Horace only had three servants, but that he required three at suppertime: “[T]he ‘Epicurean day’ in Horace is more of a luxury item than it looks. We need hardly believe . . . that Horace could afford no more than three slaves to serve his table at his Roman house. The *topos* of Epicurean ‘simplicity,’ rather, is plainly one for the luxurious and gentlemanly, who can afford better but consider this much tasteful.”


70For suavis as an allusion to Epicurean ἡδονή, cf. Lucr. 2.1 (*suave*) and Gowers (2012) 249.
In many ways, therefore, Horace’s description of his secluded and otiose life, which is made possible by income that made him more affluent (as his ownership of an urban domus and a least three servants show) but not insensitive to the requirements of nature, applies the principles that characterize Philodemean economic theory.

Many characteristics of Philodemus’ economic teachings reappear, alongside various other philosophical and literary themes, in Sermones 1.1. His introductory address to Maecenas establishes the literary setting for this poem as an informal conversation between friends, who withdraw from society in order to examine the philosophical cause of the general population’s discontentment:

Qui fit, Maecenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem
seu ratio dederit seu fors obiecerit, illa
contentus vivat, laudet diversa sequentis? (S. 1.1.1-3)

How comes it, Maecenas, that no man living is content with the lot which either his choice has given him, or chance has thrown in his way, but each has praise for those who follow other paths?

The intentional directness and low register of Horace’s language reflects the informal style of discourse traditionally associated with the Cynic diatribe; contrary to the Cynics’ reputation for

71Cf. Carm. 1.31.15-16: me pascunt olivae, me cichorea levesque malvae (“My fare is the olive, the endive, and the wholesome mallow”). Oltramare (1962) 141 interprets Horace’s meager fare as “végétarianisme cynique.”

72Gold (1992) 162-75 discusses the question of audience in this poem and observes the following: “Maecenas is presented here not as a patron, but as a friend who is interested in philosophical disquisitions on contentment and greed and is the suitable recipient of a diatribe on these subjects” (164). See also Armstrong (1964) 86-96, who discusses the structural similarities of Sermones 1.1-3, particularly with regard to their “detached” prologues.

73For Horace’s prosaic opening, see Lejay (1915) 280 and Gowers (2012) 62. Axelson (1945) 76 includes nemo in his register of typically “unpoetische Wörter.” See also Freudenburg (1993) 11, who considers this language consistent with “the popular moralist of Greek diatribe.”
public invective and street preaching, however, the poet frames this philosophical discussion within the context of a peaceful but private withdrawal among friends, which recalls Philodemus’ descriptions of the ideal Epicurean community in *De oeconomia* (col. 23.11-18; 22-36).\(^7^4\) From the point of view of two detached observers (cf. 1.6.18: *nos . . . remotos*), therefore, Horace leads Maecenas through a philosophical investigation of the causes motivating the vulgar masses’ choices and avoidances, which is a skill his father had attributed to the instruction of an unnamed sage in *Sermones* 1.4 (115: *sapiens*). The poet’s scientific method, however, is a reflection of his virtuous upbringing as programatically described in the same poem,\(^7^5\) and which involves close observation of the manifest behavior of generic examples of moral

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For studies on Horace’s so-called “diatribe satires,” see Herter (1970) 320-64, Wimmel (1962) and Freudenburg (1993) 8-27. As Moles indicates in his *OCD* article (s.v. “diatribe”), and as other scholars have argued (see Sharland [2009b] for the debate), the notion of diatribe was described as a genre by Usener but does not appear to have been employed in antiquity to refer to a specific kind of literature. See also Oltramare (1926) 9-66, Kindstrand (1976) 97-9 and Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan (1995) 53-61.

\(^7^4\) Cf. Gold (1992) 168, who states that the inclusion of *nemo* forms “a privileged group of two, who are not quite included with the rest of mankind.” Gowers (2012) 59 describes Horace’s opening as a “splendid isolation from the rest of humanity.” Cf. a similar opening in Lucretius:

\[\textit{sed nihil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere}
\textit{edita doctrina sapientum tempula serena,}
\textit{despicere unde queas alios passimque videre}
\textit{errare atque viam palantis quaerere vitae,}
\textit{certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate,}
\textit{noctes atque dies niti praestante labore}
\textit{ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri.} \quad (2.7-13)\]

But nothing is more delightful than to possess lofty sanctuaries serene, well fortified by the teachings of the wise, whence you may look down upon others and behold them all astray, wandering abroad and seeking the path of life:—the strife of wits, the fight for precedence, all laboring night and day with surpassing toil to mount upon the pinnacle of riches and to lay hold on power.

deficiency (1.4.106: exemplis vitiorum; cf. 1.1.13: cetera de genere hoc). In the case of Sermones 1.1, Horace’s preliminary observation of the perceptible behavior and consequences of vice resembles the methodological approach of Philodemus in treatises like De ira, De adulatione and De superbia; both authors, moreover, consciously imitate the Cynics’ flamboyant technique for the sake of its shocking effectiveness, which later Epicureans generally considered useful for communicating ethical truths. In the case of Horace, this becomes apparent immediately following the introductory address, as he launches into a popular theme of moral philosophy identified as μεμψιμοιωδία or “the blaming of one’s fortune,” which, according to the evidence, was extremely popular among Cynics like Bion:

‘o fortunati mercatores’ gravis annis
miles ait, multo iam fractus membra labore;
contra mercator navim iactantibus Austris:
‘militia est potior. quid enim? concurritur: horae momento cita mors venit aut victoria laeta.’
agricolam laudat iuris legumque peritus,
sub galli cantum consultor ubi ostia pulsat;
ille, datis vadibus qui rure extractus in urbem est,
solos felicis viventis clamat in urbe. (S. 1.1.1-12)

Gowers (2012) 66, commenting on the significance of genere hoc: “draws attention not just to the type of examples used and rejected here but also to the unnamed genre that contains them.” Cf. also Rudd (1966) 15: “[T]his poetry . . . is concerned entirely with the behavior of the individual in society.”


No particularly outstanding specimen of μεμψιμοιωδία has survived from the Cynics, aside from the fragmentary evidence from Teles, for which see Kindstrand (1976) F16A and Hense (1969) 9-10. More significant examples are given by later sources such as Cic. Off. 120, the seventeenth pseudo-Hippocratic letter (which Fraenkel [1957] 93 says is “certainly later than Horace”), and a passage from the third century AD sophist Maximus of Tyre, for which see Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 5. Scholarship concerning the role of μεμψιμοιωδία in Sermones 1.1 is extensive: see, e.g., Heinze (1889) 15-17, Fraenkel (1957) 90-97, Rudd (1966) 13-21, Herter (1970) 330-33, Fiske (1971) 219-28, Freudenburg (1993) 11-16 and Beck (2007) in general.
“O happy traders!” cries the soldier, as he feels the weight of the years, his frame now shattered with hard service. On the other hand, when southern gales toss the ship, the trader cries: “A soldier’s life is better. Do you ask why? There is the battle clash, and in a moment of time comes speedy death or joyous victory.” One learned in law and statutes has praise for the farmer, when towards cockcrow a client comes knocking at his door. The man yonder, who has given surety and is dragged into town from the country cries that they only are happy who live in town.

The erratic behavior of these individuals, whose dissatisfaction breeds envy and results in the constant transgression of both natural and social boundaries, provides a stark contrast with the contentment and otium of the poet’s “Epicurean day” as described in Sermones 1.6.111-31. Furthermore, while the comparison of antithetical professions is probably Cynic, Horace’s clear emphasis on the mental and physical disturbances that result from their restlessness, which bears noteworthy resemblance to a similar passage in Lucretius (3.1053-1067), is suggestively Epicurean: the immense toil that the soldier and farmer undergo preclude the enjoyment of bodily repose (Arr. 7.2: ἀπονία), while the constant anxiety that plagues the merchant and politician render impossible the attainment of tranquility (ibid. ἀταραξία). As Horace indicates a few lines later, however, the irrational willingness of these individuals to undergo such excessive labor is ultimately motivated by their underlying desire to accumulate great wealth.

In closely uniting discontentment and avarice as joint causes of the toil associated with certain sources of income, Horace is following a philosophical tradition of which Philodemus is

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79Cf. Carm. 1.1.7-18. Radermacher (1921) 148-51, who noted the similarities between these two passages early on, conjectured that the Carmina passage had actually been composed first, and that Horace modified and appended it to Sermones 1.1 later in life. This thesis, however, is rejected by Wimmel (1962) 11-17.

80Heinze (1889) 17 considers Bion as the most likely candidate. Fiske (1971) 220-21 agrees with a Cynic source, and adds to the list the fragmentary evidence from Phoinix of Colophon, for which see Gerhard (1909) 4-7. Wimmel (1962) 12 is more cautious, agreeing that Horace’s pairing of lives draws from an older source but that “es für dies Motiv keine Quellenvermutungen gäbe.”
an important part.\textsuperscript{81} This tradition includes Theophrastus’ sketch of the typical μεμψίμοιρος in his collection of moral essays, which implicitly identifies greed as the underlying cause of grumbling: the discovery of a coin, for instance, does not satisfy the desire for treasure (\textit{Char.} 17: θησαυρόν). The role of greed with regard to discontentment is also suggested by Bion, who warns against “desiring” the lot of others.\textsuperscript{82} In a fragment attributed to Philodemus’ lost treatise \textit{De invidia} (PHerc. 1678), in which envy is described as the cause of intense suffering (fr. 12.1: μάλιστα πάθειν) and self-inflicted pain (ibid. 4-5: λυπούμενοι),\textsuperscript{83} avarice is explicitly connected to irrational vice (ibid. fr. 16.1: φιλαργυρίας . . . ἄλογον κακόν).\textsuperscript{84} One may compare this to Horace’s description of certain individuals’ irrational willingness to undergo extreme labor, even to the point of risking their lives, for the sake of acquiring wealth:

\begin{quote}
ille gravem duro terram qui vertit aratro, 
perfidus hic caupo, miles nautaeque, per omne
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{81}Beginning with Heinze (1889), scholars have thought that the rough transition from discontentment to avarice was evidence that Horace had spliced these themes from two separate sources (15: \textit{diversa componi}). Cf. Rudd (1966) 13, who refers to the “informal aspect” of \textit{Sermones} 1.1 and Fiske (1971) 219, who mentions Horace’s “partially successful attempt” to fuse the two themes. The debate continues to the present day, with a number of scholars recognizing that Horace was most likely drawing from a single philosophical tradition according to which these themes were closely related. See Fraenkel (1957) 92-5, Wimmel (1962) 11-16, Armstrong (1964) 88, Herter (1970) 340-42, Brown (1993) 89, Dufallo (2000) 579-90 and especially Beck (2007), whose extended introduction provides a detailed and useful summary of the debate (with bibliography). Hubbard (1981) 305-21 argues for unity based on the poem’s “rhetorical mode.”

\textsuperscript{82}Kindstrand (1976) F16A: μὴ οὖν βούλου δευτερολόγος ὦν τὸ πρωτολόγου πρόσωπον (“Do not, therefore, desire to be the star when you are but a supporting actor”).


\textsuperscript{84}Cf. Hippoc. [\textit{Ep.}] 17.8: καὶ τοῦτον πάντων αἰτίη φιλαργυρίη (“Of all this [suffering], greed is the cause”).
audaces mare qui currunt, hac mente laborem
sese ferre, senes ut in otia tuta recedant,
aiunt, cum sibi sint congesta cibaria . . .  (S. 1.1.28-32)

That farmer, who with tough plough turns up the heavy soil, our rascally host here, the soldier, the sailors who boldly scour every sea, all say that they bear toil with this in view, that when old they may retire into secure ease, once they have piled up their provisions . . .

The busyness conveyed by this action-packed description, which is summed up by the phrase *laborem ferre*, may reflect the restless toil and pursuit of riches designated by the Greeks as *πολυπραγμοσύνη*, but it may also engage with the economic advice of Philodemus, who sanctions the accumulation of wealth provided that it is not accompanied by toil and anxiety:


For this is what I consider the proper administration of wealth to be: not to be grieved at the loss of revenue nor to be involved in “slave treadmills” with oneself because of the unconquerable zeal regarding profit and loss. For the toil involved in acquiring wealth involves dragging oneself by force and agonizing over losses that will quickly result in pains, either present or expected.

According to Philodemus, therefore, it is not wealth acquisition itself but the potential “toil” (*πόνος*) it involves that is to be avoided. Unlike the individuals in Horace’s itemized

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85Cf. Teles’ report of Bion as quoted by Fiske (1971) 221-22: ἥ πάλιν οὐχ ὀρας διότι οἱ μὲν πλούσιοι πλείω πράττοντες κολλοῦνται τοῦ σχολάζειν; (“Or don’t you see that the rich, on account of being overactive, are prevented from enjoying leisure?”). It should be noted, however, that Bion’s praise of adaptable merchants who boldly undergo storms at sea is certainly not echoed by Horace in the above passage (*pace* Fiske [1971] 222), in which *audaces* refers more closely to their rashness in foolishly risking their lives as confirmed at lines 6-8. Cf. also Arit. *Pol.* 1258a1-15 for a description of the continuous toil (*διατριβή*) associated with accumulating limitless wealth.
descriptions, whose broken limbs, calloused hands and constant fear of death are the direct result of an active pursuit of wealth (cf. 38: *quaesitis*, 92: *quaerendi*), the ideal economist is not obsessed with increasing profits at the expense of physical and mental health (cf. *De oec.* col. 15.39: ἀλυπον and 42: φροντίδα βαρείαν); rather, he passively “accepts” more (δεκτέ[ν]) whenever it comes easily and without harm (cf. ibid. coll. 16.44-17.2). In other words, Philodemus recommends that the pleasure calculus be applied to every economic decision:


(*De oec.* col. 15.37-45)

This is also necessary: to enjoy revenue without pain and make sure that the pleasure derived from this revenue is pure and that its acquisition does not render to the sage profound anxiety regarding how he will preserve it or when difficult times will arrive.

In light of this advice, Horace’s characters’ frenzied pursuit of leisure (cf. 1.1.31: *otia*) by means of intense pain and prolonged suffering seems all the more irrational. It is even possible that the poet, in a spirit of irony, has deliberately constructed these introductory scenes as a comic inversion of the Epicurean calculus with regard to wealth administration. This may be further confirmed by Horace’s surprisingly negative description of agricultural work, which, judging by Cicero’s evaluation (*Off.* 1.151) and Livy’s famous portrait of Cincinnatus (3.26.8-11), was traditionally accepted by Romans as perhaps the noblest source of income. For the poet,

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86 See Asmis (2004) 159: “Philodemus emphasizes that the rich person must not grab; he accepts.”

87 Gowers (2012) 64: “This looks more like a satire on human irrationality and the ironies of *plus ça change* than deliberately incompetent logic on Horace’s part.” Cf. also Hippoc. [*Ep.*] 17.5: τίς ἡ κενὴ σπουδὴ καὶ ἀλόγιστος μηδὲν μανίς διαφέρουσα; (“What is this empty and irrational passion, no different from madness?”) and Plut. *Mor.* 7.21.2 (*De cupiditate divitiarum*) for a description of the desire for wealth as “manic” (μανία) and “crazed” (ἐνθουσιασμῷ).
however, it is inherently toilsome: the farmer’s turning the weighty earth (1.1.28: gravem terram) with a hard mattock (28: duro aratro) is overbearing labor, as the carefully chosen vocabulary and ponderous succession of three spondees communicates. Horace’s criticism, however, may have been influenced by a similar evaluation of Philodemus, who, in addition to emphatically condemning the active pursuit of wealth through military service (De oec. col. 22.17-28: πορισμὸν . . . δοφίκτητον; cf. 29: miles) and political office (ibid. coll. 22.28-23.1: τοὺς πο[λ]ιτικούς; cf. 9: legum peritus), likewise rejects agricultural labor (ibid. col. 23.8: γεωργο[ῦν]τ’ αὐτόν; cf. 9: agricolam) as wretched on account of the many pains it involves (ibid. col. 23.7), which preclude the attainment of leisurely retirement (ibid. col. 23.15-16: ἀναχώρησιν εὔσχολον; cf. 31: otia recedant).88

Horace subsequently compares the vulgar masses’ obsession with accumulating wealth to the industrious ant, which, in addition to addressing issues related to Epicurean economic theory, also serves as an entertaining transition to the important topic of wealth limitation. According to Epicurus, the proper administration of wealth is characterized by forethought, which implies that

88See Laurenti (1973) 154-64, Tsouna (2007) 188-91 and Asmis (2004) 168-70 for these passages. According to Teles (Hense [1969] 42), Diogenes described how people wish to grow up, but, as soon as they are grown, complain about having to engage in military service and politics (but no mention of agriculture), which prevent them from enjoying the leisure (σχολάσαι) they had taken for granted as youths. It is possible that, like Philodemus, Zeno of Citium rejected agriculture as an acceptable source of income, although positive evidence for this is restricted to an ambiguous line from Stobaeus (= SVF 1.312). Chrysippus omits agriculture from his list of ways of acquiring money in De vitis, for which see Natali (1995) 122-23. Cf. also Hippoc. [Ep.] 17.5, which includes a short description of farming as inherently toilsome: ἄλλοι δὲ τῶν περὶ γεωργίην ἀσχοληθέντων (“some [laugh] at those who practice [lit. have been deprived of leisure with regard to] farming”). This last source betrays the influence of Epicureanism in various passages (e.g., the mention of ἀταραξία at 12 and 17.7, the atomic swerve at 17.7 and the implication that perception alone is sufficient for knowledge at 17.7). Like Philodemus, moreover, the author of this letter rejects mining from slave labor and horse breeding as acceptable sources of income (17.5; cf. De oec. col. 23.1-7).
the sage will not beg daily like a Cynic (Arr. 1.119.6-7: οὐδὲ κυνιεῖν . . . οὐδὲ πτωχεύσειν) but rather plan ahead (ibid. 1.120a2: προνοήσασθαι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος). The same issue is dealt with by Philodemus, who in both of his economic treatises draws heavily from Metrodorus in order to condemn the Cynics’ rejection of all possessions and their practice of begging daily as involving much anxiety and torment (De oec. col. 13.32-3: καὶ φροντίδας καὶ ἀγωνίας), both of which ultimately result in more pain than pleasure. Instead, the sage economist recognizes the importance of planning ahead, as Philodemus explains:

Δεῖ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ συνάξειν τι καὶ τὸ συναχθὲν φυλάξειν ‘μή τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν’, κατ’ Ἑπίχαρμον, οὐ μόνον δεπάνης ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ προφανέντος κέρδους ἀρσενικὸν γινόμενον, προνοεῖν δὲ καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος. (De oec. col. 25.4-12)

And it is necessary to gather something as provision and to preserve what has been gathered (“lest one should live well for the moment,” as Epicharmus says), and, making acquisitions not only with a mind towards actual expenses but also foreseeable profits, to be mindful of the future.

The importance of forethought and the recognition that wealth acquisition, even if accompanied by some toil, is preferable to mendicancy is communicated by Horace’s fabulous simile, which emphasizes the ant’s industry and providence:

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90 Philodemus discusses this issue at length in De oec. coll. 12.5-17.2, for which see Tsouna (2007) 177-80, Balch (2004) 184-86, Asmis (2004) 149-61 and Laurenti (1973) 97-149. For Cynic beggary (πτωχεύειν) as the rejection of all possessions and thus distinct from Epicurean poverty (πενία), which is the possession of few things, see De div. coll. 42.31-5 and 45.15-18 as well as Balch (2004) 195-89, Gigante (1992) 39-42 and Castaldi (1928) 305.

91 Cf. the Aesopic version (Perry 373). Marchesi (2005) 310 (n. 11) notes, however, that the ant’s laboriousness was so common in antiquity that it is difficult to connect Horace’s passage specifically to Aesop. For fables as rhetorical and moral exempla, see Holzberg (2002) 1-38, who does not include the above passage in his list of Horace’s references to fables (32). For their role in Roman education, see Bonner (1977) 254-56, who mentions their popularity among children. This may be suggested by Horace’s earlier simile (25-26): ut pueris olim dant
Even as the tiny, hard-working ant (for she is their model) drags all she can with her mouth, and adds it to the heap she is building, because she is not unaware and not heedless of the morrow.

Translating the standardized Greek epithet πολύμοχθος (cf. ps.-Phocyl. 170), Horace connects the ant to his previous characters by means of her “great labor,” which she undergoes for the sake of financial stability. In contrast to their restlessness and obsession with gain, however, the ant’s toil is favorably described in terms of reserved caution (35: non incauta) and passive awareness (35: haud ignara), which motivate her to plan for the future. Unlike the shameless dog, therefore, whom the Cynics considered a pristine example of how to live according to nature, the ant lives by calculated forethought and enjoys the worthwhile benefits of her toil,

92 For the ant as negatively characterized for its “love of gain” (φιλοκερδὴς θηριώδης), see Gerhard (1909) 27 and Laurenti (1973) 103.

93 Cf. Ep. 2.2.190-91: utar et ex modico, quantum res poscet, acervo, | tollam (“I shall use and from my modest heap take what need requires”). See Wimmel (1962) 15-16 and Rudd (1966) 29. A very different emphasis occurs at Verg. G. 1.185-86, according to which the pesky ant is motivated by fear: populatque ingentem farris acervum | curculio atque inopi metuens formica senectae (“Or the weevil ravages a huge heap of grain, or the ant, anxious for a destitute old age”). Horace describes the wise man’s economic prudence by using the expression metuens futuri at 2.2.110, although this is not the same kind of destructive fear the miser experiences, as will be shown below.

just as the sage economist is “not unaware of the toil involved in such possessions, nor of the
enjoyment that comes from it” (De oec. coll. 18.45-19.1: οὔτε γὰρ ὁ πόνος ὁ καθ’ ὁποιανοῦν
cτῆσιν [ἀ]δηλος αὐτω[ι] δήλον ὡς οὔθ’ ἤ τέρψις ἢ διὰ τὴν κτῆσιν). In addition to rejecting
Cynic mendicancy, in their economic treatises Philodemus and Metrodorus also apply to the sage
a “measure of wealth” (ibid. col. 12.18-19: πλούτου μέτρον), which, in accordance with a
similar doctrine expressed by Aristotle in the Politica (1257b30-1258a14) and influenced by his
description of the mean (Eth. Nic. 1107b5-10), places a certain limit to wealth acquisition within
the context of household economics.95 Philodemus follows Epicurus in valuing wealth as a
useful means of satisfying necessary desires (cf. Arr. 1.121b4: ἀπορήσαντα), but places
additional value on its ability to increase the general quality of life by removing difficulties,
provided that this is not accompanied by more pain than pleasure (cf. De oec. col. 14.9-23).
Under no circumstances, however, will the sage become a professional moneymaker or view
wealth acquisition as an end in itself:96

(1973) 99 for the πλούτου μέτρον doctrine in Philodemus. As Rudd (1996) 23 notes, the notion
of equating virtue with the avoidance of extremes (especially ὕβρις), which was crystallized in
doctrinal form by Aristotle, is certainly much older and even part of the fabric of ancient Greek
culture.

96For Philodemus’ identification of the sage as a good χρηματισμός but not a
φιλοχρήματος, see Tsouna (2007) 192-94 and Natali (1995) 112-14. This should be contrasted
with the definition of economic prudence (σωφροσύνη) given by Xenophon’s spokesman
Ischomachus at Oec. 7.15: ἀλλὰ σωφρόνων τοῖ ἐστὶ καὶ ἄνδρός καὶ γυναικός οὕτως ποιεῖν,
ὅπως τὰ τε ὑπ’ ὑπότε βέλτιστα ἔξει καὶ ἀλλὰ ὑπ’ τι πλείστα ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ δικαίου
προσογενήσεται (“[D]iscretion . . . means acting in such a manner that their possessions shall be
in the best condition possible, and that as much as possible shall be added to them by fair and
honorable means”). Cic. Off. 1.25 gives a similar description: Nec vero rei familiaris
amplificatio nemini nocens vituperanda est, sed fugienda semper iniuria est (“Still, I do not
mean to find fault with the accumulation of property, provided it hurts nobody, but unjust
acquisition of it is always to be avoided”).
Let not the sage be called an expert or a practitioner at generating much wealth and collecting it efficiently, for there is indeed a certain expertise and ability concerning moneymaking in which the prudent man will not take part.

Philodemus’ point is that the sage may freely acquire even great wealth, but that this must not be motivated by fear of poverty or a perverted understanding of the practical value of money; above all, the sage’s economic practices must not violate the pleasure calculus. This doctrine appears to be instantiated by Horace’s ant, whose wisdom allows her to gather substantial stores with the ultimate goal of actually enjoying their benefits and providing for her needs:

\[ \text{quae, simul inversum contristat Aquarius annum,} \\
\text{non usquam prorepit et illis utitur ante} \\
\text{quaesitis sapiens}^{97} \ldots \quad (S. 1.1.36-8) \]

Yet she, soon as Aquarius saddens the upturned year, stirs out no more but uses the store she gathered beforehand, wise creature that she is . . .

By means of the transitional \textit{quae},\textsuperscript{98} Horace effectively shifts the argument’s focus from the toil involved in acquisition to the topic of wealth limitation, of which the ant suddenly becomes a primary exemplar. The tiny creature’s “wisdom” is conveyed by the prudence and logic of her economic practices,\textsuperscript{99} which are clearly limited (\textit{non usquam prorepit}) and adhere to the

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\textsuperscript{97}The reading \textit{sapiens}, which is given by \textit{Ψ} and \textit{Blandin(i)an}us, seems more appropriate than \textit{patisens}, which appears in \textit{Ε}. As Wimmel (1962) 16 n. 16 observes, however, the latter reading would still be consistent with Horace’s portrayal of the ant’s ability to “endure” a measure of wealth (cf. 1.1.106: \textit{modus}).

\textsuperscript{98}Rudd (1966) 29: “So the innocent \textit{quae} in v. 36 has actually the force of \textit{at ea}. It represents the very thin end of the wedge which Horace is about to drive between the ant and the greedy man.”

\textsuperscript{99}Schlegel (2005) 23 calls the ant “The only \textit{sapiens} in the poem.” Cf. Hes. \textit{Op.} 778, where she is referred to as “the knowing one” (\textit{iōn eis}).

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requirements of the pleasure calculus: the previous toil involved in gathering stores (illis ante quaesitis) is outweighed by her present enjoyment (utitur). As will soon become clear, Horace’s entertaining description of the ant is carefully opposed to his portrayal of the miser, and as such provides the key to understanding his economic message.

Horace’s extended description of the miser’s irrational behavior and bizarre administration of wealth, which depend heavily on the Cynic and comic traditions, may also be interpreted as projections of his underlying false desires and fears. One may compare this to Philodemus’ description of the safeguards necessary for financial security and prosperity, which includes above all the responsible management of one’s desires and fears:


(De oec. col. 23.36-43)

Of the things that one must pursue for the sake of revenue and the protection of both this and the possessions one had before, one must keep in mind that the principle one consists in managing one’s desires and fears.

In the lines following this passage he specifically identifies the desire for “admiration” (ibid. coll. 23.46-24.1: π[ε]ριβλέψει[ς]), which also suggests the competition inspired by envy (or, as commonly designated in Greek, πλεονεξία) as one of the primary causes of the mismanagement

100Fiske (1971) 232 compares this portion of the ant simile to the following fragment from Lucilius, which may have expressed to same view through a similar example (561 M): sic tu illos fructus quaeras, adversa hieme olim | quis uti possis ac delectare domi te (“Thus should you also acquire such fruits as you may enjoy and delight in at home when adverse weather arrives”). Cf. also De oec. col. 18.40-44: Μετρήσει μὲν οὖν ἴσως τὸ συμφέρον καὶ κτήσει καὶ φυλακῇ πολὺ βέλτιστον ὡστε, ὦτε μὴ πλείω [πλοίειν διὰ τὰ χρήματ' ἤπειρ εὐπαθείν (“[The sage] will better calculate what is beneficial for both the acquisition and preservation of things, so as not to engage in more labor for the sake of money than pleasure”).
of wealth.  One may compare this to the Horatian miser’s year-round pursuit of wealth and insatiable desire to become the Uncle Scrooge of ancient Rome:

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cum te neque fervidus aestus
demoveat lucro neque hiems,
nil obstet tibi, dum ne sit te dittior alter.  (S. 1.1.38-40)
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While as for you, neither burning heat, nor winter, fire, sea, sword, can turn you aside from gain—nothing stops you, until no second man be richer than yourself.  

Our first impression of the miser, therefore, occurs within the context of his need to outstrip all others in financial prosperity and win universal admiration, although this is not explicitly revealed as a false desire until later: at the very heart of the poem, Horace introduces the partial answer to his introductory question *Qui fit* by the following verses (61-2):

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at bona pars hominum
deepteta cupidine falso | ‘nil satis est,’ inquit, ‘quia tanti quantum habeas sis’ (“But a good many people, misled by false desire, say ‘You can never have enough: for you are worth as much as you have’”). 
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The expression “worth as much as you have” appears to have been a commonplace in ancient literature, which influenced the Cynics as well as Lucilius and Plutarch; as Pseudo-

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101Cf. Lucr. 2.11-12, in which the vulgar masses are described as contending “night and day with ever-present toil in order to achieve the greatest wealth and possess property” (*noctes atque dies niti praestante labore | ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri*)

102Gold (1992) 168-69 interprets the second person pronoun singular *tu*, which occurs frequently in lines 38-91, as addressed to the “internal audience” as represented by the vicious miser. Lyne (1995) 139-43, on the other hand, notes the grammatical ambiguity of *tu* throughout the poem and considers the possibility that it occasionally refers to Maecenas (especially at lines 38, 40 and 41).

103It is expressed already in Pind. *Isthm.* 2.11, and more explicitly by Bion (Fiske [1971] 237) to which cf. Plut. *Mor.* 50 (*De cupiditate divitiarum*): κέρδαινε καὶ φειδοῦ, καὶ τοσοῦτον νόμιζε σεαυτὸν ἄξιον εἶναι ὄσον ἂν ἔχῃς (“Make acquisitions and take care of them, and consider your worth as determined by your possessions”). A similar passage occurs in Lucilius (1119 M): *aurum atque ambitio specimen virtutis est: | tantum habeas, tantum ipse sies tantique habearis* (“Gold and public approval are virtue’s ideal: you will be regarded and valued in accordance with how much you possess”).
Acro noted long ago, however, Horace specifically roots this desire in a false or empty opinion (ad 61: Falsa opinione, aut inepta et inani cupiditate), which scholars have rightly connected to Epicurus’ description of the exaggerated desire to fulfill a natural need as originating in idle imaginings (Arr. 1.5.149.9-12: κενοδοξίαν). In the case of the miser, he incorrectly imagines that more wealth will result in more happiness (72: gaudere) and tranquility (31: otia), which consequently urges him to amass limitless heaps of unused cash (70-73) in the boundless search for money and self-worth (92: sit finis quaerendi; 106: est modus). Unlike the ant, therefore, who observes the proper modus by making calculated “expenditures” in accordance with her means (cf. De oec. col. 25.23-4: κατὰ τὰς ὑπάρξεις ἀναλίσκει[ν] and rations wealth in order to satisfy both natural and necessary desires, the miser views wealth acquisition as an end in itself and refuses to enjoy its benefits (73): nescis quo valeat nummus, quem praebeat usum? (“Don’t you know what money is for, what end it serves?”). As Epicurus states, however, the objects of limitless desires, such as wealth and admiration, cannot of themselves procure freedom from disturbances or result in true happiness and joy:

Οὐ λύει τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ταραχὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀξιόλογον ἀπογεννᾷ χαρὰν οὔτε πλούτος ύπάρχων ὁ μέγιστος οὔθ ἤ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμὴ καὶ περίβλεψις οὔτ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν παρὰ τὰς ἀδιορίστους αἰτίας. (Arr. 6.81)

104 Fiske (1971) 236, Rudd (1966) 24 and Schlegel (2005) 22. Horace perhaps underscores the irrationality of the miser’s false opinion concerning hoarded wealth by placing into his mouth the Lucretian phrase suave est (51), which originally refers to the tranquility of those who have withdrawn from the race for wealth (cf. Lucr. 2.1-2).

105 Cf. Cic. Fin. 1.45: inanium autem cupiditatum nec modus ullus nec finis inveniri potest (“No measure or limit, moreover, can be found for empty desires”). According to Teles (Hense [1969] 43), Bion similarly taught that limitless desires for wealth push one into service like a slave.

The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended nor true joy created either by the possession of the greatest wealth or by honor and respect in the eyes of the mob or by anything else that is associated with unlimited causes.

The notion that substantial wealth cannot eliminate disturbances or contribute to happiness is associated with Epicurus’ teaching that pleasure cannot be increased beyond the satisfaction of basic and necessary desires (Arr. 144.8-12). This is echoed by Philodemus, who states that, since the requirements of nature are easily satisfied, the loss of wealth is “indifferent” (De div. col. 53.3-5: [ἀδιάφορος[v]) and that one may derive “equal pleasures” from wealth and poverty (ibid. col. 56.4-8: ἴσας ἡδονὰς). For this reason the sage economist is not disturbed or frightened by financial loss, which is certainly more than can be said of the miser.

Horace completes his identification of the underlying reasons for economic vice by incorporating the negative consequences of fear into his description of false desire. According to the poet, it is the “fear of poverty” (1.1.93: pauperiem metuas minus; cf. 76: metu), the “terror of evil theft” (77: formidare malos fures) and the “dread of being oppressed by scarcity of food” (98-9: ne se penuria victus | opprimeret, metuebat) that drives the miser to take drastic measures in order to guard his ever-growing wealth. This exaggerated concern for his livelihood, for instance, scares him into thinking that any expenditure will result in the complete liquidation of his resources:

quid iuvat inmensum te argenti pondus et auri
furtim defossa timidum deponere terra?
“quod, si conminuas, vilem redigatur ad assem.”  (S. 1.41-3)

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108Cf. Lucr. 1076-1094, where the empty fear of death is the underlying cause of the vulgar masses’ “great desire for life” (vitai tanta cupidō), which is projected by their discontentment and constant labor.
What good to you is a vast weight of silver and gold, if in terror you stealthily bury it in a hole in the ground? “But if one splits it up, it would dwindle to a paltry penny.”

Horace’s description of the miser secretly burying his gold, which echoes a similar passage in Plautus (Aul. 6-8), also serves to distinguish him from the wise ant’s careful use of her store. The inclusion of timidum, moreover, reveals his economic habits as influenced by the fearful equation of expenditures with poverty, which Philodemus associates with the wretched toil and anxiety avoided by the sage economist:

Κτᾶσθαι μέντοι γ’ου δυνήσεται πλείστα καὶ τάχιστα καὶ διαθεωρείν, ὅθεν ἃν μάλιστα τὸ πλείον αὐξέσθω, μηδὲν ἀπομετρῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ πλέον καὶ τούλαττον, καὶ τὰ προϊόρορχοντ’ ἀεὶ φυλάττειν ἐντόνως· πολὺς γὰρ ὁ πόνος ἥδη περὶ τούτῳ καὶ μετὰ φροντιδὸς σκέληρας γιγνόμενος καὶ πᾶν τίθεις ἐν πενίᾳ τό δυσχερές. (De oec. col. 19.4-16)

[The sage] will not acquire as much as possible very quickly or examine closely whence his surplus may be increased most of all, measuring off nothing with regard to the ultimate purpose but with regard to the more and the less, and always striving to safeguard his possessions. For the toil associated with this is great and brings bitter anxiety, which equates every difficulty with poverty.

As Philodemus explains, the fear of poverty is completely unfounded, primarily because the requirements of nature are easily satisfied (ibid. col. 19.16-19): ἐναργῶς τῆς φύσεως δεικνυούσης, ἂν τις αὐτῇ προσέχῃ, διότι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις εὐκόλως χρήσεσθ’ (“although nature makes it clear that if anyone pays attention to her, since she is easily satisfied and requires few things”); for this reason, worry about an economic fall is “not worthy of fear” (De div. col.

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109Cf. also Theoph. Ch. 10.14: καὶ τὸ ὀλὸν δὲ τῶν μικρολόγων καὶ τὰς ἀργυροθήκας ἐστὶν ἰδεῖν εὐφιλιότατας καὶ τὰς κλεῖς ἱσοῦμενας (In fine you may see the money-chests of the penurious covered in mold and their keys in rust”).

110Heinze (1889) 18 and Fraenkel (1957) 93-4 note that the portrayal of animals as free from such practices was a standard Cynic theme. Cf. Hippoc. [Ep.] 17.8: τίς γὰρ λέων ἐς γην κατέκρυψε χρυσόν; (“What lion every hid gold in the ground?”).
12.14: οὐ γὰρ ἄξιον φόβου). One may, for example, quite easily fulfill necessary desires for food by purchasing basic foodstuffs, as Horace reminds the miser (1.1.74-5): *panis ematur, holus, vini sextarius, adde* | *quis humana sibi doleat natura negatis* (“You may buy bread, greens, a measure of wine, and such other things as would mean pain to our human nature, if withheld”). Although Horace’s advice concerning such meager fare may appear to have an ascetically Cynic flavor, a few distinctions should be made: first, the Cynics were famous in antiquity for their rejection of all social conventions, which especially included money, as Diogenes’ divinely-inspired injunction to “deface the coin” reveals (Diog. Laert. 6.20-21), furthermore, even relatively less austere Cynics like Bion equated “independence” (*αὐτάρκεια*) with extreme “poverty” (*πενία*), which for them entailed the complete rejection of such basic conventions as beds, eating utensils and wine. As mentioned already, Epicureans like Philodemus condemn the Cynics’ view of poverty as entailing mendicancy (*De div. col. 45.15-17: πτωχεία* [ν. . . στέρησιν οὐ] *πολλῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντων*), which is an evil (ibid. 43.4-5: *κάρκον δὲ πτωχεία*), and instead emphatically define *πενία* as “the possession of few things”

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111Porphyrio likewise links this passage to “necessary desires” (*ad 75: quae sunt necessariae*). Cf. 1.2.111-12 for similar advice: *natura . . . quid latura sibi, quid sit dolitura, negatum* (“Nature . . . what satisfaction she will give herself, what privation will cause her pain”). Cf. also 1.6.115: *porri et ciceris* (“leeks and chickpeas”). For Epicurus’ teaching on necessary desires, see Arr. 5.149.1-8.


113Oltramare (19) 51-2 and Kinstrand (1976) 217-18. The evidence from Teles is preserved by Hense (1969) 7-8, which involves a speech given by Poverty personified and is worth quoting here: καὶ Ἡ Πενία ἄν εἶποι . . . ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἑνδέη εἰ; ἢ οὐ μεσταῖ μὲν αἱ ὁδοὶ λαχάνων, πλήσεις δὲ αἱ κρῆναι ὕδατος, οὐκ εὐνάς σοι τοσάτας παρέχω ὑπόση γῆ; Καὶ στρωμνάς φύλλα . . . ἐς τις πλακοῦντα ἡ δυσφά Χῖον; (“And Poverty would say: indeed, do you lack any of the necessities of life? Do not roads pass through the midst of wild greens, and are not the natural springs full of water? Do I not supply you with the earth as your bed and the leaves as your blanket? . . . Does one’s hunger demand honeyed cakes or one’s thirst Chian wine?”).
ὕπαρξιν τῶν ὀλίγων), which is a good (ibid. col. 49.11-12: ὁ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν). This is the context in which Philodemus asserts that the sage, though unwilling to engage in toilsome beggary, will be content with few possessions and not fear poverty (De oec. coll. 15.45-16.4): [οὐ]τὲ γὰρ ἀσχαλαὶ σώφρων ἀνήρ καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον εὐθαρσῆς τῇ ταπεινῇ καὶ πενιχρᾷ διαίτῃ, τὸ φυσικὸν εἰδὼς καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης διοικοῦμενον (“The sage is confident with regard to the future and the possibility of a poor and meager life, for he knows that the requirements of nature are satisfied even by this”). Being poor, therefore, means possessing “what suffices” (cf. col. 16.7-8: τὰ . . . ἱκανά) without being distressed by the unquenchable desire for more (cf. De div. col. 58.8-9: τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τῆς πρὸς πλοῦτον).

The same advice is offered by Horace when he states the importance of “requiring only what one needs” (1.1.59: at qui tantuli eget quantus est opus), and it also explains his careful distinction between being “poor” (79: pauperimus; cf. Carm. 1.1.18: pauperiem pati) and living without any means whatsoever (103-4): non ego avarum | cum veto te, fieri vappam iubeo ac nebulonem (“When I call on you not to be a miser, I am not bidding you become a worthless prodigal”).

Cf. Ep. 1.2.46: quod satis est cui contingit nihil amplius optet (“Whoever lives according to what is sufficient does not long for anything more”). I disagree with Fiske (1971) 224-25, who equates Horace’s understanding of satis with the Cynic teaching that the sage will live ἀκούμενος τοῖς παροῦσι (see Hense [1969] 38). The expression τοῖς παροῦσι seems to me to entail “that which is at one’s immediate disposal” (i.e., the earth, natural springs, wild barley etc.); Horace’s point, however, is not that the miser should get rid of his money and live like a beggar, but that he should learn to administer it properly and enjoy its benefits responsibly. Cf. Horace’s explicit rejection of Cynic beggary at Ep. 1.17 (the pleasure-seeking Cyrenaic Aristippus addresses a Cynic straw man):

equus ut me portet, alet rex,
officium facio; tu poscis vilia, verum
dante minor, quamvis fers te nullius egentem. (Ep. 1.17.20-21)

 “[My conduct is better by far]: I do service that I may have a horse to ride and be fed by a prince; you beg for paltry doles, but you become inferior to the giver, though you pose as needing no man.”
Above all, he reminds the miser that there is “moderation in property management” (106: *est modus in rebus*),\(^\text{115}\) and that, rather than living like a Cynic beggar or fearfully hoarding treasure, he should imitate the wise ant by acquiring and enjoying wealth responsibly.

Towards the end of his ethical investigation Horace considers the detrimental consequences of overvaluing wealth, which, aside from the immense toil and anxiety already mentioned, includes universal abandonment. In his description of the many benefits associated with cultivating friendships, Philodemus mentions that, far from being a financial burden, close friends are “a more profitable acquisition . . . than tilled land and a most secure treasure against the turns of fortune” (*De oec.* col. 24.47-25.4: κτήσεις λυσιτελέστεραι . . . ἕπερ ἄγρων καὶ πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἀσφαλέστατοι θησαυροί).\(^\text{116}\) Indeed, the cultivation of friendship is described as sowing seeds in the earth, from which it becomes possible to “reap the fruit many times over” (ibid. col. 25.18-21: πολλὰ καρπίζεσθαι γίνεται). Part of this process involves philanthropy (cf. col. 18.34 τὸ φιλάνθρωπον),\(^\text{117}\) and, according to Philodemus, the sage is always concerned with sharing surplus wealth with his friends, whose companionship ultimately contributes to the preservation of suitably acquired wealth (ibid. col. 24.19-35). The greedy and

\(^{115}\)This meaning of *res*, which is often equated with land (cf. 1.1.50: *iugera centum*), is confirmed by the obvious parallel in 1.4.31-2: *nequid | summa deperdat metuens aut ampliet ut rem* (“[the miser] fearful lest he lose aught of his total, or fail to add to his wealth”); cf. also 1.4.110: *patriam rem*. Gowers (2012) 81 notes the following: “Technically *modus* is a measured amount, sometimes of land . . . here, connected with fixed boundaries (*certi fines*), it recalls physical images of plots of land.” Cf. also Lucil. (1331 M): *virtus quaerendae finem re scire modumque* (“Virtue is knowing when to limit and control the search for wealth”).

\(^{116}\)For the importance of *φιλία* in this treatise, see Laurenti (1973) 168-72, Asmis (2004) 173-76 and Tsouna (2007) 182-83. The importance of friendship in times of financial crisis will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

acquisitive economist, on the other hand, hoards wealth, isolates himself from society, incurs the hatred of others and consequently jeopardizes his revenue:

Indeed, traditional managers think that friendlessness procures relief from costs, but it isolates them and makes them despised by everyone and not highly esteemed with regard to people’s favor, which does not lead to suitable revenue or secure preservation; consequently, if he should cultivate friendships then he would be fortunate in each of these areas. But misanthropy and rudeness cause much suffering, make one helpless and often cause one’s property to be plundered entirely.

Perhaps a perfect example of this is afforded by our miser, whose overwhelming preference for money (cf. 1.1.86: *cum tu argento post omnia ponas*) is analyzed within the context of a hypothetical situation: in the case of a medical emergency, he would be completely abandoned and left alone helplessly to face the “turns of fortune,” as Horace explains:

But if your body is seized with a chill and racked with pain, or some other mishap has pinned you to your bed, have you someone to sit by you, to get lotions ready, to call in the doctor so as to raise you up and restore you to your children and dear kinsmen? No, your wife does not want you well, nor does your son: everyone hates you, neighbors and acquaintances, boys and girls.

Contrary to the sage economist, therefore, the miser continues to lose friends and suffer more intensely on account of his perverted administration and understanding of wealth. In addition to
this, moreover, Philodemus notes that such reckless mismanagement and misanthropy runs the risk of incurring the envy of others, whose desire to plunder wealth (cf. De oec. col. 24.32: ἄν[αρ]παξεθῶαι [τῇ ὀψιαν] often results in unspeakable deeds of violence (cf. De inv. fr. 6: μοχθηρὰ πράττειν).118 The relationship between wealth and envy, which was somewhat of a commonplace of moral philosophy,119 affects even close friends and family members, as Horace’s story about the fate of Ummidius at the murderous hands of his liberta clearly shows (1.1.99-100): at nunc liberta securi | divisit medium, fortissima Tyndaridarum (“Yet a freedwoman cleft him in twain with the axe, bravest of the Tyndarid breed”).120 With this grave warning, Horace proceeds to conclude his analysis of the empty desires and fears underlying the vulgar masses’ discontentment (cf. 108-9: nemo | se probet), which, as has been shown, is closely related to avarice and manifests itself in the endless contest over wealth (cf. 113: locupletior) and willingness to undergo perpetual toil (cf. 112: hunc atque hunc superare laboret).

Horace’s ethical approach in Sermones 1.1 has often been examined within the context of popular philosophy as expressed by the Cynic diatribe, and for obvious reasons; as the preceding section has shown, his moral advice also engages with contemporary Epicurean views concerning wealth administration as evidenced by Philodemus’ economic treatises. This advice, moreover, which takes the form of a relaxed dialogue between sage client and receptive patron,

118Cf. also Arist. Eth. Eud. 1234a30: ὁ μὲν οὖν φθόνος εἰς ἄδικιαν συμβάλλεται, πρὸς γάρ ἄλλον αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ (“Therefore envy contributes to injustice, for the actions that spring from it affect another person”).

119See Gerhard (1909) 92-4 for the evidence. In De libertate dicendi Philodemus notes that the sage is “free of all envy” (col. 1b.6-7: φθόνου καθαρός).

120Gowers (2012) 80: “[T]he miser who occupies two poles of existence is split down the middle in a parody of the golden mean by an axe-wielding freedwoman.”
may occur within the larger context of the ideal Epicurean community as described by Philodemus in *De oeconomia*. The intimacy of the relationship between Horace and Maecenas, the role of poetry as useful advice and the nature of this advice with regard to wealth and property management have been the central focus of this chapter. In the following chapter, the role of Epicurean economic theory in *Sermones* 2 will be examined, which will require careful consideration of how the relationship between Horace and Maecenas changed over the decade, especially in light of the poet’s continued withdrawal from society and newfound status as a landowner in his own right. Of special importance will be the details associated with Horace’s management of his Sabine estate, which he received from his grateful patron in 33 BC, and how this reflects or even challenges Philodemus’ economic advice.
The second book of the *Sermones* presents Horace’s audience with a very different approach to ethical investigation, which largely reflects the heightened tension of political events leading up to and following the Battle of Actium in 31 BC. As the civil war between Antony and Octavian steadily escalates and perceived threats from prominent figures like Cicero are met with gruesome violence, Horatian satire’s already subdued *libertas* becomes further restrained, in accordance with Trebatius’ legal advice in *Sermones* 2.1, by complete silence (cf. 5: *quiescas*) and the withdrawal into what has been described as a “walled garden.”¹ This personal withdrawal is most obviously expressed by Horace’s delegation of the satiric role to other speakers, who are generally portrayed as dispossessed or bankrupt sages, loquacious diatribists and, to use Anderson’s description, *doctores inepti.*² Rather than completely preclude moral sincerity, however, the presence of such parodic elements has a tempering or balancing effect reminiscent of the poet’s method in Book 1 (cf. 1.1.24: *ridentem dicere verum*). With this in mind, the following chapter will consider first the advice given by one of these speakers in *Sermones* 2.2 identified as Ofellus, a dispossessed farmer whose views concerning wealth administration communicate many of the teachings expounded in Philodemus’ economic treatises. It will also examine Horace’s self-deprecating portrayal of the Stoic “sage”

¹Rudd (1966) 131. See also Freudenburg (2001) 71-5.

²Anderson (1982) 42, although I intend to show that the precepts of these speakers often contain accurate and coherently expressed philosophical teachings (especially in the case of Ofellus). Oliensis (1998) 54 discusses the connection between Horace and these speakers. For a useful introduction to *Sermones* 2 in general, see Muecke (2007) 109-20.
Damasippus in *Sermones* 2.3, who incorporates similar economic advice into his analysis of Horace’s moral and financial inconsistency. His criticisms are particularly relevant, especially given the poet’s acquisition of the Sabine estate in 33 BC and newfound economic status as landowner in his own right. This will be explored lastly as the central topic of *Sermones* 2.6, in which Horace’s wishful retirement to his country getaway and desire to engage in philosophical discussion with close friends reflects the ideal Epicurean community as described by Philodemus.

In *Sermones* 2.2 Horace indirectly expounds upon the virtues of economic restraint by casting philosophical precepts into the mouth of a rustic sage, whose portrayal as a conservative Roman peasant resembles that of the poet’s father in *Sermones* 1.4 and may similarly conceal “suspicious” Greek doctrines. The sage is identified as Ofellus, an Apulian local who had recently been dispossessed of his “little farm” (114: *metato agello*), which is a financial loss he has borne with equanimity and transformed into the opportunity for a diatribe on simple living:

\[
\text{Quae virtus et quanta, boni, sit vivere parvo,} \\
\text{—nec meus hic sermo est, sed quae praecipit Ofellus} \\
\text{rusticus, abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva—,} \\
\text{discite non inter lances mensasque nitentis . . .} \quad (S. 2.2.1-4)
\]

What and how great, my friends, is the virtue of frugal living—now this is no talk of mine, but is the teaching of Ofellus, a peasant, a philosopher unschooled and of rough mother-wit—learn, I say, not amid the tables’ shining dishes . . .

The character of Ofellus bears close resemblance to Horace’s father, who was also a bumpkin sage raised on a “starveling farm” (1.6.71: *macro pauper agello*) and whose virtuous ability to live frugally and content with few possessions is transmitted to others as precepts.³ In addition to this, Ofellus also resembles the poet himself, who, as discussed in the previous chapter,

³Barbieri (1977) 486 acknowledges some of these parallels.
similarly lost his paternal inheritance as a result of the resettlement program (Ep. 2.2.49-52). Similarly, Ofellus was an historical figure known to Horace in his youth (cf. 112-13: puer . . . Ofellum . . . novi), the aforementioned parallels between this rustic sage and the poet suggest that the former functions as the latter’s mouthpiece for communicating philosophical and economic advice to contemporary Romans. Of course, Horace attempts to disassociate his surrogate from the Greek philosophical tradition by emphasizing his rusticity and homespun wisdom (3: abnormis sapiens cressaque Minerva), both of which contrast with the exotic luxury and overindulgence which for centuries traditional Romans had associated with the effeminate East, as Horace implies (10-11): si Romana fatigat | militia adsuetum graecari (“If Roman military training is too rigorous for one accustomed to Greek culture . . .”). On the other hand, the abundance of philosophical terms (virtus = ἀρετή; boni = ἀγαθοί; sapiens = σοφός), the reference to Socratic frugality (1: vivere parco), which, according to Cicero, was the ideal of Greek philosophers like Epicurus (Tusc. 5.89), and the learned imitation of the Platonic opening

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5For the rare historical and epigraphic evidence for this name, which appears to be Oscan, see Schultz (1904) 291.

6Cf. Fiske (1971) 379: “In this satire Ofellus is a Romanized counterpart of the popular Cynic preacher, who is used as the mouthpiece for Horace’s own philosophical ideas, just as Horace’s father was in satire 1.4.”

7The qualification of Ofellus as an unschooled sage and the use of Athena’s Roman name both emphasize his portrayal as a traditional local. See also Lejay (1915) 374, Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 168 and Courtney (2013) 131. Muecke (1993) 117 notes that, although Ofellus is a home-schooled rustic, he nevertheless transmits his values “in the terms of Hellenistic ethics.” Bond (1980) 114-23 argues for “conscious inconsistency” in Horace’s depiction of Ofellus, whom he views as an Italian rustic with a knack for (in Bond’s view) mostly Stoic doctrines.

8See Rudd (1966) 161-65, who also notes that austerum (12) discus (13) and aera (13) are Greek importations. Also Muecke (1993) 118.
“this is not my story” (Sym. 177a: οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος),\(^9\) collaboratively undercut the poet’s clever smokescreen and suggest that what follows is perhaps a reflection of his own philosophical—but useful—convictions concerning wealth. Regarding the delivery of Ofellus’ advice, it has been noted that his portrayal as a lowly but fervent preacher borrows many elements from the Cynic tradition;\(^10\) his identification as a quasi-Epicurean sage, however, may actually be a better fit: the rustic sage’s rejection of the *sordidus victus* (53-69) typically associated with Cynic “shamelessness” or ἀναίδεια is not only a possible reflection of Horace’s own opinion, but also a clear expression of that of conservative Romans like Cicero (*Off.* 130).\(^11\) Unlike the Stoics, moreover, whose philosophical ideal was extreme and unattainable enough to elicit playful sarcasm from Horace (cf. *Ep.* 1.1.106-8), Epicurus’ universal invitation to philosophy (Arr. 4.122.1-11) effectively attracted Romans from all walks of life, including, as Cicero notes, respectable but uneducated rustics like Ofellus.\(^12\) As a matter of fact, Epicurus even states that, like Ofellus, the sage will be “fond of the countryside” (Arr. 1.120a.2: φιλαγρήσειν) and will closely associate the practice of philosophy with economic matters (Arr. 4.120).


\(^10\)Fiske (1971) 379.

\(^11\)For the evidence, see Griffin (1996) 190-96.

\(^12\)Cf. Cic. *Off.* 2.12: *Itaque ut maiores nostri ab aratro adduxerunt Cincinnatum illum ut dictator esset, sic vos de plagis omnibus colligitis bonos illos quidem viros, sed certe non pereruditos* (“Our ancestors brought old Cincinnatus from the plough to be dictator. You ransack the country villages for your assemblage of doubtless respectable but certainly not very learned adherents”). Note the connection between Cicero’s *bonos* and Ofellus’ identification of his audience as *boni* (1). Bond (1980) 114-16, in discussing the term *boni* in this satire and its Greek equivalent ἀγαθοί, briefly traces its development from the Classical period, in which it refers strictly to the landed aristocracy (cf. the Roman usage), to Aristotle, in whose writings it takes on the moral and philosophical meaning of “virtuous.”
6.41): \(\gamma\varepsilon\lambda\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\ \delta\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\ \phi\iota\lambda\sigma\sigma\phi\epsilon\iota\nu\ \kappa\alpha\ \\omicron\iota\kappa\omicron\nu\omicron\omicron\mu\epsilon\iota\nu\) (“One must laugh and philosophize and manage one’s economic affairs”). One wonders, therefore, whether this connection influenced Horace’s choice to portray his sage as a country-dwelling local whose advice is economic in nature, or even whether the name Ofellus translates Philodemus’ description of the ideal economist as a “useful advisor” (\(De\ oec.\ col.\ 27.39: \acute{\omega}\phi\varepsilon\lambda\eta[\sigma]\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\omicron\zeta\)), who, like Horace, is trustworthy and speaks with few words.\(^{13}\)

Immediately following the introduction of Ofellus as Horace’s authoritative replacement is an extended consideration of the requirements of nature as easily satisfied and affording the “highest pleasure” (2.2.20-21: \(summa\ voluptas\)). This is briefly prefaced by the description of luxurious delicacies as originating in “false desires” (6: \(ad\ clinis\ falsis\)) and resulting in poor physical health (5: \(insanis\)), both of which corrupt the mind’s ability to engage in discussions concerning the truth (7-9).\(^{14}\) Along similar lines, Epicurus identifies “physical health” (Arr. 4.128.2: \(t\acute{e}n\\ το\omicron\ \sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\ \upsilon\gamma\iota\epsilon\iota\alpha\nu\)) as essential for living happily but readily acquired through a

\(^{13}\)Rudd (1966) 144 suggests that the name may also communicate the frugality associated with small bits of food (\(ofella\)). With regard to the role of speaker, Palmer (1893) 255 says that Horace quotes Ofellus verbatim throughout the poem, although Rudd (1966) 171 and Courtney (2013) 131 show that the rustic’s knowledge of Plato and other authors makes this highly unlikely. As Muecke (1993) 114 notes, moreover, very little of what is said in this dialogue belongs unequivocally to Ofellus, who, rather than displaying the “excessive zeal” Anderson (1982) 44 attributes to both him and Damasippus, is a model of restraint and virtue. For the concept of \(\omega\phi\varepsilon\lambda\iota\alpha\) among the Cynics, which, given their rejection of convention, would not extend to the kind of economic advice given by Horace’s spokesman in \(Sermones\ 2.2\), see Gerhard (1909) 32-3.

\(^{14}\)Cf. Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 169, who interpret \(insanis\) in terms of the unlimited (“über das Maß des Gewöhnlichen hinausgehend”) and read \(ad\ clinis\ “in übertragener Bedeutung . . . inclinat\ ad\ falsa.”\) Muecke (1993) 117 considers the possibility that this metaphor communicates the “prone to” (\(euempt\iota\iota\)) of Stoic ethics. Pseudo-Acro interprets the passage as meaning “rather prone to what is false” (\(pronior\ ad\ falsa\)).
simple diet, which gives “health to the full” (ibid. 4.131.4: ὑγίειας ἐστί συμπληρωτικὸν). In contrast to this, he portrays a luxurious diet as a distraction and juxtaposes it to the sober reasoning and truth seeking associated with frugality:

"Οὐ γὰρ πότοι καὶ κώμοι συνείροντες οὐδ’ ἀπολαύσεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ’ ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀσα φέρει πολυτελῆ τράπεζα, τὸν ἡδύν γεννά βίον, ἀλλὰ νήφων λογισμὸς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἐξερευνῶν πάσης αἰρήσεως καὶ φυγῆς καὶ τὰς δόξας ἐξελαύνων, ἔξ ὤν πλείστος τὰς ψυχὰς καταλαμβάνει θόρυβος. (Arr. 4.132.1-6)

For it is not continuous drinkings and revellings, nor the satisfactions of boys and women, nor the enjoyment of fish and other luxuries of the wealthy table, which produce a pleasant life, but sober reasoning, searching out the motives for all choices and avoidances, and banishing mere opinions, to which are due the greatest disturbances of the spirit.

A blessed life, therefore, is attained not through overindulgence but through the careful observation of the limits and requirements of nature, which not only satisfy one’s basic needs and produce physical health (cf. Arr. 5.149.1-8), but also eliminate distractions and are thus more conducive towards the contemplative life and the search for truth (cf. 2.2.7: verum . . . mecum disquirite). On this basis, Ofellus states that one should avoid the useless toil and cost involved in acquiring Athenian honey, Falernian wine and fish (15-17), for nature only requires simple fare and, besides, the pleasant life is to be found in sober reasoning and self-control:

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cum sale panis
latrantem stomachum bene leniet. unde putas aut
qui partum? non in caro nidore voluptas
summa, sed in te ipso est.16 tu pulmentaria quaere
sudando: pinguem vitiis albumque neque ostrea
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15For the role of Epicurus’ advice to Menoeceus in this poem, see Fiske (1971) and Courtney (2013) 131. Vischer (1965) 71-4 examines Epicurus’ doctrine of “simple living.”

16Cf. Persius’ similarly introspective advice at 1.7: nec te quaesiveris extra (“and do not search outside yourself”).
Bread and salt will suffice to appease your growling belly. Whence or how do you think this comes about? The chiefest pleasure lies, not in the costly savour, but in yourself. So earn your sauce with hard exercise. The man who is bloated and pale from excess will find no comfort in oysters or trout or foreign grouse.

As Pliny the Elder mentions, the reference to bread and salt as proverbial representatives of a meager fare had been made already by Varro (Nat. 31.89), and Lucilius similarly refers to the stomach’s need for “poultice such as milled barley” (813 M: molito hordeo uti cataplasma).17 Horace’s point, however, is not that one should avoid luxuries on principle, but that such refinements should not be regarded as necessary, especially since nature only requires the bare minimum (cf. Arr. 4.130.5-131.7).18 This is expressed by means of the barking-belly metaphor, which originates with Homer (Od. 7.216 and 20.13) and Ennius (Ann. 584) but here more likely reflects a similar passage from Lucretius (2.17-18): nihil aliud sibi naturam latrare, nisi ut qui | corpore seiunctus dolor absit (“[not to see that] all nature barks for is this, that pain be removed away out of the body”).19 For this purpose simple foods easily suffice, as Epicurus’ well-known identification of “bread and water” (Arr. 4.131.1: μᾶζα καὶ ὕδωρ) as able to afford the greatest

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18 This is echoed by Philodemus in De oec. coll. 16.3-4 and 19.16-19. I do not think, however, that Horace’s discussion of simple food is to be equated with the Cynics’ wholesale rejection of luxury and complete dependence on nature, as Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 170 and Fiske (1971) 379 suggest. Instead, Horace seems to be criticizing the view that luxury goods are of prime importance and necessary for happiness. Cf. Rudd (1966) 167: “All this does not mean, of course, that Horace had no palate. He enjoyed good food as much as anyone and he respected the character of an old Falernian. He did sincerely feel, however, that the gluttony which flourished around him was wasteful and foolish and that a great deal of his contemporaries’ connoisseurship was no more than snobbish affectation.”

19 On this passage, see Bailey (1947) 799.
pleasure shows. Closely related to this teaching is the assertion that pleasure cannot be increased once necessary needs have been met (Arr. 5.144.8-9), which explains why delicacies such as oysters, trout and foreign grouse will bring “no pleasure” (2.2.22: nec . . . iuvare) to one who has engorged himself and thus exceeded the natural appetite for food.\(^{20}\)

In addition to ignoring the requirements of nature and promoting useless overindulgence, which does not contribute to an increase in pleasure, such luxurious feasting is actually detrimental to good health and therefore violates the pleasure calculus. As Lucretius notes in his explanation of the sense of taste, the ultimate purpose of self-nourishment is to promote the stomach’s constant health, especially since the pleasure of flavor does not extent to the belly:

\[
\text{Deinde voluptas est e suco fine palati;}
\]
\[
\text{cum vero deorsum per fauces praecepidavit,}
\]
\[
\text{nulla voluptas est, dum diditur omnis in artus.}
\]
\[
\text{nec refert quicquam quo victu corpus alatur,}
\]
\[
\text{dummodo quod capias concoctum didere possis}
\]
\[
\text{artubus et stomachi validum servare tenorem. (Lucr. 4.628-32)}
\]

Again, the pleasure that comes from flavour does not go beyond the palate; but when it has dropped down through the throat, there is no pleasure while it is all being distributed abroad through the frame. Nor does it matter at all with what food the body is nourished, so long as you can digest what you take, and distribute it abroad through the limbs, and keep the stomach in a constantly healthy condition.

All the culinary ostentation that goes with serving exotic peacocks (2.2.23: posito pavone) and oversized fish (33-4: trilibrem mullum), therefore, contribute absolutely nothing to the actual

\(^{20}\text{Cf. Arr. 6.59: Ἀπληστον οὐ γαστήρ, ὄσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ φασίν, ἀλλ’ ἢ δόξα ψευδής ὑπὲρ τοῦ γαστρὸς ἀφόιστον πληρώματος (“It is not the belly that is insatiable, as many say, but rather the false opinion concerning the belly’s limitless greed”).}
nourishing process, a view which Ofellus expresses in the form of a rhetorical question (27-8):

\[ \text{num vesceris ista, | quam laudas, pluma? ("Do you eat the feathers you so admire?")}. \]

Furthermore, the vain appearance of the bird (25: \textit{vanis rerum}) is a reflection of the glutton’s false opinion concerning the purpose of food and preference for a “big fish on a big dish” (39: \textit{porrectum magno magnum spectare catino | vellem}), which closely resembles the miser’s irrational desire in \textit{Sermones} 1.1 to “drink from a broad river rather than a tiny brook” (55-6: \textit{magno de flumine mallem | quam ex hoc foniculo tantundem sumere}). As Philodemus states, moreover, the natural pleasure of self-nourishment, which is easily satisfied, is “necessary . . . for the health of the body” (\textit{De elect.} col. 6.1-4: \textit{ἀναγκαῖαι . . . δ[ἐ πρὸς] τὸ ἄγ[ει]ν [ἐν ὑγι[εί]α τὸ σῶ[μα]}), whereas unnecessary overindulgence and “sumptuous fare” (ibid. col. 5.17: \textit{τρυφῶν τοιοῦτων}) result in physical harm. This view is similarly expressed by Ofellus, who gives a vivid description of the detrimental effects of such fare on the body:

\[ \text{The indifference regarding the peacock’s tail feathers with regard to flavor is similarly expressed by Lucilius (716 M): cocus non curat caudam insignem esse illam, dum pinguis siet ("The cook cares not whether those tail feathers are pretty, provided that the peacock is plump").} \]

\[ \text{Of course, Horace repeats Ofellus’ criticisms of the obsession with sumptuous feasting in poems 2.4 and 2.8, as Mueke (1993) 227 notes.} \]

\[ \text{Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 173 compare the glutton’s words to that of the miser at \textit{Sermones} 1.1.51: at suave est de magno tollere acervo ("But it is sweet to draw from a large heap"). Cf. also Arr. 6.69: Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀχάριστον λίχνον ἐποίησε τὸ ζῶον εἰς ἀπειρον τῶν ἐν διαίτῃ ποικιλμάτων ("The ungrateful greed of the soul makes the creature everlastingly desire varieties of dainty food").} \]

\[ \text{Cf. \textit{De bono reg.} col. 19.26-31: οὐ γὰρ μ[ό]νον νη[φό]ντων αἰδεῖν "κλέα ἀνδρῶν," ἀλλὰ καὶ πινόντων[ν], οὐδὲ παρὰ μόνοις τοῖς ἀστηροτέροις, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς τρυφεροσθίοις Φαίαξε ("Not only of those who soberly sing of the glorious deeds of men, but also of those who drink among both the rather austere and the overly sumptuous Phaeacians"). The Phaeacians were famous in antiquity for their luxurious feasting and carefree indulgence, for which see Ath. 1.9a (τρυφεροστάτους ἔστιων Φαίακας) and 1.16c (τὴν τῶν Φαίακαν τρυφήν).} \]
And yet they are already rank, yon boar and fresh turbot, since cloying plenty worries the jaded stomach, which, sated as it is, prefers radishes and tart pickles the while.

As this passage clearly indicates, the overabundance of fancy foods is transformed into an evil concoction that disturbs the poor stomach, whose bloated sickness could have been avoided by the consumption of the simple fare it prefers. As a result of such irrational feasting, the goal of which was identified earlier as the “highest pleasure” (19-20: voluptas summa), the body actually experiences severe pain. Horace quickly notes, moreover, that the satisfaction of necessary desires can be fully accomplished by a meager diet of eggs and black olives (45-6), which he equates with “poverty” (pauperies). As discussed in the previous chapter, Horatian poverty needs to be contrasted with the desire for more, which is reprehensible (cf. Carm. 3.29.55-6: probamque pauperiem sine dote quaero), and identified with the willingness to live content with few possessions (ibid. 1.1.18: pauperiem pati) and to avoid the economic vices of sumptuousness and meanness, the latter of which is the central focus of Ofellus’ subsequent consideration.

Ofellus’ continuing discourse on plain living expresses the importance of avoiding meanness (53: sordidus victus), which leads to the maltreatment of servants and makes for a careless and niggardly host, both of which Philodemus addresses in his economic treatises. His description of the characteristics associated with this vice is introduced by Avidienus, a

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26See Vicher (1965) 149-50.
shameless miser whose unwillingness to spend money has led to his deplorable appearance and, as a consequence, to the “appropriate nickname of Dog” (56: *cui Canis ex vero dictum*). Rather than suggest, however, as some commentators do,²⁷ that this individual was actually a Cynic, (which would be inconsistent with his obsession for eliminating expenditures and amassing wealth like a miser), the label may simply reflect conservative Romans’ association of sordidness in general with Cynic beggary.²⁸ Indeed, Avidienus’ willingness to serve sour wine to his guests and anoint himself with rancid oil (58-9) closely resembles Theophrastus’ portrait of the “mean man” or αἰσχροκερδής, who similarly feeds his guests poor fare (Char. 30.2-3) and is overly concerned with the preservation of his oil (ibid. 8-9).²⁹ Such extreme parsimony is condemned, along with its opposite vice, by Epicurus, who states that the wise man will prudently impose limits on frugality (Arr. 6.63): Ἐστι καὶ ἐν λιτότητι μεθόριος, ἢς ὁ ἀνεπιλόγιστος παραπλήσιον τι πάσχει τῷ δι’ ἀοριστίαν ἐκπίπτοντι (“There is likewise a certain limit to frugality, which, if ignored, results in pain similar to the one who has succumbed to sumptuous living”). This is precisely the reason why, as Horace states in the following lines, the sage will avoid both extremes (65-6): [sapiens] mundus erit, qua non offendat sordibus atque | in neutram


²⁸On this point, see n. 9 above. Courtney (2013) 132 notes that the nickname “Dog” likely “implies a filthy life” and cites line 65 (mundus) in addition to Ep. 1.2.26 (immundus canis). For Cynicism in Horace’s *Epistulae*, see also Moles (1985) 33-60. In addition to being associated with Cynic poverty, sordidness was also a byproduct of meanness, as Horace shows at 1.6.107: obicet nemo sordis mihi, quas tibi, Tilli (“No one, Tillius, will accuse me of your meanness) and especially at 2.3.111-28, which bears a striking resemblance to the Avidienus passage as will be discussed below. For the expression *hac urget lupus, hac canis* and its moral significance, see Houghton (2004) 300-304.

²⁹Cf. Pseudo-Acro’s interpretation of canis as “ruined by greed” (*perditus avaritia*).

³⁰I follow here Usener’s reading rather than that of the MSS. (V: ἀπτότητι καθάριος) or Muehll (ἀπτότητι καθαριότης), the latter of which is accepted by Arrighetti.
partem cultus miser (“[The sage] will be neat, so far as not to shock us by meanness, and in his mode of living will be unhappy in neither direction”). The importance of observing the Aristotelian golden mean or, perhaps more fittingly given the context, the Epicurean “measure of wealth” (De oec. col. 12.18-19: πλούτου μέτρον), is underscored by two relevant examples of economic vice: Albucius is “cruel to his servants” (2.2.64-8: servis . . . saevus) while Naevius “serves his guests greasy water” (68-9: unctam | convivis praebabit aquam). The first example resembles Philodemus’ description of the vicious economist (De oec. col. 11.3: φιλοχρημάτου), whose decisions are motivated by greed and who mistreats his servants and subordinates by denying them certain foods (ibid. col. 9.26-32), breeding them like animals (ibid. col. 10.15-21), and forcing them into cruel and dangerous work conditions (ibid. col. 23.3-5). The acquisitive manager, moreover, is also stingy and views guests as a burden, since he equates convivial gatherings with financial loss and consequently imagines that “friendlessness procures relief from costs” (ibid. col. 24.19-21: Καὶ μὴν ἀφιλία δοκεῖ μὲν ἀναλωμάτων κουφίζει[ν]).

The ideal economist, on the other hand, whom Ofellus subsequently identifies as the “sage” (2.2.63: sapiens), will not only be content with few possessions but will also know how to administer wealth responsibly and in a spirit of kindness and generosity.

Ofellus’ previous descriptions provide a sharp contrast with his treatment of the prudent manager’s administration of wealth, which includes physical health, forethought and generosity. The importance of moderation is communicated by his emphasis on the sage’s good health (71:

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31Cf. Ter. Hau. 440-41: vehemens in utramque partem, Menedeme, es nimir | aut largitate nimia aut parsimonia (“You are too excessive in either direction, Menedemus, being either too generous or too stingy”).

32This connection is also made by Pseudo-Acro’s interpretation of saevus erit as Neglegens ad conparanda obsonia (“Neglectful at providing food”).
vales bene), whereas the overindulgent glutton’s distended and onerous belly prevents his mind from soaring to the lofty heights of philosophical contemplation (78-79): [corpus onustum]
animum quoque praegravat una | atque adfigit humo divinae particulam aurae (“[the heavy body] drags down the mind as well and fastens to earth a fragment of the divine spirit”). Like the belly stuffed full with a variety of delicacies (cf. 77: dubia cena), Horace has crammed into this passage, in an undoubtedly playful and parodic manner, multiple references to and different expressions of Platonic and Stoic doctrines.33 His passionate identification of the corporeal as an impediment to wisdom and the soul as connected to the divine ether, however, both of which threaten to transport the audience into the realm of theoretical speculation, is tempered by the following verses, in which Ofellus mentions the ancient tradition of enjoying culinary pleasures moderately and sharing surplus wealth with one’s friends (89-93). The importance of friendship within the context of sharing and convivial gatherings is underscored once again in a later, more expansive passage worth quoting here:

ac mihi seu longum post tempus venerat hospes,
sive operum vacuo gratus conviva per imbrem vicinus, bene erat non piscibus urbe petitis, sed pullo atque haedo; tum pensilis uva secundas et nux ornabat mensas cum duplice ficu.
post hoc ludus erat culpa potare magistra
ac venerata Cere, ita culmo surgeret alto, explicuit vino contractae seria frontis. (S. 2.2.118-25)

33Courtney (2013) 133: “[T]his is a sarcastic Epicurean joke at this belief, a joke that belongs to Horace, not Ofellus.” Cf. Pl. Phd. 83d for the idea that physical pleasure “affixes” (προσήλοι) the soul to the body, a passage Cicero likely had in mind at Tusc. 5.100 when he says “What about the fact that we cannot make proper use of the mind when stuffed with food and drink?” (Quid quod ne mente quidem recte uti possumus mucho cibo et potione completi?). Horace also alludes to Stoic physics in calling the mind a “particle,” which translates the Stoic ἀπόσπασμα (cf. SVF 1.128 and 2.633), and associating it with the “divine breath” or πνεῦμα. See Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 178 and Muecke (1993) 125.
“And if after long absence a friend came to see me, or if in rainy weather, when I could not work, a neighbour paid me a visit—a welcome guest—we fared well, not with fish sent from town, but with a pullet and a kid; by and by raisins and nuts and split figs set off our dessert. Then we had a game of drinking, with a forfeit to rule the feast, and Ceres, to whom we made our prayer—“so might she rise on lofty stalk!”—smoothed out with wine the worries of a wrinkled brow.”

The purpose of Ofellus’ emphasis on occasional indulgences with guests is to communicate advice that is not only practical, but also conducive towards physical health and the cultivation of friendships. A similar view is expressed by Philodemus, who places significant value on the economic benefits of sharing wealth with friends and setting aside time for communal gatherings and visitations:

Χρὴ δὲ, καθὰπερ πλειόνων προσπεσόντων χαρίζεσθαι ταῖς ἀβλαβέσι τῶν ὀρέξεων αὐτῶς καὶ φίλοις, οὕτω συμβάσῃς ἄδρας κοιλότητος ἀναμάχεσθαι ταῖς μὴ ἀνελευθέρως συστολαῖς, καὶ μᾶλλον γε ταῖς εἰς αὐτοὺς ἡ ταῖς εἰς φίλους, καὶ πρὸς ἐπισκέψεις καὶ παρεδρείας ἐνίοις καὶ συλλογισμῶν συνθέσεις κατατίθεσθαι τίνας χρόνους. (De oec. col. 27.1-12)

And just as one ought to indulge oneself and one’s friends in those desires that are harmless when a larger quantity of goods has happened to come to hand, so one ought to compensate for the losses with retrenchments that are not illiberal and that are applied more to oneself rather than to one’s friends when there is a serious shortage of cash; and one ought to set aside time for visitations, communal gatherings and comparisons of ideas.

According to this description, friendship is a major priority for the good manager, who, rather than indulge himself in private, would rather save the “wild boar” (2.2.89: aprum) for a special occasion and in the meantime subsist on plain fare, as Ofellus does (116-17): non ego . . . temere edi luce profesta | quicquam praeter holus fumosae cum pede pernae (“I was not the man to eat on a working day, without good reason, anything more than greens and the shank of a smoked ham”). According to Philodemus, moreover, such consideration and generosity on the part of the

34Cf. Verg. G. 2.136-225 on the extended praise of Italy’s fertility.
sage economist only attracts friends, who, in the case of an economic crisis, can lend assistance by providing financial or, perhaps more importantly, emotional support (*De oec.* coll. 24.46-25.4): εἰσὶν δὲ κτήσειλ λυσιτελέστεραι . . . ἦπερ ἀγρῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τυχὴν ἀσφαλέστατοι θησαυροί (“[friends] are considered to be more profitable . . . than tilled land and they are a treasure that is most secure against the turns of fortune”).35 One may contrast this with the ostentatious manager, whose uncontrollable spending and lavishness have won him not only the hatred of others (2.2.96-7), but also have resulted in financial loss (cf. 96: *damno*) and “pennilessness” (98-9: *egenti* | *as*).36 Philodemus similarly states that financial vice engenders the hatred of others (*De oec.* col. 24.19-33) and he identifies prodigality as a primary destroyer of wealth (ibid. col. 23.42-6): οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκχεῖν καὶ ἀνατρέπειν εἴθισθαι λαμπρότατας καὶ πλούσιοι ὡς πολυτέλιαι καὶ πολυτέλις οἰκίας (“For nothing is wont to drain and

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35The sharing of surplus wealth with one’s friends is the hallmark not only of Epicurean philanthropy as described by Philodemus above, but also an expression of the Greek notion of “liberality” (ἐλευθεριότης), for which see Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1120a5-35. Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 181 cite Cic. *Tusc.* 4.20.46: misericordiam (*utilem*) ad opem ferendum et hominum indignorum calamitates sublevandas (“pity is useful for affording assistance and alleviating the woes of unfortunate men”). For this translation of *indignus*, see Palmer (1959) 269. Cf. also 1.2.5: *inopidare nolit amico* (“he refuses to give to a friend who is destitute”). The Cynics also highly valued generosity (χρηστότης), for which see Kindstrand (1976) F38A-C with commentary (247). On the other hand, the Cynic understanding of philanthropy involves “stripping oneself of wealth” (cf. Kindstrand [1976] F38A: χρηστότης δὲ ἀφαίρεται [sc. πλοῦτον]) in order to live a completely independent life, as the collected maxims in Oltramare (1926) 51-52 show. This view contradicts Aristotle’s teaching concerning proportionate generosity (*Eth. Nic.* 1120b5-1121a10), which is echoed by Philodemus’ observations on giving to friends in accordance with one’s means (*De oec.* col. 25.24-31). It should also be noted that Ofellus urges his wealthy interlocutor to give out of his “surplus” (102: *quod superat*), not to do away with all his possessions.

36See Courtney (2013) 133 for *damnum* and *dedecus* as an alliterative pair that also appears in Plaut. *As.* 371 and *Bacch.* 67. As Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 181 note, the spendthrift’s extreme poverty is underscored by his inability to afford even the “purchase of a noose” (99: *laquei pretium*), which is a reference to the Greek comic tradition and also appears at Plaut. *Pseud.* 88 (Calidorus explains his reason for borrowing a drachma): *restim volo mihi emere . . . qui me faciam pensilem* (“I want to buy a rope . . . to hang myself with”).
upset the most illustrious and wealthiest estates like prodigality”). Even if one’s financial resources are substantial enough to avoid serious depletion, as Ofellus’ imaginary interlocutor smugly retorts (2.2.99-101), the implication in this passage is that changes of fortune (cf. 108: *casus dubios*) may nevertheless lead to economic crises, which the friendless and myopic manager will find extremely difficult to endure.

Horace concludes this economic sermon by shifting the focus from detached examples to concrete proof of how one should endure the changes of adverse fortune,37 which is afforded by the life of Ofellus himself. This is introduced by a passage which resembles the ant simile in *Sermones* 1.1 and likewise communicates the principal attributes of an ideal economist:

> uterne
> ad casus dubios fidet sibi certius? hic qui
> pluribus adsuerit mentem corpusque superbum,
> an qui contentus parvo metuensque futuri
> in pace, ut sapiens, aptarit idonea bello?  

(*S. 2.2.107-11*

Which of the two, in the face of changes and chances, will have more self-confidence—he who has accustomed a pampered mind and body to superfluities, or he who, content with little and fearful of the future, has in peace, like a wise man, provided for the needs of war?

Imitating the wisdom of the Horatian ant (cf. 1.1.38: *sapiens*), the sage economist rations his stores carefully and is mindful of the future (cf. 1.1.35: *non incauta futuri*), knowing that nature will easily fulfill the needs of one who is content with little (cf. Arr. 4.130.5-131.2).38 This involves careful preparation (111: *aptarit . . . bello*), as Horace indicates employing a military

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37Rudd (1966) 169.

38Cf. also *De oec.* col. 19.16-19: ἐναργῶς τῆς φύσεως δεικνυόμενης, ἂν τις αὐτῇ προσέχῃ, διότι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις εὐκόλως χρήσεσθο’ (“although nature makes it clear that if anyone pays attention to her, since she is easily satisfied and requires few things”).
metaphor, which, as Frances Muecke notes, is paralleled in Latin only by a fragment of Publilius Syrus (465): *Prospicere in pace oportet, quod bellum iuvet* (“One ought to foresee in time of peace that which helps war”).

The emphasis on bravery or rather **αὐτάρκεια** in the face of adverse fortune, which is expressed at the end of the poem (135-36), may likewise recall the teachings of Epicurus (Arr. 3.131.6-7) as well as the Cynics, although their underlying reasons for such courage are quite different. For the Cynics, it originates in the complete rejection of all conventions, so that the loss of wealth becomes literally impossible, as William Desmond explains:

[T]he Cynic boasts that he lives in utmost simplicity, without house, furniture, cups, weapons, clothes, jewelry or money: in short, without the products of human craft and technology. Unhoused, unwashed, unshaven, unshod and almost unclothed, eating figs, lupin-beans, lentils and whatever else he finds growing in the fields or hills nearby, the Cynic is an “all natural” philosopher who would . . . simplify everything. Eat when hungry, drink when thirsty. Seek shelter from the elements when you have to. Relieve sexual needs when they arrive. Use only what is immediately available. Live here, now.

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39Muecke (1993) 127. Pseudo-Acro compares this passage to Juv. 1.168-70: *[voluta] haec animo ante tubas: galeatum sero duelli | paenitet* ("Ponder over these things before the trumpets sound: once you’ve got a helmet on it’ll be too late to have second thoughts about the battle"). Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 182 cite Pl. *Leg.* 8.829a: οὐκ ἐν πολέμῳ τὸν πόλεμον ἑκάστοις γυμναστέον, ἀλλὰ ἐν τῷ τῆς εἰρήνης βίῳ ("Let each man train for battle in peacetime, not wartime"). Cf. also Philodemus’ quotation of Epicurus in *De div.* col. 40.11-14: καθάπερ ἐπεὶ ἔπειν Ἑπίκουρος, ὅταν παρῇ ποτὲ πεινῶν . . . ὁ σοφὸς εἰς πενίαν, μόνον οὐ τρέπεται ("Just as Epicurus said: Whenever the sage yields, having fallen into poverty, he alone is not defeated"). Perhaps Ofellus’ words contain a veiled reference to the Battle of Philippi, at which Horace himself was stripped of his landed inheritance (cf. *Ep.* 2.2.49-52), and I agree with Freudenburg (2001) 117, who suggests that Horace’s satiric themes in Book 2 may reflect the frustration of an author who was “not so ready to adapt” to the many changes of the new age.

40See Oltramare (1926) 57.

As the passage clearly indicates, the Cynics were unafraid of losing wealth precisely because they had none; the Epicurean manager, on the other hand, is able to endure financial loss with equanimity because he is, as Philodemus states, “confident with regard to the future and the possibility of a poor and meager life” (De oec. col. 16.1-3: [οὐ]τε [γ]άρ ἁγχαλαὶ σώφρων ἀνήρ καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλ[ον εὐ]θ[α]ρής τῇ ταπεινῇ καὶ πενιχρᾷ διαίτῃ); the reason for the sage economist’s confidence, moreover, is that “he knows that the requirements of nature are satisfied even by this” (ibid. 3-4: τὸ φυσικὸν εἰδὼς καὶ ύπὸ ταὐτῆς διοικούμενον). Unlike the overindulgent spendthrift, therefore, who has become accustomed to an abundance of fancy delicacies (cf. 2.2.109: pluribus adsuerit) and will undoubtedly be crushed by their absence when his wealth is gone, Ofellus draws “unwavering confidence” (108: fidet sibi certius; cf. De oec. col. 16.1-2: πρὸς τὸ μέλλ[ον εὐ]θ[α]ρής) from the fact that he is “content with little” (110: contentus parvo) and that “cheap eggs and black olives” (45-6: vilibus ovis | nigrisque . . . oleis), which provide the body with health and are conducive to the good life, will always be readily available. One may compare this logic to a similar argument made by Philodemus regarding the financial loss of an individual who “is good at procuring what suffices for himself” (De oec. col. 16.6-8 οὔτε κακῶς εὐφέσθαι τὰ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἰκανά):

Τίνος άν οὖν ἐνεκα τηλικαῦτ᾽ ἔχων ἑφόδια πρὸς τὸ ζῆν καλῶς ἐν πολλῆι ὀαιστώνη, κἂν πλούτον ἀποβάλη, πέραι τοῦ μετρίου κακοπαθήςει σωτηρίας ἐνεκα χρημάτων;

For what reason, therefore, would one who can acquire such means [i.e., ta hikana] for the good life with such easiness undergo extreme suffering on account of financial loss, even if he should lose his wealth? (De oec. col. 16.12-18)

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The realization that a *victus tenuis* is easily supported explains why Ofellus is indifferent to the loss of wealth, to which one may compare *De div.* col. 53.2-5: ἀδιάφορον μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐκ πλούτου μετάπτωσιν εἰς πενίαν (“[They say that] the fall from wealth into poverty is something indifferent”); indeed, Horace tells us that, even after the confiscation of his property and reduction of wealth, he continues to enjoy the same degree of satisfaction as before (2.2.113-14): *[Ofellum] integris opibus novi non latius usum quam nunc accisis* (“This Ofellus, as I well know, used his full means on no larger scale than he does now, when they are cut down”).43 In addition to this, the rustic sage has “prepared for war” by cultivating friendships and being generous to his friends (118-25), who, as Philodemus puts it, are a secure treasure that fortune cannot deplete or destroy (*De oec.* col. 25.3-4). This may provide the context for Ofellus’ defiant assertion that, no matter how wildly Fortune rages, she will never diminish the bond of camaraderie (2.2.126-27): *saeviat atque novos moveat Fortuna tumultus: | quantum hinc inminuet?* (“Let Fortune storm and stir fresh turmoils; how much will she take off from this?”).44 Horace concludes the discourse on plain living by reminding his audience of the fickleness of fortune, which, as the Cynics would point out, has not “given her goods to the rich, but only lent them,”45 and of the transience of wealth, which, as Philodemus states, is “easily destroyed and

43Muecke (1993) 127: “Because he lived frugally before he lost his farm, he has not had to change the way of life in which he is happy.” See also Freudenburg (2001) 99.

44For the language in this line as a possible imitation of “epic grandeur,” see Muecke (1993) 129, who cites relevant parallels. I take *hinc* as a reference to the bulwark of conviviality expressed in the immediately preceding passage (118-25), with the phrase *quantum aut* at 126 introducing the second defense against fortune, i.e., the ability to subsist on meager fare.

45Kindstrand (1976) F30A-D: τὰ χοίρια τοῖς πλούσιοις ἢ τύχη οὐ δεδώρηται, ἀλλὰ δεδάνεικεν. Cf. also Eur. *Phoen.* 555 and Men. *Dysk.* 797-812. Fiske (1971) 385-86 cites a handful of Lucilian parallels of which the following is especially noteworthy (701 M): *cum sciam nihil esse in vita proprium mortali datum* (“Since I know that nothing in life has been given to mortals as their own possession”). The same thought is expressed by Lucretius (3.971):
perfectly subject to being taken away” (De div. col. 54.8-10: εὐφθαρτός ἐστι καὶ τελέως εὐαφαίρετος ὁ πλοῦτος). According to both Ofellus and Philodemus, therefore, the best way to maintain a “stout heart” (2.2.136: fortiaque . . . pectora) in the face of such economic uncertainty is to be content with little, which nature easily procures, and to draw strength from one’s friends, who are a most stable treasure “against adverse fortune” (De oec. col. 25.3: πρὸς τὴν τύχην; cf. 108: ad casus dubios).

Immediately following Ofellus’ advice on simple living Horace introduces the character of Damasippus, a recent convert to Stoicism whose tirade against moral deficiency, which is much longer and harsher than that of Ofellus, focuses largely on economic vice. As with the previous satires, the initial verses of Sermones 2.3 give the context in which this diatribe occurs:

‘Sic raro scribis ut toto non quater anno
membranam poscas, scriptorium quaeque retexens,
iratus tibi quod vini somnique benignus
nil dignum sermone canas. quid fiet? at ipsis
Saturnalibus huc fugisti. (S. 2.3.1-5)

So seldom do you write, that not four times in all the year do you call for the parchment, while you unweave the web of all you have written, and are angry with yourself because, while so generous of wine and of sleep, you turn out no poetry worth talking about. What will be the end? Why, you say, even in the Saturnalia you fled here for refuge.

The preceding lines indicate that Damasippus has taken upon himself the task of chiding Horace for his excessive leisure in the country, which is preventing him from filling notebooks with vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu (“Life has been loaned to everyone and freely granted to no one”). Cf. Horace’s prayer to Mercury for the lifelong preservation of his Sabine estate (2.6.4-6).

Rudd (1966) 173 imagines the setting as the Sabine estate, which Maecenas had given Horace in 33 BC. He is followed by Muecke (1993) 133 and Courtney (2013) 135.
the kind of satiric invective he had “promised” (6: promissis). The impetuousness of this city-dwelling street preacher differs significantly from the appreciation of the value of convivial otium accorded to Ofellus, whom Horace portrays as the “ideal of the frugal life in the countryside;” perhaps more importantly, the Stoic’s failure to appreciate the philosophical and—for Horace— literary advantages of a “leisurely withdrawal with friends” (De eoc. col. 23.15-16: μετὰ φίλων ἀναχώρησιν εὔσχολον) reflects his misunderstanding of the poet’s high standards, which call for refinement and brevity rather than the sheer productivity of a Lucilian “flow” (1.10.50: fluere). Instead of appreciating Horace’s love of the countryside, Damasippus blames him for his laziness and overindulgence (2.3.3: vini somnique benignus; cf. 14-15: Siren desidia) and wishes to transport him back to Rome where the “pedestrian Muse” (2.6.17: musaque pedestri) will be more productive. In fact, Damasippus is so thirsty for hardcore invective that he virtually hijacks the narrative for his own purposes, as Freudenburg explains:

Damasippus sees no trace of “virtue” [13: virtute] in Horace, no satiric vigour, so he has to assume it was “left behind” [ibid.: relicta] like some forgotten pair of socks that did not make it into the bag. He cannot see it because he equates it with something

47On the other hand, at this time Horace was also composing the Epodi, and it is probable that Damasippus’ mention of Archilochus (12) refers to these iambic poems, as Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 186, Muecke (1993) 133, Cucchiarelli (2001) 120-25 and Courtney (2013) 135 suggest.

48Muecke (1993) 114. Cf. Ep. 1.10.1-2, dedicated to Aristius Fuscus, in which the poet draws a distinction between Epicurean “lovers of the country” (ruris amatores) and Stoic “lovers of the city” (urbis amatorem). For the contrast, see Barbieri (1977) 502.

49See Freudenburg (2001) 113: “[W]hat Damasippus sees as a playboy’s failure to buckle down and produce vast amounts can be taken as an allusion to the poet’s Callimachean aesthetic sense; that is, his determination to produce small amounts, finely crafted.” Horace communicates the literary advantages of otium and the withdrawal from society at 1.1.138-39 and 1.6.122-23. Cf. also Ep. 2.2.77: scriptorum chorus omnis amat nemus et fugit urbem (“The whole chorus of writers loves the grove and flees the city”).

50For wine and sleep as promoters of poetic excellence and providing inspiration, see Ep. 1.19.1-11 and 2.2.78 respectively.
Horace has failed “miserably” [14: miser] to produce: endless reams of lectures against vice; hard-hitting Stoic diatribe. And because Horace cannot produce it, Damasippus undertakes to produce it for him, and so we have the rest of the poem, ad nauseam, the second longest lecture Horace (n)ever wrote.\(^{51}\)

It has been noted that the harshness (to say nothing of the extraordinary length) which characterizes Damasippus’ bitter attack is at odds with Horatian satire’s usually helpful criticisms.\(^{52}\) Anderson, for example, refers to the neophyte’s ravings as “impractical moral fanaticism,” presumably since they rigidly apply philosophical doctrines without the slightest concern for moral correction,\(^{53}\) and Philodemus similarly condemns the harsh and impractical approach to vice associated with Stoic and Cynic treatments of harmful emotions.\(^{54}\) In this one of his longest poems of all, moreover, Horace clearly parodies the prolixity and endless vitriol of such treatments; on the other hand, his humorous depiction is not void of moral truth, which, despite the poem’s nominally Stoic content, is eclectic in nature and therefore incorporates many of the commonplaces of Hellenistic ethics.\(^{55}\)

\(^{51}\)Freudenburg (2001) 115. For the various mannerisms and topoi of the traditional Stoic diatribe which Horace imitates in this poem, see Lejay (1915) 384, Cèbe (1966) 262 and Fiske (1971) 388.

\(^{52}\)Muecke (1993) 131: “Horace . . . disassociates himself from the Stoics’ rigid dogmatism, which swamps the listener without encouraging him to reach the balanced perspective and sense of reality which Horace himself offers elsewhere.” Cf. Cèbe (1966) 262-63, who says that “ce sont leurs procédés et leur langage qu’il dénigre, non la subsance de leur enseignement.”

\(^{53}\)Anderson (1982) 45.

\(^{54}\)De ir. col. 1.7-20 (a description of the criticisms of an unnamed adversary): εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐπετίμα τοῖς ψέγουσι μ῞ον, ἀλλὰ δὲ μηδὲ ἐν ποιοῦσιν ἢ βατι[όν], ὡς Βίων ἐν τῷ Περί τῆς ὀργῆς καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ Περί παθῶν θεραπευτικῶι, κἂν μετρίως ἰστατο (“If, moreover, he had stopped at criticizing those who merely blame others and achieve nothing else or very little, such as Bion in his treatise On anger or Chrysippus in his On treatments for anger, then it would have been appropriate”).
The extreme zeal of Damasippus is the result of a conversion to Stoic philosophy following a financial crisis and the realization that “all fools are mad” (32: insanis et tu stultique prope omnes). According to Horace’s description, Damasippus had suffered the complete loss of his wealth (18-19), which, unlike Ofellus, was a misfortune he was obviously unable to bear with equanimity (37-8): nam male re gesta cum vellem mittere operto | me capite in flumen (“For when, after my financial failure, I’d covered my head and was intending to hurl myself into the river . . .”). The entire scene, however, is conveyed in a strongly parodic manner: covering the head was customary near death, but it also recalls Plato’s dramatic telling of Socrates’ last moments (Phd. 118a6-7); Damasippus’ savior, whom he identifies as a Stoic sage named Stertinius, suddenly and auspiciously “appears on his right side” (38: dexter stetit) and

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56For the Stoic doctrine that “all fools are mad” (πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται), see Cic. Tusc. 3.7-11. Horace’s interlocutor, however, does not observe the distinction Cicero draws between moral unsoundness (insania) and mental illness (furor), for which see Rudd (1966) 181-87. Pigeaud (1990) 9-43 examines at length the Stoic tradition of madness as a sickness in this poem. With regard to the speaker, Cicero mentions a man named Damasippus who was involved in the purchase of antiquities and real estate (Fam. 7.23.2-3; cf. 2.3.20-26). Bailey (1976) 29-30 identifies him as the son of Licinius Crassus Junianus (Brutus) Damasippus. Juvenal mentions a certain Damasippus who had suffered the “destruction of his riches” (8.185: consumptis opibus).

57Muecke (1993) 130. This extreme reaction to his bankruptcy is probably intended to expose Damasippus as a hypocrite, especially given his earlier advice to Horace concerning fulfilling promises “with equanimity” (aequo animo). Cucchiarelli (2001) 160 notes “varie esperienze in commune” between Damasippus and the Cynic Menippius of Gadara, including the loss of wealth and desire to commit suicide (cf. Diog. Laert. 6.99-100).

58Horace mentions him again at Ep. 1.12.20, regarding which Pseudo-Acro states the following: Stertinius philosophus, qui CCXX libros Stoicorum Latine descripsit (“Stertinius was a philosopher who wrote two-hundred twenty books on Stoicism in Latin”). Very little is known about this individual, for which see Rawson (1985) 53 and Desideri (1996) 906 in Enc. Or. His name, which appears to be connected to the verb stertere, may conceal a pun in identifying the longwinded sage as “Mr. Snore.” See Sharland (2009a) 113-31.
employs the archaic subjunctive “doeth” (38: *faxis*), which Horace uses elsewhere in a solemn prayer to Mercury (2.6.5); the Stoic sage’s teachings, which, according to Damasippus, were “rattled off” (33: *crepat*), are rehashed in the form of ὑπομνήματα (34: *descrips* . . . *praecpt*a) that create bathos when compared to Xenophon’s record of Socrates’ teachings and, later on, Arrian’s preservation of those of Epictetus.⁶⁰ To make matters worse, Damasippus is identified as a “fool” not only by his own teacher (40: *insanus*) but also by Horace (326: *insane*), which is a label this late learner (cf. 1.10.21: *o seri studiorum*) confirms by his misapplication of Stertinius’ doctrines.⁶¹ Indeed, according to Cicero, the Stoic sage should use philosophy primarily to self-medicate:

Est profecto animi medicina philosophia. Cuius auxilium non ut in corporis morbis petendum est foris, omnibusque opibus et viribus ut nosmet ipsi nobis mederi possimus elaborandum est. (Tusc. 3.6)

The medicine of the soul is certainly philosophy, whose aid must be sought not, as in bodily diseases, outside ourselves, and we must use our utmost endeavor, employing all our resources and strength, that we may have the power to be ourselves our own physicians.⁶²

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⁵⁹Courtney 2013) 136 says that Stertinius appeared to Damasippus “like a deus ex machina.”

⁶⁰Fiske (1971) 387. It should also be noted that Philodemus likewise recorded the lectures of Zeno, of which the treatise *De libertate dicendi* is an excerpt.


⁶²A very similar view is expressed by Persius (1.1.7): *nec te quaesiveris extra* (“Do not seek outside yourself”). Cf. also Arr. * Diss. Épict. 1.15.2: ὡς γάρ τέκτονος ὀλη τά ἔωλα, ἀνδριαντοποιοῦ ὁ χαλκός, οὗτως τής περι βίον τέχνης ὀλη ὁ βίος αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου (“For just as wood is the material of the carpenter and bronze that of the statuary, so each individual’s own life is the material of the art of living”). See also Courtney (2013) 135.
Nevertheless, instead of evaluating his own life in the light of his recent conversion and education, Damasippus immediately takes the opportunity to attack mercilessly everyone else’s faults, including those of Horace (307-25). In order to do so, he relates the doctrines of Stertinius, who, like a comic actor in a Plautine prologue, now takes center stage and requests the audience’s attention while carefully outlining the content of his “play” (78-80): wicked ambition (ambitio mala), avarice (argenti amor), self-indulgence (luxuria) and superstition (tristis superstitio). As is immediately clear from this list, vices associated with avarice and the mismanagement of wealth in general promise to be the main focus of his diatribe, which is indeed the case. The overemphasis on economic vice, moreover, is intriguing given the content of the previous satire, and although there are certain thematic similarities between these two as well as Horace’s treatment of avarice in Sermones 1.1, there are also significant differences.

Sertinius’ attack on avarice focuses largely on examples of meanness (82-157), which establish numerous connections to the immediately preceding treatment of Ofellus as well as to that of the poet himself in Sermones 1.1. The first representative of avarice is the miser Staberius, whose obsession with displaying the sum total of his amassed wealth on a tombstone is explained as originating in his great fear of poverty:

\[
\text{quoad vixit credidit ingens} \\
\text{pauperiem vitium et cavit nihil acerius, ut, si} \\
\text{forte minus locuples uno quadrante perisset,} \\
\text{ipse videretur sibi nequior.} \quad (S. 2.3.91-4)
\]

As long as he lived, he believed poverty a huge fault and there was nothing he took keener precaution against, so that, if by chance he had died less rich by one farthing, he would think himself so much the more worthless.

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63I owe this observation to Muecke (1993) 141.

64As Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 199 and Muecke (1993) 142 point out, this individual is otherwise unknown.
Like the unnamed miser in *Sermones* 1.1, who fears poverty (1.1.93: *pauperiem metuas*; cf. 2.3.110: *metuens*) and equates any reduction of wealth with a corresponding reduction of self-worth (1.1.62), Staberius hoards his money and mistakenly identifies it as the *summum bonum*. Of course, these convictions are the expression of a false opinion (cf. 1.1.61: *cupidine falso*): in the case of the Horatian miser, limitless wealth is associated with pleasure (1.1.51: *suave est*; 78: *hoc iuvat?*), while for Staberius it is better than virtue and produces all of the defining characteristics traditionally applied to the Stoic sage:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{omnis enim res,} \\
&\text{virtus, fama, decus, divina humanaque pulchris} \\
&\text{divitis parent; quas qui construxerit ille} \\
&\text{clarus erit, fortis, iustus . . . et rex. } (S. 2.3.94-97)
\end{align*}
\]

“Everything, you see, merit, renown, beauty, everything divine and human yields to beauteous riches; the man who has amassed riches will be illustrious, brave, just and wise . . . and a king.”

This is a complete perversion of Stoic doctrine, which states that virtue alone is inherently good while external factors such as riches and health are considered to be “preferred indifferents,” indicating that they should be chosen for their benefits although they contribute nothing to happiness or virtue. As has been discussed above, Epicurus similarly states that great wealth cannot make one truly happy or provide the benefits associated with the *summum bonum* (Arr. 65Ofellus identifies a similar mistake in 2.2.19-20: *non in caro nidore voluptas | summa* (“The greatest pleasure does not lie in a costly aroma”).

66 Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 201 note that the identification of wealth as “beautiful” (*pulcher*) has religious connotations, implying that Staberius views wealth as “der wahre Gott.” Cf. Cic. *Fam.* 9.14.4 for the orthodox position: *Nihil est . . . virtute formosius, nihil pulchrior, nihil amabilior* (“Nothing is more handsome, beautiful or worthy of love than virtue”).

67 For ancient evidence regarding the Stoic doctrine of “preferred indifferents” (*ἀδιάφορα προηγμένα*), see Long and Sedley (1987) 349-55.
6.81); Philodemus, moreover, who recognizes the usefulness of wealth, warns against making financial acquisition an end in itself (De oec. col. 17.2-9) and associating the loss of revenue with poverty, which results in intense pain and anxiety (ibid. col. 19.4-16). 68 Indeed, the refusal to make expenditures because of the risk of poverty or a reduction of self-worth ultimately leads to wretched squalor, as the sorry life of Staberius shows: he feels compelled to keep constant vigil over his enormous heap (112: vigilent; cf 1.1.76: vigilare metu), from which, unlike the wise ant in Sermones 1.1, he refuses to subtract despite his intense hunger (2.3.113: esuriens); instead, he chooses to subsist on bitter herbs and sour wine (114-17; cf. 2.2.55-62) and his tattered, moth-bitten rags are a poor excuse for clothes (117-19). 69 As Stertinius indicates, moreover, Staberius’ twisted views regarding wealth actually prevent him from using it properly (108-9): qui discrepat istis | qui nummos aurumque recondit, nescius uti (“In what way is he different from such men, the one who hides his coins and gold, being ignorant of its purpose?”). 70

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68 This is also expressed in De div. col. 27.6-10: ποιούμενοι τῇ νυφιλακίνη καὶ σὺν μερίμναις ἐπιβιβάζοντι καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀποβολῆς οὕτως ἀγωνιῶντες ὡς ἀνυποκόμη ("Endeavoring to preserve wealth with painful anxieties and agonizing over the loss of revenue as if it were penury"). It should also be remembered that Philodemus states that “the fall from wealth to poverty is indifferent” (ibid. col. 53.3-5). Regarding wealth itself, Philodemus does not identify it as a “preferred indifferent” but considers it beneficial or detrimental in relation to the disposition of the one using it. Cf. De oec. col. 14.5-9: Οὐ φαίνεται δ’ ὁ πλοῦτος ἑπιφέρειν ἀλυστελεῖς δυσφερεῖς παρ’ αὐτὸν ἄλλα παρὰ τῇ[ν] τῶν χρωμένων κακίαν ("Wealth does not seem to bring profitless troubles of its own accord, but rather as a result of the wickedness of those who misuse it”). Diogenes Laertius preserves a similar Stoic version of this teaching (7.101-3).

69 These descriptions depend heavily on traditional depictions of “meanness” (ἀνελευθερία) and the “desire of base gain” (ἀἰσχροκερδία), for which see Arist. Eth. Nic. 1121b10-15 and Theophr. Char. 30 respectively. For keeping vigil day and night as a symptom of meanness, which appears at 1.1.76, cf. Plaut. Aul. 72-3.

70 Cf. 1.1.41-2 for hiding gold in the earth, which, as discussed in the previous chapter, was a traditional motif in serio-comic literature: cf. Hippoc. [Ep.] 17.8 and Plaut. Aul. 6-8. Horace similarly chides the miser for being “ignorant of money’s potential, of the enjoyment it can bring” (1.1.73: nescis quo valeat nummus, quem praebeat usum?).
problem of being ignorant about money and its value is a common theme of moral philosophy but of particular importance to Epicurus, who identifies philosophical αὐτάρκεια with the ability to be satisfied with and enjoy one’s possessions (Arr. 4.130.5-7). This is also expressed by Philodemus in his economic treatises, which emphasize the sage economist’s ability to acquire and use wealth beneficially (De oec. col. 19.45-20.1): ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον μάλιστα καὶ κτᾶται καὶ χρῆται καὶ ἐπιμέλεια τοῦ πλούτου (“. . . although the sage in particular acquires, uses and cares for wealth to his own advantage”). In contrast to this, Staberius’ hoarding of wealth results not only in sordidness and physical discomfort, but also in much anxiety as he fearfully keeps imagined despoilers away and worries about “not having enough” (123: ne tibi desit).

The other examples of economic vice Stertinius presents are associated with greed as well as self-indulgence, both of which Damasippus eventually attributes to Horace himself. Regarding the consequences of being unable to enjoy wealth, perhaps the best or at least most extreme example is afforded by the miser Opimius, whose greedy refusal to make expenditures ultimately results in his own death (147-57). Stertinius refers to him as “poor Opimius” (142: pauper Opimius), which, given the obvious connection to opimus, is certainly intended as a clever oxymoron but also alludes to Epicurus’ famous paradox describing the desire for great wealth as spiritual poverty (Arr. 6.25): Η ἡπενία μετρουμένη τῷ τῆς φύσεως τέλει μέγας ἔστι

71See Rudd (1966) 183. Gowers (2012) 76 also identifies Horace’s mention of the “enjoyment” (1.1.73: usum) associated with wealth as motivated by Epicureanism.

72Cf. De div. col. 23.30-31: πλοῦτον ὥθελεν εἶναι εὖ χαρόμενον (“[They say that] wealth can be beneficial for those who use it properly”).

73See Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 205-6, who cite Carm. 3.16.28: magnas inter opes inops (“poor in the midst of great riches”). Rudd (1966) 141 and Muecke (1993) 147 discuss the possible identity of this individual.
πλούτος· πλούτος δὲ μὴ ὄριζομένος μεγάλη ἐστὶ πενία (“Poverty measured by the limits of nature is great wealth, but unlimited wealth is great poverty”). Like the hospitable Ofellus, moreover, who, in accordance with Philodemus’ economic advice, knows how to enjoy good things with friends and visitors on occasion (2.2.118-25), the rich miser’s inclination to “drink bad wine on holidays” (2.3.143: *Veientanum festis potare diebus*) and “vinegar on working days” (2.3.144: *vappamque profestis*) closely resembles the meanness of Avidienus (2.2.59-62) as well as the stinginess of the inhospitable Naevius (2.2.68-9). A life of squalor and bad wine, however, is by no means the only consequence of meanness: on his deathbed Opimius is not surrounded by friends and family members (similar to the Horatian miser), but by his joyfully expectant heir:

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quondam lethargo grandi est opressus, ut heres
iam circum loculos et clavis laetus ovansque
curreret.  (S. 2.3.145-47)
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One day he was overcome by a tremendous lethargy, so that his heir was already running around among the cash-boxes and keys, happy and jubilant.

Philodemus describes “friendlessness” (ἀφιλία) as one of the major consequences of love of money (*De oec.* col. 24.19-33), although, as Stertinius clearly indicates, Opimius has not been totally abandoned: the final scene of this example involves a brief dialogue between the gravely ill Opimius and his “very quick-witted and faithful doctor” (147: *medicus multum celer atque*

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74 A similar view was expressed by the Cynics, for which cf. Kindstrand (1971) F36: Πρὸς πλούσιον μικρολόγον, “οὐχ ὀὐτος,” ἔφη, “τὴν οὕσιαν κέκτηται, ἀλλ’ ἡ οὕσια τούτον.” (“Regarding a wealthy miser, he [Bion] said ‘he does not own his possessions; rather, his possessions own him’”).

75 For the low quality of Veintine wine, which Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 206 call “ein abscheulicher roter Krätzer,” see Pers. 5.147.
fidelis), which recalls a similar passage describing the Horatian miser’s hypothetical illness (1.1.80-86). In both cases, meanness is associated with death: for the miser, it results in universal abandonment and a complete lack of medical assistance; for Opimius, it prevents him from accepting the nourishing “rice pudding” (155: *tisanarium oryzae*)\(^7\) which will save his life by restoring blood and raising his collapsed stomach (153-54). The reason for his rejection is that, like Staberius, he mistakenly views poverty as a “sickness” (157: *morbo*) and the most horrendous “wickedness” (92: *vitium*), which prevents him from enjoying the many benefits wealth can provide.\(^7\) In his remaining treatment of economic vice, Stertinius considers the madness of those who suffer from the opposite extreme, namely, self-indulgence (224-46). It is generally acknowledged that the general focus on *vitia contraria*, which is a commonplace of Horatian satire (cf. 1.2.24), largely reflects Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean; when applied specifically to economic vice, however, it may also express the Epicurean “measure of wealth” doctrine expounded by Philodemus in *De oeconomia* (col. 12.18-19: πλούτου μέτρον). According to this teaching, it is the management of one’s desires and fears which results in the proper administration of wealth (ibid. col. 23.36-42); in other words, one must eliminate the fear of poverty, which inevitably leads to meanness, as well as the unnecessary desires for exotic foods and pleasures, which originate in a self-indulgent disposition and often result in the destruction of wealth (ibid. coll. 23.42-24.2). In Stertinius’ diatribe, the self-indulgent type is

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\(^7\)André (1981) 54 discusses the medicinal uses associated with rice, which, as Pliny notes (*Nat.* 18.71), had to be imported from India and therefore cost more than local barley. See also Muecke (1003) 148.

\(^7\)Cf. *De divitiis*, where Philodemus describes poverty as a “good” (col. 49.12: ἀγαθ[όν]) that is “not worthy of fear” (col. 36.11-12: οὐ [γάθο] ἀξιόν φόβου), and *De oeconomia*, where he discusses the benefits of wealth (col. 14.9-23).
exemplified by individuals like Nomentanus (224-38; cf. 1.1.102)\textsuperscript{78} and the sons of Quintus Arrius (243-46), whose desire for extravagant commodities and dainties such as nightingales eventually strips them of their resources. It is Damasippus, however, who, in response to Horace’s question “With what folly do you think I am mad?” (301-2: \textit{qua me stultitia . . . insanire putas?}), criticizes the poet for being avaricious and overly indulgent: this is directly connected to his “mad passion” for love (325: \textit{furores}) and perhaps to his otiose life in the countryside (3: \textit{vini somnique benignus}), but also includes his desire to imitate Maecenas by “building a fortune” (308: \textit{aedificas}), which is generally understood as a reference to the Sabine estate.\textsuperscript{79} Horace’s self-deprecating response to these accusations involves the comic portrayal of himself as irascible and frustrated with his mad interlocutor (326: \textit{insane}), with no serious attempt to raise an objection or provide a defense of his administration of wealth. This topic, however, is revisited in \textit{Sermones} 2.6, in which Horace finally addresses his relationship with Maecenas and provides a detailed description of life on his newly acquired country villa.

The idyllic portrayal of life in the country in \textit{Sermones} 2.6 is deceptively simple, since, in addition to addressing the important theme of leisure as a prerequisite for poetic activity, it also involves an expression of gratitude that reconnects Horace’s audience to the complicated issue of patronage. This poem, which has been closely associated with \textit{Sermones} 2.2 on account of its praise of rural simplicity, may also engage further with the tension between city and country

\textsuperscript{78}See Rudd (1966) 142.

\textsuperscript{79}Muecke (1993) 165” Horace was probably building or extending the villa on the Sabine farm, where the conversation is imagined as taking place.” See also Courtney (2013) 139. This will be discusses again in Chapter 5.
implicitly communicated at the beginning of *Sermones* 2.3. Indeed, it may offer a response to the criticisms of Damasippus concerning the inadequacy of country life for literary productivity, which, in accordance with the characteristics of Horatian satire, requires *ōtium* and often draws inspiration from the poet’s own life experiences (whether accurately portrayed or exaggerated to promote a literary persona). Horace’s acquisition of the Sabine estate, which probably occurred in 33 BC, was undoubtedly one of these experiences, the significance of which is clearly revealed at the outset by an elaborate prayer of thanksgiving:

Hoc erat in votis: modus agri non ita magnus,  
hortus ubi et tecto vicinus iugis aquae fons  
et paulum silvae super his foret. auctius atque  
di melius fecere. bene est. nil amplius oro,  
Maia nate, nisi ut propria haec mihi munera faxis.  *(S. 2.6.1-5)*

This is what I prayed for!—a piece of land not so very large, where there would be a garden, and near the house a spring of ever-flowing water, and up above these a bit of woodland. More and better than this have the gods done for me. I am content. Nothing more do I ask, O son of Maia, save that thou make these blessings last my life long.

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80 Boll (1913) 143 was the first to arrange the poems in Book 2 as intentionally paralleled to one another, a thesis which Fraenkel (1957) 137 doubts but Rudd (1966) 160-61 is much more willing to accept. For the role of tension or opposition in this poem, especially that of civic duty/leisure and Stoicism/Epicureanism, see Muecke (1993) 194.

81 Reckford (1959) 200. But cf. Bradshaw (1989) 160-86, who points out that there is no explicit evidence in the corpus to identify Maecenas as the source of the Sabine estate. Aside from ignoring the abundant evidence in favor of this connection, his skepticism also overlooks various social factors and matters of décor to be discussed below. Also puzzling is Bradshaw’s identification of Octavian as the possible source of the Sabine estate (163-66), which, although not impossible, is a claim that does not satisfy his own rather unreasonable demand for explicit evidence.

82 This is the translation offered by Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 257 and Muecke (1993) 197, both of whom support it by citing Var. *R.* 1.21.1 (a passage encouraging proprietors to establish their villas below a wild wood). Cf. also *Carm.* 3.1.17: *destriectus ensis cui super impia | cervice pendet* (“for whom a drawn sword hangs upon impious head”). Of course, the alternative is to take *super his* as “moreover” or “in addition to this,” as does Fraenkel (1957) 138 n. 2.
It is curious that the poet should choose to express his gratitude to Maecenas in the form of a solemn invocation to Mercury, complete with formulaic lines used in traditional prayers.\(^8^3\) There are, however, various possible reasons for this: in addition to containing the mob’s jealousy (48: *invidiae*), which was a bitter-sweet reality that plagued Horace constantly (cf. 1.6.45-7), this prayer may reflect the Romans’ general distaste for explicit references to the exchange of services between patrons and clients, which would have been especially inappropriate within the context of a sophisticated poem.\(^8^4\) Ellen Oliensis gives an explanation of Horace’s indirect expression of gratitude:

“[T]he displacement is sufficient to stave off the self-incriminating “thank you” (portraying Horace as a poet for hire) that we might have expected Horace to produce. Moreover, had Horace thanked Maecenas directly, the poem might be read as an enforced or ungraciously punctual pay-off of Maecenas’ generous gift. As in *Satires* 1.6, the obliquity of Horace’s “thank you” keeps the satire’s value from being exhausted in the act of exchange.\(^8^5\)

Perhaps on a more personal level, the omission of an explicit acknowledgement of Maecenas as Horace’s benefactor may additionally suggest a certain level of autonomy on the part of the poet, who, in an earlier dedication to his patron, had boldly reserved gratitude for his biological father (1.6.65-71).\(^8^6\) As a poet, moreover, Horace was entirely justified in associating Maecenas, to whom he refers elsewhere as a source of wealth (*Epod.* 1.31-2; *Ep.* 1.7.15), with the god of financial prosperity, thereby transforming an otherwise perfunctory expression of gratitude into a

\(^8^3\)See Fraenkel (1957) 138 n. 1.

\(^8^4\)Rudd (1966) 253: “As Maecenas heard that magnificent opening, in which a human name would have been quite out of place . . .”


\(^8^6\)Cf. *Ep.* 1.7, in which Horace famously and unabashedly asserts his independence from Maecenas and his gifts, particularly the Sabine estate.
lofty and traditional invocation.\textsuperscript{87} This association is further confirmed by Horace’s deliberate use of the matronymic \textit{Maia nate}, which, in addition to reflecting the traditional Greek formula (cf. \textit{Hom. Hymn Merc. 1}),\textsuperscript{88} also appears conveniently to echo his patron’s name.\textsuperscript{89} The allegorical identification of a Roman benefactor as Mercury likewise appears in \textit{Carm. 1.2} (43: \textit{filius Maiae}), although Horace’s model was perhaps Vergil’s \textit{Eclogae 1}, in which Tityrus extols the source of his rural property in the following manner (6-7): \textit{O Meliboeae, deus nobis otia fecit.} \textit{Namque erit ille mihi simper deus} (“O Meliboeus, it is a god who wrought for us this peace—for a god he shall ever be to me”).\textsuperscript{90} In Horace’s version, however, the connection to patronage is strongly implied by means of the carefully chosen vocabulary: he is “pleased with the favor” (13: \textit{gratum iuvat}; cf. \textit{Epod. 1.24: tuae spem gratiae}) of Maia’s son, who has granted him “gifts” (5: \textit{munera}; cf. \textit{Ep. 1.7.18: dono})\textsuperscript{91} and who offers him protection as a “guardian” (15: \textit{custos}; cf. \textit{Carm. 1.1.1: praesidium}); indeed, Mercury could be regarded as Horace’s protector just as easily

\textsuperscript{87}Cf. Fraenkel (1957) 141: “Horace was poet enough to adopt and transform the hopes, the fears and even the prayers of bygone generations.” According to Fraenkel (1957) 140 and Rudd (1966) 248, the religious tone of this introductory prayer and the gravity of words such as \textit{carmen} (22) is uncharacteristic of the \textit{Sermones} and looks forward to his lyric odes. Courtney (2013) 151, however, is more cautious.

\textsuperscript{88}Muecke (1993) 197. Cf. also Alcaeus’ fragmentary hymn to Mercury, which contains the phrase \textit{Μαῖα γέννατο} (Campbell, 308b.3). Horace’s imitation of this poem in \textit{Carm. 1.10} begins with the vocative \textit{Mercuri}, which, of course, would have been metrically impossible in hexameters.

\textsuperscript{89}Oliensis (1998) 48.

\textsuperscript{90}See Bowditch (2010) 60.

\textsuperscript{91}Cf. Plaut. \textit{Cist. 93: in amicitiam insinuavit . . . blanditiis, muneribus, donis} (“He insinuated himself into friendship through flattery, favors and gifts”). The word \textit{munus} is often associated with divine gifts (cf. Verg. \textit{A. 12.393} and Cic. \textit{Arch. 18}) as well as buildings or property.
as Maecenas, since both offer assistance with regard to poetic activity: the former through inspiration and the latter through his gift of a suitable venue for leisurely withdrawal.  

Horace’s acceptance of the Sabine estate when he was already prosperous may seem to contradict Epicurus’ economic restrictions and views of natural wealth, which impose strict limits on financial success; the details related to the acquisition of his newfound estate, however, closely reflect Philodemus’ economic advice. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Epicurus sanctioned moneymaking only out of dire necessity (Arr. 121b4); in other words, wealth should be acquired for the purpose of satisfying the necessary desires associated with survival, such as food and drink. This is consistent with his view of natural wealth as the equivalent of having few possessions (Arr. 6.25), since such desires are easily satisfied and therefore cannot justify the acquisition of substantial resources (Arr. 5.144.1-2). As mentioned above, Philodemus echoes this advice in his economic treatises, stating that poverty is a “good thing” (De div. 49.12: ἀγαθόν), that the loss of resources is indifferent to happiness (ibid. col. 53.3-5) and that the sage will be content with the thought of living a poor and meager life, since nature is easily satisfied (De eoc. col. 19.16-19). In addition to this, however, he cautiously suggests that responsibly acquired wealth, although contributing nothing of itself to happiness and pleasure, affords relief from difficulties and is conducive towards leisure and the contemplative life; it is, therefore, much preferable to a life of little means:


92For the identification Maecenas = Mercury as parodic, see Bond (1985) 74-5.
The care and preservation of wealth that suits someone who takes care of it properly does not afford greater trouble than the provision of daily needs, and even if it affords more trouble, this is not more than the difficulties from which it releases us, unless someone shows that natural wealth does not provide a much greater balance of rewards over toil than does the life of little means, which he will be very far from showing.

The significance of Philodemus’ point lies in the subtle but meaningful opposition between natural wealth and the “life of few possessions,” which is different from Epicurus’ equation of natural wealth with the possession of few things. This is not to say that Philodemus places the highest value on wealth; rather, he borrows language from the Stoics and describes the change from wealth to poverty as “indifferent” (De div. col. 53.3-5: [ἀδιάφορον]) with regard to happiness or virtue, and he rejects the notion that there is a great “difference” (ibid. col. 41.35-7: διαφορά) between the two economic states, since both are able to produce “equal pleasures” (ibid. col. 56.4-8: ἴσας ἡδονάς). In the passage following the block quotation above, however, he carefully states that the Epicurean sage, though content with little and unwilling to suffer for the sake of wealth, merely “inclines in his wishes towards a more bountiful way of life” (De oec. col. 16.4-6: ὃς τῇ τῇ βουλήσει μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀφθονωτέραν).

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93 Asmis (2004) 159: “Everything Philodemus says is compatible with Epicurus’ own teachings. But there is a change of emphasis. Whereas Philodemus offers a defense of wealth, Epicurus’ economic advice appears, on the whole, a consolation for poverty.”

94 Cf. De oec. col. 16.1-4. The Stoic doctrine of “indifferents” or ἀδιάφορα has been discussed above. Of particular relevance is the evidence from Stobaeus (2.83.10-84.2 = SVF 3.124), according to which Antipater regarded wealth as having “selective value” (ἐκλεκτικὴ ἀξία), which means that, all things being equal, it should always be preferred to poverty. Cf. Plutarch Mor. 75.1047e (De communibus notitiis = SVF 3.138), who mentions how Chrysippus considered it madness not to pursue wealth, and Cicero (Off. 1.25), who places no limit on wealth acquisition so long as “no one is harmed in the process” (amplificatio nemini nocens). In contrast to this, Philodemus never claims that wealth must be pursued or that it can be amassed without limits so long as no one is harmed. Instead, he suggests that the sage accept wealth but simultaneously expresses the value of poverty (πενία), which the sage is never obligated to avoid. Cf. De oec. coll. 15.45-16.4 and De div. coll. 41.9-15 and 47.9-11.
Philodemus makes it clear that the sage freely accepts more wealth but only when it comes easily and without harm; in other words, he receives it from grateful patrons (e.g., Piso and Maecenas) rather than actively seeking it out (ibid. coll. 16.44-17.2): τὸ [δὲ π]λέιον, ἄ[ν α]βλ[α]βῶς καὶ [εὖ]πόρως γίνηται, δεκτ[ὲ]ον, τὸ δὲ κακοπαθ[ε]ῖν κατ' αὐ[τὸ τ]οῦτο μή (“One should accept more wealth if it comes without harm and easily, but one should not suffer on account of this”).

In this sense the Epicurean manager, who is content with little, prefers but does not desire to live affluently, and he only accepts more wealth when it comes easily and, in the ideal situation, in the form of “gratitude” (gratia, εὐχάριστον) from patrons and friends.

The preceding summary of Philodemus’ defense of wealth, which differs from the more restrictive attitude of Epicurus, may help to explain Horace’s acquisition of the Sabine estate, which, far from being a “little farm” (Ep. 1.14.1: agelli; cf. 1.6.71 and 2.2.114), was likely a spacious property with significant agricultural potential. Horace hints at the superiority of this property in Sermones 2.6 by mentioning its size and quality, both of which have exceeded his moderate hopes (1-4): Hoc erat in votis: modus agri non ita magnus . . . auctius atque | di melius fecere (“This is what I prayed for!—a piece of land not so very large . . . More and better than this have the gods done for me”).96 His use of modus is noteworthy, for this word elsewhere denotes the proper measure which corresponds to moderation and correct behavior (cf. 1.1.106:

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95 In other words, the sage should coolly accept but not endeavor to accumulate wealth, which is “easily taken away” (De div. col. 54. 9: εὐαφαίρετος) and “easily destroyed” (ibid. 8: εὐφθαρτος). This is consistent with Epicurus’ teaching concerning the “independence” (Arr. 6.44: αὐτάρκεια) of living with few possessions. In this sense, Philodemus’ expression “inclines in his wishes” certainly does not imply a “desire for wealth” (De div. col. 58.8-9: ἐπιθυμίας π[ῷ]ὗς πλούτον), which is reprehensible.

est modus in rebus);\textsuperscript{97} the Sabine estate, however, clearly exceeds this measure, which is a strange admission paralleled only by the poet’s recognition of Maecenas’ generosity in \textit{Epodi} 1 (30-31): \textit{satis superque me benignitas tua | ditavit} (“enough has your generosity enriched me and more than enough”).\textsuperscript{98} As scholars have noted, the mention of \textit{divitiae} is undoubtedly a reference to the Sabine estate, the overall quality of which, shockingly enough, appears to violate Horace’s usual demand for moderation and contentment.\textsuperscript{99} Indeed, the actual magnitude of what most modern commentators (undoubtedly misled by Horace) inaccurately describe as a “farm” is carefully and discretely revealed by the poet himself.\textsuperscript{100} In his epistolary correspondence with Quinctius, for example, the poet addresses the issue of the Sabine estate’s agricultural productivity (\textit{Ep.} 1.16.1-16), which consequently indicates something about its economic potential, as Leach notes:

The hypothetical questions he attributes to Quinctius locate his description within the discourse of agricultural self-sufficiency. All the products he has listed—crops, olives, orchards, pasturage, and vines—imply a major agricultural establishment, suggesting that [...]

\textsuperscript{97}As Muecke (1993) 196 and Gowers (2012) 81 note, in addition to its ethical connotation \textit{modus} is also the technical term indicating a measure of land. Cf. Plaut. \textit{Aul.} 13: \textit{agri reliquit ei non magnum modum} (“He left him not a large measure of land”).

\textsuperscript{98}Leach (1993) 272, reporting the observations of a young philologist regarding the remains of Horace’s villa in Italy, states: “[H]is confrontation with the architectural actualities disturbed his literary preconceptions in one particular. The unanticipated spaciousness of the villa and its properties seemed out of keeping with Horace’s own protestations of a modest lifestyle.”

\textsuperscript{99}Furthermore, if Suetonius’ testimony is taken into account, it seems that Horace was the recipient of not one, but possibly three properties (Suet. \textit{Vit. Hor.} 18-19): \textit{vixit plurimum in secessu ruris sui Sabini aut Tiburtini, domusque ostenditur circa Tiburni luculum} (“He lived for the most part either in his Sabine or his Tiburtine country retreat, and a house of his is shown near the grove of Tiburnus”). Lyne (1995) 9-11 also accounts for Horace’s extended description of a retreat at Tarentum at \textit{Odes} 2.6 and the townhouse he had acquired soon after his purchase of the post of \textit{scriba}—a possible total of five properties!

the question being answered is really, “How large and how productive is the farm?” If we were to answer this question on the basis of Horace’s offerings in Ode 1.17 to Tyndaris, of copia . . . ruris honorum opulenta, we would have to say “very productive,” but in the immediate situation Horace plays down productivity.\(^{101}\)

All of this, of course, begs the question: how are we to reconcile Horace’s status as an opulent proprietor with Epicurean frugality and the importance of vivere parvo (2.2.1)? As suggested above, the answer lies in the views expressed by Philodemus in his economic treatises, which sanction and even promote the acquisition of wealth under specific conditions. The first important observation is that, in accordance with Philodemus’ teaching, Horace neither pursues wealth nor does he constantly desire more like the “foolish” manager (8: stultus);\(^{102}\) on the contrary, he is able to “endure poverty” (Carm. 1.1.18: pauperiem pati), whom he “courts and whose virtue is its own dowry” (ibid. 3.29.55-6: probamque | pauperiem sine dote quaero) since she is easily satisfied and always provides “what is enough” (Ep. 1.2.46: quod satis est).\(^{103}\) In spite of this profound respect for poverty and his overall contentment, however, Horace clearly indicates that he is not poor: as a result of his patron’s generosity, not only does he “lack troublesome poverty” (Carm. 3.16.37: importuna tamen pauperies abest; cf. Ep. 2.2.199: pauperies . . . absit) but he enjoys substantial wealth, as he plainly states in a later correspondence (Ep. 1.7.15): tu me fecisti locupletem (“You have made me rich”).\(^{104}\) The point

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\(^{102}\) Rudd (1966) 243-44

\(^{103}\) See Vischer (1965) 147-52, whose analysis does not consider the fact that, despite Horace’s respect for poverty, he was willing to accept wealth.

\(^{104}\) For the meaning of this adjective, which is rarely applied to people, as denoting “abundant in land” (i.e., locus + plenus), see Cic. Rep. 2.9.16: quod tum erat res in pecore et
is that Horace, like the Epicurean manager, “does not grab, he accepts,” and that this prosperity is the result of a generous patron’s favor, which he freely receives and responsibly enjoys without toil or anxiety. As he makes perfectly clear in *Epistulae* 1.7, moreover, the poet is certainly not afraid to lose his wealth or return to a state of poverty, but he presently requests that, if possible, his newfound fortune should last a lifetime (2.6.4-5): *oro | . . . ut propria haec mihi munera faxis* (“My only prayer is that you should make these gifts mine for ever”). Far from attempting to avoid poverty and desiring limitless wealth, therefore, Horace simply “inclines in his wishes” towards affluence; and as he consciously demonstrates in the rest of *Sermones* 2.6, his decision to accept such prosperity reflects Philodemus’ concern for applying the pleasure calculus to every economic decision and ensuring that increased wealth does not result in increased pain.

Rather than functioning as a superficial foil to the later description of country life, Horace’s account of the cares associated with Rome at 2.6.23-57 are necessary for justifying his acceptance of the Sabine estate and his leisurely withdrawal there with friends. Following the poet’s second prayer to a deity, which, despite the grandiloquent tone, is merely a “counterpoint

\[\text{locorum possessionibus: ex quo pecuniosis et locupletes vocabantur} \text{ (‘Because in the past wealth was understood in terms of livestock and the possession of land: whence people were called } \text{pecuniosi or locupletes’). Philodemus mentions the troubles and difficulties associated with poverty and wealth’s ability to remove them at } \text{De oec. col. 14.9-23, as quoted above (p. 141).}\]


106 Unlike his paternal inheritance, which was lost in the confiscations. On the formulaic nature is this prayer, see Muecke (1993) 197. Cf. also Philodemus *De oec.* col. 13.34-39: τινὰ δὲ δὲ δεκτέον, ὃν καὶ τὸν πλοῦτον, τὸν βάρος ἔχοντα μετὰ ὅταν παρῆι, μᾶλλον πὸς ὅλον ἢ ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν (“Certain things ought to be accepted, among which is wealth, since it is less of a burden when present, especially if it lasts a lifetime rather than for a moment”).

107 Fraenkel (1957) 142.
to his own rueful groans,” he introduces a long list of duties and responsibilities, all of which violently thrust him (24: urge) into the bustling, crowded streets of Rome (28: in turba). The setting is aptly conveyed by the turbulent weather which accompanies him and projects his interior, psychological disturbances (26: interiore gyro) all the way to the “black Equiline” (32-3: atras | . . . Esquilias), which used to be salubrious (cf. 1.8.14) but is now the source of infinite anxieties (33: negotia centum). Through his vivid description of the innumerable cares and problems of urban life, Horace intentionally obscures the real source of his wealth, which is not the pastoral god Mercury but the city-dweller Maecenas. Of course, the dizzying flurry of requests and demands which buffs the audience for almost thirty lines (29-56) provides the perfect setup for Horace’s contrasting description of the serenity and tranquility of country living, which, instead of reminders and early business meetings (37: meminisses; 34: ante secundam) offer sleep and forgetfulness (61: somno; 62: iucunda oblivia). Above all, it offers Horace as landowner and host the opportunity to provide his friends with the kind of leisurely withdrawal into a rural stronghold (16: in arcem) which is conducive to philosophical

108 Rudd (1966) 249. See also Courtney (2013) 151.

109 For weather metaphors as a common feature of Hellenistic philosophy and particularly favored by the Epicureans, see Chapter 1, p. 48 n. 57.

110 Oliensis (1998) 50: “Horace’s country retreat is not just an alternative to but a gift from the city, a crumb, as it were, from the master’s table. Unlike the country mouse, that is, Horace has chosen the path not of virtuous poverty but of (to give it its best construction) virtuous wealth—his relation with Maecenas involves usus as well as rectum.” I agree that Horace is partly attempting to establish his independence and “defend himself from charges of manly subservience” (51); I would point out, however, that, according to Horace’s own words, he has not chosen wealth but freely accepted it (benignitas tua me ditavit; tu me fecisti locupletem). Braund (1989) 42 describes Horace’s negative account of life in the city as intended to “condemn the jealousy and curiosity” of others.

111 Cf. 1.6.122: ad quartam iaceo (“I lie abed until ten o’clock in the morning”).
After a convivial meal and a few rounds of relaxed and free drinking, which recalls the hospitality of Ofellus (2.2.118-25),

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{sermo} & \text{ oritur, non de villis domibusve alienis,} \\
\text{nec male necne Lepos saltet; sed quod magis ad nos} \\
\text{pertinet et nescire malum est} & \text{agitamus: utrumne} \\
\text{divittis homines an sint virtute beati;} \\
\text{quidve ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos;} \\
\text{et quae sit natura boni summumque quid eius. (S. 2.6.71-6)}
\end{align*}
\]

-conversation arises, not about other people’s villas or town-houses, not whether Lepos dances badly or not, but we discuss what has more relevance to us and not to know is an evil: whether it is wealth or virtue that makes men happy; or what leads us to friendships, self-interest or rectitude; and what is the nature of goodness and what its highest form.

This scene, which identifies the contemplative life and the search for wisdom among friends as the perfect expression of tranquility, reflects Cicero’s idealized portrait of Cato (Sen. 46) but also recalls Philodemus’ description of landownership as an acceptable source of income (De oec. col. 23.11-16):

\[
\text{__[Philosophy, which shall benefit the poor and the rich alike, and which will be damaging to both children and old people if neglected.]__}
\]

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112 See Braund (1989) 40. Cf. also Verg. G. 2.458-74 for the pleasures of country life, which includes plenty of otium and secura quies.

113 Cf. Ep. 1.1.24-6 (note especially the opposition of pauperes, i.e., people like Ofellus and Horace’s father, to locupletes, i.e., Horace himself):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{id quod} \\
\text{aeque pauperibus prodest, locupletibus aeque,} \\
\text{aeque neglectum pueris senibusque nocebit.}
\end{align*}
\]

[Philosophy], which shall benefit the poor and the rich alike, and which will be damaging to both children and old people if neglected.
difficulties follow” correspond to individuals such as Horace’s colleagues from the quaestorship (2.6.36-7) as well as the other nameless individuals whose requests “dance around my head and on all sides” (34: *per caput et circa salient latus*); in contrast to these trivial concerns, his country villa provides the setting for philosophical conversation, the informal and friendly nature of which is effectively communicated by the conviviality of the gathering as well as their identification as “chats” (118: *sermo*; cf. 1.1.42: *sermoni propriora*). Furthermore, this kind of leisure is made possible by the complete absence of labor, which Horace associates exclusively with the city (21: *operum . . . labores*); indeed, whether at home or on the estate, Horace portrays himself as preoccupied with philosophy and poetry, while his meals are served by personal waiters (cf. 1.6.116: *pueris tribus*) or household slaves (2.6.66: *vernas procaces*), and elsewhere he implies that agricultural work in the Sabine fields is performed by a team of at least eight laborers (2.7.118: *opera agro nona Sabino*). Horace’s mention of laborers within the context of his repeated emphasis on rural *otium* echoes the advice of Philodemus, who also emphasizes the importance of delegating manual labor to servants in order to make oneself available to one’s friends and to the pursuit of wisdom (*De oec.* col. 23.7-11): ταλαίπωρον δὲ καὶ ἀγροῦν τὸ δ’ ἄλλων, ἔχοντα γῆν κατὰ σπουδαίον


115 See Armstrong (1986) 278-79 for the luxury involved in Horace’s gentlemanly way of life and his ownership of servants.

116 Horace also employed the services of a bailiff (*Ep.* 1.14.1: *vilice*) when he was away from the country.
(“‘Cultivating the land oneself in a manner involving work with one’s own hands’ is also wretched, while ‘using other workers if one is a landowner’ is appropriate for the good man’”).117 This freedom from manual labor allows one time for more important things such as the topics of discussion Horace mentions, which, in addition to reflecting current debates among contemporary philosophical sects, also highlights wealth (74: divitiis), friendship (75: amicitias) and tranquility (76: summum bonum) as the primary concerns of Epicurean economic theory.

This chapter has attempted to show that, although Horace often delegates the role of satirist to other speakers, he still manages to communicate an economic message that consistently engages with Epicurean doctrine and is relevant to contemporary Romans. Through the mouth of Ofellus in *Sermones* 2.2, for example, the poet not only elucidates the many virtues of frugality but also suggests, in accordance with Philodemus’ economic advice, that dispossessed proprietors ought to endure the loss of wealth indifferently and with equanimity. Similar advice is given in *Sermones* 2.3 by Damasippus through the recorded lectures of Stertinius, although his love of the city, longwinded diatribe and overly critical analysis of humanity as a whole significantly contrast with Horace’s portrait of the rustic Ofellus, who in many ways resembles the poet himself. Of course, one important difference between these two is that, whereas Ofellus demonstrates how to lose wealth, Horace’s self-portrayal in *Sermones* 2.6 appears to be a Philodemean commentary on how to acquire and enjoy substantial wealth properly. In the next chapter, the role of flattery and frankness in the *Sermones* will be examined, particularly with regard to Horace’s lucrative relationship with his patron, which was constantly the subject of envy and has been described as the product of flattery. Of special

117 See Tsouna (2012) 97, commenting on Philodemus’ discussion of sources of income: “[H]e appears to assume that the person who wishes to live the philosophical life owns a substantial estate, complete with slaves, and also is probably using the services of a professional property manager as well.”
concern will be the manner in which he addresses or forestalls this accusation through the practice of frank speech and the colorful depictions of shameless flatterers.
CHAPTER 4
FLATTERY AND FRANKNESS
IN SERMONES 1

As discussed in the previous chapter, Horace’s self-portrayal in the *Sermones* as an ethical expert who dispenses moral *consilia* to a grateful and receptive patron shows signs of engagement with or at least knowledge of Philodemus’ economic advice. Closely interconnected with the issue of patronage, moreover, is the potential role of self-serving flattery, which, given the Epicureans’ reputation for forming social bonds out of utility, was often identified as the underlying motivation for their relationships with patrons and friends. By drawing evidence from Philodemus’ fragmentary treatise *De adulatione*, this chapter will investigate Horace’s relationships with his friends, especially Maecenas, with the antithesis between friendship and flattery in mind. In *Sermones* 1.6, for instance, the poet attempts to distance himself from wordy and self-seeking adulators not only by emphasizing his lack of ambition, but also by highlighting his reticence in the presence of Maecenas, who receives from Horace only straightforward frankness concerning his humble identity. In addition to promoting his pure motives, moreover, this exchange also alludes to the frankness and concern with moral correction which Horace learned from his father in *Sermones* 1.4, and which characterize his own methodological approach to vice in the introductory satires as distinct from the longwinded bitterness of Lucilius and the merciless invective of Old Comedy. Furthermore, the nature of Horatian satire, which does not glorify *libertas* in itself but rather employs it for the purpose of moral correction, will be shown to reflect the nature of Epicurean frankness, which Philodemus describes as a therapeutic tool for moral correction and intimate communication among friends in his treatise *De libertate dicendi*. Finally, this chapter will consider how Horace emphatically contrasts himself with
selfish adulators by examining *Sermones* 1.9, which includes a character portrait that incorporates many characteristics of the typical flatterer as discussed by Philodemus in *De adulatione*.

Patronage in antiquity was often associated with flattery, especially in the case of Epicurus and his followers in Rome, which might have prompted Philodemus to redefine the sage’s role in terms of philosophical friendship. Perhaps the earliest portrayal of this traditional association appears in the fragments of Eupolis’ comic play *Adulatores*, which contains references to the sophist Protagoras as a parasite in the house of his wealthy Athenian patron Callias (*PCG* 5.157-58).¹ This portrait undoubtedly influenced Plato’s comic depiction of the same sophist in his *Protagoras*, in which the eponymous sage enjoys suitable lodging and philosophical leisure at Callias’ expense (314d9-315b8).² The charge of flattery, however, which in the case of the sophists had been largely marginal, became a more prevalent and serious problem as a result of societal changes in the Hellenistic period, as David Konstan explains:

In the altered ideological environment of the Hellenistic period, in which friendship between the powerful and their dependents was the focus of attention, the chief worry concerning the perversion of friendship was the possibility that a person motivated by narrow self-interest would insinuate himself into the coterie of a superior and, by a

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¹See Ribbeck (1884) 9-12 for a discussion of this fragment and for lists of the Greek and Roman comic plays which involve flatterers or parasites (30-31). A much more recent study on the fragments of Eupolis’ *Adulatores* is Storey (2003) 179-97.

²Cf. *Theat.* 164e7-165: ὦ γὰρ ἑγὼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπίστορος (“It is not I Socrates, who is drawn to Protagoras’ teachings, but Callias the son of Hipponicus”). In the *Gorgias* Plato twice makes a connection between rhetoric, which is a distinctively sophistic skill, and flattery (517a6-7; 522d9). See Longo Auricchio (1986) 81-2 for more examples from Plato; Millett (1989) 25-37 has a useful discussion of patronage and its avoidance in democratic Athens.
pretense of friendship, achieve his own gain at the expense of his master.3

Within this new social context, those closest to monarchs and wealthy individuals (and therefore most susceptible to the charge of flattery) were typically advisors or literary figures, who in many circumstances also happened to be philosophers.4 The importance of distinguishing flatterers from friends was actually a significant concern in contemporary philosophical literature, as evidenced by Aristotle’s treatments in both the *Ethica Nicomachea* (1126b11-1127a12) and the *Ethica Eudemia* (1233b40-1234a3), not to mention Theophrastus’ influential character portrait of the flatterer (*Char. 2*).5 In the case of Epicurus, whose extant fragments do not mention flattery, the situation is rather different: he sanctioned patronage as the only reputable source of income for the sage, which on occasion entails “service to a king” (Arr. 1.121b5.1-2: καὶ μόναρχον ἐν καιρῷ θεραπεύσειν); because the Epicureans understood friendship as primarily utilitarian (cf. Arr. 6.34 and 39), however, prominent figures of the sect were easily accused of shameless flattery, which, as mentioned in Chapter 2, is exactly what happened to Epicurus regarding his various benefactors.6 Indeed, the distinction between

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4Ribbeck (1884) categorizes and lists the known flatterers of Alexander the Great (84-6), Demetrius Poliorketes (86-8) and other Hellenistic rulers (88-92).

5For this portrait, see especially the new edition of Diggle (2003) 181-98, which includes a helpful introductory note on the flatterer. Trapp (1997) 125 mentions lost treatises on flattery attributed to Simias, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, Theopompus, Clearchus, Cleanthes and Chrysippus.

6I give here the full quotation from Diogenes’ account (Arr. 1.4.10-5.3): Μιθρῆν τε αἰσχρῶς κολακεύειν τὸν Λυσιμάχον διοικητὴν, ἐν ταῖς ἐπιστολαῖς Παιᾶνα καὶ ἄνακτα καλοῦντα. ἄλλα καὶ ἰδομένεα καὶ Ἡρόδοτον καὶ Τιμοκράτην τοὺς ἐκπυστα αὐτοῦ τὰ κρύφια ποιήσαντας ἐγκωμιάζειν καὶ κολακεύειν αὐτὸ τοῦτο (“[He is also said to have] flattered shamelessly Mithres, the steward of Lysmachus, calling him in his letters both ‘Savior’ and ‘My lord.’” Idomeneus too and Herodotus and Timocrates, who divulged his secrets, he is
“friend” (φίλος) and “flatterer” (κόλαξ) was notoriously blurry in antiquity in general, but it was perhaps even more difficult to ascertain in Horace’s or Plutarch’s Rome, where the stratifications of amicitia were many and the number of Greek sages vying for their patrons’ favor unsurprisingly elicited charges of flattery. Cicero in particular considered the Greeks “truly deceptive in general as well as fickle and knowledgeable in their constant dedication to excessive flattery” (Q. fr. 1.5.19-20: vero fallaces sunt permulti et leves et diuturna servitute ad nimiam adsentationem eruditi). He was also a staunch opponent of the Epicurean view of friendship (Amic. 45 and 51; cf. also Fin. 2.78-9), which, among other things, motivated his critical portrayal of Philodemus’ relationship with Piso as the product of flattery (Pis. 70: adsentatorem). Despite the fact that Cicero’s attack involves the application of general stereotypes and stock qualities, which suggest that it is more comic than serious, his negative portrayal of Epicurean relationships probably inspired Philodemus to address formally the differences between sages and flatterers. It is possible, therefore, that certain aspects of his said to have praised and flattered all the same”). For more details, especially concerning Mithres, see Beloch (1926) 331-35 and Castaldi (1928) 293-99. Lucian notes in his satire De parasito that Epicurus shamelessly made the parasitic art his philosophical “goal” (11: τέλος). For the close relationship between parasites and flatterers, see McC. Brown (1992) 98-106 and Arnott (2010) 322-24. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

7Hunter (1985a) 483: “In the Greek world φίλος was used as a court title, and so a man who was φίλος (or ἐταῖος) τοῦ βασιλέως was, from another point of view, a flatterer and a slave.” This issue is treated at length by Plutarch in Mor. 4 (Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur).

8Allen and DeLacy (1939) 61-3.

9Cf. Orat. 1.22.102 for similar derogatory remarks concerning the Greeks.


treatment in *De adulatione* are intended to counteract this portrayal or at least apologize for any misconceptions. In PHerc. 222, for example, he acknowledges that between sages and flatterers “there will be similarities” (col. 2.1-2: ἐσονταὶ τινες ὄμοιότητες) such as the reception of gifts and honor, which others mistakenly identify as the fruits of obsequiousness (ibid. 18-21): καὶ τῶν [ὑ]πορχόντων πόλλʼ ἀπολα[ν]στὰ διδάσαιν αὐτῶι ἐνιαίνοι καὶ συνήθει[ε]ς π[ο]σιμώ[υ]ς ὑμώ[τ]εν ὑμῶ[τ]ες [ἀποδιδόσιν αὐτῶν ὡς κόλα[κα] (‘Even the relatives and associates of some [sages] will consider him a flatterer when they see him being honored more than others’).\(^{12}\) Both figures, moreover, are often drawn to wealthy or powerful patrons (ibid. col. 5.2-3: ἀνθρώπ[ο]ις μεγαλοπλούτοις), in whose presence they praise philosophical wisdom (ibid. col. 2.9-10: [τ]ῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιετικῶ[ς] σοφίας). The difference between these two, however, lies in their respective intentions or dispositions: the flatterer, whose rhetorical charm and malicious intent surpass that of even the “mythical Sirens” (ibid. col. 2.6-7: αἱμυθικαὶ Σειρῆνες), speaks only to please his victim (PHerc. 1457, col. 4.7: πρὸς χάλεγων) while slandering his competitors (PHerc. 222, col. 2.13-16), and his attraction to wealthy individuals is motivated by avarice alone (PHerc. 1457, col. 12.22: φιλαργυροῦσι).\(^{13}\) The sage, on the other hand, engages in conversations that are “truthful and devoid of spite” (*De oec.*

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\(^{12}\)The critical editions of these fragments are the following (see also the Introduction, p. 8): PHerc. 222, Gargiulo (1981); PHerc. 223, Gigante and Indelli (1978); PHerc. 1089, Acosta Méndez (1983); PHerc. 1675, De Falco (1926); PHerc. 1457, Bassi (1914) and Kondo (1974); PHerc 1082, Caini (1939). Also helpful are the treatments of Longo Auricchio (1986) 79-91 and Tsouna (2007) 126-42. For differing views regarding the proper organization of these fragments, see the back-to-back arguments of Capasso (2001) 179-94 and Monet (2001) 195-202.

\(^{13}\)Cf. Pl. *Soph.* 222e1-223a1 and Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1127a8-10. Theophr. *Char.* 2 describes flattery as “the kind of converse which is dishonorable but profitable to the one flattering” (ὁμιλίαν αἰσχρὰν εἶναι συμφέρουσαν δὲ τῷ κολακεύοντι). Philodemus briefly discusses the “dispositions” (διάθεσεις) of flatterers and sages in PHerc. 1089, coll. 1-2.
col. 23.30-31: ἀληθινῶν καὶ ἀφιλοκων], nor does he imitate the flatterer’s garrulity and rhetorical charm. Instead, he is particularly trustworthy because his conversation is not only “frank” (PHerc. 222, col. 3.27-8: παρρησιαζόμενον) but also pithy and beneficial to the recipient (cf. De oec. col. 27.37-9), whose response to the sage’s companionship, which is pleasing without being obsequious,\(^\text{14}\) is described as profound and genuine gratitude (ibid. col. 23.27-8: εὐχάριστον).

Philodemus’ concern with defending his reputation as a moral expert and close associate of the wealthy Piso in light of Cicero’s criticisms might have influenced Horace’s depiction of his own relationship with Maecenas. The poet’s charming recollection in Sermones 1.6.54-64 of the initial meeting with his future patron is obviously intended to portray the former as an honest and virtuous candidate, but it is also designed to combat the traditional identification of the sage-client as a subservient flatterer.\(^\text{15}\) Horace begins by immediately disassociating himself from the overly ambitious and headstrong toady, who characteristically propels himself towards his

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\(^{14}\)For the distinction between “being obsequious” (ἀφιλοκοίνων), which is a sign of flattery, and “being pleasing” (ἀνδάνειν; cf. 1.6.63: placuit tibi), which is an acceptable characteristic of Epicurean relationships, see Kondo (1974) 54-6 and Glad (1996) 28. This comparison with ἀνδάνειν is based on PHerc. 1457, col. 10.8-9, which is partially damaged and reads as follows in Bassi’s 1914 edition: ἐν τοῖς ΠΕ. ΚΑ. Α. ΔΑΝΕΙΝ. Kondo, following the obviously plausible reconstruction of previous scholars, reads ἐν τοῖς πέλασις ἀνδάνειν (“in being pleasing to one’s neighbors”) and compares Arr. 6.67: εἰς τὴν τοῦ πλησίου εὔνοιαν διαμετρῆσαι (“to win the good favor of one’s neighbor”).

\(^{15}\)In what follows I present an interpretation of Horace as attempting to distinguish himself (although not without humor) from flatterers, which contrasts in general with Turpin (2009) 129-37, whose view of Horace as a parasite and a completely inept moralist is far too extreme and ignores the poet’s claim to write about seria (1.1.27) and verum (ibid. 24). I am happy to cite Kemp (2009) 5, who likewise defends Horatian satire against the charge of moral incompetence.
unsuspecting prey like a hunter. He prefaces this carefully constructed scene by declaring that Maecenas rejects shameless ambition (51-2: prava | ambiguity), which, according to Philodemus, motivates flatterers to seek glory through relationships with millionaires:


(PHerc. 222, coll. 4.4-5.4)

A good reputation, which both the philosopher and the layman can have, is pursued for the sake of security in accordance with nature, but not by means of vice, in which flattery is quite involved since it brings greater infamy and shame when it is expected to produce fame. [Flatterers] aim to please millionaires, potentates and demagogues for the sake of

16Cf. Eupolis’ portrayal of the flatterer as tracking down his prey in the agora (PCG 5.172, see also Storey [2003] 190), which ultimately inspired the poets of New Comedy, as Terence’s characterization of Gnatho in the Eunuchus suggests (to which, cf. the especially portrayal of Artotrogus at Plaut. Mil. 31-45):

hoc novomst aucipium; ego adeo primus inveni viam.
est genus hominum qui esse primos se omnium rerum volunt
nec sunt. hos consector; hisce ego non paro me ut rideant,
sed eis ultimo arrideo et eorum ingenia admiror simul.
quiquid dicunt laudo; id rursum si negant, laudo id quoque.
negat quis, nego; ait, aio. postremo imperavi egomet mihi
omnia assentari. is quaestus nunc est multo uberrimus. (Ter. Eu. 248-52)

Now there’s a new way to catch our prey, and I’m the original inventor. There is a type of men who want to be the first in everything but aren’t. I track these down. I don’t set out to make them laugh at me; I laugh at them instead while at the same time expressing admiration for their wit. Whatever they say, I praise it; if they then say the opposite, I praise that too. They deny, I deny; they affirm, I affirm. In a word, I’ve commanded myself to agree to everything. That’s the most profitable way to make a living these days.

17Cf. Fiske (1971) 317, who gives Teles’ record of Bion’s opinion concerning reputations: πρὸς δόξαν καὶ ἀδοξίαν ἰθαν ἐχοντα (“[He said that he was] equally disposed towards a good reputation or a bad one”). This is obviously not Horace’s father’s view when he expresses concern for “preserving your livelihood and reputation” (1.4.118-19: vitam famamque . . . incolument).
possessions or glory or out of some other motive.

Philodemus’ description of the dangers of flattery as producing more infamy than fame reflects the principles of the hedonic calculus, but it also recalls Horace’s warning concerning placing oneself in “Glory’s chariot” (1.6.23: *Gloria curru*), which ultimately results in slavery to political responsibilities and possible infamy, as Tillius quickly discovered (107): *obiciet nemo sordis mihi, quas tibi, Tili* (“No one will taunt me with [lit. throw at me] meanness as he does you, praetor Tillius”). Furthermore, Horace underscores his passive immunity to ambition by employing the similar verb *obferre* (but with a very different meaning) to explain his encounter with Maecenas (54): *nulla etenim mihi te fors obtulit* (“For it was no case of luck throwing you in my way”). This expression is noteworthy, since it communicates that it was not Horace who “thrust himself” into the millionaire’s path; rather, their initial meeting was owed to the intervention of the poet’s close friends, who thrust Maecenas into the poet’s path. His mention of high-quality friends like Vergil and Varius, who freely vouch for his ethical credentials (55:

18Cf. *PHerc. 1675*, in which Philodemus, quoting Hermarchus, discusses the similarities between politicians and flatterers, both of whom must please their subjects in order to achieve notoriety: πονοῦσιν οὖν οἱ πολιτευόμενοι προσεπιφέρει τὸν τοιγαροῦν· ‘παραιτοῦντας διὰ μὲν τὸ περὶ πολλοῖς δυσαρεστεῖν στυγοῦντες αὐτοὺς, διὰ δὲ τὸ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖν τὸν αὐτῶν δόσεως καὶ τὰίμιος, πάλιν ἄν τιποτοῦ μενοι δουλεύειν· τοιούτοιν τι γίνεται, φησί, καὶ τοῖς κόλακας· “Thus do politicians toil, and he adds accordingly ‘They ask for favors because they suffer annoyances on account of many and they hate them, because they put great value in gifts and honors from them, and in return exert themselves by serving.’ And this sort of thing happens, he says, to flatterers as well”). Rudd (1966) 51 notes that maintaining gloria involved “attending all kinds of tiresome functions and ‘cultivating’ people who in themselves were boring and disagreeable.” See also Glad (1996) 32-3.

19Gowers (2012) 233 notes that the verb *obferre* “suggests thrusting something in someone’s path” (cf. 1.4.123, where Horace’s father “thrusts” examples into his son’s line of vision). Lucilius’ description of his encounter with Scipio probably influenced Horace (1009 M): *producunt me ad te, tibi me haec ostendere cogunt* (“They brought me to you and forced me to show you these verses”).
quid essem), is also significant: it would seem that from its very inception Horace’s relationship with Maecenas is attributed to, as well as contextualized and defined by, honesty and genuine friendship, which, as Philodemus notes, is “the adversary of flattery” (PHerc. 1082, col. 2.1-3: \( \phiιλια \ldots \eta \psi\alpha\lambdaο\varsigma \varepsilon\sigma\tau\iota\iota \iota \ \κολακε\iota \\)). By choosing to overlook completely his literary talents, moreover, Horace attempts to emphasize further his personal worth and thereby deflect any charges of flattery (1.6.46-8). Indeed, one wonders whether Cicero’s critical portrayal of Philodemus as a flattering poet in any way deterred Horace from making such a connection explicit in Sermones 1.6. Regardless of the poet’s reason, his overwhelmingly positive self-portrait assures Maecenas that he has nothing to fear from this potential client, who, in accordance with Philodemus’ description of the sage in De gratitudine (PHerc. 1414), is “pure”

\[ \text{Kemp (2010b) 67. Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. 1126b20-21, in which “friendship” (φιλια) is regarded as the most suitable mean between “flattery/obsequiousness” (κολακεια/\( \alpha\rho\epsilon\sigma\kappa\epsilon\iota \)) and “surliness/quarrelsomeness” (\( \delta\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\iota\sigma\iota\alpha\slash\delta\upsilon\sigma\kappa\alpha\lambda\iota \)).} \]

\[ \text{Rudd (1966) 41 interprets rodunt at line 46 as resentment, while Gowers (2012) 232 comments that this verb is “part of the traditional vocabulary of satirical invidia.” I follow Kemp (2010b) 65 in adding to these the charge of flattery. Regarding the omission itself, another possibility is that it reflects the nature of Horatian satire as “unpowerful,” as Schlegel (2005) 54 suggests.} \]

\[ \text{Cic. Pis. 70: Est autem hic de quo loquor non philosophia solum sed etiam ceteris studiis quae fere Epicureos neglegere dicunt perpolitus; poema porro facit ita festivum, ita concinnum, ita elegans, ut nihil fieri posit argutius. In quo reprehendat eum licet, si qui volet, modo leviter, non ut improbum, non ut audacem, non ut impurum, sed ut Graeculum, ut adsentatorem, ut poetam (“Moreover, this man about whom I am speaking is quite polished not only in philosophy but also in those other pursuits which they say the Epicureans neglect; furthermore, he writes poems that are so festive, apt and elegant that nothing could be more clever. If anyone wished to censure him for this even slightly, it would not be because he is shameless, overly bold or impure, but because he is a Greekling, a flatterer and a poet”).} \]

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καθαρούς; cf. 1.6.64: *pectore puro* and 69: *purus*) and does not snatch away his friends’ wealth (ibid. col. 9.2-6).23

Another aspect of Horace’s self-portrayal in *Sermones* 1.6 that further highlights his distance from self-seeking ambition is the combined role of frankness and pithiness, both of which are antithetical to the flatterer but characteristic of the sage. In contrast to the expressed criticisms of nameless aristocrats (29 and 38-9), the blare of trumpets in the forum (43-4) and the jeers of envious poetasters (45-8), Horace’s encounter with Maecenas occurs within the context of remarkable silence and tranquility:

> ut veni coram, singulatim pauca locutus—
> infans namque pudor prohibebat plura profari—
> non ego me clarum patre, non ego circum
> me Satureiano vectari rura caballo,
> sed quod eram narro. (S. 1.6.56-60)

On coming into your presence I said a few faltering words, for speechless shame stopped me from more. My tale was not that I was a famous father’s son, not that I rode about my estate on a Saturian steed: I told you what I was.

The language Horace employs in this passage, which contains an astonishing array of monosyllabic and disyllabic words surrounding the jarring presence of the five-syllable *Satureiano* (which represents the boaster’s inflated arrogance), has rightly been identified as an expression of Callimachean brevity (cf. *Aet*. 1.23-24).24 Without any reference to the nature of

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23The evidence for this treatise is collected by Tepedino Guerra (1975) 96-9. Cf. Eupolis’ description of flatterers as rapacious thieves (*PCM* 5.162): φοροῦσιν, ἄρπάξουσιν ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας | τὸ χρυσίον, τἀργυρία πορθεῖται (“They carry off and snatch away the gold from one’s house, and the silver is hauled away”). This passage is discussed by Storey (2003) 183, who attributes it to Callias or a slave. In his satire *Reviviscentes sive piscator*, Lucian portrays inauthentic philosophers as concerned solely with making money (42-5).

24Freudenburg (1993) 206 and Oliensis (1998) 32 discuss the programmatic nature of this Callimachean passage. For the significance of *Satureiano*, which may contain a pun with *satur*,
his poetry, therefore, Horace subtly communicates that the hallmark of his satire will be a terse frankness directed toward a discerning patron, who is more of a paternal figure than a king.\textsuperscript{25} Nevertheless, the entire scene is an expression of a traditional topos involving the truthful sage’s exchange with a powerful king, which might have originated with Herodotus’ account of Solon before Croesus (\textit{Hdt.} 1.30-33) and was apparently of great interest to Philodemus. In his doxographical treatise \textit{Stoicorum Historia}, he examines the philosophical nature of frankness as employed by Zeno of Citium before Antigonas Gonatas (coll. 8-9),\textsuperscript{26} and he offers a similar consideration of Plato before Dionysius I of Syracuse in the counterpart treatise \textit{Academicorum Historia}.\textsuperscript{27} Of course, the most popular precedent cited among scholars and commentators for Horace is that of Bion before Antigonus (Kindstrand [1976] F1A), although one immediately observes that the poet’s account is much pithier than Bion’s eleven lines of autobiographical

\footnotesize{see Gowers (2012) 234. For the anaphoric repetition of negatives in the denial of wealth, cf. Lucil. (132 M): \textit{ostrea nulla fuit, non purpura, nulla peloris} (“I had no crimson clothes, no purple trappings and no large mussels”).

\textsuperscript{25}Schelgel (2005) 53-4 discusses the poet’s self-representation as a stuttering child before an imposing paternal figure, whose nine-month deliberation resembles a gestation period.

\textsuperscript{26}See Dorandi (1994) for an edition and translation of this treatise. Clay (2004) 62-4 offers a concise but enlightening summary of its contents. The passage cited above contains a friendly insult of Antigonus directed toward Zeno, whose response has not survived (col. 8.1-13). In the following column, however, Philodemus reports that Zeno was Antigonus’ “equal” (9.2: \textit{ἴσον τε καὶ ὃμοιον}) and that he enjoyed “sweet competitions” (ibid. 3: \textit{φιλονικίαν ἥδειαν}) with the Macedonian king, who “marveled at the man and honored him” (ibid. 5-6: \textit{θαυμάζειν καὶ τιμᾶν}) Cf. Diogenes’ account of Zeno’s correspondence with Antigonus (7.6-9).

\textsuperscript{27}Dorandi (1991). The reference to Plato’s frankness occurs at col. 2X.11-15: \textit{καὶ τ[ο]’υτον σκαίλεστε[ον] αὐτοῦ τὴν παραφοσία[ν] ένέγκα[ντες] ὅτι ἐρωτηθεὶς τίς[τις] αὐτῶι [δο]’κε[ι] φα[ν]ή[ναι εὐθαμολόπτερος, οὐ[κ] εἶπεν αὐτ[ον] (“and this one [Dionysius] showed himself to be ill at ease with his [Plato’s] frankness, because when he [Plato] was asked who he thought was more blessed than others, he [Plato] did not say him [Dionysius]”). According to Olivieri (1914) 54 and, more recently, Clay (2004) 69, a similar reference to Plato’s frankness can be found at \textit{De lib. dic.} col. 15b5-6, which contains a quotation of Plato’s “second sailing” (\textit{δεύτερον πλοῦν}) as it appears in \textit{Phd.} 99d1-2 (cf. also Plut. \textit{Mor.} 4.52d and 67c-e).}
details complete with allusions to Homer. His simplicity and straightforwardness in this scene, however, are carefully balanced by the silence which characterizes Horace’s demeanor before the wealthy Maecenas, and which may reflect the principles of Philodemean homiletics as expressed in his treatise *De conversatione*. According to Philodemus’ fragmentary explanation, virtuous “conversation” \(\text{oμίλια}\) between true friends employs frankness whenever necessary but also observes the “power of silence” (col. 6.2: \(\text{σιωπῆς δύναμις}\)), which is an expression of the sage’s tranquility and underscores his disdain for dishonest or “evil talk” (col. 7.17: \(\text{κακῆς ὁμιλίας}\)). That is to say, unlike the flatterer or ambitious politician who will say anything to their listeners, a true friend’s conversations are motivated by goodwill and therefore communicate only what is relevant or helpful, as emphasized in *De libertate dicendi*:

\[
\begin{align*}
\end{align*}
\] (col. 1b.2-14)

. . . everyone who bears goodwill and practices philosophy intelligently and continually and is great in character and indifferent to fame and least of all a politician and clean of envy and says only what is relevant and is not carried away so as to insult or strut or show contempt or do harm, and does not make use of insolence and flattering arts.

In a similar fashion, Horace does not portray himself as an obsequious flatterer whose rhetoric tickles the ear with “honeyed words” (cf. P Herc. 222, col. 7.9-10: \(\text{μει[λίτει] δὲ τὸν}\)).

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κολα[κε]υόμεν[ον]) and whose physical appearance is similarly designed to please the eyes, as Philodemus explains (PHerc. 1457, col. 6.27-31 [fr. 7]): καὶ πλείστο[υ δὲ ἀποκείρα]σθαί καὶ τοὺς [οδόντας λευ]κούς ēχειν κ[αι τὰ ἰμάτια δὲ χο[η]στὰ μεταβά[λεσθαι καὶ χρίσ]ματι ἀλείψ[θαι] (“For the most part the obsequious man keeps his hair nicely trimmed, his teeth are whitened, he wears fashionable clothes and stays well-oiled with chrism”). In contrast to this, the poet shows and tells Maecenas exactly “what he was” (1.6.60: quod eram), without the cosmetic trappings of rhetoric or fashion. Furthermore, his few words are identified as originating in a “pure heart” (64: pectore puro), which, as quoted above, implies freedom from envy and ambition; indeed, unlike the flatterer, whose greatest enemies are his competitors (cf. PHerc. 222, col. 2.13-14: μάλιστα . . . [τοὺς] κόλακας ἐκ[διώκει]), Horace does not envy Varius or Vergil, whom he considers “the best of friends” (1.6.54: optimus) rather than rivals for Maecenas’ favor. Overall, Horace’s self-description in this scene effectively foreshadows the

30Cf. Bion’s statement that those who love flattery are “like amphorae, being easily lead about by their ears” (Kindstrand [1976] F51): ἀμφορεῦσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ὤτων ῥᾳδίως μεταφερομένοις.

31In this passage Philodemus quotes from Theophrastus’ character portrait of the “petty-proud man” or μικροφιλότιμος (Char. 21), which he applies to his description of the obsequious man (ἄφεσκος).

32Horace gives a similar, frank self-description in Ep. 1.194-97 (cf. the probable intertext in Ovid’s description of the appearance of the flattering amator in Ars. 1.513-22):

si curatus inaequali tonsore capillos
occurrī, rides; si forte subucula pexae
trita subest tunicae, vel si toga dissidet impar,
rides.

If, when some uneven barber has cropped my hair, I come our way, you laugh; if haply I have a tattered shirt beneath a new tunic, or if my gown sits badly and askew, you laugh.

33Cf. 1.9.49-52:
tone of his *Sermones*: they will be neither obsequious nor slanderous and overly critical, but rather truthful and terse for the sake of his audience’s moral benefit.

Despite Horace’s programmatic reticence before his patron, as a satirist his poetry endeavors to provide a critical but honest appraisal of contemporary society with regard to morality, the justification for which (as with many other things) he owes to his virtuous upbringing as described in *Sermones* 1.4. One of the major aspects of Horace’s moral training which reflects Epicurean tradition is his father’s pedagogical use of frankness, which applies many of the methods described by Philodemus in *De libertate dicendi*. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Horace’s brand of satire resembles that of Lucilius, although it has been suggested that he tempers his predecessor’s harsh *libertas* by employing Aristotle’s doctrine of the gentlemanly and liberal jest (*Eth. Nic.* 1127b33-1128a33). This virtue is opposed to “buffoonery” (βωμολοχία) as defined by the excessive desire to ridicule others (ibid. 1128a33-1128b2), which is a vice Horace similarly rejects in his correspondence with Lollius Maximus:

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est huic diversum vitio vitium prope maius,
asperitas agrestis et inconcinna gravisque,
quae se commendat tonsa cute, dentibus atris,
dum volt libertas dici mera veraque virtus.  (Ep. 1.18.5-8)
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There is a vice opposite of this [sc. flattery]—perhaps a greater one—a clownish rudeness, awkward and offensive, which commends itself by scraped skin and black teeth, while fain to pass for simple candor and pure virtue.

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   domus hac nec purior ulla est
   nec magis his aliena malis; nil me officit, inquam,
ditior hic aut est quia doctior.
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“No house is cleaner or more free from such intrigues than that. It never hurts me, I say, that one is richer or more learned than I.”
The mention of “importune harshness” (asperitas inconcinna) when blurting offensive remarks in this poem establishes a link to the bitter frankness of “biting Cynics” in Epistulae 1.17 (18: mordacem Cynicum), whom Horace similarly criticizes as “importunate” and “inept” (ibid. 29: inconcinnus; 32: ineptus). Philodemus similarly responds to the Cynic tradition of moral invective in De libertate dicendi (col. 3b.4-5: κυνώδης; cf. fr. 73.12-13: κυνικότερα), particularly by frequently condemning harsh criticism for its own sake and emphasizing the importance of frankness as a therapeutic tool intended either to prevent or correct moral deficiency. One may compare this to Sermones 1.4, in which Horace attributes his “rather free

34 For a detailed discussion of the significance of παρρησία for the Cynics, see Scarpati (1964) 62-9 and Kindstrand (1976) 263. A more recent study is that of Konstan (1996) 7-19. Cicero gives a similar definition of the terms Horace uses at Orat. 2.17, which is followed by a description that fits the Cynics in general (18): Omnium autem ineptiarum, quae sunt innumerabiles, haud sciam an nulla sit maior quam, ut illi solent, quocumque in loco, quoscumque inter homines visum est, de rebus aut difficillimis aut non necessariis argutissime disputare (“Of all the social improprieties, moreover, which are beyond number, I doubt that any is greater than what those Greeks are accustomed to do: I mean engaging in strenuous arguments over the most inappropriate or trivial matters in all places and among anyone who seems suitable”).

35 Cf. De lib. dic. fr. 79 (the end of the passage has been heavily reconstructed, but the general sense is clearly that of a contrast between harsh and well-intentioned frankness): μηδὲ συνεχῶς αὐτῷ ποιεῖν, μηδὲ κατὰ πάντων, μηδὲ πάντα ἀμάρτημα καὶ τὸ τυχόν, μηδὲ ἄν ὁ χρή παρόντων, μηδὲ μετὰ διαχύσεως, ἀλλὰ συνπαθῶς τὰς ἀμαρτίας ὑπολαμβάνει καὶ μὴ καθυβρίζειν μηδὲ λοιδοφεῖν (“Nor to do it [sc. criticize frankly] continually, nor against everyone, nor every chance error, nor errors of those whom one should not criticize when they are present, not with merriment, but rather to take up the errors sympathetically and not to scorn or insult”). Similar advice occurs at frs. 37.4-8, 38.1-6 and 60.3-10. Philodemus also explicitly supports condemnation of the harshness of Bion and Chrysippus in his treatise De ira (col. 1.11-20), for which see Cröner (1906) 32, Gigante and Indelli (1978) 125 and the critical edition of Indelli (1988). Horace apparently held a similar opinion with regard to the Stoics’ overly harsh diatribes, as his portrayal of the longwinded and arrogant Damasippus in Sermones 2.3 reveals. For general studies of Epicurean frankness, which is not mentioned in the fragments of Epicurus and appears to have been developed by Philodemus’ teacher Zeno of Sidon, see Olivieri (1914) vii-viii, Gigante (1983), 55-113, Glad (1996) 30-59 and the introduction in Konstan et al. (1998) 1-24. For discussions of this tradition in Horace, largely with respect to the Carmina and Epistulae, see Dewitt (1935) 312-19, Michels (1944) 173-77, Hunter (1985a) 480-90 and Kemp (2010b) 65-76.
speech” (103-4: liberius si | dixero quid), which is intended to provide moral correction and to which he contrasts the backbiting and dishonest speech of false friends (81-5), to his father’s training (105: insuevit pater).36 Furthermore, the passage which follows quickly reveals that his father’s frankness is the opposite of the typical Cynic asperitas or ineptia, since it is borne out of goodwill and chiefly exercised as a preventative measure intended for the future preservation of his son’s physical and moral well-being (118: vitam famamque). This concern may reflect the Epicurean tradition of frankness as essentially pedagogical, as witnessed by Philodemus’ corresponding inclusion of children among the largest group of recipients of frankness (cf. De lib. dic. frs. 18.1: παι, 31.2: νέων and 36.5: νεωτέροις),37 which, in addition to being employed for corrective purposes, may also be exercised to forestall or prevent vicious behavior.38 In fact, his description of frankness as an ongoing treatment that regularly involves the communication of advice within a private and intimate setting suggests that, rather than a mere tool for correction, Epicurean frankness is an ἥθος or way of living that thrives within relationships in

36Cf. Cic. Amic. 88-9: Nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice, cum benevole fiant (“For friends frequently must be not only advised, but also rebuked, and both advice and rebuke should be kindly received when given in a spirit of goodwill”).

37For the theme of “care for the young” (ἐπιμέλεια τῶν νέων) with regard to Philodemus’ De libertate dicendi, see Glad (1996) 34 n. 56.

38DeWitt (1935) 313: “Freedom of speech, as a paideutic method, is there assumed to be divided into two parts . . . second, admonition (νουθετησις) for future behavior.” A similar view is expressed by Michels (1944) 174. In his diatribe satires Horace combines these approaches: his direct audience (i.e., the nameless interlocutors) receives rebuke and correction, while the broader circle of intimate friends, including Maecenas, may view these conversations as admonitory reflections.
small communities,\textsuperscript{39} a detail which may be reflected by Horace’s portrayal of his father’s private training as well as his own limited correspondence within a closely-knit circle of friends.

The privacy which Horace and his father share and as a result of which frankness is exercised for the sake of moral improvement may reflect certain developments in contemporary Epicureanism regarding the nature of friendship. The first observation regarding philosophical relationships among Epicureans is that they thrive within communities that, although not officially exclusive,\textsuperscript{40} are generally described in terms of privacy and intimacy. In his treatises, for example, Philodemus repeatedly mentions “intimate fellows” (οἱ συνήθεις) and “the members of the household” (οἱ οἰκείοι), who engage in fruitful conversations and forge bonds which are not experienced by “the outsiders” (οἱ ἔξωθεν).\textsuperscript{41} As mentioned above, in the \textit{Sermones} a similar intimacy is foreshadowed by Horace’s exclusive encounter with Maecenas but more directly communicated by his father’s private education, which is founded upon an impressionable youth’s trustful surrender to a loving parent’s frank admonition concerning the outside world.\textsuperscript{42} His father’s good counsel eventually enables Horace to engage in private and

\textsuperscript{39}The identification of frankness as a way of life among friends is communicated by the title of the collection to which this treatise belongs, which includes mention of “characters” [ἠθῶν] and “ways of living” [βίων]. Philippson (1938) 2470, contrasting παρρησία with κολακεία, the latter of which is treated by Philodemus in a collection entitled \textit{De vitiis et virtutibus oppositis}, concluded that the former was to be identified as a “virtue” (ἀρετή). As Gigante (1983) 60-61 and Gargiulo (1981)103-4 have convincingly argued, however, the opposing virtue to flattery is most likely “friendship” (φιλία), while frankness itself is not a virtue but a “way of life” (ἦθος).

\textsuperscript{40}Clay (1983) 255-79 explores the details concerning community life among the Epicureans. For the Epicurean concept of “fellowship” (συνδιαγωγή, \textit{convictus}), see DeWitt (1936) 55-63.

\textsuperscript{41}See Glad (1996) 28.

\textsuperscript{42}Marchietti (2004) 17: “Quando da bambini camminiamo al lato di un adulto che ci indica aspetti del mondo, ci affidiamo a lui; ma anch’egli, l’adulto, si affida a noi: accetta di
reflective deliberations with himself (1.4.133: *consilium proprium*), which are similarly frank and motivate correct behavior. Of course, Horace is willing to share these *consilia* with others, but he makes it clear that they are intended for a restricted and familiar audience (73: *amicis*), which he describes in terms of intimate friendship (1.5.42: *devinctior*; cf. *Carm.* 1.3.9: *animae dimidium meae*) and, when necessary, constructive criticism reciprocally directed toward himself (1.10.78-91; cf. *Carm.* 1.24.7: *nudaque Veritas*). These passages reveal Horace’s understanding of frank criticism as occurring within the context of private conversations among close friends, which is an understanding Philodemus obviously shares:

κἂν π[ερὶδεικνύωμεν ἐπιλογιστικῶς, ὅτι πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν ἐκ φιλίας περιγινομένων οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τηλικοῦτον ὡς τὸ ἐχεῖν, ὥστε τὰ γόρδια τὰς ἑφε σεῖ καὶ λέγοντος ἄκουστεται. σφόδρα γὰρ ἡ φύσις ὅρεγεται πιθανῶς εἰκαλύπτειν ἃ τι πρὸς τὸν οὖν ἀκούσεται. σφόδρα γὰρ ἡ φύσις ὅρεγεται πιθανῶς εἰκαλύπτειν ἃ τι πρὸς τὸν οὖν ἀκούσεται. (De lib. dic. fr. 28.3-10)

Even if we demonstrate logically that, although many fine things result from friendship, there is nothing so grand as having one to whom one will say what is in one’s heart and who will listen when one speaks.

This description of the friendship between members of an Epicurean community as originating in a desire to share one’s innermost thoughts is potentially significant, since, as David Armstrong has noted, it suggests that “for Philodemus, friendship in its ideal form transcends its beginnings

43DeWitt (1935) 312-19 considers the significance of these passages, in particular *Carm.* 1.24, with respect to Philodemus’ *De libertate dicendi.* See also Michels (1944) 173: “One point which Horace emphasizes in *Serm.* 1.4 and elsewhere is that he is not writing for the general public, which he either despises or affects to despise, but for his own limited circle of friends.”
as a response to our human needs and frailties.”44 The exercise of frankness within the context of friendly conversation, therefore, is motivated not by self-interest but by the desire for expressing one’s innermost convictions and for moral improvement, as is obvious in the case of Horace’s father. The significance of Philodemus’ statement is that it appears to modify or at least expand Epicurus’ original conception of friendship as utilitarian and lying solely in potential benefits.45 This is not to say that Philodemus did not recognize friendship as beneficial or useful, especially within the context of patronage as an initial means to financial security (in accordance with Epicurus’ teaching at Arr. 1.121b4-5),46 but he appears to indicate that, over time and through frequent fellowship within a private community, friendship can potentially

44 Armstrong (2011) 126-27, who also notes that Philodemus draws parallels between the friendship of gods, who have no need of any benefits whatsoever, and those of the Epicurean sage (cf. De dis 3, frs. 83, 84 and 87).

45 Arr. 6.23: Πάσα φιλία δι’ ἑαυτὴν αἰρετή· ἄροχὴν δὲ εἰληφὲν τῆς ὑφελείας (“All friendship is chosen for its own sake, but its origin is the need for help”). Usener’s above emendation of ἀιρετή, which appears in the MSS. and would give Epicurus’ maxim an Aristotelian quality (cf. Eth. Nic. 1155a4), has been accepted by most editors and translators. O’Keefe (2001) 269-305 and Brown (2002) 68-80, however, have recently argued extensively against it. Armstrong (2011) 126-28 defends Usener’s emendation. See also Konstan (1997) 110 for this maxim and for the distinction between φίλοι, who are concrete and useful individuals, and φιλία, which is the more abstract concept of reciprocity as essential for survival and thus considered to be useful in itself.

46 Cf. De elect. col. 22.15-22: καὶ πολυωρεῖ τε τῶν ἄνθρωπων ὅσους δύναται πλείστοις [κ]αι φιλοφιλοσοφίμενοις εὐχαριστεῖ καὶ δι’ ἐλπίδας των ἀνθρώπων αὐτοῖς μεταλήψεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ύπο αὐτῶν εὐ τι πεισθεῖν, καὶ τεῖν τοῦτο έμαλλον ἐποροῖν [. . .]ε[−−−][τ][−−−] (“And he treats with consideration as many other human beings as he possibly can, and is thankful to those who show friendly feelings to him, and has hopes of sharing things with them and receiving good things from them in his turn, although it isn’t for that most of all . . .” [sc. for any practical return] [that he makes these friendships]). The translation is that of Armstrong (2011) 125, whose conjectural interpretation of the missing lines seems plausible and would further suggest that Philodemus endorses the view that friendship is valued in itself, apart from any advantages.
become a selfless—even an altruistic—expression of goodwill toward another. According to Cicero, certain Epicureans in his day endorsed such a view, which Horace appears to express in his genuine concern for Vergil’s safety in *Carm.* 1.3 as well as in his impassioned declaration “There is nothing I would compare to a delightful friend so long as I am sound!” (1.5.44: *nihil ego contulerim iucundo sanus amico*). The high value he places on friendship is likewise reflected by his concern for sharing moral advice with others through frankness, which, as his father demonstrates in *Sermones* 1.4, is an expression of goodwill that cannot exist outside the context of intimate friendship.

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47 Asmis (1990) 2395 n. 60 says that Philodemus, in his understanding of the ideal communication quoted above, possibly “values the intimacy of friendship more than the security that results from it.”

48 Cic. *Fin.* 1.69: *Sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiores . . . qui verentur ne, si amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videatur. Itaque primos congressus copulationesque et consuetudinum instituendarum voluntates fieri propter voluptatem, cum autem usum progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere tantum ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos amentur* (“Other less courageous Epicureans . . . fear that if we hold friendship to be desirable only for the pleasure that it affords to ourselves, it will be thought that it is crippled altogether. They therefore say that the first advances and overtures, and the original inclination to form an attachment, are prompted by the desire for pleasure, but that when the progress of intercourse has led to intimacy, the relationship blossoms into an affection strong enough to make us love our friends for their own sake, even if no practical advantage accrues”). Tsouna (2007) 28-30 identifies the *Epicurei timidiores* as “Philodemus and his disciples.” This passage is also discussed by O’Keefe (2001) 287-89, Brown (2002) 78-9 and O’Connor (1989) 165-86.

49 Gowers (2012) 198 draws textual parallels between Horace’s declaration and Torquatus’ translation of Epicurus’ famous definition of friendship (*Fin.* 1.65 = Arr. 5.148.9-10). See also Gowers (2009b) 39-60 for the thematic connections between *Sermones* 1.5 and Cicero’s *De finibus*.

50 Unlike the Cynics, who valued frankness above all things and associated it with the complete freedom enjoyed by the sage, who does not need friends. See especially Rich (1956) 23: “The Cynic, then, had no desire for wealth, knowledge, pleasure or friendship.” Scarpat (1964) 62 quotes Diogenes of Sinope’s identification of frankness as “the most beautiful thing” (Diog. Laert. 6.69: καλλιστον), which is to be preferred to everything else (ibid. 6.71).
In addition to being one of the hallmarks of true friendship and a private expression of
moral concern within a small community, the Epicurean practice of frankness is also a stochastic
or conjectural method that relies on appropriate timing and sign inference.\textsuperscript{51} According to
Philodemus, frankness is less effective when applied to elderly pupils (\textit{De lib. dic.} col. 24a.8: \textit{οἱ
πρεσβύτεροι}), whereas children, on account of their lack of experience and impressionable
nature, are more receptive to admonition or correction (ibid. fr. 18.1: \textit{παῖ}). In particular, the
successful practice of frank criticism depends on “appropriate timing” (\textit{καιρός}), which fosters
the pupil’s affection and therefore leads to a heightened sense of goodwill and gratitude:

\begin{quote}
oὐδ’ εἰς καιρόν ἐνχρονίζειν ἑπιζη\textsuperscript{τού}μεν ὀψεῖ ὁ \textit{κατ’} ἄλλον τρόπον, καὶ τοῦ \textit{πῶς} διὰ
παροσφοιὰς ἐπιπαρρησίαν τὴν πρὸς αὐτούς εἰνοικά τῶν κατ\textsuperscript{ασκέ}ναζομ\textsuperscript{ἐν}ν παρ’
αὐτὸ τὸ πεπαρρησιάσθαι. (*De lib. dic.* fr. 25.1-8)
\end{quote}

\dots nor do we seek to delay at the critical time, nor in some other way, and of how,
through frankness, we shall heighten the goodwill towards ourselves of those who are
being instructed by the very fact of speaking frankly.

The careful application of frankness at the correct time, which is a conjectural rather than a
scientific method, may similarly be attributed to Horace’s \textit{pater rusticus}, who, as a parent
concerned for his son’s disposition and willing to expose him to examples of sin at a young age,
is anything but an inept curmudgeon; on the contrary, his well-intentioned admonitions are based
on observations of perceptible behavior and his advice is delivered at the critical moment,
namely, while Horace’s mind is still “tender” (1.4.128: \textit{teneros animos}) and able to be “formed”

\textsuperscript{51} Cf. \textit{De lib. dic.} fr. 1.8: \textit{καθόλου τ’ ἐπιπαρρησιάζεται σοφὸς καὶ φιλόσοφος ἀνήρ, ὅτι
μὲν στοχαζόμενος εὐ[λογίας ἐδε[ιξε] (“And in general the wise man and philosopher speaks
frankly because, conjecturing by reasonable arguments, he has shown . . . ”)). For Epicurean
frankness as a conjectural method that depends on the observance of visible signs (σημεῖα) at the
the philosophical background of “conjectural methods” (τέχναι στοχαστικαί) as treated by
(121: *formabat*).\(^{52}\) As a conjectural method, moreover, frank criticism may be understood as the appropriate response to particular moral defects as inferred through the careful “observation of signs” (*De lib. dic.* fr. 57.4-5: οὐκεῖσαυσάμενον), the ultimate purpose of which is to prevent or therapeutically treat vice. In the case of Horace’s father, he uses sign inference (1.4.106: *notabat . . . exemplis*) not in order to provide corrective treatment for the victims, but in order to admonish his son by providing him with vivid examples of the consequences of each vice (ibid.: *quaeque vitiorum*).\(^ {53}\) As discussed in Chapter 1, the use of examples of moral deficiency for pedagogical reasons has a long tradition in antiquity, and the deictic formula “do this, avoid that” appears already in Plato’s description of the sophist Protagoras’ educational strategy (*Protag.* 325d2-5), which became popular among the Cynics and later influenced Terence’s similar portrayal of Demea’s approach (*Ad.* 417)\(^ {54}\) as well as Plutarch’s examination of pedagogical methods. With regard to Horace’s father, however, one notes that his use of examples is not merely epideictic but psychological, since it invites Horace to reflect more deeply on the consequences of vice and, presumably, on the terrifying prospect that he himself is not immune from such disaster. This use of frank criticism for the purpose of both identifying and preventing vice resembles Philodemus’ statement that the sage, on account of his frankness, will “point out how many people came to ruin badly, bereft of everything” (*De lib. dic.* fr. 72: 4-7: καὶ παραδείξει πόσοι κακώς ἀ[π]ώλοντο παντὸς στερόμενοι). In a similar manner, Horace’s father goes beyond the perfunctory dispensation of prohibitions and mandates: he encourages his

\(^{52}\)Michels (1944) 175.

\(^{53}\)For the “similarity method” of sign inference as practiced and defended by Philodemus in *De signis* and as employed by Horace and his father, see Chapter 1 pp. 27-33.

\(^{54}\)Citroni Marchetti (2004) 25-35, who contrasts Horace’s father with the more emotional and less effective Demea in the *Adelphoe* (see Traill [2013] 332-39), considers the role of the poet’s empirical training in the light of Plato’s *Protagoras, Respublica* and *Leges*. 

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son to process visually and psychologically the horrible consequences of sin, with the ultimate intention of deterring him from such ruin (112: *deterret*; 129: *absterrent*) and allowing him to avoid it more easily (106: *ut fugerem*). In his ethical treatises Philodemus often recommends that teachers admonish their pupils by “placing before the eyes” (*De lib. dic.* frs. 26.4-5, 42.1, 77.3: *τιθέναι πρὸ ὀμμάτων*) examples of vice or the consequences thereof, which, when accomplished effectively and at the right time, inspires a sense of terror and motivates correct action (*De ir. col.* 3.13-18): καὶ τιθεὶς ἐν ὀψει μεγάλην ἐντολὴν ὑπέτειλεν ὕφει πρὸς τὸν πατὸν εὔνει πρὸς τὸν ἑαυτὸν εἶναι προσυπομνημόνητος ἀποφυγείν ῥαδίως (“And having placed it before the eyes it creates great horror in him, with the result that it becomes easier to flee from what he has been prominently reminded exits in himself”).55 The ultimate purpose of such pictorial imagery, which in the previously quoted passage is corrective, must be considered preventative in the case of young Horace, especially given that the autobiographical scene in *Sermones* 1.4 is intended to explain his virtuous disposition and justify his role as moralizing satirist. As will be seen below, Horace’s father’s method of presenting either the real or implied consequences of vice through examples intended for moral correction occurs elsewhere in the *Sermones* and informs the poet’s own approach to therapeutic frankness.

Horace’s conversation with the nameless miser in *Sermones* 1.1 includes frank exhortations (i.e., ἐπίπληξεν) that are directed toward a stubborn “pupil,” whose repeated resistance to the poet’s efforts eventually elicits a harsher form of treatment. As has been

55 The concept of pictorial imagery as a special technique, which was certainly not invented by Philodemus or the Epicureans, occurs in Plato (*Gorg.* 471a8-d2 and 473c1-d2) and, more clearly, in Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.10.6: τιθεὶς ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν), for which see Tsouna (2003) 243-47. Its application specifically within the context of therapeutic frankness, on the other hand, may have been further developed by Zeno and Philodemus. For the technique as it appears in *De ira*, see Tsouna (2007) 204-9. Schroeder (2004) 139-56 discusses the technique of “placing before the eyes” (which he calls *avocatio*) in Lucretius and Vergil.
discussed by other scholars, Horace’s incorporation in the introductory poems of nameless interlocutors who allow the speaker opportunities for ethical platitudes is largely a Cynic technique.\textsuperscript{56} On the other hand, a technique that involves lively interrogation for the purpose of moral correction would have been the perfect template for a literary representation of Epicurean frankness, which, according to Philodemus, often requires multiple applications of criticism:


. . . and [having accomplished] nothing he will again employ frankness toward the same man. If, although he has erred, the student did not heed the frank criticism, the teacher will criticize frankly again. For although a doctor in the case of the same disease had accomplished nothing through a clyster, he would again purge [the patient]. And for this reason he will again criticize frankly, because before he accomplished nothing, and he will do this again and again, so that if not this time then another time . . .

The reason for such persistence is explained in relation to certain dispositions, which, in the case of stubborn or recalcitrant patients such as the Horatian miser, are described as being “strong and accepting change with difficulty” (ibid. fr. 7.6-8: τοὺς ἵσχυροὺς καὶ μόλις . . .

\textsuperscript{56}Oltramare (1926) 11, discussing dialogue within the context of Cynic literature, calls the inclusion of a fictitious interlocutor “le plus évident de tous les caractères formel de la diatribe.” See also Fraenkel (1957) 92, Coffey (1976) 92 and Freudenburg (1993) 8-16. Schlegel (2005) 19-20, however, notes that the connection to popular philosophy does not define the function of Horatian satire in Book 1, which is related to “limitation in an ethical or experiential sense.” For Philodemus’ appreciation for the effectiveness of Bion’s literary style and his willingness to imitate it in his treaties, see Gigante (1992) 106-8 as well as Gigante and Indelli (1978) 124-31 and Indelli (1988) 24-5. Lucretius similarly exploits Bion and the Cynics, for which see Schmid (1978) 135-36.
The first frank exchange in *Sermones* 1.1 involves Horace’s attempt to reveal to the miser the extreme wretchedness caused by his physical efforts to acquire wealth, which, in addition to preventing the enjoyment of Epicurean “physical repose” (ἀπονία), also forces him to endure inclement weather (38-9: *hiems*) as well as serious threats to his life (39: *ferrum*). In response to the poet’s criticism, which is centered on appealing to the miser’s consideration for his physical health, the speaker effectively states that he prefers to ruin his body rather than risk his savings (43). Instead of abandoning his “pupil,” however, Horace, like a good physician, meets this resistance by listening to his interlocutor’s excuses and subsequently altering his focus in order to provide more effective criticism (46): *non tuus hoc capiet venter plus ac meus* (“You stomach will not hold more [grain] than mine”). In his second application of frankness, Horace attempts to explain that the miser’s desire to amass unlimited stores is unnecessary and overlooks the requirements of nature (50: *naturae finis*), thus appealing to the Epicurean doctrine of natural and necessary desires as easy to fulfill (Arr. 4.127.7-10, ibid. 130.9 and 5.149.1-8). But once again, the poet’s efforts are dashed by the miser’s unwillingness to accept correction, which is expressed by his overpowering and

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57 On the distinction between “strong” and “weak” students, see Glad (1995) 137-52 and Gigante (1973) 41.

58 Codoñer (1975) 46 regards the speaker’s comments here and elsewhere (e.g., 61) as serving a transitional purpose: “Su función es operar un cambio, pasar del planteamiento concreto al general, y se encuentra en el adversario de transición.”

59 Cf. *De lib. dic.* fr. 51.1-4: ἄκεφοςει μᾶλλον, ἡμᾶς ἕαυτῶν γινομένους κατηγόρους ("the teacher will rather listen while observing us becoming accusers even of ourselves, whenever we err").

60 Gowers (2012) 73 includes the belly, which is a popular organ in Roman satire, among the “host of vessels and containers used to measure capacity in the poem (heaps, money-bags, jugs, bushels, plots of land).” See also Gowers (1993) 129: “This Epicurean tirade [sc. *Sermones* 1.1] is also a literary polemic on the excessive consumption of words.”
misguided desire for “a huge heap” (51: *magno . . . acervo*). Nevertheless, in accordance with Philodemus’ statement that the sage will employ criticism even on a “third occasion,”

61 Horace warns that such reckless excess will inevitably cause psychological turbulence (60: *turbatam . . . aquam*), which precludes “tranquility” (ἀταραξία) and complements his initial appeal to the preference for physical repose.62 Unsurprisingly, the miser’s continued obstinacy and deluded convictions finally drive him to declare “nothing is ever enough!” (62: *nil satis est*), which prompts an obviously frustrated Horace to underscore his stubbornness by asking “What can you do with someone like this?” (63: *quid facias illi*?). The solution, however, involves an application of harsher frankness through the series of vivid representations which immediately follows: the prospect of ending up like Tantalus (68-9) and the pathetic portrait of the miser sprawled among sacks of money, mouth gaping wide with admiration and religious awe (70-72).63 Perhaps the clearest example of pictorial imagery involves Horace’s subsequent presentation of the hypothetical risks or consequences involved in preferring money to friendship:

\[
\textit{at si condoluit temptatum frigore corpus}
\]

\[
\textit{aut alius casus lecto te adfixit, habes qui}
\]

61 *De lib. dic.* fr. 65.1-8: *[εἰ δὲ παρρησιά]αι χρήσεται π[άλιν], φανε[ίται] ὄντως ἐφικέσθαι. πολλάκι δ’ ἀντιστρόφως, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ ποίησας, ἣ ἔξης πρότερον ἢ δευτέρ[α], τάχα δ’ ἢ τρίτη τελεφορήσει (“... [if] he will employ [frankness again], he will be seen to succeed thus. And often conversely, at timed even when he has done it, either the second one in turn or perhaps the third application of frankness will succeed”).

62 For the significance of weather metaphors in Epicurean ethics, see Chapter 1 pp. 24-5 (especially n. 56)

63 As Herter (1970) 330 observes, Horace’s allegory involving Tantalus was probably inspired by Bion (for which, see Hense [1969] 34). Freudenburg (1993) 190-91 analyzes this passage (as well as 1.4.80-85) within the context of literary theory and Callimachean aesthetics. For *inhians* as a typical behavior for misers, cf. Plaut. *Aul.* 194: *inhiat aurum ut devoret* (“He gapes at the gold as if to devour it”).

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But if your body is seized with a chill and racked with pain, or some other mishap has pinned you to your bed, have you someone to sit by you, to get lotions ready, to call in the doctor so as to raise you up and restore you to your children and dear kinsmen? No, your wife does not want you well, nor does your son: everyone hates you, neighbors and acquaintances, boys and girls.

The vividness of this example, which creates space between the miser and his obsession, is designed to cause the patient “great fear” (De ir. col. 3.14-15: μεγάλη[ην] . . . φρίκην; cf. 1.4.127: metu) as he comes face to face with his disease and reflects on it objectively. Of course, part of the irony of this scene is that there is no conditionality: the miser is in fact gravely ill and in need of medical attention, but his is a moral disease that can only be cured by the philosopher acting as physician. The language Horace uses is wholly consistent with Philodemus’ employment of medical analogies to describe the process of frank criticism: the obstinate patient needs a caring physician (ἰατρός = medicum) who will sit by his side (βοηθέω = adsideat) and apply the necessary treatments (θεράπευσις = fomenta) in order to restore (ἀναπλάτω = suscitet) him back to health. The implication in the passage quoted above, moreover, is that Horace himself,

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64Cf. Sen. Ep. 9.8: dicebat Epicurus in hac ipsa epistula, ‘ut habeat qui sibi aegro adsideat’ (“As Epicurus said in this very letter, ‘so that he may have someone who will sit by his side when he is sick’”).

65For medical terminology and imagery in Philodemus’ De libertate dicendi, as well as citations of relevant passages, see Konstan et al. (1998) 20-23 and Gigante (1975) 53-61. Cf. Plut. Mor. 4.55c-d: δεί γὰρ ὄφελοῦντα λυπεῖν τὸν φίλον, οὐ δεὶ δὲ λυποῦντα τὴν φιλίαν ἀναιρεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὡς φαρμάκῳ τῷ δάκοντι χορήγησαι, σώζοντι καὶ φυλάττοντι τὸ θεραπευόμενον (“For it is not necessary to harm a friend, only to help him; and one should not by hurting him harm the friendship, but use the stinging word as a medicine that restores and preserves health in that to which it is applied”). Freudenburg (1993) 191-92 reads frigus as “designating bombast, the vice of the grand style,” which is cured through “criticism” (adsideat) and “warmers” (fomenta).
who has been trying to heal the miser all along and may properly be called an amicus sanus, is
the physician who will attempt (even if unsuccessfully) to cure vice through the frank criticism
of his satiric verses.

In transitioning to Sermones 1.2, traditionally regarded as Horace’s earliest satire, the
audience encounters the formidable consequences associated with sexual extremes, which, like
the dangers of poor wealth administration, was a popular topic of moral philosophy. Perhaps one
of the most salient features of this treatment is the complex variatio Horace employs, which
involves engagement with Roman comedy, elegiac poetry, Hellenistic epigram and the Cynic
diatribe to name just a few genres.66 The impressive and intentionally dizzying array of such
influences, however, which successfully communicates the disorder and chaos of sexual
imprudence, is not itself delivered in a “hackneyed” or “confusing” manner, as some scholars
have asserted.67 Rather, the poet, by means of textual and thematic parallels, coherently
establishes various links between the importance of maintaining a careful balance regarding
sexual and financial choices, thus connecting this satiric conversation to the preceding one.68
Furthermore, the main theme holding all of these components together is not just an abstract

66See Fraenkel (1957) 83. Freudenburg (1993) provides the most extensive examination
of the many allusions to and parallels with Roman comedy. Fiske (1971) considers the role of
Cynic diatribe, and Hendrickson (1918) 27-32, Schmid (1948) 181-83, Cataudella (1950) 18-31,
86-8 all look at the presence and function of the Hellenistic epigrammatists Callimachus and
Philodemus.

67Fraenkel (1957) 79 discusses the “hackneyed theme” of this satire; Rudd (1966) 11
notes that Horace’s alternation between the Aristotelian mean and the advantages of various
types of ladies is “confusing.”

68See Armstrong (1964) 88-91 and Bushala (1971) 312-15. Of particular significance are
the observations of Dessen (1968) 200-208, who considers the overall importance in Sermones
1.2 of maintaining a sexual mean through ambiguous terms such as pretium, nummus and
fructus, which also have obvious financial applications.
notion of balance or the vague application of Aristotle’s mean, but a clear expression of the Epicurean calculus, which dictates that in all ethical decisions the pleasure derived must outweigh the pain involved in satisfying one’s desires (Arr. 4.129.4-130.4).\textsuperscript{69} This identification is not only consistent with Horace’s treatment of the dangers and anxiety associated with certain relationships, but it also clears up the confusion expressed by scholars regarding the poet’s moral stance. Some, for example, have correctly noted that nowhere in \textit{Sermones} 1.2 does Horace condemn adultery per se or any particular social status, but have incorrectly interpreted this as proof that the poem is “entirely satirical” and “innocent of any moral message.”\textsuperscript{70} A more accurate interpretation would involve the realization that Horace condemns sexual affairs only

\textsuperscript{69}Cf. 1.2.78-9: \textit{desine matronas sectarier, unde laboris | plus haurire mali est quam ex re decerpere fructus} (“cease to court matrons, for thence one may derive pain and misery, rather than reap enjoyment in the reality”). Courtney (2013) 75 compares \textit{Ep. 1.2.55: nocet empta dolore voluptas} (“Pleasure procure with pain is harmful”). Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 26, Fraenkel (1957) 78 and Rudd (1966) 31 both call these verses the “main theme” of the poem, and Curran (1970) 230 identifies them as expressing the Epicurean calculus. Of particular importance are the observations of Cataudella (1950) 18-20, who not only considers Epicurean ethics the foundational principle of this poem, but also questions, based on lack of detailed evidence and proof of a similar treatment, the influence of Bion. The prominence of Epicurean ethics in this poem is discussed further by Fiske (1971) 248-51 and Gigante (1993) 23-4, who states the following: “La varietà degli episodi o delle scene è in funzione della tesi unitaria, il cui fondamento epicureo è la purezza del piacere, il conseguimento della voluptas intatta, priva di dolore, che è basato anch’esso su un doppio, sulla dottrina della scelta e della fuga, del discrimine fra retto desiderio e calcolata ripulsa.”

\textsuperscript{70}Baldwin (1970) 465, who is corrected by Gigante (1993) 19-20. Schlegel (2005) 28-9 is more careful, stating that this poem has no “overt moral content,” while Turpin (2009) 122 declares that Horace is a poet whom “we do not have to take seriously at all.” Although clearly influenced by the Aristotelian mean, Horace’s condemnation of “vice” (1.2.24: \textit{vitia}) does not involve an identification of \textit{matronae} and \textit{meretrices} as vicious in themselves, nor of \textit{libertinae} as essentially virtuous, as Lefèvre (1975) 320-22 and Freudenburg (2001) 16 think. Rudd (1966) 11, along similar lines, mistakenly concludes that Horace’s critical portrayal of unnecessary sexual desire is a condemnation of brothels and prostitutes. In general the commentators and most scholars, such as Freudenburg (1993) 26, Mayer (2005) 142 and Gibson (2007) 21 to name a few, identify Horace’s moral stance as exclusively Aristotelian, which is problematic because it does not account for the poet’s unwillingness to identify particular social statuses as vicious or virtuous; indeed, rather than a golden mean between opposing vices one should think of a balanced calculus of pleasures and pains.
when they violate the requirements of nature and result in disastrous consequences, such as public scandal or the loss of one’s property (1.2.61-2 ~ 1.4.118-19): *bonam dependerere famam, rem patris oblimate malum est ubicumque* (“To throw away a good name, to squander a father’s estate, is at all times evil”). In order to communicate this lesson to his audience, Horace employs rather shocking and obscene language that is charged with both sexual and moral meaning, which recalls to a certain degree the Cynics’ provocative style. On the other hand, such overt frankness is not gratuitously offensive but ultimately intended to influence correct behavior and promote vigorously the importance of satisfying desires in accordance with nature. This involves an application of practical and frank advice through concrete examples as well as graphic visualizations of the dire consequences of vice, all of which Horace learned from his father.

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71Courtney (2013) 76, following Dessen (1968) 202, rightly notes that the mean is to be identified with correct behavior rather than with freedwomen themselves. This important distinction had already been made by Cataudella (1950) 25.

72Fiske (1971) 251 makes the following overly simplistic and exaggerated observation: “In the first place the whole satire is characterized by a frankness, not to say a crudeness of speech, which recalls in every tone the somewhat brutal παρρησία or freedom of speech affected by the Cynics.” Horace’s use of obscene words like *futuo* (127), *cunnus* (36) and *mutto* (68) also recalls the poetry of Catullus, for which see Gigante (1993) 19. For the implications of such language for Horace’s apparently sexist view of women, see Henderson (1999) 184-91, Oliensis (1998) 24 and Courtney (2013) 72.

73See Curran (1970) 230, whose thesis involves showing that such language is intended “to make the strongest possible case for nature.” Turolla (1931) 67 is wrong in stating that Horace “è uno che ride malamente,” which completely overlooks the generally protreptic nature of this poem and his repeated emphasis on observing the Epicurean calculus for the sake of moral correction. For other descriptions of the strong language of *Sermones* 1.2, see Lefèvre (1975) 311-12.

74Gigante (1993) 15: “L’oscenità di termini e il disgusto di uno stilema godibili di per sé hanno la funzione di suscitare una ripulsa nel comportamento, nella practica della vita che è il terreno di prova di validità di un sistema filosofico. È un aspetto—il linguaggio osceno—della malattia degli altri, non del poeta; è una manifestazione della concretizza di cui l’aveva formato il padre, ma anche l’indizio della persuasione dell’inefficacia di ogni astrazione,
The poet contextualizes his treatment of sexual vice by stating, in mock-epic fashion, the importance of observing the hedonic calculus before introducing a series of frank visualizations and examples. Manipulating an Ennian passage and thus suggesting the epic nature of the “struggle” (38: laborent) between natural and unnatural desires, Horace announces the formidable “dangers” (40: pericla) of seeking “pleasure marred by much pain” (39: multo corrupta dolore voluptas). The idea that one’s pleasure should be unmixed with excessive pain is of course expressed by Epicurus (Arr. 6.51) and Lucretius, the latter of whom similarly warns against sexual delights that result in “care and certain pain” (4.1067: curam certumque dolorem). More specifically, Horace condemns the many dangers and foolish risks associated with adultery (1.2.38: moechis), but he does so through pictorial imagery and vividly “placing before the eyes” the frightening consequences of such affairs:

hic se praecipitem tecto dedit, ille flagellis
ad mortem caesus, fugiens hic decidit arcem
praedonum in turbam, dedit hic pro corpore nummos,
hunc perminxerunt calones . . .  (S. 1.2.41-4)

dell’insufficienza degli schemi.” Freudenburg (2001) 16 views Horace’s sensational treatment of sexual vice as “mock-Epicurean,” despite the fact that his message is completely consistent with Epicurean ethics.


76I owe this observation to Cataudella (1950) 18-20 and Gigante (1993) 17. Baldwin (1970) 461, who asserts that Horace parodies Lucretius’ didacticism, contrasts the poets’ views on prostitutes by quoting DRN 4.1277, which condemns the various postures adopted by scorta so that their lovemaking may be more “fitting” (concinnior). Actually, Lucretius’ point is not to condemn prostitution per se but rather to give advice on how to avoid sterility, according to which such postures are “unnecessary for wives” (nil nostris opus esse videtur) since they prevent pregnancy. See Bailey (1947) 1316-319.
One man has thrown himself headlong from the roof; another has been flogged to death; a third, in his flight, has fallen into a savage gang of robbers; another has paid a price to save his life; another has been abused by stable-boys.

Like his father (cf. 1.4.126), Horace aggressively employs the demonstrative combination *hic...ille* in order to emphasize proximity and call attention to the ubiquitous consequences of sexual vice. He relies on examples that are not only practical and immediately relevant, but also shocking and therefore intended to deter his audience from a similar fate, which resembles the frank use of pictorial imagery in *De ira* (col. 3.13-18) as described above. In the same work, Philodemus recommends that his followers assess the pure corruption associated with unnecessary sexual desires by observing their manifold consequences, which are regarded as symptomatic of this particular disposition.

Indeed, the application of frankness for the purpose of curing sexual vice is contingent upon careful observation and inference from signs (*De lib. dic. fr. 57.1-5*): 

\[
κἂν \ μὴ \ κατειλήφη \ ἐρ\[ῶν\]\tauας \ ή \ κατασ[χ]\έτους \ κακίας \ τισίν, \ ἀλλὰ \\
σημειωσάμενον
\]

(“Even if it is the case that he [the sage] has not caught them in love or possessed by some vices, but has inferred it from signs”). According to Philodemus as quoted previously, these signs may be physical symptoms or the extreme and wretched consequences of vice; according to the testimony of the Christian apologist Origen, moreover, the followers of

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77 Gigante (1993) 25: “In realtà, Orazio svela un’arte intrisa di realtà, saporosa di situazioni e di personaggi, affrancata e rovente, che raffigura lo spettro del pathos d’amore, gli amori cittadineschi. Non astrazioni, ma concretezza di parole e di gesti...”

78 *De ir. col. 7.16-26*: οὔτω δεῖ τὴν εἰλικρίνειαν ἐπιλογίζεσθαι τοῦ κακοῦ, καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐρ[ῶν]ικῆς εἰσέθαμεν ποιεῖν ἐπιθυμίας. τότε [ἡ] πάν τὸ λυποῦν αὐτοῦς ἐξαφθ[μο]ῦμεν [καὶ] τὰ παρακολουθοῦντα [δυσ]χερέστα[τα κοι][γή] (“Thus it is necessary to assess the potency of vice, just as we customarily do with erotic passion. Then we enumerate their pain as well as the extreme and wretched consequences, which they share in common”). For the meaning and significance of the term ἐπιλογίζεσθαι, see Chapter 1, p. 52 n. 70.
Epicurus avoided adultery solely because of the painful consequences, which usually involve death, exile or the fear of being caught by a returning husband:

οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Ἐπικούρου οὐ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ μοιχεύουσιν, ὅτε ἀπέχονται τοῦ μοιχεύειν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ γενομικέναι τέλος τῆς ἡδονῆς, πολλὰ δὲ ἀπαντάν κωλυτικά τῆς ἡδονῆς τῷ εἰξαντὶ μιᾷ τῇ τοῦ μοιχεύειν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἐσθ’ ὅτε φυλακὰς ἢ φυγὰς ἢ θανάτους, πολλάκις δὲ πρὸ τούτων καὶ κινδύνους κατὰ τὸ ἐπιτηρεῖν τὴν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἔξοδον ἀπὸ τῆς οἰκίας κτλ. (Origen, C. Cels. 7.63 = Us. 535)

But it is not because of this [nature and the law] that the followers of Epicurus avoid adultery when they do so, but because of their conviction that pleasure is the final end, and many hindrances to pleasure attend upon one who only pursues the pleasure of adultery, such as prison, exile or death; even before these, often there are the risks involved in observing the husband depart from the house etc.

There are numerous similarities between the moral stance of “the followers of Epicurus” and Horace: neither condemns adultery per se but rather the risks involved, which corrupt the enjoyment of pure pleasure (1.2.39: corrupta voluptas); both identify these risks as involving flight or exile (42: fugiens) and even death (43: ad mortem caesus). A further consequence Horace mentions is the loss of both money and reputation (61: famam; 62: rem patris; 43: nummos), which may allude to Lucretius’ association of sexual vice with financial ruin (4.1123-240) as well as Philodemus’ description of salaciousness as a primary destroyer of

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79 Pasquali (1920) 325, who refers to this poem as “una diatriba epicurea,” observed these connections early on, as did Kiessling-Heinz (1910) 26. See also Cataudella (1950) 22-5. Sbordone (1965) 310-12 presents a fragment of Philodemus’ lost treatise on love (PHerc. 1384), in which the victims of sexual passion are described as being “manifestly in danger” (8-9: ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις ἐπιφανές), which may allude to the observable symptoms of this particular vice. In a related fragment (PHerc. 1167), he seems to note the “perceptible clarity” (1-2: λύπην [τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν]) of the consequences of “painful desire” (5: ναογές) of the consequences of “painful desire” (1-2: λύπην [τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν]).

80 Cf. 1.2.133: ne nummi pereant aut puga aut denique fama (“dreading disaster in purse or person or at least repute”). Lucretius likewise considers the loss of one’s reputation as a consequence of sexual obsession (cf. 4.1124: aegrotat fama).
wealth in *De oeconomia* (coll. 23.42-24.2). In a later passage, Horace adds to this “mock-epic list” of the shocking consequences of adultery by vividly listing other “hindrances” (97: *multae* . . *officent res*; cf. *πολλὰ κωλυτικὰ* in the above passage) to true pleasure before completing his unabashedly straightforward and frank criticism of sexual vice with an even more shocking tableau.

A preliminary consideration of the ideal lover as described by Philodemus provides contrast for the concluding scene, which, paralleling the end of *Sermones* 1.1, involves the application of frankness through pictorial imagery. In response to the quasi-elegiac *miser amator* who expresses his preference for elusive “prey” by quoting an epigram of Callimachus (105-8), Horace quotes an epigram of Philodemus, in which the pleasurable convenience of an

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81 Cataudella (1950) 20 n. 7 makes a similar connection.

82 In addition to being a parody of epic, the asyndeton and rapid-fire description of Horace’s catalogue of the wealthy matron’s attendants has, as Gowers (2012) 111 notes, a comic feel. Cf. Plaut. *Aul.* 501-2.


> Ὡγρευτής, Ἐπίκυδε, ἐν οὐρεῖσι πάντα λαγών / διῆρα καὶ πάσης ιχθεὰς δορκαλίδος / στείβη καὶ νιφετῷ κεχρημένος, ἢν δὲ τις εἰτή / “τῇ, τόδε βέβληται θηρίον,” οὐκ ἔλαβεν. / χούμοσ ἐρως τούσδε· τὰ γὰρ φεύγοντα διώκειν / οἶδε, τὰ δ’ ἐν μέσσῳ κείμενα παρπέτεται.

The hunter on the hills, O Epicydes, searches out every hare and the tracks of every roe, beset by frost and snow. But if one say, “Lo! here is a beast shot” he takes it not. Even such is my love: it can pursue what flees from it, but what lies ready it passes by.
easy love is contrasted with the “grave cares” (110: *curasque gravis*) of a riskier and more demanding amour:

illam “post paulo” “sed pluris” “si exierit vir”
Gallis, hanc Philodemus ait sibi, quae neque magno
stet pretio neque cunctetur cum est iussa venire.  

(§ 1.2.120-23)

“The by and by,” “Nay more,” “If my husband goes out”—a woman who speaks thus is for the Galli, says Philodemus; for himself he asks for one who is neither high-priced nor slow to come when bidden.84

Both poets refer to the financial and personal advantages of an “easy love” (119: *venerem facilem*), whose natural beauty, like Horace’s pithy satires and Philodemus’ lean epigrams, is truthful, unconditionally pleasurable and not exaggerated by artificial and unnecessary embellishments.85 The following lines, in which Horace emphasizes the importance of avoiding financial strain and recognizing physical pleasure as independent of social class (125-26), have

84Horace’s presentation of this poem of Philodemus has no exact parallel in the surviving epigrams, although poem 38 contrasts *matronae* with *scorta* and even mentions a *Gallus* (Sider [1997] 199-202). Cf. his earlier, direct quotation of a Philodemean epigram (92: *o crus, o bracchia!* as discussed by Fiske (1971) 255 and especially Sider (1997) 103-10. Wright (1921) 168-69 and, much more recently, Courtney (2013) 80 plausibly argue that at lines 120-22 Horace is paraphrasing Philodemus’ epigram 22, which Sider (1997) 138 prints as follows (note especially the use of obscene language like *βινέω = futuo*, which Gigante [1993] 82 describes as “realismo brutale”):

πέντε δίδωσιν ἕνός τῇ δείνα ὃ δείνα τάλαντα
καὶ βινέω φρέσσων καὶ, μᾶ τόν, οὔδὲ καλήν·
πέντε δ’ ἐγὼ δραχμὰς τῶν δώδεκα Λυσιανάσσῃ,
καὶ βινώ πρὸς τῷ κρείσσονα καὶ φανερῶς.
πάντως ἦτοι ἐγὼ φρένας οὐκ ἕχω ἢ τὸ γε λοιπόν
τους κεϊνυ πελέκει δεὶ διδύμους ἄφελείν.

Mr. X gives Mrs Y five talents for one favor, and he screws, shivering with fear, one who is, what’s more, God knows, no beauty. I give five—drachmas—to Lysianassa for the twelve favors, and what’s more I screw a finer woman, and openly. Assuredly, either I’m crazy or, after all this, he should have his balls cut off with a knife.

often been interpreted as referring to a similar passage from the poet Cercidas of Megalopolis, who also mentions the benefits of a cheap love free from worry.\textsuperscript{86} As various scholars have indicated, however, this sentiment was a popular literary topos in Hellenistic poetry, and, given the fact that it squares perfectly with Epicurean ethics and that Horace quotes from Philodemus at least three times in this satire alone, it may be more reasonable to view it as an imitation of one of the latter’s epigrams.\textsuperscript{87} In any case, the emphasis on emotional and financial stability regarding love affairs sets up the perfect contrast with the final scene, in which Horace forces his audience to visualize the horrible risks involved in adultery:

\begin{quote}
\[
\text{nec vereor, ne, dum futuo, vir rure recurrat, ianua frangatur, latret canis, undique magno pulsa domus strepitu resonet, vepallida lecto desiliat mulier, miseram se conscia clamet, cruribus haec metuat, doti deprensa, egomet mi.} \quad (S. 1.2.127-31)
\]
\end{quote}

No fears have I in her company, that a husband may rush back from the country, the door burst open, the dog bark, the house ring through and through with the din and clatter of his knocking; that the woman, white as a sheet, will leap away, the maid in league with her cry out in terror, she fearing for her limbs, her guilty mistress for her dowry, and I for

\textsuperscript{86}Lomiento (1993) 9-26 provides a detailed introduction to this Cynic poet’s life and works, as well as copious bibliographical references and testimonia. I give the text as it appears in her critical edition (fr. 2):

\begin{quote}
\[
\]
\end{quote}

But Venus that paces the market—in preparation of desire demanding no thought or attention—here is no fear and no care: one obol will win you a mistress, son-in-law fancy yourself to Tyndarus favored among suitors.

\textsuperscript{87}Lomiento (1993) 229 notes that this sentiment is “un topos commune alla filosofia popolare, epicurea . . . e cinica.” The same theme occurs in comedy, for which see Rudd (1966) 25. Cataudella (1950) 28-31 argues for the possibility, which Gigante (1983) 242 seconds, that Horace had been exposed to Cercidas through Philodemus’ poetry.
myself.

Through this unambiguously comic yet startlingly frank exemplum, in which Horace playfully dissociates himself from the typical elegiac amator, the audience reflects, this time in a more direct and forceful manner, on the terrible fears and anxieties which accompany illegitimate and therefore dangerous love affairs. The introduction of a hypothetical situation intended for admonition and moral guidance, which is the ultimate goal of pictorial imagery as employed by Philodemus, also recalls the end of Sermones 1.1 (80-87) and Horace’s fable of the town and country mice in Sermones 2.6 (111-15), both of which incorporate colorful language and literary devices for the sake of vividness. By vividly “placing before the eyes” of his audience the formidable consequences of sexual excess, moreover, the poet draws a fitting conclusion to his riotously candid (although simultaneously therapeutic) criticism of Roman intemperance.

In Sermones 1.3 Horace delivers his final, blatantly moral treatment of vice, which, aside from being a playful lesson in tolerance and mutual forbearance at the Stoics’ expense, is also an example of more subdued and therefore more effective frankness. In relation to their conviction that the sage is perfect in every way, traditional Stoics maintain an impossibly high standard of excellence and consequently deny any intermediate stage between virtue and vice: as Cicero puts

88See Gowers (2012) 116 for allusions to mime plots and parallels with Roman comedy, including Plautus and Terence. One may compare Horace’s use of comedy within the context of administering frankness to De lib. dic. fr. 29.1-5: καταρχῶμεθα ση[με]ρόν που καὶ α[υ]τὰς τ[θώμ]εν εἰς ἑκε[ῖνον τῆν [αὐσθῆσιν· ὁ κα[ὶ] τῶν κα[ὶ]μοιδο[γοφόν] ἐμμη[σαντό] τινες (“Let us begin today perhaps and let us place them before his awareness. Which some of the comic playwrights also portrayed when they etc.”). Unless the patient is obstinate, Philodemus generally recommends that the sage apply frankness in a lighthearted and cheerful manner, as Olivieri (1914) observes in his introduction (p. vii), to which cf. De lib. dic. fr. 85.5-10.
it, for them all sins were equally reprehensible (Fin. 4.19.55: omnia peccata paria esse).\textsuperscript{89} Such an extreme conviction, according to Horace, naturally results in arrogance and the ill-treatment of “inferiors,” who, by means of a hilariously satirical inversion, become the innocent victims of the perfect Stoic’s irrational anger (1.3.76-95).\textsuperscript{90} For his own part, Horace sides with the more moderate Epicurean view of friendship, which, in the spirit of therapeutic frankness, recognizes but attempts to correct the faults of others.\textsuperscript{91} Such tolerance, according to Philodemus, is primarily the result of the Epicurean sage’s recognition of his own imperfections, which occasionally lead him astray and require gentle correction:

\textsuperscript{89}Cf. 1.2.96: quis paria esse fere placuit peccata (“those whose creed is that sins are much on a par”). For a reference to the original formulation of this thesis, see Diog. Laert. 7.127: ἄρεσκει δ’ αὐτοῖς μηδὲν μεταξὺ εἶναι ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, τῶν Περιπατητικῶν μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας εἶναι λεγόντων τὴν προκοπὴν· ὡς γὰρ δεῖν φασιν ἡ ὀρθόν εἶναι ξύλον ἢ στρεβλὸν, οὔτως ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, εὔτε δὲ δικαιώτερον οὔτε ἄδικώτερον (“For them, there is no mean between virtue and vice, whereas the Peripatetics say that in between virtue and vice there is progress. Thus the Stoics say that just as a stick is either straight or bent, so also something is either just or unjust and not ‘rather just’ or ‘rather unjust’”). Although Panaetius famously attempted to soften this view among Romans by emphasizing the importance of “making progress” or προκοπή (cf. Sen. Ep. 116.5), Horace here attacks the traditional assertion, as clearly stated by Chrisyppus (Plut. Communibus notitiis. 1063a = SVF 3.539): ὡσπερ ὁ πῆχυν ἀπέχων ἐν θαλάττῃ τῆς ἐπιφανείας οὐδὲν ἢττον πνίγεται τοῦ καταδεδυκὸς ὀργυιὰς πεντακόσιας, οὕτως οὔτως ἢ τῶν μακρὰν ὧντων ὡμοίως ἢττον ἢττον ἤττον εἰσὶν ἐν κακία . . . οὕτως οἱ προκόπτοντες ἁριὸν οὔ τίνιν ἀρετὴν ἀναλάβωσιν, ἀνόητοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ διαμένουσιν (“Just as in the sea the man a cubit from the surface is drowning no less than the one who has sunk 500 fathoms, so neither are they any less in vice who are a long way from it . . . so those who are making progress continue to be stupid and depraved until they have attained virtue”).

\textsuperscript{90}One thinks of the recent convert Damasippus’ overly zealous attack on all and sundry in Sermones 2.3, as discussed in Chapter 3. For the irony involved in Horace’s attack on such inconsistency, which is a notion particularly upheld by the Stoic Panaetius (Cic. Off. 1.90 and 111), see Fraenkel (1957) 86, Grilli (1983) 269 and especially Kemp (2009) 2-4.

\textsuperscript{91}Kemp (2009) 4-10 offers an excellent consideration of Horace’s adoption of Epicurean views in order to criticize Stoic extremism, although his focus on the role of tolerance in friendship does not encompass the Epicurean practice of frank criticism.
[εἰ τὰ ὑποπτευμένα περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ, καὶ κοινῶς τοῦ καθηγουμένου, καθάρσεως δεῖται. Πῶς γὰρ μισείν τὸν ἁμαρτάνοντα μὴ ἀπογνώσιμα μέλλει, γινώσκων αὐτὸν ὡς ἄρα τέλειον καὶ μιμνήσκων, ὅτι πάντες ἁμαρτάνειν εἰώθασιν;]  (De lib. dic. fr. 46.1-11)

... if the things that are suspected concerning the wise man, and the teacher generally, need purification. For how is he going to hate the one who errs, though not desperately, when he knows that he himself is not perfect and re[minds himself that everyone is accustomed to err?]92

Unlike the Stoic sage, therefore, the Epicurean wise man understands his limitations and therefore “sympathizes” with patients’ rather than ridiculing them (ibid. fr. 79.9-11: συνπατῶς τὰς ἁμαρτίας υπολαμβάνειν).93 Furthermore, the sage is willing to communicate his own errors and imperfections to close friends (ibid. fr. 81.1-4), “even presenting,” as Philodemus notes, “for frank criticism what concerns themselves in the presence of the students” (ibid. 55.1-4: καὶ διδόναι παρρησίαι τὰ περὶ αὐτῶς ἐπὶ τῶν κατασκευαζομένων). This view of frankness is an expression of what Clarence Glad calls an “ideal of non-concealment” and “participatory psychagogy,” both of which are necessary for a successful diagnosis.94 This realistic attitude toward moral imperfection, which obviously contrasts with the idealistic view of the Stoics, may shed light on Horace’s own admission of guilt and rejection of shameless and, one might add, unjustified self-love:

nunc aliquis dicat mihi ‘quid tu? nullane habes vitia?’ immo alia et fortasse minora.

92On this passage and the importance of καθάρσις, see Gigante (1975) 57.


Maenius absentem Novium cum carperet, ‘heus tu’
quidam ait ‘ignoras te an ut ignotum dare nobis
verba putas?’ ‘egomet mi ignosco’ Maenius inquit.
stultus et inprobus hic amor est dignusque notari.  (S. 1.3.19-24)

Now someone may say to me: “What about yourself? Have you no faults?” Why yes,
but not the same, and perhaps lesser ones. When Maenius once was carping at Novius
behind his back, “Look out, sir,” said someone, “do you not know yourself? Or do you
think you impose on us, as one we do not know?” “I take no note of myself,” said
Maenius. Such self-love is foolish and shameless, and deserves to be censured.

This important recognition of his own faults is, as Emily Gowers observes, a “defining moment
in Satires I,” since it is the first (although by no means the last!) unambiguous example of
Horace’s fondness for disarming self-deprecation.\(^95\) Perhaps of further significance is the fact
that it occurs within the context of a poem that, in embracing the Epicurean view of friendship
and forbearance, simultaneously refutes Stoic ethics as conducive toward overly harsh
criticism.\(^96\) In fact, Horace’s awareness of his own failings and relative gentleness in applying
therapeutic frankness not only provides a corrective model for the Stoics, but it also introduces
the perfect contrast for his satirical portrayal of the latter as irascible—and therefore utterly
ineffective—moralizers.

In his subsequent criticism of the Stoics’ lack of tolerance for “fools” (77: *stultis*) and
description of their disproportionate response to perceived offenses, Horace incorporates ethical
concepts that likewise appear in Philodemus’ frank treatment of anger. In laying down his

\(^{95}\)Gowers (2012) 125. Cf. 1.4.130-31 and 1.6.65-6 for Horace’s mention of his
“moderate faults” (*vitiis mediocribus*), which receives much more attention in *Sermones* 2.7 (to
be discussed in the next chapter).

\(^{96}\)According to Porphyrio (*ad* 21), this Maenius was “quite infamous in Rome for his
scurrility and extravagance” (*et scurrilitate et nepotatu notissimum Romae fuit*), for which reason
he was probably ridiculed by Luclilius, as Fraenkel (1957) 89 notes (cf. 1203 M). See Schlegel
(2005) 31-2 for the difference between Lucililius’ comic branding of others by name and Horace’s
more constructive branding of Maenius (cf. 24: *dignusque notari*).
principle rule concerning the proper way to punish offenses, for example, he invokes Lucretian rhetoric and uses philosophical language to communicate the importance of calculations made in accordance with reason:

\[
\text{denique, quatenus excidi penitus vitium irae,}
\text{cetera item nequeunt stultis haerentia, cur non}
\text{ponderibus modulisque eis ratio utitur ac res}
\text{ut quaeque est, ita suppliciis delicta coercet?} \quad (S. 1.3.76-9)
\]

In fine, since the fault of anger, and all the other faults that cleave to fools cannot be wholly cut away, why does not Reason use her own weights and measures, and visit offenses with punishment suited to each?

Aside from the Lucretian *denique* to introduce a new argument and emphasis on *ratio*,\(^{97}\)

Horace’s use of medical terminology in this passage in referring to the “excision” (*excidi*) of vice recalls similar references to scalpels and operations in Philodemus (*De lib. dic.* col. 17a.4-8).\(^{98}\)

Furthermore, in maintaining that anger cannot be completely removed but must be controlled by reason, Horace counters the Stoic doctrine of emotions as unqualifiedly vicious\(^{99}\) and possibly

\(^{97}\)Obviously one of the standard uses of *denique*, but the Epicurean tone of this poem and the specifically Lucretian explanation of evolution (99-124) leave little doubt as to the allusion, as the commentators as well as Fraenkel (1957) 87 and Gowers (2012) 134 note. See Kemp (2009) 5 for a similar observation and for the mention of *ratio* as “another ironic jibe against the Stoics” (4).

\(^{98}\)Cf. Lucr. 3.310: *nec radicitus evelli mala posse putandumst* (“one should one think that evils can be torn out by the roots”). The intertext is discussed by Grilli (1983) 270.

\(^{99}\)For the Stoic doctrine of apathy, see the accounts of Stobaeus (2.88.8-90.6 = *SVF* 3.378, 389) and Cicero (*Tusc.* 4.77-9). In his treatise *De ira*, Seneca calls anger “the most hideous and frenzied of all the emotions” (1.1.1: *maxime ex omnibus taetrum ac rabidum*) and asserts that it should be completely eradicated, not controlled (1.8.4). See Tsouna (2011) 196-209 for a more detailed discussion. Seneca’s main opponents are the Peripatetics, who taught that anger, when controlled by reason, could be useful, especially in the context of war (ibid. 1.8.9, cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 4.39-46). Although Panaetius adopted this doctrine of “moderated emotion” or *μετριοπαθής* (cf. Diog. Laert. 5.31 for the term), given Horace’s convenient oversight of the Stoics’ more moderate views elsewhere in *Sermones* 1.3, it seems unlikely that he is alluding to this in the above passage, as Gowers (2012) 134 suggests.
alludes to Philodemus’ similar statement in *De ira* concerning the role of correct opinion in reacting to offenses with due measure:

συνίσταται γὰρ ἀπὸ το[ῦ] βλέπειν, ὡς ἢ φύσις ἔχει τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ μηδὲν ψευδοδοξεῖν ἐν ταῖς σ[υ]μετρήσει τῶν ἐλα[τ]ωμάτων καὶ ταῖς κολάσεσι τῶν βλαπτόντων (col. 37.32-9)

It results from a consideration of the nature of things and not having false opinions regarding the comparison of losses and the punishment of offenders.¹⁰⁰

With regard to Horace’s treatment of the Stoics, the false opinion that “all vices are equal” clearly results in the corresponding failure to respond properly to slight offenses, which the poet criticizes by vividly describing to his interlocutor the horrible consequences of such folly: crucifixion (82: *in cruce*), hatred (86: *odisti*), flagellation (119: *flagello*) and beating with a rod (120: *ferula caedas*).¹⁰¹ This nameless straw man, however, who proves to be every bit as obstinate as Horace’s previous patients, arrogantly responds that, as a Stoic sage, he is unequivocally superior to everyone because of his complete independence and perfect virtue


¹⁰¹Cf. Philodemus’ description of the equally grave actions of irascible individuals in *De ira*, including beheadings (fr. 12.21: τὰς κεφαλὰς ἀφάσει), beatings (fr. 13.26: τύπτειν καὶ λακτίζειν) as well as self-alienation (col. 42.2: πρὸςαλλοτριοῦται) and hatred (col. 42.2-3: μισεῖ).
Such a refusal to listen to *ratio*, namely, Epicurean arguments concerning evolution and the role of convention in establishing the limits of justice (99-124), is met by a shift from theory to reality as Horace once again introduces a final tableau that forces the interlocutor to visualize his irrational conduct:

> vellunt tibi barbam  
> lascivi pueri; quos tu nisi fuste coerces,  
> urgeris turba circum te stante miserque  
> rumperis et latras, magnorum maxime regum.  

(1.3.133-36)

Mischievous boys pluck at your beard, and unless you keep them off with your staff, you are jostled by the crowd that surrounds you, while you, poor wretch, snarl and burst with rage, O mightiest of mighty kings!

This frank depiction of the irascible temperament, with its colorful and entertaining—almost theatrical—qualities and vividness, probably owes a great deal to the florid style of Bion, which later Epicureans like Demetrius of Laconia (c. 100 BC) employed in their philosophical treatises. Such borrowing also occurs in the works of Philodemus, who employs Bionian

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102 According to the Stoics, the possession of a single virtue implies the possession of all the virtues (cf. Stob. 2.63 = *SVF* 3.280: τὸν γάρ μιᾶν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν). Logically, therefore, the Stoic sage is prefect and does all things well (cf. Stob. 2.66.14 = *SVF* 3.560: λέγουσι δὲ καὶ πάντ’ εὖ ποεῖν τὸν σοφόν).


104 See Crönert (1906) 31-3. According to Diogenes Laertius (4.52), Eratosthenes said that Bion was “the first person who had clothed philosophy in a flowery robe” (*πρῶτος Βίων τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθινὰ ἐνέδυσεν*). A similar identification occurs in one of the Herculaneum papyri (*PHerc*. 1055), which Crönert assigns to the Demetrius mentioned above (col. 15.2-10). The mention of Bion’s style is significant, especially since he is quoted later on in order to communicate more gracefully an Epicurean philosophical point (ibid. col. 19.1-6): τούτον ἔχοντας τὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ Βιωνήου τούτο μὲν θήσω, διότι “γένος ἐκαστον ζώων ἰδίαν ἐχει μορφήν ἐν τοι διόι ἔγειρέ” (“Things being as they are, I shall set it down in the manner of a Bionian phrase, since ‘each kind of living thing has its own form in accordance with its own kind’”). Cf. Horace’s similar adjectival use of Bion’s name, which is in fact a
language for the sake of shocking frankness in describing the symptoms of anger (*De ir.* col. 8.34-7): οἷον λέγω τὴν ὑπὸ τῆς κ[ραυγῆς] διάστασιν [τ]οῦ πλεύμονος σὺν αὐταῖς πλαυραῖς (“For example, the swelling of the chest along with the lungs on account of screaming”).

For Horace and Philodemus, however, this connection is a stylistic rather than an ethical one, since both enhance their therapeutic visualizations for the ultimate purpose of effecting the avoidance of or release from vicious habits.

Perhaps the most colorful depiction of vicious or otherwise reprehensible behavior occurs in *Sermones* 1.9, in which Horace introduces the enormously popular character sketch of a garrulous and self-seeking Toady, which, alongside various other models, may also have drawn

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*hapax legomena* in Latin, at *Ep.* 2.2.60: *Bioneis sermonibus*. See also Gigante and Indelli (1978) 124-25. In the fragments of *De adulatione*, Philodemus even states that “we prefer to speak in the manner of Bion” (*PHerc.* 223, fr. 7: τὰ τοῦ Βίωνος [αἴρούμεν]οι λέγειν).

Indelli (1988) 158 includes commentary on the influence of Bion’s treatise *De apatheia* in this passage, evidence for which may be found in Hense (1969) 55-62. As Tsouna (2003) 243 n. 3 comments, the idea that Philodemus parodies the Stoic doctrine of ἀπαθεία in his vivid descriptions of the consequences of anger is suggested by David Armstrong in his forthcoming translation and commentary. If he is correct, this may serve to establish a stronger link with Horace’s obviously parodic treatment in *Sermones* 1.3 of the Stoic paradox that all sins are equal. For a similar description of the symptoms of anger (which is heavily influenced by that of Philodemus), see Sen. *De ira* 1.1.3-4 and Tsouna (2011) 198-99.


inspiration from Philodemus’ treatment of flattery. The setting of this poem in the Roman forum (1: *ibam forte via sacra*) and its abrupt, almost annoying conversational form, originate in Catullus (10.2: *foro*), whereas the sketch itself appears to have closer parallels in Theophrastus (*Char. 3 and 7*) and Lucilius. Certain aspects of this sketch, however, may be linked to the previously mentioned comic and philosophical treatments of the flatterer, particularly with regard to Toady’s grand entrance (1.9.3-4): *accurrit quidam notus mihi nomine tantum | arreptaque manu ‘quid agis, dulcissime rerum?’* (“when up there runs a man I knew only by name and seizes my hand: ‘How are you, sweetest of all things?’”). The manner in which Toady accosts the poet in the forum, catching his victim completely unawares, recalls Eupolis’ description of the flatterer’s technique (*PCG 5.172.7-8*): *εἰς ἀγοράν. ἐκεῖ δὰ ἐπειδὰν κατίδω*

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109 Fraenkel (1957) 114-16 discusses these two poems in more detail. See Freudenburg (1993) 209-11 for the literary significance of Horace’s imitation of Catullan “compositional variation.” For Courtney (1994) 2, the poem’s brief clauses reflect “spasmodic actions seeking escape.” There are also similarities between Horace’s satire and Vergil *Ecl. 9*, which involves a conversation between Moeris and the aspiring and inquisitive poet Lycidas en route to the city (*1: in urbem*). See Van Rooy (1973) 69-88.

110 Both Fraenkel (1957) 112 and Rudd (1966) 76-7 cite a fragment of Lucilius (1142 M ~ 534 M): *ibam forte domum* (“I was on my way home by chance”). Fiske (1971) 330-36 gives more parallels, although the precise nature and extent of Lucilius’ influence is unclear. See, for example, the conflicting views of Rudd (1966) 284 n. 38 and Anderson (1982) 84-5. Rudd (1961) 90-96 doubts the existence of a Lucilian prototype. Worthy of mention, on the other hand, is Ferriss-Hill (2011) 429-55, who argues that the nameless interlocutor should be identified with Lucilius himself. It should also be noted that there are important connections between Horace’s portrayal of Toady and the *character dramaticus*, as Musurillo (1964) 65-8, taking his cue from Porphyrio (*ad 1*), has demonstrated. On the influence of drama in general, see Rudd (1966) 75-6 and Cairns (2005) 49-55. Plutarch calls the flatterer a “tragic actor” (*Mor 4.50e: τραγικός ἐστιν*). Anderson (1982) 84-102 reads the tension between Horace and Toady within the context of an epic battle, as suggested by the poet’s use of battle terms (*16: persequer; 29: confice*) and citation of a line from the *Iliad* (*1.9.78: sic me servavit Apollo = II. 20.443: τὸν δ’ ἐξήρπαξεν Ἀπόλλων*).
τιν’ ἄνδρα ἠλίθιον, πλουτοῦντα δ’, εὐθὺς περὶ τούτον εἰμι (“[I run] into the marketplace, and there, when I catch sight of some fool—but a rich one!—I am immediately at his side”). His ambition and desire for fame is suggested by the proactive “snatching” of Horace’s hand and overly charming address “O sweetest thing on earth,” which recalls Philodemus’ observation that the flatterer “speaks honeyed words to his victim” (PHerc. 222, col. 7.9-10: μει[λίττει] δὲ τὸν κολα[κε]υόμεν[ον]). This abrupt entrance and perverted hijacking of one of Horace’s favorite terms of endearment (cf. Ep. 1.7.12: dulcis) emphasize Toady’s status as a charlatan and an actor, which is only further confirmed by his tactless self-appropriation of the title “learned poet” (1.9.7: docti sumus; cf. Ep. 1.19.1: docte Maecenas). In his attempt to win Horace’s favor, therefore, the speaker mimics his victim’s language and peremptorily insinuates himself into Maecenas’ circle by claiming poetic excellence, which apparently includes the ability to compose quickly and dance effeminately (23-5). Of course, the delicious irony of Toady’s

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111The introduction of a nameless interlocutor, which is already familiar from the diatribe satires, establishes connections not only to comedy and the Cynics, but also to the character sketches of moral philosophers like Theophrastus (see Gowers [2012] 284) and, as I argue here, to Philodemus.

112With regard to the speaker, Gowers (2012) 284 observes that arripio “signifies his opportunistic attitude to life.” See also Rudd (1966) 7 for the parallel between the opening seizure (arrepta manu) and the closing seizure (77: rapit in ius).

113For the word doctus as referring to Roman poets who were part of the Hellenistic literary tradition, see Palmer (1893) 221, Van Rooy (1972) 40 and especially Kenney (1970).

114Cf. Philodemus’ description of the flatterer’s behavior in PHerc. 222 as resembling that of a “little dog or a small monkey” (col. 9.14-15: κυνίδιον . . . ἦ [τι]θη[τ]ιο[ν], which he condemns by saying “it is one thing to mimic someone, and another to emulate him” (col. 10.8-10: [ἀ]λο [μέν γά]ρ τὸ μιμεῖσθαι τ[ιν’, ἐτερον δὲ] τὸ ζηλοῦν]. Cf. Plut. Mor. 4.51c: ὁ κόλαξ αὐτὸν ὀπειρά ὅλην τινὰ ὀνθημίζει καὶ σχηματίζει, περιαρμόσαι καὶ περιπλάσαι ζητῶν οἷς ἂν ἐπιχειρή διὰ μιμήσεως (“The flatterer bends and shapes himself like matter, as it were, seeking to adapt and mold himself to his victims through imitation”). Plutarch also mentions the “ape” (πίθηκος), the “cuddlefish” (πολύποδος) and the “chameleon” (χαμαιλέοντος) in his description of the flatterer as imitator (52b-54b), as discussed by Longo Auricchio (1986) 88.
clumsy assimilation of the poet’s talents is that he is, as Herbert Musurillo puts it, “Horace by inversion, embodying as he does all the qualities that Horace most feared and disliked in a man.”115 Closely related to the false association of poetic virtue with shoddy overproduction, which is emphatically condemned in Sermones 1.4 (9-13), is the important antithesis between garrulity and silence (11-12): *aiebam tacitus, cum quidlibet ille | garriret, vicos, urbem lauderet* (“. . . I kept saying to myself quietly while the fellow rattled on about everything, praising the streets and the city”).116 This is often read within the context of similar Theophrastean portraits; Horace’s qualification of the speaker’s loquacity as an act specifically aimed at praising everything and therefore distinct from wholesome conversation, however, is one that Philodemus also makes in De adulatione (PHerc. 222, col. 12.8: ὀμιλίαν ἀντὶ τοῦ [λ]α[λ]ε[λ]ιαν; cf. PHerc. 1457, col. 2.6-8: πᾶν[τ]ων [τ]ῇν ἐπιμέλει[α]ν π[θ]οπο[θ]ου[λ]ε[θ]α[κ] . . . καὶ λαλεῖν).117 This distinction, which may engage with Philodemus’ views on homiletics as expressed in his treatise De conversatione (see above, p. 11), has potential significance for the Sermones, since it pertains to Horace’s self-portrayal as a humble taciturn not only in this poem but also in his previous

For *mollitia* and dancing as an effeminate activity to be avoided by men, see Edwards (1993) 63-97 (especially 68-70) and cf. Lucr. 4.980: *cernere saltantes et mollia membra moventes* (“see them dancing and softly moving their limbs”). Macrob. Sat. 3.14.6-7 in particular disapproves of boys dancing, the mere mention of which he calls *nefas*.

115Musurillo (1964) 68. See also Rudd (1966) 83: “Part of the fun in this satire comes from the pest’s failure to recognize his own absurdity.”

116Ferris-Hill (2011) 431-33, on the other hand, views the interlocutor’s garrulity and productiveness as an indication that he is none other than Lucilius, who receives the following description at 1.4.12: *garrulus atque piger scribendi ferre laborem, | scribendi recte* (“[he was] garrulous and too lazy to bear the task of writing properly”).

117Theophrastus does not appear to make this connection in his treatments, which focus either on flattery (*Char. 2*) or garrulity and loquacity (ibid. 3 and 7). Cf. Philodemus’ description of the flatterer as one who “speaks in order to please” (PHerc. 1457, col. 1.9: [ὁ λέγων πρὸς χάριν ἐπιμέλειαν πεποιημένοις. . . καὶ λαλεῖν).
encounter with Maecenas (1.6.56-62). In contrast to the benefits of truthful conversation, which, like Horatian satire, is characterized above all by frankness, Philodemus describes the flatterer as engaging in shameful conversation (PHerc. 222, col. 12.2: \( \text{ἀισχρὰν \ οἵμιλίαν} \)), including begging and lying (PHerc. 1089, col. 7.5-6: \( \text{κολακικῶς \ οἵμιλήσει} \ [\text{καὶ} \ \text{πτωχέσει} \ \text{καὶ} \ \text{ψεύσεται} \)). As an actor (PHerc. 1675, col. 13.35-6: \( \text{ὑποκριτάς} \)), he praises one moment and slanders his rivals the next (PHerc. 1457, col. 12.21-2: \( \text{φθονοῦσι} \ [\text{καὶ} \ \text{διαβάλλουσι} \)). As Horace’s persona soon discovers, his pesky companion’s prattling is ultimately motivated by envy of potential rivals and personal ambition, both of which are intended to secure his prospects for self-gain.

In the course of this carefully designed portrait, Horace exposes the interlocutor’s true disposition by juxtaposing his flattering conversation to his brazen competitiveness and desperate desire to win Maecenas’ favor. Early on in the dialogue Toady betrays his selfish ambition by predicting that, rather than accept him as a friend among equals, Horace will be so impressed by the flatterer’s skill that he will prefer his company to that of Varius and Viscus (22-3): \( \text{si bene me novi, non Viscum pluris amicum, \ | non Varium facies} \) (“If I do not deceive myself, 

\begin{itemize}
  \item \text{118} Oliensis (1998) 37 describes Horace’s response to the interlocutor in \textit{Sermones} 1.9 as \text{“unresponsive silence,”} which reflects his inability \text{“to be anything but civil.”} Cf. Schlegel (2005) 108, who argues that the poet’s irritating portrait \text{“invites the reader to practice the very invective against the interlocutor that Horace’s own character in the poem refuses to practice.”} Gowers (2012) views the poet as \text{“taking the part of a satirist to suite the times, inoffensive, reticent and passive aggressive.”}

  \item \text{119} Gowers (2012) 286, who, like many others, reads Horace’s portrait primarily in terms of Theophrastus’ descriptions of the garrulous and loquacious man, is only partly right to conclude that \text{“The pest is \ldots not a subtle flatterer who rations his words to avoid offense”} (cf. 2.5.89-90).
\end{itemize}
you will not think more of Viscus or Varius as a friend than of me”). Of course, the irony here is that the flatterer’s vicious disposition and false beliefs about self-worth cloud his reason, thus precluding any possibility for self-awareness. As Philodemus states, flatterers are motivated by ambition and “the love of glory” (PHerc. 1089, col. 4.13: \[φιλοδοξία\], and “out of the compelling desire to insinuate themselves men falsely think that they will be valued more that many” (PHerc. 1675, col. 13.15-20: καὶ δ’ ἐπιθυμίαν ἣναγκασμένην ὑποτρέχειν δοκοῦσι καὶ π[\(q\)]ό πολλῶν παραλογίζεσθαι . . . [ψευδῶς]). This overwhelming desire for success is what drives Toady to compare himself to Varius, the chief significance of which lies in the latter’s important connection with Maecenas as mentioned in Sermones 1.6.54-5. The implication is that if the flatterer replaces Varius as amicus optimus or “best friend,” Horace will

120 For the expression, cf. Ep. 1.18.1-2: si bene te novi, metues, librerne Lolli, | scurrantis speciem praebere, professus amicum (“If I know you well, my Lollius, most outspoken of men, you will shrink from appearing in the guise of a parasite when you have professed the friend”). Horace mentions Varius again at 1.5.40-44 and 1.10.81, to which cf. Verg. Ecl. 9.32-6:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{et me fecere poetam} \\
\text{Pierides, sunt et mihi carmina, me quoque dicunt} \\
\text{vatem pastores; sed non ego credulus illis.} \\
\text{nam neque adhuc Vario videor nec dicere Cinna digna.}
\end{align*}
\]

The Muses have also made me a poet: I have songs as well, and shepherds call me vates—but I don’t believe them, for I do not think my poems are yet worthy of a Varius or a Cinna.

121 Cf. Plut. Mor. 4.49b: ἀντιτάττεται γάρ [ὄ κόλαξ] πρὸς τὸ γνωθί σαυτόν, ἀπάτην ἐκάστῳ πρὸς ἑαυτόν ἐμποτῶν καὶ ἀγνοοῖν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν (“For the flatterer sets himself up against the maxim ‘know thyself,’ creating in each person deception concerning himself and also ignorance of both himself and the good and evil that concerns him”).

122 Tsouna (2007) 34 describes Philodemus’ general view of vice as irrational: “The failures of understanding of vicious persons involve, importantly, understanding of themselves. They do not recognize the falsehood of their beliefs, the inappropriateness of their attitudes, and the wrongness of their actions.” See also Nussbaum (1994) 37-40 for the concept of irrationality in Hellenistic philosophy.
not only become better acquainted with Maecenas, but he will eliminate the competition and—by implication—emerge as sole beneficiary of the millionaire’s gifts:

\[
\text{haberes}
\]
\[
\text{magnum adiutorem, posset qui ferre secundas,}
\]
\[
\text{hunc hominem velles si tradere: dispeream, ni}
\]
\[
\text{summosses omnis. (S. 1.9.45-8)}
\]

“You might have a strong backer, who could be your understudy, if you would introduce your humble servant. Hang me, if you wouldn’t find that you had cleared the field!”

In this passage, the appeal to Horace’ desire for recognition further underscores Toady’s complete misunderstanding of the poet, but the notion that success within Maecenas’ circle is achieved by internal strife and competition marks the apex of his ineptitude.\(^{123}\) Indeed, for Horace the suggestion is intolerable and provokes him finally to address the nature of his dealings with Maecenas:

\[
\text{‘non isto vivimus illic,}
\]
\[
\text{quo tu rere, modo; domus hac ne purior ulla est}
\]
\[
\text{nec magis his aliena malis; nil mi officit, inquam,}
\]
\[
\text{ditior hic aut est quia doctior; est locus uni}
\]
\[
\text{cuique suus’ (S. 1.9.48-52)}
\]

“We don’t live there on such terms as you think. No house is cleaner or more free from such intrigues than that. It never hurts me,” I say, “that one is richer or more learned than I. Each has his own place.”

\(^{123}\)Anderson (1982) 97 notes the military implication of \textit{summosses} as “treacherously seizes power from within.” Cf. PHerc. 222, col. 12.13-14, in which Philodemus quotes Homer (\textit{Il.} 18.535) in order to characterize the nature and effects of flattering conversation: \(\epsilonν \delta’ \ Ε\epsilonις, \text{\(\epsilonν \delta\) Κυδομός όμιλεον, \(\epsilonν \delta’ \ όλοι} \ Κηφ (”There were present together Strife and Confusion and destructive Death”). But cf. Ferris-Hill (2011) 443-44, who argues that these lines as well as the interlocutor’s (i.e., Lucilius’) apparent interest in Maecenas in general are to be understood ironically: “Lucilius professes to desire an introduction to Maecenas, offering himself as a useful sidekick to Horace, but he can easily be understood to mean quite the opposite: as the \textit{inventor} of Roman Satire, Lucilius is confident that it is Horace who would play second fiddle to him, were Maecenas presented with both at once.”
Horace’s impassioned and spontaneous response is intended as a frank defense of Maecenas’
circle on the part of a loyal and trustworthy friend. It is also the first time in this poem that he
has taken an assertive stance and voiced his opinion directly, thereby breaking the awkward
silence as well as the passive-aggressive tone of earlier reactions. Philodemus also hints at
this contrast between the flatterer, whose “wicked conversation” is “full of strife” (De conv. col.
7.17: κακῆς ὁμιλίαις; cf. De oec. col. 23.31: ἀφιλο[ν]ε[ι]κών), and the Epicurean sage, who
observes certain “limits in speaking” (De conv. col. 5.2: [τῆς ὁμιλίας . . . τὸ πέρας]) but is not
afraid to voice the truth when necessary (ibid. col. 8.3-5: παρυπομνήσομεν ὅτι μᾶλλον
μελητὴ[σ]ει καλῶς λαλεῖν, ποτὲ λαλπῶν, οὐκ ἄε[ι]σωπῶν). Horace likewise refuses to
engage in shameful conversation with Toady, observing silence until it becomes necessary to
express the true nature of his dealings with Maecenas by means of a straightforward
description. With regard to winning the favor of his patron, Horace’s final advice to the
flatterer implies that this will inevitably be impossible: Maecenas is impressed by virtue and
purity (1.9.49: purior, 54: virtus; cf. 1.6.64: puro), while the flatterer’s strategy involves

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immediately rushes to the defense of his friends and thereby also of himself. The spontaneity
of this defense, which is represented as an outbursts forced out of an otherwise reticent poet by his
companion’s intolerably offensive insinuations, is underwritten by the dislocated word order
characteristic of authentic excitements.” The fact that Horace puts even grammatical distance
between himself and Toady, using the second person plural to exclude him throughout (e.g., 48:
vivimus; 68: consistimus), is observed by Rudd (1961) 83.

125 I disagree with Zetzel (2009) 38, who states that in this poem “[Horace] is smug, elitist
and rude, with no sympathy for the man who is in the position in which he himself once was.”
This evaluation overlooks that fact that Horace’s portrayal of the flatterer, who is obnoxious,
chatty, ambitious, greedy and relentlessly self-interested, is intended to be annoying, as Schlegel
(2005) 108-126 observes. In other words, this is Horace’ game and we are being forced to play
it, since his manipulation of a popular character portrait for his own purposes has made sympathy
an impossible (or at least an unwarranted and inappropriate) reaction.

126 Oliensis (1998) 39: [Horace is] “a man who knows both how to keep his mouth shut
and when to open it.”
corrupting his servants (1.9.57: *corrumpam*); Maecenas holds audience with those who are worthy (56: *difficilis aditus*; cf. 1.6.54: *obtulit*),\(^{127}\) while the flatterer, in his usual way, intends to force a meeting by accosting him abruptly in the streets (1.9.59: *occurram*, 3: *accurrit*).\(^{128}\)

Overall, Horace’s entertaining portrayal of the flatterer provides his audience with social commentary on corrupt relationships between patrons and clients in contemporary Rome, but it also drives a wedge between himself and his interlocutor by implicitly emphasizing the purity of his own friendship with Maecenas and the other members of his literary circle.\(^{129}\)

This chapter has endeavored to examine the nature of Horace’s relationship with Maecenas within the context of Epicurean concerns about flattery and frankness. In consolidating his persona as a faithful and true member of Maecenas’ circle of friends, Horace underscores the passiveness of his role in the initial encounter with his patron in *Sermones* 1.6, which was due to his virtuous upbringing and pure friendship with Varius and Vergil. The silence and reservation which characterize his conversation with Maecenas further emphasize his

\(^{127}\)Lejay (1915) 352: “*Aditus*, les abords de la place, mot de la langue militaire comme les autres expressions. Horace l’entend surtout de l’attitude volontairement réservée de Mécène (cf. 6, 61); le fâcheux ne l’entend que des consignes données aux gens de service et montre son défaut de tact et de finesse.”

\(^{128}\)Horace’s description of Maecenas both here and in *Sermones* 1.6 implies that he is not one of the many “lovers of flattery” mentioned by Philodemus in PHerc. 1457 (fr. 15.6: *φιλοκόλακες*). The flatterer’s use of *occurrere*, which is usually positive (cf. 1.4.135-36, 1.5.40-41 and 1.9.61), may be yet another example of his self-deception and misunderstanding of true friendship.

\(^{129}\)Freudenburg (2001) 93-5, however, draws attention to the parallel between Toady’s resolution (*non mihi deero*) and Horace’s own determination to win Octavian’s favor in 2.1.17 (*haud mihi deero*). As mentioned above, Philodemus explains the difference between self-seeking flatterers who are obsequious (*ἀρέσκειν*) and honest friends who are pleasurable (*ἁνδάνειν*) in PHerc. 1457. Nevertheless, in *Sermones* 2 Horace appears to be fully conscious of the potential similarities between the two, which he playfully exploits for the purpose of his satiric portraits.
lack of ambition, although this is carefully balanced by the frankness he learned from his father in *Sermones* 1.4. Indeed, through the diatribe satires Horace proves to his patron that, although he knows when to be silent, he is also perfectly capable of administering frank criticism with regard to contemporary vices when necessary. Furthermore, his use of pictorial imagery in order therapeutically to shock his nameless interlocutors and thereby facilitate moral correction reflects the practice of Epicureans like Philodemus, who viewed this as a healing technique. Horace concludes his self-portrayal as a true friend by means of the character portrait of Toady, which, in addition to providing entertainment value, simultaneously highlights his own virtue and distinguishes him from self-seeking flatterers. In the next and final chapter, the attention will focus on Horace’s detailed description of flattery as an art form, particularly with regard to the traditional role of the parasite. It will also consider the poet’s self-application of frankness through various, unflattering exposés of his own embarrassing vices through the criticisms of third-rate philosophers and slaves, which perhaps confirms his trustworthiness as an honest friend and client more effectively than his criticisms of others.
In the poems of *Sermones* 2, which generally include criticisms that are less public than those in the previous book, Horace furnishes his audience with inside information concerning the vices of social interaction from both ends of the spectrum, namely, self-interested flattery and overly harsh frankness. His original character portrait of Toady in *Sermones* 1.9, for instance, invites readers to observe and consider the characteristics of such a disposition from outside; in the detailed conversation between Odysseus and Tiresias in *Sermones* 2.5, however, which is essentially private advice for the self-seeking flatterer as legacy hunter (cf. 2.5.23: *captēs*), the poet grants his audience special access to top-secret “tricks of the trade.” Although Horace’s negative portrayal of Odysseus is frequently read within the context of a philosophical debate between Cynics and Stoics, this chapter will consider how Horace’s description of the flatterer’s devious tactics, which resemble Philodemus’ similar descriptions in *De adulatione*, serve a more relevant purpose: by exposing to Maecenas the hidden strategies and intentions of legacy hunters, he implicitly disassociates himself from their kind and underscores his status as a trustworthy friend. In addition to acknowledging the problem of flattery, in this book Horace also vigorously explores the Epicurean practice of self-examination through frankness, which, in the case of the arrogant and overly critical Damasippus in *Sermones* 2.3, is also a lesson in the misapplication of this method. Finally, this chapter will examine how, through the self-deprecating revelations of his own embarrassing faults and inconsistencies via the slave Davus in *Sermones* 2.7, Horace not only indicates his persona’s playfully inept and comic side, but also acknowledges his imperfections in accordance with Epicurean frankness, thus reconfirming, at
one and the same time, his own self-awareness as well as his identity as an unambiguously parresiastic friend and client of the wealthy Maecenas.

Horace’s portrayal of Odysseus and Tiresias in Sermones 2.5, which has often been viewed as his most biting satire on account of its apparently gratuitous invective on society and lack of relevance to himself, addresses certain issues that are actually of major concern to the poet and inform his self-portrayal as a trustworthy friend of Maecenas. His decision to communicate these issues within the context of Odysseus’ conversation with the blind sage in the underworld obviously owes a great deal to Homer (cf. Od. 11.100-137), but it is also influenced by subsequent comic treatments of κατάβασις adventures, such as that of Dionysus in Aristophanes’ Ranae. Another probable source for Horace is the tradition of dramatic and often burlesque criticisms motivated by philosophical debates in the Hellenistic period, especially the Silli of Timon of Phlius, which included two books of dialogues with dead sages. Within this category also falls Menippus of Gadara’s lampoon entitled Nekyia (Diog. Laert. 6.101), which, judging by Lucian of Samosata’s later imitation in Menippus sive Nekyomanteia, portrayed the philosopher as interrogating Tiresias concerning “the best life” (6: ὁ ἄριστος βίος). For G. C. Fiske, his own interpretation of this latter source’s apparent polemical underpinnings, namely,

1Lejay (1915) 416 calls the portrayal “très piquant.” Rudd (1966) 239, picking up on and responding to Seller (1924) 70, notes that it is “generally recognized as the sharpest of all the satires,” although he does not see any real trace of Juvenalian detachment from overt moral considerations. Cf. Courtney (2013) 145: “[the poem has] absolutely no relevance to himself; this is why it has often been seen as a forerunner of Juvenal and most subsequent satire.”

2Diog. Laert. 9.111: τὸ δὲ δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον ἐν διαλόγου σχῆματι. φαίνεται γοῦν ἀνακρινών Ξενοφάνην τὸν Κολοφώνιον περὶ ἑκάστων (“the second and third [books] are in the form of dialogues; for he represents himself as questioning Xenophanes of Colophon about each philosopher in turn”). This source is also discussed by Rudd (1966) 237-38 and Coffey (1976) 86.

Cynic criticism of the Stoics’ idealization of Odysseus as the perfect sage,⁴ provides a suitable background for reading *Sermones* 2.5 as a “sarcastic attack[s] on the teaching of Chrysippus and the earlier Stoa that the sage is a χρηματιστικός.”⁵ This view, however, is problematic on two counts: first, it overlooks the fact that Menippus’ original version—if one can trust Lucian’s account—is a condemnation of the inconsistency and hypocrisy of philosophical sects in general rather than (as in the case of Horace) a satire on wealth or flattery⁶; second, Fiske’s “external analogies” between the two works, such as the fact that Menippus mentions Odysseus in passing (8) and in one instance portrays Tiresias as laughing (21), are not significant enough to establish any meaningful connection. Instead of reading Horace’s satire within the context of philosophical debates between Cynics and Stoics, therefore, one should regard it as involving clever manipulation of a traditional scene, transported from Greece to Rome and used as a vehicle for social commentary on contemporary problems. This use of mythological tradition, and in particular of a popular figure’s character traits for ethical reasons, more closely resembles Philodemus’ utilization of Homeric rulers for a similar purpose;⁷ in fact, in one of his fragments

⁴On the popularity of Odysseus among philosophers in antiquity, especially the Stoics, see Stanford (1954) 118-27. On the other hand, it appears as though Antisthenes, traditionally regarded as the founder of Cynicism (although see Dudley [1974] 1-15), also had a devotion to Odysseus, on whom he wrote at least three treatises (Diog. Laert. 6.15-18). This is likewise discussed by Stanford (1954) 99-100. A similar attraction to the hero might have been felt by Bion, as Desmond (2008) 33 points out. Horace eulogizes Odysseus at *Ep.* 1.2.17-31.

⁵Fiske (1971) 401.

⁶Rudd (1966) 238 makes the same observation and concludes that, based on these different motives, none of Fiske’s other connections are valid. On the other hand, it is certainly not impossible that Horace intended to criticize the Cynics and Stoics in *Sermones* 2.5; if so, however, is not nearly as clearly expressed as in other poems. Cf., for example, the clear identification of his Stoic “adversaries” in 1.3 (127: Chrysippus) and 2.3 (44: Chrysippi porticus), as well as his condemnation of Cynic beggary in *Ep.* 1.17 (18: Cynicum).

⁷This approach, which becomes the vehicle for political commentary in *De bono rege secundum Homerum*, is consistent with Philodemus’ views regarding literary theory and the
of De adulatione Odysseus is described as a parasite among the tables of wealthy old men as well as a banqueter among the dead in the Underworld (admittedly a much more likely philosophical and satirical model for Horace):


... things at the table and the couch of Aeolus ... he was acting like a parasite. And having filled his belly at the house of noble Alcinous he thought it fit to take the full wallet. Then, having descended into Hades, he occupied the bloody tables of the dead, thinking it fit that these too should act as parasites. 8

It is unclear just how popular this view of Odysseus was before the Hellenistic period, 9 but it became increasingly common among Alexandrian and later authors. 10 As mentioned above, in Horace it becomes a useful medium for addressing the Roman issue of legacy hunting or usefulness of poetry as discussed in Chapter 1, pp. 12-13 (especially n. 28). In this treatise, Philodemus examines the nature of good kingship through the examples and characteristics of Homeric rulers: Odysseus is partly criticized for being a harsh ruler (coll. 3-5) and partly extolled for his ability to provide council and prevent civil strife (coll. 15.32-7 and 29.22-4).

8 As Kondo (1974) 49-50 discusses, for Philodemus parasitism is not distinct from flattery but rather related to it as the species of a genre. Other species of this vicious disposition include the obsequious man (ἀρεσκος) and the sycophant (προστροχαστής), for which see Kondo (1974) 50-6 and Tsouna (2007) 130-32.

9 For ancient criticism of Odysseus regarding food, see Stanford (1954) 66-71. The most recent evidence for the popularity of Odysseus, mostly in the fragments of Middle Comedy, is Casolari (2002) 197-225. Heracles is the usual butt of jokes involving gluttony and parasitism, for which see, e.g., Ar. Ran. 503-18.

10 Cf., for example, Lucian’s De parasito, in which the spokesman Simon identifies the hero as a full-fledged parasite on account of his infamously high regard for “tables laden with bread and meat” (10 = Od. 9.8-9). After quoting this passage, Simon declares (10): ἂν λὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν τῶν Ἐπικουρείων βῶ γενόμενος αὐθίς παρὰ τῇ Καλυψοί . . . οὔδὲ τότε εἶπε τούτῳ τὸ τέλος χαριέστερον, ἂν λὰ τῶν παρασιτῶν βιον (“Moreover, after he had entered into the Epicurean life once more in Calypso’s isle . . . even then he did not call that end more delightful, but the life of a parasite”). Plutarch also associates “wily Odysseus” with the changeable flatterer in Mor. 4.52c.
captatio. Cicero had already described the prevalence of this scam, which was aimed at wealthy but childless seniors (orbi) and employed flattery as a primary tactic (Parad. 5.2.39): *hereditatis spes quid iniquitatis in serviendo non suscipit? quem nutum locupletis orbi senis non observat?* (“What iniquity does the hope for inheritance not undertake, what call of a rich but childless old man does it fail to heed?”). Needless to say, it would have been important for someone like Horace to disassociate himself from flatterers, and his portrayal of Odysseus as a social climber endeavoring to recover his wealth, which reflects the financial and social circumstances of his own encounter with Maecenas, may be read as a powerful witness to the poet’s honesty and genuineness: indeed, rather than provide simple criticism of obsequious individuals, in this poem Horace essentially furnishes his wealthy benefactor with a detailed manual outlining the flatterer’s dirty secrets, thus presenting himself as a champion of candor and proving that he has absolutely nothing to hide.13

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11Lejay (1915) 416: “Sur ce discours, Horace greffe l’entretien rapport dans cette satire, sans se tenir très exactement aux données homériques et en lui prétant un caractère complètement romain et contemporain.” For background on Roman captation, including the social, financial and legal contexts leading up to the prevalence of this practice, see Frank (1933) 295-99, Rudd (1966) 224-27, Crook (1967) 119-21, Saller (1982) 124-25, Mansbach (1982) and Hopkins (1983) 99-103 and 238-41. Sallmann (1970) 182 n. 2 points out that this technical use of *captator* and *captare* is not attested before *Sermones* 2.5 and may be a “satirische Wortprägung des Horaz” (Mansbach [1982] 15 and Roberts [1984] 428 make the same observation). As Muecke (1993) 177 notes, however, Romans were certainly aware of the phenomenon itself, as *Cic. Off.* 3.74 and the passage quoted above reveal. For a list of Roman authors who address the problem of *captatio*, see Champlin (1991) 201-2 as well as the testimonies collected by Mansbach (1982) 118-34.

12See Palmer (1893) 328 and Muecke (1993) 177-78.

13One may compare Tiresias’ advice to that of Horace in *Epistulae* 1.17 and 18, both of which are addressed to prospective clients and address the issue of gaining a patron’s favor. As Hunter (1985) 484-86 observes, the poet’s advice to Lollius, although based for the most part on sound philosophical doctrines, playfully draws “a very thin line” between the flatterer and the successful client. See also Allen (1938) 172-73. For the unserious tone of this letter, see Fairclough (1991) 367 and Mayer (1994) 241.
When Horace’s exploitation of character traits in which Odysseus traditionally abounds, such as eloquence, craftiness and, within the context of his desire for reacquiring lost property, greed, are interpreted in the light of Philodemus’ treatment of flattery, intriguing connections emerge. The poet immediately highlights these aforementioned traits through Odysseus’ initial exchange with the underworld prophet:

‘Hoc quoque, Tiresia, praeter narrata petenti
responde, quibus amissas reparare queam res
artibus atque modis. quid rides?’ ‘iamne doloso
non satis est Ithacam revehi patriosque penatis
adspicere?’ (S. 2.5.1-5)

O: One more question pray answer me, Tiresias, besides what you have told me. By what way and means can I recover my lost fortune? Why laugh?
T: What! not enough for the man of wiles to sail back to Ithaca and gaze upon his household gods?

From his very first words, Odysseus is already portrayed as ambitious, restlessly curious and acquisitive (1: *hoc quoque . . . petenti*),\(^{14}\) which are merely symptoms of an avaricious disposition as revealed by his impatient demand (2: *responde*) that Tiresias show him how to recover his lost property (2: *amissas . . . res*).\(^{15}\) In his response the prophet, borrowing a typically Horatian expression loaded with moral undertones, identifies the underlying reason for the hero’s greed as discontentment (4: *non satis est*), which recalls the poet’s earlier diatribe on avarice in *Sermones* 1.1 (62: *nil satis est*) and repeated emphasis on the importance of being content with one’s lot (cf. 1.6.96: *contentus*). Discontentment and avarice, which provide the moral foundation for Horace’s character portrait of Odysseus, are also identified by Philodemus

\(^{14}\)Cf. Verg. *Ecl.* 1.44, which is spoken by Tityrus, the disinherited shepherd who had recently reacquired property as a gift from Caesar: *hic mihi responsum primus dedit ille petenti* (“He was the first to give a response to me in my search”).

\(^{15}\)For the importance of preserving one’s property in the *Sermones* in particular, cf. 1.2.62 and 1.4.110-11.
as the main passions afflicting flatterers and motivating their behavior. They suffer, for example, from “desire for wealth” (PHerс. 1457 col. 12.22: φιλαργουροῦσι; cf. ibid. fr. 12.5: πλοῦτον) as well as “love of fame” (PHerс. 1089 col. 4.13: [φιλο]δοξίαν; cf. ibid. fr. 12.5: πλοῦτον) both of which feed their “habitual discontentment” (PHerс. 1675 col. 11.25-6: [τὸ δύσκολον τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἡθέσιν] and drive them to praise for the sake of gain. Returning to Horace’s depiction of Odysseus, an additional reason for resorting to adulation as a source of income is the fear of poverty (2.5.9: pauperiem . . . horres) and refusal to endure a life of little means (6: nudus inopsque), which provides a sharp contrast with Ofellus’ philosophical equanimity and Epicurean understanding of the requirements of nature as easily fulfilled in Sermones 2.2 (cf. Arr. 5.149.1-8). Like Odysseus and Ofellus, moreover, Horace himself had lost his paternal inheritance (Ep. 2.2.50: inopemque paterni | et laris et fundi) to forceful confiscations during a war and had become poor (ibid. 51: paupertas), although, unlike Odysseus—and this is a crucial point of comparison—he regained wealth by means of a virtuous disposition and frankness (1.6.83: virtutis; 60: quod eram narro), by which he had managed to gain the favor of Maecenas (ibid. 63: placui tibi).18

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16 Horace plays with the Homeric warrior’s typical ignorance of self-modesty at 2.5.19-18, to which cf. Od. 9.19-20: Εἰμὶ Ὅδυσσεὺς Λαερτίαδης, ὃς πᾶσιν δόλοισιν ἁνθρώποις μέλω, καὶ μεν κλέος οὐρανὸν ἱκεῖ (“I am Odysseus, son of Laertes, who am known among men for all sorts of wiles, and my fame reaches to heaven”).

17 As discussed in Chapter 3, Philodemus teaches that the fall from wealth into poverty is indifferent (De div. col. 53.2-5) and that poverty is not to be feared (ibid. col. 12.14), particularly because the requirements of nature are easily fulfilled (De oec. col. 16.12-18). See also Muecke (1993) 181 for the “fear of poverty” theme in Horace.

18 Oliensis (1998) 57: “The irony is blatant, but the alternative perspective of true friendship goes unexpressed. Is Horace an honest Ofellus, content with his lot, whose farm has been miraculously restored, or a Ulysses who has worked hard and deviously to accomplish such a restoration? While Horace might like to fancy himself an Ofellus, he knows that others may accuse him of being a Ulysses. By making the implicit comparison first himself, Horace precludes their attack an shows himself to be nobody’s fool.” See also Freudenburg (2001) 99
Odysseus, on the other hand, casually subordinates his noble pedigree and virtue to money as he declares most colloquially “birth and virtue without riches aren’t worth a damn!” (2.5.8: et genus et virtus, nisi cum re, vilior alga est). His empty fears and desires, therefore, are what drive him to seek advice concerning what to do and, in a manner perfectly consistent with the “man of many turns” (Od. 1.1: πολύτροπος; cf. Carm. 1.6.7: duplicis . . . Ulixei), to inquire about the necessary “skills and methods” (2.5.3: artibus atque modis). This somewhat proleptic identification of legacy hunting as a learnable skill and source of income also appears in Philodemus, who identifies the need to satisfy false desires as the underlying cause of flattering behavior, which manifests itself through the conscious manipulation of rich people by various tactics of deception collectively identified as “the flatterer’s art” (De lib. dic. col. 1b.13-14: κολακεύταικαίς [τέχναις]). It should be noted, moreover, that although descriptions of flattery as a skill had appeared already in Plato’s discussion of rhetoric (Soph. 222e7-223a1: κολακικὴν . . . τέχνην) and in Terence’s humorous parody of its teachability (Eu. 260-64),

19Muecke (1993) 178: “Throughout the poem there is an ironic counterplay between the heroic status of the characters and the perversion of values implied in captatio, mirrored in shifts between epic style and the informal style of conversation.” This antithetical juxtaposition between the high and low styles is also discussed by Sallmann (1970) 180. Klein (2012) 97-119 reads this poem as a dramatization of the typical client’s “social performance” in contemporary Rome. For the proverbial worthlessness of seaweed, cf. Verg. Ecl. 7.42: (vilior alga) and Carm. 3.17 (alga inutili).

20Cf. also Sen. Ben. 6.38: qui captandorum testamentorum artem professi sunt (“those who are professionals in the art of legacy hunting”).

21For other references to flattery as a skill, see Ribbeck (1884) 63-4. The passage from Terence, which is discussed by Starks (2013) 138-39 and Christenson (2013) 277-78, is worth quoting here (for parasites in Terence and Plautus, see Barsby [1999] 126-27 with references):

Ille ubi miser famelicus videt mi esse tantum honorem et tam facile victum quaerere, ibi homo coepit me obscurare
before Plutarch’s *Quomodo adsentator ab amico internoscatur* and Lucian’s *De parasito* it is Philodemus alone who provides the only surviving and extended treatment of flatterers, which includes a detailed examination of their deceptive strategies, concerns and motives. Many of these details emerge in Tiresias’ exposition of the flatterer’s techniques with regard to legacy hunting, which, although an utterly shameless way to grow rich, has its own procedure and therefore requires a certain expertise (cf. 2.5.10: *accipe qua ratione*).

The first important lesson, according to Tiresias, is to select a victim with specific qualifications and thereby ensure that one’s flattering is properly received and quickly rewarded. His opening instructions include a clear description of the preferred *testator* and his potential

\[
\text{ut sibi liceret discere id de me. sectari iussi,} \\
\text{si potis est, tanquam philosophorum habent disciplinae ex ipsis} \\
\text{vocabula, parasiti ita ut Gnathonici vocentur. (Eu. 260-64)}
\]

When the starving wretch saw me held in such respect and earning my living so easily, he began to implore me to let him learn the technique from me. I told him to enroll as my pupil, in the hope that, just as the philosophical schools take their name from their founders, so parasites may be called Gnathonists.

22For lost treatises on flattery and their authors, see Trapp (1997) 125, who translates Maximus of Tyre’s philosophical orations, in which Odysseus is held as a model of virtue rather than as a flatterer.

23Cf. *Ep.* 1.1.65: *isne tibi melius suadet, qui “rem facias, rem, | si possis, recte, si non, quocumque modo rem” (“That man better convinces you who says ‘make money honestly, if you can, otherwise make it any way you can—but make money!’”). Cf. Lucil. 717 M: *sic amici quae rent animum, rem parasiti ac ditias* (“Thus also do friends seek the mind, but parasites wealth and riches”). See also Saller (1982) 125: “Paradoxically, to hunt legacies was base, yet to receive legacies was an honor, an expression of esteem from friends and kin.” Champlain (1989) 212 refers to *captatio* as a negative counterpart of *amicitia* (legacies were, after all, one of the *beneficia* attached to patronage). As Tracy (1980) 400 shows, however, a significant number of legacy hunters, such as lawyers and praetors, were from “the highest orders of society” (*splendidissimi*, quoting from Tacit. *Dial.* 6).

weaknesses, such as advanced age and financial prosperity, which additionally hint at his susceptibility to exaggerated praise:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{turdus} \\
sive aliud privum dabitur tibi, devolet illuc, \\
res ubi magna nitet domino sene; dulcia poma \\
et quoscumque feret cultus tibi fundus honores \\
ante Larem gustet venerabilior Lare dives. (S. 2.5.10-14)
\end{align*}
\]

Suppose a thrush or other dainty be given you for your own, let it wing its way to where grandeur reigns and the owner is old. Your choice apples or whatever glories your trim farm bears you, let the rich man taste before your Lar; more to be reverenced than the Lar is he.

Horace humorously communicates the seer’s instructions in mock-epic fashion through a parodic reference to augury and the prophetic power of birds, which, in the case of this delicious thrush,\(^{25}\) will metaphorically lead Odysseus (11: \textit{devolet illuc}) to the proverbial “golden bough.”\(^{26}\) His emphasis on the proprietor’s ownership of great quantities of shining wealth (12: \textit{res ubi magna nitet}) obviously indicates a suitable source of money, but it may also suggests an acquisitive disposition that will likely be receptive to all manner of gifts, whether physical objects or exaggerated praise. In addition to this, the ideal victim is advanced in age (12: \textit{domino sene}), not only because this expedites the transfer of the inheritance, but because such

\[^{25}\text{Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 244: “turdus, als beliebte Delikatesse.” Cf. Ep. 1.15.40: \textit{cum sit obeso | nil melius turdo} (“since there is nothing better than a fat thrush”). For references to food as one of the primary baits used by \textit{captatores}, cf. Ep. 1.1.78-9: \textit{frustis et pomis viduas venentur avaras | excipientque senes} (“They hunt greedy widows and catch old men with tidbits and fruits”).}\]

\[^{26}\text{Cf. Verg. \textit{A.} 6.190-204, where Venus’ doves lead Aeneas to the golden bough. According to Servius (\textit{ad} 190), the use of doves in augury was closely associated with royalty: \textit{nam ad reges pertinent columbarum augurium} (“for augury by doves pertains to kings”). With regard to Odysseus, who was a king in his own right, perhaps Horace’s inclusion of a game bird within this context provides additional, although subtle, parody. Juvenal, on the other hand, has legacy hunters offering large turtledoves (cf. 6.39: \textit{turture magno}).}\]
individuals feel self-entitled and worthy to receive high honors (13-14: *honores . . . venerabilior Lare*) while they reject honest criticism, as Philodemus explains:


. . . they think that they are more intelligent because of the time they have lived . . . and since they are revered and honored among most people they consider it untoward to have been reproached by some people, and because they deem that old age is worthy of certain things, they are careful not to be deprived of these things by having been shown to be unworthy of them.

In other words, a rich old man is the legacy hunter’s perfect target for practical as well as ethical reasons, since his acquisitiveness and inflated sense of self-worth make him predisposed to become what Philodemus calls a “lover of flattery” (*PHer. 1457 fr.* 15.6: *φιλοκόλακες*). In some cases these are people who, “although they realize they do not possess the qualities which they are said to possess and that they have imperfections, rejoice at the ones praising them” (ibid. fr. 14.5-9: τινες καὶ περ ἐιδότες δ[τί] οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἀ λέγον[τ]αί τινα δ’ ὧς ἐστ[ι]ν ἀμαρτήματα χαῖρουσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐγκωμιαζομένοις). Such individuals are likely to take advantage of or even maltreat flatterers (*PHer. 222 col.* 7.12-17), since, despite the fact that they are blindly conceited and enjoy praise, they also realize that their followers’ words are insincere. Tiresias makes similar observations, warning his pupil (2.5.88: *cautus adito*) about shrewd and

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28Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 4.49a: ἰν ἄν [φιλαυτίαν] αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ κόλαξ ἐκαστος ὧν πρώτος καὶ μέγιστος οὐ χαλεπῶς προσίεται τὸν ἔξωθεν ὧν οἴεται καὶ βούλεται μάρτυν ἀμ’ ἀντι καὶ βεβαιωτὴν προσγιγνώμενον (“It is because of this self-love that everybody is himself his own foremost and greatest flatterer, and hence finds no difficulty in admitting the outsider to witness with him and to confirm his own conceits and desires”).

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manipulative *captandi* through the examples of Coranus (64-9) and the old Theban woman (84-8), both of whom understood their respective flatterers’ intentions and, after having taken advantage of their services, ultimately cheated them of their inheritance.\(^{29}\) These warnings, however, coupled with the fact that Odysseus’ target suffers from avarice and self-love (as mentioned above), indicate that Tiresias’ advice relates more closely to “lovers of flattery” who cannot understand their imperfections and therefore truly believe that they have virtues (cf. 33: *virtus tua*) and actually deserve praise.\(^{30}\) The victim’s complete lack of self-knowledge and consequent debasement, furthermore, are emphasized by the various dehumanizing metaphors which Tiresias employs: he is transformed into an inflated bladder (98: *crescentem . . . utrem*), a set of soft ears (32-3: *molles auriculae*), a head (94: *caput*), skin (38: *pelliculam*), and, perhaps most aptly given the hunting metaphor suggested by *captare*, a greasy hide (83: *corio . . .*

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\(^{29}\)For the theme of “hunted as hunter,” see Tracy (1980) 399-402, Hopkins (1983) 240-41 and Champlin (1989) 212. Sallmann (1970) 200 discusses the symbiotic relationship between the two individuals, which he refers to as “die unlauteren Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Captator und Testator.” A prime example of this is Plautus’ characterization of the old man Periplectomenus, who shrewdly benefits from his legacy hunters’ generosity:

> sacruficant: dant inde partem mihi maiorem quam sibi, abducunt ad exta; me ad se ad prandium, ad cena vocant; ille miserrumum se retur minimum qui misit mihi. illi inter se certant donis, egomet mecum mussito: bona mea inhiant, me certatim nutricant et munerant. (*Mil.* 711-15)

They make sacrifices in giving me a larger portion than they have. They lead me to the sacrifices, they invite me to lunch and dinner with them. And the one who has given me the least amount considers himself the most wretched of the lot. They compete with gifts among themselves while I keep silent; they drool over my property and fight over taking care of me and giving me presents.

\(^{30}\)See Tsouna (2007) 133 for this category of “lovers of flattery.” Roberts (1984) 428 describes the ideal *senex* in terms of “self-deception” and “blind self-esteem.”
uncto). Given the victim’s vulnerable disposition and consequent attraction to the hunter’s bait, which make him the ideal quarry for a clever speaker like Odysseus, Tiresias next expounds upon the manner in which he may successfully apply the skill of flattery.

It is perhaps unsurprising that the bulk of Tiresias’ advice on successful legacy hunting involves adulatory speech; the specifically Roman legal context in which it is given, however, interestingly emphasizes the flatterer’s competitive spirit and perversion of the role of “advocate” (30: defensor). Odysseus’ skill as a persuasive speaker, which in Homer is either frank and aimed at preventing stasis within the Achaean ranks (Il. 2.182-206) or gentle like falling snow (ibid. 3.216-24), was easily portrayed by later authors in terms of guile and deception. In Horace’s satire it forms the backdrop for his characterization as a flatterer, who, to borrow expressions from Philodemus, “charms the mind in a way that not even the Sirens could” (PHerc. 222 col. 2.5-7: κη[λεί φοέ]νας οὕτως ὁν τρόπον οὐδ’ α[ι μν]θικαί Σειρήνες), “speaks with honeyed words” (ibid., col. 7.9: μει[λίττει]) and is “crafty” (PHerc. 1457 col. 4.27: τοῖς αἱμαλίοις) in showing “favor and charm in every way with regard to the commonest things” (ibid. fr. 5.31-33: χάριν . . . δὲ καὶ γοητεία παντελῶς ἐπὶ κοινότερα). Thus, Tiresias instructs

31I owe these observations to Roberts (1984) 428-31, who considers the Juvenalian tone of Horace’s dehumanization of the legacy hunter’s victim. He notes, however, that the indignatio characteristic of Juvenal cannot be applied to Horace; rather, similar to his portrayal of Toady in Sermones 1.9, “it is an indignatio that is not directed by the persona of the satirist, but must emerge from our own reaction to the message presented. The indignation is implicit in the content of the satire. It presupposes a like-minded audience, not one that needs to be persuaded.”

32See Stanford (1954) 90-117 for the references, which point to Odysseus’ popularity among the sophists and tragedians, especially Euripides.

33Cf. Theophr. Char. 2.12: καὶ τὴν οἰκίαν φῆσαι εὖ ἠχοικτεκτονήσθαι, καὶ τὸν ἄγρον εὖ πεφυτεύσθαι, καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα ὁμοίαν εἶναι (“He [the flatterer] will remark how tasteful is the
the hero to address his victim intimately by employing the first name, since this is pleasing and more likely to win his favor (2.5.32: *gaudent praenomine*). 34 Another way to curry favor apparently involves the use of affectionate language that coddles the “gentle ears” (31-3: *molles auriculae*), as when Odysseus is encouraged to send his victim home so that he can “pamper his precious little hide” (38: *pelliculam curare*). 35 Indeed, the flatterer is in many ways a skilled actor (91: *Davus sis*; cf. PHer. 1675 col. 13.35-6: *ὑποκριτὰς εἶναι*) who feigns concern for everything (36-8: *mea curaest . . . curare*; cf. PHer. 1457 col. 2.6-8: *πάν[τ]ων[τ]ιν[τ]ίν* ἐπιμέλειαν πασχαλικοτριχοφόρησα τοιαύτην), from ensuring his target’s health (94: *velet carum caput*) to extolling his bad poetry (74: *mala carmina*). 36 In Horace’s blatantly Romanized depiction of flattery, moreover, this feigned concern extends into the realm of moral and legal support, which may reflect Philodemus’ observation that flatterers, specifically parasites like Odysseus, “very

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34 Cf. 2.6.36-7, where the guild of *scribae*, to which Horace belonged and with which he was obviously on familiar terms, calls on his services: *de re communi scribae magna atque nova te orabant hodie meminisses, Quinte, reverti* (“The clerks beg you, Quintus, to be sure to return today on some fresh and important business of common interest”). See Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 246: “Quinte: den bloßen Vornamen in der Anrede zu gebrauchen, ist Zeichen größter Vertraulichkeit zwischen familiares.”

35 Muecke (1993) 184 notes that while the diminutive here does not express contempt, the use of *pellis* instead of *cutis* has a sarcastic tone. It may also underscore the victim’s dehumanization and foreshadow the metaphor of the greasy hide (83: *corio . . . uncto*), for which see Roberts (1984) 429-31. Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 246 associate this expression with the “zwanglose Ton” of the poem in general.

36 For the flatterer’s characteristic concern for his victim’s health see Theophr. *Char. 2.10: καὶ ἐρωτήσαι μὴ ὥσπερ, καὶ εἰ ἐπιβάλλεσθαι βούλεται, καὶ εἰ τι μὴ περιστείλη αὐτὸν (“[He is the man who will] ask him whether he is not cold? and will he not have his coat on? and shall he not draw his skirts a little closer about him?”). Contrary to Courtney (2013) 148, who strangely suggests that Horace mentions praising bad poetry because “out of tactfulness he sometimes had to do the same,” this detail is meant to contrast with the frank criticism that Horace describes as characteristic of his circle of friends (cf. 1.10.36-91 and *Carm. 1.24.5-8*, not to mention the *Ars Poetica* as a whole).
quickly pretend to pity their victims when they encounter bad fortune and at the same time provide assistance” (PHerc. 1457 fr. 2.36-9: ἀν ταχύτατα ἐλεεῖν προσποιεῖσθαι ἐν ἀτυχοῦσας καὶ βοηθεῖν ἄμου).37 Of course, in this poem such assistance occurs within the context of legal disputes involving the quarry, whose shady past and immorality (cf. 2.5.15-17) would be conducive to such public encounters:

magna minorve foro si res certabitur olim,  
vivet uter locuples sine gnatis, inprobus, ultro  
qui meliorem audax vocet in ius, illius esto  
defensor . . . (S. 2.5.27-30)

If someday a case, great or small, be contested in the Forum, whichever of the parties is rich and childless, villain though he be, the kind of man who would with wanton impudence call the better man into court, do you become his advocate . . .

The flatterer’s unconditional support of his “client,” which is a perversion of justice (34: ius anceps) as well as of friendship (33: amicum), quickly becomes an overprotective obsession fueled by insatiable avarice (cf. 4: non satis est). In addition to being instructed to spurn all others (31: sperne), for instance, Odysseus is encouraged to insinuate himself into a favorable position by maintaining a constant presence and becoming the old man’s personal bodyguard (35-6), health consultant (37-8) and attorney (38).38 The closeness and exclusivity of this kind of personal attachment leaves little room for potential rivals, who, according to Philodemus’

37This passage reflects the reconstruction of Kondo (1974) 50. See Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 246 and Muecke (1993) 183 for Horace’s extended development of the topic of legal services.

38For insinuation as a flattering tactic, cf. Cic. Amic. 99: callidus ille et occultus ne se insinuet studiose cavendum est (“One must beware lest that clever and subtle fellow carefully insinuate himself”). Kemp (2010) 71 compares this passage to 2.5.47-8: lenitire in spem | adrepe officiosus (“by your attentions worm your way to the hope that . . .”). A similar expression occurs in PHer. 1457 fr. 5.36 (εἰσδύωνται), which is a verb LSJ s.v. translates as “to worm oneself into” and cites Dem. 11.4: εἰς δὲ τὴν ἀμφιπτωσιόναν εἰσδύετωκός (“having wormed himself [Philip] into the amphictiony”).
description (PHerc. 222 col. 2.13-16), are generally on the receiving end of a suspicious flatterer’s persecutions. With regard to the victim’s family members and relatives, the flatterer is even more aggressively disposed and hostile (ibid. col. 7.1-4): \[\text{μισεῖ δ' ὁ κόλαξ} \text{πάντας ἀπλῶς τοὺς [ἔπιτη]δείους τῶν κολακευ[ομένων,] μάλιστα δὲ γονεῖς κ[αὶ τούς] ἀλλοὺς συγγενεῖς\] (“And the flatterer generally hates those who are intimates of his victims, especially their children and other relatives”). This hostility is understandable in the case of captatio, since family members as favorable heirs would most likely present the biggest threat to legacy hunters (cf. 2.5.45-6: \textit{filius . . . sublatus}), who would be in competition with them and constantly anxious about their status in the will (54-5): \textit{solus multisne coheres, veloci percurre oculo} (“swiftly run your eye across to see whether you are sole heir or share with others”). As Tiresias explains next, however, at times legacy hunters willingly cooperate with other scoundrels (70-71), but only in order to gain their favor and ensure that they themselves are praised when absent (71-2): \textit{illis accedas socius: laudes, lauderis ut absens} (“. . . make common cause with them. Praise them, that they may praise you behind your back”). The flatterer’s apparent congeniality toward his rivals, therefore, is merely a tactic of self-promotion ultimately designed to win the

\[\text{39} \text{Tsouna (2007) 128: “The flatterer makes deliberate efforts to isolate his victims, chasing away everyone who loves them and also every other flatterer who competes for their favors.”}\]

\[\text{40} \text{See Kemp (2010) 70.}\]

\[\text{41} \text{Tiresias presents this option as a necessary evil, since is it far better to work alone and be the sole victor (73-4): \textit{sed vincit longe prius ipsum expugnare caput} (“but far better is it to storm the citadel itself”). Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 251 likewise read this passage as implying strong rivalry among the victim’s servants. Cf. Philodemus’ description of how flattering servants manipulate others in order to gain their master’s trust (PHerc. 1675 col. 12.37-41): καὶ σπεύδοντες α[ύ]τοις ύποτάτειν αὐτούς, ἵνα καὶ στέγωσι καὶ συνεργάσι καὶ πίστιν ἐμποιῶσι[ν] τοῦ [ἐ]ξωθεν (“. . . taking care to subordinate them [sc. other servants] to themselves, so that they may protect them, collaborate with them and gain the outsider’s trust”).}\]
victim’s trust. Knowing how to select an ideal victim and successfully apply various methods of flattery, however, is not enough: Tiresias’ final lesson emphasizes the care which Odysseus must exercise in order to conceal his true intentions and avoid being suspected of betraying this trust.

An important purpose of Tiresias’ advice is to warn his pupil regarding the prospective victim’s rather inconsistent temperament, which, upon recognition of the flatterer’s true intentions, may be drawn to irascible outbursts or vengeful plots. Odysseus must prevent this by means of artfulness (23: astatus) and opportunistic propriety (43: aptus), which partly involves ensuring that his obsequious prattle is carefully regulated:

\[
\text{cautus adito} \\
\text{neu desis operae neve immoderatus abundes.} \\
\text{difficilem et morosum offendet garrulus: ultra} \\
\text{non etiam sileas;}^{42} \quad (S. 2.5.88-91)
\]

Be cautious in your approach; neither fail in zeal, nor show zeal beyond measure. A chatterbox will offend the peevish and morose; yet you must not also be silent beyond bounds.

This is clearly a perversion of truthful and beneficial conversation, which, according to Philodemus, is candid rather than obsequious (De conv. col. 9.15-16: τοὺς δηλ[οὐ]ν[τ]ας καὶ [τοὺς σ]υκοφαντοῦντας) and exercises frankness even when this may cause offense (ibid. col. 10.10-12): π[ο]λλὰ καὶ κατὰ πλεῖστον οὐκ ἐπιτεύξεσθαι νομ[ίζ]οντες, οἱ φρόνιμοι λαλοῦσ[ι]

(“... even when they suppose that much of it will generally not be received favorably, prudent

\[^{42}\text{Samuelsson (1900) 1-10, citing Cic. Ac. Pr. 2.104 as a parallel, had suggested the following punctuation: ultra ‘non’ ‘etiam’ sileas (“Beyond ‘yes’ and ‘no’ be silent”). Although Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 253 and Muecke (1993) 191, not to mention Klingner and Bailey in their editions, follow him, yet I prefer the punctuation and translation of Fairclough (1926) 206: ultra non etiam sileas (“Yet you must not also be silent beyond bounds”). This interpretation seems to be more consistent with Tiresias’ general advice, which is elsewhere far less restrictive and encourages more verbal deception and manipulation than Samuelsson’s reading would allow (cf. 93: obsequio grassare).} \]
men speak”). The flatterer, of course, does the exact opposite: his speech (2.5.98: sermonibus) and silence (91: sileas) are neither therapeutic nor intended to be beneficial, but rather manipulative and inspired by a desire for self-gain. Tiresias explains, moreover, that such care is necessary to avoid suspicion, which, given the victim’s demented self-love (74: vecors) and peevish nature (90: difficilem et morosus), would likely result in Odysseus’ expulsion from his company and utterly ruin any prospects of inheritance. Philodemus also emphasizes the flatterer’s great concern with avoiding such consequences by maintaining a semblance of friendship and thereby remaining undiscovered:


No longer then does he acquire from all every advantage of life by means of agreeable endeavors, but by means of abominable flattery, which he would not be able to accomplish if he were suspected of being a flatterer; no, because, having been recognized . . . For when they discover that a “friend” whom they believe to be reliable is plotting

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43This is the kind of uncompromising frankness famously exercised by Solon, Plato and other sages before wealthy and powerful individuals. See Chapter 4, pp. 11-12.

44For Philodemean homiletics as the “momento paideutico del sapiente,” see Amoroso (1975) 63. The role of silence is discussed by Tsouna (2007) 122-23 as well as in Chapter 4, pp. 11-12.

45As Muecke (1993) 191 notes, this is a standard view of old men (Kiessling-Heinze [1910] 253 call it an “allgemeine Wahrheit”) especially prominent in comedy. Cf. Cic. Sen. 65: At sunt morosi et anxii et iracundi et difficiles senes . . . idque cum in vita, tum in scaena intellegi potest ex eis fratribus, qui in Adelphis sunt. (“Yet old men are peevish, touchy, irascible and difficult . . . and just as this can be seen in real life, so also on the stage from those two brothers in the Adelphoe”).
through flattery, they banish him and bitterly thrust him out with great blows.\(^{46}\)

Tiresias’ warnings regarding the dangers of being too obvious presuppose a similar kind of violent reaction from the disillusioned victim, although they may also address another possible danger as mentioned above, namely, vengeance through disinheritance. In this sense, the prophet’s earlier advice to avoid “open devotion” (2.5.46-7: *manifestum* . . . *obsequium*) and read the victim’s will stealthily (53-5: *ut limis rapias* . . . *veloci percurrere oculo*) fittingly precede his example of Nasica, the *captator* whose plan to ensnare his victim through marriage backfired when he was struck from the will (69: *nil sibi legatum*).\(^{47}\) Similarly, his advice to avoid being garrulous is followed by the story of the Theban crone, who posthumously ridiculed an heir for his “overbearing manner” (88: *quod nimium institerat viventi*) by making him her pallbearer and thus reversing the roles. In light of these two examples, Tiresias ironically recommends that his pupil observe the “golden mean” (89: *neu desis* . . . *neve immoderatus abundes*),\(^{48}\) which will allow him to remain undiscovered and more easily achieve his purpose. Horace’s exposé of the flatterer’s methods of hunting for rewards, therefore, contrasts starkly with his own frank advice elsewhere as well as with his passive reception of wealth from a grateful patron. As will be seen presently, he goes even further than this elsewhere in *Sermones* 2 by means of relentless yet entertaining self-applications of frankness, thereby preemptively accusing himself of certain vices and further confirming his reliability as a truthful friend.

\(^{46}\)A similar observation occurs as PHerc. 1675 col. 13.4-6: καὶ φοβούμενοι μὴ παρωσθῶσι καὶ δόξαν ἐκκόπτοντες ὡς ἀληθινῶς φιλοῦσιν (“And fearing that they should be kicked out as well and, putting an end to the illusion that they truly love their masters . . .”).

\(^{47}\)See Mansbach (1982) 18-19 for the difference between *hereditates*, which enjoined upon the heirs certain legal responsibilities and duties, and *legata*, which appear to have been gifts freely bestowed upon legatees and without any demands. Odysseus is mentioned twice as a potential heir (54: *coheres*; 101: *heres*).

Although the frank criticism employed by the recent convert Damasippus in *Sermones 2.3* contains some ethical truths, its overly harsh application and ambitious handling of an extremely broad range of vices is ultimately confusing and unhelpful. Horace immediately makes it clear that the Stoic preacher takes issue with satire that is “kind” (3: *benignus*) and that his predilection is for “threats” (9: *minantis*), whether those hurled publicly by the poets of Old Comedy or the more private invective of iambographers (12: *Eupolin, Archilochum*). This temperament contrasts especially with the diatribe style of Horace, who, perhaps in accordance with Philodemus’ observations concerning frankness, is “cheerful, friendly and gentle” (*De lib. dic. fr.* 85.8-10: εὐημέρωι καὶ φιλοφίλωι [καὶ ή]πίωι), with the result that he is careful “not to be frank in a haughty and contentious way, nor to say any insolent and contemptuous or disparaging things . . .” (*ibid. fr.* 37.5-8: μηδὲ σοβ[αρῶ]ς καὶ διατε[ταμένως παρρησιάζε]σθαι, [μη]ρύ θρηστικά καὶ καταβλήτικα τίνα μη]δὲ διασυρτικά [λέγειν]). As discussed previously, the poet’s humility and moderate approach originate in a sober realization

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50 Of course, in *Sermones 1* Horace connects these authors to Lucilius, from which he attempts to distinguish his own satire (cf. 1.4.1-6). See also Muecke (1993) 133.

51 Michels (1944) 174 describes Horace’s frankness in terms of Philodemus’ cheerful approach as defined by Olivieri (1914) vii: *qui contra non iracunde nec magna vocis contentionem sed leniter et benigne, hilariter et clementer discipulos castigent, magnae eisdem esse utilitati* (“[He affirms], on the contrary, that those who chastise their pupils not with anger nor by raising their voices, but in a manner that is light, kind and cheerful, are of greater use to them”). Glad (1996) 36-8 discusses this in more detail.

52 Cf. *De lib. dic. fr.* 6.8: ἐπιτιμαὶ μετρίως (“[Epicurus] reproaches in moderation”). Although these rebukes are not always easy to hear, they should always be beneficial, as Plutarch observes (*Mor. 4.59d*): σωτήριον ἔχουσα καὶ κηδεμονικὸν τὸ λυποῦν, ὡσπερ τὸ μέλι τὰ ἡλικομένα δάκνουσα καὶ καθαίρουσα (“the pain which it [frankness] causes is salutary and benignant, and like honey, it causes the sore places to smart and cleanses them too”).
of his own imperfections (cf. 1.4.130-31: mediocribus . . . vitiis),\(^{53}\) which corresponds to Philodemus’ description of the sage’s gentle criticism and avoidance of hypocrisy as grounded in self-knowledge:

\[
\text{πῶς γὰρ μισεῖν τὸν ἁμαρτάνοντα μὴ ἀπογνώ[σ]μα μέλλει, γινώσκω[ν] αὐτὸν οὐκ ὑπό τελε[ῖ]ν οὐκ διεύθυνσιν, ότι πάντες ἁμαρτάνειν εἰσόθησιν:}
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(De lib. dic. fr. 46.1-11).

For how is he going to hate the one who errs, though not desperately, when he knows that he himself is not perfect and reminds himself that everyone is accustomed to err?

Damasippus, on the other hand, is haughty on account of his recent conversion to Stoicism (2.3.33-45), which has inflamed his mind with such philosophic zeal that he feels compelled to condemn the entire world (32: omnes). One of the obvious symptoms of this newfound “wisdom” is his extremely dogmatic and longwinded presentation of Stoic doctrine, which, as Frances Muecke observes, “is characteristic of an academic approach, not of Horatian satire’s conversational mode.”\(^{54}\) Indeed, the main purpose of Damasippus’ lecture is to give a rather emotional yet systematic condemnation, in light of the Stoic paradox “all fools are mad,” that encompasses every vice but does not offer any real solution.\(^{55}\) His lecture, moreover, is neither pithy nor useful, both of which are necessary attributes of the ideal advisor according to Philodemus’ description in De oeconomia (col. 27.37-9: [ὁ]λίγα [φήσ]ων . . . ὠφελή[σ]οντος), nor does its one-sidedness invite the kind of conversational exchange and observation that, in

\(^{53}\)For similar admissions, cf. 1.3.20 (vitia . . . minora) and 1.6.65 (vitiis mediocribus).

\(^{54}\)Muecke (1993) 130. Although it is true that most of the poems in Sermones 2 do not display a strong conversational element, the extraordinary length and doctrinaire tone of this satire are enough to characterize it as abnormal.

\(^{55}\)Damasippus’ regurgitation of his master’s lecture involves attacks on avarice (82-157), ambition (158-223), self-indulgence (225-80) and superstition (281-95). Note that Horace’s diatribe on avarice is only 120 lines long (approximately 60 lines shorter than that Stertinius).
addition to being typical attributes of Horace’s introductory satires, are also necessary for successful treatment (cf. De lib. dic. fr. 51.1-5: ἀκούσ[ε]ει . . . θεωρῶν ἡμᾶς). In contrast to this, Damasippus is brimming with invective and does little or no listening; if anything, his approach drowns the listener in a relentless barrage of rhetorical questions designed to demoralize without perceivable benefit: “do you guard . . .?” (2.3.123: custodis . . . ?); “lest you should be in want?” (ibid.: ne tibi desit?); “how small . . .?” (124: quantulum . . . ?); “wherefore . . . ?” (126: quare . . ?). Another consequence of his diffuse and badgering criticism of vice that contributes to its overall uselessness is the apparent lack of an audience or targeted victim: whereas Horace’s attacks on vice are focused and intended to rebuke an interlocutor—if only a fictional one—and provide admonitory advice for his friends and patron,56 his Stoic counterpart addresses the general folly of mankind and thereby precludes the opportunity for intimate conversation and correction. Damasippus’ exaggeratedly long and comically inept attack on vice, however, does not prevent Horace from cleverly transforming his haughtiness into indirect self-examination, which, from the point of view of the poet, does indeed serve a useful purpose.

It is characteristic of Horatian satire to communicate a subtle, more directly personal, message in an indirect and often paradoxical manner; thus, Damasippus’ arrogant condemnation of the majority of society, which reveals his ignorance, provides Horace with a suitable vehicle for self-criticism and an opportunity to underscore his own humble self-awareness. The Stoic zealot directs his final criticisms toward the poet, who, having cleverly opened the way by means of the seemingly innocuous question “from what vice of the mind am I presently suffering?” (306-7: quo me | aegrotare putes animi vitio), receives a threefold explanation effectively

accusing Horatius ethicus of being a complete hypocrite. More specifically, according to Damasippus the vices from which the poet suffers are the same ones he had attacked in Sermones 1: economic ambition (308): aedificas (“you are building”);57 lust (325): mille puellarum, puerorum mille furores (“your thousand passions for lads and lasses”); anger (323): horrendam rabiem (“your awful temper”).58 The first accusation is bolstered by Damasippus’ version of pictorial imagery (cf. 320: imago), which, rather than encouraging Horace to observe clinically the likely consequences of his vicious habits in order to motivate reform, employs a traditional fable that is more a playful taunt (cf. 320: abludit) than a stern warning (314-20).59 The point, at any rate, is that Horace’s ambition and desire to imitate Maecenas not only contradict his earlier criticisms and therefore expose him for the hypocrite he really is, but they also reveal his inconsistency and lack of a proper sense of decorum:

accipe: primum
aedificas, hoc est longos imitaris, ab imo
ad summum totus moduli bipedalis, et idem
corpore maiorem rides Turbonis in armis
spiritum et incessum: qui ridiculus minus illo?
an, quodcumque facit Maecenas, te quoque verum est,
tanto dissimilium et tanto certare minorem? (S. 2.3.307-13)

57Kiessling-Heinze (1910) 227 and Muecke (1993) 165 interpret this as a reference to the Sabine estate, which Horace was apparently in the process of developing. Courtney (2013) 139 says that “Damasippus equates this with the lavish construction boom of the time, much deplored by moralists, including Horace himself” (citing Ep. 1.1.100: aedificat).

58Cf. Horace’s self-definition at Ep. 1.20.25: irasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis essem (“quick in temper, yet so as to be easily appeased”). Mayer (1994) 273, who interprets Horace’s combination of the adjective and complementary infinitive as equivalent to the Greek ὀξύχολον, also cites Carm. 3.9.23: iracundior Hadria (“stormier than the Adriatic”).

59This is a modified translation of Babrius’ original Greek version (28 = Perry 376). For Horace’s more economic expression of the fable as well as the more vulgar version of Phaedrus (1.24 = Perry 376a), see Rudd (1966) 176-78. As Muecke (1993) 165 observes, the verb abludo is found nowhere else in Latin poetry and may be the negative of adludo (“to make playful allusion to”).
Listen. First, you are building, which means, you try to ape big men, though from top to
toe your full height is but two feet; and yet you laugh at the strut and spirit of Turbo in his
armor, as though they were too much for his body. How are you less foolish than he? Is
it right that whatever Maecenas does, you also should do, so unlike him as you are and
such a poor match for him?

This self-deprecating portrait of Horace’s relationship with Maecenas, which is appropriately
viewed through the recent convert’s Stoic lens, highlights the poet’s social ineptitude or, more
precisely, his violation of the Panaetian notion of “appropriateness” (aequabilitas). As one
may recall, this same issue provides the impetus for Sermones 1.6, in which the poet addresses
his limitations and sense of propriety by disarmingly repeating the attacks of his envious
detractors (cf. 46: quem rodunt omnes). By the time he had written the poem presently under
consideration, moreover, Maecenas had already rewarded him with the Sabine estate, which
undoubtedly would have provoked—at least according to Horace’s implication in Sermones
2.3—a resurgence or perhaps intensification of similar attacks; in all likelihood, therefore, his
vivid portrayal of Damasippus is intended to anticipate these attacks by putting a face to
potential detractors. At the same time, the public nature of the overzealous interlocutor’s
criticism and exposure of Horace’s faults in some ways reads like a self-serving parody of
Epicurean frankness. It is characteristic of the sage, for example, to promote self-knowledge by
means of communicating his own faults to other wise men and receiving correction, as

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60 See Muecke (1993) 164-5 and Kemp (2009) 2-17. Cf. also Cic. Off. 1.111: Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas cum universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam (“If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing more than uniform consistency in the course of our life as a whole and all its individual actions, which one would not be able to maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one’s own”). Horace actually advises against this within the context of patronage at Ep. 1.18.21-36, which Mayer (1994) 245-46 connects to Damasippus’ criticism of Horace as discussed above.

61 For the importance of this issue in Sermones 1.3, see Kemp (2009) 1-17 and Chapter 4, pp. 36-43.
Philodemus states (*De lib dic.* col. 8b.11-14): δὴ[ξον]ται δηγμῶ[ν] ἑαυτοὺς τὸν ἕπιώτατον καὶ χάριν εἰδήσου[σι τῆς ἄφελιάς] ([wise men “will sting each other with the gentlest of stings and will acknowledge gratitude for the benefit”).\(^{62}\) In *Sermones* 2.3, on the other hand, this ideal of frank communication among Epicurean sages completely fails: the sage Damasippus, who employs *ad hominem* attacks (cf. 308-9), does anything but apply gentle and caring admonishment (cf. *De lib dic.* fr. 26.6-7: κηδεμονικὴ νοοθέτησις), while Horace is certainly not grateful for his overly harsh criticisms.\(^{63}\) Instead, he underscores the relentlessness of the mad sage (cf. 2.3.326: *insane*) and his furious onslaught by posing as an exhausted victim, desperately crying out “stop!” (323: *desine*), “hold it!” (324: *teneas*) and “spare me!” (326: *parcas*). Despite this humorous portrayal of frank criticism gone awry, however, in the end the poet still manages to “show his errors forthrightly and speak of his failings publicly” (*De. lib. dic.* fr. 40.2-5: [δεικνύναι ἀνυποστόλως τὰς διαμαρτίας καὶ κοινῶς εἰπ[εῖ]ν [ἐ]λαττώσεις], which, in addition to demonstrating his self-awareness and consequent freedom from such moral

\(^{62}\)Although the end of this statement reflects the conjecture of Olivieri (1914) 49, the importance of “benefits” in connection with frank criticism recurs in other, well-preserved passages of the treatise (e.g., frs. 20.4, 49.5 and col. 17b.10-11).

\(^{63}\)Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 4.72f: ὑπομιμνησκόμενος γὰρ ἄνευ μνησικακίας ὅτι τοὺς φίλους καὶ αὐτὸς εἰσὼν μὴ περιοράν ἀμαρτάνοντας ἀλλ’ ἐξελέγχει καὶ διδάσκει, μᾶλλον ἐνδώσει καὶ παραδέξεται τὴν ἐπανόρθωσιν, ὡς οὔσαν εὐνοίας καὶ χάριτος οὐ μέμψεως ἀνταπόδοσιν οὐδ’ ὀργής (“For if he be gently reminded, without any show of resentment, that he himself has not been wont to overlook the errors of his friends, but to take his friends to task and enlighten them, he will be much more inclined to yield and accept the correction, as being a way to requite a kindly and gracious feeling, and not fault-finding or anger”). For the concept of “cheerful admonishment” as Philodemus’ preferred mode of correction, see Glad (1995) 120.
In *Sermones* 2.7 Horace presents his audience with a complementary self-examination of his own ethical credentials through the mouth of Davus, whose critical scrutiny of his master’s faults is more focused and direct than that of Damasippus. Indeed, Davus’ ascription to Horace of vices the poet had systematically examined and condemned previously is foreshadowed by the final verses of *Sermones* 2.3, which mention ambition, lust and anger only in passing (323-25). Both poems, moreover, are concerned with the seemingly all-inclusive condemnation of moral failings through extended diatribes, which Horace, in a spirit of parodic playfulness, attributes to their philosophical proclivities as Stoic sympathizers (although in the case of Davus this is not revealed until later). In a manner similar to that of Damasippus, the criticisms of Davus reproduce for his master the teachings of a Stoic authority (45: *Crispini*; cf. 2.3.33: *Stertinius*), although twice removed (2.7.45: *quae . . . docuit me ianitor*) and from an individual Horace had criticized earlier for being unreliable and loquacious. On the other hand, whereas Damasippus had rather haphazardly directed his venomous invective toward society at large, Davus’ frank criticism is aimed exclusively at Horace and so encompasses in its entirety the topics of previous

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64 Evens (1978) 307: “The joke, of course, is on the Mad Satirist who in his dogmatic fervor lacks the wisdom, good sense and understanding which already characterize Horace’s role in the satires.”

65 Cf. pseudo-Acro *ad* 45: *De Crispino et in primo iocatur* (“He also makes fun of Crispinus in the first book”). Horace criticizes him in the following passages (only the first is mentioned by pseudo-Acro): 1.120: *Crispini scrinia lippi* (“the roles of bleary-eyed Crispinus”); 1.3.138-39: *ineptum . . . Crispinum* (“crazy Crispinus”); 1.4.13-16: *Crispinus minimo me provocat* (“Crispinus challenges me at long odds”). For Horace’s personal rivalry with Crispinus, who was also a poet and a moralizer, see Oltramare (1926) 129-37 and Stahl (1974) 44. The theme of *ὑπομνήματα* (“philosophical memoirs”) in this poem is discussed by Fiske (1971) 405. Muecke (1993) 215 says that Davus’ report “comes somewhat garbled through the mouth of his fellow slave.”
satires. These topics, which are accompanied by vivid illustrations and examples pertaining to
the poet himself, may be organized in the following manner: the inability to maintain constancy
with regard to one’s behavior (6-20), which corresponds to Horace’s discussion of *aequabilitas*
in 1.3; this first topic easily segues into the blaming of one’s fortune and restlessness in general
(22-9), which is introduced by the *μεμψιμοιοι* theme in 1.1.1-22; the topic of obsequiousness
and subservience to Maecenas follows (29-42), which may be compared to Horace’s emphasis
on his passiveness and independence in 1.6 (cf. *Ep.* 1.7) as well as to his portraits of Toady in 1.9
and Odysseus in 2.5; sexual promiscuity and adultery are next (46-84), which easily contrast
with the poet’s condemnation of such vices in 1.2; finally, Davus criticizes his master for his
refined palate and taste for luxurious foods (103-15), which contradicts his praise of meager fare
in 2.2 and, less directly, in 2.8. In addition to providing, as Harry Evans notes, “a sort of
summary statement of Horatian satire . . . not at all unsuitable as one of the final poems,” this
critical review also provides Horace with another opportunity for self-revelation through the kind
of public confession recommended by Philodemus (cf. *De lib.* dic. fr. 49.2-7). As in *Sermones*
2.3, moreover, Horace’s comic portrayal of a sermonizing “late learner” once again exploits the

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66Rudd (1966) 194-95. See also Evans (1978) 307: “Because Davus concentrates on
Horace alone, his speech to his master is more carefully focused and is reduced in length to
approximately a third of Damasippus’ rambling discourse.”

67Rudd (1966) 194 has a similar organization, although, aside from some additional
observations, I more closely follow that of Evans (1978) 309-8.

68Evans (1978) 312.

69For the Epicurean practice of confession as a means of communal psychogogy, see
man Horaz als vor-goetheschem und vor-augustinischem Schriftsteller den Konfessions- oder
Bekenntnis-Charakter seiner Dichtung nicht hat anerkennen wollen, so kann man hier doch von
einem Geständnis-Charakter sprechen. Auch seine Dichtung hat . . . Tagebuch-, Brief- oder kurz
Privatcharakter, wie er selbst in der letzten und maßgeblichen Beschreibung seines Vorbildes
Lucilius andeutet (sat. II I, 30ff.).”

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Epicurean stereotype regarding Stoic harshness,70 cleverly transforming it into the means by which he emphasizes his willingness to disclose what is secret to his audience of close friends (cf. 1.10.73: nec recito . . . nisi amicis).71 As will be seen, the fact that Davus is one of Horace’s “household members” (familiares) means that his criticisms are the result of frequent observations within a private setting, which, to a certain degree, provides the material for another parodic yet ultimately self-serving display of Epicurean frankness.

Horace’s portrayal of himself as the master who receives criticism from his slave during the Saturnalia provides a suitable and distinctively Roman context for a comic engagement with the principles of frankness as explained by Philodemus. The circumstances of this strange reversal of roles and Davus’ identity as keen observer of another’s faults are introduced without delay:

“Iamduum ausculto et cupiens tibi dicere servus pausa reformido.” Davusne? “ita, Davus, amicum mancipium domino et frugi quod sit satis, hoc est, ut vitale putes.” Age, libertate Decembri, quando ita maiores voluerunt, utere; narra. (S. 2.7.1-5)

D: I’ve been listening some time, and wishing to say a word to you, but as a slave I dare not.
H: Is that Davus?
D: Yes, Davus, a slave loyal to his master, and fairly honest—that is, so that you need not think him too good to live.
H: Come, use the license December allows, since our fathers willed it so. Have your say.

70This is discussed in Chapter 4, pp. 14-15.

71Cf. De lib. dic. 42.6-11: καὶ τῶν συνήθων δὲ [π]ολλοὶ μηνούσοις ἐθελονταί πως, οὐδ’ ἀνακρίνοντος τοῦ καθηγουμένου[ν δ]ιὰ τὴν κηδεμ[ονία]ν (“And many of the intimate associates will spontaneously disclose what is secret, without the teacher examining them, on account of their concern . . . ”).
To anyone familiar with Roman comedy, the vocabulary and colloquial tone in this opening passage make it perfectly clear that Horace intends to couch the following conversation within this same tradition. Not only is the opening verb *ausculto* mostly relegated to comic playwrights,\(^{72}\) but the inclusion of distinctively comic and slave-related words like *mancipium* and *frugi*, as well as the conversational use of *age*, makes the same connection.\(^{73}\) Indeed, the name “Davus” itself, which is probably taken from Terence’s play *Andria*,\(^{74}\) appears to imply that Horace is being addressed by the *servus fallax* typical of comic plots; on the other hand, this version of Davus clearly indicates that, although restrained by the fear that normally motivates comic servants to deceive their masters (*2: reformido*), he wishes temporarily to abandon his apprehensions in order to address Horace as a social equal and candidly denounce him face to face.\(^{75}\) In other words, he wishes to employ the same “freedom of speech” (*4: libertate*) that is understood to be the satirist’s prerogative, as Horace indicates elsewhere (*1.4.103-4*): *liberius si | dixerō quid* (“if in my words I am too free”).\(^{76}\) In placing himself in the role of moral expert Davus closely imitates his master, adopting not only his expressions (*6: pars hominum*; cf.

\(^{72}\)Courtney (2013) 155 makes the same observation. This verb is extremely common in Plautus and appears eighteen times in Terence.

\(^{73}\)Muecke (1993) 214. Cf. also the later use of “scape-gallows” (*22: furcifer*), which is a abusive term commonly directed toward slaves by their masters in Plautus (it appears only twice in Terence, at *An. 618* and *Eu. 129*).

\(^{74}\)For the characterization of Davus in this play, see Karakasis (2013) 213-14.


1.1.61: *pars hominum* but also his concern with privately communicating advice to intimate associates and friends (2: *amicum*; cf. 1.4.73: *amicis*). As an individual who has shared living space with his master for an extended period of time, moreover, Davus has a proper understanding of Horace’s habits and behavioral faults, which, despite the latter’s apparent ignorance, have not gone unnoticed. On the contrary, the attentive slave reveals that he has been quite observant in listening at the door (1: *iamdudum ausculo*), presumably while Horace recites his satires and condemns the same vices from which he himself is suffering, which recalls Philodemus’ words concerning the important role of attentiveness in administering frank criticism (*De lib. dic.* fr. 51.1-5): ἀκ &[ούσ][ε] μᾶλλον, [ἀ]μα καὶ θεωρών ἡμᾶς κα[ι] ἑαυτῶν γινομένως κατηγόρους, ὅταν [τ]ι διαιμα[θ]τάνωμεν (“... he [the sage] will rather listen, at the same time as he observes us becoming accusers even of ourselves, whenever we err.”). By treating the *Sermones* as an inadvertent confession of moral hypocrisy, Davus differs significantly from Damasippus, who effectively criticizes the poet for his lack of productivity.

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78 For the importance of privacy and community life in the application of Epicurean frankness, see Chapter 4, p. 17. Philodemus notes that, even if a master does not disclose his vices, his slaves are conscious of them (*De lib. dic.* Col. 12a.7-8): ἐὰν δὲ μηδὲν μὲν ἐπιφέρωται τῶν τοιούτων, συνοίδασιν ἄλλο[ι] τε καὶ [οί] οἰκέται (“But if they bring up no such thing, the others and even the slaves know . . .”)

79 Horace is intentionally obscure regarding what exactly Davus was listening to, which has prompted a variety of opinions from commentators: Palmer (1883) 356-57 offers five answers given by older scholars such as Richard Bentley, but ultimately agrees with the view of the ancient scholiasts, namely, that Davus was listening to Horace scold some other slaves. Evans (1978) 309-10, probably inspired by the reversal of roles theme emphasized by Stahl (1974) 43, suggests that Davus was listening to Horace recite his satires. Courtney (2013) offers the same explanation.
and for not being satirical enough (2.3.1-16). Like Juvenal,\textsuperscript{80} however, Davus cannot remain silent for much longer while Horace continues to hold a double standard, and, in keeping with his character as a Stoic admirer, takes full advantage of the “license of December” offered by the Saturnalia in order to express his disgust without reserve. This ancient festival, which involved the loosening of traditional social restraints between masters and slaves,\textsuperscript{81} likewise offers Davus the perfect moment in which to address Horace’s intolerable hypocrisy and exercise frank criticism. As mentioned in Chapter 4 (pp. 20-1), Philodemus discusses the importance of applying frank criticism in a cheerful manner and “at the opportune moment” (\emph{De lib. dic.} col. 17b.3: \textit{κατὰ καιρόν}),\textsuperscript{82} which is ideally not hampered by social restraints and leads to mutual goodwill, but for Davus becomes the chance to unleash nonstop rebuke under the pretence of friendly intentions and altruism (2.7.2-3: \textit{amicum | mancipium domino et frugi}).\textsuperscript{83} It is quite possible, moreover, that in addition to allowing Horace to place himself under the scrutiny of a lowly slave, the extraordinary circumstances occasioned by this festive setting also entail a complete inversion (and hence destruction) of the poet’s satiric persona.

\textsuperscript{80}Cf. the famous opening of Juvenal’s satires (1.1.1): \textit{semper ego auditor tantum, numquamne reponam?} (“Am I always to be a mere listener? Will I never have the chance to respond?”). On the likelihood that Horace’s opening in \emph{Sermones} 2.7 inspired that of Juvenal, see Evans (1978) 310 n. 15, Muecke (1993) 214 and Sharland (2005) 107.

\textsuperscript{81}The Saturnalia likewise provides Damsippus with the opportunity to address the poet with impunity (cf. 2.3.4-5: \textit{ipsis | Saturnalibus}). For the festival in general and the tradition of slaves playing “king for a day,” see Sharland (2005) 103-120 and Scullard (1981) 205-7.

\textsuperscript{82}Cf. \emph{De lib. dic.} fr. 25.1-3: \textit{οὐδ’ εἰς καρούν ἐνχρονίζειν ἐπιζη[τ]ούμεν οὐδὲ κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον} (“Nor do we seek to dawdle up to the critical moment, nor in some other way . . .”). See also Gigante (1983) 68-9.

\textsuperscript{83}Davus’ onslaught is perhaps foreshadowed by the restrained tone of “for a long time now” (1: \textit{iamdudum}) as well as the rather emotional force of “desiring” (ibid.: \textit{cupiens}) and, in light of the long diatribe to follow, the obviously ironic inclusion of “a few things” (2: \textit{pauca}).
There are a number of striking differences between Horace’s self-justifying description of his upbringing in *Sermones* 1.4, which establishes his ethical credentials and role as moralist at the outset of his satiric project, and his self-deprecating portrayal at *Sermones* 2.7, which compromises this credibility through the exposure of his numerous vices. In the first instance, for example, the poet is a youth whose impressionable mind (1.4.128: *teneros animos*) is ready to be formed by his loving father’s moral teachings (ibid. 120-21: *sic me | formabat puerum dictis*), whereas by the time Davus approaches him with moral advice he is much older and stubbornly set in his ways; indeed, his patience for such moralizing wears very thin as he demands to know the practical aim of his interlocutor’s drivel (2.7.21-2): *non dices hodie, quorsum haec tam putida tendant, | furcifer?* (“Are you to take all day, you scape-gallows, in telling me the point of such rot?”). In his youth, furthermore, his father’s instruction resulted in the development of a good conscience (1.4.133: *consilium proprium*), while, according to Davus, in his later years Horace’s only proper attributes are his vicious traits (2.7.89: *proprium quid*), which easily overcome his supposed moral and intellectual purity (ibid. 103: *virtus atque animus*). Of course, Horace’s father had been concerned with preserving his son’s reputation and financial stability (1.4.116-19), which, in a manner consistent with Epicurean frankness, he attempted to achieve by taking advantage of the critical moment and admonishing him through vivid examples of others’ misery. Like Horace’s father, Davus likewise takes advantage of the opportune moment, namely, the Saturnalia, in order to address the poet; instead of admonishment, however, which Philodemus describes as useful for preventing bad habits and associated with friendly and

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84 This kind of expression recurs in the diatribe satires (cf. 1.1.14-15, 1.2.23 and 1.3.19-20). As Muecke (1993) 217 observes, the colloquial nature of these expressions adds to the overall conversational and comic element of this poem.

85 As discussed in Chapter 4, pp. 21-3.
cheerful correction through examples (cf. De lib. dic. frs. 72-3),\textsuperscript{86} he deals out unadulterated rebuke as if Horace were a stubborn and blindly vicious pupil. In other words, whereas Horace’s father uses frankness in order to prevent his son from becoming vicious, Davus uses it to rebuke him on the grounds that he has in fact succumbed to the vices his father had so firmly condemned and is therefore thoroughly corrupt. Accordingly, his first application of frankness addresses Horace’s fickle inconsistency and lack of integrity, which originate in his general discontentment with life:

\begin{quote}
laudas  
fortunam et mores antiquae plebis, et idem,  
si quis ad illa deus subito te agat, usque recuses,  
aut quia non sentis quod clamas rectius esse,  
aut quia non firmus rectum defendis, et haeres  
nequiquam caeno cupiens evellere plantam.  \textit{(S. 2.7.22-7)}
\end{quote}

You praise the fortune and the manners of the men of old; and yet, if on a sudden some god were for taking you back to those days, you would refuse every time; either because you don’t really think that what you are ranting is sounder or, because you are wobbly in defending the right, and, though vainly longing to pull your foot from the filth, yet stick fast to it.

Davus’ initial evaluation of his master’s disposition describes the overall failure to adhere to his father’s core teaching, which was firmly centered on “living contentedly” (cf. 1.4.108: \textit{viverem uti contentus}) and placed the highest value on the “ancestral traditions” (ibid. 117: \textit{traditum ab antiquis morem}). As a consequence of having failed to live up to these moral standards, which provide the justification for Horace’s criticisms in the introductory satires of Book 1, the poet’s credentials are essentially revoked and he is given a taste of his own medicine: like the

\footnotesize{86 For the identification of Epicurean frankness as a \textit{τέχνη νομοθετητική} that adopts a gentle and philotropeic method of rebuke, see Gigante (1983) 78–82 and Glad (1995) 120. The distinction between admonition that is preventative and straightforward rebuke is mentioned by Michels (1944) 174 and Dewitt (1935) 313 (see also Chapter 4, p. 16 n. 38).}
discontented masses in *Sermones* 1.1 to whom a god offers an opportunity for change (15: *si quis deus*; cf. 2.7.24: *si quis . . . deus*), he too would refuse on account of his lack of independent resolve.\(^8^7\) Indeed, unlike the miser who is ignorant of “the right” (1.1.107: *rectum*), Horace fully appreciates the concept of rectitude but lacks the determination and moral strength to adhere to it steadfastly (2.7.26: *non firmus rectum defendis*). For this reason, Davus logically connects his master’s discontentment and moral weakness to his false praise of meager fare (29-32), accusing him of employing semantics for the purpose of obscuring his own vices (41-2): *insectere velut melior verbisque decoris | obvolvas vitium?* (“Would you presume to assail me, as though you were a better man, and would you throw over your own vices a cloak of seemly words?”).\(^8^8\) It would appear, therefore, that Horace is nothing more than an actor who, like the parasite, openly praises (22: *laudas*; 29: *tollis ad astra*; 30: *laudas*; 31: *amasque*) virtue before the wealthy Maecenas but only in the hopes of getting a free meal (32-5).\(^8^9\) Finally, Davus criticizes Horace for his insatiable lust by applying the Stoic paradox “only the wise man is free and the foolish are slaves” (2.7.83: *quisnam igitur liber? sapiens*; cf. Cic. *Parad.* 5: *omnis sapientis liberos esse et...* 

\(^8^7\)Muecke (1993) 217 makes the same connection; she rightly observes, however, along with Rudd (1966) 189, that Horace is guilty of more than *μεμψιμορία*. His main fault, according to Davus, is that he lacks independence (*αὐτάρκεια*), which he masks by means of clever poetry and the criticism of other people’s vices.

\(^8^8\)According to Muecke (1993) 218, this expression means that “Horace is accused of being a glutton and Maecenas’ parasite, while claiming to be his friend,” for which see especially *Ep.* 1.18.1-2. Davus again criticizes Horace’s taste for dainty foods at 2.7.102-10.

\(^8^9\)According to Philodemus, flatterers praise the wisdom of sages in order to gain their victim’s favor (PHerc. 222. col. 2.9-10). Cf. also *Ep.* 1.17.43-62, in which Horace gives the otherwise unknown Scaeva (see Mayer [2003] 231 and cf. 2.1.53 for the name) ironic advice on how to acquire favors such as “food” (48: *victum*) from a grateful patron.
stultos omnis servos), which, coming from the mouth of a household slave, clearly serves to underscore further the reversal of roles conceded by the Saturnalian privilege. As one may recall, Horace’s father had attempted to prevent such a disposition by emphasizing the ruined reputation caused by chasing harlots as well as matrons (1.4.111-15); Davus, however, explicitly accuses his master of being “captivated by another man’s wife” (2.7.46: te coniunx aliena capit), which, even if not equivalent to an adulterous affair (cf. 2.7.72: non sum moechus), highlights Horace’s uncontrollable desire for illicit love. By means of this retrospective criticism, therefore, the poet shares with his audience a self-reflective summary of his literary persona, balancing, as it were, his positive self-portrayal in the programmatic satires by means of Davus’ negative appraisal made in hindsight toward the end of the collection.

Despite his apparent familiarity with Horace’s vices and sustained criticism aimed at exposing his master’s hypocrisy, in the end Davus, in addition to being a doctor ineptus, is also a rather obnoxious interlocutor whose invective only confirms the moral competence of the poet’s persona. Like Damasippus, whom Horace portrays as a clueless Stoic since he applies salubrious doctrines to everyone but himself, Davus is not even close to being the ideal sage: not only is he introduced by means of language better suited to the comic stage than to the observations of a Stoic philosopher, but he admits to being in the midst of an emotional quandary (1-2: cupiens . . . reformido), which is certainly a humorous touch on the part of Horace. Even worse, Davus

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90 The paradox, which is attributed to Zeno, is preserved by Diogenes Laertius (7.121 = \textit{SVF} 3.355): μόνον τ’ ἐλεύθερον, τοὺς δὲ φαύλους δούλους (“[He said that the sage] alone is free, whereas the wicked are slaves”). See also Rudd (1966) 190 n. 45 and Muecke (1993) 219.

91 Courtney (2013) 157: “Davus explains that as a strict Stoic he is equating desire and accomplishment; remove fear of punishment and Horace will be as adulterous as the best of them.” Evans (1978) 310 n. 19 makes a similar observation.

92 For the similarly comic portrayal of Damasippus, see Chapter 3, p. 24.
misunderstands the paradoxical antithesis concerning wise men and slaves, which, contrary to his preference for the comparative in issuing moral statements (e.g., 96: *peccas minus atque ego*), is absolute and thus does not admit of degrees of difference. In addition to his comic nature and philosophical incompetence, Davus also resembles Damasippus in the harshness and relentlessness of his frank criticism, which does not, as Harry Evans explains, correspond to actual moral failings of the poet:

Davus’ experiment in satire is not completely successful; we regard it as a rather as a misguided attempt which merits the angry reaction of his master. To be effective satire should serve a purpose, and most of Davus’ does not. Indeed after having read a similar and more longwinded diatribe within the same book in *S.* 2.3, we are pleased when Horace shouts down his slave after some hundred lines.

And shout him down he certainly does, with hilarious threats of violence that express both comic and tragic tones (116-17): *unde mihi lapidem? . . . unde sagittas?* (“Where can I get a stone? . . . where can I find arrows?”). Similar to the ending of *Sermones* 2.3, where Horace plays the overwhelmed victim of a moralizing Stoic’s hard-hitting frankness, the poet once again reacts negatively to his interlocutor’s observations. In the case of Davus, however, he seemingly places himself in the role of the recalcitrant pupil, who, rather than accept correction in a docile fashion, as Philodemus explains, “vehemently resists frankness . . . and responds with bitterness” (*De lib. dic.* frs. 5.6-6.4): τὸ[ν σφοδ]ρῶς ἀντέχου[ν]τα παροιησίαι . . . τῶι δὲ καὶ [πικρ]ότητας

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93Cf. Horace’s correct representation of this doctrine at 1.3.96: *quis paria esse fere placuit peccata* (“Those whose creed is that sins are much on a par”). I owe the observation concerning Davus to Courtney (2013) 156.

94Evans (1978) 310.

Nevertheless, according to the Epicurean philosopher it is important for the one applying frankness to be persistent, for, even if the pupil initially despises the treatment, he will eventually, through multiple applications of this method, come to recognize his faults and become purified:


... and although he disobeyed earlier, disdaining the reproach as foreign to himself, later he will give up and obey the admonition. Then, he was afflicted with passions that puff one up or generally hinder one, but afterwards, when he has been relieved, he will pay heed. Then, he encountered passions that distort one, but now he will not encounter them. Earlier, he was opposing his opinion to another’s, and in wandering about he has not done this [sc. reformed]; later, when he has been detected, he will indeed do it cheerfully.

Philodemus observes that, through persistence, a stubborn pupil will learn to trust (πειθαρχήσει) the one criticizing frankly, eventually heeding (ὑπακούσεται) and even happily accepting the admonishment (εὐφρονῶν). It is abundantly clear from the final exchange between Horace and Davus, however, which closely resembles the burlesque ending of Sermones 2.3, that purification and final acceptance are by no means the end products of his household interlocutor’s critical approach. For this reason, Davus’ attempt to motivate correction through

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97 Glad (1995) 147-48 discusses this passage in more detail. As Konstan et al. (1998) 73 note, the verb ἀντιδοκέω, which they render “to be on the look-out,” is unattested elsewhere. The translation adopted above is based on the suggestion of Gigante (1983) 79-80, which is also followed by Glad (1995) 147.

98 The process of relief or κούφισίς is also described in terms of “purification” (De lib. dic. fr. 46.4-5: καθάρσεως), for which see Glad (1995) 155.
frankness completely fails, and, despite his overly negative description of Horace’s bad habits being based on personal experience, one is left doubting both his motives and his overall trustworthiness as a moralist. If anything, he seems more concerned with using the festive license in order to unload his bottled-up hatred than with bringing about any serious moral reform (a fine friend, indeed). The intended result of his failure, furthermore, is the same as in *Sermones* 2.3: in the process of venting his disgust for vice through a Stoic diatribe, he becomes the means by which Horace applies disarming criticism to himself and thus displays his good cheer and sense of moral honesty.

Despite the fact that the poems of *Sermones* 2 are often read within the context of a withdrawn satirist whose observations are somewhat impersonal and remote from contemporary affairs, they actually contain much revealing information about Horace’s conception of his own literary persona, as the preceding examination has attempted to show. Indeed, the idea that in Book 2 Horace recedes into the background or leaves the stage altogether is nothing more than a clever illusion, and one that has distracted or even misled scholarship for some time. It is the popular view following Anderson, for example, that the satiric messages of this book are spoken by *doctores inepti* such as Tiresias, Damasippus and Davus, all of whom either give bad advice or attempt to express ethical doctrines in a hopelessly unappealing and misguided manner; for his own part Horace, in the manner of Plato’s dialogues, leaves it up to the audience to extract the correct moral lesson in light of these conversations. There may certainly be some truth to this interpretation, although I would point out that one major distinction must be made: whereas

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99 Evans (1978) 311: “Since Horace has already treated these failings within his two books, one is left wondering whether is worth listening to Davus at all.”

100 Anderson (1982) 41-3.
Plato’s works look beyond to the search for absolute truth, Horatian satire employs ethical doctrines and truths self-reflexively and, more often than not, for the purpose of self-justification in response to real-life literary or social challenges. No matter how foolish the dunces of *Sermones* 2 appear to be, one must remember that every word they speak comes directly from Horace himself and, as such, has some bearing on the poet’s self-representation and reflects in some way his moral convictions. The perverted advice of Tiresias, for example, certainly does not reflect the poet’s ethical views as expressed in *Sermones* 1; nevertheless, it is anything but detached and irrelevant, since it is essentially social commentary on capitation, which was a serious problem in contemporary Rome and quite relevant to Horace’s portrayal of his relationship with Maecenas. Through his negative portrayal of Odysseus’ willingness to flatter, moreover, Horace stirs up the audience’s indignation and implicitly invites a profound contrast with himself, which is ultimately self-serving. In the case of the ridiculous “sages” Damasippus and Davus, their incompetent application of frank criticism, in addition to providing Horace with the opportunity to disarm his critics and present himself as a self-conscious moralist with integrity, also demonstrates the challenges associated with effective satire, which should be beneficial without being overly harsh.
CONCLUSION

The fact that Horace, like most educated Romans, was deeply influenced by Greek philosophy and literature has always been recognized by scholars ancient and modern. It has been the main focus of the preceding study to examine further the role of philosophical thought in the *Sermones* by taking into consideration the specific contributions to Epicurean doctrine of Philodemus, who, in addition to being the poet’s contemporary, was similarly attempted to provide solutions to the economic and social issues of the day. It is important to bear in mind that, despite the obviously playful and comic nature of Horatian satire, the poet was profoundly concerned with the moral dilemmas brought on by the disruptive civil strife and political upheavals of the 40s and 30s, dilemmas which Philodemus may have anticipated in his treatises or perhaps even experienced during his lifetime.¹ These issues include the loss and reacquisition of property, the importance of leisurely withdrawal in response to increased opportunities for advancement in social status and the dangers of public life, the intrigue and self-serving deception closely associated with patronage and, perhaps most complex of all, the proper manner in which to address these issues frankly without incurring political repercussions. For Horace, satiric conversations among close friends become the vehicle for expression and criticism, but, as has been shown, he self-consciously (and perhaps very prudently) discusses contemporary problems within the context of

¹The precise dates for Philodemus’ literary activity are uncertain, although Last (1922) 177-180 posits that his treatise *De signis*, in which Marc Antony is named (col. 2.17), was possibly composed no earlier than 40 BC. Gigante (1996) 48 thinks that the treatises Philodemus dedicates to Vergil and his companions was composed after the publication of the first book of *Sermones* (35 BC) and before the death of Quintilius Varus (24 BC).
the personal struggles and relationships of his own literary persona. The result is that, unlike Lucilius, who “rubbed down the city with much wit” (1.10.3-4: *quod sale multo | urbem defricuit*), Horace achieves his goal as satirist through introspective criticisms and wit, self-consciously employing himself as the canvas on which to display, largely through implied contrast, the moral deficiency of his contemporaries.

Like his complex engagement with literary standards and traditions, the substance of Horace’s moral criticisms are likewise sophisticated. In this sense, they deserve much more than a cursory overview linking them to boilerplate Epicureanism or a simple nod to Aristotle’s seemingly omnipresent doctrine of the mean. Of course, it has not been the object of this study to argue that Horace was a philosopher in his own right or even that he officially allied himself to the Epicurean sect; rather, it attempts to demonstrate that much of the thought underlying the development of his persona and his treatment of moral issues is found specifically in the ethical treatises of Philodemus, who wrote many of his works with the needs and sensitivities of Romans in mind. The fact that Horace never mentions Philodemus in the capacity of moral expert, moreover, is no surprise at all given the proudly Roman nature of satire and its consequent resistance to foreign influence. Instead, Horace communicates the moral wisdom of Philodemus and the Greeks through the mouthpiece of traditional and conservative Romans such as his father and Ofellus, whereas self-proclaimed philosophers (i.e., Damasippus and Davus) are usually portrayed in an obviously negative light. None of this is to deny, of course, the comic and parodic element of the *Sermones*, which is by no means a foil but rather an essential component of the genre that informs and defines how it communicates more serious content. This serious content cannot and should not be denied, for this would be completely to rob satire of its purpose, which is to expose and respond in a meaningful way to contemporary problems.
And despite the anachronistic references of later satirists like Juvenal to bygone eras and their “safe” criticisms of deceased or insignificant people, the message of Roman satire is ultimately intended for a contemporary audience, which more than justifies Horace’s employment of and engagement with the moral doctrines of Philodemus of Gadara in the *Sermones*. 


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