“A DISGRACE TO HER COLOURS”: THE MEDITERRANEAN POPULATION PROBLEM & TACTICS OF GOVERNMENTALITY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY GIBRALTAR

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DISSERTATION
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Abstract

This dissertation examines the pervading sense of crisis among Gibraltar’s eighteenth-century British governors, caused by the large-scale geopolitical conflicts of the period and the multiethnic inhabitants of the territory, and the commanders’ attempts to manage that crisis by embracing technologies of governmentality. Captured by Anglo-Dutch forces in 1704, Britain formally acquired this Mediterranean possession in 1713. Shortly after its acquisition, Britons embraced the territory as their own, proclaiming it to be a “bulwark” of Great Britain and “bastion” of Britishness. However, the reality on the ground belied such rhetoric. British Gibraltar was in actuality a Mediterranean meeting ground, bringing together peoples, ideas, and goods from across the region. The vast majority of the town’s population was comprised of foreign migrants who settled in Gibraltar seeking the many opportunities that the British garrison offered. These individuals brought with them a variety of cultural, religious, and political identities that impacted the growth and development of the territory, creating a multi-cultural space that was both produced by and participated in the Mediterranean world.

These foreign bodies and their foreign mores also impacted the governance of the territory. As experienced British military men, Gibraltar’s governors desired a British Gibraltar like they had imagined, one with British laws, institutions, and peoples to serve as a British Protestant stronghold in a hostile (non-Protestant) sea. Yet this was not possible with the current composition of the town’s population. As they understood it, the foreign inhabitants posed a threat to their efforts to secure Gibraltar for Britain. Concerned by these individuals and driven by the need to manage this population, Gibraltar’s governors employed techniques of governmentality in order to better “see” any threats and “know” the population. In their minds, practices like surveillance, census taking, quarantine, and the use of documentary regimes were
necessary for them to grasp Gibraltar’s peoples and take control of the territory. The commanders consolidated this knowledge into an imperial archive, which they believed provided an orderly and rational picture of the territory. I argue that the governors embraced such tactics because they believed this would enable them to solve the population problem in Gibraltar and secure Britain’s hold on the garrison. However, the commanders’ “necessary” technologies were largely driven by their exaggerated fear of the foreign and their unsuccessful desire to create an ideally British Protestant territory. The governors’ tactics suggests a larger trend of population management that developed across the empire, but Gibraltar offers a key promontory of this phenomenon on a local level.
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# Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................1

CHAPTER 1: “SOME SHORT REFLECTIONS ON THE SITUATION OF GIBRALTAR”: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PLACE AND PEOPLES OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY GIBRALTAR..................................................................................26

CHAPTER 2: “A GREAT STRENGTHENING TO THE GARRISON”: POPULATION MANAGEMENT IN GIBRALTAR..................................................................................................................79

CHAPTER 3: “THE HEALTH AND PLEASURE OF THE TOWN”: THE MANAGEMENT OF DISEASE IN GIBRALTAR..................................................................................................................109

CHAPTER 4: “SUBJECTS OF HIS BRITTANICK MAJESTY”: PASSHOLDERS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF BELONGING IN GIBRALTAR.................................................................143

CHAPTER 5: “MILITARY TYRANNY” & “OUTRAGEOUS PEYNEISTS”: REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNMENTALITY IN GIBRALTAR (1792-1793).................................................................181

CONCLUSION.....................................................................................................................223

BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................227
Introduction

Upon the formal acquisition of Gibraltar in 1713, Queen Anne expressed her excitement about Britain’s new Mediterranean territories to Parliament: “Our Mediterranean-Trade, and the British-Interest and Influence in those Parts, will be secured by the Possession of Gibraltar and Port-Mahon, with the whole Island of Minorca, which are offered to remain in my hands.”

Captured by Anglo-Dutch forces in 1704 during the War of the Spanish Succession, the British government was eager to retain Gibraltar, which they believed offered a prime position for the state to involve itself in Mediterranean politics and trade, enabling the expansion of Britain’s influence in the region. As Thomas Gordon, a prominent British author, proclaimed, “Gibraltar was “the most important Place in the world to the trade and Naval Empire of England, the Key of the Mediterranean, the Terror of our Enemies, and the best Pledge of our new Friendships.”

In the minds of Gordon and many other Britons in the metropole, Gibraltar was a miniature British island, a “Bulwark of their Country” that promoted British ideals, culture, and trade in a hostile and pagan sea.

Yet Gibraltar’s British governors living in the territory found a very different reality: instead of a bastion of Britishness, Gibraltar was a Mediterranean meeting ground of peoples, ideas, and goods from across the region with few British peoples or practices present. As one governor commented, Gibraltar was “Chiefly Inhabited by Jews, Moors & Papists of Different

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2 Thomas Gordon, Considerations Offered Upon the Approaching Peace; And Upon the Importance of Gibraltar to the British Empire (London, 1720), pp. 27-28.

Nations, who may prove of Dangerous Consequence to the Town.” Under British rule, Gibraltar became a transnational and transimperial space, despite British administrators’ efforts, as migrants flocked to the garrison from homes across the shores of the Mediterranean. These Mediterranean bodies, and the cultural and religious identities they brought with them, were a cause for alarm for the British governors. Despite being residents of a British territory, the inhabitants’ status as “trans-imperial subjects” made them suspect to the military governors; as both foreign and familiar, they appeared to be an inherent threat to the security of the territory and its continued possession by Britain. Their ties to foreign (Catholic) states, many of which were at odds with Britain throughout the century, coupled with their intimate knowledge of the garrison, its strengths and its weaknesses, discomfited the governors. In the minds of the commanders, the best way to protect the territory, beyond that of military armament, was to create a truly British territory, supported by British subjects, laws, customs, and religion. Fixated on the territory’s lack of British bodies and beliefs, the governors deemed Gibraltar’s Mediterranean population to be a “crisis” that required constant management.

My dissertation examines this idea of crisis in eighteenth-century Gibraltar and its British governors’ attempts to manage that crisis by embracing technologies of governmentality. Such a view of Gibraltar, especially during that period, is contrary to most portrayals of the British Rock, which depict Gibraltar as an unconquerable British stronghold rather than an embattled territory plagued by the threat of invasion, rebellion, and war. The large-scale, geopolitical conflicts of the eighteenth century, many of which involved Gibraltar or were geographically near the territory, were a serious and valid concern for the military governors,

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who were single-handedly responsible for maintaining the garrison and protecting the territory. Yet, the governors’ greatest concern, which I argue was largely unfounded, was the governance of Gibraltar’s multiethnic population. Such fears, in conjunction with the surrounding international threats, drove the governors to adopt what Foucault describes as techniques of population management or governmentality.\(^6\)

As this dissertation shows, technologies of governmentality were consciously deployed in eighteenth-century Gibraltar in an effort to closely manage and control its Mediterranean inhabitants. Governors employed various means of surveillance to “see” the structure of the society and the landscape of the population. Through these surveys, they believed that they could “know” the entire picture of the territory and its people, enabling them to suss out potential threats. These individuals were divided into “schematic categories,” based on ethnicity or religion, granting the governors a sense of control and order over possible troublemakers. The governors reproduced this vision of the territory and their knowledge of the inhabitants through the conscious creation of an archive, which they used to facilitate their own as well as their successors’ administration of Gibraltar.\(^7\) While this gathering of knowledge comprised the “official” vision of Gibraltar, it was by no means coherent and comprehensive but rather contingent and ever-changing based on the governors’ particular needs and desires related to


each individual situation. Each of these technologies came about as reactionary responses to what the commanders believed was necessary to better secure the territory and solve the vexing problem of population. In their minds, Gibraltar’s security could only be guaranteed through constant population management and the development and use of such technologies.

Despite the governors’ arguments that these practices were “necessary” to properly govern and secure the territory, I contend that they were primarily driven by their (exaggerated) fear of the foreign and the desire to create a hegemonic British Protestant identity. In commanders’ minds, their solution to the problem of Gibraltar was to encourage and grow a homogenous population that fulfilled their ideas of what a British subject and British colony should look and be like. Because this imagined vision could not and did not come to be, the governors embraced these technologies as a means of flexing the arm of the state against those who sought, consciously or unconsciously, to undermine this goal. Yet their efforts to create a miniature Britain, or even to demonize non-Britons, were largely unsuccessful. Instead these practices served to limit the power of productive inhabitants and antagonize the populace, in particular the British residents. The governors’ adoption of these technologies in an attempt to control foreign bodies suggest a larger trend of population management that eventually developed in sites across the British empire. These practices were not limited to the small

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Mediterranean territory, yet the site of Gibraltar offers a prime vantage point to explore such politics on a local level in order to better understand the larger imperial and national impact. As Michael McDonnell argues, “if we really want to think global, we need to watch the local.”

**Countering the “Gibraltar Tradition”**

The common narrative of eighteenth-century Gibraltar is one of a strong, unconquerable British rock that has withstood all foreign attacks. Writers begin with its capture during the War of Spanish Succession in 1704 and the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 when Britain formally acquired the territory. The narrative continues through the wars of the eighteenth-century, focusing in

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particular on the 1727 Siege, in which the garrison was attacked by Spanish forces, and the Great Siege of 1779-1783, in which the British defeated a combined Franco-Spanish foe and held the territory despite losing the American colonies. At the end of the eighteenth-century timeline are the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars with a special emphasis on the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. The story is one of British military victory, imbued with triumphalism and pride in the power of Britain to conquer all who dared challenge their hold in Gibraltar. In this telling Gibraltar serves as a symbol of Britishness and a metaphor for British strength. Gibraltar, in many ways, acts as a miniature Britain, an “island” that embodies British values and furthers British causes.

This narrative tradition, aptly named the “Gibraltar tradition,” began in the early eighteenth century, not long after Britain’s acquisition of the territory in 1713. With the Rock threatened by the Spanish powers during the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1721), Britons at home in the metropole quickly became attached to the idea of Gibraltar. Although British ministers were not as dedicated to the idea of keeping Gibraltar, hoping that its return to Spain would bring peace between the two states, many Britons were loath to give up the symbol of their victory in the war. As contemporary writers argued, Gibraltar was “a just concern for the Honour and Welfare of the British Nation” and as much a part of Britain as a city like Portsmouth.\(^{11}\) This attachment grew stronger with the 1727-1729 Anglo-Spanish war as Gibraltar symbolized the honor and might of the British state as the prize that Spain could not recapture, despite its best efforts. By the end of the eighteenth century, in particular after the Great Siege

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\(^{11}\) A Letter to the Lord Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, p. 4; Gordon, Considerations Offered upon the Approaching Peace (London, 1720), pp. 17, 27-28; Britannus, Letter to an Independent Whig (London, 1720), pp. 17-19; see also Cato’s Letters, Vol. I: Saturday, November 5, 1720, Reasons to Prove that We Are in No Danger of Losing Gibraltar (no. 1), pp. 2, 5.
and Britain’s unlikely victory against Spanish and French forces, the “impregnable Fortress” of Gibraltar was “the brightest [jewel] in the British Diadem” and “Their Kingdom’s Bulwark.”

The Gibraltar tradition, which is carried on today, has created a “mythic” Gibraltar in which the Rock serves as a “stable, iconic landmark.” As scholars have shown, the creation of colonial landmarks constructs a “metonymic replacement” for the site itself, essentially ridding the territory of any hindrances, strife, or disorder. Instead of reflecting the constant fears of the British government surrounding the loss of the territory, this narrative establishes Gibraltar as a constant victor against all foes and a bastion of Britishness, from the Union Jack flying at the top of the Rock to the people on the ground. This narrative form also provides a sense of social, political, and even geographic stability that does not exist in reality by creating boundaries and categories that were indistinguishable on the ground. The Gibraltar tradition has performed accordingly, providing a sanitized view of life in the territory that appears stable and without international contestation, free from internal dissonance and non-British influences. Unlike the historical reality, in which the territory’s borders were a subject of debate and its people were not easily categorized – despite the governors’ efforts to do so anyway – the classic narrative of Gibraltar obscures those past conflicts to focus on the military victories and chronicle of British strength. The landmark narrative also enabled colonial governments to feel as if they had a sense of control, stabilizing the territory enough to “capture” it, and offering a “promontory” from

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13 David Lambert, “’As Solid as the Rock’? Place, Belonging and the Local Appropriation of Imperial Discourse in Gibraltar,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 30, no. 2 (June 2005), p. 211; D. Graham Burnett, Masters of All They Surveyed: Exploration, Geography, and a British El Dorado (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), p. 12. Lambert argues that the Gibraltarians have “co-opted” the tradition by “emplacing themselves firmly on the Rock,” demonstrating that “British imperial history is actually local history too” (pp. 215-216).

14 Burnett, Masters of All They Surveyed, p. 12.
which administrative eyes could survey all and any developments.\textsuperscript{15} Through the Gibraltar tradition, Britons at home, including the British government, felt that they had a clear understanding of the territory; both a mythical and geographical landmark, the Rock also served as a historical and imperial one, standing tall as a staunchly British Mediterranean outpost representing the resilient and unyielding British empire.\textsuperscript{16}

While I recognize the power and persuasiveness of the Gibraltar tradition, I seek to examine Gibraltar not from the (Union Jack-flying) promontory but from a more ground-level perspective. In particular, I am interested in exploring the relationships, and the conflicts, between the people of Gibraltar and the resident British administration. This approach will examine two viewpoints: what life was actually like in Gibraltar and how the governors managed these circumstances. As historian Geoffrey Plank noted in a recent article, “scholars have not paid sufficient attention to… the ways in which Protestant Britons, North African Jews, Muslims, Italians, and Spanish interacted there.”\textsuperscript{17} It is my goal to examine these interactions, focusing specifically on those between the British governors of Gibraltar and their multiethnic subjects. Recognizing that many of Gibraltar’s governors hoped for a territory like that espoused in the Gibraltar tradition, I want to examine how these commanders grappled with the reality of the Mediterranean Rock that they encountered on a daily basis, driving them to imagine and devise strategies to overcome these challenges. Rather than a miniature Britain, the arriving governors found a Mediterranean meeting ground comprised of peoples from across the region.

\textsuperscript{15} Burnett, \textit{Masters of All They Surveyed}, pp. 129-130.


The “Trans-imperial Subjects” of Gibraltar

As will be discussed in chapter one, migrants arrived from a variety of Mediterranean states, in particular Spain, Genoa, and North Africa. With these foreign bodies came foreign ideas, cultures, religions, languages, goods, and even loyalties. They were, as Natalie Rothman describes, “trans-imperial subjects,” serving as “intermediaries who articulated difference” by straddling Gibraltar and the Mediterranean world.\(^\text{18}\) Their non-British origins, by definition, made them foreigners, yet their residence in Gibraltar made them members of a British territory and community. As “strangers” to the garrison, the residents were both of the territory yet outside of it.\(^\text{19}\) This dual status of foreign resident positioned them within multiple societies; for some this included just their homeland and Gibraltar, whereas others may have identified with several homes or states due to the diasporic nature of their birth communities. Rothman’s conception of the trans-imperial subject emphasizes that these people brought with them diverse political attachments, confessional affiliations, kin and patronage ties, skills and knowledge, and general life experiences that subsequently affected the development of Gibraltar and the lives of the community there.\(^\text{20}\) This is true not only of Gibraltar’s “foreign” population, but all those who came to the territory, including British settlers and governors, who in turn had their own histories that influenced their experiences there.\(^\text{21}\)

\(^{18}\) Rothman, *Brokering Empire*, p. 4.

\(^{19}\) See Rothman, *Brokering Empire*, pp. 6-7 for her discussion and use of Georg Simmel’s “stranger.”


While I appreciate the importance of these trans-imperial subjects’ individual stories, this is not my primary focus for this dissertation. Instead I aim to explore how the “foreignness” of Gibraltar’s residents influenced the development and administration of the territory. Bringing with them foreign ways of living, cultures, ideas, and religions, these inhabitants challenged the conception, and the reality, of a bounded, British Gibraltar. As these actors suggest, Gibraltar’s borders were porous; the surrounding seas, rather than being a barrier, served as a site of connection, bringing together the various landmasses on its shores. As peoples from communities, states, and empires across the Mediterranean traveled to and settled in Gibraltar, they demonstrated that the British territory was not simply comprised of or influenced by Britons

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but rather was an intimate part of the Mediterranean world in which it existed. Although I focus my attention on the particular geographic space of Gibraltar, I follow David Hancock’s argument that historical subjects and empires were not sealed or bounded entities but rather were intertwined and contingent on the histories of their residents, neighbors, and the wider world.24

Situated within the Mediterranean itself, linked to other Mediterranean states, housing Mediterranean peoples, and trading Mediterranean goods, Gibraltar was largely defined by the Mediterranean. In this sense, this dissertation serves not just as history of British Gibraltar, but rather one that is firmly grounded in the Mediterranean.25 While I discuss the Mediterranean as an overarching geographic space, I do not believe that there was a singular Mediterranean culture among the region’s many peoples. Instead, I recognize that there were multiple, separate geographical spaces within the sea that need to be recognized and respected. As Ian Morris argues, the interconnection of the Mediterranean did not mean that the other existing institutions, states, and empires in that region ceased to matter.26 While my focus is not on detailing these various players or spaces, they do play an implicit role in the discussion of Gibraltar’s inhabitants and the governors’ responses to various international and internal developments. Despite metropolitan British conceptions of the territory, which proclaimed it as a key part of the British empire and the embodiment of all it stood for, this dissertation argues that Gibraltar was grounded in its Mediterranean roots.


25 This follows Horden and Purcell’s claims that their history is one that is “in” the Mediterranean not of it. See Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 2-4.

The Governors & the (Foreign) Population Problem

Sent to Gibraltar with a commission from the British Crown to administer and manage the town and garrison, Gibraltar’s governors were the primary, and occasionally, only British authority in the territory. These men served as “the executive officers responsible for ensuring that a territory accepted imperial authority, was adequately defended, and was generally profitable.” They were also responsible for “ensur[ing] that territories were sufficiently populated with those loyal to the imperial center.”27 Charged with such tasks Gibraltar’s many foreign Mediterranean residents were a great concern for these British governors’ successful administration of the territory. While many of these individuals brought a number of talents that proved useful for the development of the town and the British empire, Gibraltar’s governors did not see these migrants as advantageous. I argue that Gibraltar’s “trans-imperial subjects,” whom in many settings were beneficial, posed a direct threat to the governors’ imagined dreams for Gibraltar and their efforts to create a British territory. The inhabitants’ foreign cultural identities and mores did not align with the commanders’ visions of loyalty to the British sovereign and the empire.

Fixated on the notion of “foreignness,” these individuals were deemed to be aliens or “not of one’s own” by Gibraltar’s governors, who were preoccupied by the fact that the majority of inhabitants were born in different (non-British, non-Protestant) states or kingdoms.28 As I argue, these subject foreigners blurred the lines between Briton and non-Briton, complicating the governors’ binary understanding of the population, which they tried desperately to maintain despite its heterogeneity. The commanders’ efforts to keep clear-cut categories between


inhabitants who could be trusted and those who were suspect relied on place of birth and religion. Those who were born abroad were assumed to be untrustworthy; their allegiance, the governors assumed, would always be to a foreign state and its interests. In addition, as people of a different faith, these inhabitants’ religion was also foreign to the commanders, suggesting further loyalties to other religious leaders or states who espoused similar beliefs. Such misgivings also included true British subjects who were native to the town but had foreign parents – the vast majority of Gibraltar’s natural-born British subjects. Their families’ foreign connections and loyalties, be it political, cultural, or religious, marked them as subject aliens and thus potential (imagined) threats to the British crown. For many governors, any resident who was not a true-born Briton from the British Isles was deemed an “other,” someone whose loyalty could never be truly proven. The commanders feared that these foreign inhabitants were merely trying to “pass” as faithful subjects to the Crown, but were in actuality turncoats in disguise.²⁹

In part the governors’ fear of their peoples, I argue, was driven by Gibraltar’s situation. These commanders, who spent their lives promoting and protecting the British state across the empire, had been placed during the last years of their careers alone on a small Rock in the middle of a hostile sea, far from Britain.³⁰ Located only yards from the Spanish armaments and troops,


³⁰ For similar works that focus on British administrators’ experiences across the empire, see Lambert and Lester, Colonial Lives; Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Colony and Metropole in the English Imagination, 1830-1867
and often in the midst of heated European and North African conflicts, these men were perpetually reminded that Gibraltar was a contested territory and that an attack could occur almost at any moment. Nor were their troops the most satisfied or well-trained. As contemporaries reported, soldiers dreaded being posted in Gibraltar as there was little amusement or opportunities to travel outside the small garrison. Those that were stationed there often remained for a lengthy period of time with little hope of transfer or escape.\textsuperscript{31} As a result, some of the soldiers coped by deserting while others imbibed in any available liquor and spirits.\textsuperscript{32} The garrison also often did not have a full complement of soldiers with only a few regiments stationed in the territory at a time. During the eighteenth century, when war loomed frequently, the lack of troops made many of Gibraltar’s governors nervous as they recognized the unlikelihood of timely reinforcements.

In addition, Britain was almost 1,100 miles away, a journey that took at best a few months so long as the winds and the weather were favorable. Even if London ministers chose to send additional troops, or if they had important news or advice for the governor, he often would not receive such letters or men for an extended period of time. One can imagine that many of these men also felt alone and embittered during such postings.\textsuperscript{33} In this setting, as the only British authority in a largely foreign territory with few British institutions or peoples and Spanish

\textsuperscript{31} Robert Poole, \textit{The beneficent bee: or, Traveller's Companion} (London, 1753), pp. 73, 126; J. A. Houlding, \textit{Fit for Service}, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{32} This was one of Governor Bland’s many complaints about the soldiers in his \textit{Account}. See TNA, C) 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, Article 2.

\textsuperscript{33} Some of Gibraltar’s governors did issue complaints to the government in London about their postings. Governor Bland even asked to be recalled back to England or to Scotland after a year in the garrison because of the poor weather and its influence on his health. He could no longer stand the humidity, the rocks, and the sun of Gibraltar, he claimed, and he requested to be removed immediately. This process took at least an additional year before he was allowed to leave the territory.
forces at the doorstep, Gibraltar’s governors were constantly concerned about just how they could manage to keep Gibraltar in British hands. At a time when the larger geopolitical situation was volatile and Britain found itself frequently involved in conflicts with its European competitors, most of whom were Gibraltar’s close neighbors, the commanders were justified in their concerns about Gibraltar’s safety.

However, the governors’ fears were also largely driven by their desire to make Gibraltar a truly British territory and propagate what they defined as a British Protestant identity. As mentioned previously, I argue that the vast majority of Gibraltar’s inhabitants could not be bound by specific categories of identification. While their birthplaces and (current) religion may have been distinguishable, these were not altogether defining of who these individuals were or where their loyalties lay. This inherent messiness of the population challenged the governors’ abilities to understand their residents and the territory, impelling them to impose a simplified, binary vision of the territory (us versus them) and embrace practices that they believed could increase their control over this complicated and problematic heterogeneous population.

**Governmentality in Gibraltar**

As Michel Foucault has argued, population became the primary target of governance in the eighteenth century.\(^{34}\) This was especially true in Gibraltar where the inhabitants were a primary focus of the governors’ energy and administrative efforts. Rather than simply administering territories or fostering family values and loyalty to the sovereign, government at this time was similar to that of running a ship: “It means clearly to take charge of the sailors, but also of the boat and its cargo; to take care of a ship means also to reckon with winds, rocks and

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\(^{34}\) Foucault, “Governmentality.”
storms; and it consists in that activity of establishing a relation between the sailors who are to be
taken care of and the ship which is to be taken care of, and the cargo which is to be brought
safely to port, and all those eventualities like winds, rocks, storms and so on.”

This new style of governance, as Foucault explains, necessitated the close management of all aspects of the
heterogeneous population. As a result, governments embraced the need for “savoir,” placing an
emphasis on knowing the population in order to engender a rational and effective governance.

This process and the institution of techniques of population management Foucault termed
“governmentality” or the art of government.

My dissertation seeks to explore the techniques of governance and the practices of
governmentality employed by Gibraltar’s governors in the eighteenth century. Like Foucault
mentions, the governors were plagued by the problem of population and its effects on life in
Gibraltar. As discussed above, the governors saw the townspeople as a threat and problem that
needed to be solved. I place a particular emphasis here on the word “see” – surveillance was a
key component of governmentality both in Gibraltar and elsewhere. As Jeffrey Monaghan
argues, surveillance was the first weapon available to and employed by colonial officials.

Through these surveillance practices, governors felt that they could see the “structure” of society
and the landscape of the population. This technology enabled them to produce an overarching
image of the population, or so they believed, and discover the places and ways in which they

37 Kirstie M. McClure, “Taking Liberties in Foucault’s Triangle: Sovereignty, Discipline, Governmentality, and the
Subject of Rights,” in Identities, Politics, and Rights, ed. Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (Ann Arbor:
38 Jeffrey Monaghan, “Settler Governmentality and Racializing Surveillance in Canada’s North-West.” Canadian
39 Allen Chun, “Colonial ‘Govern-mentality’ in Transition: Hong Kong as Imperial Object and Subject.” Cultural
needed to intervene. As we see in each chapter of this dissertation, surveillance is at the heart of each of the tactics governors employed to facilitate their governance. In chapter 2, Lieutenant Governor Richard Kane’s (1720-1721, 1725-1727) surveillance encouraged and facilitated his use of the census, the alien act, and property grants; in chapter 3, surveillance was fundamental to Governor Humphrey Bland’s (1749-1752) introduction and employment of the institution of quarantine and the policing of bodies; in chapter 4, surveillance enabled Governors Robert Boyd (1768-1777, 1790-1794) and George Augustus Eliott (1777-1787) to mark individuals as foreigners or subjects based on their actions and supposed loyalties; and in chapter 5, surveillance of developments abroad and within the territory drove Governor Boyd to introduce a series of regulations that eventually propelled residents to critique his methods of governance.

In this practice of surveillance, James Scott argues, the colonial official only “sees” such activities, peoples, and practices that are of interest to him. This selective vantage point and its “simplified approximations” reduce the “complex reality” to “schematic categories.” In the case of Gibraltar, the governors did not often view their inhabitants as individual threats but rather created distinct larger groups which were easier for them to manage and control. These groups, or categories, hinged around divisions of ethnicity or religion. By focusing on these particular categories – Spaniard, North African, Genoese, or Briton; Catholic, Jew, Muslim, or Protestant – governors were able to create a sense of order to the territory. As Kathleen Wilson has shown in her work, the concept of population was directly tied to the notion of order from its very beginnings in the seventeenth century. This idea of easily divisible and definable groups

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and the practice of categorizing and subdividing the territory enabled governors to feel as if they could better grasp the nature of the situation. Following these categories, chapters two through five each implicitly highlight one particular subject group. In chapter 2, the Spaniards were the primary concern for Governor Kane; in chapter 3, the Jews, or more broadly anyone from North Africa, functioned as the potential threat to Bland and the health of the garrison; in chapter 4, the Genoese and their shifting loyalties were Boyd and Eliott’s greatest concern when trying to regulate Mediterranean passes; and in chapter 5, Gibraltar’s British commercial settlers, surprisingly enough for both myself and the governor, were the troublemakers who challenged Boyd’s authority and encouraged the rest of the population to rebel against him.

These practices of surveillance and categorizing enabled the governors to produce a large body of knowledge about the territory. Knowledge, as Nicholas Dirks argues and Bernard Cohn demonstrates, was “what colonialism was all about.” The governors’ knowledge, gathered through a variety of methods, facilitated their “techniques of rule” and management of the population and the many facets of their lives. The archive itself, as Lisa Lowe contends, was a “site of knowledge production” that can be “read” as “a technology for administering and knowing the colonized population.” For many administrators the archive was the totality of everything that was surveyed and cataloged, providing an overarching and “complete” picture of the territory. Yet as Thomas Richards argues, the archival vision, despite being often piecemeal

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43 Wilson, “Rethinking the Colonial State,” p. 1299.

44 Lowe, “The Intimacies of Four Continents,” p. 196.
and contingent, was much more coherent and unified than a territory could possibly be.\textsuperscript{45} In this dissertation I demonstrate how the governors consolidated this knowledge in the form of an archive, which sought to provide an orderly and rational understanding of the territory. This archive was not in actually a static totality, but rather was a compilation of fragmented pieces that the governors gathered through their efforts to respond to various “crises;” the archive was constantly growing, changing, and developing as each individual commander required. The governors’ archive not only serves as the primary source for piecing together Gibraltar’s eighteenth-century past today, but it also functioned as the primary source for any decisions surrounding its inhabitants. This archive and the paperwork it necessitated makes an appearance in each of the four thematic chapters.\textsuperscript{46} In chapter 2, Kane began the physical recording of the population’s numbers through the census and was responsible for issuing some of the town’s first property grants, offering a record of who qualified for the privilege as a British subject; in chapter 3, this archive appeared in the form of bills of health and quarantine notices which served to mark certain individuals as clean, foul, or suspect and facilitated Bland’s classification of them accordingly; in chapter 4, Eliott created an entire documentary regime to determine the subjecthood of Mediterranean pass applicants – this record was used later by himself and other governors for other legal decisions, such as property grants and civil suits; in chapter 5, Boyd and the British petitioners both participated in the creation of archive in an effort to convince the each other and later British ministers in London of the validity of their arguments and approaches to governance.

\textsuperscript{45} Thomas Richards, \textit{The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire} (1993), p. 4.

\textsuperscript{46} For more on paperwork, see Ben Kafka, \textit{The Demon of Writing : Powers and Failures of Paperwork} (Cambridge: Zone Books, 2012). As he argues, “paperwork syncopates the state’s rhythms, destabilizes its structures” (p. 10).
Through these tactics and technologies of population management – surveillance, the creation of categories, and the production of an archive – Gibraltar’s governors sought to solve the problem of population. The majority of their focus, I argue, was on Gibraltar’s foreign, Mediterranean bodies. This is not to say, however, that such attention to these individuals was necessary. As I illustrate in chapter 1, the foreign migrants were of great use to the garrison and the development of the town. In his work Bakhle argues that colonial authorities were often fixated on groups whose threat is “far more rhetorical and symbolic than physical” because these figures “questioned the fundamental legitimacy of colonial rule.” As my work seeks to show, the governors believed that the foreign population was the greatest possible threat to the garrison whereas a strengthened British presence would help support it. Instead, as chapters two through four show, such fears were often unfounded as Gibraltar’s governors established series of management policies and practices often to no real end. While there may have been a few offenders and potential threats, no real foreign challenges to their authority ever materialized. However, as chapter five reveals, the greatest actual population problem that the governors experienced was caused by Britons. The events of chapter five, which details British merchants’ challenges of the governor’s authority, were the only ones that truly resulted in an actual crisis. This chapter is, in essence, the exception that proves the rule. Not only did Governor Boyd have to manage the rhetorical assault as well as physical revolts, but he also had to justify his actions to his superiors in London and hope that his approaches to governance would be deemed appropriate by British ministers. Such occurrences did not come about with the foreign population; rather, they were demonized solely because of the governors’ fears. Like Foucault’s

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47 Quoted in Monaghan, “Settler Governmentality,” p. 496.
ship captains, Gibraltar’s governors were more concerned with the possible seamonsters of the deep than the rocks, icebergs, and storms brewing ahead.

Chapter Summaries

Chapter one sets the stage for the story, explaining the relationships of Gibraltar. It begins by placing Gibraltar within its Mediterranean environs and describing its relations with its neighbors, especially Spain and Morocco. These two states played a significant role in the development of Gibraltar and are key to many of the events described in the following chapters. Next, we learn about the people of Gibraltar, its inhabitants and its governors. Gibraltar’s residents came from across the Mediterranean, and from places further afield like Britain, to meet the garrison’s many needs and embrace available opportunities. Gibraltar’s governors, on the other hand, were all British military men, schooled in the struggles of the state and its empire in their postings across the globe. The governors were the British authority in the garrison and in the town, due to the territory’s lack of independent civil management. The chapter also introduces the relationship between the governor and his peoples as well as that between the military and the civil sphere in Gibraltar. As this chapter demonstrates, the military power in Gibraltar dictated all aspects of life in the town as the governors sought to impose strict regulations on all their peoples in order to secure the territory from any possible threats, including those from within.

Chapter two examines the development of different tools of population management in Gibraltar as they arose in response to the foreign (Catholic) body. When Governor Kane arrived in the garrison in 1725, the British Protestant territory seemed to be under attack from Catholic and foreign (Spanish) threats nearby and abroad. Not surprisingly then, he was equally
concerned that an attack could arise from within – in a town with a vast majority Catholic population, half of which were Spaniards, it seemed like a Catholic uprising was possible, especially with the right encouragement. Fearful that a strike was imminent, Kane sought to shore up the territory’s defenses, not only militarily but civilly. This included increasing his knowledge of the current population through the use of a census, reproducing the society in data form and detailing just how many Catholic men of fighting age and Catholic arms were in the garrison. He also employed more explicit techniques of population management by placing restrictions on all foreign visitors and requiring their registration through the renewal of his 1720 Alien Act. Finally, Kane worked to promote the British Protestant growth of the territory, encouraging the outmigration of foreign property owners, creating new spaces for British settlers to reside and privileging their ownership of property. These mechanisms of governance, Kane suggested, were necessary in order for him to know and control the territory, monitor for any possible threats, and respond accordingly. The best security, he opined, was to strengthen the British Protestant contingent which could help overcome any foreign influences.

Chapter three explores the governors’ efforts at managing the health of Gibraltar and the diseased body, and in turn, also managing its reputation as a Christian and European territory. As scholars have shown, notions of health in the eighteenth century were bound to religious, cultural, and political beliefs and institutions, and many Christian Europeans (incorrectly) saw a great divide between themselves and their Muslim neighbors to the south and east. Torn between its need for Moroccan supplies and diplomacy and the desire to court Spain and its European neighbors, Gibraltar’s governors had to find a solution that appeased, or avoided upsetting, both parties. This chapter examines Governor Bland’s efforts to negotiate Gibraltar’s place within Christian Europe through the introduction of management tools such as town sanitation projects
as well as quarantine while simultaneously maintaining communication with North Africa. I explore the problem that disease posed to the garrison, physically and ideologically, as well as Bland’s attempts to manage such threats by policing and segregating the diseased from the healthy. Such practices became even more important with the outbreak of the plague in Morocco in 1750. This case study demonstrates Bland’s efforts to control Gibraltar’s health and use such mechanisms to also manage the territory’s reputation and standing within the Mediterranean world.

Chapter four examines Mediterranean pass protection and its ties to subjecthood in the British empire. Granted to British subjects in order to protect them against Moroccan corsairs, these passes signified the privileges of subjecthood – the freedom of mobility under the protection of the British Crown. In 1722 an Order in Council made these privileges available to all residents of Gibraltar. While this legislation offered significant opportunities to expand the territory’s commerce and its involvement in Mediterranean trade networks, it also invited opportunities for abuse by mobile bodies. Gibraltar’s governors feared the outcomes that could result from this expanded pass protection to foreigners, believing it could have detrimental financial, military, and commercial consequences, as well as denigrating the status of British subjects and the name of Britain. In an effort to control access to passes and British subjecthood, Governors Boyd and Eliot introduced a number of tactics to survey passholders and determine if they were worthy of pass protection. By the end of the 1780s, Eliott initiated a pass regime that required proofs of loyalty, deliberations by other (British) garrison merchants, and the governor’s approval. This institution, he and Boyd believed, would grant them greater control over the difficult to manage maritime population.
Chapter five focuses on a particular conflict between Gibraltar’s British merchants and the governor in the prelude to the French Revolutionary Wars. Like the other chapters, in this situation Governor Boyd was concerned by the internal and external threats to the garrison caused by the surrounding revolutionary fervor and unrest. He sought to clamp down on any possible challenges to the garrison’s security by radical bodies, instituting a number of regulations. These restrictions, however, were met with a great deal of resistance by the commercial British settlers in Gibraltar. They petitioned the governor, adding their voices to the territory’s archive, complaining of his militaristic governance of the territory. Appealing to British law and liberties, the merchants protested his efforts to control all aspects of their lives, and when the governor refused to relent, they encouraged other inhabitants to revolt. After a month of unrest, both parties appealed to British ministers seeking redress and approval of their actions. These petitions to the London government employed similar republican revolutionary rhetoric as used by other British observers of the events in France. The merchants sought to present Boyd as a tyrant while he turn represented them as “outrageous Peyneists” who challenged his authority as granted by the Crown. In the end, as events in France and Britain became more volatile, the British government supported Boyd’s approach to governance, enabling him and future governors to continue with these technologies of rule.

Conclusion

Most eighteenth-century Britons imagined a Gibraltar as an undefeatable British bastion, replete with British peoples, goods, beliefs, and customs, in the midst of a distinctly non-British (non-Protestant) sea. Yet, as Gibraltar’s governors found, this vision of the territory was merely a dream – one that they hoped with their encouragement could become a reality someday. In the meantime, however, the commanders needed to manage the situation on the ground, which
included hostile neighbors, the ever-present threat of invasion and/or warfare, and a multiethnic migrant population with ties to foreign states and religions. For the governors, the lack of British influence in the territory was the most pressing threat to their administration and the security of Gibraltar as a whole; not only did these non-British subjects pose a risk for rebellion within but they also jeopardized the governors’ dreams of a British Rock. In order to manage these residents, the commanders embraced various technologies of rule, in particular surveillance, the gathering and production of knowledge, and the creation of an archive. These tactics, the governors’ believed, would support their administrative efforts to control the population and perhaps facilitate the growth of a truly British Gibraltar. Yet, Gibraltar remained – and continues today to be – a Mediterranean meeting ground, despite the overarching grand narrative of the British, Union-Jack-flying Rock.
Chapter 1

“Some Short Reflections on the Situation of Gibraltar”: An Introduction to the Place and Peoples of Eighteenth-Century Gibraltar

“Sometimes the [Mediterranean] stage is a theatre of war; more often it is the setting for peace, trade, and creative human movement. The actors on this stage speak many tongues and do not always understand each other; nor do we, the audience, always realise what is really going on, for the plots and story-lines are complex and not always what they seem.”¹

This chapter seeks to provide a brief introduction into the “geographical stage” of Gibraltar in the eighteenth-century. Situated at the crossroads of the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, with Europe to the north and Africa to the south, Gibraltar was located at the heart of many routes of exchange. As a site of encounter, Gibraltar brought together the various peoples, cultures, and goods of the region. Scholars of the Mediterranean have emphasized that the Mediterranean was (and is) a contact zone, a term introduced by Mary Louise Pratt to describe “social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination.”² This idea of Gibraltar as a


meeting point and grappling place between various cultures and communities is a fitting one, and one that this chapter and this dissertation seeks to explore.

On a larger scale, Gibraltar was a space that influenced and was influenced by the surrounding Mediterranean territories. As the first section of this chapter explores, Gibraltar’s neighbors, Spain and Morocco, played a significant role in the development and governance of the territory. The historical relations between these three sites as well as their geographic proximity meant that they were intimately bound to each other. Rarely were all three players at peace; for most of the century, this triangle of relations was defined by alliances and friendships, confrontations and struggles, and rifts and divisions. The balance of power was constantly shifting, and the plot was constantly changing, but at the center was Gibraltar and its relationships with both states. As a result, Gibraltar’s history itself was changeable, influenced by the developments of its closely-linked neighbors.

On a smaller scale, Gibraltar was a site of constant negotiation by the peoples in the territory. It is this story that dissertation and this chapter is primarily focused on – although this was influenced profoundly by the larger interstate relations described above. The second section of this chapter explores the residents of Gibraltar, people who were drawn to the territory from across the Mediterranean. The inhabitants, as mentioned in the introduction, were “trans-imperial subjects,” bringing with them connections, ideas, goods, cultures, and religions that shaped the territory in several ways. This section examines the motivations of these individuals in coming to Gibraltar, their roles within the community there, and their histories during the eighteenth century. The third section of this chapter focuses on Gibraltar’s governors, who in many ways

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situated themselves as the counterpoint to the inhabitants. As British military men in charge of a British territory, these men brought with them decades of experience serving the British state and empire across the globe. Dedicated to preserving and protecting British interests, Gibraltar’s governors were faced with a conundrum upon their arrival in the garrison. For many of these commanders, they desired to help build a British Gibraltar, one that embodied and promoted British Protestant ideals and institutions. Yet, they found an established Mediterranean territory, one with many foreign residents, goods, practices, and cultures.

It is this conflict between the British military sphere of the garrison and the Mediterranean space of the town that is the focus of the fourth and final section of this chapter. This last piece seeks to examine how the governors, in charge of both the military and civil spheres of the territory, sought to manage this great responsibility. As military men, they were significantly influenced by their past training and largely structured their civil duties accordingly. Life in Gibraltar ran under military time and on a military schedule and according to the rules instituted by the military authority. While there were attempts to change this arrangement, none were successful, leaving the garrison commanders as the sole British authority in the territory. This was troublesome for many of the inhabitants, who struggled against the imposition of military institutions. However, the governors argued that such practices were necessary both for the good of the inhabitants and, more importantly, the security of Gibraltar. Suspicious of the foreign population and fearful of the threat such outside influences might pose to the territory, Gibraltar’s governors sought to assert strict control over Gibraltar by managing all aspects of life. They believed that the foreign population of Gibraltar required an administrative approach that could recognize and respond to any potential threats to the garrison’s security. While this is
the focus of chapters two through five, this chapter offers the necessary background to understand those developments, providing “some short reflections on the situation of Gibraltar.”

**Gibraltar and its Neighbors: Spain & Morocco**

Much of Gibraltar’s history was shaped by its geography within the Mediterranean (Figure 1.1). As scholars have noted, the Mediterranean has traditionally been a close-linked, interconnected space; sharing cultures, institutions, goods, and peoples, the Mediterranean was a site of exchange and interdependence. “Bordering upon the confluence of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Seas, [and] enjoying a… centrical and convenient situation for Traffic with Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and the Barbary States,” Gibraltar was perfectly located in the midst of all the hubbub. As another author remarked, “Nature, by this Situation, seems to have annex’d to this Place the Sovereignty of the Mediterranean Seas.” As part of the Mediterranean world, Gibraltar participated in and was shaped by the influences of its Mediterranean neighbors and peoples. The story of Gibraltar, I suggest, would not be complete without taking into consideration its situation within this world and its relations with its Mediterranean neighbors.

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4 *Some Short Reflections on the Situation of Gibraltar, and Its Importance to the Trade and Maritime Force of this Kingdom* (London, 1731).

5 The notion of common Mediterranean characteristics has been deemed “Mediterraneanism” by W. V. Harris, and he argues that this is often used wrongfully to apply observations about one particular culture to many others. The interconnection of the Mediterranean, as Ian Morris argues, did not make the institutions, states, empires present in that sea cease to matter. W. V. Harris, “The Mediterranean and Ancient History,” in *Rethinking the Mediterranean*, ed. W. V. Harris (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 38; Ian Morris, “Mediterraneanzation,” *Mediterranean Historical Review* 18, no. 2 (2003), p. 51. See also Cooke, Goknar & Parker, *Mediterranean Passages*, p. 1.

6 GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 4, 1779-1786, “1784 Considerations on the Trade of Gibraltar,” fo. 526.

7 *A Letter to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations* (London, 1720), pp. 4-5.
Although each state had its own unique institutions, beliefs, and cultures, they all influenced one another, both directly and indirectly, resulting in many intertwined histories.⁸

“Near the Southernmost Point of Spain… [and] opposite to Ape’s Hill near Ceuta in Barbary,” Gibraltar’s relationship with its closest neighbors, Spain and Morocco, played the most significant role in the development of the territory. In the past, Gibraltar had been integrated into each of these states; the territory became part of the Islamic empire with the conquest of Iberia in 711 CE but was recaptured by Spanish forces in 1462 CE.⁹ Named “Djabal Tarik,” or the Mount of Tarik, in honor of the commanding Arab general, Tarik ibn Ziyad, Gibraltar served as entrance point for the Arab invasion and conquest of the Iberian peninsula in the eighth century. It appears that the site was in little use until the twelfth century, during which the work of planning Medinat-al-Fath (the City of Victory) began. Islamic influences from this period dotted the landscape of Gibraltar, some of which remain today. Parts of the old Moorish walls and towers can be found throughout the town, including the Tower of Homage which was part of the original Moorish Castle.¹⁰ These architectural pieces originated during the 300 years of struggle over the territory between North African Islamic forces and Spanish Christian armies.¹¹

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⁹ Although conquered by Islamic forces in 711 CE, a permanent settlement was not build until 1160 CE. This included the Moorish Castle, of which the Tower of Homage is still standing today. The town was fought over and captured several times in the next three hundred years by many different forces, including the Nasrids of Granada, the Marinids of Morocco, and the kings of Castile. The 1462 capture by the 1st Duke of Medina Sidonia established Gibraltar as part of the Campo Llano de Gibraltar for a short period of time under King Henry IV of Castile until it was returned to the duke, who then sold it to a group of conversos from Cordova. After two years they were expelled and the territory was returned to the Spanish crown in 1501.

¹⁰ TNA, CO 91/40, 17 January 1799, William Fyers to Charles O’Hara.

¹¹ The town was fought over and captured several times in the next three hundred years by many different forces, including the Nasrids of Granada, the Marinids of Morocco, and the kings of Castile.
In 1462, Gibraltar was taken by the Spanish Christians under the command of the first Duke of Medina Sidonia and eventually entered the hands of the Spanish monarchy in 1501. Once under Spanish rule, Gibraltar was eventually refortified with Spanish walls and towers, although the garrison was not well supported. The territory primarily served as part of the southern Spanish hinterland as a marketspace and administrative center, a Franciscan church and friary (now the governor’s mansion, known as the Convent), and an occasional naval port, which was often used by admirals from other states, including England in the late seventeenth century.\(^\text{12}\) These states’ long history in and with Gibraltar would have an influence on the development of the territory once it was acquired by the British crown.\(^\text{13}\)

On August 1, 1704 an Anglo-Dutch fleet attacked Gibraltar during the War of the Spanish Succession in the name of Charles III of Spain, and three days later the Spanish governor, fighting on behalf of Philip V, agreed to surrender. After several attacks by Philip’s forces, by 1705 Gibraltar remained securely in Charles’ hands with English military commanders at the helm. Initially the governors were appointed in the name of Charles, but by 1711 the British government made no such claims, appointing commanders of their choosing. The government also ordered the governor to expel all foreign (Dutch) troops in hopes of claiming it as a solely British possession. When the War of the Spanish Succession concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, Philip V was declared King of Spain but in return he ceded several Spanish territories to Britain and its allies, including Gibraltar. As Article X of the


treaty declared: “The Catholic King does hereby, for himself, his heirs and successors, yield to
the Crown of Great Britain the full and entire propriety of the town and castle of Gibraltar,
together with the port, fortifications, and forts thereunto belonging; and he gives up the said
propriety to be held and enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right for ever, without any
exception or impediment whatsoever.” If Britain were ever to “grant, sell or by any means to
alienate therefrom the propriety of the said town of Gibraltar,” “the preference of having the sale
shall always be given to the Crown of Spain before any others.”14 With the signing of this treaty,
Britain gained two new Mediterranean possessions as well as a Spanish adversary constantly
looking to regain its lost “jewel.”15

The rest of the eighteenth century was marked by moments of conflict between British
Gibraltar and its Spanish neighbors. In 1720 during the War of the Quadruple Alliance, Spanish
forces threatened to attack the garrison. While this assault never materialized, hostilities
continued between the Spanish monarch, Philip V, and the British state in Gibraltar. In 1726 the
Spanish government accused Britain of breaching the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht and in early
1727 war broke out between the two states. In February 1727 Spanish forces besieged the
territory of Gibraltar, making several attempts on the garrison. The British soldiers held strong,
however, and the Spaniards lifted the siege four months later in June 1727.16 A truce was
declared in 1728 and the peace agreement was finally concluded in 1729. This treaty, however,

Appendix, pp. 165-166.
15 Philalethes, *Gibraltar a Bulwark of Great Britain. In a Letter to a Member of Parliament* (London, 1725), pp. 30,
55-56; [Britannus]. *Letter to the Independent Whig, Occasioned by his Considerations of the Importance of
16 For firsthand accounts of the 1727 siege, see Colonel Guise, “Journal of the Siege of Gibraltar 1727” (Typescript,
Gibraltar Garrison Library); *A Particular Account of a Sharp and Bloody Attack* (Cork, 1727); *An Express Account
of the Siege of Gibraltar* (London, 1727); John Mawer, *Liberty Asserted: Or, the Siege of Gibraltar* (London, 1727);
did not mark the end of Spanish schemes to regain Gibraltar. Throughout the 1730s and much of the 1740s, the garrison was under alert of possible Spanish threats; however, none of these came to pass. There were still moments of aggression throughout the following three decades, but the next direct assault on Gibraltar did not come about until the War of American Independence. In 1779 Spanish and French forces besieged the garrison, embarking on the “Great Siege” that lasted for four years.\textsuperscript{17} There were numerous attacks by both sides, but British forces finally took the upper-hand during the “Great Assault” by shooting “red-hot shot” which destroyed their enemies’ floating batteries. Following the conclusion of the siege in 1783, Gibraltar was again at peace until the start of Britain’s involvement in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in 1793.

As this brief history shows, Gibraltar’s primary adversary was its (very) close neighbor, Spain. Spanish hostility over the loss of their territory has permeated Gibraltar’s history under British rule and significantly affected its development. Tied directly to the Spanish mainland by a narrow, three-quarters of a mile spit of land, those in Gibraltar could not escape the Spanish presence on their doorsteps. Gibraltar’s small size, only 2.6 squares miles, which compared to Spain’s almost 195,000 square miles felt excessively small for those under Spain’s enemy gaze. The nearby Spanish threat concerned many of Gibraltar’s governors throughout the century as they surveyed the construction of fortifications, the movements of troops, the gathering of arms, and the meeting of naval vessels. Because the eighteenth century was ripe with conflict between

\textsuperscript{17} An Accurate Description of Gibraltar Interspersed with a Pathetic Account of the Progress of the Siege (London, 1782); S. Ancell, A Journal of the Blockade and Siege of Gibraltar (Dublin, 1802); Samuel Ancell, Cock of the Rock (London, 1784); Arx Herculea Servata (London, 1783); John Drinkwater, A History of the Siege of Gibraltar 1779-1783 (London, 1785); Miriam Green, “A Lady’s Experiences in the Great Siege of Gibraltar (1779-83),” The Royal Engineer’s Journal (1912); “Some Account of the Assault of Gibraltar in 1782. In a Letter to the Earl of Balcarres” in Extracts from Colonel Tempelhoffe’s History of the Seven Years War, authored by Colin Lindsay. Vol. 2, Part III (London: T. Cadell, 1793); Captain John Spilsbury, A Journal of the Siege of Gibraltar 1779-1783 (London, 1785); Catherine Upton, The Siege of Gibraltar, From the Twelfth of April to the Twenty-seventh of May, 1781. To which is Prefixed, Some Account of the Blockade (London: J. Fielding, 1781).
England and Spain, Gibraltar was often a focal point in diplomatic and military battles. During these periods, Gibraltar’s commanders focused their attention on shoring up the territory’s works and fortifications, strengthening the garrison, and encouraging Parliament to send additional troops to support the few existing regiments stationed there. Perpetually concerned by the potential Spanish threat, the fear of attack and the possibility (and reality) of siege shaped life in the embattled territory.

Not surprisingly relations between Gibraltar and Spain in the eighteenth century were typically cool at best. For most of this period, the Spanish-Gibraltarian border was closed. While Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht decreed that the land borders between the two were to remain shut, it did allow “communication by sea with the coast of Spain.” Spanish ships were also allowed to enter Gibraltar’s harbor to trade “provisions, and other things necessary for the use of the garrison.” Yet for most of the century, all borders remained closed between the two. As the treaty noted, the land closure was part of an effort to “hinder” the “fraudulent importations of goods” from Gibraltar to Spain.18 Smuggling was a significant problem during this period, plaguing many of Gibraltar’s governors who were held accountable by the Spanish government for its peoples’ illegal sale of alcohol and tobacco.19 Tired of constantly fighting with the Spanish commandants across the border about the smuggling issue, some of Gibraltar’s commanders welcomed the closed land borders, preferring the limited communication and complaints.20 Yet

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19 Tobacco and alcohol were only to be distributed by the Spanish government so that they could collect the resulting tariffs, which provided significant revenue for the state. However, smugglers from Gibraltar circumvented these rules, resulting in significant losses of profit for the Spanish exchequer and angering the Spanish monarchy. This has been a problem throughout Gibraltar’s history since the eighteenth century and is still a concern today.
20 Governor Bland, for instance, remarked several times, including in his treatise to his successors, of the importance of keeping land borders with Spain closed. This was necessary, along with enacting extremely punitive measures, he argued to help prevent the pervasive problem of smuggling. See TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 34-43.
the sea borders were another matter altogether as their closure served as an ever-present reminder of Spanish enmity.

This complete break in communication between Spain and Gibraltar was a Spanish effort to undermine British rule by forbidding goods to cross into the territory. Because Gibraltar had little arable land and lacked the capacity to provide sufficient provisions for itself, its commanders had to seek supplies elsewhere. Britain was too far away to rely on; ships from the metropole often took a few months, if not longer depending on weather, to transport goods to Gibraltar.21 Thus by cutting off the territory’s communication with Spanish traders, the Spanish government sought to frustrate commanders’ efforts to supply the garrison. Blaming Gibraltar’s “disregard” for Anglo-Spanish treaties, the pervasive smuggling problems, and the territory’s penchant for disease, the Spanish government dismissed any claims that they were being purposefully prejudicial merely because they could.22 As relations between Spain and Gibraltar remained largely contentious, such excuses as to why the borders had to remain closed became ever-more prevalent.

During times of peace, however, there were moments of amity between the two territories and their respective governors.23 In these moments the commanders in the Campo would allow communication by sea, and even sometimes by land, and offer Gibraltar supplies and

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21 Winds in the Channel often deterred ships from making the passage to Gibraltar; in 1794 these winds lasted for more than 3 months, which limited access to British provisions and communications. See GGA, Diary 1792-1794, 30 March 1794. The majority of supplies sent from Britain were military related, such as munition, but during emergencies, they also sent food supplies, including some livestock but primarily salt provisions. See Constantine, *Community and Identity*, p. 41.


23 At times the governors (and their wives) even visited one another, spending time in the other’s garrison. See GGA, Diary 1777 & 1778-1782; GGA, Diary 1778.
provisions. The commanders also helped facilitate the British mail service, which often went through Spain on its way to British administrators in Gibraltar and throughout the Mediterranean and North Africa. When the borders were open, people from both sides were occasionally allowed to cross. Spanish merchants would come into Gibraltar to sell their wares, as permitted by Article X, while British officers would pass into Spain for entertainment. There was little for members of the British army to enjoy on the Rock, beyond illicit drinking and gambling, so some of the garrison commanders supported the officers’ travels to nearby Spanish sites. Occasionally other residents of Gibraltar were also allowed into Spain, especially for the annual bullfight in San Roque which drew large crowds of people from the surrounding towns. These times of peace and collaboration became more frequent in the last decades of the century, particularly once Britain joined Spain in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Yet for most of the eighteenth century, relations were not so amicable; instead, Gibraltar and Spain were largely at odds and Gibraltar’s governors constantly faced the challenge of managing their Spanish neighbors.

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24 This occurred during the 1750s under Governor Bland, in the 1770s under Governor Boyd, and a few other times during that century. See TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 41-42.

25 See GGA, Governor’s Letter Book 1771, fo. 22; GGA, Diary 1777 & 1778-1782, 20 March 1781; GGA, Diary 1778, 30 May 1778; GGA, Diary 1792-1794, 7 March 1793, 6 May 1793, 21 July 1793; V. Denis Vendervelde and Richard J. M. Garcia, Gibraltar: Quarantine and Disinfection of Mail (Southampton: Malcolm Beresford Montgomery, 1994), pp. 8, 11.

26 See especially GGA, Diary 1777 & 1778-1782; GGA, Diary 1778; GGA, Diary 1777-1778; GGA, Diary 1792-1794.

27 Spanish entertainment was also occasionally allowed into the garrison during times of peace. See GGA, Diary 1777 & 1778-1782, 9 December 1778; GGA, Diary 1778, 19 March 1778, 8 May 1778, 20 August 1778.

28 GGA, Diary 1778, 15 August 1778.

29 While this period is outside of the scope of the dissertation, there has been a good amount of work done on this era. See Hills, Rock of Contention; Jackson, The Rock of the Gibraltarians; Constantine, Community and Identity; Archer, Gibraltar, Identity and Empire, pp. 52-54. See also Larry Sawchuk’s work on the early nineteenth century, including his discussion of the yellow fever epidemics; Jason R. Musteen, Nelson’s Refuge: Gibraltar in the Age of Napoleon (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011).
Across the Straits Gibraltar’s neighbors by sea were typically much more accommodating to the garrison’s needs. Britain and Morocco had a long history of alliances in the early modern period, beginning in the sixteenth century. With the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, the king of Morocco, impressed by England’s military prowess, sought to form a union with Queen Elizabeth based on their mutual concern over Spanish expansion. The resulting series of treaties enabled greater access for English merchants in Moroccan ports, provided enhanced legal rights for Englishmen residing in Morocco, and solidified the two states as allies against Spanish attempts at invasion and piracy. This alliance lasted until the English took possession of Tangier in 1661; when English soldiers took the port, they displaced the local populations and heavily fortified the town, souring Anglo-Moroccan relations. With a Moroccan victory over the English forces in 1680 and England’s abandonment of the garrison in 1684, relations between the two states improved. England’s capture and eventual acquisition of Gibraltar thirty years later only further strengthened its relationship with Morocco.

During the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714), Morocco proved to be an important ally, providing fresh foods and building supplies from its cities of Tangier and Tetuan.

Negotiations regarding a formal compact between the two states were discussed earlier in the

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war but began formally in 1713.32 By 1721 the first treaty was signed, promising peace between the two kingdoms on both land and sea, permitting duty-free trade and anchorage at any port, and guaranteeing the protection of all law-abiding citizens while residing in the other’s territory.33 For Gibraltar this newfound alliance meant increased supplies for the garrison, enhanced prosperity for local traders, and security for those traveling across the corsair-ridden seas.34 For the North Africans the treaty enabled non-resident traders to be regarded as English, allowing them to reside in Gibraltar for an extended period of time without additional cost or fear of harm. This compact brought a number of benefits to both parties, especially when the Spaniards closed their borders to British trade. During the 1727 siege, British officers applauded Moroccan suppliers for giving them the provisions they so desperately needed, such as mutton, pulses and other dried goods.35 When Spain refused to allow any trade with Gibraltar after the siege had ended, the two states formed another agreement in 1729, confirming many of the articles from the 1721 treaty and adding additional guarantees of supplies for the garrison.36 This series of treaties served to elevate British standing in the North African state, leading some Britons to exclaim, “I say, the Moors regard us more than they do any other Christian State on account of Gibraltar.”37

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34 By 1682 the corsairs were no longer individual entrepreneurs but instead were largely controlled by the king. Wanting a monopoly on violence on both sea and land, Ismail order the captains to hand over all of their captives for which he would then compensate them. See C. R. Pennell, *Morocco: From Empire to Independence* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), pp. 102-105. For more on the corsairs, see chapter 4.

35 Officer, *An Impartial Account of the Late Famous Siege of Gibraltar* (London, 1728), p. 22. Pulses are considered to include dried beans, peas, lentils, and chickpeas.

36 *Daily Courant* (London, England), Friday, August 7, 1730; Issue 8996.

Morocco continued in its role as Gibraltar’s provider throughout the eighteenth century, supplying the garrison with the vast majority of its provisions, including “Horned Cattle, Sheep & Fowls; Oranges, Lemmons & other Fruits in their Season, with many other articles for immediate consumption.” Yet these transactions were not always smooth ones. The Moroccan state was engaged in a series of civil wars and regional disputes during the eighteenth century that disrupted the regular trade with the garrison. The archival record is replete with news of developments across the Straits as Gibraltar’s governors tried to follow the many changes in leadership. There were also a number of diplomatic blunders between the two states as Gibraltar’s governors tried to impose their wishes upon unwilling Moroccan leaders and the North African alcaides circumvented the terms of the Anglo-Moroccan treaties. Despite the necessary trade relationship between the two parties, leaders from both states were often frustrated with each other. Gibraltar’s governors complained of Moroccan corsairs’ illegal capture of Gibraltar’s ships, the arbitrary raises in provisioning and commercial fees, and the alcaides’ occasional refusals to provide supplies. In return the Alcaides of Tetuan and Tangier felt ignored and disrespected by the governor on a number of occasions, employing tactics such as those described previously to show their displeasure. Consequently, some of the garrison’s governors saw the alliance with North Africa as a necessary evil. As one governor described it, although the Moors are “a Treacherous, Knavish People, little regarding the Faith of Treaties,

38 GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 4, 1779-1786, “1784 Considerations on the Trade of Gibraltar,” fo. 523.
39 See GGA, Diary 1792-1794; TNA, CO 91/11.
40 For some examples, see TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo.51.
41 While Gibraltar physically required the goods Morocco provided, Tetuan and Tangier needed the garrison trade to help their revenue as provisioning Gibraltar provided much of the cities’ incomes.
42 See chapters 3 and 4.
43 See chapter 3 (and TNA, CO 91/11) for a brief discussion of this.
when they can gain by the Breach of them,” it was necessary to maintain their “friendship” “not only for the supplying of Gibraltar with Live Cattle, Sheep, Fouls &c. but likewise to prevent their Molesting the British Trading Ships.”

These relationships with Spain and Morocco set the backdrop for much of what developed in eighteenth-century Gibraltar as events in and with both of these states profoundly affected the people of Gibraltar and the functioning of the garrison. Gibraltar’s reliance on its neighbors for supplies played a significant role in the governor’s decision-making, as did its desire to keep the peace in an effort to preserve the territory. Its treaties with both states also had consequences for the management of the territory, as will be discussed below. For Gibraltar’s governors, it was a constant effort to negotiate with and between Spain and Morocco, and this posed a stumbling block for many. As Governor Bland noted, “To keep up a Friendship with them [Spain and Morocco] both at the same time, is a most Difficult Task; and yet it must be attempted, and accomplish’d if possible; as the Plenty of the Town, and Interest of Great Britain both require it.” The balance of power between the three states was constantly changing, and as it did, the governors in Gibraltar had to realign their interests and their diplomacy accordingly. In many ways, the Spain-Morocco-Gibraltar triangle is essential to understanding the Rock’s history and its administration while under British rule.


45 As long-time enemies, part of the trouble was balancing relations between the two states. According to Governor Bland, the Spaniards would not open their doors to Gibraltar unless “we renounce all our Alliances with the Mahometans, and make open War upon them,” whereas the Moors “are Jealous that we favor the Spaniards more than we do them, and would therefore have us always at Variance with them.” TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 72. See also chapter 3 for a greater discussion of this.

The People of Gibraltar

After English and Dutch forces captured Gibraltar in 1704, the majority of Spanish inhabitants, approximately 1,200 families, left the garrison, seeking safer Spanish climes in San Roque. According to Colonel Joseph Bennet, a British engineer sent to Gibraltar in 1712 to report on the state of the territory, thirty Spanish families and six clergymen remained after the initial capture of the territory. These Spaniards, likely supporters of Charles III, were guaranteed protection by the Anglo-Dutch forces and granted an allowance of provisions for their subsistence. Once the battles over Gibraltar ended in late 1705, more immigrants flocked to the territory. In 1706 Queen Anne declared Gibraltar a free port, opening it to all traders free of customs duties. This was done not just in an effort to promote commerce in the town but also to “Incorrage Merchants and others to Inhabit there.” After this proclamation was made, “many boats & Embarkations came from Portugal, Barbary, & even from the Enemy’s Towns of

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47 Colonel Joseph Bennet provides the number of families in his “Some Remarks concerning Gibraltar.” H. W. Howes and Tito Benady have estimated that there were between 5,000-6,000 individuals living in Gibraltar prior to the British occupation. Those that remained, some scholars contend, were primarily of Genoese background or single Spanish women. Many of the original civilians chose to leave with the Spanish soldiers, although they were given the right of residence to those who chose stay so long as they swore allegiance to Charles III. Some historians have argued that these Spaniards believed it would be a temporary exile, which is why they established residence in nearby San Roque, but once they realized that Gibraltar was to remain in British hands, they realized this was not the case. See H. W. Howes, The Gibraltarian: The Origin and Development of the Population of Gibraltar from 1704 (Colombo: City Press, 1951); Tito Benady, “Spaniards in Gibraltar after the Treaty of Utrecht,” Gibraltar Heritage Journal 7 (2000), pp. 125-126; David Levey, Language Change and Variation in Gibraltar (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2008), p. 17.


50 BL, Add MS 61544, Samuel Pitt (merchant at Gibraltar) to Sir C. Peers, 6 July 1708, fo. 69.
Malaga, Marvela, Estepona, Tarriffa, & other adjacent Places.\textsuperscript{51} The encouragement given to foreign merchants as well as the relative stability of the garrison and its need for civilian support and laborers made Gibraltar especially attractive to many foreigners. By the time of its formal acquisition by the British in 1713, a significant number of Spaniards, Genoese, and Jews had immigrated to the garrison.

By 1725, when the first town census was performed, there were 113 civilian Britons (10%), 400 Spaniards (37%), 414 Genoese (38%), 23 French (2%), 21 Dutch (with Spanish wives) (2%), 5 Moors (0.5%), and 111 Jews living in Gibraltar (10%).\textsuperscript{52} This ratio of ethnic groups in the territory remained largely for the same for the rest of the eighteenth century, with the Spanish population decreasing some after the 1727 siege and the Genoese and Jewish populations increasing respectively. In 1753 the population had reached 1,816 individuals: 351 Britons (19%), 83 (British) navy and victualling offices (5%), 597 Genoese (33%), 575 Jews (32%), 185 Spaniards (10%), and 25 Portuguese (1%).\textsuperscript{53} By 1767, the census no longer divided the population into specific ethnic groups, but rather based on religious confession. At that time there were 467 British Protestants, 1,460 Roman Catholics, and 783 Jews in the town.\textsuperscript{54} These numbers increased fairly proportionately for the 1777 census, which calculated 519 British Protestants (16%), 1,819 Roman Catholics (57%), and 863 Jews (27%). This census was also the first to subdivide each group into “native” and “non-native,” finding that approximately half of

\textsuperscript{51} BL, Add MS 38329, Colonel Joseph Bennett, “Some Remarks Concerning Gibraltar,” 22 November 1712. See also BL, Add MS 10034, fo. 136-140 and TNA, CO 91/1, fo. 17-19 for a similar report.

\textsuperscript{52} TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588. See chapter 2 for more on this particular census.

\textsuperscript{53} Howes, The Gibraltarian, p. 3; Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 24. The 1754 census counted 1,810 civilians (414 Britons, 604 Jews, and 792 Roman Catholics) and a military population of 4,515, which included 1,426 women and children.

\textsuperscript{54} Howes, The Gibraltarian, p. 12; Constantine, Community and Identity, pp. 24-25. See also GGA, Alien Question, Flood, “History,” Appendix A, No. 4, 17 January 1767.
the inhabitants in each group were native-born. The 1791 census listed inhabitants similarly, finding a total of 403 British Protestants (14%), 1,852 Roman Catholics (63%), and 693 (23%) Jews, of which approximately half were native-born. By the end of the eighteenth century, Britons remained a minority within the garrison, comprising a mere 13% of the population – a slight increase from the 10% total in 1725. Roman Catholics, on the other hand, which included Spanish, Portuguese, Genoese, French, and Minorcan immigrants and their children, were almost 63% of the town’s population and Jews composed almost 24%, with the majority being native-born to Gibraltar.

With this overwhelming foreign population, and very few “conquered” peoples, Gibraltar experienced the coming together of a wide variety of cultures, ideas, religions, and associations all within its small civil sphere. Bringing with them their own individual histories, these peoples created the space of Gibraltar as one of encounter and fusion. This is evident in all aspects of Gibraltar’s culture: its local dialect (Llanito), its cuisine, its religious practices, and its lifestyles. All of these peoples brought significant benefits to the territory, some because of their continuing connections with their home states. While the population was often divided into ethnic and religious groups, these were not the only defining characteristics of individuals.

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55 In actuality, there were about twice as more native Jews than “strangers” (the only group which non-natives were titled as such), whereas the British and Roman Catholic inhabitants were more evenly split. GGA, Demography, “List of Inhabitants 1777.” See also Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 26; Howes, The Gibraltarian, pp. 12-13.

56 Again, more than half of the Jewish population was native-born unlike the others. See GGA, Demography, “List of Inhabitants 1791.” See also Constantine, Community and Identity, pp. 27-28; Howes, The Gibraltarian, p. 27. According to Howes and Constantine, there was also a 1787 census; however, the original data has not survived. As Constantine argues, the numbers reported for this census look a bit high for the time period, especially considering the loss of inhabitants with the Great Siege (1779-1783) and the slow process of rebuilding the town. According to these authors, in 1787 there were 512 British Protestants, 2,098 Roman Catholics, and 776 Jews, totaling 3,386 inhabitants. See Howes, The Gibraltarian, p. 12; Constantine, Community and Identity, pp. 26-27.

57 See Jennifer Ballantine Perera, “Are We What We Eat?,” The Calentita Press 3 (2011), p. 4; Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 426; David Levey, Language Change and Variation in Gibraltar (Philadelphia: Johns Benjamins Publishing Company, 2008). Llanito is an interesting mix of several different languages, including English, Spanish, Portuguese, Hebrew, Italian, Arabic, and recently even Hindi.
However, it is probable that individuals from certain states likely formed ethnically-based groups because of similar beliefs, religions, professions, and languages. Together this combination of peoples created a small-scale Mediterranean world in the tiny town of Gibraltar.

Spaniards

Some of the earliest immigrants to English-held Gibraltar were Spaniards. Although the majority of Gibraltar’s citizens left when the garrison fell in 1704, it appears that a number of Spaniards came back across the border by the end of 1705 once the fighting in Gibraltar ceased.\(^{58}\) Colonel Bennet argued that these individuals and families “got into the Town… [so they could] also receive, the same Allowance of Provisions” as the Spaniards who remained post-capture.\(^{59}\) It is more likely that they were supporters of the defeated Charles III or Catalan soldiers who came in 1704 with Prince George’s troops and decided to stay.\(^{60}\) Regardless of their motivations, the new Spanish population proved to be a significant help to the English garrison. They served as many of the town’s laborers and shopkeepers by day, working to support the garrison community, and as watchmen by night, forming the Spanish guard which was responsible for manning the Devil’s Tower post on Gibraltar’s eastern rock face.\(^{61}\) When the

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\(^{58}\) Caruana argues that the majority of the inhabitants left post-capture because they were concerned the British soldiers would act similarly as they did in Cadiz, where the invading forces ransacked churches, convents, and homes and raped many of the female residents. Also many of the Spanish residents owned large pieces of land and industries in the Campo region, which had remained a part of Spain, and they chose to return to those holdings rather than staying on the insecure Rock. See Charles Caruana, *The Rock Under a Cloud* (Cambridge: Silent Books, 1989), p. 8.

\(^{59}\) BL, Add MS 10034, “Some Remarks concerning Gibraltar, humbly offer’d by Colonel Joseph Bennet, to the Honourable the Comissioners appointed to Examine the publick Accompts of Spain and Portugal in 1712,” fo. 136


\(^{61}\) The guard was led by a Spanish Sergeant, who also performed some policing duties for the town and liasoned between the civil and military sphere. See GGA, Diary 1778, 16 September 1778; Benady, “Spaniards in Gibraltar after the Treaty of Utrecht,” pp. 125-126; Constantine, *Community and Identity*, p. 22.
fortifications required improvements, the Spaniards, along with Gibraltar’s other foreign residents, worked to repair them, dedicating twelve hour shifts to the task. Per the Treaty of Utrecht, Roman Catholics were promised that “the free exercise of their religion” would be protected while under British rule.\textsuperscript{62} Although this was not always honored, in general Spanish Catholics were permitted to practice their religion and a Catholic church was established in the town.\textsuperscript{63} Despite these opportunities and allowances, when war seemed apparent between Gibraltar and Spain in 1727, many of the Spanish residents left the garrison for their home state.\textsuperscript{64} Some remained, and many of those who did helped to fight alongside British soldiers and man the works. This period marked a turning point for the Spanish population of the garrison. After 1727, the number of Spaniards fell significantly, not to rise again until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century when the borders with Spain opened and the two territories were joined against a common French enemy.

\textit{Genoese}

Gibraltar’s Genoese population also arrived soon after British occupation of the territory, quickly establishing itself on the east side of the Rock in Catalan Bay.\textsuperscript{65} Some Genoese were


\textsuperscript{63} For some complaints by Spaniards against Gibraltar’s governors response to Roman Catholics, see Benady, “The Depositories of the Spanish Inhabitants.” Also, technically Gibraltar was within the Bishop of Cadiz’s jurisdiction, but he was refused entrance to the territory several times, and in 1773 the governor insisted (with London’s approval) that the governors had the power to appoint the parish priests. GGA, Governor’s Letter Book 1771, fo. 177-181; GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1787-1789, fo. 374-376; GGA, Letters to Consuls, Lisbon & Cadiz, 1769-1797, fo. 11-13; GGA, Diary 1777-1778, 10 June 1777. See also Constantine, \textit{Community and Identity}, pp. 73-74; Caruana, \textit{The Rock Under a Cloud}, chapter 3. Caruana provides a very thorough overview of Roman Catholicism in Gibraltar, including the ecclesiastical disputes between priests and the governors.

\textsuperscript{64} The Spanish priests did remain in the garrison, both during the 1727 Siege and the Great Siege. See Father Francisco Messa O. F. M., “Appendix One: A Diary of Events of the Great Siege 1779-81,” in Caruana, \textit{The Rock Under a Cloud}.

\textsuperscript{65} Caruana has found a source that suggests this settlement was a result of a group of Genoese ship-workers who followed Rooke and the British fleet and performed most of their repairs. These men initially set up shop on one of the western beaches (Sandy Bay), but when the Spaniards attacked the eastern side, a permanent guardroom was
recorded among town’s earliest inhabitants, having been residents under Spanish occupation and remaining after its capture in 1704. During the early modern period, Genoese merchants and mariners had settled across the Spanish coastline, having expanded their trade networks throughout the Mediterranean. As Braudel noted in his works, “Genuensis ero mercator, a Genoese, therefore a trader.” Known for their commercial and maritime prowess, this community was drawn to British Gibraltar and its need for merchants to help support the garrison. Queen Anne’s declaration of Gibraltar as a free port also encouraged Genoese settlement as it reduced the costs associated with their trade and facilitated the use of its port as “an Emporium for Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Ocean.” The Genoese recognized the value of Gibraltar as a re-export site, seeing as the territory produced few goods of its own, and sought to use this to their advantage by integrating it into their pre-existing networks. They served as the primary merchants and mariners in the town, but they also performed a number of other duties; Genoese inhabitants served as retailers of wine and spirits, licensed porters, cooks, gardeners, and general laborers. They were also well-known fishermen, and the sea off of established there at Catalan Bay. The guardroom had a regular supply of provisions, so the Genoese workers relocated there and remained there even after the war. See Caruana’s quotation from Cecilia Hanky in Caruana, The Rock Under a Cloud, p. 190, fn. 13.


69 The position of porter became a licensed job under General Bland, who sought to regulate who was responsible for carrying goods and spirits in the garrison as an attempt to “prevent Wine or Spirits being Convey’d to the Sutlers of Soldiers Cladestinely.” Licenses were also required to retail snuff and tobacco as well as for bakers. See TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, Articles 3, 4, and 6. For examples, see GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 3, 1774-1778, fo. 1-6; GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1749-1776, fo. 42, 45, 78, 110; GGA, Diary 1777 & 1778-1782, 1 January 1779.
Gibraltar offered prime opportunities for such work.\textsuperscript{70} Not only did the Genoese fulfill many of the garrison’s occupational needs, but after 1727 they formed their own guard who worked to police the town during times of peace.\textsuperscript{71} They also helped serve and protect the territory when it was under attack, as many Genoese inhabitants supported British forces during times of war. They served as privateers, they risked capture to retrieve supplies for the garrison, they helped man the works and rebuild fortifications, and they remained in the territory even when it was under attack to help support the troops however possible.\textsuperscript{72} While the garrison’s many needs offered significant opportunities for these mobile, maritime people who flocked to the territory throughout the eighteenth century, they in turn proved to be invaluable resources for protecting and improving Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{73}

\textit{Jews}

Jewish migrants, especially Sephardic Jews from Morocco, also came to Gibraltar not long after its capture by Anglo-Dutch forces. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries many Jews settled in Gibraltar, but they were expelled after the Spanish conquest in 1492. With the English occupation of the territory, the Jewish community, which had settled in Morocco after the expulsion, returned to Gibraltar. As Colonel Bennet grumbled in 1712, “The Jews come daily in

\textsuperscript{70} Tito Benady, “Genoese in Gibraltar,” \textit{Gibraltar Heritage Journal} 8 (2001): 85-106; Howes, pp. 31-36; Constantine, pp. 56-57. Fishermen also had to get passes from the governor. See GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 3, 1774-1778, fo. 3.

\textsuperscript{71} During peacetime, many Genoese inhabitants also helped to resupply the garrison’s stores and clear the garrison walls of “rubbish and other incumbrances” for the safety of the garrison. See GGA, Governor’s Letter Book 1749-1766, 29 April 1756, fo. 152, 13 November 1756, fo. 175, 14 December 1756, fo. 180; W. Smith, \textit{Account of the Siege of Gibraltar 1727}, fo. 7R. (NB: Most of these references also apply for Jewish inhabitants who also served during the garrison during times of war and peace)

\textsuperscript{72} See GGA, Diary 1777 & 1778-1782, 3-4 July 1779.

\textsuperscript{73} The Genoese population increased significantly during the War of Austrian Succession due to the disasters happening in Genoa. See Hills, \textit{Rock of Contention}, p. 294.
great numbers from Barbary, Leghorn and Portugal.” This migration was evident not only by the engineer’s complaints, but also by the 1712 list of rents, which included several Jewish names. However, according to the Treaty of Utrecht, Jews and Moors were forbidden from living in Gibraltar. As Article X stated, “Her Britannic Majesty, at the request of the Catholic King, does consent and agree, that no leave shall be given under any pretence whatsoever, either to Jews or Moors, to reside or have their dwellings in the said town of Gibraltar.” Despite the ban on Jewish and Moorish residents, Jews comprised a significant component of Gibraltar’s population. By 1721, members of the Jewish community were formally given land grants by the governor to hold their own properties, including one grant for a piece of waste ground on which they could build their own synagogue, later known as the Great Synagogue. A second synagogue (the Little Synagogue) was constructed in 1759 on the site of one of Gibraltar’s meat


75 TNA, CO 91/1, fo. 104. See also several letters in TNA, CO 91/1; Benady, “Depositions,” p. 88.

76 The treaty also forbade “refuge or shelter… to any Moorish ships of war in the harbor of the said town, whereby the communication between Spain and Ceuta may be obstructed, or the coasts of Spain be infested by the excursions of the Moors.” See Appendix B: “Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht,” in Jackson, The Rock of the Gibraltarians, p. 334.

77 Few Moors ever settled in the territory during the eighteenth century, making that particular group less of a concern for the British and the Spaniards.

78 The grant was made to Isaac Netto, a Jew from Leghorn and London who had been trained by his father to be a rabbi. Netto had been a merchant in Gibraltar for many years, and with this grant became the leader of the Jewish community. This synagogue was fondly known as “The Dutch Synagogue” and was a single-story building located at the back of Engineer’s Lane. The synagogue was destroyed in 1766 during a terrible rainstorm, but it was rebuilt in 1768 on a larger piece of land. It was destroyed again in 1781 during the Great Siege but was once again rebuilt and then later reconstructed after a fire in 1812. See GGA, Crown Land Series A, Bland’s Court of Enquiry, fo. 163; Dieter Haller, “Transcending Locality, Creating Identity – A Diasporic Perspective on the Mediterranean: the Jews of Gibraltar” in The Mediterraneans: Transborder Movements and Diasporas, ed. Ina-Maria Greverus, Regina Romhild & Gisela Welz (Munster: Transaction Publishers, 2000), pp. 18-19; Synagogues,” Jewish Gibraltar at http://www.jewishgibraltar.com/synagogues.php.
markets and nearby one of the few Yeshivas in the town, and a third, known as the Flemish Synagogue, opened for worship in 1799.  

Although the Jewish inhabitants of the town created a number of problems for Britain with the Spanish government, these residents remained, keeping a strong presence in the territory. British ministers throughout the 1710s-1720s commanded Gibraltar’s governors to expel the Jews in accordance with the treaty; however, many of these governors refused to do so. The Jewish population had proved essential to the maintenance of the garrison, bringing supplies from Morocco and serving as the town’s primary merchants. Without the Jews, the governors realized, Gibraltar would not be able to support its current population. Also, the Jewish inhabitants were known for being very successful financially, and many of the garrison’s early governors were eager to line their own pockets. By keeping the Jews in exchange for increased taxes and fees, Gibraltar’s commanders realized that they could make a personal profit from this community. As a result, the governors insisted in their communications with inquiring British ministers that these inhabitants could not leave until all debts and other commercial negotiations

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80 For a sampling of Spanish complaints against the Jews, see TNA, SP 78/154, Prior to Dartmouth, 16/27 September 1712, fo. 64; TNA, SP 36/6, Whitehall to Colonel Clayton, 16 April 1728, fo. 46-47. For a few British responses, see TNA, CO 91/8, “The Humble Petition of Diverse Merchants;” Gibraltar a Bulwark, p. 18, 22; The Report of the Commissioners Sent Into Spain: Pursuant to an Address of the House of Commons to Her Late Majesty Queen Anne, Relating to Gibraltar (London, 1728), p. i; Letter to the Lord Commissioners, p. 12; BL, Add MS 10034, Reports Relating to Gibraltar 1704-1770, “Some Remarks Concerning Gibraltar, Humbly Offer’d by Colonel Joseph Bennet,” fo. 136-140; BL, Add MS 38329, Bennet Remarks, fo. 157; TNA, CO 91/5, Portmore to London, 21 March 1713/14, fo. 13; TNA, CO 91/4, Kane to Townshend, 15 August 1728, Kane to Delafaye, 13 October 1725, fo. 151-152; TNA, CO 91/9, Sabine to London, 15 June 1730; TNA, CO 91/4, Russell to Stanyan, 30 April 1727; various documents in TNA, CO 91/1 and TNA, CO 91/6.


were settled. Otherwise, they argued, the territory could lose money and it might drive away profitable merchants. Once the business transactions were completed, the commanders promised to force the Jews out of the garrison.

In 1717 a number of Jews were expelled, but several remained in order to supply the territory and supposedly finish their business in the garrison. By 1718 Britain and Spain went to war and Gibraltar was in need of supplies and support. As a result, the governor recalled a number of the former Jewish inhabitants, who returned to the territory and resumed their positions as garrison suppliers. By the time the war ended, Britain and Morocco were in the midst of completing negotiations of the 1721 Anglo-Moroccan treaty, which granted permission for Moroccan Jews and Arabs to settle in Gibraltar.83 Problems between Spain and Britain remained and the Spanish monarchs continued to cite the presence of Jews in Gibraltar as an aggravating factor; however, the British government was no longer willing to rid itself of Gibraltar’s Jewish community.84 War erupted again in 1727 and Spanish forces besieged the territory, during which time the Jews proved themselves as serviceable members of the garrison. Their participation during the siege, both manning the works and transporting supplies, solidified their standing in Gibraltar. Afterward there were no more attempts to rid Gibraltar of its Jews.85

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84 Some British ministers and authors continued to blame the harboring of Jews in Gibraltar as the primary reason why Spain treated the territory with such hostility. See Gibraltar a Bulwark, 20; Report of the Commissioners, i; A Letter to the Lord Commissioners, 12; BL, Add MS 10034, Reports Relating to Gibraltar 1704-1770, “Some Remarks Concerning Gibraltar, Humbly Offer’d by Colonel Joseph Bennet,” fo. 136-140. Several governors also agreed that Spain could easily use the presence of Jews against them: see TNA, CO 91/5, Portmore to London, 21 March 1713/14, fo. 13; TNA, CO 91/4, Kane to Townshend, 15 August 1728, Kane to Delafaye, 13 October 1725, fo. 151-152; TNA, CO 91/9, Sabine to London, 15 June 1730. One minister recommended that when peace was renewed with Spain after the 1727 Anglo-Spanish war that the article surrounding these residents be excluded: see TNA, CO 91/4, Russell to Stanyan, 30 April 1727.

For the rest of the eighteenth century, the Jewish community continued to grow. By the mid-eighteenth century, the population was large enough that they too had their own police system led by the “Jew Sergeant” who was responsible for managing the “lower classes” of Jewish inhabitants. While some of the town’s Jews worked as shopkeepers, bakers, butchers, tailors, shoemakers, and licensed porters, the majority served as merchants, participating in the supplying of the garrison. The commercial opportunities available in the town made many of Gibraltar’s Jewish merchants very successful. The Jewish diasporic community was spread throughout the Mediterranean and beyond, and much like for the Genoese, Gibraltar served as an important hub for re-exporting goods and advancing their trade in the region.

Also like the Genoese, the Jewish community offered a great deal of support for the garrison during times of need, especially during the Great Siege. Providing supplies, manning the works, rebuilding fortifications, among other tasks, the Jewish community served Gibraltar well when the Rock was under attack. They benefited greatly from the opportunities in Gibraltar, and in return many members of the Jewish community supported their newly adopted home unstintingly both in times of peace and in times of war.

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86 For examples, see GGA, Diary 1792-1794, 6 December 1792.

87 As described by Aslanian, Jewish commercial networks were polycentric, that is not depending on one nodal center but operating from many. Because this system required more sedentary nodes or settlements to act as “routing stations,” Gibraltar served as a useful hub in that regard. See Sebouh David Aslanian, *From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), pp. 14-15.

88 Like the Genoese, they also helped with peacetime garrison tasks, such as moving artillery, clearing walls, and restocking the stores. See GGA, Governor’s Letter Book 1749-1766, 13 November 1756, fo. 175, 14 December 1756, fo. 180.

89 See fn. 69.
Britons

In the early years of its rule, the British government sought to attract a large British population to the Mediterranean territory. With the declaration of Gibraltar as a free port, the governor tried to court British merchants settled in Cadiz and Malaga; however, few relocated to the garrison. As he informed the merchants, “any English protestant that were inclined to settle here, should meet with all the encouragement I cou’d possible show them… [and] that they shou’d on all occasions find me ready to joyn in all things for the vantage of Trade.”\(^9^0\) Spanish trade, at that time, was flourishing, whereas Gibraltar’s commercial opportunities seemed limited, especially considering that migrants from other states had fulfilled many of the garrison’s trading needs. As Admiral Cornwall complained in 1717, “there is no encouragement for any English Merchants to come and reside here, since all Trade will pass thro’ ye Jews Hands.”\(^9^1\) Other efforts, such as encouraging Protestant property ownership, granting exclusive trading rights, and privileging their standing within the community, also failed to attract significant numbers of settlers. For many Britons, the territory was simply too politically unstable, especially in the early decades of British possession, and there were few advantages to relocating there. There were not significant plots of land or houses, the civil courts had yet to be established, the port was not thriving or even all that profitable, and residents were stuck on a very small rocky outcrop in a foreign sea surrounded by largely hostile neighbors. For Britons who had opportunities to settle elsewhere, Gibraltar and its lack of land and trade was not all that appealing.

\(^9^0\) TNA, CO 91/1, Colonel Cotton, 1717.

\(^9^1\) TNA, CO 91/1, Cornwall to Cotton, 7 September 1717.
The majority of Britons who did reside in the town were primarily soldiers, either those who were still on duty or time-expired (discharged) who chose to settle there. While some governors discouraged ex-servicemen and their families from remaining in the town, others courted them, seeking simply to improve the number of Protestant inhabitants.\textsuperscript{92} Civilian Britons were typically the leaders of the business community in Gibraltar, serving as traders and innkeepers with some filling other less prominent roles.\textsuperscript{93} Because British residents were the only ones permitted to legally import wine, spirits, and tobacco, many worked in these particular trades.\textsuperscript{94} As part of the governors’ efforts to encourage British settlement, those Britons who lived in the town did enjoy certain privileges, such as the freedom to travel into Spain, and eligibility to participate in certain administrative duties, such as serving on the civil court (once it was established).\textsuperscript{95} But as demonstrated by the census figures listed above, British settlers, regardless of their roles within the territory, were still significantly outnumbered by Gibraltar’s Mediterranean population, a reality that was frightening to many of its governors.

Because the vast majority of Gibraltar’s inhabitants were migrants from different states, each resident brought with him or herself different cultural norms, practices, customs, and beliefs. Blending a variety of peoples and cultures, which seemingly were distinct on the outside,

\textsuperscript{92} Apparently Colonel Congreve, according to a petition signed by four British women who had since returned to England, had discouraged them from remaining in Gibraltar, whereas Governor Kane had eagerly granted properties to current and former soldiers. See TNA, CO 91/1.

\textsuperscript{93} Constantine, \textit{Community and Identity}, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{94} GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1749-1766, fo. 53-56, 58-59, 91-96, 99-100, 117-118, 194. These imports were highly restricted and closely monitored because of the governors’ fear of a drunk garrison and also an unhappy Spanish neighbor (because of smuggling). Offenders were fined, jailed or even exiled. For examples, see GGA, Diary 1778, 6 October 1778.

\textsuperscript{95} For examples of Britons crossing the Spanish lines, see GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1749-1766, fo. 236; GGA, Letters to Consuls Lisbon & Cadiz, 1769-1797, fo. 26-27. For British residents serving in civil courts, see GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1749-1766, fo. 32-34, 251.
over time these groups fused together to create a unique Gibraltarian identity that pulled from the residents’ many backgrounds. Yet in the eighteenth century, each of these ethnic groups were more distinct than in later years, both on their own accord – likely due to differences in language, religion, profession, and even place of settlement on the Rock – and because of the governors’ efforts to create distinct categories of individuals. Despite these distinctions, the majority of residents worked together to help further the growth of the territory and assist the garrison and its needs accordingly. This is not to say that there were not disputes, which were expected in any trading community, especially in a middle ground like Gibraltar, but in general the greatest divide was between Gibraltar’s multiethnic residents, Britons included, and its British administrators.

**The Governors of Gibraltar**

Governors, as established in the Tudor period, were “men who commanded military garrisons within conquered regions.”96 This definition was still applicable in the eighteenth century, especially in Gibraltar, where a central part of their duty was as commander of the armed forces stationed there.97 Because Gibraltar was in a constant state of alert for most of the eighteenth century, the military duties of the governor were vitally important for the maintenance of the garrison and the continued British possession of the territory. It was the responsibility of the governor to keep a constant eye on Britain’s European competitors, many of whom also proved to be enemies of Gibraltar at some point during this period. Spain, who actively besieged


97 A. Mackillop and Steve Murdoch, eds., *Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers, c. 160-1800: A Study of Scotland and Empires* (Boston: Brill, 2003), pp. xxvii-xxviii. Throughout this dissertation, governor and commander will be used interchangeably when discussing the leadership of Gibraltar.
the garrison twice during the eighteenth century and militarized its borders several other times, posed an almost constant threat to Gibraltar, and France, who was often allied with Spain in its efforts to take the territory from Britain, also presented a risk to the garrison’s safety.  

From their situation in the midst of a “hostile” sea, Gibraltar’s governors were ordered to monitor the movements of these potential enemies and keep an ear to the ground for any rumors of potential attacks. In the meantime, it was their responsibility to ensure the garrison was well fortified, the works were in good order, the soldiers were well trained and prepared for possible battle, and that there were sufficient arms and munitions should hostilities erupt. Because of these needs, it was pivotal, in the minds of the British government, that Gibraltar’s governors be well-experienced military men.

As Stephen Constantine has shown, the commanders of Gibraltar were indeed men with significant military experience. Upon their appointment to the office of governor during the first century of British rule (1707-1814), two were brigadier-generals, two were major-generals, nine were lieutenant-generals, and two were full generals. The additional thirteen appointed lieutenant governors, who served as replacements for absent governors, and the twelve officers who were put in charge of the garrison temporarily also held high military ranks, ranging from colonel to lieutenant-general.  

Nor were these governors young men, with most of the commanders being

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98 While France and Britain were allies during the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1721), King Louis XV of France and King Philip V of Spain signed the first of several Pacte de Famille in 1733, in which the French monarch promised his help to the Spanish king in restoring Gibraltar to Spanish hands. This pact truly came into action in 1779 during the War of the American Revolution when the two states besieged Gibraltar for the next four years.

99 See Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 71. His data is based on lists from Jackson, Rock of the Gibraltarrians, and entries in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. For individuals who were appointed to posts more than once, the original rank at their first appointment was used, unless they were promoted to a higher position (i.e. from lieutenant governor to governor), in which case both ranks were used.
between the ages of fifty and eighty at the time of their appointment. These men were well-versed in the ways of the British military, and many of them had served in British possessions or military engagements across the globe. This was not uncommon for British governors during this period, as several scholars have shown the “webs” of “colonial lives” that these men held across the empire. Many of the veterans of Williamite War in Ireland (1688-1691) and of the Jacobite rebellion in Scotland (1745) served as royal governors in British territories throughout the empire, and the majority of these governors had extensive military and garrison experience beyond those particular times of service.

As military men with many years of service to the British crown, these governors appeared to be well fit to serve as representatives of Britain and its empire. In many ways, their past history with the military demonstrated their qualifications for the job ahead. Their time spent in other garrisons prepared them well for their future duties, introducing them to the bureaucracies of rule, the development of civil and military policies, and the practice of techniques and politics to help stabilize volatile areas. For the British government, these past positions demonstrated their military skills, their administrative capabilities, and their loyalty to

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100 Nor were these men particularly youthful. As Constantine has shown, among the governors whose birth year is known, the eldest at time of appointment was 80 and the youngest (the Duke of Kent) was 35. The average age was 56, a number which may be even higher if the dates analyzed aligned with the period focused on in this dissertation (the Duke of Kent was governor from 1802 to 1820). The vast majority of governors covered in this dissertation were at least 60 at the time of their appointment, and for many of them, their time in Gibraltar was near the end of their careers. See Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 71.


the crown.\textsuperscript{104} Having been placed in tricky situations throughout their careers, these men had proven that they could respond to crises as they developed, a skill that was especially desirable for governors in a territory distant from Britain.\textsuperscript{105} Their many roles abroad showed the value of their experience, as well as the desire of the British government to use this knowledge in sites across the empire, even if the needs in and particularities of each location varied.\textsuperscript{106} Because of their histories abroad in service of the Crown, these men appeared to be “effective agents of imperialism.”\textsuperscript{107}

To gain a better understanding of the men who held this role in Gibraltar, I will give a brief overview of four of the governors that play a significant role in the forthcoming chapters. These include Lieutenant Governor Richard Kane (1720-1721, 1725-1727), Governor Humphrey Bland (1749-1752), Lieutenant Governor and later Governor Robert Boyd (1768-1777, 1790-1794), and Governor George Augustus Eliott (1777-1787).\textsuperscript{108} As these short biographies will show, Gibraltar’s governors were invested and skilled military men with experience across the globe fighting for Britain and its interests. Their lives were dedicated to protecting the state and its holdings, a commitment that continued during their time in Gibraltar. They sought to support the British Protestant vision of Gibraltar and encourage the growth of the territory in that direction. This included supporting British settlement, privileging British property holders, introducing British institutions and practices, increasing British revenue and reinforcing the


\textsuperscript{105} It could take several months for advice from London to reach the garrison, and Gibraltar’s governors often had to act independently from the British government (unless later commanded otherwise).

\textsuperscript{106} See Games, \textit{Webs of Empire}, p. 148.

\textsuperscript{107} Webb, “Army and Empire,” p. 19.

\textsuperscript{108} For a comprehensive list of Gibraltar’s governors, lieutenant governors, and acting governors, see Tito Benady, “Governors of Gibraltar,” \textit{Gibraltar Heritage Journal} 2 (1994), pp. 73-78.
British garrison. Their focus as British military men was to secure the territory for Britain in the present and in the future. Yet, as will be discussed in the following section, the governors’ military skills and administrative efforts were not always positive for those under their leadership.

Richard Kane (1662-1736)

Kane was born in northern Ireland in 1662 and entered the Royal Regiment of Ireland in 1689. He served with the regiment during the Williamite Wars in Ireland, including the Battle of the Boyne, the Battle of Athlone, the Battle of Aughrim, and the Siege of Limerick, as well as across the Continent during the Nine Years’ War, in which he was wounded and his regiment was rewarded for its bravery, and the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1710 he was appointed colonel of his own regiment of Irish foot, which participated in the (largely failed) Canadian expedition in 1711. In 1712 Queen Anne appointed Kane lieutenant governor of Minorca, a position in which he remained for the next eight years, until he was sent to command Gibraltar in 1720. At the time Britain was in the process of concluding the War of the Quadruple Alliance against Spain, and having shown himself to be a competent leader administratively and militarily, Kane was ordered to reinforce the garrison. He remained in Gibraltar for one year, returned to his post in Minorca as lieutenant governor for another four years, and then was again sent to Gibraltar to serve as lieutenant governor in 1725 when it seemed that a Spanish attack was imminent. When the new lieutenant governor, Jasper Clayton, arrived in 1727, Kane
returned to Minorca to prepare it for possible attack as well. In 1730, he was finally made governor of Minorca, where he died in 1736.  

Kane’s service to the Crown took him across the European and American continents, finally settling him in the Mediterranean where he served loyally for 25 years. During his time in power in that region, he proved himself to be an ardent defender of Britain and all that it stood for. As a protector of the Protestant faith, he expelled a parish priest and his vice curate from Gibraltar after they refused to lift the excommunication of a Roman Catholic resident turned Protestant. As a supporter of British liberties, he proposed a new constitution and other legal reforms in Minorca, which eventually were implemented in 1754. And as a defender of British territories, he reinforced Britain’s precarious possessions against Spanish attack, detaining additional troops to support the existing garrison and improving the garrison’s works. Kane strengthened the existing northern defenses, widened and strengthened the existing Moorish wall to make the Grand Battery in the north, built the South Barracks on the undefended south face of the Rock, and rebuilt the Landport, all in an effort to ensure Gibraltar would remain in the hands of the British monarch. As the inscription on his memorial in Westminster Abbey declares, “He who under four sovereigns had borne arms with the greatest shrewdness, courage and dignity, who had served God with all his heart and played the role not less of a Christian than of a good solider.”

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Humphrey Bland (1686-1763)

Also of Protestant Irish birth, Bland served in the Irish army beginning in 1704. It appears that he served during the War of Spanish Succession in the Low Countries and fought against the Jacobites during the 1715 rebellion. In 1727 he published his Treatise of Military Discipline, a work that detailed the contemporary practices of the army, including its drills and training, the duties of its officers, and the rules in quarters, camp, field and the garrison. His Treatise was reprinted nine times by 1762 and was thought to be one of the most widely used drillbooks of its time. After the publication of his treatise, Bland rose quickly through the ranks and was made Quartermaster-General of the Forces on the British establishment in 1742, a highly regarded senior staff appointment with the military which he held until his death. He later served in Flanders, Dettingen, and the Low Countries during the War of the Austrian Succession, and with the outbreak of the Jacobite rebellion in 1745 he returned to Britain to serve with the army in Scotland. After the Battle of Culloden, Bland led the pursuit against the fleeing Highlanders, and later commanded one of the four military districts put into place following the rising. In 1747, after a brief return to service in the ongoing war in the Low Countries, he was made commander-in-chief in Scotland, a position he held until he was appointed governor of Gibraltar in 1749, and one he returned to from 1753 until 1756 when he had to leave for health reasons.111

Bland was sent to Gibraltar by the British crown in an effort to “redress the several Grievances which the Inhabitants of that City had loudly complained of.” Prior to his term as governor there had been a number of complaints about previous governors’ abuse of the position,

and the British government sought to rectify the reputation of that post by instituting “such proper Rules as would effectually remove [these grievances] for the future.” Bland appeared to be a prime candidate for that position, known for being a methodological and strategic planner and disciplinarian who had many years of service for the Crown. Like Kane, Bland showed himself to be dedicated to promoting, supporting, and protecting Britain and its interests. To this end, Bland worked to encourage British settlers to the territory and increase the King’s revenue by reforming the system of property ownership. He also advanced the interests of British merchants and British markets by instituting specific regulations that favored these individuals. Having encouraged Parliament to enact new legislation, Bland instituted the first truly British civil court system in the territory. As he explained in his Account of Lieutenant General Bland’s Conduct, a treatise he wrote in 1751 detailing his experience as governor and providing guidelines for his successors, he “aim’d at nothing farther than doing Strict Justice both to my King and Country in the Command I was honor’d with.”

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112 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 2. Bland’s predecessor, William Hargrave, had been accused of several abuses, as had some of Gibraltar’s earlier governors. In 1749 an anonymous author published a tract entitled Reasons for Giving up Gibraltar, which included in its argument that the territory’s governors were worse than any other colonies’ leadership (outside of one unnamed exception). The author contended that “as bad Governors are a Dishonour to their Country, so ought not any Place to be kept, where none but such Governors preside, as it is much better to lose a particular Acquisition than a general Reputation.” See Reasons for Giving Up Gibraltar (London, 1749), pp. 21-22.

113 The First Charter of Justice passed in 1721 decreed that Spanish law would remain in force in Gibraltar. While the Second Charter of Justice, passed in 1740, sought to change this practice and institute British law instead, the charter never reached the garrison because the Judge Advocate refused to leave Britain until he was compensated accordingly. Because the judge never did leave for Gibraltar, the Second Charter was never enacted in Gibraltar — no one even knew it existed until decades later.

Sir Robert Boyd, c. 1710-1794\textsuperscript{115}

An “Anglo-Scottus,” Boyd was baptized in Surrey and attended Glasgow University prior to entering the army as a civilian storekeeper. He served as the deputy judge advocate and deputy commissary of the musters in Minorca prior to and during the siege of Minorca in 1756. During the siege, Boyd tried to row in an open boat to Admiral Byng’s fleet with a message from the garrison’s commander; he was later called as a witness at Byng’s court martial. He served a number of campaigns with the allied Hessian troops in Germany as both commissary general and a commander of a company of foot guards. In 1760 he was nominated to command a regiment in India, recommended by Commander-in-Chief Lord Robert Clive as “one of the best, if not the best officer in the King’s service,” but he was not sent. Instead, after the end of the Seven Years’ War, he sought a governorship; when his regiment was posted to Gibraltar in 1768, he was named lieutenant governor, a position he held until the arrival of General Eliott in 1777. He did return to the garrison to help defend Gibraltar during the Great Siege from 1779 to 1782, playing a significant role in defeating the enemy’s floating batteries by recommending the use of red hot shot. Boyd was made a knight of the Bath in 1785 in recognition of his service, and he returned to Gibraltar as governor in 1790, a position he held until his death in the territory in 1794. He was buried in the walls of his own creation, the king’s bastion, where an inscription remains today.\textsuperscript{116}

Like the others, prior to his appointment in Gibraltar Boyd’s past military experiences abroad had distinguished him as a skilled commander and administrator, dedicated to serving the Crown and its interests. During his first term in Gibraltar, Bland sought to improve Gibraltar’s

\textsuperscript{115} Boyd’s date of birth is unknown, but his baptism was recorded on April 20, 1710.

works, a desire that resulted in the construction of the king’s bastion, a fortress that could hold 800 men and 26 cannon and mortars.\textsuperscript{117} He spent much of his years as governor dedicated to fortifying the garrison and recruiting troops, and as a soldier stationed there during the siege, he was responsible for submitting the plan that resulted in the final destruction of the enemy flotillas.\textsuperscript{118} Boyd also showed his loyalty to the British flag through his civil administrative efforts, which included ferreting out and exiling illegal aliens, recalling Mediterranean passes and their protection from non-Britons, limiting the Spanish Catholic influence in the town by separating Gibraltar’s church from its Spanish diocese, and promoting commerce among British merchants.\textsuperscript{119} These actions, he believed, were necessary for “a Governor intrusted by his Majesty, with the command of this important, most critically situated Fortress.”\textsuperscript{120}

\textit{Sir George Augustus Eliott, 1717-1790}

Eliott, like Boyd, was also of Scottish birth, but unlike the other governors, he had formal military training, having attended the French military college at La Fere and the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich.\textsuperscript{121} He first volunteered with the Prussian army in an effort to expand his military knowledge, and later entered the British military, holding two commissions

\textsuperscript{117} After a major restoration project, the king’s bastion reopened as a leisure center in 2008 with a number of facilities, including an ice skating rink, movie theaters, a bowling alley, an arcade, a gym and fitness center, multiple restaurants, a youth lounge, a nightclub, and an internet café.

\textsuperscript{118} GGA, Governor to Secretary of State 1791-1794 & 1795-1801.

\textsuperscript{119} Boyd asked the Catholic Vicar, Messa, to draft a letter to the Pope requesting that the Church of Gibraltar be made independent of the Diocese of Cadiz because he feared that the bishop’s foreign connections would sway the vicar and his parishioners. He also worked to ensure that Messa was chosen as vicar, seeking a vicar who was more attuned to British interests. See Caruana, \textit{The Rock Under a Cloud}, pp. 23-29.

\textsuperscript{120} TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 27 September 1792, Enclosure No. 4.

\textsuperscript{121} Each of these governors was born not in England, but in English possession (i.e. Scotland and Ireland). J. Russell Snapp has done excellent work analyzing how Scottish and Irish imperial administrators governed and how this differs from English ones. See J. Russell Snapp, “An Enlightened Empire: Scottish and Irish Imperial Reformers in the Age of the American Revolution,” \textit{Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies} 33, no. 3 (2001): 388-403.
simultaneously. He served during the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War. Prior to his appointment in Gibraltar, he became commander-in-chief in Ireland, a post he left after a few years in order to become governor of Gibraltar in 1777. He held this post for the next ten years, leading the territory through the four-year long Great Siege and the subsequent rebuilding process. His competent leadership during those trials earned him the title of knight of the Bath in 1783 as well as the title of baron in 1787. He died while in the process of returning to the garrison to resume the post of governor in 1790.122

While much of Eliott’s term as commander was spent in peacetime, his performance during the Great Siege largely defined his governorship of Gibraltar, portraying him as a stalwart general who would fight to the death to defend the staunchly British rock.123 Britons stationed at the garrison commended his performance with one officer’s wife remarking, “Of all men living, General Eliott is the most likely to keep possession of Gibraltar… He is, I think, take him all in all, a most excellent character.”124 Depictions of Eliott at the time showed him to have an unwavering commitment to the British flag and dedication to the defense of Gibraltar. Not only did he prepare the garrison for battle by overseeing the construction and improvement of its fortifications, but he also planned and executed a number of strategic attacks and bombardments on the French and Spanish flotillas. He became known for his austerity during the siege, refusing to indulge in a typical general’s fare but rather limiting himself to only vegetables and water or a


123 Britain’s victory in the siege resulted in a great deal of propaganda that portrayed Gibraltar as a bastion of Britain. Some of these works include John Singleton’s painting, The Defeat of the Floating Batteries at Gibraltar, September 1782; James Jefferys’ painting also of the floating batteries at Gibraltar, John Trumbull’s painting, The Sortie Made by the Garrison of Gibraltar; Mozart’s Bardengesang auf Gibraltar, which commemorated the Great Siege; as well as a number of poems, siege accounts and diaries, and other narrative pieces declaring the greatness of Britain’s victory.

124 Catherine Upton, The Siege of Gibraltar, From the Twelfth of April to the Twenty-seventh of May, 1781. To which is prefixed, some account of the blockade. (London: J. Fielding, 1781), p. 4.
quarter cup of rice a day as his rations.¹²⁵ Eliott’s defense of the Rock became the representation of the victorious empire over its Franco-Spanish foes, and the governor was lauded by all for his service. As one poet wrote, “Firm as this Rock is ELIOTT’S steady Soul, / Watchful he guards, and wisely guides the whole… / Despising Death, and firm in ALBION’s Cause, / Make haughty SPAIN submit to BRITISH LAWS.”¹²⁶

Alongside his military success, Eliott also demonstrated his dedication to British interests in the civil sphere. Like Boyd and the others, he also sought to promote British settlement through the restriction of privileges to only British Protestants, which included land and property ownership, Mediterranean pass protection, trading rights, and other benefits. He suppressed attempts by foreign inhabitants to obtain such advantages illegally and he instituted a number of legislative efforts to combat their efforts. Much like the other governors described above, Eliott displayed his loyalty to the Crown both through his military prowess and his stringent efforts to promote British and Protestant efforts in a territory of foreigners.

Gibraltar’s governors, in particular Kane, Bland, Boyd, and Eliott, brought to the garrison an expansive military background that spanned across the empire and the globe. Their involvement in various conflicts, rebellions, and wars shaped their view of the world and the residents that they were sent to govern. For many of these commanders, their newfound inhabitants came from backgrounds similar to those of many of the enemy troops they had fought over the years. This, combined with their efforts to put down the Jacobite rebellions at home, left them suspect of those who they believed were not fully dedicate to the preservation of

Protestant Britain and its holdings, including Gibraltar. The governors’ extensive military experiences provided an education in the ideals of the British empire and encouraged them to uphold such beliefs and practices to the best of their capability. As J. Russell Snapp argues, these commanders, who came from the “fringes of the British Isles,” saw themselves as part of a larger whole; however, rather than celebrating the diversity as Snapp contends, I maintain that these governors were challenged by the composition of the population and the threat it presented to their ideas of a wholly British empire.127 These military commanders felt secure in their ability to defend the territory from outside harm, but did not know how to broach the challenge of governing a civil sphere with a minority of British peoples, laws, customs, and religion.

The State of the Town & Garrison

When Britain acquired Gibraltar in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, it was granted “the full and entire property of the Town and Castle of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications, and forts thereunto belonging” (Figure 1.2).128 This title was later shortened to “the town and garrison of Gibraltar,” which remained the designation for the territory throughout the eighteenth century.129 As this title demonstrates, Gibraltar was divided into two halves, the civil (the town) and the military (the garrison). The civil sphere technically included Gibraltar’s (primarily foreign) residents as well as their shops, gardens, and trades, whereas the military realm encompassed the garrison members, fortifications and works, arms, and barracks. In actuality, this division was not so clear; the town and garrison overlapped in almost every way. Physically it was virtually impossible for this not to be the case; in a small space like Gibraltar it was not

129 Gibraltar did not technically become a British “colony” until 1830.
 feasible to enact two separate spheres. Instead soldiers were lodged in houses in the town, civilians were actively involved in supplying the garrison, and even the port was shared between trading and naval vessels.\textsuperscript{130}

It was especially impossible to separate the two spheres because both were under the control of the same governor. Gibraltar’s governor was the sole administrative head of the territory, appointed to command both the civil and military realms. He functioned as the representative of the Crown in Gibraltar and fulfilled its executive, judicial, and legislative powers, while in turn serving as military commander-in-chief.\textsuperscript{131} As Bland dictated in his 1727 military treatise, prior to his term as governor, “All Persons in the [garrison] Town, whether Ecclesiastical or Civil, are subject to [the governor’s] Jurisdiction, as far as it relates to the Order and Preservation of the Town… His Power over the Military is [also] very Extensive; for all the Officers and Soldiers in the Garrison are obliged to obey him, without Controll.”\textsuperscript{132} While the governors were expected to govern both aspects equally adeptly, as military men they often gravitated toward a more militarized approach. While this did not legally include martial law, it did result in a number of restrictions, regulations, and other forms of strict administrative control. In the minds of the governors, Gibraltar was first and foremost a military territory and needed to be governed as such.

\textsuperscript{130} For some examples, see GGA, Diary 1778, 15 May 1778; GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 3, 1774-1778, fo. 343-344. Not all of these interactions were considered positive by the governors; while they approved of civilians working for the garrison, they were not so pleased when civilians tried to employ soldiers or buy and sell soldiers’ wares. Many of these civilians were fined, jailed, or expelled from the garrison. For examples, see GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 3, 1774-1778, fo. 198-199; GGA, Diary 1782-1794, 29 December 1792, 3 September 1793; GGA, Diary 1778, 10 September 1778.

\textsuperscript{131} See Steele, “Governors or Generals?,” p. 110.

\textsuperscript{132} Humphrey Bland, \textit{A Treatise of Military Discipline: In which is Laid Down and Explained the Duties of Officer and Soldier} (London, 1727), pp. 193-194.
As a result, the military sphere encroached on many aspects of civilian life, including the daily schedule. The day itself was organized around military time: gunfire signaled the opening of Gibraltar’s gates first thing in the morning as well as their closure at the end of the day. The regular changing of the guards, formal parades down the town’s main streets, and routine training practices for the soldiers marked the time each day. On Sundays, the entire military command would march down the streets on their way to the Protestant chapel for church service. After the workday was over, soldiers and citizens alike were allowed to frequent the wine houses and taverns, but there were a number of restrictions in place. No gin or “drams” could be sold at any time or by any retailer because the soldiers were known to abuse these drinks, which in turn affected the health of the garrison. Those spirits that were allowed were strictly regulated to ensure that there was not an excess in the town because an ample supply could “destroy a much greater garrison than ours.” Without such restrictions, commanders believed that their men would be found “laying by Dozens, dead Drunk in the Streets” and getting into violent quarrels with one another. All taverns and public houses were required to shut their doors to all patrons before 10 PM, following the garrison’s schedule. After the firing of the final gun and until the first gun in the morning, civilians were confined within the garrison’s walls and often required to follow a strict curfew.

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133 See GGA, Diary 1777 & 1778-1782, 4 December 1778, 23 December 1778; GGA, Diary 1792-1794, 18 December 1794.
134 See GGA, Diary 1777-1778, 24 November 1777, 2 March 1778; GGA, Diary 1778, 6 June 1778.
137 See GGA, Diary 1777-1778, 7 & 9 June 1777, 9 September 1777, 15 September 1777, 14 December 1777, 6 March 1778; GGA, Diary 1778, 25 June 1778, 10 July 1778, 22 October 1778.
138 For more on this, see chapter 5. See also GGA, Diary 1792-1794, 22 October 1793; Constantine, Community and Identity, pp. 71-73.
Not all governors fully appreciated the overlap between the two spheres, however. As Governor Bland acknowledged, while the garrison’s commanders were well-trained militarily, many had little experience in the civil realm. “Soldiers are not much Versed in that Science,” he explained, so they needed “Fixed Rules to go by” so as not to “fall into Mistakes by following their own Erroneous Judgment, which most of us Military Men are apt to do, not so much from Design as the want of Civil Knowledge.” This was especially true in the governors’ administration of the civil courts, over which they had been granted the highest power. All civil appeals went to the governor and he was responsible for deciding the outcome. Yet, as Bland recognized, “we Military Men can’t be Conversant enough in the Laws of our Country to enable us to be Competent Judges wither to Try or Determine Civil Cases.” In his mind, the mingling of the civil and military spheres provided governors with many opportunities for mismanagement. As Bland remarked in his Account, “How Strange will it appear to any one who should take a View of the English Constitution, which is so wisely framed for the Ease, Safety, and Happiness of the Subject, to find that a place of such Importance to the Power and Commerce of Great Britain should be left for so many Years under the Arbitrary will of a Governor, without the least Check to Controul him.”

140 Although the Judge Advocate was appointed by the Crown, occasionally the governor was responsible for appointing a deputy judge to fill the role as a “temporary” replacement. It was not uncommon, however, for the temporary replace to serve longer than the formally appointed judge.
141 If the aggrieved party still was dissatisfied with the decision, they could appeal to His Majesty in Council if the case involved substantial sums of money (more than £250). See John Restano, Justice So Requiring: The Emergence and Development of a Legal System in Gibraltar (Gibraltar: Calpe Press, 2012), Appendix A: Charters of Justice.
143 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 68-69. It was the case that Gibraltar’s governors could do whatever they wanted, especially in the early years of British rule. During the 1710s, a number of inhabitants issued grievances against the governors, complaining of illegal expulsions, invasions of property and liberty, and even physical abuse and rape. See TNA, CO 91/1 fo. 1-4, 8-13, 103-105; TNA, SP 34/36, “The Case of Mary Loeback.”
The British government did attempt on occasion throughout the century to further divorce the civil from the military in Gibraltar and limit the governor’s power; however, none of these efforts came to much. In 1720, at the bequest of three British merchants in Gibraltar, Parliament established the First Charter of Justice in Gibraltar in an effort to institute “some Court of Justice… for the deciding of Disputes between Merchants and Traders.” Their solution entailed creating a summary judicatory officiated by the current Judge Advocate and two prominent merchants to determine “Please [sic] of Debt Accounts and other Contracts, Trespasses and all manner of other personal Pleas.”144 While this charter did enable greater civilian involvement, the Judge Advocate was typically a commissioned military officer with some knowledge of English law and the governor remained the head of the Court of Appeals.145

In 1721 British merchants submitted another petition to Parliament, requesting the establishment of a true civil government, independent of the governor. Life under a military governor, they argued, left them feeling “[u]nsecure in their Properties” and unprotected from any infringements on their civil liberties. Protesting the “Great Prejudice and Discouragement attending their said Trade for Want of a Form of Civill Government Established in that Garrison,” the subjects begged that a “Civill Judicature may be forthwith Appointed, and proper Persons nominated to Go from hence.”146 A parliamentary committee considered the request,

144 BL, Lansdowne 767/1, “List of Papers Containing the Proceedings that have been had for the Establishing a Civil Government at Gibraltar,” fo. 10-17; TNA, PC 1/4/80, “Petition of William Hayles, William Jack, and John Gerardo Duque,” 12 July 1728.

145 Many of the Judge Advocates did not have extensive legal knowledge, but until 1752 British law was not the only law practiced in the territory. This charter did not introduce any changes in the law code, signifying that the existing Spanish civil law would continue in force. See BL, Lansdowne 558, “Precedents, Law Cases, Charters of London Etc.,” fo. 24-28.

146 TNA, PC 1/3/96, “Order Referring to a Committee a Petition (Enclosed) of the Merchants and Traders of Gibraltar,” 25 November 1721; BL, Lansdowne 767/1, “List of Papers Containing the Proceedings that have been had for the Establishing a Civil Government at Gibraltar;” TNA, PC 1/3170, “Gibraltar: Papers Relating to the Establishment of Civil Government and Civil and Criminal Courts.”
concluding that a civil judicature would indeed “Contribute very much to the Advantage of Trade in Generall and to the entire Satisfaction of all his Majesties Trading Subjects as well to ye Great Advantage of his Majesties Revenues." They drew up a proposal for government that included a mayor, alderman, justices of the peace, and two judges, one for common law cases and one for the admiralty. The Council requested that the Lord Chief Justice and Attorney & Solicitor General draw up a list of names to form the court, sending them the proposal in December 1722; it stalled there until the issue arose again in 1728.

After the completion of the 1727 siege, the political situation in Gibraltar once again became an issue in Parliament, who sought to introduce specific changes to “distinguish the Civil more Strongly from the Military Government and to set Bounds between the Inhabitants and the Garrison.” The proposed governing structure would effectually remove the military governor from all involvement in the civil sphere by “exclude[ing] the Governor from any share in the Approbation, or Nomination of these [civil] Officers.” Under the new legislation, he would be forbidden to “let, hinder, or intermeddle with the Jurisdiction of the Civil Magistrate, or invade or break in upon the Privileges thereby granted or intended to be granted to the Inhabitants of

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147 BL, Lansdowne 767/1, “List of Papers Containing the Proceedings that have been had for the Establishing a Civil Government at Gibraltar,” fo. 10.

148 London Journal (London, England), Saturday, January 19, 1723, Issue CLXXII. See also Daily Post (London, England), Wednesday, January 16, 1723, Issue 1030; Weekly Journal or British Gazetteer (London, England), Saturday, January 19, 1723; Dublin Mercury (Dublin, Ireland), Saturday, January 26, 1723. This proposal was based on the charters of Tangiers, the Charibee Islands and Jamaica, as well as the recommendations of Godfrey, an MP familiar with Gibraltar, and William Hayles, one of the original petitioners in 1720. See BL, Lansdowne 767/1, “List of Papers Containing the Proceedings that have been had for the Establishing a Civil Government at Gibraltar,” fo. 10-17.

149 TNA, PC 1/4/94, “Committee Order of Reference to the Attorney and Solicitor General of a Board of Trade Report and Draft Charter,” 18 December 1728, fo. 3.

150 TNA, PC 1/4/94, “Committee Order of Reference to the Attorney and Solicitor General of a Board of Trade Report and Draft Charter,” 18 December 1728, fo. 4, 12.
Our City of Gibraltar.” This new establishment sought to divide the territory into two separate jurisdictions, limiting the power of the commander to the military administration. However, like the previous proposal, these changes floundered under review and the proposal disappeared from the parliamentary record, never moving beyond draft form. As later parliamentary correspondence noted, the suggested changes could have never come to pass—there were simply not enough British residents to fill the proposed government positions. Such a system, the government determined, was not “well adapted” to the situation of Gibraltar “where there are but few [British] Inhabitants.”

For Gibraltar’s residents, the lack of a proper civil administration caused a number of problems. As they understood it, Gibraltar was not just a military garrison but also a lively town with a vibrant civil sphere and commercial community. Although Gibraltar never became the burgeoning port that Britons hoped during this century, it did have a number of goods travel through its harbor. Spanish and Portuguese vessels arrived with wines, oil, sugar, wood and other building materials, fruits, and other provisions, and left with British products such as cotton, wool, and manufactures from Britain, India, and North America. France brought luxuries like soap, perfume, confectionary, gold and silver threads, silk, sugar and coffee in return for North African goods, lead, copper, and North American herring. States with newfound or newly strengthened partnerships also sent merchants to the garrison to connect with their fellow

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151 TNA, PC 1/4/95, “Board of Trade Report on Several Details Concerning the Charter of Incorporation to be Granted to Gibraltar,” 1 February 1729, fo. 7


153 TNA, PC 1/3/82, “Board of Trade Report on the Petition of William Hayles, William Jacks, and John Gerardo,” 11 August 1720; BL, Lansdowne 767/1, “List of Papers Containing the Proceedings that have been had for the Establishing a Civil Government at Gibraltar,” fo. 5-6.

154 Spanish trade was off-and-on throughout the century depending on the relationship between the two states.
countrymen. The Italian city states Tunis and Algiers imported several provisions, along with legumes and grain, in exchange for British woolens, linens, and metals, North American fish, and Indian gums and spices. Morocco, as mentioned previously, provided the vast majority of garrison supplies as well as several North African specialty items to attract interested buyers while purchasing a number of British imperial goods.¹⁵⁵ These trades were only as successful, however, as the governor allowed; he had the power to restrict the merchant’s movements, the types of goods imported and exported, the vessels’ access to the ports, and the storage facilities and conditions of the goods. Gibraltar’s governors regularly employed this power, instituting a number of restrictions and regulations on the territory’s trade which limited commercial efforts. Such exacting control proved the British idiom true that “Trade was never known [to] flourish under a Military Power.”¹⁵⁶

While some governors did try to respect the needs of the inhabitants, many overrode their concerns, citing the precedence of the garrison or offering no excuses at all. For instance, after the events of the Great Siege had largely leveled Gibraltar, the returning residents sought to rebuild. However, Governor Eliott refused to give them supplies from the garrison or even grant permission for them to gather the necessary supplies themselves. All materials, he contended, were to be used to reconstruct the garrison’s fortifications, works and barracks. Meanwhile, Eliott also imposed additional restrictions on trade and refused to help the town’s merchants fight against an arbitrary Spanish quarantine. Military peace had officially returned to Gibraltar, yet the civil sphere was still in turmoil. While the residents did not remain silent, submitting a

¹⁵⁵ GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 4, 1779-1786, “1784 Considerations on the Trade of Gibraltar,” fo. 519-524.

petition to the government in London, their wishes went unheeded.\textsuperscript{157} The civil sphere, while it had occasional moments of flourishing, was largely subsumed by the military realm and its security. Throughout the eighteenth century Gibraltar remained largely a garrison community administered by a military governor; the town’s residents were at best supporting figures and at worst inconveniences and active threats.

For Gibraltar’s governors, the territory did not mirror the British images that they had taught. The military garrison was lacking and the town was replete with foreign influences. Few British institutions had been established and few Britons had actually settled in the territory. Instead their citizens looked much like the enemies they had devoted their lives fighting against: Catholics and other non-Protestants who, they believed, could not be trusted to serve British interests. The governors were wary of their non-British, non-Protestant residents and the potential threat they posed to the garrison. In their minds, Gibraltar’s inhabitants were “the ruff-raff of various nations and religions ready to commit any fraud in their power,” “dregs of a motley people, expatriated from all parts of the Universe,” and “Vagrants, of all nations.”\textsuperscript{158} Such a view of the population, not surprisingly, affected their governing of the territory, leading them to embrace a much more military and authoritarian approach to their administration.\textsuperscript{159} Rather than granting their inhabitants the freedom to pursue their trades and participate more fully in the territory, Gibraltar’s governors sought to control all aspects of garrison life in hopes

\textsuperscript{157} See TNA, PC 1/16/13; TNA, CO 91/30; TNA, CO 91/31; TNA, CO 91/32; Constantine, \textit{Community and Identity}, p. 87.

\textsuperscript{158} TNA, CO 91/11, fo. 6-7; TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 27 September 1792.

\textsuperscript{159} According to P.J. Marshall, the insistence on subordination and willingness to use one’s authority based on particular territorial needs was a development of the second half of the eighteenth century with the coming of the revolutionary era. Yet, in Gibraltar this practice is evident from the beginnings of British possession of the territory. See P. J. Marshall, “Empire and Authority in the Later Eighteenth Century.” \textit{The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History} 15, no. 2 (1987), p. 118.
that they could better manage this problematic population and protect British Gibraltar from any potential harm.

**Conclusions**

This chapter sought to explore the “situation” of Gibraltar by examining the many relationships that influenced the development of the territory, beginning with a regional perspective and focusing down to a local view. As this discussion shows Gibraltar was a site of encounter and contestation, acting as a “contact zone” on many levels. Negotiating between Morocco and Spain, Gibraltar sought to balance these two states and its own interests in such a way that would best serve the garrison. Although such goals were not always possible in light of the many complications that arose. More intimately, there was also constant “grappling” between Gibraltar’s governors and their inhabitants. Much like Pratt describes, these exchanges were defined by “asymmetrical relations” in which the commanders tried to assert ultimate control over their peoples. However, this “story-line” is more nuanced than the previous statement suggests. The need for this control was driven by fear. Gibraltar’s governors feared the foreign (non-British and non-Protestant) ideas, influences, religions, and cultures that their multi-ethnic residents carried. As military commanders attempting to keep order in a contested territory, these outside influences posed a problem and needed to be controlled. Such a view of Gibraltar and its peoples necessitated an administrative approach that sought to clamp down on any problems before and as they developed. In their “experienced” minds, this was best done through a variety of governmental tactics and technologies all focused on the production of knowledge about
Gibraltar’s peoples in an effort to “govern efficaciously.”¹⁶⁰ This story of Gibraltar’s (foreign) population, their governors, and their attempts to manage the territory is the focus of the following four chapters.

Figure 1.1: Map of the Mediterranean Sea and Gibraltar included in *Letter to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations* (London, 1720).
Figure 1.2: Map of Gibraltar (Officer, *An Impartial Account of the Late Famous Siege of Gibraltar* (London, 1728)).
Chapter 2

“A Great Strengthening to the Garrison”: Population Management in Gibraltar

Ordered to fortify the garrison against the pressing Spanish threat, Governor Richard Kane arrived in Gibraltar in 1725, dedicated to strengthening its defenses. For Kane, Gibraltar’s security relied in part on its physical fortifications but also on its inhabitants. Upon his arrival in the territory, the population immediately gave Kane cause for concern. At the time a third of the residents were Spaniards, who he “looked upon [as being] very Improper for Gibraltar.”¹ A significant number of the Spanish inhabitants held prominent positions in the garrison, guarded the town at night, and several carried arms. Despite their fidelity to the British cause during the initial occupation, Kane still believed they could still pose a threat as the possibility of war loomed. “As Peace being Concluded between the Emperour & the King of Spain,” Kane explained, “there is reason to Suppose that the Spanish Inhabitants who remain’d here as Friends to the Emperour, are now friends to Spain.” He feared that the Spaniards “may ingage all the Inhabitants, who are of their religion” to “design for a surprize.”² “Being of their [same] Religion,” Kane declared, the other Catholic inhabitants “might be easily gam’d by the power of the Priests to [Spanish] Interest if any Occasion should offer to Favour them.”³ If this were the case, the garrison’s safety could be compromised by these potential enemies, thus jeopardizing British possession and its Protestant presence in the Mediterranean.

The solution, in Kane’s mind, was to recruit British settlers and encourage the immigration of the town’s many Catholic foreigners. As he informed the Secretary of State, the

¹ TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588.
² TNA, CO 91/1, Kane to Townshend, 25 September 1725, fo. 189.
³ TNA, CO 91/4, Kane to Townshend, 18 August 1725, fo. 122-124.
Duke of Newcastle, “the Greater Number of British Protestants shall be here, and the fewer forraigne papists, the Greater Security it would be to the Garrison.” With a Protestant minority in a small Protestant territory surrounded by much larger Catholic states in a largely Catholic sea, Kane felt the need to secure the territory in favor of Britain. This was especially necessary in light of the current threats to the British state; there had been a number of recent attempts on the Crown by the Pretender and his Jacobite supporters, which included Spain and France, and the increasingly hostile Spanish monarchs seemed to be increasingly inclined to declare war with Britain. To British onlookers like Governor Kane, it appeared that British Protestantism was in jeopardy. As the former governor of Minorca, Britain’s other Mediterranean territory with a vocal Catholic majority, Kane was especially concerned by the possible dangers Gibraltar’s population could pose to the security of the territory.

As a result, I argue that Kane sought to minimize any potential threats that might arise by embracing a series of colonial technologies in order to better “know” the residents and their potential to cause the garrison harm. He instituted the first town census in an effort to determine just how many male, fighting-age Catholics were in the garrison as well as how many of these inhabitants had arms and ammunition. In addition, he issued a number of legislative orders against foreigners to better protect the garrison, limiting their access to key parts of the territory and denying them additional arms. Kane also reinforced his earlier Alien Act, an order he had given in 1720 during the War of the Quadruple Alliance when it appeared that Spanish hostilities might threaten Gibraltar. This act required all “strangers” to register with the governor before visiting or settling in the territory; all those found in the town without permission would be expelled, as would any resident found harboring such a fugitive. Much like censuses and other

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4 TNA, CO 91/4, Part II, Kane to Newcastle, 30 September 1726, fo. 223-224.
practices used in later centuries throughout the empire, Kane’s technologies served to count and catalog the foreign (Catholic) bodies as a dangerous group and restrict their movements and actions based on this knowledge. Such measures were necessary, he believed, in order to mitigate the foreign Catholic influence and protect the garrison from any internal threats.

Seeing as the town had “hitherto been run away with by Genoeses and Foreigners,” Kane also endeavored to encourage British settlers to move to Gibraltar. Unlike the many foreigners with their allegiances to foreign states and the Pope, British settlers’ loyalty was thought to be unquestionable, supporting both the British king and his Protestant faith. The best means to support British settlement, Kane believed, was to make properties available to Britons. Unfortunately for the governor, he had limited options in that regard, lacking the authority to displace property owners, the majority of whom were foreign. As a result, he resorted to alternative solutions, such as moving soldiers from available homes and permitting construction on waste grounds. He also encouraged the departure of foreign owners from the garrison and restricted all subsequent property sales to British Protestants. Although Kane could not expel foreigners who had already settled in the garrison, he sought to make it more difficult for them to remain in the territory by limiting their property rights. By promoting British ownership, I argue that Kane sought to further claim the territory for Britain and mark it as a securely Protestant possession through the epitome of British order, property. Military fortifications were merely one form of a defense; a loyal and settled populace, he believed, proved to be the best support for a British garrison situated in an enemy sea.

Following the work of scholars like John Torpey and Bernard Cohn, this chapter argues that Gibraltar’s governors embraced practices and technologies of colonial governmentality early

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in the eighteenth century, prior to the “modern” era of colonial control. These technologies, I demonstrate, were Kane’s response to the perceived internal and external threats to the garrison in effort to gain a sense of control in the territory. Religious fears generated by the specter of a growing Catholic — and hence foreign — population played a significant role in the governance of Gibraltar, especially in the early eighteenth century. Such concerns compelled Governor Kane to undertake the first census of Gibraltar, creating “ethnic intensifiers” as Elaine Ginsberg writes, in an effort to better know and control the foreign population. His findings led him to embrace restrictive policies against the existing foreign population and further limit access to the territory to foreign visitors and migrants. Kane’s fear also impelled him to link access to property expressly to confessional identity to such a degree that by the end of his term it was commonly assumed that none but British Protestants had the “rights by the laws of England to make a purchase either of the house or waxyard.” Kane’s worry surrounding foreign inhabitants and his determination to exclude Catholic foreigners from this privilege was both aided and stoked by the pressing threat of Spanish aggression and the continuing fears of the Pretender, both of which were a serious cause for concern for the small Protestant territory. To make matters worse, the loyalty of Gibraltar’s inhabitants to the Protestant Crown was largely unproven: the vast majority of residents were Catholic migrants from foreign states, many of which were currently allied


8 TNA, PC 1/4/93, Complaint of John Bertie against Brigadier Jasper Clayton, 18 December 1728, fo. 25, 28.
against Britain, who had yet to demonstrate their loyalty to their new monarch. I argue that Kane feared that many of his trans-imperial subjects were merely “passing” as British loyalists and hiding their foreign allegiances.\(^9\) Under Kane’s command, Gibraltar sought to solve the population question by marking the Catholic body as foreign, disloyal, and undeserving of property and its place in Gibraltar. Such efforts, Kane believed, were necessary in order to secure Gibraltar’s present and its future for the Protestant nation and empire.

**Kane and the Population Question**

As Linda Colley has argued, in the first half of the eighteenth century, it appeared that “the old popish enemy was still at the gates, more threatening than ever.” Between the threat of Jacobite restoration in Britain and the many wars with Catholic states abroad, the menace of Catholicism seemed unrelenting to many British Protestants.\(^10\) This was especially true in Gibraltar, a small Protestant enclave in the midst of a Catholic sea with a majority of Catholic inhabitants. When Governor Kane returned to Gibraltar in 1725, only five years had passed since his last tenure in the territory. At that time Gibraltar had also been stricken by the Catholic threat. In 1720 Britain was in the midst of an Anglo-Spanish war, the War of the Quadruple Alliance, during which Spanish forces made an attempt to infiltrate Scotland in support of the Jacobite

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cause and threatened to attack Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{11} While the Jacobite forces were defeated, thanks in part to poor weather as well as the power of British forces, the threat was still present those few years later. Also, even though the Spanish assault on the garrison never materialized in 1720, the Spaniards’ heavy armaments surrounding the border of Gibraltar had an effect on the governor and his people, suggesting that if war were to come to the territory, it would not be an easy victory. Upon Kane’s second arrival to the garrison, the situation in Gibraltar did not appear all that different than it had during his first tenure as governor: both the Jacobites and the Spaniards were an ever-present threat, weighing on the minds of many Britons.

The Jacobites had long been a concern for the British Crown. Supporters of the Catholic Stuart family, beginning with King James II and following his line of heirs, the Jacobites sought to restore the Catholic line to the British throne. The most recent attempts by Jacobite supporters were in the not-so-distant past: there was the 1715 rising, the 1719 Spanish-supported invasion, and the 1721-1722 Atterbury Plot. The Jacobite rising of 1715 was the most successful attempt of the three. Supporters of the Old Pretender, “James III,” launched an attack in Scotland, where they were more successful, and later western England, where they were less so. By the time James Edward Stuart landed in Scotland his army was already dwindling, especially in comparison to the advancing British forces. He left Scotland a month later, unsuccessful in his aims and with many of his military leaders captured, held prisoner, or executed. The 1719 invasion was less promising, with the majority of the Spanish-led invasion force failing to reach England, and the Atterbury Plot was discovered before any true attempts could be made.

\textsuperscript{11} For fears of a Spanish invasion, see TNA, CO 91/1, 8 September 1720; TNA, CO 91/7, Elrington, 30 July 1720 & 3 August 1720; TNA, CO 91/6, Cotton to Craggs, 19 January 1719.
However, this series of successive attempts by the Pretender and his supporter suggested that despite defeat the Jacobite problem was still unresolved.

With the Stuarts firmly established in Rome, and still supported by Spain and France, the Jacobites remained a concern for British administrators in the Mediterranean.\(^\text{12}\) As missives to Whitehall from the British ambassador to France demonstrate, the exiled Stuarts had many supporters in that state who were eager to turn Britons against their king. “The Roman Catholick Priests here,” Robert Sutton, the British ambassador to France, wrote, “run about all the Country, endeavouring to make Converts & preaching Rebellion to the King’s Subject… They are all known to be favourers of the Pretender.”\(^\text{13}\) Similar sentiments were thought to be present amongst the Spanish government as well, as British servants in that state contended that “the King of Spain, is entirely in the Pretender’s Interests.”\(^\text{14}\) With the exiled Stuart families and their supporters tromping around the courts of Catholic Europe, garnering the support of those peoples and their monarchs through their unwielding devotion to the Catholic faith and their desire to overthrow the Protestant Hanoverians, their activities were a constant source of conversation for British officials in the region.\(^\text{15}\) When the Pretender and his supporters were thought to be on board ships sailing through the Straits of Gibraltar, the issue struck close to home for the British government in the territory.\(^\text{16}\) The peoples of those supporting Catholic states were also a

\(^{12}\) As Linda Colley argues, one of the key fears of Britons was that a Jacobite victory would give advantage to France because people believed that the Stuarts would “operate… under the shadow of French power and in support of French interests.” See Colley, Britons, pp. 77-79.

\(^{13}\) TNA, SP 78/168, Robert Sutton to James Craggs, 4 July 1720, fo. 134.

\(^{14}\) TNA, SP 78/179, Wilkins to Robert Walpole, 2 October 1723, fo. 126.

\(^{15}\) Discussion of the Stuarts and their movements permeates the Foreign State Papers from France, Spain, Portugal and others during this period. See TNA, SP 78, SP 89, and SP 42.

\(^{16}\) See TNA, SP 89/30/40, Colonel Lord Stanhope to Captain Purvis, R. N., 15 September 1722, fo. 79; TNA, SP 42/17/173, State papers related to a letter from Lord Vere Beauclerke, commander of HMS ‘Lime’ at Gibraltar Bay, 14 November 1722; TNA, SP 89/32, Newcastle, 30 May 1726; TNA, CO 94/214, D. Houlis to Newcastle, 12 March 1726; TNA, CO 91/4, Part I, 24 January 1726.
concern as administrators worried that they would spread Jacobite ideals and propaganda. For many Britons, Jacobitism was closely tied to foreignness and Catholicism, and individuals who identified as European Roman Catholics were often deemed suspect of possible Jacobite sympathies. As a British consul in Spain commented regarding the travels of a “Romish” priest from Seville, “our Precautions against such dangerous emissarys to our Constitution and happy Establishment especially att this time, cannott be too great.” Although Jacobitism was never directly tied to the foreign Catholics in Gibraltar, their ties with the states supporting the Stuarts and their Catholic faith did make the governor and other British Protestants wary of their loyalties.

More importantly, when Kane arrived in 1725 there was the pressing threat of yet another Anglo-Spanish war. While the previous war had concluded only four years before with the British alliance declared the victors, the Spanish monarchy was dissatisfied with the resulting peace treaty. King Philip V and his queen Elizabeth Farnese were angered by Britain’s continued possession of Gibraltar, believing that Britain had violated its secret accord to return Gibraltar to Spanish hands. In an effort to recover Gibraltar, the Spanish monarchs sought the help of their neighbors. France had long shown its willingness to help the Spanish cause in regaining Gibraltar, and in April 1725 Philip reached an agreement with his former enemy, Charles VI, the Holy Roman Emperor. Charles, angry with the British monarch after a quarrel over the

17 TNA, CO 94/214, Holloway to Carteret, 17 November 1722.
18 In 1721 King Philip threatened to end all of Britain’s trade with the Spanish West Indies if George I did not promise to restore Gibraltar. In response, George’s minister, Charles Townshend, drafted a secret letter signed by the king “promising you to make use of the first favourable Opportunity to regulate this Article, with the Consent of my Parliament.” Philip, not recognizing the significance of this stipulation – Parliament was unlikely to approve such a measure as it would enrage most Britons – accepted the offer. When Gibraltar did not return to Spanish hands at the conclusion of the war or anytime thereafter, he and his wife attacked the British government for violating their agreement. “Letter from George I to the King of Spain: On the Restitution of Gibraltar (1/6/1721),” The History and Proceedings of the House of Commons: Volume 8: 1733-1734 (London, 1742), p. 356. See also Jackson, The Rock of the Gibraltarians, pp. 122-123; Hills, Rock of Contention, pp. 256-258
Company, pledged that he would not oppose “the restoration to [Philip] of that fortress and the port [of Gibraltar]” and offered to help mediate the process.\textsuperscript{19} He also agreed as part of a secret treaty that if Britain refused the offer, he would supply arms to the Spaniards and send aid to the Jacobites.\textsuperscript{20} British ministers refused Charles’ offer at mediation, choosing instead to solidify its own alliances. As relations between Spain and Britain quickly soured, it seemed likely that war would soon follow.\textsuperscript{21}

With these increasing tensions in the territory, British administrators sent Colonel Richard Kane to serve as Lieutenant Governor of Gibraltar, believing him to be the best candidate during the garrison’s time of need.\textsuperscript{22} Kane had served as lieutenant-governor in Minorca, being the first British official to formally hold the post since its conception in 1712; he had also acted as commander-in-chief in Gibraltar from 1720-1721 at the end of the last Anglo-Spanish war. During his time in Minorca, Kane had shown himself to be an adept military governor and colonial administrator. He re-organized the army and supported the construction of new defensive works; he proposed a constitution and initiated legal reforms; he relocated the capital and built a road connecting the old and new locations; he introduced new agricultural methods and imported new varieties of foods and new breeds of cattle; and he suppressed the

\textsuperscript{19} Hills, \textit{Rock of Contention}, 258-259. The Ostend Company was a private trading company established by Charles VI in 1722 to trade with the East and West Indies. Competing with British, Dutch, and French trading companies, the Ostend Company was largely successful in its early years. Its presence angered many of its competitors, especially because the Ostend Company drew many of its employees from the ranks of their own companies. It was abolished in 1731 under the Second Treaty of Vienna because of British pressure and Charles’ desire to secure his daughter’s succession to the throne.

\textsuperscript{20} In return, Philip granted Charles the same rights for the Ostend Company as the English and Dutch to trade in its colonies.


\textsuperscript{22} TNA, CO 91/1, Townshend to Kane, 10 July 1725.
hostile Catholic inhabitants who were eager to depose him.\textsuperscript{23} This combination of qualifications, in particular his military skills and ability to work with foreign populations, made him especially attractive to British administrators who desired a strong authoritative presence in Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{24}

Kane’s greatest concern upon his arrival was not just the crumbling fortifications, but more importantly the significant foreign population. As future governors observed, the inhabitants were “chiefly… Jews, Moors, and Papists of different Nations,” who they judged “may prove of dangerous Consequence to the Town.”\textsuperscript{25} Of the little more than 1,000 inhabitants in total, only ten percent were British Protestants, who the governor believed could be trusted to act in the interests of the state. Almost forty percent of Gibraltar’s residents were Spaniards, natives of the neighboring antagonists, and an additional forty percent were Roman Catholics from other states, and thus potentially unsympathetic to Protestant Britain. In light of the charged political climate and the recent union of Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, Kane worried about this overwhelmingly foreign Catholic majority. His experiences in Minorca had shown him that a vocal and involved Catholic population could cause a number of problems for a British (Protestant) territory and its governor.\textsuperscript{26}


\textsuperscript{24} The current governor, David Colyear, Earl of Portmore, spent little time in Gibraltar, instead delegating authority to a series of lieutenant-governors. The current lieutenant-governor, Colonel Stanhope Cotton, was also absent from the garrison, which is why Kane’s presence was requested. See Benady, “The Settlement of Jews in Gibraltar,” p. 94.

\textsuperscript{25} GGA, Crown Land Series A, Bland’s Court of Enquiry, fo. 1-2. Although the statement was made by Governor Bland, the population composition during Kane’s tenure (and throughout the eighteenth century) was strikingly similar if not “worse.” Britons comprised approximately 24% of the population in 1753 whereas they were only 10% of Gibraltar’s residents in 1725.

\textsuperscript{26} The Minorca clergy issued a series of complaints against Kane in 1720, to which he responded and was vindicated by the approval of the King-in-Council. For his version of the dispute, see \textit{A Vindication of Colonel Kane, Lieutenant-Governor of Minorca, Against the Late Complaints Made Against Him by the Inhabitants of that Island} (London, 1720).
In Kane’s opinion, Catholics were dangerous for a number of reasons. He feared that their missionaries could serve as spies or encourage rebellion among the people; their religious practices could “debauch” the soldiers, leading them to convert to Catholicism and then leave the King’s service; their bishops, who were from Spain, could promote Spanish interests; their services could encourage parishioners to pray for Catholic kings or take an oath of fidelity; their collections could be used to support foreign (enemy) states; and their churches could offer sanctuary to criminals, a common practice in Catholic churches. For Kane and many Protestants, the Catholic faith was directly tied to Britain’s former (and current) enemies and competitors, suggesting that belief in one resulted in loyalty to another. The power of the Pope was also seen to be dangerous for British administrators. As the representative of God, a directive from him, they believed, could result in outright rebellion by the Catholics in the territory. For many Britons, Catholics were believed to be as bound to their priests and the Pope’s teachings as a slave was to his master. If the Pope called his followers to rise up against the unfaithful Protestants, the garrison was likely to fall. In a largely Catholic sea, British Protestants already felt very vulnerable.

In the opinion of many Britons, and Gibraltar’s governors, foreigners’ connections to their home states and Catholics’ loyalty to the church always threatened their allegiance to the British monarch, regardless of proof to the contrary. Although most of Gibraltar’s foreign inhabitants had “behaved faithfully in the first Siege,” Kane was concerned that such loyalties


28 As Caitlin Anderson has argued, for many eighteenth-century Britons, “slavery” and “popery” were synonymous. See Caitlin Anderson, “Old Subjects, New Subjects, and Non-Subjects: Silences and Subjecthood in Late Eighteenth-Century Grenada,” in War, Empire and Slavery, 1770-1830, ed. by Richard Bessel, Nicholas Guyatt, and Jane Rendall (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 213.

29 Anderson, “Old Subjects, New Subjects, and Non-Subjects,” p. 213. See also chapter 4 for a greater discussion of this.
were fleeting.\textsuperscript{30} With the weakened state of the garrison due to its dilapidated fortifications and lack of troops, the governor was concerned that his inhabitants could easily plan a successful attack from within the territory. Secret attacks had occurred in the garrison before; when English forces occupied Gibraltar in 1705, a group of Spanish inhabitants who had remained in the town helped Spanish forces plan an assault on the territory. The attack was thwarted when the soldiers were caught sneaking up the shepherds’ path on the eastern rock face. In light of this past history, and his experiences with embittered Spanish Catholics in Minorca, Kane was reticent to embrace Gibraltar’s residents. In his mind, these peoples could easily be convinced by their national and religious ties to betray the British state.

Not only did the Catholic foreigners pose a direct threat to the garrison, but in Kane’s opinion they also hindered the Protestant growth of the town. As previous British residents complained, the Spaniards and other foreigners “had the best houses in the town whereas the English subjects, including the soldiers, were not granted such luxuries.”\textsuperscript{31} Foreign property owners were seen as causing a number of troubles for the governor and the British state. Financially, they were a bane for the king’s revenue because they could collect the profits from their properties and send them to their home countries. Rather than “return[ing] to our Mother Country,” these funds were “entirely lost to England.”\textsuperscript{32} More importantly, the lack of available properties discouraged any new British settlers from moving to Gibraltar, thus limiting the Protestant establishment in the town. Trusting that they “are much more to be relied on than the

\textsuperscript{30} TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588.

\textsuperscript{31} BL, Add MS 38853, “Representation of the Hardships the Garrison Lies Under,” fo. 85 and TNA, CO 91/1, fo. 102-103; TNA, SP 41/34, Colonel Bennet to Officers of Ordnance, 25 February 1712, fo. 161. Colonel Bennet also accused the Jews of being “indulged” by governors who gave the immigrants the best homes in exchange for high rents and fees. BL, Add MS 10034, Reports Relating to Gibraltar 1704-1770, “Some Remarks Concerning Gibraltar, Humbly Offer’d by Colonel Joseph Bennet,” fo. 136-140 and TNA, CO 91/1, fo. 17-19.

\textsuperscript{32} TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 4-5.
Papists,” Kane believed that British residents would “prove a great strengthening to the Garrison” and help counterbalance the foreign Catholic threat.\(^{33}\) Yet without the advantages of property ownership, it was unlikely that settlers would be attracted to garrison life with few of the advantages of other British territories.\(^{34}\) Consequently, Kane “resolved to get the Garrison cleared of them [foreign property owners] as occasion should offer” in an effort to increase the Protestant hold on the garrison and better secure the territory.\(^{35}\)

Yet, short of expelling the inhabitants, Kane was powerless to remove foreign residents from their property. The Charter of Justice did not grant the power for governors to “Determine Property of Houses, or Land,” and it was uncertain “how far [governors] have a Right to make such Grants.”\(^{36}\) If an owner was not willing to sell a property, and it had been lawfully granted, the governor had no power to act. As one British minister explained, “An idea also prevails there of Real property… [it is] understood, that His Majesty is precluded, even in the precinct of that single fort, by claims of private property, from employing the Houses and ground necessary for quarters and other Military conveniences, unless He can prevail upon the proprietors to part with them.”\(^{37}\) Unless the governor could convince the owners to sell their property or discover that it

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\(^{33}\) TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 4-5. See also TNA, CO 91/1, “Rules Humbly Proposed for the Better Government of His Majesty’s Town of Gibraltar, by Lieutenant General Bland,” fo. 123. Although these quotes were made by Governor Bland twenty years later, Kane echoed many of these sentiments.

\(^{34}\) As a small territory with little arable land and limited trade opportunities, not to mention a poorly developed civil sphere with few rights for its citizens who were ruled by a military governor, Gibraltar was not all that attractive to British settlers.

\(^{35}\) TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588.

\(^{36}\) BL, Add MS 36137, Henry Pelham to Lord Hardwicke, 27 January 1728/9, fo. 139. This issue arose again during Bland’s Land Enquiry in 1749 when he and British authorities sought to determine if former commanders had the authority to make land grants. There was no record that the Crown had ever “empower[ed] or authorize[d] any Governour, Lieut. Governour, or Commanding officer here to give or make grants, gifts, or Sales of Land or houses here.” TNA, PC 1/5/6, “Answer of General Joseph Sabine to the Complaint of Ensign Russell,” 8 August 1731, fo. 2.

\(^{37}\) TNA, CO 91/2, Al Wedderburn to Rochford, 5 September 1773.
had been “illegally given,” he was limited to marketing the sale of the few existing titles.\textsuperscript{38} As a result, Kane sought to “Encourage rather than Prevent” the sale of foreigner-held properties in order to reap the financial and tactical benefits of an increased Protestant population.

Although the governor could have expelled foreign landowners from Gibraltar as a whole in an effort to support British settlement, such a decision would have been unwise. Without its foreign residents the garrison would be seriously handicapped. Foreign inhabitants were responsible for much of the garrison’s operations, and their loss would be a serious blow to its functioning.\textsuperscript{39} As another governor explained, “foreign Inhabitants are the persons who usually equip Vessels and furnish funds for the purchase of provision and other supplies, and the Patrons and Seamen employed in fetching such provisions & supplies.”\textsuperscript{40} This was especially true during wartime as those foreign residents who remained were required to “assist in the Fortifications & other Public Works carryed on in this Garrison.”\textsuperscript{41} With war seemingly on the horizon, and a lack of troops to perform additional duties or complete the necessary construction projects, Kane recognized the value of his foreign residents. In addition, he did not want to further anger the garrison’s neighbors by evicting their countrymen as this could incite further diplomatic and military consequences.\textsuperscript{42} Kane faced a true dilemma: “should these People (who

\textsuperscript{38} BL, Add MS 36137, Henry Pelham to Lord Hardwicke, 27 January 1728/9, fo. 139; Add MS, 23643, Clayton to Pelham, 10 October 1728, 45-46. The only exception was the quartering of troops.


\textsuperscript{40} TNA, CO 91/31, Elliot to the Home Secretary, 25 June 1784.

\textsuperscript{41} The foreign workers were divided by religion and a leader was appointed to be the Spanish (later Genoese sergeant) and Jewish sergeant. Workers were compensated for their time, but if they refused to work, they would be punished and turned out of town. GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1749-1766, 14 December 1756, fo. 180; Tito Benady, “Spaniards in Gibraltar after the Treaty of Utrecht,” \textit{Gibraltar Heritage Journal} 7 (2000), pp. 125-126; Benady, “Genoese in Gibraltar,” p. 87.

\textsuperscript{42} This was a concern not just in regard to the Spaniards but also the Moroccan residents of the garrison. Kane was apt to remind the British Secretary of State that the current Jewish inhabitants were a violation of Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht; however, he and other British administrators recognized that with the current state of the garrison
are a real use to the Garrison) be turn’d out of Town before any rupture should happen, It would occasion jealousies, & might be a means to put a Stop to these Supplys of fresh provisions… but on the other hand to let them remain in Town, & put it out of their power to Injure us.” For the time being, he decided that “not all the Papists in the Town are our Enemies,” but he also requested the king send another regiment to strengthen the garrison. In Kane’s mind, the garrison was on a possible brink of crisis, which needed to be averted by whatever means possible.

**Population Management: The Census & Alien Act**

Having decided against turning his foreign workers out of the garrison, Kane resolved to get a better sense of Gibraltar’s current inhabitants. As part of his efforts at population management, Governor Kane issued the first town census since the territory passed into British hands. Censuses not only served as a means to appraise the population, but more importantly, they were employed as a management tool, signifying underlying concerns about security. As a “system of registration,” according to John Torpey, states employed censuses as a means to sort and store knowledge about their subjects in order to “embrace,” or rather control, their populations. They were often issued during times of diplomatic instability or times of economic prosperity, during both of which the governors were anxious as to what types of people the town was attracting. As scholars have argued, numbers like those provided by the census were “part

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43 TNA, CO 91/1, Kane to Townshend, 25 September 1725, fo. 189.
44 TNA, CO 91/4, Kane to Townshend, 18 August 1725, fo. 122-124.
46 Censuses were taken in 1725, 1736, 1753, 1767, 1777, 1787, and 1791. There were also occasional surveys into particular population groups, such as British subjects in 1781, Roman Catholics in 1782, Jews in 1784, and Genoese
of the illusion of bureaucratic control and a key to a colonial *imaginaire* in which countable abstractions… created the sense of a controllable indigenous reality.”  

According to Bernard Cohn, “a number was, for the British, a particular form of certainty to be held on to in a strange world.” With this knowledge, commanders believed that they could try to manage the population to the best of their abilities, or at the very least be aware of potential dangers lurking nearby.

Undertaking a census was not an easy or quick task; each inhabitant had be found, questioned about his or her origins and/or religion, and then tallied. In a territory like Gibraltar it was not necessarily easy to locate every resident as many were constantly on the move, heading out on their boats to fish or to trade, and others did not have a permanent residence in the town. Without all individuals having a consistent and stable address, a census became particularly difficult. Nor was the population truly centralized – while most lived in town, others like the Genoese lived on the eastern shore of Gibraltar, divided from the town by the Rock itself. To go to such an effort to count each individual suggests that Kane, and future governors, were driven

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49 As the census developed in Gibraltar, so did governors’ efforts to create order among properties. Various initiatives were begun to create street names and number houses in order to better track residents and where they lived. See GGA, Orders, 1749-1793. Placarts, 1793-1802, “Orders 1st July 1749 – 22nd Feb 1793,” 7 October 1765 & 15 April 1778, fo. 173-174.
by specific motives. This “fact-finding” mission was not an innocent undertaking, but rather served as a means to further the governor’s ultimate objectives of promoting Britishness and attempting to subdue the population. As Nicholas Dirks argues, “in certain important ways, knowledge was what colonialism was all about.”

In his 1725 census (Figure 2.1), Governor Kane divided the population into distinct ethnic and religious groups. He created seven primary categories: “British” (113), “Spaniards” (400), “Genoese” (414), “French” (23), “Dutch with Spanish Wives” (15), “Mores” (5), and “Jewes” (137). Each of these categories was divided between males (732) and females (381) and included a tally of males from the ages of 16 to 60 (366). On the side were two additional lists: the number of Spanish clergy (4), which included “Seculars” (2) and “Franciscans” (2), and “Males Jews & from what Nations,” which included England (4), Holland (3), Leghorn (17), Barbary (86), and Turkey (1). Kane also included the number of Spaniards that “have bore arms since the Siege,” which totaled 52. In total, there were 1,113 inhabitants of Gibraltar, and only 113 of them were British.

Although Kane’s census was not extensive as future ones, which included the residents’ age, country, occupation, years in the garrison, by what governor’s permission they came here, and cattle held, it was a technology used in the service of colonial knowledge gathering for the

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50 As Nicholas Dirks argues, “Colonial knowledge both enabled conquest and was produced by it; in certain important ways, knowledge was what colonialism was all about.” Nicholas B. Dirks, “Foreword,” in Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India by Bernard S. Cohn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. ix.

51 This subdivision of Jews, which I will not focus on in detail here, is likely due to Gibraltar’s relationship with North Africa at the time. As mentioned previously, Kane was bothered by the Moroccan Jewish presence in the garrison contrary to the Treaty of Utrecht. This census informed him that almost 10% of his residents were in breach of this treaty (yet there were also allowed by the Anglo-Moroccan treaty of 1721).

52 TNA, CO 91/1,”The Number of Inhabitants in Gibraltar,” 20 August 1725, fo. 195; TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588.
purposes of understanding the ethnic and religious composition of the garrison.\textsuperscript{53} The creation of these specific categories suggests that the governor was most concerned about where his foreign inhabitants had come from and also their religious affiliations; during this period, one’s birthplace often signified one’s faith. While some of the inhabitants may have already divided themselves among similar lines, these particular categories were fixed on individuals by the commander regardless of how they personally identified themselves. In light of the geopolitical conflicts at the time, when alliances shifted constantly and Britain could quickly find itself at odds with any European state, this picture of the population helped assure governors that they could quickly determine who to trust and who to be wary of. These categories also served to create what Elaine Ginsberg calls “ethnic intensifiers.” Ethnic or racial divisions, she argues, were created primarily for the purposes of domination, exploitation, and persecution of particular groups.\textsuperscript{54} In this particular situation, Kane focused his attention on finding and controlling the foreign Catholic bodies and their potential threat to his administration and continued British possession of Gibraltar.

As evidenced by the categories Kane devised, his focus was on the brewing war and the urgency of containing possible enemies within. In a letter to the Secretary of State Charles Townshend, Kane noted that he had discovered at least 300 male Roman Catholic residents who could be convinced to turn against the British cause.\textsuperscript{55} Although only two of the categories were explicitly religious – Jews and Moors – the ethnic division also served as a religious designation. As Kane understood it, the Spanish, Genoese, French, and even Dutch inhabitants, by virtue of

\textsuperscript{53} Cattle was broken down into mules, burros, horses, cows, goats, and sheep; this and the category regarding governor’s permission were only included in the 1791 census, not the 1777 list of inhabitants. See GGA, 1777 & 1791 Lists of Inhabitants.


\textsuperscript{55} TNA, CO 91/1, Kane to Townshend, 25 September 1725 fo. 189.
their Spanish wives, were all Roman Catholics. For him this meant that over 550 of the
garrison’s males were “Papists,” and at least 300 of them could serve as soldiers, being within
the ages of 16 and 60. In comparison to the 57 British males, 55 of which were between 16 and
60 years old, the town’s Catholic population appeared both vast and powerful. If each of the
British males had guns, they would only slightly outnumber the armed Spaniards, which Kane
would have seen as a serious problem. Crediting his newfound knowledge of these numbers
provided by his census, the governor believed that he truly understood the sheer force of Catholic
power in the territory and the possible threat their presence posed. The health of the state or
empire was commonly tied to its territories having the “proper proportion of people,” and Kane
had found Gibraltar to be seriously unbalanced.\textsuperscript{56} By dividing the community in such a way,
Kane became even more aware of Gibraltar’s British (Protestant) minority.

Toward this end Kane instituted several more garrison regulations restricting the actions
of foreigners. “Strangers,” which included many of Gibraltar’s foreign residents, were not
allowed to “walk about the Fort” or ask any questions related to the garrison.\textsuperscript{57} Nor were they
allowed to wander at night or be found “Stragling on the Iseland.” Offenders were to be taken up
the guards and sent as prisoners to the governor.\textsuperscript{58} In addition, foreigners who had not previously
declared their arms were to do so immediately on penalty of imprisonment and possible
expulsion. From that point forward, no foreigner was permitted to bring any arms or ammunition
into the town. If they were found with undeclared weapons, they would be declared “Rebells to

\textsuperscript{56} Kathrin Levitan, \textit{A Cultural History of the British Census: Envisioning the Multitude in the Nineteenth Century}

\textsuperscript{57} The distinction between “stranger” and “foreigner” was not well understood in the garrison. “Stranger” was
occasionally used in reference only to foreign visitors, but it could also encompass foreign residents. For a greater
discussion on “foreigner” versus “inhabitant” versus “subject,” see chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{58} BL, Add MS 23637, “Orders to be observed by the Captain Commanding the Guard at New Mole,” fo. 98-100.
his Majestee & punished as such.”\textsuperscript{59} These orders were posted only months after the 1725 census, suggesting that Kane’s survey compelled the governor to take more ardent strides to curb his (Catholic) foreign residents.

In addition to these restrictions placed on current residents, Kane also renewed the “Alien Act,” which he had put in force during his term as acting commander in chief at the conclusion of the War of the Quadruple Alliance in 1720. Although the war did not directly involve Gibraltar, Britons were still concerned that an attempt would be made on the garrison by the neighboring Spaniards. As a result, Kane issued the first order against the presence of foreign visitors in Gibraltar. The orders stipulated that all “strangers” had to state their name, country of origin, and business in the town before they could be admitted to the town. Visitors also had to present papers for the governor, town major, or judge advocate to inspect in order to ensure the validity of their claims. If the request was approved, the visitor would be allowed to enter via the secured gates which were locked from dusk until dawn and guarded round the clock. “Strangers” traditionally had to be hosted by a resident who would be held responsible for breaches of conduct. The hosts were also required to report the names, origins, and business of any visitor to the governor before granting accommodation.\textsuperscript{60} Yet “permission to enter Gibraltar never carried with it the right to reside,” as the order emphasized.\textsuperscript{61} Non-residents who wanted to settle in the garrison had to petition the governor for a permit authorizing a long-term stay.\textsuperscript{62} If these rules

\textsuperscript{59} BL, Add MS 23637, “Orders,” 17 August 1726, fo. 68.

\textsuperscript{60} See GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1749-1766, fo. 62; GGA, Miscellaneous Papers 1749-1779, 1755 Papers, 10 March 1750/1, 8 December 1755; 1756 Papers, 26 November 1756, 8 August 1770, 10 June 1772, 27 September 1775. See also Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 18.


\textsuperscript{62} There are examples of requests for residence permits in the arrival records, demonstrating that it wasn’t entirely uncommon for people to ask the governor’s permission rather than hiding out in the town. See GGA, Miscellaneous Papers 1749-1779, 1778 Papers for several examples.
were not followed, both the resident and the visitor could be expelled from the garrison or face more serious consequences.63

Such restrictions were necessary, Kane (and future commanders) argued, to ensure the security of the garrison. As they contended, unknown strangers were “inconsistent with the Safety of the Place” because of their “Clandestine manner.”64 These hidden aliens could learn the garrison’s secrets and weaknesses and orchestrate a secret attack. To the governor, the garrison was of the utmost importance and strangers would only cause trouble.65 This was especially true, the commanders believed, because the garrison tended to attract “unsavory characters.” Although there is little evidence of the truth of their statements, Kane and future governors were convinced that Gibraltar was comprised of “the riff-raff of various nations and religions ready to commit any fraud in their power.”66 Some were deemed “Vagabonds,” being former residents who had “been turned out of the Garrison” in the past.67 Others were “convicted of buying stolen Goods and Soldiers Necessaries” or known for “being insane & burthensome” to other residents.68 Such

63 BL, Add MS 23637, 28 March 1726, fo. 63. Future governors threatened to punish mariners who invited foreigners to the garrison by taking away their Mediterranean pass privileges (see chapter 4). Others ordered that those who introduced strangers “will be proceeded against as Spies” for their treasonous actions. See GGA, Miscellaneous Papers 1749-1779, 1756 Papers, 26 November 1756, 8 August 1770, 10 June 1772, 27 September 1775; GGA, Diary No. 4 June, 1782 – June, 1786, Wednesday 10 August 1785. See also GGA, Orders, 1749-1793. Placarts, 1793-1802, “Orders 1st July 1749 – 22nd Feb 1793,” 1770 January 2, fo. 55, 1776 April 4, fo. 149. For examples of individuals turned out of the garrison for being found without a permit, see GGA, Diary No. 4 June, 1782 – June. 1786, Sunday 18 June 1786, Monday 19 June 1786; GGA, Diary No. 5 July, 1786 – Dec, 1788, Monday 7 May 1787. Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 18.

64 GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1749-1766, 8 December 1755, fo. 147.

65 For some of the fears surrounding aliens see Perera, “Language of Exclusion,” pp. 211-212. This piece also offers insight into the alien question as it developed into the nineteenth century.

66 TNA, CO 91/11, Humphrey Bland, fo. 6-7.


troublesome foreigners, Kane argued, could jeopardize the safety of the garrison, but with the help of this act the governor believed he could better secure the territory.

While Kane justified the act as a means to prevent dangerous visitors to the garrison, it also provided him with legal cover for the more expansive form of control over Gibraltar’s population, which he sought in the face of possible war. The Alien Act served as a means for the governor to prevent the influx of additional Catholic residents, enabling him to restrict entry only to British Protestants if he so desired. Because the governor had the sole authority to grant permission for residence in the territory, he could theoretically control the growth of the population. After learning that Catholics comprised eighty percent of the town’s residents, it is likely that Kane would have sought any opportunity to restrict their power, including denying entry to additional “Papists.” This act, in conjunction with the census, gave Kane the sense that he “knew” the territory and its structure and that he had some form of control over it.69 By identifying the garrison’s residents and placing limits on who belonged, the governor believed he could better manage the population and bring greater security to the territory. Such technologies gave Kane the sense that he could “see” potential threats, mark those who he believed needed additional surveillance, and monitor that population accordingly.70 Such practices served to better “define” the people of Gibraltar in order to facilitate Kane’s administration.71 It is not surprising, in that regard, that future governors followed Kane’s precedent; throughout the eighteenth century, censuses or lists of inhabitants were used hand-in-hand with various orders


against the harboring of foreigners. These techniques of governmentality provided Gibraltar’s commanders with a sense of control and order in a territory whose population was not so easily categorized or constrained.

**Encouraging British Settlers: Property in Gibraltar**

In addition to Kane’s efforts to prevent the migration of Catholic foreigners, he also sought to explore possible housing situations to encourage British settlement. The results of the census presented the governor with the stark reality that Gibraltar was truly not a British-populated territory. In his mind, a stronger Protestant population would help balance out the foreign Catholics, restoring the “proper proportions” of the territory, and these members could work to support the garrison and ferret out any possible plots against it. In an effort to entice British settlers, Kane sought to make more properties available for current and future British migrants, recognizing the attraction ownership played in other British colonies. Property was a key bulwark of social and political order in eighteenth-century Britain, playing a significant role in determinations of social class, political participation, and above all, identification with the Protestant nation. Property ownership served to “attach a man to his country,” giving him a vested interest in the state’s well-being, which it was believed that he would then fight to protect. Consequently, property rights were deemed especially productive in colonial territories as they helped to validate possession, legitimize state power, and mark the land as one’s own. As

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72 Acts against foreigners were re-issued in 1751, 1755, 1756, 1769, 1770, 1772, 1775, 1777, 1778, 1779, 1785, 1786, 1791 (there may have been others but these are the ones that I have found in the archival sources). See GGA, Orders, 1749-1793, Placarts, 1793-1802, “Orders 1st July 1749 – 22nd Feb 1793;” GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1749-1766; GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1749-1779; GGA, The Alien Question. A History of the Permit System, 1704-1871. Draft Report May, 1871, “Memorandum on the Right of Residence in Gibraltar.”


Sudipta Sen has argued, “property rights… made the colonial extension of rule both legal and natural.”\textsuperscript{75} Drawing on these ideas, Kane sought to encourage British property ownership both to encourage new settlement and reinforce British possession of the territory.

One way of making more properties available to prospective Protestant settlers was to move the troops out of their current residences into new quarters. The garrison’s housing situation was also severely limited and in great need of repair, so many soldiers occupied the available town properties owned by the Crown. “The houses where they now quarter,” Kane believed, “would be Convenient for British Subjects who should Incline to come and Inhabit here.”\textsuperscript{76} He requested additional funds from the Privy Council to build new barracks and pavilions to quarter the troops, extolling the usefulness of such buildings for the territory. The extra housing would make the troops more comfortable while opening up the existing homes for any interested settlers. If Parliament was willing to fund this construction project, he believed it would bring “Greater Security” to the garrison for several reasons.\textsuperscript{77} The troops would be better prepared for duty, no longer crowded into unfit spaces, and Britons would be able to live comfortably in the town.

Kane also took it upon himself to utilize the vacant land that was available in the territory. As a means to promote settlement, Queen Anne had reportedly “given Incouragement to all British Subjects to build upon any Wast grounds within the Town of Gibraltar.”\textsuperscript{78}


\textsuperscript{76} TNA, CO 91/4, Part II, Kane to Newcastle, 30 September 1726, fo. 223-224.

\textsuperscript{77} TNA, CO 91/4, Part II, Kane to Newcastle, 30 September 1726, fo. 223-224.

\textsuperscript{78} TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588-589. This proclamation may not have actually existed, but others, outside of Kane, referred to it with their own claims of land. John Bertie, a Frenchman, argued for his right to two properties citing the same proclamation. However, when Governor Jasper Clayton looked into the matter, neither he nor his researchers in London could “get any insight into the alleged proclamation.” See TNA,
all unclaimed land was owned by the king, the governor was authorized to grant permission for construction following the terms of the proclamation. So long as the land did not “Interfere with the fortifications or inconvenience the rest of the town” it was available for any willing Briton. 79 The opportunity was especially attractive as Kane pledged that no troops would be quartered in these “convenient houses” so long as he was governor. 80 Kane accordingly granted “Severall plots of those Grounds… all to British Protestants.” Most of these titles were given to “Severall Officers of the Troops,” who “built handsom Houses” on the unused land. 81 The buildings, he argued, were “Necessary for the good of the place, and for the Ornament thereof.” 82 If there was more housing available for interested Britons and if the town was more becoming, he believed, it would attract more Protestant settlers and help secure the territory for Britain. To ensure that the new owners were recognized by future governors as the legal possessors of such property, Kane issued written grants and registered each title with the Judge Advocate. This record of ownership, Kane suggested, would help legitimate the Protestant landowners’ claims and remind...

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80 BL, Add MS 36137, “A Copy of the Governor of Gibraltar’s Instructions,” fo. 144-145.
81 According to Governor Clayton, there was a 1713 decree that permitted British soldiers who completed their service to remain and settle in town. Yet by 1731, the Crown declared that “no Officer has any right, or title to any House here” and he empowered the governor to “dispose of the Houses” as he “judged best for the service” regardless of the funds put into the home. See TNA, PC 1/4/93, Complaint of John Bertie against Brigadier Jasper Clayton, 18 December 1728, fo. 27. TNA, CO 91/2, Sabine 27 June 1732. There is a lengthy dispute between Lieutenant Colonel William Kennedy and Governor Sabine over a house Kennedy claimed as his own. Former governors, the Secretary of the Southern States, and even the Privy Council were involved, but Sabine’s decision held. See TNA, CO 91/2, Sabine 27 June 1732; Newcastle to Sabine, 31 August 1732.
82 TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588-589.
future governors of the importance of perpetuating proper British (Protestant) ownership “for His Majesty’s Service, and for the good of the place.”

With the escalation of Anglo-Spanish hostilities at Gibraltar’s border in late 1726, Kane finally had the opportunity to “get quit of those [Catholic] people” and make room for additional British settlers. Once armed forces occupied San Roque, the Spanish frontier town adjacent to the garrison, many of the Spanish residents were anxious about remaining in Gibraltar. Kane issued an order granting all Spaniards permission to leave the territory prior to the outbreak of war, at which point, no one would be allowed to depart. Many inhabitants chose to leave, desiring to “Dispose of their houses & Effects, and retire from the Town.” Kane eagerly permitted the sales so long as they were to the “proper” inhabitants. As his successor noted, the governor “never gave leave to a foreigner either to build or purchase, but only to His Majestys

83 TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588-589. The text of Kane’s grants are as follows: “Form of Col.o Kane’s Grants for building on new foundations. [Insert formal title] Whereas the Commander in chief in His Majestys City of Gibraltar being impowered to make Grants of the wast grounds of that City to all such Subjects of Great Brittain as shall build and improve upon the same as is set forth on the other side in the Memorial of AB, I have thought it for His Majesty's Service, and for the good of the place that the improvement should be made which is there proposed, And therefore I do by the Authority aforesaid hereby give and grant unto the said AB, to be enjoyed by him, his heirs, Executors, Administrators, or Assigns for ever, the sole possession of all the grounds, or premises which he has desired by the said Memorial to be granted and established to him, upon which he is to build convenient houses, in as short a time as he can with conveniency, and as that building must be expensive from the great quantity of Rubbish that must be removed from thence to make room for the Building. And as an encouragement to his speedy building upon the premises, it is hereby promised that no part of the said buildings shall be taken from him for quartering the Troops during the time that I shall command here, and thereby recommend that the same dispensation may be continued to AB by the Officer who shall succeed me in the command of this Garrison. Given at Gibraltar &c - Rich.d Kane… Form of Col.o Kane’s consent to the purchases made by several persons of house from those Inhabitants who had the prince of Hesse’s grant. As Lieu.t Governour and Commander in chief in the Garrison, and Capt Paterson being an Officer, and a protestant Subject of Great Britain, I do hereby give my consent to his making the purchase within mentioned. Gibraltar the day of… Rich.d Kane.” BL, Add MS 36137, fo. 154-155.

84 TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588.

85 See Benady, “Spaniards in Gibraltar,” p. 127. Once war was declared, Kane supposedly expelled the Spaniards from the territory while allowing other foreign inhabitants, such as the Genoese and Jews, to remain. I have not discovered the official orders in the primary sources; however, it is repeatedly cited in secondary works.

86 TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588.
Natural born subjects who were protestants." He confirmed each of the purchases, granting the new owners with official titles and written rights to their new properties. By doing so, Kane was able to transfer several homes “from those [foreign] Inhabitants who had the prince of Hesse’s grant” to British Protestants whose very presence would help support the territory.

Under Kane’s leadership, a key technique of colonial governmentality in Gibraltar was the guarantee that property would only be passed down to British settlers. In the service of this promise, he restricted property ownership to only “Natural Born Protestant Subjects” in an effort to “get by degrees the Property out of the Hands of Foreigners and Papists.” Kane mandated that property held by foreign owners could not “descend to or be enjoyed by any other than Protestant Subjects of His Maj.y his Heirs or Successors, Except such Children or Heirs at Law… or assigns as shall be natives and Inhabitants of this Town and Garrison.” If the owner wanted to sell his property, “it must be done to a Protestant being one of His Maj.s Natural born Subjects, and not a Foreigner or of another Religion.” While this was not made law in Gibraltar until more than twenty years later under Governor Humphrey Bland, Kane did keep detailed records of his actions and decisions surrounding property. By doing so, he created a historical archive that privileged British settlers and codified his ideas on property ownership.

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87 TNA, PC 1/4/93, Complaint of John Bertie against Brigadier Jasper Clayton, 18 December 1728, fo. 27.
88 BL, Add MS 36137, “Form of Colonel Kane’s Grants for Building on New Foundations,” fo. 155. According to Governor Clayton’s 1728 land enquiry, approximately 43 home owners had written grants from previous commanders, many of which were from the Prince of Hesse shortly after the garrison was taken by English and Dutch forces in 1705 as a “reward [for] his faithful Vassals & Subjects, who complying with their duty, remained in the City.” As Clayton noted, most of those with grants from Hesse were foreigners who “followed his Fortune” and had benefited from their loyalty. See BL, Add MS 36137, “Form of Prince of Hesse D'armstadt's Grants of Houses in the Garrison of Gibraltar translated from the original in Spanish,” fo. 154.
90 GGA, Crown Land Series A, Bland’s Court of Enquiry, fo. 208.
served to legitimate his property grants, as demonstrated during the 1749 property inquiry, and further the British Protestant mission. Through his use of the census and his manipulation of the law, Kane attempted to mark Gibraltar as British not just in the current generation, but in future ones as well.

**Conclusion**

During a property inquest begun in 1728, begun in part by Kane's earlier actions surrounding ownership, Governor Jasper Clayton came across a French resident who he believed was not fit to own land. The man, he complained, “calls himself a faithfull Subject of Your Majesty’s,” but was in actuality “a Foreigner and subject of France, a pretended protestant upon his coming here, but a professed Roman Catholick when he had once got settled.” If he could lie about his religion, the governor suggested, what would prevent him from shifting his loyalty away from Great Britain? The French and British had been uneasy allies, especially since France’s efforts to help Spain regain Gibraltar, and the governor feared that the Frenchman could be convinced to ally with countrymen. His Catholicism and implicit blind devotion to the Pope also led Clayton to doubt his loyalty to the British Protestant state. The man, Clayton argued, could pose a threat to the garrison and was thus undeserving of property ownership. As a French Catholic, he “had no right by the laws of England to make a purchase either of the house or waxyard,” rules which the governor believed should apply to Gibraltar as well. As Kane’s successor, Clayton fully embraced the former governor’s ideology about property ownership and also sought to rid the town of foreign owners and encourage Protestant settlement in the garrison.

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92 TNA, PC 1/4/93, Complaint of John Bertie against Brigadier Jasper Clayton, 18 December 1728, fo. 25, 28.
93 TNA, PC 1/4/93, Complaint of John Bertie against Brigadier Jasper Clayton, 18 December 1728, fo. 25, 28.
Kane set a precedent during his time as governor by embracing a myriad of technologies to limit Catholic influence and promote Protestantism in Gibraltar. Not only did he establish a standard embraced by all future governors surrounding property rights, but his use of census and acts against foreigners also became common practices employed by most of the garrison's commanders. By the end of the eighteenth century, governors took a census of the population at least once every decade, making special inquests into particular populations as concerns arose; the Alien Act was reinforced and expanded, including even British Protestant settlers as requiring the governor's approval before entering the territory; and the restriction of property ownership to only British Protestants became law under a government-mandated property enquiry in 1749 and was continually supported by future governors.

With the continuation and expansion of these measures, Gibraltar's governors demonstrated that they continued to struggle with the town's multiethnic and multi-religious population. While Kane was fixated on cataloging and containing the foreign Catholic body in the 1720s, spurred by outside events and the composition of the population, future governors extended their fears to encompass all of Gibraltar’s foreign population and the troubles it posed to British administration of the territory. At the root of these technologies of management was the people of Gibraltar and the governors’ lack of trust in their foreignness. Yet despite their best efforts, including those mentioned in this chapter, the composition of the garrison did not change. By the end of the eighteenth century, British Protestants remained a significant minority and Gibraltar continued to serve as a Mediterranean meeting ground rather than a bastion of Britons.
**Figure 2.1:** Kane’s 1725 Census (TNA, CO 91/1, "The Number of Inhabitants in Gibraltar," 20 August 1725, fo. 195)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nations</th>
<th>Number of Souls</th>
<th>Male from Spain &amp; Others Not Having</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>16 to 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaniards</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch &amp; Spaniards</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerines &amp; Moors</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>732</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The Spanish Gorg in Numeric Order: 555
Chapter 3

“The Health and Pleasure of the Town”: The Management of Disease in Gibraltar

In May 1750 Governor Humphrey Bland received word of an outbreak of the “plague” in southern Morocco, which was reportedly killing two hundred people a day.1 Although the news was not a surprise to the governor, who expected an epidemic to transpire “generally every Summer,” it was still cause for alarm, especially because of the closeness of the contagion.2 An outbreak in Gibraltar could be catastrophic for the small territory: inhabitants would have nowhere to flee, allowing the plague to spread quickly throughout the population, immobilizing merchants and soldiers alike.3 An infection would devastate the town’s trade and supplies as “no European Vessel would come near it” and place the garrison at risk for capture, weakening the military against any potential attacks.4 As Bland exclaimed, “should the infection get into the Town… the very thought of [which] Strikes Terror, as it would in all Probability carry off the

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1 Because there were not many physicians in the region to confirm the diagnosis, it is uncertain if the epidemic was actually the plague or a disease resulting from nutritionally deficiencies in the region. However, the Moroccan cities and Bland still treated the outbreak like the plague, so it will be addressed as such in this chapter. Mr. Carvalho, the British Vice Consul in Tangier, noted that it was a confusing plague because some of the infected recovered after a few days of bedrest. He suggested that some of the deaths were due to eating yarma, a root vegetable that was thought to be poisonous during the dry season. Because Morocco was experiencing a time of scarcity, many of the subjects had to resort to this vegetable instead of bread to satisfy their hunger. British Consul Latton in Tetuan echoed Carvalho’s sentiments, starting that the disease plaguing Fez and Tetuan in May was the “usual Sickness at this Season occasioned moorly from the Excess of those People vorisously devouring Quantities of Fruits without the Assistance of either Bread or Meat to support Nature.” See TNA, CO 91/11, Isaac Dias Carvalho to James Read, 19 May 1750, fo. 43-44; TNA, CO 91/11, Latton to Bland, 3 August 1750, fo. 77.


greatest part of the Garrison and Inhabitants, and occasion the loss of the Fortress to Great Britain.” If such circumstances were to occur, the governor pronounced, “I should rather have Courted Death, than outliv’d such a loss to my Country.”5 For Bland, the plague was both a danger to the garrison’s health but also to his reputation as commander and the territory’s standing within Christian Europe. If the disease could not be prevented from entering town, its presence would suggest that he was an ineffective governor, unable to control the influences of his southern neighbors and the troubles they brought with them.

For many in the early modern world, disease, especially the plague, was a true threat to one’s health. Yet during the eighteenth century, as Aaron Shakow argues, the plague “became less… epidemiological than… discursive.”6 In Christian Europe, I contend, disease carried significant cultural, religious, political, and economic connotations as well as significant consequences for those believed to be a site of infection. States that were deemed contagious suffered the consequences at all levels of society as trade suffered, revenue diminished, supply networks were disrupted, and the territory was marginalized and isolated.7 For most of Europe, scholars maintain that infection was equated with Islam and this ideology was propagated and reinforced discursively and in their actions.8 Treatises abounded about the diseases of the Islamic world, calling North Africa and the Ottoman territories “sanctuaries” of disease because of their supposed belief in predestination. Although many of the Islamic practices were not all that different from those of Christian states, all ships, goods, and people that passed through those regions were subject to extensive quarantines and other sanitization measures. Territories that

8 I will use “Muslim” and “Islam” interchangeably in this chapter.
were not Islamic but had close relationships with Muslim states were also penalized, especially if their health standards were deemed insufficient by other Europeans. Ports, like Gibraltar, that remained on or outside of the sanitary border were in jeopardy of being associated with the Islamic states and treated as such.

Gibraltar’s position on the Straits and its regular communication with North Africa, as well as the frequent travels of its residents back and forth from those states, made the territory suspect for many Europeans. Lacking institutionalized protective measures like quarantine, Gibraltar was often penalized by its European neighbors, in particular Spain, for its close relationship with Morocco. Upon Governor Bland’s arrival to the garrison, he recognized the territory’s many failings that could possibly endanger the health of the town. The town itself was unclean, leaving opportunities for infection, and there were no preventative measures in place to thwart the spread of disease. Eager to fix these problems, Bland established several technologies to monitor and close those breaks in security in an effort to keep “diseased” bodies separate from healthy ones. This included establishing a position to clean the town as well as one to examine all incoming ships to the port and introducing proper quarantine measures like those practiced in the rest of Christian Europe. With the arrival of the plague in 1750 across the Straits, Bland stepped up his efforts even more, establishing strict quarantine practices and cutting off almost all communication with North Africa. Yet he was unable to embrace these practices fully because of the need to keep an alliance with his Moroccan allies and facilitate the ongoing diplomatic negotiations. Even in a time of great risk for contagion, Gibraltar could not be closed off entirely to its “diseased” southern neighbors.

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As scholars like Krista Maglen and Alison Bashford have argued, quarantine and other methods of disease control were a means of “drawing and policing of boundaries.”\textsuperscript{10} While most have focused on quarantine as a strengthening of national borders, I maintain that these borders were also cultural and religious. The presence of disease and the practices surrounding it served to “accentuate” the many differences between the Mediterranean states.\textsuperscript{11} For Governor Bland, and other Christian Europeans, I contend, the practice of quarantine defined and separated Christian from Muslim, Europe from Africa and the Ottoman territories, designating the former as the civilized standard and the latter as the diseased other.\textsuperscript{12} Although there were many similar beliefs and practices shared by the faith groups, disease served as an opportunity for European peoples to set themselves apart from their African and Ottoman neighbors, arguing that their views were more advanced and legitimate.\textsuperscript{13} These “health-driven” boundaries were not only national and global also locally focused, offering the governor an opportunity to survey and police all those wishing to cross into town. Under the excuse of quarantine, Gibraltar’s commanders could record all bodies arriving at the port, monitor the actions of all those seeking


\textsuperscript{12} According to Bennison, to be Christian and/or Muslim was a political, cultural, and religious issue. See Bennison, “Liminal States,” pp. 13-17.

\textsuperscript{13} Michael Pearson, “Medical Connections and Exchanges in the Early Modern World,” \textit{PORTAL} 8, no. 2 (2011): 1-15; Justin Stearns, “New Directions in the Study of Religious Responses to the Black Death,” \textit{History Compass} 7, no. 5 (2009): 1363-1375; Nükhet Varlik, “From ‘Bête Noire’ to ‘le Mal de Constantinople’: Plagues, Medicine, and the Early Modern Ottoman State.” \textit{Journal of World History} 24, no. 4 (2014): 741-770; Birsen Bulmus, \textit{Plague, Quarantine and Geopolitics in the Ottoman Empire} (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), chapter 3. As Osheim has shown, there were divides even within Christianity relating to disease as the Catholic Venetians thought that the Lutherans and Presbyterians were also inefficient in preventing the plague because of their beliefs in predestination. See also Duane J. Osheim, “Plague and Foreign Threats to Public Health in Early Modern Venice, \textit{Mediterranean Historical Review} (2011) 26, no. 1, p. 75.
to enter the town, and restrict entry to those people whom they deemed suspect for infection. This practice afforded Bland, or so he believed, a sense of control over these foreign visitors and inhabitants who had traveled to foreign climes.

Yet, like most borders, I argue that those created by quarantine were not entirely impermeable. Although Governor Bland hoped to set himself and Gibraltar as firmly a Christian, European territory, one with all the trappings of quarantine and free from the diseases of the south, he could not fully do so. Even when the 1750 plague was at its worst across the Straits, Bland had to keep communication open with his Moroccan neighbors. Gibraltar depended a great deal on its suppliers in North Africa and the British government was not willing to abandon its relationship with those cities, regardless of their health practices. If Bland were to cut off communication entirely, he would risk angering these allies, starving the garrison, and precipitating attacks on Gibraltar’s vessels by the corsairs. Such consequences were not sustainable for the garrison, thus requiring Bland to budge on the rules of quarantine. Yet his desire to align Gibraltar with the European community led him to cater to the Spanish government’s wishes when an outbreak did occur. Such an approach, he argued, was necessary to demonstrate to Christian Europe that Gibraltar was worthy of inclusion and was willing to embrace their institutions of health governance. Despite these efforts, his decision was later challenged by the British government who demanded that he reopen communication with Morocco. As it turned out, I demonstrate, quarantine was not a simple solution and the border between the regions, especially in Gibraltar, was not easily maintained or policed. Instead, there were many “openings” in Bland’s attempted barriers, which served as “points of contact and contagion” and blurred the distinction between diseased and healthy.14

The Threat of Disease in Gibraltar

When Governor Bland first arrived in the territory in 1749, he was taken aback by the town’s “Poisonous Condition” and the many present threats to “the Health and Pleasure of the Town.”\(^\text{15}\) Most importantly, Bland was troubled by the situation of the territory itself; located a mere six miles across the Straits from North Africa and directly on the Mediterranean Sea, Gibraltar appeared to be in a prime position to contract disease. As Bland warned his successors, “the Plague breaks out generally every Summer in Africa, and in some part of the Grand Signior’s Dominions bordering on the Mediterranean.”\(^\text{16}\) Although the region was free from illness upon his arrival, Bland, and many of his contemporaries, viewed the Ottoman territories and North Africa as a harbor for infection. These territories were seen by many Christian European states as “almost a perpetual Seminary of the Plague” and believed to be “never quite free from a Pestilential Disorder.”\(^\text{17}\) The plague, they argued, was a “Poison, which [was] bred in the Eastern or Southern Parts of the World.”\(^\text{18}\) Such views were espoused and endorsed by European medical professionals and state administrators alike, who declared that “every place within the extent of those dominions… or connected with them” was considered to be “always


\(^{16}\) TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 57. Egyptian scholar, Alan Mikhail, has shown that in that region a new plague epidemic broke out on average at least every nine years (not annually) from 1347 to 1849. Consequently, the plague was a large part of peoples’ daily lives in these areas, but it was not necessarily as prevalent as contemporaries portrayed it. See Alan Mikhail, “The Nature of Plague in Late Eighteenth-Century Egypt,” *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 82, no. 2 (Summer 2008), p. 251.

\(^{17}\) Mead, *A Short Discourse*, pp. 27-28; BL, Add MS 38234, “Proposals by the Quarantine Committee,” 1800, fo. 36.

liable to suspicions” of disease.\textsuperscript{19} To many Europeans, these territories were a site of “permanent infection” that posed a risk to all of their neighbors and commercial partners.\textsuperscript{20}

Gibraltar, with its “proximity to the Coast of Barbary… [and] the Necessity there is of Constant Communication and Correspondence with many Ports on that coast for fresh provisions,” was seen to be at a great risk for contracting disease.\textsuperscript{21} The garrison’s reliance on North African suppliers for all of its provisions, including cattle, sheep, fowl, dried goods, and metals, required regular and frequent contact with those states and its peoples.\textsuperscript{22} Boats traveled across the Straits almost daily with Jewish and Muslim merchants from Tetuan and Tangier, who were permitted to enter the garrison and stay for a short time to gather any goods to trade in their home cities.\textsuperscript{23} In addition, merchants from Gibraltar, typically of Jewish and Genoese backgrounds, frequently traveled to the North African coast to facilitate British trade in that region and gather any other necessary supplies. Because Spain was largely unwilling to help supply the garrison during this period, Moroccan traders and their goods were in high demand.\textsuperscript{24} Gibraltar also served as a small, regional trading hub, which meant that there were a “number of

\textsuperscript{19} BL, Add MS 38234, “Proposals by the Quarantine Committee,” 1800, fo. 36.

\textsuperscript{20} Aaron David Abraham Shakow, “Marks of Contagion: the Plague, the Bourse, the Word and the Law in the Early Modern Mediterranean 1720-1762,” pp. 29-30, 199. See also Osheim, “Plague and Foreign Threats to Public Health,” p. 69.

\textsuperscript{21} TNA, CO 91/2, “A Scheme or Proposal for the Better Preservation of the Health and Regulation of Quarantine and Prattick in Gibraltar,” May 1754.

\textsuperscript{22} TNA, CO 91/62,”Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 43; GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 4, 1779-1786, “1784 Considerations on the Trade of Gibraltar,” fo. 519-524.

\textsuperscript{23} This relationship was allowed per the 1721 Anglo-Moroccan treaty which promised peace between the two countries on both land and sea, allowed duty-free trade and anchorage at each state’s ports, and guaranteed the protection of all law-abiding citizens while residing in the other’s territory. This treaty was renewed several times throughout the eighteenth century. See chapter 1 for a greater explanation of this. J. A. O. C. Brown, “Anglo-Moroccan Relations and the Embassy of Ahmad Qardanash, 1706-1708.” The Historical Journal 51 (2008), pp. 618-619.

\textsuperscript{24} The borders between Spain and Gibraltar had been closed since the 1727 siege and there had been a number of threats and possible attacks on the garrison between then and 1750.
Ships touching from all parts in the Mediterranean."²⁵ Some of these vessels came directly from
Ottoman territories, while others merely docked in Ottoman ports for a short period of time on
their way to Gibraltar. Other North African cities, such as Tunis and Algiers, also sent their
traders and goods to Gibraltar’s port to facilitate trade with the British and other states
represented there. Each of these areas was considered to be high risk for disease, suggesting that
the people on board their ships were potential carriers. In addition, the goods that these Ottoman
and North African merchants brought often included those that were considered to be most
contagious, such as fur, feathers, silk, hair, wool, cotton, and flax.²⁶ As a result, both
“suspicious” people and goods that could be ripe with infection crossed Gibraltar’s borders daily,
helping to support the garrison with supplies while simultaneously putting it at a risk for disease.
While this belief was unsupported by the practices of many Islamic states, it colored relations
between Christian Europe and the Muslim world related to health.²⁷

Because of this association between Islamic belief and the spread of disease, many
Christians viewed the religion of Islam itself as a “plague” and being Muslim as a key risk factor
for disease.²⁸ Travelers from these regions were automatically considered to be infected with the
plague, or another disease, and blamed for any outbreaks that occurred. For instance, authorities
during the 1721 Marseilles plague epidemic blamed a visiting Turk, despite the fact that he was
likely not the actual carrier or cause of the outbreak. No other alternative theories were

²⁵ TNA, CO 91/2, “A Scheme or Proposal for the Better Preservation of the Health and Regulation of Quarantine
and Prattick in Gibraltar,” May 1754.
²⁶ Mead, A Short Discourse, pp. 15-17. According to Mead, these goods were most apt to hold infection because
they were mostly closely related to “Animal Juices” or were “the Substances found most fit to keep them in” (p. 17).
²⁷ Even during the 1750 outbreak, the Alcaide of Tetuan embraced quarantine practices, shutting the gates to the
town and forbidding any visitors or returning subjects to enter once the plague arrived in neighboring cities. See
TNA, CO 91/11, Latton to Bland, 8 May 1750, Pastrana to Read, 19 May 1750, fo. 27.
considered because the individual was a Muslim from the center of a diseased region. Muslims were not the only religious group to be considered to be contagious; this notion of the infected body applied to all non-Christian individuals living in the region. Jews also carried the blame for several outbreaks of disease, not just the plague, especially if they were residents of the Ottoman or North African territories. The “plaguy bodies” of southern and eastern peoples, like the Turkish man, were seen as a threat to all around them.

This belief also suggested that these individuals were impure in other ways. Many Europeans believed that the state of one’s body played a significant role in contracting disease. In essence, a person could become infected only if the body “favoured” it. Joseph Browne, a


32 The cause of disease was hotly debated in the eighteenth century and most people were divided into one of two camps: contagionists and miasmaists. Contagionists, as exemplified by Dr. Mead, the author of the ideas surrounding the British quarantine bill in 1721, argued that infection spread by contact with the diseased. According to Mead, “diseased Persons give it to one another, and Contagious Matter is lodged in Goods of a loose and soft Texture, which being packt up, and carried into other Countries, let out, when opened, the imprisoned Seeds of Contagion” (18-19). Once these particles were breathed in, they “tainted the saliva juice” and “fixed their malignity” in the stomach, causing nausea and vomiting. The contaminated person could then pass the disease to others or to good, especially those of a “loose and soft Texture,” like fur, feathers, silk, hair, wool, cotton, and flax, in which the infection could easily lodge itself. See Mead, 15-19. Miasmaists, on the other hand, believed that bad air was the cause of disease. Following Hippocrates’ trio of “airs, waters, and places,” those who subscribed to this theory argued that rotten matter created poor air, which caused illness when it encountered people with weakened constitutions. Natural sites, like marshes or places with standing water, and man-made environments, such as cities with their open sewers, slaughter houses and graveyards, were believed to be the primary site of diseased air. This view is represented by Joseph Brown, a British physician who contested Mead’s Discourse. Some historians argue that the Mediterranean states often followed the germ theory of contagion and prevention by quarantine, whereas northern Europe ascribed contagion more to miasma and protected itself by sanitation and lifestyle reforms. For further explanation, see Paul Slack, “The Disappearance of Plague: An Alternate View,” Economic History Review 34, no. 3 (1981), p. 75; Harrison, “Disease, Diplomacy, and International Commerce,” p. 199; Watts, Epidemics and History, pp. 23-25; McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, pp. 281-282; Mary J. Dobson, “Contours of Death: Disease, Mortality and the Environment in Early Modern England,” Health Transition Review, vol. 2, Supplement (1992), pp. 78-79; James C. Riley, The Eighteenth-Century Campaign to Avoid Disease (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987); Katherine Johnston, “The Constitution of Empire: Place and Bodily Health in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic,” Atlantic Studies: Global Currents 10, no. 4 (2013): 443-466.
leading London doctor and author, argued that contamination was caused by “the Domestick Enemy within, a broken Constitution and ill Habit of the Body; by which means the ambient Air and Diet hath such Influence or Effect on us.” Consequently, certain people were more apt to catch a disease than others. Bodies that were ripe for infection were believed to be already diseased because of bad habits, moral corruption, intemperance, licentiousness, and sin. Disease was not just a medical diagnosis but rather a cultural and moral judgment and prevention could be facilitated by right living. For instance, during the 1750 outbreak, a British (Christian) captive held in New Fez noted that while hundreds of Moroccans were dying, “Not one of the Christians Died of that Sickness, except one of the Hanoverians.” As the Briton suggested, many Christians believed that the lack of outbreaks in Europe in the eighteenth century were due to their reformed ways of living and the righteousness of their religious beliefs. Muslims, who were viewed with contempt for being hot beds of contagion, were then also associated with moral depravity and “evilness.”


34 Healy, Fictions of Disease, p. 30; Mark Harrison, Disease and the Modern World: 1500 to the Present Day (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 42. As a result, physicians urged patients to order their lifestyles and self-government and regulate the body’s natural functions through diet and personal hygiene. All physical appetites were to be controlled according to this theory, which tied moral reform to disease prevention. See Browne, A Practical Treatise, pp. 8-9. See also Healey, Fictions of Disease, pp. 43, 122; Quinlan, “Colonial Bodies,” p. 108; Roger D. Lund, “Infectious Wit: Metaphor, Atheism and the Plague in Eighteenth-Century London,” Literature and Medicine 22.1 (2003): 45-64; Michael Stolberg, Experiencing Illness and the Sick Body in Early Modern Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 44.

35 As Shakow has argued, in the eighteenth century the plague “became less… epidemiological than… discursive.” See Shakow, “Marks of Contagion,” p. xiii.

36 TNA, CO 91/11, William Latton to Humphrey Bland, 1 June 1750, fo. 54-55.

Such a conclusion served to ideologically separate the “diseased” Ottomans and North Africans from the more ordered, moral and “civilized” European Christians who had largely been free from plague outbreaks during the last century. For individuals like Bland, the peoples across the Straits could not be trusted, both in regards to their morals and their health. This distrust and division fueled European policies surrounding disease during the early modern period. Believing that Muslim countries were incapable and unwilling to prevent the plague’s spread, many European states saw it as their duty to protect themselves from the Ottomans and North Africans’ diseases. As Bland asserted, “this Stupid Infatuation has render’d it absolutely necessary for all the Christian Powers to prevent… that Fatal Distemper from being brought into their Dominions.”

This task often involved creating physical boundaries or barriers between the two realms, mirroring and reinforcing the ideological divides that produced such policies. Goods needed to be closely examined, bodies needed to be monitored, and ships needed to be cordoned off in order to prevent the “contagion” of the Muslim world from infecting Christian states. While Christian Europe recognized it could not completely barricade itself from its Muslim neighbors, it did seek to control and monitor Islamic influences, limiting moments and spaces of exchange. Such surveillance and boundary-making techniques were believed to be especially

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39 While it may or may not have been directly related to disease, this separation between Christian and Muslim seems to have pervaded many of Bland’s decisions and opinions regarding his Spanish and Moroccan neighbors during his governorship.

necessary for Christian ports on the Mediterranean, and even more so for Gibraltar with its porous borders and close proximity to and frequent contact with Muslim territories. These openings for “points of contact” also served as opportunities for infection with the passage of diseased bodies and goods.41

The most common practice embraced by European port cities to create such boundaries, and police those crossing it, was quarantine.42 Quarantine “takes its name from forty days being the usual time that Ships from suspected places, lay at Anchor, before they are admitted to have any free communication with the People on Shore, which free communication is termed being admitted to Pratique.”43 Quarantined vessels were typically required to anchor away from the port, often in an enclosed station called a lazaretto, and were monitored by armed ships or guards to ensure that there was no contact between those on board and healthy subjects. Lazarettos offered European ports a strong and guarded barrier between the diseased and the healthy. As contemporaries described it, a lazaretto was “an Enclosure secured from any clandestine communication between those within, & those without, and constantly under the eye of a Governor assisted by some other Officer of Quarantine, and a certain number of Porters or Labourers, whose Business it is to receive, unpack, open, air and afterwards redeliver the goods


42 Maglen, *The English System*, p. 21. See also Shakow, “Marks of Contagion,” and Osheim, “Plague and Foreign Threats.” Many states also employed regulations on land borders in an effort to blockade themselves and remain free from disease. In 1679, officials in Madrid sealed off all land routes into the city from the south, which had been struck with the plague, to keep the capital disease-free. The Habsburgs employed a similar policy in the eighteenth century when combatt[ing the plague in its eastern territories, establishing a military “plague-control” front[ier along the Ottoman border. These zones consisted of sentry posts and mobile patrols who were ordered to shoot any unauthorized passersby. Travelers coming from the Ottoman empire were strip-searched and quarantined for 48 days and their goods were also fumigated and quarantined, much like was performed in Mediterranean sea ports. When the state-funded “sanitary spies” reported an outbreak abroad, the security and surveillance doubled. See Watts, *Epidemics and History*, pp. 24-25; Boris Velimirovic and Helga Velimirovic, “Plague in Vienna,” *Reviews of Infectious Diseases* 11, no. 5 (1989), pp. 823-824.

43 BL, Add MS 38234, “Proposals by the Quarantine Committee,” 1800, fo. 36.
to their Owners.” In ports like Marseilles, Leghorn, Malta, and Venice, known for their high standards of quarantine, these were large, walled enclosures with several buildings on an island or secluded piece of land. The lazaretto was often a city in and of itself: there was lodging for all passengers and crew, guard houses for the soldiers, homes for the lazaretto officers, and “every conveniency” was provided. There were also large sheds in which the goods could be unloaded, aired, and stored for the duration of the quarantine. Passengers too were subjected to “airing,” being “searched, smoaked and [required to] undergo some whimsical ceremonies” before being permitted to leave the lazaretto and enter the port city.44 Within the lazaretto, life was tightly controlled as all those within were “monitored, registered, administered and placed under all sorts of surveillance.”45 Such administrative efforts with a close eye on those kept in quarantine for reasons of “security” were required by most European ports in order to ensure that no diseased bodies or goods contaminated others.

This system was overseen by the port’s Magistrates of Health and managed by its Prattick Master, who was responsible for visiting each ship, interrogating the master, and inspecting its bill of health. The bill of health was the best means for the Prattick Master to determine the condition of those on board and the length of the ship’s quarantine, which varied depending on the vessel’s ports of call, length of voyage, and nature of goods carried.46 All ships were required to carry and present their bill of health upon entering any European port because it served as an official document for health governance throughout the Continent. It was signed and sealed by

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44 See BL, Add MS 73688, “On Quarantine,” [1751-1753], fo. 41; BL, Add MS 38234, “Proposals by the Quarantine Committee,” 1800, fo. 36-40.


46 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 63; BL, Add MS 38234, “Proposals by the Quarantine Committee,” 1800, fo. 36.
the Magistrates of Health at the vessel’s last port of call and detailed if the ship was “clean” or “foul,” meaning there was a disease onboard or in that port. 47 This practice served as a form of knowledge transfer, enabling other states to join their powers and limit the spread of disease to their ports. If a vessel was marked as foul by the previous magistrate, the Prattick Master would immediately place the ship, its passengers and goods in quarantine. In general most ships originating from the Ottoman territories or North Africa were marked as, or automatically assumed to be, foul. This meant that they were typically subject to a forty day quarantine, and sometimes an additional ten to twenty-five day preliminary airing. Vessels coming from healthy (European) ports, on the other hand, were often given reduced quarantine periods, if any at all. Those ships that carried infected peoples on board, regardless of their origin, were also kept in quarantine for lengthy periods of time, either until all members were healthy, or if someone died, until sufficient time had passed afterward. 48 In places with strict quarantine laws, ships and those on board could be delayed for up to seven months before they were allowed to go to shore or unload their goods for market. 49 Although these methods may have seemed extreme, many Europeans supported this strict institution, arguing that it was necessary to closely watch potentially diseased individuals for such a lengthy period of time to ensure that they would not carry contagion to others once released. As one contemporary maintained, such technologies of

47 Typically these were the only two designations (clean or foul); however, Britain added a third category (suspected) later in the century and Marseilles created a fourth category (touched) as well. See BL, Add MS 38234, “Proposals by the Quarantine Committee,” 1800, fo. 33-35; P. Froggatt, “The Lazaret on Chetney Hill,” Medical History 8, no. 1 (1964), 50. Vessels that failed to carry a bill of health or who falsified it were punished for their indiscretions. TNA, CO 91/62,”An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 58-59.

48 BL, Add MS 38234, “Proposals by the Quarantine Committee,” 1800, fo. 34.

governance were necessary to “establish every guard against the only event which can do us lasting and essential mischief.”

Although quarantine had been a common practice throughout Mediterranean cities since the seventeenth century, when Bland arrived, Gibraltar had no such standards. Prior to his governorship, Gibraltar had remained largely free from disease, but this, its people credited, was only thanks to the “peculiar Care of Providence” which had “so long preserved them from this Distructive calamity.” In part the lack of specific prevention procedures was due to the British influence: as an island far from the origin of most epidemics, quarantine was not a consistent practice in Britain. It was used, however, reactively in response to confirmed outbreaks abroad, typically in the eastern Mediterranean. When word of an epidemic reached Britain, the British

50 BL, Add MS 73688, “On Quarantine,” [1751-1753], fo. 40. Quarantine practices were contested, especially in Northern European states like the Netherlands and England, who were further away from the “epicenter” of disease. Contagionists were the primary proponents of quarantine, arguing that it was necessary to prevent the spread of contaminated particles from traveling and spreading to other locations. As Dr. Mead, Britain’s most vocal proponent, argued, if “Intercourse and Commerce with the Place infected be strictly Prevented, the Air cannot diffuse and spread these to any great Distance” (18-19). Supporters appealed to the use of quarantine in past epidemics, in particular the 1721 Marseille plague and the 1743 epidemic in Messina, in which the disease was contained and many lives were saved. Some contagionists even believed that if everyone followed strict quarantine protocols, the plague would disappear. Paul Slack concludes that these proponents were likely correct, attributing the use of quarantine and cordon sanitaires for ridding Europe of the plague initially. See Mikhail, “The Nature of Plague,” especially n. 73; Watts, Epidemics and History, pp. 23-25; Slack, “The Disappearance of Plague,” p. 475; Harrison, “Disease, Diplomacy, and International Commerce,” p. 199.

51 TNA, CO 91/2, “A Scheme or Proposal for the Better Preservation of the Health and Regulation of Quarantine and Prattick in Gibraltar,” May 1754.

52 In 1710 Queen Anne issued three statutes on quarantine in response to the Baltic plague, which were temporary measures lasting a few years. King George’s acts in 1721 also only lasted for two years, and there were two additional acts passed in 1728 and 1733 for two years each. For the following two decades, the government issued royal proclamations as the sole quarantine measure, invoking restrictions on ships coming from places of suspected infection. There was talk of building a lazaretto in London on Chetney Hill in the Medway Estuary in the early 1750s, but the plan was abandoned in 1754. Not all Britons were in support of quarantine practices, as evidenced by the number of complaints following the passage of the acts, especially after the expanded law passed in 1721. Critics argued that quarantine was financially costly as well as an infringement on free trade and incompatible with British freedoms. They complained that their competitors imposed unfair quarantine restrictions simply as a way to advance their own trade, and the question if it was even an effective means of stopping diseases’ spread. Many congratulated the many societal and sanitation improvements at home for keeping Britain free of the plague. See BL, Add MS 38234, “Proposals by the Quarantine Committee,” 1800, fo. 41; McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, p. 271; Harrison, “Disease, Diplomacy, and International Commerce,” p. 203; Shakow, “Marks of Contagion,” pp. 169-170; Slack, “The Response to the Plague in Early Modern England,” pp. 451-452; Margaret Healy, “Defoe’s Journal and the English Plague Writing Tradition,” Literature and Medicine 22 (Spring 2003), pp. 36-37; Slack, “The Response to the Plague in Early Modern England,” pp. 185, 187; Slack, “The Disappearance of Plague,” p. 475; Froggatt, “The
government would circulate a notice informing its colonial administrators of the threat and announcing certain precautions that should be taken (Figure 3.1). However, because of Britain’s distance, and its lack of proactive quarantine efforts, it was not typically included in the Mediterranean networks of health officials who were in constant correspondence about potential threats for disease or developments abroad.53

Not surprisingly then, there were no specific regulations given to governors in Gibraltar in relation to disease prevention.54 To outside states, in particular Spain, this made the town look poorly in a number of ways. With the absence of proper regulations, ships coming from Gibraltar could not be trusted to be free from disease. There was no careful monitoring of vessels, no surveillance of the people on board for any signs or symptoms of illness, and no thorough inspection of goods to ensure that they were not carriers of infection. Nor did Gibraltar have the means to produce bills of health and ensure their accuracy, lacking any health officials in the garrison. Its people were also deemed suspect. With more than twenty percent of the town’s inhabitants originating from Morocco, these residents were considered to pose a greater risk to the territory, especially those who traveled back and forth from their home state regularly. In addition to these residents, Gibraltar’s ports also admitted dozens of Moroccans bringing goods for the garrison. Unlike other European ports with their strict regulations, there were no clear or consistent boundaries in Gibraltar between the healthy and the (potentially) diseased.


With Gibraltar’s failure to make sharp distinctions between clean and foul ships, bodies, and goods, many European states treated vessels that touched at its port as “if they had come from an infected, or Suspected place.” As observers noted, the lack of regulations “might make other Nations cautious of admitting British Ships into their Ports, and occasion an Interruption of Our Trade & Navigation.” If Gibraltar could not verify the health of its own vessels or others, all ships coming from that port might be quarantined for a longer duration to air their goods and monitor their travelers for disease. This would result in significant financial losses for vessels who touched in Gibraltar because of the extensive delays and impeded travel; others, who did not want such a hassle, would avoid the port altogether.

While some states like Portugal were more forgiving of vessels coming from Gibraltar, others, in particular Spain, were not as lenient. As Bland complained, the Spaniards “think that

55 TNA, CO 91/2, James Read to Thomas Robinson, [1754?]. By the 1620s, most European states bordering the Mediterranean had instituted large-scale, coordinated efforts like quarantine to control the spread of infection. In the Italian city-states, quarantine was implemented as early as the fourteenth century, shortly following the end of the Black Death. See Watts, Epidemics and History, 23; Katherine Arner, “Making Global Commerce into International Health Diplomacy: Consuls and Disease Control in the Age of Revolutions,” Journal of World History 24, no. 4 (December 2013), pp. 781-782; Mark Harrison, “Disease, Diplomacy and International Commerce,” p. 202.

56 BL, Add MS 43425, Holdernesse to Blakeney & Beauclerk, 9 September 1751. This statement was made in favor of a British quarantine act, but the sentiment also applies to Gibraltar.

57 BL, Add MS 73688, “On Quarantine,” [1751-1753], fo. 41.

58 While some of these restrictions may have actually been due to a fear of contagion, it is also likely that the Spaniards more often imposed quarantine on Gibraltar for political reasons. In 1768, the governor wrote to the British consul in Cadiz regarding Spanish orders to delay pratique for ships from Gibraltar. Such practices, they argued, were “a partial distinction and highly detrimental to this place” by causing a significant delay in getting their goods to market. A few years later the governor addressed similar letters to the consul in Madrid, again complaining of the “singular regulations” imposed by the Spanish government. Only ships from Gibraltar were required to undergo a twelve day quarantine whereas vessels from France, Italy, and North Africa were admitted to pratique immediately. This practice of imposing an unnecessarily long quarantine was especially common after wartime. Following the conclusion of the Great Siege in 1783, despite the governor’s several reassurances of the garrison’s health, “rigorous quarantine is continued in the ports adjacent.” This obstruction continued for at least the next two years, causing significant problems with mail carrying as well as supplies, so much so that the British government was forced to get involved. See GGA, Letters to Consuls & Ambassadors, Lisbon & Cadiz, 1769-1797, Cornwallis to Hardy, 2 December 1768, fo. 1; GGA, Letters to Madrid, 1759-1760 & 1771-1797, “The Memorial of the British Merchants and Traders Residing in Gibraltar,” 4 April 1776, fo. 6; GGA, Letters to Consuls & Ambassadors, Lisbon & Cadiz, 1769-1797, Elliot to Hort, 10 November 1783, fo. 119-120, 124; GGA, Letters to Madrid, 1759-1760 & 1771-1797, Elliot to Liston, 18 March 1784, fo. 23.
every thing that comes from Turkey or Africa is infected.” Not surprisingly then, Gibraltar’s “close Correspondence” with North Africa invoked a great deal of fear in the Spanish government, which then refused to supply the garrison in the name of quarantine even when the region was free from disease. Spain’s “great Terror” of the plague, Bland argued, led them to “carry their Scruples to such an extravagant Length, that they exceed the Bounds of Reason and Common Sense.” In 1742 the Spanish government announced that all ships that traveled to or communicated with Africa would be refused entry into Spanish ports. Such measures were necessary, they claimed, to protect the state from any potential disease, despite the lack of infection abroad. For Spain, the health of their cities required a strict quarantine with closed borders, limiting any contact with the infected southern states.

These pronouncements had a significant effect on those in Gibraltar, especially Governor Bland who was eager to appease Spain and make an alliance with his European neighbor. Even though the Spaniards had attacked the garrison several times in the past and steadfastly refused to supply Gibraltar for years, he sought to befriend the neighboring Spanish officials however possible. Although he recognized the need to maintain a relationship with Morocco for trading and diplomatic purposes, he felt that they could not be trusted. As he later wrote to the Secretary of State Bedford upon the 1750 plague outbreak, “I should not be sorry for it; but rather Rejoice if the whole Race of that Country were Extirpated from the Face of the Earth.”

59 TNA, CO 91/62,”Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 80.
60 TNA, CO 91/2, “A Scheme or Proposal for the Better Preservation of the Health and Regulation of Quarantine and Prattick in Gibraltar,” May 1754.
61 TNA, CO 91/62,”Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 72.
64 TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 21 July 1750, fo. 64
as he portrayed them, were “Treachery Knaves” and “Thieves from their Cradles” who had terrorized Britain and its subjects with their “insolent behavior.”⁶⁵ In Bland’s opinion Britain’s alliance with the Moroccans was one that needed to be maintained but not at the expense of alienating their Christian neighbors in Spain, who he believed would best support the garrison and Britain as a whole.

Balancing Gibraltar’s relationship with the two states was especially tricky in regards to health. Unless Gibraltar were to “renounce all our Alliances with the Mahometans; and make open War upon them,” Bland argued, their Spanish neighbors would continue to punish the territory for its open borders with North Africa.⁶⁶ For a state that attempted to entirely close itself off from the threat of “African” diseases, Gibraltar’s constant communication and its peoples’ travels to and from that coast were unacceptable. As a later garrison governor protested, “I am sensible that the French & Spaniards make use of the Argument… that the Quarantine established for Ships on this Port, is on account of our Intercommunication with Barbary” rather than “on account of any danger to the publick health.”⁶⁷ Yet for some states, Gibraltar’s negligence in regard to quarantine, alongside its close relations with its “diseased” southern neighbors, suggested that it too was a haven for disease, leading them to treat the garrison as such. The port’s blurring of the lines between healthy and diseased was repugnant to many of its European neighbors, but such porous boundaries were also necessary for the wellbeing of the garrison.

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⁶⁶ TNA, CO 91/62,”Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 72.
⁶⁷ GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1749-1779, 1764 Papers, Cornwallis to Johnston, 22 March 1764.
Bland & Technologies of Disease

Upon his arrival, Bland immediately began to institute new practices to help ensure that a disaster like the plague would not strike the garrison. Initially, he took it upon himself to improve the condition of the town in an effort to prevent any disease from settling there. The town itself, he claimed, was polluted and unsanitary: the streets and lanes were full of refuse, there was rubbish lying throughout, the homes and streets were in disrepair, and there was not an official to take responsibility for helping keep the town clean. Such “Nastiness,” Bland believed, posed a serious risk for infection and was a threat to the community’s health. In order to prevent contagion, contemporary physicians argued that homes should be “more cleanly and sweet,” streets should be “washed and clean of Filth, Carrion, and all Manner of Nusances,” and the town itself should be cleaned nightly. Bland followed these suggestions to the letter, ordering inhabitants to keep all the areas around their houses clean, sweep their dirt into heaps, place their rubbish in the designated dung hills, and not to litter in the streets. All offenders, he warned, would be disciplined accordingly and forced to pay a fine or go to trial in front of the Civil Court. Embracing an involved and authoritarian attitude to regulating the civil sphere and its cleanliness, the governor argued a punitive approach was necessary in order to offer the greatest protection for his inhabitants. In addition, the governor established a new civil position of

68 Mead, A Short Discourse, pp. 41, 43, 48. See also Riley, The Eighteenth-Century Campaign. Some supporters of this approach (miasmaism) also suggested other environmental modifications, such as draining stagnant water, ventilating buildings and ships, reinterring those buried in church vaults, and moving burial sites outside of town. Some believed so strongly in the idea of environmental influences on disease that they even moved their cities in response to analyses of a site’s microclimate. The Lords Proprietors of Charleston, for instance, ordered their colonists to move the town a few miles upstream in the late-seventeenth century as it was deemed to be healthier. Similarly in Jamaica the colonists debated moving their government from Spanish Town to Kingston based on these considerations in the 1750s. Physicians were divided as to which site was healthier; Kingston being a port brought with it certain advantages of being close to the sea but its homes were close together, whereas Spanish Town’s elevation brought fresh air but the winds blew the troublesome miasmas and stenches in its direction. The governor did move the seat in 1755, although the jury was still out if it was indeed a healthier site. See Johnston, “The Constitution of Empire,” pp. 443-466.
scavenger, who was responsible for carrying away piles of dirt and rubbish and cleaning the streets nightly. Bland also initiated the repavement and repairs of the town streets to facilitate the inhabitants and scavenger’s efforts.\textsuperscript{69} Such improvements, he believed, would help keep the town free from contracting or spreading disease and prevent infection.

Not only did Bland introduce health technologies on a more micro-scale, but he also embraced macro-level changes as well, establishing formal regulations for quarantine in Gibraltar.\textsuperscript{70} Recognizing the failure of past governors to record entering ships, track the bodies of those who could transmit disease, and restrict their entrance, Bland sought to rectify their oversights. He began by establishing the post of Prattick Master, a position that was vital to implementing and enforcing quarantine standards. With the help of James Read, the chosen officer, the governor could now institute similar policies of surveillance and separation as those practiced across the region.\textsuperscript{71} All arriving ships were visited by the Prattick Master or one of his deputies, who immediately inspected their bill of health. Those vessels arriving from the Levant not only had to present their paperwork, but were also required to undergo additional monitoring, which included a formal inspection by both the Prattick Master and the Master Surgeon before being admitted to praktique. These extra precautions were necessary, Bland argued, because “an Epidemical Distemper may Seize them in the Voyage, which might be Communicated to the Town.”\textsuperscript{72}

Ships suspected of illness were sent away from the town, often docked on the eastern side of the Rock in Catalan Bay and guarded by at least one vessel or guard watchtower whose

\textsuperscript{70} For more on the micro and macro politics of disease prevention, see Bashford, “Epidemic and Governmentality.”
\textsuperscript{71} TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 58; TNA, CO 91/2, James Read to Thomas Robinson, [1754?].
\textsuperscript{72} TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 80.
primary purpose was to monitor the quarantined vessels and their passengers. From there, it was virtually impossible for the quarantined people to get into town as they would have to cross a guarded pass over the mountainous face. The only people whom they might encounter were the Genoese fishermen and mariners who set up camp on the eastern beaches, but they too rarely crossed into the town. Contact was prohibited with all quarantined ships, and any offenders were ordered to cease and desist, otherwise the guards were instructed to shoot with the intention to kill. Although his regulations sounded especially punitive, Bland argued that “it is more Equitable a few Rash, Impatient People… should suffer than endanger the Lives of Thousands, that might be Infected by their going on Shore before the time of their Quarantine is Expired.”

These diseased bodies, Bland suggested, needed to be monitored at all times to ensure there was a distinct separation between them and the healthy.

Although Gibraltar did not have enough space to erect a lazaretto, being one of the only ports in the Mediterranean without one, Bland did his best to ensure that the proper precautions were taken. With a lazaretto, appointed officers were assigned to caring for the quarantined individuals and goods and they, with all necessary provisions and equipment, remained within the station without traveling back to the port. Such complete separation was not feasible in Gibraltar, so Bland mandated that only the Prattick Master could come into contact with quarantined vessels. In order to supply those in quarantine, the Prattick Master would row out nearby the ship and place the supplies in an empty rowboat for the quarantined ship to tow in after his prattick boat had left. Any letters that those in quarantine needed to send ashore would


74 In 1754 James Read, the Prattick Master, did petition parliament for funds to build a lazaretto, with the support of then Governor Braddock. However, there was no response given to Read and in the same year British efforts to build the Chetney Hill lazaretto were also abandoned. See TNA, CO 91/2, “A Scheme or Proposal for the Better Preservation of the Health and Regulation of Quarantine and Prattick in Gibraltar,” May 1754.
also be placed on the rowboat where they would be “Smoak[ed] with Brimstone Matches and washed with Vinegar” before being brought to the town. While these measures did help hamper the spread of infection, they were not as rigorous as practices employed in other Mediterranean port cities. Yet without additional funding from Britain and the establishment of a lazaretto, Bland could not feasibly improve upon his current regulations. Although the governor implemented new boundaries between the diseased and healthy and mandated stricter surveillance and monitoring for signs of infection, Gibraltar’s borders still had places of weakness where disease could creep in.

Bland also sought to connect Gibraltar to the many Mediterranean networks of communication that monitored plague outbreaks. With a newly appointed Prattick Master and the institution of health officers in the town, Gibraltar was able to participate in such communication chains that existed across Christian Europe. These had developed hand-in-hand with quarantine regulations in many of the region’s key port cities, offering a means to convey important information and keep all participants in the know regarding any potential threats. In this regard, Gibraltar’s constant contact with and closeness to North Africa worked in Bland’s favor. As a future governor noted, those in Gibraltar have “more frequent, and better opportunitys than they can have in any other Part of Europe of knowing the State of the Health in

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76 Recognizing that a lazaretto was not feasible in Gibraltar, Read, in his proposal to improve quarantine, suggested a manned, armed vessel to guard the quarantined ships. This vessel could ensure that those in quarantine had not contact with the town or other vessels and it would circumvent the issue of the Prattick Master acting as a conduit between the healthy and the potentially contagious. While the armed vessel would require funds for maintenance, Read believed it could be financed by raising the anchorage fee slightly, which he thought could be down without many complaints from masters. See TNA, CO 91/2, “A Scheme or Proposal for the Better Preservation of the Health and Regulation of Quarantine and Prattick in Gibraltar,” May 1754.

77 Harrison, “Disease and the Modern World,” p. 60.
the Kingdoms of Fez, and Morocco.” Not only could Bland glean information from the daily visitors to the garrison, but he was also able to establish informants in North Africa to keep him apprised of any developments there. As he noted, he stayed in close communication with the British consuls across the region as well as a group of Catholic priests in Mequinez, a number of Christian merchants in Tetuan, and “Jews of Credit in several parts of that Country.” This connectivity allowed him to make quick decisions and respond to any threats as they developed, without waiting for news from other states or instruction from London, at which point it could be too late to intervene. He could also dispel any false rumors about disease in the region, which could affect the garrison’s trade or increase its ships’ time spent in quarantine. In addition, as a credible member of these health networks, Bland could present new developments to the neighboring commandant in Spain, demonstrating Gibraltar’s commitment to disease prevention and his role in these efforts. With Bland’s contributions, Gibraltar became a key link in the chain of health-related knowledge throughout the Mediterranean.

These innovations, Bland hoped, would demonstrate to Spain and the rest of Europe that he was invested in preserving the health of the garrison and those connected to it. By establishing these tactics of quarantine in the garrison, the governor sought to align himself with Christian Europe as being dedicated to disease prevention and preventing the ill effects of the town’s southern neighbors. By following in the footsteps of other European ports, the governor sought to embrace their practices and the associations that followed. These “Christian” methods would not only help rid Gibraltar of suspicion related to disease but also dispel the cultural and religious

78 TNA, CO 91/12, Thomas Fowke order, 13 February 1756.
79 TNA, CO 91/62,”Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 78. This proved very useful during the 1750 outbreak, when Bland sent a wide variety of letters to his many contacts in an effort to determine the true threat of the disease. These letters are found throughout TNA, CO 91/11.
80 TNA, CO 91/62,”Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 65.
associations that accompanied such beliefs. The governor’s greatest fear, in many ways, was that Spain and the rest of Europe would “block [Gibraltar] up so close… so that [it] wou’d be left to [itself], and in a manner abandoned by all but the Moors.” This “abandonment,” he believed, could ruin Gibraltar, effectually renouncing its place within Europe and relegating it to the Muslim world with all its “undesirable” connotations. If that were to happen, he suggested, the territory would be lost to Britain, not only physically but also ideologically. As a British territory, albeit one with close connections to Africa, the governor needed Gibraltar to remain a clear part of Christian Europe, especially in regards to health. Otherwise, they feared, the southern Mediterranean influence, with its many Gibraltarian residents, could overwhelm the territory, affecting its well-being, its practices, and its reputation. Recognizing that Gibraltar could not be entirely cut off from North Africa, Bland sought to embrace European practices as much as possible in an effort to include the territory within the boundaries of Europe and dissociate it from the undesirable, “plaguy bodies” of its southern neighbors.

The 1750 Outbreak: Plague across the Straits

While he had shown his ability to respond to the general health needs of the town, Governor Bland’s ability to navigate the challenges of a potential epidemic was put to the test in May 1750. On May 6, Bland wrote to Secretary of State Bedford that the plague had once again broken out in Morocco. Recognizing that his day-to-day protective measures would not be suitable to contain the disease if it were to reach Gibraltar’s shore, Bland decided to institute more rigorous regulations. He immediately quarantined all vessels arriving from Morocco for forty days, or, if they refused to do so, forced them to leave the bay. To enforce this strict

quarantine, the governor requested that British administrators send a man of war to patrol the bay and monitor the quarantined ships.\(^{82}\) A week later the governor instituted more stringent restrictions, informing Bedford, “The Breaking out of the Plague… is a matter of too great Importance to Europe; but more Particularly to this Place… to be Neglected.”\(^{83}\) Without the aid of a lazaretto, Bland decided, it was too risky to keep any ship that had touched in Morocco at Gibraltar, even if it were put in quarantine. He sent away all such vessels and required all who wanted to dock at the port to be examined first by a guard boat that he had hired to enforce a proper quarantine. If the guards believed that the ship had been to Morocco, they informed the master that he was to sail away immediately or else be fired upon and sunk with all of the goods and people onboard. A few Gibraltarian setees that had been in Tangier when the plague first appeared were allowed to return to the port, but they were required to perform a lengthy quarantine in Catalan Bay under the eyes of a continual guard presence.\(^{84}\) Tightening the borders surrounding Gibraltar, Bland sought to keep his healthy garrison separate from anyone or anything that could bring in the North African disease.

As Bland informed British Consul Latton and Secretary Bedford, in addition to the stringent quarantine restrictions, he felt that he was “under a Necessity of cutting off our Communication with Barbary” in order to secure the territory.\(^{85}\) Charged with protecting the safety of the town and garrison, the governor thought it would be contrary to his orders to allow any contact with the infected state. His sources abroad informed him that at least six to eight people were dying each day in Tangier and the disease continued to rage in Fez and Mequinez.

\(^{82}\) TNA, CO 91/11, Humphrey Bland to Duke of Bedford, 6 May 1750, fo. 34.
\(^{83}\) TNA, CO 91/11, Humphrey Bland to Duke of Bedford, 14 May 1750, fo. 43.
\(^{84}\) TNA, CO 91/11, Humphrey Bland to Duke of Bedford, 14 May 1750, fo. 43.
\(^{85}\) TNA, CO 91/11, Humphrey Bland to William Latton, 4 May 1750, fo. 37.
Areas such as Larache and Alcasa had reportedly already finished with the disease, as had Arzilla where it had “ceased for want of Fuel to feed the Flame, having destroyed all or the greatest pat of the Inhabitants.” Tetuan, one of the garrison’s most important suppliers, was reportedly free from the disease thanks to the efforts of the Alcaide who, Bland admitted, “was taking all the Precautions he Possibly could to keep it from them.” The Alcaide had cut off all communication with infected towns and prevented all travelers from those places from entering the city, including the Alcaide of Tangier. He even “attends in person at the Gate of the Town and does not trust this Charge to any of his Guards,” believing that his utmost vigilance was necessary so that “this City may preserve her Health and the Communication with your Garrison.”

The governor was understandably concerned by the threat such an outbreak posed for Gibraltar. The majority of the cities and towns struck down by the disease, especially Tangier, were the garrison’s key suppliers and were typically in constant communication with its port. Also, news of the disease and the rising death tolls appeared to the governor to be accurate, coming directly from the English vice consul and Spanish friars living in that region. Yet, other factors came into play also in Bland’s desire to cut off communication with Tetuan and the rest of Morocco. In particular, there was the problem of Spain. With North Africa plagued by disease, the governor needed to court the Spanish government in order to receive provisions for the garrison. Seeing as the Spaniards were “so intolerably Scrupulous on the least Shaddow of Such a Disorder, lest the Distance be ever so Remote,” it was especially necessary, Bland

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86 TNA, CO 91/11, translation of a letter from Andrew Pastrana (Chief of the Spanish Friars) to James Read, 19 May 1750, fo. 47; TNA, CO 91/11, translation of a letter from Isaac Dias Carvalho (English Vice Consul in Tangier) to James Read, 19 May 1750, fo. 43-44.

87 TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 25 May 1750, fo. 46.

88 TNA, CO 91/11, Latton to Bland, 8 May 1750, Pastrana to Read, 19 May 1750, fo. 47.
believed, to take whatever precautions necessary to facilitate that relationship. He did not want his European neighbors to “have any just Pretence of forbidding their Small Vessels with Provisions from coming here.” If the Spaniards refused to supply the garrison, the governor worried, he would be forced to reopen trade with Morocco or else starve. Implicitly, Bland was also concerned of the effect such contact with Morocco would have on his newly repaired friendship with Spain and the commandant of the Campo across the border. He feared, it seemed, that allowing communication with any towns in North Africa would cancel out all of his efforts to align Gibraltar with Europe and their methods of disease prevention.

Although it appeared that Bland desired to break free from his North African ties, such a move was not entirely feasible. At the moment Tetuan was supposedly free from disease and embracing similar quarantine practices as Gibraltar itself, making it less necessary for the governor to sever ties with that city. Also, prior to the outbreak, British officials had been in the midst of negotiations with the Bey of Tetuan to release British captives taken by Moroccan corsairs. The London government had already sent a new consul, Mr. Petticrew, who was on his way to Gibraltar to help expedite the agreement. Eager to “get rid of that Troublesome, and Expensive Affair,” Bland did not want to let the plague “retard our Treaty.” Bland also wanted to avoid upsetting the Alcaide directly. As he informed Secretary Bedford, if the Alcaide “think[s] we Slight him too much at this time of Danger,” the leader could retaliate against the garrison. Once the disease passed, Gibraltar would likely return to Morocco for its supplies, those being more affordable and generally reliable than provisions from Spain. If the governor

89 TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 25 May 1750, fo. 46.
90 TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 8 June 1750, fo. 50.
91 TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 17 July 1750, fo. 71-72.
92 TNA, CO 91/11, Humphrey Bland to Duke of Bedford, 4 May 1750, fo. 37; TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 14 May 1750, fo. 43; TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 25 May 1750, fo. 46.
angered the Alcaide in the meantime, he would likely raise the prices for the provisions. Or, the governor feared, the Moroccan leader might encourage his corsairs to raid and capture British ships in the Straits. As Bland conceded, it was necessary to “keep them in Humour” to “prevent their Molesting the British Trading Ships.”

Forced to navigate between the need for contact and the threat of contagion, Bland chose the latter. In the end, Bland decided to try to appease the Alcaide of Tetuan while favoring the desires of the Spanish government, “thinking it the least Evil of the Two.” Out of fear that the plague would eventually come to Tetuan, which it did a month later, and desiring to preserve his newfound friendship with Spain, Bland chose to suspend almost all contact with Morocco. He did, however, promise the Alcaide that he would send him a letter every ten to twelve days via a small boat which would remain in the Bay of Tetuan without any communication with land. Despite this assurance, Bland did not follow through with his promise; in August the Alcaide complained that it had been forty days since he had last heard from the governor. The governor tried to reassure the Alcaide that his absence had been “much against my inclination,” driven by the “Obstinacy of the Spaniards” and their “jealous Temper.” Yet such actions were necessary.

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93 TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 13 June 1750, fo. 52; TNA, CO 91/62,”Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 43.
94 TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 17 July 1750, fo. 71-72.
95 Prior to Bland’s governorship, the land borders, and often the sea borders, had been closed between the two since 1727. However, the Court of Madrid, thanks to the intercession of the commandant, gave orders to Spanish merchants to supply Gibraltar with cattle by land during the outbreak abroad. See TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 13 June 1750, fo. 52.
96 TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 13 June 1750, fo. 52; TNA, CO 91/11, Alcaide of Tetuan to Bland, 21 June 1750, fo. 53.
97 TNA, CO 91/11, Alcaide of Tetuan to Bland, 14 August 1750, fo. 80.
98 TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Alcaide of Tetuan, 7 August 1750, fo. 84; TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 13 June 1750, fo. 52.
he argued, both for the good of the garrison and “the Crown of Morocco.”\textsuperscript{99} Gibraltar, he maintained, was “of the greatest Consequence... to our Allies in all parts of Africa,” and by protecting it from harm, he was preserving Moroccan commerce by keeping it in friendly, British hands.\textsuperscript{100} Despite Bland’s rhetoric in his letters to the Alcaide of Tetuan, it appears that he willingly chose to separate himself from North Africa and align himself with Europe. In doing so, the governor signified that he was fully invested in the health of the garrison and the preservation of Europeans’ health, even if it meant upsetting his Moroccan allies. As he proclaimed to Bedford, the health of the garrison “was of more Consequence to Great Britain, than that of Mr. Latton, our Captives, and the Friendship of the Alcaide of Tetuan.”\textsuperscript{101} No such dismissive statements were made regarding the relationship with Spain. Bland’s decision, in essence, said to his Christian neighbors that Gibraltar was one of them, regardless of its close ties with Muslim states and its many Moroccan residents. By instituting a strict quarantine, and even more so, cutting off communication between the garrison and Morocco, Bland tried to limit the influence of North Africa and close the spaces of contact and contagion while situating himself within the Christian, European fold.

However, Bland’s isolation of North Africa would not last; while the plague continued to ravage North African cities, British officials urged Bland to reopen communication with the infected territory. Unwilling to further delay their negotiations with Moroccan leaders, the London government sent Consul Pettigrew to Gibraltar with orders to continue on across the

\textsuperscript{99} TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Alcaide of Tetuan, 7 August 1750, fo. 84; TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Alcaide of Tetuan, 31 July 1750, fo. 79.

\textsuperscript{100} TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Alcaide of Tetuan, 31 July 1750, fo. 79.

\textsuperscript{101} TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 17 July 1750, fo. 71-72.
Despite his hesitation, Bland was required to heed the “interest of my King and Country” and reopen communication with North Africa, albeit on a limited basis. While the governor hoped that he could still maintain his friendship with the Spaniards, and keep the garrison free from disease, he was disheartened to have to compromise his views and allow the vexing Moroccan influence back into Gibraltar. Spain had supplied them “Plentifully with Fresh Provisions,” whereas North African corsairs were seizing British ships and the Alcaide had embraced a “peremptory and haughty manner” in his letters. Although Bland denied the Alcaide’s accusations that the governor had “changed [his] Sentiments, and turn’d them toward Spain,” his actions as well as his tone in his memoir suggest otherwise. Bland appeared to want to remain in Spain’s good graces, while “defer[ing] opening a Free Commerce” with Morocco. Such a relationship would establish Gibraltar as a civilized port within the boundaries of Christian Europe and with the power to control North African interests and their involvement in the territory.

Conclusion

Disease, as mentioned previously, was not only epidemiological but also ideologically driven. As this chapter shows, illness carried with it several connotations, that of health, geography, religion, and culture. Disease prevention was also a loaded practice, suggesting that those who followed the stringent practices of quarantine and health governance were more enlightened and advanced than those who (supposedly) embraced religious doctrines of

102 TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 4 July 1750, fo. 57.
103 TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Alcaide of Tetuan, 7/18 August 1750, fo. 84.
104 TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 21 July 1750, fo. 65; TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Alcaide of Tetuan, 18 August 1750, fo. 83-84.
105 TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to the Alcaide of Tetuan, 18 August 1750, fo. 84.
predestination. Such technologies required a great deal of state and government involvement, necessitating close surveillance, the transfer of knowledge, and the production of explicit health-related paperwork, including bills of health and notices of potential outbreaks, in an effort to prevent and contain disease. These differences served to create what was considered to be an uncrossable boundary between Christian Europe and the Islamic states of Africa and the Ottoman territories. As the chapter argues, practices of disease prevention sought to make sanitary borders between places of disease and those of health. These borders appeared on many levels, from larger ones (i.e. diseased state/region versus healthy state/region) to smaller ones (i.e. dirty house versus clean house). As a result, disease management required constant negotiation on a number of scales as well. Governors felt the need to implement both larger and smaller changes in an effort to properly control all aspects of disease. This included micropolitical tactics like reforming the body as well as macropolitical institutions like quarantine. Yet both sought to give those who controlled such practices the sense that could govern disease and create clear boundaries between the sick and the healthy.

Yet, as Bland’s experience shows, disease management, and quarantine in particular, was not an all-encompassing practice; gaps remained, which allowed contact and intermingling between the two spheres. Despite Bland’s interventions in the health of the town and his embrace of governmental tactics of surveillance and discipline, the governor could not entirely control the process nor fully limit the exchanges between Gibraltar and its southern neighbors. Instead, the garrison was forced to remain open to all of its Mediterranean influences and the troubles they brought with them. Gibraltar’s borders could not remain entirely closed to any of its neighbors, influenced by all of the surrounding states and the opinions of those within them. Nor were its boundaries entirely dictated by Britain. For the most part, Gibraltar’s governors served as the
frontline and watchmen of disease, funneling information back to Britain rather than the reverse. As this chapter demonstrates, the health history of Gibraltar was contingent upon its relationships with the surrounding states and required certain practices of governmentality in order to define it as a “healthy” and secure port.
**Figure 3.1:** Example of a 1780 Order in Council regarding quarantine procedures

(GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1780)
Chapter 4

“Subjects of His Brittanick Majesty”: Passholders and the Construction of Belonging in Gibraltar

Writing to the British consul in Lisbon in 1777, Governor George Augustus Elliot expressed his concerns about granting Mediterranean passes to several of Gibraltar’s residents. Mediterranean passes provided British subjects with the freedom and protection to travel the seas without the threat of capture by North African corsairs. While the passes were only to be granted to British subjects, Eliott feared that these individuals were not true subjects or worthy of the pass privilege. One of the inhabitants in question was Pasqual Scarnichia Sr., a mariner born in Naples who migrated to the garrison years prior. Although the Civil Court confirmed that Scarnichia was indeed a naturalized subject of Great Britain by act of Parliament, it did not assuage Elliot’s fears of the man’s loyalty. As he informed Hort, “I am nevertheless afraid that he, as well as many others who are now soliciting for passes here, have their connections with foreigners.” To Eliott these “connections” suggested that these mariners had the means and the motivation to work for other states rather than supporting the flag that protected them. Mediterranean passes, Eliott believed, were a privilege available only to those who had proven themselves to be worthy subjects of the empire. Foreign passholders were just too great a problem for these governors, jeopardizing their efforts to secure the territory, govern their maritime subjects, and protect the name of Britain and the title of British subject.

Following accords with Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers, and Morocco, Charles II established the Mediterranean pass system in 1682 as a means to promote English trade by protecting his

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1 GGA, Diary 1777-1778, 15-17 June 1777; GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 3, 1774-1778, Elliot to Fraser, 15 June 1777, fo. 247-248.
2 GGA, Letters to Consuls Lisbon & Cadiz, 1769-1797, Eliott to Hort, 11 September 1777, fo. 66.
subjects against attacks by the North African corsairs. Like privateers, corsairs were state-sanctioned individuals given license by their leaders to attack enemies of the state. They were permitted to capture enemy ships and keep the vessel and its goods as prizes so long as they gave their sovereign a share of the profit. While some mariners and passengers on board the seized vessels were released upon arriving in North African ports, most were held for ransom by state leaders in order to garner additional profits. By the seventeenth and eighteenth century, North African corsairing was at its peak with cruisers operating across the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and North Sea. These corsairs traveled as far afield as the American colonies and northern European coats, attacking cargo and passenger ships and raiding seaside towns. In a seven-year period corsairs captured almost five hundred English and Scottish ships at sea along with entire populations of coastal cities and ports. During this period, the captivity crisis plagued European

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3 The pass system actually began in 1662 following English peace treaties with Tunis and Tripoli. Per the Anglo-Tripoli treaty, the vessel was allowed to proceed safely upon the master producing a pass from the Lord High Admiral of England or if the majority of the ship’s company were English subjects. It was not until the signing of the Anglo-Algiers treaty in 1682 that it became mandatory to carry a Mediterranean pass for safe passage without fear of capture, according to the terms of the agreement. Consequently, it was not until 1682 that the pass system was formalized due to the new requirements. See David Richardson, “Introduction: The Mediterranean Passes in the Public Record Office, London,” in British Records Relating to America in Microform, ed. by W.E. Minchinton (East Ardsley: EP Michform, 1981), p. 5.


5 According to Matar, from 1609 to 1616 corsairs captured 466 English and Scottish ships, a rate that was fairly typical throughout this period. In a single year in the 1630s, corsairs also captured the entire population of the port of Baltimore in Cork as well as 800 residents from the coast of Iceland. The corsairs’ peak in relation to British captives occurred between 1625 and 1640. Scholars suggest that it was the Europeans’ increased mobility and commercial traffic in these regions at that time that made corsair attacks even more likely. See Matar, “English Accounts,” pp. 563, 569; Clark, “Barbary Corsairs,” p. 23.
states and its peoples, limiting travel, impacting commerce, diminishing revenue, and bringing fear to many.\(^6\)

Yet the Mediterranean pass system freed English subjects from such fears, granting protection to English carriers across the corsair-ridden seas so long as they confirmed their subject status. As one contemporary author noted, “the protection afforded by these passes is such, that no ships, which traverse the seas frequented by these rovers, ever fail to furnish themselves with them; whether in the trade to the East-Indies, Africa, or the Levant, or in the trade to Spain, Italy, or any part of the Mediterranean.”\(^7\) Per the 1682 regulations, in order to receive a pass, the owner, master, and two-thirds of the crew, as well as the ship itself, had to be English or colonial-built or a foreign vessel made free. The Surveyor of the Act of Navigation had to confirm that these requirements were met and the necessary paperwork and oaths had been submitted before a pass could be granted. The pass, issued by the Lord High Admiral, informed all readers that “the said Ship appearing unto us, by good Testimony upon Oath, to belong to the subjects of Our Soveraigne Lord the King, and to noe foreigner.”\(^8\) Produced on a unique parchment size, Mediterranean passes were cut into two halves with scalloped edges (Figure 4.1). The top halves were sent to the corsairs while the bottom halves were given to the

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\(^6\) Hostages also caused difficulties for the state at home as the government was forced to see to their families’ complaints. Because those captured were typically the male breadwinners of the family, the loss of their income typically meant that those at home sank into poverty and had to petition the king for assistance. These demands were often quite vocal, bringing the corsair issue to the forefront of European domestic politics. As Nabil Matar has argued, in England they even played a significant role in disputes between the king and parliament just prior to the English Civil War. Nabil Matar, “The Barbary Corsairs, King Charles I and the Civil War,” Seventeenth Century 16, 2 (2001), p. 244.

\(^7\) John Reeves, A History of the Law of Shipping and Navigation (London, 1792), p. 424. By the 1730s, the majority of English vessels carried this protection, and the government issued nearly 1,200 passes annually. According to historians’ calculations, approximately 25-33 percent of ships bound to Spain, Portugal and the West Indies carried passes, as did over 40 percent traveling to North America, 75 percent headed to the Mediterranean, and 90 percent bound to Africa and the East Indies. It appears that more expensive voyages necessitated additional protection and insurance coverage for such investments, which is why vessels traveling certain routes were more likely to carry a pass. See Richardson, “Mediterranean Passes,” pp. 9-10.

masters to carry. When the corsairs stopped a vessel, the master would present his half, which would align with the corsairs’ piece, confirming its validity. Once the pass was deemed valid, English masters were permitted to proceed on their voyages “without any Lett, hindrance, seizure or Molestation.”

This system was designed to privilege English traders in the Mediterranean and other seas by protecting them against one of the most powerful commercial hindrances at that time. Rather than functioning solely as a tool for monitoring and surveillance, I argue that Mediterranean passes originally served primarily as evidence of state assistance and the protection of its subjects. In her work on pilgrim passports, Radhika Singha made a similar argument, contending that these forms of identification were used to monitor travelers as well as demonstrate the state’s support of these individuals. By granting carriers the opportunity to travel without impediment, the Mediterranean passes suggested that the British state supported their maritime ventures as they worked for the interests of Britain. In 1722 this support was expanded to Britain’s Mediterranean territories, including “all Inhabitants, Subjects of Gibraltar” as eligible passholders. Following popular ideologies of the period, the Order in Council affirmed the importance of foreign commerce for the development and growth of the state by utilizing any and all resources that were available, including these newly adopted subjects.

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9 This method helped protect English sailors from any possible language barriers or misunderstandings that could arise. It was also designed to help prevent pass forgeries.


12 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Order of the Council,” 14 June 1722, fo. 2

13 See Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 62-64. As Pamela Crossley has also argued, imperial policies could promote cultural diversity and assimilation simultaneously. See Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton, “Conclusion,” in Empire at the
However, the order’s broad language was a source of concern for Gibraltar’s governors, in particular Governors Robert Boyd (1768-1777, 1790-1794) and George Augustus Eliott (1777-1787). Not only did Gibraltar’s commanders shoulder any blame for their mariners’ abuse of pass protection, but they also felt that it was their duty as British governors to protect the name of Britain and the privilege of being a British subject. Because the Mediterranean pass system was intricately tied to subjecthood, they believed it was their responsibility to make sure that Gibraltar’s unworthy residents were not enjoying undue benefits just because of their location.

In response to this threat, Governors Boyd and Eliott established a formalized system for pass applications, employing conceptions of subjecthood used across the empire to determine who was indeed eligible to receive a Mediterranean pass. These governors, following a “logic of regulation” as described by Radhika Mongia, sought to restrict pass protection to only those that they deemed worthy, based on the mariner’s history of residency and service.¹⁴ As Tamar Herzog demonstrates in her work, it was not uncommon for states to divide migrants into those who willing integrated themselves into the community and served the monarch – these were deemed “good” immigrants – and those who were not willing or were different ethnically, racially, or otherwise.¹⁵ I argue that Gibraltar’s governors’ logic enabled them to better control those “bad” residents who the commanders believed were untrustworthy or suspect because of

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¹⁴ This is different from the “logic of facilitation” embraced by the British government which opened up opportunities for all in an effort to promote its own commercial interests. See Radhika Viyas Mongia, “Race, Nationality, Mobility: A History of the Passport,” in *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation*, ed. by Antoinette Burton (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 197. See also Hannah Weiss Muller, “Bonds of Belonging: Subjecthood and the British Empire,” *Journal of British Studies* 53 (2014): 29-58.

their interest in and dedication to foreign states. By embracing strict definitions of “subject,” the
governors believed they could best limit the movements of questionable residents and help
preserve the sanctity of British subjecthood. For them, subject status was a tactic of governance
with its ability to intervene in the problem of this mobile, foreign population. As “an instrument
and object of social closure,” I maintain that the governors sought to employ subjecthood to
ensure that worthy, loyal inhabitants could reap the benefits of the pass system while
simultaneously restricting and isolating those they deemed problematic. Passes marked the
privileged population of maritime Gibraltar, signifying that these individuals were worthy of
British protection and could carry the name of British subject.

As this chapter shows, subjecthood and Mediterranean passes were intricately tied
together, and by managing one, Gibraltar’s governors believed they could in turn control the
other. Governors Boyd and Eliott, fearful of the challenges that their multi-ethnic population
posed to notions of subjecthood, as well as the very real financial and commercial threats it

passport systems functioned not just to restrict but also to facilitate and enable movement, an idea that Radhika
Singha also echoes. David Shearer, on the other hand, argues that passports allowed for the isolation of threatening
populations and were a mechanism to protect the state from harm. See Radhika V. Mongia, “Historicizing State
Sovereignty: Inequality and the Form of Equivalence,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 49, 2 (April
2007), pp. 403-404; Singha, “Passport, Ticket, and India-Rubber Stamp, especially p. 59; Shearer, “Elements Near
76, no. 4 (December 2004), p. 838. See also John Torpey, “Revolutions and Freedom of Movement: An Analysis of
Passport Controls in the French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions,” Theory and Society 21.6 (Dec 1997), p. 840;
John Torpey, “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’”

17 Christian Joppke, referencing Rogers Brubaker’s Citizenship and Nationhood in Germany and France (1992),
notes that citizenship was a circular process that enabled states to remain “relatively closed and self-perpetuating
communities… open only at the margins to the exogenous recruitment of new members.” In the case of Gibraltar, it
was certainly a marginal site which the British government used to introduce new subjects with their unique talents
and resources into the empire. See Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration, pp. 16-17. Mongia also argues that the
“peculiar situation of the colony” enabled subjecthood to be modified according to the needs of the metropole. See
Mongia, “Race, Nationality, Mobility,” p. 197. See also Andreas Fahrmeir’s discussion of how naturalization was
primarily a local affair, conducted by each region’s customary procedures and differing from place to place. See
Fahrmeir, Citizens and Aliens: Foreigners and the Law in Britain and the German States, 1789-1870 (New York:
posed to British maritime trade, reflected that changes needed to be made. Their commercial population, in their mind, was both unknown and uncontrolled: the mobility inherent in the lifestyles of these maritime peoples made it difficult to track and manage this particular group, and the vast majority were foreign-born which meant their motivations and actions were suspect. Because the mobile body was a difficult one to govern, as James C. Scott has shown, Gibraltar’s commanders felt the need to create and employ additional technologies of governance in order to better grasp this group of peoples and prevent them from jeopardizing British interests and its reputation. This required the production of an archive which could create a concrete field of knowledge of this population and offer the governors a means to control them. By answering the question of who counted as a subject in Gibraltar, the governors sought to ameliorate the Mediterranean pass problem, better control these mobile subjects, and create a system of governance that determined who was worthy of inclusion in the British territory and its empire.

*The Root of the Problem: The Expansion of the Pass System in Gibraltar*

Governor Eliott’s fears about issuing passes to the Genoese mariners stemmed from concerns about the “scandalous abuse too often made of Mediterranean Passes.” As he had learned from his predecessor, Governor Boyd, there had been a growing number of “Gibraltarian” passholders, many of whom, contrary to regulations, did not actually appear to be British subjects or working for British interests. This problem, Boyd noted, was due to the imprecise language of the 1722 Order in Council that had expanded the qualifications for pass protection in Britain’s Mediterranean territories. “The present regulations of the Admiralty,” he

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explained, “say that the Governor is to issue Passes to His Majesty’s Subjects Inhabitants of Gibraltar of whatever Religion.” Boyd found these regulations puzzling as “I find all Inhabitants have been hitherto deemed subjects whether Natives or Foreigners.” As he understood it, this legislation appeared to empower all residents to apply for pass protection, regardless of their qualifications as subjects.

Prior to the 1722 Order in Council the vast majority of Gibraltar’s mariners were unable to apply for pass protection because they were not born in any dominions belonging to the Crown of England.”¹⁹ There were no legal precedents in the garrison for inherited or adopted subjects of colonial acquisition, nor were there opportunities to apply for naturalization or denization in Gibraltar.²⁰ This meant that only about ten percent of the population could legally apply for, receive, and sail under the protection of a British Mediterranean pass; the other ninety percent could not safely leave the garrison or participate in their trades thanks to its location in the epicenter of corsair activity. As an early governor, William Hargrave observed, “the Spaniards and other Inhabitants of that Town, who are of a different Religion, are excluded from the Benefit of such Passes, whereby the Trading Ships and Vessels are exposed to the Algerines,

¹⁹ Quoted in Muller, “Bonds of Belonging,” p. 32. See her piece for a greater overview on legal decisions regarding subjecthood (pp. 32-33).

who, by the Treatys now subsisting, require such Passes shall be produced.”21 Without the participation of these migrants, Gibraltar seemed likely to fail, requiring the maritime and commercial skills of its foreign-born residents to support the garrison and its needs.

The 1722 Order in Council, however, sought to remedy this problem and facilitate the use of Mediterranean passes by Britain’s Mediterranean residents. The order declared that Gibraltar’s governors were now permitted to issue passes “to His Majesty’s Subjects, Inhabitants of Gibraltar, of what Religion soever they be when they shall apply for them.”22 The attached oath and bond employed similar language, permitting “people of the Town of Gibraltar who now dwell in the Town and are Subjects of His Brittanick Majesty” to participate in the pass system.23 The new orders also compromised on other stipulations: those in Gibraltar were not obliged to crew the ship with a three-quarters majority of British seamen and they were allowed to sail foreign-built ships so long as they “wear the Colours commonly borne by those that belong to Great Britain.”24 Visually, the cut of the pass itself was also different, signaling to others that the pass and its bearer were protected by the British flag but operated under different regulations.25

According to the language of the order, virtually any “inhabitant” of Gibraltar became a subject and was entitled to British pass protection. By including Gibraltar’s foreign-born

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21 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Order of the Council,” 14 June 1722, fo. 1-2. Some early commanders tried to bend the rules by giving these residents a memorandum stating they were entitled to the rights of the pass, but this angered British merchants posted abroad. They argued that passes “were design’d only for His Majesties Subjects, & not to be sold to Forreigners,” and the governors were forced to stop this practice. TNA, CO 91/5, Cotton to Methuen, 26 January 1716/17.


23 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Forms of an Oath to be Taken by the Masters of Ships or Vessels Belonging to Gibraltar,” fo. 4-5, “Bond from the Masters of Ships or Vessels, belonging to Gibraltar to the King,” fo. 7-8.


25 TNA, SP 89/37, Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty to Compton, 11 December 1730, fo. 51-53; TNA, ADM 2/1319, Burchett to Clayton, 31 March 1730, fo. 12; TNA, SP 36/18, “Order in Council Settling the Fees to be Taken for Mediterranean Passes,” 16 March 1730, fo. 47-50.
inhabitants, such as the many Genoese and Jewish residents who were the primary commercial workers in the town, the order enabled these merchants and mariners to move about the region unhindered, free to pursue their trades. Many of these individuals were part of larger commercial diasporas that had a strong presence throughout much of the Mediterranean, North Africa, and Northern Europe. Covered by the protection of the pass system, these merchants were free to participate in the garrison’s economy and integrate it into their existing trade networks. Such work would not only bring profits for the individuals but also for Gibraltar and for Britain, introducing the state to new markets and furthering its growth and influence in those regions. By adopting these migrants as subjects, the British state was able to “lay hold of” these residents and utilize their many talents and resources.

It seemed that this order would be the solution to many of the garrison’s problems: its inhabitants could now gather the necessary supplies and provisions; they could further the town’s commercial growth; and they could travel around the region working in support of the garrison and its needs. Under this legislation mariners like Pasqual Scarnichia, Sr. could now fully participate as part of Gibraltar’s maritime community. Scarnichia, like many other foreign mariners, was of great use to the garrison and the British empire, fighting in both the Seven Years’ War and the War of the American Revolution as a privateer under British colors. His

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26 See chapter 1 as well.


28 Archival records show that he was an inhabitant of Minorca when his sons were born in the 1750s and that he fought for Britain as a privateer in the Seven Years’ War. It is unclear when Scarnichia actually arrived in Gibraltar, but he is recorded in the 1778 List of Inhabitants Houses as owning a dwelling house on Artillery Street and Cannon Lane that he held under mortgage by a land grant from General Bland, which does not necessarily mean that his case was seen and approved during the governor’s 1749 Court of Enquiry. His bondsman, Alexander Mackenzie confirmed Scarnichia’s property ownership in 1777 when questioned about Scarnichia’s residence, stating that he owned a home behind the Catholic church that had cost him over £500 and which produced about 150 dollars monthly with a net worth of £2000. See GGA, Box: 1777 & 1791 Lists of Inhabitants, 1777 List of Inhabitants, 1778 List of Inhabitants Houses, 1791 List of Inhabitants; GGA, Diary 1777 & 1778-1782, Tuesday 17 June 1777.
sons, Pasqual Jr. and James, also volunteered as privateers during the American Revolution and the French wars.\textsuperscript{29} The Scarnichias, both father and sons, were also prominent merchants, frequently sailing across the Mediterranean to provide supplies for the territory, even during wartime.\textsuperscript{30} These men were some of the few who remained in the garrison during the Great Siege (1779-1783) to gather supplies despite the risk of capture.\textsuperscript{31} According to the surviving pass registers, the Scarnichias were granted passes each year from approximately 1766 to 1797 and traveled across the region, appearing in Tunis, Malaga, Lisbon, Sicily, Genoa, and Larache for various commercial reasons.\textsuperscript{32} Even the Governor of Tangier remarked to Governor Eliott how glad he was to see Pasqual as he sent him home with provisions for the garrison. Scarnichia was known by leaders across the Mediterranean as being “a very capable man in His Nation’s Service” and offering a number of benefits for the garrison.\textsuperscript{33} Men such as him traveled and traded widely across the Mediterranean in the name of Britain; they fought under the British flag; and they helped strengthen existing ties and forge new relationships with markets and states across the region.

In an effort to make the most of Gibraltar’s inhabitants’ skills, the state was eager to grant them subjecthood in order to encourage and support their movements. Subjecthood, as understood in the eighteenth century, emphasized the personal bond between the monarch and his people, which created a sense of belonging and loyalty. In return for the subjects’ pledges of

\textsuperscript{29} GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 2, fo. 96-100, 109-111, 120-123, 153-156, 173-175, 184-185.
\textsuperscript{30} GGA, Letters to Lisbon & Cadiz, 1769-1797, Eliott to Hort, 11 September 1777, fo. 66.
\textsuperscript{31} GGA, Diary No. 4. June, 1782-June, 1786; GGA, Miscellaneous Papers. 1780-1783.
\textsuperscript{32} The pass registers span from 1766 to 1777 and sporadically from 1784 to 1797. See GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, fo. 10-11, 14-15, 20-53, 78-79, 86-91; Admiralty Book 2, fo. 58-59, 72-79, 212-213, 228-233, and several unnumbered pages; GGA, Diary No. 4. June, 1782-June, 1786; GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1780-1783.
\textsuperscript{33} GGA, Miscellaneous Papers. 1780-1783, Abdelemalek Ben Mohamed to Eliott, 2 March 1783.
allegiance, the monarch was expected to offer protection to them and grant them certain privileges – in the case of Gibraltar, this included pass protection and the freedom of mobility.\textsuperscript{34} In doing so, the mariners could access their markets more easily and securely, reduce their transport costs, shorten the length of their voyages, and earn greater profits. The success of the subjects in these areas also helped facilitate the development of the state. Following the pursuits of its newfound subjects, Britain could grow into new markets, solidify its standing in Mediterranean networks, and increase state revenue. By integrating these inhabitants into the British world, the state could harness their talents and resources while the migrants could travel freely and safely under the British flag, expanding their commercial pursuits.\textsuperscript{35} The state’s encouragement of subjecthood and its “elastic” use of the term appeared to be advantageous to everyone, allowing the government to access its Mediterranean peoples and enabling the commercial growth and protection of its residents.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34} In the words of Tamar Herzog, belonging was “generated by the ability to use rights or to be forced to comply with duties.” Traditional privileges associated with subjecthood (and granted in other colonial contexts) were the right to hold property and equal consideration under the law, but these were not granted to foreign-born residents in Gibraltar, only to British Protestants. See chapter 2 for a greater discussion of property. See Tamar Herzog, \textit{Defining Nations}, pp. 2, 4; Christopher L. Brown, “Empire without Slaves: British Concepts of Emancipation in the Age of the American Revolution,” \textit{The William and Mary Quarterly}, Third Series, 56, no. 2 (1999), p. 282. Other scholars have argued that conceptions of subjecthood and nationality varied according to location and is needs. See Mongia, “Race, Nationality, Mobility,” p. 197; Fahrmeir, \textit{Citizens and Aliens}, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{35} As scholars have argued, mobility was central to diasporic communities as their efforts focused on connecting disparate economies. These migrants had to establish themselves in new territories and integrate themselves into the local economy while still keeping close ties with the world beyond those borders. See Ian Coller, “Arab France: Mobility and Community in Early-Nineteenth-Century Paris and Marseille,” \textit{French Historical Studies} 29, no. 3 (Summer 2006), p. 436; Ned Landsman, “Introduction: The Context and Functions of Scottish Involvement with the Americas,” in \textit{Nation and Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the Americas, 1600-1800}, ed. by Ned C. Landsman (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2001).

\textsuperscript{36} As Mongia has argued, this would classify as a “logic of facilitation.” See Mongia, “Historicizing State Sovereignty,” p. 197; Muller, “Bonds of Belonging,” pp. 53-54.
The Troubles of Elastic Subjecthood

By the late 1760s, which marked the beginning of Boyd’s first tenure in the garrison, the expanded pass protection for Britain’s Mediterranean subjects had reportedly become a problem. According to one regional consul, “hardly less than two hundred [passes] circulate in and about the Mediterranean in the possession of aliens.”37 While it is likely that some mariners took advantage of the lenient pass regulations in Gibraltar, the threat and fear of pass abuse loomed much larger, especially for Gibraltar’s governors. Granted the power to issue Mediterranean passes, but without a clear explanation of who qualified for the privilege, these commanders struggled to determine who was truly worthy to carry a pass. While other British subjects had to undergo a lengthy and rigorous process to receive a pass, there were no such procedures in Gibraltar. Instead, critics noted, all of Gibraltar’s inhabitants appeared to be “born Masters of Ships,” granted a pass simply because of their residence in the territory.38 Yet this idea that all inhabitants were eligible for pass protection and could claim British subjecthood troubled Gibraltar’s governors, especially Governors Boyd and Eliott. In their minds, all of Gibraltar’s foreign-born mariners posed a potential threat because of their mobility and their foreignness.

A mobile population was understood to be especially difficult to control and govern, which is why many governments sought to keep their peoples “sedentary.”39 These challenges were particularly true in regard to mariners who were granted the freedom to traverse unmonitored seas and carried with them the power of capital and contacts.40 As Clare Anderson has argued, the ocean was a “space of disorder” because of the constant migration and controlled

37 TNA, SP 89/79, Hort to Rochford, 12 February 1775, fo. 31.
38 TNA, CO 91/18, “Cadiz Merchant Memorial to Governor Cornwallis,” 6 October 1772.
39 See Scott, Seeing Like a State, pp. 1-2. As Scott argues, many governments employed “sedentarization” in an effort to make a society legible” (p. 2).
These men, who were seen as an untrustworthy “underclass” by many by virtue of their being sailors, could pose a direct threat to the British territory without garnering attention from the appropriate authorities. Because the seas could not be heavily policed, it was possible for masters to slip through administrative efforts of control. In the minds of the governors, the mobile body was inherently suspect and itinerancy suggested that their loyalty to the British crown was unproven. For the commanders who were invested in securing an embattled British territory, the unhindered mobility of residents who could not be easily controlled or supervised appeared to be a recipe for administrative disaster.

To make matters worse, the majority of these newly included mariners were foreign-born, suggesting that they had ties to other, competing and non-Protestant states. While this was not uncommon among diasporic communities, who were “at once mobile and permanent, existing geographically across multiple points,” this knowledge did not alleviate the governors’ concerns. As birth subjects of other states, these seamen had the potential to be allied with their home kingdoms, a bond which could prove stronger than that of their newly adopted homes in Gibraltar. The threat of these trans-imperial subjects with their ties to multiple states suggested to the governors that their allegiance to Britain might not be genuine. The commanders feared that these foreign mariners might align themselves with foreign states and interests, plot designs

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42 See Hyslop, “Steamship Empire,” p. 64.


45 This follows along with Natalie Rothman’s conception of trans-imperial subjects. As outsiders and in-betweeners of various empires, some had difficulty fitting in with either state, and their allegiances could be questioned. See Natalie Rothman, Brokering Empire.
against the garrison, and even bring other injurious people into the town. While these situations may have seemed extreme to some, Gibraltar’s governors felt that such actions were not out of the realm of possibility. As mentioned in chapter two, commanders feared that the Catholic population in particular could be moved by their religious ties or by papal orders and rebel against the Protestant authority in the garrison. More likely, these foreign and religious connections, the governor believed, would result in significant commercial, financial, and diplomatic losses for Britain as the traders worked for the benefit of their home states.

To Governors Boyd and Eliott, Gibraltar’s Genoese population seemed to be the most likely pass offenders because of their itinerant lifestyles and many foreign connections. As John Brathwaite, the secretary to the governor, complained, “The greater part of the inhabitants of this Garrison consists of Genoese comers and goers, that is persons who come here very poor and when they have made a little money retire again to Genoa and are succeeded by others of their Family.”\(^{46}\) The Genoese were some of the most itinerant of Gibraltar’s inhabitants, making frequent and irregular trips to the Italian city-states as many had families or even second homes still in Genoa. This peripatetic lifestyle not only made it difficult to track their comings and goings, but they were also difficult to monitor even when on land in Gibraltar. As mentioned in chapter one, the Genoese community lived in the Catalan Bay on the eastern side of the territory, separated from the town by the towering rockface. Many of its members lived in makeshift or overcrowded housing or simply slept on the beach.\(^{47}\) Unlike the town residents, who lived under the governor’s eye in numbered houses and were largely accounted for by the patrolling troops

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\(^{46}\) GGA, Naval Correspondence, Admiralty Office 1757-1773, Brathwaite to Stephens, 3 October 1766. Leslie Page Moch would call this circular migration in that people returned home after a certain amount of time. The Genoese also participated in what she titles “chain migration,” in which there were already Genoese living in Gibraltar who aided newcomers in finding jobs and housing in their newly adopted homes. See Moch, *Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe Since 1650* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 16-17.

and guards, the governor was often unaware of just how many Genoese inhabitants there were or where they could be found. Theoretically, Genoese ships could come up to the eastern beaches and disembark people and goods without the governor ever being aware of the situation. Because they did not have the same housing situation of those in town, commanders also could not keep an accurate or consistent count of that population, and they were rarely policed by guards. While many of their professions required official government-issued passes to practice, as did their travels off of the Rock, it was still very difficult for commanders to monitor, know, and control this group of inhabitants.

As mobile foreigners, Genoese mariners were often accused of migrating to the territory simply because they found the British flag to be the “safest and best to navigate with.”48 As Governor Boyd complained to the Genoese consul, “notwithstanding the solemn Oaths which Inhabitants of this place take,” he believed “there’s scarce a Vessel they navigate, whose real Owner does not reside at Genoa.”49 Boyd judged that these mariners could not be faithful to their adopted home largely because they were rarely in it, with many of them spending the majority of their time at sea or at their original birthplaces in Genoa. Their transience, he and others believed, made it impossible for them to create the necessary bonds to the community which in turn demonstrated their allegiance to the British state.50 Boyd saw this group’s actions as contrary to that of a good British subject; in his opinion, their failure to truly settle down in the

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48 GGA, Naval Correspondence, Admiralty Office 1757-1773, Brathwaite to Stephens, 3 October 1766. As Tristan Stein notes in his piece on Mediterranean passes, the Genoese were notorious for moving between flags. Tristan Stein, “Passes and Protection in the Making of a British Mediterranean,” *Journal of British Studies* 54, no. 3 (2015), p. 616. Herzog argues that migrants to Spain were accused of having similar motivations, driven by their desire to trade in Spanish America. Herzog, *Defining Nations*, p. 107.

49 GGA, Letters to Consuls in Genoa, Leghorn, Barcelona, Alicant & France, 1770-1797, Boyd to Collet (Genoa), January 1777, fo. 23.

50 Herzog makes a similar argument in her work on community formation and subjecthood in early modern Spanish America. See Herzog, *Defining Nations*, p. 62.
territory suggested that they were not willing to play the role of faithful inhabitants.\textsuperscript{51} Their transience, in combination with their Roman Catholic faith, their strong communal ties, and their physical isolation from the rest of the territory, labeled them in Boyd’s mind as false British subjects.\textsuperscript{52}

Included in this group of potential pass offenders was Pasqual Scarnichia, Sr. and his two sons, who, Boyd maintained, were not loyal subjects.\textsuperscript{53} On one of his recent voyages, Scarnichia disobeyed the terms of the pass, allowing his mate to navigate the vessel back to Gibraltar while he “removed [himself] with all his family to Genoa.” His sons had behaved similarly by resettling their families in Genoa.\textsuperscript{54} The mariners’ frequent trips to the Italian city-state and their families’ settlement there, Boyd believed, made them especially suspect of working for foreign states and masters. As he informed the Genoese consul, “Surely the moment one of these foreigners, who have resided for their own convenience, withdraws his family, he stands under the same predicament that he did before he came here.” Those who “settled under the protection of a foreign government” had divided their loyalties and could not be trusted with the privilege of a Mediterranean pass. Such actions were not evidence of one’s allegiance to the British crown, demonstrating that their intentions were not ones of loyal citizens. As Boyd declared, “I shall no more consider Mr Scarnichia as a vassal of Great Britain, a subject he could never be… Nor should his sons, tho’ casually born in the British dominions, be permitted to navigate vessels

\textsuperscript{51} Herzog, \textit{Defining Nations}, p. 42.

\textsuperscript{52} They were also accused of using their profits to benefit their homeland rather than Gibraltar. For an analysis of a similar community in Spanish America, the \textit{Cheutas}, see Herzog, \textit{Defining Nations}, p. 128, p. 12.

\textsuperscript{53} Among the holdings of miscellaneous papers from this time appears to be a list of names of Genoese mariners who Boyd believed were potential pass abusers – Scarnichia’s name is on this list. See GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1749-1779, 1776 Papers, “List of Genoese Merchants.”

\textsuperscript{54} GGA, Letters to Consuls & Ambassadors, Genoa, Barcelona, Alicante & France, 1770-1797, Boyd to Collet, 17 March 1777, fo. 23.
which belong to their father or any other foreigner.”

Although Scarnichia and his sons were subjects formally, in Boyd’s opinion, they had lost these rights through their demonstrations of allegiance to another state. Their blood ties to Genoa, he believed, were stronger than the sons’ birth ties to Britain, especially in light of their father’s evident affection for his birth state. In Boyd’s mind, the Scarnichia family could not be trusted to employ the pass protection as loyal British subjects and thus were undeserving of the privilege. As he informed his successor, Governor Eliott, these men were not true subjects of the Crown and should not be granted Mediterranean passes in the future. Otherwise, he feared, “our Nation [will be] made somehow accountable, thro’ out all those countries, for all the villainous Practices of those People who appear on our Colours.”

Boyd and other British officials identified two primary classes of “villainous” peoples who participated in pass abuse. These offenders were either long-standing Gibraltarians who stood in for foreign masters during the pass application process or by foreigners who relocated to the Gibraltar solely to receive a Mediterranean pass. The former were known as “Captains of the Colours,” men who “take fictitious Bills of Sale of Vessels, and obtain Passes in their own Names, in order to skreen the property of Foreigners.” After completing the application

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56 As Herzog has shown in detail with her work on Spain and Spanish America, and in summary with research also on Italy, France, and England, formal rules of belonging were “modified by social practices.” See Herzog, Defining Nations, p. 15.

57 Boyd was not the only administrator during this period to have such beliefs. As Herzog details in her work, the representative of royal interests in the Council of Indies echoed similar sentiments that “the sons of foreigners cannot refrain from having affection to their origin, affection that the law considers even more important than the affection they have to their place of birth.” See Herzog, Defining Nations, p. 109.

58 TNA, PC 1/7/147, “Committee Report on the Complaint of the Dey of Algiers Against Colonel Johnston,” 25 March 1765.

59 GGA, Letters to Consuls, Lisbon & Cadiz 1769-1797, Eliott to Duff, 19 October 1784, fo. 143; TNA, CO 91/11, Fowke to Robinson, 15 August 1755, fo. 408.
process and receiving the pass, the “master” would be compensated accordingly and replaced by
the true (foreign) master of the vessel to complete the voyage and collect the profits.60 For
instance, the British consul in Malaga came upon a ship carrying a pass under the name of
Pasqual Dodero, a longtime Geneose inhabitant of the garrison. Familiar with Dodero, the consul
was surprised when, during his inspection of the vessel, the captain was in fact another
unfamiliar Genoese man with a largely foreign crew.61 While this practice was seen as
“disgracefull” by loyal Britons, it did bring about significant financial rewards.62 As James
Angus, a British subject in Gibraltar, reported, he received large sums from a Genoese house
who had contracted him to obtain a pass from Gibraltar and return to Genoa with his
merchandise. Angus was given fifty dollars for his pass expenses as well as 100 Genoa livres
each month of his travels and an additional allowance of 130 livres monthly upon his return to
Genoa; he was also granted permission to load any of his own merchandise in the vessel without
having to pay additional travel expenses.63 In light of the many financial and commercial
benefits associated with being a “captain,” it is not surprising that some inhabitants were drawn
to this illicit profession.

The “scheming” newcomers, on the other hand, were termed vandera” or “bandera” men,
signifying their desire to fly under the protection of the British flag. These mariners were thought
to follow a common practice:

60 GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 4 1779-1786, “Precept and Instructions to the Judge Relative to
61 GGA, Letters from Consuls, Malaga 1757-1772, Nathaniel Ware to John Brathewaite, 23 September 1766, fo. 22-
24.
63 GGA, Letters from Consuls, Malaga 1757-1772, John Marsh to John Raleigh, 29 May 1770, fo. 59-61; John
Marsh to John Raleigh, 18 June 1770, fo. 61-62; John Marsh to John Raleigh, 26 June 1770, fo. 63-66.
Merchants (Foreigners) having a Ship, have sent a person (whom they intend to make Master of her) to Gibraltar with his Family, there to reside some Time till he has been rekon’d an inhabitant of that place & then he returns here & procu[res] a Certificate (which way we can not tell) that he has a Ship lying in this port owned by himself or some British Merchant, with which Certificate he repairs to Gibraltar & of Course has procured a Pass.\textsuperscript{64}

Capitalizing on the lack of residency requirements mandated for pass protection, vandera men were seen as relocating to the garrison solely to support their claims for a pass. If their application was approved, meaning that they were determined to be residents and that they had the necessary certificates for their vessel and its owner, the mariners could sail for the next year under British protection. Once the pass was received, the masters were largely unmonitored, which allowed them to work for the most lucrative offer rather than only those supported by the British state. The masters were required to return to Gibraltar once a year to renew the privilege, but they rarely had to divulge their activities for the past twelve months and were typically immediately granted another pass because of their previous applications. While some vandera men did not want to risk the chance of losing their existing pass, these mariners continued to sail with their expired pass since they were rarely seized by British officials or recognized by corsairs. By funneling their trade into foreign hands while having the advantage of British protection, these vandera men were deemed a blight to the British state and its commercial pursuits.

\textsuperscript{64} GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1749-1779, 1776 Papers, “Information Concerning Mediterranean Passes Given into General Boyd,” “Report from the Masters of English Ships Relative to Trade in the Mediterranean.”
As an exclusive claim available only to Britons, pass protection was something to be coveted. British subjects and their ships had a monopoly on free travel in the corsairs’ seas because Britain was the only state granted this protection privilege from the corsairs. This gave British mariners greater access to commercial markets, reduced financial risks, and safe passage for all on board. The protection granted by the passes was so significant that many European traders sought out British masters to assist in their commercial ventures. Several Portuguese merchants, for instance, hired British vessels to transport their goods with the Mediterranean, desiring the added security in light of their close proximity to many corsair ports. Although British masters often charged costly freight rates, most European merchants preferred to pay British fees instead of the high insurance rates, which did not guarantee the same protection as a Mediterranean pass. Goods carried by British ships were much more likely to arrive safely and in a timely manner, which would reduce overall costs for owners and masters. As a result, British merchants had thrived in the caravan and intra-Mediterranean trade, expanding their commercial influence across the region and beyond.

If these adopted foreign subjects in Gibraltar were given passes, the governors feared, there would be significant material and ideological consequences: Britain’s singular protection would be endangered, its interests would be compromised, and the name of Briton would be tarnished. In their minds, British mariners would be put out of their jobs and replaced by foreign

seamen and vessels, who “[take] the bread out of the Mouth of the real Subject.” These seamen, willing to work for less money and already connected with the necessary merchants and owners, would be preferred over the more expensive and less accessible British mariners. As Governor Boyd lamented, “our Mediterranean Trade, once so flourishing as to employ eight thousand British seamen… [would] now be brought so low, as scarcely to give employment to so many hundred.” Foreign vessels covered by Mediterranean passes would also “never fail of getting Freights,” the governor charged, while “several of our [British] Merchant Ships have lain in the port of Genoa unemployed.” In his mind, this expansion of pass protection to undeserving foreigners would only hurt British masters, owners, and many others employed in commercial professions. The profits of their work, despite their “subject” status, the governors feared would “never Contribute towards Supporting the King,” resulting in a significant loss of state income. Nor could their actions while sailing under the British flag be monitored, which in turn could result in “much injury to the Trade of Great Britain and disgrace to her Colours.”

Not only did the governors believe these foreign subjects posed a threat to British commerce, but they also feared they would endanger the state’s relations with the North African powers. Because these adopted subjects were not of British origin, the corsairs could not rely on

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68 TNA, CO 91/18, Cadiz Merchant Memorial, 6 October 1772. The memorialists also complained that foreign seamen on board these vessels were “sure Recruits for the French and Spanish Navys” during war, as such ships “are a Nurcery for bringing up foreign Seamen Under the protection of British flags.” See also GGA, Admiralty Book 1, Robert Boyd to Philip Stephens, 14 August 1769, fo. 2-3; TNA, CO 91/21, Boyd to Rochford, 5 June 1775; GGA, Admiralty Book 2, fo. 53-54.

69 TNA, CO 91/16, Boyd to Stephens, 14 August 1769, fo. 2-4.

70 TNA, CO 91/18, Cadiz Merchant Memorial, 6 October 1772. The memorialists also complained that foreign seamen on board these vessels were “sure Recruits for the French and Spanish Navys” during war, as such ships “are a Nurcery for bringing up foreign Seamen Under the protection of British flags.” See also GGA, Admiralty Book 1, Robert Boyd to Philip Stephens, 14 August 1769, fo. 2-3; TNA, CO 91/21, Boyd to Rochford, 5 June 1775; GGA, Admiralty Book 2, fo. 53-54.

71 GGA, Letters to Consuls in Genoa, Leghorn, Barcelona, Alicant & France, 1770-1797, Eliott to Collet (Genoa), May 1785, fo. 90-91.
what scholars have termed a “sensory regime of verification.” The nature of the population made it impossible to determine one’s residency based on appearance, accent, and other visual and auditory cues. “Having neither the appearance nor accent of Englishmen,” one British consul remarked, “it is utterly impossible to distinguish them from Spaniards, French or Italians.”

Physically, culturally, and linguistically different from most Britons, the Mediterranean British subjects were not easily identified. As a result, the corsairs could not determine simply by looking at the mariners on board British ships if they were indeed entitled to pass protection or if they could be captured as enemies of the North African states. Desiring to improve their revenue, it was more likely that the corsairs would actually stop more ships flying a British flag, believing them to be fraudulent passholders because of the appearance of and dialects spoken by those on board. In 1751 a Moroccan corsair fleet seized a pass-carrying Minorcan ship whose entire crew was comprised of non-English speakers. The corsairs argued that they believed the ship was a French vessel masquerading as British and they were doing their duty by stopping affronts to the pass system. Attacks such as these wreaked havoc on Anglo-Moroccan relations, resulting in lengthy and expensive negotiations and diplomatic missions on both sides.

With the expansion of pass protection, the corsairs were guaranteed to lose revenue, which in turn would hurt their states’ financial and domestic welfare and challenge their economic growth and security. As historians have shown, corsairing played a central role in North African economies through the income gained from prizes and ransom, and it was the

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72 Craig Murray Robertson, “‘Passport Please’: The U.S. Passport and the Documentation of Individual Identity, 1845-1930” (PhD. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2004), pp. 21-22.
73 TNA, SP 89/79, Hort to Rochford, 12 February 1775, fo. 32.
74 TNA, CO 91/11, Petticrew to Herbert, 28 August 1752, fo. 289.
75 TNA, CO 91/11, Petticrew to Herbert, 28 August 1752, fo. 289.
primary means for these powers to bring in and circulate forms of hard currency.\textsuperscript{76} The resulting instability would then also affect their states’ relations with Britain.\textsuperscript{77} In 1752 the Alcaide of Tetuan complained to the British consul that his cruisers had met with so many vessels flying the British flag, yet “every one the Property of Foreigners, and not one English subject on board.” Consequently, he had ordered his captains to bring in any and all vessels suspected to be foreign. British subjects were to be released upon their arrival at port, but they were no longer free to travel the seas without the threat of capture and the resulting delays and losses.\textsuperscript{78} Although this dispute was later resolved, the governors believed that complications caused by these foreign subjects would continue, resulting in the loss of British privileges and primacy. In their minds, situations such as these were a direct result of this elastic conception of subjecthood which embraced untrustworthy Mediterranean peoples. Subjecthood, to these commanders, was not something that should be given freely to all those who were present, but only to proven British subjects or those born under the British crown.

In Boyd’s opinion, not even all Gibraltarians who had been formally deemed subjects should be eligible for protection. As he complained, “I have great reasons to believe the assertion very true ‘That many Vessels that are Foreign properly navigate in the Mediterranean with passes obtained here’ on the Oaths of the Inhabitants.”\textsuperscript{79} One such suspicious family was the Scarnichias, but by law they were all British subjects, Pasqual Sr. by virtue of his wartime

\textsuperscript{76} Matar, “Introduction,” p. 9.

\textsuperscript{77} Matar, “Introduction,” p. 9. There are a number of passages in the archival records in which Gibraltar’s governors complain about the effects of North African domestic unrest on the supply of Gibraltar and other international affairs. See also GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, fo. 57-58.

\textsuperscript{78} TNA, ADM 2/1321, Thomas Corbett to Burges, 5 December 1752; TNA, CO 91/11, Petticrew to Herbert, 28 August 1752, fo. 289.

\textsuperscript{79} GGA, Letters to Consuls in Genoa, Leghorn, Barcelona, Alicant & France, 1770-1797, Boyd to Bart (Leghorn), December 1773, fo. 8.
service, and his sons by virtue of being born in Minorca when the territory was under British rule. While Eliott did challenge their initial requests for passes under his governorship, the Judge Advocate supported their applications because they were legal subjects. As a result Eliott had to grant them pass protection, seeing as he was “directed to give Passes in virtue of such Oaths and their giving security.” The Scarnichias were not the only “suspicious” people who the governors hesitated to grant passes to; many of Gibraltar’s foreign mariners were thought to be unworthy of pass protection but, under the “present rules of the Admiralty,” were deemed subjects and thus entitled to the privilege of pass protection. This expansive interpretation of subject, especially for these mobile bodies who were unknown and unmonitored, the governors believed, was a hindrance to their efforts in preventing pass abuse and preserving the good name of Great Britain. It also denigrated the respect given to the British subject, a title that was supposed to be coveted by peoples across Europe, not one that was easily obtained by simply residing short-term in its Mediterranean territories. In the governors’ opinions, subjecthood should be limited only to those who had proven themselves worthy of the title. By reformulating the definition of subject in Gibraltar, they believed that they could help preserve the institution of subjecthood and protect the British flag.

_Tightening Control: The Limits of the Subject_

As the pass givers, the onus was on Gibraltar’s commanders to ensure that passes were issued appropriately to the territory’s mariners. They were responsible for determining who

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80 GGA, Diary 1777-1778, 15-17 June 1777; GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 3, 1774-1778, Eliott to Fraser, 15 June 1777 & 16 June 1777, fo. 247-248.

81 GGA, Letters to Consuls in Genoa, Leghorn, Barcelona, Alicant & France, 1770-1797, Boyd to Bart (Leghorn), December 1773, fo. 8.
should be granted or re-issued a pass and preventing fraudulent masters from receiving or renewing the privilege. However, this was a difficult task. Once the pass was granted, the holder could usually travel without any hindrances, and once their ship left port, it was not guaranteed to return, making it even more difficult for the governors to monitor these mariners. The governors’ initial attempts to prevent the abuse of pass protection involved increasing surveillance of the pass-carrying masters and circulating shared knowledge of the masters and their uses of the pass. They spearheaded efforts to improve communication surrounding Mediterranean passes in the region, keeping up a monthly correspondence with regional consuls regarding suspicious mariners. They asked their fellow officials to closely examine the pass of each British ship that came into port, subject any questionable master to additional questioning, and take up any passes that they believed were false.82 The governors also helped bring about a 1767 mandate that made such practices law by requiring all British ships arriving in foreign ports to display their passes to the local consul.83 Despite these efforts to police passholders, they recognized that their interventions were not successful – it was just too easy for pass offenders to evade these additional checks and interrogations.

82 See GGA, Mediterranean Passes: Admiralty Books 1 & 2, Passes 1785-1805. See also many of the Letters to and from Consuls found in the GGA records.

83 They also promoted legislation to increase bond amounts in 1776 from £50 and £100 to £300 and £500 respectively and to institute harsher punishments for offenders. Anyone convicted of forging, counterfeiting, altering, or erasing passes was found guilty of felony without the benefit of clergy. Additionally, the governors encouraged the King in Council to recall pass cuts to limit abuse; new passes were issued in 1729, 1750, 1765, 1776, 1783, and 1802. Not all of these were a result of the governor’s efforts. Some of the recalls came about as a response to North African concerns; the 1729 order corresponded to complaints about Gibraltar’s foreign-looking population carrying passes, while the 1765 order resulted from the Dey’s many letters of passes circulating amongst Algiers’ enemies. Pass recalls also frequently followed Britain’s major wars, as the dates above indicate. Passes often fell into foreign hands upon a vessel’s capture, and they were also granted more loosely during wartime to offer protection to neutral vessels and non-Britons to ensure the supply of British forces and garrisons. Also, as state’s boundaries and territorial holdings shifted with each war, it was necessary to ensure that people who had previously been eligible for passes but afterward were not, such as the American colonists after their revolution, could not collect such benefits. See TNA, CO 91/22, Boyd to Weymouth, 22 February 1776; also Reeves, History of the Law, 426; GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book, “Order in Council,” 28 August 1776, fo. 27-32; TNA, CO 91/21, Boyd to Admiralty, 25 September 1769; TNA, CO 91/22 Boyd to Weymouth, 22 February 1776; GGA, Letters from Consuls, Malaga 1773-1776, Marsh to Rochford, 26 June 1775, fo. 43.
In order to keep from perpetuating the problem of pass abuse, Governors Boyd and Eliott were eager to establish a legitimate means of distinguishing between fraudulent passholders and those who were truly “His Majesty’s Subjects, Inhabitants of Gibraltar.” By doing so, they could limit the access and mobility of those who they deemed unworthy or suspect while privileging residents who they believed were worthy of membership in the British empire. Yet this was difficult to do in Gibraltar, in which the majority of the population were foreigners by birth and there was little legislation to determine who should and should not be made a subject. Because the stipulations of subjecthood were different in the colonies, and because the British government offered little guidance on how to fix the situation, it fell upon the governors to determine what subjecthood would look like in Gibraltar.

As mentioned previously, Gibraltar’s commanders could not rely on a “sensory regime of verification” to easily identify who was a true British subject. Nor could the governors rely on “documentary regimes of verification,” seeing as the British government had done little to clarify subjecthood in the territory. Outside of the 1722 order, the only two pieces of naturalization

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85 This is similar to Brian Boeck’s description of the Russian state’s efforts at containment during this period in that the governors were also trying to encourage the useful residents to stay in the garrison while keeping the pass abusers out. See Brian J. Boeck, “Containment vs. Colonization: Muscovite Approaches to Settling the Steppe,” in Peopling the Russian Periphery: Borderland Colonization in Eurasian History, eds. Nicholas B. Breyfogle, Abby M Schrader, and Willard Sunderland (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 41-60.

86 As other scholars have argued, subject status looked different throughout the colonies, often tailored to individual needs. The British empire was not the only imperial power in the process of reconfiguring subjecthood. As Adrian Carton has argued, notions of French citizenship were also in flux, moving from an idea of birth and race to one of residence and culture. Eric Dursteler also mentions the expansion of the “national” borders in the Ottoman Empire to include individuals of a variety of backgrounds. Spain and Spanish America were undergoing similar debates, creating distinctive categories of “naturaleza” and “vecino,” according to Tamar Herzog. (The governors’ iteration of “subject” was fitting of Herzog’s “vecinos” in that they were adopted citizens as opposed to “naturalezas” who were more often birth-subjects.) See Adrian Carton, “Shades of Fraternity: Creolization and the Making of Citizenship in French India, 1790-1792,” French Historical Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Fall 2008): 581-607; Eric R. Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Tamar Herzog, Defining Nations.

87 Robertson, “Passport Please,” pp. 21-22.
legislation that played a role in such decisions were related to foreign marines who had served
the king for two years during wartime (1740) and foreign Protestants who served in the Royal
American Regiment or as engineers in the American colonies (1762). As these acts did not
directly apply to the majority of Gibraltar’s residents, the governors were left to their own
devices in determining subjecthood.

The first step was to establish a working definition of “subject,” one that was more
specific than that related in the 1722 order. The problem for governors with the existing pass
language was that it juxtaposed “subject” and “inhabitant” as two necessarily related terms when
in fact they were not so. The pronouncement applied to “His Majesty’s Subjects, Inhabitants of
Gibraltar” while the attached oath and bond referred to “people of the Town of Gibraltar who
now dwell in the Town and are Subjects of His Brittanick Majesty.”

Subjecthood was
relational, a connection between a king and his people, whereas residency had to do with place

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88 14 Geo. II, c. 7 in John Raithby, ed., The Statutes at Large, of England and of Great-Britain: From Magna Carta
to the Union of the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. IX. From 1 George II. A.D. 1727. – To 15 George
II. A.D. 1742. (London: George Eyre & Andrew Strahan, 1811), pp. 661-662; 2 Geo. III, c. 25 in John Raithby, The
Statutes at Large, of England and of Great-Britain: From Magna Carta to the Union of the Kingdoms of Great
Britain and Ireland, Vol. XII, From 1 George III. A.D. 1760 – To 7 George III. A.D. 1767, (London: George Eyre &
Andrew Strahan, 1811), 127-129. Carpenter seems to date this as 1773; however, the initial act was passed in 1762;
see A. H. Carpenter, “Naturalization in England and the American Colonies,” The American Historical Review 9,
no. 2 (1904), 294. These two statutes led many inhabitants to claim subject privileges in light of their service to the
garrison during wartime. All inhabitants who had remained in the territory were required to swear an oath of fidelity
and allegiance to Britain and perform all duties the commander demanded of them. This daily labor and legal
declaration of fidelity led many inhabitants to claim subject status and left governors confused as to whether they
were indeed eligible for such privileges. Despite the many inquiries by these governors, London ministers failed to
offer a clear response. See GGA, Diaries 1777 & 1778-1782, 3 &4 July 1779; GGA, Naval Correspondence,
Admiralty Office 1757-1773, Brathwaite to Stephens, 23 June 1766; TNA, CO 91/31, Eliott to Sydney, 25 June
1784; GGA, Letters to Consuls, Genoa, Leghorn, Barcelona, Alicante & France, 1770-1797, Eliott to Collet, 23
October 1777, fo. 31.

89 Some of Gibraltar’s inhabitants who stayed and manned the works during the Great Siege argued that they had
served the king during wartime and should be made subjects with the accompanying privileges. However, Governor
Elliott refused to consider such petitions and the issue was never formally resolved.

90 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Order of the Council,” 14 June 1722, fo. 2; GGA,
Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Forms of an Oath to be Taken by the Masters of Ships or Vessels
Belonging to Gibraltar,” fo. 4-5, “Bond from the Masters of Ships or Vessels, belonging to Gibraltar to the King,”
fo. 7-8.
and location. Both, however, were related to allegiance: a subject pledged allegiance to his king and an inhabitant typically felt allegiance to his place of permanent residence. Because the governors could not rely on birth to determine subjecthood, they instead focused on allegiance as shown through residency and service. Residency was a key component of the order and had become important to subjecthood in other places in the empire, while military service allowed non-Britons to become subjects per previous statutes. These two elements, the commanders believed, best indicated a person’s devotion to the empire they so loyally protected.

In doing so they drew on the precedent established by imperial administrators for other colonies. The 1740 Plantation Act, for instance, allowed North American colonists to apply for naturalization so long as they had resided in the territory for at least seven years without leaving for longer than two months. A 1774 act mandated similar requirements, stipulating a seven-year residency before the person could claim subject privileges. Both of these statutes

91 Subject status in the North American colonies depended on fixed residence, likely because the goal in those territories was settlement. According to the 1740 Plantation Act, inhabitants of the North American colonies could apply for naturalization if they resided in the territory for seven years without leaving for more than a two-month period. 14 Geo. II, c. 3 in John Raithby, ed., The Statutes at Large, of England and of Great-Britain: From Magna Carta to the Union of the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. IX. From 1 George II. A.D. 1727. – To 15 George II. A.D. 1742. (London: George Eyre & Andrew Strahan, 1811), pp. 672-675. Many scholars have marked this shift from birthright to residence as occurring after the Seven Years’ War with the acquisition of Quebec and other French territories. However, this act demonstrates that the British government was confronted with the challenge of managing and including a multi-ethnic subject population long before then. See Muller, “Bonds of Belonging,” Brown, “Empire without Slaves,” especially pp. 281-284; P.J. Marshall, “Empire and Authority in the Later Eighteenth Century,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 15, no. 2 (1987): 105-122. These authors also typically mark that period as a critical transition period between the “First” and “Second Empire,” which I would argue Gibraltar also complicates.

92 According to Herzog, the Spanish empire designated immigrants as either good or bad, favoring those who were willing to integrate themselves into the Spanish community and take on the duties of membership, which included military service, at which point they were granted certain rights accordingly. These designations of “good” and “bad” were constantly negotiated through daily interactions, although some were assigned to the “bad” category because of differences in ethnicity, race, and/or customs. See Herzog, Defining Nations, “Introduction,” especially p. 6.

93 14 Geo. II, c. 3 in Raithby, Statutes, Vol. IX, pp. 672-675.

expressed the importance of long-term residence, suggesting that one’s permanence and physical constancy served as evidence of one’s devotion. By establishing oneself in a territory for an extended period of time, an inhabitant could prove his loyalty to the crown. Such fixity was difficult for many of Gibraltar’s mariners, especially the Genoese, which served to further legitimize the governors’ decision to focus on residency. As Governor Eliott argued when processing Pasqual Scarnichia’s application in 1777, the mariner had to enter an additional bond that he and his family would return to their Gibraltar home within six months before he could receive the pass. Scarnichia’s resettlement in the town, Eliott argued, would “remove the doubt of his being a real Inhabitant of this Garrison.” When a mariner’s “House and Family are now here” and had been for years, the governor did not doubt his allegiance.

While the governors privileged inhabitants who had remained in the garrison for several years, they also supported the claims of residents who had faithfully served the crown. This too drew on previous imperial orders that granted naturalization rights to those who had served the king during times of war. As “vassals” of the king, Gibraltar’s mariners demonstrated their fidelity to the British empire through their actions, providing the garrison with provisions and stimulating the town’s economy. Boyd and Eliott both altered the pass language to include

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95 According to Stein, British admiralty courts also focused on residency in their decisions rather than the place of birth. See Stein, “Passes and Protection,” p. 621.
96 GGA, Diary 1777-1778, 15-17 June 1777; GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 3, 1774-1778, Eliott to Fraser, 15 June 1777 & 16 June 1777, fo. 247-248.
97 GGA, Letters to Consuls, Malaga & Cartagena 1769-1797, Boyd to James Marsh, 20 January 1774, fo. 16. Initially, Boyd was supportive of Scarnichia; when questioned by a regional consul, he informed the official that he had granted the pass willingly in light of his service and residence.
99 GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register 1779-1786, Eliott to Morrison, 14 January 1785. A vassal is “a humble servant or subordinate; one devoted to the service of another” (“vassal, n. and adj.” OED Online, June 2014, Oxford University Press). A subject, on the other hand, is “a person owing allegiance to and under the protection of a monarch or government” (“subject, n.” OED Online, June 2014, Oxford University Press).
these considerations, permitting “those Men who have been usually employed in Navigating the Vessels of this place” as well as “seamen solely attached to and employed in the service of this Garrison.” These mariner’s faithfulness in helping meet the needs of the garrison convinced the governors of their loyalty to Britain. For the commanders, such constancy and fidelity to Gibraltar, a site of great imperial importance, demonstrated that they deserved the privileges of British subjeclhood.

By establishing residency and service as the two pillars of subject status in Gibraltar, the governors created a population in the community that they believed were worthy of the title of British subject. However, they then had to tie this group to the institution of Mediterranean passes in order to legitimate their logic behind creating these distinctions within the community. They did so by instituting a formal process of examining and confirming such claims through Mediterranean pass petitions. In January 1785 Governor Eliott ordered that all pass applications would now be referred to a committee comprised of the Judge Surrogate of the Vice Admiralty Court and two or three of “the principal Inhabitants His Majesty’s Subjects concern’d in Trade.” This committee was responsible for investigating the petitioner’s documentation to ensure he met the necessary pass requirements. Representing both the authority of the British government and the voice of the civil sphere, the members could provide “the most authentic information” in such matters. They would then send their report to the governor, who made the final decision based on their recommendation.

100 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, Boyd to Stephens, 4 August 1769, fo. 3-4; TNA, CO 91/16, Boyd to Stephens, 14 August 1769; GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register 1779-1786, Eliott to Morrison, 14 January 1785.

101 The Judge Surrogate was responsible for informing all legal decisions in the garrison in the name of the king. Being the only other imperially appointed post, his authority was second to the governor’s in the territory.

Previously, the governor made all pass decisions on his own, recording select information into the pass register log. This included the pass number, the pass cut, the date, the quality of the vessel and its name, where the vessel was from, the master’s name, the number of men on board, the number of guns, and the vessel’s tonnage. The list of passes also occasionally included the purpose of the voyage, the destination port, and the duration of the trip.103 These registers were mandated by the Lords of the Admiralty and were required to be sent back to them in London several times a year.104 While these records did offer governors a means to be able to define and track their maritime population, creating a concrete field of data that could be used to quantify, calculate, and survey these peoples, they did not offer the sophistication of Eliott’s pass application regime, which followed the applicant from the start of the process to its completion. With Eliott’s new formulation he was able to gather a greater amount of knowledge on the passholders and compile a more extensive archive of records.

Eliott’s design enabled governors to feel secure that all pass applications had been thoroughly considered and only those mariners who had demonstrated their loyalty received the privileges of British subjecthood. His reforms of the pass applications resulted in a lengthy, well-documented, standardized process which lent an air of authority to the system. Petitioners had to provide ample evidence for the application as the committee’s thorough investigation would allow them to suss out any “specious and ill founded claims.”105 Each step was recorded, creating an archive of requests and their outcomes which could be used for future applications. While this “paperwork” was thought to help ensure administrative accountability, it also enabled

103 See GGA, Admiralty 1 & Admiralty 2.
104 This did not always happen in practice. Governor Sabine in the 1730s, for instance, frequently received scathing letters from the Admiralty for his failure to submit the proper documentation. See TNA, ADM 1/1319, fo. 350-351, 370-372; TNA, ADM 1/1320, fo. 51, 68-70, 101, 178-179, 203, 244-245, 250.
the governors to better track their subjects.\textsuperscript{106} Because the process required evidence of residency and service, these documents could be useful to the governors in questions of property sales, land grants, civil cases, or other legal situations.\textsuperscript{107} It also gave the governor a better sense of control over his population, making them more legible and easier to monitor.\textsuperscript{108}

This system, along with the other tools of pass surveillance, provided commanders with oversight of pass applications while also legitimating the granting process. The new regulations helped governors to refute claims of pass abuse caused by overly lenient commanders, especially since the application process employed a procedure similar to that used by the Civil Court and British consuls abroad in determining commercial disputes.\textsuperscript{109} For instance, when asked by the Lords of the Treasury why an inhabitant, Anthony Romagio, had been granted a pass, Governor Boyd informed them that the man’s application had been thoroughly considered, providing five additional enclosures demonstrating the process. These documents included the owner’s application for a pass as well as his oath and additional testimony, the minute of passes issued to Romagio as a master, and the judge’s certificate and reasoning behind why the pass should be granted. In addition, Boyd noted that Romagio “has been an inhabitant of this place many years, and navigated the Town vessels.” In light of his service and residency, Boyd believed him worthy of subject status. Seeing as “The term of residence which intitles inhabitants to the privilege of subjects, seems not to be well understood,” since it was not “defin’d by legal authority,” Boyd explained that in light of such considerations he and his committee felt the man

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{106} Kafka, \textit{Demon of Writing}, p. 21.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Fahrmeir, \textit{Citizens and Aliens}, p. 100. As Fahrmeir argues, this allowed the government to further discriminate resident aliens and privilege its citizens.
\item \textsuperscript{108} For similar efforts by Gibraltar’s governors, see chapter 2. Scott, \textit{Seeing Like a State}, pp. 1-2.
\item \textsuperscript{109} GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Orders to Consuls,” fo. 24-26.
\end{itemize}
was deserving of such privileges. Because of the process was based on legal precedent and existing conceptions of subjecthood, the governor felt comfortable invoking his authority in making these decisions.

Boyd’s response to the Treasury revealed that the governors had instituted a rigorous legal application process for Mediterranean passes, seeking to settle such problems at their source. As Romagio’s case demonstrates, the master had to prove through written and oral testimonies as well as garrison service and long-term residence that he was worthy of such an honor. Having lived for more than thirty years in Gibraltar, during which he dutifully supplied the garrison with provisions from across the region, Romagio seemed to meet British requirements of subjecthood. He, unlike the Scarnichias, seemed to the governor to be unlikely to sully the British name or flag. Even though his actions would be unmonitored as he traveled across the seas, the governor trusted that he would use this freedom of mobility appropriately, rather than becoming involved in illicit foreign trades. Having been thoroughly analyzed by a series of judges, Boyd felt secure that Romagio and his other passholders would not betray British interests. These particular mobile bodies were well-monitored and well-known, giving Boyd a sense of control over the mariners and their pursuits. The new pass application system enabled Boyd and future governors to feel confident about those granted such freedoms and the preservation of British honor. Subjecthood and the mobility it entailed, he believed, had been restored only to the deserving, returning to its proper role as a privilege rather than a right.

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Conclusion

This chapter argues the practice of Mediterranean passes in Gibraltar resulted in a constant negotiation of subjecthood in the territory. While the British government in 1722 was eager to embrace all of its productive Mediterranean peoples, in particular its foreign-born, maritime adopted subjects, this desire had unintentional consequences. As Gibraltar’s governors repeatedly expressed, this population, especially once given the freedom of mobility and the privilege of protection inherent in this grant of subjecthood, was not easily governed or readily trusted. They feared that the disloyalty of these mariners, who they believed were apt to work for foreign interests, would betray the allegiance inherent in the title of subject. The regulations put in place by the 1722 Order in Council, they argued, were counterproductive to fostering British trade and promoting British diplomacy in the region. As a result, Governors Boyd and Eliott sought to clamp down on opportunities for pass abuse by restricting and defining who could be considered a valid subject of Britain. In doing so, they created a system of pass reforms and legislation that required all applicants to undergo a lengthy process of investigation and approval. All steps of the process were closely documented, offering a concrete archive to which they could refer in the future for pass renewals or other civil matters. This archive not only served to legitimate their decision-making process, but it also provided a means to better track these often unmonitored subjects. This series of legal hoops that they imposed on hopeful masters, they believed, enabled them to better determine who was worthy of the privileges of protection and mobility, and who could truly be considered part of the garrison and imperial community.

Governor Eliott and Boyd’s pass regime offered them an opportunity to intervene in the problem of Gibraltar’s mariners and Mediterranean pass protection. The deliberation over who could receive a pass enabled the governors to feel as if they had control over deciding who was a
viable recipient of the title of British subject. Through this process, the governors imagined that they could exclude the frauds and imposters, as well as the mariners who would not support the territory or Britain. In essence, this system, or so they believed, enabled them to better control the mobile Mediterranean body and secure the territory as British. By “improving” the pass system and establishing a formal means of determining subjecthood, Gibraltar’s governors sought to categorize their mariners as either productive subjects or “scheming” foreigners, privileging the former and punishing the latter through the gift of pass protection. Such an approach, they believed, would enable them to better execute their power over the territory and its peoples and promote its use for the success of Great Britain.
Figure 4.1: Mediterranean Pass for Henry Hitchcock’s Ship Neptune Snow

(TNA, ADM 5117/8)
Figure 4.2: Mediterranean Pass for Henry Buese’s Ship Prince George Brigantine

(TNA, ADM 5117/8)
Chapter 5

“Military Tyranny” & “Outrageous Peyneists”: Revolutionary Rhetoric and the Crisis of Governmentality in Gibraltar (1792-1793)

The early 1790s was a time of unease for leaders across the globe, but especially those in the Mediterranean, as unrest pervaded the region. Revolutions and civil war plagued several nearby states, including France and North Africa, as well as others further abroad, such as Saint Domingue. As David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam have argued, these revolts had “global or at least pan-regional repercussion and receptions.”¹ War appeared to be on the horizon between France and the rest of Europe; as French radicals pledged their support to others willing to rise up against their governments; their neighbors, concerned about the incursion of such ideas and violence into their own states, made alliances against the revolutionaries.² The surrounding states not only had to fear French swords, but also French tongues and pens as news of the revolution and its philosophies spread throughout Europe. Many neighboring monarchs feared that the French Revolution would be “a Forerunner to other Revolutions in Europe,” spreading the new radical political ideas like a “Contagion.”³ The debates between counterrevolutionaries and those in support of the changes in France raged throughout Europe and beyond, creating a discourse and language that defined this period.⁴ Gibraltar was no exception – it too was


² The Declaration of Pillnitz, issued on August 27, 1791, stated that Austria would go to war against France if all the other major European states declared war on the French. While this was meant primarily to appease French émigrés and pledge Prussia and the Holy Roman Empire’s support for the French king, the National Assembly interpreted this as a direct threat upon the French revolutionaries, leading many to urge a formal declaration of war. In November 1792, the French revolutionary government issued the Edict of Fraternity offering military support to other radical groups seeking to follow in France’s footsteps.


⁴ See Duff, “Burke and Paine,” p. 47.
intricately woven into the global revolutionary narrative, contending with unrest from within and the threat of revolution from without. This chapter argues that Gibraltar’s British merchants capitalized on the revolutionary fervor to pit the claims of commerce against the practices of governance and authority of the governor. In doing so, they made Gibraltar itself a potential security threat to the British empire as a whole.

Located at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, those in Gibraltar were privy to much of the news, and the anxiety, of the surrounding revolutions. For Governor Boyd, this unrest abroad posed a serious threat to “the Security of the Fortress” he had been charged with defending. Boyd recognized the power of the revolutionary ideas and violence circulating throughout Europe during this time and sought to protect the garrison from its incursion. This meant not only readying the troops and strengthening its fortification, but also securing the town and its inhabitants. Gibraltar served as a stopping ground, or even a place of exile, for many visitors from the turbulent states. Most residents had contacts throughout the region, keeping them well-informed about the developments outside of the garrison, and travelers with personal stories and news from abroad passed through the port regularly. Between these personal narratives, in

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5 After France declared war on Great Britain in 1793, French prisoners of war flooded Gibraltar in an effort to escape the reign of terror. The siege of Toulon in 1793 was particularly important to the garrison as many of its refugees fled from that city to Gibraltar until they could be moved to Britain. The delay in Gibraltar was often quite lengthy, lasting years for some refugees. Even prior to the outbreak of war, many French citizens and state officials frequently passed through the territory, including the Comte de Chalons and Consul du Rocher on his way to Morocco in 1792. See GGA, Diaries 1789-1792, 1792-1794; GGA, Miscellaneous Papers 1791-1794, 1793 Papers; GGA, Governor to Secretary of State, 1791-1794; TNA, CO 91/37, “Gibraltar, Original Correspondence,” 1 December 1793 – 31 December 1795; TNA, CO 92/3, “Gibraltar, Entry Books, Correspondence,” 28 August 1794 – 18 March 1810; TNA, FO 353/72, “Diplomatic Papers (F.J. Jackson),” 1 June 1792 – 30 June 1795; TNA, FO 174/3, “Foreign and Commonwealth Office… General Correspondence from Gibraltar,” 1790-1798; TNA, WO 1/288, Rainsford to Dundas, 3 November 1794, fo. 74-75, Horse Guards to O’Hara, 8 October 1795, fo. 131-133; BL, Add MS 23660, “Rainsford Papers… Letters Relative to Gibraltar, 1793-1795;” BL, Add MS 23661, “Rainsford Papers, Journal of Public Transactions at Gibraltar, 1793-1796;” BL, Add MS 23666, “Rainsford Papers, Miscellaneous Relating to Gibraltar, 1762-1796.”

6 According to the 1791 census, at least 63 of the garrison’s inhabitants were from Savoy, which was occupied by French forces from 1792 through 1815. More than a dozen residents were from France, including at least four men who had moved to the garrison in 1789 or later. See GGA, 1777 & 1791 Lists of Inhabitants, 1791 List of Inhabitants.
addition to outside correspondence and newspapers, especially those from Britain, Gibraltar’s inhabitants were likely quite aware of the events abroad.\textsuperscript{7} To Boyd, this spread of knowledge was not reassuring, especially in light of Gibraltar’s many foreign residents, who continually posed a threat to the garrison. If his inhabitants were to catch on to the revolutionary fervor, they could challenge his authority and endanger the safety of the territory. In his mind, the garrison was in a state of emergency, vulnerable to encroaching violence and the spreading radical ideas, and it needed to be secured however necessary.\textsuperscript{8} As Boyd informed the residents, “they are inhabitants of a place of war,” and as such they were required to comply with all rules and orders that are thought necessary by the Commander in Chief.”\textsuperscript{9} And as the head of “a garrison, the situation of which is eminently critical, as the possession of it is important,” the governor believed it was his duty to use his powers to keep it from harm.\textsuperscript{10} At this time and in this place, Boyd believed that the security of the garrison depended on the close policing of all his inhabitants.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{7} It is difficult to determine exactly how those in Gibraltar learned about outside events as few letters were kept outside of those sent to the governor. While there is mention of clippings from London newspapers in some of the officers’ correspondence with their families in Britain, these records have not survived, nor is there anything to indicate if or how frequently inhabitants would have received British periodicals. The \textit{Gibraltar Chronicle}, the local newspaper did not begin until 1801, and the Gibraltar Garrison Library was not founded until 1793 with construction ending in 1804. However, based on mentions in existing records, it does appear that in general residents were fairly knowledgeable about events in Britain.

\textsuperscript{8} As Nasser Hussain notes, “Emergency is an elastic category, stretching over political disturbances such as riots, the situation of a sovereign war, and even constitutional crises within the sphere of the state.” In such a state, authorities often instituted “emergency powers,” which included martial rule, the delegation of legislative powers to the executive, and significant interventions in individual liberties. See Hussain, \textit{The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law} (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 17-18.

\textsuperscript{9} TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 23 July 1792.

\textsuperscript{10} TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 27 September 1792.

\textsuperscript{11} As Gilroy argues, in the colonial setting there was often a “distinctive association of governance with military power and martial law. Quoted in Renisa Mawani, \textit{Colonial Proximities: Crossracial Encounters and Juridical Truths in British Columbia, 1871-1921} (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009), p. 18.
However, Gibraltar’s inhabitants did not see the situation as such; instead of fearing war, many sought to profit from the resulting commercial instability. For the town’s merchants, especially the British traders, the unrest in France offered a prime opportunity for their commerce to “branch out to all Parts of the World, & be made essentially useful to the British Trade, and Manufactures.”\textsuperscript{12} This was not a possibility unless the merchants were allowed the freedom to trade without limits, which under the governor’s current rule was not likely. Boyd’s efforts to protect the territory, and in particular to control the civil sphere, posed a significant stumbling block to the residents’ commercial dreams. In February 1792, these dissenting views lead to a territory-wide conflict between the governor and the merchants. Boyd had issued two additional regulations on Gibraltar’s residents, forbidding unauthorized travel at night and mounted rides through town, which the merchants found unnecessarily repressive. While the governor maintained that his commands were “prescribed by necessity” to keep the inhabitants from harm, British residents disagreed, engaging in their own way with governmentality.\textsuperscript{13} By petitioning the governor to retract these mandates and allow them the liberties provided by British rule, the British merchants participated in and offered a critique of Bland’s practices.\textsuperscript{14} As Boyd refused to reconsider his decisions, the British merchants continued to issue petitions of complaint to Boyd while encouraging other residents to disobey the governor’s commands. In

\textsuperscript{12} TNA, CO 91/36, John Turnbull, George War, James Anderson Sr., and James Sutton to Dundas, 29 September 1792. The leading commercial inhabitants were primarily British as the governor and other administrators encouraged British migration by privileging British merchants over foreigners. As a result, most of the civilian Britons in Gibraltar were involved in its commercial sphere, typically managing trading companies, some of which were outposts of London-based traders. This meant that the British residents often had ties to leading merchants and companies in London, giving them a voice to government ministers and the Crown.

\textsuperscript{13} GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 3 April 1792, and TNA, CO 91/36, Chronology by Boyd.

\textsuperscript{14} Mehmet Safa Saracoglu, “Letters from Vindin: A Study of Ottoman Governmentality and Politics of Local Administration, 1864-1877,” (PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University, 2007), pp. 248-249. As he notes, referring to Giddens, the merchants experienced a “dialect of control” and they chose to directly intervene in the state of affairs of the town.
response, the governor vested his troops with the authority to enforce his regulations and sought to prosecute the merchants for their accusations and actions. By March the territory was in a state of unrest, plagued by physical and rhetorical violence. Although the parties differed on their opinions of the situation initially, now both were likely to agree that Gibraltar was indeed unstable and in a state of crisis.

As the merchants and the governor exhausted their options to resolve the dispute within the territory, both parties reached out to their colleagues in Britain for help. Gibraltar’s merchants wrote to their trading partners in London, begging them to petition Parliament and present the governor’s oppressive restrictions. The British traders accused Boyd of being an authoritarian, despotic governor and having jeopardized British laws and liberties. Boyd’s orders, they argued, were “entirely calculated to destroy the grand Foundation and Pillar of their happy Constitution” by “erect[ing] a Military Tyranny in [its] stead.”15 I argue that the merchants drew from a number of British traditions, echoing popular sentiments on the superiority of British law and liberty, the problems of a standing army, the fears of soldiers, and the preservation of commerce and the civil sphere.16 This language was concentrated in the London petitions by focusing on the violence and tyranny that plagued the town. Such depictions, I maintain, aligned closely with the descriptions provided by British travelers about life in France under the revolutionary government. Drawing on contemporary concerns, the petitioners sought to create a convincing argument against Boyd’s regulations.

15 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 8 March 1792.
16 This discussion of liberty can be traced back beyond the revolutionary period, but it was a rallying cry for the American revolutionaries as well as others in colonies against governors whom they believed were abusing their rights. See Hussain, *Jurisprudence of Emergency*; Robert Travers, “Contested Despotism: Problems of Liberty in British India,” in *Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas 1600-1900*, ed. Jack P. Greene (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); James Epstein, *Scandal of Colonial Rule: Power and Subversion in the British Atlantic during the Age of Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
Boyd, on the other hand, wrote directly to the Secretary of State, both to represent his position and defend himself against the merchants’ accusations. He also employed the circulating rhetoric but in a more explicit manner, denouncing the petitioners as “outrageous Peyneists” who sought to “weaken the authority of a Commander in Chief.” Echoing the complaints of many counterrevolutionaries, Boyd argued that the merchants had “a violent spirit of opposition to a Governors authority” and were willing to topple years of careful rule, compromising the security of the garrison, for the sake of their own pursuits of “liberty.” Through his letters, I contend that the governor framed himself as a steadfast British authority eager to support the king against any possible rebellion or threat thereof. Boyd maintained that he had established such measures in an effort to best protect the garrison; his initial regulations were implemented for the inhabitants’ physical safety and his response to their protests was necessary to prevent unrest. As Boyd hoped his superiors would understand, Gibraltar had been poised for crisis and he was simply doing his duty, employing the full scope of his powers to protect the territory.

This chapter demonstrates the porousness of revolutionary ideas and rhetoric in late eighteenth-century Gibraltar. While other scholars have shown the role of the Revolution in places across the globe, including in the British Empire, its effects in Gibraltar have not been discussed. I demonstrate how in their letters to Britain both Boyd and the merchants drew on language from the revolution and its commentators, employing ideas from Burke and Paine, among others, and choosing sides in the battle. By embracing contemporary revolutionary

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17 TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 23 July 1792.
18 As presented by Epstein, Governor Picton in Trinidad was in a similar situation as Boyd, surrounding by revolutionary states and fearful of threatening peoples and ideas taking hold of his colony. He, like Boyd, was also trapped in a scandal with his British settlers, who also claimed deprivation of their liberties under the authoritarian governor. See Epstein, Scandal of Colonial Rule, chapters 3 and 4. For discussions of the effects of the Revolution abroad, see Armitage & Subrahayam, The Age of Revolutions; Rachel Hope Cleves, “‘Jacobins in this Country’: The United States, Great Britain, and Trans-Atlantic Anti-Jacobinism,” Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal 8, 2 (Spring 2010): 410-445.
rhetoric, Boyd and the merchants demonstrated the spread as well as the pervasiveness of these authors, even in the small territory of Gibraltar. The publication of Edmund Burke’s *Reflections on the Revolutions in France* (1790) and subsequently Thomas Paine’s *The Rights of Man* (1791 & 1792) had a significant influence on Britain at the time. These two treatises circulated rapidly after their initial printing; in the first two months of publication, Burke’s pamphlet had been printed ten times, totaling at least 17,500 copies produced in Britain alone and by 1793, there were a quarter of a million of Paine’s pamphlets in circulation.19 As David Duff has argued, Burke and Paine profoundly shaped individuals’ language, ideas, and experience of this period, influencing British culture as a whole. Many Britons divided themselves as either supporters of Burke or Paine, embracing the perspective and vocabulary of one writer or the other and creating a British binary between two different political views.20

It appears that both the merchants and Boyd recognized the importance of this debate in contemporary Britain as shown through their use of (counter)revolutionary language in their communications with the metropole. While the Gibraltarian merchants’ language drew primarily on classic British ideology surrounding liberty and law, I argue that Boyd took advantage of the government’s stance on radical authors, portraying the merchants as Gibraltarian revolutionaries.21 By defining his opponents as supporters of Paine, a man who was currently on

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21 As H. C. Dickinson notes, Britons took pride in their historic liberties and constitution and often contrasted their benefits to the political disadvantages of their continental neighbors, especially the French with their absolute
the wrong side of the law, the governor established himself as the representative and proponent of the British monarchy in the region. The merchants, on the other hand, were easily marked as revolutionaries, challenging the governor’s authority through their petitions and physically defying his orders. Boyd’s rhetorical defense through his focused language and application of contemporary fears was in many ways the most effective justification of his actions. At a time when liberties were relegated in favor of securing authority, any possible radical rhetoric, regardless of historical appeals to British law, needed to be contained. As Lynn Hunt has argued, and eighteenth-century British leaders agreed, “ideas are never just ideas; they are cultural constructs that call forth actions.” In this time of emergency, as revolts sparked across the globe, no British authority wanted to provoke the “first spark” that would ignite a “blaze” in their territories. Any and all potentially radical bodies needed to be controlled and contained at all costs. As a result, I contend, authoritarian governors, the policing of inhabitants, and the restriction of liberties were deemed less harmful, especially in the colonial settings, than the freedoms of peoples who could possibly undermine British security.


Mobilizing for War: Boyd in Gibraltar, 1791

As states across the region mobilized for war and tried to fend off revolutionary fervor, upon his return to the garrison in 1791 Governor Robert Boyd sought to secure Gibraltar against all internal and external threats. The situation in France posed a great concern to the governor who was called to the post for a second time in order to replace the previous commander, Major General Charles O’Hara who had returned to active duty to prepare British forces against a possible French threat. By 1791 it seemed likely that war was in Europe’s future. In June 1791 Louis XVI tried to flee Paris and escape to Varennes; however, his efforts were unsuccessful and he was forced to return to the capital. His failed flight marked the a shift in French radical interest towards a republic, as opposed to the planned constitutional monarchy, as well as a shift in perceptions among the European powers towards the revolution. At this point the other monarchs recognized the king was essentially powerless, yet French émigrés urged their new home states to act against the revolutionary government. As a result, in August the kings of Austria and Prussia signed a pact that they would declare war against France so long as the other European states joined their efforts. This Declaration of Pillnitz signaled the potential for war among the European powers against the new French state and also marked an increase in French emigration, especially among the nobles and officer classes.

25 This was Governor Boyd’s second service as governor of Gibraltar. He had been appointed lieutenant governor in 1768 and governor in 1773. He left that position in 1777, but returned to defend the garrison as a major general during the Great Siege in 1779 to 1782. His second term as governor was from January 1791 until his death in the garrison in May 1794. Stuart Handley, “Boyd, Sir Robert,” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

Meanwhile, the internal strife in North Africa also posed problems for the garrison, disrupting trade and limiting Gibraltar’s provisions. As a result, the governor had to reach out to his Spanish neighbors to meet the garrison’s needs for food and supplies. However, tensions were high between Britain and Spain due to disputes in the Pacific Northwest territories. In addition, Spain had recently placed ships sailing from Gibraltar under perpetual quarantine, despite the absence of disease. There had been a number of complaints about smugglers traveling across the border from Gibraltar, carrying tobacco and alcohol for reduced prices. Smuggling had long been an issue between the two territories, and in light of the larger Anglo-Spanish hostilities, Governor Boyd was concerned about Spanish retribution. In response to these threats, Boyd mobilized his troops and sought to strengthen the garrison’s works, especially along the border with Spain. He requested additional funds from the government in London to build a new bastion and improve the crumbling fortifications, many of which had not been repaired after the Great Siege a decade prior. Having participated in Gibraltar’s most recent siege, Boyd recognized the importance of a strong garrison to counter Spanish and French threats. As hostilities grew abroad, the governor readied his defenses to secure the territory against the pressing danger of war and revolution.

27 Morocco’s wars fill many of Gibraltar’s colonial files as a primary concern, even more than events on the continent in many cases. See TNA, CO 91/36 and 91/37 for details of this particular instability.

28 See chapter three for a greater explanation of quarantine and its use in political and diplomatic disputes.

29 One such incident surrounding the importation of tobacco to Gibraltar occurred in 1791 and reappeared in October 1792, involving many of the same merchants implicated in the petition dispute discussed below. See TNA, CO 91/36, Turnbull to Boyd, 31 March 1789, 24 September 1792, 25 September 1792, 26 September 1792, Boyd to Dundas, 8 October 1792.

30 There are several letters and mentions of the need for funds to repair the works throughout the volume covering this time period. For instance, see TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 11 October 1792 and Dundas to Boyd, 21 November 1792.
Alongside his military efforts, Boyd also sought to secure the town and its residents in the face of conflict. The republican ideas espoused in France posed a threat to neighboring leaders whose authority was not based on the “rights of man” but on ancient laws and traditions or the support of an unelected monarch. With the growth of French revolutionary fervor in the years following 1789, the surrounding states feared the incursion of such “contagious” ideas, seeking the means to prevent their spread. Some states, such as Spain, established a cordon sanitaire in an effort to restrain French ideological influence, whereas others, like Sweden and Russia, employed elaborate censorship and policing efforts to restrict any escalation in radical movements.31

Like these governments, Boyd was also eager to prevent the spread of revolutionary fervor from affecting Gibraltar. One of the best ways to do so was limit the number of non-British immigrants to the territory. In states throughout the region, French émigrés were regarded with suspicion and treated with caution, if they were even permitted residence. Many states placed limits on the number of émigrés allowed, and upon their arrival they were closely monitored to ensure they would not propagate revolutionary ideas.32 In Gibraltar, where the civilian population had reached approximately 3,000 inhabitants, the majority of whom were foreigners, it was especially important for the governor to limit the influx of additional residents. The current population was already rather large for the military fortress in which space and housing were limited and likely to become even more scarce as Boyd expected a greater influx of soldiers. Additionally, the governor’s responsibilities were considerable, especially in light of his


work in the garrison, and he had little time to attend to his existing civil responsibilities. Extra
hassles, such as troublesome residents, needed to be avoided at all costs.\footnote{Governors often blamed the inhabitants for the soldiers’ misdeeds, either by providing them with illegal or excessive liquor or for paying the troops to work for them instead of doing their military duties. See CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 81-82.}

In an effort to halt the flood of foreigners and manage the civil sphere, the governor
issued the Alien Act of 1791.\footnote{These efforts were only successful until France declared war on Britain, at which point a number of French émigrés fled to British territories with the support of the British government. Throughout many of the war years, especially after the Siege of Toulon from September to December 1793, French émigrés flooded Gibraltar, creating many problems for the governors. See TNA, CO 91/37-40. For more information on alien acts, see chapter 2.} This order declared that that “no person can possess a right to enter and reside in Gibraltar, even though a natural born subject of the Crown without permission of the Governor of the Fortress.”\footnote{GGA, The Alien Question. A History of the Permit System, 1704-1871. Draft Report May, 1871, “Memorandum on the Right of Residence in Gibraltar,” fo. 1.} Not only did this act enable Boyd to reject new immigrants, but it also allowed him to expel all current residents who could pose a threat to the territory or were a point of concern for the governor. This included the many troublesome, clandestine “house breakers & other Vagrants” residing in the territory who participated in various illegal activities.\footnote{TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 27 September 1792. Smuggling was a significant problem during this period and it soured diplomatic relations between Gibraltar and Spain, leading several governors to implement measures to combat this illegal trade.} Surprisingly British citizens were not exempt from the governor’s decree, despite their other privileges in the territory.\footnote{Only British inhabitants were technically allowed to purchase and sell homes; they were given preference in trading contracts and supplying the garrison; and they were the only residents granted the privilege of serving alongside the Judge Advocate in civil disputes brought to the Civil Court.} Under the Alien Act, Boyd was able to better control the inhabitants and direct the growth of the civil sphere in the territory. In essence, this order was a civil equivalent of the governor’s military efforts: it provided a barrier from unsavory characters, it insulated Gibraltar from outside forces and peoples, and it secured the town and garrison from threats. The act also served to reassert Boyd’s power over the territory and its inhabitants,
reminding them of his authority and ability to control all aspects of Gibraltar. It stressed to the residents that he was willing to do whatever necessary to “secure the garrison,” even if it meant putting several limitations on the civil sphere and its development. An state of emergency justified such restrictions, he believed, if it prevented the spread of radical bodies and their beliefs into and within the territory.

The 1792 Controversy in Gibraltar: Trade versus Security

With the dawn of 1792, the situation abroad worsened, revolutionary fervor gained strength, and it seemed increasingly likely that war was on the horizon. After learning of the 1791 Declaration of Pillnitz, which the French government interpreted as a threat, many French radicals called for war against Austria. Military action would strengthen their personal and political influence at home and demonstrate their newfound power abroad, countering the critiques of surrounding states. By February, war seemed to be a likelihood in the near future. As the possibility of war loomed, the Revolution became even more radical as the revolutionaries sought to pursue their enemies and ferret out any traitors within the government. In addition, the situation in France worsened as the year began with significant inflation, resulting in food riots across the state. This, alongside the disagreements and competition within the parties present in the collapsing Legislative Assembly, resulted in great unrest and instability throughout the state.

As tensions rose in France, and subsequently in Britain and the neighboring states, Boyd strove to tighten his grasp on the territory in an effort to keep Gibraltar safe from the surrounding turbulence. To him, and other leaders, it appeared that Gibraltar could be on the brink of an

38 The Girondins believed that a large conspiracy threatened France, leading the Assembly to demand that Louis XVI confront King Leopold and force him to promise that he would not interfere in French affairs. France eventually declared war on Austria, and by default Prussia who had allied itself with Austria in the declaration, on April 20, 1792. See Neely, Concise History, pp. 144-145.
emergency and it was necessary to do whatever possible to privilege security over all else. As part of this effort, Boyd sought to ensure that existing regulations were enforced and that any existing holes in the control of the town were plugged. On February 10 Boyd published an order that required all residents to obtain a permit before riding mounted “anywhere within the Gates of this Fortress” (Figure 5.1). These restrictions were necessary, Boyd maintained, because “the practice is grown remarkably common” that people would ride throughout the town despite the dangers posed by the unpaved streets and close quarters. Accidents were not uncommon: a soldier had recently broken his leg when a servant rode too closely next to him. If residents did not obey the order, Boyd mandated that they would be forced to dismount and the animal would be seized and sent to the pound, released only with the governor’s permission and under the Town Major’s authority. Soldiers were also forbidden to ride through the garrison or suffer similar consequences, and officers were recommended to either ride careful or lead their horses outside of the gates before mounting. Boyd requested the aid of the garrison’s officers to help him and other administrators enforce this edict to ensure the safety of the residents.

Two weeks later on February 27 the governor issued an additional declaration, forbidding all unauthorized inhabitants and soldiers from traveling on the streets between tattoo and reveille (8 PM to 6 AM) (Figure 5.2). This order, he claimed, merely reiterated the garrison’s standing orders, which forbade all civilians from passing without a light or permit after certain hours. These restrictions would help to prevent any unsavory activities by the inhabitants, and possibly

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40 TNA, CO 91/36, Correspondence from London merchants to Dundas, 17 May 1792; GGA, Orders, 1749-1793 Placarts, 1793-1802, Orders 1st July 1749-22nd Feb 1793, fo. 331-332.
41 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, and TNA, CO 91/36, Chronology by Boyd.
42 Tattoo was the signal for the men to secure the post in preparation for bed; it also typically marked the end of drinking for the night. Reveille was typically the morning call for the troops, which marked the raising of the flag, the firing of the gun, and the assembly of men for roll call.
even thwart any secret meetings that could happen in the night. Because “Housebreakings and Thefts by night” had “grown remarkably frequent for some time past,” Boyd felt it necessary to remind inhabitants and reinforce this policy.\textsuperscript{43} The governor directed the nighttime patrols of soldiers to take up any offenders and lodge them in the Main Guard overnight; offenders would not be released until their names were sent to the governor. Boyd did allow certain exceptions to the rule, allowing people who were ill or facing some sort of emergency to carry a light and simply inform the patrols of their reasons for traveling without a permit. In addition, he also forbade the patrols from stopping anyone within the first half an hour after the firing of the evening gun. Commanding officers, and those who accompanied them, were exempt from both orders.\textsuperscript{44}

In Boyd’s mind, these orders would allow him to keep the civil sphere well managed, granting him more time and attention to focus on more pressing military and diplomatic matters. With the nightly curfew, the inhabitants would require less monitoring and his soldiers would be better able to police any offenders. His goal, he argued, was simply to protect the residents and promote order in the town. As he later informed the Secretary of State, the governor was merely acting for “the King’s Service, & the protection of the community.”\textsuperscript{45} However, Gibraltar’s British merchants did not view these new orders in such a light. In their opinion, Boyd’s orders were a threat both to their personal well-being and their professional livelihood. As the petitioners noted, they chose to settle in Gibraltar because of the Crown’s encouragement and promise to protect the “security of British Trading Subjects.” This “Royal Promise” had

\textsuperscript{43} GGA, Orders, 1749-1793 Placarts, 1793-1802, Orders 1\textsuperscript{st} July 1749-22\textsuperscript{nd} Feb 1793, 27\textsuperscript{th} February 1792, fo. 332-333.

\textsuperscript{44} GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 8 March 1792.

\textsuperscript{45} GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 3 April 1792, and TNA, CO 91/36, Chronology by Boyd; TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 27 September 1792.
sustained them through the struggles that life in Gibraltar posed: the many quarantine restrictions, the particularities of international relations in the region, and life in a garrison community under a military governor that was often at war. While they had borne the many restrictions placed on the garrison trade and weathered the losses of the Great Siege, the merchants were not willing to labor under unnecessary or overbearing regulations. In their minds, the new regulations, particularly the one restricting nighttime activities, were tantamount to an unnecessary and unjust imposition of martial law.

Gibraltar’s leading British merchants expressed their dissatisfaction in a written petition to the governor dated March 8, 1792. At the time petitions were widely regarded as a respected and peaceable means for British subjects to communicate their concerns, introduce their proposals, and voice their opinions. By responding in the form of a petition, these Britons sought to inform the governor of their unease by engaging directly with his practice of governmentality. Embracing their rights as Britons, the merchants sought to challenge the governor’s overbearing policing of the inhabitants and their every movement. In their opinion, Boyd’s micropolitical approach to government was overly excessive, especially in light of the current situation of the town.

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46 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 8 March 1792.
47 While many of the trades were limited to British subjects, there were even greater restrictions placed on carrying and selling liquor and tobacco. These were highly regulated because of the fear and prevalence of the smuggling trade with these products into Spain. All merchants required the governor’s permission before they were allowed to participate in these trades. See CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct. Many merchants were also still recovering their losses from the siege, which had decimated much of the town’s livelihood, as well as the following years which focused on rebuilding rather than commercial development. By the late 1780s and early 1790s, Gibraltar’s traders sought to improve their commercial position, expand into new markets, and increase their profits.
48 Edmund Burke, for instance, maintained that petitions were the only peaceable means of bringing suits to the attention of the government. See James E. Bradley, Popular Politics and the American Revolution in England: Petitions, the Crown, and Public Opinion (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1986), pp. 17, 37-38.
As the authors noted, the garrison was currently in a “time of profound peace;” there was even “nothing hostile [that] can be apprehended from the Court of Spain.” Yet the February orders were more reminiscent of a time of war. During wartime it was excusable for a governor to pass such regulations because he required complete control over the territory and its inhabitants. However, during times of peace, they believed there was no justifiable reason for the governor to deprive inhabitants of their “free liberty and license” as he had done. To these men, Gibraltar was not in a state of emergency and its people should not be treated as if they were. Under these orders even the most “respectable” citizens were prohibited from “the enjoyment of an Evenings Walk, or the Convivial intercourse of a Friend” without threat of seizure and imprisonment. Such restrictions, they argued, were “cruel in the extreme, and contrary to all Justice and Equity.”

Boyd’s orders also posed significant complications to the merchants’ commercial ventures, making it difficult for them to move about the town, transport their goods, or carry out business after 6 PM. Under these regulations, the petitioners argued, “No Trade can be carried on there, with any degree of Satisfaction or Sincerity.”

Such restrictions seemed especially unreasonable in light of the merchants’ positive relationship with the previous governor, Major General Charles O’Hara. O’Hara, who served from 1788 to 1790, was so beloved by the commercial community that after his departure they sent him a letter of commendation and “Piece of Plate” in thanks for his beneficence. Unlike previous governors, who had placed stringent regulations on the merchants, O’Hara “shew[ed] us that in a Garrison Town Situated in an Enemy’s Country (as the Conduct of the Spaniards to

50 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 8 March 1792; TNA, CO 91/36, John Turnbull, George War, James Anderson Sr., and James Sutton to Dundas, 29 September 1792.

51 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 8 March 1792.

52 TNA, CO 91/36, London merchants to Dundas, 27 June 1793.
Gibraltar has always proved them to be) the rigid & necessary Exactness of Military Discipline, Could be maintain’d without encroaching on the Liberty of the Subject, or restraining the Freedom of Trade.\textsuperscript{53} Recognizing the complications that plagued the governor, the merchants applauded his efforts to work with them rather than limiting their trading opportunities like past commanders.\textsuperscript{54} Although trade actually declined during this period, Gibraltar’s merchants did not appear to have blamed this occurrence on the governor; instead they emphasized his kindness and attention to the Gibraltar’s civil sphere, celebrating his efforts to foster growth in the town and its trades.\textsuperscript{55} If O’Hara could manage to secure Gibraltar against continuous Spanish threats while facilitating the growth of the civil sphere, it seemed that any governor should be able to do so, especially if not under the direct threat of war. To the merchants, the garrison’s situation had not changed in the time between the two governors’ tenures, and they refused to be treated as if it had.

The only explanation the merchants could consider was that unlike O’Hara, Boyd was not interested in preserving and promoting Gibraltar’s civil sphere. Instead, the merchants argued, he showed a “glaring Partiality” for members of the military. This was his greatest fault and formed the basis of the merchants’ complaints. Among Britons it was often avowed that “Trade was never known [to] flourish under a Military Power;” this was especially true, the merchants demonstrated, under Boyd’s administration.\textsuperscript{56} As a result, the authors focused most of their ire on

\textsuperscript{53} TNA, CO 91/36, John Turnbull, George Ward, James Anderson Sr., James Sutton & Co., James Reed, J. Parkinson, John Mosman, Joseph Bendelack, James Dunsmeere, & Matthew Cooper to O’Hara, 14 December 1791.

\textsuperscript{54} Governor Elliott, O’Hara’s predecessor, was especially exacting, even after the Great Siege had ended. Many of the merchants complained about his actions as well, but no changes were ever made. See TNA, PC 1/16/13; TNA, CO 91/30, 91/31, 91/34.


\textsuperscript{56} Joshua Gee, \textit{The Trade and Navigation of Great Britain Considered} (London, 1731), p. 110. The Boston colonists made similar comments about how military power was “unfavorable to Commerce.” Quoted in John Philip Reid, \textit{In Defiance of the Law: The Standing-Army Controversy, the Two Constitutions, and the Coming of the American
the soldiers, condemning Boyd’s use of the military. With these new regulations Boyd had
“vest[ed] the Military Officers, and even privates” with the authority to act as “Judge, Evidence,
and avenger.” Officers were permitted to stop passing inhabitants, question them about the
purpose of their travels, determine if the person was violating garrison orders, and if so, punish
them accordingly.57 In essence, the petitioners suggested, the garrison soldiers now resembled a
standing army, employed as an enforcing body during a time of peace. As they argued, Boyd’s
“Placart makes a peace Officer of a Soldier.” 58 Such bodies of soldiers were an anathema to
many Britons, who decried them as a “dangerous instrument” and a “Hydra among mankind.”
Long associated with martial law in Britain, standing armies were believed to be incompatible
with the proper administration of justice.60 The Gibraltar petitioners echoed such sentiments,
arguing that although they were promised to be “perfectly free from every Species of Tyranny &
Military law,” they were now “intirely at the Mercy of the Military.” This administrative
approach, they contended, was contrary to British law and good government and illegal in times
of peace.

Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), p. 156; see also pp. 9, 22-23, 110, 119. See also
Robert M. Calhoon, Dominion and Liberty: Ideology in the Anglo-American World 1660-1801 (Arlington Heights,
IL: Harlan Davidson, 1994).

57 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 8 March 1792.

58 Lois Schwoerer defines a standing army as “a military force that is permanently embodied and kept ‘standing,’
even in time of peace.” A standing army differs from other forms of military forces (i.e. mercenaries, local militia)
because it is not disbanded at the end of the hostilities and the men fighting were neither professional soldiers hired
strictly for that purpose nor local men trained casually to fight when necessary. See Lois G. Schwoerer, “No
Standing Armies!” The Antiarmy Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University

59 Joel Barlow, A Letter to the National Convention of France (Dublin, 1792), p. 43; David Stewart Erskine, Earl of
Buchan, Letters on the Impolicy of a Standing Army, in Time of Peace: And, on the Unconstitutional and Illegal
body of persons compared to the Lernaean hydra in its baneful or destructive character, its multifarious aspects, or
the difficulty of its extirpation” (“hydra, n.” OED Online, June 2014, Oxford University Press).

Focusing their attention on the soldiers, the petitioners also argued that Boyd’s new orders contradicted his efforts to secure the town. Instead of protecting the residents, his commands would actually effect more violence and crime. Because soldiers were “obliged to admit of no Arguments but the sword and the Musket,” it was likely that they would turn to force when challenged by an inhabitant. They had been “furnished and provided with the very proper Weapons” and “authorized… to avail of those body means which are placed in their Hands.” In that light, the merchants suggested Gibraltar’s inhabitants would be in greater danger from “the uncontrouled power vested in the Officer or Soldier” rather than “the Kick of an unruly Animal.” They feared that the soldiers’ recourse to violence would result in “the most dreadfull circumstances,” even including the murder of an innocent inhabitant. If that were to happen, they argued, it would create even greater problems for the governor, who could be charged as an accessory by virtue of issuing the orders.61 By vesting the soldiers with the authority to enforce orders and providing them with weapons to do so, Governor Boyd was treading a fine line between peaceful control and violent disorder.

The petitioners also suggested that Boyd’s orders would encourage greater thefts and other crimes. Some soldiers had already been charged with robbery, the very crime that inspired the February 27th order; now that so many of them were exempt from this regulation, there was nothing to stop them from perpetrating greater crimes. As the merchants noted, the soldiers were “none of the most rigid observers of honesty,” a stereotype that pervaded contemporary British portrayals of the military.62 Soldiers were thought to “always be uncommonly depraved,” known

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61 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 8 March 1792.
for their general debauchery and drinking habits, use of foul language, visits to public houses and
prostitutes, and fathering illegitimate children.\textsuperscript{63} Many Britons, including those settled in
Gibraltar, believed themselves to be safer when the military was engaged abroad rather than
sitting at home. Even King George III was reportedly concerned that there would be an increase
in highway robberies and property crimes with the return of the soldiers following the American
Revolutionary War.\textsuperscript{64} In the current atmosphere in Gibraltar, the petitioners worried that many
soldiers, when “enforcing” Boyd’s orders, would force the inhabitants to pay for their freedom or
rob them of the personal possessions they carried at the time of their arrest. In light of the
soldiers’ newfound powers, the memorialists feared that these orders were “the most likely way
in the World to make [crime] more frequent.”\textsuperscript{65} Appealing to Boyd’s fears of unrest in the
garrison, the merchants sought to convince him to retract his commands, allowing them to better
pursue their trades.

Despite the memorialists’ “sober” reflections on Boyd’s orders, the governor refused to
redact his commands. Rather than denying his use of military power in the town’s
administration, Boyd defended his orders and his actions. He replied that “in this Garrison, ‘the
free liberty and licence… to go and come in, by day or by night, either with or without a light,
without the necessity of any permit from a military Officer, and without he control of any
military power,’ cannot be allowed.”\textsuperscript{66} Such practices were contrary to the standing orders of the

\textsuperscript{63} William Godwin, \textit{An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice}, Vol. 1 (London, 1793), pp. 87-88. See also Thomas
Somerville, \textit{The Effects of the French Revolution, With Respect to the Interests of Humanity, Liberty, Religion, and

Power}, p. 60.

\textsuperscript{65} GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 8 March 1792.

\textsuperscript{66} GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Boyd to John Ross, 18 March 1792.
garrison, and Boyd was unwilling to budge on those regulations, which he claimed were “no innovation of mine.” It was not difficult to obtain a permit and, as Boyd later noted, many “peaceable Inhabitants” had applied for and been granted one. Only questionable residents would be bothered by these restrictions, and those peoples were the very ones that the governor sought to monitor. In light of these protests, Boyd was even more concerned for the safety of the garrison and the threat that the petitioner posed to the territory’s peace. Their challenge to his authority encouraged the governor to hold his ground, especially because he believed that his orders posed no real threat to inhabitant’s rights. In a garrison community like Gibraltar, he argued, it was essential for civilians to follow the commander’s orders for the sake of the territory and their own safety. Such a micropolitical approach to governance, he suggested, was necessary for the security of the town. Boyd decreed that his February orders would remain in force.

Even before the governor refused to relent with his orders, tensions rose between some of Gibraltar’s inhabitants and the garrison soldiers on patrol. It appears that the inhabitants did not heed Boyd’s orders, choosing instead to disobey them and travel without a permit or a light. As one report detailed, in the beginning of March a British inhabitant stayed out after hours and chose to travel home, despite not having an authorized pass. On his way home he encountered a patrol of soldiers and fled, at which point the soldiers pursued him. Reportedly a member of the patrol fired a shot at the young man, which luckily hit a wall, and the resident escaped. Such incidents were apparently not uncommon as Boyd was driven to issue a subsequent order in March, reinforcing the terms of his two February declaration. As a punishment for disobeying his

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67 TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 27 September 1792.
68 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 8 March 1792.
mandates, Boyd commanded that “any Inhabitant taken up hereafter by the Patrols, for breach of Garrison orders, shall be confined in Jail a Week.” Such a strict punishment was necessary, he believed, to deter offenders and remind them of the importance of observing the governor’s regulations. Now that the petitioners were not only authoring seditious petitions but also disrupting the peace of the garrison and flouting direct orders, the governor felt that he had to take a stand against this outright threat.

These confrontations between the inhabitants and the soldiers became even more frequent in the following months. As Boyd later reported, many of the petitioners did not respond well to the governor’s most recent order, choosing to disregard his commands and cause disruptions in the town. The numbers of inhabitants arrested for “gross abuse, & meances to an Officer” grew and those who were arrested were supported during their confinement with ample funds and provisions provided by other dissatisfied residents. One of the merchants was even accused of taking other residents’ permits, which they had legally obtained from Governor Boyd, and disposing of them in front of the Officer of the Main Guard. Meanwhile, inhabitants reported that they had been “seized in the Streets” or “forcibly taken from their doors by the Patroles,” arrested for no reason and with no opportunity to protest their innocence. One gentleman claimed that he had been forced by the soldiers to open his door, which had been shut as he was inside preparing for bed. When he was slow to respond to the soldiers’ demands, the sergeant had threatened to break down the door, “took a firelock from one of his own guard, - cocked and presented it to the Man in his own house, and swore he would immediately shoot him” if he did

70 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, and TNA, CO 91/36, Chronology by Boyd; GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 3 April 1792.
71 TNA, CO 91/36, Chronology by Boyd.
72 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 3 April 1792.
not accompany the officer to the Main Guard. The gentleman acquiesced in order to protect himself from injury, and he was subsequently confined in the guard overnight and imprisoned in jail for the following week.\textsuperscript{73} Half a dozen other men reported similar experiences with the patrols and they too were “committed to the New Jail without any Trial or Conviction.”\textsuperscript{74} During this time it seemed to some residents that “the very Name of an Inhabitant, or rather the Sight of a coloured Coat carries with it, in the eye of the meanest Soldier, Degradation, and disrespect.”\textsuperscript{75} By the beginning of April, the relationship between all parties in the territory were strained and fractious.

On April 3, the March memorialists submitted another petition to Governor Boyd, yet this one did not employ as charitable language as their previous memorial. Rather than concentrating on the inherent problems with the governor’s orders and working towards an agreeable solution, this petition served as a verbal attack on the governor, detailing his failures as a British administrator. The merchants claimed that Boyd had “struck at the Root of sacred unalienable Rights of Liberty and Property” and had done “irreparable damage… to the Majesty of Justice whose Insignia you bear.” Boyd robbed them of their right to fair trial, he had “deprived them” of their liberties, and he had “subverted” and “defied… all Laws.” As they portrayed it, the governor’s oppressive orders appeared to be “an Extract from some gloomy Relic of despotism,” not “the sober, dispassionate sentiment of an English Governor and Chief Magistrate.” Rather than honoring the “known Laws of England” that he “was bound to,” Boyd

\textsuperscript{73} GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, John Ross to John Turnbull, 17 May 1792.

\textsuperscript{74} TNA, CO 91/36, Affidavits Sworn by Jacob Bentiamee, Noah Benedetto, Andrew Illia, Solomon Uziel, and Eliau Melul, 2 April 1792.

\textsuperscript{75} GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, John Ross to John Turnbull, 17 May 1792.
had instead “aimed at establishing a Military Tyranny,” establishing exacting edicts that curtailed the rights of his inhabitants, limited their voices, and privileged the soldiers.\textsuperscript{76}

In Boyd’s eyes, the petitioners argued, “Gibraltar is only to be considered in the nature of a Garrison.” This was evident through his many restrictions and regulations upon trade, which demonstrated his “extreme aversion to the designs of Commerce,” as well as his complete disregard to the civil sphere in Gibraltar. As they maintained, because the governor appeared to believe that “there was no Town,” he also seemed to have adopted the attitude that “there was no formal establishment for the Government and protection of its Inhabitants.” Rather than attending to “the people committed to your charge,” Boyd’s “determined predilection” for the military “blinded you to the high and honorable relation in which you stand to the Inhabitants of this Town.” The governor, they argued, ignored his duty of governing, choosing instead to “enslave the people committed to your charge.” His “arbitrary and oppressive” regulations had been so restrictive and detrimental to this community that the petitioners claimed that the town of Gibraltar had never suffered so greatly under a governor’s leadership. While other governors had enforced stringent restrictions, only Boyd, they argued, had sought to “humiliate and distress the Inhabitants, to render their lives uncomfortable, and their Trade unprofitable” with “almost every order or placard which has been issued.”\textsuperscript{77} According to the authors, martial law had become the norm under Boyd’s rule as governor, and now they were unwilling to tolerate such treatment. Tired of the governor’s constant policing of all aspects of their life and his technologies of governance, the merchants chose to take a stand and appeal to a higher law.

\textsuperscript{76} GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 3 April 1792.

\textsuperscript{77} GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 3 April 1792.
Because Boyd had refused to consider their memorial, it was their duty, the petitioners contended, to inform “that most August Assemblage” in London of Boyd’s defiance of his charge as governor. As such, they concluded their memorial by informing the governor that they would “with cheerfulness refer their Cause” to Parliament, seeking restitution for Boyd’s intolerance and repression. The merchants reiterated that Boyd’s orders, and his administration of the territory, were “arbitrary and oppressive” and entirely contrary to the British constitution and the desires of the British crown and Parliament. Following through with their promise, the merchants contacted their commercial colleagues in London, forwarding their two petitions as well as several affidavits reporting on the conditions under which Gibraltar’s inhabitants suffered. As the authors affirmed, the situation in the town “becomes more irksome… daily, and hourly” and they worried that it “will not stop.” They urged their associates in the metropole to contact members of Parliament and present their concerns so as “to obtain us redress from our present disagreeable state.” If Gibraltar’s merchants could not trade freely, this would in turn affect their commercial relations in Britain, who had a much stronger voice and influence to present to Parliament and the king. It was necessary, they argued, and their associates agreed, to resolve the situation in the territory in order to allow trade to flourish and enable Gibraltar’s merchants to take advantage of the new Mediterranean trading opportunities.

In response to the merchants’ second petition, Governor Boyd sought the assistance of the acting Judge Advocate in ferreting out the offensive authors and control the situation on the

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78 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 3 April 1792.
79 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, John Ross to John Turnbull, 17 May 1792.
ground. He informed the judge that the merchants had “depreciated” his character in “the vilest terms” and “encouraged a non compliance with Garrison orders.” As he noted, these inhabitants were seditious on a number of fronts and should be prosecuted. In particular, he denounced the actions of George Davies, who he believed was responsible for the petitions and for taking residents’ permits. Boyd contended that Davies “does not only encourage sedition, but has proceeded to an overact of presumption and opposition to the Garrison Rules and orders.”81 Therefore, he asked the judge to please summon Davies and question him about his actions. Unfortunately for Boyd, Judge Morrison was not as helpful as the governor had hoped. The judge did summon Davies, but he “could not legally enforce” the merchant to respond to his questions or divulge his role in the petitions and acts of civil disobedience.82 As a result, Boyd was left without answers regarding Davies’ involvement or the future directions of the petitioners.

Without the help of the Judge Advocate, the governor was unable to pursue the matter further within the garrison and was left without the support of his fellow British administrator. Having already published an additional order and sought the help of his fellow administrator, Boyd had largely exhausted his options for managing the crisis within the garrison. While he did still have the ultimate authority in the territory, he had no means beyond those already employed to control the petitioners further. With the petitioners’ submission of their complaints to those in London, the governor recognized that he would have to defend his name to his superiors abroad should the memorial catch their attention. It appeared that this local conflict, which had emerged out of Boyd’s efforts to manage the territory and proactively prevent other crises, would now

81 TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Morrison, 11 April 1792.
82 TNA, CO 91/36, Morrison to Boyd, 17 April 1792, 8 September 1792; GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Morrison to Boyd, 17 April 1792.
become a larger imperial issue subject to the opinions of Parliament and the king. These higher powers would have to decide if Boyd had indeed employed such orders to protect the territory and its people or if he had overstepped his bounds as governor and impeded on the rights of the inhabitants. Gibraltar, both parties could now agree, was indeed in a state of crisis, caused by the other, and needed a resolution from the metropole in order to bring peace back to the territory.

**Crisis Moves to the Metropole**

In May 1792 a party of London merchants presented a memorial to members of Parliament on behalf of their partners in Gibraltar, including the Gibraltarians’ petitions, depositions, and letters in their missive. This memorial condensed several of the themes expressed by Gibraltar’s merchants, emphasizing Boyd’s tyrannical nature and his invasion of their rights and liberties as British citizens in such a way that it employed similar rhetoric as many of the revolutionary writers. Rather than simply being a poor administrator, Governor Boyd was now depicted as a tyrannical, absolutist ruler and his disregard for their rights was not just because of his military predilections but because he sought to destroy the British constitution. As suggested by both the Gibraltar and London merchants, Governor Boyd appeared to embody all the evils of the “MONSTER” French government.\(^{83}\)

According to many British onlookers, the French revolutionary government appeared to be “the bloodiest and most detestable tyranny that has blotted the annals of modern Europe.”\(^{84}\)

As observers of the Revolution noted, the situation in France had rendered everyone’s liberties, 

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\(^{83}\) Arthur Young, *The Example of France, A Warning to Britain* (Dublin, 1793), pp. 11-15, 27. While this section draws on quotations primarily from the London merchants’ memorial, their language was based largely on that used by the Gibraltar merchants. Although the previous section of this chapter did not focus specifically on this rhetoric, it is present in their two memorials, affidavits, and letters, although in a more diffuse form as it is scattered throughout the documents.

\(^{84}\) Somerville, *The Effects of the French Revolution*, p. 38.
freedoms, and property insecure, placing even their lives in jeopardy.\(^85\) This, British authors like Thomas Somerville asserted, was the epitome of tyranny: “If the invasion of private property, if intolerance of religious and political opinion, if false accusations, if the imputation of guilt without the shadow of evidence, if merciless severity of punishment, if these are characteristics and ingredients of tyranny, then assuredly we cannot hesitate a moment to pronounce, that the French Convention has reached the summit of tyranny.”\(^86\) Such a description, the petitioning merchants suggested, was not only fitting for the French revolutionaries but also for Boyd’s administration. They argued that Boyd’s governorship was “Tyranny really bordering upon Madness” with his residents suffering “under the Scourge of such an undue Exercise of Power.”\(^87\) Like the French government, depicted as “vicious, arbitrary, and incompatible with the just rights of the people,” Boyd too issued a number of “strange [and] arbitrary Orders” that “debase[d] & humiliate[d] the Civil People.”\(^88\) Due to his “Caprice & Tyranny,” the merchants argued, the inhabitants “suffer[ed] every hardship.” Employing a similar rhetoric as those protesting the revolution, the merchants demonstrated shocking parallels between their British governor and the French despots.\(^89\)

Like the French revolutionaries, who sought to “destroy all vestiges of the antient country, in religion, in polity, in laws, and in manners,” the petitioners accused Governor Boyd


\(^{87}\) TNA, CO 91/36, John Turnbull, George War, James Anderson, Sr., and James Sutton [London merchants] to Henry Dundas, 16 May 1792.


\(^{89}\) For a good comparison of what “conservative” Britons argued were the differences between them and the French, please see Dickinson, “Popular Conservatism and Militant Loyalism,” p. 106. See also Dickinson, “Introduction: Impact on Britain,” p. 10.
of violating the sanctity of the British constitution. As historians have noted, during this period there was “an almost hysterical regard for the constitution.”90 The constitution, as many proponents attested, was emblematic of the glory of Britain and its superior system of strong government and liberty.91 Burke exclaimed, “it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and assert our liberties.”92 The London petitioners echoed this sentiment, noting that the constitution was “formed by the Wisdom of Ages, to secure to Individuals the greatest possible degree of Liberty, consistent with the general Welfare & Security.”93 Liberty was seen as the key component of the constitution because it empowered Britons to follow their interests, talents and goals so long as they did not injure the property or liberty of others.94 It was through their liberties, many Britons believed, that they were able to accumulate property, wealth, and happiness under the guidance of the British state.95 As some historians have argued, liberty was “the single most important ingredient” of British identity at that time and often used to distinguish the superior political doctrine of Britain from their tyrannical neighbors.96 Although the governor was “far from ignorant of the Laws of his Country, of the Priviledges of English Subjects, & of the legal Extent of his own Power,” the merchants claimed that he had violated

92 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution, pp. 31, 33.  
95 Jennifer Mori, Languages of Loyalism: Patriotism, Nationhood and the State in the 1790s,” English Historical Review 118 (February 2003), pp. 47-48.  
96 Marshall, “Britain without America,” p. 590.
the principles established by the constitution, having “deprived [the residents] of every Shadow of Personal Liberty.”

Life in the town of Gibraltar, as the petitioners’ portrayed it, in many ways mirrored the perils experienced by French citizens. According to Arthur Young, who had traveled in France during the early years of the Revolution, the “indigent poor possessed of power” under the revolutionary government had committed “horrors” across the state, “plundering” and “oppressing” the people. The National Assembly had arrested more than five hundred people, imprisoned them without cause, tried them illegally and denied any appeals. Meanwhile, free citizens were subject to the whims of the “widely destructive” and “dangerously incontrollable” French radicals who favored “the most violent propositions.” The merchants’ depicted a similar scenario in Gibraltar, writing of the numerous illegal arrests and the imprisonment of even Gibraltar’s leading residents in the common jail, “which is a wretched Place,” and their week-long confinement “without trial, or the Imputation of any Crime, but that of having been visible, contrary to the Governor’s Orders.” Those residents who remained in the town feared the “full & unlimited Power” of the patrolling soldiers, who often turned to violence or theft with their newfound authority. The soldiers, much like the French radicals, the petitioners’ claimed, posed an “imminent danger to the Lives & Libertys of Numbers [of inhabitants].”

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99 Young, The Example of France, pp. 31, 37.
100 Young, The Example of France, pp. 11-13.
101 Somerville, The Effects of the French Revolution, pp. 40-41; Young, The Example of France, 57n.
The tales of Gibraltar’s residents depicted a life of insecurity, violence, destruction, and tyranny that seemed surprisingly similar to the stories told by anti-revolutionary Britons coming from France. Echoing these authors’ themes, the petitioners employed this rhetoric to support their cause in freeing Gibraltar’s merchants (and other residents) from Boyd’s restrictions. Such an approach was necessary in order to strengthen their argument against the governor and better represent the merchants’ case. Parliament had rarely paid much attention to the territory, and in light of the greater threats of revolution abroad and at home, it was unlikely that the merchants’ complaints of a petty trading dispute would register. As a result, the merchants took advantage of current fears and tailored their critique to the surrounding revolutionary discourse. Recognizing the importance of these conversations to their contemporaries, especially those in the government, the petitioners sought to convince their audience of the severity of the problem by using a common frame of reference. When placed together, the petitioners’ scattered critiques offered a cogent argument against Boyd and his efforts “to destroy the grand Foundation and Pillar of their happy Constitution.”

The petitioners’ tactics were successful enough to generate a response from Henry Dundas, Secretary of State for the Home Department. He wrote to Governor Boyd in July, informing him of the merchants’ complaints about his “rigid observance of the regulations.” While Dundas did not insist that Boyd halt his current practices, seeking an explanation from the governor first, he did advise that the governor “relax gradually” “the exercise of your Military authority over the civil Inhabitants.” As his letter suggested, Boyd’s approach to governance was too micropolitical and employed an excessive use of power. It was the governor’s duty, Dundas

103 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 8 March 1792.
104 This post was established in 1782 and was responsible for colonial affairs.
maintained, to “grant [the inhabitants] every degree of indulgence which can be afforded to them consistently with a due attention to the security of that important Garrison.” As his missive intimated, it did not appear that Boyd was currently governing with this in mind, instead imposing “a very improper and unnecessary restraint upon the peaceable Inhabitants.”

As Dundas’ letter traveled to Gibraltar, the governor was composing his initial attack on the petitioning merchants for the Secretary of State. Having learned of the merchants’ missive to his superiors in Parliament, Boyd felt the need to inform the Secretary of the “two infamous libels,” denouncing the traders for “so gross an insult.” Boyd likely recognized that their memorial to Parliament would denigrate his good name and administrative effort. As a result, he took a similar approach by vilifying the merchants and condemning their recent actions. According to Boyd, the “outrageous Peyneists,” also known as merchants, had “made some attempts tending to weaken the authority of a Commander in Chief.” These “high and mighty Demagogues” had bullied the Judge Advocate into inaction, leaving the governor “unsupported… in my civil capacity” and “grossly insulted by the lowest of mankind.” The inhabitants had been told repeatedly, he argued, that “they are Inhabitants of a place of war” and thus “must comply with all the rules and orders that are thought necessary by the Commander in Chief.”

Boyd’s language in his July letter, despite not knowing the exact content of the merchants’ May petition, invoked similar themes as his opponents in employing a rhetoric reminiscent of British anti-revolutionary writers. Whereas the petitioners identified the governor as a tyrant, Boyd presented the merchants as similar to the French radicals, seeking to overthrow

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105 TNA, CO 91/36, Henry Dundas to Robert Boyd, 12 July 1792.
106 TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 23 July 1792.
a well-established government. At a moment when authoritarian rule was less of a concern than radicalism, the governor’s accusation was grave. In labeling the merchants as “outrageous Peyneists,” the governor intimated that they subscribed to the beliefs of Thomas Paine, who was a pariah among the British government for his publication of the *Rights of Man*. Paine was known across Britain as exemplifying the revolutionary ideas that had created the current troubles in France. As Young noted in his treatise on the effects of the revolution, “we see the living and effective consequences of Paine’s doctrine.”

At the time of Boyd’s writing, Paine’s trial for seditious libel had been postponed, but the British government had issued a proclamation against the proliferation of seditious writings, urging Britons to avoid such publications or gatherings that could produce unrest. By characterizing Gibraltar’s merchants as such, Boyd portrayed them as revolutionary leaders who disregarded the governor’s reasoning and instead appealed to the emotions of the other inhabitants in order to subvert his administration.

Boyd echoed and expanded upon this imagery in a September letter to Secretary Dundas in which he offered a full defense of his position. The petitioners, he contended, may have presented themselves as “peaceable,” but in actuality they were “ringleaders of the licentious populace.” Their protests were not simply kindly written complaints but rather seditious writings followed by physical violence and disruption. As he argued, these seemingly respectable men were not what they appeared to be, much like the “modest reformers” of the French

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107 Young, *The Example of France*, p. 20.
110 TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 27 September 1792.
revolution who in actuality posed the greatest danger to the prevailing order.\footnote{Young, The Example of France, pp. 61-62.} Instead of simply applying for a permit, the merchants refused to so, preferring to “encourage the lower class of inhabitants to the willfull breach of orders.” Boyd reminded Dundas that Gibraltar’s residents were not entirely upright citizens; rather, they were the “dregs of a motely people, expatriated from all parts of the Universe.” Such people of “suspicious character,” Boyd argued, could not be trusted and certainly should not be “encouraged and rewarded… for defying all observance of regulations.”\footnote{TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 27 September 1792.} By supporting such disobedience, Boyd suggested, the petitioners revealed their potential for treachery both against the governor but also the basis of his power: the British sovereign himself.\footnote{Clark explains that obedience was the focus in Britain during the French Revolution of proving one’s allegiance. See J.C.D. Clark, English Society, 1688-1832: Ideology, Social Structure, and Political Practice During the Ancien Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 234. See also Morris, The British Monarch and the French Revolution, p. 131.}

Such insinuations on Boyd’s part were not innocent; by September 1792 the Revolution had become a bloody one. The Girondin ministers were dismissed in June and the king was removed from power in August with the violent uprising at the Tuileries Palace. Following the overthrow of the monarchy, the French populace feared a large-scale counterrevolutionary plot was imminent, supported by the state’s many political prisoners. These fears grew until the beginning of September when news arrived in Paris that the Prussian army had invaded France, had captured Verdun and was advancing toward the capital. On that day an armed band attacked a group of prisoners that was being transferred, ushering in the beginning of the five-day September massacres that killed approximately 1,200 prisoners. For many outsiders, especially those in Britain, the massacres represented the disorder and violence of the French revolution.
In light of these developments abroad, Boyd seemed to suggest that Gibraltar’s petitioners posed a true risk to the security of the garrison and Britain itself. The “gentlemen” had “claim[ed] as a right the total abolition of all regulations, Civil and Military,” despite the consequences that would ensue. If he were “to prefer the convenience, or rather caprice, of each private individual” as the petitioners wished, the governor feared he would not be able to fulfill his responsibilities as commander.114 By giving into their demands, Boyd argued, he would sacrifice the security of the garrison and set a dangerous precedent for other Britons that might be inclined to rebel against authority. This was a real fear for many Britons who believed that “Popular tyranny is a catching phrenzy; that will surely spread, if effective measures be not taken in time to prevent it.”115 Rewarding or giving into such disobedience was one such way to promote the spread of rebellion. Boyd suggested that he was merely trying to prevent such chaos from erupting, while performing his duties as the head of the garrison and the town. Rather than policing the inhabitants unnecessarily, Boyd argued, he was merely exerting his authority on radical bodies as needed. As evidence of such, he argued, Gibraltar’s inhabitants had been granted “every indulgence” “in their civil rights, as [well as] the protection of their persons, estates, and merchandize.”116 Yet, he contended, they continued to contest his authority with “a violent spirit of opposition” and “the darkest malice & untruth.”117

This verbal dispute continued in both Gibraltar and London as the year progressed. In September the London merchants issued a second petition to Parliament on their Gibraltar

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114 TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 8 October 1792.
115 Young, The Example of France, p. 58.
116 As Arthur Young argued against revolutionary proponents in Britain, “you have your rights; you are in possession of every right that is consistent with safety to the life and property of others; - to give you more will endanger both, - to give you much more will infallibly destroy them, and eventually yourselves.” See Young, The Example of France, p. 31.
117 TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 8 October 1792, 27 September 1792.
colleagues’ behalf. This memorial employed the same language as the first and made similar claims about the governor’s tyrannical actions and assault on his peoples’ liberties.\footnote{118} Meanwhile, Governor Boyd continued to search for the “libelous” petitioners in Gibraltar. Again in September he sought the aid of the Judge Advocate in summoning one of the merchants who he believed was responsible for authoring the missive sent to London.\footnote{119} While the merchant willingly admitted that he did write a letter to the head of the London petition, this investigation could be taken no further.\footnote{120} The Judge Advocate refused to question the man if he was not charged with a crime or if it would incriminate him against future charges, and because the merchant did not offer up any grievances against the governor, there was nothing to consider in that regard.\footnote{121} Once again Boyd was left without recourse against the rebellious merchants in the garrison. Although it appears that the physical hostilities had subsided, the animosity between the merchants and the governor remained, sparking up in other commercial disputes.\footnote{122} Until administrators in London reached an official decision on the matter, the pressure in Gibraltar continued to simmer, even as tensions in the neighboring state worsened.

**Conclusion**

At the end of January 1793 Secretary Dundas wrote to Governor Boyd, endorsing his actions as commander over the past year. As he reassured the governor, “you may readily

\footnote{118} The September memorial was more abbreviated and slightly less aggressive than the May memorial. See TNA, CO 91/36, John Turnbull, George Ward, James Anderson Sr., James Sutton to Dundas, 29 September 1792.
\footnote{119} TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Morrison, 5 September 1792.
\footnote{120} GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, John Ross to Morrison, 6 September 1792.
\footnote{121} TNA, CO 91/36, Morrison to Boyd, 8 September 1792.
\footnote{122} In October 1792 many of the petitioning merchants became involved in another dispute with the governor over the importation and sale of tobacco. This conflict had actually begun prior to the petitions; however, the memorials only made the hostilities worse as each side was even more determined to argue their perspective. This debate even appears in a letter from Boyd to Secretary Dundas. See TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 8 October 1792.
suppose that His Majesty is always inclined to give countenance and protection to His Officers, in the proper and regular discharge of their respective duties; and I flatter myself that no dissatisfaction will be given to you, by any determination which may take place on the subject of these complaints."

The secretary’s support of Boyd and his efforts to secure the garrison sent a message not only to the governor but also to both parties of merchants: they too implicitly agreed that Gibraltar was in a state of emergency and the governor was justified in behaving as such. Boyd was not to be condemned or punished for overreacting to the situation, but rather applauded for acting appropriately as he had been commanded. His actions, as the secretary noted, had been deemed “proper and regular,” thus legitimating his efforts at securing the territory and controlling the civil sphere. Dundas’ response suggested that at this time, security and protection were far more important to the government than debates over “liberties.” By supporting Boyd’s micropolitical tactics of governance, including the policing of British subjects, the secretary indicated that he believed such a focused approach was necessary for the security of the British territory.

By January, Louis XVI had been tried, found guilty, and executed by the French republican government. His death offered an even stronger argument against revolutionary ideas and their supporters, especially among states with a monarchy, like Britain. Meanwhile the French Convention pledged to pursue efforts to spread republicanism across the continent and throughout Europe, suggesting an expansion of their current war with Austria and Prussia.

This declaration, along with the execution of the king, encouraged Pitt to request funds from Parliament to fight a war against the murderous French government, despite past promises to

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123 TNA, CO 91/36, Dundas to Boyd, 29 January 1793.
124 Neely, *A Concise History*, p. 176. The Edict of Fraternity, in which the French revolutionary government pledged its support of other radical movements, was published in November 1792.
remain at peace. Louis’ execution proved to be the final straw not only for the British parliament but also its people who had become disenchanted by the violence in France.\footnote{Doyle, \textit{The Oxford History of the French Revolution}, pp. 200-202. In actuality the British had begun to prepare their fleets for war in November 1792. They had also already approached Spain seeking an alliance in the event of war at the end of 1792.} On February 1, France declared war on Britain.

In light of these developments, the British government was more likely to support an “authoritarian” governor seeking to impose order and suppress proposed “reforms” instead of a “rebellious” populace challenging authority.\footnote{Historians have argued that British imperial officials adopted more restrictive policies across the empire, instituting the authoritarian imperial rule attributed to the nineteenth-century empire. See Epstein, \textit{Scandal of Empire}, pp. 91-92; Maya Jasanoff, “The Other Side of Revolution: Loyalists in the British Empire,” \textit{The William and Mary Quarterly}, Third Series 65, no. 2 (April 2008), p. 232; Jasanoff, “Revolutionary Exiles,” p. 53. For further discussion, see also C. A. Bayly, \textit{Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World, 1780-1830} (New York: Longman, 1989); C. A. Bayly, \textit{The Birth of a Modern World 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons} (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); Linda Colley, \textit{Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).} Whereas in the past, Parliament often actively considered the complaints of Gibraltar’s merchants, at this time the discussion appeared to be largely muted.\footnote{Merchants’ petitions were the basis of several parliamentary discussions surrounding the civil and criminal laws of Gibraltar and the civil establishment of the town in the 1720s. Shortly after the French wars, from 1815-1817, the British government did make significant changes to the administration of the civil sphere in Gibraltar, expanding land grant policies, trade regulations, and the structure of civil jurisdiction.} There were more pressing matters to concern the members than insulted residents and an upset governor in a distant territory, and few in the government would have been eager to support a group of dissenters. Even if their efforts were indeed innocent, the merchants’ appeals may have appeared more radical because of current events. Ideas during this period were not simply innocent musings but could be spurs to action, posing a threat to British authority as a whole.\footnote{For the power of ideas to bring about action, see Hunt, “The French Revolution in Global Context,” p. 31.} In order to preserve British law and liberties that the merchants and others praised, it was necessary, leaders believed, to place limits on these expressions of freedom
to ensure its continuation beyond this era. Liberty was best protected, the government suggested, by ensuring that British powers were unchallenged.\footnote{129 Part of this differing focus on liberty may be due in part to the shifting definitions of liberty during this period. See Travers, “Contested Despotism.”}

As this episode shows, Gibraltar was not untouched by the era of revolutions; rather, it too was drawn into the conflicts and discourse that plagued Europe and beyond. Boyd’s response was in many ways similar to other colonial governors threatened by rebellion and unrest.\footnote{130 See especially Epstein, Scandal of Empire.} For many leaders, including Boyd, the events abroad posed a true emergency for places governed by monarchical authority. Because of the crisis situation, it was allowable for commanders to implement whatever means necessary to control possible threats, implementing a jurisprudence of emergency.\footnote{131 See Hussain, Jurisprudence of Emergency, especially pp. 17-22.} Under this form of law, governors like Boyd could employ often unrestricted power and a lack of restraint in their dealings with inhabitants in their efforts to control the radical body. What was key, however, was to convince the metropole that such measures were necessary; during the revolutionary period, especially in the 1790s, the British government, also driven by fear of revolt, was likely to agree with its commanders. By embracing counterrevolutionary language and adopting the rhetorical nuances of supporters of the monarch, Boyd and other leaders were able to use these outside events to their advantage, strengthening their control over their territories and peoples with the permission of the British government. This strategic use of revolutionary rhetoric enabled Boyd, and possibly others, to escape the blame of the very problems that they caused through excessive control and “crisis” management. Boyd’s technologies of governmentality had at last become legitimate according to the British crown and Parliament.
Figure 5.1: Governor Boyd’s 10 February 1792 Proclamation

(GGA, Orders, 1749-1793 Placarts, 1793-1802, Orders 1st July 1749-22nd Feb 1793, 10th February 1792, fo. 331)
Figure 5.2: Governor Boyd’s 27 February 1792 Proclamation

(GGA, Orders, 1749-1793 Placarts, 1793-1802, Orders 1st July 1749-22nd Feb 1793, 27th February 1792, fo. 332)
Conclusion

For many Britons in the eighteenth century, and today, Gibraltar represented the “ideal” British territory, one that has remained a British possession despite dozens of attacks and threats over the past three centuries. This dedication to the small Mediterranean territory developed early in Gibraltar’s history as British pamphleteers defended Britain’s right to and need for Gibraltar despite Spanish attacks during the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1720).¹ Gibraltar, in the authors’ portrayal, was “a Place of the greatest Concern to the Trading Part of this Kingdom” and also for diplomacy, making Britain “Masters of the Entrance into the Mediterranean.”² As one pamphleteer claimed, those states “that once seemed to vie with Us for the Mastery of the Sea… will hardly ever be able to do again if we keep Gibraltar.”³ While Spain continued to vie for the return of Gibraltar, its image in the British imagination strengthened, leaving many to see the Rock as “a Jewel in the Crown of England… with respect to our Safety, Trade, and Power.”⁴ This sentiment was renewed and reinforced with each subsequent Anglo-Spanish contest, especially during the War of the American Revolution. With the loss of the American colonies but Britain’s continued hold on Gibraltar, British writers held up the Rock as the image of Britain’s fighting spirit and glory. As one author penned, “Lo! On these Rocks, whose blood-disputed right, Contending nations long engaged in fight, Victorious Britain sits enshrined in stone; Herself a rock, and not to be o’erthrown.”⁵ In the minds of Britons, Gibraltar represented the strength and might of the British empire.

¹ Over forty pamphlets and tracts were published in defense of Gibraltar from 1720 to 1733.
³ Philalethes, Gibraltar a Bulwark of Great Britain. In a Letter to a Member of Parliament (London, 1725), p. 29.
⁵ Arx Herculea Servata; Or Gibraltar Delivered (London, 1783), p. 9.
As a symbol of Britain and its imperial power, the image of Gibraltar held a powerful sway in the British imagination. In many ways, Gibraltar was not only a physical territory, but also an imagined colony, one which embodied the ideals of the empire. The imaginary Gibraltar was staunchly British: a strong, unconquerable rock that promoted maritime expansion and commercial growth. Yet this vision of the territory could only be sustained at a distance. For those in Gibraltar, it was clear that it had little use as a British stronghold, often causing more problems than its worth. It was not used as a means to propagate British ideals, support British trade, or promote British naval and diplomatic power, but rather it served as a site of cultural contact and exchange, a port with lackluster British trade, and a source of constant contention in European politics. The reality of Gibraltar was much more grim – and much less British – than the imaginary vision of the territory that held sway at home in Britain.

It was this reality of Gibraltar as a Mediterranean meeting ground of peoples, ideas, and goods that the governors encountered during their time in the garrison. For these commanders, the situation in Gibraltar created a sense of distress, largely because of the significant difference between it and the imagination of the territory that circulated in Britain. Hoping to find a securely British Rock to finish out their decades of military service, instead the governors discovered an embattled territory replete with a vast majority of foreign inhabitants speaking foreign languages, holding foreign beliefs, and practicing foreign religions. This, in conjunction with the tense geopolitical state of the eighteenth century which often involved Gibraltar, invoked a feeling of constant crisis for the territory’s governors. The garrison’s internal affairs plus the external tensions left many of the commanders dreaming of easier postings and seeking to gain a sense of control over the unruly territory and its problematic populous.
With little control over the larger-scale diplomatic events that plagued Europe, the commanders turned their attention to the administration of Gibraltar and its people. Unable to appeal to their shared ideologies and beliefs, the governors sought to manage the inhabitants through more explicit means of governance. Embracing a variety of technologies, such as surveillance, the production of knowledge, and the creation of an archive, Gibraltar’s commanders endeavored to better “see” and “know” their population, giving themselves a sense of power in and over the territory. This form of management, they believed, was necessary to properly govern the territory and keep it securely in British hands. The driving force behind the governors’ policies was a fear of the foreign, a fear that was largely unwarranted in light of the many efforts these inhabitants made to support the garrison. The greatest troublemakers, as chapter five demonstrated, were the British inhabitants who felt that the restrictions placed by the governor were not befitting for a “free” British territory that should exemplify the British ideals of “liberty.” In this sense, the governors were not the only ones who felt the disconnect between the imaginary and real British Gibraltar.

While the current narrative of the eighteenth-century British empire has rarely included Gibraltar, this dissertation argues that Gibraltar was indeed an important part of the empire: in the minds of many contemporary Britons, in the lives of its governors and inhabitants, in the creation of an imperial ideology and narrative, and in the development of various administrative strategies and technologies. It is my aim to bring the story of Gibraltar into the eighteenth century narrative and provide a sense of these larger imperial developments and trends through the lens of this small Mediterranean holding. Gibraltar, I feel, offers a key perspective on this period that has often been ignored, one with a vision that is not bound by Europe or the
Americas, by land or by sea, or by “early modern” or “modern” periodization. Rather than focusing on the binaries of empire, Gibraltar encourages a view that accounts for the nuances, the varieties, and the multiplicities of the eighteenth century and its imperial world.

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6 Conventional narratives of the eighteenth-century British empire divide its history into two distinct phases, the “first” and the “second,” or the early modern and the modern, locating 1783 and the end of the American Revolution as the fault line between the two. The “first” empire is often understood to be a maritime empire based on trade and settlement in the Atlantic world while the “second” is portrayed as a land-based empire in the East, primarily India, that focused on conquest, territorial expansion, and the development of imperial mechanisms, such as the surveillance and policing of colonial bodies and their movements. However, this map of the empire ignores the spaces in between and outside of the Atlantic and India and chronologies that do not center on the American Revolution while reinscribing the notion of imperial progress and dominance. See Kathleen Wilson, “Introduction: Histories, Empires, Modernities,” in *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660-1840* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 10, n. 26; David Armitage, *Ideological Origins of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 1-24.
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