KOREAN IDENTITY CONSTRUCTIONS IN RELATION TO RACIALIZED DIFFERENCES

BY

JUNG-WON SUH

DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Educational Policy Studies in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2015

Urbana, Illinois

Doctoral Committee:

Associate Professor Yoon K. Pak, Chair
Professor James D. Anderson
Professor William Cope
Associate Professor Linda Herrera
Abstract

This research critically analyzes discourses concerning Korean identities in public and private sphere. It focuses on the development of discourses from mono-ethnic to multicultural Korean identities during 1990s-2000s. The rising discourses of multicultural diversity in Korean society can be seen as a strategic choice of Korean government and individuals alike in order to be successfully integrated into the globalization process. Strategic identity constructions do not necessarily imply a linear, progressive and teleological development or westernization. Rather, it should be viewed as a flexible and sustainable developmental strategy that a nation, such as Korea, constantly transforms and adapting itself to neoliberal globalization within its constrained and changing conditions.

This view of identity constructions as part of strategic globalization is based on an investigation of discourses of mono-ethnic and multicultural Koreanness in contemporary Korean society, using Foucault’s theory of governmentality and discourse as reference of framework. Analyses of the discourses were conducted in two different levels: public and individual. Public discourses were analyzed through investigations on K-12 textbooks in the field of ethics and social studies, and included public advertisements. Individual and small group interviews were conducted in order to analyze individual level discourses on what it means to be Korean in triangulation with the public discourses.

The juxtaposition of these two discursive perspectives revealed different facets of the discursive constructions of Korean identities. Seemingly contradicting discourses of mono-ethnic homogeneity and multicultural diversity as Korean identities are not mutually exclusive. Rather, public discourses from the textbooks presented mono-ethnic loyalty and multicultural diversity as one desire of Koreans: the desire to establish a rich and strong nation advancing into the
global world through peaceful unification with North Korea. For global advancement, Koreans should be multicultural citizens well-versed in diversity of any kind, but for unification, Koreans should keep their ethnic loyalty.

Individual discourses demonstrated their desire to become active participants in the process of globalization, while coveting for more advantages in the society through different discourses on Koreanness. Individuals strategically engaged mono-ethnic and multicultural identities according to their needs in different contexts. Korean individuals did not fully abide by the government’s molding. Yet, they endeavor to acquire necessary multicultural sophistication in order to become a successfully globalized member of the Korean society. At the same time, they covet for more advantageous place in the society by objectifying the recent immigrant population or by hierarchically labelling the different cultures associated with different groups of people.

In brief, seemingly shifting discourses on Koreanness as mono-ethnic to multicultural does not represent the changing identities of Koreans. On the contrary, the shift in discourses of Korean identities imply that discursive constitution of identities are strategically utilized as means of gaining global membership in Korean society, or gaining a superior legitimacy as a Korean. Korean individuals are developing more sophisticated strategies and concepts that racialize different groups of people through their discourses surrounding identities. Korean identity constructions can thus be viewed as a strategic and context-specific choice of Koreans for the sustained development in the context of neoliberal globalization.
Acknowledgement

I am very indebted to the many people who have given me support and encouragement along the way. In naming a few people here, I do not want to diminish my appreciation of those who remain anonymous.

My deepest gratitude should be given to my parents, Dr. Jaemahn Suh and Dr. Ok-Kyung Chang. They have always encouraged me to explore the larger world beyond their experience and imagination since I was young. During my long years of study, they have been very patient and enduring, always encouraging me to do my best. They have been supporting me with their great belief, love, and hope.

My committee members, Dr. James Anderson, Dr. William Cope, Dr. Linda Herrera and my advisor Dr. Yoon Pak provided much helpful advice and generous support for this project. Their ways of critically engaging knowledge and generosity in sharing their different research specialties in their comments inspired me for the further professional development. I am also grateful for Dr. Cope and Dr. Herrera taking up the responsibility of being on the committee at the last minute when two previous members could not serve any more. Dr. Anderson provided many insightful comments and constructive criticism. My advisor, Dr. Pak has been very patient, caring, and supportive over the years that I have been through ups and downs of life while studying.

My colleagues and supervisors at the International and Area Studies Library and in different departments of the Main Library have been incredibly supportive and understanding while I was writing and going through the difficult times. Many of them inspired me with their own researches and provided helpful comments in developing and refining my ideas.

Special thanks to my uncle, Mr. Jae-kwon Suh, for his careful reviews and unending interest on this dissertation. He has not only been my family, but also a keen reviewer of my research and a great friend for years while I was apart from my family. I also want to thank my dear friends both in
Korea and in the United States who I need not name. They have cheered me up and enriched my life with their wits, kindness, talents, and intelligence.

Last but not least, I wish to give my very special appreciation to Dr. Eun-Young Kim at Korea Educational Development Institute. She has been my friend since my second year in doctoral studies, and became my sister and mentor over a decade. Not only Dr. Kim has provided many insightful comments and critiques on this dissertation, but also given me a relentless support as I struggled through the years with my research. She often made me laugh with her wits and humor, pushed me to do better, and nurtured me with most understanding advices and unwavering friendship.
# Table of Contents

List of Table .................................................................................................................. viii

Chapter I Ethnic Identity Constructions in Contemporary Korea
: Mono-ethnic versus Multi-ethnic Korea ................................................................. 1
  Background .................................................................................................................. 1
  Principal Research Issues ....................................................................................... 3
  Research Questions ............................................................................................... 5
  Significance of Research ..................................................................................... 6
  Methodology and Data Collection ...................................................................... 10
  Theoretical Framework ....................................................................................... 15
  Research Design and Data Sources .................................................................. 20
  Summary and the Chapter Layouts .................................................................... 22
  Notes ..................................................................................................................... 24

Chapter II Post-structuralism and the Constructions of Korean Identities in Multicultural Era .......................................................... 25
  Studies on the Korean Identity Construction ...................................................... 25
  Identity Construction and Discourse: Post-structuralism, Power/Knowledge, and Governmentality ......................................................... 42
  The Relevance of Foucault’s Theory to This Research .................................. 52

Chapter III Contemporary Korea and the Context of Research
: Contemporary Social Context and the Discourses of Korean Identity ............... 57
  Introduction ........................................................................................................ 57
  A Shorthand Modern History of Korea ............................................................... 59
  Contemporary Korean Society: Democratization, Economic Advancement, and Neoliberal Reconstructions ......................................................... 63
  Summary and Conclusion .................................................................................. 78

Chapter IV Understandings on Public Discourses of Koreanness ......................... 83
  Introduction ........................................................................................................ 83
  Public Discourses through School Textbooks: Desire for a Rich and Powerful Nation through Peaceful Unification and Global Advancement .............. 85
  Pride in Mono-ethnic Heritage and Multiculturalism ....................................... 92
  Flexible Identities ......................................................................................... 98
  Summary and Conclusion: Global Advancement, Multiculturalism, and the Flexible Identities ............................................................... 106

Chapter V Understandings of Multiculturalism in Korea ...................................... 110
  Introduction .................................................................................................... 110
  The Color of Your Skin and the Price of Korean Economic Advancement ....... 110
  Diversity and Assimilation ............................................................................. 123
  Human Resources and Social Problem ......................................................... 129
Summary and Conclusion
: National Advancement, Social Integration, and Multiculturalism ..................132

Chapter VI Reflections and Conclusions ..................................................................................137
Introduction .................................................................................................................................137
Discourse, Social Structure, and Identity Constructions .................................................................137
Multiculturalism, Korean Style ....................................................................................................141
Center and the Periphery Revisited: Neoliberal Globalization and Strategic Identities ..................................................148
Global Membership and “Confucian” Multiculturalism .................................................................153
Implications for Further Research and Policy Implementations .....................................................159

Appendix A Public Advertisement Poster: All are skin colors ..................................................164
Appendix C List of Sample Interview Questions .........................................................................168

References ....................................................................................................................................170
List of Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1. Foreign nationals residing in Korea</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter I Ethnic Identity Constructions in Contemporary Korea

: Mono-ethnic versus Multi-ethnic Korea

Background

Middle School Korean History I

1. History of our country and our life

Centered in Manchuria and Korean Peninsula since ancient times, our people (uri minjok) have formed a mono-ethnic group (tanil minjok) and achieved splendid ethnic culture (minjok munhwa). (1996, p. 2)

It has been widely stated that Korean people are mono-ethnic (Korean Educational Development Institute [KEDI], 1991a; KEDI, 1991b; National Institute of Korean History [NIKH], 1992a; NIH, 1992b; NIH, 1996). At least, Koreans have been taught so for years. Primary and secondary school textbooks of history, ethics, and of social studies have actively represented Korea as both an ethnically and a culturally homogeneous society. Textbooks repeatedly claimed that Korean ethnic homogeneity (or, purity) is something that Koreans take pride in and that it has been maintained throughout the “five-thousand-year history” of Korea. However, Korean pride in their mono-ethnic purity recently came under attack with some researchers openly declaring that a mono-ethnic Korean identity not only lacks historical evidence, but also a historicity in Korean societies before the late-nineteenth century (Eckert et

1 Until the early-1990s, Korean school textbooks were exclusively written by government branches and organizations such as the Ministry of Education, National Institute of Korean History, Korean Educational Development Institute, and similar institutions. After early-1990s, Korean government slowly delegated their authority to write the primary and secondary school textbooks to private corporations. However, Korean Language, Ethics, and Korean History are the subjects that the government kept their authorship for another decade. Therefore, the representations in these textbooks can be read as the basic discourse of the Korean government that were meant to be inscribed in all Korean citizens through schooling. Thus, that is why there is only the quote from the single history textbook used in Korean schools up through the beginning of this decade.

2 In addition to the opening quotes from the first chapters of the Middle School Korean History textbook, there are many other examples of Korean textbooks claiming Korean mono-ethnicity and pride in it. Among many, for example, High School Ethics (Mun’gyobu, 1991) textbook states “We have flowered the purity of the mono-ethnic people (tanil minjok) and glorious national civilization throughout the long history of suffering” (p. 248). High School Civics and Economics (KEDI, 1991a) textbook also proudly claims, “Koreans have formed a mono-ethnic community (tanil minjok kongdôngch’ e) based on the unique language and tradition throughout the five thousand years of history” (p. 58).
Direct mention of Korea's pride in its long-standing mono-ethnicity began being removed from textbooks starting in the early 2000s. In May 2006, the Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development [MEHRD] of Korea declared that all K-12 textbook content highlighting Korean mono-ethnicity would be amended and replaced with content emphasizing multiculturalism and tolerance towards other racial groups (Kim, 2007, p. 65; Kang, 2010, p. 287). Government-sponsored public advertisements stated that people born to Korean and foreign parents are as much Korean as people born with both parents being Korean. Despite their distinctly “foreign” appearances, public advertisements and media reports portrayed “mixed” population as “Korean” throughout the latter half of the 2000s. In a little more than a decade, official discourse on what constitutes, or ought to constitute Koreanness has completely reversed: i.e., from the myth of homogeneous mono-ethnic purity to the ideals of multi-ethnic and multicultural harmony.

---

3 Some researchers were more direct to note that Koreans are not mono-ethnic (Sin, P., 2001), or that the feeling of ethnic national loyalty toward Korea or Koreans rarely existed prior to the late nineteenth century (Eckert et al., 1991). Others suggested Korean nationalism based on a sense of mono-ethnicity is constructed through its unique historical circumstances during the 20th century, rather than as an “immutable given” from “Korea’s long history of maintaining unified political community” (Shin & Robinson, 1999, p. 15).

4 The terminology changes of ethnically mixed population is also interesting. Presently, mixed populations in Korea are generally called “multicultural (tamunhwa)” populations, whereas twigi (crossbreed, used for animals), honhyŏra (mixed-blood child) were more popular in earlier times. There are other names such as Amerasian and Kosian, indicating the mixed populations those born to American soldiers and Korean mothers, and Korean fathers and dominantly Southeast Asian mothers respectively. Even though the definition and usage of the term “multicultural (tamunhwa)” is problematic in many ways, I will borrow this term in this research. This is widely utilized in Korean society and dominates the current discourse and imaginary of ethnically diverse populations in Korea, which is related to the topic of this research. The problematic nature of this term will be discussed later in this research.

5 Discourse, or discursive formation, can be most plainly defined as an institutionalized way of thinking manifested through language. It determines the social boundaries of the ways in which a specific topic can be conceptualized or be represented, both in verbal and non-verbal forms. In other words, discourse can be seen as a coherent set of socially or institutionally recognized body of meaning. Thus, as Stuart Hall (1992 cited in Hall, 1997, p. 44) wrote, discourse is “about the production of knowledge through language” (p. 291). The concept of discourse is not purely about language, but it is about both how language and practice constructs meaning and meaningful conduct (Hall, 1997, p. 44). Foucault rejects any notion that there can be a metanarrative or metatheory that connects, represents, and explains everything (Thompson, 1995, p. 570), and attacks these types of discursive practices that lay claim to revealing “Truth.” Although Foucault is against a strict and all-assuming definition, I use the above definition for the purposes of convenience and minimal agreement with the readers on the term.
What is driving this rapid discourse shift on “Koreanness” in Korea? And how do some Korean individuals experience this shift in the public discourse of “Koreanness”? Do any Korean individuals resist the new ideas on what Koreanness means? Or, do they simply “reconfigure” or “reset” their own identity and everyday conduct in relation to the shifting ideas of “Koreanness” from mono-ethnic to multi-ethnic and multicultural? How do these individuals construct themselves in relation to the shifting representations of “Koreanness”? I attempt to answer these questions throughout my research.

**Principal Research Issues**

In recent decades, the neoliberal reconstruction of Korean society has perpetuated a drastic makeover of what constitutes, or ought to constitute, Korea and Koreanness. The course of identity constructions of Koreans is ruptured in between the shifting public discourses on “Koreanness.” Conventional belief lies in the mono-ethnicity and homogeneous Korean culture: Koreans have been taught to take pride in their long history of ethnic purity and homogeneous cultural heritage in schools and textbooks. More recent construction is the multi-ethnic diversity and multiculturalism: the Korean government openly declares that Korea is already transforming into a multi-ethnic society and that Koreans should wholeheartedly accept multiculturalism and ethnic diversity. The drastically shifted public representations of what constitutes, or ought to constitute, “Koreanness” over the recent decades, project seemingly contradicting images of what Korean society and Korean people should be like.

The core research concern is with the discourses on Koreanness on two dimensions: 1)

---

6 Neoliberalism can be defined as a theory of political economic practices based on the assumption that the free market guarantees human well-being and freedom. In pursuit of human well-being and freedom through the free market, governments are obliged to create markets where none previously existed. However, once the market is created, it has to be left to the individual actors and entrepreneurship of the individual actors as much as possible so that the actors will be guaranteed to act upon their free will. In this regard, market exchange is considered as an ethic in itself that guides human action in promoting one’s own well-being and freedom (Harvey, 2005: Introduction). For more detailed description on neoliberalism, see David Harvey, (2005). *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
publicly presented discourses on Koreanness, and 2) individual discourses relating to the public discourses of Koreanness. For the first dimension, this research is devoted to understanding the following. What are the major discourses on Koreanness? How are these discourses related to the current changes in and around the Korean society? For instance, how and why did the discourses, such as global competitiveness and economic advancement, become the driving rationale of the shifting the discourses on what it means to be Korean? For the second dimension, this research asks: How are some Korean individuals experience the rapid shift in discourses of Koreanness in their everyday life? How do some Korean individuals perceive the relationship between the discourses of Koreanness, globalization, and economic success? How do these individuals rearticulate their own identities as Korean between the public discourses of the mono-ethnic and the multicultural Koreanness?

Korean individuals not only experience the seemingly contradictory representations of “Koreanness” but also actively maneuver between the different forms of “Koreanness” in their identifying and positioning of the self in the society. On the one hand, the governmentality of these opposing images of “Koreanness” runs down to individual conduct through the means of what Aihwa Ong (1999; 2006) calls “graduated sovereignty” embedded in the society. The whole society has been reconfiguring itself to the changing environment with the variegated levels of sovereignty over different population as parts of a massive neoliberal restructuring. On the other, individual actors actively and strategically negotiate their “Koreanness” in different contexts between the spectrum of the myth and the idealism of Korean identities in their everyday conduct. Through these two workings of power, the mainstream ethnic Korean individuals subject themselves, as well as others, to certain notions of what it means to be Korean in racially connoted senses.
The strong sense of mono-ethnicity of Koreans has been viewed as a racialized idea of ethnic identity for some time. Shin (2006) has extensively reviewed the history of how Korean ethnic nationalism developed, was contested, and eventually succeeded. Shin (2006) explains that the observed Korean pride in mono-ethnicity is partly a combined product of racism and nationalism, constructed throughout the influences of Western imperialism, Japanese colonization, and ideological war. If the concept of mono-ethnic Koreanness already contained racial elements in it, the elements are now developing into variegated manifestations as Koreans face the challenges of a multi-ethnic, multicultural society. I aim to investigate the course of the individual engagements with the two contradicting perceptions of “Koreanness” constructed in public discourse: the myth of mono-ethnic homogeneity and the new ideals of multicultural diversity.

Research Questions

I start from asking what is driving the changes in the public representation of “Koreanness” and how the changes can be understood within the socio-historical context. I then move to the main concern of this research:

1. How is the rapid shift in the public discourse of “Koreanness” experienced by some Korean individuals?

2. And how do these individuals make sense of their everyday conduct with the shifting representations of “Koreanness”?

I will examine how “Koreanness” is represented in the public discourse and how some Korean individuals experience the shift in the discourses on “Koreanness” through formal and informal education. I will provide interview data with some Korean individuals on how these individuals conduct themselves on a daily basis in relation to the seemingly contradicting ideas
of “Koreanness.” Also, I will examine how individual rationalizations of each person's own conduct connotes the increasing sense of racial/ethnic differences and hierarchy through these interviews. The shifting discourse of “Koreanness” is, of course, closely intertwined with the current context of neoliberalization.

**Significance of Research**

Korea is actively participating in the neoliberal economic restructuring of East Asia and the world, especially since the 1997 economic crisis and the following IMF intervention regime. Recent research coming out from government-sponsored institutions suggest that Korea is seeking to establish a regional cooperation network with other Asian countries (see for example, An et al., 2010; Chi, S. et al., 2010; Pak & Im, 2010; Pak, Ŭ. et al., 2010; Han et al., 2010; Yi & Im, 2010; Yi, H., 2010; Korea Institute for International Economic Policy [KIEP], 2011a; KIEP, 2011b; KIEP, 2011c; KIEP, 2011d; KIEP, 2011e; KIEP, 2011f; Pak, C., 2011; Yun, C., 2012).

While the nation is transforming into a low fertility aging society with the prospect of the country’s population of 49 million dropping sharply in coming decades (Korean Statistical Information Service [KOSIS], Population Projections – Population Growth Scenario)\(^7\), the ambition to be successful in global economy did not decrease at all. Korea strategically seeks to expand its influences overseas as well as to draw more resources, both human and financial, into the Korean society. As a consequence, “[i]n just the past seven years, the number of foreign residents has doubled to 1.2 million” (Choe, 2009, November 1).

Korean corporations and government chose to outsource their factories to cheaper regions and to import foreign laborers to fill the jobs Koreans avoid. Women have been brought in from China and Southeast Asia to marry rural farmers who cannot find Korean brides. People from

---

\(^7\) This statistical prospect provides three different levels of population growth scenario. All three levels of population growth prospects show the decline of total population, as early as mid-2020s and as late as mid-2040s. Searchable at [http://kosis.kr/abroad/abroad_01List.jsp?parentId=A](http://kosis.kr/abroad/abroad_01List.jsp?parentId=A)
English-speaking countries were recruited to teach English in public schools and private tutoring institutions (Choe, 2009, November 1). Whether it is based on national interest or is mixed with individual motivations, Korean society is experiencing a steady increase in its foreign population in the last two decades. Due to the growing visibility of foreign faces in the society and the shifting discourse of “Koreanness”, public attention is being drawn to what constitutes “Koreanness” or “otherness” in Korean society. Many recent studies are focusing on the multiculturalism and multi-ethnic families in Korea and their experience with Koreans (see for examples: Kim, Kim, and Han, 2006; O et. al., 2007; Chang, Yi, and Ko, 2008; Yi, C. et al., 2008; Chŏng, C., 2009; Kwŏn, M. K. 2009), corresponding to the growing attention on the treatments of “otherness” in the society. From newspaper articles to government reports, studies collect the experiences and narratives of individuals who became new, whether permanent or temporary, members of Korean society. This line of research examines how Korean multiculturalism is or is not fulfilling its promises.

There is also some conventional research on Korean nationalism and constructions of Korean national identity in the public sphere. The majority focus on the historical constructions of Korean nationalism and its institutional manifestations in the society (see for examples: Han, 1987; Sin, Y., 1987; Yŏksa Hakhoe, 1987; Cho & Kim, 1990; Kim, T., 1995; Pai, 1998; Shin, 1998; Cha, S., 1999; Han'guk Munhak Yŏn'guhoe, 2000; Shin, 2006; Kang, M., 2007). These research projects are mainly done in the fields of political science, sociology, and history. Most of the research is concerned with structural issues, meaning that they are mainly examining institutionalized and collective representations of mono-ethnic Koreanness. However, not much academic research on this collective Korean identity is done in the field of education. In contrast, virtually all research on issues of identity in the field of education solely focus on individual
identities of adolescents, and are not related to discussions of the Korean ethnic identity. Interestingly enough, research on Korean national identity mostly focuses on the social manifestations and the characteristics of the mono-ethnic Koreanness, while only hinting at the role of the education system. When educators conduct research about the identities of Korean subjects, it is rarely about the national identity they perceive and understand from the course of their education. Except for research in literary representations and Korean language education, discussions on national identity and education, whether formal or informal, are rare. There is not much research on how certain collective identities are received by individuals nor how this affects the shaping of the individual identity.

The existing research on the “Koreanness” and “otherness” understood in Korean society mainly bring two different perspectives to light. One is the outsider’s experiences and perspectives in adjusting to or understanding Korean society and people. Whether they use empirical data or assume general principles, researchers are keen to provide critiques of the mono-ethnic pride of Koreans through the outsider's approach. The other view is that of the insider's perspectives on constructing themselves as a collective modern entity and how Korea exercised state power over its people in building the modern nation. Nation building inevitably includes the formation of a collective, national identity. Korean pride in mono-ethnic purity intertwines with the historical course of nation building through Western imperialism, various wars, and colonial experiences. As a whole, previous research is effective in explaining the structural part of Korean society in the following ways: 1) how the Korean state and intellectuals construct and represent what Korea should be like or should be viewed as, both to its people and to the outside world, and 2) how these state constructions are, through its own institutions, imposed on both the “foreign” and on Korean population within its territory. The shortcomings
of the existing research are apparent: they are not contributing much to the discussions on what is happening to the individuals living in a society with a longstanding notion of mono-ethnic pride that faces a transition into a multicultural and multi-ethnic society.

In other words, existing research on Korean identity does not provide much insight regarding the ways in which “ordinary” Korean individuals experience and engage with their “public” images. Even less so on how these ways of experiencing their own images intertwine with the ways Koreans view and interact with different groups of people. In contrast, most research on Korean identity construction assumes that the general public accepts the publicly presented images of Koreanness. In this regard, Shin (2006) is very accurate in his comments that there has not been enough academic research on Korean national identity based on a sense of ethnic homogeneity despite its importance in Korea and for Koreans (p. 3). Shin originally pointed to the lack of quantity and depth of the research on the historical origin and politics of Korean ethnic nationalism, but it is also true the research on Korean identity in general is very limited in number, depth and area of concern. It is important to learn how “others” are experiencing Korea and Koreans, and how a national identity as social structure is built over time. It is, however, equally imperative to understand how Koreans see themselves in relation to their experiences with “others” and with their self-images, especially at the moment of shifting public discourses on Koreanness. I argue it is crucial to understand how Korean individuals are interacting with these discourses, not only to better understand Korea and Koreans, but also in order to engender any meaningful reflections and changes in the society. Korean individuals and their micro-level interactions with the “public” images of themselves are lost in the previous studies of Korean identity as an overarching national representation.

It is partly true that the images of Korea and Koreanness presented by the government or
public institutions are generated from the Korean individuals themselves. The lack of academic research on the micro-level interactions between the individuals and public representations of Korean ethnic national identity imply this partial truth. Yet, accepting the “public” representation of Koreanness as mere reflections of the comprehensive individual opinions only reconfirms the essentializing forces of the imposition of certain hegemony, be it a collective national identity or an imaginary self. I argue that the micro-politics between the individuals and public images are much more complex than the unilateral imposition – reception/internalization model. Individuals constantly struggle to grasp the meanings of the things that are projected through public discourse such as schools, textbooks, and social media. They construct and conduct themselves in continual interactions and negotiations with the public images of Koreanness and “otherness.”

Thus, my project aims to tease out some of the complexities involved in the variegated ways that individual actors actively and strategically negotiate their “Koreanness” between the spectrum of the myth and the idealism of Korean identities in their everyday conduct – in all of its conflicted ways.

**Methodology and Data Collection**

In order to understand the identity constructions of Korean individuals and their experiences of popular texts such as school textbooks and public advertisements, I employ discourse analysis and interviews. Interviews were arranged with some young Koreans who experienced the shift in public representations of Koreanness during their formative years. I employ one-on-one and small group interviews with Korean high school and college students in the metropolitan Seoul area. High school students were older than fifteen years of age at the time of the initial interview. The initial group of high school students was the ones I taught in summer 2003, at a special summer program for advanced students in a private institute. These students and their parents agreed to participate in my research, and signed the consent forms translated in
Korean. College students, both graduate and undergraduate, were recruited through personal connections, either by direct acquaintance or by going through their lecturers. After the initial group of students I approached for the pilot study in 2003-2004, I used the snow-ball method to recruit more interviewees. This method allows diversity within the limited number of interviewees, concerning their age, occupation, socio-economic status, family background, gender, life experiences, levels of participation in the neoliberal reconstruction of the society, and levels of exposure to the foreign populations.

Also, this research is based on longitudinal data of interviews. I started a pilot research on the racialized construction of Korean identity in 2003-2004, with the high school students described above. The data I collected in my pilot research eventually developed into this new research on the Korean identity constructions under the shifting public discourses of Koreanness. During the interviews, this group of young adults showed their shifting ideas on what it means to be Korean in relation to the still unfamiliar concepts of race and ethnicity at the time. I also found their ideas were increasingly connected to the discourses of globalization and cultural diversity prevailing in the Korean society. The project eventually evolved into this research on the micro-politics of individual identities in relation to the shifting discourses of Koreanness. As the research developed into a longitudinal one, I lost contacts with many interviewees who initially participated in the pilot research and gained some new participants over time. Yet, a small number of initial participants still remain in correspondence and voluntarily participated in some additional interviews. Naturally, my interviewees aged and crossed many different stages of their life while the interviews were carried out, thus many in my latest group are not young students any more.

Many interviewees spent at least a part of their formative years while the neoliberal
changes in the society were developing and the public representations of Korea and Koreans were shifting from mono-ethnic to multicultural. Many are also active participants in the current globalization and internationalization trend in the society with their educational or occupational choices, each navigating their own ways of being Korean in a rapidly changing society. Some of the interviewees also have experiences of traveling or living overseas. Several are also active consumers of the media culture prevalent in contemporary Korean society, from watching TV to skillful utilization of the smart technology in their palms. The majority of interviewees are residents of metropolitan Seoul area, but others also move back and forth between two to three different residences regularly. They are young, mobile, dynamic, flexible, and eloquent population in many respects. It is meaningful to investigate these young individuals’ experiences and development of identity with the shifting images of Koreanness in their youth. It is also meaningful to inquire about how these young and mobile individuals construct themselves in their discourses of both highly ethnicized and globalized identities.

I carried out small group or one-on-one interviews, following each interviewee’s preferences. Issues of identity formation in relation to racialized perceptions of different groups can be sensitive at times. Some interviewees from the pilot study preferred more privacy depending on their experiences and personality. Interview questions are semi-structured in order to freely expand the conversations on the grounds of the issues that my informants bring into the discussion. Interview data will also be triangulated with some raw materials such as school textbooks, public advertisements, and media reports as needed. As Báez (2007) argued, the lived experience of individuals cannot be separated in understanding a text and vice versa (p. 193). Therefore, it makes better sense to understand both the interview data and the texts synchronously, rather than analyzing each separately in this research.
Young Korean adults are actively interacting with the publicly projected images of Koreanness (texts, or discourse) in their constructions of self, both at institutional and informal levels of their life experiences. Although I recognize experiences are not always “Truths,” I understand that experiences also work in various ways in materializing knowledge/discourse (Foucault, 1990). Discourses are not disinterested, value-free, neutral, or isolated; rather, they work in systems of knowledge and power that are “in communication” with variegated levels of life experiences of individuals during a given time and context. Besides, the discourses and texts at the center of investigation here are the ones defining Korean identities. An identity is not simply a myth or a fantasy without a substantial socio-historical ground, but it has “real social and political significance” deriving “crucial behavioral consequences” (Shin, 2006: 3). Through analyzing the public discourses of Koreanness with the interviews, the everyday experience of the individuals and their identity constructions can be captured in motion: individual interactions with the popular texts projecting particular representations of Koreanness.

Discourse analysis is a well-rooted methodology in the qualitative research tradition, considering that “qualitative researchers study spoken and written records of human experience” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, p. 639). It is “an exploration of how ‘texts’ at all levels work within sociocultural practices” (Candlin, 1995, pp. viii-ix italics in original) that is not limited to a level of analysis in the use of language. A text is generally understood in linguistic tradition as a piece of written or spoken language such as a poem or words spoken in a conversation (Fairclough, 1995, p.4). It is, however, understood more broadly in cultural analysis as various types of cultural artifacts, such as a painting, a film, or a piece of music. As the texts are becoming increasingly multi-semiotic in contemporary society, Fairclough notes, discourse analysis should include inquiries of broader types of cultural artifacts as much as analysis on the use of language.
itself (Fairclough, 1995, p.4). I follow this notion of text as diverse forms of multi-semiotic artifact, and employ discourse analysis as a methodology to analyze multi-semiotic texts representing Koreanness in this research.

I recognize that “texts are social spaces in which two fundamental social processes simultaneously occur: cognition and representation of the world, and social interaction” (Fairclough, 1995, p.6). Since “all speech and writing is social” (Macdonell, 1986, p.1) and “language in texts always simultaneously functions ideationally in the representation of experience and the world” (Fairclough, 1995, p.6), text only gains its meaning in its discursive interaction with the audience. As Foucault (1972) pointed out, the meaning of the text is “variable and relative” (p. 23). The text “constructs itself, only on the basis of a complex field of discourse” beyond its material form (Foucault, 1972, p. 23). Thus, text and audience are mutually constitutive and cannot be analytically separated (Nightingale, 1996). Therefore, I argue, it is imperative to understand how different representations of Koreanness in public discourse are understood and re-articulated at the everyday-level of the talks and practices of Korean individuals. Texts and the discourse they create in the social space are not only meaningful as they are, but they gain meanings and importance in their interactions with the audience.8

Discourses and texts at the center of investigation here are the ones defining Korean identities. I will attempt to investigate their interactions with the individual Koreans, especially their re-articulations in the interviewee’s self-representations in this research.

I would also like to make clear that it is precisely because of the above that discourses and individual texts are not examined in a strictly semiotic sense in this research. Discourses and

---

8 Of course, this “audience” should not be viewed as a cohesive totality. Discussions on the definition of “audience” is outside the scope of this research; I am rather trying to describe “individuals” than “audience” as in media studies, even when I use the word “audience” in this research. The word “audience” used in this research generally means the individuals who absolve information through various media formats, from printed materials to TV programs.
texts only gain meanings in relation to a complex field of meaning making and they must be “treated as and when it occurs” (Foucault, 1972, p. 25). I attempt to analyze the public discourses on Koreanness not as their separate forms as public advertisement, textbooks, or a film, but within the everyday utterances and conduct of Korean individuals. I am more interested in where some “average” Korean individuals pick up ideas of Koreanness, and how these individuals make sense of and give meanings to certain representations projected in the society. I want to examine, in the end, how these Korean individuals employ or utilize the public representations of Koreanness in re-articulating and conducting their lives. In other words, I want to see when and how particular representations of Koreanness from texts gain and deploy their meanings in individuals' constructions of self. It is, I believe, out of the scope of this research to go into a detailed text or discourse analysis on a specific public advertisement, media report, textbook, television show, or film. Descriptions and analysis on the various forms of texts will be provided mainly to engender a better understanding on what my interviewees find meaningful, but will not be the purpose of this research.

Theoretical Framework

For the theoretical framework, I mainly draw on Foucault, particularly on his theory of governmentality and the concept of discourse. Discourses are “systems of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of actions, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak” (Lessa, 2006, p. 285). Put differently, discourse or discursive formation is an institutionalized way of thinking manifested through language. Discourse determines the social boundaries of the ways in which a specific topic can be conceptualized or be represented, both in verbal and non-verbal forms. Thus, the concept of discourse is not purely about language, but about both language and practice that constructs meaning and meaningful conduct (Hall, 1997, p. 44). It “refers to groups of statements which
provide a way of representing a particular topic, concern or subject” (Nixon, 1997, p. 302). Individual and collective identities are constantly negotiated through the different forms of discourses, or, systems of thought, on what it means to be Korean and not-Korean. As Foucault (1997) wrote, “[s]ystems of thought are forms in which, during a given period of time, the knowledges individualize, achieve an equilibrium, and enter into communication” (p. 9). Thus, analyzing discourse can be an act of accounting for “the positions and viewpoints from which [people] speak, the institutions which prompt people to speak … and which store and distribute the things that are said” (Foucault, 1990, p. 11).

My analysis of Korean constructions of identity starts with the various institutionalized forms of thoughts and representations of what constitutes “Koreanness.” These discourses that define what constitutes Koreanness (=knowledge) are directly entwined with relations of power that places “the body as an object of certain disciplinary technologies of power” (Peters & Burbules, 2004, p. 44-45). As Hein and Seldon (2000) point out, school textbooks, especially history and civics textbooks, in most societies present “official” narratives that shape the legitimate boundaries and terms of membership in a given society (p. 3). The discourses on what it means, or ought to mean, to be Korean in K-12 level school textbooks are presented with the extraordinary authority of the state, especially when Korean textbooks were exclusively written and published by the government branches.⁹ In a way, Korean textbooks are a materialization of the state in front of each individual, guiding and instructing the boundaries of their membership in the society. Government designated school textbooks are one of the most abstract forms of the

---

⁹ As was previously explained in the footnote 1, textbooks are no longer exclusively written by the government. From the early-1990s, the Korean government slowly passed out their authority to write the primary and secondary school textbooks to private corporations. However, Korean Language, Ethics, Civics and Korean History are the subjects that the government kept their authorship for another decade. Therefore, the imprints of government discourse are still heavy in these subject areas, and the representations in these textbooks can be read as the basic discourse of the Korean government that were meant to be inscribed in all Korean citizens through schooling.
official discourse on what it means to be Korean, or how to be a legitimate member of the
Korean society. In this sense, Korean individuals are automatically pulled into the power
relations with the state as well as other members of the society when faced with a primary or
secondary school textbook.

Aside from the school textbooks, I draw on media representations as important sources to
investigate in analysis of Korean identity constructions. Contemporary youth are embracing the
versatile multi-semiotic texts such as advertisements and popular films with more ease and
familiarity than the rigid, authoritative school textbooks. My interviewees implied that they
readily grasp and construct more meanings from the multimedia contents than the school
textbooks. Primary and secondary school textbooks are one of the most fundamental and
semiotic mediums through which Koreanness is represented and learned. Yet I also want to
extend my inquiries to more versatile and eloquent multi-semiotic texts with which young
individuals frequently interact, and find more appealing in their symbols and representations.
The systems of thought on what it ought to mean to be Korean are also strategically woven into
media representations, such as commercials as well as public advertisements, drama shows,
films, and posters. The discourses dispersed through these multi-semiotic texts are often
presented with more subtlety and complexity than are found in outright statements of Korean
pride and values in school textbooks. Still, these subtler discourses are “grasped immediately by
an inner metalanguage” as the image, which is immersed for its very social existence in
connoting reality (Barthes, 1977, p. 28-29). As Barthes explains (1977), the image is more
immediately grasped by the audience than the representations in the textbooks that need to be
“decoded” through one's cognitive process.

As Kang (1997) acknowledges, one of the most deeply rooted misconceptions or ideology
attached to modern thoughts could be the conviction that the realm of knowledge is the same as that of the “truth” or freedom. The belief extends so much so that there is a great chasm between the realms of power and of knowledge/truth/freedom which cannot be overcome (p. 59). Yet, Foucault argues every progress of knowledge is closely interconnected with the operations of power. The diverse mechanisms of power are embedded in cases such as society becoming the subject of observation or human beings and their behaviors becoming analytical and solvable issues. Thus, there is no such thing as pure and innocent knowledge that is removed from power, a safe space enabling one to depart for freedom (Kang, 1997, p. 59). Instead, one can only negotiate what is meaningful at the moment within the entangled relations of power/knowledge.

In these negotiations, discourse works as the medium through which power relations produce speaking subjects (Foucault, 1990, p.11). In short, Foucault traces how knowledge and power are intertwined through discourse and how individuals are positioned in power relations within the system of knowledge/power.

For Foucault, power is something that produces human realities, rather than oppressing it. It is not an institution or a set structure, and it does not belong to a special group of people. Power does not disperse from a specific center to the periphery. Rather, power can be viewed as “a strategically interwoven situation in a specific society” (Kang, 1997, p. 40) that creates certain realities for the people who are entangled in the relationship. Especially in the human sciences, “power produces knowledge and power and knowledge directly imply one another” (Peters and Burbules, 2004, p. 44). Thus, the “systems of thought,” or “the corpus of knowledge,” is produced by “power-knowledge, the processes and struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge” (Foucault, 1991, p. 28). Since power is “the operation of the political technologies throughout the social body” (Dreyfus...
and Rabinow, 1983, p. 185), the task of the research is to explain how power operates than to define what power is.

Governmentality explains how power operates through “the dynamics between social and political systems of control and practice of self-control” (Peters & Burbules, 2004, p. 65). For Foucault (1991), “[g]overnment is defined as a right manner of disposing things so as to lead not to the form of the common good, … but to an end which is ‘convenient’ for each of the things that are to be governed” (p. 95). It is, at the same time, about the relationship of the self to itself and to others “involving some control and guidance, and relations within social institutions and community” (Peters & Burbules, 2004, p. 66). Thus, governmentality can be “located at the intersection of … state centralization and a logic of dispersion” (Peters & Burbules, 2004, p. 65). In this regard, a person who defines oneself as, say, Korean will construct him-/herself in ways that correspond to one’s “knowledge” of what makes oneself a Korean. This “knowledge of Koreanness”, however, is a socially and systematically “constructed truth” that controls individual bodies and conduct. There still is plenty of room for an individual to negotiate his or her conduct as Korean, where the tension between “state centralization and dispersion exists” simultaneously. For Foucault, as Hall (1997) explains, “power does not ‘function in the form of a chain’ – it circulates” (p. 49). Power is not centered at one place or source, and it does not always runs from top to bottom. Power is everywhere and it is “deployed and exercised through a net-like organization” (Foucault, 1980, p. 98 quoted from Hall, 1997, p. 50). Thus, “power relations permeate all levels of social existence and are therefore to be found operating at every site of social life” (Hall, 1997, p. 50).

Through individuals being freely able to construct and conduct themselves while the modern state oversees and provides care and protection for its subjects (such as schooling and
social welfare), the knowledge/power works on various levels in constructing an individual's identity as a Korean. The Korean government wrote the textbooks or sponsored certain public advertisements that deployed official discourses on Koreanness to the public. These “legitimate” representations are not coerced, but they are dispersed through the education system or through public broadcasting or poster advertisements. They may be seen as state impositions of certain values on individual actors, but it is still left to the individuals on how much of the representations or knowledge they would absorb and internalize. Of course, the authority and power of the state produced discourses are not the same as individual wills, comprehensions, choices, and constructions on what it means to be Korean. However, different ways in which individuals respond to a specific discourse has the power to alter the very discourse, for we are all within a network of power relations either with ourselves or with others.

Research Design and Data Sources

As noted earlier, this research developed from my pilot research on the racialized constructions of Korean identities during 2003-2004. In 2003, I started with 10 female student and 9 male students. Among them, 6 female and 4 male students were high school students of between fifteen to eighteen years old at the time. This group of students brought in more participants in 2004. Nine college students were recruited from one of my acquaintance’s class in a four-year college in Seoul, during 2003-2004. College students were between ages eighteen to twenty five, ranging from freshman to senior in their grade levels.10 In sum, the participants in 2003-2004 interviews consist of 11 male and 13 female high school and college students. Since the pilot research was targeting younger students in their later teens, students whose ages are over 21 at the time of the interview were not actively recruited, but their initiatives to participate

---

10 Male students tended to be older, due to their two-year mandatory military service time during college years. Students enrolled in higher education institutions can postpone the military service until they earn the college degree, but majority of Korean male students complete military service during their college years.
in the interviews were appreciated. Thus, this initial group of participants includes only five
participants older than twenty-one years of age, among them, four are females.

Since then, I used snow-ball method to invite more interviewees every year. In some cases,
my interviewees voluntarily asked to invite in more potential interviewees they knew to be
interested in my research. Some interviewees stayed longer and participated in multiple
interviews. Some interviewees left after one interview. As a result, I ended up with the data from
28 males and 33 females interviewed consistently over several years by 2012, ages ranging from
eighteen to thirty-three.

Although I describe it a longitudinal data from 2003 to 2012, there is a very small number
of interviewees who constantly participated in the interviews over the period of a decade. Some
people participated in the earlier years and left. Some others came in the later part of the research
and still in contact with me. Some others came in the later part of the research but did not wish to
participate after a few sessions. Still some others, started in 2003 in my pilot research,
disappeared for some years, restored contacts with me at some point and sporadically
participated in different interviews at different times. Many were interviewed in small groups.
Yet, some individuals expressed their reluctance to speak out in front of others due to the
sensitivity of the interview topic or their shyness, and I also arranged for individual interviews.
Main questions and the structure of questions were not different from group to individual
interviews. Interview questions were semi-structured in order to focus on the main topic of the
concern but allow free expansion on the issues that different individuals bring into the sessions.

Initially, I planned to analyze only a few public advertisements with textbook phrases in
triangulation with the interview data. Public advertisements and the textbooks are most
representative of the social discourses in a given society, let alone their explicit purpose of
educating the general public as desirable members of the society. However, interviewees started to discuss various forms of media representations of “multicultural population” during the interviews. Some individuals also claimed that these diverse media representations exert more influences in their information gathering and individual life than textbooks and public advertisements. Therefore, popular TV drama shows that interviewees discussed were partly included in the analyses in relation to how Korean society generally portrays the immigrant population.

Most interviewees agreed that their principles are drawn back to the basic concepts they learned from the textbooks and schools, but general life experiences and conducts are more closely knitted with what they experience in the society at large, and through the popular media representations. Interviewees also noticed that public/corporate advertisements to promote multiculturalism as well as popular drama shows with “multicultural population” as main protagonists increased during 2000s. Advertisements and popular drama shows that contain the messages promoting multiculturalism are therefore analyzed following the interviewees’ signs of interests thereof.

**Summary and the Chapter Layouts**

The chapters in this study develop in following way. Chapter two will review the existing research on Korean identity constructions. The literatures on the constructions of Korean identity mainly focus on the mono-ethnic national identity and the recent transition to multicultural and multi-ethnic identity. Majority of scholarly works on Korean identity, both as mono-ethnic and as “multicultural”, tend to overlook the individual interactions with the publicly projected images of Koreanness. Foucauldian approach provides a unique perspective in understanding how individuals rearticulate and reconstruct their own sense of self in constant interactions with the public representations of Korean identity.
Chapter three examines the socio-historical background of modern Korean history as many Koreans have been taught in their schools and the recent changes in society that had brought forth the discourse of multiculturalism. It reviews the preserving Korean uniqueness and accepting the “global” has been the discourses deeply embedded in the society throughout its modern history. The primary purpose of this chapter is to contextualize the current shift in the public representations of Korean identity. Collective memory instilled in individuals through learning history and their recent encounters with the changing social environment is sketched out. This review of the modern socio-historical context provides a basis to start on the examination of Korean identity constructions in relation to public representations of Koreanness.

Chapter four will examine how the new discourse of multiculturalism is understood and articulated by the young individuals in Korea. I will examine the ways in which these individuals engage with the prevalent rhetoric of multiculturalism in their everyday life choices. These individuals actively incorporate different types and levels of public representations of multicultural or “global” Koreanness in articulating their positions in relation to the different groups of people.

Chapter five will analyze the issues of multicultural identities of Korean individuals in relation to the larger social issues of globalization, economic interest, and social integration. I will identify some strategies of these individuals in navigating and maintaining their balance between the two contradicting ideas of Koreanness. Young and eloquent Korean individuals not only accept new representations of Korea and Koreans as multicultural, but also actively deploy their own desires by engaging with the various representations of Koreanness.

Chapter six, which will be the final chapter, will expand the discussions on the study’s research findings and conclude with reflections on the implications for educational policy and future research.
Notes

I used the McCune-Reischauer romanization system throughout this work, except for some well-known place names (e.g., Seoul, Incheon, etc.) and personal names published/publicized otherwise (e.g., Park Chung Hee, Kim Young Sam, Shin, Gi-Wook, etc.) that would otherwise be difficult to recognize. I also observe individuals' own system of transliterating their personal names for the materials published in English. All translations from the Korean text are mine unless noted otherwise.

Regarding the use of “Korea” and “Korean(s)”, these terms are all used in relation to the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the ethnic Korean citizens of the Republic of Korea for the sake of discussions in this research. If used otherwise or needed a comparison with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), I used South Korea or Republic of Korea as seemed needed in the context.
Chapter II Post-structuralism and the Constructions of Korean Identities in Multicultural Era

Studies on the Korean Identity Construction

Introduction. This is a study on how Korean individuals rearticulate their identities between the shifting public discourses on Koreanness from a mono-ethnic, culturally homogeneous group to a multi-ethnic, multicultural one. Identity, as defined by Erickson (1959), is a personal recognition of a coherent and persistent self, as much as a recognition of the persistent relationship with a community that one shares some essential characters (p.102). Erickson also sees that identity is not a fixed final product of human characteristics, but a stabilized state where personal and collective recognitions intersect and strike balance (Erickson, 1959, p. 23). Identity then is not only an internal coherency of oneself that is recognized both by the self and the others, but also a continuation of an internalized solidarity with the ideals and characteristics of the society where one belongs. Therefore, a self-identity cannot be separated from a collective identity and recognition, and it is true that identity can be derived from a dominant institution. However, the individuals are ultimate units of internalizing certain identity. In other words, some random sets of meanings only become identity of a person or a group “when and if social actors internalize them” (Castells, 1997, p. 7).

In this research, identity is understood as “the processes of the construction of meaning on the basis of a cultural attribute, or related set of cultural attributes, that is/are given priority over other sources of meaning” (Castells, 1997, p. 6). This concept is not completely alien to the Erickson’s definition of identity, but I want to emphasize identity as a process of meaning making. This study puts more emphasis on its flexible and fluid, “in-process” characteristic at a given point. Whereas Ericksonian concept of identity sees more value in a stabilized state of one coherent balance point, the concept of identity here is multilayered, or, may have multiple
balance points at a given time. There are many different sets of meanings that one can relate to, but an identity is one or some of those traits that are prioritized at a given time in a given individual. Rather than being a static set of characteristics that defines a person or a group, identities are flexible and may be in plural. As Castells points out, such fluidity and plurality of identities may be the “source of stress and contradiction in both self-representation and social action” (Castells, 1997, p. 6). This is especially true when the society is rapidly changing and values and meanings that individuals can relate to are drastically shifting as in contemporary Korean society.

As Yerbury (2010) points out, “[q]uestions of identity and identity formation are particularly relevant to young people in their later teens and early twenties” (p. 25). People at this age develop a sense of themselves as independent individuals while they establish consistent social relations (Yerbury, 2010, p. 25). Participants of this study had been in late-teens to early twenties when first invited to the interviews. This research has been following their changes and consistency roughly over ten years since. Contemporary young people are often described as well travelled and mobile, and well-immersed in using information and communication technologies. Partly due to their mobility and flexibility, identity for contemporary young people is something of a choice and creation (Yerbury, 2010, p. 26). Therefore, as Hall argues, identities are never completed or unified (1995, p. 598; 1996), but “increasingly fragmented and fractured (Hall, 1996, p. 4)”, and “always ‘in process’” (p. 2).

Studies on the Mono-ethnic Korean Identity Construction. Studies on Korean identity traditionally concentrated on the Korean ethnic nationalism (minjok chu-ui), rather than on their political identity as Korean citizens or on state nationalism (kukka chu-ui). It is partly because “Korean nationalism has, historically, emphasised ethnicity and race rather than a secularised
republican nationalism” (Watson, 2010, p. 338). This kind of racialized and ethnicized concept of nation has been deployed through the national language, literature (Kang, 2007), civics and history education in Korea (Sŏ, 2001; Yi, 2006). Narratives of Korea’s recent historical experiences are largely subsumed under the (ethnic) nation (minjok, rather than kukka), and does not allow much room for alternative narratives (Pai and Tangherlini, 1998, pp. 1-4; Shin & Robinson, 1999, pp. 13-17). In other words, the ethnic nation (minjok) becomes the ideological authority superseding the secular state (kukka) (Shin, 2006).

Critics contend that the emphasis on ethnicity and race in Korean national history education makes Koreans unable to differentiate concepts of state subject (kungmin) and ethnic nation (minjok) (Shin, 2006; Yi, 2006). In this case, the membership to the state is easily compounded with the membership to the ethnic nation. Hence, the concerns of the state membership can more or less be equated to the ethnic membership that is essentially an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991). As such, the majority of academic research on Korean identity are centered to investigate one or more of the following issues: 1) origins of the Korean ethnic nation (minjok) or ethnic consciousness (minjok ŭisik), 2) characteristics of Korean ethnic nationalism (minjok chuŭi), and 3) historical development and political manifestations of Korean ethnic nationalism. Essentially, majority of the research on collective Korean identity have been, until recently, on the ethnic nationalism, but not on the state nationalism.

Many studies on Korean ethnic nationalism (minjok chuŭi) endeavored to inquire how or when Korean nation (minjok) originated and developed through the history. There are three contending perspectives in understanding the origins of the Korean ethnic nation: 1) ethnicist or primordialist view; 2) modernist or constructionist view; and 3) perennialist view, which disputes both primordialist and constructionist views (Smith, 1991, pp.8-28; Smith, 1998, pp. 8-24; Shin,
2006, pp. 4-7; Chang, 2011, pp. 48-56). People advocating the first perspective, ethnicists or primordialists, think “Korean ethnic national unity as natural, since all Koreans are considered descendants of Tan’gun” (Shin, 2006, p. 4). Ethnic nation is defined by bloodline where one is born into and one shares common history and destiny with (Min, 2007, p. 39; Yi, S., 2010, p. 6, 9). In other words, naturally formed linguistic and blood community existing for thousands of years developed into the modern nation, and “the contemporary sense of ethnic unity was the natural extension of historical experiences” (Shin, 2006, p. 5; Min, 2007; Yi, S., 2010, p. 6, 9). As Shin (2006) explains, primordialists view that “the Korean minjok existed even if the word did not” (p. 5). Shin (2006) contends this primordialist view still is a popular belief among the general Korean public (p. 5).

The modernist or constructionist scholars, the second group, “regard the Korean nation as a modern product of nationalist ideology that was espoused at the end of the Chosŏn dynasty” (Shin, 2006, p. 5). The concept of Korean ethnic nation as a mono-ethnic group was, according to this perspective, a product of the nation-building process “with the emergence of the modern world system” (Shin, 2006, pp. 5-6). In this regard, the modern concept of nation state and nationalism created the imaginary Korean ethnic nation (minjok) which existed from the ancient times, not the primordial ethnic nation developing into the modern nation and nationalism (Smith, 1998, pp. 18-22; Em, 1999; Chang, 2011, pp. 49-52).

The third group does not regard the Korean nation as a natural blood and language community since ancient times, but “they warn against applying the Western model to the Korean case” (Shin, 2006, p. 6). They contend the modern Korean ethnic nationalism prevailed due to the “remarkable stability of territorial boundaries and the endurance of the Korean
bureaucratic state” (Shin, 2006, p. 6) throughout history.11 They regard the premodern historical development of Korea important in engendering some level of social and cultural sense of homogenous collectivity (Schumid, 2002; Shin, 2006, pp. 6-7; Chang, 2011, pp. 52-55). As such, this sense of homogenous collectivity existing in Korea provided the fertile ground for the modern ethnic nationalism (minjok chuŭi) to grow on (Schumid, 2002; Shin, 2006, pp. 6-7).

Scholars concerned about the Korean ethnic nation (minjok) tend to take either the first or the third perspective. Those who focus on the ethnic consciousness (minjok ŭisik) or the concept of the ethnic nation tends to take the constructionist view. To my understanding, the concept of a unique ethnic nation was no doubt a product of the modern nation-building process, whereas Koreans as a loosely connected homogenous political, linguistic and cultural entity have existed for thousands of years. In what ways the future history writing should engender the general understanding of history for the Korean citizens is a fundamental question. Yet, it is not very fruitful striving only to determine whether Korean mono-ethnic nation is a creation of the modern history writing while disregarding many other aspects of Korean identity. The ways in which Koreans have learned their history as a mono-ethnic nation maintained since antiquity has provided vocabulary, symbols, and emotional grounds for the collective recognition and practice (Chang, 2011, p. 68). There are many other aspects of Korean ethnic nationalism worth scholarly attentions as much as determining when the Korean ethnic nation or ethnic nationalism originated, let alone the various levels and aspects of Korean identity that need to be addressed.

Many researchers investigated the characteristics and positive roles of Korean ethnic nationalism. Scholars in various academic fields traced the innate spirit of artistic, spiritual, and

---

11 Since Silla unified neighboring two kingdoms, Koguryŏ and Paekche, in 676 A.D., the boundary of the Korean territory has been more or less maintained throughout the later “unified” Silla (676-935), Koryŏ (918-1392) and Chosŏn (1392-1910) period. Also, it is true that the bureaucratic rule of the state was mostly maintained by one centralized government throughout this time.
racial independence to the common ancestor, Tan'gun.\(^\text{12}\) Their works deployed discourses nurturing the concept of a unique cultural and ethnic identity of Koreans (Pai & Tangherlini, 1998, pp. 3-4; Schmid, 2002; Yun et. al., 1994). Textbooks and official narratives naturally fall under this category. This type of research mainly emphasizes the positive historical effects of “Tan'gun nationalism (Tan'gun minjok chuŭi)\(^\text{13}\) and supposedly corresponding discourse of mono-ethnic unity in preserving the national heritage throughout historical turmoil (see for example, Kang, 1995, pp. 187-190; Yun et al., 1994). Few scholars nowadays directly claim that Korean people actually originated from a common ancestor Tan'gun or being mono-ethnic as earlier scholars. Still, most scholars generally agree on the need to study Korean ethnic nationalism based on Tan'gun myth as an ideological anchor supporting 1) national resistance movements against western imperialism including the Japanese colonization, and 2) the transformation of the premodern hierarchical Korean identities into the homogeneous modern

\(^{12}\) *Tan'gun* (or, *Tan'gun Wanggŏm*) is a half-mythical founding father of the Korean ethnic group (*minjok*). General plot of the *Tan'gun sinhwa* (*Tan'gun myth*), the founding myth of Korean ethnic nation (*minjok*), is as follows: Hwanung, the son of Hwanin (=the god of Heavens), was interested in benefiting the world of the humans so that Hwanin sends his son to the land where he could benefit the people widely. Hwanung came down to the land with the three thousand followers. He reigned the three hundred sixty aspects of the human life including crops, life and death, sickness and health, crime and punishment, good and bad, accompanied by the gods such as the gods of wind, rain, and cloud. A tiger and a bear desired to become humans and prayed sincerely to the heavens, so that Hwanung took pity on them. Hwanung gave them wormwood and garlic, said they would become humans when they have endured twenty one days (*samch'ir-il*) in a deep cave where they cannot see the light. Tiger could not endure for the twenty one days and left the cave, so tiger did not become human. Bear endured the time and became a beautiful woman. Yet, the Bear-woman (*Ungnyŏ*) did not find a man who will marry her, so she always prayed to bear a baby. Thus, Hwanung turns to the human form and takes Ungnyŏ, then she gave birth to a son, *Tan'gun Wanggŏm*. *Tan'gun Wanggŏm* set the capital at Pyŏngyang and named [the nation] Chosŏn. … *Tan'gun* reigned Chosŏn for 1,500 years, then went into the mountain and became the mountain god (*sansillyŏng*). His age was 1,907. (a rough translation from Iryŏn, 1982, pp. 76-77, Yi Pyŏng-do trans.).

The union of Hwanung and Ungnyŏ means the union of the god and human, of the Heavens and the Earth, and of the migrant and the indigenous tribes. Or, some people explain the union as one between the people who worship the Heavens and the Bear totem. The word “*tan'gun*” means the chief priest, “*wanggŏm*” a political leader, which indicates this ancient Chosŏn society had its religion and politics not yet separated.

The first ancient Korean document that records this story, *Samguk Yusa* (History of the Three Kingdoms, 1281) by Iryŏn, provides earlier sources for the periodization of this ancient 'nation' called Chosŏn (B.C. 2333-B.C.108).

Some ancient Chinese history also records the existence of this ancient Chosŏn by B.C. 5-7 century (Han'guksa Yŏn'guhoe (Korean History Research Association) (Ed.), 2008, p. 75); nowadays, this ancient Chosŏn is called Kojosŏn, in order to differentiate it from the later Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910)). There also remains the record of a part of the laws in Kojosŏn society. For these reasons, Tan'gun myth is generally considered a half-history half-myth.

\(^{13}\) Korean ethnic nationalism based on the belief that all Koreans have common ancestry descending from Tan'gun.
As Shin (2006) makes it clear, nationalism is only one of many modern concepts introduced to Korea at the end of the nineteenth century, which came to be a dominant collective identity of Koreans heavily connoted with race and ethnicity throughout the historical contestation (p. 21). Various ideologies were introduced to Korea from the late-nineteenth century, but the rise of ethnic nationalism as a categorical identity in Korea was both contingent and contested, as much as it was due to the specific historical experiences of Korea (Shin, 2006, pp. 8-11). Koreans, who just began to see themselves as homogeneous national subjects at the beginning of the twentieth century, were confronted by the loss of their nation under the Japanese colonization. The discrepancy was created between Korean reality of the lost sovereign nation and being subjected under the colonial racism versus the growing recognition of themselves as an independent and distinct group against the “foreigners.” Koreans turned to ethnicized nationalism to keep their identity separate from the Japanese colonizers as a sovereign imagined community of the Korean nation (Shin, 2006, pp. 41-54). In other words, “the ethnic nation (minjok) substituted the state (kukka) in colonial Korea (Im, 1999, p 6).”

With the experience of colonization, various wars, and ideological constraints, Korean ethnic identity became racialized and formed as resistance nationalism (Kim, 1995; Shin, 2006). Shin (2006) shows that the experiences after gaining independence from the Japanese colonization did not change much of the characteristics of Korean nationalism. Through similar processes as Anderson (1991) explained in formation of “official nationalism”, Koreans came to imagine a homogeneous mono-ethnic community against the foreign forces since the late nineteenth century. Scholars identify the following elements contributing to solidifying Korean

---

14 It seems to me that Tan'gun myth itself does not portray a mono-ethnic ancestry at all, but I agree with many other scholars' recognition on its overarching effects on Korean ethnic nationalism (minjok chuŭi).

This does not mean that Korean ethnic nationalism, or Korean mono-ethnic identity, is a complete fiction without any substance (Shin, 2006, p. 3). Rather, this imaginary provides vocabulary, symbols, and emotional grounds for the collective recognition and practice (Chang, 2011, p.68). And, if we regard ethnic nationalism as an imaginary, the focus of the problem moves to how this belief in ethnic unity governs the people's ways of thinking, talking, and behaving than when ethnic nation (minjok) or ethnic consciousness (minjok ŭisik) started to exist (Chang, 2011, pp. 68-70). For example, whether the Korean nation (minjok) has been truly mono-ethnic is not as much an important matter. Rather, the inquiry on how the belief or disbelief in “Korea as a mono-ethnic nation” governs the everyday life of Korean individuals become more crucial.

Recent studies on Korean identity in relation to the experiences of modernity in Korea touch on different aspects of these “hows” of the modern, colonial, gendered, and racialized life of Koreans throughout the twentieth century (see for example, Shin & Robinson (Eds.), 1999;

\(^{15}\) The notion of “pure” Korean alphabet was emphasized due to the influence of Chinese characters in written language for thousands of years, even after the creation (1443) and proclamation (1446) of Korean alphabets, then later for the use of “pure” Korean words due to Japanese (and Chinese) words remaining in everyday use of Korean language.
Jager, 2003; Moon, 2005). These studies contribute to the existing discussion by explaining how experiences of colonialism, modernity, ideological competition, or militarization transformed and complicated the development of Korean national identity (Shin & Robinson, 1999; Jager, 2003; Sŏ et. al., 2004; Moon, 2005; Ko, 2006; Yun, H., 2007). These recent studies suggest how complicated the process of Korean national identity formation has been. Examples such as ethnic Korean soldiers conscripted by the colonial government abusing their victims in other parts of Southeast Asia as “imperial Japanese soldiers” invoke reflections on the fissured identities of colonial subjects (Yun, H., 2007, pp. 20-47). Or, a study portraying the ways in which the military rule in post-colonial South Korea constructing a gendered concept of citizenship in mobilizing the populace in its pursuit of strong and wealthy nation (Moon, 2005) suggest how heavily layered the Korean identity formation has been.

They provide different perspectives on understanding the Korean identity formation previously “based largely on binary constructions [of] imperialist repression versus national resistance, colonial exploitation versus national development, or Japanese culture versus Korean culture” (Shin & Robinson, 1999, p. 5). Reflections on the historical experiences of Koreans within an overarching modernity show the various micro level manifestations of Korean identity in different times and contexts. Whereas these reflections do not specifically focus on the origin or the development of Korean identity, they still provide a rich and solid context from where more targeted inquiries can benefit. These studies also suggest how much historical experiences have been invested into the “imagined community” of ethnically homogeneous Korea, however mythic this belief is.

Studies on Multi-ethnic/Multicultural Diversity. In contrast to the earlier research on Korean ethnic nationalism, recent studies on Korean multiculturalism reflect the growing “disbelief” in
Korean mono-ethnicity. As it was briefly reviewed in earlier chapter, Korean pride in their mono-ethnic purity recently came under attack. Some researchers openly declare that a mono-ethnic Korean identity not only lacks historical evidence but also a historicity in Korean societies before the late-nineteenth century (Eckert et al., 1990; Shin & Robinson, 1999; Sin, P., 2001; Schmid, 2002; Shin, 2006; Yi, C., 2006). Many recent studies are focusing on the multiculturalism and multi-ethnic families in Korea and their experiences with Koreans (see for examples: O et. al., 2007; Chang, Yi, and Ko, 2008; Yi, C. et al., 2008; Kwŏn, M. K. 2009), corresponding to the growing attention on the treatments of “otherness” in the society. In any case, not many people argue against the claims that Korea is now becoming a multi-ethnic and multicultural society, while others assert that Korea has already become so (O et al. 2007; Kim, P. C. et al., 2011).

According to statistics from Ministry of Public Administration and Security, number of foreigners (oegugin) residing in Korea is growing every year, and one out of forty three persons in Korea was a “foreigner (oegugin)” by 2010 (Ministry of Public Administration and Security

16 Some were more direct to note that Koreans are not mono-ethnic (Sin, P., 2001), or that the feeling of ethnic national loyalty toward Korea or Koreans rarely existed prior to the late nineteenth century (Eckert et al., 1990). Some others suggested Korean nationalism based on a sense of mono-ethnicity is constructed through its unique historical circumstances during twentieth century, rather than an “immutable given” from “Korea's long history of maintaining unified political community” (Shin & Robinson, 1999, p. 15).

17 The definition of “foreigner” in this case is difficult to clarify. Legally, a “foreigner” is defined as a person who does not have Korean nationality. Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea specifies “foreign resident in Korea” as “a person who, without Korean nationality, legally resides in Korea with purpose of living in the Republic of Korea (Section 2:1).” The same Act also defines a “marriage immigrant” as “a foreigner residing in Korea who is married to or was married to a Korean national (Section 2:3).” However, the 2004 Nationality Act stipulated that “a foreigner married to a Korean national who resided in Republic of Korea more than two constant years is permitted for naturalization (Section 6:2).” Thus, a naturalized foreign born person who was married to a Korean national and lived in Korea more than two years is not a “marriage immigrant” any more. Yet, what general public (and even many researchers) recognize or define as a “marriage immigrant” or a “foreigner” can be very different from these legal definitions. Of course, none of the statistics note how they define a “foreigner” or a “marriage immigrant”, and the interpretation of the published data is left to the ones who use the information (Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea. Retrieved from http://www.law.go.kr/LSW/LsiJoLinkP.do?docType=&lsNm=%EC%9E%AC%ED%95%9C%EC%99%B8%EA%B5%AD%EC%9D%B8+%EC%82%94%EC%9A%B0+%EA%B8%B0%EB%B3%B8%EB%B2%95&languageType=KO&joNo=&paras=1#0000; English Translation from www.moleg.go.kr/Download.mo?flSeq=27308).
Korean pride in ethnic purity apparently caused trouble with this growing number of foreigners in the society. From the “bus racism incident” reported in New York Times (Ch'oe, 2009, November 1) to the EBS documentary on racism in Korea (see, for example: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DdusXidFkyY), reports of Korean racism started to draw more public and international attentions. From the beginning, issues relating to the growing number of immigrants were recognized as 'social problematic', so that policy response and alternatives were actively sought out (Kim, I. et al., 2006; Kim, P. C. et al., 2011). Studies on various groups of immigrants, including foreign laborers, North Korean refugees, and female marriage immigrants, were mainly centered on the empirical research on their life, family, and labor conditions in Korea (see for example: Kang, 1999; Seol, 1999; Yi, S., 2004; Seol et al., 2005; Kim, C. W. et al., 2006; Kim, H., 2007). Especially the forms and organizations of multicultural families drew attentions as the basis of immigrants' life marginalized from the national and community welfare system (Kim, P. C. et al., 2011).

Education of multicultural population became an important interest as well. From the research on the current conditions of education of multicultural children (see for example: Yi, C. et al., 2008; Workshop for Multicultural Education Sourcebook [WME Sourcebook], 2010) to the research on the support programs for educators of the multicultural families (see for example: WME Sourcebook, 2010; Kim, S. et al., 2011), many studies have been produced in recent years. Government also implemented many policies and programs for multicultural population. Center for Multicultural Education (Chungang Tamunhwa Kyoyuk Sentô) was established in 2007 in

---

18 Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS), “Current number of foreigners residing in Korea by local governments”

19 Of course, reports on the crimes by foreigners in Korea also increased as the number of foreign population increase in the society. Most portray the facts as to what is happening or provide more balanced views (see for example, http://news.kbs.co.kr/society/2012/04/23/2466259.html; http://www.fnnews.com/view?ra=Sent1201m_View&corp=fnnews&arcid=20120410010082780005091&cDateYear=2012&cDateMonth=04&cDateDay=10), but some are more provocative (see for example, MBC’s The Shocking Reality About Relationships With Foreigners).
order to carry out various research in “building the foundation for multicultural education in Korea” (Introduction to Center for Multicultural Education, retrieved on June 05, 2012 from: http://damunwha-edu.or.kr/Front/about/center.asp; WME Sourcebook, 2010, p. 2). Korean government is actively promoting the development of various multicultural education programs for both multicultural students and teachers, monitoring the various levels of local programs, and encouraging the teacher's colleges and colleges of education to set up multicultural education courses (WME Sourcebook, 2010, p. 6).

The government also seems to be concerned about improving Korean language and basic academic skills of multicultural students and supporting the student mentoring programs. The lifelong education and counseling programs for the parents of multicultural students are developed and implemented (WME Sourcebook, 2010). Education of female marriage immigrants were approached with the concern of social integration of the immigrants themselves as well as their children (see for example: Chang, Yi, & Ko, 2008; Chŏng, C., 2009; Kwŏn, M. K., 2009). Researchers pointed to many factors including language barrier, differences in communication styles, differences in family culture and support system as being obstacles for the female marriage immigrants in integrating into Korean society.

Education programs are recommended not only for the immigrants but also for their family, educators and administrators, and the whole society (Chang, Yi, and Ko, 2008; Chŏng, C. 2009; Kwŏn, M. K., 2009). The Korean government implemented multicultural education programs for the in-service teacher training courses. The government also is seeking to promote the general understanding of multiculturalism in schools and society, and endeavoring to train and supply the institutions with bilingual instructors (WME Sourcebook, 2010). Public advertisements started to

---

20 Naturally, it seems education issue of female marriage immigrants was initially approached with the assimilation or social integration of this population in mind. Soon the concern transmitted to the issue of their children being properly educated and successfully integrated into the Korean society.
preach multiculturalism, and Koreans seem to start seek to reconceptualize what Korean ethnic nation (*minjok*), or Koreanness, means. Still, scholars express concerns on Korean multiculturalism being a hollow promise, especially due to its strong tradition of “pure blood” ethnic nationalism (*sunhyŏl minjok chuŭi*) in conjunction with patriarchal social system (O et al., 2007; Seol et al., 2005; Kang, 2006: 19-20; Chŏng, C, 2009; Yang, 2011).

Scholars point out that the actual content of various support programs for multicultural population is predominantly structured to teach the immigrants Korean language and culture, aiming for assimilation rather than being a “multicultural” education programs in the first place (Chŏng, 2009: 75-89; Kim, H., 2007: 66-68; and see for examples, Chang, Yi, & Ko, 2008). In addition, concerns on the general recognitions and practices of multicultural education being education of the multicultural population are growing (see for example, Kim, H., 2007; 2009). Critics also argue that Korean multicultural policies are in fact assimilation policies and it is just a government strategy of improving the national image to name various kinds of immigrants as “multicultural” (Kim, H., 2007). Watson (2010) also makes it clear that multiculturalism in Korea is a state-led response to global neoliberalism, and critiques on the situation where Koreans “‘having to be seen’ … multicultural rather than wanting to be” (p. 341).

In general, scholars contend that Korean multiculturalism is exclusively structured in terms of its target population. For example, female marriage immigrants should be incorporated into the Korean society, while the foreign laborers do not belong to Korea (O et al., 2007; Kim, P. J. et al., 2011; Kim, N. H. 2012). Even the Korean legal system “entitles, selectively represents, and even actively constructs the mainstream way of recognition and behavior” regarding the multicultural population (Yang, 2011: 49). In short, they argue, Korean multiculturalism is “highly racialized, gendered, and patriarchal” (Lim, 2010; see also, Chŏng, C., 2009; Yang,
2011; Kim, N. H., 2012). Pointing to the interesting phenomenon of the migrants in Korea being indifferent to, or even critical of, the seemingly exploding discourse of multiculturalism in Korea (O et al., 2007; Yi, S.O., 2007), scholars explain that Korean multiculturalism is “implemented in an exclusive and demeaning way that invites resistance” (Kim, N. H., 2012, p.114) from the multicultural residents themselves. From formal citizenship accessibility to more delicately layered sense of belonging in the society, scholars point out that the design and implementation of Korean multiculturalism do not offer a space for the immigrants speak for themselves (O et al., 2007; Kim, N. H., 2012).

More fundamentally, some other scholars point to a lack of social consensus in how to perceive current multi-ethnic and multicultural situation in Korea as a problem. It is not clear whether the current multicultural situation transitional and should be resolved in some way, or multicultural and multi-ethnic coexistence is what Koreans do and should pursue in the long run (Kim, P. et al., 2011). In addition, as it was with the concept of “foreigner” in government census, it is not clear who is and is not included in the category of “multicultural population.”

Consulting the different clauses in <Multicultural Family Support Act (Tamunhwa kajok chiwŏnpŏp)>, <Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea (Chae-Han oegugin ch'ŏu kibonpŏp)>, and <Nationality Law (kukchŏkpŏp)>, Kim, P. et al. (2011) concludes that the definition excludes overseas Chinese in Korea (Hwagyo, Huaqiao), overseas Korean adoptees, and people born to a Korean mother and a foreign father, mostly American soldiers stationed in Korea or foreign laborers more recently, and their families (p. 31). In addition, scholars point out that the concept of multicultural family in <Multicultural Family Support Act (Tamunhwa kajok chiwŏnpŏp)> assumes only the conjugal families as the recipients and does not include the various forms of families such as single-parent, adopted, and transnational families (Kim, P., et
A member of a nation can be defined either as an entity of political citizen or of cultural and ethnic community, depending on the specific historical experiences and context of the society. Whichever category is prioritized in a given society, the form of a nation state divides its members and the non-members (foreigners), and grants specific qualifications for its members. In other words, modern nation states are “membership states” (Brubaker, 1992, pp. 21-31), and the members themselves are generally required to have a specifically formulated identity that corresponds with the boundary of their national membership. However, the current demands of the globalized market ruptures the alignment of the individual identities with the national boundaries. The number of residents that does not share the culture and bloodline or historical and political experiences of the given society are growing in the contemporary societies. The existence of these immigrants in host society, i.e., Korea, brings out the issues of social conflict and discrimination more sharply, and ruptures the concept of what constitutes Koreanness (Kim, P. et al., 2011).

The changes or fissures in the concept of national identity bring about the confusion in the individual and community identities. The collective memories and historical experiences as a member of a state can no longer be presumed as a shared identity in the society. Especially the generally shared notion of Korean mono-ethnic nation came to the point where mono-ethnicity has to be totally given up or at least the concept of ethnic nation (minjok) should be reconceptualized (Kim, P. et al., 2011). As many scholars demonstrated, multicultural policies in Korea are varied according to each target group of immigrants or minorities in the society (Wŏn: 2008; Lim, 2010; Yang, 2011; Kim, N. H. 2012). Moreover, a recent study indicates majority of (ethnic) Koreans do not have much direct interaction with the foreign-born or “multicultural”
population, and even less interact with foreigners on daily basis (Kim, P. et al., 2009, pp. 55-57), while the whole society seems to be swept into the fervor of multiculturalism.

Scholars critique multiculturalism in Korean society is still being left a hollow promise, while the prominence of the terms raise questions of what Koreanness should be like. The recent explosion of the discourse on ethnic nation (minjok) and ethnic identity (minjok chongch'ësông) among the scholars of Korean nationalism can be a form of resistance against the social demand for revising the idea of mono-ethnic nation (tanil minjok). The fact that these public discussions on how to conceptualize Korean mono-ethnicity was concentrated after mid-1990s happens in tandem with the growing foreign population in Korea and the societal needs originating from it. In other words, the very assertion that Koreans need to reconceptualize what a Korean ethnic nation (minjok) means is a reflection of the current needs of the Korean society, however accurately the demand was estimated. On the other hand, the heightened interest in Korean identity partly indicates the resistance of the conservative concept of mono-ethnic unity clashing with the demand for reconceptualizing Korean identity.

The existing research on the “Koreanness” and “otherness” understood in Korean society mainly bring two different perspectives to light. One is the outsider’s experiences and perspectives in adjusting to or understanding Korean society and people. Whether they use empirical data or assume general principles, researchers are keen to provide critiques of the mono-ethnic pride of Koreans through the outsider's approach. The other view is that of the insider's perspectives on constructing themselves as a collective modern entity and how Korea exercised state power over its people in building the modern nation. Nation building inevitably includes the formation of a collective, national identity. Korean pride in mono-ethnic purity intertwines with the historical course of nation building through Western imperialism, various
wars, and colonial experiences. As a whole, previous research is effective in explaining the structural part of Korean society in the following ways: 1) how the Korean state and intellectuals construct and represent what Korea should be like or should be viewed as, both to its people and to the outside world, and 2) how these state constructions are, through its own institutions, imposed on both the “foreign” and on Korean population within its territory.

The shortcomings of the existing research are apparent: they are not contributing much to the discussions on what is happening to the individuals living in a society with a longstanding notion of mono-ethnic pride that faces a transition into a multicultural and multi-ethnic society. Even the handful of research on how Korean general public perceive and react to the current multicultural and multi-ethnic conditions of the society (see for example, Hwang et al., 2007; Hwang, 2010; Kim, P. et al., 2011) are based on the standardized surveys. They are very valuable data and do have the strengths of quantitative research, especially in indicating where general tendency of the society points to. However, marking “Korean means someone who maintains a legal Korean citizenship” on the survey sheet does not mean this person will actually treat a naturalized citizen with the same attitude he treats other ethnic Koreans. As it will become more apparent with the interview data that I will provide in later chapters, individuals firmly state that legal Korean citizenship is the only thing you need in becoming Korean can still argue a Korean citizen who has a parent born and raised in a foreign country may not be as adequate as his own son to be, say, a military officer of Korea.

It is partly true that the images of Korea and Koreanness presented by the government or public institutions are generated from the Korean individuals themselves. The lack of academic research on the micro-level interactions between the individuals and public representations of

---

21 For example, these studies are very useful in showing the general tendency of Korean public in their feelings of distance or tolerance with different racial/ethnic groups of people, according to their education level, age, or gender.
Korean ethnic national identity imply this partial truth. Yet, accepting the “public” representation of Koreanness as mere reflections of the comprehensive individual opinions only reconfirms the essentializing forces of the imposition of certain hegemony, be it a collective national identity or an imaginary self. I argue that the micro-politics between the individuals and public images are much more complex than the unilateral imposition – reception/internalization model. Individuals constantly struggle to grasp the meanings of the things that are projected through public discourse such as schools, textbooks, and social media. They construct and conduct themselves in continual interactions and negotiations with the public images of Koreanness and “otherness.”

This research aims to tease out some of the complexities involved in the variegated ways that individual actors actively and strategically negotiate their “Koreanness” between the spectrum of the myth and the idealism of Korean identities in their everyday conduct – in all of its conflicted ways.

**Identity Construction and Discourse: Post-structuralism, Power/Knowledge, and Governmentality**

*Methodology of the research.* Identity constructions among young Korean individuals have evolved rapidly in the context of the socio-historical changes that came about from the inception of Western imperialism to neoliberal globalization today. The concept of “Koreanness” in the public discourse has changed from that of a culturally homogeneous, single-ethnic group during the period of early nation-building to that of a more diversified and dynamic framework in recent years. The process of identity construction, in defining what it means to be a Korean, involves both formal and informal educational structures typically influenced by how society projects explicit and tacit meanings of what the prototypical Korean subject ought to be. In exploring this process of identity constructions of young Korean individuals, I intend to examine the interview
data with individuals in relation to their experiences of popular texts such as school textbooks and public advertisements. The main purpose of this research is to inquire how different representations of Koreanness in public discourse are understood and re-articulated in the everyday-level talks and practices of Korean individuals.

In the field of educational research, critical ethnography (e.g., Madison, 2005) and case study (e.g. Stake, 1995) share similar methods as this research of interview, document analysis, and observation to collect and analyze data, despite each is grounded on its own philosophical assumptions and interests. Whereas critical ethnography is strongly influenced by neo-Marxism, which is concerned of political emancipation and ethnic reflexivity (Madison, 2005), case study is grounded on the constructivist philosophical tradition (Stake, 1995, pp. 99-102). Both approaches are based on the tradition of ethnographic studies.

I borrow Norman Fairclough’s working definition of discourse at a practical working level of analyzing the interview data with individuals in relation to their experiences of popular texts such as school textbooks and public advertisements. As a sociolinguist, Fairclough’s works are partially influenced by Foucault’s philosophical bases of discourse. Fairclough (2003) considers discourse as “a particular way of representing some part of the (physical, social, psychological) world” (p. 17). Discourses are related to the “different relations people have to the world, which in turn depends on their positions in the world, their social and personal identities, and the social relationship in which they stand to other people” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 124). Thus, it is inherently reflective of the relations different groups of people have to the world and to each other (Fairclough, 2003, p.124).

Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis brings micro-level linguistic and textual analysis together with a macro-level analysis of social conditions and structure (van Dijk, pp. 353-354). He identifies the ways in which individuals move through institutionalized discourses such as
democratization and commodification, constructing selves, different social categories and realities (Fairclough, 1992). The locus of critical discourse analysis is the dynamic relations between the language, text, discourse and the sociocultural events as well as the larger social structure. Although critical discourse analysis is “primarily positioned in a linguistic milieu” (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000, p. 452), it is a methodology committed to analyzing social problems and power relations mediated by discourse (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, pp. 271-80). In other words, discourses are not mere “language”, but the language constructing meanings and interacting with the human realities. And meanings come from practices and interactions, and not just from the language itself.

Despite his own claim of being epistemologically “realist” (Fairclough, 2003, p.14), his methodology of critical discourse analysis is clearly influenced by Foucault’s argument that political and sociocultural practices formulate particular discourse, and vice versa. As such, it is closely aligned with Foucault’s conceptualization of power/knowledge (Foucault, 1970/1994; 1975/1995). 22 Grounding on Foucault’s and Fairclough’s formulations of discourse and power/knowledge, the main concern of this research is analysis of discourse on Korean identities which is fluid and productive power that governs everyday life of Korean individuals. Through these analyses, this research inquires 1) how Korean individuals are subjected to 2) what kind of discourses on Koreanness, while 3) strategically negotiating and creating the discourses on what they are and what they ought to be.

Even though ethnographic methods and discourse analysis can be conveniently positioned

22 I recognize the limitations of applying Foucault’s theory, which developed out of the twentieth century context in which authoritarian governments exerting state power over their subjects, to a dynamic, liberal, and diversified context of the twenty-first century Korean society. However, there are some factors conditioning the context of discursive constructions of national identity in contemporary Korea that makes Foucault relevant. One is the long history of the government’s exclusive power over textbook writing, which continues its legacy into the contemporary society. Another reason is that the current context of discursive shift in national identity came as a state-led movement in Korean society.
under the general ambit of qualitative research, epistemological grounds of two different fields are vastly apart from each other. Ethnography, traditionally based on the philosophy of interpretivism and realist representation of the world (Marcus, 1986, pp. 190-191), celebrates the “transparency of representation and immediacy of experience” (Clifford, 1986, p. 2). In contrast, poststructuralist discourse analysis recognizes that the representation and textualization of “the other” as heavily value-laden activity. It departs from ethnography by highlighting the “constructed, artificial nature of cultural accounts” (Clifford, 1986, p. 2).

Mindful of the debates and potential issues, this research chose to juxtapose ethnographic methods and discourse analysis for the study of identity constructions of Korean individuals under the shifting discourses of Koreanness. For one, each methodology has its own strengths and weaknesses, but recognition of weaknesses of particular perspective does not need to undermine its strengths and potential contributions. Second, as Foucault (1980) effectively argued, the dominance of one particular system of thoughts renders the inscription of knowledges “in the hierarchical order of power associated with science” (p. 85). Critical discourse analysis is employed as an attempt to deconstruct the seemingly unilateral shift in the representations of Koreanness in contemporary Korea. The multicultural discourses are, in many cases, indiscriminately related to the discourses of Korean advancement in the global economy and the world politics. The necessity of the discourse analysis also lies in dismantling the linear and progressive historicity of the discourses on Korean identities: from mono-ethnic unity to multicultural diversity. Third, the two methods are, moreover, not juxtaposed in irreconcilable adversary, and different methods can complement each other. The interviews with Korean individuals will also provide more robust portrait of the micro-politics of discourses and identity constructions generally overshadowed by the official discourses on Koreanness.

*Identities “in” formation and power/knowledge.* As noted earlier, contemporary young
people are described as well travelled and mobile, and well-immersed in using information and communication technologies. Apadurai (2003) thus argues that the “mobile and unforeseeable relationship between mass-mediated events and migratory audiences defines the core of the link between globalization and the modern” (p.4). Grounded on their mobility and flexibility intertwined with the active consumption of technology-mediated images and information, identity for contemporary young people is something of a choice and creation (Yerbury, 2010, p. 26). Not only identities cannot be a complete or unified set of personal characteristics (Hall, 1995, p. 598; 1996), but they are “formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us” (Hall, 1987 cited in Hall, 1996, p. 598).

As such, an individual “assumes different identities at different times” (Hall, 1995, p. 598), thus identities become “strategic and positional” (Hall, 1996, p. 3). As Giddens (1991) notes, “[a]ll human beings continuously monitor the circumstances of their activities as a feature of doing what they do, and such monitoring always has discursive features (p. 35).” In other words, when asked, people are normally able to produce some linguistic form of explanations or interpretations on what they do and why they do so (Giddens, 1991, p. 35).23 Since “language is a social, not individual, system,” the discursive representation of one’s conducts and the reasons thereof can only be possible “within the rules of language and the systems of meaning of [the given] culture” (Hall, 1995, p. 608). So that Hall (1996) argues:

… identities are about questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being: not ‘who we are’ or ‘where we came from’, so much as what we might become, how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves. Identities

---

23 Giddens (1991), of course, recognizes that human actions and their conditions cannot always be consciously accounted for within the language system and are “not confined to discursive consciousness” (p.35). He explains this level of consciousness that enables to carry on the everyday activities are “‘non-conscious’, rather than unconscious” (Giddens, 1991, p. 36).
are therefore constituted within, not outside representation (p. 4).

In this sense, identities are in constant dialectic interactions with the history, language, culture, and different sets of meanings they impose on the validity of membership in a given society. As such, individual identities become subjugated to the discourses on what it means to be Korean in terms of their historical, linguistic, socio-cultural, economic, political, and ethnic backgrounds. And the discourse defining which set of meanings constitute Koreanness are closely intertwined with the “manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body” (Foucault, 1980, p. 93).

Whereas modern thoughts perceive knowledge as emancipatory, Foucault argues that every progress of knowledge inevitably involves the operations of power (Kang, 1997, p. 59). Pure and innocent knowledge that is independent from the power, a safe space enabling one to depart for freedom, is a myth (Kang, 1997, p. 59). Instead, one can only negotiating what is meaningful at the moment within the relations of power/knowledge. In these negotiations, discourse works as the medium through which power relations produce speaking subjects (Foucault, 1990, p. 11). Since a discourse not only is “always implicated in power; discourse is one of the “systems” through which power circulates” (Hall, 1995, p. 204, italics in original), it “produces knowledge that shapes perceptions and practice” (p. 225).

Discourse is not a closed system in a sense that it “draws on the elements in other discourses, binding them into its own network of meanings” (Hall, 1995, p. 202). In so doing, discourse limits other ways and possibilities of constructing the meanings, in this case, identities. This is how language and discourse shapes and structures the ways individuals understand and interpret the world, as well as their relations to the world. In this sense, discourse is about how knowledge or understanding of the world is produced through language (Hall, 1995, p. 201), and
in this process resides the power that gives legitimacy to a certain way of describing the world but not in some other ways. One of the social functions of discourses is to “close off alternative ways of speaking and thinking, often in ways that reflect the distribution of power in society” (Thompson, 1995, p. 409). Thus, “[t]hose who produce the discourse also have the power to make it true” (Hall, 1995, p. 205).

This “potent combination of knowledge and power” in the modern world is what Foucault calls “disciplinary power.” It “seeks invisibility and the objects of power – those on whom it operates – are made the most visible. … It is through this reversal of visibility that power now operates” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p.159). Thus, the knowledge/power of the modern world is most localized on the individual bodies (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983, p. 113), or produce human beings as docile and productive bodies (p. 135). The disciplinary power is “concerned with the regulation, surveillance, and government of, first, the human species or whole populations, and secondly, the individual and the body” (Hall, 1995, p. 609). So the government observes its people: individuals become both the subject and the object of knowledge, and the government imposes “precise norms … [such as] national standards for educational programs, for medical practice, for industrial processes and products” (Gutting, 2003). By these norms of the society, individuals are regulated, or, rather, regulate themselves. In other words, the knowledge/power operates as internalized practices of normalizing the individual behaviors, general attitudes, beliefs, and discourses in our everyday life.

*Governmentality and Power/Knowledge.* Precisely because discourse is inscribed with power/knowledge and identities are in constant dialectic interactions with discourses based on knowledge/power, it is imperative to understand the mechanism of power/knowledge to understand how individual identities are strategically constructed within the power relations.
Following Foucault, “governmentality” refers to the arrangement of knowledges and tactics to practically and systematically guide and regulate the everyday conduct (Foucault, 1978/2000; 1979/2000). For Foucault (1991), “[g]overnment is defined as a right manner of disposing things so as to lead not to the form of the common good, … but to an end which is ‘convenient’ for each of the things that are to be governed” (p. 95). This “art of government”, or the development of power techniques to govern “are oriented toward individuals and intended to rule them in a continuous and permanent way” (Foucault, 1979/2000, p. 300).

In this regard, a person who defines oneself as Korean will construct him-/herself in the ways that conforms to one’s “knowledge/power” of what makes oneself a Korean. This “knowledge/power of Koreanness”, however, is a socially and systematically “constructed truth”, projected largely by the state authority in this case, controls individual bodies and conducts. There still is plenty of room for an individual to negotiate his or her conduct as Korean, where the tension of the state centralization and dispersion exists (Peters & Burbules, 2004, p. 65) simultaneously. In this sense, governmentality explains how power operates through “the dynamics between social and political systems of control and practice of self-control” (Peters & Burbules, 2004, p. 65). It does not necessarily involve physical coercion or violence, but a specific rationality of shaping or “guiding”, and internalization of this rationality in one's conduct of the self (Foucault, 2000a, p. 324).

For Foucault (1980), power is not centered at one place or source, and it does not always runs from top to bottom. Rather, power “circulates, or … only functions in the form of a chain” (Foucault, 1980: 98). Power is everywhere and it is “deployed and exercised through a net-like organization” (Foucault, 1980, p. 98). Thus, “[p]ower relations are rooted in the whole network of the social” (Foucault, 2000b, p. 345) and “permeate all levels of social existence and are
therefore to be found operating at every site of social life” (Hall, 1997, p. 50). These relations of power, Foucault (1980) argues:

cannot … be established, consolidated, nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth (Foucault, 1980, p. 93).

Thus the necessity to analyze the socially projected “truth claims”, or discourses, on Koreanness in order to understand the operations of power/knowledge in governing every level of social life. Understanding the multi-layered messages in official and popular texts is one. School textbooks, especially history and civics textbooks, deliver official discourses, that define the legitimate boundaries of and terms of membership in the society (Hein & Seldon, 2000, p. 3). The discourses on what it means, or ought to mean, to be Korean in K-12 level school textbooks are presented with an extraordinary authority of the state, especially when Korean textbooks were exclusively written and published by the government branches.24 As part of the governmentality that “are oriented toward individuals and intended to rule them in a continuous and permanent way” (Foucault, 1979/2000, p. 300), the narratives of Koreanness presented in the government designated school textbooks most prominently pull the individuals into the power relations with the state as well as other members of the society.

Public and corporate advertisements, popular drama shows, and media reports all have the similar effects. Stuart Hall (1982) argues that mass media are one of the principal sites that produce images of the world around particular meaning. Contemporary public are very much

---

24 As it was previously explained in the earlier chapter, textbooks are no longer exclusively written by the government. From early-1990s, Korean government slowly passed out their authority to write the primary and secondary school textbooks to private corporations. However, Korean Language, Ethics, and Korean History are the subjects that the government kept their authorship for another decade. Therefore, the imprints of government discourse are still heavy in these subject areas, and the representations in these textbooks can be read as the basic discourse of the Korean government that were meant to be inscribed in all Korean citizens through schooling.
immersed in the mass mediated images that are multi-semiotic representations of the world. As Barthes explains (1977), an image is more immediately grasped by the audience than the semiotic representations that need to be “decoded” through one's cognitive process. The systems of thought on what it ought to mean to be Korean are strategically weaved into the media representations, such as commercial as well as public advertisements, drama shows, films, and posters. The discourses and knowledge/power on Koreanness dispersed through these multi-semiotic texts are often presented with more subtlety and complexity than are found in outright statements of Korean mono-ethnic pride in the textbooks or multicultural advocacy in the policy report. Still, these subtler discourses are “grasped immediately by an inner metalanguage” as the image, which is immersed for its very social existence in connoting reality (Barthes, 1977, pp. 28-29).

Korean government wrote the textbooks or sponsored certain public advertisements that may deploy official discourses on Koreanness to the public. These “legitimate” representations are not coerced, but they are dispersed through education system or through public broadcasting or poster advertisements. They may be seen as state imposition of certain values on individual actors, but it is still left to the individuals on how much of the representations or knowledge they would absolve and internalize. Of course, the authority and power of the state produced discourses are not the same as individual wills, comprehensions, choices, and constructions on what it means to be Korean. However, different ways in which individuals respond to a specific discourse has power to alter the very discourse, for we are all within a network of power relations either with ourselves or with others. In Foucault’s words, the “individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle” (1980, p. 98). Thus, power is “productive because it is not simply repressive: it also creates new knowledge (which may also liberate)” (Peters &
The Relevance of Foucault’s Theory to This Research

The drastic shift in the public discourse of “Koreanness” accompanying the rise of neoliberalism in Korean society is no accident. Korean government established laws regarding the industrial trainee program in November 1991, to resolve the labor shortage in small- to mid-sized industries. The “globalization and internationalization” slogan that rose with the presidential campaign of 1992, seems no other than to prepare the Korean public for the ever-increasing international competitions under the emerging WTO regime at the time.\(^\text{25}\)

Emphasizing the principles of excellence, efficiency, and effectiveness, Kim Young Sam government pursued two major human resource policies in order to facilitate Korea's successful incorporation into the global political economy. One was to transform its declining population into the more economically profitable human resource in science and technology. Emphasis in the quality of higher education accompanied with the large-scale higher education accreditation system in mid-1990s was a way of setting up a system of raising more economically profitable population (Yi, K. S., 2007). At the same time, Korean government started to fill up the lower level labor market with the foreign recruited industrial trainees. In the other corner of the society, pronatalism and importing the brides from other Asian societies have been in practice in order to make up for the declining Korean fertility rate (O et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2011).

\(^\text{25}\) WTO regime meant the beginning of full-fledged free trade era which subjects all possible industries including service sectors even to education under international trading. The demand for the policies dealing with the increasing pressures for opening the markets and the system of infinite competition were natural in this period.

Kim Young Sam government chose the ‘active’ liberalization strategy as a countermeasure for the launching of WTO regime. Ministry of Education stated that the education service part will “gradually and selectively open higher and adult education markets according to the following talks of Uruguay Round.” In preparation of the liberalization of education market, the Minstry of Education planned to “reform the education system, construct the competitive system, and seek to utilize the cutting edge foreign education services in Korea”

Following the active liberalization strategy, Kim Young-Sam government agreed on opening up the private education market from 1995 and higher education market from 1996 at the 1993 Korea-US Investment Environment Improvement Committee, which was even before the launching of the WTO regime. (Yi, K. S., 2007)
Demographic policies as simple as birth control (in 1960s to early 1980s), pronatalism (in 1990s to present), or the human resource policies (since mid-1990s) are the very models of how the modern technologies of power and governmentality operates on the bodies of the given subjects: the “invisible” government observing and caring for the people as it foresees and plans for the economic and political developments in the society as shown in case of contemporary Korea. And these operations of power do not only stop within the national territory any longer, but, as is evident in Korean case, it extends to the regional and global community in meeting their societal needs and desires. Korea imports Southeast Asian brides for the unmarried Korean men, recruits laborers from less developed countries for their low-paid unskilled labor market and service industry where the labor shortage is apparent, invites native English speakers as instructors for their public schools in order to raise globally competitive next generation of fluent English speakers, only to name a few. Except for the female marriage immigrants, majority of the foreign recruits are assumed to be part time residents who cannot bring in their families. Through the modern state operations such as recruiting specifically targeted groups of population from overseas, issuing different types of visas, census collection, border control, media communications, and the immigration and police operations, Korea is exercising its full governing rights on these individuals with what Aihwa Ong (1999; 2006) calls the “graduated sovereignty.” These forms of governing power operates on the individual subjects not only within the national territory, but extends beyond its national boundaries.

Of course, this process is not enforced unilaterally by the Korean government on the bodies of different groups of people. As Lemke notes, “[f]rom the perspective of governmentality, government refers to a continuum, which extends from political government right through to forms of self-regulation” (2001, p. 201). There are many individuals who voluntarily participated
in the process: Southeast Asian brides who wanted to marry Korean men for better dowry; the Korean farmers who wanted to raise families and take care of their old parents on their farms, but could not find their brides in Korea; Korean factory owners and managers who wanted to maintain their business by hiring foreign laborers when they could not find Korean workers willing to take the jobs; young Korean women who wanted their freedom in life with higher degrees and work rather than marrying a Korean farmer or factory worker; North Korean refugees who ran from the famine and dictatorship; the young Korean parents who could not afford to send their children to English-speaking countries but still wanted to provide a better life chances by teaching them English as spoken by a native English speaker; the young white native English speakers who could not afford to explore different countries on their own but found their opportunities in teaching their own languages; young men from Southeast Asian countries who dreamed to work and make more money in Korea to provide for their families in their home countries; some young men and women who just found the other half of themselves from a foreign land; and the list can go on.

All the individuals listed above are only a part of the participants who brought the recent changes in Korean society. These individuals are intertwined in the relations of power in what is going on in Korean society. In the end, they all contribute to the operations of power that engender the shift in the concept of Koreanness, as much as, for example, some Korean

---

26 The question why and how it is important to be fluent in English in Korean society remains, but I will leave them to other researchers since the questions are out of the scope of this research.

27 Both EPIK (English Program in Korea) and TaLK (Teach and Learn in Korea) require the applicant “be a citizen of one of the following countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, U.K, U.S.A.” (http://www.talk.go.kr/talk/talk_new/intro.jsp). This government webpage does not state anything about the applicant’s ethnicity, race, or phenotype for becoming an English teacher in Korea. However, Korean school teachers readily state that their school “absolutely would not want an English teacher who has different accent”, meaning that “parents want their children to learn standard English of white middle class of America or of Canada.” On a side note, my interviewees noted the changing policy of “recruiting English teachers from the countries that use English as their official language.” This policy was seen to bring in more diverse population of English speakers, such as teachers from India and Philippines, but many who had children of school age or who worked as public school teachers expressed concerns that this policy might not work in Korean context.
individuals who are active in human rights movement fighting for the equal rights of the foreign laborers, marriage immigrants, or other minorities in the society. The prominence of the discourse of “multicultural Korea” nowadays is also partly a self-reflection and self-regulation that is called for with the growing social recognition on the needs of “multicultural population.” This is as much embedded in individual as in the government-driven discourse these days. The diverse participants with various needs, interests, desires, and motives create the complex web of power that leads the current shift in the discourse of what it means to be a Korean. In this sense, the “micro-physics of power” (Foucault, 1995, p. 26) is not an abstract concept, but is closely connected and embedded in the everyday conducts, needs, and desires of the individuals.

The recent emphasis on multiculturalism, multicultural policies, or the representations of Koreanness can be understood better in this perspective. Individuals gain motives and needs from one’s life experiences. At the same time, the same individuals project one’s motives and needs into the society with one’s conducts. Combined with the national interests that drive the general neoliberalization of the Korean society sketched out in the earlier chapters, these individual projections of needs and desires create a powerful web of actualities. Currently, it is deemed as important to satisfy the needs of multicultural population growing in Korean society. Or, as an elementary school principal I met on one of my research trips argued, it is important to find a way to integrate growing multicultural population as Korean, so that their human resources can be turned into a positive contribution for the national interest. The discourse of multicultural and multi-ethnic harmony seems to gain more importance at this point, as the discourse of mono-ethnic unity and homogeneity was promoted through a certain period in Korean history. The shift in public discourses on Koreanness should not be taken lightly as an idea in quick fashion or the governmental propaganda to keep up with the international
environment which does not have a substantial social ground.

It is the coordinated process of certain social demands created by significant number of individual needs and desires and the corresponding (many times invisible) screening, caring and social “maintenance” – including the decisions regarding who gets to be acknowledged as a full member of the Korean society. Of course, this discourse of multicultural coexistence seems very self-centered sometimes, as in the argument of a principal I introduced above. As all other discourses in the world, it has a variegated ways of manifestation in various contexts. If this discourse of multiculturalism in Korea is hollow, I argue, there should be more research on as to why and how it becomes a hollow promise and how this is received by Koreans themselves. In order to engender more meaningful changes in the society, I believe it should start with knowing better about how Koreans understand themselves and the current social changes around them, and how they construct their own beings in relation to the people and society around themselves.
Chapter III Contemporary Korea and the Context of Research: Contemporary Social Context and the Discourses of Korean Identity

Introduction

Korea has more than four thousand years of “recorded” history. The earlier part of Korean history until the pre-modern period is outside the scope of this research, considering the study being on rapidly changing discourses of Korean identity in contemporary South Korea: this is a study on how Korean individuals rearticulate their identities between the shifting public discourses on Koreanness against the backdrop of neoliberal reconstruction of the society and the world. First part of this chapter will provide a rough outline of the modern Korean history that left lasting impacts on the contemporary Korean society. Also, this earlier part of historical experiences served to construct, at least partially, the current representations of Korean identities.

The concept of nationalism and national identity is closely intertwined with modernity (Gellner, 2008; Hobsbawm, 1990; Kang, S., 2004), and the ethnic nationalism has a deep historical root in Korea (Shin, 2006). Thus, a rough modern Korean history in the first part of this chapter is intended to provide a larger context of the impacts that lasted on now-reconstructing Korean identities.

Shin (2006) elaborated on the course of Korean ethnic nationalism developing, contesting with different ideas, and manifesting itself into the contemporary Korean society throughout its modern history. Kŭm, Mun, and Chŏn (2010) explored how these different modern ideas that

---

28 There is an ongoing controversy regarding how far back Korean history goes. I rely on the official textbook description for the periodization. History textbooks write that, although in a doubtful fashion, the first Korean nation was established around B.C. 2333 by Tan’gun, portrayed as the grandson of the Heaven who became the Father of Korean people (NIKH, 1996, p. 24; Chŏn’guk Yŏksa Kyosa Moim [CYKM], 2002, pp. 38-39). Later alternative text by CYKM (2002) clearly states that B.C. 2333 periodization is problematic and not accurate, but most government-designated textbooks are more discrete on this point. It is very natural to conclude that the first Korean nation was founded in B.C. 2333 with no explicit prompt on the issue of this periodization in official school textbooks, especially when the existing historical record containing this information is documented in the same text. As a side note, some Korean institutions such as big daily newspaper companies still mark both the Common Era and Tan’gi (the year of Tan’gun origin) years in parallel, according to this symbolic founding year of B.C. 2333.
competed with nationalism were adopted into current Korean ethnic nationalism. This historical process lends Korean ethnic nationalism and mono-ethnic pride a stronghold in the Korean society. It is challenged, however, by the societal needs in a rapidly changing global environment in recent years. Strong mono-ethnic pride of Koreans is viewed as a source of “Korean racism” (CERD, 2007; Choe, 2009, November 1; Kim, P. et al., 2011), and the speed Korean society changing its gear toward multiculturalism is almost impressive. In order to understand this flexibility as much as to understand the construction of Korean ethnocentric identity, it is worthwhile to glance over the modern history of Korea. First section of this chapter will roughly review the modern Korean history that resulted in cherishing its homogeneous ethnocentric identity.

Later parts of the chapter will focus on the developments of recent two decades in and around Korean society that are more directly intertwined with the general rearticulation of Koreanness. Korea has experienced an especially tumultuous and “fractured” history in last century (Cumings, 2005, p. 11), but changes in recent thirty years are particularly worthy of close attention. Since 1987, Korea achieved peaceful political democracy out of thirty-year military dictatorship, and became economically established enough to join OECD and G-20. Also, Korea is quickly turning into a low fertility aging society, and recently turned into an immigrant receiving country from formerly a sending country. The government strategically exported their citizens in order to “serve the interests of the Korean economy, primarily through direct payments and remittances” (Lim, 2010, p. 54) in 1960s-70s, but now is importing foreign workers and brides. Its industry has completely restructured to center on the service sector from previously agricultural to manufacturing centered one. This larger, latter part of the chapter will elaborate on the more recent and detailed context that encouraged the upsurge of
multiculturalism in the society.

A Shorthand Modern History of Korea

The modern history of Korea has shifted to the extreme ever since the government decided to refuse the “foreign,” which, in the eighteenth- and the nineteenth-century, meant the West. A small group of progressive scholars was already well-versed in the western thoughts and practical science in their pursuit of overcoming the growing social disparities under the decaying despotism. Even so, Chosŏn in eighteenth- to nineteenth century adhered to its closed-door policy and became (unduly) known as a “hermit kingdom”\(^\text{29}\) to the West (Cumings, 2005, p. 138; Eckert et al., 1990, p. 194; Pratt, 2006, pp. 153-176). With the continuing policy of seclusion, the rejection of Western culture and thoughts later associated with the resistance against Western and Japanese imperialism. General understanding of resistance against the “foreign” at the time surviving in current Korean collective memory was aptly summarized by a young instructor at a high school: “The robbers who took away their fatherland came with strange new ideas and customs, talking about trade and mutual exchange while pointing guns and cannons at them.”\(^\text{30}\)

The growing sense of crisis in losing the national sovereignty to a foreign power internally

\(^{29}\) William Elliot Griffis is probably most well-known and the earliest user of the term in his 1882 book, *Corea: The Hermit Nation*. Chosŏn being diplomatically closed to the West does not mean, however, that Chosŏn intellectuals were ignorant of the West and their thoughts and technology (Cumings, 2005, p. 82; Kim, 2002, pp. 242-245; KNHCC, 1992b, p. 46), or less that it did not have diplomacy (Cumings, 2005, p. 138). Rather, they did not seem to care for direct contact with the West as much as the West sought with the Eastern nations for their own interest, since their needs of intellectual stimulations was readily available in the Chinese court (Kim, 2002, p. 250-251).

\(^{30}\) This was a “standard” procedure of the imperialism all over the world at the time and what Koreans went through was not an exceptionally brutal case. However, Cumings (2005) provides an insight to this Korean sentiment of regretting the foreign influences that collapsed the society into the colonial experience (132-138). Pointing to many Westerners’ records from the turn of the century, Cumings argues that some observant Westerners understood that the early modernization in Korea was already well on its way. He also explains that the governing system of Chosŏn dynasty was “a sophisticated political system, adaptable enough and persistent enough to give unified rule to Korea for half a millennium (137)”, and questions if “the modern system has been better for Korea than the ancient and venerable East Asian system (138).”

As for the comment from the high school instructor, I asked how she understood the contradicting representations of the west before and after the twentieth century in Korean history books. She commented the Japanese after the Meiji Restoration were quite alike the whites from the West at first, so no distinctions were needed. However, she added, that the western powers only came to be recognized as “friends” by not becoming the official colonizer in Korea.
encouraged Korean ethnic nationalism. The resistance against the “foreign” and the internal unity of people became validated as both a political strategy and a strong nominal cause of the protection of the national sovereignty of Chosŏn at the time. In this sense, Korean ethnic nationalism developed as mainly defensive and resistance ethnocentrism against the foreign invasions (Chŏn, 2010, p. 145). The colonial experience under Japan nevertheless separated this general resistance against the foreign into different sectors. People under the communist influences refused the Western and the Japanese imperialism altogether, perceiving them as “oppressors” as much as the pro-Japanese Korean aristocrats of the time. Others under the influence of American missionaries naturally separated out the foreigners from the West as the carriers of the civilization and progress, in which Koreans can overcome the colonial sufferings brought upon them by the Japanese and the despotic Korean rulers of the time.31

The Soviet Union and the United States occupied the north and the south of the 38th parallel respectively at the end of the World War II, and Koreans were put under the frontline of ideological war ever since. Korean War (1950-53) ended with an armistice treaty instead of a peace treaty which symbolizes the end of a war. The latent threat it poses on the society has been both explicitly and implicitly influencing the South Korean life from individual psyche to socio-political environment. Both Korean governments also actively played on this fundamental insecurity of the society for the effective control and mobilization of the population (Eckert et al.,

31 This is a very rough and generalized description, only to serve an understanding of the process of Westerners largely viewed as “threat” at the end of the nineteenth century becoming the friends and benefactors to Koreans within less than half a century. American Protestant missionaries were instrumental in this process, bringing the modern education and medical practice into Korea since late-1800s. Protestant church was a major institution of education in Korea at one point (Eckert et al., 1990, pp. 249, 262-263), and resulted in a wide-spread notion that Americans were progressive, modern, rich, and beneficial to the country (KNHCC, 1992b, pp. 119-122; Tudor, 2012, pp. 56-59). Also, it is partly because more of the militant and communist-influenced nationalists went into exile due to the harsh repression of Japanese during the colonial period. Many fled to southeast Manchuria and Russia, and carried on the resistance movements more actively outside the border (Eckert et al., 1990, pp. 273-274). Thus, many Koreans who stayed within the border were left with the small sanctuaries from the missionary schools that “encouraged intellectual freedom and … provided cover for political activity” (Eckert et al., 1990, p. 262).
1990, p. 367; Jager, 2003; Moon, 2005). Post-war nation building process in South Korea was mostly carried on by the military dictatorships that remained until the late-1980s, with both North and South government competing for their legitimacy. In any case, the legacy of Korean ethnic nationalism and the emphasis on cultural homogeneity continued into the contemporary Korean society (Shin, 2006) as much as its openness to fresh and foreign thoughts and cultures for the progress of Korea.

From this earlier part of historical experiences of Koreans, there are a few points that are characteristic to the society and its people. These factors may be implicit yet underlie the current social context and/or the Korean consciousness. First, Korean people have been ethnically mixed with different groups of immigrants into the peninsula, but maintained a relative demographic and cultural homogeneity. I fully recognize that scholars have proved in many different ways that Korean ethnicity was created by various mixtures of different ethnic groups since ancient times (Cho, 1999; Sin, 2001). I also believe that this supposed homogeneity of ethnic and cultural Koreanness is more symbolic than having empirical substance. However, these ethnic mixtures happened over millennia and Korea happened to be eventually located in a peninsula where the borders were naturally closed by the ocean for a long period of time. Above factors provide some level of perceivable homogeneity in its people and culture, preceding the modern concept of the nation and ethnic nationalism germinated in Korean society (Shin, 2006).

Second, Korea is the last remaining country on earth that is divided by ideology. Korean War has ended with an armistice treaty, instead of a peace treaty that signals the termination of the war. However minimal the threat of war is reduced and concealed under the economic glitz and time, the war has never ended to date, as the mere existence of the most heavily militarized
Dimilitarized Zone (DMZ) in the world protests right across the peninsula.32

Third, South Korea has been, and still is, a rare case of rapid industrialization and relatively peaceful political democratization at the same time, departing from its colonial experience and the devastation of the war (Im, 2011, p. 223; Tudor, 2012, p. 10-11, 78-90). This does not, by any means, mean that Korea has completely overcome its legacy from its earlier history. Such compressed development does not always allow enough time and space for the substantial changes to follow on a deeper level of the social consciousness, thoughts, or underlying systems and infrastructure. Old ways and new ideas co-exist inevitably in the similar time frame and spatial context, and, more often than not, present a cacophony of issues. Thus, containing such drastic changes as well as keeping up with the dynamics of global environment in itself poses a challenge for Koreans.33

Fourth, considering its modern history, Korean ethnic nationalism can be characterized “defensive” unlike its European form, being “a product of outside interference, or the fear thereof” (Tudor, 2012, p. 260). Or, more accurately, Korean ethnic nationalism was constructed not against the internal minority, but against the “foreign others”, especially Japan and China. This defensive characteristic can yield more flexibility in accepting the multiculturalism quickly in current society.

Following part of the chapter will review the recent developments in South Korea that have affected the rearticulation of Koreanness. These will include changes in neoliberal reconstruction

---

32 As Andrei Lankov (2006) notes, the DMZ itself “is protected by rows of electrified fences and minefields” in addition to the “patrols and round-the-clock surveillance” (109).
33 Eckert et al. (1990) devotes a chapter on this point. In Chapter 20 of Korea old and new: a history (1990), Eckert et al. explained how the sobriquet of “the miracle on the Han” that popularly represents the transformation of South Korea obscures the complexity of the real story as well as the problems and challenges for Korea. Also, as a society which had been a colony in its recent history, “there are distinctions between identifying a disrupted pre-colonial modernization, a pre-colonial modernization that is made immanent as a result of colonialism and a colonial modernization of which a post-colonial ‘future’ modernization is influenced” (Pai & Tangherlini, 1998, quoted from Iain Watson, 2013, p. 310). All these forms of modernization exist in contemporary South Korea
of labor market and the larger political economy; in the demographic characteristics of South Korea that triggered the influx of immigrants into Korean society; in education and socio-cultural factors; and in Korean immigration policy. General form of immigration in Korean context shifted from immigrant sending to receiving within recent two decades. As such, the recent immigration policy constitutes a significant part of the current socio-political structure of Korea transforming into a multicultural society.

**Contemporary Korean Society: Democratization, Economic Advancement, and Neoliberal Reconstructions**

*(Re)opening to the world.* Korea has more than four thousand years of history, but Korea as a modern republic began with the end of World War II. South Korea, or the Republic of Korea, has been a pro-western country since 1945 establishment of the United States Military Government (1945-1948). Especially after the Korean War (1950-1953), the Republic of Korea became even more pro-western and pro-American. On the other hand, due to the sense of constant insecurity of the nation since 1945 and the period following the Korean War, the military authority thrived from the beginning of the republic (KAMHRO, 1992; Kohli, 2004; Brazinsky, 2007). Naturally, high ranking military personnel was one of the best educated individuals in the earlier years of Korea (KAMHRO, 1992, p. 178-206; Brazinsky, 2007, p. 71-100).

Military dictatorships from 1961 to 1987 had many vices but were responsible in leading industrialization and economic development in Korea. During the years of military

---

34 Only a handful of civilian elites existed in South Korea right after the Korean War, partly due to the colonial policy of limiting the educational opportunity for Korean nationals (Cumings, 2005; Eckert et al., 1990; KNHCC, 1993; O & Choe, 1993). In addition, many of these earlier intellectuals were communists or left-wing scholars who fought and struggled in opposition to the Japanese colonization. Many went to North Korea during the war and the ones left in the South were not accepted as legitimate members to exercise their intellect in the society, because of their ideological convictions. U.S. government, since the U.S. Military Administration period, offered various education and training opportunities for the Korean military officials in the U.S., which resulted in the relatively well-educated group of military leaders than the civilian scholars who had to rely on the limited government or private funding in a poverty-stricken post-colonial Korea.

35 Korean case is considered “perhaps the most dramatic case of all of an underdeveloped country turning itself into
governments from 1961-1987, huge investments were made simultaneously in both physical and human capital. Expansion of the formal school system and of the higher education in correspondence with its accumulation of physical capital contributed in raising a generation of well-educated middle class that carried on the further economic development (Freeman and Kim, 2012, p. 12).³⁶

South Korea, however, changed its pro-western attitude, as the international and national environment changed over time. Relations with North Korea changed from the exhaustive politico-ideological rivalry policy³⁷ in foreign relations to appeasement and co-existence since the mid-1970s. While South Korean government has maintained underlying pro-western attitude in general, the period following 1987 political democratization of South Korea brought about significant changes in many aspects of Korean life. For one, this period “coincided with the dismantling of the global Cold War, largely in tandem with globalization” (Choi, J.J., 2004, p. 4). Also, achieving relatively peaceful democratization and successful hosting of the 1988 Seoul Olympics instilled confidence to Koreans. At the same time, Koreans became more conscious of how they are seen in the global perspective, as they often encountered foreign press reporters on

³⁶ “By investing heavily in education on the post-Korean war baby boom generation, and then university training, Korea channeled a rapidly growing population from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector. The accumulation of human capital, particularly of young graduates with engineering and management skills, allowed Korean companies to succeed making “exports the engine of growth.” Absent the concordant accumulation of human and physical capital, Korea might have failed to sustain its rapid growth. Investment in physical capital would have run into a shortage of skilled labor that might have frustrated further investments in physical capital. The concordance of human capital development with industrialization also played a role in creating a middle class of educated industrial workers and a relatively egalitarian distribution of income, which later helped make the successful political transition from a dictatorial development state to democracy. The dictatorial military governments between 1961 and 1987 were responsible in creating a big-push of industrialization and economic development, while the new middle class in the late 1980s was responsible for establishing the stable democratic regimes that followed” (Freeman and Kim, 2012, p. 12).

³⁷ Ideological polarization and antagonism characterize the inter-Korean relationship during the Cold War era. The deep-seated mutual aversion from the experience of the Korean War continued as the belligerent discourses and metaphors were actively utilized by the governments and engendered the people’s animosity towards the “other” Korea (Choi, J. J., 2004, p. 5).
the streets. In short, Korea’s general social atmosphere and diplomatic relations dramatically changed in a very short period since hosting the 24th Olympics in Seoul in 1988 and the fall of the communist regimes in 1989.\(^{38}\)

**Political democratization and economic advancement.** By 1988, more or less a transitional government headed by Roh Tae Woo,\(^ {39} \) a former military leader directly elected by people, was in place. The new middle class grown out of the military dictatorships in the late 1980s played a vital role for establishing the stable democratic regimes in post-1987 Korea (Cumings, 2005, p. 372; Freeman and Kim, 2012, p. 12). With the peaceful accession of Kim Young Sam to power in February 1993, the military “finally retired to the barracks” (Cumings, 2005, p. 395).\(^ {40} \) Being freed from the authoritarian controls, power of workers in the labor market grew with the political democratization.\(^ {41} \) It resulted in almost doubling of real wages within a decade between 1987-1997 (Freeman and Kim, 2012, p. 2; Keum, 2012, p. 19) as well as a rapid economic growth. The union membership and power increased considerably and diverse pro-worker legislations were made since the late 1980s (Freeman and Kim, 2012, p. 1).\(^ {42} \) However, the changes during this decade also contributed to some problems in Korean economy in later decade, especially after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

For one, the wage growth between 1987 and 1997 exceeded the productivity growth in

\(^{38}\) Closer accounts on the relations between the two Koreas are well summarized in chapter twenty of Michael Breen’s book, *The Koreans: Who they are, what they want, where their future lies* (2004, see esp. pp. 244-248).

\(^{39}\) Some scholars do not agree that Roh Tae Woo government was a transitional one. For more detail, see pp. 151-157 of Buzo, A. (2007). *The making of modern Korea* (second edition), New York: Routledge.

\(^{40}\) Korea was admired after 1987 as a representative example of achieving the advancement of political democracy and capitalism at the same time (Im, 2011). This point of view is very much under controversy due to the lingering legacy from the earlier authoritarian regime, which essentially carried out the nation building process and economic development of Korea.

\(^{41}\) Korean capitalism had been a typical “authoritarian capitalism” until the mid-1980s, repressing the workers’ immediate consumption while isolating the bureaucracy from the interest groups and concentrating the resources on a small number of conglomerates (Im, 2011).

\(^{42}\) Scholars note that no more than twenty per cent of the workers ever joined the union movement, although the power of labor unions in Korea grew considerably since being freed from the military dictatorship (Freeman and Kim, 2012, p. 12).
South Korea while the labor shortage became more serious (Keum, 2012, p. 19). Also, the rapid raise in the real wages compromised the competitiveness of Korean goods in the global market (Keum, 2012, p. 19) and brought some other economic problems as well. The problems included inflation, shifts of industrial structure from manufacturing to the service sector, militant labor relations (Freeman and Kim, 2012, p. 2), and decrease in the corporate investments (Keum, 2012, p. 19). Overall changes aggravated the labor segmentation and the wage disparities between the large and small businesses since late 1980s on (Lee, 1997, p. 356). This phenomenon paired with the growth of higher education led to critical labor shortage in small and mid-sized companies mainly dealing with dirty, dangerous, or difficult (3D) jobs (Tsuda, 2006, p. 3-6; Yi, 2011, p. 33). Meanwhile, the industry started suffering from chronic shortage of unskilled low-wage laborers (Kim et al., 2011, p. 70; Keum, 2012, p. 19; Tsuda, 2006, p. 3-6).

On the other hand, the aging population and low fertility rate significantly shrunk the working-age population, such that Korea started importing a future workforce from overseas for its economic survival (Watson, 2010, p. 339; Kim et al., 2011, p. 70; Tsuda, 2006, pp. 3-6). Birth rate was rapidly declining in 1980s initially due to the success of birth control policies during 1960s-70s. One child policy during 1970s inadvertently encouraged patrilineal Korean families choose male child over female child, and resulted in a considerable gender imbalance of Korean populace. With the increasing educational opportunities and the booming economy, Korean females were seeing more opportunities in the professional world. As more Korean females finding their way into higher education and occupations outside the domestic realm, general marrying age rose steadily throughout 1980s-1990s. These socio-economic as well as political changes built up in the latter decade of the twentieth century continued and intensified in Korean society, as the globalism and neoliberalism came to ripe.
Neoliberalism, 1990s on. With the upsurge of neo-liberalism in the 1990s, Korea was confronted with the age of limitless renovations and competition. “Globalization and internationalization” became the government slogan since early 1990s, and Korean society became submerged to the discourses of excellence, efficiency, creativity, renovation and diversity in various aspects of the society including education, business and industry, technology, and in many different aspects of life. Korea started to change its policy of nationalization and privatization of the economy up until late 1980s and opened up its agriculture, business and education-culture markets as well as other aspects of the society.

1993 settlement of the Uruguay Round and the 1995 launching of the World Trade Organization (WTO) accelerated the already-in-process Korean market opening. Korean government, led by Kim Young Sam at the time, chose the “autonomous opening strategy” in response to the WTO regime. Various markets, starting with the education services, opened for the global market (Yi, 2007). Constantly referring to the recent historical tragedies of colonial subordination as the consequences of failing at autonomous reforms and opening up the society to the world, Korean government promoted “globalization and internationalization.” Reforms and open-door policy came to be familiar discourse in the society ever since.

43 “Globalization, Internationalization” was the slogan that came out during the presidential election of 1992, from the president candidate Kim, Young-Sam, who became the fourteenth president of Korea.
44 These changes started in full-scale with the results of the Uruguay Round starting to affect Korean society, especially on the opening of agricultural market including the rice market. The effects extended to other parts of the economy especially after the economic crisis that brought in the IMF relief-financing regime. These changes both inside and outside of the nation brought Korea major renovations throughout the social, commercial, economic and industrial, cultural, educational, and political arenas of the country.
45 So-called Civilian Government (Munmin Chŏngbu) of Kim Young Sam propagated “autonomous globalization.” For example, one of the Blue House (Ch’ŏngwadae) website subsections stated: “We have a painful historical experience of losing the national sovereignty due to failing at autonomous reforms and opening doors to the world in late-nineteenth century. At the turning point toward the twenty first century, we are confronted with the challenges of reforms and globalization. // At the beginning of the new Civilian Government (Munmin Chŏngbu), our society was faced with the crises of efficiency and morality, due to the influences of authoritarian regime that has continued for decades. Thus it was very difficult to actively respond to the stream of times” (The Blue House, Pyŏnhwa wa kaehyŏk ći sidae (The Era of Changes and Reforms). Retrieved on April 21, 2014, from The Presidential Archives of Korea. http://14cwd.pa.go.kr/president/1am/1a4m/1a4f001.asp).
Especially during the period following the Asian crisis in 1997-98, every sector of the society was subjected to a massive reconstruction. The problems built up in the past decade had to be addressed with a drastic measure. The reforms were presented in the forms of marketization, privatization, and liberalization under the general agreement of the Washington Consensus, and focused toward the “global competitiveness” of the given institutions (Im, 2011, p. 223, 243; Lim, 2010, p. 188). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) enforced standard procedure of market-oriented reforms in Korea, consisted of “austerity measures, export orientations, opening of financial markets, labour market ‘‘flexibility’’ and corporate restructuring” (Jang, 2003; Lee et al., 2005).

Under the IMF intervention regime, a sense of insecurity prevailed. General sentiment was that the whole nation collapsed overnight. Workers were laid off in mass scale, many becoming homeless on the streets, and liquidation of corporations was common, even on the giant transnational corporation level such as Daewoo Group. While mass-scale lay-off was in progress with the mid-level managers, small- to mid-size “3-D (Difficult, Dirty and Dangerous)” industries suffered from the chronic shortage of unskilled laborers. Young Koreans with significantly higher level of education than their earlier generations avoided manual labor. The government’s pursuit of excellence in higher education since 1990s, which aimed to build strong infrastructure for technology intensive industries and knowledge-based society, also had an effect on directing population away from the unskilled jobs.

The 1997 economic crisis and the following stagnation halted the society with a fear of the Korean economy falling back to the low-developmental, Third World state like the Latin...
American states in the 1980s with their continued stagnation and inflation. The fear that the Korean economy might fall back to the low-developmental state with the continued stagnation and inflation was compounded by the dangerously low fertility rate. The scenario of economic decline seemed more plausible when paired with the growth of unemployment and Korea’s transformation into an aging society with a low fertility rate.\(^{47}\) By 1990s, Korean government started promoting pronatalism, in contrast to the earlier birth control policy. It was, however, too late to supplement for the shortage in labor force. As such, Korea started to turn into an immigrant receiving country from a sending country in tandem with its global advancement.

*Low fertility and aging of the population.* With the 1997-98 financial crises, the scenario of Korean economy falling into the low-developmental state became prevalent in the society. According to articles published by several daily news sources, the fertility rate\(^{48}\) was 1.15 in 2009, whereas it was 6.0 in 1960. Such a low fertility rate in Korea was mainly due to the success of a series of aggressive birth control policies of the Korean government up through the early 1980s (An, 2010, February 24; Kim, 2010, October 20; Kim, 2012, July 11; Chungang Ilbo, 2012, July 3; Pak, 2012, January 09).\(^{49}\) Despite the demographic policy shifted to encouraging more childbirth since mid-1990s, current total fertility rate (1.22 in 2010) in Korea is

---

\(^{47}\) Rapid economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s made Korea started to suffer from the labor shortage in 1980s. The improvement of living standards in Korea resulted in Koreans coming into the labor market avoiding difficult, dirty and dangerous works.

\(^{48}\) (Total) fertility rate: average number of children a woman would give birth during one’s reproductive years (age 15-49).

\(^{49}\) The post-war baby boom triggered fears that the rapid growth of the population would undermine economic growth and create a vicious cycle of poverty. The Korean government implemented strong birth control policies in the 1960s-70s, such as restricting the number of children that can be registered for family medical plans. As a result of strong and continuous population control policies, the birth rate in Korea came to the alternate level of population (2.1 births per woman of childbearing age) in 1983. The speed of population growth slowed down significantly, but demographic policy did not turn quickly enough toward maintaining a proper fertility rate in the society. Thus the birth rate in Korea stayed around 1.6 per woman of childbearing age until the mid-1990s. This continued plunging especially after the 1997 economic crisis, and hit 1.08 in 2005 (Kim, Yŏnhap News: 2012, July 11). Current statistics show that Korea's fertility rate is among the lowest tier in the world (217th among the 222 countries in the world), and the aging of the population is rapidly progressing (Pak, Economist: 2012, January 09)
significantly lower than the replacement fertility rate of 2.1. This level of fertility rate is one of the lowest among OECD nations, and is causing public concern, combined with worry about the increasing level of the aging of the population. The number of people older than 65 in Korea has increased rapidly since 2000, and the rate of the aged population in 2009 hit 12.9 per cent. By 2026, according to the statistics, the rate will reach more than 20 per cent and Korea will be a “super-aged society” (Ko and Pang, 2007). Many policy reports are predicting various socio-economic issues including the national financial collapse from 2020s, especially due to the rapid increase of social welfare costs and decrease of economic vitality because of the aging of the population (personal communication with Prof. Cha, Woo-Kyu, Korea National University of Education, Jan. 2009).

The low fertility aging society phenomenon became a major political issue under the developmentalist economic rationale that dominates the Korean government, as much as it is a society-wide concern. One solution was to import foreign laborers. Korea had some immigrant workers from overseas before the 1990s, due to the increasing cost and hardships of hiring Korean workers in 3-D industries. However, immigrant laborers at this time were all undocumented (Yi, S. 2007, p. 84), and the worries over the demographic changes were not as publicized. Since 1993, the Korean government implemented an “Industrial Trainee Program” in order to boost the economy. Partly, the industrial trainee program was intended to replace the undocumented foreign laborers with legal “trainees” who will not stay in Korea, unlike some undocumented laborers had. However, Korean workers were more expensive than the foreign

---

50 These industry are known as “3-D industry”, meaning difficult, dirty and dangerous. The improvement of living standards in Korea resulted in young Koreans coming into the labor market avoiding these “3-D industry”, while the industry started suffering from chronic shortage of unskilled low-wage laborers (Kim et al., 2011, p. 70). Paired with this tendency of Koreans avoiding difficult manual labor, the aging population and low fertility rate requires Korea to import some of the future workforce from overseas for its economic survival (Watson, 2010, p. 339; Kim et al., 2011, p. 70). Korea needed policies that would attract overseas workforce, and one of the solutions was multiculturalism (Watson, 2010, p. 339).
laborers from the Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern countries. Also, the continued influx of a cheaper labor force filling in the gaps of a declining economically active population, in the long run, seemed a logical policy. The industrial trainee program was designed to solve issues of both the illegal migrant workers and labor shortage (Yi, S., 2007, p. 84). The design was true to both purposes of a neoliberal economic system of exploitation that would support continued growth of the economy, while maintaining the mono-ethnicity of the population that Korea took pride in at the time.

Another effect of Korea becoming low fertility aging society was the increase of “female marriage immigrants.” Korea has a strong tradition of patriarchal lineage, and a general tendency of preferring male children still remains. With the success of earlier birth control policies in 1960s-70s, parents preferred to have a male child when they will have only one or two children in the family. The preference for male children resulted in an unbalanced gender ratio. In addition, the improvement in the education level of women brought a growth in women's economic activities, resulting in an increase in marrying ages for women. With improved education level and economic independence of women, the number of women who do not get married also increased. All these factors contributed to creating a sharp imbalance in the gender ratio for the people of marriageable age, and many Korean males were having difficulty finding brides (Kim et al., 2011). Importing brides from China and Southeast Asia started on the private or local institutional level, when the hardships of the Korean farmers to find brides became a social issue in the 1990s (Kim, H., 2007, p. 72). Campaigns to arrange marriages for farmers

51 As the program expanded over time, of course, many problems arose: because of the inhumane working conditions with extended working hours, legally unprotected status (they were not “workers” in legal terms, and therefore excluded from the various benefits; at the same time, they were not foreign students who are registered in Korean school system, so they were excluded from the relative privileges and freedom of the foreign students), and cheaper wages than their undocumented counterparts, that caused many trainees to leave their workplaces and rather become undocumented workers. As a result, 80 per cent of total immigrant workers in Korea by 2002 were undocumented laborers (Yi, S. 2007, p. 85).
started with local NGOs and governments, and the number of Korean men marrying a foreign woman increased from 9,266 in 1997 to 29,140 in 2007 (Korea National Statistics Office (KNSO), 2007: Population-Marriages).

As the number of families formed by Korean men and women from other Asian countries increased over time, issues of these “multicultural families” gained more attention from the government and the general public. The government, in the first place, needed to provide legal grounds for the “imported brides” to settle down and live as members of Korean society. Some local institutions started to recognize the needs of these new members of society to learn about Korea so that they would be successfully incorporated into their new families and communities.  

As the number of “multicultural families” grew, the number of “multicultural” children that needed to be incorporated into the Korean school system also grew rapidly (WME Sourcebook, 2010). In the meantime, the popular imaginary of Southeast Asian brides (mainly “Vietnamese bride”) spread through media representations including popular drama shows such as Hanoi Bride (2005) and Golden Bride (2007). Government branches involved in carrying out “multicultural policies” also share the responsibility in keeping the public imagination lingering on the Southeast Asian mother-Korean father families (see for example, WME Sourcebook,  

52 This is partly due to media reports on the increasing domestic violence cases towards female marriage immigrants in recent years. Several cases of death due to domestic violence were reported in the media. The Ministry of Gender Equity and Family notes that the increasing domestic violence towards female marriage immigrants is due to cultural differences, language problems, etc. According to the Ministry of Gender Equity and Family yearly occurrences of domestic violence towards female immigrants (husband to wife) rose to 69.1% in 2010, and the death of these females caused by domestic violence is increasing (Ministry of Gender Equity and Family (2010), Investigation Report on Domestic Violence. Retrieved from http://www.moge.go.kr/korea/view/policyGuide/policyGuide04_03_01.jsp)

53 In actuality, the ‘multicultural’ population in Korea is very diverse ranging from marriage immigrants, foreign laborers, North Korean refugees, and foreign students to ethnic Chinese settled in Korea since the end of nineteenth century, and naturalized citizens. However, popular images of the multicultural population in Korea are mainly restricted to foreign laborers and female marriage immigrants from Southeast Asia, under the spreading ‘multicultural’ discourse in the society. Media representations of multicultural population are mostly limited to these two groups of people, which are not at all diverse or pluralistic. Even in academic research, the binary of female marriage immigrants of rural farming families and immigrant laborers in metropolitan factories are prevalent (Kim, P. C. et al., 2011, pp. 15-18).
Influx of various groups of immigrants. Foreign laborers and female marriage immigrants are the dominant popular imaginary of “multicultural” population in Korea, but they are only parts of the growing “multicultural” population. The number of international marriages, even the cases that do not fall under the popularly imagined categories, have consistently increased over time. Due to economic circumstances in North Korea and the decreased political tension between the two countries, the number of North Korean refugees entering South Korea grew dramatically in the last decade (Humanitarian Cooperation, Department of Settlement Support, Ministry of Unification, 2009. Retrieved from http://kosis.kr/metadata/main.jsp?surv_id=10304&curYear=2009). Native English speakers were actively recruited to work as English teachers in every level of the Korean public schools through government programs such as English Program in Korea (EPIK) and Teach and Learn in Korea (TaLK). The fact that the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States advertises these two programs (http://www.koreaembassyusa.org/han_education/kor_epik.asp?subgubun=3) on their homepage demonstrates that recruiting is strategically carried out by the government organizations.

An interesting fact about the inter-marriages of Korean men and foreign women is, despite the various “foreign” nationalities of the females, the majority of them are ethnic Koreans with Chinese nationality. According to the 2008 statistics by the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (quoted from Kwŏn, M. K. 2009, p. 16), the number of ethnic Koreans of Chinese nationality is 55,789, which consists of 38.6 per cent of the total number of female marriage immigrants, or 144,385. The second biggest group among the total female marriage immigrants is 33,667 Chinese women, a significantly smaller in number from the first (Kwŏn, M. K. 2009, p. 16).

My interviewees mainly pointed to the Korean man-Southeast Asian woman and Korean woman-white man images.

For example, the number of Korean women marrying foreign men increased steadily, from 4,660 in 2000 to 11,637 in 2005 and 7,497 in 2011. The general tendency in both types of international marriages (Korean male-foreign female, Korean female-foreign male) peaked around 2005 and somewhat regressing afterward seems interesting, but it is out of the scope of this research and therefore will not be discussed.

According to the greetings from the President of National Institute for International Education on EPIK homepage, the program “was established in 1995 with the missions to improve the English speaking abilities of students and teachers in Korea, to develop cultural exchanges, and to reform English teaching methodologies in Korea”
addition, there are an increasing number of international students and faculties in Korean colleges and universities, as these higher education institutions embrace the idea of internationalization and global competition (Yi, S., 2007). A result, there is a certain level of general consensus that “Korean society is rapidly becoming a multicultural society and that this process is inevitable and irreversible” at this point (Kim, A., 2009).

Also, developmentalist economic drive of pursuing expansion and growth of the economy as well as drawing more financial investment from overseas is supported as a political strategy towards “peace building in the Korean peninsula” thesis. South Korea has always been contesting its power and historical legitimacy with North Korea since the end of Japanese colonization. The competition between the two regimes heightened since the Korean War, as the truce line separated the peninsula. Founded on capitalist liberalism, South Korea strategically sought to gain more support internationally over the years. Especially for the recent two decades following the collapse of the communist bloc, the South Korean government has been keenly interested in maintaining international support with other sources than those of ideological alliances of the Cold-War bipolar system. The Korean government sees that maintaining economic prosperity with drawing in more overseas investment is tied into the national security against North Korea in this age of globalization. With more global economic interest and human resources invested in Korea, the Korean government expects there will be more international pressure against “destabilizing” factors in the region, e.g., militaristic North Korean provocations.

On a side note, there is also the problem of a rapidly decreasing number of students, considering the general low fertility issue in the society. Due to the rapid decrease in student population over the years, small local universities and colleges with weaker finances started to close down as they had a hard time recruiting new students.

58 On a side note, there is also the problem of a rapidly decreasing number of students, considering the general low fertility issue in the society. Due to the rapid decrease in student population over the years, small local universities and colleges with weaker finances started to close down as they had a hard time recruiting new students.
In other words, continued economic prosperity of South Korea is understood to be tied to the political stability and peace in the Korean Peninsula. Thus, the efforts in drawing in more foreign investments, both financial and human, are not only due to an interest in the neoliberal global economy. It is also a carefully designed strategy towards “peace building in the Korean Peninsula.” Some scholars and administrators also expect that building up more diverse politico-economic, cultural, and human ties will eventually lead to the peaceful reunification of the Koreas desired for the past sixty years (personal communications with Mr. Yu, MEST, Republic of Korea, March 2011). Some recent publications from government-sponsored research institutes show growing strategic interest in Central and Southeast Asian nations where Koreans see more promise for their continued economic growth.\(^59\) Expanding Korean influences and ties, whether it is economic or humanitarian support, are seen in the same strategic light as drawing in global investments. Thus, the joint interests of the economy and politics in Korea partly encourage more cross-border migrations to and from Korea. Therefore under this logic, Korea ought to expand overseas with various programs of cross-border collaboration as well as attracting more immigrants and different forms of international investments, both for economic prosperity and national security.

**North Korean escapees in South Korea.** Despite their relative marginality in the popular imaginary of the “multicultural population”, recent North Korean escapees\(^60\) contribute

---

59 See for example, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), In-depth Research Project Reports on Strategic Areas published in 2011. This series of reports, claiming that the “project was to vitalize Korean research on the emerging economies”, cover India, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Turkey and Mongolia in six volumes (http://www.kiep.go.kr/skin.jsp?bid=pub_02&grp=publication&page=4&sch_flag=&sch_text=&nameSub=&nameSubstr=&PUB_WRITER=). Also, some recent reports from Korean Educational Development Institute suggest Korea seeks for increased collaboration in education, science, and technology with the developing countries from different parts of the world (see for example, KEDI research, numbers from CR2011-54-02 to CR2011-54-09 and CR2011-54-11).

60 There are many terms that are popularly used to name these North Korean individuals who escaped their country
significant number of recent immigrants in South Korean society (Lankov, 2004, 2006; Chung, 2009). Post-“Sunshine policy”\(^{61}\) thawing of political tensions paired with the deteriorating economy in North Korea brought in steadily increasing number of North Korean escapees\(^{62}\) into South Korea in recent two decades. China also played a vital role in this process, despite the government’s effort to suppress North Korean border crossings as much as possible. Since 1989, Chinese-South Korean exchanges have been growing rapidly. The northeast region of China where it borders North Korea, known as “Kando (Jiandao)” region for many Koreans, is historically inhabited with a large number of ethnic Koreans. Fleeing from the famine and, later, from the colonial exploitation, hundreds of Koreans migrated to this part of southern Manchuria since late-nineteenth century (Yi, 2010; Lankov, 2006). Based on their ethnic ties, exchanges between South Korea and the Kando (Jiandao) region have increased dramatically since the opening of the Chinese-South Korean diplomatic relations.

On the North Korean side, continued natural disasters resulted in the breakdown of agricultural industry and rapidly deteriorating economy. North Korea experienced massive floods and draughts taking turns repeatedly since the mid-1990s, completely devastating its farmlands (Kim, M., 2010; Kim, Y., 2014, p. 78-81).\(^{63}\) Decreasing level of economic and

---

\(^{61}\) “Sunshine Policy” is Kim Dae-jung – Roh Moo-Hyun governments’ appeasement policy toward North Korea.

\(^{62}\) There are many terms that are popularly used to name these North Korean individuals who escaped their country and migrated to South Korea. North Korean refugees, defectors, escapees, Saet’ômin, T’albukcha, are all used to describe these individuals. Not many of the recent North Korean immigrants in South Korea have “refugee” status, nor they are “defectors” which carry more political connotations. Rather, they are migrants running away from their poverty and hunger.

\(^{63}\) Kim, Y’s (2014) article explains the reason why North Korea is suffering more extensively than South Korea, while experiencing the similar climatic conditions. See, Kim, Yŏng-hun, (2014). “Kisang pyŏndong e tarun nonggŏp p’îhae wa taebuk hyŏmonyŏk (Agricultural damages following climatic changes and inter-Korean cooperation)” in Wŏlgan Pukhan (Monthly North Korea), July 2014, pp. 78-83.
political ties with China and the former Soviet Union also contributed in the general decline of the North Korean economy. Since the late-1990s, North Koreans started crossing the Chinese border in large numbers, looking for food and work (Kim, M. 2010). However, Chinese government repatriated these North Korean escapees to where they certainly will face harsh retaliations for crossing the border. Eventually, many North Korean escapees headed for South Korea in search for more “secure” environment than in China. As a result, radical liberalization of China since the 1990s paired with the collapse of border control, Kando (Jiandao) province has become the major “transit point” for the North Korean escapees (Lankov, 2006, p. 110; Kim, M. 2010, p. 427).

Above conditions in recent decades also changed the characteristics of the North Korean immigrants in South Korea dramatically. Before the mid-1990s, only a handful of North Koreans defected to South Korea, typically 5-10 each year, either through the foreign legations or over the DMZ (Chung, 2009; Lankov, 2006, p. 108-109). They settled into new South Korean environment with relative ease with their education, social skills, and much appreciated intelligence on North Korean military or the government. They also had important symbolic and propaganda value for the South Korean government (Chung, 2009, pp. 5, 7-8; Lankov, 2006, pp. 109, 111). The recent wave of North Korean escapees since the mid-1990s coming in through

---

64 Due to the dangers of crossing the DMZ and their physical proximity to the Chinese border, North Korean farmers and workers started crossing the border. The northern part of North Korea is known to be populated with people whose loyalty to the party-state is not trusted as much as the people living close to the capital city of P’yŏngyang. North Korean Public Distribution System is hierarchalized according to the person’s supposed loyalty to the regime. See for more details, Melissa Kim (2010), pages 439-440.

65 Majority of them were North Korean elites stationed overseas or the elite unit soldiers who can outsmart the heavy surveillance system of DMZ. This excludes the large number of North Koreans who moved to the South before the Korean War (1950-1953). See for more details on a short history of North Korean defection to South Korea, pages 107-111 of Andrei Lankov (2006). “Bitter taste of paradise: North Korean refugees in South Korea” in Journal of East Asian Studies, 6, pp. 105-137; and pages 5-13 of Byung-Ho Chung (2009). “Between Defector and Migrant: Identities and Strategies of North Koreans in South Korea”, in Korean Studies, 32, pp. 1-27.

66 Chung (2009) provides a nice elaboration on this point: “For the two competing Korean states, a person’s migration from one state to the other is a symbolically significant act. It can be interpreted as evidence of the political legitimacy of one state over the other. The particular questions of who moves where and why become the
China, however, does not share the similar characteristics with the earlier defectors. Majority of them are workers or farmers and their dependents, fleeing from the destitute living conditions in North Korea. Naturally, they do not have the skills and knowledge that would facilitate the resettlement in the South Korean society as the earlier defectors had (Lankov, 2006).

They also started coming to South Korea when their political usefulness was diminishing with the “Sunshine Policy” of the Kim Dae-jung government. For South Korea, the government still wants to adhere to general principle of unification. South Korean government, in legal sense, assumes North Koreans as their legitimate citizens. It is, however, also apparent that South Korean government is reluctant to bear the troublesome responsibility of reunification at this point. From the German unification example, Korean government knows that the cost of unification will be a liability for the South Korean tax payers in the end. At this point, South Korean government wants to have the status quo with the North Korea, in order to avoid the incomprehensible unification cost falling on their shoulders all of a sudden (Lankov, 2006; Chung, 2009).

**Summary and Conclusion**

There are changes and developments in recent Korean society: 1) political democratization that enabled more liberalized and diversified individual explorations of the world, conveniently perched on the fruits from earlier authoritarian regime; 2) continued economic prosperity, of course, with the bases of infrastructure built up during earlier industrialization; 3) sharp turning of the demographic characteristics from post-Korean War baby boom to the low fertility aging of topics of hegemonic discourse, and individual acts of migration are interpreted as deep evidence of the overall superiority of one system over the other. Even when only a handful of people migrates into one country, these migrants are a symbolically important social group in the politics of division.” (Chung, 2009, p. 5).

67 Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea states that “The territory of the Republic of Korea is Korean Peninsula and the islands annexed” and Article 2, Section 3 of its Nationality Law defines “In case both whose parents’ nationality are unclear or whose parents do not have nationality, a person who is born in the Republic of Korea” as a South Korean citizen.
the population; 4) chronic shortage of labor force in lower-tier industry in contrast to chronic shortage of jobs in mid- to upper-level managerial positions – all coinciding with the rising level of globalization, which inevitably results in the accelerating movements of people and ideas (Appadurai, 1996); thus bringing in more immigrants into Korean society.

Then, there are government policies and discourses of: 1) pronatalism to supplement the future workforce; 2) excellence and efficiency to renovation and creativity, aiming to build a different kind of infrastructure from the earlier period, for knowledge-based, science- and technology-intensive industry; 3) autonomous reform and globalization in order to keep advancing (or, not to fall prey to bigger and stronger nations) in global competition; and 4) peaceful coexistence and cooperation with North Korea, in order to avoid catastrophic unification cost suddenly becoming their political liability – all closely interwoven with the global neoliberalization.

Right in the center of recent developments in Korean political economy and in discourses of global competitiveness, I argue, are the shifting discourses of Koreanness of mono-ethnic homogeneity and multicultural diversity. If the authoritarian regime of the earlier period led successful industrialization based on the discourses of unity of the Korean ethnic nation and anti-communism, current neoliberal regime is leading the globalization project based on the discourses of multicultural diversity and multi-ethnic harmony. Primary purpose of this research is to understand how young individual Koreans developing into their full adulthood are constructing their identities within these variegated levels of multi-layered discursive regimes (does it sound too convoluted…? Should think of some other way to say it).

As the social changes bring in a larger immigrant population, as much as engendering the need for more immigrants, the demand for reconstituting the concept of Koreanness is growing.
The global tendency of the contemporary migrations is from the developing economies to the more developed part of the world. The pressures for emigration from developing countries correspond to the needs of the developed countries where the decrease in marriage and birth rates and shortage of low-skilled labor are prevalent (Kim et al., 2011, p. 23). Korea joined this “growing array of advanced industrialized nations that import large numbers of foreign workers in recent decades” (Tsuda, 2006, p. 3). Korea is currently facing the challenges of how to reconstruct the concept of an ethnic nation (minjok) and of the membership in Korean society, in order to achieve social integration with the growing numbers of foreign-born residents. The other side of the coin is that, the multitude of Korea's needs demands the construction of a new concept of Koreanness in order to attract more human and financial investments into the society.

Although the number of foreign-born residents in Korea increased significantly during the recent decades, Korea, being one of the recent countries of immigration, is still not used to “view immigration as part of their national identity or past nation-building process” (Tsuda, 2006, p. 3). In 2010, the number of “foreigners” in Korea was 918,917 whereas the total population was 47,990,761, which made up less than two per cent of the total population. Compared to most older countries of immigration, the foreign-born population percentage is still quite low (Tsuda, 2006, p.3). A recent study shows that the majority of (ethnic) Koreans do not have much direct interaction with the foreign-born population, and even less interact with foreigners on daily basis (Kim, E., et al., 2009, p. 55-57). However, Korean pride in ethnic purity apparently has caused trouble with the growing number of foreigners in the society. From the “bus racism incident” reported in the New York Times (Choe, 2009, November 1) to the EBS documentary on racism in Korea (see, for example: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DdusXidFkyY), reports of
Korean racism started to draw more public and international attention.\textsuperscript{68}

The discourses of multicultural and multi-ethnic harmony are gaining more importance at this point, as the discourse of mono-ethnic unity and homogeneity was promoted through a certain period in Korean history. The shift in public discourses on Koreanness should not be dismissed lightly as a trendy idea or as governmental propaganda in order to keep up with the international environment: even though these characteristics certainly constitute significant parts of the multicultural discourses. It is the coordinated process of certain social demands created by a considerable number of individual needs and desires and the corresponding (many times invisible) screening, caring and social “maintenance” – including the decisions regarding who gets to be acknowledged as a full member of the Korean society.

Following two chapters are devoted in mapping out the dynamics of the public discourses governing individual conducts as well as the individual receptions of and responses to these discourses of Koreanness. This project is done by analyzing the interviews as textual bases of the various discourses on Koreanness. In accordance with the precedents of interpretive methods, interviews are coded to identify emergent themes in their narratives. Uncommon themes emerged among them were also noted separately. These common and uncommon themes reflect

\textsuperscript{68} The Korean government was requested to report on “Korean racism” at the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2007. The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD] expressed its concerns over “concepts such as ‘pure blood’ and ‘mixed-bloods’ … and the idea of racial superiority that it may entail, continues to be widespread in Korean society” (CERD (2007). Seventy-first session Summary Record of the 1834th Meeting: 3, section 12). Reflecting on their concerns, CERD recommended that the South Korean government:

\begin{quote}
adopt appropriate measures in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information, to recognize the multi-ethnic character of contemporary Korean society and overcome the image of Korea as an ethnically homogeneous country, which no longer corresponds to the actual situation existing in Korea. (CERD (2007). Seventy-first session Summary Record of the 1834th Meeting: 3, section 12)
\end{quote}

Of course, reports on the crimes by foreigners in Korea also increased as the number of foreign population increase in the society. Most portray the facts as to what is happening or provide more balanced views (see for example, http://news.kbs.co.kr/society/2012/04/23/2466259.html; http://www.fnnews.com/view?ra=Sent1201m_View&corp=fnnews&arcid=201204100100082780005091&cDateYear=2012&cDateMonth=04&cDateDay=10), but some are more provocative (see for example, MBC’s The Shocking Reality About Relationships With Foreigners, Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B09FXOZVw4g).
common and uncommon individual experiences in relation to the discourses of Koreanness, and how interviewees made sense of it within the broader political economy and cultural contexts.

The themes identified in interview data are triangulated with the multi-semiotic texts that project various meanings of Koreanness in the public space, such as phrases from school textbooks and public advertisement. As Fairclough (2003) acknowledged, to study “meaning-making, one needs to look at … how texts practically figure in particular areas of social life” (15). Also, to determine the “ideological effects of texts, one would need to … link the ‘micro’ analysis of texts to the ‘macro’ analysis of how power relations work across networks of practices and structures” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 15-16). In this sense, the analyses of individual and public discourses in relation to each other provided in the following chapters complement each other and engender dialogue between the individual text and the social realms of power relations across networks of practices and structures of Koreanness.
Chapter IV Understandings on Public Discourses of Koreanness

Introduction

As reviewed in Chapter II, great volume of research on Korean identity has been produced: the existing researches on the “Koreanness” and “otherness” understood in Korean society; and more recent researches concerned of the forms and characteristics of Korean multiculturalism. One thing clear from the previous studies is that there has been a decisive shift in discourses on Koreanness in recent decade, at least on the official level. Many scholars claim that Korea is no doubt becoming a multi-ethnic and multicultural society (Choi, 2010; Kim, A. 2009). Even before the “multicultural” population reached two per cent of the total population, the Ministry of Education and Human Resources of Korea declared that all K-12 textbook content highlighting Korean mono-ethnicity would be amended and replaced with content emphasizing multiculturalism and tolerance toward other racial groups (Kim, 2007, p. 65; Kang, 2010, p. 287).

As it is implied with the shift of public discourses, there are roughly two phases in discursive constructions of Koreanness in the recent decade: earlier mono-ethnic discourses to multicultural discourses in post-2006 period. It is not my intentions, however, to portray the shift of discourses in a linear fashion. More importantly, the discourses on Koreanness do not develop progressively from mono-ethnic to multicultural one. Rather, as Chapters IV and V will demonstrate, mono-ethnic and multicultural discourses are contesting, contradicting, and sometimes collaborating with each other in constructing the discourses of what it means to be Korean in different contexts. Whereas the discourses seemingly shift at a relatively identifiable time, which is May 2006, from one to the other, mono-ethnic and multicultural discourses are not mutually exclusive in Korea.

In this context, this research aims to complement the existing volume of researches on
Korean identities, but in a different way: this research is concerned with what people do, when raised to have a strong mono-ethnic loyalty suddenly find themselves in a society predominated with the discourses of multiculturalism and multi-ethnic diversity. Do they simply discard their mono-ethnic identities and become multicultural citizens, since they are now living in a multicultural society? What happens to these people when they try to cope with the new discourses on what they ought to become that is radically different from what they see themselves are? This process of coping may also differ from the similar process of mono-ethnic people moving to a multiethnic society such as the United States. For one, these individuals did not physically change their locations and localities, thus did not foresee the changes. Rather, the new discourses of multicultural identities “walked into [their] home with the globalization”, as one interviewee stated.

My question will be answered in three dimensions: 1) individual understandings on what public discourses on Koreanness are; 2) how individuals utilize the concepts they derive from the public discourses on Koreanness in their own claims on identity, such as Korean, mono-ethnic, or multicultural; and 3) how these individual discourses concerning identity are intertwined with the larger discourses in the society, such as globalization, economic advancement, unification, and social integration. The discourses of each dimension will be triangulated with the multi-semiotic texts of public advertisements, textbooks, popular drama shows, that were discussed during the interviews. Put this way, the analyses seem only concentrated on the discursive level. Yet, these analyses will bring out more complex themes like globalization, economic advancement, interests involved in unification, racial/cultural differences, and social integration, that govern the everyday life of Korean individuals.

This chapter will elaborate on the first two dimensions of the question. First, I will identify
tenets of “good Korean citizens” in the official discourses of the K-12 textbooks. Then, I will elaborate on the individual understandings of the public discourses on Koreanness and the ways in which individuals utilize the tenets of Koreanness in public discourses in constructing their own identity claims. Next chapter will inquire on the third dimension of the question: how individual discourses of identity claims are related with the larger social issues of globalization, economic advancement, and unification.

With the three-dimensional analyses, I will demonstrate that some factors such as economic advancement, ethnic/cultural homogeneity, and discourses of democratic and multicultural citizenry, molded the discourses of Koreanness as their means of governing the individual conducts for the expansion of neoliberal globalization. Competing public discourses of Koreanness governing the identity constructions of individual Koreans and individual reconstructions of the discourses of Korean identities are inherently involved in this process of advancement of the neoliberal globalization.

Public Discourses through School Textbooks: Desire for a Rich and Powerful Nation through Peaceful Unification and Global Advancement

Foucault (1984) once noted that “any system of education is a political way of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the knowledges and powers which they carry” (p. 123, quoted from Fairclough, 1992, p. 51). Following this notion, this section will analyze the major discourses government designated textbooks deployed through K-12 social studies, history, and ethics textbooks from early 1990s to mid-2000s. Discourses in school textbooks intend to inscribe what Korean government views most fundamental qualities needed for the future members of the society. As it was touched on in Chapter I, Korean government exerted an extraordinary authority over textbook writing until very recent times. Korean
textbooks are one of the most abstract and representative forms of the public discourses promulgated by the government in defining and regulating the boundaries of Koreanness.

This section will review six textbooks from early 1990s, eight textbooks and two workbooks from mid-1990s, five textbooks from early 2000s. Reviewed textbooks are in the social studies, history, and ethics discipline area, and spread out from upper elementary (5-6 grade) to high school grade level. As far as I can tell from the colophon pages, textbooks written in 2001-2002 were reprinted until 2008.

Earlier Korean textbooks stated that Korean people are mono-ethnic (Korean Educational Development Institute [KEDI], 1991a; KEDI, 1991b; National Institute of Korean History [NIKH], 1992a; Nikh, 1992b; Nikh, 1996). Primary and secondary school textbooks of

69 Textbooks reviewed in this section are as follows. Early-1990s: Chungakkho Kuksa (Sang); Chungakkho Kuksa (Ha) (Middle School National History 1, 2); Chungakkho Sahoe 1 (Middle School Social Studies 1); Kodung Hakkyo Chongch’i Kyongje (High School Civics-Economics); Kodung Hakkyo Kungmin Yulli (High School National Ethics); Kodung Hakkyo Sahoekwa-Munhwato (High School Society-Culture). Mid-1990s: Ch’odung Hakkyo Sahoe 5-2; Ch’odung Hakkyo Sahoe 6-1; Ch’odung Hakkyo Sahoe 6-2 (Elementary School Social Studies 5-2, 6-1, 6-2); Ch’odung Hakkyo Sahoekwa T’ang’u 6-1; Ch’odung Hakkyo Sahoekwa T’ang’u 6-2 (Elementary School Social Studies Workbook 6-1, 6-2); Chunghakkyo Sahoe 1, 2, 3 (Middle School Social Studies 1, 2, 3); Kodung Hakkyo Chongch’i (High School Civics); Kodung Hakkyo Kyongje (High School Economics). Early 2000s: Chunghakkyo Todok 1, 2 (Middle School Ethics 1, 2); Chunghakkyo Kuksa (Middle School National History); Kodung Hakkyo Simin Yulli (High School Citizen Ethics); Kodung Hakkyo Sahoe (High School Social Studies).

70 As a side note, it was very difficult to access the most recent version of textbooks, not to mention acquiring copies of them. Libraries, bookstores, government-commissioned textbook publisher all said the same thing: textbooks are printed for almost exact number of the students in each grade level, so there are no left over copies. Any copies in the libraries are, therefore, collected after the whole curriculum period is over. Curriculum revisions are done every 5-10 year period when the government acknowledges the need for updating the curriculum content of their K-12 education. Six comprehensive revisions to the Korean K-12 curriculum contents were made since the establishment of the Republic of Korea. First period was 1955-1963; second, 1963-1973; third, 1973-1982; fourth, 1982-1987; fifth, 1987-1995; sixth, 1995-2000; and seventh period was from 2000. Since then, the MEHRD decided that a comprehensive revision of the whole K-12 curriculum contents will not be done any more; instead, the contents will be revised according to the needs of each discipline area. 2007 revision extended English instruction hours in elementary schools. Contents of the revised curriculum are inevitably applied to the future students. For instance, the 2007 revision contents were not applied until the first grade students in 2009, when the new textbooks were ready with the revised contents. Since the application years are tiered, students who were second grade and over in 2007 will not have been educated with the 2007 revision until much later. In short, as of 2014, children of fifth-grade and younger are only ones taught with the 2007 revised version of the curriculum contents. Majority of the current students over fifth-grade level are taught with the older version of the textbooks.

71 There are many examples of Korean textbooks claiming the Korean mono-ethnicity and their pride in it. Among many, High School Ethics textbook states “We have flowered the purity of the mono-ethnic people (tanil minjok) and glorious national civilization throughout the long history of suffering” (p. 248). High School Civics and Economics also proudly claims that “Koreans have formed a mono-ethnic community (tanil minjok kongdongch’e) based on the unique language and tradition throughout the five thousand years of history” (p. 58).
history, ethics, and of social studies have taught young Koreans pride of their ethnic and cultural homogeneity. Not only school textbooks claimed for multiple times that Korean ethnic homogeneity (or, purity) is something Koreans should cherish that has been maintained throughout a “five-thousand-year history.” The state rituals and national holidays also carefully structured the memory of Korean unity in the everyday life of Korean individuals, “reproducing and strengthening the belief in the everlasting continuity of state and nation in the future” (Kim, 2005, p. 105). Some patriotic songs that were heard and sang at Korean schools almost every other month through these rituals for national holidays noted "one root" and "ethnic nation (kyŏre, minjok)." 

Words are often combined with the prefix “Han-”, which is the name of Korean ethnic group, and used as Han ’gyŏre and Hanminjok respectively. Words like Han ’gyŏre and Hanminjok, some interviewees reported, reminded them the concept of oneness or unity of the Korean people. Some added, because the word “Han-” easily transfers to “han(a)” which means “one” in Korean word, using the words such as Hangyŏre and Hanminjok easily stimulates ethnic nationalism in such unitarian sense:

MJ73: Hearing the words Han ’gyŏre and Hanminjok, especially in some unifying occasions like World Cup or …, yes…, when those Chinese or Japanese distort the history and say something crazy, reminds me that we Koreans all being one and the same brothers and sisters who need to stand in solidarity.

As Duara (1995) explains, this way of describing national history “secures for the

72 The Korean word kyŏre means the offspring of the same forefather, which emphasizes the bloodline of the people. Jager used the term “race-nation” for the Korean word minjok in her book on the narratives of Korean nationalism throughout the twentieth century (Jager, 2003). Songs for at least four national holidays (National Foundation Day, Memorial Day, Hanggŭl Proclamation Day, and the Armed Forces day), among other ceremonial songs, carry the direct mention of “one root” or “ethnic nation”, either with the word kyŏre or minjok.

73 All names of the participants are coded in a combination of two alphabets, without any connection to their real names in order to prevent possible individual identification. The total number of participants over roughly ten years reached 61, although meaningful number of participants came down to only 29, consisted of 16 females and 13 males. “R” will be me in any of the conversations.
contested and contingent nation the false unity of a self-same, national subject evolving through time” (p. 4). It was on the basis of this imagined social unity that previous governments mobilized the population for the economic development and industrialization projects (Kohli, 2004, p. 100).

Judging from the narratives of Korean history textbooks, one of the most important line of Korean government policy and intellectual consciousness since the late 1800s was two-folds: uniting the Korean people against the invasions from the outside grounded on the development of Korean national identity; and successfully implementing the new and “civilized,” which was equated to the western, technology, culture, and institution into the Korean society. These two contradicting ideas of unity of the nation and cherishing the Korean heritage on one hand, and of accepting everything possible that’s related to the “civilized” capitalist West on the other, are carried into the descriptions of contemporary Korean society with an interesting twist from the Cold War era: unification of the North and South Koreas as the foremost national task, and excelling North Korea in every possible way as the “legitimate” of the two Koreas. Endeavors included from achieving the “full democratization” of the society, industrialization and economic development, gaining the acceptance of the governmental legitimacy in the world, mainly from the western powers, to achieving higher levels of education and culture.

There is a seemingly compelling rationale behind pursuing these contradicting political

74 Written in the Preface of High School Civics · Economics textbook, "... we ... have the (national) task of... peacefully reuniting the divided land and the people." (Korean Educational Development Institute (KEDI), 1991, p. 1); in the Preface of High School National Ethics textbook, "... there remains ... the task of great importance ... called peaceful reunification." (Seoul National University National Ethics Unified Textbook Research and Development Committee, 1991, p. 1); and in the Preface of High School National History textbook, "Henceforth ... we shall ... achieve the historical task of today in the reunification of our nation and the prosperity of the people ... as soon as possible." (NIKH, 1992b, p. 2)

75 South Korea’s recognition of the North as a separate nation has only been a couple of decades, and many South Koreans still cannot admit, at least emotionally, the North as a legitimate descendent from the old Korean nation. This legitimacy is, of course, automatically granted by the South’s presumed capitalist liberal democracy.

76 O and Ch’oe (1993) explains how the U.S. Military Administration and Cold War era competition between the two Koreas distorted the meaning of democracy in Korean society and education (see, esp. pp. 321-329)
agenda. Reunification of the two Koreas is considered as one of the foremost political goal, if it were not a “mission” of the nation.\textsuperscript{77} In order to achieve this national mission of reunification with the North Korea, South Korea has to become strong enough in every aspect. The goal is the peaceful reunification, expanding the “democracy” into the other half of the Korean peninsula. To become stronger than the North Korea and excel them in every aspect, Korea needs to be “civilized” and “modernized” successfully with the western capitalist democracy, mainly represented by the United States in Korea, at least after the World War II.

On that note, from the K-12 social studies and ethics textbooks since early 1990s, there are three major themes that Korean government has endeavored to communicate through its citizens. One is the national development/advancement, another is international cooperation, and the other is unification. These themes, in the end, can be combined into the desire that Korea become rich and powerful in the global political economy through peaceful unification.

General tendencies of textbook changes are as follows. First, the parts for understanding global cultures and international cooperation are gaining more weight in the social studies and ethics curricula. In comparison with the advanced states of the West, or more specifically, the

\textsuperscript{77} The Charter of National Education (\textit{Kungmin Kyoyuk Hŏnjang}), drafted by 74 well-known scholars at the time and proclaimed by former Korean President Park, Chung Hee on December 5, 1969, is a good example of how reunification of two Koreas and prospering as a democratic nation are viewed in post-war Korea. National Archives of Korea explains the Charter “emphasizes the key elements of Korean education in the fundamental philosophy of education” (http://contents.archives.go.kr/next/content/listSubjectDescription.do?id=003143). A rough translation of the Charter of National Education (\textit{Kungmin Kyoyuk Hŏnjang}) as follows:

\begin{quote}
We are born with the historic mission to restore our nation. Now is the time to revitalize our ancestors’ splendid spirit, and, with it, to establish internally the posture of autonomous independence and contribute externally to co-prosperity of mankind. For this, we clarify how we will proceed and make it the directives of education.

... Looking forward to our glorious reunified nation we will hand long down to our posterity, as industrious citizens with faith and pride, let’s collect the nation’s wisdom and exert tenacious efforts to create a new history.

Although the Charter itself was virtually abolished in 1994 through surveys and research (http://contents.archives.go.kr/next/content/listSubjectDescription.do?id=003143), the emphasis on democracy and reunification continues well into the present day textbooks (National Textbook Compilation Committee, Seoul National University, 2004; Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, 2004).
“Anglo America” (KEDI, 1996, p. 91),78 discourses of national advancement is consistent. Second, the means of achieving national advancement changed over time. Early-1990s textbooks emphasize the development of democracy and economic advancement as means of achieving national advancement (KEDI, 1990; KEDI, 1991a; MCE, 1991). In mid-1990s, international understanding and cooperation, continued development of Korean democracy and economy, and peaceful unification were viewed important (KEDI, 1995; 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 1997). In 2000s, in contrast, the continued economic and political advancement in the globalizing world, or successful globalization of the nation as a whole, was emphasized (MEHRD, 2002a; 2002b; 2002e; 2002f; KEDI, 2004). Third, in case of the peaceful unification thesis, textbooks describe international roles becoming larger over time. In addition, by mid-1990s, peaceful reunification of the ethnic nation was pursued on the grounds of mutual acknowledgement, respect, and gradual increase in exchange and cooperation (KEDI, 1997, p. 201). In contrast to the earlier discourse of South Korea-centered establishment of an autonomous ethnic nation (MCE, 1990, p. 273-296), it is apparent that Korean government wants to maintain the status quo in inter-Korean relations from this point on.

There are some other noticeable changes in the textbook discourses. Recent textbooks highlight state nationalism and citizenship more than the earlier textbooks’ exclusive stress on ethnic nation until early 1990s. However, emphasis on the ethnic nation is still observed. For instance, High School Citizen Ethics (Simin Yulli) textbook (2003) has chapters such as “Ethnic national culture and ethnic identity (Minjok muhwa wa minjok chŏngchʼesŏng)” and “Proper attitude as a global citizen (Segye simin ūrosŏŭi olbarŭn chase). Notice that the chapter is not on the “national culture and national identity”, and ethnic nationalism (minjokchuŭŭi) is emphasized

---

78 This is part of the section heading of a chapter in Middle School Civics 2. Chapter IV. Life and customs of America and Oceania – 1. The World’s Advanced Region Anglo America (IV. Amerika mit Oseania ŭi Saenghwal – 1. Segye ŭi sŏnjin chiyŏk Aengŭllo Amerika).
rather than state nationalism (*kukkajuŭi*). Toward the end of the chapter for “ethnic national culture and ethnic identity” comes a section that introduces desirable attitude on cultural exchange. This section introduces globalization and cultural diversity, warns of the dangers of ethnocentrism (*chamunhwa chungsimjuŭi*), and overviews the cultural exchange, or communication between the different cultures (MEHRD, 2003, p. 233-245). Next chapter, “Proper attitude as a global citizen” discusses about various global issues such as war and peace, environmental and poverty issues, global community and ethics, and human rights, mutual consideration and tolerance (MEHRD, 2003, p. 246-261). In this regard, the chapter makes it clear that, ethnic Koreans in the global world rather than Korean citizens (or nationals) in the world, matters.

This does not necessarily mean that Korean Citizen Ethics textbook is still structured exclusively around the ethnic nationalism. My point here is that the government designated textbooks are still paying good enough attention on “ethnic nation” rather than on the loyalty of the citizens to their “state”, while the government is openly declaring that Korea is not ethnically homogeneous entity any more. Considering from the construction of the chapters, it is apparent that Korean individuals are prepared to adapt to the global diversity, but not much for the internal ethnic diversity.

Also, whereas Korean textbooks have shied away from direct mention of mono-ethnic pride over time, they still pay enough attention on the proud cultural heritage of the Korean ethnic nation. For instance, textbooks introduce Korean culture with the phrases “our proud culture (*charangsŭrŏun uri munhwa*)”, “great (*hullyunghan*)”, “worthy of emulation by the world (*segye ka ponbadŭlmanhan*)” (MEHRD, 2002b; 2002d), and “excellence of culture of our

---

79 Citizen Ethics textbook, naturally, explains on other aspects of the ethical life such as democratic citizenship, respect for life, and ethical issues related to information and technology.
What is gathered from the analyses of K-12 textbooks is twofold. One is that Korea is strategically preparing its citizens to become global citizens in order to carry on the national advancement. With all the fuss about their membership in OECD and G-20 in recent decade, it is apparent that Korean government aims to establish itself safely among one of the advanced nations in the world, through successful globalization. Second is that Korea cannot give up on the unification with North Korea. Whereas the last sixty something years of separation has estranged their people, customs, life style, political economy, ideological ground, and even a big part of their everyday level vocabulary, South and North Korea still share some things: history, language, and their deep-seated ethnic loyalty against the foreign powers. In this regard, it is apparent that South Korean textbooks cannot give up on emphasizing ethnic loyalty instead of state nationalism, as long as Korea does not completely give up on the unification thesis.

Mindful of the analysis in this section, I will proceed to elaborate on how some Korean individuals understand and utilize different tenets of public discourses on Koreanness in their own articulations of individual identities as a Korean. Many individuals aptly utilize the different discourses, such as Korean, mono-ethnic, multicultural, immigrant, or global in their articulations of the self and the “other.”

**Pride in Mono-ethnic Heritage and Multiculturalism**

I interviewed an elementary school social studies teacher, MO, in 2010. Since I met a teacher, especially a social studies subject specialist, I asked her what the most important point in elementary social studies class that students need to remember. Without any hesitation, MO told me she makes it sure that the students understand the “origin of the state/country.” Later, this young elementary school teacher in her late twenties readily stated that “state”, for her, meant Korean *minjok* (ethnic nation). On a more personal occasion, an English instructor in her early
thirties expressed the similar belief on the Korean homogeneity. In 2010, I asked how much she believed in the mono-ethnicity of the Korean people, drawing on the recent publications claiming the historical ethnic hybridity of the Korean people she discussed with me in an earlier occasion.

After a long thoughtful pause, she slowly produced an answer:

RT: I understand the historical facts tell that there had been ethnic mixture of people historically, but that does not make us think that you come from a different ethnic group from me, or me from another group than my next door neighbor. And I still feel like that Korean people being a unique ethnic group *(minjok chiptan)* does not change anyways, we look the same, we eat the same thing, (have) same culture, same language ... Maybe it’s that education we received for years, but for me, Korean people are one. … I mean..., mixed or whatever, (we) have already lived as one for so long, (we) don’t see the differences in each other, … unlike the new “multicultural population” we see now in our society. I don’t mean to say that I don’t like them being here, but compared to them, even with all those fancy scholars’ arguments and empirical data and whatever … Korean people had been one for a long time. We share history, family, friends, and all kinds of different sense of connectedness exist. I don’t feel we are different. I believe this “feeling *(nůkkim)* of sameness” will extend to the population now called “multicultural” when time passes. But it will take time, maybe a generation or more.

Both MO and RT received K-12 education before the rise of multiculturalism in Korean society. Both had master’s degree in education, vigorous readers of history, literature, and social science subjects, and actively teaching at the time they were interviewed. Their subject areas differ, but both claimed that they interacted with multicultural population frequently, either foreign teachers, instructors, or some children from multicultural families.

Even in 2010, four years after the Korean government proclaiming to promote multiculturalism in school textbooks, some people did not change their belief in mono-ethnic unity of the Korean people much. When asked how the curriculum changed after the 2006 declaration of the Korean Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development [MEHRD] to revise the textbooks, MO answered flatly, “curriculum did not change, only more paperwork for teachers.” As demonstrated in earlier section, Korean social studies, ethnics, and history
curriculum since early-1990s have been changing to prepare the individuals as global citizens, but not as multicultural citizens within the boundary of Korean society.

Explicit celebratory phrases of “mono-ethnicity” were taken out from the textbooks, but the main focus of the content did not change much. For example, elementary level social science textbooks as of 2008 presented Korean cultural heritage with the phrases “proud”, “great”, “first in the world history”, “the most scientific alphabet”, and “worthy of emulation by the world” (MEHRD, 2008, p. 110-127). In this regard, the recent argument that it is the notion of “cultural distinctiveness and superiority” embedded in Korean nationalism, rather than the notion of mono-ethnic homogeneity, that causes the ethnic/racial discrimination against the multicultural population (Han, 2007) is plausible.

For many of my interviewees, Korean state meant the Korean ethnic nation (minjok), but they were seeing more and more diverse population becoming parts of the Korean state. Many interviewees reasoned, just like RT and MO, that recent immigrants are becoming parts of the Korean state, but not quite the Korean ethnic nation. Especially in RT’s reasoning, time has the power of erasing the differences. She was very honest in saying that she needs more time to consider the new immigrants as same Koreans. The noticeable part in their reasoning is that, both participants accept that the “multicultural population” will be integrated into the Korean ethnic nation at some point in the future.

Younger students more readily stated that “anyone who has Korean citizenship is Korean.” When asked if everyone who has Korean citizenship is the same as Korean ethnic nation (minjok), their answers became fragmented. Many argued that the new citizens may not share the same sentiment with ethnic Koreans on certain historical issues, such as on the issues of Chinese
claiming ancient Korean history as part of Chinese history,\textsuperscript{80} of Japanese politicians claiming a
Korean island being their territory,\textsuperscript{81} or of the national security against the communist North
Korea. Many others also rationalized that sharing the collective memory and culture will not be a
problem as long as the new members grow up in Korea within the “Korean system”, meaning:

KM: … you know, when they are sent to foreigners’ schools all their life, their
socialization may not be the same as us. So, being in the Korean system, like
just regular Korean schools, friends, and when grown up, go to military service,
… as long as they go through similar things, I believe they will be fine.

In this line of rationalizations, socio-cultural life experiences are essentialized as a marker
that divides different groups of people. In KM’s comments, culture is understood as a marker of
Koreanness. With the rise of discourses of multiculturalism in 2010, young Koreans avoided to
comment on the differences of the multicultural population from themselves. Any differences
they recognized in the recent immigrants, even if that recognition is essentially an ethnically
exclusive “otherness”, young Korean individuals reasoned that the differences are resulting from
the different socio-cultural background.

Seemingly even more progressive, LN and IK were exceptional cases. LN, a male
participant born and raised in metropolitan Seoul, was interviewed in 2006. IK, a female
participant from Pusan,\textsuperscript{82} the second largest city in Korea, whose parents are teachers, was
interviewed in 2011. They both argued that a naturalized citizen chose to become Korean, and
their choices are stronger than the emotional loyalty of ethnic Koreans to their people and their
state. Naturalized citizens, LN argued, willfully chose to accept the history, culture, language,
people, and the whole system of thoughts, values and knowledge as their own, whereas ethnic

\textsuperscript{80} For more information, search for “Northeast Project of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.”
\textsuperscript{82} Pusan is the largest harbor city in Korea which is closely connected with the inflow of people and supplies from Japan, Russia, and Southeast Asia.
Koreans are just randomly born into a society.

R: LN, you just mentioned that anyone who is legally Korean citizen is a Korean, and naturalized citizens maybe better in being Korean than birthright Korean citizens. Is that correct?
LN: We did not choose to become Korean, but they did. And I appreciate their choices. I think … Koreans and Korean government, we all need to respect their choices. Their loyalty was chosen and reasoned out before making that choice, so it’s better than our blind loyalties to the Korean state or the Korean ethnic nation. … for the naturalized people, they chose to become Korean citizen, and that is a conviction, … a conviction that they are willing to accept our history, culture, social systems, customs, language, and so on, and… if we discriminate them for their conviction to become Korean, what kind of people and society are we? Think about that.

IK’s argument was similar. Individuals made a choice to become Korean, and thus they should be accepted wholeheartedly. She argued:

R: IK, to my question what makes a person Korean, you just answered that the condition of being Korean is enough having a Korean citizenship, no matter one is birthright or naturalized Korean citizen. Can you elaborate on your point a little more?
IK: Well…, I don’t know what else is needed to be a Korean…, like I just said, anyone who is legally Korean citizen is a Korean, period. Some people think immigrants are not as much Korean as the Korean-born Korean, but that’s wrong…, I don’t agree with them. Naturalized people went through all those processes with the laws and regulations, and they really tried to earn their citizenship. Their efforts to become a Korean should be respected. You cannot tell me I’m not such and such university student based on my dialect or my looks, because I went through all the studying and exams and application and extracurricular activities and volunteer works for years to be admitted to the school, and that’s not fair to not acknowledge all my efforts, … then why do you want to say those multicultural immigrants are not Korean just because they look different and their mother tongue is not Korean?

Both LN’s and IK’s fervent advocacy for the multicultural population, namely naturalized citizens of Korea, seems far departed from the general discourse of socio-cultural membership over official document. However, they assume that all immigrants who chose to be naturalized also fully accept the history, culture, language, and the like tenets of socio-cultural membership. In this sense, their advocacy of naturalized multicultural population is only a variation of the
cultural membership discourse.

Also, from IK’s comments on endeavoring to earn Korean citizenship implicitly discredit the immigrants who had not been through the process of earnestly learning and endeavoring to achieve their citizenship. Or, someone who acquired Korean citizenship first and then learning and trying to adjust to the new environment are disregarded in this discourse. Especially marriage immigrants had been exempt from the formal naturalization test of Korean government until 2007, for the sake of quick and easy naturalization of the wives of Korean nationals (Kim, S., 2011). In addition, by assuming the naturalized immigrants’ convictions to accept the tenets of cultural membership, LN’s and IK’s version of multiculturalism closes off the possibilities of keeping diverse identities of immigrants. In other words, LN’s and IK’s version of multiculturalism aims for the assimilation of the multicultural population into Korean society rather than achieving diversity in the society.

In this regard, younger Korean individuals’ seeming difference from the earlier generation is only a superficial change. Or, this type of separating the ethnic and cultural themes are perhaps more harmful than the former “I need more time to accept them Korean” type of honesty. The discursive practices of leaving the ethnically exclusive beliefs of having a superior culture intact while only problematizing cultural difference are a dangerous way of encouraging the racism under the guise of culture and civilization. Since Korean cultural heritage are “proud”, “great”, and “worthy of emulation by the world” (MEHRD, 2002b; 2002d), it is only natural that immigrants are eager to accept and follow Korean cultural heritage as theirs. When not, immigrants are easily deemed “backward” or “unworthy of respect”, because they do not know what is superior or what is better for them. In the end, these individuals are quick at utilizing the public discourses of multiculturalism and respect to cultural differences, yet still confused of
what kind of multiculturalism they are aiming for.

**Flexible Identities**

For me, MO, a public elementary school teacher shortly introduced earlier, was one of the most interesting participants. She was initially certified to teach in secondary schools by choosing a college of education rather than the teacher’s college for her university education. She applied, however, to teach in elementary schools when local governments were recruiting to relieve the teacher shortage in elementary schools in early 2000s. Her specialization was social studies instruction, but she also was responsible of administering the English program in her school. Korean government-recruited native English speakers were dispersed throughout K-12 level public schools in order to help English instructions of Korean school children. Each school has a teacher who is responsible for coordinating the program and taking care of all administrative procedures for “native instructor (wŏnŏmin kangsa).”

MO was a teacher who readily stated that the most important point of elementary social studies curriculum is making students understand the “origin of the state/country”, which was essentially the “origin of the Korean ethnic nation.” In contrast, she was at the frontline of globalization project of the government in teaching elementary school children English. I could not help but ask her how she copes with the discrepancy between the two different worlds on her

---

83 At the end of the 1990s, public schools were no exception from the “reconstruction”, which meant downsizing. Under the IMF-intervention regime following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Korean Ministry of Education suggested for the retirement age for public elementary school teachers were lowered from sixty-five to sixty-two. At the same time, MOE encouraged early retirement of elementary school teachers by incentives of granting the full retirement plan to early retirees until August 2000. This policy was relatively well-accepted by the elder teachers in regards to sharing responsibilities for social suffering and to provide more jobs to the younger generation than keeping the retirement-age teachers in position for a few more years. Reducing the retirement age of elementary school teachers and encouraging the early retirement of the elder teachers at the same time became only too successful that Korean elementary schools were suffering from a significant shortage of elementary school teachers in early 2000s. Local governments started hiring college graduates certified for secondary education, trained them for elementary education for four months, and sent them to the elementary schools. MO was one of these young teachers who graduated college with teacher certificate on secondary education, specialized in social studies teaching, but applied for the quick retraining to become elementary school teacher.

84 Native English speakers were recruited through TaLK (Teach and Learn in Korea) and EPIK (English Program in Korea), shortly introduced in Chapter II.
R: So…, let’s go over what you just said…, as social studies teacher, you believe in a sufficient ethnic and cultural homogeneity of Korean people, despite the scholarly findings supporting the ethnic mixture in Korean history, and you teach about the origin of the homogeneous ethnic nation…
MO: Correct.
R: And you also believe in that Korea is turning into a multicultural society, and acquiring English fluency is… one of the basic steps for the future generation in the… globalizing, multicultural conditions of the world…, did I say it correctly?
MO: Exactly.
R: Excuse me, if I am not following you…, but…, how do you cope with teaching two different beliefs…? It sounds like…, at least to me, it sounds like you are at the frontline of both spreading the ethnic national beliefs and promoting the global and multicultural changes in the society. How do you cope with this gap?
MO: Both social studies class and English program are my job responsibilities. Those are my work, it doesn’t have to concern what I am. I just happened to be certified as social studies subject specialist, and when the school needed someone to coordinate the English program, I was one of the youngest and with some English skills. Elder teachers didn’t want to have more work load, and at the same time, they were uncomfortable speaking English. I happened to have taken some on-the-job training courses and workshops during the summer and winter vacations on English instructions…, so it just came to me, because I was a rookie and elder teachers didn’t want it, and you can’t say no to what your job requires of you. Right? So…, let’s not waste our time on something completely different from what you wanted me to talk about… I think you wanted to talk about identity constructions, right? I actually studied educational psychology for my Master’s degree. I think I know what you need.

MO made it seem the job of school English program coordinator was assigned to her apart from her wishes, but it was her active choice of taking extra courses during her vacations. On-the-job training courses and workshops are sponsored and many times arranged by the local Education Office, and evaluations from these courses are reflected on the promotion of teachers. She may not have volunteered to take the role of English program coordinator. However, I learned that she took some extensive English/English instruction courses from the local Education Office for in-service teachers since the early years of her career. MO has been a high achieving person all her life, even managing to graduate from her college a semester earlier than
her cohorts.

She insisted on jumping onto my main topic of Korean identity construction than talking about her job, obviously meaning to “help me out as much as she can” within the confinement of time. From now on, it is a long conversation to follow, but I want to present most of the sequence to show how quickly an individual can change one’s positions between completely different, seemingly contradictory, stances.

MO: … so that’s that about my work. Are we going to talk about identity issues…?
R: Uhm…, yes…, sure, thanks again for reminding me, uhm…, you know…, I’m studying education but didn’t become a teacher myself, and I might need to explain out some things in my research about Korean teachers’ work, right…? So…, please do me a favor, and talk about your job … as a public school teacher in Korea…, all right? [she sighs/smiles and nods] So…, I think it’s a lot of responsibility on your part that you have to deal with such different aspects of… educational mission, right…? You need to raise children to acquire English fluency, and you also need to make sure they know the origin of Korean… state (kukka)…?
MO: (sigh…) … Origin of the Korean ethnic nation (minjok), not the Korean state. How come…, well, Korean state, it depends on what you define the state, but if you are referring to the modern republic, it only goes back to 1945, when we established the government, and if you want to talk about the ancient states, that would be like the three kingdom period first century B.C. … well, my point is, Korean state doesn’t really matter, states change…, their names, ruling system…, but the ethnic nation (minjok), people stay for thousands of years. So it’s better to teach for the ethnic nation, because the people don’t change, the lineage goes on somehow. State (kukka) is important as to being a structural format…, or a system that protects its people. It can be different for other nations in the world, because there are not many mono-ethnic states, but from the Korean point of view, state (kukka) is the outer fence that guards the ethnic nation (minjok). That’s my understanding.
R: I see. It’s great I get all the free private lessons when I interview a teacher, right? Now, will you tell me more about your other responsibility? It’s interesting that English instructions came down to elementary schools. Please tell me more of what is going on.
MO: Well…, I bet you know better than I do… It’s a globalized world, the world became smaller, and we, too, are turning into a multicultural society, the future generation needs at least basic level English skills to survive… If they are fluent [in English], it would be better for them to maneuver the global stage (küllobol mudae), that’s the presumed educational viewpoint. Of course, any foreign language fluency will help, but English happened to be the most
popularly (p’apyullŏ-hage) spoken language by majority [of the world] as common language or, at least…. communication language (kyot’ongŏ), so that’s just teaching kids basic skills for the future. And our country is already becoming multicultural, right? And foreigners visiting over an extended period are increasing, and since the society is changing, people should change as well, or, maybe it’s the other way around, people are changing, so the society should change and educate the next generation to become multicultural, we need to become multicultural and global, no one ever knows when one might come across a person who should communicate in English. [We] really need to learn English, even if we don’t go out of the country one foot, [we] will need English sooner or later.

R: I see. So…. you think learning English is very important for the Korean people to be competitive in the globalizing world.
MO: Yes, and also for the multicultural society. Our country (uri nara = Korea) is becoming multicultural, and it’s not very rare that [we] come across with multicultural population nowadays. I never dreamed that I would need to speak in English on daily basis, especially as a public school teacher, without even leaving the Republic of Korea… Even if we do not go abroad, [we] will need English nowadays, like me, for example. [You] don’t even need to work for a foreign corporation, [you] will still need some level of English fluency, either for globalization or for multicultural society. Better be equipped early than later. We are not living in a world that we can be secluded from the world, even when we live in our country and do not go abroad once in the whole lifetime, so we all need to learn English, and try to acquire some fluency at least, as long as the kids can communicate some basic things in English, they will be okay. I would say it’s one of the fundamental etiquettes of being a multicultural citizen. When people come to Korea, they try to learn our language and our ways…. so why don’t we make a little effort to make it easier for both us and them at the same time? Although…. I agree it’s very troublesome that everyone learns English, but we are seeing more people who are not very fluent in our language settling as the citizens of our country (uri nara). It is already problematized that their not being fluent in our language is one of the reasons for their school failures, and they will still grow up and go to military service in that condition.

R: I’m sorry, who are we talking about…?
MO: Multicultural children, you know, they are now old enough to come to school, and…

R: Excuse me again, could you define your concept of “multicultural children” before going on…? Who are the multicultural children are you talking about?
MO: Well…. multicultural children…. like…. the ones from Korean father-Southeast Asian mother families or foreign laborer families…. not all of them are fluent in our language (uri mal) to excel in schools. They are already struggling in schools because of their Korean language (kugŏ=national language) fluency, they are inarticulate and they speak awkwardly, and they don’t understand what’s going on in class so they don’t pay attention and make troubles, and they are uncontrollable because teachers cannot communicate well with them, … and it’s worrying me what it’s going to be like when our children
grow up. Korean language is dying out, although very slowly, no one pays so much attention in learning and maintaining Korean language, but kid’s spelling skills are definitely deteriorating, by texting and internet chatting kind of things. I find students’ Korean language competency (kugŏ sillyŏk) is deteriorating every year. But everyone learns English so earnestly, and in next couple generations…. English may become the official language, because everyone understands English, but Korean children’s Korean language competency is deteriorating, with all those multicultural children not being fluent in Korean…. we may need to start communicating in English with them…. it’s… very worrying… you know…. by the time our son (uri adŭl) goes to military service, they will be in the military as well, since they are citizens of our country, but what happens when people cannot communicate well enough with those multicultural kids in our language…. especially military orders are serious things, it’s the national security they will be dealing with, although on different levels…. you know…. it’s very worrying… once it is started, then English may become our official language, you will never know…

First of all, what struck me the most while listening to MO was how quickly she changes from being an ethnic nationalist to globalist to multiculturalist to ethnic nationalist. Both the flexibility and the fluidity of her stances were amazing throughout the whole interview. For her, teaching the origin of Korean ethnic nation to students and being a teacher at the forefront of globalization project of the government by coordinating the school-wide English program were only different job responsibilities she took on. Thus she can move from one stance to the other according to the context in which she recognized herself to be in, or according to what her current position requires her to be. She changes her stance as if she changes her masks, and there is no seeming hesitation or resistance in changing from one position to another.

However, her “jobs” were very much intertwined with her identity. It was clearly an active choice on MO’s part to take the roles as both social studies subject specialist and English program coordinator for her school. Whereas MO presented as if the jobs were assigned to her by the school regardless of her wishes, she took extra courses and made herself fit for the jobs. She also could not let it pass but “teach” me the difference of the state and ethnic nation, when I said the “Korean state” in place of “Korean ethnic nation.” She also argued that it is only proper
for Koreans try to meet the effort of the immigrants by acquiring “communicable fluency of English” as the hosts. What she claimed as her “different roles/work” were very much part of her identities, only too fluid and variable.

Second, MO uses “our country”, “our people”, “we”, “our children”, “our language”, and “they”, “those multicultural children”, “them” to indicate things Korean/Korean people and “others.” It is colloquial Korean linguistic practice to use collective possessive forms of speaking to indicate what is related to themselves. Even so, MO uses different forms of “us” and “them” too skillfully in her narrative to separate out Koreans and Koreanness from the “otherness” without clearly referring what is “us” and what is “them.” She only had a son who just turned one-year-old, so when she was worrying about “our children”, she was referring to ethnic Korean children in general as if all of them are her own. In other words, even when she speaks of promoting globalization and multiculturalism, the break between “us” and “them” in her narrative is very clear, partly by virtue of general Korean linguistic culture.

Third, while MO was confident that the lineage of people somehow continues, she also claimed that people are changing to become multicultural. She explained later in the interview that “people” here meant both demographic and cultural characteristics of Korean people, because “multicultural population will eventually become a part of Korean people.” I also asked her to clarify whether she means Korean nationals/citizens (kungmin/simín) or Korean ethnic nation (minjok), when she was saying multicultural population will become part of Korean people. She acknowledged that being recognized as Korean nationals/citizens will be easier, but “it will take a long time before [multicultural population] are completely integrated into Korean ethnic nation.”

85 For instance, Korea is usually referred as “our country (uri nara)” rather than Korea, Koreans invite a guest not to “my home (nae chip)” but “our home (uri chip)”, and never have “my father (na ūi abŏji)” even when the person is an only child but “our father (uri abŏji).”
MO still stated that multicultural population will become a part of Korean ethnic nation eventually, partly by assimilation and partly by the changes of Korean society conforming to diversity. However, from her later comments of being concerned of Korean language dying out, MO’s resistance of the society changing to accommodate the needs of immigrants is apparent. Aside from her worries being ungrounded, it was apparent that she regretted the society changing to have English as official language. Whereas MO promoted English skills as “one of the fundamental etiquettes of being multicultural citizen”, and argued that Koreans also should make efforts in response to the efforts of people coming to Korea learning Korean language and culture, she still did not want this Korean efforts should go to the level of making English an official language.

Fourth, MO made it clear that she is teaching for the “ethnic nation” when claiming that states change whereas people continue to exist through their lineage. In this respect, endeavors to ensure her students acquire English fluency can be interpreted as her strategic choice for the “ethnic nation” in a society that is increasingly globalizing and permeated by the discourses of multiculturalism. It is clear that English fluency is related to multiculturalism and, in turn, to global competitiveness, because Koreans cannot be “secluded from the world” even when they “do not go abroad.” MO’s reasoning was that if they cannot avoid it, Koreans “better be equipped early than later” with necessary English skills for their own survival. Acquiring English fluency and active efforts of becoming multicultural and global, for MO, can be interpreted as strategic choices of ethnic nationalism.

Fifth, with her “uncontrollable multicultural children” comment, MO’s imagery of “multicultural children” is limited by the popular representations of “multicultural population.” For her, “multicultural children” are mainly from Korean father – Southeast Asian mother
families or foreign laborer families. She also focused on the language barrier for the multicultural children to be difficult students, but any student can be disruptive, language barrier or not. Claiming these “multicultural children” are disruptive in classes because of their language barrier is equivalent to saying that they are disruptive because they are “multicultural.”

Sixth, MO’s concerns on the possibility of Korean language dying out quickly (within one generation) and biracial children being not fluent enough in Korean language are, in my perspective, ungrounded fear at this stage. There may be some biracial children who are not very elaborate and fluent in Korean language, and it may be true that some of them actually struggle in their academic progress due to the language barrier. However, it is doubtful that Korean father – foreign-born mother families raise children exclusively in the mothers’ languages, rather than the mothers trying to learn Korean at all. Majority of children from foreign-born father – Korean mother families will not have much difficulty either when they grow up in Korea. When children learn English, most of them learn it in Korean schools from Korean teachers in Korean language, with the help of native English speaker instructors.

As it was noted earlier, MO’s flexibility and fluidity of changing her stances were amazing. I sometimes had difficulty catching up with her speed of changing positions from being an ethnic nationalist to globalist to multiculturalist to ethnic nationalist. The closest I can tell about her was that she showed a tendency of ethnic nationalist strategically pursuing globalization and multiculturalism. She still showed some positive elements toward immigrant population and multiculturalism. One example is her comments that Koreans should respond with the same effort to understand and communicate with the immigrants, for the immigrants’ efforts to adjust to Korean society. It still remains question whether the individuals like MO would be concerned of adjusting to the immigrant’s languages and cultures of the lower tier of
the society.

From the recent statistics of foreign nationals staying in Korea, it is true that the number of
growers is increasing every year (see Table 1). Even so, 1.5 million foreigners among 50
million total Korean population (Statistics Korea, 2013) are not a huge proportion to say the
demographic composition is “multicultural.” Also, demographic diversity is even less than the
number suggests, considering that about one-third of the foreign nationals in Korea are ethnic
Koreans from China (Registered foreign nationals in Korea, retrieved on Aug. 13, 2014 from
http://kosis.kr/statHtml/statHtml.do?orgId=111&tblId=DT_1B040A7&vw_cd=MT_OTITLE&li
st_id=111_11104&scrId=&seqNo=&lang_mode=ko&obj_var_id=&itm_id=&conn_path=E1#).
Many interview participants claimed to enjoy multiculturalism than being uncomfortable with
the recent rise of multiculturalism. However, whether Koreans are actually becoming
multicultural or just wanting to be seen multicultural remains a question. It is also questionable
whether these ethnic Korean “multiculturalists” aim for the assimilation of the immigrants or for
Korean society adjusting to the open diversity. As it will be elaborated in the next chapter, the
latter case is very rare.

Table 1. Foreign nationals residing in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aliens Total</td>
<td>1,168,477</td>
<td>1,261,415</td>
<td>1,395,077</td>
<td>1,445,103</td>
<td>1,576,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended Stay</td>
<td>920,887</td>
<td>1,002,742</td>
<td>1,117,481</td>
<td>1,120,599</td>
<td>1,219,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short Stay</td>
<td>247,590</td>
<td>258,673</td>
<td>277,596</td>
<td>324,504</td>
<td>356,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal Immigrants</td>
<td>177,955</td>
<td>168,515</td>
<td>167,780</td>
<td>177,854</td>
<td>183,106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary and Conclusion: Global Advancement, Multiculturalism, and the Flexible
Identities

From the Korean textbooks, there are globalized multicultural citizens, and there are
Korean ethnic nationalists. They should be one, not two. Textbook discourses combine these two into one desire of Koreans: the desire to establish a rich and strong nation advancing into the global world through peaceful unification with North Korea. For global advancement, Koreans should be multicultural citizens well-versed in diversity of any kind, but for unification, Koreans should keep their ethnic loyalty.

Textbooks also demonstrate that the government wants Korean individuals become global citizens respecting the diverse cultures, while emphasizing on the ethnic national loyalty rather than state nationalism on the other hand. However, many interviewees in 2010, including MO and RT, view any immigrant, whether temporary or permanent, can become part of the Korean ethnic nation over time. Only their perspectives are problematic in aiming for the immigrants’ assimilation, rather than Korean society conforming to more diversity.

It is very difficult to make Korean individuals to talk about what constitutes Koreanness, while the discourses of promoting diversity, appreciation, sympathy, and inclusion are easily identifiable. As Shin (2006) noticed, challenging the beliefs on the shared ethnic heritage is regarded “politically incorrect.” Individuals, however, do talk about certain things that would imply what constitutes Koreanness while talking about something completely different from Koreanness, such as multiculturalism or the recent immigrants. Official and individual level discourses on multiculturalism prevailed in Korean society during 2000s. Yet, as it was demonstrated in the analyses, seemingly positive discourses of multiculturalism and openness can turn out to reproduce and encourage prejudices by objectifying the foreignness or closing off the possibilities of diversity.

Especially the viewpoints emphasizing the shared culture and history for the basis of being “real” Korean were disturbing, in a sense that the individuals started to separate what they think
and what is “politically correct.” Individual constructions of discourses on what constitutes Korean are becoming more sophisticated over time, but that does not necessarily mean the concept of Koreanness is being under revision. Rather, in many cases, individuals are finding more sophisticated ways to be politically correct while not changing their ethnocentric stances. Individuals fervently advocated the individual wills of the immigrants to become Korean as sufficient condition to become a part of Korean ethnic nation, such as IK and LN. Their acceptance of immigrant population is, however, based on the active efforts of the immigrants to be assimilated into Korean society. As for the immigrants’ efforts to be assimilated, it was apparent that history, language, culture, and the similar tenets underlying the idea of Korean ethnic and cultural superiority had to be learned and internalized.

In addition, these individual discourses of separating the socio-cultural differences from ethnic differences are problematic as Iain Watson (2012) argued pointedly about official discourses of Korean multiculturalism. Watson (2012) argued:

By focusing on “cultural” difference, … and by separating culture from race and ethnicity, the government can claim evidence of multiculturalism in South Korea while leaving beliefs in racial and ethnic exclusivity unquestioned … by emphasizing cultural difference rather than race and ethnicity… these beliefs remain unquestioned, implicit, and constitutive of cultural attitudes particularly toward foreigners (235).

It is apparent that school textbooks took out celebratory remarks on the mono-ethnic heritage of the nation, while emphasizing the superior qualities of culture and heritage of Korean ethnic nation (minjok). In this regard, Korean identities are closely intertwined with ethnic nationalism based on its homogeneous and superior qualities.

Moreover, it was demonstrated that Korean social studies, ethics, and history curriculum since early-1990s have been structured in order to prepare their citizens for the diversity in global setting, but not for the diversity within Korea (Choi, 2010). It was also apparent that
Korean textbooks have not shied away from celebrating its ethnic and cultural superiority. Based on their beliefs in ethnic and cultural superiority, Korean individuals are strategically encouraged to become globally competitive citizens. And Korean government aims to establish a rich and powerful Korean ethnic nation through peaceful unification and economic and political advancement in the global political economy.

In the end, there are Korean individuals who think they are multicultural, but majority of them are rather Korean ethnic nationalists pursuing to be sophisticated in global terms. Many of young interview participants needing parent’s consent were in my interviews partly due to their parents’ hopes that these young adolescents will benefit from their contacts with me: for them, I was a “global Korean” by virtue of pursuing a higher degree in the United States. Strategically globalized, but ethnically loyal Korean individuals are what Korean government envisions in their discourses in K-12 textbooks. Korean individuals did not fully abide by the government’s molding. They did, nevertheless, keenly grasped onto what public discourses of multicultural diversity required from Korean individuals.

The following chapter will explore the issues of “multicultural” identities of Korean individuals in relation to the larger social issues of globalization, economic interest, and social integration. I will also examine how these “multicultural” identities evolve over time in juxtaposition with the popular representations of “multicultural population.”
Chapter V Understandings of Multiculturalism in Korea

Introduction

It was observed in previous chapter that Korean textbooks produce seemingly contradicting discourses on being good Korean citizens: globally competitive multicultural citizens and ethnic nationalists proud of their superior cultural heritage. Individuals were found to be keenly aware of what is required of them to act as a legitimate Koreans from the public discourses, even though they did not always completely abide by the public discourses. Individuals were producing and reproducing the public discourses on Koreanness as well as their own variations of what it means to be a legitimate Korean in a contemporary Korean society.

This chapter will explore the issues of “multicultural” identities of Korean individuals in relation to the larger social issues of globalization, economic interest, and social integration. I will also examine how these “multicultural” identities evolve over time in juxtaposition with the popular representations. Although not always explicit, the issues of global advancement of Korea, social integration, and multiculturalism are closely weaved together in defining Koreanness in relation to the “otherness” in the society. Rather, Korean individuals more often define “otherness” which implies the embedded and hidden Koreanness.

The Color of Your Skin and the Price of Korean Economic Advancement

The color of your skin. When I started conducting the interviews in 2003-2004, one of the most popular imagery of a foreign resident in Korea was a dark-skinned male foreign laborer. Whereas school textbooks still propagated on the proud ethnic unity of the Korean people, public advertisement poster, “Modu salsaek86 innida (All are skin colors)”87, pleaded for the open mind

---

86 The name “salsaek” in Korean literally means flesh/skin color. The Korean word “sal” means flesh or skin, and “saek” means color.
87 See Appendix I. This poster was awarded with the first place in The 20th Republic of Korea Public Service Advertising Prize in 2001.
on the skin color. Public advertisement poster “All are skin colors” was a product of the series of events since 2001. Foreign laborers in Korea appealed to the National Human Rights Commission of the Republic of Korea (Kukka Inkwŏn Wiwŏnhoe, NHRCK hereafter) that the practice of naming a specific color as “skin color”, whereas skin colors differ from person to person, is a practice of racism. Accepting their appeal, NHRCK recommended Koreans did not use the name “salsaek” and Korean companies manufacturing the coloring materials eliminate the name “salsaek (skin/flesh color)” on the crayons and painting materials in 2001 (Han’gyŏre, 2001; 2005).

In 2002, the name of the color was corrected to “pale orange (yŏnjuhwang)”, which is a word originally consisted of Chinese words. The name “pale orange (yŏnjuhwang)”, some children of elementary and middle school age appealed to the NHRCK, is another form of discrimination and violation on human rights of children who cannot understand difficult Chinese words. The children petitioned NHRCK to change the name of the color to “apricot”, which does not carry discriminatory characteristics and easy to understand. Their appeal was accepted and the name of the color finally was settled to be “apricot” in 2004 (Han’gyŏre, 2005).

Coinciding with the popular weekly stand-up comedy sessions of “Blanca’s ‘What is this?’ (Blanca üi ‘mwŏnnikka, ige?!’), eliminating the color name “salsaek” and the poster

88 As a side note, the poster “All are skin colors” showed up on the newspapers and on the subway trains since winning the Public Service Advertising Prize of 2001, but this poster is more frequently cited after 2006 when Korean government openly declared that Korea being a multicultural society. I searched for the poster during my visits to Korea in 2002-2003, but only acquired one in summer 2003. However, this poster is readily accessible online, just by googling.

89 Blanca’s ‘what is this?! (mwŏnnikka ige?!’) was a short popular stand-up comedy section within a weekly late night comedy show, “Burst-out-laughing Club (P’okso K’ilłŏp).” This small corner of stand-up comedy show drew much attention and popularity with its satire and the portrait of the perspectives and conditions of the immigrant laborers in Korea. Chŏng Ch’ŏl-gyu (a.k.a. Blanca) described the “boss (owner of the company)” who abuses his immigrant laborers and the cultural difference of Korea from the viewpoint of the immigrant laborers. The narratives were presented as Blanca, a Sri Lankan laborer in a Korean factory, telling episodes of his life in Korea, on the abusive behaviors and talks of the Korean boss, on the puzzling aspects of Korean culture and people’s attitude, or on his relationship with his wife and the in-laws. The phrase “mwŏnnikka ige?!” with his particular facial expressions, body language, and nuance and accents indicating his “un-Koreanness” portrayed the frustrations of a
“All are skin colors” contributed in drawing more public attention on the issues of foreign laborers and their living conditions in Korea in early 2000s. There still were limitations at the time: Korea officially banned the name “salsaek (flesh/skin color)” on the crayons and painting materials around the beginning of 2002, but people were still unofficially calling the color in the middle of the poster “salsaek”, not knowing what would be the alternative name for the color that just lost its name. The poster showed, at least, a shift in the thoughts of some Korean people. Although I was somewhat stupefied by the combination of its title and the visual image it was providing, this advertisement seemed to have some positive effects. It did, indeed, provoke some comments from my interviewees during 2003-2004.

In one of the small group interviews with young college students in early Fall 2003, a student reported that he had witnessed some grownup Koreans unconsciously wiping their hands off the side of their pants after shaking hands with the darker-skinned foreign workers. He strongly expressed regrets about the behavior, saying that he becomes “wordless” when he sees some people wiping off their hands unconsciously. He said it was not only once that he witnessed the described behavior in grownup Koreans, but for a few times while he worked and lived in the factory dormitory with some foreign workers. As this experience was shared with other interviewees and comments came from different aspects, another participant talked about the public advertisement poster “All are skin colors.”

Participants and I sought to find a copy of the poster discussed, but we did not acquire a copy until the next summer when I visited Korea again. NK, a female participant in her early foreign person experiencing the life in the lower-tier of Korean economy.

90 The name “salsaek” in Korean literally means flesh/skin color. The Korean word “sal” means flesh or skin, and “saek” means color.

91 This interviewee said he lived in Buch‘ŏn, one of the satellite cities of Seoul, where the factories are concentrated. The majority of foreign laborers were from Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern countries. According to the Ministry of Justice statistics, Korea had 747,000 foreign residents by 2003, and at least half of them were unskilled laborers. Even though all 373,500 foreign workers were not concentrated in my interviewee’s neighborhood, it is not hard to guess that he was encountering the laborers along with their Korean employers and co-workers on daily bases.
twenties, brought in a photograph of the poster for the meeting in 2004, and another participant wrote down the narration of the poster for the class. LI, who initially pointed our attention to the hand-wiping behavior, assessed the effects of the “All are skin colors” poster to be positive at the beginning. Yet, some other interviewees in the group pointed out that “the very need and the presence of that public advertisement poster [was] scream[ing] out how much Koreans discriminate people with different skin colors, especially the foreign laborers.”

At the same time, this poster was more problematic than plainly educational as it was intended to be. Especially until early summer 2004, when the alternative name for “salsaek” was not “officially” suggested or publicized at all yet, and people were still calling the color “salsaek” and being confused, as another interviewee said, “it is only perplexing people more than ever.” NK burst out, somewhat angrily:

NK: There wasn’t any detailed specifics ready and just said it was not the skin color, … the name salsaek is officially suspended but no one knows what else to call it, and nonetheless, (starts laughing, making faces in ridicule) they only gave the examples of skin colors as that snow-white white, that who knows what color, and pitch-black. … Why not any more colors? Why not, uh..., any real pictures of all different shades of people? … It was so ridiculous... Poo ~ hahaha!! So what, then? No one knows what else to call that color except “salsaek”, while everyone knows there is no human being possibly having that snow-white white skin and pitch-black black skin. … At the best, I can see some positive educational effects of that poster on some (interviewee’s emphasis on the word “some”) Korean people, but..., I’m really doubtful... I’m ve--ry doubtful whether the authorities, who commissioned that poster and wanted to instruct people, actually had any ideas on what they are talking about....

My answer to her would have been that those who commissioned the advertisement might have had more ideas than she thought. Presenting a stark visual contrast of the colors which are not realistic at all as NK points out, but placing one color that has been inscribed in people’s

92 As a side note, it was difficult to access this poster at the time. I spotted it once riding in a subway train, but could not find it again on other places. The poster in Appendix I was found online with relative ease after mid-2000. The relative inaccessibility of the poster in earlier period also imply the context that the foreign industrial trainee program was becoming a hot issue in the society while the government not wanting to open up the doors for the laborers’ settlement in Korea.
minds as the closest representation of their skin colors and been called “salsaek (flesh/skin color)” for such a long time, of which the name has been officially suspended but not declared of any alternatives, in a way, was only confirming the name “salsaek.”

Even NK, who was very careful not to say “salsaek” while she was being recorded, called the color “salsaek” for a couple times as she was being tired of finding some other words to indicate it, in more private occasions where she was not recorded and did not have any young students around us. She said in a frustration:

NK: what else should we call it, then, salsaek is salsaek, whatever else that color might look like! I know that’s not even close to my own skin color either, but it was called salsaek for all my life, it’s really a “damn it”! Give me another name that I can call that damn color, like apricot or something!

I could imagine the general frustration of the interview participants on not knowing what to call the color when they were confronted with a situation where they should think or talk about that specific color. And this frustration translates into the situation where, upon seeing the public advertisement on a subway, many Koreans simply start thinking the word “salsaek” connected to the crayon in the middle, while consciously resisting towards calling the color as “salsaek.” However, in their resistance, another interviewee confessed, “with a strange paradox of psychology, in my view..., [people were] just seeing the connection between the word “salsaek” and the crayon in the middle growing stronger.” He said:

OL: it was really strange that while I was looking at that poster, I..., I just concentrated on that I don’t know what..., color crepas, because it was the only thing connected to the word “salsaek” to me, although..., uh..., I know I shouldn’t call it so any longer. I don’t know..., it was really weird..., and I felt somewhat guilty... about seeing that crepas so vividly stood out with the word “salsaek”...

---

93 I met BH while I was teaching some middle school and high school students in a “Special Summer Program for Advanced Students” at an institute in an affluent area of Seoul. She showed interest on what I was researching as a doctoral student, and volunteered to talk to me between her classes and sometimes participated in group interviews with other college students.

94 Crepas is a type of coloring device most young Korean children use, just like crayons in the United States. It is a word combined crayon and pastel. “Crepas” is, softer than the crayons and yields more vivid color on the paper. Consider it a Korean equivalent of crayons for children.
and..., it’s embarrassing to say all these, haha~~ (nervous laugh)! But, anyways, eh..., you see, it was almost doing the opposite of what it... probably meant to do..., to me. Maybe, it’s just me..., but I talked with a couple of other friends while we were looking at that poster on the train, and she was saying the same thing..., that *salsaek crepas*, eyai~~, see I did it again? (giggles) That thing, uh..., was so vividly standing out with almost a slight line to the word “salsaek” in my head, and other colors, uh..., which were not any realistic anyways, you don’t see people in those colors unless they are albinos, or intentionally painted in black, just faded into the background, I mean, in my mind... and I look at the foreign laborers, and I just don’t see their faces or colors or whatever, … (they) do not go into that poster at all. They don’t overlap. Those images... No, not at all.

In addition to a general problem that this image essentializes only three different colors as “skin colors”, if these colors can be any realistic representation of skin colors, the discourse the poster propagates is problematic in many different ways. Paying a closer attention on the small titles and the written contents in smaller print on the poster yields some more explanations for OL’s interpretation or reactions to the poster. The two-line small titles on the Poster I reads:

“Foreign laborers are precious (*sojunghan*) people [as we are] with only different skin colors *pibusaek)*; [They are] invaluable guests who will acquaint our country to the world when [they] go back.” This line of representations is problematic in many ways.

First, despite the main title and the visual image supposedly claims that there are all different shades of skin colors, seemingly orienting the audience towards a discourse on the open-mindedness towards all colors of people, small titles clearly direct the audience to a specific group of people: foreign laborers. Here, the visual image of the color in the middle “vividly stand[s] out” and other two colors fade in the background as they lose the meaning in being the “foreign laborers’ colors” to many Koreans. The laborers are “dark, but not as dark as

---

95 “Pibusaek” means the same as “*salsaek*”, only with specificity of *pibu* being *skin*, rather than skin and flesh at the same time like the word “*sal*.” It is colloquially more proper, or more forlmal, in this sentence to use the word “pibusaeok” than “salsaek.” I personally doubt that there existed any consideration for more political correctness of using “pibusaeok” instead of the word “salsaek” in this sentence. At best interpretation, though, it could be seen that the government organization which sponsored this advertisement wanted to emphasize that it is only a superficial difference that the foreign laborers had from Koreans.
pure black,” OL commented, and majority of the workers are from the “other” Asian countries. The color in the middle, “salsaek” does not “match” the color of “foreign laborers” either: hence, OL’s confession that “it was almost doing the opposite of what it... probably meant to do” to him and to many other Koreans. Besides, foreigners other than the “industrial trainees,” lose their footing immediately in the world the poster represents. As a result, an equation is established in the world this poster creates: foreigner = laborer. With the prior knowledge of most Koreans that the majority of the foreign laborers being darker in their skin tones, this “foreigner = laborer” equation easily extends to “foreigner = laborer = darker skin color.”

Second, within the combination of the provided image, main title, and the small title, biracial population who had existed in Korea at least since the Korean War was completely excluded. The same exclusion extended to: the ethnic Chinese (hwagyo, or huaqiao in Chinese) who had lived in Korea since the late nineteenth century (National Institute of Korean History, 2007: 16); other foreign-born men and women who intermarried with Korean people; ethnic Koreans from China looking for work in their recently found fatherland; and women from other Asian countries married to Korean farmers whose number was rapidly growing by the time when this poster was produced. Also, this rhetoric excluded, naturally, the children from intermarriages as well.

Third, presenting the discrimination towards foreign laborers because of their skin colors with the visual image of the crayons objectifies the foreign laborers just like the inanimate objects in the pictures. As NK ridiculed, it was too obvious to anyone that all three colors were not a realistic representation of human skin color, whereas majority of Koreans were “trained” to relate to the color in the middle as more realistic representation of their own color of the skin. With no trace of personification presented in the images, the real foreign laborers were lost in the
white background of inanimate crayons. That was why OL could not see the foreign laborers’ “faces or colors or whatever ... overlap” with the presented images of the crayons.

Fourth, the second line of the small title, “[They are] invaluable guests who will introduce our country to the world when [they] go back”, assumes that these foreign laborers are inherently outsiders. They will go back to their home, and talk about their experiences in Korea. They are guests: guests do not settle down in our home. As many Koreans were aware by 2003, foreign laborers came to Korea with entry visas that limited the period of their residence in Korea. Many of my interviewees did not know how long they were allowed to stay in Korea, but they all knew that the foreign laborers were, from the beginning, recruited to work in Korean factories for a limited time.\footnote{Foreign laborers were recruited to work in Korea for a limited amount of time up to two years, without accompanying their families. In fact, Korean government was authorizing the companies to hire foreign laborers, instead of giving the foreigners right to labor in Korea until 2006. These issues were discussed in more details in Chapter 1 of O et. al. (2009).} This sentence reinforces the prior knowledge of most Koreans on that the foreign laborers will not become members of the society, which was already very much a distant belief from the reality.

Fifth, since the “foreigner = laborer = darker skin color” equation was already established in the first line, the discourse of the second line of small titles builds another layer on the equation: foreigner = laborer = darker skin = inherent outsider, a “guest.” In this linear construction of the discourse, the slight possibility for a darker skinned foreign laborer to become a permanent resident of Korea, which was left open in the first line, is completely closed off.

Sixth, the sentence implies that Koreans should treat the darker skinned foreign laborers well, since these people will be the ones who will introduce Korea to their own people with their own experiences with Koreans. No matter what the “Industrial Trainee Program”, and the later
“Employment/Work Permit System” that Korean government set up basically meant to the laborers from the so-called Third World countries, it only depended on Korean individuals to make reputation for their country. It could be true to some degree that people remember their personal experiences more than the great wheel of the system that governs their life. However, it was no secret in the intellectual circle that Korean government was implementing a neoliberalist system of labor exploitation when they started recruiting “industrial trainees” from the Third World countries in the late 1990s. The discourse of “Korean individuals building the reputation of the nation” skillfully transfers the responsibility of the state onto its people for their exploitative system.

At the same time, seventh, this also effectively masks what Korea as a nation does to its neighbors in the world, at least to the general public. While maintaining the “Industrial Trainee System” with the temporary visas, the government preached that Koreans treat the laborers with open hearts in this poster. So the Korean individuals may feel “guilty” about “not see[ing] [the foreign laborers’] faces or colors ... [in the] poster at all” as OL confessed with embarrassment. Individuals, but not the government, should feel guilty as much, about not treating the foreign laborers better. Behind OL’s embarrassment on himself, what the system does and has been doing to the foreign laborers was safely hidden.

In the end, the poster only seemed to propagate more exclusion than inclusion of the different groups of people. Building upon the general knowledge of Koreans at the time (e.g., foreign laborers are from the Third World countries, they come to Korea with the limited time on

---

their visas, majority of them are darker skinned, etc.), the poster creates a discourse that perpetuates the foreignness of the darker skinned temporary laborers. Also by provoking Koreans’ national pride and guilt at the same time, the government skillfully slips out of its responsibility on the abuses and exploitations of the foreign “industrial trainees” while shifting it onto the shoulders of the Korean individuals. In other words, the “price” of Korean economic advancement had to be paid through the hierarchical layers of governmentality: paid in full by non-national laborers through their labor exploitation; paid partially by Korean individuals through their responsibilities of being good host and building the reputation of Korea; paid less by the small- to mid-sized companies and factories that directly employ the immigrant workers; even less by the Korean government and the transnational corporations outsourcing their unskilled and semi-skilled works to the smaller companies and factories employing the immigrant laborers.

The biggest merit it had seemed to be the freshness of the thoughts presented on the poster, which may exert “some educational effects … on some Korean people.” It may have come through some Koreans that there are all different shades of skin colors (pibusaek) although the color in the middle had been called “skin color (salsaek)” for a long time. Even if it did not immediately occur to the person that there are all different shades of skin colors in between those colors represented on Poster I, some may have still felt that “in black people’s view, our black, and in white people’s view, our white, have felt like their ‘skin colors (salsaek)’, we have openly used [the word] as a common noun salsaek” (Kim, Aug. 24, 2002; Hannuri, 2009).98 Aside from

---

98 This type of comments is still widespread through newspaper articles on education and blog postings, even though it makes sense metaphorically as the interview participant pointed out. For examples, see Kim (Aug. 24, 2002; Munhwa Ilbo); Hannuri (2009); Yi (Sept. 8, 2009; Ohmynews). It is, for me, striking that all these examples show up in relation to the Korean newspaper websites, or the blog posting exclusively stating to be “multicultural supporters.” Authors of the articles or postings are a professor, two elementary school teachers, and a reporter respectively.
its shortcomings and rather negative effects, however, the interview participants agreed that the poster had some educational effects. LI noted toward the end of the discussions, “black and white are how we call the different people’s colors and races … that it makes sense … metaphorically … to present ... color crayons in the picture.”

As a side note, it is worth noting that LI added when the group met again in 2005, “no white or black person would color themselves in those paper-white and pitch-black crayons.” He spoke with his two-year experiences in Australia through “Working Holiday” program, and his comment apparently hit other participants with a small shock of recognition. The group had another packet of interesting discussion as to why and how Koreans came to recognize a color that was not closest to their skin color as “flesh/skin color” and reproduce that recognition, building up on LI’s comments. This part of the discussions is, however, out of the scope of this research and was left out from the analysis.

*Discourses referring to colonial experiences.* Among the participants, two boys living in my neighborhood in 2003 were initiated to the interviews by their mother. They were brothers, fifteen- and seventeen-year-old at the beginning of their first interview, active and well-travelled since their childhood. Their mother, being an acquaintance of me, asked if her boys can participate in my project upon learning that I was conducting a research while visiting home. The interviews began outside of their home, away from their mother’s presence. When we discussed about the public advertisement poster “All are skin colors”, the younger brother, BH, asked: “Why do adults like to talk about the colonial experience whenever they want to talk about the serious things?” The elder brother’s answer was: “Because Japanese colonization is the most serious historical event, … and they want to make sure whatever they are talking about is as serious as that history!”
Their problematization on the phrase referring to colonial sufferings in relation to the “people from weak country” = foreign laborers is interesting, to say the least. The boys started to question and discuss about what the lines meant in:

Our people (uri minjok) know better than anyone else about the sadness of a weak country.
Pains from Japanese colonial era still remain unhealed in our heart.
Thus the frequent news of the violations of human rights of the foreign laborers Hurt our hearts even more

They both were puzzled at why the state of the human rights for foreign laborers was viewed in the light of the past Korean experiences of colonization. After a long discussion, they concluded that the harsh working conditions and their treatments from the Korean supervisors could be paralleled with the Japanese exploitation of Korean labor force and resources in the past. The elder one added:

QN: … It is similar, we couldn’t use Korean language while Japanese were here, we were forced to use Japanese language only. These workers cannot communicate with their Korean bosses unless they learn Korean, because we do not speak their language. In that sense, they are forced to learn Korean, not to use their own language, if they want to work in our country. … this really sounds like we are colonizing those people, only we did not go to their country, those people came to our country. … what I’m saying is … [T]he convention is that, these foreign laborers follow our rules when they want to work in our country, which is somewhat natural, … it’s still not quite right to call it a colonization, but, according to what this poster is saying … that these laborers are treated really badly as we were under the Japanese rule. … and it is true we force them to speak our language and do what we want them to do … I think…, you know…, if one is a bad boss, then he can just pretend he does not speak English, I mean…, even when he can speak English, he can just pretend he does not and just ignore whatever the foreign workers request in English, and say…, I did not understand what he wanted because he did not tell me in Korean, and I don’t speak whatever language that foreign laborer speaks… and they can makes excuses like, oh, their wage was to be given in a big lump sum at the end of their training, and our factory cafeteria provides their food, we have dormitory for them, we arrange for their sightseeing around the country at the beginning of the training program…, so they do not need that much of money in the first place to live here…

These young brothers were touching on the issues of the graduated governmentality which
Aihwa Ong (1999, 2006) elaborates on, although in a very crude way. Their understanding of the Korean manifestation of the “superior” power on the foreign laborers was, although not as refined as a well-known scholar, expressed in both personal and governmental level. By not speaking the language of the foreign laborers, Korean supervisors can conveniently ignore the workers’ requests, as well as forcing the laborers to learn Korean language and not communicate in any other languages. They know, although vaguely, that Korean government will not sanction the factory owners for not understanding the workers’ requests properly because of their language barrier, unless the employers were found outright breaking the law in treating the workers.

I let the college student group to listen to parts of the boys’ discussions, with the consent from BH and QN. When prompted to talk more about the lines in the poster “All are skin colors” that BH pointed out, the college student group started laughing, looking around each other. TQ, who was the eldest in that particular group, a senior female student preparing for the teacher recruitment exam at the time, said:

TQ: We can… perhaps… relate to the sentiment of losing the country and subjected under colonial rule more easily than before, because of the current social and economic environment in Korea. But I don’t think this poster wants to say that we are colonizing the foreign laborers, it just wants to tell us that once we were weak and abused by other people, so let’s just remember that and treat other people nicely, since we are now the stronger party of the relationship with the foreign laborers. … but, I still think it’s interesting that this poster draws on the sentiment of resentment toward colonial experience, … I think this was unintentional, but…, we already failed once at global advancement, but these people are still here, they are weaker than we are, … this kind of rhetoric does not help in improving the situation. No, wait, this poster does not have our failure part, strike that.

LI: hahaha~! But it’s true we failed and went bankrupt in 1997, even though it’s not said in the poster, we all know we are suffering now. So, we already have some sense of crisis in ourselves which makes it easier to relate to foreign laborers under discrimination. And, I think it is true that some Koreans behave like colonizers to foreign laborers. Or, maybe, we are culturally colonizing their minds and actions … because, like the boy mentioned, not many of us can speak English or the laborers’ languages, and it’s left on them to learn Korean, and do whatever they
have to do to deal with the whole situation of being racially discriminated… so it’s reminding us that, hey, we were colonized once, so let’s not behave like colonizers to other people, we already know it’s not fair.

Dwelling on the sense of insecurity and guilt of the Korean individuals at the time, the narrative of the poster “All are skin colors” was building up variegated levels of governmentality on different populations Korea is hosting, including their own citizens. IMF relief loan was fully repaid by August 2001, but economic restructuring was still pervasive in Korean society. For many Koreans, the powerful presence of the foreign power, IMF, in every sector of the society was still lingering. This poster awakened their sense of insecurity by the mention of colonial experience. This sense of insecurity among Korean individuals provoked the fear that they also can become a migrant laborer in another, more developed society. This fear and sense of insecurity, in turn, direct Korean individuals to emotionally relate to the conditions of foreign laborers. At the same time, the ways in which the discourses of “All are skin colors” constructed the darker skinned foreign laborer as inherent outsider of the society governs the boundary of imaginary possibility that these laborers become a part of Korean society, or Korean nationals accept these laborers as part of themselves.

**Diversity and Assimilation**

When asked who is multicultural or what constitutes a multicultural person in 2008, majority of my interviewees answered “foreign laborers and their direct families, female marriage immigrants and their direct families, any naturalized citizens and their direct families.” As the list grew longer, however, the participants started to count in ethnic Chinese residing in Korea, North Korean escapees, return immigrants from various parts of the world, undocumented immigrants, U.S. Armed Forces stationed in Korea and accompanying families, and even Korean individuals themselves. General reasoning was that while counting different
people as “multicultural”, participants started to see themselves living in a much diverse society than they usually are conscious of. When they started reflecting on how diverse a society they are living in, participants started to reason that they were also becoming more “multicultural.”

Once the impact of claiming ethnic Koreans themselves as “multicultural” subsided, I asked if they are becoming multicultural citizens since the society is becoming multicultural. Majority of them answered yes; some others said that they cannot readily see themselves multicultural, but they are becoming more open to differences with their experiences. Then we talked about what they thought to constitute their multicultural citizenry. At the beginning, participants talked about how they enjoyed diversity and multiculturalism in Korea. First things they talked about were multicultural events and various ethnic foods that they can now enjoy in Korea. Some mentioned that opportunities to experience diverse people and culture are good cultural education for the children who should live in the global era. Some others talked about life being more interesting with diverse cultural events and ethnic foods. When interesting and enjoyable part of the sharing is done, participants started to cautiously express their concerns.

SP: I think…, enjoying different food and culture is one thing, but we also… have to learn to…, mm…, live with them, uh…, the differences, and thoughts they bring in, and…, mm…, different life styles, and so on. I think…, we should screen out what is good and what is bad for us… We cannot accept the immigrants and their cultures thoughtlessly.

SP’s comment led similar comments from other participants. Many agreed that it will be different living with different people permanently from having diverse food and culture at their disposal. It is wonderful to have all different things available close by, meaning that they do not have to visit a foreign country to access different cultures. Yet, participants argued, immigrants are apparently coming into the lower-tier of the society, and some bad things and people come in as well. Thus, the participants argued the need for some “levelling and screening”, meaning
essentially “following Korean ways.” Some quoted the news sources to argue that some foreigners committed crimes in Korea. Some others argued that those are exceptional cases, and majority of immigrants and migrant workers are good people working hard to make their life better. Especially LI, who has been in the participant group since 2003 with much first-hand experiences living and befriending the foreign laborers, advocated the immigrants enthusiastically. He explained with examples that majority of the immigrants come in with good wills and healthy and noble minds, so no screening is needed on their culture and what they are. LI: … I think I talked too long, anyway, my point is…, immigrant or not, people as a group, always have good ones and bad ones, and characteristics I like and I don’t like… We Koreans too, some are bad, some are really nice, but we just deal with them, right? So we shouldn’t be intimidated in accepting different things just because of couple bad ones or some things we don’t like. Even if I don’t like some parts of their culture, it’s okay, it could be the same for them, we might have things that immigrants cannot like or appreciate…, we know all the bad things about our country and people…, but that doesn’t make us reject our country… hhhh
SP: Well…, I think that is not very different from what I was talking about. Multicultural is good, I love it, it’s fun, interesting, life enriching, as LI mentioned…, we should accept it, but we cannot accept the whole thing without any screening process…, I think it should be…, right, bilateral…, when they come into our country, we need to adjust to that new state of having something or someone not familiar, that takes time and effort, so I want them to pay more attention not to disrupt what has already been set up here…, there should be some level of screening than just indiscriminately accepting them all, otherwise, do you want to lose all that is Korean…? This is Korea, if they want to be Korean, they should be Korean, not like trying to change the whole society around to accept their taste, if everyone wants to insist on their own ways without following the rules and customs of a society, that society cannot exist, it will just collapse very soon… So differences should be accepted but smoothed out to some degree in order to maintain the society, they should try to catch up with what we are doing, learning our language, traditions, adjusting well to our society, keep their children in school, work hard…, we already have been through all that, and they should learn those things as well to live with us…, we cannot just accept everything about the different immigrants…, we have our own ways of maintaining the integration of the society, and I think different people should abide by the rules here if they want to live here.

Whereas LI was arguing that immigrants and their ways of life should be accepted as they
are, SP was arguing that multicultural diversity should be cut out to “fit” to Korean taste. Grounded on the sense of superiority or being more developed than the immigrants’ cultures, SP argued that immigrants should “catch up” by “learning Korean language, traditions, adjusting to Korean society, keeping their children in school, and working hard.” In his view, the process of screening and immigrants learning more “advanced” Korean ways were integral in maintaining the social integration of Korea.

Also, different cultures are essentialized and hierarchically marked in SP’s reasoning. This ranking of the different cultures are closely intertwined with the global hierarchy of the national power. For instance, “Anglo America” being the advanced power in the global hierarchy portrayed in the school textbooks reviewed in the previous chapter, Korea as catching up with the advanced Western nations, and the developing countries where the immigrants are coming from. In this regard, different cultures become essentialized markers of the degree of national advancement in global stage, which perpetuates the discourses of “catching up” and competition. Rather than promoting the social integration SP was arguing for, this line of reasoning only perpetuates separation and competing for the recognition of higher status of different groups of people and culture.

It is interesting that many participants posed themselves as if to take time and effort to understand and learn about the immigrants’ conditions and cultures, but not many of them actually spend much time with “multicultural population.” In addition, when Korean individuals imagine the multicultural population, the foreign laborers and marriage immigrants from Southeast Asian countries are on top of their list, whereas the “multicultural population” they are in actual contact with is mostly managers, professors, exchange students, visiting scholars, and overseas correspondents at their jobs.
Korean individuals claimed their experiences of “multicultural” have been fun, interesting, and life enriching, whereas they can easily objectify the immigrant population and their cultures, and suggest to “screen” and to “control” their flows. In other words, multicultural diversity is good only when it is screened and controlled to fit “Korean” taste. Therefore, immigrants should “respect the Korean law and customs” and be assimilated. SP made it quite clear when he said, “if they wanted to become a Korean, be a Korean.” If not assimilated, immigrants are disruptive to the society, and become the “burden” in the future.

However, there were some other views, although very small in their numbers, that were positively developing over time. QL, who was a participant since 2003 like LI, was a taciturn twenty-four-year-old male preparing for his overseas higher degree program in 2008. When the discussions became heated between the two “opinion leaders” of the day, SP and LI, on whether the immigrants and their cultures should be screened and controlled in order to be accepted by the Korean society, he raised his hand and stated very calmly:

QL: If different cultures are screened and levelled out to fit to our society, that will be Korean culture all over, after hundreds of years later, not multicultural diversity of nowadays. We can leave the integration to happen naturally in the future. The choice does not need to be made here and now, because no one knows which culture or which way of life is better, since no one tried them all. If we just accept them and leave them, good things will be valued over time and weaker and less needed ones will not.

Once his words were accepted with small laughs and nods from the group, he went on:

QL: I think immigrants are fine in general. They are not coming to our country to become social burdens. When people move, most times, they want to do better than what they have, but they cannot do any better with the current conditions they are in. Most of them will try hard, even if we do not tell them to. Our role would be to provide them with the necessary help and same opportunity. They can become welfare burden if we now discriminate them and making them drop out of school, drive them to hate our society and people… Many immigrants are not wealthy, but that’s not their fault. If we discriminate them because they are poor, that’s a shortcut to turn those people into the social burden in the future. We cannot kick them out because they are poor laborers
and you think they will become social welfare burden in the future. In that line of thinking, we will have to kick out all the poor working class Koreans as well. [giggles from some other participants]

CY: But..., maybe, if we don’t have those foreign laborers, poor Koreans will have more opportunities to work... Do you know how high the unemployment rate is in our society?

QL: Well..., that may be true up to a certain level, but even if there are jobs that needed to be filled in, people still don’t want to go work in the farms or fisheries or small factories to work with the same wage as the foreign laborers. And no one wants to marry a farmer with an agricultural high school diploma, I wouldn’t recommend my sister to do that. So..., we imported the foreign laborers and foreign brides in the first place. People think it is beneath their education level or social status to work in the factories or go marry a farmer.

LI: Right, right...! That’s exactly what I wanted to tell you guys...!! Hahaha

CY: hmm..., that makes sense, too... Hhhhh...

Through the long discussion, it became apparent that there are very small number of participants who actually consider immigrants as same people as Koreans. Many people claim to be more open-minded toward immigrants and ethnic and cultural diversity in Korean society, whereas what they really want is the immigrants’ becoming invisible as possible except for their fun and interesting qualities of differences. It is noteworthy that more participants from the group readily stating they are becoming multicultural citizens agreed with SP’s line of reasoning, whereas LI and QL being the reserved ones stating that “I have some multicultural experiences, but I do not see myself quite becoming multicultural yet.” In this regard, many Korean individuals want to be seen multicultural, rather than wanting to become multicultural.

It is still positive to find that there are more and more Korean individuals, such as LI and QL, who are modest in claiming they are becoming multicultural citizens but still endeavoring to maintain balanced perspectives toward ethnic and cultural diversity Korean society is recently acquiring. As demonstrated in the participants’ discussions, these individuals are the ones who persuade fellow Koreans and restores the balance in viewpoints when ungrounded hostilities or fears surface.
Human Resources and Social Problem

Building up on SP’s notion that “multicultural population can become the burden of the society”, I had an interesting conversation with an elder teacher who was taking courses with a couple of young interview participants in the graduate school in Seoul. It was in 2007, before the small group interview where SP commented on the “multicultural population becoming the burden of the society.” This elder teacher in his late-fifties, possibly with a big administrative role in his school, learned about my interviews from his classmates and volunteered to come and participate in a session. In the end, it became more of his lecture to three young female graduate students on multicultural education rather than usual interview, but the contents of the conversation was worth an analysis. While I was going over what this specific group talked about the last time, he caught on the phrase “children from the families of Korean father and other Asian mother becoming school age” and started on.

ZM: What did you young teachers talk about the multicultural children in schools last time?
NE: Not much, sir, JC said something like they are now becoming school age and we see more research coming out on their school adjustments and becoming victims of school bullying due to their different looks, and…
ZM: I think…, is it okay for me to talk…?
R: Of course, please go ahead.
ZM: I think, khmm…, multicultural children are valuable human resources, and we educators should focus on developing their best potentials, instead of their different looks and background. This is not only for raising the competitiveness of our country in the global market, but also for decreasing the future burden of the society. These children can become very precious human resources when we take good care of them. … before holding prejudices against them, teachers should keep it in mind how valuable human resources these multicultural children can become. We teachers should take a very good care of them. It is a globalized world, and think about it, they already have their mothers who are fluent in different languages. They can learn both languages and take on a leading role in our trade and exchanges with different countries in the world. Where do you think these precious children would end up if not taken care of properly by our teachers to develop their full potentials? … … some teachers avoid having a multicultural student in one’s class. They say, oh, I don’t want trouble in my class, but they are making the multicultural student a trouble by
rejecting them like that. They do not see how precious human resources these children can become. The fertility rate is dangerously low in our country, and without multicultural children, we cannot support the economy by 2030, the latest in 2050,99 they will become a big part of economically productive population by that time. So…, kmmm…. we should think about how to raise multicultural students to become more productive members of the society. We should encourage them to develop full potentials, so that they will grow up to be valuable human resources who will work for our country, instead of becoming delinquents and eventually becoming welfare burden for the society.

Following ZM’s reasoning, children from multicultural families will either become valuable human resources contributing to Korean global competitiveness or become future burden of the society. Due to the low fertility rate, Korea does not have a choice but to rely on the children from multicultural families for the future economic advancement. The role of multicultural children will be learning their mother’s languages and participate in global exchanges for the interest of Korea. Seemingly positive, but his reasoning was apparently objectifying the multicultural children as means of Korean global advancement. And if they cannot contribute to the global advancement of Korea, they become “delinquent” and “social welfare burden.”

R: I may be asking a silly question, but is there any special reason that you emphasize education of multicultural children specifically, rather than emphasizing the education of the future generation as a whole?
ZM: Good question! I will be honest, multicultural children have less opportunity than the ordinary (pot’ong) children, because of their background. Their parents often do not have much higher education, some of their families are broken because their parents cannot get over the cultural barriers or what not, and relatively, as a group, they are not in the higher socio-economic tier in this society. Their conditions are very difficult, they are from very poor families, this is true. So, if they are left alone without our care, it is very easy for them to become delinquent and become social problem than grow up as a good, productive member of our society. …. …. And we should include their mothers in this process of developing full potentials of the children. How nice that they have mothers who speak different languages and have social networks in a foreign land that we are not familiar with? They will be able to develop different language skills from their mothers and learn different customs of their mother-

99 He was citing the United Nation Population Division report in 2001 on the replacement migration needed for the societies with low fertility rate.
land, they will be indispensable human resources in business and cultural exchanges and in diplomacy. ... As teachers, it is up to us to take good care of them and make sure they want to work for the betterment of our ethnic nation (minjok) and the country (kukka). We have a great mission as teachers at this point...

ZM constantly emphasized the role of teachers in raising the children from multicultural families into human resources, or, rather, preventing them from becoming the social burden. For him, multicultural children have difficult conditions: they are economically deprived, growing up in broken families, and their parents have lower level of education. Listening to his reasoning, he sees teachers as only hopes for the multicultural children to rely on in their educational opportunities and encouragement. However, ZM still phrases them as “valuable human resources” for the future economic advancement, especially inheriting their mother’s linguistic and cultural background. Aside from limiting these children’s full potential to acquiring linguistic and cultural fluency of their mothers, he is also quick to point to the mother’s linguistic and cultural background as the source of problem for the children’s academic progress.

R: It sounds like multicultural children are in a very difficult environment. ZM: Yes, they are.
R: What do you think to be the most hindrance to their full development?
ZM: There are many reasons. They are poor, their mothers are less than fluent in Korean language, that hinders to establish a strong communication line between the school and the home, and because of the language barrier of their mothers, they cannot get enough help on their academic progress from home. Korean mothers are earnestly helping their children learn better, by helping the children on their homework, exchanging academic information with other parents, and seeking out for more help when needed. Multicultural mothers, on the other hand, cannot be a help to their children’s academic progress even if they want to, because they don’t speak Korean, they do not know what they can do to help..., so, many of the children from multicultural families are struggling in their grade levels. These are young children, and if they already show signs of struggling on their own grade levels, this is not a good sign to be optimistic on their academic progress in the future.

In the end, the big part of the multicultural children’s academic struggle comes from the mother’s inability to communicate effectively with teachers and other parents, as well as their
level of Korean fluency being obstacle in facilitating the children’s learning process at home. When asked about his suggestions on how to transfer the mother’s linguistic and cultural resources to the children whereas the mother’s language barrier is being an obstacle in children’s academic progress, he slipped out from answering the question by saying that it is up to the younger teachers to question and solve the problems from now on.

Of course, young people cannot find the answer to this question, because his statements are self-contradictory: he just pointed to the mother’s level of mastery of Korean language as a major source of children’s academic difficulties in school, and then tried to flip it over as linguistic potential that can be transferred to the children. Thus, it is now up to the young individual teachers to ensure multicultural children magically develop full potential of inheriting their mothers’ linguistic and cultural backgrounds while becoming loyal Koreans to work for the global advancement of Korea. Otherwise, according to ZM’s thinking, multicultural children will become delinquent and the welfare burden of the society.

Summary and Conclusion: National Advancement, Social Integration, and Multiculturalism

The discourses on the recent immigrants in Korea have evolved from the “guest” and “foreign bride” to “multicultural population” to “valuable human resources” over time. Whereas Korean individuals indicate many different groups of people as “multicultural population”, multicultural discourses are only focused on a very narrow category of immigrants. From what interview participants categorized, these discourses are narrowly constructed around the popular imagery of immigrant laborers in the urban area and marriage immigrants in the rural area.

In urban areas such as metropolitan Seoul, where I met my interviewees, multicultural population are largely viewed as a marker of global diversity. Yet, immigrants are still easily
objectified into a group which can be screened for their cultures, controlled, and exploited. Many interviewees also demonstrated their understanding of multiculturalism being concentrated on the fun, interesting, enjoyable qualities of different food and cultures. Immigrant’s personal qualities as a human being are obscured in this kind of essentializations of culture into consumable food and entertainment.

It was also notable that different cultures are essentialized and hierarchically marked in order to refer to the immigrant’s “place” in the society. Cultures were hierarchically marked to correspond to the global hierarchy of the power relations of the countries, and thus the immigrants had to follow the advanced Korean ways. This attitude also corresponds with what was projected in the textbook discourses reviewed in the previous chapter. Whereas the interview participants suggested the immigrants’ cultural assimilation as promoting the social integration, marking out different cultures in a hierarchical manner perpetuates separation and competition for the higher status recognition of different groups of people and culture.

The discourses on different immigrant populations are structured to imply the tiered system of governmentality in the society, which, in Aihwa Ong’s terms, the “graduated sovereignty” (1999, 2006). In case of the poster, “All are skin colors”, it was apparent that the price of Korean economic advancement was paid by the different groups of people. This tiered price was distributed in a reciprocal proportion to their levels of membership in the Korean society, or, their economic power: paid in full by non-national laborers through their labor exploitation; paid partially by Korean individuals through their responsibilities of being good host and building the reputation of Korea; paid less by the small- to mid-sized companies and factories that directly employ the immigrant workers; even less by the Korean government and the transnational corporations outsourcing their unskilled and semi-skilled works to the smaller
companies and factories employing the immigrant laborers.

As for the multicultural population who are related to the female marriage immigrants, it was clear in the elder teacher’s narrative that either these children become human resources or the social welfare burden. ZM’s attempt to include the female marriage immigrants in the progress of their children’s development ironically limited the immigrant mothers’ roles to transferring their linguistic and cultural assets to their children. The linguistic and cultural differences of the immigrant mothers, however, were readily pointed out as one of the biggest hindrance to the children’s academic success. ZM’s reasoning promoted individual teachers as the sole source of multicultural children’s developing their full potential, despite the difficult conditions of the students discouraging their academic progress.

This elder teacher’s narrative also outlined the differentiated levels of governmentality embedded in the discourse: children from the multicultural families, despite their difficulties, should become a legitimate member of the society by inheriting their mothers’ linguistic and cultural background and work for the global advancement of Korea; individual teachers are responsible for multicultural children’s development into a productive Korean citizens who will contribute to the Korean global advancement; the state and the transnational companies are in the background harvesting the fruit from the years of the individual endeavors, by having a pool of loyal Koreans fluent in different languages and familiar with different cultural norms. The legitimacy of the multicultural children and their mothers are not granted until the children grow up overcoming all the hardships and contributing to the Korean global advancement. Until then, the children can always become delinquents and social burden, and the mothers are major obstacle to their children’s development of the full potential.

It was also interesting ZM’s notion “multicultural children are valuable human resources”
coincided with the former Minister of Justice Ch’ŏn’s note in 2005: “it should be recognized that foreigners are valuable human resources allowing Korean society to be dynamic and diverse” (quoted from O et al., 2007: 66). Individuals are quite skillfully incorporating the different sources of authorities, such as United Nations and the Minister of Justice, in their own discursive constructions of “otherness”, which in turn shapes the forms of their own Koreanness.

Once the “multicultural population” was objectified as human resources, the discourse disperses with different variations in individuals. Since multicultural population was already objectified, they become controllable and exploitable. They are easy to become social burden when they are not controllable and exploitable for the interest of Korea and Koreans. The process also demonstrates the tiered dispersion of the government-led discourses of multiculturalism: government [Minister of Justice: 2005] → mid-level administrators (school administrators [ZM: 2007]) → academia [SP: 2008] (→ general public). Timeline should be accidental, although, from the structure of their rationales, SP’s was rough and spontaneous, whereas ZM’s arguments were relatively structured and grounded on his own experiences and knowledge despite being self-contradictory.

Although not always explicit, the themes of global advancement of Korea, social integration, and multiculturalism are all closely intertwined in the discourses defining “otherness” and the corresponding Koreanness. Although it is difficult to have Koreans talk about what constitutes Koreanness, this chapter demonstrated the cases in which Korean individuals define their own status and identities in relation to the “others”, whereas they were thinking to only talk about the “others”. Reflecting on the fact that more participants stating they are becoming multicultural citizens promoted more screening and assimilation process of the immigrants, it is apparent many Korean individuals want to be seen multicultural, rather than
wanting to be one.

This chapter also observed a very positive development over time: individuals who are modest in claiming they are becoming multicultural citizens, in contrast, endeavoring to maintain balanced perspectives toward ethnic and cultural diversity Korean society is recently acquiring. It was demonstrated in the chapter that these individuals are the ones who persuade fellow Koreans and restore the balance in viewpoints when ungrounded hostilities or fears surface toward growing ethnic and cultural diversity in the society.
Chapter VI Reflections and Conclusions

Introduction

This chapter reflects on the study’s research findings and their implications for educational policy and future research: i.e., the interaction between discourse, structure, and identity constructions in Korean context; how neoliberal globalization is shaping strategic identities; the ways in which desires of global membership interacts with the formation of multiculturalism within Korea; and implications for future research and policy implementations.

Discourse, Social Structure, and Identity Constructions

Data analyses demonstrated how publicly projected discourses of Koreanness are effectively grasped and rearticulated by the individuals in claiming their own identities. Individual statements defining their own identities as Korean are contradictory, ambivalent, and paradoxical between the globalized multicultural self and the ethnically loyal nationalist self. These statements are located within the discursive practices coveting for the individual “places” in the larger structure of the contemporary Korean society. For instance, the Koreanness in direct sense was rarely talked about among the interview participants, whereas these same individuals almost always tried to define or imply their “places” as a legitimate member of Korean society in relation to the “others” when the participants discussed about various immigrant populations in the society. In this regard, the identities are constructed within the discourses through the differences (Hall, 1996).

The discourses of what constitutes Koreanness in contemporary Korea are governed by the broader societal needs, such as globalization, economic advancement, and unification. Thus the discursive practices of defining individual identities are inevitably intertwined with the socio-political structure and the needs of the society. The Koreanness as represented in the public discourses seemingly shift at a distinctive time, May 2006, whereas individual experiences and
understandings of the discourses on “Koreanness” were not as unilateral as one big shift from mono-ethnic to multicultural. In defining their identities as Korean, individuals not only experience the seemingly contradictory representations of “Koreanness.” Individuals also strategically transform and reproduce their social realities between the different forms of “Koreanness” while identifying and positioning the self in the society.

The discursive formation of society is not derived from random ideas in people’s mind. It is, rather, engendered by the social practices firmly rooted in and oriented to real, material social structures (Fairclough, 1992: 66). The whole society has been reconfiguring itself with the variegated levels of sovereignty over different groups of its population as parts of a massive neoliberal restructuring since late-1990s. Individuals even as young as teenagers were keenly aware of the social reality or how the society is structured around them in a changing environment. Individuals demonstrated that they are quickly grasping on what Aihwa Ong (1999; 2006) calls “graduated sovereignty” embedded in the society without any academic research on the issues of recent immigration and social changes in contemporary Korea. In this regard, the discourses on Koreanness are closely intertwined with how the society is structured, or, how individuals recognize the structure of their social realities.

Official and individual level discourses on multiculturalism prevailed in Korean society during the last decade. It is apparent that school textbooks eliminated explicit celebratory remarks on the mono-ethnic heritage of the nation, conforming to the social changes aiming to become ethnically and culturally diverse. Many public advertisements in order to promote multi-ethnic and multicultural openness of the general public have been commissioned during the 2000s. Yet, this research found the concept of Koreanness based on mono-ethnic exclusivism is not necessarily under revision. Textbooks emphasized on the superior qualities of culture and
heritage of Korean ethnic nation (minjok) instead of the mono-ethnic unity. Seemingly positive discourses of multiculturalism and openness can turn out to reproduce and encourage prejudices by objectifying the foreignness or closing off the possibilities of diversity.

It was also apparent in the interviews that the individual rationalizations of the legitimate Koreanness connote the increasing sense of racial/ethnic differences and hierarchy in the society. In the discourses of economic advancement and globalization, Koreans were endeavoring to catch up with the advanced “Anglo-American” ways and the “darker-skinned others” did not exist or only existed as exploitable human resources. In contrast, the discourses of tolerance and social integration rendered “darker-skinned others” shed their backwardness and follow the “Korean way.” Following the “Korean way” meant to learn and internalize history, language, culture, and the similar tenets underlying the idea of Korean ethnic and cultural superiority. In this regard, celebrating the multiculturalism “while leaving beliefs in racial and ethnic exclusivity unquestioned” (Watson, 2012) is apparent in both official level discourses and individual ones.

With the emphasis on cultural and historical basis for the legitimacy as Korean, individual constructions of Koreanness are becoming more layered and fragmented over time, as individuals starting to separate what they are and what is “politically correct.” In other words, individuals are finding more subtle and sophisticated ways to be politically correct by separating the discourses of socio-cultural differences from those of ethnic differences. However, their beliefs in ethnocentric superiority and proud attitudes against foreigners are not necessarily revised. By leaving the sense of racial and ethnic exclusivity unquestioned while only emphasizing on the cultural differences, individuals keep their proud and superior stances against the foreigners. Mono-ethnic and multicultural discourses are contesting, contradicting, and
sometimes are collaborating with each other in constructing the discourses of what it means to be Korean in different contexts. In their attempts to situate themselves and the others within the restructuring society, Korean individuals effectively strategized, thus produce, transform, and rearticulate the discourses on what it means to be Korean.

In this perspective, identity construction in contemporary Korea is a multi-faceted and multi-layered process where different meanings and meaning-making practices constantly compete and intertwine. With the individuals, not only the mainstream ethnic Koreans but also the recent immigrants and their advocates, endeavoring to assert their places and perspectives, identity constructions in contemporary Korea are becoming increasingly strategic, positional, fragmented and fractured. Contemporary Korean identities have departed far from the conventional concept of identity proposed by Erickson, encompassing all the superficial differences to a singular self. Korean individuals are constructing their identities across distinct, often contradicting and antagonistic, discourses, practices, and positions.

The processes of public and individual level discourses interacting with each other in constructing the contemporary Korean identities imply the power/knowledge embedded in the uneven relationships in the structure. Individual discourses are apparently governed by their understandings of how the social structure, public discourses, and imagery strategically define what constitutes Koreanness and otherness. However, individuals are not completely subjected to the larger social structure and the public discourses, although the power relations are uneven in most cases. They nevertheless actively navigate the possibilities for their acceptable positions in Korean society through their claims of Koreanness or otherness. The power/knowledge embedded in the dialectical relations of the variegated levels of discourses on Koreanness is constitutive of what an individual claims him/herself to be.
Multiculturalism, Korean Style

The term “tamunhwajuŭi (multiculturalism)” originated from the western world in the mid-twentieth century. It is defined as “the proper way to respond to cultural and religious diversity” (Song, 2014). First used in Canada, then in the United States and in Australia based on the Civil Rights movements in the immigrant settlement societies, discussions on multiculturalism came to gain wide public recognition in the western world since the 1970s. Corresponding with their immigration policy changes, general connotation of the term “multiculturalism” also shifted from simple bilingualism to the commitment to revaluation of the underrepresented identities in the society and changing the pattern of disrespectful communications towards and representations of marginalized groups of people in the society (Kim, J., 2013; Song, 2014).

Fundamentally, multiculturalism and multicultural education in the western immigrant societies, such as in the United States, recognize that “race, ethnicity, culture, and social class are salient parts of [the] society” (Banks, 1999, p. 1). In these societies, multiculturalism, multicultural policies and education endeavor to achieve increased equality of opportunity in different groups of people in the society. Multiculturalism also aims to engender cross-cultural competency in cultures beyond one’s own and “the insights and understanding needed to understand how all peoples living on the earth have highly interconnected fates” (Becker, 1979 quoted from Banks, 1999, p. 23).

Korean society, on the other hand, had represented it as mono-ethnic and homogeneous at least for a century following its opening of the ports to the western world in late-nineteenth century. Thus, Koreans are generally far from recognizing the race, ethnicity, culture, and social class as salient parts of their history or their society: rather, they view the multi-ethnic diversity
and multiculturalism as a new phenomenon related to recent immigrants. Korean education does emphasize on the cross-cultural competency and understanding of the global cultural diversity. Yet, it does not necessarily compound on the global interconnectedness of the people’s fate and internal cross-cultural understandings. In short, “tamunhwa” and “tamunhwajuũi”, which are translations of the English word “multicultural” and “multiculturalism”, did not grow with the Korean society.

“Tamunhwa” and “tamunhwajuũi” had been used in Korean society since 1960s, a long time before the public explosion of the multicultural discourse observed in earlier chapters. The terms were mainly used to introduce western multiculturalism and practices in Korean media reports until the late 1990s. As some researchers observed, the frequency of the usage of the term “multicultural” or “multiculturalism” in Korean media reports and academic discourse had been negligible (Kim, A., 2010). In terms of the context of usage, they were mainly used to introduce or portray the western practices, irrelevant to Korean social context, especially up to late-1980s. Frequently attached to the news of racial conflicts in different parts of the world, the terms were used to introduce the western practices to resolve the conflicts.

Since 1990s, “multicultural” or “multiculturalism” had been used in relation to the globalization of the higher education market under the ambit of Uruguay Round. Following the Kim Young Sam administration (1993-1998)’s globalization and internationalization thesis, multicultural education was discussed mainly in two different veins: 1) in the context of the globalizing higher education market and recruiting more number of better qualified faculty and students, and 2) in the context of educating Korean individuals as global citizens. Both veins of usage of the term “multiculturalism” and “multicultural education” corresponded with the

---

100 The term tamunhwa is a noun, “multiculture”, when literally translated into English, but is more often used as adjective “multicultural” in Korean adoption.
governmental strategy of “autonomous globalization”, which mainly focused on globally expanding the higher education market and encouraging Korean citizens to learn globally sophisticated manners.

Throughout the 1990s, the discourse of multiculturalism and multicultural diversity existed in general obscurity both in the academic and social discourses (Kim, A., 2010; Yi, H., 2011). Discussions on diversity, tolerance, equal opportunity and democracy, the closest possible discourses in relation to multiculturalism in Korean society, were concerned with the gender, class, sexuality, and disability issues, but not much on the ethnic and racial issues. Thus, it can be said that even the liberal democracy discourses blossomed after the fall of the authoritarian governments in Korea effectively excluded racial and ethnic minorities in the society, whereas the terms “multicultural” and “multiculturalism” came to be used more frequently in relation to globalization of the society. The terms were more popularly used in the corporate settings than in the academia or in the society in general during 1990s, aiming to turn their employees and executives into the spearheads in global market expansion (e.g., Kim, P. H., 1996; Yi, Ü., 1997; Han, P., 1997).

In the end, the imminent purpose of the “multicultural” education or diversity sought until the late-1990s had been to engender a better understanding of the international and global context of racial and ethnic diversity. In addition, multicultural education until the late-1990s aimed to instill the global ethics and manners into Korean citizens. In other words, the terms such as “multiculturalism”, “multicultural education”, and “cultural diversity” had been used in Korean society sporadically over time, but in a very limited context unrelated to Korean life. When related to Korean context, they were used to describe educational needs for the “autonomous globalization” of the higher education market and turning Korean citizens into
global citizens (Yi, H., 2011).

Only since 2005 that “multiculturalism” came into the public discourse with the government initiative and policy focus on the foreigner/immigrant issues in Korea (O, K., 2007). Government-led multicultural discourses exploded since April 2006 with the President Roh Mu-Hyun’s comment “the transition into multiracial-multicultural society is the irrevocable trend” at the council on the state affairs (O, K., 2007, p.33). The sharp increase in female marriage immigrants around this time fueled the governmental attention on the issues regarding the treatment of immigrants in the society. NGOs and the government chose “multiculturalism” as a solution for the female marriage immigrant issues. Increasing number of the children from these Korean father + foreign-born mother families also raised the needs of multicultural education in Korean schools. By 2006, “multiculturalism” discourse became explosive in Korean society, encompassing the government, academia, and the immigrant labor movement organizations (O et al., 2007; Kim, A., 2010).

My interviewees also displayed the effects of the general trend of the social discourses. Pre-2005 interviewees accepted that this study was about Korean identity constructions in regards to perceived racial and ethnic differences in the society. Interviewees who joined the project since 2005 indiscriminately understood their interviews were located in the realm of “multicultural education research.” When I tried to explain the research they are participating in was not that of “multicultural education research”, many said that they already understand what I want to talk about, so I did not need to be frustrated to explain my topic to Koreans who are not familiar with the western concepts such as multiculturalism. Even when they accepted it was about Korean identities, many casually noted they are participating in a research concerned in Korean identity in multicultural era. Many Korean individuals coded any discussions related to
race/ethnicity, culture, immigration/immigrants, difference and diversity indiscriminately as “multicultural.”

With the increase in government funding in support of various “multicultural policy” initiatives (O et al., 2007), discourses of multiculturalism spread rapidly in Korean society during the latter-2000s. The rapid spread of the multicultural discourses stimulated discussions on reconceptualization of Korean ethnic and cultural heritage in public education. Thus the school textbooks were amended with the phrases promoting multicultural understanding and tolerance from those cherishing the nation’s homogeneity and ethnic unity. As it was observed in earlier chapters, public and corporate advertisements promoting multiculturalism also prevailed in Korean society, up to the level that many individuals express their fatigue in “multicultural propaganda.”

However, the government-driven multicultural policies are not as all-encompassing as the multicultural discourses in the society. Rather, the policies are multi-faceted and layered with different factors such as class and gender, as evidenced in data chapters. First, the policy attention is more centered on the integration of female marriage immigrants, but not on the foreign laborers and their families as many scholars argued. Due to their supposed legal status as visitors rather than settlers as much as the traditional concept of patrilineal family system embedded in Korean society, immigrant laborers and their families are practically excluded as “foreigners.”\textsuperscript{101} Government-led multiculturalism recognizes female marriage immigrants as new members to be integrated into Korean society, by virtue of having a Korean male as the head of the family. Yet, not only the laborer himself but his family is considered as visitor or temporary

\textsuperscript{101} Korea receives both professional and unskilled workers, but the treatments are considerably different. For one, unskilled laborers from underdeveloped countries are not granted rights to accompany their families, whereas the professionals can bring in their families to Korea. In current context of immigration issues and multiculturalism in Korea, professionals from the developed western nations and their families are both privileged and excluded in this sense.
resident, or at best “foreign”, even when the laborer settles down with Korean woman and become naturalized. The laborer and his family are considered inherently as “foreign”, due to the origin of the head of the family (Chŏng, H., 2007; Yi, S., 2007).

As a result, the issues of education of the “multicultural” children also become polarized by their family types: on one hand, children from Korean father + foreign-born mother families are, just like their mothers, considered as the object of social integration; on the other hand, children from foreign-born father + Korean mother families are left to be the responsibility of the fathers (O et al., 2007). Yet, this process also pushes out the Korean female marrying a foreign male from the legitimate position as a member of Korean society. Korean legal system may acknowledge the naturalized father + Korean mother families as “Korean”, whereas de facto social system does not recognize them as legitimate Korean families (Chŏng, H., 2007).

Second, as much as the government-driven multicultural policies are sharply divided by the class and gender lines, multicultural discourses are layered, fragmented and multi-faceted. It is important to remember from Chapter II that these discourses are not mere “language”, but the language constructing meanings while interacting with the human realities. The upsurge of multicultural discourse also presents possibility of becoming sophisticated ways of controlling and discriminating different groups of people, according to their class, gender, culture, ethnicity, and countries of origin. As some interviewees articulated, immigrant groups and their cultures are effectively differentiated in a hierarchical manner and used against the marginalized groups in separating, condemning, and objectifying them.

In other words, differentiated multicultural policies in Korea imply that female marriage

---

102 In some earlier cases where the fathers have not been naturalized, the children had to be recognized as “foreigners” following their fathers’ nationalities and denied of their various rights in Korea, such as access to basic education and to medical insurance. The patriarchal family law was abolished at the end of 2007, letting the children be registered under their mother as the head of the family.
immigrants are the imported productive force whereas male laborers are those of manufacturing labor force. Yet, mainstream Koreans and foreign professionals residing in Korea are considered to be successful members of global community with “multicultural” competency. In this kind of discursive constructions, immigrants and their families are hardly equal members of Korean society but mere means of the national interest. And the multi-faceted reality with the prevalence of multicultural discourses in the society while living the stratified “multicultural” environment fragments the people’s conceptions on what it means to be a legitimate Korean. From these fragmented conceptions and realities the anxieties emerge.

As it was demonstrated with the interview data, many Korean individuals readily claim to be “multicultural” while actively advocating for differentiated values and status of different cultures. Thus, “multicultural” comes to mean different things in different context for Koreans, as the anxieties in their realities direct them. As in the claims of one “being multicultural”, it means this person is to be aligned with the values such as globally competent, cross-culturally sophisticated, well-educated, success and legitimacy in the society. On the other hand, being a member of the “multicultural family” in Korea can mean illegitimacy as a Korean at large: in many cases, it connotes low socio-economic status, insufficient, needing for help and sympathy, originating from underdeveloped or uncivilized nations, culturally deprived, and academically struggling.

Based on the fact that the interview participants could only define what constitutes Koreanness by defining what is not, I conclude that the entangled and multi-layered meanings of multiculturalism in Korean society also construct the Korean identities in fragmentation. These fragmented Korean identities are constructed in ways such that many Korean individuals were able to represent themselves as “multicultural”, while essentially remaining ethnocentric as ever.
without referring to race and ethnicity. In the end, the shift in discourses of Korean identities from mono-ethnic to multicultural imply that Korean individuals are developing more sophisticated strategies and concepts that racialize different groups of people through their discourses surrounding identities.

**Center and the Periphery Revisited: Neoliberal Globalization and Strategic Identities**

From the governmental assertions of “autonomous globalization” since 1990s to the textbook narratives emphasizing international cooperation and global etiquettes of cultural diversity, public discourses demonstrate the determination of Korea to become one of the global powerhouses. Whether emphasizing on the economic or political aspects, discourses of political democratization, autonomous globalization, unification, and economic advancement made it clear that Korea endeavors to become a strong and rich nation that would never again be subjected to the foreign powers. As the teenage brothers pointed out during the interviews, public discourses frequently refer to the recent Korean history of wars, colonization, and the division of the nation as the consequences of the failure being adaptive to the dynamics of the changing times at the end of the Chosŏn period. In this regard, the discourses of Korean national advancement are multi-faceted: reopening the old wounds of wars and colonization; and guilt-provoking on the current state of the affairs; while highlighting on the recent economic and political “achievements” of Korea; and encouraging to pursue for the higher aim toward the global center of the power and wealth.

The discursive constitution of national advancement thus constantly juxtaposes Korea with the more advanced Western countries and the developing non-Western ones at the same time. The discourse of national advancement nevertheless did not necessarily limit Korea to pursuing the Western modernity with industrialization and political democratization of the earlier
period. It aimed higher for sustaining the development into the center of the global political economy. The discursive construction of situating Korea between the advanced Western and the developing non-Western countries thus present a linear and hierarchical structure of the center and the periphery, yet in a triple construction. This triple construction, or double binary oppositions, engender the sense of insecurity as much as desire, based on the possibility Korea either falling back to the periphery as much as proceeding into the center in the global power structure.

From the governmental perspective, educating the citizens for multicultural diversity or for economically profitable industries of science and technology are only parts of the national advancement project. Pronatalism, unification plans, international cooperation, expansion of the Official Developmental Assistance to developing countries, and immigration policies are not very different in this perspective. Individual discourses, at the same time, demonstrate that their interests are not necessarily contained within the public discourses of national advancement, or any of its sub-discourses. Individual discourses show that Korean individuals are also pursuing their own enjoyment or individual advantages in the society. Their individual interests happen to be closely allied with the governmental pursuit of the national advancement in the global stage in most cases. It is hasty to assume that these individuals will choose their own interests over the national interests depending on the context. Yet, it can be said that it is easier to stay loyal nationalists when the national interests are closely aligned with their individual desires and interests.

For instance, an elder teacher who visited one interview session and an elementary school principal I met on a trip were the two most assertive people on the national advancement in their discourses. Both emphasized the importance of education and educators in raising multicultural
students to become productive members of the Korean society so that they will contribute to the Korean national advancement in the global stage. At first, their discourses presented multicultural students as the future leaders of the global Korean advancement, but this population can always become delinquent and social problem. What turns the potential social problem into the loyal contributors in Korean development is the teacher. The sense of self-importance inscribed in their discourses attests for their desires to be positioned as a crucial part of the Korean global advancement.

By the similar structure of power relations embedded in the different levels of discourses, economic development, ethnic/cultural homogeneity, and democracy and multiculturalism molded the discourses of Koreanness as their means of governing the individual conducts for the Korean global advancement. Nevertheless, unmasking the complicit relationship between the national advancement and the discourses of Koreanness in the society did not reveal the muted and powerless subjects. Rather, uneven but productive power relations embedded in the discursive constitution created the individuals strategically negotiating their ways into the very power structure of the world around them. As such, individuals reconstitute the social realities around them conforming to their own needs, desires, and interests: becoming a multicultural pluralist in enjoying the different food, culture, and the expanded freedom with the acceptance of diversity in the society; claiming cultural superiority of Koreans in imposing assimilation policies and problematizing the multicultural population; and the list can go on.

If the neoliberal globalization has been the governing force of the processes of Korean national advancement into the global center, Korean government has been turning it into the profitable system of controlling and educating the population according to the national interests. As much as the government-projected discourses of Koreanness have been restructuring to
produce the Korean nationalists well-versed in global ethnic and cultural diversity, Korean individuals have been optimizing their identities in seeking to receive the most benefits from the neoliberal and globalizing social structure. It is also noteworthy that the triple discursive formation of positioning Korea between the advanced Western and the developing non-Western countries underpins the strategic constructions of Korean identities.

Many young urban mobile Korean individuals anxiously positioned themselves as multicultural and global, while arguing the multicultural population in Korea to be acculturated and assimilated into the Korean ways of living. Their concept of Koreanness were becoming increasingly racialized and hierarchically outlined with the advanced, entrepreneurial global membership and the sympathetic attitudes toward the multicultural population. The fact that their discussions of “multicultural population” being centered on the foreign laborers, female marriage immigrants, and their families attests that the white Western others, ethnic Chinese residents, or North Korean escapees are on a different conceptual ground from the immigrants from the non-Western countries. Individuals point to various groups from the early ethnic Chinese immigrants (Hwagyo/Huaqiao) to the families of American Military personnel stationed in Korea as being multicultural. However, these groups almost never came up on the discussions unless I specifically asked.

As a side note, I want to introduce a small experiment with my interviewees, which was not discussed in data chapters due to the complexity and scope of the issue that requires more research. Many individuals, both male and female, but more often females, I met during the interviews and research trips suggested, sometimes even with some envious nuances, that I should be able to find “an American guy” as marriage partner. They suggested so without even a slightest hesitation considering if their suggestions would offend me. When asked what they
meant by “an American guy”, white, tall, blond, intelligent, well-mannered and good-looking were almost automatic responses. I commented to my male interviewees during the conversations focusing on their multicultural and global identities, that they should consider international marriages due to their multicultural openness. Majority of them were completely bewildered as to what I meant by the comment. Either they took it as a joke (e.g., yeah, a cute French girl should be cool), or cautiously inquiring back that I cannot be trying to offend them by suggesting they pay to find a bride from Southeast Asian countries.

The result from this experiment can be interpreted tentatively within the same framework of the triple discursive formation of positioning Korea between the advanced Western and the developing non-Western countries. A close alliance with the white, advanced “Anglo American” is seen as a general upgrade or advancement, especially for female Koreans. In contrast, an “international marriage” for an urban Korean male not quite “internationally positioned” in the context of contemporary Korean society meant violation against their legitimate Korean masculinity. The results from this little experiment suggest a disturbing development when juxtaposed with the popular Korean drama shows centered on the female marriage immigrant protagonists’ integration into the Korean family life. These stories of Vietnamese female immigrants becoming a part of Korean families mainly portrayed the young, virtuous, upright, intelligent, well-educated and caring middle-class Korean males as the male protagonists.103

To begin with, the plot in the Golden Bride (2007) of the male protagonist’s mother searching for a possible bride for her panic-stricken son from the Southeast Asian state correlate

103 See for examples, Hanoi Bride (2005) and Golden Bride (2007) from Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS). Hanoi Bride (2005) is short, two-episode love story aired as a harvest festival holiday special, which drew much public attention. Golden Bride (2007) is a 64 episode series story of family and love, which had national rating of 27.70% and aired during weekends from June 2007 to February 2008. Hanoi Bride presents a Vietnamese female interpreter and a Korean male doctor as protagonists. Golden Bride is a story of a half-Korean/half-Vietnamese female, in her hopes to find her Korean father, marrying a Korean male suffering from the panic disorder since his tragic break up with his former fiancée. The male protagonist turns out to be an “ideal” Korean husband: a virtuous, intelligent, talented, and tender-hearted protector of the female protagonist.
with the result from the little experiment: that an urban middle-class Korean male in a normal condition would more likely not seek for, or even want, a foreign bride from Southeast Asia. Thus, the imagery of virtuous Korean male protector and the naïve and unsophisticated but docile and obedient Vietnamese female beneficiary is far from general social realities for the female marriage immigrants. What is more serious is that this line of imagery presents too familiar reproduction of the western imperialist imagination or Orientalism (Said, 1978; 1994): a virtuous white (Anglo-Saxon) male defending the unassimilated but obedient and self-sacrificing “other” female.

Coupled with the Korean desire to become rich and strong nation embedded in the triple construction of the Korean positionality in the global political economy, this line of discursive reproduction presents a fine line between the desires for stable prosperity and the imperial ambitions. As recent Korean endeavors of expansion in the international economy and politics are easily traceable (see footnote 59 in Chapter III), the supporting popular reproduction of the typical imagery of Western imperialism cannot be received as purely accidental and innocent. It is, nevertheless, premature to conclude that Korea endeavors to emulate the western imperialism or to create its own version of orientalism toward its developing neighbors and recent immigrants from these countries. Still, the discursive emergence of gendered and racialized views reproducing the classic imaginations of Western imperialism, I suggest, needs a more thorough examination and further critiques to prevent it from becoming yet another version of regional and cultural imperialism enforced onto the multicultural population in Korea.

**Global Membership and “Confucian” Multiculturalism**

Whereas the discourses of multicultural and multi-ethnic harmony are gaining more importance, this research observed that the concept of Koreanness is not necessarily under a
great revision to date. Revisions are on its way as seen in some individuals balancing out the negative arguments against recent immigrant population, but are very slow in its process. In general, Koreans are becoming more sophisticated to know how to be politically correct without significantly changing their underlying attitudes toward different groups of people. Textbooks demonstrated that Korean individuals are strategically encouraged to become globally competitive citizens while keeping their beliefs in ethnic and cultural superiority. Individual discourses coincided with the textbook discourses in phrasing the multiculturalism and multicultural population as objects of enjoyment, human resources, or social burden that should be screened, controlled, and managed.

Since mid-2000s, Korean multicultural policy and immigration policy have developed together in order to manage ethnic diversity and promote social integration.\(^\text{104}\) Since the 2008 election of President Lee Myung-bak, Korean government has been emphasizing more on creating a “global Korea” by embracing multiculturalism and becoming globally competitive as advanced “Western” states. Global competitiveness is also sought in attracting the best possible overseas human resources, such as foreign workers, academics, and students in order to compensate the declining economically productive population with low-fertility and ageing phenomena. The policies are, theoretically, designed to create a society accepting “foreigners as long-term assets” and members of Korean society (Watson, 2012: 239).

In accepting the foreigners as part of Korean society, immigration and multicultural policies are mainly concerned with the “social integration.” It is unclear what kind of integration

\(^{104}\) The government issued “Basic Direction and Action Plans for the Foreigner Policy (oegugin chŏngch’ae kibon panghyang mit ch’ujin ch’egye)” on May 26, 2006. Then, “Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea (Chae-Han Oegugin Ch’ŏu kibonpŏp)” from July 2007, and “Multicultural Family Support Act (Tamunhwa Kajok Chiwŏnpŏp)” from March 2008 were implemented. The two Acts for the treatment of foreigners and for the multicultural family support state that both Acts aim to “contribute to the social integration” (Yi, 2011, p. 43). Whereas it is not clear what kind of social integration is aimed for in these Acts, the 2007 Act defined that “multicultural society” as “the social environment that Korean citizens and foreigners residing in Korea mutually understand and respect each other” (Yi, 2011, p. 43).
is pursued at this point, but the discursive constructions of the “2012 Central Administration Implementation Initiatives of the First Basic Plan for Immigration (Oegugin =Foreigner) Policy 2008-2012”\textsuperscript{105} suggests immigrants are hierarchically classified according to the policy objectives, and regulated by the techniques of selective inclusion and exclusion. For one, detailed policy initiatives under “active opening area” clearly aims for drawing in more talented and/or rich population, whereas those of “orderly immigration administration area” are centered on the discourses of tightening control, management, and regulation of the “unwanted” sojourners.

As for the “quality social integration area”, it is a positive change that the initiative prioritized multicultural education for ethnic Koreans as well as educational support system for the multicultural families. Yet, the standardization of social integration program is structured to educate the new immigrants to facilitate their adjustments in Korean society with Korean language acquisition and obtaining basic cultural literacy. The characteristics of the social integration programs depend on the content of what is taught in the Korean language and cultural literacy classes for the immigrants. At any rate, the general logic of the policy structure is clearly hierarchical and exclusive according to the economic calculations. Modern governing techniques such as granting dual citizenship and relaxing the permanent residency requirements, or targeted border control and work site inspections are strategically implemented for different groups of immigrants.

Individual discourses examined in earlier chapters evidenced the similar tendency of being very flexible in accepting the multiculturalism while pursuing social integration of the different cultures and populations, which inevitably aims to erase the differences. Not all individuals took similarly strong stance as one of the interviewees openly stating that immigrants and their

cultures should be screened and adjusted to follow the Korean ways of living. Many individuals, in different degrees, generally agreed on managing the diverse immigrant groups and cultures in order to facilitate their incorporation into Korean society. However, what is more significant is that Korean legal system is not very closely “managing” the issues and difficulties immigrants encounter, unlike the “Basic Plan for Immigrant (Foreigner) Policy.”

For instance, many female marriage immigrants fall victim to domestic violence, both physical and verbal abuse on daily bases. According to the Korean Nationality Act, marriage immigrant woman can apply for the naturalization only two years after the marriage.\textsuperscript{106} The time until their naturalization is granted regularly takes one or two years more since the application. Between this period of three to four years, their only qualification of residency is their married status to the Korean man. If a divorce takes place for any reason, their residency is revoked and the female immigrant becomes illegal immigrant, thus deported. In addition, if she attempted to extend her residency independently of the husband on the grounds of domestic violence, etc., it is not simple and easy to clearly prove the damage and the liability for the cases (Kungmin Ilbo, Oct. 25, 2008; Ch’ungbuk Ilbo, Oct. 26, 2014). In short, Korean legal system is not very effective in protecting the immigrants.

General governmental response to the issues of domestic violence victims has been that Korean individuals and families treat the “daughters-in-law” with the traditional values of sympathy, paternalistic understanding, respect, and hospitality (Watson, 2012: 240). In this case, the paternalistic Confucian ethics becomes a system of managing and taking care of the immigrant victims of domestic violence, rather than the legal system and governmental policy. This line of discourse implies that there is no need for legislation to protect the victims, due to

\textsuperscript{106} This example applies to the immigrants without other means to apply for naturalization, such as professional skills, higher education degrees, and the likes.
the Confucian value system inscribed in the Korean society. While the Korean legal system turns blind eye on the issues of female immigrants’ becoming domestic violence victims, their fear of being deported silence and marginalize the victims even worse. Especially in cases that also involve child born or conceived in between the time of wedding and of naturalization, issues become more complex and almost dead-ended for the immigrant women.

Again, the government conveniently slips out of the responsibility while assuming full privilege of screening, controlling, and managing its population diversity through the exercise of the “graduated sovereignty.” And the female marriage immigrants are left to the discretion of individuals and individual families, even when they are abusive. In this regard, the absence of the legal sanctions against the abusive husbands or family invites more discrimination, violence, abuse, and exploitation of the immigrant women. Note also that the Korean title of the “Basic Plan” was in fact a “foreigner (oegugin)” policy plan, instead of “immigrant (iminja)” or “immigration (imin)” policy plan, even though the government published the documents in English with the title “Basic Plan for Immigration Policy.” The title of the document suggests Korean government is more interested in selective groups of “foreigners”, but not the foreign-born immigrants residing in Korea.

In this regard, there emerges another triple construction of Korean attitude on “foreign” population. For sustaining its global competitiveness, Korea wants to draw in more human resources and monetary investments from overseas through its multiculturalism and selective border control. For social integration, Korea wants to minimize the internal discordance as seen in the recent French and British immigrant uproars, through asserting multiculturalism and graduated levels of governmentality. In the meantime, ethnic Koreans are encouraged to become sophisticated in multicultural terms and to target global market. The discourse of
multiculturalism, that is inherently intertwined with the reconstituting of Korean identities, in this sense, is located at the crux of Korean membership in the global political economy. Within the discursive structure of multiculturalism, immigrants and foreigners are easily objectified into groups that can be labeled for differentiated treatments from the Korean government and the individuals.

Findings from the earlier chapters evidenced that different cultures are essentialized and hierarchically marked in order to refer to the diverse immigrant group’s “places” in the society. Cultures were hierarchically marked to correspond to the global hierarchy of the economic and political power relations, and immigrants were viewed and treated in hierarchically racialized order. Whereas the interview participants and governmental discourses suggested the immigrants’ cultural assimilation as promoting the social integration, marking out different cultures in a hierarchical manner perpetuates separation and competition for the higher status recognition of different groups of people and culture.

Examination of the discursive formation of the Korean government’s basic policy plans regarding multicultural population in Korea revealed that multiculturalism is strategically implemented to serve the national and individual interests of Korea and Koreans. At least on the discursive level, multiculturalism in Korea is faithfully serving the needs and desires of Koreans to become successful member of the global political economy while sufficiently warding off the external criticism and internal conflicts at this point. However, current equilibrium is fragile judging from the unique characteristics of Korean context of multiculturalism. For instance, Korea has recently turned from immigrant sending to receiving country, with proportionately high number of overseas Koreans in different parts of the world. Also, immigrant groups are very diverse with unprecedented proportion of marriage immigrants in traditional immigrant
receiving states, as well as the influx of North Korean escapees while confronted with the Communist regime in North Korea.

In short, the number of immigrant population is steadily increasing as well as the Korean need for the immigrants, and the context and complexity of Korean immigration issues are unique. In this regard, it will be a grave negligence to expect the underlying Confucian value system will take care of the issues of discrimination, abuse, violence, and exploitation of the immigrant population. At the same time, it is also premature to conclude that the discursive constructions of the policy aims are creating certain effects and values observed in this section: it is only one aspect of the policy structure. Instead, I suggest, more thorough and diverse empirical researches should be fulfilled on the foreign population management plans. Researches such as evaluating the financial allotment and expenditure on different sectors of policy objectives and their outcomes, the effects of discursive constitution of the policy plans as well as the legal structure on different groups of immigrant population are only few of the fields that should be examined.

Implications for Further Research and Policy Implementations

There are four implications for further research. One is more centered on the research perspective, and the rest are more concerned with the educational policy implementation.

First, I suggest diversifying the research perspectives as well as producing more critical research on identity constructions. As the literature review of existing research on the Korean identity constructions in Chapter II indicate, numerous research on Korean identity construction are mainly centered on very narrow topics of the origins, historical constructions, and manifestations of mono-ethnic Koreanness and of the contemporary inception, development, and characteristics of Korean multiculturalism especially on the policy level. Recently forming field of research on Korean multiculturalism and multicultural education has unique and significant
contributions. Similarly, critical review on the discursive constructions on what it means to be Korean on both public and individual levels provide varied perspectives in analyzing educational policy. As this research attempted to show, specific identities, such as mono-ethnic and multicultural Koreanness, that are routinely taught, learned, and internalized through formal and informal education, can be the fiercely contesting field where different value systems collide, compete, transform, and collaborate to create new meanings.

The critical disclosure of multiple needs, desires, and power invested in the individual and national level constructions of identities aims not to judge. The purpose is, rather, to open up more diverse and dynamic discussions on identity construction and education in the hopes of providing some new directions and perspectives for the policy implementation. Close examinations on the discursive constitutions of identities, for example, reveal how specific identities in the contemporary society are strategically constructed, reproduced, and rearticulated not only by education and policy implementations, but by various needs and desires on both national and individual levels.

Identity constructions are heavily invested process with emotions, psyche, politics, values, history, ethics, and various levels of ethos involved in a person’s as much as a society’s development. Being critical on this process is often taken as a threat or a violation of the value system embedded in a society, or sometimes of individual dignity. However, as one participant’s remarks on the white and black people’s use of crayons for drawing themselves evoked a new set of lively discussions on the issues of identifying one’s skin colors to a color that does not realistically represent one’s own, a criticism that does not judge indeed “multiply not judgments but signs of existence” and sometimes “(re-)invent” the beings (Foucault, 1984/1997, p. 323).

Foucault’s insight went beyond the conventional notions of being critical means to judge
and scrutinize the value of certain concept, conducts, someone or something, when he proposed a
criticism without judgment:

I can’t help but dream about a kind of criticism that would try not to judge but to
bring an oeuvre, a book, a sentence, an idea to life; it would light fires, watch
the grass grow, listen to the wind, and catch the sea foam in the breeze and
scatter it. It would multiply not judgments but signs of existence; it would
summon them, drag them from their sleep. Perhaps it would invent them
sometimes … I’d like a criticism of scintillating leaps of the imagination. It
would not be sovereign or dressed in red. It would bear the lightening of
possible storms (Foucault, 1984/1997, p. 323).

With the lyricism that often characterizes his style of narratives, Foucault creates a space
for a criticism which engenders vibrant discussions that will lead to various understandings of
different identities and their constructions than judging or condemning.

Second, it is also important to diversify the research perspectives as well as producing
more critical research on the policies regarding multicultural population in general. As it was
suggested in earlier sections of this chapter, analyzing the different policies and their
implementations should be done in diverse perspectives in order to understand their effects.
Analyzing the discursive constructions of policy plans is one thing, but this alone does not
provide a full picture of how specific policy plans are implemented and produce what effects.
Also, researches on Korean multiculturalism and multicultural population in Korea are
concentrated on specific populations of female marriage immigrants and foreign laborers. This
research had not been an exception from that limitation either, partly due to following mainly on
the individual discourses of mainstream Koreans.

Multicultural population, nevertheless, includes myriads of people from short-term
residents to long-term settlers pointed out by the interview participants. Majority of the groups
are doubly marginalized by being excluded from the discussions on multicultural population.
From the policy perspective, North Korean escapees and return migrants from various parts of
the world, ethnic Chinese who had settled in Korea for at least a century, biracial population born between Korean mothers and American soldiers stationed in Korea, and many more people are important members of increasingly diversifying Korean society. Diversifying the research perspectives also should include researches on more diverse population and their needs in different perspectives. Specifically in educational policy implementations, it is important to understand the different needs of various groups of people in providing required support for the multicultural population. Thus, more research on various populations should be encouraged and supported.

Third, there is a need for the textbook revisions according to the changes in educational purposes. Preparing the next generation for the global diversity is important. Yet, if the government wants to promote multiculturalism within its borders, textbooks also should teach to build internal diversity and mutual respect. It is also important that textbooks teach a coherent set of values as it claims to.

Building upon this, fourth, multicultural education within the teacher training curriculum should be expanded. As seen from the individuals participated in the interviews, many display confused or self-contradicting discourses on as to what they are aiming to assert as Korean self. Teachers were not exceptions in this case. Thus, it is very easy they send out dual messages to the students on a daily basis, as they did in the interviews. This is largely due to the fact that multiculturalism in Korea is still in a nascent stage. Thus follows the problem of lacking a sufficient level of social consensus on whether Korea is assuming multicultural identity as a short-term strategy or as a way of Korean life for the future.

With the persisting existence of needs to receive more immigrants into the society, I suggest that future education policy take into consideration to expand on the multicultural
education in teacher education programs, for both pre- and in-service teachers. In order to support substantial content and amount of multicultural education in teacher education programs, formerly suggested diversified research on identity constructions should be accompanied. Also, nurturing more diverse and lively discussions on the constructions of Korean identities through more researches will contribute in reaching social consensus on what kind of society Korea aims to build or reconstruct. As the issues of education of children from multicultural families already have been drawing increasing policy and academic attentions, it is only appropriate to consider this population in policy implementations without objectifying and separating them as human resources or problems of the society.
Appendix A Public Advertisement Poster: All are skin colors

모두 살색입니다 All are skin colors
외국인 근로자도 피부색만 다른 소중한 사람입니다 Foreign laborers are the same human beings, only different in their skin colors. They are our invaluable guests who will go back and introduce our country to the world.

우리 민족은 약소국의 설움을 누구보다 잘 알고 있습니다. Our people (minjok) know better than anyone else about the sadness of a weak country. Pains from Japanese colonial era still remain unhealed in our heart. Therefore the frequent news of the violations of human rights of the foreign laborers hurt our heart even more. Foreign laborers’ human rights are as precious as our (own) human rights.

2012 Directions for the Implementation Plan

□ Strengthening the national competitiveness through attracting and utilizing talented people

□ Developing into a mature multicultural society respecting human rights

□ Blocking the immigrant harmful to national interest and establishing the visiting order in accordance with the principles and law

□ Establishing an efficient and organized system of foreigner policy implementation

□ Substantial completion of the First Foreigner Policy Master Plan and establishing the foundation for policy advancement

Major Sectoral Policy Initiatives

Active opening area (40 projects, 680.66 hundred million wŏn)

1) adequate supply of foreign workers to meet the corporate demand

2) supporting the identification and attraction of the talented

3) active inducement of talented people’s citizenship acquisition and mitigation in general naturalization requirements

4) expansion of the area for indirect real estate investment immigration system

Quality social integration area (69 projects, 1,246.89 hundred million wŏn)

1) reinforcement of the education support for multicultural families

2) fostering the Korean citizens’ understanding of multiculturalism

3) supporting the social adjustment of marriage immigrants and their children, including child care, employment, and medical care

4) standardization of the social integration programs
Social integration program

- basic cultural literacy education required for the immigrant’s quick adjustment and stable settlement into Korean society
  - curriculum: Korean language · Korean society understanding (minimum 50 hrs. – maximum 465 hrs.)
  - incentives for the curriculum completion on citizenship acquisition, residency management, etc.
    - marriage immigrant: Shortening the waiting period for naturalization review and reflected in naturalization interview
    - change of residency status of professionals (F-2) will have added points (25 points), exemption of Korean language examination for permanent residency and foreign laborer specific activity (E-7) change

5) expansion of the long-term secure legal status guaranteeing permanent residency in order to encourage overseas Koreans contributing to national interest and development of the overseas Korean communities

6) establishment of the infrastructure for the local governments’ foreigner support policies

Orderly immigration administration area (24 projects, 65.54 hundred million wŏn)

1) tightening of the international student management
2) strict border control and Visa and residence control
3) supporting the social stabilization including the development of foreigner villages
4) countermeasures such as suspension of Korean language examination and of worker receiving, against the countries consistently having (significant) rate of illegal immigration of workers entered through Employment Permit System
5) strengthening the guidance and inspection on the sites employing foreign workers and foreign-national ethnic Koreans with Employment Permit System and the like

Foreigner’s human rights areas (16 projects, 111.38 hundred million wŏn)

1) support and human rights protection for immigrant victims of domestic violence and such
2) improvement of refugee screening procedures and promotion of establishing refugee support
facilities

3) strengthening of the protection of migrant worker rights
Appendix C List of Sample Interview Questions

1. Please list the different groups of people you can think of.

2. Please rate your feelings of familiarity on the people you have listed above.

3. What are your primary impressions on the people listed?

4. Have you ever come across with the different groups of people listed earlier? When and where have you seen them?

5. Did you have any interactions with those people? If yes, please explain the situation.

6. Do you differentiate between race and ethnicity? If yes, how are they different to you?

7. Do you differentiate between a state (kukka) and an ethnic nation (minjok)? If yes, how are they different to you?

8. Do you recognize any changes in the concept of what it means to be Korean in public discourses? If yes, please explain what kind of changes you recognize. If no, disregard questions #9 and #10, and go to # 11.

9. From where have you recognized the above changes?

10. How do you experience about the above changes in discourses of Koreanness?
   10-1. Do you think the changes in public discourses on Koreanness are good?
   10-2. What do you see good/not good in the changes in public discourses of Koreanness?
   10-3. Please explain the reasons for 8-2.
10-4. Do you like, or feel comfortable with, the changes in public discourses on Koreanness? Why/Why not?

11. Recently, there seems to be a rise of interest in multiculturalism in Korea. Is it true? If your answer is no, please disregard #12-16.

12. If you answered yes in #11, where can you find the evidence to the rising interest in multiculturalism in Korea?

13. If you answered yes in #11, why do you think there is a growing interest in multiculturalism in Korea?

14. How are you experiencing the changes with the growing interest in multiculturalism in Korea?

15. (If there is a growing interest in multiculturalism), Do you think the growing interest in multiculturalism in Korea is related to the concept of what it means to be a Korean in the society? If yes, please explain how.

16. (If there is a growing interest in multiculturalism), Does the growing interest in multiculturalism in Korea affect your perspective in Koreanness?

17. Do you think any biases against certain ethnic/racial groups of people exist in Korea? If yes, please explain why you think so. If no, please disregard the following questions.

18. If you answered yes in #17, can you also give me some examples on the actual practices of ethnic/racial biases on different groups of people that exist in Korea?

19. Have you ever witnessed the examples you have explained in #17? Or, do you have any first-hand experience of similar biases? If yes, please elaborate on your experiences.

An, K. et al. (2010). *Pre-feasibility Study on the Korean Law Education Program in Mongolia* (Monggol Han’gukpŏp Illyŏk Yangsŏng P’ŭrogūraem Yebi Tadangsŏng Chosa). Seoul, Korea: KEDI.


Chi, S. et al. (2010). *Pre-feasibility Study for the Establishment of the Vietnam Pharmaceutical University (Pet’ŭnam Êiyakhak Taehakkyo Sŏllip ŭl wihan Yebi Tadangsŏng Chosa)*. Seoul, Korea: KEDI.


Chŏn, C. H. (2010). Han’guk Kŭn·Hyŏndaesa Kyogwasŏ rŭl tullŏssan Yŏksa Insik Kaltŭng Yŏn’gu: Han’guk Minjokchuŭi ŭi Kyunyŏl ŭl Chunsim ŭro (A Study on the Conflict of...
Historical Recognition in the Textbooks of Korean Modern and Contemporary History: On the Concept of Korean Nationalism. *Han’guk kwa Kukche Ch’ôngch’i* (Korea and World Politics). 26(3), 159-191.

Ch’ŏng, C. S. (2009). *Kukche kyŏrhon iju yŏsŏng, Han’guk sahoe e chŏgŭng hanŭn’ga (International marriage immigrant females, (are they) adapting to Korean society).* Paju, Korea: Han’guk Haksul Ch’ŏngbo.


Ch’ŏng, K. S. (Ed.) (2011). *Han’guk Imin Ch’ôngch’aek ŭi Ihae (Understanding the Korean Immigration Policy).* Seoul, Korea: Paeksan Sŏdang.


Han, P. S. (March 25, 1997). Daewoo CEO kyo'uyuk kwajong kaesol/haeoe p'agyon imw'on taesang ohak · int'o'et tung kangu (Daewoo set up CEO education program/lectures on language · internet etc. for overseas dispatch executives). Maeil Kyongje (Maeil Economic Daily). Retrieved from http://www.mediagaon.or.kr/jsp/sch/common/popup/newsviewpopup.jsp?newsId=02100101.19970325000001709&highlight=%B4%D9%B9%AE%C8%AD

Yi, Ŭ. C. (March 25, 1997). Imw'on 33-myong taesang CEO kyo'uyuk kwajong kaesol/Dawoo
haeoe kyŏngyŏngin yuksŏng ponkyŏkhwa (Setting up a CEO educational program for 33 executives/Daewoo regularizes fostering its overseas executives). Sŏul Kyŏngje (Seoul Economic Daily).


Han, U. et al. (2010). Cambodian Medical Education Support Consultancy Pilot Projects (K’ambodia Üryo Kyoyuk Chiwŏn K’ŏnsŏlt’ing Sibŏm Saŏp). Seoul, Korea: KEDI.


Han’gyŏre. (2001, January 27). Sasŏl: ‘Salsaek’ ŭn tayanghada (Editorial: ‘Skin color’ is Diverse). 04 page 01 plate. Retrieved from http://www.mediagaon.or.kr/jsp/sch/common/popup/newsviewpopup.jsp?newsId=01101001.20010127000000407&highlight=%BB%EC%BB%F6%C0%BA%20%B4%A9%B7%BD%BA (searched through http://www.kinds.or.kr/)

Han’gyŏre. (2005, May 23). Sasŏl: Aidûri ch’a’ajan Urimal Irŭm (Editorial: Authentic Korean name children found) 23 page 06 plate. Retrieved from http://www.mediagaon.or.kr/jsp/sch/common/popup/newsviewpopup.jsp?newsId=01101001.20005023100002161&highlight=%BB%EC%BB%F6%20%C5%A9%B7%B9%C6%C4%BD%BA (searched through http://www.kinds.or.kr/)


Hwang, J. et al. (2007). *Han’guk Sahoe ŭi Taminjok·Tamunhwa Chihyangsŏng e Taehan Yŏn’gu (Research on the Multi-ethnic·Multicultural Receptivity of Korean Society)*. Seoul: Han’guk Yŏsŏng Chŏngch’aek Yŏn’guwŏn (Korea Women’s Development Institution).


Kim, H. (2009). Immigration Challenges and “Multicultural” Responses: The State, the Dominant Ethnie and Immigrants in South Korea. (Doctoral dissertation). University of
Wisconsin-Madison. Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses database. (UMI No. 3384154)


Kim, P. H. (October 11, 1996). Kiŏppyŏl kyoyuk p’ŭrogŭraem (T-chahyŏng injae rŭl ch’ajara: 6) (Corporate Training Programs (Find the people with T-type talents: 6)). Sŏul Sinmun. Retrieved from http://www.mediagaon.or.kr/jsp/sch/common/popup/newsviewpopup.jsp?newsId=01100601.19961011000000802&highlight=%B4%D9%B9%AE%C8%AD


Kungmin Ilbo, (Oct. 25, 2008). Sasŏl: Inkwŏn sagak chidae ŭi kyŏrhon imin yŏsŏng kwa chanyŏ (Editorial: Marriage Immigrant Women and Children in the Human Rights Blind Spot). Retrieved from http://www.mediagaon.or.kr/jsp/sch/commonpopup/newsviewpopup.jsp?newsId=01100201.2008122510000105&highlight=%B0%E1%C8%A5%20%C0%CC%B9%CE%20%BF%A9%BC%BA%20%B0%A1%C1%A4%C6%F8%B7%C2 (searched through http://www.kinds.or.kr/)


MEST & Taejŏn Kwangyŏksi Kyoyukchŏng (Taejŏn Metropolitan Education Bureau) (2010). Workshop for Multicultural Education sourcebook.


Duke University Press.


Pak, H. & Im, C. (2010). *Pre-feasibility Study on the Establishment of Indonesian National College of Ganesha Multimedia Digital Arts Center (Indonesia Kungnip Kanesya Taehak Mŏlt’imidiŏ Tijit’ŏl At’ŭ Sent’ŏ Kuch’uk Yebi T’adangsŏng Chosa)*. Seoul, Korea: KEDI.

Pak, Ŭ. et al. (2010). *Basic Education Support Consulting and Pilot Program in Cambodia (K’ambodia ŭi Kich’o Kyoyuk Chiwŏn K’ŏnsŏl’ting mit Sibŏm Unyŏng)*. Seoul, Korea: KEDI.


Yi, H. S. et al. (2010). *Pre-feasibility Study for the Establishment of Cambodia Battambang College of Pharmacy (K’ambodia Pat’ambang Taehakkyo Yakhak Taehak Sŏllip Yebi T’adangsŏng Chosa)*. Seoul, Korea: KEDI.


