INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, ELECTORAL STRATEGIES AND HOME COUNTRY ELECTIONS

BY

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ABSTRACT

How does international migration affect political parties' electoral strategies in the migrant sending countries? And what is the effect of these electoral strategies on migrant and non-migrant families' electoral choices? These are the two research questions that motivate this project. This dissertation argues that citizens' involvement in international migration has implications not only for their political behavior, but also for overall electoral dynamics in the sending countries.

My main contention is that international migration helps political parties to decide who to target during elections. By electoral targeting, I refer to those practices commonly used to get more votes, including: clientelism, home visits and the distribution of promotion and advertising materials. Because exposure to migration fosters political disengagement from domestic politics and makes migrant families more inclined to stay home on election day, these migration-exposed voters are more likely to be electoral targets than similar non-migration-exposed ones. Using individual-level data from Mexico's 2000 and 2006 Presidential elections, results indicate that migration-exposed voters tend to be electoral targets. Moreover, while the incumbent party is one of the key participants in this targeting of migration-exposed voters, opposition parties also engage in the electoral targeting of these voters.

Additionally, I claim that political parties are effective in getting migrant as well as non-migrant families' votes on election day. This happens due to political parties' capacity to adapt to the needs of voters and to use varied electoral tactics. Empirically, results indicate that electoral targeting is generally effective among both migrant and non-migrant families. That is, electoral targeting increases in most cases the predicted probability of getting votes from targeted migration and non-migration-exposed voters. These findings also rely on data from Mexico's 2000 and 2006 Presidential elections; and therefore present that Fox and Calderon's victories, in 2000 and 2006 respectively, were in part driven by this electoral targeting. In sum, this dissertation is essential to understanding not only political parties' electoral behavior in response to international migration, but also why migration-exposed and non-migration-exposed voters make certain electoral choices that contribute toward particular electoral outcomes.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

International migration is a worldwide phenomenon of impressive dimensions. According to the World Bank, more than 215 million people lived outside their countries of birth in 2013, and remittance flows to developing countries totaled around $401 billion in 2012, an increase of 5.3% over the previous year. Most importantly, this upward trend is neither recent nor likely to decline in the upcoming future. That is, between 1960 and 2000, the estimated number of international migrants experienced a marginal increase of about 80% (The World Bank, 2014), and factors such as demographic pressures, climate change, economic disparities, and globalization will continue to encourage the movement of people across borders.

This transfer of population across international frontiers has significant economic and political implications in both origin and destination countries. And yet, understanding the political impact for the sending communities of international migrants is a project still in its infant stages. Hence, this dissertation focuses on the consequences that aspects associated to international migration such as the loss of residents to other countries and the substantial inflow of remittances from abroad have for the workings of politics back home. Put differently, given the growing importance of this international phenomenon and the relatively lack of comprehension about what it means politically for the origin countries, expanding our knowledge in this matter is paramount.

Moreover, this study addresses the effect of this international process on home country elections and raises two research questions: First, how does international migration affect the electoral strategies of political parties back home? That is, given the presence of migration-exposed voters

in the electorate, are political parties more likely to electorally target these voters than similar non-migration-exposed ones? And second, how do these electoral strategies affect vote choices? In other words, once political parties have implemented their electoral tactics, how do migration and non-migration-exposed citizens vote? Chapter 2 provides evidence on why these questions are essential to expand the existing research agenda.

I develop my theory about the workings of electoral targeting and its effectiveness in Chapter 3. First, I argue that international migration helps political parties to decide who to target during elections. Moreover, I claim that because of migrant families' political disengagement from domestic politics and their inclination to stay home on election day, migration-exposed voters are more likely to be targets of electoral strategies than similar non-migration-exposed ones. Then, I claim that these electoral strategies are successful in getting both migrant and non-migrant families votes on election day due to political parties' capacity to adapt to the needs of voters and to use different electoral strategies.

To be clear, by *migration-exposed voters* or members of migrant families, I mean those citizens involved in or exposed to international migration processes such as return migrants, members of households who have relatives living in foreign countries and those who receive remittances from family members residing abroad. By *electoral strategies*, I refer to those practices commonly used to get more votes during elections, including: clientelism, home visits and the distribution of promotion and advertising materials. I label 'clientelism' - or the contingent exchange of goods and/or favors in return for electoral support (Scott, 1969, 1972; Fox, 1994; Hicken, 2011) - and 'home visits' as *non-programmatic electoral targeting* and the sending of promotion materials as *programmatic electoral targeting*.[1] The reason for this distinction is that clientelism and home visits are more 'questionable' electoral tactics that often include coercion and intimidation, while sending advertising materials is a pretty legitimate practice that usually emphasizes electoral promises or political programs. Finally, *effective electoral targeting* implies that these practices either increase the likelihood of a targeted voter casting the ballot in favor of the targeting party or contribute on the whole toward that party's winning chances (e.g., by making opposition supporters stay home).

While this theory on the workings of electoral targeting applies generally to any country where

[1] See Kitschelt (2000); Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007); Kitschelt et al. (2010) for some works that describe the distinction between programmatic and non-programmatic politics.

international migration is substantial and electoral targeting widespread, I use data from Mexico's 2000 and 2006 presidential elections for this dissertation's empirical tests. Various reasons support this case selection. One straightforward motive is the importance of international migration in Mexico. For instance, in 2000 the estimated number of Mexicans living abroad was about nine and half million (The World Bank, 2014) and, of course, this figure hardly accounts for illegal immigration. In terms of remittances, the corridor Mexico-US is one of the largest in the world and in 2011, Mexicans transferred $22.2 billion (or about 2% of Mexico's GDP) across this border (The World Bank, 2011). In addition, the existing literature on international migration mostly relies on Mexico for the theory building and empirical evidence. Thus, making a contribution on not only how international migration affects Mexican political parties's electoral strategies but also on the effectiveness of these practices on vote choices is essential for knowledge building in this research area. In this respect, I focus on the strategic behavior of the three main political forces in Mexico: Partido Revolucionario Institutional - PRI, Partido de Acción Nacional - PAN and Partido de la Revolución Democrática - PRD. Lastly, the Mexico's 2000 and 2006 presidential elections datasets are highly adequate to evaluate this study's theoretical predictions since they provide detailed information on political parties and voters' electoral behavior.

Building on this empirical approach, Chapter 4 analyzes who the electoral targets are during the 2000 electoral contest, while Chapter 5 conducts the same assessment for the 2006 elections. In other words, the objective of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 is to establish whether or not members of migrant families are more likely electoral targets than similar non-migrant ones during, respectively, the 2000 and 2006 Mexican presidential elections. The main take away point from these chapters is that migration-exposed voters tend to be electoral targets; and that while the incumbent is one of the key participants in this targeting of migration-exposed voters, key opposition contenders also engage in the electoral targeting of these voters to a certain extent. In Chapter 6, I compare the effectiveness of these practices among migration and non-migration-exposed voters to conclude that these strategies are generally effective for both types of citizens. The only notable exception is that electoral targeting does not seem to increase the chances of getting more votes from remittance recipients, although this assertion relies on small differences when comparing targeted and non-targeted voters. Lastly, Chapter 7 emphasizes this dissertation's major contributions, as well as its implications and provides directions for future work.

In sum, this study is essential to understand not only political parties' electoral behavior in response to international migration, but also the contribution of migrant families to home country electoral results. That is, this analysis explains the extent to which political parties (both incumbent and opposition) react to the presence of migrant families in their electorates and mobilize these migration-exposed voters to win elections. It also addresses if political parties succeed in this targeting endeavor or, if on the contrary, migration-exposed voters react negatively to these practices and decide not to comply with political parties' dictates. In addition, this dissertation expands the literature on distributive politics and elections. Essentially, it suggests that exposure to migration assists political parties in identifying their electoral targets and in deciding the mix of targeted swing and core voters that most likely gives them an electoral victory. Obviously, this connection has further implications for democratic accountability. In particular, if international migration helps political parties to employ these strategies effectively, political contenders have incentives to keep using these strategies in future electoral contests. However, conditioning the vote on the exchanges of goods/favors and on coercion mechanisms as opposed to performance in office and policy programs has widely recognized negative consequences for the workings of democracy and the quality of political institutions (e.g., Stokes, 2005; Kitschelt et al., 2010).

Chapter 2

Background

This chapter has two objectives. First, it analyzes existing research on the relationship between international migration and domestic politics back home. In particular, given that the connection between migration and politics affects a wide variety of phenomena such as exchange rate regime selection (Singer, 2010), public goods provisions (Adida and Girod, 2011; Aparicio and Meseguer, 2012*a*; Duquetter-Rury, 2014), government financing (Kochi and Ponce-Rodriguez, 2011; Singer, 2012), regime stability (Su, 2009; Wright, 2010; Ahmed, 2010, 2012; Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright, 2012) and institutional quality/corruption (Sultan, 1993; Kapur and McHale, 2005; Li and McHale, 2009; Docquier et al., 2011; Tyburski, 2012; Abdih et al., 2012; Ahmed, 2013; Tyburski, 2014); this chapter focuses on those works that causally connect international migration and home country elections. More precisely, it details the causal mechanisms that explain *why* this international process affects political behavior and electoral outcomes back home.

Second, this chapter presents why further work is necessary in this area. Essentially, existing research is deficient for two related reasons. On the one hand, while most works emphasize that international migration fosters different political behavior patterns for migration-exposed citizens and migration-rich communities, it is unclear how this phenomenon affects the electoral strategies of political parties. That is, current analyses focus by and large on the voter (demand side of elections) and the associated electoral outcome, but provide little empirical evidence about political parties' electoral strategies toward those involved in migration processes (supply side of elections). On the other, the empirical link between the actions of political parties and subsequent migrant families'

electoral decisions is non-existent. As a result, it is not really clear why migrant families make certain electoral choices (i.e., whether political parties' actions determine voting decisions or not). In this chapter, I provide evidence for these assertions.

2.1 International Migration and Home Country Elections

When analyzing the political consequences of international migration, existing research often posits a causal relationship between this international phenomenon and home country elections. This connection applies to works looking at political behavior and turnout as well as those analyzing vote choices and electoral outcomes. In addition, some scholars study how international migration affects politicians' behavior while in office, which obviously also has implications for future elections.[1] I address these three key sets of contributions in this section.

2.1.1 International Migration, Political Behavior and Electoral Turnout

Two explanations connect international migration with a variety of political actions as well as with the decision of whether to vote or not: one emphasizes the effect of *social remittances* and the other highlights the *political disengagement* that occurs among citizens exposed to this international phenomenon. Interestingly, they predict opposite outcomes but reach related conclusions.

The first mechanism states that international migration fosters democratic diffusion back home by providing contact with the political practices and democratic values of other countries (e.g., Levitt, 1998; De la Garza and Hazam, 2003; De la Garza and Yetim, 2003; Kapur and McHale, 2005; Perez-Armendariz and Crow, 2010; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves, 2011).[2] In other words, social remittances are those "ideas, behaviors, identities and social capital that flow from receiving to sending country communities" (Levitt, 1998, page 927). Thus, given that in most destination countries political participation is key for having a well-functioning democracy, social remittances should encourage higher political involvement and turnout among those directly (migrants) and

[1] See O'Mahony, 2013; Nyblade and O'Mahony, 2014 for two works that look at how international remittances increase according to the timing of home country elections. The reason for not including these works in the main discussion of this chapter is that while they connect migration and home country elections, they focus on the behavior of migrants living abroad as opposed to the behavior those migration-exposed citizens in the country origin.

[2] De la Garza and Yetim, 2003 argue that exposure to the US political institutions and processes leads to different views of democracy between Mexicans and Mexican Americans. In this regard, the results indicate that, for instance, Mexicans define democracy in terms of 'equality' whereas Mexican Americans describe it as 'liberty'.

indirectly (family members left behind) exposed to these ideas.

The second mechanism posits that the reliance on the transnational community to secure individuals' well-being decreases the incentives to know about national politics and participate in elections (Goodman and Hiskey, 2008; Bravo, 2008, 2009). Put differently, when one's welfare and comfort depend on those living abroad and improve due to monetary remittances sent from a different country, home politics and elections take a secondary role. Of course, this line of reasoning contradicts traditional models of political participation, which suggest that higher socioeconomic status increases political involvement (Verba et al., 1993; Brady, Verba and Scholzman, 1995; Bravo, 2009; Dionne, Inman and Montinola, 2014). Yet, by bringing the international dimension into the theory of political participation, these authors claim that involvement in migration does not lead to higher turnout but instead weakens the connection with national politics and reduces the incentive to vote.

Despite the different reasoning, these works deliver a similar message: international migration decreases electoral turnout (Goodman and Hiskey, 2008; Bravo, 2008, 2009) but increases participation in non-electoral activities such as civic organizations, protests and accountability requests (Perez-Armendariz, 2009; Perez-Armendariz and Crow, 2010; Batista and Vicente, 2011). Put differently, empirical results suggest that both mechanisms could be at play with political disengagement depressing turnout but social remittances encouraging higher participation in a wide variety of non-electoral activities. For example, Bravo (2009) finds support for the existence of *political disengagement* among migration-exposed voters since these citizens (i.e., those individuals who have close family living in the US, receive remittances, have lived in the US or have intentions to leave) not only know and talk less about politics but are also less likely to have voted in the 2006 Mexican presidential elections.[3] Similarly, using a combination of municipal- and individual-level data[4], Goodman and Hiskey (2008) show that high migration levels decrease political participation (i.e., voter turnout) and make those who remain back home i) less likely to view formal politics as an effective mechanism to satisfy daily needs (i.e., less likely to think politics in general and voting in particular are important) but ii) more likely to participate in non-political community organiza-

[3] This lower information about politics implies things such as the name of state governor, location of parties on the left-right scale, number of chambers in Congress.

[4] These authors capture high migration municipalities by using an index (CONAPO index of migration) which includes the share of households that i) receive remittances, ii) have family members living in the US, and iii) return migrants.

tions (e.g., religious, sports, neighborhood associations). Also, while Burgess (Manuscript) studies how migrant households in Mexico are disengaged from elections but involved in more non-electoral activities (i.e., civic organizations) in order to make demands on public officials through these non-electoral channels (i.e., societal accountability)[5], Hiskey and Cordova (2012) show that a migrant connection (e.g., family members abroad or receiving remittances) also translates into higher civic engagement (local committees and town hall meetings) in different Latin American countries. And along the same lines but from a different continent, Dionne, Inman and Montinola (2014) show that remittance recipients in 20 sub-Saharan countries are less likely to get electorally engaged and vote, but more likely to contact government officials, join demonstrations and participate in protests.

On the other hand, the *social remittances* mechanisms affects a variety of political actions. For instance, Perez-Armendariz (2009) and Perez-Armendariz and Crow (2010), using municipal- and individual-level data from Mexico, support the notion that international migration acts as a process of democratic transmission, however, indicate some interesting and contrasting patterns. While return migrants experience a change in attitudes, the friends and family members of migrants report behavioral changes.[6] Perez-Armendariz and Crow (2010) explain these results by arguing that the stronger diffusion (i.e., change in behavior) happens among those who remain abroad and their family members back home since these migrants are those who stay longer, and experience a process of deeper integration into the host society.[7] Interestingly, these authors also find that monetary remittances (i.e., individuals' total annual amounts) have no effect on political attitudes or behaviors. Relatedly, Batista and Vicente (2011) rely on the 'experience abroad of international migrants' to study its effects on government accountability. They conduct an original survey in Cape Verde and find that i) international migration - especially migration to countries where corruption levels are lower than back home - have a positive impact on return migration's demands to improve political accountability (measured as whether or not respondents sent a postcard which

[5] The rest of the chapters in this book focus on the involvement of the diaspora in activities, such as campaign financing, lobbying for external political rights, political party activism, participation in advisory councils, mobilizing collective remittances, etc. See also in this respect (Burgess, 2012, 2014).

[6] Individual political activities include participation in any of the following actions during the last three years prior to the survey: signed a complaint, wrote a letter to the editor, called into a political radio, or TV program, wrote the president or another elected authority, etc. On the other hand, political attitudes include: tolerance, satisfaction with democracy, and evaluations of government respect for rights.

[7] See Perez-Armendariz (2014) for a recent comparison of how those living abroad and return migrants contribute to the dispersion of social remittances. She actually finds that those living abroad play a greater role in the diffusion of beliefs and behavior back home such as participation in organizations, individual involvement in politics, attitudes toward corruption practices and tolerant opinions.

offer the opportunity of making the results of the survey on perceptions of corruption publicly available to the media), but that ii) remittances (share of recipient households per locality) have no effect on these demands (i.e., send the postcard).[8] Finally, Chauvet and Mercier (2011) rely on the 'transmission of norms' that migrants experience abroad to analyze their participation and democratic attitudes once back in Mali. They report that the stock of return migrants in a given municipality increased political participation in the 1999, 2002 and 2004 local and national elections. Quite surprisingly, this effect is mainly present when those migrants return home from African countries that experienced democratization as opposed to more established non-African democracies. They also find that return migrants from out-of-Africa tend to have a lower preference for democracy and higher distrust in the Malian democratic system.

In general, one can conclude that the existing evidence supports the presence of both mechanisms but with interesting contrasts: international migration and the associated political disengagement cause lower electoral turnout among migrant families (with one exception - Chauvet and Mercier, 2011 and the particular case of return migrants), but social remittances translate into higher participation rates in a wide variety of non-electoral activities.

2.1.2 International Migration, Vote Choices and Electoral Outcomes

International migration also affects the party of choice (e.g., incumbent versus opposition). A variety of works agree on this claim but offer different causal mechanisms, diverging explanations and ultimately contrasting results.

The first mechanism focuses on the *economic benefits of remittances*, which mean more votes for the incumbent. Germano (2010, 2013) argues that remittances act as safety nets and make recipients less vulnerable to economic instability and more optimistic about the economic situation than similar non-recipients. Empirically, he shows that remittance recipients in the Mexican state of Michoacan are less likely to have voted or, alternatively if they voted, more likely to have voted for the incumbent party (PAN) in the 2006 presidential elections. Morgan, Hartlyn and Espinal (2011)

[8] For a related study, see Careja and Emmenegger (2011) who analyze the political opinions of Central and Eastern European return migrants from other more established European democracies, and find systematic differences with respect to higher engagement in international politics (e.g., trust international institutions and participation in EU elections) and satisfaction with democracy back home. Interestingly, Careja and Emmenegger (2011) do not find an effect among those who return from other European newly established democracies. Across all migrants (i.e., those who return from established and new democracies), they also do not find differences in trust in the national government, interest in domestic politics and intention to participate in national elections.

offer a related argument in a different setting. They find that remittances increase the chances of voting for the incumbent party in the Dominican Republic since these flows limit recipients' need to alter the status quo.[9] And relatedly, using data from 20 Latin American countries, Bravo (2012) shows how remittances increase presidential approval and voting intentions for the incumbent via the improvement in household and country's economic assessments.

The second mechanism claims that international migration and remittances *weaken clientelism*, which means higher support for opposition parties. The majority of these works focus on Mexico and highlight the positive effect of international migration on votes against the dominant incumbent party PRI. Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast (2003) explain that the greater internationalization (i.e., international trade, people residing in the US, and remittances) of some Mexican municipalities gave citizens in these localities a *credible exit option* from the PRI's centrally distributed spoils system. The empirical analysis from 1995 Mexican local elections data indicates that i) more international municipalities were more likely to have an opposition governing party (i.e., PAN or PRD), and ii) the PRI punished these municipalities by providing less governmental funds. A number of works have continued this tradition. Merino (2005) claims that remittances constitute a "reservation wage" that allow these citizens to become independent from PRI clientelistic networks and vote for the opposition in Mexican municipal elections. Pfutze (2012) finds that migration increases the probability of an opposition party winning a municipal election against the PRI for the first time, while Pfutze (2014) develops a voting model with clientelistic transfers that accounts for social and monetary remittances. The logic in Pfutze (2014) is quite simple: remittances increase the amount that needs to be paid to clientelistic-engaged voters, but given budget constraints the party can no longer keep the same number of voters under this relationship. As a result, he shows that international migration (i.e., the proportion of remittance-receiving households) meant lower turnout for the clientelistic and incumbent PRI in those municipalities continuously ruled by the PRI in the early 2000s. Finally, and adding some geographic variation[10], Ahmed (2011) argues that remittances decrease the incumbents' ability to buy electoral support and finds that, conditional on

[9] Note that these authors also call into attention the political character of historical emigration in the Dominican Republic and the ties of these emigrants with the traditional political parties, which encourages stability of the party system in this country.

[10] Also a similar approach but looking at non-democratic regimes, Escriba-Folch, Meseguer and Wright (2012) find, in a sample of 137 autocracies from 91 countries, that remittances increase the chances of democratic transition in party-based dictatorships given that voters become less dependent of patronage networks and more supportive of opposition parties.

dissatisfaction with the ruling government, remittance recipients are less likely to have intentions to vote for the incumbent party in 18 Latin American countries.[11]

The third mechanism focuses on the *self-selection of migrants* and the resulting electoral benefits for the incumbent. That is, in opposition to the previous works and pointing out the limitations of these cross-sectional studies to show causal relations, Bravo (2008) claims that those who leave Mexico tend to be anti-PRI voters which actually causes the re-shaping of local electorates in favor of the PRI. He then shows in a differences-in-differences analysis that out-migration helped the incumbent party by increasing PRI's security (municipal vote share) in office during the 1990's.

In sum, while for some authors the economic benefits of remittances and the selectivity of migrants favor the incumbent party, for others international migration makes it harder for the incumbent party to buy votes and win elections.

2.1.3 International Migration and Political Parties' Behavior

Although not directly looking at elections, it is important to mention two additional sets of contributions because they connect international migration and political parties' behavior. Put differently, even though the electoral connection is mostly absent from these analyses, it is straightforward to think that the analyzed behavior has direct electoral implications.

First, Su (2009) claims that remittances signal to the PRI who the likely swing voters are and so this party attempts to win those voters back by providing them with materialistic incentives. The main logic is that remittances provide an alternative source of income to finance needs instead of relying on PRI's clientelistic exchanges. Household data from Mexico in 1998 indicate that remittance recipient households are more likely to receive PROCAMPO (e.g., Programa de Apoyos Directos al Campo - Mexico's governmental private transfer for direct rural support) transfers than non-recipients. Similarly, Gonzalez-Acosta (2009) shows evidence that, in the Dominican Republic, higher income and remittances do not exclude participation in this type of practices: out of 331 survey respondents: 77 participated in clientelistic exchanges, and 25 were remittance recipients.

And second, a variety of works look at the strategic allocation of collective remittances, partic-

[11] This author, however, does not directly test if remittance recipients are the targets of clientelism, although explains that strategic calculations might lead to target those voters who are poorer. Cross-country panel data from 121 countries over the period 1976-2009, also supports the theoretical claim that remittances lower the incumbent's electoral vote share.

ularly the 3x1 program in Mexico (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2012*a*,*b*,*c*). This program matches the resources that US Hometown Associations send back to Mexico with municipal, state and federal funds in order to implement much-needed public projects (e.g., public and social infrastructure). Yet, Aparicio and Meseguer (2012*a*,*b*,*c*) find that instead of purely needs-based allocation reasons, political interests are the key determinants in the distribution process since PAN strongholds (or the incumbent party during 2002-2007) and less competitive localities (i.e., determined by vote shares electoral results) are the main beneficiaries of these projects. In other words, the incumbent party uses collective remittances as a mechanism to reward core supporters/municipalities and ensure their loyal votes in future elections.[12]

2.2 What is missing?

Existing research is deficient for two related reasons. First, answers regarding political parties' electoral strategies toward those involved in migration processes (or migrant families) are mostly missing. That is, current analyses focus by and large on the voters (demand side of elections), their political behavior and the associated electoral outcome, but provide little empirical evidence about political parties' electoral strategies toward those involved in migration processes (supply side of elections). Moreover, while analyzing the strategic allocation of collective remittances (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2012*a*,*b*,*c*) and government programs (Su, 2009) are important contributions, one might wonder how political parties complement these actions with other strategies as election day approaches.

Second, the empirical link between political parties' behavior and subsequent migrant families' electoral decisions is non-existent. This absence leaves us wondering if migrant families vote in a certain way because i) they have not been the targets of electoral strategies (e.g., clientelistic exchanges and visits), ii) they have been the targets and these targets are effective, or iii) they have been the targets but these targets are ineffective.[13]

[12] See Duquetter-Rury (2014) for an additional study of the Mexican 3x1 program and its consequences on access to public goods, such as sanitation, drainage and water on the receiving communities.

[13] This criticism applies especially to the works analyzing electoral turnout since they are voter-centered approaches where the actions of political parties are absent from the analysis. As a result, various explanations are plausible as to why migration-exposed citizens are more likely to stay home on election day. One reason is that political parties do *not target* migrant families with electoral strategies and because of their political disengagement and the absence of a party telling them who to vote for, the clear alternative is abstention. The second option is that political parties do *target* these voters but are *ineffective* in getting their votes if, for instance, social remittances lead to the rejection

For instance, one could claim that these citizens are not the subjects of electoral targeting and choose 'freely' to stay home or vote for the opposition (*not targets*). But it could also be that incumbent targets are no longer effective in buying opposition supporters votes (*ineffective targeting*), or that migration-exposed voters are electoral targets and these actions are precisely the ones driving their electoral choices: i.e., opposition/incumbent targets drive opposition/incumbent vote choices (*effective targeting*). Stated otherwise, even if we take as a fact that migration benefits the opposition (or the incumbent), we still want to know if the opposition (or the incumbent) i) mobilizes their migration-exposed supporters and succeeds, ii) mobilizes them but does not succeed, or iii) migration makes such electoral practices unnecessary: i.e., political parties anticipate that migration and remittances make those exchanges ineffective and refrain from using them with these citizens.

2.3 Why this approach?

Considering the involvement of political parties and its effect on migrant families' electoral decisions is essential for various reasons. Most notably, and as previously mentioned, answers to how international migration affects political parties' electoral strategies back home are mostly missing,

of these practices or the migration option makes these exchanges with political parties less binding and abstention more appealing. And one can even claim that political parties *target* migrant families and are *effective* in getting opposition supporters to stay home and therefore maximize their winning chances. Undoubtedly, exploring these alternatives is necessary to better understand existing findings.

A similar logic applies to the works looking at the choice between incumbent and opposition. As before, different explanations can connect migrant families' economic status and more votes for the incumbent. One reason is that political parties do *not target* remittance recipients given that their better economic situation will make clientelistic exchanges (e.g., food or other material goods) less valuable for these voters. The other is that the incumbent party ensures electoral victory by mobilizing precisely those voters with a positive evaluation of the government. That is, the incumbent party rely on *effective targets* to get remittance recipients' votes since they might just need an extra incentive to vote for the candidate who is doing a good job at running the country. In addition, the opposition could be losing their traditional core supporters because their *targets* are *ineffective* if, as previously mentioned, remittance recipients' better economic situation makes these practices worthless.

The works that claim that international migration favors the opposition certainly incorporate political parties' strategic behavior into their theoretical frameworks. However, it is still unclear why international migration favors the challenger party. The reasons for this lack of clarity are twofold. First, most of these works rely on state or municipal-level data (although see Ahmed (2011) for an exception), which hinders connecting individuals' electoral decisions with electoral outcomes. Second, it is necessary to address the multiple alternatives available. Following previous reasoning, one option is that political parties do *not target* migrant families given their improved economic situation. These voters can then "freely" choose to vote for the opposition. Another plausible alternative is that the incumbent *targets* these migration-exposed voters but the exchanges are *ineffective* due to the benefits of remittances and the lower dependence on the party to ensure welfare. And yet, it might also be the case that opposition parties *target* migrant families and are *effective* if, for example, these citizens tend to concentrate among their supporters (as Bravo, 2008 suggests) and ideological affinity is all that matters. In short, the empirical link between these strategies of political parties and subsequent migrant families' electoral decisions is necessary.

and as a result, it is not clear why migration-exposed citizens make certain electoral decisions.

In addition, this approach emphasizes the fact that different explanations (e.g., effective targeting, not targeted) lead to the same outcomes. For instance, although *a priori* the effect of international migration on lower turnout is a negative consequence of migration, we might want to reevaluate this assessment if the abstention decision follows from ineffective clientelism. That is, one thing is that migrant families do not care enough about elections to go out and vote, while a different one is that these voters do not respond to the questionable electoral strategies of political parties. Therefore, establishing *why* we observe a certain outcome is critical.

Likewise, exploring the alternative channels can help to understand the somewhat puzzling finding that migration-exposed citizens commonly decide not to vote, but are otherwise more politically (i.e., non-electorally active) involved citizens. For example, if abstention is higher among targeted than similar non-targeted migrant families, international migration might be encouraging, on the one hand, politically active citizens in a wide variety of activities, but on the other, lower turnout due to negative reactions to political parties' electoral strategies, such as clientelism. Consequently, exploring these different options is paramount.

Furthermore, this approach answers the extent to which political parties (both incumbent and opposition) respond to the presence of migration-exposed voters in their electorate and use different electoral strategies to get their votes and win elections. Thus, this analysis also expands our understanding in three key areas: First, whether or not international migration weakens clientelism and other forms of political mobilization (at least at the individual level). For instance, if targeted migrant and non-migrant families are as likely to vote for the clientelistic party everything else equal, international migration is not weakening clientelism. On the contrary, if targeted migrant families are less likely to vote for that party than targeted non-migrant families *ceteris paribus*, migration could be the factor behind the ineffectiveness of such exchanges and therefore weakening those electoral practices. Likewise, building on the idea that international migration re-shapes electorates and favors the incumbent (Bravo, 2008), it is important to explore if the incumbent targets migrant families or if, given their tendency to favor the opposition (as Bravo, 2008 suggests), the incumbent party does not mobilize these votes.

Second, this analysis aims to offer some common ground to the contrasting claims that migration favors the incumbent or the opposition. In particular, after considering political parties' strategic

behavior, it is possible to establish the conditions that make migrant families more likely to vote for the incumbent or the opposition.

And third, it is possible to connect individuals' voting decisions with certain electoral outcomes at the aggregate level. This offers some clarification to the works that argue for international migration favoring a particular electoral result. That is, existing empirical analyses mostly rely on state or municipal-level data (although see Ahmed, 2011 for an exception) that make it impossible to know if results are due to migrant families' behavior or the overall effect of migration in these geographic units (e.g., economic spill over effects of remittances).

In sum, given the widespread use of clientelism and other mobilization strategies in the home country of international migrants, this dissertation proposes to start with political parties' strategic activities and then, analyze their effect on voting choices (i.e., abstention, incumbent, opposition). Put differently, it raises two related research questions: First, how does international migration affect the electoral strategies of political parties back home? That is, given the presence of migration-exposed voters in the electorate, are political parties more likely to electorally target these voters than similar non-migration-exposed ones? And second, how do these electoral strategies affect vote choices? Or, once political parties have implemented their electoral tactics, how do migration and non-migration-exposed citizens vote? This approach therefore helps to understand not only the extent to which political parties (both incumbent and opposition) rely on getting migrant families' votes to win elections but also *why* migrant families make certain electoral decisions. This dissertation provides such theoretical and empirical analysis.

Chapter 3

Explaining Electoral Targeting and its Effectiveness

This chapter develops a theory that connects political parties' electoral strategies with voter's choices. In doing so, it addresses two questions. The first question asks: who do political parties target? More precisely, are migrant families more likely to be electoral targets than similar non-migrant ones? To answer this question, this chapter builds on the literature about political parties' strategies and explains *why* political parties take migration exposure into account when designing their actions. I argue that because of migrant families' political disengagement from domestic politics, these families are more likely to be electoral targets than non-migrant ones, *ceteris paribus*.

The second question asks: are these electoral strategies effective in influencing vote choices? Or most importantly, given political parties' electoral behavior, how do migrant and non-migrant families vote? Answering this question requires considering what drives the behavior of the actors involved. That is, political parties maximize their wining chances and target voters when anticipating the effectiveness of their actions. Migrant families then respond favorably when perceiving a benefit from such practices. Thus, I claim that these electoral strategies are successful in getting both migrant and non-migrant families' votes due to political parties capacity to adapt to the needs of voters and to use different electoral strategies. Figure 3.1 depicts the connection between these two questions, i.e., the process that relates political parties' electoral strategies with citizens' vote choices (for both migration and non-migration exposed ones).

3.1 First Question: Who do political parties target?

In order to explain the connection between targeting and international migration, it is first necessary to discuss some essential aspects of the workings of this electoral process. In this respect, existing research on distributive politics makes two points clear: first, political parties are strategic when allocating resources across constituencies and voters; and second, political parties rely on local networks to implement their strategies. Both logics are essential to comprehend electoral targeting.

With respect to the first point, answers on the strategic behavior of political parties commonly highlight the key role of economic resources and political identity.[1] Interestingly, while consensus generally exists that poor voters tend be electoral targets (e.g., Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004; Jensen and Justesen, 2014), scholars disagree as to whether the core or the swing voters are the main beneficiaries of distributive practices (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Golden and Min, 2013).

Recent developments however suggest that political parties do not focus on just one set of voters (core vs. swing), but instead combine a variety of strategies in order to appeal to different types of citizens and win elections. This progress is clear in the works that analyze core and swing districts and municipalities. That is, despite extensive research and disagreement over the role of swing and core constituencies in the allocation of resources (e.g., Ward and John, 1999; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002, see Golden and Min, 2013 for a complete inventory of these works), recent contributions indicate that political parties diversify their strategies and appeal to different ideologies by using, for example, different government benefits and types of goods (e.g., Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni, 2007; Albertus, 2013).

A parallel evolution is present in the works that take individuals as the unit of analysis. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they also reach similar conclusions. For instance, some authors claim that ideologically weakly opposed (i.e., swing voters) and poorer voters are the main targets of clientelism or *vote buying* strategies (Stokes, 2005; Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004), while others argue that knowing political identity and tendency to abstain is essential because political parties mostly get involved in *turnout buying*, or in making sure core supporters at risk of abstention vote

[1] See also Finan and Schechter (2012) for a work that shows how the personal characteristic of being a reciprocal individual also increases the chances of being a target.

on election day (Nichter, 2008). Survey data from Argentina support the idea that political parties favor turnout buying of core supporters over vote buying of swing voters. However, Nichter (2008) also suggests that, even if the empirical analysis is mostly consistent with turnout buying, political parties employ different tactics, including not only some vote buying, but also *rewarding loyalists* - or targeting those supporters with inclinations to vote - and *double persuasion* - or appealing to those who favor the opposition and are not inclined to vote. Along these lines, Dunning and Stokes (2008) argue that, in order to succeed at the polls, political parties participate in both *turnout buying or electoral mobilization* of those core supporters who are inclined to abstain and *vote buying or persuasion* of opposition supporters who have every intention to vote. Relatedly, Stokes et al. (2013) find support to the logic of heterogeneous targeting by showing that whereas loyalists are key targets some swing voters also factor in strategic calculations. And Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nicther (2014) propose a formal model where political machines, influenced by the contextual factors such as compulsory voting, ballot secrecy, and political polarization, combine different strategies (i.e., *turnout buying* of core supporters, and *vote buying*, *abstention buying* and *double persuasion* of opposition supporters).

In brief, the message that emerges from works looking at individuals as well as those analyzing districts is that political parties while certainly paying attention to their core and loyal supporters, they also implement other strategies that appeal to a wider set of voters (Hicken, 2011).

With respect to the second point about local networks, political parties' reliance on these connections goes beyond the simple need of human resources to implement leaders' strategies across the country. On the contrary, local workers (i.e., brokers, bosses, middlemen) are crucial working parts of the political machine (Scott, 1969, 1972). That is, on the one hand, political brokers act as problem-solvers of every day concerns through the provision of goods (e.g., food, appliances) and services (e.g., childcare, counseling) to numerous voters (Auyero, 2000; Szwarcberg, 2012b). On the other, this delivery function allows them to acquire valuable information not only with respect to what certain voters need and would exchange for political support on election day, but also about individuals' political preferences, tendency to turn out to vote, and political behavior (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012; Lehoucq, 2007; Wang and Kurzman, 2007; Stokes et al., 2013; Szwarcberg, 2012a). Altogether, this means that local workers hold influential positions within the community and acquire precious knowledge that is unreachable for those at the top of the political ladder.

These points are instrumental to understanding why international migration plays a role in shaping political parties' strategies. I develop this theory in the following section.

3.1.1 Political Parties' Strategies and International Migrant Families

I argue that international migration helps political parties to decide who to target during elections. By electoral targeting I mean commonly used strategies, including: clientelism, home visits, and advertising materials. Moreover, I claim that because of migrant families' political disengagement from domestic politics and their lack of motivation to turn out to vote on election day, migrant families are more likely to be the targets than similar non-migrant ones. In this section, I provide the reasoning for why we expect this relationship between international migration and political parties' behavior. I develop the logic by addressing three key points: first, why migrant and non-migrant families are different; second, why these differences provide useful information to political parties; and third, why this electoral targeting is different for the incumbent and opposition parties.

Migrant and Non-Migrant Families are Different

Migration fosters differences between families involved in this international phenomenon (i.e., have someone living abroad, receive remittances, are return migrants) and those who are not. This differentiation applies to the family structure, economic situation and political behavior. Quite simply, one of the common characteristics of migrant families is that they do not have the same makeup as the rest of neighbors since the head of household, and in certain cases even children, are living in a different country. In addition, economic assistance from abroad (i.e., remittances) usually accompanies the absence of family members. That is, given the lack of local opportunities, one of the main drivers of migration is the goal to find a job, get an income and provide for family needs back home. As a result, international migration and remittances flows happen most of the time jointly. It is moreover not uncommon for those family members left behind to experience a substantial improvement in living standards and economic stability (e.g., Kapur, 2004; Kapur and McHale, 2005). As Kapur (2004) (page 11) states: "households that receive remittances rapidly attain standards of living greater than those who do not have family members working abroad." In other words, migration differentiates between those who have access to external sources of income - or remittances - and those who do not. It is also not surprising that, especially in rural and smaller

communities, income inequalities[2], better housing conditions, and different consumption patterns make the distinction between remittance recipients and non-recipients very noticeable (Barham and Boucher, 1998; Kapur, 2004; Mohapatra, Joseph and Ratha, 2012; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010; Germano, 2010).[3]

Together with these structural and economic differences, migrant families also differ from non-migrant ones in their political involvement. In his seminal work, Hirschman (1978) explains that, during the big European out-migration waves in the 19th and early 20th centuries, those citizens who chose to 'exit' were "obviously dissatisfied in some way with the country and society they were leaving" (page 102) and disaffected from the existing political situation.[4] Needless to say, far from being a phenomenon of the past, political disengagement is still very present in current migratory processes and among migrant families. This happens for various reasons. One is that migrant families depend economically more on those living abroad than on the national economy and domestic politicians to ensure welfare, which fosters disconnection from the local or national political environment. Another cause is that some migrant family members left behind have also intentions to leave (i.e., exercise the 'exit' option) and so do not care that much about the political environment or the situation back home. And even, it is certainly not unusual for return migrants to depart on numerous occasions and after spending some time in their home country, which arguably also hinders involvement in politics. Obviously, a combination of these motives is also probable: political disaffection is present among those who migrate in the first place, and remittances and the possibility of leaving and joining family members abroad reinforce political disengagement among those left behind. In any case, this reasoning means that international migration and political disengagement/disaffection from national politics go hand-in-hand. In fact, as shown in the previous chapter, existing research shows that this political disengagement translates into lower turnout and less political information, such as the location of political parties on the left-right ideological scale (e.g., Goodman and Hiskey, 2008; Bravo, 2008, 2009; Germano, 2010).

[2] The effect of remittances on higher income inequality has however been contested by McKenzie and Rapoport (2007).

[3] Mohapatra, Joseph and Ratha (2012), for instance, find that remittance-receiving households in the Burkina Faso and Ghana, have houses built of concrete rather than mud, specially if these transfers come from high-income OECD countries. Atienza (2004) and Hidalgo (2004) also highlight differences in consumption patterns among those who have access to remittances and those who do not, since recipients can afford imported goods and follow the consumption practices of developed countries.

[4] See Hirschman (1970) for a longer and detailed description of the exit, voice and loyalty option.

Political Parties' Responses to Migration

Political parties are aware of the presence of migrant and non-migrant families in their communities. Either because the distinction is quite perceivable to the community at large or because, as earlier explained, political parties use local networks to acquire detailed information on constituents' political and economic characteristics (e.g., Stokes, 2005; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012; Szwarcberg, 2012a), it is safe to assume that political contenders can identify migration-exposed voters. The relevant follow-up question is then why this information is useful to political parties.

I claim that knowing not only who the migration-exposed voters are but also why they are different helps political parties to design their electoral strategies and decide who to target during elections. In particular, the family structure and economic distinctions provide incentives for political parties to tailor the goods/favors offered to these migration-exposed citizens in exchange for political support. Indeed, this adaptation to voters' needs is not an uncommon practice for political parties (e.g., Stokes, 2005; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012). In addition, migrant households' political disengagement informs politicians that these voters are quite likely to stay home on election day. That is, even if migrant families favor some political groups over others, they commonly lack motivation to turn out to vote. This tendency of migration-exposed voters to abstain is essential to understanding electoral targeting, which - as above emphasized - also factors in political ideology. Consequently, I use both political orientation and inclination to abstain to explain why political parties target migration-exposed voters.

To start, one of the main objectives of political parties is to ensure that party supporters (i.e., those voters that identify or favor a particular party) turn out to vote on election day. Counting on the support of sympathizers is essential to win elections but not always a certainty since the lack of time, the costs of getting to the polls, and even the absence of motivation about the elections can prevent people from voting. In this respect, migrant families belong to that set of voters with higher chances of abstaining due to their political disaffection from national politics and insufficient motivation to get involved in elections. Nonetheless, political parties deal with this potential abstention by using local networks that identify those voters at risk as well as by implementing different activities (e.g., home visits, clientelistic exchanges) during the electoral campaign. In other words, political parties develop identification and mobilization strategies to avoid losing the votes of those who identify or favor the party but do not feel inclined to vote.

Thus, given that migrant families fall into the category of possible abstainers, political parties have incentives to make these party supporters the targets of their electoral actions. That is, migration-exposed voters or members of migrant families that identify/favor a particular party are more likely to be subject to *turnout buying or electoral mobilization* than similar non-migration exposed ones. Their political disengagement and the associated risk of staying home during elections are key to understanding why.

But electorates do not only include supporters with and without intentions to abstain. Instead, political parties also have to deal with non-supporters. Put differently, while making sure that party identifiers vote is crucial, political parties need to appeal to other types of voters, i.e., *non-party supporters*, in order to maximize the chances of winning the election (even if this is done in a lower degree, as previously described Hicken, 2011; Golden and Min, 2013). The obvious question is therefore who among those non-supporters should the party target. *A priori* one can argue that politicians should not invest electoral resources in encouraging turnout among those migrant families that identify with the contender party. After all, given that these voters favor the contender but have intentions to stay home, it seems an ideal scenario for the party under consideration. Moreover, targeting non-supporting migrant families requires not only convincing these citizens to vote but also to change party orientation, i.e., *double persuasion*. Of course, this strategy is quite costly and not as likely to be successful in affecting vote choices.

Nonetheless, this initial logic misses the fact that political parties can compete for the same set of voters, or that strategic interaction between parties occurs during elections. Two main reasons encourage this competition for certain votes. First, even if one party has no initial motivation to target those non-supporters with intentions to stay home, the contender party faces the opposite incentive and willingly participates in the mobilization of these voters: for example, an opposition party mobilizes migrant family voters that identity with this opposition party. This action of course means more votes toward the contender party and, potentially, an eventual electoral loss for the incumbent. In other words, the incumbent now faces an electorate with mobilized opposition supporters who originally had no intentions to vote. This implies that, due to the mobilization activities of the competing parties (or party), it is no longer necessary for the incumbent to convince these voters to vote and change the party but only to change the vote choice. For this reason, it is plausible to argue that a competition for these voters emerges, i.e., a party targets as well non-

party supporters with intentions to stay home (i.e., non-party supporter migrant families), when a contending party mobilizes them. And second, the idea of political disengagement and lower political knowledge among migrant families also explains why among mobilized non-supporters, migrant families are as well the chosen targets. That is, among the pool of mobilized voters who do not support the party, migrant families - because of their political disaffection - are the easier-to-buy types. In fact, this logic aligns with the traditional work on party switchers according to which the least informed voters and those with a certain degree of exposure to the political campaign are the most persuadable (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944; Converse, 1962). The reasoning is quite simply that political disaffection lowers attachment to political parties and thus facilities persuasion to change political sides. This means that because lower political information and involvement are common effects of political disengagement, political parties perceive migrant families as those who might easily switch parties, if persuaded to do so.

In sum, given non-party supporters (voters that do not identify/favor the party and indifferent voters), migration-exposed voters or members of migrant families are also more likely to be electoral targets than similar non-migration exposed ones, when the contender party (or parties) participates in their electoral mobilization. Stated otherwise, migrant families are also more likely to be subject to *vote buying or electoral persuasion* when mobilized by an electoral contender/s.

Incumbent versus Opposition Parties Behavior

Incumbent and opposition parties develop different electoral strategies because they have access to different means. In particular, incumbency status allows the diversion of public funds for electoral purposes, the use of public officials as party workers and even the exchange of public jobs for electoral support. The result is that incumbent and opposition parties commonly have different resources during elections (Hicken, 2007, 2011; Szwarcberg, 2013a,b) and so reach different number of voters.

Building on this reasoning and the previously-discussed idea that politicians aim to appeal to varied voters, I expect the incumbent party to be able to implement a more diversified strategy (or strategic mix) through not only the targeting of loyal or party supporters with intentions to stay home (*turnout buying/electoral mobilization*) but also reaching some mobilized opposition-inclined citizens (*vote buying/electoral persuasion*). This happens because the access to extra resources gives the incumbent an advantage to fund more electoral exchanges and pay party workers that

identify supporters and non-supporters with and without intentions to vote. Additionally, the incumbent can use these workers to deliver the necessary goods, favors and home visits that win votes for the party. On the contrary, I anticipate that the opposition, by having access to fewer resources, participates in these actions to a lower extent and hence mostly prioritizes making sure that their supporters with the risk of staying home vote on election day (*turnout buying/electoral mobilization*).

In sum, putting together the logic about how political parties respond to migration-exposed voters and the differences between incumbent and opposition parties, I hypothesize as follows:

H1: Incumbent Targeting of Party Supporters: The incumbent party is systematically more likely to electorally target migrant families that favor the incumbent (i.e., *electoral mobilization or turnout buying*) than similar non-migrant families with the same political orientation.

H2: Opposition Targeting of Party Supporters: The opposition parties are systematically more likely to electorally target migrant families who are non-incumbent supporters (i.e., *mobilization or turnout buying*) than similar non-migrant families with the same political orientation.

H3: Incumbent Targeting of Non-Party Supporters: The incumbent party is systematically more likely to electorally target migrant families that do not favor the incumbent (i.e., *persuasion or vote buying*) than similar non-migrant families with the same political orientation. This happens *when* the opposition mobilizes migration-exposed voters.

In Figure 3.2, I present how this chapter expands the existing electoral strategies (Nichter, 2008) to incorporate incumbent and opposition parties as well as the distinction between migrant families as those with no intentions to vote and non-migrant families as those inclined to vote. Further, this figure also depicts this chapter's hypotheses: i) the incumbent targeting of party sympathizing migrant families (H1), ii) the opposition targeting of party sympathizing migrant families (H2), and iii) the incumbent targeting of non-sympathizing migrant families, when mobilized by the opposition (H3)(hence the dashed line).

Of course, these hypotheses go against some other commonly mentioned reasons in the literature, essentially: the income and the social remittances effects associated to migration. These imply that given the better socioeconomic status and the potential distaste for certain electoral tactics, political parties should be less likely to target migrant families than similar non-migration exposed ones. However, I claim that because of parties' capacity to adapt to migrant families' needs and to use different electoral strategies (i.e., home visits and clientelism), experiencing less targeting is not the

most likely outcome for migrant families. I address this point in further detail in the next section.

3.2 Second Question: Are Electoral Strategies Effective?

While numerous works analyze who the targets of electoral strategies are (e.g., certain individuals, municipalities, districts), relatively less answers exist as to whether or not these actions work and deliver the intended outcome. Of course, one can claim that political parties anticipate if certain electoral tactics (e.g., vote buying, clientelism) are going to be successful and therefore employ them only under certain circumstances, such as with those voters who are willing to get involved in quid-pro-quo exchanges (Lyne, 2008) or when policy proposals lack credibility and thus electoral impact (e.g., Keefer, 2007; Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008; Robinson and Verdier, 2013). Moreover, it is then perhaps not surprising that empirical analysis mostly find actions such as clientelism, vote buying and other mobilization strategies to be effective in driving electoral behavior (e.g., Wantchekon, 2003; Vicente and Wantchekon, 2009; Vicente, 2008, although see Lindberg and Morrison (2008) for an exception). For example, Vicente (2008) and Kramon (2009) find that experiencing a clientelistic offer has a positive effect on turnout in African countries, while Carreras and Irepoglu (2013) obtain similar results in Latin America. Likewise, Bratton (2008) reports that incumbent's actions increase individuals' likelihood of choosing that party at the polls.

Building on this line of work, the objective of this second part of the dissertation is to compare the effectiveness of electoral targeting for migrant and non-migrant families. More precisely, it aims to establish the extent to which exposure to international migration makes electoral targeting effective or ineffective (or relatively less effective) among migrant families in comparison with similar non-migration-exposed ones. Effective electoral targeting means, quite simply, that these practices should increase the likelihood of a targeted voter casting the ballot in favor of the targeting party. Alternatively, it can also refer to the targeting that affects electoral choices in such a way that makes the targeting party more likely to win the contest. An example of this would be when the incumbent targets oppositions supporters to stay home on election day (i.e., abstention buying) and succeeds in such endeavor. Undoubtedly, other examples and combinations of electoral choices exist, and I will discuss these in detail in Chapter 6.

Overall, this approach allows expanding the recent literature on those individual characteristics

that affect clientelism acceptance and rejection such as education levels, socioeconomic status and reciprocity traits (Vicente, 2008; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012; Gonzalez Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson, 2014). The next section explains *why* electoral targeting should be effective among both migration and non-migration-exposed voters, but focus in particular on the effectiveness of these tactics among members of migrant families.

3.2.1 International Migration and the Effectiveness of Electoral Strategies

I argue that electoral strategies are successful in getting migrant families' votes on election day due to political parties' capacity to adapt to the needs of voters and to use different electoral strategies. This claim relies on two simple assumptions about the behavior of political parties and voters: on the one hand, political parties target certain voters when anticipating the effectiveness of their actions and, most importantly, tailor their practices in order to ensure success. And on the other, voters respond favorably when perceiving a benefit from such practices (or a potential cost from not doing so). Put differently, while the previous section explained political parties' decision about whom to target, this section addresses political parties' selection of tactics and goods that effectively deliver targeted voters on election day.

In this section, I expand this logic and explain: first, how political parties adapt to migrant families' characteristics and requirements, second, why these families see as beneficial this exchange relationship with political contenders.

Political Parties' Adaptation

Political parties are successful in getting migrant families' votes on election day because they adapt to these families' characteristics. This adaptation to voters' needs is a common practice for political parties (e.g., Stokes, 2005; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012) and relies on both the workings of local networks and the exiting differences between migrant and non-migrant families. I also claim that political contenders can adapt in two different ways, which adds flexibility to their electoral strategies and increases their chances of success: one is through the use of varied electoral tactics (e.g., clientelism, home visits, advertising), and the other is by offering different goods to a diverse set of voters.

With respect to the first option, the combination of multiple practices is not only a well-known exercise of political parties (e.g., Hicken, 2011; Golden and Min, 2013) but also has clear implications

for migration-exposed citizens. For example, if remittances improve the economic situation of their recipients and make certain clientelistic exchanges less attractive for these voters, no good reason suggests that political parties cannot remind these citizens of the importance of voting through, for example, a home visit. Moreover, this chapter argues that when having two equally rich/poor citizens (regardless of whether those resources come from abroad or not), the migration-exposed one is more likely to be an electoral target (e.g., to receive a home visit) because of his/her risk of staying home. As a result, the most effective way of getting migrant families' votes might not be through the offering of basic clientelistic goods with no extra value, but instead, by appealing to these voters' lack of motivation to vote. In this respect, home visits can act as friendly reminders of why participation is important and even why a particular candidate is the right electoral choice. Or, of course, they can work as intimidation mechanisms that threaten those not willing to show electoral support with some negative repercussions (e.g., lack of access to public services, social exclusion).

With respect to the second adaptation option, it is also plausible to argue that political parties offer *tailored goods* to migrant families. After all, political parties can use local networks to collect personal information on what people need and then tailor their exchanges accordingly (e.g., Hicken, 2011; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012; Stokes et al., 2013). Moreover, considering also the idea that clientelistic exchanges work at their best and deliver more votes when based on a long-term relationships (Hicken, 2011), political parties have incentives to maintain their connections with key voters even if that means changing what they offer as voters' circumstances vary. Exposure and involvement in international migration is a useful and clear example here. For instance, taking as a fact that international migrants provide for the basic needs (i.e., food and clothing) of family members left behind through remittances flows, political parties can still offer to these voters other appealing options, such as political or economic favors and goods targeted at migrant populations.[5] In this respect, favors could be in the form of business permits, speeding up regulation processes or ensuring contracts/customers for those migrant families that set up a new business back home.[6] Existing research, in fact, shows the connection between remittances and entrepreneurial activities (e.g.,

[5] Albertus (2013), for instance, addresses how the good (land transfers vs. rural investments) varies depending on politicians' incentives.

[6] In contexts with many return migrants who might have been disconnected from national politics for a while, this tactic could prove beneficial in initiating the type of long-term relationship upon which clientelism relies.

Sultan, 1993; Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007; Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002; Guarnizo, 2003). Of course, these are just some examples of potential exchanges, but the general logic holds: political parties adapt their exchanged goods/favors in order to maintain the electoral connection with their migration-exposed voters.

Migrant Families' Responses

The obvious follow-up question is why these migration-exposed families see as beneficial the exchange relationship with political parties and hence respond favorably (i.e., according to what the political party intended) to those practices. In particular, given the above mentioned options available to political parties, it is important to analyze what the expected behavior for migrant families is in each case.

First, in the event of receiving a tailored good or favor, the logic is quite straightforward: these provisions offer migrant families material benefits, and in certain cases, they even allow access to favors/services that only political parties can distribute (e.g., business permits, political favors). The obvious electoral answer is then to correspond the political party at the polls.

And second, in the case of home visits, it is easy to see why targeted migration-exposed voters have incentives to behave according to political parties' dictates. This favorable response applies to both friendly and those visits involving some form of intimidation. In the latter case, a simple fear of the negative consequences of staying home can motivate voters enough to go to the polls on election day. In the former situation of friendly interactions, I posit that targeted migration-exposed voters also have incentives to follow the party's indications for two main reasons. One is that remittances make it easier for these families to afford the costs of getting to the polling station. That is, while for some voters the lack of incentives to vote might be economic, remittances facilitate the costs associated with voting. Thus, when mobilized, these voters will turn out to vote. The other reason is that, to an extent, targeted voters do not want to jeopardize the fact that having a 'in good terms' relationship with political parties can bring benefits in the future, such as goods and favors. Put differently, even if during these elections a voter did not receive any goods or favors, that does not mean that these exchanges can not happen in upcoming electoral contests. As a result, targeted voters have motivation to remain loyal and within the preferential networks of political parties.

For these reasons, I expect electoral targeting to be effective among migration-exposed voters.[7]

[7] Certainly, one could ask to what extent targeted voters might have incentives to turnout to vote but cast the

Of course, it is also plausible for voters to experience different electoral tactics at once, but in that case, the previous logic still applies. That is, either because the exchanged goods/favors bring migrant families economic gains or because these migration-exposed voters just need extra motivation to turn out to vote, electoral targeting should be effective among these voters.

3.2.2 Competing Arguments

The logic presented in the previous sections goes against some other commonly mentioned reasons in the literature such as the income and the social remittances effects.

Briefly, the existing research on migration argues that this international phenomenon creates an *income effect* because of the provision of economic resources such as remittances and savings (e.g., finances brought back home by return migrants). This effect matters because it decreases the value obtained from exchanging the vote for material goods or participating in clientelism. As a result, a variety of authors explain that migration (especially remittances) makes more costly for the incumbent government to buy electoral support using clientelistic exchanges and citizens more independent from these practices (e.g., Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast, 2003; Merino, 2005; Pfutze, 2012, 2014; Ahmed, 2011). Moreover, this research connects with the broader literature on clientelism and the finding that socioeconomic status determines who benefits from clientelistic exchanges (poor voters) (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004; Stokes, 2005) as well as who is more likely to reject these practices on moral and resource-efficiency grounds (non-poor voters) (Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). Altogether, this reasoning implies that political parties might refrain from using electoral mobilization strategies with migrant families (i.e., migrant families less likely to experience electoral targeting) if they anticipate their potential ineffectiveness among these relatively better-off voters.

Additionally, the *social remittances effect* means that international migration provides exposure to how politics work in other countries. Social remittances are therefore those "ideas and behaviors" that flow from destination to origin countries (Levitt, 1998). Consequently, if we apply this

ballot for a different party than the one that attempted to get their support. In this respect, I propose two main reasons for why that might not be the case. One is the fact that when a political party offers something of sufficient value and that brings economic benefits, most individuals would be compelled to return the favor. After all, if this reciprocity mechanism was not working, electoral targeting would not be such a widespread practice. And second, turnout buying is a prominent electoral strategy and so it is those voters who are already party supporters that are the targets. Thus, the voting decision is not as much about which party to choose but instead about whether or not to turn out to vote.

mechanisms to electoral targeting and the fact that migrants go mostly to countries where strategies such as clientelism are less pervasive, one could claim that migrant families can develop negative attitudes toward these practices. Indeed, this disapproving position implies that these voters should be less likely to respond favorably to these "problematic" electoral tactics. Accordingly, if political activists get to know migration-exposed citizens (not that unlikely given local networks) and their distaste for these "questionable" strategies, political parties should not target these voters.

In a nutshell, the income and social remittances effects entail that if political parties anticipate that targeting is not effective among migration-exposed voters, migrant families will be less likely targets than similar non-migration exposed ones. However, in the event that this anticipation does not occur, targeting should have no effect on electoral turnout or vote choice among this set of voters. Put differently, these effects mean that migration-exposed voters are not going to comply with the targeting party's dictates.

Despite these reasons, I take a different stance on the matter by arguing that political parties should still target migrant families and that these targeted voters will be responsive to the parties' appeals. In particular, the income effect and the fact that migrant families might be able to provide for basic needs overlooks political parties' capacity to adapt to voters' needs by using varied exchanges and mobilization methods. Similarly, the social remittances effect might not be that relevant when voters receive material benefits from political parties. On the contrary, ideas such as 'things work differently back home' or even 'politics are the same everywhere' might justify why these voters also get involved in political networks and try to get as much as possible from them. In any case, whether or not electoral targeting is effective among migration and non-migration-exposed voters is ultimately an empirical question that chapter 6 will address.

3.3 Figures and Tables



Figure 3.1: Electoral Process: Political Parties' Actions and Voters' Choices

	Favors Party	Favors Opposition or Indifferent
Not Inclined to Vote	*Turnout Buying or Mobilization*	*Double Persuasion*
Inclined to Vote	*Rewarding Loyalists*	*Vote Buying or Persuasion*

INCUMBENT

	Favors Incumbent	Favors Opposition or Indifferent
Migrant Family	*Turnout Buying or Mobilization*	*Double Persuasion*
Non-Migrant Family	*Rewarding Loyalists*	*Vote Buying or Persuasion*

OPPOSITION

	Favors Opposition	Favors Incumbent or Indifferent
Migrant Family	*Turnout Buying or Mobilization*	*Double Persuasion*
Non-Migrant Family	*Rewarding Loyalists*	*Vote Buying or Persuasion*

Figure 3.2: Who do political parties Target?

Chapter 4

Electoral Targeting in Mexico's 2000 Presidential Election

On July 2nd 2000, Mexican voters elected PAN's (Partido de Acción Nacional) candidate - Vicente Fox - to the Presidency. This result meant the end to the world's oldest one-party regime, after over seventy years of PRI's (Partido Revolucionario Institutional) presidential governance. This outcome was of course surprising to most Mexicans. And multiple factors contributed toward making this an unexpected result: the relatively good economic conditions and incumbent's popularity, the uncertainty surrounding the oppositions' potential performance at the highest level of office, as well as their failure to unite against the incumbent PRI (Lawson, 2004; Dominguez and Lawson, 2004; Magaloni, 2006).

This chapter has one clear objective: establish whether or not migrant families were more likely electoral targets than similar non-migrant ones during the 2000 Mexican presidential elections.[1] Understanding the connection between politicians' strategies and international migration in these historical elections is paramount for a few reason: i) the lack of knowledge on the extent to which incumbent (PRI) and opposition parties (PAN and PRD) engaged in vote buying, coercion and other mobilization strategies of migration-exposed voters in order to win those elections, ii) the existing claim that international migration contributed favorably toward this phase of "Mexican democratization" (at least by favoring the opposition's victory at the municipal level)(e.g., Pfutze,

[1] This chapter is a modified version of work presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting 2014, Chicago, IL.

2012), and iii) the relatively less attention that Mexican presidential elections have received in current research on migration. This chapter therefore analyzes what role the incumbent and the opposition parties played in attempting to influence migrant families' electoral choices. Undoubtedly, this is a necessary first step to understand why migrant families voted in a particular way in these key elections and hence how they contributed to the PAN's significant victory.[2]

4.1 International Migration and Electoral Strategies in 2000

As described in the previous chapter, the argument put forward in this dissertation is that because of their political disaffection, migrant families are more likely to be electoral targets. In the context of the 2000 Mexican presidential elections, I look at three different types of *electoral strategies*: i) *clientelism*, which implies the exchange of goods and favors in return for electoral support, ii) *home visits*, which plausibly range from a friendly visit that simply encourages voters to go to the polls to a more intimidating situation where political activists remind dwellers why, for example, they have a public job or receive certain government benefits, and iii) *advertising materials*, which commonly aim to influence recipients' votes by emphasizing the main message and the electoral promises of a particular candidate. I expect that when political parties want to mobilize a given set of voters, they use all the resources and means they have to make that happen. Thus, I speculate that the positive relationship between electoral targeting and migration status should apply to these three electoral strategies. However, I also acknowledge that differences exist among the three tactics, which influence some coding decisions I address in the next section.

As for *migration-exposed voters*, I look at return migrants as well as those respondents with close relatives living in the United States. Although involvement in international migration is certainly different for those who have spent some time abroad and those who simply have a family member living in another country, I posit that the disengagement or disaffection from national politics affects both types. In the first place, I expect return migrants to experience disengagement from politics because migration is in many cases temporary but so is the period of staying back home. That is, migrants go abroad for a few months, return home, and leave again afterwards, which arguably hinders involvement in politics. In the second place, political disaffection also applies to

[2] See Magaloni (2006) and Greene (2007) for a detailed analysis of these elections and the unexpected results.

those with close family living abroad because i) the vast majority receive monetary remittances that make them both less dependent on the national economic situation and less responsive to domestic politics, and ii) given that "migration fosters more migration" those left behind might also have intentions to leave and reunite with migrants already abroad, which quite possibly also lowers the need to get involved politically back home.

As for the *political contenders* in these elections, it is clear that the incumbent and long-term governing party PRI was in a better position to reach a larger number of voters and implement a winning strategy. Essentially, the PRI's electoral strength over all those years relied on controlling not only the national government and thus the access to highly centralized fiscal resources but also on having a complex set of networks and organizations that mobilize voters before elections (Magaloni, 2006). In fact, as Magaloni (2006) explains, one of the reasons behind the PRI prolonged success was the existing threat to potential party splitters of losing the access to "government spoils and profitable state contracts" (page 46), which were key to win elections. The opposition parties, on the contrary, faced limitations on both fronts, that is, scant electoral resources and sparse local and social networks, which impeded mobilizing voters across ample territory and hence achieving victory at the national level. Simply put, the PAN and PRD were in all respects 'resource-poor' parties (Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007).

Nonetheless, and despite this PRI domination, the 2000 elections were more of a 'fair market for votes' for few related reasons, as Greene (2007) explains: First, in comparison with previous elections, the PRI had fewer resources because of the privatization of state-owned enterprises and a reduction in the number of federal employes. This obviously meant less diverted funds for electoral purposes and fewer jobs to exchange for political support. Second, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) imposed new campaign regulations that attempted to foster more fair elections, including: public funds to all parties, limits to private funding, and audits to resources' origins. And third, Vicente Fox - the PAN candidate - was highly successful in marshaling independent campaign donations under the workings of the so-called 'Amigos de Fox' organization. This fundraising capacity of an opposition candidate had no precedent in Mexican elections. Accordingly, although of course asymmetries continued between incumbent and opposition parties and the new electoral rules were far from being perfectly enforced, it is reasonable to expect that the PRI was not the only one mobilizing voters. Put differently, even if the PRI was the main campaign player in 2000,

the opposition (especially the PAN) also got involved in a decent share of electoral targeting during these elections. Hence, and building on the hypotheses of the previous chapter, I adapt them to the context of the 2000 Mexican presidential elections as follows:

H1: PRI Targeting of PRI Supporters: The incumbent PRI is systematically more likely to electorally target migrant families that favor this party than similar non-migrant families with the same political orientation (i.e., *electoral mobilization or turnout buying*).

H2: Opposition Targeting (PAN and PRD) of Opposition Supporters: The opposition parties (PAN and PRD) are systematically more likely to electorally target migrant families who are non-incumbent supporters (PAN supporters and PRD supporters, respectively) than similar non-migrant families with the same political orientation (i.e., *electoral mobilization or turnout buying*).

H3: PRI Targeting of non-PRI Supporters: Among non-PRI supporters, the PRI is systematically more likely to electorally target migrant families that do not favor the incumbent than similar non-migrant families with the same political orientation, when these voters are mobilized by the opposition (i.e., *persuasion or vote buying*).

Of course, given the 2000 context and the fact that the PAN was especially successful in procuring funds for electoral purposes, one can expect the incumbent PRI to respond particularly to the this contender's mobilization strategies. In other words, it is straightforward to especify hypothesis 3 - or the PRI targeting of non-PRI supporters - as the PRI targeting of mostly PAN-supporters.

4.2 Data and Methodology

I test the previous hypotheses using survey data from the Mexico 2000 Post-Electoral Study (i.e., after the 2000 presidential elections) (Lawson et al., 2000).[3] This post-electoral sample has 1200 respondents and is representative of 18 year old or older Mexicans.

Dependent Variables

From this dataset, I use three different questions to create my electoral targeting variables. The first question inquires whether or not 'during the elections, the respondent received advertising materials or letters from the political parties or presidential candidates, and from whom' (*advertising*

[3] The author wishes to thank Miguel Basañez, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domínguez, Federico Estévez, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, and Alejandro Poiré. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-9905703) and Reforma newspaper. Available online at: http://web.mit.edu/polisci/faculty/C.Lawson.html.

materials), the second question asks if 'a political party representative visited their home during the electoral campaign, and which party' (*home visits*), and the third if 'in the last few weeks of the campaign, the respondent received a gift or assistance from a political party, and which party' (*clientelism*).

I use these three questions to create two different measures of electoral targeting. On the one hand, a *non-programmatic target* happens when either of the two questions about *home visit and clientelism* receives a positive answer. Combining both actions in a single indicator variable as opposed to use them independently or in an additive index is helpful for various reasons. First, respondents tend to under-report involvement in clientelism due to social desirability bias (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012) and so any analysis based on this question alone would lead to doubtful results. Second, in addition to home visits being an electoral strategy commonly used to get more votes, I expect the 'visit' question to be less subject to bias, given that there is no reference to exchanged goods or favors, and to capture some unreported clientelism since it means interaction with political parties during elections. In sum, this variable is quite adequate to measure whether or not a respondent was subject to non-programmatic targeting.

On the other hand, I use responses to the question about receiving *advertising materials* as a separate indicator variable (i.e., 1 for affirmative answers, 0 for negative ones) that measures this *programmatic targeting*. The reason for not including advertising materials together with home visits and clientelism is because these activities are inherently different. That is, clientelism and home visits are more 'questionable' electoral tactics that often include coercion and intimidation, while sending advertising materials is a pretty legitimate practice that usually emphasizes electoral promises and candidates' key messages. That is why an alternative way to differentiate these practices is by referring to them as non-programmatic (visits and clientelism) and programmatic targeting (advertising). Moreover, one could expect clientelism and home visits to be more resource-demanding and therefore more selective, but the opposite holds for sending political advertisements to voters. Consequently, using different variables is also beneficial to perform a more nuanced analysis of the strategic decision-making process under study.

Additionally, given that these three questions allow exploring which political parties approached respondents, I take this information into account for both types of targeting. Obviously, identifying the party is key to understanding the ideological alignment between the targeting party and the

voter (e.g., incumbent targeting incumbent supporters). This variation results in different indicator variables that capture whether the respondent was a party's target or not: PRI/Incumbent target, PAN target and PRD target for programmatic targeting; and PRI advertising, PAN advertising and PRD advertising for non-programmatic targeting.

Independent Variables

I use two different questions to capture migration-exposed citizens or members of migrant families: i) those who report having close relatives living in the US (*family US*), and ii) those have visited the US for a period longer than three months (*return migrants*).[4] In both instances, the two resulting variables take the value of 1 when the respondent falls into the migration category and 0 when the response is negative. Although no question inquires about remittances, we could expect that most respondents with family in the US receive this financial help since the correlation between these two factors is commonly very high (Bravo, 2008; Pfutze, 2014).

In addition, I use a variety of questions to capture respondents' *political orientation*. First, I measure *past electoral behavior* with a question that directly reports this electoral choice for the previous presidential elections of 1994, including: voted PRI last elections, voted PAN last elections, and voted PRD last elections. Each of these variables takes the value of 1 when a respondent voted for a particular party, and 0 when they voted for another party or for no party. And second, I use a question that addresses *self-identification* with an existing political party as: "priista" (*PRI ID or Incumbent ID*), "panista" (*PAN ID*), or "perredista" (*PRI ID*). Each of these variables takes the value of 1 when a respondent identifies with a particular party, and 0 when they favor other party or no party at all and so qualify as 'indifferent voters'. All these variables are essential to analyze if political parties' strategies are conditional on these political characteristics and therefore necessary for this chapter's hypothesis test.

Control Variables

Finally, I control for those confounding factors that affect migration status and the dependent variable, mainly: age, gender, wealth (as the sum of whether the respondent has at home a total of six items), and education level (ranging from 0- No education to 4- University degree or more). I

[4] More precisely, the question asks if the respondent has visited the US and if yes, how long in total he/she spent there. This time abroad is even reported as 18 years for one of the respondents and varies substantially across the rest. Ideally, this question would also address if the respondent has intentions to stay for good or not, which would connect easily with the political disengagement reasoning. However, such information is not available in this dataset.

also include the type of place (rural, urban or mixed), given that the size of the location could affect the workings of political networks and political parties' ability to know who the migrant families are.

In alternative specifications, I include the following additional controls: evaluation of the national economic situation (coded as 2- for those who report improvement in the situation, 1- situation is the same, and 0- the situation is worse in the last 12 months)[5], paid employment (1- if employed and 0 otherwise), frequency of church attendance (coded from 0- Never to 4- More than once a week), frequency of political talk (0-Never to 4- Daily), risk acceptance attitudes ('no risk, no gain' question where affirmative responses take the value of 1 and negative ones the value of 0), and geographical location (North, South, Center, Center-West and Mexico City Area). Different reasons motivate considering these variables: i) evaluation of the economic situation and paid employment account for those reasons that encourage migration as well as the possibility that political parties perceive those unemployed as valuable targets, ii) church attendance measures respondents' social connectivity which arguably relates positively with the facility to migrate and exposure to political networks, iii) political talk not only relates to political disengagement but also incorporates the notion that people who tend to talk more about politics are possibly part of political networks and thus more likely targets, iv) risk acceptance is an important and unobserved characteristic that relates with migration and attitudes toward electoral targeting. In particular, migrants are risk acceptant in the sense that they are willing to leave home and venture into a foreign country (sometimes illegally) in the search of better economic opportunities. Bravo (2008) actually shows the relationship between risk acceptance attitudes and being a Mexican migrant. Moreover, risk aversion - usually in connection with economic resources - translates into preferences for the immediacy of clientelistic exchanges as opposed to the promise of a policy program for the future (e.g., Desposato, 2007; Hicken, 2011; Stokes et al., 2013). Thus, risk acceptant/aversion attitudes can affect migration, involvement in political networks and targeting. Finally, geographic location takes into account the existing predisposition of certain areas to be migrant-rich as well as to favor a particular party in their local workings and at the polls. The appendix summarizes descriptive statistics for these variables.

[5] Of course, this variable can also be affected by the migration process and the fact that, for instance, receiving remittances improves recipients economic situation. See in this respect for example (Germano, 2013). Thus, a reason for not including this variables as part of the initial analysis is because it is post-treatment to the migration process.

4.3 Empirical Results

This section answers whether or not migrant families are the targets of electoral strategies. As previously noted, I look at two types of migration-exposed citizens: return migrants and those with close relatives living in the US; as well as at two different electoral strategies: *non-programmatic targeting* (home visits and clientelism) and *programmatic targeting* (electoral advertising). A first look at the distribution of these practices indicates that 63% of return migrants were not the targets of home visits/clientelism while 36% were. On the other hand, 56% of return migrants received electoral advertising but 43% did not. Similarly, 60% of those respondents with family in the US were not the targets of home visits/clientelism while 40% were, but 63% of these respondents received political advertising materials and 36% did not. In all cases, PRI tactics reached a larger share of the respondents than the opposition ones and the PRD was the least active in this respect (even not a single return migrant was subject to PRD non-programmatic targeting). This is not surprising given the PRI's long-term incumbency status in these elections. Due to the binary nature of these dependent variables (i.e., electoral target or not as well as party variation of those targets), I use logistic regressions for the empirical analysis.[6] Further, this analysis proceeds by looking at the PRI's strategic behavior in response to migration status, PRI supporters and non-PRI supporters (i.e., PAN and PRD supporters), as well as the opposition's strategic behavior (both PAN and PRD) in response to migration status, PAN/PRD supporters and non-PAN/non-PRD supporters.

4.3.1 Return Migrants

Non-Programmatic Targeting: Home Visits and Clientelism

Table 4.1 takes a first look at the extent to which being a *return migrant* predicts electoral targeting (home visits and clientelism), when controlling for other relevant factors such as wealth and age. This table indicates that being a return migrant reports a positive relationship with being a target, including a PRI and a PAN target.[7] However, these relationships are not statistically significant, suggesting that no big differences exist between return and non-return migrants. As for

[6] An alternative way to analyze this electoral targeting is using a multinomial approach. However, because some respondents are the targets of different parties, this complicates the creation of different categories within the dependent variable. A logistic regression analysis makes the coding of the dependent variable more straightforward.

[7] This analysis does not include PRD targeting because not a single return migrant was subject to PRD non-programmatic targeting

the other predictors, being a woman and living in an urban area are both positive and marginally significant predictors of a PRI target, while higher wealth leads to more PAN targets. Although this last result is somewhat unexpected given existing findings that connect poorer voters with more clientelism (Brusco, Nazareno and Stokes, 2004; Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008), it is important to note that this result could be picking up the right-wing PAN party's tendency to approach richer, conservative potential supporters. Additionally, this chapter analyzes not only clientelism but also home visits, which could be less responsive to voters' low socioeconomic status.

Yet, as hypothesized in this chapter, not all return migrants are the same and political parties use political orientation in their strategic calculation on whom to target. Therefore, I incorporate respondents' variation with respect to their past electoral behavior as well as current party identification into the analysis (Tables 4.2 - 4.11).

To start, I explore respondent's identification with the incumbent party. As previously explained, 'PRI last elections' captures those who voted for the PRI in the presidential elections of 1994 as opposed to having voted for other party or no party at all (results in table 4.2), and likewise, PRI ID identifies incumbent supporters whereas not having a PRI ID means opposition supporters and indifferent voters (results in table 4.4). With respect to past electoral behavior, the analysis indicates that having voted for the PRI in the past (and not being a return migrant) reports a positive and statistically significant relationship with experiencing a PRI target (Model 2). No other relationship is worth highlighting in this table 4.2. With regards to party ID, results show that being a return migrant and having a PRI ID report a positive and statistically significant relationship with being a PRI target, and that a PRI identity also increases the chances of a PRI target (Model 2). Both of these regression terms are statistically significant. They also provide some preliminary evidence that the PRI targets return migrants who are supporters. On the contrary, results are not statistically significant to explain opposition targets when considering return migrant status and incumbent identity (for both past behavior and current identification) (Models 3 in tables 4.2 and 4.4). Put differently, the opposition party PAN is not strategically targeting return migrants when taking into account incumbent identification. Moreover, a further analysis also confirms these not statistically significant results for the connection between being a return migrant and experiencing opposition targeting. That is, tables 4.6 and 4.8 analyze the effect that having voted for the PAN in the past or holding current PAN ID have on return migrants' likelihood of experiencing PAN

targets.[8] As these tables show, however, the PAN is not systematically more likely to target return migrants, even when they are PAN sympathizers. Thus far, regression results suggest that the PRI responds to return migration status and PRI orientation to implement their electoral targets, while the opposing PAN does not.

Building on these results, and in order to establish a better comparison between return and non-return migrants, I report predicted probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals). I calculate these probabilities using of course the distinction between return migrant and non-return migrant as well as whether or not a respondent has a particular political ID. In addition, I take all other variables at their means with the exception of the 'size of the place' variable for which I implement two different estimations: i) one that employs the mixed areas (as opposed to rural and urban areas) as the reference category (i.e., referred to as 'mixed areas' in tables), and ii) another that gives these categories values from 1 to 3 according to size (1-rural, 2-mixed, 3-urban) and then uses the mean value to calculate the corresponding probability (i.e., referred to as 'mean size of place' in tables). The following points are worth emphasizing:

First, given PRI inclination, the incumbent PRI is more likely to target return migrants than similar non-return migrants. This relationship holds when either looking at past electoral behavior or current PRI identity (Tables 4.3 and 4.5, respectively): for example, a return migrant that voted for the PRI in the past had a 0.41 chances of being a PRI target (0.57 with current PRI ID), while a non-return migrant who also voted for the PRI had only 0.23 chances (0.27 with current PRI ID). Of course, this previous result also translates into return migrants having a higher predicted probability of being PRI targets when they did not vote for the opposition parties PAN (Table 4.7) or PRD (Table 4.11) in the previous elections as well as when they do not identify with these opposition parties (Tables 4.9 and 4.11). In this respect, results considering PAN identification are especially stronger, which suggest that the PRI strategically distinguishes between return and non-return migrants that identify with either the PRI or the PAN. For example, the PRI targets return migrants that do not identify with the PAN with a predicted probability of 0.33 while similar non-return migrants that also do not identify with this opposition party with predicted probability of 0.19. In addition, given overall non-PRI inclination (i.e., non-PRI last elections and non-PRI ID) or opposition and indifferent identity, the incumbent PRI party does not differentiate between return

[8] This analyses does not include the PRD because no return migrant was targeted by the PRD in this dataset.

and non-return migrants since their respective predicted probability are nearly the same, as shown in tables 4.3 and 4.5. In short, the incumbent PRI targets return migrants that are supporters (i.e., voted PRI last elections, PRI ID, no voted PAN/PRD last elections, non PAN/PRD ID) but does not make strong distinctions between these two types of voters when they are non-supporters.

And how about the behavior of opposition parties? Given PRI orientation, non-return migrants have a higher probability of being opposition targets than return migrants, but overall these differences are not substantial (especially when taking into account past electoral behavior)(Tables 4.3 and 4.5, respectively). Additionally, given PAN orientation, return migrants have higher predicted probability of being PAN targets, but again PAN targeting is not that different for return and non-return migrants. Certainly, this follows from the lack of statistically significant results for PAN targets in Tables 4.6 and 4.8.

In sum, the main takeaway point for this section is that the incumbent PRI tends to target return migrants that identify with this party, which is consistent with H1 or turnout buying of PRI supporters. The same analysis, however, does not lead to similar conclusions with respect to the PAN's behavior. Put differently, this opposition party is not more likely to participate in the turnout buying of return migrants who are PAN supporters, as suggested in H2. Accordingly, given the absence of opposition's mobilizing behavior of return migrants, there is no reason for the incumbent to respond by vote-buying non-PRI supporters return migrants, as discussed in H3.

Programmatic Targeting: Advertising Materials

Table 4.12 shows the relationship between being a *return migrant* and receiving promotional and advertising materials from different political parties. As before, this analysis controls for other relevant factors such as wealth and education. This table indicates that being a return migrant reports a negative relationship with receiving promotion materials from any of the parties. These relationships are however not statistically significant. As for the other predictors, higher education increases the chances of receiving PRI promotion materials (Model 2), while being a women makes less likely receiving letters/advertisements from any the opposition parties (Models 3-4). Interestingly, higher wealth also relates with more mailed advertisements, regardless of the political party (Models 1-4). This last result suggests that, contrary to clientelism, political parties direct this advertising strategy towards richer and more well-off voters.

In addition, I incorporate respondents' variation with respect to their past electoral behavior as well as current party identification. First, tables 4.13 and 4.15 explore voters' identification with the incumbent party. The main result in these tables is that having an incumbent orientation (and not being return migrant) reports a negative and statistically significant relationship with receiving advertising materials from the opposition parties (Models 3-4), while this political identity and the distinction between return and non-return migrant barely predicts receiving PRI advertisements (Model 2). This applies to both past electoral behavior and present political orientation. On the other hand, tables 4.17 takes into account those who either voted for the opposition in previous elections or identify with any of the opposition parties to explain receiving opposition promotion materials. Interestingly, table 4.17 reports that having voted for the PAN last elections/PRD last elections or having PAN orientation/PRD orientation (and not being a return migrant) increase the chances of receiving PAN advertising materials/PRD advertising materials. In short, these regression analyses indicate the opposition parties send advertising materials mainly to their supporters who are not return migrants.

Building on these results, and in order to establish a better comparison between return and non-return migrants and their respective political ideologies, I report predicted probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals) for electoral advertising. I calculate these predicted probabilities using the same methodology as before. Essentially, the following points are worth emphasizing:

First, given PRI orientation (either voted PRI last elections or have current PRI ID), non-return migrants have higher probability of receiving PRI materials than return migrants, although the difference between these two types of respondents is not very large (e.g., 0.38 and 0.46 for return migrant and non-return migrants, respectively, when looking at PRI last election results). On the flip side, given non-PRI orientation or opposition and indifferent identity, the incumbent PRI party also does not distinguish between return and non-return migrants since their respective predicted probabilities are fairly similar (e.g., 0.41 and 0.40 for return migrant and non-return migrants, respectively, when looking at non-PRI ID results). Tables 4.14 and 4.16 report these predicted probabilities. In brief, the incumbent does not consider return migration status when deciding who should receive their advertising materials. In fact, this lack of findings for return migrants and the incumbent advertising suggests that this political party by having more resources prints more materials and hence is not that selective about who receives them (i.e., those with and

without intentions to vote).

Second, given also PRI orientation, the opposition parties - both PAN and PRD - send advertising materials to non-return migrants than to similar return migrants with a higher probability, especially when the analyses uses PRI ID for the political inclination. For example, given PRI ID, the PAN sends promotion materials to return migrants with a 0.06 probability but to non-return migrants with 0.23, and likewise, the PRD sends promotion materials to return migrants with a 0.06 probability but to non-return migrants with 0.13. Tables 4.14 and 4.16 report these predicted probabilities. Additionally, given non-PRI identity or opposition identity (either PAN or PRD), non-return migrants have also a higher predicted probability of receiving PAN and PRD advertising materials. For example, given non-PRI identity, PAN sends advertising to non-return migrants with a 0.29 probability and to return migrants with 0.25; and the PRD sends advertising to non-return migrants with a 0.21 probability and to return migrants with 0.17. Table 4.18 shows similar results when looking at effect of PAN ID and PRD ID on receiving advertisements from these opposition parties. Yet, the differences between return and non-return migrants are quite small, and the PRD sends materials primarily to mostly PRD supporters regardless of their migration status.

Overall, the main findings across these different results are: i) the PRI targets without distinguishing strongly between return and non-return migrants and their respective political ideology, and ii) the opposition parties (PAN and PRD) are more active in sending advertising materials to supporters, but the differences in the predicted probabilities of return and non-return migrants are not very substantial, especially when both types share the same opposition identity (i.e., PAN ID and PRD ID). In other words, these patterns are not supportive of hypotheses 1-3. Nonetheless, this behavior suggests that advertising and promotion materials might be a useful strategy for the resource-rich incumbent and the resource-poor opposition parties to appeal to both those voters with (i.e., non-return migrants) and without (i.e., return migrants) intentions to vote. I will get back to this point in the discussion section of this chapter.

4.3.2 Family Abroad

Non-Programmatic Targeting: Home Visits and Clientelism

Table 4.19 takes a first look at the extent to which having close relatives in the US predicts non-programmatic targeting (home visits and clientelism), when controlling for other relevant factors

such as wealth and age. This table indicates that being part of a migrant family reports a positive and statistically significant relationship with being a PRI (Model 2) and a PAN (Model 3) target but a negative relationship with being a PRD target (Model 4). The positive and statistically significant relationship is also present for experiencing overall any targeting (Model 1). This is not surprising given that in these elections the PRI and PAN participated in these activities to a greater extent than the PRD. In addition, looking at predicted probabilities[9] for a better comparison of respondents with family abroad and those without it, everything else equal, table 4.20 shows that members of migrant families are more likely to be PRI and PAN targets but less likely PRD targets than similar non-migration-exposed ones (especially when using the 'mean size of place' to calculate the predicted probabilities). As for the other predictors, results are comparable to those in the analysis of return migrants. That is, being a woman and living in an urban area are both positive and marginally significant predictors of a PRI target, while higher wealth leads to more PAN targets and higher education to fewer PRD targets. Of course, these last two findings could reflect the idea that the right-wing PAN party approaches richer citizens, but the left-wing PRD party appeals to those with lower socioeconomic status.

Since those with family in the US also vary in their ideological orientation, I follow the same approach as for return migrants. Obviously, taking ideology into account is also essential for the hypothesis test put forward in this chapter. To start, in tables 4.21 and 4.23, I explore respondent's identification with the incumbent party, including reported past behavior in favor of the PRI as well as current PRI ID. With respect to past electoral behavior, the analysis indicates that having voted for the PRI in the past (and being a member of migrant) reports a negative and statistically significant relationship with experiencing a PAN target (Model 3). This provides some preliminary evidence that the opposing PAN does not target those migrant families that favor the incumbent PRI. In addition, having family members abroad and not having voted for the PRI previously increases the chances of experiencing PRI (Model 2) and PAN targeting (Model 3) as well as overall targeting (Model 1), whereas having voted for the PRI in the past (and not being a migrant-family member) is a positive and statistically significant predictor of more PRI and PAN targeting. Results

[9] As in the previous section, I report predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals, and calculate them using all variables at their means with the exception of the size of the place variable for which I use two different estimations: i) one that employs the mixed areas (as opposed to rural and urban areas) as the reference category (mixed areas), and another that gives these categories values from 1 to 3 according to size (1-rural, 2-mixed, 3-urban) and then uses on the mean value to calculate the corresponding probability (mean size of place).

are not very different when looking at PRI ID instead. Moreover, having family in the US and a PRI political identification decreases the changes of being a PRD target (Model 4 of table 4.23), which also supports the intuition that the opposing PRD does not attempt to buy migration-exposed voters that favor the incumbent PRI.

Similarly, tables 4.25 and 4.27 analyze the connection between migration exposure and PAN identity (voted opposition in for the PAN in the past and current PAN ID) to explain electoral targeting. The most consistent result in these tables is that having voted for the PAN in previous elections or holding a current PAN identity (and not having close relatives living in the US) reports a negative and statistically significant relationship with a being a PRI target (Model 2) and any target (Model 1). This connection conforms with the logic that the PRI has no intentions to mobilize those voters who identify with other party (especially if they do not belong to migrant families). Also, having close relatives in the US (and not a PAN ID) is a positive and marginally significant predictor of PRI targeting (Model 2), but a negative and significant one of PRD targeting (Model 4). This results is not that different from the one found in table 4.19, where migrant families are more likely PRI targets but less likely PRD ones. In addition, having family in the US and a PAN identity (especially having voted for the PAN in the past)[10] increases the chances of being a PAN target (Model 1), which supports the notion that the PAN targets those supporters at risk of staying home or migrant families.

Further, I explore variation in PRD orientation in tables 4.29 and 4.31. Again, this analysis allows exploring if political parties approach those with this identity or not. As these tables show, having family in the US and not a PRD political inclination increases the chances of being a PRI and a PAN target (Models 2 and 3). This result is particularly strong in the case of PAN targets, which hints at the idea that the PRI by having more resources can diversify more its targets by targeting some PRD supporters while the PAN has to be more selective. Of course, it can also point toward the logic that PRD supporters are closer ideologically to the PRI than to the PAN, which makes it more difficult to the PAN to buy these potential votes to start with and so refrains from doing so. As for the PRD, these tables indicate that the PRD targets supporters but mostly

[10] In fact, this stronger results with respect to PAN last elections could reflect two things: First, political parties rely more on information about previous elections to implement their strategies, and second, given that PAN ID is a post-electoral measure and the PAN won these elections, a lot of respondents could have reported PAN ID but were not PAN identifiers before the elections and so less likely to be approached by the PAN.

if they do not belong to migrant family ones.

Building on these results, and in order to establish a better comparison between respondents with and without family in the US and their respective political ideologies, I report predicted probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals).[11] The main comparisons are as follows:

First, given PRI orientation (either voted PRI last elections or have current PRI ID), migrant families have a higher predicted probability of being targets than similar non-migrant families (e.g., 0.31 and 0.27 respectively when looking at PRI ID). Tables 4.22 and 4.24 show the corresponding probabilities. Moreover, given non-PRI ID or opposition and indifferent identity, the incumbent PRI also targets migrant families with a higher probability than similar non-migrant ones. Consequently, I explore further if the incumbent PRI targets especially migrant families that identity with any of the key contenders (i.e., PAN supporters in Tables 4.26 and 4.28, PRD supporters 4.30 and 4.32, or both). These results indicate that the migrant families have a higher predicted probability of being PRI targets than non-migrant families when they all are opposition sympathizers. More precisely, these tables show that the incumbent PRI i) is more likely to target migrant families that voted for the PAN in the previous elections than similar non-migrant ones with the same previous electoral behavior (e.g., 0.17 versus 0.06 respectively)[12], and ii) also targets PRD supporters, but in that case, the distinction between migrant and non-migrant families is not as strong (e.g., 0.21 versus 0.16). Comparing both scenarios (i.e., incumbent supporters versus non-incumbent supporters), however, the highest chances of being a PRI target is for migrant families with PRI orientation (i.e., 0.26 for migration-exposed citizens that voted for the PRI in the past), which is consistent with a dominant mobilization strategy of core supporters.

And second, also given PRI orientation, opposition parties make barely any distinction between migrant and non-migrant families since their respective predicted probability are quite similar. Perhaps the only exception is that the PRD is less likely to target migrant families than non-migrant families with this political orientation but for both types of respondents the values of the predicted probabilities are quite small (i.e., 0.002 and 0.01, respectively). Tables 4.22 and

[11] As before, I calculate these predicted probabilities using all variables at their means with the exception of the size of the place variable for which I use two different estimations: i) one that employs the mixed areas (as opposed to rural and urban areas) as the reference category (mixed areas), and another that gives these categories values from 1 to 3 according to size (1-rural, 2-mixed, 3-urban) and then uses on the mean value to calculate the corresponding probability (mean size of place)

[12] As before, past electoral behavior might be a more useful measure for political parties to identity targets.

4.24 show the corresponding predicted probabilities. However, given non-PRI orientation (i.e., opposition and indifferent identity), migrant families report a higher probability of being PAN targets than those not involved in migration (e.g., 0.13 and 0.07, respectively). Moreover, I explore this relationship further by looking at variations in PAN identity (PAN last elections and PAN ID) to explain PAN targets. According to this analysis, the main result is that the PAN is more likely to target migrant families that favor this party than similar non-migrant ones. That is, predicted probabilities are 0.09 and 0.01 for migrant and non-migrant families respectively when looking at PAN last elections, and 0.11 and 0.04 when analyzing PAN ID, but results are overall also stronger with respect to last electoral behavior. Interestingly, the PAN also targets some non-supporters (both migration and non-migration-exposed voters alike) with a similar predicted probability to that of supporters, which informs of PAN's intentions to win these elections by also appealing to these non-core voters.[13] Tables 4.26 and 4.28 report these comparisons. A similar analysis looking at PRD supporters and PRD targeting does not lead to strong conclusions (Tables 4.30 and 4.32).

In sum, the main takeaway points for this section are: i) the PRI is more likely to target PRI supporters, and among those, migrant families have a higher probability of being subject to PRI mobilization or turnout buying than non-migrant ones, ii) the incumbent PRI party is also more likely to target migrant families than non-migrant ones when both favored the opposition (especially the PAN) in previous elections, i.e., vote buying or persuasion of migrant families who are opposition supporters, but iii) migrant families that favor the incumbent also have the highest probability of being PRI targets, and iv) the PAN is more likely to mobilize migrant families that identify with that party than similar non-migrant families with the same political orientation. Overall, these results are consistent with hypothesis 1-3. Essentially, the PRI mobilizes its core supporters with intentions to stay home (H1)(although those with intentions to vote are also targets to an extent), and persuades to change party those voters mobilized by a key contender (the PAN in his case, H3), and finally, the PAN also mobilizes its core supporters with intentions to stay home (H2).

[13] By comparing, PAN targets of those voters who voted for the PRI and the PRD in the past, the higher predicted probability of being a PAN target corresponds to non-migration-exposed voters that voted for the PRD in the past, which indicates that the PAN, in order to win these elections, was appealing to those with intentions to vote but that were other opposition sympathizers. Differences between migration and non-migration-exposed voters are however very small, regardless of their political ideology. Moreover, looking at those without family members in the US or those with intentions to vote, the PAN is more likely to target non-PAN supporters (especially past-PRD votes), which supports the logic of trying to buy those who are not at risk of staying home but that are going to vote for other party.

This chapter however does not provide support for hypothesis 2 in the case of PRD targeting.

Programmatic Targeting: Advertising Materials

Table 4.33 shows the relationship between being a member of migrant family and receiving promotional/advertising materials from different political parties. As before, this analysis controls for other relevant factors such as wealth and education. This table indicates that having family members in the US reports a positive relationship with receiving promotion materials from the different political contenders (Models 2-4). These relationships however are not statistically significant. The only exception is when looking at receiving any type of advertising materials (i.e., without party distinction), in which case migration-exposed voters indicate a positive and statistically significant relationship with this programmatic targeting (Model 1). In addition, Table 4.34 shows the corresponding predicted probabilities, which indicate that overall migrant families have a higher predicted probability of receiving political advertising. The difference between the predicted probability of respondents with family in the US and those without it is larger when considering the PRI or just overall political advertising. This is perhaps unsurprising giving the well-known PRI's active role in electoral campaigning. As for the other predictors, results are similar to those in the analysis of return migrants. That is, higher education increases the chances of receiving PRI promotion materials, while being a women makes less likely receiving letters/advertisements from the main opposition parties. Higher wealth also relates with more mailed advertisements, regardless of the political party.

In addition, I incorporate respondents' variation with respect to their past electoral behavior as well as party identification. First, tables 4.35 and 4.37 explore voters' identification with the incumbent party. The main result in these tables is that having an incumbent orientation (and not being a member of a migrant family) reports a negative and statistically significant relationship with receiving advertising materials from the opposition parties (especially the PRD) (Models 3-4). This applies to both past electoral behavior and current political orientation. And second, table 4.39 takes into account those who either voted for the opposition in previous elections (PAN and PRD last elections) or identify with any of the opposition parties (PAN ID and PRD ID) to explain receiving opposition promotion materials. Interestingly, the main result is that having voted for the opposition previously (and not being a member of a migrant family) increases the chances of

receiving materials from any of the opposing parties (Model 1 for the PAN and 3 for the PRD). Moreover, while having family in the US increases the chances of receiving PAN advertising, this relationship is negative and significant if those migration-exposed citizens voted for the PAN in the past (Model 1). On the contrary, the chances of receiving PRD advertising increases for those respondents with family in the US who voted for the PRD in the 1994 elections (Model 3). When looking at opposition identity (PAN ID and PRD ID) as opposed to past voting behavior, results are mostly not statistically significant, with the exception of receiving PRD advertising materials which increases for those respondents with PRD ID (and no family members in the US) (Model 4).

Building on these results, and in order to establish a better comparison between migration and non-migration exposed respondents and their respective political ideologies, I report predicted probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals) for electoral advertising. I calculate these predicted probabilities using the same methodology as before. Essentially, the following points are worth emphasizing.

First, given PRI orientation (either voted PRI last elections or have current PRI ID), migration-exposed voters have higher probability of receiving PRI materials, although the difference between these two types of respondents is not very large (e.g., 0.48 and 0.41, respectively). Also, given non-PRI ID or opposition and indifferent identity, migration-exposed voters also have a higher probability of receiving PRI materials, although as before the difference in the predicted probabilities for these two types of respondents is not very large (e.g., 0.46 and 0.43, respectively). Consequently, and similar to the results for return migrants, the incumbent does not consider migration status as a key determinant for whom should receive their advertising materials. Tables 4.36 and 4.38 show these probabilities.

Second, given also PRI orientation, the opposition - both PAN and PRD - do not distinguish between migration and non-migration-exposed voters since their predicted probabilities are fairly similar (e.g., 0.24 and 0.20 respectively for migration and non-migration-exposed voters when looking at PAN advertising, and 0.15 and 0.10 respectively when analyzing PRD advertising and when both respondents have PRI ID) (See tables 4.36 and 4.38). Likewise, given non-PRI id or opposition and indifferent orientation, the opposition parties also make mostly no distinctions between respondents with and without close relatives in another country. Nonetheless, tables 4.39 and 4.40 explore further the connection between having opposition identity and being an opposition target

by distinguishing between PRD and PAN political orientations. Interestingly, these tables show that given those respondents that voted for the PAN in the past, the PAN is more likely to send advertising materials to non-migration-exposed ones (0.29 for migration-exposed voters versus 0.46 for non-migration-exposed ones), while given those respondents that voted for the PRD in the past, the PRD is more likely to send advertising materials to migration-exposed ones (0.54 for migration-exposed voters versus 0.36 for non-migration-exposed ones). When looking at PAN ID and PRD ID instead, results report the same patterns but do not reach the same level of statistical significance.

In sum, the main finding of this section is that given those that electorally favor the PAN in the past, the PAN is more likely to send advertising materials to non-migration-exposed ones, while given those that electorally favor the PRD in the previous elections, the PRD is more likely to send advertising materials to migration-exposed ones. Thus, H2 or the targeting of migrant families is only present in this case for the PRD. This finding nonetheless hints at the idea that because of the differences in resource endowments, parties are not only strategic about whom to target but also with respect to what strategy to use with different types of voters (i.e., migration versus not migration-exposed and inclined to vote versus not inclined to vote). That is, the PAN uses programmatic targeting for those core supporters with intentions to vote (i.e., non-migrant ones receive advertising materials) and non-programmatic one to mobilize supporters without intentions to vote (i.e., migration-exposed ones are subject to clientelism and home visits). This makes sense since convincing someone to vote might require more effort and therefore some non-programmatic targeting, while advertising materials can simply remind someone who already has intentions to vote of the upcoming elections. The PRD, on the contrary, does not participate in much non-programmatic targeting (probably due to lower resources), and therefore, relies on programmatic targeting to mobilize supporters without intentions to vote (i.e., migration-exposed voters). I will get back to this point in the discussion section of this chapter.

4.3.3 Robustness Checks

In this section, I analyze the extent to which the previous findings are robust to the following tests: i) different model specifications, ii) alternative explanations, and iii) threats to causal inference.

To start, and as mentioned in the data section, I control for an additional set of variables, in par-

ticular: evaluation of the national economy, employment situation, frequency of church attendance, frequency of political talk, risk acceptance attitudes and geographic locations. Tables 4.41 to 4.52 show that the main statistically significant results of the previous section hold when including these variables in the regression analysis. That is, the following statistically significant relationships are still present: i) the PRI targets PRI supporters return migrant (Tables 4.41, 4.42, 4.43, 4.44), ii) the PRI targets respondents with family in the US that are supporters as well as non-supporters, and the distinction between members of migrant families and non-members is especially substantial when both types are PAN last elections supporters (Tables 4.45, 4.46, 4.47, 4.48) , iii) the PAN targets migrant families that voted for this party in the past (Tables 4.45, 4.49, 4.50), and iv) the PAN and the PRD send advertising materials to non-migration and migration-exposed supporters, respectively (Tables 4.51 and 4.52), although these last results are not as statistically significant when controlling for these additional factors.

In addition to taking into account other factors that could mask the connection between exposure to migration and electoral targeting, these additional factors also deal with alternative explanations. Particularly, one of these is that migration-exposed voters are electoral targets because of their social connectedness and political influence. That is, contrary to the political disengagement mechanism put forward in this dissertation, migrant families could be targets because their access to remittances makes them well-respected individuals with the capacity to influence the political behavior of others within the community. After all, remittances contribute in some cases toward public good provisions (e.g., Aparicio and Meseguer, 2012*a*; Duquetter-Rury, 2014). However, as previously shown, results hold when controlling for frequency of political talk, which is arguably necessary to exercise the role of political influencer, and of church attendance, which captures as well respondents' social connectivity.

Additionally, one could argue that the results are not due to political parties' actions but rather to the fact that migrant families tend to report more targeting than similar non-migrant ones. The plausibility of this explanation relies on the social remittances mechanism and the fact that migration provides exposure to the democratic practices of other countries where these practices are less pervasive. As a result, migration-exposed voters could be more susceptible to this type of actions and therefore more inclined to report them. In order to address this concern, I compare migration and non-migration exposed voters with respect to two answers about the quality of

elections in Mexico: the extent to which elections are clean (from 1- Nothing to 4- Totally) and whether or not Mexico is a democracy. Certainly, one would expect that if migration-exposed voters tend to be more susceptible to these strategies and report them more, they should also be more inclined to characterize Mexico as not having clean elections and not being a democracy. Yet, a simple look at the data does not support this intuition. That is, the correlations between being a return migrant and having family in the US are always positive with evaluations of clean elections and democracy. Accordingly, it is plausible to lower the concerns about attitudes toward electoral practices being the factors behind this chapter's findings.

Finally, I address some commons threats to causal inference: selection bias, omitted variable bias, and endogeneity or reverse causality. While the optimal strategies to deal with these concerns are longitudinal data on the same individuals before and after becoming migrant families, running an experiment or using an instrumental variable, none of these are available. Therefore, I use the existing data to show why this chapter's results are still valid.

Omitted Variable Bias

One of the most common objections in observational studies is that, in the absence of random treatment assignment, unobservable factors are causing the found relationship. I address this concern by taking into account risk acceptance attitudes. That is, risk acceptance is an unobserved characteristic that is related to migration and electoral targeting. In particular, migrants are risk acceptant in the sense that they are willing to leave home and venture into a foreign country (sometimes illegally) in the search of better economic opportunities. And risk aversion - usually in connection with economic resources - translates into preferences for the immediacy of clientelistic exchanges as opposed to the promise of a policy program for the future (e.g., Desposato, 2007; Hicken, 2011; Stokes et al., 2013). Nonetheless, this chapter's results hold when controlling for risk acceptance attitudes.

Selection Bias

One common concern to all research on migration is the selection process that leads some people to migrate. In this specific study, the selection bias could be present if, for instance, migrant families are electoral targets even before participating or being exposed to this international process. Consequently, the results would be capturing some pre-existing differences of migrant families as opposed to a more recent effect of migration. While it is not plausible to entirely dismiss this

selection bias, three reasons suggest this should less of a concern. First, the existing literature on electoral targeting commonly finds that poorer voters are electoral targets. Yet, migrant families do not belong to this poorest segment of the population but rather to the slightly better-off one that can afford the migration process in the first place. Second, one could expect that migration occurs because these voters are not beneficiaries of government handouts nor members of privileged political networks. After all, if someone is able to get a public job or receive frequent government benefits, the need to migrate and seek economic opportunities in a different country should be lower. And third, as this chapter has argued, involvement in international migration helps political parties to identify their targets and to know that these voters might be at risk of staying home. In the absence of this information, political contenders might not have a good reason to target them. In short, all these reasons raise some doubts over the claim that migrant families are targets before getting involved in migration processes.

Reverse Causality

A clear case of reserve causality applies to being an electoral target and identifying with a particular party. For instance, PRI targets lead people to identify themselves as having PRI ID. Put differently, it is not that political parties participate in the mobilization of their supporters, but rather that precisely because they are targets those voters display a particular party ID. Fortunately, it is possible to address this issue in two different ways. First, the Mexico 2000 dataset has information about the behavior in previous elections and results are generally present when using this variable. And second, we can use this information about the last elections to analyze what effect targeting has in party ID changes. In particular, 65% of respondents did not vote for the PRI in the previous presidential elections of 1994, but 22% of those were PRI electoral targets. What is interesting to explore is if those targeted switched to PRI ID after not having previously voted for the PRI and thus fostering endogeneity concerns. However, a simple look at the data indicates that targeting was not that effective since of the 22% targeted, 82% still responded not having PRI ID while 17% had PRI ID. Of those who switched, these figures are also similar for migration and non-migration exposed voters: 19% and 16% for respondents without and with family in the US and 17% and 11% for non-return and return migrants, respectively. Looking at PAN targeting leads to similar conclusions. That is, 82% of respondents did not vote for the PAN in the previous presidential elections of 1994, but 12% of those were PAN electoral targets. As before, what is

interesting to explore is if those targeted switched to PAN ID after not having previously voted for the PAN. In this respect, the data indicate that targeting was not that effective since of the 12% targeted, 72% still responded not having PAN ID while 27% had PAN ID. Of those who switched, these figures are also similar for migration and non-migration exposed voters: 21% and 31% for respondents without and with family in the US and 27% and 28% for non-return and return migrants, respectively.

4.3.4 Extensions to the existing Analysis

Strong or Weak Supporters and Strong or Weak Non-Supporters?

In general, it is plausible to ask if when political parties mobilize their supporters, they target those who strongly or weakly identify with the party. Similarly, one can ask if when political parties target non-supporters, they attempt to get the votes of those who weakly or strongly identify with the contender. Given the previous results, in particular, one may inquire if the PRI mobilizes strong or weak PRI supporters, buys strong or weak PAN supporters, and likewise, if the PAN mobilizes strong or weak PAN supporters.

To address these questions, I run the same models as in the previous section (i.e., full models with additional control variables) but using a party ID variable that not-only identifies supporters and non-supporters but also captures if those are strong or weak supporters and non-supporters (0- Not party supporter, 1- Weakly party supporter, and 2- Strong party supporter).[14] This analysis however does not lead to strong conclusions. Essentially, when the PRI targets PRI supporters (or PAN supporters), there is no statistically significant differences between strong and weak PRI-inclined migrant and non-migrant families (or weakly and strong PAN-inclined migrant and non-migrant families). Equally, when the PAN targets PAN supporters, there is no statistically significant differences between strong and weak PAN-inclined migrant and non-migrant families. As a result, the main takeaway points and findings from this chapter as those presented in previous sections.

Mexico 2000 Panel Study

Together with the Mexico 2000 Post-Electoral Study (Lawson et al., 2000), researchers also

[14] I only run this analysis for respondents with family in the US and not for return migrants. The reason is that given the low number of return migrants in our sample, any claim based on the distinction between strong and weak identifiers would be relying on a very small number of return migrants and hence its validity would be questionable.

conducted a panel study that interviewed respondents over the period of six months and in four different waves.[15] This dataset started with 2,400 respondents in wave 1, then 950 in wave 2, 938 in wave 3, and around 1200 in wave 4. That is, attrition happened, and some respondents participated in only some of the waves, while others participated in all them.

Attempting to reproduce this chapter's results with the panel dataset is challenging for a variety of reasons. In particular, the ideal way to approximate the panel data to the cross-section post-electoral survey previously used would be to take all those respondents that participated in all the waves and analyze whether or not they were the targets at any point during the electoral campaign. Unfortunately, only about 300 respondents in the panel dataset participated in all four waves, which makes it very complicated to draw any claim about the targeting of migrant families. In addition, if we analyze the behavior of political parties during any of the waves, we can reach conclusions about what political parties did six or three months before the elections but it limits knowing whether or not the overall strategy targeted migration-exposed voters. Of course, it is also important to consider that attrition was non-random and so participants in waves 2, 3 and 4 chose to re-take the surveys. This fact requires being cautious about the representativeness of any findings based on a single wave analysis.

Despite these problems, I show in tables 4.53 and 4.54 that some of this chapter's results are present in wave 4.[16] In particular, according to these tables, the opposition targeted respondents with family in the US and that identify with the PAN with a higher predicted probability than similar respondents without family in the US. Needless to say, this result requires keeping in mind the following points: first, this wave only captures if respondents were targets in the last few weeks before the elections as opposed to at any moment during the entire campaign, and second, this finding is far from matching previous findings in terms of statistical significance. Nonetheless, it suggests that a similar pattern of targeting is present when looking at this single wave.

Overall, one can conclude that using this panel dataset to study changes from wave to wave is probably a better option. In other words, the attrition and the fact that so few respondents

[15] The author wishes to thank Miguel Basañez, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domínguez, Federico Estévez, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, and Alejandro Poiré. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-9905703) and Reforma newspaper. Available online at: http://web.mit.edu/polisci/faculty/C.Lawson.html.

[16] I run this analysis using information from wave 4 for the dependent variable and from wave 1 for the independent variables in order to avoid endogeneity concerns and maximize the number of respondents, since wave 1 had the largest number of participants.

participated in all four waves makes it difficult to use it for cross-section analysis. Thus, since this dissertation does not theorize about variations from wave to wave, I leave exploring that option as a direction for future work.

4.4 Concluding Remarks

This chapter provides interesting findings on the relationship between political parties' electoral strategies and migrant families.

First, the incumbent PRI uses non-programmatic targeting to participate in the turnout buying of migration-exposed supporters. Put differently, the PRI is more likely to mobilize PRI supporters, especially in the case of return migrants and those respondents with family in the US (i.e., higher predicted probabilities for migration-exposed than non-migration-exposed voters). In addition, this party also aims for those migration-exposed voters who favored the opposition in the past. That is, the PRI uses also non-programmatic strategies to persuade or buy the votes of respondents with family in the US that voted for the PAN in the previous presidential elections of 1994.[17] With respect to programmatic strategies or the delivery of advertising and promotion materials, the PRI targets a wide variety of voters including supporters and non-supporters as well as those with (i.e., non-migrant families) and without intentions to vote (i.e., migrant families). Overall, these findings confirm the idea that the PRI by having more resources reaches a larger share of the electorate, including not only PRI sympathizers but also those mobilized voters who favor the opposition. This behavior of course conforms with the traditional PRI strategy that attempts to win elections, if possible by huge margins, in order to show electoral hegemony and prevent elite splits within the party (Magaloni, 2006).

Second, the opposing PAN employs non-programmatic targeting to participate in the turnout buying of migration-exposed supporters. In other words, the PAN is more likely to mobilize respondents with family in the US that voted for this party in the past than similar non-migrant families with the same political orientation. Additionally, among PAN sympathizers, this party also targets non-migration-exposed supporters but uses instead programmatic tactics for these voters. Interestingly, the PAN also uses both types of strategies to target some non-supporters (both migration

[17] Of course, the slightly different results for return migrants and respondents with family in the US could be motivated by the different number of each type of respondents.

and non-migration-exposed voters alike), which informs of PAN's need to win these elections by appealing as well to non-core voters. In particular, as Greene (2007) puts it, for opposition parties to beat the PRI, they had to "retain their core voters, fight for independents, and perhaps even convince some of their rival's core voters to defect" (page 215).

And third, the opposing PRD does not participate in much non-programmatic targeting. Or at least in 2000, this party engaged in this activity to a lower extent than the other two competing parties. As a result, it is not possible to establish that this party is more likely to target migrant families. On the contrary, if anything, results indicate that the PRD is less likely to target migrant families although the predicted probabilities for both types of respondents are really small. However, the PRD is more likely to send advertising materials to those who electorally favor the PRD in the previous elections and especially if they have family members living in the US. This therefore suggests that the PRD relies on programmatic targeting to mobilize supporters without intentions to vote (i.e., migration-exposed voters). Moreover, it hints at the idea that since this party had fewer resources for electoral purposes, most of its activity consisted of programmatic targeting to mobilize supporters. Although, of course, it can also mean that this party actually prefers to use programmatic targeting as opposed to non-programmatic activities such as clientelism. Thus, without the appropriate survey data at the party elite-level, this ultimate reason remains unknown.

In chapter 6, I explore whether or not these strategies had an effect on voters' electoral choices and most importantly, if this influence was different for migration and non-migration exposed citizens. Consequently, this dissertation will explore why migrant families voted for a particular party (i.e., targeted or not) and if they contributed towards this phase of "Mexican democratization" by voting for the opposition.

4.5 Figures and Tables

Table 4.1: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets (Visit-Clientelism)

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Return Migrant	0.172	0.297	0.187
	(0.251)	(0.268)	(0.349)
Education	−0.085	−0.060	−0.132
	(0.064)	(0.070)	(0.095)
Age	−0.0004	−0.002	−0.010
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Women	0.156	0.258†	−0.094
	(0.126)	(0.137)	(0.186)
Wealth	0.113*	0.033	0.170*
	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.076)
Rural Location	−0.194	−0.078	0.235
	(0.257)	(0.293)	(0.404)
Urban Location	0.282	0.490†	0.283
	(0.227)	(0.258)	(0.368)
Constant	−1.140***	−1.491***	−2.275***
	(0.340)	(0.377)	(0.527)
Observations	1,183	1,183	1,183
Log Likelihood	−806.985	−713.281	−450.016
AIC	1,629.970	1,442.561	916.032

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.2: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets: PRI Last Elections

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Return Migrant * PRI Last Elections	0.710	0.886	−0.200
	(0.526)	(0.556)	(0.753)
Return Migrant	−0.126	−0.040	0.209
	(0.336)	(0.377)	(0.449)
PRI Last Elections	0.210	0.421**	0.244
	(0.148)	(0.160)	(0.217)
Education	−0.077	−0.058	−0.123
	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.099)
Age	−0.001	−0.005	−0.012†
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Women	0.189	0.342*	0.032
	(0.132)	(0.145)	(0.194)
Wealth	0.111*	0.050	0.155*
	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.079)
Rural Location	−0.154	−0.037	0.418
	(0.266)	(0.304)	(0.442)
Urban Location	0.320	0.512†	0.513
	(0.236)	(0.270)	(0.407)
Constant	−1.206***	−1.660***	−2.490***
	(0.357)	(0.399)	(0.568)
Observations	1,075	1,075	1,075
Log Likelihood	−734.552	−644.752	−414.755
AIC	1,489.105	1,309.505	849.511

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.3: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PRI Last Elections

PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Return Migrant	0.41 (0.23, 0.63)	0.16 (0.07, 0.31)
Non-Return Migrant	0.23 (0.15, 0.34)	0.16 (0.10, 0.25)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Return Migrant	0.49 (0.31, 0.68)	0.21 (0.11, 0.35)
Non-Return Migrant	0.30 (0.25, 0.35)	0.22 (0.19, 0.25)
PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Return Migrant	0.08 (0.02, 0.26)	0.08 (0.04, 0.17)
Non-Return Migrant	0.08 (0.04, 0.17)	0.06 (0.03, 0.14)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Return Migrant	0.12 (0.04, 0.31)	0.12 (0.05, 0.25)
Non-Return Migrant	0.12 (0.09, 0.17)	0.10 (0.08, 0.13)

Table 4.4: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets: PRI ID

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Return Migrant * PRI ID	1.237*	1.371*	−1.469
	(0.597)	(0.617)	(1.212)
Return Migrant	−0.209	−0.097	0.258
	(0.322)	(0.366)	(0.412)
PRI ID	0.541***	0.781***	0.282
	(0.141)	(0.150)	(0.205)
Education	−0.052	−0.024	−0.109
	(0.066)	(0.072)	(0.096)
Age	−0.0003	−0.003	−0.010
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Women	0.192	0.301*	−0.083
	(0.129)	(0.142)	(0.188)
Wealth	0.111*	0.039	0.165*
	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.077)
Rural Location	−0.203	−0.017	0.237
	(0.267)	(0.310)	(0.423)
Urban Location	0.337	0.604*	0.318
	(0.236)	(0.276)	(0.385)
Constant	−1.407***	−1.907***	−2.427***
	(0.356)	(0.403)	(0.551)
Observations	1,155	1,155	1,155
Log Likelihood	−779.307	−679.793	−439.619
AIC	1,578.614	1,379.587	899.238

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.5: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PRI ID

PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant	0.57 (0.32, 0.78)	0.13 (0.06, 0.26)
Non-Return Migrant	0.27 (0.17, 0.39)	0.14 (0.09, 0.22)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant	0.66 (0.42, 0.83)	0.18 (0.10, 0.31)
Non-Return Migrant	0.36 (0.30, 0.41)	0.20 (0.17, 0.23)
PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant	0.03 (0.00, 0.25)	0.10 (0.03, 0.24)
Non-Return Migrant	0.10 (0.05, 0.20)	0.08 (0.04, 0.15)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant	0.04 (0.00, 0.29)	0.12 (0.06, 0.24)
Non-Return Migrant	0.13 (0.09, 0.17)	0.10 (0.08, 0.12)

Table 4.6: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets: PAN Last Elections

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Return Migrant * PAN Last Elections	−0.710	−0.650	0.348
	(0.812)	(0.918)	(1.012)
Return Migrant	0.254	0.424	0.093
	(0.276)	(0.290)	(0.394)
PAN Last Elections	−0.466*	−0.615**	−0.437
	(0.197)	(0.228)	(0.308)
Education	−0.070	−0.056	−0.120
	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.099)
Age	0.003	0.002	−0.009
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Women	0.207	0.361*	0.049
	(0.133)	(0.145)	(0.194)
Wealth	0.119*	0.055	0.158*
	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.079)
Rural Location	−0.131	−0.017	0.437
	(0.266)	(0.303)	(0.443)
Urban Location	0.331	0.515†	0.528
	(0.236)	(0.268)	(0.406)
Constant	−1.268***	−1.691***	−2.510***
	(0.357)	(0.397)	(0.569)
Observations	1,075	1,075	1,075
Log Likelihood	−733.291	−645.578	−413.866
AIC	1,486.582	1,311.156	847.731

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.7: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PAN Last Elections

PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Return Migrant	0.10 (0.01, 0.38)	0.28 (0.16, 0.44)
Non-Return Migrant	0.12 (0.06, 0.21)	0.20 (0.13, 0.29)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Return Migrant	0.13 (0.02, 0.45)	0.35 (0.24, 0.48)
Non-Return Migrant	0.16 (0.11, 0.23)	0.26 (0.23, 0.30)
PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Return Migrant	0.07 (0.01, 0.36)	0.08 (0.03, 0.20)
Non-Return Migrant	0.05 (0.02, 0.12)	0.07 (0.03, 0.15)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Return Migrant	0.12 (0.02, 0.44)	0.12 (0.06, 0.23)
Non-Return Migrant	0.08 (0.04, 0.13)	0.12 (0.09, 0.14)

Table 4.8: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets: PAN ID

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Return Migrant * PAN ID	−1.164†	−1.481*	0.698
	(0.595)	(0.705)	(0.770)
Return Migrant	0.497	0.733*	−0.330
	(0.314)	(0.323)	(0.539)
PAN ID	−0.211	−0.336*	−0.034
	(0.141)	(0.156)	(0.206)
Education	−0.072	−0.051	−0.118
	(0.065)	(0.071)	(0.096)
Age	0.001	−0.001	−0.009
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Women	0.204	0.317*	−0.082
	(0.128)	(0.140)	(0.189)
Wealth	0.110*	0.036	0.161*
	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.077)
Rural Location	−0.176	0.013	0.234
	(0.264)	(0.304)	(0.423)
Urban Location	0.354	0.618*	0.326
	(0.234)	(0.271)	(0.385)
Constant	−1.200***	−1.582***	−2.319***
	(0.349)	(0.390)	(0.545)
Observations	1,155	1,155	1,155
Log Likelihood	−786.980	−693.103	−440.511
AIC	1,593.959	1,406.207	901.023

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.9: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PAN ID

PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Return Migrant	0.07 (0.02, 0.22)	0.33 (0.19, 0.51)
Non-Return Migrant	0.14 (0.08, 0.22)	0.19 (0.12, 0.28)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Return Migrant	0.11 (0.03, 0.29)	0.42 (0.28, 0.57)
Non-Return Migrant	0.20 (0.16, 0.25)	0.26 (0.23, 0.30)
PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Return Migrant	0.11 (0.03, 0.32)	0.06 (0.02, 0.18)
Non-Return Migrant	0.08 (0.04, 0.16)	0.08 (0.04, 0.16)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Return Migrant	0.15 (0.06, 0.33)	0.08 (0.03, 0.20)
Non-Return Migrant	0.11 (0.08, 0.14)	0.11 (0.09, 0.14)

Table 4.10: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets: PRD Orientation

	Any Target	Any Target	PRI Target	PRI Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Return Migrant * PRD Last Elections	−0.899		−1.129	
	(0.795)		(0.988)	
Return Migrant * PRD ID		−0.508		−0.558
		(0.815)		(1.001)
Return Migrant	0.274	0.169	0.464	0.347
	(0.274)	(0.274)	(0.287)	(0.287)
PRD Last Elections	0.258		0.0004	
	(0.211)		(0.238)	
PRD ID		0.277		−0.181
		(0.208)		(0.241)
Education	−0.093	−0.074	−0.080	−0.062
	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.073)	(0.071)
Age	0.0005	0.001	−0.0005	−0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Women	0.190	0.183	0.318*	0.267†
	(0.132)	(0.128)	(0.144)	(0.139)
Wealth	0.106*	0.103*	0.041	0.025
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.057)	(0.055)
Rural Location	−0.160	−0.212	−0.061	−0.028
	(0.266)	(0.263)	(0.302)	(0.302)
Urban Location	0.313	0.309	0.477†	0.541*
	(0.236)	(0.233)	(0.267)	(0.268)
Constant	−1.172***	−1.218***	−1.544***	−1.510***
	(0.355)	(0.349)	(0.393)	(0.389)
Observations	1,075	1,155	1,075	1,155
Log Likelihood	−735.458	−789.422	−649.957	−699.199
AIC	1,490.917	1,598.843	1,319.915	1,418.398

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.11: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PRD Orientation

PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Return Migrant	0.11 (0.01, 0.44)	0.27 (0.16, 0.43)
Non-Return Migrant	0.19 (0.11, 0.31)	0.19 (0.12, 0.28)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Return Migrant	0.14 (0.02, 0.51)	0.34 (0.23, 0.47)
Non-Return Migrant	0.25 (0.17, 0.34)	0.25 (0.22, 0.28)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Return Migrant	0.13 (0.02, 0.50)	0.24 (0.14, 0.40)
Non-Return Migrant	0.16 (0.09, 0.27)	0.19 (0.12, 0.28)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Return Migrant	0.17 (0.03, 0.57)	0.32 (0.21, 0.44)
Non-Return Migrant	0.22 (0.15, 0.30)	0.25 (0.22, 0.28)

Table 4.12: Return Migrant and Electoral Advertising

	Any Ads	PRI Ads	PAN Ads	PRD Ads
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Return Migrant	-0.189	-0.043	-0.342	-0.378
	(0.248)	(0.246)	(0.271)	(0.314)
Education	0.193^{**}	0.130^{*}	-0.020	0.040
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.073)
Age	0.006	0.004	-0.005	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Women	-0.119	-0.128	-0.320^{*}	-0.312^{*}
	(0.124)	(0.122)	(0.130)	(0.147)
Wealth	0.263^{***}	0.269^{***}	0.214^{***}	0.197^{**}
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.060)
Rural Location	0.071	0.213	0.252	0.322
	(0.238)	(0.243)	(0.269)	(0.298)
Urban Location	0.229	0.250	0.225	0.026
	(0.215)	(0.219)	(0.243)	(0.272)
Constant	-1.351^{***}	-1.662^{***}	-1.407^{***}	-2.243^{***}
	(0.333)	(0.333)	(0.357)	(0.404)
Observations	1,183	1,183	1,183	1,183
Log Likelihood	-823.3	-843.5	-779.3	-654.8
AIC	1,662.6	1,703.1	1,574.6	1,325.6

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.13: Return Migrant and Electoral Advertising: PRI Last Elections

	Any Ads	PRI Ads	PAN Ads	PRD Ads
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Return Migrant * PRI Last Elections	−0.266	−0.336	0.299	0.512
	(0.521)	(0.520)	(0.589)	(0.666)
Return Migrant	−0.152	−0.008	−0.556	−0.582
	(0.320)	(0.315)	(0.351)	(0.410)
PRI Last Elections	−0.142	0.049	−0.447**	−0.607***
	(0.147)	(0.145)	(0.158)	(0.183)
Education	0.180**	0.106	−0.045	0.004
	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.077)
Age	0.007	0.005	−0.002	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Women	−0.168	−0.108	−0.358**	−0.327*
	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.137)	(0.155)
Wealth	0.271***	0.308***	0.217***	0.195**
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.064)
Rural Location	−0.053	0.171	0.152	0.296
	(0.248)	(0.252)	(0.279)	(0.308)
Urban Location	0.067	0.120	0.142	−0.034
	(0.225)	(0.227)	(0.252)	(0.283)
Constant	−1.171***	−1.710***	−1.221**	−2.024***
	(0.349)	(0.350)	(0.373)	(0.421)
Observations	1,075	1,075	1,075	1,075
Log Likelihood	−745.531	−763.954	−699.918	−588.122
AIC	1,511.062	1,547.907	1,419.836	1,196.244

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.14: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PRI Last Elections

PRI Ads (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Election
Return Migrant	0.38 (0.20, 0.59)	0.45 (0.28, 0.62)
Non-Return Migrant	0.46 (0.35, 0.57)	0.45 (0.35, 0.56)
PRI Ads (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Election
Return Migrant	0.40 (0.23, 0.60)	0.48 (0.33, 0.62)
Non-Return Migrant	0.49 (0.43, 0.55)	0.48 (0.44, 0.52)
PAN Ads (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Election
Return Migrant	0.18 (0.08, 0.38)	0.21 (0.10, 0.37)
Non-Return Migrant	0.23 (0.15, 0.33)	0.32 (0.22, 0.43)
PAN Ads (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Election
Return Migrant	0.20 (0.09, 0.39)	0.23 (0.13, 0.37)
Non-Return Migrant	0.25 (0.21, 0.30)	0.35 (0.31, 0.38)
PRD Ads (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Election
Return Migrant	0.14 (0.05, 0.32)	0.15 (0.06, 0.31)
Non-Return Migrant	0.14 (0.08, 0.23)	0.24 (0.15, 0.35)
PRD Ads (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Election
Return Migrant	0.14 (0.05, 0.31)	0.15 (0.07, 0.29)
Non-Return Migrant	0.15 (0.11, 0.19)	0.25 (0.21, 0.28)

Table 4.15: Return Migrant and Electoral Advertising: PRI ID

	Any Ads	PRI Ads	PAN Ads	PRD Ads
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Return Migrant * PRI ID	−0.702	−0.433	−1.377	−0.567
	(0.586)	(0.582)	(0.912)	(0.930)
Return Migrant	−0.054	0.017	−0.192	−0.309
	(0.294)	(0.289)	(0.306)	(0.350)
PRI ID	0.147	0.252†	−0.262†	−0.569**
	(0.141)	(0.140)	(0.151)	(0.182)
Education	0.189**	0.136*	−0.035	−0.004
	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.075)
Age	0.006	0.005	−0.004	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Women	−0.113	−0.119	−0.302*	−0.334*
	(0.126)	(0.124)	(0.132)	(0.150)
Wealth	0.272***	0.279***	0.227***	0.210***
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.062)
Rural Location	0.064	0.236	0.243	0.360
	(0.244)	(0.250)	(0.277)	(0.309)
Urban Location	0.225	0.291	0.209	0.048
	(0.221)	(0.226)	(0.251)	(0.284)
Constant	−1.407***	−1.841***	−1.402***	−2.063***
	(0.343)	(0.346)	(0.369)	(0.417)
Observations	1,155	1,155	1,155	1,155
Log Likelihood	−803.320	−822.254	−755.228	−630.106
AIC	1,626.641	1,664.508	1,530.455	1,280.212

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.16: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PRI ID

PRI Ads (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant	0.36 (0.17, 0.61)	0.41 (0.26, 0.57)
Non-Return Migrant	0.46 (0.35, 0.58)	0.40 (0.30, 0.51)
PRI Ads (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant	0.42 (0.21, 0.65)	0.47 (0.33, 0.60)
Non-Return Migrant	0.53 (0.47, 0.58)	0.46 (0.43, 0.50)
PAN Ads (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant	0.06 (0.01, 0.26)	0.25 (0.14, 0.40)
Non-Return Migrant	0.23 (0.15, 0.34)	0.29 (0.20, 0.39)
PAN Ads (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant	0.07 (0.01, 0.29)	0.28 (0.18, 0.42)
Non-Return Migrant	0.27 (0.22, 0.33)	0.33 (0.29, 0.36)
PRD Ads (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant	0.06 (0.01, 0.27)	0.17 (0.08, 0.32)
Non-Return Migrant	0.13 (0.08, 0.22)	0.21 (0.14, 0.32)
PRD Ads (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant	0.06 (0.01, 0.27)	0.18 (0.10, 0.30)
Non-Return Migrant	0.15 (0.11, 0.19)	0.24 (0.21, 0.27)

Table 4.17: Return Migrant and Electoral Advertising: Opposition Orientation

	PAN Ads Model 1	PAN Ads Model 2	PRD Ads Model 3	PRD Ads Model 4
Return Migrant * PAN Last Elections	−0.268			
	(0.749)			
Return Migrant * PAN ID		0.309		
		(0.571)		
Return Migrant * PRD Last Elections			0.063	
			(0.765)	
Return Migrant * PRD ID				0.912
				(0.805)
Return Migrant	−0.421	−0.544	−0.495	−0.583
	(0.312)	(0.372)	(0.387)	(0.381)
PAN Last Elections	0.510**			
	(0.185)			
PAN ID		0.242†		
		(0.141)		
PRD Last Elections			1.421***	
			(0.214)	
PRD ID				0.947***
				(0.217)
Education	−0.045	−0.030	0.004	0.034
	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.079)	(0.075)
Age	−0.008	−0.004	0.0004	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Women	−0.383**	−0.312*	−0.230	−0.290†
	(0.138)	(0.132)	(0.160)	(0.152)
Wealth	0.213***	0.222***	0.211**	0.222***
	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.065)	(0.062)
Rural Location	0.131	0.237	0.351	0.368
	(0.279)	(0.277)	(0.315)	(0.311)
Urban Location	0.122	0.206	0.042	0.087
	(0.252)	(0.251)	(0.290)	(0.287)
Constant	−1.217***	−1.519***	−2.325***	−2.476***
	(0.374)	(0.367)	(0.433)	(0.422)
Observations	1,075	1,155	1,075	1,155
Log Likelihood	−699.617	−757.300	−568.106	−623.985
AIC	1,419.233	1,534.600	1,156.213	1,267.969

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.18: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and Opposition Orientation

PAN Ads (mixed areas)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Return Migrant	0.26 (0.12, 0.47)	0.16 (0.08, 0.31)
Non-Return Migrant	0.30 (0.21, 0.42)	0.26 (0.17, 0.36)
PAN Ads (mean size of place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Return Migrant	0.30 (0.15, 0.49)	0.19 (0.10, 0.33)
Non-Return Migrant	0.35 (0.30, 0.40)	0.29 (0.26, 0.33)
PRD Ads (mixed areas)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Return Migrant	0.43 (0.15, 0.75)	0.10 (0.04, 0.22)
Non-Return Migrant	0.35 (0.22, 0.50)	0.17 (0.10, 0.26)
PRD Ads (mean size of place)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Return Migrant	0.45 (0.17, 0.75)	0.11 (0.06, 0.21)
Non-Return Migrant	0.38 (0.29, 0.48)	0.19 (0.17, 0.22)

Table 4.19: Family US and Electoral Targets (Visit-Clientelism)

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US	0.353**	0.277*	0.424*	−0.747*
	(0.127)	(0.137)	(0.191)	(0.374)
Education	−0.085	−0.071	−0.132	−0.388*
	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.095)	(0.198)
Age	−0.0001	−0.002	−0.010	−0.008
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.012)
Women	0.136	0.225†	−0.086	0.393
	(0.125)	(0.136)	(0.186)	(0.357)
Wealth	0.090†	0.015	0.153*	0.148
	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.077)	(0.143)
Rural Location	−0.163	−0.064	0.282	1.252
	(0.258)	(0.293)	(0.406)	(1.097)
Urban Location	0.287	0.494†	0.288	1.221
	(0.227)	(0.257)	(0.367)	(1.063)
Constant	−1.246***	−1.499***	−2.466***	−4.196***
	(0.343)	(0.379)	(0.537)	(1.273)
Observations	1,183	1,183	1,183	1,183
Log Likelihood	−801.678	−711.141	−445.408	−154.349
AIC	1,619.356	1,438.282	906.815	324.698

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.20: Predicted Probabilities - Family US

Mixed areas	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
Family US	0.34 (0.25, 0.44)	0.21 (0.14, 0.30)	0.10 (0.05, 0.18)	0.005 (0.00, 0.04)
No Family US	0.26 (0.18, 0.36)	0.17 (0.11, 0.25)	0.07 (0.03, 0.13)	0.01 (0.00, 0.08)
Mean size	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
Family US	0.37 (0.33, 0.41)	0.27 (0.24, 0.31)	0.13 (0.10, 0.16)	0.01 (0.00, 0.02)
No Family US	0.29 (0.26, 0.33)	0.22 (0.19, 0.26)	0.09 (0.06, 0.11)	0.03 (0.02, 0.05)

Table 4.21: Family US and Electoral Targets: PRI Last Elections

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PRI Last Elections	−0.304	−0.274	−0.932*	−1.404
	(0.270)	(0.290)	(0.406)	(1.041)
Family US	0.508**	0.435*	0.724**	−0.472
	(0.169)	(0.188)	(0.262)	(0.469)
PRI Last Elections	0.426*	0.626**	0.766*	0.211
	(0.199)	(0.216)	(0.305)	(0.458)
Education	−0.071	−0.056	−0.121	−0.307
	(0.067)	(0.074)	(0.099)	(0.206)
Age	−0.001	−0.005	−0.012	−0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.013)
Women	0.168	0.291*	0.025	0.495
	(0.132)	(0.143)	(0.194)	(0.382)
Wealth	0.086	0.026	0.152†	0.052
	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.080)	(0.149)
Rural Location	−0.107	−0.007	0.474	1.209
	(0.267)	(0.303)	(0.444)	(1.098)
Urban Location	0.317	0.493†	0.490	1.161
	(0.236)	(0.267)	(0.407)	(1.070)
Constant	−1.416***	−1.769***	−2.929***	−4.099**
	(0.367)	(0.408)	(0.593)	(1.309)
Observations	1,077	1,077	1,077	1,077
Log Likelihood	−732.119	−644.949	−408.995	−139.767
AIC	1,484.238	1,309.898	837.991	299.534

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.22: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI Last Elections

PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.26 (0.16, 0.38)	0.20 (0.12, 0.29)
Non-Family US	0.23 (0.14, 0.35)	0.13 (0.08, 0.22)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.33 (0.26, 0.40)	0.25 (0.21, 0.30)
Non-Family US	0.29 (0.23, 0.36)	0.18 (0.14, 0.23)
PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.07 (0.03, 0.16)	0.09 (0.04, 0.18)
Non-Family US	0.09 (0.04, 0.19)	0.04 (0.02, 0.10)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.11 (0.07, 0.17)	0.13 (0.10, 0.17)
Non-Family US	0.14 (0.09, 0.20)	0.07 (0.04, 0.10)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.002 (0.00, 0.02)	0.006 (0.00, 0.05)
Non-Family US	0.01 (0.00, 0.10)	0.01 (0.00, 0.08)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.006 (0.00, 0.03)	0.02 (0.00, 0.04)
Non-Family US	0.04 (0.02, 0.08)	0.03 (0.01, 0.05)

Table 4.23: Family US and Electoral Targets: PRI ID

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PRI ID	−0.293	−0.142	−0.420	−2.677*
	(0.271)	(0.287)	(0.403)	(1.322)
Family US	0.457**	0.342†	0.562*	−0.139
	(0.158)	(0.178)	(0.239)	(0.436)
PRI ID	0.793***	0.947***	0.479	0.750†
	(0.193)	(0.206)	(0.298)	(0.425)
Education	−0.051	−0.036	−0.107	−0.380†
	(0.066)	(0.072)	(0.097)	(0.200)
Age	0.0003	−0.003	−0.009	−0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.013)
Women	0.162	0.245†	−0.054	0.387
	(0.128)	(0.140)	(0.188)	(0.359)
Wealth	0.090†	0.023	0.145†	0.147
	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.078)	(0.145)
Rural Location	−0.172	−0.011	0.304	1.238
	(0.266)	(0.306)	(0.424)	(1.098)
Urban Location	0.316	0.564*	0.359	1.162
	(0.235)	(0.271)	(0.385)	(1.063)
Constant	−1.601***	−1.943***	−2.763***	−4.541***
	(0.365)	(0.409)	(0.570)	(1.306)
Observations	1,155	1,155	1,155	1,155
Log Likelihood	−775.325	−679.762	−435.722	−150.752
AIC	1,570.649	1,379.525	891.443	321.505

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.24: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI ID

PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.31 (0.20, 0.44)	0.16 (0.10, 0.25)
Non-Family US	0.27 (0.17, 0.40)	0.12 (0.07, 0.20)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.40 (0.32, 0.47)	0.23 (0.19, 0.27)
Non-Family US	0.35 (0.28, 0.43)	0.17 (0.14, 0.21)
PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.10 (0.04, 0.20)	0.09 (0.04, 0.18)
Non-Family US	0.09 (0.04, 0.18)	0.05 (0.02, 0.12)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.13 (0.09, 0.19)	0.12 (0.09, 0.16)
Non-Family US	0.12 (0.07, 0.17)	0.07 (0.05, 0.10)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.001 (0.00, 0.02)	0.007 (0.00, 0.05)
Non-Family US	0.01 (0.00, 0.13)	0.008 (0.00, 0.06)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.003 (0.00, 0.03)	0.02 (0.01, 0.04)
Non-Family US	0.05 (0.02, 0.10)	0.02 (0.01, 0.04)

Table 4.25: Family US and Electoral Targets: PAN Last Elections

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PAN Last Elections	0.360	0.862†	1.835*	1.359
	(0.386)	(0.474)	(0.838)	(1.326)
Family US	0.338*	0.213	0.171	−0.984*
	(0.143)	(0.154)	(0.209)	(0.435)
PAN Last Elections	−0.705*	−1.183**	−1.730*	−1.296
	(0.301)	(0.393)	(0.773)	(1.010)
Education	−0.065	−0.054	−0.111	−0.271
	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.099)	(0.207)
Age	0.003	0.001	−0.008	−0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.013)
Women	0.197	0.325*	0.063	0.555
	(0.132)	(0.144)	(0.194)	(0.382)
Wealth	0.091†	0.031	0.150†	0.060
	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.081)	(0.150)
Rural Location	−0.083	0.012	0.484	1.284
	(0.268)	(0.303)	(0.444)	(1.099)
Urban Location	0.344	0.517†	0.518	1.223
	(0.236)	(0.267)	(0.406)	(1.069)
Constant	−1.361***	−1.664***	−2.629***	−4.097***
	(0.362)	(0.401)	(0.579)	(1.313)
Observations	1,077	1,077	1,077	1,077
Log Likelihood	−730.205	−643.358	−406.975	−139.153
AIC	1,480.410	1,306.716	833.949	298.306

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.26: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN Last Elections

PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.17 (0.09, 0.29)	0.22 (0.14, 0.32)
Non-Family US	0.06 (0.02, 0.14)	0.19 (0.12, 0.28)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.23 (0.15, 0.33)	0.29 (0.25, 0.33)
Non-Family US	0.09 (0.04, 0.17)	0.25 (0.21, 0.29)
PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.09 (0.03, 0.21)	0.08 (0.04, 0.16)
Non-Family US	0.01 (0.00, 0.06)	0.07 (0.03, 0.14)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.14 (0.08, 0.23)	0.12 (0.09, 0.16)
Non-Family US	0.02 (0.00, 0.09)	0.11 (0.08, 0.14)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.00 (0.00, 0.06)	0.00 (0.00, 0.03)
Non-Family US	0.00 (0.00, 0.05)	0.01 (0.00, 0.09)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.01 (0.00, 0.07)	0.01 (0.00, 0.03)
Non-Family US	0.01 (0.00, 0.07)	0.04 (0.02, 0.06)

Table 4.27: Family US and Electoral Targets: PAN ID

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PAN ID	0.261	0.022	0.654	0.914
	(0.276)	(0.304)	(0.424)	(0.789)
Family US	0.273†	0.270†	0.216	−1.055*
	(0.152)	(0.163)	(0.230)	(0.478)
PAN ID	−0.445*	−0.440†	−0.448	−0.412
	(0.207)	(0.227)	(0.342)	(0.505)
Education	−0.067	−0.058	−0.116	−0.384†
	(0.065)	(0.071)	(0.097)	(0.200)
Age	0.002	−0.002	−0.008	−0.006
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.012)
Women	0.173	0.266†	−0.063	0.381
	(0.128)	(0.139)	(0.189)	(0.359)
Wealth	0.087†	0.020	0.143†	0.146
	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.078)	(0.144)
Rural Location	−0.162	−0.002	0.309	1.235
	(0.264)	(0.302)	(0.424)	(1.097)
Urban Location	0.339	0.582*	0.378	1.212
	(0.233)	(0.268)	(0.385)	(1.063)
Constant	−1.236***	−1.522***	−2.481***	−4.088***
	(0.352)	(0.391)	(0.556)	(1.280)
Observations	1,155	1,155	1,155	1,155
Log Likelihood	−783.164	−694.096	−434.385	−152.875
AIC	1,586.328	1,408.193	888.770	325.751

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.28: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN ID

PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.16 (0.09, 0.25)	0.22 (0.14, 0.33)
Non-Family US	0.12 (0.07, 0.21)	0.18 (0.11, 0.27)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.22 (0.17, 0.28)	0.30 (0.26, 0.35)
Non-Family US	0.17 (0.12, 0.24)	0.25 (0.21, 0.29)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.11 (0.05, 0.21)	0.09 (0.04, 0.17)
Non-Family US	0.04 (0.02, 0.11)	0.07 (0.03, 0.14)
PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.14 (0.10, 0.20)	0.12 (0.09, 0.16)
Non-Family US	0.06 (0.03, 0.11)	0.10 (0.07, 0.13)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.00 (0.00, 0.06)	0.00 (0.00, 0.03)
Non-Family US	0.00 (0.00, 0.07)	0.01 (0.00, 0.09)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.02 (0.00, 0.05)	0.01 (0.00, 0.03)
Non-Family US	0.02 (0.01, 0.06)	0.03 (0.02, 0.06)

Table 4.29: Family US and Electoral Targets: PRD Last Elections

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PRD Last Elections	0.380	−0.012	−1.082†	−0.822
	(0.406)	(0.456)	(0.562)	(1.112)
Family US	0.342*	0.308*	0.511*	−0.685
	(0.141)	(0.153)	(0.216)	(0.443)
PRD Last Elections	−0.001	−0.078	0.946*	1.193*
	(0.295)	(0.331)	(0.369)	(0.524)
Education	−0.088	−0.076	−0.134	−0.302
	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.098)	(0.203)
Age	0.001	−0.001	−0.011	−0.008
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.013)
Women	0.187	0.288*	0.070	0.620
	(0.132)	(0.143)	(0.195)	(0.387)
Wealth	0.080	0.015	0.134†	0.026
	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.081)	(0.151)
Rural Location	−0.134	−0.040	0.490	1.353
	(0.267)	(0.302)	(0.445)	(1.105)
Urban Location	0.321	0.483†	0.554	1.355
	(0.236)	(0.266)	(0.407)	(1.077)
Constant	−1.272***	−1.569***	−2.767***	−4.276***
	(0.360)	(0.397)	(0.579)	(1.321)
Observations	1,077	1,077	1,077	1,077
Log Likelihood	−733.721	−650.753	−408.184	−138.807
AIC	1,487.442	1,321.507	836.367	297.614

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.30: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRD Last Elections

PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.21 (0.11, 0.36)	0.22 (0.14, 0.32)
Non-Family US	0.16 (0.08, 0.29)	0.17 (0.11, 0.26)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.26 (0.16, 0.39)	0.28 (0.24, 0.32)
Non-Family US	0.21 (0.12, 0.33)	0.22 (0.19, 0.27)
PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.07 (0.02, 0.19)	0.08 (0.04, 0.16)
Non-Family US	0.12 (0.05, 0.27)	0.05 (0.02, 0.11)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.11 (0.05, 0.22)	0.13 (0.10, 0.16)
Non-Family US	0.18 (0.10, 0.30)	0.08 (0.06, 0.11)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.00 (0.00, 0.08)	0.00 (0.00, 0.03)
Non-Family US	0.02 (0.00, 0.19)	0.00 (0.00, 0.06)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.02 (0.00, 0.11)	0.01 (0.00, 0.02)
Non-Family US	0.08 (0.03, 0.18)	0.02 (0.01, 0.05)

Table 4.31: Family US and Electoral Targets: PRD ID

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PRD ID	0.300	0.074	−1.067†	−1.408
	(0.406)	(0.472)	(0.629)	(1.249)
Family US	0.309*	0.266†	0.528**	−0.565
	(0.135)	(0.145)	(0.205)	(0.399)
PRD ID	0.034	−0.309	0.462	0.951†
	(0.302)	(0.355)	(0.422)	(0.528)
Education	−0.071	−0.073	−0.124	−0.382†
	(0.065)	(0.071)	(0.097)	(0.198)
Age	0.002	−0.002	−0.009	−0.008
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.012)
Women	0.172	0.233†	−0.070	0.389
	(0.127)	(0.138)	(0.189)	(0.360)
Wealth	0.081	0.007	0.139†	0.142
	(0.052)	(0.055)	(0.078)	(0.143)
Rural Location	−0.178	−0.004	0.322	1.249
	(0.264)	(0.302)	(0.424)	(1.098)
Urban Location	0.318	0.556*	0.386	1.247
	(0.233)	(0.267)	(0.385)	(1.064)
Constant	−1.324***	−1.512***	−2.591***	−4.283***
	(0.352)	(0.391)	(0.557)	(1.280)
Observations	1,155	1,155	1,155	1,155
Log Likelihood	−784.726	−697.240	−434.059	−152.060
AIC	1,589.452	1,414.481	888.118	324.120

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.32: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRD ID

PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Family US	0.17 (0.09, 0.31)	0.21 (0.13, 0.31)
Non-Family US	0.13 (0.06, 0.25)	0.17 (0.10, 0.26)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Family US	0.23 (0.14, 0.35)	0.28 (0.24, 0.32)
Non-Family US	0.18 (0.10, 0.30)	0.23 (0.19, 0.27)
PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Family US	0.05 (0.01, 0.16)	0.10 (0.05, 0.19)
Non-Family US	0.09 (0.03, 0.22)	0.06 (0.03, 0.12)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Family US	0.08 (0.03, 0.17)	0.13 (0.10, 0.17)
Non-Family US	0.12 (0.06, 0.24)	0.08 (0.06, 0.11)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Family US	0.00 (0.00, 0.06)	0.00 (0.00, 0.04)
Non-Family US	0.00 (0.00, 0.06)	0.00 (0.00, 0.07)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Family US	0.01 (0.00, 0.08)	0.01 (0.00, 0.03)
Non-Family US	0.07 (0.03, 0.17)	0.03 (0.01, 0.05)

Table 4.33: Family US and Electoral Advertising

	Any Ads	PRI Ads	PAN Ads	PRD Ads
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US	0.305^{*}	$0.215^{\dagger}$	0.182	0.046
	(0.124)	(0.122)	(0.130)	(0.148)
Education	0.200^{**}	0.132^{*}	-0.008	0.047
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.073)
Age	0.007	0.004	-0.004	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Women	-0.075	-0.110	-0.260^{*}	-0.288^{*}
	(0.123)	(0.122)	(0.129)	(0.146)
Wealth	0.247^{***}	0.259^{***}	0.203^{***}	0.196^{**}
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.061)
Rural Location	0.111	0.240	0.288	0.339
	(0.240)	(0.245)	(0.270)	(0.298)
Urban Location	0.249	0.262	0.246	0.040
	(0.216)	(0.219)	(0.243)	(0.272)
Constant	-1.545^{***}	-1.781^{***}	-1.594^{***}	-2.357^{***}
	(0.335)	(0.336)	(0.360)	(0.407)
Observations	1,183	1,183	1,183	1,183
Log Likelihood	-819.2	-841.2	-777.8	-653.6
AIC	1,654.5	1,698.5	1,571.7	1,323.2

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.34: Predicted Probabilities - Family US

Mixed areas	Any Ads	PRI Ads	PAN Ads	PRD Ads
Family US	0.57 (0.47, 0.67)	0.45 (0.35, 0.55)	0.28 (0.19, 0.38)	0.19 (0.12, 0.29)
No Family US	0.50 (0.40, 0.60)	0.39 (0.30, 0.50)	0.24 (0.16, 0.34)	0.19 (0.12, 0.28)
Mean size	Any Ads	PRI Ads	PAN Ads	PRD Ads
Family US	0.62 (0.58, 0.66)	0.50 (0.46, 0.54)	0.32 (0.29, 0.36)	0.21 (0.18, 0.25)
No Family US	0.55 (0.51, 0.59)	0.45 (0.41, 0.49)	0.29 (0.25, 0.33)	0.20 (0.17, 0.24)

Table 4.35: Family US and Electoral Advertising: PRI Last Elections

	Any Ads	PRI Ads	PAN Ads	PRD Ads
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PRI Last Elections	0.122	0.185	−0.073	0.153
	(0.268)	(0.265)	(0.291)	(0.337)
Family US	0.278†	0.130	0.163	0.015
	(0.164)	(0.161)	(0.166)	(0.184)
PRI Last Elections	−0.223	−0.082	−0.392†	−0.650**
	(0.191)	(0.192)	(0.214)	(0.249)
Education	0.196**	0.117†	−0.027	0.026
	(0.067)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.077)
Age	0.008†	0.006	−0.001	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Women	−0.116	−0.075	−0.296*	−0.295†
	(0.130)	(0.128)	(0.137)	(0.155)
Wealth	0.248***	0.290***	0.211***	0.184**
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.064)
Rural Location	−0.007	0.200	0.179	0.308
	(0.250)	(0.253)	(0.280)	(0.309)
Urban Location	0.096	0.148	0.142	−0.023
	(0.226)	(0.228)	(0.252)	(0.283)
Constant	−1.370***	−1.799***	−1.438***	−2.130***
	(0.356)	(0.357)	(0.381)	(0.428)
Observations	1,077	1,077	1,077	1,077
Log Likelihood	−743.461	−763.627	−700.571	−589.610
AIC	1,506.922	1,547.255	1,421.141	1,199.220

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.36: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI Last Elections

PRI Ads (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.48 (0.37, 0.60)	0.46 (0.35, 0.57)
Non-Family US	0.41 (0.29, 0.53)	0.43 (0.32, 0.54)
PRI Ads (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.52 (0.44, 0.59)	0.49 (0.44, 0.55)
Non-Family US	0.44 (0.37, 0.52)	0.46 (0.41, 0.52)
PAN Ads (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.23 (0.15, 0.34)	0.32 (0.22, 0.44)
Non-Family US	0.21 (0.13, 0.32)	0.29 (0.19, 0.40)
PAN Ads (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.25 (0.19, 0.32)	0.35 (0.30, 0.41)
Non-Family US	0.24 (0.18, 0.31)	0.32 (0.27, 0.37)
PRD Ads (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.15 (0.09, 0.25)	0.23 (0.15, 0.34)
Non-Family US	0.13 (0.07, 0.23)	0.23 (0.14, 0.34)
PRD Ads (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.16 (0.11, 0.22)	0.24 (0.20, 0.29)
Non-Family US	0.14 (0.09, 0.20)	0.24 (0.19, 0.29)

Table 4.37: Family US and Electoral Advertising: PRI ID

	Any Ads	PRI Ads	PAN Ads	PRD Ads
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PRI ID	0.017	−0.060	0.039	0.445
	(0.272)	(0.268)	(0.295)	(0.358)
Family US	0.310*	0.221	0.168	−0.050
	(0.150)	(0.148)	(0.154)	(0.170)
PRI ID	0.118	0.266	−0.311	−0.812**
	(0.187)	(0.188)	(0.211)	(0.265)
Education	0.197**	0.139*	−0.022	0.004
	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.075)
Age	0.006	0.005	− 0.003	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Women	−0.062	−0.093	−0.230†	−0.308*
	(0.125)	(0.124)	(0.131)	(0.150)
Wealth	0.256***	0.269***	0.215***	0.208***
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.055)	(0.062)
Rural Location	0.106	0.264	0.279	0.370
	(0.245)	(0.251)	(0.277)	(0.309)
Urban Location	0.255	0.310	0.243	0.066
	(0.221)	(0.226)	(0.251)	(0.283)
Constant	−1.610***	−1.977***	−1.588***	−2.107***
	(0.350)	(0.352)	(0.375)	(0.423)
Observations	1,155	1,155	1,155	1,155
Log Likelihood	−799.498	−820.053	−755.502	−628.204
AIC	1,618.996	1,660.106	1,531.004	1,276.408

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.38: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI ID

PRI Ads (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.47 (0.35, 0.60)	0.42 (0.32, 0.53)
Non-Family US	0.43 (0.31, 0.56)	0.37 (0.27, 0.48)
PRI Ads (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.54 (0.46, 0.62)	0.49 (0.44, 0.54)
Non-Family US	0.50 (0.42, 0.58)	0.44 (0.38, 0.49)
PAN Ads (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.24 (0.15, 0.35)	0.29 (0.20, 0.40)
Non-Family US	0.20 (0.12, 0.31)	0.26 (0.17, 0.36)
PAN Ads (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.28 (0.21, 0.36)	0.34 (0.29, 0.39)
Non-Family US	0.24 (0.18, 0.31)	0.30 (0.26, 0.35)
PRD Ads (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.15 (0.08, 0.25)	0.20 (0.13, 0.31)
Non-Family US	0.10 (0.05, 0.19)	0.21 (0.13, 0.32)
PRD Ads (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.17 (0.12, 0.23)	0.22 (0.19, 0.27)
Non-Family US	0.12 (0.08, 0.18)	0.23 (0.19, 0.28)

Table 4.39: Family US and Electoral Advertising: Opposition Orientation

	PAN Ads Model 1	PAN Ads Model 2	PRD Ads Model 3	PRD Ads Model 4
Family US * PAN Last Elections	−1.055**			
	(0.355)			
Family US * PAN ID		−0.161		
		(0.273)		
Family US * PRD Last Elections			0.777†	
			(0.412)	
Family US * PRD ID				0.042
				(0.414)
Family US	0.338*	0.233	−0.063	0.031
	(0.153)	(0.163)	(0.176)	(0.164)
PAN Last Elections	1.060***			
	(0.255)			
PAN ID		0.320		
		(0.200)		
PRD Last Elections			1.061***	
			(0.289)	
PRD ID				0.989***
				(0.300)
Education	−0.036	−0.017	0.019	0.040
	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.079)	(0.075)
Age	−0.007	−0.004	0.001	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Women	−0.323*	−0.240†	−0.185	−0.262†
	(0.138)	(0.132)	(0.159)	(0.151)
Wealth	0.203***	0.213***	0.205**	0.224***
	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.066)	(0.063)
Rural Location	0.164	0.273	0.335	0.361
	(0.281)	(0.277)	(0.316)	(0.310)
Urban Location	0.144	0.228	0.039	0.070
	(0.253)	(0.251)	(0.291)	(0.285)
Constant	−1.494***	−1.740***	−2.397***	−2.579***
	(0.381)	(0.372)	(0.439)	(0.425)
Observations	1,077	1,155	1,077	1,155
Log Likelihood	−695.351	−756.190	−565.736	−623.084
AIC	1,410.702	1,532.380	1,151.471	1,266.168

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.40: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Opposition Last Elections

PAN Ads (mixed areas)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.29 (0.18, 0.44)	0.29 (0.20, 0.40)
Non-Family US	0.46 (0.31, 0.61)	0.22 (0.15, 0.32)
PAN Ads (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.32 (0.23, 0.42)	0.32 (0.27, 0.36)
Non-Family US	0.49 (0.38, 0.60)	0.25 (0.21, 0.29)
PRD Ads (mixed areas)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.54 (0.36, 0.70)	0.15 (0.09, 0.24)
Non-Family US	0.36 (0.22, 0.53)	0.16 (0.10, 0.26)
PRD Ads (mixed areas)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.56 (0.43, 0.68)	0.17 (0.13, 0.20)
Non-Family US	0.38 (0.27, 0.51)	0.18 (0.14, 0.22)

4.5.1 Additional Figures and Tables

Table 4.41: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets (Visit-Clientelism)

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Return Migrant * PRI Last Elections	0.646	1.035†	−0.211
	(0.558)	(0.593)	(0.771)
Return Migrant	−0.225	−0.219	0.203
	(0.359)	(0.407)	(0.466)
PRI Last Elections	0.119	0.235	0.151
	(0.168)	(0.182)	(0.246)
Education	−0.118	−0.070	−0.099
	(0.077)	(0.084)	(0.113)
Age	−0.002	−0.005	−0.008
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Women	0.169	0.332*	−0.037
	(0.153)	(0.168)	(0.223)
Wealth	0.102†	0.034	0.106
	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.091)
Employed	−0.106	0.007	−0.005
	(0.156)	(0.170)	(0.227)
Church Attendance	0.119†	0.086	0.205*
	(0.068)	(0.075)	(0.102)
Talk Politics	0.218*	0.097	−0.064
	(0.092)	(0.100)	(0.136)
Risk Acceptant	−0.248	−0.360*	0.201
	(0.162)	(0.173)	(0.243)
National Situation	0.187†	0.324**	0.203
	(0.098)	(0.108)	(0.143)
Rural Location	−0.104	−0.051	0.444
	(0.297)	(0.339)	(0.499)
Urban Location	0.082	0.303	0.249
	(0.273)	(0.311)	(0.469)
Constant	−1.975***	−2.065***	−3.430***
	(0.484)	(0.532)	(0.759)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Observations	950	950	950
Log Likelihood	−637.441	−560.324	−363.263
AIC	1,312.883	1,158.649	764.526

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed and Center.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.42: Return Migrant and Electoral Targets (Visit-Clientelism)

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Return Migrant * PRI ID	1.430*	1.825**	−1.303
	(0.657)	(0.688)	(1.223)
Return Migrant	−0.356	−0.310	0.222
	(0.344)	(0.392)	(0.428)
PRI ID	0.349*	0.552**	0.089
	(0.169)	(0.180)	(0.248)
Education	−0.112	−0.071	−0.097
	(0.075)	(0.082)	(0.109)
Age	−0.0004	−0.004	−0.005
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Women	0.176	0.308†	−0.125
	(0.150)	(0.164)	(0.217)
Wealth	0.113†	0.029	0.113
	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.088)
Employed	−0.123	0.016	−0.041
	(0.152)	(0.166)	(0.221)
Church Attendance	0.094	0.063	0.162†
	(0.065)	(0.072)	(0.097)
Talk Politics	0.215*	0.111	−0.042
	(0.089)	(0.096)	(0.130)
Risk Acceptant	−0.206	−0.184	0.095
	(0.168)	(0.181)	(0.251)
National Situation	0.119	0.204*	0.233†
	(0.096)	(0.104)	(0.139)
Rural Location	−0.159	−0.011	0.193
	(0.298)	(0.346)	(0.471)
Urban Location	0.097	0.390	0.052
	(0.273)	(0.318)	(0.440)
Constant	−2.018***	−2.269***	−3.146***
	(0.480)	(0.534)	(0.731)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1,014	1,014	1,014
Log Likelihood	−673.885	−590.948	−384.871
AIC	1,385.771	1,219.895	807.743

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.43: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PRI Last Elections

PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Return Migrant	0.34 (0.17, 0.60)	0.13 (0.05, 0.29)
Non-Return Migrant	0.20 (0.11, 0.32)	0.16 (0.09, 0.27)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Return Migrant	0.40 (0.21, 0.62)	0.16 (0.07, 0.30)
Non-Return Migrant	0.23 (0.17, 0.31)	0.19 (0.14, 0.25)

Table 4.44: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrant and PRI ID

PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant	0.56 (0.27, 0.81)	0.10 (0.04, 0.23)
Non-Return Migrant	0.22 (0.12, 0.35)	0.14 (0.08, 0.23)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Return Migrant	0.62 (0.34, 0.83)	0.13 (0.06, 0.25)
Non-Return Migrant	0.27 (0.20, 0.35)	0.17 (0.13, 0.23)

Table 4.45: Family US and Electoral Targets (Visit-Clientelism)

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US	0.441**	0.342*	0.513*	−0.738†
	(0.141)	(0.152)	(0.208)	(0.396)
Education	−0.131†	−0.090	−0.120	−0.617**
	(0.074)	(0.080)	(0.109)	(0.233)
Age	−0.001	−0.004	−0.007	−0.019
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.014)
Women	0.105	0.207	−0.125	−0.003
	(0.148)	(0.160)	(0.216)	(0.409)
Wealth	0.096	0.007	0.122	0.236
	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.088)	(0.174)
Employed	−0.122	−0.005	0.016	−1.063*
	(0.151)	(0.163)	(0.220)	(0.463)
Church Attendance	0.109†	0.086	0.164†	0.160
	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.098)	(0.187)
Talk Politics	0.201*	0.102	−0.075	0.413†
	(0.088)	(0.095)	(0.129)	(0.247)
Risk Acceptant	−0.381*	−0.486**	0.110	0.377
	(0.151)	(0.161)	(0.227)	(0.433)
National Situation	0.174†	0.279**	0.241†	0.742**
	(0.094)	(0.102)	(0.139)	(0.274)
Rural Location	−0.120	−0.045	0.339	0.999
	(0.291)	(0.332)	(0.472)	(1.139)
Urban Location	0.059	0.318	0.105	0.599
	(0.264)	(0.301)	(0.439)	(1.118)
Constant	−1.914***	−1.908***	−3.355***	−5.559***
	(0.468)	(0.512)	(0.729)	(1.550)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1,035	1,035	1,035	1,035
Log Likelihood	−684.757	−607.948	−385.588	−130.346
AIC	1,403.514	1,249.897	805.176	294.693

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.46: Family US and Electoral Targets (Visit-Clientelism)

	PRI Target Model 1	PRI Target Model 2	PRI Target Model 3	PRI Target Model 4
Family US * PRI Last Elections	−0.319			
	(0.314)			
Family US * PRI ID		−0.017		
		(0.310)		
Family US * PAN Last Elections			0.834	
			(0.512)	
Family US * PAN ID				−0.257
				(0.322)
Family US	0.476*	0.375†	0.233	0.413*
	(0.207)	(0.193)	(0.169)	(0.182)
PRI Last Elections	0.482*			
	(0.242)			
PRI ID		0.680**		
		(0.235)		
PAN Last Elections			−1.109**	
			(0.428)	
PAN ID				−0.137
				(0.244)
Constant	−2.209***	−2.240***	−2.202***	−1.956***
	(0.543)	(0.538)	(0.538)	(0.519)
All Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	952	1,014	952	1,014
Log Likelihood	−559.797	−591.073	−556.152	−597.498
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,157.593	1,220.146	1,150.304	1,232.997

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.47: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI Last Elections

PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.22 (0.12, 0.36)	0.19 (0.11, 0.31)
Non-Family US	0.19 (0.11, 0.32)	0.13 (0.07, 0.22)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.25 (0.18, 0.35)	0.22 (0.16, 0.30)
Non-Family US	0.22 (0.16, 0.31)	0.15 (0.10, 0.21)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.16 (0.07, 0.30)	0.20 (0.12, 0.32)
Non-Family US	0.06 (0.02, 0.15)	0.16 (0.09, 0.27)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.19 (0.11, 0.30)	0.23 (0.17, 0.31)
Non-Family US	0.07 (0.03, 0.16)	0.20 (0.14, 0.26)

Table 4.48: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI ID

PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.28 (0.16, 0.43)	0.16 (0.09, 0.27)
Non-Family US	0.21 (0.11, 0.35)	0.12 (0.06, 0.20)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.32 (0.23, 0.43)	0.20 (0.14, 0.26)
Non-Family US	0.25 (0.17, 0.35)	0.14 (0.10, 0.20)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.15 (0.08, 0.26)	0.21 (0.12, 0.34)
Non-Family US	0.13 (0.07, 0.24)	0.15 (0.08, 0.25)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.18 (0.12, 0.26)	0.25 (0.19, 0.33)
Non-Family US	0.16 (0.11, 0.24)	0.18 (0.13, 0.25)

Table 4.49: Family US and Electoral Targets (Visit-Clientelism)

	PAN Target	PAN Target	PRD Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PAN Last Elections	1.867*			
	(0.851)			
Family US * PAN ID		0.449		
		(0.443)		
Family US * PRD Last Elections			−0.993	
			(1.154)	
Family US * PRD ID				−1.539
				(1.312)
Family US	0.192	0.336	−0.649	−0.562
	(0.228)	(0.252)	(0.472)	(0.420)
PAN Last Elections	−1.672*			
	(0.784)			
PAN ID		−0.286		
		(0.360)		
PRD Last Elections			1.693**	
			(0.596)	
PRD ID				1.112†
				(0.631)
Constant	−3.635***	−3.276***	−6.304***	−5.857***
	(0.780)	(0.735)	(1.680)	(1.573)
All Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	952	1,014	952	1,014
Log Likelihood	−354.640	−379.078	−115.005	−128.451
AIC	747.280	796.156	268.010	294.902

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.50: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN Last Elections

PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.06 (0.02, 0.19)	0.05 (0.02, 0.14)
Non-Family US	0.00 (0.00, 0.05)	0.04 (0.01, 0.12)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.09 (0.04, 0.17)	0.07 (0.04,0.12)
Non-Family US	0.01 (0.00, 0.05)	0.06 (0.03, 0.10)

Table 4.51: Family US and Electoral Advertising: Opposition Orientation

	PAN Ads Model 1	PAN Ads Model 2	PRD Ads Model 3	PRD Ads Model 4
Family US * PAN Last Elections	-0.940^{*}			
	(0.386)			
Family US * PAN ID		-0.140		
		(0.293)		
Family US * PRD Last Elections			0.641	
			(0.448)	
Family US * PRD ID				0.138
				(0.463)
Family US	0.263	0.207	-0.097	0.016
	(0.167)	(0.181)	(0.195)	(0.181)
PAN Last Elections	1.057^{***}			
	(0.285)			
PAN ID		0.256		
		(0.219)		
PRD Last Elections			1.022^{**}	
			(0.320)	
PRD ID				0.758^{*}
				(0.348)
Constant	-1.897^{***}	-2.206^{***}	-3.173^{***}	-3.359^{***}
	(0.511)	(0.491)	(0.594)	(0.573)
All Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	952	1,014	952	1,014
Log Likelihood	-603.630	-653.043	-478.630	-523.649
AIC	1,245.261	1,344.085	995.260	1,085.297

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed and Center.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.52: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Opposition Last Elections

PAN Ads (mixed areas)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.26 (0.14, 0.43)	0.24 (0.15, 0.36)
Non-Family US	0.41 (0.24, 0.60)	0.19 (0.11, 0.30)
PAN Ads (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.28 (0.18, 0.40)	0.25 (0.19, 0.33)
Non-Family US	0.43 (0.30, 0.58)	0.21 (0.15, 0.27)
PRD Ads (mixed areas)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.36 (0.19, 0.57)	0.09 (0.05, 0.17)
Non-Family US	0.24 (0.12, 0.42)	0.10 (0.05, 0.19)
PRD Ads (mixed areas)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.36 (0.22, 0.52)	0.09 (0.06, 0.14)
Non-Family US	0.24 (0.14, 0.38)	0.10 (0.07, 0.15)

4.5.2 Extensions to the Existing Analysis: 2000 Mexico Panel Study

Table 4.53: Family US and Opposition Targeting: Wave 4

	Opposition Target Model 1	Opposition Target Model 2
Family US * PRI ID	−0.370	
	(0.488)	
Family US * PAN ID		−0.115
		(0.535)
Family US	0.637*	0.524†
	(0.320)	(0.292)
PRI ID	0.274	
	(0.401)	
PAN ID		0.272
		(0.430)
Constant	−3.759**	−3.656**
	(0.854)	(0.828)
All Controls	Y	Y
Observations	791	791
Log Likelihood	−266.440	−266.340
AIC	568.880	568.680

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed and Center.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 4.54: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Opposition Targets - Wave 4

Opposition Targets (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.12 (0.06, 0.21)	0.13 (0.07, 0.21)
Non-Family US	0.09 (0.05, 0.18)	0.07 (0.04, 0.13)
Opposition Targets (mean size of place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.14 (0.07, 0.25)	0.12 (0.07, 0.19)
Non-Family US	0.09 (0.04, 0.19)	0.07 (0.04, 0.13)

Chapter 5

Electoral Targeting in Mexico's 2006 Presidential Election

While the 2000 Mexican presidential elections were surprising due to the PRI's first electoral defeat in over seventy years, the 2006 ones resulted also in a never seen before electoral result: a near tie between the PAN Candidate - Felipe Calderón and the PRD Candidate - Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Multiple factors contributed toward this tight competition (Dominguez, 2009; Dominguez, Lawson and Moreno, 2009; Flores-Macias, 2009): on the one hand, López Obrador enjoyed a lead in the public opinion polls throughout most of the campaign due to his likable personal characteristics and respected political abilities. However, this candidate's popularity contrasted with the lack of good evaluations voters had on the rest of his party, the PRD. On the other, Calderón entered the contest without the support of some of his party because of internal divisions over whom the presidential candidate should be. Yet, a successful electoral campaign, together with an improving economic situation and a highly-regarded incumbent PAN President, changed the fate of the elections and gave the PAN another six years at the highest level of office.

This chapter has one clear objective: establish whether or not migrant families were more likely electoral targets than similar non-migrant ones during the 2006 Mexican presidential elections.[1] By doing so, it aims to understand the extent to which the incumbent (PAN) and the opposition parties (PRI and PRD) engaged in vote buying, coercion and other mobilization strategies of

[1] This chapter is a modified version of a poster presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting 2014, Washington, DC.

migration-exposed voters in order to win these elections. Most importantly, it also addresses how changes in incumbency and opposition status at the presidential level affected the electoral targeting of the different parties. That is, the PAN was for the first time in Mexican history the party of the President while the PRI no longer held that powerful position. As the previous one, this chapter therefore analyzes what role the incumbent and the opposition parties played in attempting to influence migrant families' electoral choices. Undoubtedly, this is a necessary first step to understand why migrant families voted in a particular way in these elections and hence how they contributed to the PAN's reelection victory.

5.1 International Migration and Electoral Strategies in 2006

This dissertation argues that because of their political disaffection, migrant families are more likely to be electoral targets. In the context of the 2006 Mexican presidential elections, I look at two types of *electoral strategies*: clientelism and home visits. As in Chapter 4, *clientelism* refers to the exchange of goods and favors in return for electoral support, while *home visits* quite obviously mean that a representative of a political party goes to someone's house during elections time. Of course, these visits can range from friendly ones that simply encourage voters to go to the polls to more intimidating situations where political activists coerce voters to turn out as well as to cast their ballots in a particular way.[2]

As for *migration-exposed voters*, I look at remittance recipients as well as those respondents with close relatives living in the United States, and posit that the disengagement or disaffection from national politics affects both types. In the first place, I expect remittance recipients to experience disengagement from politics because the financial help from abroad makes them less dependent on the national economic situation and less reliant on domestic politics to ensure well-being. In the second, those respondents with family members living in the US might also have intentions to leave and reunite with migrants already abroad, which quite possibly also lowers the need to get involved in politics back home. Needless to say, overlap exists between those respondents that receive remittances and those who have close relatives living in a foreign country.

With respect to the *political contenders* in 2006, one point is clear about these elections: the

[2] Although sending electoral advertising is also an important electoral strategy, no question was asked about it in the 2006 dataset. Therefore, this chapter focuses just on non-programmatic strategies: clientelism and home visits.

PAN was now the party managing the national government and therefore the competitor with access to centralized fiscal resources. Put differently, the PAN's incumbency status at the President level gave Calderón an advantage over the PRI and the PRD candidates, given that controlling this institution facilitated the funding and implementation of electoral targeting. As a result, and despite some initial divisions over whom the presidential candidate should be, the party eventually united in support of Felipe Calderón and worked on intense canvassing and some gift distribution prior to the elections and in order to ensure re-election (Shirk, 2009; Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni, 2009).

With respect to the PRI, while this party still counted on a widespread political network at the local level to mobilize voters, this capability did not prevent a disastrous electoral performance in the 2006 elections. As Langston (2009) puts it: "The PRI not only posted a miserable third place finish in the presidential race, but its candidate's poor showing also cost the PRI over half of its congressional delegation" (page 153). Of course, not a single factor caused this electoral defeat but rather a combination of reasons, including: a very competitive primary that left the party internally divided[3], a candidate that lacked personal popularity but owned the reputation of being a fraudulent politician, and a poor communication strategy during the campaign (i.e., no clear electoral message nor a credible candidate) (Lawson, 2009; Langston, 2009). Altogether, this meant that the PRI candidate, in addition to not possessing anymore the incumbency advantage at the national level, did not have the support of a committed party working toward his electoral victory at the local level. In other words, the absence of a good candidate as well as the internal divisions throughout the campaign meant that Roberto Madrazo could not rely as much as before on the workings of the PRI machine to deliver votes. Obviously, this electoral machinery had been essential and highly successful in delivering winning strategies in the past.

As for the PRD candidate, López Obrador had serious options of becoming the next Mexican President in 2006. This fact was a certainly a change with respect to the 2000 elections and demanded an electoral campaign able to materialize the initial projections into a final victory. However, despite leading public opinion polls throughout most of the campaign, López Obrador did not have the incumbency advantage the PAN had nor a strong party supporting his candidacy.

[3] See for example the TUCOM ("Todos Unidos con Mexico") organization. This organization was created by some PRI party leaders to mobilized against Madrazo's presidential candidacy.

As a result, the electoral campaign did not play in López Obrador's favor. Put differently, while it is reasonable to argue that the PRD participated in electoral targeting and mobilization activities, one can as well expect this party to have participated in these practices to a lower extent than (or especially not more than) the other two main competitors.

In sum, and building on the hypotheses of chapter 3, I adapt them to the context of the 2006 presidential elections, with the PAN as the incumbent party and the PRD and the PRI as the opposition parties, as follows:

H1: PAN Targeting of PAN Supporters: The incumbent PAN is systematically more likely to electorally target migrant families that favor this party than similar non-migrant families with the same political orientation (i.e., *electoral mobilization or turnout buying*).

H2: Opposition Targeting (PRI and PRD) of Opposition Supporters: The opposition parties (PRI and PRD) are systematically more likely to electorally target migrant families who are non-incumbent supporters (PRI and PRD supporters, respectively) than similar non-migrant families with the same political orientation (i.e., *electoral mobilization or turnout buying*).

H3: PAN Targeting of non-PAN Supporters: Among non-PAN supporters, the PAN is systematically more likely to electorally target migrant families that do not favor the incumbent than similar non-migrant families with the same political orientation, when these voters are mobilized by the opposition (i.e., *persuasion or vote buying*).

Additionally, and contrary to the previous chapter where it was easier to hypothesize the PRI's response to the active PAN targeting. It is not that straightforward in this case to predict PAN's responses given that both PRI and PRD participated in electoral targeting to a certain extent. Thus, I leave H3 as it is: the PAN targeting of non-PAN-supporters.

5.2 Data and Methodology

This chapter relies on data from the Mexico 2006 Panel Study (Lawson et al., 2007).[4] The panel format of this dataset relies on the fact that the same participants responded to (sometimes the

[4] Senior Project Personnel for the Mexico 2006 Panel Study include (in alphabetical order): Andy Baker, Kathleen Bruhn, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domnguez, Kenneth Greene, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, Alejandro Poir, and David Shirk. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-0517971) and Reforma newspaper; fieldwork was conducted by Reforma newspapers Polling and Research Team, under the direction of Alejandro Moreno. http://web.mit.edu/clawson/www/polisci/research/mexico06/index.html.

same) political and socioeconomic questions at three different points in time: October 2005 (wave 1), April and May 2006 (wave 2), and after the elections in July 2006 (wave 3).[5] Of course, attrition happened but a majority of the respondents remained involved during the second and third wave (i.e., the sample started with 2400 respondents and finished with approximately 1600). I use information from these three different waves in this chapter's empirical analysis. I provide further details in the remainder of this section.

Dependent Variables

From this dataset, I use two different questions to create my electoral targeting variable. The first question asks if 'a political party representative knocked on your door during the last few weeks, and which party or candidate' (*home visits*), and the second if 'in the last few weeks, a political party representative or candidate gave the respondents a gift, money, meals, groceries, or any other type of help, and which party or candidate' (*clientelism*). As in the previous chapter, this non-programmatic targeting happens when either of these two questions receives a positive answer. Moreover, given the panel format of this dataset, I create my dependent variable by considering those respondents that participated in *all the three waves* and their answers to the questions about clientelism and home visits, without regards to whether the targeting occurred in the first, second or third wave. Thus, this variable takes the value of one when a respondent was a target either in the first, second, or third wave, as well as when he/she was a target in more than one wave; and a value of 0 when a target did not occur at all.[6]

Also, given that these questions allow exploring which political parties approached respondents, I take this information into account. This variation results in different indicator variables that capture whether the respondent was a party's target or not: PRI target, PAN/Incumbent target and PRD target.

Independent Variables

I use two different questions to capture migration-exposed citizens or members of migrant families: i) those who report having close relatives living in the US (*family US*), and ii) those who

[5] Although this dataset also incorporates a cross-section part before and after the elections, no question was asked about migration in this part of the dataset. Hence, the analysis is this chapter relies exclusively on the panel dataset.

[6] I opted for coding this as an indicator as opposed to an index because for some respondents answering 'yes' to these questions could refer to being a target at any point in the past, as opposed to only within 'the last few weeks' as the question specifies. Put differently, capturing with exactitude those who were a target only 'within the last few weeks' seems a bit too demanding for respondents, and therefore, a simple indicator variable for the overall electoral campaign is *a priori* more appropriate.

affirm receiving themselves or the household money from someone living in the US (*Remittance Recipients*). In both instances, these two resulting variables take the value of 1 when the respondent falls into the migration category and 0 when the response is negative. Of course, overlap exists between these two migration characteristics but it is far from complete.[7]

With respect to the panel format of this dataset, the first wave asks about having relatives in the US and second one about receiving remittances. While it would be ideal to have these questions again in subsequent waves in order to capture potential changes in migration status, it is reasonable to expect that, given the short span (i.e., months as opposed to years) of the survey, changes would be minimal and in general would not affect the results in any substantial way.

In addition, I use a variety of questions to capture respondents' *political orientation* since this information is essential to analyze if political parties' strategies are conditional on these political characteristics. First, I measure *past electoral behavior* with a question that directly reports this electoral choice for the previous presidential elections of 2000, including: voted PRI last elections, voted PAN last elections, and voted PRD last elections. Each of these variables takes the value of 1 when a respondent voted for a particular party, and 0 when they voted for another party or for no party. Wave 1 of the survey includes this question. And second, I use a question that addresses *self-identification* with an existing political party as: "priista" (*PRI ID*), "panista" (*PAN ID or Incumbent ID*), or "perredista" (*PRD ID*). Each of these variables takes the value of 1 when a respondent identifies with a particular party, and 0 when they favor other party or no party at all and so qualify as 'indifferent voters'. I use this information from the wave 1 of the survey even though this question is present in wave 2 and wave 3 of the panel as well. The reason for choosing answers from wave 1 is quite simply to avoid the endogeneity concerns that emerge from electoral targeting driving party ID as opposed to party ID leading to political parties' actions. The panel format of this dataset makes addressing this endogeneity issue easier.

Control Variables

Finally, I control for those confounding factors that affect migration status and the dependent variable, mainly: age, gender, wealth (as the sum of whether the respondent has a total of eight

[7] In particular, 10% of the respondents belong to both categories, 40% of respondents have close relatives living in the US but do not receive remittances, 1% of respondents receive remittances but do not have close relatives living in the US, and 47% of the respondents do not belong to any migration category.

items)[8], and education level (ranging from 1- No education to 9- University degree or more). I also include the type of place (rural, urban or mixed), given that the size of the location could affect the workings of political networks and political parties' ability to know who the migrant families are. Also, since the political identity variables are from wave 1, I use these control variables from wave 1 as well, although most of these personal characteristics do not change that much (if at all) from wave to wave.

In alternative specifications, I include the following additional controls: approval or disapproval of the incumbent President's performance (0- Disapprove, 1- Neither and 2- Approve), frequency of church attendance (from 0- Never to 4- More than once a week), frequency of political talk (1-Never to 4- Daily), and geographic location (North, South, Center, Center-West and Mexico City Area).[9] In addition, I also use an alternative measure for the size of place: the population per municipality. Different reasons motivate considering these variables: i) evaluation of president's performance might encourage participation in migration processes as well as getting involved in political networks[10], ii) church attendance measures respondents' social connectivity which arguably relates positively with facility to migrate and the exposure to political networks, iii) political talk incorporates the fact that people who tend to talk more about politics are possibly local political influencers, part of political networks and thus more likely targets, and iv) geographic location takes into account the existing predisposition of certain areas to be migrant-rich as well as to favor a particular party in their local workings and at the polls. The appendix summarizes descriptive statistics for these variables.

5.3 Empirical Results

This section answers whether or not migrant families are the targets of electoral strategies. As previously noted, I look at remittance recipients and those respondents with close relatives living

[8] A measure of income (raging from 1- '0 to 1300' to 10- '10500 or more') is included in wave 2 and 3 of the study, but not in wave 1. However, given that most of my control variables are from wave 1 and that subsequent waves lose participants, I use wealth from wave 1 instead of income in order to maximize the number of respondents included in the analysis. Both variables are of course positively and significantly correlated.

[9] Unfortunately, no question asks about this risk acceptance attitudes in this 2006 data.

[10] Of course, this variable can also be affected by the migration process and the fact that, for instance, receiving remittances improves recipients' economic situation and leads to better presidential evaluations. See in this respect for example (Germano, 2013). Therefore, another reason for not including some of these variables as part of the initial analysis is because some of them are post-treatment to the migration process, which hinders estimating the effect of migration-exposure.

in the US. A first look at the distribution of these practices indicates that 64% of remittance recipients were not the targets of home visits/clientelism while 35% were. These figures are pretty similar when looking at those respondents with family abroad. In addition, the main competing parties - PAN, PRI and PRD - all reached a similar share of voters (see descriptive statistics in the appendix), which introduces an interesting contrast with the electoral targeting dynamics of previous elections. Given the binary nature of these dependent variables (i.e., electoral target or not as well as party variation of those targets), I use logistic regressions for the empirical analysis.[11] Further, this analysis proceeds by looking at the PAN's strategic behavior in response to migration status, PAN supporters and non-PAN supporters (i.e., PRI and PRD supporters), as well as the opposition's strategic behavior (both PRI and PRD) in response to migration status, PRI/PRD supporters and non-PRI/non-PRD supporters.[12]

5.3.1 Remittance Recipients

Table 5.1 takes a first look at the extent to which being a *remittance recipient* predicts electoral targeting (home visits and clientelism), when controlling for other relevant factors such as wealth and age. This table indicates that being a remittance recipient reports a positive relationship with being a target with all the political parties. However, this positive relationship is only statistically significant in the case of PAN/incumbent targeting. Further, I look at predicted probabilities[13] for a better comparison of remittance recipients and non-recipients, everything else equal, in table 5.2. As this table shows, those who receive remittances from the US have a higher predicted probability of being electoral targets than similar non-recipients. This holds across the different competing

[11] As in the previous chapter, an alternative way to analyze this electoral targeting is using a multinomial approach. However, because some respondents are the targets of different parties, this complicates the creation of different categories within the dependent variable for a multinomial logistic analysis (i.e., creates to many categories and leads to some cells with a small number of respondents, especially when the migration-status is taken into account). A logistic regression analysis makes the coding of the dependent variable more straightforward.

[12] For this analysis, I use the weights from wave 1. This chapter's results hold when using alternatively the weights from wave 2 and wave 3. I also run the analysis without including any weights at all, in which case, this chapter's conclusions are similar when looking at the behavior of the PAN. The only noticeable difference is that the PRD is not more likely to target remittances recipients than similar non-recipients with PRD orientation, but instead, this party targets PRD supporters who are remittances recipients with a higher probability than non-recipients. Put differently, some of the statistically significant relationships lose strength.

[13] As in Chapter 4, I report predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals, and calculate them using all variables at their means with the exception of the 'size of the place' for which I use two different estimations: i) one that employs the mixed areas (as opposed to rural and urban areas) as the reference category (referred to as 'mixed areas' in tables), and another that gives these categories values from 1 to 3 according to size (1-rural, 2-mixed, 3-urban) and then uses the mean value to calculate the corresponding probability (referred to as 'mean size').

parties but the difference between recipients and non-recipients is especially substantial in the case of PAN targeting (0.17 for remittance recipients and 0.09 for non-recipients). As for the other predictors in table 5.1, being older and living in an urban area are both positive and significant predictors of experiencing targeting from different parties, while being a women leads only to more PRD targets and higher wealth only to more PAN ones. As in the case of the 2000 elections (Chapter 4), this last finding could be picking up the right-wing PAN party's tendency to approach richer, more conservative and potential supporters.

Additionally, in order to test this chapter's hypotheses, it is necessary to consider variation in political orientation. Thus, I analyze the relationship between past electoral behavior and party identification (both from wave 1 of the study) with political parties' strategic targeting (Tables 5.3 - 5.14).

To start, I explore respondent's identification with the incumbent PAN party. As previously described, 'PAN last elections' captures those who voted for the PAN in the presidential elections of 2000 as opposed to having voted for other party or no party at all (results in table 5.3); and PAN ID identifies incumbent supporters whereas not having a PAN ID means opposition supporters and indifferent voters (results in table 5.5). With respect to past electoral behavior, the analysis indicates that being a remittance recipient and not having voted for the PAN in the past reports a positive and statistically significant relationship with experiencing a PAN target (Model 3). No other relationship is worth highlighting in this table 5.3. With regards to PAN ID, results are quite similar since remittance recipients who do not have PAN ID have higher chances of being PAN electoral targets (Model 3). In addition, table 5.5 shows that PAN ID is a negative and significant predictor of PRI targeting (Model 2). As for the other parties, these tables do not show statistically significant results for the connection between remittance recipients and PAN orientation. This is not surprising given that in general I do not expect the opposing parties PRI and PRD to approach those voters that identity with the incumbent PAN.

I also explore respondent's identification with the PRI party, including information about voting for the PRI in the past presidential elections (results in table 5.7) as well as about PRI ID (results in table 5.9). Interestingly, table 5.7 shows that having voted for the PRI last elections (and not being a remittance recipients) increases the chances of experiencing a PRI target (Model 2), while being a remittance recipient that did not vote for that party in the past increases the probability of

experiencing PAN (Model 3) and PRD electoral targeting (Model 4). These results therefore hint at the idea that the PAN and PRD approach those migration-exposed voters that did not favor the other contestant PRI in the past. When analyzing PRI ID to explain targeting in table 5.9 results are pretty much the same. The only exception is the slight decrease in statistical significance to explain PRD targets, which suggests that the PRD takes more into account past electoral behavior favoring the PRI to design PRD targeting than current PRI identification. Furthermore, tables 5.11 and 5.13 show the results for performing the same analysis as before but looking at having voted for the PRD in the last elections and holding PRD ID. In these tables, the main result is that incumbent PAN targets report a positive and statistically significant relationship with those remittance recipients that are not PRD sympathizers (Models 3). In addition, this analysis indicates a positive and statistically significant relationship between remittance recipients with PRD ID and PRD targets (Model 4, Table 5.13), which offers initial support to the notion of the PRD targeting remittance recipients who are supporters.

Given these results, and in order to better understand the interactive effect of having a certain political ideology and the distinction between remittance recipients and non-recipients on electoral targeting, I report predicted probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals). I calculate these probabilities using of course the distinction between recipients and non-recipients as well as whether or not a respondent has a particular political ID. In addition, as in the previous chapter, I take all other variables at their means with the exception of the 'size of the place' variable for which I implement two different estimations: i) one that employs the mixed areas (as opposed to rural and urban areas) as the reference category (i.e., referred to as 'mixed areas' in tables), and another that gives these categories values from 1 to 3 according to size (1-rural, 2-mixed, 3-urban) and then uses the mean value to calculate the corresponding probability (i.e., referred to as 'mean size of place' in tables). The following points are worth emphasizing:

First, given PAN/incumbent identity, the incumbent PAN party targets remittance recipients with a higher probability than similar non-recipients. This relationship holds when either looking at past electoral behavior or current PAN identity (Tables 5.4 and 5.6, respectively): for example, a remittance recipient that identifies with the PAN has a predicted probability of being a PAN target of 0.17 (0.16 if using PAN last elections), while a respondent with the same political orientation that does not receive remittances has 0.10 chances (0.11 if using PAN last elections analysis). Equally,

this previous result also translates into a remittance recipient being a more likely PAN target than a similar non-recipients when both do not favor the PRI (Tables 5.8 and 5.10) nor the PRD (Tables 5.12 and 5.14). For example, a remittance recipient that did not vote for the PRI has a predicted probability of being a PAN target of 0.18 (0.17 when looking at PRI ID instead) while for a non-recipient with the same past electoral behavior this probability decreases to 0.10 (0.08 also when looking at PRI ID). Likewise, a remittance recipient that did not vote for the PRD has a predicted probability of being a PAN target of 0.17 (0.17 also when looking at PRD ID instead) while for a non-recipient with the same past electoral behavior this probability decreases to 0.10 (0.09 when looking at PRD ID).

Second, given overall non-PAN inclination (i.e., non-PAN last elections and non-PAN ID) or opposition and indifferent identity, the incumbent PAN party is also more likely to target remittance recipients than similar non-recipients (Tables 5.4 and 5.6). Consequently, I explore further if the incumbent PAN targets especially remittance recipients that identity with any of the key contenders (i.e., PRI supporters in Tables 5.8 and 5.10, PRD supporters in Tables 5.12 and 5.14). These results indicate that the remittance recipients have also a higher probability of being PAN targets when they identify with the PRI and the PRD than similar non-recipients who also identify with that particular party. And results are stronger in the case of those who voted for the PRD in the past, which is not surprising given the tight competition between PAN and PRD in the 2006 elections. More precisely, a remittance recipient that voted for the PRI in 2000 has 0.17 (0.16 when using PRI ID instead) chances of being a PAN target, while a non-recipient that voted the same way has a 0.10 chances (0.10 also when using PRI ID). As for PRD sympathizers, a remittance recipient that voted for the PRD in 2000 has 0.24 (0.15 when using PRD ID instead) chances of being a PAN target, while a non-recipient that voted the same way has a 0.08 chances (0.07 also when using PRD ID). In short, the PAN targets supporters with a higher probability when they are remittance recipients (and is also more likely to target remittances recipients who are not opposition supporters), but this party also gets involved in the targeting of recipients who are non-supporters, especially if these citizens voted for the PRD in the past.

And how about the behavior of the parties in opposition PRI and PRD? With respect to PRI electoral targeting, and given those respondents that identify with this party (i.e, voted PRI last elections and PRI ID), differences between remittance recipients and non-recipients are quite small,

although the predicted probability is slightly higher for non-recipients (i.e., in Tables 5.8 and 5.10). For instance, a recipient that voted for the PRI in 2000 has a 0.15 (0.13 when analyzing PRI ID instead) chances of being a target and a non-recipient with the same past behavior 0.18 (0.15 when analyzing PRI ID instead). Likewise, these small differences (and even no differences at all) between remittance recipients and non-recipients are also present when comparing the PRI targeting of these two types of respondents and given lack of support for the PAN (Tables 5.4 and 5.6) or the PRD (Tables 5.12 and 5.14). In addition, given non-PRI orientation, remittance recipients have a higher predicted probability of being PRI targets than similar non-recipients (e.g., 0.13 for recipients and 0.09 for non-recipients). But overall these differences are also quite small. And I further explore this connection by looking at PRI targeting of remittance recipients and non-recipients that are PAN or PRD sympathizers. This analysis indicates that the PRI targets remittance recipients with a higher predicted probability than non-recipients when they have either PAN or PRD ideology. These results are stronger when looking at past electoral behavior and PRD orientation. For example, remittance recipients that voted for the PRD in 2000 have 0.18 (0.15 if voted PAN) chances of being PRI targets but 0.07 (0.11 if voted PAN) if they are non-recipients that also voted for the PRD. In any case, the differences between recipients and non-recipients are not statistically significant. Moreover, these predicted probabilities are very similar to those of remittance recipients with PRI orientation (see above), and so, it is possible to conclude that the PRI targets across different ideologies, and without making strong distinctions between remittance recipients and non-recipients.[14]

Finally, analyzing PRD targeting, and given those respondents that identify with this party (i.e, voted PRD last elections and PRD ID), the PRD is more likely to target remittance recipients that similar non-recipients with the same political orientation (in Tables 5.12 and 5.14). For instance, a recipient that voted for the PRD in 2000 has a 0.24 (0.21 when analyzing PRD ID instead) chances of being a target and a non-recipient with the same past behavior 0.07 (0.07 also when analyzing PRD ID instead). Similarly, remittance recipients have a higher predicted probability of being PRD targets than non-recipients when both types do not favor the PAN nor the PRI (in Tables 5.4 and 5.6 for PAN orientation, and 5.8 and 5.10 for PRI orientation). Generally though, these differences tend be quite small. On the flip side, given non-PRD orientation or opposition and indifference

[14] Interestingly, given non-remittance recipients, the PRI is more likely to target PRI supporters.

ideology, differences in the predicted probabilities of remittance recipients and non-recipients are really small (e.g., 0.07 for recipients and 0.05 for non-recipients). And these small differences in the predicted probabilities of remittance recipients and non-recipients hold when comparing both types of respondents and the same PAN or PRI inclination. In short, the main result is that the PRD participates in the mobilization of remittance recipients that are supporters.

In sum, the main takeaway points for this section are: i) the PAN is more likely to target remittance recipients, and especially, ii) the PAN targets with a higher predicted probability remittance recipients than non-recipients given PAN supporters, iii) the PAN is more likely to target remittance recipients than non-recipients, given non-PAN sympathizers and especially PRD past electoral supporters (which is not surprising given the tight competition between PAN and PRD in the 2006 elections), iv) the PRD is more likely to target remittance recipients given PRD supporters, and v) PRI's behavior does not lead to any conclusive remark about the this party's treatment of remittance recipient and non-recipients. Overall, these results are quite consistent with hypothesis 1-3. Essentially, the PAN mobilizes its core supporters with intentions to stay home (H1), and persuades to change party non-supporters, especially those voters that favored and are mobilized by a key contender (the PRD in his case, H3). Interestingly, the PAN puts similar efforts in targeting these two different sets of voters (i.e., PAN inclined and PAN non-inclined voters). Finally, the PRD also mobilizes its core supporters with intentions to stay home (H2). With respect to PRI targeting, results are not supportive of H2, which potentially might be due to the PRI's lack of coordinated party efforts during these elections.

5.3.2 Family Abroad

Table 5.15 takes a first look at the extent to which having close relatives in the US predicts experiencing electoral targeting (home visits and clientelism), when controlling for other relevant factors such as wealth and age. Interestingly, this table indicates that being part of a migrant family reports a positive and statistically significant relationship with being a PAN (Model 3) and a PRD (Model 4) target. This positive relationship is also present for PRI targeting but it does not reach statistically significant results. In addition, looking at predicted probabilities[15] for a better

[15] As in the previous section, I report predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals, and calculate them using all variables at their means with the exception of the size of the place variable for which I use two different estimations: i) one that employs the mixed areas (as opposed to rural and urban areas) as the reference category

comparison of respondents with family abroad and those without it, everything else equal, table 5.16 shows that members of migrant families have overall a higher predicted probability of being electoral targets (albeit a small difference), regardless of the targeting party (i.e., experiencing any target). Yet when looking at parties individually, while this difference between migration and non-migration-exposed respondents is no longer present for PRI targets, the predicted probability of being a target is higher for migration-exposed voters in the case of PAN and PRD targeting (especially when using the 'mean size of place' to calculate the predicted probabilities). As for the other predictors, results are comparable to those in the analysis of remittance recipients vs. non-recipients.

Since those with family in the US also vary in their ideological orientation, I follow the same approach as for remittance recipients. Obviously, taking ideology into account is also essential for the hypothesis test put forward in this chapter. To start, I explore respondent's identification with the incumbent PAN party (i.e., voted PAN last elections in table 5.17 and PAN identity in table 5.19). While these analysis do not show any statistically significant results in the case of past electoral behavior (Table 5.17), Table 5.19 shows that i) having family abroad and a PAN ID increase the chances of experiencing a PAN target (Model 3), and ii) having family abroad and not a PAN ID increase the chances of experiencing a PRD target (Model 4). These results therefore point toward the notion that the PAN targets members of migrant families who are PAN supporters, but the PRD targets members of migrant families who are not PAN supporters.

Additionally, I explore respondents' identification with the PRI party, including information about voting for the PRI in the past presidential elections (results in table 5.21) as well as PRI ID (results in table 5.23). Interestingly, table 5.21 shows that being a member of a migrant family that did not vote for the PRI in the past increases the probability of experiencing PAN (Model 3). This result therefore hints at the idea that the PAN approaches those migration-exposed voters that do not favor the other contestant PRI. When analyzing PRI ID to explain targeting in table 5.23, results are pretty much the same and in addition show that a PRI ID increases the chances of experiencing a PRI target (Model 2). Furthermore, tables 5.25 and 5.27 show the results for performing the same analysis as before but looking at having voted for the PRD in the last elections

(mixed areas), and another that gives these categories values from 1 to 3 according to size (1-rural, 2-mixed, 3-urban) and then uses the mean value to calculate the corresponding probability (mean size of place).

and holding PRD ID. In these tables, the main result is that incumbent PAN and, quite surprisingly, the opposing PRD target those respondents with family in the US that are not PRD sympathizers (Model 3 and 4 in both tables).

In order to understand the overall effect of having a certain political ideology and the distinction between migrant and non-migrant families on electoral targeting, I report predicted probabilities (with 95% confidence intervals).[16] The following points are worth emphasizing:

First, given PAN/incumbent identity, the incumbent PAN party is more likely to target a member of a migrant family than a similar respondent who does not have close relatives in the US (in tables 5.18 and 5.20). This relationship holds especially when looking at current PAN ID. For example, a migration-exposed voter that currently identifies with the PAN has a predicted probability of being a PAN target of 0.15 (0.14 in the PAN last elections analysis), while a non-migration-exposed respondent with the same political orientation has 0.06 chances (0.09 also in the PAN last elections analysis). Of course, this previous result also translates into member of migrant families having a higher predicted probability of experiencing PAN targeting when they do not favor the PRI (Tables 5.22 and 5.24) nor the PRD (Tables 5.26 and 5.28). For example, a migration-exposed voter that did not vote for the PRI in 2000 has a predicted probability of being a PAN target of 0.12 (0.11 when looking at current PRI ID instead) while for a non-migration-exposed voter with the same past electoral behavior this probability decreases to 0.08 (0.07 when looking at PRI ID). Likewise, a member of a migrant family that did not vote for the PRD has a predicted probability of being a PAN target of 0.12 (0.12 when looking at current PRD ID instead) while for those who do not have close relatives living in the US but voted the same way have 0.09 (0.08 when using PRD ID). These differences are statistically significant when using 'mean size of place' to calculate the corresponding predicted probabilities.

Second, given overall non-PAN inclination (i.e., non-PAN last elections and non-PAN ID) or opposition and indifferent identity, the incumbent PAN party targets respondents with family in the US with a higher predicted probability than similar respondents without family in a foreign

[16] I calculate these probabilities using of course the distinction between recipients and non-recipients as well as whether or not a respondent has a particular political ID. In addition, I take all other variables at their means with the exception of the 'size of the place' variable for which I implement two different estimations: i) one that employs the mixed areas (as opposed to rural and urban areas) as the reference category (i.e., referred to as 'mixed areas' in tables), and another that gives these categories values from 1 to 3 according to size (1-rural, 2-mixed, 3-urban) and then uses the mean value to calculate the corresponding probability (i.e., referred to as 'mean size of place' in tables).

country (Tables 5.18 and 5.20). But differences between the two types are quite small and not statistically significant. In addition, I explore further if the incumbent PAN targets migration-exposed voters that identity with any of the key contenders (i.e., PRI supporters in Tables 5.22 and 5.24, PRD supporters in Tables 5.26 and 5.28). These results also indicate that the members of migrant families have a higher probability of being PAN targets when they identify with the PRI and the PRD than respondent with the same political orientation but without families in the US. In general, however, these differences are not substantial. Thus far, the PAN is more likely to target members of migrant families that are supporters (or non-opposition supporters) than similar members of non-migrant families (especially when looking at PAN ID).

And how about the behavior of the parties in opposition PRI and PRD? With respect to PRI electoral targeting, and given those respondents that identify with this party (i.e, voted PRI last elections and PRI ID), members of migrant families have a higher predicted probability of being PRI targets than similar non-migrant ones (in Tables 5.22 and 5.24). For instance, a migration-exposed citizen that voted for the PRI in 2000 has a 0.20 (0.15 when analyzing PRI ID instead) chances of being a PRI target and a non-migration one with the same past behavior 0.15 (0.14 when analyzing PRI ID instead). But of course these differences are small. Moreover, the PRI also does not make strong distinctions between respondents with and without family in the US when both types do not support the PAN (Tables 5.18 and 5.20) or the PRD (Tables 5.26 and 5.28). On the other hand, given non-PRI orientation, non-migration-exposed voters have a higher predicted probability of being PRI targets than similar migration-exposed ones (e.g., 0.09 for recipients and 0.11 for non-recipients), but overall differences are also quite small. These small differences in the predicted probabilities of migration and non-migration-exposed voters are also present when looking alternatively at PAN and PRD sympathizers. In short, results indicate that the PRI does not make strong distinctions between migrant and non-migrant families.

Finally, analyzing PRD targeting, and given those respondents that identify with this party (i.e, voted PRD last elections and PRD ID), results indicate that differences in the predicted probabilities of being PRD targets for these two types of respondents are small (in Tables 5.26 and 5.28). For instance, a migration-exposed citizen that voted for the PRD in 2000 has a 0.08 (0.10 when analyzing PRD ID instead) chances of being a target and a non-migration exposed with the same past behavior 0.10 (0.08 also when analyzing PRD ID instead). These results are similar when

comparing members of migrant and non-migrant families that do not favor the PAN nor the PRI (in Tables 5.18 and 5.20 for PAN orientation, and 5.22 and 5.24 for PRI orientation). Although generally, members of migrant families have a higher predicted probability of being electoral targets. In addition, given non-PRD orientation or opposition and indifference ideology, members of migrant families have a higher predicted probability of being PRD targets, but again differences between the two types of respondents are not very large (e.g., 0.07 for respondents with family in the US and 0.04 for those without it when looking at those respondents that did not vote for the PRD in the past). Interestingly, this difference is statistically significant when using the 'mean size of the place' to calculate the corresponding predicted probabilities. Further, exploring identification with the PRI and the PAN, these results show that the PRD targets members of migrant families with a higher predicted probability than non-migrant families. For example, given PRI sympathizers, respondents with family members in the US experience PRD targeting with a 0.07 probability, while for those without relatives abroad this probability is 0.03. Altogether, these results suggest that the PRD targets members of migrant families with a higher predicted probability than similar members of non-migrant families. This pattern holds across PRD supporters and non-supporters.

In sum, the main takeaway point for this section is that the incumbent PAN is more likely to target members of migrant families that identify with this party, which is consistent with H1 or turnout buying of PAN supporters. In addition, the PRD targets members of migrant families with a higher predicted probability, including both supporters or non-supporters. The differences between migration and non-migration exposed voters are however not always statistically significant in the case of PRD targets. Further, this same analysis does not lead to strong conclusions with respect to PRI's behavior and the targeting of migrant families versus non-migrant ones.

5.3.3 Alternative Dependent Variable

One can wonder the extent to which the previous results rely on analyzing only those respondents that participated in the three waves of the study. To address this potential concern, I run the same analysis as in the previous section but using a different dependent variable. This dependent variables gives as before the value of 1 to those respondents that experienced electoral targeting at any point during the panel study, and 0 to those who did not. The main difference however is that this variable no longer excludes those respondents that dropped from participating in subsequent

waves, but instead, gives them the value of 0 for those waves in which they did not participate. Of course, this approach introduces more non-targeted observations (even though whether or not these citizens were targets is actually unknown), and makes it *a priori* harder to find results.

The empirical analysis nonetheless suggests that the relationships previously found are also present when using this alternative dependent variable.[17] In particular, and with respect to the comparison remittance recipients versus non-recipients, Tables 5.29 and 5.30 show that remittance recipients are more likely to be PAN targets than non-recipients everything else equal. In addition, when incorporating political orientation, Tables 5.31 and 5.32 indicate that i) given PAN supporters, the PAN targets remittance recipients with a higher predicted probability than similar non-recipients, and ii) this party is also more likely to target remittance recipients given non-PAN supporters. Additionally, Tables 5.33 and 5.34 present that, given PRD orientation, i) the PAN targets remittance recipients with a higher predicted probability, and ii) the PRD is more likely to target remittance recipients than non-recipients (especially when looking at PRD ID). These results therefore suggest that the PAN mobilizes core supporters and tries to vote buy some non-supporters, while the PRD practices turnout buying of party sympathizers.

With respect to the contrast between members and non-members of migrant families, the main findings still hold. Essentially, respondents with family in the US are more likely PAN targets than those without relatives abroad (see Tables 5.35 and 5.36). Moreover, given PAN supporters, this same party is also more likely to target members of migrant families than non-members everything else equal (especially when looking at PAN ID) (See Tables 5.37 and 5.38). In other words, the PAN participates in the turnout buying of migrant families. Consequently, results are overall quite consistent when using this alternative measure of the dependent variable.

[17] For this analysis, I use weights from wave 2 when analyzing remittance recipients/non-recipients and weights from wave 1 when analyzing respondents with/without family in the US. The reason is that the question about remittances was only asked in the second wave. Therefore, when using this migration variable for the regression analysis we are missing those respondents that did not participate in the second wave. Hence, that is the motivation to use the weights from wave 2. In addition, since the dependent variable gets the value of 0 for those respondents that did not participate in subsequent waves (i.e., wave 2 and wave 3), we are not loosing observations in the analysis due to the dependent variable. And that also motivates conditioning the selection of weights according to the migration variables as opposed to the dependent variable.

5.3.4 Robustness Checks

As in the previous chapter, in this section I analyze the extent to which the previous findings are robust to the following tests: i) controlling for additional confounding factors, ii) alternative explanations, and iii) threats to causal inference.

To start, I control for an additional set of variables, in particular: evaluation of President's performance, frequency of church attendance, frequency of political talk, alternative measure of the size of place and geographic location. Tables 5.39 to 5.50 test whether the main results of the previous section hold when including these additional controls. As these tables shows, the following patterns are still present: i) the PAN targets remittances recipients who are supporters with a higher predicted probability than similar non-recipients (using both PAN last elections and PAN ID) (Tables 5.39, 5.40, 5.41 and 5.42), ii) the PAN is more likely to target remittance recipients than similar non recipients, given non-PAN sympathizers and especially PRD supporters (Tables 5.43, 5.45, 5.44 and 5.46), iii) the PRD is more likely to target remittance recipients given PRD supporters (Tables 5.43, 5.45, 5.44 and 5.46). On the contrary, when including these additional controls, the analysis no longer supports the finding that the PAN is more likely to target migrant families that are supporters than similar non-migrant ones with the same political orientation (Tables 5.47, 5.48, 5.49 and 5.50). Nonetheless, the same pattern of targeting holds, that is, the PAN targets members of migrant families with PAN ID with a higher predicted probability than non-members of migrant families, everything else equal.[18]

Also as in Chapter 4, in addition to taking into account other factors that could mask the connection between exposure to migration and electoral targeting, these additional variables also deal with alternative explanations. Particularly, one of these is that migration-exposed voters are electoral targets because of their social connectedness and political influence. However, results hold when controlling for frequency of political talk, which is arguably necessary to exercise the role of political influencer, and for church attendance, which captures as well respondents' social connectivity.

Additionally, in order to test if findings are due to migration-exposed voters reporting more targeting than similar non-recipient ones, I compare these migration and non-migration exposed

[18] All these predicted probabilities in the "Additional Figures and Tables" section are calculated as before, that is with all variables at their means and, in addition, using "center" as the geographic region of reference.

voters with respect to two answers about the quality of elections in Mexico: the extent to which elections are clean (from 1- Nothing to 4- Totally) and whether or not Mexico is a democracy. Certainly, one would expect that if migration-exposed voters tend to be more susceptible to these strategies and report them more, they should also be more inclined to characterize Mexico as not having clean elections and as not being a democracy. Yet, a simple look at the data does not support this intuition. In particular, the correlations between being a remittance recipient and evaluations of clean elections and democracy are always positive. And the same positive relationship exists when looking at respondents with family in the US and their evaluations of Mexico's elections and democracy. Accordingly, it is plausible to lower the concerns about attitudes toward electoral practices being the factors behind this chapter's findings.

Finally, I address some commons threats to causal inference: omitted variable bias, selection bias and endogeneity or reverse causality. With respect to *omitted variables bias*, the main concern is that some unobservable factor is the one connecting international migration and more electoral targeting. In the previous chapter, I addressed this issue by controlling for risk acceptance attitudes and showing that the statistically significant results for exposure to migration and more electoral targeting hold. Unfortunately, the 2006 dataset does not have any questions about risk acceptance attitudes, which makes it impossible to follow the same approach as for the 2000 elections. Nonetheless one can argue that if results hold in 2000 when controlling for this unobserved characteristic, this personal feature should not affect the robustness of the results in 2006. As for *selection bias*, I direct the reader to this section of the previous chapter since the same reasoning applies to the 2006 analysis.

To conclude this section, I address *reverse causality* concerns. A clear case of reserve causality applies to being an electoral target and identifying with a particular party. For instance, PAN targets lead these targets to identifying themselves as having PAN ID. Of course, this issue is less of a concern in this analysis because of the panel format of the 2006 dataset and the fact that we have party ID from wave 1 (in October), and electoral targeting happened most intensively as election day was approaching (in July). In any case, I exploit respondents' behavior in the previous elections to further deal with this problem. Particularly, 61% of respondents did not vote for the PAN in the previous presidential elections of 2000, and of those a 1% were PAN targets during the first wave. What is interesting to explore is if those targeted switched to PAN ID after not

having previously voted for the PAN and thus fostering endogeneity concerns. However, a simple look at the data indicates that targeting was not that effective since of the 1% targeted, 76% still responded not having PAN ID while 23% had PAN ID. And in general, we are dealing with a very small number of respondents since targeting during this period was minimal.

Similarly, in the case of the PRI, 79% of respondents did not vote for the PRI in the previous presidential elections of 2000, but of those respondents 3% were PRI targets during the first wave. Of this 3% targeted, 80% did not respond having a PRI ID in wave 1, while only 20% did. And for the PRD, 88% of respondents did not vote for the PRD in the previous presidential elections of 2000, but 2% of those were PRD targets. Of this 2% targeted, 77% did not respond having a PRD ID in wave 1, while only 23% did. In short, this simple analysis can lower the concerns about endogeneity driving the chapter's findings.

5.3.5 Extensions to the Existing Analysis

Strong or Weak Supporters and Strong or Weak Non-Supporters?

As in Chapter 4, it is plausible to ask if when political parties mobilize their supporters, they target those who strongly or weakly identify with the party. Similarly, one can ask if when political parties target non-supporters, they attempt to get the votes of those who weakly or strongly identify with the contender. To address these questions, I run the same models as in the previous section (i.e., full models with additional control variables and participants of all waves) but using a party ID variable that not-only identifies supporters and non-supporters but also captures if those are strong or weak supporters and non-supporters (0- Not a party supporter, 1- Weakly party supporter, and 2- Strong party supporter supporter, all from in wave 1). I only run this analysis for the comparison of respondents with/without family in the US and not in the case of remittances recipients/non-recipients. The reason is that given the lower number of remittance recipient in our sample, any claim based on the distinction between strong and weak identifiers would be relying on a small number of respondents and hence its validity would be questionable.

The analysis considering strong and weak party supporters, however does not lead to strong conclusions. Essentially, when the PAN targets PAN supporters, there are no statistically significant differences between strong and weak PAN-inclined migrant and non-migrant families. To be precise, the predicted probability of being a PAN target increases substantially for those who are strong

supporters (0.24 for respondents with family in the US and 0.18 for those without) as opposed to weak supporters (0.12 for respondents with family in the US and 0.06 for those without). Yet, this increase happens for both respondents with and without family in the US. Thus, one can claim that the PAN is more likely to target strong supporters than weak supporters, but without making claims about the distinction between migration and non-migration-exposed voters in that respect.[19] In addition, no other result with respect to the behavior of the other parties - PRI and PRD - and political identities - PRI ID and PRD ID - is worth highlighting.

5.4 Concluding Remarks

This chapter provides interesting findings on the relationship between political parties' electoral strategies and migrant families.

On the one hand, the incumbent PAN uses non-programmatic targeting to participate in the turnout buying of remittance recipients supporters. Put differently, the PAN targets PAN supporters than receive remittances with a higher predicted probability than similar non-recipients. This finding is also present for those respondents who have family members living in the US. In addition, this party is more likely to target migration-exposed voters who favored the opposition. That is, the PAN uses also non-programmatic strategies to persuade or buy the votes of migrant families that favor the opposing parties, especially the PRD. Altogether, this chapter's findings suggest that the incumbency advantage gave the PAN the possibility to target not only supporters with intentions to stay home (i.e., remittance recipients and respondents with family in the US) but also mobilized opposition supporters, especially those sympathizers of the main competitor during these 2006 elections. On the other, the opposing PRD employs non-programmatic targeting to participate in the turnout buying of remittance recipients who are supporters. In other words, the PRD is more likely to mobilize remittance recipients that identify with that party than similar non-recipients with the same political orientation. This finding is not present in the case of respondents with family in the US.

Finally, this chapter has not found any strong relationship between the PRI electoral targeting and the distinction between migration and non-migration exposed voters. Of course, the fact that

[19] Results not shown in full detail for simplicity and due to the lack of statistically significant results.

the PRI candidate - Madrazo - did not count on the workings of the PRI machine to deliver votes could explain the this lack of findings. In the next chapter, I explore whether or not these strategies had an effect on voters' electoral choices and most importantly, if this influence was different for migration and non-migration exposed citizens.

5.5 Figures and Tables

Table 5.1: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Remittances w2	0.323†	0.084	0.674***	0.278
	(0.177)	(0.217)	(0.202)	(0.234)
Education	0.020	0.027	0.009	0.042
	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Age	0.007	0.011*	0.010*	0.009†
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Women	0.159	0.201	0.075	0.338*
	(0.122)	(0.148)	(0.151)	(0.167)
Wealth	0.067†	0.050	0.161**	−0.021
	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.050)
Rural Location	−0.078	0.171	−0.013	0.121
	(0.245)	(0.315)	(0.338)	(0.384)
Urban Location	0.673**	0.669*	0.696*	0.939**
	(0.213)	(0.278)	(0.290)	(0.337)
Constant	−2.052***	−2.999***	−3.575***	−3.276***
	(0.361)	(0.451)	(0.476)	(0.519)
Observations	1,361	1,361	1,361	1,361
Log Likelihood	−931.981	−718.530	−683.068	−560.415
AIC	1,879.962	1,453.060	1,382.136	1,136.831

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.2: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances

Mixed areas	Any Targets	PRI Targets	PAN Targets	PRD Targets
Remittances	0.28 (0.19, 0.39)	0.12 (0.06, 0.20)	0.17 (0.09, 0.27)	0.08 (0.04, 0.16)
No Remittances	0.22 (0.16, 0.29)	0.11 (0.06, 0.17)	0.09 (0.05, 0.15)	0.06 (0.03, 0.12)
Mean size	Any Targets	PRI Targets	PAN Targets	PRD Targets
Remittances	0.37 (0.30, 0.45)	0.18 (0.13, 0.24)	0.24 (0.18, 0.31)	0.15 (0.10, 0.22)
No Remittances	0.30 (0.27, 0.33)	0.16 (0.14, 0.19)	0.14 (0.12, 0.16)	0.12 (0.10, 0.14)

Table 5.3: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PAN Last Elections

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Remittances w2 * PAN Last Elections	−0.127	0.455	−0.363	0.066
	(0.375)	(0.444)	(0.424)	(0.480)
Remittances w2	0.342	−0.057	0.815**	0.311
	(0.239)	(0.297)	(0.275)	(0.319)
PAN Last Elections	0.187	−0.143	0.219	0.062
	(0.137)	(0.166)	(0.173)	(0.187)
Education	0.016	0.029	0.016	0.026
	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.045)
Age	0.007	0.012*	0.012*	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Women	0.153	0.207	0.088	0.320†
	(0.128)	(0.154)	(0.158)	(0.174)
Wealth	0.054	0.041	0.123*	−0.017
	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.053)
Rural Location	0.084	0.292	0.042	0.385
	(0.254)	(0.319)	(0.345)	(0.408)
Urban Location	0.654**	0.610*	0.632*	1.037**
	(0.220)	(0.282)	(0.294)	(0.363)
Constant	−2.001***	−2.901***	−3.494***	−3.299***
	(0.379)	(0.468)	(0.494)	(0.553)
Observations	1,206	1,206	1,206	1,206
Log Likelihood	−842.392	−657.170	−619.369	−507.427
AIC	1,704.784	1,334.340	1,258.738	1,034.854

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.4: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PAN Last Elections

PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances	0.16 (0.08, 0.31)	0.18 (0.10, 0.32)
Non-Remittances	0.11 (0.06, 0.18)	0.09 (0.05, 0.15)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances	0.23 (0.14, 0.36)	0.26 (0.18, 0.36)
Non-Remittances	0.16 (0.13, 0.20)	0.13 (0.11, 0.16)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances	0.15 (0.07, 0.29)	0.11 (0.06, 0.22)
Non-Remittances	0.11 (0.06, 0.17)	0.12 (0.07, 0.19)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances	0.23 (0.14, 0.35)	0.18 (0.11, 0.27)
Non-Remittances	0.16 (0.13, 0.20)	0.18 (0.15, 0.21)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances	0.09 (0.03, 0.20)	0.08 (0.03, 0.17)
Non-Remittances	0.06 (0.03, 0.12)	0.06 (0.03, 0.11)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances	0.18 (0.10, 0.30)	0.16 (0.10, 0.25)
Non-Remittances	0.13 (0.10, 0.16)	0.12 (0.09, 0.15)

Table 5.5: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PAN ID

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Remittances w2 * PAN ID	0.237	0.590	−0.149	−0.479
	(0.400)	(0.483)	(0.447)	(0.569)
Remittances w2	0.284	−0.040	0.749**	0.399
	(0.207)	(0.255)	(0.237)	(0.265)
PAN ID	−0.150	−0.409*	0.172	−0.019
	(0.147)	(0.188)	(0.179)	(0.197)
Education	0.018	0.020	0.022	0.037
	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.043)
Age	0.007†	0.010*	0.012*	0.010†
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Women	0.157	0.199	0.077	0.352*
	(0.124)	(0.151)	(0.154)	(0.169)
Wealth	0.059	0.049	0.145**	−0.015
	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Rural Location	−0.034	0.216	0.019	0.172
	(0.245)	(0.315)	(0.339)	(0.385)
Urban Location	0.701**	0.694*	0.689*	0.970**
	(0.214)	(0.279)	(0.291)	(0.338)
Constant	−1.995***	−2.876***	−3.665***	−3.311***
	(0.368)	(0.460)	(0.485)	(0.529)
Observations	1,311	1,311	1,311	1,311
Log Likelihood	−907.465	−694.399	−662.281	−549.493
AIC	1,834.931	1,408.798	1,344.561	1,118.985

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.6: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PAN ID

PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Remittances	0.17 (0.08, 0.34)	0.17 (0.09, 0.29)
Non-Remittances	0.10 (0.06, 0.17)	0.09 (0.05, 0.14)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Remittances	0.25 (0.14, 0.41)	0.25 (0.18, 0.33)
Non-Remittances	0.15 (0.12, 0.20)	0.13 (0.11, 0.16)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Remittances	0.13 (0.05, 0.27)	0.11 (0.06, 0.20)
Non-Remittances	0.08 (0.04, 0.14)	0.11 (0.07, 0.18)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Remittances	0.20 (0.11, 0.35)	0.17 (0.11, 0.25)
Non-Remittances	0.12 (0.09, 0.17)	0.18 (0.15, 0.21)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Remittances	0.06 (0.02, 0.16)	0.09 (0.04, 0.18)
Non-Remittances	0.06 (0.03, 0.12)	0.06 (0.03, 0.11)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Remittances	0.11 (0.04, 0.25)	0.17 (0.11, 0.25)
Non-Remittances	0.12 (0.09, 0.16)	0.12 (0.10, 0.14)

Table 5.7: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PRI Last Elections

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Remittances w2 * PRI Last Elections	−0.450	−0.535	−0.171	−0.999
	(0.423)	(0.485)	(0.481)	(0.627)
Remittances w2	0.402†	0.307	0.698**	0.560*
	(0.214)	(0.262)	(0.242)	(0.266)
PRI Last Elections	0.262	0.727***	0.092	0.157
	(0.161)	(0.182)	(0.206)	(0.217)
Education	0.027	0.035	0.026	0.035
	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.045)
Age	0.007†	0.010†	0.013*	0.010†
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Women	0.148	0.177	0.086	0.320†
	(0.128)	(0.155)	(0.158)	(0.174)
Wealth	0.059	0.047	0.126*	−0.019
	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.053)
Rural Location	0.066	0.206	0.047	0.390
	(0.254)	(0.322)	(0.345)	(0.409)
Urban Location	0.668**	0.636*	0.635*	1.047**
	(0.220)	(0.283)	(0.293)	(0.363)
Constant	−2.091***	−3.103***	−3.522***	−3.395***
	(0.381)	(0.477)	(0.495)	(0.556)
Observations	1,206	1,206	1,206	1,206
Log Likelihood	−841.361	−647.053	−620.756	−504.971
AIC	1,702.721	1,314.106	1,261.512	1,029.942

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.8: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PRI Last Elections

PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Remittances	0.17 (0.07, 0.34)	0.18 (0.10, 0.30)
Non-Remittances	0.10 (0.06, 0.18)	0.10 (0.06, 0.16)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Remittances	0.24 (0.13, 0.40)	0.25 (0.18, 0.34)
Non-Remittances	0.15 (0.11, 0.21)	0.14 (0.12, 0.17)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Remittances	0.15 (0.06, 0.31)	0.13 (0.06, 0.23)
Non-Remittances	0.18 (0.11, 0.28)	0.09 (0.06, 0.15)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Remittances	0.22 (0.12, 0.38)	0.19 (0.13, 0.28)
Non-Remittances	0.26 (0.21, 0.32)	0.14 (0.12, 0.17)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Remittances	0.04 (0.01, 0.14)	0.10 (0.04, 0.20)
Non-Remittances	0.06 (0.03, 0.13)	0.06 (0.03, 0.11)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Remittances	0.09 (0.03, 0.24)	0.19 (0.13, 0.28)
Non-Remittances	0.14 (0.10, 0.19)	0.12 (0.10, 0.14)

Table 5.9: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PRI ID

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Remittances w2 * PRI ID	−0.665	−0.333	−0.253	−1.035
	(0.419)	(0.478)	(0.466)	(0.704)
Remittances w2	0.519*	0.247	0.783***	0.451†
	(0.205)	(0.258)	(0.233)	(0.256)
PRI ID	0.206	0.595***	0.234	−0.183
	(0.146)	(0.169)	(0.185)	(0.206)
Education	0.025	0.036	0.024	0.040
	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.043)
Age	0.008†	0.010*	0.012*	0.011†
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Women	0.147	0.157	0.061	0.366*
	(0.124)	(0.152)	(0.155)	(0.170)
Wealth	0.058	0.053	0.151**	−0.025
	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Rural Location	−0.011	0.213	0.027	0.215
	(0.246)	(0.318)	(0.340)	(0.385)
Urban Location	0.713***	0.740**	0.722*	0.940**
	(0.214)	(0.281)	(0.292)	(0.338)
Constant	−2.147***	−3.267***	−3.739***	−3.264***
	(0.375)	(0.472)	(0.493)	(0.535)
Observations	1,311	1,311	1,311	1,311
Log Likelihood	−905.907	−691.477	−662.678	−545.749
AIC	1,831.813	1,402.954	1,345.356	1,111.499

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.10: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PRI ID

PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Remittances	0.16 (0.07, 0.33)	0.17 (0.09, 0.28)
Non-Remittances	0.10 (0.06, 0.17)	0.08 (0.05, 0.14)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Remittances	0.25 (0.14, 0.41)	0.25 (0.18, 0.33)
Non-Remittances	0.16 (0.12, 0.20)	0.13 (0.11, 0.15)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Remittances	0.13 (0.06, 0.28)	0.11 (0.05, 0.19)
Non-Remittances	0.15 (0.09, 0.23)	0.08 (0.05, 0.14)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Remittances	0.22 (0.12, 0.37)	0.17 (0.11, 0.25)
Non-Remittances	0.23 (0.18, 0.27)	0.14 (0.12, 0.16)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Remittances	0.03 (0.00, 0.12)	0.10 (0.05, 0.20)
Non-Remittances	0.05 (0.03, 0.11)	0.07 (0.03, 0.12)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Remittances	0.06 (0.02, 0.20)	0.19 (0.12, 0.27)
Non-Remittances	0.10 (0.07, 0.14)	0.12 (0.10, 0.15)

Table 5.11: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PRD Last Elections

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Remittances w2 * PRD Last Elections	1.361*	0.974	0.694	1.141
	(0.654)	(0.757)	(0.725)	(0.702)
Remittances w2	0.168	0.060	0.597**	0.212
	(0.194)	(0.232)	(0.220)	(0.259)
PRD Last Elections	−0.212	−0.565†	−0.269	0.281
	(0.244)	(0.334)	(0.320)	(0.301)
Education	0.022	0.024	0.024	0.026
	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.045)
Age	0.008†	0.012*	0.013*	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Women	0.157	0.204	0.087	0.333†
	(0.128)	(0.154)	(0.158)	(0.174)
Wealth	0.059	0.043	0.127*	−0.018
	(0.039)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.053)
Rural Location	0.073	0.275	0.045	0.372
	(0.254)	(0.319)	(0.345)	(0.410)
Urban Location	0.667**	0.605*	0.632*	1.077**
	(0.221)	(0.282)	(0.294)	(0.365)
Constant	−2.011***	−2.886***	−3.483***	−3.330***
	(0.379)	(0.468)	(0.492)	(0.554)
Observations	1,206	1,206	1,206	1,206
Log Likelihood	−840.758	−655.893	−620.210	−504.117
AIC	1,701.517	1,331.786	1,260.420	1,028.233

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.12: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PRD Last Elections

PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances	0.24 (0.08, 0.55)	0.17 (0.09, 0.29)
Non-Remittances	0.08 (0.03, 0.16)	0.10 (0.06, 0.16)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances	0.33 (0.13, 0.63)	0.24 (0.18, 0.32)
Non-Remittances	0.12 (0.06, 0.20)	0.15 (0.12, 0.17)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances	0.18 (0.05, 0.47)	0.13 (0.07, 0.22)
Non-Remittances	0.07 (0.03, 0.15)	0.12 (0.07, 0.19)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances	0.26 (0.09, 0.56)	0.19 (0.13, 0.27)
Non-Remittances	0.11 (0.06, 0.19)	0.18 (0.16, 0.21)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances	0.24 (0.08, 0.54)	0.07 (0.03, 0.15)
Non-Remittances	0.07 (0.03, 0.16)	0.05 (0.03, 0.11)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances	0.42 (0.18, 0.70)	0.15 (0.10, 0.22)
Non-Remittances	0.15 (0.09, 0.24)	0.12 (0.10, 0.14)

Table 5.13: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PRD ID

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Remittances w2 * PRD ID	0.560	0.600	0.155	1.268*
	(0.447)	(0.562)	(0.544)	(0.528)
Remittances w2	0.238	0.021	0.688**	−0.041
	(0.198)	(0.240)	(0.222)	(0.287)
PRD ID	−0.014	−0.417†	−0.283	0.230
	(0.176)	(0.235)	(0.239)	(0.228)
Education	0.019	0.026	0.021	0.034
	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.043)
Age	0.007†	0.010*	0.012*	0.010†
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Women	0.172	0.192	0.064	0.413*
	(0.124)	(0.151)	(0.155)	(0.172)
Wealth	0.060	0.042	0.146**	−0.008
	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Rural Location	−0.018	0.214	0.014	0.229
	(0.246)	(0.315)	(0.339)	(0.387)
Urban Location	0.708***	0.678*	0.695*	1.019**
	(0.214)	(0.279)	(0.291)	(0.341)
Constant	−2.061***	−2.891***	−3.563***	−3.500***
	(0.370)	(0.460)	(0.485)	(0.537)
Observations	1,311	1,311	1,311	1,311
Log Likelihood	−906.398	−696.791	−662.622	−542.539
AIC	1,832.796	1,413.583	1,345.244	1,105.078

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.14: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PRD ID

PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Remittances	0.15 (0.06, 0.34)	0.17 (0.10, 0.29)
Non-Remittances	0.07 (0.03, 0.13)	0.09 (0.05, 0.15)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Remittances	0.22 (0.10, 0.41)	0.25 (0.18, 0.34)
Non-Remittances	0.11 (0.07, 0.16)	0.14 (0.12, 0.17)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Remittances	0.13 (0.05, 0.30)	0.11 (0.06, 0.20)
Non-Remittances	0.07 (0.04, 0.14)	0.11 (0.07, 0.18)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Remittances	0.20 (0.09, 0.38)	0.18 (0.12, 0.25)
Non-Remittances	0.12 (0.08, 0.17)	0.17 (0.15, 0.20)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Remittances	0.21 (0.09, 0.41)	0.05 (0.02, 0.12)
Non-Remittances	0.07 (0.03, 0.14)	0.06 (0.03, 0.11)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Remittances	0.35 (0.20, 0.54)	0.11 (0.07, 0.18)
Non-Remittances	0.14 (0.10, 0.20)	0.11 (0.09, 0.14)

Table 5.15: Family US and Electoral Target

	Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US	0.110	0.0002	0.403^{**}	0.376^{*}
	(0.121)	(0.145)	(0.153)	(0.166)
Education	0.008	0.013	-0.008	0.027
	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.042)
Age	0.006	$0.009\dagger$	0.010^{*}	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Women	0.152	0.187	0.058	$0.315\dagger$
	(0.122)	(0.147)	(0.151)	(0.166)
Wealth	$0.071\dagger$	0.060	0.150^{**}	-0.030
	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.050)
Rural Location	-0.067	0.165	0.010	0.101
	(0.244)	(0.314)	(0.337)	(0.383)
Urban Location	0.693^{**}	0.688^{*}	0.731^{*}	0.974^{**}
	(0.213)	(0.278)	(0.289)	(0.337)
Constant	-2.011^{***}	-2.904^{***}	-3.579^{***}	-3.315^{***}
	(0.363)	(0.452)	(0.479)	(0.524)
Observations	1,367	1,367	1,367	1,367
Log Likelihood	-937.057	-724.432	-690.056	-562.783
AIC	1,890.115	1,464.865	1,396.112	1,141.566

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.16: Predicted Probabilities - Family US

Mixed areas	Any Targets	PRI Targets	PAN Targets	PRD Targets
Family US	0.23 (0.17, 0.31)	0.11 (0.06, 0.17)	0.11 (0.07, 0.18)	0.08 (0.04, 0.14)
No Family US	0.21 (0.15, 0.29)	0.11 (0.06, 0.17)	0.08 (0.04, 0.13)	0.05 (0.02, 0.10)
Mean size	Any Targets	PRI Targets	PAN Targets	PRD Targets
Family US	0.32 (0.29, 0.35)	0.17 (0.14, 0.20)	0.17 (0.15, 0.20)	0.14 (0.12, 0.17)
No Family US	0.30 (0.26, 0.33)	0.17 (0.14, 0.20)	0.12 (0.10, 0.15)	0.10 (0.08, 0.13)

Table 5.17: Family US and Electoral Target: PAN Last Elections

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PAN Last Elections	0.161	0.043	0.158	0.169
	(0.251)	(0.300)	(0.317)	(0.345)
Family US	−0.002	−0.063	0.296	0.294
	(0.169)	(0.199)	(0.220)	(0.235)
PAN Last Elections	0.087	−0.092	0.089	0.010
	(0.190)	(0.225)	(0.251)	(0.273)
Education	0.011	0.017	−0.001	0.007
	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.045)
Age	0.006	0.011*	0.011*	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Women	0.158	0.215	0.065	0.299†
	(0.127)	(0.152)	(0.157)	(0.173)
Wealth	0.057	0.054	0.112*	−0.027
	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.054)
Rural Location	0.102	0.289	0.084	0.370
	(0.253)	(0.319)	(0.343)	(0.407)
Urban Location	0.662**	0.632*	0.644*	1.058**
	(0.220)	(0.281)	(0.293)	(0.363)
Constant	−1.935***	−2.846***	−3.380***	−3.243***
	(0.386)	(0.474)	(0.504)	(0.565)
Observations	1,214	1,214	1,214	1,214
Log Likelihood	−849.533	−666.868	−627.738	−511.518
AIC	1,719.065	1,353.736	1,275.476	1,043.036

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.18: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN Last Elections

PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.14 (0.08, 0.23)	0.11 (0.06, 0.18)
Non-Family US	0.09 (0.05, 0.16)	0.08 (0.04, 0.15)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.20 (0.16, 0.26)	0.16 (0.13, 0.20)
Non-Family US	0.14 (0.10, 0.19)	0.13 (0.09, 0.17)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.11 (0.06, 0.19)	0.12 (0.07, 0.19)
Non-Family US	0.11 (0.06, 0.19)	0.12 (0.07, 0.20)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.17 (0.13, 0.22)	0.18 (0.14, 0.22)
Non-Family US	0.17 (0.13, 0.23)	0.19 (0.15, 0.24)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.08 (0.04, 0.15)	0.07 (0.03, 0.13)
Non-Family US	0.05 (0.02, 0.10)	0.05 (0.02, 0.10)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.16 (0.12, 0.21)	0.14 (0.11, 0.18)
Non-Family US	0.11 (0.07, 0.15)	0.11 (0.07, 0.15)

Table 5.19: Family US and Electoral Target: PAN ID

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PAN ID	0.430	−0.132	0.801*	−0.387
	(0.283)	(0.346)	(0.365)	(0.375)
Family US	0.035	0.047	0.207	0.472*
	(0.141)	(0.167)	(0.181)	(0.195)
PAN ID	−0.394†	−0.248	−0.399	0.169
	(0.223)	(0.265)	(0.306)	(0.294)
Education	0.011	0.008	0.009	0.019
	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.043)
Age	0.007†	0.009†	0.012*	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Women	0.163	0.204	0.054	0.316†
	(0.123)	(0.149)	(0.153)	(0.168)
Wealth	0.060	0.061	0.133**	−0.026
	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Rural Location	−0.027	0.217	0.033	0.149
	(0.245)	(0.315)	(0.338)	(0.384)
Urban Location	0.723***	0.726**	0.710*	1.007**
	(0.214)	(0.279)	(0.291)	(0.339)
Constant	−1.965***	−2.866***	−3.571***	−3.350***
	(0.370)	(0.461)	(0.487)	(0.535)
Observations	1,318	1,318	1,318	1,318
Log Likelihood	−913.045	−703.352	−666.990	−552.137
AIC	1,846.090	1,426.705	1,353.980	1,124.274

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.20: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN ID

PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.15 (0.08, 0.24)	0.10 (0.06, 0.17)
Non-Family US	0.06 (0.02, 0.12)	0.08 (0.05, 0.14)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.22 (0.17, 0.28)	0.16 (0.13, 0.19)
Non-Family US	0.09 (0.05, 0.15)	0.13 (0.10, 0.17)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.08 (0.04, 0.14)	0.12 (0.07, 0.18)
Non-Family US	0.09 (0.04, 0.16)	0.11 (0.06, 0.18)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.13 (0.09, 0.19)	0.18 (0.15, 0.22)
Non-Family US	0.14 (0.09, 0.21)	0.18 (0.14, 0.21)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.06 (0.03, 0.13)	0.08 (0.04, 0.14)
Non-Family US	0.06 (0.02, 0.12)	0.05 (0.02, 0.10)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.12 (0.09, 0.18)	0.15 (0.12, 0.18)
Non-Family US	0.11 (0.07, 0.18)	0.10 (0.07, 0.13)

Table 5.21: Family US and Electoral Target: PRI Last Elections

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PRI Last Elections	0.202	0.542†	−0.088	0.531
	(0.290)	(0.326)	(0.368)	(0.410)
Family US	0.022	−0.183	0.392*	0.245
	(0.145)	(0.180)	(0.183)	(0.197)
PRI Last Elections	0.104	0.369	0.117	−0.296
	(0.216)	(0.246)	(0.284)	(0.328)
Education	0.016	0.022	0.004	0.008
	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.044)
Age	0.007	0.008	0.012*	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Women	0.154	0.183	0.069	0.302†
	(0.127)	(0.154)	(0.157)	(0.173)
Wealth	0.065†	0.058	0.120*	−0.022
	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.053)
Rural Location	0.078	0.205	0.076	0.378
	(0.254)	(0.323)	(0.343)	(0.408)
Urban Location	0.683**	0.658*	0.660*	1.083**
	(0.220)	(0.283)	(0.292)	(0.363)
Constant	−2.013***	−2.901***	−3.491***	−3.236***
	(0.383)	(0.478)	(0.498)	(0.558)
Observations	1,214	1,214	1,214	1,214
Log Likelihood	−849.284	−654.491	−629.064	−510.804
AIC	1,718.569	1,328.982	1,278.128	1,041.607

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.22: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI Last Elections

PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.12 (0.07, 0.22)	0.12 (0.07, 0.20)
Non-Family US	0.09 (0.05, 0.18)	0.08 (0.05, 0.14)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.18 (0.13, 0.26)	0.18 (0.15, 0.21)
Non-Family US	0.14 (0.09, 0.21)	0.13 (0.10, 0.16)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.20 (0.12, 0.32)	0.09 (0.05, 0.15)
Non-Family US	0.15 (0.08, 0.26)	0.11 (0.06, 0.18)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.29 (0.22, 0.38)	0.14 (0.11, 0.18)
Non-Family US	0.23 (0.16, 0.31)	0.17 (0.13, 0.21)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.08 (0.04, 0.17)	0.07 (0.03, 0.13)
Non-Family US	0.04 (0.01, 0.09)	0.05 (0.02, 0.10)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PRI Last Elections	Non-PRI Last Elections
Family US	0.17 (0.12, 0.25)	0.14 (0.11, 0.17)
Non-Family US	0.09 (0.05, 0.15)	0.11 (0.08, 0.15)

Table 5.23: Family US and Electoral Target: PRI ID

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PRI ID	−0.132	0.104	−0.002	0.451
	(0.267)	(0.308)	(0.339)	(0.395)
Family US	0.179	−0.003	0.434*	0.247
	(0.145)	(0.182)	(0.185)	(0.191)
PRI ID	0.199	0.496*	0.180	−0.558†
	(0.198)	(0.230)	(0.265)	(0.313)
Education	0.014	0.024	0.003	0.016
	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.043)
Age	0.007†	0.009†	0.011*	0.009
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Women	0.151	0.163	0.041	0.339*
	(0.124)	(0.150)	(0.154)	(0.169)
Wealth	0.061	0.060	0.140**	−0.033
	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Rural Location	−0.023	0.183	0.034	0.132
	(0.245)	(0.317)	(0.338)	(0.385)
Urban Location	0.734***	0.752**	0.752**	0.959**
	(0.214)	(0.280)	(0.291)	(0.338)
Constant	−2.121***	−3.157***	−3.700***	−3.085***
	(0.382)	(0.480)	(0.502)	(0.544)
Observations	1,318	1,318	1,318	1,318
Log Likelihood	−914.215	−700.088	−670.512	−550.674
AIC	1,848.431	1,420.176	1,361.024	1,121.348

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.24: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRI ID

PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.13 (0.07, 0.22)	0.11 (0.06, 0.18)
Non-Family US	0.08 (0.04, 0.15)	0.07 (0.04, 0.13)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.20 (0.14, 0.26)	0.17 (0.14, 0.20)
Non-Family US	0.13 (0.09, 0.19)	0.11 (0.09, 0.15)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.15 (0.09, 0.25)	0.09 (0.05, 0.15)
Non-Family US	0.14 (0.08, 0.23)	0.09 (0.05, 0.15)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.24 (0.18, 0.31)	0.14 (0.12, 0.18)
Non-Family US	0.22 (0.16, 0.28)	0.15 (0.11, 0.18)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.07 (0.03, 0.14)	0.08 (0.04, 0.14)
Non-Family US	0.03 (0.01, 0.08)	0.06 (0.03, 0.12)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PRI ID	Non-PRI ID
Family US	0.13 (0.09, 0.19)	0.15 (0.12, 0.18)
Non-Family US	0.07 (0.04, 0.11)	0.12 (0.09, 0.15)

Table 5.25: Family US and Electoral Target: PRD Last Elections

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PRD Last Elections	0.343	0.153	0.796	−0.560
	(0.467)	(0.617)	(0.678)	(0.549)
Family US	0.037	−0.045	0.316†	0.419*
	(0.132)	(0.156)	(0.166)	(0.185)
PRD Last Elections	−0.270	−0.528	−0.751	0.782†
	(0.377)	(0.492)	(0.593)	(0.428)
Education	0.014	0.015	0.003	0.008
	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.044)
Age	0.008†	0.011*	0.012*	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Women	0.161	0.209	0.066	0.313†
	(0.127)	(0.152)	(0.157)	(0.173)
Wealth	0.066†	0.055	0.124*	−0.027
	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.053)
Rural Location	0.107	0.291	0.087	0.378
	(0.253)	(0.319)	(0.343)	(0.407)
Urban Location	0.677**	0.619*	0.658*	1.088**
	(0.220)	(0.281)	(0.293)	(0.363)
Constant	−2.001***	−2.838***	−3.444***	−3.359***
	(0.379)	(0.467)	(0.493)	(0.555)
Observations	1,214	1,214	1,214	1,214
Log Likelihood	−850.985	−666.268	−628.282	−510.890
AIC	1,721.971	1,352.536	1,276.563	1,041.780

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.26: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRD Last Elections

PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.13 (0.06, 0.24)	0.12 (0.07, 0.19)
Non-Family US	0.04 (0.01, 0.14)	0.09 (0.05, 0.15)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.18 (0.11, 0.30)	0.18 (0.15, 0.21)
Non-Family US	0.07 (0.02, 0.19)	0.14 (0.11, 0.17)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.08 (0.03, 0.18)	0.12 (0.07, 0.19)
Non-Family US	0.07 (0.02, 0.20)	0.12 (0.07, 0.20)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.13 (0.07, 0.23)	0.18 (0.15, 0.21)
Non-Family US	0.12 (0.05, 0.26)	0.19 (0.15, 0.22)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.08 (0.03, 0.19)	0.07 (0.03, 0.13)
Non-Family US	0.10 (0.03, 0.23)	0.04 (0.02, 0.09)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Family US	0.17 (0.10, 0.28)	0.14 (0.12, 0.18)
Non-Family US	0.19 (0.10, 0.35)	0.10 (0.07, 0.13)

Table 5.27: Family US and Electoral Target: PRD ID

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PRD ID	−0.349	−0.334	−0.542	−0.233
	(0.320)	(0.417)	(0.428)	(0.406)
Family US	0.196	0.043	0.501**	0.428*
	(0.135)	(0.159)	(0.170)	(0.190)
PRD ID	0.279	−0.112	0.061	0.557†
	(0.233)	(0.292)	(0.315)	(0.306)
Education	0.010	0.018	0.003	0.019
	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.043)
Age	0.007†	0.010†	0.011*	0.009†
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Women	0.168	0.191	0.044	0.347*
	(0.124)	(0.150)	(0.153)	(0.169)
Wealth	0.058	0.049	0.134**	−0.024
	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Rural Location	−0.030	0.196	0.025	0.155
	(0.245)	(0.315)	(0.338)	(0.385)
Urban Location	0.712***	0.685*	0.720*	1.000**
	(0.213)	(0.279)	(0.290)	(0.338)
Constant	−2.075***	−2.863***	−3.605***	−3.474***
	(0.372)	(0.461)	(0.490)	(0.539)
Observations	1,318	1,318	1,318	1,318
Log Likelihood	−913.006	−706.903	−668.585	−550.400
AIC	1,846.012	1,433.805	1,357.170	1,120.801

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.28: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PRD ID

PAN Targets (mixed areas)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Family US	0.08 (0.04, 0.15)	0.12 (0.07, 0.20)
Non-Family US	0.08 (0.04, 0.16)	0.08 (0.04, 0.13)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Family US	0.12 (0.07, 0.19)	0.19 (0.16, 0.22)
Non-Family US	0.13 (0.07, 0.20)	0.12 (0.09, 0.15)
PRI Targets (mixed areas)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Family US	0.08 (0.04, 0.15)	0.11 (0.07, 0.18)
Non-Family US	0.10 (0.05, 0.19)	0.11 (0.06, 0.18)
PRI Targets (mean size of place)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Family US	0.12 (0.07, 0.19)	0.18 (0.15, 0.21)
Non-Family US	0.16 (0.10, 0.24)	0.17 (0.14, 0.21)
PRD Targets (mixed areas)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Family US	0.10 (0.04, 0.19)	0.07 (0.04, 0.13)
Non-Family US	0.08 (0.03, 0.17)	0.05 (0.02, 0.09)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Family US	0.18 (0.12, 0.26)	0.14 (0.11, 0.17)
Non-Family US	0.15 (0.09, 0.23)	0.09 (0.07, 0.12)

5.5.1 Alternative Dependent Variable

Table 5.29: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Remittances w2	0.272†	0.061	0.514**	0.303
	(0.165)	(0.209)	(0.197)	(0.218)
Education	0.036	0.028	0.021	0.032
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.038)
Age	0.007†	0.009*	0.010*	0.007
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Women	0.181	0.140	0.079	0.235
	(0.111)	(0.138)	(0.141)	(0.153)
Wealth	0.084*	0.066	0.153***	0.014
	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Log Municipal Population	0.114**	0.039	0.142**	0.119*
	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.050)
Constant	−3.303***	−3.121***	−4.894***	−4.068***
	(0.479)	(0.586)	(0.634)	(0.660)
Observations	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,751
Log Likelihood	−593.453	−437.341	−423.300	−345.616
AIC	1,200.907	888.683	860.600	705.231

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.30: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances

Mean Size of Place	Any Targets	PRI Targets	PAN Targets	PRD Targets
Remittances	0.33 (0.27, 0.40)	0.15 (0.11, 0.21)	0.20 (0.15, 0.26)	0.15 (0.10, 0.21)
No Remittances	0.27 (0.25, 0.30)	0.15 (0.13, 0.17)	0.13 (0.11, 0.15)	0.11 (0.10, 0.13)

Table 5.31: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PAN Supporters

	PAN Target Model 1	PAN Target Model 2
Remittances w2 ∗PAN Last Elections	−0.196	
	(0.411)	
Remittances w2 ∗PAN ID		−0.035
		(0.434)
Remittances w2	0.597*	0.543*
	(0.266)	(0.232)
PAN Last Elections	0.240	
	(0.162)	
PAN ID		0.243
		(0.169)
Education	0.023	0.031
	(0.037)	(0.036)
Age	0.011*	0.011*
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Women	0.101	0.069
	(0.148)	(0.143)
Wealth	0.121*	0.138**
	(0.048)	(0.046)
Log Municipal Population	0.128**	0.126**
	(0.049)	(0.048)
Constant	−4.669***	−4.758***
	(0.659)	(0.641)
Observations	1,545	1,689
Log Likelihood	−379.565	−412.243
AIC	777.129	842.486

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.32: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PAN Last Elections

PAN Targets (Mean Size of Place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances	0.21 (0.13, 0.33)	0.21 (0.14, 0.29)
Non-Remittances	0.15 (0.12, 0.19)	0.12 (0.10, 0.15)
PAN Targets (Mean Size of Place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Remittances	0.23 (0.13, 0.37)	0.20 (0.14, 0.27)
Non-Remittances	0.15 (0.12, 0.19)	0.12 (0.10, 0.14)

Table 5.33: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PRD Supporters

	PAN Target	PRD Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Remittances w2 ∗PRD Last Elections	0.227	0.636		
	(0.669)	(0.602)		
Remittances w2 ∗PRD ID			−0.189	0.855†
			(0.520)	(0.469)
Remittances w2	0.491*	0.270	0.581**	0.021
	(0.216)	(0.244)	(0.217)	(0.273)
PRD Last Elections	−0.208	0.424		
	(0.286)	(0.262)		
PRD ID			−0.231	0.355†
			(0.213)	(0.200)
Education	0.030	0.011	0.031	0.022
	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.039)
Age	0.012*	0.006	0.011*	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Women	0.103	0.259	0.066	0.271†
	(0.147)	(0.159)	(0.143)	(0.155)
Wealth	0.128**	0.013	0.141**	0.026
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.047)
Log Municipal Population	0.127*	0.114*	0.131**	0.104*
	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.051)
Constant	−4.686***	−3.892***	−4.729***	−3.980***
	(0.658)	(0.685)	(0.640)	(0.670)
Observations	1,545	1,545	1,689	1,689
Log Likelihood	−380.478	−309.987	−412.454	−336.374
AIC	778.957	637.974	842.907	690.749

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.34: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PRD Last Elections

PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances	0.21 (0.08, 0.45)	0.21 (0.15, 0.28)
Non-Remittances	0.11 (0.07, 0.18)	0.14 (0.12, 0.16)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances	0.33 (0.16, 0.57)	0.15 (0.10, 0.21)
Non-Remittances	0.17 (0.11, 0.25)	0.11 (0.10, 0.13)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Remittances	0.15 (0.07, 0.30)	0.22 (0.16, 0.29)
Non-Remittances	0.11 (0.08, 0.15)	0.13 (0.12, 0.16)
PRD Targets (mean size of place)	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Remittances	0.30 (0.18, 0.45)	0.11 (0.07, 0.17)
Non-Remittances	0.15 (0.11, 0.20)	0.11 (0.09, 0.13)

Table 5.35: Family US and Electoral Target

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US	0.142	0.047	0.307*	0.232†
	(0.099)	(0.125)	(0.132)	(0.139)
Education	0.034	0.032	0.010	0.046
	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.035)
Age	0.010**	0.012**	0.012**	0.011*
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Women	0.307**	0.210†	0.157	0.410**
	(0.098)	(0.124)	(0.128)	(0.138)
Wealth	0.044	0.034	0.118**	−0.035
	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Log Municipal Population	0.108***	0.047	0.123**	0.118**
	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.045)
Constant	−3.507***	−3.430***	−4.918***	−4.439***
	(0.430)	(0.534)	(0.580)	(0.602)
Observations	2,383	2,383	2,383	2,383
Log Likelihood	−1,442.870	−1,056.300	−988.319	−834.355
AIC	2,899.740	2,126.600	1,990.638	1,682.711

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.36: Predicted Probabilities - Family US

Mean Size of Place	Any Targets	PRI Targets	PAN Targets	PRD Targets
Family US	0.24 (0.22, 0.27)	0.13 (0.11, 0.15)	0.12 (0.11, 0.14)	0.11 (0.09, 0.13)
No Family US	0.22 (0.19, 0.24)	0.12 (0.10, 0.14)	0.09 (0.08, 0.11)	0.09 (0.07, 0.10)

Table 5.37: Family US and Electoral Target: PAN Last Elections

	PAN Target Model 1	PAN Target Model 2
Family US ∗PAN Last Elections	0.073	
	(0.271)	
Family US ∗PAN ID		0.431
		(0.300)
Family US	0.247	0.191
	(0.191)	(0.157)
PAN Last Elections	0.331	
	(0.213)	
PAN ID		0.032
		(0.246)
Education	0.007	0.024
	(0.034)	(0.033)
Age	0.012^{*}	0.014^{**}
	(0.005)	(0.004)
Women	0.171	0.146
	(0.134)	(0.130)
Wealth	0.074†	0.092^{*}
	(0.044)	(0.042)
Log Municipal Population	0.106^{*}	0.109^{*}
	(0.045)	(0.044)
Constant	-4.555^{***}	-4.770^{***}
	(0.608)	(0.592)
Observations	2,115	2,303
Log Likelihood	−893.982	−953.025
AIC	1,805.965	1,924.051

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.38: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN Supporters

PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.16 (0.13, 0.20)	0.11 (0.09, 0.14)
Non-Family US	0.12 (0.09, 0.16)	0.09 (0.07, 0.12)
PAN Targets (mean size of place)	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.17 (0.13, 0.21)	0.11 (0.09, 0.13)
Non-Family US	0.10 (0.06, 0.14)	0.09 (0.07, 0.12)

5.5.2 *Additional Figures and Tables*

Table 5.39: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PAN Last Elections

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Remittances w2 * PAN Last Elections	−0.217	0.310	−0.407	−0.042
	(0.386)	(0.460)	(0.437)	(0.494)
Remittances w2	0.296	−0.216	0.703*	0.300
	(0.248)	(0.311)	(0.285)	(0.330)
PAN Last Elections	0.305*	−0.063	0.280	0.248
	(0.149)	(0.181)	(0.188)	(0.203)
Education	0.023	0.030	0.028	0.014
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.049)
Age	0.007	0.013*	0.013*	0.010
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Women	0.199	0.282†	0.132	0.478*
	(0.136)	(0.165)	(0.169)	(0.187)
Wealth	0.007	−0.005	0.057	−0.038
	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.056)
Church Attendance	0.030	−0.024	−0.001	−0.029
	(0.061)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.084)
Talk Politics	0.160†	0.229*	0.266*	0.217†
	(0.084)	(0.101)	(0.105)	(0.113)
Presidential Approval	−0.198*	−0.179†	−0.180†	−0.197†
	(0.082)	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.107)
Log Municipal Population	0.095*	0.010	0.106†	0.054
	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.062)
Constant	−3.279***	−3.409***	−4.730***	−4.451***
	(0.690)	(0.842)	(0.878)	(0.954)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1,147	1,147	1,147	1,147
Log Likelihood	−794.976	−609.680	−580.319	−468.932
AIC	1,621.952	1,251.360	1,192.639	969.864

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.40: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PAN Last Elections

PAN Targets	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Remittances	0.18 (0.10, 0.31)	0.20 (0.12, 0.31)
Non-Remittances	0.14 (0.10, 0.20)	0.11 (0.08, 0.16)

Table 5.41: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PAN ID

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Remittances w2 * PAN ID	0.134	0.530	−0.089	−0.763
	(0.410)	(0.503)	(0.460)	(0.584)
Remittances w2	0.202	−0.271	0.569*	0.389
	(0.216)	(0.268)	(0.248)	(0.279)
PAN ID	−0.083	−0.389†	0.140	0.213
	(0.159)	(0.204)	(0.195)	(0.217)
Education	0.037	0.038	0.048	0.035
	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.048)
Age	0.008†	0.013*	0.014*	0.011†
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Women	0.191	0.234	0.080	0.489**
	(0.132)	(0.161)	(0.164)	(0.182)
Wealth	0.031	0.003	0.080	−0.014
	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.055)
Church Attendance	0.062	0.009	0.053	0.025
	(0.058)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.081)
Talk Politics	0.171*	0.248*	0.221*	0.269*
	(0.082)	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.110)
Presidential Approval	−0.106	−0.106	−0.131	−0.143
	(0.080)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.107)
Log Municipal Population	0.111*	0.036	0.117*	0.062
	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.060)
Constant	−3.868***	−4.044***	−5.150***	−5.189***
	(0.671)	(0.829)	(0.852)	(0.930)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1,240	1,240	1,240	1,240
Log Likelihood	−862.260	−646.513	−624.818	−504.914
AIC	1,756.520	1,325.026	1,281.635	1,041.827

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.42: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PAN ID

PAN Targets	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Remittances	0.19 (0.09, 0.34)	0.18 (0.11, 0.28)
Non-Remittances	0.13 (0.08, 0.18)	0.11 (0.08, 0.15)

Table 5.43: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PRD Last Elections

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Remittances w2 * PRD Last Elections	1.172†	0.765	0.526	1.012
	(0.667)	(0.779)	(0.748)	(0.716)
Remittances w2	0.097	−0.137	0.480*	0.152
	(0.203)	(0.245)	(0.229)	(0.272)
PRD Last Elections	−0.258	−0.577	−0.145	−0.068
	(0.262)	(0.353)	(0.341)	(0.324)
Education	0.031	0.027	0.035	0.021
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.049)
Age	0.009†	0.013*	0.014*	0.012†
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Women	0.208	0.287†	0.132	0.487**
	(0.136)	(0.165)	(0.169)	(0.187)
Wealth	0.018	−0.001	0.064	−0.029
	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.055)
Church Attendance	0.036	−0.029	0.007	−0.026
	(0.061)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.084)
Talk Politics	0.172*	0.234*	0.279**	0.216†
	(0.084)	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.113)
Presidential Approval	−0.159*	−0.208*	−0.146	−0.151
	(0.081)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.105)
Log Municipal Population	0.101*	0.008	0.108†	0.062
	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.062)
Constant	−3.460***	−3.356***	−4.836***	−4.638***
	(0.685)	(0.836)	(0.872)	(0.947)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1,147	1,147	1,147	1,147
Log Likelihood	−795.691	−606.920	−582.152	−467.927
AIC	1,623.381	1,245.839	1,196.304	967.854

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.44: Remittance Recipients and Electoral Target: PRD ID

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Remittances w2 * PRD ID	0.576	0.650	0.187	1.459**
	(0.460)	(0.580)	(0.557)	(0.552)
Remittances w2	0.115	−0.225	0.508*	−0.190
	(0.207)	(0.254)	(0.231)	(0.301)
PRD ID	0.060	−0.290	−0.009	−0.020
	(0.192)	(0.254)	(0.258)	(0.254)
Education	0.036	0.042	0.045	0.033
	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.048)
Age	0.009†	0.013*	0.014*	0.012†
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Women	0.208	0.248	0.083	0.525**
	(0.132)	(0.162)	(0.164)	(0.184)
Wealth	0.032	−0.003	0.083	−0.008
	(0.040)	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.054)
Church Attendance	0.064	0.003	0.054	0.027
	(0.059)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.081)
Talk Politics	0.168*	0.239*	0.231*	0.275*
	(0.081)	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.110)
Presidential Approval	−0.110	−0.162†	−0.108	−0.109
	(0.077)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.102)
Log Municipal Population	0.109*	0.028	0.121*	0.062
	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.060)
Constant	−3.885***	−3.886***	−5.216***	−5.253***
	(0.670)	(0.820)	(0.852)	(0.931)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1,240	1,240	1,240	1,240
Log Likelihood	−860.357	−647.345	−625.234	−499.371
AIC	1,752.714	1,326.689	1,282.468	1,030.741

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.45: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PRD Last Elections

PAN Targets	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances	0.26 (0.08, 0.57)	0.19 (0.12, 0.28)
Non-Remittances	0.11 (0.05, 0.20)	0.13 (0.09, 0.17)
PRD Targets	PRD Last Elections	Non-PRD Last Elections
Remittances	0.13 (0.04, 0.36)	0.05 (0.02, 0.11)
Non-Remittances	0.04 (0.02, 0.09)	0.05 (0.03, 0.08)

Table 5.46: Predicted Probabilities - Remittances and PRD ID

PAN Targets	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Remittances	0.21 (0.09, 0.41)	0.18 (0.11, 0.27)
Non-Remittances	0.11 (0.07, 0.18)	0.11 (0.08, 0.16)
PRD Targets	PRD ID	Non-PRD ID
Remittances	0.14 (0.05, 0.29)	0.03 (0.01, 0.07)
Non-Remittances	0.04 (0.02, 0.08)	0.04 (0.02, 0.07)

Table 5.47: Family US and Electoral Target: PAN Last Elections

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PAN Last Elections	0.015	−0.268	−0.011	−0.042
	(0.263)	(0.318)	(0.332)	(0.363)
Family US	−0.139	−0.325	0.131	0.232
	(0.179)	(0.214)	(0.230)	(0.246)
PAN Last Elections	0.275	0.156	0.255	0.319
	(0.204)	(0.244)	(0.269)	(0.291)
Education	0.020	0.027	0.011	−0.006
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.048)
Age	0.006	0.011†	0.012*	0.008
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Women	0.188	0.263	0.095	0.439*
	(0.136)	(0.164)	(0.168)	(0.185)
Wealth	0.014	0.016	0.055	−0.040
	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.056)
Church Attendance	0.032	−0.028	0.001	−0.034
	(0.061)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.083)
Talk Politics	0.156†	0.228*	0.252*	0.190†
	(0.085)	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.113)
Presidential Approval	−0.202*	−0.185†	−0.210*	−0.237*
	(0.082)	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.107)
Log Municipal Population	0.093*	0.009	0.102†	0.062
	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.062)
Constant	−3.143***	−3.330***	−4.427***	−4.315***
	(0.692)	(0.846)	(0.877)	(0.956)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1,153	1,153	1,153	1,153
Log Likelihood	−799.785	−612.691	−588.466	−474.994
AIC	1,631.571	1,257.382	1,208.932	981.988

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.48: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN Last Elections

PAN Targets	PAN Last Elections	Non-PAN Last Elections
Family US	0.16 (0.11, 0.23)	0.13 (0.09, 0.18)
Non-Family US	0.14 (0.09, 0.21)	0.11 (0.07, 0.17)

Table 5.49: Family US and Electoral Target: PAN ID

	Any Target	PRI Target	PAN Target	PRD Target
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Family US * PAN ID	0.138	−0.474	0.539	−0.655†
	(0.292)	(0.361)	(0.375)	(0.391)
Family US	−0.099	−0.263	0.022	0.353†
	(0.151)	(0.182)	(0.192)	(0.212)
PAN ID	−0.147	0.007	−0.219	0.573†
	(0.234)	(0.281)	(0.318)	(0.315)
Education	0.031	0.032	0.036	0.019
	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.047)
Age	0.008†	0.012*	0.014*	0.010
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Women	0.189	0.221	0.056	0.441*
	(0.131)	(0.160)	(0.163)	(0.181)
Wealth	0.039	0.020	0.081	−0.021
	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.054)
Church Attendance	0.056	0.003	0.046	0.025
	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.081)
Talk Politics	0.156†	0.244*	0.193†	0.241*
	(0.082)	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.110)
Presidential Approval	−0.108	−0.106	−0.156	−0.180†
	(0.080)	(0.096)	(0.098)	(0.106)
Log Municipal Population	0.111*	0.040	0.114*	0.067
	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.060)
Constant	−3.749***	−4.000***	−4.843***	−5.095***
	(0.672)	(0.832)	(0.847)	(0.930)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	1,244	1,244	1,244	1,244
Log Likelihood	−867.297	−649.746	−631.512	−510.110
AIC	1,766.593	1,331.492	1,295.025	1,052.219

S.E. in parentheses. Location reference category: Mixed.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 5.50: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and PAN ID

PAN Targets	PAN ID	Non-PAN ID
Family US	0.16 (0.11, 0.24)	0.12 (0.08, 0.17)
Non-Family US	0.10 (0.05, 0.17)	0.12 (0.08, 0.17)

Chapter 6

The Effectiveness of Targeting in 2000 and 2006

The objective of this chapter is to compare the effectiveness of targeting for migrant and non-migrant families.[1] In other words, this chapter raises the following question: given political parties' electoral actions, how do migration and non-migration-exposed citizens vote? In order to answer this question, I first provide some key information about the workings of the Mexico's 2000 and 2006 presidential elections. These facts are essential to understanding electoral outcomes and serve as the starting point to analyze what role political parties' strategies and migration-exposed voters play in producing those results.

With respect to the Mexico's 2000 presidential election, three related factors explain why the PAN candidate - Vicente Fox - won this contest. First, electoral competition emerged around the issues of economic policy and political regime, which divided the electorate between PRI supporters and non-supporters (Dominguez and Lawson, 2004; Magaloni and Poire, 2004*a*). That is, while some voters were loyal to the PRI and wanted to preserve the existing economic and political model, others wished for a change in the status quo and aimed to bring reforms to Mexico. For this latter group, demands for democracy together with doubts about the PRI's ability to handle the economy were key determinants of their voting intentions (Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007).

Second, the patterns of political participation greatly benefited the opposition over the PRI.

[1] Part of this chapter, i.e., the analysis corresponding at the 2006 elections, and a modified version was presented in poster format at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting 2014, Washington, DC.

As Lawson (2004) puts it: "on election day, opposition supporters turned out in higher than usual numbers and PRI supporters proved more inclined to stay home" (page 10). A couple of reasons suggest why this happened. On the one hand, and in comparison with previous elections, PRI's strategies of turnout and vote buying appealed to a smaller segment of the electorate (Dominguez and Lawson, 2004). Put differently, in 2000 a lower number of voters were willing to behave according to the dictates of this party's electoral tactics. On the other, Fox was highly successful in bringing a wide set of voters to the polls by using a centrist electoral message and emphasizing the need for democratic change (Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007). Jointly, these reasons explain why turnout favored the opposition.

And third, strategic voting translated into voter coordination against the incumbent PRI and in favor of the opposing PAN. These strategic voters were mostly PRD weakly supporters who saw the PAN as the more viable opposition party and the one with real winning possibilities against the PRI (Magaloni and Poire, 2004*b*). Most importantly, this coordination was plausible due to i) the common goal of political change, ii) the increasing availability and importance of polling information in Mexico, and the fact that in 2000 predictions make the PAN as the potential winner against the PRI, and iii) Fox's electoral message, which delivered the idea of democracy and a centrist policy program (Magaloni, 2006; Greene, 2007).

In sum, demands for political change, successful mobilization of opposition supporters and voter coordination in favor of the PAN made possible Vicente Fox's victory.

The Mexico's 2006 presidential election resembles the 2000 one in certain aspects but is entirely different in others. For instance, while electoral competition also focused on the economy and the pursuit of economic growth, political and regime change received little emphasis this time around. In particular, a division emerged between those voters who wanted to keep the PAN in power and the same economic policies in place, and those who wished for the PRD to step in and implement a more leftist economic program. Perhaps unsurprisingly, PAN supporters had a more positive evaluation of Mexican democracy than PRD sympathizers, but still, the nature of the political regime was not an essential electoral concern in the 2006 contest (Dominguez, 2009; Ai Camp, 2009).

In addition, the 2006 elections highlighted the fact that electoral strategies such as vote buying and coercion were not as common as what had historically been the case in Mexico (Dominguez,

2009). Certainly, the decrease in the use of these practices was already noticeable in 2000 but became more evident in 2006. As for the reasons behind this decline, one can mention that the traditionally clientelistic PRI no longer had the incumbency advantage nor the access to extra resources, which hindered the implementation of widespread targeting. Also, instead of relying predominantly on electoral actions to get votes, the new incumbent invested in highly effective social programs that aimed to win poorer voters before the electoral campaign (Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni, 2009). Nonetheless, and despite this lower intensity, political parties still participated to a great extent in electoral targeting and hence analyzing their effects on vote choices is paramount.

Finally, something that clearly distinguished the 2000 from the 2006 elections is the fact that strategic voting was not a key determinant of the electoral outcome in the latter contest (Dominguez, 2009). In the absence of substantial voter coordination or strategic voting, the electoral result was due to (Flores-Macias, 2009): i) Calderon's successful strategy of getting PAN partisans to the polls as well as of appealing to other segments of the electorate, ii) López-Obrador's failure in convincing non-partisans and moderates that his economic proposal was what Mexico needed, and iii) the fact that most of Madrazo's supporters ended up not voting, given the lower expectations of this PRI candidate wining the elections.

All in all, the right economic proposal and an electoral campaign that reached a broad spectrum of voters translated into the PAN keeping the presidency in 2006.

With these general facts about the Mexico's 2000 and 2006 presidential elections in mind, it is time to analyze how migration and non-migration exposed citizens responded to political parties' actions and hence how they behaved at the polls.

6.1 International Migration and Electoral Choices

6.1.1 The Effectiveness of Electoral Strategies: Theoretical Approach

As a short recapitulation, this dissertation argues that, due to political disaffection from national politics, political parties have incentives to make migrant families their electoral targets even if this process involves tailoring exchanges and employing different electoral methods. In return, my expectation is for migrant families to respond favorably to these practices and to cast their votes

for the targeting party. The reasoning is quite simple. Either because the exchanged goods/favors bring migrant families economic gains or because these migration-exposed voters just need extra motivation to turn out to vote, electoral targeting should be effective among these voters. I also claim that electoral effectiveness should prevail over other competing mechanisms: the income and the social remittances effect. Chapter 3 provides the detailed reasoning for these assertions.

6.1.2 The Effectiveness of Electoral Strategies: Empirical Approach

As previously mentioned, the objective of this chapter is to compare the effectiveness of targeting for migrant and non-migrant families. To accomplish so, this section proposes to compare the behavior of: first, targeted and non-targeted voters in order to establish the difference between effective and ineffective targeting; and second, migration and non-migration-exposed citizens so that it is plausible to know if these two types of citizens respond equally or differently to targeting. In addition, this latter comparison also allows to establish if the mechanism (i.e., effective targeting, ineffective targeting, no targeting) leading to a certain electoral choice is the same or different for these two types of voters. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present these comparisons. In particular, Table 6.1 shows the different types of outcomes that might occur given effective and ineffective targeting. And Table 6.2 establishes the potential differences for migration and non-migration-exposed voters as well as the implication for targeting: i.e., whether the connection between international migration and the weakening of these practices exists or not.

More precisely, Table 6.1 explains that the comparison of targeted and non-targeted voters allows establishing that *effective targeting* happens in three situations: i) an increase in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party[2] through a decrease in the predicted probability of voting for the opposition and without changes in the predicted probability of abstention (outcome type 1 - vote buying), ii) an increase in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party through a decrease in the predicted probability of abstention and without changes in the predicted probability of voting for the opposition (outcome type 2 - turnout buying), and iii) no changes in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party but a decrease in the predicted probability of voting for the opposition party through an increase in the predicted probability of abstention

[2] The targeting party is the incumbent in Table 6.1, but the same logic follows if using an opposition party as the targeting one, and changes in the predicted probabilities would apply accordingly.

(outcome type 3 - abstention buying). Of course, it is also quite possible to observe a combination of the previous outcomes and where targeting increases the predicted probability of voting for this targeting party through a decrease in both the predicted probability of voting for the opposition and in the predicted probability of abstention.

Similarly, the comparison of targeted and non-targeted voters allows establishing that *ineffective targeting* happens in three situations: i) no changes in either the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party, the opposition, or abstention (outcome type 4 - rejection with no changes), ii) a decrease in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party through an increase in the predicted probability of abstention and without changes in the predicted probability of voting for the opposition (outcome type 5 - rejection with abstention), and iii) a decrease in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party through an increase in the predicted probability of voting for the opposition and without changes in the predicted probability of abstention (outcome type 6 - rejection with change in vote choice).[3] As before, it is also possible to observe a combination of these outcomes and where targeting decreases the predicted probability of voting for this targeting party through an increase in both the predicted probability of voting for the opposition and in the predicted probability of abstention.

Given these different effective and ineffective targeting outcomes, it is now possible to compare the behavior of migration and non-migration-exposed voters. In particular, Table 6.2 establishes four key cases: i) targeting is effective for both types of voters, ii) targeting is ineffective for both types of voters, iii) targeting is only effective for migration-exposed voters, and iv) targeting is only effective for non-migration-exposed voters. Accordingly, the implication for these comparisons is that one can only claim that international migration leads to the weakening of certain electoral practices such as clientelism in situations i and iv. That is, in the case when targeting is effective for both types of voters, weakening occurs only if the relative change in the predicted probabilities, from a situation of non-targeted voter to a targeted one, is lower for migration-exposed citizens. For example, targeting leads to an increase in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party but the marginal change for targeted migration and non-migration-exposed voters versus non-

[3] This outcome seems more plausible in those elections where only the incumbent participates in these 'questionable' electoral strategies. In those situations, targeting by the incumbent leads to the rejection of those practices and more votes for the opposition parties that do not practice them. On the contrary, in those elections where all parties participate in electoral targeting, it is less clear that rejection of those practices should lead to more votes for other parties that also participate in them (even if the voter only experience targeting by one of the parties).

targeted migration and non-migration-exposed voters is lower for the migration-exposed ones. In addition, if targeting is only effective for non-migration-exposed voters, it is quite straightforward to speculate that a connection between international migration and the weakening of electoral targeting exists.

Further, one can ask about the implications of having two different processes leading to effective (or ineffective) targeting for migration and non-migration-exposed voters. For example, for migration-exposed voters effective targeting might occur through outcome type 1 - vote buying, whereas for non-migration-exposed ones through outcome type 2 - turnout buying.[4] In response, one can argue that this information just adds richness to our analysis by explaining *why* different types of citizens cast their ballot in a particular way on election day, but does not affect the overall conclusions of the study.

6.2 Data and Methodology

6.2.1 2000's Presidential Elections

In order to compare the effectiveness of electoral targeting for migration and non-migration-exposed voters, I use as in Chapter 4 data from the Mexico 2000 Post-Electoral Study (Lawson et al., 2000).[5] The research design for this chapter is as follows[6]:

Dependent Variables

From this dataset, I use the following question to create two dependent variables: if 'the respondent voted in the elections of July 2nd and the chosen party'.[7] This electoral choice results in two different categorical variables. The first one captures: 1- Did not vote, 2 - Voted PRI (incumbent), 3 - Voted Other (opposition) (i.e., voted for any other party, left the ballot in blank), while the

[4] Perhaps the most complicated case is when migrant families are subject to abstention buying. In a way, one could argue that this abstention buying is an alternative explanation to the political disengagement mechanism and the fact that migrant families are more likely to stay home on elections day. However, I claim that this abstention buying can also happen precisely because of the political disaffection and the fact that these voters already inclined to stay. That is, political parties see these voters as appealing targets who can easily deliver more abstention.

[5] The author wishes to thank Miguel Basañez, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domínguez, Federico Estévez, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, and Alejandro Poiré. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-9905703) and Reforma newspaper. Available online at: http://web.mit.edu/polisci/faculty/C.Lawson.html.

[6] With respect to the Mexico 2000 Panel study, see section 4.3.4 for an explanation of why using the post-electoral study is more adequate for this dissertation's analysis.

[7] The wording of the question was: Did you vote in the elections of July 2nd? if yes, Could you please mark in this ballot for whom you vote in the Presidential Elections?.

second incorporates more information about the opposition party of choice: 1- Did not vote or other option (e.g., left the ballot in blank), 2 - Voted PRI (incumbent), 3 - Voted PAN, and 4 - Voted PRD. Using both dependent variables for the empirical analysis allows me to study voting behavior in favor of the incumbent or the opposition as a whole as well as understanding which opposition party got most of the votes. Given the categorical nature of these dependent variables, empirical results in this chapter are from multinomial logistic regressions.

Independent Variables

The key independent variables are those that capture migration-exposed voters: i.e., return migrants and those respondents with close relatives in the US; and experiencing non-programmatic targeting: i.e., clientelism and home visits. These variables are essential to analyzing if migration and non-migration-exposed voters' electoral choices are conditional on being targeted or not, as well as to understand the relative effectiveness of targeting among these two set of voters. The reason for focusing on non-programmatic targeting and using programmatic targeting (i.e., advertising materials) as a control variable (see below) is to isolate the effect of these more 'questionable' electoral strategies for migration and non-migration-exposed voters. Since chapter 4 describes the coding of these variables, I direct the reader to that chapter.

Control Variables

I control for those factors that affect the selection process of who gets targeted, including: education, age, gender, wealth, frequency of church attendance, risk acceptance attitudes, size/type of place (rural, urban or mixed) and geographical location (North, South, Center, Center-West and Mexico City Area). I also control for programmatic targeting in order to capture the effect of this tactic on electoral choices. Chapter 4 also describes the coding of these variables in detail.

Together with these variables, I also include voters' political orientation given that this factor is an essential determinant of turnout and vote buying strategies. In particular, I use three different variables: i) past electoral behavior, which measures for each respondent this electoral choice for the presidential elections of 1994 (i.e., voted PRI last elections, PAN last elections, PRD last elections, voted opposition)[8], ii) respondent's political orientation on the left-right scale (from 0- Left to 10-Right), and iii) respondent's support for income redistribution measures (from 1- 'The government

[8] I do not use party ID because of the endogeneity and high correlation concerns that arise between targeting and a certain party ID in the 2000 dataset.

should try to reduce differences between the rich and the poor' to 10-'The Government's attempts to decrease differences between the rich and the poor create more problems than the ones they solve'). I use these last two different measures to, on the one hand, account for other forms of political orientation besides the ones more directly associated to targeting such as past electoral behavior and party ID; and, on the other, because while a lot of respondents do not know their location on the left-right scale (which of course decreases the number of observations), this is not a big concern in the case of preferences toward income redistribution. Of course, a positive correlation exists between favoring income redistribution attitudes and a left-wing ideology.

In addition, I include those factors that not only affect the dependent variable of the electoral choice but also relate to the migration status of a voter. Those are: interest in politics (1- Nothing, 2- A little, 3- Something, and 4- A lot), evaluation of the national economic situation (in the last 12 months, the national economic situation has 0- Worsened a little/a lot, 1- Neither worsened or improved, and 2- Improved a little/a lot), and evaluations of Mexico's democracy (0- Mexico is not a democracy, and 1- Mexico is a democracy). The motivation for controlling for these factors is quite straightforward: i) interest in politics is of course a clear determinant of the decision to participate in elections, and based on the notion of migrant-families' political disaffection from national politics, it can also relate to the migration status; ii) evaluation of the national economic situation is an essential factor of two decision: the one about whom to vote for as well as the one about migrating in the first place, and iii) evaluations of Mexico's democracy is a key control in the 2000 elections given that electoral competition was primarily about those in favor of preserving the political status quo and those who wanted regime change. Also, migrant families could have more negative evaluations of Mexico's democracy and therefore reasons to leave this political system. Accordingly, these factors are highly relevant for this chapter's empirical analysis.

6.2.2 2006's Presidential Elections

In order to study the effectiveness of electoral targeting in 2006, I use as in Chapter 5 data from the Mexico 2006 Panel Study (Lawson et al., 2007).[9] As previously explained, this dataset has a

[9] Senior Project Personnel for the Mexico 2006 Panel Study include (in alphabetical order): Andy Baker, Kathleen Bruhn, Roderic Camp, Wayne Cornelius, Jorge Domnguez, Kenneth Greene, Joseph Klesner, Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), Beatriz Magaloni, James McCann, Alejandro Moreno, Alejandro Poir, and David Shirk. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation (SES-0517971) and Reforma newspaper; fieldwork was conducted by Reforma newspapers Polling and Research Team, under the direction of Alejandro

panel format that captured information at three different points in time. In this chapter 6, I use information from these three different waves.

Dependent Variables

From this dataset, I use a question asked in wave 3 (i.e., after the elections) to create two dependent variables: if 'the respondent voted in the elections of July 2nd and the chosen party'.[10] This electoral choice results in two different categorical variables. The first one captures: 1- Did not vote, 2 - Voted PAN (incumbent), 3 - Voted Other (opposition) (i.e., voted for any other party, left the ballot in blank, refused to answer), while the second incorporates more information about the opposition party of choice: 1- Did not vote or other option (e.g., other minor party), 2 - Voted PAN (incumbent), 3 - Voted PRI, and 4 - Voted PRD. Given the categorical nature of these dependent variables, empirical results are from multinomial logistic regressions.

Independent Variables

As before, the key independent variables are those that capture migration-exposed voters: i.e., remittance recipients and those respondents with close relatives in the US; and experiencing non-programmatic targeting: i.e., clientelism and home visits. Since chapter 5 describes the coding of these variables in detail, I direct the reader to that chapter.

Control Variables

As for the 2000 analysis, I control for those factors that affect the selection process of who gets targeted, including: education, age, gender, wealth, frequency of church attendance, size/type of place (rural, urban or mixed) and geographical location (North, South, Center, Center-West and Mexico City Area). Chapter 5 describes the coding of these variables in detail.[11]

Together with these variables, I also control for voters' political orientation, particularly: i) past electoral behavior, which measures for each respondent this electoral choice for the previous presidential elections of 2000[12], ii) respondent's political orientation on the left-right scale (from 0-Left to 7- Right), and iii) respondent's support for government intervention/social insurance, which

Moreno. http://web.mit.edu/clawson/www/polisci/research/mexico06/index.html.

[10] The wording of the questions was: 'There were presidential elections this past July 2nd. As you know, some people do not have time to vote, or are not interested. Did you or did you not vote in the elections this past July 2nd?' and 'For the purposes of this survey, I will give you a sheet where you can mark how you voted on the last presidential elections, without me seeing you, and then deposit it in this bag. For whom did you vote for president?'.

[11] Due to the fact that questions about risk acceptance attitudes or programmatic targeting were not asked in 2006, this information is not part of the 2006 analysis.

[12] Although I could use party ID from wave 1, I prefer past electoral behavior in order to make the analysis consistent with that of the 2000 elections.

approximates the income redistribution attitudes used for the 2000 analysis (from 1- 'the government should be responsible for the economic well being of individuals', 2- Both, or 3- 'Individuals should be responsible for their own economic well being'). The reasoning for using these different variables is the same as in the 2000 analysis.

In addition, I include those factors that not only affect the dependent variable of the electoral choice but also relate to the migration status of a voter. Those are: interest in politics (1- Nothing, 2- A little, 3- Something, and 4- A lot), presidential approval ('In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way which Vicente Fox is doing his job as president? from 0- Disapprove a little/a lot, 1- Neither approve nor disapprove, and 2- Approve a little/a lot), and evaluations of Mexico's democracy (0- Mexico is not a democracy, and 1- Mexico is a democracy). The motivation for controlling for these factors is the same as in the 2000 analysis. All these variables are from wave 1.[13]

6.3 Empirical Results

This section compares the effect of electoral targeting on voting choices among migration and non-migration exposed voters. Put differently, the ultimate objective of this analysis is to establish if voters were more likely to vote for a particular party due to i) the absence of electoral targeting, ii) effective targeting, or iii) ineffective targeting and; of course, whether or not this mechanism was different from migration and non-migration-exposed voters.

6.3.1 2000 Presidential Elections

To start, I simply analyze the predicted probabilities of each vote choice by running a set multinomial logistic regressions (abstention as the reference category) with the migration exposure factor - return migration and family in the US - as the only independent variable. In particular, Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show, respectively, the results of the multinomial logistic regression and the corresponding

[13] Various reasons support using the control variables from wave 1: First, in order to avoid endogeneity concerns (e.g., targeting affecting evaluations of the president and political orientation), and second, to avoid the loss of respondents who did not participate in wave 2 but took part in wave 1 and in the last post-electoral round (i.e., responded the question about the electoral choice). This last point does not apply to the analysis of remittance recipients since the question about receiving remittances was asked in wave 2. Still, looking at the number of respondents for the remittance recipients analysis and the number of respondents with family in the US analysis, the difference in the number of respondents is minimal.

predicted probabilities for return and non-return migrants. As these tables show, being a return migrant is not a significant predictor of the different electoral choices (i.e., abstain, vote incumbent PRI, or voted other), which means that the predicted probabilities for each vote option are quite similar for these two types of voters. Regardless of these small differences, it is interesting to notice that non-return migrants have a higher predicted probability of abstaining and voting for the PRI than return migrants (0.17 versus 0.14 and 0.28 versus 0.22, respectively), while the opposite holds for voting for opposition parties (0.63 for return migrants vs. 0.54 for non-return ones).

Similarly, Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show the results of the multinomial logistic regression and the corresponding predicted probabilities for respondents with and without family in the US. Interestingly, having family abroad marginally increases the log odds of voting for the opposition as opposed to abstaining. In terms of predicted probabilities (Table 6.6), respondents with family in the US have a higher predicted probability of voting for the opposition (0.58 versus 0.52), while those without it have a higher predicted probability of abstaining and voting for the incumbent PRI (0.18 versus 0.15 and 0.29 versus 0.25, respectively). In any case, these differences are quite small. Additionally, when incorporating variation in the opposition party of choice in Tables 6.7 and 6.8, results suggest that having family in the US increases the log odds of voting for the PAN as opposed to abstaining. This means that when looking at the corresponding predicted probabilities in Table 6.8 respondents with family in the US voted for the PAN with a 0.44 probability and this values is 0.38 for those respondents without it.

Given this baseline behavior of migration and non-migration-exposed voters, it is now necessary to incorporate the effect of electoral targeting on these vote choices.

Return Migrants

Table 6.9 takes a simple first look (i.e., no control variables) at the extent to which PRI and opposition targeting have an effect on voting behavior among return and non-return migrants. As this table shows, experiencing a PRI target and an opposition target increases the log odds of voting for both the PRI and the opposition as opposed to staying home on election day. With respect to the return-migration variable, results are not statistically significant.

Nonetheless, in order to get a better comparison of the effect of targeting on electoral choices among return and non-return migrants, I report predicted probabilities in Table 6.10. Briefly, this

Table 6.10 shows that electoral targeting is effective among return and non-return migrants since for both types of respondents experiencing a PRI target increases the predicted probability of voting for the PRI and decreases the one of abstaining (or turnout buying) as well as of voting for the opposition (or vote buying). In the case of experiencing an opposition target, the pattern of changes in the predicted probabilities is the same, that is, increases in the predicted probability of voting for the opposition while decreasing the chances of voting for the PRI as well as abstaining. Interestingly, when looking at the relative change in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party from a situation of not being a target to that of being one, return migrants experience a marginal increase that is always greater than the one for non-return migrants. Thus, PRI targets as well as opposition targets are relatively more effective among return migrants than among non-return migrants.

Given these baseline results, I explore how controlling for relevant factors affects, if at all, the relationships of interest. As explained in the previous section, I include those individual characteristics that intervene in the selections process of who gets a target such as education, wealth and political orientation, as well as those individual attitudes that affect the dependent variable such as evaluations of the nation's economy and democracy. Particularly, I incorporate political orientation by looking at past electoral behavior (Table 6.11), left-right ideology (Table 6.12), and income redistribution preferences (Table 6.13). In general, results in these tables are quite similar to those of the simple models. That is, a PRI target mainly increases the log odds of voting for the PRI as opposed to staying home on election day and an opposition target also increases the log odds of voting for the opposition as opposed to abstaining. In addition, the return-migration variables are mostly not statistically significant. Quite interestingly as well, the variable capturing programmatic targeting (PRI Ads and Opposition Ads) - or whether or not a respondent received advertising materials from a particular party - is not statistically significant to explain electoral choices.[14]

Analyzing predicted probabilities, results are also similar to those of the simplest models.[15] Essentially, PRI targeting and opposition targeting are effective among return and non-return

[14] In some of the models (see Table 6.13) receiving promotion materials from the opposition decreases the log odds of voting as opposed to abstaining, but this result does not hold across the different model specifications.

[15] I calculate these predicted probabilities using all variables at their means, with the exception of the categorial variables for location and region, which take respectively the values of 'mixed' location and 'center' region.

migrants since both increase the chances of voting for the respective party. This happens when for controlling for either past electoral behavior (Table 6.14), left-right ideology (Table 6.15) or redistributive attitudes (Table 6.16). However, a couple of findings are worth emphasizing. First, the PRI gets more votes among return migrants by getting them to not vote for the opposition (or vote buying) instead of through a decrease in abstention. That is, when comparing targeted and non-targeted return migrants, the predicted probabilities for abstaining barely change. Exploring this result further by comparing those respondents who voted for the PRI in the past or PRI supporters and those who did not or non-PRI supporters, the predicted probability of abstaining in the former group goes from 0.10 when non-targeted to 0.08 when targeted, and from 0.10 when non-targeted to 0.13 when targeted in the latter group. That means that abstention among return migrants increases mostly among non-PRI supporters after being PRI targets while it decreases among PRI-supporters after being PRI targets. Thus, this suggests that the PRI gets involved in some *abstention buying* of non-PRI supporters. Second, the opposition gets more votes among non-return migrants by getting them to vote (or turnout buying) instead of through a decrease in votes for the PRI. That is, when comparing targeted and non-targeted non-return migrants, the predicted probabilities of voting for the PRI barely change. And third, looking at the relative change in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party from a situation of not being a target to that of being one, return migrants experience a marginal increase that is always greater than the one for non-return migrants in the case of PRI targets but not for opposition targets. Put differently, PRI targets are relatively more effective among return migrants than among non-return ones, but the marginal effect is similar for return and non-return migrants when looking at opposition targets and across the different model specifications.

In sum, electoral targeting is effective among both return migrants and non-return migrants. Moreover, the PRI tends to be relatively more effective among return migrants, even when comparing PRI supporters and non-PRI supporters. In addition, this effective targeting means that the highest probability of i) abstaining corresponds to non-targeted non-return migrants, although the values for return migrants are pretty close, ii) voting for the PRI is for PRI targeted non-return migrants, and iii) voting for the opposition is for opposition targeted return migrants. Consequently, electoral targeting reinforces the voting patterns described at the beginning of this section: the probability of voting for the PRI is highest for non-return migrants (e.g., 0.28 vs. 0.19 for

return migrants in the same situation and when controlling for past electoral behavior), and the probability of voting for the opposition is highest for return-migrants (e.g., 0.89 vs. 0.78 for non-return migrants in the same situation and also when controlling for past electoral behavior). But in any case, the differences in these predicted probabilities of making different electoral choices from targeted and non-targeted return and non-return migrants are not substantial.

Family Abroad

Following the same approach as for return migrants, Table 6.17 takes a simple first look (i.e., no control variables) at the extent to which PRI and opposition targeting have an effect on voting behavior among respondents with and without family in the US. As this table shows, experiencing a PRI target increases the log odds of voting for this party as opposed to abstaining, and an opposition target marginally increases the log odds of both voting for the PRI and the opposition. With respect to the migration variable, results are not statistically significant.

Additionally, in order to get a better comparison of the effect of targeting on electoral choices among migration and non-migration-exposed voters, I report predicted probabilities in Table 6.18. According to these results (table 6.18), electoral targeting is effective among voters with and without family in the US. In particular, experiencing a PRI target increases the predicted probability of voting for the PRI and decrease the one of abstaining (or turnout buying) and of voting for the opposition (or vote buying) for both types of respondents. The relative change in the predicted probability of voting for the PRI from a situation of not being a target to that of being one is also quite similar for migration and non-migration-exposed voters (albeit slightly larger for migrant-families). In the case of experiencing an opposition target, results are quite the same: an opposition target increases the predicted probability of voting for the opposition for both types of respondents as well. Although in the case of respondents without family in the US, even if an opposition target increases the predicted probability of voting for this party, it also increases slightly the one of voting for the PRI (together with the decrease in abstention). This means that the relative change in the predicted probability of voting for the opposition from a situation of not being a target to that of being one is larger for migrant families than for non-migrant ones (relative changes of 0.19 and 0.13, respectively). But in any case, this difference is not substantial. In sum, PRI targets and opposition targets are similarly effective among migrant and non-migrant families.

I explore this simple analysis further in Table 6.19 and use a dependent variable the breaks down the opposition parties into PAN and PRD.[16] As this table shows, and similar to the previous analysis, experiencing a PRI target increases the log odds of voting for this party as opposed to abstaining, and quite interestingly, a PAN target marginally increases the log odds of voting for the PRD as opposed to abstaining. With respect to the migration variable, results suggest that a PRI target increases the log odds of respondents with family in the US voting for the PAN as opposed to abstaining. But for the most part, the migration variables remain not statistically significant.

When looking at the corresponding predicted probabilities in Tables 6.20, some interesting contrast for respondents with and without family in the US emerge. First, the PRI is effective among both types of respondents albeit, as above, the relative change is slightly larger for migration-exposed than for non-migration-exposed voters. Most importantly, this increase in the predicted probability of voting for the PRI after a PRI target happens through a decrease in abstention for both types of voters (or turnout buying) but through a decrease in the predicted probability of voting for the PRD in the case of respondents with family in the US (or vote buying) and through a decrease in the predicted probability of voting for the PAN in the case of respondents without family in the US (or vote buying). And second, while the PAN is effective in making PAN targets increase the predicted probability of respondents with family in the US to vote for the PAN, this is not the case for respondents without family in the US. That is, for non-migration-exposed voters, a PAN target has no effect on the predicted probability of voting for the PAN but instead it increases the predicted probability of these respondents voting for the competitors PRI and PRD (or rejection with change of vote choice). In short, PRI targets are similarly effective among migrant and non-migrant families, while PAN targets tend to motivate votes from members of migrant families only.

As in the analysis for return migrants, I explore how controlling for relevant factors affects these relationships of interest. As before, I incorporate political orientation by looking at past electoral behavior (Table 6.21), left-right ideology (Table 6.22), and income redistribution preferences (Table 6.23). In general, results in these tables are quite similar to those of the simple models, at least in

[16] I do not follow this approach for return migrants because due to the lower number of return migrants in the sample and the fact that this variable divides respondents into more electoral choices, the analysis would rely on some very small cells and is therefore not quite appropriate nor a robust estimation. Additionally, I do not conduct an independent analysis for PRD targets due the low incidence of PRD targeting during these elections.

terms of statistical significance. That is, a PRI target increases the log odds of voting for the PRI as opposed to staying home on election day and an opposition target also increases the log odds of voting for the opposition as opposed to abstaining. But only results with respect to PRI targeting are robust to the different model specifications (i.e., different set of control variables). In addition, the migration variables are mostly not statistically significant, which suggests generally not big differences between migration and non-migration-exposed voters in terms of electoral effectiveness and the subsequent vote choices. Quite interestingly as well, the variables capturing programmatic targeting (PRI ads and Opposition Ads) are also not significant to explain electoral choices.[17]

Analyzing predicted probabilities, results are also similar to those of the simplest models.[18] Essentially, PRI targeting and opposition targeting are effective among respondents with and without family in the US since both increase the chances of voting for the respective party. This happens when for controlling for either past electoral behavior (Table 6.24), left-right ideology (Table 6.25) or redistributive attitudes (Table 6.26). However, a couple of differences are worth emphasizing. First, the previous finding that opposition targets not only increase votes for the opposition but also for the PRI (together with decreases in abstention) is the case of respondents without family in the US is not consistent when including control variables and using the different model specifications. And second, looking at the relative change in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party from a situation of not being a target to that of being one, respondents with family in the US experience a marginal increase that tends to be greater than the one for non-migrant family members in the case of PRI targets. This means that the increase in the predicted probability of voting for the PRI for a member of migrant family that is a PRI target versus one that is not a PRI target is substantial (i.e., 0.27 for PRI targets members of migrant families and 0.12 for non-PRI targets members of migrant families when controlling for past electoral behavior). Put differently, PRI targets are relatively more effective among migrant families than among non-migrant ones, but the marginal effect is mostly similar for member and non-members of migrant families when looking at opposition targets and across the different model specifications.

In addition, I also expand this analysis by using the dependent variable that breaks down the

[17] In some of the models (see Table 6.23) receiving promotion materials from the opposition decreases the log odds of voting as opposed to abstaining, but this result does not hold across the different model specifications.

[18] I calculate these predicted probabilities using all variables at the means, with the exception of the categorial variables for location and region, which take respectively the values of 'mixed' location and 'center' region.

opposition parties into PAN and PRD. As before, I incorporate political orientation by looking at past electoral behavior (Tables 6.27 and 6.28), left-right ideology (Tables 6.29 and 6.30), and income redistribution preferences (Tables 6.31 and 6.32). Some interesting results emerge from these tables. In particular, and similar to the simple analysis, a PRI target tends to increase the log odds of voting for the PRI as opposed to staying home on election day and, quite interestingly, a PAN target increases the log odds of voting for the opposition, especially for the PRD, as opposed to abstaining. In addition, with respect to the migration variables, these tables show the following: i) having family in the US and not being a PRI target marginally decreases the log odds of voting for the PRI as opposed to abstaining, and ii) while having family in the US and experiencing a PAN target decreases the log odds of voting for the PRD, having family in the US and not experiencing a PAN target increases the log odds of voting for the PRD. Finally, the variables capturing programmatic targeting (PRI ads and PAN Ads) are also never statistically significant to explain electoral choices when using this alternative dependent variable.

Comparing predicted probabilities for targeted and non-targeted respondents with and without family in the US (See Tables 6.33, 6.34 and 6.35), the following findings are worth emphasizing. First, as in the simple models, the PRI is effective among both respondents with and without close relatives in the US. Also, while for both types of respondents a PRI target means a decrease in abstention across the different model specifications (i.e., controlling for past electoral behavior, left-right ideology and redistribution preferences), changes in the predicted probabilities of voting for the opposition parties varies depending on the control variables. Thus, it is not possible to reach a clear conclusion with respect to the effect of PRI targets on opposition votes. However, it is fair to say that a PRI target is effective among both migration and non-migration-exposed voters and, most notably, that the relative effect is larger for migrant family members. And second, when looking at the effect of a PAN target, the previous results of the PAN not being effective among respondents without family in the US does not hold when controlling for relevant factors (especially when controlling for last elections and left-right ideology). Moreover, it is interesting to note that a PAN target is similarly effective (i.e., relative change is similar) among migration and non-migration-exposed voters. And this is probably due to the fact that, for non-migration-exposed, a PAN target increases the predicted probability of voting not only for the PAN but also for the competitor PRD, and for migration-exposed voters, a PAN target increases the predicted

probability of voting for the PAN as well as (slightly) for the competitor PRI. In sum, PRI targets are relatively more effective among members of migrant families than non-members, while PAN targets are similarly effective among both types of respondents.

In sum, electoral targeting is effective among both members and non-members of migrant families. Moreover, the PRI tends to be relatively more effective among migrant families than among non-migrant ones but the opposition/PAN targeting is similarly effective among these two types of respondents. As a result, PRI targets increase substantially the predicted probability of getting votes from members of migrant families versus similar members of migrant families that are not targets. In addition, this effective targeting means that the highest probability of i) abstaining corresponds to non-targeted voters (similar for migrant and non-migrant family members), ii) voting for the PRI is for PRI targeted non-migrant family members, and iii) voting for the opposition/PAN is for opposition/PAN targeted migrant family members. Consequently, electoral targeting reinforces the voting patterns described at the beginning of this section: the probability of voting for the PRI is highest for non-members of migrant families (e.g., 0.29 vs. 0.27 when controlling for past electoral behavior - see Table 6.24), and the probability of voting for the opposition/PAN is highest for members of migrant families (e.g., 0.83 vs. 0.75 for opposition votes, and 0.69 and 0.59 for PAN votes, when controlling for past electoral behavior - see Tables 6.24 and 6.33). But in any case, the differences in these predicted probabilities of making different electoral choices from targeted and non-targeted migration and non-migration-exposed voters are not substantial.

6.3.2 2006 Presidential Elections

As in the case of the 2000 elections, I start by simply analyzing the predicted probabilities of each vote choice and running a set of multinomial logistic regressions (abstention as the reference category) with the migration factors - remittance recipients and family in the US - as the only independent variables. In particular, Tables 6.36 and 6.37 show, respectively, the results of the multinomial logistic regression and the corresponding predicted probabilities for remittance recipients and non-recipients. As these tables show, being a remittance recipient is not a significant predictor of the different electoral choices (i.e., abstain, vote incumbent PAN, or voted other), which translates into both types of respondents choosing with quite equal probabilities the different voting alternatives: abstain with 0.10 chances, vote for the incumbent PAN with about 0.35

chances and cast other option with about 0.55 chances (See Table 6.37).

Similarly, Tables 6.38 and 6.39 show the results of the multinomial logistic regression and the corresponding predicted probabilities for respondents with and without family in the US. Results in Tables 6.38 indicate that having family in the US decreases the log odds of voting for the incumbent PAN and the opposition as opposed to abstaining, although this relationship is not statistically significant. In terms of predicted probabilities (Table 6.39), respondents with family in the US have a higher predicted probability of voting for the incumbent PAN (0.38 versus 0.34), while those without it have a higher predicted probability of voting for the opposition (0.54 versus 0.48, respectively). In any case, these differences are quite small. Additionally, when incorporating variation in the opposition party of choice in Tables 6.40 and 6.41, results show again that the migration variable is not statistically significant to predict voting behavior. Also, the corresponding predicted probabilities in Table 6.41 indicate small differences between members and non-members of migrant families, essentially: respondents with family in the US voted for the PAN with a 0.38 probability and this value is 0.34 for those respondents without it, while these probabilities are 0.26 and 0.30 in the case of voting for the PRD. The choices of abstention and voting PRI are pretty much equal for both respondents.

Given this baseline behavior of migration and non-migration-exposed voters, it is now necessary to incorporate the effect of electoral targeting on these vote choices.

Remittance Recipients

Table 6.42 takes a simple first look (i.e., no control variables) at the extent to which PAN and opposition targeting have an effect on voting behavior among remittance recipients and non-recipients.[19] As these tables show, while PAN targeting is not a significant predictor of electoral choices, experiencing an opposition target increases the log odds of voting for both the PAN and the opposition as opposed to staying home on election day. With respect to the remittance recipient variable, results are not statistically significant.

Nonetheless, in order to get a better comparison of the effect of targeting on electoral choices

[19] I run this section's analysis using the weights from wave 3 given that the dependent variable is from wave 3. Nonetheless conclusions/results of this simple analysis are the same when using alternatively weights from wave 1, wave 2 or no weights at all. In addition, results are also the same with the targeting variable that incorporates all respondents (See previous chapter), instead of when using only those respondents who participated in all the waves.

among remittance recipients and non-recipients, I report predicted probabilities in Table 6.43. Briefly, this Table 6.43 shows that PAN targeting is effective among remittance recipients and non-recipients since for both types of respondents experiencing a PAN target increases the predicted probability of voting for the PAN and decreases the one of voting for the opposition (or vote buying). Further, this targeting has barely any effects on abstention (or turnout buying) for recipients as well as non-recipients. Interestingly, when looking at the relative change in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting party from a situation of not being a target to that of being one, remittance recipients experience a larger marginal change than non-recipients. In the case of experiencing an opposition target, results in the predicted probability show that opposition targeting is effective among non-recipients and ineffective among remittance recipients. Essentially, opposition targeting is ineffective among remittance recipients because even though the chances of abstention decrease, opposition targeted recipients report a higher probability of voting for the PAN and a lower one of voting for the targeting opposition (or rejection with change of vote choice). This suggests that the opposition is mobilizing remittance recipients who end up voting for the incumbent PAN. On the contrary, opposition targeting is effective among non-recipients. In short, PAN targets are relatively more effective among remittance recipients while opposition targets are ineffective for recipients and effective for non-recipients. Yet, the mostly lack of statistically significant results in Table 6.42 translates into these changes of predicted probabilities from targeted and non-targeted remittance recipients and non-recipients being quite not substantial.

Given these baseline results, I explore how controlling for relevant factors affects, if at all, the relationships of interest. As explained in the previous section, I include those individual characteristics that intervene in the selections process of who gets a target such as education, wealth and political orientation, as well as those individual attitudes that affect the dependent variable such as evaluations of the nation's economy and democracy. Particularly, I incorporate political orientation by looking at past electoral behavior (Table 6.44), left-right ideology (Table 6.45), and income redistribution preferences (Table 6.46). In general, results in these tables are quite similar to those of the simple models. That is, while an opposition target increases the log odds of voting for both the incumbent PAN and the opposition as opposed to abstaining, a PAN target decreases the log odds of voting for the opposition as opposed to staying home on election day (albeit in only some of the models). In addition, the remittance recipient variables are mostly not statistically

significant, although being a remittance recipients and an opposition targets marginally decreases the log odds of voting for the opposition as opposed to abstaining.

Building on these analyses and analyzing predicted probabilities, results show some interesting contrast with that of the simple models.[20] Essentially, PAN targeting and opposition targeting are not effective among remittance recipients but effective among non-recipients. That is, for remittance recipients experiencing a PAN target or an opposition target do not increase the predicted probabilities of voting for the respective targeting party. This happens when for controlling for either past electoral behavior (Table 6.47), left-right ideology (Table 6.48) or redistributive attitudes (Table 6.49). Moreover, this happens mostly because targeting not only increases the chances of abstaining (or rejection with abstention) but also those of voting the competing party (or rejection with change of vote choice, especially more votes for the PAN due to opposition targeting). Exploring this result further by comparing those respondents who voted for the PAN in the past or PAN supporters and those who did not or non-PAN supporters, the predicted probability of abstaining in the former group goes from 0.03 when non-targeted to 0.08 when targeted, and from 0.02 when non-targeted to 0.06 when targeted in the latter group. That means that abstention among remittance recipients increases for both targeted PAN supporters and non-supporters. It is important to notice however that the changes in the predicted probabilities from a situation of being a target to that of not being a target are quite small. By contrast, in the case of non-recipients, both PAN and opposition targets increase the predicted probabilities of voting for the targeting party mostly through a decrease the chances of voting for the main electoral contender (or vote buying).

In sum, results suggest that electoral targeting is not effective among remittance recipients but effective among non-recipients (especially when controlling for a full set of confounding factors). Nonetheless, the corresponding changes in the predicted probabilities from a situation of being a target to that of not being one are quite small. In addition, these findings translate into the highest probability of i) abstaining corresponds to PAN-targeted remittance recipients, ii) voting for the PAN is for opposition targeted remittance recipients, and iii) voting for the opposition is for non-opposition targeted remittance recipients. Put differently, the highest probability of voting for the PAN is 0.26 for opposition targeted remittance recipients and 0.25 for PAN targeted non-

[20] I calculate these predicted probabilities using all variables at their means, with the exception of the categorial variables for location and region, which take respectively the values of 'mixed' location and 'center' region.

recipient (when controlling for last electoral behavior). And the highest probability of voting for the opposition is 0.76 for non-opposition targeted remittance recipients and 0.75 opposition-targeted non-recipients. In short, the effectiveness of targeting for non-recipients and the ineffectiveness for recipients makes the predicted probabilities of the different electoral choices nearly equal for these two types of respondents. But again, not significant changes in predicted probabilities happen when comparing targeted and non-targeted remittance recipients and non-recipients.

Family Abroad

Following the same approach as for remittance recipients, Table 6.50 takes a simple first look (i.e., no control variables) at the extent to which PAN and opposition targeting have an effect on voting behavior among respondents with and without family in the US.[21] As this table shows, and as in the case of remittance recipients, while PAN targeting is not a significant predictor of electoral choices, experiencing an opposition target increases the log odds of voting for both the PAN and the opposition as opposed to staying home on election day. With respect to the migration variable, results are not statistically significant.

Additionally, in order to get a better comparison of the effect of targeting on electoral choices among migration and non-migration-exposed voters, I report predicted probabilities in Table 6.51. According to these results (table 6.51), PAN targeting is only effective among voters with family in the US since for these respondents experiencing a PAN target increases the predicted probability of voting for the PAN and decrease the probability of voting for the opposition (or vote buying). In the case of respondents without family in the US, a PAN target decreases the chances of voting for this party and increases the chances of voting for the opposition (or rejection with change of vote choice). Also, this targeting has barely any effects on abstention (or turnout buying) for both members and non-members of migrant families. In the case of experiencing an opposition target, results in the predicted probability show that opposition targeting is effective among non-members of migrant families and ineffective among members of migrant families. More precisely, opposition targeting is ineffective among respondents with family in the US because even though the chances

[21] As in the case of remittance recipients, I run this section's analysis using the weights from wave 3 given that the dependent variable is from wave 3. Nonetheless conclusions/results of this simple analysis are the same when using alternatively weights from wave 1, wave 2 or no weights at all. In addition, results are also the same with the targeting variable that incorporates all respondents (See previous chapter), instead of when using only those respondents who participated in all the waves.

of abstention decrease, opposition targeted migration-exposed voters report a higher probability of voting for the PAN and no changes in the probability of voting for the targeting opposition. This suggests that the opposition is mobilizing migration-exposed voters who end up voting for the incumbent PAN. On the contrary, opposition targeting is effective among non-members of migrant families through an increase in the predicted probability of voting for the targeting opposition and decreases in both abstention and voting chances for the incumbent PAN. In short, PAN targets are effective for members of migrant families and ineffective for non-members of migrant families, while opposition targets are ineffective for the members of these families and effective for non-members of migrant families.

I explore this simple analysis further in Tables 6.52, 6.53 and 6.54, and use the dependent variable the breaks down the opposition parties into PRI and PRD.[22] As these tables show, experiencing a PRI target increases the log odds of voting for any of the parties as opposed to abstaining, but none of the other targeting variables are statistically significant. And the same lack of statistically significant results applies to the migration variables.

When looking at the corresponding predicted probabilities in Tables 6.55, some interesting contrast for respondents with and without family in the US emerge. First, as before, the PAN is only effective among members of migrant families. Essentially, PAN targeting increases the predicted probability of getting votes from members of migrant family, mostly through a decrease in votes for the PRI and PRD (or vote buying), while the opposite holds for respondents without family in the US (i.e., PAN targeting increases the predicted probability of votes for the PRI and the PRD). Second, the PRI is effective among both types of respondents albeit the relative change is larger for non-migration-exposed than for migration-exposed voters. Most importantly, this increase in the predicted probability of voting for the PRI after a PRI target happens through a decrease in the predicted probability of voting for the PAN (or vote buying) for both types of respondents but only through a decrease in abstention for non-migration-exposed voters (or turnout buying). Interestingly, PRI targeting also increases the predicted probability of voting for the PRD for both types migration and non-migration-exposed voters. And finally, the effect of PRD targeting is pretty similar to that of PRI: the PRD is effective among both types of respondents albeit the

[22] I do not follow this approach for remittance recipients because due to the lower number of these respondents in the sample and the fact that this variable divides respondents into more electoral choices, the analysis would rely on some very small cells and is therefore not quite appropriate nor a robust estimation.

relative change is larger for non-migration-exposed than for migration-exposed voters. Moreover, PRD targeting also increases the predicted probability of voting for the PAN for both migration and non-migration-exposed voters but especially for the former group. In short, PAN targets are only effective among migration-exposed voters, and PRI and PRD targets, while effective among both types of respondents, are relatively more effective among non-migration-exposed voters.

As in the analysis for remittance recipients, I explore how controlling for relevant factors affects these relationships of interest. As before, I incorporate political orientation by looking at past electoral behavior (Table 6.56), left-right ideology (Table 6.57), and income redistribution preferences (Table 6.58). In general, these results show that a PAN target tends to decrease the log odds of voting for the opposition as opposed to abstaining (although this result is not consistent across models), and an opposition target increases the log odds of voting for the opposition as opposed to staying home on election day. Also, the migration variables are mostly not statistically significant; although interestingly, Table 6.56 indicates that being a member of migrant and an opposition targets decreases the log odds of voting for the opposition as opposed to abstaining. This last result conforms with the previous finding of opposition targets being less effective or even ineffective among migrant families. But, in any case, these results suggest overall not big differences between migration and non-migration-exposed voters.

Analyzing predicted probabilities, results are also similar to those of the simplest models, and when controlling for either past electoral behavior (Table 6.59), left-right ideology (Table 6.60) or redistributive attitudes (Table 6.61).[23] In particular, PAN targeting tends to be effective among members of migrant families but ineffective among non-members of migrant families (although this does not hold when controlling for left-right political orientation[24]). The effectiveness happens mostly through a decrease in the predicted probability of voting for the opposition, while the ineffectiveness means that PAN targeting leads non-members of migrant families to increase the chances of voting for the opposition and to abstain more.[25] On the flip side, opposition targeting is effective among non-members of migrant families but ineffective among members of migrant families. This

[23] I calculate these predicted probabilities using all variables at the means, with the exception of the categorial variables for location and region, which take respectively the values of 'mixed' location and 'center' region.

[24] This could be motivated by the lower number of observations included in this analysis, since a lot of respondents respond 'do not know' to the question about their location on the left-right ideological scale.

[25] Analyzing this abstention further into those who voted for the PAN in the previous elections or PAN supporters and those who did not or PAN non-supporters, changes in abstention increases for both supporters and non-supporters. Hence, there is no indication that the PAN is especially targeting non-supporters to stay home (or abstention buying).

happens because opposition targeting leads members of migrant families to increase the chances of voting for the incumbent PAN instead, while for non-members of migrant families opposition targeting does increase the chances of voting for the opposition (and decrease the ones of voting for the PAN - or vote buying). These results are consistent across the different model specifications. In short, the incumbent PAN is only effective among migration-exposed voters, and the opposition is only effective among non-migration-exposed voters. Nonetheless, the corresponding changes in the predicted probabilities from a situation of being a target to that of not being one are quite small.

In addition, I also expand this analysis by using the dependent variable that breaks down the opposition parties into PRI and PRD. As before, I incorporate political orientation by looking at past electoral behavior (Tables 6.62, 6.63, and 6.64), left-right ideology (Tables 6.66, 6.67 and 6.68), and income redistribution preferences (Tables 6.70, 6.71 and 6.72). The most consistent result in these tables is that PRI targeting increases the log odds of voting for the PRI and for the PRD as opposed to staying home (similar to the finding in the simple model without control variables). Results with respect to PAN and PRD targeting are not statistically significant. Interestingly, and with respect to the migration variables, these tables show that having family in the US and experiencing a PRI target decreases the log odds of voting for the PRI and the PRD as opposed to abstaining. This last result suggests, as previous findings, that opposition targets - at least PRI targets - are less effective or even ineffective among migrant families. Other than that the variable that captures migration exposure is not statistically significant.

Comparing predicted probabilities for targeted and non-targeted respondents with and without family in the US (See Tables 6.65, 6.69 and 6.73), the following findings are worth emphasizing. First, and as before, PAN targeting tends to be effective among members of migrant families but ineffective among non-members of migrant families (with the exception of when controlling for left-right political orientation). Nonetheless, it is important to notice that PAN targeting also leads some migrant families to vote for the PRD, which makes electoral targeting not that effective. Still, the relative change due to PAN targeting is larger for the increase in PAN votes than the one for PRD votes. Second, PRI targeting increases the predicted probability of getting more votes for non-migration-exposed voters, but decreases the one of getting votes for migration-exposed ones. Still, although this seems to indicate the PRI targeting is only effective among non-members of migrant families, these PRI targeted voters also result in increasing the chances of voting for the

PRD. And the relative increase in actually larger for PRD than for the targeting PRI party. As a result, one can suggest that PRI is generally unsuccessful in ensuring electoral success among both types of votes. Of course, the fact that this party had lower winning chances in these elections can also explain this low targeting effectiveness. Finally, PRD targeting seems to mobilize members of migrant families to vote for the PAN since the predicted probability to vote for the PAN increases with PRD targeting but the one of voting for the PRD decreases. As for respondents without family in the US, PRD targeting leads to an increase in the predicted probability to vote for the PRD, but also increases votes for the PAN and the magnitude of this effect varies depending on the model specification. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the PRD is not highly successful among non-migration-exposed voters either. In short, results suggest that the PAN is only effective among members of migrant families but ineffective among non-members of migrant families. On the other hand, the opposition is ineffective among members of migrant families, while the results were not very supportive of the opposition being effective among members of non-migrant families. But again, not significant changes in predicted probabilities happen when comparing targeted and non-targeted respondents with and without family in the US.

In sum, the most consistent finding is that the incumbent PAN is only effective among migration-exposed voters, and the opposition parties - both PRI and PRD - are generally effective among non-migration-exposed voters. Nonetheless, the corresponding changes in the predicted probabilities from a situation of being a target to that of not being one are quite small. In addition, this translates into the highest probability of i) abstaining is similar for targeted members of migrant and non-migrant families, ii) voting for the PAN is for PAN targeted/PRD targeted migration-exposed voters, and iii) voting for the opposition is for opposition targeted members of non-migrant families; that is, PRI targeted members of non-migrant families in the case of votes for the PRI and PRD. This last results suggest that some PRI targets ended up voting for the PRD or the contender with better winning options. Put differently, the highest probability of voting for the PAN is 0.28 for PAN targeted migration-exposed voters (controlling for past electoral behavior) and 0.21 for a non-migration-exposed voter in the same situation. And the highest probability of voting for the opposition is 0.71 for non-opposition targeted remittance recipients and 0.79 opposition-targeted members of non-migrant families, while members of migrant families in the same situation vote for the opposition with a 0.68 probability (Table 6.59). Of course, these differences are not substantial.

6.4 Concluding Remarks

This chapter contributes to our understanding on the effectiveness of electoral targeting for migrant and non-migrant families. Essentially, one point is clear: migration and non-migration-exposed voters are not that different in their electoral choices, even after taking into account the effect of electoral targeting. Nonetheless, a few additional points in connection with the Mexico's 2000 and 2006 elections are worth emphasizing.

In the context of the 2000 presidential elections, this chapter finds that while PRI targeting tends to be relatively more effective among migration-exposed voters (i.e., return migrants and members of migrant families), opposition targeting is similarly effective among both migration and non-migration-exposed ones. In addition, the highest probability of voting for the PRI corresponds to non-migrant-families, but the opposite occurs when looking at the probability of voting for the opposition; that is, migrant families have the highest probability of voting for the opposition. As a result, the findings have the following implications: i) no weakening of electoral targeting due to exposure to international migration, ii) members of migrant families favored the opposition and supported the regime change these elections were mostly about (although again the differences with non-migrant families are small), and iii) the mobilization of opposition supporters, which was so key for Fox's victory, included migration-exposed voters.

With respect to the Mexico's 2006 presidential elections, this chapter shows that electoral targeting tends to be ineffective among remittance recipients but effective among non-recipients. Similarly, PAN targeting is only effective among respondents with family in the US, while opposition targeting suggests more effectiveness among members of non-migrant families. Interestingly, this means the highest probability of voting for the PAN is for those remittance recipients who are opposition targets, and the opposition gets more votes from remittance recipients when non-opposition-targeted. Thus, this result indicates that targeting leads remittance recipients to reject those strategies and vote for the contender instead. Most importantly, it signals that receiving monetary help from abroad might be weakening some of these 'questionable' electoral practices. In the case of the broader category of respondents with family in the US, the PAN targeting effectiveness gets members of migrant families to be the ones with the highest probability of voting for this party, while the contrary holds for opposition targeting effectiveness; i.e., opposition targeting gets

members of non-migrant families to be the ones with the highest probability of voting for them. Nonetheless, these findings rely on small differences when comparing targeted and non-targeted migration and non-migration-exposed voters, and therefore, these observations are not strong claims. In a nutshell, these results suggest that Calderon's victory was in part due by the PAN's successful mobilization of respondents with family in the US as well as by the opposition targeting of remittance recipients. Moreover, given the tied electoral result, one can wonder if the opposition could have changed the outcome by focusing their efforts exclusively on non-migration-exposed voters.

6.5 Figures and Tables

Table 6.1: Establishing Effective and Ineffective Targeting

	Outcome Type 1	Outcome Type 2	Outcome Type 3
Effective Targeting	△ Vote Incumbent ▽ Vote Opposition = Abstention	△ Vote Incumbent = Vote Opposition ▽ Abstention	= Vote Incumbent ▽ Vote Opposition △ Abstention
More votes for the incumbent party through:	*vote buying*	*turnout buying*	*abstention buying*
	Outcome Type 4	Outcome Type 5	Outcome Type 6
Ineffective Targeting	= Vote Incumbent = Vote Opposition = Abstention	▽ Vote Incumbent = Vote Opposition △ Abstention	▽ Vote Incumbent △ Vote Opposition = Abstention
No more votes for the incumbent party through:	*rejection no changes*	*rejection with abstention*	*rejection with change of vote choice*

Note 1: △, ▽, and = refer to changes in the predicted probability for targeted vs. non-targeted voters.

Note 2: In this table, the targeting party is the incumbent, but the same would apply to an opposition targeting party.

Table 6.2: Establishing Comparison of Migrant and Non-Migrant Families

Migrant Family	Non-Migrant Family	Implication
Effective	Effective	Weakening of targeting, *only* if relative change in predicted probabilities is lower (as opposed to equal or higher) for migrant families.
Effective	Ineffective	No Weakening of targeting due to migration.
Ineffective	Effective	Weakening of targeting due to migration.
Ineffective	Ineffective	No weakening of targeting due to migration.

Table 6.3: Return Migrant and Vote Choice

	Voted PRI	Voted Other
Return Migrant	−0.061	0.327
	(0.401)	(0.347)
Constant	0.503***	1.166***
	(0.094)	(0.085)
Observations	1148	
AIC	2,269.488	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.4: Predicted Probabilities - Return Migrants vs. Non-Return Migrants

	Abstained	Voted PRI	Voted Other
Return Migrant	0.14	0.22	0.63
Non-Return Migrant	0.17	0.28	0.54

Table 6.5: Family US and Vote Choice

	Voted PRI	Voted Other
Family US	0.035	0.287†
	(0.183)	(0.165)
Constant	0.493***	1.065***
	(0.124)	(0.113)
Observations	1149	
AIC	2,262.611	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.6: Predicted Probabilities - Family US vs. Non-Family US

	Abstained	Voted PRI	Voted Other
Family US	0.15	0.25	0.58
Non-Family US	0.18	0.29	0.52

Table 6.7: Family US and Vote Choice

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US	0.002	0.282†	0.172
	(0.174)	(0.161)	(0.220)
Constant	0.330**	0.585***	−0.653***
	(0.118)	(0.112)	(0.154)
Observations	1149		
AIC	2,975.929		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention/Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.8: Predicted Probabilities - Family US vs. Non-Family US

	Abstained/Other	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US	0.18	0.25	0.44	0.11
Non-Family US	0.21	0.29	0.38	0.11

Table 6.9: Return Migrant and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted Other	Voted PRI	Voted Other
Return Migrant * PRI Target	0.641	−0.625		
	(0.920)	(0.861)		
Return Migrant * Opposition Target			−0.612	0.113
			(1.397)	(1.151)
Return Migrant	−0.430	0.452	0.027	0.329
	(0.521)	(0.390)	(0.421)	(0.369)
PRI Target	0.984***	0.372†		
	(0.228)	(0.217)		
Opposition Target			0.576*	0.779**
			(0.277)	(0.254)
Constant	0.244*	1.090***	0.419***	1.042***
	(0.109)	(0.094)	(0.101)	(0.091)
AIC	2,242.993		2,265.094	
Observations	1148		1148	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.10: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice

Abstained	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Return Migrant	0.11	0.15	0.08	0.15
Non-Return Migrant	0.11	0.19	0.10	0.18
Voted PRI	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Return Migrant	0.47	0.12	0.12	0.24
Non-Return Migrant	0.39	0.24	0.27	0.28
Voted Opposition	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Return Migrant	0.41	0.71	0.79	0.60
Non-Return Migrant	0.49	0.56	0.62	0.52

Table 6.11: Return Migrant and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted Other	Voted PRI	Voted Other
Return Migrant * PRI Target	−0.032	−0.739		
	(1.092)	(0.945)		
Return Migrant * Opposition Target			−0.519	0.075
			(1.726)	(1.233)
Return Migrant	−0.719	0.470	−0.385	0.343
	(0.688)	(0.487)	(0.525)	(0.465)
PRI Target	1.056***	0.399		
	(0.304)	(0.270)		
PRI Ads	−0.079	−0.013		
	(0.254)	(0.212)		
Opposition Target			0.260	0.696*
			(0.336)	(0.299)
Opposition Ads			−0.259	−0.429†
			(0.255)	(0.227)
PRI Last Elections	2.311***	−0.311		
	(0.283)	(0.246)		
Opposition Last Elections			−1.974***	1.309***
			(0.441)	(0.257)
Education	0.321*	0.231*	0.242†	0.197†
	(0.136)	(0.110)	(0.129)	(0.113)
Age	0.006	0.023**	0.033***	0.012
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Women	−0.284	−0.109	−0.246	−0.061
	(0.250)	(0.207)	(0.239)	(0.212)
Wealth	0.226*	0.291***	0.203*	0.285***
	(0.099)	(0.084)	(0.093)	(0.084)
Church Attendance	0.251*	0.099	0.328**	0.066
	(0.112)	(0.091)	(0.107)	(0.094)
Risk Acceptant	−1.263***	0.536*	−1.346***	0.519*
	(0.257)	(0.227)	(0.244)	(0.234)
Interest Politics	0.367*	0.274*	0.448***	0.274*
	(0.146)	(0.122)	(0.141)	(0.127)
National Economic Situation	0.041	−0.115	0.174	−0.120
	(0.167)	(0.142)	(0.159)	(0.144)
Democracy	0.106	−0.096	0.113	−0.048
	(0.254)	(0.207)	(0.242)	(0.213)
Rural Location	0.032	−0.018	−0.026	−0.157
	(0.464)	(0.397)	(0.434)	(0.405)
Urban Location	0.010	−0.097	0.074	−0.043
	(0.430)	(0.371)	(0.403)	(0.378)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−2.864***	−1.799**	−2.551***	−1.618*
	(0.788)	(0.663)	(0.746)	(0.679)
AIC	1,467.299		1,500.435	
Observations	988		988	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.12: Return Migrant and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted Other	Voted PRI	Voted Other
Return Migrant * PRI Target	0.458	−0.933		
	(1.113)	(0.942)		
Return Migrant * Opposition Target			−0.659	−0.335
			(1.734)	(1.210)
Return Migrant	−1.333†	0.322	−0.907†	0.206
	(0.696)	(0.469)	(0.544)	(0.439)
PRI Target	1.273***	0.684*		
	(0.343)	(0.320)		
PRI Ads	0.006	−0.006		
	(0.270)	(0.231)		
Opposition Target			0.594	0.740*
			(0.384)	(0.339)
Opposition Ads			−0.303	−0.125
			(0.279)	(0.239)
Right ID	0.082*	−0.031	0.085*	−0.025
	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.033)
Education	0.105	0.076	0.107	0.099
	(0.138)	(0.118)	(0.136)	(0.118)
Age	0.042***	0.030***	0.041***	0.030***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Women	−0.253	0.056	−0.257	0.060
	(0.262)	(0.225)	(0.259)	(0.224)
Wealth	0.251*	0.335***	0.248*	0.321***
	(0.108)	(0.093)	(0.107)	(0.092)
Church Attendance	0.419***	0.076	0.420***	0.069
	(0.118)	(0.099)	(0.117)	(0.100)
Risk Acceptant	−1.257***	0.717**	−1.272***	0.701**
	(0.277)	(0.256)	(0.273)	(0.256)
Interest Politics	0.574***	0.368**	0.628***	0.380**
	(0.153)	(0.133)	(0.155)	(0.136)
National Economic Situation	0.121	−0.141	0.119	−0.173
	(0.179)	(0.155)	(0.177)	(0.155)
Democracy	0.252	−0.185	0.197	−0.150
	(0.267)	(0.226)	(0.264)	(0.226)
Rural Location	0.219	0.013	0.124	0.014
	(0.526)	(0.462)	(0.517)	(0.461)
Urban Location	0.084	−0.135	0.093	−0.089
	(0.481)	(0.424)	(0.474)	(0.424)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−4.433***	−2.165**	−4.212***	−2.156**
	(0.883)	(0.755)	(0.866)	(0.755)
AIC	1,371.589		1,388.229	
Observations	866		866	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.13: Return Migrant and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted Other	Voted PRI	Voted Other
Return Migrant * PRI Target	0.262	−0.840		
	(1.003)	(0.921)		
Return Migrant * Opposition Target			−0.529	0.016
			(1.669)	(1.196)
Return Migrant	−0.786	0.364	−0.498	0.192
	(0.613)	(0.453)	(0.493)	(0.428)
PRI Target	1.162***	0.531*		
	(0.281)	(0.264)		
PRI Ads	−0.126	−0.083		
	(0.233)	(0.204)		
Opposition Target			0.463	0.699*
			(0.328)	(0.291)
Opposition Ads			−0.520*	−0.397†
			(0.242)	(0.211)
Less Redistribution	0.009	−0.017	0.005	−0.015
	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.031)
Education	0.163	0.177	0.140	0.183†
	(0.124)	(0.108)	(0.123)	(0.108)
Age	0.029***	0.021**	0.027***	0.020**
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Women	−0.372	−0.196	−0.330	−0.187
	(0.231)	(0.202)	(0.230)	(0.202)
Wealth	0.180†	0.332***	0.177†	0.322***
	(0.092)	(0.082)	(0.091)	(0.081)
Church Attendance	0.278**	0.095	0.282**	0.080
	(0.105)	(0.090)	(0.104)	(0.090)
Risk Acceptant	−1.337***	0.639**	−1.362***	0.622**
	(0.236)	(0.223)	(0.234)	(0.225)
Interest Politics	0.471***	0.360**	0.537***	0.388**
	(0.133)	(0.119)	(0.136)	(0.122)
National Economic Situation	0.165	−0.141	0.177	−0.162
	(0.154)	(0.137)	(0.153)	(0.137)
Democracy	0.189	−0.186	0.128	−0.174
	(0.230)	(0.200)	(0.230)	(0.202)
Rural Location	0.158	0.038	0.062	0.008
	(0.435)	(0.392)	(0.430)	(0.392)
Urban Location	0.083	−0.110	0.094	−0.083
	(0.399)	(0.360)	(0.395)	(0.360)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−2.523***	−1.971**	−2.232**	−1.848**
	(0.743)	(0.665)	(0.730)	(0.662)
AIC	1,710.424		1,726.265	
Observations	1029		1029	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.14: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: past electoral behavior)

Abstained	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Return Migrant	0.12	0.11	0.06	0.11
Non-Return Migrant	0.08	0.14	0.08	0.14
Voted PRI	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Return Migrant	0.19	0.06	0.03	0.09
Non-Return Migrant	0.28	0.16	0.13	0.17
Voted Opposition	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Return Migrant	0.67	0.82	0.89	0.78
Non-Return Migrant	0.62	0.68	0.78	0.68

Table 6.15: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: Left-Right ID)

Abstained	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Return Migrant	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.13
Non-Return Migrant	0.06	0.14	0.07	0.13
Voted PRI	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Return Migrant	0.25	0.04	0.05	0.08
Non-Return Migrant	0.31	0.19	0.21	0.22
Voted Opposition	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Return Migrant	0.62	0.82	0.84	0.77
Non-Return Migrant	0.61	0.66	0.71	0.64

Table 6.16: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: redistribution preferences)

Abstained	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Return Migrant	0.11	0.12	0.07	0.13
Non-Return Migrant	0.07	0.14	0.07	0.13
Voted PRI	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Return Migrant	0.33	0.08	0.07	0.14
Non-Return Migrant	0.35	0.21	0.21	0.24
Voted Opposition	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Return Migrant	0.55	0.79	0.84	0.72
Non-Return Migrant	0.56	0.64	0.70	0.61

Table 6.17: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted Other	Voted PRI	Voted Other
Family US * PRI Target	0.188	0.266		
	(0.445)	(0.425)		
Family US * Opposition Target			−0.295	−0.0002
			(0.547)	(0.502)
Family US	−0.065	0.220	0.054	0.237
	(0.215)	(0.184)	(0.198)	(0.178)
PRI Target	0.958**	0.178		
	(0.308)	(0.300)		
Opposition Target			0.668†	0.730†
			(0.402)	(0.376)
Constant	0.256†	1.033***	0.412**	0.974***
	(0.142)	(0.125)	(0.132)	(0.120)
AIC	2,237.132		2,259.828	
Observations	1149		1149	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.18: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Electoral Targeting

Abstained	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.09	0.17	0.09	0.16
Non-Family US	0.12	0.19	0.10	0.19
Voted PRI	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.37	0.21	0.22	0.26
Non-Family US	0.43	0.25	0.31	0.29
Voted Opposition	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.53	0.61	0.67	0.56
Non-Family US	0.43	0.55	0.58	0.51

Table 6.19: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target	0.474	0.867*	0.001			
	(0.408)	(0.406)	(0.546)			
Family US * PAN Target				−0.233	0.190	−0.717
				(0.626)	(0.599)	(0.753)
Family US	−0.152	0.094	0.175	0.001	0.228	0.231
	(0.206)	(0.181)	(0.247)	(0.183)	(0.169)	(0.232)
PRI Target	0.699*	−0.274	0.102			
	(0.275)	(0.287)	(0.374)			
PAN Target				0.749	0.542	0.966†
				(0.469)	(0.464)	(0.545)
Constant	0.141	0.635***	−0.675***	0.272*	0.547***	−0.737***
	(0.138)	(0.125)	(0.174)	(0.123)	(0.116)	(0.163)
AIC	2,949.966			2,979.235		
Observations	1149			1149		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention/Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.20: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Electoral Targeting

Abstained/Other	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.11	0.21	0.11	0.19
Non- Family US	0.18	0.21	0.12	0.22
Voted PRI	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.37	0.21	0.25	0.25
Non- Family US	0.43	0.25	0.34	0.29
Voted PAN	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.43	0.44	0.53	0.42
Non- Family US	0.26	0.41	0.37	0.38
Voted PRD	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.07	0.12	0.09	0.11
Non- Family US	0.10	0.11	0.15	0.10

Table 6.21: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted Other	Voted PRI	Voted Other
Family US * PRI Target	0.204	−0.262		
	(0.565)	(0.507)		
Family US * Opposition Target			−0.174	0.084
			(0.636)	(0.567)
Family US	−0.349	0.168	−0.277	0.097
	(0.287)	(0.226)	(0.255)	(0.226)
PRI Target	0.951*	0.474		
	(0.425)	(0.388)		
PRI Ads	0.003	0.001		
	(0.256)	(0.213)		
Opposition Target			0.318	0.634
			(0.486)	(0.441)
Opposition Ads			−0.242	−0.418†
			(0.258)	(0.228)
PRI Last Elections	2.307***	−0.341		
	(0.285)	(0.246)		
Opposition Last Elections			−2.194***	1.290***
			(0.469)	(0.258)
Education	0.322*	0.196†	0.247†	0.159
	(0.137)	(0.111)	(0.130)	(0.113)
Age	0.005	0.022**	0.033***	0.011
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Women	−0.248	−0.161	−0.210	−0.119
	(0.250)	(0.207)	(0.239)	(0.211)
Wealth	0.248*	0.308***	0.224*	0.296***
	(0.100)	(0.085)	(0.094)	(0.084)
Church Attendance	0.248*	0.084	0.323**	0.043
	(0.113)	(0.092)	(0.108)	(0.095)
Risk Acceptant	−1.310***	0.570*	−1.370***	0.556*
	(0.258)	(0.227)	(0.245)	(0.234)
Interest Politics	0.369*	0.268*	0.456**	0.268*
	(0.146)	(0.122)	(0.142)	(0.127)
National Economic Situation	0.053	−0.134	0.190	−0.142
	(0.168)	(0.142)	(0.160)	(0.145)
Democracy	0.073	−0.041	0.092	−0.0001
	(0.254)	(0.207)	(0.243)	(0.213)
Rural Location	−0.038	−0.022	−0.091	−0.184
	(0.468)	(0.397)	(0.437)	(0.405)
Urban Location	−0.001	−0.110	0.061	−0.054
	(0.433)	(0.370)	(0.403)	(0.377)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−2.807***	−1.776**	−2.536***	−1.514*
	(0.794)	(0.665)	(0.751)	(0.682)
AIC	1,459.123		1,487.550	
Observations	989		989	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.22: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted Other	Voted PRI	Voted Other
Family US * PRI Target	0.376	−0.233		
	(0.649)	(0.606)		
Family US * Opposition Target			−1.218	−1.178
			(0.837)	(0.766)
Family US	−0.578†	0.181	−0.231	0.257
	(0.299)	(0.245)	(0.280)	(0.242)
PRI Target	1.155*	0.741		
	(0.499)	(0.473)		
PRI Ads	0.106	0.058		
	(0.272)	(0.233)		
Opposition Target			1.391†	1.482*
			(0.722)	(0.674)
Opposition Ads			−0.251	−0.062
			(0.282)	(0.241)
Right ID	0.087*	−0.029	0.083*	−0.029
	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.034)
Education	0.137	0.058	0.140	0.077
	(0.139)	(0.120)	(0.138)	(0.119)
Age	0.042***	0.029**	0.041***	0.028**
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Women	−0.155	0.031	−0.160	0.033
	(0.263)	(0.226)	(0.260)	(0.225)
Wealth	0.269*	0.332***	0.262*	0.320***
	(0.110)	(0.094)	(0.109)	(0.094)
Church Attendance	0.418***	0.056	0.424***	0.058
	(0.119)	(0.101)	(0.119)	(0.102)
Risk Acceptant	−1.330***	0.765**	−1.332***	0.720**
	(0.280)	(0.256)	(0.275)	(0.257)
Interest Politics	0.590***	0.383**	0.633***	0.393**
	(0.154)	(0.134)	(0.155)	(0.137)
National Economic Situation	0.134	−0.171	0.114	−0.217
	(0.180)	(0.157)	(0.179)	(0.157)
Democracy	0.208	−0.151	0.188	−0.096
	(0.267)	(0.227)	(0.266)	(0.228)
Rural Location	0.214	0.033	0.152	−0.007
	(0.527)	(0.461)	(0.515)	(0.461)
Urban Location	0.197	−0.119	0.179	−0.108
	(0.481)	(0.422)	(0.469)	(0.420)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−4.552***	−2.201**	−4.341***	−2.133**
	(0.889)	(0.758)	(0.868)	(0.758)
AIC	1,358.389		1,375.928	
Observations	866		866	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.23: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted Other	Voted PRI	Voted Other
Family US * PRI Target	0.020	−0.193		
	(0.522)	(0.494)		
Family US * Opposition Target			−0.165	0.017
			(0.619)	(0.553)
Family US	−0.206	0.263	−0.106	0.196
	(0.264)	(0.220)	(0.243)	(0.215)
PRI Target	1.202**	0.573		
	(0.383)	(0.368)		
PRI Ads	−0.082	−0.064		
	(0.235)	(0.206)		
Opposition Target			0.512	0.640
			(0.475)	(0.429)
Opposition Ads			−0.500*	−0.368†
			(0.243)	(0.212)
Less Redistribution	0.013	−0.015	0.007	−0.013
	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.031)
Education	0.177	0.158	0.158	0.164
	(0.125)	(0.109)	(0.124)	(0.109)
Age	0.029***	0.020**	0.027***	0.019**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Women	−0.324	−0.241	−0.283	−0.233
	(0.231)	(0.201)	(0.229)	(0.201)
Wealth	0.188*	0.327***	0.178†	0.317***
	(0.093)	(0.083)	(0.092)	(0.082)
Church Attendance	0.270*	0.078	0.275**	0.062
	(0.105)	(0.091)	(0.105)	(0.091)
Risk Acceptant	−1.359***	0.682**	−1.381***	0.652**
	(0.237)	(0.224)	(0.234)	(0.225)
Interest Politics	0.481***	0.364**	0.544***	0.392**
	(0.134)	(0.119)	(0.136)	(0.122)
National Economic Situation	0.153	−0.178	0.169	−0.192
	(0.154)	(0.137)	(0.153)	(0.137)
Democracy	0.171	−0.146	0.108	−0.148
	(0.230)	(0.201)	(0.230)	(0.203)
Rural Location	0.144	0.050	0.066	0.001
	(0.434)	(0.392)	(0.429)	(0.392)
Urban Location	0.134	−0.101	0.149	−0.077
	(0.397)	(0.359)	(0.392)	(0.359)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−2.585***	−1.975**	−2.294**	−1.804**
	(0.745)	(0.669)	(0.729)	(0.663)
AIC	1,701.780		1,719.103	
Observations	1030		1030	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.24: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: past electoral behavior)

Abstained	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.09	0.13	0.07	0.14
Non- Family US	0.08	0.14	0.08	0.14
Voted PRI	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.27	0.12	0.09	0.13
Non- Family US	0.29	0.19	0.15	0.18
Voted Opposition	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.62	0.73	0.83	0.71
Non- Family US	0.62	0.66	0.75	0.66

Table 6.25: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: Left-Right ID)

Abstained	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.07	0.13	0.09	0.12
Non- Family US	0.06	0.14	0.03	0.14
Voted PRI	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.28	0.11	0.15	0.16
Non- Family US	0.32	0.22	0.24	0.23
Voted Opposition	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.63	0.74	0.74	0.70
Non- Family US	0.61	0.63	0.71	0.62

Table 6.26: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: redistributive preferences)

Abstained	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.07	0.12	0.07	0.13
Non- Family US	0.07	0.14	0.08	0.14
Voted PRI	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.32	0.16	0.17	0.20
Non- Family US	0.38	0.23	0.24	0.25
Voted Opposition	PRI Target	No PRI Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.59	0.70	0.75	0.66
Non- Family US	0.54	0.61	0.66	0.60

Table 6.27: Family US and Vote Choice: PRI Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target	0.590	0.420	−0.879
	(0.517)	(0.470)	(0.694)
Family US	−0.413	0.056	0.309
	(0.278)	(0.221)	(0.302)
PRI Target	0.605	−0.071	0.319
	(0.376)	(0.353)	(0.486)
PRI Ads	0.040	0.058	0.236
	(0.243)	(0.205)	(0.289)
PRI Last Elections	2.365***	−0.125	−1.565***
	(0.273)	(0.240)	(0.431)
Education	0.254†	0.092	0.189
	(0.129)	(0.105)	(0.146)
Age	−0.0002	0.013†	0.034***
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Women	−0.263	−0.186	−0.192
	(0.238)	(0.200)	(0.282)
Wealth	0.248**	0.366***	0.088
	(0.096)	(0.083)	(0.116)
Church Attendance	0.277*	0.141	0.074
	(0.109)	(0.090)	(0.122)
Risk Acceptant	−1.249***	0.745**	0.536
	(0.245)	(0.227)	(0.332)
Interest Politics	0.301*	0.191	0.176
	(0.138)	(0.116)	(0.158)
National Economic Situation	0.142	0.039	−0.407*
	(0.160)	(0.137)	(0.198)
Democracy	0.194	0.216	−0.376
	(0.242)	(0.200)	(0.276)
Rural Location	0.007	0.017	0.201
	(0.454)	(0.399)	(0.515)
Urban Location	−0.045	−0.130	−0.488
	(0.416)	(0.368)	(0.491)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−2.706***	−2.277***	−2.387**
	(0.758)	(0.649)	(0.865)
AIC	1,996.705		
Observations	989		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.28: Family US and Vote Choice: PAN Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PAN Target	−0.076	−0.283	−1.830†
	(0.733)	(0.694)	(0.943)
Family US	−0.245	0.156	0.297
	(0.232)	(0.210)	(0.287)
PAN Target	0.470	0.823	1.227†
	(0.584)	(0.569)	(0.653)
PAN Ads	0.057	−0.103	0.076
	(0.250)	(0.226)	(0.305)
PAN Last Elections	−2.068***	1.312***	−1.159†
	(0.563)	(0.305)	(0.614)
Education	0.169	0.053	0.282†
	(0.120)	(0.107)	(0.146)
Age	0.030***	0.006	0.029**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Women	−0.207	−0.199	−0.224
	(0.225)	(0.203)	(0.280)
Wealth	0.209*	0.345***	0.103
	(0.089)	(0.083)	(0.111)
Church Attendance	0.369***	0.106	0.077
	(0.101)	(0.092)	(0.123)
Risk Acceptant	−1.348***	0.767***	0.679*
	(0.229)	(0.233)	(0.331)
Interest Politics	0.338**	0.163	0.183
	(0.129)	(0.119)	(0.159)
National Economic Situation	0.270†	0.014	−0.488*
	(0.149)	(0.138)	(0.196)
Democracy	0.280	0.204	−0.427
	(0.225)	(0.204)	(0.276)
Rural Location	0.019	−0.206	0.236
	(0.416)	(0.405)	(0.511)
Urban Location	0.036	−0.235	−0.473
	(0.381)	(0.371)	(0.480)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−2.602***	−1.844**	−2.748**
	(0.701)	(0.659)	(0.874)
AIC	2,083.767		
Observations	989		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.29: Family US and Vote Choice: PRI Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target	0.721	0.309	−0.392
	(0.587)	(0.553)	(0.730)
Family US	−0.587*	0.126	0.364
	(0.285)	(0.236)	(0.317)
PRI Target	0.890*	0.430	0.413
	(0.435)	(0.419)	(0.547)
PRI Ads	0.066	−0.035	0.290
	(0.257)	(0.223)	(0.300)
Right ID	0.098*	0.014	−0.137**
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.043)
Education	0.099	−0.012	0.083
	(0.131)	(0.113)	(0.147)
Age	0.032***	0.015†	0.030**
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Women	−0.258	−0.123	0.017
	(0.249)	(0.217)	(0.292)
Wealth	0.229*	0.351***	0.098
	(0.104)	(0.092)	(0.119)
Church Attendance	0.475***	0.153	0.067
	(0.113)	(0.097)	(0.128)
Risk Acceptant	−1.356***	0.839**	0.540
	(0.265)	(0.256)	(0.349)
Interest Politics	0.522***	0.313*	0.333*
	(0.144)	(0.127)	(0.166)
National Economic Situation	0.141	−0.111	−0.449*
	(0.169)	(0.149)	(0.205)
Democracy	0.262	0.020	−0.562†
	(0.253)	(0.218)	(0.287)
Rural Location	0.296	0.170	0.040
	(0.502)	(0.459)	(0.550)
Urban Location	0.216	0.016	−0.535
	(0.455)	(0.416)	(0.506)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−4.194***	−2.623***	−1.959*
	(0.841)	(0.738)	(0.939)
AIC	1,881.953		
Observations	866		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.30: Family US and Vote Choice: PAN Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PAN Target	−1.462	−1.644	−2.656*
	(1.280)	(1.228)	(1.352)
Family US	−0.312	0.222	0.448
	(0.256)	(0.223)	(0.302)
PAN Target	2.120†	2.142†	2.578*
	(1.187)	(1.151)	(1.224)
PAN Ads	0.044	0.136	0.020
	(0.274)	(0.237)	(0.315)
Right ID	0.094*	0.012	−0.136**
	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.043)
Education	0.115	0.012	0.109
	(0.129)	(0.113)	(0.147)
Age	0.032***	0.015†	0.031**
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.011)
Women	−0.240	−0.097	0.022
	(0.246)	(0.216)	(0.291)
Wealth	0.212*	0.337***	0.099
	(0.102)	(0.091)	(0.119)
Church Attendance	0.476***	0.154	0.070
	(0.113)	(0.098)	(0.129)
Risk Acceptant	−1.391***	0.768**	0.530
	(0.261)	(0.256)	(0.351)
Interest Politics	0.531***	0.298*	0.345*
	(0.144)	(0.128)	(0.168)
National Economic Situation	0.137	−0.138	−0.490*
	(0.168)	(0.149)	(0.205)
Democracy	0.233	0.052	−0.549†
	(0.251)	(0.219)	(0.289)
Rural Location	0.254	0.155	−0.0004
	(0.490)	(0.458)	(0.552)
Urban Location	0.224	0.039	−0.541
	(0.443)	(0.414)	(0.508)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−4.016***	−2.606***	−2.004*
	(0.819)	(0.735)	(0.935)
AIC	1,899.069		
Observations	866		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.31: Family US and Vote Choice: PRI Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target	0.326	0.416	−0.684
	(0.474)	(0.461)	(0.635)
Family US	−0.242	0.141	0.625*
	(0.253)	(0.215)	(0.299)
PRI Target	0.890***	0.050	0.585
	(0.339)	(0.341)	(0.463)
PRI Ads	−0.023	−0.003	0.142
	(0.222)	(0.199)	(0.275)
Less Redistribution	0.031	0.019	−0.036
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.045)
Education	0.119	0.066	0.185
	(0.117)	(0.103)	(0.142)
Age	0.024**	0.012†	0.026**
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Women	−0.352	−0.287	−0.350
	(0.219)	(0.194)	(0.270)
Wealth	0.160†	0.349***	0.126
	(0.089)	(0.081)	(0.111)
Church Attendance	0.312**	0.139	0.161
	(0.100)	(0.088)	(0.120)
Risk Acceptant	−1.332***	0.761***	0.858*
	(0.223)	(0.223)	(0.337)
Interest Politics	0.393***	0.277*	0.255†
	(0.125)	(0.113)	(0.153)
National Economic Situation	0.221	0.003	−0.561**
	(0.145)	(0.132)	(0.193)
Democracy	0.260	0.070	−0.473†
	(0.217)	(0.194)	(0.265)
Rural Location	0.174	0.112	0.090
	(0.418)	(0.392)	(0.506)
Urban Location	0.068	−0.144	−0.442
	(0.379)	(0.356)	(0.459)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−2.434***	−2.403***	−2.949***
	(0.703)	(0.649)	(0.881)
AIC	2,287.936		
Observations	1030		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.32: Family US and Vote Choice: PAN Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PAN Target	−0.306	−0.260	−1.545†
	(0.724)	(0.681)	(0.859)
Family US	−0.103	0.222	0.635*
	(0.223)	(0.201)	(0.282)
PAN Target	0.753	0.670	1.514*
	(0.577)	(0.558)	(0.665)
PAN Ads	−0.104	0.046	−0.082
	(0.235)	(0.210)	(0.292)
Less Redistribution	0.022	0.017	−0.042
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.045)
Education	0.107	0.073	0.197
	(0.116)	(0.103)	(0.141)
Age	0.023**	0.012†	0.026**
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Women	−0.311	−0.272	−0.337
	(0.216)	(0.194)	(0.269)
Wealth	0.143	0.340***	0.118
	(0.087)	(0.080)	(0.110)
Church Attendance	0.318**	0.135	0.150
	(0.099)	(0.088)	(0.121)
Risk Acceptant	−1.360***	0.729**	0.859*
	(0.221)	(0.223)	(0.338)
Interest Politics	0.411***	0.271*	0.270†
	(0.125)	(0.114)	(0.154)
National Economic Situation	0.233	−0.018	−0.597**
	(0.144)	(0.132)	(0.193)
Democracy	0.233	0.084	−0.454†
	(0.216)	(0.195)	(0.267)
Rural Location	0.120	0.089	0.053
	(0.412)	(0.391)	(0.507)
Urban Location	0.081	−0.139	−0.439
	(0.373)	(0.355)	(0.461)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−2.206**	−2.360***	−2.873**
	(0.687)	(0.644)	(0.876)
AIC	2,309.275		
Observations	1030		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.33: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: past electoral behavior)

Abstained/Other	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.11	0.16	0.10	0.14
Non- Family US	0.14	0.16	0.07	0.15
Voted PRI	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.29	0.12	0.16	0.15
Non- Family US	0.30	0.19	0.17	0.21
Voted PAN	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.54	0.56	0.69	0.58
Non- Family US	0.42	0.53	0.59	0.53
Voted PRD	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.05	0.13	0.04	0.11
Non- Family US	0.11	0.09	0.15	0.08

Table 6.34: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: Left-Right ID)

Abstained/Other	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.09	0.19	0.11	0.17
Non- Family US	0.11	0.19	0.02	0.19
Voted PRI	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.30	0.12	0.21	0.15
Non- Family US	0.33	0.22	0.26	0.24
Voted PAN	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.50	0.49	0.55	0.49
Non- Family US	0.41	0.44	0.49	0.43
Voted PRD	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.09	0.19	0.11	0.17
Non- Family US	0.12	0.13	0.21	0.12

Table 6.35: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: redistributive preferences)

Abstained/Other	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.09	0.15	0.10	0.14
Non- Family US	0.12	0.17	0.08	0.17
Voted PRI	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.33	0.16	0.23	0.20
Non- Family US	0.40	0.23	0.26	0.26
Voted PAN	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.47	0.50	0.55	0.49
Non- Family US	0.35	0.48	0.44	0.46
Voted PRD	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PAN Target	No PAN Target
Family US	0.08	0.16	0.10	0.14
Non- Family US	0.12	0.09	0.20	0.09

Table 6.36: Remittance Recipients and Vote Choice

	Voted PAN	Voted Other
Remittances w2	−0.064	−0.018
	(0.299)	(0.288)
Constant	1.262***	1.632***
	(0.108)	(0.104)
AIC	2,286.773	
Observations	1265	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.37: Predicted Probabilities - Remittance Recipients vs. Non-Recipients

	Abstained	Voted PAN	Voted Other
Recipients	0.10	0.35	0.53
Non-Recipients	0.10	0.36	0.53

Table 6.38: Family US and Vote Choice

	Voted PAN	Voted Other
Family US	−0.011	−0.216
	(0.176)	(0.170)
Constant	1.147***	1.583***
	(0.133)	(0.127)
AIC	2,826.906	
Observations	1472	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.39: Predicted Probabilities - Family US vs. Non-Family US

	Abstained	Voted PAN	Voted Other
Family US	0.12	0.38	0.48
Non-Family US	0.11	0.34	0.54

Table 6.40: Family US and Vote Choice

	Voted PAN	Voted PRI	Voted PRD
Family US	0.079	0.143	−0.098
	(0.178)	(0.153)	(0.159)
Constant	−0.046	0.677***	0.539***
	(0.131)	(0.113)	(0.116)
AIC	3,915.093		
Observations	1472		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention/Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.41: Predicted Probabilities - Family US vs. Non-Family US

	Abstained/Other	Voted PAN	Voted PRI	Voted PRD
Family US	0.17	0.38	0.17	0.26
Non-Family US	0.17	0.34	0.16	0.30

Table 6.42: Remittances and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PAN	Voted Other	Voted PAN	Voted Other
Remittances w2 * PAN Target	−0.009	−0.249		
	(0.696)	(0.679)		
Remittances w2 * Opposition Target			−0.101	−0.810
			(0.747)	(0.736)
Remittances w2	−0.069	0.035	−0.098	0.129
	(0.353)	(0.337)	(0.344)	(0.325)
PAN Target	−0.016	−0.140		
	(0.292)	(0.283)		
Opposition Target			0.754*	0.909**
			(0.305)	(0.296)
Constant	1.273***	1.671***	1.125***	1.462***
	(0.120)	(0.116)	(0.120)	(0.116)
AIC	2,248.198		2,236.300	
Observations	1265		1265	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.43: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice

Abstained	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Recipient	0.12	0.10	0.08	0.11
Non-Recipient	0.10	0.10	0.05	0.11
Voted PAN	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Recipient	0.40	0.33	0.45	0.32
Non-Recipient	0.38	0.36	0.35	0.36
Voted Opposition	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Recipient	0.46	0.55	0.46	0.56
Non-Recipient	0.50	0.53	0.58	0.51

Table 6.44: Remittances and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PAN	Voted Other	Voted PAN	Voted Other
Remittances w2 * PAN Target	−0.888	−0.727		
	(0.850)	(0.814)		
Remittances w2 * Opposition Target			−1.197	−1.640†
			(0.872)	(0.873)
Remittances w2	0.606	0.546	0.552	0.784
	(0.520)	(0.499)	(0.489)	(0.478)
PAN Target	−0.138	−0.236		
	(0.368)	(0.354)		
Opposition Target			0.779*	0.896*
			(0.380)	(0.373)
PAN Last Elections	1.297***	−0.006		
	(0.287)	(0.282)		
Opposition Last Elections			0.556	2.000***
			(0.370)	(0.352)
Education	0.116	0.048	0.153*	0.079
	(0.076)	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Age	0.009	0.017†	0.014	0.008
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Women	0.876**	0.412	0.816**	0.320
	(0.278)	(0.265)	(0.275)	(0.272)
Wealth	0.218*	0.219**	0.251**	0.245**
	(0.086)	(0.082)	(0.086)	(0.085)
Church Attendance	0.041	0.079	0.069	0.109
	(0.122)	(0.116)	(0.122)	(0.121)
Interest Politics	0.352*	0.408**	0.402**	0.386**
	(0.152)	(0.146)	(0.150)	(0.149)
Presidential Approval	0.637***	−0.234	0.876***	0.048
	(0.178)	(0.155)	(0.185)	(0.167)
Democracy	0.586*	0.025	0.593*	−0.081
	(0.293)	(0.272)	(0.291)	(0.281)
Rural Location	−0.457	−0.785	−0.620	−1.129†
	(0.634)	(0.603)	(0.634)	(0.621)
Urban Location	−0.751	−1.378*	−0.762	−1.442*
	(0.611)	(0.585)	(0.601)	(0.589)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−3.594***	−0.405	−4.216***	−1.217
	(1.090)	(1.025)	(1.081)	(1.049)
AIC	1,461.803		1,437.576	
Observations	943		943	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.45: Remittances and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PAN	Voted Other	Voted PAN	Voted Other
Remittances w2 * PAN Target	0.092	0.826		
	(1.561)	(1.523)		
Remittances w2 * Opposition Target			−0.344	−1.156
			(1.561)	(1.543)
Remittances w2	0.867	1.040	0.930	1.425†
	(0.756)	(0.740)	(0.762)	(0.739)
PAN Target	−0.231	−0.851*		
	(0.433)	(0.426)		
Opposition Target			0.908†	0.753
			(0.475)	(0.462)
Right ID	0.044	−0.125	0.033	−0.128
	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.095)
Education	0.144	0.140	0.140	0.134
	(0.100)	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.098)
Age	0.029*	0.041**	0.027†	0.039**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Women	1.042**	0.614†	0.959**	0.549
	(0.360)	(0.351)	(0.361)	(0.350)
Wealth	0.314**	0.263*	0.302**	0.250*
	(0.107)	(0.104)	(0.107)	(0.104)
Church Attendance	0.035	−0.055	0.013	−0.075
	(0.154)	(0.150)	(0.155)	(0.150)
Interest Politics	0.440*	0.503**	0.370*	0.415*
	(0.192)	(0.187)	(0.188)	(0.182)
Presidential Approval	0.880***	−0.004	0.955**	0.075
	(0.217)	(0.197)	(0.220)	(0.197)
Democracy	0.400	0.045	0.422	0.074
	(0.381)	(0.361)	(0.383)	(0.362)
Rural Location	−0.785	−0.309	−0.849	−0.333
	(0.804)	(0.772)	(0.807)	(0.772)
Urban Location	−0.902	−1.205†	−0.987	−1.267†
	(0.754)	(0.732)	(0.747)	(0.720)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−4.406**	−1.759	−4.187**	−1.635
	(1.390)	(1.333)	(1.375)	(1.313)
AIC	1,069.750		1,070.338	
Observations	716		716	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.46: Remittances and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PAN	Voted Other	Voted PAN	Voted Other
Remittances w2 * PAN Target	−1.096	−0.927		
	(0.853)	(0.832)		
Remittances w2 * Opposition Target			−0.854	−1.506†
			(0.870)	(0.854)
Remittances w2	0.562	0.499	0.373	0.528
	(0.524)	(0.511)	(0.485)	(0.470)
PAN Target	−0.020	−0.092		
	(0.392)	(0.385)		
Opposition Target			0.539	0.770*
			(0.383)	(0.372)
Less Social Insurance	−0.167	−0.269*	−0.164	−0.267†
	(0.140)	(0.136)	(0.140)	(0.136)
Education	0.134†	0.065	0.130†	0.062
	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Age	0.018†	0.020†	0.017†	0.019†
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Women	1.059***	0.640*	0.997***	0.574*
	(0.283)	(0.274)	(0.281)	(0.273)
Wealth	0.277**	0.273**	0.269**	0.263**
	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.088)	(0.085)
Church Attendance	0.125	0.061	0.127	0.064
	(0.121)	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.118)
Interest Politics	0.463**	0.488**	0.444**	0.460**
	(0.156)	(0.152)	(0.154)	(0.150)
Presidential Approval	0.672***	−0.192	0.689***	−0.163
	(0.174)	(0.157)	(0.175)	(0.158)
Democracy	0.400	−0.108	0.383	−0.125
	(0.296)	(0.281)	(0.297)	(0.283)
Rural Location	−0.554	−0.547	−0.556	−0.554
	(0.627)	(0.603)	(0.627)	(0.603)
Urban Location	−0.643	−1.228*	−0.696	−1.298*
	(0.600)	(0.581)	(0.595)	(0.576)
Constant	−3.538**	−0.424	−3.412**	−0.334
	(1.116)	(1.069)	(1.117)	(1.071)
AIC	1,574.202		1,569.847	
Observations	969		969	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.47: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: past electoral behavior)

Abstained	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Recipients	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.02
Non-Recipients	0.06	0.05	0.02	0.04
Voted PAN	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Recipients	0.22	0.25	0.26	0.20
Non-Recipients	0.25	0.23	0.22	0.24
Voted Opposition	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Recipients	0.69	0.71	0.69	0.76
Non-Recipients	0.68	0.71	0.75	0.70

Table 6.48: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: Left-Right ID)

Abstained	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Recipients	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Non-Recipients	0.06	0.03	0.02	0.04
Voted PAN	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Recipients	0.31	0.33	0.51	0.29
Non-Recipients	0.50	0.36	0.43	0.39
Voted Opposition	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Recipients	0.67	0.64	0.46	0.69
Non-Recipients	0.43	0.59	0.54	0.56

Table 6.49: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: redistribution preferences)

Abstained	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Recipients	0.07	0.02	0.05	0.03
Non-Recipients	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.04
Voted PAN	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Recipients	0.28	0.31	0.36	0.28
Non-Recipients	0.31	0.30	0.26	0.30
Voted Opposition	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Recipients	0.64	0.65	0.58	0.68
Non-Recipients	0.63	0.65	0.70	0.64

Table 6.50: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PAN	Voted Other	Voted PAN	Voted Other
Family US * PAN Target	0.317	−0.146		
	(0.553)	(0.530)		
Family US * Opposition Target			−0.533	−0.863
			(0.612)	(0.596)
Family US	−0.218	−0.404†	−0.125	−0.305
	(0.230)	(0.221)	(0.228)	(0.219)
PAN Target	−0.270	−0.111		
	(0.452)	(0.426)		
Opposition Target			1.049*	1.326**
			(0.519)	(0.505)
Constant	1.391***	1.891***	1.188***	1.637***
	(0.176)	(0.169)	(0.174)	(0.166)
AIC	2,247.579		2,237.695	
Observations	1269		1269	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.51: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Electoral Targeting

Abstained	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.12	0.11	0.08	0.13
Non-Family US	0.09	0.08	0.03	0.10
Voted PAN	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.43	0.37	0.40	0.37
Non-Family US	0.30	0.34	0.31	0.34
Voted Opposition	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.43	0.51	0.50	0.49
Non-Family US	0.59	0.56	0.65	0.54

Table 6.52: Family US and Vote Choice: PAN Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PAN Target	−0.819	−0.086	−0.598
	(0.562)	(0.493)	(0.503)
Family US	0.024	0.070	−0.129
	(0.217)	(0.192)	(0.198)
PAN Target	0.321	0.097	0.356
	(0.438)	(0.406)	(0.399)
Constant	0.155	0.783***	0.685***
	(0.159)	(0.141)	(0.143)
AIC	3,190.066		
Observations	1269		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention/Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.53: Family US and Vote Choice: PRI Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target	−1.041†	−0.798	−0.844
	(0.577)	(0.538)	(0.542)
Family US	0.039	0.159	−0.119
	(0.218)	(0.189)	(0.197)
PRI Target	1.153*	0.744†	0.979*
	(0.459)	(0.441)	(0.437)
Constant	0.030	0.705***	0.601***
	(0.161)	(0.140)	(0.142)
AIC	3,186.132		
Observations	1269		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention/Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.54: Family US and Vote Choice: PRD Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PRD Target	0.628	0.418	0.246
	(0.659)	(0.551)	(0.561)
Family US	−0.175	−0.0002	−0.262
	(0.211)	(0.187)	(0.193)
PRD Target	−0.331	0.188	0.315
	(0.509)	(0.417)	(0.415)
Constant	0.229	0.773***	0.694***
	(0.155)	(0.140)	(0.142)
AIC	3,188.561		
Observations	1269		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention/Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.55: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Electoral Targeting

Abstained/Other	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.18	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.11	0.17
Non- Family US	0.12	0.15	0.07	0.17	0.13	0.15
Voted PAN	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.43	0.37	0.35	0.39	0.43	0.37
Non- Family US	0.30	0.34	0.31	0.34	0.36	0.33
Voted PRI	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.13	0.19	0.19	0.17	0.15	0.18
Non- Family US	0.20	0.18	0.24	0.17	0.12	0.19
Voted PRD	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.25	0.27	0.29	0.26	0.29	0.26
Non- Family US	0.36	0.31	0.36	0.31	0.37	0.31

Table 6.56: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PAN	Voted Other	Voted PAN	Voted Other
Family US * PAN Target	0.212	−0.271		
	(0.678)	(0.642)		
Family US * Opposition Target			−0.772	−1.499*
			(0.766)	(0.754)
Family US	−0.450	−0.402	−0.293	−0.084
	(0.317)	(0.302)	(0.311)	(0.309)
PAN Target	−0.438	−0.218		
	(0.560)	(0.524)		
Opposition Target			1.074	1.576*
			(0.663)	(0.652)
PAN Last Elections	1.252***	−0.046		
	(0.284)	(0.278)		
Opposition Last Elections			0.528	1.966***
			(0.367)	(0.349)
Education	0.136†	0.075	0.167*	0.100
	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.077)
Age	0.011	0.019*	0.016†	0.011
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Women	0.856**	0.409	0.798**	0.327
	(0.276)	(0.263)	(0.274)	(0.271)
Wealth	0.225**	0.231**	0.263**	0.269**
	(0.085)	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.085)
Church	0.027	0.076	0.067	0.106
	(0.122)	(0.116)	(0.121)	(0.120)
Interest Politics	0.380*	0.415**	0.424**	0.390**
	(0.151)	(0.145)	(0.148)	(0.147)
Presidential Approval	0.661***	−0.202	0.862***	0.034
	(0.175)	(0.152)	(0.182)	(0.164)
Democracy	0.522†	−0.003	0.529†	−0.151
	(0.292)	(0.271)	(0.290)	(0.280)
Rural Location	−0.407	−0.675	−0.546	−0.969
	(0.633)	(0.602)	(0.631)	(0.618)
Urban Location	−0.834	−1.421*	−0.794	−1.422*
	(0.612)	(0.586)	(0.603)	(0.591)
Region Dummies	Y		Y	
Constant	−3.467***	−0.460	−4.187***	−1.424
	(1.098)	(1.035)	(1.076)	(1.045)
AIC	1,468.168		1,440.767	
Observations	947		947	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.57: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PAN	Voted Other	Voted PAN	Voted Other
Family US * PAN Target	0.710	0.657		
	(0.818)	(0.788)		
Family US * Opposition Target			−0.466	−1.175
			(0.915)	(0.889)
Family US	−0.013	−0.203	0.205	0.170
	(0.394)	(0.379)	(0.390)	(0.374)
PAN Target	−0.659	−1.114†		
	(0.625)	(0.592)		
Opposition Target			1.078	1.244†
			(0.747)	(0.719)
Right ID	0.061	−0.109	0.057	−0.105
	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.097)	(0.094)
Education	0.150	0.146	0.155	0.154
	(0.100)	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.097)
Age	0.030*	0.041**	0.028*	0.040**
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Women	1.038**	0.577†	0.975**	0.561
	(0.357)	(0.348)	(0.356)	(0.346)
Wealth	0.307**	0.259*	0.291**	0.252*
	(0.108)	(0.104)	(0.108)	(0.104)
Church Attendance	0.040	−0.046	0.033	−0.054
	(0.154)	(0.148)	(0.153)	(0.148)
Interest Politics	0.428*	0.489**	0.391*	0.437*
	(0.190)	(0.184)	(0.186)	(0.180)
Presidential Approval	0.903***	0.028	0.971***	0.073
	(0.214)	(0.193)	(0.218)	(0.196)
Democracy	0.335	−0.006	0.336	0.002
	(0.378)	(0.357)	(0.380)	(0.358)
Rural Location	−0.739	−0.214	−0.730	−0.124
	(0.805)	(0.773)	(0.803)	(0.767)
Urban Location	−0.904	−1.230*	−0.934	−1.217*
	(0.756)	(0.734)	(0.748)	(0.722)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−4.432**	−1.673	−4.504***	−1.970
	(1.394)	(1.327)	(1.366)	(1.297)
AIC	1,073.258		1,071.974	
Observations	717		717	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.58: Family US and Vote Choice: Electoral Targets

	Voted PAN	Voted Other	Voted PAN	Voted Other
Family US * PAN Target	0.503	0.147		
	(0.687)	(0.661)		
Family US * Opposition Target			−0.140	−0.934
			(0.704)	(0.682)
Family US	−0.356	−0.426	−0.250	−0.168
	(0.319)	(0.309)	(0.317)	(0.308)
PAN Target	−0.582	−0.399		
	(0.555)	(0.528)		
Opposition Target			0.427	1.043†
			(0.584)	(0.564)
Less Social Insurance	−0.144	−0.246†	−0.137	−0.232†
	(0.139)	(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.135)
Education	0.149†	0.088	0.149†	0.089
	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Age	0.021*	0.022*	0.020†	0.021†
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Women	1.062***	0.642*	1.022***	0.602*
	(0.281)	(0.273)	(0.280)	(0.272)
Wealth	0.279**	0.279**	0.268**	0.273**
	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.085)
Church Attendance	0.120	0.066	0.125	0.068
	(0.122)	(0.119)	(0.122)	(0.118)
Interest Politics	0.483**	0.493**	0.466**	0.472**
	(0.155)	(0.151)	(0.153)	(0.149)
Presidential Approval	0.696***	−0.168	0.718***	−0.147
	(0.171)	(0.154)	(0.173)	(0.155)
Democracy	0.349	−0.144	0.352	−0.174
	(0.295)	(0.280)	(0.296)	(0.281)
Rural Location	−0.543	−0.515	−0.538	−0.505
	(0.627)	(0.602)	(0.625)	(0.601)
Urban Location	−0.714	−1.317*	−0.740	−1.347*
	(0.603)	(0.583)	(0.599)	(0.580)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−3.486**	−0.400	−3.542**	−0.583
	(1.129)	(1.078)	(1.119)	(1.070)
AIC	1,575.441		1,568.479	
Observations	971		971	

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.59: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: past electoral behavior)

Abstained	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.08	0.06	0.04	0.05
Non- Family US	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.04
Voted PAN	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.28	0.24	0.27	0.23
Non- Family US	0.21	0.25	0.19	0.27
Voted Opposition	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.62	0.69	0.68	0.71
Non- Family US	0.73	0.70	0.79	0.68

Table 6.60: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: Left-Right ID)

Abstained	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.04
Non- Family US	0.08	0.03	0.01	0.04
Voted PAN	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.50	0.39	0.52	0.39
Non- Family US	0.43	0.34	0.35	0.37
Voted Opposition	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.44	0.57	0.44	0.56
Non- Family US	0.48	0.61	0.63	0.57

Table 6.61: Predicted Probabilities - Vote Choice (control: redistributive preferences)

Abstained	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04
Non- Family US	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.04
Voted PAN	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.34	0.30	0.33	0.29
Non- Family US	0.25	0.29	0.20	0.31
Voted Opposition	PAN Target	No PAN Target	Opposition Target	No Opp. Target
Family US	0.59	0.64	0.61	0.65
Non- Family US	0.69	0.66	0.77	0.63

Table 6.62: Family US and Vote Choice: PAN Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PAN Target	−0.864	0.091	−0.183
	(0.679)	(0.612)	(0.620)
Family US	−0.115	−0.162	−0.028
	(0.294)	(0.268)	(0.270)
PAN Target	0.199	−0.124	0.120
	(0.522)	(0.502)	(0.500)
PAN Last Elections	−0.697*	1.244***	0.288
	(0.296)	(0.246)	(0.255)
Education	0.053	0.137*	0.093
	(0.073)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Age	0.023*	0.009	0.017†
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Women	0.165	0.578*	0.028
	(0.266)	(0.240)	(0.243)
Wealth	0.142†	0.153*	0.174*
	(0.081)	(0.074)	(0.075)
Church Attendance	0.084	0.009	0.060
	(0.116)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Interest Politics	0.162	0.123	0.101
	(0.140)	(0.126)	(0.127)
Presidential Approval	−0.291†	0.675***	−0.159
	(0.152)	(0.156)	(0.140)
Democracy	0.151	0.508*	−0.121
	(0.274)	(0.255)	(0.248)
Rural Location	−0.329	−0.158	−0.554
	(0.541)	(0.533)	(0.524)
Urban Location	−1.233*	−0.589	−1.295***
	(0.516)	(0.503)	(0.495)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−1.106	−3.072**	−0.575
	(1.003)	(0.938)	(0.919)
AIC	2,114.361		
Observations	947		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.63: Family US and Vote Choice: PRI Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target	-1.721^{*}	-0.827	$-1.217^{\dagger}$
	(0.719)	(0.660)	(0.663)
Family US	0.259	-0.042	0.144
	(0.311)	(0.261)	(0.271)
PRI Target	1.277^{*}	0.661	1.373^{*}
	(0.575)	(0.545)	(0.544)
PRI Last Elections	1.987^{***}	-0.243	-0.185
	(0.311)	(0.303)	(0.316)
Education	0.082	0.164^{*}	0.097
	(0.076)	(0.065)	(0.067)
Age	0.012	0.019^{*}	0.019^{*}
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Women	0.019	0.576^{*}	0.022
	(0.278)	(0.236)	(0.244)
Wealth	0.167^{*}	0.194^{**}	0.199^{**}
	(0.085)	(0.073)	(0.076)
Church Attendance	0.089	0.053	0.064
	(0.122)	(0.105)	(0.108)
Interest Politics	0.102	0.177	0.120
	(0.145)	(0.123)	(0.126)
Presidential Approval	-0.193	0.769^{***}	-0.141
	(0.158)	(0.155)	(0.142)
Democracy	-0.100	0.570^{*}	-0.120
	(0.287)	(0.252)	(0.251)
Rural Location	-0.595	-0.138	-0.593
	(0.557)	(0.526)	(0.525)
Urban Location	-1.398^{***}	-0.558	-1.394^{***}
	(0.524)	(0.495)	(0.494)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Constant	-1.665	-3.658^{***}	-0.840
	(1.039)	(0.916)	(0.913)
AIC	2,076.838		
Observations	947		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.64: Family US and Vote Choice: PRD Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PRD Target	0.453	0.765	0.273
	(0.790)	(0.704)	(0.729)
Family US	−0.292	−0.261	−0.209
	(0.287)	(0.256)	(0.270)
PRD Target	−0.061	0.116	0.088
	(0.594)	(0.520)	(0.532)
PRD Last Elections	−1.151	−0.006	1.934***
	(0.804)	(0.605)	(0.521)
Education	0.045	0.150*	0.095
	(0.073)	(0.064)	(0.068)
Age	0.020*	0.017*	0.016†
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Women	0.173	0.529*	−0.008
	(0.264)	(0.237)	(0.248)
Wealth	0.136†	0.189**	0.192*
	(0.080)	(0.073)	(0.077)
Church Attendance	0.071	0.069	0.078
	(0.116)	(0.104)	(0.110)
Interest Politics	0.130	0.177	0.083
	(0.139)	(0.124)	(0.130)
Presidential Approval	−0.400**	0.804***	−0.039
	(0.150)	(0.155)	(0.143)
Democracy	0.173	0.590*	−0.063
	(0.273)	(0.251)	(0.254)
Rural Location	−0.302	−0.258	−0.694
	(0.536)	(0.524)	(0.530)
Urban Location	−1.378**	−0.548	−1.248*
	(0.503)	(0.491)	(0.493)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−0.774	−3.496***	−0.774
	(0.977)	(0.915)	(0.923)
AIC	2,121.442		
Observations	947		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.65: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Electoral Targeting (control: past electoral behavior)

Abstained/Other	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.11	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.06	0.09
Non- Family US	0.08	0.08	0.03	0.09	0.07	0.07
Voted PAN	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.26	0.23	0.21	0.24	0.36	0.24
Non- Family US	0.21	0.25	0.17	0.28	0.27	0.25
Voted PRI	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.11	0.19	0.13	0.20	0.16	0.18
Non- Family US	0.23	0.20	0.20	0.17	0.17	0.19
Voted PRD	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.50	0.46	0.56	0.46	0.40	0.46
Non- Family US	0.47	0.44	0.58	0.44	0.47	0.46

Table 6.66: Family US and Vote Choice: PAN Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PAN Target	0.445	0.768	1.016
	(0.852)	(0.729)	(0.747)
Family US	0.082	0.198	−0.027
	(0.337)	(0.309)	(0.312)
PAN Target	−0.795	−0.188	−0.558
	(0.623)	(0.542)	(0.552)
Right ID	0.154†	0.093	−0.233**
	(0.088)	(0.079)	(0.080)
Education	0.062	0.098	0.110
	(0.086)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Age	0.009	0.007	0.020†
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Women	0.462	0.718*	0.036
	(0.319)	(0.290)	(0.297)
Wealth	0.085	0.184*	0.173†
	(0.094)	(0.087)	(0.089)
Church Attendance	−0.047	0.041	−0.044
	(0.137)	(0.126)	(0.128)
Interest Politics	0.174	0.098	0.091
	(0.160)	(0.145)	(0.146)
Presidential Approval	−0.278	0.744***	−0.084
	(0.177)	(0.178)	(0.163)
Democracy	0.036	0.306	−0.099
	(0.336)	(0.310)	(0.302)
Rural Location	−0.586	−0.953	−0.457
	(0.667)	(0.664)	(0.660)
Urban Location	−1.157†	−0.781	−1.167†
	(0.627)	(0.617)	(0.618)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−0.956	−2.465*	0.201
	(1.190)	(1.117)	(1.101)
AIC	1,594.921		
Observations	717		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.67: Family US and Vote Choice: PRI Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target	−1.301	−0.485	−0.840
	(0.849)	(0.795)	(0.800)
Family US	0.403	0.418	0.285
	(0.343)	(0.309)	(0.313)
PRI Target	1.160†	0.830	1.181†
	(0.643)	(0.617)	(0.614)
Right ID	0.150†	0.091	−0.235**
	(0.088)	(0.079)	(0.081)
Education	0.070	0.100	0.111
	(0.086)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Age	0.009	0.007	0.019†
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Women	0.473	0.703*	0.039
	(0.319)	(0.288)	(0.297)
Wealth	0.091	0.185*	0.181*
	(0.095)	(0.088)	(0.090)
Church Attendance	−0.061	0.038	−0.050
	(0.137)	(0.126)	(0.128)
Interest Politics	0.149	0.108	0.082
	(0.158)	(0.143)	(0.145)
Presidential Approval	−0.284	0.750***	−0.083
	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.165)
Democracy	0.067	0.285	−0.117
	(0.337)	(0.311)	(0.303)
Rural Location	−0.506	−0.933	−0.387
	(0.665)	(0.663)	(0.659)
Urban Location	−1.164†	−0.808	−1.176†
	(0.625)	(0.615)	(0.616)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−1.202	−2.536*	0.025
	(1.174)	(1.097)	(1.086)
AIC	1,595.609		
Observations	717		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.68: Family US and Vote Choice: PRD Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PRD Target	0.672	0.579	0.201
	(0.966)	(0.820)	(0.811)
Family US	0.109	0.254	0.118
	(0.333)	(0.303)	(0.308)
PRD Target	−0.548	0.243	0.141
	(0.739)	(0.597)	(0.576)
Right ID	0.148†	0.089	−0.235**
	(0.087)	(0.079)	(0.080)
Education	0.059	0.097	0.109
	(0.085)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Age	0.009	0.006	0.019†
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Women	0.481	0.687*	0.031
	(0.318)	(0.289)	(0.297)
Wealth	0.081	0.179*	0.170†
	(0.094)	(0.087)	(0.089)
Church Attendance	−0.042	0.054	−0.031
	(0.137)	(0.125)	(0.128)
Interest Politics	0.167	0.120	0.100
	(0.158)	(0.144)	(0.145)
Presidential Approval	−0.267	0.774***	−0.063
	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.163)
Democracy	0.085	0.333	−0.108
	(0.337)	(0.312)	(0.302)
Rural Location	−0.558	−0.967	−0.406
	(0.664)	(0.662)	(0.658)
Urban Location	−1.132†	−0.787	−1.138†
	(0.623)	(0.615)	(0.615)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−1.032	−2.500*	0.087
	(1.178)	(1.106)	(1.094)
AIC	1,597.077		
Observations	717		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.69: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Electoral Targeting (control: Left-Right ID)

Abstained/Other	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.07
Non- Family US	0.12	0.08	0.03	0.09	0.08	0.08
Voted PAN	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.50	0.40	0.46	0.41	0.55	0.41
Non- Family US	0.44	0.36	0.33	0.38	0.44	0.37
Voted PRI	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.09	0.20	0.13	0.19	0.12	0.18
Non- Family US	0.13	0.20	0.21	0.18	0.10	0.19
Voted PRD	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.34	0.31	0.34	0.31	0.27	0.32
Non- Family US	0.29	0.35	0.41	0.33	0.36	0.33

Table 6.70: Family US and Vote Choice: PAN Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PAN Target	−0.490	0.118	−0.262
	(0.671)	(0.598)	(0.614)
Family US	−0.034	0.014	0.041
	(0.287)	(0.255)	(0.263)
PAN Target	0.092	−0.104	0.224
	(0.526)	(0.486)	(0.488)
Less Social Insurance	−0.199	−0.057	−0.130
	(0.129)	(0.115)	(0.120)
Education	−0.011	0.094	0.045
	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.065)
Age	0.011	0.012	0.014
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Women	0.417	0.706**	0.147
	(0.260)	(0.230)	(0.238)
Wealth	0.176*	0.191**	0.212**
	(0.081)	(0.072)	(0.075)
Church Attendance	0.084	0.106	0.040
	(0.115)	(0.102)	(0.105)
Interest Politics	0.203	0.198†	0.164
	(0.137)	(0.120)	(0.123)
Presidential Approval	−0.405**	0.619***	−0.220
	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.136)
Democracy	0.131	0.432†	−0.159
	(0.271)	(0.244)	(0.243)
Rural Location	−0.268	−0.441	−0.577
	(0.532)	(0.517)	(0.517)
Urban Location	−1.194*	−0.552	−1.257*
	(0.508)	(0.489)	(0.490)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−0.397	−2.686**	−0.158
	(1.001)	(0.918)	(0.918)
AIC	2,292.284		
Observations	971		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.71: Family US and Vote Choice: PRI Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PRI Target	-1.346^{*}	-0.701	-1.297^{*}
	(0.686)	(0.643)	(0.643)
Family US	0.122	0.124	0.226
	(0.289)	(0.252)	(0.264)
PRI Target	1.115^{*}	0.414	1.391^{**}
	(0.549)	(0.528)	(0.521)
Less Social Insurance	-0.189	-0.057	-0.112
	(0.129)	(0.115)	(0.121)
Education	-0.004	0.099	0.048
	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.065)
Age	0.011	0.012	0.014
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Women	0.395	0.698^{**}	0.129
	(0.261)	(0.230)	(0.239)
Wealth	0.178^{*}	0.193^{**}	0.218^{**}
	(0.081)	(0.072)	(0.075)
Church Attendance	0.081	0.114	0.038
	(0.115)	(0.101)	(0.105)
Interest Politics	0.190	0.197†	0.156
	(0.136)	(0.119)	(0.123)
Presidential Approval	-0.408^{**}	0.613^{***}	-0.224
	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.138)
Democracy	0.111	0.437†	-0.199
	(0.272)	(0.245)	(0.245)
Rural Location	-0.276	-0.422	-0.594
	(0.531)	(0.517)	(0.517)
Urban Location	-1.242^{*}	-0.560	-1.319^{**}
	(0.509)	(0.489)	(0.491)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Constant	-0.507	-2.782^{**}	-0.289
	(0.994)	(0.910)	(0.913)
AIC	2,279.891		
Observations	971		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.72: Family US and Vote Choice: PRD Targets

	Voted PRI	Voted PAN	Voted PRD
Family US * PRD Target	0.503	0.950	0.309
	(0.792)	(0.703)	(0.704)
Family US	−0.163	−0.075	−0.024
	(0.279)	(0.247)	(0.256)
PRD Target	−0.089	−0.117	0.137
	(0.586)	(0.513)	(0.501)
Less Social Insurance	−0.193	−0.056	−0.130
	(0.129)	(0.115)	(0.120)
Education	−0.009	0.091	0.044
	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.065)
Age	0.011	0.011	0.013
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Women	0.414	0.685**	0.133
	(0.260)	(0.231)	(0.238)
Wealth	0.168*	0.184*	0.209**
	(0.080)	(0.072)	(0.074)
Church Attendance	0.080	0.109	0.040
	(0.114)	(0.101)	(0.105)
Interest Politics	0.188	0.192	0.161
	(0.136)	(0.120)	(0.122)
Presidential Approval	−0.394**	0.632***	−0.209
	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.136)
Democracy	0.144	0.466†	−0.165
	(0.271)	(0.245)	(0.243)
Rural Location	−0.317	−0.466	−0.616
	(0.530)	(0.516)	(0.516)
Urban Location	−1.227*	−0.558	−1.274**
	(0.506)	(0.488)	(0.488)
Region Dummies	Y	Y	Y
Constant	−0.289	−2.603**	−0.075
	(0.994)	(0.914)	(0.915)
AIC	2,290.236		
Observations	971		

S.E. in parentheses. Reference category: Abstention-Other.

$***\ p < 0.001, **\ p < 0.01, *\ p < 0.05, (\dagger)\ p < 0.1$

Table 6.73: Predicted Probabilities - Family US and Electoral Targeting (control: redistributive preferences)

Abstained/Other	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.09
Non- Family US	0.08	0.08	0.03	0.09	0.08	0.08
Voted PAN	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.33	0.30	0.24	0.30	0.39	0.29
Non- Family US	0.25	0.30	0.17	0.31	0.26	0.30
Voted PRI	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.13	0.19	0.16	0.19	0.16	0.18
Non- Family US	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.19	0.18	0.20
Voted PRD	PAN Target	No PAN Target	PRI Target	No PRI Target	PRD Target	No PRD Target
Family US	0.43	0.41	0.50	0.42	0.38	0.42
Non- Family US	0.46	0.40	0.57	0.39	0.46	0.40

Chapter 7

Conclusion

International migration is a worldwide phenomenon that touches the lives of millions of people across the developing world. In particular, not only does migration affect those families whose members are miles apart from each other, but also those communities that lose numerous neighbors and receive substantial remittances in return. In this dissertation, I have addressed the implications of this movement of people across borders on the electoral dynamics of the sending countries. By looking at political parties' electoral strategies as well as voters' ballot decisions, this project shows that international migration shapes political parties' electoral targeting and this targeting then affects voters' behavior.

My theory draws on the idea that citizens' involvement in migration has an effect on their political lives. While this exposure might happen because of direct (i.e., being a migrant) or indirect (i.e., having close relatives abroad, being a remittance recipient individual or household) participation in migration, it creates a distinction between migrant and non-migrant families. Migrant families are therefore those whose members exercise the 'exit' option and move to another country in the search of better opportunities, plan to join relatives already abroad, and/or receive monetary help from a different country (i.e., remittances). These conditions make them both less dependent on governments' actions and less politically engaged in domestic politics.

Building on this logic, this dissertation has argued that international migration helps political parties to decide who to target during elections. Because exposure to migration fosters political disengagement from domestic politics and makes migrant families' more inclined to stay home on

election day, these migration-exposed voters are more likely to be targets of electoral strategies than similar non-migration-exposed ones. That is, as developed in Chapter 3, migrant families' lower dependency on governments' actions, lower motivation to get politically involved, and lower attachment to political parties explain why political contenders attempt to win these voters during elections. Additionally, I have also defended that, due to political parties' capacity to adapt to the needs of voters and to use varied electoral tactics, these electoral strategies are successful in getting migrant and non-migrant families' votes on election day.

This dissertation's findings support the intuition that political parties respond to the presence of migration-exposed voters in their electorate. In particular, Chapter 4 shows that both incumbent and opposition parties approach these migration-exposed voters in order to win elections. During the 2000 electoral campaign, the incumbent PRI used non-programmatic (clientelism and home visits) targeting to participate in the mobilization or turnout buying of migration-exposed supporters, especially return migrants and those respondents with family in the US. In addition, the PRI also aimed to persuade or buy the votes of those respondents with family in the US who favored the PAN in the 1994 presidential elections. Importantly, the PAN was a key contender in 2000 and mobilized migrant families as well that were PAN supporters through non-programmatic targeting. With respect to non-migration-exposed voters, the PAN also targeted those who were PAN sympathizes but used instead programmatic tactics (PAN advertising and promotion materials). As for the PRD, Chapter 4 finds that this party relied mostly on sending advertising materials - or programmatic targeting - to those who electorally favor the PRD in the previous elections, especially if they had family members living in the US.

Similarly, in Chapter 5 and during the 2006 electoral campaign, the incumbent PAN used non-programmatic targeting to mobilize migration-exposed voters, both remittance recipients and respondents with family in the US, that were sympathizers and tried to win the vote of migration-exposed voters that were non-supporters, especially remittance recipients that voted for the PRD in the 2000 elections. Moreover, the opposing PRD also participated in the turnout buying of remittance recipients who were supporters. This last finding about PRD's behavior also explains why the PAN attempted to persuade remittance recipients that favored the contestant PRD. In particular, the PRD candidate was a plausible winner in 2006, and so these PRD mobilized remittance recipients could jeopardize PAN's winning chances. Thus, the PAN had incentives to target

these mobilized remittance recipients and convince them to vote for the PAN instead of the PRD. With respect to PRI's behavior, Chapter 5 has not found any strong relationship between the PRI electoral targeting and the distinction between migration and non-migration exposed voters in 2006.

In short, results in Chapter 4 and 5 indicate that migration-exposed voters tend to be electoral targets. This dissertation's argument that exposure to international migration promotes political disengagement from national politics and fosters intentions to stay home on election day is essential to understanding why. Put differently, due to the effects of international migration on migrant families' political lives, political parties have incentives to mobilize and persuade these voters in order to win elections. And while the incumbent is one of the key participants in this targeting of migration-exposed voters, opposition contenders also engage in the targeting of these voters.

This project has also addressed whether political parties' electoral strategies are successful and deliver the intended outcome. Interestingly, results from the 2000 elections indicate that electoral targeting was generally effective among both migration (return migrants and respondents with family in the US) and non-migration-exposed voters. In other words, PAN and Fox's victory was possible in part because of the successful mobilization of non-PRI supporters, which included members of migrant families. On the other hand, results from the 2006 elections offer some differences for migration and non-migration-exposed voters. Particularly, electoral targeting (both incumbent and opposition targeting) was mostly ineffective among remittance recipients but effective among non-remittances-recipients. Similarly, PAN targeting was only effective among respondents with family in the US, while opposition targeting reported more effectiveness among members of non-migrant families. Consequently, PAN reelection and Calderon's victory were to an extent due to the PAN's successful mobilization of respondents with family in the US. Nonetheless, these findings rely on small differences when comparing targeted and non-targeted voters, and therefore, these assertions about electoral effectiveness/ineffectiveness are not strong claims. Moreover, results in Chapter 6 indicate that, in general, migrant and non-migrant families are not that different in their electoral choices, even after taking into account the effect of electoral targeting.

These findings have numerous implications. First, the results provide new perspectives on how international migration affects domestic politics back home. That is, while existing work had focused mostly on the demand side of elections - or migrant families and migrant-rich communities'

behavior - this project helps us to understand the relationship between migration and political parties' electoral strategies - or the supply-side of elections. Simply put, international migration and the distinction that emerges between migrant and non-migrant families (e.g., differences in political engagement) assist political parties in identifying their electoral targets. Second, these strategies tend to be effective in delivering the intended electoral outcome. Thus, these findings indicate that besides socioeconomic status, which is commonly mentioned in the literature on electoral targeting; political parties rely on other characteristics of voters to identify their targets and design electoral strategies that maximize their winning chances. Both contributions are essential to connecting international migration with political parties' strategies and voters' decisions. Moreover, this work improves our understanding on not only how political parties respond to the presence of migrant families in the electorate, but also on why, given political parties' actions, migrant and non-migrant families vote in a particular way.

Relatedly, and despite previous arguments (e.g., Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast, 2003; Pfutze, 2012), this project does not find much evidence for the association between international migration and the weakening of electoral targeting, at least at the individual level. That is, this analysis shows that migration-exposed voters still respond by and large to the electoral strategies of political parties. This holds especially when looking at the 2000 elections and mostly for the 2006 ones as well. The only notable exception is that electoral targeting does not increase the chances of getting votes from remittance recipients. Yet, as above mentioned, the changes in behavior from targeted and non-targeted remittance recipients are overall not significant enough to make a substantial claim about this ineffectiveness.

This dissertation's findings also connect with the broader literature on democratic accountability and political development. Essentially, if international migration helps political parties to employ certain strategies effectively, political contenders have incentives to keep using them in future electoral contests. Yet, conditioning the vote on the exchange of goods/favors and on coercion mechanisms as opposed to performance in office and policy programs has widely recognized negative consequences for the workings of democracy and the quality of political institutions (e.g., Stokes, 2005; Adsera, Boix and Payne, 2003; Kitschelt et al., 2010). Most importantly, if migration fosters politicians' behavior that hinders sound developmental policies, it is quite likely that instead of bringing positive benefits back home and eventually ending the need to leave, this international

phenomenon just means more 'politics-as-usual' and further migration.

In addition, this negative outcome has important policy implications for both destination and origin countries. That is, if international migration fosters electoral practices that impede development back home, looking for economic opportunities abroad will remain as the obvious option for many people. High levels of migration are, however, not only detrimental for the economic prosperity of the sending countries, but also cause significant security issues in certain regions of world (e.g., Central America, North Africa). Thus, designing migration policies and regional collaborations that ensure the electoral engagement of migrant households and prevent the encouragement of questionable electoral tactics can bring significant benefits across the world.

Needless to say, this research offers opportunities for future research. In particular, an ideal next step will be to address some the weaknesses of the data used in this dissertation: first, the fact that a national sample does not include that many return migrants and remittance recipients, which makes the existing findings rely on a small number of observations, and second, the use of direct survey questions to inquire about clientelism. As mentioned in previous chapters, due to the dishonest nature of clientelism, direct questions about this activity can lead respondents to lie about (i.e., under-report) being approached by political parties. This is why this project has not used these direct questions about clientelism alone for the data analysis, but instead has combined them with answers about home visits (i.e., direct questions about home visits are less subject to bias because there is no reference to exchanged goods or favors and possibly capture some unreported clientelism since they mean interaction with political parties during electoral campaigns) (see Chapters 4 and 5 for additional details on data coding decisions). As a way to deal with both limitations, conducting a survey in a migrant-rich locality or region would help maximizing the number of, for instance, return migrants. In addition, using list experiments to deal with social desirability bias (see Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012 for an example) could be highly useful to capture more accurately the clientelistic targeting of migration and non-migration-exposed respondents. More precisely, this survey list experiment would randomly split the sample into a control and a treatment group, and only the later group will be asked about being clientelistic practices (i.e., receiving gifts and favors from political parties). Given that respondents only have to report the total number of electoral practices they have experienced as opposed to detail which ones, anonymity about clientelism is ensured and social desirability pressures are reduced. Then, it

would be possible to compare the results for treatment and control group as well as for migration and non-migration-exposed voters.

This project also raises a number of additional questions (or, put differently, leaves some questions unanswered) about political parties' behavior. One is whether or not political parties use certain political strategies with particular types of voters, for instance, home visits are chosen over clientelism to target migrant families, or vice versa. Therefore, using the above mentioned survey list experiment should provide a good starting point to test if political parties choose clientelism or home visits when targeting migration and non-migration-exposed voters. A related query is *where* political parties decide to concentrate their electoral targeting efforts. That is, if international migration leads migrant-rich municipalities to improve their economic situation (i.e., due to monetary remittances) or to lose their most educated voters (i.e., brain drain mechanism), this can affect the extent to which political parties focus their efforts on these or other localities.

Additionally, this project would also benefit from in-depths interviews with representatives of political parties. These interviews would help to provide evidence on why political parties target members of migrant families. While I have argued that these families experience political disengagement and are at risk of staying home on election day, obtaining the same reasons from political parties would be an ideal complement to the existing data analysis. Moreover, these interviews could also address the extent to which political contenders offer tailor goods to migration-exposed voters. As previously mentioned, this is one of potential reasons explaining electoral effectiveness among migrant families.

Finally, this analysis of the Mexican case also raises the questions of how international migration affects political parties' strategies in other countries with similar or different political party systems and migration profiles; as well as how migration-exposed voters respond to these practices in other parts of the world. In other words, expanding this study to other countries and political contexts is also an exciting next step. Given the magnitude of international migration across the world, understanding its implications on the electoral dynamics of the sending countries more broadly remains as an inspiring area for future research.

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive Statistics: 2000 Post-Electoral Sample

Vote Choice	Abstention	Incumbent	Opposition
Respondents	182	311	661

Vote Choice	Abstention/Other	PRI	PAN	PRD
Respondents	220	311	492	131

Type of Place	Mixed	Rural	Urban
Respondents - Type of Place	119	257	823

Region	Center West	Center District	North	South
Respondents - Region	319	153	307	252	168

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Target	1199	0.34	0.47	0	1
PRI Target	1199	0.25	0.43	0	1
Opposition Target	1199	0.18	0.39	0	1
PAN Target	1199	0.11	0.32	0	1
PRD Target	1199	0.02	0.16	0	1
Advert	1199	0.58	0.49	0	1
PRI Advert	1199	0.48	0.49	0	1
Opposition Advert	1199	0.38	0.48	0	1
PAN Advert	1199	0.31	0.46	0	1
PRD Advert	1199	0.22	0.41	0	1
Return Migrant	1193	0.06	0.25	0	1
Family US	1193	0.51	0.5	0	1
PRI ID	1171	0.28	0.44	0	1
PAN ID	1171	0.33	0.47	0	1
PRD ID	1171	0.10	0.30	0	1
PRI last elections	1088	0.34	0.47	0	1
PAN last elections	1088	0.17	0.37	0	1
PRD last elections	1088	0.12	0.32	0	1
Opposition last elections	1088	0.30	0.45	0	1
National Economic Situation	1155	0.92	0.73	0	2
Right ID	950	5.59	3.25	0	10
Less Redistribution	1145	3.79	3.03	1	10
Women	1199	0.49	0.5	0	1
Age	1194	37.45	15.43	18	90
Education	1194	2.04	1.18	0	4
Wealth	1199	3.83	1.43	0	6
Risk Acceptant	1140	0.71	0.45	0	1
Employed	1163	0.46	0.49	0	1
Church Attendance	1184	2.19	1.11	0	4
Talk Politics	1191	2.59	0.82	1	4
Interest in Politics	1186	2.38	0.90	1	4
Democracy	1199	0.59	0.49	0	1
Clean Elections	1145	3.25	0.85	1	4

Descriptive Statistics: 2006 Panel Sample

Vote Choice	Abstention	Incumbent	Opposition
Respondents wave 3	209	580	1048

Vote Choice	Abstention/Other	PAN	PRD	PRI
Respondents wave 3	327	580	617	313

Type of Place	Mixed	Rural	Urban
Respondents - Type of Place, wave 1	160	620	1620

Region	Center West	Center District	North	South
Respondents - Region	380	320	880	320	500

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Targeting - Participants all Waves					
Target wave 1- wave 3	1377	0.33	0.47	0	1
PRI Target w1-3	1377	0.17	0.37	0	1
PAN Target w1-3	1377	0.16	0.36	0	1
PRD Target w1-3	1377	0.15	0.36	0	1
Targeting - Participants Any Wave					
Target wave 1- wave 3	2400	0.25	0.43	0	1
PRI Target w1-3	2400	0.12	0.33	0	1
PAN Target w1-3	2400	0.11	0.32	0	1
PRD Target w1-3	2400	0.12	0.32	0	1
Remittance Recipients w2	1758	0.11	0.32	0	1
Family US w1	2393	0.51	0.49	0	1
PRI last elections w1	2123	0.20	0.40	0	1
PAN last elections w1	2123	0.38	0.48	0	1
PRD last elections w1	2123	0.11	0.31	0	1
PRI ID w1	2317	0.25	0.43	0	1
PAN ID w1	2317	0.22	0.41	0	1
PRD ID w1	2317	0.22	0.41	0	1
Right ID w1	1522	3.91	1.77	1	7
Less Redistribution w1	2151	2.18	0.96	1	3
Presidential Approval w1	2272	1.36	0.89	0	2
Women w1	2400	0.51	0.49	0	1
Age w1	2397	40.36	16.07	17	92
Education w1	2393	4.92	2.54	1	9
Wealth w1	2400	5.03	2.07	0	8
Church Attendance w1	2368	2.14	1.16	0	4
Talk Politics w1	2372	2.37	0.88	1	4
Interest Politics w1	2349	2.17	0.99	1	4
Democracy w1	2115	0.65	0.47	0	1
Democracy w3	1455	0.66	0.47	0	1
Clean Elections w3	1530	2.66	1.01	1	4

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