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THE EFFECT OF MODERNIZATION
ON ISLAM IN WEST
By possessing a belief in God, man demonstrates his own realization of a sense of purpose and direction for his life. Such belief removes from man the notion of his being alone, drifting in the infinity of space and time. This belief can be developed into a complex set of regulations whereby nearly every aspect of a man's life is directed. Thus, a man can find himself securely interwoven into the fabric of society, which he in turn helps to perpetuate by his own belief in its precepts. Yet, what happens when something comes along which causes that fabric to become torn or frayed? Is all lost save despair? Not usually, for if the fabric cannot be mended then surely it can be replaced. It is not intended that this discussion should remain abstract. An analogy will be drawn specifically to the religion of Islam in the modern era.

In July of 1798, Napoleon's army succeeded in defeating the Egyptian Mamluk forces at the Battle of the Pyramids. For the first time in over five hundred years, Christian Europeans had attacked the very center of the Islamic world and threatened the Muslim holy cities. Not only were these invaders European but they were the descendants of the Franks whom Salah al-Din had defeated in 1187. A modern, highly technologically developed Europe was on the move all over the world. Napoleon was finally forced out of Egypt not by the Egyptians but by Lord Nelson's destruction of the French navy. Indeed, the star of Great Britain had already begun its ascent and by the end of the First World War, it would dominate nearly the entire Middle East.

Such events seemed to tear into the very fabric of Islam. The Realm of Islam had fallen to infidels. Muslim scholars who had long revelled in past glories now faced the reality of intellectual and social poverty. It became clear that reforms had to be undertaken, but to do so a problem had to be recognized. To admit that a problem
existed was tantamount to declaring Islam to be imperfect. For centuries Muslims had been faithful, yet their belief had resulted in both economic poverty and foreign domination. Answers had to be found to explain the present state of affairs. Two extremes in outlook evolved. One position maintained that nothing was really wrong and that Islam ought simply to continue functioning as it had done for centuries. As the modern period progressed, this position became increasingly untenable. At the other extreme, there were Muslims who in seeing the poverty and oppression of their people could only come to blame Islam itself. Such individuals discarded their faith and searched for a new one to replace it. Of course, the minority of Muslims have fallen somewhere between these two extremes. It will be attempted in this paper to present a review of the efforts of modern Muslim scholars to explain the role of Islam in the modern world. This work will concentrate on Egyptian material drawn from both Western and Near Eastern scholars with emphasis on the period beginning with Muhammad Ali and proceeding through the 1952 Revolution.

With the Prophet Muhammad's flight to Medina in 622, the Islamic era began. A new socio-cultural entity had been born. In time it would develop into one of the world's three great monotheistic religions. Muhammad's ideas were somewhat radical to the native polytheistic Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula. The Prophet intended to change fundamentally the beliefs of these Arabs by his insistence on the existence of one and only one God. Many Arabs were reluctant to submit to the will of such a God. To do so would mean that one would have to give up his traditional way of life. In Arabia, any innovation was a risk, for in such a harsh, desert environment change could mean death. In order to force people to recognize the truth of Islam, death was proscribed for those pagan infidels who refused to convert. Thus, the Prophet established the precedent of extending the Realm of Islam by means of
the sword. As the empire expanded, it came into contact with the ideas of those whom it met. Initially, Islam was influenced by local Arab tribal practices but as time passed Sassanian, Persian, Jewish, Roman and Canon law all had to be examined and interpreted. The Koran had been given to mankind but its application to everyday life would involve centuries of work by theologians and jurists. Just as the early Arabs had been hesitant to accept the ways of Islam, so once established did Islam become slow to accept change. Its voice was authoritarian and discouraged popular initiative. It was not up to the people to express their own particular ideals but rather to do what they were told without question.

In the Umayyad period (661-750) Islamic jurisprudence was organized and refined. It was not yet codified but continued to grow until finally certain distinct schools of law could be discerned. During the Umayyad period, it was established that no personal interpretation of how one could act was to be valid if the subject had been discussed in the Sunna of the Prophet or in the Koran. Thus, the caliph was legally bound to the precepts of Islam which were in turn to be formulated by the Ulema. Depending on the disposition of the Ulema, Islam could be stagnant or vibrant. In pre-Islamic times disputes had been arbitrated by hakams whose decisions were largely based upon common legal customs of a particular region and were referred to as sunna. The Umayyad dynasty retained the office of the hakams but changed their title to Kadi and left their appointment up to the region's governor. Thus a change was effected so as to maintain the office of the hakams in a way which would conform to the designs of the Islamic government. The Umayyads, as well as the Abbasids, were able to confront the Persian and Byzantine empires in such a fashion so as to be able to derive from the experience a strengthening of Islam. An alteration of Arabic word usage was caused by the addition of Greek philosophy in order to accom-
mediate new concepts into the language. Eventually, after a long line of rationalists, some of the more salient aspects of Greek philosophy itself were accepted and standardized under the guidance of al-Ghazzali (1057-1111). Islam, although true to the traditional Arab's reluctance to change, did in fact effect change as it grew into a world power.

Islam's initial military successes were awesome. In a little over a hundred years, the Middle East, North Africa and Spain had been conquered. Constantinople had been besieged and the preparations for an invasion of France were nearly complete. Yet, the tide was turning. A lot of land had been conquered, but effective control was still lacking as revolts plagued the empire. Rivalries between differing factions arose, sapping the dynasty's strength. Finally, in 1099, Christian Europe staged a successful offensive and Jerusalem fell to infidels. The struggle was nothing new for Islam and Christianity had been warring since the days of the Prophet. During most of that period, the Arab armies had been the more victorious of the two archenemies. Yet, suddenly Jerusalem had been captured by Christians who would control it for nearly a century. Salah al-Din in 1187 finally retook Jerusalem but the respite for Islam was short-lived. In the early 1200's, the Mongolian invasion began and in it Islam faced a long, hard struggle for its own existence. During this period of internal hardship, Islam spread rapidly as if to counter the tarnished image which Islam now possessed.

It appeared to some that Islam would produce nothing but intrigue and war. If Islam was to create a better society, then some degree of peace and prosperity would have to be established. Throughout the 1300's, decline set in as the Mongols under Timur continued to wreak havoc while an awakening Europe began to flex its muscles.

Under the Ottomans, Islam was able to restore for at least a short time much of her past prestige. In 1453, Sultan Mohammed II was able to take Constantinople. At last, the Byzantine empire was defeated and the eastern gate to Europe was opened. Unfortunately for Islam,
the time for the conquest of Europe had passed. Although eastern Europe had been conquered, central and western Europe was now strong enough to defend her own gates. After the failure of the siege of Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman empire fell into serious decline.

The French were moving into North Africa. Czarist Russia moved to further encroach upon Islam's northern border while Austria approached from the west. As Europe moved out expanding and conquering new lands and peoples, the Islamic world became increasingly isolated. Since Vasco de Gama had discovered the trans African route to the Orient, trade through the Middle East had been decreasing. In Egypt the Ottomans had imposed heavy taxation, had nearly wiped out the beginnings of industrialization, had reduced commerce by high custom duties and allowed the irrigation system to fall into disrepair. Egypt which had once been a flourishing intellectual center for the entire Muslim world was crushed by Turkish policies. Islam had survived for over a thousand years. It had played the prince and now it was to play the pauper.
CHAPTER II

After having reviewed the political evolution of Islam, attention will now be focused on what exactly Islam is or at least purports to be. According to Muslim traditions, God has revealed to mankind how to act in righteousness several times throughout history.¹ Yet each time, man has strayed from the true path and become corrupt. Finally, under Muhammed an uncorruptable version of the truth of man's being was revealed for all of the world to accept. Indeed, to be a Muslim means that one is an accepter of or a submitter to the truth of the words of God as transmitted by his Prophet Muhammed.² The central reason for belief in Islam is that by adhering to the revelation of God through Muhammed, one will reach Paradise.³ Bound up with such notions of salvation are the equally strong ideas that mankind is to be united under one world religion.⁴ This does not mean that Islam refuses to tolerate other religions but simply maintains the righteousness of its own position. At times conversion has come at sword point but then each of the major monotheistic religions have had their periods of military expansion whereby the conquered either lived by the newly imposed laws or were killed. Islam has never been a passive religion. It is active and seeks to define all aspects of a man's life by his relation to God. In its traditional form Islam is highly individualistic stressing a personal relationship with God.⁵ A Muslim lives with God by the will of God.⁶ It is thus impossible for Islam to be divorced from everyday actions.⁷ It is God who pushes man to live and act but God never pushes a man beyond that man's strength.⁸

Islam in practice is derived from two major sources which are iman (faith) and din (religious practice).⁹ The form or structure of these religious sources is determined by Islamic law. Islamic law is based on three points which are: the Koran, the traditions of the Prophet and consensus of the community.¹⁰ Shacht went on to expand this basis into four sections which are: the Koran, the Sunna (traditions) of the
Prophet, Ijma (consensus) of the Companions (community scholars) and included Ijtihad (the method of reasoning by analogy). Traditional Islamic belief maintains that the Quran is indeed the truth and is to be followed without question. It is perfect and unchanging. The Sunna of the Prophet are those traditions which were recorded by the associates of the Prophet as to what he said concerning various issues. Ijma is that way of living which the people as a whole accepted to be just and proper under the guidance of the Prophet. Ijtihad is a method of independent reasoning so as to determine the position of Islam on certain issues not dealt with by the Quran or the Sunna of the Prophet. Traditionalists reject this last position and hold that it is wrong to use reason independently of the direct wording of the primary sources. Such use of independent reasoning was popular in the early ninth century in the Mu'ta zilah movement and later with the Ash'arites. Over the centuries as traditions became more firmly established Ijtihad (open interpretation) gave way to taklid (derived interpretation). Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728) was one of the few scholars who permitted some open interpretation. Even so, such notions had to be in strict accord with the Sunna of the Prophet and the Quran. The unfortunate result of the closing of the gates of Ijtihad was that creativity in religious exegesis became so limited that new or unique problems were unsolvable since they had not been considered before and thus there was no precedent for action.

Eventually, the system became exceedingly legalistic with interpretation of the law left to scholar-jurists. These legal specialists developed and refined Islam in part so as to meet the great influx of converts. Slowly, these jurists developed their own particular conventions as to their views on the interpretation of the law. Each generation would add its own renderings of the law, with no clergy to set down official doctrine, it would have seemed likely for Islam to disintegrate into a disunited religion of varying sects. Such was not to be
the case. About the beginning of the ninth century, Shafi'i (707-819) who was one of the greatest scholar-jurists moved to secure Islam in its pristine form. He attempted to put the entire legal basis of Islam on the Sunna of the Prophet. Although largely successful, the consensus of the scholars of each generation continued to have some freedom of interpretation. Eventually as each generation looked to the passing one for guidance of action, the consensus solidified into increasingly narrow decisions concerning the law. What was there that the past Ulama had not considered? Surely those closest to the Prophet's time best understood his words. From such attitudes, a rigid orthodoxy evolved, over the centuries, four major orthodox schools of thought evolved being: the Hanafi, the Malaki, the Shafi'i and the Hanbali. Each school differed over how lenient or strict it would be in certain applications of the law. Of course, there was a major split in Islam between the Sunnite and Shi'ite orders but the ramifications of that split will not be considered in this paper.

Thus, Islam evolved into a world religion. By adhering to the Shariah (law), the Muslim community or Umma was itself fulfilling the will of Allah. So long as the Ulama was able to meet the challenges of its particular period, the Umma was strong and vibrant. Generations of scholar-jurists worked to ensure that the truth of God's revelation to Mohammed would remain unaltered. Each generation received the traditions and faithfully passed them on to the next one. Nothing could be added or detracted from the perfect faith which they possessed. What was good or bad in life had been legislated long ago so that creative theological reasoning fell into disuse to be replaced by a structured, well-ordered existence. The scholar-jurists who had once used their minds to determine the proper relation of God to man were out of a job. They had accomplished their task and what were apparently needed were guardians who would ensure that the law would be followed in its proper form. Philosophic questioning had merged with theology to produce dogma.
The law was set; it could not be changed or at least so it appeared.

In reality, the law was inherently flexible enough to allow change since most of its prescriptions were in the form of general rulings. Yet the Ulema had become so dogmatic and adverse to new adaptations that the past became preferred to the present. Indeed, sufism arose in reaction to the rigidity of such dogma. Sufism proved only to be an escape from the problems of society and was ineffective in creating a progressive Islam. To reopen the gates of ijtihaad and to revitalize the concept of ijma in the modern period would require an enlightened Ulema capable of rendering the law in regards to modern conditions, yet still in accordance with the Sunna of the Prophet. The risk of having Islam declared imperfect would be great. For ijtihaad to be resurrected without reducing the sanctity of the Shariah which already exists, an Ulema of scholar-jurist skilled in both spiritual and secular wisdom must evolve to meet the challenge. The task, as will be shown, has been started but its successful completion is as yet far from becoming a reality.
CHAPTER III

It may be asked why the year 1798 was chosen as a starting point for the modern period in Egypt. Surely Egypt and the Islamic world had never been completely cut off from the West. Trade had not halted and travel through perhaps perilous was still possible. The Ottoman empire although weak and somewhat shrunken was far from rolling over into the grave. The Nile continued to flood each year and the Sultan continued to sit before his court. Yet the world was changing and changing fast. The industrial revolution had already begun in the West, whereas the East had long been the intellectual superior of its Western brother, by the 1800’s Europe had succeeded in combining the resources of the mind with those of the land to produce a growing science oriented society. Advances in technology were soon to be so great that science would become a real and present danger to organized religion. The Near East had few natural resources and was thus not able to advance industrially with Europe. The Islamic world continued in its traditional patterns of life while the Christian West faced political and religious revolution. In 1798, the West marched to conquer the East.

When Napoleon seized Egypt, he moved not only to possess it as conquered territory like Augustus had but rather moved to Hellenize it after the manner of Alexander. Like Alexander, Napoleon brought his scholars and tactical advisors into the field with him. He had soon defeated the Mamluks and had become master of Egypt. To the average fellah, not much had changed. One foreign ruler had been replaced by another. Indeed, Egypt had not known independence since 525 B.C.E. when it had been conquered by the Persians. 1 For millennia Egypt had been ruled by foreigners. In the Mamluk-Ottoman period foreign military elites had ruled through native religions and merchant leaders. 2 One exception to traditional dominion was that Napoléon instituted reforms in the Egyptian government by way of working through native elites.
Instead of appointing a completely French hierarchy, he tried to put
native Egyptians into ruling positions. Unfortunately the Egyptians
were unaccustomed to self-rule and preferred the old Turkish-Mamluk or-
der to be reinstated. 3 Instituting his code Napoleonic, Bonaparte moved
to reform the military and to set up municipal councils or divans com-
posed of three ulama, three merchants and three local leaders. 4 It is
possible that Napoleon's reforms may have been more effective if his
tenure in office had not been so short. By 1801, the remainder of the
French forces were removed from Egypt as the British under Nelson and
the forces of Selim III under his son and one Muhammad Ali moved to
attack the French position. Lasting reform had failed but its seed re-
mained waiting for the winter rains to fall.

By 1806, Muhammad Ali, a Turk by birth, had successfully maneuvered
himself into a position of military and political control of Egypt. 5 In
1811, he wiped out the last vestige of Mamluk control. He had become
absolute ruler of Egypt. It seems that he had designs on becoming sultan
and establishing a dynasty of his own. 6 To succeed in building one's
own empire, one must possess a military force capable of backing up one's
orders. Muhammad Ali recognized this fact. He had worked with British
forces against the French army and so knew something of European mili-
tary power. It was his apparent intention to secure his position in
it by the modernization of his army. Muhammad Ali utilized French and
Italian military personnel, who had remained after Napoleon's hasty
departure in 1801, to train his own troops. 7 He realized the importance
of modern technology to an efficient, powerful army. He sent hundreds
of students to study in European schools. 8 Between 1813 and 1848,
Muhammad Ali had sent 339 students sent to Europe with most of them
studying in France. 9 Of these students, some 310 concentrated on studies
in industry and engineering. 10 This higher education was secular and
was intended to be used for secular purposes. If Muhammad Ali was to be
a great man then Egypt would necessarily have to be great as well to
reflect his greatness. Muhammed Ali seems to be a prime example of how a military regime is capable of inducing modernization on an underdeveloped country. He had nearly complete control over the Egyptian economy. Improvements were made on the irrigation system and it was expanded. Muhammed Ali moved to set up industries throughout Egypt. By the 1820's, Egypt's economic output was competing with European goods. Unfortunately, Egypt was unable to long stand against European businesses. No protective tariffs were established to safeguard the growth of Egypt's infant industries. Finally, by 1838, whatever hope for Egyptian commercial development which had existed was crushed by the Anglo-Turkish commercial convention of 1838 which favoured European goods. In 1840, the power of Muhammed Ali to direct Egypt's destiny was ended as the British forced him to capitulate and recognize Turkish sovereignty. His attempt at empire had been confounded by the parties to the Convention of London of 1840 who did not want to see the Turkish empire fall into his hands. Although Muhammed Ali had largely failed to achieve his goal of creating an independent Egyptian empire, he had succeeded in setting the precedent that European technology could be applied within a traditional Islamic framework. He also furthered the notion that if reform was to be instituted, it would have to come from an individual with strong military backing. The proper guardians of society, the Ulama, tended to be composed of reactionary elements unable or unwilling to effect modernization within society. A strong central leader would continue to be a necessary predicate for change.

Muhammed Ali was followed by one of his sons, Abbas Pasha. Abbas ruled until 1854 when he was succeeded by another of Muhammed's sons, Sa'id. While Abbas had been anti-European, Said proved to be pro-European. He had been educated in Europe. It was under his administration that de Lesseps was given the right to begin work on the Suez canal. In 1863, the reins of Egyptian government fell into the hands
of Ismail, another of Muhammad Ali's descendants. Ismail attempted to restore Egypt's sovereignty and succeeded in becoming largely independent of the Sultan. In 1867, he proclaimed himself, khedive or ruler of Egypt. He moved to modernize the country through various means. New irrigation canals were dug. Docks and harbours as well as railways and telegraph lines were constructed. Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez were provided with gas and waterworks. Ismail also furthered the cause of education by raising the number of schools from some 195 in 1863 to 4,017 in 1890. Under his reign, for the first time in Egypt, there were founded a girl's school, a medical school and a military academy. The number of students (279) studying abroad during the period between 1849-1852 was slightly less than the number of similar students (339) in the period of Muhammad Ali (1813-1848). It is interesting to note that the number of industrial and engineering students dropped from 310 to 149 while the number of medical students increased from 15 to 121.

During Ismail's reign, the legislative assemblies continued to function. The matters brought before them were concerned with such things as agricultural problems, regulation of commerce, reformation of the judiciary, compulsory primary education, regulation of the pension system for government employees, and revision of the electoral system. By 1871, these parliaments had begun to show some independent authority but were still largely subservient to the will of the khedive. Khedive Ismail had wrought much good but it had been expensive. His military campaigns had drained Egypt's treasuries of what little remained from his prodigous and ostentatious spending habits. In 1870 Ismail attempted to void part of his financial debt to European creditors. His action resulted in these creditors bringing the powers of their respective governments to bear on the Turkish sultan to whom Ismail was still liege. Sultan Abd al-Hamid II then deposed Ismail
and replaced him with his son, Tawfiq. Tawfiq would reign for almost twelve years, but he would reign as a puppet of the Imperial British government.

In 1881 on the thirteenth of September, Colonel Ahmed Urabi was defeated at Tell at Kabir by the British forces of General Wolseley. Unlike the French some eighty years earlier, the British came with an invitation. It seems that Khedive Tawfiq had feared for his position and had called for British support against the insurgents. Ismail had created opposition against the central government when he had refused to reseat the Assembly of Notables in 1879. That action resulted in cries for a new more representative government by such leaders as al-Attar and al-Muwallihi. Secret societies, some of which would later grow into full-fledged political parties, arose in opposition to the Egyptian government. These societies were well trained in Near Eastern politics keeping no written records by which to be incriminated. Unfortunately, such tight security measures also resulted in little evidence for the historian to base any notion of such societies importance in Egyptian government. Jacob Landau theorizes in his book, Parliaments and Parties in Egypt, that such groups, sometimes using Masonic lodges as covers, became the nuclei of future nationalist parties. It is known that the National Party, al-hizb al-watani, was formed by army officers in 1879. The party was strongly anti-British. Another party founded in the same year was called Young Egypt. Its policy tended to blame Egypt’s problems on her lack of proper educational institutions. From 1871 to 1879, Jamal al-Afghani lived and taught in Egypt. Afghani saw the danger of Western domination and moved to prepare the Islamic world against foreign oppression. He saw the West as a real threat yet recognized the value of western technology. He stressed the point that the Islamic people must act openly and not sit waiting for God’s helping hand. Jamal taught the proper use of the press and how
to act effectively in the political sphere. Indeed, to some people, al-Afghani would be the "prime mover" in the 1882 Revolt.

The support for Urabi's Revolt came from army and religious sectors. The army seems to have been upset over the appointment of Turkish and Albanian officers regardless of the seniority of native Egyptian officers. There is some question as to whether or not Urabi was merely a tool in the hands of others who surrounded him. His power rested largely in his charismatic appeal and when the situation became difficult he proved to be lacking in ability. He failed to control internal dissent and showed military incompetence in the field. What Urabi finally succeeded in doing was causing Egypt to be occupied, something which neither the British nor the Egyptians for the most part wanted. It is ironic that the British worked to modernize the Egyptian army into a cohesive unit which ultimately resulted in its ability to seize power in 1952.

By 1882, the British had effectively occupied Egypt and largely controlled it. Yet such a presence served to further the consolidation of the Egyptian leadership against the British. Rather than fight one another, a common enemy had arisen against which the Muslim factions could direct their energies. It became a goal that the infidels should be driven from the land. Even so, such a common aim did not quiet all dissent as various religions and secular elements struggled for power. The press which had been established by the now banished al-Afghani, continued its assault against the government. Even with such an active press, the struggle remained in the hands of the elite of Egyptian society and had little impact on the common fellahin. The British were content to see Egypt continue in its traditional agriculture based economy. In particular, Egypt's abundance of cotton was to be put to use in the textile mills back in England. The British also permitted the General Assembly of Notables to exist but allowed it very little real power.
Under the British, Egyptian nationalism grew in strength and influence. The exact origins of Egyptian nationalism are too complex to be related in this paper, so only those aspects dealing with Egypt in the modern period will be reviewed. Nationalism was perhaps not such a foreign notion to Egypt as it was to other Muslim regions. To be bordered on two sides by seas and on a third side by a desert, easily leads a people to a common identification. Most of Egypt's population has been further restricted to the banks of the Nile and thus creating a similar lifestyle for most of that population. Egypt also developed its own dialect of Arabic. Indeed, Egypt was not even considered to be truly Arab by many Muslim scholars who identified it with its Pharonic tradition. In negotiations with the British during World War I, Sherif Hussein of Mecca declared the Red Sea to be the western border of Arab lands. Yet, as will be discussed later, one of the central themes of Islam is the united brotherhood of all Muslims which is a nation that seems to conflict with the one of independent Arab states. The ideal was the caliphate as the central government of the Islamic world. The empire of the Ottomans was crumbling and a replacement had to be founded. Al-Afghani had preached a form of Muslim nationalism in calling for the creation of a united Muslim state. Such notions of pan-Arabism as they came to be termed, were predominant for nearly a century to come. Nasser's United Arab Republic was an attempt at the creation of such a state. Whatever form Islamic nationalism took, it still differed markedly from European nationalism in that religion played a central role. The religious elements refused to allow the sanctity of the Shariah to be replaced by the sanctity of the state. Religion was never separated from the state as it was in the West.

Jamal al-Afghani was followed by his student, Muhammed Abduh, in the role of working toward a restored independent Arab state. Abduh had been a member of the Young Egyptian Movement and had studied under
al-Afghani. Egyptian in birth, Abduh seems to have been more concerned with an Egyptian revival of culture when compared to al-Afghani. He was exiled after the failure of the Urabi Revolt. From Paris, Abduh wrote sharp denunciations of the British occupation and called for Egypt to be returned to Egyptians. It seems that by 1888, the British had come to the conclusion that Abduh was causing more problems outside Egypt than he would within it and so allowed him to return. In Egypt he was clearly under the thumb of the British but he reasoned that he could be more help to his people within the country. Abduh was able to maintain his hopes for reform in spite of suppression. From his position as kadi or judge, he moved to reinstate a limited application of ijtihad. His religious reforms will be considered later. Abduh believed that when a nation abandons its intellectual pursuits and forgets justice then it falls into a degraded and despised position among the nations of the world. To counter such a fall, Muhammed Abduh pushed for a literary and scientific revival in Egypt. He wrote articles on wide ranging topics for numerous journals. In 1900, he founded the Society for the Revival of the Arabic Sciences. In 1899, he was elected to be a member of the First Legislative Council. In his role as a legislator he moved for state improvements particularly in education for children wherein were his hopes for the future. Indeed, education was one of the few areas where the national assemblies had some power. Bills for reforms in the educational system were quite common. In the area of secular higher education, some 289 students were sent abroad between 1883 and 1919. It is interesting to note that whereas before the British occupation most Egyptian students had gone to France, now most students went to Great Britain. An even more remarkable change is seen in the shift from technical studies to the humanities. Between 1813 and 1882, some 597 students had studied in technical fields with only 21 students in the humanities. Between 1883 and 1919, only
74 students were engaged in technical fields while some 215 students studied in the humanities. Of course, it should be noted that technical studies often meant military course work which the British would want to control closely.

Muhammad Abduh had pushed for many reforms but had realized few. By the common people, Abduh was seen as a westernizer. To many people, he was a kafir being a traitor to his religion. Eventually, most of his reforms would be implemented to the benefit of the state. As Mufti of Egypt, which will be discussed at length later, he had broken the ice of religious reform and shown that Islam could survive change and yet not betray its traditions. He succeeded in instilling in those who surrounded him the notion that a better Egypt could be effected and that a modern Egypt could be a reality. Unfortunately, much of his zeal for improvement in society was to be buried with him when he died in 1905.

During the next ten years of British control, Western acculturation became increasingly pronounced. The military continued to be directly infused with Western culture through British administration. Commercial and penal law was revised along Western styles by World War I. After Abduh, there was little strong leadership in Egypt and apathy seemed to prevail as voter turn out for elections often dropped to virtually zero. Paris was more politically active in Muslim affairs than Cairo. In 1911 in Paris, Arab activist students including Egyptians such as Ais Ali founded al-Patat. In 1913, the mostly Syrian composed Arab Congress met in Paris. Political parties back in Egypt were slowly becoming more active. British occupation proved to be a period of improvement largely in the field of material prosperity as well as some advances in education. Such growth helped to add new members to the ranks of political organizations. Foreign domination became a central issue as the enlightened Egyptian attempted to discern just what was happening to his world. The National Party which had been around since 1879, saw as its goal the
elimination of foreign control. Religion proved a convenient and useful tool for promoting such an end. In 1913, Kitchener as governor of Egypt reorganized the Assembly of Notables and created a new assembly with much more power than its predecessor. It was simply called, The Legislative Assembly.

In 1914, Egypt's progress toward social improvement was halted as World War I broke out. Egypt was suddenly made an official British protectorate. Response to the British take over was hostile particularly among the peasants who were inflamed by the notion of infidel rule. So long as the semblance of joint rule had been maintained with the Khedive, the British presence could be tolerated. For the duration of the war, active resistance against the British was almost impossible. With the cessation of hostilities in Europe, anti-British sentiments quickly surfaced. Comments such as, "Today the Crusades have come to an end" by Marshall Allenby as he entered Jerusalem only served to aggravate the entire situation. The same Allenby was later to become ruler of Egypt. If each period of time is to be marked by a certain dominating person, then for the post World War I period it would be Sayid Zaghlul for Egypt.

After the war, public opinion cemented against the British with the Nafid party becoming the prominent political party. Its leader was Sayid Zaghlul who had carried on an intensive public relations campaign both inside and outside of Egypt. Zaghlul was able to assemble enough popular support to force Britain's hand. The situation actually became so volatile that the British chose to give up Egypt as a protectorate rather than commit themselves to open fighting. Zaghlul was not without native opposition and was finally exiled for a short time at the end of 1921 as the British backed one of his rivals, Adli Pasha. Indeed, the Nafid rejected the Declaration of Independence of 1922 as a sham while the Independence Party received much popular support for its work on
the Declaration. The political parties had come a long way. They were still basically religious in their views but the tendency seemed to be favoring an increasingly a-religious position. Zaghlul was clearly a secularist in his political attitude. He was also one of the first to publish his own views for government before an election after the manner of the West. For the first time, political parties in Egypt were doing more than just talking.

On February 28, 1922, the Declaration of Independence of Egypt was proclaimed and on the next day Ahmed Fuad who would become king later in March called for the organization of a constitutional government. A year later on April 19, 1923, the Egyptian constitution was adopted. It was based on the Belgian Constitution of 1830. It, in principle, created a constitutional monarchy. It was intended to guarantee free press, equal education, equality before the law, liberty of assembly, and Islam as the state religion. The British were still in military control of the country and Fuad moved to become despot of Egypt. By 1930, the Legislative Assembly had become a rubber stamp for Fuad as the Wafd fell from power. Before Zaghlul’s death in 1927, some work had been accomplished such as better administration of the cotton market and a reduction of malaria cases. Between 1920 and 1936, the number of students studying abroad rose to 1450 of whom over a thousand went to Great Britain. The Bank Misr which had been founded in 1920 continued to offer some protection for Egyptian industry. Even so, the government remained far from stable. Between 1923 and 1942, no cabinet held its position for a full term of office. The Wafd returned to power in 1936 with Fuad’s death. Its return was marked by its “blue shirts” who terrorized opponents and announced their superiority over all other parties. Opposition mounted against the Wafd and it was defeated in the 1938 election. During the next ten years Egypt was placed on an emergency footing as the world was once again ravaged by war.
A war-weary, land-ravaged Europe emerged from World War II. The
great colonial empires were soon to become a thing of the past. Not
only had Europe lost its military capacity to hold on to its territories
in case of revolt but the people in those territories had been shown
that the colonial Goliath was far from invincible. British control in
the Middle East was tenuous at best. By 1948, the British had with-
drawn from Palestine. Military advisors remained for a time in Iraq and
Jordan but possessed little actual authority. In Egypt, the British
retained some political control although the situation was decaying
rapidly. Egyptian nationalism was once again on the move. As King
Farouk continued to acquiesce to British demand, the Egyptian military
elite became divided and certain factions began to organize against him.
The Egyptian army had been humiliated in the Palestine War and now
moved to pin the blame on Farouk's ineptitude as well as on the British
presence. Meanwhile, the British continued to flout their arrogance
in spite of their diminished power. Hatred of the British had only
increased since the failure of liberalism with World War I and the sub-
sequent decline of European power. The modern Western world had come
to the point of needing to enforce its allegedly enlightened rule from
the muzzle of a gun. The Arab on the other hand was seen by the West
as an uncouth, unkempt, uncivilized bedouin. Such a creature was un-
important except as a means to gain an end. Arab reactionary elements
such as the Muslim Brotherhood responded to such treatment by becoming
increasingly hostile to all foreign elements. Any liberal Egyptian who
held sympathies for the West was seen by these fanatics to be traitors
to the Muslim cause. The West seemed to be asking the Muslim world
to give up its traditions and become modern yet the West failed to offer
any viable substitute for the culture that would be lost in the process.
The Muslims in turn preferred to place the blame for any and all problems
on the West. Most Muslims failed to realize or cared not to be
concerned with the many cultural differences between the man from South Hampton and the man from Bues. The West for its part none too successfully understood the complexities of the Islamic East. It appeared that no open resolution of differences would be reached by way of cooperation. In 1952, control of Egypt's destiny was placed into the hands of Egyptians for better or worse. King Farouk was deposed and being the last ruler of the dynasty of Mohammed Ali, "foreign" rule came to an end in Egypt.

The Free Officer's Rebellion succeeded where Urabi's Revolt had failed seventy years earlier. The Wafd, King Farouk, and many army officers had blatantly stooped to corruption. Attempts to prosecute leading members of that Wafd in early 1952 failed. Certain members of the military moved to effect an overthrow of the government. According to Naguib in his autobiography, the revolution had been in the works since the Arab defeat in Palestine in 1948. Its membership was largely composed of younger army officers dissatisfied with their superiors who bowed to the status quo. On January 26, 1952, fires set by arsonists broke out in many parts of Cairo resulting in open rioting against the Wafd government. Over the next several months, tensions continued to mount and violence became more frequent. Finally, on July 23, 1952 at 3:00 A.M., seven army officers headed by Gamal Nasser took over the Army General Head Quarters in Abbassia. By taking control of the army, these men had in fact taken control of Egypt. Three days later, King Farouk was forced to leave the country. A provisional regency was established for one of his infant sons. At that point, it was thought that to maintain the monarchy in name would reduce opposition. Actually, opposition proved to be nearly non-existent. The planning for the revolution had been efficient and almost every governmental agency had been seized by or acceded to the new regime. The coup had been practically bloodless with casualties being extremely light. The concept of such a
military elite ruling Egypt was far from new to the average Egyptian. Yet, there was one thing different about these men who had taken control for they seemed intent on reforming the country to the benefit of the people rather than in pursuit of personal gain. Naguib who was the only one of the old general staff to be retained, was set up as president. His influence was limited and by his own account, he was more of a figure head set up to lend authority to the movement than anything else. The Free Officers controlled the government, but whether they could hold it long was another question. With the apparent removal of a strong central authority, every petty faction clamoured for attention. Momentum for revolution once started is difficult to stop and such was the case in Egypt. By January of 1953, it had become necessary to abolish all political parties and to purge the army of dissentors. It was important for the welfare of the country that civil war be prevented. Through a combination of Islam and nationalism, the leaders of the revolution were able to secure their position and to gain support from the masses. In a limited sense, self-determination had finally been restored to Egypt. A feeling of national pride could now be propagated within the Egyptian people. In relation to modernisation, the military regime unfortunately found itself in the same predicament as its predecessors. How could Egypt be modernized (i.e. utilize modernize technology) and still retain its cultural traditions? Were the two incompatible?

The Free Officer's Revolution was composed largely of Islamic fundamentalists although it included within its ranks some members of the Muslim Brotherhood and a few Marxists. To face modernization, the drifting sort of non-concerned attitude had to be replaced with patriotic commitment to the state. The notions of past glory were maintained so long as they did not lead to a defeatist attitude concerning the present. It is clear that the strongly religious elements in Egypt would have
seen an abandonment of the traditions as little more than a crime against God. Yet, Islam's past and its traditions could not go unexamined in the face of modernization. Certainly, the well being of the people had to be protected. Agricultural and educational reforms were desperately needed. The position of religion in the state had to be defined. It would take a strong leader to be able to deal with the religious ambiguities which existed in Egypt. That leader who would unite the country behind one central cause was Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser sought a "strong, liberated Egypt" which would be responsible to and for the welfare of the people.

One important tool which Nasser had at his disposal was a fairly modern and well trained bureaucracy. Egyptian civil servants had worked under a multitude of not very successful rulers since at least the dawn of recorded history. British occupation had served to westernize and standardize the already bureaucratic system. Loyalty in that system rested with the one who held power. The civil service was not cohesive enough to effect policy change within the government, but did tend to be rather clannish seeking to watch out for its own members. As in all bureaucracies, personal initiative was frowned upon. Those persons in the government who had received the most exposure to Western thought, were apparently the ones most committed to the system. In attempting to imitate the West, Berger maintains that Egypt's civil service over the years became increasingly secular, less personal and less prone to permit advancement by means of political or familial connections. As time passed, the civil service came to be increasingly specialized and technical in its knowledge and ability. Such a trend has been present but it has not been as drastic as Berger portrays it. As mentioned, the civil service tended toward secularism. Fear of God may well be the beginning of wisdom but if so few civil servants were so wise. Indeed in 1952, the state chose to impose some moral standards as part of the
Code of Civil Service in which civil servants were forbidden to gamble in public. 92 Contrary to Western ways, morality seems to have been legislated by the military elite rather than the political or industrial elite. 93 This military elite was able to provide a secure setting in which Egyptians as a whole were better able to develop their own potential abilities.

With the elimination of political parties in 1953 (except with government approval could an organization operate openly), the two major factions left struggling for power could be described as those who believed in a traditional Islamic government and those who believed in a new enlightened Islamic government. Both factions were composed largely of religious fundamentalists but each differed somewhat in its application of the Shariah. Nationalism itself was one point of sharp controversy between the factions. Some leaders felt that nationalist ideals led to disunity in Islam by causing dissent as nation strove against nation for the superior position. 94 Such division was seen as a reversion to pagan ways and worked to weaken Islam in the face of its enemies. Other people such as Nasser saw nationalism as a source of pride from which the people of a state could gain a sense of self respect. A few other individuals followed a more radical national line of thought in maintaining that nationalism rose above "religious, racial, communal or class divisions" creating such a love of country which would result in a strong, vibrant Arab world. 96 Most of the leaders in Egypt agreed that such national characteristics as religion, history, language, literature and art were a source of strength for the modern Muslim. The question was to what end were they to be directed. Religion was so closely tied to government in Egypt that little could be affected without at least the tacit approval of the Ulema. Rather than confronting the religious power structure, the military regime moved to effect changes through the medium of the promotion of its own interpretation of Islam.
and the state. The leaders of the revolution were fully aware of the power of the religious sphere yet changes had to be made. Justice in the application of Islamic doctrines depended largely on the government in power. In attempting to solve the problem of how to be just and yet to bring Islam into the twentieth century, the military regime chose a form of government which came to be known as Islamic socialism.

Islamic socialism basically is the attempt to increase income by increased production through a mixture of private, state, and cooperative ownership. Private property remained very respected yet the physical nature of Egypt demanded an interlocking system for the maintenance of dams, canals, railroads and communications. In spite of the respect granted to private property, capitalism was viewed as an agent of the despotism which had exploited the Egyptian people for centuries and brought Islam to a ruinous state. Communist on the other hand was atheistic and therefore, the enemy of every true Muslim. Islamic socialism called for a society based on Islam and the brotherhood of all men sharing equally in the benefits of the government with no class prejudices. It was hoped that so long as such socialism was based on shari'a, then it would not become totalitarian. Still, it was far from clear that the traditionally dominant characteristic of Islam would not continue to result in the destruction of individual incentive and the removal of all elements critical of the government. In order to shore up their position, the revolutionary government attempted in special Friday sermons to show that their form of socialism actually was based in Islam being derived from policies of the first Caliphs, Abu Bakr and Omar. Responsibility for effecting change in Egypt rested with its leaders yet no program could be carried out successfully without at least the passive consent of the people. The problem was that the Egyptian people were largely uneducated seeing any change in their lives as a probable heresy. Thus, a respected national leadership was essential to
modernization. The common Egyptian fellahin had been for generations downtrodden both in mind and body. The military government under Nasser felt it had a duty to raise its people out of such torpidity. Furthermore, it was the responsibility of an Islamic government to see that no gain was made immorally, that there was no great reward for small services or vice versa, and that no employment was ever present in the state. The government was also responsible for preventing or stopping both luxury and extravagance in order that equity and brotherhood might better be promoted. British colonial authorities had been able to work some changes in education and public works, but they had been severely hampered by their being Christian. Such reforms as were needed in Egypt could only be brought about by a Muslim government recognized as legitimate by the people.

By 1954, Egypt's population density along the Nile had risen to 677 people per square kilometer which was one of the highest in the world. The population in 1953 was over two million and the death rate continued to fall as modern technology became increasingly available. For the years between 1945 and 1953, the death rate dropped from 2.7 to 18.4 per 1,000 people which was attributed to improved water systems, use of insecticides and a wider use of medical services. Agriculture remained the dominant field of occupation and continued to rest largely in private hands. Indeed, the government was dominant over the private sector only in such fields as transportation, communication, education, health, and security-defense. With time, there has been some movement of people into the city but Egypt is still largely agricultural. Agriculture provides the majority of Egypt's exports. Many of the farm remain small with children being a critical source of labor. The problem herein is that parents seek more children to help with farmwork yet when the children grow up they only add to the unemployment problem since there is no
industry to absorb excess labor. One possible alternative to the present situation is the transformation of villages into cooperative units so that the resources of each community can be fully utilized. With adequate education, such communities could well serve to create a better Egypt. Yet, in such a natural resource deficient country as Egypt, progress is slow at best.

The results of the 1952 Revolution have been for the most part positive. Illiteracy has been reduced. Nursery schools have been organized. New schools and libraries have been built. Doctors and hospital facilities have become increasingly available. The task of creating a generation trained to work toward the solution of national problems has been largely realized. Such improvements in education and social agencies have enabled Egypt to overcome many of her technological deficiencies. The lack of modern technology which has plagued the Islamic world for the past century has at last shown signs of being cured. The cultural degeneration which resulted in part from European occupation has been reversed. With the employment of able leadership, the military regime has every reason to believe in the realization of a strong, vibrant in the years to come.
CHAPTER IV

A brief sketch of Egypt's political development in the modern era has been given. Attention will now focus on how Islam in Egypt has been affected by the west and by modernization. The work will be concentrated on the periods of Muhammed Abduh and of Nasser.

The central problem for Islam leaders to face, has been the problem of change. The deterministic elements in Islamic religious doctrine were conducive to the notion that the existence of the world and man is entailed directly from God's being. God is perfect and so how could anything be other than perfect if it is derived from God. In order to alter such a mental framework, a basic change in the way the average Muslim perceived his position in relation to God would be required. Such a change would be drastic.

In the backwash of the dissolution of the Roman Empire, Islam arose to assert its own form of law and order. Islam claimed to be the way to security and happiness. Islam offered a common point around which one could concentrate one's efforts. It presented a central and unified position against the defusion of power which was then prevalent in the Mediterranean world. The notion of Islam moving to rescue the world from its false beliefs and dissolution would later become the hallmark of future modernizers. There had been some reform in Islam as it rose to become a world religion. Umar had interpreted the Sunna of the Prophet so as to fit the then present social and economic needs of society. Islam had not been so dogmatic as to endure the conflicts of the centuries without change. Close, objective analysis of Islam's history shows it to be complete with its own innovations to meet new situations as they arose. As will be discussed in relation to Muhammed Abduh, the gates of ijtihad may have been closed but they were far from nailed shut. To face modernization without abandoning Islam as a religion, the gates of ijtihad would have to be reopened. The world was changing too fast for change to evolve by consensus and it was imperative for Islam to adapt
or be swept away. The three central points of faith to be preserved were belief in God alone, sincerity in prayer, and actual cooperation in ridding the world of evil.  

Jamal al-Afghani is generally held to be one of the first major forces of modernization in Muslim intellectual circles. He perceived Islam as a world religion which would stand for all people and for all time yet which would be capable of changing its means so as to achieve the needs of society. Afghani moved to condemn those traditions which were not in accord with reason and common sense. There was nothing so terribly revolutionary in the action of man utilizing his reasoning capabilities so long as such ideas were tempered by having some basis in the traditions of Islam. Thus, only reasoning in accord with traditional modes of interpretation would be acceptable to the religious man. Islamic reform would prove to be a tight rope to walk but not impossible. Afghani who was finally exiled by the British puppet Tawfiq was attacked by his fellow Muslims on three main points. The first point was his familiarity with non-Muslim philosophies. Such philosophies having been developed by infidels certainly had to be heretical in nature and therefore not to be studied. The second point of condemnation was his refusal to follow traditional rituals. To deviate from the ways of one's forefathers in connection with the traditions of the Prophet, was heresy. Finally, Afghani was known to associate with non-religious persons. If being religious was good, then it was determined that anyone who was not religious was bad. Such bad characters were not to be associated with, for surely their evil ways were communicable. The ideas of Afghani were largely rejected by the traditional religion sphere in Egypt yet he had succeeded in at least opening the possibility for change to occur. He had also left behind him a contingent of followers who would work to further his position. Two schools of thought developed after al-Afghani which were represented primarily by two extremist positions. One group
was a strongly rigid and religiously conservative group while the other group pursued a goal of total assimilation to a western lifestyle. Both groups were hostile to each other and largely cut off from the common person in society. Other names given to these two positions are scholar-jurists and westernizers or Islamic fundamentalists and Liberals. These two groups may not have represented the true character of the Egyptian populace but they were the upperclass and controlled much of the decision making power of the government.

The center for Islamic fundamentalism was the religious university of al-Azhar. It had been the home of the Egyptian Ulema for centuries. Before Muhammed Ali, it was the only institution for higher education in Egypt. The decisions and teachings of its sheiks were largely traditional in nature. Its curriculum until 1952 concentrated on the fields of theology, jurisprudence, Arabic language and Arabic literature. Unless a student studied at modern universities, his education would be hardly sufficient to train him to work with the intricacies of modern world politics. Although its curriculum was improved in 1952, it was not until 1961 that a law was passed for al-Azhar to be reorganized and rejuvenated. Al-Azhar was a bulwark of traditional thought although it was not without its liberal elements. The most outstanding juror-scholar of al-Azhar was Muhammed Abduh.

As mentioned previously Abduh was exiled by the British from 1882 until 1884 when he returned to become a kadi or judge. It was to Abduh that fell the dreams of Jamal al-Ahmad al-afghani for a strong, vital and enlightened Muslim world. Abduh had gone through the traditional Koranic school system in Egypt. At one point, he had come to so dislike his schooling that he ran away and finally took shelter with one of his uncles. From this uncle, he is supposed to have learned the value of education and that an ignorant Muslim leads an "unjust and untruthful life." Islam was backward and divided into many sects, each with its own complex rationale which remained largely unintelligible to the com-
mon man. Abdur sensed the necessity of working back to the original basis of Islam where dwelt its strength and vitality. The Koran was viewed by him to be the fundamental truth upon which a modern society could be based. He was strongly opposed to the notion of taklif and felt that such blind acceptance of the past only served to perpetuate the errors of the past. Since he attempted to open the gates of ijtihad, many Muslims labeled him a heretic. Others not quite so critical branded him a wahabi. Even though Abdur accepted the use of reason in Islam, he strongly sought a system which in no way violated the Shariah. The primary purpose of reason and logic was to refute the claims of non-believers. The study of philosophy and science were fields separate and distinct from religious studies. Science and religion each had their own purposes to fulfill in regards to man. Thus, Abdur had not abandoned faith, but saw it as essential to man. It is not by way of empirical evidence derived from prophets or miracles that one is led to faith in God but rather it is faith in God which leads one to recognize prophets and miracles. Indeed, sufism was not condemned outright but rather was criticized only for its corruption. Reason was assigned the additional role of aiding the Muslim in deciding which aspects of foreign cultures or modernity were worthy of being adopted into Muslim society and which aspects were to be set aside.

With the ascent of Abbas II to the throne of Egypt in 1892, Abdur was better able to exert his influence for reform. He succeeded in reducing the power of the Sheik al-Azhar and in improving the salaries as well as the living conditions at the university. The administration was revamped in several ways. Examinations for teachers and students were standardized as was the course load and time schedules of classes. The school year was increased from four to eight months which allowed for a better, broader education to be given to the students. In 1899, Muhammed Abdur became the Grand Mufti of Egypt. As Mufti or Sheik al-Islam of Egypt, he was a legal specialist who was capable of and had
the power for giving opinions on legal renderings and the correctness of the application of the Shariah.\textsuperscript{17} Such a position enabled Abduh to attempt to effect some of his long awaited reforms. One example of his legal interpretations was that he permitted the eating of animals slaughtered by Jews and Christians which had heretofore been forbidden. He also allowed interest to be gained from money put into banks. In the area of the judiciary, reforms in legal procedures were effected as well as an increase in salaries for the kadis.\textsuperscript{18} Indeed, a result of his actions was the founding of a school for the training of kadis in 1907.

Muhammad Abduh had set his aims high and had only limited success. After his death in 1905, the country lapsed into its former stupor of backwardness at least in regards to religious reforms. Yet perhaps such a view is a bit too harsh. Actually, the vast majority of Egyptians had been in an intellectual slump for centuries if not for millennia. Abduh foresaw that modernization possessed the capacity to raise the weak and ignorant out of their lowly positions in society. Yet even Abduh saw the immense difficulties in bringing Egypt up to western standards of living. He felt that the quickest way for modernization to occur would be under the strong hand of an enlightened, benevolent dictator who would reform the government along religious lines.\textsuperscript{19} Even so, according to Abduh, it would take such a ruler at least fifteen years to effect modernization. (It should be noted that such a decision was made at the turn of the century when the differences between Egyptian and European technology were not nearly so great as they are now.) Unfortunately, enlightened monarchs are very rare in history and are usually followed by ruinous despots. Abduh had striven to free Islam of its inflexible orthodoxy and to show that Islam was a vibrant, viable world religion. He had shown that reason within a framework of the Shariah was not heresy. He had opened the gates of ijtihad but it would be a half century before his reforms would be realized.

As mentioned, Egypt continued under British dominance until the
1952 Revolution, only Zaghlul was able to effect any major change as the Muslim world suffered under the impact of global conflict. Even so, the changes which did occur were of a secular rather than a religious nature. Indeed, the trend in the early twentieth century seemed to move away from religious government in favor of a separation of church and state. Ali Abdel Nazzar was one of the prominent liberals to hold such a view. In order to save Turkey from dissolution by the Allied Powers after World War I, Mustafa Kemal had reduced the power of the Scholastic juror class in favor of the liberal position. In 1924, the caliphate was abolished. The Shaviah was replaced with civil law. In Egypt, Zaghlul moved to carry out similar programs but was less successful. Egypt had not been recently defeated in war and thus was not so open to radical change as was Turkey. With little real driving force for change, little change occurs.

Muhammad Rashid Rida took over the central religious role after 'Abduh but lacked his force of character. He became editor of al-Manar which had been founded in 1898 "to promote social, religious and economic reform."20 Rida felt that it was the personal responsibility of every Muslim to strengthen Islam and saw education as playing a central role.21 Unfortunately, he was for the most part an apologist who concentrated on proving the good qualities of Islam rather than working more directly for their implementation. Rida called for the establishment of an Islamic society with all Muslims being placed under a federation with a caliph at the head of government.22 He apparently saw the different national states as members of this federation. Such pan-Islamic notions were acceptable enough to most Muslims, where Rida differed from traditional Islamic thought was in as that he sought a separation of church and state.23

For some parts of the religious corpus in Egypt, such separation of religion and state was far too liberal and by 1927 one group had broken off from the Islamic fundamentalists and formed the fanatically conserv-
ative, Muslim brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood was to play an increasingly influential role in Egypt as until it was abolished in 1953.

In its fanatical stance the Brotherhood sought to end Egypt of all infidel influence. The traditional Muslim lifestyle was slipping away, it seemed, that the British were to be replaced with British protégés. To the fanatic, anything short of a theocracy was heresy. Indeed, a government directly based on the letter of the law was what the Brotherhood wanted. Their convictions rested on the belief of their own righteousness. In the name of righteousness, terrorism was employed. The Muslim people had to be saved from evil and all means had to be employed. Two major problems arise out of the doctrines professed by the Brotherhood. First, just exactly what right did these zealous men possess to be able to represent the consensus of the Egyptian people? Secondly, was it realistic to believe that a Muslim theocracy would do anything to improve the condition of Islam in Egypt?

In relation to the first point, it is commonly known that the primary concern of the average person in any society is one's own health and well-being. Most Egyptians have been secure in their station in life and have possessed of a strong affinity to their religions and cultural background. Islam was the faith of their forefathers. To deviate from their religion was to deviate from their culture. In this view the average peasant and the fanatically religious agreed. Yet, it was somehow contrary to one's common sense to follow onea beliefs to the point of self-destruction. It is difficult to pursue a line of reasoning that denies a person food and shelter. Modernization had improved the standard of living in Egypt if even slightly as has been shown. How could improvement in one's life be wrong? Perhaps, wretched poverty when accompanied by strictly legal devotion was the preferred state of existence to a life of wealth yet with little fear of God. Surely, such a view is a bit unrealistic for it is very difficult for most people to consider their spiritual relation to God when they are starving. In
holding such a view, the religiously fanatic were a minority. Although it seems to have expressed a more popular view in his time, that the teachings of Islam must be carefully applied to modern life, even in a way as to bring about the great benefits, it was not the immediate intention of rallying the Egyptian peasants separated feelings. What was immediately necessary only if the Turks, whom that his very way of life was threatened. The problem of raising such emotions was not so difficult as long as an infidel administration was in power, but with the 1952 revolution, Egyptian faced Egyptian. In the ensuing struggle, the people of Egypt showed with whom they sided.

The second question mentioned will now be reviewed. The idea of a fanatical Muslim theocracy has been largely preserved throughout Islamic history. The term theocracy is often used in the sense of a government being directed by divinely guided officials. In the Islamic sense, divinely guided would refer to that government official who submits to the authority of the shari'ah. Although the caliphate had long since ceased to exist, Islamic leaders who were true to the traditions could still be considered theocrats. The Mamluks over the centuries had been largely able to preserve the shari'ah in its traditional form without any major innovations. In the face of modernization and foreign occupation, it became an imperative for the shari'ah to be re-examined and renovated. The world was changing and Islam had to adapt to its changes. Sometimes the conservative elements of Islam have maintained the notion that nothing need be adapted in Islam except to return to a way of life before modern influences had penetrated the realm of Islam. Such a view is, to say the least, naive and received little enlightened support. Modernization does not entail an abandonment of Islam and Islam in any way requires a nation or people to be stagnant and antiquated. Most modern Egyptians would probably agree with Smith's evaluation that true Islam must be based on a real and close relationship to God by which one seeks to fulfill the will of God rather than to serve the abstractions of a degener-
erate set of practices. This is not an abandonment of shariah but rather an analysis of shariah with a modern perspective. Abdullah showed that one could be religiously orthodox and yet be modern. The two are not contradictory, what is contradictory is the attempt to live in the twentieth century and yet try to retain a form of government out of the seventh century. The Muslim brotherhood was pursuing a policy that held little hope for even being a realistic possibility and lacked popular support of the Egyptian people.

Thus, the 1952 revolution not only revealed a change of people in positions of power but a change of attitude. The new government began with little more than the notion that the old power structure had to be removed and replaced with enlightened leadership. Such sentiments of power were far from having precedent, but there was something unique in what the Nasser regime attempted to effect. Most of the Free Officers were practicing Muslims who were sworn to protect the well-being of Egypt. Most of these officers were opposed to the creation of a theocracy such as the Muslim brotherhood wanted. Yet, they in no way sought to remove religion from society. Nasser maintained that the intention of the revolution was to create a secular republic which retained Islam as the official state religion. It is possible although the evidence is scant that Islam was used merely as a tool to gain a position of power by the leaders of the 1952 revolution. Such is a cynical attitude. Although it is true that Marxism and western liberalism had been rejected, it is not the case that Islamic fundamentalism was the only alternative left in Egypt. It is possible that a military junta might have been set up which simply ignored religion. Yet, Nasser and his followers saw the great value of Islam as a uniting factor for diverse people if nothing else. The central theme of the 1952 revolution was cultural rejuvenation. Islam was the source of strength which could bring about a great Egyptian renaissance if led by enlightened leaders. Orders for change were invoked. The titles of "bey" and "pasha" were
abolished, not to be used after July 30, 1952. Each title was viewed as Turkish innovations which were not in keeping with the true ideals of Islam. Muslim society was supposed to be classless. The new government was extremely careful not to move against the religious establishment except in those areas which were a danger to the state. Thus, the Muslim brotherhood was outlawed but in turn Mawdudi's was sent in 1955 to the Islamic Congress in Medina to show that the regime was in no way anti-religious. The shariah was still superior to the state, so that the revolutionary government did was to utilize the shariah with emphasis on the physical and practical rather than spiritual aspects of mankind. As Nasser maintained, one can believe in the world to come but one must not forget to live this life and work for its improvement. Of course, Nasser was a pan-Islamist who sought political and even the unification of all Muslim states. In Egypt, Nasser centralised the government under his central control. As if to fulfill Stalin's decree of the necessity of a dictator in order to effect rapid modernisation, Nasser took the reins of the government to himself. Naguib had been retired from service having completed his role as a transitional figure between the old and new orders.

To Nasser, Islam was the binding factor between Muslims. Islam was essential to the existence of a cohesive state. The Muslim world was composed of many peoples of varying cultures, without the religious bond of Islam, the hope for social and economic cooperation would be greatly reduced. In this pragmatic view, the value of Islam rested in its capacity to produce positive results. So long as it could be used as a tool for the betterment of society then it would receive government support. Thus, when Islamic institutions failed to maintain a proper administration, they were seized by the government and revised. The Kadi courts and the waqf system were two of the first to be taken over. Education and agricultural reforms were introduced. All political parties were abolished in the name of facilitating reform. Indeed, by way of a
law passed in 1964, organizations in Egypt had to have the approval of the government to meet and were under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs. 32

Thus, Egypt had in effect become a dictatorship yet rule was not as yet despotic. The concentration of the powers of government into the hands of one man is, of course, an open invitation for tyranny. Whether Nasser was a tyrant or a dictator in their classical sense is open for debate. Certainly, he had been the primary organizer of the revolution and he had seized power by the use of open force. Yet, it is clear that he possessed at least the tacit approval of the Egyptian people to effect some badly needed reforms. His affront to the religious order was far from hostile and largely proved beneficial to society at large. His successor, Anwar el-Sadat, has only furthered the position of the religious order in Egypt. He has reinforced the portrait of an Islamic Egypt by his own personal religious devotion. Islam and modernization seem to have found a viable working relationship in Egypt. Although apologetics has become common to explain Muslim backwardness, Islam seems to have been able to hold its own position within Egyptian society. The government has become neither secular nor anti-religious. A degree of pride has been restored to a people who had been degraded by colonial occupation. Nasser's pan-Islamic policy has been replaced by a return to a traditional notion of Egyptian nationalism. Within such a nationalist framework, Islam has adapted and prospered. It is clear that certain inconsistencies still exist in Islamic doctrine such as the reason for Islam's degradation at infidel hands. Yet, it must be realized that such inconsistencies are largely the concern of elites and seldom have real influence among the masses of people. If the typical Muslim can find some security and peace of mind in an Islamic framework, then what is his concern over some subtle philosophic inconsistency. Islam has adapted to modernization and at the same time modern technology has been adapted to Islam. The two have not proved to be mutually exclusive.
At this point a closer examination of the relationship between Islam and modernization will be undertaken.
CHAPTER V

What exactly are the problems which face Islam in the modern era? Certain problems have been revealed as the political and religious development of Egypt has been traced. Now, these problems will be outlined in detail. After the problems have been stated, a short review of how Islam in times previous to the twentieth century has attempted to handle modernization. That section will be followed by one concerning what has been done in the twentieth century concerning such changes. Finally, a brief projection of what Islam has to look forward to in the future will be given.

Central to all problems facing Islam in Egypt is the question of how can a religion continue to be vital. So far as man is able to discern, something which is affected with time does in some way change in time. Man exists in time and changes with the passage of time. Thus, it follows that man's relationship with a particular religion changes over time.

A vibrant religion is one in which such changes can be incorporated within the system. Islam as transmitted by the Prophet Mohammed is held to be perfect by Muslims. What is considered to be the word of God cannot be altered or revised. Mohammed was deemed to be the last prophet and thus, prophecy ceased to be a source for religious change. In Judaism, the guarding of the Law to protect it from corruption rested with the Rabbinate. In Islam, such a task was left to the Ulema. Unlike the Rabbinate, the Ulema carried the clout of political power in government. Indeed, religion and government remained largely inseparable in Islamic nations until the modern era. The nature of Islam has been seen by many to be such that if it were to be removed from active participation in government, Islam would cease as a religion.¹ For well over a thousand years, the Ulema were able successfully to perpetuate Islam and to satisfy the needs of its adherents. Even so, it is not the case that there were no problems during this period.
After a long struggle with certain elements which favored religion by reason, the Ulema was able to close the gates of ijtihad around 1,000 C.E. The traditional elements gradually removed the rational elements from positions of power. Although a certain degree of homogeneity was established, Islam found itself increasingly unable to harmonize innovations in society with the Koran without compromising and without opening up the potential for anything to be justified by the Koran. The decline of sufism from intellectual mysticism to common superstition also served to hinder the application of modern innovations. Sufi notions of asceticism evolved into an acceptance of the poverty in which many Muslim's found themselves. Intellectual pursuits gave way to arguments which rather than trying to solve a problem which might have evolved, turned to prove that no problem existed. The man who turned to rationalize a situation became a heretic and was ostracized from the community. In the midst of such anti-rationalism, wahhabism made its appearance and moved along more of a Hanbalic tradition calling for a return to the fundamentals of faith. Wahhabism, in a sort of backward way, actually was open to modernization in the sense that it called for a re-interpretation of just exactly what was meant by fundamental Islam. The movement gained little support until the modern period.

Although the Islamic world by the eighteenth century had become far from an intellectual's paradise, it was not so moribund as is often held by the West. European imperialism had brought western technology into the Muslim world. With the presence of such technological superiority, the Muslim world came to doubt its own worth. Islam became pervaded by a sense that something had gone wrong and that divine guidance had been lost. The Ulema instead of moving to facilitate new policy, took the position that the problem stemmed from irreligiosity. Anything which was Western was evil. Thus, the ability to effect modernization by the religious sphere became stifled. New programs were delayed or undermined by the Ulema. The natural sciences were portrayed as illusions
or superstitions to be disregarded. It seems that the Ulema feared modernization as a threat to its own political power and social position. Instead of utilizing the power which modern technology could give them, the members of the Ulema turned against modernization. These scholars continued to utilize their time in writing diatribes using such complex arguments that in reality only the best educated Islamicists could understand. Thus, their energies were wasted on the obscure. The Ulema were able to maintain their position as the sole interpreter of the Shariah, but the Ulema were slowly losing their audience. Secularism, humanism, and nationalism were all making inroads on Islam. Such movements tended to factionalize the Egyptian population and thus weakened its ability to deal with the British and with modernization.

Abdulw saw four major objectives which needed to be reached as quickly as possible. First of all, Islam needed to be purified in the sense of getting back to the fundamentals of faith (similar to wahhabism). Secondly, the salient aspects of modern thought should be added to Muslim culture. Thirdly, the educational system had to be revamped to fit modern conditions. Finally, the corruptive ideas of the West and Christianity had to be eliminated from Muslim thought. As previously noted, Abdulw's pleas fell largely on deaf ears. Al-Azhar continued to be counterprogressive and to fail to communicate much of positive value to the people in respect of modernization. Meanwhile, Western authorities moved to further debase Islam and thus to intimidate the Egyptian people.

Surely, al-Azhar could have done a better job of helping the Egyptian people through the difficult process of modernization. By sheer force of reputation, it carried great weight in Egyptian politics. Yet, al-Azhar failed to work with other institutions in Egypt. It refused to modernize its curriculum, thus cutting itself off from the modern world. The sciences which it possessed were antiquated, being the remnants of a sort of monastic-type library collection held in trust for centuries. Al-Azhar was even backward in the field of Arabic studies during the
It was not until 1924 that a standard Koranic text was established by the Egyptian Royal Committee of Experts. Education in spite of the religious sphere was slowly improving and a text of the Koran in modern Arabic was desperately needed. The Ulema bickered and quarreled over exact word interpretations and thus hindered the publication of the new text. The intent of the Shariah fell by the way as the letter of the law was pursued.

With the demise of the sultanate in Turkey after World War I, the religious sphere was left without its centralized political system. Liberal nationalists moved to take new positions of power. Constitutional governments were organized in Egypt and Turkey. Their citizens were promised improvements in living standards and a casting off of European imperialism. In the case of Egypt, such improvements would be slow in coming. The religious sphere would continue to refuse to cooperate with the liberals. The trend toward secularism reduced the number of scholars interested in traditional religious problems. The result only served to slow religious adaption to modernization.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the religious element in Egypt was dominated by a foreign, secular administration. The religious sphere continued to blame its loss of power on the evil Christian west. The problem remained as to why Muslim Egypt had become so poor and why it had become dominated by Europe. Islam once struggled against foreign armies, but now its struggle was internal. How could Islam be a strong, viable world religion after such degredation? The glory of the past would have to be removed from the center stage of Muslim thought, if positive reform was ever to be accomplished. As adaptations to new environments had been made in the past, so they would have to be made in the present.

There has seldom been a period in Islam's history when it has not had to face some threat to the status quo and thus forced to make changes to meet each new threat. Although Islam is presently confronted by
serious and trying problems, as has been shown, its modern religious reformers are not without some help from traditional sources.

During the Abbasid caliphate (750-1258), Greek ideas were actively studied with full knowledge of their pagan origins. Such an approach was not seen as heretical until such liberal thought came to be a challenge to dogma. Intellectuals like al-Ghazali openly maintained that to know the Koran well, one had to have training in scientific studies. Yet, overall Islam historically has been conservative and its tendency toward holding the old ways to be the good ways remained predominant. The armies of Islam repelled the Christian crusaders and by the 1600s Muslim forces were threatening Vienna. Thus, for Islam these centuries were successful, revealing the strength of Islam. Little change seemed necessary. Sufism had been developed to give Islam a personal touch, an intimacy with the divine. The legalist way of life was simply too dry and theoretical for some scholars. Mysticism has throughout history been a medium by which man has been able to reduce his fears and anxieties in dealing with the unknown in life. Later, in the face of defeat at the hands of Israeli forces, Sufi orders would prosper in Egypt. Throughout most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, an integrated blend of ideologies actually existed between the strict legalists and the Sufi orders.

In the mid-1700s, a small but powerful movement called imitation of life arisen in Najd. Its founder was Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. In the tradition of Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab called for a return to the original state of Islam and the abolition of certain innovations such as sacred groves and smoking. His movement is important for two reasons. First, he strove for a back-to-basics movement which stressed what Islam should be rather than what Islam is. Intentionally or not, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab had started a revival of ijtihad however puritanical and narrow it may have been. If the hope for an Islamic revival rests with a return of rational freedom of thought, then Wahhabism had planted the
seeds for such a rebirth.

During the Mamluk civil wars in the late 1700’s and the following French occupation, the Ulama became the central political power in Egypt. Indeed, it was the Ulama who backed Mohammed Ali in restoring order after the French withdrawal. The native Ulama of Egypt had a great deal of potential for effecting modernization. Some progress was made but the Ulama chose to take control of iltimams, thus, gaining great personal wealth. Such fortunes were acquired at the cost of the fellahin who were soon in worse shape than under the Mamluk Amirs. There was little justice in Egypt and modernization was used for purely personal gain. Mohammed Ali eventually consolidated the powers of government in himself. Egypt became his personal domain and he dealt with it as his own private monopoly. Thus, most Egyptians saw little advantage in modernization. To the fellahin, Western technology was only another tool, and a foreign one at that, by which the upper stratum of society maintained its position of dominance.

Al-Afghani saw the need for reform in Islam. He saw how weak the realm of Islam had become and feared that the West would overwhelm and destroy the Muslim faith. Al-Afghani portrayed Islam and the West as opposing forces. Such a view only furthered the association of modernization with an evil, dangerous West. Even so, few among the religious sphere heeded Al-Afghani’s call to action. One important exception was, of course, Mohammed Abduh. Abduh tried to turn Koranic study away from mere scholasticism to practical application. He truly believed that the Koran was the source where solutions to all problems could be found. Yet, he was a rationalist who believed that human reason could be consulted in the interpretation of revelation. Set dogma and the traditional interpretations were not to be excluded from possible revision. For Abduh, the gates of ijtihad were open to meet the problems of the present. Speaking to the people rather than to the scholars, Abduh moved to ascertain the basic goals and meanings of Islam so as to overcome
the deplorable situation into which Islam had fallen with respect to the west. He recognized the value of Western technology. Most of his reforms were radical at best and he was seen by many of his contemporaries as an opostate. Abdel actively sought reform in Egypt but met with little success. The country lacked education and his plans lacked any overall unity. Yet, he had made progress in making modern technology somewhat more acceptable to the Muslim world. For all of his questionable views, he was Maffi of Egypt and commanded respect due a member of the Egyptian Ulema. It would take decades before his liberal renderings would become authoritative in conservative circles, but the time would come. The religiously decadent groups would continue to reject any form of modernization, but such people would constitute an increasingly small section of society. The mainstream of the Egyptian population slowly moved toward the realization that at least some modern technology would be necessary for a revitalization of Islam.

For Islam, the First World War marked the beginning of a new age. The Ottoman empire came to an end. From its remnants, Mustafa Kemal was able to salvage the Republic of Turkey. Kemal was a liberal and a secularist. In a radical move to force Turkey into modernization, the Caliphate was abolished in March of 1924. Each Islamic region was left to be administered by its local Ulema. Actually, the local Ulema had been largely in charge of their own affairs even under the Caliphate so the change for most regions was not drastic. Without the Caliphate, the local Ulema became directly responsible for the perpetuation and welfare of Islam in its area. There would be no central authority to appeal to if a region ran into problems. Each region would sink or swim largely by its own merits. The hope that modernization could be rapidly applied to the Realm of Islam through the central authority of the Caliph was swept away. Turkey, thinking that to be as powerful as a European state, all one had to do was to act like one, moved to imitate European models of government. Thus, a division of religion and state
was effected. Shariah was replaced by civil law. Islam remained but it was divorced from the state.

Egypt at first moved along similar lines of action under Sayid Zaghlul. Yet conditions in Egypt differed significantly from Turkey. Egypt had not just been defeated in a major war. More significantly for Islam, Egypt's Ulema remained in strong political positions and held much influence among the Egyptian population. Egypt was also under the dominance of Great Britain who was not likely to allow too radical a change in the status quo for fear of losing power.

A new age dawned for Islam and in the words of Sayid Amir Ali, "Each one has its own standard". Unlike Turkey, Egypt chose to follow largely traditional standards of action. Al-Azhar remained a bulwark for the religious sphere in Egypt. The Ulema although possessing much power were unable to use it effectively. The Ulema had the power to be in control of the government but failed to exercise its power effectively because of infighting. Such disputes led to the Ulema being factionalized which greatly reduced their effective power. Indeed, the Ulema found it necessary, as had often happened in the past, to work with the government in order to maintain their own social position and to ensure their own safety. The Ulema continued to see the evil West and modernization as one and the same thing. Yet, in an attempt to maintain something of their soci-economic position, the Ulema have moved slowly to accept some modern technology. Rashid Rida followed Abduh's doctrine that ijtihad was necessary. Rida went so far as to say that if ijtihad were not permitted then divine law would become "unfit for all people at all times". It should be remembered that ijtihad is not a method for effecting change but rather a way of showing that changes which have taken place in Islam are justified. Rida also maintained that religion should be standardized and separated from the state. Abu Zayd followed Abduh's rationalism and pushed for ijtihad but went somewhat too far until it seemed to the Ulema that he was trying to throw the gates to
Ijtiḥād is not a process to be used wantonly but rather sparingly. There are many disagreements as to what actions are open to ijtiḥād. Certainly, it may not be applied to acts of devotion as in prayer. It also may not be used for any sort of personal gain. Abduh's thinking is probably best represented by Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghi. He favored no particular school of law. Unlike Rida, he accepted the idea of translations of the Koran.

For centuries, the Koran had remained in its traditional form. Over those centuries, Arabic had changed to the point that many passages were now difficult to understand if not unintelligible. The increase in education and literacy has created a greater demand for Koranic texts. It was traditionally held that the Koran could not be translated. Rida refused to accept the validity of a translation. Rida also condemned Mustafa Kemal for the use of a Turkish translation in the face of an Arabic Koran in prayer. Rida felt that different languages would lead to disunity in Islam. His argument may have some value but it also seems important for people to be able to have a text of the words of God which they can read. Eventually, translations came to be accepted by the Ulama as simply different forms of interpretation and not as corruptions of the true text. Concerning interpretations of the verses of the Koran, traditional commentaries are still largely favored. Modern Koranic exegesis has made some progress in attempting to present a better understanding of Islam. Most attention has focused on three points. The first point involves the attempt to prove that there is no conflict between the Koran and science. The second point involves philology. The third point is concerned with the role of the Koran in modern society and whether society has drifted too far from its precepts. Muslim commentaries on the history of Koranic interpretation have come only in the second half of the twentieth century. Most Muslims would still be wary of any critical analysis of the Koran. The Koran is seen by most Muslims as clear, rational and flexible to interpretation. Ambiguity
may be found in the Koran but such a view is deemed to be the result of a lack of insight. The Western notion of objective scriptural criticism has found some adherents in Muslim circles, but for the most part, it is held that to understand a religious text one must be religious. The circular logic is completed by the view that the religious man does not question the sanctity of holy scripture. Thus, critical textual scholarship can be seen either as progressive or regressive depending on one's personal views.

In the realm of science, there is a somewhat similar situation. There still exists tension between scientific and Koranic explanations with regard to the physical nature of the world. The traditional belief which held that the Shariah is superior to any of the sciences often left Islam lacking in scientific inquiry. Logical, scientific analysis was particularly lacking in the field of theology where apparent inconsistencies were seldom resolved. Such problems are, of course, in no way unique to Islam. Islam has in no way ever been torn by the great social upheavals which occurred in the Western world after the development of modern scientific exegesis. Indeed, Islam has very seldom been hostile to science. Science was simply seen as a waste of time, in as much as such time could be spent upon study of the Koran. Science was seen as being somehow contained within the words of the Koran. It is difficult to see such a link since it is not possible to find any direct evidence of modern science in the Koran. Many different theories have been expressed as to the reason for, if not decline, then at least stagnation of science in the Islamic world. The most commonly held view is that Islam has suffered from cultural degeneration which must be reversed for enlightenment to occur. Such a view is held in both Western and Muslim circles. Such notions stem from biased or ignorant sources. Iron works and coal mines do not prove the cultural superiority of one people over another. All that it shows is the ability of a people to develop the resources which it possesses. The Realm of Islam possessed little iron
or coal. Western technology cannot be equated with cultural superiority. The 100 horsepower tractor is useful for farming in the middle United States, but it is impractical for the small farms of Egypt. The building of the Aswan Dam may be a sign of technological ability but the problems which it has caused for farming and for maintenance seriously question the wisdom of its having been constructed. The resources and geography of a land must be taken into account when judging the worth of its achievements. Egypt's natural resources are virtually non-existent when compared to those of Britain or France. Thus, the practical application of scientific exegesis in Egypt was severely limited by its resources.

The role of science in Egyptian socio-political development has not been as marked as it was in the West. The modern religious element has had both pro-science and anti-science factions. The Ulema for the most part saw modern science as being bound up with Western ideas. Rashid Rida in 1927 spoke out against scientific study and was followed later by al-Khuli. Most Egyptians follow the standard of the anti-scientific approach to the Koran. Amin al-Shuli held three basic reasons why scientific exegesis cannot be applied to the Koran. In the first place, the words of the Koran have no parallel to modern scientific concepts. Some scholars in attempting to show a precedent for science in Islam, have made some far-fetched statements. Secondly, Shuli held that the Koran was written in the language of the seventh century. He felt that one should strive after the literal rather than the implied meaning by attempting to understand the mental framework of the Arab at the time of the Prophet Muhammed. Thirdly, he maintained that the Koran expresses religious ethical codes which are universal and not transient like the often changing theories of science. Others such as al-Shafibi held that the Koran was written in time at the time of Muhammed and thus relates the sciences then known. Still others such as al-Maraghi believed that some knowledge of science would enhance one's understanding of the Koran yet science could not be used to explain the textual meaning or
development of the Koran. Finally, the pre-science religious element represented by al-Bardiri maintained that scientific exquis is mandatory for observant Muslims. Only the backward and the uneducated who speak from ignorance raise arguments against modern science. Thus, the reaction to modern science by the religious sphere has been largely hostile but not to the point of completely rejecting science.

Islam stresses the notion of an individual working in accord with society. The goals of society are projected on and through the individual. Thus, the Western ideal of individualism is rejected by Islam. Islam maintains a strong sense of brotherhood among Muslims which does not always result in united action but it does produce a solidarity in purpose and ideology. Muslim communal activities are organized around the Sufi orders and the mosque. Besides the Sufi orders, there have developed fraternal orders such as the Muslim Young Men's Association. The modern Sufi orders in Egypt have supported Nasser's regime and even attacked his opponents as in 1965 against the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1964, there were sixty-four official Sufi orders headed by the Supreme Sufi Council. The Egyptian government has worked with and supported the Sufi orders. Indeed, the government's call for self-denial in order to secure a better future, has fit well with the doctrines of Sufism.

The mosque has been the traditional center for Islam in a community. Modernization has little affected the organization of the mosque. Most changes which have occurred in the twentieth century have been improvements. In the past, mosques have been built and maintained by wealthy land owners. Thus, the conditions under which a mosque existed depended on the whim of such an aristocrat. The devout Muslim believed that it was his sacred duty to maintain the mosque. Unfortunately, there were not enough devout, wealthy people to provide properly for the upkeep and staff of the mosque in Egypt. In some cases, waqfs which were a sort of personal endowment were set up to provide for a mosque. Yet, the waqf system became corrupt and was reorganized under the Nasser regime.
A Ministry of Waqfs was established to oversee such endowments and to help in the maintenance of the mosques. The government also moved to place all mosques under that ministry. Law 157 of 1960 said that all mosques were to be under government supervision by 1970. Mosques under government administrations were usually better kept than private mosques. Personnel training, salary and sanitary were normally of a higher standard in government mosques. The mosque has been seen as a public utility which the state has a responsibility to maintain. Although the Egyptian government had much power, it was still not able to effect modernization rapidly. In 1962, the government tried to establish a new post to replace the muezzin but the attempt failed as people refused to recognize the authority of the new post. Also, most of the imams of the public mosques were volunteers with degrees from al-Azhar. Thus, although the mosque would seem to be the perfect place to work to effect an attitude conducive to modernization, in reality, the religious sphere retained a firm hold upon the mosque. Vice President Hussein al-Shafei in 1963 went so far as to say that government has a responsibility to keep up the mosques since they were the places where the 1952 Revolution began.

Cooperation between the government and the religious sphere has often been strained. Most of the influential positions in the major professions, in the educational system, in the newspaper field, and in the government, are held by liberals. Although such liberals are in positions of power, their tenure is dependent on at least the tacit approval of the religious element. The liberal secularists attempted to replace religion with a sense of national patriotic duty. Such a sense of duty set well with traditional Islamic doctrines of duty (fiqh). Nationalism required a commitment to a way of life rather than a religion, one followed a sort of cultural Islam. Thus, one chose the culture of Islam over the culture of the West. Such ideas as these were ill-liked by the religious sphere who saw cultural Islam as undermining religion.
in the state. Yet, the liberals failed to create a system which contained the dynamism of Islam. Smith defines dynamism as "the appreciation of activity for its own sake, and at the level of feeling a stirring of intense, even violent, emotionalism". Moslem group loyalty only holds up within a religiously unified sphere. Thus, Muslims in Egypt strive not for Egypt but for a Muslim Egypt. The current regime in Egypt although largely composed of liberals is not truly secular but rather took over many of the duties of the Ulema. Indeed, so long as a national government works toward at least the maintenance of Islam, then it is religiously creditable and should be listened to by the people. The Ulema's rejection of modernization has resulted in a loss of prestige and power for the Sheiks. The only real weapon left to the Ulema is the tongue. Such power should not be underestimated for it is a power of the Unseen and not tied to the restrictions of reason as in the West.

The current military regime has taken the traditional Muslim government role of being the protector of Islam. The military regime clearly needs the religious sphere but still is not dictated to by that sphere. The military's grass root support is composed of largely fundamentalist Muslims who the military elite would prefer not to alienate. The regime has made no attempt to conceal the fact that it places more importance on national sovereignty than on religious propriety. The government since 1952 has not opposed religion but has tried to use its social aspects as a forum to express government ideals. The government's success has been limited. Indeed, the fact that the Shariah has not been outlawed in Egypt shows that religion still holds a good deal of sway in the government. This is not to say that religion has not undergone any significant changes at the hands of the government. The Kadi courts have been completely revised. Even so, the religious sphere has been tolerant of some changes simply in order to be strong against the West. The religious element in turn has been able to force some major policies on the government, such as having Islam declared the national
religion of Egypt. It is not inconsistent with Islamic doctrines to have religious men in office in Egypt. Islam is not a theory to be pondered, but a religion to be lived practically and spiritually. Sadat seems to be attempting to exemplify such a position. Secularists, abandoning the traditional view that individuals are responsible for their own actions, have tried to blame religion for irresponsible actions of individuals. In other words, religion should not be blamed for man's stupidity.

Today, Egypt has become one of the major centers for Islam. Cairo has replaced Istanbul as the leading Islamic center in providing religious training for the Islamic world. Al-Azhar has undergone reform and has been modernized although it still lacks diversity in its curriculum. The reforms of Abouh and kida have not yet been realized. The status of women has been slightly improved. Classical Islam has remained strong and vibrant. Punishments such as maiming or flogging are viewed as primitive and not in accord with modern society. The west is still seen as materialistic and evil, but its technical advancements are no longer shunned to the point of rejection. Some objectivity toward the analysis of Western ideas has been advanced without a reduction in the status of Islam. Xenophobia has been somewhat reduced in most Muslim countries and the notion has become prevalent that those who treat Muslims justly should in turn be treated justly.

In regards to the problem of the failure of modernization in Egypt, apologetics is the most commonly employed tool. Smith defines Islamic apologetic as "the endeavor to prove, to oneself or others, that Islam is sound." It is defensive in nature and tends to dwell on the past glories of Islam. Apologetics is dangerous in or in as much as that it move to save the Muslim ego rather than to work in the service of God. Energies need to be concentrated on what can be done at the present to make Islam more vibrant. Apologetics although necessary should not be the center of Islamic work. Efforts in the field of historiography would
probably better serve Muslim objectives. Historiography is the use of history not to relate exact facts and dates but rather to give society a sense of bearing or purpose. There is a great need for critical historical study of Islam by Muslims themselves so as to develop their own historiography. The danger in historiography is that it lends itself to self-delusion. Such delusions can lead to a state of inaction. Indeed, some such self-delusion already exists in Islam. Islam needs a proper view of itself in history if it is able to develop properly its goals for the future.

Egypt has an extremely long tradition of organized religion to the point that religion is strongly a part of Egyptian culture. The conflict between reform and orthodoxy continues to this day. Al-Khidr Husayn spoke of "a moral imperative" for Islam to go on to a modern society. It is not that the Koran is imperfect but rather man's interpretation which requires revision. Al-Khidr thought that work toward the ideal Muslim society does not cease at any point but must be continually refined. Stagnation must be avoided. The best of human qualities must be incorporated into the body of Islam. Badawi echoes such thoughts in a slightly stricter fashion. Again the text of the Koran is perfect and to try to change it is heresy. The restrictions guarding its interpretations must be preserved. Yet, by seeking an understanding of the text in toto, one will be able to work toward a better world. Rahman presents a slightly more liberal view in his notion of "living Sunna" where the community makes use of historical criticism and reinterpretation of hadith to fit modern problems. Rahman feels that it is imperative to stop the degeneration of Islam which has been brought about by a traditional formal application of the Sunna of the Prophet and the Shariah. If change is needed then it must be effected. Rahman's approach is a bit too liberal for most Muslims and his influence is limited.

Most of this section has been concerned with change by means of ijtihad. Another way of change which is perhaps more effective though
less obvious is ijma. If the community of Islam is able to reach consensus concerning a new way of doing something, then that change is legal. Of course, it can be argued that ijma is impossible since consensus is impossible to attain amidst millions of people. Such an argument is irrelevant when it can be seen that change has occurred in Islam as certain aspects of foreign cultures have become everyday things in Islam. Smoking is one example. The process of ijma is slow and does not always meet the particular problems of the day but it is effective and lasting once invoked. The goal of the 'ulema is to direct the process of ijma along the lines of thought which it thinks most fitting to the will of Allah. The task is difficult but not impossible.

What does the future hold for Islam? As with any projection concerning the future, one must be wary of seemingly obvious conclusions. The reality of a situation, being influenced by the bias of the observer, is illusive. To this particular observer, Islam is in the midst of self-evaluation and re-orientation. Self-evaluation is intended to refer to the current struggle within Islam to determine just exactly what are the relevant and fundamental concepts of Islam. Re-orientation refers to the necessity of Islam to view itself on a world scale so as to see how its decisions affect the world at large. Islam today is more vital than it was a hundred years ago. The threat of being overwhelmed by western ideologies has proven largely empty. The notion that Islam is moving toward a state of humanism is ill-founded. Gibb's concept of the Islamic world returning to the ways of the Mutazilites (i.e., humanism of a sort) has not been born out by any evidence in Egypt. Traditional Islamic observance has continued and has even been strengthened by the model of piety which Sadat has attempted to present. Islam under Sadat has served the function of furthering the sense of national spirit among Egyptians. Although a sort of Mahdism has been employed in Iran and attempted in several other states, most change has occurred with a limited amount of violence.
The goals of Islam must be concentrated on solving the problems of the present so as to create a better future. The preservation of Islam's glorious past can only be accomplished by making the present worthy of such a past. The religious modernist must strive to strengthen the belief of Muslims in the truths of the Koran. The realization of a modern, viable Islam rests with the Orthodox Ulema. The Ulema must move to be the voice of criticism against the faults of the government and the advocate of the needs of the people. The Ulema should work on finding inspiration in the ancient verses to help build a better world. The Sheiks of al-Azhar need to work to produce well-trained students who are capable of facing the problems of religion in a modern state. Al-Azhar should become the religious and cultural center for the Islamic world. It should be a source center for Islamic knowledge and wisdom. It might be wise for al-Azhar to shift from establishing more secular courses to improving its religious instruction. Thus, the other universities would be allowed to train people in the secular fields while al-Azhar would be left to concentrate on the moral and religious fabric of Islam in Egypt. Such a view was advanced by Taha Hussein. Such a plan seems to favor the distinction between secular and religious elements while adding a practical problem of how to get a student to go to two different universities. The future of Islam is crucially dependent on the quality of youth being trained today. Islam has so long been politically active in the running of the state, that it is difficult to see its role being altered in the near future. For Islam to be Islam, it must have the offices of the government to express and accomplish its socio-cultural objectives. In Islam, it rests with the state to protect the faith, to ensure the well-being of the people, and to educate each new generation in the ways of Islam.

A return of the Caliphate to Islam seems highly unlikely in the near future. Nationalism has become predominant. Since, the death of Nasser, Egypt has increasingly followed a policy which is concerned with
the Egyptian people rather than the Islamic world at large. Egypt through centuries of domination has maintained its own sense of identity among the nations of the world. Although from a religious standpoint it may be enough to be a Muslim, practically it seems vital for a person to identify himself with the aspirations of a nation. The cultivation of a sense of working toward a better Egypt will probably result in a strengthening of the institution of Islam within the state. The religion of a strong, vital state reflects that strength and vitality. Islam in Egypt can only benefit from a strong, vital Egypt. In its turn, Islam gives Egypt a sense of destiny and purpose. Through an interweaving of the secular and religious spheres, a strong, vital Muslim Egypt will emerge.

Before ending this paper, there will be presented a review of two specific topics relevant to religion and the process of modernization in Egypt. The topics will be concerned with modern education and the role of women in Egyptian society.
CHAPTER VI

EDUCATION

Education is one of the primary tools of socialization. Through education, the goals and ideals of a society are supposed to be transmitted to new generations. Thus, education is essential to effecting modernization in Egypt. The traditional schools in Egypt were only open to a minority of the population who could spare the money to send their children to school and who could spare the loss of their child's labor. Education beyond the level of Sunday-school type religious training was rare. The upper class held a virtual monopoly on the poor education which was available. If someone had the money, he might be able to send his children to a "kuttab" where they could learn to read, write and memorize the Koran.  

It was not really until Muhammed Ali moved to improve the military quality of Egyptian forces that education began to improve. Under Muhammed Ali several hundred upper class young men were trained and finally sent to Europe to complete a university level education. In Egypt itself, medical, linguistic, military and polytechnical schools were established. Eise in the mid-eighteen hundreds, Christian missionary schools were organized. Indeed, the growth of Muslim schools may be in part attributed to a reaction to missionary efforts. Even so, the affect of education on the population was virtually nil. Government schools remained open only to those children of government officials. In 1837, a Department of Schools was founded but it did not last partly because most people saw the schools as a form of conscription. The traditional schools continued their so called education. Memorization was still held to be the equivalent of understanding and thus remained a sign of degeneracy. The teachers continued to teach in a way which failed to induce understanding in their students. A teacher would merely repeat what he had learned from his teacher often times not even understanding what it was that he was saying. The pupil was not
expected to question but only to inject the information being related. The situation slowly improved in Egypt over the years. Even so, by the turn of the century the illiteracy rate in Egypt was still somewhere between 80 and 90 percent. Ismail founded many primary and secondary schools including a girl's school in 1873. Journals were also becoming increasingly common. In 1875, there was one Arabic newspaper in Cairo, whereas by 1890 there were fifty.

Under the British, the number of students studying for the military was reduced and shifted to the humanities. The British moved to educate the upper stratum of Egyptian society in order to gain help in the administration of the government. Such training for civil service work did not necessitate a European university education and the number of state scholarships was reduced. Even so, the number of students studying in Europe increased through the use of private funds. Muslim students studying in Europe found themselves in a Christian environment which was foreign to them. Their dislike of Christianity led them to favor European humanist and anti-religious elements. Some of these ideas found their way back into revolutionary circles in Egypt and eventually came face to face with the dilemma.

As have been mentioned, Abduh moved to make what reforms in education as were possible. He attempted to revitalize classical Arabic as the standard language of education. He had new libraries established and old ones rejuvenated. Abduh warned against foreign schools in Egypt for fear that Islam would be undermined. Under the British, many different foreign schools had been established, such as French, Italian, Greek, English, American and German schools. With so many diverse systems, there was little unity of effect or direction for education. In an attempt to bridge the gap between the extreme conservatism of al-Azhar and the modern secular schools, the Dar al-Ulum university of established. It met with little success. The religious and the secular schools continued side by side with the religious schools being by far the more
numerous. Most Egyptians see religion as a vital part of life that should not be restricted to the home but extended to be a part of the educational system. Some segments of Egyptian society were fearful that education in the hands of the government would lead to religion becoming subservient to the state. Such a view, although well-founded, denied the reality of the situation. Education has indeed led to reform, but the alternative even to the conservative mind could not have been appealing. In the face of Western technology, Egypt possessed a largely ignorant population. An ignorant person could be easily influenced by the "pin-up" superficial materialism of Western societies. Some education was and is necessary to show the Egyptian people the value of their own culture. The people must be able to grasp at least the fundamentals of what their leaders are trying to tell them. Thus, a primary system of education is needed to impute the ideals of a modern, Muslim, socialist state to its citizens.

Since the Free Officer's Revolution in 1952, substantial advances have been made in education. In 1952, the per capita income was so low that the average Egyptian could not afford a private education. With the Revolution of 1952, education has become free and compulsory for children between the ages of seven and twelve. Upper level studies after primary school and through the university are sponsored by the state. Illiteracy has been reduced and Egypt enjoys a healthier, better educated population. Such a population is not as prone as it once was toward apathy and stagnation. Reforms in religion have been enacted largely to the benefit of the Egyptian people with the understanding of the Egyptian people. Through education, religion to the modern Egyptian has become something vital and progressive rather than stagnant and restrictive.
THE ROLE OF WOMEN

The status of women in Islam has long been held to be one of its more antiquated and backward aspects. A review of the reforms and treatment of women in Islamic society may help to illustrate the process of modernization of religion in Egypt. First, in order to eliminate some bias, it should be noted that women have traditionally been better treated in Islam than they have been in Christianity.14 It is part of the process of modernization which has created a more enlightened population. This better educated population has sought reforms so as to improve the social standing of its members. Islam in regards to women has suffered in part from an overprotection complex. The Islamic notion of protecting women from dishonor has been extended by the oriental cultural tradition of male domination. There is nothing in Islam inconsistent with sexual equality.15 Indeed, since the late 1900's, there have been many scholars such as Kusmin Amin and Muhammad Abduh who have moved to establish women's equality with men. Abduh maintained that it is the Islamic tradition that all people are equal.16 He felt that Muslims have an obligation to work toward making women's status equal to that of men's. Abduh pushed for the founding of schools for girls. Most orthodox Muslims also hold women's education to be important yet their reasons were different, the traditionalists held that a woman must be educated because of her influence on the family.17 Children will of course be better educated if there is a healthy attitude toward education at home. Such traditionalist views, although not modern, did in fact give women the opportunity to improve their social standing. This access to education in coordination with a liberal government has brought about an improvement in women's status in Islam. It is wrong to think that it is Islam as a religion which is restrictive to women. This is not the case. It is rather that the application of Shariah has so long been in the hands of men (due largely to pre-Islamic traditions) that women have been slighted. With
no voice, one is seldom represented.

In the post-world war I strikes against the British, men and women stood side by side demanding independence.¹³ Such activism by women had been unheard of in Islam. Upon close examination of the Koran, it can be seen that it moves to strengthen equal rights for women.¹⁴ The Prophet Muhammed moved to improve the position of women from their status in pagan societies. The God of Islam saw man and woman as equals.²⁰ Such trappings as the veil are not dictated by Islam which states that a woman's hands and face need not be covered in public. According to Islam, a woman can make business contracts and control their assets. A woman may even volunteer for service in war.²¹ Even hard line traditionalists hold that women can be attorneys so long as her job does not conflict with her family or honor.²² Such a view holds that a woman could be a general attorney since she could choose her cases, but not a public defender who has to accept what cases are given to him. The cultural tradition, still hostile toward women, sees them as lacking in leadership qualities as well as in intelligence. It must be remembered that western society until very recently held the same view and even now is still culturally prejudiced against the abilities of women in an active job situation. Women in the west are still seen to be lacking in business acumen and leadership qualities. It is hypocritical for the west to condemn Islam for what appears to be its prejudice toward women when the west with all its socio-economic advantages is not all that much better. The west has an educated, supposedly enlightened population and still refuses to grant women equality. Surely, the west needs to be a bit more self examining before it moves to overtly criticize other cultures. It is true that there are points of the Shariah where women are not viewed in the same capacity as men, but such does not necessarily deny their equality only their differences from men. Clearly what is needed to resolve many of these apparent problems in the Shariah, such as the laws of witness, is moreudy of it by better trained, enlightened individu-
als including women. In the mid-sixties for perhaps the first time in Islamic history, a commentary on the Koran was written and published by a woman professor at Ayn Shams University.23

Modernization has done much to improve the status of women in Egypt. Only the lag of cultural traditions holds women back from taking a more active, more equal role in Egyptian society. Once both men and women in Egypt realize the equality which dictates their relationships towards one another, not only Egypt but Islam itself will become stronger and more viable as a world religion.

The effect of modernization on Egypt has now been reviewed. It has been shown that Islam has been placed in the throes of great moral conflict and emerged the better for it. Change is always difficult because it requires a new beginning. The old has to be renovated and the obsolete removed. Change which occurs too quickly risks being replaced just as quickly. For reform to be effective and lasting, it must be done with forethought and patience. Egypt is in the process of modernization. There is no need to scrap the old ways for they are superior to nearly anything which would replace them. Islam will survive, and Muslim Egypt will survive for generations to come.


5. Schacht, pp. 55-57.


7. Schacht, p. 8.


2 Smith, p. 15.


11 Schacht, p. 60.

12 Badawi, p. 11.

13 Schacht, p. 61.

14 Schacht, p. 207.

15 Schacht, p. 59.


18 Schacht, p. 207.

19 Berger, p. 9.


15. Holt, p. 188.
16  Brockelmann, p. 364.
17  Brockelmann, p. 389.
18  Brockelmann, p. 371.
19  Zaki, p. 25.
20  Brockelmann, p. 371.
21  Brockelmann, p. 372.
22  Brockelmann, p. 373.
23  Brockelmann, p. 373.
24  Zaki, p. 37.
25  Zaki, p. 37.
27  Landau, p. 32.
28  Brockelmann, p. 373.
29  Brockelmann, p. 381.
30  Landau, p. 71.
32  Landau, p. 73.
33  Landau, p. 82.
35. Landau, p. 94.
40. Landau, p. 149.
41. Naguib, p. 10.
42. Landau, p. 97.
44. Adams, p. 118.
45. Adams, p. 70.
46. Adams, p. 141.
47. Adams, p. 85.
81 Adams, p. 87.
82 Zakl, p. 87.
83 Zakl, p. 87.
84 Zakl, p. 87.
85 Zakl, p. 87.
86 Adams, p. 87.
88 Lanman, p. 50.
89 Holt, p. 290.
90 Lanman, p. 100.
91 Lanman, p. 55.
92 Holt, p. 294.
93 Holt, p. 295.
94 Chazzali, p. 5.
95 Lanman, p. 147.
96 Brockelmann, p. 152.
98 Lanman, p. 56.
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69 Landau, p. 50.
70 Landau, p. 50.
71 Zaki, p. 68.
72 Landau, p. 167.
73 Zaki, p. 68.
74 Zaki, p. 47.
76 Smith, p. 69.
77 Smith, p. 78.
78 Smith, p. 100.
79 Smith, p. 102.
80 Naguib, p. 184.
81 Naguib, p. 94.
83 Abdel-Malek, p. 46.
84 Abdel-Malek, p. 61.
86 Abdel-Malek, p. XXV.

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101  Abdel-Fattah, p. 104.

104  Shazalli, p. 137.

105  Shazalli, p. 116.

106  Berger, p. 15.

107  Zaki, p. 19.

108  Zaki, p. 31.


110  Zaki, p. 107.

111  Zaki, p. 82.

112  Zaki, p. 310.

113  Zaki, p. 115.


15. Adams, p. 73.


19. Abdel-Malek, p. XXXIV.


27. Naguib, p. 17.


29. Abdel-Malek, p. XXXIV.


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17 Berger, p. 1.
18 Shazzali, p. 61.
19 Jensen, p. 61.
20 Jensen, p. 36.
21 Berger, p. 75.
22 Hub, p. 47.
23 Smith, p. 44.
25 Keddie, p. 113.
27 Smith, pp. 47-49.
28 Jensen, p. 28.
29 Jensen, p. 19.
30 Jensen, p. 20.
31 Gibb, p. 100.
32 Keddie, p. 177.
33 Keddie, p. 167.
34 Keddie, p. 170.
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— Berger, pp. 10, 13.

— Berger, p. 15.

57. Ghazzali, p. 47.

58. Ghazzali, p. 87.

59. Neddle, p. 103.


62. Ghazzali, p. 3.


64. Smith, p. 63.

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66. Smith, p. 126.

67. Smith, p. 117.

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16 hulsen, p. 126.

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18 Landau, p. 150.


20 Badawi, p. 10.

21 Badawi, p. 10.

22 Ghazzali, p. 123.


