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The Defeat of Varus and the German Frontier Policy of Augustus

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The present monograph is the outcome of a certain dissatisfaction felt with the traditional view as expressed in some of the literature which appeared six years ago on the occasion of the nineteen-hundredth anniversary of the battle of the Teutoburg forest. The principal theses as here presented were jotted down at the time, and although a variety of circumstances prevented their immediate elaboration, they were not forgotten, collections of literature were made from time to time, as occasion offered, and the general course of argument outlined. In 1912 Mr. Cyrus S. Gentry, then a graduate student in this university, working under the supervision of Mr. Oldfather, prepared and submitted, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Classics, a thesis entitled: "The Effect of the Defeat of Varus upon the Imperial Policy of Rome regarding the Northern Frontier." We desire to express our thanks to Mr. Gentry for kind permission to use some of his collections of material. The present work is, however, a wholly independent production, being much more extensive and detailed, and differing substantially in plan and scope. Active work upon the present study was begun by us in cooperation in the spring of 1914, and continued, with intermissions, to the present time.

In the first part, which deals with the traditional view, we have gone into some detail in the presentation and criticism of current explanations, with the hope that, as a review of present and past opinion, it may not be without value, even if our new interpretation fail to receive general acceptance. A certain amount of repetition in the two parts of the monograph has thus been rendered unavoidable, but though this may at times prove tiresome, it contributes to the clearness of the argument, which is, after all, the chief consideration.

To some it may perhaps seem unfortunate that a discussion of such a subject as this should appear at a time when the German nation is involved in a momentous conflict. We do not
so feel. Disinterested scholarship should not be affected by transitory or even permanent emotions. We are confident that our work has not been so affected. That we have been compelled in scientific candor to destroy a certain glamor which has been attributed to an early period of German history, has not the slightest bearing upon our attitude toward German character and achievement, for which we entertain the most sincere respect. Our investigation deals not with the quality of the deed of Arminius, but only with its historical consequences, two utterly unrelated aspects. It is surely no discredit that an act of heroism should not be also big with destiny. Over consequences no man has control. The modern German nation needs, perhaps less than any other, the lustre of a long buried past to shed renown upon the present.

We take pleasure in acknowledging our indebtedness to Professor A. S. Pease of the Department of Classics, who has kindly read all the manuscript in proof.

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May 24, 1915

W. A. O.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL VIEW OF THE QUESTION

Historians and other writers in discussing the defeat of Varus, and its bearing upon the subsequent history of Rome and Germany, are almost united in the belief that Augustus, until the events of the year 9 A. D., had in view the complete subjugation of Germany as far as the river Elbe. Gardthausen1 unhesitatingly predicates the emperor's intention in the following words: "er wollte das Land östlich vom Rhein und nördlich von der Donau mit seinem Reiche vereinigen, um ihm eine bessere Grenze zu geben." Mommsen everywhere expresses the traditional view. In discussing Drusus' command of the year 13 B. C. against the Germans he says:2 "Drusus . . . übernahm bei Augustus Rückkehr nach Italien (741) die Verwaltung von Gallien und den Oberbefehl gegen die Germanen, deren Unterwerfung jetzt ernstlich in das Auge gefasst ward." Further on3 Drusus' successor, Tiberius, is represented as having suc-

1 Augustus und seine Zeit, Leipzig, 1891, I, p. 1069.

3 Ibid., p. 28. So J. Beloch, Griech. Gesch², I, 1 (1912), Einleit., p. 14, says that not only was the attempt made but that Germany was actually subjugated: "Denn Augustus hat diese Eroberung ja versucht trotz der Verfassung, die er dem Reiche gegeben hatte, und er hatte die Eroberung des Landes bis an die Elbe vollendet, als in der Teutoburger Schlacht alles Errungene zusammenbrach."
ceeded in making this subjugation: "'weit und breit zwischen Rhein und Elbe zeigten sich die römischen Truppen, und als Tiberius die Forderung stellte, dass sämtliche Gaue die römische Herrschaft förmlich anzuerkennen hätten . . . fügten sie sich ohne Ausnahme.'" Again, Mommsen\textsuperscript{4} calls Arminius the leader in the conflict of despair over the lost national independence, and speaks\textsuperscript{5} of the campaign of the year 16 A. D. as the last which the Romans waged in order to subdue Germany and to transfer the boundary from the Rhine to the Elbe. Delbrück's position on the question is unequivocal\textsuperscript{6}. So is that of Schiller.\textsuperscript{7} Hübner\textsuperscript{8} voices the surprising belief that Augustus in his effort to subdue Germany was merely following in the steps of Julius Caesar! Koepp\textsuperscript{9} hazards the same view, and says that not only was the shortening of the Rhine boundary planned by Caesar, but that this plan was to have been carried into execution after the overthrow of the Getae; that nothing but more pressing duties prevented Caesar's heir, for thirty years after Gaul's subjugation, from pushing the boundary beyond the Rhine; that the settling of the Ubii on the left bank of the Rhine by Agrippa (19 B. C.) was not a backward step from that taken in crossing the Rhine in 37 B. C., but a mere confession that only in this way could Rome protect the Ubii from the attack of their neighbors.

Seeck\textsuperscript{10} and many others assert that not only was Ger-

\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., p. 40.
\textsuperscript{5}Ibid., p. 50.
\textsuperscript{6}See the chapter "Die Unterwerfung Germaniens durch die Römer" in his Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, Berlin, 2nd edit., 1909, II, p. 47 f.
\textsuperscript{7}Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit, Gotha, 1883, p. 221 f.
\textsuperscript{8}Röm. Herrschaft in Westeuropa, Berlin, 1890, p. 110.
\textsuperscript{9}Die Römer in Deutschland (Monographien zur Weltgeschichte, XXII), 1912, p. 8. Fischer (Armin und die Römer, Halle a. S., 1893, p. 4) is entirely correct in saying that Julius Caesar's conflicts with the Germans were intended merely "die Germanen von Einfallen in Gallien abzuschrecken," i.e. to frighten them and to flatter Roman pride. However, inconsistently enough, he adds that Augustus saw a hope of expansion in this direction, "und demgemäß sah er, als Adoptivsohn Cäsars, die Unterfug Germaniens als eine ihm vermachte heilige Pflicht an" (p. 25).
\textsuperscript{10}See Kaiser Augustus (Monographien zur Weltgeschichte, XVII), 1902, p. 111: "bedrückte Drusus vom Unterrhein her die freien Germanen, und hatte sie bis zur Elbe unterworfen . . . . Tiberius
many subdued by Rome, but that Roman administration was actually set up in the new province. This is stated by Knoke as follows: "Das germanische Gebiet konnte bis zur Elbe als unterworfen gelten . . . . Römische Verwaltung und Gerichtsbarkeit waren eingeführt, die Deutschen zu Heeresfolge und Tribut gezwungen. . . . nach menschlichem Ermessen musste für das deutsche volk die zeit gekommen sein, wo es auf immer der Herrschaft Roms verfallen war." However, there is no general agreement as to when Augustus conceived the plan of conquering Germany. Hertzberg believes it doubtful whether he had any such intention at the time of Lollius’ defeat (16 B. C.): "Ob er wirklich schon jetzt die Eroberung Deutschland bestimmt ins Auge gefasst hat, ist uns—wir wiederholen es—freilich zweifelhaft." Abraham’s conclusion is that as late even as 10 B. C. Augustus had no further purpose than to secure the Rhine boundary, but that later he had larger ambitions which were fully realized: "Später indessen hat Augustus wirklich Deutschland bis zur Elbe . . . . zur Provinz machen wollen, und vor der Niederlage des Varus sah er die Unterwerfung Norddeutschlands für vollendet an." Many believe that an effort was made on Augustus’ part to shorten the Rhine-Danube boundary, and they regard this as tantamount

... vollendete dann in den beiden folgenden Jahren die Eroberung und ordnete die Verwaltung der neuen Provinz."

11See also Mommsen, Röm. Gesch., V, 31 f.; Schiller, op. cit., p. 222. Riese (Forschungen zur Gesch. der Rheinlande in der Römerzeit, Frankfurt am Main, 1889, p. 11), while believing that subjugation was made, shows that no province was established; cf. pp. 6, 7, 12. Mommsen’s statement that proof of such organization is seen in the fact that, when Drusus consecrated for Gaul the altar of Augustus at Lyons, the Ubii were not included, but a similar altar was erected for the German cantons, is answered by Riese, who points out that the emperor’s worship was by no means confined to a single place in a province. For proofs of this statement see examples given by Riese, p. 7 f.; also by Marquardt, Röm. Staatsverwaltung, I, p. 504. Ferrero (Characters and Events of Roman History, New York, 1909, p. 165) reaches the conclusion that, owing to the absence of Tiberius at Rhodes, Germany was not organized into a province; that the Germans were not bound to pay tribute, but were left to govern themselves solely and entirely by their own laws.

12Armin der Befreier Deutschland, Berlin, 1909, p. 6 f.

13Die Feldzüge der Römer in Deutschland, Halle, 1872, p. 49.

to an attempt to subjugate Germany. The campaigns of Drusus and Tiberius in particular are usually cited as proofs of Rome's purpose with respect to Germany. So by Pelham:

"Nor can we doubt that the object of the campaigns carried on beyond the Rhine by Augustus' two step-sons, Drusus and Tiberius (13 B. C.—6 A. D.), had for their object the extension of Roman rule up to that [the Elbe] river."

Occasionally, however, more caution is shown in discussing Rome's policy. So Abbott: "To the north the frontier policy of Augustus was, at the outset, less clearly determined. For a time the Romans seem to have intended making the Elbe the line between them and the Germans." Ferrero, although he devotes a chapter of his well-known work to the "Conquest of Germania," concedes, nevertheless, that Augustus was opposed to expansion by conquest, and that the first fifteen years of his rule unmistakably contradict such a policy:

"he had persistently avoided hazardous adventures beyond the frontiers of the empire and had found a thousand pretexts to deceive the impatience and ambition of the people." We may observe also that Eduard Meyer's view is not wholly in harmony with the commonly accepted one. He objects to the assertion frequently made that the victory of Arminius preserved the individuality of the German nation:

"Wenn wir . . . . die Frage aufwerfen, wie es gekommen ist, dass den romanischen Völkern germanische zur Seite stehen, dass ich hier deutsch zu Ihnen rede und nicht in einer romanischen Sprache, so wird einer vorurteilslose Erwägung


\[17\] History of Roman Political Institutions, Boston, 1910, p. 282.


\[19\] So Mommsen, Die germanische Politik des Augustus, p. 9: "Caesar Augustus wollte womöglich, und insbesondere in dem ersten Drittel seiner Herrschaft, den Frieden."

\[20\] Kleine Schriften zur Geschichtstheorie, Halle, 1910, p. 444.
nicht die Schlacht im Teutoburger Wald nennen dürfen.’” And although he insists on the necessity resting upon Augustus to war against the Germans in order to preserve Gaul, to maintain peace, and to secure a shorter and more distant frontier at the Elbe, he makes it clear that the war was in no sense prompted by the desire for imperial expansion\textsuperscript{21}: “aber auch dieser Krieg ist durchaus nur als Grenzkrieg geführt worden, nicht als ein Reichskrieg an der Art wie Cäsar seinen Geten-und Partherkrieg geplant hatte.’’

Nevertheless, from a careful consideration of the foregoing opinions, which have been selected merely as representative of a very large number of similar expressions, we may discover a strikingly universal belief that before the battle of the Teutoburg forest Augustus was attempting the conquest of Germany; that the disaster which overtook the legions of Varus in this battle caused him to give up his plans, and to renounce all hope of making Germany a province\textsuperscript{22} Most historians claim in addition that Arminius was the preserver of the German nationality, and that his victory over Varus was a turning point in the world’s history. So Seeck\textsuperscript{23}: “Der Sieg des Armin hat es für alle Zeiten verhindert, dass auch die Germanen Bürger des Reiches wurden und so den Keim gerettet, aus dem künftig die Völkerwanderung und mit ihr eine neue Welt erwachsen sollte.” Gardthausen\textsuperscript{24} states the same belief in still stronger terms: “Wenn wir daher jetzt, also beinahe nach 2000 Jahren, noch von einer deutschen Nation reden, wenn es noch heute eine deutsche Sprache gibt, so ist das ohne Frage, zum grossen Theile, das Ver-

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., p. 471.


\textsuperscript{24}Op. cit., I, p. 1202 f.
dienst des Arminius . . . kurz, die Entwicklung der deutschen Geschichte und in beschränkterem Masse auch der Weltgeschichte wäre eine andere geworden, wenn Arminius nicht zur rechten Zeit den Kampf mit dem Varus aufgenommen und wenn er nicht später—was noch schwerer war—den Siegespreis der Freiheit gegen Germanicus verteidigt hätte.” The debt of the German nation, and the world at large, to Arminius, is proclaimed again and again in monographs, remarkable as exhibitions of patriotic fervor, but at times wanting in scientific spirit and in the objective temper that should characterize estimates of historical significance. 26 Mommsen and Koepp may be cited as the most distinguished representatives of the view that the battle of the Teutoburg forest is a turning point in national destinies, an ebbing in the tide of Rome’s sway over the world, a shifting of the bounds of Roman rule from the Elbe to the Rhine and the Danube. 28 Koepp is the more guarded. He says 27, “Seit dieser Niederlage scheint Roms Macht, auf dieser Seite wenigstens, zurückzuebben, und wie ein Wendepunkt der Weltgeschichte erscheint diese Schlacht im Teutoburger Walde.” But this view has currency elsewhere than in the writings of


27“Die Varusschlacht in Geschichte und Forschung,” Westfalen, I (1909), p. 34.
German authors. Thomas Arnold voices it with all the extravagance that characterizes rash generalizations: "The victory of Arminius deserves to be reckoned among those signal deliverances which have affected for centuries the happiness of mankind; and we may regard the destruction of Quintilius Varus, and his three legions, on the bank of the Lippe, as second only in the benefits derived from it to the victory of Charles Martel at Tours over the invading host of the Mohammedans." We find it, as one might expect, in a text of such unscientific character as that of Creasy, the motto for whose discussion is an epigrammatic sentence taken from the epitomator Florus, "Hac clade factum, ut imperium quod in littore oceani non steterat, in ripa Rheni fluminis stater." And we need feel no surprise that this view is perpetuated in such a compilation as that of P. V. N. Meyers. Here and there, however, are to be found writers who warn against such a sweeping generalization. So Eduard Meyer, who has been quoted above, Ferrero too shows a saner historical view when he says: "Historians have long been accustomed to regard the defeat of Varus as one of the 'decisive' battles of the world, and as an event which may be said to have changed the course of history. It is said, that if Varus had not been overthrown, Rome would have preserved her

29The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World, London, 1859, pp. 179, 195: "Had Arminius been supine or unsuccessful our Germanic ancestors would have been enslaved or exterminated in their original seats along the Eyder and the Elbe. This island would never have borne the name of England... Never was victory more decisive, never was liberation of an oppressed people more instantaneous and complete... within a few weeks after Varus had fallen the German soil was freed from the foot of the invader."
30Rome: Its Rise and Fall, Boston, 1901, p. 323: "The victory of Arminius... was an event of the greatest significance in the history of European civilization... the Teutonic tribes were on the point of being completely subjugated and put in the way of being Romanized, as the Celts of Gaul had already been. Had this occurred, the entire history of Europe would have been changed. Had Rome succeeded in exterminating or enslaving them Britain, as Creasy says, might never have received the name of England, and the great English nation might never have had an existence."
31Note 20.
grip upon the territory from the Rhine to the Elbe and would have romanised it as she did Gaul: the prospects of a Germanie nationality and civilization would have been as impossible as those of a Celtic nationality and civilization after the defeat of Vereingetorix. Thus the defeat of Teutoburg is said to have saved Germanism even as that of Alesia was the ruin of the old Celtic nationalism. This straightforward line of argument, however, touches the sinuous course of reality only at a few points, and those far distant from one another. It is always a dangerous task, in dealing with history, to say what might have happened, in view of the considerable difficulty involved in the attempt to explain what did happen.  

It should be observed also that such a generalization involves the assumption that the German nation developed as it did because of its liberation from Roman influence, whereas it may properly be argued that the so-called liberation was instrumental in separating Germany for centuries from civilizing contact with Rome. For it is a fact that the early Germans made no progress whatever, left no literature, no monument, no memory of themselves until they again came into relations with that great transmitter of civilization, Rome, in the person of Rome’s new representative, Charlemagne.  

33 Oskar Jäger (Deutsche Geschichte, München, 1909, I, p. 28) is correct in denying any significance to Arminius’ victory further than that it showed the Germans that the dreaded Roman legions were not invincible: “Aber weitere Erfolge hatte das Ereignis nicht. Es erwuchs keine dauernde Organisation aus diesem Erfolg, und im römischen Hauptquartier erholte man sich bald von dem Schrecken, den die Nachricht in Rom hervorgerufen hatte. Tiberius, der nach dem bedrohten Punkt geschickt wurde, fand keine geeinigte germanische Macht zu bekämpfen. Er konnte sich damit begnügen, wie einst Cäsar, über den Rhein zu gehen, um dem jenseitigen Lande zu beweisen, dass die Macht des Imperiums durch die Niederlage dreier Legionen nicht erschüttert sei. Es geschah nichts weiter; die Politik des Tiberius, die Germanen ihrer eigenen Zwietracht zu überlassen, bewährte sich.” Cf. also Jullian, Histoire de la Gaule, Paris, 1914, IV, p. 125: “Mais la victoire d’Arminius n’eut point d’autres résultats que de refouler les Italiens jusqu’au Rhin. Il ne put rein entreprendre de plus contre Rome, ni rien fonder en Germanie”; p. 127: “Les temps n’étaient donc point venus ni de la défaites pour l’Empire romain ni de l’unité pour la Germanie.”  

34 Ch. Gailly de Taurines, Les Légions de Varus, Paris, 1911, p. 312: “Grâce à Arminn, sept siècles plus tard, Charlemagne, conquérant latin, champion de la Rome nouvelle, retrouvera, sur le même sol, les tribus
Now it is of course obvious that the estimate of Arminius’ achievement will depend upon the significance which impartial criticism will assign to the battle in which Varus was defeated—Arminius’ one great deed. Regarding that we propose in the present monograph to show that the ancient accounts of the battle of the Teutoburg forest are of inferior authority; that while some of them are broadly detailed, they are on the whole meager, inconsistent, and full of errors, exaggerations, and absurdities; that a striving after rhetorical effect is their peculiar characteristic; that frequently what these sources say in express words is not objectively trustworthy, and still less so are the deductions made immediately from the descriptions found there, or from the delineations which the authors of the sources doubtless never intended to serve as objective pictures of reality; that only the less cautious writers assert that
germaniques de l’interieur dans l’état même—ou peu s’en faut—ou les avait laissées Germanicus. De leur existence, durant ces sept siècles, elles n’avaient été capables de laisser à la postérité ni un monument, ni un souvenir, ni une inscription, ni une pierre.” Cf. also Fustel de Coulanges, Histoire des Institutions politiques de l’ancienne France, Paris, 1891, II, p. 227: “Nous ne possédons aucun document de source germanique... nous n’avons pas un livre, pas une inscription, pas une monnaie.”


36 For a glaring example of how history should not be written, as though all the labors of scholarship had been in vain, and Florus or Dionysius of Halicarnassus were models of historical style, one might cite the highly dramatic account of the battle as repeated by Leighton, History of Rome, New York, 1891, p. 436: “Without troubling about military measures he [Varus] travelled over the country, imposed taxes and pronounced decisions as if a praetor in the forum at Rome. Among the bold and turbulent Germans the spirit of freedom and independence only slumbered; it was not broken. The national hero Arminius raised the standard of revolt. Under this prince a confederacy of all the tribes between the Rhine and the Weser was formed to throw off the yoke of Rome. The governor collected three legions and advanced in 9 A. D. to quell
Augustus in a spirit of imperialism sought to conquer Germany;\(^37\) that historians who have the best standing as authorities abandon this ground and give as a reason the necessity resting on Augustus of protecting Gaul and Italy from the Germans. An effort will be made to show that Germany was never made a Roman province; that Augustus never had the intention, and never made the attempt, to conquer Germany and organize it as a province; that his operations in Germany consisted merely in making a series of demonstrations in force, in order to impress the barbarians and to facilitate the defense of the frontier by pacifying and bringing into friendly relations with Rome a wide strip of the enemy’s territory.

It is but natural, when such exaggerated estimates are current regarding the significance of the battle of the Teutoburg forest, that the leading figure on the German side, Arminius, should be elevated to a position of quite fictitious glory, and that he should have been exalted to the rank of one of the world’s greatest heroes.\(^38\) As Koepp pertinently observes, many well-meaned accounts of the Teutoburg battle have been written the revolt. The Germans retired; but the Romans pushed on until they had advanced into the Teutoberger\(^{[sic]}\) forest. Then Arminius turned and defeated them with tremendous slaughter. The defiles of the woods were covered far and wide with the corpses of the army, for nearly 40,000 soldiers perished. The eagles were lost and Varus perished with his own hand. The news of the disaster caused the utmost alarm in Rome. The Emperor himself was astounded. In his despair he dashed his head against the wall and exclaimed ‘Varus, Varus! give me back my legions.’

\(^37\)Creasy, op. cit., p. 182: “It is a great fallacy, though apparently sanctioned by great authorities, to suppose that the foreign policy of Augustus was pacific. He certainly recommended such a policy to his successors, either from timidity, or from jealousy of their fame outshining his own; but he himself, until Arminius broke his spirit, had followed a very different course.”

\(^38\)Cf., e. g., the poem *Hermann* (in twelve books, 2nd ed., 1753) by Christopher Otto von Schönai, beginning:

“Von dem Helden will ich singen, dessen Arm sein Volk beschützt,
Dessen Schwert auf Deutschlands Feinde für sein Vaterland geblitzt;
Der allein vermögend war, des Augustus Stolz zu brechen,
Und des Erdenkreises Schimpf in der Römer Schmach zu räch en.”

under mere impulse of national feeling. However, that the glorification of heroes at the expense of truth finds no place in sober historical investigation is the warning given by the best trained German scholars themselves, and by none more effectively than by Koepp, who said to an assembly of scholars at an Arminius Jubilee celebration held at Detmold, October 22, 1908: "eher dürften wir heute unseren Helden aus der bengalischen Beleuchtung romantischer Schwärmerei in das Tageslicht geschichtlicher Betrachtung rücken, ohne uns gegen die Jubiläumsstimmung zu versündigen. Es ist ja auch Vorrecht und Pflicht der Wissenschaft, auch an festlichen Tagen der Wahrheit die Ehre zu geben." So Fustel de Coulanges complains that in Arminius' case historians have taken liberty with historical

39Die Römer in Deutschland, p. 24: "Mag dem Patrioten bei dem Namen die Brust schwellen: dem Geschichtsschreiber muss der Mut sinken beim Gedanken an so manche Bemühungen seiner Vorgänger um dieses Ereignis! Mit Beschämung gedenkt er der alten Kollegen, die es so unge nau, mit Beschämung vieler neuen, die es so genau erzählt haben, so mancher, so mancher wohlgemeinten Schriftstellerleistung, der man kein besseres Motto geben könnte als Scheffels Vers: 'In Westfalen trank er viel, drum aus Nationalgefühl hat er's angefertigt.'" A good instance of blind adulation is that of Hertzberg, op. cit., p. 307: "Niemals wieder spiegelten sich die Adler der Legionen in den gelben Wellen der Weser oder in dem breiten Spiegel der Elbe. Und das ist das niemals welkende Verdienst des Armin gewesen . . . das Bild des ersten grossen Mannes deutscher Nation . . . die eherne Heldengestalt des Arminius."

40Westfalen, I (1909), p. 34. How timely this warning by Koepp is may be seen from the following extraordinary burst of spirit, at a similar celebration, by T. Beneke, Siegfried und die Varusschlacht im Arnsberger Walde (Ein Beitrag zur neunzehnten Jahrhundertfeier), Leipzig—Gohlis, 1909, p. 84: "Sechsundzwanzig Jahre war Siegfried alt, als er diese Tat vollbrachte, die in ihren Folgen den grössten weltgeschichtlichen Ereignissen gleichzustellen ist, indem er dem Welteroberer eine Niederlage beibrachte, die fast einzig bis dahin in der sonst so ruhmreichen Kriegsgeschichte dieses Volkes dasteht ... Die Varusschlacht rettete mit der reinen Rasse alle ihre Vorzüge in leiblicher und geistiger Hinsicht, germanische Treue, Freiheit, Religiosität, Innigkeit, Gediegenheit, Schaffensfreudigkeit, Tüchtigkeit und Zähigkeit, kurz das, wodurch im Laufe der folgenden Jahrhunderte die Germanen in Civilization und Kultur an die Spitze der Völker des Erdkreises traten. Siegfrieds Tat ist der erste geschichtliche Beweis der Überlegenheit einer jungen tatkräftigen Rasse, von der eine Neubelebung der Welt ausgehen sollte."
facts under motives of idealization: "Nous désapprouvons les historiens allemands, qui ont altéré l'histoire pour créer, un Arminius légendaire et une Germanie idéale." Finally, we may note that the same authority warns also in more general terms of historians who allow patriotic motives to exaggerate the few facts at their disposal.\(^4\)

\(^{41}\)Quoted by Gardthausen, op. cit., II, p. 793.

\(^{42}\)Histoire des Institutions politiques, etc., II, p. 247: "Il y a une école historique en Allemagne qui aime à parler des anciens Germains, comme une école historique en France se plait à parler des anciens Gaulois. On ne connaît pas mieux les uns que les autres; mais on se figure que le patriotisme éclaire ces ténèbres et qu'il decuple le peu de renseignements que l'on possède."
CHAPTER II

SOURCES

The only ancient accounts that have come down to us which throw light on the battle of the Teutoburg forest are: Cassius Dio, 56, 18-23; Velleius, II, 117-120; Florus, II, 30, 21-39; Tacitus, Annales, I, 60-62. These we must now compare with each other, with the purpose of determining their weight and credibility in the light of what we know of the authors, of the time and circumstances under which they wrote, and of the purpose had in view.¹

Cassius Dio (ca. 150—ca. 235 A. D.) is the only one of these ancient writers who has given us anything like a connected account of the catastrophe.² Although he wrote in Greek, Dio

¹The great interest in the story of Arminius and his victory has led to an examination of the sources by many investigators. The following is a partial list of the works of which use has been made:


must be regarded as a Roman, being the son of a Roman senator, and himself filling the office of praetor and consul. His industry—he spent ten years (200-210 A. D.) in accumulating material for his history—and his various activities, as a practical soldier and politician, made his work much more than a mere compilation. While not remarkable for historical insight it represents what Dio sincerely believed to be the truth. Nevertheless, Dio was a product of the rhetorical schools and under the spell of their influence he wrote. His battle scenes are rhetorical exercises. Noticeable also is his inclination toward a lively narration of events of a military character, a tendency which causes him to depart from the bare truth of his sources, and to ornament them with sensational descriptions after the rhetorical manner. Delbrück notes that our sources for the wars of the Romans with the Germans are almost all from second, third, or fourth hand, and that Dio’s account was written at the very time when the rhetorical spirit most completely dominated literature. Dio, as well as our other sources for these years, is to be used with caution, since these writers regarded historical composition as preeminently an opus oratorum, and sought first of all to hold the reader’s attention by brilliant characterizations and striking descriptions.

To Velleius (ca. 19 B. C.—ca. 30 A. D.), the only contemporary author who tells of the Varus disaster, we are indebted for a brief account. A loyal officer with a military record behind him, a dilettante with undeniable studium, Velleius, in the reign of Tiberius, turned to the writing of history. As prefect of horse he accompanied Tiberius to Germany, where he served "per annos continuos novem praefectus aut legatus." His fervid loyalty and extravagance cause him to magnify everything that concerns Tiberius to such a degree that he is scarcely

3Schwartz, loc. cit.: "Die Schlachtbeschreibungen Dios sind ausnahmslos rhetorische Schildereien ohne jeden Wert . . . Ein drastischer Beweis, wie unmöglich es dem im Praktischen verständigen Manne war, als Schriftsteller den Bann der Schultheorie zu durchbrechen."

4As an example of this tendency Christ (l. c.) cites 40, 41, where Dio writes a whole chapter of rhetorically effective scenes on the surrender of Vercingetorix and his last meeting with Caesar, whereas his source, Caes., B. G., VII, 8, has only "Vercingetorix deditur."

5For Velleius as a historian, see Schanz, Röm. Literaturgesch., II, 2 (1913), p. 255 f.; Wachsmuth, p. 60 f.; Peter, I, 382 f.

6Velleius, II, 104, 3.
more than a partisan memoir writer. In his hasty sketches of military campaigns in Germany and Pannonia, full of blunders and inconsistencies, it is clear that he is but little concerned with the exact establishment of facts. With no appreciation of the internal connection of things, and no ability to sift evidence, he centers his interest almost entirely upon individuals for purpose of praise or blame, and excels as a rhetorical anecdotist, and as a delineator of individual actors. His inflated style, his straining after effect by hyperbole, antithesis, epigram, and piquancies of all kinds, mark the degenerate taste of the Silver Age, of which he is the earliest representative. His reflections and observations generally outweigh the information given. Velleius' training, the occasion of his composition, the attempt to satisfy the taste of his age, all make him a source, which, because of distortions and overemphasis, cannot be accepted at full value.

L. Annaeus Florus, usually identified with the rhetorician and poet of Hadrian's time, wrote (probably in 137 A. D.) an abridgement in two short books of Rome's wars from the foundation of the city to the era of Augustus. As to Florus' purpose in writing, and his rating as a rhetorician, scholars are agreed. He composed solely from rhetorical motives, hence historical truth is frequently misrepresented, both intentionally and unintentionally, in a work full of errors, confusions, and contradic-

7Norden, Antike Kunstprosa, I, p. 302: "Velleius ist für uns der erste, der, jedes historisches Sinnes bar, Geschichte nur vom Standpunkt des Rhetors geschrieben hat."


Florus' work is declamatory in tone, shows no traces of independent investigation, and little of the calm, even temper demanded of the historian. In his search for the surprising, the unusual, and the spirited, he is frequently led into exaggerations. He is given to the use of superlatives and enhancing epithets, as *ingens*, *immensus*, *incredibilis*, *perpetuus*, etc., and that he was himself conscious of exaggerations is clear from his free use of such words as *quippe*, seventy-five times, and *quasi*, more than a hundred times. In Florus each event is presented as a marvellous fact, and no better commentary on the poverty and unsatisfactoriness of our sources for the Varus disaster could be found than the fact that to Florus many writers have given the honor of being our chief authority.

It is apparent to the most superficial reader that the accounts given by our sources—especially those by Cassius Dio and Florus—are contradictory, notwithstanding the efforts that have been made to show that there is no conflict between them. According to Dio, supported by Tacitus, the attack was made on Varus while he was on the march, whereas Florus says that Varus was seated in his camp quietly dispensing justice, when he was surprised by the German host.

Further, a

10Cf. Wachsmuth, p. 612: "Wie ein solcher Litterat mit dem historischen und chronologischen Thatsachen umspringt, kann man sich denken, und das Sündenregister seiner absichtlosen Versehen und absichtlichen Verdrehungen ist ellenlang." See also Peter, II, 289; 292.

11Equally pertinent for Florus is von Ranke's criticism (II, 2, p. 396 N. r) of Dio: "Bei Dio muss man immer seine Bemerkungen, die aus einer späteren Epoche herrühren, von den Thatsachen, die er authentisch kennen lernt, scheiden; dann haben auch die ersten ihren Wert."


14On the assumption that a choice must be made between Dio and Florus, a great difference of opinion has arisen among investigators as to their respective value. Von Ranke, followed by Höfer, Asbach, and others, argues that Dio's report is untrustworthy, while that of Florus is correct. This view has been rejected by Knoke, Edmund Meyer, Deppe, Mommsen, and Gardthausen.
detailed examination of the several accounts, sundry particulars of which we have no other means of testing, reveals so many inconsistencies and improbabilities that we are scarcely justified in accepting more than the bare defeat of Varus, the popular tradition of which was later incorporated into the studiously dramatic sketches of the rhetorical historians who serve as our sources. For example, Dio tells us\(^\text{15}\) that the Germans craftily enticed Varus away from the Rhine and by conducting themselves in a peaceful and friendly manner lulled him into a feeling of security. This enticement is not mentioned by the other writers, and is in itself improbable\(^\text{16}\), as Roman generals had frequently down to this time marched much further into the interior without any enticement whatsoever. It becomes doubly suspicious when we note the excellent rhetorical effect it produces by bringing into greater relief the setting of the disaster, and Varus’ sudden reversal of fortune. Again, Dio makes the statement that Varus and all his highest officers committed suicide.\(^\text{17}\) If this remarkable event took place, it is almost wholly inconceivable that it should have found no mention in Velleius and Florus, the former of whom stood much nearer in time to the event. On the other hand, both of these writers relate that Varus’ body was treated with indignity by the savage foe, and according to Velleius, one prefect died honorably in battle, and one preferred to surrender, while Varus’ legate, Numonius Vala, treacherously deserted. Dio’s description of the battle, moreover, is in sharp contradiction to that revealed by Tacitus’ account of conditions in Varus’ camp, as discovered by Germanicus in the year 15 A. D. The first camp that he came upon was one which, by its wide circuit and the measurement of its headquarters, showed the work of three legions, i. e. of an undiminished army; then came a second camp, with half-fallen rampart and shallow trench, where the diminished remnant were understood to have sunken down, i. e. the camp was laid out after a day’s loss with heavy fighting. Finally, Germanicus found in the plain the whitening bones, scattered or accumulated, just as Varus’

\(^{15}\)Von Ranke, op. cit., p. 275: “Dass sich nun Varus in unwegesame Gegenden mit seinem ganzen Lager, seinem ganzen Gepäck habe führen lassen, um eine kleine Völkerschaft niederzuwerfen, ist . . . . kaum zu glauben.”

\(^{16}\)Von Ranke, op. cit., p. 275: “Diese letzte Nachricht ist die unglaubwürdigste von allen.”
men had fled or made their stand in the final catastrophe.\textsuperscript{18} Tacitus' description of a regular camp, the "wide circuit and headquarters" on a scale suitable for the whole force, is utterly inconsistent with the statement of Dio that the first camp was pitched "after securing a suitable place so far as that was possible on a wooded mountain." And so is there contradiction in Tacitus' statement that the legions suffered loss only after moving on from the first encampment. For according to Dio their greatest suffering and losses were on the first day's march before their first encampment; on the second the loss, he tells us, was less because they had burned or abandoned the greater number of their wagons, and hence advanced in better order.

According to Florus it was while Varus was in his summer camp holding court that suddenly the Germans broke in upon him. Mommsen is undoubtedly correct in saying that this ridiculous representation does not reflect real tradition, but a picture of sheer fancy manufactured out of it. Doubtless it is nothing but a rhetorical exaggeration of the silly security into which Varus is represented as having been inveigled, and by which the disaster is dramatically brought about. It is past credibility that the Germans in such numbers could have broken into the Roman camp without arousing suspicion, or without having come into contact with the Roman sentries. And the more so if Varus had already been warned by Segestes of the enemy's plans. Further, the storming of a single camp is out of harmony with the two camps mentioned by Tacitus, and clearly implied in Dio's narrative. And it is difficult to believe that Varus would choose such a place for his summer camp—one shut in by forests, swamps, and untrodden ways. The entire description of the place where the battle was fought is far more in keeping with a camp pitched by an army on the march, than with a summer camp, in which Varus exercised the functions of a judicial office. Moreover, Florus' account is contradicted by Velleins\textsuperscript{19}, who says that Ceionius, one of the prefects of Varus' camp, wished to surrender to the enemy just at the time when a large part of the Roman army had fallen in battle. Now if this refers to the first camp, in which the Romans must have left a detachment

\textsuperscript{18}Cf. Tac., \textit{Ann.}, I, 61: "Prima Vari castra lato ambitu et dimensis principiis trium legionum manus ostentabant; dein semiruto vallo, humili fossa occisae iam reliquiae consedisse intellegebantur. Medio campi albentia ossa, ut fugerant, ut restiterant, disiecta vel aggerata."

\textsuperscript{19} II, 119, 4.
(for which there is no direct evidence), then the main part of the army must have come out in orderly wise, and no unexpected surprise at the hands of the Germans could have occurred. Or, if it refers to the second camp, it was clearly not the summer camp, as Florus relates.

Florus' account is by no means a bare narration of events, nor does he bring forward events in their sequence. His choice both of materials and the grouping of facts is with reference to the leading thought. The very words introducing the story of the Germanic wars show that they serve as the theme for the part that follows: "Germaniam quoque utinam vince re tanti non putasset! magis turpiter amissa est quam gloriose acquisita." The same is true of the words by which he passes on to the events under Varus' rule: "sed difficilium est provinciam obtinere quam facere." Having assumed that Augustus conquered Germany, Florus seeks to maintain the thesis that the government of a province is a difficult undertaking; that Varus took the task all too lightly, and as a result Germany was ignominiously lost. It is significant that Florus is the only author who asserts that Augustus wished to conquer Germany. And the reason assigned for this conquest is as follows: "set quatenus sciebat patrem suum C. Caesarem bis transvectum ponte Rhenum quaesisse bellum, in illius honorem concepierat facere provinciam." It is absurd to believe that Augustus ever intended to make a province of Germany for so puerile a reason as merely to honor Julius Caesar, for the latter "had not charged the heirs of his dictatorial power with the extension of Roman territory on the north slope of the Alps and on the right banks of the Rhine so directly as with the conquest of

20This same observation is made in slightly different words (I, 33, 8) with respect to affairs in Spain, recently won by Scipio Africanus: "plus est provinciam retinere quam facere."

21We must notice that in Florus' account provincia is used several times, and in no clearly defined way. He says, e. g. (II, 30, 23): "missus in eam provinciam Drusus primos domuit Usipites"; and again (II, 30, 26): "et praeterea in tutelam provinciae praesidia ubique dispositi." In the first provincia="land," since at that time, before Drusus' campaigns, it is clear there could have been no province even in a rhetorical sense; in the second it can easily refer to the province of Gaul.
If Augustus had desired to make a province in honor of his father, he would doubtless have conquered Britain instead, in accordance with Caesar's supposed wish. Julius Caesar's expeditions against the Germans were, as stated by Mommsen himself\(^{23}\), merely forward movements of defense. And it seems reasonable to assume that Augustus did not, as Florus tells us, wish to conquer Germany, but was merely continuing in a more extensive manner the policy of his father.

How untrustworthy Florus is as an authority may be seen from the following: "quippe Germani vieti magis quam domiti erant moreisque nostros magis quam arma sub imperatore Druso suspiciebant; postquam ille defunctus est, Vari Quintilli libidinem ac superbiam haut secus quam saevitiam odisse coepitur."\(^{24}\) That is, according to Florus, Varus follows Drusus directly as commander in Germany, in spite of the fact that there intervene between them three commanders, and a long series of important events.\(^{25}\) The reason for this statement is Florus' indifference to mere facts, and his desire to harp on the theme "difficilius est provinciam obtinere quam facere," and hence to bring into sharp contrast the man who won that territory and the man who was directly responsible for its loss.\(^{26}\) Florus' method is observable elsewhere. According to Velleius the Germans purposely introduced a series of fictitious lawsuits and legal contests to throw Varus off his guard. It suits Florus'...
purpose, however, to represent them as having recourse to arms at once, as soon as they saw the toga, and felt that laws were more cruel than arms. He thus illustrates in a rhetorical way the sudden and unexpected perils which beset one who attempts the difficult task of maintaining authority over a province. Further evidence of Florus' inaccuracy is found in his statement that "to this day the barbarians are in possession of the two eagles." They had as a matter of fact been recovered long before the time at which he wrote, two in the time of Tiberius\(^27\), and the third during the reign of Claudius.\(^28\) With this fact established, Florus' story to the effect that one of the standards was saved at the time of the disaster is seen to be without any basis of truth. Finally, attention may be called to Florus' concluding statement: "hac clade factum est ut imperium, quod in litore Oceani non steterat, in ripa Rheni fluminis staret." This has no value save that of a glittering rhetorical antithesis, but like other statements in the account, has exercised far more than due influence upon writers who discuss the effect of Varus' defeat upon Rome's imperial policy.

Velleius' undisguised flattery of Tiberius warns us that even a contemporary source must be used with caution. His account shows that his one great purpose is to praise Tiberius, and place him in a favorable light. To shed the greater luster on his hero he reveals a marked animus against Varus, whose command in Germany immediately preceded Tiberius' second term of service there. Note the depreciatory tone in which Varus is spoken of, a man who in his stupidity imagined that the inhabitants of Germany were not human beings save in voice and body, and that men who could not be subdued by the sword might be civilized by law; likewise the persistent malice which runs through his account of the loss of Varus' legions, a dreadful calamity brought about by the incompetence and indolence of the leader; an army unrivalled in bravery, the flower of Roman troops in discipline, vigor, and experience, some of whom were severely punished by their general for using Roman arms with Roman spirit, chastised by a general who showed some courage in dying though none in fighting. Immediately following this is a sketch of the mighty deeds in Germany done by Tiberius, the constant patron of the Roman

\(^{27}\)Tac., \textit{Ann.}, I, 60; II, 25.

\(^{28}\)Cassius Dio, 60, 8.
empire, who undertook its cause as usual. And the next chapter relates that the same courage and good fortune which had animated Tiberius at the beginning of his command still continued with him.

Certain disagreements between Tacitus' account of the Varus disaster and that of our other sources have already been cited. But of even more importance for our discussion is Tacitus' warm personal eulogy of Arminius at the notice of his death. There can be no doubt that this tribute has done much to perpetuate the traditional view as to the effect of Varus' defeat. The observation has often been made that Tacitus' sympathies were strongly inclined toward the aristocratic Republic; that notwithstanding his conviction that the Republic had become impossible and the monarchy necessary, the terrors and indignities of Domitian's reign embittered his whole thought; that although he felt that the beneficent rule of Nerva and Trajan offered to the Roman state the best possible combination of liberty and authority, 'those happy and glorious times when men were able to think what they would and say what they thought' the dark colors, the severe and uncompromising judgment found in Tacitus' representation of the whole imperial

29See p. 25 f.
30Ann., II, 88: "liberator haud dubie Germaniae et qui non primordia populi Romani, sicut alii reges ducesque, sed florentissimum imperium laces- sierit, proeliiis ambiguus, bello victus. Septem et triginta annos vitae, duodecim potentiae explevit, caniturnque adhuc barbaras apud gentes, Grae- corum annalibus ignotus, qui sua tantum mirantur, Romanis haud perinde celebris, dum vetera extollimus recentium incuriosi."
31Boissier, L'Opposition sous les Césars, 1892, p. 288 f.
32Hist., I, 16.
33Agr., 45: "praecipua sub Domitiano miseriarum pars erat videre et adspici, cum suspiria nostra subscriberentur; cum denotandis tot hominum palloribus sufficeret saevus ille vultus et rubor, quo se contra pudorem muniebat"; Ibid., 2: "dedimus profecto grande patientiae documentum; et sicut vetus aetas vidit quid ultimum in libertate esset, ita nos quid in servitute."
34Cf. Boissier, op. cit., p. 30: "il possédait enfin le gouvernement qui lui semblait préférable aux autres, et, sous les plus mauvais empereurs il n'a jamais attendu et souhaité que l'avènement d'un bon prince." Agr., 3: "nunc demum redit animus; sed quamquam primo statim beatissimi saeculi ortu Nerva Caesar res olim dissociabiles miscuerit, principatum ac libertatem, augeatque quotidie felicitatem temporum Nerva Trajanus."
period covered by the Annals owe not a little of their gloom to the sense that the acts of the early emperors were in anticipation of, even a direct preparation for, the wretchedness and bitter degradation which Tacitus himself felt at the hands of Domitian.\textsuperscript{36} Having at best little or no sympathy with the early emperors, and living in a time of great imperial expansion, Tacitus has only contempt for the prudent foreign policy of Augustus.\textsuperscript{37} He regards it as a weakness of all the emperors\textsuperscript{38} that down to the days of Nerva and Trajan they took no pains to extend the empire. But for the two generals in whom he discovered some inclination to renew the traditions of conquest he has warm admiration. Observe the complacency with which he dwells upon the campaigns of Germanicus and Corbulo, and upon these alone, in his history of the early empire. These two characters he treats with sympathy and admiration bordering on affection.\textsuperscript{39} And just as Tacitus is hearty in his praise of those features of German social life which reflect obliquely on the life of the Roman aristocracy\textsuperscript{40}, so he regards as a hero the energetic and martial Arminius, who destroyed three legions of the conservative Augustus, led by the supine and incompetent Varus.

\textsuperscript{36} Spooner, \textit{Histories of Tacitus}, 1891, Introd., p. 7.
\textsuperscript{37} See Chapter III, n. 68.
\textsuperscript{38} That Tacitus disliked Tiberius' conservative attitude toward Germany is clear from such a passage as \textit{Ann.}, IV, 74, where it is implied also that for selfish reasons Tiberius was unwilling to entrust the war to any commander who might thus gain military prestige: "clarum inde inter Germanos Frisiam nomen, dissimulante Tiberio damna, ne cui bellum permitteret. Neque senatus in eo cura an imperii extrema dehonestarentur."
\textsuperscript{39} Ferguson, "Characterization in Tacitus," \textit{Class. Weekly}, VII, 4 f.
\textsuperscript{40} Cf. Mackail, \textit{Latin Literature}, p. 210: "What he [Tacitus] has in view throughout [the Germania] is to bring the vices of civilized luxury into stronger relief by a contrast with the idealized simplicity of the German tribes . . . . the social life of the Western German tribes is drawn in implicit or expressed contrast to the elaborate social conventions of what he considers a corrupt and degenerate civilization." Gudeman (ed. of \textit{Agri cola and Germania}, Boston, 1900, Introd., p. xlii), though rejecting the ethical purpose of the Germania, says: "Now to a man like Tacitus who, dissatisfied with the conditions in which his lot was cast, longed to dwell in the 'good old times,' these sturdy vigorous Germans naturally came to serve as a welcome background for his pessimistic reflections."
It is worth while to notice the basis for Tacitus’ generalization, ‘‘liberator haud dubie Germaniae.’’ Does Tacitus here summarize correctly the facts as given by him of Rome’s conflict with Germany under the leadership of Varus and his successors?41 Did Arminius become a liberator by virtue of the defeat of Varus? Or by the defeat of Varus’ successors? Is it correct to infer that Arminius was oftentimes victorious, when only one instance is cited of a clear defeat for the Romans? An examination of Tacitus’ narrative forces a negative to each of these inquiries. His first mention of Arminius is as a leader of one of the German parties—Segestes was leader of the rival faction—against whom Germanicus was operating in the campaign of 15 A. D.42 In this year Germaniens fell suddenly upon the Chatti, many of whom were captured or killed, while others abandoned their villages and fled to the woods. Their capital, Mattium, was burned, and their country ravaged before Germanicus marched back to the Rhine.43 Then acting on an appeal from Segestes for relief against the violence of Arminius, Germanicus marched back and fought off the besiegers of Segestes, who was rescued, together with his followers and relatives, among them his daughter, the wife of Arminius.44 Next, after Arminius had aroused the Cherusci and bordering tribes, Germanicus, having dispatched a part of his army under lieutenants, who utterly defeated the Bructeri45, himself pursued Arminius until he retired into pathless wastes.46 The Germans, after engaging and harassing the Romans in the swamps, were finally overpowered and the slaughter continued as long as daylight

41See T. S. Jerome, “The Tacitean Tiberius: A study in Historiographic Method,” Class. Phil., VII, pp. 265-292. In this valuable study two main conclusions are reached: (1) That the disharmonies between data and generalizations in the Annals are so constant and glaring as to give conclusive evidence of Tacitus’ untrustworthiness in that work; (2) that the Annals are “an example of historical writing done according to the method of the rhetorician, and that this is the true explanation of those disharmonies which are not explicable on the theories that Tacitus told the truth, or followed an established tradition, or that a strong bias against Tiberius entered into the composition thereof.”

42Ann., I, 55.
43Ibid., I, 56.
44Ann., I, 57.
45Ibid., I, 60.
46Ibid., I, 63.
lasted. Tacitus adds that although the Romans were distressed by want of provisions and wounds, yet in their great victory they found everything, vigor, health, and abundance.

With the year 16 A. D. Germanicus, supported by the ardent enthusiasm of his soldiers, sought further engagements with the Germans, remembering that they were always worsted in a regular battle and on ground adapted to fighting. The Chatti, who at this time were besieging a Roman stronghold on the river Lippe, stole away and disappeared at the report of the Roman approach. Finally, however, the Germans dared to meet the Romans in the plain of Idistaviso, near the river Weser. Tacitus, after giving a detailed account of the dreadful slaughter which here befell the Germans, says that it was a great victory for the Romans and without loss on their part. Not less disastrous to the Germans was a succeeding Roman victory on grounds chosen by the Germans. But after the losses by storm that overtook the Roman legions on their return by fleet to winter quarters, the Germans were encouraged to renew their attacks. Again Germanicus marched against the Chatti and the Marsi, who either did not dare to engage, or wherever they did engage were instantly defeated, exclaiming that the Romans were invincible and superior to any misfortune. Tacitus tells us that at the conclusion of the conflict the Roman army was led back into winter quarters full of joy that this expedition had compensated for their misfortune at sea. Significant are his concluding words: 'nor was it doubted that the enemy were tottering to their fall and concerting means for obtaining peace, and that if another summer were added the war could be brought to completion.' Immediately following this we read of Germanicus' recall by Tiberius to celebrate his triumph, and to enter on a second consulship, no further operations being conducted against the Germans. Tacitus hints that this step was taken by Tiberius through envy of Germanicus. But whether for this reason or for the far more probable one,

47 Ibid., I, 68.
48 Ibid., II, 5.
49 Ibid., II, 17-18.
50 Ibid., II, 19-22.
52 Ibid., II, 25.
53 Ibid., II, 26.
assigned by Tiberius himself\(^{54}\), it is evident to any one following the story as told by Tacitus that Arminius was not a liberator of Germany, either by his defeat of Varus or through the conflict that he waged against Varus’ successors. Tacitus’ account shows on the one hand that the Romans were not concerned about securing permanent possessions in Germany, and on the other that with but one exception the Romans were victorious throughout the conflict. But in tracing the biography of Arminius further Tacitus recounts that on the departure of the Romans the German tribes, the Suebi led by Maroboduus, who had assumed the title of king, and the Cherusei, led by Arminius, the champion of the people, turned their swords against each other;\(^{55}\) that, however, after the defeat of Maroboduus, Arminius aiming at royalty became antagonistic to the liberty of his countrymen, and fell by the treachery of his own kinsmen.\(^{56}\) The opportunity here for a rhetorical antithesis between Arminius the foe of his country’s liberty and Arminius its erstwhile champion, Tacitus could not resist. Hence, “liberator haud dubie Germaniae,” notwithstanding the fact that this bold assertion has no basis in what has gone before. A Roman historian under the spell of rhetoric did not as a rule hesitate to adjust his conclusions in the interest of dramatic portrayal of character.

\(^{54}\)Ann., II, 26: “se noviens a divo Augusto in Germaniam missum plura consilio quam vi perfeccisse; sic Sugambros in deditionem acceptos, sic Suebos, regemque Maroboduum pace obstrictum; posse et Cheruscos ceterasque rebellium gentes, quoniam Romanae ultioni consultum esset, internis discordiis reliqui,” i. e. that the Romans were acting from diplomatic considerations, and in accordance with this policy he himself, sent nine times into Germany by Augustus, had by diplomacy brought the Sugambri, the Suebi and Maroboduus into peaceful relations; that the Cherusci also, and other hostile tribes, now that enough had been done to satisfy Roman honor, might be left to their own internal dissensions. See also Jäger (l. c.): “die Politik des Tiberius, die Germanen ihrer eigenen Zwietracht zu überlassen, bewährte sich.” Lang (Beiträge zur Geschichte des Kaisers Tiberius, Diss. Jena, 1911, p. 56) says that Germanicus was not recalled through envy; that Tiberius avoided all wars except such as were immediately necessary: “Aus diesem Grunde (nihil aeque Tiberium anxium habebat quam ne composita turbarentur, Ann., II, 65), suchte er alle Kriege zu vermeiden, die nicht unbedingt im Interesse des Reiches lagen. Den Abbruch der Germanenfeldzüge veranlasste nicht Angst oder Neid gegen Germanicus, wie kurzschichtige Schriftsteller jener Zeit vermuten, sondern die Tatsache, dass wenig dabei erreicht, den Prov. inzen jedoch grosse Lasten aufgeburdet wurden.”

\(^{55}\)Ibid., II, 44.

\(^{56}\)Ibid., II, 88.
CHAPTER III

CRITICISM OF THE ACCEPTED VIEW

Examination has already been given to the sources on which historians base their accounts of the Varus disaster. The influences under which these sources were written—ancient accounts repeated for the most part without question by later writers—and their availability for sound historical conclusions have also been discussed. We now advance to a general consideration of facts which are in contradiction to the accepted view as to the effect of Varus’ defeat.

The great importance usually attributed to this defeat is surprising to the student of history, in the light of several significant facts revealed by a study of the battle. Varus at that time had three legions, which, if complete, comprised not more, or scarcely more, than 20,000 troops. The battle was not a regular contest, but one in which the Romans were hemmed in, we are told, by woods, lakes, and bodies of the enemy in ambush. Our authorities are agreed that swamps, forests, a running contest, and the elements were factors that contributed to the Roman defeat. Further, in the encounter the Romans were directed by a leader very generally represented as indo-

1Mommsen, Röm. Gesch., V, p. 41; 51; Idem, Die Oertlichkeit der Varusschlacht, p. 207; Gardthausen, I, p. 1199. Ch. Gailly de Taurines (Les Légions de Varus, Paris, 1911, p. 73) places the number as probably 22,000.

2Vell., II, 119.

3Velleius’ words (II, 119) suggest a series of changing incidents and conditions: “ordinem atrociissimae calamitatis; exercitus iniquitate fortunae circumventus . . . inclusus silvis, paludibus, insidiis”; cf. also Tac., Ann., I, 65: “Quintilium Varum sanguine oblitiu et paludibus emersum”.

lent, rash, and self-confident, and they were pitted against far superior numbers.  

This contest, therefore, waged under such circumstances, could not have been in any sense a real test of the military strength of the contending forces. Remembering too that it was a fundamental policy of Rome to take no backward step in the face of defeat, and considering also the known strength of Rome at this period, it is inconceivable that the loss of three legions could in itself have reversed the policy of that great world-power, particularly when it is remembered that only a few years before (6 A. D.) Tiberius had assembled twelve legions against Maroboduus, while in that same year, against the Dalmatian-Pannonian insurrection, the Roman legions were increased to twenty-six, a body of troops such as had never since the close of the civil wars been united under the same command.  

 tres vagas legiones et ducem fraudis ignarum perfidia deceperit” [Arminius], where “vagas” suggests an army marching in loose order, ignorant of the territory and without proper leadership. So Mommsen (Röm. Gesch., V, p. 40) calls Varus: “Ein Mann . . . . von trägem Körper und stumpfem Geist und ohne jede militärische Begabung und Erfahrung”; Deppe (Rh. Jahrbr., 87, p. 59) accepting Zangemeister’s date for the defeat of Varus as August 2, 9 A. D. (see Westd. Zeitschr., 1887, pp. 239-242) says that the battle followed a feast day, which explains the enigma of how a Roman army of 18,000 men could be annihilated by an unorganized German host: “Die Soldaten waren an diesem Tage noch festkrank, nicht geordnet, überhaupt unvorbereitet, entsprechend der Angabe des Tacitus, der sie in den Ann., II, 46, nennt ‘tres vacuas [vagas] legiones et ducem fraudis ignarum’”.

5 Dio, 56, 20 f. says that the Romans were fewer at every point than their assailants; moreover, the latter increased as the battle continued, since many of those who at first wavered later joined them, particularly for the sake of plunder. Mommsen (Die Oertlichkeit, etc., p. 209) thinks that from the communities which joined the Cherusci in the uprising the Romans were confronted by numbers probably two or three times their equal.  

6 Cf. Tac., Ann., II, 46: “At se [Maroboduum] duodecim legionibus petitione dux Tiberio inlibatam Germanorum gloriam servavisse.” Mommsen (Röm. Gesch., V, p. 34) estimates the combined strength (regular and auxiliary) of the two armies in the campaign against Maroboduus at almost double that of their opponents, whose fighting force was 70,000 infantry and 4,000 horsemen.  

crulty has not escaped notice. Schiller recognizes it, and while denying that the explanation is to be found in the exhaustion of the empire, he urges the advanced age of Augustus and the financial situation, which, without the creation of new revenues, could not have provided sufficient means. Similarly Mommsen observes: “We have difficulty in conceiving that the destruction of an army of 20,000 men without further direct military consequences should have given a decisive turn to the policy at large of a judiciously governed universal empire.” Immediately following this Mommsen offers as explanation: “there is no other reason to be found for it than that they [Augustus and Tiberius] recognized the plans pursued by them for twenty years for the changing of the boundary to the north as incapable of execution, and the subjugation and mastery of the region between the Rhine and the Elbe appeared to them to transcend the resources of the em-

in Gallien,” Rh. Jahrbr., 114-115, p. 162) argues, on the basis of three legions each to the nine provinces, that Augustus retained 27 legions after the battle of Actium. This is out of harmony with the well-known view of Mommsen that Augustus had only 18 legions until the year 6 A. D., at which time he raised eight new legions in view of the uprising in Illyricum.

"Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit, I, p. 232 f.: “Der Verlust—er mag 16,000 betragen haben—erscheint trotz alledem nicht bedeutend genug, um eine Wendung in der germanischen Politik zu rechtfertigen.” Koepp (Die Römer in Deutschland, p. 34) agrees that it is absurd to think that the loss of three legions could produce such a change in policy: “so ist es doch schwer zu glauben, dass er [Augustus] in besonnenen Stunden aus dem Verlust dreier Legionen die Konsequenz gezogen haben sollte, dass es mit der Provinz Germanien aus und vorbei sein müsse.” Much the same view is expressed by him in Westfalen, I, p. 40: “nicht als ob der Untergang dreier Legionen eine Verlust gewesen wäre, der das Reich in seinen Grundfesten hätte erschüttern können; wenn man in Pannonien fünfzehn Legionen aufgeboten hatte, so hätte man auch am Rhein eine ähnliche Waffenmacht zusammenbringen können, wenn wirklich der Sieg des Arminius zu einer Gefahr des Reiches geworden wäre. Und später noch ist Britannien erobert worden, ist Dacien Provinz geworden, ist der Kampf gegen die Parter aufgenommen worden.”

"Hist. of Rome, V, p. 61; cf. also p. 54: “The Romano-German conflict was not a conflict between two powers equal in the political balance, in which the defeat of the one might justify the conclusion of an unfavorable peace; it was a conflict in which . . . . an isolated failure in the plan as sketched might as little produce any change as the ship gives up its voyage because a gust of wind drives it out of its course.”
pire." Seeck, commenting on the difference in Rome's policy in the time of the Punic wars and after the disaster to Varus\(^\text{10}\), believes that Augustus turned back to his 'weaker wisdom' of an earlier day (the year 20 B. C., when he said the empire was large enough), because the Germans threatened only the provinces, not Rome itself, as did the Pannonians, whom Rome was at all hazard and at any cost compelled to subdue. Eduard Meyer thinks that although Arminius' revolt and the battle as a military event had no greater significance than the revolts and victories of the Celts and the Pannonians, the battle nevertheless was decisive because it was not possible for Rome to raise troops sufficient to win back the advantage lost, the two legions that were levied being raised by proscription, and from the non-citizen class. Further, whereas the insurrection in Pannonia left no choice but to increase the army, the war with Germany would have imposed not only too great a financial burden, but would have revoked in the most drastic way the old rule which permitted service in the army only to citizens.\(^\text{11}\) To have subdued Germany at such a cost as this, argues Meyer (p. 487) would have been as inexpedient as to subdue the Parthians.

These suggestions by Mommsen and Meyer as to Rome's lack of resources necessitate, before any conclusion is reached as to the permanent effect of this one defeat, a consideration of the relative resources of Rome and Germany at this period.

When we compare the general resources of the Roman empire with those of Germany the balance is found to be overwhelmingly in favor of the former, had its whole strength, or even any considerable fraction thereof, been employed. The

\(^{10}\text{Kaiser Augustus, p. 116.}\)

\(^{11}\text{Kaiser Augustus, p. 486; cf. Dio, 57, 5. However, Meyer attaches undue significance to this fact. While the old rule confined service in the army to citizens, in times of peril freedmen, or slaves manumitted especially for the occasion, had been enrolled many times previous to the occasion referred to—indeed as early as the Punic wars. See examples cited by Shuckburgh, Suet., Aug., 25. According to Suetonius libertini were employed twice by Augustus: "Libertino milite, praeterquam Romae incendiorum causa et si tumultus in graviore annona metueretur, bis usus est: semel ad præsidium coloniarum Illyricum contingentium, iterum ad tutelam ripae Rheni." These two occasions, at the uprising in Pannonia, and after the defeat of Varus, are mentioned also by Dio, 55, 31 and 56, 23.\)
population of the empire under Augustus was not far from 55,000,000\textsuperscript{12}, and, as service was voluntary and men of any nationality were admitted, at least into the auxilia, practically the whole free male population of the empire was available for service. There was, of course, the traditional custom according to which the legions were restricted to Roman citizens, and the auxilia, consisting of foreigners, were kept at about the same number as the legionaries\textsuperscript{13}, but Pompey and then Caesar had enrolled legions of provincials (the so-called legiones vernaculæ), and in the armies of Brutus and Cassius and the triumvirs this was done on so extensive a scale that Vergil, Ecl. I, 70 f. calls the veterans who were settled in Italy out and out "miles . . . barbarus."\textsuperscript{14} Now Augustus appears to have made some con-

\textsuperscript{12}This is the figure given by Ed. Meyer ("Bevölkerung des Alterums," Conrad's Handw. d. Staatsw., 3rd ed., II (1909), p. 911), who accepts with slight modifications, Beloch's calculations. The latter (Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt (1886), p. 507) gave 54,000,000 at the time of the death of Augustus. In a later essay (Rh. Mus., IV (1889), p. 414 ff.) Beloch raises materially his estimate of the population of Gaul, which, if accepted, and it seems very plausible, would affect somewhat the total for the empire. Thus H. Delbrück (Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 175) after Beloch's revision, calculates the population of the empire at sixty to sixty-five millions, and O. Seeck (Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, III, 13 (1897), p. 161 ff.), would prefer in many instances much more generous calculations than those of Beloch. Compare, however, Beloch's vigorous reply in the same volume. We have preferred to accept, however, the more conservative figure.

\textsuperscript{13}That this was the custom followed for the socii and auxilia during the period of the republic is suggested by Pliny, N. H., 25, 33, 6, and the same general proportion seems to have been observed later, as Tacitus, Ann., IV, 5, in speaking of the "sociae triremes alasque et auxilia cohortium," adds, "neque multo secus in numero virium." Detailed information regarding the size of these auxiliary contingents is nowhere given. See Liebenam, art. "Exercitus," Pauly-Wiss., VI, 1601, 1607. G. L. Cheesman (The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army, Oxford, 1914, p. 53 ff.) finds that the auxilia under Augustus were at least as numerous as the legions, and later became more so. He calculates 180,000 for the year 69 A. D., and 220,000 for the middle of the second century A. D. Cf. also Delbrück, Op. Cit., II, p. 203 (2nd ed.).

\textsuperscript{14}Cf. Ed. Meyer, ibid., p. 909. The evidence for the enrollment of foreigners in the legions at this time is conveniently summarized by Liebenam, art. "Dilectus," Pauly-Wiss., V, 611 ff.
sistent efforts to restore the old conditions, but even then the eastern legions seem to have been recruited, in large part at least, from the Orient, while those of the west were drawn from Italy and the Latin Occident, and under the succeeding emperors the provinces were more and more heavily drawn upon, until Roman citizens almost wholly disappeared from the ranks of the imperial army. Seeck indeed, after a renewed examination of the material collected by Mommsen, comes to the conclusion that Augustus did exercise much greater caution in drawing the bulk at least of his forces from the citizens of Italy and the Roman citizens of the provinces. But granting this position for the sake of argument, and admitting that Augustus would recruit his legions only from Roman citizens (for we prefer to give minimal estimates in order to avoid any charge of overstating our case), the citizen population of the empire


16 We must remember that this restriction in the recruiting sources of the legions was wholly an act of free choice on the part of Augustus, whatever the motive may have been. That suggested by Seeck, *l. c.*, p. 611, does not seem very probable; it involved a change in the usage to which men had already become accustomed in the civil wars, and it was gradually but completely abandoned by his successors. There was nothing in the general conditions which required it.

17 *Rh. Mus.*, XLVIII (1893), p. 602 ff. His conclusions in part rest on none too certain foundations, and introduce an insufficiently motivated complexity in the system of levying troops, for Augustus at the beginning of his career used non-citizen soldiers freely, and after the defeat of Varus, of the two new legions which were raised one was a Galatian contingent, the *Deiotariana*, which was given citizenship and a place in the army (Mommsen, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, 2nd ed. (1885), p. 70; O. Seeck, *Gesch. d. Untergangs d. ant. Welt*, 3rd ed., I, p. 260), and the other was recruited from the non-citizen population of Rome (*Tac., Ann.*, I, 31, "vernacula multitudo"; cf. Mommsen, *Hermes*, XIX (1884), p. 15, n. 1). Seeck's statement of the system which he believes Augustus followed is: "Prätorianer und Stadtsoldaten rekrutirten sich aus Latium, Etrurien, Umbrien, und den frühesten Bürgercolonien; den übrigen Italikern sind die Legionen zugewiesen, den Bürgern der Provinz die Freiwilligencohorten; aus den Libertinen setzen sich die Mannschaften der Flotte und der Feuerwehr zusammen; die Nichtbürger bilden Cohorten und Alen und einen Theil der Flotte."
(about 4,700,000 in 9 A. D.)\textsuperscript{18} was sufficient to raise an army of 400,000 men under the inspiration of some great national cause, which, with an equal number of \textit{auxilia}, would yield a total potential military force of 800,000, not counting the fleet which was frequently employed in the operations in Germany, and must have been heavily drawn upon if any permanent conquest of the land was to be undertaken.\textsuperscript{19} That such a figure as this is not beyond reason is clear from the fact that after Actium Augustus found himself in possession of 50 legions, a total army of between five and six hundred thousand men\textsuperscript{20}, while after Mutina, 66 legions, at least 660,000 men, were in the field at once, and after the defeat of Sextus Pompey in 36, Octavian and Antony had together no fewer than 74 or 75 legions under arms, which, counting everything, and including naval contingents, must have amounted to at least 800,000 men.\textsuperscript{21}

However, even if the numerical superiority of the Roman empire may not appear so overwhelming in the number of troops which might be raised, we must remember that the resources of the whole population were available to the full for maintaining in the field, at the highest efficiency, and for an indefinite period, an army of several hundred thousand men; for all the inhabitants of the empire without exception con-

\textsuperscript{18}In B. C. 8 it was 4,233,000; in A. D. 14, 4,957,000. See the Mon. Anc., 8. Of course if we accept the view still defended by Gardthausen and Kornemann that this number represented only the male population (\textit{Augustus}, II, 532; and \textit{Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie u. Statistik}, III, 14 (1897), p. 291 ff.), a citizen army of more than a million men might have been raised, but the view of Beloch and Ed. Meyer that the numbers in the Mon. Anc. include women and children seems the only one possible. See Meyer's complete refutation of Kornemann, \textit{Jahrb. für Nationalökonomie}, III, 15 (1898), p. 59 ff.

\textsuperscript{19}This figure, 800,000, is modest, amounting to roughly \(1\frac{1}{2}\%\) of the total population, about the same proportion which Germany and France have for some time past kept under arms in time of peace, while their war strength is several times as great as this. Rome did actually at one time, the crisis of the Second Punic War, have at least \(7\frac{1}{2}\%\) of her total population in the field, even according to the most conservative estimates. Cf. H. Delbrück, \textit{Gesch. d. Kriegskunst}, I, 2nd ed. (1908), pp. 349, 355 ff.

\textsuperscript{20}Mommsen, \textit{Hermes}, XIX (1884), p. 3, n. 3, gives the number of Roman citizens who were engaged in the war between Octavian and Antony as 300,000, which makes a total of 600,000 troops or more.

tributed abundantly in money and materials, so that in this respect the great numbers and vast economic resources of the empire gave it a position of immeasurable superiority over the barbarians. Furthermore for a war such as the organized conquest of Germany would have entailed, a huge levy of men suddenly rushed to the spot, would have proved useless—or rather positively injurious; without adequate means of communication in that rough country it would have been almost impossible to make effective use of them at one spot, or even along one line, while the difficulty of provisioning them would have been quite insuperable. What was needed was a force of moderate size, capable of meeting any concerted effort on the part of the enemy, which could press steadily forward, constructing roads, establishing depots of supplies, firmly seizing and organizing the territory that was reached and passed, and leave no possibility of revolt in their rear. For this an army of ten to twelve legions operating from two established bases, the Rhine and the Danube, would have sufficed. Before such methods Germany must inevitably have succumbed after two or three campaigns.

For the actual size of the standing army under Augustus was ample to have carried on precisely such operations. The number of his legions varied somewhat from time to time. After Aetium Augustus had about 50 legions; this number was reduced to 18, then raised again to 26 at the outbreak of the Pannonian revolt. 22 Three were lost in 9 A. D., and in their place but two were added, so that the number left at his death was 25. 23 Taking this latter as that of the average number about

22 Or possibly 28; see von Domaszewski, "Zur Geschichte des Rheinheeres," Röm.-Germ. Korrespondenblatt, 1910, on the date of the establishment of the twenty-first and twenty-second legions. There is some question about the exact date at which the increase in the size of the legions was made (see the literature cited by Gardthausen, Augustus, II, p. 775), but that does not affect our argument. See above note 7.

23 Mommsen, op. cit., p. 75; Liebenam in Pauly-Wiss., VI, 1605. We must remember that this number was somewhat low; and was gradually raised by succeeding emperors. Claudius added two legions, Nero one, and Galba two, so that Vespasian had thirty, and that number seems to have been maintained until the time of Septimius Severus, who added three more. It is significant that Trajan found 30 legions quite sufficient for extensive and difficult conquests, so that 25 would doubtless have been regarded even by him as adequate for the conquest of Germany. For the evidence of the gradual increase in the army see Marquardt, op. cit., p. 448 ff.
the time of the defeat of Varus, calculating the theoretical strength of the legion at 6000 men\textsuperscript{24}, and adding in an equal number of \textit{auxilia}, the city troops, the praetorian cohorts, the fleet, and various detached contingents\textsuperscript{25}, we get about 325,000. The effective force would be somewhat less than this, of course, but would not probably fall much if any under 300,000 men.\textsuperscript{26} Now the majority of these could have been launched upon Germany with little or no difficulty. Fifteen legions, or nearly three-fifths of the total force of the empire had been concentrated in Pannonia for three years (Suetonius, \textit{Tiberius}, 16), and there is no conceivable reason why these same legions might not at once have turned upon the Germanic tribes, their task in Pannonia now accomplished, especially as twelve legions, that is to say, two-thirds of the whole army as it stood at that time, were actually operating in Germany at the time of the outbreak of the Pannonian revolt. Fifteen legions and the whole of the

\textsuperscript{24}The evidence for the size of the legion at this time is conveniently summarized by R. Cagnat, "Legio," \textit{Daremberg et Saglio}, III, p. 1050 ff. The most elaborate discussion of the size of the legion (especially that of Caesar) is in Fr. Stolle, \textit{Lager und Heer der Römer}, 1912, pp. 1-23. He finds what he regards as evidence for legions of varying size, from 3600 up to 5000 men. The standard legion of the empire, however, can hardly have been less than 6000. Cf. also Fröhlich's review of Stolle's work, \textit{Berl. Philol. Wochenschr.}, 1913, 530 ff.

\textsuperscript{25}A list of these is given by Liebenam, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 1607 ff.

\textsuperscript{26}Calculations as to the effective strength of the standing army of Augustus vary somewhat. H. Furneaux (\textit{The Annals of Tacitus}, I (1884), p. 109), gives 350,000; Mommsen (\textit{Hermes}, XIX (1884), p. 4—apparently excluding the naval forces), 300,000 as a maximum figure; Seeck (\textit{Rh. Mus.}, XLVIII (1893), p. 618) reckons on the basis of 20 legions (which would be applicable only down to the year 6 A. D.) 132,000 citizen soldiery out of Italy: in his \textit{Gesch. des Untergangs d. ant. Welt}, 3rd ed., I (1910), p. 255, on a basis of 25 to 30 legions, from Augustus to Diocletian, he calculates the total forces of the empire at 300,000 to 350,000; H. Delbrück (\textit{Gesch. d. Kriegskunst}, II, 2nd ed. (1904), p. 174) counting only the 25 legions, estimates 225,000 men; if other contingents he included the total would certainly exceed 250,000 even on the basis of his extremely low estimates; Gardthausen (\textit{Augustus}, I, p. 635) estimates 250,000-300,000. The figure 200,000 which he gives on p. 637 seems to refer to the conditions before 6 A. D., when only 18 legions were maintained. G. Boissier's number, 500,000 (\textit{L'opposition sous les Césars}, 3rd ed. 1892, p. 4), seems to count the \textit{auxilia} three times, once in making up the number 250,000 for the legions, and again in doubling that!
otherwise unoccupied fleet would constitute an effective strength of at least 175,000 men, a force several times as large as that with which Caesar had accomplished the conquest of Gaul.

On the other hand the population of Germany between the Rhine, the Elbe, and the Danube was extremely small. The Germans had no regular cities (Tacitus, Germania, 16), some tribes had as yet scarcely passed the nomadic state, there were immense forests, and undrained swamps, while there were here and there wide stretches of waste and uninhabited land on the marches between hostile tribes. Agriculture was primitive, and industries did not exist at all. Under such conditions the density of population must have been low indeed. And yet the traditional view represents the Germans as being very numerous, several millions in fact (Gutsche und Schultze, Deutsche Geschichte, I (1894), p. 236, for example, estimate the total number of Germans at no fewer than 15,000,000, more in fact, rather than less!), and the persistence of such utterly uncritical opinions explains in part the strange tenacity with which even those who know better are obsessed with the idea that the conquest of Germany, because of its teeming millions, would have been a very difficult undertaking. Fustel de Coulanges long since and H. Delbrück more recently had insisted upon the

27For historical parallels to this condition compare Miss Ellen Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, New York, 1911, p. 215 ff.
28E. M. Arndt (Zeitschr. f. Geschichtswissenschaft, III (1845), p. 244, calculated a population of 800-1000 per (German) square mile, but only then on the assumption, which no man would now accept, that the Roman reports about the primitive conditions of agriculture were incorrect. On this estimate the population of Germany between the Rhine, Elbe, and the Main-Saale line, which is the part generally considered in the question of conquest, would have been roughly 1,840,000 to 2,300,000. H. Von Sybel (Entstehung d. deutschen Königlums, 1881, p. 80) estimates the Germans at 12,000,000, basing his calculation on a highly problematic series of inferences regarding the extent of territory which the Sugambri once occupied, 40,000 of whom were said to have been transferred to the west bank of the Rhine by Tiberius. Karl Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte (1894), I, p. 236 accepts the traditional statement that the Goths alone amounted to five-sixths of a million, a reckoning which would make the total population of Germany many times that number. Even G. Waitz, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte (1880), I, p. 19, takes at their face value such Roman exaggerations as 300,000 warriors for the Cimbri and Teutones, 60,000 for the Bructeri, and the like, figures which presuppose an incredibly dense population.
numerical weakness of the tribes which actually overthrew the empire in the fifth century\textsuperscript{29}, and Ch. Dubois, in an elaborate study of Ammianus, has shown that the actual numbers of the Franks, Alamanni, etc., who wrought such devastation in Gaul in the fourth century, were astonishingly small.\textsuperscript{30}

H. Delbrück was the first to use severely critical methods for the calculation of the population of Germany.\textsuperscript{31} On the basis of Beloch's calculations for Gaul he estimated an average density of population of 4-5 per square kilometer, which makes for the region between the Rhine, Elbe, and the Main-Saale line, with which alone he is concerned, a population of roughly 515,000 to 645,000, or as he prefers to count it at 250 per (German) square mile, about 575,000 (calculating the area of this district at ca. 2300 (German) square miles). For the whole region between the Rhine and the Elbe he estimates not more than about 1,000,000 inhabitants. That makes for all Germany about 2,000,000, taking the first group of tribes as constituting not quite one third of the whole nation.\textsuperscript{32} This calculation he supports on the basis of a totally different one, which is derived from the number of warriors who could take part in an assembly and be addressed by a single speaker. Setting this at a maximum of six to eight thousand, and taking the average as five thousand,


\textsuperscript{31}"Der urgermanische Gau und Staat," Preussische Jahrbücher, 8t, (1895), p. 471 ff. The main arguments here presented (except the detailed criticism and comparison of a number of ancient estimates, p. 474 ff.) are repeated with some slight modifications in his Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, II, 2nd ed. (1909), p. 12 ff. L. Schmidt, Gesch. der deutschen Stämme, I (1904), p. 46, accepts Delbrück's calculations indeed, though with some reserve; p. 46 f. he criticizes effectively the absurd exaggerations with which the pages of many ancient authors abound.

\textsuperscript{32}Preuss. Jahrb., p. 482.
at the ratio of 5 to 1 he gets 25,000 as the size of the average German tribe, and as there were about twenty-three of these between the Rhine, Elbe, and Main-Saale line, he reaches exactly the same figure of 575,000 for the population of this district.

A different line of attack was pursued by G. Schmoller shortly after Delbrück's critique. Taking the results of extensive studies in the population of nations at different stages of economic development, he estimates the average density of population per square kilometer for "the north Indogermanic farming and cattle-raising communities about the beginning of the Christian era" to have varied between the limits 5 and 12, setting that of Germany as 5 to 6. This would give for the area between the Rhine, Elbe, and Main-Saale line a population of roughly about 640,000 to 770,000, or for the whole of Germany, taking this portion as not quite one-third, a total population only slightly in excess of two millions. The substantial agreement in the results reached by these three different methods employed independently, the historical-statistical, the institutional, and the economic, makes an exceedingly strong case. It can be further strengthened, perhaps, by one or two other considerations which have as yet not been employed. They are the following.

Maroboduus at the head of the Marcomannic confederation, which included a large number of tribes (even the distant Semones and the Longobardi) seems, at the height of his power, to have commanded a total force of 74,000 men. This number, as Ludwig Schmidt has pointed out, bears every evidence of being reliable, because of the immense force, twelve legions, one hundred thousand men at the lowest estimate, which Tiberius felt he must employ in order to crush him. Now this is probably the total number of males who in the last extremity might bear arms, i.e., following the customary Roman calculations, one-fourth of the whole population. The Marcomannic

34 Velleius, II, 109.
36 See Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1169 on this campaign.
37 This is the calculation Caesar uses for the Helvetians (Bell. Gall., I, 29), and Velleius (II, 116) for the Pannonian rebels. Cf. Beloch, Rh. Mus., LIV (1899), p. 431, 1. L. Schmidt uses the ratio of one to five. It seems more reasonable, however, to use the Roman system of
confederation at its greatest development would have had, therefore, a population of 296,000, or let us say, in round numbers, 300,000. Now some years later the Cheruscan confederacy under Arminius waged war with Maroboduus on fairly even terms; hence it is not unreasonable to suppose that the strength of the two confederations was about equal.\(^{38}\) Of course a large number of the tribes which lay even between the Rhine and the Elbe must have held aloof from the struggle, certainly those along the sea coast like the Cannanefates, the Frisii and the like, who were under Roman control, but doubtless many others also in the remoter parts of the district concerned. The neutrals may very well have been as numerous as either confederacy, but hardly more numerous than both combined, for the struggle is represented as a great national movement. In one case we would get a total population of 900,000, in the other 1,200,000, figures which agree very closely with those already reached by Delbrück and Schmoller.

Again Posidonius in his description of Gaul (in Diod., V, 25) has calculated that the smaller tribes of Gaul counted 50,000 members, the largest a scant 200,000. The average would be 125,000, but, as E. Levasseur, who has used this datum for his calculations of the population of Gaul, observes\(^{39}\), the num-

\(^{38}\)That the Cheruscan confederacy was originally not more powerful than the Marcomannic seems clear from the fact that, even after the defection of the Semnones, Longobardi and certain Suebian tribes (Tacitus, Ann., II, 45) Arminius and Maroboduus fought a drawn battle. Tacitus' statement that the counter defection of Inguiomerus was a complete offset is most improbable; see L. Schmidt, op. cit., II, 2, 181.

\(^{39}\)La population française. Histoire de la population avant 1789, I, Paris, 1889, p. 99 ff. Otto Hirschfeld (Sitzungsber. d. Berl. Akad., 1897, p. 1101) also uses this bit of evidence as a basis for calculations. Beloch, however, (Rh. Mus., LIV (1899), p. 414 f.) utterly rejects it, because he insists on taking the word ἄρκης here as equivalent to fighting men. That is doubtless correct, but as it makes arrant nonsense of the calculation, it should not be ascribed to so well-informed a scientist as Posidonius, but only to the stupid Diodorus, who has thus changed what must have been an estimate only of the total population, into one of the number capable of bearing arms. Beloch's remark that the ancient Gauls had no idea of the total population, but only of the fighting men,
ber of large tribes was probably very small, so that a lower average (he accepts 100,000) must be taken. On what seems to be a fair assumption, therefore, i. e., that the 60 tribes of Gaul which were represented on the great altar at Lyons, existed in Posidonius’ day, one would get a total population of about 6,000,000, which is astonishingly close to Beloch’s own revised calculations, who concedes the possibility of 6,750,000, but prefers 5,700,000. Now the Germans being without cities, developed agriculture or elaborate commerce, must have had a very much scantier population, certainly not more than an average of 50,000 per tribe, and probably much less. Hence taking 50,000 as a maximum figure, we should get for the whole of Germany with about 60 tribes, a maximum of 3,000,000, and for the Rhine, Elbe, Main-Saale district with 20 to 23 tribes, a maximum of 1,000,000 to 1,150,000, and a probable size of about three quarters of a million—or even less. These numbers, while somewhat larger than those already reached by other methods, are yet reasonably close to them to serve as a sort of confirmation, and in any event come very far below the figures customarily given for the population of Germany.

Finally, one might note Lamprecht’s ingenious estimate of the population in a district of the Moselle country by a comparison of the relative number of place names recorded for different epochs. He finds that a district which in 1800 A. D. seems to go too far. If one number be known it is an easy matter to calculate the other. Certainly Posidonius was capable of multiplying any figures the Gauls may have given him for their fighting men by 4 or 5, in order to secure an estimate of the whole population. Besides, the Gauls must have had a certain accepted proportion between the total population of a district and the number of fighting men it could produce. They had a great many more occasions to make use of such calculations than any one in modern times would ever have; for questions of life and death depended only too frequently on just such estimates.

40 Strabo, IV, 3, 2.
41 Rh. Mus., LIV (1899), pp. 438, 443.
42 Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., p. 47 f. Any exact calculation of the total number of tribes in Germany is impossible because our knowledge of the different tribal names comes from diverse periods, and the designations of clans and confederacies varied greatly from time to time.
had a population of about 450,000, had in 800 A. D. only about 20,000. This would give the German settlements of the year 800 A. D. as a whole, about 4.5% of the population one thousand years later. As the population of Germany in 1800 was about 23,000,000 (Levasseur), that of a correspondingly large area would have been slightly in excess of one million. In attempting to apply this result to conditions in Germany at the beginning of our era\(^{45}\), we must bear in mind that the method employed is one which is likely to secure minimal figures, and that in the Moselle land we do not have the ancient seat of the Germanic tribes, but only a colonised territory, which for some accident or other may not have been as thickly settled as other localities. On the other hand, we must note that the land in question had been German probably for four centuries, and the conditions were favorable to its bearing as heavy a population as that of any interior district of Germany in the first century of our era. While, therefore, we should regard this estimate as being certainly too low, yet it supports in a way the calculations of Delbrück and Schmoller, and is utterly inconsistent with figures like twelve or fifteen millions.

We shall regard then the population of Germany between the Rhine, Elbe, and Danube, as about 1,000,000, or taking the Main-Saale line instead of the Danube, for all the campaigning was done in the region northwest of these two streams, the population could not have been in excess of three quarters of a million. Taking Caesar’s calculation of one man for every twelve inhabitants as the largest army which a semibarbarous people could collect from a considerable extent of territory\(^{46}\), we should get something over 60,000 men as the maximum force which the Germans could put into the field for a single stroke. Without any adequate organization, transport, or central authority, this number could not be fed and maintained any length of time, and it is extremely doubtful whether Arminius ever had a force as large as this. Besides, a number of the tribes along the coast as far as the Weser, and along the lower Rhine,

\(^{45}\)Assuming that the region occupied by the Germans in the time of Augustus was approximately as large as the modern German empire. Agrippa’s imperfect calculation, even including Raetia and Noricum, was to be sure much smaller, i. e., 686 x 248 m.; Pliny, Nat. Hist., IV, 98.

\(^{46}\)See Beloch, Rh. Mus., LIV (1899), pp. 418, 423, 428. In his Bevölkerung, p. 457, he had estimated one in ten, which was too large a fraction.
remained friendly and loyal, so that their contingents would have to be subtracted from the total. That something less than 60,000, say roughly 50,000, is approximately correct may be inferred from the size of the armies which campaigned in Germany. We have already seen that when Tiberius set out to crush Maroboduus with his 74,000 men, he assembled twelve legions, a force of 100,000 to 120,000 legionaries and auxilia. Yet Germanicus invaded Germany in 14 A. D. with only four legions⁴⁷, and fought the campaigns of the next two years with no more than eight⁴⁸, and that too when he had reason to expect that practically all of the tribes of northwestern Germany would be united against him. We cannot imagine that the extremely cautious Tiberius would have entrusted his nephew, his legions, and his own imperial position to eight legions alone, if he had had reason to think that the enemy exceeded 50,000 in number, when he had ventured against Maroboduus only with a numerical superiority of 50%. In other words the same proportional strength used against Maroboduus, 12 legions against 74,000 men, would allow us to infer that Tiberius expected to find no more than 50,000 capable of meeting his eight legions.⁴⁹

We have already referred to the hopeless inferiority of the Germans in tactics, strategy, and equipment, and their inability to cope with the great resources of the empire, if systematically employed in steady and long drawn out operations. The only branch of service in which the Germans were on an equality with the Romans, if not actually surpassing them, was the cavalry, but that was of comparatively little consequence, partly because the Romans used the Batavians for cavalry service, and they were easily the equals of the Germans, while the nature of the country, consisting largely of swamps and forests, made cavalry an unimportant arm of the service. Indeed the cavalry played no very important rôle in the great battles, and in the

⁴⁷Tac., Ann., I, 56.
⁴⁸Tac., Ann., II, 16. This was the force later kept at the Rhine. Tacitus, Ann., IV, 5; Josephus, II, 16, 4.
⁴⁹Delbrück, Preuss. Jahrb., p. 481 f., has well refuted the Roman claims of great numerical superiority on the part of the Germans, and concludes that the forces on both sides were about equal. Judging from the campaign against Maroboduus, which it may be noted, is the only one in which we have apparently reliable information regarding the strength of both sides, one might safely infer that, at least under Tiberius, the Romans enjoyed actual numerical superiority.
one serious defeat of the Romans, that of Varus, they are not so much as mentioned.\textsuperscript{59} Two other advantages the Germans had on their side, one a difficult terrain, the other inadequate supplies for a large force of invaders. The first was a real difficulty, but nothing insuperable; indeed it may be questioned whether the terrain of Germany was much more difficult than that of Gaul in Caesar's time, and certainly not nearly so difficult as that of the Alps and of Illyricum, the inhabitants of which were subdued with no especial difficulty. As for provisions, it was a simple thing for the Romans to collect immense stores along the frontier and to deposit them at various stations inland as the armies advanced; besides, the numerous navigable rivers would enable them to bring supplies in any desired quantity far into the interior, and it is well known how often the fleet was used in the campaigns, on one occasion actually sailing far up the Elbe to meet Tiberius and the land army.\textsuperscript{51}

This suggests the final point of advantage which the Romans had, that of the superior military position. Germany could be attacked from three sides, the Rhine, the Danube, and the Ocean. The Romans could select their own time and place of attack, and support a forward thrust in any direction by a powerful flank movement. Any position the Germans took up might have been turned by forces coming from one side or the other, or, if they held their ground, they would be in imminent danger of being caught and crushed between two armies. The rivers of Germany are numerous, and most of them, three at least in the west, navigable for Roman fleets, which could not merely move considerable armies at slight risk far inland, but also furnish inexhaustible supplies. That the Romans know how to use this superior strategical position is clear from the plan of campaign against Maroboduus, and the numerous occasions when the fleet cooperated with the Rhine armies.

To sum up, the Romans had such overwhelming superiority\textsuperscript{52} in total population, size of army, general resources, equip-

\textsuperscript{59}Delbrück, \textit{Preuss. Jahrb.}, p. 481, exaggerates somewhat the advantage in cavalry which the Germans enjoyed.

\textsuperscript{51}Velleius, II, 166.

\textsuperscript{52}The overwhelmingly superior force of Rome is specifically admitted by some historians, but hardly seems as yet to be generally accepted. See especially Fustel de Coulanges, \textit{Histoire des institutions politiques de l'ancienne France}, vol. II, 2nd ed. (by C. Jullian), Paris, 1891, p. 328; Ed. Meyer, \textit{Kl. Schr.}, p. 486; von Domaszewski, \textit{Geschichte der
ment, tactics, strategy and military location, that any serious and persistent effort at conquest could not conceivably have failed. If the Romans, therefore, did not complete a conquest it was unquestionably because they did not desire to do so, not because they could not. As we shall see later on, the course of their operations nowhere shows a consistent effort at subjugation; the reason they did not incorporate Germany into the empire is simply that they were engaged in doing something quite different. We must not forget that what the Middle Ages could not bring about in the Alps, or the Turks in the Balkans, i.e., the utter pacification of these districts, the Romans accomplished with ease and celerity, while Charlemagne, with forces and opportunities incomparably inferior to those of Rome, achieved the most thorough subjugation of the Germanic tribes. To deny that Rome could have done the same is an utterly untenable position.

It is clear from the preceding discussion, and of the utmost significance for our question, that this battle was not a fair test of the comparative strength, actual or potential, of the Roman and Germanic forces. Not less noteworthy is a consideration of the incidents following the defeat. One would have expected that the events succeeding such a momentous engagement would have been equally as important as the battle itself, if not more so. Such, however, is not the case, and this fact is recognized by Mommsen in the words quoted above 53, “without further direct military consequences.” If there was an advantage on either side it was with the Romans 54, for immediately the army was

römischen Kaiser, Leipzig, 1909, p. 245. The same thing is meant also by J. Beloch where he observes that the Romans recognized “dass die Eroberung grössere Anstrengungen kosten würde als das Objekt wert war” (Griechische Geschichte, 2nd ed., vol. I, 1 (1912), p. 14).

53See p. 37.

increased to eight legions, and Tiberius, an experienced general, was placed at its head.\textsuperscript{55} It is to be noted too that not another victory was gained by the Germans, while the Romans under Tiberius (who had no opportunity for victories), and particularly under Germanicus, marched and countermarched over practically all of Germany (certainly over the territory of the tribes who had taken part in this war), with little or no opposition. Tiberius’ activity following the overthrow of Varus is told by Velleius (II, 120), and making due allowance for the latter’s partiality and proneness to exaggeration, we cannot disregard entirely his general statements, since he was an eye witness (II, 104). There is no doubt that Tiberius proceeded cautiously\textsuperscript{56} in the years 10 and 11, but in the latter year he crossed the Rhine and starting from Vetera marched up the Lippe river, utterly devastating the territory of the Bructeri\textsuperscript{57}, resentment for which doubtless caused a member of this tribe to attempt Tiberius’ assassination.\textsuperscript{58} Later on (16 A. D.) Germanicus, just before his recall, was so successful against the Germans that he requested only one more year for the completion of his work.\textsuperscript{59} This means that Germany at this time was as near to being a province as in any of the preceding years, but no nearer, since the land had never been reduced to tranquillity. And with respect to possession, the Romans were in control of

\textsuperscript{55}Vell., II, 120: “mittitur [Tiberius] ad Germaniam \ldots ultro Rhenum cum exercitu transgreditur.”

\textsuperscript{56}Suet., Tib., 18 and 19; Gardthausen, I, p. 1224.

\textsuperscript{57}Gardthausen, I, p. 1225.

\textsuperscript{58}Suet., Tib., 19.

\textsuperscript{59}Cf. Tac., Ann., II, 26, 4: “Precante Germanico annum efficiendis coeptis.” This is the basis of Mommsen’s statement (Hist. of Rome, V, p. 59): [Germanicus] “reported to Rome that in the next campaign he should have the subjugation of Germany complete.” And just preceding this the same author says: “The second tropaeum of Germanicus [in the Teutoburg forest] spoke of the overthrow of all the Germanic tribes between the Rhine and the Elbe.” See also p. 54 f. for further discussion of the campaigns of Tiberius and Germanicus. Mommsen speaks of the campaigns of the summers 12, 13, and 14 as years of inaction, a mere continuance of the war, of which nothing at all is reported. This gap in the record Riese explains, Forschungen, etc., p. 13 by the meagerness of our sources (Velleius, Suetonius, and Dio) covering the last years of Augustus, as compared with the fuller account in Tacitus of the early years of the regency of Tiberius. So Koepp, op. cit., p. 34.
as much territory as they formerly held, and had the advantage of having an army larger than it had ever been before. Moreover, while it doubtless was more difficult to raise troops at this time than in the days of Julius Caesar, the presence in Germany of this larger armed force shows beyond doubt that Rome's resources were as yet by no means exhausted. As already noted above, excellent authorities admit that had Rome made any whole-hearted attempt she could have conquered Germany just as she had other countries. Likewise Mommsen, after observing that it was no easy task for Rome to overthrow the Germanic patriot-party, as well as the Suebian king in Bohemia, says\(^60\): "Nevertheless they had already once stood on the verge of succeeding and with a right conduct of the war these results could not fail to be reached." Gardthausen\(^61\) too agrees that Rome could easily have erased this blot upon her military honor had she tried.

As has been suggested above, the Romans never at any time brought into the field against the Germans their full quota of available troops. If it had been necessary, Augustus could have sent into Germany the larger part of the great army of Tiberius, after the revolt in Pannonia had been put down.\(^62\) It is evident, therefore, that Augustus had sufficient troops at his disposal for Germany's subjugation, if he had wished to use them for that purpose. And, if we grant the contention put forward by many, that he changed his mind after he had once resolved to subdue that country, some purely psychological reason must be found for this change. A brief review of his leading traits of character ought to bring to light such a reason, if there be one. Does it accord with what we know of Augustus to conclude that he gave up such an ambitious undertaking because of the intervention of a single, incidental defeat? Cold, calculating, shrewd, determined, is the character that Augustus reveals preeminently in his public and private life.\(^63\) Nor is

\(^{60}\text{Hist. of Rome, V, p. 62.}\)

\(^{61}\text{I, p. 1201.}\)

\(^{62}\text{Cf. p. 36.}\)

\(^{63}\text{Cf. Gardthausen, I, p. 492: "Mit einem Worte Augustus ist der-}
\text{selbe geblieben: kalt, klar und klug sein ganzes Leben lang, keineswegs so genial wie Julius Caesar, aber entschieden verständiger." These charac-
\text{teristics are uncontradicted save, of course, by the rhetorically em}
\text{bellished gossip about Augustus' discomposure after the defeat of Varus; see Suet., Aug., 23; Dio, 56, 23. There is not the slightest evi-}
there any contradiction in recognizing in Augustus' nature a desire for supreme power united with great gentleness, and at the same time with great positiveness. One can conceive that Julius Caesar might attempt the impossible, Augustus never, since he began nothing without careful preparation, and tests which brought a decision favorable to the undertaking.  

Meyer, after contrasting Augustus' calm and deliberate procedure with that of Julius Caesar, says: "In all seinem Tun dominiert der Verstand ... Alles sorgfältig wieder und wieder zu erwägen, alle Chancen in Rechnung zu ersetzen, immer den sichersten Weg zu gehen, das war Octavians Art." No basis whatever exists for the reproach sometimes brought, that Augustus was wanting in courage, even if he did lack the bold warrior-spirit of Caesar. Considering then
dence of a panic at Rome or of alarm on the part of any one except Augustus. Yet at the Pannonian-Dalmatian revolt, only a short time before (6-9 A. D.), the people were greatly wrought up because of wars and famines (Dio, 55, 31), and Augustus announced in the senate that in a few days the enemy might reach Rome, while Tiberius was provided with 15 legions (Velleius, II, 111,1). So there was profound alarm at Rome at the time of the Marcomannic war (167-180 A. D. See Julius Capitolinus, Marcus Antoninus, 13, 1 and Ammianus, XXXI, 5, 13), while at the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones all Italy was palsied with fear (Sall., Jug., 114; Orosius, 5, 15, 7; 6, 14, 2). But at the defeat of Varus we hear nothing of the kind. Besides, Augustus was now well advanced in years, his health was precarious, his daughter and granddaughter had humiliates and cruelly disappointed him, while the successive deaths in his family had forced him to adopt as his heir and successor Tiberius, whom he greatly disliked. It is small wonder that in his old age and bereavements he should give way to some momentary weakness. The Varus calamity, coming so soon after the Pannonian revolt, and just at the time when the strain from the latter had momentarily lifted, must have been too much for Augustus to bear.

Gardthausen, I, p. 508. This view of Augustus is not invalidated by Gardthausen's further statement: "Der Kaiser scheute sich nicht zurückzutreten, wenn der Widerstand grösser war als die Mittel, die er darauf verwenden wollte oder konnte." These words are nothing more than an attempt to explain what all who hold to the traditional view are forced to explain, viz., Augustus' reversal of policy in "die schwere Wahl zwischen der Politik des dauernden Friedens und der Politik der fortgesetzten Eroberung."

Kleine Schriften, p. 462.

Meyer, l. c.: "Der Vorwurf, dass er feige gewesen sei, ist gewiss unbegründet."
that Augustus began nothing without careful and thorough preparation, that he was positive and resourceful, and not wanting in bravery, there is no reason for the belief that he would suddenly have given up a policy so important and so far-reaching. Further, it must be remembered that it involves a contradiction of Rome's entire previous history to conclude that she would abandon, because of a trivial reverse, a great national plan of conquest, once it had been begun. But even should we admit such an abandonment, it is almost impossible to believe that Augustus would have undertaken a war as extensive as that necessitated by the subjugation of Germany, after his army had been so greatly diminished.  

That too in the face of the fact that he was primarily a man of peace, as is shown by the following words from one of the documents deposited by Augustus with his will: "nulli genti bello per injuriam lato." That he was a man of peace is shown also by the statement of Suetonius, and of Dio (56, 33) to the effect that whereas Augustus might have made great acquisitions of barbarian territory, he was unwilling to do so; also of Dio (54, 9), a striking bit of evidence, which has not been accorded its due significance, to the effect that in the year 20 B. C. Augustus

67 The reduction of the army after the battle of Actium shows that Augustus wished no larger standing forces than would be sufficient for the internal and external peace of the empire. See Gardthausen, I, p. 637; Furneaux, Tacitus, Introd., p. 121; Mommsen, Germanische Politik, etc., p. 8: "ja man darf sagen, dass Augustus das Militärwesen in einem Grade auf die Defensive beschränkte."

68 Monumentum Ancyranum, V, 14. Cf. Dio, 56, 33; Suet., Aug., 101; Tac., Ann., I, 11: "quae cuncta sua manu perscripserat Augustus addideratque consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii, incertum metu an per invidiam." The sneer, "metu an per invidiam", found in the words of Tacitus, who wrote in the time of the great expansive conquests of Trajan, and who had only contempt for the prudent foreign policy of Augustus (see Furneaux on this passage), has undoubtedly caused many to restrict Augustus' peace policy to the period after Varus' defeat. But no such restriction should be made. We now know that the Monum. Ancyrr. was not written at one time, nor at the end of Augustus' life, but was finished in 6 A. D. See Chapter III, notes 84 and 88. This shows that his counsel of peace and his advice not to extend the limits of the empire was made prior to, and hence not as a result of, the defeat of Varus (9 A. D.), as has so frequently been asserted.

69 Aug., 21: "nec uilli genti sine iustis et necessariis causis bellum intulit."
laid down as his policy that "he did not think it desirable that there should be any addition to the former [subject terri-
tory] or that any new regions should be acquired, but deemed
it best for the people to be satisfied with what they already pos-
sessed; and he communicated this opinion to the senate." Similar
too, we note, is the view of Gibbon:70 "It was reserved for Augustus to relinquish the ambitious design of subduing
the whole earth and to introduce a spirit of moderation into
the public councils. Inclined to peace by his temper and sit-
uation, it was easy for him to discover that Rome, in her pres-
ent exalted station, had much less to hope than to fear from
the chance of arms." Finally, Augustus found no joy in war
for war's sake, as did Julius Caesar.71
Since Augustus was practically an absolute ruler, his wishes
and character would determine the policy of the empire. And,
as seen above, it was contrary to Augustus' character and wishes
to carry on extensive wars of conquest. Further, that peace
was Rome's object at this period is universally admitted.72 The
reason for this desire for peace Meyer sums up as follows:73:
'weil die Kämpfe des letzten Jahrzehnts einen so furchtbaren
Charakter getragen hatten, weil . . . . aus dem entsetz-
lichen Elend der Zeit nur ein Gefühl übermächtig sich erhoben
hatte, die Sehnsucht nach Frieden, nach Ordnung und Sich-
erheit um jeden Preis.' While it is true that this feeling
and condition refer more particularly to the early part of
Augustus' reign, the same policy of peace manifested itself all

70Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ed. 1910, I, p. 1 f.
71Gardthausen, I, p. 317: "Freude am Kriege und an Eroberungen ist
bekanntlich das Letzte, was man dem jugendlichen und doch staatsklugen
Caesar billiger Weise vorwerfen konnte." Tacitus' statement (Ann.,
I, 3), that Augustus' later wars against the Germans were "abolendae
magis infamiae ob amissum cum Quintilio Varo exercitum quam cupidine
proferendi imperii", does not necessarily mean, as is often inferred, that
the earlier wars aimed to enlarge the empire.
72Vell., II, 89: "Finita vicesimo anno bella civilia, sepulta externa,
revocata pax, sopitus ubique armorum furor, restituta vis legibus, iudiciis
auctoritas." This is well expressed by Botsford, Hist. of Rome, p. 205:
"The chief aim of Augustus was to protect the frontiers, to maintain
quiet by diplomacy and to wage war solely for the sake of peace."
73Kleine Schriften, p. 455.
through his rule, and was continued by his successors.\textsuperscript{74} The fact that the doors of the temple of Janus, which had stood open for more than two centuries, and had been previously closed but twice since Rome's beginning in recorded history, were closed three times in the first few years of Augustus' reign\textsuperscript{75} proves that he was eager for a cessation of war.

The previous discussion shows that the effect of Varus' defeat has long been exaggerated; that this reversal was a mere incident, "a wound to the pride rather than to the prosperity of the empire."\textsuperscript{76} While it was without doubt of greater consequence than the loss of Lollius' legion\textsuperscript{77}, which occurred at the beginning of the Germanic incursions across the northern border (16 B. C.), the overthrow of Lollius, coming at an earlier date, should naturally have influenced Rome's policy more than Varus' misfortune, which came long after her plans of conquest, as many suppose, had been definitely formed. If a defeat did not cause Rome to take a backward step, when she was merely on the defensive, it seems highly improbable that "a wound to her pride" could have done so, when she had once definitely assumed the offensive. If there is any truth in the theory that Augustus intended to subdue and organize Germany into a province, no satisfactory explanation has been offered as to why he allowed a defeat, which was of such little military or political consequence, to interfere with a national policy of so great moment.

We must now examine in more detail three questions which have a very important bearing on the subject under discussion. First, why did Augustus begin his wars against Germany? Second, was Germany ever subdued by Rome and organized into a province? Third, if not, and if the attempt was made, why


\textsuperscript{75}Suet., \textit{Aug.}, 22: "Janum Quirinum, semel atque iterum a condita urbe ante memoriam suam clausum, in multo breviore temporis spatio terra marique pace parta ter clusit."


\textsuperscript{77}Dio, 54. 20; Suet., \textit{Aug.}, 23.
was the effort not carried to completion? In the absence of documentary evidence historians must have recourse to conjecture to explain why Augustus, contrary to his well-known personal inclination, contrary to his peace policy of years, attempted the conquest of Germany. The view has been advanced that he had a burning ambition for world-empire, and, through mere desire for military renown, he wished to see himself at the head of such an empire; that as a part of his plans to that end, the attempt at conquest was begun. This view merits little consideration, as it has been rejected by practically every competent historian who has investigated the subject⁷⁸, despite the fact that it enlists the support of von Ranke, whose authority, to be sure, in the field of ancient history is relatively slight. He sees in Augustus’ plans with respect to Germany “das ideale Ziel der Welteroberung⁷⁹, welches aus einem ungeheuren geographischen Irrthum entsprang. Man meinte, nach Osten weiter schifffend in das caspische Meer gelangen

⁷⁸See Eduard Meyer, Kleine Schriften, p. 230: “He [Augustus] might have followed the precedent of Caesar and have aspired to world-conquest and absolute monarchy; by shrinking from it, by giving the state a new constitution and retaining for himself only limited powers, he made world-conquest impossible”; Ibid., p. 470 f.; Gardthausen, I, p. 1069; Drumann, Röm. Gesch., IV (1910), p. 300; Gibbon (see above p. 57). It is refuted also by the emperor Julian, who shows himself to be singularly well-informed regarding the history of the early empire (Cf. J. Geffcken, Kaiser Julianus, Leipzig, 1914, p. 150: “Julian zeigt . . . wie gründlich er sich mit der Geschichte jener Zeit beschäftigt hat”). In The Caesars, 326 C, he represents Augustus as saying: “For I did not give way to boundless ambition and aim at enlarging her [Rome’s] empire at all costs, but assigned for it two boundaries defined as it were by nature herself, the Danube and the Euphrates. Then after conquering the Scythians and Thracians I did not employ the long reign that you gods vouchsafed me in making projects for war after war, but devoted my leisure to legislation and to reforming the evils that war had caused.” (Trans. by Wilmer Cave Wright).

⁷⁹Op. cit., p. 12. There is at least consistency in von Ranke’s position. The only conceivable reason for the conquest of Germany would be precisely such a fantastic dream of universal empire. But the weakness of the whole argument of those who claim that Germany’s conquest was intended is that its logical consequences lead to absurd results, contradicting all that we know of the character of the emperor and of his times.
zu können, das einen Busen des indischen Weltmeeres bilde, welches die Erde umkreise." Further, he speaks of Augustus' ambition as directed toward the unattainable. But there is no evidence to show that the sober-minded Augustus ever indulged the vision of world-empire that haunted Alexander. Moreover, it is too much to assume that he shared the colossal geographic error of Strabo.\textsuperscript{80} And even if he had, that is no reason for assuming a desire to conquer the whole world. Besides, universal dominion must have included the South as well as the North, and there was never any attempt by the Romans to push their conquests far into Africa, either directly from Egypt into the Sudan or along either eastern or western coast. Furthermore, the conquest of Britain must have been an important milestone in such an undertaking, yet there was no move in the long reign of Augustus toward that end. Finally, Augustus must have had much clearer conceptions of the immense stretch of Asia, as he was the first of European monarchs to receive ambassadors from China, a region which these same ambassadors must have made clear to him lay far beyond the utmost confines of Parthia, or the remotest conquests of Alexander. On the other hand, if he had wished to send his legions to the ends of the earth, it is unthinkable that he would have waited until fifteen years after he had become master of the Roman world as a result of the battle of Actium. And for a beginning, to engage in slight and irregular campaigns with small armies, no consistent plan of action, and with the requirement that each fall the legions were to recross the Rhine and winter behind the frontier! If this be the indication of a policy of universal dominion its futility is nothing less than colossal. The madcap fancies of the "Emperor of the Sahara" would look like the combined sagacity of Bismarck and von Moltke in comparison. It is to be remembered too that plans for universal empire would have brought Augustus into conflict with the Parthians, with whom he was very careful to avoid war, preferring the less hazardous weapons of diplomacy. Further, it is to be borne in mind that by character and from principle Augustus was committed to a policy of peace. The brilliant successes of his earlier rule, instead of firing him with a desire for world-empire, brought to him the conviction that his empire was large enough. Neither the wish nor the need of enhancing his military renown can

\textsuperscript{80} II, 39.
be used as a valid reason for his having altered his belief in this respect.\textsuperscript{81}

Kornemann\textsuperscript{82} indeed maintains that Augustus suddenly became warlike about the year 4 B. C. The events leading up to, and the evidence for, such a singular reversal of policy he gives as follows. In 5 B. C. the Roman senate agreed that Gaius Caesar, grandson of Augustus and heir presumptive, should be consul, as soon as he had attained the age of twenty. Augustus, with a successor thus assured, invited the people to share his own joy and that of the prince’s family in the celebration of public festivals, in the construction of buildings, in the distribution of largesses, donations, etc. to the public. At this time Augustus added to the \textit{Monumentum Ancyranum} (which Kornemann believes was a political document written in five distinct parts and at as many different periods\textsuperscript{83}), the second part, chapters 15-24, in which he enumerates with satisfaction all that he has done for the people, for the city of Rome, and for the army. Then in 2 B. C. Lucius Caesar obtains the same favor as his brother Gaius, and shortly thereafter aids in the establishment of the Roman protectorate over Armenia. Thereupon Augustus, forgetting that he had already represented himself as the champion of peace, and yielding to the love of military glory and conquest, added, about 1 B. C., a third part, chapters 25-33 with chapters 14 and 35, in which he sets forth what he has done to strengthen the Roman power in the provinces and to extend it beyond, dwelling all the while on the part that his grandsons and future successors have played in this achievement. However, Kornemann’s theory and the deduction therefrom as to Augustus’ attitude toward imperial con-

\textsuperscript{81} Cf. Drumann, \textit{Gesch. Roms},\textsuperscript{2} 1910, IV, p. 300: “Octavian ergriff als Imperator das Schwert nur zu seiner Verteidigung; er führte nur gerechte Kriege; die Lorbeerren reizten ihn nicht, und darin, nicht in der Ueberzeugung, dass ein endloss vergrösserter Koloss in sich zusammen-stürzt, lag die erste und vorzügliche Ursache seiner Mässigung. Gern hätte er den Tempel des Janus für immer geschlossen.”

\textsuperscript{82} “Zum Monum. Ancyr.” \textit{Beiträge zur alten Gesch.}, II (1902), pp. 141-162.

\textsuperscript{83} This view, together with the statement that the last addition was made by Augustus in 14 A. D., was subsequently modified by Kornemann in placing the number of revisions at seven (\textit{Klio}, IV (1904), pp. 88-97), and the final revision at the end or middle of the year 6 A. D. (\textit{Beiträge zur alten Gesch.}, III (1903), p. 74 f.).
quest find contradiction in an article by Wileken\(^4\), who argues that while Augustus worked long over the document nothing was added after the year 6 A. D. Further, the three parts, *honores, impensa, res gestae*, form a whole, and were written at one and the same time. Augustus filled in the original outline with details which may be easily detected. For example in chapter 26 the provinces of western Europe are thus enumerated: Gaul, Spain, Germany. Now Germany, according to its geographical position, ought to stand at the head of the list, but its position of third in order is proof that it was inserted after the other two.\(^5\) For Germany could not have been called a province until after the campaign of Drusus to the Elbe in 9 B. C. Hence the first outline of the *res gestae* antedates not only the year 1 B. C. (proposed by Kornemann), but even 9 B. C. Therefore Augustus' warlike tendency developed, if at all, prior to 4 B. C., the date claimed by Kornemann.

This conclusion Kornemann combats\(^6\) with the assumption that while the passage referring to the western provinces shows clear traces of interpolation, the name of Germany was not inserted until the year 6 A. D., at which time there was entered also the mention of Tiberius' naval expedition to the coasts of that country in 5 A. D. The insertion of each item attests the desire which Augustus felt at that time to bring into relief the services rendered to Rome by his adoptive son and sole heir. But the chapter as a whole, he avers, is older than this, and the reasons for attributing it to the earlier date remain unshaken. Bésnier\(^7\), on the other hand is undoubtedly right in saying that it is impossible to follow Kornemann in assigning precise dates


\(^5\)Vulić, “Quando fu scritto il monumento Ancyrano,” *Riv. di Storia Ant.*, XIII (1909), pp. 41-46, objects to the theory of interpolation in chapter 26. In it Augustus says: “Gallias et Hispanias provincias et Germaniam . . . . pacavi”, i. e. the Gauls and the Spains are considered real provinces, while Germany is a neighboring territory, over which for the time Rome's beneficent influence was extended. The necessity of bringing out this distinction made imperative the repetition of the word "provinciae" (read two lines above), and this repetition justifies the abandonment of the geographical order.


to each fragment of the *Monumentum Ancyranum* and in tracing point by point, from 23 B. C. to 14 A. D., the successive accretions to the text. The most that can be said is that the three parts, *honores, impensa, res gestae* were written at three different times and that they correspond to the different and successive preoccupations of Augustus. We may feel certain, however, that Augustus did not revise his work just before his death, and that he ceased to add to it in the year 6 A. D. 88 Kornemann’s theories are super-subtle and break down under a cumulation of interdependent suppositions, besides being psychologically almost inconceivable. Their rejection by such scholars as Wileken, Gardthousen, Koepp, Mareks, Vulić, and Bésnier completely invalidates his view as to Augustus’ attitude toward the expansion of the empire by conquests. Kornemann feels keenly, as do others, the psychological difficulties in the way of explaining Augustus’ Germanic campaigns as due to thirst for conquest. He therefore attempts to suggest a plausible motive, i. e., to give the young princes their “baptism of fire”, and a chance to win the military prestige, which down to that time every great Roman had had. But his effort fails for reasons which may now be summarized as follows: (1) If Augustus really was engaged in the conquest of Germany he had been at the task ever since 10 B. C., and not merely since 4 B. C. (2) The explanation offered creates far greater difficulties than it avoids. (3) There is no need of any explanation whatever, if one takes the simple straightforward view of events.

More important, and very widely accepted, is the view that Augustus, in order to protect Gaul and Italy from the barbarians, was under the military and political necessity of conquering Germany. The year 16 B. C. is cited as the time which

88Cf. Bésnier, *op. cit.*, p. 145: “nous savons en tout cas, qu’Auguste n’a pas improvisé son apologie à la veille de sa mort, qu’il a commencé de bonne heure à la rédiger, au moins dès l’an 12 av. J.-C. et peutêtre plus tot encore, qu’en l’an 6 de notre ère il a cessé d’y travailler, et que dans l’intervalle il l’a enrichie graduellement d’additions nombreuses et significatives . . . . Le souple génie politique d’Auguste s’y manifeste tout entier et l’on y retrouve, présentées sous le meilleur jour, les grandes pensées dont il s’est inspiré tour à tour pendant son règne si long et si bien rempli.”
brought a significant change in Rome’s foreign policy, and committed Augustus to the subjugation of Germany. The reasons are stated broadly by Hertzberg as follows: “es waren die Verhältnisse an der gesamten europäischen Nordgrenze des römischen Reichs, die schliesslich den grossen Staatsmann bestimmt haben, abermals und in sehr umfassender Weise, eine Arena auswärtiger Kriege zu eröffnen.” The events of this year were the barbarian invasions from all the boundaries of the north. From the Danube wild robber bands made their way into Macedonia. Germanic stocks, the Sugambri with the remnants and descendents of the Usipites and Tencteri, under the leadership of Melo, attacked and killed the Roman traders sojourning in their midst, crossed the Rhine, plundered Gaul far and wide, cut off and defeated the fifth legion under Marcus Lollius, and captured its standard. To meet this danger Augustus himself was called to the Rhine, and although he found to his surprise that the enemy had retreated and the land was enjoying peace, he decided upon “einen Gegenstoss nach Germanien hinein und . . . ein Vorschieben der Marken bis zur Elbe.” It is also Gardthausen’s belief that by reason of Lollius’ defeat Augustus felt the necessity of protecting Gaul either by an offensive or a defensive policy; that he had to choose between either strengthening the army for holding the Rhine or the subjugation of Germany; and that he finally


91Monumentum Ancyranum, VI, 3.


93Dio, 54, 20; Vell., II, 97; Suet., Aug., 23.

94Paul Meyer, Der Triumphzug des Germanicus, p. 85.
decided on the latter.\textsuperscript{93} Eduard Meyer finds not only the protection of Gaul but the winning of a shorter and more distant boundary from Italy as reasons for Augustus' wars against Germany\textsuperscript{98}: "nur gegen die Germanen hat er sich nach der Vollendung der Organisation Galliens zum Kriege entschlossen: der selbe schien notwendig um Gallien zu sichern und womöglich in der Elblinie eine kürzere und zugleich weiter von Italien abliegende Grenze zu winnen." So Schiller urges the same reasons.\textsuperscript{97} Likewise it is Mommsen's view\textsuperscript{98} that Augustus' change in policy was necessary to Rome's security; that it is easy to understand how Roman statesmen, who, like the emperor himself, were opposed to a policy of subjugation, could no longer assume that it was expedient for the empire to halt at the Rhine and on the north slopes of the Alps; that "Great Germany" (so called by the Romans), which forced itself in like a wedge between the Rhine and Danube boundaries, and the Germans on the right of the Rhine, with inevitable boundary strife, were far more dangerous to Roman rule than the blazing torch in Gaul and the zeal of Gallic patriots. Hertzberg\textsuperscript{99} thinks that Augustus was greatly influenced by the eager desire for war and adventure on the part of the three military leaders of his household, his spirited step-sons, Tiberius and Drusus, and his old friend and son-in-law Agrippa.\textsuperscript{100} Gardthausen also believes\textsuperscript{101}

\textsuperscript{93}I, p. 1067. According to Niese, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 295, the decision came later, and by reason of a new attack from the Sugambrì: "Dann erfolgte 12 v. Chr. ein neuer Angriff des Sugambrers Melo, und nun ward beschlossen, um Gallien zu sichern und zu beruhigen, über den Rhein hinüberzugreifen und die Germanen zu unterwerfen."

\textsuperscript{97}\textit{Kleine Schriften}, p. 471.

\textsuperscript{98}\textit{Op. cit.}, p. 214: "Der Kaiser entschloss sich jetzt von seinem Grundsatz, das Reich nicht durch Eroberung zu mehren, abzugehen und . . . . auf diese Weise eine Grenze herzustellen welche leichter zu verteidigen und kürzer war als die jetzt bestehende."

\textsuperscript{99}\textit{Germanische Politik}, etc., p. 9.

\textsuperscript{100}\textit{Op. cit.}, 29.

\textsuperscript{101}The same statement is made by other historians, e. g., Merivale, \textit{General Hist. of Rome}, New York, 1876, p. 431; Bury (\textit{Hist. of the Roman Empire}, New York, 1893, p. 125), who speaks of "The project of extending the empire to the Albis, into which perhaps the cautious emperor was persuaded by the ardor of his favorite stepson, Drusus." Cf. Mommsen, \textit{Germanische Politik}, etc., p. 10: "Ob Augustus ganz von freien Stücken sich dazu entschloss, die Friedenspolitik zu verlassen, oder ob er dem Drängen der Seinigen [Agrippa, Tiberius, and Drusus] nachgab, die Niederlage des Lollius gab den Ausschlag."
that, while preliminary conditions urgently demanding a strong offensive policy were at hand, the desire and vigorous support of such a policy by Tiberius and Drusus was a matter of considerable weight. As for Agrippa, he was either not an open advocate of imperial conquest or did not wish to hazard his well-deserved military reputation by new ventures; moreover advancing age and illness made him cautious. As long as he lived his voice was potent in the emperor’s counsels, and no attempt was made to break away from Augustus’ policy of peace. But with his death the situation changed; youth took the place of age, and while both Tiberius and Drusus were alike supporters of the now altered policy, Drusus must be regarded as the really aggressive factor. Ferrero at the very beginning of his chapter on the “Conquest of Germania” 102 discusses the reasons therefor. He rejects “the theory of ancient and modern historians” that Augustus’ unexpected decision for expansion by conquest can be “traced to no other cause than an inexplicable change of personal will.” 103 The urgency of the undertaking depended on the fact that it was the only possible means of preserving Gaul, the value of which had been revealed to Augustus by Licinicus. Beside the economic advantages of this rich province great political advantages also were apparent. The western provinces were inferior to the eastern in population, and though national feeling affected to despise the orientals, eastern, particularly Egyptian influence, was spreading a more refined and intellectual civilization throughout Italy and the empire. “It is therefore not improbable” adds Ferrero, “that Augustus under the advice of Lici-

103 Eduard Meyer, Kleine Schriften, p. 230, citing Augustus’ decision against imperial expansion, as a remarkable instance of the power and consequence of the individual action in history, says: “If we put the question, how it came to pass that the . . . . . Germans were not bent under the yoke of Rome . . . the only reason history can give is that it was the result of the decision which Augustus made concerning the internal organization of the empire, when he had become its absolute master by the battle of Actium. This decision sprang from his character and his own free will.” On the other hand Beloch, Griech. Gesch², I, 1 (1912), p. 15, takes the traditional view: “nicht der Wille zur Eroberung hat den Römern gefehlt, sondern die Macht; wenn man lieber will, sie erkannnten dass die Eroberung grössere Anstrengungen kosten würde, als das Objekt wert war."
nus may have regarded the rich and populous province of Gaul
. . . . as a counterpoise to the excessive wealth and the
teeming populations of the eastern provinces.'" Finally we
may note the view expressed by Seeck\textsuperscript{104}, viz., that Rome dis-
covered from the events of the year 16 B. C. that only continued
conquest would permit Roman territory bordering the em-
pire's boundaries to come to quiet and fruitful development;
that the peaceful provinces had imperative need of the partially
subdued ones at their side as a protection; that if these half-
subdued territories became peaceful, and developed under
Roman culture into a condition that attracted plundering bands,
then the partially subdued must in turn be wholly subdued
until some natural protecting border of sea or desert was
reached. He concludes: "so wurde denn die Eroberung der
freien Barbarenländer in noch grösserem Umfang ins Auge
gefasst, als sie zwanzig Jahre früher beabsichtigt war.'"

Gardthausen voices the belief\textsuperscript{105} that political reasons also
forced Augustus into a policy of imperial conquest. He him-
self from principle and character was a man of peace, but
the man of peace had to reckon with both citizens and soldiers.
Not only had he to convince the former ever anew of the abso-
lute necessity of the form of government he had wrought out,
but he was obliged to gratify the soldier's desire for his natural
element, by allowing him to break the eternal monotony of
long service in peace by the glory and spoils of war. Unimpor-
tant wars, which, even when unsuccessful, were not sufficient
to destroy the equilibrium of the state, seemed to be the best
means to meet the wishes of the citizen and soldier classes.
After the civil wars a time of rest was necessary to recruit
the strength of the Roman state. This transition period
was now past and the gaps which many battles had made in
the ranks were now filled. Peace was no longer praised as the
greatest blessing. Freedom for the Romans was forever gone,
but as a recompense the empire could offer its subjects fame
in war, and by foreign victories could also strengthen itself
internally. Indeed even the opponents of Augustus' govern-
ment were easily reconciled to imperial expansion when they
saw Rome's position abroad bettered through the operations
of the army, and the burdens of the individual diminished by

\textsuperscript{104}Kaiser Augustus, p. 111.

\textsuperscript{105}I, p. 1048 f.
the empire's enlargement. But of special moment to the emperor was the temper of the army. The soldier loves war as such; the avarice of the commanders, the hope of the soldiers for booty, and the desire for adventure are all factors with which even a peace-loving prince must reckon. So Ferrero, wholly apart from conditions in Gaul, finds a necessity for some military conquest by Augustus, and says further, that this necessity was recognized by Augustus by virtue of his acute appreciation of public opinion; that some important enterprise at this time had to be found, which would occupy the attention of the people as a whole, and would serve as a concession to the ideas of a new generation, which could not sympathize with the peaceful ideals of the early empire, and which was restive under Augustus' social reforms. Further, Augustus saw clearly the decadence in Roman society; that the Roman aristocracy was now willing to die by a kind of slow suicide in physical and intellectual indolence and voluptuousness, tendencies which were personified by Ovid and which were beginning to act upon the new generation, as peace dispelled the recollections of the civil wars, and as Egyptian influence grew stronger.

By way of summary we may note at this point that of the long series of opinions and explanations given above:

(1) One set assume a sudden change of Augustus' peace policy through mere desire of conquest for its own sake. These have been shown to have no basis in fact.

(2) Another set assume that Augustus, in order to protect Gaul and Italy, found it necessary to conquer Germany and make it a province. But this process as a protective policy, as Seeck admits, would have been a futile one, for it would have been necessary to continue it indefinitely. That is, as soon as each new province became civilized the bordering territory must have been subdued until some great natural barrier for a frontier was reached. Such a barrier did not exist. The great plains of Northern Europe were known by all, statesmen as well as geographers, and by none better than Augustus himself. Such a policy would have been one of sheer stupidity, a quality that we

must not impute to one of the most astute political geniuses of the ancient world.

(3) Another set assume that Augustus was influenced in changing his policy by his stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus, and by the desire to give his grandsons, Gaius and Lucius Caesar, a chance to win military prestige. But on the one hand there is no evidence whatever for such an assumption, and on the other it is at variance with what we do know of Augustus’ caution and singular independence in dealing with matters of state.

(4) Still other views assume that Augustus was compelled to yield to the demands for war by army and citizens. But where is there a shred of evidence to show that the Roman army pined for conquest? On the other hand in the long and melancholy list of military revolts and imperial assassinations during the empire no cause is more frequently given than the dislike of active campaigning against a dangerous enemy, and the strictness of discipline which it demanded. Troops constantly revolted because they were compelled to leave comfortable quarters and go to distant ends of the empire on campaigns. Under great and successful generals like Trajan, there would not likely be revolts against profitable conquests, but where is the evidence to show that the army as such ever demanded conquests, and had to be appeased? Least of all conquests in Germany, where there was no spoil, nothing but privations, dense forests, untrodden ways, storms, and in particular a savage foe. Armies mutinied when ordered to undertake wars against the Germans: there is no instance of their urging a campaign against them. As for the demands of the citizens for wars it may be said that hatred of wars and praise of peace is the key note of the literature of the period. Nothing can be further removed from the demands for war than the spirit in which the elegiac poets, for example, pride themselves on their disinclination to encounter the perils and hardships of war. The senate and nobility were not eager for war, since an emperor’s conquest made him even more powerful and necessary to the state, while working a corresponding diminution in the prestige of the senate and the nobility. As for the plebs urbana, they had by this time lost practically all their political activity and influence. Neither their condition nor their temper would prompt
them to yearn for a war, which would likely result in their being called away to service from the distributions of corn in the city, from the largesses of money, and from the games now more numerous and splendid than ever.

(5) It will be observed further, that all the views cited above assume: (a) that the conquest of Germany was the only means at Augustus’ disposal for protecting Gaul; (b) that his conflicts on German soil could have had no other purpose than Germany’s subjugation. These views, however, prove nothing further than that Gaul needed protection, and that to this end battles were fought in Germany. Evidence will be presented to show that at this period, in Germany as elsewhere, Rome was endeavoring to protect her borders by a show of military strength, and by rendering friendly considerable portions of territory between these borders and the strongholds of the enemy. A study of Rome’s several campaigns from this point of view justifies such a conclusion. Only in this sense could Rome have sought to establish at the Elbe a shorter and more distant boundary from Italy. The "bufferstate" policy (see Chapter IV), once we concede it as a possibility, makes unnecessary any speculation as to who, if any, of Augustus’ military advisers was responsible for his abandonment of peace plans, so long maintained. The military movements involved in such a policy, in lieu of imperial conquest, would satisfy very well the longing for adventure, and even for the spoils of war, on the part of the Roman soldiery. Foreign victories were scarcely needed to strengthen the internal organization of the Roman state. And it seems difficult to believe that Augustus could have expected to find in them any effective antidote for the decadence in Roman society, a decadence which had begun during, and largely as a result of, a period of conquests, and had grown apace down to the days of his own reign. It was from the middle class, in whom the frugal and constant virtues of earlier days still survived, not from the fashionable upper classes, the young nobility, to whom Ovid’s writings appealed, that the empire drew its solid and dependable support.

We must now consider the matter of a German province in the time of Augustus. Many assert that the subjugation
was complete or practically complete;\textsuperscript{107} that the provincial organization was just about to be put into operation when disaster overtook Varus, and made such an organization forever impossible.\textsuperscript{108} Gardthausen thinks\textsuperscript{109} that Drusus' death came opportune for German freedom; that although his three campaigns did not reduce Germany to the actual condition of a province, Drusus had nevertheless laid sure foundations for the subjugation of that country. And while he can point to no certain evidence Gardthausen believes the Romans established garrisons in the very heart of the land\textsuperscript{110}: Koepp sees no reason to conclude that Germany was ever a Roman province\textsuperscript{111}; he is quite

\textsuperscript{107}Mommsen, \textit{Germanische Politik}, etc., p. 13: "wie Gallien durch Caesar, so war vierzig Jahre später Germanien zum römischen Reiche gebracht, die neue Monarchie mit Waffenruhm und Siegesglanz geschmückt worden." In explanation of the fact that still later, in Tiberius' time, Germany is spoken of as "almost a province" (Vell., II, 97, 4), Mommsen says: "so ist es begreiflich genug, dass man das nachherige Aufgeben desselben mit dem Willen des Augustus zu beschönigen bemüht war." Niese, \textit{Grundriss der röm. Gesch.}, 1910, p. 297; Gardthausen, II, p. 1197; Fr. Kauffmann, "Deutsche Altertumskunde" (in Matthias' \textit{Handbuch d. deutschen Unterrichts}, München, 1913, p. 317): "In den Jahren 12 v. Ch. Geb. bestand offiziell eine römische Provinz Germanien, die das Land vom Rhein bis zur Elbe unfasste."

\textsuperscript{108}But see the evidence to prove that as late as 6 A. D. Augustus did not consider Germany a province. (See Chapter III, note 85). Augustus' own opinion as to whether it was or was not a province at this date is of the highest value for our question. For if he did not so consider it, then a great deal of first class documentary evidence is necessary to establish the fact that it really was a province. Similarly some convincing reason must be given to account for his failure to call it a province. Such evidence is not forthcoming. On the other hand there is no evidence to show that Augustus did regard it as a province but was hindered by the defeat of Varus from formally organizing it as such. For since no part of the \textit{Monum. Anycr.} was written after 6 A. D., it cannot be cited as evidence of any change in Augustus' views after 9 A. D., as is often done on the assumption that the final revision of that document took place in 14 A. D.

\textsuperscript{109}II, p. 1089.

\textsuperscript{110}, p. 1198: "Wenn auch die von Schuchhardt gefundenen Reste zweifelhaft sind, so bleibt doch immer die Thatsache bestehen, dass die Römer im Innern von Deutschland Castelle angelegt haben."

\textsuperscript{111}\textit{Die Römer in Deutschland}, p. 34. Eduard Meyer, in \textit{Kleine Schriften}, p. 230, expresses the same view in different words: "Now the very existence of Teutonic languages is a consequence of the fact that Germany was not subdued by the Romans . . . . Caesar would
sure that the part on the right of the Rhine was never such, either before or after the battle with Varus.\textsuperscript{112} Zumpt\textsuperscript{113} was probably the first to deny the existence of a province in Germany. Later, however, Mommsen's view became the accepted one.\textsuperscript{114} He mentions for the year 16 B. C. a "governor of Germany", and gives for the years 9-6 B. C., during which the land between the Rhine and the Elbe is described as "a province, though still by no means reduced to tranquillity", a discussion on the "Organization of the province of Germany", as evidence for which he adduces the administration of Roman law, and the establishment of an altar to Augustus among the Ubii. Next, for the years 6-9 A. D., he speaks of the "province of Germany", as an undoubted fact, and says that the battle of the Teutoburg forest was the reason for "giving up the new German province" (p. 52). Quite positively he says (p. 107): "The original province of Germany, which embraced the country from the Rhine to the Elbe, subsisted only twenty years", i. e., 12 B. C. to 9 A. D. Further on (p. 108) we are told that "the governorship and the command were not, in a strict sense done away with by that catastrophe, although they were, so to speak, placed in suspense", and that out of the parts on the left of the Rhine, and the remnants of the district upon the right, there were formed the two Roman provincies of Upper and Lower Germany\textsuperscript{115}; that these were "in the territory which properly belonged to the Belgic", but that the latter, since a separation of the military and civil administration was, according to the Roman arrangements, excluded, was placed for administrative purposes also under the commandants of the two armies, so long as the troops were stationed there" [east of the Rhine].

have subdued Germany as well as he did Gaul when he had once begun; but for the military and financial organization which Augustus gave to the Roman world, the task was too great indeed. So the emperor left Germany to herself."

\textsuperscript{112}Westfalen, p. 40: "das rechtsrheinische Germanien ist niemals eigentlich Provinz gewesen, auch nicht vor der Varusschlacht."

\textsuperscript{113}Studia Romana, 1859, p. 130.

\textsuperscript{114}Röm. Gesch., V, p. 23 f.

\textsuperscript{115}In Germanische Politik, etc., p. 13, Mommsen suggests that these terms, Upper and Lower Germany, later and improperly applied to the small territory on the left bank of the Rhine, were probably original designations for Germany between the Rhine and the Elbe. For the correct status, see Riese's view as given below, p. 73 ff.
The relation of this so-called province of Germany to the great Gallic-Germanic command is discussed by Hirschfeld, who believes that the separation of the command over the Rhine legions from the Gallic governorship was complete in Augustus’ time. In like manner Marquardt thinks that as a consequence of subjugation on the east side of the Rhine there arose the two provinces of Upper and Lower Germany, whose organization was interrupted by reason of the unexpected events of the year 9 A. D. Schiller also speaks of a division into two provinces, but regards the establishment of the provinces as planned rather than actually carried out. While he includes the Germans on the left bank of the Rhine in the Belgie, one of the three Gallic provinces set up by Augustus 16-13 B. C., he adds: “Wahrscheinlich nahmen später auch die beiden Germanien an den gallischen Provinziallandtagen [in Lugdunum] theil.” On the other hand, he describes Mainz in the year 9 B. C. as lying in “der von ihm [Drusus] gewonnenen künftigen Provinz Germaniae.” Further on we are told that after Quintilius Varus succeeded Tiberius, and at the same time obtained command over both the provinces of Germany, the disaster to Varus took place, and a change in the German policy of the emperor ensued, “und die Benennung Ober-und Untergermanien, einst als Benennung für das Land zur Elbe geplant, bezeichnete jetzt etwas prahlerisch den schmalen Streifen längs dem Rheine am linken Ufer.”

119 p. 219.
120 p. 229.
121 p. 233. Pelham, “The Roman Frontier in Southern Germany” (in Essays on Roman History, 1910, p. 179 f.), while speaking repeatedly of Upper and Lower Germany, limits his discussion for the most part to the period after Augustus’ time and specifically to the territory lying along the left bank of the Rhine. He says, referring to Tacitus’ statement (Germ., 29) to the effect that a stretch of territory beyond the Upper Rhine had been annexed by Rome and made a part of the province, that Upper Germany must be the province meant; that the land annexed to it was in reality “debatable land” (dubiae possessionis of Tacitus), and had been so for more than 150 years. The last sentence clearly indicates that, in the writer’s view, Rome had never had the land organized as her own territory.
who has carefully examined all the available sources, shows conclusively that no such separation was made, and that Germany was considered by the Romans as merely a part of Gaul, which they regarded as extending to the Elbe.\footnote{122} The east boundary of Roman Gaul, to be sure, was originally the Rhine, and, as land divisions in the geographical treatise of Agrippa (who died 12 B. C.), Gaul appears on the one side, while Germany with Raetia and Noricum stands on the other. The governor of Gaul (the so-called Gallia Comata) was Agrippa in 21, M. Lollius in 17, and Tiberius in 16. Then, probably during the presence of the emperor in Gaul (16-13 B. C.), the land was divided into three separate provinces—Belgica, Lugdunensis, and Aquitania.\footnote{123} The legate of Belgica naturally, as before, commanded the army of all Gaul\footnote{124}, which was on duty among the Germanic stocks on the left bank of the Rhine, and intended to serve as a defense against the Germans on the right bank of that river. Therefore such commanders could very properly be called commanders in Germany, as by Velleius (II, 97, 1): 'accepta in Germania clades sub legato M. Lollio', although, as is well known, the actual defeat of the legion was west of the Rhine, in Roman Germany, i. e., in Gaul proper. During Drusus' command, in the year 12 B. C., the three Gauls were again united. Later Tiberius, and after him Ahenobarbus, commanded, probably under like conditions, as more certainly

\footnote{122}{\textit{Forschungen zur Gesch. der Rheinlande in der Römerzeit}, p. 5 f. See also Riese in \textit{Westdeutsche Zeitschrift f. Gesch. u. Kunst}, \textit{Korrespondenz-Blatt}, xiv (1895), p. 156 f. He shows here that the two provinces, Upper and Lower Germany, were not established until the time of Domitian, some time between 82-90 A. D.: "Vor dem Jahre 90 gab es also . . . nur eine Germania, in der ein exercitus Germanicus als superior und inferior unter zwei zu gegenseitigen Hülfe verbundenen Heereslegaten standen; daggen gab es keine Germania superior und keine Germania inferior . . . Auch ist jene Germania keine Provinz, sondern der Herresbezirk des gallischen Provinzen."}

\footnote{123}{Plin., \textit{N. H.}, iv, 105; Dio, 53, 12; Oros., I, 2.}

\footnote{124}{Ritterling \textit{(op. cit.,} p. 162) believes, however, that there were only two Gauls, and that the division took place at the beginning of Augustus' reign: "Bei der Neuordnung des Reiches nach Beendigung der Bürgerkriege, i. J. 727-27, war ganz Gallien in zwei Kommandbezirke geteilt worden: der eine umfasste Aquitania und Narbonensis, der andere Gallia comata, also die Gebiete der späteren Provinzen Lugdunensis und Belgica." See also Gardthausen, I, 662; II, 355.}
Tiberius did, when a second time (4-6 A. D.) he held both the supreme civil and military commands in Gaul and the Danube lands. The only difficulty in the acceptance of such a view is that Sentinus is called by Velleius "'legatus Augusti in Germania', and by Dio "τῆς Ἑρμανίας ἀρχητού". But this does not mean that at that time there was a German province along with the Gallic one. The combined testimony of Pliny, Ptolemy, Strabo, and of Augustus himself, tells us nothing of a German province, but indicates that the Gallica extended to the Elbe. Significant too are the words employed by Velleius. Although ever ready to praise Tiberius, and to expatiate on his military achievements, in his narrative of peoples subdued by Tiberius ("in formam provinciae redacti"), he says nothing about his conquering the Germans, but "sic perdomuit Germaniam, ut in formam paene stipendiariae redigeret provinciae" (II, 97, 4). Florus is the only ancient author who supports the view that Germany was conquered and organized as a province (II, 30). And he is not only unreliable, but uses the term provincia in different senses. Once (II, 30, 23) it may mean nothing more than "land", since surely there was no province before Drusus, while in another place (II, 30, 25) it may very well refer to the province of Gaul. In answer to Mommsen's view that the establishment of a separate province in Germany is evident from the organization of courts there, and in the erection of an altar to Augustus, Riese convincingly argues that the administration of justice, which could be exercised also by a Gallie governor, proves nothing; further that the establishment of an altar to Augustus at Köln would be of significance for our question only in case it had been customary in every province for the emperor's worship to be observed in a single place. But that this was by no means true is seen from the instances of this cult in different places of one and the same province, e. g., in Asia, Macedonia, and Lycia. Riese concludes that Varus also, as his predecessors, was at the head of the entire Gallic-Germanic province. This is nowhere expressly stated in the ancient sources, but seems probable from all the facts. First of all Varus, as the husband of Claudia Pulchra, was related by marriage to Augustus, and so an available man for the position, since it was the emperor's policy from the

125See p. 27 and note.
126Marquardt, Röm. Staatsverwaltung, I2, 504.
beginning of the reorganization in Gaul to entrust this position of plenary power only to those who were closely connected with the emperor’s house. And not only are we nowhere told the contrary, but it is highly improbable that the emperor, just at the time when the Gallico-Germanic provincial arrangement was succeeding so well, would have instituted any change in it. Further, since we find that under Varus’ successor, no less than under his predecessors, the entire power of Gaul and Germany was combined, it would seem most probable that the status was not different during Varus’ incumbency.

From the foregoing it is evident that scholars are far from unanimously accepting the old view that Germany was organized into a province, or that any attempt was made to that end. On the other hand Riese’s presentation of facts has definitely proved, beyond the chance for further argument, that no such province was organized. But so strong is the force of the preconceived and traditional view that Riese, despite his successful attack on a part of it, expresses the belief that a conquest of Germany was intended. However, we are by no means restricted to Riese’s contention that Rome’s relations with the Germans, as a part of the Gallic province, looked to their subjugation. If so, they would have been treated as other peoples, including the Gauls, whom we know Rome wished to make subjects, and would not have been left in a state of uncertainty, neither a province nor yet wholly independent, as they were left for fifteen years after Tiberius’ departure for Rhodes. This very matter of indecision with reference to Germany has been suggested as directly responsible for the catastrophe which

127There seems to be no doubt that the military forces of all the Gauls were at this time under the direction of one commander; further that this position was in the nature of a commandship-in-chief of all the forces, on the lower, middle, and upper Rhine. Cf. Ritterling, op. cit., p. 187: “die Neuordnung der politischen und militärischen Verhältnisse Galliens durch Augustus seit dem Jahre 739-15 musste notwendig auch eine Aenderung in der Organisation des Heereskommandos zur Folge haben. Dem Statthalter der neugebildeten Provinz Belgica, in deren Gebiet jetzt beide gallischen Heere ihre Standlager hatten, konnte unmöglich diese bedeutendste Streitmacht des Reiches und die Führung des Krieges gegen die Germanen anvertraut werden. Anderseits machte die Grösse der militärischen Aufgaben und das Ineinander greifen der geplanten Operationen am Mittel-und Niederrhein ein einheitliches Oberkommando notwendig.”
befell Varus. So Ferrero says: "In Germany . . . . the people, apparently subdued, were not bound to pay any tribute, and were left to govern themselves solely and entirely by their own laws,—a strange anomaly in the history of Roman conquests." Nor in theirs alone, one may well add. It seems strange that such an anomalous "conquest" should not long since have been recognized as no conquest at all, and as nothing more or less than a desultory series of punitive expeditions or of demonstrations.

Once more we press the question why, if Germany was not subdued by Rome and never organized into a province, did Rome give up the attempt to do so? Many, as shown above, argue that Rome was unable to accomplish her purpose, and that the defeat of Varus was the great turning point in her policy, and the direct cause for abandoning the attempt. Gardthausen in addition to the direct cause (the defeat) finds also a more remote one. He thinks that the unfortunate family estrangement which in 6 B. C. drove Tiberius into voluntary retirement forced Augustus to suspend or give up a

128 *Characters and Events of Roman History*, p. 165.

129 See also Sadée, *Römer und Germanen*, II. Theil, p. 99 (the chapter "Die Befreiung Deutschlands durch Arminius"); Wolf, *Die That des Arminius*, p. 41 f. ("Der Befreiungskampf"). Eduard Meyer's statement that it was not possible for Rome to raise sufficient citizen troops to win back the advantage lost in 9 A. D. has already been answered (see p. 38).

130 Reitzenstein, "Das deutsche Heldenlied bei Tacitus," *Hermes*, 48 (1913), p. 268, quite correctly observes that the defeat of Varus had no such significance; that there was no change in Rome's policy until Germanicus' time, and that Rome's contest with Germany through three decades did nothing to unite the strength of her antagonist, for hatred toward Arminius and the desire for his downfall characterize a political situation which is found at a much later time.

131 Cf. also Mommsen, *Germanische Politik*, etc., p. 14 f.: "Die Unterverfung Germaniens . . . stockt mit dem Jahre 747 [7 B. C.] plötzlich. Wenn die sachlichen Verhältnisse dafür schlechterdings keinen Grund an die Hand geben, so liegt derselbe in den persönlichen klar genug vor." As reasons of a private character he mentions: (1) the deaths of Agrippa and Drusus; (2) the estrangement of Tiberius. Then, after Tiberius' return and the beginning of the war anew (4 A. D.), the following events: (1) the Dalmatian-Pannonian uprising; (2) the defeat of Varus; (3) the recall of Germanicus and the conditions surrounding the absolute monarchy of Tiberius.
plan that was well considered and already successfully begun; that this advantage nevertheless was forever lost, since Augustus could find no competent successor to Tiberius\textsuperscript{132}, and was unwilling to entrust to one person the large forces which were necessary to bring about the subjugation of the land. Although the war with Germany was costly and fraught with danger, Delbrück is of the opinion that Rome could reasonably count upon final success, since the war party which is not strong enough to risk an engagement must sooner or later succumb. Energetic prosecution of the war with Rome’s available forces would without doubt have brought ultimate victory.\textsuperscript{133} But the explanation why Rome did not continue the war which Germanicus was apparently bringing to successful issue Delbrück discovers not in the war itself, but in the inner conditions of the Roman principate. Tiberius had become emperor only by adoption; Germanicus, however, stood in the same relationship to the deceased Augustus in which the latter once stood to Julius Caesar. Tiberius was by nature jealous, and concluded that for his own safety he could not allow the same condition to establish itself between Germanicus and the legions in Germany as had once existed between Caesar and the legions in Gaul. To bring the war to a close required not only a commander of the highest ability, and with great means at his disposal, but one who had a free hand in the prosecution of the war. Tiberius did not have a general who could meet the requirements, and even if he had had such a one, would not have dared to send him. Hence after watching the course of affairs for a year or two he recalled Germanicus, and the Germans remained free.\textsuperscript{134} Koepp\textsuperscript{135} sees the

\textsuperscript{132}\textsuperscript{132}II, p. 1214; this is also the view of Ferrero, \textit{Characters and Events}, p. 165.


\textsuperscript{134}\textsuperscript{134}Practically the same point is made by Paul Meyer, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 86. That is, Germanicus was making notable progress in his campaigns, but was forced by the suspicions and jealousy of Tiberius to sheathe his sword. For the purpose of closing his career an elaborate and well-de-
reason for Germanicus’ recall not, as Tacitus hints, in the jealousy of Tiberius, but in the fact that Germanicus’ campaigns and losses were proving too expensive. Riese is closely in agreement with Delbrück’s view given above. There was, he says, no change of policy on the part of Augustus, but the change was due to Tiberius. Nothwithstanding Germanicus’ loyalty in putting down a rebellion in the legions, Tiberius was suspicious and recalled him. The Roman troops were brought to the right bank of the Rhine, and Germanicus, as commander of Gaul, never had a successor. Never again was Tiberius willing to expose his power to the danger of great leaders in command of the Rhine army. As a result of this decision the frontier forces were divided into the armies of lower and upper Germany, and, after the year 17 A. D., these were under the command of consular legates, because Tiberius was too suspicious to allow the command of these armies to be united with that of Gaul.

The great diversity of views cited above shows that as yet no satisfactory conclusion has been reached which will explain Rome’s alleged change of policy toward German territory. As we have seen, many have sought other reasons for this change beside the defeat of Varus, a clear indication that it in itself served triumph was given him May 26, 17 A. D. Von Ranke, op. cit., p. 28, on the other hand, does not believe that hostilities were renewed against the Germans under Tiberius for purposes of conquest “sondern nur darauf, die Ehre der römischen Waffen herzustellen.” Hence the Roman troops were withdrawn because “die Germanen wurden, wie Tiberius mit Recht bemerkt, für die römische Welt durch ihre inneren Entzweiungen unschädlich.”

135Die Römer in Deutschland, p. 45.
136This is not convincing to Riese (p. 12, n. 1): “Allerdings bildeten diese Schädigungen . . . nur einen und zwar nicht den wichtigsten Grund der Abberufung des Germanicus.” As for the matter of the great costs of such a campaign, one should bear in mind that the difference in cost between maintaining an ancient army on a war footing and on a peace footing was relatively slight. There was no great expense involved in the wastage of artillery and of equipment, when most of the fighting was done hand to hand, and when the soldiers required less rather than more supplies while living in part from the enemy’s country. As a professional standing army was always ready, and no new levies of troops required, not even in the greater wars, regular campaigns in Germany would have been a very slight drain on the treasury.
137See op. cit., p. 20.
is insufficient. If one must assume such a series of personal
and accidental causes, adding supposed conditions of jealousy,
weakness of the empire, inadequate finances, etc., it is evident
that the defeat of Varus ceases, even under the most favorable
interpretation, to be a great climactic cause. It was only one of
a series of contributing causes, i.e., of relatively small concern,
and significant only because of chance association with other
reasons. The whole position of the theorists as to Varus’ defeat
is full of inconsistencies, assumptions, and inferences, at vari-
ance with the evidence, and ending in the admission that after
all several other causes were equally operative. With this we
may take leave of the traditional view as to the significance of
the defeat of Varus, in the conviction that no one has reasonable
ground to continue to espouse it, when once a simple and satis-
factory solution is offered that not only recognizes but explains
all the ascertainable facts. And at this point we may summarize
the objections which have been adduced against the belief that
Augustus had in mind the conquest of Germany:

(1) Varus was defeated with a small army in a battle which
was absolutely no test of the military strength of the two
peoples.
(2) The defeat was completely avenged by Tiberius and
Germanicus, and Germany was overrun by them only a few
years later. Only twice in these campaigns did the Germans
venture to meet the invaders in the open field, and each time
they were severely defeated.
(3) The Roman power was vastly greater than that of even
a united Germany, and could unquestionably have completed
a thorough conquest had that been the desire.
(4) It was contrary in the first place to the well-known char-
acter of Augustus to attempt this war of conquest, and in
the second place, after having begun it, to abandon the under-
taking.
(5) It was also contrary to the well-recognized peace policy
of Rome at this period.
(6) It was highly unlike Rome to give up this conquest on
account of a single setback.
(7) Whatever may have been the ultimate intentions of
Augustus, certainly the methods followed were utterly unlike
those of any conquest ever undertaken, and a rational crit-
icism will try to explain the facts rather than to twist them so as to fit a preconceived theory.

(8) There was certainly no "provincia" to abandon, under any circumstances.

(9) If there was any change of policy it was under Tiberius, and to be explained by circumstances peculiar to that time. Augustus, after the defeat of Varus, went on quite as he had after the defeat of Lollius.

The cumulative effect of these objections is overwhelming, and causes the student of history not only to feel sceptical about the significance of Varus' defeat, but strongly convinced that it played no such part in the determination of Augustus' Germanic policy as is generally supposed. And since the current theory as to this defeat can be maintained only after disregarding these several and serious objections, some interpretation of Augustus' purpose must be offered which will obviate these difficulties, and still be consistent with his known policies and acknowledged acts. In the following chapter it will be made clear that Augustus had no other purpose in his operations in Germany than to make repeated demonstrations of Rome's power, in order to impress the barbarians \(^{138}\), and to make the frontier defense effective by pacifying and bringing into friendly relations with Rome large parts of the bordering territory; that it was not at any time his intention to conquer Germany, and organize it as a subject province.

\(^{138}\)Cf. Merivale: History of the Romans under the Empire, IV, p. 240: "These repeated advances . . . though far from having the character of conquests, could not altogether fail in extending the influence of Rome throughout a great portion of central Europe. They inspired a strong sense of her invincibility, and of her conquering destiny; at the same time they exalted the respect of the barbarians for the southern civilization, which could marshal such irresistible forces at so vast a distance from the sources of its power."
CHAPTER IV

A NEW INTERPRETATION

Every empire of the ancient world was bordered on one or more sides, if not actually surrounded by barbarian tribes which envied its prosperity and were ever on the alert to organize a razzia into its prosperous domains. It was therefore a prime policy of every empire builder, not merely to mark out distinctly the limits of national authority and responsibility, and to round off the lines of dominion by the inclusion of the whole of some tribe or nation, or the complete extent of a certain well defined district possessed of a unified economic character, but beyond all else to secure an easily defensible frontier line against the aggression of his civilized rivals, and the chronic brigandage of barbarian neighbors. Certainly no civilized country of ancient times enjoyed such immunity from annoyance on the part of its neighbors as did ancient Egypt, when once the upper and the lower kingdoms had been united, for it is wholly surrounded by seas and deserts; yet even here the barbarian was an intermittent danger, the Nubian and Ethiopian in the south, against whom many a Pharaoh waged punitive campaigns; the Libyan in the west; the Bedouins at the northeast; and even the sea could not protect the Delta from the ravages of freebooters from the isles, the far spread front of the latest wave of the Hellenic invaders of Greece. And two of the barbarian nations actually invaded the country in such numbers as to set up dynasties of more than an ephemeral character, the Hyksos and the Ethiopians. Less favorably situated was the civilization in the Mesopotamian valley; Elamites, Kassites, Mitanni, Khita, Aramaeans, and the brigands of the mountains, the last and most powerful, the Medo-Persians, were ready to devastate their peaceful preserves. Persia had to contend with Massagetae and Scythians;1 Philistia had the Hebrews, and they in turn the

1The whole history of Iran has been dominated by the ever recurring struggle with Turan, the barbarians of the northeastern steppes and deserts, down even to the 18th century. Compare Ed. Meyer's excellent characterization of this relation, Gesch. d. Alt., III, p. 103 ff.
Amalekites and other dwellers in the wastes; Carthage, the Numidians, Libyans, and Moors; the Macedonians had the Thracians and Paeonians; the Greeks in Asia Minor had the Lydians, in Italy, the Sabellians, Bruttians, Lucanians, Iapygians.—in short the Greek colonies had upon every coast of the three continents a fringe of warlike and rapacious enemies with whom permanent peace was an impossibility.

Rome was, of course, no exception to the rule, and once her power had spread beyond the confines of Italy it was inevitable that her extraordinary national vitality and genius for organization must keep extending her confines until strong and satisfactory frontiers were secured. By the beginning of our era the great permanent boundaries of the empire had in the main been reached. To the west lay the Atlantic ocean; the south and southeast was covered by the deserts of Sahara, Arabia, and Syria; the north had the Black Sea and the Danube; only two quarters were inadequately provided for, the northeast, Armenia, and the northwest, Germany. In the former case the uplands of the Taurus constitute a welter of confused peaks and ranges, whose trend is, however, in the main east and west, so that neither the crest of a long line of mountains nor the course of some large river supplies any satisfactory north and south line. In the latter, a relatively small river, that showed a marked tendency to flow in parallel channels, with a rather sluggish current except in a few places, and with a considerable number of islands, so that it could be crossed almost at will even by barbarian tribes, furnished inadequate protection to the rich provinces of Gaul. Had the population

2 The feeble Greek colonies on the north coast of the Black Sea, though dependent upon the Empire, were hardly an integral part thereof, and really existed more through the favor of the barbarians, for selfish personal ends, than by reason of their own strength or the protecting arm of Rome. They were little more than trading posts preserved for their mutual serviceability, not the frontiers of empire. Compare Mommsen, Röm. Gesch., V, p. 277 ff., especially 286.

3 See V. Chapot, La frontière de l'Euphrate de Pompée à la conquête arabe, Paris, 1907, pp. 377, 381.

4 Upon the general inadequacy of rivers as frontier lines there are some good remarks by Lord Curzon, The Romanes Lecture: Frontiers, Oxford, 1908, p. 20 ff., and Miss Ellen Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, New York, 1911, p. 360 ff. It is only rarely in fact that a large river actually forms a boundary line; exceptions like the Rio
on the right band of the Rhine been extremely thin, or sluggish, as for a long period it seems to have been on the north bank of the Danube, no great danger need have been anticipated here, but the Germans were, for barbarians, relatively numerous, brave, and adventurous to a fault, and passionately addicted to warfare and marauding. Under these circumstances it seems clear that an ordinary frontier line would have been thoroughly insecure. No matter how many forts and trenches might be established along the Rhine it would have been impossible to hold a single line intact even with the full standing army of the Empire. If the hostile territory extended right up to the ramparts of the legionaries, the Germans, secure in the protection of their hills, forests, and swamps, could gather an overwhelming force, cross the river and break through the fortifications at any point they pleased along a line of several hundred miles in length, before an adequate force, with the slow methods of communication then available, could be gathered to resist them. And once past the defenses, either the invaders must be allowed to harry and plunder at will, while the breach

Grandé, a short stretch on the upper St. Lawrence, the La Plata, the Amur, the lower Aras and the lower Danube, only emphasize the rareness of the phenomenon. Besides, rivers play a relatively slight rôle in military history; they can be crossed only too easily, if not in the direct face of the foe, as at Wagram, Fredericksburg, or the Yalu, at least at some point above or below. In the long course of the German wars the river Rhine plays a most subordinate part; battles were fought freely on one side or the other, but none, that we have noted, for its actual passage, unless an exception be made of an action of Drusus in 12 B. C., which Dio 54, 32, 1, thus describes: “Having watched for the Kelts until they were crossing the Rhine he cut them to pieces.” This may have been a battle for a crossing, but it seems much more plausible that it was a mere attack from an ambuscade, the river playing merely an incidental part. Of course these remarks apply only to the period of mobile armies. In modern trench warfare, with solid lines hundreds of miles long, any ditch, even such as the trifling Yser canal, may be a formidable obstacle; but this is a wholly new phase of military tactics.

The North American Indians were incomparably less numerous and more widely scattered than the Germans, but our Indian wars were frequent, difficult, and costly to life and property. Probably no other nations with which civilized peoples have had to deal have made such a cult of valor and of rapine as did the ancient Germans and the North American Indians.
was repaired to stop the influx of others, or else, if they were pursued and hunted down, the forts must be weakened to the imminent danger of a repetition of the same event at some other point.

There were but two ways to remedy this situation. One was to give up the Rhine as a frontier and to push on; but this would merely have transferred the scene of difficulty, not removed it, for bad as the Rhine may have been it was the best available frontier in this direction until one came to the Arctic Ocean and the Ural Mountains; or if only the Germans were so dangerous as neighbors, the limits of the empire must have been pushed to the almost equally impossible line of the Vistula, or beyond, in order to include them all within its confines; and finally, a very material increase must have been made in the size of the standing army, because the legions on the Rhine served not only the purpose of warding off the Germans but also of keeping in restraint the restless Gauls, while, if the frontier were fixed at the Elbe or the Oder, quite as many troops would be needed to defend it there, and many additional legions for garrison service in Belgica, Gaul, and Noricum. The other way was to buttress the frontier by securing on the right bank of the Rhine a series of friendly states or tribes, whose leading men or factions were to be kept well disposed to the empire by all the expedients of force and diplomacy. In this way the danger from the barbarian would be minimized, no sudden attacks from the proximate tribes need be apprehended, and even against a great tribal movement in the remote hinterland, like that of the Basternae, the Galatians, the Cimbri and Teutones, the Helvetians, and many another even before the Völkerwanderung, the Romans would be amply prepared in advance. The shock could be absorbed by the launching of friendly tribes, more or less strongly supported by Roman troops, against the newcomers, and, if worst came to worst, and the foe pushed his way relentlessly onward, the issue could be decided on foreign territory beyond the frontiers, and with the assistance of tribes which otherwise would have been forced to

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6O. Seeck (Kaiser Augustus, p. 110 f.) only partly recognizes the difficulties involved in the constant pushing forward of the lines of empire. It is wrong to ascribe to Augustus the absurdities which a policy of indefinite advance entails. Cf. p. 67.

7See p. 65.
join the invaders against Rome, or at the best, have remained neutral.\(^8\) Once established, such friendly relations might easily

\(^8\)These are perhaps the “strategical considerations which tempted the Romans beyond [the Rhine and the Danube], as the English have been tempted across the Indus”, to which Lord Curzon (The Romances Lecture: Frontiers, Oxford, 1908, p. 21) refers. His interesting discussion of the problems of imperial boundaries calls occasional attention to the similarity between the conditions faced by the Roman Empire, and by those of the great modern empires in Asia and Africa; e. g., pp. 8, 32, 38f., and 54. Upon one point, however, Lord Curzon’s generalization is not quite satisfactory. It is that of the difference between the policy in the East, where protectorates were freely established, and that in the West, where, to use his own words: “protectorates, strictly so-called, were not required because the enemy with whom contact was to be avoided was the barbarian, formidable not from his organization, but from his numbers; and against this danger purely military barriers, whether in Britain, Gaul, Germany, or Africa, required to be employed” (p. 38). Organized states long since accustomed to the rule of a monarch did not exist in the West, and of course the Romans could not be expected to create them, but their nearest equivalent under the circumstances, tribes closely bound to Rome by treaties of friendship and alliance, did exist, at all events in the earlier period of the empire. Certainly this was the situation in Germany, where at one time all the tribes between the Rhine, and the Weser seem to have been socii of Rome, and it was the case in Gaul before the advent of Caesar, where the Haedui had long been allies (called actually “fratres”) of the Romans (at least since 121 B. C., cf. Kraner-Dittenberger-Meusel on Caesar, Bell. Gall., I, 11, 3 and 33, 2), and even the newcomer Ariovistus, as a possible source of danger, had been solemnly recognized as rex and amicus in 59 B. C. That Ariovistus had made overtures for this recognition, having attempted to ingratiate himself with the proconsul of Gaul as early as 62 B. C., is no doubt to be admitted, as M. Bang (Die Germanen im römischen Dienst bis zum Regierungsantritt Constantins I., Berlin, 1906, p. 2f.) has convincingly argued (cf. also T. Rice Holmes, Caesar’s Conquest of Gaul, 2nd ed., 1911, p. 40), but the Romans were apparently even more eager to give than was Ariovistus to receive, in order to secure his neutrality before the impending Helvetian invasion, no doubt—nothing else would excuse the abandonment of their old allies the Haedui in the face of the outrageous treatment which Ariovistus had accorded them. A certain case of the establishment of a buffer state in Africa will be noted below. To a later period, when the Romans put all their faith in palisade and trench, Lord Curzon’s statement is no doubt perfectly applicable. But that was the time of marked decadence, when the vigorous offensive-
be maintained by the countless devices of a resourceful diplomacy, the honors and recognitions, the flattery and gifts which are so dear to the barbaric heart, and for which incalculable values have oftentimes been rashly bartered away; or, when a chief proved recalcitrant, it was easy among so ambitious and independent a nobility as was that of Germany to raise up a rival who could either compel obedience or else take his place. A We can readily believe that the subtle and resourceful Tiberius accomplished during his German campaigns more by diplomacy than with the sword, and characteristic not merely of the man but of the general situation which had been produced was his effort to console the impetuous Germanicus with the observation that the Germans could well be left to themselves now, i.e., to cutting one another's throats at the artful suggestion of Roman diplomacy. But diplomacy alone could never have initiated such a condition in Germany; nothing less was needed than the vivid fear of the legionaries, and that too not as a static body of troops however powerful, but dreaded through bitter experience of what it meant to have the cohorts carry fire and sword to the innermost recesses of the country. Barbarian defensive of the early period had changed to a defensive pure and simple, and when, instead of foreseeing and preventing invasion, men merely clung despairingly to a wall, and prayed that the barbarian might dash himself to pieces against it.

9 A good example of the way in which such affairs might be managed, is Caesar's treatment of Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, rivals among the Treveri (Bell. Gall., V, 3 f.).

10 Tacitus, Ann., II, 26: "Se noviens a divo Augusto in Germaniam missum plura consilio quam vi perfecisse".

11 Ibid.: "internis discordis relinqui." Cf. above p. 34. An example of such diplomacy on the part of the Romans is the way in which a special territory (that of the Ubii) had been assigned to the Chatti, who, for a time at least, were thereby prevented from joining the Sugambri and the national cause (Dio, 54, 36, 3; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1085). Similarly the Frisii were treated with marked friendliness, and cordial relations were maintained for more than a generation (Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1076). A party friendly to Rome was long supported against great obstacles among the Cherusci. Domitian experienced a humiliating diplomatic reverse in an effort to compel their return from exile in 2 B.C. (Dio, 55, 106, 3), but later commanders were more successful. Only after it became impossible to support them in their own land were the leaders of this party transferred to a position of safety within the empire.
peoples are easily impressed by a portentous occurrence, but with them the effect wears rapidly away, unless by frequent repetition it be seared into their consciousness. This process of terrorization had to be kept up until the fear of Rome was so great that the mere thought of invasion would be recognized as madness. The readiness with which the tribes of Gaul and even of Germany\(^1\) expressed their submission to Caesar, after some heavy stroke, is familiar to all readers of the *Gallic Wars*, but no less characteristic is the readiness with which they would take up arms at the least rumor of a reverse, or even without any change in the situation whatsoever, merely after the first effects of the news of disaster had worn away.\(^2\) For years therefore after the Rhine had been definitely determined upon as a frontier it was necessary for Roman generals to march at frequent intervals into Germany, making powerful demonstrations in force not simply among the proximate tribes, but penetrating far into the interior, so that even the remotest might trust no more to their forests and their swamps; bringing ships of war up the larger rivers not merely to support the land troops, but also to demonstrate the mastery over water as well as land, and to show how far beyond the actual frontier of the empire its outstretched arm could strike; rewarding friends and establishing them more firmly in places of authority, punishing foes individually and in small groups, beating down any armed opposition that dared to raise its head (and that was relatively seldom in the numerous campaigns that were waged), and ruthlessly devasting the territory of the intransigent, frequently in the more completely pacified districts adjusting disputes between Roman merchants and the natives, or acting as arbitrators in difficulties which had arisen between individuals and factions among the Germans themselves. Such is the picture of these German campaigns as we should draw it, filling in the meager outlines of events as given by the ancient historians. Of a similar nature are the punitive or monitory expeditions carried on by the French, the British, and the Russians, in their dealing with similar barbarous or semicivil-

\(^1\)The Ubii had made a treaty of friendship and given hostages even before Caesar crossed the Rhine in 55 B. C. (*Bell. Gall.*, IV, 16, 5).

\(^2\)Compare Caesar's admirable characterization of the Gauls (*Bell. Gall.*, IV, 5), who in this respect are typical of many, if not most, primitive peoples.
ized tribes upon the borders of their African or Asiatic empires. Real warfare was rare, a pitched battle seldom took place\textsuperscript{14}, but the repetition of the demonstrations gradually had its effect even upon the fierce and rapacious Germans.

Let us examine from this point of view the actual conduct of the Germanic campaigns, bearing in mind the utter dissimilarity with the methods employed by Caesar for the conquest of Gaul under similar conditions. In the first place no army posts, forts, or powerful garrisons were established and maintained in Germany. Also was nothing more than a station for munitions of war and no doubt traders' stocks of goods\textsuperscript{15},

\textsuperscript{14}Compare the remark of Tiberius noted above (Ch. IV, n. 10). In his two expeditions into Germany Caesar fought nothing that he could dignify with the appellation of a battle (cf. Florus, I, 45, 15: "fuga rursus in silvas et paludes, et quod acerbissimum Caesari fuit, non fuere qui vincerentur"). The same is true of Agrippa in 37—"he crossed the Rhine for the purpose of making war", says Dio (48, 49, 2), not that he actually fought a battle; and such is the case with the other German campaigns, always the vaguest terms, never any details of a severe engagement; a few skirmishes undoubtedly took place, and there was plenty of ravaging and burning, but pitched battles must have been very rare. Even the disgraceful defeat of Lollius was not followed by any battle (Dio, 54, 20, 6). The tumultuous assault on Drusus in 11 B. C. (Dio, 54, 33, 3) was hardly more than a skirmish, as the enemy remained in the field, and is represented merely as growing more cautious thenceforward. This was hardly a "decisive, brilliant victory" as Gardthausen (\textit{Augustus}, I, p. 1083) calls it. Indeed the defeat of Varus, and the two engagements of Germanicus, which Tacitus describes, are the only certain "battles" that were fought in more than 50 years of intermittent campaigning.

\textsuperscript{15}Roman traders were active far beyond the limits of the empire. They constitute a familiar feature of Caesar's campaigns in Gaul. For example, they were present in such numbers and with such equipment at the surrendering of the Aduatuci (\textit{Bell. Gall.}, II, 33) as to purchase and take over at once 53,000 captives, and a small campaign in the Alps was undertaken upon one occasion merely to open up a trade route for them (\textit{Ibid.}, III, 1). They mingled with the Suebi under Ariovistus (\textit{Ibid.}, I, 49, 1) and had frequently entered Germany, where they exerted a marked influence upon the Ubii (\textit{Ibid.}, IV, 3, 3) long before Caesar's advent into Gaul. In later years we hear of them occasionally in Germany (Dio, 53, 26, 4; 54, 20, 4 etc.). Varus' army had a large \textit{tross} (Dio, 56, 20, 2), which must have been in part at least composed of traders. A. C. Redderoth (\textit{Der Angrivarianwall und die letzten Römerschlachten des Jahres} 16 p. C., Toronto, 1912, p. 10 f.)
and it was established so short a distance from the Rhine, only a trifle more than 30 miles from Vetera, as to have little more effect in overawing the tribes in its vicinity than did the powerful fortresses along the Rhine itself.\textsuperscript{16} The fort built by Drusus in Mt. Taunus can hardly have been much out of sight of the Rhine, and doubtless served merely to secure an easy entrance into the upland country for the garrisons farther south along the river.\textsuperscript{17} These two posts certainly could have had no direct influence upon the maintenance of authority in the remote interior. Flevum on the coast was a feeble trading post for merchants, sufficient only to hold their supplies, give a safe anchorage for their vessels, harbor an occasional Roman war vessel which would be needed to guard against the danger of piracy, and protect a few ships engaged in coast traffic towards the north and the northeast. \textit{On rare occasions it might serve as a naval base for a large fleet sent out to make a demonstration along the coast and rivers of Germany.}\textsuperscript{18} None of these is doubtless correct in emphasizing the importance of commercial considerations at this time in Germany, although our sources (like ancient historians in general) give only the scantiest indications of the influence of economic interests upon history. See Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16.

\textsuperscript{16}See Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16.

\textsuperscript{17}Tacitus, \textit{Ann.}, I, 56: "positoque castello super vestigia paterni praeidii in monte Tauno." This is probably the same fort which Dio (54, 36, 3) describes as "among the Chatti beside the Rhine"; (cf. Koepp, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 20). The location is generally thought to be not far from Höchst, only a few miles up the Main. A \textit{castellum} here would merely command the entrance to a road into the interior; it would be no "Zwingburg."

\textsuperscript{18}Kornemann (\textit{Klio}, IX, 1909, p. 436) regards the words of Tacitus, \textit{Ann.}, IV, 72: "haud spernanda illie civium sociorumque manus litora Oecani praesidebat," as proving that "das Kastell eine starke Besatzung hatte." On the other hand the inability of the garrison to do more than hold the fort against the uprising (IV, 73) would indicate that the force was rather small. A Roman fort was an easy thing to protect against the Germans; even the feeble garrison of Aliso held out easily against great numbers after the disaster to Varus (cf. Delbrück, \textit{Gesch. d. Kriegskunst}, 2nd ed., 1909, II, p. 138). That Flevum was not established until the time of Germanicus, Kornemann (\textit{loc. cit.}, p. 437) has argued, in refusing to accept the plausible identification of Drusus' naval base with Flevum, and locating Borma (Florus, II, 30, 26, a form which he very properly defends) between the Cannanefates and the Frisii (\textit{loc. cit.}, pp. 430 ff., especially 437-8). Our argument is not seriously affected
can properly be denominated a "Zwingburg", yet how could the Romans have expected to maintain and make permanent a conquest over such fierce barbarians without overawing them in some wise with great fortresses located at strategical points in their very midst?

It is noteworthy also that no Roman army ventured to spend the winter on German soil except on one occasion, and that was in 4-5 A. D., when for some unknown cause (doubtless one of considerable importance judging from the way in which Velleius speaks of it), Tiberius was so long delayed in the north that his active campaign was not over until December, and winter must have been upon him before he could reach the Rhine.\(^\text{19}\) In this case he remained "ad caput Iuliae", as near the permanent camps doubtless as he could get.\(^\text{20}\) The next summer an extensive campaign was undertaken to the north and east, and with the cooperation of the fleet even the Elbe was reached, but that this encampment in the confines of Germany the preceding winter had meant nothing singular, and established no new policy, is clear from the fact that after this summer’s campaign, when, if ever, it would have been necessary to retain a powerful army in the "conquered" territory whose thereby, for Borma must have been yet closer to the Rhine than Flevum (Kornemann, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 437), and neither was so situated as to be a far flung outpost designed to hold conquests fast. At the very most they were merely starting points for hostile or commercial activity. To be sure, if Borma could be identified with the modern Borkum, as has been frequently attempted (cf. Kornemann, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 433, n. 1), its foundation might, with a certain degree of plausibility, be regarded as a serious move looking towards conquest, but Kornemann’s localization of Borma seems unassailable, the philological obstacles are great, and the military difficulty of setting a naval base at this period so far away from the Rhine quite insuperable.

\(^{19}\) Velleius, II, 105, 3. Dio indeed (56, 18, 2) speaks of the Roman soldiers in Varus’ time as "spending the winter in Germany". The tense used, however, the imperfect, at the head of a series of the same tenses which are used in the inceptive sense, shows clearly that the word means no more than: "were beginning to spend the winter." A single instance would be sufficient justification for the expression.

\(^{20}\) This is generally changed, following Lipsius, to \textit{caput Lupiae}, and is identified with Aliso. If Aliso be at Haltern it is strange indeed that he did not move on to the Rhine; if near Paderborn there is good reason for his having remained at a depot of supplies fully 90 miles away from Vetera.
limits are supposed to have been greatly extended, Tiberius calmly led his troops back to the Rhine as usual ("in hiberna legiones reduxit", Velleius, II, 107, 3).\footnote{21}

Furthermore, there was no building of a network of great military roads to facilitate the march of the legions far into the interior, yet if such roads were anywhere needed it was surely in Germany, where the trifling commercial trade routes could not possibly have sufficed for the sure and speedy movements of the legions and their large baggage trains. There are some vague statements regarding engineering works by Drusus\footnote{22}, and

\footnote{21}Ritterling (op. cit., p. 181) suggests the possibility that these "hiberna" are the same as those that were occupied the preceding winter, while others speak without reserve of a second winter in Germany (e. g., Gardthausen, \textit{Augustus}, I, p. 1168). But Velleius uses "reduxit", which distinctly implies that the legions were being led back across the Rhine. Besides, "in hiberna reducere" was a phrase which any one acquainted with the conduct of the German wars would at once understand as implying the recrossing of the Rhine. For "hiberna" alone as meaning the Rhine forts, see Velleius, II, 120, 3: "ad inferiorea hiberna"; see also §2 of the same chapter: "in hiberna revertitur", of the campaign of Tiberius in 10 A. D., where there is no doubt that the Rhine forts are meant (see Zonaras, 10, 37 ex.). Compare also Tacitus, \textit{Ann.}, I, 38: "reduxit in hiberna"; \textit{ibidem}, I, 51: "miles in hibernis locatur"; II, 23: "legionum aliae . . . in hibernacula remissae"; and II, 26, "reductus inde in hiberna miles"; and finally, Dio, 55, 2, 1, where Tiberius with the corpse of Drusus comes from the interior of Germany "as far as to the winter camp", i. e., across the Rhine. It is clear that "hiberna" or the equivalent, when used without a special qualifying phrase, as in Velleius II, 107, 3, means the Rhine forts and nothing else. In order to make clear that these "hiberna" were in the interior of Germany it would have been necessary to add some special note calling attention to that fact. Finally, as the spending of the preceding winter in Germany is told with such a flourish ("in cuius mediis finibus . . . princeps locaverat"), the repetition of the same deed, as enhancing its significance, could not have failed to be emphasized.

\footnote{22}The most important was certainly the \textit{fossa Drusiana} which led from the Rhine to the North Sea, through a lake, probably that of Flevum (Tacitus, \textit{Ann.}, II, 8). This may very well be identical with the \textit{fossae Drusinae} (Suetonius, \textit{Claud.}, 1). Drusus also did some work to regulate the course of the Rhine (Tacitus, \textit{Ann.}, XIII, 53, and \textit{Hist.}, V, 19). Whether he built corduroy roads (\textit{pontes longi}) over the swampy land is not so certain, though Becker, Domaszewski, and Korne mann (the references in Kornemann, \textit{Klio}, IX, p. 432 ff.) are probably correct when they interpret \textit{pontibus} (Florus, II, 30, 26) in this sense.
we hear likewise of certain structures of Domitian, the *pontes longi* in the northwestern swamps\(^{23}\), and certain *limites* and

If this was actually a coast road connecting two naval bases, Borma, a short distance from the Rhine, with Gesioriacum-Bononia (Boulognesur-mer), as Kornemann very plausibly argues (p. 432, 435), then it really connected only such naval bases as were necessary to hold the mouth of the Rhine with the general military road system of Gaul. Of course both banks of a river at its mouth must be seized in order to insure certain control, but neither the establishment of Borma nor the construction of this particular bit of road can properly be regarded as measures which necessarily had the conquest of Germany in mind, nor would they have furthered very materially such a conquest, even if it had been intended. Professor Frank (*Roman Imperialism*, New York, 1914, p. 352) seems to make too much of this canal of Drusus as evidence “that serious measures were planned from the first”. The Romans unquestionably made preparations to march into Germany and to support armies upon such excursions; the critical consideration, however, is what they did after entering the country, not their preliminary preparations. If they constantly marched out again every fall, it is impossible to speak of permanent occupation. Nor is it satisfactory to restrict the attempts at conquest to the campaigns of Drusus, 12-9 B. C., and of Tiberius, 4-5 A. D., alone. Domitian penetrated deeper into Germany than either of them, as he alone crossed the Elbe. If some invasions imply conquest then all should, or else Augustus was guilty of an incredibly shilly-shallly policy. And if all the invasions aimed at conquest, then there is an absurd disparity between their number, scale, and extent and the utterly negligible results obtained. Kornemann’s view (p. 440 ff.) that Drusus constructed a coast road as far as the mouth of the Ems can hardly be established by the evidence which he presents. It does not appear how any number of campaigns along the coast could have accomplished the conquest of the remote interior. Even if the view be accepted, however, it could only show the importance of the control of the coast, a circumstance to which we shall revert later.

\(^{23}\)For the literature on these see Gardthausen, *Augustus*, II, p. 763 f. Nothing definite is known about them. If very significant for the “conquest” of Germany, why was their construction deferred to the period of Domitian, years after Drusus and Tiberius had been engaged in carrying on the most extensive campaigns? The very fact that these early incursions into Germany had been repeatedly made without the erection of any elaborate network of solidly constructed roads, is the clearest evidence that no permanent occupation of the country was intended. For the purposes of the occasional demonstration mere “war-paths”, supplemented here and there with some light, temporary construction were entirely adequate. It is a striking fact that of permanent road
aggeres with which Germanicus connected Aliso and the Rhine, nothing at all commensurate with the ambitious schemes which the Romans are supposed to have entertained for the conquest of the country.

Finally there was no civil administration established for any part of the country, even that which might have some appearance of being under Roman sway; no colonies were founded, either military or commercial; there was no effort to push forward, to settle, and to absorb the newly acquired "province". Nor can shortness of time be put forward as an construction not a trace has been found in Germany, not in the lower Lippe valley, where, if anywhere, the highways of armies must have been solidly constructed if Germany was to be held as a province, nor even before the very gates of the camp at Haltern (cf. Koepp, Die Römer in Deutschland, 2nd ed., p. 136). Yet along the limes roads were regularly constructed, and were an essential part of the system of defense. Tiberius seems to have begun a limes in the silva Caesia, but not to have completed it (Tacitus, Ann., I, 50: "limitemque a Tiberio coeptum"). It was obviously a slight undertaking.

24Tacitus, Ann., II, 7. These were probably roads (Delbrück, Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, 2nd ed., p. 128 ff.). The use of "novis" indicates that such structures had been erected earlier. Their flimsy nature is to be inferred from the fact that the work had to be repeated in a few years, and the construction of Germanicus was doubtless no more lasting (see the preceding note).

25As for example Agrippa's system of roads for Gaul. Yet Gaul needed them far less than Germany, for it was a relatively civilized country with means of rapid communication. Caesar seems to have been embarrassed but little in his campaigns by poor roads, in sharp contrast with the conditions prevailing in Germany.

26Dio (56, 18, 2) states that "their (i. e. Roman) soldiers were beginning to winter there and were founding cities", but just what these "cities" were, he neglects to say, and they appear nowhere else either in his narrative, or in that of any other ancient writer; yet the destruction of such incipient "cities" after the defeat of Varus is just the sort of event that could not possibly have been passed over in silence by all our sources. When Dio comes to the appropriate section in his later narrative (22, 2=Zonaras) where these should be mentioned, he speaks of nothing but "forts" (ἐπιθυμας). It is perfectly clear that his sources knew nothing about real "cities", and that from his knowledge of the way in which settlements grow up about any army post however small, he is indulging in a little exaggeration in telling of the foundation of "cities" so as to give the desired background for his picture of a complete reversal of conditions in Germany.
excuse for failure to perform these characteristic features of a regular Roman conquest. Two generations had passed between Caesar’s first passage of the Rhine and the defeat of Varus, forty-seven years since Agrippa had crossed the same river, or, if we consent to take the date generally set for the conquest of Germany, the last campaign of Drusus, 9 B. C., eighteen years of Roman domination had elapsed before the battle of the Teutoburg forest, yet nothing of any real importance had been done to organize the “new province”. For the earlier part of this period since Caesar, one might indeed argue that Rome had been engaged in more absorbing enterprises, to wit, the civil wars, but since the battle of Actium, or at all events since the establishment of the dyarchy, Augustus had a perfectly free hand to complete any project whatsoever that he may have had in mind with regard to Germany. Drusus, Tiberius, Domitian, Vinicius, and Tiberius again had campaigned often enough beyond the Rhine, but nothing was actually done toward finishing any formal conquest. Nor will it do to ascribe to Augustus, as is generally done, the policy of turning over to Quintilius Varus the last formal act of organizing the province. What less opportune moment could possibly have been selected than just the period of the Pannonian revolt, when the Rhine armies were reduced below their normal strength, and a man placed in charge, who, whatever his other virtues may have been, was certainly not an experienced general? For it would certainly be expected that the formal establishment of complete imperial administration in Germany would have aroused what little spirit of independence yet remained (according to this theory) in German bosoms, and to have entrusted such a mission to such a man, at such a time, with such small forces, and without any of the necessary preliminary work of roadbuilding, fortress erection, stationing of garrisons and the like, would have been an act of colossal and criminal folly on the part of one of the shrewdest and most patient and calculating statesmen of the ancient world.27

27 These defects in method have not escaped the sharp eyes of the latest historian of the German wars, Camille Jullian, Histoire de la Gaule, IV, Paris, 1914, p. 117 ff. He notes especially the failure to create a great system of converging roads, establish numerous strong garrisons, found colonies, and maintain a powerful army in the land. Yet under the influence of the theory of conquest he can explain all
We must here examine the arguments of the authorities who are cited for the statement that Varus was engaged in organizing a full civil administration for the "province" when disaster overtook him. The rhetorical nature of these documents and their general untrustworthiness have already been emphasized; when we look for perfectly definite acts we find either the vaguest language, or else utterly improbable statements. Much has been said of the presence of "causarum patroni" in Varus' army, but just how much is properly to be inferred therefrom is doubtful. In the first place the evidence for their presence is the worst possible, Florus alone mentioning them (II, 30, 36 f.), and that with the most patent rhetorical purpose, and the highly colored story of how, when the tongue of one was cut out and the lips sewed together he was taunted with the remark, "Viper, you have finally ceased to hiss". But granted that some "causarum patroni" attended Varus, how much does that signify? When was the organization of a province entrusted to these men, or what official rôle would they play in such a process? Their presence is easily enough explained as an aid to the general in his semilegal activities. We have already observed that he must often have been called upon to settle disputes between the numerous rival nobles of Germany. Who indeed was better suited to act as arbitrator than a powerful and disinterested official of the great neighboring empire?28 Doubtless many an appeal regarding the busi-

these grave errors only as due to the ignorance and incapacity of the ageing emperor and his entourage. "Il y a eu, de la part d'Auguste, de véritables aberrations militaires" (p. 117) . . . . "Une puérile ignorance des situations se montra dans la politique romaine au delà du Rhin" (p. 118) . . . . "L'empereur vieillisait, et il semblait que sa vieillesse pesât sur tout son entourage" (p. 119). Such a position is logical indeed but quite inadmissible. One must surely recognize in this the *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole theory of conquest.

28The amount of such legal business that Varus did is emphasized by Velleius (II, 118) and Florus (II, 30, 31), but not mentioned at all by Dio (56, 18, 1) who says merely that the Germans "were establishing markets and making peaceful gatherings". Dio's account is a more military and political document; Varus there is acting in an understandable if not wholly sagacious fashion. But Velleius and Florus wish to point a contrast between the man of the forum and the man of the camp, and in so doing make Varus out to have been an utter fool. Of course advocates and law suits belong to the conventional equipment
ness dealings of Roman traders with the Germans was referred likewise to him. The only regular course of procedure would have been to act in accordance with the recognized Roman legal traditions—one surely would not expect a Roman general to dispense German law or to act merely on his passing whims—, and it would be perfectly natural to have on his general staff a few legal advisers. That Varus took their advice frequently, and that some persons felt that they had been injured when such advice was followed, and bore a special grudge against those men, may very well be, but that the final steps of turning a barbarian country into a province were being then and there taken surely cannot be established by the presence of a few legal advisers on Varus’ staff.

More serious is the statement that tribute was being assessed and collected. That this was literally true on any of the forum, and must be played up in such a picture. There is grave doubt whether Varus had any more of such matters to adjust than any other Roman general after the presence of the Roman soldier and merchant came to be no unusual thing in the land.

This time Dio alone (56, 18, 3) mentions this feature: “he gave them orders like slaves and in particular collected property from them as from subjects.” It is singular indeed that neither Velleius nor Florus is aware of any such striking change in Roman policy, the more so as Velleius (II, 117) expressly calls attention to the avarice of Varus (“pecuniae vero . . . non contemtor”) in a short character study and sketch of his previous record, so that some reference to his exactions must inevitably have been made had Velleius ever heard of them. The fact that he mentions nothing of the kind is the very strongest argumentum ex silentio against the correctness of Dio’s statement, as far as it can be considered a matter of general policy. Or, to look at the situation for a moment in its broader connections: our three main sources are equally at pains to explain the reversal of the situation in Germany, and this they very naturally do by assuming that there was a marked change of policy under Varus. All are at the same time noticeably under the ban of a tradition which represented the earlier campaigns in Germany as having produced a marked change in the character of the inhabitants: so profound was the peace established by Drusus that even the climate seemed to have been affected thereby (Florus, II, 39, 37); Tiberius as early as 8 B. C. had made Germany practically a tribute-paying province (Velleius, II, 97, 4); the barbarians established fairs and conventions, and were rapidly growing Romanized without realizing it (Dio, 56, 18, 3).

Now inconsistently enough with this picture, both Velleius and Florus, when they come to the time of Varus, describe the Germans as fierce
comprehensive scale is clearly impossible. We hear nowhere of *publicani*\(^{30}\), or any of the paraphernalia for collecting the tribute of a conquered province.\(^{31}\) That certain things were given Varus and his army by allied and friendly chiefs and tribes there can be no doubt, and these may have been objects of high specific value, as choice pieces of amber and the like, or mere supplies of grain, meat, hides, and similar material. It was not to be expected that Roman armies should march through Germany without being amply assisted by their *socii* and *amici*. An example of what such assistance may have been is the well-known case of the Frisians, who were expected to

and warlike barbarians who found irksome the piping times of peace and were ready to fall upon their masters at the slightest occasion (Velleius, II, 117, 118; Florus, II, 30, 30 and 32). On the other hand the more philosophical or consistent Dio recognized a discrepancy in these two pictures of the Germans, and sought to avoid it by representing the Germans as experiencing a re-transformation. Peaceful and pious men would not attack their masters even if they were weak and incautious, therefore Varus must be presented as a typical tyrant who treats the Germans “as slaves” and levies tribute upon them “as subjects.” Florus also (II, 30, 31) ascribes to Varus the characteristics of the conventional tyrant (*libidinem ac superbiam . . . . saevitiam*), traits about which his contemporary Velleius, who had no occasion to flatter Varus, and certainly did not do so, knows nothing whatsoever. These rhetorical flourishes in Florus are the less excusable, as they are perfectly gratuitous, for the attack of the Germans is already otherwise quite sufficiently motivated in his own narrative. Of course, the mere facts are that the Germans had never been broken, pacified and civilized, and that therefore their attack on Varus needs no specific explanation other than that he was careless enough to give them their chance. Dio's artless acceptance of the palpably exaggerated reports concerning the earlier campaigns leads him to falsify history in the interests of an illusory consistency.

\(^{30}\)Certainly if the *causarum patroni* excited the peculiar animosity of the Germans the *publicani* must have done so much more, yet not even Florus mentions the latter.

\(^{31}\)It is an axiom of historians of the ancient history of the East not to accept at face value the numerous boastful announcements of the receipt of tribute. In a very great many cases this was nothing more than an exchange of gifts, as little “*tribute*” on one side as on the other. Of course the Romans gave many valuable presents to German chieftains, otherwise it would have been impossible to maintain their friendship, the case of Flavus, the brother of Arminius, being especially in point (Tacitus, *Ann.*, II, 9).
furnish a few oxhides annually for military uses, and who started to fight when an exacting officer modified the terms of the original understanding. That the Frisians however were really a free, though allied people, at this time, there can be no question, for there is not a hint of actual Roman administration of their affairs.\textsuperscript{32} Similar must have been the case with the Cheruscans and other tribes farther inland. A certain amount of assistance was doubtless quite properly expected, and in fact the genuineness of the friendship might well have been doubted if there were no willingness manifested to be helpful.\textsuperscript{33} That Varus or some of his officers may occasionally have regarded a voluntary service of friendship or policy in the light of an obligation, and may have requested and even insisted upon more than friendship or policy would lead the Germans to regard as a fair offering, is quite possible, although with a weak force and while the Pannonian revolt was still unsubdued, it would indeed have been preternatural folly. But we are not justified in admitting any more, and this is all that our sources, stripped of a little rhetorical embellishment, really assert.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{32}Tacitus, \emph{Ann.}, IV, 72 ff. The very phrase which Tacitus uses of the outbreak of war, “pacem exuere” (IV, 72, 1), shows clearly that it was nothing like a revolt; no civil or military commanders are mentioned, only “qui tributo aderant milites.” On the friendly relations with the Frisians which were long maintained after their first contact with the Romans, see Gardthausen, \emph{Augustus}, I, p. 1076.

\textsuperscript{33}The parallel case of the friendly Indians, who, especially in the early period of colonization, frequently gave the white men valuable aid and material assistance, is very much in point.

\textsuperscript{34}We must here consider the impassioned language which Tacitus (\emph{Ann.}, I, 59) puts in the mouth of Arminius: “Germanos numquam satis excusatos, quod inter Albim et Rhenum virgas et secures et togam vide-rint, alis gentibus ignorantia imperi Romani inexperta esse supplicia, nescia tributa: quae quoniam exuerint”, etc. That this is a violent \emph{ex parte} harangue, and in no sense to be regarded as an exact statement of facts Tacitus makes sufficiently clear by calling Arminius “vaecordem” at the very moment of introducing him. On the other hand these expressions may not be wholly without justification. That criminals, outlaws, and marauders may have been beaten and beheaded is not in itself improbable. How else should a Roman commander punish injuries to his fellow citizens, or disloyalty to political or military agreements? That an occasional legal adviser was to be found on the staff of the commander in chief is altogether natural. And finally that assistance of any kind in
Finally, Dio speaks of a division of Varus' forces, whereby a large portion of his army was serving on garrison duty at one point or another in the country, and adds that after the defeat of the main body of his troops all these separate detachments were hunted down and destroyed. This would be important if it could be used as evidence for the establishment of Roman garrisons throughout the land, but it cannot. There is no hint in any other author that a large number of forts and strongholds were captured in consequence of this defeat, yet as intensifying the importance of the reverse, that must surely have been referred to by some one. Every other authority knows merely of the annihilation of Varus and his army, not of the capture of a whole series of strongholds all over the land. Besides, one asks in vain what these places were and when occupied. There is nothing in the accounts of earlier or of later operations which furnishes any answer to such questions, or a parallel to such a military policy on the part of Varus. And finally, what could have been more foolish than to divide a force, unusually small in itself, at a critical period, when the great revolt in Pannonia was not yet put down? That Varus might not have had every man of his three legions with him on the fatal occa-

the form of service or the furnishing of supplies may have been called "tribute" by an excited patriot need occasion no surprise. But it must be a weak case indeed that can find no better arguments than such statements as these for its support.

35Dio, 56, 19, 1 and 5; 22, 20 (Zonaras).

36The siege of Aliso is, of course, abundantly described. The seacoast was not given up at all, as is well known, and whatever castella may have been there were no doubt maintained. A small force was kept among the Chauci, to the remote northwest (doubtless on the sea coast), until after the death of Augustus (Tacitus, Ann., I, 38; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1227). The Taunus fort is the only other whose location is even approximately known. Germanicus found it a ruin some years later (see references n. 17 above), and it might conceivably have been destroyed at this time, but it is much more likely that the enemy did not appear in sufficient force to do this so far from the seat of the uprising, and so close to the unshaken legions of the upper Rhine. It was no doubt abandoned and dismantled voluntarily by the Romans when they felt constrained to concentrate their strength. Now these three regions are the only ones in which we have any definite record that Roman outposts were stationed. As usually happens when one examines these rhetorical flosculi they are found to be either in flat contradiction to the definite facts, or else improbable in themselves.
sion, is quite conceivable. Some detachments might have been with convoys of provisions, others out to look for supplies, yet others engaged in hunting down some band of outlaws, or in putting into execution some decision favorable to a conspicuous supporter of Rome, and that these small bands may have fallen victims after the great disaster is perfectly possible. That is all that we are justified in inferring from Dio after the veneer of rhetoric has been removed.

For we must bear in mind the marked tendencies of our sources for the administration of Varus. Florus was concocting a melodrama; Dio arranging an explanation, which should save the credit of Rome and the Roman soldier by putting all the blame on the dead who tell no tales; Velleius distorting everything in maiorem gloriam of Tiberius, for whom Varus must serve as a foil at every turn. There is therefore nothing so stupid, arrogant, or wilful that it is not cheerfully ascribed to him, while perfectly proper and natural things, like the presence of lawyers on his staff, the making of arrangements regarding the quantity and character of the assistance to be rendered by the socii, the dispersion of little detachments of troops upon one or another small but necessary service, are exaggerated into acts of wanton folly and oppression, and interpreted as the inauguration of a totally new policy. Yet every one of these things must inevitably have taken place on all the numerous similar demonstrations that had been made in Germany; the only reason that they are not mentioned elsewhere is that we have no accounts regarding other operations in Germany in which such details would have been in place. They were the ordinary routine of campaigning and of no interest to the average ancient historiographer, save as they served to point a lurid description of a disaster, or to supply a basis, however flimsy, for a misrepresentation.

Varus was, we may feel assured, doing no more, in all probability much less, than his predecessors had done on numerous occasions. Two years of heavy fighting had not broken the Pannonian revolt. The forces along the Rhine, if not actually weakened in order to enlarge those in Pannonia, would doubtless be so represented by hot-headed Germans of the nationalist persuasion, particularly after two years of utter inaction. It was doubtless in response to suggestions that Roman prestige needed some refurbishing in the interior, and very likely at the
express command of Augustus, that Varus undertook his fatal demonstration. The very fact that he left so large a force at the Rhine under Asprenas would indicate that he felt it safer to keep two armies in readiness for action at different points, rather than to concentrate his forces and so risk the breaking out of trouble in some quarter from which pressure had been removed. Without any open show of violence, rather with every expression of courtesy, confidence, and good will, he was engaged in the ordinary routine of a commanding officer upon such a demonstration in force, when suddenly attacked and destroyed. Graciousness and friendliness had been taken for weakness, as too often with the barbarian, and he and his men had to pay for a conciliatory attitude with their lives. All this is but the thing which we should reasonably expect under the circumstances; it is all that the sources, critically examined, will justify us in asserting. We do not possess, to be sure, the actual documents of alliance between Rome and various tribes or chieftains of Germany; we have in fact scarcely the name of any German preserved from Ariovistus to Arminius, but we can be perfectly certain that negotiations of friendship and alliance were frequently and solemnly entered upon. If Rome had made an alliance with Ariovistus in 59 B.C. (see above n. 8), while as yet he was a relatively unknown force, hundreds of miles from the frontier, how much more must she have been busy in organizing friendly relations with the German tribes that were immediately contiguous to the Rhine and through whose territories her armies so often marched in peace?

Finally, we would emphasize the general defensive character of the campaigns. In the great majority of cases some disturbance in Germany is definitely given as the cause of the operations, and if our sources for the Germanic wars were not so hopelessly fragmentary we should doubtless find that in every instance the Germans were the aggressors.\(^37\) Even the proposed

\(^37\)A brief summary of the provocations offered by the Germans may not be superfluous in support of such a statement. Caesar’s first campaign in Germany, in 56 B.C., was preceded by the invasion of the Usipetes and Tencteri (Bell. Gall., IV, 1), and by the refusal of the Sugambri to yield up the survivors (Bell. Gall., IV, 16). The second crossing, in 53 B.C., was due to the fact that the Treveri had received assistance from across the Rhine (Bell. Gall., V, 27; VI, 9). Disturbances in Gaul and Germany compelled Agrippa’s crossing in 37 B.C. (Dio, 48, 49, 2). In 29 B.C. the Suebi crossed the Rhine, and were defeated by
campaign against Maroboduus we have no right to regard as an act of wanton aggression, for Maroboduus had retired sulkily into the forests of Bohemia, and there developed a formidable army, and though his overt acts were conciliatory, his very presence, considering the inflammable character of the nation to which he belonged, and in which he might incite greater disturbances than had ever yet broken out, was a cause of justifiable apprehension. Indeed any other German than Maroboduus, but no invasion of Germany followed (Dio, 51, 21, 6). The punitive expedition of M. Vinicius in 25 B.C. was occasioned by the maltreatment of merchants (Dio, 53, 26, 4). In 19 B.C. Gaul was disturbed by German invaders, but Agrippa restored order without being compelled to invade Germany (Dio, 54, 11, 1). The campaign of Lollius in 17 B.C. was to drive out the Sugambri and others who had crossed the Rhine after having put to death Roman citizens in their own confines (Dio, 54, 20, 4). The first act in Drusus' campaigns was to beat back the Sugambri who began the war with a raid into Gaul (Strabo, VII, 1, 4; Dio, 54, 32, 1). Rome was by this time clearly disgusted with a situation which allowed so much opportunity for disturbance, and decided now to spread the terror of her arms far and wide on the right bank of the Rhine. For the next few years the Germans were too busy defending themselves to take the offensive. The moment, however, pressure was relaxed, new troubles started, as in 7 B.C. (Dio, 55, 3, 3), although no serious reprisal was undertaken by the Romans this time. Again, after Tiberius went into exile, "Germania . . . rebellavit" (Velleius, II, 100, 1), and this disturbance must surely be brought into connection with the extensive campaigns of Domitius in 2 B.C. (Dio, 55, 104, 2; Tacitus, Ann., IV, 44). More troubles in Germany which required to be "pacified" in 4 A.D., inaugurated the second period of activity (Suetonius, Tib., 16). Tiberius remained on the offensive until the Pannonian revolt called him away in 6 A.D. From this time until the defeat of Varus there is a blank in our information; nevertheless, from the consistent record of other Roman leaders who never went into Germany except on strong provocation, and not always even then, we feel certain that some threat of trouble in the back country alone could have tempted Varus forth on this occasion. Rome always let the Germans studiously alone as long as they kept the peace; it would have been utterly unprecedented for Varus to go into the German forests in search of trouble, were his presence not demanded there. Under the circumstances, while the Pannonian revolt was still in progress, to have wantonly run any serious risks with so small an army would have been sheer madness (cf. pp. 95, 99, 100 f.).

38 Besides, as noted just above, this was only the crowning act of a general extensive policy of reprisal, which was intended to forestall the possibility of trouble in this quarter for a long time to come. On Maroboduus see Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1152 ff.
boduus would almost certainly have acted in an aggressive fashion, and the fact that he did not seems to have been regarded by his fellow Germans as disloyalty to the national cause. Likewise the campaigns of Germanicus in 14 A. D., while apparently at the very moment unprovoked, were in reality a bit of deferred revenge for the treacherous attack upon the legions of Varus. Is it in fact not truly singular that among so many scattered references to the Germanic wars, there is nowhere, save in Florus, who has been dealt with elsewhere, any direct assertion that the purpose was conquest, reduction to a state of subjection, or the like† (Cf. pp. 27 and note; 75). All writers represent the Romans as being compelled to send troops from time to time into Germany to preserve the peace, and to make powerful demonstrations; there are none of the characteristic marks or processes of conquest. Were it not for the all but universal preconception that conquest was intended the sources speaking for themselves would tell a very different tale. That is briefly the following: for a generation from the time of Caesar to that of Drusus, Rome had been content with merely repelling attacks and punishing the immediate offenders, together with a local demonstration of her forces. That procedure finally appeared to be ineffective, and so a vigorous policy of terrorizing the Germans from further disturbances of the peace was tried. Some canals were dug to facilitate the movements of the fleet which was greatly needed for the purpose of transporting supplies upon the marches into the remote interior; close to the Rhine some swamp road construction was undertaken, subsidiary apparently to the naval operations; a few castella near to the Rhine and along the highways leading into the interior were erected as munition depots, and nothing further.\textsuperscript{39} Preparations were made to facilitate incursions into Germany, and these were repeatedly undertaken, but every year Drusus came back to his starting point upon the Rhine, after the most approved manoeuvres of the noble Duke of York, or of the perplexed Persian poet who tried to become a philosopher,

"but evermore

Came out by the same door where in I went."

The campaigns of Domitius and of Tiberius are of exactly the same character, a rally, a raid, and a relapse. Regarded as

\textsuperscript{39}For the statements of Florus regarding the general establishment of castella, see Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16 \textit{sub finem}.
attempts at conquest these operations represented from the political point of view sheer folly, from the military point of view a sequence of grandiose fiascos; considered as a prolonged series of demonstrations intended to establish a line of buffer states in the form of friendly, allied tribes as a further protection of a naturally weak frontier against the barbaric hordes of the remote swamps and forests, they were sagaciously conceived and to the highest degree successful.

Our argument has thus far followed the process of exclusion. The Roman operations in Germany were either those of permanent conquest or of demonstration; there is no tertium quid. If not conquest, and we have endeavored to refute that view at every point, it must have been demonstration. The nature of our sources does not permit a positive and detailed proof of our new interpretation; that, properly interpreted, however, they are in harmony with it, we have been at pains to show. By way of conclusion we shall undertake to strengthen our position by pointing out analogies and parallels, not merely in the general course of ancient history, but in the foreign policy of Augustus himself.

Punitive and monitory raids were frequently undertaken in antiquity without any attempt whatsoever at making permanent conquest. Such were the oft repeated razzias into Nubia made by the Pharaohs, the countless raids of Assyrian monarchs into the mountains to the east and north, especially the great campaign of Darius among the Scythians in 512 B. C.40 Of the same sort were the frequent campaigns of the

40 Compare A. Wittneben, "Dareios' Zug gegen die Skythen im Lichte des russischen Krieges von 1812", Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen, LXVI (1912), pp. 577-94, especially 588 ff. Wittneben quite properly insists that the move was not intended for conquest, but rather to clear the right flank of the Persians in a contemplated offensive against Hellas. As a demonstration it was eminently sagacious and successful, and he very properly draws a close parallel between this move and Caesar's invasions of Britain and Germany (p. 593 f.). G. B. Grundy, The Great Persian War, London, 1901, p. 58 f., shows clearly "that the expedition in the form it was made was not ... an attempt at conquest", and he regards it as either "a reconnaissance in force" or "a display intended to strike awe into the tribes beyond the newly won territory." J. Beloch, Griech. Gesch., 2nd ed., II, 1914, p. 5 f., agrees with Grundy that no conquest was intended: "er wollte nur den Skythen seine Macht zeigen, um ihnen die Lust zu nehmen, den Istrros zu überschreiten" (p. 6). Any
Macedonian kings against the Paonians and Thracians, though no serious attempt was made to extend their dominion greatly in this direction. A typical example of such chronic punitive campaigning was the service of Clearchus in the Chersonese, who used that peninsula as his base of operations while raiding the Thracians above the Hellespont. The whole history of the more powerful Greek colonies is filled with the record of such punitive expeditions intended to keep the restless barbarians at peace. Of this identical nature were Caesar's demonstrations across the Rhine in Germany, and beyond the channel in Britain. He had surely no thought of making a permanent conquest, at least at that time, but desired merely to make a display of Roman power to the barbarians who were, or might be, interfering with the security of his conquests in Gaul. It is true that the Romans were not generally in the habit of keeping a foe off at arm's length in this fashion, but preferred to close with and destroy him once for all, but the time was bound to come soon or late when even the amazing vitality of the Romans would reach its limit, and when they must content themselves with defense instead of new conquest. And this limit was first reached along the Rhine, where an effort at further advance would have involved endless difficulties.

But we are not without examples of quite the same thing from the very reign of Augustus, and that too at a period considerably prior to the disaster of Varus. Of precisely this nature was the raid into Arabia in 25-24 B.C. There is no evidence that a permanent seizure of the land was intended; but occasion was taken to demonstrate the power of Rome, and then the expedition returned. That there may have been some intention of seizing or securing fabled wealth we cannot perhaps wholly deny, although men so well informed as the Roman merchants and administrators of Egypt could hardly have been other interpretation of this campaign seems to be quite untenable. On the date we follow Ed. Meyer, Gesch. d. Alt., III, p. 114 f.

41Xenophon, Anab., I, 1, 9.

42The purpose in both cases is excellently expressed by Caesar himself, Bell. Gall., IV, 20: "in Britanniam proficiisci contendit (sc. Caesar), quod omnibus fere Gallicos bellis hostibus nostris inde subministra auxilia intellegebat"; and IV, 16: "cum videret (sc. Caesar), Germanos tam facile impelli, ut in Galliam venirent, suis quoque rebus eos timere voluit, cum intellexerent et posse et audere populi Romani exercitum RHenum transire."
guilty of such folly, but its main purpose seems to have been merely a demonstration of the vigor of the new Egyptian administration.\(^43\) For it is significant that in the very next year began the Ethiopian wars, which lasted until 20 B. C., wherein likewise no effort was made at extending the limits of the new province, but the Ethiopians or Nubians were given a taste of Roman steel, and made to realize how serious a thing it would be to harass the new lords of Egypt.\(^44\) Of quite the same nature was the invasion of Dacia, 12-9 B. C., and the later raids during the Pannonian revolt, 6-9 A. D. Augustus had certainly no intention of adding Dacia to the Empire; he merely wished to punish the tribes north of the Danube for interfering in the affairs of the province and to give a sharp warning against a repetition of the offense.\(^45\) That the invasions of Germany were made more frequently and probably upon a larger scale than elsewhere, there can be no denial, but that is due to the fact that the Germans were more warlike and martial than the other contiguous barbarians. We have already observed that practically every campaign in Germany was preceded by grave provocation on the part of the barbarians, while frequently the difficulties raised were settled by diplomacy without recourse to armed intervention. But the lesson that an invasion of the Empire was likely to cost far more than it was worth, while it took a long time to teach, was in the end thoroughly learned. For two hundred years after the death of Tiberius almost unbroken peace reigned along this quarter of the frontier, which had been for half a century the storm center of the empire\(^46\), and when the northern defenses finally began to crumble, it was towards the north and northeast, not the northwest, that they first succumbed. The policy of the first


\(^{44}\) See Mommsen, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, p. 108 f.

\(^{45}\) On these see Mommsen, *Res Gestae*, p. 130 ff.; Gardthausen, *Augustus*, I, p. 1181 ff., II, p. 779 ff.; Domaszewski, *Geschichte der römischen Kaiser*, I, p. 222 f. The Dacians seem to have given provocation in every instance, and even in 11 A. D. once more invaded the empire, though we know nothing about a retaliatory campaign in Dacia on the part of the Romans upon this occasion; cf. Mommsen, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

two *principes* was therefore abundantly justified by its lasting success.

As regards the secondary policy, i. e., that of the upbuilding and support of friendly or buffer states immediately contiguous to the actual frontier, there is no lack of parallels from antiquity.\(^47\) Tiglath Pileser IV in 732 B. C., after annexing certain parts of Palestine, set up such a buffer between his empire and Egypt along the marches of Philistia, in the shape of a vassal principality under a Bedouin chief called "*kipi*, (or resident) of Musri" (i. e. Egypt).\(^48\) Similar was doubtless the purpose of Nebuchadrezzar in leaving Jehoiakim of Judah upon the throne of a subject kingdom after his conquest of Palestine in 704 B. C. Only after two revolts, both instigated apparently by Egypt, did he apparently feel compelled to give up a policy which, though it made it unnecessary to invade Egypt directly, nevertheless allowed the temptation to renew hostilities without a desperate risk.\(^49\) Something similar, though under very different conditions was the policy of Sparta in building a ring of Perioeci about her own Helot population on every side save that of Messenia, where by the destruction of cities and the closing of harbors the Helots were likewise cut off from contact with the outside world. The Perioeci thus formed a double barrier, warding off the enemy on the outside, and helping to keep in a disaffected servile population.\(^50\) Again, this was clearly the policy of Alexander in the East, who set the Indus as his actual frontier, but secured that by establishing two powerful protected states, the kingdoms of Porus and

\(^{47}\)An historical study of the buffer or allied state, as a device to strengthen a frontier, would be a profitable one to undertake. There seems to exist no comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon.


\(^{49}\)For the events compare Hall, op. cit., p. 543 ff.; for the interpretation in terms of a buffer state, Klamroth, op. cit., p. 20. See Appendix, Chapter IV, note 49.

of Taxiles, on the eastern bank.\(^{51}\) A parallel not too remote, perhaps, can be pointed out in the case of the first contact of Rome and Carthage in Spain. Here the Romans seem to have set up Saguntum as an allied state to act as a buffer or check to the advances of Hannibal to the Ebro, and towards what they chose to regard as their proper sphere of influence (or, if one prefer, that of their ancient ally Massilia). That the policy in this case failed to prevent war is of course no proper criticism of its intent. There were also the numerous but ephemeral protectorates of the eastern marches, which served for the most part the purpose of preparing the formal advance of the empire rather than actually covering a difficult frontier, and so lasted only a short time. But in Armenia we have a truly classical example of a buffer state, whose fortunes no less an authority than Lord Curzon compares directly with those of Afghanistan, similarly situated between the two great rival powers of Russia and Great Britain.\(^{52}\) One Roman general or emperor after another might have made Armenia a province, as Trajan actually did, although his successor immediately restored it to its former state of uncertainty, but for more than four centuries it was preserved as a buffer state against Parthia.\(^{53}\)

\(^{51}\) See J. G. Droysen, Geschichte des Hellenismus, I, 2, p. 163 ff. This interpretation of events is much more plausible than that of J. Kaerst (Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters, I, p. 369, and n. 2), who argues that the kingdoms of Taxiles and Porus were actually parts of the empire. J. B. Bury (A History of Greece, 2nd ed., 1913, p. 807) very properly maintains the position taken by Droysen.


\(^{53}\) The most elaborate recent study of the policy of Augustus towards Armenia is by A. Abbruzzese, "Le relazioni fra l'impero romano e l'Armenia a tempo di Augusto", Riv. di storia antica, VII (1903), pp. 505-21; 721-34; VIII (1904), pp. 32-61 (also separate, Padova, 1903). His attitude towards the diplomatic policy which Augustus followed is, however, hypercritical, and his thesis that a policy of economic absorption should have been followed is illusory. (Cf. De Sanctis, Riv. di filol. LII (1905), p. 159 f.). A fairly satisfactory statement, though somewhat superficial, is P. P. Asdourian's dissertation, Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Armenien und Rom von 190 v. Chr. bis 428 n. Chr., Venedig, 1911. His statement, p. 79, of the policy of Augustus as one that attempted to maintain the controlling position in Armenia by peaceful means, or through political manoeuvres, is correct enough, but the
Less notorious but equally clear is the case of Mauretania. In 25 B.C. Augustus transferred King Juba from Numidia, which he thereupon transformed into a province, to Mauretania, which, after having been eight years a province, was once more made a kingdom. The purpose of this singular interchange of political status, must have been to protect the actual confines of the empire from direct contact with the barbarians of the south and west, who were not yet accustomed to the presence of the Romans. 54 It was not until sixty-five years afterwards, 40 A.D., when danger from this quarter might have been expected to have diminished or disappeared after two generations of a strong and peaceful government, that Mauretania was once more made into a province. 55

sneering remark that this was due not to Augustus' own inclination, but rather to the rivalry of Parthia is quite superfluous. Of course Rome's relations to Armenia would have been quite different had there not been a powerful Parthian monarchy. In the mutual rivalries of Rome and Parthia lay the whole difficulty. The best general statement of the problem in its large outlines is in V. Chapot, La frontière de l'Euphrate etc., p. 377 ff. He also can make nothing out of Abbruzzese's "lotta commerciale" theory (p. 382, note). Mommsen's statement (Röm. Gesch., V, p. 370 ff.) of the general course of Augustus' Armenian policy is admirable.

54This has been recognized by Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 706. That this danger was a real one is clear from the wars with the Gaetulians and Musulami, which seem to have broken out about the time of the accession of Juba, and, after dragging on intermittently for a generation, were ended only by the vigorous interposition of the Roman army under Cn. Cornelius Lentulus in 6 A.D. This is R. Cagnat's certain interpretation of Dio, 55, 28 (L'armée romaine d'Afrique et l'occupation militaire de l'Afrique sous les Empereurs, 2nd ed., Paris, 1913, I, p. 3 ff., esp. 7 and 8). It seems that Augustus had let Juba struggle on as best he could for a whole generation against these wild tribes, and finally when he seemed unable longer to cope with the situation, he was given the assistance of a Roman army in an effort to end the trouble once for all. The whole situation and its treatment are perfectly typical of a developed buffer state policy.

55Even then the transformation was made rudely and without sufficient preparation, for a vigorous revolt broke out which was not completely put down until the year 42 or 43. It may very well be that Caligula's act in dethroning and later executing Ptolemaeus was instigated solely by greed, as Mommsen (Röm. Gesch., V, p. 629, following Dio, 59, 25), remarks, but that the land itself was not turned over to
With this brief list of parallels and precedents to the German frontier policy which we have ascribed to Augustus, we hope to have shown that there was no striking innovation involved therein, nothing really beyond the range of the expedients and experiences of an ancient statesman. In thus attributing to Augustus in Germany a policy bearing so modern a designation as that of the "buffer state", we feel convinced that we are not modernizing the ancients, but only recognizing how very ancient some of our supposedly modern expedients of statesmanship in reality are.

another native prince was surely due to the belief now prevalent at Rome, that the work of the local dynasts was completed, and it was safe to incorporate the kingdom into the empire. This is also the view of R. Cagnat, op. cit., I, p. 28. On the whole the act of Caligula seems to have been justified; after the first revolt was put down we hear only of slight disturbances in the reign of Domitian (Cagnat, p. 38 ff.), and Hadrian (p. 45 f.), and thenceforward at occasional intervals until the great revolt of the third century. Upwards of 40 years of peace followed the inclusion in the empire, which is a long period, considering the time and the circumstances.
APPENDIX

CHAPTER IV, NOTE 16

Of course this assumes that Aliso was at Haltern, which is far from being well established (see below). Even Oberaden is not so very much farther away from the Rhine, but it seems not to have been occupied any great number of years, as Aliso certainly was. Koepp's remark (*Die Römer in Deutschland*, p. 102) that the extent of the fortifications at Aliso sets a minimum figure for the number of the troops that occupied it permanently, seems to be the reverse of probability. The camp was more likely laid out on a large scale so as to be able to hold the largest army that might be expected to operate in that region on its way forward and back, as well as great quantities of war supplies, but the actual number of troops which held the fort year in and year out was probably very small, since our literary sources are unanimous in representing the left bank of the Rhine as the permanent headquarters of the army. As for the camp at Oberaden, it has yet to be proved that it was occupied in force throughout the winter, as Koepp (*loc. cit.*) believes, and so accuses Velleius of an outright falsehood in a plain statement of fact, where he must have known better. Certainly its size does not prove this, as it might not have been occupied at full capacity all the time; nor does the ornamentation of certain wall posts upon which Koepp lays such stress. That beams were artistically shaped shows merely that the builders had plenty of time in which to do their work, or else loved a bit of ornamentation, not that whole armies wintered in these quarters. The probability is that if occupied at all during the winter, it was held by only a small body of troops. Finally, if it could be shown that it was occupied during the winter, is it impossible that this may have been one of the camps of Tiberius, who wintered once in Germany? Can the archaeologist really date a structure like a camp within a limit of 15 years (only 13 years separated Drusus' death from Tiberius' winter in Germany), in the case of a simple construction, whose general plan never varied greatly, and without the evidence of superposition and modification of structure? That a thing is "Augustan" may well be asserted; to claim that a fortification belongs to Drusus, and not to Tiberius, is perhaps going too far, particularly when one must reject utterly the literary evidence in order to do so. Koepp is at pains to insist upon this matter of permanent occupation, because, as he rightly observes, "ein grosses Land schwerlich erobert werden kann, wenn der Eroberer alljährlich bis zu seinem
Ausgangspunkt zurückgeht, und nicht vielmehr einen von Jahr zu Jahr wachsenden Gebietsteil besetzt hält." But even if one granted that Oberaden is Drusus' first fort and Haltern a later or contemporary establishment (as Kropatschek, and Koepp, p. 26, believe), nothing is gained regarding an ever advancing limit of possession, for Haltern is nearer the Rhine than Oberaden. In order to prove that the Romans were actually moving forward in this systematic fashion, as indeed they must have done, if conquest was their purpose, one would have to be able to show not two neighboring camps of the same period, but a whole series of advancing forts, the later situated ever farther inland than the earlier. This has not been done, and one is inclined to doubt greatly if it ever can be.—Delbrück's arguments against Haltern or Oberaden as Aliso (Gesch. d. Kriegskunst, 2nd ed., II, pp. 131-150) seem very convincing, but there are also grave difficulties in the way of setting Aliso near Paderborn. However, no matter in which place Aliso be located, the upper or the lower Lippe, our argument is not affected, for though the location near Paderborn is far inland, and, if held in great force, must have overawed the surrounding tribes, it is perfectly clear from Delbrück's arguments (pp. 48-50, 130 ff.) that Aliso was never a "Zwingburg", but only a center for munitions and supplies, probably as small as it could possibly have been made for easy defense. He has well emphasized the fallacy of parcelling out an army in fortresses so long as there remains a hostile force in the field. The point we wish to make, however, is that, if the whole country was subdued, or even any substantial portion thereof, it must have been necessary to move forward the legions into great permanent fortresses either in its midst, or on its farther borders, and that this was never done in Germany; the few castella of which we hear were certainly not far extended points held in full force by an army of permanent occupation.—We have hitherto paid no attention to the statement of Florus that "Drusus castella ubique dispositus per Mosam flumen, per Albin, per Visurgin" (II, 30, 26). Of course no one accepts this as being in any sense literally true of the Elbe and the Weser, cf. Abraham, Zur Gesch. d. germ. u. pannon. Kriege, etc., p. 4) and there is grave doubt even of the correctness of the statement regarding the "quinquaginta amplius castella", that Drusus is supposed to have built along the Rhine (cf. Hübner, Römische Herrschaft, p. 110). So much however is clear, that the Romans did make a serious effort to pacify and control the coast, and castella may very well have been located at or near the mouth of the Weser and the Elbe (cf. Delbrück, op. cit., p. 51). The strategical value of such naval bases has already been pointed out (above, p. 51); their commercial significance is quite as great. Ancient commerce was, whenever possible, water-borne. With Germany, in the absence of even tolerable roads, it must have been almost wholly so. A close parallel is furnished by the conditions which prevailed in the American Middle West during the period of French occupation and even later. For the
Roman trade with Germany see K. T. von Inama-Sternegg, *Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1909, I, p. 220 ff., a good though somewhat cursory summary, with references to the literature. The very carefully worded official statement of Augustus regarding the results of his activities in Germany, mentions this feature, and it alone, as a solid achievement: “Gallias et Hispanias provincias et Germaniam qua includit oceanus a Gadibus ad ostium Albis fluminis pacavi” (c. 26). “Pacavi” seems to be chosen in order to indicate that peaceful commercial enterprises had been made possible.

CHAPTER IV, NOTE 49

[For the following important note upon Palestine, and especially Judah, as a “buffer state”, I am indebted to my friend Professor F. C. Eiselen, who writes me the following under date of May 5, 1915. W. A. O.]: “The two great world powers in antiquity were Babylonia-Assyria on the one hand and Egypt on the other; only for a short time did the Hittites and the people of Urartu play a very important rôle in the ancient history of Western Asia. Between them lay Syria-Palestine; hence if we look for buffer states in antiquity we might expect to find them in that region. Now the strategical position of Syria-Palestine in relation to these two great powers has long been recognized, but historians do not seem to have considered it from the standpoint of buffer states, but more from the standpoint of a bone of contention, or the mixed character of its population and civilization, or the opportunity of exerting an influence in all directions (E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, zweite Auflage, I, 2, pp. 602 ff.). It is rather strange that the other question has received so little attention, but such is the case: while there are more or less indirect suggestions of such a situation, the idea of buffer states receives very little consideration. No doubt Klamroth is right in saying that the establishment of buffer states was not foreign to Assyrian policy. At any rate the line in the inscription of Tiglath-Pileser IV, to which he refers (II Rawlinson, 67) may well be interpreted as implying such a policy on the part of this ruler. It is translated by E. Schrader (*Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek*, II, p. 21) as follows: “Den (Stamm) Idibi-il machte ich zur Grenzwacht gegen Egypten”; similarly by A. S. Strong (*Records of the Past, New Series*, V, p. 125): “Idibi-ili as a watch over (against) Egypt I appointed.” (Cf. also the establishment of a Phoenician province by Tiglath-Pileser under the rule of his own son, to hold together the states along the Mediterranean, Hugo Winckler, *Altorientalische Forschungen*, II, p. 4; cf. p. 67). The interpretation by Rogers of the significance of Gaza and other Philistine cities [i.e. as possible buffer states for Egypt against the Assyrian] is undoubtedly quite correct. The relation of Israel and Judah and Assyria as reflected especially in 2 Kings 15-25,
suggests that the Egyptians also considered Syria-Palestine in the nature of a buffer state. In describing the policy of Egypt during the eighth century J. H. Breasted uses these words—applicable also in other centuries: "Unable to oppose the formidable armies of Assyria, the petty kinglets of Egypt constantly fomented discontent and revolt among the Syro-Palestinian states in order, if possible, to create a fringe of buffer states between them and the Assyrian" (*A History of Egypt*, p. 549). The Egyptians succeeded in stirring up Hezekiah of Judah (Isa. 28:30), whereupon Sennacherib came, severely punishing the rebel (2 Kings 18, 19; Isa. 26, 37). May it not be that the transfer of some of Hezekiah's territory to Ashdod, Ekron, and Gaza was for the purpose of maintaining or intensifying the good will of these buffer states? (*Taylor Cylinder* 111, lines 1-26; Lehmann-Haupt, *Israel*, p. 122). The later history of Judah may be interpreted on the same principle. The rapid advance of Necoh against Assyria through the territory of Judah (2 Kings 22:28, 29) resembles the rapid advance of the Germans against the French, through the territory of Belgium; Nebuchadnezzar cannot afford to lose such a valuable buffer state (2 Kings 24:1); and after the revolt and destruction of Judah, he still attempts to maintain a state under Gedaliah (2 Kings 25:22). The restored community, after the exile, served as a buffer state between Persia and Egypt. Six years ago I wrote regarding the attitude of Cyrus toward the Jews: "A clash with Egypt was inevitable; hence it was to the interest of Cyrus to have on the Egyptian border a state that was bound to him by the strongest ties of gratitude, and upon the fidelity of which he could rely" (*Prophecy and the Prophets*, pp. 246, 247). Regarding the general policy of Cyrus see E. Schrader, *Keitinschriften und das alte Testament*, dritte Auflage, p. 115; L. W. Batten, *Ezra and Nehemiah*, p. 35. A similar situation continued to exist in later ages."

**ADDENDUM** (p. 87)

Perhaps the best ancient statement regarding the workings of Roman diplomacy with both friendly and hostile tribes beyond the Rhine is in Flavius Vopiscus, *Probus*, ch. 14 and 15, especially the succinct report of Probus himself to the senate (15, 2): "Omnes iam barbari vobis arant, vobis iam serunt et contra interiores gentes militant". Though the period is late this is the same policy as that inaugurated by Augustus, perfected by Tiberius, and maintained doubtless by all the abler emperors.
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