Land Use Policy in the Mexican Periphery
A Capstone Project with the United Nations Human Settlements Programme

Ashlee McLaughlin
Masters Candidate
Urban and Regional Planning
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Spring 2008
INTRODUCTION
As towns and cities grow at unprecedented rates setting the social, political, cultural and environmental trends of the world, sustainable urbanization is one of the most pressing challenges facing the global community in the 21st century. During the next 30 years, urban growth will bring a further 2 billion people into the cities of the developing world, doubling their size (UNHSP 2003). Cities are the hub for much national production and consumption including the varied economic and social processes that generate wealth and opportunity. These same economic and social processes also foster environments of disease, crime, pollution and poverty due to the competition and exploitation present in industrialized, market-driven societies. In many cities around the world these contrasting but inseparable conditions of wealth and poverty, opportunity and marginalization have created an environment in which a small percentage of wealthy possess a disproportionate amount of the wealth\(^1\) and slum dwellers number more than 50 per cent of the population with little or no access to shelter, water, and sanitation (Hoffman 1996). Historically, no single factor has contributed to this inequality as much as the unequal distribution of land (UN Habitat 2005).

Slum settlements are defined in a variety of ways by different locations around the world. According to a review of the literature on slum settlements around the world, the three most common aspects of the varying definitions are the illegality of land tenure, the use of poor-quality construction materials in housing, and the existence or absence of basic services, (potable water, electricity, and sanitation). While slums can exist in any geographical location, this paper refers specifically to slums located in the periphery of cities where residents do not have legal tenure for the property they occupy, but desire access to the economic and social opportunity of the city. While slum settlements lack safe housing, basic service provision, and security of land tenure and experience a wide range of health and safety problems as well as social and economic limitations, they also fill a crucial void in the housing market for residents who can’t afford legal or regularized housing or real estate. According to the 2003 Global Report on Human Settlements, the most common reasons for the formation and growth of slum settlements are rapid rural-to-urban migration, increasing urban poverty and inequality, insecure tenure, and globalization.

\(^1\) “Whereas the richest tenth of the population in the region [Latin America] earn 48 percent of total income, the poorest tenth earn only 1.6 percent. By contrast, in developed countries the top tenth receive 29 percent of total income, compared to 2.5 percent for the bottom tenth.” (Ferranti 2004:1)
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the implementation of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDG) target intended to improve the living conditions in low-income settlements and encourage sustainable urban development. The paper is a result of a ten week research endeavor in the city of Xalapa, Veracruz, Mexico, sponsored by the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat) Mexico City office, to investigate the state of land tenure procedures in place for addressing the global mandate to “achieve significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020.” The paper describes the main arguments within the academic literature regarding tenure security and then examines the ways in which this debate is reflected in policy decisions and local actions in Xalapa, Mexico. The Xalapa study is primarily based on approximately 40 semi-structured interviews ranging from thirty minutes to three hours with government officials and academics on local, state and national levels that participate or specialize in the history or current state of regularization processes in Mexico. These interviews were accompanied by the collection and review of work plans, development plans, and organizational missions and procedures. The interviews and document collection/review were jointly undertaken by Ashlee McLaughlin of the University of Illinois and Jennifer Lewis of Yale University.

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
At the Millennium Summit in September 2000, the largest gathering of world leaders in history adopted the UN Millennium Declaration, committing their nations to a renewed global partnership to “uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level” (United Nations 2000) and setting out a series of time-bound goals (see Figure 1). With a deadline of 2015 - 2020, these goals have become known as the Millennium Development Goals. The aforementioned target to improve the lives of slum dwellers falls under Goal 7, which calls to “ensure environmental sustainability.” Implicit in MDG discourse is a foundation of global citizenship wherein the costs and opportunities of globalization can be more equitably and inclusively shared. The translation of this global mandate into effective local initiatives is an important and complicated task with a number of potential obstacles to consider.

Within academic discussion, there is an increasingly recognized need to address the MDGs, the assumptions upon which they were founded and ultimately their expected and actual success. To begin, how is it possible to bridge the globally mandated

---

2 The Millennium Declaration cites the Cities Alliance’s Cities Without Slums Action Plan as the foundation for Target 11. A partnership between UN Habitat and the World Bank, the Cities Alliance was started in 1999 to mobilize funds and facilitate practices specifically committed to improving the living conditions of the urban poor around the world.
3 Ashlee McLaughlin is a Masters Candidate in the department of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign.
4 Jennifer Lewis is a dual Masters Candidate in the schools of Forestry and International Relations at Yale University.
MDGs with tangible actions on the ground in developing countries already suffering from debilitating shortages of lack of funding and other resources? In addition, Payne (2005) questions the value of using the MDGs as realistic targets for development initiatives. For example, his evidence suggests that even if Target 11 is achieved, only 11 percent of existing slums will be sufficiently upgraded, and only 7 percent of future estimated upgrading needs, by 2020. In addition, recent initiatives within UN Habitat have facilitated a timely discussion of tenure provision as it relates to Target 11.

An important tool for addressing Target 11, UN Habitat’s Global Campaign for Secure Tenure is one of only two global campaigns within the Habitat division, indicating the amount of importance they place on secure tenure as a path to achieving their mission to improve the quality of life in illegal slum settlements, and there is a large body of evidence to back this up. The outcomes of unstable tenure that this campaign aims to combat include the inability to mobilize household capital, participate in local government, establish firm geographical roots, which subsequently limits social networks, and to obtain consistent access to employment opportunities (UN Habitat 2003). Further justification of tenure security provision includes tenure as a means to reduce structural vulnerability of precarious housing conditions, susceptibility to harassment or expulsion that residents of informal areas tend to endure, poor access to basic services and detrimental ramifications to the environment due to lack of planning (Durand-Lasserve 2006). As evidenced in the following section, the myriad ways that tenure is defined for policy application to address urban living conditions demands much-needed flexibility as well as presents a fundamental challenge to successful achievement of Target 11.

**TENURE DEBATE**

Secure tenure is cited within UN Habitat’s Global Campaign for Secure Tenure as a fundamental component for addressing MDG 7 (UN 2005). There exists a wide array of different tenure definitions that form the basis of contentious debate regarding the value of prioritizing this factor as a fundamental step towards achieving these goals within both urban and peri-urban environments. The tenure categories included in what Payne (2000) terms “the tenure continuum” are 1) Pavement dweller, 2) Squatter tenant, 3) Squatter `owner’ - un-regularized, 4) Tenant in unauthorized subdivision, 5) Squatter `owner’ – regularized, 6) Tenant - unauthorized construction, 7) Legal owner - unauthorized construction, 8) Tenant with contract, 9) Lease-holder, 10) Free-holder. These categories become even more complex when trying to take the bundles of rights (access to services and amenities such as water, electricity, markets, schools, and civic centers) associated with specific locations into account. Accordingly, responses to tenure insecurity also vary according to local contexts, types and diversity of irregular settlements, governments’ political orientations, and pressures from civil society and from local voters. Broadly, however, there are two fundamental approaches: the first emphasizes formal tenure regularization of land and housing in informal settlements based on individual freehold titles; this tends to be more difficult legally and in particular, time consuming. The second approach emphasizes security of tenure (Durand-Lasserve 2006). This approach does not require the provision of freehold
individual title, and provides protective administrative or legal measures against forced evictions and for effective inclusion in service provision including the provision of titles that can be upgraded, if required, with the connection of basic services to public utility infrastructure systems.

**Support for Formal Tenure Regularization and Individual Freehold Titles**

There are several arguments arguing for individual freehold titling as a necessary precursor for development goals within low-income communities in the urban periphery consistent with the first approach mentioned above. Inherent in this view is the ultimate goal of tenure regularization and formal market integration of previously invisible, informal communities. This discussion has its historical roots in property rights discourse spearheaded by Turner (1968) that draws connections between legalization of land rights and housing improvements. Similar arguments have been set forth by Hernando De Soto, famous for his global quest to "formalize the informal." De Soto (2000) advocates property ownership as a means to protect assets, use as collateral for loans and risk sharing for investment, all of which contribute to economic growth.

More recent research has focused on three main justifications for formal regularization and household-level titling as the groundwork for further development in the urban periphery: 1) equalization of land prices in formal and informal markets, 2) establishing effective cadastral systems for tax collection, and 3) as a foundation for investment in low-income communities. First, regularization is often viewed as a means to equalize land prices in urban areas by reducing inflationary trends that lead to increases in prices of both legal and illegal land due to the rapid pace of urbanization and urban development (CORETT, pers. comm.). Additionally, a successful cadastral system on a municipal level is seen as essential for active and sustainable land markets that reduce fluctuations due to speculation. These official and standardized records of regularized land allow for more regulated and standardized purchase, sale and mortgage of land (Williamson 1997). Taxes assessed and collected as a result of these records can then, theoretically, be reinvested in urban development projects.

Finally, research on investment in different types of development projects reflects emphasis on regularization of land and issuance of individual property titles by international financial institutions as well as governments as a foundation for investment and in turn, economic development. For many projects, land essentially represents collateral for loans and other financial involvement in low-income areas. For example, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) often requires legal tenure as a prerequisite for credit acquisition for both low-income households to invest in small-scale projects and local governments requesting funds for municipality-wide investments (Armstrong 2002). Additionally, Siembieda and Lopez (1997) draw links between international financing mechanisms based upon goals to achieve improved housing and urban development that prioritize ‘efficiency’ (or regularization) of land markets. Similarly, Jones and Ward (1994) highlight the centrality of regularization of land titles within World Bank discourse and project funding.
Criticism of Formal Tenure Regularization and Individual Freehold Titles

On the other side of the debate, there are those who criticize the conventional belief that legal regularization and individual property rights are a necessary foundation for urban development. Evidence shows that in some places the regularization process, instead of improving the lives of existing slum residents, has actually spurred the creation of more slum settlements, as many of the existing residents could not afford the costs involved with regularization and the formal land market, including service upgrading, heightened construction regulations and taxation (UNCHS 1987). Often, as land becomes regularized and in turn, more valuable, it becomes a target of "raiding" by individuals of higher income classes which continually forces the poor out of newly legalized lands and onto less desirable illegal land (including floodplains, hill sides, and other risk-prone land) and/or illegal land further away from the city (Burgess 1982 in Varley 2002).

Furthermore, De Souza (1999 and 2001) argues that regularization of informal settlements also reduces the available land stock in illegal land market, and therefore, limits the accessibility of even illegal land to the low-income sector. Additional limitations to the formal regularization process stem from a lack of resources within the local governments responsible for such processes. Because of the time and cost required, formal regularization cannot respond effectively to large-scale slum regularization, particularly in peri-urban areas where migration tends to be more rapid than regularization (Vargas, pers. comm.). In turn, these conventional uses of tenure regularization that inevitably occur piecemeal, due in part to administrative constraints, can break down community cohesion, social links and ability for residents to participate in community development initiatives (Durand-Lasserve 2006).

Another powerful criticism is offered by Varley (1999) regarding the use of formal land regularization as a political tool, utilized by the elite for a variety of ends. Most notably, investing in regularization has the ability to coerce votes for the party in power, therefore providing necessary security and power structures established within the status quo. The prioritization of regularized property for investments by the government also maintains a necessary binary between "legal" and "illegal" (Varley 2002). The implication embedded within this discourse is that the government must intervene in order to resolve this dispute and legitimize, or formalize, these informal communities, thus reinforcing a political use of illegality to justify state paternalism.

This criticism is echoed by Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan (2002) in describing new, dynamic conceptualizations of property rights that correspond to a global reality of legal pluralism. This work suggests that policy that relies principally on statutory law to develop rigid and so-called "efficient" property rights do not recognize multiple claims for property rights and varying strategies by which people achieve access and control over resources, an oppression that disproportionately burdens low-income populations who don’t or can’t participate in the formal land market.
Support for Tenure Security Without Immediate Regularization

Consistent with the second, more flexible approach to providing tenure security, innovative case studies from around the world have attempted to offer alternative approaches to addressing urban poverty and development goals, without relying solely on regularization and individual titling as the foundation for the initiative. Case studies from around the world highlighting the successes of community land trusts, city-wide infrastructure upgrading and targeted housing subsidies, just to name a few, all provide valuable insight on alternatives to formal land regularization. Research by Durand-Lasserve (1998) also highlights the prioritization of urban needs, suggesting that basic service and infrastructure provision are more urgent action areas than tenure. This is reiterated by several authors who advocate improvement of basic services and increase "rights" without major changes to tenure status within urban landscapes (de Souza 2001; Payne 2000). Other studies have shown the importance of geographic proximity to work opportunities and fiscal policy mechanisms for serviced-land acquisition as future key elements of urban development (Payne 2000; Iracheta 2000).

Recent work has challenged traditional definitions of tenure security, rejecting the existing binary between legal and illegal that governments often maintain. The heterogeneity of tenure claims and rights among urban dwellers is beginning to be examined and at times local recognition of land rights confers enough security so as to make state recognition unnecessary (Nuijten 2003). Often, informal arrangements and squatting are culturally accepted means of procuring land for low-income families, and thus institutionalized on national scales (Iracheta 2000). Indeed, in many case studies, de facto tenure has provided enough security of land rights and potential housing improvements that legal titles become obsolete (Varley 2002). These approaches recognize a range of meanings and applications of tenure, as referenced earlier in Payne’s continuum, rather than assuming that legalization is necessary or even a positive component of urban development initiatives.

From a multi-national standpoint, UN-Habitat also recognizes a range of tenure local situations, adhering more closely with the second definition of secure tenure (Durand-Lasserve 2006). On a local level, the UN-Habitat defers to context-specific definitions for tenure and oftentimes promotes global goals through pathways established by existing discourse, in turn legitimizing practices for securing tenure that exist in particular countries (ibid., Rodriguez pers. comm.). In order to evaluate the potential application of MDG policies in Mexico, it is important to consider the potential application of this conceptualization of tenure security and the opportunities and challenges existing on local levels of government responsible for improving the living conditions in illegal slum settlements.
URBANIZATION AND THE PHENOMONON OF EJIDOS IN MEXICO

Rapid urbanization trends in Mexico make this country an important case study to examine changes in urban environments and potential options to develop sustainable and inclusive cities. According to 2001 estimates, the urban population of Mexico is approximately 75% of the total population and is estimated to increase to 85% within 25 years (UNHS 2001). Data also indicate that 10% of the urban population lacks potable water, 4.5% lack electricity and 20.9% lack proper drainage systems (See Table 1, UN Habitat 2005). Many of these households exist in the periphery areas of cities, as migrants establish homes through informal acquisition where land is accessible but largely un-serviced. Over the last 20 years, the informal sector has produced more than 60% of housing in major Mexican cities (Lemus 1994 in Siembieda and Lopez 1997).

The peri-urban interface in Mexican cities is a complex geographical zone of often overlapping and contested land rights. Many informal land market trends are couched within a long history of land rights in Mexico, principally stemming from land reforms enacted after the Mexican Revolution in 1917. Originally surrounding many urban settlements, communally run ejido properties were, in part, intended to serve the agrarian community as a way to protect their livelihood and sustain agricultural production in Mexico. This reform established the ejido tenure form, communal land that confers use rights for cultivation yet remains property of the nation. Under the 1992 Agrarian Law reform, ejido members were given rights to vote to change tenure regime, granting them the power to sell, rent, sharecrop, or mortgage the land (Appendini 2001). Since the bureaucratic process of transferring land-use designations and ownership rights for these properties is time-consuming and legally cumbersome however, the legal right to sell the land is often surpassed for faster, technically illegal, methods of subdividing, selling and distributing land use rights.

The urban footprint of many Mexican cities, including Mexico City, Monterrey and Guadalajara has grown into, through, and sometimes beyond the ejido lands that originally functioned as the boundary of the city (see figure 2). These settlements are often qualified as “slums” due to the lack of legal property titles, little or no basic service provision and the ad-hoc nature of construction and development. Increasingly, urban expansion and accompanying property demand have increased land values in ejidos near urban areas often making it more profitable for ejido leadership in urban or peri-urban areas to subdivide and sell the ejido property than to use it to practice agriculture (CORETT pers. comm.).

Some of the illegal trends of peri-urban ejido land sales include: selling ejido property with no use titles, selling the same piece of land several times, subdivide parcels outside of municipal regulations and without municipal permission, selling land that is legally designated as prone to hazards such as landslides or flooding. There is also significant attention drawn to the presence of land speculators, or "leaders," who operate outside of the law and make a living continually relocating poor households to new informal settlements only long enough to gain a profit on property value increases once basic services have been connected or made accessible. There is little existing
research that documents the scale of this trend outside of our interviews (CORETT, Hernández, Martínez, and Rodríguez pers. Comm.). Additionally, research has shown that the cycle of informal settlement and subsequent titling has resulted in a process that is institutionalized and a culturally accepted means for attaining low-cost land in urban and peri-urban areas of Mexico (Iracheta 2000). In other words, the residents of illegal slum settlements in Mexico are not necessarily impoverished and might have other options.

Several trends are also apparent among residents that have established homes in this peri-urban zone. Oftentimes these residents will pay disproportionately high prices for land with no accompanying services or titles. Conflict and/or dangerous living conditions can be common if single properties are clandestinely sold to multiple people or if upon arrival, new owners discover their properties exist on steep hillsides, or too close to rivers or underground gas pipelines. Additionally, without intervention from city planners in the subdivision and development of these settlements, community layouts can result streets that are too narrow for emergency vehicles to pass, unsafe residential construction, and inadequate or no spatial provision for vital social services such health clinics, education or green spaces. In these cases the services must be negotiated retroactively, if possible, and therefore at a greater financial cost to the provider(s). These potential downfalls are further promoted by the fact that, historically, tenure and service provision have been dealt with separately in Mexico (Azuela and Duhau 1998). Even though urban plans recognize that most future growth will occur on ejido lands within the peri-urban interface, there are few clear policies to formalize this to attend to existing irregular settlements and reduce the tendency for irregular settlement formation (Iracheta 2000). It seems that the residential settlement and development practices in Mexico result from an overall lack of property rights and regulations enforcement. A Mexico case study report published by UN Habitat notes dramatic inconsistencies in laws concerning tenure, noting in particular that possession rights are ambiguous and rarely recognized (UN HABITAT 2005).

Recent policy initiatives have started a forum for discussing the role of tenure Mexican cities. In May 2007 the Mexican Federal Government presented the Felipe Calderón Administration’s first five year National Development Plan. Strategy 3.1, Objective 3 of Axis 3 articulates the goal to “promote regional planning, legal land tenure and public security in marginal zones of cities." Within the plan are ambitious platforms for granting tenure to those illegally living on property they do not own, paired with ambiguous references to service provision as “easier to provide...once already regularized.” The plan is unclear whether the federal government is willing to fund infrastructure upgrading in illegal slum settlements and aid in addressing MDG Target 11, or whether regularization and a residents property “legality” will continue to determine their access to basic services. With this objective currently positioned at the national level of discourse and debate, it is an opportune moment to examine tenure security in the country and its potential use as a tool of equity and justice for Mexican citizens.
Case Study: Xalapa, Veracruz

The medium-sized city of Xalapa, Veracruz was chosen by the UN HABITAT office in Mexico City to evaluate the on-the-ground reality of illegal slum settlements, service provision initiatives by the local, state and federal governments, and how these initiatives may or may not coincide with the aims of the MDGs. Research shows that aggressive urbanization trends, a major contributor to the creation and growth of informal settlements, are currently greatest in medium-sized cities making Xalapa a good candidate for this research (Martinez pers. comm.). As of 2005, the urban population of Xalapa was 413,136 including illegal settlements in the city’s periphery qualified as slum settlements due to the lack many basic services such as electricity, water and drainage, among others. Population growth is expected to yield a total population of anywhere between 456,076 to 474,465 by 2020 (INEGI 2005; COPLADEVer 2007). Xalapa was also chosen as the research site because of UN Habitat’s ongoing professional ties to the area resulting from a six year collaborative effort to foster strategic management and urban planning in local government projects (UN Habitat 2006).

This case study is primarily based on approximately 40 semi-structured interviews ranging from thirty minutes to three hours with government officials and academics on local, state and national levels that participate or specialize in the history or current state of regularization processes in Mexico. The organizations represented by the individuals in these interviews included UN HABITAT, the Commission for the Regularization of Land Tenure, CORETT; the Secretary of Social Development, SEDESOL; the Veracruz State Institute for Housing and Regional Planning, InVivienda; the regional Center of Social Anthropology Investigation and Studies, CIESAS; the Veracruz state development planning committee, COPLADEVER; the Xalapa municipal cadastre office; the National Autonomous University of Mexico, and the University of Veracruz. These interviews were augmented by the simultaneous collection and review of work plans, development plans, organizational missions and procedures, and site visits to ejido and non ejido settlements in the Xalapa periphery in order to identify physical and ideological overlap or conflict.

Currently, the processes of government-sponsored tenure regularization and service provision in Xalapa function sequentially in a timeframe that takes anywhere from 2 – 10+ years from the time of the initiation of the regularization process to the installation of basic services, including water, electricity, drainage, and sanitation. The overarching order of formal tenure legalization is determined by existing policy set by the federal government. Currently this order is: expropriation of ejido lands to the government, regularization and provision of land titles to current residents, municipal incorporation and update of cadastral systems and finally, basic service provision as scarce resources are divided throughout city projects. This sequential order is initiated only after an ejido leadership council has unanimously agreed to give up their communal administration rights back to the federal government to divide up accordingly amongst existing property settlers at the time of the agreement, regardless of the legality of their residence. The residents who are “awarded” tenure from the federal government are charged a fee, (600 Pesos, about $60 USD July 2007), to
obtain their title in addition to the support from the federal government who maintains the federal expropriation offices and staff around the country who carry out the process.

The two most obvious problems facing people illegal occupying land in slum settlements are related: tenure security and the provision of services (UN Habitat 2003). There is a portion of federal funds distributed to municipalities for use in any location of the city including illegal settlements as part of a municipal development funding account, known as “Ramo 33,” specifically distributed for use in wide-ranging "municipal strengthening" projects (Hernández pers. comm.). However, existing municipal, state and even national government discourse stipulates that legal tenure in the form of individual titles is necessary prior to public investment in household and neighborhood-specific service provision. This prioritization of legal tenure provision over all other types of investment in periphery informal communities was reiterated by representatives of the Commission for Regularization of Land Tenure (CORETT), Secretary of Social Development (SEDESOL) Habitat Program, the municipal development office, the Veracruz state urban planning office and the Veracruz State Institute for Housing and Regional Planning. Common justifications for this prioritization echo the arguments outlined by property rights promoters worldwide, corresponding to the first broad definition of tenure mentioned earlier in this paper. One predominant justification for this prioritization was that legality reduced land speculation in periphery lands, principally in ejido lands that currently are being subdivided and sold to migrants entering the city, or city residents migrating further out. These representatives often extended this issue, however, claiming that legality was the only means by which local and state planning representatives and government officials can retain some degree of control over future urban expansion without encouraging illegal subdivisions, settlement and development. Different planning representatives at both the state and local level claimed to be in competition with large land speculators who intend to make money off of illegal purchases of land in peri-urban areas throughout Mexico. These representatives not only justified but also adamantly declared that legalization of these communities was the only means by which development should occur and land speculation kept under control, regardless of the numbers of Xalapa residents without access to basic services (Basic service access statistics for Xalapa unknown, see Table 1 for basic service access statistics nation-wide).

Throughout the course of interviews with these same state and city planning and development stakeholders, it became clear that there are also secondary reasons for which legalization of property rights is deemed a necessary precursor to service provision and other types of investment. These included: legality as a means for residents to embody a sense of community or identification with their property and legality as a prerequisite for tax collection necessary for municipal investment. The underlying assumption within these claims is that residents of these communities do not feel a sense of attachment or accountability to the land where they have established homes. In addition, planners and other property administrators within the state and city governments consistently cite legal property rights as a precursor to
upgrading. The definition of upgrading varied significantly, ranging from provision of basic services for illegal settlements upon regularization to modifications of zoning and land use regulations that would be consistent with long-range plans developed by the agencies themselves. Without further investigation, including in-depth contact with the residents of these communities, is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate about the positionality of the residents who are affected by these practices and policies.

Within these processes, several practices are apparent: First and foremost is careful observance of the federal directive that prohibits investment of most federal monies in property that is being illegally occupied. The paradox of planners relying on titles as a precursor, however, is that this inevitably leads to a situation in which informal settlement occurs first without regard to plans and only subsequently are government officials, in particular planners, allowed to engage with concrete actions in these areas. Only following settlement and legal recognition are city officials allowed to enter these areas. This means that although formal comprehensive plans do exist, proactive planning does not occur in any of the hazard-prone areas, ejido property, or state and federal reserves since any subdivided settlements on them are technically illegal. Subsequently, all future development in those areas will almost certainly occur by retrofitting the spaces after regularization has been completed, which again, in a worst case scenario, can take more than ten years after the process has been initiated. The on-the-ground reality in Xalapa, however, reveals a markedly different picture than a simplistic model of legal and illegal definitions for areas across the urban landscape.

Despite these apparent trends promulgated by government agents based on legal property rights provision, throughout the course of the study, inconsistencies in landholding, investment, legal tenure and service provision were continually apparent. Although the government relies heavily on a discourse rooted in legality, our interviews indicate a continuum of tenure with regard to land given the fact that residents are actively settling and investing in landholdings, before legal formal property titles are granted. In contrast to the administrative and bureaucratic environments of Xalapa, the populations residing in illegal settlements in the periphery of Xalapa do not always resemble the transient, predatory populations discussed within government circles. In most cases, there appears to be little risk of eviction from these peri-urban zones within the study area, even though individual property titles had not been issued. This agrees with the discussion earlier regarding the lack of property rights and regulations enforcement in the country as a whole according to several federal officials, which was reiterated by a state planning official in an off-the-record interview. This also confirms findings by a UN Habitat report that indicates forced evictions are uncommon in practice in Mexico and a more serious issue resulting from informality is the denial of basic service provision by local governments (UN HABITAT 2005). It is also relevant to note that according to local government officials as well as 3 different personal visits, two principal services, electricity and water, are common in many illegal settlements. These services are not publicly funded, but procured via private investment by the national electric company
(CFE), community mobilization for services and/or local politicians investing in water and electricity as a means of procuring political support (CORETT pers. comm.).

In the end, the reality in illegal and slum settlements in Xalapa is one in which some the services that are more difficult to obtain due to government control and or cost of implementation depend largely on two characteristics of the property resident: their income and their tenure status, given existing government models for investment projects. Even though water and electricity might be facilitated prior to legalization, other services depend more heavily on regularization and individual property titles. These services include drainage systems, sanitation, trash disposal and improved social services such as education and health services. Currently, existing government programs to address urban poverty and development in growing cities in Mexico do not acknowledge these subtle yet fundamental relationships between legal land tenure and the issues of citizenship and human rights involved with basic service provision at the local level.

CONCLUSIONS
The Millennium Development Goals defer implementation power of globally advocated development objectives to national and local level governments throughout the world, theoretically allowing the process to be adaptable and participatory in the hopes of leading to more feasible and effective policies. In the case of Mexico, the implementation of MDG Goal 7, Target 11 becomes intractably linked to the legal/illegal binary, which is at the core of discussions about tenure, urban citizenship, and access to basic services. This analysis highlights the existing binary between "legal" and "illegal" within government discourse in Mexico and the limitations it currently presents to contributing to MDG Target 11 in Xalapa and might present to other externally-conceived development initiatives in the future. This binary, which stems from a property rights school of thought, results in a situation in which low-income citizens lack the necessary resources to be able to obtain some or all basic services which, according to government officials, are only accessible to regularized properties where individual property titles exist. Despite these limitations, within informal communities, this paper contends that there is a continuum of land tenure and service provision in periphery areas of cities in Mexico. This critique is important to evaluate the existing situation in order to develop feasible policy proposals that can address improving the lives of slum dwellers in the peri-urban interface of Xalapa.

Currently, the discrepancies between the UN MDG agenda, national government policy and local reality, specifically with regard to tenure security, underscore the problem facing urban development initiatives in Xalapa. Not only are the global citizenship rights, regardless of property ownership, associated with the MDGs and UN agenda essentially ignored and left unrealized, but simultaneously, government policies do not take into account local reality to inform necessary public investment for impoverished urban areas. In Xalapa, the question of what form of tenure is desirable for which locations remains unanswered and in fact, largely unasked. What we are left with, is a city where the awarding of tenure rights is slow and inflexible,
where the enforcement of property rights and regulations is exercised only in the form of withholding basic services from illegal settlements, and the cost of urban development and service provision is higher than it needs to be due to the resulting practice of retrofitting existing settlements rather than planning for future ones.

This case study underscores the existing limitations to achieving both the UN Millennium Development Goals as well as the current National Development Plan in Mexico. These discrepancies between discourse and reality result in municipal urban planning practices that operate retroactively rather than proactively to accommodate urban growth and augment development and living conditions in the City of Xalapa. The implication for global urban mandates is clear: dramatic inconsistencies between global development goals, government policy and local reality should be further explored and evaluated in the future if new strategies for sustainable urban development are to be effective.
Figure 1: Millennium Development Goals and Targets

Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Hunger and Poverty | more >>>
1. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day
2. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education | more >>>
3. Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

Goal 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women | more >>>
4. Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015

Goal 4: Reduce Child Mortality | more >>>
5. Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate

Goal 5: Improve Maternal Health | more >>>
6. Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio

Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases | more >>>
7. Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS
8. Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases

Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability | more >>>
9. Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources
10. Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation
11. Have achieved by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers

Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development | more >>>
12. Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, nondiscriminatory trading and financial system (includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction, both nationally and internationally)
13. Address the special needs of the Least Developed Countries (includes tariff- and quota-free access for Least Developed Countries’ exports, enhanced program of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries [HIPCIs] and cancellation of official bilateral debt, and more generous official development assistance for countries committed to poverty reduction)
14. Address the special needs of landlocked developing countries and small island developing states (through the Program of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and 22nd General Assembly provisions)
15. Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term
16. In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth
17. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries
18. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications technologies

Source: MDG Monitor website www.mdgmonitor.org
Table 1: Availability of Basic Urban Services in Mexico, 1980 – 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Houses without drinking water</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses without drainage</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houses without electricity</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INEGI, Mexico Census 2000

Figure 2: Xalapa City Boundary 1949 and 2005 and Original Ejido Boundaries

Data Source: Agrarian Department, Mexico, 1949
Boundary Highlights added by Ashlee McLaughlin, 2007
BIBLIOGRAPHY


UN Habitat. 2006. 
http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=4883&catid=156&typeid=13&subMenuId=01


An initiative proposed by the UN Habitat office in Mexico City aims to coordinate the federal tenure regularization and service provision processes with local regularization processes in an attempt to channel federal urban improvement funds to illegal settlements on *ejido* land faster than is currently possible through the existing procedure. The five main parties involved in this collaboration would include the *ejido* leadership, residents of the illegal settlement, CORETT, (the federal land regularization organization), the SEDESOL Habitat Program, (the federal entity in charge of social and urban development) and the local municipal government, (responsible for official municipal incorporation of newly regularized settlements). The three steps UN Habitat initially proposes as the foundation of the collaboration are the following:

1. A legal agreement, signed by all five main parties, to initiate the regularization process including:
   a. Definition of overarching collaboration mission and respective roles.
   b. Understanding that no financial transactions can take place for the duration of the collaboration to inhibit sales to speculators and stabilize price/value of the land.
2. Simultaneity of 3 separate regularization processes:
   a. CORETT (Federal level)- regularization process
   b. SEDESOL Habitat (Federal Level)- funding and installation of basic services\(^5\) and other social and urban development
   c. Municipality – incorporation of the formerly illegal settlement into official municipal plan
3. Signed agreement is returned to the community residents with individual land titles, the incorporated area officially recognized by the city, basic services, access to federal development funding in the future, and the freedom to do what they want with their respective properties.

The UN Habitat’s goal for this initiative is to figure out how it can, with additional political support from the National Development Plan for 2007-2012, function on the national scale to change rules of operation and policies for SEDESOL Habitat, CORETT, and/or the municipality, in areas deemed suited for the collaboration. Part

---

\(^5\) In this paper, the term “basic services” includes potable water, electricity, and adequate sanitation and waste management for each dwelling unit.
of our fieldwork in Mexico included an investigation specifically geared toward understanding the feasibility of this proposal.

In order to design a strategy for the three main processes involved in the regularization of *ejido* property, (expropriation and regularization, service provision, and municipal incorporation), to operate simultaneously, we had a number of different meetings with CORETT, SEDESOL Habitat, and the Xalapa municipal government. At first we wrote our meeting agendas according to information about the UN’s initiative to improve the infrastructure in under-serviced periphery settlements with supporting evidence from the UN Millennium Development Goals, the National Plan 2007-2012, basic human rights and statistics regarding the negative effects of slum settlements and rapid urbanization. The initial finding of these meetings included a realization that our theoretical arguments held little weight and sparked little interest in light of the existing work plans and regulations of the respective organizations. The institutions we talked to consistently suffered from a lack of staff, technical expertise, and general funding to carry out their respective missions with desired timeliness and efficacy – for an outsiders to walk in and propose an additional burden to their workload was understandably unwelcome. We also gathered confirmation that currently the three main regularization procedures never overlap when carried out by these institutions with which the UN project intends to coordinate. Therefore, the processes work one after another in a timeframe that could take anywhere from 2 – 10+ years from the time of the initiation of the regularization process to the installation of basic services such as water, electricity and sanitation services.

At first, based on our meetings in those offices we determined the lack of institutional overlap to be a byproduct of three different factors: first, the careful observance of the federal mandate to not invest federal money in property that is being illegally occupied; second, a lack of communication and information-sharing between organizations, and; third, a rhetoric of illegality in reference to both the residents of illegal communities as well as land speculators (that could potentially have played a part in their settlement), that prohibits institutional sympathy, prioritization or even what we would consider adequate attention for periphery settlements, particularly those on *ejido* property since they are not recognized by the federal government as legal.

Simultaneously, we were studying the work plans and timelines of each organizational process involved in order to identify opportunities for overlapping work and information sharing. Upon examination of this data, however, we found that the illegal settlement of our study site was located within one of the designated work zones of the SEDESOL Habitat program. Upon even further investigation, we confirmed that federal funds had been spent on development initiatives and construction projects directly in and around the illegally settled communities we were studying. Unfortunately, even after speaking extensively with local and regional administrators on both sides of this overlap, we have not been able to explain this contradiction and it still remains a mystery to us. With all the legal and verbal opposition to spending federal funds in illegal settlements, it is hard to even imagine what the cause of this
slip-up might be due to besides simple oversight or inter-organizational communication between the highest ups in the institutions who’s motives and decision making processes are not always transparent to the regional administrators or people outside the organization such as ourselves. We were unable to re-connect and meet with the institutional heads in Mexico City in the time between this discovery and our departure date.

As a result of this line of investigation, we were ultimately able to determine a specific point in the larger regularization timeline of potential simultaneity. To our dismay, this point was so conservative in its lack of willingness to challenge current institutional work plans or current federal spending policy, that we are not convinced it would significantly reduce the larger timeline or even require a policy change or a legally binding agreement. At this point in our research we started to see the benefits of the top-down approach of simply imposing policy change over our own preference to grow it from below. This possibility of top-down policy “imposition” rather than “growth” of the collaboration initiative was presented as a real option by the UN Habitat coordinators during our final meetings at their Mexico City office. Our UN counterparts informed us that the UN Habitat program has the legal authority and the will to impose policy change in Mexico through their own contacts in different departments of the federal government, though to what extent we are unclear. This leaves us to question if we were sufficiently radical in our work plan and policy negotiations with the various institutions and players involved in the regularization process.

The research and drafting of a legal collaboration agreement that could be utilized for collaboration during the regularization process proved to be one of the most frustrating uses of our time in Mexico. Trying to navigate legal rhetoric in Spanish as well as get face time with attorneys proved to be difficult and thus far, unrewarding. Before we left we were able to put together a draft agreement with guidance from few different legal sources to use a tool to talk about the project with various parties, but we weren’t able to get very specific or professional feedback on the draft before we left. We were told the attorney in the UN office has had a copy since we left the country but we have yet to hear from him or her. This is a task that we would have preferred to contract out but didn’t feel we had the resources or right contacts to do so.
COLLABORATION AGREEMENT CELEBRATED BY THE HABITAT PROGRAM OF SEDESOL, CORETT AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF XALAPA, VERACRUZ, MEXICO FOR THE PROVISION OF SERVICES AND REGULARIZATION OF LAND TENURE IN IRREGULAR PERI-URBAN SETTLEMENTS OF XALAPA

I. Parties

Collaboration agreement observed by the Human Settlements Program of the United Nations (UN HABITAT) represented by the National Coordinator, the Commission for the Regularization of Land Tenure (CORETT) represented by ____, the Habitat Program of the Social Development Secretary (SEDESOL) represented by _____, the Municipality of Xalapa, Veracruz de la Llave represented by the Mayor and the residents of the neighborhoods of _____, according to the following background content, declarations and clauses.

Executers
Human Settlements Program of the United Nations (UN HABITAT)
National Coordinator
Commission for the Regularization of Land Tenure (CORETT)
Federal – Technical Director
State – Technical Director
Social Development Secretary (SEDESOL)
Federal – Habitat Program Director
State – Habitat Program Coordinator, Veracruz
Xalapa Municipality
Mayor
Legal board
Residents or representatives of the communities Tronconal I, II, III
II. Background

Land Tenure
- General UN data
  - Relevant Millennium Development Goals (Goal 7, Point 11, Indicator 32)
  - Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- National Development Plan for Mexico
  - Axis 3
- Current situation of urban land in Mexico
  - Urbanization trends
  - Land speculation
  - Poverty in peri-urban areas
  - Irregular settlements

CORETT
- Date of establishment
- Organizational mission and work procedures
- Applicable federal laws

SEDESOL Habitat
- Date of establishment
- Organizational mission and work procedures
- Applicable laws (Social Development Secretary, Laws of Human Settlements)

Veracruz State and Xalapa Municipality
- Municipalization procedures and responsibilities
- Applicable laws (Law of Regional and Urban Development of the Veracruz State etc.)

Tronconal I, II, III
- Geographic location
- Current projects of CORETT
- Current projects of SEDESOL
- Other current projects and community partners

Goals and benefits of pilot project
- Recognition of the human rights of all Mexican citizens
- Area regularized and incorporated into the Municipal development plans
  - Investment with security in housing, land, and the community
  - Reduction of negative environmental impact caused by urbanization trends without accompanied planning, including irregular settlements
- Services which benefit individual properties as well as the community
- Combat land speculation in peri-urban lands
- Case study that can serve as a model for replication in other parts of Xalapa as well as other cities in Mexico
III. Declarations

Declarations of each institution:
The Human Settlements Program of the United Nations (UN HABITAT) declares themselves responsible for…
   - Supervision of pilot project
The Commission for the Regularization of Land Tenure (CORETT) declares themselves responsible for…
   - Continuation of regularization of Tronconal II and III
   - Permission to enter of SEDESOL and Xalapa Municipality to carry out their institutional functions and projects following the "Dictamen de Procedencia" step within the regularization process which assures that the full regularization process will occur
   - Final report submitted to UN HABITAT
The Social Development Secretary (SEDESOL) declares themselves responsible for…
   - Initiation of project development following the CORETT Dictamen submission
   - Project completion in priority zone 30069
   - Final report submitted to UN HABITAT
Xalapa Municipality declares themselves responsible for...
   - Initiation of municipalization process following the CORETT Dictament submission
   - Final report submitted to UN HABITAT
The residents of the colonias Tronconal III declares themselves responsible for…
   - No land sales will occur on this property through the duration of the three processes until they are awarded a property title from CORETT
   - Land taxes will correspond with municipalization processes (?)

Declarations of all parties:

That it is by voluntary acceptance to subscribe to the present collaboration agreement, to the end of mutually contributing to the accomplishment of the responsibilities and the promise of mutual support.

That each party will ascribe to communication between the institutions throughout the duration of the project, sharing of information, community data and geographical data etc.

That each institution involved will submit a final report to the national office of UN HABITAT, located in Mexico City, Mexico.
IV. Clauses

For the completion of the objectives of this agreements, each participant will carry out the specific programs of their association according to the norms and regulations stipulated by national, state and local laws applicable to each institution.

The parties will comply with the agreement according to the mutual understanding of it's intention, conforming to the written and signed document. Any discrepancy that could occur in the application and completion of this agreement should be resolved through mutual agreements.

The present agreement will be valid for a period of ___ and will go into effect with the signatures of the participating parties. Modification or cancellation of the agreement should be requested by written document from the interested party, at least 60 days before the anticipated change or cancellation.

THE PRESENT AGREEMENT IS SIGNED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF XALAPA, VERACRUZ, MEXICO ON THE DAY ___ OF THE MONTH OF ____ OF THE YEAR ___.

APPENDIX
See electronic files attached

Note: All resources are in Spanish unless otherwise noted

Presentations
American Planning Association Annual Conference, Las Vegas, NV
Research poster presented, April 2008 (English)

UP 418: GIS, Case study of development in two periphery communities in Xalapa
Case study poster presented, December 2007 (English)

INESURE Second National Conference of Urban Land, Chihuahua, Mexico
Research presentation, October 2007

Collected Resources
Cadastre, Xalapa Municipal Office
- Infrastructure maps (AutoCAD)
  - Road conditions
  - Service networks
  - Services networks and road conditions
- Public Works maps (AutoCAD)
  - Government administrative buildings
  - Public works 2005
  - Public works 2006

CIESAS-Golfo (Center of Social Anthropology Investigation and Study), Golf Region
- Map of Xalapa ejido lands, 1949
- Residential Mobility in the Veracruz Metropolitan Zone by H. Rodriguez

COPLADEVER, (State Development Planning Committee). Veracruz State Office
- Basic statistics for the Xalapa Municipality, 2005-2005
- National Road Infrastructure map, projected for year 2012
- National Transportation Arteries Map, 2006
- Population data and projections for Veracruz State 2000-2020
CORETT, (Commission for the Regularization of Land Tenure), Federal Office
- COMERI program, organizational outline
- CORETT anti-corruption plan, 2006
- General organizational overview (PowerPoint)
- White paper, Operation of Expropriation Decrees, 2006
- Photographs of a land title presentation ceremony, 2006
- SULI, program technical guide, 2007
- SULI, organizational flow chart, 2007

CORETT, Veracruz State Office
- Initial data sheets for regularization in Tronconal communities II and III
- Lot maps of Tronconal I, II, and III (AutoCAD)
- Xalapa City community map including areas regularized by CORETT, 2007
- Xalapa City land use map, 2002

InVivienda, (Veracruz Institute of Urban and Regional Development and Housing)
- Constancia: legal agreement for regularization of a specific lot – used by owners to prove future ownership in order to solicit basic utilities from service providers
- Current and projected land use map for Xalapa, 2003
- Periphery highway plans, Xalapa region
- Plans for the Urban Zone of Xalapa-Banderilla-Emiliano Zapata-Tlalnelhuayocan, Veracruz, 1998 (12 files) and 2003 (5 files)
- Law for Urban and Regional Development of the State of Veracruz, 1999

SEDESOL Habitat, (Secretary of Development, Habitat program), Federal Office
- Current Housing Situation in Mexico, 2006 (English)
- Mexico National Development Plan, 2007-2012
- SEDESOL Habitat Strategic Objectives, 2007-2012
- SEDESOL Habitat general organizational overview, 2007 (PowerPoint)
- SEDESOL Rules of Operation, 2006

SEDESOL Habitat, Veracruz State Office
- Annual Report of Habitat works for 2006
- Summary files of completed works by Habitat program in Xalapa, 2005 and 2006
- Xalapa City map with the work communities of the Habitat program, 2005

UN HABITAT, Federal Office
- The Millennium Development Goals: A Latin American and Caribbean Perspective, 2005 (English)
- The Political Constitution of the Mexican United States, 2005 (English)
- Mexico: Law, Land Tenure and Gender Review, 2005 (English)
- A Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (English)
UN HABITAT, Regional Office in Xalapa
- Academic Manual for DEL (Local Economic Development) Workshops, 2006
- DEL: Land and Shelter Development as a result of Planning and Strategic Management in the State of Veracruz, final presentation, 2007
- Final Report of DEL Workshops, Xalapa, 2007
- Instructional Guide for DEL Workshop, 2006
- Global Campaign for Urban Governance and Security of Housing Tenure, presentation, 2006

Public Relations Office, University of Veracruz, Xalapa Campus
- GIS Data for Xalapa region produced by SEDESOL, 2006
- Tronconal Territorial Reserve - Technical Profile and Financing, 2003
Funding support thanks to:
The Tinker Foundation
The Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, UIUC
Department of Urban and Regional Planning, UIUC
Hixon Center for Ecology, Yale University
Coca Cola World Fund, Yale University
Project Description

The maps below exist as a framework for a community needs assessment in the urban periphery of Xalapa, Veracruz, Mexico. Xalapa, a medium-sized state capital with a population of approximately 400,000, has seen aggressive rural-urban migration in recent years. Uncontrolled growth in legal and illegal settlements has caused concern from planners trying to meet the needs of this community. These maps explore relationships between land use and risk, density and utilities, and social services and transportation. For the purpose of a comparative analysis between the infrastructure available in illegal and legal settlements we have chosen two communities to analyze: the illegal settlement of Lomas De Casa Blanca and the legal settlement of Carolino Anaya.

Land Use Hazards and Road Hierarchy

Mixed use corridors served by arterials are the predominant feature of both neighborhoods that are otherwise characterized by large residential zones. The illegal neighborhood has a scattering of small-scale industrial uses throughout, whereas the legal neighborhood has other mixed use corridors not served by major roads, with a smaller scattering of industrial uses. Both neighborhoods face the same hazards within their boundaries; some differences include an overlap in the legal neighborhood with a flood prone area and hazardous slope. Additionally, a low accessibility zone exists within each neighborhood, but is much bigger in the illegal neighborhood; however there is no overlap with the other two threats as found in the far northern tip of the legal neighborhood.

Density and Infrastructure Analysis

The main differences between the two settlements are in the density and sanitation lines. The legal settlement is mostly low density and has many more sanitation lines than the illegal settlement. However, the illegal settlement is mostly medium density and has only one sanitation line.

Transportation and Social Services Analysis

Thirteen routes in total serve at least one of the two neighborhoods (two serve both), with eight in the legal neighborhood and seven in its illegal equivalent. Within an easy walking distance of 500 m from bus stops serving routes that enter the legal neighborhood, 85.8% of Xalapa’s 274 community services are easily accessible; the equivalent for the illegal neighborhood is 77.7%. However, a significant number of all ten service types still remain within easy access for residents of both neighborhoods. The maps on the right show the amount of provided access to social services within the two settlements. Legal Settlement has 1 Bus Station, 4 Bus Stops, 1 Medical Facility, 7 Schools, 1 Sports Facility, 1 Library, 1 Anealing, 1 Church, 1 School. Through the findings, it is clear to see that the Legal Settlement not only has more social services within it, there are also more bus stops allowing access to services on the outside. There are many social services, according to the map, that lie on the outskirts of the Illegal Settlement; however, they have limited access via bus stops to these services.