FRBR, Information, and Intertextuality

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Abstract
Following from approaches that view information as documentary forms of specific communicative practices, this paper uses theoretical concepts derived from cultural theory to examine the concept of work in Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records (FRBR) in relation to authorship, the ur-text, and intertextuality. Historically, the practice of librarianship has existed on a foundation of standards, and among the earliest of the standards is the Anglo-American Cataloguing Rules (AACR). The basis of this set of standards is materialist: the object of scrutiny is the document, and the document, whatever its specific form, is considered to possess materiality. This paper argues that unlike the AACR, FRBR lays bare its own ideological underpinnings, and in so doing, it dematerializes the text and mystifies the creative process. At the same time, it has really been with the development of FRBR and linked-data models that library and information science has considered intertextual analysis at the level of the document rather than at a more abstract level. The idealism that underpins FRBR’s notion of work points to intertextuality, with all its potential for rich analysis, but at the same time embeds deep in its system the logocentrism of the ideal signified—another example of disciplining epistemology. The paper will examine these two interlinked themes through discussion of FRBR and the strange case of the vanishing text, the ur-text, and intertextuality.

Introduction
Using Foucault’s (1966/1974) analysis of localized knowledge/power regimes allows us to explore the everyday ideological power facilitated in and through the practice of librarianship, and in this context, it is possible to argue that while the idealism underpinning Functional Require-
ments for Bibliographic Records’ (FRBR) notion of work points to intertextuality with all its potential for rich analysis, at the same time, it embeds deep in its system the logocentrism of the ideal signified, thus disciplining epistemology. With its definition of work as an abstract concept, FRBR valorizes the Platonic distinction between the idea and the word. At the same time, it has really been with the development of FRBR and linked-data models that librarianship and information science have begun to explore the possibilities opened up by linking and intertextual mapping (see, for example, Bartlett & Hughes, 2011; Mäkelä, Hypén, & Hyvönen, 2012).

Another point of departure for this examination is Frohmann’s “Documentation Redux: Prolegomenon to (Another) Philosophy of Information” (2004), published in the original Library Trends philosophy of information special issue. Frohmann was interested in following Nunberg’s (1996) approach to information as documentary practice and cites Wittgenstein’s language-games to argue for language as embodied human practice:

When we look at Wittgenstein’s example, we do not see minds engaged in cerebration but embodied persons engaged in activities of operating with words. Wittgenstein calls such activities language-games; at other places, he uses different terms: “To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique” (Wittgenstein, 1958, §199). We can bring these ideas together under the category of practice. For Wittgenstein, attention to the actual practices with language deflates philosophical ideas of meaning by exposing them as occult and magical fantasies of essential connections undergirding language use. And since informativeness follows from meaningfulness, attention to practice also deflates ideas of information as the equally occult, noble, and intentional substance by virtue of which a document is informing. (p. 396)

Frohmann (2001) argued that there are three key ideas in Foucauldian discourse analysis that offer useful analytical resources for library and information science (LIS), of which the first is “the shift of theoretical attention from interpretation to the existence of statements, sets of statements, texts, and documents” (pp. 16–17). Moreover, the emphasis on the materiality of information is important because

... (p. 17)
The same impulse that underpins Frohmann’s Foucauldian-inspired work, which seeks to situate communicative practice in concrete, historically and culturally contingent human activity, underpins the current paper and the work of the cultural theorists that have been called on in the argument. My interest in exploring the *work* entity in FRBR is to highlight the dangers of abstraction—dangers that lead to reification, essentialism, and idealism. There are other ways of thinking about documentary practice, ways that acknowledge the materiality of documentary signs, their embeddedness in institutions and logonomic systems, the social discipline inherent in documentary practices, and their historicity (Frohmann, 2004, pp. 396–397).

At the same time, and calling on the double-faced disciplinary/emancipatory nature of library practice, the notion of *work* as described in FRBR points to a belief in the existence of an idealist metaphysical entity separate and anterior to specific manifestations of the work. While as a cultural materialist this is a position with which I am slightly uncomfortable, it is nevertheless a position that might offer links to the idealist intertextuality of Barthes and idealist approaches to information. Intertextuality as critique allows for the “death of the author”; FRBR’s *work* category allows for the dematerialization of the ur-text and, at the same time, implicitly celebrates the transcendent power of the signified.

**BACKGROUND**

The tradition of library cataloging and bibliographic description goes back to the foundations of librarianship as professional practice. Histories of cataloging exist elsewhere (for example, Chandel & Prasad, 2013; Denton, 2007; Miksa, 2012; Svenonius, 2000), and most emphasize the contribution of Antonio Panizzi, author of *91 Rules for the Compilation of the Catalogue* (1841), which, among other things, provided rules for author names and titles and anonymous works (Denton, 2007, p. 39). Discussion about the meaning of *work* began relatively early in the history of librarianship. Denton argues that Panizzi played a major part in explicitly engaging with the notion of *work*, “even though he did not think of it in that way” (p. 39). For Panizzi, the catalog was not merely a list of titles but an instrument that could inform the user about the differences among different editions of a title. Lubetzky and Svenonius (2001, cited in Denton, 2007) quote Panizzi’s own words in the “British Museum Report” (1850): “A reader may know the work he requires; but he cannot be expected to know all the peculiarities of different editions, and this information he has a right to expect from the catalogues.” They compare Thomas Carlyle’s view of the book as a material object unrelated to any other book in the library with Panizzi’s view of the book as an edition of a particular work, related to other editions and translations of the work, which should be integrated with those other editions and translations. For our purposes, it is interesting
to note that while there might be a difference of opinion here about the ontological status of the individual book, the focus appears to be on material objects rather than ideal speculations.

Denton (2007) argues that it is with Seymour Lubetzky and the adoption of the “Paris Principles” in 1961 that the notion of work takes center stage in the drafting of cataloging standards. Lubetzky viewed Cutter’s rules as being vague in relation to work. The “Paris Principles” (International Conference on Cataloguing Principles, 1963) state the following:

The catalogue should be an efficient instrument for ascertaining 2.1 whether the library contains a particular book specified by (a) its author and title, or (b) if the author is not named in the book, its title alone, or (c) if author and title are inappropriate or insufficient for identification, a suitable substitute for the title; and 2.2 (a) which works by a particular author and (b) which editions of a particular work are in the library.

Denton notes that while the first point is clearly based on Cutter’s rules, the second explicitly includes the word work, which fixes the “failure” that Lubetzky saw in confusing the book and the work. We can see some of the implicit assumptions underpinning the Paris Principles in and through Lubetzky’s writing. In “Principles of Cataloging,” Lubetzky (1969/2001) argued that the book comes into being as a dichotomic product—as a material object or medium used to convey the intellectual work of an author. Because the material book embodies and represents the intellectual work, the two have come to be confused, and the terms are synonymously used not only by the layman but also by the cataloger himself. Thus catalogers refer to the author and title of a book instead of, more accurately, to the author of the work and the title of the book embodying it, and the inquirer searching the catalog for a particular book is more often than not after the work embodied in it, although he is very likely unaware of the distinction between the two. . . . The question that must then be faced at the outset—and that has been faced since Panizzi, though beclouded by the failure to distinguish clearly and consistently between the book and the work—is whether the objective of the catalog should be merely to tell an inquirer whether or not the library has the particular book he is looking for, or whether it should go beyond that and tell him also what other editions and translations—or other representations—of the work the library has. (pp. 270–271; emphasis in original)

Here, there is a clear distinction between the material object and the intellectual work embodied within the material object. The distinction that Lubetzky wanted us to make is between the “author of the work” and the “title of the book embodying it.” Splitting the two in this way arguably allowed for the further development of idealist concerns about the contents of authors’ heads. The distinction between idea and word, a distinction deriving from Platonic idealism, has been made more explicit in FRBR than
it was in AACR (Anglo-American Cataloguing Rules). AACR did not force us to ponder the nature of work or whether we are distinguishing between ideas in authors’ heads and signs embodied within documents, but it provided us with rules to undertake specific bibliographic tasks in relation to material documents, including the provision of uniform titles to describe documents in existence. The basis of AACR is materialist: the object of scrutiny is the document, and the document, whatever its specific form, is considered to possess materiality. In its rubric, AACR avoids explicit reference to its own ideological assumptions; unlike AACR, however, FRBR lays bare its own ideological underpinnings, and in so doing, dematerializes the text and mystifies the creative process.

FRBR and the Strange Case of the Vanishing Text
In 1997, the International Federation of Library Associations (IFLA) set up a working party whose remit to develop new approaches to bibliographic description is documented in FRBR. FRBR states the aim of the working party and the methodology undertaken to actualize the work. The project is of some historical importance, in that this was the first time that bibliographic description analysis had been undertaken using an entity-relationship model. Carlyle’s (2006) paper situates the FRBR entity-relationship (e-r) model in its broader context. She discusses the roles and purpose of models in general, and e-r models in particular, emphasizing that their purpose is to offer a framework for problem solving and their validity and success can be measured by their usefulness. An e-r model does not represent the only way to describe the phenomenon under scrutiny, just one of the ways to describe the phenomenon, and it is in this light that she asks us to consider FRBR.

In this context, it might be useful to consider FRBR through the lens of Foucault’s localized instruments of ideology. Librarianship is an interesting practice to examine in relation to emancipation and ideology. It has always been an emancipatory profession because its purpose and focus are not merely to develop, order, and maintain collections but to make those collections of documentary forms available to users. It creates products and processes to facilitate access, such as open-access libraries, catalogs and metadata standards, OPACs (online public access catalogs), and, increasingly, online repositories. At the same time, everyday, its professional practice necessarily imposes conventional ideology, as its products are historically and culturally contingent. One of the interesting results of the FRBR project is that it has revealed the assumptions underpinning the notion of work in a way that AACR never really did. The FRBR model may not be the only possible one, but it is the one that the IFLA has chosen to publish, and to the extent that IFLA is a powerful institution, so the FRBR model promotes a certain worldview and a particular epistemological perspective.
FRBR’s e-r model identifies groups of entities and the relationships among them. Group 1 includes the following entities: work, expression, manifestation, and item. Work is described in FRBR as “a distinct intellectual or artistic creation”: “a work is an abstract entity; there is no single material object one can point to as the work. We recognize the work through individual realizations or expressions of the work, but the work itself exists only in the commonality of content between and among the various expressions of the work” (IFLA, 2009, p. 17). The second entity defined in the model is expression, which is defined as “the intellectual or artistic realization of a work in the form of alpha-numeric, musical, or choreographic notation, sound, image, object, movement, etc., or any combination of such forms.” An expression is the specific intellectual or artistic form that a work takes each time it is “realized.” Expression encompasses, for example, the specific words, sentences, paragraphs, and so on that result from the realization of a work in the form of a text, or the particular sounds, phrasing, and so on resulting from the realization of a musical work. The expression entity has boundaries, but in relation to the work entity, boundaries are more fluid and seem to be dependent to some extent on cultural relativity: “the concept of what constitutes a work and where the line of demarcation lies between one work and another may in fact be viewed differently from one culture to another” (p. 19).

Underpinning the model is a view of the world that distinguishes among the idea, the mental concept, and the word (the material manifestation of the mental concept), a disjunction that has underpinned much of Western epistemological philosophy. In semiotic terms, the signified (idea) in this model is dislocated from and precedes the signifier (word). Doerr and LeBoeuf (2007), for example, distinguish between the substance of work as “the concepts or internal representations of our mind” and the substance of expression as “signs or symbols. It is only representation. It has no direct intellectual qualities, but humans can interpret the signs and recognize the work behind” (p. 119). They write that it is only when work is externalized for the first time that its creation becomes evident, although the author may have conceived it, or claimed to have conceived it, at another date. Ideas exist in our minds, sometimes in a way that is volatile and not evident, but these might, Doerr and LeBoeuf argue, already “exist as parts of a work” (p. 120). Here, work becomes something akin to a metaphysical signified—unknown, immaterial, and speculative. This view of work seems to assume that accessing work through expression is unproblematic for human interpreters.

Creider (2006), on the other hand, suggests that while the definition of work in FRBR “preserves Lubetzky’s insight that readers look for works rather than particular objects, the corollary is that the critic, the reader, the cataloger, or even the work’s creator(s), never actually encounter ‘the work’ but only a specific realization of it” (p. 4). He argues that the defi-
nition shares much with, and is possibly partially derived from, current textual-criticism scholarship, which “distinguishes between the work as conceived by the author (authorial intention) or reader (reception) and the physical document that never contains a ‘perfect’ or ‘complete’ version of the work but which is the only means through which the work can be encountered” (p. 4). Creider notes that while FRBR offers a list of modifications that are expressions and a list of examples of modifications that might be considered new works, its explanation that a new work results from “a significant degree of independent intellectual or artistic effort” is a “valiant attempt to cover the ground without providing a list of all possible cases” (p. 4), which does not address the social and intellectual factors that are involved in the processes of determining the boundaries of a work.

Work is difficult to pin down, in Creider’s view, because the mental construct must exist not only in the mind of the author but also in

the minds of editors, publishers, readers and critics, even catalogers. These individuals, who can be called users, may not (almost certainly do not) share identical constructs of a work. Further, those constructs may or may not be accessible to other minds. As the construct varies, therefore, a given work’s identity may differ from one individual to another, both synchronically (users at the same or approximately the same point in time) and diachronically (the construct may also differ over time). (2006, p. 8)

Here again, the definition of work seems to point to some transcendental signified that is possibly out of reach.

Users generally form their concept of a work, according to Creider, beginning with

some notion derived from the descriptions and references made by others and encountered in encyclopedias, in lectures, in advertisements, in casual conversations, on the Internet, or even in bibliographic records. The user employs the constructs of others to arrive, however vaguely, at a construct of that work. In other words, questions of reception are inextricably connected with the definition of the boundaries of a work. . . . All of these factors mean that the definition of the boundaries of a work is to a considerable extent a subjective yet social process, often extending over a span of time. (2006, p. 8)

In this discussion, the boundaries of a work are not clear-cut and objective, but dependent on reception, interpretation, and also diachronic transformation. (See also Heaney [1995] on the existence of works over time.)

Smiraglia (2002) writes of the relationship among work, expression, and manifestation in FRBR:

In this schema, a work begins as a set of impressions (ideational concepts) in the mind of its creator (what I called above “authorial intention”).
Once the creator has mulled over these impressions sufficiently to formulate an ordered presentation, then they may take on the characteristics of expression (ideational content). Once expressed, capture as a specific set of semantic and ideational strings yields an ordered set that is a concrete manifestation of the work. A manifestation, in turn, may be embodied in one or more items. (p. 4)

There are some practical problems with this. For example, if the work relates to the ideas in the creator’s head, which themselves derive from signs circulating in society at a given moment, contemporary and historical, one might wonder at what point, precisely, in the process the work emerges. How closely related are the impressions formulated into an ordered presentation and the captured, fixed text? Manzanos (2010, p. 66) makes the point that the question of “how come some ‘ideas’ in the mind of the author—if the work consists of ‘ideas’—is a matter for psychology and not Information Science.” Moreover, “the testimonies of those who have created works can not presume one only way of being of the creative process. From Mozart, who hears his work ‘not as a sequence of things, as they will appear, but as a whole,’ to Strauss, who comes up with a two-bar phrase, which then will develop slowly, all variants are possible.”

An example from Hodge and Kress (1988) might help to illustrate the difficulties inherent in trying to map the processes involved in the creation side of artistic and/or intellectual production. They distinguish between the manuscript form, handwritten by Sylvia Plath ten days before her suicide, and the printed text of her poem “Child.” They argue that in the manuscript form, with its crossings out, underlinings, angles and shifts from clearly delineated characters to messier, mixed-up letters and stanzas, the despair shows through. The published, printed text is very different: it is precise, ordered, hypnotic, its boundaries clear indeed: “the signifiers have stabilized the semiotic act by assigning it to a recognized genre, poetry” (p. 118). The poem in print removes the material traces left by the material social being, Plath (p. 119). Through technology and production processes, the material author has been disciplined and controlled, at the same time as the myth of the unstable and despairing Plath is in circulation, informing interpretation. In this case, it would seem that Plath’s thoughts only became formulated into an “ordered impression” at the actual point of transcribing words onto paper, the marks on the paper showing the work being done as the writing happened. The mechanics of working in and through writing are often seen in relief in poets’ manuscripts in particular. In the case of Plath, the text that readers have come to know through the printed medium arguably differs from the handwritten ur-text. The technology of print—not, perhaps, part of Plath’s intention—has shaped the text in circulation.

Another interesting example of the difficulty in determining the moment at which the work emerges might be found in the publishing history
of Ferdinand de Saussure’s *Cours de linguistique générale [Course in General Linguistics]* (1916/1974), which was published posthumously based on notes taken from his lectures in Geneva. All texts have specific, material histories, and the vagueness of authorial mulling does not seem to cover the complexities of creation.

There is some debate about the boundaries of a *work* and the relationship between *work* and *expression*. Smiraglia (2007), discussing instantiation networks of popular literature, distinguishes between derivations (in which there is little or no change in ideational content, so that “a new instantiation is said to be a derivation, even if the semantic content is entirely changed [as in the case of a translation or transposition]”) and mutations (in which the ideational content also shows change). Smiraglia traces instantiation networks of popular texts—for example, Shaw’s *Saint Joan*—and demonstrates how the concept *work* allows for the construction of such networks. Questions of interpretation remain in relation to the boundaries between *work* and *expression*, however, and the whole edifice is built on the abstract notion of *work*. Carlyle (2006) offers some examples to help distinguish between *work* and *expression*, although she argues such considerations might differ with different interpretations and different cultural contexts (as acknowledged in FRBR’s rubric)—indeed, it might be that *work*/*expression* categories could be dissolved into one. Carlyle suggests treating the Alistair Sim film version of *A Christmas Carol* as a work, related to Dickens’s work though individual enough to merit the *work* category (and there is an implicit categorical hierarchy in these entities). In the same article, she offers some examples of the types of questions users ask, categorized in FRBR terms: “A library user may ask a question like ‘Do you have Seamus Heaney’s translation of *Beowulf*?’ (a request for an *expression*)” (p. 266).

With this example, Carlyle takes us into two highly charged areas in cultural and literary politics: that of the relationship between translation and original, and that of Irish literature. In relation to the first issue, Zeller (2000) explains that there is an Anglo-American cultural bias against seeing translators as authors, which is nowhere more obvious than the way in which translators are treated in classified library catalogs. She is referring to AACR’s treatment of translators, where editors and compilers may be awarded the status of main author, but translators are not because “the reason, I fear, is that translation is perceived as a mere transfer of an author’s vision from his language into another language. It follows, then, that to information specialists translation is little more than a mechanical process. Yet nothing could be further from the experience of a literary translator” (p. 135). This cultural bias has been transferred over to the FRBR model, arguably with a more explicit emphasis on the hierarchy of creation. As regards the second point, Heaney’s translation of *Beowulf*, although widely praised as a poem, has not been without some critique as
a translation, particularly in regard to his use of “Irishisms”—a tactic that arguably radicalizes the poem, which becomes, in the hands of this Irish author, a cultural-political intervention. According to Geremia (2007), for example,

Heaney’s controversial translation of *Beowulf* shows characteristics that make it look like an original work: in particular, the presence of Hiberno-English words and some unexpected structural features such as the use of italics, notes and running titles. Some of Heaney’s artistic choices have been brought into question by the Germanic philologists, who reproached him with his lack of fidelity to the original text. Moreover, the insertion of Hiberno-English words, which cause an effect of estrangement on Standard English speakers, was considered by some critics not only an aesthetic choice but a provocative act, a linguistic and political claim recalling the ancient antagonism between the Irish and the English. (p. 57)

We are right into the heart of Irish cultural politics with our rather blunt description of Heaney’s poem as an *expression*. FRBR considers translations to be *expressions*, however: “By contrast, when the modification of a work involves a significant degree of independent intellectual or artistic effort, the result is viewed, for the purpose of this study, as a new *work*. Thus, paraphrases, rewritings, adaptations for children, parodies, musical variations on a theme and free transcriptions of a musical composition are considered to represent new *works*” (FLA, 2009, p. 18). Who is to determine the point at which a translation becomes a rewrite and thus a *work*? In cultural-political terms, these things might matter. Feinberg (2013), commenting on the Platonic idealism underpinning the *work* concept, and indeed the lack of a precise and specific definition, points to other, less rigid notions of the *work*: for example, O’Neill and Vizine-Goetz (1989) and Renear and Dubin (2007), who see *work* in terms of a relationship or category rather than an entity. Andersen (2002) describes *work* in more materialistic terms when he writes of the term as referring to a “class of objects (this is similar to how Wilson [1968] conceives of the work), rather than an object,” and cites Shillingsburg’s (1991, p. 48) definition of a *work* “as that which is implied by and bounded by its physical manifestations” (pp. 49–50).

There are some approaches to language and idea developed by Marxist philosophers of language that might be useful in unpacking the disjunction of signified and signifier implicit in FRBR’s *work* entity, and that might provide alternative or perhaps complementary frameworks for developing models of the bibliographic universe—for example, Raymond Williams’s (1976) *cultural materialism*. Writing at the same time as Richard Hoggart and with the similar purpose of opening up a space in the British academy for the development of cultural studies, Williams was careful to identify different aspects of culture. He identified culture as lived expe-
rience certainly, but in relation to historical cultural analysis; the major way we access lived experience of past cultures is through documentary cultural products. Focusing our attention on the documentary, on the products, rather than concerning ourselves with the process of creation, might be helpful. For Williams, culture is always material, and specific objects of culture grow out of specific conditions of cultural production. 

Signification, he argues, the social creation of meanings through the use of formal signs, is then a practical material activity; it is indeed, literally, a means of production. It is a specific form of that practical consciousness which is inseparable from all social material activity. It is not, as formalism would make it, and as the idealist theory expression had from the beginning assumes, an operation of and within “consciousness,” which then becomes a state of a process separated, a priori, from social material activity. It is, on the contrary, at once a distinctive material process—the making of signs—and, in the central quality of its distinctiveness as practical consciousness, is involved from the beginning in all other human social and material activity. (p. 202)

As librarians and information professionals, we are concerned with the documentary products of the creative process, and the documentary objects that we have to describe grow out of specific conditions of cultural production. Following Nunberg (1996), we can take a historical approach: from the late eighteenth century until the digital era, we were concerned mainly with books, but also periodicals, newspapers, and “gray literature,” and we developed standards to describe these objects. Now, we have to deal with digital objects—websites, articles in databases, social-media sites, tweets—as well as traditional documents, and although these are digital texts in the Web environment, they also have specific forms—material forms, developed from the specific conditions of production (for example, tweets cannot be more than 140 characters long).

The social semiotics of Hodge and Kress (1988), based on a materialist interpretation of Saussure (1916/1974) and borrowing concepts from Voloisinov (1973), offers a useful framework through which to think about documents as signs operating within an active social language. Partly developed from a critique of Saussure, social semiotics is concerned with parole, diachrony, time, history, process and change, the process of signification, the structure of the signified, and the material nature of signs (Hodge and Kress, 1988, p. 18). Social semiotics sees semiotic activity as occurring within logonomic systems and subject to diachronic transformation. In this context, a logonomic system is “itself a set of messages, part of an ideological complex but serving to make it unambiguous in practice” (p. 4). Logonomic systems are visible—seen, for example, in politeness conventions, industrial relations, and legislation. Logonomic rules code a set of messages arising from interactions and are able to indi-
cate the status of dominant and dominated; for example, “mother-in-law jokes” were regular features of 1970s British comedy shows but would perhaps be less acceptable in the early twenty-first century. Social semiotics uses the notion of the Saussurean sign made up of signifier/signified and also Peircean typology of signs to help map out varieties of signs. Following Volosinov, ideas are seen as developing in and through language as communicative practice.

Communicative practice is a process through which documentary records are formed, and communicative practice always takes place within specific logonomic parameters. Documentary products are determined by the practices of production, distribution, circulation, and consumption facilitated by these logonomic parameters. In the conventional book-publishing world, facilitators include book publishers, shops, and libraries operating in a capitalist environment, so there is a dialectical relationship between the production of the individual documentary record (for example, the book) and the determinants of logonomic systems (for example, novels are “marketable,” therefore novels, rather than other forms of fiction, are likely to be sought by publishers). Moreover, any individual author is always-already born into an existing bibliographic universe and writes within an already existing set of genres, forms, metaphors, themes, and so on. Rather than seeing the relationship as author creating an original text for reader, the relationship might be expressed as author-as-reader, or decoder, preceding author-as-author, or encoder (Rafferty, 2009). The position draws heavily from Marxist approaches to authorship and the critique of the conventional view of the singular genius of the author, and indeed the originality of the document. Barthes (1981), for example, argues against the traditional distinction of work/text and the notion of the author as authorial by writing about the always-already nature of writing, which is born into already existing intertexts of language, culture, and so forth.

Considering work and authorship through the prism of a cultural-materialist, social semiotic–influenced framework begs the question of whether the notion of work in FRBR, as explicated by Smiraglia (2007), is really a blurring of certain diachronic transformations that occur in and through the history of cultural processes and products. Perhaps focusing on the “ideational content” being molded into product is focusing on the wrong part of the process, and with it comes a certain mystification of labor. Hall’s essay “Encoding/Decoding” (1980/2006) might be of some interest here. Although his model is specifically developed in relation to television news programs, there is some value in considering his focus on mass communications as a complex structure of relations. Hall characterizes the mass-communications process as a structure produced and sustained by the articulation of linked distinctive “moments,” which in his typology are production-circulation, distribution/consumption, reproduction. The objects of these practices are meanings
and messages in the form of sign-vehicles, which are organized through the “operation of codes within the syntagmatic chain of a discourse” (p. 167). At the production end of the model, the process requires “the institutional structures of broadcasting, with their practices and networks of production, their organized relations and technical infrastructures” (p. 167). The circulation of the product takes place in its discursive form. Once accomplished, the discourse “must then be translated—transformed, again—into social practices if the circuit is to be both completed and effective” (pp. 166–167). If there is no “meaning” taken, there is no consumption, and if the meaning is not “articulated in practice, it has no effect” (p. 167). Each moment is necessary in the circuit as a whole, but no moment can guarantee the next moment with which it will articulate.

Arguably, the structuralist language, so popular at the time Hall’s essay was written, has some potential for a reductive reification of the text and a tendency toward idealism in its minimal connection with human agents of production; nevertheless, implicit in this framework is the recognition of the materiality of the message in the form of the broadcast text, and recognition that human agents both produce and receive the message. The term encoding takes us away from the notion of the individual genius of the author/creator, suggesting the formation of the sign in and through already existing cultural codes and conventions and signifying practices. Although Hall was using this term in relation to television, there is some merit in reflecting on it more generally because, following Barthes (1981) and Kristeva (1986), we might see all cultural production as intertextual communicative practice. Hall also emphasizes the communicative framework through which meaning is made and interpretation occurs. For our purposes, in thinking of the notion of the work as an abstract, perhaps the value of this model is that it has the potential to provide us with a theoretical framework that models cultural communication as a historical process based on concrete, real forces and relations of production in the material world.

Following Hall, such a framework might view cultural production and distribution as consisting of encoding (following Williams [1976, p. 33], we might argue that any encoding occurs within the structure of feeling of the historical and cultural moment), which occurs in and through the production of the documentary sign (determined by logonomic systems and rules and historically contingent cultural conventions) and circulation of the documentary sign (in its discursive form), and distribution/consumption (its reception, circulation, and interpretation through various decoding positions), leading to reproduction of the documentary sign, and so on.

This general model would hold with Web-based documentary signs, as well as with conventional documentary signs, although the specifics of production and distribution change and speed up the consumption part of the process. Using this model allows us to see the concerns of infor-
information science as being focused on documentary signs at the points of circulation, distribution/consumption—definitely not production, when the readers have access to the signs in material form. Our interests would then be less concerned with the author than with readership and interpretative practice of material documentary forms.

Using a cultural-materialist, social semiotic framework that might be constructed from the works of theorists Volosinov, Hodge and Kress, Williams, and Hall allows us to focus on signifying practice as material, and enables us to see the dangers inherent in the FRBR approach, which are those of dematerializing the text and mystifying the creative process. A cultural-materialist position would query the notion that Jane Eyre exists in the abstract, and would take the view that there is always the material ur-text in relation to documentary ontology. What we have knowledge of, in Hall’s terminology, is the syntagmatic chain of discourse circulating in and through sign-vehicles. We know about Jane Eyre because Charlotte Brontë wrote the text that was sent in manuscript form to five publishers, the final one of which published the book in typographical form. Its history is that it has been so popular that it remains in print to this day, it has been translated into other languages, and it has inspired many adaptations for stage, film, and television, as well as talking-book versions, often abridged. Jane Eyre is known as a distinct intellectual and artistic creation because of its production, circulation, and reception history, not because of some abstract and metaphysical existence.

There are some texts without conventional ur-texts, such as stories and fairytales that emanate from an oral tradition, thus crossing boundaries between written text and performance and disrupting neat distinctions between original, or progenitor work, and modified instantiation. Even in this context, Nicolas (2005) argues, the identity conditions for work are, above all, historical and normative. Turner, Feinberg, and Holland (n.d.) write about the “fixity of documents and the fluidity of works” in relation to oral-tradition documents, suggesting that it is the fluidity that is the property of the oral expression as work and not as document (p. 3). Although they borrow from textual scholars the distinctions between text as “a particular expression of semantic content,” document as “the physical embodiment of that,” and work, which for some textual scholars means “authorial intentions,” they make the point that other lines of textual scholarship consider work as a production process (McGann, 1983) or as a pragmatic regulation principle (Eggert, 1999). Using this as a starting point, Turner, Feinberg, and Holland suggest that work is a “dynamic category that relates textual versions.” Texts constituting a work are fixed, but the work may change as “more texts are added to the work set, as interpretations of the texts change, and in different contexts of use” (p. 5). Important for us here is that they see work as referring to something other than what is in the head of the author(s); the focus is historical and material, embracing interpretation, reception, and diachronic transformation.
Turner, Feinberg, and Holland follow this argument with the observation that *work* cannot then be defined and delineated generically, and in so doing follow FRBR’s own acknowledgment that *work* has different meanings in different contexts. In relation to a poem by Byron, we can “identify a chronological chain of versions emanating from one single progenitor text”—in other words, the ur-text; however, for Yugoslav oral epic, “we cannot rely on traditional markers such as authorship or a chain of texts linked to a single ancestor” (p. 6). They use the Parry-Lord model, which argues that a basic sequence of narrative units may underlie many songs, to map the primary regulatory principle for oral epic (p. 7). Albert Lord (2000) describes a large group of songs dealing with “such diverse actions as the return of the hero, rescues, weddings and the capture of a city,” which share a “pattern of captivity and freedom” (qtd. in Turner, Feinberg, & Holland), and argues that these songs are almost similar and can be considered as the same work. Turner, Feinberg, and Holland’s argument is that we need different definitions of *work* based on specific contexts, an argument that follows FRBR in spirit, but the notion of *work* here would appear to depend on concrete expression(s) of some form of communicative practice rather than authorial intention and ideal abstraction.

Do such things matter? On the one hand, one might argue that in practice, they might not matter at all, for as Carlyle (2006) reminds us, the FRBR model is pragmatic and the work/manifestation categories might in some information systems be collapsed into one. On the other hand, Foucault reminds us of the power of everyday, localized practices as transmitters of ideology, and the explicit statement in FRBR of the abstract nature of work is one that perhaps needs to be countered and critiqued, if only to show that such critique exists.

**Intertextuality and FRBR**

While on the one hand, the FRBR model imposes the logocentrism of the ideal signified, on the other, the model, through its emphasis on relationships, allows for the development of rich intertextual bibliographic information systems in a way that, arguably, AACR and other earlier bibliographic standards did not. Barthes (1981) wrote about intertextuality in idealist terms, subverting the traditional notion of the individuality of the author through the concept of intertexts and the web of textuality, arguing that “any text is a new tissue of past citations. Bits of code, formulae, rhythmic models, fragments of social languages, etc., pass into the text and are redistributed within it, for there is always language before and around the text” (p. 39). His interpretation of intertextuality is very antihumanist, and in that sense is quite opposed to the interpretations of interrelationships among texts found in Bloom’s (1973) thesis about the “anxiety of influence.” Humanist and materialist approaches to the interrelationships among texts view documentation as practice so that material documents have relationships through human agency with other docu-
ments, both anterior in historical time and contemporaneous. The idea of influence, however, has significance across a broad range of positions.

The notion of intertextuality and the insights offered by semiotics have inspired interesting work in the areas of HCI (human–computer interaction) and information design. Marcoux and Rizkallah (2007) have been working on the notion of intertextual semantics since the mid-2000s. They use this phrase to describe a semantic framework in which the semantic intentions of the modelers would be easy to communicate to human authors, right in the editing window, at the creation time of valid XML documents. This idea might be expressed bluntly as “showing authors the immediate textual context in which their content is going to be interpreted, is the best way to get pretty much exactly what you want from them.” The name that Marcoux and Rizkallah have chosen for this semantic framework is explicitly drawn from Kristeva: “We suggested the phrase intertextual semantics (IS)—after ‘intertextuality,’ coined in 1966 by Bulgarian philosopher Julia Kristeva—for our semantic framework. The phrase ‘intertextual semantics’ was chosen to reflect the idea that meaning is given to a document fragment (or piece of data) by placing it in a network of other texts or text segments (‘interrelated texts,’ hence the name)” (p. 1).

The fundamental hypothesis underpinning Marcoux and Rizkallah’s (2009) approach to the design of information is that at least some form of communication between humans can be viewed as the preparation, transmission, and in some cases, storage and management, of information-bearing objects (IBOs), some of which are decoded (or interpreted) by readers (or users) who make sense of them. Actual communication usually takes place in sequences of such exchanges, which can be called dialogues or conversations. Each step of a dialogue, or conversation, contributes to the context of the upcoming exchanges and thus influences how readers decode the IBOs involved. As a whole, a conversation is itself situated in a broader context, which influences how the entire sequence of exchanges is interpreted. For example, an overheard conversation may lead one to think that someone is angry, but if it appears that the conversation was part of a performance by actors, it will be understood that the anger was simulated. (p. 1897)

In “Intertexual Semantics: A Semantics for Information Design,” Marcoux and Rizkallah (2009) discuss communication as communicative practice and explicitly use the language of semiotics. They are interested in signifiers and the uniformity of interpretation, the measure of meaning, and the importance of context. Their concerns are with creating rich document-modeling systems, but at present, their focus is on information-oriented documentation, or IBOs (information-bearing objects). They recognize that questions relating to uniformity of interpretation might well depend on the type of document and its purpose, provenance, authorship, and audience:
In some cases, ending up with a rendition that has uniform interpretations in the target community is not at all a design goal. This would be the case, for example, with works of art for which the scattering of possible interpretations is desired, or in computer games where the process of converging towards a “final” interpretation is meant to be iterative and gradual, even for a single user. However, we claim that in applications where communication is first and foremost a matter of conveying facts or triggering actions—which we think applies to most business applications—having renditions with as uniform interpretations as possible should be a design objective. (p. 1898)

For Marcoux and Rizkallah, IBOs can be concrete, material objects like books, but they can also be nonmaterial objects like words, sentences, database records, moving images (although film would seem to be material), and icons. Nonmaterial IBOs become physically perceivable through renditions; with increasingly sophisticated technologies like “transient image- and sound- (and, more recently, tactile and olfactory stimuli) production capability of technologies such as screens and loudspeakers, renditions appear to the reader as consultations of material IBOs, in virtually every respect but materiality” (p. 1897). This leads the authors to suggest that it might be possible to consider material IBOs as particular renditions of nonmaterial IBOs, a move that is, in some ways, reminiscent of Derrida’s privileging of the word over the written text. Renditions can use a variety of semiotic systems. They might be of a specific modality like text, image, or sound, or they might be multimodal; and within specific modalities, there are choices about signifiers among all those possible for that modality (p. 1897).

Marcoux and Rizkallah’s research is still in its early stages, and the choice of renditions they use as examples is still focused on informative and/or performative communicative practices, but what is of interest in relation to this paper is the centrality of the notion of intertextuality and the theoretical concepts of semiotics to their thinking. It might be worth noting in passing that the idealist disjunction between word and text that we see in the FRBR model also seems to underpin Marcoux and Rizkallah’s thinking, since they write that “in designing a rendition, a designer must first choose one or more modalities, then signifiers, to convey his or her ‘message’” (2009, p. 1898). Here, there is a distinction between the message and the rendition in and through which it is to be conveyed; however, that fact that the word message is enclosed in quotation marks might suggest that the authors are aware that the distinction is perhaps one that tends toward the artificial though nonetheless is useful for analysis, much as semioticians use the artificial distinction between denotation and connotation to facilitate analysis while acknowledging that in practice these categories are fluid, and that in reality there is no neutral, value-free meaning.

While Marcoux and Rizkallah focus on intertextual semantics, Peroni and Shotton (2012) are interested in semantic publishing, which is “the use of
web and semantic web technologies to enhance a published document such as a journal article so as to enrich its meaning, to facilitate its automatic discovery, to enable its linking to semantically related articles, to provide access to data within the article and to allow the integration of data between papers” (p. 33). The language is the language of information science, but the underlying concepts—the integration of data, the linking to semantically related articles—is the stuff of intertextuality. Peroni and Shotton look to the development of FaBio (the FRBR-aligned bibliographic ontology) and CiTo (the citation-typing ontology) to build on previous work in the domain. These ontologies are being adopted in a number of publishing and academic environments, including the Linked Open Vocabularies Dataset, CiteULike, WordPress, and Linked Education. There is a real sense that intertextuality operating in and through the Web offers practical and interesting possibilities in the area of online publishing and communicative practice.

Intertextuality as a concept came to the fore through the writings of Kristeva (1986) and Barthes (1981), although if one follows the logic of the concept, it would be inappropriate at the very least to suggest that either theorist should be considered a point of origin. For Kristeva, the text is considered as “a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another” (p. 37). Barthes, as mentioned earlier, makes a distinction between work and text. For him, work is the “material book offering up the possibility of meaning, of closure, and thus of interpretation”; text is used to refer to the force of writing, which although it is “potentially unleashed in some works, [it] is in no sense the property of those works” (Allen, 2011, p. 66). For both Barthes and Kristeva, it seems that only modernist and postmodernist literature really offer text—that is, space for the reader to become fully active in the production of meaning (Allen, 2011, p. 68). Thus defined, there would seem to be little space for intertextuality in librarianship and bibliographic description; however, there is another approach to intertextuality, this one through the works of structuralist literary theorist Gérard Genette that has proved to be quite productive.

In Palimpsests: Literature in the Second Degree, Geneté (1997) outlines five types of transtextual relationships (Geneté uses the term transtextuality to denote what others generally mean by intertextuality). These relationships are as follows:

- **Intertextuality**, defined in a more restricted way than Kristeva’s to mean a “relationship of co-presence between two texts or among several texts” and “the actual presence of one text within another” (pp. 1–2). Its most literal form is quotation, but it also covers plagiarism and allusion.
- **Paratextuality**, defined as those elements that help direct and control the reception of a text; for example, titles, subtitles, intertitles, pref-
aces, postfaces, notices, forewords (p. 3). This set of relationships also includes interviews, publicity, and reviews by critics. Allen (2011) describes paratextuality as being the threshold of the text (p. 101).

- **Metatextuality**, defined as “the relationship most often labeled ‘commentary’” (Genette, 1997, p. 4). It unites a given text to another, of which it speaks, without necessarily citing it (without summoning it)—in fact, sometimes without naming it. Genette’s example is of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of the Mind* “allusively and almost silently” (p. 4) evoking Diderot’s *Neveau de Rameau*.

- **Hypertextuality**, defined as “any relationship uniting a text B (which I shall call the hypertext) to an earlier text A (I shall of course call it the hypotext) upon which it is grafted in such a manner that is not that of commentary” (p. 5). Genette draws attention to the provisional status of this definition. The derivation may be direct, such as when one text “speaks” about another, or it may be that the hypertext cannot exist without the hypotext, a relationship he calls a “transformation.” An example of this might be the relationship between the *Odyssey* and Joyce’s *Ulysses*. A text derived from an earlier text through simple transformation is what Genette refers to as a “transformation”; if it is an indirect transformation, he refers to it as an “imitation” (p. 6). Genres that are officially hypertextual are parody, pastiche, and travesty (p. 9), but Genette moves beyond these to also discuss self-expurgations, excision, and reductions. He produces a table that maps out a whole range of hypertextual relations according to mood, from serious to playful.

- **Architextuality**, defined in terms of the genres and models of discourse: “the entire set of general or transcendent categories—types of discourse, modes of enunciation, literary genres—from which emerges each singular text” (p. 1).

Genette’s categories have been used by Bartlett and Hughes (2011) and Vernitski (2007) as a framework through which to theoretically describe and illustrate the possibility of developing innovative bibliographic tools. Vernitski, designing a potential intertextuality-oriented fiction-retrieval tool for academic use, argues that the work-to-work relationship in FRBR is the most relevant for an intertextuality-oriented fiction-classification scheme. Writing in 2006–2007 and using an earlier version of FRBR, she felt that there are some FRBR relationships that would be useful in developing an intertextual retrieval tool; however, even they were not without their limitations. Eventually, Vernitski decided that neither FRBR’s set of relationships nor Beghtol’s (1994) EFAS set of relationships provided her with quite what she needed to map out literary intertextuality, so she devised her own categories: *quotation, allusion, variation*, and *sequel* (fig. 1).

Bartlett and Hughes (2011) show how Genette’s typology can be used to create a mapping of intertextual relations using *Jane Eyre* as an exam-
They include a diagram showing their mapping expressed in Linked Data, and they suggest that such an approach could result in the creation of rich retrieval tools, such as library catalogs and reading lists. In their model, they trace the relationships beyond literary texts using LCSH (Library of Congress Subject Headings) and suggest that through “modeling literary relationships within a broader context, we can see the development of literature in a wider cultural context” (p. 164).

Returning to the FRBR model, we can see evidence of Genette’s influence in the mapped relationships. The work-to-work relationships include the following categories: successor, supplement, complement, summarization, adaptation, transformation, and imitation. The inclusion of the two latter types (with imitation’s subcategories, parody, imitation, and travesty) seems in particular to reveal the traces of Genette’s intertextual poetics (tables 1–2).

In relation to hypertextuality, and indeed metatextuality, Genette (1997) points out that some of the recognition of such relationships comes from the reader(s). This is of some interest in developing a model for bibliographic description because it takes us to the very threshold of authority and interpretation, and there might well be differences of opinion on how far intertextual mappings should go. Vernitski (2007), for example, is very

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**Figure 1. Notations in Vernitski’s (2007) intertextuality-oriented fiction classification.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quotation (Q)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exact Quotation Q/Ex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misquotation Q/Mis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Allusion (A)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title A/T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Title of Work A/T/Wor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Title of a Section or Chapter in a Work A/T/Sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Name (A/N)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Character Name A/N/Cha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Place Name A/N/Pla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Institution Name A/N/Ins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Concept Name A/N/Con</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variation (V)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theme V/Th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form V/Fo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sequel (S)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
clear about the need to locate the source of any relationship claim in her approach. For her system, any claim should be sourced in published literary criticism and textual analysis, and the source for any relationship claim should be cited (table 3).

The inclusion of some of Genette’s relationships in FRBR takes us some way toward describing intertextual relationships, but it perhaps stops short at some of the more subjective hermeneutics of intertextuality. It is noticeable that while the relationship category transformation is included, it is defined in a fairly restricted way to focus on transformations of form. There are other forms of discursive transformation that could be usefully included in a map of the bibliosphere; for example, generic transformations have been modeled in relation to fiction and literary works and offer a possible framework through which transformation might be mapped. (See, for example, Fowler [1982, pp. 212–213] for one possible framework of generic transformations.) Perhaps it would be possible to design systems that could include the authoritative elements, up to and including parody, imitation, and “pastiche,” and then to include more hermeneutic and interpretative responses through some form of crowdsourcing; or perhaps for some this would take us too far from the authority of bibliographic description. Either way, at least FRBR gives us a starting point for such ruminations.

Figure 2. Bartlett and Hughes’s (2011) example from *Jane Eyre* showing some of the five transtextual elements identified by Genette (1997).
### Table 1. Work-to-Work Relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship type</th>
<th>Referential work</th>
<th>Autonomous work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Successor:</td>
<td>Sequel</td>
<td>Sequel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has a successor →</td>
<td></td>
<td>Succeeding work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>← is a successor to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplement:</td>
<td>Index</td>
<td>Supplement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has a supplement →</td>
<td>Concordance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>← supplements</td>
<td>Teacher’s guide</td>
<td>Appendix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gloss</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supplement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appendix</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complement:</td>
<td>Cadenza</td>
<td>Incidental music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has a complement →</td>
<td>Libretto</td>
<td>Musical setting for a text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>← complements</td>
<td>Choreography</td>
<td>Pendant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ending for unfinished work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summarization:</td>
<td>Digest</td>
<td>Abstract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has a summary →</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>← is a summary of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptation:</td>
<td>Adaptation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has adaptation →</td>
<td>Paraphrase</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>← is an adaptation of</td>
<td>Free translation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Variation (music)</td>
<td>Harmonization (music)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fantasy (music)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation:</td>
<td>Dramatization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has a transformation →</td>
<td>Novelization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>← is a transformation of</td>
<td>Versification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Screenplay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imitation:</td>
<td>Parody</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has an imitation →</td>
<td>Imitation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>← is an imitation of</td>
<td>Travesty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2. Whole/part work-to-work relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship type</th>
<th>Dependent part</th>
<th>Independent part</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whole/part:</td>
<td>Chapter, section, part, etc. and so on</td>
<td>Monograph in a series</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>has part →</td>
<td>Volume/issue of serial</td>
<td>Journal article</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>← is part of</td>
<td>Intellectual part of a multipart work</td>
<td>Intellectual part of a multipart work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Illustration for a text</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sound aspect of a film</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusions

This paper began as an examination of FRBR, authorship, the ur-text, and intertextuality. It was motivated by Foucault’s (1966/1974) exploration of the operations of power and ideology through localized institutions and practices, and FRBR’s treatment of the entity work is examined through a critical framework that takes as its starting point Foucault’s insights. There have already been some theoretical approaches to developing retrieval tools that have suggested that designing intertextual retrieval tools might lead to the development of rich maps of the documentary universe, or bibliosphere. An examination of FRBR’s relationships suggests that Genette’s (1997) structuralist poetics has had some influence in its design. An intriguing debate lies ahead: at some level, intertextuality depends on readership, subjectivity, and interpretation; it will be interesting to see how far and in what ways such possible roads might be traveled.

References


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