RETHINKING INTEGRATION: WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

BY

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DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science with a minor in European Union Studies in the Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, 2015

Urbana, Illinois

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Abstract

The integration of vast numbers of migrants into European countries from North Africa and the Middle East continues to pose challenges for policymakers. The many differences between these immigrants and the native population can make assimilation difficult. In order to increase trust and social cohesion between citizens and migrant populations, various forms of multicultural and assimilatory policies have been enacted with mixed success. This study challenges the usefulness of the current way people think about integration ideologies, namely as a choice between assimilation and multiculturalism. I hypothesize that we can better analyze public attitudes about integration by conceptualizing integration as a continuum of possibilities arranged along a scale of overall permissiveness. Using this continuum, we can entertain new and more effective ideologies as policy options. My field research conducted surveys with native-born citizens in the Netherlands and Belgium to gather information about the appeal and usefulness of these new integration ideologies. This paper finds evidence that the more moderate ideologies of interculturalism and “liberalism as identity” create stronger feelings of trust toward immigrants while minimizing in-group projection, overcoming the in-group projection problem. Furthermore, in Belgium, interculturalism is seen as more desirable to the respondents than the current more extreme policies of multiculturalism and assimilation.
To Audrey, my safe harbor
Acknowledgements

This research was conducted with generous financial support from the European Union Center at the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, the Survey Research Center at the University of Illinois at Chicago, the University of Illinois and the Catholic University of Leuven. Additional support was provided by faculty members at Ghent University and Tilburg University. Further thanks are due to the members of my dissertation committee, especially Carol Leff and Robert Pahre, for providing consistent support and guidance throughout my graduate studies. Of course, none of the above would have even be possible without the support and love of my family (especially my mother, father, and sister) and my fiancé, Audrey.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In 2006, the Dutch Ministry of Interior Affairs outlined new rules for the assimilation of migrants seeking residency in the Netherlands. One new requirement was to watch an integration video “To the Netherlands”. This video is still considered controversial in some parts of the world, as it features clips of two men kissing and a bare-breasted woman. For immigrants coming from cultures that are far more reserved than the socially permissive traditions of Holland, these clips represented a violent, purposeful culture shock. The producers of the video even had to distribute an edited version for countries where the possession of such material is considered a criminal offense.

This controversy illustrates a widespread problem that has taken root in Western Europe, namely the processing of large numbers of migrants from around the world, particularly from the Maghreb and the Middle East into European society. While Europe has dealt with immigration since the formation of nation states, the disparities present between the host European culture and the culture of the migrant have rarely reached such politicized levels. Consequences of this phenomenon include perceptions of increased crime, feelings of social isolation, segregated migrant communities (such as the banlieues outside of Paris), heightened xenophobic political rhetoric frequently institutionalized by far right parties, and at its most extreme, the creation of the concept of “parallel communities” where migrants live entirely removed from their host culture.

The importance of this political issue is increasing. In 2011, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Prime Minister David Cameron, and French President Nicholas Sarkozy gave public speeches proclaiming the death of multiculturalism and the need for a “muscular
liberalism” (Cameron’s term), an ideology that vigorously promotes and defends the values of western culture and secular liberalism. Right-of-center and in some case far right parties with anti-immigrant appeals made strong gains in 2010 elections, such as those in Sweden and in the Netherlands. In light of the political upheaval in Libya and Tunisia, Italy requested EU patrol ships to interdict the new surges of people crossing the Mediterranean looking for a better life in the more stable region of Western Europe. Then in 2015, Muslim gunmen targeted the satirical magazine, *Charlie Hebdo*, in Paris as well as cartoonist Lars Vilks at a gathering in Copenhagen. Later that year, an Islamic fundamentalist opened fire on a train traveling from Amsterdam to Paris.

These events and the following backlash illustrate strains on the “social cohesiveness” of European countries. Violence and discrimination fuel distrust and suspicion, eroding the potential for good relationships between natives and immigrants (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2012, Adida et al, 2012). Prudent integration policies can address these shortcomings, but there exists fundamental (some may even say irreconcilable) questions involving how to structure the relationship between citizens and natives, including which parties have the responsibility to compromise and in what way (Scholten, 2011). This debate is traditionally structured in terms of a dichotomy between the policy frames of multiculturalism and assimilation, but this need not be the case. If these integration strategies represent extreme or ideal positions, it is possible that better policies may exist in between these extremes. This dissertation explores novel, theoretically moderate policy strategies as they exist in Belgium and the Netherlands. These countries have rich histories of negotiating identities and fostering dynamic public debates over the responsibilities of immigrants. This relationship is studied both through an analysis of elite
and national policies, as well as a public opinion survey done of long-term residents at the local level.

This dissertation is structured into four parts. In Chapter Two, the idea of integration and its relationship to identity is explored through an overview of the multiple literatures that converge in this topic. This discussion begins with an exploration of identity as a broad concept. It then narrows into an examination of the defining characteristics of national identities. The successful management of national identities and the differences in immigrant behavior relative to these identities are the primary motivators for integration as a process. The chapter then defines integration more generally as a multi-faceted and frequently contested concept. Integration imposes normative responsibilities on actors that are politically negotiated in the context of a power hierarchy between native residents and newly arrived immigrants. After discussing the rationale for integration, this chapter concludes with an identification of the anticipated products of successful integration (and therein evaluative elements of successful integration policies).

An important distinction must be maintained between integration as a concept and integration as applied through policy. As a nebulous idea, the purpose and intent of integration is not always neatly or uniformly expressed through policy products. Different nations have different approaches towards the same end of goal of social cohesion and are subsequently met with various levels of success. This dissertation addresses both the concept of integration and how it is made manifest in the Netherlands and Belgium at the national and local levels. It also observes how long-term residents react to different integration strategies. This more abstract strategy avoids some of the pitfalls commonly associated with measuring laws as written or
inferring the status of integration from various elements of related citizenship or naturalization policies (Michalowski and van Oers, 2012).

Chapter Three begins an in-depth exploration of different integration strategies divorced from policy implementation. Debates over the direction of integration policy revolve primarily around normative claims, as there are many ways to achieve integration’s ultimate goals of managing difference, creating equality and unity, and fostering trust. These different integration strategies are informed by ideologies or systems of ideas attached to normative values. Once the universe of ideas available integration strategies are discussed, this dissertation proposes restructuring the assimilation-multiculturalism dichotomy to produce a continuum, which then can be arranged as a typology. Especially at the mass-level, people frequently think about integration as structured around an artificial dichotomy between the ideologies of multiculturalism and assimilation. This frames the importance of maintaining immigrant culture as a yes-no question. Chapter three lays the theoretical framework for moving away from dichotomous thinking, opening up the option for immigrant cultures to be considered important within certain conditions and constraints. This restructuring increases flexibility in thinking about integration and therefore allows for the consideration of more moderate integration ideologies and policies. These moderate ideologies better reflect empirical findings in social psychology that claim people seek balance when relating to groups. Within these or any normative discussion are also empirical claims about the advantages and usefulness of each ideology.

Chapters Four and Five lend empirical support to the theoretical restructuring proposed in Chapter Three by applying the ideas to actual national policies. This support is provided in both qualitative and quantitative forms, allowing for this exploration to be both context-sensitive and
scientifically rigorous. The dissertation uses the cases of the Netherlands and the Flemish region of Belgium, two regionally proximate governments with similar migrant populations. This situation aids in the construction of a most-similar research design, for despite their similarities, Belgium’s regionalized government creates a system of multiple, sometimes conflicting national and regional identities which can confuse and undermine integration goals. Centralized Netherlands, however, has only one national identity, which helps make the goals of integration clear and uncontested. Furthermore, the Netherlands has a longer history of policy innovation when it comes to integration, whereas Belgium (due to its more complicated identity context) started focusing on integration much later.

In Chapter Four, Belgian, Flemish, and Dutch integration policies are dissected. It begins by laying out current integration policies for these governments, as well as their historical roots. It then examines the integration materials that both governments provide to immigrants before they enter the country. These materials carry messages about how each government views their own policies which can be deciphered through observing their word choices and decisions on emphasis. The messages pulled from the integration materials are further substantiated through interviews with the government officials and contractors involved with the creation of integration examinations. In addition to studying integration policies themselves, this dissertation also includes policies that are related to integration in a larger context. Chapter four concludes by analyzing government programs such as requests for integration funding from the European Union and the nature of government burqa bans are also explored and incorporated into the overall analysis.

Whereas in Chapter Four, I analyze the positions and outreach efforts of governments relative to the newly proposed understanding of integration, in Chapter Five I conduct a similar
type of analysis at the mass survey level. This analysis allows the dissertation to not only speak at the level of policy, but also speculate how changes in existing policy may reflect attitudes among the people at large. To conduct this analysis, I survey self-selected native respondents in the Netherlands and Belgium and gauge their reactions to two randomly selected vignettes out of a pool of four. I hypothesize that responses for those who are shown the new more moderate ideologies of “liberalism as identity” and interculturalism will be more favorable (creating higher levels of identity-based trust and being more desirable to the survey respondent) than the traditional integration ideologies of multiculturalism and assimilation. The study also tests the relationship between vignettes and feelings of ethnic and civic importance, projection, and meaningfulness of national identity.

Results from these two empirical chapters are briefly discussed at their respective conclusions, as well as in greater detail in Chapter Six. Chapter Four and its qualitative study suggest the presence of two different integration policies in Flanders and the Netherlands. Despite their similarities, the government of Flanders has vigorously pursued interculturalist policies, or those that devote great attention on encouraging contact between the native and immigrant population. This strongly contrasts with the Netherlands’s idea-oriented, generalized more-assimilationist approach. Instead of tailoring the integration process, the Dutch opt for a one-size-fits-all, approach. Interestingly, these approaches are also those supported by a majority of respondents in Flanders, suggesting a good symmetry between government policies and the will of the people. While the many hypotheses of Chapter Five are not always completely supported by the data, general trends include overall superior performance for interculturalism, generally poor performance for liberalism as identity, and interculturalism’s persistent group emphasis.
In Chapter Six, I explore venues for further research on this topic. This includes a deeper analysis of liberalism based identities and the inclusion of cosmopolitanism into the new typology of integration ideologies. Strategies to strengthen future quantitative studies are also explored and the policy implications of the paper’s primary findings are detailed.
Chapter 2: Integration and Identities

At the heart of integration is the concept of identity. The London and Madrid Bombings, the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoon controversy, the assassination of Pim Fortuyn and Theo Van Gogh, and the attack at Charlie Hebdo all involved immigration and personal dissatisfaction with the consequences of the lack of congruency between migrant and native cultures. Immigrant alienation is paralleled by suspicion from native citizens. Sniderman et al 2004 and Ivarsflaten 2008 detail that immigration and considerations of national identity are leading factors contributing to exclusionary reactions and far right party membership. Successful integration, by contrast, is accomplished when immigrants are able to find a place in a country’s culture and society that both they and native citizens feel comfortable with.

Beginning with identity, I shall examine the role that national identity plays in the context and substantive content of integration. I first discuss the special characteristics of national identities in particular, as well as the special context in which national identities are considered when discussing integration. I then discuss the complexities of building inclusive national identities and the benefits in terms of trust that successful integration can bring.

Identity as a Component of Integration

As discussed in Putnam 2007, the purpose of integration policy is to create communal identities and a sense of shared citizenship. By identity I refer to “the aspects of an individual’s self-image that derive from the (social) categories to which that person perceives himself as belonging” (Tajfel and Turner 1979). This means that any sort of identity has a number of important characteristics. Identity as a concept is personal. People may choose to opt into or out of identities. This self-categorization is also part of the interaction the person has with the external world. Society is structured into groups driven by the benefits associated with working
together and communal living, and the individual, through self-perception, can opt in or out of said grouping. These personal and communal aspects of identity are not entirely separate phenomenon. Prestige and position conferred through social groupings can enhance one’s self-esteem, and one’s personal identifications can impact behavior, potentially impacting standing within group structures (Deaux, 1993). Implied in the definition is also the fact that identities can be multiple, and can be held at different intensities. For example, a left-handed African American can belong in both social groups, but may only feel that only one of these identities are particularly salient and valuable. It is up to the individual to arrange and prioritize their multiple identities. This arrangement is usually configured in a way that minimizes cognitive dissonance (Roccas and Brewer, 2002). The socially constructed components of identities mean that social groups (including governments) can play important roles in changing the personal identities of individuals.

**Nation Identities as Particular Kinds of Identities**

Successful integration does not focus just on any sort of identities. Rather it concerns itself with a particular type of identity, the national one. Montserrat Guibernau defines national identity as a “collective sentiment” based on shared feelings of belonging and attributes that make a nation distinct from other nations. Such collective sentiments and shared ideas have long been viewed as essential for the existence and success of societies (de Tocqueville, 1835 (1991), Hobsbawm, 1990). These characteristics of national identities are not unlike those of superordinate identities in general. However, as Guibernau continues, there are a few distinctive characteristics of national identities. In particular, the relationship of national identities to territory and the coercive resources of the state makes national identity different and distinct. National identity can therefore be seen as particularly concrete, with its symbols and history tied
to physical things like currency, monuments, and land. National identities also have the capacity
to be enforced by the state’s monopoly on power. National identity is an extremely powerful and
politicized form of superordinate identity, used to create loyalty not only amongst immigrants,
but also among conquered peoples and subnational units.

Perhaps due to the concept’s ambiguity, there have been only a few attempts to
deconstruct national identity into its component parts. Keillor and Hult 1999, drawing from
Herskovits 1948 and Huntington 1996, attempt to break national identity into four universal
components (using the USA, Mexico, Japan, Sweden, and Hong Kong as test-subjects). These
include a nation’s belief structure, heritage, ethnocentrism, and cultural homogeneity. Belief
structure references the nation’s religious orientation and religiosity, heritage constitutes the
country’s historical reference points, ethnocentricity references the importance individuals place
upon the national identity, and homogeneity denotes the number of cultures found within a
country. A strength of this approach is its inclusion of both individual and group components,
reflecting this dual nature of identity. While Keillor and Hult’s five-country analysis lacks a
large number of case subjects, it offers an exceptionally helpful theoretical tool for identifying
and structuring the components of national identity.

There are a number of ways liberal democratic governments have attempted to create
identities so as to emphasize shared values. Here the conception of the nation and national
identity (i.e., the superordinate group) is critically important. Scholars tend to study the content
of national identities using two distinct schools of thought. One way to view national identities is
in terms of “national models” (Bertossi et al 2015, Goodman 2012). Because identities are so
tied to the history and mythology of a people and culture, national models preserve these
elements as essential (though in the process sacrificing comparativeness). Brubaker 1992
identified two different types of nationalisms in his study of Germany and France. Following earlier scholars, he labels these categories “ethnic” and “civic” respectively, as they refer to conceptions of nationhood that revolve around either ethnic origins and histories (and thus often utilizing *jus sanguinis* as the principle means of acquiring citizenship) or civic responsibilities (and thus using the more open *jus soli* system). Greenfeld 1998 builds upon Brubaker’s work by incorporating conceptions of collectivity into Brubaker’s old dichotomy, creating three effective types of citizenship regimes/ideologies: collectivistic-ethnic, collectivistic-civic, and individualistic-civic.

Collectivistic-ethnic countries, claims Greenfeld, are those societies where citizenship is defined primarily as membership within a primordial ethnic community. State membership is exclusive and exists beyond the individual. Its membership is idealized as homogenous and is de-facto distinct from other ethnicities. Germany in the 1990s is often viewed as a typical collectivist-ethnic state (Weldon 2006). Collectivistic-civic regimes, on the other hand, try to remove ethnicity as a basis for national identification, replacing it with membership in a purely constructed civic identity. Best exemplified by France, the principles for which the state stands, the cultural symbols it uses, and civic duties become the basis for national membership. Lastly, individualistic-civic regimes forego the emphasis of creating similarities altogether. Difference is viewed as a right of the individual and from these differences come strength in the form of varied experience and enriched livelihoods. Strongly multicultural countries like Canada or Australia would be examples of countries with individualistic-civic citizenship regimes.

Greenfeld and Weldon’s works illustrate how conceptions of nation and citizen are connected and demonstrate the importance of ideas in this process. Weldon’s work in particular suggests that the ideas emphasized in determining national membership have some sort of
consequence, therefore integration strategies should as well. However, their conceptualization is not without its weaknesses. In particular, the distinctions between civic and ethnic identities are not always clear and distinct (Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010) and Greenfeld’s models have limited international applicability (Heath, Martin, and Sprecklesen, 2009).

Due to these shortcomings, a secondary school arose involving the consideration of national identities in terms of discourses and ideal policy frames (Scholten, 2011). Rather than seeing national identities and their associated integration policies as unique and monolithic, this discourse-based approach interprets national identities as a series of coherent normative stories that compete with each other and can be switched between over time. Associating a nation with a particular national identity or citizenship practice for too long (like the Dutch with multiculturalism) risks oversimplification and a under emphasis on the agency of policymakers (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2012, Renn and Schon, 1994). The ideal policy frame approach is argued to better account inconsistencies present within a nation, as well as changes that occur over time. It avoids distilling national identities into stereotypes and prevents tautological interpretations of policy. This paper adopts the secondary approach, viewing multiculturalism, assimilation, and so forth as competing, discrete interpretations that can be theoretically divorced from any one particular country and applied internationally.

Integration and its Base in Identities

Europe’s evolving challenge of integrating its immigrant population must begin with national identities, as they are the foundations of the subsequent social clashes. But where national identities represent the raw material of the problem, “integration” as a concept is a process of incorporating identities. As discussed above, integration involves the creation of
superordinate, often national, identities. But there is more than just identity creation involved in this process.

Integration is a nebulous concept that can be applied to many different levels of analyses and phenomena. Although discussing integration of an entirely different sort, the literature on the integration of nation states into the European Union can provide a structural framework for considering the integration of migrants into European nation states. Tariq Modood frames the problem of integration as one on how to properly handle the differences between people. Using Ben Rosamond’s analysis of European integration, we can structure this discussion about difference as a contrast between integration as a process and integration as an outcome (Rosamond, 2000). We can see this distinction in conceptions of integration at the micro-level. Is the offset and successful management of difference something that can be permanently accomplished, or is constant action needed to “maintain” a level of integration?

Ernest Haas speaks to the “outcome” school of thought by defining integration in terms of shifting the loyalties of disparate political actors towards a new center (Haas, 1968). Integration ideologies differ widely in defining what this center may be, with options including the nation, tolerance, speaking a language, etc. Tilly 1997 discusses citizenship (and by extension, integration) as a one-time “contract,” where a person trades the acquisition of status in exchange for taking on duties and obligations. Adrian Favell elaborates upon and further applies this concept, referring to integration as the “glue” that holds society together (Favell, 2001). The goal, or outcome, is unity and togetherness. Such a togetherness necessitates not only a superordinate identity, but also a degree of significance and meaningfulness.

However, the “process” school of thought is also compelling, presented as the creation and maintenance of patterns of interaction among previously autonomous units (Wallace, 1990).
Under this conception, integration ideologies are seen as contestations over what that pattern of interaction might entail. Modood 2013 offers a compelling defense of defining integration as the equality of opportunity. He stresses that integration should be seen as a solution to racism, xenophobia, and other forms of discrimination and unfair treatment. He further notes that this equality must be deep and complete, extending into “subjective and symbolic” dimensions. The disadvantaged group must also be seen as equals in society and perceived as such by the advantaged/standard group. Integration can be seen as a correction of an imbalance that needs to be applied and sustained.

The purpose of one ideology associated with integration, multiculturalism, is neatly packaged into a familiar phrase for most Americans, *E Pluribus Unum*, or in English “Out of Many, One.” In fact, many governments have mottos that emphasize unity and togetherness. Like the concept of identity which underlies it, integration in either understanding can happen at both the individual and societal levels. Individuals can adopt traits to unify them with the overall population, or be subjected to processes that correct inequalities. This thesis, however, focuses on integration at the “macro-symbolic level” (as discussed by Modood 2013). Integration at this level concerns how (especially minority) groups are treated and their relationship to society at large. How differences are conceptualized at this level inform if they are viewed as something to be cherished or eliminated, and if they are viewed as static or persistent.

The goal of creating unity among peoples (“turning the many into one”) has been well studied by social psychologists. Building on Tajfel and Turner 1979’s social identity theory, Gaertner and Dovidio 2000 propose their Common In-Group Identity Model (CIIM) as an optimal solution to bringing disparate groups together. They propose that the key to unifying

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1 Examples include the motto of the EU, “United in Diversity”, Belgium “Unity gives Strength”, etc.
distinct groups of people is to create common in-group identities. Gartner and Dovidio note in their research that intergroup bias is rooted more in favoritism towards one’s own group than in antagonism towards an exterior one. Therefore, they argue, the key to reducing intergroup bias is to create superordinate groups through recategorizing dominant group identities into more inclusive forms (essentially, turning “us” and “them” into “we”). Research has demonstrated that strength of especially exclusive social identities have significant effects on how individuals feel and respond to immigration related policy (Breznau and Danielson 2014, Ackerman and Freitag 2015).

There are, however, challenges associated with this task. These new in-group identities must be constructed with the utmost care. Indeed, Dovidio et al 2009 noted that a frequent critique of the common in-group identity theory is that these new, more inclusive in-groups are difficult to maintain. Here they reference Marilynn Brewer’s Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (hereafter ODT) for explanation (1991). Brewer argued that people have competing desires for belonging and distinctiveness, and truly durable groups reflect this fact. If the identity upon which a group is based is defined either too broadly or too narrowly, it will not be desirable or important to its members. An identity that is overly homogenizing will not allow for the differentiation members require, harming individuality and personal agency. However, an identity that is too inclusive will not provide the sense of belonging people crave, marginalizing and ultimately rendering the identity irrelevant. The best identities are therefore those that balance these two competing imperatives.

Figure one illustrates Brewer’s conception in a different fashion. As inclusion increases, the need for being part of a group (here referenced as “assimilation”), decreases. The group incorporates more individuals, which widens its identity to incorporate more individuals in a
more complete manner. However, as the group identity widens, the salience of its identity decreases. Salience here refers to the “relative importance of the group boundary” (Breznau, 2014). The identity means less because more differences are included in the group, which makes the identity less capable of satisfying human needs for differentiation. The optimal identity is therefore at the point where the sum of these needs can be maximized, which would be some middle level of inclusion. This research suggests that national identities, as identities, will observe similar behavior.

Dovidio et al 2009 note that if Brewer’s conception is correct, the creation of inclusive in-groups will always create backlash through their inability to satisfy their member’s needs for differentiation. Dovidio argues, however, that even if Brewer is correct, there is still some usefulness in constructing in-group identities, as even the effects of dissolved in-groups can increase the success of future attempts (Gaertner et al, 1988). Rather than see the optimal distinctiveness theory as running contrary to the Common In-Group Identity Model, the ODT can provide a guide to creating more successful inclusive in-group identities. The amount of inclusion within the common in-group can be adjusted according to Brewer’s recommendations to achieve the benefits observed by Gaertner and Dovidio without sacrificing in-group stability.

**Identity Hierarchies Present in Integration**

Considering national identities in the context of integration, another layer of analysis is the power dynamic between a privileged in-group (native citizens) and a disadvantaged out-group (immigrants). When there is a power differential between two groups, the resulting larger, or superordinate, group (all citizens) cannot too closely resemble the identity of the original in-group, lest the out-group see their fusion into the in-group as a hostile attempt at subjugation.
Worse still, such actions could spawn discrimination towards the out-group and overall intergroup hostility (Branscombe and Wann, 1994).

However, as the in-group has the power to create the new superordinate identity, they have an incentive to project whatever they consider to be their own identity onto the superordinate one. Such projection would increase the appeal of the superordinate identity to the in-group, as well as reduce any cognitive dissonance for in-group members (as both native born citizens and immigrants stand to benefit in being considered prototypical or “ideal” citizens). Wenzel et al. 2007 calls this phenomenon the “In-group Projection Model” (IPM). Avoiding the consequences of the IPM for migrant integration is particularly difficult. National identities, as they exist, are frequently supported by deep histories and the social and symbolic machinery of the nation state. However a national identity is defined, it is done so subjectively (Schinkel, 2013). Even defining national identities in more inclusive terms (such as “modernity” or “individualism”) requires certain subjective criterion used to measure and conceptualize these ideas. National majorities usually have no incentive to refrain from projecting their own cultural identities on any attempt to create a superordinate identity.

Sacrificing characteristics of national identities is a very demanding process, and minority groups like immigrants usually do not possess the leverage needed to persuade native citizens to undertake this task. Social psychology has yet to identify a solution for overcoming this in-group projection problem. The IPM illustrates the importance of national identities appealing to all groups involved in the integration process, especially (but certainly not exclusively) the needs of the native citizen. The theory also echoes the need for balance between inclusion and exclusion called for in Brewer 1991. Balancing the needs of the native population with those of the immigrant can be seen as an extension of this balance.
The Role of Trust in Integration

One might wonder why the in-group would seek to create superordinate identities (or integrate) at all, instead choosing to enforce assimilation into its own in-group identity. Drawing again from the social psychology literature, it seems that the true value of a superordinate (national) identity comes primarily from the threat-neutralizing ability it has on out-group members. National identities provide a path for potentially “subversive” immigrants to homogenize into the national culture. If members of an out-group share some characteristics with the in-group, they may also share some preferences, and can therefore be better trusted to act as loyal agents of the in-group. This desired increase in trust is particularly important to remember, as it is the primary purpose of integration policy-making (i.e., to allow for more harmonious relations between new and native citizens).

It is therefore important to understand how trust is studied in the literature and what sort of trust integration policies seek to maximize. Scholars have conceptualized three types of trust frequently used in social interaction. There are particularized trust (trust shown towards people one personally knows), generalized trust (trust bestowed upon strangers), and identity-based trust (trust shown among people who share identities). Particularized trust is critically dependent upon past experiences, preferably repeated ones. It is from these experiences that actors can come to reasonably expect reciprocity, honesty, and fulfillment of promises (Berggren and Jordahl, 2005).

Generalized trust, however, is more closely associated with a person’s environment and upbringing. Culture and religion can instill a greater willingness to trust strangers, as can interactions with collective bodies of people, such as government and elements of civil society (Hardin, 2002). Additionally, levels of particularized trust can influence levels of generalized
trust. This phenomenon, known as the “transitivity of trust” comes from repeatedly trusting people who are known (particularized trust). This can create a habit of trust that can increase a person’s willingness to trust a stranger as well (Putnam 1995). This habit is a change of basic presumptions when interacting with people, namely that they are trustworthy instead of untrustworthy.

Identity-based trust is separate from both types of trust discussed above and is the most important type of trust for integration. Identity-based trust refers to the trustworthiness of one group of people relative to another. First formulated by Tajfel 1974 and elaborated upon by Tajfel and Turner 1979, the concept was meant to bridge a gap in the trust literature between generalized and particularized trust. Identity-based trust is neither constrained to specific individuals, as particularized trust is, nor is it bestowed upon people that are undifferentiated strangers, as generalized trust is. Rather, this type of trust refers to how people interact with groups and group identities. Identities shared between people (be it class, race, religion, etc.) can create a basis from which bonds of trust can be formed that are stronger than those found just between strangers. Psychologically, people are inclined to bestow positive attributes upon members of groups to which they themselves belong (Brewer, 1996). Additionally, group identities can serve as a simplifying heuristic that can operate in information-poor environments (Stolle 2002). Because two people share group identities, it is presumed that they also share some preferences, and therefore can be trusted more. Also, a history of trust would not be necessary because a violation of trust based upon a shared identity once bestowed is often considered particularly loathsome. It would be an offense not only to the person betrayed, but to group norms as well (Stolle, 2002). Group censure is used as a strong tool to discourage violations of identity based trust (also noted in Fearon and Laitin, 1996).
Lewicki and Bunker, in Kramer and Tyler 1996, elaborate further on identity based trust from the perspective of labor and management. Identity-based trust (in this case referring to employee loyalty to their firm), can be strong or weak, depending on how strongly the group identity is developed. They discuss four ways in which this group identity can be made salient, drawn from Shapiro et al. 1992. They include 1.) the development of collective identity through the use of symbols, names, songs, titles, etc., 2.) a collocation in the same building, neighborhood, country, etc., 3.) the creation of joint products or goals, and 4.) commitment to commonly shared values. Shapiro’s recommendations directly apply to how states can increase the importance of national identity. Some of these recommendations, like collocation, happen automatically, but others, like committing to commonly shared values, are more difficult. This commitment to shared values is particularly important in developing salient and trust-inducing identities, as it ensures actors within a group evaluate situations in the same way as other group members do.

By understanding the styles and components of trust, the success or failure of different integration approaches can be determined. While trust creation may not be the only metric for determining integration success, it provides needed contextualization for the endeavor of group building. Furthermore, the notion of identity based trust allows us to understand some of the components of identity salience and appeal (as they are the building blocks for the trust identities provide).

**Conclusion**

Integration is a complicated process that involves overcoming both inequality and the power dynamic that is associated with it. The construction of effective superordinate national identities can be one way to further these goals at the macro-symbolic level. It involves not only
negotiating the religion and history of a country, but also the expectations, rights, and norms expected by the native citizens. When constructed properly, national identities will be attractive to immigrants, increasing trust and social cohesion in society. But when these superordinate identities are constructed in ways that are coercive or exclusive, national identities can lead to further prejudice and xenophobia. Immigrants may reject superordinate identities if the in-group projects too heavily. Conversely, if the need for differentiation is not met in a particular identity, native citizens may reject superordinate identities and form far right parties to contest the more inclusive national identity. The content of national identities ultimately varies by country, but one aspect we can study comparatively is Keillor and Hult’s “ethnocentrism” component, or how citizens and governments approach their own heritage. While many simplify this component in terms of “high” and “low”, there are a variety of different understandings about the macro-symbolic nature of societies that can make a significant difference for the success of creating equality through integration.

These principles offer scholars a guide to better understand and evaluate integration policies. By using social psychological principles, previously abstract and normative concepts can be organized and evaluated. Integration in particular is usually considered as a dichotomy, pitting multicultural against assimilatory ideas. Using the principles discussed in this chapter, the strength of this conceptualization can be evaluated. The Optimal Distinctiveness Theory and In-group Projection Model emphasize the importance of moderate solutions when it comes to creating common in-group identities. Both the degree of inclusion present in the identity and the favoritism shown towards native citizens must be balanced to achieve greatest durability. National identities are particular forms of identities, and therefore should follow the logic of these theories. As such, these theories suggest that a reconceptualization of integration is needed.
Rather than categorizing a complex phenomenon like integration into the two camps of assimilation and multiculturalism, the Optimal Distinctiveness Theory and In-group Projection Model suggest that a continuum might be most useful in creating situations where a maximal amount of trust is created through maximally durable in-groups.
Chapter 3: Deconstructing the Assimilationist-Multiculturalist Dichotomy

Integration is commonly framed as a choice between multiculturalism (individualistic-civic) and assimilation (collectivist-civic), which are together seen as the two primary modes of acculturating or changing cultures (Berry 1974, Sam and Berry, 2010). This happens because these two categorizations follow from answering the normative “yes-no” question on the value on maintaining immigrant cultural heritage. Answering “yes” entails multiculturalism and answering “no” entails assimilation. While it is tempting to simplify the world into these “black and white” categories, I argue that integration is far too complex of a concept to do this effectively. Even setting aside differences in national histories and cultures, popular decisions about the value of immigrant ethnicity should incorporate the “shades of gray” often found in the real world.

I propose a reframed understanding of integration that relies on a fluid continuum, creating a more flexible understanding that should be more useful for the purposes of policy-making. This theoretical argument is supported through a critical exploration of the existing dichotomy, as well as advocating for the inclusion of new integration ideologies. Furthermore, I support my arguments through pair of surveys, sampling undergraduates at the University of Illinois Urbana Champaign. The results suggest that the people recognize the distinctiveness of different styles of integration beyond assimilation and multiculturalism. They also demonstrate that respondents think about ordering integration strategies in the manner hypothesized by this study.

By integration ideologies, I reference the sociopolitical and philosophical recommendations to establish and/or sustain the social component of a particular national
identity. These ideologies, also known as “ideal-typical” frames, are comprised of four components (Scholten, 2011). These include establishing a name and classifying groups as native or foreign, cultural or religious, economic or refugee. These integration strategies must also tell a story about how these groups interact and explain phenomenon such as violence, social disharmony, or racism. Furthermore, the story must also contain a normative component. The story describes not only what is, but what ought to be. These stories occur within particular countries, and so political elites can exercise some leverage in creating policies that intersect with these stories. Policy creation and revision can occur after a “frame shift” or “frame reflection” (Rein and Schon, 1994). These usually follow external perturbations that spur reflection about the consistency and coherence of story relative to observations about the world and the appropriateness of the solution that the frames offer. In the European case, frame shifts about immigrant integration in particular can occur when far right parties get seats in the government of center-right coalitions (Akkerman, 2012). They also can be brought about by consultative commissions called by the government, although there is some risk that these commissions themselves become politicized, weakening their overall impact (Scheider and Scholten, 2015). Because these ideologies concern constructed components of national identities, and because the nation speaks from a position of privilege regarding what its national identity should be, these frame shifts situate nations in different positions relative to the ideal-typical frame.

**Traditional Integration Ideologies: Multiculturalism**

I begin this discussion about integration ideologies with well-known frames, and then work outwards towards new and more exotic ones. Multiculturalism is a difficult term to define, for while its basic qualities are easy to comprehend, there is no shortage of variant definitions,
depending on the country and philosophical starting point (Sijl, 2010). Beginning with two general definitions, Modood 2013 discusses multiculturalism most broadly as “being true to one’s nature or heritage and seeking with others of the same kind public recognition of one’s collectivity.” Modood rightfully notes that in Europe, multiculturalism tends to take a different meaning that, although not divorced from the larger meaning, tends to be somewhat narrower in nature. He notes this “narrow conception” of integration involves the recognition of group difference in the public sphere, including related to laws, policies, citizenship, and national identities.

To further complicate matters, multiculturalism is frequently conceptually bifurcated into the multiculturalism of countries that have historically accepted mass-immigration like the United States and Canada, and those where mass-immigration is a new phenomenon, like countries found in Europe. This functionally translates into the “new world” countries having stronger federal states with more experience negotiating difference and protecting minorities (Brewin, 1997). Will Kymlicka defines these countries as those who legally admit immigrants as residents and future citizens, as opposed to guest workers or refugees (Kymlicka, 2007). These countries have transitioned over time towards migrant-oriented multiculturalism. Kymlicka defines the important tenets of “immigrant multiculturalism” to include all or some of the following: a legal affirmation of multiculturalism, the adoption of multiculturalism in school curricula, “the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing”, ethnic exemptions from dress codes, dual citizenship, funding of ethnic organizations, and bilingual education, and an adoption of affirmative action for immigrant groups. Kymlicka is quick to note that these characteristics are *most common* ones and are
therefore likely to be controversial as a comprehensive definition of what multiculturalism entails in the policy sphere.

In the same book, Kymlicka later tries to narrow multiculturalism down to its essential elements, but the effort still leaves much to be desired. He mentions that multiculturalism is firstly “highly group differentiated”, targeting different minority groups with different minority rights. Multiculturalism also entails not just recognition, but the redistribution of power and resources from dominant towards non-dominant sociopolitical groups. Lastly, he notes that multiculturalism should not be considered anathema to nationalism (or assimilation). Rather, he asserts that multiculturalism serves as a moderating force to nationalism, pushing the national-building process down paths that are “less likely to marginalize or stigmatize minorities.” This third point is particularly contested. It also takes a holistic view of the national-identity creating process, refusing to sever multiculturalism from nationalism as a separate entity. The strongest point in favor of this interpretation, as Kymlicka rightly notes, is that there exists no modern state that does not engage in some nation-building exercise. Even the most multicultural societies enforce the national language, fund museums, promote national imagery and symbols, and so forth.

In later pieces, Kymlicka adds considerable nuance to this viewpoint. He makes the distinction between the commonly held interpretation of multiculturalism and multiculturalism as he himself understands it. Kymlicka argues that most people consider multiculturalism as synonymous with cultural celebration. He calls this “3S” multiculturalism, borrowing from Brown 2001. The 3S stands for “saris, samosas, and steel drums”, a critique of the superficiality and distance that this conceptualization of multiculturalism fosters.
Kymlicka, however, views multiculturalism as new model of democratic citizenship (Kymlicka 2012). Here he defines multiculturalism as “constructing new civic and political relations to overcome the deeply entrenched inequalities that have persisted after the abolition of formal discrimination.” Echoing his prior work, he argues that this kind of multiculturalism is concerned with political and economic inequalities, obliges both migrant and native to uphold the values of human rights and civil liberties, and spurs interaction between native and migrant populations. Multiculturalism, according to Kymlicka, is thus a rejection of the idea that there is only one way to be a citizen of a country. Rather, it should best be seen as a “filter”, a way to bring plural conceptions of citizenship into line with liberal democratic principles. As state sponsored discrimination faded away in industrialized societies, affirmative action policies have stepped in to further dismantle the remaining power hierarchies.

Considering the current events in Europe, and explaining the “retreat from multiculturalism” present there, Kymlicka offers five factors that can foster or undermine multiculturalism in various countries. Not surprisingly, many of them apply quite strongly to the European countries, like the Netherlands, that are experiencing difficulties with multiculturalism. These factors include whether immigration has security connotations, whether the immigrant group is seen as a.) economically contributing to society and b.) invested in human rights, whether countries have control over their borders, and how diverse the immigrant group is. These are all important conditions for perceptions of risk, and as Kymlicka rightfully notes, this creates a difficult situation for multiculturalism. It is easy to adopt generous policies towards immigrants when the consequences are minor, and similarly easy to use harsh policies when a danger is near. However, Kymlicka argues that policy makers and voters must fight against these
easy urges, as assimilationist immigration policies further antagonize immigrants at the time that they need understanding the most.

Kymlicka’s elaborations on multiculturalism are clearly well thought out, blending political philosophy with empirical argumentation. However, the distinction between 3S multiculturalism and Kymlicka’s own “multiculturalism as citizenization” (hereafter, MaC) is problematic. Like Kymlicka’s own critique of Miller 1995’s idea of “radical multiculturalism”, “multiculturalism as citizenization” seems to lack applicability to how people think about multiculturalism. Kymlicka convincingly shows that MaC corresponds most closely with real world policies through his reference to the scores compiled in Banting and Kymlicka’s “Multiculturalism Policy Index” database (2010). However, he admits that the 3S understanding of multiculturalism dominates the literature critical of the concept (Kymlicka 2012). While this does not rule out the possibility of mass misunderstanding, there is something that drives the 3S vision and makes it convincing.

Kymlicka tackles this point head on, attributing the prevalence of this vision to three sources, namely poisonous rhetoric and the rise of more exclusive and coercive civic integration policies. Kymlicka’s discussion of integration policies will be explored at greater length in the next section. However, his attempt to dismiss the 3S approach as rhetoric is unconvincing. While Banting and Kymlicka’s construction and use of their index is to be admired for its vision and comparative purposes, its coding is subjective. The indexes and decisions are informed by academic, political, and secondary sources, but there are no rules governing the inclusion of sources and the justification of scoring. The rules that the index uses are clearly elaborated and empirically backed, but at its core, the findings remain dependent on the flexible interpretations
of the reviewer or guidelines given by the index itself\textsuperscript{2,3}. This, coupled with the index’s coarse granularity (10-20 years), limits its usefulness, especially when responding to other, more interpretive, narratives.

Furthermore, his multiculturalism as citizenization runs into troubling philosophical problems. If multiculturalism does not embrace complete cultural relativism, then an internal tension develops within the concept. Inherently, this understanding of multiculturalism seems to erect social hierarchies, placing the liberal above the illiberal and mandating the illiberal to conform to the liberal and/or postmodern. While not racial or ethnic in character, these ideas have historical roots that tie them to certain cultures, peoples, and places. This is clearly seen in the case of Islamic immigration, which draws from entirely different cultures and rationalizations. For example, the wearing of the veil may be seen as oppressive to the Westerner, yet to the Muslim, it may be a statement of modesty (and in some more modern interpretations, a rejection of materialism). Kymlicka tries to rescue multiculturalism from cultural relativism by noting that even the most multicultural Western countries do not exempt immigrants from standards prohibiting forced marriages or cliterodectomies. But does this originate from multiculturalism itself, or from aspects of assimilation that were not “filtered out” through the multicultural discourse?

\textsuperscript{2} This is not surprising, considering the subject matter involved.

\textsuperscript{3} For example, one measure involves the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction. One point is given if the country funds bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction either for children or adults, a half point is granted if this is done in some provinces, states or areas, but not offered as a general rule, and no points are given if the country does not fund bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction. This rule has a number of ambiguities. For example, a country funding bilingual education for adults would be scored the same as one giving mother-tongue instruction for both (which indicates a much higher degree of commitment to multiculturalism). How many “some” is for a half point will either be arbitrary or suffer a similar problem of coding a country with 99% of the localities participating as the same as one where only one percent of the localities do so. Regarding the rule for no points, the rule leaves little flexibility for third parties offering these services and their varied relationships to the state.
It is not clear how Kymlicka’s “multiculturalism as citizenization” avoids the problem of creating hierarchies and delegitimizing cultures. By insisting on Western “human rights” values, this interpretation of multiculturalism ultimately loses its distinctness from assimilation. It is still assimilating immigrants to national ideals, however thinly defined. To characterize human rights as a universal ignores its Western origins and perspective. This tension about how value-laden multiculturalism should be further explored in future literature.

**Traditional Integration Ideologies: Assimilation**

The literature on classic assimilation is not very large, as it is considered a default form of integration inherent in the nation-state system. Multiculturalism is usually presented as a unique deviation from traditional assimilation policies (as in Kymlicka 2007). The Westphalian system of nation-states implies that the land of a particular state be occupied and ruled by a particular nation of people. This nation is privileged and uses the state to “express its nationhood” (ibid). Integration policies are intended to be coercive tools meant to transform those who are not “nationals” into those who are. Those who do not wish to conform to national characteristics are not seen as welcome within the nation state, a “love it or leave it” ideological approach.

Within the assimilation literature, there is some debate about how robust assimilation needs to be. Alba and Nee 2003 introduce one approach, defining assimilation as “the decline of ethnic distinction and its corollary cultural and social differences”. They are quick to note that this doesn’t mean the complete abolition of ethnicity, only its decline in salience and relevance when used in relation to others. Assimilation is not ethnic; it works against the notion that national membership is a closed system translated through ancestry. Rather, the other elements
of ethnicity such as the shared culture, language, religion, and history are considered most important. These characteristics, while unique and people-specific, can be adopted by anyone. This understanding of assimilation does not veer far from Greenfeld’s “collectivist-civic” nationalism as opposed to her “collectivist-ethnic” one. Instead of becoming like native citizens, this conception of assimilation focuses on the seeking new ethnicity-neutral ways to relate between individuals.

Writing within the acculturation literature, Berry 1997 takes a more robust approach, defining assimilation as an active rejection of one’s own culture and its importance. Berry notes that instead, those wishing to assimilate seek “daily interaction with other cultures.” He argues that the end goal of assimilation should be to make those integrating “like those in the dominant society.” While ethnicity obviously cannot be imparted into immigrants, this understanding advocates a maximization of shared characteristics as opposed to simply preferring native cultures over non-native ones.

Kymlicka does a great service by discussing civic integration policies, as this provides a way to properly contextualize assimilatory policies and their relationship to multicultural ones. Seeing multiculturalism as an offshoot of liberalism, he deems illiberal (and therefore incompatible with multiculturalism) civic integration policies that are coercive or involve closed conceptions of national identity. If multicultural policies are about disassembling hierarchies, then these sorts of assimilatory civic integration policies maintain and enhance them. Kymlicka also asserts that assimilation tends to be more duty-based, insisting that immigrants fulfill certain tasks or requirements before they are admitted into their host society as full members. This is contrasted to the more multicultural account of integration as a “right to integrate” or join
society. This approach is accompanied by a variety of tools used to help the immigrant in doing so.

**The Interculturalist Alternative**

From ascendant far right parties to migrant ghettoization, there are signs that the multiculturalism-assimilation dichotomy forces policymakers into picking between two suboptimal situations. The dominant way of categorizing integration ideologies as multicultural or assimilatory excludes a number of novel alternatives that should be considered. While there is plenty of debate over the relative merits of multiculturalism and assimilation, there is much less about the alternatives to these two. What literature does exist is primarily normative or specialized to particular subfields such as education.

One of the alternative integration ideologies is known as “interculturalism”. According to Berry 1997, this approach first arose in the French literature as an alternative conceptualization for assimilation. Clanet 1990 defined *interculturation* as “the set of processes by which individuals and groups interact when they identify themselves as culturally distinct.” We can see from this definition an emphasis on interaction and an assumption that group identities are real and distinct. Berry adds to this discussion that interculturation focuses more on the creation of new cultures as opposed to the maintenance of a dominant one. These dueling priorities accurately reflect interculturalism’s nuanced position. It acknowledges that individuals belong to distinct, non-hierarchical cultures, yet at the same time seeks to create completely new cultures that bring people together. Interculturalism later took the first steps towards policies in the field of cross-cultural education (Booth 2003).

Interculturalism began to take shape as a viable policy alternative after the findings of the 2008 Bouchard-Taylor report in Quebec. The authors begin by noting that it has been long
observed that Quebec’s approach to integration has historically sought to balance the ideas of unity and ethnic recognition (Gagnon, 2000). This balance was never specifically defined as “interculturalism”, but functioned as a principle in the political background. They then discuss the need for the existence of a “minimum of cohesion” in Quebec. Such a minimum is necessary for the establishment of a cultural solidarity and for mobilization in times of emergencies. These things are particularly important in Quebec, where its French-speaking majority is already a minority within Canada. The report sought to determine the bounds of reasonable accommodation multiculturalism must allow foreigners and migrants. Within this report, Bouchard and Taylor discuss moderating Canada’s robust multicultural policies, and name their new set of recommendations “interculturalism”.

In the resulting scholarship, four common themes have emerged that attempt to define interculturalism, mirroring some of the initial components discussed by Clanet and Berry. Outlined by Meer and Modood 2011, these are:

1.) increasing “communication” and interaction between majority and minority groups (such as arranged contacts and exchanges, debates, initiatives and joint projects),
2.) multidirectional dialogue that changes all cultures involved, not just minority ones
3.) a stronger emphasis on unification and the needs of majority cultures
4.) the ability to criticize illiberal culture and escape cultural relativism

Watt 2006 adds to this discussion by noting that multiculturalism as commonly adopted fosters only a superficial understanding of difference, not promoting enough interaction between groups and wrongfully assuming that the state is a neutral broker within the assimilation process.
He discusses further how Ireland (observing Canadian recommendations) is developing integration policies that create interaction between groups, rather than passively presuming it will occur.

It is important to note that Bouchard and Taylor did not wish to abandon ethnically sensitive policies in general (especially since Quebec benefits from such policies). They argue that ethnic groups serve an important transition role for newly arrived immigrants. These beacons of familiarity can bridge transitions, providing the recognizable and familiar in an unfamiliar land (eg: Duc Do, 2006). Bouchard and Taylor argue that the increased emphasis on interaction overcomes any social fragmentation created by these groups.

Outside of Canada, an example of interculturalism in Europe can be seen in the positions of the outspoken mayor of Rotterdam, Ahmed Aboutaleb. Born in Morocco, Mr. Aboutaleb has been widely advocating what he calls a “we-society”, a social situation founded on tolerance and acceptance which emphasizes cooperation between peoples (Aboutaleb, 2015a). In his CNN interview, Aboutaleb recognized the presence and value of diversity, speaking particularly about Rotterdam, the most ethnically diverse city in the Netherlands. With this fact in mind, though, he emphasizes that this diversity underlines the necessity of the rule of law. No culture can be given preferential treatment in light of so many living together. Only principles that build community and togetherness can serve as stable grounds to unite a community.

Aboutaleb, taking an unusually strict stance for a member of the Dutch labor party, continues by saying that if individuals opt out of the community, or threaten it, or “go to Yemen to learn how to use a Kalashnikov”, then those people should no longer be welcomed in the “we-society” (ibid.). In a separate piece, he notes that people in the “we-society” have responsibilities to the Dutch constitution’s principles of tolerance (Aboutaleb, 2015b). He
advocates for a society where everyone can be what they’d like, so long as they are willing to let others do the same. Even radicals are welcome in the “we-society”, so long as they behave within the limits of the law.

Interculturalism’s primary conceptual weakness lies in its similarities to multiculturalism. Tremblay 2009 begins this discussion, noting the difficulties in distinguishing interculturalism from multiculturalism. He asserts that the former shares a number of qualities with the latter, including most importantly an emphasis on diversity and non-hierarchical nature. Sticking closely to the content of the Bouchard-Taylor report, Tremblay notes how that its interactivity-intensive recommendations align with recommendations for dialogue and community frequently mentioned by leading multicultural authors such as Kymlicka. Meer and Modood 2011 build upon this argument that interculturalism is not intellectually distinct from multiculturalism. They argue that each of the four common themes they use to describe interculturalism is foundational to multiculturalism.

This problem of distinctiveness ultimately stems from the ambiguous definition of multiculturalism. Tremblay, Meer, and Modood use Kymlicka’s understanding of multiculturalism as citizenization, which is more assimilatory in nature than 3S multiculturalism. However, as discussed in the prior section on multiculturalism, there are some philosophical problems with “multiculturalism as citizenization” that may serve to reinforce hierarchies and delegitimize cultures. Meer and Modood’s critique of interculturalism is critically dependent upon the legitimacy of Kymlicka’s version of multiculturalism, which attempts to claim some of interculturalism’s advantages as its own.

In light of this tension between cultural relativism and multiculturalism, I will argue that interculturalism can be distinguished from multiculturalism by its insistence on increasing
intergroup unity and escaping cultural relativism. 3S multiculturalism will be used here due to its consistency for hierarchy dissolution and cultural respect. Interculturalism will be treated as a quasi-assimilationist ideology that upholds certain universal principles beyond multiculturalism’s necessary tolerance for diversity. For the purpose of this study, this universal principle will be a strict necessity for cooperation and dialogue between groups. Despite this principle, interculturalism remains closely tied to multiculturalism in its formation of a superordinate (national) identity enriched by diversity. If multiculturalism is commonly referred to as the “salad bowl,” interculturalism would be best considered as a burrito, a variety of mixing ingredients surrounded and encapsulated by minimal robust values and principles whose sole purpose is to keep the ingredients mixed together.

**Liberalism as Identity as Another Option**

Related to this discussion of interculturalism is another neglected assimilation ideology this paper will identify as “liberalism as identity” (LAI) (Joppke 2008). Like interculturalism, LAI rejects the multicultural frame by prioritizing shared universal principles. However, LAI infuses these principles with more meaning, giving them a stronger role in the integration process. Liberalism as identity emphasizing that the universality of classical liberalism and liberal values grants them a superiority that allows liberalism morally trump any aspect of diversity which runs counter to them. Whereas interculturalism requires only enough universal principles to ensure dialogue and engagement, LAI prioritizes all of the ideals associated with the liberal ideology, including controversial elements like the primacy of reason over superstition. Whereas interculturalism allows for the majority culture to change as a result of cultural mixing, LAI holds changes in liberal tenets as out of bounds.
Joppke 2008, drawing from Gray 2000, discusses how liberalism, from its conception, has had two competing sides, one stressing tolerance (also known as modus vivendi or simply vivendi liberalism) and the other stressing an ideal way of life via human autonomy and use of reason (also known as Republicanism, drawing from its French heritage). In his earlier 2007 piece, Joppke also refers to these competing sides of liberalism as “Rawlsian Liberalism” and “Foucauldian Liberalism” respectively. He ties the coercive side of liberalism that LAI embodies to Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” or the building of ties between government and modes of thought (Foucault 1982, Lemke 2002). While Goodman rightfully notes that these bridges between governed and government are present in all forms of coercive integration policies, path dependency can lead even the most innocent and liberal of beginnings to coercive destinations (Goodman 2012).

Joppke points to European history to justify the existence of the liberalism as identity, discussing tension between religious and scientific powers during the Age of Enlightenment. He further argues that each of these sides, “liberalism as tolerance” and “liberalism as identity” respectively, periodically grow stronger than their counterpart, with liberalism as identity dominating Europe’s colonial era and liberalism as tolerance dominating the era after the Second World War. Joppke 2008 further argues that with the debate over Muslim migrants in Europe, liberalism as identity is enjoying a return to prominence, though without its former imperialist trappings. We can see calls for this very type of “muscular liberalism” in the statements of Prime Minster Cameron, President Sarkozy, and Chancellor Merkel in 2011. Joppke was not alone in tying these facts to contemporary politics. Habermas also acknowledges the competing faces of liberalism in his reflections on secularism’s relationship with Islam in western society (Habermas...
et al, 2008). Like Joppke, he ultimately calls for dialogue and balance between these two faces of liberalism.

In both pieces, Joppke regards Liberalism as Identity with an abundance of caution. Its assertion of detailed universal and superior values carries with it the threat of fanaticism and intolerance. LAI divides the world into liberals and illiberals, commanding the later to conform to the wishes of the former. However, many scholars do not view this development as unexpected. Talcott Parsons discussed the trend towards “value generalization” that follows in the wake of globalization (1971). Similarly, this kind of aggressive liberalism is suggested by German political philosopher Carl Schmitt. An ardent realist, Schmitt defined politics as the process of creating friends and enemies. Liberalism, he critiqued, has difficulty doing this, which constitutes arrogance and a weakness. He therefore suggests a type of liberalism later called “Schmittian Liberalism” that is able to take forceful measures to defend itself against those seeking to do it harm (Schmitt, 1996). This type of liberalism is not unlike Joppke’s “liberalism as identity”, advocating (in times of crisis) illiberal means to promote liberal ends (Triadafilopoulos, 2011).

It is these sorts of contradictions present in LAI that make it so peculiar. It is at once universal enough to be open to everyone, yet particular enough to form a salient, even compelling, identity. Nothing formally bars the illiberal from embracing such a national identity outside of that individual’s own conviction or belief. And the very same principle that works to protect that individual’s belief also firmly denounces it. Likewise, it protects liberalism through the use of illiberal means. In countries such as the Netherlands (whose popular far right party, the Party for Freedom, seems to be embracing an ideology that is very close to LAI), the answer to the tension between freedom and tolerance tends to favor tolerance. A society that favors
liberalism as identity will prioritize open, tolerant, and respectful behavior even if these ideas are elastic. As Schinkle 2013 notes, even tolerance and openness to modernity can be used to exclude individuals that fall outside of their arbitrary definitions.

Liberalism as Identity represents a peculiar form of universal, yet strongly collectivist, identity. Joppke 2013, arguing that liberalism can be considered as an identity, notes a similarity shared with Nazism and Communism. Like liberalism, the ideas of communism and socialism have been considered particularly powerful identities, despite all three having universalizing tendencies. It is this universality of values, transcending the nation state, which distinguishes liberalism as identity from collectivistic-civic/assimilationist regimes. Some collectivist-civic regimes claim to protect the same universal ideals that LAI does, such as freedom, justice, equality, etc. However, these claims are filtered through the nation-state. The nation-state becomes the provider of these values, and they take on certain national characteristics as a result. LAI flips this relationship between values and nation in favor of values. A citizen who believes in LAI would consider him or herself first a liberal, and second a Dutchman/Frenchman/Englishman, instead of the inverse. Liberty and freedoms are not products or privileges of the state, but rather are channeled and protected by them.

Towards a New Integration Typology

We see in the political philosophy literature a ferocious debate which tends to revolve around the competing integration ideologies of assimilation and multiculturalism. On a theoretical level, scholars led by Will Kymlicka (2001) have argued that the neutrality of assimilationist regimes is a sham. They point to the persistence of an exclusive culture and ethnicity in such states, and decry the lack of tolerance the emphasis on collectivity creates.
While the identity may be open to all in theory, by privileging one nation of people, it creates a hierarchy that continuously oppresses those who fall into the lower levels.

Other scholars, such as Barry 2001 and especially Joppke 2004 point to the failure of multiculturalism to create cohesion within the nation state and its normative inconsistency in combating discrimination with reverse discrimination. Furthermore, it is argued that multiculturalism discourages the mixing of people by emphasizing their unique contributions. Additionally, multiculturalism has been accused of privileging power structures within the immigrant group, as they are given guardianship of their group’s cultural significance. Of the very few empirical pieces that attempt to moderate this debate, Weldon 2006 stands out with his findings that more civic and individualistic regimes create better levels of social and political tolerance than more ethnic and collectivistic regimes.

As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the multiculturalism-assimilation dichotomy stems from framing the value of maintaining ethnic culture as a yes-no question. However, conceptualizing this question in such a manner excludes a number of potential responses that reside between “yes” and “no”. Immigrant cultural heritage can be valued, but within certain boundaries or attached to certain caveats. There can be other sources of allegiance outside of the “the nation” for assimilation, and either tolerance or “human rights” for multiculturalism. By abandoning the yes-no dichotomy, this study will open up new ways of thinking about the integration of migrants.

In reframing integration, it is useful to have a theoretical frame as guidance. Due to its focus on identities in general, social identity theory can be useful here. It both illuminates problems present in the multiculturalism-assimilation dichotomy and suggests solutions. Remembering Brewer’s Optimal Distinctiveness Theory, it seems that the identity associated
with multiculturalism fails to provide the distinctiveness required for continuous and meaningful social cohesion (as argued by Fukuyama 2006, Joppke 2004, and Huntington 2004). However, more assimilationist conceptions of nationhood run into problems with Wenzel’s In-group Projection Model. In its naked coercion, assimilation is seen as unappealing by out-groups in democratic societies. Particularly when facing onerous requirements for citizenship and rigid conceptions of national identity, the incentive for the creation of ethnic enclaves and parallel societies increases.

As Gaertner and Dovidio argue, the most salient and attractive identities are found where the human needs for differentiation and assimilation are maximized. If the assimilationist / collectivistic-civic mindset is too homogenizing (low differentiation) and the multicultural / individualistic-civic mindset is too open (low assimilation), then the Optimal Distinctiveness Theory suggests that the most durable, meaningful national identities will be found in between these ideal poles. I argue here that integration should be seen as a continuum, informed by the Optimal Distinctiveness Theory, with assimilation and multiculturalism as its poles. In between then, we can find better preforming integration policies, such as “liberalism as identity” and “interculturalism”. If the social psychological analyses of Brewer 1991 and Gaertner and Dovidio 2000 are correct, the identities in this middle ground should foster more identity-based trust in the respondents and should seem more attractive than the current universe of normative ideologies.

Figure Two represents the universe of assimilation possibilities according to a continuous understanding of integration. Their locations are not exact, relative to the overall scale. The inverted-u represents the theoretical overall effectiveness of these integration policies, drawing from Optimal Distinctiveness Theory. This effectiveness is drawn as a logical consequence from
the Optimal Distinctiveness Theory and the Common In-Group Identity Model. If the most effective identities are those that balance inclusion and distinctiveness, this should also hold for the national identities that guide the integration process. The best theoretical policy would be one that closest approaches the maximum, located half-way between assimilation and multiculturalism.

The ordering of the ideologies is theoretically driven. I utilize Koopman et. al’s conception of differential rights based on group membership as my x-axis. Assimilatory regimes such as France stand on one end of the scale, representing strong state loyalties that emphasize a robust understanding of civic requirements and a prioritization of the importance of the nation and national culture. Keeping with Koopman’s terminology, I call this viewpoint “cultural monism.” On the other end of the continuum, I place more multicultural regimes such as Canada and Australia, representing the full breadth of the individualistic-civic vision on protecting cultures and disassembling the hierarchies established by overly harsh national identities and civic integration measures. This viewpoint will be referred to as “cultural pluralism.” In between these poles, I place liberalism as identity and interculturalism in the middle ground. The Y axis plots the overall effectiveness of policies in a particular society. The parabolic line reflects the need for balancing assimilation and differentiation as per the Optimal Distinctiveness Theory. The curve represents the total amount of need satisfaction in a society, maximized at the intersection/optimum point (see Figure 1 for reference). At each extreme, there will be individuals that are satisfied with assimilation and multiculturalism, however, additional social happiness is gained when policies move towards the center. It is important to note that figure one theorizes identity characteristics at the individual level, while figure two attempts to model them at the social level.
The placement of the ideologies between the poles is justified according to the amount of meaning attached to an overarching national identity. Because every country is different, the points here are ideal strategies, able to be plotted on a single dimension due to their shared quality of carrying meaning and content. Assimilationist regimes carry the most content, emphasizing the importance of civic traditions, symbols of nationalism, and other historic and cultural elements associated with the state. Moving slowly down the continuum from most to least content, liberalism as identity only emphasizes transnational values such as democracy, liberalism, and an importance of reason. Next then would be interculturalism, which emphasizes only the importance of cooperation and working together. This has even less normative content than LAI, as cooperation can happen between any two people that seek to do so. Lastly is multiculturalism, whose emphasis on tolerance asks for even less from its participants. Whereas interculturalism asks its participants to engage actively, multiculturalism asks only passive tolerance.

This again assumes 3S multiculturalism, as Kymlicka’s “multiculturalism as citizenization” would require more beliefs attached to the importance human rights. According to my continuum, Kymlicka’s multiculturalism would fall near LAI. Like LAI, multiculturalism as citizenization comes with ideological values, namely those of human rights. Unlike LAI, however, Kymlicka advocates for minimal coercion, similar to 3S multiculturalism. The tension between these two priorities illustrates another difficulty associated with the concept of multiculturalism as citizenization.

Integration ideologies are complicated and multifaceted. While the continuum in figure two captured only one aspect of their arrangement, this expanded reconceptualization of integration can account for additional relationships between ideologies that a coarser dichotomy
may overlook. The typology presented in table one is one such way to account for these differences. This typology uses a number of unconventional metrics for thinking about integration. The “focused” measures on the columns refer to where allegiances are constructed. Inward focused ideologies (the traditional pair) expect that immigrants make changes inside themselves (either internally adopting a national culture for assimilation or tolerance for multiculturalism). Inward focused integration focuses on changing how immigrants think. Outward focused ideologies expect immigrants to be responsive to the practical needs of a collective (either by cooperating for interculturalism or behaving as liberals for LAI). While it is true that liberalism is also a set of internally-oriented ideas, the content of the ideas are outward in nature. Unlike assimilation, it does not contain enough internal content to be a traditional sort of identity. This references its universal characteristics. And unlike multiculturalism, liberalism as identity requires certain active behaviors such as voting and respecting the equality of all people. Tolerance only requires an internal decision not to act. A multiculturalist would respect a sect’s worship, even if they themselves find it abhorrent, whereas a liberal would actively defend that sect’s right to worship freely. Liberalism is classified as outward focused because it demands action above and beyond the passivity of multiculturalism.

The distinction between the row columns is much simpler. The direction of the integration policy measures who the policy affects and where burdens are being placed. This measure roughly approximates coerciveness. One-way integration policies expect immigrants to conform to be integrated into a society. Illiberal natives or those natives who do not culturally identify with the nation are exempt and not targeted by the government. Two-way integration, however, expects both natives and the immigrants to change and meet at a middle point. Both

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4 It is worth noting that here, “multiculturalism as citizenization” could also fit into the typology.
cooperation and tolerance are not something that only immigrants must do. Both interculturalism and multiculturalism require adherence to their respective ideologies, regardless of whether you are a native or a migrant.

This alternative conception does not replace the continuum presented earlier in the section. In fact, it can be neatly overlaid onto it. Figure three visualizes this claim. Because sidedness, coerciveness, and homogenization tend to be conceptually linked, the integration ideologies explored in this paper can remain in their positions on the continuum.

The new formulation allows scholars to talk about unconventional forms of assimilation that have since been discussed at the margins of the field and have not been formally integrated into integration scholarship. These concepts (particularly interculturalism) have all been raised as either solutions to the dilemma of integration, or curious consequences of the process of grappling with integration policy-making. By moving closer to the middle, these new superordinate identities strike a better balance between homogenization and differentiation, which would allow for feelings of shared preferences and loyalties to be constructed in less coercive manners. This would help lower feelings of threat. Migrants may be seen as acting differently in public, or adhering to a different values, but at least they would be “playing for the same team” as the native population, remaining loyal to their national identity (and thus the in-group as well).

**Prior Models of Integration**

Exceptionally few studies have explored the macrosymbolic dimensions of integration. Modood 2013 stands alone as a structured exploration of different modes of integration. Modood also abandons the multicultural-assimilation dichotomy, favoring four modes of integration
arranged along a dimension of openness or permissiveness. Keeping with common understandings, at the extremes of Modood’s integration scale are assimilation and multiculturalism. These are understood primarily in the same way as this paper, with assimilation seeking to promote conformity to a national standard and multiculturalism celebrating difference. One exception is that Modood uses Kymlicka’s understanding of “multiculturalism as citizenization,” therefore presuming a universal acceptance of liberal democratic norms.

Between them, Modood sets a pair of ideologies named “individualist-integration” and “cosmopolitanism”. These do not neatly fall along the hypothesized scale of this thesis, and therefore deserve attention. Modood notes that only assimilation is a one-way “mode” of integration, meaning that liberalism as identity is not included. In its place (meaning that it is placed closest to assimilation) is “individualist-integration.” Where LAI prioritizes liberalism and interculturalism stresses cooperation, individualist-integration focuses on the individual. This is a logical conceptual middle-ground between LAI and interculturalism, as individualism is both an important tenant in liberalism and a required prerequisite for interculturalism’s requirement of cooperation. Individualist-integration is best understood as a blend between these two conceptual markers.

Closer to multiculturalism is the idea of cosmopolitanism. This idea has a much longer intellectual history, first recognized as a changing form of identity brought about from globalization and modernization (Waldron, 1991). Cosmopolitanism as an integration strategy recognizes difference, but not groups. This puts it somewhere past multiculturalism, as all group associations are discouraged. Interculturalism, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism are all diversity-friendly modes of integration, but increase in demandingness relative to the dominant culture. Interculturalism stresses only cooperation, building bridges between the majority and
minority cultures, but not dismantling either of them. The hierarchy between the two is present but not coercive. Multiculturalism maintains the groups as entities, recognizing the role that groups play here and formally acknowledging them in government and society. Multiculturalists argue that difference is robust and requires group acknowledgement and structure to best protect minority interests. Cosmopolitanism goes one step further and attempts to dismantle the idea of majority culture entirely, emphasizing instead a global citizenship and a global culture. All people are human beings, and therefore share certain realities associated with this fact. Modood places cosmopolitanism between assimilation and multiculturalism because cosmopolitanism is less free in its permitted associations than multiculturalism, despite cosmopolitanism asking more of both groups. Cosmopolitanism is less permissive, but more evenly two-way directional.

It is clear that Modood’s two additional integration pathways are distinct concepts that can be plotted onto this thesis’ hypothesized scale. However, they will not be included into the following chapters for a number of reasons. Individualist-integration is partially captured by liberalism as identity. While LAI is more coercive in that it calls for all elements of liberalism, many of liberalisms tenants, including items like democracy, rest on an implicit valuation of individualism. LAI can be argued as a more “applied” version of individualist-integration, and perhaps even capturing Joppke’s conceptualization of “liberalism as tolerance”. Because the difference is so fine, and because LAI as Schmittian Liberalism gets more attention by far right groups, individualist-integration shall be left aside.

As for cosmopolitanism, its inclusion would negate the premise of the study. While non-group difference can serve as a viable principle for the orientation of human social living,

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5 In addition to the conceptual reasons outlined in the main text, adding two more integration strategies would require considerably more respondents to properly test this thesis’ hypotheses. Their exclusion was therefore as much theoretically driven as it was practical.
cosmopolitanism’s call for the dissolution of national identities seems both practically impossible and runs counter to thesis’s purpose of exploring different bases for national identities. By calling for the dissolution of the dominant national identity, cosmopolitanism cannot be studied as a proper integration option. It would require too much absolute change from the majority group and would never be admitted as a viable alternative while the nation-state system remains intact.

**Conceptual Boundaries between Integration Strategies**

The section so far offers theoretical justifications for reframing of integration with the four conceptual markers of assimilation, liberalism as identity, interculturalism and multiculturalism. To support this conceptualization, I supplement this discussion with an empirical analysis of how people actually think about these ideologies. This is important step to make sure that the posited ideologies could actually exist as distinct and discrete entities in the real world. Prior studies suggest that national identities exist as “discrete entities on multidimensional scales”, and so there is reason to believe that integration ideologies should function in a similar manner (Breznau and Danielson, 2014). For this purpose, I use the results of my quantitative study (Chapter 5), where vignettes are used to package the ideologies into generally accessible terms accessible\(^6\). The sample here is drawn from 902 native Belgian and Dutch citizens\(^7\).

If the vignettes offer conceptually distinct ideologies, we should expect responses for each one to have a low probability of being answered in the same way. Stated differently, we

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\(^6\) Table 6 and Appendices E and G discuss in great detail the wording and decision-choices involved with the creation of these vignettes.

\(^7\) Further information about the nature of the sample can be found in Appendix D.
should expect that exposure to the vignette had an impact on answers in a statistically meaningful way, making them unlikely to be samples of a larger shared population. I use two-tailed Welch’s t-tests to test the probability that the results from different vignettes were drawn from the same two underlying populations. These results were gathered from a sample corrected for ordering effects. The results for each question, in each country, for each ideological dyad are presented in table two.

The results show is that for almost every possible vignette-pair, at least one question differs in a statistically significant way. For example, according to these results, there is only a one percent chance that the set of answers given by those who got the assimilation and “liberalism as identity” vignettes for question three (the importance of ethnic culture) are actually from the same type of group of respondents. Because almost every dyad has at least one area where the responses are significantly different, this suggests that the ideologies themselves are distinct. They may not be very distinct (example: interculturalism and multiculturalism), but they are distinct all the same.

The only exception to this is the distinction between assimilation and liberalism as identity in the Netherlands, which were apparently evaluated in the same way. This is a curious result considering that the vignettes did indeed differ in the content variable of the vignette. This suggests that in the Netherlands teaching “history and language” and teaching “liberal values” are interpreted in non-distinct ways (an interesting commentary on their cultural thought!). This, intersects, interestingly, with Duyvendak and Scholten’s argument that the Dutch have had experiences with both of these models, separately (Duyvendak and Scholten 2010). This finding may suggest that their distinction between these two phases of Dutch integration policies are not

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8 See Chapter 5 for a further discussion of this.
very distinct. As this pairing in Belgium does show some significant difference, this finding is not enough by itself to suggest that LAI and assimilation are theoretically non-distinct concepts. However, in future studies, their distinction should be carefully monitored.

The results from this study have the ability to adjudicate the blurry line between interculturalism and multiculturalism present in Meer and Modood 2011. While the answers are statistically indistinguishable in both countries for most questions, we see that being shown the interculturalism or multiculturalism vignette does have an effect in evaluations regarding the importance of the individual versus the group (question four). This speaks the core of the theoretical distinction between the two (passivity versus activity) and lends credence to the idea that they are distinct concepts. This claim is further strengthened by the construction of the vignette, which skirts Meer, Modood, and Kymlicka’s potential critique over what multiculturalism entails. While the vignette was constructed with 3S multiculturalism in mind, the multiculturalism specific elements of non-coercion, tolerance, and involvement of the native populations do not explicitly conflict with multiculturalism as citizenization.

**Conceptual Ordering of Integration Strategies**

The prior section concluded that all four ideologies can be understood as conceptually distinct from each other. However, it said nothing regarding their relationship relative to each other. In order to confirm these relationships, a specialized survey was distributed to 279 American undergraduate students voluntarily participating in the Political Science subject pool at the University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign during the spring 2014 semester. It asked
respondents to rank four randomly ordered integration philosophies, presented as hypothetical vignettes.\footnote{The wording of both the vignettes and the question can be found in the appendix.}

If the vignettes are properly constructed to reflect a continuum of permissiveness/openness, then if presented the opportunity to rank the full selection of the vignettes from best to worst, I hypothesize that respondents will order their ranking accordingly: Assimilation, Liberalism as Identity, Interculturalism, and Multiculturalism. This would reflect an overall preference for more closed identities. This ordering would also be valid in reverse if the respondent favors more open policies.

The total number of possible combinations for arranging the four vignettes is four factorial or 24. If the vignettes do not reflect a changing degree of openness, we should expect to see each combination happen with a 1/24 chance (random), and the pair of typology-conforming combinations with a 1/12 chance. As table three shows, we see typologically conforming combinations occur at nearly twice the expected rate, leading to a healthy chi-squared of 53.44 and a p-value of less than 0.001.

These results demonstrate that the construction of the vignettes used here and in the rest of my dissertation can be interpreted to align with the hypothesized continuum. Combined with the finding that each of these vignettes are distinct, this means that respondents both see the vignettes as distinct from each other and recognize the intended continuum-based logic behind them. Most importantly, the results validate my rationale for arranging the new ideologies of liberalism as identity and interculturalism in the manner proposed. These claims are strengthened by the fact that the ALIM-MILA pair – in other words, responses that ordered the vignettes
according to the continuum I have proposed- is the only statistically significant pair of responses present.

Widening our lens to look at the characteristics of the non-hypothesis conforming combinations, a number of interesting observations can emerge. These findings are outlined in table four. We notice, for example, that the ideologies of assimilation and liberalism as identity, as well as the ideologies of interculturalism and multiculturalism are together (ie: paired) for four out of the five of these combinations. This further supports the proposed continuum, and suggests that the directionality of integration may be a more important signal than where the identity’s focus is located. Additionally, throughout the results, the pairs of assimilation/interculturalism and LAI/multiculturalism are less often together than they should be if their relationship was random. If the relationship was random, two-thirds of all possible combinations would contain the pairs of assimilation/interculturalism or LAI/multiculturalism, yet only 57% of the respondents gave at least one of these combinations. This result is statistically significant with a chi-squared value of 10.9 and a p value of 0.001. It further supports the logic of the alternative typology, as assimilation-interculturalism and “liberalism as identity”-multiculturalism are in categories furthest removed from each other. By pairing these ideologies less frequently, the respondents recognize this fact.

Conclusion

Together, these discussions and studies give support to a reconceptualization of integration and integration policy-making. Limiting our understanding of integration to assimilation and multiculturalism artificially obscures a host of creative but less orthodox methods of unifying disparate people. By exploring the ideologies, we see that they can be arranged according to permissiveness/openness, with liberalism-as-identity and interculturalism
in between. I also propose a typology to order the various characteristics of these ideologies, arranging them according to the scope and nature of the identities they promote. These theoretical claims are supported by empirical research, done both in Europe and the United States. By revising our prior held notions about integration in ways that correspond with how people conceptualize groups, more effective policies can be explored and implemented.
Chapter 4: Differing Elite Strategies Promoting Integration

It is always the responsibility of governments to craft effective policies. Yet integration presents a special challenge due to the sheer complexity associated with creating social cohesion. In providing integration services, governments need to be able to communicate expectations about the very complicated processes associated with national culture and the opinions of native citizens. Failure to do so risks creating unrealistic expectations that breed resentment and alienation. Due to the complexity of the task and the high risk of failure, it becomes very important to research the nature and intent of government policy, regardless of their consequences.

It is extremely difficult to accomplish an analysis of integration policies without a detailed and holistic treatment of the national situation, including histories, cultures, implementation strategies, and policy content. Even institutional characteristics may influence the propensity for one type of integration policy versus another (Manatschal and Bernauer, 2015). Using measures drawn from current integration databases like the MIPEX and CIVIX (Goodman, 2010) requires adopting significant amounts of coder interpretation. Furthermore, these databases often measure a wide variety of theoretically incompatible factors that make constructing new variables difficult. As Michalowski and van Oers 2012 comment, it is exceedingly difficult to do theoretically cohesive integration policy analysis solely on the basis of integration policy-content. The symbolic and normative nature inherent in integration policy significantly complicate any theoretically grounded statistical analysis of integration.

To accommodate this, my research includes a multifaceted qualitative analysis of integration policies in Belgium and the Netherlands, including interviews with government officials responsible for various parts of the integration process and textual analyses of
integration resources available to newly arrived immigrants. My research finds that despite their shared histories and characteristics, Flanders and the Netherlands pursue very different policies. These differing philosophies are made evident not only through their programs, but are also seen in the words they use and the goals they pursue.

After changes in the mid-2000s, we see the Dutch pursuing an assimilatory strategy, placing the heavy burden of assimilation squarely on the migrant through tests, fees, and an overall emphasis on the importance of “self-integration.” In neighboring Flanders, integration policy uses an interculturalist approach that engages the immigrant through offering free courses, a personalized integration plan, and the emphasis on communal living. Immigrants into the Netherlands are expected to have very high degrees of knowledge and competency upon entry into the country. While in Flanders, immigrant competency is viewed as something to be developed over time. High expectations upon entry can be viewed as another type of cultural expectation. The Netherlands expects immigrants to assimilate into these standards, whereas the Flemish authorities work together with the immigrant to build up to the skill of autonomy. This is another example of their interculturalist approach, holding standards but approaching them communally.

**Historical Context of Dutch and Flemish Integration Policies**

**Belgium and Flanders**

Before analyzing the integration policies, it is important to discuss how Belgium and the Netherlands arrived at their current policies. In Belgium, immigration and integration policies is formally split between the federal and regional levels. The federal state maintains competence with regards to the intake and monitoring of migrants, as it alone has the capacity to police the
national borders (Doomernik and Jandl, 2008). However, the bifurcated federation leaves integration in the hands of the regions. While French Wallonia has adopted a very relaxed/multicultural policy towards immigration, Dutch Flanders has attempted to go down a more restrictive route, prompted by demands to define itself in ethnic terms so as to underscore its claims for greater regional autonomy. However, because integration policy is not enforced at the national level, the regions have a difficult time enforcing integration requirements. They can predicate integration for regional benefits, but the migrant can always chose to forgo such benefits, relying instead on federal benefits or moving to regions like Wallonia where requirements are more relaxed (MIPEX, 2011).

Additionally, due to the variation between the Belgian regions, it is unique in that the hypothetical integration-reluctant migrant has a choice as what sorts of pressures he or she has to face in daily life. As stated above, Flanders has the most restrictive immigration and integration policies. Perhaps not surprisingly, it also has the smallest percentage of migrants as a portion of its population (~5%). Wallonia and Brussels are entirely different in that respect. Because immigrants in French-speaking Belgium are courted heavily by the Socialist Party, they have an incentive to keep their integration laws minimal. In the 2009 regional elections in Brussels, at least a third of the Socialist Parties 21 elected seats are held by Muslims. The French speaking Socialist Party (SP) also managed to shepherd an amnesty bill through the Belgian congress in 2009 for approximately 25,000 migrants. This powerful and immigrant-friendly party benefits from the 10% population of immigrants in Wallonia and the enormous 28% immigrant population in Brussels. The three regions provide a wide variety of choices for the newly arrived migrant: a more assimilationist Flanders, a rural migrant-friendly Wallonia, or an urban strongly multicultural Brussels. Belgium’s German speaking community does not figure strongly into my
quantitative analysis because Muslim migrants usually settle in heavily urban areas like Antwerp, Brussels, and Charleroi. They will be included, however, in my qualitative analysis.

Belgium’s federal system complicated the formation of formal integration policies at the national and regional level. With reform of the federal government’s capacities in 1980, Belgian regions gained the authority to make integration policies. In the beginning, they modeled their policies after the old Dutch multicultural system (Verlot 2001). The goal was to make a policy that was “multicultural with an intercultural exchange” (Loobuyck and Jacobs, 2006). Here interculturalism is meant in its literal sense, referencing movement between cultures and not the Quebecois-inspired integration system discussed above.

In the 1980s, Flemish integration policy began with attention to cultural and social aspects. In the 1990s, however, this changed with the “Strategic Plan for Ethnocultural Minorities” adopted in 1996. This policy redefined integration in a more welcoming direction by stressing the importance of full social participation of the immigrant, in addition to government responsibilities towards meeting their basic needs. In 2004, the government adopted its latest “grand vision” integration policy, “Living Together in Diversity”. This policy established the basic foundations of Flemish integration as it currently exists, establishing integration classes, personalized integration trajectories, and providing language training. This policy was designed to be implemented and monitored into 2010, which it successfully did. Currently the Flemish government is in the process of considering new integration policies. In July 2013, the government released a one year plan outlining its intentions and observations on the “Living Together in Diversity” status quo. While a majority of the proposed actions in the report are relatively minor developments of existing programs, one notable change is an increased expectation of Dutch proficiency, from level A1 in the Common European Framework of
Reference for Languages towards the higher A2 level. This represents a jump from a beginners towards an elementary knowledge of the language (Bourgeois, 2013). While language itself is fairly value-neutral from an integration perspective, its purpose as a conduit for communication (as opposed, for example, to a less-practical integration requirement such as a knowledge of state holidays) supports an emphasis on interculturalism.

The Netherlands

The history of Dutch integration policies is a bit more dynamic than the Flemish instance. Scholten 2011b frames Dutch integration policy into four distinct periods, ordering which this paper will also utilize. It is important to remember that much of what followed after the Minorities Policy of the early 1980s represented a critique of the multicultural model it established and more importantly, its lasting legacy and legend (van Reekum and Duyvendak, 2012). This persistent retreat from multiculturalism is mirrored in the Netherlands’ longitudinal Migration Policy Index scores\textsuperscript{10}.

Like many European countries, throughout the 1970s, the government was still under the impression that the immigrants would return home (Dukes and Mosterd, 2012). Because of this, there was not a set integration policy in place despite the fact that the issue was gaining salience. Countering a string of train hijackings by disgruntled Moluccan immigrants, a second stage of Dutch integration policy began with the debate and eventual passage of the 1983 Minorities Bill, one of the most multicultural integration policies ever adopted. While their familiar “pillarization” policy was fading from mainstream Dutch politics, Dutch policy makers felt that

\textsuperscript{10} The Netherlands MPI scores are 2.5, 5.5, and 2, corresponding with the measurement years of 1980, 2000, and 2010. 1980 was before the Minorities Bill of 1983, which explains its more nativist leanings. Belgium exhibits a more steady progression towards multiculturalism during this period, moving from 1 to 3 to 5.5.
it could apply for their integration policy (Joppke 2004). In practice, this meant officially recognized, funded, semi-autonomous communities of immigrants (Nagel and Hopkins, 2010). This bill was enforced for approximately seven years, and granted minority groups explicit recognition for the purpose of receiving government aid to help develop their communities.

This policy began to change in the early 1990s, as the Dutch shifted focus from promoting different cultures towards a more mainstream reduction of racism and discrimination. The next major Dutch shift was preceded by the release of a highly critical report by the Scientific Council for Government and Policy in 1989. The report pointed out a number of perceived flaws in the 1983 legislation and urged Dutch politicians to strongly encourage minorities to participate in Dutch society rather than preserve their own ethnic identities. Everyone was equal in their identities, and the report argued that it was not the government’s business to get into policies and the politics of identity (ibid.). This report was so controversial that it prompted the also established “Advisory Committee on Minorities Policy” to issue a fierce counter-report. They claimed the Scientific Council’s report was not properly conducted, and was political in nature (Duyvendak and Scholten, 2009). Additionally, controversial comments by respected politician Fritz Bolkestein in 1991 about the suitability of Islam in the integration process moved this discussion into the public sphere (Penninx et al. 2005). It was around this time that migrant integration began to become politicized in the Dutch media, a trend that would persist throughout the 2000s (Scholten, 2012).

In 1994, the Dutch adopted their new Integration Policy, representing a step backwards from the Minority Policy and the beginning of the third stage of Dutch integration policy according to Scholten 2011b. The definition of integration in this act clearly illustrates Dutch backpedaling from their history of multiculturalism, defining integration as “a process leading to
the full and equal participation of individuals and groups in society, for which mutual respect for
identity is seen as a necessary condition” (Contourennota 1994 in Entzinger 2003, Vasta 2007).
Here we see the old definition of mutual respect for identity being reduced to a stipulation for
another goal, the participation of individuals and groups in society. This policy introduced
integration and language classes, and is the one modeled by the Flemish government. The
Integration Policy also introduced the possibility of fines for those who did not take the classes.
In 1998, the Dutch government passed the Civic Integration of Newcomers Act. This act
strengthened and standardized the programs outlined in the Integration Policy, including new
penalties tied to attendance versus course completion and the addition of an “end exam.”

The events of September 11th, as well as the rise and assassination of both Pim Fortuyn
and Theo Van Gogh propelled Dutch politics even further away from the multicultural
sentiments expressed in the Minorities Bill (Vasta, 2007). In 2004, the Dutch government
changed integration policies even more, beginning the fourth and current stage of Dutch
integration policy. In the New Integration Act, the Dutch dismantled their extensive system of
classes and put the responsibility for integration entirely upon the immigrant. The testing regime
was expanded to include more subjects, and fines were automatically imposed if the migrant
failed to complete the formal integration requirements within five years. These fines are enforced
by the municipality in which the immigrant resides, and vary accordingly. For example, in the
municipality of Amsterdam, the fine is 200 euros, doubling to 400 euros every year after until
integration requirements are fulfilled (City of Amsterdam, 2009). In the municipality of
Eindhoven, the fine is 500 euros every two years, with good conduct and overall financial
hardship taken into account (City of Eindhoven, 2011). And in the municipality of Tilburg, the
fine is 40% of the immigrant’s monthly social assistance stipend, as well as a one-time one
thousand Euro fine if not completed in the time period (City of Tilburg, 2013). In 2011, the integration plan *Integration, Bonds, and Citizenship* strengthened these provisions, increasing the knowledge expected from the migrant, cutting subsidies to Muslim groups and strengthening sanctions for those who fail to meet their integration responsibilities (*Integration, Bonds, and Citizenship*, 2011 and Kern, 2011). This Dutch focus on cultural knowledge and the high barriers they erect for entering citizens looking to integrate supports an assimilationist interpretation. Immigrants are expected to meet the requirements expected of them or face the consequences.

Throughout their history, the Dutch can be seen as an *innovator* with regards to integration support measures. As discussed in Michalowski 2009, the Netherlands is also the only country in Europe that has experimented with a privatized system of migrant integration. It is clear, argues Michalowski, that the Germans emulated the Dutch model in creating their integration laws in 2005, which require that immigrants must be versed in German prior to their arrival in Germany. Likewise France has adopted some elements in its integration policy similar to the Dutch model. While France provides classes from its incoming immigrants free of charge, these classes must be completed abroad and teach not only French, but the ideals of the French Republic. These policy ties to other countries and the evidence of learning across European governments increases the appeal of using the Netherlands as a case study when observing immigration and assimilation. Due to this teaching role, studying the Dutch case is exceptionally important, as it has indirect relevance to other European integration policies.

**Current Policies of the Netherlands and Flanders**

In Flanders, a regional authority, the Agency for Internal Affairs, is responsible for integration across the Flemish provinces. Participation in the Flemish integration program is
mandatory for most foreigners living in Flanders, enforced by a system of fines. The Flemish integration program consists of a number of different obligations, including language education and a “civic integration” course, which will be the primary focus of this study. For these requirements, the people living in the Brussels region are considered exempt\textsuperscript{11}. In order to be considered “integrated,” migrants are required to attend eighty percent of the classes for each part of the program. No examination or testing is required. Classes take place in integration offices, or onthaalbureaus, which are present in each of the five Flemish provinces, as well as the major cities of Ghent, Antwerp, and Brussels. For some, there exists a test-based exemption from the civic integration requirement. Access to this test is reserved primarily for those who have lived in Belgium for some time but have not had the chance to integrate, such as asylum seekers.

In the Netherlands, integration is measured through achieving a passing grade in a series of state-sponsored integration exams. There are no mandatory classes. The first exam is known as the Basic Civic Integration Exam Abroad (BCIEA). As this is the first exam immigrants must take, it is their first exposure to the requirements of the Dutch state. These exams take place at the Dutch embassy in the immigrant’s native country. The second exam is the expanded and more difficult Civic Integration Exam (CIE), which must be passed within three years of arrival or fines would be assessed. Integration offices exist, as in Belgium, but they are different in purpose. DUO, the Education Execution Service, maintains regional offices where the BCI is administered and where services related to the exam are centralized. There are also locality-level integration offices that are more oriented towards helping immigrants take advantage of local

\textsuperscript{11} Brussels is considered exempt because, while the city is located in Flanders, it is technically its own administrative unit. The Flemish government provides integration services there for those people living there that wish to integrate into Flemish culture.
services. Dutch integration offices do not provide integration services in the same way Flemish centers do. They are similar to middle men, facilitating communication as opposed to being a final destination for integration.

The BCIEA is a three part exam that tests knowledge of Dutch society and the ability to speak Dutch. The full list of questions for the knowledge of Dutch society (KNS) portion of the BCIEA is available for those who purchase the “Naar Nederland” packet, and the rest of the language exam involves the ability to speak and read Dutch. Because of the test’s public nature, it is easy (not to mention legal!) to examine the nature of these questions. For this part of the BCIEA, thirty questions are randomly chosen out of a list of 100. Some of these questions are value neutral, such as the five questions about geography (ex: “Which country lies to the south of the Netherlands?”), while others seek to test an understanding of Dutch values (ex: “Is discrimination against homosexuals illegal or permitted?”). Additionally, some questions are very simple, such as a visual question where the respondent is asked to identify the person depicted in a painting of William of Orange, with their other alternative being the current Dutch Queen consort, Maxima. Other questions, however, are quite difficult to those who have not watched Naar Nederland or lack familiarity with the Netherlands (ex: “At what age must children [in the Netherlands] attend school?”12).

The BIC is a five part exam that tests both knowledge of Dutch culture as well as the ability to read, write, speak, and listen to Dutch. The KNS portion of the BIC is randomly chosen from an electronic bank of thousands of carefully crafted questions, all of which are not available to the public. Classes are available through private firms to help immigrants prepare for their examination. The immigration exam is not free, and migrants must cover the cost of their

12 Answer: From age five.
participation (250 Euros in total). DUO offers loans to immigrants for that amount based upon need.

The structure of the Dutch examination can give some insight into what the Dutch government considers to be important. The largest portion of the exam is the “Knowledge of Dutch Society” section (Kennis van Nederlandse Samenleven, or KNS), with 45 questions about living in the Netherlands. The questions in the KNS focus primarily on practical issues like the procedures required to start a business, raise a family, rent an apartment, handle disputes at work, and so forth (Teletoets, 2014). The contents of the KNS are so important that they are subtly written into the other parts of the ICE exam. For example, one part of the writing portion of the Dutch language exam involves immigrants being able to comprehend and properly fill in government forms.

**Research Design for Qualitative Study**

In order to further understand the results of my quantitative study, it is important that a more qualitative study is conducted. Ordinary people understand integration through their preferences and experiences, which are related to a country’s integration policies. Studying a country’s integration policies will also establish the closest thing to “objective” understandings of how a country views its own identity. There have been plenty of studies about the nature of national identities and how individuals relate to them. Far less work has been done on governmental efforts to create and establish national identities. While national identity is a largely abstract and personal concept, it does concretely intersect with government at the level of citizenship and integration policy. In these policies, government agencies set the two important elements of national identity. These include the important elements of my typology: where citizens are expected to place their allegiance and what the requirements of integration will be in
relation to those who already are citizens of a country. They also stipulate other important elements, such as which identities are being used as grounds for entry and how strongly they wish to emphasize these identities.

Country-specific characteristics are extremely difficult to measure empirically, especially when it concerns identity. The closest one can get to an objective understanding of a national identity is by looking at what the governments say they are. As national identity exists on the personal level, the usefulness of this “objective standard” is limited. However, as discussed in Chapter Two, national identity consists of both internal and external components. The integration literature grants this study leverage on the external element, on what immigrants are integrating towards. Additionally, any variation between the “official” policy and the personal interpretations of those who participated in the survey would be important to judge the effectiveness of different integration policies in creating cohesive identities and reflecting the desires of the native population.

I use two different methods to gauge the policies of the government. The first involves interviewing officials who directly oversee integration programs. These people are the ones most familiar with how the laws work and apply to everyday people. The second involves what is communicated through integration packets. These items form some of the first impressions that immigrants have of their host society and government. This study will take a look at the kinds of knowledge governments expect their migrants to know, as expressed either through the content of their integration courses or through questions asked on their exams. It will also compare how these countries spend European Integration Funds, and what this prioritization suggests at the policy level.
In the spring of 2014, I interviewed a variety of officials from the Netherlands and Flanders. In Flanders, this includes an official who oversees the integration program in the province of East Flanders (in which Ghent is included). Another interviewee is an official from the “Agentschap voor Binnenlands Bestuur” or Agency for Local Government. This agency is responsible for the policies that the local official follows, and is also in charge of administering integration exams for the Flemish region for those people that seek exemptions from the Flemish integration course system.

Due to the nature of the Netherlands’ integration system, local officials are not involved in the integration process in the same way they are in Belgium. The Dutch test-oriented system does not offer as many points of entry for the conduct of interviews. The Dutch Education Execution Service, DUO, is involved in the execution of the exam, and primarily does secretarial work. The Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment is responsible for the guidelines governing the integration process in the Netherlands. However, the agency does not grant interviews for academic purposes. Therefore, in order to interview similar types of officials, I chose to interview a representative from the private testing firm, Bureau ICE, which created and currently oversees the Dutch Civic Integration Exam. This service is an important middle link in the Dutch integration process, and provides insight on the processes at the federal and individual levels.

For every interview, English is used as the primary mode of communication. While this may introduce some translation issues, all respondents are highly educated and from cultures where English is widely used. I ask a modified version of the survey I administered in the quantitative portion of my study. Examples of such modified questions would include items such as the logic the government uses in creating its policy (more assimilatory or multicultural), how
strongly ethnicity and shared values correspond to official citizenship, and how the role of
migrant customs fit within the current national identity as seen by the government. These
questions were open-ended, and allowed for the official to say as much or as little as he or she
would like. The second section of the survey involving ideal migration policy preferences would
not be needed in the interviews, as the ideal policy for the government is always the current one
(by virtue of the government theoretically having the power to change it). However, asking the
officials how they would classify their own policy could be insightful. The questions I ask can be
found in the appendix.

While interviews are excellent means to collect information about how institutions
actually function, official government statements are also important. To determine this, it is more
helpful to observe the official documentation provided to immigrants before they arrive in
country. In Belgium and the Netherlands, these come in the form of welcome packets that
contain a variety of helpful items: from elementary Dutch language instruction to advice on what
paperwork will needed to be completed in the next stage of the integration process. For the
purpose of this study, I focus on the documentation provided that offers advice on making the
adjustment to Dutch and Belgian society. For the Netherlands, I use the official packet “Naar
Nederland” (“To the Netherlands”) and the “kennis Nederlandse samenleving” (knowledge of
Dutch society), or KNS, DVD. For Belgium, I use the packet “Migreren Naar Vlaanderen”
(“Migrating to Flanders”) and their booklet on maatschappelijk oriëntatie (social orientation), or
MO.
Findings from Expert Interviews

Flanders

From these interviews, a nuanced and multifaceted picture emerges of the integration system for these two countries. While the two countries may be similar, their integration systems are anything but.

In Belgium, we see an exceptionally welcoming integration system eager to accommodate the needs of those entering their country. Welcome packets are tailored to individual groups. The DVD included in the packet contains integration advice tailored to each migrant group. The Flemish government also prints their integration materials in fifteen different languages, from Dutch to Russian to Sanskrit. Even the integration examinations are offered in languages other than Dutch, in particular English and French. In Flanders, the preferred route towards integration is hands-on and occurs in the classroom. Here a variety of topics are emphasized, including information about welfare, hospitals, unions, and education. This type of practical information focuses less on the characteristics of the country and more on the services to the individual. Immigrants are also encouraged in these courses to ask questions about their integration process and engage with the official understandings of what it means to be Belgian or Flemish.

This approach corresponds with the principal focus of Flemish integration, where immigrants are pushed towards the conceptual goal of “greater autonomy” (see Figure Four). Autonomy as a conceptual end-goal for integration is interesting, as it is both subject and government oriented. Autonomy aims for the immigrants to live more fulfilling and personally satisfying lives. Autonomy is intended to serve the migrant, giving the individual power and pushing them towards parity with the native citizen in terms of agency. At the same time,
autonomy also encourages migrants to rely less (or not at all) on government assistance, though perhaps not at first. It’s also interesting to note that part of the process of becoming individuals with greater autonomy includes steps such as “openness to diversity” and “self-evaluation and regulation.” How these items relate to autonomy is not self-evident, and is likely value-laden.

Integration in Flanders is person-centric. Classes emphasize the needs and empowerment of the individual and the program goes to great lengths to reach out and personalize the integration experience. In addition to its extensive efforts to translating integration materials into the home languages of the immigrant, integration courses are also tailored to the city or province they take place in. These details are meant to help aid immigrants in orienting themselves to their immediate surroundings. Flanders also assigns immigrants to a personal advisor who shepherds them through the process. This includes steering the migrants’ integration process towards their eventual career goal, in either education, professional, or sociocultural fields.

The Flemish plan for integration borrows from a number of integration ideologies. By placing a priority on autonomy, the plan clearly focuses on people. Integration is seen as less about imparting ideals and more about improving individual wellbeing. Furthermore, the level of coercion used by the Flemish integration system is low. The success of the immigrant is seen as critically dependent on the migrant getting what they need. It is no coincidence that the first two steps in figure four involves acquiring insight and expertise, items the state works to supply to the migrant. Integration in Flanders happens in the classroom, where free communication and problem solving can occur and incorporate working together in groups and interacting with others. In this respect, the state seeks to create a good example and first impression. Additionally, “openness to diversity” can be read as a call for a more engaged form of tolerance. The Flemish integration policy critically depends on conceptualizing openness as an active idea.
It involves not only the tolerance to permit actions that one might not agree with, but it also involves some recognition that these actions may be a net-positive for personal or social enhancement.

Furthermore, Flemish authorities seem actively concerned about how to promote more interculturalist thinking. By bringing integration to the most local level possible, they are able to give migrants more tools to interact with their daily realities. Furthermore, an official at the AvBB noted that there was some concern within the agency about how to properly bridge the integration gap. For although the Flemish provide detailed services, there has not been enough success with the program to demonstrate that their methods are superior. A study from the 2006 King Baudouin Foundation found that poverty is considerably higher among immigrants than the native population (Robaeys and Perrin, 2006). 10.16% of native Belgians earned less than 60% of the median income in 2001, compared to 55.5% of Morroccans and 58.9% of Turks. This effect seems to be confined to Muslim immigrants in particular, as only 21.49% of those with Italian heritage were at these lower levels of income.

It is perhaps due to this persistent poverty that we also see an increased willingness of Belgian Muslims to fight for ISIS in Syria (Zelin, 4/2013 and 12/2013). According to a report from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, there are between 76 and 296 Belgian foreign fighters in Syria, representing 27 per one million Belgians. This compares to between 29 and 152 Dutch foreign fighters, or 9 per one million Dutchmen. It is because of this poverty and threat of radicalization that the AvBB are worried about painting a falsely positive picture of their country. While the informal atmosphere of the integration class may be able to expose immigrants to a deeper reality of what living in Flanders is really like,
ultimately some responsibility lies with the ethnic Flemish in accepting and accommodating the migrants.

The importance of activity is present everywhere in the Flemish integration program. In its documentation, the Flemish government refers to integration as “not something you just do inside a classroom.” Integration offices also actively work to bridge the gap between the native and immigrant populations. As local offices, this job is easier to accomplish. Their services include having native volunteers organize outings and work to help immigrants get membership in certain clubs and civic organizations. Additionally, the onthaalbureaus encourage their immigrants to go out and do voluntary work. Affiliated organizations like “Dzjambo” in Ghent hold monthly meetings where native citizens and new comers can meet in a welcoming space to talk, dance, eat, drink and play games. While Dzjambo may be small (286 Facebook followers, roughly 20-30 people per event), it is an active group, holding multiple events per year. Such events include skating, ethnic cooking sessions, trips to museums, and outdoor sports like soccer and kickboxing. Although their impact may be small, the presence of volunteer groups like Dzjambo give immigrants state sanctioned options they may not normally have the chance to enjoy.

The Flemish system also appears to be dynamic and evolving. Flemish officials openly acknowledge their investigations into integration systems in other parts of the world, with the Dutch and Quebecois systems being mentioned in particular. They also are paying attention to the traditional “old countries of immigration”, such as the United States and Australia. In doing so, the Flemish hope to learn why these countries are so much more successful in integrating their immigrants than the countries in Europe. Due to their involvement in the integration process, the Flemish have also been able to gather more data on the functioning of their
integration processes. This includes information at the provincial level about things like language preferences and career trajectory.

The Netherlands

In their insistence on exams, the Dutch philosophy of integration is clearly more top-down in nature. Integration research is spearheaded by “quasi-independent research institutions” like the Netherlands Institute for Social Research and the Scientific Research and Documentation Center (Schinkel, 2013). Their recommendations, along with those of Dutch policymakers, are translated into tangible integration exams, overseen by private test companies (CINOP for the BCIEA and ICE for the CIE at home) that review the quality and relevance of the questions used on the exam every year. Standardization, objectivity, and professionalism are very important to Dutch authorities. The type of personalization found in Belgium consequently falls to the wayside.

Integration has been defined using very exclusive terms. The Netherlands Institute for Social Research has defined integration as “participation... requiring that all immigrant learn the Dutch language and adopt the norms, values, and forms of social conduct prevailing in [the] country” (Netherlands Institute for Social Research, 2006). While measuring Dutch language competency is a more straightforward task, the Netherlands Institute for Social Research recognized that the social aspects of integration are much more difficult to account for. In 2009, they attempted to clarify these aspects by defining them as the degree of intra-ethnic contact, cultural orientation, and religious identification and behavior, which still only questionably clarify these topics (Netherlands Institute for Social Research 2009, Schinkel 2013).

The construction of the tests girding the integration process reflects this care and focus of attention. For this section, we will look more closely at KNS portion of the CIE. The BCIEA is a
relatively easy exam that most people pass. It is the first contact migrants have with Dutch society, but the tougher CIE is the real gatekeeper to full Dutch membership. This is reflected in their pass-rates, with the BCIEA having a pass-rate of about 95%, whereas the CIE has a rate ranging between 75% and 85% (for the first try). Since 2007, the CIE is also a component in the process of acquiring citizenship.

The KNS portion of the CIE conforms to preset “end-terms” decided by the Dutch government in consultation with a variety of expert support groups. The exam borrows from research done by a private consulting firm in Rotterdam in 2005. It outlines eight themes of information that the test is designed to measure. These themes are discussed in some detail, and are used by test prep firms to help educate their customers. The themes are:

- Work and Income
- Manners, Values, and Norms
- Housing
- Health and Healthcare
- History and Geography
- Government Bodies / Institutions
- State government and law
- Teaching and Education

As in Flanders, integration takes into consideration both practical and normative values. However, in forgoing local details, the Dutch exam spends more time on national level characteristics. For example, its history section expects immigrants to be familiar with the history of the Netherlands during the Second World War, including the fact that the United States, Canada, and the UK helped to liberate the country. It also expects knowledge of major holidays (Christmas and Easter included) and tolerance for less important, more religiously themed holidays like Ramadan, Pentecost, etc. Additionally, it expects immigrants to be familiar with the more liberal value-system present in the Netherlands, such as a “respect for forms of
cohabitation other than marriage.” However, an official at ICE hinted that there is continued interest in moving away from more normative and values-oriented questions and towards a greater emphasis on more practical and objective elements of integration.

The Dutch attempt to become pertinent at the daily level by achieving some symmetry between the objectives of the KNS and the objectives of the language-oriented parts of the integration exam. The KNS is in Dutch, and therefore requires some knowledge of the language. Similarly, the parts of the integration exam meant to measure language skills often are about living in the Netherlands and situations that arise while doing so. Such spillovers include things like reading a newspaper article, making an appointment with a doctor, or talking with a police officer. Still, it is not clear that these exercises found in the language exam can properly substitute for the amount of attention a class-oriented integration strategy can provide.

This overlap between the language and cultural parts of the integration exam is purposeful, and is also reflected to some degree in the DVD “Naar Nederland”. Language and culture are seen to be tied together. Culture shapes what words and expressions are used in the language, and the language offers full access and a deeper understanding of the culture. According to an official at ICE, the integration exam should best be seen as a positive element. ICE sees the exam as an educational tool, something used to help people make a very delicate and important transition. With proper guidance and the instruction that an exam can provide, immigrants will be able to live more successful and fulfilling lives in their new country. This viewpoint is infused with a gritty realism. There is a reality out there that is hard and unforgiving, and immigrants need to be able to conform to its dictates. This does not mean that immigrants are unworthy of respect, help, or tolerance. Nor does it mean that they need to
abandon their ethnic cultures. But it does recognize a real concrete Dutch identity that is relatively non-negotiable.

**Textual Analysis of Integration Requirements**

Integration requirements themselves only tell part of the overall story of integration. They communicate the end-goals of the integration process. However, there should also be attention paid to the moment of first contact, and how the government chooses to introduce itself. Here integration documents are helpful. While discussing similar topics in similar areas of the world, the Dutch and Flemish integration documents are quite different. Beginning with composition and nature of the documents, the Dutch welcome packet, “Naar Nederland” costs over one hundred Euros, to be paid by the immigrant. It is a much more extensive resource, both for language and for the KNS DVD. That DVD, for example, has a runtime of just less than two hours. It is also noteworthy that most of the documents, the DVD included, are either in Dutch or with the native language dubbed over Dutch. The Flemish integration packet, “Migreren naar Vlaanderen” is completely different. It is a small packet, provided free of charge, in both Dutch and the native language of the immigrant. In addition to the MO booklet, it also contains an integration DVD. The booklet is only 28 pages long, and the DVD has a run time of just under a half hour.

Turning to the content of the documents, I have counted the frequency of words used in the KNS DVD and the MO brochure: for illustrative purposes, the frequency count is presented in the Word Cloud in Figures Five and Six. The MO DVD was not used because, unlike the brochure, the DVD content does not stay the same among different immigrant groups.

As table five shows, there is a fair amount of overlap between these two documents. Most are unsurprising, like Dutch, the shared language of the countries. Words like work, children,
and school are also unsurprising, as these are important aspects of integrating into a new society. However, there are some important distinctions. For example, the Dutch DVD contains many more severity indicators, stressing the seriousness of integration. Words like “important”, “really,” and “need” are all present in abundance, whereas they play a much smaller role in the Flemish document.

Outside of word frequency, other interesting differences can be seen between the two documents and the messages their governments give through them. The Flemish document, for example, offers a much more welcoming picture to the incoming immigrant. The document, a quarter of the size of the total Dutch KNS DVD, includes information on maternity and geriatric services. While some services like employment agencies are mentioned in “Naar Nederland”, it does not mention these more generous social services. Furthermore, the Flemish document frames integration more in terms of rights than the Dutch document. The MO document mentions rights twice as frequently per page as the Dutch document. It also balances this discussion by discussing the duties of citizens to pay taxes and uphold Belgian social norms. Respect is also mentioned twice as frequently as the Dutch document per page. Respect is characterized as important in creating sustainable living situations.

In contrast to the more positive, equality-enforcing Flemish packet, the Dutch document strikes a considerably more negative tone. While both orientation packets stress difference, even using the same phrase of “culture shock”, the Dutch document stresses this to a stronger degree. It uses words like “different”, “problems”, and “punishable” far more frequently per page than in the Flemish document. The Dutch DVD even takes time to outline the reality that new immigrants may find themselves living in low-income housing. It describes the low quality of these housing complexes, as well as the crime and social problems that frequently happen in
these neighborhoods. Interestingly, this is a message the Dutch government fairly reliably communicates, including to workers from Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe (“Housing EU Migrant Workers”, 2013).

Additionally, because of its length and its place as testable material, the Dutch DVD covers a far wider breadth of knowledge, including history and a very detailed look at the government of the Netherlands. Lastly, the Dutch document is quite individually oriented. It uses a wide-variety of self-oriented words, such as “own,” “yourself,” “independent,” “responsible,” etc. This corresponds with the current Dutch stress on “self-integration.” From acquiring the integration packet to preparing and passing the integration exam, the onus in Dutch society is on the migrants to accomplish their own integration.

It is interesting to note the similarities between “self-integration” and the Flemish concept of autonomy. It is not surprising that these goals overlap, as it is in any state’s interest to have immigrants be self-sustaining and productive members of society. The difference is that in Flanders, autonomy is an end goal that is reached through care and diligence in its integration efforts. The Netherlands, on the other hand, assumes some degree of autonomy as a prerequisite for integration. To pass the BCIEA and the CIE, immigrants need to be willing and able to assume the responsibility necessary for preparing, paying for, and ultimately passing these exams.

**Flemish Integration as an Example of Cultural Tailoring**

As mentioned in prior sections, a primarily characteristic of the Flemish integration program is its tailoring to particular groups. This tailoring is most fully expressed in the DVDs that come with their integration packet. Here, the Flemish government invites four immigrants from their respective immigrant groups to speak about life in Flanders.
Presented below are three examples of speakers from the Flemish immigration DVDs. A full list of larger speaker images can be found in the appendix. We see immediately a number of different cultural cues, some overt and some covert. In figure seven, for example, we see covert signs of reaching out in the form of ethnic Turkish cuisine. In figure eight, copious amounts of Russian symbols are seen, including Russian stacking dolls, a calendar with Eastern Orthodox imagery, and even a picture, in the foreground, of St. Basil’s Cathedral in Moscow. Finally, in figure nine, we see a very overtly presented Moroccan flag, clearly demonstrating that although the DVD is in Arabic, the Flemish government realizes that this language is used in a wide variety of different cultures. In the appendix, you can also see a variety of ethnic wall decorations, tea pots, and cups. For all speakers, food and drink are involved, perhaps signaling a feeling of ease and welcome to the viewer. Men and women are equally represented, and in some cases ethnic clothing is worn. It is worth noting, however, that the headscarf and veil are noticeably absent. It is also worth remembering that these speakers communicate in the video in their native tongue.

Upon careful examination, we can also observe certain similarities that the Flemish government maintained between the videos. Figure ten demonstrates that they used the same set for all of their filming. The door frame behind the speaker was either left open or covered strategically with different kinds of fabrics. We also note some reuse of particular items. For example, the table cloth from the speaker in the top left is re-seen as the table cloth in the rear table on the far right. However, for the Russian speaker, the rear table is covered with a plain (perhaps ethnically neutral) fabric. Other reused items seen clearly in Appendix C include lamps, background flowers, and other table cloths.
In stark contrast, figures 11 and 12 show the first and second immigrant speakers presented in the Naar Nederland, the Dutch integration DVD. There is no tailoring here. Immigrants from many different lands are presented, all speaking Dutch. The background is a non-descript red cloth, and there are no symbols of their prior ethnicity to be seen. The videos here elegantly illuminate the principal difference between national approaches. The Flemish approach infuses the integration process with familiar images and a welcoming atmosphere. The Dutch approach, however, emphasizes a coming together and adoption of a unified cultural identity.

**Differing Priorities Through EU Integration Funding**

Welcome materials given to (or purchased by) the immigrant provide some of the most direct understandings of how the state views itself and how it approaches welcoming immigrant populations. However, these documents cannot exclusively encompass a government’s integration policies. By analyzing relevant grant requests and government positions on sensitive and related cultural laws, the conclusions drawn from the welcome documents can be better nuanced and contextualized.

**European Fund for the Integration of Third Party Nationals (2007-2013)**

One useful avenue in understanding the differences between Dutch and Belgian integration programs is to leverage the basis for comparison introduced by the European Union. The EU offered “integration funds” to assist national governments in the integration of their citizens from 2007-2013 (Council Decision 2007/435/EC). Funding was allocated on the basis of reports submitted to the Commission arguing their need, so the amount of funds allocated was less important. Countries that were experiencing less immigration would be less successful in
getting large amounts of funding. However, seeing what countries chose to spend this money on can reveal much about the priorities of their integration programs. Upon analysis, Flemish funding priorities reflect their commitment to interculturalism through their high levels of spending on immigrants and outreach, whereas the Dutch tend to reserve their integration funding for research and quality control.

These EU integration funds were allocated by the European Commission on the behalf of the Justice and Home Affairs Council. It was meant to be spent towards four priorities. These were 1.) the development of indicators used to measure successful integration, 2.) supplementary funds towards the betterment of national policy-making, 3.) creating a platform for the exchange of ideas and experiences, and 4.) the fulfillment of the eleven “common basic principles” set down as European guidelines (European Commission, 2005). It was towards this last goal that a majority of the spending in each country is allocated. The principles present at the European level included a variety of different objectives, such as the promotion of respect for European values (#2), access to employment and government institutions (numbers three and five), and knowledge of a host country’s language, history, and institutions (#4). Interestingly, it also contained a directive emphasizing integration as “a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation” (#1) and “frequent interaction between immigrants and member state citizens” (#7).13 The EU’s increasing power regarding immigrant integration adds further complexity to the analysis of integration policies in Europe. While these principles currently give states quite a bit of freedom in the utilization of EU funding, this may change in the future as more immigrants

13 See website below for full text: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0389
attempt to arrive in Europe via increasingly desperate means. They are both sufficiently broad to accommodate a variety of different goals, and sufficiently vague to give states freedom in doing so.

Belgium spent around 2.4 million Euros of the 4.6 million allocated to the country through the integration fund program (for fiscal years 2007-2009). This amount is distributed at the federal level, going to all four communities: Brussels, Flanders, Wallonia, and the German-speaking region. For the Flemish region, all money spent went to priority four, satisfying the EU’s principles. In particular, the Belgians used the funds for a variety of personalized coaching and expert support present in their integration process. There was also money spent to develop integration projects to be used in their countries of origin (like what is done in the Netherlands). In short, the money was spent on their immigrants, and helped co-finance their national integration system. Belgium noted in their report that because the EU expected the nation to be the principal beneficiary of the funding, this complicated their efforts in properly distributing the funds to their sub-national communities.

The Netherlands used their funding a little differently. They used 4.5 million euros of an allocated 5.5 million euros (also for fiscal years 2007-2009) to fund large educational projects researching integration, as well as to coordinate and attend integration conferences abroad. One of their educational projects, for example, focused on gauging the importance of participation in the integration process, while the other involved increasing dialogues between native and immigrant residents in schools, among young people, and among women. The Dutch report that European integration funds are less useful for their country because the amount is small relative to their yearly integration spending (around 580 million euros), and limited in its application to only newly arrived third party nationals (therefore not applicable to programs for dual nationals
or second/third generation immigrants). The Dutch view these provisions as unduly restrictive to the proper use of this funding in their country.

**Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund (2014-2020)**

In 2014, the EU reorganized its funding in the area of immigration, combining the European Refugee Fund, the External Borders Fund, the European Integration Fund, and the European Return Fund into one grant, called the Asylum, Migration, and Immigration Fund, or AMIF (EU Parliament, 2014). Because of the recent nature of the program, spending details about the new plans are scarce. However, the more comprehensive nature of the fund has spurred more government interest.

In the Netherlands, a “New European Immigration Funds” department has been established with the purpose of transitioning, coordinating, and overseeing these new grants. According to their nation government’s program, the Netherlands will be entitled to approximately 80 million Euros over the grant’s seven year cycle (Programmaplan Nieuwe Europese Migratiefondsen, 2013). According to the Union of Dutch Municipalities’ 2014-2020 European Grant Primer, the Netherland’s National Plan for the use of the AMIF funds has not yet been finalized (Langhorst and van Diemen, 2014). This is likely because the grant utilizes a new “policy dialogue” procedure by which national authorities engage in intense conversation with the European Commission to avoid subsequent negotiations between these parties during the span of the grant.

Flanders has also undergone a little less governmental restructuring in anticipation of the new AMIF. Because it already had a robust integration program in place, the Flemish integration program will retain responsibility (The Kingdom of Belgium, 2014). However, a new change is the incorporation of the European Social Funds office (ESF) as the management authority for the
AMIF (The Government of Flanders, 2013). Like the Netherlands, Belgium has not yet issued a call for programs, currently scheduled for the fall of 2015. However, Flanders has issued a policy-note outlining their priorities for the years that overlap the range of the AMIF. In their policy note, the Flemish government discusses their goals of “horizontal” integration (Flemish Government, 2013). The “horizontal” approach acknowledges that integration is the responsibility of not only the entire Flemish government, but also “social partners, educational partners, social organizations, local authorities, media and associations of people with a migrant origin.” Such a communal approach helps make integration something that isn’t just constrained to a government classroom or course. The same policy note states that the Asylum, Migration, and Immigration Fund will be “maximally deployed” to assist this horizontal integration, with special emphasis on promoting “stimulating and interesting” integration plans that solve new and existing challenges.

Integration through Differing Burqa Bans

Differences in EU funding and prioritization illustrate how governments approach integration outside of their direct efforts via their welcome documents. But these decisions are largely decided at the elite level, far from public scrutiny. Sometimes, however, important integration decisions must be made very publically. Legislation involving the wearing of burqas in public is one such example. While not contained in any government welcome packet, these decisions are important in establishing the overall tone of integration and intergroup relations within a particular government. Here too, Belgium and the Netherlands pursue different approaches that are in-line with their overall emphases on interculturalism and assimilation, respectively.
Belgium’s stress on intercultural principles has manifested itself in strict ways. Belgium is one of the very few countries in Europe (France being the other) that has instituted an overall ban on Muslim women wearing the burqa. This ban entered into force in 2011 at the federal level, and was passed almost unanimously by the Chamber of Representatives (van der Schyff and Overbeeke, 2011). It was immediately referred to the Belgian Constitutional Court, which in 2012 upheld the ban on the grounds of public safety and the promotion of ‘le vivre ensemble’ / ‘samenleven’ / ‘living together’. The law was further upheld in 2014 by the European Court of Human Rights, where Belgium was a party to a pre-existing challenge to France’s burqa ban. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), in the case S.A.S. v. France, agreed that the use of the burqa interfered with the goals of living together and creating social bonds. The court noted that seeing one’s face is an exceptionally important element to this end (European Court of Human Rights, 2014). Discrimination on the grounds of religion is therefore avoided through this narrow and fairly utilitarian interpretation.

Considering the strict Dutch integration process, we might expect the Netherlands to also observe a harsh burqa ban. However, this has not been the case. A ban on burqas had been seriously discussed in the Netherlands since Pim Fortuyn rose to political prominence in 2002. After the Dutch election of 2010, resulting in a conservative minority coalition with far right support, the first Rutte coalition passed a burqa ban in January 2012. Following the French and Dutch example, the ban would penalize the wearing of burqas, as well as ski-masks and motorcycle helmets in inappropriate places. However, the coalition fell apart in April after failed negotiations over austerity measures. When the centrist second Rutte coalition formed in November, they severely curtailed the areas where the ban would apply, limiting it only to public transportation, healthcare, schooling, and government buildings (Smouter, 2014). The original
law from 2012 was still in effect, banning the burqa in public, but it was not being strictly enforced on a national level. In May 2015, the Dutch government formalized these burqa ban restrictions into law. The new law is narrower than the 2012 law as written, but can now be enforced more reliably. The new law also includes details about the fines for those who break it, currently are set at 405 Euros (Back, 2015).

These differences in emphasis further highlight the principal distinction between Belgium and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, a burqa ban was the brainchild of Geert Wilders and his PVV (Party for Freedom/Partij voor Vrijheid) party, who leveraged his party’s position of power to strong-arm the legislation through. The process was met with strong resistance throughout, including the non-binding, advisory “Council of State” (NOS.nl, 2012). This Council was concerned that the ban violated religious freedom, a value strongly protected in Dutch society. Proponents of the law side-stepped this criticism by referencing Article 6 of the Dutch constitution, which notes that religious freedom can be curtailed in the interest of protecting health, traffic, order, and safety. The current stipulations on burqa usage are directly drawn from this article’s provisions.

The implementation of these bans emphasizes the different approaches each country uses when negotiating cultural differences. In Belgium, where interculturalist norms of cooperation are emphasized and religious practice challenged by understandings of the French laicité found in Wallonia, the government interprets usage of the burqa as asocial and uses the law to encourage people into contact and socialization when in public. Such an insistence is maintained even in the face of strong protest from Islamic radical groups like sharia4Belgium. Such protests have included rioting, such as those that occurred after the arrest of Stephanie Djato of Brussels in 2012 (Hilburn, 2014). The Dutch, focused more on assimilation and the principles it entails,
are more willing to extend religious protections to immigrants, as long as it doesn’t endanger the safety of the public or sensitive areas. Religious freedom is an important element of the Dutch identity narrative, and this includes Islam and its religious tenants (van Reekum and Duyvendak, 2012). Any decrease in socialization or cohesion is outweighed by fidelity to principle so long as it does not endanger the lives of others.

Discussion

Through this series of comparisons, it is clear that the Dutch and Flemish are engaging in different sorts of integration policies. The engaged Flemish government pursue policies with an interculturalist bent, focusing on increasing the agency of individuals and their deepening interactions with society around them. This is communicated in a variety of different ways, from how the program is structured, to what it directly communicates and how it acts and spends its resources. It is a person-centric program. Its focuses on moving immigrants towards greater autonomy and brings them into close contact with native citizens. While Dutch is stressed as important, getting migrants the knowledge necessary for them to function is of a higher priority. Their insistence on the practical over the principle is particularly strong signal of intercultural thinking.

The Dutch integration program has a different, more assimilatory focus. It also seeks to communicate knowledge, but the type of knowledge stressed is less readily applicable to daily living. It has less flexibility built into how the migrant integrates. There are set priorities and knowledge of these priorities overrides the particularities of the immigrant’s local or personal situation. By including history and culture on the integration exam, it grants this type of knowledge an importance far beyond the level stressed in the Belgian system. In many ways, the Dutch system is a type of shock-treatment for the immigrant. It forces the immigrant to be
competent and responsible. The onus is on the migrant to acquire the material, training, and funding necessary to integrate properly. In going through the process and taking the initiative, immigrants learn how to do things for themselves. This also fosters autonomy, but in a different sort of way. Unfortunately, as a consequence of this set-up, there are fewer state sponsored methods to encourage cooperation between the native and migrant populations. The immigrant is reminded of the importance of reaching out to the natives, but this cannot be done so easily without state sanction.

Both countries stress the importance of reaching out, of cooperation, tolerance, and a respect for difference. But there are a number of important differences. In interculturalist cases such as Belgium, an active role is taken to promote engagement and communication. It is built into the very core of the system, not above value and information transmission, but on a similar level. More assimilatory countries like the Netherlands proclaim similar goals, but neglect an active cooperation in favor of passive personal expectations. It is important to note that that like multiculturalism, the Dutch make clear the values of tolerance and respect for differences. However, these values are treated similarly to any other nationalist expectation, be it respect for the flag or the knowledge of an anthem. The onus is entirely on the immigrant to internalize these norms.
Chapter 5: Mass Opinion on the Integration of Immigrants

The success of any integration policy ultimately resides with the beliefs and behaviors of the public. Even the best integration policies will fail if they are not internalized by individuals and lived during day to day interactions. It is in public where people socialize and where different values and beliefs can interact with each other. It is therefore essential that any complete exploration of integration policies in contemporary European politics include a mass survey. When people interact, a complete picture requires looking at a relationship from both sides. Studying immigrants and their opinions can tell researchers the actual effectiveness of immigration policies, which may include observations that run counter to popular expectations (see: Wright and Bloemraad, 2012).

This chapter, however, focuses on the other side of the relationship, namely how natives view their own integration policies. Regardless of the actual effects of integration policies, natives (who do not need to worry about integrating themselves) will have opinions about what should be expected of immigrants and how successful their country’s integration policies are relative to how they should be. These opinions can condition how natives view immigration in their country and the amount of trust (or not, according to Sniderman and Haagendorn 2007) they offer those who are different. Even perfectly integrated immigrants can be isolated and marginalized by a native population unwilling to accept difference. To study these important actors, I conducted a large sample survey of established residents in the Netherlands and Belgium. I asked those who agreed to participate to evaluate a pair of vignettes describing hypothetical policies informed by one of the four integration ideologies presented above. The survey demonstrates clear preferences for more permissive policies, and suggests clear advantages for intercultural policymaking.
The Netherlands and Belgium as Test Cases

As discussed in prior chapters, this dissertation is conducted in two countries: the Netherlands and Belgium. These countries have been chosen for their differences in context, as well as their unique qualifications to contribute to the study of national identity and identity-based trust. Chapter Four provided an analysis about the Dutch experience and their dissatisfaction with multiculturalism, as well as Belgian challenges grappling with its dual ethnic identities. These characteristics make the people in these countries very familiar with the intricacies and difficulties of constructing and negotiating national identities.

Outside of their overall expertise in immigrant integration, the Dutch and Belgian cases are well suited for a most-similar research design, as so many characteristics are shared between these two countries. While Belgium has its unique federal system, the consequences of this system for Belgian national identity (and its influence therefore on integration) will be of interest in comparing Belgian and Dutch subjects. Belgium and the Netherlands are excellent cases for a most similar research design. The two countries share histories, neighborhoods, and are in a number of shared international organizations (down to the regional BeNeLux organization). They are also roughly similar in terms of population, GDP per capita, and land area. Perhaps most importantly, their modern migrant populations also look similar (Turks and Moroccans) and they share the same language usage (Dutch in Flanders and a passive knowledge of English everywhere). These similarities will make it easier for the effect of the differing immigration and integration policies to be observed.
The Netherlands

As discussed in Chapter Four, the Netherlands provides a helpful political environment to discuss immigration and migrant assimilation in Western European countries. Features that make the Netherlands an attractive case study include a popular national narrative that prides itself on progressivism and liberalism and a history of innovative approaches to integration and assimilation that are shared or modeled by other countries in Europe.

Another advantage of the Dutch case is the rich debate in the country about the limits of tolerance, the appropriateness of multiculturalism, and a thoughtful consideration about the appropriateness of the scope of the social revolution of the 1960s. This debate is an exciting one to consider in terms of the progression/history of ideas, and can be seen in the discourse surrounding the Dutch far right. Since the New Integration Policy in 2004, their modified xenophobic appeals have represented a strong alternative to more mainstream liberal multicultural leanings. This debate has reached a prominence in the Dutch public discourse relatively unmatched by other Western countries over the past decade. Said dynamic appropriately justifies the Dutch conception of the Netherlands as the *gidsland*, or mentor state with regards to modern social liberalism (Herman, 2005). This notion of the Dutch as a cultural leader makes the Netherlands all the more credible as a case where we can see the limits of multicultural / individualistic-civic citizenship.

According to Collinson 1994, the Netherlands is the only West European country that has attempted to explicitly endorse multicultural values in a coherent policy framework (though Sweden has also attempted a similar policy).\(^{14}\) Considering their lengthy experience with

\(^{14}\) See Chapter Four for a more complete discussion the historic experience of multiculturalism in the Netherlands.
multiculturalism, it is reasonable to expect that the strengths and weaknesses of this ideology will be more apparent to Dutch citizens than to people living in other countries.

**Belgium**

Belgium is another useful laboratory for the study of the immigration and integration of Muslim immigrants into Western Culture. Despite the similarities with the Dutch case mentioned earlier, Belgium offers potentially valuable variation. As Chapter Four noted, the Belgian state has no form of integration or language tests, it possesses an internal regional variation that permits migrants to favor a “path of least resistance”, and it has very immigrant-friendly laws and programs.

At the federal level, Belgium is an attractive place to study immigration with respect to the Netherlands because it provides more support for incoming migrants. If reluctance to assimilate stems from too much hostility from the in-group (coupled with identity projection), we should see this minimized in the Belgian case. Some figures from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) III clearly illustrate this point. Using the Netherlands as a point of comparison, Belgium has 2.3 times as many foreign born people in their society as the Dutch do. In 2009, the Belgians approved 23% more family unification permits than the Netherlands and naturalized 27% more long term residents. Despite its smaller population and economy, Belgium still had 34% more migrants entering their community in 2009 than the Netherlands. While migrant unemployment is over three times higher in Belgium than in Holland (29.40% vs. 9.30%), this lack of employment opportunity does not seem to deter increasing numbers of migrants from entering Belgium.
Hypotheses

There are two types of hypotheses that will be tested by the on-site surveys. The first two test the nature and characteristics of the four integration strategies: multiculturalism, assimilation, liberalism as identity, and interculturalism. The claims for these hypotheses will be informed by the alternative typology presented in table one. The second set of hypotheses (i.d.: the following five ones) will test the claims of the optimal distinctiveness theory and in-group projection theory.

Typologically Informed Hypotheses

The first two hypotheses test the alternative typology discussed in table one. Multiple sources of evidence from the United States supporting the spectrum understanding of integration can be found in Chapter 3. The typology, however, requires a more sophisticated survey to tease out the various aspects of the integration ideologies. Starting first with the directionality of the ideologies, the survey asks about the importance of ethnic culture. This is a useful proxy variable for directionality, as ethnic culture is something that belongs to one group in particular. A policy that favors one group in particular is clearly more mono-directional than a policy that is open to many different cultures and traditions. Translated in terms of my study, I predict:

H1: Those evaluating one way ideologies like assimilation and liberalism as identity should evaluate the vignettes as making ethnic culture more important than those evaluating two-way ideologies like interculturalism and multiculturalism.
Looking at the other element of the typology, my survey also examines what the vignettes consider important and worthy of loyalty. I ask respondents if the vignettes presented make individuals or groups more important. This maps directly onto the question of if an ideology is community or ideologically focused. Respondents should rate community oriented vignettes like “liberalism as identity” and interculturalism as making groups more important than individuals. Conversely, assimilation and multiculturalism should make individuals seem more important than groups.

**H2: Evaluations on the outward focus of the vignettes should score highest for the interculturalism and liberalism as identity ideologies.**

**Social Psychologically Informed Hypotheses**

The next two hypotheses test the optimal distinctiveness and common in-group identity theories. In hypothesis four, I test the relationship between different types of integration and salience/importance of a respondent’s national identity. In his 2006 study, Weldon determines that individualistic-civic countries (multiculturalism) have higher levels of tolerance than their collectivist counterparts (assimilation). His study, however, does not address the theoretical downside of these citizenship regimes in the form of decreased identity salience / meaningfulness. Few studies have observed the relationship of identity salience to content in an empirical, cross-national fashion. This hypothesis serves as a test of Brewer 1991’s optimal distinctiveness model. If there is a necessary trade-off between inclusiveness and differentiation, then we should see responses for those shown more multicultural vignettes to rate their perception of national identity meaningfulness lower than those shown more assimilatory vignettes. In short:
H3: The closer a vignette advocates a multiculturalist perspective; the more likely respondents will evaluate the policy as harmful to the meaningfulness of their national identity.

Hypothesis four tests the contention that the intermediate ideologies of “liberalism as identity” and “interculturalism” (following the proposed structure of the vignette) are more attractive to people than the polar ideologies of individualistic civic (multiculturalism) and collectivistic-civic (civic nationalism). If the social psychology literature is to be believed, an intermediate ideology would be more desirable than an ideology at either extreme.

When considering the optimal distinctiveness theory, it is important to remember that as any identity grows more defined, it also grows more exclusive. This applies also to well-defined civic identities, as few people completely identify with a civic identity. There are Frenchmen, for example, who may agree with the French ideals of liberté and fraternité, but not égalité. Such people would be considered by others to be less “French” than if, in an alternate world, égalité was not considered an important component of Frenchness. If social identity theorists are to be believed, people should gravitate towards a definition of Frenchness that includes them (and is thus broader). Such an example would apply to almost everyone, from the atheist seeking a more secular national identity, to the racist seeking a less egalitarian one, and to the libertarian seeking a freer one. In short, people have a preference to minimize cognitive dissonance between their personal ideas and the ideas of the group by configuring their own interpretation of the group to include them. Claims that the United States is “a Christian nation” are examples of this type of thinking.
Brewer’s Optimal Distinctiveness Theory therefore entails that personal desire for an equilibrium national identity fall somewhere between complete assimilation and pure multiculturalism. Given the ability to rank ideologies, we should therefore see interculturalism and liberalism as identity being more attractive to native citizens than multiculturalism and civic nationalism. Hypothesis four tests if individual preferences gravitate towards the center now that my expanded conception of assimilation ideologies has created one. Stated more formally:

**H4: Given the choice, more survey respondents should prefer the middle pair of assimilation ideologies (interculturalism and liberalism as identity) to the outer pair (collectivistic civic and individualistic civic citizenship regimes).**

Hypothesis five builds on hypothesis four in testing the details of the relationship between the ideological center and periphery. Whereas hypothesis three tested gravitation towards the center, this hypothesis tests that this gravitation is operating in a manner predicted by notions of political distance. According to the typology, interculturalism can be considered a more moderate version of multiculturalism. Similarly, liberalism as identity can be considered a more moderate version of civic nationalism. If this is true, we should expect to observe these preference pairings in respondent evaluations of these ideologies. For example, people who do not identify closely with their national identity should find interculturalism and then multiculturalism (because of H4) more favorable than liberalism as identity and assimilation (collectivistic civic regimes). Stated formally:
H5: Those survey respondents expressing low attachment to the state should exhibit a higher preference towards interculturalism than LAI or civic nationalism. Similarly, those expressing higher attachment to the state should exhibit higher preference towards LAI than interculturalism or individualistic-civic citizenship regimes.

The Belgium and the Netherlands are fascinating places to study migrant integration. Belgium shares many important similarities with the Netherlands, yet exhibits important variation in the strength of national identities. Hypothesis six tests this notion by observing differences in levels of attachment to the state between Belgians and Dutchmen. If it is true we should see Belgians expressing lower levels of connection to the state (and thus, according to H5, exhibiting stronger preferences for interculturalism). Stated formally:

H6: Belgian respondents should exhibit lower levels of attachment to their state than Dutch respondents. This will translate into greater Belgian support for multicultural policies, especially interculturalism.

For my final hypothesis, I will be looking at how levels of identity-based trust (identity meaning national identity), identity salience, and in-group projection vary among the four potential integration ideologies. Questions gauging the respondent’s baseline preference towards assimilation or multiculturalism will condition the results reported and will be accounted for within the survey. In order to truly claim that interculturalism and LAI are better performing ideologies relative to the dominant integration ideologies of collectivistic-civic citizenship and multiculturalism, they must demonstrate the ability to create stronger levels of trust based upon
the national identity, while at the same time maintaining as low levels of in-group projection as possible. To this end, we can create a composite scale judging the strengths of each of the ideologies according to social psychological theory. If $t$ represents levels of identity-based trust and $p$ represents perceived in-group projection, the best policy would be one with the highest value ($v$) according to the formula:

$$v = t - p$$

We can expect identity salience/importance to be an appropriate proxy variable for identity-based trust value, as Brewer 1991 and Gaertner and Dovidio 2000 assert that only salient identities are able to create the group expectations required for the creation of identity based trust. Only salient identities carry enough meaning to create the expectations in how one acts or what one believes. It is from these similarities that trust arises. As for projection, it must be subtracted from trust to faithfully replicate the tradeoff found in social psychology. High levels of trust, for example, coupled with strong in-group identification would ultimately produce an unsatisfactory policy, as migrant groups would see the resulting superordinate identity as threatening to their own subordinate identities. Stated more formally, the hypothesis is:

**H7:** The middle integration ideologies (interculturalism and liberalism as identity) will have higher values for “$v$” than the outer integration ideologies (collectivist-civic and individualist-civic).
Design of the Survey

This study surveys primarily at the individual level, as national identity and trust strongly vary from person to person. While the discussion has this far centered on integration ideologies at the level of national policy, the ideologies that underpin the policy are accessible and resonant to the average person. In an increasingly globalized world, personal conceptions of national identity are constantly challenged by interactions with immigrants and their cultures. While the average citizen may not be sophisticated enough to understand the difference between interculturalism and multiculturalism in abstract terms, framing this difference in terms of concrete examples about what national identity means and how people should interact with each other will better speak to such citizens. Additionally, individuals live within nations that chose to actualize certain integration ideologies. A person who lives within a strongly multicultural country may not have ever heard about multiculturalism in an academic sense, but he or she certainly interacts with multicultural expectations and consequences on a daily basis.

Vignette Construction Details

In every survey, each respondent is presented with a pair of vignettes designed to prompt evaluations of the different integration ideologies. This includes a question on the respondent’s preference between them. The construction of these vignettes is critically important, as they are the vehicles through which the integration ideologies are presented and evaluated. In order to minimize noise within the vignettes, variation between them was restricted to three places. This is illustrated in the formula for the vignette below:
“The policy [suggests / requires] attending a government-run integration course for immigrants entering the country from outside the Netherlands. The importance of [ideological value] would be especially emphasized under this policy. This message [would / would not] be communicated to native citizens”

Ideally, the least noisy vignette would vary only the second sentence in this formula. This second sentence is most important, as it incorporates the heart of the meaning for each vignette. However, this research does seek to measure the effect of particular words on people’s responses. Ideologies are complex entities that cannot be encapsulated in one word or a pair of words. For example, it is difficult to accurately reflect what a word like “liberalism” or “egalitarianism” mean in one word. Is “liberalism” equality, freedom, or change? Does the equality in “egalitarianism” apply to all people, all the time, in all circumstances? Does the separation of powers in “federalism” apply to all branches of government in the same manner? Assimilationism, multiculturalism, and the rest of the vignettes suffer from these same problems. In order to better portray these ideologies without completely sacrificing comparability, I include flanking sentences with dichotomous variables to both add nuance and more detail to the vignette. While evaluations of these vignettes must remain holistic, the limited, constrained, and sometimes overlapping nature of the first and third sentences allows social scientists to understand (and in some cases isolate) the nature of the variation they are seeing. Table six illustrates the logic behind the vignette construction.

The coerciveness variable in the first sentence approximates the expectations loaded within the ideology about what is required from the immigrant. This distinction helps to illustrate one of the fine and often-overlooked differences between interculturalism and multiculturalism.
Kymlicka’s warning about the incompatibility of excessive coercion in civic integration policies support multiculturalism’s use of “suggests” in the coerciveness sentence, a helpful symmetry between the 3S and citizenization conceptualizations of multiculturalism (Kymlicka, 2012).

The content variable provides unique substance for each vignette. Some choices here, like “tolerance” and “cooperation” were fairly easy to make, and accurately summarizes the core of the vignette. These words can be viewed as symbolic commitments to belief systems/frames, which can significantly impact attitudes towards immigration (Jeong, 2013). LAI and Assimilation, however, require a little more explanation. The principal challenge here was to make these items comprehensible and relatable to the average respondent. For LAI, “our liberal values” was utilized. “Liberal” is used the same way in Dutch as in English (Dutch: liberalisme), as does its adjective form, liberale. As in the United States, liberale is sometimes used to describe political parties (usually the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy in the Netherlands and the Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats party in Flanders). The inclusion of “our” is used to prevent misunderstanding here, as it would be nonsensical to presume a priori that the respondent votes for these parties. The few respondents who did ask for clarification here were provided it, being informed that the word was used in this context to reference liberalisme.

As for assimilation, the problem was that assimilation can be used to mean many things, including the adoption of the national language, religion, customs, holidays, clothing, and more. Compounding this problem is that not all of these elements are considered of equal importance. Knowledge of the national language, for example, would be considered very important, as suggested by the integration material in Chapter Four. Conversely, celebration of national holidays would be considered not all that important at all, as they tend not to carry much significance. To escape this problem, I chose to characterize assimilation in terms of a high and
low salience ideology, respectively: language and knowledge of history. This choice tempers the enthusiasm most respondents would show for a language-only vignette, and demonstrates the multifaceted nature of assimilationist policies.

The final sentence of the vignette involves the importance attached to the communication of integration to the native citizens. This emphasizes the fact that integration may not be only a one-way street. It directly addresses the one versus two-way variable of the alternative new typology of integration presented in chapter three and positively nuances the presentation of the intercultural and multicultural vignettes.

The construction of these vignettes is empirically validated by studies presented in Chapter Three. The results of these studies demonstrate that respondents were able to evaluate the vignettes in the manner sought by the study, validating their construction. While this study was given to American students, I believe the responses should remain valid for Dutch and Belgian citizens. The vignettes were presented in plain language regarding a relatable situation, and therefore should be able to apply to all Western liberal democracies.

**Questionnaire Construction Details**

For this study, I conduct a paper-based survey with third generation or greater immigrants about their opinions on migrant integration\(^\text{15}\). This means that only individuals whose parents were born in the country were admitted into the survey. This choice was made to ensure that the subject’s dominant national identity was the same as their home countries, free from any possible international influence arising from their parent’s upbringings. The questions presented in the survey correspond directly to the hypotheses of the study. Each respondent is first asked to

\(^{15}\) A good deal of thanks goes to Brian Gaines for helping me with the construction of this survey questionnaire.
evaluate their attachment to their nation. This question serves as a check against projection by taking into account any pre-existing feelings of national identity and attachment in the respondent. Following this first question, the respondent is then presented with a random choice of one of four vignettes. They are then asked to evaluate the vignette on their value focus (H1), directionality (H2), strength of national meaningfulness (H3), and trust creation and identity projection (H7).

Immediately after completion of the first evaluation, respondents are asked to do an identical evaluation with a different vignette randomly chosen from the remaining pool of three. Differences between the vignettes are highlighted and bolded to aid in emphasizing the distinction between this exercise and the one preceding it. Any differences between responses given to the first and second vignettes will be particularly important as they would suggest strengths or weaknesses of particular integration ideologies. Finally, respondents are then asked to express their overall preference towards one policy or the other (H4-H6).

In conducting the survey as a two distinct steps, the possibility of ordering bias is introduced into the second vignette of the survey. For example, a respondent who reads about assimilation first may be more or less generous in evaluating the second vignette if it is about multiculturalism than if the multicultural vignette was shown first. Because the first vignette will not suffer from ordering bias, this can serve an unbiased standard to test for ordering bias in the second vignette. Those responses that exhibit said bias are removed from the study, while those free from it were included in the final sample.

Because the survey is conducted entirely on paper, question order randomization is not possible. To accommodate this problem, the question order of the survey was determined in such a way so as to narrow the breadth of the questions as the survey progresses (McFarland, 1981).
This prevents any discrepancies between questions and minimizes the chance for the details of one question to bias the responses of the other. Additionally, this design minimizes acquiescence bias by not presenting respondents the option of disagreeing with any statement. This includes the first screening question about how strongly the respondent relates to their nation. The demographic portion of the survey is also non-randomized, as the questions presented there are straightforward and not very prone to ordering biases. The only thing randomized in the survey is the ordering of the vignettes.

The survey is based primarily on semantic differential scales to minimize acquiescence bias. The possible responses to a question are never presented to the respondent in a particular order\textsuperscript{16}, rather questions are always presented at once, all together. This avoids the tendency for respondents to mark or acquiesce to the first response given. This is particularly important when discussing immigration, a polarized political topic with anti-immigrant stances being associated primarily with radical far-right parties. There is evidence suggesting that semantic differential scales handle acquiescence bias in these situations much better than Likert scales (Friborg et al, 2005). Unfortunately, this bias mitigation comes at the expense of consistency, as semantic differential scales are cognitively more complex for respondents to evaluate. However, as Friborg demonstrates, this loss of consistency is generally within the accepted threshold of $\alpha > 0.70$. The polarity of these questions is not ordered according to any meaningful or consistent manner, and this should not have any impact on the results of the survey (Dickson and Albaum, 1975)

\textsuperscript{16} For example, a choice of answers presented as a.), b.), c.), d.).
Sampling Details

The full sample for my research consists of four sub-samples, two for each country. In Belgium my samples focus on the city of Ghent, both a student sample drawn from the University of Ghent and from pedestrians found in the squares of town. In the Netherlands, my sample is drawn from students at the University of Tilburg and pedestrians found in the squares of Eindhoven. Tilburg did not allow sampling in their main squares during a large portion of the week, limiting my ability to collect non-student samples there. Similarly, the University of Eindhoven does not offer social science courses, making any student sample there difficult to compare with the students sampled in Ghent. Therefore combining these Dutch cities creates a sample maximally parallel to the one found in Ghent. Figure 13 shows the positions of the cities relative to each other, and Figure 14 shows them relative to the Dutch/Belgian border.

This study opted for city based sampling based upon findings that Dutch cities tend to have fairly wide autonomy when it comes to addressing immigration (Scholten, 2013). Immigration is national by nature as it focuses on residency in a state and membership into the national “family” of citizens. However, it also has a distinct local character, as the lives of immigrants and their interactions with people happen every day in municipal neighborhoods. Enforcement is also particularly local in nature. Due to this issue being a widely recognized problem, all levels of governance have incentives to address immigration. Since there are often disconnections between municipal and national government in composition and in salient issues, policy divergence is common and can be quite dramatic (ibid). By keeping this mass-level public opinion survey local in character, the effect of local characteristics is acknowledged and can be controlled.
Theoretically, the sample only needs to be composed of third generation immigrants or greater. This is required in order to assure that the respondents are adequately exposed life in their country and that their national identity is uncontested by other national identities (in Belgium, of course, strong regional identities complicate matters in interesting ways). The city choice, however, is important in creating a convincing “most-similar” case design. All three cities (Ghent, Tilburg, and Eindhoven) are nearby the border with the Netherlands and Belgium, they are all in traditionally Catholic areas, and they all are in regions that speak Dutch or a regional variant thereof (Flemish).17

Beyond these basic characteristics, the cities share a number of more detailed commonalities. They are roughly the same size, falling between approximately 207,000 people in Tilburg and 248,000 in Ghent. In all towns surveyed, social-democratic parties were winners in the 2012 elections (federal elections in the Netherlands, local elections in Flanders). As for far right parties, they perform modestly. Vlaams Belang gets 6.5% of the vote in Ghent whereas the Party for Freedom gets 9.8% in Eindhoven and 10.4% in Tilburg. Each city also contains sizable numbers of immigrants, with Tilburg having 14.6% and Eindhoven having 17.5% of their population from non-Western origins (Mulder, 2013). Ghent has roughly the same number of immigrants. About 19.7% of the population has origins from outside the European Union (Agentschap voor Binnenlands Bestuur, 2013). With such a prevalence of immigrants in the population, it is likely that native Dutch and Belgians living in the cities will have opinions about integration, multiculturalism, national identity, and immigration.

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17 Some may wonder why Antwerp was not selected as the Flemish city, as it too is a major metropolis with a university, even closer to the Dutch border. Ultimately, Antwerp was a little too large (twice as large as Eindhoven), and a little too conservative (it is a political stronghold of Vlaams Belang, for example).
The survey is comprised of only fourteen close-ended questions, lowering the opportunity costs respondents would incur in taking it (Crawford, 2001). Additionally, the content of the survey is salient to the population being surveyed (immigration), and is customized to the target population with references to the Netherlands/Belgium and to the Dutch/Flemish; both of which increase my response rate (Sheehan, 2001).

**Methodology of the Survey**

For the student sample, I arranged for my survey to be given at four classes in Ghent and Tilburg. These classes were all social scientifically oriented, and were all given at the university level. The similarity in type of classes and type of institution helps to control possible bias in the audience of the respondents. Instructions were given in English, and were collected at the break and end of each class. A short power-point presentation supplemented the instructions to ensure clarity, as individualized attention could not be given to each respondent in these cases. Additionally, the screening questions about their parent’s birth and place of residence were added to the beginning of the survey. This addition substitutes for screening questions that were done verbally at the beginning of the non-student sample. Further details about these surveys can be found in Appendix D.

For the non-student sample, I used a random number generator to pick three city squares in Ghent and Eindhoven and spend a number of hours per day holding a sign which asks in Dutch if they would wish to participate in a short internet survey on immigrant integration. This choice is semi-random, as certain municipal laws prohibit completely free access to these squares (see Appendix D for further details). Respondents self-select into participation through stopping and doing the survey, but all people passing through the public space will see the invitation to do so. This self-selection does introduce a bias towards more outgoing people, but this kind of bias
is present in all types of surveying. Even using random digit dialing techniques, more reserved respondents are less likely to answer the phone, or to hang up when the survey is offered.

It is worth noting that there is not much literature on sign-based recruitment methods for surveys. As discussed in greater detail in Appendix D, the need for sign based recruitment arose as a solution to the prevalence of solicitors using clipboards. Without signs, respondents presumed I was asking for money, and many refused to participate in the survey before it was introduced to them. Furthermore, signs have the advantage of more easily recruiting bicyclists, as riders can see their message as they pass. Signs also have the advantage of exposing anyone who sees it to the recruitment message, and doing this in a very non-confrontational, polite manner.

While not enough data was collected to draw sound empirical conclusions about this methodology, the experience of this study was very positive. Response rates increased over 50%, rising from four to six people per day to about ten people. Furthermore, these people were very happy taking the survey, due to its more passive presentation. In areas where solicitors use aggressive tactics to pressure people to donate or buy products, the quiet nature of the recruitment was very effective. In fact, it was not uncommon for respondents to thank me for recruiting in the fashion I did. It is likely this gratitude contributed to the increased response rate. My study suggests that sign usage may be a very effective tool for future surveying in high traffic urban areas. It may be very illuminating to test this recruitment method in future studies, controlling for as many items as possible outside of the recruitment method.

**Summary Statistics of the Sample**

Surveying was done in autumn of 2013. In total, 902 respondents agreed to take the survey. Table seven outlines the breakdown of this number between the Netherlands and Belgium, and between samples taken on the street and in the classroom. The sample skews
female, but not dramatically so. 58% of the respondents in Belgium and 60% of respondents in the Netherlands identified as women. With so many students being surveyed, the sample also skews young. In the Netherlands, this breakdown between young, middle age, and old respondents is 64%, 26%, and 10%, respectively. In Belgium, this skew is even more significant, both because the student sample is a larger portion of the overall sample gathered and because Belgian youths were more likely to self-select into the survey. Flemish culture tends to be a little more reserved than Dutch culture, and this did depress response rates. Belgium has a respondent age profile of 90% - 7% - 3%, respectively.

**Ordering Effects in the Sample**

Each respondent was asked to evaluate a pair of vignettes. In order to make sure the second vignette is not biased by the one preceding it, ordering bias must be controlled. Tables eight and nine outline the P-values that were obtained using a two-tailed Welch’s t-tests for every question on every combination of vignettes. In Belgium, only 22% of the 72 question-vignette pairs exhibited ordering effects (that is, the sample of responses had a five percent or less chance of coming from the same underlying population as the sample where the vignette came first). For the Netherlands, only 11% of the question-vignette pairs exhibited this ordering effect. All responses that exhibited ordering effects were removed from the sample to control for this source of error.

For those questions not exhibiting ordering bias, the responses are pooled together with the results from the first-shown vignettes to increase the number of responses for the survey. From 902 total respondents, this allows for the study to increase the total number of vignette
evaluations upwards to a range between 1479 (for Q4) and 1694 (for Q1). Tables ten and eleven outlines the number of responses per country, per vignette, per question.

**Hypothesis-Oriented Results**

**Typologically-Informed**

For the hypotheses involving the typology proposed in table one, the results are surprising and unexpected. The results for each question are outlined in tables twelve and thirteen.

H1 predicts that the vignettes for assimilation and liberalism as identity should have the strongest ethnic evaluations, displayed under the variable “Ethnic”, as a focus on ethnicity suggests. However, what we see is that in Belgium, multiculturalism and assimilation are viewed as making ethnic culture most important. In the Netherlands, the results run completely counter to the hypothesis, with interculturalism and multiculturalism making ethnic culture most important. While assimilation does rank highly in Belgium, multiculturalism is clearly viewed as most ethnically-oriented ideology. The Belgian results suggest that idea-based ideologies may have better abilities to create ethnic feelings than group-based ones. This results seem counter-intuitive on face value, as ethnicity is a group-based phenomenon. However, ethnicity is also an abstract notion that may be best communicated at an ideological level.

For the second hypothesis measures the nature of the loyalty produced by each ideology. It predicts that liberalism as identity and interculturalism should be most group oriented (most negative in table 5) and multiculturalism and assimilation as least group oriented. This question was measured through question four. In both Belgium and the Netherlands, interculturalism is the most group oriented, confirming the hypothesis. Similarly, multiculturalism is always in the upper half of the most individually oriented hypotheses, also confirming the hypothesis.
However, liberalism as identity does not behave in the expected manner. The respondents’ evaluation of LAI is consistently more individualistic than expected. It is viewed as most individualistic in Belgium, and second most in the Netherlands. It is very difficult to speculate why this might be the case. Not only does liberalism as an idea involve ideas on the proper function of groups, but the vignette even has the word “our” in it!

The above analyses involved using simple comparisons of means to observe the relationship between vignette choice and the six principle variables of interest for this study. Such an analysis, of course, ignores a number of important demographic variables such as gender, age, and the screening question of national pride / attachment. As table fourteen demonstrates, all three of these variables play significant roles in influencing their dependent variables, though only rarely do they surpass the impact of the vignettes. In all both countries, the model tested had low r-squared, meaning they do not explain much of the variance. This is not surprising, as many of the dependent variables such as trust are complex items that cannot be captured in the streamlined models.

The regression analyses unfortunately fail to provide much support to the paper’s hypotheses. Referencing hypothesis one, only one vignette significantly alters perceptions of ethnicity, namely liberalism as identity and only in Belgium. While this is one of the hypothesized vignettes, along with assimilation, its sign is not in the direction hypothesized, with liberalism as identity actually lowering the perceived importance of ethnicity. Mirroring the aggregate results in tables twelve and thirteen, interculturalism consistently and significantly impact the respondent’s view of their vignette as being more group oriented (six percent in Belgium and approximately eight percent in the Netherlands). Liberalism as identity continues to
not behave as hypothesized, however, but the regressions suggest the results are statistically insignificant rather than running contrary to the hypothesis.

Some interesting differences can be noted between Belgium and the Netherlands. Unsurprisingly, national pride/attachment plays a much smaller role in Belgium than in the Netherlands, with the variable losing all significance in the latter country. Both models are interpreted in comparison to a respondent seeing the multiculturalism vignette, so it make sense to see more significant values associated with the assimilation and liberalism as identity vignettes. The regressions further support the notion that interculturalism and multiculturalism are conceptually distinct when evaluating the concepts in terms of collectivity versus individuality. In the Netherlands, people who saw the interculturalism vignette evaluated their vignette as eight percent more aligned to conceptions of individualism. In Belgium, this value was around six percent.

Tables fourteen and fifteen used a limited set of variables in order to preserve the size of the sample. Models sixteen and seventeen used the fullest set of available variables while still controlling for heteroscedasticity. When considering the vignettes in these full models, only one vignette became significant, with liberalism as identity creating significant feelings of group orientation in Belgium. The rest of the changes were vignettes losing significance. In Belgium, the effects of liberalism as identity generally remained significant between models, while assimilation and interculturalism lost significance. In the Netherlands, no vignette has significant effects on their dependent variable except assimilation’s on integration direction and interculturalism on group feelings. It is curious that liberalism as identity had such different effects between countries.
New variables are introduced into the models in Tables Sixteen and Seventeen. These new variables did not reveal any consistent results. None of the new variables were significant in both the Netherlands and Belgium, or over the many dependent variables. Income was seen as significantly impacting projection in the Netherlands and feelings of ethnicity in Belgium. Likewise, knowing immigrants as coworkers in the Netherlands significantly decreases the amount of importance respondents perceived their vignettes creating on civic importance.

Whereas knowing immigrants as friends in Belgium significantly increases the amount of trust respondents perceive their vignettes fostering. The latter observation is particularly interesting, as it is the only significant effect in these expanded models that increases trust. In the shorter models with larger sample sizes, national attachment was perceived as significantly increasing trust in the Netherlands, but that curiously disappears in the extended model. The adjusted $R^2$ values, while remaining small, increase in the larger models for seven of the twelve dependent variables, while decreased for five of the models.

Social Psychology-Informed

The paper’s third hypothesis tests the tradeoffs between the meaningfulness and exclusivity of national identity. Under this hypothesis, the multicultural vignette, which defines identity only in terms of tolerance, should have the least meaning (and also cause the most harm to any existing meaning). Likewise, a vignette with a “thick” or laden understanding of national identity (that is, assimilation) should have the most meaning, and do the most to make national identities meaningful. This hypothesis, tested through question one, does not hold up in either country. For both the Netherlands and Belgium, liberalism as identity is evaluated as

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18 Barring the intercepts
strengthening national identities the least. In Belgium, interculturalism best strengthens the meaning of national identities, whereas in the Netherlands, multiculturalism does this best.

These findings were further confirmed by the regression analysis done in table fifteen. Liberalism as Identity and Assimilation (only in the Netherlands) were seen as harming the importance of national identity relative to those exposed to the vignette for multiculturalism. This more negative impression of the vignettes’ impact on national identity ranges from five to seven percent.

For the fourth hypothesis, social psychological principles predict that people should gravitate towards the vignettes informed by the middle ideologies of liberalism as identity and interculturalism. The trade-off between the exclusivity of collectivistic-civic/assimilatory thinking and the inclusivity of individualistic-civic/multicultural thinking should drive people to pick these “balanced” middle policies. The choices in each country are outlined in tables eighteen and nineteen below.

The data does demonstrate gravitation towards the center, but only in one pair of ideologies per country. In Belgium, the more balanced interculturalism is favored over multiculturalism. Similarly in the Netherlands, liberalism as identity is favored over the more extreme assimilation. In both countries, more welcoming integration polices are preferred, with inter- and multi-culturalism getting approximately two-thirds of all preferences shown.

Breaking this data down into each vignette dyad fails to shed additional light on this mystery. This can be seen in table 20 above. As with the aggregate data, multiculturalism and interculturalism triumph when paired against any ideology except themselves (in both countries). Interculturalism is also preferred in both countries when paired against liberalism as identity. For the hypothesis, we see assimilation preferred to liberalism as identity in Belgium, but it is less
clear in the Netherlands. The pairing between interculturalism and multiculturalism is even less clear, as each country has different results depending on the ordering. There are hints here that hypothesis four might be supported by the data, but more research is called for here.

My fifth hypothesis tests the relationship between pre-existing attachment to the state and vignette preference. Those who have low attachment to the state should favor policies that trend towards favoring the individual. Normally this would be multiculturalism, but considering H4, I hypothesize that these individuals should actually prefer interculturalism. Conversely, those with high attachment to the state should favor assimilation and therefore, through social psychological principles, liberalism as identity. Attachment, measured in quintiles, is measured against vignette choice in table 21 and 22. Hypothesis five has mixed results. In Belgium, only the second least attached group, as well as neutral, exhibits a strong preference for interculturalism over other integration forms.

Curiously, the groups indicating most attachment to the state also prefer interculturalism or even multiculturalism. In the Netherlands, both less attached groups favor interculturalism, but like Belgium, the groups with higher-levels of attachment to the state do not exhibit any drift towards liberalism as identity or even assimilation. It is worth noting in these response groups that the numbers of respondents indicating the least attachment to their state are very small. Those findings in particular should be considered with caution.

The sixth hypothesis of the paper concerns the differences between Belgium and the Netherlands as a whole. Because Belgium has a weakened central government compared to the Netherlands, we should see Belgians respond with lower levels of attachment to their state. Following the thinking in H4, we should therefore see them embracing interculturalism more strongly than respondents found in the Netherlands. The data, as presented in table 23, does
support the hypothesis that Belgians do feel less attachment to the federal state of Belgium. Similarly, Tables fourteen and fifteen also show that Belgians favor interculturalism more than the Dutch do (33% to 31.7%). Not only do Belgians support interculturalism more, but it is also the most popular vignette for the country, managing to compete with multiculturalism successfully. While the difference might not be much, hypothesis six is supported by the data.

Lastly, hypothesis seven speculated about the ability of interculturalism and liberalism as identity to bring about normatively desirable results. It suggested that policies which maximize trust while minimizing projection would be most desirable. Trust is most valuable when it is able to be created between disparate people and groups. It named this normative value as $v$, which was defined as the levels of trust that the vignette created subtracted by how homogenizing the vignette was perceived to be. Values for “$v$” are given in tables thirteen and fourteen.

In Belgium, hypothesis seven was confirmed by the data. Both interculturalism and liberalism as identity had the highest levels of $v$ of the different vignettes. It is interesting to note that in all countries, for all vignettes, this value was measured as negative, suggesting that any type of integration reduces this durable type of trust. However, interculturalism and liberalism as identity reduced this trust less. In the Netherlands, the results were not so clear. While interculturalism again reduced trust the least of all the vignettes, liberalism as identity reduced it the most. In the Netherlands it was multiculturalism that was seen as the second least destructive policy in the creation of social trust.

**Data Subsampling**

This far, the results have been analyzed in terms of the full sample. However, certain demographic groups can contain interesting trends that are obscured when placed in larger samples. Basic observational characteristics were gathered about the respondent’s gender and
age for all surveys, and all of the above as well as skin-color for the surveys gathered in the public setting. Because the sample size of the full pool was smaller to begin with, the usefulness of these subsample analyses are limited.

Tables 24 and 25 outline the choice of vignette preferences for males and females in Belgium and the Netherlands. Differences between Belgian males and females are small, with males favoring assimilation slightly more than females, and females doing likewise with multiculturalism. In the Netherlands, the differences are a little more pronounced, especially concerning liberalism as identity and interculturalism which were favored by males and females (respectively) by six to seven percentage points.

Tables 26 and 27 outline the choice of vignette preferences for young, middle-aged, and elderly respondents in Belgium and the Netherlands. Differences between age groups are also small, and in some instances, hindered by the sample size. Younger respondents tended to favor interculturalism in Belgium, whereas in the Netherlands multiculturalism was the clear victor. These preferences were reversed in both countries for the small number of elderly that opted to take the survey.

The Flemish Student Subsample

Unfortunately, due to the constraints involving how the data was collected, detailed analysis about the role of subject characteristics (beyond sex and a rough indicator of age) are scarce. The demographic section of the pedestrian-based survey was optional, and therefore often neglected by busy pedestrians, fatigued after completing the longer and mentally intensive integration questionnaire. However, this fatigue was mitigated for the surveys that were completed in the classroom setting. As captive audiences, the students that participated in my classroom surveys had no incentive to neglect this demographics section. Luckily, my study was
able to capture a student subsample from the University of Ghent that included 398 respondents, of which 385 respondents participated in and 201 completed all of the questions. The class was an introductory political science course and took place in a large lecture hall on campus. Because of the Ghent student sample’s large size, extensive participation, and single surveying location, it represents an opportunity for a more in-depth exploration of all of the data gathered in the survey. Table twenty-eight explores the relevant dependent variables for this study\textsuperscript{19}. Because this is a subsample, the values associated with the vignettes are already accounted for in Table Fourteen and Sixteen. However, Table 28 allows for the consideration of education, religious membership, and self-assessed partisanship.

The muted impact of the additional variables here is surprising. Increased education creates a small increase in trust, and religious membership decreases the willingness to project (perhaps through its emphasis of differences). Most surprisingly, one’s ideological position on a left-right scale did not meaningfully impact the subject’s evaluations of their vignettes. This is curious because attitudes about migrants are the subject of frequent and often spirited political posturing. While the individuals may not have politicized their associated national identities (necessary as per Miller et. al 1981), the popular political climate should have accomplished this in some respondents. It may be that the question was too far removed from people’s conceptions on migrants, with the intermediary concept of “national identity” preventing people from making the connections between their political beliefs and what would be their logical immigration preference.

One notable exception to this is age, which is a more-refined alternative to the “older” variable tested in table fifteen. Whereas the variable in table fifteen reflects three aged-based

\textsuperscript{19} The model explored in Table 28 represents a model that minimizes the amount of data lost due to incompleteness.
categories based on reviewer classification, this age measures self-reported years. This less-coarse measure provides a more reliable understanding of age’s effect. Measuring years, we see that with each additional year that a person has, respondents become one-third of a percent less likely to view their vignettes as making their institutions and civic obligations important, one half of a percent less likely to see their vignettes as making their ethnic culture less important, and one half of a percent more likely to see their vignettes emphasizing groups over individuals. Of these variables, only group emphasis was seen as significant in table fifteen (also with a positive relationship).

Revisiting the hypothesis, the Flemish subsample largely confirms the findings, but with a few alterations. Liberalism as identity once again rejects its hypothesized emphasis on ethnicity. While interculturalism once again does increase the perceived importance of groups relative to individuals, here liberalism as identity significantly increases individualism, actively rejecting the hypothesis. Finally, liberalism as identity is seen in the subsample as harming the perceived importance of national identity, running against the expectations of the third hypothesis. Interestingly, these results are much closer in line with Modood 2013’s conceptualization of individualist-integration. While it would be a leap to assume that respondents read individualism into “our liberal values,” this should be an avenue for future research.

**Discussion**

In total, the hypotheses tested perform in a mixed fashion. Only two of the thirteen hypotheses tested were completely supported by the empirical data, and three were partially supported.
Overall, the typologically informed hypotheses fared worse than the social psychological ones. We do see some acknowledgement of interculturalism being group oriented, and multiculturalism individual oriented in hypothesis two, which is encouraging. However, the ethnic feelings attached to multiculturalism are confusing, as is the individual focus of “liberalism as identity”. These observations are so peculiar and counterintuitive that it makes forming a typology at all very challenging. If vignettes emphasizing “tolerance” (Belgium) and “working together” (Netherlands) are evaluated as making ethnic culture more important than a vignette emphasizing “language and history”, then the concept of ethnicity in advanced western democracies needs to be re-examined.

Because the social psychology informed hypotheses perform better, the implications of this study are less clear. Convergence towards a more moderate vignette is seen in each country (interculturalism as more popular than multiculturalism in Belgium, and LAI as more popular than assimilation in the Netherlands). Furthermore, the vignettes did produce better normative results than assimilation/multiculturalism in Belgium, and partially in the Netherlands. Here “liberalism as identity” again causes some confusion. In the Netherlands, it is the worst normative performer, and in Belgium, it does not exhibit the same gravitation against assimilation as interculturalism does against multiculturalism (hypothesis four). Liberalism as identity calls for further research, as it created significant variation when compared against multiculturalism for every question asked in the University of Ghent student subsample. While typologically far from multiculturalism (and therefore surprising to generate significant results),

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20 The first formulation of this dissertation tested a hypothesis informed by a typology inspired by the work of Greenfeld 1998. This typology adopted and expanded upon her scales of collectivism and ethnicity and performed even worse than the hypothesis presented here. For example, Greenfeld classifies both assimilation (“civic-collective”) and multiculturalism (“civic-individualistic”) as civic minded policies. However, in both the Netherlands and Belgium we see large differences in how people evaluate the two vignettes’ abilities to make “institutions and obligations as citizens” important. This brings into question the external validity of Greenfeld’s typology.
it is always more significant (in the Ghent subsample) than assimilation, and over a wider range of questions.

The data also points to many interesting findings that lie outside of the hypotheses for the paper. Of particular note is the performance of interculturalism. The vignette inspired by the intercultural approach prompted the most normatively desirable results in both countries. It also had the highest ability to strengthen national identity in Belgium, and second-highest ability in the Netherlands. This consistent strong showing suggests that it may be beneficial to be study interculturalism further. Secondly, in both countries, multiculturalism exhibits superior potential in making immigrants seem trustworthy and like other nationals. Setting aside interculturalism and liberalism as identity, these findings are useful in providing empirical support for the ongoing debate between multiculturalists and assimilationists that tend to dominate the political landscape on integration.
Chapter 6: Conclusion and Directions for Future Research

This study represents a wide ranging exploration of integration policies and the ideologies that inform them. The dissertation discovers new findings, as well as more riddles. As many European governments are relying more heavily on civic integration policies, making sure the full universe of options are understood and available will be very important. Furthermore, some knowledge of their effects, especially on the understudied native population, will help future policy-makers make the best choices among them.

Theory

The dissertation argued for the abandonment of the traditional assimilation-vs.-multiculturalism dichotomy. It proposes a continuum-based understanding of integration ideologies, backed by empirical studies. The dissertation demonstrates the existence of four distinct ideologies, and supports a conceptual ordering of multiculturalism, then interculturalism, liberalism as identity, and assimilation (MILA). This support is clearly observed through the responses from the spring 2014 subject pool, as well as in tables twenty one and twenty two below. In the Netherlands, the ordering of the means for civic and projection measurements are also ordered according to this pattern.

My research also arranges these ideologies into a typology informed by less studied integration characteristics. This typology was tested in the dissertation’s quantitative study and frequently failed to conform to the typology’s predictions. An exception to this was the general performance of interculturalism, which both supported its group-oriented focus in both countries and over both comparisons of means and regression-based analysis.
The most interesting avenues for future research in the dissertation’s theory chapter come from its ordering study. What is particularly interesting is the third most popular ordering, which consists of interculturalism, followed by multiculturalism, assimilation, and liberalism as identity (IMAL). This is interesting, as it bucks the trend of putting assimilation and multiculturalism at the poles of their ordering. This trend is present in both the top two choices, as well as in the fourth most popular choice. According to the logic of my argument, multiculturalism and assimilation should not be placed so close to each other.

More intriguing still, this pattern is not uncommon in the data, as demonstrated by tables 29 and 30 below. We see IMAL ordering in the meaningfulness and civic measures in Belgium, as well as in the ethnic measure in the Netherlands. It also reflects Belgium’s aggregate preference for integration policies. What could bring the two most-extreme poles inwards like this? One explanation is that it could relate to the directionality of the vignettes, as interculturalism and multiculturalism are both two way vignettes, whereas assimilation and LAI are both one way. But then why should we not see the MILA arrangement of vignettes, which would fulfill the same requirements? Another possibility could be that there exists some kind of conceptual discontinuity between multiculturalism and assimilation (within IMAL that is). If that is the case, then we would observe both sides go from more restrictive to less. But then what would explain such a conceptual reset between multiculturalism and assimilation? A follow-up study asking people to explain such an ordering would be insightful in unraveling this riddle.

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21 With the ordering being interculturalism to multiculturalism first, followed then assimilation to liberalism as identity.
Qualitative Study

Following this reconceptualization of integration, the study moves towards a government level analysis of integration policies found in the Netherlands and in Flanders. Despite these lands similarities in geography, history, and economies, the policies at work could not be more different. The Dutch utilize a more coercive, hands-off, idea driven system that focuses on presenting integration as a demanding but high-quality service standardized to be appropriate and applicable to everyone. The Flemish, on the hand, have created a flexible, hands-on, individual and community focused system that adapts to the needs of those going through it and reaches out to members in the community to streamline this process. These prioritizations are seen not only in the body of the programs, but pervade throughout their entire governments. Echoes of these attitudes are also seen in their regulations against wearing burqas and their grant requests to the European Union.

The most promising future research on the level of government policy seems to be in exploring the macro-consequences of these systems. The quantitative study begins this process by observing the differences in how native people think about integration as a whole. In my interview with a representative from the Flemish Interior Ministry, the representative mentioned that there was frustration at a lack of results from their integration policy, confirmed by the number of foreign fighters in Belgium and overall levels of migrant poverty. Exploring what is going wrong in Belgium would be fascinating and instructive.

Further exploring regional variations in native attitudes may be a useful avenue for future research. Different onthaalbureaus (welcome desks) reach out to native Flemings in different ways and observing the regional variances among them (as well as gauging the attitudes of Flemings living in those regions) could be illuminating. As Scholten 2013 notes in his discussion
of integration policies in Rotterdam and Amsterdam, political differences between cities can be vast, even under the leadership of a national government with a central vision. Bak Jorgensen 2012 even notes that in Denmark, some municipalities have policies in direct contrast to the national policies! In the Flemish case, such a study would be particularly interesting as these onthaalbureaus are all run the same regional organization, which may or may not impact the variety of their offerings.

In regions where outreach is more plentiful, this may correspond to a decline in xenophobic attitudes. Similarly, there may be interesting neighborhood outreach efforts, such as those observed by De Zwart 2005. While Flemings in Ghent expressed some preference for intercultural policies in the large-n quantitative study, and this does align with the overall position of the Flemish government, would this finding hold in all of the Flemish provinces, such as in more conservative Antwerp or francophone Brussels? And how would this variation impact the daily life of ethnic Flemish citizens?

**Quantitative Study**

Finally, the dissertation conducts a large-n quantitative study about attitudes towards various integration policies. The survey served multiple purposes, asking opinions on questions related to the paper’s typology construction, certain elements inherent in each policy, the normative implications of certain policies, and respondent preferences between them. The survey unfortunately provides conflicting results, sometimes working in one country and not the other, or sometimes working only for certain ideological pairs.

Some promising avenues for future research here involve the curious findings of this research. We see that interculturalism often performs very well, most notably providing the most desirable normative combination of trust creation without projection. This calls for more
attention to interculturalism as a superior policy alternative. Likewise, liberalism as identity is generally not well received (with the Dutch being a little more welcoming to the ideology than the Flemish). Despite its frequent negative impact on the dependent variables of interest, these impacts are frequently statistically significant. The outcomes for liberalism as identity are surprising as the ideology was conceptualized as a policy more liberal-leaning than assimilation. Considering that liberalism as identity is becoming a popular phenomenon in the Dutch far right, this ideology should not be ignored. A follow-up study focusing only on this type of identity would be useful in understanding how people relate to LAI. It is possible that perhaps the identity is too abstract, with liberalism falling into a middle ground that is not appealing to anyone. Or perhaps it is charged with connotation drawing from the US-lead “War on Terror”, which is often framed as a battle between the liberal west and the illiberal east. Further research here would help in establishing a more conclusion.

Flanders and the Netherlands make interesting cases of study, because of their similarities. However, the Netherlands is a nation and possesses certain powers that the Flemish region does not. While there is certainly nationalism in Flanders, it does not control elements that would be very important in nations, such as border control and a degree of coercion in enforcing its integration policies. The study shows that the Flemish have considerably weaker feelings of attachment to the federal nation of Belgium than the Dutch do to the Netherlands. We see this reflected in their choice of favored policy, the group-oriented, two-way policy of interculturalism. Future studies would be helpful in strengthening a claim for causality here. However, this exploration supports an interpretation that Flemish government seeks to promote unity amongst its people in a robust and binding manner. Perhaps this is due to their lack of national powers that would be able to accomplish this normally.
By learning from social psychology, scholars can observe exciting new policies like interculturalism. It is from the hope of these new policies that they can provide superior policy making tools to navigate an increasingly complex world. My dissertation suggests that this promise is real and that through daring social science research, social cohesion and harmony can be more effectively achieved.
Figures and Tables

Figures

Figure One – Optimal Distinctiveness Model

*Source: Brewer, 1991

Figure Two – The Integration Policy Continuum

*Source: Brewer, 1991
Figure Three – Table One Overlaid onto Figure One

![Graph showing cultural integration goals]

Cultural Monism / Most Homogenizing

Cultural Pluralism / Most Differentiating

Figure Four – Flemish Integration Goals

![Diagram illustrating Flemish integration goals]

Source: East Flemish integration materials (Powerpoint)
**Figure Five:** Word Cloud “Naar Nederland”

really, education, language, live, Holland, more, well, one, school, children, all, own, people, good, work, because, exam, come, here, country, other, learn, Netherlands, important

*Service: http://worditout.com/word-cloud/make-a-new-one

**Figure Six:** Word Cloud “Migreren Naar Vlaanderen”

other, family, live, everyone, first, work, more, always, come, child, learn, home, language, many, Flanders, government, Dutch, Flemings, children, new, school

*Service: http://worditout.com/word-cloud/make-a-new-one
Figure Seven – (Turkish) Speaker Two

Figure Eight – (Russian) Speaker Two

Figure Nine – (Arabic) Speaker Four
Figure Ten – Compilation of Different Speakers

Figure Eleven – Speaker One from Naar Nederland
Figure Twelve – Speaker Two from Naar Nederland

Figure Thirteen – Geography of the Survey Cities

~87 miles

~91 miles

~21 miles
Figure Fourteen – Distances between the survey cities and the Dutch-Belgian Border

Tables

Table One – An Alternative Conception of Integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Outward Focused</th>
<th>Inward Focused</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>One-Way</strong></td>
<td>Liberalism as Identity</td>
<td>Assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two-Way</strong></td>
<td>Interculturalism</td>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
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Table Two – Vignette responses according to ideological dyad

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Question 1</th>
<th>Question 2</th>
<th>Question 3</th>
<th>Question 4</th>
<th>Question 5</th>
<th>Question 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A and L</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L and I</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I and M</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A and I</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A and M</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L and M</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Question 1</th>
<th>Question 2</th>
<th>Question 3</th>
<th>Question 4</th>
<th>Question 5</th>
<th>Question 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A and L</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L and I</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I and M</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A and I</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A and M</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L and M</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.00*</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Values shown are p-values testing the proposition that each vignette pair is drawn from a single population. P values rounded up to the nearest hundredth.
- * Indicate values that reject the hypothesis with statistical significance (p ≤ 0.05)
- A = Assimilation, L = Liberalism as Identity, I = Interculturalism, M = Multiculturalism
- Source: Responses from 902 Dutch and Belgian residents surveyed in the Autumn of 2013

Table Three – Frequencies of Hypothesis Supporting Sequences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis Supporting Sequences</th>
<th>Actual Frequency</th>
<th>Expected Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>23.25 (2/24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis Refuting Sequences</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>255.75 (22/24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Source: Responses from 279 American students surveyed in the Spring of 2014.
### Table Four – Top Six Most Common Combinations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordering</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALIM</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILA</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAL</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AILM</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMLA</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ordering column represents the way the four vignettes are ordered, left to right from first to last. They use the following acronyms: A: Assimilation, L: Liberalism as Identity, I: Interculturalism, M: Multiculturalism.
- Source: Responses from 279 American students surveyed in the Spring of 2014.

### Table Five: Word Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shared</th>
<th>Only Netherlands</th>
<th>Only Flanders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Follow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Own</td>
<td>Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>Everyone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learn</td>
<td>One</td>
<td>First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come</td>
<td>Here</td>
<td>Home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
<td>Exam</td>
<td>Child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>Well</td>
<td>Flanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Flemings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Live</td>
<td>Because</td>
<td>Many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>People</td>
<td>Always</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>New</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Important</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Really</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Flanders, Top 22 words (frequency of seven or more)
*Netherlands, Top 26 words (frequency of twenty-six or more)
### Table Six – Typology Outline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Coerciveness</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Sidedness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>“requires”</td>
<td>“our history and language”</td>
<td>“not”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism as Identity</td>
<td>“requires”</td>
<td>“our liberal values”</td>
<td>“not”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interculturalism</td>
<td>“requires”</td>
<td>“cooperation”</td>
<td>“---”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>“suggests”</td>
<td>“tolerance”</td>
<td>“---”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table Seven – Sample Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N=902</th>
<th>The Netherlands N=401</th>
<th>Belgium N=501</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Street Sample N = 349</td>
<td>City: Eindhoven N: 246</td>
<td>City: Ghent N:103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Sample N = 553</td>
<td>City: Tilburg N: 155</td>
<td>City: Ghent N: 398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table Eight – Ordering effects among vignettes (Belgium)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Nat ID</th>
<th>C.Priorit</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Individ.</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Projection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AX and IA</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AX and LA</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AX and MA</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX and AI</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX and LI</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX and MI</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LX and AL</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LX and IL</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LX and ML</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MX and AM</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MX and IM</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MX and LM</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Values below are p values.
*A = Assimilation, L = Liberalism as Identity, I = Interculturalism, M = Multiculturalism, X= Any vignette
### Table Nine – Ordering effects among vignettes (Netherlands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Nat ID</th>
<th>C.Priorit</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Individ.</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Projection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AX and IA</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AX and LA</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AX and MA</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LX and AI</td>
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<td>0.72</td>
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<td>LX and LI</td>
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<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>IX and MI</td>
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<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LX and AL</td>
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<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LX and IL</td>
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<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.00</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MX and AM</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MX and IM</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MX and LM</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Values below are p values.
*A = Assimilation, L = Liberalism as Identity, I = Interculturalism, M = Multiculturalism, X= Any vignette

### Table Ten – Number of responses per question per country (Belgium)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Nat ID</th>
<th>C.Priorit</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Individ.</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Projection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assim</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAI</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercult</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicult</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Values are the number of responses for each question

### Table Eleven – Number of responses per question per country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Nat ID</th>
<th>C.Priorit</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Individ.</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Projection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assim</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAI</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercult</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicult</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Values are the number of responses for each question
### Table Twelve – Mean responses per question (Belgium)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nat ID</th>
<th>C.Prior</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Individ.</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Projection</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assim</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAI</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercult</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>-0.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Values are the mean values for the non-order biased vignette evaluations

### Table Thirteen – Mean responses per question (Netherlands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nat ID</th>
<th>C.Prior</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Individ.</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Projection</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assim</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAI</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercult</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Values are the mean values for the non-order biased vignette evaluations

### Table Fourteen – Linear Modeling the Effects of Vignettes (Belgium)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV // DV</th>
<th>Nat ID</th>
<th>C.Prior</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Individ.</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.65***</td>
<td>0.62***</td>
<td>0.54***</td>
<td>-0.55***</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>1.00***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assim</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.31*</td>
<td>-0.41**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interculturalism</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.38**</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism as ID</td>
<td>-0.42***</td>
<td>-0.22*</td>
<td>-0.37**</td>
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Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variables are displayed on the columns, independent variables are displayed on the rows
*** p-value < 0.001
** p-value < 0.01
* p-value < 0.05
- Source: Author’s calculations from self-collected data
### Table Fifteen – Linear Modeling the Effects of Vignettes (Netherlands)

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Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are displayed on the columns, independent variables are displayed on the rows. *** p-value < 0.001, ** p-value < 0.01, * p-value < 0.05. - Source: Author’s calculations from self-collected data
Table Sixteen – Linear Modeling the Effects of Vignettes (Belgium)

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Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are displayed on the columns, independent variables are displayed on the rows.

*** p-value < 0.001
** p-value < 0.01
* p-value < 0.05

Source: Author’s calculations from self-collected data
Table Seventeen – Linear Modeling the Effects of Vignettes (Netherlands)

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Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are displayed on the columns, independent variables are displayed on the rows.

*** p-value < 0.001
** p-value < 0.01
* p-value < 0.05
- Source: Author’s calculations from self-collected data

Table Eighteen – Belgian Respondent Choices (Aggregate)

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### Table Nineteen – Dutch Respondent Choices (Aggregate)

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<td>25.4%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table Twenty – Respondent Choices (By Dyad)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>First (%)</th>
<th>Second (%)</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>First (%)</th>
<th>Second (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assim. vs. LAI</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>Assim. vs. LAI</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assim vs. Intercult.</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>Assim vs. Intercult.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assim vs. Multicul.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>Assim vs. Multicul.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAI vs. Assim.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>LAI vs. Assim.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAI vs. Intercult.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>LAI vs. Intercult.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAI vs. Multicul.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>LAI vs. Multicul.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercult. vs. Assim.</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>Intercult. vs. Assim.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercult vs. LAI</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Intercult vs. LAI</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercult vs. Multicul</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>Intercult vs. Multicul</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>55.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicul. vs. Assim.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>Multicul. vs. Assim.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicul. vs. LAI</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>Multicul. vs. LAI</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicul. vs. Intercult.</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>Multicul. vs. Intercult.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Values represent percentage chosen
Table Twenty-One - Relationship for national attachment and vignette choice (Belgium)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chose:</th>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>LAI</th>
<th>Interculturalism</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Least attached</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second least</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second most</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.5%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most attached</td>
<td></td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers represent percent of times each vignette was chosen for those who provided answers per attachment group

Table Twenty-Two - Relationship for national attachment and vignette choice (The NL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chose:</th>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>LAI</th>
<th>Interculturalism</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Least attached</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second least</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second most</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most attached</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers represent percent of times each vignette was chosen for those who provided answers per attachment group

Table Twenty-Three – Different levels of attachment within Belgium and the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean – Attachment to state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table Twenty Four – Relationship between sex and vignette choice (Belgium)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chose:</th>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>LAI</th>
<th>Interculturalism</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers represent percent of times each vignette was chosen for those who provided answers per gender
Table Twenty Five – Relationship between sex and vignette choice (The Netherlands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chose:</th>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>LAI</th>
<th>Interculturalism</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers represent percent of times each vignette was chosen for those who provided answers per gender

Table Twenty-Six – Relationship between age and vignette choice (Belgium)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chose:</th>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>LAI</th>
<th>Interculturalism</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Aged</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers represent percent of times each vignette was chosen for those who provided answers per age group

Table Twenty-Seven – Relationship between age and vignette choice (The Netherlands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chose:</th>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>LAI</th>
<th>Interculturalism</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Aged</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers represent percent of times each vignette was chosen for those who provided answers per age group
Table Twenty-Eight – Linear Modeling the Effects of Vignettes (Ghent Student Sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>1.19**</td>
<td>0.91*</td>
<td>-1.14*</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.30*</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>-0.35*</td>
<td>-0.36*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interculturalism</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.38*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism as ID</td>
<td>-0.34**</td>
<td>-0.34**</td>
<td>-0.47**</td>
<td>0.36*</td>
<td>-0.37*</td>
<td>-0.39*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
<td>-0.03**</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-Right</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variables are displayed on the columns, independent variables are displayed on the rows
*** p-value < 0.001
** p-value < 0.01
* p-value < 0.05
- Source: Author’s calculations from self-collected data

Table Twenty Nine – Vignette ordering for each question (Belgium)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assim</th>
<th>Nat ID</th>
<th>C.Priorit</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Individ.</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Projection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>3rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAI</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercult</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Values represent the magnitude of the responses per variable from most (1st) to least (4th)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nat ID</th>
<th>C.Priorit</th>
<th>Ethnic</th>
<th>Individ.</th>
<th>Trust</th>
<th>Projection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assim</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAI</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercult</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Values represent the magnitude of the responses per variable from most (1<sup>st</sup>) to least (4<sup>th</sup>)
Appendix A: Interview Questions

**KOMPAS- Ghent**

1.) Some people say that integration policy can be described as multicultural or assimilationist. How would you describe the integration policy found here? Does the policy always translate well into practice, or do you find your organization needs to be flexible some times.

2.) Does your office ever receive feedback as to the difficulty or ease for the process of assimilating into this country? Do you find it normally comes from immigrants, or from concerned citizens?

3.) Has the region’s integration policy ever invited any attention from [The Party for Freedom / Vlaams Belang / the National Front / a Far Right political group]? Could you tell me a little more about that?

4.) Is your office generally satisfied with the progress of its integration policy? Is there any area it feels it needs to devote more attention to?

5.) Does your office have any concern about hate crimes or discrimination happening in your region? Would you say there has been more, less, or the same amount of these crimes as usual?

6.) How much emphasis does the local integration policy place on civic elements in its integration policies. For example, informing migrants about the [Dutch/Belgian] government, national holidays, flag, and anthem?

7.) How much emphasis does the local integration policy place on the importance of group obligations and duties in becoming a [Dutch/Belgian] citizen? For example, voting, serving one’s country, paying taxes, etc.

8.) How much emphasis does the government place on the importance of individual rights and the freedom of a person to act in ways they are comfortable and familiar with? For example, protection of speech and religion, tolerance, and a celebration of diversity.

9.) What would you say are the ideal (if any) characteristics of a “good [Dutchman/Belgian]”?

**Bureau ICE**

1.) How did the Bureau ICE get the ability to write the Dutch integration exam? Was an open call put forward? Were there competitors?

2.) Are there multiple versions of the KNS portion of the integration exam? How does ICE combat cheating and/or question-leaking?
3.) What guidance does ICE provide to test-prep firms? How do people know what to study for the exam?

4.) Has the KNS been revised over time (esp. between the old and new style exams?)

5.) Is the KNS (or practice materials) provided in the ICE’s TOA package?

6.) Who provided the framework or test matrix for this exam? Did the government give ICE certain guidelines? What were they?

7.) Who was consulted in the exam making process? Answers for this kind of exam are not as clear as say a language test where set rules exist. Who was consulted to lend authority to this exam?

8.) Were other government integration or citizenship exams used as models?

9.) How did 70% become the pass-benchmark? How was this decided? Is it true that the exam was tested on four thousand people? Was 70% decided before or after the questions were created?

10.) Why is the KNS in Dutch? Isn’t there a risk of mixing up language skills with KNS skilled? Are they viewed as one in the same?

**Agency for the Interior**

1.) What brought about the need for the MO exam? Were there complaints that the classes were too simple or not helpful?

2.) Is it in Flemish or in other languages? If Flemish, is there a concern that it is unfair to people who have difficulty with languages but who know the culture well?

3.) How is the exam structured? Is it on paper or on a computer? Are there multiple versions or a bank of questions?

4.) Why is it currently only available in three cities? Is there a concern about calling it out to all of the onthaalbureaus? Or is there something the government wishes to see first?

5.) The test was developed by the University of Antwerp, is that correct? Was the development competitive, such as between different schools or firms?

6.) How do people know what to study before taking the exam? Is there a guide or some recommendations
7.) Were foreign integration or citizenship exams (such as the Dutch one), used to guide the development of the MO exam?

8.) Is there an older version of the exam or prototype that I could see?

9.) What was involved in the development of the exam in particular? What kinds of people are they? Did migrants have a voice in this process?

10.) How objective is the exam? How are the questions justified?

11.) How is the test monitored and regulated?

12.) If allowed, could I have contact information for the developers of the exam?
## Appendix B: Integration Documents Word Count Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank Order</th>
<th>Naar Nederland</th>
<th>Migreren Naar Vlaanderen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>Flanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>Flemings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Here, Holland</td>
<td>Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Children, many</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Dutch, government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Work</td>
<td>Other, everyone, live, new, school, child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>There, house</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Complete Collection of Flemish Video Speakers

Turkish

Speaker One

Speaker Two
Speaker Three

Speaker Four
Russian

Speaker One

Speaker Two
Speaker Three

Speaker Four
Appendix D: Sampling Procedure and Characteristics

Non-Student Sampling Procedure

The following procedure was used to gather respondents for the man-on-the-street portion of the study. Three public squares were randomly drawn from a series of sites located in the center of the city. These public sites were located in different parts of the main shopping center of the city. The first chosen site was where sampling initially began. This first-choice was semi-random, as the pool had to be restricted to accommodate local laws. For example, weekly markets often take place on certain days in these squares. The following tables contain the sites used for this survey and stipulations associated with them. Eindhoven had a fewer number of plein-candidates, as the city’s re-development after the Second World War de-emphasized the older style of square-oriented city planning.

Belgium Sites - Ghent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Site Name</th>
<th>Number of Responses</th>
<th>Stipulations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ghent</td>
<td>Groentemarkt</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Closed Friday-Sunday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ghent</td>
<td>Kalendeberg</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ghent</td>
<td>Korenmarkt</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Frequent Solicitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ghent</td>
<td>Kouter</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Closed Sundays, Low traffic after 5pm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Netherlands Sites – Eindhoven

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Site Name</th>
<th>Number of Responses</th>
<th>Stipulations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Eindhoven</td>
<td>September 18th plein</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Frequent Solicitors, Closed Thursday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Eindhoven</td>
<td>Catharinaplein</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Eindhoven</td>
<td>Kennedyplein</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Student traffic on weekdays only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Eindhoven</td>
<td>Markt</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Closed Thursday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Eindhoven</td>
<td>Piazza</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>Covered public space, used on rainy days only, in mid-December had periodic stage shows</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to periodic availability, weather and solicitors played roles in determining my site selection. Since this research was done in the fall and winter, rainy weather had to be constantly accommodated. During inclement weather, surveying was necessarily confined to covered locations present in each city.
A less controllable force concerned the frequent presence of solicitors at most locations (and especially at those locations where it is noted in the tables above). Locations with solicitors present were avoided, as their activities competed for the attention of potential respondents. Additionally, these solicitors seemed to negatively pre-dispose pedestrians from participating, as they create an incentive for quicker, more narrowly-focused movement into and out of the square being surveyed. While my usage of a sign for recruitment helped to mitigate this damage, the impact of their presence remained considerable. When solicitors entered the vicinity of my surveying site, this triggered a movement to an alternative, randomly chosen site until they relocated.

**Student Sampling Procedure**

Student sampling occurred in four total classes. All of the classes were social scientifically oriented, occurring in the disciplines of Political Science, Sociology, and Cultural Studies. The distribution and details can be found below. Like the street sample, students were screened on if they were a third generation immigrant or higher. Unlike the street sample, however, students were not required to live where they attended school. Because the Netherlands and Belgium are such small countries with developed mass transit systems, commuting students are common. In fact, their rail passes are often subsidized by the government. I do not anticipate this to bias the most-similar case study because these students do spend a substantial portion of their day in their city of study. Furthermore, if they do commute, it will be primarily from neighboring cities, as longer commutes will become exceedingly costly in terms of time and money (especially when comparable universities are found closer by, which they tend to be). Any difference between these neighboring cities and the cities of study will be negligible. This is especially true in the Netherlands, where many commuting students are from Eindhoven, a city already incorporated into the study. Other possible cities students may be commuting from include Breda and ‘s-Hertogenbosch, cities so similar to Eindhoven and Tilburg in their interests that they have formed an administrative network called BrabantStad or Brabant City for deep cooperation and collective negotiation.

**Student Samples**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Site Name</th>
<th>Number of Responses</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghent</td>
<td>Introduction to Political Science</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>Surveyed on 10/15/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tilburg</td>
<td>Introduction to Sociology</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>Surveyed on 10/08/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tilburg</td>
<td>Politics of Globalization</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Surveyed on 11/08/2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tilburg</td>
<td>Research Design: Ethnography</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Surveyed on 11/13/2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Overall Sample Characteristics**

Because respondents self-selected into the survey, and because of the ways respondents were selected, the sample is skewed in a number of different directions. While the sex of the
respondents were relatively evenly distributed, it does lean female. Similarly, because student sub-samples were utilized, the overall sample does lean towards younger respondents. This is also due to that group’s increased willingness to select into surveys. Finally, because the sample was pre-screened to incorporate third-generation immigrants and older, it does lean predominantly, but not exclusively, white.

**Sample Characteristics - Sex**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sample Characteristics - Age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Young</th>
<th>Middle Age</th>
<th>Old</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sample Characteristics - Ethnicity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Non-White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix E: Sign Design

In order to recruit respondents, this study used signs for recruitment. These signs were printed on an “A2” sized piece of paper (16.54 in. x 23.39 in.). These signs were printed in Dutch and double laminated for outdoor durability. Pictures of the signs used can be found below:

In English, the signs translate to the following:

Can You Help Me?

Student in search of Ghentians/Eindhovenians for a short survey.

* Only 14 questions! * No money necessary! *About five minutes!
Appendix F: Survey Text

Vignettes

“Imagine that the government is considering a new policy to help better integrate immigrant populations into the Netherlands. You hear on the evening news the following information about the policy:

(Assimilation): The policy requires attending a government-run integration course for immigrants entering the country from outside the Netherlands. The importance of our history and language would be especially emphasized under this policy. This message would not be communicated to native citizens.

(Liberalism as Identity): The policy requires attending a government-run integration course for immigrants entering the country from outside the Netherlands. The importance of our liberal values would be especially emphasized under this policy. This message would not be communicated to native citizens.

(Interculturalism): The policy requires attending a government-run integration course for immigrants entering the country from outside the Netherlands. The importance of cooperation would be especially emphasized under this policy. This message would also be communicated to native citizens.

(Multiculturalism): The policy suggests attending a government-run integration course for immigrants entering the country from outside the Netherlands. The importance of tolerance would be especially emphasized under this policy. This message would also be communicated to native citizens.
Integration Survey

{Section included only in student surveys}

* I live here in Eindhoven: Yes O No O
* Both of my parents were born in the Netherlands Yes O No O

{Below included in all surveys}

Please chose the option that best describes your understanding
I identify very closely with O O O O O I do not identify with
The Netherlands
Netherlands at all.

First Vignette Here

If this new policy became law, please chose the option that best reflects your understanding of how it would affect this country

According to me:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column A</th>
<th>Strongly Agree With Column A</th>
<th>Agree with Column A</th>
<th>No Change</th>
<th>Agree with Column B</th>
<th>Strongly Agree with Column B</th>
<th>Column B</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This new immigration policy would <strong>harm</strong> what it means to be a Dutchman</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>This new immigration policy would <strong>strengthen</strong> what it means to be a Dutchman</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This new immigration policy makes our institutions and obligations as citizens <strong>very important</strong></td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>This new immigration policy makes our institutions and obligations as citizens <strong>unimportant</strong></td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This new immigration policy makes our shared ethnic culture <strong>very important</strong></td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>This new immigration policy makes our shared ethnic culture <strong>unimportant</strong></td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>very important</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This new immigration policy makes <strong>individuals</strong> seem more important than groups</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>This new immigration policy makes <strong>groups</strong> seem more important than individuals</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This new immigration policy makes immigrants seem <strong>as trustworthy</strong> as people born here in the Netherlands</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>This new immigration policy makes immigrants seem <strong>not as trustworthy</strong> as people born here in the Netherlands</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This new immigration policy makes it <strong>impossible</strong> for a foreigner living here to be just as Dutch as a Dutchman</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>This new immigration policy makes it <strong>possible</strong> for a foreigner living here to be just as Dutch as a Dutchman</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Second Vignette Here**

**If this new policy became law, please chose the option that best reflects your understanding of how it would affect this country**

According to me:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column A</th>
<th>Strongly Agree With Column A</th>
<th>Agree with Column A</th>
<th>No Change</th>
<th>Agree with Column B</th>
<th>Strongly Agree with Column B</th>
<th>Column B</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This new immigration policy would <strong>harm</strong> what it</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>This new immigration policy would <strong>strengthen</strong></td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>means to be a Dutchman</td>
<td>what it means to be a Dutchman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This new immigration policy makes our institutions and obligations as citizens very important</td>
<td>This new immigration policy makes our institutions and obligations as citizens unimportant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This new immigration policy makes our shared ethnic culture very important</td>
<td>This new immigration policy makes our shared ethnic culture unimportant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This new immigration policy makes individuals seem more important than groups</td>
<td>This new immigration policy makes groups seem more important than individuals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This new immigration policy makes immigrants seem as trustworthy as people born here in the Netherlands</td>
<td>This new immigration policy makes immigrants seem not as trustworthy as people born here in the Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This new immigration policy makes it impossible for a foreigner living here to be just as Dutch as a Dutchman</td>
<td>This new immigration policy makes it possible for a foreigner living here to be just as Dutch as a Dutchman</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Circle One

Given the choice, I would prefer if [the first policy] [the second policy] were enacted into law.

Optional Demographics Questionnaire

- What year were you born in?

19____ (write in last two digits)

- What is your gender?

1.) Male
2.) Female
3.) Other

- What is the highest educational level that you have attained? If you are a student, what is the highest level you expect to complete?

1.) No formal education
2.) Incomplete primary school
3.) Complete primary school
4.) Incomplete Technical High School
5.) Complete Technical High School
6.) Incomplete University Prep. High School
7.) Complete University Prep. High School
8.) Incomplete Technical/Vocational College
9.) Complete Technical/Vocational College (B.A.)
10.) Complete Technical/Vocational College (M.A.)
11.) Incomplete University
12.) Complete University (B.A.)
13.) Complete University (M.A.)
14.) Incomplete Post University Education
15.) Complete Post University Education

- The choices below represent a range of incomes from people living in Europe. In what range does your household fall? Please specify the appropriate range, counting all wages, salaries, pensions, and other incomes

1.) € 0 - € 10,000
2.) € 10,000 - € 20,000
3.) € 20,000 - € 30,000
4.) € 30,000 - € 40,000
5.) € 40.000 - € 50.000
6.) € 50.000 +

- Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination?
  1.) No
  2.) Yes

- Which religion or religious denomination do you identify with?
  1.) No religion
  2.) Roman Catholic
  3.) Protestant
  4.) Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.)
  5.) Jew
  6.) Muslim
  7.) Hindu
  8.) Buddhist
  89.) Other

- Apart from weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days?
  1.) More than once a week
  2.) Once a week
  3.) Once a month
  4.) Only on special holy days
  5.) Once a year
  6.) Less often
  7.) Never, practically never

Do you currently have a job?

  1.) Yes – Full Time
  2.) Yes – Part Time
  3.) Yes - Homemaker
  4.) No – Unemployed
  5.) No – Student
  6.) No – Retired / On Pension

-Do you have any friends or close acquaintances that were not born in this country, but now permanently reside here?

  1.) No
  2.) Yes (one or two)
  3.) Yes (two to five)
  4.) Yes (more than five)
Do you have any colleagues at work that were not born in this country, but now permanently reside here?

1.) No
2.) Yes (one or two)
3.) Yes (two to five)
4.) Yes (more than five)

- In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix G: Subject Pool Dataset

The dataset drawn from the Political Science Department’s subject pool at the University of Illinois Urbana Champaign during the Spring of 2014 can be found in the file “Subject Pool Dataset.csv”. This departmental subject pool is IRB pre-approved.

The text of the question students were asked to respond to was:

“Read these alternative policies designed to better incorporate immigrants into our country. Arrange them from what seems to be the best policy (1) to what seems to be the worst (4).”
Appendix H: Public Survey Dataset

The dataset drawn from the student and public surveys during the Fall and Winter of 2013 can be found in the file “Public Survey Dataset.xlsx”

A copy of the survey participants filled out can be found in Appendix F. The associated IRB number for this research is #13797, PI: Carol Leff. In Belgium, permissions for this study can be referenced through its case number: DOS 2013 01545-006 XB, on file at the Commission for the Protection of Privacy.
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