ILLINOIS POLITICAL PARTIES

Final Report and Background Papers

ASSEMBLY ON ILLINOIS POLITICAL PARTIES

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INTRODUCTION

Much discussion has taken place recently among journalists, politicians, and political scientists about the functions of political parties in the American governmental system and about the desirability of strengthening the parties to make them more efficient vehicles for carrying out their job in our democratic society. There has been general agreement not only that a competitive, two-party system is desirable in our democracy, but that it is indeed almost necessary.

Because parties are so important in Illinois, and because little information about them is available, the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, in cooperation with the Illinois Citizenship Clearing House, sponsored an Assembly on Illinois Political Parties, in order to come to grips with some of the problems facing the state parties. An attempt was made to bring together people representing both parties and all geographical areas of the state, as well as to provide a balance between types of people interested in political parties—politicians, government officials, interest group representatives, etc. The participants were divided into three round-table sections to discuss the following problems, among others: legal regulation of the parties, competition between the parties, financing of the parties, participation in politics, and the function of the non-party or auxiliary organizations in the political system. During their discussions, the participants contributed significantly to a better understanding of the Illinois parties, their activities and their problems. After the round-table discussions, a final general session was held in which the final report, or findings, of the Assembly was drafted. In this volume are presented the findings of the conference, representing in all cases the thinking of a majority of the participants, and the background papers used as a basis for the discussions in which the findings were developed.

Background Papers

Each of the eight background papers was written by a person familiar with the topic, and each was intended not as an intensive study of some aspect of party structure or activity, but rather as a problem paper to facilitate discussion by the conference participants.

Mr. Ranney has defined the concept of party responsibility as a model, or a set of ideas about how a party should perform. Without considering the desirability of party responsibility, he has presented the responsible-
parties model as a framework in which Illinois political parties can be considered.

Mr. Tearney and Mr. Ford have written about the structure of the Democratic and Republican parties in Illinois, noting both the statutory, formal organization and the more informal aspects of party structure.

Mr. Mason has examined problems arising from the existence of three kinds of extra-party organization: the group created by party leadership to meet certain specific needs; the intellectually-oriented group set up either with or without party encouragement as a research and policy-suggesting agency; and the group clearly and expressly in competition for actual leadership of the party. He asked, do the organizations established by the party serve their purpose adequately, can intellectually-oriented groups function except as critics of the opposition party, and what problems in party structure and leadership are shown by the existence of an extra-party group frankly competing for party control?

Mr. Gove, in his study of inter-party competition, has sought to point out what kind of competition between the parties actually exists in elections on the state and local level in Illinois. He has considered the effect of cumulative voting on inter-party competition and has discussed nonpartisan elections and their relationship to party competition.

Mr. Milbrath has discussed party finance and cited as one main problem public apathy to party financial needs. He has considered how much campaigns cost, how money is raised and from whom, and what effects different kinds of regulatory laws may have on party finances.

Mr. Berdahl was concerned mainly with legislation controlling primaries in his discussion of legal regulation of parties, and he pointed out particularly the problems arising from cumulative voting and the loose definition of party membership.

Mr. Bindley's discussion of political participation deals with the political activities of organized groups (business, labor, agriculture, etc.), primarily those activities designed to stimulate group members to take an active role in party affairs. and asks, what will be the total effect of these programs?
Assisting in the planning of the Assembly was an advisory committee consisting of Stanley H. Guyer, state chairman of the Republican party; James A. Ronan, state chairman of the Democratic party; Richard Nelson of Inland Steel Company; Samuel W. Witwer of Wilkinson. Witwer and Moran, a law firm; Professor Clarence A. Berdahl, Southern Illinois University; Professor J. H. Bindley, Knox College; and Professor Bruce B. Mason, director of the Illinois Citizenship Clearing House. The assistance of these people has been greatly appreciated.

Also contributing to the success of this endeavor were the authors of the background papers, who are identified in the list of authors near the end of this volume.

To the chairmen of the various panels — Professor Morton Grodzins of the University of Chicago, Professor John A. Kinneman of Illinois State Normal University, and Professor Clarence A. Berdahl of Southern Illinois University — must go most of the credit for channeling the conference discussions and bringing out the final findings. Also thanks should go to the reporters of the panel sessions — Professor Eric H. Olson of Carthage College, Professor Marcy G. Bodine of Western Illinois University, and Mrs. Lois Pelekoudas of the University of Illinois — who recorded the discussions of the panels.
Agreeing that informed, militant, and effective participation in party politics is critical to American democratic life, the participants in the Assembly on Illinois Political Parties, meeting at Robert Allerton Park, Monticello, Illinois, December 8-10, 1959, approved this summary of their findings at the conclusion of their discussions. Since there were dissents on particular points, it should not be assumed that every participant subscribed to every detail of the statements contained herein.

I

Among the major causes of failure to participate in partisan politics are the following: (1) the stigma attached to politics and politicians has led to an overemphasis on nonpartisanship; (2) there is widespread ignorance of party machinery and operations; (3) party organizations often refuse to accept responsibility for local issues and to formulate programs consistent with community needs; and (4) in some instances the party organization fails to use the full potential within the party. To the extent that business, labor, and other groups seek to overcome these causes, their efforts should be supported.

II

The prestige and authority of the state central committees should be enhanced. The state chairmen should continue to be picked by the respective committees from their membership.

The county chairmen's associations should be encouraged as voluntary organizations, but need not be accorded statutory
recognition. The party organization should provide for the necessary and legitimate expenses of county chairmen.

III

Party-sponsored or party-affiliated agencies which concern themselves with recruiting new members, generating enthusiasm, getting out the party vote, developing new ideas, and providing information and research services are commended.

IV

A formal system of slate-making is generally desirable. On the state level, official slate-making should be made compulsory. However, clear and explicit public statements explaining the slate-making process should accompany the announcement of the slate. Criteria for slate-makers and methods of slate-making need to be established, and the representative character of slate-making committees should be improved, perhaps by use of the state central committee as the slate-making agency.

The legislature should pass permissive legislation allowing county committees to adopt official systems of slate-making.

The primary should be preserved and an opportunity provided for other candidates to run against the slate in order that the party rank and file may be the ultimate decision-maker as to the party’s role on public issues and candidates.

V

The right to vote in a party’s primary should be limited to those who publicly declare their adherence to that party; the present Illinois closed primary meets this requirement. Not only should efforts to weaken the present system be resisted, but a system of formal party membership enrollment should be established.

VI

Cumulative voting has worked effectively to insure minority representation in the Illinois House of Representatives. Cumula-
tive voting involves technical problems and may lead to intra-party friction and an occasional lessening of inter-party competition. However, in the absence of a more desirable substitute technique, the system should be continued.

VII

Intra-party contests are not substitutes for inter-party contests. Inter-party competition should therefore be encouraged, and partisanship at the local level should not be discouraged.

VIII

Efforts should be directed to maximizing the number of financial contributors to parties and candidates. As well as providing funds, contributions encourage psychological identification with party. To a wider extent than at present, local party organizations should secure financial support from their home bases.

Tax credits (with a nominal top limit) are recommended to encourage more people to contribute to candidates and parties. Campaign expenditures of candidates should be made tax deductible to a reasonable amount.

The public has a proper and vital interest in the source of the campaign contributions to and the expenditures of candidates and political parties. Unable to agree on any detail, other than that campaign contributions of corporations and labor unions should be subject to the same regulations, the Assembly recommends further and continued study looking toward appropriate legislation in this field.
THE CONCEPT OF PARTY RESPONSIBILITY

J. AUSTIN RANNEY

The concept of party responsibility is a model—a body of ideas about the role political parties should perform in a modern democratic government and about how they must organize and operate in order to perform this role. Being a model, it is not an exact description of any actual party system. It is, rather, an ideal—a set of intellectual bench marks which may be used to analyze and evaluate an existing political party or party system.

The responsible-parties model has been developed and championed by a number of eminent political scientists. It was first put forth around the turn of the present century by such distinguished scholars as A. Lawrence Lowell, Frank J. Goodnow, and, pre-eminently, Woodrow Wilson. In recent years its best-known advocate has been E. E. Schattschneider, and its most authoritative statement has been the 1950 report of the American Political Science Association's Committee on Political Parties, entitled Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System.

The publication of this report notably stepped up the tempo and intensity of the long-standing debate among political scientists over the question of whether the responsible-parties model constitutes an appropriate standard of measurement and a desirable goal for the American party system. The model's early critics numbered such men as Herbert Croly and James Sayles Brown, and in recent years it has been attacked by such scholars as Pendleton Herring, Herbert Agar, and Ernest Griffith.

At present the controversy over the doctrine of responsible party government may be described as one of the "great debates" in contemporary political science and democratic theory. In the present paper, however, the debate will not be described, nor will sides be taken. This paper will, instead, concentrate upon two tasks: outlining the nature of the model and using it to appraise the current state of political parties in the State of Illinois.

Outline of the Model

The advocates of the doctrine of responsible party government are concerned with maximizing both the level of efficiency and the degree of democracy in modern government. They do not feel any need to assign priorities to these two values, for they believe that a system of truly responsible parties—and only such a system—can enable a modern, thickly-
populated community to have a government that is both efficient and democratic.

Their reasoning supporting this conclusion may be reduced to the following five steps.

1. The Nature of Modern Democratic Government. The only meaningful conception of democratic government in the modern community is that of government in which the ultimate power rests in the hands of all the citizens, and decisions are made according to the wishes of popular majorities. The older Athenian and New England town-meeting dream of having all the citizens participate in all the day-to-day decisions of government has little relevance to the modern nation-state. In such a community there are simply too many citizens to participate in this manner, and to insist upon such a role for them is to deny the possibility of achieving democracy in the modern world. Hence the citizens' role should be thought of as the making of only the basic decisions: e.g., what shall be the constitutional structure of government, what general direction shall public policy take, and, above all, who shall hold public office? Where the citizens effectively decide such matters as these, democracy is well satisfied—and satisfied in the only manner possible in the modern community.

2. Teamwork and Efficiency in Modern Government. A modern national or state government is so huge and complex an organization and deals with such enormous and complicated problems that it can not be run effectively by a series of isolated individual officeholders, each acting without reference to or consultation with the others. Such a situation inevitably means that public policy will fly off in all directions at once, governmental agencies will work at cross-purposes, and the result will be increased costs and, in the fullest sense of the term, inefficiency. Only a team of officeholders working together under recognized mutual leadership and pursuing a common program can hope to meet the tremendous demands made upon a modern government.

3. Power, Visibility, and Responsibility. Democratic government must be responsible government: if the citizens like what their government has been doing, they must be able to reward the officeholders by keeping them in office; and if they do not like what their government has been doing, they must be able to punish the officeholders by turning them out of power and replacing them with another group who will change things. In order to provide this kind of responsibility, the governors of a democratic community must have two characteristics. First, they must, during their term in office, have full power over governmental operations, for only he who has full power over an organization can be held fully and meaningfully responsible for what that organization does or fails to do. And second, the
governors must be visible— that is, the citizens must know who has power
to do what in order to know whom to reward or punish at the polls.

4. The Central Role of Political Parties. Of all political groups, only
the major political parties are large enough, comprehensive enough in
member and goals, and visible enough to the general public to provide
the kind of teamwork required to run a modern government efficiently and
to provide the kind of responsibility necessary to make it democratic. Their
only conceivable alternatives are pressure groups, and the latter can not do
the job. Each and every particular pressure group is necessarily concerned
with a private interest. and the public interest is far more than the sum of
all private interests. Thus, government-by-pressure-groups can not be either
efficient or democratic.

In a modern community, therefore, the only way to achieve govern-
ment that is both efficient and democratic is to establish responsible party
government: put a major party in control of the government for a fixed
period of time; let the people judge how well or how badly the party has
used its power; and, according to the people’s judgment as expressed at
the polls, let the party continue in power or be replaced by the opposition
party. In short, efficient and democratic government can be achieved only
by establishing collective party responsibility rather than a series of isolated,
disconnected, individual responsibilities of particular officeholders to their
local constituencies.

5. The Proper Organization of Political Parties. In order to perform
fully and properly the demanding role democracy requires of them, the
major political parties must, above all other things, be cohesive. That is to
say, each party’s members holding public office must work together as a
team and not separately as independent individuals. For example, when
a legislative body is about to vote on an important bill, the legislators belong-
ing to a particular party should meet together and decide what should be
the party’s stand on that bill. When they have decided, every legislative
party member should vote according to his party’s stand even if he person-
ally may disagree with it—or he should resign his membership in the
party. For another example, the party’s program should be formulated by
mutual consultation and give-and-take among all of the party’s leaders in
both the executive and legislative branches. Once the program is formu-
lated, however, every party member in both branches should support it
whether or not he approves of it in all its details. “Independence” of party
members in public office, in other words, is incompatible with responsible
party government and should be eliminated by whatever means seem
appropriate.

Why is party cohesion so crucial? Because only cohesive parties can
provide the collective party responsibility which, as noted above, modern
democracy demands. When the members of a particular party are regularly divided among themselves and vote and act differently on matters of public policy, there is no meaningful sense in which the party, as a collectivity, can be held responsible for how well or how badly the government is being run. In such a situation there is no real teamwork in government operations, and all the people have is the same old series of isolated individual responsibilities of particular officeholders to their local constituencies. Hence, only truly cohesive parties can be truly responsible parties, and only truly responsible parties can make modern governments both efficient and democratic.

This, then, is the model of responsible party government. As previously noted, the much-debated question of whether or not it is a desirable model for Illinois or for any other modern community will not be discussed. Nor will any of the numerous specific reforms suggested by the advocates of the model as means for converting irresponsible parties into responsible parties be considered. Instead, to what extent the Republican and Democratic parties of Illinois measure up to the model will be noted.

Party Responsibility in Illinois

Judged by the foregoing standards, the parties of Illinois are clearly irresponsible. Among the abundant evidence supporting this statement two scholarly studies may be cited. First, the study of the Illinois legislative process by Gove and Steiner shows that the two parties' organizations in the General Assembly play very minor roles indeed in the formulation of legislative policy.¹ And second, Keefe's study of roll call votes in the General Assembly shows that the party labels of legislators mean very little when it comes to voting on bills.² From two-thirds to three-fourths of all roll call votes are unanimous (that is, all members of both parties vote the same way). Hence, any voter who is trying to decide which party to support in the next election will find the parties' legislative records of little or no help in discovering what differences, if any, the parties have on matters of legislative policy. Moreover, Keefe's study shows that less than 5 per cent of the roll call votes are "party votes" in the sense of divisions in which 80 per cent or more of the Democrats vote one way and 80 per cent or more of the Republicans vote the other way.

In short, judged by the standards of our model, political parties in Illinois are unquestionably irresponsible. This does not mean that they are unimportant or inactive or evil. It means only that they provide little,

if any, of the sort of collective party responsibility advocated by the adherents of the model.

Much of the explanation of why this is so can be found in the other papers given at this Assembly. Whether or not it is good that it is so is a question beyond the scope of the present paper. But that it is so seems undeniable.
SOME PROBLEMS IN THE LEGAL REGULATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN ILLINOIS

CLARENCE A. BERDAHL

The political party in the United States grew up as an entirely voluntary, private, extra-legal, and extra-constitutional institution. Professor Arthur N. Holcombe, in one of his books, very aptly referred to the political party as "The Unplanned Institution of Organized Partisanship," and other writers have described its beginnings this way: "When the parties first developed they were children of nature, unplanned and unchecked. Party candidates were named by whatever group of influential citizens had the gumption and go to do it. The smoke-filled caucus room was a private club making public policy." The party remained in this extra-legal situation until 1866, when laws were enacted in California and New York that had for their purpose the protection of party caucuses and meetings against bribery, intimidation, and other corrupt practices, but that incidentally subjected the party to some legal regulation. With this beginning, legal regulation of the political party spread rapidly throughout all the states and increased in scope until it covered virtually all phases of party organization and activity. In fact, the party became in general so completely dependent on state law that a Minnesota state commission twenty years ago (1939) pleaded for a return to party self-government, and in that state a considerable measure of self-government for each party has been provided. At any rate, the status of the political party has undergone such substantial change that, as a recent Federal Court decision put it, "The party may, indeed, have been a mere private aggregation of individuals in the early days of the Republic, but with the passage of the years, political parties have become in effect state institutions, governmental agencies through which sovereign power is exercised by the people."

3 The titles of these earliest laws are significant: California, "An Act to Protect the Elections of Voluntary Associations and to Punish Frauds Therein"; New York, "An Act to Protect Primary Meetings, Caucuses, and Conventions of Political Parties."
Beginnings of Party Regulation in Illinois

This general pattern in respect to legal regulation of the political party has been followed in Illinois. There was no regulation of the party at all until 1891, when the Ballot Act established the Australian ballot system, with its requirements that only official ballots could be used; that candidates' names be put on the ballot in party columns; that for this purpose a legal definition of a party was provided; and numerous other regulations that recognized and established the party as a legal institution. This legalization became even more detailed with the development of the direct primary, and Illinois was among the earliest states to provide for such a primary, with a law enacted by the legislature of 1905, under the leadership of Governor Deneen. Illinois has also had probably more primary laws than any other state, the present law (aside from minor amendments), enacted in 1927, being the sixth completely separate statute on the subject. A discussion of statutes concerning political parties in Illinois is, in effect, a discussion of this primary law, for the parties are legally regulated only as parts of the nominating machinery. Therefore, most of this paper will deal with the primary law and the problems resulting from its application.

This large number of laws dealing with primaries is due to certain conditions peculiar to Illinois, involving particularly (1) the special needs of Chicago and Cook County, which have approximately half the population of the state, and (2) the constitutional requirement of minority representation, or cumulative voting, for the lower house of the legislature. The existence of these special conditions in Illinois has made it unusually difficult for the legislature to enact a workable law which would also meet the interpretation of the courts. The earlier primary laws, enacted in 1905, 1906, 1908, 1910, and 1919, were all declared unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court; but the legislature, obviously convinced that a primary was essential to good government, persisted in dealing with these problems, and its sixth law, enacted in 1927, was upheld as a valid measure. In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court expressly reversed its previous decisions on the primary, held that a primary is not an election in the sense in which that term is used in the Illinois Constitution, and gave the legislature almost complete freedom to regulate the primary as it will.

Chicago and Cook County Situation

With respect to the first of these problems, the Chicago and Cook County situation, the legislature recognized that it was quite impossible for
effective party committees to be organized in Cook County on the same basis as in downstate counties. A county committee composed of all the precinct committeemen in the county is reasonably appropriate and workable for downstate counties, although the number of committeemen varies (in 1956 Putnam County had 7, Champaign County 91, and Peoria County 220): but, applied to Cook County, this would mean a county committee (in 1956) of 5,001. The legislature therefore attempted to prescribe a separate and different scheme of party organization for Cook County, which the Illinois courts held was in conflict with the provision in the Illinois Constitution requiring "free and equal elections." In the 1927 law, the legislature solved this problem by an ingenious application of the principle of classification: (1) by classifying cities and counties, for the purposes of party organization, in such a way that only Chicago and Cook County fell into one class; (2) by providing for "ward, township, and precinct committeemen," but in such a way that only ward and township committeemen are elected in Chicago and Cook County; and (3) by composing the county committee of each party of "the various township committeemen, precinct committeemen and ward committeemen, if any, of such party in the county." This was technically the application of the same provision alike to all the counties, and therefore constitutional; but actually it provided for Cook County a committee based on ward and township committeemen instead of precinct committeemen, and a workable committee (in 1956) of only 80 members.

Cumulative Voting

The second and more difficult constitutional problem was that of cumulative voting. It may be recalled that minority representation in the Illinois House of Representatives, secured by cumulative voting, was incorporated into the Constitution of 1870 in order to break up the north-south political division of the state that came about as a result of the Civil War. That purpose was laudable and has, in fact, long since been accomplished; but the cumulative voting system persists, and its application to the primary makes no sense. That is, there is no situation within each party at all comparable to the sectional division within the state, and certainly those who wrote the cumulative voting provisions in 1870 could not have contemplated their application to the internal operations of the political parties. The Illinois legislature recognized this, and at first attempted, in enacting a primary law, to ignore these cumulative voting provisions. However, the Illinois courts held that a primary is an election within the meaning of the Constitution, and therefore required the cumulative voting provisions to be applied in the same way at party primaries as at general elections.

The legislature, confronted with the necessity of meeting this judicial requirement if there were to be a legislative primary at all, and at the same
time of writing a law that would avoid party chaos, finally hit upon the device of a party committee within each legislative district (at first, the senatorial committee; since reapportionment, the representative committee) to decide the number of nominees to run for the three seats. In that way the cumulative voting privilege was made workable. The Illinois Supreme Court, as already noted, not only upheld these provisions as incorporated in the 1927 law, but indicated that it had changed its mind on the basic assumption and gave the legislature much greater freedom than before to work out practicable measures for party primaries within the cumulative voting system, and presumably for other party controls.  

The result of this application of cumulative voting to the primary has been to encourage, or even to require, a considerable manipulation by the respective party organizations of the nominations and elections to the House of Representatives, and to impose serious limitations on the voter’s right of choice. Since 1902, or through 29 legislative elections, there has not been a single district in which the voter has been offered a full slate of six nominees for the three seats. During that period there have been 17 occasions, involving 10 districts, when there were five nominees by the two parties, but none since 1954; and this practice probably stopped because, while the party which nominated three elected three on four occasions (Republicans, 10th district, 1930; Democrats, 27th district, 1948, 1950, 1952), that party on other occasions risked too much and elected only one (Republicans, 50th district, 1928, 10th and 39th districts, 1936; Democrats, 21st district, 1916, 10th and 24th districts, 1948, 10th district, 1954).

On 46 occasions there have been four nominees, three by one party (Republicans, 39 times in 12 districts; Democrats, 7 times in one district, the 27th). The Republicans won all three on 17 occasions, and the Democrats on three occasions. Since 1954 there have been no such combinations.

7 “If, as stated in People v. Election Commissioners supra, and the later cases following it, a legislative primary is an election in the sense that every voter must be given the right to vote for three candidates, as he is entitled to do at a general election, it seems clear that we must say that it is impossible to devise a valid scheme for the nomination of candidates for representatives in the General Assembly by primary, for the reason that such a method of nomination will, at all events, result in the nomination of three candidates for each party, and thus render nugatory the provisions of sections 7 and 8 or article 4 of the Constitution, designed to secure minority representation. . . . The former decision of this court on this point in People v. Election Commissioners supra, and the cases decided by this court following that case, in so far as they are in conflict with the views herein expressed, are overruled.” People v. Emmerson, 333 Ill. 606 (1929), at 613-614, 623.

8 In making preparations for the 1956 elections, Joseph L. Gill, chairman of the slating committee for the Cook County Democrats, announced that no attempt would be made in the future to elect three Democrats from any district. “It would be a violation of the spirit of the Illinois Constitution to deny minority representation to a district,” he said. It was also decided that the Democrats would nominate two candidates for each district, and this has been carried out in Cook County. Robert Howard in the Chicago Tribune, December 19, 1955, p. 7.
but only two nominees by each party or two and one. Thus, in 1956 there were only three nominees for the three seats in 30 of the 59 districts (two by each of the parties in 15) and in 33 districts in 1958 (two by the Republicans in 14, and two by the Democrats in 19). In all other districts in 1956 and 1958 there were four nominees (two by each party) for the three seats, and something like that has been the case in most years. In the Champaign district (the 24th before, the 44th after reapportionment), which is fairly typical, in the 29 elections since 1902 there have been five nominees only once (three by the Democrats in 1948), four nominees (two by each party) 12 times, and three nominees 16 times.

What all this means is that, as far as the Illinois legislature is concerned, there is grave uncertainty as to the extent of either representative government or responsible party government. In the first place, the party nominees are not necessarily the choice of a majority or even a plurality of the party voters, but may well be the choice of a smaller number who “plumped” their three votes on these particular candidates. Plural voting has long been abandoned as a democratic concept or practice everywhere but in Illinois. Second, the voter has little or no choice in the election. In 1956, 90 members (45 of each party) and in 1958, 99 members (52 Democrats, 47 Republicans), or a full majority, had no opposition whatever and got a free ride to the legislature: and those years are typical of most, with only slight variations in the figures. Third, most contested districts throughout the years have been with two nominees by each party, or four candidates for three seats, which at the best has given the voter a very limited choice and which has actually been in most instances a contest between the two candidates of the minority party rather than between the two parties. The effect on the so-called two-party system is obvious.

Another feature of the cumulative voting system is that it has led to considerable confusion and illegal practice. Apparently election officials, if not the voters, have assumed that cumulative voting applies to certain

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9 A good example is what happened in the Champaign (24th) district in 1946, when the Democrats decided to nominate two candidates, Tom Garman, the incumbent, and Charles “Jim” Simpson, a blind young man just out of the University of Illinois Law School. These two campaigned openly and bitterly against one another, a sample being a newspaper ad run by the Simpson supporters, headed “Prominent Democrats Flay Garman —” and including these statements: “As members of the Democratic Party in Champaign County, we have felt it our duty to seek the election of every candidate on the Democratic ticket. However, we no longer feel that we can conscientiously support Tom M. Garman. In a recent circular letter Garman requests support for himself and urges the defeat of his running mate, Charles (Jim) Simpson. We suggest that every Democrat urge the defeat of the man who has worked against the party, and elect Charles (Jim) Simpson. One Democratic candidate is assured of a seat in the General Assembly. Therefore both Republicans and Democrats have a duty to vote for a competent man — Jim Simpson, to represent us in the crucial period that lies ahead. . . .” Champaign-Urbana News-Gazette, November 4, 1946, p. 4.
other offices as well as to members of the House, notably University of Illinois trustees and delegates and alternates to the national conventions. The *Official Vote of Illinois* shows, for example, that in 1954 half-votes were recorded and counted in DeKalb County for every trustee candidate, and for two of them (Vernon L. Heath and Dr. Ralph H. Kunstadter, Republicans) also in Mason County; in 1956, for four of the trustee candidates (Wayne Johnson and Earl M. Hughes, Republicans; Joseph B. Campbell and Richard J. Nelson, Democrats) in Clinton County, for the same two Republicans in La Salle County, and for the same two Democrats in Ogle and Pulaski counties; and in 1958, for two trustee candidates (Park Livingston and Doris S. Holt) in Marion County.

Such half-votes were similarly recorded in 1948 for Democratic delegate candidates in eight counties (Boone, Coles, Crawford, DeKalb, Grundy, Henry, Mason, and Pike), for Democratic alternate candidates in three of these counties (Crawford, Mason, and Pike), for Republican delegate candidates in two (Crawford and Mason), and for Republican alternate candidates in one (Mason). In 1952, the record shows half-votes for one Republican delegate candidate in one of these counties (Coles).

The record shows the application of cumulative voting to these offices in many other years, and of course its application may be much more extensive than is revealed by the record. Since an even number of such half-votes would result in even totals for any precinct or county. These votes are obviously illegal, but in some cases the explanation for the confusion is reasonably clear. In the case of the University trustees, there are three seats to fill at any election, and the election judges apparently consider that the same voting principle should apply as does for the House of Representatives. Thus, if a voter votes for only one or two of the trustees, he is allotted three votes which are split and counted accordingly.

In the case of some delegate contests, three candidates ran for two seats (in 1948, Boone, Coles, Crawford, DeKalb, Grundy, and Henry counties, all Democrats; in 1952, Coles County, Republican), and similar confusion presumably arose. In other cases, however, there were only two candidates for two seats (in 1948, Crawford County, Democratic alternates, Republican delegates; Mason County, Democratic and Republican delegates and alternates: Pike County, Democratic delegates and alternates), and it is difficult to explain how the confusion could have arisen. This counting of illegal votes or the illegal computation of the vote may well make the actual result doubtful in close contests, and no doubt should invalidate the election for those offices. In view of this confusion and misapplication of the cumulative voting system, as well as the fact that cumulative voting has long since accomplished its original purpose, it would seem that the system ought now to be abolished.
Other Problems in Legal Regulation of Illinois Parties

Except for the cumulative voting feature, the Illinois law is fairly typical of primary legislation throughout the United States, differing from most other state primary laws only in its details. Its essential features may be summarized as follows and certain problems noted: First, a political party for the state or any election area within the state is defined as a group which cast at the last preceding general election more than 5 per cent of the total vote cast at that time within such area. A new party for the state may be formed on petition of 25,000 voters, including 200 from each of at least 50 counties; and for any other election area on petition of 5 to 8 per cent of the voters within such area. Communist, Fascist, Nazi, or other un-American groups are outlawed as political parties. The requirements in most other states are more severe (10 per cent in thirteen, 15 per cent in one, 20 per cent in three, 25 per cent in one), and the Model Primary Law adopted by the National Municipal League proposes a 10 per cent requirement. On the other hand, the Progressive (Wallace) party, which failed in 1948 to qualify as a political party in Illinois, particularly because of the county-distribution requirement, challenged the constitutionality of these provisions. The law was upheld, and does not seem unreasonable in this respect.

Second, the Illinois law is a mandatory and detailed law in its application to qualified political parties. This has meant for a long time that only the Democratic and Republican parties in this state are required to hold primaries for the nomination of their candidates, but also, such primaries must be held for most elective offices — federal, state, legislative, county, and local — from United States Senator, Congressman, and Governor down to county coroner and county recorder. The only exceptions of any consequence in Illinois are presidential electors, University of Illinois trustees, and Circuit and Supreme Court judges, who are still nominated at party conventions. Other and smaller groups may, of course, make nominations to public office if they desire, but must do so at a later date by the procedure of independent petition.

Third, the Illinois law also regulates in some detail the party organization of these qualified, or major, parties. That is, certain committees and conventions are required, their composition and method of selection are specified, their functions are to some extent enumerated, and, to a degree, even their meetings and procedures are prescribed. The principle of popular or democratic control of the party organization is emphasized by the election at the party primary of the state committee, the representative committees (formerly the senatorial committees), and the precinct (including ward and township) commiteemen; the other party committees are made up

through interlocking arrangements that make use of these elective committees. These committees are also presumably representative of the party rank and file, in that the principle of unit representation is applied, each committeeman having a vote equal to the party vote cast in his area. Accordingly, in 1952, when Governor Stevenson withdrew from the Democratic gubernatorial nomination after being nominated for President, the Democratic state committee substituted Lieutenant Governor Sherwood Dixon by a vote of 467,706 to 435,244, although a majority of the committee members (13-12) favored Secretary of State Edward Barrett.

Fourth, a mere plurality of the votes cast is required for nomination to public office or election to party office in Illinois. This is in accord with the practice in most states, and has the advantage of an assured result (except in the rare instance of a tie) and no additional inconvenience or expense. This also means, however, that in many cases the nominee is not necessarily the real choice of the party voters, but only of a minority and sometimes of a small minority. An outstanding example is the Republican nomination for United States Senator in 1954, when Joseph Meek won the nomination with a vote of 283,843, leading his nearest competitor, Edward Hayes, by more than 100,000, and therefore being generally credited with an “overwhelming” victory; but there were ten candidates on the ballot, who polled a total vote of 845,465, and a total vote for Meek’s opponents of 561,662. In other words, Meek received only one-third of the primary vote, and was by no means the choice of the Republican voters. This situation may well account for the dissatisfaction in the Republican party that year and for the easy defeat of Meek by Senator Douglas. The alternatives to the plurality system are the requirement of a majority, with a run-off primary in case no majority is obtained at the first primary, a system used in most southern states; or a minimum vote, such as 35 or 40 per cent, with nomination by a later convention if such minimum is not secured. This latter system is used in some states, such as Iowa and South Dakota, and might well be considered for Illinois if the primary choices are to be at all representative of the party rank and file.

A fifth problem involves the procedure of getting candidates’ names on the primary ballot and the relationship of the party organization to this procedure. In Illinois the presumption is that any legally qualified person should have the right to file for a party nomination under the prescribed procedures, and that the party voter should have a completely free choice. Actually, however, the party organizations, particularly in Cook County but also throughout the state, make their selections or endorsements for most offices, state and local, before the party primary. Only occasionally do these organizations announce a so-called “open” primary — that is, a primary in which no candidates will be endorsed by the appropriate party organization for any or for particular offices. In general, the practice of organization
endorsement has become so regular in Illinois that slate-making committees are openly announced in advance and candidates are invited or summoned to appear before these committees to explain their qualifications and suitability for the desired office. The result of this is to give the endorsed candidates a considerable advantage, and to discourage others from running, and since this appears to limit the party voter's choice and to be contrary to the spirit and intent of the primary, there is some criticism of such slate-making as "bossism," "dictatorship," and the like. There have, however, been instances when candidates bold enough to run against the organization have broken the slate and won nomination without organization endorsement or support, notable examples being Governor Horner, who won nomination in 1936 against the Democratic organization choice, Dr. Herman Bundesen; and Warren Wright, who won the Republican nomination for State Treasurer in 1958 against the organization choice, Louis Beckman.

Since such slate-making can not be prevented, goes on virtually everywhere in some form, and actually has some advantages in reducing the number of candidates, in discouraging fly-by-night candidates, and in attaching some responsibility to the party organization for the calibre of the party candidates, five states now provide by law for slate-making by the party organization, requiring that it be open and official and always with opportunity for qualified individuals to run against the organization slate. This is also in accord with the principle, now increasingly recognized as sound, that the party organization should be responsible for party operations, including selection of party candidates for office, and at the same time be completely accountable to the party voters for its actions under such responsibility. The Model Primary proposed by the National Municipal League includes recommendations to this effect, and these ought to be given serious consideration in Illinois.

Still another problem is that of party membership in relation to party operations. The Illinois law provides for a closed primary, which presumes that the respective party primaries are closed to all except bona fide members of the party, that only Democrats should participate in a Democratic primary and only Republicans in a Republican primary. The statutory test of such party affiliation, namely that one must not have participated over a period of 23 months with any other party or with an independent group or individual, seems fairly severe; but it is actually very loose, since it permits switching from one party to another for any statewide primary. The method of applying this test in Illinois is that of an open declaration of party affiliation or request for the appropriate party ballot at the primary, with the possibility of a challenge. This procedure is easy for the voter, challenges are infrequent, and bona fide party membership is difficult to prove or disprove.
The result is that organized raiding or invasion of the opposing party primary has occurred on many occasions in Illinois, and the presumptions of a two-party system are thereby vitiated. For example, Chicago Democrats were encouraged to invade the Republican mayoralty primary in 1927 in order to help nominate William Hale Thompson, who was thought to be the easiest man to beat in the election; the Democratic leaders later openly acknowledged their mistake, and in 1931 issued public appeals to Democrats to stay in their own primary. In 1934 and 1938 it was a Republican problem, in that some 250,000 Republicans, who had invaded the Democratic party in 1932, probably because of a genuine interest in Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, were urged by the Republican leaders to return to their own party; the legal, as well as the practical, problem involved was noticed in full-page newspaper explanations and appeals. These and other examples are sufficient evidence of the practice.

In 28 states there is an enrollment system in respect to party membership, instead of the simple declaration used in Illinois and seven other states. That is, voters are required to register or enroll themselves as members of a particular party (or as independents), and this written record is produced at the primary as a check on the voter's claim of party affiliation. This system makes the selection of a party a much more serious act, it effectively prevents raiding, and it helps to preserve a more genuine two-party system.

In Illinois, a beginning of a sort has been made toward such an enrollment system, in that in Cook County and certain downstate cities a written certificate on which the voter checks his party affiliation is substituted for the oral declaration. This does not, however, constitute a permanent record of party membership, and the oral declaration is expressly preserved in general; however, it would be easy to extend this written statement of party affiliation to all election areas in the state and make it over into a genuine enrollment system.

There are those in this state, such as Governor Adlai Stevenson and Stephen A. Mitchell, who urge the adoption of the open primary instead of the present closed primary. The principal arguments for this change being that the open primary is "secret," that more voters would participate if they did not have to reveal their party, and that independents could also participate more freely in the primary. The open primary is more secret than the closed primary only in the sense that the voter, who must affiliate with one of the established parties, makes his choice without undergoing any test and without a public revelation of his choice; but, in view of the importance of the political party in our system of government, it may be doubted whether this kind of secrecy is desirable, even if it is actually possible. There is no persuasive evidence that the open primary actually

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11 Illinois Election Laws (1955), pp. 77-78, 83, 156 (§ 5-30, 6-1, 7-44).
attracts greater participation, although it may attract to a party primary a larger number of independents, who by definition have no genuine concern for any party. On the other hand, the open primary tends to confuse still further the operation of the two-party system by encouraging voters to ignore party lines and party differences; it makes much more difficult the establishment of responsible party government; and it runs counter to the trend in respect to parties in the United States, since only six states (including Washington, with its blanket primary) continue to maintain the open primary. It would seem far better for Illinois to strengthen, rather than to weaken, its system of party government by moving along the lines suggested in this paper.

Finally, it should be noticed that Illinois is one of only three states (the others being Nevada and Rhode Island) that have no corrupt practices act and that do not regulate party financing or campaign funds at all. There are many difficult problems in respect to such legislation, but there is definite need for it; and the Florida law on the subject is generally considered the best and may well serve as a model.
The presence of two major political parties actively competing for power has been deemed essential to the successful functioning of the American system of government. A strong minority party acting as a watchdog over the party in power and waiting to capitalize on that party's mistakes is considered desirable.

Inter-party competition raises two fundamental questions: first, how much competition exists, and second, how much is desirable? More specific queries are: does the absence of a close two-party vote in a particular county or area necessarily result in unrepresentative or ineffective government, can competition in primaries in a one-party area adequately replace inter-party competition, and is it possible to encourage competition at the local governmental level by eliminating national party labels from local elections?

This paper attempts to answer the question of how much inter-party competition now exists in Illinois. The answer to the question of how much inter-party competition is desirable is left to the reader. However, it should be remembered that any change in the present competitive situation would require large numbers of voters to change their voting habits. This change very likely would involve the question of party ideology and party loyalty.

On a national basis there is a reasonably effective two-party system, although in some areas competition between the two parties is practically nonexistent. Similarly in Illinois, two highly competitive parties exist on a statewide basis, although the degree of competition varies in different areas and at different levels of government.

Because of the high degree of competition between the Illinois parties in state and national elections, the state's electoral vote and control of the state government have switched from one party to the other with some frequency in recent years. However, the same high degree of inter-party competition is found in only a few localities, and it is not unusual to find in many counties one-party domination nearly as extreme as that found in the southern states. In the one-party counties in Illinois, there is little or no competition for local offices in elections when these offices are selected on a national party basis. Of course, intra-party competition for these offices in a primary may take the place of inter-party competition. Competition also may be encouraged in these same counties by providing for nonpartisan
local elections. In fact, nonpartisan elections are the practice in school board elections, in most municipal elections, and in some township elections. Nonpartisan elections (other than for school boards) do not necessarily mean that candidates run without party labels; local party labels, instead of Republican and Democratic labels, are frequently used.

This paper is primarily concerned with inter-party competition in elections, and does not deal with the political actions of the successful candidates after they assume office. It would be well to study the political action of a party's delegations to the legislative bodies — boards of supervisors and city councils as well as the state legislature — to determine if there are, or should be, positive party programs. The same general consideration can be raised in regard to elective administrative officers. In other words, a discussion of inter-party competition in elections alone leaves an important void in the understanding of Illinois political parties in action. Unfortunately, however, little study or attention in a systematic way has been given to party activity in the actual policy-making and administrative aspects of governmental operation. Studies have been made of parties and roll calls in the Illinois state legislature, but there knowledge in this area ends.

Party Competition in Statewide Elections

Since the turn of the century, Illinois has followed national trends in presidential elections. and, except in 1916, the state's electoral vote has been delivered for the winning candidate. In 1916, when President Wilson was re-elected, Illinois gave Hughes a plurality. Although Illinois has almost always been on the winning side, the percentage of the vote given to the winner has varied considerably from that which he received on a national basis. Table 1 shows Illinois presidential voting summarized from 1900 to 1956.

It is interesting to note that the Republican presidential candidate has usually carried more counties than the Democratic candidate. As an extreme example, in 1944 President Roosevelt carried Illinois, but carried only 17 of the 102 counties. This discrepancy occurs, of course, because the counties that the Democrats carry are generally the more populous industrial areas. The Republicans, on the other hand, have their strength in the less populated downstate counties. The map on the next page gives some indication of where the strength of each of the two parties lies geographically. Classified by the vote in the fifteen presidential elections since 1900, the counties are designated "always," "usually," or "doubtful" for one party or the other. Those counties that have given the Republicans a plurality of the two-party

1 Also omitted from this paper, because of space limitations, is the subject of judicial elections, although judicial politics are important in inter-party competition, especially when coalition slates of judicial candidates are developed.
TABLE 1. ILLINOIS PRESIDENTIAL VOTE, 1900-1956
(Major party percentages do not necessarily add to 100 per cent because of the vote for other parties.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Republican Candidate</th>
<th>Per Cent of Total Vote</th>
<th>Counties Carried</th>
<th>Democratic Candidate</th>
<th>Per Cent of Total Vote</th>
<th>Counties Carried</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>McKinley*</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Bryan</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Roosevelt*</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Parker</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Taft*</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Bryan</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Taft†</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Wilson*</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Hughes</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Wilson†</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Harding*</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>Cox</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Coolidge*†</td>
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<td>88</td>
<td>Davis</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Hoover*</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>11</td>
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<td>71</td>
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<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Dewey</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Roosevelt®</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>77</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>Eisenhower*</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>Stevenson</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>Eisenhower*</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>Stevenson</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Winner nationally.
† In 1912 Roosevelt on the Progressive ticket received 33.7 per cent of the total vote and carried 28 counties. In 1924 LaFollette on the Progressive ticket received 17.5 per cent of the total vote and carried one county.

vote (excluding the 1912 Progressive vote) throughout this period are classified as "always Republican." No county has a similar "always Democratic" voting record. Those counties that have delivered a plurality in ten or more of the fifteen elections are classified as either "usually Republican" or "usually Democratic"; the counties where neither party won as many as ten elections are classified as "doubtful Republican" or "doubtful Democratic."

It can be seen from the map that the large majority of counties have consistently had a Republican voting record since the turn of the century. In fact, 17 counties fall into the category "always Republican," 48 into the category "usually Republican," and 14 into the "doubtful Republican" category. In contrast, there are only 12 "usually Democratic" and 11 "doubtful Democratic" counties.

Some counties have had a major change in voting habits in national elections since 1900, and the classification used on the map would not be the same if only recent elections had been considered. Probably the most obvious case is Cook County. In the fifteen presidential elections since 1900, that county has had a Republican plurality in nine and a Democratic plurality in five, and in 1912 the Progressive candidate led. All of the Democratic victories in Cook County have been in elections since 1932. A similar situation of changing voting behavior prevails in some of the downstate counties.

The preceding analysis is based entirely on presidential elections. If a
similar study had been made of gubernatorial or congressional elections, the patterns would have varied somewhat, but probably to no great extent.

Generally, in each election for state and national offices, Illinois voters choose all candidates from the same party. Since the turn of the century, split party tickets have been elected in only four election years — 1930, 1940, 1944, and 1954. In 1930 a Republican Superintendent of Public Instruction was elected at the same time as a Democratic United States Senator and State Treasurer. In 1940 and 1944, President Roosevelt carried the state by small margins, receiving less than 52 per cent of the total vote. With this close vote, the Republicans were able to win all the state government executive positions other than that of Secretary of State. They won the contested U.S. Senate seat in 1940, but lost it in 1944. In 1954 the Democratic candidate for U.S. Senator was elected at the same time as the Republican candidates for State Treasurer and Superintendent of Public Instruction.

Table 2 shows the party affiliation of the successful candidate for the various statewide offices in Illinois in each election contest from 1920 to 1958, and thus shows the tendency of Illinois voters to choose one-party slates. The absence of split tickets can partly be explained by the inclusion of the party circle on the "Australian form" ballot used in Illinois. The party circle tends to put more emphasis on party than on individual candidates, especially for lesser offices. It is difficult to generalize about the effect of straight party voting on inter-party competition, and more study in this area is needed.

**Party Competition and Cumulative Voting**

Illinois' cumulative voting system for electing the representatives to the General Assembly is unique in this country and raises certain questions about inter-party competition. Three representatives are elected from each of the 59 districts, and each voter casts three votes. He may give all three of his votes to one candidate, or he may divide them among two or three candidates. Cumulative voting was intended to secure minority representation from each district by enabling the voters in the minority party to cast all of their votes for their party's candidate, and thus to assure his election. The system has had the desired result, and only rarely has a district elected a three-man slate from one party.

The legal basis for the system is found in the Constitution of 1870, and the statutes empower party leaders to determine the number of candidates from their party to be put on the ballot at the general election. In many districts it is customary for one party to put up two candidates and the other party one, thus presenting "no contest" at the November election. It is argued, and rightly, that the voters in the "no contest" districts can deter-

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2 For further discussion of cumulative voting, see Professor Berdahl's paper.
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TABLE 2. WINNING CANDIDATES BY PARTY: ILLINOIS ELECTIONS, 1920-1958
mine the candidates in the primary, but here they have a choice only within their own party. The voter who is unwilling to declare his party affiliation and vote in the primary has no voice in choosing representatives to the General Assembly.

The cumulative voting system sets up the possibility of inter-party collusion in the determination of the number of candidates to be selected by each party. Although there is no evidence that one party ever consciously threw away the possibility of electing more representatives by putting too few candidates on the general election ballot, a party in a particular district might miscalculate the "landslide" effect of a national election and thus lose its chance for an additional representative. There is, however, no evidence that this is widespread. In defense of the present system, it has been pointed out that the Illinois House has relatively little turnover in membership, and thus gets the benefit of the experience its members gained in prior sessions. Also, it has been pointed out that party representation (on a percentage basis) comes close to the party division for the top office on the ballot at a general election. Cumulative voting also insures the presence of a strong minority party in terms of numbers in the legislature, and some feel that this will foster strong inter-party competition there. Whether this has been the case in practice is open to discussion.

Intra-party friction results when leaders of the minority party in a district decide to run two candidates for representative. The two minority party candidates often campaign against each other in the general election for the one seat in the House usually won by their party, and the resulting friction causes the minority party to lose whatever effectiveness it might otherwise have in the general campaign.

Party Competition in Local Elections

The main issue in the present system of local elections is whether these elections should be conducted with formal national party labels, or whether they should be nonpartisan. The issue has been much debated here and elsewhere. The nonpartisan movement has gained considerable support, and most of the cities of over five thousand population in this country have nonpartisan local elections. The argument that "there is no Republican or Democratic way to collect garbage" is considered valid by many civic leaders, who argue that there is no relationship between national and local issues, and that a person elected to a local office should be chosen on the basis of his stand on local issues and not simply because he ran under the label of one of the national parties. It is further argued that when national party labels are used in local elections, a person affiliated with the national party that is a weak minority in a particular community is, in effect, disfranchised.

The opponents of nonpartisanship argue that it is not uncommon for
the local political parties to participate actively in local nonpartisan elections, thereby negating the nonpartisan concept. They say that it is generally considered desirable to strengthen the parties and that this can be done by encouraging young people to seek political elective office. Thus, if political parties are encouraged to participate actively in elections from the township level to the national, a "political career ladder" can be established. And lastly, it is argued that the concept that national and local issues are unrelated is becoming obsolete in our changing federal system. It is not unusual today for county and city officials to have direct relationships with federal agencies in Washington. The local public official who is an acknowledged political leader in his state will undoubtedly have a better reception when he is negotiating in Washington for, say, an urban renewal project for his community.

The role of the Illinois political parties in local government elections is inconsistent and unclear on a statewide basis. The multiplicity of local governments created under several differing authorizations has led to confusion, as has the nonpartisan movement.

The nonpartisan movement has been aided by the election calendar now found in this state. In order to separate local issues from state and national issues, spring election dates have been established for municipalities and townships. One consequence of the spring election date is that less attention is given to these elections, and in many areas voter turnout is extremely light. County office contests, on the other hand, are held at the November general election, and the results are therefore influenced by the outcome of the national and state contests. Because of the timing of the county elections, voter participation is generally greater than in other local elections. But there is no indication that citizens' understanding of county government is either greater or less than their understanding of other local governments.

Throughout Illinois elections for county offices are conducted with national party labels, and only infrequently do the names of independent candidates go on the ballot. In 1958, for example, nine independent candidates in seven counties ran for office; only one of these was elected. In all the other contests, the candidates ran under either a Republican or Democratic label.

The amount of competition for county offices varies greatly. In the southern half of the state there seems to be more interest in county offices, and personalities play a more important role than partisan affiliation. In strong one-party counties, the competition, if any, usually takes place in the primary. In general, however, state politics and national party labels are important in Illinois county elections.

Illustrative of the noncompetitive situation found between the parties in some counties is the fact that in 1958 the minority party frequently did
not contest all the county offices. In 45 counties, for example, the Democrats failed to contest one or more offices; in 14 counties the Republicans failed to put up a complete slate. In 3 heavily Republican counties, the Democrats did not put up any candidates. The 1958 election results show that in 52 counties a straight party slate was elected. In 36 counties, all Republicans were elected and in 16, all Democrats. Split partisan slates were found in the remaining 50 counties.3

In township elections,4 the role of political parties varies even more than in county elections. Township supervisors and assistant supervisors are, to a considerable extent, county officers even though they are elected from townships. The supervisor has certain township functions, but also sits as a member of the county board, and the assistant supervisors' function is limited to sitting on the county board.

From a sizeable sampling of township election returns in the spring of 1959, it is apparent that in most counties, township officials run with national party labels. However, it also seems that “independent” township candidates are more numerous than “independent” county candidates. In some counties it has become the practice for all candidates to run under local party labels, and many examples of candidates being elected as representatives of a Citizen party, Progressive party, Taxpayer’s party, etc., can be cited. In still other counties no party labels of any kind appear on the ballot. In the eight townships in Stark County, illustrations of all of these varying practices were found in 1959. One result of having either local party labels or a completely nonpartisan election is that elected supervisors and assistant supervisors sit on a board that must work with the sheriff, clerk, and other county officials, all of whom have been elected as partisans.

The review of the election returns for the townships sampled showed that there was considerable competition for township offices, and a “no contest” was the exception. Competition for the office of township highway commissioner was particularly heavy.

Illinois is not a “home rule” state in the usual sense of that term, but the citizens in a municipality are granted considerable freedom in forming and running their local government. Optional forms of government are possible, and further freedom is generally permitted as to whether or not political parties are to participate in local elections. Under the commission form, elections are nonpartisan, and no party designation is permitted on the ballot. Under other forms, there can be party labels, either those of the

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4 Township elections come in the spring, and usually are held separately from other elections. Under certain circumstances, township and municipal elections are combined.
national or of local parties. Most cities have nonpartisan or local party elections. Only in a sprinkling of cities scattered throughout the state are the city officials elected as Republicans or Democrats.

Considerable hypocrisy exists in the so-called nonpartisan system, and the contests in many nonpartisan cities are in fact between the local organizations of the two major political parties. Probably the most obvious case of "partisan nonpartisanship" is the city council of Chicago. In Chicago, the mayor and other elected administrative officials are selected under party labels, but the 50 aldermen sitting on the council are selected on a nonpartisan basis. However, the regular party organizations campaign in each ward, and only the most poorly informed citizen does not know the partisan affiliation of his alderman. Attempts have been made in the General Assembly from time to time to provide for partisan elections for aldermen, but there seems to be little interest in making a change in this direction.

The situation that prevails concerning "partisan nonpartisanship" in the Chicago city council is also found in many downstate cities. Also, the present situation in the cities presents some interesting contrasts, with the twin cities of Champaign and Urbana being a good, although not typical, example. Because of the contiguity of the two cities, the contrasts in the role of the parties in local elections are more vivid. Champaign, under the council-manager form of government, elects its city council and mayor without any party labels. Adjoining Urbana has the mayor–alderman form and elects its officials with national party labels. The citizens of the two communities fall into similar social and economic groupings, and in state and national elections, the partisan division does not vary greatly. But because of a historical situation, partisan elections in one city and nonpartisan elections in the other have become well accepted. An interesting result of the present situation is that a person subject to the federal Hatch Act is eligible to run for public office in Champaign, but ineligible in Urbana.

Conclusion

Considerable inter-party competition exists in statewide elections in Illinois, and, barring a significant change in voting trends, one need be little concerned with the state becoming completely dominated by one of the major political parties. In local areas, however, competition between the parties presents another picture. In some limited areas there appears to be healthy and active competition in both state and local elections, and every election is closely contested. In others, it is obvious there is virtually no, or at best a very weak, minority party. This is true not only in rural Republican counties, but also in Chicago, with its well-organized Democratic machine. Cumulative voting may have an effect on inter-party competition in some areas of the state.

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The question that arises is whether it is possible or desirable to have strong inter-party competition in all parts of the state in all elections. If it is impractical to reach this supposedly desirable goal, then would a strengthened and more effective over-all two-party system result if the local organizations of the national parties were made responsible for the conduct of government at all levels, from the township to the White House? Would this cause a member of the minority party in any one county to be disfranchised, in effect, from participating in local affairs, or would it mean that a minority party would be forced to exert more effort to become a more effective minority, or even to become the majority party in that particular locality? On the other hand, would it be better to make all local elections nonpartisan to the extent of removing national party labels from local elections, and thereby provide a basis for competition for these offices other than the candidate's affiliation with one of the two national parties? And lastly, would better political leaders rise to the top if it were possible to establish a "political career ladder" starting at the lowly positions in township government and ending at the national government level?
Political campaigns are run on the energy of a great variety of people. A certain portion of the energy in campaigns is contributed by interested partisans, but generally this energy is not sufficient nor does it enlist the variety of talents needed for the job at hand. Money as a convertible currency must then be used to purchase the needed energy which is not contributed. Money does more than just fill in the gap; it is more flexible than labor, for busy people it is a substitute for service, and it also helps to insure that campaign costs are shared more widely. No one expects the printer of campaign literature to contribute the time of his entire plant for a few days, especially since the talents of other vendors of service (dry cleaners or plumbers, for example) would not be needed to the same extent. Similarly, no one expects all of the complex talents of television transmission to be contributed without compensation. Money, then, provides a medium whereby numbers of people, many with no special talent or little available time, can share the energy requirements of a campaign.

Money also enables a party to purchase campaign energy which far surpasses the support for that party as measured by votes or work contributions. It is in this sense that people complain about large amounts of money buying candidates and elections. The democratic ethic sanctions individual contributions of energy in any amount, perhaps because individuals have more or less equal amounts of energy, and perhaps because it is a clear-cut expression of a personal political commitment. However, money is not held more or less equally. Also, it is generally not as clear an expression of political commitment as energy per se. For example, a contributor may give money to both parties, but will hardly give time to both. Therefore, people frown on large amounts of money being used to purchase energy that would not otherwise be committed in a campaign.

The Costs of Democracy

One often hears the complaint that campaigns cost too much. Well, how much should they cost? Just how big is the campaign task? In most campaigns the voter is the target of messages coming from candidates in primaries and general elections, from candidates at three levels of government, and from candidates of two or more parties. The average voter must choose among thirty to fifty candidates in a normal election year, nearly all of whom would like to get messages through to him. Candidates com-
pete among themselves for the attention of the voter and also compete with all the other possible stimuli he might attend to, such as a western or a football game on TV. Getting messages through to voters is a complicated and difficult task, and it is bound to cost money. Considering the number of candidates and the competition for attention, it would not be unreasonable to expect that minimum communication costs could come to about one dollar per voter.

If there are approximately seven million potential voters in Illinois, reasonable campaign costs for both political parties could total seven million dollars. There are no good figures for election year costs in Illinois, but few knowledgeable people estimate that costs exceed seven million dollars in any election year. Even if national campaign expenditures are considered in the total, the costs do not seem unreasonable. Total campaign costs for the 1952 election have been estimated at 140 million dollars: this means an expenditure of about $1.25 per voter. On this basis it seems fair to say that, as a practical matter, it would be very difficult to reduce campaign costs. Furthermore, the public has refused to recognize the inevitable high cost of operating a political democracy. Attention to high costs diverts attention from some of the more urgent problems of political finance, and thus forces political leaders to seek funds in questionable places. It would probably be to its advantage if the public would accept the high cost of democracy and turn its attention to meeting the challenge of adequate party finance.

Where Does the Money Come from?

On the whole, the public has been reluctant to accept and share the burden of party finance. Many citizens think of parties as institutions apart from themselves, staffed and financed by self-seeking and corrupt individuals, and presenting them with unhappy electoral choices. Most of them have never seriously confronted the thought of making a political contribution, and some of them would consider such a contribution to be downright immoral. In such a setting, how are political parties financed in Illinois?

The answer to such a question should be prefaced with the caution that reliable and complete evidence is difficult to find. Nevertheless, although details are absent, there is a general picture from which some meaningful observations can be made. Both political parties depend to a certain extent on persons who receive their livelihood from state expenditures to help finance party activities. At the present time, with the Republicans controlling the state administration and the Democrats controlling the City of Chicago, both parties have access to this kind of financial support. It is

common knowledge that persons holding government jobs through political appointment are expected to make a small percentage of their salary available to the party that helped them procure the jobs. Much the same can be said of people who receive government contracts or concessions.

Since this type of contributing fits the popular conception of party donors, there is a great temptation to overestimate its importance. Some states and the federal government have somewhat effectively outlawed contributions from persons likely to receive direct financial benefit from government, yet the parties continue to function. In other states where such contributing is allowed and reports of contributors are available (North Carolina, for example), the percentage of total dollars contributed by these kinds of people is not great.

Closely allied to the contributor who seeks a job or contract is the person who hopes to receive some benefit for being a “right guy,” perhaps from a solicitor who can pass rewards in his direction. One of the secrets of political money raising, as well as money raising of other types, is to have the potential donor solicited by someone he will have difficulty in turning down. In this sense political money raising is inextricably intertwined with a network of business, financial, and social relationships.

Because these motivations are direct and obvious, many people commit the error of thinking that these are the only reasons why people give money to parties. To find out if this were true, the writer made an intensive study of a random sample of one hundred contributors in North Carolina. It is not possible to give detailed findings here, but it can be stated that contributors like these were found. However, the motivations were much more complex than is popularly supposed. Most contributors were trying to accomplish a variety of purposes with their contributions, and there was substantial evidence that few were interested in direct personal reward. Instead, the majority of the contributors (who also gave most of the dollars) were hoping by their contributions to place in office a certain style of government which would be congenial to the kind of life they hoped to lead. They conceived of contributions as weapons in a political battle. This motivation is not unlike that of most voters. Although the same conditions may not prevail in Illinois, there is no obvious reason why Illinois should differ in this respect from North Carolina.

Besides looking at sources from the point of view of individual contributors, one should look at the sources from the point of view of the two kinds of institutions in Illinois seeking support — the regular party organizations and the volunteer committees supporting specific candidates. On

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the Republican side the regular party organization is supported by the United Republican Fund. The URF is a legally separate adjunct of the party, staffed and supported largely by people who consider themselves "non-professional" politicians. It was initially organized in the late 1940's to prevent fraudulent solicitation of funds on behalf of nonexistent Republican committees. Now it has become the official money-raising arm of the party. with organization parallel to the party in each county. In some counties the URF seems to be under the control of the county Republican committee; however, in Cook County the URF has its own leadership. URF's appeal for funds seems to be pitched toward business and professional men, and presumably most of the funds come from them. At present URF is engaged in a drive to broaden its base of support by seeking to add nine thousand new memberships. About 30 per cent of the new memberships are in the five dollar category, and another 30 per cent are in the ten dollar category.

On the other hand, there are persistent rumors that the regular Republican organization continues to have lucrative sources of support outside the URF. Presumably, many of these donors prefer a more direct channel to the party organization than URF provides. In addition to this gap, the URF does not support special candidate and volunteer committees. These committees may get support from certain regular Republican county committees, but they must rely on donations from interested private citizens for most of their funds. Some money may also come from individuals or committees from outside the state, such as the party congressional and senatorial committees.

On the Democratic side the party does not have a money-raising arm comparable to the URF, although there is a move afoot to start such an organization. Most of the funds for the regular organization are raised by the "professionals" in the party. In Cook County most of this money is raised at the ward level by various devices, some aboveboard and some not. In downstate counties, where Democrats are seldom in power, patronage and concession sources are slender, and a Democratic money-raising arm would probably be very welcome. At present there seems to be only limited interest among Democratic party "professionals" in setting up a separate money-raising arm and in trying to broaden the base of contributions.

Democratic candidate and volunteer committees get very little help from the regular Democratic organization. Labor unions are a major source of funds for these committees. Labor has traditionally preferred to allocate its contributions to specific candidates, hoping thereby to encourage more direct support for labor policies, rather than to diffuse its impact through general party support. These special committees also obtain additional funds from individual contributions and from committees out of state, such as the Committee for an Effective Congress.
When one looks at this complex picture, one is struck by the competition for funds by committees and organizations at various levels. Not only does this duplicate many solicitations, but it makes it difficult for the donor to place his contribution most effectively. In this complex situation it is unlikely that the public will get to know who is supporting which candidate, a bit of information which voters are entitled to know. Some people would get around this problem by centralizing money raising in one organization or highly placed individual. The URF is one example of such an endeavor. Great Britain has worked a variation on this theme by centralizing responsibility for money raising and spending in a candidate’s agent, and the law imposes severe penalties for money raising or spending without the agent’s approval. This applies only to candidate funds raised in a constituency. It is frequently argued that this kind of centralization is the only realistic way of trying to impose limitations on contributions and expenditures.

There are additional questions relating to sources of funds that might be discussed. To what extent is the Republican party dependent on “big business” and the Democratic on “big labor” for support? Does any special interest group have an extraordinary influence on party policies through financial support? How broad is the base of contributors for each party? Would broadening the base free party decision-making or alter party makeup? Is the centralized money-raising arm (like the URF) a good device for broadening a party base and making money raising visible and responsible? Are there other consequences of this method?

**Once Raised, How Is the Money Channeled?**

Generalization is difficult since practices will vary with specific campaign situations. On the whole, there is comparatively little transferring of funds from committee to committee in Illinois. In some states and at the national level one tends to find more committee transfers. It might be conjectured that in Illinois the financial independence of committees reflects the relatively independent and autonomous nature of the various campaign and party organizations. One can speculate further that they can maintain this autonomy because they do not depend on issues and public enthusiasm for basic support. Rather, basic support tends to flow from *quid pro quo* relationships between party officials and segments of the economy dependent on the party for prosperity.

The United Republican Fund has a budget agreed upon in advance by party and URF officials. As a general rule, one-third of the money raised in Cook County goes to the national committee, another third to the state committee, and the remaining third to the county committee. In downstate counties, usually about one-half remains at the county level, the other half moving on to the state URF, where again a certain portion is sent on to
the national. Apparently other money raised by Republicans remains with
the committee or candidate who is first recipient.

On the Democratic side the information is more sketchy. Occasionally
money goes from the Cook County Democratic committee to the Democratic
national committee, but it is not a regular practice. More regularly, some of
its funds may go to the state committee. Money raised by the Democratic
national committee in Illinois seems to come from individual contributions.
Candidate committees may on occasion get money from the regular party
organization, but it is a more common practice for the candidates to be
required to pay some kind of assessment to the regular party organization
for the work the party presumably does on behalf of the whole ticket.

For What Is the Money Spent?

It is extremely difficult to get reliable information on this subject. No
official reports are required by state law, and most records of this sort are
considered partisan secrets by campaign and party committees. On the
other hand, certain types of costs are characteristic of all campaigns, and the
subject can be considered in this more general sense.\(^3\)

Organization costs like salaries, rent, utilities, travel, etc., are basic and
tend to remain more or less constant no matter whether there is an extrava-
gant or a sparse campaign expenditure. To put it another way, a certain
amount of money is allocated to these basic costs; then, if additional funds
are raised, they tend to be allocated to more elastic costs, like TV time,
rather than to the addition of new staff to the headquarters. Thus, if
campaign funds were very scarce, organization costs could become as high
as 40 per cent of the total; but if funds were plentiful, they could drop to 5
or 10 per cent. In one statewide campaign for which figures were available,
they were about 20 per cent.

Mass media costs like radio and TV time are perhaps the greatest con-
sumer of campaign dollars. They are also the most elastic, absorbing without
much additional thought or planning any unexpected arrival of funds. One
state campaign committee bought only one five-minute time period and
several spot announcements; still 30 per cent of the budget went for this
item. This same committee spent another 10 per cent for newspaper adver-
tising.

Most campaign committees also spend a fair proportion of their funds
for additional means of communication, such as printing and distributing
literature, billboard advertising, banners, stickers, buttons, etc. These costs
consumed about 25 per cent of the dollars in the campaign for which there
are figures.

\(^3\) See, for example, Alexander Heard, *Money in Politics*, Public Affairs Pamphlet
No. 242, 1956; or his forthcoming *The Costs of Democracy*. 
Probably the most difficult costs to evaluate are election day expenses. Every precinct organization has costs in getting out the vote. Some of the money distributed pays for valuable services, but some of it is paid because ward and precinct officers have come to expect it as a reward for the position they hold. The amount of money allocated to this purpose in any committee budget depends on many factors: the relationship of the committee to the regular party organization, the activities and contributions of other candidates on the ticket, the over-all public interest and concern in the campaign, which, if high, may turn out the vote without the intervention of the party organization. In some campaigns election day expenses could run as high as 25 per cent, but for most campaigns it would be less than that. In connection with this aspect of campaign costs, many people think of vote buying. The best information available from around the country indicates that this practice is passing out of the picture, probably because of such factors as a generally high level of prosperity, increased literacy and education, the secret ballot, and public alertness and indignation about the problem.

In general, there is not as much reason for public concern about the spending of political money as there is about the raising of it. The way that money is spent is largely dictated by other factors. For example paying party officials to go out and work for the ticket seems to come about more from the characteristics of party organization than from the immoral or foolish decision of the man or committee responsible for spending campaign funds. In many localities this cost is negligible because campaign work by officials is volunteered. Even the allocation of funds to different kinds of communication media is largely determined by the habitual attention patterns of media consumers.

Many observers lament that the taste of the potential political consumer is not more cultivated. The technological advances of the mass media have produced so many competing stimuli for the attention of the average citizen that the emphasis in communication has shifted from informing the citizen to making the message attractive enough to grasp his attention. The major endeavor is to sell candidates on the basis of their superficial packaging, like cosmetics or soap, rather than to analyze and teach about political problems and issues. Since learning is hard work, the political communicator risks losing his audience if he tries to get them to think. It is this trend that has led to the "cult of personality" in American politics. In order to battle more effectively for the campaign audience, the politician has turned to the public relations man for advice and assistance. In some instances all the major campaign decisions have been turned over to the PR men. This

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trend certainly does not indicate that we are moving toward a better in-
formed electorate.

**Legal Controls of Money in Politics**

Illinois is one of only five states that do not require reports of contrib-
utions and expenditures by political committees. Most states not only
require these reports at stated intervals in election years, but also set limits
on who may contribute, the maximum size of contributions, and the total
amounts that given committees may spend. The only specific limitation in
Illinois law is a prohibition against contributions from anyone connected
with the liquor business. (Even this prohibition seems to be winked at in
some quarters.) There was some agitation during the Stevenson administra-
tion for a law requiring contribution and expenditure reports, but nothing
came of it. Bills dealing with campaign expenditures were also introduced
in both the 1957 and 1959 sessions of the Illinois legislature but were, in both
cases, killed in committee.

The experience of other states with corrupt practices legislation has not
been completely satisfactory. Limits on size of contribution or on committee
expenditures frequently have little relationship to the magnitude of the
campaign task to be undertaken. For example, the laws in most states
prohibit a candidate from spending more than $10,000 (sometimes even
less) in a campaign; federal law prohibits a senatorial candidate from
spending more than $25,000. Unrealistic limitations like these force candi-
dates to set up volunteer committees to raise and spend funds on their
behalf. Instead of limiting expenditures, these laws result in a further
obscuring of information. In response to this problem ten states merely
require the reports and place no limitations on size of expenditures. The
hope is that this will ensure full disclosure and enable the public to act
appropriately if a candidate or committee acts contrary to public concep-
tions of fair play. The fear of public reaction is indeed present, but, instead
of acting fairly and informing the public in all cases, in many instances the
campaign manager simply decides not to report occurrences that he thinks
the public might not like. Thus, one still is not sure of reliable information
where publicity is the only legal requirement.

These official reports might be made more reliable if some executive
officer were given the specific responsibility for checking the reports and
prosecuting violators. In most states one official, usually the secretary of
state, receives the reports, and another, the attorney general, has the broad
responsibility for prosecution; the upshot is that the reports are seldom
examined for accuracy, completeness, or legality. Unless a state is prepared
to police the reports and to make some effort to pass the information on
to the public *in advance of the election*, the salutary effects of a reporting
statute will not be realized.
Prospects and Problems

Many students of politics have come forth with suggestions for reform of political finance which are worthy of further discussion.

As an inducement for contributing, and thus for broadening the financial base of parties, it has been suggested that political contributions be made deductible from state and federal income taxes or that tax credits be given for small contributions. Under the deduction system contributions up to a certain size (maybe $100 or $500) could be deducted from gross income before taxes are computed. Under the tax credit system the amount of the contribution up to a small size (maybe $10 or $25) would be subtracted from the tax payable once the tax had been computed. Both are indirect governmental subsidies for the maintenance of the political system. The tax credit system would be a clearer inducement for the small contributor and would probably broaden the base further than the tax deduction. Minnesota allows tax deductions from the state income tax, and preliminary reports indicate general satisfaction with the statute, although the effect in broadening contributions has not yet been accurately measured. Illinois has no state income tax, and a deduction plan would therefore not be feasible; however, the federal government could be urged to inaugurate such a provision for the federal income tax.

Such a law not only helps create incentive for contributions, but also implies tacit approval for the act of contributing. Widespread approval of political contributing as an honorable act and a civic duty is a prerequisite for a broad financial base for parties. If the public could be convinced they have as much a duty to contribute to their party as they do to contribute to their church, or to vote, the elimination of many of the unsavory aspects of politics could be hoped for.

Another suggestion for broadening the financial base and for legitimizing contributions is to establish a financial foundation which would provide equal funds for candidates in both parties, or to establish a separate foundation for each party. These organizations would be legal entities separate from the parties; they would be governed by a separate board; contributions to them would be tax exempt; and they would provide more constant and stable income for the parties. This type of organization has some similarities to the United Republican Fund described above. Establishing such institutions would present many problems, such as selecting the board and personnel, defining who would be eligible for grants, and preventing the holders of the money from controlling party policies. However, these foundations would make political contributing attractive to many more people.

It has been suggested repeatedly over the years that the government could give direct or indirect support to the parties. Direct support could be in the form of a grant of money to each party. Indirect subsidies could be
accomplished through free mailing privileges, publication of a campaign information pamphlet, or free use of governmental facilities, as well as the tax subsidy described above. Indirect subsidies have been tried several places and seem to work well: e.g., Britain allows to each candidate one free mailing to every voter in a constituency. Direct subsidies have never been tried in the continental United States; however, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Puerto Rico have experimented with the method. For both kinds of subsidies, problems of eligibility and limitations on amounts would have to be settled in order to prevent raiding of the public treasury.

Closely allied to subsidies is another British practice, allowing each party a certain amount of free radio and TV time. This is simple to provide where facilities are state owned. But even private facilities are state licensed, and provision of a minimum amount of time could be made one of the requirements for licensing. In fact, there is some indication that the networks would give some free time to the major parties without being required to do so if they could be relieved of the possibility of having to give equal time to every person who might claim he was a serious contender for office.

The main value of the variety of subsidies discussed is that they would help to equalize access to voters, whereas under present circumstances the party with the richer constituents may have an advantage. Subsidies would also be a recognition that the political process is a public concern and responsibility. They are a means of insuring that the citizen can hear all the political messages he has a desire to hear.

Increasingly, one hears pleas for a shorter ballot. The main justification given is that it would simplify the decision task of the overworked voter, but fewer candidates would also lessen the pressure for campaign money. Since the total information task of campaigns would be simplified, it should be possible to get a better informed electorate for a smaller expenditure of money.

Perhaps the most gnawing question for observers of political money is, “Can money buy elections?” Stated in a related fashion, it becomes, “Do large contributors have undue influence on party and public policy?” No one can give a definite answer to this; reliable data could come only from an exhaustive examination of the psychological decision process of large numbers of governmental decision makers. Confusion also arises from the fact that a contribution is seldom the only way that a large donor is related to a public official. A donor generally also has done some work on behalf of the candidate, he is usually a man of some substance in the community, and quite frequently he is also a personal friend of the official.

More reasonably, the question should be rephrased, “Can a person who has not contributed find alternative channels to decision makers?” Unquestionably, candidates welcome other kinds of support in addition to monetary
support. The dedicated doorbell ringer in a campaign provides a type of service that money simply cannot buy. In the North Carolina survey, political contributors and leaders were asked if they thought time or money contributions were considered more valuable. The closer the respondent was to the political process, the more likely he was to prefer time and work contributions. Of course, support by time and money is not the only channel to decision makers. Joining one's fellows in a special interest group provides a voice that the decision maker cannot ignore. Individual letters or visits to officials also are almost sure to get a fair hearing. One political savant has observed that the large contributor does not get a better hearing than the ordinary citizen; he may get only a quicker hearing. In the final analysis, it is the vote that insures that these channels stay open to all citizens.

To turn this thought around, it can be said that it is impossible to steal an election while the public is looking. It is when the public is unconcerned and apathetic that the influence of money in politics need be feared. Without public concern, any number of legal restrictions can not keep out corruption. With public concern, a minimum of legal requirements will suffice.

The greatest danger in the political process is the widespread feeling that politics is a dirty, rotten business that good and decent people have as little contact with as possible. Generally accompanying this feeling is a sense of futility and disinterest which serves to breed the very thing deplored. Our analytical talents must be turned to discovering how this perception of the political process is developed in people, which may then give some guidance toward how it might be changed. Until the public takes responsibility for widespread financial support of parties and campaigns, there is little hope that the inequities and corruption now found can be eradicated.
THE ROLE OF THE EXTRA-PARTY ORGANIZATION

BRUCE B. MASON

There have always existed extra-party groups which are authorized (or assume the right) to speak for the regular party in certain circumstances. The extra-party organization is distinguished from the party organization by one fact: it does not have control of the legally prescribed party machinery. The extra-party organization is distinguished from the interest group — although the dividing line is thin in some cases — primarily in two ways: the extra-party organization is composed entirely of persons who allege themselves to be members of one particular party, and it attempts to press its views on public policy through one party only.

Some Reasons for the Development of Extra-Party Groups  
Certain facts of political life have more or less influence in the creation of extra-party organizations. For example, the party leadership promotes extra-party organizations and activity among young people because they will someday come of age and provide new leadership, and among women because their peculiar social circumstances seem to demand a “bow” in their direction.

However, other factors are important to the growth of extra-party organizations. One is the looseness with which party membership is defined in the United States (and Illinois). Everyone is privileged to choose his party by simply declaring his preference. Each party thus contains, subsumed under one label, great masses of people who actually vary significantly in their attitudes towards public policy, the party, and even politics itself. These people, of all shades of opinion and degrees of loyalty, are democratically privileged to seek control of their party. By voting in the party primary, they have paid the only price that is legally demanded of them. They are also privileged to try to influence their party's attitudes in regard to public policy. In fact, the ideological motivation is usually a very strong stimulus for the extra-party organizational member. He often does not want, and usually can not gain, a seat within the ranks of the actual party leadership. If he wants a tangible reward, it is usually a public rather than a party office he covets.

While party membership is thus loosely defined, resulting in mass parties which encompass all opinions along the political spectrum, party leadership

\(^{1}\) This study omits consideration of the ad hoc candidate-oriented groups and the bi-partisan groups which work for constitutional reform, bond elections, etc.
tends to be oligarchic. One factor causing the tendency towards oligarchy is, of course, the extensive legal prescription of party machinery and party processes. In Illinois, for example, the statutes regulate minutely the composition of the various party committees, including the methods by which committeemen may be chosen, and give them strong controls over party operations.

The major reason for the tendency towards oligarchy, however, is that party leadership carries with it not only some influence over the attitude of the party towards public policy, but control over the rewards available to the party: patronage and prestige. In fact, these latter rewards undoubtedly serve as the primary stimuli for most “professional” party activity. They serve, too, to place a premium on the type of person who can get out the vote. Hence, the party “pro” is an activist, while the extra-party man is often a “thinker.” The age-old quarrel between doers and thinkers often plays a role in the relationship that develops.

Of course, one should not overemphasize the separation between party doers and party thinkers. As has already been noted, the regular party leadership often has a hand in the creation of some extra-party organizations. Moreover, it looks with only mild disdain on the strictly intellectual group. The real rub comes only with those extra-party organizations that compete with the existing leadership for party control. In this case the relationships are further strained because a feeling often exists among party leaders that the extra-party group has been founded to promote the candidacy of someone or of some group that has not actively served in the legions of the party.

The Three Types of Extra-Party Organizations

Extra-party organizations arise from different stimuli, maintain varying relationships with the regular party organizations, and have different conceptions of their roles in the political process. Generally speaking, and for the sake of clarity and order, it is possible to divide the extra-party organizations into three major categories. The first category includes extra-party organizations created by the party leadership for special reasons. In this category would be the Young Democrats and Young Republicans, who appeal to potential voters; the United Republican Fund, which is a special group for fund raising; and the women’s organizations, which were brought into being by the Nineteenth Amendment and were continued to appeal to women voters.

A second category includes those organizations, which may or may not be established by the party, that are largely content to offer public policy suggestions to the established party leadership and to criticize the leadership of the opposition party. Thus, they compete for the “mind” of the party,
although not for control of the leadership. Included here would be the Committee on Illinois Government, a Democratic group.

The third category includes those groups which are for one reason or another dissatisfied with the regular party leadership, and which attempt to compete for control of the party. In Illinois, the Democratic Federation of Illinois, active on the state level, and the Abraham Lincoln National Republican Club, active on the national level, would fall into this category. If each of the three major types of extra-party organizations is examined in turn, some of the problems will become evident.

**Party-Sponsored Extra-Party Organizations**

Those extra-party organizations created by the party leadership to serve some special party purpose (e.g., the Young Democrats, Young Republicans, United Republican Fund, and the various women's organizations of both parties) are so closely aligned with the existing party leadership that they are subject to the latter's control. If any serious challenge to existing authority were to arise, it could be (and often is) promptly squelched. There is, for example, no question but that both the Young Democrats and Young Republicans in Illinois are firmly under the domination of their respective seniors. There have been numerous complaints made by representatives of both groups against the rigidity of the senior party and the plasticity of their own leadership.

Evidence also seems to indicate that not only are the women's organizations firmly in accord with the regular party leadership by whom their leaders are appointed, but also that they actually perform much of the "leg work" for that leadership in downstate counties.

With limited exceptions, these extra-party organizations do not constitute serious threats to the control of the established party leadership. Do they, however, promote the causes of the party as well as might be expected? A definite answer, of course, can not be given, but the weight of opinion is that they do not. Both the Young Democrats and Young Republicans are at best anemic organizations, torn between the natural inclinations of youth to ideals and the practical demands of their seniors for party activism. To a lesser extent, the same holds true of the women's groups. They neither appeal heavily to feminine morality nor provide the women with the excitement they crave. The continued growth of the League of Women Voters, an organization which originally arose from the suffragette movement, may be an indication that the parties are not appealing to women as

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^2^ The Independent Voters of Illinois was investigated, but has been omitted from consideration. Although its actions would appear to make it a Democratic extra-party group, the IVI has some Republican members and has supported Republican candidates at times.

^3^ Described in Professor Milbrath's paper.
effectively as they might. The League at least gives women a vicarious sense of participation on a high moral plane.

It appears that the party-stimulated extra-party organizations should be examined with a view to taking advantage of the natural political inclinations of women and young people. As long as the leadership of these extra-party organizations does not represent a threat to party leadership, frank recognition might be taken of their potential "ideological" base, and less emphasis might be put on developing recruits for the party cadre. These few leaders who are necessary can be co-opted from the cream at the top of a much larger membership.

**The "Intellectual" Extra-Party Organization**

The second type of extra-party organization, as noted, may or may not be established by the party leadership, and, in any sense, seems largely content to offer public policy suggestions. In Illinois, the Committee on Illinois Government falls into this category.⁴

Organized at the beginning of the Stratton administration, the Committee on Illinois Government largely represents the liberal wing of the Illinois Democratic party. It is not under the control of the regular party leadership in Illinois. Yet, because it is largely a fact-finding agency that contents itself with acting as a "watchdog" over the Republican administration in Springfield, the Committee has gained the tolerance of the party leaders now in control, who have praised it for "extremely effective work" in recent campaigns.

According to the Committee's own literature, it has performed various intellectual tasks for the party, such as the following:

- Maintained a complete file of clippings on subjects involving State government taken from Illinois newspapers published all over the state.
- Published *The Stratton Record*, a 1954 campaign manual detailing instances of corruption and bad administration under Governor Stratton.
- Drafted "planks" for the 1954 and 1956 State Democratic platforms.

Despite the glowing tributes paid by party leaders to the Committee on Illinois Government, the future relationship between the CIG and the party seems uncertain. As long as the Republican party controls the state administration, it seems likely that the CIG can continue its role of an "intellectual thorn" in the Republican side. Already, however, some of the more activist members of the CIG have turned their attention to and their guns on the leadership of the Democratic party. Continued success of the Republicans at the polls might drain the lifeblood from the CIG. On the other hand, a Democratic victory at the polls in 1960 (or soon thereafter) could be equally troublesome; in this event the CIG's role as intellectual

⁴A similar, but not identical, development on the national level in the Republican party can be seen in the so-called Percy Committee reports.
critic would become either superfluous or, if directed toward a Democratic administration, divisive.

For promoting the welfare of the Democratic party, there is, nevertheless, much potential advantage in the Committee on Illinois Government, or an agency like it. The same might be said for a similar agency devoted to the Republican cause. Were it possible to establish a party headquarters that functioned actively on a full-time basis, it might be helpful to incorporate within it a research or fact-finding agency that would serve the same ends as the CIG.

**Dissident Extra-Party Organizations**

The third category includes those groups which are for one reason or another dissatisfied with the regular party leadership, and which attempt to supplant or control it. Both the Democratic Federation of Illinois and the Abraham Lincoln National Republican Club fall into this category, but because the Abraham Lincoln Club has little influence in state affairs, our discussion will be confined to the DFI.

The immediate stimulus for the creation of the DFI was undoubtedly the feeling among the liberal wing of the Democratic party that the party leadership had "snatched defeat from the jaws of victory" in 1956. First, then, the DFI was formed as a protest against the "slating" of gubernatorial candidates in 1956, and thus it represented a criticism of the established party leadership. Underlying the immediate cause for the formation of the DFI, however, were other motives that also reflected dissatisfaction with the party leaders. For some of its adherents, the DFI represents a way for the downstate area to gain a greater voice in the party. However, for others it represents an attack on downstate Democratic leaders. In some of the older areas of Chicago, the DFI seems to have a strong ethnic base, representing in some cases a protest against Irish Catholic domination of the party. In the fringe areas of Chicago, the DFI gains strength from members of the upper middle class, who are shut out of Democratic leadership because they lack a strong voter base. Their strongest complaint is against the "closed" party machine; hence, the DFI made an effort to get a secret primary law passed in the 1959 General Assembly. Finally, the DFI contains large numbers of people who are nominal followers of Governor Adlai Stevenson.

Regular party response to the DFI has varied according to locale. Chicago leaders have not been openly hostile to the group; they may feel there is a genuine need for party competition. Downstate leaders, on the other hand, have often been more critical; party competition in these areas some feel, would destroy the party's already tenuous position.

To a certain extent, the DFI is suffering from political schizophrenia, as shown by its indecision on whether to support Stephen A. Mitchell in his bid for the primary nomination for governor, or to support a regular
organization candidate. Mitchell, former Democratic national chairman, encouraged the creation of the DFI. The first president of the DFI is now the co-chairman of the Mitchell for Governor committee. There is no question but that a large share of the DFI membership favors Mitchell for governor. On the other hand, the leadership of the DFI has strongly presented the charge that the organization is the handmaiden of Mitchell. The DFI seeks instead, its leaders say, to ensure that the Democratic party in Illinois will promote the cause of liberalism and the election of "good" candidates. "Good" candidate is to them a generic term. Consequently, at the October 10, 1959, "issues convention" of the DFI, both of the featured speakers were men prominently mentioned as likely candidates for governor in 1960.\(^5\)

The role of the DFI is at this time in doubt. Composed of people who are strongly oriented toward the party, the organization wants nothing more than to have the party win the 1960 elections. Yet it also would like to have a voice in the choosing of Democratic candidates. The fulfillment of the latter hope is, to the DFI, a prerequisite to the enjoyment of the first. Also, the DFI will probably have to maintain its opposition to the urban party organization, or it will lose much of its reason for being.

Conclusions

The extra-party organization is an institution as old as the parties themselves. Because there are only two major parties in an essentially pluralistic society, the parties themselves form extra-party organizations to attract significant special groups. Political parties in this country are not organized, generally, to speak with a clear voice on matters of public policy. Although parties lack an authoritative voice in matters of public policy, they function through a party machinery that tends toward oligarchy in structure, especially in metropolitan areas. In many ways, metropolitan political party organization rests on a base that seems to be losing some of its vitality. In the past, metropolitan party leadership has often failed to take into account the rise of the middle class, the existence of intellectually-oriented voters, the growth in number of Negroes, the aspirations of reformers, and the increasing role of militant labor leaders. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the Republican party, which is weak in Chicago and the East St. Louis area, has had fewer extra-party organizations stirring its ranks.

The problems the extra-party organization poses for the regular party leadership depend upon into which category the particular group falls. For

\(^5\) Since this paper was written, the DFI, in its January, 1960, convention, indicated a "preference" for Stephen A. Mitchell, but did not actually endorse him because "the organization also has many members who favor State Treasurer Joseph Lohman and Cook County judge Otto Kerner." The emphasis on "preference" rather than "endorsement," of course, is just one more indication of the DFI's problem of operating within, but not as an official part of, the Democratic party in Illinois.
the party-sponsored groups, the major questions are whether what the
groups are organized to accomplish might better be achieved in another way,
and, even more fundamentally, whether the purposes for organizing the
groups are valid. Specifically, do the young people's organizations and the
women's groups function in the manner most rational for them? If not,
what are the alternatives?

The intellectually-oriented groups that do not seek active control of the
party machinery raise some interesting questions and reflect upon the
irresponsibility of party structure. Should not the parties, especially in a
large industrial state like Illinois, maintain full-time research agencies to
provide public policy statements? If the answer is "Yes," then should not
the party organization be restructured to provide authority for these state-
ments? Or is it better to continue with the present arrangement, where an
extra-party organization issues statements that lack "party" authority and
are, therefore, not widely publicized?

The natural response of party leaders to a group that is sharply critical
of them is to criticize in turn, and, if possible, to thwart the growth of the
offending group. However, party leaders might also ask whether the exist-
ence of an extra-party organization of the type represented by the DFI
reflects basic problems in the party's appeal, leadership, and operations. Is
not the problem one of accommodation of the progressive elements into the
regular party structure, and might not this problem plague the Republican
party as well as the Democratic? To a certain extent, the Republican party
in the Chicago area seems to be but an extension of the downstate group;
contrariwise, the downstate Democratic party seems to be an extension of
the Chicago metropolitan party. Is there a chance that the existence of
intra-party rivalry may stir up the parties enough to make Illinois a two-
party state on a local as well as a statewide basis? Fundamentally, is intra-
party competition helpful to the party or harmful?
Concurrent with the regular political party operations, both independent organizations and pressure groups have played an important role in state and national politics. This paper is designed to supplement the discussions of the parties and their auxiliary groups by examining the organized efforts at participation by groups other than those of a purely partisan character. An analysis of the role of the citizen as an individual voter is not contemplated.

The real significance of the current trend of developments lies in comprehending the change in emphasis in the concept of what is meant by participation. While all of the programs which emanate from the various groups throughout the country and in the State of Illinois stress the importance of voting, the student of politics becomes immediately aware that the new “political participation” implies something more. Through professional associations, trade associations, unions, and independent organizations, the citizen is being prodded to take a more active interest and to play a greater role in the political affairs of his community, state, and nation. He is being urged to analyze issues, meet candidates and office holders, become familiar with the party structure and its leadership, and even participate actively in campaigns either as a candidate or as a worker for the party of his choice.

The legitimate interest of special groups in the political process is well recognized. Organized efforts representing many facets of our economic and social structures have long been brought to bear upon the legislative bodies of the country. Lobbying does and will continue to constitute an important segment of the operation of our democratic processes. These new educational programs aimed at greater participation in politics are not intended as substitutes for the accepted practices of lobbying, but rather as supplements to that process.

A detailed analysis of all the programs in Illinois, either actual or contemplated, is beyond the scope of this paper. In the sections which follow, an attempt will be made to generalize about some of the group efforts to encourage political participation. No prescribed order of discussion has been selected, but, in view of the nationwide publicity which the current business interest in politics has received, it seems appropriate to initiate this discussion of Illinois activities with this group.
Business

The history of American politics clearly demonstrates a long-standing interest by the business community in the political process. In fact, a student of politics might well assert that at the turn of the century the activity of business interests in politics had reached its zenith. Certainly the advent of the depression and the changes in the nature of corporate management since the 1930's produced a retrenchment of many business interests from the political arena. Except in a few states and localities, business leaders in recent years have assumed a more inactive role on the political scene and have resorted largely to financial contributions and lobbying techniques as their basic *modus operandi* for political participation. This attitude was reflected in the activities of many of the business trade associations. The Illinois Manufacturers' Association, unlike its Pennsylvania counterpart, has not played a direct role in the formulation of party policies in campaigns.

For the most part, Illinois businessmen, with only individual exceptions, such as the Williamson committee in Cook County, have carefully sought to dissociate themselves in a corporate fashion from partisan politics. Companies have meticulously avoided taking a stand on controversial issues unless their direct interests were clearly at stake. Even in these latter cases, many corporations have relied upon their trade associations to represent them or else have hurriedly rushed off a spokesman to Springfield at the last minute. As the political complexion of Illinois has changed through increased urbanization, many corporation representatives have experienced increased difficulty in securing a friendly hearing at Springfield. The political na"\i"vete of the new corporate managers has been in evidence, and their representatives have been puzzled when conscientious legislators have posed a question, "What has your company done to help me get elected?"

For whatever motive, the fact remains that the businessmen in Illinois have become increasingly aware of the importance of comprehending the operations and even machinations of practical politics. As a result, a veritable deluge of programs of practical politics has been developed, and the interested corporate executive in Illinois finds opportunities to expand his understanding of political activity.

The United States Chamber of Commerce developed an "Action Course in Practical Politics," which has evoked considerable interest throughout the nation. The course consists of a series of eight pamphlets which are designed to be utilized in discussion groups either by individual companies within their own structure or in unified efforts conducted by local chambers of commerce. In several cities throughout the state, local chambers of commerce have inaugurated seminars in practical politics based upon this course. A similar training program, which is available to individual companies, has also been designed by the Illinois Manufacturers' Association.
The Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry has developed a course of its own which seeks to bring together representatives of various companies to receive instruction as potential leaders of programs which their companies might seek to inaugurate. In addition to the formalized course, participants in the Chicago Association's program receive much bibliographical material and are exposed to speeches by political leaders of both parties in the State of Illinois.

Illinois businessmen have also been attracted to special courses conducted by the Effective Citizens' Organization. This private group sponsors intensive two-day sessions on college campuses, utilizing not only college facilities but members of the college teaching staff as well. Two such ECO programs have recently been completed in the Chicago area.

Some individual companies have developed programs of their own. Impressed by the apparent success of the program established more than a year ago by General Electric in New York, many Illinois businessmen are contemplating the undertaking of a company program in the area of practical politics. At the time of this writing, however, many such individual political training programs in Illinois remain in the planning stage. While the attitude that business should participate more actively in politics continues to grow, how best to accomplish this result remains obscure. Inevitably some educational programs will emerge, but whether or not mere edification will provide motivation remains a moot question.

Labor

In contrast to business, labor historically followed the advice of Samuel Gompers and remained out of politics in the early stages of its development. However, contemporary labor leadership has long realized the importance and effectiveness of interest in practical politics, a fact that is clearly demonstrable by the activities of the old Political Action Committee of the CIO and the more recent efforts of the Committee on Political Education which developed through the merger of the AFL-CIO. Furthermore, labor leaders have been astute enough to realize that mere voter education is not the most effective device by which to accomplish their political ends. As a result, the programs of COPE emphasize action and direct participation in the political process.

In Illinois, the unions have not been as immediately effective as have the United Auto Workers in Michigan. This does not mean, however, that Illinois labor leaders have not been active. In fact, in some of the more industrialized areas of the state, labor has legitimately earned the respect of the practicing politician.

Despite some claims to the contrary, there is little evidence that Illinois labor leaders have sought to operate directly through the vehicle of the political party. Instead, labor support has been offered to individual candi-
dates rather than to the party committees. In some instances this support has been in the form of financial contributions, while in other cases volunteers have been furnished to work in the precincts and assist in the general conduct of the campaign. In addition, labor has not hesitated to educate its membership on the issues through association publications, and to endorse selected candidates openly. Thus, the Illinois labor movement actively seeks the election of its friends and the defeat of its enemies.

The effectiveness of the role of organized labor in Illinois politics becomes more apparent every year. Candidates who have been elected with labor support feel a legitimate responsibility to their benefactors. At the time of this writing, there is little reason to doubt that Illinois labor will continue to intensify and sharpen its efforts in the area of political action. The pamphlets which are available from the AFL-CIO headquarters in Chicago on political action rank with the very best publications in the field to date.

**Agriculture**

The most powerful of the farm organizations in Illinois is the Farm Bureau. Since any member of a county Farm Bureau automatically becomes a member of the Illinois Agricultural Association, the state organization is more than a mere federation of county groups.

The IAA lobbies at Springfield and cooperates with the national organization in Washington. Members of the Farm Bureau are urged to vote and participate in the party of their choice. Positions on state issues are assumed through resolutions adopted in a state convention. The IAA position on these issues, including many referenda which are not directly concerned with farm problems, is published and circulated among the members. While individual candidates are not openly endorsed, members of the state legislature and the Illinois congressional delegation are “rated” on their votes on farm issues. Like labor, the Farm Bureau suggests that those who have “good” or “excellent” farm records deserve the farmers’ support.

In addition to the IAA and the county Farm Bureaus, both the Grange and the Farmers’ Union operate in Illinois. Neither of these latter groups, however, is as large or as effective as the IAA.

**League of Women Voters**

Operating in a nonpartisan fashion, the Illinois League of Women Voters, like its national counterpart, has sought to educate the public on issues and candidates. The League carefully seeks to avoid endorsing any particular candidate for office, but it has taken an active stand in support of issues that have appeared as referenda on the ballot.

The Illinois League has available for distribution a large number of books and pamphlets relating to Illinois politics and government. In addition, the League periodically issues statements on matters of current import.
The *Illinois Voter's Handbook*, published by the League, contains much valuable data relating to state election laws and requirements.

As a part of their program to enlighten the voter about candidates and issues, local divisions of the League frequently conduct nonpartisan political rallies. Candidates from both parties are invited to attend these public meetings and present their views on the issues involved in the campaign. The League also circulates questionnaires among candidates for office soliciting their opinions on specific questions. The results of these questionnaires are then published and made available for general distribution among the voters as an educational service. At all times the League strives for fairness in these presentations and remains independent from the point of view of either of the political parties. While the League may cooperate in general campaigns to get out the vote, its main function is educational, and its officers are prohibited from being associated with either political party in any official capacity.

**The Illinois Citizenship Clearing House**

Under the leadership of Judge Arthur T. Vanderbilt, a national organization known as the Citizenship Clearing House was established on the campus of New York University. Support from the Falk and Ford Foundations has enabled the national headquarters to establish regional or state affiliates throughout the country. The Illinois affiliate currently operates through the Institute of Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois.

Dedicated to the principle that "Better Minds Make Better Politics," the ICCH seeks to inspire college students to take a more active interest in the party of their choice. All the colleges of Illinois are welcome to affiliate with the ICCH, which serves as a clearing house of political information and affords statewide political participation and educational opportunities. Last year, for example, the ICCH sponsored an all-day meeting at Springfield where student delegates from participating schools were able to observe the legislature and hear addresses by state executive and legislative officials. Participating schools were later invited to nominate students for an internship experience in the state government. Student-oriented programs have been supplemented by special symposiums for faculty members and political leaders.

Beyond its own immediate programs, the ICCH encourages affiliate members to develop political participation programs on their own campuses. The total aim of the effort is to produce an interest in politics at the college level which will continue in later life.

**Other Groups**

Like other states, Illinois experiences political activity by professional associations, such as the legal, medical, and teachers' groups. Usually these
associations participate only sporadically, when specific issues before the state legislature have a direct bearing on their professional interests, and only by attempting to influence public opinion and, particularly, individual legislators.

An analysis of all the groups in Illinois which participate in one form or another in the political process constitutes an impossible task. We must recognize the existence of citizens' leagues, better government associations, the Illinois State Chamber of Commerce, and the Taxpayers' Federation of Illinois, all of which are engaged mainly in lobbying.

Conclusion

The role of special interest groups in Illinois politics should not be minimized. To date, four facets of political participation have been utilized by these organizations:

1. Direct attempts to influence the legislative process through lobbying.
2. Direct participation in political campaigns through the contribution of funds, workers, and services.
3. Indirect participation through educational programs aimed at their own members or the general public in support of their positions on issues, or through the endorsement of specific candidates.
4. Indirect participation through educational programs designed to interest their own members and associates in individually assuming more active roles in the political process.

Some special considerations need summarization. First of all, the future of all these educational programs remains indefinite. Business will need to take two steps to guarantee any success: management must assure employees that participation in politics will not be detrimental to their employment opportunities; and training programs must emphasize a bipartisan or nonpartisan approach. If business leadership envisions these programs as a counterforce to COPE, they are doomed to failure. Candidly speaking, business, labor, farm, and professional groups all pose a dilemma for themselves as they encourage greater political participation. On the one hand, they anticipate a return for expenditures on such programs, at least in the form of support for their interests. On the other hand, their programs may encourage greater activity by those who do not hold their point of view. Labor particularly has experienced this dilemma when, as in the Taft-Ferguson campaign in Ohio in 1950, a fight for principles caused it to support an inferior candidate.

Second, the attitude assumed by the regular party organizations toward those individuals who have been stimulated to greater participation and interest as a result of exposure to the programs of these various organizations is a vital consideration. Should the party regulars disdain the assistance of these new people, the programs will lose their vitality. On the other hand,
if party leaders welcome this reservoir of interested personnel, better parties and better candidates may result.

Third, all of these various efforts may serve to awaken a more vital interest in politics on the part of the citizens in general. A reduction in the public apathy toward politics might distress the politicians, but could strengthen the democratic process and help eliminate the feeling that "politics is a dirty business."

Finally, the long-range benefit which might be derived from these programs will, in large measure, depend upon good leadership and a continuing effort. The college and independent programs require continued financial support, and the business programs must not be a mere fad. At the same time, business, labor, farm, and professional groups must revitalize their own thinking to produce broad constructive programs, rather than assume only narrowly selfish positions or act in a negative manner.
Political parties in Illinois are minutely regulated by the state statutes. The structure of the parties is set forth in detail, and their test of membership, methods of nominating and electing candidates to public office, and convention machinery are specified in the laws. This statutory prescription provides the framework in which the formal and informal aspects of party action take place.¹

Membership in the Illinois Republican party is loosely defined, individually declared by requesting a Republican primary ballot. No test of party membership other than this is required. Membership can be ascertained only if one has access to the permanent registration forms deposited in the office of the county clerk or election board. Although the statute prohibits a person from changing his party affiliation for a 23-month period, he might never again support the party after a primary declaration.

**How Party Officers Are Chosen**

The “grass roots” officer of the party is the precinct committeeman in all parts of the state except Cook County. There the ward committeeman in the City of Chicago and the township committeeman in the remainder of the county serve as the party base. Committeemen are elected at the primary election, those from the downstate precincts for a two-year term, and those from Cook County for a four-year term. Thus, at the party primary the Republican voter elects the party worker.

These committeemen form the hard core of party organization, for it is upon them that the success or failure of the party’s effort depends. Mitigating against the urgency of strong party allegiance or discipline is the choosing of committeemen by election. Anyone presenting a petition signed by ten Republican voters in his precinct may have his name placed upon the ballot. If he is elected, he may or may not serve the party well. There is no way to remove him until the next primary. Republican committeemen are not under pressure to produce results to the same degree as are those of the Democratic party, and have in numerous instances been less vigorous or less bound to party discipline.

A somewhat different situation prevails in Cook County, for in Chicago precinct captains and workers in each ward are appointed by the ward committeeman, and precinct captains in the township organizations in the

¹ See the Appendix for a statutory digest applying to both parties.
rest of the county are appointed by the township committeemen. The appointed workers have a greater stake in the party organization and tend to work harder than those elected in the downstate areas. The organization in Cook County and Chicago tends toward more cohesiveness in the prosaic duties of precinct work than is evident downstate.

The statutes further provide for the election of other party officials, all of whom are less important, in the estimation of the author, than are the precinct, ward, or township committeemen.

Representative district committeemen are elected for a two-year term from all the representative districts except those in Cook County. Where the district is composed of three or more counties or parts of counties, a committeeman is elected from each county or part of a county: if the district is made up of two counties or parts of counties, three are elected for the district, two from the county or part of a county polling the largest number of votes in the primary. The former is illustrated by the 52nd district, which is composed of five counties, Jersey, Macoupin, Montgomery, Christian, and Shelby: the latter by the 39th district, Rock Island and Mercer counties. If the district comprises only one county, like the 36th district, Du Page County, three members elected from the district form the representative district committee. In Cook County, again the exception, township and ward committeemen in each representative district function as district committeemen. State central committeemen are elected for a four-year term at the primary, one from each congressional district, or 25 in all.

Although a representative committeeman or a state central committee-
man is elected from a relatively large electoral area, his importance as a party worker is limited. Most are unknown to the rank and file of the party, and they perform their functions unheralded. Here again it may be emphasized that the precinct, ward, or township committeeman mans the most active party groups.

Organization and Functions of Party Committees

The party officials elected in the primary are formed into a series of committees. The township committee, which consists of all the precinct committeemen in the township, functions only to determine the time and place for holding the biennial caucus for the nomination of candidates for office in those townships that do not use petitions or primaries for nominations. Many townships include only a single precinct, in which case the committeeman alone performs this function.

The municipal committee, composed of the precinct committeemen in downstate municipalities or the ward or township committeemen in Chicago and Cook County, performs a vital job for the party if the municipal elections are partisan. The municipal committee may become an important
factor in the party's activity in the state, and may even challenge the position of a county committee.

This latter group, the county central committee, is generally the most active functioning organization of the party, exercising vigorous control over party activities in the county. The success of Republican fortunes in a county may be determined by the effectiveness of the work of the committeemen and the leadership of the county chairman, who is the strongest individual in the party system. In fact, a county chairman who has the support of his committee, especially in a populous county, can determine the fortunes of nominees, local and state. The bailiwick of the county chairman is limited by the county boundaries, but in a populous county his control goes beyond the county, and in many instances his influence extends further than that of the chairman of the state central committee.

The number of functions performed by the county chairman adds to his political status. In a congressional district comprising more than one county, the county chairmen and the state central committeeman, who serves as chairman, make up the congressional committee. The importance this committee may have was shown in the election of 1958, when the Republican candidate for Congress in the 20th district died ten days before the election. The county chairmen met and put forth another candidate. In addition, county chairmen serve on the state senatorial district committees, which have the power to nominate a candidate in case of a vacancy. The powers accruing to the county chairman from his position on these committees, plus the fact that the Republican state central committee and its chairman have little effect in the counties, congressional districts, or senatorial districts, give him added influence. The existence and influence of the Republican County Chairmen's Association, a group not authorized by statute, also attests to the importance of these officials. Where county chairmen in small counties cooperate, they present a very strong force in party affairs, and in some instances may counter the influence of county chairmen from more populous counties, particularly since the chairmen of large, urbanized counties, such as Cook, St. Clair, Madison, and Peoria, are not noted for cooperation. It is a generally accepted idea that the Republican county chairman is a more powerful and important cog in the party machinery than is his Democratic counterpart.

The other local party organization is composed of all representative committeemen in each district. The representative committee decides 70 days prior to the April primary the number of candidates that the Republicans will nominate in the district for the state House of Representatives. Each party may nominate three under the cumulative voting procedures,
but few districts do.\textsuperscript{2} The usual number is two, and sometimes only one is nominated.

In light of the actual influence of the county chairmen, as noted above, the comment that the state central committee "has precedence over all other committees" is somewhat misleading. This committee, made up of the 25 state central committeemen, has formal supervision over affairs relating to statewide nominations and elections of party candidates. This function is, of course, highly significant, but often the county chairmen, especially when they cooperate, assume more authority over state elections than do the state central committee and its chairman. Evidence of the weakness of the state central committee is a bill (S.B. 887), apparently stemming from the Republican County Chairmen's Association, proposed in the 1957 General Assembly to abolish the office of state central committeeman, and provide instead a committee formed of county chairmen and, for Cook County, ward and township committeemen. The bill was not passed, but did get through a second reading in the Senate before it was stricken.

In short, the Republican state central committee, because of its formal power, has the potential for control over the party in Illinois, yet it has not used it. Its Democratic counterpart serves its party much more effectively in producing a cohesive, smoothly running machine.

**Party Conventions: Local, State, and National**

Since the primary is the major device for selecting nominees for public office in Illinois, the county and state conventions are unimportant and ineffective. However, they are still used. In the county conventions, each precinct committeeman possesses one vote for each Republican ballot cast in his precinct at the preceding primary, which he, in turn, casts for the officers of the county central committee and for delegates to the state convention. In many of the smaller county committees, the process of electing delegates to the state convention resolves itself into finding those that want to go, and it is usually fairly difficult to find enough to fill the allotment of one delegate per 500 votes or fraction thereof cast for the Republican party at the primary. In Chicago and Cook County the convention to elect delegates is a ward or township one.

The state convention has few functions to perform: making a state platform, which very few of the party workers ever see; nominating candidates for electors in the presidential and vice-presidential electoral college elections; nominating candidates for trustees of the University of Illinois; and selecting delegates-at-large and alternates for the national convention. Usually, these functions are perfunctory, and the leadership of the Governor, if he is a Republican, is in evidence.

\textsuperscript{2} For a more extensive discussion of this topic, see Professor Berdahl's paper.
Candidates for the Supreme Court districts and the judicial circuits are nominated in conventions, and here the basic operations toward the selection of candidates are sparked by the county chairmen. Their position is paramount and their influence vital. Qualifications of candidates mean little, but the posturing of the chairmen means a lot.

The state Republican party is a part of the national party, and chooses one woman and one man to be elected to the Republican national committee at each national convention. When Illinois has elected a Republican Governor or when its last electoral vote was Republican, the chairman of the state central committee also becomes a member of the national committee. The selection of the national committeeman and woman is left to the state's delegation to the national convention. Very often the delegation is controlled by the Governor, and therefore the members selected for the national committee represent his influence. Or, if one of Illinois' United States Senators is a Republican, he may be an influence. Often the national committeeman and woman are not outstanding leaders in the party, but instead represent blocs within the party then in control. Where a powerful national committeeman is found, his influence more often than not is exerted in the background. To a large degree the importance of any state’s representation on the national committee is in proportion to its electoral vote. Since Illinois possesses one of the larger electoral votes, it has influence, provided it has leadership to equal it.

For the 1956 Republican national convention, two delegates and two alternates were elected from each congressional district in Illinois. Candidates for delegate may support a known presidential candidate, or keep very quiet about their preferences. Individuals running for delegate may or may not be well known. Unless alerted by the county chairman, many precinct committeemen know little about the candidates for delegate. In some cases, even the county chairmen do not know them. The delegates-at-large and their alternates are most carefully selected in convention, and the cohesiveness of the whole delegation stems from the leadership of the Governor or Senator.

**Actual Leadership in the Republican Party**

During the past few years the leadership exerted by the state central committee has been rather weak. The committee is often unknown to the precinct committeemen, and does not inspire the party organization with leadership that would produce vital action or develop strong party harmony.

The resulting diffusion of authority has forced leadership of the party into the hands of strong state candidates or officials. The Governor, a Republican, exercises stronger leadership than any party official. Although his leadership is sometimes challenged, in general it may be assumed that a candidate for state office, as well as candidates for Congress and for the
United States Senate, is only infrequently nominated without either his nod or his tacit approval. When the Republicans are not in power, the candidate for the gubernatorial nomination may have enough personal appeal to dictate certain approval of other nominees.

To get authority over the party, the officeholder uses many devices to build prestige, such as putting county chairmen on the state payroll for giving key workers prestige jobs in repayment for work done. It has been reported that over half of the Republican county chairmen have state jobs. This condition is not found to the same extent in the Democratic party, where the leadership of the state central committee chairman is more effective. Strong leadership among Democratic legislators is also effective. Leadership from these two sources supplements and sometimes replaces the leadership of a Democratic Governor.

The Republican party in Illinois is not a strong, solid organization. Rather than having a well-developed party with responsibility located in a strong hierarchy, the Republicans have carved out enclaves of independent power that in many instances show internal conflict instead of cooperation. Within a county, strife for party control often takes precedent over the general party good. Where no single party leader is strong enough to crack down on dissident groups, chaos is common, even though it means the election of Democratic officials. No strong state leader has emerged to provide inspiring leadership. The Governor approximates it, but the structural weaknesses of the party prevent him from exercising strong leadership. In spite of this, the Republicans have been able to control vital state offices.
The formal structure of the Democratic party in the State of Illinois is an intricate network of committees, conventions, and officers, for the most part defined by statute. Party organization is closely tied to certain levels of election organization. The various committees, conventions, and officers do not, in theory, law, or fact, form a neat, pyramidal, hierarchical pattern, with lines of responsibility and authority clearly established. The most concrete example of this is that the members of the state central committee are elected directly by the primary voters in congressional districts, but each congressional district has its own so-called congressional committee, made up of all the chairmen of all the county central committees within its boundaries. Each county central committee, in turn, consists of all the ward, township, and precinct committeemen in the county, and elects its own chairman.

In other words, the pattern appears fairly neat and hierarchical up to the top of the pyramid — the state central committee. This committee in no sense emerges from the committees further down, and, indeed, it results from an entirely different process of selection. None of the committees has any legal power, control, or influence over any of the other entities, except in the sense that what one committee may decide influences the actions of another committee.

Informal Structure and Leadership

These brief comments only highlight that structure of the Democratic party wherein the leaders of the party must function. However, any discussion of the structure would not be complete without a few explanatory inquiries which convert this legal, impersonal structure into a living political party.

Democratic voting strength in Illinois is concentrated mainly in a few urban centers, and, although the party is definitely competitive on a state-wide basis, only infrequently has a Democratic state administration actually been elected. Consequently, there is not now, and usually has not been, an elected state official who can exert leadership over the state Democratic party like the present Republican Governor does over his party. Statewide leadership thus falls to the appropriate party officials — i.e., the state central committee — much more than it does in the Republican party.

1 See the Appendix for a statutory digest applying to both parties.
However, real leadership in the party tends to gravitate toward the leaders of the strong Democratic urban organizations, particularly to the leader of the Chicago organization. Thus, at the present time, the mayor of Chicago is generally recognized as the *de facto* leader of the Illinois Democratic party, with his leadership resting quite frankly on the number of votes the Chicago organization can amass in the general election and, especially, in the primary. It is even doubtful whether a Democratic Governor could seriously challenge the leader of the Chicago organization for leadership of the party, since in any primary contest — and nominations for all key offices are decided in the primary — the person who controls most of the votes will have the most to say about candidates. In fact, there has been a tendency to have very little competition in the Democratic primary; slate-making of nominees is done by the party leadership before the primary, and most potential candidates seem to feel that unless they get the nod from the organization, it is useless to run in the primary.

The leadership of the Chicago mayor is occasionally challenged by downstate leaders and even by dissatisfied Cook County Democrats. Two recent developments among Illinois Democrats — the formation of the Democratic Federation of Illinois and the establishment of a Democratic County Chairmen's Association — might be interpreted as, in the first case, a protest against "machine domination" of the party, and in the second, a move to strengthen and coordinate downstate county chairmen to balance the power of the Chicago organization. There is no evidence, however, that the Democratic County Chairmen's Association is, or will soon become, nearly as important as its Republican counterpart.

Most of the problems within the Illinois Democratic party arise from its bifurcation. Although some of the county Democratic organizations operate in highly competitive districts, the usual pattern has been for the Chicago and East St. Louis organizations to be almost always successful, and for most of the downstate organizations to be almost always unsuccessful. The weaker downstate organizations can get no patronage unless a Democratic Governor is elected, and in many cases their only function, besides the sending of a representative to the Illinois General Assembly, is to cut down the opposition majority so that state Democratic candidates will have a better chance. On the other hand, the strong urban organizations operate with a great deal of patronage at their disposal, and can maintain their strength without having a Democratic administration in Springfield. On a statewide basis, it is the piling up of large majorities by these strong organizations that permits state candidates to be elected.

This extreme difference in situation and consequently in function causes misunderstandings between leaders from the majority and minority areas,

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2 For a discussion of the DFI, see Professor Mason's paper.
and has brought about an informal understanding, usually adhered to, that nominees for state offices will be split evenly between Chicago and down-state. This kind of situation, of course, also exists within the Republican party, which is strong in less populated counties but weak in major urban areas.

The major problem, then, is: how can leadership be satisfactorily provided in the Democratic party on a statewide basis? Whether any state leadership can be provided, of course, depends largely upon the attitude of the strong urban organizations toward the rest of the state, and up to now no concentrated attempts to build up weak organizations and broaden the base, area-wise, of Democratic leadership has become evident.
APPENDIX

In Illinois there have been traditionally two specific primary laws: the General Primary Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., Art. 7, Ch. 46); and the Legislative Primary Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., Art. 8, Ch. 46).

Prior to this code, these various separate acts and provisions were interwoven and actually constituted a sort of patch-quilt in the Illinois election statute. The code now organizes and separates them in an orderly fashion. These statutes are generically regulatory and definitive.

Illinois courts have laid down a number of rules applying to party affairs, which, in the absence of legislation on the points involved, have the force of law. The courts are often called upon to rule on the constitutionality of these statutes governing the parties; and while they generally rule favorably on such statutes, these decisions must always be kept in mind as a potential source which could change the legal status of political parties in Illinois.

The general rule of the Illinois Supreme Court appears to be that the courts will follow a hands-off policy unless the courts' jurisdiction has been specifically conferred by statute or the matter in dispute is regulated by statute or, in the courts' view, some basic civil right is involved.

The prime source of the general, formal structure of both parties in Illinois is the General Primary Act, which spells out the various elected levels of each party.

STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
. . . each primary elector may vote for one candidate of his party for member of the State central committee for the congressional district in which he resides. . . .

WARD COMMITTEE MAN
. . . each primary elector in cities having a population of 200,000 or over, may vote for one candidate of his party in his ward for ward committeeman. . . .

TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE MAN
. . . each primary elector in counties containing a population of 500,000 or more, outside the cities containing a population of 200,000 or more, may vote for one candidate of his party for township committeeman. . . .

PRECINCT COMMITTEE MAN
. . . each primary elector, except in counties having a population of 500,000 or over, may vote for one candidate of his party in his precinct for precinct committeeman. . . .

This statutory digest applies to both political parties, and has been prepared by Mr. Tearney.
COUNTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE
The county central committee of each political party in each county, shall consist of
the various township committeemen, precinct committeemen and ward committeemen,
if any, of such party in the county. . . .

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
The congressional committee of each party in each congressional district shall be
composed of the chairmen of the county central committees of the counties composing
the congressional district, excepting that in congressional districts, wholly within the
territorial limits of one county, or partly within two or more counties, but not
coterminous with the county lines of all of such counties, the precinct committeemen,
township committeemen and the ward committeemen, if any, of the party represent-
ing the precincts within the limits of the congressional district, shall compose the
congressional committee. . . .

APPELLATE COURT DISTRICT COMMITTEE
The appellate court district committee of each political party in each appellate court
district shall be composed of the chairman of the county central committees of the
counties composing the appellate court district. . . .

MUNICIPAL CENTRAL COMMITTEE
The municipal central committee of each political party shall be composed of the pre-
cinct, township or ward committeemen, as the case may be, of such party representing
the precincts or wards, embraced in such city, incorporated town or village. . . .

POWERS
Each committee and its officers shall have the powers usually exercised by such com-
mittees and by the officers thereof, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Article.
The several committees herein provided for shall not have power to delegate any of
their powers, or functions to any other person, officer or committee, but this shall not
be construed to prevent a committee from appointing from its own membership proper
and necessary sub-committees.

The Supreme Court of Illinois in People by Brundage v. Brady, 302 Ill. 576 (1922) has stated in essence that since party committeemen selected
under the primary law are not public officers, the franchise and prerogatives
of the state are not involved in a determination of the right to hold such
position, and therefore the Attorney General can not maintain quo warranto
to test the right of claimants of such positions. This case is a personification
of the ruling case law in Illinois regarding the various political parties.

As found in the Illinois Business Corporation Act, minority stockholders
in private corporations have certain rights which may be enforced by the
courts. This is not true for a minority part of a political party within the
State of Illinois. A minority faction within this "association of voters . . .
which seeks to manifest its philosophies of Government" must function
within the party structure with no help or deterrence of court orders.
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