BRISTOL PLACE NEIGHBORHOOD PLAN:
URBAN RENEWAL IN POST-KELO FISCAL POLICY SPACE

BY

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THESIS

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ABSTRACT

Institutional racism in the United States has evolved into a “racial state” that situates the state as a reproducer of the inequalities of the past in terms of resource allocation, social consciousness, and political power, but which is often operationalized under more subtle guises. One of the primary mechanisms of this contemporary disenfranchisement centers around value capture through property disputes, and can be traced back to the evolution of urban renewal policies, and the integral early coalitions between local political actors and real estate capital interests. Urban renewal has been the focus of extensive research and debate, and one of its defining characteristics has been the deleterious and disproportionate impact on African American residents of central city neighborhoods. The evolution of urban renewal policy represents a powerful manifestation of state-led land revalorization and socio-spatial stratification with such disparate impacts that the program earned the nickname “Negro Removal.”

Using Pagano and Hoene’s (2010) theory of fiscal policy space, I analyze a case study in Champaign, Illinois that illustrates how a local redevelopment plan’s use of eminent domain represents a new form of urban renewal that reproduces the unequal racial and spatial outcomes of a previous historical era. This case uses interviews with local political actors, financial managers, and civic subjects in addition to archival newspaper and city records research to determine how the decision space and strategy of the local government is shaped by local fiscal constraints (context, economic base, local fiscal controls, and local politics) that create the justification for actions predisposed to differential impacts on low-income and minority residents. In this paper, I chart the evolution of urban renewal policy since mid-century, provide a historical analysis of affordable housing issues and mid-century urban renewal in Champaign, and use an inductive instrumental case study method to investigate the continued unevenly racial outcomes of stated-initiated forced residential displacement as embodied by the implementation of the housing and land use goals of the currently ongoing Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan.

The findings from this work contribute to debates on transforming the use of eminent domain statutes as applied to low-income communities of color in order to more justly facilitate urban growth and development processes driven by political-capital interest coalitions. This will help us to better understand a place-specific economic and political racial project through the applied theory of fiscal policy space, with implications for analysis in other municipalities and at different scales of analysis. This will also contribute to recent fair housing litigation progress in evaluating disparate impact claims.
To my Dad:

I hope this research provokes the same kind of subversive revolutionary critique in others that you have inspired, nurtured and encouraged in me every day since childhood.

I love you, always.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The persistence of racial segregation, and the profound physical isolation between neighborhoods across the United States, is stunning. When neighborhoods continue to reflect the persistent color divide, then so do schools, churches, workplaces, friendship circles, and marriages. White and black Americans effectively lead physically separate lives. This has repercussions in the political sphere, because when political jurisdictions are racially homogenous, there is no opportunity for blacks and whites to join together to press for common goals, and this physical separation encourages the view of racial politics as competitive. The segregation of neighborhoods reinforces racial divisions in politics, which reinforces further separation in other areas of society and government, leading to the existence of institutionally defined and supported racial segregation that is simply no longer explicitly stated as such. We have moved beyond the pre-Civil Rights era of racial politics defined by Jim Crow laws to a new period characterized by less overt institutionally enforced inequality, one that is reliant on more subtle forms of entwined economic and social disenfranchisement of minority groups.

Historically, the state has played the roles of both architect and enforcer of racial difference. If a racial project is the link of idea and action to control resources along racial lines, then the first major racial formation project was the conquest by Europe of the Americas, and the beginning of the largest, most economically and socially complex racial state in existence. The social structures in which race operated went from colonial military conquest to nation building, but racial taxonomy based in inequality was threaded so thoroughly within the new legal structures that the emergence of the new state was indelibly intertwined with race-based abuse and economic disparity.

Institutional racism in the United States has taken many forms in our history, often a Janus-faced representation of the liberal democratic ideals espoused by the early American state, which from its very inception was required by its already established practices of slavery and economic dependence to take a definite stand on racial classification in order to legitimize and protect itself. In the United States today a “racial state” exists that places the contemporary state as a reproducer of the inequalities of the past in terms of resource allocation, social consciousness, and political power, but operationalized under more subtle guises.
One of the primary mechanisms of this contemporary disenfranchisement centers around value capture through property disputes, and can be traced back to the evolution of mid-century urban renewal policies, and the integral early coalitions between local political actors and real estate capital interests that they spawned. Urban renewal has been the focus of extensive research and debate, but one of its defining characteristics was the deleterious and disproportionate impact on African American residents of central city neighborhoods. Urban renewal displaced an estimated one million people from the time of its enactment in 1949 to 1965 (Anderson, 1964) and the impact on African American communities was so disproportionate that the program earned the nickname “Negro Removal” from novelist James Baldwin (Goetz, 2013).

However, while many scholars have reached consensus about mid-20th century urban renewal (hereafter referred to as “Old Urban Renewal”) as a forced displacement racial project, they have not yet translated these historical narratives onto more contemporary experiences of the less rhetorically repulsive “community development” and “economic development” initiatives which continue to reproduce many of the same unequal racial and social outcomes across urban spaces, but which use different and often more subtle institutional and political justifications to accomplish. Forced displacement of already marginalized (and often minority) citizens is a persistent observed outcome of government intervention in land use regulations and practices since the 1950s. Thus, despite a rhetorical shift and revamping and redefinition of tools available to local governments in managing different land uses (zoning, intergovernmental agreements, economic development tools like TIFs and Enterprise Zones, etc.), their ultimate outcomes are still dictated by the neoliberal market-based logics of the contemporary U.S. capitalist property context. And these market-based logics are firmly rooted in America’s unique historic form of unequal access to capital and legal barriers based on racial designations.

Richard Foglesong labels this primary area of struggle the “property contradiction,” defined as “the contradiction between the social character of land and its private ownership and control,” explaining land in its functionality as “not only a commodity but also a collective good” (Foglesong, 1986). The creation of “private property” made land simply another exchangeable private commodity on the market (albeit an immobile one), but it was also needed to house and reproduce labor, and ensure both efficient circulation of goods and collective spatial coordination of the physical infrastructure designed to optimize mobile commodity circulation. This conflict between the static commodification of land and its communal value thus creates an
“in-between” space defined by the conflict it breeds in debates over highest order uses. The central task for land use law as it has developed over the years in the United States is to resolve conflict between the interests of private property and the interests of the general public as manifested by the government’s regulation of land.

These conflicts have in the U.S. context historically been governed by legal statutes including eminent domain and other decisions deriving from the Fifth Amendment, which states that “no person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Both federal and state governments must satisfy the two requirements of “public use” and “just compensation” in order to exercise the power of eminent domain. While the Supreme Court has provided a reasonably clear definition of “just compensation,” holding that it is essentially equivalent to fair market value, a precise definition of “public use” has proven more elusive. In addition to traditional public uses of property such as schools, roads and other public works that involve the public actually using the property, the Supreme Court has long denied deliberate and specific interpretation that defines “public use” beyond a “public purpose” or “public benefit.” Regardless of such historical non-specificity, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated since 1798 that the government does not have the power to take property from one individual and give it to another for a use that is “purely private,” historically describing such takings as “against all reason and justice” (Kokot, 2011).

There is a long history in property takings jurisprudence debating the appropriate uses of eminent domain, but the most recent and most significant change, an undeniable example of how entrenched neoliberal economic philosophy has become to the modern American state, was the controversial June 23, 2005 Kelo v. City of New London Supreme Court decision. This decision held that states could use their power of eminent domain to condemn private property and transfer it to private developers for the purpose of “economic development.” Despite many states passing eminent domain reform bills in the aftermath of this decision to try and limit its power, many bills were undermined by broad exceptions for “blight” clearance, which the Supreme Court upheld as a constitutional “public purpose” in its 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker.

1 Ref. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934); see also J. Kelly, 2006.
2 Lavine & Oder, 2010; see also Mount Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916): “The inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test is established.”
In Berman the Supreme Court held that eliminating “miserable and disreputable housing conditions” was within the scope of Congress’ police powers (the government’s authority to regulate or otherwise restrict the use of private property) and thus satisfied the public use requirement.\(^3\) It also declared that the legislature, not the judiciary, has the power to determine how best to address the “public use.” In this way, it did not matter to the Court whether the plaintiff’s property was itself “blighted” because it ceded to Congress the authority to “attack the problem of the blighted parts of the community on an area rather than on a structure-by-structure basis.”\(^4\) Thus the Supreme Court upheld private-to-private takings on the grounds that any resulting private benefit was ancillary to the public purpose of blight clearance (Kokot, 2011).

The very structure of the common law system and the principle of legal precedent, or stare decisis, means that once a court has formulated a legal principle to resolve a particular factual dispute before it, it is committed to adhering to that legal principle when it is called upon to resolve a similar factual dispute in the future. Stare decisis operates in both a horizontal and vertical fashion within the American court system, in that lower or inferior courts are bound by the legal precedent established by those higher or superior courts above it, which is precisely why the Kelo decision was so controversial – its potential effects were, and remain, incredibly far-reaching, both temporally in terms of the cases it will effect in the future, and hierarchically in terms of lower courts bound by a legal precedent set in the highest court.

In Kelo, the Court argued that because “economic development is a traditional and long-accepted function of government,” the redevelopment plan proposed “unquestionably serve[d] a public purpose,” despite the fact that the area was not confronted with the need to clear blight. Simply the fact that “the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation” was enough. In this unprecedented decision, the Court not only refused to distinguish economic development from other recognized pubic purposes, but also failed to require that the city in question prove with “reasonable certainty” that the hoped-for benefits would actually occur. This statement of position by the highest court in the American judiciary on what constitutes the “highest and best uses” of land, and who gets to decide, has resounding implications for the future of our representative democracy, particularly for those most marginalized citizens disproportionately affected by the use of eminent domain-justified takings

\(^3\) See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 31.
\(^4\) See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 34.
historically, as *Kelo* dissenting Justices O’Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas all agreed. Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion stated:

> Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded -- *i.e.*, given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public -- in the process.

Thus, in O’Connor's view, “[t]he specter of condemnation hangs over all property,” because “who among us can say she already makes the most productive or attractive possible use of her property?” She continued, saying:

> The fallout from [*Kelo*] will not be random. The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more (*Kelo*, 545 U.S. at 494-505: O’Connor J., dissenting).

Justice Thomas echoed these sentiments, saying:

> So-called “urban renewal” programs provide some compensation for the properties they take, but no compensation is possible for the subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes. Allowing the government to take property solely for public purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not only systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but are also the least politically powerful (*Kelo*, 125 S. Ct. at 2687: Thomas J., dissenting).

He also noted that over 97% of the individuals forcibly removed from their homes by the “slum-clearance” project upheld in the *Berman* decision were African-American.

> These comments echo widespread sentiments among legal and civil rights scholars published since 2005 about the potentially highly unequal combined racial and economic ramifications of this decision. The Director of the NAACP, Hilary O. Shelton in the wake of *Kelo* stated, “the history of eminent domain is rife with abuses specifically targeting racial and ethnic minority and poor neighborhoods,” and in a brief supporting the petitioners of *Kelo*, several civil rights organizations pointed out that

> The economically disadvantaged and, in particular, racial and ethnic minorities and the elderly ... have been targeted for the use and abuse of the eminent domain power in the past and there is evidence that..., these groups will be both disproportionately and specially harmed by the exercise of that expanded power (Brief for NAACP, et al. as

Because local governments are susceptible to the influence of wealthy private and corporate developers who may promise more jobs and tax revenue, private parties can potentially use their superior legal sophistication and financial resources to co-opt the eminent domain process for their private advantage. This is a process that has now been made easier with the *Kelo* decision. Disparities in legal and financial resources often “create the opportunity for the private exploitation of the economically disadvantaged and the politically disfavored” (D. Kelly, 2006). Despite the majority of state legislatures enacting post-Kelo reform laws, only two states, Florida and New Mexico, have prohibited blight takings entirely (Kokot, 2011), and the effectiveness of the reform bills passed after the *Kelo* decision in actually preventing economic-development-style takings has largely depended on how those state legislatures define “blight.”

In myriad ways, legal and state legislative apparatuses have colluded since the Civil Rights era to create outcomes that disproportionately impact minorities and low-income urban communities, with local governments serving as market mediators whose fiscal priorities are increasingly driven by profit-seeking private “partners” who help to broaden definitions of the “public interest” to suit their own motives. In this research, I use a single instrumental, embedded case study design to answer the following research questions:

1. How does the City of Champaign’s Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan reflect historical urban renewal trajectories and outcomes?

2. To what extent do new municipal fiscal priorities influence the plan’s rationale for the use of eminent domain?

3. To what degree are new fiscal priorities underscoring disparate impacts of redevelopment on minority communities?

In general, case studies are best when such explanatory questions are posed, as they allow operational links to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence, which would be better suited to traditional scientific method-based experiments, surveys, or histories. Case studies are most often used when “a how or why question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin, 2009). Instrumental case studies are used when the intent is to understand a specific issue or problem (here: the disparate racial outcomes of stated-initiated forced residential displacement) (Stake, 1995).
To answer these questions, I use an approach that is inductive, interpretive and historical, developing subjective knowledge (from interview content), and contextual historical knowledge (from newspapers and other local historical sources) in understanding the fiscal policy space of the City of Champaign. Using Pagano and Hoene’s (2010) theory of fiscal policy space (FPS), I analyze a case study in Champaign, Illinois that illustrates how a local redevelopment plan’s use of eminent domain in a neighborhood planning process represents a new form of urban renewal, one that reproduces the unequal racial and spatial outcomes of a previous historical era, but via different and often more subtly complex interactive mechanisms.

FPS encompasses (1) the state or intergovernmental context; (2) the economic base of the municipality; (3) municipally and locally imposed fiscal controls and policies; (4) service responsibilities; and (5) the political culture of the city (Pagano & Hoene, 2010). Local governments are increasingly driven by fiscal parameters and constraints that are imposed from state and federal levels of government, but are translated and applied through local politics. Previous scholarly work using the FPS framework has primarily focused on (1), examining the state government limitations on local government finances, focusing on spending volatility as part of a broader strategy for managing uncertainty (Pagano & Hoene, 2010; Hendrick & Crawford, 2014). In this case study, I will only attempt to explicate (3) - (5) via qualitative interview data, published planning documents, newspaper records and local reports. I will not attempt to fully explore the state context. The purpose of examining (3) is to describe the city-imposed controls on the plausible behavior of fiscal policy makers, the purpose of (4) is to describe changing service demand in municipalities and citizens’ and firms’ willingness to pay for services by taking citizens’ demand, need, and preferences for services into account. The prevailing political culture of a community, embedded in its unique history, directly influences and often constrains the “plausible” set of fiscal management options available to decision-makers. Thus, the purpose of examining (5) is to identify the difference between the “plausible” FPS and the potential “actual” fiscal management tools available to local government actors. The sum of the analysis of (3) – (5) will provide insight into the “constrained” fiscal policy space of the City of Champaign.

The FPS framework for understanding how local governments manage revenue and spending volatility, and financial problems more generally, is much more comprehensive than what has been presented in previous studies that usually focus on one feature of government
fiscal structure, such as the fund balance or revenue diversification. Understanding the locally perceived and explicitly stated service responsibilities and the effects of the local political culture in influencing and shaping decision-making spaces (posited here as the interactions of (3) – (5)), provides a better, more holistic lens through which to understand “the decision-making opportunities and constraints on the space within which key elected and appointed city officials operate” (Pagano & Hoene, 2010). Not every city starts from the same set of options and capacities, and a model of cities’ “constrained” FPS provides a more policy-relevant and realistic understanding of the actual decision-making options available to local government actors. It does this by providing a multifaceted structural lens through which to understand the local cultural, political and historical trajectories facing decision-makers in local political and financial decisions that go beyond traditional revenue and expense accounting to shape neighborhood outcomes.

This case uses interviews with local political actors, financial managers, and civic subjects in addition to archival newspaper and city records research to determine how the decision space and strategy of the City of Champaign’s local government is shaped by local fiscal constraints that create the justification for actions predisposed to differential impacts on low-income and minority residents. This approach to analyzing fiscal imperatives in political and community decision-making spaces is a unique lens that has not been applied in traditional urban renewal literature to answer the “how” and “why” questions behind historically documented uneven racial outcomes. I use this combination and type of evidence to explore the constrained FPS of the City of Champaign in the creation of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan and Bristol Place Master Plan as a way to identify new financial imperatives and government process mechanisms leading to unequal outcomes not captured by traditional Old Urban Renewal literature.
2.1 Introduction

The forced removal of a household from its home is one of the most intrusive exercises of state power – indicative of what sociologist Johan Galtung in 1969 termed ‘structural violence.’ The disruption of families is significant and the sense of loss - of home, of community, of a sense of identity and belonging - can be profound in cases where people have developed strong place attachment. Forced displacement can also have negative effects on self-sufficiency and well being regardless of place attachment, simply from the disruption of social support networks and survival strategies designed and employed by people, especially those living on the economic margin.

It is difficult to overstate the impacts that the loss of a home has on an individual: psychologically, emotionally, physically and materially – and even more difficult to accurately quantify and aggregate those impacts to give an accurate portrayal of the subsequent life repercussions post home-loss. Whether that loss is the result of personal action or inaction or something completely out of an individual’s control has different effects as well.

The lived experience of “home” and the policy dimensions discussed in relation to “housing” are often divergent. Analysis of “housing” in the U.S. has emphasized individual market choice limited by economic capacity (Glazer, 1975), and is most often discussed through the lens of neoclassical economic theory and a false assumption of a self-regulating free housing market. The emphasis on individual choice rather than factors affecting economic capacity is an unbalanced treatment of the subject that lacks nuance and denies the complexity of systemic context. The institutional structures that shape economic choice, primarily housing industries and political lobbies, must be taken into account along with local government. These industries include contractors, home builders, lenders, insurers, appraisers, real estate agents, and others. These groups all contribute to the availability and cost of housing in any given community. The central structural base of housing includes the process of private capital accumulation, urban restructuring, and political responses at local, state and federal levels.

In this chapter I trace the historical trajectory of urban renewal from its mid-century roots into subtler, more diffuse serial political decisions and practices. I then use this history to
describe the value of using urban renewal projects as a lens into the social, economic and political governance processes involved in the structural violence of housing provision in the U.S. This lens is particularly important in that it not only allows us to view “economic greed, ethnic enmity, class division, and political jockeying for power” (Teaford, 2014) in urban renewal policy applications, but also the intentional and unintentional ways in which urban planning has contributed to the reproduction of unequal spatial and social outcomes.

2.2 Old Urban Renewal (1949-1973): Race trumps class - “Negro Removal”

Residential segregation began in city life as a response to the growing population of free blacks migrating from the south in the post-slavery era. Before urban population increases, and “as late as 1910, negroes were less highly segregated from native whites than were Italian immigrants” (Spear, 1967). Spear describes that as the growing black population attempted to secure adequate housing, a pattern of resistance emerged on the part of white residents:

When a Negro moved family moved into a previously all-white neighborhood, the neighbors frequently protested, tried to buy the property, and then, if unsuccessful, resorted to violence to drive out the interlopers. In many cases, the residents organized to urge real estate agents and property owners to sell and rent to whites only (Spear, 1967).

It became commonplace for real estate agents to either refuse to sell to blacks in certain areas or to raise prices enough that even middle class black families looking for a place to live among people of the same socioeconomic standing were driven into black only zones of housing.

A striking example of this occurred in southern Chicago in 1908, when the Hyde Park Improvement Protective Club, membership consisting of 350 of the wealthiest south-side city dwellers, proved to be an early very successful example of techniques that whites used to keep blacks out of “their” geographical areas of the city. These techniques included redlining, the then-widespread use of racially restrictive covenants, the neighborhood improvement association club, the community newspaper, the boycott, and as a last resort, violence (Massey & Denton, 1993). This Hyde Park example is significant, because it occurred in a middle and upper class community, and its victims were middle and upper class black residents attempting to find comfortable homes among people of their own economic status. As Massey & Denton (1993) put it, “the housing problem for Negroes was not restricted to the poor; even the affluent were blocked in their quest for a decent place to live.” The economic disenfranchisement that took place as a result of this racism was far reaching, and included African Americans being “forced
to pay rents 10 to 15 percent higher” because they were so limited in their choice of housing. “One realty company inserted two advertisements for the same apartment in a daily newspaper: one read, “seven rooms, $25”; the other, “seven rooms for colored people, $37.50” (Massey & Denton, 1993). The first half of the twentieth century was full of racially significant social and cultural developments that culminated in the Civil Rights Movement, but that began with Reconstruction-era Jim Crow legislation and the first wave of the Great Migration, African Americans serving as WWI commanders, the Depression, the New Deal, widespread race riots, and the Harlem Renaissance.

The 1937 Wagner-Steagall Act (formally the United States Housing Act of 1937) creating the United States Housing Authority (USHA), and together with the National Housing Act of 1934 which established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), introduced the very beginning of what historian Gail Radford calls a “two-tier” approach to American housing policy: “publicly subsidized, restrictive housing for inner city poor and an elaborate series of subsidies and tax breaks to producers and consumers of private, single-family suburban homes on top” (Zipp, 2013). This was in spite of the 1937 Act’s original draft, largely prepared by Catherine Bauer, which had intended the Authority to make grants and loans to nonprofit and noncommercial housing agencies to underwrite moderately priced shelter. Input from the private housing industry (whose constituent members wanted to ensure no federal program could threaten the market), and other reformers focused on slum clearance, and succeeded instead in

…keeping construction cost ceilings minimal, excluded all but the poorest residents with restrictive income limits, eliminated nonprofits and cooperatives, gave authority to sometimes hostile local governments, and tied public housing to slum clearance with the so-called equivalent elimination clause that required new dwelling units to replace an equal number of slum units (Zipp 2012).

With these restrictions, developers would not face urban fringe competition, and landlords would not be squeezed by higher supply, ensuring that they could continue to charge high rents for slum housing. Combined with the 1938 Underwriting Manual provided by the FHA which observed, “if a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes - a change in social or racial occupancy generally contributes to instability and a decline in values” (Squires, 1994), the two-tiered American housing system laid its structural foundations.

Urban renewal ethos evolved up until its initial policy implementation in 1949. Initially a
postwar modernist vision meant to transform the urban environment, early urban renewal visionaries wanted to completely eradicate the 19th century industrial landscape. This early era of city reconstruction was initially led by lofty ideals about how city-dwellers should live. A deeply flawed experiment in re-creating overcrowded industrial cityscapes, it centered around city planners’ confidence in scientific rationalism’s ability to create a better future for urban citizens through modifications to the built environment. Focused around downtown preservation and minority containment, “Old Urban Renewal” was a national effort to remove ‘blighted’ properties and poverty from areas around central business districts (CBDs) in postwar American cities. As Jon Teaford (2014) wrote:

Like the protagonist in a Greek tragedy, urban renewal’s fall was at least in part owing to hubris. Renewal’s progenitors believed they had the answer to urban problems; unlike their parents they knew how to build cities. They were going to create the heavenly city, but too often the result was an urban renewal hell.

What I call here “Old Urban Renewal” officially began with the 1949 Housing Act, in which Congress declared that the national welfare required “housing production and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage,” to eliminate “substandard and other inadequate housing,” and to realize “the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family” (Bauer, 1951). Congress launched the federal urban redevelopment program in Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, and along with the subsequent Housing Act of 1954 provided billions of dollars in federal resources to local authorities to redevelop “blighted” areas (Hyra, 2012). Urban renewal advocates’ initial goals centered around clearing slums and rehousing the poor in public housing – combined responses to an international “modern housing” movement and years of campaigns against tenement housing (Zipp, 2013). Modernist construction aesthetics combined with socialist city planning ideals to try and “improve the welfare of slum families, to remove civic eyesores, to stabilize central property values, to make old areas available for profitable building enterprise, and to ‘save’ cities from disintegrating forces of decentralization” (Bauer, 1951).

Joel Schwartz says slum clearance in this period was guided by “machine-age assumptions” (Schwartz, 2015), essentially, that run-down areas close to the downtown cores with higher land values were the proper location for middle-income housing and commercial uses, and the working class and the poor should occupy the cheaper fringe lands. In New York, redevelopment preceded public housing and corrupted it from the start: “Amidst constant talk
about housing improvement,” Schwartz writes, Lower East Side realty interests and businessmen “kept sight on redevelopment that had no room for social justice” and “pounced on New Deal public housing as an expedient route to redevelopment.” He maintains that “housers” (early 20th century affordable low-income housing advocates) were largely complicit in what amounts to a kind of land grab. The process by which federal policy was transmuted onto the physical environments of individual cities varied across the U.S. by locality and was tied up in local politics, but there are universal themes that emerge in hindsight involving the land grabs of early real estate coalitions that emerge through historical review (Schwartz, 2015).

Private real estate interests had begun to push for their vision of urban redevelopment as early as the 1920s, and planners and politicians in this era assisted in developing the jurisprudence of eminent domain for condemnation of “unproductive” property into private reuse ostensibly for public benefit. The “discourse of blight,” a term coined by University of Pennsylvania legal historian Wendell Pritchett, became central to urban renewal policy rhetoric. Blight was posed as a disease that threatened to turn healthy areas into slums. “A vague, amorphous term, blight was a rhetorical device that enabled renewal advocates to reorganize property ownership by declaring certain real estate dangerous to the future of the city” (Pritchett, 2003).5 This positioning of “blight” as a potentially city-threatening disease allowed renewal advocates to change the meaning of the Public Use Clause through re-conceptualizing property rights (legally conceived as a “bundle of rights” including occupation, exclusion, use, and transfer rights). In 1954 the U.S. Supreme Court approved the use of eminent domain for urban renewal, interpreting the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause as applicable for “public purpose” when just compensation is provided (Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26). Berman severely restricted judicial review of cases involving eminent domain, where before this decision the judiciary played a significant role in reviewing government condemnations, with judges frequently declaring a particular taking not in the public interest (Pritchett, 2003).

The significance of this initial case to later American jurisprudence cannot be overstated, as it not only affected how eminent domain cases were handled at the local level and provided Supreme Court precedent, but it also provided the common law basis for two subsequent historic rulings: that of 1984 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (9-0), and 2005 Kelo v. City of New

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London (5-4). Legal scholars have written much about the significance of these cases in creating the rules by which we manage government property takings today. In *Midkiff*, the government redistribution of land from some private parties to other (more numerous) private parties passed constitutional muster as a means of rectifying what the state legislature found to be an oligopoly in fee simple land titles. This case established precedent for government taking private property and transferring that property to other private owners, justified by the negative public welfare implications of a land ownership oligopoly in Hawaii at the time. In the highly controversial 2005 *Kelo* decision briefly discussed in the Introduction to this paper, the Supreme Court extended the *Berman* ruling to allow takings of “unblighted” private property, solely for the broader economic benefit of the condemner-city (Eagle, 2009).

With each of these historic cases, stare decisis (a doctrine of precedent) was set, police powers expanded, and the “public use” clause opened up incrementally further than the precedent set by each prior decision. While the doctrine of stare decisis, that courts should abide or adhere to set precedents, does not prevent re-examining and if necessary over-ruling prior decisions, a party attempting to over-rule a precedent faces significant legal burdens. Overruling precedent legally is often directly proportionate to the age of the precedent, the extent of public and private reliance on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with other legal statutes or rules of law. *Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies* (1988) stated:

> It is … a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the current justices. This policy … ‘is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of law’ (*Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296).

According to planner Catherine Bauer, urban redevelopment in the mid-20th century won congressional approval “because different groups of people, like the blind men feeling the elephant, made entirely different assumptions as to the essential nature and purpose of this legislation” (Gelfand, 1975, quoted from Teaford, 2000). The wording, however, permitted federal subsidies for projects that destroyed residential slums and replaced them with commercial

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6 For further reading, see Bruce Ackerman, Private Property & The Constitution 190 n.5 (1977); Richard Epstein *Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain* 162 (1985); Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property 136-37 (1993).
development or leveled commercial slums and erected private residences. There was thus a loophole that developers of nonresidential properties could exploit. Even more important, nothing in Title I of the Housing Act of 1949 mandated the construction of low- or moderate-income housing. The federal government paid two thirds of the net cost of clearing slum tracts, local authorities shouldered the rest, and the law permitted private developers who constructed new buildings on the cleared land to build high-rent structures. The 1949, 1954, 1959, and 1961 housing acts permitted ever-increasing amounts of public urban renewal money in this period to be spent on constructing commercial projects, which facilitated the use of eminent domain-based urban renewal in expanding colleges, universities, and hospitals in city centers (Teaford, 2000).

2.3 Old Urban Renewal Results: “diddling with the symptoms”

“Like Fight Blight and Conservation campaigns in neighborhoods declining into slums, slum shifting fails because it tries to overcome causes of trouble by diddling with symptoms. Sometimes even the very symptoms that preoccupy the slum shifters are, in the main, vestiges of former troubles rather than significant indications of current or future ills.” – Jane Jacobs, The Death & Life of Great American Cities

Thus in Old Urban Renewal, the modernist planners’ vision, supported by “scientific” approaches to cutting out “blight” and other inefficient land uses, combined with the judiciary’s re-definition of what constitutes a public purpose in defining government takings to create the pernicious and unjust racial displacement legacies that urban renewal carries with it today. Parallel to Jim Crow legislation in the South, African Americans were limited in their choices of settlement to only entry communities that had housed previous generations of migrants to Northern cities. Often over-crowded, the housing stock was likely to also be substandard and worn down. Influenced by military experiences like the 369th Infantry Regiment nicknamed the “Harlem Hellfighters” in World War I, African American communities had begun to slowly prosper. While the Harlem Renaissance is the best-known example of this process, a similar kind of social and cultural awakening was evident in other cities at the time as well (Fullilove, 2001). Between 1950 and 1960 nearly a million and a half southern African Americans fled the Southern U.S. to various Northeast and Midwest American cities during the second wave of the Great Migration (Lemann, 1991). As Black Belts in still-segregated cities expanded towards the CBDs and stable manufacturing employment relocated out of the city, urban renewal backed by eminent domain became a redevelopment strategy used by housing industry and local urban
growth machine (Molotch, 1976) stakeholders.

By its end in 1973, the total cost of ‘Old Urban Renewal’ likely exceeded $41 billion in current dollars (calculated from $30 billion value from 2000 listed in Hyra, 2012). Between 1950 and 1974, urban renewal was associated with bulldozing an estimated 2,500 neighborhoods in 993 cities (Fullilove 2005). In these 2,500 redeveloped neighborhoods, an estimated 400,000 residential units were demolished (Weiss 1985). Most of these residential units were older tenements and single-family homes that typically housed African-Americans. In 1961, for example, African Americans were 10% of the US population, but 66% of residents of areas slated for urban renewal (Fullilove 2001). Urban renewal “slum clearance” did not clear slums at all – it merely relocated them within the city. In The Federal Bulldozer (1964), Martin Anderson estimated that by 1963 more than 609,000 people had been displaced because of redevelopment projects, and that once all pipelined projects were completed the figure would likely increase to 1.6 million. Of the 609,000 people displaced by 1963, two thirds (406,000) were racial minorities, mostly African-Americans.

Similar to the undeniable evidence of disproportionate impacts on African American communities, urban renewal projects also often succeeded in their machine-age goals of increasing property values near center-city areas, as well as in other areas where eminent domain was used to displace residents. Philadelphia’s redevelopment authority “renewed” the 18th-century Society Hill neighborhood on the southeastern fringe of downtown in the mid-1960s. During the first 10 years of renewal, private investment in Society Hill totaled $180 million and tax receipts soared. Before renewal, the neighborhood produced $454,000 annually in property taxes; by 1974 it was generating $2.47 million (Garvin, 1996).

Freedom of choice needs to be recognized in trying to understand the effects on individuals and communities of non-voluntary residential movement. Hartman et al’s classic 1981 work “Displacement: How to Fight It” defines displacement as

…occurring when any household is forced to move from its residence by conditions which affect the dwelling or its immediate surroundings, and which (1) are beyond the household’s reasonable ability to control or prevent; (2) occur despite the household’s having met all previously imposed conditions of occupancy; and (3) make continued occupancy by that household impossible, hazardous, or unaffordable (Hartman et al, 1981).

The key to understanding the severity and consequence of displacement impacts lies in
understanding the physical effects, certainly, but also the material (financial) and emotional effects on individuals, which when compounded across segregated social networks and political jurisdictions affect an entire population and an entire generation disproportionately. And because of socio-spatial compounding effects also transmit significant lost opportunity costs across generations of affected African Americans.

2.4 Root Shock: permanently fractured communities

2.4.1 Lack of opportunity for collective political bargaining; increased residential segregation

In the disproportionate effects on low-income and African American populations, urban renewal strengthened residential segregation. In some localities, there was no vacant housing for the displaced African Americans, which forced families to share accommodations, creating severe overcrowding problems (Fullilove, 2001). Many of those displaced relocated to public housing, but that was only a partial solution to overcrowding problems, and did nothing to address the widespread residential segregation (Hirsch 1998; Holliman 2009; Zipp 2010). Often, replacement public housing was built in already predominantly African American residential areas, which means that urban renewal directly facilitated the creation of the “second ghettos” and the system of institutionalized segregation that many authors have written about since (Hirsch 1998; Massey & Denton, 1993; Turner, Popkin, & Rawlings 2009; Wolfinger 2009; Zipp 2010). Urban renewal policies were not the only factors contributing to segregation and neighborhood poverty in this historical era; white flight (Massey & Denton, 1993) and shifting urban labor dynamics as a result of manufacturing job loss (Wilson, 1996) also contributed, but the role that federally subsidized urban renewal projects had on concentrating and institutionalizing African American neighborhood poverty cannot be overlooked (Clark 1965; Massey & Kanaiaupuni, 1993).

As the newly created, often tightly knit communities built in the spirit of the Harlem Renaissance were scattered, vast social networks were simultaneously fractured. Even 40 years later, people reported that their social networks remained much smaller than they had been prior to urban renewal. Further, because of the compounding ruptures by class, people’s social networks also became less diverse, which was a loss for both those with higher incomes and the poor. The political costs of displacement occurred both in the loss of concentrated voting blocks and in the growth of intra- and intercommunity tension. Within the African American
community, those who wanted to hang on resented those who sold their homes early, and those who spoke out resented those who remained quiet (Fullilove, 2001). Urban renewal also generated hostility and suspicion toward the white establishment, in this paper seen as synonymous with American government and governance more generally. One Roanoke man was reported in the aftermath as saying, “I don’t own anything any more. I just lease it until the government comes to take it from me” (Fullilove, 2001).

Because of the multilayered structures of social and spatial segregation, white Americans rarely visited African American communities then, and rarely visit them still – their knowledge is instead often informed by superficial inspection, rumor and frequently prejudice. If neighborhoods continue to reflect the persistent color divide, then so do schools, churches, workplaces, friendship circles, and marriages. When white and black Americans effectively lead physically separate lives there are serious repercussions in the political sphere. When political jurisdictions are racially homogenous, there is no opportunity for African Americans and whites to join together to press for common goals, and the separation encourages the view of racial politics as competitive. In this way, historical and contemporary segregation of neighborhoods reinforces racial divisions in politics, which reinforces further separation in other areas of American society and government, which has led us to the existence of institutionally created and supported racial segregation that is simply no longer as explicitly stated as such.

Tensions over Old Urban Renewal were often mediated by local politics, and outcomes varied by locale. Sometimes class and race would intersect and collective bargaining would happen across racial lines in support of class differences, but more often in the aftermath of Old Urban Renewal the opposite was the case – evidence points overwhelmingly to the fact that racial divisions were more important than class lines in neighborhood outcomes. One exception to this occurred in the Hyde Park Chicago neighborhood, four decades after the Hyde Park Improvement Protective Club led the way in 1908 with its restrictive racial covenants and selective neighborhood association redlining. Arnold Hirsch is an advocate for the localization of all histories of urban renewal, and in Chicago, he demonstrated that private enterprise had insisted on a more aggressive government clearance and renewal campaign (Hirsch, 1998).

By the 1960s, Chicago’s Hyde Park-Kenwood renewal project was winning national recognition for its success in preserving a middleclass neighborhood around the University of Chicago. During the early 1950s, many poor African Americans moved into the university area
and crime rates rose. The university faced increasing difficulty in attracting first-rate faculty and students. To help the university and its neighborhood, the City of Chicago embarked on a renewal scheme that involved combining rehabilitation with selective clearance (Rossi & Dentler, 1961). As in Society Hill in Philadelphia, buildings deemed unsalvageable were bulldozed, but the majority of others were repaired, and 80% of the area’s buildings actually survived renewal (Weicher, 1972). Through strict code enforcement, the city blocked the conversion of single-family dwellings into low-rent apartments and eliminated overcrowding by the poor in existing buildings. A combination of strict code enforcement, rehabilitation, and clearance thus preserved the university area and served as a model to other cities that did not want to rely solely on wholesale leveling of neighborhoods.

But Chicago’s Hyde Park-Kenwood project also had its dark side. It won applause for its sensitivity to existing buildings, but it proved less considerate of disadvantaged human beings. Poor structures were to be rehabilitated, but poor persons were to be removed. To preserve the middle-class neighborhood, the poor were evicted, and there was a conscious policy to ensure that they did not encroach again on the university’s sphere of influence (Hirsch, 1983). African Americans were welcome in Hyde Park by mid-20th century, as long as they were middle class, but low-income newcomers from Mississippi and Alabama were not permitted to move too close to the faculty or students. As one comedian observed: “This is Hyde Park, whites and blacks shoulder to shoulder against the lower classes” (Beadle, 1964). Ironically, this became the framework for the next phase of urban renewal policy – neighborhood segregation effects less of a burden for middle-class African Americans, but with the worst effects remaining squarely on the shoulders of the most marginalized by income and race.

But as stated above, overwhelmingly housing coalitions in Old Urban Renewal actually reinforced racially segregated residential areas. By the early 1960s, the creation of all-African American Title I housing in Cleveland such as Longwood and Garden Valley, which consisted of moderate-income apartments for African Americans together with low-rent public housing, did not sit well with a number of angry African Americans. Such projects perpetuated racial segregation by attempting to ensure that middle or moderate-income blacks remained in black neighborhoods, despite additional provision of decent, affordable dwellings. Urban renewal overall displaced poor city residents, did not adequately provide for their relocation, and seemed dedicated to enhancing the wealth of the central cities by getting rid of the less affluent through
forced residential displacement (Teaford, 2010).

Ostensibly, after the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act and the 1968 Fair Housing Act were all passed, discrimination on the basis of race was illegal, but the undeniable facts are that African-Americans are still denied jobs, homes in mostly white areas, face harassment from police officers, and overly-enthusiastic security guards wherever they go. One of the primary goals of the Civil Rights Movement\(^7\) was real equal participation in the democratic political process, seen in the competition for favorable policy outcomes, not just fairness in the struggle for representation. For the individual in a minority group, a system that gives everyone a chance of having their political preferences physically represented or voiced is inadequate. Lyndon Johnson said in a 1965 address at Howard University:

Freedom is not enough. You do not take a person who for years has been hobble by chains…bring him to the starting line of a race and then say, ‘you’re free to compete’ and justly believe that you have been completely fair (Kinder & Sanders, 1996).

Residential segregation creates and amplifies economic inequalities, and citizens who do not live in the same neighborhoods do not easily come together, as they have fewer shared political and social concerns.

2.4.2 Financial Hardship

Urban renewal also exacted a massive financial toll for those displaced. In Roanoke, one of the earliest cities to enact urban renewal efforts, homes and businesses were initially lost because of disinvestment in the area triggered by the prospect of urban renewal. People stopped investing in their homes because they thought the government would soon take them (Fullilove, 2001). Even those who were not relegated to public housing often faced rent increases seldom justifiable by the extent of landlord reinvestment in a particular property, forcing residents to move again in order to find affordable rents (Hartman et al, 1981). Those who were homeowners received very little for their properties, rarely enough to pay for the more expensive homes that were the only housing available for them to buy post-displacement. People who had paid off their homes and had made substantial investments in renovations incurred new debt as a result of the displacement, often requiring many years of additional payments. People who were renters

\(^7\) Defined here as 1954-1968, beginning with Brown v. Board of Education and ending with President Lyndon Johnson signing the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
often moved into public housing, which was a social situation inferior to the one they had left. Affected businesses had great difficulty relocating, and many closed. Churches also did not fare well in the transition, grounded by congregations often physically proximate to their structures (Fullilove, 2001).

Urban renewal forced a small number of people to expend economic, social, and political capital on resettlement, thus placing them at a disadvantage relative to the rest of society. Put in neoclassical economic terms, those affected by Old Urban Renewal’s displacement collectively experienced massive opportunity costs that those who had not been displaced did not face. Including loss of investments made to owned structures, resources that were “spent” on resettlement could not be spent to buy advantages, such as the creation of new enterprises or the acquisition of education (Fullilove, 2001). Jane Jacobs disparaged urban renewal policy, saying:

At best, it merely shifts slums from here to there, adding its own tincture of extra hardship and disruption. At worst, it destroys neighborhoods where constructive and improving communities exist and where the situation calls for encouragement rather than destruction (Jacobs, 1961).

LeGates and Hartman found, contrary to the HUD Displacement Report released in 1979, that displacement is almost always accompanied by rent increases, forcing families into severe financial binds, the change in rental unit quality is irregular - even when replacement units are physically superior, neighborhood conditions or location may be worse or displacees may feel their overall situation has deteriorated for other reasons. As Hartman et al put it in 1981:

The trouble, cost, psychological trauma and political impotence associated with forced displacement represent a real hardship for the elderly and many other displacees … we note that what limited evidence is available suggests that low-income displacees are particularly hurt. In summary, displacement appears, in our view, seldom to be unproblematic and frequently is a severe hardship (Hartman et al, 1981).

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the policy shift away from affordable housing projects was evident in many American cities and generated objections from displaced residents and their allies in academia. One of the most publicized examples of the callous disregard for the poor was Boston’s West End renewal project. The West End neighborhood was a close-knit Italian community living in a collection of high-density older tenements. Unfortunately, it also bordered on Boston’s central business district. Sociologist Herbert Gans chronicled the West Enders’ attachment to their “urban village,” psychologist Marc Fried reported on the psychological damage inflicted on the displaced residents, and housing expert Chester Hartman
computed the financial burden that relocation placed on West Enders as they paid an average of 73% more for rent in their new homes (Fried 1966; Gans 1962; Hartman, 1966).

2.4.3 Psychological effects

Urban renewal-based displacement disrupted existing social networks, causing widespread emotions of sadness, grief, and depression at the individual level (Gans 1962, Fried 1966). These negative emotional impacts were the strongest and the longest lasting for those who had strong ties to family, friends, and neighbors who were also in the neighborhood that was redeveloped (Gans 1962, Fried 1966). Marc Fried (1966) identified external stability as extremely important for the working-class (more so than the middle-class); with the loss of home and neighborhood came a loss of spatial identity and severe grief. As Jacobs puts it, “the treasured ‘security’ of the home base is, in part, a literal security from physical fear,” and in early stages of relocations to condensed public housing superblock developments, Mrs. Ellen Lurie of Union Settlement in Harlem in 1956 described conditions in a new project for the relocated families as, “a bulk of initially unhappy people, angry at the Housing Authority for forcibly uprooting them, not fully understanding all the reasons for the move, lonely and insecure in a strange new environment” (Jacobs, 1961).

In the short term, people were aware of the trauma of moving and of the significance of the loss of “home.” But the financial costs were high and drained many families, some for years to come. Fullilove (2001) believes that

…it is an accurate reading of the available data to say that community dispossession—and its accompanying psychological trauma, financial loss, and rippling instability—produced a rupture in the historical trajectory of African American urban communities. By the 1950s, communities were beginning to accumulate sufficient capital to enable their members to move on to the broader American scene. In this, they followed patterns established by earlier waves of immigrants to the city, indeed, immigrants who, years earlier, had settled in the same urban neighborhoods that became African American enclaves early in the 20th century. That road to the melting pot was closed by urban renewal.

As Zipp (2013) succinctly summarizes, postwar Old Urban Renewal was a process in which “private real estate interests enjoyed public sanction and subsidy in a campaign that destroyed working-class neighborhoods, uprooted and dislocated communities, reinforced racial
segregation, spurred suburbanization, and furthered deindustrialization.”

2.5 End of Old Urban Renewal

Urban renewal officially ended in 1974. Title I funding ceased and President Ford and the U.S. Congress incorporated urban renewal funding into the Community Development Block Grant program (Erickson, 2009). Recent scholarship proves that urban renewal was relentlessly local - the federal push for urban redevelopment progressed under terms established by local political cultures in cities across the country. In most cities the local “growth coalitions” that assembled to try to harness the government funding unleashed by the 1949 Housing Act were more influenced by the real estate industry and downtown business interests than the reform-minded intellectuals like Catherine Bauer pushing for idealistic and supportive moderately priced low-income affordable shelter (Zipp, 2013).

The utopic paradigm that was intended to create an egalitarian and cosmopolitan urban culture, in reality generated a dystopic version of urban life whose legacies we continue to see today, one which encourages a privatization of public space and exaggerated social stratification and hierarchy. This spatial logic of modernism continues to be employed by developers and other proponents of urban growth who use the vocabulary of urban renewal to create new lines of segregation between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the disenfranchised. The pattern of urban segregation based on the rhetoric of urban renewal represents a new spatial strategy to get access to and command over resources belonging to unprivileged groups. David Harvey perceives the appropriation of assets as a form of capital accumulation that rests upon dispossession of the surpluses of others, “to absorb them into the circulation of capital but to have the power to devalue them and even destroy them” (Harvey, 2007). How to make the land more productive was the major concern for the city planners. Increased property tax, land values, and higher rents led to a coherent pattern of exclusion under the name of urban renewal. Through these socio-spatial strategies, the city became less livable for the poor and racial minorities.

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2.6 Between Renewal ‘Eras’ (1974-1992)

Urban renewal officially ended in 1974. Title I funding ceased and President Ford and the U.S. Congress repackaged urban renewal funding into the Housing and Community Development Act, which consolidated community development programs into the now-ubiquitous block grants, establishing the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, and officially established the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) assistance program (Erickson, 2009).

CDBG began in 1975 as a direct result of the community needs identified by the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, and deployed money on a needs-based assessment to metropolitan areas for infrastructure development (Richardson, 2005). The CDBG program marked a shift in federal government funding policy away from categorical grants to local communities in favor of “revenue sharing” in the form the block grants that allow for more local flexibility in dispersion (Ball & Heumann, 1977). The formula takes into account population, overcrowding, poverty, growth lag and pre-1940 housing. Cities receiving funds were required to spend it on projects benefitting low and moderate-income residents (Rich, 1993). As was the case under the previous urban renewal program, cities could allocate the money for clearance or rehabilitation of slum buildings, but the grants could also fund a range of programs and facilities including neighborhood centers, nonprofit economic development schemes, building code enforcement, energy conservation, and varied public works projects and public services (Teaford, 2000).

One of the emphases of CDBG that has become more prominent in the decades since its initial inception but that is also a direct response to documented Old Urban Renewal failures is the citizen participation element. The CDBG policy goals theoretically emphasized participation of members of local communities affected by CDBG investment, but the program began to emphasize conflicting goals as it evolved: (1) aiding low and moderate income households and (2) meeting general community development needs (see National Citizens Monitoring Project, 1981). The results have often been less effective citizen input and a dispersion of CDBG funding outside of low-income areas nationwide (Heumann, 1982). The other critique of CDBG policy has focused on the quality of federal monitoring of the program (see NAHRO, 1977; Nenno,
The 1980s saw a period of innovation in affordable housing policy and new ideas for addressing urban poverty. Mixed-income housing and low-income resident mobility became the foci, new public housing was rarely built and subsidies began shifting towards community-based non-profit organizations that were building mixed-income communities (Goetz, 2003). Many public housing developments during this time, faced with management challenges, aging building stock and declining social conditions in housing developments gaining national press attention, attempted to deal with their worst properties through demolition. Public housing authorities that could not afford straightforward demolition according to HUD’s criteria often used a process called “de facto demolition” where they allowed properties to decline by “neglecting upkeep, filing to re-rent vacant units, and sometimes even refusing to spend HUD-allocated funds for modernization and improvement” (Goetz, 2003). Then, when conditions had deteriorated enough, the housing authority would petition HUD for demolition as a necessary action due to properties’ poor extant conditions.

The HOME program, enacted in 1990 funds municipalities through a needs-based formula to create affordable housing opportunities for low and moderate income residents (Hyra 2012). Hyra (2012) argued that the combination of these two funding streams with two created in the early 1990s (HOPE VI & EZ) helped stimulate the “New Urban Renewal.”

2.7 New Urban Renewal (1992-2007): Community Development, Glocalization & more nuanced race-class dynamics

From 1992 to 2007, old urban renewal language transformed to new community development language and translated into new federal policy in the Homeownership and Opportunity for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) and the EZ Initiative programs, combined with earlier CDBG and HOME programs. A focused downtown growth and expansion strategy, “New Urban Renewal” focused on destroying the modernist superblock public housing developments, redeveloping the “second ghettos” and attracting middle class families and members of the “creative class” to new mixed-income housing in the inner city (Goetz 2011a, Hyra 2008). As in its previous iteration, New Urban Renewal’s rhetoric and policy outcomes did not align. The outcomes of this round of urban investment created substantial increases in central business district (CBD) property values, with another round of displacement for those in public housing
and other inner city residents near CBDs around the U.S. Distinct from Old Urban Renewal however, disenfranchisement divisions along solely racial lines turned into disenfranchisement along racial and class lines – middle class African Americans in New Urban Renewal were often economic beneficiaries at the expense of lower income residents, the majority of whom remained racial minorities.

Between 1980 and 2000, Chicago’s downtown “Loop” experienced a 150% increase in population and New York City’s Manhattan experienced a 7.6% increase. At the same time, their property values skyrocketed. From 1980 to 2000, the median home value increased 266% in the Loop, and 581% in Manhattan. In addition to increased population and booming property values, these cities also experienced job growth, particularly in the high-wage service sector. Between 1980 and 1998, New York and Chicago added 222,000 and 150,000 jobs respectively (Hyra 2008). Moreover, between 1996 and 2003, Washington, D.C. added 41,600 employment opportunities (Fuller, 2004). Many of these jobs were located in the CBD and in the high-wage financial and business service sector. Goetz’s (2011a) national study shows that, while holding other variables constant, cities with greater rent gaps between citywide private market and public housing median rents were more aggressive in razing public housing during the new urban renewal period. This empirical study suggests that hot housing market cities used HOPE VI to promote further growth and centralization by labeling and then razing ‘economically underutilized’ properties.

Massive restructuring of the type observed in Chicago, Washington, and many other cities required the use of multiple policy tools to aid in renewal processes. Hyra (2012) argues that four federal policy initiatives and their respective funding streams in particular helped to stimulate the “New Urban Renewal” – HOPE VI Grants and Enterprise Zones combined with above-mentioned Community Development Block Grants and Federal HOME dollars. I briefly describe these two more recent initiatives below.

HOPE VI began the “New Urban Renewal,” deploying more than $6 billion in grants to local housing authorities to raze distressed public housing units and replace them with mixed-income developments (Turner, Popkin, & Rawlings, 2009). HOPE VI grants were designed to redevelop large tracts of land and ranged from $30 to $50 million. In Chicago, nearly all of its infamous public housing high-rise projects, many located just outside of the CBD, were demolished as part of the city’s $1.6 billion Plan for Transformation (Bennett & Reed, 1999;
Bennett, Smith, & Wright, 2006). In 2009 Atlanta’s public housing authority completed the demolition of its entire traditional public housing stock (Oakley et al, 2010). New Orleans, which once had nearly 12,000 public housing units, now has only 1,000 (Hyra, 2012).

The Enterprise Zone (EZ) Initiative enacted in 1993 was a competitive initiative where cities were selected to receive $100 million block grants to stimulate business development and job creation in low-income areas (Hyra, 2008). Businesses in EZ areas received tax breaks and reduced regulatory requirements for the initial 10 years (Ranney, 2003).

However, unlike “Old Urban Renewal,” there has been an upscaling of causality to include not just federal policy, but the “glocalization” of financial markets related to housing. The integration and deregulation of global financial markets affected inner city development specifically in the availability of capital and credit (Hyra, 2008; Gramlich, 2007; Ranney, 2003; Sassen, 2000; Wyly et al, 2004). Mortgage credit for home purchase, unlike during Old Urban Renewal, flowed unregulated into inner city areas, stimulating inner city gentrification patterns and outpacing even mortgage lending in the suburbs (Getter 2006; Sassen 2009; White 2004; Wyly et al 2004). These developments were particularly associated with the “financial product innovation” that led to the subprime mortgage lending crisis in 2008. Often peddled in the neighborhoods that had been previously “redlined” for mortgage lending, subprime loans went disproportionately to African Americans, increasing from $35 billion in 1994 to $625 billion in 2005 (Gramlich, 2007).

Ranney and Wright (2003) argue that one key to understanding the redevelopment of Chicago’s Black Belt is “the integration of real estate into global capital markets.” They state the “integration of financial markets is a major factor driving changes in the housing market and the gentrification of many cities” (Hyra, 2012). Ding et al. (2008), in their subprime-lending analysis of Atlanta, “found a strong geographic concentration of higher-priced lending in African American tracts and low-income tracts, even after including other tract-level explanatory variables.”

Similar to Old Urban Renewal, the demolition of distressed public housing disproportionately affected African Americans, displacing nearly 240,000 people, 80% of whom were African American (Goetz, 2011b). In fact, this is a conservative estimate, only accounting for people displaced from demolished public housing units, not inclusive of the gentrification of the surrounding neighborhoods. As explained above, often with rising property values, many
renters and small businesses are unable to stay. Hyra (2012) in researching Harlem in New York
City and Bronzeville in Chicago said he

…witnessed and heard of cases where landlords damage their buildings’ roofs or
foundations to get tenants out of what was deemed, after the damage, an unsafe building.
Once the tenants were out, the landlords planned to redevelop for market rate rents.

This, in addition to figures for small business displacements, are the kinds of secondary and
tertiary effects of urban renewal and gentrification processes in cities that are so difficult to
quantify. This “indirect displacement” is a highly debated topic (see Freeman & Braconi, 2004;
Hyra, 2008; Newman & Wyly, 2006; Vigdor, 2002). Nevertheless, given that in 2000 only 48% of
the nation’s public housing population was African American (Goetz, 2011b), the
disproportionate effect of displacement (80%) can be explained by the focus of HOPE VI funds
on demolishing “the most distressed public housing stock” (Hyra, 2012).

2.8 New Urban Renewal: Outcomes

One of the differences in the outcomes from Old to New Urban Renewal has been a shift
in the contained class - race dynamics. There has been the emergence of a significant black
middle class since the Civil Rights Movement, and from 1960 to 1991 the black middle class
more than doubled in size (Massey & Denton, 1993). However, the black middle class remains
economically vulnerable because of its extreme reliance on public sector and quasi-public sector
employment. These individuals also have to deal with glass ceilings, job and social segregation,
and residential segregation. However, some affluent and middle-income African Americans
(politicians, real estate developers and middle income homeowners) have definitively benefited
from new urban renewal (Boyd, 2008b; Hyra, 2008; Patillo, 2007). The black middle class
moved to the inner city, and their political actions contributed to neighborhood revitalization by
discouraging additional subsidized housing and social services and supporting the construction
of upper- and middle-income housing (Boyd, 2008b; Goetz, 2011b; Hyra 2008; Pattillo, 2007).
In the 1990s and 2000s, the urban black middle class became part of Logan and Molotch’s
(2007) urban growth machine, demonstrating that local as well as international and national
forces entwined to create the effects of New Urban Renewal.

In Washington, D.C., the African-American mayoral and city council leadership gave
$23 million in subsidies to an African-American development team to help finance the
construction of a large mixed-use building with 300,000 square feet of commercial space and 180 residential units, which contributed to the redevelopment of a formerly low-income, African-American neighborhood (Hyra 2011, quoted from Hyra 2012). In Chicago and Washington, D.C., African-American directors of the housing authorities controlled the distribution of HOPE VI funds, which directly contributed to inner city redevelopment. In New York City, African-American development companies built luxury housing that contributed to Harlem’s redevelopment (Hyra, 2008). In this most recent urban renewal cycle, the less advantaged were displaced, but often local middle and upper-income African Americans benefited financially.

The dramatic reduction of HOPE VI funds in 2010 to only $5 million down from its original $6 billion, combined with capital and credit flows slowing down in 2007 combined to bring “New Urban Renewal” to an end. In Making the Second Ghetto (1998), Arnold Hirsch argues that the symbolic architects of the old urban renewal were all white. But in the new urban renewal some of the development actors were African-American. Thus, the racial implications of the New Urban Renewal are tied to class as well as race.

While these precise mechanisms of urban redevelopment have slowed, recent designations for post-recession foreclosure crisis funding has shifted the conversation yet again to “blight” in combination with the contemporary foreclosure crisis. Between 2008 and 2010, through HUD’s Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP), nearly $7 billion was allocated to cities to help them deal with mounting foreclosures and blight. Some municipalities are proposing to use their NSP funds to demolish units in blighted areas. For instance, Detroit plans to demolish nearly 10,000 units of housing (Hyra, 2012).

2.9 Combined Health & Financial Effects of New Urban Renewal

There have been a number of theoretical constructs put forward by social scientists in the intervening decades since the beginning of Old Urban Renewal to explain the social structures we see in the U.S. today. The “housing niche” model and the “neighborhood effect” are two primary lenses that help shed light on the significance and long-term implications of housing displacement on individuals.

2.9.1 The Housing Niche Model

The “housing niche” model is a social ecological framework for understanding the
cumulative disparities in housing and health among non-white segments of the American population. The complex histories of property and wealth depletion among African Americans, only one aspect of which is very briefly outlined above (urban renewal), demonstrate in part how displacement from property transmits disadvantage intergenerationally in the U.S. context (Saegert et al, 2011). Researchers using post-2000 data sets find that black households nearing retirement have a median net worth of $27,000, compared to $198,000 for whites in the same age group (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007; Saegert et al, 2011). Low-income people and people of color are no longer explicitly denied access to mortgage credit, but rather are granted access on highly unequal terms (Wyly et al, 2009), a shift that has occurred with an increasing policy emphasis on neoliberal demand-based private market housing solutions and corresponding reductions in traditional supply-oriented policy outcomes of physical public housing stock.

Starting with Clinton in the mid-1990s and continuing through Bush’s “Ownership Society” initiative, the federal government sought to expand homeownership, particularly among the communities that had long been excluded from it. Federal policies targeted not only the consumption side of subprime lending but also supported the expansion of the demand side. Multiple federal regulatory and legislative policies promoted deregulation (Immergluck, 2009, 2011). Executive and judicial actions undermined state and local protections from predatory and fraudulent lending practices (Sagert et al, 2011), and the communities hit hardest were those who received the majority of subprime mortgage loans – low-income African American residents.

African Americans have been more likely to experience mortgage delinquency and foreclosure, partially as a result of subprime loans, but also because of the history of racially specified dual housing markets (Apgar & Calder, 2005; Schwartz, 2015). The traditional conception of the “American Dream” includes homeownership as a centerpiece. For most families, their home is their largest investment and their largest asset – and if the value of a home is depressed, the accumulation of wealth is correspondingly restricted, as well as the advantages that wealth provides. If home values are depressed because the land they occupy is in center-city, lower-income lower-serviced areas, those homeowners do not benefit equally from the same levels of appreciation of real estate that higher-income higher-serviced areas experience. This has direct effects on the accumulation of wealth, but it also makes it more difficult to secure home improvement loans, or use a residence as collateral for obtaining home equity loans or loans for education for children, automobiles or business start-ups (Squires & Kubrin, 2005).
Homeownership has been viewed as a way to improve lives and a way to build wealth that could be passed on to the next generation, as well as a way to stabilize neighborhoods and regenerate the “underserved markets” that had been repeatedly socially, economically, and physically destabilized by policies and practices of racial exclusion. These include restrictive legal covenants, the neighborhood residential redlining codified by FHA and the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC) (Schwartz, 2010), urban renewal, not-so-benign neglect (Wallace 1988, 1998), blockbusting, and the Section 235 scandal (Bratt, 2007). This long line of nearly uninterrupted crisis has disproportionately affected African Americans and low-income and inner-city communities. Despite the rhetoric of ownership as a stabilizing force, between 1997 and 2005 African Americans were more at risk for foreclosure even after controlling for other factors related to sustainable homeownership such as employment, household income, and home equity (Apgar & Calder, 2005; Williams et al, 2005; Gerardi & Willen, 2009). As Rugh and Massey (2010) put it, “high levels of segregation create a natural market for subprime lending, and cause riskier mortgages, and thus foreclosures, to accumulate disproportionately in racially segregated cities’ minority neighborhoods.”

In further evidence of low-income communities of color being targeted for financial strategies of accumulation by the white establishment at the expense of material dispossession of African Americans, in 2005, Wells Fargo created a series of ‘Wealth Building Strategies’ seminars and dubbed itself “the nation’s leading originator of home loans to ethnic minority customers.” The bank enrolled black public figures in an ostensible effort to educate blacks on building “generational wealth,” but the seminars were in fact a front for wealth theft, or what David Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession” in Marxian terms. In 2010, the Justice Department filed a discrimination suit against Wells Fargo alleging that the bank had funneled black customers into predatory loans regardless of their creditworthiness. This was not coincidence – it was racism reifying itself under more subtle and complex intertwined economic and property tools. According to The New York Times, affidavits found loan officers referring to their black customers as “mud people” and to their subprime products as “ghetto loans.” “We just went right after them,” Beth Jacobson, a former Wells Fargo loan officer, told The Times. “Wells Fargo mortgage had an emerging-markets unit that specifically targeted black churches because it figured church leaders had a lot of influence and could convince congregants to take out subprime loans.” In 2011, Bank of America agreed to pay $355 million to settle charges of
discrimination against its Countrywide unit, and the following year, Wells Fargo settled a discrimination suit for more than $175 million. But in 2009, half the properties in Baltimore whose owners had been granted loans by Wells Fargo between 2005 and 2008 were vacant, and 71% of these properties were in predominantly black neighborhoods (Coates, 2014).

2.9.2 The Neighborhood Effect

The second lens that helps understand the compounding and cumulative effects of American public policy disproportionately affecting its most vulnerable citizens is the now widespread recognition that neighborhoods, as a proxy not just for physical environments but also social networks and access to opportunity, matter for life outcomes. A consensus has emerged since 2008 among social scientists that neighborhoods do matter in determining human welfare, and the negative effects of concentrated neighborhood disadvantage are broad, especially in the long-term (Massey, 2013; Wodtke, Harding & Elwert, 2011). After analyzing the effects of the recent Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment HUD initiated in the 1990s whose findings were released in 2011, Massey (2013) concludes, “the social structure of urban America is such that absent a forceful intervention, powerful, institutionalized, socially-embedded processes will operate to replicate the existing ecological landscape, despite the noble intentions of voucher program designers.” MTO demonstrated the limitations of supply-side voucher-based housing programs in increasing the social capital of poor minority families by moving their residential locations within our modern urban landscape, precisely because urban America remains highly segmented along both race and class lines.

Despite extensive residential mobility relative to what African American residents experienced in 1950 in the City of Chicago, the socioeconomic and racial-ethnic composition of Chicago’s neighborhoods in stable over time. The same neighborhoods that were disadvantaged in 2000 were disadvantaged in 1990, in addition to 1980, 1970, and 1960. In addition, irrespective of year, neighborhoods that were disadvantaged with respect to socioeconomic status were also disadvantaged with respect to health, crime, collective efficacy, civic organization, altruism, and other factors relevant to human welfare (Massey, 2013). Along with poor health, high neighborhood disadvantage simultaneously predicts high crime, weak civic organization, isolated social networks, and cynical social attitudes, exposing residents to the combined influence of these maladies so that their independent effects cannot really be disentangled
theoretically or empirically.

In 2011, Robert Sampson published “Great American City: Chicago and the Enduring Neighborhood Effect,” demonstrating that interlocking experiences of human disadvantage begin in human social cognition and have interlocking effects in constraining individual choice. As Massey (2013) summarizes:

The perceived level of crime and disorder within neighborhoods increases systematically as the black percentage and poverty rate rise, irrespective of actual rates of crime and delinquency. Although observed disorder may predict perceived disorder, racial and economic composition matter far more in determining the perceived safety and desirability of neighborhoods and strongly shape residential decisions. Not only are African Americans far more likely than whites to experience concentrated poverty at any point in time, but exposure to its pernicious effects has actually increased over time, despite the passage of landmark civil rights legislation. Among African Americans born prior to the end of the civil rights era (1955–1970), for example, 62 percent grew up in neighborhoods that were more than 20 percent poor whereas among those born afterward (1985–2000) the figure had risen to 66 percent. In contrast, the respective figures for whites in the same birth cohorts were just 4 percent and 5 percent. Racial gaps in income and wealth are determined far more by neighborhood conditions than family background, ‘For these outcomes, aspects of the family environment play little role in explaining black/white gaps, while neighborhood conditions explain a substantial portion of the racial gap in each outcome’ (Sampson 2011, emphasis in original).

The predominantly black West Side Chicago neighborhood of West Garfield Park had one of the highest incarceration rates in Sampson’s research, more than 40 times as high as the white neighborhood with the highest rate – Clearing, bordering Midway Airport on the South Side of Chicago. Sampson writes, “this is a staggering differential, even for community-level comparisons – a difference of kind, not degree” (Sampson, 2011).

2.10 Fiscal Policy Driven Urban Renewal: 2007-Current

The public sector has long played a role in structuring housing markets, from tax deductions for mortgage and property tax interest, federal insurance of many mortgage loan products, and even public housing supply and low income housing tax credits – and often these essentially amount to subsidies for the profits of contractors, lenders, insurers, and other entities involved in housing construction or provision. In most federal programs providers charge what they determine to be a fair market price, the consumers pay what the government determines to be an affordable share of their incomes, and the government pays the difference. By encouraging homeowners to purchase more expensive housing than they could otherwise afford, and creating
financial subsidy tools to assist those who don’t qualify for credit thresholds in the private market access to capital, the U.S. government has for decades subsidized contractors, lenders, insurers, and all others involved in the housing industry. In myriad ways, as R. Allen Hays put it in his seminal 1985 book Federal Government and Urban Housing, “subsidies to the poor become, in effect, subsidies to the winners in the marketplace” (Hays, 1985; quoted from Squires, 2005).

Since the 2008 crash, the extent and use of these subsidies, from federal neighborhood and community development funds to housing choice vouchers and the general move from public housing supply to demand-based housing subsidy policies in the second half of the 20th century, have been increasingly guided by local municipalities’ “constrained” fiscal policy space, which is constitutive of increasingly globalized capital markets and risk-spreading real estate speculation, combined with local political culture and growth machine pressures. Not every city starts from the same set of options and capacities, regardless of their position relative to global capital, and understanding a specific cities’ plausible FPS provides a more policy-relevant and realistic understanding of the actual decision-making options available to local government actors in addressing issues related to affordable housing need in constrained local urban land markets.

Rather than understanding factors affecting local economic capacity (like job opportunities, minimum vs. living wage policies, cost of living, and economies of scale in non-local business supply chain operations), previous emphasis has been on Tiebout-esque individual choice sorting in explaining housing market trends at the local level. But by examining FPS (3) the city-imposed controls on the plausible behavior of fiscal policy makers, FPS (4) the changing service demand in municipalities, and FPS (5) the prevailing local political culture, I posit that another round of urban renewal is now taking place. A process of urban renewal that is locally constrained, fiscally driven, influenced by global property capital markets and state and federal legislation, but also directed by local citizens’ demands, needs, and preferences for services as interpreted through the prevailing political culture of the local community. It is the combination of all of these elements in our increasingly globalized and glocalized world that directly influences and often constrains the ‘plausible’ set of fiscal management options available to local decision-makers. It remains to be seen whether this new analysis lens of fiscal policy driven urban renewal can stimulate changes to the increasingly widely documented outcomes of the
recurrent structural violence and further marginalization of those most historically denied access and disenfranchised at every possible level. However, adding the additional levels of fiscal policy analysis to traditional urban renewal studies is vital in providing a framework for an analysis that is increasingly as layered and complex as the phenomena being studied.
3.1 Research Approach

Epistemology and ontology form the theoretical basis of how the world can be experienced, what constitutes knowledge, and what can be done with that knowledge (Walliman, 2006). Social science research is carried out from manifold epistemological and ontological perspectives that affect research outcomes based on emphasis and process. It is therefore important to account for assumptions and positions at the outset, as methods should be aligned with ontology and epistemology (Pouliot, 2007). The theoretical perspective this paper takes lies firmly in an inductive, historical, interpretivist constructivism. I use a primarily inductive case-study method, the goal of which is to generate a theory of how “fiscal policy-driven” urban renewal works, through what mechanisms and with what outcomes. My constructivist methodology has two components: first, the inductive case-study method; and second, an interpretive and historical qualitative analysis.

I follow Adler (2002) and Guzzini (2000) to define constructivism as based on three tenets: first, knowledge is socially constructed (an epistemological claim); second, social reality is constructed (an ontological claim); and third, knowledge and reality are mutually constitutive (a reflexive claim). Accordingly, the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality are two sides of the same coin. This position is of particular importance to the planning profession, whose primary focus has been to tell functional descriptive ‘stories’ (GIS-based planning maps and models) identifying decision points by illuminating “the facts.” These have historically often served to perpetuate the myth of the objective and technical planning expert. But as Sandercock (2003) convincingly and eloquently argues:

…there is no such thing as mere description, or pure facts. There is always an author, the planner as policy analyst, who is choosing which facts are relevant, what to describe, what to count, and in the assembling of these facts a story is shaped, an interpretation, either consciously or unconsciously, emerges. Facts are usually marshaled to explain something and to draw some conclusions for action.

Constructivists believe that the human capacity for reflective learning is the primary way social actors cognitively frame and understand the material world they experience. It sees social facts as only “facts” by human agreement, and these collective understandings then informing and guiding how individuals use their material abilities and power. All constructivists agree that
what is most important is not just to explain the ways that structures contribute to individual identity and interests, but also vital is understanding how these structures are socially constructed in the first place (Adler, 1997; Wendt, 1992).

Based on a pragmatist philosophy of science, constructivism places interpretation as equally important as traditional natural sciences methods of investigation that result in either deductive proof or inductive generalization. Interpretation thus becomes intrinsic to explanations about the social construction of reality, providing better explanations of social reality. The roles of choice, deliberation and judgment become equally paramount. Historical methodology focuses on the historical processes that create specific social contexts. No social realities are natural, being rooted in specific historical political and social processes that are best uncovered through narrative causality. Narrative causality traces the historical evolution of subjective and intersubjective social meanings to explain how they brought about a given social context. For constructivists, this historical analysis combined with an interpretive approach that allows subjective meanings to become objectified as part of an intersubjective context, allows for a holistic portrayal of causality and historicity in our contemporary context (Pouliot, 2007).

Thus, we can only study the appearance of a thing in the physical world, rather than the thing itself, but because of our own humanity, we are in a position to know about human consciousness and its variegated roles and influences in individuals and in society. As a method, the purpose of interpretivist constructionism then is not to search for causal explanations, but to find a deeper and more holistic understanding (Walliman, 2006). Language is full of shared meanings and symbols, and the interactions of humans through speech define individuals as the source of ideas and opinions, but also as reflections of the perceptions of others (Walliman, 2006; Alcoff, 2006). Humans are reflective, which makes cause-and-effect relationships complex and difficult to determine, and incredibly subjective. It is impossible for a researcher to take a completely detached view of society, so investigation is necessarily dependent on interpretation, and a less deterministic approach can provide useful understanding, without the need for the kind of universal or uniformly verifiable facts the natural sciences and rational scientific method aims to produce.

There are many different social science research methods, which fill different needs and situations, but case studies are best when one needs to understand complex social phenomena. Case studies are empirical inquiries that “investigate a contemporary phenomenon in depth and
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2009). Often the most interesting and most powerfully relevant phenomena in politics and planning are found in the nuanced minutiae of power dynamics that cannot be distilled into formulaic “standard” cases.

In general, case studies are best when explanatory questions are posed, as they allow operational links to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence, which would be better suited to experiments, surveys or histories. Case studies are most often used when “a how or why question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin, 2009). Instrumental case studies are used when the intent is to understand a specific issue or problem (here: the uneven racial outcomes of state-initiated forced residential displacement) (Stake, 1995).

The case study method uses similar techniques to those used in a history, but adds sources of evidence not usually included: direct observation of the events being studied and the interviews of people involved in the events. Experiments in the rationalist tradition decontextualize phenomena from their contexts, attempting to isolate variables to learn how they respond in a ‘controlled’ environment; histories do deal with phenomenon and context but focus on non-contemporary events, and surveys often try to deal with phenomenon and context, but are limited in their ability to explain context. These methods overlap certainly, but the case study is better suited to the tri-part constructivist methodology laid out above, providing source material for inductive reasoning, interpretation and historical context into a holistic aggregate. This approach allows for better identification of the sum and implications of the structural constraints on actors and their motivations in the political and social spheres. This distinction from extractive research methods is particularly important to understand in the context of planning interventions and outcomes, whose main concern involves the creation of practical, immediate and intermediate, solutions to “wicked problems” (Rittel & Webber, 1973).

The contextual conditions of the creation and implementation of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan (e.g. the constrained fiscal policy space of state agents) are vitally important to understanding not only the causal links and pressures that led to observed outcomes, but that context helps answer the question of why we continue to observe uneven racial outcomes from state-initiated forced residential displacement. This requires historical and contemporary triangulation to contextualize observed results with their structural conditions.
Unlike other research methods, there are no “standard” case study research designs. In this study, the process of collecting, analyzing and interpreting data was guided by the following propositions:

(1) The City of Champaign’s Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan will result in racially significant spatial outcomes similar to those documented from Old Urban Renewal
(2) We need better tools and a more holistic approach to identify the causal relationships between the plan’s stated intentions and observed material outcomes
(3) Fiscal Policy Space can help identify these causal relationships and better guide future interventions

The specific “case” evaluated here is the City of Champaign’s design and implementation of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan (BPNP), which to date has been a roughly 7-year process (2007-2014), but currently remains ongoing. This case was chosen as a current and ongoing paradigmatic example of contemporary urban investment and development processes occurring in U.S. cities in our contemporary, devolved, neoliberal socio-political context. While this is the specific time frame of the Bristol Place neighborhood redevelopment plan, I also trace local long-term historic narrative themes of affordable and public housing provision, local urban renewal, and their effects on the Champaign-Urbana community from 1949-1973, and situate that context with a more recent historical portrayal of neighborhood change dynamics and governance ethos from 1990-2014, as the City of Champaign’s fiscal and political priorities shifted in the wake of Neighborhood Wellness initiatives initiated at the federal level by HOME funding, but which also had localized effects, seen through the creation and development of the Neighborhood Services Department within the local city government, for example.

3.2 Data Collection and Analysis

In performing the research, I reviewed government documents, newspaper and other news-related archives, local community research reports and conducted semi-structured interviews with government officials, local affordable housing advocates, financial managers, and community members.


The government documents I assessed were available online at either the City of Champaign’s document portal for official City Council Study Sessions and Council Bills, or through other portions of the City of Champaign’s website that list planning and budget-related
finance documents from 1990-2014. These often included as attachments, private consultants’ reports and local housing and market studies, which I also evaluated. I spent more time exhaustively evaluating documents from the most recent time period bounding my case study, from 2007-2014, and used older documents to provide historical and cultural community context as needed.


I collected complaint-based code violation citations by location and length of time to resolution for FY2007-FY2014, also generated by filing Freedom of Information Act requests.

3.2.2. Historicity – Newspaper Archives (1949 – 1973)

The historical newspaper archives referenced in this study are from: (1) the Champaign County Historical Archives at the Urbana Free Library which contains searchable issues from the Champaign-Urbana Courier from 1877-1978 (the name changed 8 times during this time period and ceased publication in 1978 under the title ‘Morning Courier’), and searchable issues from the Champaign News-Gazette from 1919-current on microfilm; and (2) the Illinois Digital Newspaper Collections at the University of Illinois which contains issues from the Daily Illini from 1874-1975. Searched issues from all three sources were limited by date to 1949-1973, concurrent with the timeline of national Old Urban Renewal. The following search terms were used to identify historical public newspaper documentation of apartheid housing processes in Champaign-Urbana: “North End,” “Urban Renewal,” “Slum,” “Shack,” “Blight,” “Community Development,” “Housing,” “Zoning.” While there were other local newspapers printed in the Champaign-Urbana area at the time (Illinois Times (1949-1965), Urbana High School Echo (1915-1993), Champaign-Urbana Underground Press (1969-1982)), this study focuses on the City of Champaign and its housing and recent urban development history. Historically and currently, the Champaign News-Gazette focuses on and is published in the historically and contemporary more conservative ethos of the City of Champaign, the Daily Illini is an independent University of Illinois student publication, and the Champaign-Urbana Courier was a
newspaper that is well-known locally as the voice of Urbana residents, historically a publication with a more liberal political ethos.

In choosing these three newspapers, I am not claiming to have performed an exhaustive historiography of apartheid housing patterns in the Champaign-Urbana area from 1949-1973, I rather used a less rigorous methodological approach to provide insight into the local historical context of the larger focus of my instrumental case study, in terms of local social, cultural, planning and governance histories. As a primary source, historic newspapers provide windows into our past, and offer a rich documentation of the development, course and history of local industry, politics, and local cultural and social community life and its significance relative to larger national and global trends.

Analysis of these records was done with the aim of identifying in this local context, what nationally-recognized Old Urban Renewal themes were evident in local experiences and conversations going on at the time. Thus, the focus was on identifying segregated housing, “slum” or “blight” clearance, redevelopment, proximity to the CBD (here, the downtown Champaign business district), minority containment via displacement, poverty alleviation, and any stated financial, social and political costs associated with either containment or displacement during this time period.

3.2.3. Semi-Structured Interviews

I conducted 25 semi-structured interviews, 14 with non-residents identified through my own snowball sampling method, and 11 with residents over the age of 18 as part of Dr. Andrew Greenlee’s ongoing research project. The residents were identified as those living in the area defined by the Bristol Place Master Plan Draft for Review dated April 15, 2014. Interviews across both groups ranged from 30 minutes to almost 2 hours in length (average was 66 minutes long): the resident interviews averaged 46 minutes long, and the recorded non-resident interviews averaged around 86 minutes each.

The 14 non-resident interviews were identified through a snowball sampling technique. I used a snowball sampling technique in order to develop a theory throughout the research process, and to look for participants who could provide the appropriate and relevant missing data for the elements of the theory as different pieces came together. Guided by an initial understanding informed by publicly available planning documents and information gathered from interviews
with residents living in the redevelopment area in 2014, I identified the 14 non-resident interviewees by iteratively asking, “What stakeholder group should I turn to next to gather information I need to understand what is happening or has happened, and why?” What often occurs in such qualitative research, and what was also the case in my case study, was a clear shift over the course of the data collection period from theory development to testing out ideas as more explanatory information was gathered. I attempted to balance race and gender with mixed results, and tried to focus generally on interviewees with longer community tenures because of the historical trajectory of my assessment, relying heavily on referrals from prior interviews to select interview subjects strategically. Of my 14 interviews, 4 were with “top tier management” professionals, 6 were with “middle management” professionals, and 4 were with other community stakeholders with experience in local housing issues; 9 interviewees (64%) were male and 5 (36%) female; and 11 interviewees (79%) were white and 3 (21%) were African-American.

The questions I asked this set of stakeholders were based off of a different set of semi-structured interview questions than those used with the residents as part of Dr. Greenlee’s research, and focused on interviewees’ personal history in the Champaign-Urbana area, the nature of their involvement with the Bristol Place Redevelopment initiative, and their opinions and thoughts about their own experiences with its planning process. Additionally, in order to guide the snowball sampling method, each interviewee was asked to identify from their perspective the key decision-makers, proponents and opponents of the BPNP over the length of their involvement or knowledge of the project. I used detailed field notes from each interview when interviewees did not consent to being audio recorded, transcribed those notes after the interview and sent them back to each interviewee via email to verify accuracy of facts recorded (see sample consent form in Appendix B.1).

The 11 resident interviews I performed as part of Dr. Greenlee’s research, only a small fraction of which are referenced here, were based off of a set of semi-structured interview questions approved by the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) Institutional Review Board asking about housing status and history, employment status and history, and personal questions ranging from basic family dynamics to social network and neighborhood perception. All interviewees were also asked what their strongest personal reactions were to their
experience with the BPNP planning and relocation process (to date) and perceptions of the stated goals of the plan.

This interview research in its entirety was conducted in accordance with informed consent guidelines: a detailed research summary sheet written in language no higher than an 8th grade reading level was provided in advance of conducting interviews, a phone screening occurred before each interview was conducted, and before consent forms were signed, I assessed the decision-making capacity of all participants to ensure with specific questions that they fully understood the participation risks and plans for results dissemination clearly. Each interviewee was given the option for fully confidential participation or for the researchers to be able to share de-identified text transcriptions of portions of interview audio, and/or their name and relevant background information (see sample consent form in Appendix B.2). All resident interviews were audio-recorded, interviewees filled out a basic demographic survey before the interview, and all resident participants received a $20 Visa gift card as remuneration for their participation in the research. All participant data post-interview was assigned a unique identification number, stored securely and separately from the transcription, and all signed consent forms and confidential data was stored in accordance with UIUC electronic data security procedures.

3.2.4. Semi-Structured Interview Analysis

My approach to interview data analysis is grounded in the interpretive, inductive, constructivist approach outlined above. I attempted to identify the relationships between social behavior and individual cognition through understanding my interviewees’ mental models as represented by their question responses through open coding those responses by theme. In attempting to understand the constrained and plausible fiscal policy space of the City of Champaign’s Planning, Finance, and Neighborhood Services staff, as well as its elected officials on City Council during 2014, I relied on statements by all interviewees to define the parameters of what each interviewee understood to be the most and least important components of this plan and planning process. After assembling these themes, I re-engaged with the direct text of interviewee’s responses to evaluate the strength of theme represented by the strength and frequency of concepts’ presentation. Only those themes whose strength either by position of interviewee in structural hierarchy or by frequency among other respondents were analyzed in
this case study. These themes show up as headers that guide the planning story relayed in Chapters 5-7.

The mental models of individuals serve as internal representations of their perceived world, and language is the key to mediating and developing them (Vygotsky 1962, 1978; Luria 1978, 1981; Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Latour & Woolgar, 1979). Concurrent with Carley & Palmquist (1992), I understand mental models to be (1) internal representations, (2) language being the key to understanding and represent mental models, (3) mental models are networks of concepts, (4) individual meaning of a concept is embedded in its relationship to other concepts in the individual’s mental model, and (5) the social meaning of a concept is found in the intersection of multiple individuals’ mental models. We can thus use language as a window through which to view the individual’s mind and by studying the social use of language we can build representations of the mental models that inform social action (Stryker, 1980).

These claims rest on three assumptions: (1) that interview text can be modeled using concepts (“open” codes); (2) that interview text is a sample of what is individually known and thus the contents of an individual’s cognitive structure; and (3) that the symbolic structure extracted from the interview text is a sample of the full symbolic representation of the individual’s cognitive structure. Evaluating the completeness of the interview samples collected here would involve evaluating the original mode of communication, the length of the text, and the method of extraction, which is well beyond the scope of this paper.

The conceptual content analysis I used in evaluating my interview data relied primarily on exploratory open coding, which examines the content of written texts and identifies the presence and frequency of certain concepts or words (Palmquist, 1990). Primarily focusing on the frequency of words or phrases and not relationships between them, conceptual content analysis can “tell us about a text’s fundamental building blocks but not the structure in which those blocks are arranged” (Carley & Palmquist, 1992).

I began with an exploratory “open” coding process, proceeding line-by-line, to ensure that analysis reflected what the data were saying, rather than my preconceptions as a researcher (Corbin & Strauss, 2007). Resident audio interview transcripts and field notes were “open” coded with a combination of “in vivo” coding and manifest themes to form an axial coding taxonomy based on the results of this first stage of the coding process. “In-vivo” coding uses direct quotes or explicit terms taken from the interview transcripts, and I use manifest themes
here to refer to the types of salient concepts addressed in interview dialogue that were
summarized or condensed to capture their essence (Saldana, 2009). For example, one of the
primary “in vivo” codes that came out of my analysis was “Champaign is a well-oiled machine,”
and depending on which type of interviewee elaborated on their beliefs about Champaign’s
governance, manifest themes that related to this in-vivo code were “shadow state politicking”
and “showcase neighborhood redevelopment.”

My exploratory coding process focused on identifying intentions, beliefs, motives, rules
and values, while keeping the following questions in mind from Saldana (2009), to help
understand the plausible fiscal policy space of Champaign’s decision-makers:

- What are people doing? What are they trying to accomplish?
- How, exactly, do they do this? What specific means and/or strategies do they use?
- How do members talk about, characterize, and understand what is going on?
- What assumptions are they making?
- What do I see going on here? What did I learn from these notes?
- Why did I include them?

In identifying manifest themes, I followed Lofland et al (2006) to identify major units of
social organization referenced that fell into:

1. Encounters (a temporary interaction between two or more individuals such as sales
transactions, panhandling, etc.);
2. Roles (student, mother, customer, etc.) and social types (bully, tight-ass, geek, etc.);
3. Social and personal relationships (husband and wife, party-goers, etc.);
4. Settlements and habitats (villages, neighborhoods, etc.); and
5. Subcultures and lifestyles (the homeless, skinheads, gay leather bears, etc.)
6. Cognitive aspects or meanings (e.g., ideologies, rules, self-concepts, identities);
7. Emotional aspects or feelings (e.g., sympathy in health care, road rage, workplace
satisfaction);
8. Hierarchical aspects or inequalities (e.g., racial inequality, battered women, high school
cliques)

Each of these categories of codes inter-related with information gathered from
government documents and data requested by FOIA request, and helped to illustrate the
decision-making space of different stakeholders in the planning story laid out in Chapters 5-6.
These categories of storytelling in turn helped me to construct the plausible fiscal policy space
constraints experienced by decision-makers.
4.1 Early Housing Practices in CU: The creation of the segregated “North End”

Patterns and practices of housing discrimination have generated and often sustained detrimental race relations in all other areas of community living, and the currently branded “micro urban” twin city communities of Champaign and Urbana, Illinois are no exception. The widespread trajectory of housing issues in the Champaign-Urbana (CU) area dovetails with the evolution of widely documented trends elsewhere nationally, full of racially restrictive covenants, segregated separate and unequal housing stock and neighborhood access, and different forms of institutional and local gatekeeping. The context of housing in the City of Champaign needs to be situated with two major facts about the area: (1) the City of Urbana and the City of Champaign are twin cities that border one another to form the contemporary U.S. Census-designated metropolitan area “Champaign-Urbana”; and (2) the flagship campus of University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign spans the boundaries of both cities. It is impossible to separate the influence of the university on the relative growth and development of both incorporated municipalities since its founding in 1867. The policies of both local and university housing systems affected local housing history, and together set the tone for community race relations in all other areas of living.

Housing discrimination in the form of residential segregation was virtually 100% complete in CU until the 1960s. Through the 1940s, and extending into the 1960s all blacks were required by policy or practice by both town and gown to live in the outskirts of town in a “Black Belt” area that became designated the “North End” and the “Negro District” by whites (Frank, 1990), and the “East End” by black residents (Plaut, 2010). Between 1940 and 1968 the African-American population of Champaign more than quadrupled in size from approximately 1,700 to 8,000 (LWV, 1968). As the African-American population in Champaign increased, the area now known as the “North End” emerged as a wholly “black neighborhood,” shaped by discriminatory housing practices that forced African-Americans into a geographically bounded space.

Unlike in the Jim Crow south during the same time, northern whites often attempted to conceal their racist ideas and actions by shifting the impetus for discriminatory philosophy onto institutions, hierarchies, and the rules and procedures laid out by vague, amorphous “others” in
ways that facilitated local actors concealing their own often deep-seated personal racism. Because in the North race laws and policy mandated equality, the spirit and letter of the law were contravened by practices and customs rather than legal statute, and nowhere is that more easily and widely documented than in housing access and conditions. Illinois had statutes between 1865 and 1963, for example, which charged its citizens to provide for the “full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations” for all its people and which prohibited “discrimination and intimidation on account of race or color in employment under contracts for public buildings or public works.” In 1937 the state of Illinois also passed a statute which mandated that “no office of the State of Illinois, ... or of any State University ... shall deny or refuse to any person, on account of race, color or religion, the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of his office or services or of any property under his care” (Frank, 1990).

Sociologists Charles S. Johnson and Herman H. Long studied the characteristics and effects of housing segregation and containment in Northern cities, and in their 1947 findings documented the circular reasoning laden with stereotypical thinking which evolved into creating and sustaining a self-fulfilling prophecy of the image of black inferiority. Johnson and Long reasoned: “for the mass of white citizens, if they give the matter any thought at all, the unsightly appearance of the overcrowded Negro areas is sufficient evidence of carelessness, neglect and a disregard for the upkeep of property; and these are cited as racial traits” (Long & Johnson, 1947). Johnson and Long further argued that these inferior “traits” of the designated section of town then “become the reason for public insistence that Negroes continue to live in it.” This description provides the relevant socio-historical lens to understand the history of housing discrimination in CU.

During the period leading up to Old Urban Renewal in East Central Illinois, multiple groups recognized the poor housing conditions in the Champaign-Urbana area. The Chairman of the City Planning and Landscape Architecture Department at the University of Illinois spoke on this topic in the late 1930s, and the Champaign-Urbana Planning Commission (now the Regional Planning Commission of Champaign County (RPC)) in 1938 evaluated the local housing stock and published a study on “Sub-Standard Housing of Champaign-Urbana” (Patton, 1968). Led by

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Professor Karl Lohmann, the evaluation team noted the obsolescence of dilapidation of hundreds of houses, many of which were still occupied, and the inadequacy of building codes and city ordinances to enforce “a minimum standard of decency, safety and sanitation” (LWV, 1951). In 1941 the Housing Authority of Champaign County (HACC) ordered a study of housing conditions for low-income families. Of 3,722 dwellings inspected, 43% were declared substandard. Substandard designations involved one of the following observed conditions: (1) when it lacked sanitary facilities (1,349 were in this category); (2) when in need of major repair (744); (3) when in a condition so hazardous to health and safety as to be considered unfit for habitation (210). As a result of this report, land was acquired by the HACC to construct 140 units of public housing, but there were many project delays and before the project could be started, funds were diverted to war purposes (LWV, 1951).

These initial studies and additional postwar surveys discussed below identified the greatest concentration of substandard housing and associated infrastructure and health problems as being centered around the Illinois Central Railroad tracks north and slightly east of the City of Champaign’s downtown area. The bulk of the substandard housing cited was within the City of Champaign, but conditions extended further eastward into Urbana as well. A long-time local black activist Terry Townsend identified the power dynamics evident in something as basic as the nomenclature behind the segregated spatial area containing the majority of African-American residents in Champaign-Urbana north of University Avenue (the local Black Belt): whites calling it the “North End,” and blacks calling it the “East End,” referring to the Northeast end of Champaign. Significantly, this area has since widely become known in CU as the North End.

4.2 The Role of UIUC in creating and sustaining segregated early CU housing markets

The founding of UIUC in 1867 was fraught with real estate speculation parallel to anticipated growth across the twin cities and the 1862 passage of Lincoln’s Morrill Land Grant Act. CU speculators understood that:

…a college would bring stores to adjoining locations. Rooming houses and boarding houses would be needed. Teachers would rather live near the school; houses would be needed for them. In a few years such a school would have its own little community. Therefore, money was to be made in real estate rather than in education (Sifferd, 1967).

The University of Illinois’ housing policy from 1880, when its only dormitory was destroyed in a wind storm, until the World War I era when Busey Hall was built in 1918 was that the university
would not own any student housing, instead “depending almost entirely on the Champaign-Urbana community to provide the food and shelter its students required” (Zammuto, 2010a). In 1911, of the 695 women in attendance at UIUC, 350 were in private rooming houses, and one third did not board where they roomed (Sifferd, 1967). Town residents very early on created an implicit symbiotic dependence between “town and gown” from the earliest origins of student housing. And “the recurrent theme [in university housing provision] … extended priority to white males first, white females second, and blacks, if considered at all, last” (Frank, 1990). By the 1940s, UIUC owned three dormitories which housed only 841 (7%) of its 12,358 and increasing enrollment numbers (Zammuto, 2010b). The practice of residential segregation was so entirely accepted by the majority of University affiliates that in virtually all official housing documents dated prior to 1945, the housing needs of black students were never even mentioned. African-American UIUC students fended for themselves with the help of other local African-American residents (Frank, 1990).

During WWII, housing conditions across CU grew worse rather than better. New building virtually stopped and many materials for remodeling were not available. The expansion of Chanute Field, an Air Force training camp in nearby Rantoul (a suspected sundown town 16 miles northeast of CU (Loewen, 2005)) and the migration from the south of workers in the expanded Illinois Central Railroad Yards and other industries, and finally the post-war influx of families of student veterans increased CU population from 49,000 in 1940 to 62,000 in 1950 (37% over the decade). Lack of supply of building materials during this time meant overcrowding, use of basements and attics, conversions of sheds, garages, and chicken coops, and the erection of many tar-paper shanties. Trailer camps sprang up, and poorly-built visiting camps were used as permanent dwellings at high rents. Sanitary conditions were often “deplorable” (LWV, 1951).

The end of the war exacerbated community housing provision problems even more, as returning veterans who were entitled by the GI Bill to receive a government-funded college education flooded into CU, making up part of what would be a very profitable blessing to the community’s housing industry, as UIUC housing historian Charles Sifferd put it, “enrollment in the University was contingent on whether or not one could find housing” (Sifferd, 1967). Because private housing was preferable to the makeshift barracks-style quarters in the Ice Rink, the West Hall of Memorial Stadium, and the Armory on campus, the time was perfect for profit-
hungry exploitation of a captive market. Overall, conditions were over-crowded, dilapidated, rents were high, and discrimination against women, and most severely, blacks, was rampant.

In fact, the actions of Illinois administrators lagged behind other Big Ten universities as well as some factions on campus. In 1959, the Urbana chapter of the American Association of University Professors issued an official statement urging the administration to “move with all deliberate speed to eradicate the evil of discrimination from the University community” (AAUP statement, 1959). In 1961, Cornell, Wisconsin, Iowa, Michigan State, and Michigan had all banned racial discrimination in housing. The University of Illinois though, still supported racial segregation. By February 1965, a document entitled “Report Concerning University Policies Relating to Racial Discrimination in Private Student Housing,” was issued by the Housing Review Committee which stated that there were still

…about 52 percent of spaces in uncertified homes and 80 percent of the apartments that were offered to students through the Housing Division listing service before March 1965 [we]re not listed because of the operator's failure to sign the pledge of nondiscrimination (Frank, 1990).

The University of Illinois is deeply embedded in CU community norms and vice versa, especially in housing, and along with many of those who held power in this area at the time, the “town and gown” relationships built along real estate speculation and market advantage together promoted and reinforced racial segregation in housing, even when it explicitly broke Illinois law. It is worth emphasizing that the speculative real estate market has been active in the CU area since the founding of the University, and particularly the local rental market is still deeply intertwined with housing provision and policy at UIUC and in CU more broadly today.

4.3 Housing Conditions in the East End 1930-1959: Villainous

In 1949, “a group of Negro women” from the League of Women Voters of Champaign County’s Social Welfare Committee performed a “Shack Study” investigating the housing of Negroes in CU.\footnote{The area studied roughly corresponds to the early North End: bounded on the south by Washington, north by Bradley, east by Goodwin, and west by the IL Central RR tracks.} A random sample of 85 shacks was performed, shacks inhabited by 109 families and 389 people, including 166 children. The study determined that the neighborhood “contained both negro and white families but was predominantly Negro.” The study began with this description:
The area is not beautiful. Streets are unpaved and sidewalks at a premium. The mean little shacks are strangely haphazard and ugly, the yards teeming with litter, stagnant pools of water are underfoot, the privies, doorless, send out their stench, and everywhere mud lies thick (LWV, 1949).

Out of a random sample of 85 “shacks” less than a third, or only 27, had inside faucets. In 19 shacks water had to be carried from next door, and in one case, had to be carried from a faucet a block away. Only 18 dwellings had inside toilets. In these the pipes frequently froze during the winter. Outdoor privies, often shared with neighbors, were used by the occupants of more than half of these shacks and sometimes required an extra rental of four or five dollars a month. Nine shacks had no toilet facilities whatsoever, inside or out, not even a neighbor’s privy (LWV, 1951). When asked how waste disposal was managed in one of the shacks without toilet facilities, one of the occupants replied, “we just wait until dark and go out in the yard” (LWV, 1949). The rooms were about half the size of ordinary rooms, many with six- or seven-foot ceilings. The study disclosed that 62 percent of the people were living in overcrowded conditions, according to the American Public Health Association standard of one and one-half persons per room. 45 percent were living two or more to a room, and 20 percent were living three or more to a room (LWV, 1949).

The rushed and poor construction of dwellings as a result of post-war materials scarcity combined with the area wide population increases referenced above, created deplorable living conditions for the poorest and most marginalized residents in a still segregated community. For many of the people described in the Shack Study, their only shelter options were the types of makeshift quarters described. A single example: a converted chicken house consisted of 2 rooms occupied by 2 people, where the kitchen was 7’4” by 9’6” by 6’9” and the ceilings were 6’ high. The total number of cubic feet in the two rooms was 680, or 340 per person. The American Public Health Association in its Committee on Hygiene of Housing had set 500 cubic feet as an absolute minimum amount of space per person where rooms are used for both sleeping and eating (APHA, 1941). FHA standards were considerably higher at the time, and the mortgage lending practice in CU at the time was not to grant home mortgage loans where the number of cubic feet per person fell below 720. The average room in these shacks was half the size of the smallest room in a house of standard construction (LWV, 1951).

The rapidity of construction of the majority of the North End shacks also did not take ventilation or insulation into account, and this meant that heating costs were excessive,
particularly in winter, when in most cases the cost of fuel ended up being higher than the cost of rent. Additionally, coal had to be bought in small quantities (which meant at a greater cost), due to lack of storage space. Many families burned two tons of coal a month in winter, at an average cost of $12.50 per ton. Of the 85 shacks, 80 were heated by coal stoves, two by coal furnaces, two by kerosene stoves, and one by a gas heater. The LWV wrote:

…the area offers a serious fire hazard. In the tiny, cramped rooms crowded with necessary possessions, stoves had to be close to tinder walls, and there was almost no chance to control a sudden flame if it should spurt up, before the entire room would be ablaze. A fire in July 1949 destroyed a shack in a few minutes and took the lives of the young occupants. Colonies of shacks, dangerously close to one another, increase fire hazard, and fires are frequent (LWV, 1949).

Sometimes shack colonies, clusters of three to five shacks found on one lot, created further problems of overcrowding, and serious fire hazards were found everywhere (see shack images in Appendix C.1).

Unpaved streets and lack of sewage disposal and garbage collection created a scene that was not only dreary but definitely hazardous to residents’ health. Unpaved streets became muddy, and the justification given to the LWV Social Welfare Committee members from private garbage collectors for not collecting garbage in the North End was that the muddy conditions were so bad they could not take their heavy trucks over the unpaved streets (LWV, 1949). The Committee’s report also stated that city ordinances that forbade such neglect were not enforced in the North End neighborhood. As for privies, both Urbana and Champaign had regulations for their construction and maintenance, but neither had inspection requirements ensuring compliance. Axiomatically, the Public Health Department acknowledged the high degree of communicable diseases in the area as a result of such conditions, yet the Public Health Department, despite having “the authority to condemn dwellings, consider[ed] it impossible to exercise this authority when there [wa]s no place for people to move” (LWV, 1968). At the time, such conditions were often considered sufficient “proof” in support of the circular logic and self-fulfilling prophecy held by most whites at the time that African Americans were “dirty, neglectful, and have little dignity” (Frank, 1990). It is highly likely that this kind of logic was one of the driving forces in perpetuating racial segregation and containment in CU’s housing history.

For the conditions described above, the median rent paid per shack was $22.50 per month (the range was $5.00 to $42.00 per month), exclusive of utilities, which were never included in
the rent. Particularly in terms of the conditions of shelter, most agree that the rents were excessive. A study of 200 low-income renting families showed that 28.5% were paying one third or more of their incomes for rent, and more than ten percent were paying half or more. Yet 70% of these families had to provide heat in addition, at an average estimated additional cost of $19 per month for fuel in winter, a cost heightened by the flimsy construction that made the houses almost impossible to keep warm. The social workers who provided data for this study noted tensions in families living under makeshift conditions, as well as lowered physical stamina and spread of disease (LWV, 1949).

4.4 Gatekeeping and Racially Restrictive Covenants in Champaign-Urbana

With the variety of institutions and individuals, along with the variety of methods that they used, Champaign-Urbana’s early dual housing markets are consistent with the findings of Dorothy K. Newman (1978) who writes about black Americans’ experience and treatment within white institutions: “from the first visit to the realtor, up through various institutions locally, and even shaping the many layers of governmental policy which underwrites so much of the housing financially, separation is virtually ensured” (Newman et al, 1978). Historians and sociologists have studied the “gatekeeping” roles of various community actors in creating and maintaining segregated housing markets in the United States at length: research on the causes of residential segregation has focused on the “institutional web” created by redlining, racial steering, and market forces (Farley, 1987; Foley, 1973; Kain, 1968; Kain & Quigley, 1975; Myrdal, 1944; Feagin & Feagin, 1978); micro-level analyses of discrimination documented by studies of real estate steering (Wienk et al, 1979). On a neighborhood level, segregation has been conceptualized as ordered segmentation (Suttles, 1968) and the defended neighborhood (Suttles, 1972); and in actual practice, attempts to maintain separation among people of different ethnic and racial groups have taken the form of restrictive covenants or zones (Kruse, 1982), acts of violence (Rieder 1985), and the use of local social networks (DeSena, 1990, 1994).

In most parts of the country gatekeepers are typically identified as real estate agents, lending institution agents, and property owners and managers. The history of CU supports this, and local evidence in the form of oral histories, newspaper editorials, and other period reports overwhelmingly support the assertion that the dual housing market did not exist by chance, as result of variation in income level, or from the personal preference of local African-American
residents. Instead, whites, whether acting as individuals or as members of institutions, deliberately confined black residents to the tiny parcel of space in the North End (see Frank, 1990 for detailed primary source research supporting this claim).

Racially restrictive covenants were the primary and most deplorable mechanism used to segregate African-Americans because of their implicit legal justification couched in traditional American property-rights-based individualism. Between 1941 and 1950 in Champaign County, 18 racially restrictive covenants were written into new subdivision deeds. The total number of parcels affected was 774 (65 in Rantoul, 50 near Savoy and 587 in CU) (Schwarzlose, 1965). Not coincidentally, this period was also when the CU area experienced the largest increase in African-American residents. All of the covenants were worded exactly the same, in the highest restrictive legal terms possible for similar statutes at the time: “no part thereof will be sold or leased, either in whole or in part, to or permitted to be occupied as owner, or tenant by any person or persons not of the Caucasian race” (Frank, 1990). By contrast, in Chicago for example, only 1.4% applied to all races except Caucasian, and 85% applied to “all persons with 1/8 part or more Negro blood.” Additionally, only 0.5% of all race covenants in Chicago provided an indefinite duration, most containing language like “until abrogated by written agreement of owners of 75 percent of frontage” (Long & Johnson, 1947).

As mechanisms of segregation and containment, it is hard to find covenants more direct than these. When considered in the light of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, a direct contradiction results: “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” In addition to federal constitutional law, the State of Illinois had an 1885 law that forbade discrimination in public accommodations:

All Persons Entitled to the Full and Equal Enjoyment of the Accommodations at Inns, Etc.: Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois represented in the General Assembly: That all persons within the jurisdiction of said state shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, restaurants, eating houses, barber shops, public conveyances on land or water, theatres and all other places of public accommodations and amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to all citizens (Criminal Code, Illinois Revised Statutes. 1885, 338).

In addition to the 1937 amendment, the Illinois General Assembly passed another Civil Rights statute. Section I of this Act states:
No officer or employee of the State of Illinois, or of any political subdivision thereof, or of any county, or of any Park District, or of any Forest Preserve District, or of any State University of subdivision thereof, or of any State Normal School or of any subdivision thereof, or of any municipal corporation in the State of Illinois, shall deny or refuse to any person, on account of race, color or religion, the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges of his office or services or of any property under his care (Laws of Illinois Sixtieth General Assembly, 1937).

This would seem to legally prohibit the signing of racially restrictive property deeds by all “officers and employees of the State of Illinois,” but in 1944, Illinois legislators voted against two bills that would have specifically provided for the legal enforcement of the prohibition of race covenants. And unfortunately, it was not until 1948 that the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the race covenant as unconstitutional and legally unenforceable in the NAACP-initiated case Shelley vs. Kraemer in St. Louis, Missouri. Chief Justice Vinson delivered that opinion, which stated:

The States have made available to such individuals [those “private individuals (who) impose such discriminations as they see fit”] the full coercive power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing and financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to sell ... The historical context in which the Fourteenth Amendment became a part of the Constitution should not be forgotten. Whatever else the framers sought to achieve, it is clear that the matter of primary concern was the establishment of equality in the enjoyment of basic civil and political rights and the preservation of those rights from discriminatory action on the part of the States based on considerations of race or color (Bardolph, 1970).

Despite these state-level legislative directives, between 1948 and 1950 there were more racially restrictive covenants recorded in Champaign County, the collective tracts of which were owned by 17 individuals, 2 of which did not reside in CU, 5 of whom were only listed as “wives” following their husbands’ names, and 9 of whom held positions of power within the community related to land management and housing:

1. Howard O. Watson, Field Supervisor for the Equitable Life Insurance Company
2. H. A. Richter, Real Estate Agent and Insurance Agent
3. L. M. Rovelstad, Real Estate Agent and Secretary/Treasurer of the Commercial Savings and Loan Association
4. Myra Rovelstad (L. M. and Myra were married), Real Estate Agent
5. Cecil R. Ozier, General Contractor for Ozier-Weller
6. Scott E. Weller, General Contractor for Ozier-Weller
7. Catherine M. Weller (Scott and Catherine were married), Secretary/Treasurer of Ozier-Weller
8. Gordon F. Kamerer, Manager of the Urbana-Lincoln Hotel (now Jumer’s)
9. Most significantly: Charles M. Webber, presiding as Champaign County's only judge from 1935 to 1946 (during which time he annexed two other subdivisions to Champaign with race covenants) and who returned to practice law as an attorney with Webber and Balbach following his judgeship (Frank, 1990).
But residential segregation has often also perpetuated in the United States through the everyday activities and community and social norms of individuals as much as by legal statute. Together with the formal practices of institutions, the informal actions of people attempting to preserve the local culture of their neighborhoods plays a major part in the systemic violence of racism. Casual conversations among neighbors on the streets, in church, and around political events are often the medium by which the preferences of individuals are translated into macro-level patterns of residential segregation (DeSena, 1994). Directly affecting the quality of lives of African American CU residents, covenants translated into cues for social interactions as well. In their 1947 book People vs. Property: Race Restrictive Covenants in Housing, Long & Johnson explained:

...the race restrictive covenant is significant not only as a legal instrument limiting the housing supply and defining residential racial segregation, but also because its use brings into existence a body of social practice, attitudes and policy having a detrimental effect upon the character of race relations for the total community (Long & Johnson, 1947).

Thus, in less easily traceable and thus documentable ways after *Shelley vs. Kraemer*, pernicious personal stereotyping based on residential neighborhood location persisted.

To illustrate the injurious confluence of structural racism as seen through covenants and gatekeeping in real estate combined with social prejudice in restricting life outcomes, I present a single case study: that of Taylor Thomas, a prominent Champaign local (see Appendix C.2 for photo). After he earned his degree in English and History from Tennessee State University (an HBCU) in 1935, he sent out about 75 letters to find a teaching job. Only a few letters came back to him but no jobs were offered so he started waiting tables and he found other odd jobs. He saw white men who did not have as much education as he had, but they had better jobs. He got tired of the situation so he decided to move to Indianapolis where he found a government job as a night watchman. He had so many jobs, extension courses, and singing lessons that five years later he got tuberculosis and had to stay in bed four years. In the fall of 1945, he became the first director of the Douglass Center, a recreation center named for Frederick Douglass. At the Douglass Center, he started a kindergarten and he coached athletic teams that were so good he was offered a teaching job at Jackson, an all-black school in Danville. He was educated to be a teacher and it took 12 years to become one. In Danville, in addition to being a teacher, he was the coach of all the sports. His football team won all their games for six years. He was the education
association vice-president but he was stopped from becoming president of the association because of his skin color. While he was doing all of this he earned a master’s degree in education in 1951, and an advanced certificate in educational administration in 1955, both from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (Roundtree & Tyler, 1997).

During this time, he and his wife lived in a tiny upstairs apartment in the North End on Columbia and Fifth streets, then later on Fifth and Vine Streets, and during this entire time, the couple sought housing commensurable with their incomes but could not get it. Thomas remarked:

We think that we knocked on so many doors...we received all kinds of insults and everything else in trying to get housing. Housing was very hard, I mean wherever you wanted to buy it, it isn’t that you--sometimes there’s a certain house that you’d like to have and I don’t care where it is, if you can afford to buy it you’ll like to get it, but you couldn’t (Roundtree & Tyler, 1997).

In one instance, Thomas made a phone inquiry about a home with a real estate agent. When Thomas met the agent at the available house, Thomas reported he was told “Oh, well if you would of told us who you were over the phone, you would have saved both of us a lot of time.” The agent, of course, had not known Thomas and his wife were African American until they met. The dual housing system went unquestioned and unchallenged by this agent; no excuses or lies were necessary: race was the sole reason for the Thomas’ s rejection upon first sight.

In another instance, Thomas reported that he approached a realtor in efforts to buy some land. Here, the agent required “earnest money” as a down payment. Less direct than an outright refusal, Thomas interpreted this as a ploy by the realtor; if cash were required it would hopefully deter the prospective black buyer from purchasing the land. The stereotype that all blacks are poor was also in operation here. If the fee were high enough, the black “threat” would be easily eliminated. Thomas, however, had the money. He sent the specified amount to the realtor at which point his check was promptly returned. The note attached stated that the owner “wouldn’t sell to you.” Whether the agent’s delayed tactic was of his own volition, or whether the agent did indeed approach the owner with Thomas’s offer, the result was no sale, and it was obvious to Thomas, in his years of experience in such matters, that it was due to his race.

Taylor Thomas experienced the discriminatory effects of CU financial institutions as well as with real estate agents and homeowners. After twelve fruitless years searching for an appropriate home, the Thomas’s found one out in the countryside near Urbana whose owner was
willing to sell. The owner required a down payment due in forty-five days. The search for a lender began. Said Thomas:

We kept trying and trying, and we went to everyplace in town. We went to insurance companies, we went to banks ... they wouldn’t let us have the money saying that it was out in the country ... We tried First Federal, and finally there was an insurance company, Equitable ... but we finally went--we said well there’s one more, and we’d tried every bank in town except that bank. And we said well, we’ll try them, we don’t think were going to get it there either (Roundtree & Tyler, 1997).

The final bank was Busey Bank. Incredibly, the loan was granted for a higher sum than Thomas had required. The bank personnel said a “home in the country” was no problem to finance. Finally, the Taylor family had a suitable home. But over the course of their twelve-year pursuit, the Thomas’s had been rebuffed by realtors, owners, and lenders, and their story is consistent with the collected experiences of other North End residents.12

4.5 The Role of the Housing Authority of Champaign County (HACC)

The HACC in 1948 ordered a “Housing Market Analysis in Champaign-Urbana Illinois” from the Real Estate Research Corporation of Chicago. This study, known as the “Downs Report,” showed that 71.8% of area workers had incomes too low to justify a monthly rental of $50, or the purchase of a $6,000 home. Essentially, housing in CU before Old Urban Renewal began was too expensive for the majority of its residents. The report recommended (1) the formation of nonprofit corporations contemplating a loan of equity money for the down payment on houses through grants by the State Housing Board, and (2) direct government subsidy, as in public housing projects (LWV, 1951).

In 1950 the Housing Authority ordered a survey of substandard housing in Urbana conducted by the Real Estate Research Corporation. It was estimated that the area surveyed (containing 1,533 dwelling units) included 65% – 75% of all the substandard dwelling units in Urbana and all the non-white units. The report supported findings from the League of Women Voters’ Shack Study completed a year earlier, and reported that 49% of all families in substandard units had no inside flush toilet (either shared or used exclusively), and 26% had no kitchen sink. The rental housing for African American residents was found to be particularly bad.

12 Virtually all those interviewed for the Urbana Free Library’s Black Oral History Project mentioned the dismal state of housing discrimination and cited poor housing as the main problem they had to endure. See Black Oral History Project, Box 338, Urbana Free Library Archives, Urbana, Illinois.
Almost three quarters (72%) was dilapidated, almost half (48%) had no inside flush toilet, and almost one-quarter (24%) had more than 1.5 persons per room. Of all rental properties available to African Americans, 39% had no running water, and 61% had no kitchen sink (LWV, 1951). These results combined with the studies the League of Women Voters produced and its own 1948 ‘Housing Market Analysis’ spurred the HACC to begin building public housing units on the land it had purchased in 1941.

In 1951, Champaign had 140 units of public housing nearing completion, and Urbana had begun work on 125 units. African Americans and whites were segregated, but “equal facilities were provided for each group” according to the League of Women Voters. Champaign had 70 units for whites and 70 units for blacks; Urbana had 99 for whites and 26 for blacks. The African American project in Champaign was called Birch Court after a soldier killed in WWII, and was located on a 5-acre tract north of Bradley Avenue between Fourth and Fifth Streets. The white project was on a 7-acre tract at the northwest corner of Bradley and McKinley. The cost of both the Urbana and the Champaign projects was $1,470,000, but only $305,000 (21%) went towards the Burch Court and the remaining $1,165,000 was spent constructing the white project. Because of the way that payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs) were set up in this era, the local community was expected to benefit (even though it technically lost property tax revenue from tax-exempt public land) from the PILOTs paid, which at the time totaled 10% of the total shelter rents received from the structure (calculated from net rent paid after the cost of utilities were deducted) (LWV, 1951).

The HACC restricted residential eligibility by income and race, as well as previous housing circumstances. Veterans were given overall preference, but all other prospective tenants had to either have been displaced by a slum-clearance project or have been occupying substandard housing. The very poorest families were ineligible because their incomes were still not steady enough and not large enough to pay the minimum rent made necessary by federal financing limitations. The highest rent charged in these early public housing units had to be 20% lower than what was charged for standard available housing. Tenants had to pay 20% of their income for rent, including utilities, but they were granted an exemption of $100 a year for each minor household member (LWV, 1951).

In Champaign, a non-political committee of six local citizens appointed by the Housing Authority selected the first tenants chosen for the Birch housing project. In addition to the factors
of income and occupancy of substandard quarters for non-veterans, they gave consideration to the length of residence in the community and to the “character” of the applicant. The tenants were expected to be “good risks for the prompt payment of rent and to be cooperative citizens, not trouble-makers.” The task of selection of tenants along these lines was clearly highly subjective, and mistakes were probably made. Many African-Americans were disappointed because their incomes were too high for public housing, but they could find no better privately owned housing because of color restrictions in other areas of the community. As a result, there were four eligible applicants for every vacancy in the project (LWV, 1951).

Many North End residents opposed the segregationist practices of the housing authority. Two lists were kept, and it was often not provided on a first-come, first-served basis. Instead, applicants were assigned to housing by race (Patton, 1968). This created and helped foment intense distrust and suspicion leading up to Champaign’s first urban renewal project, as a debate around the inclusion and number of public housing units as part of the renewal plan was debated over the nine years leading up to its first project implementation.

4.6 Old Urban Renewal comes to Champaign: 1960-1969

After much was made in the news about two local children killed in a 1953 fire resulting from the structure burning so rapidly they could not escape, public opinion demanded that the city do something about housing conditions in the North End. As a response, the first minimal housing code of Champaign was created, which prohibited dirt floors and designated space requirements per person (applying to only those above six years of age) (Patton, 1968). Enforcement remained a problem however, as code enforcement relied on complaints and “because the offices of the building inspectors [we]re understaffed and neighbors [we]re unwilling to make complaints” (LWV, 1951). Later codes prevented new construction with obvious fire hazards or lack of sanitation, but

...in some areas buildings [went] up or [we]re converted for use as dwellings without the issuance of a permit, as in the case of the converted sheds and tar-paper shanties... [and] in the absence of routine inspection or complaints from others, many violations, particularly in the poorer neighborhoods, [went] undetected. Public opinion, unfortunately, [did] not supported enforcement (LWV, 1951).

This conflict between general white and black community public support for better housing conditions, but lack of functional support for explicit enforcement programs to
implement the changes is also widespread in political science research on voting attitudes and behavior patterns in the post-Civil Rights era into the 1980s and 1990s. Another limiting factor to early code enforcement was the realization that if the majority of the North End housing was in poor enough condition to condemn, those residents would need to relocate to housing elsewhere in the city, and explicit residential segregation disallowed blacks in any other area of the city at the time. The issue of poor code enforcement arose in 1964 during debates around the use of federal funds to finance the urban renewal program by the Chamber of Commerce, who “criticized the lax enforcement of the building code and Council’s proposal to increase the utility tax to pay their share of the cost of urban renewal” (Patton, 1968). Code enforcement came up again two years later in January 1966, when the City was notified that its Workable Program for Community Improvement (a prerequisite to receiving federal funds for nearly all community improvement programs) would not be recertified unless it undertook either urban renewal or a housing code enforcement program (Patton, 1968). And in May of 1966 while waiting to hear whether the documentation submitted by the housing authority requesting 30 additional units of public housing for Champaign’s urban renewal relocation housing would be approved, then-City Manager Browning outlined alternatives to federally-funded urban renewal, the second of which was: “enforce the city housing code. This course of action applied to northeast Champaign will work a great hardship on a great many people due to the absence of relocation housing” (Patton, 1968). These all indicate widespread community recognition of an underutilized tool available to the City to promote better housing conditions in the North End, one which was not used because of the residential apartheid evidenced by stories like the Thomas’s.

Old Urban Renewal came to Champaign in 1960, when a Citizens Advisory Committee on Urban Renewal (CAC) was formed from an initial community meeting with Mayor Emmerson Dexter and 30 residents who listened to a Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) representative explain the municipal-federal relationships of urban renewal. The CAC was to carry out the necessary steps required to initiate an urban renewal project, the first being an attempt to clarify what the city must do to meet the requirements of the Workable Program, a prerequisite required by HUD to granting loans and grants for clearing, redeveloping and rehabilitating slums and blighted areas, grants for concentrated housing code enforcement projects and for the demolition of unsafe, dilapidated buildings, plus mortgage insurance for housing construction or improvement in renewal areas. With the aid of the City, the CAC
completed the workable program and took it to Chicago for review by HHFA. The agency recommended that “the section on relocation of residents displaced by renewal efforts be expanded” before submission of the program for final approval. The City of Champaign decided to implement a General Neighborhood Renewal Plan. Under this approach a renewal plan in sections is prepared for a neighborhood of the city, to be implemented over a period of time (see maps of proposed urban renewal area in Appendix C.3.) (Patton, 1968).

4.7 Old Urban Renewal: Neighborhood changes indistinct from effects on residents

The primary issues debated in the early planning stages of Old Urban Renewal in Champaign involved open occupancy and the desegregation of the larger community and more widespread housing access for African American residents, specifically regarding the renewal plan’s proposals on the location of public housing and potential further concentration of disadvantage in the North End.

The first public opposition occurred in early 1962, when Mrs. Louis Bundman, a member of the Council for Community Integration, asked whether or not the proposed urban renewal project wouldn’t reinforce the segregated housing across the city. Traffic engineers and urban planning consultants Harland Bartholomew and Associates were contracted by the City of Champaign to prepare the General Neighborhood Renewal Plan. From July to November, the consultants claimed they interviewed the residents and determined their needs and desires, interviewing 75% of the people living in the area (Champaign-Urbana Courier, March 31, 1963; Patton, 1968). When it became clear that 10% of residents in the proposed renewal area desired to move outside of their old community, and the audience insisted that black residents could not move wherever they wanted in CU, the consultant replied, “I don’t know of anything like that,” and the planning director insisted it was too early to talk about this topic. A spokesman for the people then replied, “the fact is, we cannot separate the physical changes within the neighborhood from the ‘effect upon the people.’ This should be considered - by some group - at the same time as the actual urban renewal planning” (Champaign-Urbana Courier, November 28, 1962). The residents were unconvinced when the planners claimed this was of no concern to the urban renewal plans. One man summed up the feelings of the residents who attended: “What's going to happen to me and my family? Where am I going to live? Am I going to be able to pay the rent? As long as there is restricted housing in Champaign, urban renewal will do no good”
(Champaign-Urbana Courier, November 28, 1962). Despite the planning director and City Council’s initial attempts to avoid committing to desegregation simultaneously with implementing urban renewal policy, the CU community insisted over the next three years in numerous public sessions and neighborhood meetings that they were necessarily concurrent issues.

In a September 1963 Courier article titled: “Champaign’s North End: A Look at the Negro and His Housing Woes,” the Champaign Human Relations Commission is quoted as saying:

…the commission believes that the greatest single local barrier to fair treatment of all people is the severely restricted opportunity afforded minority group people in securing suitable housing within their means…Failure to achieve positive, rapid progress here can only lead to undesirable activities which reflect unfavorably on the good name of Champaign and its progress as a desirable and thriving community…in the North End, there are conditions of misery which only a small percentage of the community is aware of – and which an even smaller percentage admits. What to do about this is a problem the community has been unable to solve. It is a problem that at last is being recognized.

On March 31, 1963, after nine months of preparation, Harland Bartholomew and Associates presented its plan to the city. The General Neighborhood Renewal Plan contained six projects covering 227 acres, requiring 800 families to be relocated, with 200 not to be disturbed. Of the extant 941 structures, 494 (52.5%) were planned for complete leveling (Champaign-Urbana Courier, March 31, 1963). A new Citizens Advisory Committee, under the chairmanship of John E. Severns, a partner in a local architectural firm, was formed. This committee was to play a large role in the upcoming dispute over the urban renewal project. Membership on the CAC consisted of three residents of the community and four people from elsewhere in the city. Although their backgrounds differed, all but one of the members was a professional or businessman (see complete list in Appendix C.4). The first public hearing held by the CAC after Mr. Severns became chairman, was held on April 4, 1963. Severns described the atmosphere at this time. This meeting was attended by 250-300 people principally from the North End. The questions raised clearly indicated that there existed a number of areas of concern, misunderstanding, and misconception regarding the proposed plan and its effect on the residents of the proposed neighborhood affected.13

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Concern for the “human side” of urban renewal was re-voiced by several groups at this time, the primary fear being that the city was concerned only with improving the structural condition of the neighborhood, and not the situations of its residents. The Champaign Human Relation Commission sent a letter to the City Council, asking it to go on record supporting open occupancy and stipulating that the primary reason for relocating people displaced by urban renewal was neither geography nor existing neighborhood patterns, but the needs and the means of the persons involved. On an April 5, 1963 City Council presented its statement of Urban Renewal Policy, involving “the democratic principle and right of every citizen in our city to live in a residence which meets at least minimum acceptable standards, the choice of which is only limited by the individual’s means.” The Council went on to promise priority in the purchase of land to those displaced and promised that all developers in the area would be required to state in writing “that their developments will be sold, rented, or leased without prejudice as to race, color, or creed” before they will be allowed to purchase land in the area (Champaign-Urbana Courier, April 5, 1963).

Part of the initial concern around Old Urban Renewal stemmed from residents’ fear that their neighborhood was chosen for renewal to provide expansion space for the rapidly growing university. The proposed renewal area’s location directly north of campus provided an optimal area for university housing, and the campus had already expanded as far south as it could – running into the extensive university farms to the south of the general campus along current Windsor Road. North End residents thought it was entirely probable that the city intended to turn over their neighborhood to university oriented housing – it would rebuild the slum area, reduce costly water and sewer expansion, raise tax revenue and retain higher educated and wealthier people in the inner city area near the business district and major highways. When city planners mentioned that this plan would bring whites into the community, these suspicions were given substantive support, and most interpreted that fact, giving the segregation at the time, as “an indication that the neighborhood would be taken away from the Negro” (Patton, 1968). Compounding these fears was the widely-known fact at the time that the mayor was a close friend of one of the city’s largest slum landlords (name unknown), “whose practice it had been to convert one and two-family homes into multiple units as well as construct poor quality new homes” (Patton, 1968). Thus local fears of extractive and exploitative private profit to be made by this public project took hold.
A September newspaper article in 1963 explained some of the prejudicial and predatory housing finance practices extant in the North End at the time:

Because of the sharp demand for housing in the Negro section of CU, the opportunities for exorbitant rent collection and inflated real estate prices are many…A young Negro couple recently was offered the opportunity of buying a similar home for $11,500. The landlord owner, a prominent Champaign citizen, priced the same house to a white friend of the Negro couple at $7,000.

Echoing sentiments in this story, the LWV (1951) report stated, “a landlord may receive as much as $250 per month from rent for one house, yet only 24 properties in the area are assessed at more than $5,000, including businesses.”

As the community debated and discussed the merits and potential pitfalls of implementing a local urban renewal program as a solution to local conditions of “blight,” Planning Director David Gay explained the City’s perspective on renewal at the time:

…one alternative is simply to practice rigid enforcement of the city building codes. That would mean that the city would demand that all substandard housing be improved immediately at the expense of the property owner. If this is not done, the city then can order the property vacated. But then the city would have no legal obligation to relocate occupants of substandard housing: it would not be liable for damages to property owners and it would not be required to purchase the condemned property at fair value. The trouble is that slums are profitable to some property owners. Properties there are cheap and can be paid for in a short time. There is no upkeep required and they provide income for the life of the property (Champaign-Urbana Courier, September 26, 1963).

This perspective on upkeep of residential property in slums (“none required”) is further indicative of attitudes towards the municipal code responsible for regulating property maintenance and construction at the time – essentially, of its pro forma status. This “no upkeep required” perspective held by City officials like the planning director is one of the ways the municipal government is complicit in the creation of residential apartheid in CU. In their 1951 report on public housing and slum clearance, the League of Women Voters defined the physical symptoms of blighted and slum areas as including, “poor building design and construction, high population density, overcrowding of dwelling units, faulty subdivision of land, poor street pattern, and lack of utilities.” Notably, poor construction, overcrowding, poor street patterns and lack of utilities can all be either mitigated or prevented by regular proactive enforcement (not complaint-based) of municipal land use codes and city ordinances.

Around the same time (early 1964 – mid 1965), the proposed renewal area residents began to get more vociferously involved in the urban renewal controversy. One of the groups
that had previously opposed the project reversed its stand. The Champaign-Urbana Improvement Association issued a statement supporting the urban renewal, with reservations. Reverends J. E. Groves and Blaine Ramsey presented the position of the group, claiming urban renewal could not be regarded as an end in itself. They stated:

We don’t unanimously agree that urban renewal is the best thing for Champaign’s North End…our experience in the past is all we can go by, and we have seen it fail in other cities, at least what most of them have is not what we want…but we must do something to help stop a problem that could get out of hand given 10 years or more…so we support this with the following reservations:

1. The cost of new homes must not be beyond the ability of the average wage-earner now living in the area to purchase and maintain.
2. Profiteering on the part of private developers should be discouraged.
3. Reasonable assurance should be given and a climate established whereby displaced persons may be allowed to buy homes outside the renewal area.
4. A fair price should be paid for homes taken, and after the sale, if the occupants did not have sufficient funds to purchase their property, they would be subsidized by the government with low-interest loans to assure adequate housing.
5. Homeowners located in the renewal area whose homes are classified as substandard will be allowed to bring their homes up to the present code requirements.
6. Public housing should be minimal and be designed as not to take on the appearance of ghetto housing.
7. Developers in the renewal area must hire Negroes in all job categories (Patton, 1968).

The major neighborhood group to oppose the project consistently was the Northeast Neighborhood Homeowners Association, led by Reverend A. W. Bishop. This North End neighborhood had about 70% owner-occupied homes, and a relatively high median age of 50 years. Thus, not only were residents likely elderly, but a high percentage were unemployed, unable to work or on fixed incomes. Their immediate concern was loss of their largest asset: their homes. The general theme of opponents to Old Urban Renewal, voiced in an informational community meeting held on January 25, 1966 was:

…they were too old to leave their homes which they owned and purchase new ones. They felt they would be forced into renting, and said, ‘I worked hard for my shack, and I intend to keep my shack till I die,’ and ‘All my earnings, all my savings are in that home. My husband is sick and not able to work, and I’ve already got enough problems without losing my home’ (Champaign-Urbana Courier, January 25, 1966).

Due to very limited resources in monetary terms particularly, but also in varying ability to understand or oppose the city’s policies, many residents at the time chose the short-range personal goals of saving their homes in order to avoid being placed into public housing. They understood that the only way to keep their homes was by defeating urban renewal. Public
housing and urban renewal appeared as one and the same thing, not mutually exclusive elements. Other groups also opposed aspects of the project: the Urban League opposed the construction of another public housing project in northeast Champaign, claiming it would only ensure more segregation. Other than the CAC, which was established by the City, the League of Women Voters was the only organization fully supporting urban renewal. Though both the CAC and the LWV periodically voiced opposition or concern for elements in the planning process, their firm support for the overall idea did not wane during the plan creation process (Patton, 1968).

4.8 Urban Renewal moves ahead (1964): Primary community concerns continue to be open occupancy and relationship to public housing

In late 1964, after extensive community debate, six urban renewal projects were planned at a cost of $8.7 million (Champaign’s share was roughly one fourth) (Champaign-Urbana Courier, September 26, 1963). David Gensemer, the newly hired urban renewal project director from Arkansas, when asked whether urban renewal would simply rebuild the “Negro ghetto,” replied that the purpose of an urban renewal project was not to change the character of an urban renewal community but to provide adequate housing for those who need it. He stressed that at least two adequate housing sites would be offered to any family forced to move because of the execution of the plan, and that urban renewal law requires that they be equal in location, proximity to work and price (Champaign-Urbana Courier, November 17, 1964). In 1969, the two main stated objectives of Champaign’s first urban renewal project had shifted from ‘provision of adequate housing’ to (1) the elimination and prevention of the spread of existing deterioration and blight; and (2) provisions for better living conditions within the project area by stabilization and conservation of property values” (Daily Illini, March 13, 1969).

Toward the latter part of February 1965, home interviews were undertaken by the relocation officer to determine the preferences and situation of people within the project area. The most common question of the people interviewed was, “Where can we move since there is no open occupancy in this city?” The people were assured that, although this was a problem, progress was being made toward making houses available on an open occupancy basis. However, a shortage of low-cost housing both within and without the project area was the greatest single problem that faced the relocation efforts. The urban renewal director noted that this was one of the areas in which urban renewal becomes a social problem: “most of the people
in the area are Negroes, and the agency becomes involved with open occupancy, fair housing and integration” (Champaign-Urbana Courier, February 28, 1965).

Relocation problems were complicated by the existing practices in the assignment of housing units of the HACC, through its director, Mr. Harold Sloan. It was claimed that applicants were assigned to the housing units on a racially segregated basis. This led the CAC to request that the HACC assign public housing on a first-come, first-served basis as to location (Northeast Neighborhood Committee of the Citizen's Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, July 7, 1965; from Patton, 1968).

By the June 2, 1965 meeting of the Neighborhood Committee of CAC, the mayor had appointed John Barr, a local realtor, as chairman of the Committee. At this meeting, Mayor Dexter informed the committee that the City Council’s interest in the urban renewal program had “increased by 80% in the last eight months, and that it wants to see Project I completed.” Putting high-level institutional pressure behind the impetus moving the Old Urban Renewal plan forward, the mayor drew a line in the sand supporting the location of public housing as a component of the urban renewal plan being concentrated in the North End’s renewal area. He stated: “I can tell you right now that if the units are not to be placed - in the urban renewal area, all meetings on the subject might as well ‘go out the window.’ There will be no urban renewal unless these units are built inside Project I” (Northeast Neighborhood Committee of the Citizen's Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, June 2, 1965; quoted from Patton, 1968).

When the question of the location of public housing was raised at the July 29th meeting of the CAC, City Manager Browning asked, “Is integration the goal of the urban renewal program or is improved housing?” (Citizen’s Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, July 29, 1965; quoted from Patton, 1968). He stated that the Federal Housing Act pertained primarily to the improvement of housing. The CAC nevertheless forwarded a recommendation to the City Council asking that they review the situation concerning an open occupancy policy. Additionally, even though City Manager Browning stated that he felt the City Council had indicated it was reticent about putting pressure on another public body, City staff recommended advocating to the HACC that all vacancies in public housing units be filled on the basis of priority without regard to the location of such units.

John Barr, chairman of the CAC, stated that he thought there could be an urban renewal plan to benefit the North End if the people in the area participated in the plan, and “that urban
renewal could help the community of Champaign-Urbana, but that it was a grave error to have a plan without much participation from the people affected.” Mr. Barr said that urban renewal would have an effect upon integration and could possibly create more problems than it solved, it was foolish to try to separate urban renewal and integration, and the CAC was for a program that fostered integration. The CAC presented the following points as suggestions from the area leaders who could adequately represent the people, and stated that the CAC was for a program that fostered integration:

1. There was a need to have more parks in the multi-family area and a buffer zone along the railroad.
2. The density (dwelling units per acre) was too high.
3. There should be single family housing units within the public housing.
4. It was opposed to placing all of the ninety units of public housing in the North End.
5. All standard housing should be left standing if possible.
6. A good urban renewal plan can make the North End a better area, but further segregation would make this a bad project (Northeast Neighborhood Committee of the Citizen's Advisory Committee, minutes of meeting, August 16, 1965; quoted from Patton, 1968).

The first public meeting on the almost complete plan was held on December 20, 1965, where two spectators spoke in favor of the plan, and 30 voiced opposition. One of the comments made was:

One thing that is confusing me is that we’ve all had men come out and tell us one thing but when they get back to the west side they talk differently. I’ve heard some people say that if this project goes through I’ll make a killing off these Negroes in the North End (Champaign-Urbana Courier, December 20, 1965).

Later, others, including the NAACP spokesman, expressed the feeling that placing any public housing in the renewal area would reinforce the existing ghetto pattern. Its location near the tracks was also opposed in that the one hundred foot buffer was not felt great enough to cut the train noise. Homes near the tracks were attacked for psychological reasons as well, as one resident shared: “our children, because their faces are black, feel they are inferior. Placing them back down by the tracks will strengthen this feeling” (Champaign-Urbana Courier, January 25, 1966). In an informational meeting in January 1966 held in a local school, residents voiced virulent protests against the proposed urban renewal plan, citing worries “that [existing residents] were too old to leave their homes which they owned and purchase new ones…they felt they would be forced into renting” (Patton, 1968).

Finally in early February 1966, when asked if the city would relocate residents outside the area, Urban Renewal Director Gensemer said, “we will relocate a family wherever in the City
we can find a house they can afford” (Champaign-Urbana Courier, February 1, 1966). The tensions around urban renewal and race relations came up early and often in the beginning stages of CU’s Old Urban Renewal project planning, and as Mr. Barr explained to HUD:

Early in the planning period we were advised that urban renewal and race relations were two separate problems and we should not try to mix the two. We have learned, however, that at least here in Champaign the two problems cannot be separated, and we have kept this uppermost in our minds while planning the project. Despite this awareness by the City, some of the conflicts have not proved fully reconcilable. The most intense and concerted “segregation” charge has involved the proposal to locate sixty units of public housing within Project I. This problem has been consistently opposed by civil rights groups and others concerned over the possible perpetuation of the ghetto pattern (Champaign-Urbana Courier, February 1, 1966).

By March of 1966 general consensus had been reached that urban renewal would proceed, and the conversation and debate then shifted towards growing opposition to the existing concentration of public housing in the area (Patton, 1968).

4.9 De-segregation in CU begins, with mixed community responses

October 18, 1966 was the first record of African American families leaving the North End (9 families moved into unidentified “widely separated areas of the community”), which Human Relations Commission chairman Donald E. Moyer called “really dramatic” after the previous three years of debate and advocacy documented by the Fair Housing Bureau (Champaign-Urbana Courier, October 18, 1966). A month later on November 17, 1966 Champaign’s Urban Renewal Project I was approved to move forward by a 5-1 City Council vote. This vote occurred after a three-hour public hearing, in which “councilmen listened to 13 talks favoring the urban renewal plan and 26 opposing it.” Still claiming a very much mixed reception in the broader community, some of the critiques presented were from David Gass, a resident living south of the proposed renewal area at 305 E. Park St., who spoke to say, “I’m for urban renewal. I think just about everyone here is for urban renewal,” and after waiting for a chorus of objections to die, continued, “but one thought is in my mind. You’ve got a part of town and you want to clean it up. The majority of people in that part of town will be put within 100 feet of the railroad tracks” he then admonished the Council:

…you have chosen to do this because of economic reasons and the image of the city. To place people next to the railroad tracks is a sign than Champaign favors cleanliness. The council faces a test of whether it supports integration in all forms or can get by with a
little here and a little there – with a little paradise next to the railroad tracks (Champaign-Urbana Courier, November 17, 1966).

Robert Eubanks, another speaker representing the Council for Community Integration stated that he supported “the principle of urban renewal, but disagree[d] completely with many elements of this plan,” terming it “woefully deficient in social planning,” further arguing that the “social causes of slums are just as important as the physical causes” (Champaign-Urbana Courier, November 17, 1966).

With project implementation near, the topic for debate shifted. It now centered on the price to be paid for properties that were to be taken. Purchase prices offered by the city were determined by appraisals from two private companies, but were termed inadequate by the residents who were unable to purchase other homes for the price paid them for their project area homes. They were told, however, that the city was operating under the premise that they “should pay for what’s there - the as-is condition, including all improvements on the property - but there [was] no need to take into account what amount [would be] needed to replace it with similar property” (Champaign-Urbana Courier May 21, 1967). This provides another example of the deep disconnects between the intent of federal law and its local applications in the North. Specifically, the ways local decision-making elites during OUR undermined legislative intent geared at residential equality and minimizing harm by attempting to disavow responsibility for unequal outcomes resulting from state-initiated displacement of African American citizens.

Urban Renewal Project I moved forward in Champaign regardless, and 1969 brought additional race-based community challenges in the process of selecting a developer. Creative Buildings, a local Urbana firm, already had a contract to build a 72-unit apartment project in the renewal area for Mt. Olive Baptist Church. Creative Buildings had promised to help organize a black construction firm to help handle the on-site assembly of pre-constructed housing modules, but CAC members expressed doubt. CAC Vice Chairman Henry Spies said he “was not sure banks would finance such a firm, even with backing from Creative Buildings,” and Chairman John Barr said that since the housing modules would be pre-built, “I can’t see what work besides a little painting and site preparation remains to be contracted.” Mt. Olive Baptist Church Reverend James Offutt argued that the proposal would create jobs for blacks in the Creative Buildings factory where the modules are built, as well as on the site. The relocation officer for the urban renewal department told the CAC that a number of black skilled craftsmen in CU had...
been unable to find work, because of trade union discrimination. A committee member said he doubted the unions would accept the housing project being constructed with non-union labor, and Reverend Offutt scoffed at a statement that some unions had indicated a willingness to allow black craftsmen to work on projects in the urban renewal area and to admit them to the unions if they “prove themselves.” “That’s ironic,” he said. “I have to ask the person with his foot on my neck for permission to work in my own area” (Champaign-Urbana Courier, March 12, 1969).

The Champaign City Council had the final choice in selecting a developer, but the CAC recommended who it considered had the best design - Lippman Associates out of St. Louis. This recommendation was made despite not knowing whether Lippman would be willing to make an extra effort to employ local people. Reverend Offutt voted for Creative Buildings, saying that although most of their construction was done in the factory, all but the carpentry was handled by subcontracting firms, and that “blacks w[ould] be employed in all phases of construction of North Mt. Olive Manor” (Champaign-Urbana Courier, March 12, 1969).

Roy Murphy, president of Creative Buildings appeared before City Council during budget hearings later that year to protest his company’s treatment in the bidding process, arguing that he felt “there had not been a fair opportunity to bid openly and competitively on the housing projects” (Daily Illini, April 16, 1969). A member of the Urban Renewal Citizens Advisory Commission Harry Spedes said the specifications were provided by the Federal Housing Authority, and the CAC’s recommendations for a developer were based on “what they believed would be the best plan for the area” (Daily Illini, April 16, 1969). Robert Pope, a conservative Council member on record as opposing Champaign’s Urban Renewal project, argued that critiques were unfounded, as all local construction companies would naturally benefit from urban renewal, “even those which will not receive any of the contracts, such as those owned by several of the city councilmen,” because “if certain companies are engaged in federal projects, fewer companies would be left to handle the normal business” (Daily Illini, April 2, 1971).

This reasoning, of local market contraction and competition effects, does not engage with the real structural violence issue here – that local prejudice against African Americans went so deep locally that it affected trade union membership, which directly affected skilled black laborers’ local earning capacity, and led to contracting preference to the direct benefit of white laborers and businesses at the expense of blacks. This is the precise definition of accumulation by dispossession, and is yet another example of the power that structurally embedded social bias
has to constrain life outcomes on multiple fronts simultaneously.

4.10 Tense race relations and housing debates in Champaign after Old Urban Renewal

The Council runoff in 1969 provides further insight into the local racial, housing and political tensions that made up the structural violence of Old Urban Renewal in Champaign. For the first time in Champaign history, two black candidates vied for a City Council seat: James Ransom, a “black unity candidate,” and Joe Somers, a “veteran North End politician” and a 20-year justice of the peace. The Daily Illini reported on February 7, 1969 that Somers was being “encouraged to run by the city’s status quo group to split the black vote and prevent any black from sitting on the council.” Somer’s politics seem to support this assertion, calling for “strict enforcement of zoning and housing codes,” and unwavering support for local policing: “shoplifting has become such a problem locally that I favor an ordinance making this offense a city violation in order to permit a speedy disposition of these cases” (Daily Illini, February 7, 1969). Ransom on the other hand, thought “there should be more involvement by the blacks and poor whites in the policy making of city government” (Daily Illini, February 7, 1969). Somers lost the race to Ransom.

Local racial tensions escalated after an event at the Moose Lodge at 124 West White Street which began April 19, 1969 when a black musician, Maurice McKinley, was denied a drink in the club bar. McKinley had arrived before other members of the combo with which he was supposed to play to set his equipment up, and when he went to the bar to purchase a drink, he was refused. Dick Davis, a Concerned Citizens of Champaign (CCC) member, said that although food is cooked and served by black people on the third floor of the building, blacks are not served as guests at the bar on the lower level. Blacks were able to visit the club as members of organizations, but the charter limited membership only to Caucasians, and further required that a member be married to a Caucasian (Daily Illini, May 20, 1969). In early May 1969 a group appeared before City Council suggesting the city pass an ordinance prohibiting any city employee or official from belonging to any “racist organization such as the Moose Club” (Daily Illini, May 7, 1969). At the time, three members of Champaign City Council were Moose Club members, and a professor of Political Science at UIUC along with members of a local Citizens for Racial Justice group called for their resignations.
Ransom was shot and wounded with a 20-gauge shotgun through a window three months after his election (Daily Illini, May 13, 1969), and a few weeks later Ransom withdrew his resolution condemning organizations that restrict membership on the basis of race “because it wasn’t strong enough to have any effect,” and then further stated he was “not planning to draft a stronger resolution.” At the time, Mayor Virgil Wikoff, Councilmen Seely Johnston and M. G. Snyder were members of the Moose, and Wikoff argued that he joined Moose 15 years prior, and his membership had not affected any of his decisions. The Council simultaneously approved the sale of a 5-acre tract in the urban renewal area to the HACC for the construction of 60 units of public housing (Daily Illini, May 21, 1969), against the explicit and widely vocalized wishes of community residents.

Another instance of community racial tensions focused on the Champaign-Urbana chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). This organization tried to stop all construction campus wide because of discrimination in contractor hiring policies. Ernest Westfield, president of the local NAACP said they would try to initiate court action to stop construction because of discrimination in construction companies and unions in the area. Westfield said there were other racist organizations the NAACP planned to attack locally, but the Moose Club forced the NAACP to act because of the incident with Morris McKinley (Daily Illini, May 20, 1969).

John Lee Johnson, then-chairman of the CCC, supported these efforts, arguing that the size of the 3,000-member roster of the Moose Club meant that there were at least 3,000 racists in this town at the time. The CCC also recommended the formation of a student union for black Special Education Opportunities Program (SEOP) students and other black University students to protect their interests in relation to individuals, agencies or the whole University as necessary. A program to improve academic counseling for SEOP students was also suggested. Johnson said he talked to students who said they had trouble getting counseling appointments making schedule changes or learning University procedures. Johnson said these problems should be resolved for the benefit of incoming new students, many of whom resided in Northeast Champaign. Another agenda item asked that CCC meet or correspond with John Burrell, director at the time of the newly-completed Krannert Center for the Performing Arts, as to the role blacks could play in the utilization of the facility, just finished in 1969. The committee
noted that no black events or artists had been scheduled to perform in the Center (Daily Illini, April 30, 1969).

These events indicate a changing racial climate with more widespread and organized community advocates, but one still very much mired in discrimination and community resistance to real racial integration. This community resistance, as Council member Ransom discovered, was still strong enough to provoke violence. Public housing, urban renewal, and university policy all dovetailed in Champaign to create community tensions around the issue of race in employment, housing, and access to community amenities.

By May 7, 1969, 106 out of 135 total families targeted for Phase I of Old Urban Renewal in Champaign had been relocated, and “when the project first started only four realtors cooperated with the relocation office. This compares with over 113 realtors and agencies listed in the Champaign-Urbana area” (Daily Illini, May 7, 1969). Debate in Champaign persisted over the role and placement of public housing relative to urban renewal areas in the North End. In September 1971, over 200 citizens from Champaign’s North End attended a Champaign City Council meeting in a protest against a proposed urban renewal public housing project. “The north side of Champaign, declared a spokesman, is already over saturated with public housing. As a result of increased density, he continued, crime rates will increase, traffic will become unmanageable, sanitation problems will become worse and property value will decline greatly” (Daily Illini, September 22, 1971).

Affordable housing tensions in the community continued into the 1970s, and in late 1973 Champaign County Housing Authority executive director Edwin Finney explained his position on locating public housing units: “There’s no neighborhood that can stand 50 or 60 low income families. A neighborhood will help one or two deprived families in an area, but if more move in, the neighborhood will move out” (Daily Illini, December 14, 1973). Public pressure against concentrated public housing was so intense, that when the City of Champaign and the housing authority tried to build two projects, one directly west of the urban renewal site on North Harris Street near Spalding Park as it crosses Bradley Avenue just east of Prospect Avenue, and one on North Fourth Street in the middle of the urban renewal project area west of Douglass Park and south of Bradley Avenue, they abandoned both projects. Local neighborhood protests centered on the belief that “public housing would bring higher crime and juvenile delinquency rates to the area.” Jim Williams, director of the Champaign Department of Environmental Development in
1973, described the protests as basically racist: “the residents were concerned about black minority people in the area” (Daily Illini, December 14, 1973). Two of the most vocal leaders of that protest were Jim Cross, a Champaign fireman, and his wife Linda, who lived a block away from the proposed North Harris Street site. The Crosses raised a zoning petition later passed by the Champaign City Council to prohibit additional public housing projects north of University Avenue. They contended that the city dumps the public housing projects north of University Avenue “because other areas of Champaign have the prestige or influence to stop such projects” (Daily Illini, December 14, 1973).

As national public housing debates began moving away from supporting the dense concentration of low-income housing in communities, so did Champaign’s siting practices. Champaign City Council member John Lee Johnson, a longtime local black activist and advocate, made a clear distinction between the housing he sees as best for Champaign and the scattered housing which he says places the poor throughout a city, saying: “if area A has a problem to correct you don’t correct the problem by moving everyone to Area C.” Champaign’s Better Housing Commission chairman Henry Spies further argued that Champaign did precisely that during its relocation of 270 families as part of the Old Urban Renewal program, with observed negative results:

There were…problems with that scattered project: for those without cars, the breakup of congregations, a stabilizing force in a community, and a loss of some political power when persons with similar interests are separated…These people need some political clout, and they need the stabilizing influence of the churches (Daily Illini, February 2, 1974).

Federal housing trends continued to affect the supply choices involved in public housing provision locally, as Spies reported in 1974, saying after a conversation with a Houston-based HUD representative inquiring about grant funding for new construction of public housing being cut off: “I really think the present administration leans toward rent subsidies rather than the conventional form of public housing.” This contraction of supply began in Champaign as “3,000 – 4,000 persons [remained] in need of better housing. That tells you that there are not enough sites to meet the needs,” according to John Lee Johnson (Daily Illini, February 2, 1974).

Old Urban Renewal in Champaign was fraught with racist institutional and community tensions, and unequal power dynamics between community and resident advocacy groups and elected officials on City Council and the Mayor of Champaign. Rationales and justifications
based on race about inherent ability and devaluation of citizen’s needs and realistic alternative opportunities and options were frequent during this period in CU’s history. It is very clear that despite widespread mobilized and often vocal protest by African American residents and their local allies of the potential ramifications and unequal treatment of different options considered, the City staff and elected officials responsible for Old Urban Renewal in Champaign had their own opinions and agendas, and simply disregarded the voiced preferences of an entire group of its citizens.
5.1 Introduction

Because of the reliance on historical sources, primarily archival news records, evaluating the constrained decision-making space of local elites and government officials in the first round of Old Urban Renewal in Champaign, IL is difficult. Assertions and assumptions based on verbiage in news articles’ selected quotations bias both interpretation and analysis, and the temporal distance makes it hard to rely on first-person narratives as another source from which to evaluate credibility and accuracy of reporting. There are missing pieces of key information in understanding the speculative real estate market at the time and its keys players, which limits a thorough analysis of the Champaign’s constrained fiscal policy space during Old Urban Renewal. In the creation and evolution of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan, which has occurred more recently, there is much more, and more recent, information to investigate about causality, motivations, and the planning rhetoric surrounding the neighborhood redevelopment decisions. The ‘plausible’ fiscal policy space of the City of Champaign, while still incredibly complex, is more easily understood and accessible in this modern planning process.

I posit that the power and politics operating in the decision-making spaces in the City of Champaign in regards to its most recent neighborhood redevelopment plan constitute a ‘paradigmatic case study’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006), which highlights the more general characteristics of the local community in question. Case studies provide lenses through which to tell stories, and storytelling, as alluded to in the introductory chapter, is inherently central to and constitutive of planning practice. Narratives operate as filters for understanding, reflect power dynamics at play, help identify dominant cultural norms, and can guide us as planners to be ever self-reflective (Sandercock, 2003). Many researchers have noted that narrative is an ancient method and perhaps our most fundamental form for making sense of experience (Mattingly, 1991; Novak, 1975; see also Abbott, 1992; Arendt, 1958; Bal, 1997; Carr, 1986; Fehn, Hoestery, & Tatar, 1992; Rasmussen, 1995; Ricoeur, 1984).

According to Adler (2005), research must begin with what it is that social agents, as opposed to analysts, believe to be real. The dialectical constitution of knowledge and reality begs for a process-centered approach like the one I have used in interpreting interview results as part
of the case study contained here. Through interpretation, subjective meanings become objectified as part of a larger intersubjective context – objectifying meanings, and upscaling relevancy, involves asking not only what something means for a specific individual, but relating its meaning within a larger hermeneutic circle of interpretation by relation of individual parts to the whole, and then again relating the whole reciprocally back to understand the structure’s effects on the individual. This is part of the narrative contained in the succeeding two chapters, in which I have traced the historical evolution of both subjective and intersubjective meanings of housing segregation, code enforcement and policing practices, and social bias in the North End of Champaign-Urbana to explain how the constrained fiscal and racial contexts for the Bristol Place component of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan evolved. Historical methodologies involve identifying the historical processes that create specific social contexts, and as all social realities are the result of political and social processes rooted in history, tracing them requires narrative explication. As Pouliot (2007) explains in relation to constructivist social science research:

…explanatory narratives order variegated meanings and practices in time around a number of “plots” or causal stories. Like counterfactual analysis, causal narratives reason backwards in order to understand why the branching tree of history has taken one direction instead of others (ref. Lebow, 2000). Inside the constructivist style of reasoning, thus, historical analysis and interpretation go hand in hand.

This construction of simultaneous subjective and objective knowledge makes better sense of complex socio-historical realities, and lends itself well to explicating in particular FPS elements (3) - (5).

It also follows that power must play a crucial role in the construction of social realities. Power, in short, means not only the resources required to impose one’s view on others, but also the authority to determine the shared meanings that constitute the identities, interests and practices of states, as well as the conditions that confer, defer or deny access to ‘goods’ and benefits. Because social reality is a matter of imposing meanings and functions on physical objects that do not already have those meanings and functions, the ability to create the underlying rules of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable play, and to be able to get other actors to commit themselves to those rules because they are now part of their self-understandings is perhaps the most subtle and most effective form of power (Adler & Barnett, 1996). This means that there is a very strong relationship between knowledge and power; knowledge is rarely value-neutral but frequently enters into the creation and reproduction of a
particular social order that benefits some at the expense of others.

Traditional public policy domains (education, policing, sanitation, transit, etc.) now contain a more diverse body of players (“ed and med” institutions, organizations from the philanthropic sector, nonprofit intermediaries, and business organizations, among others), and the public policy domain has expanded to now also include economic development (ED) as an over-riding priority for cities. Directly a result of federal retreat from social support and funding for neighborhoods in distress, the new diverse players who control resources are increasingly empowered and have emerged as key participants and new investors in place-based investments. Economic imperatives in the post-industrial United States are less distinct from social policy imperatives, and economic development is no longer seen as a discrete and privileged policy domain – policing, education, employment and others are now factors in ED initiatives, but ED remains the central priority in most cases.

As a result, there are more varied and complex assortments of policy tools available to local governments, ranging from comprehensive community initiatives through transit-oriented development, community benefits agreements, and mixed-income redevelopment projects. As cities have become more entrepreneurial, governance arrangements begin more and more to see neighborhoods as investment sites and as economic units - e.g. Business Improvement Districts, TIF-eligible areas, etc. This new era of post-industrial politics with greater actor fragmentation requires much higher levels of coordination and strategic activism among disadvantaged neighborhoods to organize against such pressures. One of the primary results of increased economic development imperatives in the face of increasing federal retreat from financial support for social programming is that the use-value – exchange-value dichotomy involved in property disputes increasingly results in exchange values being privileged over use-values. This means that materially, neighborhoods with more capacity and market potential are best situated to take advantages of institutional representation. As a result, the survival of urban neighborhoods may not rest entirely on the willingness of residents to participate, but on what options the state has put forth to begin with (seen in its constrained FPS), and what groups are funded to propose and make changes to the status quo.

Austerity politics combine with structural inequality (distressed neighborhoods systematically disadvantaged in attempts to participate in local politics) to produce contemporary structural violence. The Housing and Land Use Goal of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan and
its politics and partners, beneficiaries and benefactors, provide insight into the structural decisions that make governments decide who among its citizenry to advocate for and how far that advocacy extends. In the words of Ta-Nehisi Coates, I put “elegant racism” at the center of this understanding.

This chapter provides historical insight into Champaign’s governance and then traces the evolution of the BPNP through information gathered from institutional interviewees and city documents. I begin with an overview of Champaign’s council manager form of government, continue with a brief community development services history, and then begin tracing narratives about how the Bristol Place redevelopment plan came to exist in its current form, detailing some of the controversies around its primary contained components.

5.2 Council-Manager Governance: “Champaign is a well-oiled machine”

The history and management style of the City of Champaign should be understood through the lens of the dynamics involved in the decision-making space dictating City actions and previous neighborhood interventions. The official leadership of the City, the form of government dictates the dynamics that take place between executive leadership and institutional leadership. Evaluating FPS element (5), the “political culture” of the city, helps provides this lens, in order to interpret and evaluate governance in the City of Champaign.

Much is contested in mayoral forms of government. The council-manager form contains different dynamics, and is often much more cooperative and routinely used in suburban communities with more money. As structural dynamics influence political relationships, the nature of the relationships directly affects how places perform. The City of Champaign is organized around the council-manager form of government (as opposed to mayor-council or commission forms), with an elected 9-member City Council, composed of the Mayor and both three “at large” and five “district” officials. The Council members each serve four-year terms, and the city manager and the ten department heads who serve under her supervision direct the executive and administrative functions of the City (see organizational matrix in Appendix D.1). The city manager form of government began in an era when progressives were trying to bring principles of good business to government by asking, “why aren’t we hiring a CEO to run our City like I would to run my company?” Many early city managers across the country came from hard technical business backgrounds like engineering and finance, according to current City
Manager Dorothy David. Essentially the model is most similar to a corporate management model: an elected City Council hires a business professional to run the day-to-day operations of the city.

Some argue that this is less democratic. The City Council hires and fires one person, but all other personnel hiring and firing is the city manager’s responsibility. The city manager’s power is limited by city code and city ordinances, among other things. Elected officials have no influence over the hiring or firing of other City staff such as department heads. This encourages service provision and organizational stability across political tenures, as staff does not turnover according to election cycles. As Ms. David puts it, “thus the person actually running the city is not elected to be responsive to the people - the position is outside of electoral politics.” The current City Manager Dorothy David argues that this form of government is actually more democratic, because a local citizen does not have to quit their job to run for office and represent the community. Having a full time professional CEO allows anyone to serve on the policy-making body of the City (the City Council), rather than limiting the candidate pool to only professional politicians or people who have the financial resources to serve in a full time City government role. According to Ms. David, Champaign’s City Council sets all of the laws and policies of the City and remains responsive and accountable to the citizens, and the City Manager serves at their will and is required to implement the direction that they set.

In many ways, this arrangement seems optimal, as running a city requires specific professional expertise, and due to its position as a public service provider funded by tax-paying local residents, it also requires significant accountability to taxpayer expenditures. In Champaign, the City Manager is the CEO of a $100 million corporation. As current City Manager Dorothy David puts it:

We really are a conglomerate of many different companies that provide services to the public – there are all kinds of services that I am running that have no relationship to one another. What it takes to run a fire department is radically different than what it takes to run snow removal. There are very technical pieces, law and policy, and other things you need to know to run a City well. So, elected officials don’t necessarily have the knowledge or expertise to run the day-to-day services of City government. They are experts in what the community/citizens need and want and they provide that direction to a professional staff who are trained to deliver the services.

Ms. David has built a whole career, education and set of skills and experience in this field, and argues that in the council manager form of government, citizens don’t have to quit their jobs in
order to choose to serve and run for office. The Champaign mayor at the time of our interview still had a full time job at the University of Illinois – he came in and provided leadership along with 8 other elected officials. Ms. David continued, with a clearly stated caveat about being admittedly biased as the current City Manager: “To me, this form of government affords every citizen a fair opportunity to run for office and be elected to serve. Our 9 elected officials all serve equally.”

The mayor in Champaign thus does not have total ownership because he or she is just one of nine votes, but as other Council members I interviewed shared, the Champaign Mayor does have a great deal of influence nonetheless; he/she convenes all meetings, decides what order people get to speak, how long, and in what order. There is a lot of power in facilitating the public dialogue, of being the facilitator and convener of the other eight participants. The mayor also has more of a time commitment than other Council members, being the primary “face” of the community, and more often people want him/her present at more meetings than other Council members.

In contrast, Mayor Laurel Prussing in bordering twin city Urbana would argue differently, because Urbana has a strong mayor as their CEO in a mayor-council form of government. They also have partisan ballots in Urbana – according to current City Council members interviewed, Champaign is non-partisan on the ballot, which one longtime Urbana city staff member (who started working for the City of Urbana in 1995) says in this local community is synonymous with being “more Republican.” In Urbana the staff facilitate the political actors, and project (and sometimes staff) turnover often follows election cycles. The same Urbana staff member argued the opposite of Ms. David’s position on the council-manager form being more democratic, saying that in the strong mayoral form in Urbana, “there is much more participatory governance due to the mayoral electoral accountability – in Urbana, the mayor runs the show, and in Champaign, the staff run the show, and mayors are only a ceremonial position. Champaign’s City Council relies on Champaign staff in decision-making.” This arguably affords Urbana citizens more direct input into local governance processes via electoral veto power at regular temporal intervals.

Champaign has had a council-manager form of government for a long time, and its Council members have also historically served very long successive terms. Current City Manager Dorothy David’s predecessor Steve Carter was in office for 28 years. The term lengths
of Champaign’s City Council members vary, but some leadership legacies persist back two to
three decades as well. Current Council member Michael LaDue has been on Champaign City
Council the longest – 28 years. Two other Council members interviewed as part of this research
served for seven years and 20 years, respectively. A map of the Council Districts can be found in
Appendix D.2.

Politics do change over such long tenures, and according to one Council member, “if you
make someone mad along the way, five council members could get together and they could fire
you.” Ms. David and the City Council members interviewed here agreed that Champaign’s
governance and management philosophy has been that staff “doesn’t want to get in the vote
counting business.” Champaign staff members need to make sure they have a minimum of five
votes to support any proposal, but Ms. David does not go to the table trying to count five, she
says she goes to the table trying to count nine – she and the staff under her actively try to craft
policy recommendations so the Champaign City Council can reach consensus. As she puts it,
“you want to be responsive to the input of all Council members because that is your best
assurance that you are being responsive to the public.”

Critics from Urbana say that in Champaign, the staff run the show, the mayors are a
ceremonial position, and City Council relies on their staff in all of its decision-making. But as
one Champaign City Council member with a 20-year tenure put it:

As a city councilmember, I am concerned about city policy and help set city policy, but it
is not my full time job. I trust judgment calls made by staff and department heads. The
nitty gritty of how deals get hammered out – I don’t understand all of that. I don’t think I
need to - I have a great deal of faith in our city manager, the department heads, planning,
finance, neighborhood services, etc. Champaign has a strong city manager who we have a
great deal of faith in, she in turn hires qualified department heads and we trust them.

And as another City Council member interviewed said admiringly of the organizational
partnerships that have evolved in Champaign, “Champaign is a well-oiled machine – the
City Council sets priorities and goals and the staff carries them out.”

Both forms of government have advantages and disadvantages, but almost anyone
who is from the CU area will explain that Champaign has historically been more fiscally
and politically conservative, while Urbana has been more progressive and claimed better
democratic participation and service responsiveness to its residents.

Similar to other communities across the U.S., community tensions and debates around the intersection of race and affordable housing persisted through the political eras of the 1970s and 1980s in CU, the detailed elucidation of which are beyond the scope of this paper. According to the current city manager, who arrived in Champaign in 1994 as the Neighborhood Services Director, became Assistant City Manager in 2007 and then City Manager in 2013, the City of Champaign’s philosophy about funding distribution across city neighborhoods began to shift in the early 1990s. CDBG funding, which replaced federal-level neighborhood revitalization Urban Renewal funds after 1972, was limited to only low-income areas of Champaign. There was a sense among local staff and city officials that the City had been receiving and pouring federal funding into the same low-income places, and yet 15 years into the steady stream of federal funding, the same areas were still all designated ‘low-income’ according to federal HUD guidelines. City council members began asking: “are we making a difference?” Particularly council members from those districts that were not eligible for CDBG funds based on income guidelines began to question in the early 1990s why resources were not being spent to address neighborhood needs in their districts.

The concept of ‘neighborhood wellness’ originated in the late 1980s as part of a citywide planning effort to promote healthy and stable neighborhoods. Prior to this planning effort, the City had concentrated its housing rehabilitation programs, intensive code enforcement, and Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)-funded capital improvements almost exclusively in the northeast section of the City, the location of the Old Urban Renewal process described in Chapter 4. By the mid-1980s, grants that had been available for these costly urban renewal clearance projects were no longer available, so in 1985, the City Council moved to expand community development activities citywide (NWVR, 2006-2010).

This concern about how to address neighborhood needs outside of low-income census areas gave rise to the City of Champaign’s Neighborhood Wellness Plan (NWP), which was a citywide approach to identifying neighborhood needs and strategies. It was ground breaking for its time and led to the creation of the Neighborhood Services Department (NSD) in local city government in 1992. According to City officials interviewed, there was internal debate in the early 1990s about whether the implementation of the NWP should belong as a division to the Planning Department, or whether the City needed a new and separate organizational unit.
dedicated to this new approach to City service provision. The Planning Department put together a Neighborhood Analysis Report in 1991 that measured wellness indicators on a scale of standards for the defined planning areas. The Wellness Plan assesses the physical and social conditions of each of the City’s neighborhoods. Data is collected and analyzed in the following areas: housing conditions, real estate market trends, property maintenance, population and demographic characteristics, civic involvement, household economic conditions, infrastructure, and public safety (AAP, FY10-11). In 1992 in conjunction with the creation of the Neighborhood Services department, the City Council adopted the Neighborhood Wellness Action Plan, identifying strategies targeted at the needs of specific neighborhoods (NWVR, 2006-2010).

Wellness indicators were measured by neighborhood through the Neighborhood Classification System. This system places each planning area in one of four categories: Healthy, Conservation, Preservation, and Restoration. Each classification represents a stage in the neighborhood change process and reflects the type and intensity of physical problems and the extent to which residents possess the means to improve neighborhood conditions. Detailed definitions of the classification categories can be found in Appendix D.3, and a comparison between planning classifications by neighborhood in the City of Champaign between 1990, 2006 and 2008 can be found in Appendix D.4.

According to one top-tier management city official, restoration and preservation areas in Neighborhood Wellness are those with higher evidence of neighborhood problems and generally poorer property conditions. One City staff member I spoke with critiqued the NWP initiative, saying that its primary weakness was that it was not set up to measure progress towards stated goals moving forward. There was a huge effort in data collection and analysis in the mid to late 1990s, and then again in 2005-2006 when the City hired an intern, who along with a planner from the Planning Department, was assigned to do an update/refresh of plan involving primarily data collection and re-classification of neighborhoods. But those efforts are currently not ongoing – it is nobody’s job to be measuring things on a routine basis.

A city planner critiqued the NW indicators themselves, saying that NW indicators guided Champaign’s planning into the 2000s, but in the last 6-7 years they have not been a deciding factor because they “are not great holistically.” He gave the example of sidewalk evaluation to illustrate. One of the NW indicators measured the condition of sidewalks (cracked, broken, disconnected), but ‘no sidewalks’ is not included in the rating system. This means that
neighborhoods without sidewalks are indistinguishable from neighborhoods with disconnected sidewalks, according to the NW indicators, and thus does not provide an entirely accurate picture of neighborhood quality. He also critiqued the reliance on evaluating property value in an area in determining whether a neighborhood is “healthy,” saying that rising home values often means an area is wealthy, but “does not necessarily provide information about localized city infrastructure quality or other relevant planning issues.”

5.4 The Bristol Place Neighborhood Plan: Overview & Context

The precise date of the creation of the Bristol Place Neighborhood Plan varies based on which sources are consulted. When asked the question, “When did the Bristol Place Neighborhood Planning process begin?” my interviewees gave vastly different time frames – some said the planning process began in 2008, 3 years before the Plan was released in 2011, and some said it has been in the works for decades, since the early 1990s. I have bounded this particular case study around the largest neighborhood timeframe discussed by interviewees: from 1990 – 2015. While the majority of the actual planning process likely occurred in the last seven years (2007 – 2014), it is important to understand the peculiar stagnation in the local community culture and as a result in its governance over the course of the 1990s and into the early 2000s, as well as very recent more progressive shifts in the last 2-3 years.

The official Champaign City Council Goal regarding the Bristol Place neighborhood was created in 2007 under the City Council Vision + Goals statement for 2007-2012: “Develop a Redevelopment Plan for the Bristol Place Neighborhood.” The first round of official public participation input process occurred between 2009 and 2010, during which a Neighborhood Services Advisory Board was created and four meetings were held, six resident input neighborhood meetings were held, one neighborhood survey was distributed, and ‘neighborhood stakeholder interview sessions’ occurred. This first official part of the planning process culminated in February 15, 2011 when the City Council adopted the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan\textsuperscript{14} as an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan, calling for targeted reinvestment in the form of infill development and rehabilitation of deteriorating properties.

\textsuperscript{14} Terminology note: The original neighborhood plan was named “Bristol Park,” and encompassed three different neighborhoods into a single planning area, of which the sub-area “Bristol Place,” the primary focus of this narrative, is only one. The larger community plan is therefore still for “Bristol Park” in its entirety, which includes the three neighborhoods of Shadow Wood, Garwood, and Bristol Place. See plan area maps in Appendix D.13 for distinction.
Specifically, Goal #3 of the 2011 BPNP “Housing and Land Use” involved short-term objectives of “promoting well-maintained properties in the neighborhood and providing the best land use mix for the neighborhood as shown on the Future Land Use Map (see Appendix D.5),” a medium-term objective of promoting a balanced mix of home ownership and rental units,” and a long-term objective of “redeveloping underutilized properties (vacant or blighting)” (2011 BPNP). The implementation strategies listed involved creating a targeted rental inspection program, among others.

In early 2012 however, the city shifted to a policy of forced residential displacement, demolition and redevelopment. City staff I interviewed claimed the shift, from Preservation (targeted reinvestment and rehabilitation) according to the 2008 NWP update (see Appendix D.4), to total Restoration status requiring demolition and redevelopment, came from a process of combined internal investigating and community outreach. The results of the internal investigating that occurred, NSD Director Kevin Jackson said concluded:

…the likelihood the City could turn the entire neighborhood around with spot infill development over time was not likely – if the City wanted to turn the area around, the best way to do it was the clear it…Technical experts looked at the economics of the issue, that the tenure of neighborhood was 70+% investor-owned and low property values and extreme safety issues (violent crime concentration), and also had to take into account that the City and NSD has other neighborhoods to serve as well. NSD and the City wanted to invest in areas that will actually be successful expenditures. Infill would be a sunk cost. Folks are living in bad conditions. It is unlikely that we could rely on code enforcement to get investors to rehab the houses. Experience bears out that that approach could take 20 years to fully resolve current issues, which was an untenable solution, given that folks are living in bad conditions.

And as another Planning Department employee put it:

Previous city intervention involved a whole lot of carrot in the way of funding for home improvement programs. We could have tried to direct more local money towards reinvestment, but it was recognized that only so much could be put in – City asked, ‘what is the threshold for value returned?’ Burdensomely high improvement was determined to be needed in the Bristol Place area.

A city planner further explained in my interview with him that crime was not the number one reason for moving forward with the Housing and Land Use approach of the BPNP, the condition of the existing infrastructure and housing stock was. Both Planning and the Neighborhood Services departments evaluated the condition of the housing stock and whether it could be fixed, and “often found liens on properties for lack of payment.” The results of
windshield surveys done by NSD, combined with Robbie Boyer & Marissa Dolin’s existing conditions report included in the 2011 BPNP pointed to the fact that the integrity of the existing physical structures and property values had both dropped dramatically, and as one Planning staff member characterized them, the NSD’s housing reinvestment programs were just “$15-20k band-aid fixes.” One feature phrase of many City employees when discussing why the nature of BPNP solution changed involved “the existing planning tools in the toolbox failing to address neighborhood problems adequately.” These planning tools referred to were primarily programs targeted at owner-occupied properties however, the implications of which I discuss in more detail in section 5.6 below.

Current NSD Director Kevin Jackson said that the “broad objectives and goals [of the BPNP] were human development and public safety” from the very beginning, and that that has not changed. The NSD claims that the BPNP is “still a redevelopment plan and not a clearance plan, it is still a plan for affordable housing.” He stated that the City is in the business of facilitating the development of affordable housing – the BPNP needed to be an affordable housing project because of housing needs identified in the larger community. Kevin shared that he thought it would be unlikely that a private developer would choose to redevelop the area as an affordable housing project of their own volition.

The plan since this policy shift in early 2012 has generated much community controversy. In detailing the timeline of events leading to its current implementation stage, I use news articles, city documents and my own interviews with resident, neighborhood and institutional stakeholders.

5.5 Initial Bristol Place Neighborhood Plan Approval: February 2011

Since 1985, the Champaign City Council every two years has adopted a City Council Vision and a set of Goals, each of which has corresponding actions assigned, that provide direction in allocating City fiscal and staff resources in the best interests of the citizens of Champaign (CB 2007-303). The process includes a variety of public input methods, including workshops for board and commission members, and feedback from City staff on current goal and project status. The Vision statement in 2007 at the time of the initial Council goal for Bristol Place the was:

Champaign is a vibrant Midwestern City with an active center city and healthy neighborhoods. The City is designed for quality and sustainability, and has a growing local
economy. City residents are safe, enjoy a great quality of life, 1st class educational opportunities, and easy mobility. Champaign is an inclusive community that welcomes all.

The first mention in publicly available documentation about a plan for the Bristol Place neighborhood, as mentioned above, is from the Resolution Adopting City Council Vision and Goals for FY 2007-2012 (CB 2007-303). Goal #3 was “Our Community Has Healthy Neighborhoods,” and included things like a comprehensive housing strategy and developing a funding and staffing plan for ongoing implementation of multi-family common area inspections along with developing a redevelopment plan for the Bristol Place neighborhood. Goal #5 in this same document was “Our Community Has Balanced and Sustainable Growth,” and listed the following three components as strategic directions to meet this goal:

1. Develop a fiscal impact analysis of new development and adopt a development cost recovery policy.
2. Develop land use and development policies to positively impact the environment and promote long-term sustainability.
3. Implement programs and strategies to increase commercial and residential infill development.

On December 12, 2008, Council was provided an Information Only memorandum that contained an existing conditions report of the Bristol Place neighborhood prepared by Robert Boyer & Marissa Dolin, graduate students in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Illinois. This report detailed existing land use and zoning, population characteristics, property conditions, public infrastructure quality, transit access, public safety concerns, and existing City programming offered in the area.

The Neighborhood Services Advisory Board (NSAB) met on January 22, 2009, before the City embarked on a series of public participation input sessions addressing issues in the Bristol Place neighborhood. The NSAB consists of seven members appointed by the Mayor and approved by City Council to assist in the articulation of citizen concerns and direction for the expenditure of Community Development Block Grant funds, as well as other local, state and federal funds available to the City for improving housing opportunities for low- and moderate-income people. There is no record publicly available online of the notes from any of these sessions. On February 10, 2009 an “Open House” event was held at the Apostolic Faith Church to share the results of the Boyer & Dolin Existing Conditions report conducted during 2008, and gather information from residents about the neighborhood and what changes they would like to
see addressed. 470 invitation flyers were distributed door to door, and only 15 people participated in the open house event.

In the spring of 2009, 40 surveys were completed by residents and collected by staff, asking 10 questions on safety issues and asking residents to describe what they liked and what they would like to see change about the Bristol Place neighborhood. Two public meetings were held in April 2009 to share survey results and gather ideas for the plan vision, goals and objectives. Staff met individually with neighborhood business owners, local for-profit and non-profit developers, property owners, Unit 4 School District Staff, Champaign Park District Staff, and the Housing Authority of Champaign County throughout the summer of 2009. The purpose of the meetings was to seek stakeholder input into the plan and to gather their ideas on improvements in the neighborhood (BPNP, 2011).

In early December 2009 a joint NSAB and neighborhood meeting was held at Human Kinetics (a publishing business located in the neighborhood) to share issues gathered and discussed from both residents and other stakeholders. February 11 and March 11, 2010 were the dates of the next two NSAB meetings, and on April 26, 2010 another joint NSAB and neighborhood meeting was again held at Human Kinetics, to share and discuss the draft BPNP. Most discussion that followed focused on public safety and housing issues, which were summarized in the following way for a City Council Study Session dated September 24, 2010:

In particular, regarding public safety, some residents expressed interest in a greater police presence with an emphasis on proactive community-oriented policing and interaction with the residents when the area is patrolled. However, other residents were uncomfortable or not interested with the suggested solution. Another concern, regarding housing by residents included finding effective ways to hold landlords accountable for the maintenance and appearance of their properties as well as unlawful tenant behavior (SS 2010-059).

On June 7, 2010 the City held a social event that 75 adults and children attended in Bristol Park (the city park located in the Bristol Place neighborhood that the plan was named after) to further discuss draft objectives and outcomes. On May 19, 2010 the Plan Commission was presented with a memo introducing the draft goals and objectives of the redevelopment plan, given “input gathered from neighborhood stakeholders comprised of the residents, business owners, school and park districts, local developers, and City Staff” outlining the “desired changes to this neighborhood” (09/17/2010 Report to Plan Commission). The plan was originally designed to “be a holistic plan that addresses physical issues, such as vacant lots and declining
housing stock as well as social issues, such as the need for more activities for children in the neighborhood,” according to the 9/17/2010 Report. The plan contained five areas to be addressed: housing and land use, human development, parks and open space, public safety, and transportation.

The plan was shared at two final Plan Commission meetings on September 15 and December 1, 2010, with the NSAB on December 9, 2010, and then at City Council Study Sessions on September 28 and December 14, 2010 before the City Council adopted the February 11, 2011 BPNP as an official amendment to the City’s Comprehensive Plan (SS 2010-072). In the Report to the Plan Commission from the Planning Director dated September 17, 2010, the Housing and Land Use Goal for the neighborhood lists three example implementation measures:

1. Targeted rental inspection
2. Applying for designation as a Neighborhood Revitalization Strategy Area from HUD
3. Programs to encourage home ownership in the area

None of these or any other proposed implementation strategies listed under the other four goals for the neighborhood involved the use of eminent domain, residential displacement, demolition or reconstruction of existing homes or other neighborhood structures. All recommendations listed, responsive to previously gathered public input, were infill facilitation and community programming suggestions.

5.6 Changes made in early 2012: Bristol Place residents to be displaced, homes demolished

On February 15, 2011 the City Council adopted the BPNP as an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan (CB 2011-028). The roughly 1-year time period between February 2011 and January 2012 marks the timeframe during which the City shifted its focus and plans for the Bristol Place neighborhood. The official documentation of this shift and its rationale is at best unclear, and at worst, deliberately opaque. Table 1 in Appendix A lists the public and community input meetings for the BPNP contained in the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 AAPs whose meeting minutes and public comments I evaluated and asked interviewees about to try and determine how this displacement and clearance decision came about.

The members in attendance at the first meeting listed ended up turning into the Bristol Park Steering Committee, which coordinated and led all community input throughout the rest of the planning process as strategies for achieving the housing and land use goal were “debated.”
The November 16, 2011 focus group discussion for the BPNP, other than City Council and Staff, was attended by Champaign resident and local entrepreneur Seon Williams, Reverend and Mother Giboney (Apostolic Faith Church leaders), Reverend Eugene Barnes (Metanoia Centers – faith-based housing and mini social services organization started in 2001), Edward “Zig” Isaac (Shadow Wood Property Manager) and Dr. William Patterson (founder and co-director of Youth Media Workshop, creator of Hip Hop Xpress, and educational policy professor at UIUC) as well as two members of Human Kinetics staff.

5.6.1. Metanoia, Reverend Barnes, and historical City actions in Bristol Place neighborhood:

Reverend Eugene Barnes, pastor of New Life Church of Faith in Urbana, started Metanoia Centers on Clock Street in the Bristol Place neighborhood in 2001 with Reverend Charles B. Jackson, a fellow community organizer and former pastor of Bethel AME Church. It has functioned as a community center, hosting at one time an after-school program and now a technology center for neighbors. But Metanoia's primary mission is housing: building homes, persuading banks to invest in poor neighborhoods, and helping homeowners avoid foreclosure. The organization is allied with the Central Illinois Organizing Project in Bloomington, which has been instrumental in persuading large banking interests such as National City, Bank One and Union Planters to begin reinvesting in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods under the provisions of the federal Community Reinvestment Act. Metanoia created a “1 percent, $500 down” mortgage lending program with National City in the early 2000s, a breakthrough in opening up home ownership to a previously ineligible class of citizens. Essentially, prospective buyers need only $500 or one percent of the purchase price from their own savings for a single-family home, including homes that need renovation. The remaining two percent down payment, if necessary, can come from other sources, such as a relative or a nonprofit or government agency. The loan incentive program was actually launched in July 2003 in Springfield, and in the first five days, National City did $10 million worth of business, but the bulk of the loans originated in the Springfield, Peoria and Bloomington areas (News Gazette, October 23, 2003).

Nationally, Metanoia helps empower communities in economic and social crises-high unemployment, drugs, violence and poor housing. From 2005-2008 in Champaign, Metanoia partnered with the mostly Latino population in the Shadow Wood Mobile Home park to try to bring the two communities together. A technology center, with donated computers from Human Kinetics
Kinetics, was set up in 2007 to provide Internet access and after-school help to Shadow Wood families (News Gazette, November 7, 2008). Barnes, who got his start in the civil rights movement, says partnerships among citizens, government, clergy, nonprofits and corporations are the key to improving neighborhood conditions in the Bristol Place area: “That’s what community organizing is all about” (News Gazette, December 7, 2008). Metanoia has conducted neighborhood walks at night, joined forces with the Apostolic Faith Church on Bellefontaine Street, and organized cleanup days. The City has had a poor track record on responsiveness to this neighborhood’s needs, which has contributed to much of the now-labeled ‘blight’ that currently exists. For a clean-up day in July 2002, Metanoia went to its own expense to rent a dumpster, even though the city provides them in other neighborhood clean-ups when there is a neighborhood group officially registered with the City. The City requires a registered neighborhood organization to apply for Neighborhood Coordination’s Small Grant program in order to shoulder the cost of a dumpster for a single weekend (City of Champaign’s Neighborhood Services Code Compliance Community Outreach and Education on Neighborhood Cleanups). Metanoia also lobbied city hall in 2003 to change the one-way streets that “act[ed] as a maze contribut[ing] to a sense of enclosure,” and delivered 96 signatures of people who wanted the one-way streets changed back to two-way, but the proposal was rejected. It took another 7 years before the City responded and returned all streets in the neighborhood back to two-ways in 2010. Metanoia staff at the time said they weren’t very happy with the lack of response they had received from the city (News Gazette, March 23, 2003). 

Despite disagreement, then-Neighborhood Services Director Dorothy David (now City Manager) said that Metanoia Centers “represent a tremendous positive” in the neighborhood. In 2003, the city provided three vacant lots to the center to build homes in the neighborhood, plus $84,040 in federal Community Development funds (HOME) for down payment assistance (CB 2002-193; CB 2002-194; CB 2004-016). In a city solicitation for residents to apply for home improvement grants in 2003, only two people from the Bristol Place neighborhood responded, and one “did not qualify” because the needs of the house exceeded the $25,000 spending limit (News Gazette, March 23, 2003). Currently, these three originally City-donated vacant lots (119 E. Roper, 202 E. Bellefontaine & 208 E. Bellefontaine) house three owner-occupants, although 202 Bellefontaine ended up being sold to Habitat for Humanity and currently houses a “working
towards ownership” owner-occupant (News Gazette, June 17, 2012).

Patricia Martin, a resident and former organizer of the center, said she found that people in the neighborhood didn’t respond to City efforts because they were mistrustful. Martin did much of Metanoia’s early legwork in establishing contact with neighbors, running after-school programs and acting as an intermediary between residents and social services. “I had to first convince them I wasn’t trying to get anything out of them,” she said in 2003. Besides the houses, success from 2001-2003 came in getting five women off the street and into drug treatment, in signing up 26 children for after-school programs and in getting 28 houses signed up for a beautification contest. “We're trying to get the kids to help with painting, picking up trash, fixing gates, mowing, planting flowers, little things that make a big difference,” she said (News Gazette, March 23, 2003).

In 2003, Barnes was quoted in the same News Gazette article as saying: “This is an area no one seemed to want to be involved in. There’s open drug dealing, prostitution, gambling, threatening behavior. You see the older residents come out in the morning, but by afternoon, everybody’s back in, and that’s where they stay. It’s tantamount to terrorism by default.” Reverend Barnes said seven years later in 2010 that 90% of the problems that have existed in the Bristol neighborhood (open-air drug sales and prostitution specifically) have been eliminated. He was quoted in a News Gazette article dated December 14, 2010 as saying, “we’ve been able to stabilize it from the way it used to be,” and with his own background as a community organizer hoped City officials would include all of the Bristol Park Redevelopment project’s stakeholders in decision-making, which he reported somewhat differently from the City’s stakeholder list mentioned above, as consisting of “community members, labor unions, environmental and faith-based groups and affordable housing advocates” (News Gazette, December 14, 2010). The City’s list, from the September 2010 Report to Plan Commission mentioned above, consisted of residents, business owners, school and park districts, local developers, and City staff members.

5.6.2. Community input disregarded as City moves ahead with its redevelopment plans

The first community input meeting to be held after the February 2011 approval of the BPNP was the November 11, 2011 focus group meeting listed above, and the focus of discussion, according to minutes contained in the 2012-2013 AAP, centered around the BPNP’s housing and land use goal. Reverend Barnes voiced concerns at the time about possible pushback
on relocation and total clearance, urged a ground-up rather than a top-down approach to community revitalization, and wanted to put protections in place to eliminate the prospect of real estate speculators in the area.

On December 20, 2011 the first Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee took place, with a stated goal of “providing advisory and community liaison support to City Staff to support implementation of the February 2011 BPNP” (12/20/2011 Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee Meeting Notes; quoted from AAP, FY12-13). There were no attendees to the January 11, 2012 Shadow Wood resident meeting, and the next publicly available meeting document dated January 17, 2012 already references acquisition and relocation as Greg Skaggs’ response to an audience members’ question about her residency in Bristol: “Woman in the audience said we are in Bristol. How does this affect us? Greg stated by Acquisition/Relocation. If approved by Council, then specific of your needs and relocation will be negotiated” (January 17, 2012 Bristol Park Neighborhood Non-Profit Organization and Business Owner Meeting Notes; quoted from AAP, FY12-13).

Between February of 2011 and January 2012, something changed in the City’s approach to the infill development and City programming housing goals laid out for the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan dated February 2011. And there is very little documentation to show for either any resident input, or 3rd party “technical expert” reports or documentation alluded to by Kevin Jackson above to support the changes made. Within a month of the very beginning of the public participation process supposedly led by the Bristol Park Steering Committee, City official Greg Skaggs was documented as explaining to a Bristol Place neighborhood resident at the time that they would be displaced from their home, essentially telling her what was going to happen and giving a “more details to come” response. There is no publicly available documentation of any public meetings or notes of city staff or council member discussion during the time period from February 2011 to January 2012.

The Neighborhood Services Advisory Board meeting videos available during this time period are for meetings held on 1/13/11, 3/10/11, 6/9/11, 10/13/11, and then only two meetings during the year of 2012 were dated 9/13/12 and 10/11/12, respectively. The only NSAB agenda that lists a discussion item related to Bristol Place was dated December 18, 2011: “staff will provide the Board with a status update on the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan and Implementation Strategy…staff will also request that the Board designate one of its members to
participate on the Bristol Park Steering Committee,” but this December 2011 meeting was never held. The first NSAB meeting for 2012 dated January 12 stated in its minutes:

  Greg presented the housing analysis of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan. Suggestions for each of the neighborhoods were presented. John then presented how the development of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Steering Committee was developed. After discussion, the board came to a consensus and showed support of the plan (January 12, 2012 NSAB Meeting Minutes; quoted from AAP, FY12-13).

It is unclear from this language and lack of earlier or more explicitly detailed documentation what exactly the board came to a consensus to support at this time, but given the City’s focus on housing decline and “blight” as justification for clearance four months later in the first City Council study session where the plan in its near-final form was presented by staff, it is likely the ‘suggestions for each neighborhood’ were the same as those presented during the May 2012 study session, which are elaborated below.

  In addition to the gap in a paper trail of public documentation in the official planning process, in email correspondence retrieved via FOIA, local activist scholar and reporter Brian Dolinar reported:

  It appeared from email correspondence that by January 2012, Ed Bland and Champaign city staff were already working together to redevelop Bristol Place. On January 13, 2012, Patty Smith, HACC’s Director of Capital Programs, sent an email to her boss, HACC Executive Director Ed Bland, HACC consultant Cindi Herrera, Champaign community development specialist Greg Skaggs, and developer for The Benoit Group, Torian Priestly. Smith had met earlier in the week with the City of Champaign who wanted to set up monthly meetings to discuss ‘Champaign development issues.’ She proposed meeting before HACC Board meetings in the housing authority building, ‘since we will have so many commitments back to back’ (Urbana-Champaign Independent Media Center, September 17, 2012).

  These pieces of evidence all point to the fact that the planning decision-making process was already much further along than the public participation process timeline would initially lead an outsider to believe, as the Steering Committee and the majority of the public input sessions listed in the 2012-2013 AAP had yet to occur. The input these public meetings did collect correspondingly seemed to go unheard by those crafting the details of meeting the housing and land use goal laid out in the original February 2011 plan, which also supports the fact that some vital decision making had already occurred behind the scenes.

  All of the City staff and most of the institutional stakeholders I interviewed denied that crime rates had much of anything at all to do with the displacement and redevelopment decision,
instead referencing “blighted structures” and declining property values as the primary reasons.

As one City Council member I interviewed put it:

Race touches the BPNP – it becomes a really sensitive thing. Every time an issue comes up that involves a part of town where large amount of blacks live, race enters into the equation. Arguments get more cautious, and comments get more careful and there are hidden agendas and third rails that people don’t want to step on. Those kinds of issues can make an otherwise difficult problem into an even more difficult problem.

A primary theme that came out unmistakably in the Steering Committee’s community survey responses, my own interviews with residents, as well as input from public participation during City Council study sessions, was that many residents in the neighborhood (often those of longer tenure and many homeowners) felt a strong sense of community in the Bristol Place neighborhood and liked the location, but were fearful of the recurrent crime. However, respondents resoundingly stated beliefs that the “ riff raff” came from outside the neighborhood, not from neighborhood residents. Area resident attendee comments from the January 25, 2012 Garwood property owners meeting also supported this:

[You will] never change home value when people perceive this area as violent, etc. There are lots of police and court reports where people have provided an address in this area, but if you look at the lease that person is an 18 y.o. male (AAP, FY12-13).

Another audience member, a property owner in Garwood, said, “You cannot attack good tenants when there are guys in windbreakers talking to cars for five minutes (drug dealers).”

Many Bristol Place residents as part of Dr. Andrew Greenlee’s research agreed, saying that crime may occur in their neighborhood, but those perpetrating it do not reside there:

…What I saw living in Bristol Place, it wasn’t always the people that lived in there that was doing all the damaging, it was the people that the people that lived there allowed to come in to visit them that was doing all the damage. Because a lot of fights that were going on and shooting up was going on, it was people that didn’t even live in the neighborhood, but they brought all the drama to the neighborhood, and you know, so you know, and we can't – we – all of us, we can't control other people coming, but we try.

…I mean you could give people – I think if they gave them a grant to clean up, do better in their properties that’s better. Why tear down and build? I mean in this area here there have been some shooting going on and people getting killed and hurt. But it don’t make no sense and it’s not the people that live in the area. It’s the people that come across over here. They come across the [railroad] tracks.

…They have some bad parts about the neighborhood, but most of the bad parts do not come from the people who live in the neighborhood; it’s from people who come into the
neighborhood and cause – and wreak havoc and mayhem and whatever. Most of – I’d say 99 percent of the time anything that happens over here that’s criminal has to do with someone who doesn’t live in this area.

And it is not just existing Bristol Place and Garwood area residents who share this perception, as one of the city residents who commented during the May 2012 Council study session who was voicing support of the plan said, “95% of the people in that area are strong, have unfortunate circumstances and are law abiding citizens. If you disperse 100% of these people, you disperse 5-10% problems but the rest are good hard working citizens, very, very good people.”

In addition to resident perceptions, which opponents may dismiss as merely subjective judgments, arrest notices from the News Gazette from 2003 – 2013 support the assertion that drug-related criminality rhetoric often used to vilify the area stems from transactions that may occur in the neighborhood but that occur as a result of actions of individuals who do not reside in the neighborhood:

Jameson Johnson, 19, who listed an address in the 800 block of East Pennsylvania Avenue, U, was arraigned Friday on a Class X felony charge of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a public park. Champaign police arrested Johnson in the 1300 block of North Champaign Street about 2:30 a.m. Thursday, court records show. Johnson was arrested in the vicinity of Bristol Park (Drug charges brought in 3 separate cases; News Gazette, October 7, 2003).

Dorian Benton, 27, who listed a Centralia address, was arraigned Tuesday on a Class X felony charge of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of Bristol Park on North Market Street in Champaign (News Gazette, August 4, 2004).

William D. Dixon, 43, who listed an address of the 0--100 block of Willow Court, was arrested Wednesday in the 1200 block of North Champaign Street after he allegedly fled from Champaign police. He was charged Thursday with unlawful possession to deliver heroin and cocaine, both Class X felonies because the offenses allegedly occurred within 1,000 feet of Bristol Park. If convicted, he faces a mandatory six to 30 years in prison (Champaign man has felony drug case; News Gazette, June 30, 2011).

Randy Willis, 40, who listed an address in the 800 block of North State Street, was charged Friday with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of Bristol Park. A Champaign police report said between October 2012 and March 2013, Champaign police narcotics agents arranged five separate purchases of crack cocaine from Willis at a home in the 100 block of Bellefontaine Street. (News Gazette, April 5, 2013: Champaign man facing crack cocaine charge).

Andrew Greenlee, a Professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at UIUC, and Stacey Tutt, director of the Community Preservation Clinic at the UIUC Law School,
both members of the Steering Committee, conducted a survey of Bristol residents from March 10-12 of 2012 whose highlighted results were presented at the last Steering Committee meeting listed in the 2012-2013 AAP (SS 2012-024). Out of 69 occupied units, 43 people participated in the survey (a 62% response rate). The survey found that the average length of stay at their current residence for renters was 3.75 years, and for owners was 27.75 years. Of the 15 households who reported being homeowners, 8 reported living in their current home for more than 30 years. Approximately 50% of the residents surveyed stated that they desired to return to a redeveloped Bristol Place community (SS 2012-024). In addition to providing vital information about the housing cost-burden, income, and residential tenure demographics of residents in the area (which I discuss later), the survey asked respondents what they liked about their neighborhood and what they would like to see change. The positive responses had to do primarily with a sense of community, family connections and history in the neighborhood, a sense of community and relationships with neighbors, recent improvements in terms of safety and a sense of peace and quiet, and the central location and proximity to parks. The desired changes reported were reduced crime, increased youth activity opportunities, better lighting and sidewalk infrastructure, and an improved external perception of the neighborhood (March 8, 2012 NSAB Meeting; quoted from AAP FY12-13).

My interviews conducted two years later in 2014 as part of an expanded research project Dr. Greenlee is working on echoed many of these themes summarized by the original 2012 survey:

…Well, all of my life I have lived here. I was raised here as a baby and grew up. This is the area there. We was all here, when we was younger here. And we raised our grandchildren and great-grandchildren right here in this area. So everybody really been – this has really been our neighborhood where we've been living at all our lives. We grew up here and then had our families and stuff here. [My mom is] She's 80. She don't like the idea of moving. Disturbing to her. She does not like it at all.

…It's just – I don't know. So a lot of people just coming into your neighborhood and make it their neighborhood, so that makes everybody think your neighborhood is a bad neighborhood. So that makes people want – I mean what is their purpose? What is their purpose for moving everyone out? I don't understand that either.

…There are people in this neighborhood, as you say, that have been here forever, and to them it is a great neighborhood. And to me, I think it's a very convenient neighborhood; it's close to downtown, it's got good public transportation, it's close to the mall. And it’s not overly – I don’t think it's an overly dangerous neighborhood.
…Yes, there is crime, but there’s crime all over. You know, there are – I think more could be done with some of the crime than what we do. I mean there’s been shootings, you know, down the street here. There’s been – there was a murder here last year over on Roper, a boyfriend of a gal, you know, stabbed her to death or whatever. You know, those things happen, but, you know, it’s probably – it happens a little more often in this neighborhood, I think, and I think it has to do with the socioeconomic level of most of the people here. You know, in a neighborhood where there’s a lot of people that are underemployed or on assistance and all this kind of stuff, I think there tends to be more crime than in a neighborhood where everybody has a good paying job and, you know, they’re not wanting for anything, they’re not – there’s people in this neighborhood who would literally steal for food, I mean ‘cause they don’t have anything.

These neighborhood resident comments, area resident input, and arrest records beg the critiques raised by Terry Townsend and other community advocates throughout this decision-making process in local news articles: “What is being proposed is the breakup of a community. Clear and simple, you’re going to gentrify that neighborhood. This is the breakup of an African-American community.” Reverend Barnes was quoted in the same article as saying “he sees it differently,” having been in the neighborhood since the demolition of the infamous “Green Apartments,” he said that the area is much improved since the Green Apartment days, and the residents who remain deserve better: “These people are part of the city. They’re part of the citizenry. They deserve the same kind of attention as the people down in Devonshire” (News Gazette, June 17, 2012).

These allusions to recent improvements in crime reduction and neighborhood peace and quiet by those who lived in Bristol Place at the time remained largely unconsidered by the City as it went forward with its “public participation” sessions. Public participation, as too many planners know, is not only about the quantity of meetings held, but about their quality – the attendance, the input received, and most importantly and most relevantly here, whether that input is then considered and incorporated into final decision-making. When I questioned residents about what their thoughts were about the meetings, responses varied, but were often negative: [Q: What were your thoughts about City-led community meetings about this redevelopment plan?]

…Bullshit. I mean why would you want to tear down – it’s older people in this neighborhood been here. They’re set in their ways and everything. Why you want to move these people from where, their homes? To build something that’s going to cause trouble? You’re going to have more trouble.
…Well first, the brunt of it I got when I started going to the meetings. But it seemed like it was the same information over and over again. So I stopped going to the meetings. Then there was the rumor out that if you don’t come to the meetings, if they don’t – because they had a sign-up sheet. So those people that were more involved and coming to their meetings would be taken care of first as opposed to the people that didn’t show up at all. So I don’t know how true that was. But there was a sign-in sheet. So I was like, ‘That’s not fair. Maybe I don’t have anywhere to get there or maybe I’ve got some other appointment that I have to go to, plus you guys ain’t telling us nothing.’ And so, those meetings not only were for Bristol Park. They were also kind of like neighborhood meetings and the police would be there and stuff, and if you had any problems on your block you kind of let them know, which was a good thing, but ain’t nobody going to talk about nothing in this neighborhood. You know how that is.

At one of the best-attended major public input meetings and in “a final attempt to reach out to residents and owners in the Bristol Park neighborhood who were not previously able to attend the other neighborhood meetings,” the February 18, 2012 public event held at Stratton Elementary was attended by 118 neighbors, volunteers and committee members to discuss the City’s housing strategies plan for the neighborhood (SS 2012-024). This meeting concluded with staff seeking feedback through comment cards with two questions: “Do you reside in Bristol or Garwood?” and “Are you supportive of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Proposed Housing Strategies?” The Neighborhood Services Advisory Board 3/8/12 minutes state that 30 comment cards were received, of which 7 were negative, and elaborated that some of the comments focused on trust and prices for the homes. However, in the May 4, 2012 housing goal implementation study session memo to then-City Manager Steve Carter, the results of the comment cards were tallied as “a total of 33 comment cards received with only 7 negative responses.” But in the appendix provided (see Appendix D.6), which included a matrix of response breakdowns, there were in fact only 29 comment card responses received, one of which was classified as “other” rather than a yes or no, and 4 responses of which could not be identified by neighborhood.

Given the wording of the questions asked, it seemed City staff was trying to gauge whether current residents in either of the affected neighborhoods of Garwood or Bristol agreed with the proposed housing strategies presented and outlined in the meeting. If this is the case, then the actual tally of responses should have been 18 in favor (75%), 6 against (25%), and a total of 24 reasonably reliable responses. Not having a record of the number of resident attendees versus volunteers and committee members, 24 responses/118 is a 20% response rate; even
29/118 is only a 25% response rate, and even if the 118 total number is reduced by known Steering Committee membership averaging around 15 members, 24 responses gives a 23% response rate, and 29 responses gives 28%. Neither of these come even close to the 62% response rate of the much ore in depth survey done by the Steering Committee, whose responses indicated more a desire for better City services provision for the neighborhood in the way of streets, lighting, illegal dumping enforcement, property code enforcement, and more effective policing, in addition to explanations of intense emotional valuation of their neighborhood and its residential history.

In email correspondence retrieved via filing a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, local university activist, African-American history scholar and reporter Brian Dolinar reported that he uncovered correspondence during this time dated March 29, 2012 between NSD Neighborhood Programs Manager Kerri Spear and Kevin Jackson where Kerri sent Kevin a news report from Housing Affairs Letter about cuts to housing authorities across the country, speculating, “This may explain why Ed is reluctant to ‘add’ more vouchers to his inventory” (Urbana-Champaign Independent Media Center, September 17, 2012: Emails reveal Champaign city staff working behind the scenes to level Bristol Place). This allusion to discussions with Housing Authority Director Ed Bland on a component of the eventual Bristol Place land use plan that had not yet materialized in public forums – the use of Housing Choice Vouchers (HCVs) to relocate residents living in the Bristol Place area – is discussed in detail in section 5.6.3 of this chapter.

The next official City documentation of progress on the housing strategies goals was made on April 10, 2012 during the Annual Action Plan Council Study Session (SS 2012-024). This document contained language under Goal 2 (“eliminating blighting conditions in the City’s neighborhoods”):

In FY 2012/13, the City anticipates moving forward with the Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan. Some activities, including the Lot Acquisition/Clearance Program, meet other goals (i.e. Goal 4) - and therefore will be listed only once under another goal. The plan recommends the City acquire, through voluntary acquisition when possible, up to 76 parcels in the Bristol Place neighborhood due to the overall housing and public safety conditions of the neighborhood. This plan was not yet approved by City Council at the time of this Annual Action Plan (scheduled for May 8, 2012 study session).

Despite the plan “not having been officially approved,” all language seems to indicate that it would be and that the City was moving forward assuming that it would be.
Goal 4 referenced above from the 2012-2013 AAP is to “preserve the character, value, and marketability of the City’s older neighborhoods,” and sub-part b) is to “develop new activities to improve neighborhoods identified in the Wellness Plan as having the greatest need for public sector intervention.” Then, after a brief reference to funding issues, the following statement was made justifying why acquisition and complete redevelopment is necessary:

Widespread neighborhood improvement will occur when services and resources can be concentrated in a given area over a significant period of time and are delivered as part of a well planned redevelopment strategy. Declining neighborhoods could be revitalized with this level of intensive service delivery. However, existing community development funding is not sufficient to address this redevelopment need (AAP 12-13).

It then goes on to again say specifically that the housing and land use goal will be further discussed in a May 8, 2012 City Council study session, but that “due to the extensive needs of Bristol Place subdivision, staff estimates a five year schedule to acquire and complete redevelopment.” The 2012-2013 AAP continues to move full speed ahead in its assumptions for residential relocation, structural demolition and redevelopment approval, and an attachment under the Neighborhood Revitalization (NR) HUD CPMP Project Tables section lists the following as an explanation for the proposed earmarked $30,000 in NR funds:

This program allows the City to identify properties creating a blighting influence on the surrounding neighborhood, acquire those properties, and clear them for affordable housing and/or mixed-income development. This can be accomplished with existing tools or in partnership with approved neighborhood improvement plans, including the new Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan, which will require the acquisition, relocation and demolition of existing units.

In sum, the 2012-2013 AAP contained 3 funds specifically already packaging money for the BPNP: Maintenance of City-owned Properties ($10,459), Code Enforcement salaries ($40,000); Neighborhood Revitalization ($30,000). In early 2012, City staff had already begun to earmark funding in order to plan for the eminent domain-based redevelopment housing and land use strategies they had proposed, in advance of the public or City Council officially approving them. As Greg Skaggs later succinctly summarized of their strategy in a June 2012 interview, “the strategy is kind of a replace Bristol (Place), repair Garwood” (News Gazette, June 10, 2012).

In addition to the official documentation gap from February 2011 to January 2012 and ahead-of-public-input-schedule earmarked funding and decision-making language in later
official documents, a report on the “Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan” by City Manager Steve Carter dated May 4, 2012, spoke as if a partnership had already been formed, saying “the Housing Authority is currently drafting an intergovernmental agreement that provides for Section 8 vouchers for all eligible households” (IMC, August 24, 2012: *Champaign Housing Authority considers demolishing a third black neighborhood*).

The widely anticipated and documented major City Council study session ostensibly discussing and gathering input on implementation alternatives for the Housing and Land Use goals of the BPNP proposed by City staff was dated May 8, 2012. At this meeting, City staff presented to Council recommendations they claimed were the synthesized results from the previous year of public meetings input. In this study session, Greg Skaggs, the then-NSD lead on the Bristol Place project stated that the City had three neighborhood redevelopment options: (1) maintaining the status quo - providing maintenance and baseline services, and no new investment; (2) what he called “neighborhood revitalization” - administered through programming and rehab to make basic improvements; and (3) what he termed “neighborhood reconstruction” - wide scale clearance and redevelopment.

Staff recommendations then presented for the three neighborhoods in the planning area covered by the BPNP included all three redevelopment options. Shadow Wood, as a privately owned mobile home park that is 95% owner-occupied (although each mobile home technically leases land) was designated as a stable area whose biggest need was a storm shelter. City discussions about locating Fire Station 3 in this neighborhood according to the proposed land use plan (see Appendix D.7) would in effect “kill two birds with one stone,” providing larger community center space in the same structure, which addressed resident needs gathered through public input processes simultaneously with fire services needs.

City staff recommended that the Garwood sub-area neighborhood be targeted for neighborhood revitalization, as Skaggs stated that “some homes need a lot of work, but existing City programming can bring it up to a healthy status.” The staff felt that improvements could be made with existing housing rehab programs to enhance and maintain the current character of the Garwood neighborhood.

Bristol Place, on the other hand, staff now formally recommended be targeted for neighborhood reconstruction. The rationales presented at this study session for this decision have not changed since, and included property values and existing structures that had collectively
declined further than Garwood’s, and increased vacant properties by abandonment which had turned into blight and were housing illegal activities in the neighborhood. In Bristol Place, staff said that home values are so low that property owners complain that the neighborhood does not provide enough return on investment to put money into existing properties, so owners do not invest additional funds and properties continue to decline with negative effects on both the immediate surrounding structures and the larger neighborhood.

In this May 8, 2012 study session before Council, Skaggs detailed a single 10-year-old infill project that the City had been involved in as a representative example of the City’s poor return on investment of public funds. According to Skaggs, the City invested an unspecified amount of funding in bringing a home in the neighborhood up to an initial post-improvement assessment value of $95,000, then it ended up being foreclosed, went through two different ownership transitions, and in 2011 sold for $27,500. Its value continuing to decline, it was then assessed at $26,900 in the next year. This example is an interesting choice to use as an example by the City, because (1) the timeframe of the City investment goes back an entire decade, with no more recent examples of infill investment failing with such significant results; (2) he did not actually provide the dollar amount of City funding invested, how it was invested, or how this investment fit within any larger plan for the neighborhood; and (3) he only elaborated on the particular circumstances of this example property after being questioned further by Council member Marci Dodds. The reason for (1) is that after this initial investment in the early 2000s, the City has only invested funding in one other infill project partnership with Habitat for Humanity in 2010 by purchasing and donating a vacant lot at 607 E Beardsley to build a home on (CAPER, FY2010-2011). Beyond this, the City has not invested any further funding in infill development in the neighborhood beyond their existing collection of NSD housing programs, the disproportionate majority of which are geared towards homeowners, who as they widely argue are not the problem properties in this neighborhood – slumlord managed rental properties were documented by the City as being the most blighted and problematic. You can see just by walking through the neighborhood which homes are owner-occupied – they have flowers, nice landscaping, neat grass and no debris on lawns or driveways – they look well cared for. As for (2), the investment made by the City was a donation to Metanoia Centers of three vacant city-owned lots and $84,040 in federal CDBG funds to be used for income-eligible (below 80% AMI) down payment assistance, but that amount was actually divided between three properties, of
which the referenced was only thus one. Additionally, regardless of Skaggs’ quoted “$95,000 assessed value,” the Champaign County Assessor’s records show a sale price from 2003 of $82,426 (see Table 8). As for (3), this home and example (at 119 E. Roper) does not seem a particularly helpful representative example (which was how it was presented in the study session), as the original person Metanoia Center qualified to put in there was James “Ervin” Allen, a 69-year-old blind, crippled man who passed away tragically only a year after he moved into the first home he had ever owned (News Gazette, July 19, 2004: Local man realized dream before he died). This left the structure vacant for a while, and as Greg did then elaborate when pressed by Marci, the Urban League looked into leasing or purchasing it for someone who then ended up falling out of their program, upon which according to Skaggs “one problem after another led to vacancy led into foreclosure.” The Urban League of Champaign County had a lease-purchase program but they closed in November 2008 after being the first staff paid organization attending to the human/civil rights needs of black citizens locally since around the time of Old Urban Renewal in 1961. While this property is undeniably a stark example of precipitously declining neighborhood property value (Allen bought it for $82,426 in 2003; it sold for $62,873 in 2006 and $55,000 in 2007), the house was last purchased in 2011 and has had a stable assessed value as well as being occupied by the same homeowner for the last four years. Skaggs went on to say that “Metanoia Center has one other home in the area whose residency has held steady through the years, but it is still losing value.” And continued, citing “local appraisers and realtors” explanations that property values had declined because of the perception of the neighborhood within the larger Champaign area housing market. The May 4, 2012 Housing Goal Implementation memo elaborates, “site clearance and reconstruction is supported by some property owners, local lenders, Realtors©, and the Champaign County Housing Authority” (SS 2012-024).

The two houses (three lots) listed above represent a single lot-by-lot infill approach and in the context of the number of structures in the area that are in decline, the City claimed these infill investments had not been forceful enough of a tool to have positively impacted surrounding values. Clearly, this is true, but just as clearly when you look at the details of the neighborhood programs offered in the area, which as the City has emphasized many times over is one of the main reasons contributing to the blight that has led to the decision to demolish the entire area, the area is only 30% owner-occupied. Almost all of the City’s housing funds available are geared at
and for improvements to owner-occupied structures. The City has framed this decision and debate as a simple return on public investment evaluation. Skaggs went on in the May 8, 2012 session to claim, “for the last 12 years [we] have been providing infill development. Look at the money we have put in, [we] have to ask is this a good use of public funds when it isn’t having the effect on the neighborhood to bring values up in neighborhood.” The conclusion that neighborhood investment cannot be stimulated under the existing conditions in Bristol Place was thus made to City Council and to the public.

This was part of the narrative repeated by almost every City official I interviewed, who when asked about the primary rationale behind the clearance decision focused on the combination of poorly aging housing stock (declining property values) and ineffective infill investment being the least cost-effective way to improve the neighborhood as being the deciding factors in the City’s displacement, clearance and rebuild redevelopment decision for Bristol Place. One Planning Department staff member explained it as:

It’s going cost too much and we’re not going to make headway. The housing stock’s too old. There’s just too many problems there anyway. Planning & NSD evaluated the condition of housing stock and whether it could be fixed. Often found liens on properties for lack of payment. Previous city intervention involved a whole lot of carrot in the way of funding for home improvement programs. The City asked, ‘what is the threshold for value returned?’ And burdensomely high improvement was determined to be needed in the Bristol Place area.

One long-time affordable housing advocate in the area said of his perceptions of the City’s decision-making in the Bristol Place clearance and rebuild decision: “that decision was based on a number of things. It wasn’t just one thing. It was police calls, quality of life in the neighborhood, you know just different kinda problems in the neighborhood.” The Neighborhood Services Department Director explained that the departments of Planning & Neighborhood Services wanted the proposal to be acceptable to the City from a feasibility standpoint, and to the larger community. He said “technical experts” had looked at the economics of issue, the combination of 70% investor-owned properties, low property values and extreme safety issues, and mentioned that the City and the NSD also had to take into account that the City has other neighborhoods to serve as well. The City wants to invest in areas that will actually be successful expenditures, and the “experts” said that infill would be a “sunk cost,” and it was unlikely that the City could rely on code enforcement to get investors to rehab the houses. He continued,
saying “experience bears out that that approach could take 20 years to fully resolve current
issues, which was an untenable solution, given that folks are living in bad conditions.”

A City Council member put it in the following way: “In any other part of town if you
gave away a vacant lot someone would build a modest home on it. Once the City touches it, it
costs $50,000 - $70,000 to bring a house up to code that would then have a market value of
$30,000. Home repair fund or grant program would be putting more money into shacks than they
would be worth after completed it.” City Manager Dorothy David said that Metanoia’s efforts
were an example of trying to build infill housing in Bristol Place in the absence of massive
reconstruction. But that unfortunately, they built nice homes whose values could not be
maintained because of the declining home values around them. In Bristol Place, people were
actually losing value when they invested resources in their properties. While all of this is
undiably true, and confirmed by much of the investment property owner public participation
comments gathered, this issue framing does not even allow for the consideration of alternative
suggestions made to improve the neighborhood in public sessions, including creating community
gardens and providing more and different kinds of assistance with fewer income restrictions for
property upgrades. Nor does it allow for something in between a single lot-by-lot infill strategy
and complete displacement and clearance, like developing groups of lots at once.

In a March 11, 2010 NSAB meeting, Jim Rose, current local public housing authority
board commissioner and long time local affordable housing advocate who has given technical
financial advice to housing authorities across Illinois, worked at UIUC doing research on
supportive housing issues for almost two decades and with local mental health and affordable
housing groups like Homestead locally, suggested this as a possible alternative method to
beautify the neighborhood and begin to bring property values up and improve traditional quality
of life measures: “Jim [Rose] asked about the vacant lots in the area and if residents might use
those for vegetable gardens and suggested a good use of the land. Ed [Hawkes] asked if that was
something that could be started this summer. Mishauno [Woggin] wasn’t sure it could happen
this summer, but for future years. Jim asked if the small park in the Bristol area is maintained by
the Park District and if it could be expanded” (3/11/10 Neighborhood Services Advisory Board
Meeting Minutes, from 2010-2014 Consolidated Plan).

During the public comment part of the May 8, 2012 study session, Reverend Barnes of
Metanoia elaborated on his efforts to work with the City in the 2000s on infill rehab investments:
We proposed to NSD at that time to build 6 houses at one time, then come back and build 6 more, and then 6 more. [We] had a firm commitment from Danny Cameron who was CEO of National City Community Development Corporation, whose Vice President in Springfield personally came down to NSD to confirm the City’s commitment with Metanoia. What was finally decided was that Metanoia would build one home at a time and then have that house presold. Roger Morsch, the Executive Director of housing at IHDA [at the time] said the way to turn a neighborhood around is to build at least 3 houses at one time. What we discovered is that it is impossible to turn around a neighborhood building one house at a time. We suffered a great loss of revenue, and we only ended up building 2 houses.

The lesson here is thus not that infill investment failed in Bristol Place, the lesson is that tiny owner-occupied rehab assistance funds in a 70% renter-occupied neighborhood and single lot infill development failed in a neighborhood with more significant challenges than its surrounding areas. This leaves a vast array of grouped infill investment, rental assistance, incentive programs for investment property owners and code enforcement alternatives between what was actually tried by the City and the total displacement and clearance that was eventually decided upon. Especially when what was decided upon is costing the City $6.3 million. So much more could have been done in this neighborhood to preserve its value for longtime residents, even when this amount if cut in half, as part of the funding structure was for complete demolition and relocation. As longtime local activist Martel Miller put it in continued public comment in the May 8 study session:

Last year there wasn’t even a plan because you took money from Urban Renewal funds earmarked for Bristol Place and gave it to a youth program. Why can’t we partner with homeowners? Ask the homeowners, do you want incentives from the City to help invest in the neighborhood. Talk about crime, you need jobs – that’s how you change the neighborhood, giving people jobs, opportunities, not by knocking down houses. I think you’re looking at it all wrong, and I think this is racial.

And as Terry Townsend, a longtime local and community activist who worked in state government for 30 years, was a Housing Authority Commissioner for ten, and on the Champaign County Board in the 1980s echoed:

You’re not going to solve the problems of poverty by destroying people’s neighborhoods. You will only spread the problem around. Slow down, before you create another problem in another part of the City. You use eminent domain, but you need to understand what you’re doing and it ought to be in the context of a very good plan for that area.
It is vitally important when evaluating the history of this redevelopment plan to recognize that the vast majority of City “carrot” assistance in the way of neighborhood programs were historically, and continue to be, primarily geared at homeowner assistance. A major theme that has been interwoven throughout the institutional approach to this neighborhood redevelopment plan is the persistent bias towards normative values of homeownership, in direct opposition to contemporary research on increased rental tenure because of the rise of housing cost-burden locally (as well as nationally) resulting from the 2008 housing market crash. As Michael Stone put it in the early 1990s:

The attractions of homeownership are undeniable: most of us desire the security of tenure and control over our living space that only homeownership has seemed to provide in this society, along with the possibility of relatively stable housing costs, some equity accumulation, income tax benefits, and a sense of community membership and social status that homeownership has promised (Stone, 1993).

Conventional homeownership has historically offered three primary economic advantages over renting: (1) homeowners have lower monthly payments than renters residing in an identically valued house because there is no payment for the landlord’s cash-flow profits and overhead costs; (2) homeowners receive income tax benefits through mortgage interest and property tax payment deductions from taxable income (if itemized); and (3) homeowners are able to build wealth through equity buildup via mortgage principle payments and rising property values (Stone, 1993).

As long-time local rental housing advocate, former Urbana City Council woman, and founder and manager of the Champaign-Urbana Tenant’s Union Esther Patt explained in an example of one of the ways in which this ethos translates locally:

The Urban League had this rent-to-own program where, basically, families got a $15,000 gift, $15,000 per family, and as long as you were income-eligible, and the income requirements were higher, of course – so if you made $35,000 a year and you were going to buy a single-family home, you would get a $15,000 grant through the City of Urbana, and you had to live in it for five years for it to be a gift. Five years. Well, okay, if I came and proposed giving a $3,000 rent subsidy each year for five years to a family who’s renting, would people be excited about that? Well, no, no, because they like home ownership. America’s love affair with home ownership has hurt renters more than anything, including pushing people into home ownership that they can’t afford.

In the City of Champaign, of the approximately 16 neighborhood services programs offered geared towards housing stock improvements (which vary by year, somewhat based on
federal funding cycles, but mostly guided by City Council and staff priorities), eight are geared at homeowners, six are more general City-wide assistance for specific incentive programs, one is targeted at assistance to investment property owners, with only one geared towards assisting renters (see Table 2 in Appendix A). The single program geared towards rental assistance, the Tenant Based Rental Assistance Program, only began in 2009. Many of the eight programs geared at homeowners have been around for over a decade, and even then have eligibility limitations on them, which is sometimes due to federal HOME and CDBG source funding constraints. In 2010, 54.6% of public funding was directed towards assistance for homeowners, 26.4% towards other community programs, 10.5% towards investment property owners’ assistance, and 8.5% towards assistance for renters (see Table 2 in Appendix A & Appendix D.8). In 2010, 57.3% of the housing units in Champaign were owner-occupied, but even if you take out of the equation the 26.4% of funding towards community programs (which are fantastic and geared at disabled and youth populations citywide – e.g. CommUnity Matters), and divide the remaining funding budgeted for only housing assistance (73.6%) equitably according to existing homeowner-renter population breakdowns in 2010 (excluding investment property owners and only focusing on program assistance for actual housing expenses), that leaves a 12.4% overfunded discrepancy between what homeowner support programs should receive, and what they did in fact receive in 2010. Similarly, that leaves an 11.3% underfunded discrepancy for renter assistance. And this is a conservative proportionately equitable division, when in fact homeowners, as stated above and demonstrated by housing cost-burden data contained in Table 3 and Appendices D.8 – D.10, almost always have higher incomes and assets than renters, are generally less cost-burdened and less in need of financial assistance. Esther Patt, a local community advocate for tenant’s rights locally, said in our interview:

Homeowners are who matters, and everyone else – nobody ever says this, but when you look at how public policy is enacted, I don’t think decision makers think of tenants as people, and that’s part of what you see with code enforcement. They never would say, ‘We don’t consider tenants people,’ but they sure don’t think of them as people who matter. Tenants are mostly lower-income people, and even middle-income tenants get squeezed out just by the prejudice against tenants.

Part of this bias has to do with widespread misperceptions and social biases surrounding who pays property taxes and what proportion of total tax revenue to the City different citizens contribute in the community. Individual property owners pay property taxes on the properties
they own, but in 2004 the Illinois General Assembly passed a law to allow landlords to create the fiction that the tenant is the property taxpayer for the purpose of the landlord getting the “homeowner exemption” on property taxes in single family rental home investment properties they own. This means that all landlords have to do is have the tenant sign something, most often embedded in leasing terms, saying the tenant agrees to be responsible for all property tax for the unit, and that the tenant has satisfied this requirement through the payment of rent. Notably, there is no additional requirement that landlords are then required to pass any resulting savings along to their tenants. Landlords renting out single family homes thus now get more tax breaks (homestead exemptions are currently worth $6,000 each) than homeowners who can only afford one home – the one they live in.

The General Homestead Exemption, more colloquially known as the owner-occupied or homeowner exemption, “also applies to certain leasehold interests in which the person occupying the residence is liable for the property taxes. In addition, it applies to each unit in a multi-unit building owned as a cooperative, including some assisted living facilities,” which has caused controversy as well (35 ILCS 200/15-175). According to County Assessor Stan Jenkins, in 2011 in Champaign County there were 1,520 single-family rental homes where the property owner had filed for the homestead exemption. This brought the total 2011 assessment value down $9.1 million, which translated to roughly $730,000 that did not go to county taxing bodies (News Gazette, September 18, 2011: Law allows landlords to claim multiple homestead exemptions). Thus, investment property owners are the ones paying the physical tax bills, but they certainly do not pay property tax out of their own pockets – they act as intermediaries, with money flowing directly from renters paying rent to local property tax collectors. The only difference is now in addition to the investment property income generated by rent, landlords get even more biased beneficial consideration legally in Illinois. Normative social valuations of the “value” of homeowners skew this community’s perceptions of who is contributing to and taking away from public tax coffers and contributes to the widespread prejudice against renter rights locally.

Special interest tax loopholes aside, which abound at all levels of government in this country, and which this is nowhere near the most egregious example of, this brings up a vital part of the constrained fiscal policy space that have affected local municipalities’ spending allocation decisions since 2008. Declining federal, state and local revenues have spurred cities, and the City of Champaign in particular locally, towards more conservative direct assistance programs, and
more creative and complex public-private partnerships to fill the gap between public services provision and budgetary shortfalls. A public comment from the City Council study session for the AAP 2012-2013 dated April 10, 2012 sums up the results of the declining trajectory of federal funding in the last five years and the City of Champaign’s response. This resident, retired UIUC Urban Planning professor and local housing expert Len Heumann pointed out that the housing programs included in the 2012-2013 AAP make no attempt to address the local *quantity* of affordable housing, just the *quality* by only providing small funding for structural improvements. He went on to say that local nonprofit housing developers fight over existing resources, but the real problem is the decline in overall federal funding in the Central IL area.

This has tragically happened simultaneously as need has risen to unprecedented levels and housing cost-burden has increased across the country, with Champaign being no exception. Evaluating housing cost burden in the City of Champaign calculated as spending more than 30% of income on housing from 2008-2013 shows decreases in cost burden for homeowners with annual incomes between $20,000 – $49,999, and slight increases in cost burden for homeowners with income less than $20,000, and between $50,000 - $74,999. For renter-occupied housing units however, all income categories below $50,000 show significant increases in housing cost burden, with income groups between $20,000 - $49,999 experiencing increases over 10% since 2008. In 2008, 62% of households earning between $20,000 - $34,999 annually were spending more than 30% of their income on housing in Champaign, but in 2013 this number increased to 73%. For those with annual incomes below $20,000, housing cost burden has remained at nearly 100% of all households paying more than 30% of their incomes on housing (see Appendices D.9 - D.11).

The data collected in 2012 from Bristol Place residents supports these housing cost burden numbers as well. HUD considers 80% of area median to be low-income, 50% of area median to be considered very low-income, and 30% of area median to be extremely low-income. 30% of area median income is approximately the poverty level. In 2012, the CU MSA’s area median income was $68,000, which locally means household incomes in 2012 below $54,400 annually were considered low income, below $34,000 annually were considered very low income, and below $20,400 were considered extremely low income. As the Bristol Park Steering Committee’s survey of Bristol residents in March 10-12 of 2012 demonstrated, 93% of the
renting households in Bristol Place were classified as low-income, with 60% paying more than 30% of their monthly income on housing (see Appendix D.12 for a full statistical breakdown).

The average reported monthly household income was $1,977 per month ($23,726 per year). Owners on average had higher household incomes ($2,214 per month / $26,571 per year) when compared to renters ($1,905 per month / $22,861 per year). The average monthly housing cost (average rent/mortgage plus average utility costs) was $968 for renters and $1,069 for homeowners with a mortgage. Comparing the housing expenses to household incomes, an estimated 60% of renters and 7% of owners were housing cost burdened, based upon the federal standard of 30% of income spent towards housing (SS 2012-024).

By HUD designations then, renters in Bristol Place on average fall between the extremely low income and very low income categories (making an average of $22,860 annually), and if these residents only paid 30% of their income on housing costs, those housing expense amounts would range from $510 (for extremely low income) to $850 (for very low income). The average monthly rental housing cost in Bristol Place was reported in 2012 as $968, which is $11,616 annually. This means that those who fell into the very low income category were spending 34% of their total income on housing, and extremely low income renting residents were paying 57% of their total income on housing.

This extreme need and financial squeeze between incomes and housing costs was echoed in my interview with Aaron Smith, the manager of Homestead Corporation, a local Community Housing Development Organization (CHDO) that has run into difficulty in recent years because of funding cuts and new restrictions on project-based subsidies. Homestead is a small local nonprofit developer that does individual homeownership development projects for low-income families, as well as some scattered site rental rehab for very low-income families. When asked about the local population Homestead targets and serves with the greatest need, Aaron responded:

…We see the greatest needs right now are affordable rental for very low income is where the greatest need is. Unfortunately making a project like that work requires vouchers, requires some sort of ongoing operating subsidy. I mean there are sources of funding out here for development subsidy. That’s not an issue. If we kept the project small enough we could even probably do one without the tax credits but ongoing operating expense is for something like that if you’re going to serve very low income population you really have to have an operating subsidy like a project based subsidy that’s attached to the units.

His experience echoes sentiments of Kevin Jackson and Esther Patt of the extreme housing-cost burden in the area, and the disproportionate burden felt by lower-income family and single non-
student household renters, exacerbated locally in particular because the large student rental population so heavily skews the local rental market. As Aaron puts it, “I talk to people who spend an outrageous amount of their income on housing.” And as Esther elaborates:

…If you’re the sole wage earner for the household, like a mother with children, and you get paid the current Illinois minimum wage, then in order to afford a two-bedroom apartment at a tax credit apartment complex – that would be Douglass Square, Oakwood Trace, Crystal View Townhomes, Town Center, Prairie Green, or Rainbow Apartments – you would have to work 80 hours a week just to not go over 30 percent of income for rent and utilities to afford an affordable two-bedroom. Someone who makes $30,000.00 a year can’t afford to own a home, around here at least, without financial assistance, but if you make $30,000.00 a year and you’re looking for a two-bedroom apartment, you don’t need to go to the tax credit places.

According to Esther, other than public housing and Housing Choice Vouchers through the Housing Authority, there is virtually nothing else (no program) that helps households with incomes below 30% AMI locally.

Even Habitat for Humanity, which is a wonderful program, does not help households with incomes that low. Do you think people that live in Habitat housing make $10,000 a year? No. How would they pay insurance, how would they pay property tax? You have to be able to own a home. It makes homes cheaper, and I’m not sure what the figure is today, but in 2005, the last year I was a city council member, the lowest income homeowner that they were helping had a household income of $25,000 a year, which is pretty poor.

In contrast to Habitat for Humanity, whose local branch is part of a large enough international organization and has access to enough capital that they can do their own lending, Homestead is restricted to a very small subset of the affordability spectrum – people who qualify for mortgage loans based on credit worthiness, but also qualify for development subsidies due to income levels. Aaron said the four biggest problems in getting piecemeal affordable homes built locally are (1) the combination of Congress cutting the overall HOME funding pool by 50%, (2) the lack of availability of credit for a lot of the demographic the organization works with, (3) the role that the Housing Authority has begun to play as a local developer, and (4) the fact that to serve the neediest demographic developments need operating subsidies, which the Housing Authority has sole control over and has reserved for their own ongoing projects. As Aaron puts it:

I mean it was always kind of a narrow demographic for the home ownership part of it because you need to work with low income people but they have enough income where they can afford to own a home but then they also have to have credit that’s sufficient for
them to get a loan. So that was always kind of a narrow segment to work with but it’s
gotten smaller. Trying to find someone in that income spectrum who’s also got the credit
- it’s been difficult.

The third issue according to Aaron is that the Housing Authority has turned into a
housing developer, and they have the majority of Illinois Housing Development Authority
(IHDA) funding tied up in their current large-scale projects underway.

We go to IHDA to ask for funds and they look; [and then say] ‘Well you’ve got three
IHDA funded projects going on in your geographic area already and two of them are still
under construction and haven’t been rented up yet.’ In addition to that IHDA has really
been focusing the last few years on preservation of existing housing and on doing
developments with a high percentage of units for the supportive housing community so
people who need supportive housing so very low income people, people with – who
needs social services, things of that nature. So if your project doesn’t have high enough
percentage of units directed at supportive housing and it also isn’t preserving existing
housing it’s harder to get the funding now than it was a few years ago. We’ve been trying
to get something going on an open 5-acre site. And we’ve been trying to get that project
funded for like three or four years now and we still can’t get it funded. We’re looking at
some various possibilities like getting some veteran’s assistance supportive housing
vouchers to put a veteran’s housing component into the project. We’re basically trying to
make the project more appealing.

He said recently the only way for Homestead to get operating rental subsidy vouchers is to
…focus in on a particular group, a supportive needs group that maybe the housing
authority doesn’t want to necessarily try to incorporate into what they’ve got going but
maybe they’ve got the vouchers – they’ve got vouchers to the side that they can direct
towards that.

This sentiment, of trying to stitch together funding for a project from so many pools of
funds with different restrictions on them that you end up integrating different design elements
into the final proposal in order to access those funds, is evident in the funding structure for the
BPNP housing strategy as well. Listing the sources included in the Preliminary Funding Model
in 2012 took an entire paragraph and spans almost the entire range of creative financing currently
available to municipalities:

Funding identified in Section 11 (Preliminary Funding Model) for FY 2012/13 are currently
included in the City’s proposed budget, including the Home Investment 16 Partnership
Program (HOME) and Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) from the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD); Urban Renewal and Urban Development
Action Grant funds (UDAG). Future funding may come from: HOME, CDBG, Federal
Home Loan Bank of Chicago (AHP), State Affordable Housing Tax Credits, Federal Low
Income Housing Tax Credits, Urban Renewal and UDAG in addition to a Hazard
Mitigation FEMA grant and debt financing (SS 2012-024).
Some of the redevelopment design decisions (e.g. the decision to include a tornado shelter as part of a new fire station located on the site giving the City access to FEMA money; the integration of part of the City’s Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) funds targeted at hiring Minority and/or Women-owned Business Enterprises (MWBE) as demolition contractors, a fund which also provides Champaign’s matching for federal HOME program funding) likely stem from these kinds of funding constraints and considerations.

As financing mechanisms for public investment become increasingly opaque to anyone without an advanced academic degree or financial experts, potential abuses abound, easily justified by the modernist myth long plaguing the planning profession of the impartial objective planning expert. It will likely only continue to become more difficult for ordinary citizens affected by their government’s financial decisions to grasp the myriad abstruse and often esoteric complexities of its services financing. This trend is also a vital part of understanding the City of Champaign’s explanations and motivations, the “plausible” fiscal policy space that constrains decisions ranging from service delivery to financing mechanisms. Dorothy David provided further explanation, saying that neighborhood wellness investments are sometimes not as complex as the BPNP.

Sometimes policy recommendation is self-evident, or sometimes support for City Council deciding to do something is unanimous. She gave the example of the local MTD having received notification of $15 million TIGER grant close to the time of our interview in late 2014. It was a federal allocation with Durbin’s influence to do multi-model street improvement projects straddling CU that would be focused on the campus community. There was a local match involved, and required an intergovernmental agreement between Urbana and Champaign, and MTD and UIUC. That kind of wellness investment, she explained, is agreed upon and passes quickly precisely because it allows the City to achieve a community goal using outside resources. She explained, “it causes us to shift work priorities because often outside funding has its own timelines and we cannot be slow to obligate the money or we will lose it.”

Esther Patt, echoing Aaron Smith’s earlier comments, also elaborated in our interview on the new role the Housing Authority has begun playing in a new fiscally creative, partnership-based era:

The Housing Authority is building 160 units of housing west of I-57 just south of Springfield in the Thornberry Ridge subdivision. This is a new thing the Housing
Authority is doing – actually, they’re not building it. They’re partnering with not-for-profit housing developer Benoit Group for a tax credit apartment complex. These tax credit places are getting tax credits, which if they’re a non-profit, they sell them to for-profit corporations for part of the money for operating.

The tax credits she is referring to are those involved in HUD’s Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program, which have been in operation since 1986 and are responsible for 90% of the affordable housing development in the U.S. since. These tax credits last for ten years and the project developments are required to meet low-income tenancy requirements for a 15-year initial compliance period and a subsequent 15-year extended use program. This program has primarily promoted public-private partnerships and leveraged primarily private corporate equity for affordable housing development that would have otherwise been priced out of the housing market due to low ROIs. They also count towards federal evaluation of banking institutions’ compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, which some argue is the primary reason financial institutions pursue tax-credit investments, rather than any significantly positive financial gain equations (Schwartz, 2015).

In 2010, the cities of Urbana and Champaign, the Champaign County Regional Planning Commission (RPC), the Housing Authority of Champaign County (HACC) and the Village of Rantoul partnered to fund a consultant-prepared Regional Housing Study. The top three priorities discussed by the City of Champaign in a December 13, 2011 study session included the lack of emergency shelter, especially for families; lack of affordable rental housing units or subsidy for extremely low income households; and affordable homeownership and preservation (AAP, FY13-14). Right now, there are no programs or organizations in the area that serve the need of developing increased affordable rental units for extremely low income residents other than the local public housing authority.

Dorothy David in our interview said that Champaign’s housing strategy is about setting priorities. In housing, she said, Champaign has problems with homelessness, rental affordability, and homeownership affordability. There is an entire policy spectrum of things the City could get involved in, but a limited amount of resources. She echoed Aaron’s financing sentiments earlier, explaining the evolution of the City’s relationship with Habitat for Humanity in recent years as a result of Habitat having access to more grants and being positioned to help achieve the City’s housing goals of affordability and infill development, which is why she argued the city spends so much time building partnerships and relationships to support other local organizations in
housing-related efforts. She continued this explanation as a reason for the City’s partnership with the HACC in the Bristol Place redevelopment.

5.6.3. Housing Authority Housing Choice Voucher Allocation and Developer Controversy

In a memo dated June 15, 2012, approximately a month after the May study session where the housing strategy recommendations were first presented to Council and the public, a memo was presented to City Council from then City Manager Steve Carter with a draft Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) with the Housing Authority which listed a $1,092,000 contribution either through Housing Choice Vouchers (HCVs) valued at $33,600 each, cash, or a combination at its discretion. This was based on an estimated 40 rental households to be displaced by the BPNP, but the IGA verbiage itself specifically stated:

The Authority shall determine eligibility and may make available a voucher for each eligible Bristol Place household displaced as the result of the revitalization plan, but not to exceed 32 vouchers. The vouchers shall be targeted for seniors, persons with disabilities, persons with special needs, or extremely low-income renters, defined as households with incomes of less than 30% of the AMI (CB 2012-215).

It further stated that HACC is required to make a decision regarding eligibility within 30 days of the initial referral, which would occur during Phase I relocation.

There was widespread community disagreement with the City’s decision to partner with the HACC on the financing of the BPNP. FOIA-ed email correspondence reported a letter dated June 1, 2012 from Antwaun Neely, a local landlord who rents to many local Section 8 recipients, alerting the Chicago office of HUD in outrage that

…the HACC would be relieving the city, in part of its responsibility to help the families that the CITY is displacing at an estimated cost of a million dollars!! It also strikes me that this resolution appears to suggest that the HACC currently has the vouchers for use, yet is holding them aside to be used as a bartering tool with the city (Urbana-Champaign Independent Media Center, September 17, 2012).

On August 23, 2012 before a meeting of the HACC’s Board of Commissioners met, a community protest took place about the City and HACC’s combined plans to prioritize displaced Bristol Place tenants by setting aside the 32 vouchers. Because the local housing authority is allotted a limited number of vouchers, they are in very high demand in Champaign County, and giving special preference and priority to 32 displaced Bristol residents means the financial hardship of the displacement effects from the BPNP double. The existing 32 residents who had
been on the HACC’s waiting list for rental assistance would also be “displaced,” by being bumped further down the waiting list, while vouchers for Bristol renters are held “in reserve.” Esther Patt also voiced objections, saying “with more than 300 homeless children in the county and more than 400 families waiting on the Section 8 waiting list, it’s unconscionable for the housing authority to be sitting on close to 200 vouchers and not putting them into use right now” (News Gazette September 27, 2012: Voucher-plan opponents to voice concerns). As both Terry Townsend and Esther Patt alluded to in our interviews, often people wait years on a HCV. Edward Bland, executive director of the housing authority, has said it can take from one to five years for someone to go from the waiting list to receiving a voucher. The waiting list is cut off at about 400 households, so some have to wait just to get on the list (News Gazette September 27, 2012: Voucher-plan opponents to voice concerns).

Terry Townsend, a former HACC Commissioner for 10 years who led the protest, continued his prior protests against the eminent domain-based displacement and clearance housing strategy being used in Bristol Place. Arguing that it would “psychologically disturb” existing residents and deepen their financial challenges (News Gazette August 23, 2012: “Protest planned over Housing Authority plan”), his sentiments were similar to what Reverend Barnes in a Bristol Park Steering Committee meeting eight months earlier on January 26, 2012 shared, where meeting minutes stated that he said “studies of relocation show depression is a factor with relocation,” and distributed information about (CARE) Church Assisted Relocation Engagement geared towards social and emotional support in partnerships with area churches. In a public meeting on January 30, 2012, a “male audience member” asked of the City’s relocation and compensation plans, “what about emotions, etc. of disruption?,” to which Kerri Spear responded, “the ones we have kept in touch with are much happier in the new place,” and then talked about the Douglass Square development on the other side of the railroad tracks (AAP, 12-13). This blanket dismissal of even the potential for negative and disparate life impacts post-forced relocation is representative of the problematic approaches and lack of historical understanding evidenced by City officials as they moved forward with the BPNP.

During the protest in August, Townsend argued that he wanted to see preferential treatment in the distribution of HCVs - but for the homeless, disabled and seniors first: “Rather than give preferences to Bristol Park, we want them to do these kind of preferences” (News Gazette August 23, 2012: “Protest planned over Housing Authority plan”). After the community
protests, in November 2012 the housing authority added to the list of people who would be considered for preferential treatment, including veterans, victims of domestic violence, homeless people, people with disabilities and people already living or working in Champaign County (News Gazette, November 8, 2012: Housing authority to hear Bristol Place presentation from Champaign).

Another layer of controversy in the approval of the IGA between the HACC and Champaign occurred in September of 2012, as one of the Commissioners’ terms expired at the end of July 2012 (Al Anderson), and the City of Champaign is one of the local agencies with representatives on the housing board. The City of Champaign and the HACC operate as separate entities under state law, but the Cities of Champaign and Urbana each have two appointments to the HACC Board of Commissioners. A fifth position serves as a “floating” appointment that rotates between the two cities, a sixth commissioner is appointed by the Champaign County Board, and the seventh commissioner is a resident appointment. But it isn’t only the makeup of the board that links local municipalities with the housing authority. During the HACC’s annual planning process, the City of Champaign receives a copy of the draft plan for review. Once the review process is completed and the HACC has satisfactorily responded to any City concerns, the City will issue notice certifying that their Plan is consistent with the City’s adopted Consolidated Plan. As stated in the 2010-2011 Annual Action Plan, this review process includes “reviewing any upcoming demolition or disposition cases, proposed capital improvement projects, and overall policy changes.” The partnership between the HACC and Champaign is made clear in another statement: “the City of Champaign and the HACC have enjoyed a much more cooperative arrangement since the late 1990’s due to the success of joint redevelopment activities at Taylor Thomas Subdivision, Oakwood Trace Townhomes, and Douglass Square.”

In September 2012, Champaign City Council unanimously approved then Mayor Don Gerard’s appointment of Reverend Larry Lewis, the pastor of Bethel AME, to the housing board. Gerard maintained that he selected Lewis for “no political reasons whatsoever,” and that “he quite simply is the best man for the job,” but Terry’s take was different: “I have no doubt that Rev. Lewis will do whatever the mayor asks of him.” Lewis’ take was to claim religious objectivity, saying “As a minister, I have no political ties. My only ties are to God and doing what is right” (News Gazette September 19, 2012: Mayor’s pick for housing authority board creates stir). In our interview, Terry elaborated, saying that City officials in Champaign recruited
HACC board members, and put people on the board as political puppets to get the votes needed to support designating Section 8 HCVs to support the city’s renewal efforts. After Lewis’s appointment, the HACC board voted to move ahead with the Bristol IGA.

Another conflict of interest argument put forward by concerned community members Terry Townsend and Martell Miller, among others, concerned Housing Commissioner Bishop Lloyd E. Gwin of the Church of the Living God. He had an ownership interest in a parcel in Bristol Place at 1307 N. Clock St., although he was reported as saying he was “only holding ownership of the lot for a family that would have lost the home had he not gotten involved financially” (News Gazette September 12, 2012: Gerard pick for housing authority board could sway Bristol Park decision). From another interview I did however, I learned that in addition to that physical parcel inside the plan area, his church owns four large properties just east across the railroad tracks from Bristol Place, where he is building a new mega church on a 10-acre site. The church will double as a storm shelter from tornadoes with its poured-concrete walls, and the church plans to use its current building, right across Bradley Avenue to the south, as a community center “we want to make it a community facility, not only for our membership, we want to make sure we have a positive impact on the community” (News Gazette January 5, 2015 “Pastor hopes new church transforms North End from ‘notorious’ to ‘glorious.’”). Gwin also plans to transform the former Champaign Asphalt garage directly behind the new site into an activities or sports center, he says the young people need and deserve a place to have fun and play ball.

In the summer of 2012 the City of Champaign paved an extension of Fourth Street north of Bradley, put in sidewalks, sod grass, and drainage, spending nearly half a million dollars in taxpayer money. On June 5, 2012, City Council voted 9-0 to approve the project. At the council meeting, Gwin said this project would benefit the “entire community,” but his church was the biggest winner with free infrastructure provided by the City of Champaign. The City gains little financially from the church, as it is a tax-exempt institution (Urbana-Champaign Independent Media Center, September 17, 2012: Emails reveal Champaign city staff working behind the scenes to level Bristol Place). But when taken in the context of public participation community input desiring a community center, the City identifying need for a storm shelter, and athletic facilities, it seems clear why the City approved those infrastructure expenditures.
In fact, in the February 2011 BPNP, one of the least involved “approaches” the City identifies for meeting the stated Human Development goals listed in the original plan as gathered from residents, “call[s] for establishing partnerships with other agencies to ensure access for the neighborhood’s children and families to existing programming.” The full excerpt discussing those needs is below:

For example, one objective in the Human Development goal is to increase activities for children and families in the neighborhood. If the City were to choose an approach with a high level of involvement, staff could seek funding and pursue a strategy to establish a Family Resource Center in the neighborhood. In this example, it is possible that the City may consider donating a City owned lot for a new facility to build on and potentially pursue grant money to fund it. As operated in other communities, a Family Resource Center is typically run by a non-profit and has facilities to provide afterschool activities for children or other activities, such as computer education classes. Another approach where the City is less directly involved would call for establishing partnerships with other agencies to ensure access for the neighborhood’s children and families to existing programming.

In September 2012, housing authority commissioners were documented as having said that city officials had not been completely transparent with the board about their plan to use the vouchers. “What we were hearing was, they didn’t know anything that was going on,” then-Mayor Gerard said (News Gazette, September 12, 2012: Gerard pick for housing authority board could sway Bristol Park decision). In the midst of the previous month’s protests, the seven-member housing board voted on whether to invite the city to formally present its plans to the board, the vote was split 3-3 with board members Margaret Neil, Grant Henry, and Eddie Adair voting “no,” and Rev. Bishop Gwin, Janice Mitchell, and Clyde Walker voting “yes.” Board chair Al Anderson abstained from the vote, as his term expired on July 31, 2012. Board commissioner Grant Henry said in the August 23, 2012 board meeting following the protest that the board has been “kept in the dark” about the negotiations of the director Ed Bland. Bland resigned from his previous position with the Gary Housing Authority amidst a scandal in which other top administrators were fired or reassigned. A federal report concluded that Bland had “grossly mismanaged” a $1.2 million rehabilitation project (IMC, August 24, 2012: Champaign Housing Authority considers demolishing a third black neighborhood).

The City made a presentation on November 8, 2012 to the HACC board, and on November 15, 2012 the HACC Board of Commissioners approved the IGA. Terry Townsend said at the time that he did not believe commissioners knew at the beginning of the process what
they were being asked to approve, “the executive director had cut these deals with the city of Champaign, and the board was not aware of what was going on,” to which Ed Bland responded “I guess they just wanted to get a better understanding” (News Gazette, November 8, 2012: Housing authority to hear Bristol Place presentation from Champaign). When I asked Ed Bland if I could interview him, he declined, saying, “The City of Champaign is responsible for the redevelopment of Bristol Place. The contact for the City of Champaign is listed below,” and gave me Kevin Jackson’s contact information at the City.

In even further controversy, on June 13, 2012, the use of the Atlanta-based developer The Benoit Group also simultaneously seemed already arranged by HACC and City staff. Kerri Spear wrote in an email, “I felt very strongly that Torian [Priestly, developer for the Benoit Group] was patiently sitting on his hands, waiting for us to ask him to join in the project. :)” To which Patti Smith, HACC’s Director of Capital Programs, responded positively, saying:

…we spoke to our attorney, Eric Hanson, regarding our solicitation of The Benoit Group - specifically as it may apply to the HACC’s and The Benoit Group’s participation as our developer in the Bristol Place redevelopment. Eric told us he had no problem with it (Urbana-Champaign Independent Media Center, September 17, 2012).

Further documentation of some involved individuals knowing they were hiding their plans was found in a June 28, 2012 email Kevin Jackson wrote to Kerri Spear, saying “Ed has previously requested discretion with communication on this issue. Thanks.” (Urbana-Champaign Independent Media Center, September 17, 2012: Emails reveal Champaign city staff working behind the scenes to level Bristol Place).

In my interview with Esther, she shared similar sentiments about both the HACC-City collusion, as well as developer and development design decisions already made, saying:

Now, the other thing that was the eye opener for me at that [Steering Committee] meeting in July 2012, because someone there asked, and I asked, too… ‘Why don’t you tear down everything that’s substandard, and then leave the stuff that is in good shape, and then rebuild around it, and that will give you more of a neighborhood. Then, Kevin Jackson said ‘A developer wouldn’t want that,’ like a developer wants all cleared land, and I didn’t realize at the time, and this is why the city officials may disagree with me, but if they say anything otherwise, hooey! They knew, I don’t know at what start, maybe from the start, they were looking at wanting to build another single-family home neighborhood, like Taylor Thomas Homes or something. But, when I attended my first steering committee meeting in January of that year [2012], for those six months I was there, there was all this talk about how we’re going to talk about what we want in there, and …they went through all the motions of trying to find out what people want. I mean they didn’t do a very good job of it. It was clear to me at that meeting because Kevin did clarify it. That’s when I
realized, ‘Oh, they already decided, before they embarked on this project, when they created the steering committee, that they’re demolishing the entire neighborhood, and they’re putting in a tax credit housing complex. That has been the decision, so I’m here as part window dressing, and now we’re just going to go through the motion that there was all this public engagement to come up with the solution. At one point, it became – well, the Housing Authority, I mean Ed Bland sort of let the cat out of the bag that, ‘Well, we already have the developer.’ It’s like, ‘We haven’t even decided what we’re going to do yet, and you’ve already got a developer? How does that work?’ so then Kevin, of course, pulled it back, ‘No, no, no. Ed has a developer he’s working with if we do that,’ but that was clearly what they were going to do. I thought, ‘Of all the foolish things.’ Being in planning, you know that the thing that’s frustrating is, you know, people have ideas like, ‘If only you had six square blocks with nothing on it, then how would you plan it?’ and you never have that. What you have is things in pieces, real spaces. Here, you have it. This was an opportunity. What a wasted opportunity. This was the opportunity to develop an actual neighborhood.

The IGA and resident relocation plans were both approved by City Council on December 18, 2012, and the BPNP moved forward with its displacement and clearance decision for the Bristol Place neighborhood.

5.6.4. Residential Relocation Plan: City claims is more humane than Old Urban Renewal

The City has argued that they are going beyond the minimum federal requirements for residential relocation assistance as determined by the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4601) (URA), by “also includ[ing] local enhancements, based on substantial public input over the last year, to protect the long-term housing stability for the most vulnerable” (CB 2012-214). In addition to the URA, the use of HOME, CDBG or UDAG funds in the BPNP project is subject to section 104(d) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, which requires a one-for-one replacement of lower-income housing (CB 2012-214).

Existing federal requirements under both the URA and Section 104(d) require comprehensive relocation assistance advisory services (see §24.205 (c)(2)(ii)), and moving and related expenses (e.g. security deposits and credit checks for new housing) (49 CFR Part 24). Relocation advisory services include (1) relocation planning, involving determination of the relocation needs and preferences of each person to be displaced; (2) explanations of the relocation payments and other assistance for which the person may be eligible; (3) the related eligibility requirements; and (4) the procedures for obtaining such assistance, which includes a
personal interview with each residential displaced person. For moving expenses, displaced persons have the option to either receive payment for actual moving and related expenses (§24.301), or fixed moving cost payment determined according to the Fixed Residential Moving Cost Schedule (FRMCS) approved by the Federal Highway Administration and published in the Federal Register on a periodic basis.\(^\text{15}\)

Differences between the federal relocation requirements under the URA and Section 104(d) may help explain why the City of Champaign pushed so hard to involve the Housing Authority of Champaign County in the financing model for Phase I of the BPNP. Existing federal requirements under the URA for displaced residential tenants require payments equal to 42 times the monthly rental assistance payment. This is calculated as the difference between (A) the lesser of (1) old housing costs (rent & utilities), (2) 30% of gross monthly income, or (3) welfare rent (as paid); and (B) the lesser of (1) comparable housing costs (rent & utilities) or (2) the occupied decent, safe and sanitary (DSS) replacement dwelling (HUD Tenant Assistance, Relocation and Real Property Acquisition Handbook 1378). Under the URA, cash replacement housing payments are required if the displaced tenant is not currently receiving government housing assistance, although they do have the option to accept government housing assistance if desired and available.

Interestingly, due to the funding package of the BPNP including HOME and CDBG funds, Section 104(d) requirements must also be satisfied, which has slightly different requirements for displaced residential tenants. Section 104(d) requires 60 times the monthly rental assistance payment, calculated as the difference between (A) the greater of (1) 30% of adjusted gross monthly income, (2) 10% of gross monthly income, (3) welfare rent (as paid), or minimum rent for the local public housing authority; and (B) the lesser of (1) comparable housing costs (rent & utilities) or (2) the occupied decent, safe and sanitary (DSS) replacement dwelling. Under 104(d), the displacing government agency may offer Housing Choice Vouchers (Section 8) in lieu of cash replacement housing payments, but low income tenants can request direct cash assistance calculated under the URA instead.

The City’s partnership with the HACC translates directly into this project costing the City less money in CDBG Section 108 loan financing than it would have had without the option of using HCVs to help fund residential displacement costs, specifically due to the funding sources\(^\text{15}\) For further FRMCS info see http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/realestate/fixsch96.htm

\(^{15}\) For further FRMCS info see http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/realestate/fixsch96.htm
involved in Phase I. Phase I of the BPNP, which involves the acquisition of parcels, relocation of residents and demolition of all properties in Bristol Place, is budgeted to cost a total of $7,585,695: $1,200,000 in HOME funding, $1,780,000 from the Urban Renewal fund, and CDBG Section 108 debt financing in the amount of $3,524,000 (CB 2013-187). The HACC is providing the remaining $1,092,000 via HCVs.

The residential relocation plan provided by the City for the BPNP included one main “local enhancement” and one main modification to existing federal requirements. The primary ‘enhancement’ and additional resource the City will be providing is a real estate tax rebate program targeted chiefly towards elderly or disabled displaced homeowner residents, defined as “homeowners receiving a pension, social security or social security insurance” (CB 2012-214). This enhancement was created as a response to concerns that arose through public participation sessions about the long-term affordability for displaced existing homeowners in the neighborhood, as most were found to be elderly and/or on fixed incomes, and Bristol Place property values were the cheapest in the City. Essentially, this real estate tax rebate program involves the City committing to pay the difference between the elderly or disabled displaced person’s Principle, Interest, Taxes and Insurance (PITI) above 30% of their gross monthly income, reimbursed annually as a tax rebate for as long as they occupy the original replacement unit. All other homeowner households will “be considered for,” but not guaranteed, this rebate for a period of three years only. In addition, there is cap on the program of $25,000 a year, and the City stated in its relocation plan, “if the cost of the program should exceed this amount, the seniors and persons with disabilities will be prioritized. If any funding remains after the seniors and persons with disabilities receive their payment, then the remaining portion shall be equally divided amongst the remaining eligible homeowners” (City of Champaign Bristol Park Relocation and Replacement Plan).

The main modification to existing federal requirements is a stipulation resulting from the resident protests held outside the HACC Board of Commissioners meeting in August 2012, which preferentially targets the HACC’s HCVs for seniors, persons with disabilities, special needs or extremely low-income renters (<30% AMI) that are paying less than $500 in rent in their leave unit (City of Champaign Bristol Park Relocation and Replacement Plan).
5.6.5 Use of Housing Choice Vouchers problematic

These two ‘optional policies’ funded by the City are the only real financial evidence of any responsiveness to public input received throughout the planning process, and while I commend the real estate tax rebate program, the HCV prioritization still leaves unaddressed community protests and concerns about transferring displacement effects beyond just the residents of the Bristol Place neighborhood through the use of priority-access HCVs. In the only public comment Council received during the 30-day period before the Relocation Plan was approved in a November 20, 2012 City Council meeting, Martel Miller protested, again, the conflict of interest present by the two people appointed by the Mayor to serve on the Housing Authority of Champaign County Board of Commissioners, and re-stated that vouchers should not be used for people who are going to be displaced by the Bristol Park Plan because that compounds the area-wide disadvantage of the exact same struggling low income rental population this development is supposedly targeting. It is also significant that the only real addition to federally required relocation policies was for the most vulnerable elderly homeowners, and that the remaining and majority renting residents in the neighborhood will receive no assistance with rent increases (which are virtually guaranteed) beyond three years after their forced displacement.

Esther Patt stated that she initially got involved in the Steering Committee for precisely this reason:

The concern there wasn’t that these folks shouldn’t get relocation, our feeling was that the city should pay for the relocation costs for those people who live at Bristol Place and not take it out of the pool of vouchers that people are waiting for years. Why should they [Bristol Place residents displaced by government action] get bumped ahead of them [existing HCV waiting list members]? 

Hopefully, the use of HCVs in the relocation of displaced persons affected by this project may prove a beneficial thing in the future for expanding the City of Champaign’s human rights ordinance to no longer allow housing discrimination based on income, because City staff and officials will work with residents who need to relocate, and will thus become aware of local Section 8 discrimination. Local housing experts I interviewed corroborated the widespread Section 8 housing discrimination in Champaign. Aaron Smith with Homestead stated of his experience working with affordable housing provision locally, “if you get a voucher it’s still kind
of hard to find landlords who will accept them. But if you get a voucher definitely you’re in a better position than someone who’s on the wait list.” Esther said,

Even in Urbana, there are landlords who will turn you down, and then you’ve got to go to the city and file a discrimination complaint. Most people do not file discrimination complaints because you’ve got 90 days to find a place, and then you lose your voucher. Most people who are victims of discrimination don’t file complaints anyway because they’re not looking for civil rights action, they’re looking for housing. If it will get them the housing immediately, they’ll do it. Otherwise, you know.

And Jim Rose said, “landlords in Urbana cannot discriminate based on race or whether that person has a voucher and that’s not the case in Champaign. It’s just hard to get people into good quality housing when they have a voucher.”

In addition to finding it difficult to get into a unit initially with a property owner who will accept Section 8 HCVs as a source of income, once residents do get into a unit, it is by no means guaranteed that the unit will translate to more housing stability for its residents. As Esther Patt elaborated, echoing earlier BPNP opposition sentiments shared by Martel Miller:

With public housing, the Housing Authority wanted to tear down all the public housing, and it’s really because HUD wasn’t providing enough money to do maintenance on it, but they created this baloney fiction that it’s about density, that we have to have lower density, and also about mixed income, that if you have all poor people together, that – but somehow if poor people live around people with money that somehow that will inspire them to have more money or something. You want them to have more money? Give them jobs. For that matter, if you want to lessen the achievement gap in the schools, provide housing stability. At least 20% of third graders are attending their third school by third grade. That’s why a lot of kids aren’t doing well in school. It’s not because people whose parents are crack heads or something, it’s kids who just they have to keep changing schools because the family has to keep moving. On Section 8, you will not get an honest answer from the Housing Authority, and I don’t care if you publish this on the front page of the News-Gazette and put it on TV and radio. The Housing Authority is not honest about how much people have to move when they have Housing Choice Vouchers because either the landlord won’t do repairs, or the landlord raises the rent beyond the amount of the voucher, or the landlord just refuses to renew. People with Housing Choice Vouchers have to move a lot. I see, from the number of people on Section 8 who contact us [the Champaign-Urbana Tenant Union], who have to move because the landlord is not doing repairs, so they call the Housing Authority, they call the Section 8 person. They send someone out, they do the inspection, they tell the landlord, ‘We’re not going to pay the voucher anymore,’ and then the tenant has got to move. A lot of times, the landlord sues the tenant anyway, so there’s that whole problem.

Esther is referencing widely-documented scholarly evidence for the housing and school achievement linkages that has been around since the Civil Rights era. This linkage has been
documented as a key element in both the 1968 Kerner Commission Report (Report of the National Advisory Commission On Civil Disorders (1968)) and in the legislative history of the Fair Housing Act. The relation between school and housing segregation was also explored in a series of school desegregation cases beginning in the 1970s. Yet in spite of HUD’s duty to “affirmatively further fair housing (42 U.S.C. § 4208),” and the parallel “compelling government interest” in the reduction of school segregation, there have been few examples of effective coordination between housing and school policy in the intervening years, according to Philip Tegeler in a report prepared by the Poverty & Race Research Action Council in October 2011 (Finding Common Ground: Coordinating Housing and Education Policy to Promote Integration).

Despite these issues, when compared to the subsidized rental assistance provided by the City limited to three years post-displacement, despite the limitations of local landlords’ acceptance and management of tenants with HCVs, the longevity of the tenant housing assistance provided by HCVs is much better. This longevity, however, comes with additional requirements, often very difficult to meet in the current job climate.

5.7 Shifts in public housing supply and decreased responsiveness to demand

The HACC four years ago (in 2010), with 788 applicants on the HCV Program waiting list, became a Moving to Work agency. As Jim Rose explained, “That’s important to know because it’s a real change in the way housing authorities can do business and there’s less paperwork. There’s more flexibility about what the Housing Authority can do. They can be their own developer. They can buy property without prior approval from HUD.”

One of the changes immediately implemented by the HACC as a MTW agency was the creation of a Mandatory Local Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) Program for all non-elderly households in both the Housing Choice Voucher and Public Housing Programs. This mandates that all residents aged 18 or over must be employed a minimum of 20 hours or more per week for at least one year, with incentives offered to families that succeed on an annual basis (HACC MTW Year 1 Report). As Jim Rose explained:

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We’re trying to break the cycle of families, one-family-after-another living in subsidized housing and with the Moving to Work idea the people cannot live in the housing permanently and they have an obligation to either work or go to school because in order to live in the housing you have to do one of those and the term is 7 years. After 7 years you can’t live in the housing anymore because, by that time, you’ve either got a better education or you’ve been working.

And as the HACC’s annual plans explains:

Created by Congress in 1996, Moving to Work (MTW) is a HUD demonstration program that allows housing authorities to design and test innovative, locally-designed strategies for providing low-income families with affordable housing and new paths to economic independence. MTW is currently the only mechanism through which public housing authorities can wholly transform housing delivery, programs and operations. The broad flexibility to waive statute and regulations allows HACC to better serve and house residents while streamlining internal operations.

Terry Townsend in our interview shared that he does not see this shift quite as positively, despite HUD’s good intentions for more local flexibility in meeting locally specific needs. He blamed federal devolution and the regional office at HUD for relaxing its enforcement responsibilities too much, evolving “from a policeman to a partner,” by giving the local housing authority too much flexibility. He said there is a whole host of problems with that approach locally, because of the makeup of the HACC’s management.

In its own Year 3 MTW Report, the HACC included a status report and evaluation of the MTW program prepared by researchers in the Department of Agricultural and Consumer Economics at UIUC that included excerpts from 15 tenant interviews, all of which were with female African American HACC residents with between one and five children. These women reported having worked or currently working in fast food jobs, earning $8.00 an hour with no benefits. When asked about the primary barriers to finding and maintaining employment, respondents mentioned the economy: “I get no response from applications,” “Right now with the economy it’s just not that easy. I would take any job right now to be honest”; and when asked about the barriers to continuing education, inadequate supplemental childcare and inability to balance work and childcare demands simultaneously were reported: “I actually did try going back to school, I wanted to get a business degree, but it’s like the bills didn’t stop coming, so I cut my hours back at work but it didn’t work out so I just said I’ll leave school alone until maybe the kids get a little older.” These struggles are reflective of the majority of the most vulnerable lower income Champaign residents, not just those currently receiving HACC housing assistance.
This MTW ideology includes no assistance for educational expenses, childcare or any other form of job training – it merely offers an “incentive payment” that residents have the option of receiving in the full amount as a credit against the upcoming year’s rent, or a commercial “gift” card equal to 50% of the annual incentive payment (Year 1 MTW Plan). As Esther Patt put it:

“They had this idea that, ‘We’re going to increase people's employment opportunities,’ blah-blah-blah, which of course you know rarely ever happens with people’s employment. If you want to increase people’s employment opportunity, you have to send them to a four-year college to get a degree, and that means you have to give them aid beyond tuition and fees. You have to give them free tuition and subsidy, because they have to give up work, you can’t go to school at night much, and you have to have a car if you want to go to Eastern and to drive an hour each way. You’ve got to give people a four-year college education. There’s a whole lot of people who have a high school degree, diploma, and even have some college, but they still can’t get better-paying jobs, and actually there are people with college degrees who are having trouble getting jobs, it depends on what your degree is in, but you know - you [also] see that most of these people are too old, and for that matter, if you’re 55 years old and you need a job and you have a master’s degree, it ain't so easy. People don’t want to hire you.

While the HACC seemed to understand these realities three years after implementing this program, reporting in its 3-year MTW report that “initial data collected through the University of Illinois evaluation program indicated that significant educational and training was going to be required in preparation for gainful employment by residents,” they have neither discontinued the FSS program, provided supplemental support for child care or lost income from educational programs, nor changed its mandatory requirements. The requirements state that in order to continue receiving HACC assistance, one adult member of each household must be employed 20 hours a week or enrolled in a certificate-granting educational program full time by the second year of housing assistance, and in order to receive any assistance after 5 years, all adult household members must be employed 20 hours per week (Year 3 HACC Report).

As Aaron Smith with Homestead mentioned, and as Jim Rose confirmed, the HACC has also changed the way they allocate government housing subsidies. The HACC has turned into an affordable housing developer, and has set aside and assigned project-based vouchers to all of its new LIHTC mixed-income private partnership projects. As Jim explained of the project-based voucher program:

That means the voucher is attached to the unit and it’s good for 20 years, so a person who moves into these newer developments that are coming online get subsidized. The unit itself will have the subsidy. The person’s still only gonna be able to live there X number
of years and have to move on but it’s good for the Housing Authority because the subsidy money is guaranteed for the units for a longer period of time – 20 years.

Aaron elaborated further, recognizing the squeeze for low-income renters as a group area-wide:

I know the housing authority has gotten a little bit of flack about the fact that they’ve held on to some of the vouchers for their development, to use in their developments. I don’t know. People can debate that but I mean certainly once somebody gets moved into a project based unit that has a subsidy attached to it that will be a great help for those people. But that also means there’s less vouchers out there.

In 2013, the HACC had a total of 1,798 authorized HCVs, 281 of which were held for project based vouchers (PBVs). The HCV waiting list was opened for a limited time period in November 2011, and out of a total of 2,200 applications received, 400 were selected via random lottery to be placed on the waiting list. Of these 400, 389 (97%) were considered extremely low income, with household incomes below 30% of the AMI. In 2014, there were 606 households on the HCV waitlist, 45 on the PBV waitlist, and 139 on the public housing unit waitlist, for a total of 790 on the waitlist for public housing assistance in Champaign County (2014 MTW Annual Report). While this only underscores the high level of need already documented for affordable low income rental housing units across Champaign County, HACC turning into an affordable housing developer led to a 312-unit increase in new housing made available for households at or below 80% AMI, and an average waitlist applicant time decrease from 36 months (3 years) to 13.6 months. Overall, the HACC states that at least 75% of the families assisted by HACC are very low-income families (indicated as <50% AMI) (Year 4 MTW Report). Unfortunately, those who most need it, as demonstrated by multiple interviews with local housing experts, government officials, and data on local housing cost burden, are precisely those below 30% of the AMI. And as documented above, the HACC is the only local option for financial assistance for those households, which explains why 97% of the households on the HCV waitlist in 2013 fell into this income category.

Similar to complex financing partnership trends discussed above in relation to the BPNP, with the PBV Program the HACC has also shifted some of its maintenance responsibilities onto the private sector, with the “establishment of project based waiting lists and transference of all administrative functions for the operation of the vouchers and processing of all project based activities at the property to the respective property management company.” In 2014 this led to a $19,882 annual cost savings and 888 hour staff time savings for the HACC. The three new large
development complexes HACC has partnered with LIHTC developers on since turning into a MTW agency have leveraged $6.92 in private funding for every $1.00 of HACC funds spent (Year 4 MTW Annual Report).

Despite these seemingly positive indicators, in 2010, the HACC owned 434 total units of public housing (109 Family, 84 Elderly/Disabled mixed, and 250 Elderly only units) (MTW Year 1 Report). But by 2014, that number had dropped to 354 (16 Family, 106 Elderly/Disabled, and 232 Elderly only units), including a staggering 85% decrease in total family units available, compared to a 7% decrease in elderly only units and a 21% increase in elderly/disabled units. In addition to traditional public housing stock owned and operated by the HACC, it also claims Oakwood Trace and Douglass Square in Champaign and Hamilton on the Park in Urbana, all LIHTC properties owned by “HACC affiliates,” which adds 74 additional total PBV units to the HACC’s unit inventory. While in overall numbers this is positive, these 74 units with PBVs only made up 35% of the total units constructed in these developments, meaning that as public housing units have been demolished, they are not being replaced at the same rate, and market rate units make up the difference. Providence at Thornberry, by far the largest development HACC has undertaken as a MTW agency and developer thus far, has a more advantageous affordable-to-market-rate unit split at 227 PBV units (47%) compared to 252 market rate units.

In 2005, Burch Village, at the time a 70-unit family public housing development was demolished, and replaced with only 50 units built under HUD’s mixed-income HOPE VI guidelines, which do not require a one for one unit replacement. Burch Village was the first public housing development in Champaign and opened in 1952 for white families only. HUD’s mixed income approach to public housing (which began in 1992 with HOPE VI) breaks down most developments into 1/3 market rate units, 1/3 moderate income, and 1/3 of total units set aside for low-income residents. The new Burch Village, called Douglass Square, thus only set aside 16 units for the lowest income eligible renters, and only 36 of the original 70 residents were able to return – the remaining 34 families who were originally tenants of Burch Village were permanently displaced. Additionally, former public housing residents were not guaranteed the ability to come back, but instead had to go through a screening process before being declared eligible (Ferrari, 2013).

Essentially, similar to nationwide public housing supply trends, Champaign is losing public housing units. As Jim Rose put it:
When we tear down public housing, we usually lose units and now we’re replacing them with different kinds of housing. But we’re not entire owners of the things we redevelop in town anyway so a private developer comes in and does in all the work and does that and we give ‘em a land lease at 99 years usually, and we’re a limited partner so it’s not public housing. So we’re losing public housing in that regard but we’re gaining affordable housing. Public housing used to serve only the lowest of the low-income so when we replaced the housing we tried to set aside a lot for very extremely low-income families.

This is directly reflective of national policy shifts that began in the early 1990s as HUD responded to other widespread neoliberal governance changes and began an ideological shift from supply to demand-oriented approaches to low-income housing provision nationwide. Public housing according to HUD “was established to provide decent and safe rental housing for eligible low-income families, the elderly, and persons with disabilities.” Historically, HUD has administered federal aid to local housing agencies (HAs) that manage the housing for low-income residents at rents they can afford. This stance on housing provision positions Has providing both a rival and excludable private good to fill the gap between the realities of market provision and consumer budget lines of that same good. Public housing has historically provided homes for low-income households who cannot afford equilibrium market rents, and in effect has acted as a subsidy that enables these households to devote more of their limited incomes to other basic needs (e.g. food and clothing).

The use of HCVs is a paradigm shift and a direct change from historical supply-oriented solutions to meeting the affordable housing needs of low-income residents to more demand-oriented theory and policy. In supply-side approaches to public housing, the government builds or subsidizes new housing, which is generally more expensive, gives recipients fewer options and increases housing consumption. In demand-side approaches, existing housing stock is occupied by families who need it and receive government assistance in the form of income supplements (coupons or vouchers), which give recipients more options, but increases both prices and demand for housing overall as the available supply is in higher demand, which in turn increases prices. This increase in pricing becomes especially problematic when public voucher programs are not sufficient to meet the needs of all of the low-income households who are

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19 HUD’s Public Housing Program, Downloaded on December 2, 2013 from http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/rental_assistance/phprog
eligible for assistance, as is clearly the case currently in Champaign County.\textsuperscript{21}

In part, this new HA role was made possible by the 1998 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (QHWRA) that allowed PHAs to work directly with the private sector to develop mixed-finance projects (among a series of other provisions). Overall, the QHWRA legislation privileges a demand side approach over a supply side approach to meet the housing needs of low-income households, and has essentially entailed shifting a large part of the cost of maintaining and producing housing for low-income people to the private sector (a combination of both for-profit and not-for-profit developers).\textsuperscript{22} Turning to the private sector may provide additional sources of funding to rebuild and renovate buildings, but it also adds stakeholders previously absent into the public housing provision equation. Namely, the investors and developers in the private sector who are generally more risk averse in building low-income housing as they are required by law to measure all of their actions against the amount of profit those actions generate for their shareholders. Developers now often have lead responsibility for securing financing, overseeing design and construction, marketing to subsidized and unsubsidized residents, and contracting for property management and social service provision.\textsuperscript{23}

This is exactly the kind of “streamlining of operations” the HACC has sought with its new mixed-income LIHTC housing development complexes, as they put it, successfully transferring “all administrative functions for the operation of the vouchers to the property management company.”

Public housing, dissimilar to general housing or other private goods, constitutes both an economic \textbf{and} a social asset, and one that cannot be successfully created or sustained solely by the private market to meet all the needs of those who cannot afford market rents. While portable, vouchers also put greater responsibility on the user to find and secure housing in the private sector and then manage finances and unfamiliar institutional mechanisms to keep it. Very specific assumptions about the market need to be fulfilled in order for vouchers to actually expand choice. These include the availability of units at a fair market rent (i.e. a rent level set by HUD that generally reflects the 40th percentile for a geographic area) in good neighborhoods (i.e. one that is an improvement over the current public housing environment), and, if units are

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid, pg. 225-26.
available, the ability for voucher holders to actually use their vouchers (i.e. the landlord is willing to participate and the unit meets housing quality standards set by HUD).

5.8 Elderly housing assistance privileged over family housing assistance: Reflection of community-wide NIMBY biases

Another theme that has come up in interviews and in low-income housing provision in the HACC’s stock is the Champaign-Urbana community’s bias towards privileging elderly residents’ needs over those of local families. In addition to the 85% decrease in the HACC’s supply of family units compared to the overall 14% increase in elderly and disabled units since 2010, of the 1,879 MTW households served by the HACC in 2013, 78% of were African-American, 83% were female-headed households, and 79% were family households with 3 children or less (MTW Year 3 Report). In my interview with Jim Rose, he explained his thoughts on why there is more community support for elderly supportive housing than housing for families:

Well it’s easy to build senior affordable housing because it’s not controversial. You can put affordable senior housing anywhere in the community and people will say, ‘yeah, that’s great because we have to help our seniors citizens of elderly people.’ But if you try and start placing affordable family housing in areas, it becomes very controversial and we’re finding that out because we’re building something in West Champaign – Providence at Thornberry – when it first came to light the neighbors were just outraged… a lot of people see public housing as being occupied by only one group of people - that is African Americans - and that’s gonna have to change, too, and we’re gonna try and do some marketing outreach for our Thornberry development because it’s a bad perception, you know? I mean this town is full low-income people and they’re not African-American. There’s Asian and there’s Hispanic people who work in restaurants who make minimum wage. There’s a lot of different groups of people, across the whole board but the perception was it’s gonna be all one group of people living in their housing.

The malicious NIMBY vitriol Jim referred to is easily seen in web board responses to a single local news article’s coverage of the HACC’s Thornberry LIHTC development in April 2013:

…I moved out of Turnberry a few years ago as my family size grew. Praise Jesus I did. This is not a good situation, but it sounds as if it is moving FORWARD! I took a hit on my home value when I sold it due to the timing; I can only imagine the hit homeowners in the area will be facing. I promise a few things: 1) Super Pantry will be increasing their single serve alcohol and tobacco sales post-development of Providence at Thornberry. 2) Emergency response time to 911 calls will have to be deeply considered by homeowners in the area who currently do not own a firearm. 3) Champaign Police Department will be forced to quadruple their route presence in that sector of town. 4) There will be a substantial increase of homes for sale (both by owner and
by agent) in that area in the next 60 days. In conclusion, my message to the neighbors of 'Providence at Thornberry' is GET OUT, GET OUT, AND GET OUT!!!!

…Those living in subsidized housing care very little or nothing for their environment because they have no skin in the game. They don't have to care. Its those around them who suffer. This is not a good thing for SW Champaign.

…What it means is more section 8 people from the Mattis to Neal down Bradley crowd is going to keep getting thrust upon on better areas of town and then continue with the trend of putting the problems of crime, drugs, gunfire and shootings out in what used to be good neighborhoods. With the city’s blessing an outside, out of state developer will come in and make all the money and then not have to deal with the lowering of property values and the increase in crime and drugs in areas where they weren't that prevalent before that comes with this element of the population. They want to erect these mixed housing multi family plans and locate them near good decent single family housing subdivisions and then you get the increase in crime in those areas (News Gazette, April 3, 2013).

There were a few more reasonable responses to these comments posted in the same thread, “but this is mixed income, not section eight,” and “some serious white flight going on here”; but overall, these perceptions reflect a much larger social divide in the local community.

However, by the HACC's own recent PBV program and primarily elderly and disabled public housing supply design, as the physical supply of family units have disappeared, as one might expect, the statistics on those waiting on HCVs have reflected more families. Of the 400 total HCV waitlist applicants in 2013, 390 (98%) were African American, and 97% were extremely low income (below 30% AMI). On the public housing unit waitlist, 128 applicants (82%) were African American, 100% are below 30% AMI, and 72% are families (MTW Year 3 Report).

The fact that 98% of the HACC’s waitlist are African-American combined with the intensely segregated neighborhoods in the Cities of Champaign and Urbana makes these community comments decidedly racist as well as classist (in addition to just being ignorant). This widespread racist community rhetoric can be found widely documented in other sources. It is in fact, such an issue in the local community that it is listed in the City’s Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing Report submitted to HUD as “Perceptions of affordable rental housing – NIMBYism/Perceptions of “Section 8” Voucher holders.” This report states:

The low/moderate income areas of Champaign are fairly compact geographically. In keeping with federal direction to reduce concentrations of poverty, efforts have been made to achieve this with new developments in Champaign including affordable rental housing. However, these efforts have often been met with public opposition. Some property owners believe that the construction of multi-family housing will bring down
property values in adjacent neighborhoods. Other arguments that have been expressed include the fear that renters make less desirable neighbors and that multi-family units overly burden the infrastructure and create traffic problems in residential neighborhoods. This attitude has been present as recently as April 2013 – the announcement of pending construction of subsidized housing in southwest Champaign was met with significant public resistance to the effort, much of which was based in traditional misconceptions. The practice of defining a population (Section 8 people) and then judging them as a whole is a classic example of prejudicial behavior, and remains present in Champaign. These misconceptions persist despite a body of work disproving it.

And in its following recommendations for addressing this barrier, the report states:

Local officials might consider approving additional incentives or requirements for the inclusion of some affordable units in new neighborhoods to try and break the pattern of development that has occurred over the years. Another important factor in ensuring that rental units do not detract from neighborhood property values is a continued emphasis on code enforcement.

Under another name, this is called inclusionary zoning, which can be set up to require developers to provide some percentage of housing that is affordable to low and moderate income renters or buyers, or pay into an affordable housing trust fund in lieu of providing affordable units in his/her development. However, the report then concludes, despite identification of the severity of the problem and what I assume to be NSD staff recommendations proposing two incredibly positive and potentially very effective solutions:

At this time, the City has decided to focus more on providing incentives to developers to encourage this type of affordable new construction, similar to what was done for the Atkins Group in the development of Ashland Park on the north end of town. If incentives continue to be sufficient to encourage voluntary construction of affordable units, no changes need be considered.
CHAPTER 6
URBAN RENEWAL IN CHAMPAIGN: COMMUNITY RATIONALES

In contrast to the primary reasons for the clearance and rebuild decision stated by City officials related to the physical and market conditions of existing housing stock, other community stakeholders, when asked what they believed the main rationale behind the City’s plan was, reported crime, poor property management combined with no code enforcement (unregulated slumlords), the lack of effective city reinvestment programs and the City’s northward development expansion plans as their perceptions of the City’s primary motivations.

6.1 “Crime”

Jim Rose, as mentioned above a long time local resident and housing and social services professional recently elected to the Housing Authority Board of Commissioners said:

The crime issue was a big one in that area. There were shootings and there were lots of things going on. A lot of it’s related to drug trafficking as far as I can tell. They’ve been thinking about it because that neighborhood has really been a kind of a drain on the resources of the city. There’s been a lot of police activity on the area.

In recounting the history of the neighborhood, specifically related to addressing or mitigating criminal activity in the area, there were always two City actions that all interviewees mentioned: the demolition of the infamous “Green Apartments” in 1998, and the City changing all of the streets in the Bristol Place neighborhood to one-ways in a neighborhood-wide crime reduction effort recommended by the police and also enforced by the City in 1998. According to City Council member Tom Bruno, the Green Apartments were a “hangout for a bad element” and “adversely affected the neighborhood” to the point that Marty Smith, a former City Council member, negotiated a deal with Jerry Schweighart, former Mayor of Champaign, to sell the property to the City and demolish it. One of the buildings stood where the current city park somewhat confusingly labeled ‘Bristol Park’ is on the westernmost edge of the Bristol Place neighborhood, and the other across the street in neighboring Garwood. As Kerri Spear said, “the Green Apartments had high drug trafficking issues, tearing those down was a short fix for the neighborhood while the City expended its limited resources in building Douglass Square and the Taylor Thomas subdivision.” A News Gazette article dated June 17, 2012 stated that in 1998, police estimated a drug transaction went down in the Bristol Place neighborhood every two or three minutes.
The other crime mitigation decision, also in 1998, to turn all neighborhood streets into one-way streets, occurred when police determined that would be a better way to manage the drug activity in the neighborhood, according to former community development specialist Greg Skaggs. In a News Gazette article documenting the 2010 change back to two-ways, Skaggs alluded to earlier efforts of residents and Metanoia detailed above, saying “the one-ways have been up there ever since, and there’s been different times the neighborhood has approached the city to get them removed.” Metanoia’s Reverend Barnes was quoted as saying, “once we got those old apartments out, that presence tried to remain here. After a while, people who have other intentions, they decided to move on or move some place else.” And since then, it has been like “night and day,” Barnes said. “There was a time when, just at the corner where we’re located, you could find anywhere from 15 to 20 individuals just standing in the street, and today we don’t have any of that. The community itself, it rallied around a lot of issues.” He was further quoted in the article as saying that he believed the change back to two way streets was a City change in the right direction for the health of the neighborhood and its residents, “the neighborhood needed to be turned back to normalcy” (News Gazette, March 6, 2010). Barnes said two years later that the area was much improved since the Green Apartment days, and the residents who remain deserved “better…these people are part of the city. They’re part of the citizenry. They deserve the same kind of attention as the people down in Devonshire” (News Gazette, June 17, 2012: Is it time to Wipe the Slate Clean in Bristol Place?). Terry Townsend agreed, saying in our interview that the crime issues had decreased significantly in Bristol Place in recent years, but that City Hall did not take that into account when creating their redevelopment plan. He asked rhetorically, “where are the statistics to justify what you are doing?”

The Champaign Police have re-structured their service delivery twice since 1992 – once in 1994 when the City was broken into three districts with specific officer teams assigned to each district in efforts to incorporate a ‘community oriented policing’ ethos into services, and once again in 2006 when those three districts were divided into four because of the expansion of the City’s southwestern subdivisions. This shift from rotating beat officers to fixed assignments so officers and residents become familiar and hopefully more comfortable working with one another is an immensely positive shift, if done in the right way. The Garden Hills neighborhood group, one of the oldest registered neighborhood groups in the City, has been vital in leading
these efforts along with Champaign police, as is evidenced from selected 2008-2009 Annual Report excerpts listed below.

The re-districting that occurred in 2006 cut the West District, which as is evident from the map contained in Appendix E.1 covered the largest geographic area in 2001, in half using University Avenue as the dividing line. Interestingly, Beat A in the North District, which from 1994-2006 contained the current BPNP redevelopment area, the Old Urban Renewal area, as well as the locations of the most recent two City neighborhood improvement projects (Douglass Square and Taylor Thomas Subdivisions), was the smallest geographic sub-area designated for assigned regular patrol policing services. And despite the geographic area of the West District being approximately 7 times the size of Beat A in the North District, the same number of officers were assigned to the entire West District as to the smallest Beat in the North District until 1997. Between 1998 and 2000 the West District had marginal patrol officer assignment increases, but still definitively not proportionate to either the residential numbers in either area or to the physical size of the two geographic areas: 2 more patrol officers were assigned to the West than North in 1998, 4 more in both 1999 and 2000, only 3 more in 2001, then 2 more in 2002, 1 more in 2003, and 3 more in 2004 (see Tables 4 and 5). Additionally, the only Lieutenants assigned to any Districts are assigned to the North and Norwest Districts.

What used to be Beat A in 2006 turned into Beat 11, still part of the North District, but at the same time as the District boundaries were re-drawn, the Beat boundaries were re-drawn and now encompass, instead of avoiding, the largest regional shopping center in the area (and a source of significant sales tax revenue for the City of Champaign), Marketplace Mall (see Appendices E.4 – E.6). While an exhaustive review of the concentrations of Part I Index Crimes by Beat in this area is still underway and whose publication is forthcoming, Larceny-Theft incidents (which includes shoplifting and forgery, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program) are concentrated in this retail center, due simply to its size and sales volume relative to the rest of the retail shopping opportunities in the Champaign-Urbana area. This means that without a breakdown of specific Index Crimes by offense type listed, the aggregate “criminal activity” attributed to this area in criminal data reports have the potential be inflated by these re-drawn boundaries in the same way that gerrymandering in political redistricting can skew election results. The UCR Program, used by the City of Champaign in collecting and tracking local criminal activity according to Champaign
Police Intelligence Analyst and 2013 Employee of the Year Renae Yandell, collects data about Part I offenses in order to measure the level and scope of crime occurring throughout the country. The UCR Program’s founders chose these offenses because they are serious crimes, they occur with regularity in all areas of the country, and they are likely to be reported to police (Crime in the United States Uniform Crime Reports, printed annually, FBI).

When reviewing Annual Police Reports dating back to 1992, there is a clear pattern of disproportionate policing efforts concentrating in Champaign’s North End and there have been many local critiques of disproportionate policing of African-American residents (e.g. via traffic stops), trends dovetailing the results of over two decades of criminal justice research nationally (see The New Jim Crow by Michelle Alexander for a comprehensive national overview of national racial disparities in policing practices).

The distribution of Champaign police patrols and calls for service by beat (see Table 5 and Appendix E.2) demonstrate the breakdown of policing services’ concentration in the North District, and the misconduct allegations data collected from 1989-2000 demonstrate a serious spike in 1998, corresponding to the time period in the late 1990s when the Green Apartments were demolished (see Appendix E.3). The most revealing quote indicating the Champaign Police Department’s ethos about concentrating more policing in the North End, the high Disparity Indices related to traffic stops and other accusations of racial profiling was:

The 2005 [IDOT Traffic Stop Study] report revealed that there continues to be a 15% difference in the citation versus warning tickets issued to Caucasian and African American motorists, with African-American motorists receiving a higher percentage of citations. We believe there is likely an underlying economic correlation contributing to this issue. We readily acknowledge that we routinely assign more resources to beats and districts that have large minority populations, but this stems from crime volume, more violent crime, and the rate at which police resources are utilized in various areas (2005 Annual Report).

This makes little sense from a number of perspectives: first, economic status has no correlation to a residents’ likelihood of a police officer issuing a citation or a warning (or it should not), and at best this demonstrates a vilification of lower income citizens. Second, the claims of ‘crime volume’ are exactly the sorts of generalizing stereotypes by area that I refer to above when discussing potential abuses of re-districting, and that does not even take into account inflated arrest rates and therefore incident rates in precisely the neighborhoods they reference. Some argue that this is a chicken and egg problem, but if there are more officers patrolling a
neighborhood, and the differences in arrest disparity index by race is as pronounced as it is, that is a false analogy. Increased police presence in an area by definition means more stops, more citations, and more arrests than in an area with fewer physical patrols. Assigning more resources to areas with more violent crime, specifically, is exactly what police should do, as the need for those kinds of responses are the primary reason taxpayers are willing to fund municipal police departments, but broad claims about “the rate at which police resources are utilized” rings false in light of widespread community documentation over the same time period in news articles and court records of the often tragic results of police misconduct over the last two decades.

Evaluating the calls for service by beat (see Table 5 in Appendix A and Appendix E.2) demonstrates that in fact, the South District, which contains the highest student population in Champaign, except for a two year period between 2007 and 2009, had the highest number of service calls by area in the City. As Brian Dolinar put it in our interview:

There’s this argument about police calls: ‘Well, we know there’s high crime because there’s a high number of police calls. We need to wipe out the community because there’s a high number of police calls.’ The police racially profile black people because there’s more phone calls in a black neighborhood, when actually the largest number of phone calls in this town come from Green Street and Campus Town.

Interestingly, in an early Neighborhood Services Advisory Board meeting discussing the BPNP in 2009, this very ‘data conclusion ambiguity’ issue was discussed. The overall number of police calls in Bristol Place had gone down while in Garwood they had gone up at the time, and community development specialist Greg Skaggs said that in talking with police officers in that area, they believed that the number of calls going up was actually a positive, as it indicated more trust in the police - more citizens calling when issues arise. If trust in the police is lower, the number of calls also decreases. Robert Boyer, a City of Champaign Planning Department intern at the time and the co-author of the existing conditions report cited by the 2011 BPNP also stated in this meeting that it was hard to determine whether the numbers reported indicated an increase in service calls, more patrolling, or a surge in crime (1/22/2009 NSAB Meeting Minutes). Thus despite early and more accurate considerations of the limited conclusions that can be drawn from calls for service data, the ultimate perception in the community overall has remained that as police call numbers increase, overall crime must also be increasing, when in fact this is not definitively the case.
One caveat about the historical calls for service data contained in Table 5 in Appendix A and in Appendix E.2 is that it is both incomplete because not every District Lieutenant reported exact numbers, some often gave rounded off thousands, so where I could I filled in gaps based on simple math from the aggregate number of annual police calls, but whenever there were more entries missing, I left cells blank. Even with this approach, the numbers do not quite add up correctly, but they give some sense of distribution nonetheless, and in more recent years, for 2007 - 2013 they are more accurate.

A brief timeline of Annual Champaign Police Report excerpts is included below to highlight approaches and service delivery ethos over time, as well as a few notable incidents on the history of police misconduct in the North End of Champaign:

**In 1992:** The Tactical Team has considerable flexibility for tactics in addressing street crime, surveillances, and order maintenance problems throughout the City. However, most of their enforcement efforts were in public housing areas in northeast Champaign during 1992. In addition to the usual two patrol officers assigned to northeast Champaign, a Tactical Team of three officers and one sergeant has devoted most of its time toward drug enforcement in northeast Champaign. This group of officers, known as Team 11, contributed significantly to an 81% increase in drug arrests in the City during 1992 (1992 Annual Champaign Police Report).

**In 1994:** The Champaign Police Department began implementation of what could arguably be the most fundamental change in service philosophy in its history. This change moves the department away from a traditional, narrow focus to service delivery toward a broad focus characterized by problem solving and citizen involvement. All Police Department employees received training during the year in the Community Oriented Policing philosophy and problem solving. Patrol officers, assigned to permanent beats, have developed beat profiles and established park and walk locations in their patrol areas city-wide. Patrol officers and supervisors regularly attend neighborhood meetings on their beats (1994 Annual Champaign Police Report).

**In 1996:** Foot patrol efforts in the City continue to play a vital role in the policing arsenal of the Champaign Police Department. Efforts in northeast Champaign as well as the Maple Vine area have been especially praised by neighborhood residents. These officers through innovation and hard work keep the criminal element off balance and provide considerable reassurance of safety to law-abiding citizens in the neighborhoods. This along with their positive approach to youth in the neighborhood win them high marks with citizens. The Gang/Tactical Team Unit was most proud of a comprehensive problem oriented policing project in the North Market Street area. The project involved cooperation with property owners and resulted in numerous drug arrests (1996 Annual Champaign Police Report).

**In 1998:** 1998 has been a year to test the metal of the men and women of the Champaign Police department. Considerable attention was focused on the citizen complaint process during the year. During these discussions there were many comments made that were inaccurate and unsubstantiated. Positive police-citizen relations are essential to the community oriented policing philosophy of the Champaign Police Department. The Human Relations Commission examined
5 years of complaint data along with information relating to traffic stops and calls for police service. As the chair of the Commission has stated on several occasions, no discriminatory policies or prejudicial patterns of conduct were found during an exhaustive examination of the data. There remains however, a certain lack of trust among some citizens. This is especially true among African Americans and efforts are underway to address their concerns. Over 100 drug related search warrants were served during the year. This along with the destruction of the infamous “Green Apartments” represent considerable pressure on drug traffickers throughout the City (1998 Annual Champaign Police Report).

The Champaign Police SWAT team brutalized a black 81-year-old grandmother. Renee Holt said she was grabbed by the throat and pushed to the floor while the police searched for her nephew who, it turned out, was not in the apartment. She had to receive medical treatment at a local hospital (News-Gazette, Dec. 11, 1998).

In 1999: There were growing concerns of racial profiling and alleged discriminatory practices by Champaign police officers. There were also high expectations of furthering the concepts of community policing (1999 Annual Champaign Police Report).

In 2000: Gregory Brown died in the custody of Champaign police. Brown, a developmentally disabled man, was beaten in an alleyway late at night by over a dozen Champaign police officers. Witnesses heard Brown crying out for help and telling police he could not breathe. He died of a heart attack. The Brown family received a $185,000 settlement from the incident. Officer Daniel Norbits, who in 2009 shot and killed Kiwane Carrington, was one of the officers involved (History of Police Misconduct in Champaign County, Champaign-Urbana Citizens for Peace and Justice (CUCPJ), local community advocacy group started in 2004 to combat misconduct and racial profiling in local policing activities: http://cucpj.org/page/history-police-misconduct-champaign-county).

In 2002: An understanding and awareness of concerns of the community related to equal treatment continues to be addressed by the installation of mobile video recorders in every patrol car. It may be too early to make a judgment on exactly how this affected operations but our citizen complaints resulting from traffic stops decreased from ten in 2001 to one in 2002. Regular meetings between Police Department command staff and members of the minority community to discuss relations between the Police Department and the community continue. Citizen complaints decreased twenty percent to the lowest level since statistics have been kept (2002 Annual Champaign Police Report).

In 2004: Black activists Patrick Thompson and Martel Miller were charged with felony eavesdropping by the Champaign Police Department for videotaping local police. The Citizens Watch video contrasted the heavy policing of the African American community, with the hands-off attitude of police toward students on campus. Both Police Chief R.T. Finney and City Manager Steve Carter denied involvement in the plot to charge the two activists, but an affidavit from Assistant State’s Attorney Elizabeth Dobson implicated Champaign police. The City of Champaign agreed to a civil settlement with the two activists (History of Police Misconduct in Champaign County, Champaign-Urbana Citizens for Peace and Justice, local community advocacy group started in 2004 to combat misconduct and racial profiling in local policing activities: http://cucpj.org/page/history-police-misconduct-champaign-county).

In 2005: The 2005 report revealed that there continues to be a 15% difference in the citation versus warning tickets issued to Caucasian and African American motorists, with African-American motorists receiving a higher percentage of citations. We believe there is likely an underlying economic correlation contributing to this issue. We readily acknowledge that we
routinely assign more resources to beats and districts that have large minority populations, but this stems from crime volume, more violent crime, and the rate at which police resources are utilized in various areas (2005 Annual Champaign Police Report).

In 2006: Champaign Police called out its SWAT team to deal with a suicidal black man in Garden Hills. Carl “Dennis” Stewart was the head janitor at Booker T. Washington Elementary School. He was going through marital problems, had separated with his wife, and was suicidal. Police received a call that he was in his car with a gun. Calling out its SWAT team in an Armored Personnel Carrier, an expensive high-tech tank designed to suppress mobs and riots, police blocked Stewart’s SUV in a driveway while a hostage negotiator used a phone and a bullhorn to talk to him. Police brought Stewart’s mother to the scene, but would not allow her to talk to him. They also restrained his brother, also on the scene. After he drive his truck across the lawn and down a side street, Champaign police chased him in a car through Garden Hills, a neighborhood directly west of the BPNP plan area, also with a large population of African Americans. After police cornered him with the SWAT truck, Stewart took his own life (NG 5/12/2006: Standoff Ends in Tragedy; The Public I June 2006: Police Stage Attacks on Garden Hills).

In 2007: Champaign police send 17-year-old black youth Brian Chesley to the hospital as a result of pepper spray, wait five weeks until his 18th birthday to file a misdemeanor charge of resisting a police officer, which he was then convicted of and sentenced to 100 hours of community service and required to pay court fines. Chesley had been playing basketball at the Douglass Center gymnasium which was open until 11 p.m. At approximately 8:30, he was walking an 8-year-old home through Douglass Park (3 blocks away from the area of the BPNP), but according to Champaign police the park had closed at sundown. When Chesley took the case to court, Champaign police admitted on the stand that they had been instructed to stop individuals in the North End, check them for warrants, and enter them into a police database. Champaign police officer Andre Davis said he stopped Chesley because, “I wanted to know why he was in the park.” When Chelsey refused to stop and kept walking, he was grabbed by backup police who slammed him face down on the pavement and pepper sprayed him, so that afterwards he had to be sent to the hospital. After a judge disallowed several arguments by the defense, an all-white jury found Chesley guilty of resisting and obstructing a peace officer (NG 3/29/2008: Racial bias alleged in outcome of trial; February 2008, The Public I State’s Attorney Implicated in Cover-up of Police Brutality).

In 2008-2009: We believe and expect that our officers continue to use an objective process when deciding who to stop. It is has been continually reinforced through training, supervisory review and anti-biased training; that race in and of itself is neither a valid nor acceptable reason for initiating enforcement action. Over the past year, CPD has deployed a new digital in-car video system. The police department has made a commitment to apply the Problem Oriented Policing (POP) process through out the city. Problem Oriented Policing has proven so successful in Garden Hills that the same tactics and initiatives will be focused in other neighborhoods in the City (2008-2009 Annual Champaign Police Report).

2009-2010: Kiwane Carrington, 15-year-old unarmed black male, shot and killed in what was ruled an accidental shooting (December 8, 2009 Report of the State’s Attorney). The Northwest District has undergone a positive transition over the last few years. This improvement is directly related to the Garden Hills Neighborhood Group and its intimate involvement with City personnel and most importantly the police department. In 2009 officers and citizens continued their focus with neighborhood involvement and problem policing. This
steadfast approach has made a noticeable reduction of crime and nuisance violation (2009-2010 Annual Champaign Police Report).

In 2004 the Illinois General Assembly enacted legislation requiring every Illinois law enforcement agency to collect data on traffic stops and send it to the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) as a result of concerns about traffic stop practices. Traffic stop reports from Champaign between 2006-2010 demonstrate that African-American residents were stopped at twice the rate of their proportionate population represented in Champaign (see Table 6 in Appendix A), although the results of the stops (warning vs. citation) demonstrate no strong racial bias. The 2008-2009 Champaign Annual Police Report concludes:

The only definitive conclusion from the distribution of these numbers is: this is who the CPD police officers deal with and it is this interaction that creates the basis for the individual and collective knowledge our officers possess as they serve our community.

In 2010, data on “consent searches” (when officers ask motorists they stop for permission to search a vehicle) showed that 1/3 of Caucasian searches resulted in contraband found, while only 7.7% of minority drivers searched resulted in contraband found. The Champaign Police Department’s summary of this data was, “officers were moderately more successful searching Caucasian motorists than minority motorists.” And yet, the concentrations of drug-related policing efforts remain concentrated in minority neighborhoods in the North End.

Brian Dolinar, local activist scholar and University of Illinois lecturer, did a study in 2007 on SWAT raids in Champaign County and both Urbana and Champaign. There were 63 separate SWAT raids, and though data is slightly flawed because many names were redacted, and some cases were still pending at the time of analysis, he found that in 49 incidents where race was indicated, 44 were against black households, and the concentration of raids occurred in the neighborhoods north of University Avenue and on Lierman Street in southeast Urbana. He also reported that the majority of the SWAT raids were for drugs: “in 52 SWAT raids where the cause of the warrant could be determined, 45 were for drug searches. This indicates that 87% of SWAT raids were for drugs.” He concludes, echoing the sentiments of Reverend Barnes quoted above about unequal treatment of Champaign’s citizens by neighborhood (and in Champaign neighborhood designations are often used as a rhetorical proxy for race and income-based citizen valuations, as demonstrated by NIMBY comments above):
Authorities often say there is more crime in black neighborhoods. They say this is where all the service calls come from. Yet in the case of drug raids, police are selectively pursuing individuals. Studies have shown that blacks and whites use and sell drugs at equal rates. Still, it is commonly believed that only blacks are drug dealers. The targeting of blacks by SWAT teams is unequal enforcement of the law, plain and simple. What would happen if a SWAT team targeted a fraternity house on campus or a suburban home in Cherry Hills?

In Illinois in 2007, 66% of those who were in prison for drugs were black, and the state’s rates of blacks incarcerated for drug possession was the highest in the country (IMC, 10/19/2007: Home Invasion: Racial Disparities in SWAT raids).

In 2011, 658 (88%) of the 744 persons arrested for jaywalking were black, which is even more discriminatory and racially repressive when taken in conjunction with the fact that: (1) a large number of these tickets are given for walking in the street in the same direction as traffic; (2) a disproportionate number of people are ticketed in an area that does not have sidewalks; and (3) jaywalking tickets carry a $120 fine (Cha-Jua, 2014).

The history of hiring practices in the Champaign Police Department (CPD) also contributes to its alienation from the local North End community: only 6 (less than 5%) CPD officers in 2010 were black, and 75% of all officers live outside the corporate limits. Until 1970, CPD officers were required to reside inside the city’s corporate boundaries. This is no longer the case. This is highly problematic in the case of Champaign County, as many if not most of the surrounding suburban communities according to historical sociologist James Loewen, are sundown towns (Loewen, 2005). Sundown towns are communities where either by law or custom and history the communities prevent or minimize African American residence and enforce sunset curfews for blacks. Most CPD officers live in one of the historically sundown towns that surround Champaign-Urbana, in virtually all white communities like Mahomet and St. Joseph (where the largest proportion of officers reside), Effingham, Areola, Homer and Monticello (see Appendix E.7). This racist local history is further documented in the 1994 CPD Annual Report, which documented CPD officers responding to “4 call outs and 1 Ku Klux Klan rally in Decatur, Illinois,” where they “recovered and rendered safe: 3 conventional pipe bombs; 3 small improvised devices; and 1 anti-tank bazooka round.”

Hate crimes in Illinois decreased from 379 in 1999 to 155 in 2009 (Crime in Illinois Annual Uniform Crime Reports, 1999-2013), and in Champaign County from 49 in 1999 to 0 in 2009, according to the 2010 Champaign County Statistical Abstract published by the Champaign
County Regional Planning Commission. However, the perpetrators and targets of hate crimes in Illinois since 1999 support a distinct black-white divide (see Appendices E.8 – E.12).

In 2013, newly appointed African American Chief of Police Anthony Cobb said the biggest need for improvement in the Champaign Police Department was community relations: “it was overwhelming from the majority of staff. Community relations were abysmal when I got here. We recognized that there was a lot we could do in that area to improve.” In October, volunteers went door-to-door in the troubled Bristol Park neighborhood as part of a “Walk As One” event to distribute information about crime prevention and to work with residents to address neighborhood concerns. Champaign resident and member of the Bristol Park Steering Committee Seon Williams has been deeply involved in a lot of those efforts for more than three years, since the October 2009 fatal police shooting of Kiwane Carrington. Many community members felt the shooting could have been prevented had the police and black teens been more comfortable with each other. Williams said that he has seen change for the better since then, “I see us being more involved, more engaged, our communities coming together and being able to heal from Kiwane” (News Gazette March 12, 2013: Cobb: Tested, challenged, 'a lot more left to do').

More recent data on the Champaign County Jail population confirms that the disproportionate policing of the local black community remains a local problem: tracking the local jail population, demographics and charge types from January through September of 2014 demonstrated that over half (53%) of the individuals arrested and detained during this time period were African-American (in 2013 the Champaign County African-American population represented 12.8% of the total County population, and 16% of the population of the City of Champaign) (see Appendix E.13). When using a Disparity Index (DI) method to evaluate the level of disproportionality, a ratio of 1 indicates a racial group’s likelihood of being arrested is equal to their presence in the general population. This 2013-2014 DI for blacks arrested countywide is 4, while for whites is 0.6. This means that in Champaign County, blacks were four times more likely to be arrested, and whites were almost half as likely to be arrested as their relative proportionate population numbers countywide. Even when comparing to the relative total population percentages in the City of Champaign, which has a higher percentage of black residents than the entire county, the disproportionate DIs remain undeniably clear: for African-Americans, the DI is 3.3; for Whites, the DI is 0.63.
Delores Jones-Brown, professor of criminal justice at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York, said the data in Champaign and Urbana are consistent with national trends. The criminality of black people has been accepted, she said, with people of all races comes to see black and Latino people as the crime problem. “The kinds of things you see happening to black people in Champaign and Urbana are happening to black people across the country,” she said. Rod Brunson, professor at the School of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University, said that change can be a lengthy process, and is one that requires leadership from the top that is carried out at the street level. “Culture is slow to change,” Brunson said. “It has to be enforced in the most basic and routine interactions that people have with citizens.” “People like to break it down like it’s two different situations,” said the Rev. Zernial Bogan, assistant pastor at Champaign’s Salem Baptist Church and president of the Black Chamber of Commerce for Champaign County. “It’s really one situation. It’s Chambana” (CU-CitizenAccess.org October 18, 2012 Police move to improve relations with black communities in Champaign, Urbana).

6.2 “Poor property management combined with no City code enforcement”

In further contrast to the primary reasons for the clearance and rebuild decision stated by City officials related to the physical and market conditions of existing housing stock, the second primary interview theme that came out when I questioned other community stakeholders about what they believed the main rationale behind the City’s plan, was poor property management combined with no code enforcement by the City. Many of the themes echoed issues raised during Old Urban Renewal about understaffing and lack of public support for enforcement being the primary reason for poor code enforcement in Champaign.

Poor property management happens everywhere, sometimes a result of poor planning and lack of investment property management inexperience, and most often as a result of purely individualistic profit motives. Without having conversations assessing each property manager’s history, it is difficult to tell why owners do not manage upkeep on homes in an adequate manner for their tenants’ habitation, but this is precisely the reason municipal property maintenance codes were created, as I explained in detail in Champaign’s Old Urban Renewal chapter. Additionally, as I explained in the same chapter and section, often the problem lies not in the official rules, but with enforcement, and correspondingly (and often overlooked), with widespread community support for enforcement, including additional public funding allocations for inspector salaries.
In all of my interviews with institutional, community stakeholder, and Bristol residents, it became abundantly clear that not only does the City of Champaign perform no regular inspections except in common areas of multi-family buildings, but it has a very poor track record with code enforcement citywide, thrown into particularly stark relief when compared to the enforcement policies of sister city Urbana. From the more vocal and virulent opposition to the more conservative or politically correct responses I received when asked about the differences in code enforcement and inspection processes between Urbana and Champaign, in addition to conversations in both cities with code compliance experts, the City of Champaign’s historical negligence towards tenant inspection requests and its clear bias and support of investment property owners poor property management practices for individual profitable ends is clear.

Aaron Smith’s perception:

Urbana is…generally much more on the side of policies that protect the tenants to the point where like landlords and things like that will get very annoyed with some of their policies. I think it’s kind of a little bit more the opposite way in Champaign. So I think the policies in Champaign tend to be a little bit more on the side of the landlords and Urbana tends to have a lot more deference towards the rights of the tenants in sort of their policies. But I’d say probably the biggest difference is the landlord tenant ordinance in Urbana prevents landlords from denying housing to people with criminal records, things like that.

Esther Patt’s perception:

But the key, to conclude the highlights on Bristol, the neighborhood wouldn’t have been run down if the city would have proactive code enforcement to stop deterioration of housing, and not just in Bristol but everywhere. I don’t know if they’re still doing this because it’s only come up now and then [in my experience with the CU Tenant’s Association], where the City of Champaign has really hurt the tenants because they don’t condemn the property…even when something should be condemned, when they agree that it should be condemned, they don’t actually bother condemning it. It’s not that they don’t bother, it’s really they’re cutting a break to the landlord. They won’t declare it condemned if he’ll agree — if he’ll just tell them he’s not going to re-rent it again…I don’t think they do it deliberately to enable the landlord, or to try to enable the landlord to continue to collect rent when they shouldn’t after a condemnation by not condemning it, but I don’t know why they do it…You know when they finally cared? At one property on Church Street, after the tenant rented the condemned place, then she thought she had a carbon monoxide leak…she went to the City, and there was a carbon monoxide leak. That’s why I say that I really think that, to a large extent, government officials have the attitude the only good tenant is a dead tenant. If it’s something that will actually kill you, if it will mean a loss of human life, boy do they care. They even sentence to prison or jail for six months for it, but if you’re not going to die, eh, they don’t care so much, or at all.”
Brian Dolinar’s perception:

This is a college town, and, you know, my sense is they should be very on point about maintaining properties, because you know you can have landlords come in here, buy up the property, rent it out, and just see the money stream in. You hire a manager to take care of it, and if you’ve got the capital to put upfront, you know, it’s a moneymaker. And so who are the inspectors and who are the authorities that are going to make sure that people living there are in safe conditions? The City is supposed to fill that function, and they send out inspectors, but the City needs to be prosecuting them in court. Why does Bristol go to shit, you know? It’s partly because those properties are rented out and the landlords are absent and the properties deteriorate, the city never prosecutes any of the violations. You know, you go out there and – when I was doing stories, and I think I had a photo of one of the houses where there was just a big pile – somebody had moved out and there was just a pile of junk out on the curb that sat there for days, weeks. And, you know, the City is supposed to follow up with things like that, make sure that stuff gets cleaned up. So it sounds to me that basically what’s happening is they’re using police – they’re basically vilifying the neighborhood and, you know, classifying it as blight due to crime, due to lack of property ordinance issues, not taking responsibility or, you know, acknowledging some responsibility in this enforcement of ordinance violations.

Jim Rose’s perception:

Garden Hills is another trouble spot in the city and people talk about it all the time and we’re concerned about it as a Housing Authority because one of our developments is at the corner Bradley and McKinley and our executive director is always asking the city, you know, what’s gonna happen to the housing stock in those areas as well, you know? Code enforcement is the only way you can keep the properties up, code enforcement, and the city is pretty good. The city uses things like just the specific loans to individuals to rehab their properties and bring ’em up-to-code and things of that nature and they were working in Garwood.

6.2.1 Urbana’s code enforcement is proactively responsible, Champaign’s is criminally negligent

The City of Urbana’s code enforcement policies, and the regulation of rental housing, according to an Urbana City Planner, is vastly different in Urbana than Champaign. Urbana has a comprehensive rental registration policy and for 50 years, Urbana has had systematic inspections of apartments inside and outside every unit for apartments defined as 3 units or up. This program expanded in 1997 to include every rental property, including single family homes and 1- and 2-bedroom structures, not just 3+ bedroom structures. In 1997, Urbana also created a rental registration program, and hired a second inspector. Urbana city ordinance now requires each year that everyone who rents residential property must register that property with the City and provide info on who manager is, with local contact info, and affidavits that occupancy is to code. Annual registration costs $55 per SF home per year. Urbana has 9,600 units total, and the annual fee
pays the City costs for their second inspector. She admitted that Urbana is aiming towards a better, shorter regular inspection cycle – the goal is regular inspections every 3-5 years – but the inspection cycle had expanded to over 10 years because one inspector could not be spread that far, so they increased the registration fee recently to be able to hire a 3rd inspector because the regular inspection cycle length had gone up again. Urbana currently has two housing inspectors and one code enforcement coordinator. In the registration system, each property is graded on an annual basis: no violations gets an A, but most regular property gets a B or C usually. If you have many violations you get an F and lose your right to rent property. Urbana levies fines if owners do not fix violations. Thus, Urbana does systematic inspections, but also has to respond to tenant complaints, which have tighter timelines for being repaired. Up to 40-50 tenant complaint-based inspections are requested per year in Urbana, often referrals from the Tenant Union.

She continued, explaining that if a city just relies on tenant complaints, they will not get “the worst of the worst” property management violators. The local Tenant Union plays a vital role in facilitating complaints, but often it is the neighbors who complain. It has become common opinion locally that the Champaign City Council never supported a rental registration program because there have historically been too many owner interests on council. A tragic incident occurred in 2004 when a Champaign City Council member (J.W. Pirtle) who was a slumlord, did not fix a furnace and a tenant died of carbon monoxide poisoning. He was indicted in 2004 on an involuntary manslaughter charge and five counts of criminal housing management (a misdemeanor that alleges he allowed the condition of the home to endanger to lives of its occupants), and after agreeing to let his case be decided by a judge and not a jury in 2006, the involuntary manslaughter charge was dropped (NG 7/12/2006: Involuntary manslaughter charge dropped). He was then sentenced to six months in jail and two years of conditional discharge (NG, 12/21/2006: Champaign landlord gets six months in jail). According to a current City of Urbana staff member, the partisan nature of Urbana’s politics, in addition to the tenant bias and influence of political heavyweight Esther Patt helped produce the rental registration program in Urbana.

In addition to these policies, Urbana has been doing 5 rehabs per year for 25-30 years in east Urbana and other target areas. The City has partnered with local CHDOs Habitat, Homestead and EcoLab on 25 rebuilds. Urbana has also had a longtime goal of preserving older
neighborhoods with supportive programs like Old House Rehab, Emergency Grants Access grants (for things like broken heaters, accessibility ramps, senior preference targets). These investments and programs stabilized Urbana’s “blighted” neighborhoods, and crime went down. Urbana’s ethos with property management and code enforcement has historically been more of a “preservation of existing housing stock” than in Champaign, and less about building new buildings. Champaign has more money, resources, and business activity, and it is easier to be landlord in Champaign, but according to an Urbana planner, “the neighbors are fussier.” Many tenants locally also value Urbana’s human rights ordinance over Champaign’s, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of prior arrest or conviction record or source of income, and move to Urbana. The City of Champaign currently allows discrimination in housing based on source of income – if you have a Section 8 voucher, a landlord in Champaign in 2015 can refuse to rent to you.

Champaign’s history with the particular element of their Human Rights Ordinance dealing with discrimination based on source of income in housing is odd, to say the least. Champaign was actually the first city in 1977 to prohibit housing discrimination on the basis of source of income, and from 1977 through 2001, refusal to rent to someone based solely on the basis that they would use a Section 8 voucher to pay part of their rent was enforced as a violation of the city ordinance. In 2001, Royse & Brinkmeyer Apartments refused to rent to 70-year old Bettina Chapman, one of the Tenant Union’s clients, who had rented her whole life, because she had a Section 8 voucher. In a hearing before the Human Relations Commission (HRC), Royce & Brinkmeyer’s attorney made a pre-hearing motion to dismiss, arguing that federal law established Section 8 as a voluntary program and that the federal law should pre-empt the city’s ordinance. Essentially, that Section 8 is not a source of income. To the surprise of many, the hearing officer ruled in favor of the apartment owner, finding the “source of income” clause in the city ordinance did not cover Section 8 (Public I, November 2007, Champaign Landlords Now Permitted to Discriminate Against Section 8 Voucher Holders). The HRC then accepted the hearing officer’s ruling, according to Esther Patt, because they did not realize they had the authority to ignore or the overrule what the officer said. The complainant appealed the decision to the Circuit Court, which ruled that the HRC had acted within its authority by interpreting the “source of income” as not including Section 8. Thus, “discrimination against people with vouchers was not protected by law anymore in the City of Champaign because one hearing
officer said so, and the Human Relations Commission didn’t know to say otherwise,” according to Esther.

In 2004 the Illinois Appellate Court (1st District, Godinez v. Sullivan Lackey), upheld the City of Chicago’s practice of interpreting the “source of income” clause in their human rights ordinance to include Section 8, so in 2006, Esther Patt brought the issue back before the HRC, and after public hearings by the Champaign HRC and a study session by the City Council, in March 2006 the council voted 6-3 to follow the recommendation of the HRC and specifically prohibited discrimination against Section 8 voucher holders again. However, a year later in the spring of 2007 there was a City Council election in Champaign and two of the council members who had supported Section 8 protections were replaced by two who opposed them.

Likely unsurprisingly to those who know local area politics, the new City Council member who requested a bill to be placed on the City Council agenda deleting the language from the ordinance was the Council representative from District 5 in Southwest Champaign (see Council map in Appendix D.2), Ken Pirok, who then lead the Council in October 2007 to reverse the 2006 decision. Also unsurprisingly, the most outspoken Council opponent was then-District 1 city council member Gina Jackson, who starkly pointed out, “we talk about a city of diversity, as long as that diverse person is not living next to you - that’s unacceptable” (Daily Illini, 10/10/07: Champaign to remove language about federal housing vouchers).

Given the demographics of Section 8 voucher holders discussed above, this income-source-based discrimination has a disparate impact on the disabled, families with children and people of color. And there continue to be vitriolic, uninformed, and discriminatory NIMBY sentiments echoed across the City of Champaign as it relates to conflating Section 8 recipients with crime, degradation and destruction of property, and more. Demonstrating yet another investment property owner-friendly policy created and upheld by the Champaign City Council, one of the primary theoretical burdens investigated that was used to support this decision was the fact that HUD can prematurely terminate a contract with a landlord when special circumstance arise (e.g. if a tenant has a child and needs an extra bedroom or if a tenant marries), and landlords do not have the capacity to sue to recover lost rental income as they would with other lessees. It is difficult to obtain data on how often this occurs, but the rate of overall premature terminations is less than 5%, because Section 8 vouchers are so valuable to those who receive them that they
will do everything they can to avoid losing them (Public I, November 2007: Champaign landlords now permitted to discriminate against Section 8 voucher holders).

And the most heinous and obviously racially targeted exception to the City of Champaign’s Human Rights Ordinance, particularly in the context of local policing practices and jail population breakdowns in Champaign County:

Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit discrimination in the leasing of residential property based upon a person’s record of convictions for a forcible felony or a felony drug conviction or the conviction of the sale, manufacture or distribution of illegal drugs or convictions which are based upon factors which would constitute one of the categories of convictions listed above under Illinois law; provided, that the conviction shall not be allowed to be the basis of discrimination if the person convicted has resided outside of prison at least the last five (5) consecutive years without being convicted of an offense involving the use of force or violence or the illegal use, possession, distribution, sale or manufacture of drugs. This exception is not a restriction on the use of conviction information for other necessary business reasons (C.B. No. 94-167, § 1, 7-5-94).

And as the Steering Committee’s survey results reported in 2012, two residents of Bristol Place had experienced this housing discrimination in the past (March 8, 2012 NSAB Meeting Minutes).

But even when tenants do get into leasing agreements, if they are unlucky enough in the City of Champaign to sign a lease with a slumlord, there is very little of the proactive enforcement of preservation of older housing stock evidenced by the Urbana policies detailed above. Champaign does not have a rental registration program, does not do regular inspections of interiors of buildings other than the common areas of apartment buildings with three or more units, and relies solely on tenant inspection requests for its interior structural code enforcement. The sole exception is private certified University housing – Champaign inspects sororities, fraternities, and other private housing approved by UIUC. It does do systematic exterior code violation inspections, but primarily code inspections occur by complaint. The multi-family common area inspection program is supposed to be on a 3-year cycle, but similar to Urbana’s staff issues, current Champaign Code Compliance Manager David Oliver explains “this is a huge undertaking without additional staff in addition to tenant-generated inspection request responses.” David also explained, partly because Champaign does not have a rental registration program or regular interior inspections, that when Champaign inspectors go into properties with tenant complaints there is a good chance an inspector has never been inside the property before, so unless the property owner has done their homework in advance and is well-versed in property
management and codes, the owner may or may not have known a violation exists. This can mean significant expense to property owners if many violations are cited upon initial inspection. According to David, this is the main reason the City of Champaign tries to work with property owners and give them extensions and many chances to correct violations.

The code enforcement process in Champaign according to David, begins after a complaint is filed with inspectors trying to get initial inspection response schedule within three days of a complaint being made, but they shorten that timeframe if the condition is considered ‘critical,’ like backed up sewage in a one bathroom dwelling unit, lack of sufficient heat or no heat at all, or if utilities supplied by property owner are shut off. Once an inspection is done, the inspector generates a housing violation notice, with a list of observed deficiencies. This notice is sent to the owner of record identified by the property assessor’s office unless a management company involved, and a copy is also always sent to the tenant. Unless a life safety issue is reported, the City sends a 30-day violation notice (meaning the property owner has 30 days to fix the violations cited). The City will sometimes send 24-hour notices when the case is an emergency, but by and large the first grace period is 30 days.

The City inspector then returns after 30 days to update the case and document compliance for those violations that have been corrected. Ideally it is all of them. More likely than not according to David, not all of them are done, and the City then sends an amended re-inspection notice listing those remaining. The property owner then gets another 14 days to bring the property into compliance, although the City also provides an opportunity for an extension agreement in that second notice.

Extension agreements are either time or money related – e.g. when a property owner says they couldn’t schedule a contractor or don’t have capital ready for immediate repairs. The City then asks the property owner to give a date of expected completion – as long as the date is reasonable, Oliver says, the City will agree (e.g. asking for two months to replace a carbon monoxide detector battery the city will not agree to, but fixing a plumbing leak or doing a major capital-intensive program like a roof replacement will likely lead to an extension being granted). City inspectors work with property owners to come up with a compliance plan, get repairs completed, and then the City closes the case. If an owner gets into an extension agreement and that agreement expires before the violation(s) are corrected, the City sends a legal warning letter explaining that without completion, they will refer the case to the legal department for litigation.
David says at this stage the City also provides property owners another opportunity to review or create a new extension agreement.

The City emphasizes mediating and negotiating with owner to get violations resolved. As David puts it, “cooperation is better than competition – [we go for] win-win or no deal,” where the property owners cited win, the tenants win because their complaints are resolved, and the City wins because they don’t have to go the expense and hassle of taking an owner to court (the no deal scenario). He said the end goal of the City is all property owners’ compliance to code, and he would rather see property owners invest their money in fixing up their properties rather than paying court fines. He explains that sometimes this results in tenant eviction, and the City does not provide tenants legal advice, it sends them to Land of Lincoln or the Tenant Union instead.

If an inspector knows they are dealing with a historically uncooperative property owner, the inspector will still send a 14 days notice with offer for extension agreement, but will then go straight to a legal warning letter which gives owners 10 days to comply. It is a lengthy process to file in court. If there is only one violation, property owners are cited for a municipal ordinance violation. If multiple violations are associated with one case, the City will file a raze or repair order with all violations included. There are only 1-2 legal cases a year filed by the City of Champaign, because they work with property owners for such extended periods of time to resolve violations.

A direct result of this process-oriented leniency towards property owners in violation of City property management codes is a truly abysmal length of time to resolve complaints. An evaluation of code compliance data going back to FY2006-FY2007 shows that on average over the 8 year period evaluated it took almost a year (355 days) to resolve tenant inspection request-based code compliance complaints; there were an average of 98 requests per year, although the largest spike was in FY2009-FY2010 at 117; and 123 requests, or 15.7% of all tenant requests are still open and have yet to be resolved as of the beginning of FY2014-FY2015 (see Appendix E.14 and E.15). David Oliver arrived in Champaign in 2010, and as is evident from Appendix E.16, days to resolution have dropped every year he has been in code enforcement management. When I first met with and interviewed him, he had also recently returned from an International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) full week of training on planning for public engagement and communication strategies.
David agrees with many other interviewees quoted, that property decline in the Bristol Place neighborhood is an example of not having an aggressive code enforcement approach, with property values declining to the point of redevelopment being the only option. When I asked him why Champaign does not have a rental registration program, which seems like the most effective way to prevent conditions like those in Bristol Place from occurring, he said he believes the City would meet resistance if they tried to charge a rental registration fee, most likely from the Chamber of Commerce and the Central Illinois Rental Property Professionals. He alluded to the fact that while rental property owners should ensure their properties are up to code, many fear city inspectors would find violations requiring modifications, which cost money to correct. As many interviewees have explained or alluded to, and as is borne out by mid-century UIUC community housing history in the Old Urban Renewal chapter above, owning rental properties is a booming business in the Champaign-Urbana area – and there is also a very vulnerable population of family and working renters because of the numbers of students here – it is “almost like shooting fish in a barrel,” according to an Urbana planner, who shared her experience, saying that for a long time, property owners could rent almost anything to students because of lack of education about tenant rights.

A current Champaign City Council member who owns and manages property in Urbana I interviewed explained from his perspective why he does not support a regular rental inspection program in Champaign:

Council has been tempted from time to time to impose inspection programs, sometimes initiatives come from NSD – they want to inspect rental properties – but it will cost money so they want to impose a fee. Urbana has a rental registration fee and government inspectors that come into rental units whether people ask for them to come or not. Proponents would say that mandatory regular inspections improve the quality of housing stock. Opponents would argue that it just adds to the cost of housing. Owners will add fees to leases to pass on the additional expense. And inevitably, inspectors want to justify their existence so they aggressively come up with lists of violations. Whatever people inspect, it is always tempting to say, ‘I better justify my position and this program.’ Then more charges come and grow and never go away. Mandatory inspections add to the cost of housing – the more aggressively you inspect housing, no doubt the safer housing stock becomes, but the more expensive it is as well. We need to come up with a good balance between regulation and market effects. Urbana has pretty expensive housing because every idea sounds good to them. In a property I own [in Urbana], an Urbana city inspector cited a torn off piece of paint – I had to touch it up with same color paint. What is the government’s role in that? That’s what you get when there is an inspector who wants to find every violation in the book, because that is his job. Next year when I set the prices for four apartment leases it may be built into the equation. It’s burdensome.
Housing gets a little bit more expensive. In Urbana, property owners have to do an inspection with a government individual once a year. That’s invasive. It’s your home, it’s sacred.

It is worth re-iterating here that under Illinois law, an annual $6,000 homestead exemption deduction far outweighs even a $55 annual fee, but his points about government employees needing to justify their salary expenses, especially in the current conservative fiscal climate, is entirely valid, and in fact goes beyond just code inspectors to police and other government service providers as well.

This kind of Council membership ethos in Champaign has developed over decades, and investment property owners and other property management interest groups have created strong constituency and advocacy organizations to support their property-based profit interests, and as has also been evidenced by comments and news reports already referenced, Champaign’s City Council has been dominated by those very investment property owners for a long time. These legacies will not fade easily, or quickly, but challenges need to be issued nonetheless, particularly when those protections directly, disproportionately, and deleteriously affect life opportunities and outcomes for historically marginalized low-income people of color. Private citizen interest groups have more leeway, but similar to recent financial regulation legislation conflict of interest issues in Congress, particularly when serving on a public body that is supposed to represent the interests of the larger community in a representative democracy, Champaign City Council members must be cognizant and ever-vigilant not to vote with their own profit interests, but in the interests of those they represent, citywide.

The code compliance approach currently taking shape in Garden Hills and led by David and the NSD, is a first run test attempt by the City of Champaign to improve their code enforcement practices, and may operate as an experiment before determining whether the City believes it needs to try and implement a more comprehensive citywide registration process. Right now, as part of the Garden Hills code strategies, Champaign is considering a neighborhood-based rental property registration program as a targeted rental management scheme whereby if a neighborhood met certain criteria, rental property professionals would be required to have a certificate of inspection prior to leasing the unit. This would be at no cost to the property owner other than whatever repairs they would have to make if code-based deficiencies were identified. In the most recent Garden Hills Action Planning City Council study session in December 2014
(SS 2014-058), the next steps on this are researching other Big Ten, Central Illinois and comparably sized cities’ rental registration programs and then evaluating the feasibility for the Garden Hills neighborhood before expanding such a proposal citywide.
CHAPTER 7
DISCUSSION

7.1 Discussion

My analysis engages with three questions regarding the evolution of “new” fiscal policy driven urban renewal in Champaign:

1. How does the City of Champaign’s Bristol Place Neighborhood Plan reflect historical urban renewal trajectories and outcomes?
2. To what extent do new municipal fiscal priorities influence the plan’s rationale for the use of eminent domain?
3. To what degree are new fiscal priorities underscoring disparate impacts of redevelopment on minority communities?

This chapter engages these questions directly in light of the results described in chapters 4-6.

7.1.1. BPNP ↔ OUR parallels

This case study has produced evidence that historical urban renewal trajectories and outcomes are being reproduced in the City of Champaign’s Bristol Place neighborhood redevelopment plan, 50 years after Old Urban Renewal. Specifically: (1) the valuation of residents’ opinions in directing neighborhood intervention and public policy is according to what they can pay into City coffers; (2) there exists an institutional bias against renters as documented by lax and ineffective code enforcement combined with financial assistance geared overwhelmingly towards homeowners and no regulation against predatory housing practices; (3) political decision makers are out of touch with lower income community desires and needs, even after going through public participation process motions; (4) there exists widespread devaluation of residents of the North End community wide; and (5) evidence for shadow state planning and growth machine influenced governance exists in Champaign.

(1) The valuation of residents’ opinions in directing neighborhood intervention and public policy is according to what they can pay into City coffers

In a news article dated November 19, 1966 the director and chief advocate of the old urban renewal program in Champaign said:

…it is actually a program of selective destruction and redevelopment. Owners of property who are absentee owners have allowed their property to deteriorate. The area is not only an eyesore but a more or less wasted area as far as revenue is concerned. People in that area have been paying very little money into the city, properties comprising a scant 1.78% of the total assessed valuations in Champaign…It may be worth $16,000 to the owner, but it's put down as $600, because that's all the value he's able to pay taxes on. Urban renewal would put
some of these properties into the hands of people who could afford to pay the taxes on them. This, in turn, would bring increased city revenues and a host of possible community improvements (DI, November 19, 1966 “Low assessed values contribute little value to City tax receipts”).

These increased city revenues and “host of possible community improvements” are echoed in more recent BPNP planning documents as City rationales for the redevelopment moving forward using eminent domain.

Currently, of the 118 total parcels in the Bristol Place sub area of the BPNP, 20 are owner-occupied, 64 are investor-owned, 27 are City-owned, and 7 parcels are tax-exempt. Of the investor-owned property, 30 parcels’ owners live in Champaign and contribute $3,679.93 (23.4% of the tax value in the area) to the City in property taxes, 18 are owned by Urbana investors and contribute 13.8% of the area’s tax value, and 16 are owned by remote investors as far away as California, contributing 13.8% of the area’s tax value (see Table 7). In total, investor-owned property in the area contributes 51% of the total tax value, owner-occupied properties contribute 24.3%, and the single parcel in the entire site area that is exempt from the BPNP demolitions is the Family Dollar store on the southwest corner of Market & Bradley, whose assessed value is almost as high as all 20 owner-occupied properties combined, and contributes 20% of the entire area’s property tax value to the City. The planning decisions identifying who benefits according to this redevelopment plan are not random. In reality, it is actually directly proportionate to the value of the land in total assessed property taxation.

The total revenue of the entire Bristol Place sub-area, including the Family Dollar (which is excluded from the redevelopment – the only structure that will be left untouched by the City’s use of eminent domain) is $15,729.73 (based on the 2014 portion of the property tax that goes to the City of Champaign of 1.3152%). The largest property tax contributor is exempt from the development, the second largest group of contributors are given financial remuneration with as little hassle as possible, and owner-occupants are provided additional protections beyond federally-mandated displacement requirements. Renters are forcibly displaced, given preference to HCVs above all other qualified Champaign County residents in need, and provided no more than 3 years rental assistance after displacement. According to a planning staff member I interviewed, the City has also decided, upon a TIF study recently completed by Kane McKenna, to move forward with creating a TIF in the Bristol Place and Garwood areas (excluding Shadow Wood) in 2015/2016. At this time the City will own all 23 acres, so its assessed value will be $0,
once totally cleared. After implementing a TIF, it then has the potential to create large value, likely to repay part (if not all) of the CDBG Section 108 loan financing the City will take out to help finance Phase I of the redevelopment.

(2) Bias against renters as documented by lax and ineffective code enforcement combined with financial assistance geared towards homeowners and no regulation against predatory housing practices

As becomes indelibly clear when evaluating a historiography of the residential segregation in Champaign, affordable housing demand and local supply, and complaint-based code enforcement, rental discrimination policies and predatory slumlord rental practices have been around since Old Urban Renewal and remain active today (see sections 4.3, 4.6, 4.7 and 6.2 for more detailed discussion).

(3) Political decision makers are out of touch with lower income community desires and needs, even after going through public participation process motions

‘This is a matter of takeover’ said Lincoln Wesley, 506 E. Beardsley: Champaign. ‘The people in this area don’t get any direct information from the city officials whatsoever. They’ll come out here and say a few things, then you meet them again it’s something different. They go behind closed doors and do the things they wish to do and the people who are directly involved are excluded.’ ‘I would like for people to get their houses all fixed up,’ said a housewife. ‘We need a lot of that. Some houses — I don't know if they need to be torn down or what — they in a bad way. But some ain’t so bad. Why tear down all the houses? Why should we suffer for the ones that the houses in such bad dispositions? And they live in their homes,’ she said. ‘So why shouldn’t we live in ours? They wouldn’t want their homes torn down because there was a few bad homes on the block where they lived. They’d get a petition to get them bad homes out. Help them if they wasn’t able to fix them up,’ … Mrs. Shirlee Zervoulias [Administrative assistant for the local Community Action Program agency - part of the county Economic Opportunity Council, the local arm of the federal War on Poverty] said the [City] council’s greatest problem lies in ‘closing the breech’ between people on the council, professionals, and people who serve as voices of the poor. To a large extent this becomes a matter of interracial relations” (Of Community Motives, Poor are ‘Suspicious’; Local Negroes discover: No Way to Escape ‘Ghetto’; Daily Illini December 19, 1966).

This Old Urban Renewal newspaper excerpt actually provides evidence for three common themes: disconnect between decision makers and impoverished constituents, the devaluation of North End residents’ equal consideration as citizens, and political decision-
making being made in non transparent and undemocratic ways. In my interviews it became clear that there were iterative sentiments and preferences voiced by residents and neighboring community members during the evolution of the BPNP that were not heard or incorporated by City Council and staff, regarding specifically the desire for more financial assistance for structural repair work being made available to renters who live in poor housing conditions, homeowners questioning why if their home was one of the nicer ones, it was also slated for demolition, and sidewalk and lighting improvements neighborhood-wide. One particular interview excerpt echoed such disconnects:

Even Jim Rose, who ran Homestead for so many years, looked me right in the eye and said, ‘Esther, everybody has a car now.’ I thought, ‘Are you tripping on acid, or are you just in total denial of reality? How can you think something so foolish?’ … And when the YMCA moved out to Staley Road and Windsor, the director of the Y said to me ‘Oh, no one rides the bus anymore. Their parents all drive them.” I said, “What income level people are you talking about? If you’re talking about the people you serve, on Hill Street, you serve a large number of people who are lower income.’ I just said, ‘You’re right here. Just walk down to University Avenue around 2:45 when Central gets out, and see how many kids are waiting for the bus.’ This is one of my dreams. One of my fantasies is that public policymakers who deal with anything having to do with location of stuff, would all, if not ride the bus, at least sit down with the MTD bus schedule route. The primary focus of the MTD is to keep cars off the U of I campus. They still have no night and weekend service, and I don’t know if they ever will. I really do wish MTD would provide service on weekends and on Sunday night and on holidays. I mean people are absolutely stranded unless they have people [to drive them around]. I found the HUD data on people with the HUD Housing Choice Vouchers nationwide. Sixty percent do not have cars.

(4) Residents of the North End unequal and devalued members of “the public”

Another parallel between OUR in Champaign and the BPNP is its indifferent dismissal and devaluation of black citizens’ voices as equal members of “the public.” A 1967 news article stated:

Why all the fuss about urban renewal? Much of the static has come from the ghetto, from people who simply don’t want to lose their homes. It may or may not be valid opposition. From a larger perspective, however, they don’t really matter. What matters, in the end, is the good of the public. Most observers not directly involved agree the city is justified in clearing ghetto land as long as it’s done for the overall good (Daily Illini, September 22, 1967).

Similar sentiments were more recently and explicitly stated in a Plan Commission Meeting Minutes document from June 2014 discussing the BP redevelopment Master Plan concept diagrams prepared for the City by an independent consultant, where one member stated:
I believe the Commissions role is to speak to Planning but not social planning. We hear these comments about how individuals or neighborhoods might be affected on a personal level. It is not really our purview but I believe it is going to be the kind of issue that would be important to the City Council. I personally look at the history of gentrification as simply displacing people and moving them out to a perimeter that is just as unattractive as the place they are leaving but as they leave it behind someone else takes advantage of it. That is not necessarily wrong but there is a little social discomfort having to watch that sort of thing happen. I like the way it is being articulated here. I believe we are going to be giving a developer an opportunity to earn some money and at the same time we are going to be improving an area to the great benefit of the City. We are somewhat mitigating the consequences to the people who have to pay something of a price by leaving and many will leave and not come back (City of Champaign Plan Commission Meeting Minutes, June 4, 2014).

These sentiments are compelling insight into the position of some in the contemporary local government structure in Champaign. Despite its protests saying they did everything they could to elicit public participation, the City assuming that it could get good public meeting participation in this neighborhood by traditional channels is at best incongruous (and at worst acrimoniously belittling) due to the deep distrust on the part of longtime homeowners from decades of City disinvestment in the area and disregard when collective neighbors’ opinions were voiced, combined with high rates of rental residential turnover with no extant organized tenants’ association. Real community preferences being voiced requires a collective effort, or mobilization by a group of concerned residents who feel that if they spend their time organizing and debating, the recommendations they come up with will then have some effect on their circumstances, particularly when those circumstances are promulgated by the elected governing body.

The history, however, from this particular neighborhood of effective community mobilization voicing preferences to the City that then successfully instigated community-desired change, is abysmal. The primary example discussed above related to restoring the traffic from one-way to two-way streets, which had at least a seven-year lag between when residents organized to voice desires opposite to the current policy of the City and when the City responded positively to those preferences. But other examples abound: Reverend Barnes’ comments about his failed efforts to elicit enough City financial support for neighborhood revitalization infill projects in partnership with Metanoia and First National to make a significant change in the neighborhood; even for something as small as providing a dumpster for a neighborhood clean-up project, which the City refused to do because the area didn’t have an officially City-registered
“neighborhood group;” the many comments about crime and policing “services” being disproportionately directed towards this area; the lack of monitoring of the physical deterioration of housing stock via proactive City code enforcement policy, etc.

Much in the same way that public housing authorities in the 1980s used a process of de facto demolition through neglecting maintenance and upkeep until they could petition HUD for demolition funding (referenced in Old Urban Renewal chapter), the City of Champaign allowed investment property owners to create the “blighted” conditions of the existing declining properties by not just neglecting code enforcement for minimum habitable standards, but sometimes even refusing to spend public funds for modernization and improvement due to policy-led caps on grants available or the targeting of grant programs effectively excluding 70% of neighborhood residents due to communitywide tenure bias (see Chapter 5). Called by another name, these policies and limitations on funding access and design of supportive programs combine to produce an overall collective historical City policy towards this neighborhood of benign neglect. In public housing projects in the 1980s and into the 1990s, once conditions had deteriorated enough, local HAs would petition HUD for demolition funding as a necessary action due to public housing properties’ poor conditions – the parallels here are clear.

(5) Decision-Making Process in Champaign: Shadow State Politicking

Contemporary democratic governance in the U.S. has been empirically documented to favor dominant economic interests at the expense of less powerful groups (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Fox-Rogers et al., 2011; McGuirk, 1995). Often attributed to the structural constraints that shape power relations (Abu-Orf, 2005; Harris, 2002; McGuirk, 2001; Neuman, 2000; Tewdwr-Jones & Allmendinger, 1998; Tewdwr-Jones & Thomas, 1998; Watson, 1998), the ability of stakeholders to participate in and shape collaborative process is largely found to be determined by the availability of resources available to them (e.g. economic power), resulting in “the continued dominance of the already powerful” (Fainstein, 2000). This conception of power is deeply rooted in Marxist theory, which emphasizes the exploitative class relations in linkages between economic and political power based on the historical origins of the state, making “power over” process vitally more important than individual subjective “power to” effect change in individual circumstances (Fox-Rogers, 2014). Marxian perceptions of political economy in planning systems argue against the conception of planners as modernist, impartial “referees,” instead
questioning the ability of the state to act as a politically neutral institution given its historical origins in race and class conflict seen most clearly through the regulation of property ownership (Healey, 2003).

McGuirk (1995) demonstrated the informal participation channels in the policymaking stages of planning processes between “central government representatives and development interests,” and Fox-Rogers (2014) argues further that there exist two planning systems:

One is the ‘official system’ that (theoretically at least) everyone can access and engage with and the second is the shadow (informal) planning system only accessible to vested interests and utilized primarily by the key holders of power, such as developers, politicians and senior management (i.e. the elite in class terms).

And that planners hold a central stakeholder position given their liaisons with all other stakeholders (developers, community groups, management, politicians), and their position in constructing proposals’ pieces (Fox-Rogers, 2014). The dynamic interplay between these four primary group categories determines neighborhood outcomes. In Fox-Rogers’ (2014) study of informal planning process navigation in Ireland, and in Bent Flyvberg’s (1998) landmark study of power and planning in Aalborg, which demonstrated the ability of powerful groups to exercise power over the planning process by adopting a strategy of rationalization (presented as rationality) to serve their own interests at the expense of others, these concepts come through clearly. In my interviews with City of Champaign officials, neighborhood and local housing stakeholders, it was also the case that the planning strategies employed in the creation of this neighborhood plan operated according to pre-existing relationships between individual interests and senior officials. While this could be attributed to a benign natural result of the scale of interactions over the lengthy period of time an intensive redevelopment plan like the BPNP takes to come to fruition, and may also have to do with the complexity and scale of various proposals and pieces involved, it is absolutely vital to question and recognize the political culture and history of such interactions and evaluate the extent to which the informal actions that take place in the construction of such plans ultimately shape neighborhood outcomes. This is where evaluating this local neighborhood planning process through the lens of what makes up the constrained fiscal policy space of the City of Champaign becomes vitally important to uncovering some of the truths behind its constraints.

In the case of Ireland, “the central driver in the emergence of informal interactions stems from the power imbalances that exist between powerful economic interests and the executive
arm of the local authority given the latter’s reliance on private investment to generate independent income streams” (Fox-Rogers, 2014). This has direct relevance to evaluating the BPNP through the lens of fiscal policy space, and shifting intergovernmental funding streams, property value capture mechanisms, and local government decision-making in the face of increasing fiscal austerity. The recent and inherent reliance of local government on privately generated income streams for development adds a new “Economic Development” dimension to the traditional roles of the public sector, seen historically as:

1. Regulator (e.g. when individual property owners cannot regulate and public goods or externalities issues arise)
2. Service Provider (e.g. roads, sewer/water/electric, schools, fire, police, public amenities)
3. Growth Manager (e.g. zoning)

In the decision-making processes in the City of Champaign between Council members and staff in the creation of the BPNP, two City Council interviewees said the following:

From time to time when an idea like BPNP comes up, will meet systematically two at a time. Here’s what we are thinking, what do you think? Ask questions, give feedback – do that systematically with all 9 council members. Preliminary discussions usually include staff members. Systematically a handful of staff members will talk to a couple of city council members at a time to brief us on what they are thinking and ask us for our input. May need to change plan slightly to win support from X & Y council members. Study sessions are all open to public – plans are presented after adjustments are made based on private discussions. Take straw poll – maybe passes 7-2 BPNP, maybe another study session where those remaining issues are addressed. Then get formal council bill that passes 9-0. Staff knows they need to come to Council with ideas that likely to win broad support. Public often misperceives this – ‘you are just rubber stamps for staff – every time idea brought vote 9-0. Should tell staff to go shove it more often.’

Another Council member said:

Agenda item & reports are received every week by Council members with agenda item report updates – transmitted via explanatory memos to help Council members make an intelligent decision on whether to support or not. Then Council members go to private entity or someone we know to help with decision-making.

These descriptions referencing very small numbers of individuals discussing different options, running those options by “private entities” to help with decision-making, straw polling to count consensus votes before a proposal even comes to a public study session, is directly tied to what both Fox-Rogers and Flyvberg discuss in their case studies, and to Marxian conceptions of the way that institutionalized power filters through official but not publicly transparent decision-making channels to produce observed outcomes. Echoes of growth machine coalition politics are
evident here as well, with commodity relationships being established as a result of geographic immobility and locally dependent embedded social and professional relationships, whose power is only enhanced by the tenure structure of City Council described above and the relatively small size of the City of Champaign (e.g. smaller towns have more direct overlap, retain more “usual suspects” for longer periods of time who then build more local influence over politics and culture than in larger urban areas).

As one long-time City Council member put it: “Being active in city government is a hobby, a small group of people who are willing to spend their free time [doing this work].” Other community members I interviewed see it as decidedly less benign: one local resident I interviewed said he believes that City staff embarks on plans like the BPNP because of political pressure – “they know it’s wrong, but they try to justify doing it – or they go and do it anyway and hope they don’t get caught. If you are working there, you have to keep your mouth shut.” He continued, explaining that political parties are always guiding and close to these kinds of processes – you often don’t see or hear them but they are there. Often instructions to staff are for closed session debates, phone conversations, and “don’t ever write me anything.” This comment dovetails with the email comments referenced earlier between Kerri Spear and Kevin Jackson during the shadow politicking stage of the BPNP in early 2012 as well.

As another community member I interviewed said:

The plan to displace people and move people to gentrify the neighborhood, no, I’m against it, you know? That’s fundamentally what that is, and that’s what the city has wanted all along. You know, I have my own ideas about – and there’s talk about, you know, the city expansion and now the new high school discussion and the direction that it is taking up north, you know, gives major incentive to the city to further beautify these neighborhoods en route to the new high school. So, you know, we believe these plans have been in the works, some on a few cadre of people for many years, and they’re just carrying them out slowly and tediously so that they don’t get any political blowback.

When I asked who the “cadre” consisted of, responses essentially reflected growth machine theories of urban power and development:

It’s the city officials and the white ruling class of Champaign-Urbana, in a nutshell. The people who own property; own the land around Champaign-Urbana; the Peter Foxs; the people who run the restaurants; the developer behind M1 and M2; you know, people who own the banks; and the lawyers in town. And they have their functionaries at the city building, and that’s who – you know, they all – there’s colluding between a small set of people, is my perception.
7.1.2. New municipal fiscal priorities influence plan components and justifications for use of eminent domain

In answering my second research question, new municipal fiscal priorities, constrained and shaped by Champaign’s contemporary fiscal policy space, have influenced the plan’s rationale for the use of eminent domain on a widespread area instead of using a neighborhood preservation infill approach. Specifically, a new environmental responsibility ethos, declining federal funds for neighborhood investment, and increasing post-2008 crash financial problems-solving through local partnerships to diversify service provision expenses, combined with a new focus on racial sensitivity in business contracting, have all influenced components of the plan, in ways that are distinct from Old Urban Renewal.

New environmental responsibility: LEED-ND & Safety Town ‘showcase’ neighborhood

Kevin Jackson in our interview shared that former City Manager Steve Carter is the one who initially pushed the LEED-ND idea for the redevelopment – he sent Kevin a packet of information prior to the plan being developed, stating he wanted to emphasize sustainability, and wanted a state of the art proposal in accordance with the new City Council’s Goal #5 “Our City is a Model for Environmental Sustainability.” Kevin admitted that the LEED-ND point system will be an additional expense in the final redevelopment plan. In an article published by the News Gazette about the LEED-ND design decision, there is no room for discussion about why it makes sense for the lowest-income residents of the neighborhood to pay more for housing to make it energy efficient, beyond vague allusions to keeping energy costs down for residents. Likely much more relevant, and part of the constrained fiscal policy space Champaign operates within, is the fact shared by Lorrie Pearson (the land development manager for the Champaign planning department), who said that the use of LEED guidelines could help qualify the city for $10 million to $30 million of grants from HUD. This along with the usual adage that property values will increase – always in the context of the BPNP posited as a normative good without any nuanced investigation or analysis of potential “squeezing out” gentrification effects behind it – clearly demonstrates where City priorities lie (NG 3/28/2013: Energy efficiency, environment to be considered for neighborhood redevelopment).

Much more widespread in other news coverage are comments about this blank slate redevelopment site being an opportunity for Champaign to advertise itself in a textbook-example
neoliberal place-making marketing strategy. In late 2013, neighborhood coordinator John Ruffin said “this is probably one of the only times we’ll get to do a substantial neighborhood redevelopment, so we want this to be a showcase neighborhood.” (NG 11/20/2013: Meeting planned for input on Bristol Park). On November 21, 2013, a “Community Envisioning Workshop” was held by Farr Associates – a design firm from Chicago hired by the City Council to create a ‘Master Plan’ vision for the redevelopment – that was supposed to gather residents from the Bristol Place neighborhood and from Champaign to provide redevelopment design input by viewing and discussing design preferences. During this meeting, Doug Farr mentioned that the city’s goal was to help create a “model neighborhood” with design features and elements that other areas of the country could emulate. The goal as stated in this meeting was to help “create a vision for the model community,” and echoing Esther’s earlier statements, it was explained that this was a “once in a lifetime opportunity.”

Roughly thirty people attended the meeting, including roughly ten city officials, and only two Bristol place residents. Given the low number of resident participants, and the fact that the city officials were also voting during the “image preference survey,” it is clear that the redevelopment “Master plans” (see Appendix F.1) (a) show what the city wants to see, and (b) further support sentiments alluded to but often not stated explicitly by city staff and officials that existing residents will likely not be returning. By de facto lack of explicit policy in place to provide and encourage return, in most cases residents will not even be encouraged to return. Ostensibly the long-time owner occupants will be given demolition timing preferences on a “last-out, first-in” basis, but this has not been codified in official documentation beyond a vague statement in the Relocation Policy saying that “efforts will be made to keep all homeowners desiring to return as homeowners in the new development in their current home as long as possible” (CB 2012-214). Otherwise, those who wish to return need to work individually with the City on income and background eligibility and strategy in order to do so.

So the “new” Bristol Place will be a “showcase,” “model” neighborhood that uses environmentally efficient state-of-the-art construction and design principles, will cost more as a result, provide much better City services to new residents, and solves a number of other city issues at the same time – providing a site for a new fire station, a community storm shelter, and a “safety town” to draw visitors to the community. As Kevin Jackson put it, “A safety town is an attraction to the entire community and beyond – Champaign is talking about how the
transformation of that space will transform the entire area.” It will include some affordable housing as part of the redevelopment design but not its primary focus, and what will be included will likely be designed and therefore limited by LIHTC development mixed-income unit distribution policies, which effectively means that there will not be anything close to a one-for-one affordable housing unit replacement.

These visions – from LEED-ND walkability and sustainable energy design, to including a model “Safety Town,” and comments from Council members about beautifying North Market Street – “[The BPNP] is huge, specifically because it’s one of the entrances and exits to our city” (Will Kyles’ comment, NG 9/28/2010) – have a lot to do with what would benefit the City overall to have in this particular north central corridor urban location, and do not address community concerns about widespread joblessness and underemployment, local income-based rental discrimination, local race-based housing finance discrimination, or the fact that the City’s plan will compound the displacement and dispossession effects beyond the project area itself onto all low-income area renters by the use of the area’s fixed and limited high-demand HCVs in its relocation plan, exacerbating widely recognized affordable housing issues community-wide.

These are just a few among a whole host of other issues raised by residents concerned over the plan’s effects, including the fact that resident perceptions in the last 2-3 years are that neighborhood crime has been decreasing and what they want most is financial help in the upkeep of properties or small project incentives for neighborhood beautification efforts. These, along with early steering committee meeting discussions and other resident comments about neighborhood preferences, reflect the widespread Bristol Place community desire to build stronger “collective efficacy,” defined by criminal sociologists Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) as “cohesion among residents combined with shared expectations for the social control of public space.” Essentially, that the ability of members of a community who trust one another and are willing to cooperate to prevent crime, allows community residents to create a safe environment through things like monitoring children playing in public areas, acting to prevent truancy and street corner “hanging” by teenagers, and confronting individuals who exploit or disturb public spaces. This theory ties directly into Jane Jacobs’ understanding of the urban spatial and social fabric, and what creates “community,” and is in fact also the new service philosophy of the CPD in their “community oriented policing” efforts to date.

In a document recently released named, “Bristol Place Talking Points,” other than
statistics on declining property values and this neighborhood containing the lowest valued property in the City, it states as justification for the demolition, displacement and new development: “landlords are unable/unwilling to invest further due to the return on investment.” This statement remains quite beyond the pale when understood in the context of the City’s history of racist community policing, neighborhood disinvestment since the 1990s and not-so-benign neglect in its code enforcement before David Oliver was hired, Dorothy David became City Manager, and the NSD was given more support by Council in its community initiatives. It is the role of government to police property for minimum living standards for its residents in the same way that they police people for crimes against each other or against property – I wonder what the Bristol Place neighborhood would look like physically, and what kinds of success infill investments would have, if this had actually occurred in this neighborhood?

Those who should have been and who should still, in all fairness and reasonable accountability, be held accountable for this devastation of neighborhood decline are the slumlord-type managerial investment property owners. And this is precisely the group benefiting most from this redevelopment plan. While those who have the largest stake in the neighborhood and who for the most part have persisted in keeping their properties clean, up to code and often even beautified – the older longtime owner-occupants – are those who are being hurt worst by this plan. They are also the only group for which extra displacement care has been taken in the form of the tax rebate program, but the success of that limited and capped fund in mitigating the very real financial challenges resulting from the displacement of the elderly has yet to be demonstrated.

Additionally, nothing is being done to compensate or account for displacement effects on Bristol Place local businesses run out of personal homes, the two local churches and their affected congregations, or any property improvement investments made recently by any homeowners. Not to mention the emotional distress, amplified for long-time homeowners, of being forcibly displaced from a home full of memories and rich with individual emotional significance. Or the neighborhood social networks, documented in literature as being stronger among people at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum due to their experiences of shared deprivation and disadvantage. In this particular area for example, two resident themes that came out in those interviews involved the future difficulty posed post-displacement by not having neighbors available to babysit in case of emergencies, to borrow a car from, and for older
residents not having trusted relationships with younger neighbors around to mow lawns or help with trash pickup, house management, etc. Re-building community-based social support networks takes time, and energy, compounding relocation hardships discussed in detail above.


Another of the more recent City Council goals involves increasing public contracting opportunities for female- and minority-owned businesses. Under the City Council goal “our City promotes economic opportunity” is the subheading “increase minority and women-owned business opportunities.” In working towards this goal specifically related to the BPNP demolition policy, City staff worked with the Small Business Development Center, Chairman of the Committee on Construction at Illinois Black Chamber of Commerce, Illinois Procurement Technical Assistance Center, local contractors, and community leaders to identify barriers to minority contractor participation in City demolitions. The key barriers they identified included lack of bonding, not enough insurance and financial capacity for large demolition projects, and a lack of experience with demolitions overall. Input from the outreach also indicated that smaller contractors have difficulty generally competing with larger established contractors regardless of the size of the project.

The BPNP Demolition Policy works around these issues in its demolition contracts for the BPNP neighborhood by breaking down demolition contracts into no more than five parcels per package, and creating a prequalified contractor pool to assist in meeting this goal (CB 2014-001). The prequalified contractor pool will address issues of capacity, capability and inclusion of minority- and women-owned business as prerequisites to bidding. Competition for demolition jobs will relate only to responsible bidding and pricing, and minority and women contractors lacking demolition experience will have an opportunity to obtain experience through partnerships with experienced contractors. Contractors wanting to participate in the prequalified contractor pool during the estimated three-year period will receive, upon request, an application from the NSD. In addition to standard demolition requirements, contractors will need to demonstrate the following minimum requirements: (1) designation as a small business, MBE/WBE or a Section 3 contractor; (2) 20% minority and/or women participation with a goal of at least 10% for minorities through (a) current employee makeup of their company, (b)
subcontracting, or (c) joint venture; (3) a bonding capacity of $50,000; and (4) demonstration of positive demolition experience equivalent to job requirements (CB 2014-148).

As one City Council member I interviewed put it:

Kevin Jackson and the NSD have worked really hard to unbundle projects all around the City to allow more space for minority public contracting. Our reports have been including minority participation where it is relevant – e.g. on small enough projects that it’s feasible. Kevin Jackson suggested unbundling demolition so minority contractors (only 2-3 in town currently) have more opportunities. NSD has been putting on training classes to write RFPs, get bonding advice, etc. NSD, as much as they can, try to keep jobs and contracts within the community.

According to all of my research, this is undeniably true, and insofar as I have specifically critiqued the actions of Kevin Jackson and Kerri Spear in other decision-making conduct related to this plan, it is very clear that in addition to their necessary collusion and orchestration behind the scenes to make the BPNP redevelopment successful (generously, likely due to job-related political and growth machine pressures), the NSD worked very hard throughout this process to include what few concessions they felt they could into the design of the relocation and demolition policies. I do not doubt that without the Neighborhood Services Department staff pushing for neighborhood resident and youth involvement and attempting in some way to incorporate responsiveness to concerns voiced in resident participation sessions, the demolitions would not be unbundled, there would be no prequalified contractor pool, no real estate tax rebate program for elderly homeowners would exist at all, and HCVs would have no associated preferences attached to their distribution. These additions go above and beyond what federal laws absolutely require. Dissidents might argue that these policies were the bare minimum the City could have done to get away with as little community outcry over the use of eminent domain as constitutive of this plan as they have, but eventual displacement outcomes for the residents affected by these small concessions will be better because of these policy changes.

One of the City Council members I interviewed shared that public works has been the City department most responsive to the minority business initiative, but that the Urbana-Champaign Big Broadband (UC2B) initiative started the change in City contracting to expand a focus on including MWBEs. However, there has been controversy around how the work was completed, which individuals in the community brought to Council attention by critiquing the work partially completed. This Council member was unwilling to share more details, and when I tried tracking down explanations for the change in contracting between phases 2 and 3 of that
project, the most explicit statement contained in city documents was “the City did not want to extend the contract with Power Up and desired to undertake the incomplete work with a different contractor” (CB 2014-053). An earlier document stated of this contracting decision shift:

Staff did not utilize the components of the approved alternative procurement plan relative to Minority and Female Business Enterprise (MAFBE) participation or the minority participation in the workforce as determinative factors in this evaluation or recommendation. As was noted at the time the alternative procurement process was considered, race-conscious determinative outcomes, without a more thorough analysis and endpoint, may raise legal issues currently being considered by the U.S. Supreme Court. Though not utilized as a determinative factor in the evaluation of these proposals, Western has indicated that it will achieve the MAFBE participation goal through its subcontract with Prairie Restorations, Inc. This company is located in Tolono, Illinois, and is certified as a female owned/controlled business enterprise by the Illinois Department of Central Management Services (CB 2013-111).

It is ironic that “race-conscious determinative outcomes” are only feared when the “alternative procurement process” proposed is meant to reverse traditional racial and gender power arrangements to provide room for more historically marginalized women and minority inclusion in public contracting.

This alternative process, similar to what ended up being used in the BPNP demolition policy, was proposed by staff but eventually not followed by Council. It provided preference points for proposers who pledge a diverse workforce composition, proposed unbundling the project into multiple smaller component parts, collecting prime contractor and subcontractor registration information to verify MWBE status, and implementing an annual contractor pre-qualification system, along with incentive payments to contractors successful in achieving the workforce diversity pledges made in their proposals (CB 2012-020; CB 2013-081).

It seems certain staff members have tried to push more progressive contracting and housing provision city policies forward only to have them rejected by Council. To some Councilmembers, apparently “good faith efforts” are enough on the part of the City for remedying decades of historical disadvantage and dispossession precisely by these sorts of decisions made by those who occupy positions of power able to define that decision-making space. When contracting for professional financial consulting services, the longest-standing City Council member Michael LaDue said, “we have to work with the demographics that the market presents us with. We do our best to get minority and female-owned firms ... I think this reflects our best good-faith effort. It’s still a field that is not dominated by women.” Robert W. Baird &
Co. and Comer Capital Group were recommended as co-financial advisors, and Kane, McKenna Capital was recommended for planning services. Comer Capital Group is a minority-owned firm, and Robert W. Baird & Co. is neither a minority-owned firm nor a female-owned firm. (Champaign City Council hires two new minority, women focused financial advisors Wednesday, November 20, 2013 Daily Illini article).

In the Council Bill approving these two financial and advising services contracts, staff recognized that taking the easy, well-trodden path of least resistance would not meet new MWBE contracting City Council goals. Staff listed easy, known-quantity contracting in its recommendation to hire Kane McKenna for planning advising services, stating:

Retaining Kane, McKenna Capital as the City’s financial advisor would provide continuity with a firm that has provided excellent service, and does not require the staff workload to explain the City’s financial policies and procedures, and for staff to become familiar with a new financial advisor’s procedures and expectations.

At the same time staff clearly recognized and stated that this recommendation had a disadvantage of undermining the MWBE Council goal: “Depending on the specific direction given to staff, this alternative might not advance the City Council goal of doing more business with minority and/or female-owned enterprises” (CB 2013-224).

The City of Champaign has definitively moved forward from the old urban renewal era in its encouragement via public policy for increased MWBE involvement in the demolitions of Phase I BPNP, especially when compared to the local history of the Creative Buildings proposal from the first round of urban renewal in Champaign. But City staff and elected officials universally continue to claim limited power over influencing “market dynamics,” and somehow relate these market dynamics’ constraints to not just all of its MWBE contracting, but to restrictions on what can be constructed, and re-constructed, in Bristol Place as well. “The market” didn’t allow for successful infill development, and when deciding what the replacement will look like, the City has been exceedingly careful to not commit to anything beyond vague statements about the redevelopment “still being a plan for affordable housing construction,” as it moves forward soliciting developer proposals in 2015.

7.1.3. New fiscal priorities underscore disparate impacts of redevelopment on minority communities

New fiscal priorities involving value capture through property value increases directly resulting from market-interventionist neoliberal government action, inaction, and investment
have been turned into tools for financing urban development as a result of declining federal funding for neighborhood and affordable housing initiatives in Champaign. These fiscal priorities and arrangements, embedded in longitudinal narratives about the City of Champaign’s social and political history, provide the lens necessary to evaluate the plausible fiscal policy space of the City of Champaign in the BPNP redevelopment. Specifically, new partnerships have emerged as a result of contemporary local municipal fiscal pressures, and their historical embeddedness in traditional neoliberal market philosophy underscores the conclusion that growth machine coalitions continue to drive development in Champaign, disproportionately impacting the lowest income, and in Champaign that also means minority, citizens. The degree to which this is a result of compounded historical disenfranchisement in land use policy and local government simply not taking proactive corrective action and continuing with the path of least resistance ‘business as usual,’ or a more deliberate racially motivated modern disenfranchisement requires further study.

This emphasis maintained by City officials and representatives on market-driven constraints in the provision and regulation of affordable housing supply rings hollow, particularly in the face of market constraints’ potential to address affordable housing issues locally. As early as March 2012 City officials were claiming market-based limitations on replacement housing in Bristol Place. In a NSAB meeting on March 8, 2012 Jim Rose said, “It was my understanding that the goal was to have new development match the same percentages as existing neighborhoods,” to which Greg Skaggs replied, “Due to current economic state the current 50/50 split will likely not be possible.” Combined with the comment in July 2012 about “developer preferences” let slip by Kevin Jackson about a developer wanting all cleared land, shared by Esther Patt, the universal “economic forces” monolith is all that is usually required to remove oneself from culpability and declare oneself a neutral professional evaluator, or guided by one. Kevin Jackson and other City staff have maintained that the primary goal in the whole BPNP endeavor is to provide and expand affordable housing options for the local community. But directly after this statement in the March 2012 Council study session, he said:

The market will dictate what we put back. We do know it will be a mixed income affordable housing development. It would have a funding arrangement that would include housing across affordability scale: 80% AMI being highest level of affordability of units going back into the area, market rate units would be in the minority.

This sounds exactly like another City and HACC plus a private developer and manager mixed-
income LIHTC housing development partnership project along the lines of Douglass Square, the replaced Burch Village complex just across the railroad tracks from the BPNP project area.

It is clear that some individuals on the City of Champaign’s staff have the expertise and backgrounds necessary to recognize inequity locally and propose good solutions to counteract it, but those solutions often seemed to be undermined or not agreed to by City Council in my research. The starkest example of this is in the Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing Choice (AIFHC) submitted in July 2014 (a requirement of HUD’s as a component of Champaign’s Consolidated Plan every 7 years), where the City explicitly states, “the continued presence of [fair housing] impediments suggests that established efforts to address fair housing are insufficient.” It goes on to list nine local fair housing impediments in data-backed, documented detail. One of which remains, from the eras of Old Urban Renewal and New Urban Renewal, mortgage lending disparities for minority borrowers across all income categories seeking all loan categories analyzed: home purchase, home improvement, and refinancing. The local supporting data for mortgage lending disparities by race goes back to 2001, and the more recent data collected in 2011 demonstrates that the disparities in lending have actually gotten worse: in 2005 the average disparity was a difference of 13 percentage points, but that number increased to 17 points in 2011. The Community Reinvestment Group, a group of local mortgage lenders, apparently explained this as potentially resulting from private mortgage insurance guidelines including qualifying ratios, debt-to-income ratios and loan-to-value ratios, but then stated that overall credit was the biggest determining factor in loan application outcomes.

Another fair housing barrier listed is “inadequate supply of affordable rental units/barriers for low-income population.” The Champaign County Regional Housing study, completed by professional consultant Vogt Santer Insights in 2010, found that in the City of Champaign there is a gap of 1,858 units of affordable housing for households with an annual income below $20,000 (SS 2015-011). City staff in the AIFHC recommended “continued analysis of housing need and availability” in order to implement proportionate “policies regarding new developments [that] could require 20% of the units to be affordable (or more, in order to address Champaign’s current deficit in affordable housing).” Staff preparing this fair housing barriers report also recognized some of the structural barriers to low-income housing seekers, including up-front costs of renting application fees, policies that ask for extended periods of financial stability or deny people with particular criminal backgrounds, in addition to the virulent NIMBYism
referenced earlier. Despite this clear recognition of significant “inadequate supply” and “structural barriers,” bafflingly, the end of this report states:

At this time, the City has decided to focus more on providing incentives to developers to encourage this type of affordable new construction, similar to what was done for the Atkins Group in the development of Ashland Park on the north end of town. If incentives continue to be sufficient to encourage voluntary construction of affordable units, no changes need be considered (SS 2015-011).

The City’s 2013/2014 Consolidated Annual Performance Evaluation Report (CAPER) stated that in the Ashland Park development, it

…consented to waive some of the normal development costs, including building permit fees, to encourage the private developer to build affordable, visitable single-family homes. To further reduce the cost of the homes, the City also agreed to give all buyers with incomes at or below 100% MFI a partial rebate of City property taxes for the first five years after purchase (CAPER, FY13-14).

As of the 2013-2014 CAPER, 141 buyers were participating in the tax rebate program with an average home cost (of those participating) of $141,595 and an average median family income of 68% (this falls between the 50% AMI very low income and 80% AMI low income HUD designations). The City then concluded:

This project has been an excellent example of affordable housing built entirely by the private sector, with no investment of federal funding whatsoever… The range of new home prices is from $119,000 to $200,000+, making many affordable to lower income buyers. This incentive was approved by the City Council to encourage homeownership, particularly for low- and moderate-income buyers (CAPER, FY13-14).

When evaluating this particular decision-making through a fiscal policy space lens, what becomes clear, in addition to the continued homeownership bias, is the preference in financial decision-making on the part of the City Council of the budget impact via property tax revenue capture to the City from the Ashland Park subdivision proposal by the Atkins’ Group. As early as 2004 when zoning and plat infrastructure for this proposed development was being discussed:

…the development has approximately 540 homes proposed. If each home is valued at approximately $150,000, the development would generate $27,000,000 worth of equalized assessed value. Annual property tax revenues would be estimated at $351,000 (CB 2004-232).

Two years later, this number had dropped to 225 homes, providing only $118,080 in property tax revenue, but still requiring the City to build new infrastructure “including new roads and

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sidewalks…In addition, the new housing will extend the City’s fire, police, snow removal and road maintenance services” (CB 2006-200). By 2014, the Ashland Park subdivision had constructed and sold 418 homes out of the 540 anticipated lots.

This provides yet another piece of evidence that despite staff evaluations of barriers to affordable housing and recommendations related to addressing local affordable housing need concentrated in the very low-income (<30% AMI) and predominantly African-American communities of Champaign (see maps in Appendix F.2), Champaign’s City Council remains focused on providing financial incentives geared primarily towards those both able to afford and desirous of pursuing homeownership. The Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing concluded, “housing units exist, but not of the type or number currently needed in the area,” and then additionally:

…while there is a deficit at the higher income levels as well, of more concern is the deficit at the lower levels – while people in higher income brackets have options for housing (notably home ownership and renting “lesser” units that are available), those with lower incomes do not have these options.

City staff clearly recognizes the extant problems, and has both reported problems and proposed potential solutions to City Council, but overall it seems Council has chosen to disavow responsibility, citing monolithic opaque “market forces.” Champaign has clearly not been willing to exercise its “stick”-oriented regulatory power over any but its most vulnerable and least organized citizens, to their detriment and simultaneously to the benefit of developers, property managers and owners area-wide who all benefit financially from the City’s “carrot”-based incentive attitude towards new construction and development.

This “hands-off” regulatory attitude unfortunately jives with my interview with Dorothy David, who shared that over the course of her 20-year tenure working for the City of Champaign, even though the City Council is more progressive than it was 20 years ago, they still do not want to insert the City into things they believe are managed well by the private sector, like affordable housing development. Beyond standard policy guidelines like zoning ordinances, lot sizing, infill development versus greenfield protection – the kinds of policies that assure development meets community standards, she said that the City will not develop housing outside of achieving other missions like eliminating blight or promoting affordability, and that it wants to focus public resources where they are most needed and does not want to duplicate other efforts.
The problem is, there are no other efforts locally to provide lower than market rate rental housing, and specifically all types of housing for those at or below 50% of AMI besides the HACC and its larger recent LIHTC complexes. This denial of culpability in market influence was again echoed at the Farr Associates “visioning” Master Plan community meeting when towards the end of the meeting as city officials were explaining that their hands were essentially tied, saying “a lot of what we have to do is reactionary. We react with what developers tell us they want to do.” This sentiment not only completely belies the ultimate goals of democratic government and planning more generally, but even more egregiously of public participation requirements in public planning processes specifically. Instead of a reactionary, hands-off market politics which is really just a politics directed by property elites that provides financial incentives to Capital, the City should focus on identifying a vision for the neighborhood and development directed by residents and community members who actually live in that community, and then hire a developer who will work to deliver that local community’s vision.

7.2. Fiscal Policy-Driven Urban Renewal: increasing fiscal partnership complexity and humanistic rhetoric

The focus in Fiscal Policy-Driven Urban Renewal, different from the two earlier eras discussed, has become a more humanistic and “politically correct” rhetorical façade, combined with increasingly complex financial market integration and evolving local U.S. municipal government place-making pressures in the face of increased global competition.

These claims to only minimally intervene in the local housing market run parallel to traditional neoliberal government policy on intervening on markets that focuses on the neoclassical model of “economic man,” competition, and free markets. Similar to Flyvberg’s study in Aalborg, in this case study I have found that members of the local business community put pressure on political actors to create special privileges and spaces to capture individual value for themselves, whether by city branding, land use incentives and regulations or selective City decision-making to preserve higher taxable property value. The in-between planning spaces in the City of Champaign’s operations are not directed by the correct ethics of representative democracy, redistributive equity and responsibility towards all citizens, equally.

Further, the opacity of these decision-making spaces disallows reflexive state-market critique and leads to exactly the kind of Fiscal Policy-Driven Urban Renewal detailed here,
complete with unequal outcomes borne by those who can least afford it and whose demographic
group for decades has been locally undervalued, denied access to the same wealth-building
opportunities as others, unjustly targeted for criminal justice fines and fees, and unjustly forced
to bear the undeniable financial and emotional costs of state-initiated forced residential
displacement. Representative democracies are only as representative as those who participate,
and come together to form groups to collectively advocate for their combined interests. As Terry
Townsend put it, “in black power coalition politics [in Champaign], you don’t have the luxury of
staying in one area and delving deep – you go where the storm is – because there is never a large
enough group [locally] to support the Black Coalition (often between 5-25 people).”

Much urban research focuses on the resulting manifestations of racial inequality in urban
areas, but often this research fails to explicate the causes of race inequality in them. The
dehumanization of black bodies has been a fundamental part of capital value capture by whites
through the structuring of urban land markets, and the dispossession and serial displacement of
African-American people for decades. One of the challenging issues concerning cities and the
changing nature of multiscalar governance in the wake of federal devolution and austerity
measures for neighborhood investment funding in particular, is determining who governs what at
the local level: who gets to participate and in what ways, how power is allocated and mediated,
and what kinds of governance systems or structures will best serve a multitude of ecological and
social goals. Who decides meaningfully impacts what gets decided. As Harvey and Molotch
(2007) put it, “the politics of place is about whose interests government will serve.”

Land use regulations in the U.S. and in Champaign-Urbana were initially designed to
construct an American version of apartheid, separating people by phenotype via the use of
racially restrictive covenants and racial zoning ordinances. The idea that minorities, especially
African-Americans but also Latinos and Asians, threaten property values was not just
conventional wisdom but federal and state policy until the 1960s. But discovering the links
between land use controls and racial exclusion since then requires more indirect and difficult
tracing than the mapped-out apartheid of racial zoning (de Souza Briggs, 2005). For those
seeking to make the connection between land use and housing regulations and racial equity, one
must first determine whether a particular regulation or a combination of regulations raises
housing costs or limits the availability of rental housing, then determining how higher housing
costs or limited rental housing availability affect African-Americans. Part of the appeal of
market-oriented planning stems from its apparent ability to negotiate through rhetorically value-neutral mechanisms in the same way that modernist planning sought to suppress through technical expertise. Economic change, real estate cycles, and transformations of urban governance all produce cycles of “creative destruction” which limit low-income households’ control over place-making in their own neighborhoods.

In this case study, there have been clear and undeniable data produced from a number of sources about rental income barriers, the dearth of affordable rental or homeownership housing units, racism in home financing, and the relative successes of “carrot” and “stick” public policy approaches in effecting changes in housing market supply locally. The City of Champaign holds the legislative power, as a home-rule municipality, to create and enforce the development requirements proposed in the Impediments to Fair Housing report to specifically target and expand the supply of rental units available to its lowest-income and most vulnerable residents. Instead, it has chosen not to take an active role in representing its vulnerable populations’ interests in the heinously skewed (primarily by student-gearde luxury rental development pressures) local housing and property markets, instead choosing via public policy to facilitate, represent and protect the interests and the individual profit motives via accumulation by dispossession of the investment interests of the white local elite. This case considers the circumstances surrounding the application of market logics in Champaign’s urban planning and examines the racist implications of this approach, given historic land use practices, wealth accumulation, and policing trajectories.

The main effect of the neoliberal political turn that began in the 1970s has been a redistribution of assets and wealth from the mass of the population toward the upper class, documented as “accumulation by dispossession” by David Harvey in *The New Imperialism* (2003). This accumulation, Harvey explained as the proliferation of Marxian ‘primitive’ accretion practices during the rise of capitalism, including (1) the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; (2) conversion of various forms of property (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusively private property rights; (3) suppression of rights to the commons; (4) commodification of labor power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; (5) colonial, neocolonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets; (6) monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; (7) the slave trade (which continues, particularly in the sex industry); and (8)
usury, the national debt and most devastating to working classes’ obliviousness to its own
decline since and from the early 1990s, the use of the credit system as a means of primitive
accumulation (Harvey, 2007).

The state, with its monopoly of violence and constructing definitions of legality, backs,
promotes and constructs all of these accretion practices, and the gap between its rhetoric (for the
benefit of all) and realization (for the benefit of a small ruling class) has increased in Fiscal
Policy-Driven Urban Renewal. The idea that markets are about fair competition has been widely
negated by the monopoly and internationalization of corporate and financial powers, and the role
that government has historically played in constructing and regulating spaces of exchange. As
Harvey and Molotch (2007) put it, “life chances of all sorts, including the ability to make money
from property, are significantly determined by what goes on at the local level.” This oft-repeated
fallacy that the City’s decision-making space is constrained by “market forces” may be in some
senses true (although really only related to FPS #1 in the form of explicit federal cuts to
programs like the CDBG), but what is equally clear in this case study example is the fact that this
justification was used as a smokescreen to disguise and devalue other options available for
neighborhood revitalization and investment, using rhetoric referencing the incomprehensible
expertise of those who understand property markets and real estate cycles being the only
individuals capable of determining how urban space can be structured. This rhetoric is presented
as precluding critique, obviating any substantive alternative analysis or interpretation by either
the broader public or members of the affected community.

Markets however, like everything else humanly created, work through, are organized by
and entirely bound up with human interests in wealth, power and emotional valuation, as
opposed to being inherently individualistic and thus necessarily hyper efficient in the aggregate
(e.g. neoclassical ‘invisible hand,’ Tiebout sorting, economic efficiency arguments). Molotch’s
“growth machine” argument is that “the pursuit of exchange values so permeates the life of
localities that cities become organized as enterprises devoted to the increase of aggregate rent
levels through the intensification of land use.” This “creates a stratification of places according
to the ease with which they can attract capital – a stratification that then alters the life chances of
local individuals and groups.” They argue that neighborhood stability is entirely dependent on an
area’s strategic utility to the growth machine apparatus:

People dreaming, planning and organizing themselves to make money from property are
the agents through which accumulation does its work at the level of the urban place. Social groups that push against these manipulations embody human strivings for affection, community, and sheer physical survival...Neighborhoods whose obliteration would better serve growth goals are subject to the strongest pressure; unless their residents and organizations are high enough in the hierarchies of power to resist, neighborhoods are sacrificed to the growth goal. The mode of interpersonal supports, the presence or absence of an indigenous business class, and race and racism shape specific outcomes (Harvey & Molotch, 2007).

In Champaign-Urbana, we continue to see the long-time indigenous white business class consisting of property owners and their allies on City Council securing individual profit value created in black community spaces in the North End.

Part of the problem is that often government decision makers who deal with neighborhoods are stuck in a CDBG-defined world, but those funds are increasingly limited, so cities are increasingly becoming more “entrepreneurial,” interpreting the primary problem as a lack of investment capital, which leads to seeing neighborhoods as economic units (TIF districts, Business Improvement Districts, etc.). In this way, neoclassical economic assumptions try to convert “places” into definable units to be bought and sold as conventional commodities. But neighborhoods organize life chances in the same sense as class does, and “one’s home provides access to school, friends, work place, and shops. Changing homes disrupts connections to these other places and their related values as well” (Harvey & Molotch, 2007). Neoliberal market logics do not map well onto human conceptions of place, of home, and the complex social networks that arise over long tenures in a single location.

In Illinois, home rule municipalities have much more discretion than non-home rule municipalities over property taxes, sales taxes, debt, and other financial areas including contracts and impact fees. Home rule municipalities can levy more types of taxes than non-home rule municipalities and are not subject to property tax limitations. The economic base determines the wealth of the revenue bases from which local governments draw revenues to finance spending, and spending needs and demands determine how much they must spend to ensure that services are adequate and citizens satisfied. Research shows that local governments have adapted to these changes by becoming more reliant on elastic and volatile revenue sources over which they have control rather than reducing spending (Mullins & Wallin, 2004; Brunori et al., 2008). Research in Illinois has shown that governments are not completely bound or constrained by their external environment in solving financial problems. Rather, governments have resources and options for
managing fiscal stress and volatility within their internal environment, and these features can act as filters or buffers on external events. According to an article detailing the interactions between Illinois municipalities’ fiscal policy space elements (1) the state or intergovernmental context and (3) municipally and locally imposed fiscal controls and policies, Hendrick & Crawford (2014) conclude that a government’s fiscal structure represents a set of moving parts that are likely to be used to solve multiple problems at the same time. The application of the FPS evaluation lens helps identify the complexity and the evolution of the multiple plan components and financing decisions behind the BPNP redevelopment that further support this claim.

The City’s focus in the BPNP has clearly been on outsourcing the financing as much as possible through partnerships, as Kerri and Kevin repeated in many City meetings after its initial controversial May 8, 2012 study session, “the City’s goal is not to be the sole source of funding but to leverage other dollars.” The City’s take is that partnerships are the only way to create the collaborative, creative financing mechanisms required to do projects on the scale of the BPNP. As Dorothy David explained in our interview, there is an entire policy spectrum of things the City can get involved with in addressing housing issues locally, but it often does not have the funding to get involved directly (as for example, a developer), which is why they work so hard to build partnerships with organizations like the HACC and Habitat for Humanity to address local housing supply issues. But this approach runs the risk of exactly what occurred in this case study, the focus of the planning intervention shifting to manage and encompass so many other constituent goals that it became no longer solely geared towards targeted neighborhood revitalization and service improvements to existing residents, and was instead used to promote growth machine development interests and a more marketable “model neighborhood” place-making. As Mihaly (2007) put it:

Public-private development is notoriously difficult to describe. Conference panels regarding urban economic revitalization often involve disconnected presentations of project after project, devoid of connecting themes, reflecting the reality that large urban public-private redevelopment engages multiple actors in such complex realities so as to defy generalization.

The complexity and scale of these revitalization efforts will remain opaque to the public without specific legislation enforcing transparency and accountability measures, even as public funding is funneled into them, because of the nature of private contract law in the U.S.

Places are in fact created by the machinations and institutional maneuvers surrounding
them, and people construct land use regulations as parts of organizational webs that include political, economic and cultural values unique to individual localities. Land use is above all, constituent of collective local decisions. Even boundary demarcation is political and fraught with local social judgments and meaning, as I discussed in the creation of the ‘North End’ designation in Chapter 3. As Harvey and Molotch (2007) say, “The boundaries and meanings of place are repeatedly named and defined in anticipation of specific consequences.” This was even evident in the BPNP, as participants in a Youth Participatory Action Research project geared towards getting more youth participation in community planning efforts stated that study respondents:

still had some difficulty identifying the Bristol Park neighborhood following explanation of the area and distribution of outlined maps of the area. When described by street names and nicknames for different areas of the neighborhood used by youth, participants then seemed to recognize the area referenced (Echetebu, 2014).

This lack of understanding of what the City’s neighborhood designation of “Bristol Park” even meant, another UIUC researcher said “was a key factor in why youth had declined to participate in events and forums related to the redevelopment of the area, because it was not clear to them that it was referring to their own neighborhood” (Echetebu, 2014).

As is evident from interview themes with Champaign city officials and politicians, there is a very common, ongoing, widespread and myopic acceptance of the self-equilibrating real estate market. The acts of exchange, buying and selling real estate needs no justification, and developers interests dictating market redevelopment options is simply taken and presented as a given, but regulating those exchanges for the benefit of residents requires special political and ideological mobilization and action. Unfortunately, this is a mentality stuck in the neoliberal economic traditions of the 1970s, as the issue of whether or not to intervene in property markets has been disproved as a premise entirely since then, and it is now widely understood as a fictitious creation of neoclassical economics. The only real issue, currently, is the form that property market intervention takes and whose goals it serves. As Kirk Harris (2015) put it, “the nagging questions are which public, whose interests, and how do we define the public good in the context of economic-development-driven eminent domain practices?”

By giving public-private development entities that operate outside of traditional governmental structures public authority (such as HACC’s outsourcing of PBV management in its new mixed income LIHTC developments), municipalities limit the transparency of pubic decision-making, making accountability difficult, if not impossible (Harris, 2015).
There is consistent deployment of corporate-centered public–private development strategies, even in the absence of a plausible cost-benefit advantage to the municipalities and their working-class and low-income residents. These strategies promote a symbolic sense of progress that is compelling, politically expedient, and congruent with the entrenched neoliberal philosophy that has dominated local economic development activities, while foreclosing the possibilities of more redistributive development strategies (Ledebur & Woodward, 2003).

In recent years, the role of municipal governments has shifted from guidance of social, spatial and economic order, to be subsumed by the drive for economic growth, which is presumed to expand the municipal revenue base and in the ethos of trickle down economics, benefit all residents. As Jennings & Jordan-Zachery (2010) argue, this private-public partnership paradigm insulates government from taking responsibility for the destruction of neighborhoods and displacement of populations.
Elegant Racism in its contemporary form: Housing

Structural violence theorists define violence as the unavoidable disparity between the potential ability to fulfill basic needs and their actual fulfillment, locating the unequal share of power to decide over the distribution of resources as the pivotal causal factor of these avoidable structural inequalities. Galtung defines violence as the:

…avoidable impairment of fundamental human needs…human life, which lowers the actual degree to which someone is able to meet their needs below that which would otherwise be possible (Galtung, 1993 quoted from Ho, 2007).

In order to understand the crucial distinction between types of violence, Galtung constructed a typology of violence composed of three categories: personal, structural and cultural (Galtung, 1990). He asserts that structural violence, as opposed to personal or direct violence, is indirect in that “there may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances” (Galtung, 1969). Therefore, racial inequality in America, often coupled with poverty, is an institutionalized social structure that lowers the level of actual fulfillment of one’s fundamental needs below the potential, defined by the availability and access that other American citizens enjoy. Racial inequality is an example of structural violence in that the inequalities that exist in terms of disproportionate life chances because of disease or poverty are directly caused by an unequal distribution of resources. The underlying problem in structural violence is that ‘the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed’ (Galtung, 1969).

Ho (2007) argues that when agency is constrained to the extent that fundamental human needs cannot be attained, structural violence becomes a violation of human rights and thus constitutes a structural violation of human rights. As medical anthropologist and physician Paul Farmer notes, “the world’s poor are the chief victims of structural violence…the poor are not only more likely to suffer; they are less likely to have their suffering noticed’ (Farmer, 2005). As Ho (2007) says, “crucial in making the transition from violence to human rights violations is the recognition that structural causes are responsible for constrained agency.” Poverty means not only a lack of money, but also a concurrent impairment of access to adequate healthcare,
education and welfare services, and shelter. This often in turn affects the degree to which impoverished victims of structural violence enjoy their civil and political rights (Landman, 2006). From a structuralist perspective, with a focus on interdependent relationships, there are clear inequalities between collectivities along social axes - race is clearly a social axis along which inequalities have been institutionalized. Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois contend that since social structures have institutionalized structural violence, social structures therein render that violence invisible. For them, structural violence is “everyday violence [or] part of the normative fabric of social and political life. Structural violence is generally invisible because it is part of the routine grounds of everyday life…” (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004).

The cumulative fiscal decision-making in the City of Champaign reifies unequal and historically racist outcomes in state-initiated residential displacement of the lowest-income, minority city residents, similar to both earlier forms of urban renewal. The constrained fiscal decision pressures municipal governments face in the U.S. helps provide a lens to evaluate and understand the interacting decisions that continue to produce these results, particularly through the approach of government relative to housing industry stakeholders.

This is not a new process, and depressingly, we have seen this occur in different historical eras and in much larger cities like George-Eugene Haussmann’s Paris and in Robert Moses’ New York. Haussmann deliberately engineered the removal of much of Paris’ working class from Paris’ city center, using powers of expropriation for supposedly public benefit, and did so in the name of civic improvement, environmental restoration, and urban renovation. The deep social consequences of these historical actions have been seen in recent years in uprisings and conflict in the isolated suburbs within which the marginalized immigrants and unemployed workers are increasingly trapped. Robert Moses “took a meat axe to the Bronx” with unprecedented neighborhood groups and movements protesting using Jane Jacobs’ rhetoric of the destruction of whole communities of residents and their long-established networks of social integration. But once the “brutal power of state expropriations” had been resisted and contained in both cases, “a far more insidious and cancerous process of transformation occurred through the fiscal disciplining of urban democratic governments, land markets, property speculation,” and the sorting of land to those “highest and best uses” that generate the highest possible financial rates of return on investments (Harvey, 2012).

In heartbreakingly clear parallels to the story of the BPNP, Engels in 1872 said:
In reality, the bourgeoisie has only one method of solving the housing question after its own fashion—that is to say, of solving it in such a way that the solution perpetually renews the question anew. This method is called “Haussmann” [by which] I mean the practice that has now become general of making breaches in the working class quarters of our big towns, and particularly in areas which are centrally situated, quite apart from whether this is done from considerations of public health or for beautifying the town, or owing to the demand for big centrally situated business premises, or, owing traffic requirements, such as the laying down of railways, streets...no matter how different the reasons may be, the result is always the same; the scandalous alleys disappear to the accompaniment of lavish self-praise by the bourgeoisie on account of this tremendous success, but they appear again immediately somewhere else...The breeding place of disease, the infamous holes and cellars in which the capitalist mode of production confines our workers night after night, are not abolished; they are merely shifted elsewhere! The same economic necessity that produced them in the first place, produces them in the next place.

...The growth of the big modern cities gives the land in certain areas, particularly in those areas which are centrally situated, an artificially and colossally increasing value; the buildings erected on these areas depress this value instead of increasing it, because they no longer belong to changed circumstances. They are pulled down and replaced by others. This takes place above all with workers’ houses which are situated centrally and whose rents, even with the greatest overcrowding, can never, or only very slowly, increase above a certain maximum. They are pulled down and in their stead shops, warehouses and public building are erected (Harvey, 2012).

Being ethical in planning practice means recognizing and understanding in as much depth as possible the line between using information to teach or to persuade, and the institutional and ultimate goals behind each instance of persuasive argument. There is an immense and often underappreciated power that comes with an expertise in the art of information sharing with the American public. Only when one understands both current and historical national and local rhetorical frames and the contemporary implications of less than half of the entire electorate even voting in local elections (Champaign County’s relatively high voter turnout in local elections this November was only 49%), can one comprehend the potential for misuse of privileged information through shadow-state processes in directing the distribution of public resources in the land-use planning process.

With the power to share information in different ways to inform a differentially invested and engaged public, there is significant potential to present information in ways that sway audience members to a specific conclusion. Since a few key players in every locale participate in the land use and distribution game, working with them will always be part of every planner’s job, and thus general public persuasion to justify observed outcomes in the built environment will
necessarily also be. There is immense power involved in presenting information fairly and accurately without appealing to emotive claims, and in using data to argue for a particular position, decision or set of actions.

Rhetoric in my conception encompasses the practical art of turning deliberation and judgment into argument. Centered around the primary trait of planning – the communication of information through storytelling – the ethical use of rhetoric in my mind is the best possible means of persuasion towards redistribution of public benefits in the U.S. context. Often in contemporary media, rhetoric is positioned opposite to substantive analysis, usually in reference to political language. However, decisions about the allocation of public funds in communities (the traditional focus of planning activity) involve mediation between plural values, means and obligations. This is most often done from a position of institutional power, and as such requires those in planning positions to persuade the local public to agree with funding allocations and their outcomes. Rhetoric uses specific “topics”\(^{24}\) with the aim of communicating a trustworthy and expert character and healing the negative political emotions that result from pain at inequitable decisions. However, rhetorical practice in planning easily slides into deception and emotional manipulation, especially when one has access to “shadow planning” apparatuses and privileged technical information.

An ethical use of rhetoric in planning practice involves understanding the links between trust and truth. The ability to discern factual and perspectival truths is only part of addressing irreducible differences in the interests of citizens. Democratic governance requires deliberation, persuasion, and compromise, all of which presume the trustworthiness of words. However, repeated trauma and disenfranchisement produces severe distrust, and shows us that truth is not just a correspondence between statement and reality, but also a relation between speaker and hearer. Inherently based in communication and therefore subjective interpretation, ethical rhetoric can direct attention using topoi, ethos (character), logos (argument) and pathos (emotion), with the end of establishing trust in those who sacrifice, that in the long run their interests will be addressed – an absolutely vital part of planning practice in order to preserve community-wide reciprocity when outcomes are unfair. Ethical rhetoric emphasizes accurate

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\(^{24}\) Referencing Ciceronian “topoi” – the signs or pointers to proof that organize argument (analogous to indications a prospector uses to find gold). Often not universal, they are unique to and shared within specific communities, and vary by cultural norm and common beliefs.
articulation of information and comprehensibility, sincerity, and truth. Unethical rhetoric, on the other hand, can selectively persuade or disguise, depending on the user’s aims.

The process behind the implementation of the Bristol Place housing and land use goals relied on unethical rhetoric from the very beginning, and guided the conversations about what was possible in the public domain based on fundamentally structurally biased neoliberal market-based growth machine coalition interests.

**Elegant Racism: Lovely, Monstrous**

These themes are all directly tied to the oppressive dominance of the entire system of costs and benefits, advantages and opportunities conferred on us as Americans by circumstances wholly out of our control at birth. The philosopher Barbara Applebaum in her study *Being White, Being Good: White Complicity, White Moral Responsibility, and Social Justice Pedagogy* argues that recognizing complicity is the necessary first step in beginning to challenge systemic racial oppression. She argues that not only is systemic racism often perpetuated by well-intentioned white people but also those who claim being morally good by virtue of religious affiliation or action. As James Baldwin once explained:

…white people have been married to the lie of white supremacy too long; the effect on their personalities, their lives, their grasp of reality, has been as devastating as the lava which so memorably immobilized the citizens of Pompeii. They are unable to conceive that their vision of reality, which they want me to accept, is an insult to my history and a parody of theirs and an intolerable violation of myself (Baldwin, 2010).

These new “elegant” structural and institutional forms of racism in housing and land use practices do not require a real estate agent “steering” black residents to specific neighborhoods, or telling black homeowners looking to move that they cannot buy a specific property. The embedded discriminatory arrangements of the law, economy, and real estate capital interests create an institutional web that no longer requires such overt statements, and in the process, renders overtly racist interactions unnecessary. The very fact of our current system’s immense and embedded complexity is a result of previous Jim Crow and Old Urban Renewal era blunt racist policy which has since experienced widespread social backlash and been manipulated into a more subtle series of economic and political tools. As Coates tragically and eloquently put it:

The elegant racist knows how to injure non-white people while never summoning the specter of white guilt. Elegant racism requires plausible deniability. Elegant racism is invisible, supple, and enduring. It disguises itself in the national vocabulary, avoids
epithets and didacticism. Grace is the singular marker of elegant racism. Elegant racism lives at the border of white shame. Elegant racism was the poll tax. Elegant racism is voter-ID laws. If you sought to advantage one group of Americans and disadvantage another, you could scarcely choose a more graceful method than housing discrimination. Housing determines access to transportation, green spaces, decent schools, decent food, decent jobs, and decent services. Housing affects your chances of being robbed and shot as well as your chances of being stopped and frisked. And housing discrimination is as quiet as it is deadly. It can be pursued through violence and terrorism, but it doesn’t need it. Housing discrimination is hard to detect, hard to prove, and hard to prosecute. Even today most people believe that Chicago is the work of organic sorting, as opposed segregationist social engineering. Housing segregation is the weapon that mortally injures, but does not bruise.

I am not an optimal person to speak to these issues. I am not a person of color, and I have never experienced those daily, lifelong oppressions. I likely have left out avenues of struggle and have not elucidated at all the multitude of micro oppressions experienced every day by people of color in the CU area community. I struggled in writing this to try and let the stories and experiences I uncovered speak for themselves, to be a real ally, and avoid the sentiments shared below by Jessie-Lane Metz:

When a person of colour speaks to their own experiences of racism, they are speaking to a collective pain, and speaking truth to power. When a person with white skin privilege gives an anecdote about racism, whether their own or someone else’s, they are exposing more racialized people to this discrimination, and reasserting their own privilege. The narrative is no longer about Black victims of racist crimes and a deeply flawed justice system, it is about white feelings about Black bodies and their experiences…I don’t believe that when an individual holds power as part of a group over another marginalized group, that despite the hard work they do in an effort to be an ally, they are the ones best situated to quantify to what extent their racism impacts others, or whether or not they would be the better power holder when compared to others in any given situation.

Others will judge how successful I was at this endeavor, but what I did see, over and over again in the conversations between City Council, staff, and community members, were African-American Champaign residents, speaking truth to power (as embodied by HACC commissioners, City Council and staff), these “truths” seen in community sentiments and historical knowledge were then supported and reified by white community residents who did not personally have a financial or political stake in the redevelopment, but spoke out in public forums and in my interviews regardless. And then fairly universally, local representatives framed the discussion of potential options to suit specific constituent interests, often constrained by financial habit, effectively disallowing even the idea of infill investment that might preserve historical
community character and make for a less violent state-led neighborhood improvement intervention. The end result of this is a neighborhood redevelopment plan that actively discourages residents from returning by stipulating developer-led rental screening requirements, and does not creating easy avenues for even the most vulnerable and arguably the most disenfranchised to return to the new neighborhood, which will have so many more amenities and City services than what has been there for the last two and a half decades. Given that this community is majority African-American, and that the City does not have protections in place against income-based discrimination, many community members believe that Champaign is in effect pushing these residents into neighboring Urbana.

As Reverend Barnes put it in a News Gazette article documenting the first community-wide celebration of Martin Luther King day in the Champaign-Urbana area in 2004: “We do see progress. What I continue to see, however, is the great failure of white America to love people of color.” The University Laboratory High School counselor Sam Smith at the time commented:

In New York, I grew up in an area with many ethnic influences, and I was quite comfortable in that. Living here, I sometimes think the country is more polarized around issues of race. There’s a lot more opportunity, a lot less overt racism. But structurally, where we live and where we interact with each other, we’re still so segregated.

We have moved beyond the pre-Civil Rights era of racial politics defined by Jim Crow laws to a new period characterized by less overt institutionally enforced inequality, and more subtle forms of economic disenfranchisement of minority groups. But in the words of Peter Fitzpatrick, “it is difficult to establish the significance of racism in a society whose self-preservation denies that significance.” Achieving true equity requires real, actual hard work to address privilege, and policies and money directed at equalizing outcomes.

Advanced global capitalism is a sinister, complex, and absolute system of domination whose very comprehensiveness allows very little room for expressions of anti-systemic dialogue. This system of capitalism began by placing restrictions on human relationships (exchange vs. use value), and with the invention of the “global open market” and particularly seen in financial market deregulation during the New Urban Renewal era, transcended national boundaries, making the systemic violence of market capitalism anonymous, no longer attributable to concrete individuals precisely as a result of its overwhelming scale and complexity. In this way, the normative myth of systemic objectivity can be perpetuated. Similar to advanced global capitalism, the complex financial machinations involved in increasingly private capital-
dominated state services provision make it increasingly difficult to attribute to even a series of specific policies, but the case study presented here hopefully provides some insight into the way that these public-private partnerships can develop and are privileged in the public policy domain.

And, if corrective market action is needed to mitigate the worst externalities of advanced global capitalism, and specifically growth machine coalition interests, the state retains the most power to enforce those corrections. The state institutionalized by government is often conceived of as the “monopoly on the legitimate use of violence” (a la Marx), and most conceive of this “institutional violence” in the combination of police and military power. In traditional liberal democratic social arrangements, the state is supposed to serve the needs of all groups equally. But that ideal state, as made up of members generally elected through democratic, consensus-based pluralist processes, does not exist today. However, it is vitally important to not discount the power the state holds to be a corrective agent in the market system. That power of collective action is the only institutionalized force available today to mitigate some of the worst externalities propagated by capitalist economic exchange.

The planning process here reflected a co-optation of state apparatuses by local political and economic interests to specifically devalue civil society’s role in its ability to direct public investment in the local built environment. A grassroots community-based land use planning intervention could have been incredibly beneficial at a bare minimum in informing the development trajectory, and possibly effective in preventing the forced relocation of over 70 households and multiple community institutions. This intervention would most likely have looked like traditional representative organizing to enhance collective efficacy along the lines of classifying properties by their collective risk to the neighborhood according to both physical structure and vacancy status. This information could have been used by the community to propose reinvestment actions materially supported by the financial resources of the City but primarily effective as self-policing within the smaller community of desired outcomes along the lines of safety, increased property values for the entire area, and other common concerns related above. Putting together a comprehensive community-based alternative redevelopment proposal could have been incredibly powerful. This land use debate illustrates the limitations of state-led determinations of the public good, and grassroots coalitions’ potential power to change material outcomes.
Reform strategies must involve giving distressed neighborhoods a stronger voice in cities’ deliberations over policy, as neighborhoods with more capacity and market potential are better situated to take advantages of institutional representation. Local governments need to be held fully accountable for the displacement effects of their actions, and particularly held accountable for the alleged forthcoming benefits from exercising eminent domain specifically. This is precisely because the results of the exercise of the eminent domain authority can and has led to the leveling of large segments of communities, the loss of affordable housing, the loss of small businesses, and the destruction of neighborhood and community social infrastructure, and can precipitate the affects of gentrification that make communities unaffordable for existing working class and low-income individuals (Carpenter & Ross, 2009).

And most importantly, as Americans, we need to become a more representative democracy, and we as equal citizens by law if not practice or social norms need to actually concern ourselves with the actions our governments take with our implicit non-votes and mandatory taxation laws. If our elected officials and the state systems no longer work to represent our collective desires and instead work to actively destroy spaces where locational residential collectives become or have the potential to become cohesive real community, creates barriers to participation, and outright lies about deal-making occurring without transparent public access, and if we find ourselves at the same historical junction repeatedly, we need to decide whether we consent to such manipulations, implicitly or explicitly. And by “we,” let me be clear, I mean white Americans. In this struggle for accumulation by dispossession on the part of a predominantly small number of male, white elites at the expense of predominantly non-male non-whites, recognizing our own culpability and responsibility in reifying extant arrangements will lead to helping to create a more equal system of opportunities for wealth creation, advantages in early life conferred by neighborhood location, and consequences for the use of blunt state power instruments that unequally affect life outcomes by race.

We need to stop denying our collective culpability, our collective privilege at the expense of others, and begin to create spaces of dialogue that listen to the truths being spoken, and then take corrective action based directly upon those truths. I hope that I have documented the beginnings of these kinds of changes in Champaign, in City policies improving code compliance enforcement and trying to create spaces for WMBE contracting. But there is still much, much more that can and should be done, and “good faith efforts” are not enough to create true positive
change. Government entities need to begin strong-arming capital in the exact same way that capital has strong-armed government since the 1980s, but in order for this to happen, citizens need to carefully and thoughtfully re-engage with democratic apparatuses, holding systems made up of elected and appointed officials accountable for future community needs.
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APPENDIX A:
TABLES

Table 1: List of community input meetings for the BPNP from 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 Annual Action Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type of Meeting/Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11/16/11</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Focus Group for Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/20/11</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/11/12</td>
<td>Shadow Wood Mobile Home Park</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Public Input: Shadow Wood residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/17/12</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Public Input: Businesses and Nonprofits in the Bristol Park Neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/17/12</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Public Input: Tenants in Garwood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/23/12</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Public Input: Tenants in Bristol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/25/12</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Public Input: Owners in Garwood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/26/12</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/30/12</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Public Input: Owners in Bristol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/18/12</td>
<td>Stratton School</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Public Input: All residents/owners in Bristol and Garwood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/23/12</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/8/12</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Joint NSAB &amp; Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/29/12</td>
<td>Apostolic Faith Church</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/14/12</td>
<td>Apostolic Faith Church</td>
<td>Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/23/12</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/11/12</td>
<td>Apostolic Faith Church</td>
<td>Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/12</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/9/12</td>
<td>Apostolic Faith Church</td>
<td>Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/25/12</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/6/12</td>
<td>Apostolic Faith Church</td>
<td>Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/29/12</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/11/12</td>
<td>Apostolic Faith Church</td>
<td>Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/8/13</td>
<td>Apostolic Faith Church</td>
<td>Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/24/13</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/12/13</td>
<td>Apostolic Faith Church</td>
<td>Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/28/13</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Bristol Park Neighborhood Steering Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/12/13</td>
<td>Apostolic Faith Church</td>
<td>Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/28/13</td>
<td>Human Kinetics</td>
<td>Bristol Park - LEED-ND Presentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/9/13</td>
<td>Apostolic Faith Church</td>
<td>Bristol Place Neighborhood Meeting - draft Annual Action Plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2: City of Champaign Housing Program Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Type</th>
<th>FY10-11</th>
<th>FY11-12</th>
<th>FY12-13</th>
<th>FY13-14</th>
<th>FY14-15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total City of Champaign CDBG Funds</strong></td>
<td>$835,895</td>
<td>$754,153</td>
<td>$702,739</td>
<td>$645,114</td>
<td>$688,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total City of Champaign HOME Funds</strong></td>
<td>$337,438</td>
<td>$433,757</td>
<td>$295,612</td>
<td>$273,901</td>
<td>$207,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total City of Champaign HOME Administration</strong></td>
<td>$31,302</td>
<td>$11,302</td>
<td>$3,191</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL City of Champaign Federal CDBG + HOME Assistance</strong></td>
<td>$1,184,635</td>
<td>$1,199,212</td>
<td>$1,003,542</td>
<td>$919,015</td>
<td>$956,733</td>
</tr>
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</table>

#### Owner-Occupied Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Type</th>
<th>FY10-11</th>
<th>FY11-12</th>
<th>FY12-13</th>
<th>FY13-14</th>
<th>FY14-15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition/Rehabilitation Program</td>
<td>$241,360</td>
<td>$415,251</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Home Improvement Program</td>
<td>$162,500</td>
<td>No additional allocations</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Counseling (Central IL Debt Mgmt &amp; Credit Education)</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td>$20,000</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Repair Program</td>
<td>$152,500</td>
<td>$122,000</td>
<td>$122,000</td>
<td>$122,000</td>
<td>$125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Home Repair Program</td>
<td>$60,000</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessory Structure Demolition</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
<td>$2,500</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Percentage of total programs expenditures:**

- 54.6% to 67.2%
- 63.3% to 35.5%
- 35.0%

**Total City of Champaign HOME Assistance:**

- **$623,360**
- **$571,751**
- **$481,015**
- **$238,300**
- **$234,201**

#### Investment Property Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Type</th>
<th>FY10-11</th>
<th>FY11-12</th>
<th>FY12-13</th>
<th>FY13-14</th>
<th>FY14-15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rental Rehabilitation Program</td>
<td>$120,000</td>
<td>No additional allocations</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Percentage of total programs expenditures:**

- 10.5%
- 0.0%
- 0.0%
- 9.1%
- 8.9%

**Total Investment Property Assistance:**

- **$120,000**
- **$61,800**
- **$59,201**

#### Renter-Occupied Assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Type</th>
<th>FY10-11</th>
<th>FY11-12</th>
<th>FY12-13</th>
<th>FY13-14</th>
<th>FY14-15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tenant Based Rental Assistance</td>
<td>$97,500</td>
<td>$90,000</td>
<td>$90,000</td>
<td>$90,000</td>
<td>$90,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Percentage of total programs expenditures:**

- 8.5%
- 10.6%
- 11.8%
- 13.4%
- 13.5%

**Total Renter-Occupied Assistance:**

- **$97,500**
- **$90,000**
- **$90,000**
- **$90,000**
- **$90,000**

#### Other Community Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Type</th>
<th>FY10-11</th>
<th>FY11-12</th>
<th>FY12-13</th>
<th>FY13-14</th>
<th>FY14-15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Matters Program</td>
<td>$125,384</td>
<td>$104,688</td>
<td>$105,411</td>
<td>$145,767</td>
<td>$152,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Accessibility Retrofit Program</td>
<td>$60,000</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood Clean-up Program</td>
<td>$22,000</td>
<td>$25,000</td>
<td>$25,000</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological Construction Laboratory</td>
<td>$14,000</td>
<td>No offered</td>
<td>No offered</td>
<td>No offered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lot Acquisition/Clearance Program</td>
<td>$70,560</td>
<td>No additional allocations</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor Incentives for Lead Training and Certification</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
<td>$9,000</td>
<td>$9,000</td>
<td>$9,000</td>
<td>$9,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Percentage of total programs expenditures:**

- 26.4%
- 22.2%
- 24.9%
- 41.9%
- 42.7%

**Total Other Community Programs:**

- **$1,003,944**
- **$1,888,488**
- **$1,887,411**
- **$238,087**
- **$285,439**

#### Housing and Community Programs Listed Above

**Proportion of Champaign's Federal CDBG + HOME Affordable Housing and Community Programs Listed Above:**

- **96.4%**
- **70.9%**
- **75.8%**
- **73.0%**
- **69.9%**

*In the 2013-2014 AAP, all of these programs were bundled under "Neighborhood Revitalization" and the amount listed to fund all of them was $183,901.

**In the 2014-2015 AAP, Neighborhood Revitalization was budgeted $177,602 on HOME funding in the 2014-2015 AAP.

**To calculate subtotals for each category bundled into NR, $183,901/3 = $61,300 was added as a proxy calculation for 2013-2014, and $177,602/3 = $59,201 was added for 2014-2015.**
### Housing Cost Burden as a Percentage of Household Income (>30%)

**City of Champaign (2008-2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than $20,000:</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>83.0%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>86.0%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>79.3% 27.8% 76.6% 33.1% 78.7% 22.8% 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,000 - $34,999:</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>47.9% 27.8% 45.0% 26.9% 50.1% 23.7% 2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$35,000 - $49,999:</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>33.8% 32.2% 32.5% 33.2% 29.9% 34.1% 3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,000 - $74,999:</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>18.7% 33.9% 18.1% 33.8% 15.0% 37.9% 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75,000 or more:</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
<td>4.0%  36.8% 3.5% 52.4% 3.3% 65.1% 11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Renter-occupied housing units</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>% Change (2008-2013)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than $20,000:</td>
<td>94.2%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>95.4%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>98.3% 10.5% 97.2% 9.1% 96.2% 8.7% 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,000 - $34,999:</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>69.2% 17.5% 66.4% 19.4% 73.1% 17.7% 11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$35,000 - $49,999:</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>32.4% 37.5% 34.8% 36.5% 27.4% 33.4% 9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50,000 - $74,999:</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>108.3%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>118.5%</td>
<td>5.6%  138.4% 7.2% 106.7% 8.1% 111.0% 2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$75,000 or more:</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>160.9%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>166.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.7%  160.9% 1.0% 166.7% 1.7% 160.9% 1.0% 166.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates Table B25106

Note: Data are based on a sample and are subject to sampling variability. The degree of uncertainty for an estimate arising from sampling variability is represented through the use of a margin of error. The value shown here is the 90 percent margin of error. The margin of error can be interpreted roughly as providing a 90 percent probability that the interval defined by the estimate minus the margin of error and the estimate plus the margin of error contains the true value.
### Table 4: Distribution of Champaign Police Officers by District (1992-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Northwest (Created in 2006)</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Southwest (West until 2006)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1/2006-6/30/2007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>6/1/2007-6/30/2008</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1/2008-6/30/2009</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1/2009-6/30/2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lieu. = Lieutenants; Ser. = Sergeants; P.O. = Patrol Officers; K-9 = K-9 Officers

Source: City of Champaign Police Annual Reports
Table 5: Champaign Police Calls for Service by Beat (1997-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Total:</th>
<th>North (Created in 2006)</th>
<th>Northwest</th>
<th>South (West until 2006)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>76,651</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>78,506</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>73,905</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>89,358</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>87,758</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>18,700</td>
<td>46,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>86,891</td>
<td>35,700</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>27,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>62,026</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>64,552</td>
<td>33,544</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>6,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1/2005 - 6/30/2006</td>
<td>65,996</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21,450</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1/2006 - 6/30/2007</td>
<td>63,764</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1/2007 - 6/30/2008</td>
<td>64,672</td>
<td>20,393</td>
<td>7,479</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/1/2008 - 6/30/2009</td>
<td>63,067</td>
<td>25,407</td>
<td>3,160</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1/2009 - 6/30/2010</td>
<td>60,752</td>
<td>18,740</td>
<td>14,012</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>71,709</td>
<td>18,915</td>
<td>14,495</td>
<td>26,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>71,710</td>
<td>20,604</td>
<td>14,924</td>
<td>22,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>74,667</td>
<td>20,342</td>
<td>16,310</td>
<td>24,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: City of Champaign Police Annual Reports
Table 6: Traffic Stop Outcomes by Race (FY2006-2007; FY2008-2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citation</td>
<td>Written Warning</td>
<td>Citation</td>
<td>Written Warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African-American</td>
<td>65.1%</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>67.1%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>75.3%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>75.9%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>78.1%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Champaign Police Report IDOT Traffic Stop Reporting Data
## Table 7: Summary Table of Property Values and City Revenue Capture in Bristol Place

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property types by ownership in Bristol Place Neighborhood</th>
<th>Number of Parcels</th>
<th>Percent Total</th>
<th>Equalized Assessed Value (2013 pay 2014)</th>
<th>Market Value (from EAV)</th>
<th>Total City Property Tax Revenue Value Capture (based on 2014 rate of 1.3152%*)</th>
<th>Percent Total Revenue Capture</th>
<th>Approximate average City revenue value capture per parcel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owner-Occupied Property</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>$271,260</td>
<td>$813,780</td>
<td>$3,828.55</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>$191.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Investor-owned Property</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>$606,290</td>
<td>$1,818,870</td>
<td>$8,014.17</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
<td>$125.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbana Investor-Owned Property</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>$164,750</td>
<td>$494,250</td>
<td>$2,166.79</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>$120.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champaign Investor-Owned Property</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>$276,740</td>
<td>$830,220</td>
<td>$3,679.93</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>$122.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote Investor-Owned Property</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>$164,800</td>
<td>$494,400</td>
<td>$2,167.45</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>$135.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City-Owned Property</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>$28,960</td>
<td>$86,880</td>
<td>$380.88</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>n/a - only 2 properties have taxable value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Property (4 tax-exempt nonprofits; 2 tax-exempt HACC owned properties; 1 HFH owned property)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>$27,590</td>
<td>$82,770</td>
<td>$362.86</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>n/a - only 1 taxable property (HFH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Dollar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>$232,490</td>
<td>$697,470</td>
<td>$3,143.26</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>$3,143.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$1,572,793</strong></td>
<td><strong>$4,828,553</strong></td>
<td><strong>$20,515.73</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$2,070.36</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Champaign County Assessor Stan Jenkins*
Table 8: Owner-Occupied Property Assessment and Sale History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Street</th>
<th>Year Sold</th>
<th>Sale Price</th>
<th>Equalized Assessed Value (2013 pay 2014)</th>
<th>Market Value (from assessed value)</th>
<th>City Property Tax Revenue (based on 2014 rate of 1.3152%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>E Bradley</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
<td>$12,060</td>
<td>$36,180</td>
<td>$158.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>$7,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1201</td>
<td>N Clock</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$9,920</td>
<td>$29,760</td>
<td>$391.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1204</td>
<td>N Clock</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$31,000</td>
<td>$15,260</td>
<td>$45,780</td>
<td>$200.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1306</td>
<td>N Clock</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$18,700</td>
<td>$56,100</td>
<td>$245.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N Clock</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>$40,500</td>
<td>$4,020</td>
<td>$12,060</td>
<td>$52.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1311</td>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$18,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$17,814</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>$23,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>$9,660</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>E Garwood</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$12,640</td>
<td>$37,920</td>
<td>$166.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1406</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$14,620</td>
<td>$43,860</td>
<td>$192.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>E Roper</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>$26,500</td>
<td>$13,580</td>
<td>$40,740</td>
<td>$178.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E Roper</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$27,500</td>
<td>$8,790</td>
<td>$26,370</td>
<td>$115.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>$55,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>E Roper</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$45,000</td>
<td>$13,580</td>
<td>$40,740</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>E Roper</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>$14,620</td>
<td>$43,860</td>
<td>$192.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>211</td>
<td>E Roper</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>$21,000</td>
<td>$20,620</td>
<td>$61,860</td>
<td>$271.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>E Bellefontaine</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<td>$18,170</td>
<td>$54,510</td>
<td>$238.97</td>
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<tr>
<td>106</td>
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<td>$31,980</td>
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<tr>
<td>107</td>
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<td>1986</td>
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<td>$1,530</td>
<td>$4,590</td>
<td>$20.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>E Bellefontaine</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$13,070</td>
<td>$39,210</td>
<td>$171.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>$15,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>E Bellefontaine</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>$24,000</td>
<td>$12,680</td>
<td>$38,040</td>
<td>$166.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1988</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>206</td>
<td>E Bellefontaine</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>$15,650</td>
<td>$14,100</td>
<td>$42,300</td>
<td>$185.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>208</td>
<td>E Bellefontaine</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$89,137</td>
<td>$30,240</td>
<td>$90,720</td>
<td>$397.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>$9,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>E Bellefontaine</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$12,400</td>
<td>$37,200</td>
<td>$163.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL:** $271,260 $813,780 $3,828.55

Source: Champaign County Assessor's Office Records
APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 3 FIGURES

Appendix B.1: Interview Consent Forms for current landlords and other stakeholders

Forced Out? Measuring the Household Impacts of Urban Renewal-Based Forced Displacement in the Bristol Place Neighborhood in Champaign, IL

Consent for Participation in Research (Current landlords and other stakeholders)

Why am I being asked?
You are being asked to take part in a research study looking at what happens to households currently or recently facing a residential move because of the City of Champaign’s Bristol Place redevelopment plan. The researchers would like to conduct a short interview with you to learn more about your experience. During the interview, you will be asked how long you have had a stake in the Bristol Place area, what your perceptions are about the local community, and your thoughts and opinions about the Bristol Place redevelopment plan.

The research is being conducted by a University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign faculty member Dr. Andrew Greenlee with the help of his research assistant Natalie Prochaska. Your participation is completely your own choice. You may choose not to answer any questions that we ask, and may stop the interview at any time. If you do participate, you will help us learn more about how individuals and households respond to moves that are not a result of their own choice, and may help structure policies to better support those experiencing similar forced moves in the future. The results of this study are likely to be shared in academic journal articles, and with your local community in the form of recordings made available on a public website (but only with your permission).

Why is this research being done?
We want to have conversations with a broad range of people about their experiences with the Bristol Park redevelopment process. Specifically, we want to have conversations with property owners and other stakeholders to understand how the current redevelopment plan will affect personal and professional outcomes.

What is the purpose of this research?
This research is being done to try and understand the short-and long-term results of this kind of redevelopment project for both individual people and the communities they move to and from.

What procedures are involved?
If you agree to participate in this research, we would ask that you do the following things:

1. Fill out a short (10-minute) written demographic survey (answer questions about your age, gender, marital status, education, employment, etc).

2. Participate in a 45-minute interview where a researcher will ask you questions about your experiences and opinions about the Bristol Place redevelopment plan and your involvement in the neighborhood prior.

Version 2.0 (7/18/2014)
Appendix B.1 cont’d

Forced Out? Measuring the Household Impacts of Urban Renewal-Based Forced Displacement in the Bristol Place Neighborhood in Champaign, IL

Consent for Participation in Research (Current landlords and other stakeholders)

3. Preferably be willing to have your interview audio recorded and photographed; but the interviewer will only take notes if you are uncomfortable with your voice being recorded or your picture being taken.

What are the potential risks and discomforts? Are there any benefits to taking part in this research?

No risks or discomforts come with this research beyond the risks that exist in daily life, although we would like to make an audio recording of your interview and take photographs of you. We would like to ask you potentially sensitive questions about your job status, income, and your professional history, but you may choose not to answer any questions that we ask, and may stop the interview at any time. All audio transcripts from the interviews will remain secure and confidential, unless you tell us it is okay to identify you and/or your responses.

This research will benefit academic researchers and policymakers.

Who should I contact if I have questions?

Please contact either Dr. Greenlee or his assistant Natalie Prochaska with any questions or concerns about the research. You may also call Dr. Greenlee or Natalie if you feel you have been injured or harmed by this research.

Dr. Andrew Greenlee
Natalie Prochaska
agreen4@illinois.edu prochask@illinois.edu
(217) 333-9069 (217) 419-6868

If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study or any concerns or complaints, please contact the University of Illinois Institutional Review Board at (217) 333-2670 (collect calls will be accepted if you identify yourself as a research participant) or via email at irb@illinois.edu. The Institutional Review Board is the office at the University of Illinois responsible for protecting the rights of human subjects involved in studies conducted by University of Illinois researchers.
Forced Out? Measuring the Household Impacts of Urban Renewal-Based Forced Displacement in the Bristol Place Neighborhood in Champaign, IL

Consent for Participation in Research (Current landlords and other stakeholders)

**Signature of Subject**
I have read (or someone has read to me) the above information. I have been given an opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in this research. I understand that by signing below, the audio recording of this interview may not be confidential unless I request that it be so. I have been given a copy of this form.

- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No

I am at least 18 years of age or older and do not have a guardian.

- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No

I agree to participate in this research process.

- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No

The researcher may audio tape my interview.

- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No

The researcher may take pictures of me during my interview.

---

If you agree to participate in this research and agree to have your interview audio recorded, please select one of the following options regarding the use of your interview audio recording:

- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No

The researcher may use my responses in educational or public settings – this may include playing or sharing via the internet* audio recordings and/or pictures (based upon my consent above) from my interview without my further approval or review of the edited audio.

- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No

The researcher may use my responses in education or public settings – this may include playing or sharing via the internet* audio recordings and/or pictures from my interview (based upon my consent above) only after I have reviewed the edited audio and provided written approval.

*audio will be hosted by the researcher's website

---

If you agree to participate in this research and agree to have your interview audio recorded, please select one of the following options regarding the use of your interview audio recording:

- [ ] Yes
- [ ] No

The research team may identify me by name in educational or public settings.
Appendix B.1 cont’d
Appendix B.2: Interview Consent Forms for Bristol Place Residents

**Why am I being asked?**

You are being asked to take part in a research study looking at what happens to households currently or recently facing a residential move because of the City of Champaign’s Bristol Place redevelopment plan. The researchers would like to conduct a short interview with you to learn more about your experience. During the interview, you will be asked how long you have lived in the Bristol Place area, when you received notice that you would be required to move, what you like and dislike about your local community, and your thoughts and opinions about your moving experience as a result of the Bristol Place redevelopment plan.

The research is being conducted by a University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign faculty member Dr. Andrew Greenlee with the help of his research assistant Natalie Prochaska. Your participation is completely your own choice. You may choose not to answer any questions that we ask, and may stop the interview at any time. If you do participate, you will help us learn more about how individuals and households respond to moves that are not a result of their own choice, and may help shape policies to better support those experiencing similar forced moves in the future. The results of this study are likely to be shared in academic journal articles, and with your local community in the form of recordings made available on a public website (but only with your permission).

**Why is this research being done?**

We want to have conversations with a broad range of people about their experiences with the Bristol Park redevelopment process. Specifically, we want to have conversations with homeowners and renters to understand how moving from one home to another changes or has changed their lives.

**What is the purpose of this research?**

This research is being done to try and understand the short-and long-term results of this kind of redevelopment project for both individual people and the communities they move to and from.

**What procedures are involved?**

If you agree to participate in this research, we would ask that you do the following things:

1. Fill out a short (10-minute) written demographic survey (answer questions about your age, gender, marital status, education, employment, etc.).

2. Participate in a 45-minute interview where a researcher will ask you questions about your experiences and opinions about being forced to move.
Appendix B.2, cont’d

Forced Out? Measuring the Household Impacts of Urban Renewal-Based Forced Displacement in the Bristol Place Neighborhood in Champaign, IL

Consent for Participation in Research (Current Residents)

3. Preferably be willing to have your interview audio recorded and photographed; but the interviewer will only take notes if you are uncomfortable with your voice being recorded or your picture being taken.

What are the potential risks and discomforts? Are there any benefits to taking part in this research?

No risks or discomforts come with this research beyond the risks that exist in daily life, although we would like to make an audio recording of your interview and take photographs of you. We would like to ask you potentially sensitive questions about your job status, income, and your residential history, but you may choose not to answer any questions that we ask, and may stop the interview at any time. All audio transcripts from the interviews will remain secure and confidential, unless you tell us it is okay to identify you and/or your responses.

This research will benefit academic researchers and policymakers, and you will be compensated for your time with a $20 Visa gift card if you complete both the interview and demographic survey.

Who should I contact if I have questions?

Please contact either Dr. Greenlee or his assistant Natalie Prochaska with any questions or concerns about the research. You may also call Dr. Greenlee or Natalie if you feel you have been injured or harmed by this research.

Dr. Andrew Greenlee
agreeen4@illinois.edu
(217) 333-9069

Natalie Prochaska
prochask@illinois.edu
(217) 419-6868

If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study or any concerns or complaints, please contact the University of Illinois Institutional Review Board at (217) 333-2670 (collect calls with be accepted if you identify yourself as a research participant) or via email at irb@illinois.edu. The Institutional Review Board is the office at the University of Illinois responsible for protecting the rights of human subjects involved in studies conducted by University of Illinois researchers.
Consent for Participation in Research (Current Residents)

Signature of Subject
I have read (or someone has read to me) the above information. I have been given an opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to participate in this research. I understand that by signing below, the audio recording of this interview may not be confidential unless I request that it be so. I have been given a copy of this form.

_____ Yes _____ No  I am at least 18 years of age or older and do not have a guardian

_____ Yes _____ No  I agree to participate in this research process

_____ Yes _____ No  The researcher may audio tape my interview

_____ Yes _____ No  The researcher may take pictures of me during my interview

If you agree to participate in this research and agree to have your interview audio recorded, please select one of the following options regarding the use of your interview audio recording:

_____ Yes _____ No  The researcher may use my responses in educational or public settings – this may include playing or sharing via the internet* audio recordings and/or pictures (based upon my consent above) from my interview without my further approval or review of the edited audio.

_____ Yes _____ No  The researcher may use my responses in education or public settings – this may include playing or sharing via the internet* audio recordings and/or pictures from my interview (based upon my consent above) only after I have reviewed the edited audio and provided written approval.

*audio will be hosted by the researcher’s website

If you agree to participate in this research and agree to have your interview audio recorded, please select one of the following options regarding the use of your interview audio recording:

_____ Yes _____ No  The research team may identify me by name in educational or public settings

Signature: ______________________________________ Date: ________________

Name: ______________________________________

Signature of Researcher: ________________________

Version 2.0 (7/18/2014)
Appendix C.1: Champaign-Urbana Shack Images

Taken by Kenneth Stratton and Romeo Green, Jr., from Doris K. Wylie Hoskins Archive for Cultural Diversity, “Drawer 6: Healthcare and Housing” housed in the Champaign County Forest Preserve District’s Museum of the Grand Prairie in Mahomet, IL.
Appendix C.1, cont’d
Appendix C.1, cont’d

FAMILY IN TENT
TYPICAL OF CITY
HOUSING WOES

[Image of a tent and a shack]

HOME, CHILLY HOME. Unless something can be done for these—Mrs. A. and her family of eight juveniles face a bleak winter with only a canvas tent over their heads. This is a scene in north Champaign, where the tent is pitched as a vacant lot. Inside is a small pile of coal, and some cramming, for the heating above inside. Can one survive the winter this way?

5 FAMILIES ON LOT! 13 LIVE IN SHACK

[Image of a shack]

NINE LIVE IN THIS SPACE. Mrs. A. and one of the kids are shown bundled up at noon in the tent, which serves as kitchen, living and sleeping quarters. Bad in winter weather. Mrs. A. says: With winter setting in, she doesn’t know what to do. Hundreds of other local families not much better off are caught in the vile, inefficient and unsatisfactory housing conditions.

IF YOU LIKE PLENTY OF NEIGHBORS... Mrs. A. in the chummy little two-bit apartment down in one of the sections of north Urbana where residential space is a premium. Four individual dwellings occupy the basic portion of this one lot, with a small shed of ground in the center. The four are extremely close, and they live in close quarters, one family belonging to a single tenant. It is typical of the community’s housing, especially acute since the
Appendix C.2: Taylor Thomas, of Champaign, IL Portrait Photo
Appendix C.3: Maps of Old Urban Renewal Area in Champaign, IL
Appendix C.3, cont’d
Appendix C.3, cont'd
**APPENDIX IV**

REORGANIZED CITIZENS ADVISORY COMMITTEE  
December 19, 1962  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John E. Severns (Chairman)</td>
<td>Architect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otho F. Bartholow</td>
<td>Realtor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*John Petry</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Reverend Blaine Ramsey</td>
<td>Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack L. Simpson</td>
<td>Banker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald M. Tennant</td>
<td>Attorney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Roscoe Tinsley</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Designates resident of northeast neighborhood.*
Appendix D.1: City of Champaign Governmental Organizational Structure Matrix
Appendix D.2: Map of Champaign City Council Districts
### Neighborhood Analysis Report Classification System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEALTHY</td>
<td>Basic City services are adequate to maintain a high quality of life. Housing and infrastructure conditions are sound, property ownership is stable and investments are steady. No significant threats to public safety and citizens participate actively in neighborhood or community issues. Residents have the ability to maintain their neighborhood in a healthy state, with little or no need for outside assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATION</td>
<td>City attention may be needed in some aspects to maintain neighborhood stability and prevent future deterioration. May experience some slight increases in City maintenance and service needs, which should be expected as a normal result of neighborhood aging. Housing and infrastructure conditions are essentially sound, with minor deterioration limited to spot locations. Residents are likely to reinvest in their neighborhood and participate actively in issues that affect them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESERVATION</td>
<td>Requires an increased level of City involvement to maintain and/or restore a high quality of life. Deteriorated infrastructure cannot be addressed through regular City maintenance programs and the housing stock may need significant rehabilitation. May also experience increased incidents of crime or other public safety problems. Population trends may include a decline in owner-occupancy and decreasing household incomes. This could make it more difficult for residents to invest in their neighborhood or to be active in problem-solving efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESTORATION</td>
<td>A Restoration neighborhood requires a significant level of City intervention to address neighborhood problems and restore a positive quality of life. In many cases, basic services cannot keep up with needs, and parts of the area require major reinvestment to prevent further decline. Property maintenance is a significant problem and major infrastructure improvements may be necessary. Levels of private reinvestment are low, and citizens may face significant obstacles when trying to address neighborhood problems on their own.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1990 & 2006:
Introduction
Appendix D.5: Bristol Park Neighborhood Plan Conceptual Future Land Use Map
Comment Cards Summary

Comment cards included two (2) questions—"Do you reside in Bristol or Garwood?", and "Are you supportive of the Bristol Park Neighborhood Proposed Housing Strategies". Respondents were asked to provide a comment if they answered no to the second question. There were a total of thirty (30) comment cards received. Twenty-two (22) were positive responses, seven (7) were negative responses and one (1) was a yes and no, conditional response. Responses are identified by neighborhood area below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garwood</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Identified</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D.7: Bristol Place Master Plan Proposed Land Use Plan
Appendix D.8: Figure of Champaign Housing and Community Programs Funding by Type, FY2010 - FY2015 (corresponding to Table 3 in Appendix A)
Appendix D.9: Figure of Renting Households Spending More than 30% of Income on Housing, by Household Income Category (2007-2013)
Appendix D.10: Figure of Owner-Occupied Households Spending More than 30% of Income on Housing, by Household Income Category (2007-2013)
Appendix D.11: Figure Comparing Cost Burden of Renters to Owners in Champaign (2007-2013)
Appendix D.12: Bristol Park Steering Committee Survey Results (from survey conducted March 10-12, 2012)

**Table 1: Length of Residence in Current Residence**

| Length of Residence | Renters | | | | Owners | | | | Total | | | |
|---------------------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|
|                     | N       | %      | N       | %      | N       | %      |                     | N       | %      | N       | %      |
| Less than 1 year    | 8       | 29%    | 1       | 7%     | 9       | 21%    |                     |         |        |         |        |
| 1-2 years           | 5       | 18%    | 0       | 0%     | 5       | 12%    |                     |         |        |         |        |
| 2-5 years           | 9       | 32%    | 0       | 0%     | 9       | 21%    |                     |         |        |         |        |
| 5-10 years          | 4       | 14%    | 4       | 27%    | 8       | 19%    |                     |         |        |         |        |
| > 10 years          | 2       | 7%     | 10      | 67%    | 12      | 28%    |                     |         |        |         |        |
| **Total**           | 28      | 100%   | 15      | 100%   | 43      | 100%   |                     |         |        |         |        |

**Table 2: Tenure by Bedrooms**

| Bedrooms          | Renters | | | | Owners | | | | Total | | | |
|-------------------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|
|                   | N       | %      | N       | %      | N       | %      |                     | N       | %      | N       | %      |
| Studio            | 0       | 0%     | 0       | 0%     | 0       | 0%     |                     |         |        |         |        |
| 1 Bedroom         | 0       | 0%     | 2       | 13%    | 2       | 5%     |                     |         |        |         |        |
| 2 Bedrooms        | 15      | 54%    | 5       | 33%    | 20      | 47%    |                     |         |        |         |        |
| 3 Bedrooms        | 8       | 29%    | 7       | 47%    | 15      | 35%    |                     |         |        |         |        |
| 4+ Bedrooms       | 5       | 18%    | 1       | 7%     | 6       | 14%    |                     |         |        |         |        |
| **Total**         | 28      | 100%   | 15      | 100%   | 43      | 100%   |                     |         |        |         |        |

**Table 3: Head of Household Age by Tenure**

| Age               | Renters | | | | Owners | | | | Total | | | |
|-------------------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|
|                   | N       | %      | N       | %      | N       | %      |                     | N       | %      | N       | %      |
| 20-30             | 7       | 25.0%  | 1       | 6.7%   | 8       | 18.6%  |                     |         |        |         |        |
| 30-40             | 3       | 10.7%  | 1       | 6.7%   | 4       | 9.3%   |                     |         |        |         |        |
| 40-50             | 1       | 3.6%   | 4       | 26.7%  | 5       | 11.6%  |                     |         |        |         |        |
| 50-60             | 6       | 21.4%  | 2       | 13.3%  | 8       | 18.6%  |                     |         |        |         |        |
| 60-70             | 2       | 7.1%   | 2       | 13.3%  | 4       | 9.3%   |                     |         |        |         |        |
| 70-80             | 3       | 10.7%  | 1       | 6.7%   | 4       | 9.3%   |                     |         |        |         |        |
| > 80              | 1       | 3.6%   | 3       | 20.0%  | 4       | 9.3%   |                     |         |        |         |        |
| No Response       | 5       | 17.9%  | 1       | 6.7%   | 6       | 14.0%  |                     |         |        |         |        |
| **Total**         | 28      | 100.0% | 15      | 100.0% | 43      | 100.0% |                     |         |        |         |        |
Table 4: Households by Number of Adults Present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adults</th>
<th>Renters</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Owners</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Households by Number of Children Present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Renters</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Owners</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

Table 6: Reported Monthly Household Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Income</th>
<th>Renters</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Owners</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,000</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,000 - $3,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3,000 - $4,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; $4,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Appendix D.12, cont’d

**Table 7: Households with Income Below 80 Percent of Area Median Income**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household Size</th>
<th>MFI Standard</th>
<th>HHs Below</th>
<th>HH Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$38,100</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$43,550</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>$49,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>86%</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>$54,400</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>$58,800</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>$63,150</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>$67,500</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>$71,850</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Responses to the income question were not recorded for 14 households.

**Table 8: Summary of Employment and Benefits**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Renters</th>
<th>Owners</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed Adults</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Adults</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults Receiving Social Security Benefits</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults Receiving Federal Disability Benefits</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults Receiving a Pension Disbursement</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adults Receiving Unemployment Compensation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 9: Public Benefits Received**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Benefit</th>
<th>Renters</th>
<th>Owners</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Stamps</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 10: Households with Children by Number of Children in the Champaign School System**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Renters</th>
<th>Owners</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D.12, cont’d

Table 11: Schools Currently Attended by Bristol Place Children

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busey</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden Hills</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Side</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edison</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Academy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative High School</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central High</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Housing Characteristics

The majority of responding households in Bristol Place rented their housing (65 percent), with 33 percent owning their housing and 2 percent renting to own (Table 12). Of the 15 households who reported being homeowners (or in a rent-to-own contract), 11 households reported owning their home outright. None of the households with loans shared information regarding their estimated equity in their home. For those homeowners who owned outright, equity reported ranged from $37,000 to $75,000, with an average reported home equity of $56,000. For those households with a mortgage or in a rent-to-own contract, the average reported monthly payment towards their mortgage was $508 (Table 13).

Three quarters of households renting in Bristol Place reported having 12-month rental agreements with their landlords. Several households had longer rental contracts, rented on a month-to-month basis, or rented from a friend or family member without a rental agreement (Table 14). The average monthly rent reported was $536 (Table 15). Six of 28 rental households received a rental subsidy via the Champaign County Housing Authority’s Housing Choice Voucher Program. Renters were asked whether they had renewed their lease for another year, and if not, whether they planned to renew their lease. Six respondents (21 percent) reported that they had already renewed their lease for another year. Of those respondents who had not yet renewed their lease, twelve (55 percent) stated that they planned to renew their lease, with another four respondents (18 percent) who were not yet sure whether they would renew their lease (Table 16).

Thinking about housing costs, the average monthly housing cost (average rent/mortgage plus average utility costs) was $968 for renters and $1,069 for those homeowners with a mortgage (excluding rent, the average is $561 in utilities costs for owners, which provides some insight into costs incurred by households who own outright). Comparing the ratio of individual housing expenses (rent plus utilities) to reported household income, an estimated 60 percent of renters and 7 percent of owners were housing
**Table 15: Monthly Rent**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly Rent</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;$ 400</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$400 - $500</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$500 - $600</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$600 - $700</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; $700</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 16: Plans to Renew Lease at Contract Expiration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Renewed Lease?</th>
<th>Plan to Renew Lease?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sure</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 17: Housing Cost Burden for Owners and Renters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Housing Cost Burden</th>
<th>Rent/Mortgage Only</th>
<th>Rent/Mortgage and Utilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Renters</td>
<td>Owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Cost Burden</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost Burden</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Calculated</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Cost burden reflects the ratio of housing expenses to total income. The Federally defined standard for housing cost burden is 30 percent of household income spent on rent plus utilities.

**Community Sentiment**

In addition to questions about household and housing attributes, respondents were asked about the qualities of Bristol Place which they liked, and qualities which they would like to see change. Responses are summarized below:
Appendix D.12, cont’d

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likes</th>
<th>Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Family connection and history to the neighborhood</td>
<td>• Reduce troublemaking: drugs, fighting, and violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Central location and proximity to parks and other amenities</td>
<td>• Increase community activities for children and youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Neighbors and sense of community</td>
<td>• Improve infrastructure—lighting, sidewalks, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recent improvements in terms of safety, sense of peace and quiet</td>
<td>• Improve external perception of neighborhood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although redevelopment plans have not yet been formulated, residents were also asked about their desire to return to a redeveloped Bristol Place neighborhood, should relocation be necessary for redevelopment. Fifty-seven percent of renters and 47 percent of owners stated they desired to return to a redeveloped Bristol Place community. Residents were also asked whether they would prefer to return as renters or as homeowners. All current owners who responded to the question wished to return as homeowners, and 32 percent of renters desired to transition from renting to owning in a redeveloped community.

Table 18: Desire to Return to a Redeveloped Community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desire to Return</th>
<th>Renters</th>
<th>Owners</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19: Desire to Return by Returning Tenure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired Tenure</th>
<th>Renters</th>
<th>Owners</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeowner</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response (1)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D.13: Bristol Park Plan Area Spatial Reference Maps
Appendix D.13, cont’d
How to save a neighborhood

In addition to addressing the workforce and financial needs of Bristol Park residents, city officials also think some infrastructure changes can help to improve home values and deter crime in one of Champaign’s most troubled areas. Bristol Park includes three neighborhoods: Bristol Place, Garwood and the Shadow Wood mobile home park.

Bristol Place will be overhauled — the city plans to purchase the properties, tear down the buildings and make them available for new development.

The approach to the Garwood and Shadow Wood neighborhoods is different. Community Development Specialist Greg Skaggs said Garwood has yet to reach the point of no return, like Bristol Place already has. The homes in Garwood can still be maintained, but their owners will need some help.

The strategy is “kind of a replace Bristol (Place), repair Garwood,” Skaggs said.

Officials are working with local banks to make low-interest loans available for those residents, and Skaggs said city funds may be made available, too.

“We’re looking at trying to create local funds to assist property owners to make improvements to their homes,” Skaggs said.

Workforce development for residents of all three neighborhoods is a long-term goal, but city officials see the surrounding areas of the entire Bristol Park area as opportunities.

Neil Street just south of Interstate 74 and the intersection of Market Street and Bradley Avenue could be a key area for business development. The area around Human Kinetics on North Market Street could become an “employment center,” with an emphasis on light industrial and office jobs.

1. Human Kinetics and Parkland College training facility — City officials hope these two facilities will be a force in helping to provide job opportunities and training for Bristol Park residents in the future.

2. Interstate 74 overpass — Shadow Wood residents are without any basements or storm shelters and typically use the overpass as a safe haven when severe weather is approaching. Bridges like these, however, are among the worst places to take shelter, and officials think moving Fire Station 3 to the Bristol Park area could address a strategic fire coverage concern and provide shelter during a storm.

3. Boneyard Creek — The city already owns a number of properties along the creek, and officials see the drainage channel as an opportunity for future improvements.

4. North Fourth Street — Workers will extend the street 500 feet this year. City officials believe the small extension could open up big opportunities for future development.

5. Church of the Living God expansion — The first development spurred by the Fourth Street extension is expected to be the expansion of the religious institution.

6. Completed redevelopments — Some what similar to the planned Bristol Place overhaul, the Oakwood Trace, Douglass Square and Taylor Thomas subdivisions have already been completed and hailed by city officials as successes for removing blight-ridden areas and promoting mixed-income housing.

7. Market and Bradley — An opportunity for future development, the intersection of Market Street and Bradley Avenue is prime for what city officials call “neighborhood commercial” buildings, which in turn generate jobs. Family Dollar has been in operation on the northeast corner.

8. Neil Street corridor — According to city documents, this segment of Neil Street could be part of redevelopment plans in the future.

SOURCE: City of Champaign
Appendix E.1: Champaign Police District Map before 2006
Appendix E.2: Figure of Champaign Police Calls for Service by Beat (2001-2013)
Appendix E.3: Figure of Champaign Police Misconduct Allegations (1989-2000)
Appendix E.4: Champaign Police District Map after 2006
Appendix E.5: Champaign Police Beats Map after 2006
Appendix E.6: Champaign Police North District Zoom after 2006

North District
Appendix E.7: Infographic of Champaign Police Residency (2010)

BEYOND CITY LIMITS
Race, Residency and the Champaign Police Department

RACE & RESIDENCY BY THE NUMBERS

In 2010, the Champaign Police Department employed a total of 121 police officers.

More than 90% of Champaign police officers are white. Only six African Americans and two Latino/a officers serve on the force.

Three-quarters of Champaign police officers live beyond Champaign city limits in predominantly white towns and bedroom communities.

WHY POLICE LIVE BEYOND CITY LIMITS

Until 1970, the City of Champaign required that all police officers reside within the city limits.

However, in the aftermath of the fierce school integration battles of the late 1960s, the predominantly white police force and their families lobbied to change this policy. It seems that while many white police officers were willing to perform their law enforcement duties in a racially diverse community they were not willing to live and participate in it as equals.

The Champaign city council voted to expand the existing residency perimeter twice in 1970 and, eventually, handed decision-making power to the police department and the police union. Today, there are no restrictions on the residency of Champaign police officers.

THE IMPACT OF RACE & RESIDENCY

The city should reinstate the residency requirement because it will ensure that officers are invested in the local community, that our financial investment in police salaries is returned through tax revenue, and that skilled employment opportunities are opened up to local people. In addition, reinstating the residency requirement will help change the culture of the Champaign Police Department and improve our chances of recruiting a racially diverse workforce.
Appendix E.8: Hate Crimes in Illinois (1999-2013)
Appendix E.9: Hate Crimes in Champaign County (1999-2009)
Appendix E.10: Hate Crimes in Illinois by Bias Type (1999-2013)
Appendix E.11: Racial Hate Crimes in IL by Race (1999-2013)
Appendix E.12: Illinois Hate Crimes by Offender Race (2000-2013)
Appendix E.13: Champaign County Jail Population by Race (January-September 2014)

Champaign County Jail Population by Race
January-September 2014

- White: 44%
- Black: 53%
- Native American: 0%
- Asian/Pacific Islander: 2%
- Not Recorded: 1%
Appendix E.14: Open Champaign Tenant Inspection Requests (FY2006-FY2014)
Appendix E.15: Champaign Tenant Inspection Requests (FY2006-FY2014)
Appendix E.16: Average Days to Resolution for Champaign Tenant Inspection Request (FY2006-FY2014)
Appendix F.1: Bristol Place Master Plan Concept Images
Appendix F.2: Maps from Impediments to Fair Housing Report of income and race distribution in Champaign

2014 Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing/page 43
Appendix F.2, cont’d
Appendix F.2, cont’d

Attachment C

Minority Communities - Asian
City of Champaign, IL

Concentration of Select Populations by Block

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2014 Analysis of Impediments to Fair Housing/page 45
Appendix F.2, cont’d

Minority Communities - Hispanic/Latino Ethnicity
City of Champaign, IL

Attachment D

Concentration of Select Populations by Block

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