

CHINESE MUSLIMS IN THE QING EMPIRE:  
PUBLIC CULTURE, IDENTITIES, AND LAW,  
1644-1911

BY

SHAODAN ZHANG

THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Master of Arts in East Asian Studies  
in the Graduate College of the  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2015

Urbana, Illinois

Adviser:

Professor Kai-wing Chow

## ABSTRACT

This thesis discusses the issues of public culture, identities, and law of Chinese Muslims in the Qing Empire (1644-1911). It goes beyond current scholarship which focuses on official and elite narratives of Chinese Muslims, and tries to explore the public culture in which ordinary Chinese Muslims participated in their daily life during the Qing period.

Mainly based on steles erected by Chinese Muslims in mosques, shrines, cemeteries, and other public places where they usually gathered, this thesis tries to shed some light on the following questions: Did Chinese Muslims live as a distinctive community in the Qing society? How were Chinese Muslims organized in society? How were those organizations managed and regulated? How did they identify themselves in the Qing Empire? And what was the role of religious distinction in their identity?

This thesis reveals that, for various practical purposes, Chinese Muslims in the Qing formed different publics based on a number of common bonds they could invoke, including native place, religion, occupation, gender, and lineage, etc. The religious identity and religious publics represented only part of Chinese Muslims. To Chinese Muslims, their religious identity was parallel to their regional, familial, and occupational identities. It could be abandoned when it jeopardized their economic interests. It could also be invoked to form a public when it was beneficial to the common interests of certain Chinese Muslims. In addition, publics often overlapped, and Chinese Muslims felt comfortable to adopt multiple identities at the same time. For example, a *jiaofang* (a group of Chinese Muslims affiliated to the same mosque) was a religious organization, as well as a local community where the government often relied on the locally based gentry to provide semi-official governance. Therefore, Chinese Muslim gentry

participated actively in religious activities of *jiaofang* as Muslims, and meanwhile, adopted the identity as gentry, cooperated with the government, and managed local Islamic *jiaofang*, just like non-Muslim Han Chinese gentry managing their local communities.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my adviser Professor Kai-wing Chow who led me into the field of history and provided me with invaluable guidance and encouragement all along my study in UIUC and my thesis research.

I would also like to thank Professor Alexander Mayer and Professor Valerie Hoffman for serving as my committee members and offering me valuable comments.

I also thank the Graduate College for providing me with partial financial support for my thesis research in China during winter 2014.

Last but not the least, a big thank-you goes to my friend You Li who was there accompanying and encouraging me while I was writing my thesis. I am also particularly grateful to my parents for always believing in me and supporting me.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP ON CHINESE MUSLIMS IN THE QING .....	3
THE PROBLEM OF NAMING ---HUI AND CHINESE MUSLIMS.....	9
<b>CHAPTER 2 RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND RELIGIOUS PUBLICS OF CHINESE MUSLIMS</b>	<b>13</b>
PUBLIC CULTURE OF CHINESE MUSLIMS .....	13
LOCAL MOSQUES AND <i>JIAOFANG</i> .....	18
RECOGNITION OF THE <i>UMMAH</i> IN QING CHINA .....	30
<b>CHAPTER 3 INTERACTION BETWEEN <i>JIAOFANG</i> AND THE STATE IDENTITY OF CHINESE MUSLIMS .....</b>	<b>34</b>
MOSQUES' LOSS OF LEGAL AUTHORITY IN <i>JIAOFANG</i> .....	34
APPEALING TO THE QING STATE .....	37
<b>CHAPTER 4 MANAGEMENT OF <i>JIAOFANG</i>.....</b>	<b>42</b>
LEADERSHIP OF MOSQUES AND <i>JIAOFANG</i> : REGIONAL VARIATIONS AND DIACHRONIC EVOLVEMENT.....	42
CONFLICTS AND CREATION OF CUSTOMARY LAW.....	52
<b>CHAPTER 5 MULTIPLE IDENTITIES AND OVERLAPPING PUBLICS .....</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>ABBREVIATIONS.....</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>	<b>66</b>

## Chapter 1 Introduction

The history of Chinese Muslims is a relatively new field of research. In terms of Chinese Muslims in the Qing Empire, current scholarship mainly focuses on the official narrative of their history, including discussion on major rebellions led by Chinese Muslims, their relationship with Han Chinese, and the Qing state's ethnic and religious policies. Some scholars also touch upon the Islamic revival among Chinese Muslim literati, which started in the late Ming and early Qing period (around the 16<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup> centuries). Their discussion mainly centers on the intellectual world of elite Chinese Muslims.<sup>1</sup>

This thesis goes beyond official and elite narratives and discusses the “public culture” in which every ordinary Chinese Muslim participated in their daily life. The major primary sources are steles erected by Chinese Muslims in mosques, Islamic shrines, cemeteries, and other public places where they usually gathered during the Qing period. Contents of those steles include records of newly built or renovated mosques, records of donation to mosques by local Chinese Muslims, the gentry, and officials, public agreements of Chinese Muslim groups, which included fund-raising organizations, lineages, and merchant associations. There are also steles on which inscribed public notices concerning economic conflicts within Chinese Muslim groups. Those steles provide important information about how Chinese Muslims organized themselves, how they managed themselves, and how they solved intra-group conflicts during the Qing period. There have been collections of those steles published in the People's

---

<sup>1</sup> For detailed discussion of current scholarship, please refer to the following section ---“Current Scholarship on Chinese Muslims in the Qing.”

Republic of China but no scholarship has made extensive use of them for historical research on Chinese Muslims. Incidents recorded in local gazetteers and *Shen Bao* during the Qing period will also be referred to from time to time.<sup>2</sup>

Through examination of everyday life and the “public culture” of Chinese Muslims, this thesis tries to shed some light on the following questions: Did Chinese Muslims live as a distinctive community in the Qing society? How were Chinese Muslims organized in society? How were those organizations managed and regulated? How did they identify themselves in the Qing Empire? And what was the role of religious distinction in their identity?

This thesis reveals that Chinese Muslims in the Qing formed various “publics,” often for practical purposes such as to compete more effectively for social resources. They invoked different common bonds /identities to form those publics including native place, religion, occupation, gender, and lineages, etc. Religious identity and religious publics represented only part of the quotidian life of Chinese Muslims. To Chinese Muslims, their religious identity was parallel to their regional, familial, and occupational identities. It could be abandoned when it jeopardized their economic interests. It could also be invoked to form a public when it was beneficial to the common interests of certain Chinese Muslims. In addition, publics often overlapped as Chinese Muslims felt comfortable to adopt multiple identities at the same time. For example, a

---

<sup>2</sup> *Shen Bao* (申报) was a commercial Chinese newspaper founded by a British businessman in Shanghai, China. It was published from April 30, 1872 to May 27, 1949.

*jiaofang*<sup>3</sup> was a religious organization, as well as a local community where the government often relied on the locally based gentry to provide semi-official governance. Therefore, Chinese Muslim gentry participated actively in religious activities of *jiaofang* as Muslims, and meanwhile, adopted the identity as gentry, cooperated with the government, and managed local Islamic *jiaofang*, just like non-Muslim Han Chinese gentry managing their local communities.

This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of current scholarship, and discussion of the concept of “Chinese Muslims.” The second chapter discusses the concept of public culture and the two religious publics of Chinese Muslims. The third chapter reveals how various Chinese Muslim publics adjusted to or resisted government policies. Chapter 4 examines how Chinese Muslims’ religious publics were managed and regulated from two perspectives ---leadership and conflict settlement. Chapter 5 unveils Chinese Muslims’ overlapping publics and multiple identities. The last Chapter will be the conclusion, summarizing how Chinese Muslims in the Qing invoked various identities and participated in overlapping publics.

### **Current Scholarship on Chinese Muslims in the Qing**

Scholars of the New Qing History such as Pamela Kyle Crossley and Mark Elliot have opened a new angle to look at the Qing state and society. They question the traditional paradigm of acculturation to Chinese civilization and

---

<sup>3</sup> *Jiaofang* 教坊 refers to publics formed by Chinese Muslims affiliated to the same mosques. For detailed explanation, please refer to the section ---“Local Mosques and *Jiaofang*” ---in Chapter 2.



bring attention to the distinctive ways of living of other ethnic groups other than Han Chinese in the Qing Empire.<sup>4</sup> In his book examining Qing's governance in Xinjiang (East Turkestan) where local residents were mainly Turkic-speaking Muslims, corresponding to Elliot's argument that the Qing Empire ruled in a "cosmopolitan" and "ethnic" mode,<sup>5</sup> Millward draws our attention to the new vision of the Empire proposed by Emperor Qianlong in the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century when the Qing had far expanded into Mongolia, Tibet, East Turkestan, and the southwestern borderland. The vision was called *A Great Unity* (*datong* 大同) of five domains ---Manchus, Mongols, Han Chinese, Tibetans, and Turkic-speaking Muslims. Millward therefore argues against the classic Chinese World Order formulated by John King Fairbank with China in the center of a series of concentric rings of other ethnic groups, and the more acculturated to Chinese civilization, the closer an ethnic group was to the center. Instead, Millward proposes a new "map" for the Qing's ideal polyethnic structure of ruling in which the Qing Imperial House was surrounded by those five main ethnic groups. Each was connected to the Qing state but remained separate from one another.<sup>6</sup> Millward's map reflects the parallel relationship among the five main ethnics and the pluralistic vision of the Qing Empire.

Chinese Muslims, as a group of Muslims without a territory and a language distinct from Han Chinese, were not among the five major ethnics, and had complicated connections with both Turkic-speaking Muslims and Han

---

<sup>4</sup> See Pamela K. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); and Mark Elliot, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

<sup>5</sup> Elliot, *The Manchu Way*, 4.

<sup>6</sup> James A. Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 197-203.

Chinese. Even the Qing State had difficulty in identifying Chinese Muslims in a unified way. In one of his essays discussing the history of Chinese Muslims, Lipman examines Qing's legal discourse concerning Chinese Muslims, and notices that Chinese Muslims, different from Turkic-speaking Muslims in Xinjiang who were governed by legal pluralism, were under the jurisdiction of regular civil officials just like Han Chinese, which is described by Lipman as "an administrative decision that emphasized their Chineseness." Nonetheless, as Lipman points out, their "non-Chinese" characteristics ---basically their identity as Muslims ---was often invoked as an explanation for their crimes especially when they attacked Han Chinese or participated in uprising. Lipman discusses how specific clauses regulating only Chinese Muslims started to appear in the Qing Code since the late 18<sup>th</sup> century. In those clauses, Chinese Muslims were punished more severely than Han Chinese who committed the same crimes. Those discriminative clauses mainly appeared in sections of theft, robbery and violent assaults in which the Qing government believed "fierce and brutal" people like Chinese Muslims were easier to get involved.<sup>7</sup> Lipman's findings support the argument that despite its paradigm of universality and polyethnicity, the Qing state at times still invoked "the rhetoric of civilization" which presumed the dichotomy between those who were civilized and those who were uncivilized barbarians. When discussing Chinese Muslim rebellions in northwestern China, Lipman reveals how the Qing central government and local officials' problematic intervention in internal conflicts between different Islamic sects in northwestern China gave rise to large-scale rebellions of Chinese Muslims against the Qing

---

<sup>7</sup> Jonathan N. Lipman, "A fierce and brutal people: On Islam and Muslims in the Qing Law," in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 83-112.

state. When those conflicts were brought to local governments for settlement, officials usually took the side with the well-established sect and therefore appeared more familiar and more “civilized.”<sup>8</sup>

Though a pioneering study in the field of the history of Chinese Muslims in the Qing, Lipman’s research mainly focuses on the official narrative of Chinese Muslims’ history and their identities imposed by the state. Later scholars started to turn their attention to the subjectivity of Chinese Muslims in the Qing Empire.

In his book on Turkic-speaking Muslims in Xinjiang, Millward already unveils a small part of the self-perceived identities of Chinese Muslims. Millward notices that after the Qing’s conquest of Xinjiang, many Han Chinese and Chinese Muslim merchants went there from northwestern provinces such as Gansu and Shaanxi to seek lucrative opportunities. In a small section where Millward discusses those Chinese Muslim merchants in Xinjiang, he states that they were well aware of their somehow double identities as both Chinese and Muslims. As we may expect, Chinese Muslim merchants in Xinjiang often worked as commercial mediators between Han Chinese merchants and local East Turkestani Muslims. Millward also provided an example where a Chinese Muslim Green Standard soldier, who was stationed in Xinjiang after the conquest, disguised himself as a foreign Muslim merchant from Central Asia, trying to escape west out of the Qing Empire. Millward argues that this would not be a single case since in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Qing state and officials were deeply concerned about the circumstances of “desinicization” where Chinese

---

<sup>8</sup> Jonathan N. Lipman, “Ethnic Violence in Modern China: Hans and Huis in Gansu, 1781-1929,” in *Violence in China: Essays in Culture and Counterculture*, ed. Jonathan N. Lipman, et al. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 65-86.

Muslim merchants in Xinjiang married local Turkestani women and even cut their queues. Chinese Muslim merchants started to be closely scrutinized in official checkpoints between Xinjiang and China proper<sup>9</sup> and their intermarriage with local women in Xinjiang was prohibited.<sup>10</sup>

Studies by Sachiko Muraka and Zvi Ben-Dor Benite focus on the Islamic revival among Chinese Muslims starting from the late 16<sup>th</sup> and early 17<sup>th</sup> centuries. During that period, large quantity of Chinese translations of Islamic classics and Sufi texts were produced and widely circulated in China proper. Chinese Muslim literati also wrote and published many Islamic research works in Chinese language. Those works were called the *Han Kitab* ---a name combining the Chinese word for “Chinese” and the Arabic word for “book.” Meanwhile, an Islamic educational network also started to burgeon in China proper. Whereas Muraka’s book examines only two of the representative works of the *Han Kitab* in Qing China and analyzes them purely from the angle of intellectual history,<sup>11</sup> Benite’s book reveals the issue of identity of Chinese Muslim literati through examination of the *Han Kitab* and the Chinese Muslim educational network. He argues that through the writing of the *Han Kitab*, Chinese Muslim literati “created, shaped, and expressed” their identity. He also argues that “Chineseness” and “Muslimness” were equally important for and “simultaneously” present in the identity of those Chinese Muslim literati, though there was still a strong

---

<sup>9</sup> “China proper” is used by New Qing historians to refer to the area where Han Chinese mainly lived in the Qing Empire.

<sup>10</sup> Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 168-175.

<sup>11</sup> Sachiko Murata, *Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light: Wang tai-yü’s “Great Learning of the Pure and Real” and Liu Chih’s “Displaying the Concealment of the Real Realm”* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2000).

feeling of diaspora expressed in their works.<sup>12</sup> It should be noted that since most of those Chinese Muslim literati settled in southeastern China, Benite's work only unveils the identity problem of Chinese Muslims of a specific social class in a small area of Qing China.

This thesis goes beyond official and elite narratives of the history of Chinese Muslims in the Qing Empire, seeking to reveal the everyday public life of ordinary Chinese Muslims and their subjective identities. It also expands our knowledge of Chinese Muslims in the Qing from Islamic sects and Sufi orders in the northwest and those literati in the southeast where historical records are comparatively abundant. Through examination of steles erected by Chinese Muslims all over China proper, this thesis will show how Chinese Muslims in various regions of Qing China --- such as Sichuan, Guangxi, Hebei, and Hunan --- organized themselves and formed social groups. It will also compose a preliminary picture of regional differences in terms of the public culture of Chinese Muslims. This thesis also examines how Chinese Muslims responded to and coped with Qing's ethnic policies in their actual daily life. Last but not least, through examination of the public culture of Chinese Muslims, this research is able to reveal what kind of identities Chinese Muslims tended to invoke when participating in various social groups and what rules or laws they chose to protect their interests.

---

<sup>12</sup> Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad: A Cultural History of Muslims in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005).

## The Problem of Naming ---Hui and Chinese Muslims

In historical records of the Qing Dynasty, Muslims were generally referred to as *hui* 回, or *huihui* 回回, a name which was thought to have been developed from *huihe* 回纥 adopted during the Tang Dynasty (618-907) to refer to the Uighur --- an ethnic group from Central Asia who were adherents of Islam. Islam, correspondingly, was called *huijiao* 回教 (the teachings of the Hui people) in the Qing. The connotation of the name *hui* is not only religious, though. Chinese Muslims in the Qing generally believed themselves to be descendants of the first group of Muslims who started to settle down in China since the 7<sup>th</sup> century. They thought they possessed a common root (*ben* 本) which lay to the west of China.

The Hui were widely distributed in the Qing Empire and could differ greatly from one community to another. In the northwestern part of the Empire ---Xinjiang, which was incorporated into the Qing in 1759, there mainly lived Turkic-speaking Muslims, including Uighurs, Uzbeks, and Kazakhs, etc. Due to their linguistic and cultural uniqueness, those Turkic-speaking Muslims belonged to one of the aforementioned five major cultural “domains” of the Qing Empire, which also included Manchus, Mongols, Han Chinese, and Tibetans. Before the incorporation of East Turkestan into the Qing Empire, those Turkic-speaking Muslims were referred to in Qing historical records as *huizi* 回子, a somehow derogatory version of *hui*. After their incorporation, they started to be called *huimin* 回民. The term *min* 民 (people, subjects) represented their legal category as the registered subjects of the Qing. Like the Mongols and the Tibetans, Muslims in Xinjiang were governed under the principle of legal

pluralism. Legal affairs of local Muslims were dealt with under the Islamic law (*shari'a*) ---which was administered by local noblemen (*begs*; Chinese: 伯克) and religious leaders --- and a set of Qing regulations specially designed for Xinjiang --*Qinding huijiang zeli* 钦定回疆则例 (Imperial Regulations of Xinjiang).

Another distinctive Hui group was the Salar Hui (撒拉尔回/撒拉回). They were a comparatively small group of Muslims living in the southwestern part of Gansu ---the middle area between Tibet and China proper. The area was the west borderland of the Ming Empire (1368-1644) under which the Salar Hui was considered as *fan* 番 (barbarians, non-subjects) rather than *min* 民 (subjects). The Qing kept their legal status as *fan*, who were ruled by *tusi* 土司 (local leaders) and enjoyed a great degree of political and legal autonomy, which remained until the late 18<sup>th</sup> century. "*Fan*" only indicated a legal category. It did not hinder their connections to Chinese Muslims living in proximity. Indeed till the Qing, the area of Salar Hui had already been inhabited by large numbers of Chinese Muslims. Many Salar Hui and Chinese Muslims in Gansu belonged to the same Islamic sects.

Apart from Muslims in Xinjiang, another big group of *huimin* 回民 (Hui subjects) was Muslims living in China proper. Those were what this thesis refers to as Chinese Muslims. Since the mid Ming, Muslims living in China proper in proximity with their Han Chinese neighbors began to be assimilated to local Chinese ways. They gradually lost their original languages of Persian, Arabic, or other Turkic languages and spoke only Chinese. They also widely adopted Chinese customs and became very difficult to be differentiated from Han Chinese. At the same time, they were still different from Han Chinese in terms of religion

and related rituals. This caused some ambiguity for the Qing state to categorize and name them. On the one hand, as mentioned earlier, legal affairs of Chinese Muslims were dealt with by regular civil officials in the same way as those of Han Chinese. On the other hand, Chinese Muslims and Muslims in Xinjiang were both called *huimin* and there were often no ways to differentiate them in written documents unless other information was provided. The only exception existed in Xinjiang in cases where local Turkestani Muslims, as well as sojourning Han Chinese and Chinese Muslims were all involved. Under those circumstances, Chinese Muslims were called *neidi huimin* 内地回民 (Hui subjects from the inner land) or *hanhui* 汉回 (an invented compound consisting of names for both Han Chinese and the Hui). The name *hanhui* reveals the confusion which the Qing state had towards Chinese Muslims, who seemed to lie somewhere in between the two cultural “domains” of Han Chinese and Turkic-speaking Muslims.

Problems with Chinese Muslims include not only their confusing double categories in the Qing Empire. The picture was further complicated by the *minzu* 民族 (nationalities) paradigm adopted by the People’s Republic of China in modern times. Under the *minzu* scheme, Muslims in the PRC are divided into ten nationalities, among which nine are linguistically and territorially distinct such as the Uighur, Kazakhs, and Salars. Muslims, or descendants of Muslims, who do not belong to the nine nationalities are categorized as another nationality --- *huizu* 回族 (the Hui nationality) which includes basically Chinese Muslims defined in this thesis and some other Muslims who lives in proximity to Tibetans and southwestern ethnic groups such as the Bai and the Tai and speak their



languages.<sup>13</sup> This modern appropriation of the name Hui confuses scholars. Additionally, the PRC has been successful in imposing its discourse of *minzu* paradigm. Chinese scholars, even including scholars of the Hui nationality, tend to essentialize the modern paradigm and make the anachronistic argument that *huizu* has been presenting itself as a distinct ethnic group long since the Ming Dynasty. This thesis indeed provides counter-evidence to that argument.

Chinese Muslims were widely distributed in China proper in the Qing --- in Gansu and Shaanxi in the northwest, in Yunnan in the southwest, in Shandong in the East, and in Fujian in the southeast, etc. Among those communities, Chinese Muslims in northwestern China were the most distinctive due to their proximity to Central Asia. They showed relatively strong Islamic inclination during the Qing and had a unique way of organization --- *menhuan* 门宦, which was a Chinese invention combining characteristics of Sufi orders and Chinese lineages. They have been studied in detail by a number of scholars and will not be a focus of this research.<sup>14</sup>

---

<sup>13</sup> For detailed analysis of the ethnic invention of *huizu* in the PRC, see Dru C. Gladney, *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991).

<sup>14</sup> For detailed analysis of the history of Chinese Muslims and *menhuan* in northwestern China, see Jonathan N. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997); and Ma Tong 马通, *A Brief History of Chinese Islamic sects and the Institution of Menhuan* (*zhongguo yisilan jiaopai yu menhuan zhidu shilue* 中国伊斯兰教派与门宦制度史略) (Ningxia: People's Publishing House of Ningxia, 1983).

## Chapter 2 Religious Identity and Religious Publics of Chinese Muslims

### Public Culture of Chinese Muslims

Historians of late imperial China have generally noticed the trends of “commercialization, urbanization, and population growth” during that period.<sup>15</sup> Many scholars, through their study of social groups also point out how those trends drove people to organize themselves into various auto-organizations so as to compete for social and economic resources more effectively. Most studies focus on Han Chinese gentry and merchants, who invoked different common bonds to form various auto-organizations such as native-place associations, occupational associations, and lineages.<sup>16</sup> Those groups worked together to safeguard the common interests of group members. In his paper on merchant auto-organizations in the Qing, Kai-wing Chow notices that, when recording their activities, members of those groups extensively adopted the word *gong* 公 in

---

<sup>15</sup> Mary B. Rankin, “Observations on a Chinese Public Sphere,” *Modern China*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Symposium: “Public Sphere”/“Civil Society” in China? Paradigmatic Issues in Chinese Studies, III (Apr., 1993), 161. For more detailed discussion on the social trends in late imperial China, see Chen Baoliang 陈宝良, *A History of Society and Life in the Ming Dynasty (mingdai shehui shenghuo shi 明代社会生活史)* (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2004); and Fan Jinmin 范金民, *Commercial Development of Jiangnan in Ming and Qing (mingqing jiangnan shangye de fazhan 明清江南商业的发展)* (Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1998).

<sup>16</sup> For discussion of the emergence and development of auto-organizations in late imperial China, see, for example, Ping-ti Ho, *A History of Huiguan in China (zhongguo huiguan shilun 中国会馆史论)* (Taipei: Taiwan Students Press, 1966). See also William T. Rowe, *Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1984); and Bryna Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1995), which examine auto-organizations in two representative Chinese cities. See Tang Lixing 唐力行, *Merchants and Culture ---A History of Huizhou Merchants and Lineage Society (shangren yu wenhua de shuangchong bianzou ---huishang yu zongzu shehui de lishi 商人与文化的双重变奏——徽商与宗族社会的历史)* (Wuhan: Huazhong University of Science and Technology Press, 1997); and Yongtao Du, “Locality, Identity, and Geography: Translocal Practices of Huizhou Merchants in Late Imperial China” (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006), which look at the formation of merchant associations and lineages of Huizhou merchants. For more discussion on lineage formation in late imperial China, see, for example, Zheng Zhenman 郑振满, *Lineages and Social Changes in Fujian during Ming and Qing (mingqing fujian jiazuzhi yu shehui bianqian 明清福建家族组织与社会变迁)* (Changsha: Hunan Education Publishing House, 1992).

such compounds as *gongsuo* 公所 (public place/venue), *gongchan* 公产 (public/communal property), and *gongtian* 公田 (public/communal land). It represented and contributed to “a drastic expansion” of the term *gong* “in its semantic scope in the Ming Qing period.” *Gong*, previously a term mainly referring to things related to the imperial government, was increasingly used to specially refer to “non-government, communal, or collective practices” of social groups.<sup>17</sup> The new sense of *gong* reveals how Qing auto-organizations worked to meet common needs and protect common interests of all group members.

There were some prominent characteristics of those auto-organizations which embodied *gong* principles. Firstly, they were formed based on a constellation of common interests. On the one hand, people joined groups to better serve their private interests. On the other hand, groups were formed to promote communal interests of all members. Those organizations were thus where private and public interests entangled and interacted, and where private interests eventually were reconciled with public ones for the smooth operation of those groups. Secondly, to serve common interests and to facilitate collective actions, auto-organizations needed specific means for transmitting information to ensure publicity and openness. Regarding Chinese Muslim groups examined in this thesis, they resorted to public steles, and later newspapers as well, for publicity of information. Thirdly, certain large auto-organizations also represented their individual members and mediated between them and the state.

---

<sup>17</sup> Kai-wing Chow, “Printing from Stone: Steles, Law, and Public Culture in Qing China (1644-1911)” (paper presented at the International Conference on “Reading without Books: Experiences of Print in Everyday Life in Imperial China, Tang (618-907) Through Qing (1644-1911),” University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, September 26-27, 2014), 3-4.

Many of them gained local authority due to their social resources, and could affect local laws and policies.

In describing those auto-organizations and their activities, Chow uses the term “public culture.”<sup>18</sup> This thesis follows his usage.<sup>19</sup> The meanings of “public” properly correspond to the increasingly emphasized *gong* values (common interests, collective actions, and openness/publicity) in the Ming Qing period. *Gong* and “public” also share the same semantic ambiguity ---sometimes referring to the government and sometimes the society exclusive of the government.<sup>20</sup> “Public” also connotes all individuals in a certain group without regard to limits of social categories or status. Indeed, this thesis discusses all individual Chinese Muslims, including both elites and common people, and including those in religious as well as secular professions. By using “culture,” this thesis mainly looks at the practices of Chinese Muslim groups in organizing themselves.

---

<sup>18</sup> Chow, “Printing from Stone.”

<sup>19</sup> The term “public culture” may remind the reader of the debate on “the public sphere” in the field of late imperial Chinese history. This thesis does not intend to enter into the debate. Habermas’s concept of “the public sphere” is closely related to the specific situation of the emergence of a bourgeois society in early modern Europe. Even though scholars on late imperial Chinese history such as William Rowe and Mary Backus Rankin find it reasonable to apply a broad version of the concept of “the public sphere” ---any “intermediate arenas in which open, public initiatives are undertaken by both officials and the populace”---to late imperial China, yet as scholars such as Philip Huang and Rowe himself question, when the concept is made that broad, its utility as an analytical tool becomes questionable. Hence, this thesis, though focusing on the public culture of Chinese Muslims in Qing China, does not intend to enter into this debate. It does not start from “the public sphere” drawn from Western contexts against which social changes in late imperial China are to be measured, but looks from a Chinese perspective, investigating situations in China, and wishing to represent how *gong* expanded its meanings along with social changes, especially with regard to the experience of Chinese Muslims in the Qing. For more information about the debate, see articles from *Modern China*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Symposium: “Public Sphere”/“Civil Society” in China? Paradigmatic Issues in Chinese Studies, III (Apr., 1993).

<sup>20</sup> This similar semantic ambiguity between “public” and *gong* is pointed out in Rankin, “Observations on a Chinese Public Sphere,” 160; and William T. Rowe, “The Problems of ‘Civil Society in Late Imperial China,” *Modern China*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Symposium: “Public Sphere”/“Civil Society” in China? Paradigmatic Issues in Chinese Studies, III (Apr., 1993), 142.

Expanding from the usage of “public” as an adjective like the word *gong*, suggesting “common,” “collective,” and “open,” Chow also uses the term as a noun to refer to the auto-organizations he examines, which invoked *gong* values. This thesis expands this usage to include any social groups that followed *gong* principles ---pursuing common interests, taking collective actions, and resorting to publicity of information. In this sense, “publics” not only indicates auto-organizations such as native-place associations, occupational associations, and lineages, but also refer to any other types of social groups which follow *gong* principles. For example, as will be shown later, certain locally based communities, which are generally believed to be loosely bound simply by common location of residence, can also be regarded as publics. Sometimes, for practical reasons, multiple auto-organizations or multiple communities also came together to form a network, making collective decisions and taking collective actions. In this case, they also constituted a single public. Therefore, a public could be one organization or a group of them working together. Whether they were loosely formed communities or systematically organized auto-organizations, any types of social groups could be deemed publics as long as *gong* principles were followed. A public is also not defined by its size. For example, a small pilgrim group attached to a temple with less than ten members and a large occupational association of a whole city could both be regarded as publics.

Concerning Chinese Muslims specifically, they first formed various auto-organizations which were similar to those formed by Han Chinese gentry and merchants, such as lineages, and native-place associations. When participating in

those publics, Chinese Muslims often did not invoke their identity as Muslims. Chinese Muslims also participated in two types of unique publics which were formed based on their common religion and were thus exclusive of Han Chinese. The first one is *jiaofang* (publics formed by Chinese Muslims with the same mosque affiliation). *Jiaofang* were primarily locally based communities, but were not just as loosely bound as ordinary communities. Chinese Muslim *jiaofang* were well-organized and managed collectively, and also promoted shared interests of their members. They provided local semi-formal governance, and worked as economic enterprises for common prosperity of local communities. In some highly urbanized areas of Qing China such as Guangzhou, multiple local *jiaofang* also developed into a network to promote interests of the larger Muslim community of the whole city. In this case, the citywide community of Chinese Muslims in Guangzhou also worked as a public. The other public is the *Ummah* (the worldwide Islamic community of all adherents of Islam) of which Chinese Muslims ideally would recognize themselves as members. The *Ummah* in Qing China, unlike auto-organizations and *jiaofang*, did not have a tangible organization undertaking collective actions and publishing information. It was a “potential” public, which was only invoked by certain groups of Chinese Muslims when it was beneficial to their shared interests, and would return to invisible as long as more immediate public interests were jeopardized.

Various publics often overlapped. In his research on the history of Chinese merchant associations, Ping-ti Ho points out that in some Chinese cities such as Suzhou, there already existed both native-place associations and occupational associations with overlapping membership at least since the late

Ming. For example, a silk merchant in the 19<sup>th</sup>-century Suzhou, who came from Hangzhou, could participate in both the Hangzhou merchants' association in Suzhou, along with other sojourning merchants from Hangzhou who were engaged in various areas of business, as well as the Suzhou silk merchants' association, which were formed by silk merchants in Suzhou regardless of their places of origin.<sup>21</sup> Chinese Muslims were also involved in multiple and overlapping publics in their daily life. Evidence will show that the two types of religious publics of Chinese Muslims were only part of the publics in which they participated, and did not hinder their participation in other publics such as groups formed on common place of origin, gender, kinship, profession, and educational network, many of which they actually shared with Han Chinese. This Chapter first discusses Chinese Muslims' participation in the two types of religious publics.

### **Local Mosques and *Jiaofang***

The Chinese term *jiaofang* 教坊 refers to local publics formed by Chinese Muslims with the same mosque affiliation. During the Tang Dynasty, Muslims from Arabia and Persia started to travel to China for trading. They mainly stayed in Guangzhou, which was the largest port city. For easier management of those foreigners, during the Kaicheng period (836-840), officials in Guangzhou designated specific areas for foreign Muslims to live in, which were called *fanfang* 蕃坊 (residential areas of foreigners). In each *fanfang*, Muslims

---

<sup>21</sup> Ho, *A History of Huiguan in China*, 101-103.

established a mosque, which served as their religious, social, political, and legal center. In Ming and Qing period, though Muslims living in China proper were culturally assimilated and also became legal subjects, they maintained their way of living as relatively separate communities surrounding specific mosques. These communities were no longer called *fanfang* but *jiaofang* (residential areas of religious people).<sup>22</sup>

In the Qing period, a mosque still served as a public venue for the local Chinese Muslim *jiaofang* and connected each Chinese Muslim within the *jiaofang* with one another. Mosques were sometimes referred to as *gongsuo* 公所 (public place/venue) ---sharing the same name with those meeting places of Han Chinese merchant associations, and ancestor halls of Han Chinese lineages, etc. In this sense, as Dillon argues, the growing scale of mosque building within China proper in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries could serve as evidence for the prosperity and increasing size of Chinese Muslim communities during that period.<sup>23</sup>

Millward also notices that when traveling in Xinjiang for trading, Chinese Muslim merchants outside their hometowns quickly established their own mosques. Chinese Muslims who came from cities such as Xi'an and Lanzhou established different mosques and formed new publics based on their religion and native region in Xinjiang. Millward also points out that mosques in Xinjiang established by sojourning Chinese Muslim merchants from various regions

---

<sup>22</sup> Su Xue and Liu Jin, "Historical Evolvement of the Social Functions of Mosques in China (*zhongguo qingzhensi shehui gongneng de lishi yanbian* 中国清真寺社会功能的历史演变)," *Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Trade (Comprehensive Edition)* (September 2009): 73, 75; and Ma, *A Brief History of Chinese Islamic sects and the Institution of Menhuan*, 108-109.

<sup>23</sup> Michael Dillon, *China's Muslim Hui Community: Migration, Settlement and Sects* (Richmond, England: Curzon Press, 1999), 48.



resembled those mosques in their hometowns in appearance.<sup>24</sup> Millward's example shows how a public of *jiaofang* could still connect a group of Chinese Muslims even when members were far away from their native *jiaofang* community.

### *Supporting Local Mosques*

How active were Chinese Muslims in *jiaofang*? It can be partly reflected by large numbers of steles recording Chinese Muslims' donation to their local mosques. Donation was generally made in the forms of money, land, and houses. It was a popular practice for Chinese Muslims to ask their children or other family members to donate their property to mosques after their death.

Chinese Muslims usually had specific requirements in terms of the usage of their donations, and words like "it cannot be used for other purposes with any excuses (不得借故预收作别项使费)" were not rarely seen on steles. Chinese Muslims' demands for proper usage of their donations suggests Chinese Muslims' authentic devotion to and concern for their *jiaofang*. Donors commonly wished to provide financial support for purchasing sacrifices, holding feasts in holy days, aid to the poor and funeral expenses, employing religious teachers, and aiding the maintenance of Islamic schools.

Sometimes, Chinese Muslim donors also expected something in return from the mosques. Children who donated their parent's property often

---

<sup>24</sup> Millward, *Beyond the Pass*, 169.

requested Islamic teachers in mosques to pray for their parents during their death anniversaries. Therefore, on steles where their donation was recorded, death anniversaries of donors or family members of donors were sometimes clearly written down. For example, in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, after her husband and daughter died, a Chinese Muslim woman in Guangzhou donated her family's estate to the local mosque for purchasing sacrifices during death anniversaries of saints and other public expenses. On a stele recording an extended explanation of her donation, the birthdays and death anniversaries of her patrimonial family, as well as her own birthday, were all listed at the bottom. It states that during those death anniversaries, one *yuan* could be withdrawn from the rents of her donated property for incense and service expenses rendered for Islamic teachers to visit their tombs and pray for them.

As an upgraded form of individual donation, many autonomous fund-raising groups were formed by Chinese Muslims in the Qing, with the specific goal of raising money for local mosques. Many of them had their own rules to protect communal money from being embezzled. A well-known example is *xiaohui* 小会 (small club) in Yunnan which was established in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. The group expanded from a couple Chinese Muslims to 26 members in 1817. They contributed their own money to renovating the local mosque. To enlarge the influence of their local *jiaofang*, they also donated money to support non-native Muslims coming to study in the Islamic school affiliated to the local mosque.<sup>25</sup> In 1860, a group in Henan ---which was called *jijin hui* 积金会 (club of accumulated funds) ---was established by local Chinese Muslims. The group was

---

<sup>25</sup> ZHJL, 435.

specially organized to raise funds to support the local Islamic school. They had a purpose similar to *xiaohui* (small club)--- to expand the influence of Islam and to attract non-native Muslims to the local *jiaofang* (吾教大兴, 近悦远来). The group also formulated rules of management agreed upon by all of its members. The rules mainly state that members could not quit at will, and they could not lend public money to others for personal profits.<sup>26</sup> In 1844, a similar group called *sufushaosheng tang* 溯夫绍圣堂 was established in Guangdong. The group kept operating at least until 1979. The purpose of this group was to contribute money to the local mosque for holding ceremonies and feasts during holy days.<sup>27</sup> There were also analogous groups formed exclusively by females. In 1794, a group called *yixin hui* 懿馨会 was formed by 30 female Chinese Muslims in Guangxi. The group was established to commemorate the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad. Group members contributed money, bought a house together, and donated it to the local mosque. The group continued to operate and expand at least until 1830.<sup>28</sup>

Apart from forming groups to support local mosques, Chinese Muslims also formed mutual-help groups within their *jiaofang*. A very famous mutual-help group was established in 1716 in Guangdong by 27 Chinese Muslim elders. They contributed money to buying communal shops, and used the profits to support their funerals. After more than 40 years when all the members passed

---

<sup>26</sup> ZHJL, 426.

<sup>27</sup> Ma Jianzhao and Zhang Shuhui, *Supplementing Archival Records on the Hui Nationality in Southern China (Zhongguo nanfang huizu guji ziliao xuanbian buyi 中国南方回族古籍资料选编补遗)* (Beijing: Nationalities Press, 2006), 422-423.

<sup>28</sup> ZHJL, 432-433.

away, their descendants followed the agreement of the group and donated its public property to two local mosques.<sup>29</sup>

### *Supporting Local Islamic Schools*

As mentioned earlier, Chinese Muslims usually had specific requirements in terms of the usage of their donations. Among those common requirements, aiding the maintenance of local Islamic schools was the most popular one, suggesting Chinese Muslims' intention to preserve the religious tradition of their *jiaofang*. Increasing support for building local Islamic schools was related to the Islamic revival starting in the late Ming and early Qing period.

Generally, large mosques in the Arab and Islamic world are also important educational institutions. Before the late Ming and early Qing period, however, this educational function was absent in Chinese mosques. The situation started to change in the late Ming. Concerned about the degree of Chinese Muslims' assimilation to Chinese culture and their gradual loss of religious distinction, Chinese Muslim literati initiated a movement of Islamic revival. One of their ways to revive the Islamic awareness of common Chinese Muslims was to establish free and public Islamic schools inside mosques, which was called "scripture hall education" (*jingtang jiaoyu* 经堂教育). Those schools borrowed the form of private schools (*sishu* 私塾) from Han Chinese, but different in terms of location and curricula. An Islamic school usually taught classic Islamic texts,

---

<sup>29</sup> ZHJL, 430-431.

basic Arabic language, and sometimes also Persian. Some big and influential schools also taught more sophisticated Islamic works.<sup>30</sup>

The scripture hall education changed the teaching and learning of Islamic texts in China proper from personal activities between teachers and students or between fathers and sons to public activities. Active participation in supporting local Islamic schools also reflected Chinese Muslims' intention to preserve the religious tradition of their *jiaofang*.

#### *Sojourning Chinese Muslims in Local Jiaofang*

Undoubtedly Chinese Muslims travelled. Sometimes, like Chinese Muslim merchants in Xinjiang, Chinese Muslims built their own mosques in sojourning places when traveling in China proper. In 1708, for example, a group of Muslim merchants from Jiangnan contributed money to building a mosque in Foshan, Guangdong, which was on their regular trading route.<sup>31</sup>

There were also Chinese Muslim merchants who chose to go to specific mosques in cities where they regularly traded. Though not belonging to the local Chinese Muslim *jiaofang*, those sojourning Chinese Muslim merchants were highly involved in those local publics. For instance, Chinese Muslims commonly praying in the Lianhuajie Mosque in Xiangtan, Hunan included not only the local *jiaofang*, but also the Jiangnan Chinese Muslim merchant association and the Henan Chinese Muslim merchant association. In 1892 when a conflict arose in

---

<sup>30</sup> For detailed discussion of the Islamic Revival, see Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad*.

<sup>31</sup> ZHJL, 389-390.

terms of management of the mosque, the two Chinese Muslim merchant associations were invited to discuss the issue together with the local *jiaofang*. They worked together and formulated a set of rules to protect the public property of the mosque.<sup>32</sup> The case indicated that the two merchant associations had close connection with the local *jiaofang* and even significant power. It is possible that they were also big donors of the mosque.

Apart from traveling merchants, large numbers of Chinese Muslims serving in the Qing military were also often outside their native *jiaofang*. In Guangdong, where one major banner garrison of the Qing Empire was stationed, many sojourning Chinese Muslim bannermen were also actively engaged in local Chinese Muslim publics. For example, in 1697, a stele was erected to record the good deed of Hong Jin 洪瑾, who was a descendant of the Hong's in Shandong --- which was a renowned lineage of Islamic teachers. He moved to Guangzhou as a member of the Plain Yellow Banner (*zhenghuangqi* 正黄旗). To commemorate his virtuous daughter-in-law, he bought a piece of land in Guangzhou for her burial and also donated it as a free cemetery for all other Chinese Muslims in Guangzhou who did not own a burial place.<sup>33</sup>

#### *Various Degrees of Participation in Jiaofang*

Despite the generally active public culture of *jiaofang*, not every Chinese Muslim participated with the same level of engagement. As Dillon points out,

---

<sup>32</sup> QZS, 247-248.

<sup>33</sup> GYGY, 94-95.

Chinese Muslims' degree of integration into the mainstream society "varied from community to community and from individual to individual."<sup>34</sup> There were those who became religious professionals, as well as those who were increasingly drawn into the mainstream society, participating in the civil service examination and becoming officials. Chinese Muslims' degree of involvement in their religious publics varied significantly.

Compared with Chinese Muslim commoners and merchants in earlier examples, those who became officials were generally less involved in donation to mosques. They often did so only as a response to the request of the local Chinese Muslim gentry who initiated donation activities. For example, in 1855, a mosque in Nanchong, Sichuan were lack of financial support and difficult to survive. Worried about the circumstance, the Islamic teacher of the mosque and the Chinese Muslim gentry of the local *jiaofang* decided to travel around the province to raise funds (赴省募化). Many officials indeed made donation when reached by them.<sup>35</sup>

High-ranking Chinese Muslim officials, if actively participating in charitable activities, often chose not to engage in charities with specific Islamic features. For example, the famous first-ranking Chinese Muslim official Liu Fengwu 刘凤舞 funded many charities. He supported free Confucian schools, poor scholars who wanted to take the civil service examination, and disaster victims, etc. None of those activities could be clearly attributed to his religious orientation.

---

<sup>34</sup> Dillon, *China's Muslim Hui Community*, 6.

<sup>35</sup> ZHJL, 354.

Compared with high-ranking officials, lower-ranking Chinese Muslim officials seemed to be less concerned about participating in activities of their religious publics, probably because they were more locally based and faced less pressure of acculturation from their working environment. For example, Jin Baofu 金宝符 was a fifth-ranking official who were very active in his native *jiaofang* and several neighboring *jiaofang* in Jinan, Shandong. His wife funded renovation of an Islamic school affiliated to the Southern Mosque of Jinan in the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>36</sup> In 1865, he also donated a piece of land to the Xiaojinzhuang Mosque in Jinan. In 1873, after he died, his wife donated another piece of land to the mosque.<sup>37</sup> He was also the author of several inscriptions on steles erected in both the Southern and the Northern Mosque of Jinan. In another case in 1862, the local magistrate of the Nanchong County, Sichuan named Li Sui 李璿 gathered the local gentry and raised fund to renovate the local mosque in Nanchong. He not only initiated the donation activity, but also donated almost 200 tales of silver, and gathered the local gentry and formulated rules to manage the mosque. In the inscription written by him, he also stated that he was luckily selected as the magistrate of Nanchong because of the bliss of the Allah (蒙真主默佑), explicitly showing his religious devotion.<sup>38</sup>

Different from incumbent officials who might face pressure of integration into mainstream Chinese culture and therefore chose not to invoke their religious distinctiveness, the local Chinese Muslim gentry had no concerns in that aspect because they were locally based. Active engagement in local publics was

---

<sup>36</sup> JYB, 41-42.

<sup>37</sup> JYB, 199-200.

<sup>38</sup> ZHJL, 304-306.



also a necessity for them to maintain their local influence and authority. The gentry were degree holders of the civil service examination who did not fulfill a government position or had retired and therefore stayed in their home *jiaofang*. Like the case of Han Chinese, the Chinese Muslim gentry were often actual managers of local communities whom officials had to rely on to deal with local affairs and maintain local order.

The Chinese Muslim gentry were comfortable with their overlapping identities as both Muslims and members of the gentry and generally happy to be managers of local mosques. They were also actively engaged in raising funds for local mosques. Chinese Muslim gentry were also often the authors and calligraphers of steles erected in mosques. A retired high Chinese Muslim official as the author or calligrapher could add value, influence, and authority to an inscription. In remote areas without such figures, local *jiaofang* would at least invited local Chinese Muslims who had passed the first level (county level) of the civil service examination to be authors and calligraphers of inscriptions. In inscriptions, there were sometimes statements such as “I was invited to write a passage to record this (索记于余).” It reflected that the level of education in Chinese classics and participation in the civil service examination of the Qing state were no less valued in the religious publics of Chinese Muslims than Han Chinese publics.

In rural areas of Chinese Muslim communities where there were no or few member of the gentry, Islamic teachers of mosques were the local elite. And it was them who led and managed the local *jiaofang*. For example, in a village in Yunnan in 1811, the local mosque was built with donation made by several local

Islamic teachers. On the stele which was erected to record their good deed, people who erected the stele were written as “Islamic teachers and people of the whole village who were gathered by the teachers,” clearly indicating the elite status of local Islamic teachers in that village.<sup>39</sup>

### *Mosques as Economic Enterprises*

With abundant financial support from Chinese Muslim *jiaofang*, mosques in Qing China were able to function as enterprises participating in social economy. A Qing mosque was at least able to maintain self-sufficiency by renting land and houses donated by local Chinese Muslims of the *jiaofang*. Some wealthy mosques also had extra money to purchase more land and houses. For example, the Southern Mosque of Jinan, Shandong had abundant financial support from the local Chinese Muslim *jiaofang* to maintain self-sufficiency and develop as a large-scale Islamic center in China proper. It not only included the main mosque for prayers and ceremonies, but also one small mosque affiliated to it for meditation and supplementary prayers. It also had two independent Islamic schools. One was open for Chinese Muslim children, called *xiaoxue* 小学 (small school; school for children) and the other was open for more advanced learners of Islamic classics, called *daxue* 大学 (big school; advanced school). The scale of the Northern Mosque of Jinan was similar to the Southern Mosque. A stele in 1840 recorded a title deed in which a person Huang Tingzhu sold his land of more than 17 *mu* (around 11333 square meters) to the Northern Mosque. It was

---

<sup>39</sup> ZHJL, 309.

a standard transaction with a broker mediating the business and a title deed written down during the transaction. The mosque participated in this activity as an ordinary economic enterprise.<sup>40</sup>

Both donated and purchased land and property were commonly not regarded as privately owned by a mosque, though. It would be clearer if we say mosques served as representatives of entire *jiaofang* when participating in social economy. Therefore, property of mosques were indeed public property of *jiaofang*, which were often referred to as *gongtian* 公田 (public/communal land) and *gongchan* 公产 (public/communal property). In Qing China, big mosques often had complex rules and regulations to manage public property, which were very similar to those rules of property management developed by Han Chinese auto-organizations. Generally, the local Chinese Muslim gentry or other local elite such as the elders (*xianglao* 乡老/*xiangqi* 乡耆) took turns to be managers of mosques and kept clear and detailed accounts.

### **Recognition of the *Ummah* in Qing China**

Apart from participating in *jiaofang*, Chinese Muslims in the Qing also shared a common Islamic public ---the *Ummah* --- of which ideally every adherent of Islam in the world was a member. Even though there was no formal institution connecting every *jiaofang* in China proper, Chinese Muslims generally followed the Islamic spirit and recognized each Muslim (Chinese as well as

---

<sup>40</sup> JYB, 118-119.

foreign Muslims) as a family member (*jiaoqin* 教亲). For example, Islamic schools were often not only open to the local *jiaofang*, but all Muslims who would like to go there. For instance, in previous examples, *xiaohui* 小会 (small club) not only funded renovation of the local mosque but also provided financial support for non-native Muslims coming to study in the Islamic school affiliated to the local mosque. Similarly, *jijin hui* 积金会 (club of accumulated funds) which was specially organized to raise funds to support local Islamic school stated its purpose as to expand the influence of Islam and to attract non-native Muslims.

In 1782, a Chinese Muslim Hai Furun 海富润 was arrested in Guangxi for carrying Islamic books, which were mistaken for books of heterodoxy by local officials. Before his arrest, he had travelled and studied in major mosques around China proper for over seven years. Those books were given as presents by a Chinese Muslim merchant Yuan Guozuo 袁国祚 when Hai sojourned in a local mosque in Hankou.

In 1841, a Chinese Muslim in Guangzhou donated a shop to the local Islamic school as “public property” (*gongchan* 公产). Content of the stele recording his donation reflected that Chinese Muslims recognized the importance of Islamic schools in maintaining their religious “root” (*genben* 根本) and in expanding the size of the *Ummah*:

I once heard that learning scriptures were the root of Islam. With the root, branches and leaves grow. With branches and leaves, flowers and fruits grow. Fruits then become ripe and the process never ends. Life follows the root. Thousands of generations then follow. There won't be

any limit. If people of our religion are able to read Islamic classics and scriptures, and pass to our offspring, our community will endure forever.<sup>41</sup>

Qing mosques also offered free accommodation and traveling expenses to Muslim travellers. Rules of a mosque in Hunan in 1823 state that all non-native Muslims would be allowed to stay for one night and offered with two meals for free, and the mosque would also provide them with traveling expenses.<sup>42</sup>

Similarly, in 1825, a set of *quanshan tiaoyue* 劝善条约 (Guidance for Goodness) in a mosque in Shandong included the following articles:

If there are people in the world who know well about Islamic classics, respect and love them. Take your books and ask them your questions, or listen to their teachings. If they stay, take turns to provide them with food. If they leave, raise money and provide them with traveling expenses. You cannot neglect their needs and make guests faraway disappointed.

Help those adherents of Islam (教中之人) who are impoverished. Give them clothes, food, or traveling expenses. You cannot let them unable to return home or feel hopeless.

It is a traditional virtue to help people with funerals and weddings. Also, us adherents of Islam belong to the same group (同教一体). Our

---

<sup>41</sup> GYGY, 24.

<sup>42</sup> ZHJL, 386-388.

fates are bound together (休戚相关). We must help each other... It is not only out of our sympathy, but also required by Islamic teachings...<sup>43</sup>

In the late Qing, two Chinese Muslims in Guangzhou donated their money and built a wing-building (别室) next to the local mosque. They made the donation because many impoverished Muslims were living inside the mosque, making it untidy and disordered. They built the new building to hold those homeless Muslims both from and outside the local community (内外远近贫难亲友).<sup>44</sup>

To Chinese Muslims in some regions, recognition of the *Ummah*, which helped Chinese Muslim communities connect with each other, was a latent hazard to local economic interests. A petition to the local magistrate by Chinese Muslims in Jiangsu in 1881 requested the official to issue a notice prohibiting against the practice of non-native Muslims who forced the mosque to offer them free accommodation and traveling expenses.<sup>45</sup> The case shows that there was a possible tension between non-native Muslims who wanted free accommodation and traveling expenses and local mosques which offered those. It also reveals the limited recognition and influence of the worldwide Islamic public in the mind of Chinese Muslims especially when it jeopardized the interests of local *jiaofang*.

---

<sup>43</sup> JYB, 193-195.

<sup>44</sup> GYGY, 215.

<sup>45</sup> Wang Guoping and Tang Lixing, *Selected Steles Related to the Social History of Suzhou since the Ming and Qing (Mingqing yilai Suzhou shehui shi beike ji 明清以来苏州社会史碑刻集)* (Suzhou: Suzhou University Press, 1998), 448.

## Chapter 3 Interaction between *Jiaofang* and the State Identity of Chinese Muslims

As Liang Zhiping argues in his book on Qing law, in Qing China, the state intervened little in local order. Various auto-organizations and social groups developed independently with their own hierarchy, goals, rules and regulations. They were locally based and constituted the foundation of local order.<sup>46</sup> Nonetheless, primarily, those local publics emerged in the Qing Empire, and their public culture developed within long-term interactions ---accommodation as well as resistance ---with the state discourse, policies, and laws. This chapter looks at how public culture of *jiaofang* adjusted to or responded to the state identity imposed on Chinese Muslims.

### Mosques' Loss of Legal Authority in *Jiaofang*

Unlike other popular religions in China such as Buddhism and Daoism, Islam also regulates the legal and political life of its adherents. Islamic jurisprudence is no less important than Islamic scripture. In pre-modern times, a mosque in the Arab and Islamic world generally also served as a judicial court dealing with local disputes.<sup>47</sup> A Chinese mosque during the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368) was very similar to a mosque in Arab countries. In each mosque, there was a judge (*qadi*; Chinese: 哈的) attending to local legal affairs including penalties, household registration, marriages, distribution of local resources, and legal

---

<sup>46</sup> Liang Zhiping 梁治平, *Customary Law in the Qing Dynasty: Society and the State (qingdai xiguanfa: shehui yu guojia 清代习惯法: 社会与国家)* (Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 1996), 28.

<sup>47</sup> Sami Zubaida, *Law and Power in the Islamic World* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 1, 46.

conflicts, etc.<sup>48</sup> Such a judicial function was totally lost in Qing mosques.

Historical evidence suggests that Chinese Muslims resorted to Qing laws and officials even for personal, family, and religious matters.

For instance, in 1907, a group of Chinese Muslim gentry in Hebei filed a petition to the local government regarding the local custom of requesting lavish betrothal presents. Those members of the gentry firstly worked together and came up with a set of rules (*zhangcheng* 章程) regulating the amount of betrothal presents. They then petitioned the local government requesting an official notice to be issued to recognize those rules. The government later approved their request, announcing that all local Chinese Muslim marriages should follow the rules, and those who violated them would be punished by the government. The government also gave an order to local Islamic teachers, asking them to oversee the matter.<sup>49</sup> This example demonstrates that common Chinese Muslims followed Qing government orders even in terms of their marriage. Similarly, in 1905, Chinese Muslim gentry in a village in Tianjin petitioned the Tianjin provincial government, requesting an official notice prohibiting local practices of same-surname marriages.<sup>50</sup>

Chinese Muslims even resorted to Qing officials for issues of managing mosques. In 1881, a group of Chinese Muslim gentry in the Wu County, Jiangsu petitioned the local magistrate, stating that Islamic teachers of the local mosque wanted to occupy their positions by passing their positions directly to their sons. This practice posed a threat to local Chinese Muslim gentry in terms of their

---

<sup>48</sup> Su, "Historical Evolvement of the Social Functions of Mosques in China," 74.

<sup>49</sup> ZHJL, 370-371.

<sup>50</sup> ZHJL, 653-654.



leadership over the mosque and their power of managing public property of the mosque. They wanted the local government to issue a notice regulating the way of selecting Islamic teachers.<sup>51</sup> This example betrays that Chinese Muslims recognized the authority of the Qing government even concerning leadership of mosques.

Apart from Chinese Muslim gentry, sometimes Islamic teachers also reached out to the Qing government for internal affairs of local mosques. In 1784, an Islamic teacher in Henan was nearing 70 years old. He was worried that Islamic teachers who were going to take his position could not follow the old rules and traditions of the mosque that had been kept since the Tang dynasty. He then filed a petition to the local magistrate and requested the official to issue a notice that could prevent such circumstances. Later, the local magistrate issued a public notice informing every local Chinese Muslim that if successive Islamic teachers did not keep old traditions, managers of the mosque could bring them to the court.<sup>52</sup> Those examples above show that Chinese Muslims were comfortable with their legal identity as Qing subjects and they recognized the authority of the Qing government in regulating their *jiaofang* and mosques.

---

<sup>51</sup> Wang and Tang, *Selected Steles Related to the Social History of Suzhou since the Ming and Qing*, 448.

<sup>52</sup> Stele of Prohibition (*qingzhensi shijinbei* 清真寺示禁碑), in the Eastern Mosque of Kaifeng, Henan, May 1, 1784.

## Appealing to the Qing State

Chinese Muslims not only recognized their legal category as Qing subjects, but also consciously presented themselves as law-abiding subjects and tried to win support or legal protection from the Qing government. For instance, in 1843, Chinese Muslim gentry in Fujian who had donated their money in building the local mosque filed a petition to the local magistrate, requesting the official to issue a notice to protect the public property of the mosque. In their petition, in order to persuade the magistrate, those members of the gentry emphasized the facts that they were Chinese Muslims who abided by Confucian teachings (遵守儒业, 以资正端) and that in the prayer hall of their mosque they also made offerings to the tablet of the Emperor and prayed for the Qing Empire.<sup>53</sup> The above petition filed by the Fujian gentry reflects how Chinese Muslims presented themselves as law-abiding Qing subjects and made use of their state-imposed category to demonstrate their loyalty to the empire and win support of Qing officials.

In 1879, a mosque in Shanghai was under renovation. Worried about being bothered by local ruffians (*guntu* 棍徒) and their construction materials being stolen, local Chinese Muslim gentry filed a petition to the magistrate requesting official protection during the process of renovation. In their petition, the local gentry even stated that the mosque was built by them during the

---

<sup>53</sup> QZS, 163-165.

Tongzhi period (1862-1875) specially for making offerings to the Imperial tablets.<sup>54</sup>

Even though in examples above, Chinese Muslims expressed their loyalty to the Qing Empire by referring to the imperial tablets, there are scholars who have argued “when Muslims prostrated themselves before them they avoided touching the floor with their head and so invalidated the rite in their own minds.”<sup>55</sup> Records of Western missionaries also suggest that Chinese Muslims might not pray for the Qing imperial family in actuality, but a tablet of the Emperor was deemed necessary to avoid being accused of disloyalty.<sup>56</sup>

Apart from emphasizing their sacrificing to the Imperial tablets, Chinese Muslims also often made use of the fact that they offered free schools inside mosques. In both of the examples above where local Chinese Muslim gentry tried to display their loyalty to the Qing state so as to persuade local officials to approve their petition, they not only stated that they made offerings to the tablet of the Emperor, but also added that their mosques also offered free schools for local Chinese Muslim children. In the first example, they even stated that it was a Confucian school (*shuguan* 书馆<sup>57</sup>) inside their mosque, teaching local Muslim children Chinese classics.

---

<sup>54</sup> *Shen Bao*, November 19, 1879.

<sup>55</sup> Dillon, *China's Muslim Hui Community*, 6.

<sup>56</sup> Ma Jianchun and Xu Hong, “Chinese mosques recorded by Westerners in the Ming and Qing (*Mingqing shiqi xifang ren zaiji zhong de zhongguo qingzhen siyuan* 明清时期西方人载记中的中国清真寺院),” *Journal of Northwest University for Nationalities (Philosophy and Social Science)* (No.4 2014): 47-48.

<sup>57</sup> On steles erected by Chinese Muslims, *shuguan* 书馆 (schools of books) often appears together with *jingguan* 经馆 (schools of scriptures). The former refers to Confucian schools and the latter refers to Islamic schools.

Chinese Muslim gentry's emphasis on the educational function of local mosques when trying to persuade Qing officials could be viewed as a response to the Qing's adoption of the ethnic discourse of civilization in dealing with affairs concerning Chinese Muslims since the late 18<sup>th</sup> century. From the late 18<sup>th</sup> century to the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, there were several major rebellions led by Chinese Muslims in northwestern China. To pacify those areas after rebellions, the Qing state emphasized the importance of *jiaohua* 教化 (to educate and to civilize). Responding to the state discourse, local officials in northwestern China established many free schools teaching Chinese classics in Chinese Muslim communities to "educate" and "civilize" them. Even though the central policy of civilizing Chinese Muslims was only formulated to pacify those rebellious areas, judging from the examples above, clearly Qing officials in many other areas of China proper adopted the same attitude that Chinese Muslims who were more educated in Chinese classics would be more civilized and would be better subjects. Chinese Muslims, therefore, presented themselves as good subjects by consciously emphasizing that Chinese classics were taught in *jiaofang*.

In 1874, local Chinese Muslim merchants in Henan donated some money and purchased a house, where they opened an Islamic school, which was named as *shanyi tang* 善义堂 (the Hall of Kindness and Righteousness). The school was divided into two parts. The inner part was an Islamic school (*jingxue* 经学) open for local Chinese Muslims, teaching Islamic scriptures. The outer part was a free school (*yixue* 义学) open for both Han Chinese and Chinese Muslims in the local area, teaching Confucian texts. A highly possible reason for having the outer part is that they wanted their school to appear more legitimate in the eyes of Qing

officials. In this case, preserving Chinese Muslims' religious distinction was obviously not the only concern of those Chinese Muslim merchants when establishing the school.

Indeed, since Chinese Muslims were after all different from the majority Han Chinese residents in China proper, it is not difficult to imagine the pressure they could receive from Qing officials and local Han Chinese residents, especially in regions where they only constituted a very small minority. It partly explains why Chinese Muslims put much importance on getting official protection from the Qing government when it was possible.

A case recorded in the local gazetteer of Ninghe during the Guangxu period (1874-1908) reveals how much pressure Chinese Muslims could be under. During the Xianfeng period (1850-1861), local Chinese Muslims of Ninghe established a mosque. Later, the mosque was alleged to be harmful to local *fengshui* and the provincial official ordered the mosque to be demolished and Chinese Muslims could never reestablish it. In 1979, local Chinese Muslims opened a free Islamic school. Later, local Han Chinese gentry complained that it was indeed a mosque in disguise. The magistrate found their complaint credible and issued a public notice prohibiting local Chinese Muslims from opening free schools again.<sup>58</sup> In the gazetteer, demolition of the mosque was even recorded as a political achievement of the local official.<sup>59</sup>

These examples reveal that in some cases, Chinese Muslims consciously made use of their state-imposed identity and category to seek official protection.

---

<sup>58</sup> Gazetteer of the Ninghe County (*ninghe xianzhi* 宁河县志) (1880), *juan* 3.

<sup>59</sup> Gazetteer of the Ninghe County (*ninghe xianzhi* 宁河县志) (1880), *juan* 9.

It did not mean that they felt totally comfortable accepting those. When possible, they also tried to resist certain pressure from the government. In 1877, rules of a mosque in Hunan stated that the Confucian school was not allowed to be established inside the mosque. The reason provided was that the mosque was too small to hold both Confucian and Islamic schools, and conflicts among students of the two schools would cause unnecessary troubles which would harm local harmony.<sup>60</sup> It is possible that the mosque was once forced to offer a Confucian school for local children. When there were conflicts between Han Chinese children and Chinese Muslim children of the two schools, the mosque found it to be a good excuse to reject the government's requirement of continuing to maintain the Confucian school.

---

<sup>60</sup> ZHJL, 386-388.

## Chapter 4 Management of *Jiaofang*

### Leadership of Mosques and *Jiaofang*: Regional Variations and Diachronic Evolvement

In Chapter 2, a regional difference between less developed rural areas and more developed areas in terms of management and leadership of local mosques and *jiaofang* has been noted. In remote rural areas, mostly in western part of China proper, where Islamic teachers were major local elite, mosques and the local Chinese Muslim publics were usually led and managed by them. Islamic teachers in mosques were in charge of not only religious matters such as leading prayers and holding ceremonies, but also secular matters such as managing the property of the mosques. Their authority was not limited to religious matters. During the Panthay Rebellion (1856-1873) led by Chinese Muslims in Yunnan, the Qing state relied greatly on local Islamic teachers to control the situation and maintain local order.

As a contrast, religious teachers in more developed areas, mainly in eastern and southeastern China, had much less power. In those areas, Chinese Muslim gentry were actively engaged in local affairs, and they also managed to attain the power of managing local mosques. One important way to understand the gentry's power in the mosques was that mosques had to rely on them for financial support. In those areas, terms like *gongtian* 公田 (public land) and *gongchan* 公产 (public property) ---which were often used to refer to property owned by auto-organizations such as lineages and merchant associations ---were also commonly seen to refer to property owned by mosques, or to be precise, by the entire *jiaofang*. Property was also managed in a way very similar to

communal property of other secular auto-organizations. The local gentry selected several representatives as managers of mosques. They also developed complex rules to protect public property from being appropriated or misused. In historical records of mosques in Guangdong during the Qing period, a peculiar term *gongxiang* 公箱 (public coffer) was often seen. Donations, rents of public houses, and other possible income of the mosque were all sent to *gongxiang*. When religious ceremonies were going to be held, funds were withdrawn from it. In such developed areas, Islamic teachers had almost no secular power. They only fulfilled religious responsibilities such as leading prayers. Even the selection of Islamic teachers lay in the hands of the gentry. Sometimes, the gentry selected Islamic teachers from local Muslims who were deemed intellectually and morally qualified. They also at times employed non-native Islamic teachers.

In between the more developed areas, such as Jiangnan, and the less developed areas, such as Yunnan, there were also some regions where mosques were managed in a middle way. For example, in a village in Sichuan, land donated in 1822 was managed by religious teachers and the local gentry jointly.

In the following paragraphs, two case studies are offered to show how leadership of mosques and *jiaofang* varied from one region to another and how it evolved through the Qing period.



## *The Southern Mosque of Jinan*

The Southern Mosque of Jinan (济南清真南大寺) was located in the Licheng County, Jinan Prefecture, Shandong Province in Qing China. On steles, it was often referred to simply as the Mosque of Jinan, suggesting that it was probably a main, if not the biggest, mosque in the Jinan prefecture. The mosque was established during the Yuan Dynasty. In the Ming, it was expanded greatly to include a prayer hall, a fasting room, an Islamic school, a kitchen, a warehouse that stored funeral supplies, and a tower named *jiaohua lou* 教化楼 (Tower of Educating and Civilizing) or *wangyue lou* 望月楼 (Tower of Moon-observing). An inscription in 1833 stated that “its palace has been tall and its scale has been grand for a long time (殿宇高耸，规模宏敞，由来已久).”

In the Qing period, the mosque continued to be expanded. Islamic schools affiliated to the mosque developed into two separate parts --- a school for children (*xiaoxue* 小学) and a school for advanced learners (*daxue* 大学). There were also three different sites of the school for children. A public shower room was also built. There was also a small mosque affiliated to the Southern Mosque of Jinan, which was for Chinese Muslims to supplement their prayers. One site of the Islamic school for children was also inside the small mosque.

All construction and renovation were initiated, financed, and overseen by Chinese Muslims of the local *jiaofang*. For example, in 1810, a huge and tall screen wall was built between the prayer hall and the front door of the mosque. It was initiated and funded by a group of local Chinese Muslim merchants working in the Changshun grain shop (*changshun lianghang* 长顺粮行). One site

of the school for children was financed by the wife of Jin Baofu 金宝符 ---a renowned member of local Chinese Muslim gentry who was very active in local affairs. In 1874, the entire mosque, including the Islamic schools, was under a large-scale project of renovation, which was entirely supported by funds raised from the *jiaofang*. Apart from donating money for renovation, local Chinese Muslims also donated their property to the mosque for daily maintenance, such as providing expenses for the shower room and stipends for Islamic teachers.

As Benite discusses in his book, Shandong was one of the centers of the Islamic revival in the late Ming and early Qing period, and Chinese Muslims from all over China proper went to visit and study there.<sup>61</sup> Steles indeed reveal that the Southern Mosque was large in scale and managed in a more sophisticated way than common mosques. In as early as 1715, a stele in the mosque already clearly prohibited Islamic teachers from passing their positions to their sons, which only started to concern the mosque in the Wu County in Jiangsu in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>62</sup> Such a stele not only reveals the advanced level of management of the mosque, but also betrays the limited power enjoyed by Islamic teachers in the local *jiaofang*.

In 1737, a local Chinese Muslim woman donated money to renovate the Tower. The stele recording the donation shows that it was received by Islamic teachers of the mosque. The author and calligrapher of the inscription was also one of the Islamic teachers rather than local Chinese Muslim gentry.<sup>63</sup> It reflects that in 1737, Islamic teachers still had power of managing the mosque property

---

<sup>61</sup> Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad*, 49-51.

<sup>62</sup> JYB, 16-17.

<sup>63</sup> JYB, 70-71.

and their intellectual influence beyond religious aspects was recognized by the *jiaofang*.

The situation changed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. At the bottom of a stele in 1810 which recorded renovation of the mosque, besides the names of the Islamic teachers, a new title also appeared ---*lingxiu xianglao* 领袖乡老 (the leading local elder). The title was filled by a *juren* 举人 (a degree holder of the second/provincial-level civil service examination).<sup>64</sup> It reflects the fact that local Chinese Muslim gentry began to participate in managing the mosque.

In 1845, on a stele recording a donation activity, which also served as a title deed of the donated property, receivers of the property were written as three Islamic teachers and twelve managers (*shoushiren* 首事人).<sup>65</sup> Compared with *lingxiu xianglao* (the leading local elder), this new title ---manager --- suggests the formal involvement of local Chinese Muslim gentry in the management of the mosque. In 1874, on the stele recording the renovation of Islamic schools, names of Islamic teachers were not even seen.<sup>66</sup>

The title of the manager and that of the local elders were used interchangeably on steles after 1845. Since 1872, the local elders (or managers) appearing on steles were limited to a specific number, sometimes four, six or eight. And some names appeared repetitively. For example, Fan Changqing 范长清 was recorded on steles as a member of “the local elders” from 1872 till

---

<sup>64</sup> JYB, 20-21.

<sup>65</sup> JYB, 28-29.

<sup>66</sup> JYB, 38-39.

1890.<sup>67</sup> Some members of Chinese Muslim gentry who were active participants in the local *jiaofang* ---common donors of the mosque, and common authors and calligraphers of steles inside the mosque --- were also members of the group of “local elders” or “managers” such as Zuo Fengsheng 左凤盛 and Ma Bingzhang 马炳章. Arguably, local Chinese Muslim gentry who were powerful and active in local affairs both participated in and led the local Chinese Muslim public.

In contrast, the power of Islamic teachers in the Southern Mosque of Jinan was limited. No evidence suggests that they were involved in any fund-raising activities for the mosque. They were sometimes not even natives of the *jiaofang* but were employed by the local gentry due to their fame and intellectual achievements. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the authority of Islamic teachers was still respected in affairs of mosque management. At the bottom of steles recording donation or renovation, names of Islamic teachers were generally inscribed before those of the local elders, even though the local elders were the actual receivers and managers of donation. The circumstance was very different in Guangzhou.

#### *The Huaisheng Mosque of Guangzhou*

The Huaisheng Mosque of Guangzhou (广州怀圣寺) located in the Guangzhou Prefecture, Guangdong Province was one of the oldest mosques in China. It was built in the Tang dynasty by Arab merchants trading in Guangzhou.

---

<sup>67</sup> JYB, 36, 45, 47.

Until the Qing period, it was still the leading mosque in Guangzhou. The public culture of Chinese Muslims in Guangzhou was highly active (if not the most active in China proper). As early as 1718, an autonomous mutual-help group was formed by a group of local Chinese Muslim elders to support each other's funeral. In 1762, their children donated their remaining communal property to the Huaisheng Mosque and the Haopan Mosque (濠畔寺) for "public" use only.

It seemed to have been a tradition in Guangzhou that during each time of renovation, names of all donors contributing to renovation would be inscribed on steles. It was also seen in some other regions, such as Sichuan, but the number of names (at most fifty) was much fewer than those on steles in Guangzhou. In 1871, the Huaisheng Mosque was under a large renovation project. Two steles were used to record all donors (approximately 500) to this activity. The name list started with officials and military officers who contributed their money. A name list of foreign donors (mostly Arabs) in Hong Kong followed. After the two lists, donors from the local and all neighboring *jiaofang* were listed one by one, including Chinese Muslims from the Haopan Mosque, those from the Nansheng Mosque (南胜寺), those from the Dongying Mosque (东营寺), those from the Eastern and Western Zhaoqing Mosque (东/西肇庆寺), and, finally, those from the Huaisheng Mosque. These donors from the local and nearby *jiaofang* were recorded mostly as individuals. Sometimes a place name was put next to their names, such as Shaanxi, Shandong, Yunnan, or Sichuan, indicating that the person was a sojourning Chinese Muslim. There were also bannermen participating in donation. At times, names of shops or auto-organizations were recorded as donors, such as *guiri tang* 贵日堂 and *jingzhen zhai* 敬真斋. Further

research will be needed to determine which kind of organizations they were. Chinese Muslims also made donation as households. For example, there were names such as *yangdazhai* 杨大宅 (the first household of the Yangs), *yangsanzhai* 杨三宅 (the third household of the Yangs), and *lindazhai* 林大宅 (the first household of the Lins).<sup>68</sup>

Like the Southern Mosque of Jinan, the Huaisheng Mosque of Guangzhou was also under systematic management. Steles show that, in 1770, title deeds of property donated to the mosque were still kept by Islamic teachers who led the mosque (*zhangjiao* 掌教, religious leaders).<sup>69</sup> In 1779, the title of “manager” (*zhishi* 执事) emerged. Property of the mosque was handled by managers by turns (轮流支理). The position of the manager continued to exist through the Qing period. Those managers were a group of local Chinese Muslim elites (basically the gentry and merchants). Each year, generally two of them would be managers, called “managers of the year” (*dangnian zhishi* 当年执事). Those elites took turns as managers of the year. There were also deputy managers (*fuzuo zhishi* 副佐执事). After managers emerged, the title of *zhangjiao* 掌教 (religious leaders) was seldom seen on steles. Their names never showed up at the bottom of steles. They were also rarely mentioned in inscriptions.

One characteristic of the management of the Huaisheng Mosque was the existence of “public coffers” (*gongxiang* 公箱). In 1848, 37 managers of the mosque contributed their money and bought a shop. The rent of each month was

---

<sup>68</sup> GYGY, 45-60.

<sup>69</sup> GYGY, 17-18.

stored in the “public coffer” of the mosque (*bensi gongxiang* 本寺公箱) and taken care of by the managers of the year. The money was used for celebrating the anniversary of the Prophet’s ascension (*Lailat al Mi’raj*) each year. When there was money left over, it was deposited into another “public coffer” and saved for renovating the shop.<sup>70</sup> Judging from this example, a “public coffer” resembled a public account.

Another unique feature of the management of the Huaisheng Mosque was that it also belonged to a unified system which connected four neighboring *jiaofang* and their mosques in Guangzhou. The four mosques were the Huaisheng Mosque, the Haopan Mosque, the Nansheng Mosque, and the Dongying Mosque. They firstly appeared together on a stele in 1770 when a person divided his property evenly into four parts and donated it to each of the four mosques.<sup>71</sup> In 1779, a group of local Chinese Muslims bought a house together and donated it to the four mosques. This time the donors did not divide their property. Rather, the managers of the four mosques were asked to care for it by turns. It suggests that a system of rotation was created to include managers of the four mosques. In the same year, a person sold his house to the four mosques (出买[卖]与四寺公众管业).<sup>72</sup> In this case, the four mosques worked as one unified economic enterprise with collectively owned property.

Another piece of evidence to support the formal connection of the four mosques was the existence of the public coffer owned by the four *jiaofang* jointly

---

<sup>70</sup> GYGY, 33-34.

<sup>71</sup> GYGY, 17-18.

<sup>72</sup> GYGY, 101.

(*sifang gongxiang* 四方/坊公箱). In 1813, the managers of the four mosques turned a donated house into a shop. On the stele, it stated that because at that time there was no remaining money in the joint coffer of the four *jiaofang*, a manager named Liang 亮 contributed his own money to the renovation.<sup>73</sup> Judging by this example, a joint account of the four *jiaofang* had already emerged in 1813. After 1813, a large number of donations were made directly to the joint coffer, which was attended to by managers of each of the four mosques by turns.

The emergence of the joint coffer of the four *jiaofang* did not make public coffers of individual mosques disappear. In 1848, the managers of the Huaisheng Mosque still donated property to the public coffer of the Huaisheng Mosque.<sup>74</sup> When individual donors made a donation, they could choose to donate their property either to a specific mosque or the joint coffer of the four *jiaofang*. For example, in 1841, a local Chinese Muslim in Guangzhou, after seeing many people donate their property to the joint coffer of the four *jiaofang*, wanted to follow their example, so he decided to donate his property to the Islamic shrine of Guangzhou.<sup>75</sup>

This way of managing public property through “public coffers” was not a unique feature of mosques. In local gazetteers of Qing China, the term “public coffer” was also found in the gazetteer of the Fanyu County, the Nanhai County, and the Shunde County of Guangdong. In those records, “public coffers” was mentioned in the management of various social groups such as public schools (邑学) and literati groups (文社) in which the main participants were Han

---

<sup>73</sup> GYG, 109-110.

<sup>74</sup> GYG, 33-34.

<sup>75</sup> GYG, 120.



Chinese. Apparently, religious publics of Chinese Muslims in Guangzhou were managed in a way not so different from how Han Chinese in Guangdong managed their auto-organizations. Chinese Muslims and Han Chinese in Guangzhou shared a common public culture.

### **Conflicts and Creation of Customary Law**

Chapter 3 demonstrates the mosques' loss of judicial functions and legal authority in the local *jiaofang*. In Qing China, there were no longer Islamic judges in mosques dealing with conflicts and legal affairs of the *jiaofang*. How did Chinese Muslims settle their conflicts in managing their publics? Scholars studying laws and legal cases in the Qing such as Philip Huang and Liang Zhiping have noticed some different approaches of Han Chinese communities to settling conflicts. In many civil cases dealing with issues such as property ownership and inheritance, local magistrates were often happy to leave them to "extrajudicial community/kin mediation." It was also common, though, for even "simple peasants" to turn to the Qing courts and lodge lawsuits for settlement of disputes.<sup>76</sup> Various publics also attended to internal disputes with agreed-upon rules and regulations. To enhance the authority of their rules or agreements, they also often sent them to local governments for official registration or recognition. Such practices, as Liang argues, formed the "customary law" in Qing China, which he defines as regional rules developed by local residents for distribution of rights and obligations and for settlement of disputes, and

---

<sup>76</sup> Philip C. C. Huang, *Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice in the Qing* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 11-12.

enforced in social networks.<sup>77</sup> Historical evidence shows that Chinese Muslim publics created local customary law, just like Han Chinese publics.

Conflicts and problems in management of mosques and *jiaofang* were very similar to those problems arising when managing auto-organizations such as lineages, literati groups, and merchant associations. Large numbers of conflicts centered on economic issues, such as appropriation of public land and selling public property in secret. Common possible conflicts were reflected in a set of regulations of a mosque in Hunan in 1877. The following are specific rules related to possible conflicts:

Sixth, local Muslims or people with spouses and children may not be guards of the mosque. Only non-natives who are single can be guards.

Seventh, spaces of the mosque may not be lent to craftsmen for working...

Ninth, furniture, tableware, lights and decorations of the mosque may not be lent to people holding banquets...

Fifteenth, during holy days, beef may not be sold outside...

Seventeenth, land and houses of the mosque and the community are available for renting... They may not be appropriated.

Eighteenth, managers of the mosque should be clear when keeping accounts. They may not manipulate accounts and embezzle money. If

---

<sup>77</sup> Liang, *Customary Law in the Qing Dynasty*, 1.

there is extra money, the community can decide whether to purchase more property.<sup>78</sup>

The above rules reveal that the space, buildings, and property of the mosque were all deemed public property of the *jiaofang*. Usage of public property should be approved by the entire *jiaofang*. Any possible threats to public property, such as guards who had access to property inside the mosque, were under agreed-upon regulations.

As mentioned earlier, Chinese Muslims often sent their rules to local government to enhance the authority of those rules. In 1886, Chinese Muslims in Jilin proposed a set of rules to protect the public property of their mosque, and they petitioned the local government for an official registration of their activities and their rules. Twelve years later, due to poor management, corporate land was either taken back by donors or appropriated. Local Chinese Muslims decided that, since they had an old set of rules which were officially registered, they should again follow those rules to rearrange their public property. They also invited local officials to be eyewitnesses when they recreated title deeds of the property.<sup>79</sup>

Similarly, in 1843, public land of the Mosque of the Dang Village in Shandong was occupied by two local Chinese Muslims. Residents of the entire village filed a complaint to the local magistrate who later gave his verdict that the two Chinese Muslims must return the land and should not make trouble. After the affair, in 1844, local Chinese Muslim elites of the village had a public discussion (*gongyi* 公议) and they formulated a set of rules stating that Islamic

---

<sup>78</sup> ZHJL, 386-388.

<sup>79</sup> ZHJL, 372-373.

teachers should not pass their positions to their sons, let unknown people stay in the mosque, or sell public property of the mosque privately. If Islamic teachers did not follow the rules, all residents of the village would discuss publicly and select new teachers. Worried about unpredictable situations such as the previous trouble, the village petitioned the local magistrate for registration of their rules and also requested that the magistrate issue an official notice that all residents of the village should follow the rules and that those who violated them would be taken to court and punished by law (按法究治).<sup>80</sup> The statement that people who violated rules of the Chinese Muslim public would be punished by law reflects the actual legal authority of those rules formed outside the state legal system. It reveals how rules of Chinese Muslim publics and laws of the state cooperated in dealing with local disputes.

The above example also shows that economic disputes in *jiaofang* were often closely related to conflicts over mosque leadership. As discussed earlier, mosques in China proper were often not led by Islamic teachers who had religious authority, but the local gentry who held economic and social power. Sometimes Islamic teachers tried to keep and expand their authority by passing their positions to their own children, while the local gentry were against such hereditary practices and claimed that religious teachers should be selected by them. When actual power conflicts arose, local Chinese Muslim gentry often resorted to Qing officials for settlement. In an aforementioned example, the Chinese Muslim gentry in the Wu County, Jiangsu petitioned the local magistrate

---

<sup>80</sup> JYB, 146-147.

in 1881 regarding the hereditary practices of those Islamic teachers in their local mosque.<sup>81</sup>

Chinese Muslim gentry were not only Muslims but also degree holders of the civil service examination. Their authority and influence in local areas came from their status as members of the gentry. In this sense, there is no surprise that when attending to local disputes, they adopted their identity as members of the gentry and worked with local governments, just like Han Chinese gentry. However, even when there were no conflicts over leadership between Islamic teachers and local Chinese Muslim gentry, and mosques were entirely led by Islamic teachers, Islamic teachers also chose to reach out to the Qing government for official recognition of mosque rules. In an earlier example, an Islamic teacher in Henan petitioned the local magistrate in 1784. At that time, he was nearing 70 years old and worried that the Islamic teachers who would take his position could not follow the old rules and traditions of the mosque that had been kept since the Tang dynasty. He then filed a petition with the local magistrate and requested him to officially recognize those old traditions.<sup>82</sup>

These examples reflect the fact that the religious publics of Chinese Muslims faced disputes similar to those faced by secular publics, such as lineages and merchant associations. They also settled those disputes in a similar way --- formulating agreed-upon rules and sometimes seeking official recognition. Through petitions to the Qing government, rules formed by Chinese Muslim

---

<sup>81</sup> Wang and Tang, *Selected Steles Related to the Social History of Suzhou since the Ming and Qing*, 448.

<sup>82</sup> Stele of Prohibition (*qingzhensi shijinbei* 清真寺示禁碑), in the Eastern Mosque of Kaifeng, Henan, May 1, 1784.

publics attained legal authority. Qing officials oversaw the enforcement of these rules in the way they enforced the state laws. In this way, Chinese Muslim publics contributed to creating Qing customary law.

## Chapter 5 Multiple Identities and Overlapping Publics

The many examples described above demonstrate that Chinese Muslims had multiple identities. Their identities came from their religious affiliation, region, and occupation, etc. Even in participating in and dealing with the internal affairs of the *jiaofang*, Chinese Muslims might adopt non-religious identities such as members of the gentry and law-abiding Qing subjects when expedient. Most of the time, there was no choice to be made between being a Muslim or a Chinese, for an identity like a member of the gentry was not an exclusively Han Chinese identity. There was never a real dichotomy between “Chineseness” and “Muslimness,” nor was there a “simultaneity” of the two, as Benite argues,<sup>83</sup> which still presupposes a dichotomy between them. Chinese Muslims had multiple identities and were involved in overlapping publics. They consciously adopted certain identities when participating in and forming various publics.

For instance, Chinese Muslims generally also organized themselves into lineages. They built ancestral halls, composed genealogies, ran public land and property of their lineages, and formulated rules regarding ancestor worship and lineage management. When participating in activities of their lineages, they sometimes did not invoke their religious identity. During the 1880s, two publics -- *beili yuying hui* 北李育婴会 (Infant Center of the Northern Li) and *nanli yuying hui* 南李救婴会 (Infant Center of the Southern Li)--- were established by Chinese Muslims in the Taojiang County, Hunan to support local newborn infants financially, especially to prevent the practice of killing female infants. The two publics were sub-organizations under the Li lineage of the county. Members of

---

<sup>83</sup> Benite, *The Dao of Muhammad*.

the public were viewed not primarily as Muslims but as descendants of the Li family. Public meetings were also held in the ancestral hall of the Li lineage.<sup>84</sup>

There were also cases in which Chinese Muslims simultaneously invoked their religious and familial identities. This was commonly seen in some rural areas where residents of a village belonged to the same lineage as well as the same *jiaofang*. For example, in 1708, Chinese Muslims of the Cui Village in Shandong re-built their mosque. On the stele recording the event, terms of *zuren* 族人 (members of the lineage) and *jiaomin* 教民 (adherents of the religion) were used interchangeably. For instance, in one single statement ---“With the efforts of the entire lineage, the project was finished in autumn. The wish of us adherents of Islam was fulfilled. The power and influence of our village and our lineage were also promoted.” (经族人合力，至秋告竣，以结教民心愿，振庄族之威) --- Chinese Muslims of the Cui village simultaneously identified themselves as members of the Cui lineage, adherents of Islam, and residents of the village.<sup>85</sup> Their public was simultaneously a lineage, a *jiaofang*, and a village. In the activity of rebuilding the mosque of the Cui Village, the three identities were all invoked and no one identity was more prominent than the others.

Another popular form of public among Chinese Muslims was the merchant association. Chinese Muslims attained fame as successful merchants, exemplified in the Hui caravans in northwestern China and in Yunnan. When traveling for trade, Chinese Muslims were usually engaged in different merchant

---

<sup>84</sup> Ma Jianli, *Selected Records on Social Organizations in Southern China (Zhongguo nanfang huizu shehui tuanti ziliao xuanbian 中国南方回族社会团体资料选编)* (Sichuan: Sichuan Nationalities Press, 2003), 103.

<sup>85</sup> JYB, 244.



associations with a combined identity of religion and region. For example, Muslims who regularly prayed in the Lianhuajie Mosque in Xiangtan, Hunan were not only local Chinese Muslims, but also members of the Jiangnan Chinese Muslim merchant association and the Henan Chinese Muslim merchant association. In 1892, when a conflict arose over mosque management, the two merchant associations were invited to discuss the issue together with local Chinese Muslims. They worked together and came up with a set of rules to protect the public property.<sup>86</sup> This case indicates that Chinese Muslim merchants might organize themselves by religion as well as region. Chinese Muslim merchants from Jiangnan and those from Henan belonged to different publics.

Chinese Muslim merchant publics often excluded other Chinese Muslims. Chinese Muslims of one region were not necessarily willing to share their privileges or property with Chinese Muslims of another region in spite of their common religious identity. In the early 19th century, a group of Muslim merchants who were from Jiangning and trading in Hankou bought a piece of land to serve as a free cemetery for all Jiangning Muslim merchants trading in Hankou. Later, they found out that some local residents had secretly buried family members in the land. They then petitioned the local government requesting an official notice prohibiting such practices, stating that the land was specially bought for Jiangning Muslim merchants in Hankou, and even local Hankou Muslims could not appropriate it.<sup>87</sup> This example shows that various

---

<sup>86</sup> QZS, 247-248.

<sup>87</sup> ZHJL, 382-383.

factors such as economic interests could make Chinese Muslims leave aside their common religious bond.

Economic interests could separate Chinese Muslims from different regions, and they could also drive Chinese Muslims to invoke their common religious identity in order to cooperate. For example, in his book on the ethnogenesis of the Hui nationality, Gladney offered an example of Chinese Muslim communities near the Liu Pan range in Ningxia who fled or were forcibly relocated there after the Shaanxi Hui Rebellion (1862-1877). They belonged to disparate *menhuan* (the Chinese form of Sufi orders), which were extremely exclusive groups and often had severely violent conflicts. But after being forced to move away from their local communities, they invoked their “sense of a common religious heritage” to connect with each other so as to build a trading network.<sup>88</sup>

Since Chinese Muslims in the Qing were involved in various overlapping publics, mosques sometimes served as not only public venues of local *jiaofang* but also public venues of other publics formed by Chinese Muslims. For example, in 1911, the Chinese Muslim merchant association of Shanghai held its public meetings inside the local mosque.<sup>89</sup>

---

<sup>88</sup> Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*, 39.

<sup>89</sup> *Shen Bao*, December 30, 1911.

## Chapter 6 Conclusion

Examination of the public culture of Chinese Muslims shows that they participated in a number of different publics based on various common bonds they could invoke such as religion, place of origin, kinship, economic interests, and occupation. Chinese Muslims had their unique religious publics exclusive of Han Chinese ---the *Ummah* and *jiaofang*. They also formed publics which Han Chinese commonly organized themselves into and in which they sometimes did not invoke their religious identity, such as lineages and merchant associations. Chinese Muslims were involved in those multiple and overlapping publics in their daily life. These two types of Chinese Muslim religious publics were only part of the publics in which they participated, and did not go against or hinder their participation in other publics, many of which they actually shared with Han Chinese.

Whether it was a *jiaofang*, a lineage, or a merchant association, Chinese Muslims participated, managed and regulated their publics in ways no different from their Han Chinese neighbors. Chinese Muslim publics faced disputes similar to those faced by Han Chinese publics. They also settled those disputes in a similar way --- formulating agreed-upon rules and sometimes seeking official recognition. Through petitions to the Qing government, rules formed by Chinese Muslim publics attained legal authority. Qing officials oversaw the enforcement of those rules in the way they enforced the state laws. The religious publics of Chinese Muslims in Guangzhou, for example, were managed in a way not so different from how Han Chinese in Guangzhou managed their auto-organizations. Chinese Muslims and Han Chinese in Guangzhou shared a common public culture.

In many circumstances, Chinese Muslims did not view religious distinctiveness as the primary source of their identity. Even when participating in and dealing with internal affairs of their religious publics, Chinese Muslims might adopt non-religious identities such as members of the gentry and law-abiding Qing subjects, when expedient. For example, Chinese Muslim gentry were not only Muslims but also degree holders of the civil service examination. They were comfortable with their overlapping identities as both Muslims and members of the local gentry and generally happy to be managers of local mosques. Indeed, their authority and influence in local areas came from their status as members of the gentry. Like the case of Han Chinese, Chinese Muslim gentry were often the actual managers of local publics on whom officials relied to deal with local affairs and maintain local order. In this sense, it is no surprise that, when attending to local disputes, they adopted their identity as members of the gentry and worked with local governments, just like Han Chinese gentry. It suggests that Chinese Muslims did not really have to choose between being a Muslim or a Chinese, for an identity like membership of the gentry did not belong exclusively to Han Chinese, and there was no tension between being a Muslim and being a member of the gentry. Chinese Muslims had multiple identities and were involved in overlapping publics. They consciously adopted certain identities when participating in or forming various publics.

Like all other publics, Chinese Muslim publics were also often formed for the purpose of cooperation and to serve common economic interests. Different bonds were invoked consciously for certain purposes. For example, Chinese Muslim merchant associations were often exclusive of other Chinese Muslims.

Chinese Muslims of one region were not necessarily willing to share their privileges or property with Chinese Muslims of another region in spite of their common religious identity. Therefore, various factors could make Chinese Muslims leave aside their common religious bond. On the other hand, economic interests could also drive Chinese Muslims with long-term severe conflicts to invoke their common religious identity in order to cooperate.

This thesis is a preliminary study on the public culture, identities, and law of Chinese Muslims in the Qing Empire. Currently, steles and other historical records that have been found pertaining to Chinese Muslims in remote and rural areas as well as those regions with a very small minority of Chinese Muslim residents are much fewer than those pertaining to Chinese Muslims in big cities. Materials from the 18<sup>th</sup> century are also less abundant than those of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Further search for primary sources is needed. On the other hand, it would be interesting to see if there were any publics in which both Chinese Muslims and Han Chinese participated together.

## Abbreviations

For complete bibliographic data on the following works, see the Bibliography.

GYGY	Zhong Yuanxiu et al., eds., <i>Guangzhou yisilan guji yanjiu</i>
JYB	Yi Muzhi, ed., <i>Jinan yisilanjiao beike jianzhu</i>
QZS	Chen Leji et al., eds., <i>Zhongguo nanfang huizu qingzhensi ziliao xuanbian</i>
ZHJL	Yu Zhengui and Lei Xiaojing, eds., <i>Zhongguo huizu jinshi lu</i>

## Bibliography

### Collections of Primary Sources

Chen Leji, Luo Shirong and Long Xiaojin. *Selected Records on Mosques in Southern China (Zhongguo nanfang huizu qingzhen si ziliao xuanbian 中国南方回族清真寺资料选编)*. Guizhou: Guizhou Nationalities Press, 2004.

Ma Jianli. *Selected Records on Social Organizations in Southern China (Zhongguo nanfang huizu shehui tuanti ziliao xuanbian 中国南方回族社会团体资料选编)*. Sichuan: Sichuan Nationalities Press, 2003.

Ma Jianzhao and Zhang Shuhui. *Supplementing Archival Records on the Hui Nationality in Southern China (Zhongguo nanfang huizu guji ziliao xuanbian buyi 中国南方回族古籍资料选编补遗)*. Beijing: Nationalities Press, 2006.

Wang Guoping and Tang Lixing. *Selected Steles Related to the Social History of Suzhou since the Ming and Qing (Mingqing yilai Suzhou shehui shi beike ji 明清以来苏州社会史碑刻集)*. Suzhou: Suzhou University Press, 1998.

Yi Muzhi. *Commentary on Islamic Steles in Jinan (Jinan yisilanjiao beike jianzhu 济南伊斯兰教碑刻笺注)*. Jinan: Islamic Association of Jinan, 2004.

Yu Zhengui and Lei Xiaojing. *Selected Steles Related to Chinese Hui Nationality (Zhongguo huizu jinshi lu 中国回族金石录)*. Ningxia: Ningxia People Press, 2001.

Zhong Yuanxiu, Ma Jianzhao and Ma Fengda. *Research on Historical Records of Islam in Guangzhou (Guangzhou yisilan guji yanjiu 广州伊斯兰古迹研究)*. Ningxia: Ningxia People Press, 1989.

### Secondary Sources

Benite, Zvi Ben-Dor. *The Dao of Muhammad: A Cultural History of Muslims in Late Imperial China*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005.

Chen Baoliang 陈宝良. *A History of Society and Life in the Ming Dynasty (mingdai shehui shenghuo shi 明代社会生活史)*. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2004.

Chow, Kai-wing. "Printing from Stone: Steles, Law, and Public Culture in Qing China (1644-1911)." Paper presented at the International Conference on "Reading without Books: Experiences of Print in Everyday Life in Imperial China,

- Tang (618-907) Through Qing (1644-1911)," University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, September 26-27, 2014.
- Crossley, Pamela K. *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999.
- Dillon, Michael. *China's Muslim Hui Community: Migration, Settlement and Sects*. Richmond, England: Curzon Press, 1999.
- Du, Yongtao. "Locality, Identity, and Geography: Translocal Practices of Huizhou Merchants in Late Imperial China." PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006.
- Elliot, Mark. *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.
- Fan Jinmin 范金民. *Commercial Development of Jiangnan in Ming and Qing (mingqing jiangnan shangye de fazhan 明清江南商业的发展)*. Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 1998.
- Gladney, Dru C. *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic*. Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1991.
- Goodman, Bryna. *Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1995.
- Habermas, Jurgen. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1989.
- Ho, Ping-ti. *A History of Huiguan in China (zhongguo huiguan shilun 中国会馆史论)*. Taipei: Taiwan Students Press, 1966.
- Huang, Philip C. C. *Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice in the Qing*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.
- . "Public Sphere'/'Civil Society' in China?: The Third Realm between State and Society." *Modern China*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Symposium: "Public Sphere"/'Civil Society" in China? Paradigmatic Issues in Chinese Studies, III (Apr., 1993): 216-240.
- Liang Zhiping 梁治平. *Customary Law in the Qing Dynasty: Society and the State (qingdai xiguanfa: shehui yu guojia 清代习惯法: 社会与国家)*. Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 1996.
- Lipman, Jonathan N. "A fierce and brutal people: On Islam and Muslims in the Qing Law." In *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, edited by Pamela K. Crossley, Helen F. Siu and Donald S. Sutton, 83-112. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.



----- . "Ethnic Violence in Modern China: Hans and Huis in Gansu, 1781-1929." In *Violence in China: Essays in Culture and Counterculture*, edited by Jonathan N. Lipman and Stevan Harrel, 65-86. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990.

----- . *Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997.

Ma Jianchun and Xu Hong. "Chinese mosques recorded by Westerners in the Ming and Qing (*Mingqing shiqi xifang ren zaiji zhong de zhongguo qingzhen siyuan* 明清时期西方人载记中的中国清真寺院)." *Journal of Northwest University for Nationalities (Philosophy and Social Science)* (No.4 2014): 45-49.

Ma Tong 马通, *A Brief History of Chinese Islamic sects and the Institution of Menhuan (zhongguo yisilan jiaopai yu menhuan zhidu shilue* 中国伊斯兰教派与门宦制度史略). Ningxia: People's Publishing House of Ningxia, 1983.

Millward, James A. *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998.

Murata, Sakicho. *Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light: Wang tai-yü's "Great Learning of the Pure and Real" and Liu Chih's "Displaying the Concealment of the Real Realm."* New York: State University of New York Press, 2000.

Rankin, Mary B. "Observations on a Chinese Public Sphere." *Modern China*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Symposium: "Public Sphere"/"Civil Society" in China? Paradigmatic Issues in Chinese Studies, III (Apr., 1993): 158-182.

Rowe, William T. *Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984.

----- . "The Problems of 'Civil Society in Late Imperial China.'" *Modern China*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Symposium: "Public Sphere"/"Civil Society" in China? Paradigmatic Issues in Chinese Studies, III (Apr., 1993): 139-157.

Su Xue and Liu Jin. "Historical Evolvement of the Social Functions of Mosques in China (*zhongguo qingzhensi shehui gongneng de lishi yanbian* 中国清真寺社会功能的历史演变)." *Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Trade (Comprehensive Edition)* (September 2009): 72-78.

Tang Lixing 唐力行. *Merchants and Culture ---A History of Huizhou Merchants and Lineage Society (shangren yu wenhua de shuangchong bianzou ---huishang yu zongzu shehui de lishi* 商人与文化的双重变奏 ——徽商与宗族社会的历史). Wuhan: Huazhong University of Science and Technology Press, 1997.

Wakeman, Frederic Jr. "The Civil Society and Public Sphere Debate: Western Reflections on Chinese Political Culture." *Modern China*, Vol. 19, No. 2,

Symposium: "Public Sphere"/"Civil Society" in China? Paradigmatic Issues in Chinese Studies, III (Apr., 1993): 108-138.

Zheng Zhenman 郑振满. *Lineages and Social Changes in Fujian during Ming and Qing (mingqing fujian jiazuzhi yu shehui bianqian 明清福建家族组织与社会变迁)*. Changsha: Hunan Education Publishing House, 1992.

Zubaida, Sami. *Law and Power in the Islamic World*. London: I. B. Tauris, 2003.