BORDERLINE EUROPEANS:
EUROPEAN UNION CITIZENSHIP ON THE POLISH-GERMAN FRONTIER

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Abstract

Based on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2003 and 2006 in the border cities of Slubice, Poland and Frankfurt(Oder), Germany, this dissertation is an examination of the meanings and practices of the European Union’s transnational citizenship policies. By documenting the everyday negotiations, interactions, and reflections of life on the Polish-German border, this study chronicles both the successes and failures of European Union citizenship at the local level, and focuses particularly on how various social groups experience European Union citizenship in disparate ways, how the performance of citizenship contributes to the formation of transnational public spaces and identities, and how the tension between the legal and cultural elements of European Union citizenship profoundly structures local citizenship practice. The key intervention of this study is the observation that even as European Union policies aimed at creating deterritorialized economic, social, and political spaces expand supranational citizenship rights and privileges, hierarchies of value embedded within these policies grant rights differentially to individuals and groups in ways that are often linked to ethnicity and nationality. This dissertation therefore argues that despite European Union policymakers’ efforts to create a hybridized “European” identity that might transcend historical conflicts and divisions, the processes they are using to pursue this goal are simultaneously generating new forms of difference and inequality.
For my Parents

and

For Sofiya
Acknowledgements

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<tr>
<td>A8</td>
<td>The 10 countries that acceded to the EU on May 1, 2004 with the exception of Cyprus and Malta.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A10</td>
<td>The 10 countries that acceded to the EU on May 1, 2004 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A12</td>
<td>The 12 countries that acceded to the EU on May 1, 2004 and January 1, 2007 (the A10 plus Bulgaria and Romania).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>Collegium Polonicum in Słubice, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>German Marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>European Monetary Union</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU15</td>
<td>The 15 EU member states prior to the EU expansion on May 1, 2004 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU25</td>
<td>The 25 EU member states following the accession of the A10 on May 1, 2004.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU27</td>
<td>The 27 EU member states following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on January 1, 2007.</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>EU Euros</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLN</td>
<td>Polish Zloty</td>
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MEPS Master's of European Political Studies

PPP Purchasing Power Parity

PPS Purchasing Power Standard
Chapter 1

Introduction

A European Border in 2005

An ironically located McDonald's on the corner of Karl Marx Strasse and Rosa Luxemburg Strasse marks the beginning of the border crossing between Frankfurt(Oder), Germany and Slubice, Poland. Proceeding west toward the border, a traveler passes a casino, a few taxis waiting near the Frankfurt(Oder) Sports Museum, and several empty lots that until recently held socialist-style apartment blocks. Entering the covered area of the border control complex, cars and bicycles continue along the roadway to inspection booths, while pedestrian traffic is directed along the outside edges to windows located in the checkpoint buildings. After waiting in a short line—almost never more than five minutes—all travelers must present a passport or national identification card to both the German and Polish border police. For European Union (EU) citizens, this is an open border, and the document check is usually cursory, amounting to only a glance through a passport or at an ID card. For people carrying non-EU, “third country” passports, the check is more stringent, and its rigor often depends on the traveler’s country of origin.

After clearing the checkpoint, travelers cross a steel three-lane bridge that spans the Oder River (Fig. 1.1). From the bridge, crossing the approximately 150 meters that actually separate Frankfurt(Oder) and Slubice appears deceptively easy. However, at least 70 people have drowned since 1993 during attempts to illegally cross the Polish-German border.¹ Police boats and helicopters regularly patrol the river, while various

¹ Source: Data compiled from various media sources as of March 14, 2007 by the NGO UNITED (www.unitedagainstracism.org).
less visible surveillance technologies, such as thermal imaging cameras, monitor the frontier to prevent unauthorized access to the EU’s border-free zone.

At the end of the bridge, a white and red boundary marker bearing Poland’s crowned white eagle (Fig. 1.2) greets travelers arriving on the east side of the river. Parallel to the river and adjacent to Słubice’s protective dike, a long, often two-car-wide, line of taxis waits around-the-clock for people crossing from Germany. On the opposite side of a traffic circle, mini-buses stop to take people to the local bazaar, located a little less than two kilometers from the bridge and a favorite destination of German shoppers (See Chapter 4). Directly across from the bridge, Słubice’s pedestrian zone, ulica Jedności Robotnicze (United Workers Street), or the “Zigaretten Straße” (Cigarette Street) in local slang, offers the discount cigarette and alcohol shops that are ubiquitous along the border, as well as restaurants, beer gardens, hair salons, convenience stores, and money exchanges.

Fig. 1.1: The border bridge between Frankfurt(Oder) (far side) and Słubice. The border checkpoint buildings are visible at the left end of the bridge.
The less famous of Germany's two Frankfurts, Frankfurt(Oder) is referred to locally simply as "Frankfurt," and its full name is normally used only to differentiate it from the much larger Frankfurt(Main)--a stylistic convention I will also observe throughout this dissertation. Frankfurt is located about 80 kilometers east of Berlin, and together with Slubice forms a transnational urban area of about 90,000 residents. Even before Poland's EU accession on May 1, 2004 made the Oder River an internal EU border, this location placed the cities at the center of the EU's efforts to expand its common market through the elimination of barriers to the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital. As a "laboratory" of European integration, Frankfurt/Slubice is therefore one of the locations where the EU has most vigorously pursued policies aimed at creating what Martinez (1994) calls "integrated borderlands," or border regions that have "no barriers to the flow of goods and people," and "enjoy a relationship of equality, trust and respect" (Donnan & Wilson 1999:51).

By pursuing this project of deterritorialization, EU policymakers work against several of the most entrenched functions of state borders. Borders are extremely potent symbols of state power, and are places not only where the practices, techniques, and tactics of Foucaultian governmentality are particularly visible and personally encountered (Foucault 1991:102, cf. Donnan and Wilson 1999), but also where populations, the

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2 Frankfurt(Oder)'s population in 2005 was 64,656, while Slubice's population in 2006 was 20,212.
“terrain par excellence of [modern] government,” can be delineated, managed and regulated (Miller and Rose 1990:2, cf. Brubaker 1992a:27-31, Foucault 2007:105, Inda 2005:4). In this regulatory function, state borders act as powerful mediators of identity by separating individuals into different categories (e.g. “national,” “alien,” “asylum seeker,” “legal permanent resident,” etc.) based on the relationship between the traveler and the government whose border is being crossed. This is particularly true in places like Poland and Germany, where state borders correspond closely to linguistic, cultural, and ethnic boundaries, and where the concept of citizenship is intimately—and often legally—tied to an idea of common descent within an ethnic and cultural nation.

Although state borders are powerful markers of national identity and difference, the economic, cultural, and even political ties produced by local cross-border contact can also work to subvert these divisions by producing ambiguous transnational identities that pull individuals away from close identification with the “imagined community” (B. Anderson 1983) of the nation-state where they reside (Berdahl 1999, Donnan & Wilson 1999, Sahlins 1989, Strassaldo 1982). This tension between the “interface” and “identity” components of borders contributes to their inherent dynamism (Wallman 1974:206). As places of “cultural confrontation, articulation and…penetration, where struggles over the production of cultural meanings occur in the context of asymmetrical relations” (Berdahl 1999:9), borders can be understood as culturally creative spaces in which ethnic and national identities are at once constructed, employed, challenged, and negotiated through everyday social practices (Berdahl 1999, Hannerz 1997, Rosaldo 1989).
For this reason, border regions are potentially fertile grounds for the development of an EU citizenship identity that can accommodate multiple ethnicities and nationalities. However, border regions also present significant obstacles to the deployment of this identity. Because they are locations where high levels of inter-group contact continually threaten the coherence of group identities, border regions are often places where the maintenance of social boundaries becomes especially salient (Barth 1969:15-16). In fact, Barth (1969) suggests that boundaries between groups in poly-ethnic societies will remain stable despite long-term and intensive interactions between groups as long as they continue to be socially meaningful. EU policymakers have therefore devoted significant attention in border regions to establishing an equally meaningful transnational social sphere by using EU regional development funds (e.g. PHARE and INTERREG) to support transnational projects and institutions that promote cross-border integration and cooperation.

Especially in locations like Frankfurt/Słubice, where ethnic conflict has been both intense and recent, the success of transnational citizenship initiatives at the EU’s internal borders is often read—rightly or wrongly—as a bellwether for transformations occurring throughout the EU in the wake of the continued expansion of its powers, institutional bureaucracy, and territory. Frankfurt and Słubice have frequently played a similar symbolic role in Polish-German relations, and public officials from the two countries have periodically made use of the cities as an apt setting for high-level summit meetings and policy announcements. Because of their placement on a multiplicity of social and

3 Cole and Wolf’s (1972) study on the persistence of ethnic borders between villages in northern Italy is a powerful example of this assertion.
4 For example, the following meetings were held in Frankfurt and Słubice: in 1972, Prime Ministers Piotr Jaroszewicz and Willy Stoph, and First Secretaries Edward Gierek and Erich Honecker met for a summit
symbolic boundaries, Frankfurt and Slubice present a unique transnational locality from
which to ethnographically interrogate the tensions created between national and EU-level
paradigms of citizenship as Poland and Germany reconfigure their governing regimes in
order to accommodate the requirements of the EU.

Based on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork and approximately 100 in-depth
interviews conducted between 2003 and 2006, the following chapters explore what it
means to be an EU citizen, and in some cases a non-citizen, through the daily practices,
negotiations, interactions, and reflections of the residents of Frankfurt and Slubice. The
core theme of this dissertation is the observation that even as EU policies aimed at
creating deterritorialized economic, social, and political spaces expand supranational
citizenship rights and privileges, hierarchies of value embedded within these policies
grant rights differentially to individuals and groups in ways that are often linked to
ethnicity and nationality. Thus, despite the EU’s efforts to produce a hybridized
“European” identity that might transcend the region’s historical ethnic and national
divisions, the very processes the EU is using to pursue this goal are simultaneously acting
to create new forms of hierarchy and difference.

A Troubled History

The origins of inter-ethnic conflict and competition in the territories surrounding
Frankfurt and Slubice date back to at least the Middle Ages. In 1250, Piast Poland ceded
control of its lands bordering the Oder river (ziemia lubuska) to Brandenburg, and by the

[Note: The text contains a series of dates and events related to the history and development of the border between Poland and East Germany, including treaties and declarations.]
time of Frankfurt’s charter in 1253, the site of the city already contained both German
and Slavic settlements. This mixed settlement pattern was typical of the regions
surrounding the Oder and Neisse River valleys, and persisted until after World War II.
Although the border regions came under the jurisdiction of several states, the political
border separating Polish and German-controlled lands remained more or less stable in its
location east of Frankfurt and west of Poznań until the late 18th century, when the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth was partitioned by Prussia, Russia, and Habsburg Austria.
By the end of the third partition in 1795, Prussia had expanded its borders to include both
Poznań and Warsaw.⁵

During the 19th century, nationalist movements that emphasized ethnic
determinism and a tripartite link between a distinct territory, its people, and their culture
developed in both Prussia and a then-stateless Poland (cf. Brubaker 1992a, 1996, Porter
2000, Snyder 2003). Both Germany (in 1913) and Poland (in 1920) later codified this
ethnicity-based view of the nation-state in citizenship laws that privilege *jus sanguines*
and an idea of common descent. Recognizing the potential problem of Polish nationalism
within its borders, the Prussian state increased its efforts to colonize ethnically Polish
lands with German settlers (Brubaker 1992:128-132), particularly in the late 19th century
after the Franco-Prussian war and the declaration of German Empire in 1871.

Coupled with efforts by Polish nationalists to restore the historical borders of the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the multiethnic composition of Western Poland and
competing claims over its territories created a highly volatile situation between Poland
and Germany after Poland regained independence in 1918. Between 1918-1921, Poland

⁵ Prussia later lost control of Warsaw in 1807 when Napoleon “liberated” the city. After the Congress of
Vienna in 1815, Warsaw became part of Russian-controlled Congress Poland.
participated in six border conflicts, including a major war with the Soviet Union. Two of these conflicts were with Germany: the Posnańian War of December 27, 1918 to June 28, 1919 and the Silesian Uprisings, which were fought sporadically during the summers of 1919-1921 (Davies 2005:292,372). The conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 required Germany to further cede territory to Poland in Upper Silesia as well as West Prussia, where the co-called “Polish Corridor” secured Poland’s access to the Baltic Sea. Both regions continued to be sites of conflict between the Polish and German governments, and eventually became part of Hitler’s pretext for the invasion of Poland in 1939.

According to Arendt (1968:141-161), the map of Eastern Europe drawn by the Treaty of Versailles and the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was inherently unstable. By leaving large numbers of ethnic minorities within states whose legitimacy was based principally on the representation of ethnic majorities, the Treaty created a situation in which minorities could appeal directly to another nation-state for protection, especially when they faced disenfranchisement or discrimination their country of residence. Because these ethnic minorities were structurally out of place within a system of ethnically-defined nation-states, these minorities created a perennial problem for national governments that could only be dealt with in one of three ways: assimilation, repatriation, or elimination (Arendt 1968:161, cf. Bauman 1989).

As the interwar period progressed, there was increasingly less popular or political will to pursue minority assimilation in either Poland or Germany (Brubaker 1996). In the Polish-German border regions, two-thirds of the German minority opted for repatriation and emigrated to Germany, a population shift that so weakened Germany’s ethnic claims
to the territories it lost at Versailles that the Weimar Republic paid agricultural subsidies to German landowners to remain in Poland (Brubaker 1996:90, 125-126).

Simultaneously, German revisionist propaganda focused on the “heroic” struggle of the German minorities in the ethnic borderlands of Silesia, Poznania, and East Prussia, which had the effect of contributing to the ever-increasing level of tension between the two countries prior to the outbreak of World War II (Brubaker 1996:119).

At the end of World War II, the comprehensive Allied negotiations at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences in 1945 realigned Poland’s post-war borders and attempted to solve the problem of the overlapping settlement between Poland and Germany once and for all. After the Soviet Union made clear its intention to annex the portions of Poland it had acquired in the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, Poland’s eastern border was shifted to the Curzon line.6 Poland was compensated for this loss of territory by the movement of its western border to the Oder and Neisse rivers.7 In order to avoid establishing a large German minority in Poland, about seven million ethnic Germans were forcibly expelled from these “recovered” territories8 (deZayas 1979:xxv,58-59,89). The expellees were replaced by approximately 4.5 million ethnic Poles who were resettled primarily from central Poland and Soviet-annexed lands located in contemporary Ukraine and Belarus (Gruchman, et al. 1959:136,144). One of the principal motivations for the displacement of these populations was Allied policymakers’ goal of ensuring a more lasting peace in the region by removing the problematic and potentially subversive ethnic minorities that

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6 This line was proposed by British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon during the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1920 and the post World War I peace negotiations (Davies 1982:504) and was in approximately the same location as the Nazi-Soviet demarcation line of 1939.
7 Poland was also granted most of East Prussia.
8 In total, around 12 million Germans were expelled from Poland. Another 3.5 million were forced to emigrate from Czechoslovakia (deZayas 1979:xxv).
had plagued Central Europe during the inter-war years (deZayas 1979:4-10). The desire for security and stability thus trumped human rights concerns, and justified the resettlement of at least 31 million people throughout Central Europe by both organized and disorganized means between 1944 and 1948 (Magoci 2002:192-193). As a result of these population transfers, Poland—like much of Central Europe—became more ethno-linguistically homogeneous than at any other point in its history (cf. Magoci 2002:97-30,197-201) and for the first time the post-war Polish-German border corresponded strictly with ethno-linguistic settlement patterns.

Słubice was “founded” by resettled Poles in 1945, when the shift of the Polish-German border divided the eastern riverside district of Frankfurt—then called Dammvorstadt—from the rest of the city. The historical city center, railway station, and most of the remaining post-war industry and infrastructure were located on the German side of the border, and Słubice was transformed from an integral part of a regional center to a small and relatively isolated town with only 3,198 residents by 1950 (Preiss, et. al. 2003:116). Elena, a physical education instructor, outlined a common story about her grandparents’ arrival in Słubice:

After World War II, their house [near Warsaw] burned, so my grandparents came here... They came by train—a cattle train. When the train stopped, [they just got off]. My grandfather had 7 kids, and was looking for a big house and land. There were lots of free houses [in

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9 This strategy was pursued throughout post-World War II Central Europe. In addition to Germans and Poles, populations of Czechs, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Magyars all experienced resettlement. For a summary and cartographic representation of these population shifts see Magoci (2002:189-193)

10 Słubice’s name derives from a Slavic settlement in the Middle Ages called Śliwice (Urząd Miejski w Słubicach 2003:5). Several other cities were also divided by the movement of the border, including Görlitz/Zgorzelec, Guben/Gubin, and Küstrin/Kostrzyn
Słubice. A lot of people were afraid to go near the border, because they thought it would be temporary...but they stayed 30 years. No one wanted to invest in houses, and it was unkempt because people were afraid the Germans would come and take it back.

While the post-war border was officially accepted by East Germany in 1950 by the Görlitz Treaty, the permanent residence of Polish settlers in the border regions was relatively assured only after West Germany and Poland concluded the Warsaw Treaty in 1970, which confirmed the Oder-Neisse line and normalized relations between the two countries. However, the final disposition of the Polish-German border was not resolved until 1990, when Poland and a newly reunified Germany reaffirmed its location in a border treaty. While this treaty settled any territorial claims between the Polish and German states, it did not address property claims made by individuals, and the status of compensation for the losses experienced by German expellees remains an unresolved issue for international courts. In December 2006, the Prussian Trust (Preussische Treuhand), a group representing about 1000 German expellees, filed 22 claims with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, an action that was immediately denounced by the Jarosław Kaczyński-led Polish Government, which insinuated that the cases might require a renegotiation of the border treaty. Although a study by a team of Polish and German legal experts (Barcz and Frowein 2004) suggested that the Prussian

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11 Formally known as the “Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland on the confirmation of the frontier between them.”
12 This group should not be confused with the Federation of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen), a political organization led by the German MP Erica Steinbach (CDU), which has about 2 million members. The Federation of Expellees is best known for its support of a permanent exhibition and documentation center in Berlin called the “Center Against Expulsions” (Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen). This initiative is extremely unpopular in Poland, and in 2003, the cover of the Polish weekly Wprost featured a photomontage portraying Steinbach in a Nazi SS Uniform sitting astride then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl under the title, “A German Trojan Horse: Germans owe Poles Billions of Dollars for World War II.” However, neither Steinbach nor the Federation of Expellees supported the claims of the Prussian Trust.
Trust’s suits have little chance of success, the Prussian Trust’s strategy is nevertheless predicated on the assertion of enforceable citizenship rights at the European level, as well as the assumption that Poland, as an EU member state, would be unlikely to disregard the Court’s ruling should the Trust prevail.\textsuperscript{13}

**Living on the Border**

The contested nature of the Polish-German border contributed to post-World War II border regimes that reified national and ethnic difference as a way to consolidate and legitimize power over the new territorial arrangements (S. Anderson 2001, Schultz 2002, 2003). According to Schultz (2002), the residents and administration of Słubice constructed a civic identity in opposition to Frankfurt. She explains, “[Słubice] wanted never to share the urban history of Frankfurt(Oder). Słubice as border guard of the Polish ‘Regained Territories’ built up her own history, rooted in the pioneer period after the last world war” (2002:53). This cross-border division was reinforced by the physical separation of the two cities. For most of the 45 years between 1946, when the border was closed, and 1991, when visa-free travel was introduced between Poland and Germany, the border crossing between Słubice and Frankfurt was strictly controlled. With the exception of 1972-1980, when the border was opened to limited cross-border traffic, it was very difficult—and often impossible—for average residents to travel between the two cities. Individuals authorized to commute across the border for work were one exception

\textsuperscript{13} It should be noted that the European Court of Human Rights is not an EU institution, but rather an institution of the Council of Europe (a 47-member non-EU international organization founded in 1949 for the purpose of protecting human rights and promoting the development of democracy and the rule of law in Europe), which is responsible for the enforcement of its decisions.
to this rule, and the semiconductor plant (*Halbleiterwerk*) in Frankfurt was a particularly important source of employment for women from Slubice.

Jan, a Slubice musician, described crossing the border in the 1980s:

[Even though the border was closed,] I could cross because the orchestra in Frankfurt invited me, and I was given a border pass. I also worked in Frankfurt. . . [Because of this,] I had occasion to watch the reaction of people in the GDR to Martial Law. About 3 months after Martial Law was declared. . . [at the] railway bridge, and the bridge here [between Slubice and Frankfurt], four bunkers were installed for heavy arms. The border officers were armed to the teeth, as if there was Martial Law in Germany and not Poland. . . It was a “Border of Friendship” but only on paper. . . “Friendship,” but you couldn’t move freely. There weren’t railway connections. The border between Poland and Germany was as tightly guarded as North and South Korea! . . A person who was guarding the border had an obligation to know all citizens. [There were] mines, barbed wire, even a mouse couldn’t get through. But it was all about friendship!

In the years immediately following the opening of the border in 1991, there was little improvement in the relationship between residents of Frankfurt and Slubice. After German unification, Frankfurt became a center of neo-Nazi activity, much of it directed at Poles. On the day visa requirements were dropped between the two countries, a group of about 200 neo-Nazi protesters gathered near the border crossing in Frankfurt to throw rocks and accost Polish cars (Boyes 1991). Anti-Polish violence, mainly in the form of
robberies and minor assaults, was not uncommon in Frankfurt throughout the early 1990s, and in 1992, a dormitory at the European University Viadrina was firebombed in an attack apparently motivated by its high enrolment of Polish students (United Press International 1992).

Maciej, a retired radio operator from Slubice, described one of these altercations:

When I was in [Frankfurt], around 1994-ish... I was coming out of a store and stopped [my car] to let some people cross. When they saw the Polish license plate, some skinheads sat on the hood of the car, and two came to the window, talking and giving a “sign of peace” (i.e. the middle finger). Behind me there was a line of German cars, but no one said anything.

When I left, I drove slowly, and one kicked the turn signal light and broke it out. There was a police car sitting 200 meters away. I showed them the car was damaged, and the skinheads came that way, but the police said they weren’t interested. At the border I told the guards, but the answer was the same, the [Polish guards] said I could file a complaint, but I didn’t want to.

Neo-Nazi activity in Frankfurt was eventually brought under control, and by the time of my fieldwork had been virtually eliminated. Nevertheless, Frankfurt continues to enjoy a notorious reputation throughout Germany, and its infamy was reinforced in 2006, when the remains of nine newborn children were discovered hidden in a garden shed in a nearby village. The infants’ mother, a resident of Frankfurt, was convicted of allowing the children to die by neglect, in a case that was widely considered symbolic of the depth of social alienation and deprivation present in the former East Germany.
Peter, a cultural studies student from Berlin, had a first impression that was
typical for many Germans arriving in Frankfurt, “I didn’t like it. I was afraid of the
Hochhäuser (high rise socialist-style blocks of flats), afraid of fascists... I was fed up
with the prejudice of people here... All my friends [in Berlin] said, ‘don’t go out at
night, be careful of Nazis.’” Others found the post-socialist aspects of Frankfurt exciting
and exotic. Alex, a student in international business from West Germany, explained:

I like to go out in the Eastern area [of Germany] and the shrinking
Plattenbau (socialist-era pre-fabricated concrete buildings) ghetto. East
Germany is becoming a huge national park, with people leaving and
factories closed... the Plattenbau ghetto is so run down it already has
beauty... For me [Frankfurt is] like living in a city in a desert, the city
only provides shopping. I don’t do much with the city; it has more
infrastructure than people. A friend of mine says Frankfurt is just a
panorama: the Oder River and the Plattenbau. You don’t really interact
[with people] and it’s empty.

When I asked Frankfurt’s mayor, Oberbürgermeister Martin Patzelt, if the city had an
image problem, he replied:

It is certainly so. Comparatively, the unemployment level—17%--is the
same as in Dortmund [in West Germany], and the level of criminality and
right-wing extremist groups is no higher in Frankfurt than anywhere else.
However, Frankfurt has been put into a box by the media. The media
picture is not the same as what the objective figures show... Visitors can
only be happily disappointed in Frankfurt, or happily disappointed that
their stereotypes didn’t fit. In comparison with other towns, the cultural and social activities [in Frankfurt] are fantastic, and the number of international events through the university, and also through the theaters, ensure that Frankfurt will become increasingly interesting.

Patzelt was highly committed to the creation of a transnational urban environment in Frankfurt and Slubice. Nevertheless, Patzelt was also acutely aware of the many obstacles to cross-border cooperation, and, in a list that was frequently reiterated by my correspondents, identified three issues as especially frustrating:

The disproportion in income between Poles and Germans... is why the town planning between Frankfurt and Slubice is not making much progress. The second problem is the difference in languages. The third is the mental difference. If the mental difference were smaller, then the other barriers would be easier to cross. On the other hand, if there weren’t the language barrier, then the mental barrier would also be easier to cross. And the problem of income difference would be more quickly solved if we could cooperate better. They are all interconnected.

In spite of these problems, Patzelt was optimistic about the future of the “European” project in the two cities. When I asked him what he hoped to see in Frankfurt and Slubice in ten years time, Patzelt answered that he would like to see the cities “work together in such a way that from the outside it would look like one town.” In a broad sense, this is also the goal of the EU’s more generalized efforts to establish fluid and integrated market and social spaces within its borders—goals which were key motivations behind the creation of the EU’s transnational citizenship initiatives.
Citizenship is Hereby Established

As the residents of Frankfurt and Słubice began to negotiate the local meanings and practices of the newly opened border, the leaders of the then-12 EU member states were in the process of redefining the scope of cooperation in the European Community in the Treaty on European Union (commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty), which was signed on February 7, 1992, and established the blueprint of the European Union as it operates today. Among its many policy innovations, the Maastricht Treaty codified EU citizenship for the first time, stating, “Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship.”14 With this declaration, the Maastricht Treaty established how its supranational body of citizens would be defined and continuously replenished; two issues that are central to any governing regime (Brubaker 1992b:277). However, rather than simultaneously creating supranational eligibility criteria for this new membership category, the Treaty instead relied on the citizenship policies of the EU member states to determine who qualifies as a citizen. In this way, Maastricht balanced the challenge its supranational expansion of EU citizenship rights posed to the national sovereignty of its member states with a reaffirmation of their authority.

The overlaying of the EU’s supranational citizenship onto the citizenships of its member states represented the culmination of a legal process that began in 1957 when the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) directed its member

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states\textsuperscript{15} to create a common market characterized by the free movement of goods, capital, services, and people. The EEC Treaty viewed its proto-citizens essentially in economic terms, and refers only to "workers" in its provisions.\textsuperscript{16} In keeping with the EEC Treaty's mandate, the Council of Ministers issued secondary legislation on citizenship rights in the 1960s and early 1970s, with the goal of implementing the free movement of workers between member states and enabling them to be employed in the same manner as member state nationals (Council Regulations 15/61, 38/64 and 1612/68, Kostakopoulou 2001:42). To promote the use of these rights, the Council also issued regulations granting the rights to entry and residence to workers' family members (Council Regulation 1612/68, Art. 10) and the right for workers and their families to remain in a member state after employment (Council Regulation 1251/70, Kostakopoulou 2001:42).

At the 1972 Paris Summit, EEC officials realigned their objectives to place more emphasis on political union between the member states. With this change in focus, they simultaneously recognized the importance of establishing a "European" identity to the success of the project. In 1973, the foreign ministers of the nine member states followed up on this conclusion by issuing a "Declaration on European Identity" at the Copenhagen Summit, which defined European identity in terms of a shared European civilization based on the principles of democracy, rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights (Part I, Para. 1), and sought to locate the role of this identity both in relation to the rest of the world (Part II) and in the construction of a united Europe (Part III) (cf. Kostakopoulou 2001:44-45, Wiener 1998:67-68).

\textsuperscript{15} Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg.
\textsuperscript{16} See Art. 48-51 in EEC Treaty.
The European Council established policy initiatives to support the development of this conception of European identity at a second Paris Summit in 1974, including direct elections of the European Parliament\(^{17}\) and the creation of a passport union\(^{18}\) (Kostakopoulou 2001:45-46, Weiner 1998:85-89). The Declaration on European Identity thus became the basis for a “special rights” policy that developed for European Community (EC)\(^{19}\) citizens during the 1980s, and through which the EC established the supranational rights that would be granted to EC citizens in addition to the national rights provided by their country of residence.

In 1978, the Bayerl Report to the European Parliament defined “special rights” as “the rights which the citizen possesses as a legal subject vis-à-vis the State and may be asserted at any time” (European Parliament 1979:86, Wiener 1998:90). The report went on to distinguish between three types of special rights:

(a) defensive rights that protect fundamental freedoms vis-à-vis the state (fundamental rights);

(b) claims which citizens are entitled to make on the state, for example in respect of provision for their welfare (civil rights); and

(c) rights which guarantee participation of citizens in the state’s institutions (political rights) (European Parliament 1979:87).

The Bayerl Report also argued that fundamental rights should be incorporated explicitly into Community law through the EC’s Treaties, and that in order to support workers’

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\(^{17}\) This was achieved by a Council decision in 1977 (OJ EC 278, 8/10/77, p. 1-11)

\(^{18}\) See Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 7/75, “Towards European Citizenship” (European Commission 1975). While a uniform passport was introduced by a European Council resolution in 1981 (OJ C 241, 19/09/81, p. 1), a common policy for the elimination of identity checks at internal Community frontiers was established separately from the institutions of the EEC as part of the 1985 Schengen Agreement. The provisions of the Schengen Agreement, and the 1995 Schengen Convention were incorporated into the framework of the EU in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.

\(^{19}\) Over time, the EEC eventually became known simply as the European Community.
special right of free movement, political rights for Community citizens residing outside their country of national citizenship should be expanded to include voting rights at all levels of decision making as well as the right to hold public office (European Parliament 1979:87-90).

As EC policymakers pursued their primary goal of establishing a common market during the 1980s, they gradually realized that in order for transnational labor mobility to become a practical reality, it would require a corresponding expansion in social and political rights at the EC-wide level, such as guaranteed access to healthcare, portability of pensions, mutual recognition of diplomas, and some degree of local suffrage. (Dell’Olio 2005:58, Wiener 1998:132-134, 162-175, 203). In this manner, the construction of the common market gradually became as much about creating a transnational social space as an economic space (Wiener 1998:203). While no new citizenship legislation was adopted before the Maastricht Treaty in 1992\(^{20}\) (cf. Wiener 1998:163-180), the European Council responded to the need of greater protection and portability of social rights in 1989 by issuing the “Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers” (European Council 1990). The Charter laid out the guidelines for a more comprehensive social policy within the EC including social protections and benefits for workers, living and working conditions, pensions, recognition of diplomas and occupational qualifications, the right to collective bargaining, and gender equality (cf. Wiener 1998:176-178). As in earlier legislation, social rights were once again extended only to economically active individuals and their families.

\(^{20}\) Both the Commission and the Parliament addressed the issue during this period, but no compromise was ultimately reached.
At the same time, the European Parliament sought a more far-reaching solution to citizenship rights within the EC, and in 1989 adopted the “Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms” (European Parliament 1989). Although not a legally binding document, the declaration reads like a Community Bill of Rights, and extends these rights to “everyone” within the EC (cf. Kostakopoulou 2001:53). This more liberal approach to citizenship did not, however, become part of the definition of EU citizenship codified in the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.

Along with formally defining EU citizenship (Art. 17), the Maastricht Treaty imparts EU citizens with a limited set of formal rights: the right to free movement and residence anywhere within the EU’s member states (Art. 18); the right to vote and stand as a candidate in European Parliament and municipal elections in whichever member state the citizen chooses to reside, under the same conditions as nationals of that state (Art. 19);21 the right to diplomatic or consular protection from the authorities of any member state while in a third country where the state of the individual’s national citizenship is not represented (Art. 20); and the right to petition the European Parliament and apply to the European Ombudsman (Art. 21). The Maastricht Treaty therefore represents a minimalist conception of EU citizenship which “conceives EU citizens as derivative or the sum of the member states’ citizens” and limits itself to a few basic rights that ensure labor mobility while minimizing legal institutionalization and the impact on national citizenship laws of the member states (Eder and Giesen 2001:9). With the exception of officially creating a legal basis for citizenship in a supranational treaty organization, the citizenship provisions outlined in the Maastricht Treaty were hardly

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21 This right may be subject to a residency period of not more than 5 years for voting, and not more than 10 years for standing as a candidate, in municipal elections if the proportion of community nationals exceeds 20% of the total population (Council of the European Union Directive 94/80/EC, Art. 12).
revolutionary. Except for the provision of local electoral rights, all of the rights granted to members of the new and novel category of “EU citizen” previously existed in other EC legislation, and no fundamental civil rights, nor social or cultural rights, were addressed in the Treaty (Kostakopoulou 2001:57, cf. Closa 1992, Wallace and Smith 1995, Welsh 1993).

However, it is important to point out that all members of the EU are signatories to both the European Convention on Human Rights, which addresses civil rights, and the European Social Charter, which addresses a wide range of social rights (although the number of Charter’s articles implemented varies from state to state). Additionally, the economic and political membership criteria for EU applicant countries adopted at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 (the “Copenhagen Criteria”) required “that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.” It might therefore be argued that human and social rights in the EU were sufficiently supported by agreements external to the EU Treaties. In order to address the perceived shortcoming in the Maastricht Treaty, the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council of the European Union “solemnly proclaimed” the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in 2000, which comprehensively outlined the civil, political and social rights of all individuals within the EU, as well as the particular rights reserved for EU citizens (essentially a restatement of the rights contained in the Maastricht Treaty).

Because it is not part of EU law, the Charter currently enjoys ambiguous legal status, a

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22 See also Treaty on European Union, Art. 49 and Art. 6(1).
problem that is rectified by its inclusion in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, assuming that the treaty successfully completes the process of ratification in all 27 member states.

**Defining a Supranational Citizenship**

Although the creation of EU citizenship made possible a layered system of local, national, and transnational citizenship practices that could potentially divide, contest, and multiply the allegiances and loyalties of its member states' populations in a way that fundamentally questions the authority and sovereignty of the nation-state (Lodge 1993:380, Cohen 1999, Turner 1993), EU citizenship was not initially conceived as something inherently “post-national.” When the concept of a Community citizenship first began to regularly appear on policy-makers’ agendas in the 1970s, it was conceptualized principally as a modern citizenship which would help enhance EC legitimacy by scaling up the state-building and identity-generating elements of the national citizenship model for use on the supranational level (Wiener 1998:8 cf. Brubaker 1996, Bendix 1964, Tilly 1975). For this reason, nation-state-based theories of citizenship provide a useful starting point for examining the characteristics of transnational citizenship in the EU.

By integrating a population into a “community of citizens,” the principle of citizenship allows the EU, like a nation-state, to assert its legitimate authority to represent this community both within its borders and in international relations (Schnapper 1998:16-35 cf. European Commission 1995:19-23). In this way, citizenship has played a crucial role in establishing and maintaining sovereignty within the modern nation-state system.

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24 Both the United Kingdom and Poland, however, secured an opt-out to the Charter of fundamental rights section of the Lisbon Treaty.

Citizenship need not be uniform across a governed population or territory. Instead, a range of citizenship practices and identities can coexist within a single governed territory, and individuals can be subjected to differing, multiple, and even conflicting, sets of rights and obligations, depending on the constituent groups to which they belong (cf. Tilly 1996, Ong 1999). Two interrelated elements of citizenship are particularly instrumental in determining the shape of these practices: a legal element, defined by the juridically supported rights and privileges a citizen can demand (Brubaker 1996:43, Cohen 1999:248), and a cultural element, defined by a sense of belonging in a particular community (Soysal 1996:17, cf. Flores 1997, Rosaldo 1989, Stevenson 1999).
In his influential studies of citizenship, T.H. Marshall (1950, 1964), offers one model for addressing the differential character of citizenship rights by arguing that citizenship can be broken down into bundles of sequentially evolving component rights. In a typology that almost certainly informed the Bayerl Report’s classification of the “special rights” needed for EC citizens (European Parliament 1979:87-90), Marshall argues that within the nation-state, civil rights, or the rights required to secure individual freedom (e.g. free speech, right to own property, right to justice and equality before the law) developed first, followed by political rights ensuring participation in the exercise of political power, and finally, social rights (e.g. education and social services), which allow individuals to share in the economic and social welfare, as well as the heritage, of a society (Marshall 1950:10). Within a system of governmentality (Foucault 1992, 2007), the rights contained in these bundles can be allocated differentially across political, social and cultural fields, creating varied and unequal “citizenship regimes” (D. Anderson 1996, Humphrey 1999) in which some groups are empowered with more rights, or more access to rights, than others.

While Marshall has been appropriately criticized for his evolutionary approach, (Cohen 1999, Turner 1990, 1993), his discussion of the component nature of citizenship remains highly relevant to an analytical framework for investigating how different groups (e.g. different national citizenships) within the EU are unequally empowered in the exercise of EU citizenship rights by the policies and practices of the EU and its member states (See Chapters 4 & 5). I am therefore less concerned with the evolutionary aspects of Marshall’s theory, than with his assertion that social rights facilitate the exercise of

25 Marshall’s civil rights and social rights are equivalent to the Bayerl Reports fundamental and civil rights respectively.
civil rights and mediate the contradiction between a liberal democracy's basic equality of law and the fundamental inequality of the capitalist economic system (Marshall 1950:25, 33-35, cf. Turner 1986, 1990, Soysal 1994). This is especially important in the context of the EU law, which has tended to define its subjects in economic terms, and has attached its rights of citizenship to circulation within its economic system rather than the ascriptive criteria of *jus sanguines* or *jus soli* (Peebles 1997:586, 592). Furthermore, individuals within the EU only receive protection under EU law when "they fall into the sphere of commodity circulation and production," that is, when they are exercising mobility within the market (Peebles 1997:591, cf. 586, 593-595). For this reason, mobility is the core right of EU citizenship because it is the right that most serves the market, while the EU's other transnational political and social rights crystallize around and support this mobility (d'Oliveira 1995:65). This support is critical because it is these social and political rights that make the right to free movement meaningful by enabling transnationally mobile EU citizens to participate in their new communities.

**EU Citizenship in Practice**

Despite their importance to the legal identity of EU citizenship, the rights contained in the Maastricht Treaty appear to be utilized by only a small minority of EU citizens. In 2003, EU citizens exercising the right to reside in another EU member state accounted for only about 2% of the EU's total population, a figure that is lower than the total number of "third country" nationals living in the EU (accounting for about 3%) (Eurostat 2006:39). In terms of historical mobility, 4% of EU residents reported moving

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26 This figure includes nationals from the 2004 accession countries.
27 Citizens of countries that are not EU member states.
to a different EU country after leaving their parental home (another 3% reported moving outside the EU), although this figure varied widely from country to country, up to a high of 15% in Ireland (EuroFound 2005:17). However, for people who do exercise freedom of residence, it appears to be a right of paramount importance, and is often related to major life-course decisions such as job, family and housing. Changes in employment motivated 34% of moves between EU countries or outside of the EU, while changes in partnership or marital situation motivated 18% (EuroFound 2005:19).28

While residing abroad, few non-national EU citizens exercised their right to vote or stand as a candidate in European Parliament and municipal elections. At 45.6% in 200429, turnout in EU parliament elections is typically low in comparison to national elections (European Commission 2000b:5). For non-national EU citizens, participation is even lower, with only 11.9% registered to vote EU-wide in 2004, ranging from a low of 3.9% in Greece to a high of 39% in Ireland to (European Commission 2006:7). Unfortunately, there is no data indicating how many of these individuals actually turned out to vote, and it also appears that some number of EU citizens living abroad choose to continue to vote in their country of national citizenship (European Commission 2000:33). In the same 2004 European Parliament elections, 57 non-nationals stood as candidates, but only 3 were elected MEPs30 (European Commission 2006:9).

In the case of municipal elections, 13 (of the then 15) member states responded to a 2001 European Commission questionnaire on the right of non-national EU citizens to

28 In this case, the categories were not mutually exclusive, and respondents could indicate multiple motivations.
29 Participation in EU Parliament elections has declined steadily since the first elections in 1979 (at 63% turnout). In 1999 turnout was 49.7%, and in 1994 it was 56.5%. Source: European Parliament.
30 In 1999, 62 stood as candidates and 4 were elected, and in 1994, 53 stood as candidates and 1 was elected (European Commission 2000:8).
vote and to stand as a candidate,\textsuperscript{31} but the data reported is much less clear than for the European Parliament elections. In Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, all residents, including non-national EU citizens, are automatically entered on electoral rolls, while in the other nine member states, the average rate of registration was 26.7\%, varying from a low of 9.5\% in Greece and a high of 54.2\% in Austria (European Commission 2002b:11). No systematic turnout data is available for either group, making it impossible to gauge participation levels.\textsuperscript{32} It is also difficult to assess the number of non-national EU citizens who stood as a candidate in municipal elections, as only Finland, Sweden and Luxembourg could provide data. From the limited data available, it can be determined that non-nationals stood as candidates in at least eight member states, and some of these candidates were elected in at least seven member states (European Commission 2002b:13).\textsuperscript{33} Nevertheless, it is probably safe to conclude from the information available

\textsuperscript{31} France and Denmark did not respond.
\textsuperscript{33} The following table (1.1) summarizes the information available for non-national candidates in EU municipal elections for 1996-2001 (European Commission 2002:13).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Non-national Candidates</th>
<th>Number elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1829</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Unknown number</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Unknown number</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Unknown number</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Unknown number</td>
<td>319 elected in nine Länder, no information available from seven Länder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Unknown number</td>
<td>20 elected in seven Länder, no information available from two Länder</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: Non-national candidates in EU municipal elections, 1996-2001.
that non-nationals hold a very small percentage of the offices available in the EU’s more than 85,000 municipalities.\textsuperscript{34}

EU citizens make use of their right to petition with similar infrequency. In 2005, the European Parliament received only 1032 petitions, 628 (60.9\%) of which were admissible (European Parliament 2006:20), and the Ombudsman only 3,920 complaints, 1184 (30.7\%) of which were inside its mandate\textsuperscript{35} (European Ombudsman 2005:22). For the Ombudsman, this represents a 5\% increase over 2004 (European Ombudsman 2005:10), while petitions to Parliament remained more or less stable\textsuperscript{36} (European Parliament 2006:20). For institutions representing an estimated 458 million people,\textsuperscript{37} these figures seem quite modest.

Finally, no definite information is available on EU citizens utilizing diplomatic and consular services of other EU member states in third countries where their country of citizenship is not represented, although the legislative procedures required to implement this right were completed by the fifteen pre-2004 EU member states (EU15) by 2002 (European Commission 2004:9). Nevertheless, knowledge of this right is not widespread among EU citizens, and in 2006, a Flash Eurobarometer survey reported that only 23\% indicated they were aware of this right, and 34\% believed that in such circumstances,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{34} At the time of the questionnaire in 2001
\textsuperscript{35} Of those within the mandate, 84.6\% led to a formal inquiry.
\textsuperscript{37} As of 2004. Source: Eurostat
\end{flushright}
they would have to contact their home country's ministry of foreign affairs (Eurobarometer 2006a:9). 38

Judging from the above data, one might expect EU residents to exhibit a correspondingly weak sense of cultural citizenship within the EU. On the contrary, in a 2006 Eurobarometer survey, 50% of EU residents said they felt attached to the EU, while 63% said they felt attached to "Europe" (2006b:70), suggesting that many more people identify with EU citizenship than actually put its rights into practice. The notable exception to this gap between the EU's social imaginary and actual citizenship practice appears to be the right to travel freely within the EU, which was exercised by 169 million EU residents in 2005, and accounted for 69% of the EU's total tourist receipts (EUR 161.6 billion) (Hussain and Bylinski 2007:5-6). When asked, "What does the European Union mean to you personally?" 50% of EU residents answered, "Freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the European Union"--the highest level of any response (Eurobarometer 2006b:73).

Perhaps more than the other Maastricht citizenship rights, the right to free movement operates as an especially powerful symbol for EU integration by promising an ever more unified and border-free social space. It is also a future-oriented right, which offers the potential of opportunities within the EU. Even if only a small number of the EU's total population has already resided in another EU country, the proportion of EU citizens intending to do so is increasing. This is especially true for young people and citizens of the ten 2004 accession states (A10), as was demonstrated in a 2005 Eurobarometer survey on future mobility intentions. Compared to 3% of EU15 residents, 38 17% thought they would have to use consular assistance from the European Commission Delegation in that country, and 16% thought they would have to use the services of a travel agent (Eurobarometer 2006:9).
5% of A10 residents intend to move within the EU in the next five years (3% overall of EU25 residents) (EuroFound 2005:22).

Younger and better-educated individuals tend to have greater mobility intentions, with 9% of EU25 residents aged 18-24, 6% of those aged 25-34, 4% of those classified as highly educated, and 12% of those still studying, intending to move within the EU in the next five years. Latvia (7.4%), Poland (7.2%), Lithuania (8.5%), and Estonia (8.3%) had the four highest levels of mobility intentions, and of the individuals from these four countries who expected to move, 75% of were under 35, and 66% were either highly educated or still studying (EuroFound 2005:24). Compared to earlier findings from 2001, intentions to move within the EU have increased in both the EU15 and the A10, from 1.7% to 2.7% and 1.6% to 5.1% respectively (EuroFound 2005:27). This increase in mobility intentions for A10 residents is likely a direct result of EU accession and the possibilities for inter-EU mobility provided by EU citizenship rights, a conclusion supported by the observation that past mobility and intended mobility for people moving outside the EU are equal, at 1% (EuroFound 2005:16, 22).

Residential mobility in the EU is therefore gaining momentum, especially among young and well-educated populations—the transnationally-oriented elites who are more and more proving to be the “winners” of Europeanization (See Chapter 2). Freedom of residence also seems to be valued more highly by the populations of certain member states, and here the Polish example is both illustrative and striking. In absolute numbers, the 7.2% of Poland’s 38.6 million residents who intend to move within the EU over the next five years amounts to 2.78 million people. Even if this figure is diminished by a

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39 Interestingly, residents of other A10 countries also have some of the lowest levels of intentions to move within the EU, with the Czech Republic at 1.6%, Slovakia at 1.8% and Hungary at 2.5% (EU Mean: 3.1%) (Eurofound 2005: 23, Krieger and Fernandez 2006:12).
factor of 2-3 to account for only those with a firm intention to move, between 900,000 and 1.39 million additional Polish migrants can be expected (Krieger and Fernandez 2006:11-12).

These figures are corroborated by post-accession trends in Polish migration, a phenomenon that has recently received widespread international media coverage. Using data collected by the European Citizen Action Service, the Polish daily *Rzeczpospolita* concluded that about 3% of Poland’s total population, and 5% of its working age population, left to work in another EU country since 2004 (Słojewska 2006). Of these approximately 1.1 million people, more than 70% went to Germany or the United Kingdom (Słojewska 2006). Despite Germany’s maintenance of post-accession restrictions on labor mobility for workers from the A8 (the ten 2004 accession countries minus Cyprus and Malta), it remains the primary destination country for Polish migrant workers (although Germany’s percentage of this total has declined as migration to the United Kingdom has increased) (Kępińska 2005:26). German law allows workers to be recruited from neighboring countries in certain economic sectors, including agriculture, construction and seasonal work, and Polish workers dominate all of these categories. About 380,000 work permits were issued under these laws in 2004, 75% of which were to Polish recipients (Migration News 2007). 45% of another 22,000 project-tied workers sent to Germany in 2005 by firms based outside Germany were also Polish, as were 85% of Germany’s approximately 330,000 seasonal workers, who were admitted to Germany in 2005 to work for up to 90 days (Migration News 2007).

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40 The EU15 were allowed to implement an up to seven year transitional period during which measures to limit labor migration by restricting labor market access could be applied unilaterally on the citizens a new member state. Only the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden fully opened their labor markets in 2004. Cyprus and Malta were excluded from these transitional agreements, and their citizens enjoyed immediate access to all labor markets within the EU.
After fully opening its labor market to A10 citizens in 2004, the United Kingdom experienced a remarkable influx of foreign workers. According to an estimate by Capital Economics, a market research consultancy, more than 600,000 migrants have entered the UK from the A8, about 100,000 more than the 510,000 who officially registered to work between May 1, 2004 and Sept. 30, 2006 (Ford 2007, Home Office 2006:4), and a figure that overwhelmed the Home Office's 2003 estimate of between 5,000 and 13,000 per year (Dustman, et. al. 2003:57). Of those officially registered, 63% (about 320,000) are Poles (Home Office 2006:8).

These high levels of Polish migration recently played a key symbolic role within the EU’s project of continued integration. In the months leading up to France’s 2005 referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty, the hypothetical “Polish plumber,” who might move to France and undercut French workers, became a metonym for labor mobility and transnational integration within the EU, as well as a stand-in for French fears related to immigration and the economy in a domestic labor market characterized by nearly 10% unemployment. This mistrust of immigration contributed to the subsequent defeat of the Constitutional Treaty referendum in France on May 29 (55% against), followed by a second defeat in the Netherlands two days later (62% against).

The Polish Tourism Board in France responded to this debate with a humorous poster campaign featuring a sexy Polish plumber holding a phallically placed group of pipes (Fig. 1.3) and a slogan reading, “I’m staying in Poland, come in great numbers” (Je reste en Pologne, venez nombreux). The campaign received worldwide media coverage,

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41 Like Germany, France has maintained restrictions on labor market access for A8 citizens. The EU Constitutional Treaty did not, in fact, make any changes to this policy.
42 Ironically, according to a New York Times article, the French pluming union reported that while there is an overall shortage of 6,000 plumbers, there are only about 150 Polish plumbers in France (Sciolino 2005).
and the “Polish plumber” became something of a national celebrity in Poland, with the image appearing regularly in newspaper articles and advertisements.

The fact that this “Polish plumber” is “staying” while inviting tourists to visit from abroad is also indicative of the tension between legal and cultural citizenship within the EU. By exercising the rights of working and living abroad where market-determined demand and wages are highest, it would seem that a mobile Polish plumber should be celebrated as an archetypical EU citizen rather than one of anxiety and apprehension. Instead, it is the tourist that more often fills this role. Even though both tourists and workers have the legal right to free movement within the EU, it is the non-threatening movements of the tourist that most easily fit with current sense of EU cultural citizenship. Like the “Polish plumber,” who is excluded from French society by local economic uncertainties, EU citizens wishing to exercise their supranational citizenship rights beyond traveling routinely encounter a host of social realities and structural factors that limit their ability to do so; a situation which contributes to the relatively limited exercise of most of the Maastricht Treaty-defined citizenship rights outlined above.
Location and Organization of this Study

The failure of the Constitutional Treaty in two of the EU’s founding members plunged the EU into a period of institutional crisis. In October 2005, the EU entered an official “period of reflection” on the future of Europe, which sought to build a new political consensus by engaging citizens in a wide-ranging discussion about the EU’s future, organized around the various efforts of the European Commission’s “Plan D—Democracy, Dialogue, and Debate” framework. After a little over a year, the German European Council presidency declared the reflection period over in January 2007, and secured a mandate for an intergovernmental conference to draft a new treaty, which opened in Lisbon on July 23, 2007. Essentially a slightly modified version of the Constitutional Treaty, the subsequent “Reform Treaty” (later renamed the Lisbon Treaty after its signing on December 13, 2007) is currently undergoing ratification, a process EU policymakers hope to complete by 2009.

The majority of the research for this dissertation therefore took place in this liminal period between the collapse of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and conclusion of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, a time when debates about what type of governing body the European Union is and should become were especially salient—questions that remain highly relevant as the EU moves forward. This dissertation contributes to this debate by describing how the EU is experienced in the daily lives of the residents of Frankfurt and Slubice. By documenting the everyday practices of life on the Polish-German border, the subsequent chapters chronicle both the successes and failures of EU citizenship at the

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local level, paying particular attention to how different social groups experience EU citizenship in different ways, how the performance of citizenship contributes to the local formation of a transnational, or "European," public space and identity, and how the tension and gaps between the legal and cultural elements of EU citizenship structure local citizenship practices.

Following a narrative organization that starts with contexts where EU citizenship has become most meaningful and concludes with those where it has been more problematic or even divisive, this dissertation approaches the urban space of Frankfurt/Slubice as a microcosm for understanding EU-wide struggles and negotiations over the content and meanings of the EU’s transnational citizenship policies. Chapter 2 begins with an evaluation of how tomorrow’s transnational “Europeans” are created and socialized in Frankfurt and Slubice by focusing on the cities’ university and secondary school students—two groups that have been especially targeted by EU initiatives aimed at promoting citizenship in the Union (Shore 2000). Chapter 3 then describes how cultural events in Frankfurt/Slubice have been used to build social connections and establish the beginnings of a unified public space in the two cities, and presents an extended case study of how a local NGO employs citizenship practices and imagery as part of an ongoing project designed to break down cultural barriers between the cities. Chapter 4 examines how varying “citizenship regimes” (D. Anderson 1996, Humphrey 1999) are constructed in Frankfurt/Slubice as the interaction between governing institutions, social apparatuses, and everyday cross-border activities categorize individuals into groups that are subject to differing and unequal citizenship practices that introduce hierarchy into provisions of EU citizenship. Chapter 5 explores how “third country” nationals residing in
Frankfurt/Slubice are excluded from full participation in the local practices of EU citizenship due to the limitations placed on their cross-border movements by the implementation of the EU’s common border regulations (cf. Balibar 2004, Kipnis 2004, Peebles 1997, Torpey 2000, Wiener 1998), and how these individuals respond to this exclusion by strategically managing their citizenship statuses. Finally, Chapter 6 observes how individuals living in Frankfurt/Slubice locate themselves as subjects within an orientalizing discourse (Said 1979, Wolff 1994) that evaluates Eastern European countries and their citizens as less “European” than their Western counterparts (cf. Todorova 1997, 2005, Bakic-Hayden 1995), and argues that the internalization of this discourse creates the potential for a permanent and destabilizing “second-class” citizenship status within the EU.

By expanding citizenship rights transnationally and offering membership in an international governing body, EU citizenship puts into question the sovereign authority of EU member states to govern their citizens (Lodge 1993:380, Turner 1993:2). As a location at the edge of two member states, Frankfurt/Slubice is therefore at the center of the reorganization of social membership provoked by the disorienting effects of the EU’s efforts to deterritorialize and integrate its internal borders and spaces. In Frankfurt/Slubice, the opening of state borders has also destabilized the boundaries between the cities’ two dominant ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups, leading to the sometimes-uncomfortable confrontation between individuals interacting in everyday domains of cross-border practice. By resolving these confrontations, residents of Frankfurt/Slubice negotiate and define not only the local meanings of “European”
citizenship, but also what it means to be an EU citizen living in a transnational

Europastadt, miasto europejskie, or “European City.”
Chapter 2

Tomorrow’s Europeans Today

Introduction

On a sunny afternoon in April 2006, classes were cancelled at the European University Viadrina (Europa Universität Viadrina, henceforth the Viadrina) in Frankfurt, and its faculty, staff, and students assembled to celebrate the 500th anniversary of their university’s namesake, the “Alma Mater Viadrina.” During its 305-year history (1506-1811), Alma Mater Viadrina’s law, theology, medicine, and philosophy faculties educated many of Frankfurt’s most renowned residents, including Ulrich von Hutten, Thomas Müntzer, Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, Heinrich von Kleist, and both Alexander and Wilhelm von Humboldt. This final student was eventually responsible for the university’s demise, when his foundation of the University of Berlin (today Humboldt University) precipitated the Prussian State’s closure of Alma Mater Viadrina in 1811 and the transfer of its library and much of its faculty to Breslau (Wroclaw).

Full of academic and political pomp, the formal ceremony was clearly intended as a tradition-inventing event that “establish[ed] a continuity with a suitable historical past” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983:1), a purpose reinforced by the event’s gothic setting in a 13th century Franciscan church, now converted into the C.P.E. Bach concert hall. The German Ministry of Finance validated the symbolic link between the two universities by issuing a stamp (Fig. 2.1)—which was officially unveiled during the ceremony—commemorating “500 Years of Viadrina University Frankfurt(Oder),” and bearing the seal of the modern university. The blue and gold anniversary banners displayed throughout the city also displayed the modern seal, further encouraging the conflation of
the two institutions. The 180-year gap between the closure of the first Viadrina and the foundation of the second in 1991 was not emphasized, nor was the fact that the new university bears little resemblance to the old, save for its name and location.

It is perhaps not surprising that a young and future-oriented institution like the Viadrina would cultivate links to a more ancient tradition in order to provide a type of retroactive endorsement to its contemporary claims of legitimacy. Nationalist movements have frequently made use of this strategy (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983), as have the EU’s institutions, which routinely make reference to a common cultural legacy inherited from ancient Greece and Rome, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment (Shore 2000:54-57).1 At the same time, the Viadrina and its partner university in Slubice, Collegium Polonicum (CP)2, are themselves both symbols and products of EU integration, with a mandate to prepare their students for the demands of an increasingly borderless and transnational Europe through comparative EU-oriented study.

Within the history of the nation-state, education has been a core technology for the legitimation of new social and political orders, the establishment of collective identities, and the initiation of citizens (B. Anderson 1992, Gellner 1983, Hein and Selden 2000, Hobsbawm 1990, Nóvoa and Lawn 2002, Shore 2000:56, Soysal 2002, Soysal and Schissler 2005). For these same reasons, the EU has also endeavored to use

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1 The strategy was employed in the naming of many of the EU’s educational initiatives, which have included Erasmus, Socrates, Leonardo, Comenius, and Grundtvig.

2 Collegium Polonicum is a division of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań.
educational mobility initiatives as a way to foster a sense of EU citizenship and identity. However, EC member states were reluctant to grant the Community the legal competence required to actively intervene in a field so central to the maintenance of their "imagined communities." EC educational programs were therefore quite limited until the mid-1980s, when several European Court of Justice decisions concluded that the principle of non-discrimination between EC nationals included transnational access to education (Corbett 2005:10-13,123-125). Following these decisions, EC policymakers began to focus their attentions on establishing international exchange programs and creating bureaucratic mechanisms to facilitate the mobility of students, vocational trainees, and teachers, and in 1988, the Council of the European Union issued a resolution requiring member states to make "every effort" to implement a "European dimension" in education. The "European dimension" described in the resolution was a somewhat amorphous concept which included language skills, knowledge of the historical, cultural, social and economic aspects of the Community, a preparedness to "take part in the economic and social development of the Community," the "value of European civilization," "a sense of European identity" and an awareness of "the advantages which the community represents" (Council of the European Union 1988). In keeping with the principle of subsidiarity, the EC continued to restrict its role in this Europeanizing process to facilitating information exchange, providing basic teaching materials about the EU, supporting teacher training and exchanges, and promoting cooperation among NGOs and educational institutions.

In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty formally expanded the EU’s legal competencies in education (Art. 149-150), and committed the EU "to the development of quality
education” through actions that encourage mobility for students and teachers, establish educational exchanges, promote language acquisition, and develop cooperation between educational institutions. Mobility is the key term in EU-level educational policy, and almost all of its initiatives are centrally about creating workers and citizens that are prepared to respond to the demands of its transnational market. To this end, the Council has emphasized the experiential aspects of education, especially the participation of students and teachers at all educational levels in transnational exchanges and cooperative “European” projects. Because these programs are voluntary, they avoid transgressing on member states’ educational sovereignty (Tulasiewicz and Brock 2000:33), while providing participants with a first-hand experience of transnational, “European” citizenship.

The Erasmus program for university students and teachers is perhaps the most well known of these exchanges, and since its inception in 1987 more than 1.5 million students have participated (European Commission Press Service 2006). While a sizeable number, this participation rate is well short of the European Commission’s long-held goal of 10% of its total student population (2% of eligible students per year over an assumed 5 year course of study) (Corbett 2005:118-146). Achieving this goal would require more than doubling the 2005 participation rate of about 150,000 students a year (European Commission Press Service 2006).

The EU’s 7 billion-Euro educational framework for 2007-2013, the “Lifelong Learning Initiative,” includes the Comenius program for primary and secondary schools, the Erasmus program for higher education, the Leonardo da Vinci program for vocational education and training and the Grundtvig program for adult education. The “Lifelong Learning Initiative” superceded the Socrates I (1995-1999) and Socrates II (2000-2006) initiatives which included the Comenius, Erasmus, and Grundtvig programs, as well as the Lingua program for language education and the Minerva program for information and communication technologies in education.

This amounts to a little less than 1% the eligible student population. Teacher mobility is about twice this level, at 1.9% of the eligible teacher population in 2005 (European Commission 2006).
3 million participants by 2012 (European Commission Press Service 2006). For its part, the Viadrina easily exceeds the Commission’s goal with about 6%, of its students participating in Erasmus during the 2004-2005 academic year.

In order to support Erasmus exchanges, the Council established the European Credit Transfer System (ECTS) in 1989 to facilitate the international transfer of university credit and enhance comparability between national programs.\(^5\) This move toward an EU-wide standard in higher education was expanded in 1999, when the Ministers of Education from 29 European countries (including both EU and non-EU members) met at the University of Bologna and agreed to take steps toward the implementation of a “European higher education area” by 2010. The subsequent “Bologna process” aims to establish a universal three-cycle university degree system (bachelor/master/doctorate), as well as processes to assure mutual recognition of qualifications (through the “Europass” documentation system) and educational quality assurance (managed by the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA)). Assuming this process is completed, it represents nothing short of a revolutionary reorganization of long-established national education systems in favor of an international and EU-driven model.

As a technology of government, the EU’s educational programs are part of a broad strategy of building a sense of “European” identity and citizenship. By creating common degrees and actively supporting student mobility, EU policymakers help

\(^5\) ECTS is based on the principle that 60 credits equal an academic year of full time study, or about 1500-1800 working hours (1 credit equals 25-30 hours). ECTS also introduces a standard grading system, which is normally given alongside the local grade and follows an A-F scale (A represents the top 10%, B the next 25%, C the next 30%, D the next 25%, E the next 10% and F for failing students. F grades are divided into FX: “fail- some more work required to pass,” and F: “fail – considerable further work required.”).
establish an educational context that provides tomorrow’s “European” elites with a basic set of common experiences, skills, and values from which they can derive the cultural capital necessary to become fully active EU citizens. According to 2006 Eurobarometer survey results, students and young people already exhibit a more positive general attitude toward the EU than older cohorts (See Table 2.1). If there is an emergent sense of EU cultural citizenship, it would therefore seem that students are among those who exhibit it most fully.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>People answering:</th>
<th>Their country’s membership in the EU is “a good thing.”</th>
<th>Their country has, on balance benefited from being a member of the EU.</th>
<th>They are “optimistic” about the future of the European Union.</th>
<th>They are “for” further enlargement of the EU.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age 15-24</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 25-39</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 40-54</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 55+</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People still studying</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Attitudes toward the EU according to age group in 2006 (Eurobarometer 2007b:97,99,171,190).

Because EU educational policy operates principally at the international administrative level, its efficacy is dependant on the cooperation of individual universities like the Viadrina, which must actively engage in the “European” project and structure their curricula and study programs accordingly. This chapter therefore examines how students in Frankfurt and Ślubice are being trained in EU citizenship practices as they prepare for careers in presumptively transnational corporations and
institutions. Having grown up in the normative context of open borders and easy travel within the EU, today’s students can be considered part of the first truly EU-generation.  

In Frankfurt and Slubice, an average university student has few or no memories of the socialist period and its collapse, or even a time before visa-free travel between Poland and Germany. Unlike their parents and grandparents, many of whom experienced forcible expulsion from their homes after the post-World War II revision of Poland’s borders, today’s students often consider international displacement to be a potential source of social and cultural capital in a manner similar to language or technical skills.

Michał, a recent graduate of Slubice’s liceum⁷ told a familiar story about his family’s arrival at the Polish-German border. At age three, Michał’s father and his family were deported to Siberia after World War II when their home in Western Poland (today Belarus) wound up inside the Soviet Union. After seven years, they were allowed to return to Poland. According to Michał, they “tried to get as far away from the Soviet Union as possible” and chose Slubice because it happened to be the place where the transport was crossing the Polish-German border. Michał’s family was hardly unique in this regard, and I was told many similar stories of people simply getting off the train in post-war Slubice and looking for an empty house in which to live. As for himself, Michał was preparing to study multimedia technology at the polytechnic university in Szczeczin. When I asked him if he might return to Slubice after his studies he said “Not on my life.”

Slubice and Frankfurt are thus located at the historical confluence of two opposed governing dynamics, both of which require the displacement of persons and populations.

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⁶ The journalist T.R. Reid has labeled this group “Generation E” (2004).
⁷ Poland’s college-preparatory secondary schools.
The first is a territorializing dynamic, which endeavored to secure the legitimacy and long-term stability of post-World War II territorial arrangements by creating more ethnically homogeneous national populations through compulsory emigration. Ironically, the success of this stability project helped give rise to a second, deterritorializing dynamic, which is driven by the creation and expansion of the EU’s common market and its requirement of open borders and a transnationally mobile labor force. Given this context, Frankfurt/Slubice’s border location makes their universities a fitting microcosm for exploring the potentiality of EU citizenship in spaces and institutions where the everyday interaction of multiple histories, nationalities, ethnicities, and languages creates possibilities not only for division and conflict, but also for cooperation and integration.

**Building a “European” University**

Despite its focus on pursuing the “European dimension” in education, Viadrina University’s contemporary history begins amidst the national and regional political confrontations following German unification in 1990. The Viadrina was founded in 1991 during a period of systematic devaluation of East German education, which included not only an overall reduction in the faculty of East German universities, but also the mass migration of West German academics to take over key positions in the Universities of the new [East German] Länders” (Weiler, Mintrop & Fuhrman 1996, cf. Rodden 2002:175-217). After 1990, “more than two-thirds of the 140,000 [higher education] employees from the [GDR] era were fired or furloughed”8 (Rodden 2002:215), while hiring processes that advantaged West German scholars resulted in “virtually an entire change of personnel” in faculties of social sciences, law, education, and economics--fields

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8 For example, at Humboldt University in Berlin, only 37% of its 1230 faculty positions in 1993 were held by people who worked there before 1989 (Rodden 2002:213).
viewed as most susceptible to the ideological demands of the East German state (Weiler, Mintrop & Fuhrman 1996:99-100).

While responsibility for higher education in the German federal system lies with the governments of the individual Länder, the national government wields considerable fiscal power over educational policy decisions by providing up to 50% of investment funds for educational institutions. The allocation of these funds is subject to the evaluation of the Wissenschaftsrat, a “scientific council” consisting of both academics and representatives of the federal and Länder governments that provides advice and recommendations on issues in higher education and research (Weiler, Mintrop & Fuhrman 1996:93). After unification, the Wissenschaftsrat evaluated the entire East German educational system, and by 1992 had typically recommended that each East German Land limit itself to one university (cf. Weiler, Mintrop & Fuhrman 1996:92-98).

Working under the assumption that Wissenschaftsrat would eventually come to this conclusion, Brandenburg⁹ sought to subvert the Wissenschaftsrat by quickly establishing three new universities in 1991—Brandenburg Technical University (Brandenburgische Technische Universität) in Cottbus, Potsdam University, and Viadrina University in Frankfurt—before the Wissenschaftsrat had time to evaluate the state (Weiler, Mintrop & Fuhrman 1996:97). The Wissenschaftsrat was then faced with three already-operating universities that would be politically difficult to close (Weiler, Mintrop & Fuhrman 1996:97, Weiler 1994:432). Each university was given a particular disciplinary mandate: Potsdam for education and teacher-training, Cottbus for environmental science, and Frankfurt for business administration and economics, cultural studies (Kulturwissenschaft), and law. This choice of faculties for the Viadrina

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⁹ The German state (Land) containing Frankfurt(Oder).
represents four areas of academic production that are all central competencies of EU policymaking. The Viadrina was also given the specific task of enhancing Polish-German relations by linking the countries' academic communities. In a demonstration of this commitment, the Viadrina's Chancellor, Gesine Schwan, has also served as the Coordinator for German-Polish Social and Cross-border Cooperation in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 2005.10

Brandenburg also intended its universities to be a pragmatic way of shoring up development and partially stemming the tide of emigration from the economically weak eastern (Frankfurt) and southeasten (Cotbus) parts of the state (Weiler, Mintrop & Fuhrman 1996:97). After the post-unification collapse of the Frankfurt’s once-renown semiconductor industry, it was hoped that Viadrina might become a “new point of identification for the city” (Weiler 1994:431). Judging by opinions of my correspondents, the Viadrina has played this role quite well, with many people openly acknowledging the importance of both cities’ universities in keeping Frankfurt(Oder) and Słubice from disappearing into peripheral obscurity.

Beginning with 456 students in 1992, Viadrina’s enrollment had grown to 5199 by the 2007-2008 academic year. While still a small university by German standards, the Viadrina is unique in its commitment to building an international student body, backed by Brandenburg’s formal policy of reserving one-third of the university’s places for Polish students (Weiler 1994:433). In the 2007-2008 academic year, Polish students comprised about 20% (1053) of Viadrina’s enrolment, while students from another 73 countries represented about another 10% (490), a remarkably high number given that German

10 In 2004, Schwan was also the SPD/Green Party candidate for the German presidency, but was defeated by Horst Köhler (589 to 604 votes).
universities typically allocate no more than 5% of places in most major subjects to foreign students (Weiler 1994:436).

By providing its students with diverse cultural experiences and an interdisciplinary and comparative approach to scholarship, the Viadrina explicitly endeavors to educate tomorrow’s transnational “Europeans.” As part of this international mission, the Viadrina participated in the organization of the Collegium Polonicum (CP) in Słubice, which opened in 1998 under the auspices of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. Although CP’s students and faculty are organizationally part of Adam Mickiewicz, CP was envisioned as a cooperative cross-border research and teaching institution. Located only 50 meters from the bridge linking the two cities, the construction of CP’s modernist main building and library transformed Słubice’s city center and are lasting symbols of Polish-German reconciliation and European cooperation. The cooperative nature of CP also allowed the universities to tap sources of EU funding for cross-border cooperation. Of the approximately DM 70 million in total investment funds spent on Collegium Polonicum by 1998, DM 24 million was provided by the EU regional development funds (through the PHARE and INTERREG programs), DM 30 million by the Polish government, and DM 12 million by the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation (TAZ 1998:17).

By the 2006-2007 academic year, CP enrolled approximately 1800 students, who, together with students from Viadrina, form a cross-border community that was designed to express and enact the EU values of cooperation and integration. However, managing the cross-border programming of the universities has also presented unique

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11 CP offers courses in 15 disciplines including undergraduate studies in Political Science, Polish Philology, Environmental Protection, Information Sciences and Polish Studies for Foreign Students.
difficulties, not the least of which was the logistical problem of delays at the border potentially interfering with students’ course schedules and attendance. To help alleviate this problem, an agreement was reached with the local border authorities which allowed university students, staff and faculty to bypass lines at the border by showing their university ID cards. While more efficient border controls had made this privilege mostly redundant by the time I began my fieldwork in 2003—and Poland’s Schengen accession on December 21, 2008 eliminated the need altogether—a sign posted at the border crossing continued to explain the policy and thanked other travelers for their patience and cooperation. Nevertheless, in the courses I taught at CP, my students still occasionally attributed their tardiness to delays at the border, and it remained apparent that for a cross-border university to function in a way that it is practical for students to attend classes in two countries on the same day, the border controls between these countries must be sufficiently deregulated to consistently allow easy travel in either direction.

The universities also continue to observe their respective national—and non-equivalent—academic and holiday calendars. A colleague at CP explained, “[when you plan a course,] you have to decide first if your class is German or Polish [as far as the calendar is concerned]. You can choose either way, but in practice most students and professors are both.” Differences in faculties and curricula further limit integration between the universities, and for the most part—and particularly at the undergraduate level—students are enrolled in, attend classes at, and receive degrees from only one of the two universities. Dual degrees from both universities are offered only at the graduate level in the Master’s of Polish and German Law and Master’s of European

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12 For students from non-EU countries, obtaining visas for both countries was often a problem as well. See Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of this issue.

13 CP’s degrees are granted by Adam Mickiewicz University.
Political Studies programs. The latter degree is a flagship cooperative program of the universities, and is illustrative of the universities’ approach to the training of “European” citizens.

**Mastering Citizenship Practice**

The Master’s of European Political Studies (MEPS) program at Viadrina and CP is the universities’ local contribution to Europe’s growing number of EU-oriented study programs that endeavor to train students the EU’s economic, legal, political, and cultural fields. The MEPS program aims to attract about 30 students per year in equal numbers from Poland and Germany. Due to the program’s high language requirements—students must be proficient in both German and English prior to admission, and if they do not already speak Polish, must enroll in courses during the program—finding qualified applicants is often difficult, and for the 2006-2007 academic year the program admitted only 9 of 11 applicants. These high admission requirements also help ensure that MEPS students will have backgrounds that contribute to their successful post-graduation entry into a transnational and deterritorialized “European” elite which has the international experience required to join businesses and institutions anywhere in the EU, including the institutions of the EU itself.

Iwona was a prototypical example of this type of MEPS student. Until age five, she lived in Wrocław, where her Grandmother had settled after being forced to leave Lwów.

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14 Perhaps the best known and most prestigious of these programs is the Master’s of European Studies at the Collège d’Europe in Bruges, Belgium and Natolin, Poland. According to the Collège d’Europe’s website (accessed February 7, 2008), 26% of its alumni work at EU institutions.

15 Viadrina also offers two other single-degree Master’s of European Studies programs, a “regular” program in which only German is required, and a “multilingual” program that requires German and at least two languages out of English, French, and Polish.
(L’viv) following World War II. After her parents divorced in 1985, Iwona moved to West Berlin with her mother, who was ethnically German and could exercise the right of return. Iwona spoke both Polish and German at home, and, unusually, retained citizenship in both countries. This Polish-German background made Viadrina’s border location especially appealing, and Iwona chose to live in Ślubice rather than Frankfurt not only because it was cheaper—she said that she might not have been able to afford the living expenses in another university town—but also because she wanted to take advantage of the chance to correct problems in her Polish by speaking it more regularly. Iwona described her biography as an asset to her studies, saying, “I can do a double diploma, and I have the [Polish] language. It is easier to communicate. There are big differences [between Polish and German] students; they are not always interested in each other. It is easier for me to integrate on both sides.” Like many of the students I interviewed, a strong identification with a nation-state has become destabilized for Iwona. When I asked her if she felt more German, Polish or European, she explained, “I try to think in a very European way. If someone asks me [this question] I have no answer. I have both nationalities. . . I try to take the good things from both nationalities. I try to think European. It is the best solution for me.”

Holding a MEPS or a similarly EU-focused degree helps validate an individual’s membership in a developing “European” social category. Bourdieu observes the important role academic degrees play in making and maintaining distinctions between social groups (Bourdieu 1984, 1996) and in instilling group members with a sense of common culture (Bourdieu 1996:81). By guaranteeing “a competence extending far beyond what they are supposed to guarantee” (Bourdieu 1984:25), academic
qualifications and titles certify an individual’s possession of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1984:23). Therefore, “it is written into the tacit definition of the academic qualification formally guaranteeing a specific competence (like an engineering diploma) that it really guarantees possession of a ‘general culture’ whose breadth is proportionate to the prestige of the qualification” (Bourdieu 1984:25, emphasis original).

For graduates of EU-oriented degree programs, this “general culture” is the ability to—like Iwona—“think European.” Along with possessing this naturalized sense of what it means to be European, EU degree holders also acquire the experience of living and working in a multinational and polyglot environment, as well as membership within the kind of deterritorialized networks of EU elites that are becoming an increasingly important, but not necessarily democratic, source of power within EU governmentality (Novoa and Lawn 2002:8). For students in Frankfurt/Slubice, it is this cultural capital that is the true “European dimension” in their educational experience, and in practical terms translates into proficiency in two critical areas for the full exercise of EU citizenship: a preparedness for transnational displacement and mobility, and language ability.

**Mobility as Opportunity**

Almost all the students I spoke with in Frankfurt and Slubice were preparing for a future elsewhere. In 2004, youth unemployment (ages 15-24) in Lubuskie\(^\text{16}\) was 48%, making it the fifth highest region anywhere in the EU (behind only three French foreign departments and one region of Greece). Youth unemployment for the same period in Brandenburg was also quite high, at 23% (Eurostat 2005a). With few prospects in the

\(^{16}\) The Polish district (województwo) containing Slubice.
region, most students have little choice except to leave the cities soon after the end of their studies, and only one of the students I interviewed planned to stay in either city.\footnote{This student only planned to stay because he hoped to eventually take over his family's house, one of the few in Slubice that had remained in the same family since before World War II.}

Slubice and Frankfurt's students thus embody the EU's normative ideal of a mobile citizenry, even if this displacement is driven as much by economic realities as identification with the EU's values of open markets and multiculturalism. When I asked her about the effects of the EU expansion in her home country, Diana, a Viadrina master's student in economics from Latvia, described this economic exodus:

It is a very big problem in Latvia that young people go to Ireland, Germany, etc. to earn money and think they don't have to stay in Latvia. There is a lot of unemployment [in Latvia] and [on top of that] now we don't have our people. They are in London, or Ireland and we have only old people. [The young people] think, 'why do I have to stay here, if I can go to Germany, etc.?’ Many young people graduate and go to the USA, thinking they can earn money [there].

Even though she was part of this problematic population, Diana did not plan to return to Latvia immediately after her studies. When I inquired if she identified herself as more Latvian or European, she said, “I think more European. I like it here--Germany, Hamburg, Berlin. Maybe I'll stay here. But I also like Latvia. Maybe in 6 or 7 years I can go to Latvia and work there.”

The lack of opportunity closer to home helps fuel the post-accession wave of young people moving from throughout the eight 2004 East European accession countries (A8) (See Chapter 1) to more prosperous places in the EU. In September 2006, the
United Kingdom reported that 83% of the 743,000 post-accession immigrants who arrived from the A8 and applied for worker registration were under 35 (44% were between 18 and 24) (Home Office 2007:10). In this regard, attending Viadrina also provides Polish students with potential access to Germany’s still-restricted labor market,\(^{18}\) since graduates of German universities were allowed to stay for up to one year to search for employment (this period was increased to three years after November 1, 2007). Foreign students at German universities are also permitted to work up to 90 days per year, making Viadrina’s border particularly attractive to Polish students who can live (cheaply) in Poland, but work—albeit limitedly—in Germany. Given that Polish wages tend to be about 25% of wages in Germany (See Chapter 6), ninety days of work in Germany could potentially equal a year’s pay in Poland.

Especially for its Polish students, the Viadrina offers relatively easy access to international experience, a source of cultural capital that is increasingly convertible directly to economic advantage within the EU. According to a 2006 study on the value of ERASMUS student mobility, 53% of former ERASMUS participants believed that their experience abroad was an important aspect in obtaining their initial post-graduation employment (Bracht, \emph{et. al.} 2006:61). Employers evaluated work experience abroad less enthusiastically, with only 34% indicating that it was an important recruiting criterion (Bracht, \emph{et. al.} 2006:90). However, foreign experience seems to be valued much more highly in Central and Eastern Europe,\(^{19}\) where 48% of employers indicated it was an important recruiting criterion, compared to only 25% in Western Europe (Bracht, \emph{et. al.} 2006:90).

\(^{18}\) In accordance with the provisions of the Accession Treaty negotiations, Germany exercised its right to maintain up to seven years of post-accession restrictions on labor mobility for workers from the A8.

\(^{19}\) Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
Furthermore, when employers were asked to indicate the competence of graduates, graduates with international experience received ratings of high proficiency more often than graduates without international experience in all 19 categories surveyed, ranging from adaptability (81% vs. 57%) and initiative (79% vs. 62%) to written communication (70% vs. 58%), analytical competence (70% vs 59%), and problem-solving ability (70% vs. 58%) (Bracht, et. al. 2006:96-98). 42% of employers also indicated that internationally experienced graduates are more frequently given increased levels of responsibility than non-experienced graduates (Bracht, et. al. 2006:102), while 21% indicated that internationally experienced graduates receive higher pay after five years of employment (Bracht, et. al. 2006:103). While the amorphous nature of cultural capital makes it difficult to quantify its economic value, the perceived proficiency gap between mobile and non-mobile graduates seems to indicate a competitive advantage derived from students’ experience of transnational displacement.

Linguistic Advantages, Linguistic Barriers

Of the many benefits of international study, language ability appears to most clearly contribute to a student’s fund of cultural capital. 70% of employers (87% in Central and Eastern Europe) indicated that foreign language proficiency was an important recruitment criterion, and graduates with international experience were rated as demonstrating a high degree of foreign language proficiency by 88% of employers compared to only 48% for graduates without international experience (Bracht, et. al. 2006:90,98). For Polish graduates of the Viadrina, one of the most valuable aspects of their diploma is therefore its validation of their practical mastery of German, certified
formally by their university entrance exams, and informally by several years of successful study in a second language. Likewise, an MEPS degree indicates the ability to work in both English and German, two of the EU’s most important and widely used languages. Given that exercising the right to work anywhere in the EU often depends on language abilities, this “guarantee of competence” (Bourdieu 1984) makes it more likely that these students will experience a full sense of cultural citizenship within the EU.

Nevertheless, language use remained a distinct area of non-integration at CP and the Viadrina, despite the everyday multilingualism of their students. Language was often cited by my correspondents as the biggest barrier to cooperation between the residents of Frankfurt and Slubice, and continued to be extremely contentious issue for many of the universities’ students. Language use in the cities and at the universities was almost always asymmetrically skewed in favor of German, with Poles generally expected to learn German, while very few Germans learned more than a few words of Polish. This situation was usually justified by the higher levels of wealth and stronger economic positions of Germany and Frankfurt relative to Poland and Slubice. My correspondents on both sides of the border regularly told me that learning German presents Poles with a potential economic opportunity, while few Germans, even in the border regions, have an incentive to learn Polish, and instead choose to concentrate on learning English or French.

At the EU-wide level, the use of English far outpaces both Polish and German. English is the most widely spoken and studied foreign language in the EU, as well as in Poland and Germany (Table 2.2), where the study of English at the secondary school
level is nearly universal\textsuperscript{20} (Table 2.3). Increasingly, English is also the EU’s language of state, and the common language in which EU policymakers from different member states communicate. According to Phillipson, a hierarchy of languages can be identified within the EU’s institutions, with English at the top, followed by French, more distantly by German, and finally by everything else (2003:132). This hierarchy is supported by the widespread use of English and French as languages for the drafting of EU documents and as everyday “procedural languages” in the EU’s institutions,\textsuperscript{21} particularly as the number of official EU languages continues to expand, reaching 23 by 2008\textsuperscript{22} (Phillipson 2003). The position of English as the EU’s preeminent international language increases the potential cultural and political capital of English speakers—especially as a first, but even as a second (or third) language—and enhances their ability to exercise their rights as EU citizens and to fully participate in the EU’s institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>English</th>
<th>German</th>
<th>Polish</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Russian</th>
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<tr>
<td>EU25</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2: Percentages of people reporting that they spoke a language other than their mother tongue in the EU25, Germany, and Poland in 2006, by language indicated (Eurobarometer 2006).

\textsuperscript{20} While all four of Frankfurt’s Gymnasien (college preparatory secondary schools) teach English, only one—Karl Liebknecht Gymnasium—teaches Polish. At Karl Liebknecht, about 37\% (273) of its 729 students study Polish, although about 90 of these students are Polish nationals from Slubice participating in an international student exchange. All of Karl Liebknecht’s students study English (Karl-Liebknecht-Gymnasium 2006). In Slubice, all 337 Liceum students study both English and German.

\textsuperscript{21} The figures provided by the EU’s translation service regarding the original language of documents submitted for translation suggest that English is even rapidly displacing French. In 1997, the top three source languages were English, at 45.4\%, French at 40.4\% and German at 5.4\%. In 2006, the languages were the same, but the proportions had shifted dramatically, with English accounting for 72\% of the 1.541 million pages translated, followed by French at 14\%, and German at 2.8\% (European Commission 2007b:6).

\textsuperscript{22} Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish.
Table 2.3: Percentages of secondary students studying foreign languages in Germany and Poland in 2005 (EU25 data was not available). Source: Eurostat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Polish</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>96.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dominance of English as the principle second language of the EU is reflected in the languages used at CP and the Viadrina. Although Polish and German language courses are offered at both universities CP and Viadrina, the universities’ curricula are predominated by their respective national languages, followed by English at Viadrina, and combination of German and English at CP. Given this language profile, English is often used as the common language of communication since it is most reliably the language spoken most fluently by the most people and English is frequently the lingua franca of conferences, seminars and other cross-border meetings at the universities and in the cities, particularly when participants cannot be reliably assumed to speak German.

Krzysztof, a Polish graduate student in linguistics, believed that language use deeply influenced inter-personal relations and attitudes in Frankfurt/Słubice, and given Poland and Germany’s history of conflict, working in a third language—usually English—is often helpful in easing the deep-seated tensions between the two sides. With both sides using a second language, the linguistic advantage that Germans often enjoy, and many Poles experience as neocolonial, is diminished. In keeping with this argument, Krzysztof routinely chose to speak English instead of German in public settings, even though he spoke both languages quite well.

Language difference at the university also contributed to the polarization of social groups, and in social situations students regularly separated by native language, even to the point that several of my correspondents reported attending parties where the Germans...
had gathered in one room and the Poles in another. This division also seemed to extend to students’ residency choices. Even though Slubice’s dormitory compound offered rooms at rents about 50% (or less) lower than similar accommodations on the German side, and was open to all students at both universities, its residents were almost exclusively Polish, and most German students preferred living in Frankfurt (or even Berlin). This residency barrier was even a problem for a new international student house in Frankfurt. Working under the motto of “Europe begins here” (Hier fängt Europa an! Tutaj zaczyna się Europa), the student house’s membership was in the process of remodeling a small block of socialist-style flats they had managed to save from demolition with the support of the Viadrina’s administration and the mayor’s office of Frankfurt. The flats cost only about 100 EUR a month—less than average in Frankfurt, and not much more than in Slubice—as long as residents agreed to participate in the project. The student house had the goal of filling at least 50% of its 33 rooms with non-German students, but at the time I visited it had succeeded in attracting only three Polish students (although another four residents were international students).

Social pressures among students appear to reinforce this self-segregation by language and nationality. Karl, one of the few Germans students I met who lived in the Slubice dormitories, explained the double bind he experienced after moving to Poland, “[In Poland] I talk like normal. Some people say, ‘you are in a foreign country, you shouldn’t speak German,’ but I don’t think it is foreign. I live here. Poles say I am kurwa (a whore) for it. Germans say I am kurwa for living here.” By not bothering to

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23 This practice seems to be common even at the European Commission (Shore 2000:164,188).
24 See Chapter 4.
25 Literally meaning “a whore,” kurwa is a strong expletive in Polish and is used in a way similar to “fuck” or “fucker” in English.
learn and use Polish, Karl embodied Gemany's economically superior position vis-à-vis Poland, and in the local context of Slubice/Frankfurt, not learning the neighboring language is an economically-supported privilege available only to the German side. Furthermore, by moving to Poland, Karl also reversed the "normal" hierarchal flow of individuals from the "poor" East to the "rich" West. In this way, Karl's experiment with displacement was out of step with local norms—*kurwa*—on both sides, even as he was ostensibly enacting the EU principle of free movement between member states.

**Conclusions**

Language proficiency is one of the primary gatekeepers for individuals to fluidly function in the EU's transnational spaces, including the cross-border space of Frankfurt/Slubice. Multilingualism is at the core of the contemporary conception of EU cultural citizenship, not only because it enables the free movement of workers within its common market, but also because it helps provide individuals with a common ground from which to assert a transnational "European" identity that supersedes the ethnic and nationalist differences—differences in which language has historically played a central role.

By "creating new possibilities of identification within and about Europe" (Borneman and Fowler 1997:489) which can encompass multiple ethnicities, nationalities, and languages, EU educational initiatives and EU-oriented degrees help establish and promote emerging forms of "European" cultural citizenship. In this way, education is a key site where the processes of Europeanization can be observed, as individuals, institutions, and governing bodies work to shape a definition for a common "European" community that "fundamentally [reorganizes] territoriality and peoplehood,
two principles of group identification that have shaped modern European order”
(Borneman and Fowler 1997:487).

As is demonstrated by the difficulties the Viadrina and CP have encountered in
creating a locally integrated cross-border university, establishing this sense of European
community is fraught with conflicts, accommodations, and compromises in even the most
enthusiastic of environments. However, this context makes the Viadrina and CP a dress
rehearsal for students preparing to live and work in the transnationally mobile
environment expected of tomorrow’s “European” elite. United by the normative values
of multiculturalism and transnationalism, students with “European” degrees like Viadrina
and CP’s MEPS might fulfill a role for the EU similar to Benedict Anderson’s (1983:47-
65) notion of “Creole pioneers,” who provided the leadership for national independence
movements in the Americas once their similar administrative experiences and common
language coalesced into a shared cultural identity. In Frankfurt and Słubice, most
students already take for granted the existence of “Europe” as a coherent cultural field,
and while they may have only have a second (or third) language in common, these EU
pioneers share the kind of transnational experience that is at the core of what it means to
be an EU citizen.
Chapter 3
Inventing a City: Cultural Citizenship in “Slubfurt”

Introduction

In September 2004, an information center opened in Frankfurt for a city that didn’t exist. Located among the many empty storefronts of Grosse Scharrnstraße, a pedestrian zone running most of the distance between the bridge and Viadrina University, the “Slubfurt Information Center” resembled any typical tourist information office. At one end of the center’s long street-level space, a counter held Slubfurt-themed brochures and souvenirs, such as wine, postcards, t-shirts, videos, and newspapers. The remainder of the space was devoted to a meeting and exhibition area. When I visited, the walls were covered with informational displays, including maps of the city, newspaper clippings, the results of a Slubfurt “mental map” survey,¹ and excerpts from Frankfurt’s analysis of a proposed cross-border tram or bus line (See Chapter 4).

A visitor to the information center would also find someone to explain the almost entirely invented history of the city:

Slubfurt arose from the cities of “Slub” and “Furt” on the German-Polish border with its two cultures, two languages and two realities in two countries. It was founded on November 8, 1999 at a cooperative city council meeting and on November 29, 2000 was entered on the Register of European City Names. Slubfurt is one of the youngest cities in the world. Today everyone who settles down here is a Slubfurter equally, whether coming from Asia, Africa, America, Australia, or Europe.

¹ For the full results of the mental map survey, see Garand (2002)
The city government of Słubfurt is composed of two city parliaments, one from Slub and one from Furt. Both municipal authorities collectively constitute the city council of Słubfurt, and from its members the mayor is chosen in four-year cycles, alternating between a person from Slub and one from Furt. The current incumbent mayor is Mr. Władysław Müller, a genuine Słubfurter. Born in Slub and raised in Furt, he studied European law and city planning at Collegium Pollonicum in Slub. Today he holds office in the newly built Słubfurt town hall on the Oder bridge between Slub and Furt.2

The Słubfurt Information Center was part of a series of projects undertaken by the NGO “Słubfurt,” a cross-border cultural organization formed in 1999 to promote the transnational character of Slubice/Frankfurt’s urban space. As an organization, Słubfurt is about both art and activism, supporting not only artistic installations and performances, but also community events, research projects, and even university seminars. As Słubfurt’s name implies, almost all of these activities are aimed at promoting identification with, and cultural citizenship in, Slubice/Frankfurt as a unified cross-border city.

Cultural citizenship describes an individual’s sense of belonging within a particular group or society, most often in relation to the dominant cultural community of a nation-state (Soysal 1996:17, cf. Flores and Benmayor 1997, Flores 1997, Rosaldo 1989, Stevenson 1999). In establishing this feeling of a ”right to belong,” Flores emphasizes the importance of claiming not only a physical, geographic space, but also a

2 This explanation, as well as a great deal of additional information about Słubfurt, is available at www.słubfurt.net.
place for "creative expression, self-representation, and engagement," where groups can define themselves, define their membership, claim rights and develop a vision of the type of society that they want to live in" (Flores 1997:263). Slubfurt endeavors to establish a forum for making this type of claim on the transnational social space created in Slubice and Frankfurt by the opening of the border to visa-free travel in 1991 and encouraged by the EU’s subsequent interest in de-emphasizing and deterritorializing its future internal borders.

Although it focuses on the local expression of transnational citizenship practices rather than “European” citizenship per se, Slubfurt is very much a product of the “European” moment, as well as the social and cultural funding initiatives that support the promotion and deployment of EU citizenship. This relationship demonstrates a second aspect of cultural citizenship, which “consists of two mutually-determining dimensions; specifically, as a strategy of cultural politics and as a set of techniques of governmentality” (Stevenson 1999:66, cf. Ong 1996).

For the EU, policies sponsoring cultural initiatives have a specific purpose directly related to its governing efforts. By encouraging EU citizens to feel a sense of belonging anywhere in Union, cultural programming is intended to provide support for the smooth functioning of the common market by making meaningful the rights, privileges and social benefits guaranteed by the EU at the supranational level. To this end, the EU’s involvement in cultural politics increased dramatically after 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty established a legal basis for EU interventions in the cultural field (Art. 151). As of the EU’s 2007-2013 budgetary cycle, this involvement has grown to an

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3 Specifically, the Treaty tasked the Community with bringing to the fore Europe’s common cultural heritage, contributing to the “flowering of the Cultures of the Member States, while respecting their
allocation of about EUR 400 for cultural initiatives, about three-quarters of which is intended for cooperation between cultural organizations such as theatres, museums, professional associations, research centers, universities, cultural institutes. EU citizens affirm the importance of these efforts. According to a 2007 special Eurobarometer survey, 89% of EU citizens indicated that they either "totally agree" or "tend to agree" with the statement, "Culture and cultural exchanges should have a very important place in the EU so that citizens from different member states can learn more from each other and feel more European" (Eurobarometer 2007a:35). Nevertheless, a slight majority of EU citizens also agreed that a common culture is presently lacking. 53% said the statement, "There is no common European culture because European countries are too different from one another," reflected their personal view either very well or fairly well. (Eurobarometer 2007a:64).

Given the historically ambivalent and contested location of the Polish-German border (See Chapter 1), divided cities like Słubice/Frankfurt are locations of particularly high symbolic value for demonstrating the success of the EU's supranational governing project in overcoming old divisions. Markus, the director of an NGO dedicated to teaching and preserving the history of the Polish-German border region, argued that this symbolic status of the cities had ironically become an obstacle to effective cross-border cooperation:

One thing I observe. . .when you look [at Słubice/Frankfurt] from the outside [people] have big expectations. It's a symbol of Polish-German cooperation, but

national and regional diversity, improving "the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples, and the "conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance."

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objectively it’s a small Polish city and a medium German city, both with high unemployment, where the fittest [people] leave. . .People know [cooperation] is an expectation and some are sick of it. . .I don’t think we have to force people, it will either happen or it doesn’t. That’s one thing I learned from history. Without this pressure from the outside, I think Frankfurt and Słubice would be better off. . . Słubice/Frankfurt is a political symbol. In the media there is [a lot of] observation—like it’s a barometer for Polish-German relations—but it’s not. That’s the point of view of the outside.

Part of this outside attention on Słubice/Frankfurt results from the sustained funding the region has received from the EU’s INTERREG program for cross-border cooperation. In 2000-2006, the EU allocated EUR 132.25 million in INTERREG funds to Brandenburg and Lubuskie. National and local governments provided another EUR 44.11 million in matching funds, for a total to EUR 176.36 million. While infrastructure development received the highest proportion of these monies (34.7%, or 61.45 million Euros), EUR 14.7 million (8.3%) was spent on co-operation in cultural and social affairs, including EUR 9 million on 1738 small projects aimed at building connections between individuals (The remaining funds were distributed among 56 larger projects) (Euroregion Pro Europa Viadrina 2007:8,58).

As is suggested by the sheer number of projects and events funded by INTERREG, cultural events are an extremely cost effective way to promote EU

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4 These funds are administered through the "Pro Europa Viadrina" Euroregion, an NGO established in 1993 by an agreement between the Verein Mittlere Oder (Central Oder) e.V. (a conglomerate of smaller associations, trade unions, administrative districts and municipal governments) in Germany and the Association of Lubuskie Municipalities and the Association of the Municipalities of Gorzów in Poland. The Euroregion is therefore comprised of the Eastern part of Land Brandenburg in Germany (specifically the two administrative districts of Markisch–Oderland and Oder–Spree), and the Lubuskie Voivodship in Poland.
citizenship goals and practices directly to individual citizens, and to generate a participatory dynamic that is not usually a characteristic of more capital-intensive infrastructure improvement initiatives. Perhaps for this reason, cultural events play a conspicuous role in cross-border cooperation efforts of the municipal governments of Slubice and Frankfurt. Of the 44 events and initiatives specifically mentioned in Frankfurt’s 2005 report on cross-border cooperation, half were in cultural or recreational fields.\(^5\)

Community improvements and cultural events also provide a vehicle through which the EU can promote its “brand,” and the EU flag routinely appeared in the sponsors’ sections of event advertisements and materials like any other corporate logo (Fig. 3.1). To assure that the EU receives appropriate credit for its contributions and to maintain a system of brand continuity, the European Commission issued a regulation in 2000, which outlined the rules and guidelines for the publicity of EU-funded projects and included requirements for billboards, commemorative plaques, posters, publications, and websites.\(^6\) As a result of this regulation, residents of Slubice and Frankfurt were constantly reminded of the EU’s financial presence in the cities’ public spaces, at

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\(^5\) Specifically, 17 were cultural events and five were recreational (including sports). Of the remainder, four events were focused on market or economic development, seven were cooperative meetings between government functionaries, eight were types of educational cooperation, and three were related to health and welfare.

\(^6\) EC 1159/2000 (OJL 130/30, 30 May 2000).
construction sites (Fig. 3.2), on buildings (Fig. 3.3), and even in books at the library (Fig. 3.4).

Fig. 3.2: A billboard erected during the renovation of Słubice's Friendship Square (Plac Przyjaźni) that conforms to the EU publicity rule requiring at least 25% of the total area must be devoted to the EU's contribution (European Commission 2000:35).

Fig. 3.3: A plaque in one of the residences of Słubice’s student campus the commemorating EU’s role in its construction.
While the EU provides a large proportion of the funds supporting "European" cultural programs, it typically depends on the planning and initiative of local governments and NGOs for the execution of these projects. This symbiotic relationship between the EU and organizations like Slubfurt contains an inherent tension between the supranational goals of the European Commission when it allocates funds, and the local goals of the people and organizations taking part in the projects. Shore observes that much of the high-level discourse of EU cultural policy involves a type of "departicularization" in which national cultural icons, (such as Beethoven, Rembrandt, Shakespeare, or Venice) are "appropriated, re-interpreted, and then offered up as indices of a unitary 'European' history" (Shore 2000:54, cf. Alonso 1988:45). However, in the context of Slubice/Frankfurt, most EU-sponsored cultural events--and in particular those
organized by Słubfurt—were more concerned with *re-particularization*, that is, the shifting of old local symbols from both sides of the border into a transnational frame and the establishment of new transnational symbols, practices, and traditions for the local space. The remainder of this chapter focuses on an in-depth examination of Słubfurt's efforts to establish these forms of cultural citizenship by engaging the cities’ residents in an ongoing series of performances and projects aimed at redefining the cities as a unified multinational space.

**Słubfurt: “The first German-Polish city on the Oder”**

Michael Kurzwelly,⁷ the organizational force behind “the first German-Polish city on the Oder,” describes himself a conceptual artist working in the medium of “social sculpture.” When he arrived in Frankfurt in 1998, Kurzwelly was surprised by the division he observed between the cities, and decided to use art as a way to address the issue. He explained:

To me, Słubfurt started when I came here and I wanted to define my space for me personally, because I do not feel that I live in Frankfurt, I feel that I live in Słubfurt. I use both sides and I came here because of both cities... When I came here, I felt nearer to the Polish culture than the East German culture. I had lots of problems of integration in the first years here, [because I was] seen as a West German [Kurzwelly grew up in Bonn]. It was, and sometimes even now is, difficult for me to understand people from here. So for me, the space was Słubfurt, because in my identity I felt

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⁷ Because Kurzwelly is so closely identified with Słubfurt, it is impossible to discuss the organization without making him easily recognizable. For this reason, I have not replaced his name with a pseudonym and have limited myself to materials collected during public events and in formal “on the record” interviews.
in between. It's a kind of hybrid identity, or even more, a layered identity.

. . . Each time you are in a place with a different culture where people have a different point of view on life, you start adopting elements—not all, but you start adopting [some]--and you change yourself. So to me, identity isn't something which is stable, it is something. . . in movement, in process. . . I feel culturally in-between, and to me this is a question of identity, and that is why I created Slubfurt. I created the word Slubfurt to define my identity, and that is why I am from Slubfurt when you ask me.

In pursuing this identification with Slubfurt, Kurzwelly has become a kind of "ethnopopitical entrepreneur" who "may live 'off' as well as 'for' ethnicity (Brubaker 2004:10), or, in Kurzwelly's case, the self-consciously multi-ethnic "Slubfurt." Drawing on Bourdieu (1991), Brubaker explains that these individuals often display "a performative character. By invoking groups, they seek to evoke them, summon them, call them into being. Their categories are for doing—designed to stir, summon, justify, mobilize, kindle and energize" (2004:10); goals that describe the mission of Slubfurt well.

Performative elements comprised of "those enactments and processes that forge a sense of community and belonging, lead to renewed experiences of identity, and provide a social space for the formation of collective practice and its concomitant forms of power" (Flores 1997:125) are likewise central to the concept of cultural citizenship. Slubfurt explicitly attempts to provide these types of identity-forming events through its model of combining of art, activism, and education to engage people in a cross-border
dialog about the cities. In this way, Slubfurt encourages residents of the two cities to
develop a critical perspective that questions the nature of identity and belonging.

Kurzwelly outlined some of these questions while discussing his view of
Slubfurt's goals:

To me, as an art project, [Slubfurt] is a project of asking about identity and
who defines it. . . Is it a reality that [here in Ślubice and Frankfurt], we
[have] two states, and that we are citizens of these states? . . . Is it really
the nationality that decides? Or, somebody making you a passport [and]
telling you that you are a German or a Pole? [It is] the same [about] the
body of a city. Who defines this body? Well, you could say society, but
who defines society? It's a group of people, and then you go down to each
[individual], and each person has a different kind of mental map. Lots of
[people] adopt a vision of the world given [to them] by others, but one
also has the chance to build up one's own space, which does not have to
exist for others. So for me, Slubfurt already has the right to exist at the
moment when I say Slubfurt is there. . . Then I started working with this
idea, trying to show my space. . . This is why I tried to develop Slubfurt.
But I think Slubfurt has different aspects, it could have political aspects, it
could have social aspects, but to me it is especially about the conversation
between people.

The new transnational space of “Slubfurt” offers an antidote to a profound sense
alienation that characterizes many residents’ relationship with the two cities.
Kurzwelly described this condition as “an identity crisis on both sides of the Oder” (*Eine Sinnkrise auf beiden Seiten der Oder*) (Szrek and Kurzwelly 2005:6), that has its origin in the lack of “roots” in both cities resulting from Frankfurt’s near complete destruction during World War II (only about 600 people remained by April 1945 (Gramlich, et. al. 2002:42) and Słubice’s post-war history of expulsion and resettlement.

For Kurzwelly, this “identity crisis” destabilizes a sense of *Heimat* within the cities. “Literally translated as the home or homeland, the term *Heimat* refers to a discourse of belonging in which identity becomes grounded in place” (Berdahl 1999:82). Referring as much to an emotional concept as a physical space, *Heimat* has neither a single meaning, nor an adequate direct translation to Polish or English. It does, however, share a great deal with the concept of cultural citizenship. “[Heimat] is both inherently linked to notions of Germaneness and an imagining of a local community. It [provides] emotional as well as ideological common ground for the construction and maintenance of local identities...” (Berdahl 1999:82-83). Like Slubfurt, the notion of *Heimat* also stems from a desire to invent a place in which to belong within the context of destabilizing social change. As Appelgate observes, “Heimat has never been a word about real social forces or real political situations. Instead it has been a myth about the possibility of a community in the face of fragmentation and alienation” (1990:19). In Frankfurt and Słubice a lack of this feeling of community contributes to the persistence of divisions between the cities and fundamentally weakens residents’ sense of cultural citizenship in a shared community.

Opposition on both sides of the border regarding the use of Slubfurt as a collective name for the cities is illustrative of this continued division. According to
Kurzwelly, many Poles initially thought Slubfurt was advocating a return to Germany, while many Germans thought he was destroying “their” city’s name. City names occupy a particularly ambivalent position within the cultural politics of the Polish-German border regions. Within Poland’s “recovered” territories, almost all cities have both Polish and German names, as do many cities throughout Poland. These names are linked not only to specific periods of historical rule, but also to ethnic and national claims to place. Because of this, the use of a particular name today can be employed to make implicit (and sometimes explicit) claims about the “rightful” ownership of a city, which is often based on a selective reading of history. The historical complexity of the settlement and rule of Western Poland by both Slavic and Germanic groups usually provides ample evidence for both Poles and Germans to assert primeval ethnic ties to any given location (see Chapter 1). An informational brochure about Slubice distributed by the city’s administrative office provides an example of this strategy, emphasizing a Slavic settlement on the site of the city during the Middle Ages, as well as Piast Poland’s loss of the lands bordering the Oder River (ziemia lubuska) to Brandenburg in 1250 (Urząd Miejski w Slubicach 2003:5).

By renaming the cities, Slubfurt makes an internationalist claim to their common space and asserts a basic parity and ethnic equality between the Polish and German sides. Slubfurt also tends to de-emphasize the cities’ potentially problematic history, and its website makes no mention of the cities prior to Slubfurt’s foundation in 1999. Instead,

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8 Slubice is actually exceptional in its lack of a German antecedent since as “Dammvorstadt” it was a district of Frankfurt(Oder).
9 Two of the best-known examples are Breslau(German)/Wrocław(Polish), and Danzig(German)/Gdańsk(Polish).
Słubfurt focuses on starting anew with concerted efforts to invent traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) for its newly imagined bi-national and “European” city.

This approach is not universally accepted, even among those who are committed to the transnational idea of Słubice/Frankfurt. Markus (the NGO director mentioned above) observed that he didn’t really believe in Słubfurt. When I asked him why, he answered:

First, I don’t like the name. Like Słubice—it’s 60 years old and the real city is Frankfurt. It’s attractive to have a city with two equal partners, but its not going to work in Frankfurt; they think [Słubice’s] a smaller city. That’s typical of Germans; they look at a small city and [its] poor Poles, and think that [the Poles] have to apply to get into Frankfurt again—[the Germans] don’t think it is one city with equal rights.

In contrast to Słubfurt, Markus’s NGO prefers to deal with the region’s past directly and focuses on educating people about the history of the cross-border region. Markus explained:

[Our projects are about] rediscovering history, it’s a forgotten one, even people in Frankfurt don’t remember Neumark [the old German region located mostly east of the Oder River]. In Słubice they remember only the recovered territories. Not many people do real research... [There are] a lot of stereotypes and prejudices--this structure has roots in history. It seems obvious, but people aren’t aware of it. The reason Poles and Germans are living here—it wasn’t this way here [before the war], it was
because of the war. If you don’t know the history, you don’t know what
is happening today. You have to trace the effects back.

Slubfurt and Markus’s NGO thus represent two different, although not necessarily
irreconcilable,\textsuperscript{10} approaches for overcoming the perceived lack of a strong identification
with the cities and their history. Where Markus’s NGO attempts to use history as a way
to illuminate and provide context for today’s social problems and structures, Slubfurt
attempts to establish a new history for a unified city space—a space that last existed only
in the national context of pre-war Germany.

\textbf{Inventing Slubfurt City?}

According to Hobsbawm, the invention of tradition tends to occur when processes
are sufficiently novel (e.g. nationalism and its institutions) that previous symbols can no
longer be stretched to embody and represent these new social processes (1983:5-7), or
“when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the
social patterns for which ‘old’ traditions had been designed”
(1983:5). The collapse of the socialist regimes in Poland and
East Germany in 1989, followed by their subsequent
reorientation toward the EU and the deregulation of their
common border, placed Slubice and Frankfurt in precisely
this context. In the EU and Slubfurt’s internationalist
approach to cultural citizenship, references to the city’s
unified past as a German city becomes highly problematic

\textsuperscript{10} In fact, I met Markus during the planning of a Slubfurt event.
because this history lacks the transnational and multi-ethnic associations required of the “new” Polish-German city.

For this reason, Slubfurt tends to eschew history in favor of an elaborate and open-ended performance in which Slubfurt members consciously apply symbols normally associated with municipal governments to Slubfurt in an effort to create a potential space of social cohesion and identification. In addition to the city information center, alternative city history, and entry of Slubfurt on the Register of European City Names (Register der europäischen Städtenamen) discussed above, Slubfurt also adopted a coat of arms, depicting a rooster standing on an egg (Fig. 3.5), and began issuing Slubfurt identity cards. Kurzwelly viewed these ID cards as particularly successful: “Every month I get people coming, and wanting to have an identity card. This seems to be something very important to them. In a way it expresses their feeling. This is the kind of thing that works. When people start to be proud of being from Slubfurt and show their identity card and so on, it starts creating something.”

Slubfurt also occasionally publishes newspapers,¹¹ which are particularly useful in helping establish a sense of simultaneity and common experience that are critical to the circumscription of local identity and the creation of an “imagined community” (B. Anderson 1983). In Slubice and Frankfurt, no multi-lingual newspaper currently exists to serve both sides of the border region, and it is extremely difficult to find any Polish newspaper in Frankfurt or any German paper in Slubice. While the Slubfurt newspaper is probably not published often enough to truly provide a sense of simultaneous community that a local daily newspaper might provide, its rigorous bilingualism, with every text

published fully in both Polish and German (a principle Slubfurt generally tries to follow in all contexts) provides a model that might eventually take root.

Slubfurt expanded on these performances in 2004-2005, during its year-long “Slubfurt City?” project, which directly addressed the question of creating of a common social space in the cities. Organized to celebrate Slubfurt’s 5-year anniversary, the project invited a group of artists from throughout Europe to create art installations and performance events that investigated the idea of “coexistence” (Zusammenleben/współzycie) in the two cities. While all of these projects focused on community building in Slubfurt, I will focus my attention on two particularly symbolically apt projects: the minting of Slubfurt coins and the construction of the Slubfurt city wall.

**Slubfurt Money**

Slubfurt coins appeared without warning on the streets of Slubice and Frankfurt in April 2005. The coins had the same color pattern as two Euro and five Zloty coins (a silver ring around a gold center) (Fig. 3.6). The front side depicts the EU’s circle of 12 stars and the inscription “Slubfurt City 2004-2005,” while the reverse side is inscribed with the numeral “1” surrounded by the motto “It depends on you” (das berifft dich/To dotyczy ciebie), but no currency denomination.

The artist, Roland Schefferski, left the coins in public spaces throughout Slubice and Frankfurt, and waited to candidly film and
photograph the reactions of people to finding them. Once viewed up close, the coins are easily identifiable as non-currency, but their incongruous nature and unexplained appearance is meant to underscore the symbolic value of money within the everyday transactions that help build a community. This is a particularly salient point in Frankfurt, which has experienced the disorienting effects of two currency changes since the collapse of socialism: from the East German to the West German Mark in 1990, and the Mark to the Euro in 2002.

Typically depicting nationally important people, places, or events, modern currencies have been a valuable symbol for the demonstration of state sovereignty and national identity, or in the case of the EU, the pooling of this sovereignty into a common market represented by the Euro (Shore 2000:111-118, Borneman and Fowler 1997:498-500). With this in mind, Euro banknotes were consciously designed to be non-national, and their generically stylized bridges, gateways and windows are meant to signify the "European" values of connection, openness, and cooperation (Euro coins, however, have one common face and one face of unique national design). By representing a common economic space, a coin as a material object also evokes the shared social space where it is agreed the currency has value and can be used for exchange. The adoption of the Euro for general use was one of the EU's most significant achievements, and the Euro itself is one of the key public symbols of European identity (Shore 2000:115). Aside from language, the different currencies in use in Frankurt(Oder) and Slubice are also one of the most apparent markers of continued difference and lack of integration between the cities, even after Poland joined the EU (See Chapter 4).12

12 Poland is not projected to adopt the Euro until sometime around 2012, after it has fulfilled the debt to GDP ratio, interest rate, and inflation requirements of the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact. According to
According to Schefferski’s description of the project, the goal of his intervention was to emphasize personal responsibility within the contexts of the border cities and the common past, present, and future of the EU, as is pointed out to the coin’s discoverer by the inscription “It depends on you”. What exactly depends on you was left purposefully ambiguous in the hope of provoking dialog and reflection about the meaning of social spaces. The sudden and unannounced appearance of a “Slubfurt” coin was therefore doubly incongruous, as it was not legal currency on either side of the border, and it represented a transnational imagined space that few residents of Slubice and Frankfurt identified with, or in some cases even knew existed. One of the films accompanying the project displayed the uncertainty provoked by the coins. The film takes place in a Frankfrut(Oder) Döner shop, and documents the exchange when the filmmaker attempts to buy a sandwich with Slubfurt coins:

Server: What’s this? (Reading off the coin) “It depends on you” .

.(sounding out Slubfurt incorrectly) “Slub-feert . .2004.” (Looking confused) Is this new money, or what? From which country?

Filmmaker: From Slubfurt.

Server: (In English) From . . ?

Filmmaker: From Slubfurt. Slubice and Frankfurt together.

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the European Commission’s 2006 convergence report, Poland currently fulfills the price stability and long-term interest rates convergence criteria, but not the criteria for its government budgetary position and currency exchange rates. Once these conditions are met, Poland will be permitted (and obligated) to participate in the third and final stage of the EU’s economic and monetary union (EMU) and to adopt the Euro for general use (European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 2006:24-25).

13 A döner is a type of a flatbread sandwich consisting of meat roasted on a vertical spit, and topped with a selection of salads and sauces. It is itself a product of globalization and cross-cultural interaction between Turkey and Germany, and was invented by Turkish immigrants in Germany as an adaptation of an “ethnic” Turkish dish tailored to Germany’s (and especially Berlin’s) fast-food market (Caglar 1995)
Server: Ah, okay. But its not good in the market [i.e. its not legal]. They don’t know it at the bank.

Filmmaker: It is [good]. I’m giving you two, and I would like a Döner

Server: (Laughing incredulously) Really?

Filmmaker: Yeah.

Server: It’s not a Euro.

Filmmaker: It’s Slubfurt. Here, from Slubfurt.

Server: (Smiling) From Slubfurt...Okay, I’ll give you a Döner.

Filmmaker: Great! ... Thanks.

This exchange encapsulates not only the confusion an unexpected type of currency instills, but also the lack of identification with Slubfurt as a common space, so much so that the server doesn’t even recognize the word. While the situation is meant to be humorous, on film the exchange is palpably uncomfortable, and while the server eventually (and graciously) plays along, the scene could have just as easily ended badly (Frankfurt’s shopkeepers are not generally known for their good humor). Slubfurt’s attempts to destabilize and challenge people’s assumptions about the cities’ organization routinely produce decidedly mixed reactions, as is shown by Kurzelley’s contribution to the Slubfurt City project, the “Slubfurt City Wall.”

The City Wall

The Slubfurt City Wall is a 25m long and 50cm high section of red brick (Fig. 3.7) located in plac Bohaterów (Heroes’ Square), a small park just outside Słubice’s city center. Given the symbolic baggage of building a wall so close to Berlin, Kurzwelly encountered a great deal of opposition when he first sought approval for the project in
To determine the approximate route of a wall surrounding the hypothetical city center of Slubfurt, Kurzwelly drew two congruent circles around the centers of Slubice and Frankfurt and used overlapping space to find the center of a third circle that represented the wall and encompassed most of both city centers.

Despite the negative connotations that often accompany the building of walls, Kurzwelly pointed out that borders are required to define any space, and a closed or bounded space can also provide physical and psychological security. He told me:

Walls or borders not only have a negative meaning, but also can have a positive meaning... to show this is “our” place, to define it in a way... Borders can become prisons, but they can also link things together... [I don’t] really [want] to create a wall, but to create a kind of sign. So, I only created 25m here [in Slubice] and in spring [2006] 25m on the German side (this section was not completed until over a year later in November 2007), so it is more like opening brackets and closing brackets and within there is Slubfurt.

In his published description of the project, Kurzwelly continued:
We create our borders for ourselves. These borders are above all in our minds, before they manifest themselves physically. They define our space of action and our identity. They can halt or also confine. Therefore, I am building the Slubfurt City Wall -- A new borderline that defines my living space. It is a metaphor for my mental map. Slubfurt is this space, my self-chosen home (Szrek and Kurzwelly 2005:6).

By placing a border in the middle of Slubice's city space, the Slubfurt City Wall attempts to challenge and subvert residents' presumptions about the cities as separate national spaces by physically suggesting the existence of an alternative and unified living area. However, because the wall is only 50cm high-- "more a bench than a wall"-- it creates a border that is easily traversed, and while its slight curve indicates the direction of Slubfurt's center, its intention is to define and give shape to space rather than to create a barrier. Indeed, the wall became a relatively unassuming part of plac Bohaterów's landscape, and can be easily overlooked among the park's bushes. The wall is also not immediately identifiable as an artistic installation, nor is its symbolic goal readily apparent to passersby without closer investigation of the plaque affixed at one end (Fig.

![Fig. 3.8: The Slubfurt City Wall's informational plaque.](image-url)
3.8). The space of Plac Bohaterów is instead dominated by a post-World War II monument, Braterska Walka (Fraternal Struggle).

Installed in 1949, Braterska Walka presents a column topped by a Soviet and a Polish soldier storming the West (Preiss, et. al.:2003:121), and is similar in design to other Braterstwo Broni (Fraternity in Arms) monuments throughout western Poland.

Meant to memorialize the comradeship of the Polish and Soviet armies, the monument’s original inscription read, “We offered our lives together. Let our tie stay forever (Nasze życie ofiarowaliśmy wspólnie. Niech nasza więź pozostanie na zawsze), but this was later replaced with a new inscription dedicated to all World War II victims: “To the memory of the dead of World War II (Pamięci poległym w czasie II wojny światowej) (Preiss, et. al.:2003:121).

Like the Słubfurt City Wall, Braterska Walka was also about claiming space. Braterstwo bronı monuments formed part of the symbolic vocabulary developed and deployed by Poland’s socialist government as part of its efforts to define and structure the spaces “recovered” from Germany after World War II, to link Poland politically to the Soviet Union, and to reinforce Poland’s new socialist traditions. Braterska Walka’s prominent position in a public square was therefore aimed at mobilizing the sentiments of local inhabitants, supporting the ideological foundations of the socialist state, and legitimising the new, Soviet-dominated, geopolitical position of Poland after World War II (Asher and Jańczak 2008).
The landscape of Plac Bohaterów thus juxtaposes a monument representing a past that divided the cities with one representing a potential future which reunites them in a European space. Nevertheless, while the Slubfurt City Wall is symbolically suggestive, it does little to create the sense of social belonging that is so critical to cultural citizenship and the future of Slubfurt as a unified city. The next section focuses on a Slubfurt event that was designed with precisely this identification in mind.

The Slubfurt Oderfest

The Slubfurt Oderfest was one of Slubfurt’s most significant projects of 2006 and was envisioned as a tradition-inventing and cultural citizenship-building event. The planning for the Oderfest began in January at a “City Residents Forum” (Stadtbürgerforum) meeting organized by Slubfurt and held in Slubice’s cultural center. A surprisingly diverse group of 21 people attended the meeting, ranging in age from college students to retirees and about evenly split between Poles and Germans. In keeping with Slubfurt’s commitment of equal access for residents of both cities, the discussion was conducted in both Polish and German simultaneously, with Kurzwelly interpreting (he is fluent in both languages). The festival was organized within the framework of a “city game” in which people would travel between different locations.
around the cities to complete a game piece. Each station would be based on ideas from organizations in the communities and staffed by volunteers from these groups.

Enabling this participation was the central idea in Slubfurt’s vision of the Oderfest as a community-building event. Kurzwelly explained:

[When] I meet people individually, I see there are lots of people with creative energies, who have something to say, have ideas, and could realize their ideas, but maybe they just [lack] a kind of forum. . . I thought maybe there is a way to somehow link these energies and to give them a place and a space to express themselves. Because to me, they are the positive energies which could give the city a new kind of perspective. And if it works out, then we will have this fest as a kind of a game. The game will link all the different energies. If it works out, people will feel happy, [and] this could somehow become a kind of tradition. [People] would wait for the next fest, and start creating it right after the last fest . . . And if you start having something like this, then this gives a strong feeling of identity. . . This is us. Our city is the sum of all these different activities.

The prevailing ethos of the Oderfest was therefore one of maximal inclusion. 36 locations representing various landmarks and cultural sites of Slubice and
Frankfurt were initially identified as potential locations for stations in the game. A variety-show type performance by groups from the cities and a bonfire at the Slubice harbor were also planned for the evening after the game in the hope of further increasing participation.

Over the course of four months, the Oderfest slowly took shape. Fifteen organizations agreed to participate, providing ten stations in Frankfurt and five in Słubice. Each competitor was given a game card showing the “board,” a hand-drawn map of Słubfurt with each of the stations numbered, but no street names (Fig. 3.10). At each station a player could accumulate between one and six points depending on how well he or she completed a task. Competitors then rolled a die numbered 1-3 to determine how many stations to proceed along the game’s path. Six stations had to be visited to complete the card, and the person accumulating the most points would win a prize presented at the evening performance and bonfire.

The Oderfest took place on a Saturday in May during the “Oder days” (dni Odra); a festival consisting of three days of open-air concerts in Słubice’s city center. When I began the game at 2 pm, the bridge was busy with its usual weekend traffic. As I waited
in the line for passport control, several of the red bicycle rickshaw taxis that were being used to link the game’s stations and decrease the walking demand for participants passed by, advertising free rides around Slubfurt. One person waiting in line joked, “I think I’d like to take it to Berlin.” Meanwhile, the “Slubfurt Brückenhahn” (Bridge Rooster), another “Slubfurt City” project, played on the bridge’s loudspeaker, as it does on each hour between 7 am and 7pm. The Brückenhahn’s call is a recording of the winner of a contest for the best rooster cry performed by a Slubfurt resident, and it was installed on the bridge with the intention of linking a unique sound with Slubfurt’s city scape, in a manner similar to the chimes of Big Ben in London, or the bugle call of Krakow.\textsuperscript{14}

After crossing the bridge, I started the game at Frankfurt’s Friedenskirche (Peace Church), with a quiz sponsored by the European Ecumenical Center. I earned three points and rolled a one, taking me to Rosa Luxemburg Straße, where I was required to write and sing a city anthem for Slubfurt. The remainder of my route took me to the Polish-German Literature Office, a museum installation on the history of the Oder River, the Slubfurt Jungendklub (Youth Club)\textsuperscript{15}, and a photographic gallery set up on the bridge.

Above all, the Slubfurt game was designed as an exercise in claiming space. By requiring participants to complete a long walk around the cities, the formal aspects of the

\textsuperscript{14} The Krakow bugle call is played to each of the cardinal directions every hour on the hour, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, from the tower of the St. Mary’s church in Krakow’s central square, and is broadcast at noon live on Polish national radio. According to tradition, its distinctively abrupt ending commemorates a bugler shot through the throat while warning the town during the Tatar invasion of 1241. This legend is itself an excellent example of invented tradition, and its popularization is likely attributable to a version of the story told in a 1928 Newberry award winning children’s book by Eric Philbrook Kelly, \textit{The Trumpeter of Krakow: a Tale of the Fifteenth Century} (Kelly 1928:3-8).

\textsuperscript{15} The Slubfurt Jungendklub opened in January 2006 in Frankfurt as a cooperative project between Slubfurt and an established German youth club as a gathering space for students from both sides of the border. The EU provided two years of funding from the INTERREG IIA program for 75% of the club’s costs while the municipal governments of Frankfurt and Slubice paid for the remaining 25%.
game encouraged participants to use unusual or unfamiliar routes that might reveal overlooked aspects of the cities or alter participants' normal perception of the cityscape. The structure of the game also provided a source of advertising for Slubice and Frankfurt’s NGOs, as well as a way of connecting the NGOs with potential members. Sybila, the organizer of the Slubfurt Jungendklub, pointed this out when I spoke to her a few weeks after the festival, “I [thought] it was good that different institutions could make themselves visible on the map. Many people said they didn’t know about the club so it was good for advertising. I think the border played a role, because not so many Poles came.”

Turnout for the game was generally weak. On my route, I encountered only a few fellow players, and the Jungendklub recorded visits by only 22 players. Attendance at the evening performances was also modest, with only about 50 people in attendance when the program started. The organizers later estimated that a total of about 100 people participated in the game, while about 200 people came to the evening program. Attendance at the same evening’s Oder Days concerts was much higher, a particularly disappointing, if unsurprising, result given that the Oderfest was planned in part as an alternative to more commercially oriented social events. Kurzwelly told me, “I generally observe –[and] not only here--the commercialization of . . . let’s say the whole creative life of a city. This is a process which I feel very negative [about]. People stop creating something for themselves, they just go to have a sausage and a beer, and consume something often of very low quality.”

At the Oderfest’s evaluation meeting, the game’s organizers and participants discussed the lackluster attendance, and identified several logistical issues. Publicity was
a primary problem: more posters were needed, and due to editing delays the Slubfurt newspaper, which contained an explanation of the game and articles about each of the stations, arrived too late to be effective. Some participants (including myself) also reported difficulty reading the game map and finding some of the locations, while others suggested that the game itself might have been too complicated or might have required too much time commitment. Even so, the organizers and participants at the meeting viewed the Oderfest as an overall success, and the decision was made to produce another version the following summer.

While most of the Oderfest's participants were realistic about the difficulties, time, and work required for building a cross-border community, almost all agreed that actively pursuing a transnational sense of cultural citizenship was central to achieving this goal. Markus observed, “Even if only one-third [of cooperative projects] work, its better than it was before and [some of] the results stick... People in Frankfurt and Slubice won’t unite in Europe if you just wait, you have to have people with a vision. Likewise, Peter, a member of an international student housing co-op that sponsored an Oderfest location, observed the importance of gradual progress, “It’s like a snowball, some people meet and go on to make a bigger cooperation. You can’t expect from just one meeting that the cities will be closer.” Event by event, Slubfurt thus helps provide the contexts and structures necessary for intensifying and expanding this cooperation in the hope that it will eventually become a community.
Conclusion

Until 1991, the impassibility of the border between Frankfurt and Słubice made the idea of unified Polish-German city essentially unthinkable, and it is unlikely that authorities would have tolerated an organization that actively supported this identification. Even today, only a few residents would self-identify as “Słubfurters,” and the cities continue to lack the sense of shared historical continuity that is often central to building feelings of solidarity and belonging within a community. The creation of a rigorous cultural citizenship in a transnational and multi-ethnic “Słubfurt” will therefore require the development and naturalization of new symbols, events, practices and traditions for the new cross-border space. In this way, the efforts of the Słubfurt organization dovetail with EU-wide policies aimed at establishing “European” citizenship identities.

Frankfurt and Słubice’s border location has also made the cities a focal point for the funding of EU cultural initiatives. Because the EU derives so much of its political legitimacy from the values of integration and multiculturalism, it can ill afford to fail to deliver on these goals at its internal borders, since their high potential for transnational contact and cooperation are natural locations for the development of a rigorous everyday transnationalism. Nevertheless, the local resistance and indifference toward Słubfurt’s efforts to establish a new social space or a shared Heimat in Słubice/Frankfurt shows the difficulty in overcoming entrenched national divisions. Like the cities themselves, which play a central role in the EU’s efforts to deterritorialize its borders, but are also economically, politically and socially marginal in the national contexts of Germany and
Poland, Slubfurt can also be both central and marginal to an individual’s experience of the cities depending on his or her stance toward the project of integration.

While it remains to be seen if Slubfurt’s vision of the cities as a shared space will eventually take hold, the organization has successfully incorporated itself into the cities’ cultural fabric. Today, Slubfurt is not only tolerated, but also actively supported by both cities’ administrations, although it is probably unrealistic to believe that Frankfurt and Slubice will ever adopt a single city government like the one described in Slubfurt’s alternative city history. However, judging by the enthusiasm and dedication of Slubfurt members, there does seem to be great potential for the development of a more inclusive sense of cultural citizenship within the cities, particularly as the demands of the EU’s common market continue to dismantle formal and legal barriers between Poland and Germany, and the memories of the impermeable border grow ever more distant.
Chapter 4

Spaces of Commerce: Citizenship Regimes and Local Economics in Frankfurt(Oder)/Slubice

Introduction

Despite diverse efforts on both sides of the border to promote identification with Frankfurt/Slubice as a transnational “European city,” and more than fifteen years of visa-free travel between Poland and Germany, most of the residents I spoke with continued to construct the cities principally as two separate spaces with populations distinguished by differences in language, ethnicity, nationality and citizenship.

Although crossing the border between Frankfurt and Slubice has become a routinized and often banal experience for the cities’ residents, they remain highly conscious of its function as a transforming, “territorial” passage, where one moves from the identity of a citizen to that of a foreigner (Berdahl 1999:4).

Material and economic differences between the cities reinforce this sense of disconnection, and contribute to the creation and maintenance of social asymmetries and ethnic boundaries. According to Comaroff and Comaroff, the construction of “ethnicity has its origins in the asymmetric incorporation of structurally dissimilar groupings into a single political economy” (1992:54). This description fits the relationship between Frankfurt and Slubice within the EU almost perfectly. In Frankfurt and Slubice, EU policies aimed at establishing a single “European” social and market space through the deregulation of the Polish-German border have simultaneously created a local context where the economic disparities between Poles and Germans are readily apparent through everyday cross-border interactions. These disparities encourage the development of
variable and unequal “citizenship regimes” within the two cities in which the interaction between socio-cultural systems and governing institutions, laws, and regulations, categorize individuals into groups that are subject to different citizenship practices (D. Anderson 1996, Humphrey 1999). By authorizing the members of a group to behave in certain ways within particular social contexts, citizenship regimes configure the terms by which individuals have access to, and can make demands for, the entitlements, privileges, and rights of citizenship (D. Anderson 1996, cf. Wiener 1998:30).

Ironically, in Frankfurt/Slubice, EU citizenship provisions intended to enable transnational citizenship practices and encourage a sense of “European” citizenship that might transcend national divisions have instead produced citizenship regimes that continue to reify national citizenship identities and divide the cities’ residents according to ethnicity and nationality. In this chapter, I utilize four overlapping and interrelated domains of cross-border citizenship practice in Frankfurt/Slubice to illustrate these processes: shopping and consumption, public transportation, housing, and work.¹ These domains are particularly important areas for the further development of the cities’ transnational economy, and as such are at the crux of the success or failure of the EU’s local project. They are also areas where the lack of economic convergence and integration between the cities has especially impeded Slubice’s residents from exercising the mobility rights guaranteed by the EU. It is this link between economic difference and the creation of citizenship regimes in Frankfurt and Slubice that asymmetrically structures the ability of Poles and Germans to access EU citizenship rights, and

¹ These domains also crosscut the domains of practice Borneman and Fowler (1997:498) identify as particularly salient for studying the processes of Europeanization: languages, money, tourism, sex, and sport. Like Borneman and Fowler, I also see my list as far from exhaustive.
demonstrates one way in which the EU’s emphasis on economic viability within its citizenship policies and practices can translate economic inequalities into inequalities of civil rights (Peebles 1997:592, 597). Since the borders of relative economic prosperity, nationality, and ethnicity are so closely correlated in Frankfurt/Slubice, these inequalities introduce hierarchy into the local experience of EU citizenship that reinforces ethno-national divisions which are directly at odds with the EU’s vision of a transnational and multiethnic citizenship identity.

**Shopping without Borders**

Like many border regions, (cf. Berdahl 1999, Donnan and Wilson 1999, Thuen 1998, Wilson 1993, 1995), shopping and the consumption of goods and services are two of the foremost cross-border activities in Slubice and Frankfurt, and nearly half of my correspondents specifically mentioned shopping as the primary reason they cross the border. The importance of cross-border shopping between Frankfurt and Slubice is also not a recent phenomenon. During the socialist period, when hard to find items were sometimes available in one country but not the other, the ability to shop across the border was one advantage of living in the Polish-German border regions (Dürrschmidt 2002:136). Even though the border was normally closed to the general population, scarce goods routinely found their way across through personal networks that included people who had special authorization to travel between the cities. In Slubice, one of these groups consisted of Polish women hired to work at Frankfurt’s semi-conductor plant *(Halbleiterwerk)* (cf. Berkner 2005:121-123). Later, when border controls were relaxed somewhat in the 1970s, many people in Slubice recalled crossing the border to shop in Frankfurt’s better supplied stores. Gosia, a retired seamstress, described her experience:
There was a factory for semiconductors, which worked three shifts, and women from Slubice worked there. They were paid in Marks. We asked them to do shopping for us. You needed a passport and currency books. It was an event to go to Germany from Slubice—they had wonderful shop windows. We went to buy things for children at second hand shops—prams, [for example]. When there were ration cards in Poland, you could buy sugar, [and so forth,] there if [you] could afford to change currency...

When I went shopping in the GDR, Poles couldn't buy more than was allowed, and the Germans would just take it out of your basket. Times have changed, and now they come here to buy everything, butter, sugar. . . Lots of people went to West Germany to sell cigarettes after the wall came down. There used to be such lines, that you’d have to arrive at 2 a.m., [wait] 2-3 hours in line, then go to Berlin to earn West German Marks. . . The Germans caught them in a suka (a paddy wagon, literally, a “bitch”). Once I saw this, I stopped wanting to earn money in this way.

Tomik, a retired mechanic and teacher, recalled a similar narrative of shopping in Frankfurt:

In ‘72 there was a great difference in the standard of living [between Poland and East Germany]. East Germany had everything, especially [things] for children. Also tools. [We] went to the Russian shops-- the Russian army was [in Frankfurt]--it was easier to shop there than in German shops, because of language issues.
The Germans in shops were very unpleasant, because it was the beginning of [the economic] crisis. They would take things from the baskets. The shop assistants treated you as if it was written “not for Poles” on the shelves, and they would take it out of the basket.

While the character of today’s cross-border shopping practices has shifted dramatically since the socialist period, it continues to be structured by similar differences in currencies, languages and nationalities.

Unlike the socialist economy, when the ability to purchase goods was of paramount importance in Frankfurt/Slubice (as was typical throughout Eastern Europe), following the shift to the market economy, the tendency has been for price to take precedence (cf. Berdahl 1999, Dunn 2004a, Verdery 1996, Wedel 1992). This has resulted in a reversal of the ethnic flow of individuals crossing the border to purchase basic necessities. Whereas Poles went to Germany during the socialist period to buy goods that were more difficult or impossible to obtain in Poland, today Germans go to Poland in search of lower prices. For many residents of Frankfurt/Slubice, shopping was the only reason they crossed the border, and relative prices and the best places to buy particular items were topics of frequent discussion and debate. Nearly everyone had at least one product they bought exclusively on the other side of the border, either because of price, preference, or availability.2

For residents of Frankfurt, the most common cross-border purchases were cigarettes, grocery items—especially fresh produce and other perishable products—and gasoline, all of which are significantly less expensive in Slubice. For Slubice residents,

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2 Highly sophisticated calculations are often involved in these decisions. For a detailed description of the complexity of buying detergent in Frankfurt/Slubice see Appendix A.
the most common items were clothes, cosmetics, drugstore items (e.g. soaps, personal
hygiene products, etc.), and detergents, usually for reasons of selection and preference
rather than price, although clothes are often cheaper in Germany. Service products, such
as hairdressers and beauty salons, dentists, restaurants, bars, and “nightclubs” featuring
dancers and often prostitution, were also almost always less expensive on the Polish side,
and for its size, Slubice had a disproportionately large numbers of these businesses, many
of which expressly cater to German customers. The daily exchange rate between Euros
and Zloty\(^3\) further influenced purchasing decisions, most notably on higher-ticket items
such as electronics, or used automobiles, two products Poles often purchase in Germany.
Carrying of two currencies was also commonplace, and often a necessity, particularly for
Poles shopping in Germany. While many businesses in Slubice would conduct
transactions in Euros, few businesses in Frankfurt accepted Zloty, making the division in
currency a continuing indicator of economic difference between the cities.

**European Shopping in Local Spaces**

Because cross-border consumption is such an integral part of everyday experience
in Frankfurt/Slubice, the role of the EU citizen as transnational consumer is a natural one
for many of the cities’ residents. After visa requirements were dropped between Poland
and Germany in 1991, transnational consumption expanded rapidly in the two cities.
However, the cities did not immediately develop into a unified local market, and the
social interactions of producers, consumers, and service providers continued to structure
the spaces and practices of consumption in ways that were linked to ethnic and national

\(^3\) Poland is not projected to adopt the Euro until sometime around 2012.
identities. Consumption practices routinely facilitate the creation and maintenance of social distinctions as well as the organization of these differences into hierarchies of political and cultural value (Appaduri 1986, Berdahl 1999, Bourdieu 1984, Howes 1996). This is particularly true for cross-border consumption, which provides exceptionally apt contexts for the ascription of similarity and difference simply by facilitating contact between individuals from varying social groups and backgrounds (Berdahl 1999:104-139, cf. Barth 1969). As is reflected in the purchasing habits discussed above, in a border region, what you buy, and where you buy it, can be an important indicator of your membership in an ethnic group (Kelleher 2003:71-73).

In Słubice, many consumption spaces have become closely associated with German consumers. Within these spaces, ethnic roles tend to be well defined, and interactions limited to a narrow economic sphere. The pedestrian zone immediately preceding the bridge on ulica Jedności Robotnicze (United Workers Street) in Słubice is one example of this type of space. Known on both sides of the border as the “Zigarettenstraße,” (Cigarette Street) a German nickname derived from the many stores selling cigarettes at about half the price in Frankfurt, the street was a reflection of the cross-border demands of German consumers and was lined with convenience stores, tobacco and alcohol shops, hairdressers, currency exchanges, and a few restaurants and

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beer gardens. As a site of primarily German consumption, the shops on the
Zigarettenstraße almost always accepted Euros, had German-speaking clerks, and
German signs and advertising, as well as slightly higher prices than elsewhere in Słubice.
Due to less restrictive regulations on retail sales in Poland, these shops were also open
longer hours than their counterparts in Frankfurt (as were most shops in Słubice), and late
in the evening or on weekends and holidays it was common to see Frankfurters making a
quick cross-border shopping trip.

The Słubice bazaar (Fig. 4.1), sometimes called the “Polenmarkt” (Polish
market), was an even more exclusively German consumption space than the
Zigarettenstraße, and has provided a
vital source of income for many
residents of Słubice since it opened
in 1991. The bazaar was a
freestanding roof covering 1.6
hectares and containing about 1200
stalls offering a wide variety of
goods, including clothes (much of
which were counterfeits of well known designers and trademarks), bootleg DVDs,
ceramics and porcelain, leather goods, fishing gear, bicycles, groceries (especially
vegetables, meats and cheeses) alcohol, cigarettes, kittens and puppies, and even one
stand of Nazi and military memorabilia (Fig. 4.2). Prices were almost always marked in
Euros, and the merchants generally approached potential customers in German first. For
the Germans who shopped there, a trip to the bazaar was often part of the recreation

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planned during a weekend outing—an atmosphere that was promoted by the bazaar’s beer
gardens and grill stands. However, for the Slubice residents who worked there, the
bazaar represented a way of extracting profits at the expense of their more wealthy
neighbors. One of my correspondents who had worked at the bazaar said that the few
Poles who shopped there received lower prices, while another observed that the Polish
salespeople saw the German shoppers simply as “walking wallets.”

While distinctions in ethnicity and nationality were also present in cross-border
consumption practices in Frankfurt, divisions in its consumption spaces were less
pronounced. Frankfurt’s shopping district was dominated by German and European
franchises, and while most of my Polish respondents indicated they regularly shopped for
clothes in Frankfurt, most of these stores are only just beginning to court Polish
consumers by hiring Polish speaking staff and advertising in Poland. Frankfurt’s
discount outlet of Germany’s *Karstadt* department store has probably taken this practice
the furthest, actively serving Polish customers by printing all of its in-store signs
simultaneously in both Polish and in German, and by stocking products such as bulk
detergent that were aimed specifically at Polish consumers.

Frankfurt merchants initially saw Polish consumers more as a liability than a
potential source of sales, and my correspondents from Slubice continually complained of
shop assistants who shadowed them around stores and treated them like thieves. The
assumption that all Poles steal is a common stereotype in Germany, and was featured in a
well-known television advertisement for the German electronics retailer *Media Markt* as
part of a series of ads that featured foreign consumers visiting Germany for the 2006
World Cup. In the advertisement, three *Media Markt* employees meet three Polish
consumers with electronics-laden shopping carts, and following an exchange about the store’s excellent prices and selection, the six men embrace and the Poles leave. Afterwards, one of the Media Markt employees says, “Those Poles are nice guys, (pointing to his watch) see I still have my watch.” The camera then pans back and reveals that all three of the employees’ pants have been stolen.

It is difficult to ascertain how much truth there is to this stereotype in the local context of Frankfurt/Slubice. Crime data does suggest that foreigners\(^4\) account for a higher proportion of property-related crimes (e.g. thefts, “car-related” crimes, and street crimes) in Frankfurt than in other cities in the state of Brandenburg, such as Brandenburg and Potsdam, which are located far from the border regions (Dascher 2003:20). However, crime in Frankfurt is still quite low, especially when compared to large cities like Berlin (Dascher 2003:20). Nevertheless, theft from Germany was frequent enough that residents of Slubice commonly described the practice using the slang term “\textit{Juma}” (Yuma). \textit{Juma} can refer to acts of theft or petty crime committed abroad, or to the items procured by these acts, and is most often used to describe goods stolen in Germany and sold in Poland.\(^5\) Maja, a Slubice education administrator, described \textit{Juma} as “when you steal in Germany... Society allows it. Theft and stealing is not called theft. It’s stealing from the enemy. It used to be very common, but now happens less. Lots of people in shops [used to] ask if you would like to buy something [that was stolen] at half price, and also if you would ask your friends [if they wanted something].” While a few of my correspondents suggested that the use of \textit{Juma} in Slubice derived from Yuma, Arizona, one of Slubice’s partner cities, as a metaphor for the one-sided “partnership” that theft in

\(^4\) The nationalities of these suspects were not given.

\(^5\) \textit{Juma} can also be used in verb form (jumac/zajumac).
Germany represented, the term was already in widespread use by the mid-1990s, well before the conclusion of Slubice and Yuma’s partnership agreement in 2000. It is therefore more likely that Slubice’s partnership with Yuma contributed an additional layer of ironic symbolism within Juma’s the local use and practice. While most of my correspondents agreed that theft from Germany continues to decline, the persistent the link between Poles and crime acts to orient (and orientalize) Poland as not quite as “civilized” as Germany or the EU (See Chapter 6). A common joke told on both sides of the border about car theft in Germany demonstrates this positioning: “What is the slogan of the Polish tourism office in Germany? Come to Poland--Your car has already arrived!”

**Disharmony and Economy**

Czesław, a retired border guard living in Slubice, summarized his view of consumption and cross-border relations, “Services in Poland are much cheaper than in Germany--hairdressers and others. That’s why Germans come here. They are friendly, but [only] “so-called” friendly, because it’s cheaper. But without them, the bazaar would close and many workshops would collapse. There used to be three barbers and three hairdressers [in Slubice], now there are 70. The engine of development for Slubice is Germans coming here and being served.”

On the evening of January 11, 2007--about six months after I completed my fieldwork--a fire almost completely destroyed the Slubice bazaar. Although almost 200 firefighters responded from fire departments in both Slubice and Frankfurt, problems

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6 An alternate (and possibly apocryphal) etymology for the term is that it referred to the train between Wroclaw and Berlin—a well-known smuggling route—which departed at 3:10, the same time as the prison train in the classic 1957 American western 3:10 to Yuma.

7 According to the Slubice Mayor’s Office, as of 2006 there are 75 beauty salons and hairdressers in Slubice (Urząd Miejski w Ślubicach 2006)
with the water supply lines hindered their efforts to control the blaze, which eventually resulted in an estimated PLN 50 million in damages and lost inventory, almost all of it uninsured (PAP 2007). According to the subsequent newspaper accounts, the bazaar was the largest employer in the region, and contributed to the support of around 6000 people (counting both workers and their families) (Gazeta Lubuska 2007a, PAP 2007)—an astounding figure for a town with a total population of about 20,000 people and a testament to the importance of cross-border consumption to Slubice’s economy as well as its lack of other industries. Because it owned the site, the Slubice municipal government also stood to lose about PLN 2 million per year in rent and tax revenue, and Slubice’s mayor immediately pledged to rebuild the bazaar (Bielecka 2007). Unfortunately, the city found itself unable to obtain the estimated PLN 24 million necessary to cover construction costs, and eventually reached an agreement with the bazaar merchants’ association in which the merchants agreed to pay for the reconstruction costs while the municipal government agreed to waive their rent and taxes for nine years and eleven months (Bielecka 2008, Gazeta Lubuska 2008). Almost a year after a temporary bazaar with 430 stalls reopened in the old bazaar’s parking lot on March 31, 2007, the merchants’ association was finally seeking bids in the hope of completing construction sometime between November 2008 and March 2009.

Even before the fire, many residents of Slubice expressed their concern regarding the town’s dependence on German consumers, as well as the long-term reliability of the cross-border price differences driving their shopping practices. Anecdotal evidence from my correspondents also suggested that bazaar-type trade peaked in Slubice in the mid-1990s, and has been in gradual decline ever since (cf. Gazeta Lubuska 2007b). In this
regard, Poland’s recent EU accession and the expansion of the EU’s common market was seen as a threat to the local economy by putting further inflationary pressure on local prices, prices which many people complained were already higher than elsewhere in Poland because of the proximity of German consumers. Given that Lubuskie had the third highest aggregate consumer price level and the third lowest average earnings of Poland’s 16 voivodships in 2005, this explanation seems plausible (although a causal relationship is difficult to determine).

Markus, the director of a local NGO, explained a commonly held view of Slubice’s precarious economic situation:

I think in Slubice they are relying on tourism—shopping from Germany—and it’s going to decline, and people will have to find something new. It’s a monoculture in the economy and when it stops, [Slubice’s residents] will have to reinvent themselves, and I don’t know how much Frankfurt will [be able to] help because they too have been reinventing themselves since 1990.

Darek, an English teacher in Slubice, put it even more bluntly, underscoring the economic dangers of fully opening the border:

In the 1990s, the problem [in Slubice] was unemployment. Companies collapsed and many people worked in the bazaar and speculated. Many people did things illegally to keep living and make money. Many people supported those sharks. Now, [the problem is still] unemployment.

Slubice doesn’t have any industry. The worst was when we joined the

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8 Source: Calculated from 112 consumer prices available from the Regional Data Bank of the Central Statistical Office (GUS) of the Republic of Poland.
9 Source: GUS Regional Data Bank
[EU's] common market and many transport firms collapsed because business moved to the East. Many people who were employed by the border, customs officers for example, had to leave. Only a few stayed. I don't know what keeps people living here because there is no industry. Probably they opened some kind of business. From the economic point of view, Słubice may be facing another crisis. We are in the middle of Europe and the border is moving to the East and that will create many problems.

Here we see the paradox in the relationship between Słubice's economy and the integrationist goals of the EU's expansion. While Słubice's businesses require an open border to enable cross-border consumption, they also depend on the economic differentials that the border helps maintain. A more Europeanized local space marked by price convergence, fully opened borders, and increased multiethnic intermixing, might have the side-effect of driving many of Słubice's enterprises out of business by eliminating the impetus for German consumers to cross the border. While a few Słubice businesses serve an almost exclusively Polish customer base (in particular small neighborhood shops), most depend on German consumers for a significant percentage of their total revenue. In an informal survey I conducted of eighteen Słubice businesses, eleven estimated revenues from German consumers in excess of 20%, and two of these, including one large furniture manufacturer, estimated the figure at 70% (the most common estimate was 40%). For individuals and business owners who depend on the patterns of cross-border consumption produced by local citizenship regimes that emphasize a social structure in which inexpensive goods and services are provided by
Poles and consumed by Germans, there are therefore strong disincentives for pursuing the more unified “European city” advocated by the cities’ Europhillic residents.

**A Few Hundred Meters Short**

Determining how Frankfurt and Słubice should respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by the structural adjustments surrounding Poland’s EU accession is one of the most important issues currently facing the cities’ residents and policy makers. Frankfurt’s mayor, *Oberbürgermeister* Martin Patzelt,\(^{10}\) believed that intensive cross-border economic cooperation is the key to the cities’ future development. He elaborated:

> In the area of business, cooperation is beginning, and Słubice is a part of [Frankfurt’s] economic development community (*Wirtschaftsfördergesellschaft*). It is one community. This is important because the businesses are actually in competition. However, that is only at first glance. When you look at it again more closely, you’ll see that the development of Frankfurt can only happen, or can happen much better, with the cooperation of Słubice. Every investment in Frankfurt or Słubice is important for the future of both towns. . . I think that business and industry are the driving forces that are bringing the towns together.

In 2005, a plan to extend Frankfurt’s tram network to include Słubice became one test case for public commitment to the vision of the cities as an integrated urban space. The proposed tram line would reestablish the service that had served Słubice (then

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\(^{10}\) Because of his position as an elected official, I conducted my interview with *Oberbürgermeister* Patzelt “on the record” and therefore do not replace his name with a pseudonym.
Dammvorstadt) from 1900 to 1945 (Barański 2006), and would follow a circuitous route across the bridge and through Slubice’s main commercial streets, making stops at its shopping areas, student residences, and Collegium Polonicum before returning to Germany. In addition to making cross-border shopping trips much more convenient, the tram would connect the campuses of the cities’ two universities, as well as the Slubice bus station and the Frankfurt railway station, making travel from Frankfurt simpler not only for Slubice residents, but also people traveling from outlying towns.

With a population that has declined over 25% since 1989 (from 87,123 to 64,656) (Stadt Frankfurt(Oder) 2005), Frankfurt can no longer support its existing public transport network, while Slubice, with about 20,000 residents, currently has no local public transport. Extending one of Frankfurt’s tram or bus lines to incorporate Slubice would help alleviate both problems. In 2004, a feasibility study was conducted, which estimated the number of weekday public transport passengers between Slubice and Frankfurt in 2015 at between 3,300 and 4,800 people per day, a level comparable to several of Frankfurt’s existing tram routes (Sommer and Klipphahn 2004:25). When forecasting Frankfurt’s costs for 2015, the study also counterintuitively concluded that operating a tram on the route to Slubice would actually be about EUR 94,000 per year cheaper than a bus (Sommer and Klipphahn 2004:36). This conclusion assumed that Frankfurt would shoulder only EUR 2.7 million of the tram’s approximately EUR 7.6 million capital investment costs and would be responsible for building only 450 meters of the 3.4 kilometers of track required for the new route, while Slubice would cover the remaining construction costs, ostensibly with the help of EU funding initiatives (Sommer...
and Klipphahn 2004:9, 34-36). Frankfurt’s public referendum on whether or not to build these 450 meters of track would eventually determine the outcome of the project.

Oberbürgermeister Patzelt supported either a tram or a bus, arguing that while he believed connecting the two cities was an important urban development goal, he had no ideological position on how it should be done. Słubice’s mayor, Burmistrz Ryszard Bodziacki, supported only the tram, probably because of the political strength of Słubice’s taxi drivers, who had reportedly blocked all previous attempts at connecting the cities’ via public transport, and vehemently opposed a bus as a threat to their livelihood. Unlike a tram, a bus line could be easily changed to include the taxi drivers’ most profitable routes, such as between the bridge and the bazaar; routes that were sure to be in demand by public transport customers (the planned tram line did not include service to the bazaar). The taxi drivers notwithstanding, most of the people I spoke with in Słubice generally supported either a tram or a bus, while in Frankfurt, the tram was widely perceived as too expensive, and a commonly expressed feeling was that Frankfurt would pay, but Słubice would benefit.¹¹

Based on the support of both administrations, a public referendum was held in Frankfurt on January 22, 2006 to approve the construction of its portion of the tram connection across the bridge. In a devastating symbolic blow to the vision of a single integrated city, the referendum was defeated by an overwhelming margin of 83% against (on a 30% turnout) (Märkische Oderzeitung 2006). Several months later, Patzelt used

the referendum as an illustration when I asked him if he thought Frankfurt/Slubice’s history as a divided city was a problem for social relations today:

[History] always plays a role in the unconsciousness of people, and the sentiments and fears that are involved with these [intercultural] feelings, but in public and direct communication you don’t notice it as much. I’d like to make clear with an example: the tram that was supposed to go across the border. It was opportune from all logical arguments, but it was rejected by one in four Frankfurters (based on the number of votes against compared to Frankfurt’s entire population). And the arguments to reject it weren’t correct—they weren’t factual. And it is a phenomenon, because if we were going to build 350 meters of track on the German side—if we had built this amount anywhere else--no one would blink an eye. This gives me the impression that there are other reasons for [the result] that are actually there but aren’t communicated. . . There is a double situation, the public one and the reality that underlies it . . .

[AA: What could be done to overcome these problems of cooperation?]

I think that we have to create many and different forms of meeting that include cooperation on concrete projects. . . In my experience here, when you make concrete projects and plans, they grow into greater cooperation. Those who were very reserved about [cross-border cooperation] at the beginning are now the protagonists in this cooperation. And it is not so much an ideological statement, but concrete action.
Sometimes it works, and sometimes it doesn’t work. In the example of the tram, Germans and Poles were sitting together who might not have come together in other situations. In these spontaneous meetings, things are normalized. That is just an example. There are other examples of people who take their car to a Polish mechanic, or go to a Polish beauty salon for a manicure or pedicure, or to the dentist, and these experiences have changed their opinions from what it would have been three years ago, and I see many Poles who spontaneously and without thinking about it, use Frankfurt as part of their free time, and as part of their recreation.

Exercising the right to vote in a referendum about the future of one’s town is one of the most exemplary expressions of local citizenship practice, and as such, Frankfurt’s referendum on the tram project demonstrates several important aspects of transnational citizenship in the two cities. First, the referendum can be interpreted as an example of boundary maintenance, and it would seem from the results that many, if not most, residents of Frankfurt do not yet see the cities as a single space, at least not enough to invest in integrating the public transport system. For many Frankfurters, building a tram to facilitate cross-border movements seemed less like investing in economic development, and more like funding a potential threat to Frankfurt’s already marginal business environment by further enabling competition from Slubice.

Second, the referendum demonstrates a weakness in cross-border governance in Frankfurt/Slubice, in particular the lack of mechanisms beyond mutual cooperation by the cities’ administrations for deciding policies that simultaneously affect both sides of the border. Even for a project as explicitly transnational as a cross-border tram requiring the
participation, planning, and financial commitment of both sides of the border, the vote on starting construction polled only the citizens of Frankfurt. Once Frankfurters (or “the Germans”) had refused to build the connection across the bridge, it was irrelevant if Slubicers, (or “the Poles”) were still committed to the project (a referendum in Slubice was never held). Under these circumstances, the citizenship regimes of the cities clearly gave Frankfurters more decision making power over both cities than Slubicers. Had both sides of the border voted in the referendum, the outcome might have been different, and a more equitable situation might have been to hold referendums on both parts of the project simultaneously, so the overall opinion of the residents of both cities could have been ascertained.

Creating more rigorous governing structures and policy-making institutions that could truly serve both sides of the border equally would require a radical structural change not only in local politics well beyond today’s level of administrative cooperation, but also in the citizenship practices of the cities’ residents. As Patzelt noted, by attending common meetings to discuss and debate the tram proposals, the cities’ residents demonstrated an emerging transnational public space that does suggest a gradual shift in citizenship practices. That this space was not quite robust enough to produce an integrated public transport solution for 2015 is perhaps not surprising given the long-term

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Euroregions are one unique type of local cross-border governing institution that have been established to provide transnational administrative frameworks for managing EU funding initiative for transnational regions. Euroregions are voluntary associations of municipal and local governments rather than official governing bodies, and while they blur the boundaries between levels of government by brokering relationships directly between local member governments and the EU bureaucracy, they can generally be understood as civil society institutions. Four Euroregions were created along the Polish/German border, including Pro Europa Viadrina in 1993, which encompasses Frankfurt and Slubice. The Viadrina Euroregion plays an extremely important role in the distribution of funds for transnational and interregional cooperation through the INTERREG A program of the EU’s European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). In 2000-2006 the INTERREG III A provided EUR 132.25 million in co-financing for programs in Brandenburg and Lubuskie (Inforegio 2007).
tensions and divisions between the cities. If this transnational public space continues to expand, it might eventually provide a substrate for a sustainable sense of cultural citizenship in, and identification with, Frankfurt/Slubice as a single transnational city. Until this occurs, one of the most effective ways for Slubicers to gain a voice in Frankfurt’s politics (and vice versa) is to exercise their rights as EU citizens to move across the bridge and vote in municipal elections. So far, very few people have exercised these prerogatives.

**A Flat in Frankfurt(Oder)**

According to official records, only 1239 Poles lived in Frankfurt (1.9% of its population) at the end of 2005\(^\text{13}\), and only 38 Germans lived in Slubice (0.2% of its population) in 2006\(^\text{14}\). As these figures suggest, cross-border residency has failed to materialize as a transnational citizenship practice in Frankfurt/Slubice, a failure resulting directly from cross-border economic inequalities and the citizenship regimes they create.

In contrast to Slubice, one of the distinguishing features of Frankfurt’s cityscape is the remarkable number of vacant flats and storefronts, even in its most central districts. This is a common feature of post-unification East Germany, which has some 1.4 million vacant flats as a consequence of the widespread emigration of its population to West Germany in search of better economic prospects (Dascher 2005:1). Despite this oversupply, rents in East Germany have actually increased to levels approaching those in West Germany as local public housing corporations and cooperatives—which own about two-thirds of East German housing stock—have subsidized the modernization of some...

\(^{13}\) Down from 1420 at the end of 2003. Frankfurt(Oder) Büro des Oberbürgermeisters, personal communication with the author, March 8, 2006

\(^{14}\) Urząd Miejski w Slubicach, personal communication with the author, August 4, 2006.
flats by increasing rents for all flats (Dascher 2005:2-4, 29). Unmodernized flats are therefore overpriced and oversupplied, making the buildings potential maintenance liabilities for their owners. To counteract this problem, approximately EUR 3 billion has been set aside by German policymakers to support the demolition of around 350,000 “socialist-style” flats, even though most of these flats are in perfectly useable condition, and are sometimes still occupied (Dascher 2005:1-2, 5-6).

With two companies controlling around 80% of the city’s housing stock, rents in Frankfurt are inflated well above what the local market should support, even to the point that it is sometimes cheaper to commute from Berlin.15 As a result of this incongruous economic environment, new housing continues to be built in Frankfurt, even as literally thousands of flats stand empty and apartment blocks in convenient, centrally located districts are torn down, including several buildings less than 100 meters from the border crossing. Meanwhile, because its border location has made it more economically attractive than surrounding communities in Poland, Slubice is experiencing an acute housing shortage, and has at least 500 low income families waiting for housing (Frankfurt(Oder) Sonderbeauftragter des Oberbürgermeisters für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 2005:1), and probably many more individuals, such as adult children living with their parents, who would seek different living arrangements if the opportunity existed. After unemployment, Slubice’s shortage of flats was the second most maligned of the city’s problems among my correspondents, and many expressed the hope that

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15 Coupled with Berlin’s cultural attractiveness, this fact has resulted in a tremendous number of Viadrina University’s students, professors, and staff to prefer living in Berlin, so much so that the typical three-day university workweek when faculty can (usually) be found on campus is nicknamed “DiMiDo” after Dienstag-Mittwoch-Donnerstag (Tuesday-Wednesday-Thursday). Heavily subsidized public transport passes for students and regional express trains that make the 1-1.5 hour trip to Berlin twice hourly also facilitate this practice.
Frankfurt’s abundance of housing might offer a solution, if only it could be made more affordable.

Piotr, a Słubice handyman, commented jokingly, but without exaggeration, “I didn’t wait long for a flat, only 16 years! . . . The mayors had talks about getting flats for Poles [in Frankfurt], but it would cost too much [for the Poles to live there].” Jarek, a member of the university staff, made a similar observation when talking about what he would like to see in the future for Słubice, “I know there are many places in Frankfurt where Poles could live, but because of the costs it isn’t as popular or realized as it could be, so you have many Poles who don’t have any place to live or live with their parents because prices are too high or they can’t find a place. There are many buildings in Germany which could be used for this but aren’t.”

While explaining the difficulties in undertaking cross-border urban planning, Oberbürgermeister Patzelt echoed these comments:

There is a joint plan for the use of land, but the readiness to cooperate on this isn’t well developed on either side. It isn’t any good to have good plans if, in the realization of these plans, both sides go their own way. There are two examples of this. The first is the [hot water] heating of the towns. Frankfurt has too much capacity, but Słubice is building a new heating unit. This is because Frankfurt— in the short and medium term— can’t offer Słubice an attractive price. Second, in Frankfurt there are 7000 empty flats, and in Słubice there are about 700 families that desperately need a flat. However, in Frankfurt we are [spending a lot of money] demolishing flats. This is because the Poles can’t pay the rent that they
have to pay in Frankfurt. Even if we reduce the rents, they have to pay high costs for energy and water. The disproportion in income between the Poles and Germans, and in social aid (Sozialsecurity), is why town planning between Frankfurt and Slubice is not making much progress.

By obstructing the development of a more open and transnational housing market and preventing a common solution to the social problems of excess housing in Frankfurt and the scarcity of housing in Slubice, the persistence of cross-border economic difference reinforces a citizenship-based division of the cities. This barrier also demonstrates a shortcoming of the economic emphasis contained in the EU’s model of citizenship (Peebles 1997, cf. Chapter 1). It matters very little if Poles from Slubice have the right as EU citizens to live in Frankfurt, if income inequality makes finding affordable housing impossible.

A few of my Polish correspondents did take advantage of the possibility to establish “official” residency in Frankfurt in order to gain access to Germany’s higher wages and better social services. For example, when Jakub and Joanna, a Polish couple living in Slubice, learned that Joanna was pregnant, they decided to use the better and more modern medical facilities available in Frankfurt. Due to Jakub’s cross-border position at the cities’ universities, both he and Joanna were insured in Germany, but once their baby was born, it would not be eligible for German insurance unless they lived in Germany. To circumvent this requirement, Jakub and Joanna registered at the apartment of a friend in Frankfurt, although after three months they needed the certification of the apartment’s owner in order to maintain their status—a certification that would be
impossible for them to obtain. Fortunately, the timing went smoothly and their daughter was born during their three-month “residency” in Frankfurt.

Bernard, who also lived full-time in Slubice, used a flat in Germany as a location from which to officially register his residency so that he could operate a tile installation company in Frankfurt. He explained that it was not difficult for him to open a business in Germany; he only had to register at the town hall and state the kind of work he would do, and then apply for a residency card for EU citizens. Although Bernard had crossed the border every day for work since before Poland’s EU accession, he said that the right to free movement provided by the EU Treaties had made the process easier:

Before joining the EU, there was a law [in Germany], that you were supposed to have at least DM 50 [for expenses], and if I didn’t have the money, I wasn’t allowed to cross. When I used to go to work [before accession]. . . the official would generally ask me questions every day. [Now,] he can’t do anything, but kiss your ass. He can ask questions, but you can answer, “I’m going to France,” because its your right. He knows it’s a stupid question and that I am going to work. . .

**Commuting across the River**

Like shopping, limited cross-border work developed between Frankfurt and Slubice during the socialist period. By the end of the 1970s, about 500 Poles were bussed daily across the border to work in Frankfurt’s Halbleiterwerk (Berkner 2005:121). Similar to wage levels today, when pay in Brandenburg tends to be at least four to five
times higher than in Lubuskie,\textsuperscript{16} socialist-period wages at the Halbleiterwerk--as well as at other jobs in Germany--were relatively high. Czeslaw and Magdalena, my neighbors in Slubice, described how they were able to utilize working in Frankfurt to provide their family with supplementary income:

Czeslaw: [In the 1970s and 80s] Poles started to get to know the GDR, [and work] at the Halbleiterwerk, in gardening, or in restaurants. That’s how many families’ situations got better; when a family member worked in Germany. Speaking about us in those years, there was generally certain life stability. You were sure of what you had, work, etc. In 1980, I finished army service and retired. That’s why our financial situation got worse, because of the difference in my salary and pension. After a year of rest I started to work again.

Magdalena: I worked in Germany, and I didn’t speak German at all. First, I was angry and I didn’t want to learn German, but then I did. It was a good experience.

AA: Where did you work?

M: At a hotel in Frankfurt.

AA: How did you decide to work in Germany?

M: It was in 1986, in March. Some other Poles also worked there, not many, six or seven. I had worked at the kindergarten, but it was very stressful for me, and then [I worked] in a military commissary. It was very difficult work because I was the director of a district shop, and it was too

\textsuperscript{16} Unfortunately, the categories used by the statistical offices of Germany and Poland to calculate average wages are not equivalent, and more accurate comparison is not possible.
difficult for my nerves. After working in the shop, I had nine months medical leave and then I decided to work in Germany. . . I can’t complain about Germans treating me badly. After I worked a bit, they gave me the best floor in the hotel, working with Germans. When we had meeting and the boss spoke I didn’t understand, but a co-worker explained it to me again in German, so it was easier. . .

I worked two years after unification. These years were rich for me personally. Finances were better. I was working in the hotel and Germans from the FRG came as guests to visit. They came to give workshops, and they lived in the hotel for three months. When they went for the weekend home, they left five or ten, or even once, 50 Marks for us. Once a German left laundry, a shirt and pants. It didn’t take long [for me to do it], and he gave me 20 Marks, and left 20 Marks at reception for me, because he couldn’t believe I did it. They were nice and generous.

While cross-border work provided an extremely important source of income for individuals like Magdalena, for the most part the labor markets of Frankfurt and Slubice remained separate. Even today, Germany’s restrictions on the employment of workers from the eight Eastern European countries that acceded to the EU in 2004 (A8) continue to make Frankfurt’s labor market highly regulated and restrictive towards workers from Slubice. In order to provide the fifteen “old” EU member states (EU15) a way of managing the employment-driven immigration from the A8, the EU15 were allowed to implement an up to seven-year transitional period during which measures restricting
labor market access could be applied unilaterally toward A8 citizens. These policies follow a “2+3+2” format, meaning that they must be reviewed after two years and an additional three years, and must be dropped altogether after seven years (i.e. in 2011) (European Commission 2002a:6). Only the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden fully opened their labor markets in 2004. Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain followed in 2006, as well as the Netherlands and Luxemburg in 2007. The labor markets of the remaining five countries, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, and Germany remain restricted. For this reason, Poles from Slubice can not be employed in Frankfurt without special permission—a point that was often cited as unfair by my correspondents. By bolstering the right of individuals to provide services outside their country of origin, the passage of the EU services directive by the European Parliament and European Council at the end of 2006 facilitated one way to circumvent these employment restrictions, assuming the individual is willing to follow the regulations and labor laws of the country where the service is provided (and the service is not one that is excluded from the directive).

17 Transitional arrangements apply to the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Malta and Cyprus were not included in this portion of the accession agreements. Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary applied reciprocal labor market restrictions in 2004, but Slovenia and Poland dropped these restrictions in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Due to concerns about foreign land purchases (especially from Germany), Poland also negotiated a transitional period limiting EU citizens’ right to purchase property in Poland for twelve years for agricultural and forest lands, and five years for secondary residences (European Commission 2002a:14).

18 After experiencing the immigration of nearly 400,000 Eastern European workers after the EU’s 2004 expansion (Home Office 2006), the United Kingdom placed restrictions on workers from Romania and Bulgaria after their EU accession on Jan 1, 2007.

19 In order to be employed in Germany, Poles (and other foreigners) must obtain permission from the local labor office (Arbeitserlaubnis). Permission will only be granted if employer/employee “match is not ‘to the disadvantage of local labor market,’ . . . there are no German workers with similar qualifications while unemployed and willing to work, and . . . the wage paid to foreign worker does not fall below going wage for German worker with similar qualifications” (Dascher 2003:28, summarizing the requirements of the Sozialgesetzbuch, Part III, Sec. 284-5).

20 See OJ L 376/36, Dec. 27, 2006. Unfortunately, my fieldwork ended before the Services Directive was passed, and I was unable to assess its impact in Frankfurt/Slubice.
Along with wages that give German citizens little incentive to work in Ślubice, Germany’s labor policies contribute to a difference in citizenship regimes in which citizens from each side of the border consume, but do not produce, on the opposite side, and the vast majority of the cities’ residents work on the side of the border where they hold national citizenship. At the end of 2005, there were 127 Polish businesses registered in Frankfurt, accounting for only about 2.6% of businesses in the city, and only about 10% of my correspondents crossed the border for work (no official data on cross-border employment was available). All of these individuals worked in service industries (both skilled and unskilled) and commuted from Ślubice to Germany, and only one was German. Coupled with consumption practices that map Poles as providers of inexpensive domestic services (e.g., cooking, cleaning, haircuts, or prostitution), these cross-border working relationships facilitate a sense of German superiority within the local space, as well as the perception of Poles as second-class Europeans—the hired help in the “House of Europe.” Alicja, a Ślubice resident who worked illegally in Frankfurt, felt that Germans routinely treated Poles who work in Germany with a superiority complex:

[Germans] only hire Polish people to do certain kinds of jobs, because [Poles] don’t have a chance to find a job in Poland. They let you know your place. They wear a mask of friendliness but feel superior. The only way out is for Poles to pretend they don’t notice. [AA: What kind of jobs?] Gardening, cleaning, building for men. Under the table. They pay half of [a normal] salary. It’s ridiculously low for Germans, but enough for Poles. Germans understand that it’s significant money for Poles. It degrades the [social] level of the work.

21 Frankfurt(Oder) Büro des Oberbürgermeisters, personal communication with the author, March 8, 2006.
By helping establish a transnational space in which cross-border consumption and production of services is possible, but simultaneously structured by citizenship regimes that assign roles according to nationality, EU policy has ironically contributed to an experience of national-citizenship-based hierarchies within the local practices of its supranational citizenship in Frankfurt/Slubice. This feeling that Poles are treated as inferior EU citizens was widespread among my Polish correspondents (see Chapter 6). A wry pre-accession joke perhaps best summarizes their perception of Poland’s position in relation to the EU’s promise of prosperity for all: “Once Poland joins the EU every Pole will have a Mercedes. . .to wash.”

**Conclusions: Harmony and Disharmony in a European City**

Cross-border economic and social difference frames nearly every aspect of daily life in Frankfurt/Slubice. Nevertheless, this difference is dynamic, and even as distinctions in currency, prices, income, housing, and employment opportunities all work to construct the cities as separate social spaces, the constant cross-border movements and interpersonal contact of the cities’ residents act to break down these divisions and construct a more unified, or “European,” space. This tension is at the core of citizenship practices in Frankfurt/Slubice, as the efforts of EU and local-level policymakers to harmonize both sides of the border meet up with a variety of structural, financial, and social barriers which operate to maintain disharmony; a disharmony which helps maintain the cross-border economic differentials that provide the impetus for many of the consumption patterns that fuel Frankfurt/Slubice’s local economy.

As is demonstrated by the domains of practice examined in this chapter, the factors promoting harmony and disharmony operate simultaneously at a variety of levels,
ranging from local and regional, to national and supranational. For example, the high relative cost of housing observed in Frankfurt was not intended to exclude Polish citizens from exercising their supranational right to live in Germany, but instead resulted from local patterns in the ownership of housing stock, population and migration trends in Frankfurt and Slubice, and Germany’s national and Länder-level public housing budgets and policies. This amalgam of overlapping and competing jurisdictions, institutions and interests is characteristic of the variable geometry of EU governmentality and policy-making, particularly in border regions where close proximity necessitates international cooperation at the local level. One outcome of this “graduated” (Ong 1999), or “gothic” (Asad 2002), construction of space is the complexity of compromises, accommodations, and limitations that produce citizenship regimes which vary between social groups. Because the opportunities available to Polish citizens are limited in comparison to their German counterparts within the common transnational space of Frankfurt/Slubice, the cities’ citizenship regimes repeatedly map Polish citizens as holders of a weaker set of rights and privileges; a situation that lends itself to the continued division of the cities by nationality and ethnicity and the persistence of citizenship-based hierarchy within the EU.
Chapter 5

Schengen's Excluded: Third Country Nationals on the Polish-German Border

Introduction

“I don’t have a visa... I dream about going to Germany, but I don’t know how.”

Nadia, a Ukrainian student living in Slubice was continually reminded of this frustration by the panoramic view of Frankfurt that accompanied her daily walk along the Polish-German border to her university. In contrast to her Polish and German contemporaries, who have enjoyed visa-free travel between their countries since 1991, Nadia was unable to obtain a Schengen zone visa and had therefore never been permitted to make the five minute trip across the Oder River to visit the German side of the cities' cross-border urban area. Like many citizens of non-EU states, or “third country nationals,” living in Frankfurt and Slubice, Nadia experienced the everyday proximity of the border as a type of social exclusion; a limitation on her freedom of movement that distinguished her as an outsider not only in the cities’ locally transnational spaces, but also in the supranational spaces created by the EU.

Poland’s EU accession on May 1, 2004, and subsequent adoption of the Schengen acquis—the EU’s common policies on visas, cooperation in law enforcement, the management of its external borders, and the elimination of its internal borders—was

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1 The Schengen acquis was incorporated into the EU’s legal framework by the Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into effect on May 1, 1999. It collectively contains the provisions of the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1995 Schengen Convention, as well as later decisions. Although there is not an exact correspondence between Schengen and EU member states—the United Kingdom and Ireland are EU members, but not Schengen signatories, while Iceland, Norway and Switzerland are Schengen signatories, but not EU members—the Schengen border protocols treat all citizens of the European Economic Area (EEA), which includes Ireland and the United Kingdom, in the same way as citizens of Schengen member states. The slippage between the two memberships is small enough that in terms of EU identity politics, they can generally be understood as coterminous, and they are routinely treated as a single entity in both the media and everyday discourse. Because the distinction in memberships is not essential to my arguments,
supposed to make border controls between Słubice and Frankfurt obsolete. However, because Poland had not fully implemented the acquis’s requirements prior to its EU accession on May 1, 2004, it remained outside of the Schengen area’s border-free zone for a little over three-and-a-half more years. For this reason, the border checkpoint on the bridge between the cities stayed anachronistically in place until December 21, 2007 (Council of the European Union 2006b:13), and third country nationals continued to require both Polish and Schengen visas in order to maintain access to both sides of the city space.

Michel Foucault observes that the effective operation of the apparatuses of security, that is, the mechanisms and calculations modern forms of governmentality use to determine the optimum parameters within which to manage the well-being of a population, both requires and creates freedom of movement, specifically, “the possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of people and things” (2007:48-49, cf. 6,63, Gordon 1991:20-21). In the course of establishing its common market, the EU has scaled up this concept for use at the transnational level. Indeed, the principle of free movement is one of the most fundamental of the EU’s governing values and one of the core rights of EU citizenship (cf. D’Oliveira 1995). The EU’s foundational document--the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU, commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty)--requires member states to “maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured,” and create “an internal market characterized by the abolition... of obstacles to the free

2 TEU Art. B (Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version) Art. 2). For the aid of the reader, when an EU Treaty is cited in this article, I indicate the original version first, followed by the most recent consolidated versions in parentheses.
movement of goods, persons, services and capital.” The Maastricht Treaty goes on to make free movement of persons a hallmark of its newly established definition of EU citizenship, stating, “Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.”

EU citizens also appear to regard mobility as one of the Union’s most important attributes. In response to a 2006 Eurobarometer question, “What does the European Union mean to you personally?” 50% of EU citizens answered “freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the European Union,” a rate of response more than twice as high as “democracy” (at 24%) and five times higher than “social protection” (at 10%) (Eurobarometer 2007b:73). Nevertheless, because the Maastricht Treaty grants EU citizenship automatically and exclusively to the citizens of the member states, the principle of free movement is not extended to the approximately 16 million third country nationals who reside within the EU. For these individuals, the Maastricht Treaty powerfully demonstrates the exclusionary function of citizenship as a membership category which divides those who are entitled to full participation in a community from those who are not (Brubaker 1992, Cohen 1999, Soysal 1994, Tilly 1996).

This chapter utilizes the lens of mobility to respond in two ways to Andrew Kipnis’s recent call for increased anthropological focus on the legal structures of citizenship in order “to lay the basis for the theoretical construction of citizenship as an

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4 TEU, Art. G, Para. 9 (Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated Version) Art. 17). This right is, however, “subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in [the TEU] and by the measures adopted to give it effect.”
5 The Eurobarometer survey allowed respondents to give multiple responses to this question. In Poland and Germany, the percentage answering “freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the European Union” was even higher, at 62% and 57% respectively. (Eurobarometer 2007b:Table of Results QA14)
independent axis for the analysis of both social difference and inequality” (2004:258). First, this chapter examines how the techniques and technologies of governmentality (Foucault 1991, 2004) contained within the Schengen acquis’s regulations and procedures systematically constitute third country nationals and EU citizens as separate legal categories that are subject to different degrees of mobility, security, and surveillance. Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller describe governmental technologies as the “complex of mundane programs, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures through which authorities seek to embody and give effect to governmental ambitions (1992:175, cf. Inda 2005:8). In this way, the institutionalization of the Schengen acquis at Ślubice/Frankfurt’s border checkpoint reveals one aspect of an EU-wide enactment of varying and unequal “citizenship regimes” (D. Anderson 1996, Humphrey 1999) for EU and third country citizens. By subjecting the members of each group to different citizenship practices, these citizenship regimes configure the terms under which individuals have access to, and can make demands for, the entitlements, privileges, and rights of citizenship (D. Anderson 1996, cf. Wiener 1998:30).

Second, this chapter investigates how the presence of a Schengen border between Ślubice and Frankfurt obliged third country nationals to respond to the regulations it imposed either by accepting limits on their freedom of movement, or, more often, by strategically managing their citizenship statuses. By so doing, these individuals exhibited a type of “flexible citizenship,” whereby economic calculation becomes “a major element in diasporan subjects’ choice of citizenship,” as they ”both circumvent and benefit from different nation-state regimes” (Ong 1999:112). In Ślubice/Frankfurt, where the local economic space was divided between two national markets, this
flexibility was often a matter of financial necessity, and many third country nationals sought EU citizenship through naturalization in Poland or Germany simply as a way to guarantee continuous access to economic opportunities in both cities.

At the beginning of 2005, Frankfurt had a foreign population of 2,824, accounting for 4.4% of its total population of 64,656, or a level about half of Germany’s national average of 8.8%. In comparison, 230 foreign residents were registered in gmina Słubice as of 2006, amounting to 1.1% of its total population of 20,212, or a proportion similar to Poland’s national average of about 1.8%. 80% (185) of Słubice’s foreign residents were third country nationals, 66% (152) were from former Soviet republics (excluding EU members Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), and 44% (102) were from Ukraine. Although it includes individuals living in both cities, the breakdown of citizens in my sample also roughly follows this distribution. All but two of the seventeen correspondents I interviewed for this chapter originated in the former Soviet Union, and eleven originated in Ukraine. As the above figures suggest, Słubice and Frankfurt are not destinations for large migrant populations. Nevertheless, because they lack citizenship in any of Słubice/Frankfurt’s three local spaces—Poland, Germany, and the EU—third country nationals are particularly “good to think with” as they document one instance of the considerable “degree of ‘illiberality’ in [the] supposedly neoliberal world” (Kipnis 2004:266, cf. Torpey 2000:166) of EU citizenship by virtue of their exclusion from it.

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8 Kommunale Statistikstelle der Stadt Frankfurt(Oder) (2005)
10 Urzad Miejski w Słubicach (Municipal Government of Słubice), personal communication with the author, August 4, 2006.
11 The regional district containing the city of Słubice.
13 Unfortunately, a similar breakdown of Frankfurt’s foreign population by citizenship was not available.
Everyday Exclusions

As the physical location of the Schengen border checkpoint, the bridge linking Frankfurt and Slubice was a liminal space where individual mobility between the two cities was regulated personally and directly, and where third country nationals were differentiated from their Polish and German neighbors. For third country nationals who were authorized to cross it, the bridge was sometimes experienced as transcendent and deterritorialized space that invoked a sense of freedom. Lyudmyla, a Belarusian graduate student who lived in Frankfurt and held both Polish and Schengen visas, described this sensation, “There aren’t borders for me now... I [enjoy] the feeling of freedom here. On the bridge, I feel like I am in Neverland, neither Germany nor Poland—in between.” Olena, a Russian student in European Studies, echoed this experience, “I have a feeling of freedom on the bridge... I don’t know where I am. I never had that feeling before.”

Conversely, the inability to cross the bridge brought into sharp relief the EU’s exclusionary policies toward third country nationals, as well as the importance of freedom of movement to the full exercise of citizenship within the EU. Perhaps because of this experience, almost all of my correspondents had, at one time or another, applied for a visa to visit the side of the border “across from” where they lived. For residents of Frankfurt this was a relatively straightforward matter, requiring a trip of a little over an hour to the Polish consulate in Berlin. In contrast, for Slubice residents, obtaining a Schengen visa necessitated a journey of about four to six hours to the German consulate in Wroclaw, a trip that routinely demanded two full working days due to the consulate’s schedule and the lack of public transport connections from Slubice. Coupled with
unpredictable results, the expense in time and money of this trip made it extremely
difficult for third country nationals living in Słubice to continuously maintain a valid
Schengen visa.

An individual who lacked a visa for one side of the border was subject to a host of
small and seemingly banal exclusions that, when taken together, fundamentally altered
the experience and quality of life provided by the two cities. For example, a third country
national who resided in Słubice without a Schengen visa could not shop in Frankfurt’s
larger and often cheaper clothing stores, watch a film at the cities’ only movie theater,
attend a play or a concert at Frankfurt’s performing arts center, spend an afternoon on
the beach at the nearby Helenesee, or travel from the region’s nearest major airport in
Berlin. Similar exclusions applied to third country nationals living in Frankfurt without a
Polish visa, but given Słubice’s smaller size and less developed infrastructure, the list
was not as extensive, and primarily included a loss of access to cheaper restaurants,
services, groceries, gasoline, cigarettes and other products on the Polish side of the border
(cf. Asher 2005:133-135). As an intrinsically transnational space, an individual who
lacked access to both cities was prevented from fully participating in local social and
economic life, a situation that often gave rise to a profound sense of alienation.

Aleksandra, a Ukrainian secondary school teacher who lived in Słubice and held a
Schengen visa intermittently, explained, “It feels better when you can cross the border.
You can buy things with better quality and at a lower price. It was always difficult when
friends cross the border for festivals, concerts, the Helenesee ... and you can’t go. I
could live without [crossing the border], and I still can live without it ... and I will have
to [her current visa was just about to expire]. But it is better when you can go.”
Codifying Difference

Third country nationals' experience of alienation at the Polish-German border was far from accidental. In fact, the Schengen acquis's border procedures were explicitly intended to have an identity-generating component (Wiener 1998:115,185-186,229). The process of passing through a Schengen checkpoint is meant to foster a personal identification with EU citizenship as a membership category by promoting a sense of community, solidarity, and fraternity among EU citizens as they are physically separated from non-citizens and subjected to less rigorous levels of surveillance and regulation.

The EU citizen/non-citizen binary is formally codified in the Schengen Common Manual, which mandates different protocols for third country nationals as part of its uniform border procedures. According to the Common Manual (Part 2, Point 1.3.1), only a "minimum check" involving a "rapid and straightforward" verification of the validity of travel documents is necessary for nationals of Schengen member states, while third country nationals require "thorough checks" involving "detailed" verification of travel documents, visas or residence permits, the individual’s origin and destination (and supporting documents if necessary), sufficient means of subsistence, and finally, that "the person, his vehicle and the objects he is transporting are not likely to jeopardise public policy, national security or international relations" of the member states.

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15 See also Schengen Borders Code, Art. 7, Para. 2. The Schengen Borders Code specifically invokes the principle of free movement of persons by calling for a minimum check on "persons enjoying the Community right of free movement." It also adds the examination of entry and exit stamps to verify that a
Unlike most Schengen border crossings, the Slubice/Frankfurt checkpoint did not have the requisite separate lanes for member state and third country citizens. However, it still achieved the effect of physical separation by following the Common Manual’s prescription of placing the documents presented by third country nationals under greater scrutiny. During the day-to-day operation of the checkpoint, the identification cards or passports of Poles and Germans (the vast majority of EU citizens crossing at between Frankfurt and Slubice) were rarely checked electronically and were usually only given a brief visual check before the individual was waved through—a process which took only a few seconds for each side of the border. While rarely subjected to the full requirements of the Common Manual’s thorough check, non-Schengen passports were almost always scanned electronically, visually checked, verified for visas and previous entry/exit stamps, and finally stamped again, usually by both the Polish and German border guards. This process could take several minutes or longer depending on the officer’s level of suspicion. During this time long and impatient lines of EU nationals quickly formed, making the position of the third country national as an outsider plainly and uncomfortably clear. A feeling of embarrassment or humiliation was one of the most common complaints third country nationals made about the border checkpoint, and are feelings I experienced personally during many of my trips between the cities with my own—albeit still comparatively privileged—third country passport from the United States. Through this more intense surveillance, Schengen border practices effectively reinforce the status of third country nationals as potentially dangerous and untrustworthy.

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16 This is likely because the Slubice/Frankfurt checkpoint was already scheduled to be eliminated before 2009, the date by which the Schengen Borders Code (Article 9) required these lanes to be in place.
"foreigners" who must continually justify and verify themselves and their movements. This is the essence of the difference in citizenship regimes produced and reinforced by the Schengen acquis, and is a dynamic reflected in the results of a survey I conducted in 2005 on frequent border-crossers at the cities' two universities,¹⁷ in which 48% of respondents from non-Schengen countries characterized the border as "very strict" or "strict" compared to only 18% from Schengen member countries (primarily Germany) and 11% from Schengen signatory countries (primarily Poland).¹⁸

The Power of Stamps

Even for third country nationals who held both Polish and Schengen visas, specific aspects of the Schengen acquis's practices of governmentality, such as variations in the stamping of passports, functioned to limit their cross-border mobility and further structured distinctions between EU citizens and non-citizens. Entry and exit stamps were a ubiquitous part of the Ślubice/Frankfurt border checkpoint, and were a lasting reminder that even as EU citizens are allowed to travel freely with no record of their journeys, the cross-border movements of third country citizens must be documented and verifiable. A 2004 Council of the European Union (henceforth Council) regulation requires "the travel documents of third country nationals . . . [to be] systematically stamped on entry and exit,"¹⁹ while the Common Manual simultaneously assures that "no entry stamp shall be affixed to the documents of nationals of the Member States of the European

¹⁷ Collegium Polonicum in Ślubice, and European University Viadrina in Frankfurt.
¹⁸ Only 7% of non-Schengen passport holders rated the border checkpoint as "easy" or "very easy," compared to 58% from Schengen member states and 76% from Schengen signatories.
When placed in the transnational context of Slubice/Frankfurt, this simple difference in a routine border procedure was transformed into a powerful device for limiting the movements of third country nationals. This power worked through what would seem to be an almost inconsequential aspect of Foucaultian governmentality: the dimensions of a passport.

A standard machine-readable international passport measures approximately 125 by 85 millimeters (IACO 2003), and an EU entry/exit stamp about 43 by 30 millimeters. This provides space for only four non-overlapping stamps per visa page, but between six and eight if they are overlapped (as is common practice). Given these constraints, passports of third country nationals attempting to use both sides of Slubice/Frankfurt’s urban space were filled extremely quickly if the EU’s stamping regulation was fully observed and they received two entry and two exit stamps for each round trip across the border. For example, a Ukrainian passport contains 32 pages, 27 of which are visa pages available for stamps. Subtracting two pages for visas, this leaves enough space in a new passport for about 50 round trips. The situation for United States passports is even worse, with space for only about 25 round trips on 13 pages. At a rate of only one cross-border trip per week—about average for the cities’ residents—a new Ukrainian passport would last at a little less than a year, and a United States passport only about six months, even though both documents are designed to be valid for 10 years. Perhaps with this problem in mind, the border guards at the Slubice/Frankfurt checkpoint rarely followed the stamping regulation completely, and some of my correspondents reported occasional

20 Common Manual Part 2, Point 2.1.1, See also Schengen Borders Code, Art. 10 Para. 2.
21 United States citizens are, however, allowed to add supplemental pages to their passports at United States consulates in sets of 24 pages, with theoretically no maximum limit. This option is not available to Ukrainian citizens.
success in convincing an individual officer not to apply a stamp. Nevertheless, stamping, and the subsequent need to renew passports, were widely considered by third country nationals to be significant problems introduced by Poland’s implementation of the Schengen acquis, as well as Germany’s stricter enforcement of its protocols.

Prior to, and even immediately following, Poland’s EU accession, stamps appear to have been less frequently applied at the Slubice/Frankfurt checkpoint. In my survey of frequent border crossers, 90% of non-Schengen passport holders reported receiving stamps either “always” or “often” in 2005, compared to 75% between May 1 and December 31, 2004, and 72% prior to Poland’s EU accession (May 1, 2004). The stamping record contained in my own passport also indicates this increase. In 2003, I made 72 round-trips across the border and received a total of 23 stamps (21 from the Polish side, and two from the German side), or about one stamp every three trips. In 2004, I crossed 18 times and received only three stamps (two Polish and one German), and in 2005 and 2006, I made 43 round trips across the border, and received 88 stamps (37 from the Polish side and 51 from the German side), or about two stamps per trip—a more than six fold increase over 2003. Like many of my correspondents, even though I was legally authorized to travel freely between the cities, in order to conserve space in my passport, I was forced to decrease the frequency of my border crossings in proportion to the number of stamps I received. Compared to 2003, when I made my 72 trips in only 86 days, I crossed the border more than seven times less often in 2005 and 2006, when it took me 370 days to make the 43 trips.

A passport with too many stamps can have further negative implications. First, a passport lacking enough space to apply a stamp can be cause for a border guard to deny
its bearer entry, and must therefore be renewed, a procedure that typically necessitates the renewal of all the visas in it. For third-country nationals with both visas, this means a minimum of three trips to different consular offices, as well as the expenses, paperwork, processing times, and uncertainties of approval that are typical of visa and passport bureaucracies. Second, passports with many entry and exit stamps from a single border checkpoint can precipitate greater scrutiny at other border crossings and in consular offices, where these stamps often translate into suspicions of trafficking activities and difficulties in obtaining visas.

Vasyl, a Ukranian musician living in Slubice, was surprised to be denied a Schengen visa when he brought a new passport to the German consulate. He recalled, “I had [a visa] last year, but this year the fascists didn’t give me one! I brought an empty passport to the embassy--I had renewed it--and they said ‘you must have done something, [that’s why] you renewed it’ (e.g. a refusal of entry or illegal border crossing indicated by a stamp in the passport\textsuperscript{22}). I brought the same documents as last time, but they didn’t like my face this time.” The denial had immediate economic repercussions for Vasyl by preventing him from playing concerts in Germany. Consequently, Vasyl decided to apply for Polish citizenship, and was eventually approved, pending his renunciation of his Ukrainian citizenship. He viewed this decision as a pragmatic way to ensure the mobility

\textsuperscript{22} On June 25, 1995, these “no entry” stamps were one of the causes behind a public demonstration in Slubice that gained international attention by blocking traffic across the border bridge. The previous day, about 250 Poles from Slubice had gone to Frankfurt in response to an advertisement offering DM 100 for a day’s work distributing free newspapers. The advertisement was posted at the Slubice town hall and appeared to be legitimate, and most of the people who responded assumed that the company had secured the appropriate work permits. When the perspective employees arrived in Frankfurt, they were detained by the German border police for working illegally even though they had not yet accepted jobs. Several hours later, the Slubice residents were deported, and “no-entry” stamps (officially called “administrative visas”) were placed in their passports, barring their entry into Germany for five years. This decision in particular sparked the subsequent public outcry in Slubice, which eventually resulted in the cancellation of most of these stamps provided the affected individuals filed official appeals (Bajak 1995a, 1995b, 1995, PAP 1995a, 1995b).
required of his profession, explaining, “Until the time I get Polish citizenship, Europe is closed to me.”

Because of difficulties like Vasyl’s, most third country nationals residing in Slubice/Frankfurt carefully planned and managed their cross-border movements in order to minimize the stamps they received. For example, Isabela, a Romanian university student who lived in Frankfurt, explained to me that she had to drop out of a course I taught at the university in Slubice (ironically, on the topic of European borders) because she had decided to schedule all the classes she attended in Poland on the same day in order to conserve space in her passport and avoid running out of pages for stamps before the end of the semester. Several of my other correspondents reported being forced to give up visiting one side of the border altogether. This type of self-limitation on cross-border movement demonstrates the powerful disciplining effect the Schengen acquis can have over the individual, so much so that even when a third country national had de jure freedom of movement by virtue of obtaining the proper visas, routine border practices and regulations, such as the use of passports to provide a physical record of its bearer’s movement, placed a de facto limitation on the exercise of this freedom. In this way, the administration of the Schengen acquis in Slubice/Frankfurt contributed to a citizenship regime in which third country nationals were functionally less mobile than EU citizens; an inequality that worked at cross-purposes to the Maastricht Treaty’s neoliberal goal of transforming the EU into an unimpeded social and market space.
A Local Solution

Recognizing the problem that the Schengen stamping regulation presented for third country citizens living in Slubice and Frankfurt, the local border authorities developed a limited solution based on a liberal interpretation of another of the Common Manual’s provisions (Part 2, Point 2.1.6), which reads, “Exceptionally, at the request of an alien, insertion of an entry or exit stamp may be dispensed with if insertion might cause serious difficulties for that person. In that case, entry or exit must then be recorded on a separate sheet indicating the name and passport number.”23 While this section is more likely intended to protect individuals who might fear repercussions in their home country resulting from travel to the EU, such as political dissidents or human rights advocates, the obligation to renew one’s passport too frequently was considered a serious enough difficulty by local border officials to allow third country nationals to request a letter on which to receive entry/exit stamps.

However, the process of obtaining this letter in Slubice and Frankfurt was not a simple matter. Because the practice makes use of a discretionary area of the Common Manual’s regulations (and a somewhat dubious interpretation of its intentions), the border guard did not readily advertise the existence of the measure, and an individual was required to make separate requests to the local commanders on each side of the border in their respective national languages. In my own case, I made requests on both sides of the border, but was only able to complete the process on the Polish side, as the German officials failed to return my correspondence after an initial reply. Upon receiving my

23 Art. 10, Para. 3 of the Schengen Borders Code repeats this regulation, changing only alien to “third-country national” and indicating that the sheet should be given to that individual.
inquiry, the Polish regional Komendant required a personal meeting in order to approve the letter, at which I was asked to provide proof of my affiliation with Słubice’s university (through a letter of invitation), my status as a researcher in Poland (through letters from the United States Department of Education and the United States Embassy in Warsaw), and a formal letter of request detailing my circumstances.

After examining my passport and visa and observing that I should really be making the request on the German side since most of the stamps were from the German authorities, the Komendant asked for my residency registration card (potwierdzenie zameldowania), which I did not have. An uncomfortable moment followed as I attempted to explain why, after living in Słubice for more than six months, I had still not obtained the card without openly admitting that I had failed to properly register my residence with the local police. He apparently decided this was not a major infraction, and after a few more questions, he agreed to approve my request. Once my documents were photocopied for their records, I was given two sheets of standard A4 paper bearing my name, citizenship, passport number, the stamp of the Komendant, and an expiration date that corresponded to the last day of my visa. I was instructed to present these papers only on the Polish side of the checkpoint between Słubice and Frankfurt, and never to present them to the German officials or at any other border checkpoint in Poland, since they could potentially be construed as false documents.

Because they were often unable to follow the exact requirements of Poland’s residency registration system, or were disinclined to voluntarily subject themselves to the additional scrutiny and surveillance involved in completing the request, only a handful of third country citizens I met had obtained a letter. Even so, the existence of a local border
policy that used of one aspect of the Schengen border regulations to circumvent another less convenient aspect of these same regulations—even if it applied only to the third country citizens that were able to justify their need to frequently cross the border—illustrates the extent to which Frankfurt and Slubice’s border authorities were willing to accommodate the imperatives of the cities’ unique transnational space. The next section examines the personal compromises and citizenship strategies many third country nationals were also willing to make in order to accommodate the requirements of living along a Schengen border.

**Strategies of Citizenship**

Within the modern nation-state system, restrictions on personal freedom of movement are inherently linked to the question of “how the economic advantages available in a particular area [are] to be divided up, whether these [involve] access to work or to poor relief” (Torpey 2000:19). This is also true within the EU’s common market, where efforts to enable transnational labor mobility and market access for member state citizens through the expansion EU-level citizenship rights simultaneously necessitated supranational policies to manage the movements of third country nationals (Wiener 1998, Kostakopoulou 2001). Indeed, one of the core functions of the Schengen acquis is to push outward the regulatory nexus of market access from the borders of the member states to the external borders of the Schengen area.

Unlike EU citizens, who are allowed—with certain exceptions—free access to all the national labor markets within the EU, third country nationals are limited to the

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24 Although citizens of the 2004 accession countries were immediately granted the right to travel and reside anywhere in the EU after May 1, 2004, their right to work was subject to qualification for a transition
terms of their work and residence permits, which almost always restrict them to work available in their country of residence, and sometimes to a single firm.

In Slubice/Frankfurt, the question of economic advantage for third country nationals therefore took the form of how to gain access to the financial opportunities afforded by cross-border travel. All except one of my correspondents moved to Slubice/Frankfurt either for immediate economic benefit, or for the future advantages provided by the "European" degrees available at the cities’ universities. A third of my correspondents also depended on cross-border access for at least part of their income, despite the tenuousness of their visa situations. Among my correspondents living in Slubice, residence in Poland was viewed as economic opportunity in its own right and as stepping-stone for gaining access to the Schengen area, and it was generally agreed that receiving a Schengen visa in Poland (with its status as an EU member state and Schengen signatory) was considerably less difficult than in their home countries. This conclusion was supported by considerable anecdotal evidence gleaned from personal experience and from the reports of friends, family, and acquaintances.

Acquiring Polish citizenship was also regularly used both as a way to guarantee an individual’s economic position in Poland, and as a way to gain access to EU citizenship rights through the automatic conferral of EU citizenship. In keeping with Aihwa Ong’s assertion that dynamics of globalization have produced a more flexible approach to citizenship in which economic calculation is a central element, (1999:112),

period of up to seven years. Only the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden fully opened their labor markets in 2004, while Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain followed in 2006, and the Netherlands and Luxemburg in 2007. The labor markets of the remaining five countries, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, and Germany remain restricted. Cyprus and Malta were excluded from these transitional agreements, and their citizens enjoyed immediate access to all labor markets within the EU. Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary applied reciprocal labor market restrictions in 2004. Slovenia and Poland dropped these restrictions in 2006 and 2007 respectively.
three-quarters of my correspondents who lived in Poland had either naturalized as Polish citizens or had applied and were awaiting a decision. Like Vasyl, the economic imperatives generated by differences in the EU’s citizenship regimes created a powerful pull towards obtaining EU citizenship for these individuals. Guaranteeing a position in Słubice/Frankfurt’s labor markets and strategies to maximize economic benefits featured prominently in their immigration narratives, as is demonstrated by the following three examples.

Dmytry, a Russian secondary-school teacher from Kazakhstan, immigrated to Poland in 2000 after experiencing ethnic discrimination and becoming afraid that he might lose his job. His wife, Beata, is ethnically Polish, and because her maternal grandmother was deported from eastern Poland (now western Ukraine) in 1939, she was eligible for a Polish repatriation program and automatic citizenship. After deciding to move, Beata and Dmytry wrote over 50 letters to different Polish cities, and were eventually invited to settle in Słubice, where, as a Polish citizen, Beata was able to begin working immediately. As a foreign national, Dmytry had difficulties finding a job in his field, and during the four years he waited to receive Polish citizenship he “worked everywhere” in a series of short-term manual-labor jobs. Dmytry was finally able to find a teaching position at a school in Słubice only after he was granted citizenship. For him, citizenship was “...the most important thing... Before, it was difficult to get a job, since permission is given for a specific firm or school. Now I can change jobs quickly, and I’m not dependent on a piece of paper.”

Ivan, a Ukrainian who traded in used appliances, was also pursuing Polish citizenship as a way to ensure access to the EU’s economic markets. Ivan immigrated to
Poland in 2000, and was in the process of making a heritage-based application for Polish citizenship, even though he did not identify himself as ethnically Polish. He chose to pursue Polish citizenship for economic reasons, and claimed that if he could apply for American or German citizenship he would eagerly do so. Ivan held a temporary residence card for Poland that had to be renewed yearly and did not grant him work authorization, but did help him, along with an invitation from a German colleague, to obtain a three-month Schengen visa. Ivan attributed the possibility of getting a Schengen visa directly to his residency in Poland, and said that it would have been much more difficult to receive the visa if he still lived in Ukraine. Holding a Schengen visa allowed him to purchase used appliances in Germany, which he transported to Ukraine for resale—a grey market activity that enabled him to exploit cross-border price differentials by virtue of his access to Polish, Ukrainian, and EU spaces.

Similarly, Larisa, a Ukrainian IT analyst, chose to live in Slubice as a way to strategically utilize the current Schengen border policies to her maximum benefit. Slubice’s location permitted her to compete for work available on the German side of the border, while still allowing her parents to visit relatively easily from Ukraine. In order to secure both her position in Poland’s labor market and her cross-border access to Germany, Larisa entered into a fraudulent marriage to obtain Polish citizenship. She found this arrangement preferable to marrying a German citizen and living in Germany, since she believed her parents might have problems getting a Schengen visa in Ukraine.

All of these narratives demonstrate the importance of acquiring EU citizenship to the full exercise of economic rights within the Union. The rights of labor market access and freedom of movement are fundamentally intertwined within the concept of EU
citizenship, and exclusion from one can imply exclusion from the other. In order to function, the EU’s transnational labor market requires the right of free movement. However, because economic self-sufficiency without the aid of social benefits continues to be a de facto requirement for the full exercise of this freedom—particularly with regards to the right of residency—labor market access is essential to assuring mobility (Peebles 1997: 601-604). Without a legal claim to either of these rights, third country nationals are doubly disqualified, and must appeal to national citizenship policies in order to gain supranational citizenship rights. This dynamic reveals a central tension within EU citizenship. Even as EU citizenship policies and practices challenge its member states’ monopoly on the management and regulation of their populations, because national citizenship regulations determine the conditions under which a third country national can obtain EU citizenship, these same transnational policies continue to reinforce national understandings of citizenship identities.

In locations like Poland and Germany, where the concept of nationhood privileges common ethnicity and descent, and citizenship laws are based primarily on *jus sanguines*, proving a link to the ethnic nation through familial descent, or establishing a familial relationship by marriage to a citizen, is often the fastest and simplest way to achieve citizenship. These links, whether based on an advantage of personal history like Beata

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25 To be eligible for naturalization, a foreigner must have lived legally in Germany for eight years, seven years if he or she completed an integration course, or three years if the person is a spouse or a same sex partner of a German citizen (German Nationality Act as amended 15 July 1999, Sect. 9 and Sec. 10 Para. 1). Individuals must also demonstrate knowledge of German, declare their allegiance to the German constitution, and prove that they can support themselves. A foreigner is eligible for naturalization in Poland after five years of residence on a permanent residence permit, which is usually granted only after a three-year period of temporary residence, for a total of eight years. In the case of marriage to a Polish citizen, only three years of residence are required (Statute on Polish Citizenship, Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Official Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland) No. 28, Item 353, 5 December 2000). Poland does not have a language requirement, nor does it recognize same sex partnerships. Both Germany and Poland make provisions for granting citizenship to repatriates: Germany in Article 116 of the Basic Law
or Ivan's demonstrably Polish ancestors, or a willingness to enter into a marriage of convenience like Larisa, become a form of social capital that helps determine which third country nationals will have the potential of gaining access to citizenship in an EU member state.

In many cases, this "trading up" of citizenship regimes also implies a loss, as member state regulations frequently require applicants for naturalization to give up their previous citizenship. Anastasiya, a conductor and instructor at Slubice's music school, immigrated to Poland in 1994 and was naturalized six years later. She wanted to maintain dual citizenship, but was required by the Polish authorities to renounce her Ukrainian citizenship. Because Anastasiya regularly crossed the border to participate in collaborative musical projects undertaken by Slubice and Frankfurt—many of which were sponsored by EU funds—her continuous need to maintain a Schengen visa made keeping Ukrainian citizenship an impractical option. In effect, the difficulties imposed by the Schengen acquis eventually forced Anastasiya to choose between two exclusive citizenship regimes and compelled her to seek EU citizenship in spite of her professed fear of cultural assimilation and a lack of identification with either Poland or the EU. For Anastasiya, lacking the ability to cross the border presented an economic handicap was simply too costly to bear.

Because of the definitional link between EU citizenship and citizenship in a member state, the EU citizenship model, even with its emphasis on transnational and (Grundgesetz), which establishes the right of return, and Poland by the Repatriation Act of 9 November 2000 (See Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 5 December 2000).

26 As a general rule, Germany requires individuals to renounce their previous citizenship before naturalization, although dual citizenship is possible in certain narrow circumstances. In Poland, dual citizenship is permitted, but an individual can be required to renounce his or her previous citizenship prior to naturalization (as was the case for Vasyi and Anastasiya).
neoliberal ideas of economic viability (Peebles 1997), ultimately fails to supersede *jus sanguines* and *jus soli*-based models of national citizenship, and despite attempts to imagine the EU as a transnational or supranational community (Shore 2000 cf. B. Anderson 1983), the legal apparatuses of the member states remain the institutions with which actors “must negotiate in the final instance” within the domain of citizenship (Kastoryano 2003:194, 2002:170-172). Étienne Balibar has warned that this tacit incorporation of member states’ exclusionary citizenship practices within EU citizenship has the long-term potential of expanding the scope of the discrimination against third country nationals by fostering the development of a sustained system of asymmetric power relations distinguished by the restriction of third country nationals’ relative freedom of movement and access to economic spaces (2004:43-44, 121-124). The power of this discriminatory potential was displayed by my correspondents’ great desire to gain EU citizenship and the lengths they would go to attain it. However, as is also demonstrated by my correspondents, for those who have the necessary social capital, the layering of EU citizenship onto national citizenship can provide a way to convert their status from categorical outsiders to citizens. In this way, Vasyl, Beata, Dmytry, Ivan, Larisa, and Anastasiya all made strategic use of the *inclusionary* aspects of Poland’s national citizenship laws as a way to gain citizenship privileges in both national and the transnational spaces, including, perhaps most critically, full access to the local cross-border space of Slubice/Frankfurt.
Conclusions: Schengen’s End

In 2007, the Council of the European Union determined that Poland27 had sufficiently implemented the requirements of the Schengen acquis, and the border controls between Poland and Germany were eliminated at midnight on December 21.28 In Frankfurt and Slubice, a crowd of around 5000 people gathered on the border bridge to celebrate with music and fireworks, and Frankfurt’s mayor rode ceremonially in the last car controlled at the border checkpoint (Märkische Oderzeitung 2007a, 2007b). Only Frankfurt’s border guard, which stood to have 800 of its 1600 officials withdrawn from the region, seemed to object to the situation, and a month earlier many of its members had participated in a protest march through Frankfurt warning that the Schengen expansion was premature and presented significant security concerns; claims that Germany’s interior minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, flatly denied (Deutsche Welle 2007, Märkische Oderzeitung 2007a).

While both countries continue to maintain mobile surveillance patrols along the Polish-German frontier,29 the focus of Poland’s border security apparatus has shifted to its eastern borders, completing a process that began in 2003 when Poland reintroduced visas for Ukrainian (as well as Russian and Belarusian) nationals as part of its harmonization with the Schengen acquis.30 In contrast to the Polish-German border,

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27 All of the 2004 accession countries except Cyprus were also included in this decision.
28 This included only controls at Poland’s land and sea borders. Controls at airports were not eliminated until March 2008.
29 All areas within 30 km of an internal Schengen border continue to be patrolled by the respective member states’ border guards.
30 See Council regulation 539/2001 (OJ L 81, 21.3.2001, p. 1), and Art. 3, Para. and Annex I of the 2003 Act of Accession (OJ L 236, 23.9.2003, p. 33). This ended a bilateral policy of visa-free travel between the two countries. Ukraine, maintained its visa-free policy towards Polish citizens, and as of September 1, 2005 dropped the visa requirement for citizens of all EU member states, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. Despite the additional bureaucratic hurdles required to obtain a visa, the requirement does not appear to have curtailed travel between Ukraine and Poland, and Poland continued to provide visas to Ukrainian
where waiting times were measured in minutes and searches were rare, as an external EU border, checkpoints on Poland’s eastern frontier are being reinforced and expanded. According to several of my correspondents, these are the “real” borders of the EU, where travelers are subjected to full customs control, routine luggage and vehicle searches, and waiting times of several hours—practices that powerfully assert the exclusionary dynamics of the EU’s citizenship regimes, as well as the differentiation of the EU as a separate economic and security space. For the EU, this is where the sorting and processing of third country nationals is supposed to occur: outside of the Schengen area and outside the common market.

For this reason, between 2004 and 2007 the checkpoints in Slubice/Frankfurt and elsewhere on the Polish-German border were already structurally out of place in the midst of the EU’s theoretically open market. However, the experience of third country nationals living in Slubice/Frankfurt during the transition period between Poland’s EU accession and the deregulation of the border is also instructive, as it acutely demonstrates how Schengen acquis systematically excludes and separates EU insiders from third country outsiders. At the Polish-German border, the implementation of the Schengen acquis increased surveillance for third country citizens, making the supposedly neoliberal moment of Poland’s EU accession a disappointment as many people found their nationals free of charge in order to alleviate some of the policy’s effects. While cross-border traffic initially fell 70-90% in the days immediately following the introduction of visas (PAP 2003), the total border traffic between Poland and Ukraine increased 3.74% between 2003 and 2004 and 46.5% between 2004 and 2005 (Source: Straz Granica Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej). Since the Polish border guard does not report the nationality of individuals crossing the border, it is ultimately unclear what country’s citizens are responsible for this dramatic increase in border traffic. In 2004, Poland issued 575,471 visas to Ukrainian citizens, and 217,935 visas at the L’viv consulate alone (the Polish consulate closest to the border), making it the busiest Polish consulate in the world (Ministerswo Spraw Zagranicznych 2004). L’viv retained the title in 2005 issuing 273,565 visas, while Ukrainian citizens were issued around 600,000 visas in total (Ministerswo Spraw Zagranicznych 2005). In accordance with the visa facilitation agreement signed between the EU and Ukraine, Poland began charging Ukrainian nationals a reduced fee of 35 Euros for Schengen visas as of December 2007. Visa fees continue to be waived for several groups, including students, journalists, pensioners, disabled persons and close relatives of people in the EU.
movements further limited by the acquis's practices and procedures. This experience reveals a more generalized reality facing third country nationals within the EU, one in which they are unequal to EU citizens in the realm of transnational citizenship. Although a single Schengen visa will now suffice for both sides of the border and restrictions on third country nationals' mobility between Frankfurt and Słubice have been lifted, third country nationals are still not extended other EU-wide economic rights, such as the right to work and the right to reside, and their construction as a structurally "foreign" group remains. Like any citizenship, the creation of the EU citizens simultaneously created non-citizens, and as social and economic rights expanded transnationally for these new EU citizens, the relative level of citizenship rights declined for third country nationals because they received no corresponding expansion.

By emphasizing freedom of movement for its citizens while simultaneously limiting resident third country nationals from accessing this freedom, the EU's citizenship regimes underscore the power differential that globalization creates between mobile and non-mobile subjects (Ong 1999:11). With a conception of citizenship organized around access to economic markets and economic viability (Peebles 1997), the neoliberal approach taken by EU policy encourages an entrepreneurial and flexible assessment of citizenship (Ong 1996:739), an approach that was exhibited by many third country nationals in Słubice/Frankfurt as they utilize aspects of their personal histories to strategically gain access to EU citizenship through citizenship in a member state.

Two dynamics therefore illustrate the critical differences between the EU citizenship regimes experienced by third country nationals and EU citizens. First, EU citizenship policies segregate EU citizens and non-citizens through practices and
regulations that construct EU citizens as freely mobile while simultaneously subjecting third country nationals to surveillance, verification, regulation, and limitation. In Ślubice/Frankfurt, this process strongly divided third country nationals from their Polish and German counterparts by fundamentally altering the way they could experience the cities’ spaces. Second, the citizenship regime applied to third country nationals provides them with recourse to fewer transnational rights within the EU, especially with regard to the economic activity and mobility that is so important to the EU’s neoliberal conception of the citizen. This distinction represents a type of “status inequality” (Schnapper 1998:117) that is an anathema to the creation of a supranational citizenship community within the EU, but nevertheless threatens to become one of its permanent features.
Chapter 6

New Citizens of a New Empire? EU Imperialism and Euro-orientalism

Introduction

At a July 10, 2007 press conference, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso caused a minor media stir when he explicitly compared the EU to an empire. The purpose of the press conference was to announce the Commission’s position on the proposed revisions to the EU’s failed Constitutional Treaty, and as part of a lengthy answer to a journalist’s question, “What will the EU be when the new treaty has been concluded?” Barroso said:

Sometimes I like to compare the European Union as a creation to the organisation of empires. The empires... because we have the dimension of empires. But there is a great difference. The empires were usually made through force, with a center that was imposing a diktat, a will, on the others. And now, we have what some authors call the first non-imperial empire. We have, by dimension, 27 countries that fully decided to work together, to pool their sovereignty-- if you want to use that concept of sovereignty--and work together toward values. I believe it is a great construction and we should be proud of it. At least, we in the Commission are proud of it.

Amidst the debates and political turmoil surrounding the initial rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands in 2005 and its eventual revival two years later as the Reform Treaty (later renamed the Lisbon Treaty), the question of what

1 This is not the first time Barroso has made this comparison. He also made a reference to the EU’s “empire of law” in an earlier speech to the Italian Senate on March 23, 2007 (Barroso 2007).
the EU is becoming seemed to be on everyone’s mind. Despite Barosso’s assertion of the “non-imperial” nature of the EU, in Słubice and Frankfurt, my correspondents regularly described their discomfort with aspects of the EU’s 2004 expansion in imperial terms. While discussing her country’s EU accession process, Diana, an economics student from Latvia who studied in Frankfurt, typified this unease, saying, “We were in the Soviet Union, and not European, for 45 years, and then the EU came. First [it was] the Soviet Union and then the EU. [People] think we are not independent anymore.” In just a few sentences, Diana made two particularly incisive points about the ideological and political location of post-socialist Europe. First, the Soviet Union is located decidedly outside of “Europe,” and to be part of the Soviet Union is to be automatically excluded from the category of “European,” and second, for many people living in post-socialist Europe, the limits EU membership place on their countries’ state sovereignty are often reminiscent of the not-too-distant experience of Soviet domination.

Given that the Soviet Union shared the EU’s goal of creating a cooperative international economic and political system—albeit one based on international socialism rather than neoliberal market integration—it is perhaps not surprising that the comprehensive economic, legal, and political reforms implemented by East European states as part the requirements of EU accession are sometimes perceived a similar imperial imposition. Several theorists have recently begun to evaluate the imperial qualities embedded within the processes of EU governance, even if these processes are based on principles of consent rather than conquest, and are evaluated as positive developments by the states and populations involved (J. Anderson 2007, Anderson and
Börösz identifies four mechanisms of control as the defining features of an imperial order, all of which are present in the relationship between the fifteen “old” EU member states (EU15) and the ten 2004 accession countries (A10):

1. Unequal exchange—the sustained centripetal funneling of economic value,
2. Coloniality—the cognitive mapping of the empire’s populations, creating a fixed system of inferiorized otherness,
3. Export of governmentality—through the launching of the normalizing, standardizing and control mechanisms of modern statehood,
4. Geopolitics—fitting the above into a long-term global strategy of projecting the central state’s power to its external environment (2001:18).

Because they are divided by a 2004 accession border, Slubice and Frankfurt are a location where the imperial aspects of the EU are readily experienced through everyday cross-border interactions that encourage expressions of EU coloniality. Like elsewhere in the EU, hierarchies of economic and political value contained within the EU accession process in Slubice/Frankfurt have rearticulated already-established orientalist discourses (cf. Said 1979, Wolff 1994) which evaluate East European countries and their citizens as less developed, less civilized, and ultimately less “European” than their West European counterparts. Within the local context of Frankfurt/Slubice, the significantly superior material and economic position of the German side of the border often translates into
social privilege that reinforces a cognitive link that equates economic power with social status in the EU.

While many Słubice residents viewed cross-border inequality as a problem that will be gradually overcome through Poland’s sustained economic growth, others attempted to subvert this form of EU coloniality by displacing blame for their experience as second-class EU citizens onto the lingering effects of Soviet imperialism, and by asserting counter-claims of higher social status on the basis of moral or ethical criteria. For residents of Słubice/Frankfurt, two forms of EU imperialism were therefore experienced as interrelated, with the EU-wide systemization of economic and governmental mechanisms of imperial control reinforcing cultural forms of imperialism by enabling orientalizing representations of EU citizens from Poland and the rest of the A10. In order to contextualize this discussion, I begin with an evaluation of the extent to which the EU exhibits the characteristics of unequal exchange and export of governmentality in its relationship with the 2004 accession countries.

**Valuing the Empire**

Bőrös’s first criteria might be better phrased as a sustained *attempt at* the centripetal funneling of economic value. Empires are expensive to administer, defend, and maintain, and their economic benefit to the imperial centers is often unclear. In the case of the EU, net transfers to the A10 (primarily from funds contributed by the EU15) amounted to a little over EUR 6.5 billion in 2006 (Table 6.1), while overall expenditures in the A10 accounted for about 11% of the EU’s total spending in 2006 (about EUR 11.5 billion). As with other empires, value derived by the “old” EU members from trade and new investments is expected to more than offset these expenditures. While a

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<td>696.2</td>
<td>346.5</td>
<td>349.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total A10</strong></td>
<td><strong>11479</strong></td>
<td><strong>4929.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>6549.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU25</td>
<td>97443.4</td>
<td>87322.9</td>
<td>10120.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total EU Expenditures</td>
<td>106575.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A comprehensive review is not possible here, it is useful to utilize several examples from the British Empire in the late-19th and early 20th centuries as a foil to help illustrate how well the economic relationship between the EU15 and the A10 approximates the imperial model.

In his classic work on British imperialism, Hobson (1965[1902]) concludes that the benefits of Great Britain’s trade with its empire were not worth the additional costs required for its maintenance, particularly when compared to the value of foreign trade outside the empire during the same period.\(^2\) In a more comprehensive statistical review, Clark (1936) comes to a similar conclusion not only for the British Empire, but also for

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\(^2\) Hobson goes on to argue that while the British Empire might not have been very profitable for Great Britain or the British people, it could be very profitable to members of the capitalist class, who received the revenues from foreign investments and had considerable influence on government policy (1965[1902]:52-53). According to Davis and Huttenback, who examine the profitability question in detail, return on investments in the empire from 1860 to 1880 were much higher than in Great Britain. However, after 1885, empire returns never again exceeded domestic returns, and in general were lower than returns in other foreign markets (1986:106-108).
the empires of Germany, Italy, France, and Japan. However, even if the value of this trade was not worth the costs incurred, Clark does demonstrate that the volume of trade between Great Britain and its empire was quite significant, accounting for 30.42% of its total foreign trade in 1894-1903\(^3\) (Clark 1936:75). It appears that the EU15’s trade with the A10 is also significant. While there is only aggregate data available for total trade between the Euro-area and Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, trade with these three countries has ranged between 8.0% of the Euro-area’s external trade in 2003 and 8.7% in 2006 (Table 6.2). Since these three countries represent only about 80% (in 2005) of the A10’s total population, and the Euro-area does not include Great Britain, Sweden and Denmark, actual trade between the EU15 and A10 is probably much higher.

In addition to trade, the British Empire was also an important location of foreign investment for the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom’s investment in its empire increased steadily during the second half of the 19\(^{th}\) century, from a conservative estimate of about 25% of its total capital investments in 1865-1869 to about around 45% in 1910-1914 (Davis and Huttenback 1986:40-41). The EU15’s investment in the A12—the A10 plus Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the EU in 2007—is approaching this level, at 17% if its total extra-EU15 investment in 2005, compared to only 4% in 2003 (Table 6.3). In actual Euros invested, this represents a more than six-fold increase in only three years, and suggests that one useful way of interpreting the EU’s eastward expansion might be provided by Luxembourg’s (1951[1913]) thesis that imperial expansion stems

\[^3\] Trade between France and its empire was also significant at 10.49% of total foreign trade in 1894-1903. However, for the other imperial states, the volume of trade within their respective empires was quite small at 2.15% of total foreign trade in Japan, 0.21% in Germany, and 0.16% in Italy during the same period (Clark 1936:64-68).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Imports from</th>
<th>Exports to</th>
<th>Total Trade</th>
<th>Trade balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>26.82</td>
<td>33.94</td>
<td>60.76</td>
<td>7.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>27.04</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>55.34</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>23.71</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>48.01</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of PL, CZ, HU</td>
<td>77.57</td>
<td>86.54</td>
<td>164.11</td>
<td>8.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-Euro Area Total</td>
<td>988.82</td>
<td>1058.39</td>
<td>2047.21</td>
<td>69.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>29.63</td>
<td>38.75</td>
<td>68.38</td>
<td>9.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>27.48</td>
<td>31.04</td>
<td>58.52</td>
<td>3.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>24.68</td>
<td>25.86</td>
<td>50.54</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of PL, CZ, HU</td>
<td>81.79</td>
<td>95.65</td>
<td>177.44</td>
<td>13.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-Euro Area Total</td>
<td>1081.32</td>
<td>1152.82</td>
<td>2234.14</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>32.66</td>
<td>45.33</td>
<td>77.99</td>
<td>12.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>31.45</td>
<td>35.05</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>26.61</td>
<td>27.62</td>
<td>54.23</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of PL, CZ, HU</td>
<td>90.72</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>198.72</td>
<td>17.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-Euro Area Total</td>
<td>1225.81</td>
<td>1241.93</td>
<td>2467.74</td>
<td>16.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>41.14</td>
<td>58.36</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>17.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>38.93</td>
<td>41.22</td>
<td>80.15</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>29.63</td>
<td>31.36</td>
<td>60.99</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum of PL, CZ, HU</td>
<td>109.7</td>
<td>130.94</td>
<td>240.64</td>
<td>21.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-Euro Area Total</td>
<td>1389.09</td>
<td>1379.86</td>
<td>2768.95</td>
<td>-9.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2. External trade (in EUR billions) of the Euro-area, 2003-2006. Source: Eurostat

from the pressure created by capitalism’s persistent need to reinvest the surplus value not consumed in the production cycle in order to avoid a crisis of over-accumulation (cf. Bukharin 1929:28,79). According to Harvey (2003), this structural problem can be redressed in two ways. Surpluses must either be displaced spatially, through expansion into new markets, development of new production capabilities, or utilization of new resources (including labor), or temporally, through investment in long-term capital
projects or social expenditures (e.g. education and research) (Harvey 2003:109). In short, the capitalist system must either intensify or expand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extra-EU15</td>
<td>137.949</td>
<td>149.884</td>
<td>194.820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A12</td>
<td>5.147</td>
<td>18.324</td>
<td>32.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Extra EU15</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1.663</td>
<td>6.081</td>
<td>2.639</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By facilitating further capital investment in the A10 and integrating a little over 74 million people—a population that until 1989 had only been peripherally involved in the capitalist system—into its common market, the EU’s expansion into Eastern Europe provided opportunities for both types of displacement. Along with the approximately EUR 32.7 billion in pre-accession aid provided by the EU to its candidate countries between 1990 and 2006, a considerable proportion of the EUR 22 billion in 2004-2006 and EUR 151.5 billion budgeted in 2007-2013 for EU regional development in the A10 supports precisely the type of capital and social expenditures that Harvey classifies as temporal displacement.

Perhaps even more significant for the EU15, however, are the tremendous new low-cost labor resources provided by the A10. High levels of wage inequality between the EU15 and A10 facilitate the exploitation of these resources. In the seven economic sectors where comparative data was available, labor costs in the A10 tend to be only about 20-25% of levels in the EU15 (Table 6.4). In imperial terms, lower wages allow
for greater extraction of surplus value between the center and the periphery (Luxembourg 1951[1913]:38-39), particularly within a system where commodities and capital are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Labor Costs in 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


universalized while labor remains immobile (Amin 1977:40). Table 6.5 shows a rough measure of differential labor exploitation within the EU by comparing the ratio of average individual income to per capita GDP in the member states. This ratio indicates the relative amount of an economy’s produced value that is returned to its population. A higher ratio result therefore indicates a lower relative level of labor exploitation, but not necessarily a higher income. With the exception of Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta, the other seven 2004 accession countries show the highest levels of labor exploitation in the EU. Here, the imperial nature of the transitional limits that the EU15 were allowed to place on the labor mobility of A8\(^4\) citizens comes into full focus (See Chapter 4).

Because labor mobility between the EU15 and A8 remains limited while capital and

\(^4\) These transitional agreements applied to all the A10 countries except Cyprus and Malta (A8).
commodities are allowed to flow freely, the expansion of the EU’s common market enables capital investments from the EU15 to effectively exploit A8 labor by paying workers according to the local wages while simultaneously taking advantage of a reduction in the other marginal costs (in both time and money) normally associated with offshore production (such as shipping costs, tariffs, etc.). In this way, surplus economic value is funneled from the A8 to the EU15, and is no doubt part of the explanation behind the sudden post-accession influx of capital to the new member states from the EU15.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mean income (EUR PPS) 2005</th>
<th>Per capita GDP (EUR PPP) 2004</th>
<th>Ratio of Income to GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>16762</td>
<td>19648.4</td>
<td>.8531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>21572</td>
<td>26455.5</td>
<td>.8154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>12432</td>
<td>15988</td>
<td>.7776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>18660</td>
<td>24903.2</td>
<td>.7493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>11467</td>
<td>16086.1</td>
<td>.7129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>12734</td>
<td>17919.8</td>
<td>.7106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>19652</td>
<td>27666.2</td>
<td>.7103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>12862</td>
<td>18244.6</td>
<td>.7050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>16095</td>
<td>23094.9</td>
<td>.6969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>16600</td>
<td>24145.8</td>
<td>.6875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>17575</td>
<td>26759.1</td>
<td>.6568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>17876</td>
<td>27945.9</td>
<td>.6397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>15780</td>
<td>24834.2</td>
<td>.6354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>16812</td>
<td>26771.8</td>
<td>.6280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>13464</td>
<td>21658.2</td>
<td>.6217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>15487</td>
<td>25865.3</td>
<td>.5988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>17430</td>
<td>30413.9</td>
<td>.5731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>30675</td>
<td>53977.6</td>
<td>.5683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>8873</td>
<td>16171.3</td>
<td>.5487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>5756</td>
<td>10908.4</td>
<td>.5277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>4957</td>
<td>9775.1</td>
<td>.5071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>5819</td>
<td>11977.5</td>
<td>.4858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>5719</td>
<td>12196.2</td>
<td>.4689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>6397</td>
<td>13751.3</td>
<td>.4652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>4845</td>
<td>10981.5</td>
<td>.4412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5. Differential labor exploitation in the EU. A10 countries highlighted. Source: Eurostat.
For the EU as a whole, these vast economic differences between the EU15 and the A10 create the potential for the development of a nationality-linked division of labor which not only perpetuates unequal development between the two regions (Amin 1977), but also risks mapping A10 nationals as the EU’s permanent second-class citizens. This danger is enhanced by the process of EU accession itself, in which barriers to the mobility of goods and capital are removed long before the implementation of labor mobility. In fact, as the next section will show, the 2004 EU accession process was centrally concerned with establishing EU standards of government in order to ensure a stable and predictable environment for the penetration of capital from the EU15.

**Incorporating Eastern Europe**

The EU’s export of governmentality into Eastern Europe was one of the most publicized and politicized aspects of the 2004 EU expansion. Beginning with the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993, the European Council indicated that candidate countries would first be required to distance themselves from the socialist system before joining the EU by meeting specific economic, political and social requirements. These criteria included “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and the protection of minorities, the existence of a market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.”

For a potential member state, the lengthy process of EU accession begins with the formation of an “association agreement,” which indicates the state’s willingness to implement EU standards. The state then moves on to develop an “accession partnership”

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5 European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency, Point 7, Para. A(iii).
outlining the reforms necessary to become a member. Once the partnership agreement is concluded, a candidate country enters into accession negotiations, which detail the steps and actions for the implementation of these reforms and eventually results in the finalization and ratification of an accession treaty.

The common description of the EU accession negotiations as a "structured dialog" reveals its clearly pedagogical theme, as applicant countries are gradually disciplined into behaving in a manner satisfactory for an EU member state. One of the most arduous obstacles for a candidate country to overcome is the requirement to modify its national law to incorporate the entirety of the *acquis communitaire*—the collective body of EU law and regulations that consist of at least 80,000 to 100,000 pages of text. This process normally takes several years (a little over 4.5 years in Poland) of accession negotiations, as candidate countries gradually make their way through each of the acquis' topical chapters (31 for the 2004 accession countries, 35 today). In contrast to earlier enlargements, when countries were allowed to "opt out" of some aspects of the EU treaties, such as the European Monetary Union (EMU) or the Schengen Agreement, the 2004 accession countries were obligated to join both institutions, and as a result to commit to the adoption the Euro and the implementation of the EU's common border and visa policies. Finally, as potential member states, all candidate countries were also required to accept the supremacy of EU law.7

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6 After examining the EU's legal database, the think-tank Open Europe concluded that figure is closer to 170,000 pages of active text (in English) (Open Europe 2007).
7 This principle is not codified in the treaties, but established by ECJ rulings, beginning with the Costa vs. ENEL ruling on July 15, 1964 (Case no. 6/64).
This importation of EU governmentality was a powerful normalizing force for the 2004 accession countries. With the exception of some minor concessions, the accession negotiations were highly one-sided, with applicant countries primarily negotiating how fast they would implement the acquis, and how much less of the EU's benefits they would receive in comparison to the EU15, rather than the content of these laws and policies. In this regard, the EU accession process closely resembles the 19th century practice of utilizing "standards of civilization," such as the efficient operation of a state bureaucracy and legal system, the capacity for self defense, and the ability to fulfill the obligations of international diplomacy, as a way to determine the nature of the relationship between European and non-European states (Behr 2007:243-244, cf. Gong 1984). These standards of civilization helped justify the conclusion of "unequal treaties," in which non-European states were required to grant unreciprocated rights to foreign nationals and the officials of foreign governments (Behr 2007:244). Inequalities were supposed to be gradually reduced in subsequent agreements, as the non-European state became more modernized and more integrated in international society (Behr 2007:244).

The stepwise EU accession process is essentially a series of progressively less unequal treaties, by which non-EU populations are integrated into EU markets, bureaucratic processes, and disciplinary regimes long before they gain any rights within these structures of power. In exchange for the potential advantages of EU accession, candidate countries must for the most part accept and implement a pre-determined governing framework shaped by the goals and interests of other nation-states (i.e. the

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8 For example, Poland negotiated a transitional period limiting property purchases by EU15 nationals.
9 These lesser benefits included the up to seven-year transitional limits placed on the labor mobility of A8 citizens, and the 10-year phasing-in of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies for the A10 starting at 25% of EU15 levels in 2004.
current EU member states). According to Böröcz and Sarkar, “such structural conditions of dependence on a foreign authority for laws and regulations make the situation of East European applicant states somewhat similar to that of ‘dependencies’, ‘protectorates’ and a form of externally supervised government reminiscent of the history of colonial empires’ ‘indirect rule’” (2005:158-159).

While it should be pointed out that the imposition of EU governmentality most resembles an imperial arrangement before an applicant country gains formal power within the EU’s institutions, the normalizing aspects of EU governmentality continue even after accession. In 2000-2006, 1252 cases were brought against EU member states in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for failing to meet treaty obligations. Of the 111 of these cases concluded in 2006, the court judged that an infringement occurred in 103 (93%) (ECJ 2007:86,92). If a state still fails to comply after a ruling has been made, a penalty payment can be imposed on the member state (Art. 228 of the EC Treaty), although this has only occurred on three occasions.¹⁰

The ratification process of new EU treaties also regularly exhibits a coercive element within EU governmentality, as is most clearly demonstrated on the occasions when a member state rejected a proposed treaty. All EU treaties require unanimous ratification by the member states, but as is shown in Table 6.6, in the case of almost every major treaty since the Single European Act, one member state has failed to ratify. With the exception of the Constitutional Treaty, which failed in two countries, a second vote was held—usually after a break for more intensive campaigning—on exactly or essentially the same treaty, and in each case the second vote proved successful. Even in the case of

¹⁰ For a detailed description of the financial penalties imposed on member states by the ECJ, see European Commission Memo/05/482. In the extreme case of a “serious and persistent breach” of EU principles, it is also theoretically possible to suspend a member state’s Treaty rights under Art. 309 of the EC Treaty.
the Lisbon Treaty, most estimates agree that about 90% the Constitutional Treaty has been retained. In order to guarantee the Lisbon Treaty’s ratification, efforts were made throughout the EU to avoid popular referendums altogether (France ratified via parliament on February 14, 2008). This pattern of voting until the “right” answer is obtained not only undermines a sense of democracy in the EU, but also expresses the extent of the normalizing power of EU governmentality, in which it is extremely difficult for a single member state to dissent against a consensus of the other member states. Despite this, Irish voters rejected the Lisbon Treaty in its only public referendum on June 12, 2008, and the Treaty’s future status is presently unclear.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Referendum fails in</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Subsequent Vote</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single European Act (1986)</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Fails in parliament (80 votes for, 75 against)</td>
<td>Popular Referendum (1986)</td>
<td>56.2% in favor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maastricht Treaty (1992)</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>52% against</td>
<td>Second Referendum after addition of “Edinburgh Agreement” (1993)</td>
<td>57% in favor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty of Nice (2001)</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>53.87% against</td>
<td>Second referendum after national debate (2002)</td>
<td>62.89% in favor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>61.54% against</td>
<td>Renegotiated as Lisbon Treaty (2008),</td>
<td>Expected to be ratified by parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisbon Treaty (2008)</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>53.4% against</td>
<td>Undetermined as of July 1, 2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.6. Failed EU treaty referendums and subsequent re-voting.

11 The Edinburgh Agreement granted Denmark minor exceptions in four areas of the Maastricht Treaty including citizenship, economic and monetary union, defence policy, and justice and home affairs.
Euro-Orientalism

Judging by the criteria of sustained funneled value and export of governmentality, the EU appears to thoroughly exhibit the hallmarks of an imperial order. However, by extending EU citizenship and EU citizenship rights to citizens of the new member states, the EU treaties potentially diffuse this imperial dynamic by expanding its body politic concurrently with its political power (cf. Arendt 1968:15). Nevertheless, because economic inequality and the results of the accession negotiations made A10 nationals subject to different citizenship regimes than citizens of the EU15 (see Chapter 4), EU citizenship also became a mechanism of EU imperialism by helping reinforce a system of coloniality, or "Euro-orientalism," in which east European countries and populations are persistently mapped as inferior in the hierarchy of "Europeanness."

The profound restructuring of economies and societies required by Eastern Europe's post-socialist "transformation" and reorientation toward the EU created many new opportunities for (re)inscribing "Other-ness" within, and especially between, national societies (Buchowski 2006). In fact, a significant component of the 2004 EU accession process can be read as a systematic form of orientalization aimed at "putting down and putting off" the applicant countries (Börösz and Kovács 2001, Kovács 2001).

During the accession process, the EU established its authority vis-à-vis Eastern Europe by exercising the power of evaluation over, and the production of knowledge about, the applicant countries--both central aspects of orientalizing discourse (Sher 2001:242-243, Kovács 2001:199-200). Said writes, "Knowledge of the Orient, because it is generated

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12 The orientalizing tendencies of the 2004 accession negotiations have been demonstrated in several studies of documents produced by the European Commission about the applicant countries, such as the 1997 European Commission opinions on the candidate counties (Kovács and Kabachnik 2001, Börösz 2001), and the Commission's 1998 and 1999 follow-up reports (Kovács 2001).
out of strength, in a sense creates the Orient, the Oriental, and his world” (Said 1979:40). For the EU, this production of knowledge took the form of a “topos of discovery” that operated as part of the EU’s more general strategy of making known the workings of its member states, their economies, and their populations (Börösz 2001:105, cf. Shore 2000:31-32, Scott 1998). Europe was thus separated into the “Europe that [knows] things... and the other Europe that [waits] to become known,” a conceptual division of the continent into a civilized “West” and an uncivilized “East” in need of discipline and domination (Wolff 1994:90,100), which has its origins in the Enlightenment, if not before (Wolff 1994, Tornquist-Plewa 2002, Strath 2000).

The idea of “Europe” has never been “a stable, sovereign, autonomous object but exists only in historical relations and fields of power...The relationship of the European to this entity is a form of identification that works simultaneously as a strategy of self-representation and a device of power. Such a strategy has always been as dependant on the externalization or creation of negative others as on the internal dynamics of group formation” (Borneman & Fowler 1997:487). Within the EU, multiple levels of “otherness” have been fostered and organized by its policies into a widespread hierarchy of nations and nationalities. In general terms, this hierarchical geography places nation-states on different tiers of “European-ness,” depending on how fully they have accepted and internalized the institutions, governing practices, and values of the EU. At the top of the hierarchy is a core of “European countries” represented by the 15 “old” member states. Next are the “partially European” countries represented by the twelve 2004 and 2007 accession countries, followed first by a group of “potentially European” candidate countries such as Croatia and Turkey, then by countries in the European “neighborhood,”

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such as Ukraine and Belarus (as well as the Caspian Sea region, North Africa, and parts of the Middle East), and finally by countries excluded from the EU altogether (notably Russia). With each lower tier, nation-states and their citizens move from more “European” to more “non-European,” from greater EU inclusion to greater exclusion, and are empowered with an ever-diminishing opportunity for incorporation within the EU’s practices of citizenship (See Chapters 4 & 5). This locational subjectivity has become a core feature of EU citizenship as well as a new and naturalized form of orientalism.

As recent newcomers to the EU, Słubice residents were particularly cognizant of their location on the EU’s second tier, and frequently referenced their Europeanness as a way of differentiating themselves both from their non-European neighbors and from their own non-European (i.e. socialist) past. In Słubice, the Soviet Union—often represented synecdochically by Russia—fills the space of a non-European Other that prevented Poland from occupying its rightful place in Europe. Arek, a Słubice electronics technician, expressed this position as he explained his opinion on Poland’s EU accession, “We were always in Europe, like France, Germany—not Russia—a narrow group of countries that created Europe for 2000 years. After the communist occupation—and I can call it that—it is like returning home, [there was] no other way out. For the old EU, it was admitting Poland was always in [Europe]. It was a recognition of us.” Iwona, a Słubice Masters of European Studies student, also indexed Russia as non-European, “I think [EU accession] was a very important step for Poland. After World War II, Poland was very isolated from

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13 See also Balibar (2004:169) for a discussion hierarchy in Europe using the concept of “concentric circles” radiating from a core of “European” countries.
14 In a more detailed analysis, each category could probably be further broken down into ranked subcategories. For example, Greece and Portugal have long been economically (and politically) problematic to the “core” European states, and share many characteristics with the new member states. Likewise, the new member states are “integrating” with EU standards at different speeds, and the EU and its member states support a myriad of policies and “partnerships” with non-EU countries. The current ambiguity in the EU’s relationship with Ukraine is but one example that deserves detailed attention.
Europe. Before the war it was on [the European] side and not the Russian side. It was
important, because before the EU, it seemed all the time that [Poland] was a country that
belonged to the former state of Russia [i.e. the Soviet Union], now it is seen as a western
country. That is important for Poland.”

Declarations of “Europeanness” like these are equal parts assertion and
identification, designed to both justify one’s place within the EU, and avoid classification
with an externalized and inferiorized Other outside of the EU’s borders. At the same
time, my correspondents also acknowledged a not quite European subjectivity, a second-tier status resulting directly from a kind of essentialized pathology deriving from
socialism and the socialist experience (cf. Dunn 2004a, Asher 2003). Given that the EU
and its institutions developed during the Cold War not only in opposition to, but also in
concert with, the institutions of the Soviet Bloc, the continued use of the socialist past as
Other is perhaps unsurprising.

The Local Orient

Several authors have made detailed interventions applying the concept of
orientalism to Europe’s media, intellectual, and historiographic discourses, particularly in
relation to Europe’s East/West divide (Melegh 2006, Todorova 2005, Wolff 1994), the
philosophic location of the Balkans (Todorova 1997, Bakić-Hayden 1995, Bakić-Hayden
and Hayden 1992), and the expansion of the EU into post-socialist Europe (Börösz and
Kovács 2001, Buchowski 2006, Melegh 2006). These studies identify several recurrent
themes in discourses about an orientalized Other: economic backwardness, temporal lag,
social inequality and civilizational inferiority. Each of these themes was clearly visible in
Słubice/Frankfurt, as residents of the cities participated in a dynamic process of locating and contesting both cities’ hierarchical position relative not only to one another, but also to the EU’s wider system of coloniality.

Economic Asymmetry

The significant financial and material differences between post-socialist Eastern Europe and the “old” EU member states reinforce hierarchical relationships within the EU and between EU member and non-member states. As is shown in Table 6.7, Germany’s 2005 median income was almost four times higher than Poland’s, and its 2004 per capita GDP was more than double. A similar difference occurs at the regional level between Brandenburg and Lubuskie, where the GDP on the German side of the border is almost twice the level of the Polish side, even though both regions have lower levels than their respective national averages. Expanded to include Ukraine, this pattern is replicated in the United Nation’s Human Development Index (HDI), a composite measure of relative wealth, life expectancy, and education, in which Germany (21) ranks 16 places higher than Poland (37) and Poland ranks 40 places higher than Ukraine (77) (Table 6.8). Poles also appear to suffer more material deprivation than Germans, have more difficulty paying bills, and have a higher at risk of poverty rate, as is demonstrated in Table 6.9 (comparable date was not available for Ukraine).
### Table 6.7: Economic Asymmetry between Poland and Germany. Source: Eurostat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU27</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Brandenburg</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Lubuskie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per capita GDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PPP in Euro, 2004)</td>
<td>21502.9</td>
<td>24903.2</td>
<td>17504.6</td>
<td>10908.4</td>
<td>9764.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (PPP) as a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage of the EU</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>115.8</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average (2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PPS in Euro, 2005)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>16482</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4796</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004 HDI Value</td>
<td>0.932</td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td>0.774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum value = 1.0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldwide Rank (out of 177)</td>
<td>28,303</td>
<td>12,974</td>
<td>6,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PPP in USD)</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth 2000-2005</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Households Unable to pay for: | Poland | Germany |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One week's annual holiday away from home</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate heat</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eating meat, chicken, or fish every second day if desired</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility bills</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car for personal use</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with rot in windows, doors, or floors</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households that are damp or have leaks</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households lacking an indoor flushing toilet</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At risk of Poverty Rate</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While the broad measures of wealth and quality of life contained in this type of aggregate data do not tell the whole story about differences between particular places, it does seem that as a general rule, when moving between Ukraine, Poland, and Germany, people are wealthier, live longer, and have less material deprivation the further west they reside. Not surprisingly, relative rank in the European hierarchy also correlates with relative economic wealth. Residents of Frankfurt and Słubice (which includes many Ukrainian nationals) readily observe these economic asymmetries, and they are extremely important to the construction of everyday forms of difference.

For residents of Słubice, the routine experience of Frankfurt itself is a powerful example of this difference as well as the economic potential that the EU accession might
provide. Having enjoyed the benefit of large-scale transfer payments from West Germany—payments that accounted for up to one-third of East Germany’s consumption and investment expenditures (Dascher 2003:11)—Frankfurt often appears less “socialist,” more affluent, more modern, and more “colorful” than Slubice (cf. Galbraith 2004:63). Although the gap is gradually diminishing, this difference in appearances makes it easy for Slubice to seem “inferior in space and behind in time” (Borneman 1998:110), despite the fact that the cities share endemic problems of economic stagnation and chronically high unemployment.\footnote{18.4\% in Brandenburg and 23.2\% in Lubuskie in 2004 (this level gave Lubuskie the eighth highest unemployment level of all EU regions in 2004) (Eurostat 2005)}

For many residents of Slubice, asymmetries of wealth translate into feelings of marginalization and second-class status in the workplace, and are experiences that profoundly affect their sense of cultural citizenship within the EU, a consequence that is hardly surprising given the EU’s emphasis on economic viability in its citizenship practices (See Chapters 1, 4 & 5). When I asked his opinion about Poland joining the EU, Marek, a truck driver from Slubice, replied:

We [Poland] didn’t have any way out. I think we are still like Negroes, like slaves. There is no industry here. Now we can go somewhere in Europe [to work], but the same countries don’t open [their labor markets] and it is bad for Polish citizens. Lots of people founded “Polish” firms (firms that were created to circumvent national labor restrictions by hiring East European workers “locally” for lower wages, even though they were actually working in another country). I work for a big firm--I don’t want to say which one--and we were all hired on Polish conditions and
[therefore] work for half price. For example, a driver from Belgium has weekends at home, and gets 2000 EUR [a month], I work all month with no weekends off and get 1200 EUR. So [we] drivers fight amongst ourselves. This is why [we are] like slaves: [the] poor conditions.

Andrzej, a German teacher in Słubice, also pointed out the importance of economics and personal wealth to identification with the EU. When I asked him if he considered himself more Polish or more European, he said:

[That’s] a very interesting question… I decide here economically. First, I am Polish, and then European. [AA: Why?] Money I think. Not all nations in the EU have the same [incomes], the same economic standard. And often I feel like a poor relation. And my nation is very proud of its history, and all I know [is] we must be patient. But the relation between the old European Union nations and us has changed, and every year the situation is better, [but] the process needs time. I understand that.

Temporal Lag

As Andrzej observed, time and temporality are central to discourses of orientalization within the EU. The year by year progression towards “Europe” that Andrzej experienced is one aspect of a widespread “denial of coevalness” between the EU15 and the A10 which contributes to a sense of temporal and spatial distance that is often central to the constitution of the Other (Fabian 1983:2-35). This “chronic allochronism,” is a regular feature of western historiography, “in which the non-western world lives in another time” and Eastern Europe is portrayed as perpetually lagging
behind the West in the historical processes of nationalism, industrialization, modernization, and economic development (Todorova 2005:145,147).

The EU’s asymmetrical incorporation of its post-socialist member states therefore represents a contemporary iteration of a structural pattern of East European “backwardness” relative to Western Europe that originated with agrarian reforms in the 16th and 17th centuries, if not earlier (Chirot 1989). The cause of this backwardness is routinely viewed as external. With the exception of Turkey, “for the rest of eastern Europe, it is Ottoman or Russian rule or communism, as imposed by the Soviet Union, that has severed Eastern Europe from what is often described as its own evolution within its own larger organic space: Europe. The lag is depicted as an artificial one, having delayed one’s own evolution. In a word, the acceleration of time in the future, the catching up, is with one’s own ‘what might have been.’” (Todorova 2005:160). The “cost” of communism’s intervention in Eastern Europe can be subsequently evaluated in terms of temporal distance from “Europe.” An International Monetary Fund working paper entitled, “How Far is Eastern Europe from Brussels?” typified this stance by concluding: “The cost of the socialist experiment—which lasted roughly two generations—was, in terms of lost income, equivalent to about one generation” (Fischer, Sahay and Végh 1998:35). In Poland, the authors estimate that it will take about 24 years to “make up” this lost time (Fischer, Sahay and Végh 1998:34).

Conclusions like these not only devalue 45 years of Eastern Europe’s history as merely an ill-conceived “experiment,” they also deny Eastern Europe a common modernity with the West (cf. Dunn 2004). Isabella, a Romanian student living in Frankfurt, was one of the last of the “socialist experiment’s” second generation.
However, she described even her brief experience with Romania’s communist past as a hindrance to her self-actualization as a European: “I have a Dutch friend, who said, ‘I was born a European.’ I can’t say that, but I want to be acculturated. We had very different experiences, [Romanians] can never reach the [EU members]. [There is] a gap between [the two] mentalities [because of communism]. For me, communism ended when I was 7, so I had a basic indoctrination in communism.” The fact that Isabella, who was living abroad, spoke several languages, and was participating in the EU-sponsored Erasmus student exchange program, still did not feel European almost twenty years after the end of communism demonstrates how powerful the temporal distancing between Eastern and Western Europe remains.

The time a country spends between its application for accession and full EU membership—when all “transitional” agreements are completed—might therefore be understood as a liminal period: a temporal and transitional rite of passage during which an applicant country and its citizens are gradually transformed from the status of non-European to—if not fully European—European enough to join the community of EU member states and EU citizens (Börösz 2001:62, cf. Gennep 1960:10-11, V. Turner 1967:93-110). In Poland, which applied for membership in 1994, and will have the final restrictions on its citizens’ labor mobility lifted in 2011, this period will have lasted 17 years. The potential effect of this waiting time should not be underestimated. “The longer the waiting time between the onset of ‘eastern enlargement’ and the completion of full accession, the more likely that the attendant ‘interim’ imbalances [e.g. in economic and political power] will become intrinsic to the very structures of these societies,
especially since such imbalances are the hallmark of the east European history of capitalism” (Böröcz and Sarkar 2005:158).

Within the subjectivity of Słubice residents, allochronism and the denial of coevalness have been internalized, as is demonstrated through the routinized use of future-oriented statements about Poland’s progress within the EU. Typically framed as a judgment about when “it will get better,” these statements represent Słubice residents as citizens from a time somewhere behind their contemporaries in the EU15. When I asked her what she thought about Poland’s EU accession, Magda, a member of a Słubice NGO’s staff, explained, “It is good idea, we [Poland] have only two ways: the EU, or Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The EU is the better way I think. Now we live worse than one year ago, but in four or five years I think it will be better.” Michał, a customs officer, was less optimistic, “I think [Poland’s EU accession] is good, and the effects will be seen in 10-15 years . . . In 10-15 years there will be changes for individual citizens.” Adam, a Słubice secondary student, concurred, “For all of Poland, [EU accession] is better, but for some people, [it’s worse since] they don’t have a job because [their] firm closed . . . In 10 years perhaps it will be better.”

The idea that a future will be better was a central argument of the pro-EU campaign preceding Poland’s accession vote.

Fig. 6.1: The farmer who is voting yes to the EU.
in 2003, and was particularly emphasized by one government-sponsored advertising campaign. These posters had a standard format, with each showing a picture of an archetypical representative of a segment of the Polish population, and a quote attributed to that person saying, “I vote yes, because...” (Tak głosuję, bo). A mother with her child: “Because our world can be better” (bo nasz świat może być lepszy). A businessman: “Because I know what to do so that it will be better” (bo wiem, co zrobić żeby było lepiej). A farmer: “Because a good farmer plans for the future” (bo dobry gospodarz myśli na przyszłość) (Fig. 6.1). Each of these advertisements emphasized the better and more perfect future that could be achieved through EU accession. This positive outlook is widespread in Poland. According to the 2005 Eurobarometer survey, 42% of Poles expect their personal situation will be better in five years (33% said the same, 13% worse), despite the fact that 40% said their lives today are worse than five years ago (30% said better, 27% the same) (Eurobarometer 2006:13-14).

The comparison of today to a better future in the EU not only reinforces temporal distance from the EU, but also implies an economic and social hierarchy in which “catching up” is necessary and--now that Poland is in the EU--a foregone conclusion. With the EU cognitively mapped in such a way that it represents a civilizational apex, the implication of refusing to emerge from socialism’s shadow and not joining would be tantamount to relegation to the uncivilized world. Ania, a teacher in Slubice, represented this argument by referencing a colloquial expression of temporality to describe her take on EU accession: “I think it is good because [otherwise] we [Poland] would be ‘100 years

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16 In Germany, 25% of people surveyed expect their personal situation will be better in five years, 49% the same, and 23% worse. 35% said their lives today are worse than five years ago, 25% said better, and 35% said worse.
behind the Africans’ (*Sto lat za Murzynami*\(^{17}\))—third world.” While I doubt that she meant it exactly in this way, Ania’s statement reveals an important irony of Poland’s position in the EU, in that, Poland must accept a colonization of sorts by the EU in order to avoid the fate of Europe’s past colonies. It is better to be a second-class citizen of the EU than to be externalized from it.

*Nesting Orientalisms*

With the EU and the Soviet Union anchoring opposite ends of the “European” spectrum, another central aspect of orientalist discourse in Slubice concentrates on locating the cities’ places within this hierarchy. This discourse follows a pattern of differentiation described by Bakic-Hayden as “nesting orientalisms,” in which the original dichotomy of Orientalism is reproduced (and re-reproduced) in a graduated fashion of ever finer distinctions, so that places and peoples are perceived to be located on a ranked scale of “Eastern-ness” or “Otherness,” relative to one’s own society (Bakic-Hayden 1995:918). In Slubice/Frankfurt, this hierarchy follows a perceived distance from the Russian Empire or Soviet Union, and is expanded across Germany and Poland in a generalized pattern so that more westward regions are viewed as more advanced or “European” than eastern regions. Put simply, West Germany is perceived as the most European, followed by East Germany, Western Poland, Eastern Poland, and finally Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia.

Third country nationals seem to have felt this pattern particularly acutely (See Chapter 5). Olena, a student from Russia, summarized this hierarchy, “In our [Russians’]

\(^{17}\) Literally, “100 years behind the negroes.” In Poland, which has an insignificant African population and no history of slavery or colonialism in Africa, this statement is not as racially and politically charged—or as offensive—as it might be in the American context.
understanding, Germany is Europe. Poland is not-so-Europe—it is closer to us. In Belarus, Poland looks like Europe. Russia is definitely not Europe.” Aleksandra, a Ukrainian secondary school teacher, also experienced a citizenship-based social hierarchy in Słubice: “Poles say that Germans have a superiority complex, but Poles definitely have a superiority complex toward Ukraine. Maybe [here] in the west [of Poland] [it] is better because they don’t know as many Ukrainians. If someone drinks, fights, lies or isn’t reliable, [Poles] say they are Ukrainian. [When] the grandparents of a friend [of mine] argue, [they] say to each other “you are a Ukrainian” [Poles] think [Ukraine] is Third World and won’t catch up.”

The idea that a “Russian” or “Soviet” social mentality inhibits civilizational growth and progress forms the basis for a second form of nesting orientalism in Poland. In this case, contemporary social and political variations are explained by perceived differences in the 19th century governing regimes, social orders, and institutions put in place and administered by Prussia, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Russia, after the completion of the final partition of Poland in 1795. A particular contrast is routinely drawn between the enlightened” “western” powers and the more authoritarian Russian Empire.

For example, after the first round of the 2005 presidential election, Gazeta Wyborcza ran a brief article illustrating differences in the district (powiat)-level voting results the Wielkopolska voivodship. The article explained that the districts voting for Donald Tusk (Platforma Obywatelska—Citizens’ Platform), a “progressive” center-left, economically liberal, and pro-EU candidate, were located in the Prussian partition, while the districts voting for the conservative, populist, and Euroskeptic Andzej Lepper
(Samobrona—Self Defense Party), were located in the Russian–controlled Congress Kingdom (created at the Congress of Vienna in 1815) (Bojarski 2005). The East-West political divide was also strikingly apparent in the final-round election results, when Tusk won much of western and northern Poland while Lech Kaczyński (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość --Law and Justice Party), his more economically and socially conservative, and less enthusiastically pro-EU rival, won the vote in the east and south as well as the overall election (Kublik 2005). The same pattern was similarly demonstrated in the 2003 EU accession referendum, when support for the EU was highest in the west and north, although the referendum passed in almost every powiat (Gazeta Wyborcza 2003).

In its analysis of Poland’s 2005 election, The Economist (2005:52) also fell back on Partitions-based orientalism to explain the results:

It is hardly news that Poland’s east and south-east--much of which used to be part of Russia--are poor and conservative, while the north and west--formerly part of Germany--are more liberal and open to change. . . In the latest election, voting patterns followed the dictates of history and geography more closely than ever and in ways that were not always obvious. Most of the families who now live in the ex-German territories originate from the east, and only moved west after borders were redrawn in 1945. But that does not make them conservative now: life in formerly German lands, where the infrastructure is good and contact with westerners frequent, has made people more open to change.
The implications of both the *Gazeta Wyborcza* and *The Economist* articles are clear. First, the East continues to be held back from becoming more progressive and European by the lingering effects of Russia's influence. Not only that, the differences between the "German West" and "Russian East" are portrayed as so stark that even 60 years after the shift in the border, the leftovers of German civilization converted conservative settlers from the East into liberals.

Given the complexity of population movements in Poland after World War II, in which the majority of families settling in the "Recovered Territories," did not, in fact, come from the "East"¹⁸ (Gruchman, et. al 1959 143-145, cf. Szaz 1960:133), as well as the almost 90 intervening years since Poland's reemergence as an independent state in 1918, it would seem that a Partitions-based explanation for political difference in 2005 is highly suspect if not analytically meaningless. The observed election results probably have much more to do with regional variations in age, education, and population density, with Tusk garnering higher support among people under age forty, individuals with a high level of education, and in cities over 50,000 people (Kochanowicz 2005).

Nevertheless, because the German/Russian division corresponds with broader orientalizing discourses in which Germany is at the core of Europe and Russia is at the periphery, the historical explanation carries a great deal of rhetorical power for explaining and asserting why Poland's west is more "progressive" and "European" than its east.

¹⁸ Only about 28% of the "Recovered Territories" residents in 1950 were repatriated from lands annexed by the Soviet Union. About 20% were pre-war inhabitants of the region, and about 49% arrived from within Poland's post-World War II boundaries. The remaining 3% were repatriated from elsewhere abroad (primarily France and Germany) (Gruchman, et. al 1959:144).
Reclaiming value

For residents of Slubice, asserting moral or social superiority over residents of Frankfurt was often even more important than claiming a higher level of European-ness compared to eastern Poland. By shifting the comparison to social and ethical values, such as "hospitality" or "friendliness"—qualities that are, as a rule, highly esteemed in Poland (cf. Holly, et. al. 2003:825)—Slubice residents attempted to create a counter-narrative to the prevailing orientalist discourse between East Germany and Poland as a way of reclaiming some of the status lost due to the economic asymmetry between the two cities. In these narratives, Slubice residents regularly utilized discourses that portrayed East Germans as inferior to West Germans, and are similar to German forms of nesting orientalism, which were established and reinforced by the asymmetrical processes of reunification (cf. Berdahl 1999, Borneman 1992, 1993, 1998).

Michał, a Slubice customs officer, and his wife Maja, an educational administrator, used a vocabulary of social values while discussing the difference in attitudes between East and West Germans:

Michał: In the Western part of Germany, people are more normal. Here [in Frankfurt] they are different, the Germans are evil, naughty, jealous, envious—they feel [they are] better than Poles. We used to think all Germans were like [in Frankfurt], but we met a couple who live near the French border, and they were very friendly and wanted to have fun, to go on a tour in Poland—to Mazuria (a region in northeast Poland known for its lakes). In the western part of Germany you can see [the difference] on the street, they are more helpful and friendly.
Maja: Sometimes [here] they act like they don’t understand you.

Michał: The attitude has changed a lot since 15 years ago, but it still lacks a lot.

Maja: Once the older generation dies, the younger people who participate in [cooperative] projects will change the attitude.

Michał: Sometimes you meet people here in Frankfurt [with a more positive attitude] like this, but they are the exception. We [Poles] say they must be baby born in a family with someone from a Slavic family—Too friendly for a German.

Maja: [Too friendly for] a “typisch Deutsch” (typical German).

. We had a good experience at a wedding in Warsaw for two students from Viadrina University, one polish and one German. The wedding had lots of people from Germany, mixed [with Poles]. We met a couple that were Polish but had lived in Germany, and spoke both Polish and German, and also a German couple who were very tense. They were closed, didn’t dance, and the woman asked what the [banquet] dishes were. These were “typisch Deutsch” the [bride also said so] —I was surprised that the people who live in Germany also differentiate.

Bartosz, a social services worker, had a similar perception:

“I was in Frankfurt(Main), [and] I was in Bavaria. I think people in West Germany are friendlier than in the East. I feel better in West Germany than in East Germany. [AA: Is there anything specific that makes you say that?] I think people in the West live more calmly than people in the East.
People from East Germany think they are treated worse than people in the West. People from the west call them "Ossi" and it offends them, and they [Wessis] make fun of them [Ossis] and laugh at them.

By claiming affinity with West Germans, who not only occupy the apex of the EU’s economic and social status hierarchies, but also, as citizens of a founding member of the EU, have an unassailable European pedigree, Slubice residents used narratives like these not only to assert their social superiority over East Germans from Frankfurt, but also to demonstrate a values-based acceptance of their status as Europeans.

Judgments about the relative character of East Germans also fit into larger ethical narratives about contemporary progress and decline which residents of Slubice used to talk about life in the EU (Armbruster et. al. 2003, cf. Galasińska 2003:398, 400). In this case, the socialist past and its “everyday moral communities” is rehabilitated for use as a yardstick to evaluate and critique the present (Hann 2002:10, cf. Asher 2003, Dunn 2004a), as is shown by the following composite narrative constructed from several of my correspondents:

When I was 17, [Slubice] it was a sad city, a small, sad communist city. I traveled the area, and all small cities looked the same, gray and sad, it was a sad time. . .when communism fell, changes burst forth rapidly (Arek, an electronics technician).

[Slubice has changed,] a lot for the better, but it started in 1989. It used to be grayer, sadder. The only plus was that people had jobs, but that didn’t mean they worked, [only that] they went to work. [During socialism.] Frankfurt looked better than Slubice. Today, Slubice looks
better than Frankfurt. Frankfurt is now sad and empty. Maybe it was because our shops were empty [then]. Frankfurt is sad, there are hardly any people around. Slubice is always full of people (Iza, an English teacher).

People take better care of [Slubice] now—new roads, new houses, new cafes—lots [of places] have been redecorated. At the time of the communist regime, everyone had a job and was well paid, maybe it wasn't beautiful, but... Comparing now to the time of the communist regime, back then new houses were built and people had a hope of having new houses, but they weren't beautiful. Now it is more beautiful, but unemployment is higher . . . That's why problems appear. People start drinking, stealing, smuggling drugs. Lots of prostitutes work here. . .

Living expenses have gotten higher, everything is more expensive. Prices are almost the same as the West, but salaries are 10 times less! And the only plus is that I see that the town is prettier. . . It is difficult to say that something positive has happened (Maria, a teacher).

There is too much development right now. I don't like this. The rush, people are in a hurry to achieve something. But do you really need this? I have never complained that I am in a bad situation. I've had enough (Tomik, a retired teacher and mechanic).

Visually, [Slubice] is more beautiful. Speaking of places of work, there are no firms, no companies. Now a capitalistic approach can be seen toward people. . . People are not as nice to each other--people
Families visited more, talked more. [Today it's] a hectic lifestyle. People always run after some job (Marek, a forwarding agent).

Within these observations, aesthetic progress and improvement is juxtaposed with a deep ambivalence toward the realities of Poland’s market economy, and an anxiety regarding potential social decline. While the EU is not foregrounded in the narratives above, my respondents’ experience of the EU expansion and EU policies are central to contextualizing these comparative observations.

First, EU funds are directly or indirectly responsible for many of Słubice’s aesthetic improvements, in particular the renovation of three of its parks and its soccer stadium, which were part of a comprehensive 2003 urban renewal and cultural exchange project for Frankfurt(Oder)/Słubice known as the “Europagarden” and funded in large part through the EU’s regional development initiatives (specifically PHARE and INTERREG) (Urząd Miejski w Słubicach 2003). Second, these observations contradict the implied promise of EU accession—at least as it was understood by most of my correspondents—that life would immediately get better. Instead, while the city improved on the surface, deeper economic problems, such as unemployment and low relative wages, persisted with few indications of near-term improvement, save the possibility of emigration to elsewhere in Poland or abroad (See Chapters 1 & 2). Furthermore, the asymmetries of wealth inherent to the EU and its economically-oriented conception of citizenship created a desire to “catch up” with more affluent member states, which continues to threaten local social ties and relations—two of the redeemable qualities of the socialist Other.
Although their socialist past often works to separate Slubice residents from their West European counterparts, in making sense of the EU’s transnational projects of deterritorialization and integration, their lived experience with the socialism’s similar goal of building a cooperative international economic and political system becomes a useful tool for evaluating the present. While most, if not all, of my correspondents would agree with the assessment that socialism was the cause of their current experience of economic "backwardness," they would not necessarily agree that socialism was civilizationally or ethically inferior to Western Europe, especially given the failure of the post-socialist state to secure employment or basic living wages for much of its population. In this way, discourses about social values are both a way of asserting a morally based claim to higher status within the EU hierarchy and a form of resistance to the more neo-liberal aspects of the EU’s social model.

Conclusions

The EU’s 2004 expansion was marked by the extension of hierarchy in economics, social practice, and governmentality. In each case, Eastern Europe and its citizens were placed in a second-class position relative to the older West European members. Despite EU policies and discourses that have orientalized Eastern Europe as economically backward, temporally behind, and socially inferior, the location where countries or individuals fall on the European/non-European continuum can also be relative and contestable, as is shown by the discourses of nesting orientalism my correspondents strategically employed to reclaim and assert their value within the EU. In theory at least, EU accession promises a further way for East European countries and
their citizens to improve their place in the European hierarchy, based on how completely they have normalized and internalized the EU’s governing practices, policies, systems and institutions.

Expansion is additionally a way through which the EU fulfills the last of Börösz’s characteristics of imperial order: the projection of power onto the external environment. The promise of EU accession has been an extremely effective mode of foreign policy for successfully prevailing its will on other countries. Simultaneously, the EU’s East European expansions in 2004 and 2007 further enhanced its status as an economic superpower, allowing it to exercise a commensurate degree of political power on the world stage. Since the scope of future EU expansions seem to have narrowed for the foreseeable future to the former Yugoslav republics and Turkey, the EU has recently shifted to the European Neighborhood Policy as an alternative method for projecting long-term power onto its neighbors. Established in 2004, the European Neighborhood Policy’s stated purpose is to extend EU standards through economic, political, cultural, and security cooperation to its immediate neighbors via land or sea borders in North Africa the Middle East, and Eastern Europe with no pretense of eventual EU accession. Prior to the 2004 expansion, Börösz observed, “The essence of the European Union’s strategy vis-à-vis the central and eastern European applicants is integration without inclusion: participation in the production systems, and appendance to the consumption markets of the EU corporations without the attendant political, economic, social and cultural rights conferred by European Union citizenship” (2001:108). While this remains partially true for the East European accession countries, it is perhaps even truer for the
countries in the European neighborhood, which, unlike the A10, have little or no hope of inclusion within the EU's power and policy-making structures.

If the EU has exhibited many of the characteristics of imperial order vis-à-vis the A10, why, in contrast to most empires, is it still seen as a "good thing" by a majority of the population in its new member states? For the EU's supporters, its imperial aspects are regularly justified by arguments similar to Hobson's (1965 [1902]:294) concept of the "imperial trust," which asserts that an imperial policy can be acceptable and legitimate as long as it is (1) mutually beneficial for both parties (2) it advances the common good and "civilization" and (3) it contains some sort of democratic representation for all parties. One doesn't (and didn't prior to the 2004 expansion) have to look too far to find more or less these same arguments in print, both in the general media and in the academy. When I asked a class of (mostly Polish) Masters of European Studies students in Ślubice if they would classify the EU as a colonial power, this was essentially the answer I received, as the class came to the consensus of "sure, the EU may be colonial, but that's okay because it's better." There is a certain force to this argument. The EU's new member states do have representation in both the European Parliament and the European Council. In Poland, and elsewhere in the A10, wages and GDP are increasing, inflation is relatively low or in-check, and investment is on the rise. For those who are well educated, speak several languages, or are prepared to live abroad (see Chapter 2) the future does look promising. Nevertheless, the answer to the question of the whether or not the EU is enhancing the common good, and if life is, in fact, getting better, depends much on whom you ask.

19 54% in 2006. Another 36% remained neutral, saying EU membership was neither good nor bad (Eurobarometer 2007b:75).
For many Slubice residents, the economic realities of the EU accession moment were often disappointing, especially for the generation that brought about the end of socialism and ushered in the reorientation toward the EU. Near the end of my fieldwork, I discussed Poland’s EU accession with my neighbors in Slubice, Magdalena and Czesław, who summarized the ambivalence of accession well as they simultaneously conveyed not only the lack of difference the EU has made for them personally, but also the hope they maintain for the future:

Magdalena: Different people have different opinions, but ours is good.

Czesław: For us at our age, lacking one year from 70, the EU generally won’t give anything to me, or take anything from me. For young people it is a chance to get a job, because there is a chance for development. [But,] I don’t mention broad state matters. If a farmer gets some funding to make his farm stronger, it matters. A person who goes to work in Germany, England or Ireland earns three times more. For this person everything is good and positive. It’s a good prospective for him [motioning to his infant grandson sitting on my wife’s lap].

Another of my correspondents put this mixed view of EU accession even more succinctly, saying, “We wanted a rose but got a tulip-- it’s a flower, but not the same.”
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Appendix A

Buying Detergent: A Transnational Illustration

Given a local context of multiple currencies, variable availability of goods, and regulatory standards that are incompletely harmonized (cf. Dunn 2004b), shopping in Frankfurt and Słubice quickly becomes a complicated affair. This complexity is well illustrated by the example of cross-border purchases of laundry detergent. Laundry detergent was one of the products that residents of Słubice most frequently purchased in Germany, and most of my correspondents assured me the detergents sold in Germany were higher quality than those sold in Poland, even when comparing detergents manufactured by the same company under the same brand name. Initially skeptical of this claim, I purchased a box of Ariel laundry detergent—a widely available brand manufactured by Procter & Gamble—from each side of the border for the purpose of comparison.

The boxes of the two detergents immediately suggested differences in the targeted markets and consumers. The packaging of the Ariel from Germany was highly specific to the German market, including a map of Germany indicating different water properties and the corresponding dosages, as well as German-language only instructions. In contrast, the packaging from Poland was not country-specific, and gave instructions in language-free graphics. Both packages listed similar active ingredients, although the ranges of the proportions listed allowed for a great deal of variance in their contents.¹

Visually, the detergents were virtually indistinguishable, and although their fragrance was different, the critical factor seemed to be the detergents’ concentrations.

While the ingredient lists and dosage charts did not give enough information for a precise calculation, a rough estimate based on the dosages recommended for normally dirty laundry and a medium level of water hardness suggested that the German detergent was about 1.5 times stronger than the Polish version. Using this result to calculate prices in cleaning power per kilogram, in Frankfurt/Slubice the Polish detergent ranged from about the same cost to twice as expensive as the German detergent depending on where and in what quantity it is purchased. At least for this product, my formal calculations confirmed my correspondents' experience-based opinions, a result that is probably not atypical. According to Miller, consumers are surprisingly accurate in evaluating the complex equations of price, quantity and quality that determine value in shopping decisions (Miller 1998:53), and one quantitative study observed an in-store level of computational accuracy of 98%, compared to only 59% for similar questions on a formal test (Lave, Murtaugh, and de la Rocha 1984:82).

The conclusion that concentration was a key difference between detergents sold in Poland and Germany was supported by the 2006 "Eurocompact" campaign instituted by the International Association for Soaps, Detergents and Maintenance Products (AISE) in cooperation with the European Commission. The campaign aimed to reduce the consumption of detergents in Central and Eastern Europe by 33% in weight and 25% in volume, primarily by concentrating detergents at a ratio of 3 kg of old detergent to 2 kg of new (or 1.5 to 1) (AISE 2006), and included an educational campaign consisting of posters, in-store displays, and television and print advertisements. Ariel was one of the

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2 The AISE is the official representative body of the detergent industry in Europe, with a membership that includes 33 National Associations in 30 countries, and over 900 companies.
brands participating in this reformulation, and an updated version of its Polish packaging included the campaign's labels to differentiate the concentrated detergent.

When I contacted the public relations offices of Procter & Gamble in Germany and Poland, both representatives confirmed that the composition of the detergents was different from country to country, but neither would indicate precisely what the differences were. The German representative simply indicated that legal regulations on ingredients and the needs of consumers vary from country to country, while the Polish representative stressed that the detergents in Poland and Germany are of the same efficiency and safety, and variations in the detergents arise from differences in laundry methods (e.g. the type of machine, the temperature of the wash, and the dosage of the detergent) and consumer needs, including the type of "dirtiness" of clothes and fragrance preferences—needs which she said Procter & Gamble thoroughly researches. She went on to assert that the belief detergent sold in Germany is better results from the prejudice embedded in individuals from the "previous" (i.e. socialist) system, "when practically everything from the West was better in reality," and that in a "blind" test both detergents would perform equally well. This response met with amusement and derision from several of my Polish correspondents, who first sarcastically remarked, "so now German dirt is different than Polish dirt" and then observed that most of the people they knew used German or western manufactured washing machines, so the laundry methods probably were not all that different.

As this illustration shows, shopping in the local context of Frankfurt/Slubice takes place at the intersection of national and international regulatory and market spaces. Even

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3 Procter & Gamble Service GmbH, personal communication with the author, April 27, 2006.
4 Procter & Gamble Dzial Konsumenckii, personal communication with the author, April 26, 2006
5 Procter & Gamble Dzial Konsumenckii, personal communication with the author, April 26, 2006
though the Polish detergent appears to be designed for, and aimed at, an international audience, it was viewed by Słubice consumers as a lesser product in comparison to the detergent marketed specifically to Germany. In this case, the Polish detergent was seen as part of the wrong type of international market, that is, a market outside of the “first world” which is less technologically advanced than Germany or the EU, and where second-rate goods can be sold. Consumers in Słubice sought to circumvent consuming in this inferior market by purchasing western-built washing machines and buying their detergents in Germany. By reformulating the detergents sold in Eastern Europe so that they more closely resemble concentrations in other EU countries, the Eurocompact campaign therefore tries to do for Poland what residents of Słubice have already been doing locally for years: more closely integrating the Polish and EU markets through consumption habits that impart individual shoppers with a more transnational and “European” sense of consumer identity.
Curriculum Vitae

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MA (2005)
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Participated in long-term strategic planning, policy development, and management supervision for an international NGO organization committed to the mission of providing medical supplies and enhancing medical infrastructure in developing regions throughout the world.

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2004 Welcome to the EU: The Politics, Culture, and Identity of Poland's EU Accession.
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Awards

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2005  Edward M. Bruner Award
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2000  Society for the Anthropology of Europe Outstanding Paper Award
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Working Papers

2004  Bridging the Divide? Europeanization, Transnational Consumption, and Ethnic
European Union Center.

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Conference Papers

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2007  Living on the Border of Schengenland: "Third Country" Nationals and
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2004 Marketing Utopia: Selling the EU in Poland. Midwest Slavic Association Annual Conference. February 28. Columbus, OH.


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