THE UNIVERSITY AND ITS PUBLICS:
THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS FROM PROGRESSIVISM TO GLOBALISM

BY

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DISSEbTATION

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ABSTRACT

The modern university is a public institution. Its teaching, research and service mission all intersect with the public, and the public often serves as the source of its legitimacy, governance and support. The precise nature of the relationship between the university and the public is variable, something that changes over time and differs between institutions. However, regardless of historical and institutional contingencies, questions about the university and the public are of essential importance because they are about the university’s very place in society. This dissertation explicates some of the ways in which the question of the university and the public has been answered. It does so through an analysis of how the relationship between the university and the public was formulated and articulated by three University of Illinois presidents: David Kinley (1920-1930), George D. Stoddard (1946-1953) and B. Joseph White (2005-2009). It places their formulations of the university, its public credentials, and its contribution to the public in their respective historical contexts—the Progressive Era and interwar years, the immediate post-World War II period, and the first decade of the twenty-first century—as well as within the context of the University of Illinois, its immediate environment, and higher education in the United States in a broad sense. By doing so, this dissertation demonstrates how ideas about the relationship between the university and the public corresponded to their historical circumstances, discerning the conditions that influenced changes in how the university’s public nature was described. It shows how some formulations of the university-public relationship remained viable, whereas others changed over time. It reveals that the most resilient aspects of the university’s public credentials were those that related to its economic character, while those associated with its political qualities declined significantly over time.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION....................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER 2: A STATE UNIVERSITY IN THE SERVICE OF DEMOCRACY:  
THE KINLEY PRESIDENCY, 1920-1930................................................................. 34

CHAPTER 3: DE-LOCALIZING THE PUBLIC IN A POST-WAR UNIVERSITY:  
THE STODDARD PRESIDENCY, 1946-1953.......................................................... 94

CHAPTER 4: A UNIVERSITY IN AN ERA OF ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND  
GLOBALIZATION: THE WHITE PRESIDENCY, 2005-2009................................. 148

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD............................................. 205

REFERENCES........................................................................................................ 224
CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

It ought always to be remembered, that literary institutions are founded and endowed for the common good, and not for the private advantage of those who resort to them for education. It is not that they may be able to pass through life in an easy or reputable manner, but that their mental powers may be cultivated and improved for the benefit of society. If it be true no man should live for himself alone, we may safely assert that every man who has been aided by a public institution to acquire an education and to qualify himself for usefulness, is under peculiar obligations to exert his talents for the public good.

- Joseph McKeen, 1802

American higher education institutions have long been considered public. Even during the nineteenth century, university leaders, including Bowdoin’s President McKeen, claimed that colleges were social institutions with the primarily role of serving the public. The very nature of their founding and endowment, McKeen explained, corresponded to this public function. From McKeen’s time to the present, higher education leaders have made similar claims about the public nature of the college and university. The breadth of these claims increased with the development of the American research university and its mission of teaching, research and service. While fulfilling this expansive mission provides more than public benefits, the university’s societal role and expectations of return on public support promote the idea that the university is a public institution.

However the university’s relationship to the public evades simple characterization and generalization. Instead it is a highly contingent phenomenon, shaped and limited by institutional particularities and historical and contemporary contexts. The diverse and evolving nature of the university’s relationship to the public ensures that it is never possible to speak definitively of the

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university and its public; it is more accurate to speak of universities and their publics. Doing so acknowledges the multiplicity of institutions and the diverse ways in which they relate to different, often changing, publics. But an attempt to comprehend such multiplicity may devolve into a cacophony of exceptions and nuances, and the question of the university and its public—often an inquiry into the *raison d’être* of the university itself—becomes obscured. This difficulty can be remedied by focusing on the case of one university over time. An approach of this sort reveals in concrete terms the ways in which institutional and contextual factors can influence the relationship between a university and the public. Its focus not only has value as a means to understand this relationship in the case of the institution that is the object of the study, specific examples also historicize and thus de-naturalize assumptions about the relationship of the university and the public writ large.

Recognizing the utility of such an approach, this dissertation explicates the relationship between the university and the public through an examination of the University of Illinois. It considers how this relationship was articulated by presidents of the university during three different times in U.S. history: the late Progressive Era/interwar period, the immediate post-World War II era, and the early years of the twenty-first century. The institutionally focused approach of this study is not intended to suggest that the University of Illinois should be seen as typical of *the* university, or even of U.S. public doctorate-granting universities with very high levels of research. An analysis of another public university of this type, a private peer, or an institution of another kind, such as a master’s degree granting university or a community college, would likely lead to conclusions that differ significantly.

2 In the current Carnegie Classifications, Illinois is placed in the “RU/VH: Research Universities (very high research activity)” class. “RU/VH,” Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, accessed September 15, 2014, http://classifications.carnegiefoundation.org/lookup_listings/srp.php?cld=2%22basic2005_id%22%3A%2215%22%22&start_page=index.php. Although the scope and scale of research and graduate education expanded tremendously over the course of the 20th century, Illinois was a leading institution in both of these areas throughout the period under consideration.
Instead, the choice of the University of Illinois is based on its appropriateness to the question of the university and its public. It proceeds from Illinois’ status as a public research university. Founded in 1867 under the aegis of the state of Illinois, the university was one of the original 37 land-grant institutions supported by the Morrill Act of 1862, defined from the very beginning in terms of its relationship to the public due to the nature of its foundation and funding. Illinois subsequently served the public through its role in educating students, conducting research and educating the wider population through its extension programs. By the early years of the twentieth century, Illinois began to distinguish itself not only in agricultural and mechanical education, areas of emphasis for land-grant institutions, but also in the social sciences, humanities and natural sciences. Its role in educating large numbers of students in diverse fields at the undergraduate and graduate level made it a decidedly visible means of preparation for vocation and citizenship. Because Illinois conducted high levels of research, it attracted both public and private sector attention and support, and broad anticipation of the returns on this research. Its service mission, through extension and other mechanisms, encouraged it to assist and connect with people throughout the state and beyond. This connection was also solidified through state governance, federal and state funding, enrollment of Illinois’ young people, and through less formal means such as popular identification with Illinois sports. The university subsequently extended this connection through national and international research, geographically expanded enrollment, student and faculty exchange, institutional partnerships, and related measures.

The historical scope of this dissertation begins in approximately 1910 and concludes a century later, in 2009. While the University of Illinois changed during this time, it retained a generally coherent set of traits, including an emphasis on research, the awarding of bachelor’s
through doctoral degrees in a wide variety of academic fields, and a mission to serve greater society. All of these functions relied on generally consistent structures, processes and academic and professional standards. This consistency also corresponded to its stature among universities in the U.S. In 1910, magazine editor Edwin Slosson included it in his list of fourteen “great American universities.”3 Historian Roger Geiger later confirmed Slosson’s evaluation, noting that Illinois as one of fifteen universities “whose credentials … were most secure” by 1920 as “seriously committed to research as an institutional goal.”4 It retained its position among premier research institutions into the post-World War II era, continuing, to this day, to be recognized for its high quality in the U.S. and abroad.5

Therefore, although this dissertation focuses on different historical eras, the institution it examines was generally stable at all of these times. However, regardless of the University of Illinois’ stability, the meaning of the university—including how it related to the public—remained fluid. The focus of this dissertation is found in this unresolved territory. It is an inquiry into the changing meaning of the university in its relationship with the public. More precisely, it is the question of how three Illinois presidents articulated this relationship. These presidents—David Kinley, George D. Stoddard, and B. Joseph White—led the university within specific institutional and societal contexts. David Kinley’s presidency (1920-30) took place during the late Progressive Era/interwar period, the presidency of George D. Stoddard (1945-53)

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3 In addition to Illinois, these institutions included the Universities of California, Chicago, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, as well as Columbia, Cornell, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Princeton, Stanford, and Yale Universities. Edwin E. Slosson, Great American Universities (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1910), ix.
immediately followed World War II, and B. Joseph White was president in the early years of the twenty-first century (2005-2009).

The cases of Kinley, Stoddard and White were chosen for this project because each of their presidencies took place during important eras in the history of the University of Illinois and, more broadly, the American research university. Kinley became president in 1920 and thus led Illinois at a time when it, and its peers across the country, had recently matured as research universities. While the university in a general sense was occupying an increasingly important place in the national consciousness, at the beginning of Kinley’s presidency the University of Illinois suffered from a lack of sufficient resources and popular legitimacy. Kinley addressed these limitations by appealing to people across the state and asserting that it was indeed the University of Illinois, an institution that had a special relationship with, and primary responsibility to, the localized public of its state. At the same time, Kinley’s presidency saw the continuation of much of the national anxiety that characterized the Progressive Era. Like many others, Kinley expressed great concern about what appeared to be the decline of American democracy. The university, he argued, could play an essential role in the reinvigoration of democracy by educating an informed and critical citizenry. In this respect, the university could serve the public good. Consequently, Kinley’s presidency reveals how, in the 1920s, the university was being increasingly formulated as a public institution, not only in its relationship to the people of its state, but also as a means to address broader, national problems.

Stoddard’s presidency began in 1946, at the beginning of post-war prosperity. His university, like numerous other elite research institutions, did not face financial challenges but instead benefitted from increasing wealth, student demand and institutional stature. In this respect, the University of Illinois had entered a period when its resources and societal position
provided it with the ability to serve the public to an unprecedented level. Of the large number of possibilities for the university’s public service role, Stoddard specifically emphasized how it could contribute to the enormous project of global stability. For Stoddard and many others of the era, the post-war need for this stability was particularly acute. World War II had demonstrated to them the very real possibility of totalitarianism, and post-war communism appeared to be an increasing danger. Stoddard argued that the university was a key means for the maintenance of peace and liberal values in the face of such threats. By promoting this more expansive idea of the societal role of the university, he stood in opposition to the notion that it was a primarily local institution. Correspondingly, in his formulation, the public that the university served was not tightly circumscribed by its state or even its nation but instead encompassed all of humanity. In this regard, the Stoddard case provides an example of a time in which the university, already recognized as deeply public, was being confidently extended as an institution that could address far-reaching, even global, problems. However, as will be shown, resistance to Stoddard’s agenda also reveals that an expansion of the university’s public role was both controversial and contested.

By 2005, when White became president, the financial security of the post-war period was long past. Attention was greatly focused on the economic role of higher education institutions, not only on their ability to provide financial returns on investment for their graduates and economic development for their local and national communities, but also on how they could generate revenue to address their own budget shortfalls. By the time White came to office the University of Illinois had already developed the infrastructure for realizing this economic role. It invested highly in its technology and applied science programs, inaugurated a research park and other mechanisms to commercialize research, created on-line courses that could increase
enrollment at relatively low cost, and even revised its mission statement to reflect a new level of commitment to economic development. Hence the White era was a time in which financial need and the means to address it came together in a particularly strong way. White responded with a number of initiatives that were designed to provide revenue for the University of Illinois and he emphasized the greater economic returns the university could bring to its state, country and the world. While there was an increasingly widespread tendency to frame such benefits in private terms, he maintained an overall emphasis on the societal returns on investment in higher education. An especially fervent advocate of public research universities, White made a particularly strong case for how these institutions reciprocated the investment made by the people of their state by contributing to the public good, especially in an economic sense. This focus on what can be called the economic public good was part of a historical shift from earlier eras, including those of Kinley and Stoddard, when the public good was framed to a greater extent in political terms.

Recognition of the importance of the Kinley, Stoddard and White cases does not diminish the significance of presidencies that took place during other eras in University of Illinois history. Because its relationship to the public is essential to the university and its societal place, there is no time in its history when this relationship was not important. Consequently, any period is worthy of study but, admittedly, some explicate the university/public intersection in especially clear terms. As has been argued, the Progressive Era and interwar period, the years immediately following World War II, and the first decade of the twenty-first century can all be characterized in such a way. So too can other times in University of Illinois history. For example, as was the case across the country, the end of the nineteenth and very beginning of the twentieth century was time of ambitious building projects at the University of Illinois, both in Urbana and Chicago.
These projects not only provided the physical infrastructure needed for the later maturation of the university, the very prominence of the structures they produced also helped to raise the university’s institutional stature among the public it served.\(^6\) Another, perhaps more significant era, was during the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, Vietnam War protests and the civil rights movement foregrounded the public role of the university as it became an extremely important, and highly visible, location for public demonstration, organization and dialogue.\(^7\) Nevertheless, the visibility of the university’s public role during the 1960s and 1970s does not mean that it, or other eras, are necessarily of greater historical interest than times in the past when the university and its relationship to the public were being formulated in less publically overt ways.

Regardless of the historical era, the University of Illinois, like its institutional contemporaries, continually addressed the challenges and possibilities of its environment in a variety of ways and with varying degrees of success. The contextual factors it faced did not necessarily determine the ways in which Illinois presidents defined the relationship between their university and its public, nor did they determine how these presidents described the university and the public in general terms. Nevertheless, their respective institutional and historical environments corresponded to the views they articulated, at least informing and making them culturally sensible. Therefore the ideas expressed by each University of Illinois president—including Kinley, Stoddard and White—were of their era and of a particular iteration of their university and of the American research university more broadly.

**Method and Structure**

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This dissertation is a work of history. It considers how University of Illinois presidents formulated their understandings of the university at specific times in the past and contextualizes the presidents’ views historically in terms of their personal experiences, their university, and broader developments in higher education and the U.S. during their respective eras. It situates the question of the university and the public within the literature on the public, especially as it relates to the university. However, this dissertation relies more significantly on historical works, including those that examine the University of Illinois, American higher education, and twentieth-century U.S. history. It employs a number of sources contemporary to each era, such as government reports, newspaper articles, university reports, board of trustee minutes, and studies of higher education. The primary sources used to discern the articulated views of Kinley, Stoddard and White are those that were communicated to public, rather than personal, audiences. Speeches delivered by the presidents are used most extensively but the primary sources also include transcripts of their radio broadcasts, newspaper and magazines articles, widely distributed leaflets and e-mails, and other public statements. For the most part, these sources were found in the presidential papers in the University of Illinois Archives and, to a lesser extent, in the University of Illinois’ Newspaper Library, both on the Urbana-Champaign campus.

As the selected primary sources indicate, this dissertation focuses on what Kinley, Stoddard and White stated in public fora. Its objective is to determine their formulation of the relationship between the university and the public within these spaces. The choice of this approach is based on the recognition that statements of this sort are necessarily directed at larger audiences than personal communications. Because these are statements by leaders in their official capacities they have greater visibility and are more likely to be intended to convey what each president would like to have widely known. Indeed, by articulating their views on the
university and the public, in such spaces, Kinley, Stoddard and White contributed to a discourse that is itself public.

While the presidents’ statements did indeed contribute to discourse, they did not necessarily represent the actual relationship between the university and the public as experienced by all of its stakeholders. The reasons for this difference are due to matters of perspective and intent. Kinley, Stoddard and White all occupied a position that was very distinct from those of the university’s students, faculty and staff, as well as alumni and people of the state of Illinois. Their presidential perspectives may have allowed for special insights, such as macro-level understandings of their university and higher education in a broader sense. However, this elite position limited the extent to which they could recognize all aspects of the university and its relationship to the public. For instance, regardless of the presidents’ assertions that the university was fulfilling ideals of public access to enrollment, to some people in the state of Illinois the extent of its accessibility was restricted due to expense, admissions competitiveness or gender, racial, or other forms of discrimination. Consequently, to these people, the university was not as public as the presidents described it. Similarly differing viewpoints were also likely to be held by others, including those who studied, researched and administered at the University of Illinois and those who supported it through their tax dollars. Given the differences in their own perspectives, the extent to which these people might have disagreed with the assessment offered by Kinley, Stoddard and White is difficult to determine. However, this difficulty does not preclude recognizing that the presidential perspective, while valuable in its own right, could not encompass all possible understandings of the university and its relationship to the public.

It is also difficult to discern the precise reasons why Kinley, Stoddard and White provided their particular formulations of the university and its public credentials and roles. It is
possible that they intended to give wholly accurate representations but these were subject to the limitations of perspective. However, it must be recognized that their descriptions of the university and its relationship to the public also may be characterized as largely rhetorical formulations rather than accurate representations of reality. Although the precise intent for employing such rhetoric can vary significantly, there is often a normativity to its use. To be sure, public statements are not always normative but certain types of these statements, such as the speeches that are used in this dissertation, are frequently not merely descriptive but are instead aspirational or calls-to-action. The normative appeal of this rhetoric encourages its employment to legitimate leadership and institutions to a public audience and, by doing so, help to advance agendas, even those that do not necessarily correspond to the ideals found in rhetorical descriptions. Hence for leaders who must mobilize people and inform opinion, such as university presidents, the appeal of rhetoric is especially clear.

Kinley, Stoddard and White all had their own visions of the public place of the University of Illinois, and higher education institutions more broadly, and to varying degrees these visions had not been achieved. Therefore the use of such rhetoric may reveal what they hoped the university could, or should, be. However, regardless of the distance between the ideals found in rhetoric and real circumstances, the relationship between rhetoric and reality should not be understood as a binary. Even when rhetorical formulations do not correspond closely to what is actually experienced, it is not divorced of reality. Instead, rhetoric is the product of particular historical contexts and its power is derived from its correspondence to recognizable circumstances and possibilities. When Kinley, Stoddard and White articulated their notions of the relationship between the university and the public, the ideas they employed were drawn from widely, albeit not universally, held assumptions about the societal roles of the university.
Consequently, even rhetoric speaks to the question of the university and its relationship to the public.

The employment of private, rather than public, sources would likely lead to different conclusions. Personal letters and other forms of private communication are typically more candid than speeches, articles and similarly public types of communication. Consequently, an examination of private sources from the Kinley, Stoddard and White presidencies might provide other insights into their respective views on the university and the public, perhaps even revealing challenges, anxieties and hopes that were not discussed publically. As useful as such private sources might be, however, their necessarily limited audience ensured that their contemporary impact was also limited. The greatest benefit of the public sources is that they delivered ideas about the university and its place to large audiences, with presumably little concern about the exclusivity of the message. Therefore, these sources provide an unparalleled means to access what Kinley, Stoddard and White believed would be most resonant to a public that had an interest in the university.

However, prior to examining these sources in subsequent chapters, this Introduction next moves onto an inquiry about the meaning of the term “public” and the ways in which the university can be considered a public institution. It then discusses how the question of the university and its relationship to the public has been explained as an historical phenomenon. Both of these sections detail key works in the literature on the public and the university. While doing so, they elucidate the concepts, terminology and historical developments that guide the analysis that follows.

After this introductory chapter, the dissertation continues with Chapter 2: The State University in the Service of Democracy: The Kinley Presidency, 1920-1930; Chapter 3: De-
Localizing the Public in the Post-war University: The Stoddard Presidency, 1946-1953; Chapter 4: The University in an Era of Academic Capitalism and Globalization: The White Presidency, 2005-2009; and finally, Chapter 5: Conclusion: Looking Forward. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 serve as the empirical core of the dissertation, employing historical narrative and analysis to contextualize and explicate the publically articulated views of Kinley, Stoddard and White on the university and the public. Each of these chapters begins with a brief discussion of the literature on the president and his administration and the primary sources used to show how the president understood the university and the ways in which it related to the public. It then contextualizes the presidency by discussing major developments in U.S. higher education that preceded and were contemporary to the administration, especially those developments most relevant to public research universities. Each chapter then concentrates analysis on the University of Illinois through focused institutional and presidential history. Building on this deductive contextualization, analysis shifts to the specific ways in which Kinley, Stoddard or White each described the relationship between the University of Illinois, or the university more generally, in reference to the public. The dissertation ends with the Conclusion: Looking Forward. This final section analyzes the findings of early chapters and provides a comprehensive statement about how the three Illinois presidents articulated the relationship between the university and the public. It then considers this institutionally specific conclusion in reference to more general questions about the current state and future of the university.

The Public Nature of the University

Analysis of the relationship between the university and the public proceeds from the essential question of what is meant by the term “public.” As Jeff Weintraub observed, public is “open,
revealed, or accessible” and/or is “collective, or affects the interests of a collectivity of individuals.” The meanings of the first three ideas of public, which all have to do with a level of transparency and availability, are relatively easy to understand. However, the latter ideas of public as collective or in a collectivity’s interests are more complex. In the “liberal-economistic model,” for instance, the collective public and its interests are identified with the government or the state. The government or the state subsidizes, has jurisdiction over, or “owns” on behalf of the collective. Especially clear examples of this relationship are institutions such as public schools or universities (which also fulfill, albeit to varying degrees, the public criterion of access). While governmental or state institutions like these can serve private interests, they are public because they provide benefits to the collectivity. The nature of these benefits varies, but they are frequently considered, in economic terms, as “goods.” Consequently, the liberal-economistic public can be described in relational terms: it is public because it is affiliated to the government or the state in terms of funding, jurisdiction, ownership and outputs, and all of these attributes necessarily correspond to the collective and its interests. In the “civic perspective,” the collective is formed through rational and consensus-seeking discourse in the service of the citizenry or political community. In many of its formulations, it only comes into existence deliberately when politically needed. Given the necessity for agreement, the realm of this collective—most notably described as a “public sphere” by Jürgen Habermas—becomes more effective when its constituent members are relatively equal. When it is able to fulfill its

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9 Ibid., 7-10.
10 Ibid., 7, 10-16.
potential, this discursively-formed “civic” public is an effective means for political self-determination and collective action.

Although there are additional definitions of the public and even more nuances, for purposes of this dissertation the preceding analysis provides definitions that are most relevant to the university and serve as starting points for subsequently deeper inquiry. These forms are: (1) public in relation to the government or state; (2) public as a recipient of benefits that are in the collective interest; (3) public as a realm of discourse; and (4) public in terms of access. However, while all of these forms of public are relevant to an analysis of the university and its relationship to the public, not all of them (as will be shown) were of great, or even notable, concern to Kinley, Stoddard and White.

The question of the university and the public is ultimately about the nature of the, or a, university’s “public-ness.” Underlying this broad question are subsidiary questions about how this public-ness is constituted. For instance: what is the relationship between the university’s public qualifications and the nature of its funding sources, governance and student enrollment? To what extent do the beneficiaries of its teaching, research and service efforts determine these qualifications? Does the university serve a public that is proximate, circumscribed and clearly identifiable or one that is undifferentiated and relatively amorphous?13 If this public is proximate, to what degree is it geographically localized, such as residents of the state of Illinois? If it is undifferentiated, is it diffuse and unbounded—like “humanity”—or does it have limitations? If the university serves both of these publics, what is the relationship between proximate and undifferentiated publics and when does one take priority? Questions of this sort, and their larger implications about the university’s public nature, can be addressed by general questions about an

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institution’s public-ness. As Craig Calhoun argued in “The University and the Public Good,” public-ness can be identified by answering four questions: (1) “where does the money come from?,” (2) “who governs?,” (3) “who benefits?,” and (4) “how is knowledge produced and circulated?”

Finding the answers to the first two questions, “where does the money come from?” and “who governs?” is relatively straightforward. Financial resources come from governments, external organizations, endowments and other investments, students, parents and alumni. There is a general correlation between the degree of government financial support and public-ness, hence state non-profit institutions are privileged in terms of public-ness relative to privately endowed non-profit and for-profit universities. Governing bodies vary between specific universities and higher education systems, but usually involve external stakeholders. At most state universities in the U.S., political leaders, especially governors, appoint the boards of directors or trustees that typically oversee individual universities such as the University of Illinois.

Calhoun’s third question—“who benefits?”—is arguably the most difficult because its answer must account for the complexity of differentiating the nature of university benefits and, correspondingly, their recipients. Differences between benefits most often adhere to the categories of “public” and “private,” terms that have been traditionally seen as dichotomous. Yet despite the tendency to distinguish public and private benefits discretely, this approach is inadequate. For instance, speaking of the benefits or “outputs” of the university, Calhoun acknowledged that some are demonstrably directly public, such as improved public health or an

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15 Weintraub, 34-38. Simon Marginson discussed the difficulty of this dichotomy as it relates to Calhoun’s “University and the Public Good” in “Putting ‘Public’ Back into the Public University,” Thesis Eleven 84 (February 2006): 44-59, accessed June 10, 2014. http://the.sagepub.com/content/84/1/44.
informed citizenry, and other outputs are appropriated for private benefit, including highly marketable credentials and technologies. However, even these latter, “private,” outputs may be publically useful.\textsuperscript{16} Indeed, to deepen Calhoun’s analysis, consider his examples of private outputs of marketable credentials and technologies. Earning a doctor’s credential, for instance, leads to individual employment, status, and a relatively high salary but, at the same time, a doctor also contributes to public health. An information and communications technology innovation, such as an Internet browser, has market value and thus may provide an individual with monetary returns, but it also facilitates popular communication and may help to inform the citizenry. Returning to Calhoun’s own argument, even such public benefits are not obvious reasons why university outputs that provide private returns should be publically funded. Nevertheless, Calhoun admits, the public does indeed pay for them: first through providing higher education subsidies and second when they purchase them in the marketplace.\textsuperscript{17} Given this, many ostensibly private outputs can also be considered public to some degree, both in terms of the benefits they provide and in the way in which they are funded.

In “The ‘Public’ Contribution of Universities in an Increasingly Global World,” Simon Marginson parsed the question of public benefit into two notions of “good.” The first of these is the idea of “public goods” (plural) and the second “public good” (singular).\textsuperscript{18} The plural form originated in Paul A. Samuelson’s “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,” an article which delineated two types of economic goods: “ordinary private consumption goods” and “collective consumption goods.”\textsuperscript{19} Private consumption goods are what we might typically understand when

\textsuperscript{16} Calhoun, “University and the Public Good,” 11-12.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
we speak of goods: those that are discreetly distributed and consumed by individual parties. Collective consumption goods—or “public goods”—are quite different because they are: (1) nonrivalrous because their consumption by one person does not diminish additional people from enjoying its benefits, and the addition of more consumers does not incur additional marginal costs; and (2) nonexcludable because, by their very nature, they are extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to restrict to certain people.20

The private/public goods concept can be readily applied to the university. For instance, in “Knowledge as a Global Public Good,” Joseph E. Stiglitz used Samuelson’s formulation to illustrate how knowledge, the essential university output, is a public good.21 To illustrate this argument, Stiglitz employed the example of a mathematical theorem, explaining that a theorem is nonrivalrous and nonexcludable: “if I teach you the theorem, I continue to enjoy the knowledge of the theorem at the same time that you do … once I publish the theorem, anyone can enjoy … [it]. No one can be excluded.” Subsequently, the theorem could be used in research or even commercial applications.22 While knowledge is education’s most direct output, education can also contribute to other public goods. For instance, some university research can be seen as contributing to national defense, the archetypical public good.

In “Public Goods, Private Goods,” David F. Labaree demonstrated how education itself could be viewed as either a public good or a private good depending on which education goals were privileged. Two of these goals are consistent with the idea that education is a public good: (1) “democratic equality”: preparation of people for political roles, and (2) “social efficiency”:

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20 A standard example of a public good is national defense. If one person in a specific geographical region is defended from an attack, other inhabitants are also likely to be defended from the attack. Consequently, it is difficult to charge people individually for defense. Hence defense is an area in which “free-riders” are likely to receive defense whether or not they pay for it. Consequently, defense is a type of public good especially well suited to government funding.
22 Ibid., 308-310.
preparation of workers to fill roles in the market. The third goal, “social mobility”: preparation of individuals to successfully compete for desirable roles in the market, relates directly to viewing education as a private good.\textsuperscript{23} Democratic equality is operationalized as “citizenship training, equal treatment and equal access;” social efficiency as “vocationalism and educational stratification;” and social mobility as “individual status attainment.”\textsuperscript{24} These operational forms are useful for considering the university’s public-ness: training citizens and providing equal access and treatment for all students are political characteristics of the public university, and preparing students for the working world and social structure are ways in which the university serves the public economic interests.

Marginson argued that the concept of the singular public good is more normative than its plural near namesake. The public good, he said, emphasizes collective actions and benefits and a widely accessible resource. While the medieval commons is a traditional example of the public good, non-corporeal resources, such as knowledge, make more sense in our era of clearly limited resources.\textsuperscript{25} The example of knowledge demonstrates that some resources can fulfill the criteria of both public goods (plural) and public good (singular). However, Marginson noted, whereas plural, economic goods are “objectivist and empirical,” the singular public good tends to be normative and political.\textsuperscript{26} “In a social democracy,” he observed, “the common public good is associated with democratic forms, openness, transparency, popular sovereignty, and grassroots agency.”\textsuperscript{27} Given this overtly political aspect of the public good, there is often especially strong disagreement about how it can be achieved. Within pro-capitalist discourse, its accomplishment

\textsuperscript{23} David F. Labaree, “Public Goods, Private Goods: The American Struggle over Educational Goals,” \textit{American Educational Research Journal} 34, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 42. Labaree explained, “for the democratic equality goal, education is a purely public good; for social efficiency, it is a public good in the service of the private sector; and for social mobility, it is a private good for personal consumption,” 43.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 46-51.

\textsuperscript{25} Marginson, “The ‘Public’ Contribution of Universities in an Increasingly Global World,” 11.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 9.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 11-12.
follows Adam Smith’s invisible hand: unfettered profit-seeking behavior leads to societal prosperity; within socialist discourse, it is achieved through regulation by the state. Such disagreements about how the public good can be facilitated impact measures of public-ness. For example, a university that adheres to pro-capitalist values would not be tightly governed by the state nor receive its subsidies. A university that abides by socialist ideals, on the other hand, would be substantially state-governed and subsidized.

Recently, there has been great interest in the connection between the public sphere and the modern university. Marginson, for instance, argued that higher education’s public aspect can be seen as “an umbrella public sphere sheltering projects that pertain to the public good (singular) and the more narrowly defined public goods (plural).” Usually the university accomplishes these projects through its role as a space for discourse, learning and knowledge discovery and production. While this idea that higher education serves as a key generative space for the public good and public goods reflects its productive capacity, it frames these goods in terms of outputs. Brian Pusser shifted emphasis by arguing that the public sphere’s very “preservation . . . through higher education” is itself “an essential public good and arguably the one that makes the more traditionally defined public goods possible.” As Pusser noted, the university has played a significant role in some of the most important political struggles of recent history including civil rights, the Vietnam War, and divestment from South Africa. In capacities

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28 Ibid.
such as these, he argues, the university itself serves as a public sphere. Tierney observed that Pusser reminds us that “education writ large and public higher education in particular . . . derive from a fealty to the public good—not simply to educate the citizenry for jobs, skills and citizenship but also to be a public place where thoughtful debate and examination about the polis might occur.” In such instances, this “thoughtful debate and examination about the polis” serves as the discursive mechanism through which a public comes into being.

Calhoun’s fourth and final question is “how is knowledge produced and circulated?” It is based on the assumption that research has the greatest public utility when it is conducted in a climate of open debate and critical inquiry, and moved forward on the basis of the intellectual quality of ideas rather than the influence of external factors such as the mere status of the researcher or institution or the economic or political clout of research sponsors. Knowledge produced in such an ideal discursive environment is most likely to have the intellectual rigor necessary to meet recognized measures of quality. However, just meeting such criteria does not sufficiently fulfill the requirement of public-ness. Instead there must be a connection between research activity and the public sphere that exists outside of the university. This connection is established through the transparency of the research process itself in accordance to the public criterion of access. It continues with the outputs of research that should, to a reasonable degree, inform public discourse and policy-making.

The extent to which a university can produce and circulate knowledge in a manner that allows it to be considered public is limited by multiple factors. To some degree, the conduct of

32 Ibid., 17-19.
research has always been liable to be curtailed by influences beyond normal research practices, but the rise of research on behalf of businesses has arguably increased this possibility.\textsuperscript{35} Access to research outputs, including those that can contribute to public discourse and policy making, is restricted by disciplinary language, subject complexity and a number of other aspects of doing academic research. However, especially prevalent limitations are external to the research process itself. Intellectual property and copyright law, and closed publication and retrieval systems are barriers that dramatically reduce the public availability of research outputs, even when the research has been publically funded. Difficulties of this sort have led to calls for greater access to the knowledge produced through research. For instance, John Willinsky argued that knowledge is a public good and open access to it is not only societally necessary, it is also technologically feasible in the digital age. In a work that focuses on the worldwide ascendency and convergence of “openness as an overall educational and scientific value,” Michael A. Peters and Peter Roberts argued that knowledge is a global public good and considered how innovations in the system of knowledge production and distribution may facilitate its public circulation.\textsuperscript{36}

As this discussion demonstrates, there are multiple reasons why a university may be considered public. The nature of its funding, governance, knowledge production and circulation, and relationship to the public sphere all serve as ways to evaluate public credentials. However, the over-riding determinant of a university’s public-ness is the way in which it addresses questions of who benefits, and how. If it fails to answer these questions sufficiently, the resources required to fulfill funding, governance and other social investment criteria of public-ness may be considered wasted. On a conceptual level, the intersection of questions of beneficiaries and benefits can be accommodated by the ideas of private and public goods (plural)

and public good (singular). The latter two ideas necessarily move benefits from the discrete individual to a larger collective group: from the private to the public. Differentiating between public goods (plural) and the public good (singular) can be complex, but these two types of good share the criterion of being in the collective interest. For purposes of evaluating the university’s public-ness, collectivity is the primary concern regardless if it is manifested in terms of democratic equality or social efficiency, widely useful (and perhaps nonrivalrous and nonexcludable) knowledge, or a range of other ways in which the university serves the public and the public good.

**Historical Considerations of the University and the Public**

The question of the university and the public is one both implicit and explicit in the higher education literature. Because the university necessarily intersects with the public in the fulfillment of its teaching, research and service missions, and because it is an institution that relies on public support in diverse ways, any discussion of the university speaks of the relationship between the university and the public. The precise nature of this relationship varies between the types of, and specific, institutions examined in the literature but the relationship is always present to some degree. Yet regardless of the pervasiveness of the question of the university and the public, a subset of the literature that speaks most substantially to the method and purpose of this dissertation are those works that show how the relationship of the university and the public are context-bound, historical phenomena.

However, unlike the more conceptual or theoretical works discussed in the previous section, most studies tend to not engage the question of the university and the public in explicit terms. Instead they discuss it less directly through their descriptions of universities and higher
education and the conclusions they provide about educational philosophies, student characteristics, research activities, governmental involvement, and other topics are usually framed precisely rather than in macro-analytical terms such as public good or public-ness. While this approach is appropriate to the purpose of these studies, it does create challenges when considering how the literature engages the question of the university and the public.

In order to address this difficulty, it is necessary to frame the conclusions found in the literature in terms relevant to the question of the university and the public, even when the literature itself does not employ this terminology. The review that follows uses this approach to connect key works to this dissertation and its theme and, by doing so, situate it in the literature. Because all of the literature on American higher education can be connected to the question of the university and the public, selections for this review can only be illustrative. Consequently, this review examines works that are most relevant to the question of the university and the public and this dissertation’s historical foci: the Progressive Era and interwar period, the years immediately following World War II, and first decade of the twenty-first century.

The historical literature demonstrates that by the beginning of the Progressive Era in the late nineteenth century, the criteria that would subsequently determine a university’s public-ness were largely established. As John S. Whitehead and Jurgen Herbst argued in “How to Think About the Dartmouth College Case,” prior to the late 1860s there was not a clear distinction between public and private higher education institutions. From that time, however, there was a general acceptance of standard distinguishing criteria, including funding sources and nature of governance.

Although the state college predates the Civil War, the archetypical “public” higher education institution—as based on government funding and governance—was the land-grant

37 John S. Whitehead and Jurgen Herbst, “How to Think About the Dartmouth College Case,” History of Education Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Autumn 1986): 333-349. Although Whitehead and Herbst agree on when the public/private distinction became clear, they disagree significantly on the importance of the Dartmouth College case to this distinction.
college initiated by the federal Morrill Act of 1862. Earle D. Ross characterized the land-grant movement as the rise of “democracy’s college,” a necessary response to the educational demands of a growing and democratizing nation. This evaluation was re-iterated in much of the subsequent literature. However, as Eldon L. Johnson cautioned in “Misconceptions About the Early Land-Grant Colleges,” while “nothing did more eventually for mass and democratized education” than these colleges, it took decades to fulfill this potential because they attracted too few students. Instead, as Roger L. Williams argued in The Origins of Federal Support for Higher Education, it was not until the Hatch Act of 1887 and second Morrill Act of 1890 initiated federally supported agricultural experiment stations, regularized federal funding and encouraged greater state support, and increased the overall number of land-grant higher education institutions that they could significantly contribute to the public good. Nevertheless, from the first Morrill Act of 1862 to the present, the land-grant designation has been often invoked as an argument for the unique public-ness of this particular type of institution, even among state universities.

The university served the public in multiple ways during the Progressive Era. Laurence R. Veysey’s The Emergence of the American University, the essential work on the development and maturation of the university, characterized it in a way that is especially helpful for discerning its service role. Veysey argued that the traditional curriculum was replaced by a focus on utility, research and liberal culture. With a few exceptions, utility and research became dominant and

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increasingly overlapped as applied research gained legitimacy. As Veysey’s work and Frederick Rudolph’s *The American College and University* noted, the university was increasing enlisted to address social problems, such as urbanization and poverty. Interest in citizenship education was minimized in the face of more narrow utilitarian concerns. Higher education institutions across the country increased their curricula in scientific and professional fields and, influenced by German universities, the conduct of research became an area of focus.\(^{42}\) As Roger L. Geiger explained in *To Advance Knowledge*, research was on a general upward trajectory from 1900 but its place in the developing national system of research remained inchoate until World War I demonstrated that applied research was in the national interest.\(^{43}\) Carol Gruber’s *Mars and Minerva* recounted how the war encouraged professors to provide advice and other forms of expertise and universities themselves centers for military training, often at the expense of the ideals of unfettered inquiry.\(^{44}\)

Through its utility function, the university contributed to the public good by addressing societal problems and, by preparing students for the workforce, contributed to social efficiency. It is important to note, however, that while such public interests were widely advocated by the era’s higher education and political leaders, these interests were not necessarily the driving force in college enrollment on an individual level. As David O. Levine’s *The American College and the Culture of Aspiration* demonstrated, individual demand for higher education was not necessarily based on public spirit or even the mere interest in developing useful skills, it was also


due to college’s ability to confer cultural capital for private social mobility. Burton J. Bledstein’s *The Culture of Professionalism* traced middle class demand for the cultural of professionalism and the university’s role in its promotion, formation and credentialization. While Bledstein’s middle class saw private benefits in professional status, professionalization and its emphasis on merit, competence and discipline also contributed to publically important social efficiency and democratic equality.

In *Gender and Higher Education in the Progressive Era*, Lynn D. Gordon detailed how women students at the Universities of Chicago and California-Berkeley negotiated male-dominated institutions and became increasingly integral parts of campus life, including through participation in publically-minded reform activities. Levine’s broader study demonstrated that while higher education enrollment continued to increase and diversify, women, immigrants, poor students and students of ethnic and racial minorities remained largely segregated in higher education, either through being limited to their own colleges or through exclusion within universities. Hence, while universities were indeed partially addressing the public criterion of democratic equality by providing access, this access was not necessarily equal nor was the treatment students experienced.

The literature on the immediate post World War II era demonstrates how federal involvement dramatically increased the university’s ability to serve the public. When it came to research, Geiger explained in *Research and Relevant Knowledge*, the high level of federal aid that characterized the post-war period began prior to the war. Mobilization for war invigorated campuses, which became centers for military training and federally supported research, not only to address immediate security concerns but also for economic growth and general societal well

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being. This federal investment in research continued through the war and even expanded during the post-war period. In this respect, the federal government furthered the university’s public-ness by serving as the source of funds for research and training, and by contributing to the singular public good through advancing national defense (also a non-excludable and non-rivalrous, plural public good) and economic and social progress.

In 1944, the federal government expanded its involvement to fund college education through the G.I. Bill. As Daniel A. Clark showed in “Two Joes Meet—Joe College, Joe Veteran,” the G.I. Bill did more than provide financial aid; it naturalized the idea that college was a viable path to fulfill the American dream. In Soldiers to Citizens, Suzanne Mettler argued that the G.I. Bill also instilled civic mindedness among those who received its support. The Truman Commission further advanced the democratizing principles of the G.I. Bill. The Commission’s Report, Philo Hutcheson argued in “The 1947 President’s Commission on Higher Education and the National Rhetoric on Higher Education Policy,” shaped the debate on higher education’s mission, role and financing until the 1970s, placing particular emphasis on democratic access and the corresponding need for continuing federal support. Hence, the federal government furthered the university’s public-ness in the post-war period by serving as the source of funds for education, expanding access and thus the formation of educated and engaged citizenry, and advancing the overall discussion on higher education in the national public interest.

48 Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge.
The literature of the first decade of the twenty-first century provides insight into developments that affected the public-ness of the university. In *A History of American Higher Education*, John R. Thelin described the era as a time when the university’s long-established approaches to funding and resources, and leadership and vision, became inadequate for fulfilling its traditional functions, including many that could be considered public such as research and democratic access and opportunity.\(^{52}\) Because the university’s ability to fulfill its public roles is largely dependent on its financial circumstances, changes in these circumstances impacted both private and state institutions. In *Tuition Rising*, Ronald G. Ehrenberg examined the increasing cost of higher education at elite private universities and argued that it threatened their ability to provide access to students of all income levels and therefore raised the chance that they would lose public support for their many subsidies, including tax exempt status.\(^{53}\) Ehrenberg’s conclusions about such threats to legitimacy can also be applied to state universities, especially highly visible and increasingly expensive flagship institutions.

Although private universities faced notable challenges, most of the literature was in response to the general disinvestment in government funding for the country’s state, or public, universities. For instance, in *Privatization and Public Universities*, Douglas M. Priest, Edward P. St. John and Rachel Dykstra Boon emphasized how privatization, a standard response to reduced funding, was transforming state-subsidized, low-tuition institutions. These universities, which had traditionally provided mass enrollment opportunities at minimal cost to students, were becoming dependent on earned income, including tuition revenue. The corresponding rise in tuition was increasingly excluding a large portion of students from a college education.\(^{54}\) In another work, *What’s Happening to Public Higher Education?*, Ehrenberg and his contributors


identified the essential phenomenon of the “crisis” of public higher education: the long-term decline in state funding was not merely economic, it was also a political condition produced by growing ambivalence about and distrust of higher education institutions.\textsuperscript{55} Christopher Newfield’s \textit{Unmaking the Public University} emphasized the political aspect of distrust in a study of the “dismantling” of the state university. Characterizing this dismantling as an "assault on the middle class" and its possibilities for self-betterment, Newfield argued that the catalyst for assault was more than scarce resources, it was instead a concerted attack on state universities by conservatives who fear the destabilizing effect of these institutions and the left-leaning middle class they serve.\textsuperscript{56}

As studies of this type suggest, much of the literature from the first decade of the twenty-first century focused on changes to the traditional relationship between the university and society. Indeed, many of more theoretical works discussed in the previous section on the public nature of the university, including those by Calhoun and Pusser, can be seen as contemporary arguments for re-establishing this fraying relationship.\textsuperscript{57} In \textit{The Conditions for Admission}, John Aubrey Douglass examined how the bond between the university and society was changing through a study of admissions policies and practices. These policies and practices, Douglass argued, were built on the idea of a social contract that asserted the need for largely inclusive access to higher education. However, he warned, access is now threatened as the very idea of the social contract is in retreat.\textsuperscript{58} Further substantiating the changing relationship between higher education and society is Adrianna Kezar’s “Obtaining Integrity,” which argued that their

\textsuperscript{56} Christopher Newfield, \textit{Unmaking the Public University: The Forty-Year Assault on the Middle Class} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).
\textsuperscript{57} Calhoun, “University and the Public Good” (2006); Pusser, "Reconsidering Higher Education and the Public Good" (2006).
traditional “charter,” based on a communitarian notion of the public good, has been replaced by the logic of industrial higher education. The industrial model, Kezar argued, is characterized by privatization, commercialization, vocationalization and related emphases that undermine the broadly communitarian ideals that were long central to framing and legitimizing higher education’s public role.\(^{59}\)

By highlighting the essential place of the relationship between the university and society, these works situate many of the recent developments in higher education, such the growth in privatization and commercialization, within the broader context of changes in the way the university is understood. Consequently, they shift emphasis from symptom to cause. If these authors are correct, the circumstances of the university at the start of the twenty-first century are indeed difficult. As the literature on the Progressive Era and interwar years, and immediate post-war period indicate, higher education in the U.S. has long benefitted from a general acceptance of the university’s public nature, including a recognition that it needed to be subsidized in order for it to serve the public good. If this understanding and the popular willingness to support it is changing, then the university’s public-ness will also change.

The literature discussed in this review demonstrates how the university fulfilled criteria of public-ness during the three eras that serve as the analytical focus of this dissertation. While it did so in different ways, and with differing levels of success, the university nevertheless repeatedly affirmed its position as a public institution. Even though the literature may show that this position is changing substantially in the twenty-first century, the university still retains decidedly, if increasingly strained, public support and roles.

In the chapters that follow, this dissertation explicates the ways in which the university was formulated in public terms and contributed to the public interest within the context of its 100-year history, and with particular focus on the Progressive Era and interwar period, the years following World War II, and the beginning of the new century. It does so through an examination of three University of Illinois presidents and the ways in which they articulated particular ideas about university’s relationship to the public. In this respect, this dissertation foregrounds this central question as a context-bound even personal issue, one that was susceptible to change but often resilient. The conclusions achieved through the course of analysis contribute to the literature on the history of higher education and on its public role by demonstrating how the essential question of the university and the public is made most sensible when foregrounded and contextualized. Doing so demonstrates that the university’s relationship to the public is neither transcendent nor assured.

More precisely, it shows how—at least as it was formulated by Kinley, Stoddard and White—the relationship between the university and the public changed over time. All of the presidents described the university in reference to the liberal-economistic model of the public. The university’s public-ness was determined by its collective ownership and outputs. In the case of the Kinley and Stoddard presidencies, a civic, discursive, model of the public appeared, but the extent to which it could be viable as a free public sphere was curtailed by political concerns. Although there are multiple differences between the views expressed by the presidents, the primary distinction concerns the nature of the outputs. All three confirmed the publically local character of the university, but differed when they extended its public role further. Kinley described the university as something that could serve U.S. democracy, Stoddard designated it an agent for world peace, and White identified it as a means for economic competitiveness within
an increasingly global marketplace. In this respect, each of them identified the university’s role in addressing the concerns of their historical eras. Correspondingly, their formulations of the university and its relationship to the public show how the idea that the university served the public good politically was, by the White presidency, supplanted by an emphasis on its economic capabilities.
CHAPTER 2:

THE STATE UNIVERSITY IN THE SERVICE OF DEMOCRACY:
THE KINLEY PRESIDENCY, 1920-1930

In 1893, David Kinley arrived in Champaign to begin his employment as assistant professor of economics. His initial impressions did little to encourage him about his new post. “It was about dusk when I arrived,” Kinley recalled, “and the impression made by my new environment was not encouraging.” Looking for a place to stay for the night, he asked a policeman where he might find a good hotel. The policeman responded, pointing to the wooden building that housed the railroad ticket office and observing, “that’s as good as there is.” “The whole place,” Kinley remembered, “struck me as being still on the frontier, crude and unlovely.” Over the course of his 37 years at the University of Illinois, Champaign would change dramatically as would its university. Kinley would witness the growth of Champaign and its twin city, Urbana, and the transformation of Illinois into one of the most important universities in the country.

Kinley himself would contribute greatly to this ascendency through his teaching, research and administration. By the time he was called to the presidency in 1920, long and substantial experience had prepared him well to address the needs of his institution during an era in which higher education was growing both in size and importance. During the Kinley presidency, the University of Illinois kept pace with this broader trend, expanding to meet the needs of a growing number of students, faculty, and researchers. Yet, as Kinley argued so strongly, the university was also serving the needs of people beyond campus by reflecting and shaping public opinion and helping to realize the public good.

Kinley’s presidency has received some scholarly attention. The most substantial study is Karl Grisso’s dissertation, “David Kinley, 1861-1944: The Career of the Fifth President of the

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University of Illinois.” This work provides significant insight on Kinley, his leadership style, and the many accomplishments of his presidency. It reveals Kinley to be a highly competent, hard-working leader who, despite a tendency towards irascibility, was able to move the university beyond difficult circumstances to stability, promise and achievement. Grisso’s work demonstrates how, as he shifted from the professoriate into administration, Kinley moved away from progressivism to increasingly embrace a conservative world-view. Kinley’s conservatism is also discussed in two articles: Jerome Rodnitzky’s “David Kinley: A Paternal President in the Roaring Twenties” and Timothy Reese Cain’s “‘Learning and Labor: Faculty Unionization at the University of Illinois, 1919-1923.” In addition, Kinley’s presidency is featured in three descriptive, largely uncritical, works. Carl Stephens’ Illini Years: a Picture History of the University of Illinois describes the primary developments of the Kinley administration, paying particular attention to the growth of the university. Roger Ebert’s An Illini Century: One Hundred Years of Campus Life, on the other hand, focuses on student life during the Kinley era. Kinley’s own perspective on his career is recounted in The Autobiography of David Kinley, a work that Grisso described as “a bare understatement of his career and achievements . . . that creates the mistaken image of a querulous and extremely conservative man . . . assumed to have been opposed to most of the progressive currents of his lifetime.” In agreement with Grisso’s assessment, this chapter will show that Kinley’s recollections miss the intellectual and professional nuances that place him, if not always easily, as a representative of the Progressive Era.

61 Karl Max Grisso, “David Kinley, 1861-1944: The Career of the Fifth President of the University of Illinois” (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1980).
63 [Carl Stephens], Illini Years: A Picture History of the University of Illinois, 1868-1950 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1950), 76-87.
64 Roger Ebert, An Illini Century: One Hundred Years of Campus Life (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967), 100-147.
65 Kinley, Autobiography of David Kinley; Grisso, ix.
The primary sources used in this chapter include a collection of 62 speeches that Kinley delivered to a variety of audiences from 1921 to 1930. Some audiences were professional, such as the National Association of State Universities, Chicago Association of Commerce, Farmers and Grain Dealers Association, Southern Illinois State Teachers Association, Western Society of Engineers, and National Warm Air Heating and Ventilation Association. Others were philanthropic or social in orientation, including the Chicago Women’s Club, Knights of Columbus, Glencoe Men’s Club, Master Farm Homemakers, and the Jewish Peoples’ Institute. In addition to delivering addresses, including commencement speeches, at the University of Illinois, Kinley spoke at other higher education institutions, such as Knox College, the University of Minnesota, Butler University, and the College of Medicine at the University of Tennessee. Only those present at the respective events heard most of these speeches but some were later published individually or as part of a collection.

This chapter also relies on publications intended for popular consumption, including the leaflets Kinley wrote for his publicity campaigns and his biennial President's Reports. Kinley was unusual not only due to his distribution of leaflets but also because his reports, unlike those of earlier presidents, were intended for a broad readership. According to Grisso, these reports were one of Kinley’s “most effective publicity vehicles” to address criticism of his administration, explain and defend university policy, and draw attention to the accomplishments and needs of the university and its faculty. Often these reports were summarized in the popular press and discussed in educational literature.

66 “In keeping with his belief that the University belonged to the people, Kinley issued a separate biennial Presidents Report addressed to the Board of Trustees but distributed by the thousands to members of the legislature (representatives of the citizenry), government officials, and prominent people of Illinois. The early presidents had written very brief accounts which appeared in the voluminous reports of the State Superintendent of Education and were probably read only by a few professional educators. On the other hand, Kinley’s reports, usually of about 165 pages, were definitely meant for public consumption.” Grisso, 407.

67 Ibid.
An examination of speeches and popular publications from the duration of Kinley’s presidency reveal a consistent focus on the University of Illinois—and the university more generally—as an institution primarily in the service of the people of its state and, to a lesser degree, the United States of America. Kinley’s local focus is demonstrated by the audience of his speeches and publications, which tended to reflect of the breadth of the state’s population. Although Kinley did leave Illinois on occasion, he concentrated his efforts on describing his vision for the university, and higher education more broadly, to a relatively defined and proximate public. No doubt this geographic focus had much to do with the practical needs of his administration, especially the need to appeal to the people for greater state appropriations. Regardless of such ultimate causes, Kinley’s works demonstrate far more than mere administrative expediency. Instead they reveal a coherent vision of the university as a reflection of public will and a means for the public good.

Kinley acknowledged the many ways in which the university could serve society, but his public pronouncements were most strongly focused on its role in advancing democracy, which he saw as essential to societal success. Preparing students for the workplace, researching social and natural phenomena, contributing to economic growth, and other aspects of the university’s role were all important but they, Kinley argued, were subsidiary to realizing the potential of democratic society. In this respect, his vision for the university was optimistic and ambitious, two characteristics that could also describe the era of Kinley’s intellectual development and professional achievement.

The National Context from the Progressive Era to 1930
According to Laurence Veysey, the American university achieved its “stable twentieth century form” by 1910.\textsuperscript{68} This form began to cohere as early as the 1890s and, from that time, Veysey argued, success in building “a major university” increasingly required conforming “to the standard structural pattern in all basic respects—no matter how one might trumpet one’s few peculiar embellishments.”\textsuperscript{69} Hence, by 1910, the period of creativity that began after the end of the Civil War finally drew to a close with the general acceptance of shared notions of what constituted the university’s structure, practices and markers of success. Competition for students, faculty, funding and prestige precluded much deviance from the standard university model. Institutions across the U.S. adopted the characteristics of this model including a board of trustees, a president, department chairs and other aspects of a system of faculty rank, academic departments, student transcripts and formal registration processes.\textsuperscript{70} These and related developments have served to define and delimit the American university to the present day. Therefore any discussion of the university as a coherent and identifiable institution, one that had been translated to multiple sites around the country, begins most seriously with a discussion of the last decade of the nineteenth and first decade of the twentieth century.

This era in the development of the university coincided with the wider phenomena of the “Progressivism,” which has often been dated from the 1890s to the 1920s.\textsuperscript{71} Progressivism corresponded historically to the ascendancy of industrial capitalism, corporate monopolies, immigration and urbanization, and anxiety over the upheaval and dislocation they produced. The

\textsuperscript{68} Veysey, 338. Although the general terms of Veysey’s evaluation are widely accepted, many scholars are cautious about his identification of the “emergence” by 1910. For instance, Thelin asserted in A History of American Higher Education, 153: “the American university of 1910 was an adolescent—gangly, energetic, and enigmatic.” Geiger argued that the American university did not achieve it standard, mature, form until 1920. Gieger, To Advance Knowledge, 1-2.

\textsuperscript{69} Veysey, 340.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.

era was one of diminished participation in traditional party politics; even the “progressives” did not share a common party or organization. Regardless of reduced national participation in the traditional structure of political action, and despite the lack of organizational coherence on the part of the progressives themselves, the central tenet of Progressivism was the need for interaction in politics and social affairs. This need was based on a wide-ranging, if not precisely defined, belief that individual welfare depended on the welfare of the collective. Hence social cohesion and collective action were mutually constituted.  

Despite the many-shared principles of its advocates, scholars have argued that the term Progressivism is highly problematic. One key aspect of the debate is whether or not there was enough coherence to progressive reactions—and the underlying values and goals—to even warrant the identification of Progressivism.  

So-called progressives may have been largely middle class and shared optimism about the potential of purposeful action to improve society. They may have most often articulated their positions in terms of anti-monopolism, human sociability, social efficiency, and frequently shared goals of increased democracy, public service, improved government, business regulation and social justice. However, these scholars have contended, progressives could also differ to a significant degree, revealing the often-contradictory nature of their respective positions and the overall difficulty of ascribing ideological coherence to Progressivism. There was disagreement over anti-trust policy, suffrage, direct democracy and other issues. Given this lack of a “common creed or a string of common values,” Daniel Rodgers argued, it is more helpful to see Progressivism’s anti-monopolism and emphasis on human sociability and social efficiency not as constituting an ideology, but as “the surroundings of available rhetoric and ideas—akin to the surrounding structures of politics and

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73 Ibid., 113-114.
power—within which progressives launched their crusades, recruited their partisans, and did their work.”

Rodgers’ focus on contextual factors, including rhetoric, ideas and structures, shifts emphasis away from defining Progressivism precisely to viewing it as a reflection and agent of the Zeitgeist. In this respect, the relationship between Progressivism and particular forms of political action was not a necessary relationship but instead one of affinities. Progressivism corresponded to an extensive but circumscribed number of possibilities, including those that characterized the nascent American university. As Frederick Rudolph observed, the service ideal that has differentiated and characterized the American university is consistent with the broad service ideal of Progressivism. Rudolph argued that “unquestionably” the university’s emphasis on service is at least partially due to the “timing of its flowering” during the era when the progressive spirit was ascendant. Both the university and Progressivism promoted social stability and equality of opportunity and sought progress in material and moral terms. However, for Rudolph, there was not a direct causal link from one to another but instead a mutual reinforcement of their respective elements of service.

Seeing Progressivism as part of a wider, if less precise, phenomenon—the Progressive Era—reconciles the inclusion of other developments that are not considered progressive in a strict sense, but which served, or at least shared in, the optimism and energy of progressive reformers. The Protestant social gospel, for instance, a product of the late nineteenth century, promoted the application of Christian ethics to societal issues. Although the religious component of the social gospel differentiated it from much of what has been described as progressive, its

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75 Rodgers, 123.
76 Rudolph, American College and University, 356-7. This is not to say that the traditional colleges did not serve society; indeed their history was one of significant service. Yet, to some (e.g. University of Michigan’s President Angell) their service role had diminished. What differentiated the university’s service role were not only the new ways in which it served, but also the breadth of this service. Ibid., 358-360.
focus on addressing societal issues makes it characteristic of its period. Indeed, the social gospel influenced a great number of progressives, such as William Jennings Bryan, Theodore Roosevelt and Robert La Follette. Nevertheless, Progressivism was most often identified with confidence in scientific inquiry and science-based problem solving, including a belief in the utility of rationalization, all of which provided a more secular catalyst for a social change agenda.

Yet the distinction between the religious and secular was not always so clearly delimited. Both the social gospel and science, particularly social science, could serve an agenda of social and moral reform. John Bascom, exponent of the social gospel, advocate of science (including evolution) and fifth president of the University of Wisconsin, did not see truth as something ossified, but instead promoted a vision of truth that was dynamic and future oriented. In this respect, Bascom more clearly represented the modern university than he did the traditional college with its emphasis on preservation of cultural and intellectual heritage. Largely though Bascom’s efforts, the “Wisconsin Idea” developed at his institution became the model for a societally engaged, progressive university.

The emphasis Progressivism placed on collective action was a challenge to individualism. In this formulation, interdependence and cooperation provided the means for the improvement of society in its entirety and many progressives saw education as a key mechanism for this change. For instance, educator William Bagely, declared that “social efficiency” was the “ultimate aim of education.” In order to serve social efficiency, a person needed to not only “pull his own weight” and minimize interference with others, but also energize the “social forces” that

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are “everywhere synonymous with progress.” For some, such as Bagely, individualism needed to be tempered by reconciliation with the collective good. For those at the more extreme end of Progressivism, individualism—or at least unbridled individualism—was a particularly pernicious problem that should be eradicated. Some education reformers saw a solution to individualism in the removal of competiveness from the classroom and replace it with cooperative activities, and teach students about social problems. John Dewey’s emphasis on the social community role of the school was particularly influential in validating the educational utility of clubs, sports and other aspects of the extra-curriculum.

As Dewey’s influence suggests, the progressive agenda also owed a great deal to innovations within the academy. The end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century saw the establishment of academic disciplines. The social sciences were especially well suited to progressive goals while, at the same time, shared an affinity to the social gospel. Although arguments that the social gospel facilitated the adoption of sociology in the United States must be considered with caution, it is clear that both the social gospel and sociology promoted action in the service of moral and material progress. Other branches of the social sciences, such as economics, also grew in stature as they became increasingly seen as readily applicable to real world problems. The humanities also responded to the call for morally purposeful action. For instance, philosophy, which might appear impractical, was increasingly seen as a viable mechanism for social change, particularly in the form of American Pragmatism.

The rationalization of society demanded by progressives corresponded to the

81 Spring, 57-60.
82 J. Graham Morgan, “The Development of Sociology and the Social Gospel in America,” *Sociological Analysis* 30, no. 1 (Spring, 1969): 42-53. Graham’s argument was challenged by Jeffrey K. Hadden, Charles F. Longino, Jr. and Myer S. Reed, Jr., “Further Reflections on the Development of Sociology and the social gospel in America,” *Sociological Analysis* 35, no. 4 (Winter, 1974): 282-286. Hadden et al contended that Morgan’s argument that higher education institutions that promoted the social gospel were much more likely to promote academic sociology was methodologically suspect. They did, however, agree that the social gospel provided at least some legitimacy for sociology.
rationalization of the professions. As Burton Bledstein noted, the development of the professions along rational lines served, and defined, the increasingly professionalized middle class. At the same time, Bledstein argued, this rationalization was a primary driver in the formation of the university: “by and large the American university came into existence to serve and promote professional authority in society . . . the development of higher education in America made possible a social faith in merit, competence, discipline, and control that were basic to accepted conceptions of achievement and success.” Hence, professionalization was a means to assert the culture of expertise and, because it was the primary mechanism, the university’s societal place was greatly dependent on the elevation of the ethos of professionalization. Without the university, Progressivism would not only have had fewer sources of expertise, it also would have been denied the legitimacy conferred by higher education.

Even within a sphere as circumscribed as education, Progressivism could mean different things. A given object of reform, in particular, differentiated types of Progressivism, and types of progressives. Dewey’s reform agenda, for example, placed him among the “pedagogical progressives,” to use David Tyack’s terminology. Progressives of this sort centered attention on the learning needs of students, encouraging their development as individuals through holistic

83 Rodgers, 118.
84 Bledstein, x.
85 David B. Tyack, The One Best System: A History of American Urban Education (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 197. Admittedly, Tyack employed this terminology in a work about schooling, not higher education. However, as Tyack demonstrated, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (the beginnings of Kinley’s career) many educational reformers did not limit their efforts to a discrete focus on either schools or higher education. Even some university presidents, including Andrew Sloan Draper, who Kinley served under at Illinois, were involved in school reform. Furthermore, the pedagogical and administrative differentiation of Tyack’s terminology corresponds well to Kinley’s professional roles as university faculty member and administrator. David F. Labaree noted that Tyack was not alone in differentiating progressives: in Education in the United States: An Interpretive History (New York: Free Press, 1976), Robert L. Church and Michael W. Sedlak discussed conservative and liberal progressives, and Herbert Kliebard grouped progressives based on their respective relationship to social efficiency, child development and social reconstruction in The Struggle for the American Curriculum, 1893-1958 (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986). However, as Labaree observed, Tyack’s approach has the most currency. David F. Labaree, “Progressivism, Schools and Schools of Education: An American Romance,” Paedagogica Historica 41, nos. 1 & 2 (February 2005): 279.
education. If properly reformed, pedagogical progressives argued, education could serve as a primary mechanism for personal fulfillment while, at the same time, encouraging democratic ideals of equality.

Pedagogical progressives, Tyack observed, were substantially different from “administrative progressives,” reformers who were not primarily concerned with the needs of students but instead attempted to change educational administration. Administrative progressives, Tyack argued, “wished nothing less than a fundamental change in the structure and process of decision-making.”86 “Their social perspective,” he continued, “tended to be cosmopolitan yet paternalistic, self-consciously ‘modern’ in its deference to the expert and its quest for rational efficiency yet at times evangelical in its rhetorical tone.”87 Administrative progressives were especially interested in centralizing control and maximizing social efficiency. Unlike pedagogical progressives, they did not see how education could overcome presumably natural inequalities. This perspective corresponded well to a belief in the primacy of societal interests over those of individuals and, ultimately, a relatively conservative view of society’s possibilities.

For the most part, the progressives who sought to reform education administration were from the professional and business elite. They saw the decision-making model of the business corporation as the ideal replacement for what they viewed as the then outdated, inefficient and corruption-prone education administration model. Although, as Tyack’s study shows, much of their efforts were directed to urban schooling, they counted distinguished members of academe in their ranks, including members of the professoriate and higher education administrators. For instance, presidents Charles Eliot of Harvard, William Rainey Harper of Chicago, and Andrew

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86 Tyack, 127.
87 Ibid.
Sloan Draper of Illinois were all administrative progressives who provided leadership for their cause and served as experts on reform.  

The affinity between Progressivism and the university was based on shared values. In this sense, they had a common culture. Progressivism and related aspects of this culture served to legitimate the university while the university provided progressive agendas, in all their variety, with their own mechanism of legitimacy: an institution identified with rational, scientific progress. This mutualism served to strengthen both progressive politics and higher education, especially at research universities. However, the ascendancy of the American research university cannot be wholly attributed to culture. Institutions are evaluated within cultural contexts and belief in their utility rises and falls depending on the nature of these contexts. Yet without sufficient material resources no institution, no matter how popular, can develop to any significant degree. Indeed the ascendancy of the university can also be greatly attributed to the growth in its material resources.

The university benefitted from a period of economic growth that continued from the end of the nineteenth century though the First World War. National wealth more than doubled from 1895 and 1915, with wealth accumulation especially great at the very highest stratum. This was indeed the case for research universities, which saw a fivefold increase in regular income within the first two decades of the new century. Financially, private and state research universities were on par at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, the primary sources of their respective wealth differed: the former relied on income from endowments whereas the latter depended on state funds. Both relied on tuition dollars, with tuition generally higher at private

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88 Ibid., 126, 133.
universities. Private institutions benefitted exceptionally well from personal philanthropy, not only from high profile benefactors such as John D. Rockefeller—who founded the University of Chicago—but also from the growing number of prosperous alumni. State university funding grew dramatically through increased government appropriations. Appropriations for the Universities of Michigan, California, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Illinois, for instance, increased fourfold in the first two decades of the twentieth century, a rate even greater than enrollment growth. In 1900, these funds comprised from 58 to 100 percent of their respective budgets. By 1920 this difference was reduced significantly, ranging from 72 to 87 percent.

In the Midwest and West, Thelin observed, the “rhetoric of Progressivism as political movement for social reform made some headway toward persuading legislators and citizens of the value of sustained investment in public higher education.” Regardless of the success of such rhetoric, the states’ commitment to funding their institutions was based on a realization that tuition dollars and land-grant revenues alone could not sustain their universities. Instead, it was understood that their maintenance and expansion required continual investment, and that these universities—as state agencies—were a permanent state responsibility.

The growing wealth of universities corresponded to the increased size and number of their activities. Larger enrollments demanded more faculty and classrooms, a commitment to research necessitated laboratories, equipment and specialized literature, and new academic programs required buildings in which to house them. Overall, from 1890 to 1930, building expenditure first satisfied teaching and research needs and then moved on to less essential

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90 Ibid., 41.
91 Ibid., 43.
92 Ibid., 41.
94 Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 42.
95 Ibid., 47.
projects including student dormitories, carillons and football stadiums and other recreational structures. It was, as Thelin described it, the era of the “monumental campus.”

However, change extended beyond the growth of physical capital. Universities across the U.S. became increasingly committed to research, although only a select few were able to enact it in a substantial way. “By the first decade of the twentieth century,” Geiger noted, “a [limited] number of research universities had clearly established themselves and claimed a significant portion of the available scientific talent.” Earlier, government bureaus and endowed research institutions had competed with universities as sites for basic scientific research but, by the first two decades of the twentieth century, universities had become dominant. Despite greater attention to research, and the Germanic academic pedigree of so many American scholars, institutions in the U.S. did not emphasize pure research like their German counterparts. Even Johns Hopkins, the most decidedly research-focused university in the country, eventually accommodated undergraduate teaching. By doing so, Hopkins was following the general trend of the period from 1890 to 1920, when the research university combined both research and teaching, a characteristic that defined it as decidedly American.

Expansion of research and graduate-level study was accompanied by changes in the undergraduate curriculum. The classical curriculum that had characterized the traditional college was already in decline at the end of the Civil War. In a broad cultural sense, the prescribed, limited and seemingly esoteric classical curriculum was at odds with the heightened interest in individualism and demonstrable practicality that characterized the latter half of the nineteenth century. “Utilitarian” reformers focused on connecting higher education to “real life” and, often

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96 Ibid., 56.
98 Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 67.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid., 77.
described this connection in terms of democracy and vocation.\footnote{Veysey, 61-68.} At least from the 1890s, the word “democracy” was employed in discussions of the university and its place in society. It could refer to different types of equality: equality of all fields of study, equality of treatment for all students, and equality of access regardless of background or circumstances. “Democracy” was also used when highlighting the university’s role in preparing young people to achieve personal success once they entered the competitive world of work.\footnote{Ibid., 62-64.} “Such emphasis upon the whetting of practical talent by the university,” Veysey observed, “signaled a major accommodation with the non-academic outlook of the age.”\footnote{Ibid., 64.}

However, “democracy”—even as it related to the university—was not limited to academe’s internal concerns or to the personal success of its graduates. From 1865 to 1910, it commonly referred to the assumption that learning of all types “trickle-down” from the university. This definition, Veysey observed, accommodated a “Jeffersonian aristocracy of talent and virtue, perhaps defined by intellect as well as by skill.” Placed below the aristocratic stratum of the university, society received multiple benefits such as scientific knowledge, aesthetic standards, and the principles of good government and citizenship.\footnote{Ibid.} The trickle-down formulation was challenged in the 1890s by assertions that such elitism had no place in American society. Correspondingly, the university should not condescend to the populace but should instead recognize the people’s legitimate opinions and common sense and follow the popular lead. Echoing this position in 1893, University of Wisconsin President Charles Kendall Adams stated that his university was “the creation and possession of the people,” despite the fact, Veysey noted, that “he did so largely as a means of appealing for funds.” Such rhetoric continued long after Kendall left Wisconsin in 1901. Indeed, as Veysey explained, the “concept of
‘democracy’ as a naturally operative folk wisdom became ever more fashionable” during the Progressive Era. Its utility came from its lack of precision and the general contentment of the age. In an era lacking opinion polls and without any demonstrations of mass discontent, university leaders could claim a popular mandate without facing the possibility of any significant challenge.\footnote{Ibid., 65.}

Along with democracy, utilitarian reformers emphasized higher education’s role in preparing students for entry into the workforce and contribution to social efficiency. They tended to be uninterested in scholarship for its own sake and instead stressed vocational outcomes. Those students who completed a practical course of study were not only expected to benefit professionally, they were also, more importantly, expected to employ their vocational calling in service to the public good.\footnote{Ibid., 66.} This utilitarian approach to higher education was accompanied by recognition that one type of education was neither sufficient for all students nor for society’s wide-ranging needs. The adoption of the elective system and creation of majors and other forms of specialization provided the means for greater options and flexibility. Choice became characteristic of the curriculum at a growing number of college and universities. “By 1910,” Thelin observed, “the American university offered a linear array of fields, most of which were readily open to all comers.”\footnote{Thelin, History of American Higher Education, 153.} Students could choose to enroll in the more traditional bachelor of arts track, which retained classical language study, the bachelor of philosophy track, which discarded it, and a breadth of other, more professionally focused, programs such as business, law, engineering medicine, agriculture and theology.\footnote{Ibid.} Although these areas of study were generally available to undergraduates, higher-level study became increasingly available through

\footnote{Ibid., 65.}
\footnote{Ibid., 66.}
\footnote{Thelin, History of American Higher Education, 153.}
\footnote{Ibid.}
the establishment of professional graduate programs, including doctoral programs for the training of new college faculty.

As establishment of these programs indicate, vocational preparation became the ascendant goal of higher education. For many private colleges and universities, offering practical degrees was necessary for survival in the education marketplace. Public institutions were also compelled to add such degrees. “The dependency of state universities and land-grant colleges on legislatures,” Rudolph noted, “moved their courses of study easily in the direction of ‘job related’ education.” Therefore, regardless of whether or not an institution was private or public, widespread demand by both the people and their representatives drove the growth of vocational education.

For many people, vocationalization was a highly dangerous force that was threatening to destroy the established ideals of higher education. At the end of the nineteenth century, traditional colleges responded by articulating their value as educators of the “whole man.” This enterprise employed humanistic and liberal learning to inculcate a shared notion of culture, moral responsibility and measured change, and a rejection of materialism, progressivism and expanding democratic inclusion. Another form of resistance came from those who saw the university as a place primarily for the unfettered search for truth. For the most part, these fears were not addressed through the elimination of recently established professional programs, but instead through reform on the undergraduate level. Within the first three decades of the twentieth century a number of innovations were implemented at college and universities across the country, including general education and social science courses, residential college houses and

110 Ibid., 174.
112 Levine, American College and the Culture of Aspiration, 90.
honors programs. These innovations helped to add vitality and coherence to learning, but efforts such as these—like appeals for educating the “whole man”—could not counter the overall trend towards vocational education and general utility.

Although the research university was following a general upward trajectory in terms of enrollment numbers, research activity and physical size, this trajectory was not smoothly linear. World War I was especially disruptive of university development. Institutional expansion was halted as material resources (private giving and state appropriations) diminished. As current and potential students left for military service or war-related civilian employment, classrooms became increasingly empty and tuition review declined.

The war provided a way for the university to demonstrate its value, both internally and to the public upon whose support it relied. Following the declaration of war on April 6, 1917, university presidents across the country committed their institutions to the war effort. As Carol Gruber explained, they “donated their intellectual and physical resources to the war effort almost without reservation.”113 Faculty members provided expert advice and conducted research that could be applied to military concerns. Campuses became centers for the preparation of new soldiers—training and housing them before they were sent off to serve. On October 1, 1918, in the most extreme example of student mobilization, 140,000 students from 516 higher education institutions were simultaneously inducted into the Army and began the program of the campus-based Students’ Army Training Corps.114

Although the war gave faculty members multiple ways to show the utility of their university or discipline, it also threatened ideal notions of pure and unfettered inquiry and academic freedom. Many areas of study, especially in the sciences, had long been recognized for

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113 Gruber, 95.
114 Ibid., 213.
their practicality. Shifting their activities to wartime applications highlighted their usefulness, while moving them away from the ideals of disinterested research. Disciplines that were not recognized as being societally useful prior to the war, such as history, now had a forum where their value could be demonstrated. Scholars from these fields addressed both their interest in advancing the war effort and their discipline by explaining the war and its social, economic, cultural and political contexts. However, rather than merely employing their knowledge in the spirit of disinterested study, they often used it to manipulate conclusions about the enemy, including through involvement in the propagandistic Committee on Public Information.115

Such challenges to the intellectual ideals of the academy not only undermined traditional measures of disciplinary legitimacy; they also threatened the professional lives of faculty members and administrators. Those who were identified as German sympathizers, pacifists, or having insufficient enthusiasm for U.S. involvement in the war suffered censure and often career ruin. Anxiety over un-American activities continued into the Red Scare of the immediate post-war era, with its emphasis on identifying and quashing communism and socialism. Attacks on academic freedom were frequently discarded or qualified in the face of these presumed threats, even within faculty organizations. Although there were some moderate voices, Timothy Reese Cain concluded, “war hysteria revealed the tenuous nature of faculty positions and raised fundamental questions about the extent to which professors and their organizations were devoted to the protection of faculty rights.”116

The war had brought new attention to the university. Not only did it demonstrate the public utility of campus-based research, it also raised interest in the university’s teaching function. Higher education was legitimated by the needs of mobilization combined with the

115 Ibid., 118-162.
influence of progressives. Increasingly, the desired form of education was not classical, but was instead one that would be useful in a rationalized world where managerial and technological expertise were becoming highly valued. Educational institutions responded to the real or perceived needs of students and employers by providing new curricula. For example, business courses and programs were created, and the liberal arts were adapted to business applications. However, growing interest in higher education on the part of students and their families was largely not about education \textit{per se}. Instead college provided marketable credentials and a means to develop social skills and contacts. Those who graduated with both could anticipate the private benefits of economic rewards and social privilege.\footnote{Levine, \textit{American College and Culture of Aspiration}.}

The inflation of World War I greatly reduced the value of endowments at research universities. After the War, endowment drives attempted to resolve this shortfall. However, the post-war period also brought an increase in enrollments that, in turn, reduced the amount of capital per student.\footnote{Geiger, \textit{To Advance Knowledge}, 131.} This difficult situation, however, was only temporary. During the 1920s, the capital and income of research universities grew tremendously. Public institutions benefitted from increases in state appropriations that often exceeded the rise in student enrollment.\footnote{Ibid., 122.} At the same time, there was a growth in the amount of funds given to colleges and universities by foundations and private individuals. Foundations were especially important to the expansion of endowments and the support of scholarship and scientific research, at least at a select number of institutions. Private individuals also played a significant role, with state universities benefitting greatly from broad-based alumni giving.

Alumni contributions, in particular, were frequently tied to enthusiasm for the extra-curriculum, and the era saw a corresponding growth in funds for dormitories, football stadiums,
and student unions. Indeed, Geiger observed, during the 1920s “college life attained a degree of notoriety that has probably not been equaled since” and this notoriety had less to do with academics than it did with the extra-curricular attractions. Spectator sporting events, fraternities and sororities, and a breadth of other social activities were attractive to both students and the popular imagination. These events and activities provided private enjoyment and increased identification with the university among students, alumni and the wider public.

The ascendency of the American university coincided with the rise of the United States during the latter half of the nineteenth century and first two decades of the twentieth. Although a large number of higher education institutions remained limited in scope and influence, many research universities became increasingly bureaucratic and nationally important. In this respect, they followed the same trajectory as other cultural and economic institutions that moved beyond local and parochial concerns. Like steel and oil, Geiger observed, higher education was a growth industry. Certainly, he argued, “major research universities had become the corporations of the education industry—organized to gather the lion’s share of social resources available to higher education, and committed to produce the most valued education products for the most important national markets.”

Geiger’s equation of business and higher education might suggest that universities were merely implementing the logic of business alongside non-educational institutions. However, the relationship between the world of business and that of higher education was much more intertwined. As Clyde Barrow demonstrated, the influence of business over higher education was the product of conscious action on the part of business leaders who, through their membership on

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120 Ibid., 126.
121 Ibid., 122.
122 Ibid., 1.
123 Ibid., 40.
124 Ibid., 1.
university boards and role in large-scale philanthropy to higher education institutions, were positioned to manipulate the academy in administrative and ideological terms. The results of this influence were universities in which the pursuit of business ideals became prominent and academic freedom was consequently circumscribed.\textsuperscript{125}

Many people were not pleased by the direction in which the university was moving. Across the country, critics—including some who identified as progressives—deplored recent developments in higher education. In his 1903 essay, “The Ph.D. Octopus,” William James lamented the rise of the necessary Ph.D. and the assumption that its credential confirmed teaching and research skills.\textsuperscript{126} Upton Sinclair’s, \textit{The Goose-step: A Study of American Education} (1923), argued that colleges and universities were controlled by elites and served not the public, but the interests of the ruling capitalist class.\textsuperscript{127} Most famously, in \textit{The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum of the Conduct of Universities by Business Men} (1918), Thorstein Veblen deplored the ways in which businessmen and their approach impacted the nature of higher education and, in particular, the university.\textsuperscript{128} Veblen argued that the university was far removed from ideals of free inquiry, having been compromised by its teaching function and—more significantly—the evaluation of university success in monetary terms and corresponding focus on accountability and the bottom line. Equating university leaders with their business counterparts, he characterized them as “captains of erudition.”\textsuperscript{129}

Such criticism was not without merit. The university had indeed changed and, arguably not always for the better. Despite assertions of wider accessibility, universities remained


\textsuperscript{129} Veblen, 85-134.
relatively elite spaces. The rise of professionalization, as popular and as useful as it might be, could also facilitate the rise of hollow credentialization and exclusion. Finally, while the employment of business processes and measures could help large and complex institutions compete, and allow for some to reach new heights of achievement, the elevation of such processes and measures could move the university away from its intellectual ideals. Criticisms of this sort were not only specific responses to real or perceived loss, or the identification of hypocrisy; they were also—in a broad sense—confirmation of just how much the university was changing and how much it had already changed.

The University of Illinois prior to the Kinley Presidency: 1894-1920

The University of Illinois grew substantially during the presidency of Andrew Sloan Draper (1894-1904), a prototypical administrative progressive.¹³⁰ During Draper’s administration, the College of Medicine and the Schools of Dentistry and Pharmacy were established in Chicago. In Urbana, the university added the College of Law, School of Music and School of Library Science, the first of its kind in the Midwest. The College of Agriculture was revitalized with more funding, a new building, greater enrollment, and a rise in research and outreach activities.¹³¹ The stature of the highly regarded College of Engineering continued to rise, as did the structures of new buildings, including the President’s House, Observatory, Chemical Lab and Library and Agriculture Buildings. In 1903, Illinois awarded its first Ph.D.s, in mathematics and chemistry. Drapers’ administration also saw developments in the extra-curriculum, such as fraternities, the yearbook, a daily student paper, and a championship-winning track team. Indeed, by some measures, the university was becoming increasingly competitive. By the end of the

¹³⁰ The best work on the Draper era is Solberg’s The University of Illinois 1894-1904. For a brief overview see [Stephens], 42-57. Tyack described Draper as an administrative progressive in One Best System, 133.
¹³¹ Solberg, University of Illinois 1894-1904, 120-146.
Draper presidency, Illinois’ enrollment had grown to 3,592, exceeding the number of students at the Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin; it almost matched these institutions in number of buildings and in the size of state appropriations.  

Despite such numerical progress, Illinois did not come into its own until the next presidency. As Winton Solberg argued, by the end of Draper’s administration the “university had the structure if not the spirit of a modern university.” In many ways, Draper was an able administrator, but he was not the primary force in the growth of the university’s colleges and schools. Furthermore, he disparaged an essential component of the modern university—disinterested research—and did little to promote its development. As such, the Draper presidency can be seen as an era of tremendous infrastructural growth, but one relatively static in terms of commitment to academic substance. The situation changed with the presidency of Edmund Janes James (1904-1920). Draper’s administration, Rodnitzky recounted, had given Illinois the “outward appearance of a comprehensive university.” By choosing James as Draper’s successor, the Board of Trustees “had recruited a scholar to make its physical image a reality and carry the whole enterprise on to greater heights.” Unlike Draper, Solberg argued, James “thoroughly understood the nature of the modern university” and, under his leadership, Illinois became “a leading American university.”

From the beginning of his tenure, James had an ambitious plan for his institution. In a work published in 1905, just one year into his presidency, he envisioned that Illinois would

132 Stephens, 43.
133 Solberg, *University of Illinois 1894-1904*, 395. Aside from one year of law school, Draper had no higher education. In this respect, he was quite different that his degreed colleagues. He was however, a skilled organizer and administrator. Ibid., 7, 10.
become increasingly a “great civil service academy” that would prepare young people for state, county, municipality and township civil service in the same way that military academies prepared men to serve their government. In addition, the university would also become the “scientific arm of the state government,” providing the expertise to solve societal problems and, in concert with the normal schools, “practically” becoming the “state department of education.” James’ vision, Veysey observed, demonstrated that the Wisconsin Idea extended well beyond Madison.

The extent to which James achieved his vision depended on his ability to gain public support for the university. Although his methods that were often inflexible, even overbearing, James was remarkably successful in getting this support, at least until 1914. His advocacy for Illinois to its students and alumni, business and special interest leaders, and members of the legislature provided the impetus for a significant increase in state appropriations, which included the first state subsidy for the College of Medicine. These resources provided the support for a wide range of building projects. State funds allowed for the construction of Lincoln Hall, Foellinger Auditorium, the Physics Laboratory, Round Barns and the Commerce and English Buildings. The Graduate School in Urbana-Champaign and the newly re-opened College of Medicine in Chicago were also built during the James administration.

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138 Ibid., 627.
139 Veysey, 73.
140 The election of the new governor, Edward Dunne, negatively impacted James’ fund raising abilities. Grisso, 411.
142 [Stephens], 58-75.
legacies was the University Library, which by the end of his tenure held over 440,000 volumes and was the ninth largest university library in the U.S.\footnote{Winton U. Solberg, “Edmund Jane James Builds a Library: The University of Illinois Library, 1904-1920,” \textit{Libraries and Culture} 39, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 67.}

Unlike his predecessor, James was a strong advocate of raising the university’s academic stature. He successfully recruited ambitious and distinguished professors to Illinois, increasing both the size and quality of its faculty and research activity.\footnote{[Stephens], 60.} James established the Graduate College, a key event in the university’s maturation. Its official opening in 1908 coincided with Illinois’ election to the Association of American Universities.\footnote{Solberg, “President Edmund J. James,” 233.} In addition, James’ presidency saw the creation of lecture series that attracted accomplished scholars from around the world and the establishment of the University of Illinois Press.\footnote{[Stephens], 59-60.}

For James, the university’s service role included national defense. When the U.S. declared war in 1917, he contacted President Woodrow Wilson to let him know that the University of Illinois would aid in the war effort. James subsequently sent Kinley, then vice president and dean of the Graduate School, to Washington DC to discuss the university’s role. Illinois was mobilized soon after. Policies were created to grant students combat leave and the School of Military Aeronautics was set up on campus.\footnote{Bruce Tap, “Suppression of Dissent: Academic Freedom at the University of Illinois during the World War I Era,” \textit{Illinois Historical Journal} 85, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 5.} The Amory, which had been built in 1914, served as a mess hall and barracks for 2,000 members of the Student Army Training Corps.\footnote{[Stephens], 58-75.} Like many of their students, some faculty members became soldiers, while others provided advice or conducted research on war-related problems. Faculty from the College of Agriculture, for instance, focused on food production and conservation.\footnote{Tap, 5.}
As was the case at institutions across the U.S., the war led to the curtailment of academic freedom. During a Liberty Bond drive in October 1917, six Illinois professors were exposed as being unwilling to buy Bonds. Soon a Department of Justice investigator, the Urbana Postmaster, and a member of the Board of Trustees became involved in the inquiry. The professors were accused of being pro-German and socialist. Despite mobilizing the university for war, James was himself a Germanophile and, therefore, was in a difficult situation. He decided to ask the accused professors to declare their loyalty; and a Board of Trustees appointed committee held an investigatory hearing on the disloyalty question. The committee concluded that there was no disloyalty at the University of Illinois and that academic freedom had been restricted by the war. The committee advised those who were pursuing disinterested truth to do so privately while appearing patriotic in public. Nevertheless, by 1920 all of the accused professors except one left the university.\textsuperscript{150}

James was no longer actively leading the university when the last of these professors left. In 1919, he became ill and offered his resignation to the Board of Trustees. Hoping that James’ illness was temporary, the Board rejected his resignation and instead gave him a leave of absence. They appointed Kinley acting president in June 1919. As Bruce Tap argued, the ascendancy of Kinley to acting president was at least partially to blame for the departure of the accused professors. Kinley was more conservative than James, and was well connected to business leaders and shared their anxiety about radicals and socialists.\textsuperscript{151} Despite expectations that James would return and take over leadership from Kinley, his health did not improve and he formally resigned from the presidency in March 1920.\textsuperscript{152}

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{152} Grisso, 382-383; Tap, 19.
David Kinley and His Presidency

After earning his undergraduate degree from Yale in 1884, David Kinley was employed for six years as the principal of Massachusetts’ North Andover High School. During his tenure as principal, he studied economics through a Chautauqua summer school and correspondence courses with Richard T. Ely. Kinley would later trace his interest in economics to his time at Yale, when he took courses from William Graham Sumner, the eminent classical economist. However, he did not decide to pursue economics as a profession until he worked with Ely. In 1890, Kinley moved on to graduate work at Johns Hopkins University, where Ely was professor, and later to Ely’s new institution, the University of Wisconsin. In 1893, he completed his Ph.D. at Wisconsin and accepted the position of assistant professor at the University of Illinois.

Kinley was exposed to the social gospel at his New England Congregational Church and at Yale, but his belief in its ideals matured through his relationship with Ely, who was a key figure in the social gospel movement. Ely’s influence was especially great early in Kinley’s career, when Kinley joined his mentor in reform circles, participated in reform organizations and wrote articles for popular religious magazines. Nevertheless, Kinley saw himself as a professional economist and increasingly realized that he shared little in common with the clergy and non-academic laypeople of the popular reform community. By 1899, he was disillusioned with them and public reform advocacy. Kinley explained that popular reformers were insufficiently knowledgeable of the topics they discussed and he found their events overly political and poorly grounded in serious scientific study. However, although he no longer believed in the efficacy of the public advocacy of reform, he retained a belief in reform itself.

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154 Grisso, 227-231, 284.
Kinley focused his efforts on his academic specialization in monetary economics and, by the early 1900s, he was an expert advisor to policy makers. As an advisor to Illinois governors and through his involvement in the Carnegie Endowment, National Monetary Commission and Fourth Pan American Conference, Kinley promoted a view that melded the ideas of his two teachers. Rather than wholly accept Sumner’s uncompromising laissez-faire or Ely’s strong state interventionism, Kinley advocated a moderate position. In his autobiography, he contrasted Sumner’s strong emphasis on individualism and the primacy of philanthropy in Ely’s thought. “To my mind,” he noted, Ely “was a sort of a counterbalance to Sumner.” Ely rejected laissez-faire economics and what he saw as excessive individualism and replaced it with a combination of the social gospel and the historical school of economics, which emphasized welfare over wealth and the value of state intervention. Kinley was also anxious about unrestrained individualism and competition but, unlike Ely, he did not discard laissez-faire economics and advocate a form of socialistic Christianity as its replacement. Instead, as Grisso argued, he reconciled his training in economics and sympathy to social gospel ideals by taking a more moderate position, dismissing socialism in all its guises while allowing for state intervention to resolve key economic, social and political ills. For instance, Kinley saw monopolies as natural development that, rather than being destroyed, ought to be publically owned and managed or controlled and supervised in order to minimize abuse. Hence, in such cases, government regulation could be necessary.

Despite advocating intervention of this sort, Kinley was generally a believer in the current social and economic order. He did not advocate Ely’s dramatic reforms but instead largely sympathized with classical economists like Sumner. Although he disliked the most

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155 Ibid., 285.
157 Grisso, 205-209.
158 Ibid., 233.
extreme examples of individualism and competition, he found more moderate versions essential
to societal progress. Increasingly, he moved further away from Ely and, as Grisso observed, “by
the turn of the century Kinley was slowly reverting to classical economic theory, the deductive
method, and a modified form of laissez faire.” He still believed in reform, albeit to a limited
degree, but was becoming more conservative.

Kinley’s professional ascendency was dramatic. In 1894, only one year after arriving at
Illinois, he was promoted to full professor, department head, and dean of the College of
Literature and Arts. In his capacity as director of the Training for Business courses, Kinley
organized the creation of the College of Commerce and Business Administration (1902). In
1906, he became the inaugural dean of the Graduate School, which he saw as a means to advance
knowledge through research and publications and to prepare teachers to work in schools,
colleges and universities. At the official opening of the Graduate School, Kinley proclaimed that
a commitment to research of all types—in technical areas, theoretical and abstract sciences, and
humanities—was necessary for democracy. Through their support for the Graduate School, he
added, the people of the state of Illinois had demonstrated that they recognized research’s
essential democratic role. In 1913, Kinley moved even further in the administrative hierarchy,
accepting an appointment to vice-president of the university.

Kinley’s shift from teaching staff to general administration was accompanied by a change
in his ideas about the relationship between faculty, administration and the university itself. This
change is most clearly illustrated by the development of his views on academic freedom. In
1894, a year after he finished his Ph.D., Kinley organized the successful defense of Ely against

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159 Ibid.
160 Grisso emphasized Kinley’s moderate position between Ely and Sumner and growing conservatism over time. However, Rodnitzky (1973), stressed the primacy of Sumner and portrayed Kinley as highly conservative. In part, this discrepancy can be reconciled by the scope of their work: Grisso’s dissertation looks at the entirety of Kinley’s career whereas Rodnitzky’s article focuses on his presidency.
charges of radicalism that were being investigated by the University of Wisconsin Board of Regents. He retained a similar position on academic freedom in 1885 in support of University of Chicago economist Edward W. Bemis. Nevertheless, Grisso argued, with the growth of his administrative duties during the James presidency (1904-1920), Kinley’s began to temper his position on academic freedom. Increasingly, he highlighted its limitations, especially in terms of faculty members’ responsibility to support their university’s administration and reputation. In a 1909 correspondence to a professor who had reportedly advocated socialism while identifying himself as Illinois faculty, Kinley acknowledged academic freedom but also argued that faculty must not “discredit” their colleagues or institution “in public opinion.” He again confirmed this position in 1913 when, as president of the American Economic Association, he was asked to determine if the dismissal of Willard C. Fisher by Wesleyan University was a violation of academic freedom. Speaking before a local club, Fisher had argued for greater flexibility in religious observance and suggested that churches might even experiment with being closed on a Sunday to allow time for service obligations. Kinley concluded that because Wesleyan was church-affiliated, those who accepted employment as its faculty must recognize “its history, its attitude and doctrines” and not “purposely or thoughtlessly” expose them to “public criticism and ridicule.” “In other words,” he continued, “while I believe thoroughly in the principle of speech, I do not believe in anarchy of speech; or, I think that we are all limited in our freedom of speech by the character of the organization or society of which we consciously and purposely remain members.” In this respect, Kinley argued for privileging of collective interest over the needs of individual conscience.

162 See Grisso, 57-64.
163 Grisso, 220-221.
164 Quoted in Ibid., 221.
165 Quoted in Ibid., 223-224.
Kinley’s growing emphasis on loyalty to the university—which often meant loyalty to leadership—was exhibited in other ways. In 1908, he expressed the need for the student newspaper, *The Illini*, to support the administration and faculty senate on the question of expanding the football schedule.\(^\text{166}\) In 1917 (as discussed earlier), then vice-president Kinley provided little support for Illinois faculty during the Liberty Bond investigation, leading to the forced departure of many of the accused.\(^\text{167}\) In a discussion of faculty unionization, Timothy Reese Cain argued that Kinley’s conservatism was a key factor in the demise of the Federation of Teachers of the University of Illinois. With the growing confluence of interests between Kinley and the business community, including members of the Board of Trustees, unionization and progressive politics were met with suspicion and even hostility. Those faculty members who were determined politically undesirable were either removed by Kinley or pressured to leave.\(^\text{168}\)

Following James resignation in March 1920, the Board of Trustees conducted a nationwide search for University of Illinois president. They ultimately decided on Kinley, who was serving as acting president, and notified him of his election on June 5, 1920. The immediate post-war era was one of economic and socio-political instability and the University of Illinois was itself in a difficult situation.\(^\text{169}\) In 1919, when Kinley was still only serving as acting president, prices doubled, the university’s income had been almost static for five years, and its building program nearly reached stasis after a seven-year decline. Soon student enrollment would increase by fifty percent.\(^\text{170}\) Working through such circumstances made Kinley a suitable replacement for James. He provided continuity and stability and his long and varied service to

\(^{166}\) Ibid., 222.
\(^{167}\) Ibid., 19.
\(^{168}\) Cain, “‘Learning and Labor.’”
\(^{169}\) Grisso, 382-3.
\(^{170}\) Ibid., 384.
the university, and deep understanding of its problems and potential, gave him the perspective and skills needed to move the university forward.  

Kinley set out immediately to address the university’s shortcomings. His acceptance letter noted his priorities, including increased salaries, an extensive building program, and greater support and development of the Colleges of Agriculture, Commerce, Education, Engineering, Law and Medicine and the Library and Music Schools. The success or failure of Kinley’s goals depended on funding. Despite James’ success in raising funds, Kinley’s administration began with a shortfall that was caused significantly by the post-war rise in the cost of living and a dramatic increase in student enrollment. The 1919-20 academic year brought unanticipated enrollment, which resulted in overcrowded classrooms and laboratories. Student enrollment, which had been 5,590 during the 1917-18 academic year, grew to 9,249 by 1919-20, an increase of 3,659. Faculty members, whose salaries had not kept up with post-war inflation, suffered from correspondingly greater workloads. Consequently, the university was faced with high faculty turnover, which made the situation worse.

In order for Illinois to keep its position among the best universities in the nation, it needed to increase funding to retain faculty and improve the physical plant. To accomplish this, Kinley sought public support through the efforts of university trustees, faculty, administrators, students and alumni. As part of this effort, he implemented a publicity initiative for the university that integrated the state legislature into its strategy. Through this, the people of the State of Illinois would not only learn about the university and its programs and achievements, but

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171 Ibid., 382-3.
172 Ibid., 383.
174 Grisso, 383.
175 Ibid., 386.
also its difficult financial condition.\textsuperscript{176} Over the course of his administration, Kinley headed five different legislative campaigns, all of which used the same methods and followed the same general pattern. For these campaigns, Kinley employed a variety of civic, business and social organizations to gain wide public support. He highlighted the university’s needs by distributing leaflets, gaining the sympathy of newspapers across the state, and using business-style public relations techniques.\textsuperscript{177} According to Grisso, Kinley did not employ these techniques cynically. Instead, like many progressives, he optimistically believed in public opinion and saw publicity and public relations as means to inform the people who would, in turn, support their university.\textsuperscript{178} In addition, as part of his legislative campaigns, Kinley pressured state legislators, often though the assistance of business and party leaders and the Board of Trustees. The campaigns also benefitted from Kinley’s public reputation. He was known, Grisso recounted, “as a man of integrity and a sound practical administrator . . . traits [which] helped him to win the trust of the citizenry of Illinois and perhaps even win the respect of the sometimes corrupt and cynical politicians with whom he had to deal.”\textsuperscript{179}

Kinley’s efforts to improve the university’s financial situation were successful, confirming his talent as a fundraiser. “Of all Kinley’s attributes as a university president,” Grisso observed, “contemporaries were most impressed with his ability to get money from the state legislature and to garner widespread public support for the University of Illinois. To the faculty and others at a distance, it seemed an almost effortless exercise as biennium after biennium the university received the appropriations which Kinley requested under his Ten Year Plan.”\textsuperscript{180} The Ten Year Plan, Grisso continued, addressed the “crisis which nearly engulfed the university” and

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 409. For an in depth treatment, see: Jerome Leon Rodnitzky, “A History of Public Relations at the University of Illinois, 1904-1930” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1967).

\textsuperscript{177} Grisso, 427.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 490-491.

\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., 427.

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., 408.
“would become the best known feature of Kinley’s presidency.”

It proposed the replacement of the insufficient Mill Tax with biennial state appropriations of 10.5 million dollars each, double the amount of the largest Mill Tax.

Greater resources allowed Kinley to move ahead with university development. The implementation of biennial state appropriations increased the operations and maintenance budget and allowed for an extensive building program. The most substantial construction took place on the Urbana-Champaign campus and included the Architecture Building, Horticulture Field Laboratory, West Residence Hall, Men’s Gymnasium, Agriculture and Commerce Halls, and expansion of the University Library. Additional projects, including the President’s House and Women’s Gymnasium, were initiated but were only completed after Kinley left office. In Chicago, the School of Pharmacy and College of Medicine were expanded, and the latter became the largest medical school in the world. Building funds did not come exclusively from the state. As had occurred at other universities during the era, students, alumni, and other supporters raised millions of dollars for the building of Memorial Stadium in Urbana-Champaign. The main campus also saw the construction of Smith Music Hall and the University Hospital, both of which were funded by private donations.

In addition to developing the university’s physical infrastructure, Kinley also made changes to the structure of its educational administration. During the James presidency, Grisso observed, “the university had resembled a federated republic with considerable authority lodged in the deans and various colleges.”

Kinley, however, returned the university to the centralization that characterized Draper’s presidency and the broader agenda of administrative progressives. He resurrected the Council of Administration to its Draper-era position, reasserting

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181 Ibid., 410.
182 Ibid., 478-479; [Stephens], 78-79.
183 Grisso, 388.
the power and authority of it and its constituent members: the president and vice president, and the deans of undergraduates, women, and the various colleges. By doing so, he greatly diminished the role of the University Senate. Kinley also created the new positions of Provost and Superintendent of Business Operations. These change corresponded to Kinley’s belief in strong presidential leadership, desire to work with small groups, and growing interest in personal control. Although Kinley had hoped to make other changes to the administration, resistance by deans and inadequate financial resources frustrated his plans.\textsuperscript{184}

Kinley’s administration witnessed significant growth in the student population. In 1921, Illinois has 9,493 students, making it the ninth largest university in the U.S. By 1930, Kinley’s final year, it was the fifth largest university in the country, with over 14,000 students. Only the City College of New York, the University of California, and Columbia, Boston and New York Universities had a larger enrollment.\textsuperscript{185} This increase in student numbers was accompanied by the growth of the university’s physical and human capital, and new developments in the extra-curriculum. During the 1920s, the Greek system grew to include 92 fraternities and 33 sororities, Mothers’ Day and Dads’ Day weekends were inaugurated, and sports drew an increasing large audience, most famously due to the remarkable college career of football player Harold “Red” Grange.\textsuperscript{186} As was the case at universities across the country, these and numerous less formal events and activities made the student life in the 1920s especially exciting, regardless of (or perhaps despite) growing opportunities in the classroom.\textsuperscript{187}

Although these opportunities were especially attractive to undergraduate students, Kinley wanted to make sure that exuberance was kept in check at Illinois. Regardless of a professed belief in liberal individualism, Rodnitzky noted, Kinley’s approach to university leadership could

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., 387-389.
\textsuperscript{186} [Stephens], 79-80.
\textsuperscript{187} For a discussion of student life during the Kinley presidency see Ebert, 107-129, and Grisso, 590-596.
be characterized as paternalistic.\textsuperscript{188} Paternalism of this sort was not unusual; it was typical of the administrative progressives of the era. Many Illinois faculty members, especially those deemed overly radical, experienced Kinley’s use of this approach to leadership, which at its most extreme was conservative and authoritarian. When it came to students, Kinley was particularly concerned with morality. Working most closely with his dean of men, he warned of the moral dangers of the automobile (its ability to facilitate drinking, stealing and sexual immorality), women smoking, dancing, and a range of other social activities.\textsuperscript{189} Kinley extended his concern for student morality to the classroom. He paid attention to what was being taught to Illinois undergraduates and was especially interested in their reading assignments in literature classes. On more than one occasion, he attempted to stop students from reading “immoral” books.\textsuperscript{190}

Kinley’s belief in the value of morality for personal and societal benefit was typical of the era. Morality was a great concern for conservatives and progressives alike and, within higher education, proponents of classical, liberal arts, and utilitarian curricula were all in general agreement on the need for a moral component. Kinley made it clear, however, that moral education alone was insufficient preparation for life. He argued that education ought to be comprehensive in scope. A man or woman cannot be “well-educated” by possessing “knowledge alone” or “character alone,” he observed. “A man may be a university graduate, with the finest intellectual training, and still be a scoundrel. On the other hand,” he continued, “he may be a man of the highest moral and religious character, and lack that intellectual acumen, that point of view, and that spirit necessary to make a truly educated man.”\textsuperscript{191} Regardless of Kinley’s role as the president of a significantly vocational institution, his articulation of what makes a person

\textsuperscript{188} Rodnitzky, “David Kinley: A Paternal President in the Roaring Twenties,” 5-19.
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 15-18; Grisso, 590
\textsuperscript{190} Grisso, 568-569.
\textsuperscript{191} David Kinley, “The President’s Report for the Year 1922-1923,” \textit{University of Illinois Bulletin} XXI, no. 23 (February 4, 1924): 9.
truly educated is similar to those who denounced vocationalization and argued for the education of the “whole man.” The important conclusion, however, is not Kinley’s intellectual genealogy but is instead how Kinley, and the institution he led, were agents and manifestations of what might be considered both conservative and progressive impulses.

Over the course of his career, Kinley demonstrated actions and behaviors from across the political spectrum. His views changed over time and he could be inconsistent. He did, however, have clarity of focus when it came to administrative efficiency and institutional reputation, and an overriding confidence in his ability and vision. Soon the Great Depression would create substantial new challenges for students, faculty and administrators at Illinois and all American higher education institutions. Kinley himself would not see this difficult new era from the president’s office. By 1930, he had reached maximum retirement age and was exhausted and ready to leave office. Although his tenure was over, Kinley’s legacy was substantial. His successes, particularly those which increased the university’s financial resources, had advanced the agenda that he had worked for even prior to his presidency: to expand the University of Illinois’ teaching and research capacity and raise its institutional prominence.

**Kinley, Progressivism, and the University’s Role**

For David Kinley, the university was an inherently public institution. Regardless of differences between types of universities he articulated a vision in which all were public to some degree. In his speeches, leaflets, and institutional reports, Kinley described ways in which the university was, or could be, considered public. He devoted special attention to how the university, especially the state university, failed to meet its potential as a public agent and how this failure imperiled the public good. However, Kinley did not see this situation as necessarily dire but

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192 Grisso, 612.
instead called for purposeful action to center the university to serve democratic society. While confidence of this sort is often characteristic of educators, in the Progressive Era it was widely popular. Whether Kinley’s confidence was itself a product of his vocation, his moment in history, or a combination of both is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, his hope for the purposeful application of the university to what he repeatedly described as profound societal problems corresponded well to the reformist spirit of the age.

Kinley’s understanding of the university’s role related directly to his views on the state of American society and the means of its successes and failures. Although he expressed a strong belief in progress—especially through the transformative possibilities of education and science—Kinley’s statements demonstrate that his confidence was moderated by deep concern about societal decline. He articulated especially acute anxiety over the political trajectory of the United States, particularly as it related to shifts in the quality of political culture. In this respect, Kinley joined with others of his era who saw a causal relationship between the industrial age and the demise of the vitality, clarity and courage that characterized early American democracy.

Kinley maintained that individualism played an essential role in the formation of the United States. The frontier experience, he argued, instilled in the American people a level of individualism exceeding that of people in all other countries. “The American pioneer,” Kinley said, “was a man of initiative, courage, self-reliance, personal independence and faith. He had vision. He worked out his own salvation. He conquered the frontier and merged its ever flowing tide of people into the ocean of our American population and life.” However, while individualism was crucial to the foundation of the early Republic, Kinley warned that it was declining in his own era. He expressed especially great concern about how this decline was

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impacting the political cultural of the country, especially in relation to public opinion and affairs. The decline of individual leadership by college men in such matters, he posited, was at least partially due to a lack of courage. Courage, he said, was required to think, to voice an informed opinion, and to stand up for that opinion. When it came to matters of public policy, standing alone was far more difficult than following the crowd. “We have lost our courage in a measure by the suppression of our individuality,” Kinley lamented, “we are victims of mob thought, mob psychology, mob action. We have lost too much of our courage to stand alone.”

As Kinley described it, the ability to stand alone had been replaced by group action and an undue reliance on legislation, both of which undermined societal possibilities. He warned of the rise of “class sectionalism,” a phenomenon where each class sought “special privileges and advantages” without consideration of the greater good. Across the country he saw the growth of organizations that represented particular classes and interests while limiting membership. He described this trend, an aspect of rising professionalization, as a danger to the integrity of the social fabric: “we are told that organized medicine wants this, the organization of lawyers wants that, and that the organization of teachers demands something else; all in the interest, not of all of us, but of the teachers and lawyers and doctors and laborers and capitalists and manufacturers, speaking as distinct economic classes rather than as American citizens.” However Kinley’s concerns went beyond the rise of selfish collectivism in professional fields. He argued that personal responsibility and character, so essential to citizenship, were being diminished and degraded. Their vital role in democracy had been replaced by an over-reliance on legislation as the appropriate means for social change. Ultimately, this approach would prove wanting, Kinley

194 David Kinley, “College Men and Popular Leadership,” (speech delivered at Butler University, [Indianapolis, Indiana], Saturday, February 11, 1928), 18. University Archives, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
195 David Kinley, “Honest Citizenship: An Address Delivered at the Fifty-Fourth Commencement of the University of Illinois June 15, 1925 by David Kinley, Ph.D., LL.D. President of the University.” University of Illinois Bulletin XXII, no. 48 (July 27, 1925), 8.
warned: “we know very well that in the long run we cannot accomplish the elevation of humanity through any agency other than the minds and hearts of individual men and women.”

Kinley’s anxiety about the rise of self-interest groups and increasing use of legislation can be understood as a response to the more general growth in organizational culture during the Progressive Era. Processes and mechanisms of bureaucratization and rationalization accompanied the transition from the relative simplicity of agrarianism to the complexity of urban industrialization. This change in the way society was structured and how it functioned was seen in the growth of professional organizations and government. Although this development was characteristic of the Progressive Era, Rodgers explained, historians are divided on the exact nature of the relationship between Progressivism and the ascendency of organizational culture. For Richard Hofstadter, “the progressive movement itself was the complaint of the unorganized against the consequences of organization.” Louis Galambos, on the other hand, asserted that progressives, with their overriding interest in systemization, social efficiency and the use of science to create harmony, were themselves central agents for organizational dominance.

There is a great deal of truth in Galambos’ argument: much of what constitutes Progressivism facilitated organization. However, Hofstadter’s claim accounts for the despair progressives expressed when faced with other organizational forms, including corporate monopoly and party politics. The difficulty of reconciling such arguments demonstrates how a precise definition of Progressivism is so elusive and why typologies that differentiate progressives—such as Tyack’s in the realm of education—can be extremely helpful.

Regardless of whether Hofstadter or Galambos are correct about Progressivism, their analyses highlight an essential tension during the Progressive Era. On the one hand, increasing

197 Ibid., 10
198 Rodgers, 117-118.
199 Quoted in Ibid., 118.
200 Ibid., 117-118.
societal complexity required the use of organizational methods and institutions, while on the other hand these very methods and institutions could undermine the quality of American life, including the nature of its democracy. Kinley himself can be seen as someone who manifested this very tension. As an economist and leader of a growing bureaucracy, he was advancing the rise of organizational culture while, at the same time, he looked back fondly to a simpler America in which societal vitality proceeded from healthy individualism.

While it is difficult to determine the extent to which Kinley understood this tension, it is clear that he retained the belief that humanity would be elevated only if people had the freedom to act as individuals. If properly equipped, these individuals would be able to overcome the new frontier that had replaced the frontier of the early Republic. Unlike the earlier, physical, frontier its replacement was, Kinley explained, “a frontier of ignorance, of lack of interest in public duty, of lack of proper standards of public life and conduct, of due sense of responsibility on the part of our citizens, and especially of citizens who have had the advantage of a higher education. That frontier can be conquered.”201 Surmounting this new challenge would require a means for education and socialization and, according to Kinley, the university was an institution well suited to address this need.

The Public Nature of Kinley’s University

Kinley described the university as a primary means to address societal problems; and its responsibility to society stemmed from its relationship to the public. Although he did not provide a theoretical definition of what he meant by “the public,” it is possible to discern a coherent theory of the public from Kinley’s statements on society, its institutions and its people. His discussions of the university’s societal role suggest that the public was an entity constituted from

the people in relation to institutions, including the university. When the people came together to support an institution—especially politically and financially—they formed a public. When an institution truly served the people, the popular object of that service was itself the public. If an institution failed to meet its service duty, it would lose its legitimacy as a public institution. This analysis of how Kinley formulated the public is not meant to suggest that he would have described it in precisely this way. Nevertheless, it corresponds to his essential focus on societal structure, including the relationships between its constituent institutional and popular components, and it is therefore well suited to identifying how Kinley understood the university and its public.

In order to clarify the role relationships played in Kinley’s description of the university and the public, it is necessary to examine other fundamental relationships: those between the university and the people, the state and the government. Because specific institutional characteristics greatly influence relative positions, it is useful to differentiate privately endowed and state funded universities; doing so helps explicate Kinley’s broader articulation of the university within its societal context. By the early twentieth century, privately endowed universities were legally, administratively and financially autonomous of the state. They were not founded as state entities and were not subject, as was typical of state universities, to governor-appointed boards of trustees. Endowed universities were also exempt from most state regulation. State universities, on the other hand, were necessarily tied to the state they inhabited, subject to the control of and dependent on their respective governments. Endowments comprised substantial portions of operating expenses at private universities, whereas the primary monetary inputs of state universities were appropriations derived from tax dollars. Both private

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202 Governors did not always appoint boards of trustees (or their equivalents, e.g.: boards of governors, boards of regents). In some cases, alumni elected boards of trustees were from their peers and, in others (including Illinois) they were nominated by the two political parties and subsequently popularly elected. Grisso, 452, 470.
and state universities relied on tuition, but it was typically of much greater importance to endowed universities. At state universities, tuition was ultimately subsidized by taxes collected from the people.

Kinley repeatedly declared that the people of Illinois were the owners of the state university. He explained that it did not belong to him, the dean, or the faculty.203 “Whose is the university?” Kinley asked, in a widely distributed leaflet, “it belongs to you, the people of Illinois.”204 As was the case with state universities across the U.S., he explained, the University of Illinois belonged to the people who paid the taxes that, in turn, provided appropriation funds. Following the conventional idea of what constituted “public,” Kinley clarified the necessary correspondence between ownership and public-ness: “the state university is a public institution. It belongs to the people.”205 Hence, given their source of funding, state universities were archetypically public. However, Kinley did allow privately endowed universities to be considered public, at least to some degree, since they were “in a measure publically supported because of exemption from taxation.”206

Regardless of level of ownership, Kinley acknowledged that ownership did not itself guarantee viability. The university, he noted, “is worth establishing and maintaining if, and only if, it serves the purpose which the people have in mind in establishing it.”207 In this respect, it was like all public institutions, which “have no excuse for existence” unless they serve a human need.208 Their ability to serve this need determined if they deserved popular financial support, and to what degree. As Kinley noted, some people had argued that the state university was “a

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203 David Kinley, [n.t.], (speech delivered at the National Warm Air Heating and Ventilating Association meeting, n.p., December 4, 1923), 2-3. University Archives, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
204 David Kinley, “How Is The University,” University of Illinois Bulletin XIX, no. 34 (April 17, 1922), n.p.
207 Kinley, “Honest Citizenship,” 6-7
208 Ibid.
burden to the taxpayers of the state.” However, he countered, an examination of expenditures demonstrated that the cost of higher education was negligible. For example, for each tax dollar levied by the state of Illinois in 1919, the University of Illinois received only a cent and a half. The university and any other public institution that provides substantial returns, Kinley argued, is not a true burden. This was recognized, he said, by “many thoughtful citizens” who understand that some of the discoveries made by the university were “individually worth much more to the state and nation than all the appropriations which the institution will get in a hundred years.” Speaking more specifically, he claimed that agricultural and chemical discoveries made in the University of Illinois’ fields and laboratories added a greater amount to state wealth than the sum of all of the appropriations the university had ever received.

However, according to Kinley, the people of Illinois were not mere underwriters of the university, they were the state and thus essential to the state-university relationship. The state, as he defined it, was “the people organized for the performance of political, economic, and other activities that have to do with their life as a group.” In order to accomplish these activities, the people have employed legal and constitutional theory to form the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Nevertheless, he continued, “nowhere in our system is there any provision for what I may call the developmental arm or agency of the state.” Although legal and constitutional theory had not provided for such a developmental entity, Kinley argued that it was sorely needed “to search out the paths the people must follow in order to progress; to

213 David Kinley, “Education and Progress in a Democracy” (speech delivered at a new building dedication, University of Tennessee College of Medicine, Memphis, November 27, 1928), 7. University Archives, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid.

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discover how the culture of the people . . . may be improved; to find new truths and new ways
which will make it possible for the people at large to attain a higher life, economically, socially,
intellectually, culturally.”

While he described the university was a state arm or agency, Kinley differentiated it from
the state’s governmental components. He cautioned that the university was not a division of
government: it belonged to neither the executive, nor the judicial, nor the legislative branches but
instead stood apart from them. Yet, despite being separate from government branches, it held
an extremely important place. “The state university . . . the fourth division or arm of the state,”
he concluded, “is fundamental to all the rest.” According to Kinley, the university was
fundamental because of its role in education, the essential guarantor of democratic society. “A
democracy,” he observed, “is never secure unless it is progressive” and “it is never progressive
unless it is educated.” Without education, progress was impossible because progress is the
result of the application of current knowledge to new conditions, its employment in new ways, or
the discovery of new facts or principles.

Although the university had the ability to play such essential societal roles, Kinley
warned that its capability of doing so was regularly threatened by biased interests. At privately
endowed universities, Kinley noted, “educational ideals” are controlled by only a few people,
“some of whom . . . have . . . an interest in establishing in the minds of those they are educating
ideals and aims which the people at large do not sympathize with and do not want realized in
practice.” State universities, on the other hand, were not as susceptible to the will of a few

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216 Ibid.
217 David Kinley, [n.t.], (speech delivered at the University of Indiana, Bloomington, January 21, 1921), 3-4. University
Archives, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
220 Ibid.
221 Kinley, “Advantages of State Universities and Their Relation to the Public,” 104.
elites. They were, however, subject to hazards that usually posed far less danger to private universities, namely “political influences” and the “pressure of public opinion.” To put the matter baldly, Kinley explained, “the endowed institution is, or may be, under the domination of wealth or doctrinal organizations, while the public institution is, or may be, under the domination of politicians or the public at large.”

Much of the risk faced by the state university was due to its relationship to government. State governors often appointed boards of trustees and these boards, Kinley argued, “are necessarily the creatures of the governors, and therefore the institutions controlled by them are controlled by him.” This situation, he continued, is “undemocratic” and therefore “un-American . . . a state university should rest upon the direct consent and action of the people.” Accordingly, Kinley said, the university “should be kept by the people in their own direct control, instead of being made by them an incidental or subsidiary portion of any one of the three commonly recognized divisions of government.” If the university is to facilitate widespread progress, he concluded, it could only do so if it is allowed to perform its function freely, not subject to the control of state agencies.

Despite such statements, Kinley was not about to relinquish all control to the people. After all, he had warned that political influence was not the only threat to the university: undue popular pressure was another danger. Nevertheless, he did not propose the same solution to the threat of popular pressure as he did for political influence. Political influence originated in the government and its branches. Consequently, Kinley proposed that the state’s governmental arms

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222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid., 109.
225 Ibid.
226 David Kinley, “Freedom of the University (speech delivered at the Association of State Universities meeting, n.p., 1925), 8. University Archives, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
227 Ibid.
be as distanced as possible from its developmental arm (the university), performing only disinterested administrative functions. When it came to the people, however, he acknowledged the need for a closer connection between them and their institution. As funders of the university, the people were its public and, Kinley observed, “it is idle to think that any publicly supported organization can become independent of the public that supports it in the sense that it can do just as it pleases without reference to that public.”

Instead the public must be acknowledged as owners and be recognized as arbiters and recipients of university public service.

While Kinley recognized the ultimate authority of the people over the university, on a practical level the relationship between this authority and the university was mediated. The people could not really administer the university; instead they relied on their agents, namely boards of trustees. Yet even boards of trustees, Kinley argued, were not suitable for addressing the quotidian duties of internal administration. At Illinois, such mundane involvement by trustees had effectively ended during the Draper presidency (1894-1904).

Trustees did have a role, Kinley explained, when matters moved upward through normal bureaucratic channels from university administration to the board of trustees, and the board had an important function in appointing faculty and staff, and removing them in extreme cases. Ultimately, Kinley observed, the faculty and administration was better equipped to resolve the university’s problems. His attitude on this issue was made clear in a 1925 speech to the Association of State Universities where he asserted that the faculty should determine education policy and the board of trustees, who have appointed the faculty for this and other purposes, should adopt it “without question.”

On the other hand, Kinley expected the people to raise questions about

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228 Kinley, “Freedom of the University,” 13.
229 Grisso, 481-482.
230 Kinley, “Freedom of the University,” 18.
231 Grisso, 482.
232 Kinley, “Freedom of the University,” 19.
their public institution. “This,” he offered, “is proper [and] suggestions and constructive criticism are always welcome.”233 As this passage demonstrates, Kinley was willing to allow for public involvement in the university but such involvement should be limited. Just like the board of trustees, the people needed to recognize that they should ultimately defer to the expertise of university faculty and administration.

In this respect, Kinley shared a characteristic of his progressive contemporaries: a strong belief in the expert. Experts were not only faculty members who were the origin of knowledge distributed to students and wider society, in their administrative capacities faculty and staff were also experts. Because Kinley saw these faculty members and administrators as having the knowledge most suitable to running their institution, he expected them to be recognized as authorities and allowed to go about the business of running the university. In a broader sense, Kinley’s elevation of the expert related directly to the university’s ability to ask questions. Its methods and expertise allowed it to see further ahead than the populace could, and its developmental role demanded it ask far-reaching questions. Kinley explained: “if the university is the principle developmental agency of the state and of society it can perform its function only by moving in advance of popular opinion.”234 Given its prescience, the university was therefore uniquely suited to address the great challenges of an increasingly complex world.

**Kinley’s University in the Service of the Public Good**

The preceding discussion describes how, for Kinley, the university’s public nature correlated to its relationship to the people, the state, and the government. These three correlations can be understood as being based primarily on inputs, including funding and governance. However,

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233 Kinley, “President’s Report for the Year 1922-1923,” 52.
Kinley’s formulation of the relationship between the university and the public also included a substantial emphasis on outputs: contributions to the public good. The extent to which a given university could contribute to the public good was largely determined by its status as either a state or private institution. Regardless of the societal value of both types of universities, Kinley argued that state institutions were necessarily more valuable because of the ways in they served society.235

According to Kinley, the state university had four different functions: undergraduate teaching, faculty and executive staff training, research, and the extension of knowledge beyond campus. A proponent of broad access, Kinley maintained that the university should teach as many qualified undergraduates as it could accommodate.236 Consequently, he can be seen as advocating democratic access. Given their low tuition rates, Kinley noted approvingly, state universities were able to accommodate more students of lesser means than private universities, which have fewer spaces, scholarships and forms of tuition remission.237 In respect to maximizing access to higher education, he expressed agreement with those who saw it as a fulfillment of the university’s democratic role. Through the accomplishment of its teaching function, Kinley explained, it increased the general educational level of undergraduates, in areas of study that addressed the needs of all social classes.238 Private institutions, he asserted, were likely to retain conservative curricula and “turn the cold shoulder” to new fields, whereas state universities were predisposed to training people in innovative areas, such as household, agricultural and industrial sciences, and were liable to resist public demand for training in these

236 David Kinley, “Functions of the State University,” (speech delivered at the National Association of State Universities, n.p., November 11 and 12, 1929), 11. University Archives, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
237 Ibid.
238 Kinley, “Functions of the State University,” 11.
fields. The university also trained new faculty and staff, including teachers and researchers; and it conducted research, Kinley said, “for the purpose of correcting false beliefs, adding to knowledge, improving teaching, advancing the industries, refining the arts of life, and promoting human welfare.” Finally, he concluded, the university provided knowledge to the general populace through numerous off-campus events, including conferences and conventions and a variety of economic, educational, industrial and social meetings.

Despite Kinley’s acknowledgment of the university’s ability to extend its educational mission, he did not frame this capacity in terms of its land-grant status. Indeed, Kinley’s public statements did not emphasize that the University of Illinois was a land-grant institution and thus, arguably, among the most public of the country’s colleges and universities. His only significant focus on its special nature was when he fought for the land-grant university’s continued role as a place for military training. However, this particular emphasis was not a significant aspect of his formulation of the relationship between the university and the public. Instead, as has been explained, Kinley encouraged popular support for the university by characterizing it as Illinois’ state rather than its land-grant university. The reason for this choice is unclear but it may relate to his emphasis on expertise and declined enthusiasm for relatively informal means of educating the populace, which (as noted earlier) dated from the turn of the century. It is clear, however, that he was privately anxious about some of the course offerings at land-grant and state institutions. According to Grisso, Kinley said that “the public was being ‘mislead’ and ‘hoodwinked’ into spending money in the name of the farmer or agriculture and in the name of professional and vocational education.” Kinley saw much of agricultural education as unnecessary, had little

239 Kinley, “Advantages of State Universities and Their Relation to the Public,” 103.
240 Kinley, “Functions of the State University,” 11.
241 Grisso, 601-611.
enthusiasm for home economics, and was not in support of providing advice to farmers. Given Grisso’s analysis, it appears that Kinley was at least apprehensive about areas of instruction that were especially effective in connecting his institution and the populace of the state, a connection that could be characterized as archetypical of the land-grant university. If this is indeed the case, it provides a convincing reason why Kinley might not have been enthusiastic about the land-grant mission and thus did not emphasize it as a means to legitimate his university.

While the reason why Kinley did not invoke his university’s relationship to its land-grant status remains inconclusive, there is no ambiguity about the position he articulated on the state university’s research prowess. The state university, he argued, distinguished itself especially well as a research institution. “For the proper development of all subjects of study and the prosecution of research,” he contended, “a university of the people is . . . the best agency.” Private institutions were likely to resist innovative areas of inquiry and popular calls for their application to societal problems, whereas—as with teaching—state institutions were more willing to embrace these fields. The state university, Kinley asserted, had also made substantial progress is breaking the “line of cleavage” between the practical and theoretical. Speaking of his own university, he described Illinois as a place that “knows no difference between the most abstruse subject and the most practical one . . . no one can tell where unknown truth hides, nor what additions to human welfare the most abstruse inquiry may ultimately produce.” Despite statements about varied forms of inquiry and unexpected benefits, Kinley acknowledged that state universities had focused primarily on research that benefitted to human welfare by

242 Ibid., 535.
244 Kinley, “Advantages of State Universities and Their Relation to the Public,” 103.
245 Ibid., 107.
246 Kinley, [n.t.], (speech delivered at the National Warm Air Heating and Ventilating Association meeting), 5.
improving economic conditions. By doing so he highlighted the tangible utility of the university in the service of the public good.

Although Kinley viewed the university as the best means to identify future problems and provide their solutions, he also assigned it more mundane roles. Like other higher education utilitarians, he saw the preparation of men and women for employment as one of its primary functions. Thus prepared, Kinley noted, graduates would have the means for personal financial and professional gain. However, while he acknowledged that higher education could provide such private goods, Kinley de-emphasized this benefit by arguing that the university was an institution primarily in the service of society. He was especially explicit about this function as it related to the state university:

The primary purpose of the public in establishing and supporting a state university, through the legally organized machinery of government, is not to promote the interests of individuals. The promotion of the interests of individuals is rather the means through which the primary purpose is attained. That primary purpose is the maintenance and improvement of what I may roughly call “the social order,” meaning by that term the existing conditions, legal, economic, political, etc., established by the authority of the sovereign group, the people of the state.

Therefore Kinley’s hope for resurgence in individualism had little to do with the fulfillment of mere personal self-interest. He was indeed a proponent of individualism, and at odds with those progressives who deplored it, but he was suspect of individualism that saw the self, rather than society, as the ultimate object.

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247 Kinley, “Advantages of State Universities and Their Relation to the Public,” 104.
248 Kinley, “Functions of the State University,” [1].
Given this, the university’s role in the formation of individuals was in the service of the public good. The university’s goal in teaching an individual citizen, Kinley argued, “is not primarily that he may be prosperous or that he may be educated, but that, being educated and prosperous as a result of this training . . . he will be an appropriate unit of the social structure.”\(^\text{249}\) Speaking at a commencement ceremony, he explained to the graduating students that they were not only going to be engineers or other professionals, they were also going to be citizens. “You will make a mistake,” Kinley cautioned, “if you think that the success of your career . . . is more important than your success in the discharge of your duties of citizenship.”\(^\text{250}\) Neglecting these duties, he continued, would lead to decay in government for which personal economic success was insufficient compensation. Consequently, Kinley implored the graduates to apply the same level of responsibility to the duties of citizenship as they expected to apply to their professions. Such an effort was especially important at that moment in history, when the threat to popular government had never been greater. Concluding his commencement address he asked the graduates to make themselves “the best that is in you, not only for yourselves, but for God, for country, and for Illinois.”\(^\text{251}\)

As this speech demonstrates, Kinley placed particular emphasis on the role university graduates could play in addressing societal needs. He argued that these men and women have a greater responsibility to maintain society and advance progress than the “uneducated” because the “college educated . . . should have higher standards and ideals” than those who had fewer educational opportunities.\(^\text{252}\) Furthermore, those who were educated at public expense, at both privately endowed and publically supported universities, had more responsibility to fulfill

\(^{249}\) Ibid.
\(^{250}\) Ibid., 10-11.
\(^{251}\) Ibid., 11.
\(^{252}\) David Kinley, “The University Graduate and His Community” (speech delivered at the University of Illinois commencement Urbana, June 13, 1928), 4. University Archives, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
citizenship duties.\textsuperscript{253} In correspondence to his overall evaluation of state universities, Kinley argued that this public service responsibility was strongest for those who were educated by their state institution, which was created to train leaders “under direct obligation to win their personal success through service to the people.” Indeed, he concluded, “there is a greater obligation on those educated in a public institution than there is upon others to adopt as their motto, ‘service rather than self-interest.’”\textsuperscript{254}

Kinley’s confidence in the power of education was necessarily tied to his belief in education’s indispensable role in democracy. Without sufficient education the people—the essence of democracy—would be unable to fulfill democracy’s promise. Kinley acknowledged that the question of sufficient education could be a problem. The very nature of a democratic republic made it impossible for each and every citizen to be sufficiently educated on public policy matters and unlikely to join in mass action based on prejudice and emotion.\textsuperscript{255} The solution to this inefficiency of democratic government, he argued, was more higher education for more people, “provided their education includes character development as well as intellectual growth.”\textsuperscript{256} Looking forward to a possible increase in the number of colleges and universities, Kinley argued that expansion of this sort would not cause a leveling effect that would discourage the development of leaders. What it would do is produce both leaders and those who are capable of understanding the policies these leaders create. Without this benefit of mass higher education, he warned, leadership would be “used in the interest of the leader and not in the interest of the led.”\textsuperscript{257}

\textsuperscript{253} Kinley, “Lost Leadership,” 9.  
\textsuperscript{254} Kinley, “Advantages of State Universities and Their Relation to the Public,” 107.  
\textsuperscript{256} Kinley, “Functions of the State University,” 9.  
\textsuperscript{257} Ibid.
Hence, for Kinley, the teaching component of the university could better serve the public by educating two types of people: the leaders and the intelligent and discerning led. The former would not only direct those who followed them, they would also serve an important moderating function. “A political society like ours,” Kinley argued, “will always need men like Washington and Lincoln who dare to oppose the public passion of the moment and depend upon the sober second thought of the people.” Leaders of this sort try to realize their high standards but do so with humility and patience, even in the face of ill will from a populace that has yet to come to sober conclusions. All aspects of society benefits from such leader, Kinley explained, but they are of most important in the realm of public policy.

The university, especially the state variety, is the ideal means to prepare these civic leaders, Kinley argued. However, changes in the curriculum through the growth in electives and, especially, the rise of new and increasingly focused areas of specialization, undermined this preparatory role. Kinley generally applauded how higher education had become a way for people to develop into efficient workers in areas of vocational specialization, such as agriculture, business or engineering. Education in such fields, he allowed, did not necessarily exclude the development of public policy leaders but people of this sort were unusual. To assume that expertise in one area was transferable to matters of policy was imprudent. Kinley contended, “it is foolishness for us to look to Mr. Henry Ford for expert advice on our monetary policy because he has shown great genius in a certain manufacturing industry; or to expect wise advice from Mr. Edison on education because he has shown genius in electrical research. Yet there is too much of this sort of thing in our American life.” The national tendency to ignore how success is highly particular, should not allow us to mistakenly expect public policy leaders from among the highly

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258 Kinley, “Curriculum and Some of Its Consequences,” 27.
259 Ibid.
260 Kinley, “University Graduate and His Community,” 7.
specialized. Instead, Kinley offered, “leadership by university men on great questions of public policy is likely to lie in the main with men with what we call an all-round education in the more or less old fashioned sense.”

Hence for the societally essential matters of citizenship, public policy, and overall effective democracy, Kinley advocated comprehensive education. This form of education should include instruction in science, which had become the “dominating motive” of the era, but science alone is insufficient. “If we would make our social systems more permanent,” Kinley argued, “we must provide educational facilities not only for science and technology, but for economic, political, spiritual, aesthetic subjects in full measure, so that our society shall be under the influence of as many as possible of the civilization-dominating influences of the past.” In addition, he said, education should include moral training because the decay of civic life is not merely the result of ignorance. Instead, its main cause is corruption. Kinley saw this corruption manifested in the bad government on the state, city and national level. In this regard, he was like so many other people of the Progressive Era, including progressive reformers who tried to change things outside of traditional party politics. Kinley himself hoped to address the problem through higher education but he argued that knowledge and intelligence were themselves insufficient to the task. They are, he warned, extremely dangerous when possessed by people with bad character and selfish desires. “Public office is a public trust,” Kinley explained, and it should only be entrusted to those who have characters of high quality who will, in turn, apply their knowledge and intelligence to achieving general interests not their own.

263 Ibid., 8-9.
265 Ibid., 11-12.
266 Ibid., 13-14.
Because character development is required to prepare people to fulfill their civic duties, the curriculum should include relevant areas of study, such as ethics, philosophy, logic, psychology and, although it was just Kinley’s “personal opinion,” religious instruction.  

Kinley’s curricular ideal incorporated a focus on morality, as was typical of his era, and the inclusion of subjects that would provide the broad knowledge and skills necessary for citizenship. As Kinley indicated, he hoped that this form of liberal education would address the inadequacy of narrow specialization to advance democratic society. The goal of this curriculum can be described as conservative, and even nostalgic. Kinley looked back to what had been lost in American political culture and saw potential resurrection through the employment of traditional values. Unable to achieve this goal through the old frontier’s revitalizing clarity, he had to look to the curriculum of the university—an institution of the new frontier.

Conclusion

From the late nineteenth century to 1930, the United States faced new challenges as urbanization, immigration, the rise of industry, and other phenomena transformed the country. In response to such changes, many people across the U.S. pursued a reformist agenda that can be generally, if not precisely, described as “progressive.” As a student and young faculty member, David Kinley was especially sympathetic to the more transformative of these agendas. However, as his administrative duties grew, he increasingly found greater correspondence between his interests and those of conservatism. In his public statements he expressed a strong belief in education as a means for dramatic change, a return to earlier ideals and an antidote to the status quo. He repeatedly explained that the restoration and expansion of what he saw as the democratic vitality

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267 Ibid., 11-14.
of the past was possible through one of the primary institutional innovations of the present, the research university.

In Kinley’s formulation, the university was archetypically public, and the state university was particularly so. Through popular support the state university came into being as a public institution and it, in turn, served this public through its education and research functions. According to Kinley, the state was the manifestation of the people: hence the public was the state. The university served this public by acting as the state’s developmental arm. Its success necessarily depended on its freedom to act, a form of freedom in which expertise must not be encumbered by the interference of biased government interests or popular ignorance. When freed in this way, Kinley contended, the university could fulfill its potential. It erased false beliefs, added knowledge, advanced the economy and improved the overall condition of life. However, as Kinley made clear, it did not do these things for the benefit of the individual; it was not primarily a means for private good. Instead, individual gain was incidental to addressing the wider needs of society. Most importantly, the university was the means to resolve the growing deficiency in American political culture. By destroying ignorance, building character, and increasing knowledge, it helped to create people who were suited to civil society.

Therefore Kinley’s vision of the relationship between the university and its public was a political one. By supporting the university—especially the state university—the people became the university’s public and, correspondingly, its essential subject and object. The university not only served this public by educating political subjects and providing valuable research, its very formation and maintenance was a reflection of popular enfranchisement and will. In this respect the university was an indispensable public institution and a necessary condition for the fulfillment of the public’s democratic interests at a time when they appeared in decline.
However, Kinley’s notion of how the university could serve democracy did not mean that he embraced the idea of the university as a space of public discourse, or public sphere, in which different views could be accommodated and discussed in a rationale manner. Instead, he discouraged such a space and its discursive ideals by his deliberate measures to quash what he saw as a leftist threat to the University of Illinois.

Whether or not Kinley could be described as progressive, at any time during his career, is open to debate. He displayed some characteristics that are considered generally typical of progressives, including a confidence in purposeful action in politics and social affairs, trust in the utility of scientific problem solving, and an ultimate belief in the needs of society over those of the individual. He was highly committed to promoting democracy and its expansion; and, to some degree, he even saw value in government intervention. It is clear, however, that Kinley did not display the concern for equality and individual development of Tyack’s pedagogical progressives but was instead, if anything, an administrative progressive. Regardless if Kinley should be described in such terms, he shared with administrative progressives a tendency towards paternalism and the promotion of efficiency, expertise and centralization. It is nevertheless clear that he was of the Progressive Era. As a scholar of economics and a leader of a research university, his academic training and professional responsibilities were developments of his own time. The university where he worked for nearly forty years was an institution that shared the ideals of service, utility, and science that were essential to the spirit of the age. Kinley’s understanding of the university’s role in relation to the public also corresponded to the Progressive Era Zeitgeist. It was a relationship in which a rationalized institution—bureaucratic, scientific, and professional—was the locus for the formation of the public and the ultimate means for the fulfillment of the public good.
CHAPTER 3:

DE-LOCALIZING THE PUBLIC IN THE POST-WAR UNIVERSITY:
THE STODDARD PRESIDENCY, 1946-1953

In July 1946, George D. Stoddard, former Commissioner of the New York Department of Education, arrived in Urbana-Champaign to assume the presidency of the University of Illinois. Stoddard, his wife Margaret, and their five children moved into the President’s Mansion on Florida Avenue, transforming it, he recalled, “from a quiet, serene, childless residence into a beehive of activity involving family, students and faculty.”268 Over the next six years, Stoddard maintained a high level of activity not only in his presidential residence, but also in more discretely professional spaces of the University of Illinois. However, his relentless activity frequently took place beyond the domestic comforts of home and the familiar offices of campus. The responsibilities of his position and his personal agenda drew him to locations elsewhere in Illinois and the United States, and to countries throughout the world. It was this latter, international, space of activity that most significantly corresponded to Stoddard’s articulated vision of the university’s role and its relationship to a public unbounded by local assumptions and state or national borders.

Stoddard’s presidency followed a period of significant upheaval and growth in the higher education sector. The Great Depression was a time of enormous difficulty for American colleges and universities, and their students, faculty and staff. Although World War II injected new resources into higher education, the war era brought its own trials as campuses became important factors in the war effort. Nevertheless, higher education institutions endured and began the post-war era as vital and societally important institutions. At the same time, the end of the war was followed by new challenges, not only the advent of mass higher education but also far broader

concerns about political stability in the atomic age. It was in this context that Stoddard assumed the presidency of the University of Illinois. During his tenure, the university continued its trajectory of growth, both in size and stature. Its expansion corresponded to Stoddard’s own claim that universities ought to assume a greater role in the world, one that reflected its important responsibilities within a larger education project and the dire need to marshal resources to address the problems of the post-war world. According to Stoddard, public universities, such as the University of Illinois, were especially well suited to resolving such problems. They reflected the will of the citizens who supported them and the democratic ideals of the nation. Yet although the relationship between the university and the citizenry might suggest that its responsibilities were necessarily localized, for Stoddard this was not the case. Rather, through speeches, radio broadcasts and magazine articles, he promoted a notion of education that was not locally circumscribed but instead served national and even international interests. Through his articulation of this particular view, Stoddard asserted that the University of Illinois, and the university in more abstract terms, was an institution that performed an expansive public service. Correspondingly, the object of this service—the university’s public—was not something exclusively bounded by the campus or the state of Illinois. It was instead something far greater.

Despite the important role Stoddard played in the history of Illinois, his presidency has received almost no scholarly attention. The two most significant contributions, Winton U. Solberg and Robert Tomilson’s “Academic McCarthyism and Keynesian Economics: The Bowen Controversy at the University of Illinois” and Nicholas Wiseman’s “Falsely Accused: Cold War Liberalism Reassessed” focused on Stoddard’s relationship with Cold War conservatives.  

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College of Commerce and Business Administration reveals essential divisions over the question of the free market vs. Keynesianism. Stoddard’s role in this case placed him squarely in the camp of the Keynesians and at odds with many traditionalists on campus and in the state of Illinois.

Wisseman examined the tensions between Stoddard’s anti-Communism and anti-McCarthyism and argued that Stoddard’s attempts to quash Communism on campus lacked the virulent hysteria and dogmatism of the McCarthyists. He characterized Stoddard as a man following his principles in a coherent and measured way. While both of these works give insight into Stoddard’s administrative style and particular brand of Cold War liberalism, they provide little to help clarify his vision of the university and how it related to the public. Aside from these two articles, the literature on Stoddard and his presidency is primarily descriptive. Like Kinley, Stoddard is featured in Stephens’ Illini Years and Ebert’s An Illini Century. Stephens’ work provides little more than an overview of key developments during Stoddard’s first three years, and Ebert’s book is limited to student life. The most detailed and comprehensive source for Stoddard and his time at Illinois is Stoddard’s own, The Pursuit of An Education: An Autobiography. Although useful, it has the limitations typical of many works of this sort: even when the goal to be as neutral as possible, it tends to exonerate and celebrate.

Conclusions about Stoddard’s formulation of the relationship between the university and the public are based on a collection of 67 speeches, radio broadcast transcripts, and articles delivered or published by Stoddard between 1946 and 1953. A number of the speeches and radio broadcasts were not only heard by audiences in person or over the airwaves, they were also made available later in journals, proceedings and magazines. Reflecting on some of the speeches in his autobiography, Stoddard recounted that, in his first year as president, he made 140 speeches,

270 [Stephens], 113-118; Ebert, 167-186.
“that is, I spoke 140 times on variations of the same theme: what the university means to the people of the state and especially to the veterans returning from World War II.” These speeches, he explained, discussed how the university was working towards accommodating greater student enrollment while also enlarging and enriching its programs. He indicated that, due to the state’s regional political differences, “it was necessary to remind audiences that the University of Illinois, supported by all citizens of the state, was beholden to all; through instruction, research, and extension service it was in a position to penetrate every region and appeal to every walk of life.” Like comprehensive state universities in Minnesota and Wisconsin, Illinois’ “special power” lied in a “vision of the mutuality of education and public service.”

Stoddard’s recollections suggest that a significant number of his speeches were focused on the relationship between the University of Illinois and its state. However, the extent to which these speeches did indeed discuss “what the university means to the people” in a specific and localized sense is difficult to determine. The archive contains only five speeches from the year of “140 speeches” (1946-1947) and only two of these are focused on the university’s role in Illinois. Instead, the available speeches for the entirety of Stoddard’s presidency suggest a different emphasis. A review of all of the speeches from 1946-1953, the duration of his presidency, reveals a strong focus on issues beyond the University of Illinois and its state. Very often these speeches discuss issues in broad, even theoretical terms—such as the purpose of education—or examining the role of education and educational institutions in an era of international, post-war, anxiety.

273 There is no reason to believe that Stoddard did not communicate his ideas to a broad and general audience of Illinois citizens. His admission that he spoke, in his first year, “140 times on variations of the same theme” suggests that he did not prepare a new text for each speaking engagement, yet this does not sufficiently address the scarcity of documentation. Perhaps Stoddard’s populist “speeches,” unlike his other speeches, were not written down but were instead comments delivered casually. If they were written down, it is possible that they did not survive to be archived. Lastly, it is may also be the case that Stoddard did not include these speeches in his archives, instead privileging those that are now extant, seeing them as being especially representative of his presidency and ideals.
This apparent emphasis on large, delocalized, issues is also reflected in other sources. The radio broadcasts and publications examined devote little attention to Illinois or its state university. To some degree, there is a correspondence between audience and emphasis. For example, Stoddard’s articles in the *University of Illinois Faculty Bulletin* and *Illinois Alumni News* are indeed focused on the University and its role in Illinois. However, aside from the correlation between such highly circumscribed audiences and content, Stoddard’s articles and speeches follow a general pattern: the audience is usually quite specialized while the message is far reaching. The only instances in which the audiences are potentially, if not actually, truly popular are radio broadcasts via the *University of Chicago Roundtable* and *America’s Town Meeting of the Air*.

Hence the majority of Stoddard’s works that are employed in this chapter were not directed at the populace of Illinois but at relatively specialized audiences, such as teachers and other educators, professional associations, and organizations to which Stoddard had especially strong ties, including the Unitarian church and UNESCO. The articles that provide analytical substance were most often featured in publications with, to varying degrees, focused audiences, including *The Phi Delta Kappan*, *Scientific American*, and *NEA Journal, School and Society*, and other professional media. Similarly, his speeches were delivered to professional groups, such as the National Association of Secondary School Principals and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Stoddard also addressed the Decatur, Illinois PTA and other community groups and political organizations, such as UNESCO and the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. In addition to a variety of events at the University of Illinois, Stoddard delivered speeches on special occasions at other institutions, including Pennsylvania State College’s Honor’s Day, and the University of Florida’s Presidential Inauguration.
Collectively, Stoddard’s speeches, radio broadcasts and articles demonstrate a strong focus on the wide-ranging societal possibilities of higher education. The precise nature of Stoddard’s formulation of these possibilities, and the ways in which they related to the University of Illinois, owe a great deal to the context and development of higher education from the 1930s to the beginning of the post-war era. This historical milieu profoundly corresponds to the ways in which Stoddard, once he had become the president of Illinois in 1946, articulated the relationship between the university and the society it served.

The National Context from 1930 to the Post-war Era

When David Kinley left office in 1930, many of the defining changes in interwar higher education were well under way. By that time, universities had attained unprecedented stature in American society. Their contribution to the war effort solidified enthusiasm of external actors, including state and federal governments and private foundations, and led to dramatic growth in political and economic support for their research and teaching activities. Increasingly, a college degree was seen as the primary mechanism for social mobility and this, combined with popular interest in college life, encouraged significant expansion in student enrollment.274 Between the wars, enrollment in college and universities grew from 250,000 to 1.3 million, more than a fivefold increase. In response to these changes, higher education institutions—especially research universities—were becoming larger and more complex. Administration grew to meet the needs of greater numbers of students and to provide the support necessary for faculty who were increasingly focused on research. At the same time, universities were responding to the growing needs of students, faculty and staff, and to a populace ever more interested in college

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274 On the growing belief that a college degree would lead to social mobility, see Levine, *American College of the Culture of Aspiration*. 
sports, by adding significantly to their campus, including dormitories, classrooms, laboratories and monumental football stadiums.\textsuperscript{275} In broad terms, the interwar period can be seen as an era of university growth, not merely in terms of enrollment and physical size, but also in terms of its recognized social status and utility.

However, despite the general continuity of the interwar years, higher education’s developmental trajectory could not avoid the impact of the Great Depression. For the most part, colleges and universities did not immediately feel the full effect of the Depression, with research universities largely escaping its effects from 1929 to 1932. This nearly three-year respite was due to a number of factors that mitigated short-term economic crises. Student enrollments continued the upward trajectory that began in the 1920s through the 1930-31 academic year and did not decline markedly for two more years. Appropriations for state universities were set long before a given year and usually provided two years of funding. Endowments, of especial importance to private universities, were invested conservatively and generated anticipated income well into the Depression. Therefore, until 1932, these research institutions remained for the most part financially stable.\textsuperscript{276}

By 1932 the situation had changed. U.S. national income had dropped to half of what it was in 1929 and between 12 and 14 million people were unemployed.\textsuperscript{277} With household income plunging and no end in sight, more and more students were unable to return to their universities and fewer new students could afford to enroll. To address this financial shortfall, many universities raised tuition, and the legislatures that funded state universities dramatically reduced appropriations. At most institutions the situation became worse in the 1933-34 academic year. Investment income, essential to private universities, decreased rapidly as companies defaulted on

\textsuperscript{275} Thelin, \textit{History of American Higher Education}, 205-211.
\textsuperscript{276} Geiger, \textit{To Advance Knowledge}, 247.
their dividend and interest payments. These factors reduced general and educational expenditures at all research universities to levels lower than they were two years earlier.278

By the latter half of the 1930s, the situation had improved to some degree. State universities rebounded relative to private institutions but this change had little to do with state appropriations, which remained weak. Instead, state institutions benefitted from a surge in tuition income caused by a 21% growth in student enrollment and greater external funds in support of research. Private universities continued to lag behind. For these institutions, tuition income did not increase significantly but their primary difficulty was a persistently poor rate of return on investment. However, for both private and public universities, the economic conditions of the Depression could provide ways to minimize the impact of these conditions on university operations. Cost of living dropped tremendously, which especially benefitted students. Reduced competition for labor allowed universities to retain highly qualified employees, even when it was necessary to reduce salaries to address budget shortfalls. Indeed, institution-wide salary reductions were the standard approach used by most universities. Salary cuts were not usually restored, but were instead eventually offset by later raises and promotions. Nevertheless, due to the reduced cost of living in the latter half of the 1930s, the real income of the average college teacher was the highest it had been in a generation.279

In addition to salary reductions, research universities adopted other measures to lower administrative costs. A number of junior-level faculty members were fired and some older ones were forced into retirement but, more frequently, costs were reduced through other measures such as not filling faculty and staff vacancies, cutting funds for fellowships and visiting lecturers, and shrinking departmental research budgets. There was a perception that many faculty members

278 Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 248.
279 Ibid., 248-249.
lost their jobs during the Depression, with a corresponding increase in teaching load. However “insofar as this view was correct,” Geiger cautioned, “it pertained only to the crisis years.” For the entire higher education sector, the 1930s saw a significant growth in teaching faculty but this growth was exceeded at research universities, which had a 45% increase from 1929 to 1939. Furthermore, with the exception of the Universities of California and Michigan, student/faculty ratios decreased at research universities nationwide during the 1930s.

Although the Depression required large reductions in expenditures, the consequential institutional changes, combined with lowered costs, allowed research universities to return to or even exceed their activities once the Depression began to wane. Research activities, in particular, weathered the Depression remarkably well. Much of the financial and material investment that was made in the 1920s continued to support research activities into the next decade. Labor-intensive research benefitted from the era’s reduced costs, and student researchers were able to continue their work through New Deal labor subsidies. As was the case with general endowment funds, universities saw poor returns on investments made to subsidize research, however external research funds, including corporate and foundation grants and private gifts, grew consistently following the depth of the crisis in the mid-1930s and often compensated for reduced return on investments. The limited resources of the 1930s ensured that overall research activity did not expand during the decade but, given the dire economic condition of the country, university research was quite resilient during the Depression.

For major research universities, the 1930s was also the era in which graduate education matured. Prior to the 1930s, the admission of graduate students was a largely a highly localized and even ad hoc enterprise, without standardized criteria. By the late 1930s, however, the

\[\text{Ibid., 250.}\]
\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., 251-252.}\]
process of graduate admissions was significantly more rationalized, including through the use of
the Graduate Record Examination (1937). Such developments were accompanied by greater
financial support for post-doctoral fellows and graduate students, and the latter were increasingly
employed as teaching assistants. The 1930s was a period of similar changes for university
faculty. The structure of their careers became further rationalized with clearer and more regular
processes of evaluation and promotion.²⁸³

The general impact of the Depression differed for private and public research
universities. Private institutions were especially hurt by a decrease in investment income. In
addition, the large private gifts that had greatly contributed to their growth diminished
considerably or were directed more specifically than they were in the past. Consequently, capital
was not available for large projects. Public universities faced the same problems but their
situation was less severe. In some states, including California, Michigan and Minnesota, these
universities developed strong support networks that allowed them maintain or even increase
endowments. Furthermore, public universities received New Deal relief funds through the Works
Projects Administration and Public Works Administration, allowing them to improve their
physical infrastructure.²⁸⁴ Across the country, public universities renovated existing buildings
and constructed new ones, including student unions and administrative and classroom buildings.

As the Depression waned and war looked increasingly likely, a new source of research
funding promised to improve the situation of all research universities, both public and private.
From the second decade of the twentieth century, universities relied on external funds to support
research. During the 1920s and 30s, the primary source of these funds were philanthropic
foundations, but from the 1940s, the importance of the foundations diminished as the U.S.

²⁸³ Roger L. Geiger, "Research, Graduate Education, and the Ecology of American Universities: An Interpretive History" in The
²⁸⁴ Geiger, To Advance Knowledge, 252.
federal government played an increasingly greater role. In June 1940, Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington, began to outline a relationship between the federal government and universities that would not only suit the needs of wartime mobilization, but also characterize research funding well into the post-war period. Unlike the approach during the First World War, when government laboratories were set up and staffed by university researchers, Bush’s new plan promoted the establishment of contractual relationships between the federal government and universities which allowed most scientists to conduct their research in their on-campus laboratories.285

The war effort organized a variety of researchers on projects of different types and sizes. The “Big Science” projects were the most notable results of the university-government partnership. Two examples, the Manhattan Project and the Radiation Laboratory at MIT employed over 1000 people, including researchers gathered from universities across the country. At the same time, there were much smaller research efforts. Medical researchers, for example, often worked individually in their own laboratories. Regardless of the size of the research projects the relationship between the federal government and the scientists remained the same. Agents of the federal government, such as National Defense Research Committee, would determine strategic research need and proceed with the contractual and administrative arrangements. Decisions in scientific matters, however, would remain the province of the scientists themselves.286 Although the applied sciences received the most attention and the vast majority of funds, the war effort included a wider range of disciplines. For example, professors of geography and history analyzed the topography, politics and culture of both allies and enemies. Language professors provided instruction and expertise in key strategic languages,

285 See Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge, 3-29.
286 See Ibid., 11.
including Italian, Japanese and Russian; and biologists and medical researchers studied tropical diseases and developed ways to treat them.\(^{287}\)

As was the case in the First World War, colleges and universities across the country became the location of intensive military training programs. However, the time spent on these campuses were necessarily limited. Soon these trainees, like so many young Americans, would be sent to war. Student enrollment could not keep up with the attrition and its numbers dropped precipitously. Even at Harvard enrollment dropped so much that its administration considered an enrollment and teaching moratorium for its graduate programs.\(^{288}\)

The end of the Second World War inaugurated what Thelin described as higher education’s era of the “three Ps”: “prosperity, prestige, and popularity” and what others referred to as a “golden age.”\(^{289}\) The war itself provided the essential foundations of this period of success. Colleges and universities had played a key role in the military effort and widespread awareness of this contribution increased academe’s public value. After the war, higher education institutions continued to assert their problem-solving role. The war had extended the efforts of many institutions beyond their geographical locale and, hence, these institutions saw themselves to an unprecedented degree in national, even international, terms.

This shift from away from the relative localism or regionalism of the pre-war period can be attributed in part to the major role played by two federal initiatives: government support for scientific research and the Servicemen’s Adjustment Act of 1944, commonly referred to as the G.I. Bill. Although each of these initiatives supplied funds for the university’s most prominent roles, research and teaching, they did more than provide material support. Through their very

\(^{288}\) Ibid., 261.
\(^{289}\) Ibid., 260.
existence they legitimated higher education and asserted its prominent place in post-war America.

As the wartime mobilization of research had demonstrated, applied knowledge was of tremendous importance to national security. The government-university partnership that Vannevar Bush pioneered in 1940 had developed a highly effective infrastructure and set of processes through the course of the war. At the request of President Roosevelt, Bush examined how science might benefit the nation when peace returned. Bush’s 1945 report, *Science, the Endless Frontier*, argued for continued federal support of scientific research, citing its importance not only for national security [an archetypical public good], but also medicine, job creation and the growth of industry.\(^\text{290}\) Federal support, Bush explained, was especially imperative for basic scientific research. Bush proposed a continuation of competitively awarded research grants and their administration through federal channels, which eventually included the National Science Foundation and National Institutes of Health. Because the grants were most often awarded to scientists at elite research institutions, they ultimately did little to advance the status of research at non-elite universities. Instead they served to reify established hierarchies. At the top were those institutions that had long dominated scientific research, such as MIT, Johns Hopkins and California-Berkeley. Within these institutions, research in physics, biology and medicine benefitted most significantly.

Whereas federal support for research was primarily to the advantage of elite institutions, federal student support was far more widespread in its impact. The return of millions of servicemen would necessarily have led to an increase in college and university enrollment. However, the mass enrollment of the post-war period was only possible through affordances

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made possible by government policies the G.I. Bill. The G.I. Bill sought to integrate returning soldiers into civilian life. It was hoped that it would allow the labor market sufficient time to adjust to the influx of returning workers, while at the same time preventing the type of civil strife that had followed World War I. It accomplished these goals by providing returning soldiers with funding for tuition and fees, educational supplies and subsistence.

By fall of 1946, over 1 million veterans were attending college via the G.I. Bill. This number increased to over 2 million four years later. The G.I. Bill was especially effective in assisting students who would not have been able to pursue higher education without financial assistance. The tuition and fee subsidies provided by the G.I. Bill were particularly beneficial to state colleges and universities, which were generally the less expensive option. Consequently, they attracted larger numbers of students and, correspondingly, more federal funds. Greater means allowed for the expansion of facilities, more faculty and higher salaries. Eventually the value of the G.I. Bill diminished relative to the large increase in subsidies state institutions received from their governments. These were so significant that they allowed tuition and fees to be set artificially low, at levels well below those of privately endowed colleges and universities. Overall, the post-war growth of the state higher education raised its profile as a key societal actor, one of increasingly greater importance to the populace.

Regardless of state or private status, higher education institutions faced an enrollment boom. Prior to the war, during the 1939-40 academic year, enrollment in all U.S. colleges and universities was a bit less than 1.5 million students. This number dipped significantly during the war itself. It increased after 1945 until, by the 1949-50 academic year, student enrollment

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292 Ibid., 262-268.
reached nearly 2.7 million nation-wide, an 80% increase in a decade.\(^{293}\) This growth can be partially attributed to the material support provided by the G.I. Bill, but the correlation between the legislation and enrollment was most often not so direct. A Veterans Administration study later concluded that 80% of veteran students would have gone to college regardless of the G.I. Bill.\(^{294}\) Furthermore, the post-war enrollment bulge cannot be wholly attributed to returning soldiers. It was instead the aggregate of veterans and traditional students, all of whom enrolled in college during an era of great enthusiasm for higher education. Per David O. Levine’s formulation, this post-war enthusiasm can be seen as continuation of the pre-war belief in the utility of higher education for social mobility, a private good.\(^{295}\) However, as Daniel A. Clark observed, interwar colleges and universities remained institutions primarily for the upper-middle class. The “most important result” of the G.I. Bill, Clark argued, was that it helped to reshape the place of college education in the post-war U.S.\(^{296}\) It did this by instilling in the popular imagination the idea that a G.I.—long portrayed as the common man—could also be a student at an elite institution. Hence the G.I. Bill served as the catalyst for a cultural transformation in which college became viewed as a viable option for men and, to a lesser degree, women regardless of social class, and a means for democratic access. As Clark argued, the G.I. Bill led to the increasing popularization of higher education as a “new route to the American dream.”\(^{297}\)

Graduate student enrollment increased as part of this post-war boom. During the 1939-40 academic year, for example, 106,000 students (7%) were enrolled at the masters or Ph.D. students. By 1950, the number doubled to 237,200.\(^{298}\) Despite this increase, graduate students

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\(^{293}\) Ibid., 261.

\(^{294}\) In Keith Olson, *The G.I. Bill, the Veterans, and the Colleges* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1974), 109-110.

\(^{295}\) Levine, *American College of the Culture of Aspiration*.


\(^{297}\) Ibid., 189.

remained a small percentage of total enrollees, and most of them continued the trend of earning
their degrees in a limited number of well-funded fields, and from the same 20 universities that
had been long dominant.299 However, the rise in undergraduate enrollment provided an
opportunity for the funding of more graduate students through teaching assistantships, especially
in those fields that were less likely to receive external funds.

This significant increase in student enrollment created new institutional challenges. To
process large numbers of applications and place students appropriately in courses, colleges and
universities increased their reliance on standardized tests. Such expansion in the bureaucratic
workload led to corresponding growth in administration; and the faculty swelled to address the
demand for classes. Campuses were often inadequate to needs of greater numbers of students and
responded by building temporary structures, including the ubiquitous Quonset hut. In some cases
branch campuses were added to accommodate the surge in student numbers. Many of these
branch campuses remain part of state university systems, whereas others lasted only for a few
years after the conclusion of the war.300

Whereas Bush’s Science, the Endless Frontier was concerned with research, and
universities’ research capabilities, two other reports of the immediate post-war era focused on its
teaching component. The first of these was the product of a committee that was convened at
Harvard University in 1943 while the war was still underway. This committee set out to examine
the education system in the United States and, Harvard President James Conant explained,
consider how it might “shape the future and secure the foundations of our free society.”301 The
findings were published in 1945 as General Education in a Free Society: Report of the Harvard

299 Ibid.
300 For instance, the Hartford campus of the University of Connecticut has continued since its 1946 opening, whereas the Fort
Trumbull campuses was only open from 1946-1950.
301 James Bryant Conant, "Introduction," in General Education in a Free Society: Report of the Harvard Committee (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1945), x.
Committee, more popularly known as the “Harvard Red Book.” The Red Book asserted that American secondary and higher education was no longer sufficient to meet the needs of what had become a specialized and complex society. The solution, it argued, was a store of common knowledge. The Red Book expressed special concern over how political power had shifted from the hands of a broadly educated elite to an undereducated populace. It sought to address this concern by broadening the education of average Americans to include “general education,” defined in contrast to “special education.” The former was “that part of a student’s whole education which looks first of all to his life as a responsible human being and citizen,” whereas special education was “that part which looks to the student’s competence in some occupation.” If general education were indeed accomplished it would not only lead to the education of the “whole man,” an ideally integrated social and political subject, it would also bind each of these whole men cooperatively, facilitating national unity.

The implementation of general education would require a revision of the curriculum. To this end, the Red Book provided a nuanced analysis of the relationship between learning a specific type of knowledge (the humanities, social science and natural sciences) and the development of key abilities: “effective thinking, communication, the making of relevant judgments, and the discrimination of values.” To accomplish these abilities it, in turn, provided a curricular model, one that incorporated precisely designed humanities, social science, and natural science courses. The Red Book’s message resonated to post-war educators. Daniel Bell observed, “in many places it quickly became the bible of general education, particularly in

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303 Ibid., 51.
304 Ibid., 74.
305 General Education in a Free Society, 73.
smaller colleges and state universities.”\textsuperscript{306} “The higher education community,” Morton and Phyllis Keller noted, “seized on it as the definitive statement of post-war curriculum reform.”\textsuperscript{307} By 1950, more than 40,000 copies had been sold.\textsuperscript{308}

In November 1945, five months after Harvard President Conant completed his introduction to the Red Book, representatives of 44 countries met at a United Nations conference in London to establish an organization for the promotion of peace and understanding in the post-war world. The constitution of this new body, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), opened with the statement, “that since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.”\textsuperscript{309} Given this, Article 1.1 of the Constitution explained, the purpose of UNESCO is:

To contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{310}

UNESCO was founded as a response to war and based on the assumption that future wars might be averted through educational, scientific and cultural mechanisms of understanding. Because universities played such an important role in all three of these areas, the creation of UNESCO suggested that universities would also play a role in the fulfillment of UNESCO and its


\textsuperscript{308} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{309} “Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,” in Fernando Valderrama, \textit{A History of UNESCO} (Paris: UNESCO, 1995), 395; Signed on November 16, 1945, the constitution of UNESCO was later ratified on November 4, 1946 by twenty countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Lebanon, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

\textsuperscript{310} Ibid., 396.
international goals. Even if universities themselves were not directly involved in UNESCO, they were likely to contribute by supplying the scholars and researchers who would provide much of the expertise employed by UNESCO and, more generally, by serving as the essential legitimating agent for the belief in the social utility of knowledge.

The signing of UNESCO’s Constitution reflected both international anxiety about the post-war world and a desire to find knowledge-based solutions to global problems. Such concerns were also expressed, on a national level, with the publication of Higher Education for American Democracy.311 This work was initiated in 1946 when President Harry S. Truman asked his Commission on Higher Education to examine “the functions of higher education in our democracy and the means by which they can be best performed.”312 Truman was especially interested in the “ways and means of expanding educational opportunities for all able young people; the adequacy of the curricula, particularly in the fields of international affairs and social understanding; the desirability of establishing a series of intermediate technical institutes; the financial structure of higher education with particular reference to the requirements for the rapid expansion of physical facilities.”313 Such concerns had long been considered local and state issues. The president’s Commission was the first federal initiative of this sort, one based on the assumption that higher education was in the national interest.314

The Commission’s report was published in 1947-48 as Higher Education for American Democracy. Its six volumes focused on dramatically increasing college and university enrollment. In this respect, Thelin argued, Higher Education for American Democracy was an

313 Ibid.
implicit attempt to permanently extend the principles of the G.I. Bill.\textsuperscript{315} To accomplish this goal, it promoted the growth of state higher education and federal aid and called for the end of discriminatory practices, particularly when based on race and religion. The Commission contended that private colleges and universities promoted hierarchy and exclusion and argued for federal policies that would provide support for state colleges and universities, which were better suited to fulfilling democratic ideals. It proposed huge amounts of federal aid to help these institutions grow and improve in quality and federal student aid that would allow lower income students to enroll. The Commission condemned colleges and universities that practiced racial and religious discrimination and recommended that only racially integrated institutions receive federal funds. In this way, it was advocating for access in the service of the public good.

Like the Harvard Red Book before it, \textit{Higher Education for American Democracy} promoted general education. According to the Commission, general education would provide the skills and knowledge necessary to a democratic citizenry and while doing so reconcile the differences between liberal arts and more vocational programs. Students who received this general education would be prepared for their citizenship role by having a knowledge of both domestic and international affairs, and the ability to critically analyze themselves and their society, allowing it to become more reflexive and productive.

The Commission argued that the need for such educational innovations was especially acute. Not only had the end of the war increased popular demand for higher education, it had also revealed far-reaching developments that had made colleges and universities crucially important. The Commission highlighted four key developments: (1) technology had facilitated societal complexity and thus the need to better understand social processes; (2) occupational, religious and cultural diversity had led to tensions over difference and, consequently, the

\textsuperscript{315} Ibid.
necessity of democratic reconciliation; (3) national isolation had been replaced by global responsibilities and the corresponding need for international cooperation; and (4) the rise of the atomic age brought promise, peril and uncertainty, as well as a great need for understanding and anticipating the changes that would undoubtedly come. According to the Commission, higher education could contribute to resolving all of these post-war concerns.316

The ambitious agenda of the Truman Commission met with significant opposition. Much of this resistance was the result of anxiety over favoritism towards state educational institutions and excessive federal control, both of which were seen as possible threats to the financial viability and autonomy of private colleges and universities. In addition, there was apprehension that if proposed measures were implemented the nation would be incapable of accommodating the growth in the number of college students and graduates.317

Despite such concerns, the Commission’s agenda did not lead to dramatic upheaval in the higher education sector. In the short term (late 1940s-early 1950s), local stakeholders—including foundations, state governments, and individual colleges and universities themselves—were at the forefront of implementing the types of changes recommended by the Commission, some of which had already begun before the 1947 publication of Higher Education for American Democracy. “It had been premature, perhaps presumptuous,” Thelin observed, “for the Commission to take on a visionary role.”318 Eventually, the federal government would assume responsibilities only anticipated in 1947 but, as Philo Hutcheson argued, the primary benefit of Higher Education for American Democracy was not so much specific results, such growing acceptance of the argument that a large percentage of American youth was capable of college-level work. Instead, Hutcheson continued, what is “more important . . . is the rhetoric of the

316 Higher Education for American Democracy, 2.
report and its endurance through three decades of national debate about the mission, roles, and financing of higher education in the United States.  

With this rhetoric in place, it was increasingly difficult to see American colleges and universities as discretely local entities. Rather, they were key institutions in the national project and, as such, appropriate objects of the country’s post-war policies.

The confidence exemplified by *Science, the Endless Frontier*, the Harvard Red Book, the founding of UNESCO, and *Higher Education for American Democracy* was soon tempered by the Cold War. Many in the U.S. and other Western nations had been suspicious of the U.S.S.R. during the war, but the post-war breakdown of the relationship between the former allies created anxiety over the perceived communist threat. This anxiety was only heightened by the rise of the post-war “red scare” and its agents of accusation, investigation and punishment, most famously Senator Joseph McCarthy and the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). A number of colleges and universities were implicated in high-level investigations, particularly when faculty, staff and students were accused of Communist Party affiliation. During the late 1940s through the mid-1950s the demand for affirmations of national fidelity spread to campuses across the country. Many colleges and universities required loyalty oaths and disclaimers of communism as conditions of employment. They held their own investigations of supposed subversive activity and imposed sanctions on those who failed to cooperate with government committees. On these campuses both Constitutional rights and academic freedom were ignored and many of those who were deemed disloyal were barred from teaching, while others were fired.

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The period from 1930 to the post World War II era presented substantial challenges, but university maintained the general trajectory that had been gaining momentum since the end of the First World War. It was an institution that was growing in size, stature and societal relevance. The Great Depression may have delayed the progress of the university but it was not completely halted. Instead, despite reduced funds and declining enrollment, it retained its promise of education and research. The outbreak of war ensured the continuation of low enrollment but, unlike the Depression era that preceded it, the Second World War brought tremendous federal resources for research. Whereas state universities were relatively far better off during the Depression, wartime increased the parity between state and private research universities. Although the Cold War brought tension to American campuses and took a significant professional and personal toll on faculty, staff and students, the immediate post-war era was a highly optimistic time overall. The war had indeed demonstrated the destructive potential of modern weaponry and the broader threat of global instability but it had at the same time shown the tremendous potential of knowledge, especially scientific knowledge, for problem solving in the public interest. In this respect the war can be seen as an important mechanism in the growing social utility of the American research university.

The University of Illinois before Stoddard: 1930-1946

The University of Illinois changed significantly from 1930, the end of Kinley era, and the beginning of the presidency of George D. Stoddard’s in 1946. Like colleges and universities across, the country it negotiated the challenges of the Great Depression and the Second World War. Despite the challenges of financial shortfalls, decreased enrollment and new wartime responsibilities it continued its general trajectory of growth, an achievement overseen and

President from 1930-1933, Harry W. Chase’s was the first leader of the University of Illinois during the Great Depression. During his administration no new funds were allocated for campus building, but projects that were inaugurated during Kinley’s presidency were completed, including the Chemical Annex, Ice Skating Rink, Women’s Gymnasium, water filtration plant and new President’s House. The first unit of the medical laboratory was built in Chicago from the same funds. Through the reorganization of already existing departments, and reallocation of the existing budget, the university was able to create two new colleges: the College of Fine and Applied Arts and the College of Physical Education. Chase’s organizational efforts extended to high-level administration, which he relieved of a number of small responsibilities in an attempt to increase efficiency, particularly as it related to issues of major university importance. In addition, he also greatly liberalized the regulations of student governance, allowing students to assume greater responsibility for their actions. However, Chase’s ambitions were greatly restrained by the growing impact of the Depression. In addition to a reduction in funds for campus building, the University of Illinois had to deal with dropping student enrollment and state appropriations, which fell from over 10 million dollars for the 1931-33 budget to 7.8 million dollars for 1933-35. According to Louis Wilson, these difficult circumstances, and the corresponding need to deal with the state legislatures, contributed to Chase’s resignation in 1933 and assumption of the presidency of New York University.321

Arthur Hill Daniels served as Acting President from 1933 to 1934. During his short tenure he worked through the continuing economic crisis, but his duties were soon consigned to the university’s new president, Arthur Cutts Willard. Willard faced the same budgetary

difficulties as a two predecessors. With no additional state funds forthcoming he lobbied the U.S. government for money. The university subsequently received needed support, including Public Works Administration grants and a loan from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. On the Urbana-Champaign campus, such federal resources allowed for the new Illini Union and Natural Resources Building. In Chicago, they enabled the construction of the McKinley Hospital, the College of Medicine and College of Dentistry laboratories, and library expansion. This investment in health sciences infrastructure allowed for the consolidation of medical, dental and pharmaceutical program. By 1942, enrollment in the College of Pharmacy became the highest in the United States; the College of Medicine, second; and the College of Dentistry, seventh.322

The Second World War brought dramatic changes to the University. Even before the war began, a number of Illinois scientists left for mobilization projects in Washington DC, whereas others remained, accelerating their research on the Urbana-Champaign campus, Chicago’s medical campus, and at the Agriculture Experiment Station in Des Plaines. Once the war began, the University’s contribution to the war effort grew significantly. With the support of both Vannevar Bush and Harvard President James B. Conant, chemistry professor Roger Adams served on the National Defense Research Committee. F.W. Loomis, professor of physics, was associate director of the radar laboratory in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Nineteen Illinois physicists contributed to the Manhattan Project and the production of the first atomic bomb.323 In Urbana-Champaign, Noyes Lab hosted a range of classified research projects including munitions, water purification, and synthetic rubber. Memorial Stadium was used for fog

322 [Stephens], 97-101.
dispersal experiments and, in Davenport Hall, human subjects were employed in a study of the impact of extreme temperatures on vitamin and mineral requirements.\textsuperscript{324}

Soon after the war began, the Urbana-Champaign became a training ground for soldiers and sailors from the U.S. Army and Navy.\textsuperscript{325} This training was primarily conducted by the military (through, for example, the Navy signal school) but the university also began offering courses in areas relevant to the war including aerodynamics, first aid, camouflage, military history and censorship.\textsuperscript{326} The influx of trainees was countered by an increasing number of Illinois students who were leaving for war either through enlistment or the draft. The University Board of Trustees facilitated this exodus by accelerating the academic calendar, thus allowing students to graduate more quickly. In November 1942, U.S. Congress lowered the draft age from 21 to 18 and soon most male students faced compulsory service. Overall, the number of enrolled civilian students dropped dramatically. At the Urbana-Champaign campus, for example, it fell from 12,624 in 1938-39 to 5,824 in 1943-44, a depth of enrollment it had not reached since before World War I.\textsuperscript{327}

By 1944 the University of Illinois began to prepare for the end of the war. It created the Division of Special Services for War Veterans to assist returning soldiers and sailors as they started or resumed their education. The university also began to prepare for the return of students by studying housing needs, including accommodations for spouses and children. As was the case across the nation, the end of the war brought dramatic increases in student enrollment. By the fall of 1945, enrollment on the Urbana-Champaign campus rebounded to 12,780; of these, 5,794 were veterans.\textsuperscript{328} These students required correspondingly greater resources, including housing, 

\textsuperscript{324} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{325} [Stephens], 100.
\textsuperscript{326} Franch, 4.
\textsuperscript{327} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid., 24.
classrooms and teaching faculty. With the retirement of Arthur Cutts Willard in 1946, the responsibility for these needs shifted to the president-elect, George Dinsmore Stoddard.

George D. Stoddard and His Presidency

By the time Stoddard achieved the presidency of the University of Illinois in 1946, he had not only demonstrated significant professional success within academe, but also in institutions and organizations external to higher education. He began his undergraduate education at Pennsylvania State College, but his studies were interrupted by service in the Field Artillery Reserve Corps in World War I. After returning from the war, Stoddard completed his bachelor’s degree at Pennsylvania State College and then moved to France where he studied for a Diplome D’Etudes at the University of Paris. Two years later, in 1925, he completed his Ph.D. dissertation, “Iowa Placement Examinations,” at the University of Iowa and began his academic career as a faculty member in psychology and education, specializing in child psychology. He later became head of the Department of Psychology (1938-39) and Dean of the Graduate College (1936-42). Immediately prior to his University of Illinois presidency, Stoddard moved outside of academe, serving as New York’s Commissioner of Education. Although this position was officially in the service of New York, Stoddard later noted that it offered “inspiring opportunities for a public service that extends beyond the boundaries of the state of New York.”329 While Commissioner of Education, he had a particularly noteworthy opportunity beyond state borders, serving as Chairman of the U.S. Education Mission to Japan that assisted the American occupying forces in their attempt to revise the Japanese education system. In 1945, Stoddard was

329 George D. Stoddard, “For Bulletin to the Schools” (May 29, 1945), University Archives, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
chosen as one of the U.S. delegates to UNESCO. One year later, President Truman made Stoddard a member of the President’s Commission on Higher Education.

Stoddard’s arrival at the University of Illinois coincided with the influx of students created by the end of the war and the G.I. Bill. Stoddard and his administration moved to address this large student population through a number of measures. Two temporary branch campuses were established: one on Chicago’s Navy Pier and the other in Galesburg, western Illinois. These campuses provided lower division undergraduate instruction to students who were expected to complete their education on the University of Illinois’ main campus. In Urbana-Champaign, a number of temporary housing measures were employed. Two hundred seventy-five prefabricated houses were set up for faculty and married veteran students and the Men’s Gym Annex, Ice Rink, and Memorial Stadium were outfitted as dormitories. The university also created 31 high school extension centers that dispersed the student population away from the overwhelmed campuses. By the fall of 1946, 28,553 students were enrolled at the University of Illinois, the largest number in its history. The Urbana-Champaign campus accommodated the majority, 18,378; of these 11,200 were military veterans.330

The university’s administrative, teaching and research infrastructure saw additional growth during Stoddard’s presidency. The Business Management Service, Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, Speech Clinic, Institute of Communications, College of Veterinary Medicine, Institute of Aviation, and Institute of Government and Public Affairs were all established; and the university proceeded with the most extensive building program in its history.331 The Urbana-Champaign campus grew with the construction of the East Chemistry Building, Physics Research Laboratory, Lincoln Avenue Residence Hall, Electrical and

330 Franch, 28.
331 [Stephens], 114.
Mechanical Engineering Buildings, and student-staff housing units. The University Library expanded to 2.5 million books, which made it the third largest university library in the United States. In Chicago, the university increased the size of its hospital and built the Aeromedical and Physical Environment Laboratory. By the early 1950s, Stoddard recalled, Illinois was composed of twelve colleges, four schools, seven divisions, and twelve institutes and bureaus. Its largest college, Liberal Arts and Sciences, had 28 departments.\textsuperscript{332}

The growth of the university extended its reach not only in terms of size but also in the ways it interacted with the populace. New curricula and research units increased the chances that people of the state of Illinois, and well beyond its borders, would be impacted by the university regardless of whether or not they ever set foot on its campuses. Stoddard later expressed special fondness for two other developments that increased the university’s role. During his administration the university acquired Robert Allerton’s estate. Its 5,600 acres, mansion and other buildings served in multiple capacities including experimental farming, and conferences and programs attended by thousands of people from around the world. The Stoddard era also saw the inauguration of the Festival of Contemporary Arts, which featured exhibitions, performances, conferences, lectures and other events. Looking back on the success of earlier Festivals, Professor Allen Weller recalled that their “primary purpose” was serve the people of the local population, both within and without the university, but “their total effect” was more than local: “friends from far and near have joined us in participating in the various aspects of the Festivals.”\textsuperscript{333}

All of these advances took place in an often-challenging environment. Post-war wealth allowed for university growth, a one-time 24% average salary increase, and other developments

\textsuperscript{333} Quoted in Ibid.
that were impossible or unnecessary during the years of financial hardship and enrollment contraction. However, the post-war era also brought anxiety about communism and corresponding concern over the political orientation of faculty, staff and students. The degree of anxiety and type of action differed widely. Within the state of Illinois, for instance, members of the legislature tried to outlaw the Communist Party, require loyalty oaths of all state employees, and establish grounds for firing any public school teacher who undermined the government.

Stoddard was also anti-communist, but his approach was more moderate and nuanced. In 1946, he set up the Security Office on the Urbana-Champaign campus. Although its duties were generally mundane (such as parking registration, photo IDs and student discipline), they soon included political surveillance. The office investigated employees and student organizations and, based on its findings, employees were dismissed. At the same time, however, Stoddard denounced loyalty oaths and other aspects of the doctrinaire platform of anti-communist legislators. He denied and disparaged State Representative Ora Dillavou’s assertion that the university housed about fifty “reds, pinks and socialists” and defended the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations against charges of subversion.334 When he thought there was insufficient evidence, he supported even those who had been previously characterized as leftists.335 Hence, in Nicholas Wisseman’s assessment, Stoddard was indeed an anti-communist but never one who devolved into McCarthyism. Instead, he was a Cold War liberal, a creature of the post-war era who tried to defend liberal values while ignoring them when deemed necessary to stop totalitarianism.336

In the College of Commerce and Business Administration, Dean Howard Bowen tried to raise the college’s stature by hiring high quality faculty from the East Coast. Like Bowen

334 Quoted in Wisseman, 329.
335 Ibid., 327-328.
336 Ibid., 320-334.
himself, these new hires were at least highly sympathetic to Keynesianism. Old guard conservatives in the faculty saw these changes as a move from the college’s free-market orientation. Bowen’s trying management style did little to help the situation and soon the university drew the attention of journalists, businessmen and politicians across the state. To some, it looked like the university was moving away from local values and adopting alien leftism. For example, News Gazette managing editor Edward Jacquin described the “planned heavy infiltration” of New Dealers who promoted deficit spending and the welfare state. 337 “We don’t want a Harvard . . . down here in black dirt country,” Jacquin argued, “let the East and Big Cities espouse those kind of universities.” 338 Most faculty members, he continued, taught “good American principles” and were the kind of people who built the stadium and were loyal to Illinois; people of “leftist and liberal ideas” had no place at the University of Illinois. 339 This evaluation suggests that, for Jacquin, the university’s public was not only geographically limited, it was also ideologically bounded. Ultimately, the opposition of Jacquin and others led to Bowen’s ouster in January 1951 and the departure of recently hired faculty members. Stoddard’s support of his beleaguered dean and his progressive agenda undermined his position with key conservatives in the state, including faculty and members of the Board of Trustees.

Two and a half years later, on July 24, 1953, nine members of the Board of Trustees called Stoddard and Provost Coleman R. Griffith to a secret midnight meeting. The majority of the Board submitted votes of no confidence for the men, and Stoddard and Griffith—who served as the discretion of the Board—submitted their resignations soon after. Stoddard retained his office for one more month, bringing his presidency to its official end on August 31, 1953.

337 Quoted in Solberg and Tomlinson, 63.
338 Wisseman, 324.
339 Quoted in Solberg and Tomlinson, 63.
Stoddard’s Idea of the Public University

Stoddard did not provide an explicit statement, in abstract or theoretical terms, of how he understood the relationship between the university and the public. Instead he expressed it through statements he made about key social institutions, particularly those that placed education at the center of their responsibilities. He focused his attention on the institutions he knew so well: schools, universities and UNESCO, the organization that he had advocated since its inception. He saw these institutions as part of a mutual relationship, one in which the goals of specific institutions (such as the University of Illinois or UNESCO) corresponded to the goals of institutional types (such as universities or IGOs) and, finally, to the goals of educational institutions in their broadest sense—as components of a meta-level mechanism for the betterment of society.

This is not to suggest that Stoddard ignored the particularities of individual institutions, conflating their goals. In his various administrative capacities, including as the president of the University of Illinois, he addressed the needs of specific institutions. Nevertheless, he did articulate an essential correspondence between the purposes of, for example, primary and secondary schools, the University of Illinois, and UNESCO. Institutions of this sort were types of educational institutions that, despite their very clear differences, served society in broad, general terms. As Stoddard noted during his presidential inauguration, “the aim of education is to develop a structure of thought and to improve human relations.” As he would later express through his other speeches and published works, this aim could be met most completely through the efforts of multiple educational institutions.

Yet Stoddard devoted special attention to the university. In part this can be attributed to the fact that he had become the president of the University of Illinois and was focused on the university’s societal role. However, he also placed the university, in a more general sense, in an especially exalted position, stating “the university is the crown of every modern educational system.” He explained that it “guards as a treasure beyond price the tradition of intellectual liberty, stimulates freedom of thought, perfects methods of inquiry, promotes the advancement of knowledge, cultivates science and scholarship, nurtures love of truth, and serves as a source of perpetual enlightenment to society.” In addition, Stoddard continued, the university exposes young men and women to ideas and aspirations that prepare them as leaders in their families and communities, in government and industry, and in the pursuit of understanding and good will between nations. Finally, at the most mundane level, it provided the technical skills young people need for their respective professions. Hence the university, as Stoddard described it, was not merely just another educational institution but was instead an archetype and apogee, the institution that provided the best chance for the realization of human potential.

Since the late nineteenth century, the university had become an increasingly important institution. Stoddard understood this development and explained, “in the last 50 years universities everywhere have been characterized by four great trend lines: (1) An expansion of science and technology; (2) an expansion of the arts and communication; (3) the idea of higher education for all talented youth and, (4) a close correlation between research and public service, particularly in regard to national defense.” Hence Stoddard expressed a recognition that the recent half-century had seen a growth in the university, not only in terms of what it taught and

341 George D. Stoddard, “The Role of Education in International Affairs,” in The Inauguration of Joseph Hillis Miller as President of the University of Florida, Friday, March the Fifth, Nineteen Hundred and Forty-Eight (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, [1948]), 12.
342 Ibid.
343 Ibid.
researched, but also in terms of the number of people who were impacted by it. He described the post-war university as a truly public institution, one that benefitted many more people than the students, faculty and staff that inhabited its campuses. Through teaching and research it played an important and far-reaching role of service to society.

For Stoddard, contributing to the public good did not wholly establish the university’s public credentials. All universities served the public in significant ways but Stoddard expressed most enthusiasm for state institutions, including state universities. He argued that the people of the United States had benefitted from a number of “great cultural inventions — such as the public school, the land-grant college, an effective tax system and a social structure almost devoid of class barriers.”345 These innovations, he continued, developed from Americans’ distaste for elite rule, and demand for widespread literacy and, eventually, for easily accessible higher education institutions. When combined, the “great cultural inventions” produced “something the world solely needed: the emergence of talented leaders and the most universally educated citizenry in history.”346 Stoddard’s inclusion of the public (state) school and the land-grant college highlighted their societal utility. By mentioning them along with taxation and the absence of class barriers he suggested that these four “great cultural inventions” advance American society through their mutual relationship.

In this specific instance, Stoddard recognized the land-grant college rather than the broader category of state higher education institutions. However, beyond this emphasis on the land-grant college in one document, he paid almost no attention to the land-grant distinction in his speeches, articles or radio broadcasts. Instead, like Kinley before him, Stoddard distinguished his university and its peers as state institutions. While his focus on the land-grant college in this

345 George D. Stoddard, “Youth,” Scientific American 185, no. 3 (September 1951): 101.
346 Ibid., 101-102.
instance is unusual, it does make sense within a historical analysis of innovations that served as foundations of American distinctiveness and success. The land-grant college was not only foundational to the land-grant university; it was also a clear (perhaps most visible) manifestation of many of the ideals of the state university more widely defined, such as government funding and democratic access. Stoddard’s omission of the land-grant designation in his other, non-historical, statements suggests that he understood the state university designation to be adequate for his purposes. As with the Kinley case, it is unclear why Stoddard did not emphasize land grants in his discussions of the university and its relationship to the public. However, because land-grant institutions typically had especially strong relationships with communities in their state through extension programs, a land-grant emphasis might have served as a counter argument to Stoddard’s extension of the university’s public role well beyond state borders.

Like Kinley, Stoddard connected the source of an institution’s funding to its public status. The very existence of the University of Illinois depended on the largess of the people of its state and, in Illinois and elsewhere, generosity of this sort demonstrated popular affirmation of the university. “The faith in higher education shown by the people of a state,” Stoddard observed, “is correlated with measures of [institutional] size and financial support.”347 Within Stoddard’s formulation such support proceeded from a belief in the correlation between collective funding and collective benefit: “the tax money that helps to provide teachers and facilities is . . . a charge upon everybody. It is made available on the principle that public welfare is advanced thought the education of all citizens able to succeed at advanced levels.”348 As Stoddard described it, the public university was not only defined as such because it received government support, but also

348 George D. Stoddard, “A Forward Look” in Ferment in Education: The Problems, Responsibilities, and Opportunities in This Time: A Symposium at the Installation of George Dinsmore Stoddard as President of the University of Illinois (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1948), 187.
because this support was based on popular confidence in its ability to advance the public good.

“This public stake in higher education,” Stoddard posited, “may in the future offer a stronger argument than the hope of personal gain,” or, in other words, private goods.349

The public’s stake in higher education necessarily placed it in a key decision-making role. While discussing growing demand for higher education and the subsequent need for university expansion, including at Illinois’ facilities in Chicago, Stoddard observed that neither he, nor faculty communities, nor the university as a whole could answer such questions. Instead, he explained, these are questions which “must be shared with the people of Illinois, for public education is the property of the people”350 Hence Stoddard’s idea of what constituted a truly public university was not merely based on its source of financial support, but was instead a more inclusive idea, one in which the people of the state could claim ownership and the rights and responsibilities it contained.

In addition, Stoddard argued, the state university was also differentiated by the nature of its relationship to popular democratic will. Discussing the American state university, he quoted historian Frederick Jackson Turner who wrote in 1920: “nothing in our educational history is more striking than the steady pressure of democracy upon its universities to adapt them to the requirements of all the people.”351 The Midwestern state universities, Turner explained, had responded to popular demand for the disintegration of the traditional curriculum, corresponding interest in reconciling vocational and “college work,” and desire for new curricula in areas such as agriculture, engineering, applied science and business.352 These innovations, Turner continued, better prepared people for employment in both the private and public sector “all under

349 Ibid.
352 Ibid., 29.
the ideal of service to democracy rather than of individual advancement alone.” As described by Turner, the people of these states, through boards of trustees and legislatures, provided the essential guidance and resources for their universities, constituting the very atmosphere in which these institutions moved, and providing their strength and direction. Stoddard expressed his agreement with Turner’s assessment and assured his audience that the “farmers, lawyers, doctors, homemakers, and businessmen who make up the typical state university board of trustees can be counted on to take the long view.” In this way, the relationship between the university and the larger population ensured its responsiveness to democratic will while also providing for its continuing stability. Because the people of its state ultimately owned it and this ownership included rights and responsibilities, including governance, the state university was also, in this sense, public.

The Public Service Roles of Stoddard’s University

According to Stoddard, the state university was especially well suited to serving democratic inclusion. He explained, “I expect that our public [state] institutions are in a better position to enforce our beliefs in full democracy at this [higher education] level.” “On the whole,” Stoddard argued, “the independent [private] colleges do not follow the Bill of Rights as closely as the tax-supported colleges in regard to race, religion, national origin and economic status, but there are notable exceptions.” Perhaps there were indeed exceptions among private institutions, but Stoddard made it clear that his own state university exemplified the ideal of democratic inclusion, at least when it came to race. As the record of the University of Illinois...

353 Ibid.
354 Ibid.
355 Ibid.
showed, he contended, “we simply do not recognize racial differences!” This statement reflected the view that state colleges and universities were better suited to realizing democratic ideals, a position most visibly asserted in *Higher Education for American Democracy*.

Stoddard asserted that the relationship between state universities and the eradication of discrimination was not unidirectional: demand for inclusion could precede institutions. Popular antipathy towards discrimination, he argued, could even be a primary factor in their establishment: “I should go so far as to say that it is this racial discrimination, true or alleged and probably true in part, which has been the chief factor in bringing before the people of the state of New York the probable desirability of starting a public state university.” The importance of this claim is not primarily in what it suggests about Stoddard’s understanding of popular attitudes towards race, but instead how it is an articulation of his view on the role of democratic will in the founding of public institutions.

Although Stoddard contended that state colleges and universities were especially capable mechanisms for democratic inclusion, he recognized that defining education as public based on funding sources could be problematic. In a broadcast roundtable, Stoddard explained, “one of the most controversial items of all is what shall be considered public education. What shall we aid through public funds?” Robert Redfield, another discussant, asked if he meant whether the federal government should aid private or public education. “Yes,” Stoddard replied, “should private and parochial schools share in the distribution of federal funds? I think that most of us in education do not believe that that should be done.” Regardless of how Stoddard and many of his contemporaries felt, legislation was proposed to allow each state to decide where to allocate federal funds. Were this legislation to pass, Stoddard observed, it would be called “public

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education” and would be eligible to receive “public aid from federal sources,” but he expressed anxiety over whether minority groups would be protected from discrimination.³⁶⁰ For him, educational institutions that were public not only in terms of funding, but also due to public oversight, were ideal mechanisms for the fulfillment of democratic ideals of inclusion. However, Stoddard was hopeful that administrators from private institutions would join him to address the problem of discrimination. “If we do not solve it,” he continued, “we shall fail to live up to some of our really crucial democratic principles.”³⁶¹

For many people in the post-war era, including the members of the Truman Commission and delegates to UNESCO, the possible misuse of science was an especially profound concern. World War II had confirmed the destructive capabilities of applied science and the birth of the atomic age provided new reasons for unease. Stoddard was keenly aware of this problem but maintained that science was necessary to civilization. In this respect, he was in agreement with Vannevar Bush and his Science, the Endless Frontier. “The simple truth,” Stoddard contended, is that large-scale survival is only possible through the application of science to agriculture, industry, transportation and medicine.³⁶² Science could be harmful, he admitted, but it is nevertheless foundational to civilization: “if civilization cannot be founded upon science, then we shall not be civilized. These are the new choices: (1) Science and civilization [and] (2) Science and deterioration.” Moreover, he continued:

We can no more lay away science and its household aid, its technology, than we can eliminate the use of fire, the building of shelters, the domestication of animals or the growth of transportation and communication. The choice, then, is restricted: it is between

³⁶⁰ Ibid., 10.
³⁶¹ Ibid., 8-9.
civilization and deterioration. Now, in the middle of the twentieth century, deterioration, while not proclaimed a winner, is a sufficient menace.\textsuperscript{363}

Given the necessity of science, Stoddard claimed, discussion of the conflict between science and culture is not useful. Instead there is no conflict. This is not because there is agreement, he noted, but because science “has won every battle that has taken place within its own territory . . . after all, the term conflict implies antagonists, preferably well matched.”\textsuperscript{364} Like C.P. Snow would argue over a decade later, in 1959, knowledge was divided into “two cultures” and rapprochement was difficult, perhaps unlikely.\textsuperscript{365} Yet for Stoddard the divide was not based on mutual unintelligibility but instead on the unequal power relationship between science and culture.

This power differential posed a significant problem. As Stoddard described it, science was both foundational to civilization and potentially destructive. Consequently, it must be tempered by culture. “Culture,” he argued, “has to be blended with and superimposed upon scientific progress. The great blending vats will be found in the social sciences and social structures; they form the mother liquor of the firm values by which they are transformed.”\textsuperscript{366} The need for these values was especially acute in the post-war era, given its dangerous technologies. To address this problem, Stoddard called for what John Dewey termed “social intelligence” since “it took brains to produce the atomic bomb. It will take still more brains to avoid its suicidal use.” This much-needed social intelligence would be based on social science, he argued.\textsuperscript{367} He anticipated difficulty, however, because the social sciences were likely to face resistance in the academy. “In all planning for the future of the University,” Stoddard noted, “the place of

\textsuperscript{365} C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959).
\textsuperscript{366} George D. Stoddard, “New Horizons in University Development,” 7.
\textsuperscript{367} Stoddard, “Youth,” 102.
physical and biological science is secure; it is permanent.” The social sciences, he continued, are just as important, “but it will be hard to capture territory from the garrisons of tradition, opportunism, and prejudice.”

Despite such difficulties, social sciences and other forms of inquiry Stoddard considered innovative were essential to his higher education ideals. He acknowledged that traditional areas of study, including natural science, remained very important but the rise of totalitarianism had demonstrated they needed to be supplements. “It is a sober truth that progress does not lie simply in teaching the older disciplines,” Stoddard explained, “two generations of school children in modern Germany learned their lessons well. They were steeped . . . in basic science and technology.” Indeed, “no country had better technically trained people than Germany.”

However, Stoddard argued, this technical training did not equip the German people to question tyranny. He asked: “who thought to proclaim loudly, so that every schoolmaster and public leader might hear, that the German was really being taught how to destroy himself and his nation?” Nobody raised this alarm, he explained, and students “became easy targets for the Kaiser and the Fuhrer” as they left the classroom. As Stoddard saw it, the problem was not that these students forgot what they learned, but that their education was inadequate and misdirected by propaganda. Germany was not alone in failing to properly educate, Stoddard noted, nor was a focus on science and technology the only culprit. During the same period of time, he observed, the young people of Italy and Japan, “reciting verbatim wonderful lessons in the classics, arts and sciences, also missed the greatest lesson of all—how to apply ethical

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principles at the level of nations.”

Hence for Stoddard, the Axis countries demonstrated the profound need for a comprehensive curriculum that went beyond mere training to produce citizens who are capable of ethical and critical thought.

Stoddard’s educational ideal was in agreement with general education as proposed by the Harvard Red Book and Higher Education for American Democracy. It also corresponded well to the ideals of UNESCO and its concern for global understanding. This “liberal education,” he explained, is comprehensive and creates the subtlety of thinking needed to address a wide range of problems: it “contributes to mental power in situations that cannot be predicted in detail. It is abstract, but not unreal.” “Without this generalizing power,” he continued, “the human mind would run over its problems like an insect, understanding nothing, but trying only to get away. Not all knowledge is of equal worth. Learning proceeds by selection and imagination.”

Hence, in Stoddard’s formulation, education must provide the student with a great breadth of knowledge and the skills to discern and apply the type of knowledge appropriate to a given situation. The requirement of breadth was especially important in the perilous atomic age. “To be educated,” Stoddard contended, “under the blinding light of released atomic energy, is to know science, physical and social, and to be at home in the arts and humanities; it is, above all, to know that all such knowledge will come to a common ash heap unless we set about vigorously to repair the terrible break in universal friendship.” As this statement demonstrates, Stoddard emphasized the need to impart an understanding of common interest and interconnectedness, especially in the service of peace. The problems of the modern age, he explained, implicated all: “whatever is now in store for any of us is to be the lot of everyone.”

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372 Ibid.
373 “Are We Educating for the Needs of Modern Man?” Town Meeting 14, no. 39 (January 25, 1949), 7.
Korean effects Illinois and will continue to do so, but “every so often we pay with blood and treasure for failing in this primary lesson.”

While Stoddard was a strong advocate for broad, liberal education, he recognized a need for vocational training as a component of the higher education curriculum. All “college education . . . must contain a substantial liberal ingredient,” he observed but, at the same time, universities should not apologize for the “workaday aspect of their programs.” All nonparasitic men have a vocation, Stoddard noted: “the complete human being—something organically developed out of science, art and humanity—will work for a living; otherwise someone must work in his place.” Education may indeed be costly, Stoddard admitted, but it should not be seen as a luxury good. Instead, liberal education should include vocational, technical or professional components in order to prepare people for economic life, which is itself the “good earth of liberalism everywhere.” In this formulation, education was the necessary foundation of liberal democratic society, providing both the economic and critical means for its achievement.

Hence Stoddard’s vision for education in the post-war era would equip people with focused and practical skills and the ability to analyze phenomena in a way that accounted for complexity, recognized global interdependence, and led to a true breadth of understanding. Such education did not take place exclusively in the university, but the university was indeed a crucial space. Stoddard’s evaluation of the relationship between education and the rise of totalitarianism was not focused on the university; it was instead articulated in greater terms, about how entire systems of education had failed. However, the university—as part of those systems—was

375 George D. Stoddard, “East and West in Education” (speech delivered to Theta Chi, Chicago, Illinois, September 7, 1946), 5-6.
378 Ibid.
complicit in their failures. At the same time, given its essential role in education broadly defined, the university also had the potential to make tremendous contributions to education and the society it served. Its public service mission should not be neatly limited to any locality; instead urgent need demanded it be much wider in scope.

**Stoddard’s Vision for UNESCO**

From 1945, when he served as a delegate to the foundational meeting of UNESCO through his tenure at Illinois, Stoddard was strong advocate of UNESCO and its world-view. Park Livingstone, president of the Board of Trustees which cast the vote of no confidence that led to Stoddard’s resignation, listed UNESCO involvement as one of the controversies that necessitated the dismissal. In response, Stoddard explained that he felt that any contribution that he could make to UNESCO was “in the public service and consistent with the purposes and ideals of a great university.” Stoddard’s continued support of UNESCO is reflected in the significant amount of attention he gave it in his speeches, radio broadcasts, and articles. It appears very frequently in these materials. Even in cases where UNESCO is not the topic of discussion, it is still often mentioned in relation to schooling and higher education and their societal goals. For Stoddard, UNESCO was not separable from his larger educational project but was instead a key, and very promising mechanism, of education and its service function.

Stoddard characterized UNESCO as an essentially educational institution. He explained, its acronym, noting that “the ‘E’ . . . stands . . . for education, the ’S’ . . . for science, and the ‘C’ is not the hallmark of the college dilettante, but the initial for culture, including libraries,

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museums, journals, radio motion pictures, fine arts, literature, philosophy, and religion.”

Regardless of the specialty of UNESCO employees, he continued, they are all “called upon to behave as teachers, creators, producers, and distributors” and bring to it the ability to “shine through the fog of ignorance, something not to be stopped by artificial boundary lines.”

Stoddard described UNESCO as an organization, like schools and higher education institutions, in the service of serious learning and knowledge. The people it employed were selflessly helping to stop ignorance and thus socio-political disaster, he said. The UNESCO Constitution explained that “wars begin in the minds of men” and therefore the mind can also be an agent for peace. In the twentieth century, Stoddard argued, the need to end ignorance was especially acute because at this time in history ignorant people were not merely unhappy, they were also dangerous because of their susceptibility to tyrannical leaders.

For Stoddard, the ability to “shine through the fog of ignorance” was crucially important because the world was in discordance. In order to bring peace, he explained, the well-intentioned people of the world needed “machinery” that represented their true aspirations. UNESCO and its affiliates were precisely such machinery, he explained. Stoddard described UNESCO as an educational organization, noting: “UNESCO is only new in form. Education is running the race for ever assigned to it—to overtake the forces of darkness and danger.” This assertion that UNESCO was but a continuation of education’s long history is further substantiated by Stoddard’s invocation of the Yale Report of 1828, which argued for the value of liberal education. Using the precise language of the Report, Stoddard said that UNESCO would help

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380 Stoddard, “Role of Education in International Affairs,” 14.
381 Ibid.
384 Stoddard, “Fresco, Unesco, and Mr. Wierblowski,” 3.
impart “the furniture of the mind which is to be our chief weapon in a new-type attack on war.” However, he made it clear that UNESCO was not like any higher education institution, but was akin to a state university. He claimed: “if we think of a tax-supported university as being a combination of teaching, research, and public service, then the analogy to UNESCO, and its international sphere, is not far-fetched.” Like the state university, he observed, UNESCO ultimately relies on public funds (from its member states) and its workers “are chiefly professors cut loose from their campuses.”

Many of the people who serve UNESCO, Stoddard explained, are professors who are part of the bidirectional movement between college campuses and government offices. Some of these people were military leaders and others might eventually become university presidents. Furthermore, he continued, there were U.S. presidents who were professors before and after their terms of office, and government leaders had long relied on the advice and service of academics. Consequently, Stoddard concluded, UNESCO is a “bridge between the academic and the political, [and] is new chiefly in form and size; it has official standing and is almost world-wide in scope.” The assertion that UNESCO was a “bridge” between academic and political spaces suggests that it be understood as the intersection of the university’s often abstract, even idealistic, principles and the Realpolitik of government. In this respect, UNESCO extended the reach of the university well beyond the campus, state and nation. Through it, the university’s public service mission could potentially have a significant global impact.

The claim that UNESCO could serve as an extension of the university, and the ideals of higher education more broadly, is advanced further in Stoddard’s evaluation of UNESCO’s

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386 Stoddard, “The Role of Education in International Affairs,” 18.
387 Ibid.
389 Ibid.
education and research potential. He was especially keen on the potential for the social sciences, noting that “under UNESCO (which has a tremendous program on the understanding of tensions conducive to war) we shall have an upturn and we shall have an international interest in the methods and in the outcomes of the social sciences.” However, he cautioned, as is the case with the university, UNESCO’s efforts must be integrated into society: “UNESCO as an isolated example of scholarly cooperation will fail; UNESCO as a force with roots penetrating the daily life of people has at least a chance to succeed.”

While the governments of member states supported UNESCO, Stoddard argued that it was possible for the people of these countries to have a deeper attachment the organization. He noted that mechanisms of the United Nations and its affiliated organizations, including UNESCO, appear closer to the common people of the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union than to the government officials of these countries. Whereas statesmen are prone to hesitate, argue and despair, Stoddard said, the common people, through their educational, scientific and agricultural leaders “quietly undertake new forms of cooperation.” This cooperative effort, he argued, was not new; the only innovation was the form of it agent, UNESCO. Stoddard’s formulation of the relationship between UNESCO and common people is similar to his statements about the relationship between the American state university and the people of its state. Like this university, UNESCO had a special relationship to democratic will, echoing and manifesting its desire for a better world; and it too was an educational institution, new in form but committed to the maintaining the long term goal of societal improvement.

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391 Stoddard, “Role of Education in International Affairs,” 17.
392 Stoddard, “Fresco, Unesco, and Mr. Wierblowski,” 3.
393 Ibid.
The effectiveness of UNESCO, Stoddard argued, rested on its level of penetration into people’s daily lives. In part, this would be determined by the relationship between it and the institutions and organizations of the respective member states. Stoddard noted that in the United States, the UNESCO National Commission had been aided by more than 300 institutions and organizations including schools (which he counted collectively), farm groups, labor unions, women’s organizations and many others interested in public affairs. Furthermore, UNESCO was affiliated with more than 400 international scientific organizations. These institutions and organizations served as mediators between people and UNESCO, Stoddard observed: “small amount of contact at the heart of UNESCO may . . . set up lines of influence that affect some millions of persons. This is true, for example, in plans for the improvement of education.”

To facilitate such improvement, Stoddard called for active participation, including the participation of members of the education community. All people, he said, could work towards peace in a variety of ways. They could become familiar with UNESCO’s aims and, through activities and organizations (such as women’s, education and service clubs) on the local, state and regional level they could promote international relations. People could endorse including UNESCO content in school and college curricula, especially in civics, international relations, and political science courses. Stoddard explained that teachers, scientists, students and workers were all eligible to take part in UNESCO’s work through its affiliated organizations and some could find opportunities in UNESCO itself. He asked for involvement in the Third National UNESCO Conference noting, that those who attend are expected to return to their home communities, “‘spread the gospel’ and undertake practical programs.”

Addressing his message to the particular concerns of higher education counselors and deans of women, Stoddard

explained “the goal is world peace. As we move haltingly toward it, we who guide and counsel youth may be able to help them toward a better future.”³⁹⁶

**Stoddard’s Re-spacialization of the Public**

Stoddard’s formulation of the university’s service role and its relationship to other educational institutions, including UNESCO, suggests that true agents of public service could not be easily bounded. Even the university, which had so often been characterized as discretely apart, perhaps even divorced from society, did not warrant such descriptions. “Nowadays the ivory tower of the mythical professor is a stale joke,” Stoddard explained; wartime mobilization—both at home and in the trenches—had demonstrated this.³⁹⁷ His characterization of the essential role of universities and their faculties in UNESCO further suggested that the strict exclusion of the ivory tower from society might indeed be a thing of the past. At this moment in history, Stoddard explained, “the university has a part to play in the establishment of peaceful relations among all nations.”³⁹⁸

Although Stoddard described the post-war world as distinct, with new dangers but also new opportunities, his argument for the extension of the university and its role relied on more than the uniqueness of the historical moment. It was also based on the assumption that colleges and universities were institutions that possessed an inherent tendency towards transcending geographical boundaries. Stoddard explained:

The community that all institutions of higher education seek to bring about extends beyond any set geographical limits. The students concentrate in a locality, but they scatter upon graduation. Wherever they go, they take with them the essence of their college

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³⁹⁶ Ibid.
³⁹⁸ Ibid., 7.
education. Moreover, right at the start the student realizes that he has entered a new world, a world eagerly anticipated. It is not really a campus, a town, a city; rather it is a state of mind.\textsuperscript{399}

Hence, for Stoddard, the process of higher education—which takes place within the locally bounded space of campus—forms communities that, regardless of the geographical diffusion of their members, retain the ethos of their universities. This notion, coupled with the Stoddard’s idea that education forms an unbounded state of mind, which can be presumably advanced by the institutional mechanisms of the university and organizations like UNESCO, allows for the extension of the university’s public role. In this formulation, the university has the means to further its mission globally and, by doing so, enlarge the very space in which it can act.

The ability of the university to expand its role made it well suited to respond to Stoddard’s call for greater public service. As it related to the university and similar institutions, the core of this public service was education. “Education begins at home,” Stoddard said, “but it does not stop there.”\textsuperscript{400} “As physical barriers are removed,” he continued, “we discover new channels of thought and social exchange. We encounter new dangers . . . we are concerned on the instant about things far away, for all distance is now short.”\textsuperscript{401} Stoddard’s emphasis on the shift from the traditionally localized nature of education to its post-war expansion paralleled his description of a world that had become interconnected; the distant had become the local. It can certainly be argued that even prior to the realization of post-war globalization the object of education’s public service role defied strict limitation. The public can be amorphous, even when understood within bounded social groups. However, in Stoddard’s formulation, the public service demands of the post-war university, whether when acting in its own or in concert with

\textsuperscript{400} Stoddard, “East and West in Education,” 11.
\textsuperscript{401} Ibid.
other education institutions, were truly global. Consequently, the university’s public had become undifferentiated, encompassing humanity. This did not mean that the University of Illinois, for instance, no longer owed service to the people of Illinois who provided its funding, were its ultimate owners and governors, and served as the font of its democratic legitimacy. Yet to an unprecedented level the university, even a state university with its often profoundly local ties, had, according to Stoddard, responsibilities far beyond political borders. The argument for these expanded responsibilities was not just a moral demand, but also a practical necessity in a dangerous world. A realization of this danger could not only mobilize the university, but also institutions that shared the same values, namely schools and UNESCO. Ideally, all of these institutions would work on behalf and through the efforts of the public itself, an entity manifested by its public institutions, including the university.

**Conclusion**

By the time Stoddard assumed the presidency of the University of Illinois, it had developed into a societally important institution. The trials of the Great Depression and Second World War had tested Illinois and universities across the country. For the most part, these institutions were able to weather these periods, even making occasional progress. The war and years immediately after the cessation of conflict saw greater appreciation of the role of universities, not only as sites of research but also as places for the inculcation of skills and values suited to the post-war world. Illinois and many state universities across the country emerged from war with both the benefits of resurgent funding and the challenges of unprecedented student numbers. Stoddard responded to logistical and demographic problems by building the necessary administrative and physical
infrastructure. Overall, the University of Illinois addressed these difficulties rapidly and effectively.

Yet Stoddard and his administration were less successful in responding to the anxious political climate of post-war America. To some members of the Board of Trustees, Illinois state legislature and the media, among others, he appeared to be at odds with local values. As Stoddard’s speeches, radio broadcasts and articles show, he articulated a vision of the university that was anything but locally contained. For him, higher education was not an ivory tower endeavor, discretely limited to scholastic concerns and confined by campus or disciplinary boundaries. Nor should state or national borders restrain it. Instead, Stoddard described higher education as a necessary, even foundational, component of a healthy society; the university served the formation and maintenance of such a society, helping to discourage the types of societal diseases that had recently engulfed the world in war.

Stoddard acknowledged that state universities, including Illinois, had a special relationship to their local population. Their government funding, and popular ownership and governance defined them as public, at least in part. State universities were also especially representative of, and respondent to, the democratic will. According to Stoddard, they could, for example, better fulfill the ideals of democratic access. However, Stoddard’s primary focus was on the university’s broader service role. All universities, even those not defined as public in terms of funding, ownership, governance, or capability to promote inclusion through access, could serve the public. They could provide vocational and liberal education, supply useful research, and through these, serve society. But the university could also assist society through its place within the larger assemblage of educational institutions. It, the school, and organizations like UNESCO could all work together to advance the public interest in understanding and peace.
The university—that “crown of every modern educational system”—was, as Stoddard’s description of UNESCO demonstrated, a model for educational institutions that were not circumscribed by campus borders or localized by geography. Even a university that owed its existence to a localized public, such as Illinois, could be an exemplar for education and its global capacity to serve the public good.

However, Stoddard’s particular vision of the relationship between the university and its publics was not universally well received. Although his dismissal from the University of Illinois was not necessarily or exclusively the result of competing visions of this relationship, evidence suggests that they played a significant role. Because Stoddard’s downfall has not received scholarly attention, there has been no widely recognized evaluation of the reasons why he was forced from office. Yet the accounts of the actors themselves highlight a political divide that may have implicated the ways in which the university and its relationship to the public were understood.

Two days after the resignation of Stoddard and Griffith, a front-page story in the Chicago Daily Tribune explained the rationale behind their dismissal. In this article, Park Livingston, President of the Board of Trustees, stated that the decision to remove Stoddard and Griffith from office was the culmination of more than a dozen controversies during Stoddard’s tenure. Livingston said that Stoddard had been in repeated conflict with the state legislature, had engaged in a feud with a university contractor, and supported his provost’s dictatorial leadership style. Livingston highlighted additional problems during Stoddard’s administration, including strife in the College of Commerce and Business Administration, the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations’ questionable political climate, and removal of support for research on a cancer drug. Livingston’s charges portrayed Stoddard as a difficult man and, more significantly,

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402 Stoddard, “Role of Education in International Affairs,” 12.
as one of dubious moral and political character. He recounted charges of Stoddard’s godlessness and insufficient anti-communism, and suggested that the university president opposed free enterprise and supported the campus radio station’s “globalist propaganda.” Stoddard’s long-time affiliation with UNESCO disturbed Livingston and, presumably, other members of the Board of Trustees. Livingston complained of Stoddard’s absences from campus for UNESCO events and described the organization as a “global group, which has produced many controversial proposals.” Overall, Livingston described an administration that was not merely incapable of providing effective leadership; it was one based on values at odds with those of the University of Illinois, its state, and the country.

Hence it is clear that dissatisfaction with Stoddard was not limited to his managerial style; his values were also implicated in his suitability for the presidency. As Livingston unmistakably conveyed, some saw Stoddard as morally and politically suspect. His alleged godlessness and opposition to the free market and openly admitted internationalism might have raised suspicions even had he not been the leader of a major institution. Stoddard, however, was the president of a state’s flagship university, an institution that, despite its national and even international stature, was understood by some members of the Board of Trustees, state legislature, media and populace, as decidedly local, not merely in terms of geography but also in terms of the values it inculcated and manifested. Stoddard’s expanded vision for the university and its public role was not easily reconcilable to such expectations and, in this respect, was in opposition to many of the people who constituted the University of Illinois’ most proximate public.

404 Ibid. Stoddard responded to Livingston’s charges soon after, taking exception to each one-by-one. However, because the university president served at the discretion of the Board of Trustees, these responses did little. Stoddard, “Remarks on a Series of Controversies Involving the University of Illinois.”
CHAPTER 4:

THE UNIVERSITY IN AN ERA OF ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND GLOBALIZATION:
THE WHITE PRESIDENCY, 2005-2009

At his 2005 inaugural address, incoming University of Illinois President B. Joseph White recounted the conflict surrounding the university’s curriculum soon after its founding. He explained how Illinois’ first regent, John Milton Gregory, who served from 1867-1880, broadly interpreted the Morrill Act of 1862 to promote the teaching of literature and languages. According to White, Gregory’s initiative ran counter to the desires of many people in the state who wanted the university to focus only on transparently practical areas of study. Gregory prevailed and, White proclaimed, out of his efforts the university triumphed because Gregory’s vision for the university was ultimately far better than the narrow focus promoted by his opponents.  

This evaluation of Gregory’s legacy was confirmed as early as 1910 by Slosson, who described Illinois as “the most conspicuous example” of “the agricultural and mechanical colleges [that] gradually introduced humanistic studies until they developed into well-rounded universities.” Indeed, Solberg later noted, Gregory was “a prophet in envisioning a comprehensive university.” Hence rather than become an institution known only for the study of practical subjects, such as agriculture and the mechanical arts, the University of Illinois became distinguished in a wide variety of fields of research and study, including those that were not demonstrably practical. Its institutional status could be attributed to its contributions to

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405 B. Joseph White, “Inaugural Address” (speech delivered at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, September 22, 2005): n.p. Office for University Relations, University of Illinois, Urbana and Chicago.
406 Slosson, Great American Universities, 281.
407 Winton U. Solberg, The University of Illinois 1867-1894: An Intellectual and Cultural History (University of Illinois Press, 1968), 92. While Gregory was indeed prophetic, his university did not develop as rapidly as he would have liked. As Solberg noted, Illinois developed into a comprehensive university in the 1880s but humanities lagged behind architecture, botany, chemistry and engineering. Ibid., 166.
engineering, agriculture and other applied sciences, and to its great success in the basic sciences, arts and humanities.

The development of higher education in the United States was shaped by the debate over the precise nature of the university’s societal role, a question that necessarily implicated its curricular and research focus. The emergence of the American university at the beginning of the twentieth century answered this question to a significant degree. The curriculum was to be a melding of traditional areas of study—such as Gregory’s literature and languages, as well as mathematics and the natural sciences—and more recently popular areas, including fields such as engineering, business, medicine and law. Hence the university was to be a comprehensive institution that promised to deliver a range of choices. In practice, the truly comprehensive university was often only an ideal. Imbalances in funding and popularity ensured that certain areas of research and teaching received greater resources and attention. Societal factors placed an important role in such imbalances but they were often paralleled by internal, institutional agendas. This inequity, even within the most comprehensive universities, dated from the very beginning of the modern university and has continued well into the current century. Both Gregory and White faced similar questions about what should be taught and studied, despite the nearly 140 years that separated their presidencies.

By the time White became president, the question of the university’s practical role had become especially acute. Earning a degree was increasingly expensive and, correspondingly, the market value of a college education was a growing concern for students and their parents. More and more, those areas of study that could not readily display tangible utility were imperiled. Demands for marketable research, collaboration with the business sector, and incubation of economic growth added to this emphasis on practicality. Return on investment had become a
primary concern, with a focus on economic, rather than other social, returns. White was himself a proponent of such returns, especially when they increased competitiveness in the new increasingly globalized economy. Whether or not he truly believed these to be the primary goal of the university or whether he was merely responding to societal demands is beside the point. What is important to note is that White’s presidency was one in which these concerns overshadowed the need to maintain the type of comprehensive university Gregory envisioned. This not to say that White’s predecessors, especially those from the 1980s on, did not face many of the same issues, nor suggest that these issues diminished after White left office. However, the confluence of budgetary concerns, the globalized knowledge economy, and White’s own agenda—including his on-line “Global Campus”—made the White presidency a particularly important time in the development of the university’s role and, consequently, the way in which the university related to the public.

In order to discern how White articulated his understanding of the university and its relationship to the public, this chapter explains the types of sources employed, then discusses primary developments in higher education from the end of the Stoddard era in the 1950s to the early part of the next century when White was president of the University of Illinois. The chapter then describes the administrations of Illinois presidents who followed Stoddard and preceded White. Because the intent of these two sections is to provide context for the White administration itself, they are not comprehensive in scope, nor do they treat all developments in higher education or University of Illinois history equally. Instead, they selectively focus on key developments that anticipate characteristics of the White administration and its era.

To date, there is no scholarly literature on White and his tenure at the University of Illinois. For this dissertation, the paucity of secondary literature is addressed by information from
a wide variety of sources. News sources contemporary to White’s presidency, including *The Champaign* News Gazette, *The Chicago Tribune* and *Inside Higher Ed*, and widely distributed university publications *Inside Illinois* and *The University Record* were particularly helpful. Additional information was found in a number of sources, such as *The University of Illinois Pocket Facts* and institutional websites, including those of the University of Illinois Strategic Plan and the Office of the President. Meeting minutes and other Board of Trustee documents provided important details, especially about the level of support White had from the Board. These sources are employed in this chapter primarily to describe the White era at Illinois but they are also used in the subsequent section that closely examines how White articulated his ideas on the university in relation to the public. The latter section, however, draws most substantially from a collection of 54 speeches, e-mails, radio interviews, and other public statements made by White from 2005 to 2009.

The audiences for these statements were quite diverse. White sent out mass e-mails to the University of Illinois community and spoke before smaller groups of university stakeholders including the Board of Trustees, Black Alumni Reunion Chicago Committee, University of Illinois Foundation, UIC Institute for Health Research and Policy, UIUC ROTC, Faculty Senate, and graduating students of the UIC Business School. Outside of the university, White focused his efforts on elsewhere in the state of Illinois. For example, he addressed the Illinois Manufacturers' Association, Urbana YMCA, Illinois Education Excellence Task Force, Champaign Urbana Schools Foundation, Illinois Biotechnology Industry Organization, and Illinois House and Senate appropriations committees. White paid special attention to Chicago. He was interviewed on two of its radio stations, WGN and WBBM, and delivered speeches to a variety of Chicago organizations such as the Harvard Club, City Club, Mid-America Club and Standard Club. White
also spoke before an audience at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and officially inaugurated the university’s Brilliant Futures capital campaign at Chicago’s Navy Pier. Many of White’s engagements suggest that he was concerned with diversity and social issues. For instance, he participated in the Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Dinner and Celebration; Chicago Project for Violence Prevention annual meeting; Uncovering, Discussing and Transforming the University diversity conference; [suicide prevention] Jed Foundation Dinner; and Ounce of Prevention’s "It's Good Business to Invest in Young Children" Luncheon.

Collectively, these sources reveal White’s ambitions as he led the University of Illinois. They show the ways in which his vision for the university was informed by his context and advanced or limited by his professional circumstances and those of his institution. In an era of budget shortfalls, White attempted to address financial deficits through other revenue sources, including a large capital campaign, increased out-of-state enrollment, and an online “campus,” and by emphasizing the connection between the financial health of the university and the economic fortunes of its state and country. In arguing for these initiatives, White characterized the university and its role in largely practical, especially economic, terms. Rarely were its other traditionally recognized roles, including the formation of civil society and effective democracy even mentioned. This emphasis on the economic benefits of the university elevated those areas of research and study that promised the greatest, often most immediate, market returns. By doing so, White undermined the legitimacy of those fields of study that could not make strong claims about their role in the market, including those that made for a truly comprehensive university.

While the immediately practical focus of White’s public statements undermined the university as an institution that encompassed all areas of study, it did not narrow emphasis to only serve the needs of individuals. Instead, he repeatedly stressed the wide societal impact of
higher education. His appeal to practicality and marketability did not devolve into a privileging of private goods over the public good. The private interests of individual students were indeed important to White but he articulated a vision of the university that was primarily in service of society in a broad sense. Hence, despite elevating the practical and marketable, White retained a traditional adherence to the idea that the university is first and foremost an institution for the public good.

The National Context from the 1950s to the 21st Century

By 1953, when George Stoddard resigned from the presidency of the University of Illinois, the post-war era in higher education was well underway. The harried pace of the immediate post-war years were replaced by more steady accommodation to larger enrollments and greater resources. The substantial infrastructures of established research universities made them particularly well suited to addressing growing undergraduate population and increased focus on research and graduate-level education.

The extended post-war era saw tremendous growth in the number of state colleges and universities. In 1949, approximately 35 percent of all higher education institutions were state and the remaining 65 percent were private. By 2001, primarily due to substantial state funding, public colleges and universities had become the majority, nearly 59 percent, and private institutions had declined to 41 percent. The state institutions accommodated tremendous growth in enrollment. They enrolled 49 percent of the 2.3 million students attending college in 1947. By
1969, 8 million students were enrolled nation-wide and, of these, 74 percent attended public colleges and universities.\textsuperscript{408}

Federal support for higher education increased in the late 1950s. This support was tepid until the Soviet Union launched the satellite Sputnik in October 1957. Sputnik seemed to confirm fears that the Soviets were outpacing the U.S. in science and technology, consequently posing a growing geopolitical danger. The 1958 National Defense Education Act (NDEA) asserted that security needs demanded more financial support for education. The context and rhetoric of the NDEA’s development suggests it was an initiative almost exclusively for promoting science and technology in response to the Soviet threat. However, as Wayne J. Urban argued in More Than Science and Sputnik, the launching of Sputnik created political conditions that allowed advocates of broad federal investment in education to push through more comprehensive support. The NDEA did increase funding for science and technology research and education but it also expanded financial support elsewhere. For instance, graduate fellowships were made available for study in science and technology fields but also in the humanities, social sciences and education. It made huge amounts of funding available for basic research, teacher education, and the study of strategically important areas and languages. The NDEA, Urban concluded, “was both a science education and a much-more-than-science education measure, and it broke the dam against federal aid to education through astute use of a national defense metaphor by all of its proponents.”\textsuperscript{409}

Federal support for higher education became tremendously important to universities and their students. Select universities and areas of study received the greatest benefit from federal


\textsuperscript{409} Wayne J. Urban, More Than Science and Sputnik: The National Defense Education Act of 1958 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2010), 210; Similarly, Geiger argued, “the real significance of NDEA . . . was that it broke the stalemate that had been blocking federal assistance for higher education.” Geiger, Research and Relevant Knowledge, 165.
grants. A small number of agencies including the National Institutes of Health and Department of Defense awarded most grants to a only a few institutions in limited fields: engineering, and biological, health and physical sciences. In 1960, six universities received 57 percent of federal funds, and twenty universities 79 percent. At the top twenty institutions federal support comprised 20 to 80 percent of their operating budget. Concentration of these funds among a small number of institutions exacerbated the class division between research universities, differentiating the “federal grant university” (to use Clark Kerr’s terminology) from all others. 410 However, the effect of federal support for higher education was felt more broadly with the expansion of financial aid inaugurated by the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). Prior to the HEA, federal financial aid was only available to military veterans and graduate students in the sciences. With its passing, loans and scholarships became available to the general undergraduate student population. 411

The 1960s and 1970s saw significant growth in research, graduate level education, and academic publications. In part, this growth was encouraged by the possibility of receiving federal funds. Adding grant-relevant Ph.D. programs became an especially important focus, but the overall growth in graduate programs was also due to concerns that mass higher education would require more faculty numbers. Efforts to increase the number of Ph.D.s were successful. In the 1949-1950 academic year, 6,420 degrees were awarded. By 1960-1961 it increased by 55 percent to 11,622 and, by 1969-1970 it had grown to nearly 30,000, an increase of 467 percent from the number of Ph.D.s awarded in 1949-1950. 412 Greater financial support for research was accompanied by an escalation in faculty publications. Prior to the late 1960s, faculty members at most institutions devoted little attention to publications but greater federal funds and focus on

institutional prestige led to an emphasis on published research. In 1969, the percentage of university professors who published was 70.5 percent but, by 1989, it had reached 90.9 percent.\textsuperscript{413}

The 1960s was the era and activism and protests. At many of the country’s largest institutions, emphasis on research and graduate education mobilized undergraduates who felt that their own education was receiving inadequate attention. By the early 1960s student energies were directed at more than curricular inadequacies, as they, and some faculty, challenged activities engaged by the university, including Department of Defense research. Protests grew from 1965, when the U.S. deployed ground troops to Vietnam, and increased over the course of the war. Yet activism was not limited to anti-war protests. Students and faculty were also involved in the civil rights movement, with students founding organizations such as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and Students for a Democratic Society. A number of universities, such as Columbia University, the University of California-Berkeley and the University of Wisconsin-Madison, were sites of especially intense, and often highly visible, activism. Despite heightened activism nationwide, the protestors’ political positions and actions were not characteristic of most students and faculty in the country, who were relatively conservative and generally focused on the routines of academic life. Regardless of the true breadth of the protest movement on campuses, it received a great deal of media attention from 1963 to the end of the decade.\textsuperscript{414} As Hutcheson and Kidder noted, heightened awareness of the protests contributed to a “widespread loss of faith in higher education.” Many people saw the protests as destructive activities that demonstrated the student’s lack of focus on attending to their tax-supported studies. Popular

\textsuperscript{413} Hutcheson and Kidder, 242-243.
disillusionment was also the result of growing antipathy towards the use of federal funds to support research that was deemed of dubious value.415

The 1970s inaugurated a dramatic shift in the fortunes of research universities. Federal funding agencies, of tremendous importance since World War II, shifted resources away from higher education to institutions outside of academe. The loss of federal grants was not only a loss of revenue, it also signaled a shift away from the relationship of trust between higher education and the federal government. On the state level a similar change occurred. Many in state legislatures, which had been often uncritically supportive of higher education, lost confidence in it. Not only did legislators frequently share in popular disillusionment towards student and faculty protestors, they also increasingly doubted the ability of university administrators, who had appeared inadequate to address upheavals on campus.416

From the 1970s, students demonstrated greater interest in career-related programs and increasing relied on student loans to pay for their education. The liberal arts retained wide enrollment through the 1960s but undergraduate students were increasingly interested in programs that prepared them for business careers or graduate study in law, medicine or business-rated fields.417 For many students, access to higher education depended on state and federal government initiatives that made college more affordable. States provided per capita and low tuition for state residents. Federal student aid was largely limited to need-based grants until 1978, when the Guaranteed Student Loan Act made student loans available to a far larger portion of the population. Although this policy shift facilitated a growth in enrollment, it also created the means for high levels of student indebtedness. Indeed, by 2006, an undergraduate graduated, on

415 Hutcheson and Kidder, 239
417 Hutcheson and Kidder, 327.
average, with $17,000 of college debt and indebtedness could be dramatically higher, especially in professional fields.\textsuperscript{418}

Writing in 1977, Howard R. Bowen observed, “the public has become more skeptical towards higher education.” Many people, he continued, argue that the “value of its outcomes does not justify the amount of resources employed, and that public subsidies should be curtailed.”\textsuperscript{419} Bowen’s response to this skepticism, \textit{Investment in Learning: The Individual and Social Value of American Higher Education}, aggregated research to argue for higher education’s individual (e.g. citizenship, economic productivity) and societal (e.g. new knowledge, economic efficiency and growth) benefits.\textsuperscript{420} He made a convincing case for higher education’s ability to yield benefits other than private economic returns. Thelin later argued that Bowen’s efforts encouraged the American people and their political leader to view higher education funding as a “social investment for the public good.”\textsuperscript{421} While Thelin’s evaluation acknowledged \textit{Investment in Learning}’s notable success, the skepticism that Bowen described (and thus the need for his work) demonstrates that higher education’s place in society was being questioned.

In 1980, only three years after Bowen’s \textit{Investment in Learning}, Arthur Levine contended that students had shifted their focus from forward-looking responsibility to others to a presentist and hedonistic emphasis on “duty to oneself.” Levine noted that in 1969, when undergraduates were asked about the higher education outcomes they most prized, they chose: (1) learning to get along with other people and, (2) developing goals and values for their lives. In 1976, these primary and secondary outcomes were replaced by: (1) gaining a detailed understanding of a

\textsuperscript{420} Ibid., 55-59.
specialized field and (2) occupational training. Seventy-five percent of freshmen indicated they were attending college to improve their chances of getting a good job. Levine attributed this vocational focus to recent financial difficulties, including inflation, unemployment and multiple recessions.  

Hence growing interest in career-related programs and increasing reliance on student loans corresponded to a shift in how the role of higher education was understood. Colleges and universities had always provided benefits to individuals, including opportunities for intellectual stimulation, social interaction, and vocational preparation. Nevertheless, recognition of such private goods tended to avoid overwhelming a widespread understanding that higher education was largely, perhaps even primarily, a means for the public good. However, during the 1970s and 1980s the societal value of higher education was viewed with increased skepticism and more and more it was seen as personal investment that ought to lead to private economic returns.

Business interests and ideas influenced higher education since the beginnings of the American university, a phenomenon that to some, including Veblen, threatened the university’s very mission. However, the incorporation of business goals and practices reached an unprecedented level in the 1980s. At that time, accountability and position in the education marketplace became especially prominent concerns and strategic planning and marketing campaigns were increasingly seen as important components of university administration. In 1983, U.S. News and World Report issued its first ranking of the “Best Colleges.” Rankings existed well before 1983 but U.S. News was essential to their popularization. From the 1980s on, college and university rankings have become extremely important to marketing campaigns,

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423 Barrow; Veblen.

424 Hutcheson and Kidder, 244.
providing significant returns to highly ranked institutions and major challenges to lower ranked, or unranked, colleges and universities.

The growing employment of business practices corresponded with a greater interest in securing external funds, especially among the country’s state universities. In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration reduced federal funding for higher education. In response to this decrease, Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie argued, states attempted to make up the funding deficit at their universities, but their own budgetary crises limited this ability. By the beginning of the 1990s, for the first time, a number of states reduced their financial support for higher education in absolute terms. The overall reduction in funding from both federal and state sources demanded new revenue streams. The most viable possibility was through the creation of research and programs that had the greatest market value. Consequently, higher education institutions and their faculty increasingly focused on activities most likely to receive external funds. Slaughter and Leslie termed this phenomenon “academic capitalism,” defining it as “institutional and professorial market or marketlike efforts to secure external moneys.”

Within academic capitalism, colleges and universities increasingly looked towards the business sector for collaborative efforts that would increase financial resources. To some degree, the time was well suited to such commercial efforts. By the 1980s, higher education had re-established much of the popular credibility it had lost by the late 1960s and early 1970s. Early in the 1980s, economic growth provided resources for larger appropriations and messages of support for higher education increasingly gained political currency among governors and gubernatorial candidates. These political leaders argued for partnerships between their states, their universities, and private sector businesses. These partnerships, they contended, could lead

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to the development of the high tech economy in their respective states.\textsuperscript{426} In order to facilitate such development, from 1985 to the present, states and universities have worked together to develop research parks to attract tech-based businesses and the economic vitality that presumably follows. Universities, Thelin observed, “started to believe their own public relations about their destiny as economic incubators.”\textsuperscript{427}

The advent of research parks in the 1980s heralded the university’s role as a key economic driver. Recognition of this role grew dramatically from the 1980s through the closing decades of the twentieth century. Discussions about the societal place of colleges and universities were increasingly framed using economic language, including the terms “human capital” and the “knowledge” (or “knowledge-based” or “new”) economy. The idea of human capital had been gaining currency since the 1964 publication of Gary Becker’s \textit{Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education}.\textsuperscript{428} Nevertheless, it did not become commonly used in both general academic and popular discourse until the 1990s.\textsuperscript{429}

While the concept of human capital could be applied to industrial production, it gained the most attention with the development of heavily knowledge-based forms of economic production, particularly in the technology sector.\textsuperscript{430} Human capital and technology, especially information and communications technology (ICT), cohered in the idea of the knowledge economy. One of the earliest articulations of the knowledge economy, a 1996 report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), noted that “knowledge is now recognized as the driver of productivity and economic growth, leading to a new focus on the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{426} A possibility demonstrated by the already established successes in California (Silicon Valley), North Carolina (Research Triangle) and Massachusetts (Route 128 Electronics Belt). Thelin, \textit{History of American Higher Education}, 341.
\item \textsuperscript{427} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{428} Gary Becker, \textit{Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education}, 3d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), xix.
\item \textsuperscript{429} Ibid., 16.
\end{itemize}
role of information, technology and learning in economic performance." However, as Michael A. Peters argued, the knowledge economy has been, from its inception, an evolving phenomenon. Therefore universities must adapt to the needs and implications of its forms, whether it focuses on learning for national innovation, creativity and the monetization of largely cultural knowledge, or the open knowledge economy with its promise of access to education, science and democratic opportunity. Regardless of the iteration of the knowledge economy, on a conceptual level neither it nor the idea of human capital necessarily implicates the university. Either could be facilitated through other educational means. However, as a site of both human capital and technological production, the university—especially the research university—serves as the archetypical institution of the knowledge economy.

While traditional colleges and universities were increasingly seen as essential components of the knowledge economy, they faced growing competition from for-profit higher education institutions, especially those that delivered instruction via the Internet. From the 1990s to the present, for-profit institutions, such as the University of Phoenix, challenged the educational role of the country’s traditional, non-profit, colleges and universities. Student enrollment in for-profit colleges expanded through the 1990s until it reached more than 10 percent of overall enrollment by 2010. Although they did not always enroll the same type of students as residential universities, they drew on the same federal resources for student aid. Furthermore, for-profit colleges promoted their practical focus often in contrast to the presumably esoteric curriculum provided by their established non-profit counterparts. To some

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extent assertions of practicality are true: not only do for-profits colleges focus almost exclusively on clearly career-related curricula, they also provide it in a way that is relatively easy to accommodate to the schedules of students who hold fulltime jobs and have family responsibilities.

Traditional colleges and universities soon followed the lead of for-profit on-line colleges. By 2010, the majority of these traditional institutions offered credit courses via the Internet.\textsuperscript{435} As Thelin observed, on-line professional programs could be especially “good deals” for prestigious universities. “They were relatively inexpensive to provide,” he noted, “yet their ‘branding’ power meant that they could command a high tuition—thus becoming a ‘cash cow’ for the university. For better or worse, all colleges and universities had become involved in the technological transformation of academic programs.”\textsuperscript{436} However, such successes were not guaranteed and, early in the decade, failure was common. In 2003, for example, Columbia University, one of the strongest brands in higher education, announced that it was closing its for-profit, on-line initiative, citing difficult economic conditions as the cause. Columbia was not alone in its failure, but was preceded by the closing of for-profit initiatives at the University of Maryland and Temple and New York Universities.\textsuperscript{437} Much later in the decade, in 2009, the University of Illinois’ own entry into the for-profit sector, the Global Campus, would also fail. Nevertheless, albeit to varying degrees, on-line courses and programs became increasingly important to non-profit universities, expanding their visibility, educational portfolios, and revenue generation options.

On-line education was just one of the ways through which the world was increasingly interconnected from the 1990s. The maturation of the Internet and related information and

\textsuperscript{435} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{436} Ibid., 369.

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communications technologies (ICT) allowed distance education to gain a level of immediacy that would have been impossible otherwise. This “time-space compression,” a term notably used by David Harvey, characterized a new form of globalization in which people, ideas and capital moved around the world at an unprecedented rate.\footnote{David Harvey, \textit{The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change} (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1990).} For colleges and universities, globalization advanced their already high levels of internationalization, at least relative to most other institutions. Faculty and student exchange and research collaboration across national borders continued to grow, but increasing international student population was the most visible effect of globalization on higher education in many countries.\footnote{For a discussion of international student mobility, see Jenny J. Lee, Alma Maldonado-Maldonado and Gary Rhoades, “The Political Economy of International Student Flows: Patterns, Ideas, Propositions,” in \textit{Higher Education: Handbook of Theory and Research XXI}, ed. J.C Smart, 545-590 (Dordrecht, NL: Springer, 2006).} In the U.S., during the 1969-1970 academic year, 134,959 (1.7 percent) of the country’s 8,005,000 students were international. This percentage grew to 2.4 percent in 1979-1980, 2.9 percent in 1989-1990, and stabilized at 3.5 percent in 1990-2000 and in 2009-2010, when an unprecedented 690,923 international students were studying in the U.S.\footnote{Patricia Chow and Rajika Bhandari, \textit{Open Doors 2010: Report of International educational Exchange} (New York: Institute of International Education, 2010), 2.}

The correspondence between technology-driven globalization and the growth in international student numbers is difficult to determine. The Internet did heighten the visibility of individual institutions while also readily allowing for comparisons between colleges and universities in increasingly important U.S. and international rankings.\footnote{For a discussion of this growing importance see Sverker Lindblad and Rita Foss Lindblad, “Transnational Governance of Higher Education: On Globalization and International University Ranking Lists,” in \textit{Globalization and the Study of Education}, ed. Thomas S. Popkewitz and Fazal Rizvi, 180-202 (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).} However, this change has done more than make institutions more noticeable to potential students, it also raised their profiles to each other. As Simon Marginson and Marijk van der Wende observed, “in a networked global environment in which every university is visible to every other, and the weight

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of the global dimension is increasing, it is no longer possible for nations or for individual higher education institutions to completely seal themselves off from global effects.” Research universities are among those most likely to be “implicated in globalization” and most needing to highlight this relationship. Institutions that fail to engage in internationally relevant research, educate the global workers of tomorrow, and successfully compete in domestic and worldwide rankings risk being considered irrelevant in the globalized world. Local and national understandings of their role, never wholly adequate, have become less tenable in an era of profound interconnectedness, mobility and competition. Ultimately, the era of the globalization has provided substantial new opportunities for American universities while, at the same time, presenting them with an increasingly complex environment in which to accomplish their shifting societal roles.

In addition to the effects of increasing globalization, the twenty-first century brought a number of other challenges to universities. Overall, their financial health worsened as donor contributions, endowments, and state appropriations declined. Federal student financial aid seemed to be in a tenuous position as it became a topic of Congressional debate, and federal research and development support continued to decrease. Universities were criticized for their decreasing undergraduate retention and graduation rates, the quality of the medical education they provided, and their lack of control over “big-time” intercollegiate athletics. As the literature demonstrated, Thelin observed, “American higher education in the twenty-first century had taken on a defensive posture” and had a “crisis of confidence.”

The University of Illinois prior to White: 1953-2005

In 1953, soon after George Stoddard left office, long-time University of Illinois comptroller Lloyd Morey took over as acting president. Morey’s tenure, as both interim and permanent president, lasted only two years (1953-1955). While brief, it did see the establishment the university’s educational television station and career services for students and alumni. David Dodds Henry succeeded Morey and led the university through 16 years of growth and unrest (1955-1971). During Henry’s presidency, residence halls, the Krannert Center for the Performing Arts, and the Assembly Hall were built on the Urbana-Champaign campus; and the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle opened, expanding the university’s presence in the state’s largest city. Student enrollment doubled and the university’s academic stature grew. The Graduate College expanded and science and technology fields benefitted from increased federal funds. The state of Illinois raised financial support to its other universities, and thus reduced the University of Illinois’ portion from 78 percent in 1948 to 49 percent in 1968. During the 1960s, the state provided 66 percent of the university’s budget, but 90 percent of research funding came from the federal government. As was the case at many universities, the 1960s and early 1970s were the era of student activism at Illinois. The anti-war movement began at Illinois in 1965 and reached new heights in 1967 with draft resistance and disruption of interviews conducted by Dow Chemical, producer of napalm. The university responded by expelling some of the students involved. During the mid-1960s Illinois also became a site for civil rights activism. Notably,

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448 Kennedy, “Reactions Against the Vietnam War and Military-Related Targets on Campus.” Despite such activity, Illinois was never a leader in protest movements like its institutional peers in Berkeley, Madison or Ann Arbor, a characteristic Kennedy
black students at the university sought to reform their institution and effect wider societal change.  

With Henry’s retirement in 1971, John E. Corbally became Illinois president. At that time, Illinois had 60,000 students, making it the ninth largest university in the country. But regardless of size, it was in difficult financial circumstances. Corbally expressed concern about this situation from the very beginning of this presidency, when noted that he expected financial difficulties to be an especially significant problem. He called for renewed “public enthusiasm” for higher education funding, noting that investment in higher education had great potential “in a world which is urgently in need of every one of the kinds of products which come from a high quality university.” Corbally addressed the need for research and construction funds by inaugurating a capital campaign that raised over $130 million from outside donors. He focused efforts on improving agriculture and veterinary medicine programs and expanding agricultural research and, by again seeking outside funding, raised $30.4 million for the Agricultural Engineering Sciences and the Veterinary Medicine Basic Science Buildings. Regardless of Corbally’s success in raising funds from outside donors, the Illinois legislature cut funding intended for faculty salary increases. However, with the support of alumni, students and their parents, a lobbying effort successfully restored half of what had been cut. In 1979, Corbally resigned from the Illinois presidency to head the MacArthur Foundation in Chicago.

Stanley O. Ikenberry became the fourteenth president of the University of Illinois in 1979. Over the course of his presidency (1979-1995), Illinois continued its success in securing

attributes to the conservatism of Urbana-Champaign, its distance from a major urban area, and the university’s lack of a tradition of liberal activism. Ibid., 107.

Williamson, Black Power on Campus.


external funds, with federal research dollars increasing almost four times and growth in other sources, including private grants, contracts and gifts. Ikenberry led capital campaigns, but he exceeded the accomplishments of his predecessor Corbally: the second of his two campaigns brought in more than $1.35 billion. The Ikenberry presidency also saw substantial growth in the university’s infrastructure. In Urbana-Champaign, the building of the Grainger Engineering Library and the Beckman Institute for Advanced Science and Technology, and establishment of the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA), advanced the university’s commitment to technology and applied sciences. The NCSA quickly demonstrated its value: in 1993, it released one of the most important innovations of the nascent digital era, the pioneering graphical web browser Mosaic. However, Ikenberry’s infrastructural developments were not limited to the university’s flagship campus. The consolidation of the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle and the University of Illinois Medical Center in 1982 formed the largest research university in the Chicago area, the University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC).

In January 1995, Ikenberry spoke before the Board of Trustees about the possibility of Sangamon State University becoming part of the University of Illinois. He explained that there was a great deal of support in Springfield, the Illinois capital and location of Sangamon State, and interest from faculty on the Chicago and Urbana-Champaign campuses. He then added his own vision of the new campus as small, high quality and focused on undergraduate education, with an additional emphasis on graduate programs in government and public affairs. Sangamon State University officially became the University of Illinois, Springfield (UIS) on July 1, 1995.

Although Ikenberry oversaw development of high visibility infrastructural projects, he also

devoted attention to the types of students who enrolled in the university through the establishment of the President’s Award Program. By providing financial support for under-represented but high achieving students, he advanced access and the overall quality and diversity of Illinois’ student body. Ikenberry resigned in 1995 and later became the president of the American Council of Education.456

University of Illinois alumnus James J. Stukel became president of his alma mater in 1995. During Stukel’s presidency, federal research funding grew by almost 100 percent and fundraising reached unprecedented levels. Stukel focused on administration reform, initiating strategic planning focused on administrative services and ultimately cutting their overhead by 25 percent. In addition, he developed an academic priorities plan, an area that had not received such comprehensive attention in twenty years. As was the case during earlier administrations, Stukel’s presidency was one of substantial growth in the university’s infrastructure. The Chemical and Life Sciences Building, Spurlock Museum, and Agriculture, Consumer and Environmental Sciences Library were built in Urbana-Champaign; and the east campus of the University of Illinois at Chicago grew by 50 percent. In 1997, University of Illinois On-line was established, providing the foundation for Illinois’ later on-line initiatives, including B. Joseph White’s Global Campus project. While on-line education would become an important means to connect the university to people beyond its three campuses, during the Stukel administration connections were also made in more traditional ways. Like Kinley and other predecessors, Stukel spent a great deal of time travelling throughout the state to personally advocate for the university. In

addition, he also initiated a program for legislative advocacy and public engagement, Illinois Connection, in order to better bring together the university and the people of the state.457

The Stukel era was a time of heightened emphasis on the university’s economic role. At a 1999 meeting of the Board of Trustees, Interim Vice President Chester Gardner identified economic development as “an emerging mission” at the university and promoted the establishment of a research park as a place for economic incubators and start-up companies; that year, the Board approved the establishment of the University of Illinois Research Park.458 In 2000, the Illinois State Senate passed a resolution that noted that the technology sector provided the “best opportunity for long-term economic vitality.” Consequently, it added economic development “as a distinct part” of the state research universities’ traditional instruction, research and public service responsibilities. The resolution encouraged these universities to use their resources “for the development and commercialization of new technological and scientific innovations, and that such uses be deemed to be in the public interest.”459 Stukel was instrumental in institutionalizing this directive, inaugurating the Office of Vice President for Technology and Research, which facilitated business, academic and governmental partnerships in the service of economic growth, and IllinoisVENTURES, a technology-focused venture capital firm.460 Stukel’s role in the development of such forms of “academic capitalism” at the university reflected a general trend in U.S. higher education; all across the country, institutions focused on monetizing their activities. Stukel retired in 2004 after 43 years of service to the

university, but the demand for finding new sources of funding continued to into the presidency of his successor, B. Joseph White.

**B. Joseph White and His Presidency**

In January 2005, White assumed the office of the president of the University of Illinois. White earned his undergraduate degree in international economics at Georgetown University and later completed a MBA at Harvard Business School and a Ph.D. in business administration from the University of Michigan. He began his academic career in 1975 when he became an assistant professor of organizational behavior and industrial relations in the Michigan Business School. He left the academy in 1981 to join the Cummins Engine Company where he was vice president for management development and vice president for personnel and public affairs. White returned to the University of Michigan, where he served as associate dean of the Business School from 1987 to 1990 and then as dean from 1991 to 2001. In 2002, he was appointed Michigan’s interim president and returned to position of dean that same year. Two years later, White was named Illinois’ sixteenth president.

Lawrence C. Eppley, Chairman of the Illinois Board of Trustees, noted that White was “the clear choice” for the presidency due to his record and national reputation. According to Eppley, White was known for being a creative leader who set high goals and achieved them. His Midwestern “values and sensibilities,” and knowledge of the Big Ten and leading research universities made him highly suitable to the job. To a degree, there is something to Eppley’s evaluation, White was indeed familiar with large research universities and their substantial size. This familiarity may have prepared him for what would be a time of significant growth. During

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White’s presidency, campus infrastructure grew substantially, most notably on the Urbana-
Champaign campus. The Institute for Genomic Biology, Undergraduate Library renovation,
Activities and Recreation Center, Business Instructional Facility, Sally McFarland Carrillon and
the Illini Media Company Building were all completed while White was in office. University-
wide enrollment increased steadily, if not dramatically. In fall 2005, on-campus enrollment at all
University of Illinois campuses and branch locations was 68,325; by fall 2009 it had increased to
71,459. The university budget grew from $3.2 billion for 2005-2006 to $4.66 billion for 2009-
2010 and, for those same years, separately funded research went from $668.8 million to $727.2
million.\footnote{The University of Illinois Pocket Facts 2006 [Urbana: Office for University Relations, 2006], 1; The University of Illinois Pocket Facts 2010 [Urbana: Office for University Relations, 2010], 1.} In addition, the university’s Urbana-Champaign campus retained its distinction as one
of the primary U.S. destinations for international students. Of the 40,360 students who enrolled
at UIUC during the 2004-2005 academic year, 5,560 (13.8 percent) were from abroad. Only the
University of Southern California (USC) had a greater number of international students (6,846:
International Education, 2005), 42.} By the time White left office, during the 2009-2010 academic year, UIUC’s
international enrollment had increased to 7,287 of the total student enrollment of 43,723, or to
16.7 percent. Again, only USC had a larger number (7,987: 22.9 percent).\footnote{Patricia Chow and Rajika Bhandari, Open Doors 2010: Report of International Educational Exchange (New York: Institute of
International Education, 2010), 72.}

Of White’s many qualifications, Eppley expressed especially strong interest in his fund-
raising experience, noting that White had “demonstrated an ability to raise funds from friends
and alumni of a university to provide the margin of excellence in a time of less reliance on state
support.”\footnote{Quoted in “University of Illinois Names 16th President,” [2].} White was indeed known as a successful fundraiser. During his time as Dean (1991-
2001), the Michigan Business School had increased annual fundraising from $5.5 to 26.5 million
and its endowment grew from 35 to $260 million. White’s experience suggested that he would be well suited to address the University of Illinois’ difficult financial situation. By the time he arrived in Urbana-Champaign, state support for the university had declined dramatically. In 1994-1995, a decade prior to his arrival, state revenue provided 33.5 percent of the university’s operating budget. In 2004-2005, immediately before White became president, state support had declined to 21.3 percent. While the total amount of the budget increased during White’s tenure, the portion subsidized by the state continued to decline. By 2008-2009, the final year of White’s administration, the state supplied only 18.3 percent.

At his inauguration, White introduced a “new Compact” that would help address this financial challenge by bringing together five of the university’s key constituencies: the state, tuition payers, faculty, private donors and university leadership. He asked the state to do “what it can and when it can”—a less than encouraging call to action but one which corresponded to his clear disappointment in the level of state support. Tuition payers were to bear a greater burden but access would be maintained through greater amounts of financial aid. Illinois faculty would continue to bring in grants and contracts, while private donors would provide more funding for students, faculty, programs and physical infrastructure. White and other university leaders would find ways to continually reduce and reallocate costs and, through “entrepreneurial activity,” develop new revenue streams. Collectively, this new Compact would help to maintain and advance the university, which White described as “a vital public asset.” He indicated that when he spoke publically of the university’s value to the state, the need to maintain its quality, and the necessity of his proposed Compact, his message was well received. However, he found that state

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legislators, faculty senates, private donors, university leaders, and those who set tuition, all frustrated the Compact and its agenda by finding “hard choices” too difficult to implement.\(^\text{469}\)

Like many other university leaders of the era, including Stukel, White employed strategic planning to identify and advance institutional goals. In early 2005, only a few months after he assumed the presidency, he inaugurated a university-wide planning initiative. The development of this strategic plan was described as essential to building on Illinois’ “greatness” and ensuring it a “brilliant” future. The plan would enable the university to “adapt to and take advantage of the opportunities presented by an expanding global marketplace for research, education and training.”\(^\text{470}\) It was to take place in three stages: (1) plans for the entire university, (2) plans for all three campuses, university administration, the Alumni Association and University of Illinois Foundation, and (3) plans for each college, school and major administrative unit. Between March 2005 and June 2006, faculty and administrators from across the university worked on all aspects of the strategic plan. Four priorities developed from this process: (1) “develop UIUC into the nation’s preeminent public research university,” (2) “develop UIC into the nation’s premier urban public research university,” (3) “position the U of I Medical Center and UIC health sciences college for the next quarter century,” and (4) “develop UIS into one of the nation’s top five small, public, liberal arts universities.”\(^\text{471}\)

Achieving each of these ambitious priorities relied on accomplishing their respective underlying strategies and goals, which were themselves dependent on resources, accountability and leadership.\(^\text{472}\) While White had expressed his frustration with the progress of his new


\(^{472}\) Ibid.
Compact, his administration did see notable success in increasing the university’s financial resources, an essential component of strategic plan fulfillment. In June 2007, he publically announced the largest fund-raising campaign in the institution’s history, the $2.25 billion Brilliant Futures: The Campaign for the University of Illinois. White noted that the purpose of the campaign is “simple: to support our faculty, thus ensuring excellence, and to support our students, thus ensuring access and affordability.” Consequently, Brilliant Futures prioritized funds for a number of key areas, including student scholarships, endowed chairs and professorships, support for programs that would help maintain institutional competiveness, and increasing annual giving and the overall size of the endowment. Brilliant Futures was a great success. By the time White left office in September 2009, the campaign had already achieved $1.71 billion of its $2.25 billion goal. It concluded in December 2011, having exceeded this goal by raising a total of $2.43 billion. The strategic plan’s need for accountability was addressed through the creation annual progress reports. Each year, from 2007 to 2010, these reports detailed the achievements and difficulties faced by the university and its campuses.

Effective leadership, the third foundation of the strategic plan, is more difficult to quantify than resources and accountability. White had demonstrated leadership in the strategic planning process itself but, arguably, his overall effectiveness was undermined by a number of challenges. In 2006, the second year of his administration, he proposed that the University of Illinois increase its out-of-state enrollment from ten to fifteen percent within six years. Of the Big Ten universities, Illinois had the lowest percentage of out-of-state students. Some of its Big

Ten competitors (including Michigan, White’s former employer) had at least one-third of their student body from out-of-state, including students from abroad. Because these students paid higher tuition than Illinois residents, doing so would increase revenue. However, increasing out-of-state students was not framed merely as a revenue generating initiative; it was described as a way to make the university more competitive, increasing its prestige along with its domestic and international visibility.477

Regardless of such benefits, the proposal was not widely well received. For example, State Senator Susan Garrett acknowledged that the university was in need of more revenue but finding additional sources “should not be to the detriment of Illinois students.” Garrett argued that the university was already not admitting many of the best students from Illinois and, consequently, a large number of them were leaving the state for college, often permanently. The loss of these students undermined the state’s financial health through reducing long-term tax revenue, and denying the state an adequate return on K-12 education and the benefit of retaining some of its “best and brightest.” Garrett observed that she continued “to hear from people who want the University of Illinois to give priority to educating our own highly qualified students” and concluded, “I hope that the university . . . will heed the concerns of Illinois residents.”478

Although there was indeed widespread concern about the possible growth of out-of-state students, some people were in agreement with White’s initiative. Responding to Senator Garrett, John A. Johnson accused the senator of engaging in “cheap politics” rather than addressing the real issue of insufficient funding for the university. Out-of state students, Johnson noted, pay much more in tuition than in-state students. White, he suspected, was being realistic in terms of budget constraints and idealistic in terms of education by working to increase the number of out-

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of state students. If Garrett were truly interested in higher education, and Illinois’ future well-being and economic health, Johnson concluded, she would confront her (Democratic) party on the issue of insufficient resources.\textsuperscript{479} However, responses like Johnson’s were not sufficiently popular to enable the adoption of the out-of-state enrollment initiative. Admitting that the initiative could not go forward, White observed that the strength and negativity of the “public reaction” exceeding the benefit of increased numbers of non-resident students. “We are a public institution,” he explained, “and trust and confidence in us are really important. It sure is not worth damaging that trust and confidence over a small matter like this.”\textsuperscript{480}

The out-of-state enrollment issue was a product of a White administration initiative, but the matter of Chief Illiniwek had a far longer history and was much more controversial. “The Chief” first appeared at an Illinois football game in 1926 during the Kinley administration. For the next eighty years, the Chief—a student dressed in Native American garb—danced at Illinois sports events. Increasingly, however, the Chief had become a divisive issue. For some, he was a noble tradition whereas other saw him as anachronistic or racist. In 2005, the NCAA banned specific universities that used Native American imagery from post-season competition. Although the Illinois Board of Trustees had resolved to address the issue in 2004, the NCAA ban gave it new urgency. The Board retired the Chief in February 16, 2007 and he performed for the last time at a basketball game five days later.\textsuperscript{481} White spoke in support of the Board’s decision, noting that although he understood that many people felt strongly about the tradition, “for the good of our student-athletes and our university it is time to come together and move on to the

\textsuperscript{481} Craig Chamberlain, “Chief Illiniwek Performs Last Dance Amid Continued Controversy,” \textit{Inside Illinois} 26, no. 15 (March 1, 2007), 1.
next chapter in the history of this distinguished institution.”482 While the Board of Trustees, rather than White, had made the final decision, both supporters and opponents of the Chief faulted White for his handling of the issue. White recounted that while most people had been “quietly thoughtful,” both he and other University of Illinois leaders had received “strong and even hateful expressions” from people on both sides of the issue.483

Whereas the resolution of the Chief Illiniwek issue was divisive, and even the out-of-state enrollment proposal had sympathetic parties on both sides, two other difficulties of White’s presidency—the failure of the Global Campus and the admissions scandal—were not so ambiguous. White introduced the University of Illinois Global Campus at his September 2005 inauguration. At that time, he asked if the university should create “a fourth ‘campus,’ a virtual university?” He argued for this new campus by suggesting that the university was not sufficiently participating in degree and non-degree education, which were “among the fastest growing enterprises in America,” and by highlighting the success of the University of Phoenix. White noted that the Apollo Group, the owner of the University of Phoenix, enrolled almost 230,000 students and its market value grew from $35 million in 1994 to $14.1 billion in 2005. “We have no desire to be Phoenix,” he cautioned. However, White asked, “might we combine the academic quality of the University of Illinois with the ‘user-friendliness’ of the University of Phoenix and create something of substantial value?”484

In the two years that followed the inauguration, the Global Campus proceeded steadily. Even prior to its approval by the Board of Trustees, the Global Campus cost approximately $1.1 million in discretionary funds from the President’s Office budget. White defended these

483 B. Joseph White, Testimony before the Higher Education Appropriations Committee, 95th Illinois General Assembly (February 23, 2007), n.p. Office for University Relations, University of Illinois, Urbana and Chicago.
preliminary expenses, arguing that a million dollars was reasonable given the need for research and planning before recommending a course of action to the community and Board of Trustees. White explained to faculty and staff that the Global Campus was “driven by mission, mastery and money, in that order.” He argued that the university’s mission “as a land-grant institution is to bring quality education to large numbers of able and motivated Illinois citizens and others.” The Global Campus would help fulfill this access mission by continuing the extension of the university that had proceeded from the Morrill Act of 1862, the building of the Urbana-Champaign campus, establishment of campuses in Chicago including the medical school and UIC, and the recent addition of the University of Illinois-Springfield. Furthermore, White declared, the growing need for, and affordances of, on-line education made institutional mastery of it a necessity for all three University of Illinois campuses. Finally, the university’s desperate financial situation demanded new sources of revenue and the Global Campus was “by far our best new financial prospect.” In five years, White asserted, the Global Campus should provide a surplus of more than $25 million, an amount that exceeded the $10.5 million increase in the state appropriation for the 2006-07 academic year (the first in five years).

In March 2007, two months after White spoke to faculty and staff, the Board of Trustees approved the Global Campus initiative. As White had done earlier, the Trustees argued that the Global Campus was to extend the university’s land-grant mission by serving more students, make it a leader in educational innovation and provide new revenue sources. The Trustees also emphasized that the on-line campus would be “student-centered in its mission and goals.”

486 B. Joseph White, “Global Campus Message to University Faculty & Staff” (January 8, 2007), n.p. Office for University Relations, University of Illinois, Urbana and Chicago. White reiterated the access argument after the establishment of the Global Campus: “And last year Global Campus was launched, expanding educational opportunity and access with state-of-the-art online coursework.” University of Illinois Annual Report 2008-2009 (Urbana: University of Illinois, 2008), 1.
487 B. Joseph White, “Remarks to the Annual Meeting of UIUC Faculty” (speech delivered at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, September 11, 2006), n.p. Office for University Relations, University of Illinois, Urbana and Chicago.
488 White, “Global Campus Message to University Faculty & Staff,” n.p.
offering “high-quality courses and educational programs and use innovative technology solutions and flexible instructor models to scale them to meet demand.”\textsuperscript{489} The academic programs offered by it, they continued, would meet both “societal need and student demand.” The Global Campus would also conduct and publish research on “technology-assisted learning” and its relationship to pedagogy and learning outcomes, as well as the possibilities of new technological innovations in education. In addition, it would serve the physical campuses of the University of Illinois system by assisting them with the incorporation of on-line technologies into their own programs.\textsuperscript{490}

The Global Campus did not offer all of the University of Illinois’ on-line degree programs. Instead it supplemented those that already existed, such the Springfield campus’ bachelor’s degree programs in history and environmental science, and the Urbana-Champaign campus’ master’s degree programs in library and information science and Global Studies in Education. The types of programs offered by the Global Campus were quite narrow, and highly technical or managerial. By 2008, they included bachelor’s degree completion programs in business administration and nursing. At the master’s level, programs were offered in human resource education (e-learning concentration), patient safety leadership, and recreation, sport and tourism. The Global Campus also provided opportunities to earn graduate certificates in business process management, information technology project management, foundations of e-learning, management of e-learning, business process management, information technology management, Patient Safety Organizations, and Patient Safety, Error Science and Full Disclosure.\textsuperscript{491}

Regardless of the types of programs offered, the Global Campus failed to meet the enrollment expectations of campus leaders. It had been hoped that it would enroll 9,000 students

\textsuperscript{489} University of Illinois Board of Trustees, “Implementing the University of Illinois Global Campus Partnership by Establishing the Global Campus as a Unit Organized at the University Level” (March 13, 2007): 1-2, Board of Trustees, accessed June 14, 2014, http://www.uillinois.edu/trustees/agenda/March percent2013, percent202007--Approved percent20and percent20Reported/a percent20008 percent20mar percent2020global percent20campus-revised.pdf.

\textsuperscript{490} Ibid., 3.

within five years but its trajectory was far from encouraging.\textsuperscript{492} In its first year, 2008, it enrolled only 10 students and made $500,000 less than had been projected.\textsuperscript{493} By April 2009, enrollment had increased to 360 students, and a third of these were in non-degree courses. More than $10 million had been spent on the Global Campus and it was expected that this would increase to $15 million by June 2009.\textsuperscript{494} However, it did not survive until June. On May 21, the Board of Trustees voted to close the Global Campus. With the closure of Illinois’ “fourth campus,” all online education became the responsibility of the traditional campuses in Chicago, Springfield and Urbana-Champaign.\textsuperscript{495}

The Global Campus failed due to multiple factors. As its CEO Chester S. Gardner argued, it faced an increasingly competitive marketplace, in which low-cost exclusively on-line providers offered students less expensive options, at the same time the Global Campus was trying to recover its startup costs and increase enrollment. However, as Steve Kolowich noted, this challenge is not itself a sufficient reason for the Global Campus’ demise. After all, the University of Illinois brought its own advantage to the marketplace: a strong and prestigious brand. The most significant factor in the failure of the Global Campus, Kolowich asserted, was the lack of faculty support. From the beginning, faculty were suspicious of its profit-driven model, with its plan to appropriate faculty syllabi and course content, incorporate them into a course management system, and have the courses taught by adjunct instructors. The Faculty Senates at each of the three campuses found this approach unacceptable and rejected the for-profit model and the drive for independent accreditation of the Global Campus. In addition, they also sought oversight of their own courses, which were to be provided through already existing

\textsuperscript{494} Cohen, “College Unplugged.”

Ultimately, the faculty position won out: for-profit status was abandoned and existing academic units became partners in the Global Campus’ degree programs. Despite this partnership, deans and faculty were largely unwilling to work with the Global Campus. This resistance dramatically hindered growth in the number of courses offered and, correspondingly, student enrollment. \footnote{Kolowich, “What Doomed Global Campus?”} At a Board of Trustees meeting held on May 21, 2009, the Trustees expressed satisfaction “with neither the progress of Global Campus . . . nor the costs incurred” and resolved that all University of Illinois on-line programs become the property and responsibility of the university’s three campuses, with the Global Campus only providing service and support. This resolution effectively ended the Global Campus initiative and, with it, White’s most significant attempt to find a sustainable solution to the university’s budgetary challenges. \footnote{University of Illinois Board of Trustees, meeting minutes (May 21, 2009), 31-33. Board of Trustees, accessed June 7, 2014, http://www.bot.uillinois.edu/minutes.}

On May 29, 2009, only seven days after the Global Campus resolution, the Chicago Tribune published the details of an investigation into admissions irregularities at the Illinois’ Urbana-Champaign campus. As the Tribune demonstrated, applicants to the university who were connected to state lawmakers, members of the Board of Trustees, and other powerful people had received preferential admissions treatment through what was called the “Category 1” process. Between 2005 and 2009, the names of approximately 800 potential undergraduate students were placed on what the Tribune described as a “clout list” that differentiated them from students in
the general applicant pool. The *Tribune* admitted that it was uncertain how many of these applicants would have been admitted on their own, but did note that for the 2008-2009 academic year, 77 percent were admitted, a number well above the 69 percent for all applicants. Nevertheless, it was clear that some especially well-connected but under-qualified students were admitted to undergraduate, law and MBA programs despite failing to meet standard criteria and the expressed reservations of admissions staff. White was himself implicated in the unfolding scandal for advocating to Chancellor Richard Herman the admission of two students following the receipt of an e-mail from Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich who had “expressed his support, and would like to see [these students] admitted.” One of these students was a relative of Tony Rezko, a Chicago businessman who would later be convicted of public corruption and fraud. Despite an admissions officer’s recommendation to deny the application, the student was admitted.\(^{500}\)

White issued a statement the same day of the *Chicago Tribune* article. In this response, he explained that he wanted to share some observations on the admissions process at the Urbana-Champaign campus. He noted that all admissions to Illinois should be merit-based and it was “our” job to resist the pressure of powerful people and other who would attempt to influence this process. He admitted, however, that those applicants who are supported by “key alumni, political officials, trustees and others” are tracked. This is the case at all “highly selective” institutions, White argued, including Georgetown University and the University of Michigan, and is both a good way to manage admissions and a courtesy to these people. However, White continued, this tracking does not bias the admissions process. The *Tribune* he noted, does not assert that...
unqualified applicants were admitted, however, if admissions officers were pressured to accept
students who were less qualified, it is a problem “that we can and will correct.”

Within two weeks of the Tribune article, Illinois governor Pat Quinn appointed the
Admissions Review Commission to investigate admissions at the university. The
Commission’s report was strongly critical of the Board of Trustees and the Governmental
Relations Office and specific trustees, deans and other leaders. Herman received the greatest
criticism for his role, but White’s contribution was also strongly noted. The Commission argued
that White had “failed to exercise appropriate oversight of persons who reported directly to him
and who, on a regular basis, engaged in admissions-related abuses” and “personally participated
in admissions applications in a manner inconsistent with university-sanctioned principles of
ethical conduct and fair dealing.” Collectively, White and all others involved damaged the
university and, the report noted, “public confidence in the university and its leadership has
eroded, and the university must set out in earnest to regain the public’s trust and repair the
damage done to its reputation.” In order to address the admissions scandal and its
repercussions, the Commission recommended the resignation of the current Board of Trustees
and the re-establishment of the Board with new members who would conduct a review of White,
Herman and other administrators. In addition, the Commission called for enhancing ethical
behavior in university governance, dramatically changing admissions policy (including ending
Category 1), and creating the position of inspector general to enforce ethical behavior at state
universities.

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501 B. Joseph White, “President B. Joseph White Responds to Admissions Issue: Communication to Members of the University
Community and Public (May 29, 2009). University of Illinois Office for University Relations, accessed June 7, 2014,
http://www.uillinois.edu/cms/one.aspx?portalId=1117531&pageId=1156009
503 Ibid., 5.
504 Ibid., 2.
505 Ibid., 6-7.
While the Commission’s report played an extremely important role in the resolution of the admissions scandal, many of its recommendations were anticipated prior to its August 6th release. In early July 2009, both White and Herman promised to reform admissions at the university. Later that month, two members of the Board of Trustees resigned. On August 7th, one day after the Commission’s report was released, Governor Quinn called for all members of the Board to resign, and by September 4th the governor reconstituted the Board.

Ten day later, on September 14th, White went before the Faculty Senate and argued that he had “stood behind every admissions denial, no matter who the advocates or how persistent they were.” He cited examples of his ethical behavior while in office and asserted, “I am not and never have been a servant of power. I came to Illinois in 2005 a fiercely independent person and high integrity leader. I still am.” Nonetheless, the Senate passed a resolution that called for White’s removal, along with that of Chancellor Herman. On September 23rd, 2009 White announced his resignation, indicating that he would step down from the presidency at the end of the year. Less than one month later, on October 20th, Herman announced that he too would resign.

In a letter accepting White’s resignation, the new Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Christopher Kennedy, noted that he and the Board appreciated that the resignation was “motivated by serving the university’s best interests” and was “not intended to create any
presumption of wrong-doing by you [White] concerning the subjects investigated by the Governor’s Admissions Review Commission.”\textsuperscript{509} Later, during the final Board meeting of his presidency, White publically thanked the Abner J. Mikva, chairman of the Review Commission for a personal letter that indicated that the investigation had confirmed that White always had the university’s best interest in mind. Mikva noted that White “is a person of great integrity and worthy of great respect,” a characterization similar to Kennedy’s observation that White “is a class act.”\textsuperscript{510} Regardless of such characterizations, the White era had come to a close.

**White’s Idea of the Public University**

Like Kinley and Stoddard before him, White did not articulate how he understood the public as it related to the university in theoretical terms. Instead, his speeches and other public statements focused on the operational needs of his own university and emphasized the how its institutional health corresponded to the health of its state and country. White expressed great admiration for Illinois and the country’s other state-supported universities, highlighting their distinctive, important and wide-ranging roles. He explained how through teaching, research and service, the University of Illinois and its peers not only contributed to the success of individual students but, more broadly, to the success of local, national and global society. Most often, he focused on the economic returns of higher education to individuals and society. He acknowledged the university’s role in delivering private goods and providing for the (largely economic) public good, but emphasized the latter. Providing these goods required significant financial resources and White lamented diminishing state support for higher education. Overall, he emphasized how public investment in higher education brought substantial returns on investment to individuals.

\textsuperscript{509} Christopher G. Kennedy to President B. Joseph White, September 23, 2009, University of Illinois Office for University Relations, accessed June 7, 2014, \url{http://www.uillinois.edu/cms/one.aspx?portalId=1117531&pageId=1156009}.

\textsuperscript{510} University of Illinois, Board of Trustees, Minutes, November 12, 2009, 3-4, University of Illinois Board of Trustees, accessed June 7, 2014, \url{http://www.bot.uillinois.edu/minutes}. 

186
and, especially, society writ large. Such public support had long provided educated people and knowledge that were foundational to the state’s success. However, increasingly reduced support threatened the state’s health at a time in which the rise of the global economy elevated the role of knowledge and human capital production.

While White paid great attention to the future role of the University of Illinois, he expressed admiration for its history and wide-ranging achievements. At his inauguration, for instance, he told his audience how honored he was to be the new leader of “a university that for nearly 140 years has been an institution of such enormous consequence to the student, the state, the nation, and the world.” The university, he explained, “is a tribute to the foresight of past generations . . . [who] understood the contribution of a great public research university to developing the state into an agricultural and industrial powerhouse with an educated citizenry. Our university’s transforming power has spilled over to the nation and the world, through the brilliant accomplishments of our faculty and alumni.” White recognized distinguished faculty and alumni and their many achievements in engineering, agriculture, computer science, business, medicine, film criticism, history, architecture, and public health. A number of these accomplishments, such as the transistor, green revolution in agriculture, and web browser, highlighted the globally important influence of the university.511 White’s inaugural address is consistent with his later evaluations of the University of Illinois and its accomplishments. He consistently noted how the university benefitted the individual student, thus conferring a private good, but he devoted greater attention to how it brought great rewards to society in a more general sense, especially through technology-based innovations.

White explained how the substantial benefits provided by the university were the result of its special relationship with the state of Illinois. Along with faculty, students and staff, he

credited the people of Illinois for the creation of its university. He recognized that for most of the university’s history the state had provided the resources for buildings and operations.\textsuperscript{512} In this respect, White was emphasizing the important connection between the source of funding and the university’s institutional character: a state-, ultimately popularly-, funded institution was necessarily public. However, he clearly emphasized that the relationship between the state and the university was not unidirectional. Instead, this relationship was one in which both parties benefitted. “For nearly 140 years,” White argued, “the fortunes of the University of Illinois and the state of Illinois have been completely intertwined and causally connected. As the state grew and prospered, so did the university. And vice versa. It has been a great, mutually beneficial partnership.”\textsuperscript{513} White not only recognized that the university had benefitted the corporate body of the state, but that “the prosperity and well-being” of Illinois’ citizens and the university’s performance have been completely intertwined.\textsuperscript{514} The university, he concluded, is “one of the state’s most prized and valuable assets.”\textsuperscript{515}

Speaking more precisely, White described why the university was such a great asset. He argued that state financial support led to returns well in excess of the state’s financial investment. He said that approximately one billion dollars of direct and indirect funds, around 25 percent of the university’s budget, allowed Illinois to provide thousands of students with an education valued at 25,000 dollars per year for only 7,500 dollars in tuition. Most of these students, White noted, were Illinois residents who remained in the state after graduation. University faculty did more than educate these students, they added to the state appropriation by bringing in over 600 million research dollars per year, often from out of state. This research promoted innovation,

\textsuperscript{512} White, “Inaugural Address,” n.p.  
\textsuperscript{514} B. Joseph White, “Presidential Acceptance” (speech delivered at the University of Illinois, n.p., November 2, 2004). Office for University Relations, University of Illinois, Urbana and Chicago.  
production and the establishment of new businesses.\textsuperscript{516} It created, White explained, “a huge multiplier effect in intellectual capital and new jobs,” making the university “an engine of economic growth.”\textsuperscript{517}

On multiple occasions, White described Illinois as a “great public university.”\textsuperscript{518} Although he did not clearly say what made it great, it is reasonable to assume that he correlated greatness to its many educational and research accomplishments and, more generally, the ways in which it contributed to economic growth and societal success. The university’s public nature, as has been shown, was due to the source of its support, its deeply intertwined relationship to its state, and its contribution to the public good. However, White’s statements also demonstrate that he considered accessibility and size to be important characteristics of great state universities, especially relative to private institutions.

He observed that state colleges and universities had long provided opportunities to a greater breadth of Americans than their private counterparts. For instance, speaking before a Jewish organization in Chicago, White argued, “public higher education and the success of Jews in America are historically and inextricably intertwined.” He explained how elite private universities had discriminated against Jewish students for decades. Yale, for example, had restricted Jewish admissions up until less than 40 years ago, while at “great public universities like the University of Illinois and the University of Michigan” Jewish students had long been welcome.\textsuperscript{519} However, White did not limit his comments on accessibility to evaluations of the

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\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{516} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{517} White, “Inaugural Address,” n.p.
\item \textsuperscript{519} White, “Standard Club Address,” n.p. Office for University Relations, University of Illinois, Urbana and Chicago. Levine discusses admissions discrimination from 1915 to 1940, including discrimination against Jewish students in \textit{American College and the Culture of Aspiration}, 136-161. For a focused discussion of Ivy League anti-Jewish admissions discrimination see:
\end{enumerate}
past. At the beginning of his presidency he looked at the current circumstances of state higher education and proclaimed access, along with excellence, as a leading challenge. He said, “I will focus intensively on maintaining access to the university as a gateway of opportunity for tens of thousands of talented students [and] … do my best to ensure that our campus communities are models of diverse people working together with mutual respect and thriving in the process.”

White maintained this emphasis on accessibility over the course of his presidency.

Although he had criticisms of private institutions, such as their discriminatory past, White acknowledged the high quality of private universities, including a number in the Midwest. “I respect the elite privates,” White said, “but we and they have very different missions and pursue very different strategies. A great public university—like the University of Illinois—achieves excellence and we do it on a very large scale. Remember that Northwestern, University of Chicago and Notre Dame together have fewer students than our Urbana campus alone!”

White applauded how Illinois strives to achieve its educational and research mission on such a large scale. With its 70,000 students a year on its three campuses, 25,000 faculty and staff members and over 500,000 alumni, he exclaimed, “we’re the opposite of a boutique organization. We’re big, powerful and consequential in the life and history of the state, nation and world.”

The success of the University of Illinois and other state research universities was, as White said, substantial and far-reaching. Nevertheless, he expressed great anxiety about the future of his university and, more broadly, public higher education in the U.S. He noted that

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520 Quoted in “University of Illinois Names 16th President,” n.p.


although the state and private colleges and universities had different missions, these missions complemented each other in the service of the country. However, highly competitive realm of higher education, the publically funded universities were falling behind. “In 1987,” White explained, “seven of the top 26 universities in *U.S. News* rankings were public. Recently, the number was down to four. This is a disturbing trend. The stakes are high in maintaining the excellence of our great public universities.”

In order to maintain such excellence, White argued, universities needed to receive sufficient financial support. Speaking of his own institution, he observed that for much of the University of Illinois’ history, the state provided the majority of the funds needed to build its physical infrastructure and maintain its operations. Given its diverse, multiple and continued successes, he argued, “you would think the state leadership would love us . . . not only for . . . winning basketball—but because for an annual expenditure of $1 billion, the state of Illinois gets deep-discounted quality education for 70,000 students, research, a Medical Center, and 100 percent ownership of a highly consequential, financially sound, $3.5 billion a year institution. Such a deal!” However, White conceded, the university is at a “crossroads” and a “tipping point” simply because the state, which generously supported it for 140 years has, since 2001, sent an “unmistakable” message: “when it comes to incremental operating funds and new capital, you are on your own.” By the time of White’s inauguration the budget had been reduced for four years. However, he did not blame the state exclusively for the university’s declining fortunes. Instead, he asked why, “if a great public research university is so important to our future, elected officials can back away from supporting it so fast and so far with hardly a peep from the public.” He admitted that he did not know why the public was so disengaged from university’s plight but

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offered that it must be complex. The result of this lack of support by both the state’s elected officials and the wider public was a new financial situation, which “is an enormous sea change for us to navigate successfully.”

Although he did not describe it in such terms, the lack of support by elected leaders and the public that White identified can be ascribed to a shift in how the higher education was being evaluated. Colleges and universities had always produced private goods and provided for the public good but the perceived relative value of these two goods had changed over time. During earlier eras, including those of the Kinley and Stoddard presidency, the public utility of higher education was often foregrounded. Kinley, for instance, privileged the university’s role in re-invigorating democratic society and Stoddard emphasized how it could contribute to global understanding in the face of totalitarian threats. These earlier presidents both recognized how higher education could provide private goods, especially vocational training, but they described this function as incidental. However by the time White became president, private goods had become especially important whereas public goods resonated less convincingly to many people. This explanation may not be wholly sufficient to account for the lack of support for the university. The answer may be, as White observed about the public’s indifference, complex.

Nevertheless, the question of private versus public good, and the respective sources of responsibility, does seem likely to have played a role in the situation that frustrated White and his efforts, including his new Compact between the state, tuition payers, faculty, private donors and university leadership.

As White described it, this lack of support came at precisely the time when the university had become especially central to addressing individual and societal needs. He explained: “the

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529 Ibid.
university has never been more important than it will be in the decades ahead. We will be a great gateway of opportunity for students. And we will address the world’s most pressing problems, like safety and security, economic opportunity, energy and the environment, healthcare and nutrition, peace and justice.” To some degree, the types of problems that the university would address were those in which it had long played a role. However, White anticipated an era when such concerns would be of increasingly crucial importance. The future would not only provide more opportunities, it would also be a time of stronger competition: circumstances that would require innovation and aggression.530

The new era of opportunity and competition that White identified was that of the global, knowledge-driven, economy. He explained that whereas the era of industrial production was largely reliant on natural resources and geographical location, “the new, true wealth of nations” was educated people and knowledge.531 Using Thomas Friedman’s terminology, White noted that in today’s “flat world” of competition between the dominant open market economies, “educated people and the knowledge that flows from scientific discovery are the raw material of new industries, companies, jobs and incomes.”532 He acknowledged that this change was worldwide but highlighted how it was impacting the upper Midwest, including Illinois. Manufacturing and agriculture had long been most important, and would remain relevant, but the service and information economy was rapidly ascending.533 The region, White explained “is going through a tremendous economic transformation, from what we were to what we’re becoming.”534

White’s public statements repeatedly discussed the economic role of the “raw materials” of this new economy: educated people and knowledge. While he only occasionally described the first of these—educated people—by employing Gary Becker’s human capital language, he was consistent in his emphasis on educating people so they could serve as inputs for production.\(^535\) However, White’s emphasis on the role of education in economic production did not mean that he ignored its other benefits. The “power of education,” he also proclaimed, “enables people to realize their dreams, builds a strong society, and increases international competitiveness.”\(^536\) Two of these, the realization of dreams and the building of a strong society, are long familiar benefits of education. The first can include a breadth of individual desires, including material and social fulfillment. The second can also have multiple meanings, but in the case of the United States, calls for building a strong society very often emphasize the formation of citizens and the maintenance of a vigorous democracy. White himself acknowledged that “educated people are the key to a strong democracy” but, unlike Stoddard and, especially, Kinley, he spoke infrequently of the connection between education and the fulfillment of democratic society.\(^537\) Instead, White focused on how educated people “are key to having a vibrant economy” including, as his third “power of education” indicated, the ways in which they contributed to international economic competitiveness.\(^538\)

Due to the tremendous importance of education, White expressed great concern about what he saw as the poor condition of education in the United States. He acknowledged that there had been some positive development in educational achievement, including increased high school graduation and college enrollment rates. However, he cautioned, such improvements were unevenly distributed across society and any progress was “inadequate in international

\(^{535}\) For instance: White, “Human Capital Investment and America’s Children.”
\(^{536}\) Ibid.
\(^{537}\) Quoted in “University of Illinois Names 16th President,” n.p.
\(^{538}\) Quoted in Ibid., n.p.
In a co-authored piece published soon after the 2008 financial crisis, White argued that while state and national leaders asserted that declining employment and economic activity could be addressed simply through job creation and economic stimulus, unless we properly educate people the economic crisis would become permanent. “In the global economy,” he argued, “education is destiny for most individuals.” However, he warned, in the U.S., fifteen percent of students do not graduate from high school, only two-fifths of adults between 25 and 34 years old have graduated from college and, increasingly, a college education has become a possibility limited to the top income quintile. White admitted that not all people were suited to a college education; nevertheless, it remained the best means to diminish incarceration and increase employability, income, voting activity, and longevity. “A college education,” he observed, “is not a guarantee, but it’s a darned good bet.” Consequently, White lamented, it is very alarming that the U.S. had declined from number one in college graduation rates to number ten, falling below other countries including Belgium, Canada and Japan. The only viable solution, he argued, is to fix the country and the state’s “horribly leaky education pipeline . . . this enormous threat to individual futures and American economic security and prosperity.”

Although White’s focus was on college education and its benefits, his approach to fixing the country and state’s educational system was comprehensive. He argued that a solution needed to begin with prenatal care and quality parenting, which were both necessarily foundational to success in K-12 and college level classrooms. Preparation of this sort would ensure that

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541 Ibid.
542 Ibid.
additional funding for formal education, which was indeed needed, would attain maximum effectiveness.\textsuperscript{543}

For White, efforts to improve education ultimately cohered in the nation’s colleges and universities, institutions that educate the people and create the knowledge that are immediately applicable to the new global economy. Citing Thomas Friedman, White argued that for the U.S. and its citizens to prosper in this globally competitive environment, “the first place to turn is our great public research universities.”\textsuperscript{544} Educated people and the science-based knowledge that fuels innovation and economic growth, White observed, is “our beat” at the great public research universities of the upper Midwest and “educating people on a large scale with excellence and conducting research in engineering, computer science, chemistry, biomedicine, and agriculture—that’s what we do at the University of Illinois.”\textsuperscript{545}

Looking towards the future, White identified health care, life sciences, information and energy as major growth industries. The state of Illinois, he noted, already has strength in the health care industry, and is making progress in both life sciences and information. Given the state’s energy producing resources, including wind, nuclear and biomass and fossil fuels, and the expertise of its energy companies, laboratories and universities, it was well situated to be a “global spire of excellence in sustainable energy production and consumption.” The University of Illinois, currently essential to health care, life sciences and information industries, could also play an important role in the development of state as a key player in what White referred to as the “century of energy transformation.”\textsuperscript{546}

White’s enthusiasm about the potential of Illinois and other research universities in the global economy is also confirmed by his description of a meeting with visitors to the Urbana-
Champaign campus. He recalled hosting a delegation headed by Governor Lu Hao of the Chinese province of Gansu. Following of the signing of an inter-institutional agreement, White “watched in delight” as Dean Robert Easter described how University of Illinois agricultural scientists would teach their Chinese colleagues how to make Gansu Province the center of livestock production in China equal to the Texas-Kansas-Oklahoma-Colorado region, which produces nearly half of all beef in the U.S. Reflecting on the establishment of the University of Illinois’ collaborative relationship with Gansu Province, White observed:

At its heart every agreement is based on a simple exchange. The one I witnessed yesterday was expert American advice to create a better Chinese diet facilitated by China’s new global status and its hard-won international purchasing power. All parties emerge as winners. And there will be indirect winners, like the grain growers of Kazakhstan, northeast China, and, of course, Illinois and Iowa … because these animals have to eat to grow. I’m telling you, the meeting would have gladdened Tom Friedman’s heart … and Adam Smith’s.

Overall, White described this meeting as one in which he “saw the promise of our economic future as clearly as one could imagine.”547 This was a future of rising tides lifting all boats; all parties could be winners and the university, in this case the University of Illinois, would play the central role of producer and distributor of knowledge.

As such statements demonstrate, White understood the university as essential to economic success on a local, state, national and international level. This had long been the case for major research universities, such as Illinois, and the need for the university to serve this function would only increase in the era of globalization. “We can have many more winners than losers in the global economy, in Tom Friedman’s new, flat world,” White argued, and “the

people of Illinois can be among the winners—but only with a healthy, vibrant University of Illinois.” He warned that the health and vibrancy of public research universities, including Illinois, was under threat. These institutions, which he described as a “dynamic treasure,” were at a crossroads. Long the envy of the world, they could now go in either of two directions: they could decline from greatness or they could move towards “a brilliant future.” If they went in the latter direction, White explained, these public universities would continue their historic mission of changing peoples’ lives by providing affordable and high quality education and allow their states and the country to succeed in a dynamic new economic era.548

White’s most visible attempt to maintain “affordable and high quality education” was also his primary means for providing a sustainable source of funds: the Global Campus. From its unveiling at the presidential inauguration, the Global Campus was clearly a revenue generating initiative. At that time, White drew a strong parallel between the success of the University of Phoenix and the potential of the Global Campus, which he described as “by far our best new financial prospect” for achieving a “brilliant future.”549 White’s emphasis on the Global Campus’ financial role does not mean that he did not sincerely believe in its ability to provide a quality education to a larger number of people, both in Illinois and elsewhere. Indeed, he argued for its access role, noting that the launch of the Global Campus expanded “educational opportunity and access with state-of-the-art online coursework.”550 Nor did its financial role mean that White did not see it as a means to advance the university’s land-grant mission or see real utility in developing institutional mastery of on-line education for the university’s three physical campuses.551 However, as White repeatedly stressed, his institution’s most crucial needs were

551 White, “Global Campus Message to University Faculty & Staff,” n.p.
financial. Expanding its ability to educate, as per its mission, and developing its technological, administrative and pedagogical prowess in on-line education were not as immediately important.

Like the University of Phoenix and other for-profit institutions, the Global Campus was intended to take advantage of the growing market for on-line degree programs. It offered bachelor’s and master’s degrees and certificates that clearly and directly corresponded to specific types of jobs in presumably high demand fields, such as nursing, human resources and business process management. Had the Global Campus continued, it might have added other, less ostensibly utilitarian programs, but additions of this sort might have been difficult to sell to students who were concerned about the professional benefits of their education; such programs might also have been less liable to receive support from Global Campus leaders who were commissioned to generate revenue. Students who enrolled in Global Campus programs may not have been different from many of their counterparts who enrolled in the on-campus or non-profit on-line programs administered by Illinois’ three traditional campuses. Like them, and students across the country, their interest in higher education was presumably due to a variety of reasons, such including a desire to maximize (largely economic) private goods.

On the level of the university, the Global Campus was something distinct. It was an attempt to create a wholly separate, for-profit campus that would provide the financial resources necessary to advance the university’s overall mission and, in this way, it was different from other academic units administered by the three other campuses. The Global Campus was a confirmation of just how much the university and its societal environment had changed. No longer were state appropriations sufficient to support the university’s teaching, research and service activities. Declining state support, encouraged by public indifference (as White expressed it), necessitated the pursuit of new revenue sources that would address the financial deficit. The

552 University of Illinois Global Campus, 1-2.
for-profit Global Campus could help subsidize the university but, ultimately, its for-profit nature facilitated own demise. Illinois’ regular faculty showed little support for business practices that threatened their role in governance and their ability to retain control over their own course content. The Global Campus thus reveals a necessary tension between goals and procedures of the traditional non-profit university and business-minded for-profit institutions.

The case of the Global Campus also reveals a tension in White’s articulation of the relationship between the university and the public. In his many statements about the University of Illinois and public research universities more generally, White repeatedly asserted that these institutions were essential to societal success. While he did allow for the success of individuals, his overall emphasis was on how the university benefitted the people as a collective, undifferentiated, whole. In other words, White privileged the university’s role in providing for the public good rather than private goods. This particular vision was nothing new. Traditionally, the university was seen as a means to the public good, often above the fulfillment of individual interests.

The Global Campus (and for-profit units at other public universities) not only destabilized this vision, it also conceded a changed reality. Its founding as a new, for-profit “campus” among the university’s three traditional campus undermined any coherent understanding that the University of Illinois was an institution, first and foremost, for the promotion of the public good and creation of private goods. From its inception, and by its very nature, the ultimate goal of the Global Campus was profit; benefitting the public good and delivering private goods were incidental. Nonetheless, in the long term it would at least need to provide private goods. If its students did not see sufficient return on their investment of time and money, the Global Campus would be unsustainable. This circumstance also applied to the
University of Illinois’ traditional campuses, especially in the era of reduced state appropriations. If they did not deliver a sufficient number of private goods, they—and their ability to provide for the public good—would also be threatened. However what made the Global Campus different was that it dispelled any assumptions about its purpose: it was a “campus” created to generate revenue.

Therefore the Global Campus was at odds with White’s many statements about the university and its public. Its very existence was an admission that despite a long history of public investment and public returns, the University of Illinois and its state university counterparts had, presumably, entered a time in which there was insufficient support for its traditional place and role in society. While White’s public statements suggest that he remained an advocate of the long established university-public relationship, his Global Campus initiative undermined the very type of university for which he so publically advocated. This clear distinction between White’s rhetoric and the reality of his Global Campus need not suggest that he was cynically employing rhetoric. Instead it might be an indication of the extent of the divide between traditional ideals of public higher education and the public financial support that subsidized the pursuit of these ideals.

Conclusion

B. Joseph White described the University of Illinois and other public research universities as institutions that had a special relationship with their respective states and their people. As White’s statements about his university asserted, their public nature was not merely due to state subsidies; instead they were public because they had a long and mutually beneficial relationship with their state and its residents. As White explained, the fortunes of the University of Illinois
and the state of Illinois were intertwined. The state supported the university and, in turn, the university provided both private and public goods well in excess of the state’s investment. Over the course of this relationship, the University of Illinois had become a great public university that had remarkable educational and research success.

Regardless of past achievements, White cautioned, the University of Illinois and its public peers were in an especially precarious position. Shrinking financial support threatened the ability of public universities to fulfill their important societal role. Such circumstances would be of concern in any era but, for White, the new era of globalization had made the need for these universities especially acute. As he explained, because public research universities are premier sources of educated people and knowledge production, they are particularly well suited to address the complex problems of the globalized world and succeed in an economic environment that is human capital and knowledge-based. However, without sufficient support for these universities, neither their states nor the nation could compete internationally.

From the very start of his presidency, White made it clear that he intended to invigorate the University of Illinois and prepare it for the global era. The extent to which he could have accomplished these goals remains unclear because he left office after just four and a half years. While his resignation closely followed the admissions scandal, White’s fortunes may have been waning much earlier. Commenting after the president’s resignation, former Illinois Trustee David Dorris indicated that his concerns about White’s performance had a longer history and included the failure of the Global Campus, which had cost over $10 million while enrolling only a few hundred students. Dorris noted that White’s “failures were more complex and more long-standing, and I think it’s a good thing he’s resigning.” 553 While Dorris’ final evaluation of White’s performance may not have been universally shared, White’s administration did indeed

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553 Cohen, St. Clair and Malone, “University of Illinois President B. Joseph White Resigns.”
experience setbacks that undermined its legitimacy. In addition to the admissions scandal and the Global Campus failure, the resolutions to the out-of-state enrollment initiative and the Chief Illiniwek issue made White less credible to many of his constituents. Given these liabilities, White’s resignation may have been inevitable regardless of other successes. It might have been impossible for him to counterbalance aggregate negative outcomes and the final blow of the admissions scandal.

In 2005, at the beginning of the new presidency, a *Chicago Tribune* writer observed, “White’s aggressive ideas will require aggressive levels of funding.” Undeniably, White’s ambitious plan to not merely maintain Illinois’ status as a “great public university” but to move it to new heights would demand larger financial resources than the university had available. If White had been able to secure a greater portion of these resources and apply them to his agenda in a demonstrable way, perhaps his resignation would have been avoidable. However, with the exception of the Brilliant Futures capital campaign, the primary fund-raising initiatives White led were politically hazardous. Increasing out-of-state enrollment was publically unpopular and the Global Campus, White’s signature means of revenue generation, lacked faculty support. The extent to which this lack of support contributed to the failure of the Global Campus is beside the point. What is important is that the Global Campus and the out-of-state enrollment initiative were both weakened by traditional understandings about the nature of the public, non-profit, university. Opponents of increasing out-of-state enrollment maintained that the university must overwhelmingly serve the people of its state. Opponents of the Global Campus fought to retain the levels of control long the standard at institutions like Illinois. White found himself in the difficult position of trying to reconcile such traditions with new financial circumstances that,

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555 “Strategic Planning at the University of Illinois.”
despite resistance, were changing the nature of the public university.
CHAPTER 5:

CONCLUSION:
LOOKING FORWARD

The major principles that undergird public higher education remain as valid today as they were at earlier times—manifested in a bond between the society and its universities to educate, to discover, to serve. Now, more than ever before, the national interest calls for an investment in human and intellectual capital and hence in public higher education. The fundamental mission of the public university continues to be that of advancing the public good but in a way that serves an ever-changing society in a new age.

- James J. Duderstadt and Farris W. Womack, 2003 556

The history of the American university is also the history of its relationship to the public. Although the precise nature of this relationship has always been debated and in flux, it is a relationship that has remained central to the university’s position in society. Even before the advent of the modern university, higher education was described in public terms. In 1802, Bowdoin College president Joseph McKeen argued that colleges were social institutions with the primarily role of serving the public. 557 Over 200 years later, University of Michigan president emeritus James J. Duderstadt and former chief financial officer Farris W. Womack made similar claims. Like McKeen before them, Duderstadt and Womack emphasized higher education’s contribution to the public good; however, they made their comments in considerably different circumstances. The two centuries that separated McKeen from Duderstadt and Womack saw the formation and maturation of the American university and the development of arguably its most public iteration, the state research university. Within the past 100 years, the state university grew alongside higher education more generally, with dramatic increases in enrollment, resources and

557 Rudolph, American College and University, 58-59.
societal importance. But the great significance of university’s relationship to the public remained.

The University of Illinois has been public since its founding as a land-grant institution in 1867. Like universities across the country, its public service roles grew dramatically during the twentieth century and remained important into the twenty-first. This dissertation has examined the University of Illinois’ public nature at distinct times in its history as articulated in public fora by three of its presidents: David Kinley, George D. Stoddard and B. Joseph White. Although these men all held the title of President of the University of Illinois, they did not always share the same conclusions about the university’s public character. However, their formulations of the relationship of the university and the public, even if seen as rhetoric, are sensible within their respective contexts. At times they demonstrate a close correspondence to the values and developments of their era, whereas in other instances they exhibit resistance to these values and developments.

The Progressive Era was a time of social transformation and correspondingly high levels of anxiety. The shift from agrarian to industrial society was accompanied by a number of other changes including urbanization, immigration, rationalization, the rise of corporate monopolies, and feelings of political disenfranchisement. Progressives expressed deep concern about these issues but found solutions in the application of purposeful, often collective, action. Progressive focus on public service corresponded with the service ideal of the emergent American university. As a university student, faculty member and leader, Kinley acquired many of the ideas and credentials of this institution and its era. He developed a belief in the ability of scientific analysis to discern and address societal problems and, with the conferral of his Ph.D. in economics, gained legitimacy as an expert on such concerns. Over the course of his career, Kinley grew
more politically conservative but retained a belief in social reform. The ideal means of reform, Kinley argued, was the university.

Kinley expressed a particularly strong belief in the state university. He argued that it had a special relationship to the people, the state, and the government and this relationship distinguished it from the privately endowed university. He stressed its popular ownership and role as the development arm of the state, and its particular success as an institution for educating students, training faculty and staff, conducting research and extending knowledge beyond campus. When his own institution was inadequately funded, he made a popular appeal and emphasized the university’s substantial return on investment, including its contribution to state wealth and overall progress. Kinley also noted that the state university, more generally, provided democratic access to education and facilitated social efficiency through job training. However, he cautioned that private gain was merely incidental to the university’s primary function. Kinley greatly emphasized the university’s role in the formation of courageous and informed citizens. He expressed deep anxiety about the trajectory the United States and saw the university as the key means to resurrect the robust citizen of an earlier time. Counter to much of the sentiment of the Progressive Era, Kinley described his ideal citizen an individual and a member of the elite. However, this citizen who would re-invigorate American democracy did so in the service of society writ large. Hence, in Kinley’s formulation, even the most exceptional individuals would act for the benefit of the public good if appropriately cultivated by the university.

The years immediately following World War II were a time of general optimism and growing national wealth. The confidence of the post-war era, however, was moderated by concern over the apparent political and ideological precariousness of the atomic age, a situation exacerbated by rising tension between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Both of these
circumstances influenced higher education. The war demonstrated the national utility of university-based research and encouraged federal investment in research activities, while the availability of grants fostered competition between universities and the expansion of graduate education. The federal government facilitated increased student enrollment through the G.I. Bill and high levels of state funding provided universities with the resources needed for operations and expansion of their physical capital. Concern about the endurance of liberal democracy in a complex and potentially hazardous era was reflected by the Harvard Red Book and Truman Commission’s emphasis on general education to produce informed citizens and national unity. The Truman Commission placed particular importance on the need for education to prepare students to live in a culturally diverse world and for greater federal oversight and resources to increase enrollment. It was an especially strong advocate of the country’s state colleges and universities, which it deemed less likely to engage in discriminatory practices than private institutions and therefore more suited to advancing democratic ideals of access and opportunity.

It was within this environment that Stoddard became president of the University of Illinois. Under his leadership the university accommodated larger student enrollment and continued to grow overall. Unlike Kinley and White, Stoddard did not face the challenges of limited or diminishing state funds and, consequently, he did not need to focus his efforts on lobbying the state’s people and its leaders for greater financial resources. Nevertheless, Stoddard did assert that financial support by the people of the state was a criterion of the University of Illinois’ public-ness, a manifestation of its high level of popular support and, ultimately, its relationship to democratic will. Consequently, the people of the state could claim ownership and rights as they related to their university. Stoddard also emphasized the state university’s accessibility and service to its state through its teaching and research functions, and its ability to
better serve democratic ideals than private universities, especially when it came to eliminating racial discrimination. In this respect, Stoddard expressed agreement with Kinley, as he also did when he drew attention to the university’s role in serving the public good over delivering private goods.

Like Kinley before him, Stoddard argued for vocational education but placed special emphasis on the importance of liberal education for the public good. Whereas Kinley concentrated on liberal education’s role in forming political subjects to serve democracy in the United States, Stoddard focused on its ability to prepare subjects to engage not only domestic concerns but also the broader global issues of the post-war world. In agreement with the Harvard Red Book and Truman Commission, Stoddard contended that liberal education prepared students to understand and negotiate a complex and diverse world. According to Stoddard, liberal education was especially useful for providing a critical and balanced perspective to counter any tendency towards totalitarianism. Liberal education moderated the dominance of science as well as autocratic political ideologies and regimes. Kinley was suspicious of group action in the service of the public good, but Stoddard’s emphasis on the important role of UNESCO necessarily privileged organizational culture. However, the primary difference between Kinley and Stoddard was the way in which they framed the public, the ultimate object of the university’s actions. For Kinley, this public was proximate and circumscribed. When he discussed it in relation to the University of Illinois’ specific needs, the public was the people of Illinois; and when he discussed in relation to democratic society, it was the people who constituted democratic society in the United States. Stoddard, on the other hand, emphasized the university’s undifferentiated public, an entity not bounded by border but instead something diffuse, in development, and global.
The initial decade of the twenty-first century differed from the Progressive Era and interwar period, and the years immediately following World War II. Although there were distinct differences in their respective contexts, Kinley and Stoddard led the University of Illinois at times when there was generally strong confidence in public institutions. During the Kinley and Stoddard eras, it was expected that returns would be both private and public but, as they described it, the latter were largely seen as the primary reason for the establishment and maintenance of state universities and similar institutions. As Kinley and Stoddard’s statements demonstrate, the university was identified as playing an especially important role in providing public economic returns but its role in creating a healthy and peaceful political environment was just as, if not more, important.

In many ways, the new century was a continuation of the substantial trends that began as early as the 1970s and continued through the close of the twentieth century. Overall, there was an emphasis on privatization, commercialization and the logic of business. There was a growing ambivalence towards public institutions and their need for relatively high levels of public support. This ambivalence did not necessarily mean a decline in legitimacy but it did often correlate to questions about sufficient return on investment. Investment in public institutions, including state universities, waned and universities responded by looking for ways to assert their legitimacy as economic drivers and address their own budgetary shortfalls. Consequently there was growth in research parks and the monetization of the university’s research and teaching functions and increases in student tuition and fees. These changes did not mean that the university was no longer seen as a means to deliver democratic equality and other non-economic public goods, however they did signal a growing interest in economic returns. These economic
returns included collective benefits, including vocational training that contributed to social efficiency, as well as private goods such as social mobility.

Like Kinley, who also had to address inadequate institutional resources, White invoked the special relationship between the University of Illinois and the people of its state. He made a very similar argument to that of his predecessor, stressing the substantial economic return on investment provided by the university. To address the university’s budgetary issues, White also advanced a number of revenue-raising initiatives including a capital campaign, an increase in out-of-state students and the Global Campus. While the capital campaign succeeded, White’s other initiatives failed. Their failure can be seen, at least partially, as due to an inability to sufficiently convince two of his constituencies, the people of the state and the faculty of the University of Illinois. It appears that White’s rhetoric about the university and its public role was ultimately inadequate. Of his revenue-raising initiatives, the Global Campus was particularly significant, not only because of its high profile and central place in White’s vision, but also because it suggested the growing importance of for-profit initiatives to the survival of the non-profit, state university and, consequently, the changed relationship between the university and the public that had long subsidized it.

This dissertation has focused on a number of research questions. It has asked about the relationship between the university’s public qualifications and its funding sources, governance and student enrollment and how the beneficiaries of its teaching, research and service determine these qualifications. As the subsequent analysis demonstrated, Kinley, Stoddard and White all expressed agreement on the necessarily correlation between government, hence popular, funding and the degree of a university’s public credentials. Within this formulation, the state universities were more public than their privately endowed counterparts and, due to the source of their funds,
had an especially strong relationship to the people of their states. The presidents also saw this relationship as an essential determinant of the university’s public-ness as based on its form of governance. Kinley and Stoddard, in particular, emphasized how the people of the state—its public—were the ultimate governors of their university. All three presidents asserted that the state university was better suited to democratic access for its students than private higher education institutions. Similarly, they also described the state university as ideally suited to providing benefits to a large number of people, including the people of its state, through its research and service functions. These were wide ranging and included a great variety of economic, political and social returns.

Neither Kinley, nor Stoddard, nor White framed the benefits of access, research and service in exclusively public terms. However, while they acknowledged that the university provided private goods, their statements were devoted almost exclusively to the ways in which the university contributed to the public good. There was some difference in focus: while Kinley and Stoddard stressed the university’s role in serving the public good through its socio-political contributions, White highlighted its ability to contribute economically. As this dissertation has shown, this difference is sensible given the growing emphasis on the university’s ability to provide financial returns on investment. Yet, regardless of this important difference, it remains clear that all three Illinois presidents described the state university, and especially their university, as something inherently public not only in terms of its ultimate foundation and composition but also in terms of its far-reaching societal role.

Although Kinley, Stoddard and White recognized the University of Illinois was inherently public, overall they placed little emphasis on its status as a land-grant institution. Even when proclaiming its long and substantial relationship to the people of Illinois, state university
terminology was generally preferred over that of land-grant. Only White notably invoked the land-grant origins of the University of Illinois, equating the access and extension ideals of land-grant institutions with the potential of the Global Campus. While White, who had never attended or worked at a land-grant university prior to his presidency, occasionally used such language, Kinley and Stoddard, both educated at land-grant institutions, did not. Kinley’s apparent suspicion of popular, informal education especially via extension may have discouraged a land-grant focus, while Stoddard’s global ambitions for the university may have dissuaded him from highlighting the university’s local character. For whatever reason, it is indeed unexpected that Kinley and Stoddard would not have celebrated their university’s land-grant as an especially public credential.

This dissertation also addresses another research question, one concerned with the breadth of the university’s role in society. It is a question about the scope of the university’s public, whether it is proximate, circumscribed and identifiable or undifferentiated and amorphous, and the conditions under which one takes priority. All three presidents framed the university in terms of a proximate public, the people of its state. This formulation was especially prominent in Kinley and White’s statements, suggesting a need to assert the primacy of the relationship between the university and the people at times insufficient resources. Stoddard, who did not face similar difficulties, still emphasized the importance of this connection but with less frequency and urgency. At the same time all of these men argued that the university served people beyond its locality. For Kinley, it was the people who constituted American democracy, for Stoddard it was the American subject engaging a complex world, but it was also the people of

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558 White graduated from Georgetown University, Harvard University, and the University of Michigan and was later employed as faculty at Michigan. Kinley was educated at Yale and Johns Hopkins Universities and the University of Wisconsin (a land-grant university), followed by employment at Illinois. Stoddard was educated at the land-grant Pennsylvania State University, the University of Paris and the University of Iowa. He was subsequently employed as faculty at Iowa before returning to a land-grant institution when he assumed the University of Illinois presidency.
this world, a public of undifferentiated humanity. White’s statements not only assert the university’s ability to address the economic difficulties of its state, they also make claims about its national economic utility within the global marketplace. In this respect, albeit with less clarity, White also asserted the university’s role in attending to the needs of a national public and, given his formulation of mutual economic returns, arguably its relationship to an amorphous global public.

The three Illinois presidents addressed a number of the questions about the university and the public that were asked at the beginning of this dissertation but there are others that they did not engage, or engage fully. Kinley and Stoddard’s discussions of liberal education suggests that they considered “liberal” in terms of a breadth of areas of study, rather than a free flow of ideas. Indeed, both silenced radical speech and presumably dangerous ideas on their campuses, albeit to differing degrees. Hence neither of them demonstrated an interest in the creation of a public of truly free discourse at their university. The University of Illinois, during their presidencies, could at best only serve as a highly imperfect public sphere. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the types of critical and informed political subjects that Kinley and Stoddard hoped would be created at the university would be well suited to external public spheres, including those of national democracy or global reconciliation such as UNESCO. Due to the paucity of evidence from White’s statements, it is unclear if he saw the university in any relationship to an internal or external public sphere.

However, all three presidents addressed the question of knowledge production and circulation. While none of them explicitly discussed the process of knowledge production as an open and transparent—and thus public—discursive activity, they all emphasized the university’s role as a space for the production of knowledge and advocated its part in widely distributing the
benefits of its research activities to the public. Yet the extent to which any knowledge produced by the university was to be free is uncertain. None of the presidents made statements that precluded wholly free access to knowledge and thus appeared to have been in agreement with the public criterion of access. Unlike his predecessors, White led the university at a time when intellectual property regimes and digital affordances raised unprecedented questions about the restriction and possible liberation of knowledge for the public good. Nevertheless, his public statements did not engage these questions regardless of their growing importance.

Overall, Kinley, Stoddard and Whites’ speeches, articles, radio broadcasts and other form of public communication emphasized the university’s close and continuing relationship to the public. All of the presidents acknowledged the importance of the university’s connection to its people. Although they often framed this connection in terms of popular financial support via government subsidies, they also noted how the state university was public due to its accessibility to students. None, however, encouraged the university’s role in the formation of a discursive public or framed it, even ideally, as a type of public sphere. Kinley, Stoddard and White did articulate a shared commitment to the university’s responsibility to provide benefits to a collective public. There was variation in the parameters of this public but, as demonstrated by comparing Kinley, Stoddard and White’s statements, the greater variation was between the types of benefits the public would receive. While all three devoted noteworthy attention to how the public gained economically due to the university and its actions, Kinley and Stoddard were most enthusiastic in their explanations of how the university served the public in political terms, advancing national democracy and world peace. White, on the other hand, noted its political role only in passing. Almost exclusively, he described the university’s public role in economic terms.
As noted in the Introduction, the conclusions of this dissertation are based substantially on public presidential statements that demonstrate particular formulations of the relationship between the university and the public. Like all sources, these have limitations that do not allow them to comprehend all aspects of the topic of study. They are especially limited due to matters of perspective and the possibility that they are intended as rhetoric, instead of direct representations of reality. However, even if they are indeed largely rhetorical, these sources nevertheless say a great deal about the university and the public. They demonstrate the ways in which Kinley, Stoddard and White chose to describe the university and its public credentials to popular audiences. Even if these formulations did not depict actual circumstances, they explicate the types of concerns that each president felt were appropriate to the situation. Consequently, they demonstrate that Kinley believed it was important to highlight the crisis in American democracy and the ways in which the university could address it. They show that Stoddard thought that the university’s role in securing world peace needed to be widely known. They indicate the White considered the economic function of the university to be the topic of primary emphasis. Therefore, through their formulations, each president demonstrated what they viewed to be key concerns for their university, and of their era. Hence, in a broad sense, their public statements suggest the retreat of the university’s role as an agent for the political public good, and the ascendency of the university’s function as an agent, almost exclusively, for the fulfillment of the public’s economic needs.

This dissertation has demonstrated that the relationship between the university and the public has long been an issue of concern. It predates the rise of the American research university and continued through the twentieth- and early twenty-first century eras of Kinley, Stoddard and White. The question of the university and the public has remained a focus of much attention. The
new century has seen a spate of literature about the future of the public university and of the university’s public role in a broader sense. Calhoun, Ehrenberg, Newfield, Pusser and Kezar, to name just a few of the scholars discussed in this dissertation, have been joined by others from around the world.\(^{559}\) In *The Assault on Universities: A Manifesto for Resistance* Michael Bailey, Des Freedman and other contributors responded to fee deregulation and dramatic cuts in higher education subsidies by David Cameron’s UK government. Freedman warned that the university was threatened by “renewed privatisation, intensive marketisation, rampant financialisation and a challenge to the very notion of the university as a mechanism for addressing social inequality and facilitating the circulation of knowledge whether or not it has immediate practical consequences.” Put simply, Freedman proclaimed, “it is the substitution of private economic activity over robust public life.”\(^{560}\) Ka Ho Mok raised similar concerns in “When Neoliberalism Colonizes Higher Education in Asia: Bringing the ‘Public’ Back to the Contemporary University.” Focusing on the situation in East and Southeast Asian countries, Mok warned that universities were increasingly being transformed by the rise of corporate values and market-driven processes that threatened their ability serve as critical agents in the service of democratic public interests.\(^{561}\) The wide-ranging discussion about the rise of market-based ideas demonstrates the extent of their pervasiveness in higher education systems and institutions around the world. Speaking specifically of privatization, Fazal Rizvi noted that it is a “global ideology,” a “new regime of discipline” shaping public university management style and


strategies in countries in both the developed and developing world. Rizvi’s depiction of privatization can be extended to broader logic of the market that serves as its source of legitimacy, as well as the legitimacy of most other agents of efficiency that promise to dramatically change the nature of the university as a public institution. Hence the issues of the university’s public role and the future of state supported universities are not just domestic concerns. In countries around the world, those who study universities are attempting to understand the difficulties faced by this centrally public institution.

In response to the changing relationship between and the university and the public, a number of works have provided ways to negotiate new circumstances and challenges while, at least to some degree, retaining the public nature of the university and its important societal role. Most of the literature focuses on the state-supported university, a sensible emphasis given the depth of public investment in these institutions and the large number of people who benefit from them either directly through formal education or as a result of their research and service functions. In an example that focuses on the U.S. case, The Future of the Public University in America, Duderstadt and Womack argued that the state university would benefit from the installation of corporate style governance and increased private funding. Doing so, they contended, would allow it to maintain its traditional roles, including access and public service.

In Saving Alma Mater, James C. Garland asserted that American state universities ought to no longer be subsidized but should instead compete in the marketplace. Funds that would have been used for university subsidies would instead be used to assist students with financial need, thus retaining the traditional public service of democratic access. As these works show, some

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563 Duderstadt and Womack.
authors have attempted to reconcile an acceptance of the university’s changed financial circumstances with its long-standing role as a contributor to the public good.

A more radical approach is found in the provocatively titled *Public No More: A New Path to Excellence for America’s Public Universities.*[^565] In this book, Gary C. Fethke and Andrew J. Policano observed that the time of high government subsidies and low tuition has long been waning. This “new reality,” they asserted, should be recognized and, consequently, the university should transform the ways in which it allocates budgets, structures incentives, and is governed and organized. The core of this transformation, Fethke and Policano explained, is a change in the way the university evaluates its activities. Rather than measure these based on lofty academic ideals and other values of internal stakeholders—including faculty and many administrators—the university should shift its evaluative criteria to the needs of its external constituents, namely students, taxpayers and donors. This reorientation of the university, they contended, would lead to greater efficiency and quality. In turn, the university’s external stakeholders would be more willing to subsidize its activities. Programs in which revenue are not covered by cost would ultimately fail and cross-subsidies would be reduced, hastening this process. Consequently, universities would become more specialized, even positioning themselves as delivering something unique to the market. In order for these changes to be enacted, Fethke and Policano argued, it would be necessary for university governance to change dramatically, with a great reduction in the power of faculty and boards of trustees and corresponding increases in the power of central administration, including the university president.

As Fethke and Policano admitted, even if central administration leaders chose to follow their “new path to excellence” it would be difficult to do so in the face of resistance, especially from many members of the faculty. This resistance would be due to anxiety over a number of changes, including loss of employment, professional prestige and personal agendas when inefficiencies, such as undersubscribed academic programs and research activities, are reduced. Framing the contestation in terms of practical needs versus entrenched values, Fethke and Policano asked: “can strategy trump culture?” If strategic interests win out, they argued, the “long-standing tradition of excellence in America’s top public universities” will continue instead of eroding with the steady decline in state subsidies. They contended:

The demise of the major public research university is neither immediate nor inevitable … but the fate of the distinctive public university lies not in the hands of the state or the taxpayer, but rather within the confines of the university itself. If the vast array of public university resources can be channeled into distinctive visions that create measurable value based on sound financial practice, there is indeed a bright future. The path ahead is not easy; there are many impediments and entrenched beliefs that must be overcome. However, if these difficulties are ultimately overcome, Fethke and Policano concluded, “public universities [will] retain their distinction.”

If Fethke and Policano’s agenda were implemented, it is difficult to see what distinctions “public”—or “state”—universities would retain. As this dissertation has demonstrated, the university’s public-ness is derived from a number of factors. It is not merely, as Fethke and Policano suggest, due to the sources of its funding and the nature of its governance. It is also due to other qualities, including access, the public goods it provides, and how in countless ways it

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566 Ibid., 220.
567 Ibid.
contributes to the public good. If the state university is deprived of its public financial support, and even its traditional form of governance, it becomes more like the private university, and by doing so, loses its distinction. This loss of distinction would not mean that the transformed “public-no-more” university would cease to benefit the public. Like its private counterpart, it could still provide education, research and service that would go beyond advancing mere private interests. In this respect, this new iteration of the state university could retain its position as a public institution, albeit to a lesser degree.

It is highly unlikely that the public-no-more university would resemble the university as articulated by Kinley, Stoddard and White. Its special relationship with the people of its state would lose legitimacy as public financial support and even (admittedly tenuous) connections to public governance are reduced even more. Although the relationship between the university and the public has changed over time, most significantly with the reduction of public subsidies, the solution provided by Fethke and Policano would transform this relationship dramatically. Restructuring the university to strictly follow the logic of the marketplace, with a subsidiary rise in consumerization of the student and monetization of all university activities, would reduce the democratic access that has been a hallmark of public higher education and greatly diminish the ability to engage in projects that do not provide quick and clearly demonstrable returns. It is unclear how very public returns, such as effective democracy and overall societal health could be sufficiently demonstrated to satisfy a constituency defined primarily in consumer terms. In Fethke and Policano’s university, the nature of these returns would be decided by the students, taxpayers and donors who would, almost exclusively, set the priorities of the university. No doubt there is something to the argument that these stakeholders deserve to be heard more than
they are currently; and no doubt their voices, most often expressed in terms of consumption, are being heard more frequently regardless of Fethke and Policano.

While characterizing the university’s external stakeholders in consumer terms is reductionist and often unfair, it is indeed correct that the university has traditionally provided a space where clearly market-compatible values have less currency. As Fethke and Policano described this situation, faculty and administrators present the value of higher education in the “context of lofty principles” such as teaching critical thinking, attaining liberal education or developing skills to analyze societal problems. In response to John Stuart Mill’s argument that “the object of universities is not to make skillful lawyers, physicians or engineers” but “to make capable human beings” they contended, “value is not usefully defined only as reflecting a set of intrinsic and ethereal features of higher education.”

In place of what they described as an exclusive focus on the intrinsic and ethereal, Fethke and Policano provided their own means of evaluation: “value = willingness to pay – opportunity cost of resources.”

It is difficult to establish a definitive conclusion about how Kinley, Stoddard and White would have responded to Fethke and Policano’s public-no-more university, but it is clear that none of the Illinois presidents articulated a vision in which the university had wholly given up on “intrinsic and ethereal” notions of its value. Like Fethke and Policano’s book, the public statements of the presidents acknowledged that higher education should confer private benefits but they differ because they privileged the public good. To be sure, the university’s role in achieving Kinley’s democratic goals and Stoddard’s quest for world peace seem far more distanced from Fethke and Policano than White’s emphasis on the economic role of the university. However, even in the latter case, the university was to serve the greater public good.

568 Ibid., 26.
569 Ibid., 27.
The very presence of Fethke and Policano’s book, and the warnings of scholars who examine the current situation of the university in its role as a public institution, demonstrate that the university is indeed in precarious circumstances. However, as this dissertation has shown, the University of Illinois and the American university in a broader sense have seen a variety of challenges for more than a century. To varying degrees, Kinley, Stoddard and White’s formulations of the relationship between the university and its public reflected these challenges while also proclaiming the resilience of public ideals. The extent to which these ideals retain their currency into the future, not merely as ineffective rhetorical devices but instead as compelling calls to action, remains to be seen.
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