A STUDY ON THE ETHICAL STRUCTURE OF AWAKENING OF FAITH IN THE MAHĀYĀNA: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH

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Abstract

In this thesis, I refute the consequentialist approach to Chinese Buddhism. This approach to Buddhist ethics has been popularized by scholars such as Charles Goodman in the last two decades. In a sense, they try to establish a systematic Buddhist ethical theory that can be applied to our daily lives. However, the consequentialist approach is very problematic in that it fails to incorporate important ontological concepts of Buddhism regarding a sentient being's mind. In addition, this approach has some radical arguments, such as justifying harming others, which can be hardly accepted by a common understanding of Buddhism.

In order to dispute consequentialist approach, I mainly examine the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* (大乘起信論, = the *Awakening*), the most important treatise in Chinese Buddhist history. Many Chinese Buddhist scholars consider this treatise to be crucial because it provides a thorough explanation of the mind. Using the *Awakening*, I will discuss concepts about the mind in an exploration of the theoretical structure of Chinese Buddhist ethics. By doing so, I will show why the consequentialist approach is problematic. I will argue that Chinese Buddhist ethics around the *Awakening* is more similar to deontology, and that the consequentialist approach is only plausible based on narrow interpretations of the *Awakening*. 
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INTRODUCTION

Once established, schools of interpretation can easily extend their interpretational territory into peripheral areas surrounding their original target. Cases in which hegemonic schools of thought have generated wasteful debates are aplenty across fields of study. And though these debates may have contributed to the quantity of human ideas, and may have even provided foundations for creative thinking, these potential advantages do not justify the establishment of a misleading framework of thought. It is hard to deny that misleading schools of thought have impeded the development of proper discourse. I believe that any misunderstandings that have been generated through such problematic schools should be rectified as soon as possible in order to prevent their further diffusion. The consequentialist approach to Buddhist ethics, which has been established recently in Western and Eastern academia, is one of the misunderstandings.

This thesis is prepared for two major purposes. The first one is to critique the consequentialist approach to Buddhist ethics. For this critique, I will mainly refer to the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna (大乘起信論, = the Awakening), one of the most important treatises in the Chinese Buddhist history. This treatise was composed by Asvaghosa (馬鳴) and translated into Chinese by Paramārtha (真諦, 499~569) who came to China during the Liang (梁) dynasty from Ujjayanī of Western India. From its compilation, its ontological idea of the

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1 Two different translated version of the Awakening are extant, but there is no original Sanscrit version of this treatise. The other translated version was composed by Sikasananda (實叉難陀, 652~710). Since many later Buddhist scholars worked based on Paramārtha’s translation, I chose his translation as a main object of this paper.
tathāgata-garbha (如來藏) has affected the thought of various sinicized Buddhist schools like Shelun (攝論), Huayan (華嚴), Tiantai (天台), and Chan (禪). Thus, I will limit my focus on the schools that share the idea of tathāgata-garbha. This means that I will not discuss applications of consequentialism to other branches of Buddhist tradition.

The second purpose is to provide more appropriate interpretations of various aspects of Chinese Buddhist ethics. This thesis will shed light on important aspects of Buddhism omitted by the consequentialist approach, and seek how to incorporate them into a revised single ethical system. I believe that the aspects omitted are the most important components in Buddhist ethical theory. So I intend to present an ethical model different from that proposed by the consequentialist perspective. Since the Awakening provides a detailed explanation of the aspects that the consequentialist omitted, studying this treatise will be the best choice.

This thesis comprises of three main chapters based on the purposes described above. In the first chapter, I will examine the logic of ethical consequentialism. The recent consequentialist approaches to Buddhist ethics and their characteristics will also be discussed here. In the second chapter, fundamental notions in the Awakening, like Suchness (真如) and the five ways of practice (修行五門), will be examined in detail. In the last chapter, a critique of the consequentialist approach will be presented based on the ethical aspects of the Awakening. The issue of the moral evaluation in both traditions will be mainly discussed. In the third chapter, I will show why the consequentialist approach cannot properly apprehend Chinese Buddhist ethics.

According to Gyoo-tag Shin, there are other sutras, which share the idea of tathāgata-garbha, such as Avatamsaka Sutra (華嚴經), Shurangama Sutra (楞嚴經), or Diamond Sutra (金剛經). These sutras also affected the formation of Chinese Buddhist schools. Cf. Gyoo-tag Shin, "The Thought of Pure Land (淨土) from the Perspective of the School of Fa-Xing (法性宗)," Studies of Pure Land Buddhism (淨土學硏究) Vol.13, 2010, 57–58.
and suggest an alternative interpretation of the ethical theory of the *Awakening*. In this chapter, I will refer to the *Commentary on the Awakening* (大乘起信論義記), one of the major three commentaries on the *Awakening*. This commentary by Fazang (法藏, 643~712), who was the third Chinese Huayan master, is traditionally considered required reading in studying the *Awakening*. Its detailed and clear exposition supplements the *Awakening*’s terseness. In the second and third chapters, I will also refer to the translations written by Yoshito Hakeda and Jongsik Jeon in citing the original texts of the *Awakening* and Fazang's commentary.³

CHAPTER ONE: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH TO BUDDHISM

Rectifying misunderstandings is a common feature in Chinese Buddhist studies. It is currently also one of the most important activities in the field of Buddhist ethics because many interpretations are continuously established to explain the same, or at least, similar ideas. I want to analyze how the many dominant interpretations of Buddhist ethics are informed by Western ethical models functioning as methodological tools of analysis. Firstly, it is at some level natural that Western scholars’ treatments of Buddhist ethics would be informed by their culturally-specific ethical theories, especially when Buddhist ethics were incorporated into their general discourses on ethics. We see this mostly in translations that interpret Buddhist concepts through pre-existing ethical concepts. For example, the Buddhist concept of Dabeixin (大悲心) is commonly translated as “great compassion,” as this phrase is accessible to the Western discourses of ethics. Therefore, this translated phrase is understood as a major part of Buddhist ethics, despite some nuance of the concept being lost. Nonetheless, culturally different knowledge about ethical theories is productive at some level when studying Buddhist ethics. Indeed, much research on it has been conducted as comparative studies.

Secondly, it is convenient to overlay a single system over the diversity of Buddhist theory to aid interpretation. Historically, Buddhism has been affected by Indian thought and religions when it was established. It also continuously developed its doctrines in various areas as time went on. Thus, Buddhism is too doctrinally complex for a single theory. This difficulty is not even resolved when the field is limited to a specific region and topic, such as Chinese Buddhist ethics. In this regard, approaching Buddhist doctrine from the perspective of existing ethical theories is an apparently attractive option. But this method of studying Buddhist ethics
easily generates a tendency to understand Buddhist theory as a part of existing ethical theories. This assumption also implies that Buddhist theory can be fully grasped just by these existing theories, although this illusion is only due to some overlaps or similarities. Such a tendency is highly likely to distort or just bury the multifarious aspects of Buddhist doctrine by treating them as unnecessary components.

Understanding Buddhist ethics as a sort of consequentialism is one of the examples of this tendency. Even though it is helpful in apprehending the partial meaning of some Buddhist ideas, the consequentialist approach fails to incorporate many theoretical aspects in Buddhism. This approach makes problematic judgements about Buddhist ethics while disregarding important concepts of Buddhist doctrine. I will start my discussion from examining this process.

The word “consequentialism,” created by Anscombe, has been used to label a certain type of theoretical tendency that exclusively sticks to consequences to assess acts. It is defined as

… the view that normative properties depend only on consequences. (……) The most prominent example is consequentialism about the moral rightness of acts, which holds that whether an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of something related to that act, such as the motive behind the act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind.

For instance, when doing harm to others is discouraged by consequentialism, this is only because it may cause negative consequences like a pain that outweighs the pleasure that they feel. Violation of others' rights or social rules are not relevant matters. This implies that some extreme acts, like killing others, which is absolutely prohibited from other ethical viewpoints, can be morally permitted if it is expected to generate good consequences. While there are various

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4 In the article prepared to dispute utilitarianism, she argues that this word is created in order to mark some utilitarian philosophers like Henry Sidgwick. Cf. G. E. M. Anscombe, "Modern Moral Philosophy", Philosophy 33, No.124, 1958, 10.


6 These are considered only when they are counted as a part of consequences.
offshoots of consequentialist theories, I am going to examine *act-consequentialism* and its relationship to morality.\(^7\)

Before the word "consequentialism" was formulated and started to be widely used, "utilitarianism" had been commonly used to indicate the same line of thought. In many contexts, therefore, utilitarianism is still considered to be the essence of consequentialism, and is sometimes considered to be interchangeable with it. Some classic utilitarians, such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, are regarded as major figures who established the basis of consequentialism.

As is well known, Bentham was the moral ethicist who paved the road for the development of utilitarianism. In his famous book, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, he starts his discussion by declaring utilitarian logic as follows:

> Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think. (…….) The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assume it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. (…….) By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this in present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the part whose interest is considered.\(^8\)

According to him, the balance between pain and pleasure, which he addresses as utility, is the only standard in determining what is morally right, and what we ought to do. That is, increasing the sum of pleasure, minus the total amount of pain, is the only method required. And all men, by

\(^7\) Act consequentialism is defined as "the claim that an act is morally right if and only if that act maximizes the good, that is, if and only if the total amount of good for all minus the total amount of bad for all is greater than this net amount for any incompatible act available to the agent on that occasion." Cf. Ibid. URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/.

their nature, calculate their own amounts of pleasure and pain. This was his fundamental assumption and he suggested a detailed method to measure the balance of them. Hence, the only standard to assess human acts is their consequences. Since desirable consequences are condensed into a single object, that is, sensory happiness or pleasure, his utilitarian theory has been also called *quantitative hedonism* or *quantitative utilitarianism*. Namely, this theory assumes that every type of consequence can be measured by means of the tools, pleasure and pain, and further can be expressed as a sum total. This implies that moral values of each act depend on their consequences and they can be compared to one another and one can be chosen as the best.

Setting up a single standard was an effective way to establish his theory clearly, but at the same time, it generated lots of counter-claims against Bentham. Many refutations were closely related to questions about the quality of pleasure. And these affected the establishment of Mill's utilitarian idea. The main point of Mill's texts, such as *Utilitarianism*, was to answer critiques of consequentialism and make utilitarian theory clearer, while Bentham's writings were supposed to prepare the fundamental ground of utilitarian theory. The unification of moral values, suggested by Bentham, was problematic in some important aspects indeed. For example, it caused human beings and other animals to be bound by the same moral principle since physical pleasure was not a unique feature of humans. In addition to that, the more intricate problem

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9 Ibid., 146.
10 Ibid., 31–34.
12 Mill says: "For it the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other." Cf. John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism and On Liberty*, edited by Mary Warnock, Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2003, 186.
was that some acts, which seem to be immoral, can be justified by his theory as a means of obtaining pleasure. Sadistic pleasure, for instance, can be considered as one of consequences, and further pursuing it can be morally justified by the fact that the total amount of this pleasure exceeds the amount of pain that sadistic acts may generate. Thus, this sadism can be justified even in the case that a sadist harms others for the purpose of his pathological pleasure. Mill's idea to solve such problems was to grade the qualities of pleasures and assign different moral values to each act. He states:

Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification. (…….) There is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, &c., of the former. (…….) It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others.  

Thus, Mill discriminated between different qualities of pleasure. Qualitatively superior pleasures and acts which cause those pleasures, must be considered as more morally important than others. Mill counted various mental or spiritual pleasures, which belong neither to immoral acts nor animal behaviors, in the list of the relatively superior pleasure. This is actually the reason why his utilitarianism is sometimes called qualitative hedonism or qualitative utilitarianism.

Meanwhile, he provided a method to discern which pleasures are superior to others. This method is to find which pleasure an individual would prefer among a set of target pleasures, given that the individual had experienced all of them.  

However, this was still a little naive because differences in personal backgrounds, which may affect individual preferences and choices,

13 Ibid., 187.
14 Ibid., 187.
would not be considered in establishing his graded structure of pleasure. That is to say, different individuals, who have different backgrounds, would assess the same set of pleasures differently. This problem, in practice, causes huge trouble in using Mill's moral principle. Mill's answer to the existing critiques of utilitarianism was seemingly successful. In practice, however, he left space for another type of critique.

Examining these critiques of utilitarianism is not the purpose of this thesis. However, the utilitarians' reactions to the critiques actually seem to show two very important implications. On the one hand, they tried to assess the rightness of human acts by means of measuring the total amount of pleasure resulting from them. However, it is not the case that all of them valued every type of pleasure equally. Some of them, such as Mill, tried to grade pleasures based on their qualities, and designate some mental or spiritual pleasures as superior to others. Indeed, consequentialism is not solely concerned with physical pleasures. The area of pleasures for consequentialism can be extended to conceptual objects which offer mental or spiritual happiness to an agent. In fact, utilitarians attempt to unify various different purposes of acts into a single one which is called pleasure. However, they then multiplied these pleasures again. This characteristic of utilitarianism actually allows a broad interpretation of the concept of good consequences. For example, some non-physical objects such as knowledge, fine character, a sense of morality, and social regulation and rules can be related to the pleasure or happiness of an agent as consequences. In this regard, there is room for some moral theories which pursue these objects to be counted as variations of consequentialism.\(^{15}\) On the other hand, the logic of

\(^{15}\) It is still arguable, but Mill insists that even virtues are desirable only for the purpose of earning pleasure or happiness. It seems that he considers the happiness achieved by virtues to be a kind of optional consequences. Ibid., 213.
consequentialism, which is derived from utilitarianism, has a close relation to a principle of justifying an agent's acts. In this logic, acts that pursue the best or relatively better consequences are justified by their results. That is, moral acts here are assessed only by the consequences they have caused or may cause in the near future. This logic actually implies that there is no assumption about a certain fixed set of right acts. In consequentialism, therefore, some acts which may cause positive consequences in specific circumstances would be considered to be morally good, and the same acts which generate negative consequences under different circumstances would be inversely assessed. There is no act which has an inherent moral quality within it.\(^{16}\)

In the consequentialist logic, therefore, if an act is said to be morally encouraged, it merely means that the act has already caused, or is expected to cause the best consequence in the specific circumstances. This is one of the perspectives that has been utilized in the discussion of Buddhist thought in the field of ethics. In contemporary academia, in fact, it is not hard to find scholars who consider Buddhism as a sort of ethical consequentialism. Barbra Clayton, Charles Goodman, and Namkyul Hur are representative of such a perspective. Here I am going to examine the consequentialist approach suggested by Goodman to find what aspects it includes and how we can deal with it in the Chinese Buddhist context.

Goodman's approach has three major aspects. The first aspect, which clearly shows the theoretical characteristics of consequentialism, is the fundamental ground of his ideas. He argues that some consequentialist theories admit the existence of objective and intrinsic forms of

\(^{16}\) Damien Keown, who understands Buddhism as a sort of virtue ethics, also points out this aspect. He declares: "For consequentialism, nothing has inherent value other than the utility produced." Cf. Damien Keown, "Karma, Character, and Consequentialism", *Journal of Religious Ethics* Vol.24, 1996, 346.
goodness, like happiness and virtues. These theories are categorized as character consequentialism.\textsuperscript{17} According to him, Buddhist ideals like achieving enlightenment and salvaging sentient beings can be considered as good consequences in this perspective. He states:

But at its core, the theory of character consequentialism involves taking virtues to be intrinsically valuable—that is, adding them to the objective list of intrinsic goods—and then maximizing the good thus defined. (…….) Given the particular theory of well-being I have attributed to Buddhists, when they discuss the motives behind actions, they may be as interested in what acting out of a particular motive does to your psyche as in what it reveals about your psyche. Buddhists should agree with Aristotle that, over time, habitual actions can shape your character, for good or bad. Since, as I have claimed, Buddhists consider character traits to be intrinsically morally important, they will regard effects on character as among the more important consequences of many of our actions. Insofar as similar actions performed out of different motives have different effects on character, they have different consequences.\textsuperscript{18}

Since Goodman defines his main idea as character consequentialism,\textsuperscript{19} I believe that it is not problematic to see the above citation as his understanding of Buddhist ethics. It seems that this explanation modifies existing consequentialist theory a lot by assuming goodness as inherent and objective. However, this is actually no more than a specific example of the first implication of the consequentialist logic derived from classic utilitarian theories. As a matter of fact, consequentialism has acknowledged the existence of inherent goodness since the advent of utilitarianism. It was nothing but pleasure. As discussed, this singular tool for measuring consequences was actually multiplied after Mill broadened the conceptual area of pleasure by proposing a qualitative hedonism. Some mental or spiritual happiness had already been considered as a desirable consequence in the tradition of consequentialism. By adding some detailed explanations to that, Goodman just imputed Buddhist ideal characteristics to the forms

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 206–208.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 43.
of inherent goodness. Hence, the inner logic of consequentialism is still valid here. That is to say, pursuing the best or better consequences is assessed to be morally right. If some Buddhist characteristics have intrinsic goodness, as Goodman describes, any act to achieve them must be considered to be morally right since it will lead to good consequences. On the other hand, his character consequentialism is also compatible with the second implication of the consequentialist logic. Namely, the proposition that there is no act which has an inherent moral value in itself is still valid because the morally important thing is not an act per se, but achieving the ideal characteristics which are inherently good. Some acts pursue the ideal characteristics function as a means to achieve goodness. However, these are still considered not to have their own moral value. There is no necessary causal relationship between goodness and some acts which lead to achieving it.

This feature provides a theoretical foundation for the second aspect of Goodman's character consequentialist approach. According to him, some Buddhist precepts, which are supposed to be practiced, can be violated for the purpose of achieving the best consequence. He refers to the story of King Anala from the *Avatamsaka Sūtra*:

> When Sudhana arrives in the city, he discovers that the king is surrounded by frightening, wrathful demons who are constantly engaged in meting out severe punishments to those who violate the city's laws. (……) But King Anala reveals to him that both the wrathful guardians and their criminal victims are actually illusions created by Anala's magical powers. As a result of the punishments meted out to these wholly illusory malefactors, the real citizens are terrified into acting rightly. (……) One of the things he is trying to bring about in deceiving his people is virtue. He is prepared to tell lies—thereby, perhaps, impairing his own virtue—in order to bring about a much greater total amount of virtue among the populace, including the virtue of not telling lies. (……) This idea—that rules such as "Don't tell lies" are merely rules of thumb, which can be broken when breaking them would have good consequences—may itself be an indication of a consequentialist moral perspective. We have some reason, it seems, to interpret King Anala as a (perhaps tacit) character consequentialist.20

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20 Ibid., 92–93.
According to Goodman, it is obvious that King Anala broke the precept by deceiving his people. But his deceptive act could be justified by the context of the *Avatamsaka Sūtra* because he could achieve the greater good by sacrificing his own virtue. Indeed, because of his sacrifice the people could have more stable circumstances to keep and cultivate their own virtues. It seems that here Goodman is deriving the proposition that Buddhist precepts can be broken in specific circumstances from the perspective of universal consequentialism. According to this perspective, total goodness as consequence must be calculated agent-neutrally. Hence personal losses of the agent really do not matter in the calculation of consequences. It means that an agent's personal goodness can be ignored if it is a matter to achieve someone else's goodness, that is, if it will obviously lead to better consequences. Therefore, an agent must be ready to bear his loss whenever he can achieve the best net goodness for others as, King Anala did.

The third aspect of Goodman's position is that the exact target of moral assessment here is not an act which actually generates the best consequences, but intention to achieve those consequences. In this regard, his consequentialism is classified as subjective consequentialism or subjective utilitarianism. He describes:

> Although objective utilitarians think that acts that appeared to be right could later turn out to have been wrong, since they happened to have bad consequences, subjective utilitarians, like Buddhists, would hold that if you do what you expect to have the best consequences on the whole, your action is morally right, no matter what its actual consequences are. (……) Thus, for instance, Channa, who donated the food to the Buddha that gave him dysentery and thereby caused his death, was acting rightly, according to the Buddhist scriptures, because he did not know that the food was contaminated. (……) A subjective utilitarian could praise Channa for acting rightly, since he thought his action would have the good consequences of sustaining the Buddha's life and making merit for

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22 Goodman explains the fundamental feature of universal consequentialism as follows: "One of my actions can be right even though it is harmful to my flourishing, so long as its consequences are sufficiently beneficial to others, including others who are in no important way related to me. (……) The value of generous acts derives from the benefits they confer on all those involved: the contributions to the welfare of both the giver and the recipient matter, and matter equally, in deciding the value of the action." Ibid., 617.
As we can see in the case of Channa, the moral assessment of an act is based on the actor's intention. If the agent had the intention to achieve the best consequence for others and himself, his action must be regarded as right no matter what consequences eventually accrued. I believe that such a perspective is inevitable for consequentialists, because *objective consequentialism*, which assesses the moral value of an action solely based on its actual consequence, cannot guide an action in practice. Guiding good actions is properly workable only when the guidance is offered in advance of the action. In the case of objective consequentialism, however, assessing the moral value of an act is only possible after the act has already transpired and lead to consequences. Hence, this type of consequentialism cannot guide an agent to necessarily do a good action. Whenever it tries to function as action guidance, it must include intention and expectation of an act, which has not been practiced yet, as a standard for the moral assessment. This fact implies that it must also include the possibility that the actual consequences of an act can differ from the original intention. Eventually, therefore, his logic leads to a subjective consequentialism. That is, it is inevitable to *expect* possible consequences beforehand in order to judge which act would cause the best consequence. Buddhist ethics has focused on actual practice and its motivation, for the purpose of achieving enlightenment, rather than moral assessment after the act. Given that, it is plausible that we cannot interpret Buddhist ethics as a sort of objective consequentialism, which cannot provide any guidance about what an agent ought to do. These three aspects that I have derived from Goodman's work show the typical

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characteristics of the consequentialist approach to Buddhism.

One important ground of Buddhist ethics that the consequentialists commonly utilize is karma (業) theory. This notion, which had been shared by many Indian philosophical traditions, also takes an important role in Buddhism's understanding of motivation and practice. However, this theory actually does not per se include ethical implications, rather, it merely describes the causal relation between an act and its consequence. That is, it describes the proposition that every cause (因) must generate its fruit (果), and thereby, every agent must receive karmic retribution (業報) corresponding to previous acts. It seems, however, that some consequentialists, including Goodman, actually try to derive a specific ethical implication from this proposition.\(^\text{24}\)

For example, Goodman says:

The Buddha famously identified karma with intention. If motives and intentions control what kind of karma we receive from an action, and karma is a powerful source of future happiness and suffering, then obviously Buddhists should be concerned about it. But the role of karma in moral evaluation does not make Buddhist ethics nonconsequentialist; rather, on my interpretation, karmic consequences are among those that need to be considered in evaluating an action.\(^\text{25}\)

Karma connects the deed with its consequence by assigning causality between them. Therefore, we can anticipate which consequence we may receive as a result of what we do. This means that, conversely, we can decide what we will do based on an expected consequence which we may receive as a result. If we have a specific purpose that we want to achieve eventually, we may be likely to do an act which is expected to be helpful for the achievement. As Goodman describes, therefore, karmic consequence is indeed what we need to consider in the moral evaluation of an


act. Karma theory allows us to anticipate what retributions we will receive and suggest the theoretical ground where our acts can be morally assessed in advance. And such, the moral assessment practically controls what we should do. As we have examined so far, the consequentialists derive the inner logic of their interpretations, which tries to decide what we do based on consequences expected, from karma theory. In this regard, there is no doubt that karma theory is one of the most important factors of the consequentialist approach.

I believe that those aspects of the consequentialist approach that we have shed light on can be considered to be representative, even though I have derived them only from Goodman's work. In the next chapter, I will examine the theoretical aspects of a selection of Chinese Buddhist ethics in order to discuss how the consequentialist approach should be denied or limited. In this process, the characteristics of the consequentialist approach will be refuted or rectified with additional explanation.
CHAPTER TWO: THE ETHICAL CONSTITUTENTS OF THE AWAKENING

Before proceeding, it is necessary first to briefly take into consideration the relationship between the fields of Buddhism and ethics. Given that these two fields have historically developed with different interests and in separate locations, it seems that they would not correspond perfectly with each other. To be specific, the field of ethics, which had been mainly developed in Western scholarship, is commonly defined as "the study involved in practical reasoning: good, right, duty, obligation, virtue, freedom, rationality, choice." It considers some fundamental questions like 'what should be our conduct?', "what characters should we cultivate?", and "what social regulations should we have?" The issue of "how we should live with other beings in society" is the core of ethics. On the other hand, it seems that Buddhism focuses on an understanding of the world and an ideal goal to be achieved. Even though Buddhism suggests some guidance about 'how we should live', this must be understood in relation to its perspective and ideal goal. Therefore, the matter of how to live righteously may be not the first concern in Buddhism. However, when we consider that Buddhism has provided a systematic methodology to achieving its goal and has been asking us to follow it, answering the question of how to live righteously according to the Buddhist perspective is still important and valid. My point is, we can find a subordinate area in Buddhism, which shares same general types

27 For example, the Awakening describes this perspective as follows: "There are eight reasons [why I write this discourse which shows the teaching of Mahāyāna.] What are they? The first is a generic reason (總相). It is to make all sentient beings escape from every type of suffering and achieve the perfect happiness [by raising faith of the teaching in their mind.]" This generic reason assumes the perspective that every sentient being is suffering and they need to be freed from that. Cf. 馬鳴, 大乘起信論, "是因緣有八種. 云何為八? 一者, 因緣總相. 所謂為令眾生離一切苦, 得究竟樂." T32, 575b; Fazang explains that this perspective is not limited to the Awakening, and that is why Asvaghosa used the expression "generic reason (總相).") Cf. 法藏, 大乘起信論義記, "此之一門通於一切菩薩之心. 非局此論. 故云總相.", T44, 249a.
of concerns and interests with the field of ethics. We may label the study, which focuses on this area, as Buddhist ethics. This means that this thesis will be limited to this aspect.

Consequentialism is limited because it does not share the theoretical features of the *Awakening* even though some important concepts within the *Awakening* overlap. But I do not want to deny every aspect of what consequentialism has proposed, as its explanations are based on some supporting literary sources. Thus, it seems that their approach can be plausible. However, in this thesis, I am trying to define the limits of applying the consequentialist interpretation to the Buddhist structure of ethics within the *Awakening*. While this treatise has influenced the establishment and development of various Buddhist schools in China, it can be a controversial to argue that this treatise is representative of Chinese Buddhism. Hence, I will also illustrate the limits of the ethical interpretation I will derive from this treatise. Specifically, I will demonstrate that the ethical structure of the *Awakening* can only be applied to interpret other schools that share the notion of tathāgata-garbha (如來藏).\(^{28}\)

The function of precepts (戒律)\(^{29}\) in Buddhism is consistent with the concerns that the

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\(^{28}\) In the *Awakening*, tathāgata-garbha is also called dharma-kāya (法身). This notion is explained as inherently having an infinite capacity of goodness (一切功德) and constituting one dimension of the mind of a sentient being, as an aspect of truth. Cf. 馬鳴, 大乘起信論, "復次, 真如自體相者, 一切凡夫, 聲聞, 阿耨, 諸佛, 無有增減, 非前際生, 非後際滅, 極竟常恒, 稱本已來, 性自滿足一切功德, 所謂自體有大智慧光明義故, 遍照法界義故, 真實識知義故, 自性清淨心義故, 常樂我淨義故, 清涼不變自在義故, 具足如是過於恒沙不離, 不斷, 不異, 不思議佛法, 乃至滿足無有所少義故, 名為如來藏, 亦名如來法身." , T32, 579a.

\(^{29}\) According to Charles Prebish, the concept of precepts (戒律) comprises two different aspects, that is, śīla (戒) and vinaya (律). In East Asian Buddhism, however, these two aspects have not been understood as separate things. He explains that vinaya is rendered as discipline or education in Buddhist communities. Cf. Charles Prebish, "From Monastic Ethics to Modern Society," edited by Damien Keown, in *Contemporary Buddhist Ethics*, London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2000, 44–57; In this regard, Sunghyun Shin argues that the concept of śīla, which is derived from the root *śī*, connotes the voluntary will to prevent evil. In this paper, I use the term 'precepts' to indicate the both aspects of śīla and vinaya. Cf. Sung-hyun Shin, "A Study on Understanding of Vinaya Pitaka in East Asian," *Studies of Seon Culture* Vol.19, 2015, 120–123.
field of ethics traditionally has. Given that, I believe that it is proper to start our discussion about Buddhist ethics from examining how precepts line up with ethics, even though ethics does not encompass all the theoretical aspects of Buddhist ethics. Discourse around Buddhist precepts is a huge part of Buddhism. For example, teaching is classified into the three teachings (三學), and the discourse on the precepts is labeled as the teaching of precepts (戒學). Also, in the classification of the three types of collections (三藏), the discourse on the precepts is included in them, and is called the collection about precepts (律藏). Indeed, the precepts are a very significant aspect of Buddhism. Precepts offer practical guidance on how to achieve a perfect character or wisdom. Observing the precepts is required of practitioners because the precepts are not only right in themselves, but also the fundamental method to achieve Buddhism’s ideal goal.

There are various sets of precepts in Buddhist tradition. In general, they differ from one another in terms of detail. In the case of the Awakening, this treatise frames the precepts in terms of the five ways of practice (修行五門). The Awakening is composed of five chapters (分): the reasons for writing (因緣分), outline (立義分), interpretation (解釋分), on faith and practice (修行信心分), and encouragement of practice and the benefits thereof (勸修利益分). The main chapters of the treatise are considered to be the second to the fourth, and the discourse on the precepts is included in the third chapter. This signifies that precepts are very significant.

Sungtaek Cho broadly defines the philosophical meaning of the precept as "the general concept which incorporates every aspect of Buddhist ethics and includes regulations of Buddhist communities and their criteria." This definition shows how significant the precepts are in Buddhist ethics. However, I do not fully agree with his definition because I believe there are important things to be considered beyond the domain of the precepts in order to fully comprehend the whole shape of Buddhist ethics. Cf. Sungtaek Cho, "A New Approach to the Buddhist Precepts in the Modern society", Journal of Buddhist studies Vol.8, Korean Society of Buddhist Studies, 2004, 245.

Asvaghosa describes the five ways of practice as follows:

From here, I will explain about the chapter on faith and practice (修行信心分). I will discuss the teaching of this chapter based on the circumstance of sentient beings who have not yet entered the group of sentient beings who are determined to achieve enlightenment (正定, =正定聚). (……) There are five ways of practice and they help the sentient beings to raise faith in their mind. What are the five practices? These are charity (布施), observance of precepts (持戒), patience (忍辱), zeal (精進), and cessation and observation (止觀).32

The explanation of the five practices is one of two main axes of the chapter on faith and practice (修行信心分). It is offered to help sentient beings who are not yet in the group headed for being awakened (正定聚).33 In the detailed exposition of the method of each practice, the reader learns that first, charity is to help others, who are in need, with compassion; second, observance of precepts is to always obey various precepts, including the five practices; third, patience is to endure slander from others in order to prevent the practitioner and others from committing sins; fourth, zeal is to make an every effort to be awakened; and fifth, cessation and observation practice is a method to realize the truth of the world immediately.34 As we can see from the above, these precepts are suggested to help sentient beings raise their faith in the Mahāyāna teaching, and be awakened.

If we can say that most ethical theories are related to the moral evaluation of human acts, then practicing the five ways (五門) is among said theories. These practices are the core methods

32 馬鳴, 大乘起信論, "次說修行信心分, 是中依未入正定聚生故。修行信心, 云何為五? 一者施門, 二者戒門, 三者忍門, 四者進門, 五者止觀門.", T32, 581c.

33 According to Fazang, this group is composed of sentient beings who are in the tenfold stages (十住). These sentient beings have a sturdy faith in the teaching so they do not retreat. Cf. 法藏, 大乘起信論義記, "菩薩十住已上決定不退名正定聚", T44, 278b.

34 馬鳴, 大乘起信論, T32, 581c~583a.
in the *Awakening* since there are no additional practical precepts in this treatise. In this regard, it is interesting that Asvaghosa (馬鳴) rearranged the sixfold Pāramitā practice (六波羅蜜), one of representative concepts in Mahāyāna tradition, to these five components by combining dhyāna (禪定) and prajñā (般若) into the cessation and observation practice. I believe that this rearrangement shows his specific intention to emphasize the special role of cessation and observation practice.\(^{35}\) This point seems to be clearly supported by the treatise in various ways. The first is the fact that Asvaghosa extensively describes this practice, more than the other four practices. In the fourth chapter, he describes those five practices in sequence and the former four practices are introduced briefly with similar lengths of explanations. However, the space he uses to discuss the method of the fifth practice is twice more than that of the total space used for the former ones. In addition, the discussion of the fifth practice is noticeably more detailed.\(^{36}\) These features accord with Asvaghosa’s intention in writing the *Awakening*. We can reaffirm this point from the introductory chapter, labeled as the reasons for writing (因緣分). There, he deals with eight generic reasons why he wrote this treatise. Letting sentient beings learn how to practice cessation and observation is included as a sixth one.\(^{37}\) My point is, offering exposition of the fifth practice is one of his main purposes of this work. Not only is the fifth practice more important than the other four practices, its function is different from the first four ones. In the case of the

\(^{35}\) It seems that Asvaghosa was aware of the original components of the sixfold Pāramitā since he lists these six components in another explanation. From this fact, we can guess that he rearranged these components with such an intention. Cf. Ibid., ”若說布施，持戒，忍辱，精進，禪定，智慧.”, T32, 582b.

\(^{36}\) In contrast to the first four practices, for instance, this fifth practice is explained to have a theoretical relationship with the important notions of the *Awakening*, such as one mind, samādhi of Suchness, and great compassion. However, the explanation of the first ones are actually no more than a repetition of a conventional understanding of them. This difference between the practices gives an impression that the fifth practice is more significant in the ethical theory of the *Awakening*.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., ”六者，為示修習止觀，對治凡夫二乘心過故.”, T32, 575c.
four practices, Asvaghosa addresses why practitioners should observe them with only one illustration that following them is helpful in raising faith in their mind. That is, as faith deepens, sentient beings gradually get closer to the circumstance for awakening. However, Asvaghosa offers more fundamental reasons why practitioners should observe the fifth practice. He says:

[s]ince practitioner's mind abides [with equanimity (止)], it will be gradually sharpened and then he will be absorbed into the samādhi of Suchness (真如三昧). [Thereby,] his defilements (煩惱) will be deeply suppressed and his faith will be strengthened. So he will quickly attain the state where there will be no regression. (……) The samādhi of Suchness is the state in which a practitioner does not stick to the function of seeing something (見相) nor the function of experiencing something (得相). And further, [this is the state] in which the practitioner will not be indolent nor arrogant even after he gets out of this samādhi. So his defilements will gradually decrease. No sentient being can enter the group which is determined to become Tathāgatā (如來種性) without practicing this samādhi. (……) A sentient being who wants to practice observation (觀) should observe that all conditioned dharmas (有為之法) in the world are impermanent, so they are extinguished in a moment; and that all mental activities (心行) arise and disappear from moment to moment so they are the source of suffering.38

The detailed explanation of the cessation and observation practice is dealt with in the part of practice and faith. According to that, this practice includes setting the mind at rest (止) and observing the truth of the phenomenal world (觀). These two should be practiced simultaneously. Otherwise, practitioners cannot achieve enlightenment.39 Here we can find that the distinct function of the fifth practice is not a merely to raise faith in practitioners' mind. Rather, its practice is immediately involved with the awakening itself, and this is the main reason why this practice is required. As Asvaghosa describes above, entering the samādhi of Suchness is a necessary course for practitioners in order to achieve enlightenment. This means that they cannot

38 Ibid., “以心住故，漸漸猛利，隨順得入真如三昧，深伏煩惱，信心增長，速成不退. (……) 真如三昧者，不住見相，不住得相，乃至出定亦無懈慢，所有煩惱漸漸微薄，若諸凡夫，不習此三昧法，得入如來種性，無有是處. (……) 修習觀者，當觀一切世間有為之法，無得久停，須臾變壞，一切心行，念念生滅，以是故苦.”, T32, 582a.
39 Ibid., “若行若住，若臥若起，皆應止觀俱行. (……) 是止觀二門，共相助成，不相捨離，若止觀不具，則無能入菩提之道.”，T32, 583a.
be awakened without performing this practice. He also describes that the practice of observing the truth of the phenomenal world, which is the important part of cessation and observation practice, is the root (根本方便) of every type of practice. In other words, this practice is actually the only way for practitioners to immediately enter the stage of awakening while the other four practices are regarded as mere secondary means to raise faith in their mind.

This interpretation does not deny that the four practices are also what lead practitioners into the stage of enlightenment in the long-term perspective. However, they are still obviously supplementary. For instance, the difference in the moral motivations that those two types of practices respectively involve supports this point. We can say that they have the same final purpose of achieving enlightenment when we interpret them broadly. However, when it comes to the moral motivations of them, there are distinctions in their purpose. The four practices, as Asvaghosa describes, are presented in order to raise faith in practitioners' minds. These practices, such as helping others or enduring insults may be good actions in themselves, but they are not immediately related to the final achievement of awakening. Rather, they are basically meant to test their faith in the teachings and strengthen resolve. In other words, these are practiced with the motivation to raise faith in their mind, and eventually enter the group determined to achieve enlightenment. In contrast, practicing the fifth way is not a supplementary method, but the process of awakening itself. Given that, the moral motivation for this practice should be understood as different from the other one of the former practices. In fact, the fifth practice is less related to performing good actions to save others, but to achieve practitioner's own enlightenment. However, the fifth practice is explained to cause practitioners to realize the sorry

40 Ibid., 一者行根本方便，謂觀一切法自性無生。離於妄見，不住生死。觀一切法因緣和合，業果不失。起於大悲修諸福德，攝化眾生不住涅槃，以順佛法性無住故．”, T32, 580c.
truth of the world and to raise great compassion (大悲心) in their mind. In other words, when a practitioner completes this practice, he must realize that sentient beings who have not yet awakened suffer from being attached to this conditioned world. Thereby, the practitioner raises great compassion in his mind and makes a vow (誓願) to help and save them. So the practitioner performs good actions because of his commitment of saving others. Here, he is supposed to have the only one moral motivation caused by practicing the fifth way, which is different from the motivation for conducting the four practices. While the first four practices encourage good acts to raise faith in the mind to achieve enlightenment in the future, the last one is just doing good actions to help others.

These five practices can be valid only after the possibility of awakening is postulated as they are basically required for that purpose. Thus, the assumption that enlightenment can be ensured as a possibility, is a foundational in the ethical theory of the Awakening. This assumption is called Suchness (真如), and is described as

The teaching of Mahāyāna (摩訶衍) can be explained in two aspects. What are they? The first is the essence (法) and the second is features (義).

The body means mind of a sentient being. This mind subsumes every dharma (法) in the worlds which are conditioned (世間) and unconditioned (出世間). The characteristics are manifested based on this mind. Why? This is because the true aspect of this mind (真如相) manifests a ground (體) of the teaching of Mahāyāna, and the other aspect, which arises and disappears, manifests the ground (體), characteristics (相), and functions (用) of Mahāyāna itself.

41 The causal relation between observing the truth in the samādhi of Suchness and raising the compassion in their mind is described in various places in the Awakening. Below shows some examples of them. Ibid., "復次，若人唯修於止，則心沈沒或起懈怠，不樂眾善，遠離大悲，是故修觀。……如是當念：「一切眾生從無始世來，皆因無明所薰習故令心生滅，已受一切身心大苦，現在即有無量逼迫，未來所苦亦無分齊，難捨難離而不覺知。眾生如是，甚為可愍。」作此思惟，即應勇猛立大誓願：「願令我心離分別故，遍於十方修行一切善業功德，盡其未來，以無量方便救拔一切眾生，令得涅槃第一義樂。」以起如是願故，於一切時，一切處，所有眾善，隨已堪能不捨修學，心無懈怠，唯除坐時專念於止。……) 修觀者，對治二乘不起大悲狹劣心過，遠離凡夫不修善根。" T32, 582c-583a; Fazang explains that the good will (誓願) is derived from this compassion. Cf. 法藏, 大乘起信論義記, “大願觀中因悲立願.”, T44, 286a.
There are three features. What are they? The first is the greatness of the ground (體大). It indicates that Suchness in every sentient being is the same (平等) so it does not increase nor decrease. The second is the greatness of characteristics (相大). It indicates that Tathāgata-garbha (如來藏) includes numberless supreme goodness (功德). The third is the greatness of functions (用大). It indicates that [the essence (法)] can generate every type of good cause and fruit (善因果) in the worlds which are conditioned and unconditioned. [We can know that] because every Buddha (佛) has depended [on this essence] and every Bodhisattva (菩薩) also enters the stage of Tathāgata (如來地) by depending on this essence.42

Suchness is a kind of universal concept which assures achieving enlightenment of every sentient being. It has an infinite capacity for goodness and generates every good cause (因) and fruit (果). It is explained that every sentient being, including Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, can enter the final stage of awakening by depending on it. The way to the final achievement is to recover the original pure aspect of this Suchness. Therefore, this ontological postulation of Suchness is necessary to explain the methods to head towards the awakening, including doing good practices.

Asvaghosa further describes about this concept as

two aspects (門) in one mind. What are they? The first is a true aspect of the mind (心真如) and the second is an aspect of the mind, which arises and disappears (心生滅). These two aspects respectively subsume every dharmas. Why? Because those two aspects are not different from one another.

The true aspect of the mind is a single dharma-dhatu (一法界). This is the generic ground (體) of every dharma, which subsumes those two aspects of the mind. So to speak, this mind is neither what arises nor disappears. Every dharma differs (差別) only based on the aspect of the mind, which arises and disappears. If this aspect disappeared, there must be no [differentiation of] object (境界).

Therefore, the true aspect of the mind, from its beginning, cannot be explained by discourses (言說) nor illustrated by words (名字), nor conceived by thinking (心緣). This must be a same single one so it does not change (變異) nor break (破壞性). This is only one mind (一心), which is called Suchness.

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43 In terms with these good cause and fruit, Fazang explains that Suchness leads sentient beings to earn goodness in the mundane world (世間), and then achieve awakening (成出世) . Cf. 法藏, 大乘起信論義記, "令眾生始成世善終成出世善也。", T44, 251a.
speak, it is to discard its name (遺言) by naming it with the closest name (言說之極) [to its meaning, that is, Suchness]. (……) If [a practitioner] ceases (離) his mind, which arises and disappears, then it is called entering [a state of wisdom (得入)].

This detailed explanation of the two aspects of one mind (一心二門) shows the theoretical relationship between Suchness and the mind of sentient beings. Asvaghosa describes that this Suchness is not an object that we can empirically examine through thought or language. It is supposed to be equally inherent in every sentient being. It also does not change as time passes by. Suchness is postulated in the *Awakening* as a kind of a metaphysical concept. Additionally, this Suchness is explained in the above to be covered by the delusion (無明) from its beginning.

It manifests itself only based on the deluded aspect of mind, which arises and disappears. However, it actually does not mean that those two aspects are separated from one another. This is because Suchness is nothing but what the deluded aspect has erased from the mind. Recovering this original pure aspect of mind is understood to be the final achievement in the treatise. In this sense, achieving enlightenment is an inherent possibility. This point is supported by the word 'original enlightenment (本覺)' which appears in the treatise. This concept basically implies two significant characteristics of Suchness. The first one is that Suchness, the ground of awakening, is pure and unconditioned. The other is that it assures the awakening of every sentient being by

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44 馬鳴，大乘起信論， "依一心法，有二種門。云何為二？ 一者心真如門。二者心生滅門。 是二種門，皆各總攝一切法。此義云何？
以是二門不相離故， 心真如者， 即是一法界。大總相法門體。所謂心性不生不滅。一切諸法唯依妄念而有差別。若離妄念則無一切心界之相。是故一切法， 均本已來，離言說相，離名字相，離心緣相， 舉等平等， 無有變異， 不可破壞。唯是一心。 (……)
言真如者， 亦無有相。謂言說之極。因言遺言。 (……) 若離於念， 名為得入。", T32, 576a.


46 Ibid., "離念相者， 等虛空界， 無所不遍， 法界一相， 即是如來平等法身， 依此法身， 說名本覺。何以故？ 本覺義者， 對始覺義說，
以始覺者即同本覺。", T32, 576b.
being universally inherent in their mind. Meanwhile, we can find that the method to recover Suchness, that is to cease the deluded mind, corresponds to an important part of the fifth practice that Asvaghosa emphasizes. Hence the point that the fifth practice is immediately related to awakening is proven here again.

Suchness also inherently holds perfectly pure (無漏) goodness (功德). According to the *Awakening*, this goodness manifests as the pure function of wisdom (智淨相) and the function of incomprehensible karma (不思議業相). These help a sentient being to cease his deluded mind and recover his inherent pure mind. Even though wisdom and karma are revealed in the deluded aspect of mind, they are still pure. In addition, the pure goodness has another function to help sentient beings to achieve enlightenment. This function is labeled as the function from the body of enlightenment (覺體相). The body of enlightenment (覺體) is nothing but Suchness. Since Suchness is not an object of empirical examination, as I discussed above, nor does this function depend on the deluded aspect of mind. Hence, these functions imply that Suchness immediately and positively affects sentient beings so that they can be awakened. These functions are actually introduced in the treatise with the other name, permeation (薰習), and it will be discussed again in

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47 Ibid., "復次，本覺隨染，分別生二種相，與彼本覺不相捨離。云何為二？一者，智淨相，二者，不思議業相。智淨相者，謂依法力薰習，如實修行，滿足方便故，破和合識相，滅相續心相。顯現法身，智淳淨故。

48 Ibid., "復次，覺體相者，有四種大義，與虛空等，猶如淨鏡。云何為四？一者，如實空鏡，遠離一切心境界相，無法可現，非覺照義故。二者，因薰習鏡，謂如實不空，一切世間境界悉於中現，不出不入，不失不壞，常住一心，以一切法即真實性故；又一切染法所不能染，智體不動，具足無漏薰習生故。三者，法出離鏡，謂不空法，出煩惱罣礙，智慧，離和合相，淳淨明故。四者，緣薰習鏡，謂依法出離故，遍照眾生之心，令修善根，隨念示現故." , T32, 576c.
the next chapter as a proof to refute the consequentialist approach.

As we have examined, awakening involves that a practitioner obtains some pure functions of Suchness and utilizes them at some level. According to the treatise, a practitioner can realize the truth of the world by the pure functions holding perfect wisdom. In this regard, the treatise describes that there is luminosity of great wisdom (大智慧光明) in the body of Suchness (自體). This wisdom has the function of penetrating (照) the whole dharma-dhatu (法界) and knowing the truth (真實識知) of that. This point corresponds with the description about the observation (観) practice that I cited above. There, a practitioner is supposed to enter the samādhi of Suchness first, and then, observe the truth of the phenomenal world. As we have examined, a practitioner's great compassion and good will (誓願) are generated as a result of achieving the truth of the phenomenal world. Therefore, I believe that the pure functions of Suchness can be broadly understood as moral ground for a practitioner. That is to say, a practitioner realizes the truth based on the pure functions of Suchness, and then they come to know what they should do for other beings who are in need. The ground for moral determination and action lies in the inherent functions of Suchness. In this sense, we can say that the norm for moral determination in the Awakening is prepared in the ontological ground that is called Suchness. This implies that the moral standard is inherently within the agent, and that it does not change based on circumstance. These implications of the ethical theory of the Awakening will be discussed again in the next chapter as well.

49 Ibid., “所謂自體有大智慧光明義故, 遍照法界義故, 真實識知義故.”, T32, 579a.
To sum up, the ethical discussion on the structure of the *Awakening* starts from the idea of the five ways of practice. These ways could be workable only after postulating the ontological ground of Suchness. Achieving enlightenment, the ultimate practical purpose, is guaranteed by the postulation of Suchness. Thus, Suchness is that which is manifest by the practices, and at the same time, the condition that makes the practices possible. This theoretical feature shows that the whole ethical theory of the *Awakening* is established on the basis of ontological grounds. As we discussed in the last chapter, some consequentialists had tried to incorporate some important conceptual constituents of Buddhism in their interpretation, but it seems that they failed to catch the important ontological discourses around the mind of a sentient being. I believe this omission can be finally turned out as a critical weak point of their approach. In the next chapter, I will further contrast the consequentialist application to the *Awakening*, and raise important ethical ideas based on the ontological ground.
CHAPTER THREE: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH AND AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE ETHICS OF THE AWAKENING

As demonstrated by Goodman’s flawed interpretations in the first chapter, consequentialists can derive their interpretations from selective descriptions of Buddhist precepts found in the *Awakening*. These precepts are related to traditional Buddhist ideas that are relatively common in Buddhist schools, but do not express the core ideas of the *Awakening*’s ethical theory. It is necessary to examine these descriptions first because they can be foundational to the consequentialist approach.

The first idea is about the instrumental approach to the precepts for the benefit of the practitioner and others (自利利他). In this idea, the precepts are assumed to be a means to obtain benefits. Asvaghosa claims that his motivation for writing the *Awakening* is that when sentient beings practice his precepts, the profitability of his lessons will be self-evident to the practitioner and others.\(^{51}\) Sentient beings are supposed to be motivated to raise faith in their minds to practice samādhi of Suchness (真如三昧), which may immediately allow the practitioner to enter the final stage of awakening.\(^{52}\) In fact, the main point of *Awakening*’s last chapter is to emphasize that holding to this treatise and its teachings are beneficial. It is especially interesting that Asvaghosa considers that the benefit from holding to the treatise is superior to the goodness from reforming

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\(^{51}\) 聖者，大乘起信論，”八者，為示利益勤修行故，有如是等因緣，所以造論。”；”三者，為法有大利益，常念修行諸波羅蜜故。四者，僧僧能正修行自利利他。”，T32, 575c.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., ”復次，精勤專心修學此三味者，現世當得十種利益，云何為十？一者，常為十方諸佛菩薩之所護念。二者，不為諸魔惡鬼能恐怖。三者，不為九十五種外道鬼神之所憂懼。四者，遠離諸惡淵深之法重罪，業障漸漸微薄。五者，滅一切疑諸惡覺觀。六者，於如來境界信得增長。七者，遠離憂悔，於生死中勇猛不怯。八者，其心柔和，捨於憍慢，不為他人所惱。九者，雖未得定，於一切時一切境界處，則能減損煩惱，不樂世間。十者，若得三昧，不為外緣一切音聲之所驚動。”，T32, 582c.
(化，= 敎化) every sentient being in the universe (三千大千世界)。53 Of course, this phrase has room to be understood as a rhetorical expression. In the previous chapter, I discussed that the benefit Asvaghosa refers to is explicitly a practitioner setting himself and others free from the suffering of living in ignorance of the truth. Thus, the first idea of the consequentialist approach is a misinterpretation of the sections emphasizing the benefits of the final stage of awakening as an encouragement for practitioners to pursue good consequences as an ultimate goal. This is a short sided understanding of what should motivate sentient beings to start practicing the precepts.

Another descriptive aspect of the Awakening that the consequentialists can misread is regarding karma theory. In the treatise, Asvaghosa says that, “[y]ou are not free because of the karmic retribution you will receive based on the karma you made.”54 This common idea in various Buddhist schools is that a cause (因) must involve consequence (果). As we could find from Goodman's explanation of karma in the first chapter, the consequentialist approach interprets karmic consequences as the most important site for morally evaluating actions. The logic assumes that because a sentient being is strongly encouraged to cause good consequences, including being awakened, achieving those good consequences is the practical goal of Buddhist teaching. Actions that may generate good consequences must surely considered to be morally good. Therefore, the practitioner determines what kinds of deeds he should conduct or avoid based on the expected consequences they would generate.

53 Ibid., "次說勸修利益分. 如是摩訶衍諸佛祕藏, 我已總說. 若有眾生, 欲於如來甚深境界得生正信, 遠離誹謗入大乘道, 常持此論思量修習, 究竟能至無上之道. 若人聞是法已不生怯弱, 當知此人定紹佛種, 必為諸佛之所授記."

54 Ibid., "以依業受果, 不自在故."
The concepts of the benefits for sentient beings and karma are shared by many Buddhist treatises. However, these concepts are actually just descriptive in the *Awakening*, rather than prescriptive. The descriptions about those concepts in the treatise merely offer an exposition of how they work. But these, in themselves, do not prescribe how a practitioner should interpret those concepts and how he should conduct himself in accordance to them. That is, they do not provide a formulaic norm for evaluating the morality of actions. For instance, the benefits that the treatise claims to give to sentient beings is just describing that some Buddhist goals involve benefits for practitioners. Indeed, it does not imply that the benefits must be considered the final goal of their practice, and simultaneously the standard for moral evaluation. Rather, it is possible to understand conducting good practices or actions to be moral in themselves. In this understanding, the benefits of faithful practice can be regarded as just felicitous coincidences rather than expected rewards earned by conducting good deeds. Similarly, karma theory also merely describes the causality between a cause and its consequence. It does not prescribe that we should consider expected consequences in order to determine what we ought to do. Those normative interpretations about the two concepts are actually the results of consequentialists interpreting the basic Buddhist concepts to their own advantage.

While the first two characteristics of the consequentialist approaches are interpretations shared by that school of thought, the third one is proposed specifically by Goodman. Goodman argues that moral evaluation of actions must be based on expected consequences, rather than ones that have transpired. In other words, this argument means that the intention that aims to earn the best consequences should be the standard for evaluating the action’s morality. I think that this consequentialist interpretation about the relationship between intention of an action and its morality is valid. This is because the five ways of practice are required for the purpose of
achieving good consequences. As we have seen in the last chapter, the first four practices and the fifth practice respectively raise faith in a practitioner's mind or achieve enlightenment immediately. If these purposes can be understood to be a kind of desirable consequence, it is hard to deny the interpretation that pursuing good consequences fulfills the purpose of these practices. Here, striving for good consequences provides the moral intention. Even though the *Awakening*’s descriptions about the benefits of sentient beings do not outline any normative statements like Goodman does, his interpretation of moral intent makes the consequentialist understanding of the benefits plausible. Again, if the beneficial consequences of moral intention includes achieving enlightenment which may set the practitioner free from suffering, then the consequentialists can justify using their moral intention as practicing the five practices.

However, the five ways of practice are also misread if they correspond to the consequentialist logic. The practitioners can give the impression that they are conducting the practices for the purpose of having good consequences. However, such an impression is only possible when they analyze just a portion of the whole ethical system of the *Awakening*. Indeed, they are missing an important task in learning Buddhist ethics, which is to grasp the ethical role of the ontological ground of Suchness and incorporate it into their ethical evaluations. If consequentialists continue approaching Buddhist treatises like the *Awakening* through their own established perspectives, their attempts will remain highly restricted.

Hence, the consequentialist approach can be critically refuted based on its lack of the ontological ground, Suchness. The first reason that I can oppose the possibility of the consequentialist approach to this treatise is that the treatise does not explain the final cause of performing practices as a mere desire to earn good consequences. Rather, the final cause is naturally derived from Suchness, through the permeation of Suchness (真如熏習). According to
Asvaghosa, the permeation of Suchness can be illustrated like this:

How does the permeation (熏習) occur and raise the pure state (淨法) continuously? So to speak, since there is the principle of Suchness (眞如法), the delusion (無明) is permeated [by it]. Because of the force (因緣力) of this permeation, the deluded mind gets to hate the suffering from birth and death and like to be awakened. Because the cause (因緣), which triggers [the deluded mind] hate the suffering of birth and death and like to be awakened, is included within the deluded mind, [this mind] is permeated by Suchness. [A sentient being who has] the deluded mind comes to believe in his Suchness and know that what exists is only from the vain activity of the mind and that there is no real object (境界) in front of him. [So he] comes to practice to set [himself] free from the objects [遠離行], and then, he comes to clearly know that there is no object existent in front of him. Thereby, [he will] conduct practices that follow Suchness (隨順行) with various expedients (方便), and then, [he will] not attach to [something] nor give rise to any deluded thought. Furthermore, the delusion will be disappeared by the force of the permeation from Suchness over a long time. (……) It is said to achieve the enlightenment and complete the dharma of nature (自然業).

The notion of permeation here is a figurative expression which indicates that the sentient being is continuously and invisibly affected by being of Suchness just as a cloth is permeated by scents of other objects. Also, Suchness is not in a different mind from the deluded one. Therefore, it is assumed that there is always pure Suchness within the mind. This pure aspect continuously releases a beneficial force, and this innate function is called the permeation of Suchness. Having faith in the mind and conducting practices to achieve enlightenment are all the caused by the force of this permeation.

Hence, we can say that sentient beings' intention to raise faith and head toward awakening is also a result of the permeation. That is, the intention is not a mere desire to earn good consequences, but a result caused from the function of pure wisdom of Suchness. This fact actually goes against the consequentialist logic whose the final purpose in this logic is to earn

55 Ibid., "云何熏習起淨法不斷? 所謂有如法法能熏習無明, 以熏習因緣力故, 則令妄心厭生死苦, 欲求涅槃。以此妄心有厭求因緣故, 即熏習真如, 自信己性, 知心妄動無前境界, 修遠離法, 以如實知無前境界故, 種種方便起隨順行, 不取不念, 乃至久遠熏習力故, 無明則滅。((……)) 名得涅槃成自然業。", T32, 578b.

56 Ibid., "熏習義者, 如世衣香非臭非香, 隨以物熏則有彼氣。((……)) 無明染法實無淨業。真如熏故說有淨用。", T32, 586c.
good consequences. Indeed, even the reason why the consequentialists consider awakening to be the ideal goal is that it is included in the list of those good consequences. Good consequences take on the role of being the standard for moral evaluation, and they determine which actions should be regarded as good or bad. However, the concept of the pure permeation shows a very different logic. The most critical fact is that the awakening is pursued not because of the purpose of earning good consequences. Rather, the awakening is assumed to be naturally pursued by the functions of Suchness, such as the pure wisdom. The practices, including the five ways of practice, are also considered to be naturally known to sentient beings because of the functions of Suchness. In the *Awakening*, therefore, the norm for moral evaluation is not derived from the consequences of actions, but from the pure functions of Suchness which is the ontological ground. Furthermore, specific actions’ morality is to be determined based on the functions of Suchness, not the practitioner’s expectations.

A further detailed explanation of two different aspects of the permeation of Suchness clearly illustrates this difference. First, according to the *Awakening*, the permeation by being of Suchness itself (真如自體相熏習) manifests with the practitioner delightfully raising the faith of Suchness in their mind and seeking for awakening because he was affected by a being of Suchness. This is the source caused through the inner (內因), which makes the sentient being head toward the right way. The second aspect is the permeation by the function of Suchness (用熏習). The treatise describes that the function of Suchness appears as an outer figure like Buddha, Bodhisattva, or a family member. This figure encourages every practitioner to head

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57 Ibid., "真如熏習義有二種，何何為二？一者，自體相熏習，二者，用熏習。自體相熏習者，從無始世來，具無漏法備，有不思議業，作境界之性。依此二義恒常熏習，以有力故，能令眾生厭生死苦，樂求涅槃。自信己身有真如法，發心修行。", T32, 578b.
toward the right way to awakening. This function is from the outer (外緣) and supports the practitioner's practice, too. Asvaghosa uses the simile of wood in order to explain the relationship of those two aspects. According to him, the permeation by being of Suchness itself is like the nature of wood that can burn (火性), and the permeation by the function of Suchness is like the action that ignites the wood. As both aspects are required to burn the wood, those two different types of permeations are also required for sentient beings to be awakened. And those permeations are actually explained to be naturally given by being of Suchness per se. Therefore, every sentient being is assumed to raise faith of the truth in their mind and conduct practices naturally because of these fundamental functions of Suchness.

This notion of permeations implies that what sentient beings practice is a result of being permeated by Suchness at some level. In this theoretical structure, having a desire to achieve enlightenment is not for pursuing good consequences, but the result from being permeated by Suchness. That is, the sentient beings remove the delusion in their mind and achieve awakening naturally based on being of Suchness, not based on the expectation of good consequences. From this ethical structure, we can reconfirm that the reason why a practitioner does practice is quite different from the basic logic of consequentialism. The approach from such perspective, therefore, cannot be properly workable.

58 Ibid., "用熏習者，即是眾生外緣之力，如是外緣有無量義，略說二種。云何為二？一者，差別緣，二者，平等緣。差別緣者，此人依於諸佛菩薩等，從初發意始求道時乃至得佛，於中若見若念，或為眷屬父母親親，或為知友，或為怨家，或起四緣，乃至一切所作無量行緣，以起大慈薰習之力，能令眾生增長善根，若見若聞，得利益故，此緣有二種。云何為二？一者，近緣，速得度故。二者，遠緣，久遠得度故。是近遠二緣，分別復有二種。云何為二？一者，增長行緣，二者，受道緣。平等緣者，一切諸佛菩薩，皆願度脫一切眾生，自然薰習恒常不捨。以同體智力故，隨應見聞而現作業。所謂眾生依於三昧，乃得平等見諸佛故。"，T32, 578c.

59 Ibid., "如木中火性是火正因，若無人知，不假方便，能自燒木，無有是處。眾生亦爾，雖有正因薰習之力，若不信諸佛菩薩知識等以之為緣，能自破煩惱入涅槃者，則無是處。若雖有外緣之力，而內淨法未有薰習力者，亦不能究竟斷生死苦累求涅槃。"，T32, 578c.
In regard to the matter of moral intention, we can find another problem in the consequentialist approach because of the moral intention of ideal characters in Buddhism, such as a Buddha or Bodhisattva. As we have discussed in the examining the fifth way of practice, a sentient being is supposed to raise the great compassion in his mind after realizing the truth of the conditioned world. So he comes to make a vow to save others and put great compassion into actual practice. In this case, this ideal one, who has already achieved enlightenment, feels pity for what the others are suffering in the world. His moral intention here is assumed to be what aims to help and save them. Namely, he conducts good deeds because he feels pity in his mind.

However, the consequentialist approach explains the purpose of performing good deeds as causing good consequences. Feeling pity for others is not necessary in consequentialist interpretation. This is one of the important points that their interpretation omit. The reason why the awakening is considered to be good is that the ideal characters involved in it will generate good consequences for every sentient being due to feeling pity. However, as the ideal characters show, even though it is true that the great compassion can cause good consequences for the others, it is actually not defined as a feeling that just wants to make the good consequences. The norm for moral evaluation in the idea of the great compassion is dependent on whether the practitioner feels pity for the other in his mind and acts according that feeling, not whether he merely intended to cause good consequences. This is because the great compassion is ultimately derived from the perfect wisdom of Suchness. However, the consequentialist approach does not theoretically include this pure altruistic intention of the compassion. Thus, this idea can cause a problem to the approach by suggesting another type of pure intention that is different from consequentialist one. In this respect, consequentialist interpretation does not fully elucidate the teaching of the *Awakening* by skirting around the core aspect of an ideal character in the
The other reason why the *Awakening* cannot properly align with the consequentialist approach is related to the calculation of expected consequences. The calculation assumes it can find the greatest benefit among the possible consequences. This calculation, which shares the same historical trajectory with the tradition of classic consequentialism, cannot be considered plausible without this assumption. Otherwise, it would be impossible to determine which action is morally better than other options. This assumption seems to have been transposed to consequentialist interpretations of Buddhist doctrine. The second theoretical characteristic of Goodman's approach is a typical example of this assumption. Goodman argues that the moral values of possible consequences, including achieving enlightenment, can be quantified and compared one another in order to choose the best one. The result of this calculation is supposed to be the basis of determining which option is morally better, and thereby, what we ought to do.

However, there is actually no description that implies this type of assumption in the *Awakening*. Rather, we can find the other descriptions which are discordant to the case of calculating the benefit. For example, the charity (布施) and patience (忍辱) practices in the five ways of practice shows that practitioners and others do not calculate the benefits of the practices amongst themselves. Benefit or loss is not considered for determining if practitioners conduct practices or not. Even if it is possible that practicing the ways can lead to a terrible result for the practitioner, this negative possibility is never considered before conducting practices. The only fact we can deduce is that practitioners are just required to follow these practices in every circumstance. The typical illustration about Buddha, who postponed his nirvana in order to save the every sentient being, also supports this point. Practitioners may practice sometimes to benefit himself or sometimes for the benefit of others, but he does not calculate the possible benefits to
find which practice will cause the best consequence. Consequences are really not the standard for evaluating morality here. Rather, practitioners are supposed to follow the pure wisdom from Suchness in order to conduct what he ought to do. We have examined that practitioners come to conduct practices, and thereby, head toward awakening as a result of being permeated by the wisdom of Suchness due to the pure function of Suchness. Hence this ethical structure of the *Awakening* cannot be interpreted as consequentialism.

The more problematic implication of the assumption of calculation is that some Buddhist precepts can be violated after the moral values of their expected consequences are compared to one another. This violation can be justified by the consequentialist interpretation if the other option was estimated to generate the better consequence. We can find an example for it from the citation about the kind Anala in the first chapter. Here, the king is illustrated to deceive his people in order to lead them to practice Buddhist precepts well. In general, deceiving others is considered one of the five grave sins like killing others in Buddhist schools. However, Goodman interprets that some precepts can be violated for the purpose of earning the better consequence. Is this interpretation really plausible? Is it acceptable that someone who has perfect wisdom and character can commit the grave sins in order to achieve the bigger benefit? Admittedly, these questions are quite difficult to simply answer. At the very least, however, it seems that such an interpretation is not commonly accepted in Buddhist schools. Buddha or Bodhisattva is not just an *impartial spectator* whom consequentialists have always requested. In addition, it is an oxymoron to indicate the eligibility to harm others with the words of *perfect or pure*. So I am sure that most Buddhists would have negative answers to these questions.

It is really difficult to imagine Buddhist ideal figure who harms other sentient beings somehow. Buddhist precepts are what are required for every Buddhists to observe. Observing
them is generally regarded as not only the foundation of their faith in the teaching, but also the sign of qualification for being a Buddhist. So they are what should not be violated. The five ways of practice in the *Awakening* are also considered similarly and it is actually not very difficult to find such consideration in other treatises. It seems that expositions about karma theory which frequently appear in those treatises supports the consideration. This theory emphasizes that a practitioner must receive results corresponding to the violation of the precepts. Hence, the consequentialist interpretations that maintain that a Buddha or Bodhisattva can kill or deceive others for the purpose of earning better results are inappropriate understandings of Buddhism. Such a sin will not be justified because the karmic retribution must follow. Thus, these interpretations are unusual and radical understandings which depend on some selective reading of treatises. In order to plausibly generalize their interpretation, consequentialists need to provide wholistic explanations with more literary support, starting with analyzing the meta-ethical issues such as what is the ideal wisdom and character in Buddhism.

If we accept that the precepts should be always observed, they refute consequentialist interpretations. This is because they fundamentally rule out the possibility of choosing one among possible actions, making the quantifiable comparison and calculation of actions pointless. Instead, the moral evaluation of actions is supposed to be based on the rightness or goodness inherent in those actions, not based on their expected consequences. The five ways of practice in the *Awakening* are the kinds of the precepts that share this logic of the moral evaluation. Especially since they explain what practitioners should observe, and at the same time, would

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naturally observe, because practitioners are permeated by the pure functions of Suchness. That is, the five ways of practice have their own inherent moral rightness or goodness, which can be penetrated by the pure functions of Suchness, so they are constituents of a fixed set of practices that should be always followed. It is clearly different from consequentialist interpretation in which a moral values of an action vary based on its expected consequence. Committing sin by violating the precepts is never justified here for any reason.

For the ethical structure of the *Awakening*, the first thing we need to consider is the metaphysical nature of Suchness. As discussed above, Suchness, as a fundamental ontological ground for the ethical theory, takes a role of enabling sentient beings to raise faith and conduct actual practices. It is the powerful innate cause which leads practitioners to recover the original ontological state of it. That is, Suchness is the start, but at the same time, the end of the ethical theory of the treatise. Suchness is what subsumes every important ethical aspect within a single coherent system. Therefore, this ontological ground and the ethical theory of the *Awakening* cannot be considered separately.

Given these innate functions of Suchness, raising faith of the truth in the mind and achieving enlightenment must be considered to be the results caused by being of Suchness itself. Here, the two different types of practices, cessation and observation practice and the other four practices, are harmoniously united into a single theoretical structure based on the ontological ground. The fifth one was explained to be workable only after the faith of truth is sufficiently accomplished by the other four practices. So it still seemingly looks like that these two types of practices have different purposes and functions. However, now we can say that all of them are

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61 Asvaghosa emphasize the importance of raising faith as a condition to head toward awakening. Cf. 马鸣, *大乘起信論*, "信得增長，乃能志求無上之道", T32, 580c.
actually the results from same Suchness. That is, they are the different parts of the process of being purified and changing to the right way (淨緣起). This means that every practice that raises faith, observes the truth and is awakened are merely the results of Suchness even though they are seemingly explained to be the separate things.

Therefore, it is clear that the ethical structure in the *Awakening* is quite different from the inner logic of consequentialism, which prioritizes beneficial consequences over evaluating if they ended up being moral ones. In this treatise, the agent can naturally know what he ought to do by the functions of Suchness, and his practice must generate goodness for himself and others just as a result. The practice of good deeds in this ethical structure, therefore, is a kind of natural consequence. This may be a reason why Asvaghosa sometimes uses the expression of "natural" (自然) in the treatise.62 Conducting practices as a result of being permeated by Suchness is naturally so, as he described above, it is called completing the dharma of nature (自然業). He explains the this expression "natural" means that there is no intention (作意).63 Hence, sentient beings are supposed to head toward awakening just as they inherently are.

Additionally, Suchness functions as a fundamental principle of the moral norms and its role does not change. In a long-term perspective, therefore, practitioners are supposed to necessarily head toward the right way. Because they are permanently permeated by the functions, they will comply with this principle somehow in the future. However, it does not mean that being of Suchness is the sufficient condition of awakening in itself. There is still room for the practitioner to voluntarily decide whether he seeks awakening or not. As described in the

62 Ibid., ”唯依法力自然修行, 真質真如, 灭無明故.”, T32, 579a.
63 Ibid., ”諸佛如來法身平等處一切處, 無有作意故, 而說自然.”, T32, 581c.
treatise, the mind of a sentient being is deluded from the very beginning of its being. Thus, the practitioner may not be able to achieve awakening if he does not willfully try to comply with the permeation of Suchness, and thereby try to remove the delusion. Of course, Suchness will positively affect them as an inner and outer causes, but sentient being still can decide if he will follow that or not.

Given the relation between Suchness, the fundamental principle, and the practices, it seems that the type of ethical structure the *Awakening* outlines is close to a deontology based on metaphysics. Moral deeds are to be conducted because beings are fundamentally affected by the ultimate principle, not because they desire to earn a certain benefit. According to the treatise, such desire is explained to be generated by the pure functions of Suchness. In addition to that, Suchness enables sentient beings to discern which deeds are morally good by guaranteeing the inherent pure wisdom of it. Therefore, moral rightness or goodness of deeds does not change according to their consequences. Rather, those deeds, including Buddhist precepts, are right or good in themselves. And it comes to be known to practitioners who achieved the pure wisdom of Suchness.

This type of ethical structure seems to remind us of classic deontological theories like Kantian ethics. Strictly speaking, however, it does not completely coincide with such Western deontology. Rather, it may be a stricter type of deontology in terms of the important notions that constitute the potential possibility of awakening, such as the moral motivation, good will, and intention of actions, which are also explained to be immediately provided by the principle.

Another significant difference between the ethical theory of the *Awakening* and classic deontology is that the former integrates an emotional aspect, which is called the great compassion, as an important constituent within its system. Kant, on the other hand, assured that
altruistic emotions must be ruled out from the norms for moral evaluation because he thought that emotions are random by nature, so they cannot necessarily cause right actions in a coherent way.\textsuperscript{64} However, the great compassion is considered to be necessarily felt when a practitioner realizes the truth by the wisdom of Suchness. That is, this emotional aspect has a necessary relationship with the ultimate ground, so it can function as a moral motivation of performing good deeds at all time. In sum, in the \textit{Awakening}, moral deeds are properly conducted as a result of the combination of rational apprehension and emotional motivation, and this process is based on the ultimate ground of Suchness.\textsuperscript{65} This characteristic distinguishes the ethical theory of the \textit{Awakening} from the existing deontological traditions or consequentialism.


CONCLUSION

The ethical structure of the *Awakening*, which cannot be separated from its ontological ground, is quite different from the basic structure of the consequentialist perspective. However, the consequentialists failed to incorporate this ontological ground into their interpretations. Therefore, approaching to this treatise with such perspective is improper. Rather, the ethical structure of this treatise is closer to the strict version of deontology. The moral motivation and actual ways of practice are just provided from the metaphysical principle, which is called Suchness, and these factors are related one another naturally. The practitioner in this structure is just assumed to practice what he should do following the perfect wisdom and the good influence from Suchness.

The *Awakening* is not very rich in content. Thus, the ethical structure that I derived from this treatise may not represent Chinese Buddhist ethics. However, it is true that the idea of tathāgata-garbha within the *Awakening* has been shared by many Chinese Buddhist schools. Given that, this paper can be the starting point for studying the entire picture of Chinese Buddhist ethics.

This paper concentrated on the ontological aspect of the *Awakening* in order to refute the possibility of the false approach, that is, consequentialism. However, an epistemological aspect is also important in studying the ethical structure of this treatise. In the *Awakening*, Suchness is not only the ontological ground, but also the epistemological ground. Thus, the ethical structure of this treatise can be fully grasped by incorporating these two aspects into a single theoretical system. This task will be a next research subject that we should pay attention to.
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