CIVIL WAR PRISONS IN ILLINOIS 1862-1865

BY

MITCHELL M. HACOPIAN

Thesis
For the

Degree of Bachelor of Arts
In Liberal Arts and Sciences

College of Liberal Arts and Sciences
University of Illinois
Urbana Illinois
1984
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

MAY 20, 1981

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

MITCHELL M. HACOPIAN

ENTITLED CIVIL WAR PRISONS IN ILLINOIS 1862-1865

IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS

ROBERT W. JOHANSSON
Instructor in Charge

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF
RICHARD W. BURKHARDT, HISTORY
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I am indebted to Professor Robert W. Johannson, without whose patience and enthusiasm this paper would not have been possible.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF PRISONERS AND THE ILLINOIS PRisons</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I: FEBRUARY - SEPTEMBER, 1862</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II: OCTOBER, 1862 - MAY, 1863</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III: MAY - DECEMBER, 1863</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV: JANUARY, 1864 - APRIL 9, 1865</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION: CLOSING THE PRISONS - AFTERWORD</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM OF PRISONERS
AND THE ILLINOIS PRISONS

The Confederate soldiers captured by the Union Army during the early months of the Civil War caused some serious problems for the Lincoln administration. Nobody really knew what to do with them. The suddenness of the war found the United States completely unprepared to care for large numbers of military prisoners. Traditionally, an agreement calling for a general exchange of prisoners would have been signed quickly between the warring parties. The United States had disposed of its prisoners by this method in its previous military conflicts. However, the administration's fear that such an agreement might imply recognition of the seceded states as an independent nation delayed the implementation of a general exchange until well into the second year of the war.\(^1\) By that time a substantial number of captives had been taken, forcing the army to take some sort of precursory action.

That action took the form of a makeshift prison system and, more important in the early months of the war, a series of "special" exchanges in the embattled areas. A special exchange differed from a general one in that it was merely an agreement between opposing military officers, rather than between sovereign nations. It therefore had no implications
for recognition of the Confederacy. Although the majority of the prisoners taken during the first year of the war released through this means, the special exchange system was very flawed. It was not only extremely inconvenient for field commanders to negotiate these agreements but also because of the unequal number of prisoners either side might have at any one location, they were often impossible to effect.² Despite the best intentions of the field officers a percentage of the prisoners was bound to remain unexchanged.

To accommodate these men a military prison system evolved in the north. This consisted primarily of military fortresses and any available civilian prisons. The capacity of these facilities was necessarily limited, and by January of 1862, space in them had been exhausted. This finally forced the Quartermaster General, Montgomery Meigs, to order the construction of a legitimate prisoner of war camp, which was to be located on Johnson's Island in Lake Erie, near Sandusky, Ohio. Its capacity, however, was only 1,000 prisoners.³ This decision reflected the army's reluctance to make large scale preparations for maintaining prisoners.

These measures were acceptable as long as the prisoners only trickled in. Unfortunately, in the spring of 1862, with the fall of Fort Donelson, the Union was inundated with captured Confederates. Overnight the United States found itself with 12,000 military prisoners to care for -- and more important, to keep secure. The problem became acute.
The creation of a Civil War prison system within the state of Illinois is inextricably linked to the Confederate surrender of Fort Donelson. The location of the state with respect to the Mississippi River and the western theater of operations made it a logical place to send at least a large percentage of the Donelson captives. While Illinois was close enough to the military front to make the cost of transporting the prisoners acceptable, the upper half of the state was sufficiently northward to reduce greatly their chances of successful escape. Probably a more important consideration in the army's decision to send the majority of the Donelson prisoners to Illinois, however, was the fact that it had the facilities -- of sorts at least -- to contain them.

These facilities consisted of military camps designed to quarter the large numbers of volunteers then joining the newly formed Illinois regiments. The principal mustering stations for these troops were Camp Douglas in Chicago and Camp Butler in Springfield. It was to these two places that over half of the Donelson prisoners were sent. Although these camps had not been intended for use as prisoner of war camps, they served that purpose tolerably well. They provided ready accommodations for large numbers of men in a relatively concentrated area. The "ready" part was the most important, for the captives had to be disposed of as quickly as possible. The volunteer camps in Illinois
represented a simple solution to the problem. By the end of February, 1862, some 8,000 Confederates were confined at Camps Douglas and Butler.

A third Illinois prison was also permanently activated by the end of February, but this one did not owe its existence to the Federal victories on the Mississippi. During the first year of the war most of the prisoners taken in the west had been held in St. Louis. By January of 1862, however, that city's prison facilities had become extremely overcrowded. To accommodate the overflow from St. Louis, the old state penitentiary at Alton was reopened as a military prison. The prison had been closed in 1860 with the opening of the penitentiary at Joliet. Conveniently, the prison was located only a few miles up the Mississippi from the St. Louis facilities. Alton's proximity to St. Louis also created problems, however. During 1862 and 1863 the Alton prison had difficulty maintaining an identity separate from that of the St. Louis prisons.

In 1863, due to the Union Army's unwillingness to reinforce the dwindling Confederate forces through prisoner exchanges, the general exchange agreement broke down. The increasing number of prisoners held in the north because of this, forced the army to order the construction of a new prison barracks in Illinois, this one to be located at Rock Island, literally in the middle of the Mississippi River. The Rock Island prison camp was one of only two United
States prisons built specifically for the confinement of captured Confederates.

The prison network that developed in Illinois during the Civil War contained examples of most of the elements that formed the national system. Camp Douglas and Butler were converted instruction camps, which, while meeting the basic needs of prisoner of war camps, had many disadvantages. The Alton penitentiary exemplified the many civilian prisons that the army utilized as military prisons; except for their size, these prisons suited their purpose admirably. Finally, the Rock Island prison barracks represented the army's attempt at building its own prisoner of war camp. Logically, this camp's design should have benefited from the experience of two years of guarding prisoners. Sadly, it did not.

Conditions in the four prisons varied considerably, but in none were they very pleasant. Inadequate clothing, insufficient medical attention, and harsh weather affected all the camps. Smallpox epidemics struck each of the prisons sometime during their existences, sharply increasing their mortality rates. All these conditions were aggravated by what William Hesselton has called the "war psychosis of the north," the feeling which pervaded the Union that, in view of the cruel treatment the Federal soldiers were receiving at the hands of their captors, the treatment of the Confederate prisoners had been far too gentle. This irrational
feeling led to the general neglect of the prisoners' basic needs during the final year of the war. 5

By the close of the Civil War, Illinois had become the most important state in the nation's military prison organization. This was mainly because of the fact that most of the Confederate soldiers captured during the war were taken in the west. Consequently, Illinois was the safest and most convenient place to hold them. Of the 220,000 Confederates captured by the Union Armies, about 56,000 spent their lonely captivity in the prisons of Illinois. Nearly 8,800 of them died here. 6
Chapter I
FEBRUARY-SEPTEMBER, 1862

"I fear they will prove an elephant," wrote an exasperated Ulysses S. Grant of the 12,000 Confederates he had just captured at Fort Donelson. Indeed, they did. Because of the lopsided number of captives held by the north, a negotiated local exchange was impossible. The Union had no choice but to keep the Donelson prisoners. The question was, where? The only places capable of containing so large a number of men with a reasonable assurance of security were the various mustering camps of the northern states. In Camps Butler and Douglas Illinois had two of the largest of these. Major General Henry Halleck, commander of the Department of Missouri, assumed military jurisdiction of the prisoners and promptly devised a plan by which most of them would end up in those two places.

Actually, Halleck should not have been the one to determine the destination of the prisoners. In October of 1861, as part of the War Department's response to the increasing number of Confederates being held, Colonel William Hoffman had been appointed commissary general of prisoners. The office was designed to centralize all matters concerning prisoners, from their capture to their release. The post, however, had not been filled since 1816 and most of the Union high command was unaware that it existed, let alone what the breadth of its authority was. Until the position
and Hoffman's appointment to it had been formally announced to the army in June, 1862, Halleck assumed responsibility for the western prison camps. In any case, Halleck took charge of the Donelson prisoners immediately. Neither Grant nor Halleck had expected the fort to fall so quickly -- if at all; therefore, when it was invested on February 16, 1862, no preparations whatsoever had been made for the containment of its garrison. Grant's army itself was not even twice the size of the captured force, making it extremely difficult and dangerous to guard them in the field. In order to get the Confederates away from the front lines Halleck ordered them to Cairo, Illinois, a Federal base on the Mississippi. Upon their arrival there he planned to send them to St. Louis, from which 9,000 would be dispatched to Chicago's Camp Douglas and 3,000 to Springfield's Camp Butler. A telegram dated February 18 from the governor of Illinois, Richard Yates, however, forced Halleck to alter his plans. Yates warned that there were "many secessionists" at Springfield and advised Halleck not to send any prisoners there. In response to this, Halleck wired Brigadier General George Cullum at Cairo and instructed him to divert the 3,000 men intended for Springfield to Indianapolis. Due to an untimely break in the telegraph, however, this message did not reach Cullum until late in the evening of February 19. By that time he had already dispatched 11,000 prisoners.
northward, thereby forcing Halleck to follow his original plan. Ultimately, about 2,000 of the Donelson captives went to Camp Butler and 7,000 to Camp Douglas. The remainder ended up in various camps in Indiana and Ohio.

The night of February 20, 1862, found the first Confederate prisoners arriving at Camp Douglas. The Chicago populace was eager to view the unfortunate rebels:

The arrival of the first prisoners aroused the curiosity of the local citizens who wanted to see the "queer-looking Southern sons of chivalry." Fathers and mothers were teased to death to take their children somewhere, anywhere within a mile of the train which would bring such unheard of freight, that their eyes might for awhile look on such men as had confidently boasted that "they could each one whip five times their own individuality!" Some young ladies were willing to turn out at midnight to get a glance at the secesh.

Though Chicagoans may have been ready to see the prisoners, Camp Douglas was by no means prepared to receive them. First of all, Douglas had been designed to quarter U.S. volunteers, not prisoners of war. Consequently, the barracks were not built off the ground, thereby facilitating tunneling by the prisoners. More important, it had no fence surrounding it. In addition to these problems, on February 21, all the troops stationed at Camp Douglas were ordered to the front, while the guards who accompanied the captives were supposed to return to their units. This would leave the camp virtually unguarded. A worried Chicago mayor,
Julian Rumsey, wrote to Halleck of these conditions, saying "our best citizens are in great alarm for fear that the prisoners will break through and burn the city." He asked that Halleck "immediately give the necessary orders to have the camp put in better order." Halleck impatiently replied with an order to detain the guard in his name and the suggestion that the mayor raise a temporary civilian police force. Halleck followed with a sharp rebuke to the flustered Rumsey: "I have taken these Confederates in arms behind their intrenchments; it is a great pity if Chicago cannot guard them unarmed for a few days."

If the description that a Chicago woman gave of the new arrivals to Camp Douglas was at all accurate it seems doubtful that Mayor Rumsey's fears were justified:

A more motley-looking crowd was never seen in Chicago. They were mostly un-uniformed and shivering with cold, wrapped in tattered bedquilts, pieces of old carpets; hearth rugs, horse blankets, ragged shoals -- anything that would serve to keep out the cold and hide their tatterdemalion condition. They had evidently suffered severely in the terrible three days' fight at Donelson, not only from the arctic weather but from insufficient clothing.

Their gaunt appearance must have been enhanced by the fact that from the time of their capture to the time of their arrival, a period of four to five days, only two days' worth of rations had been issued them. Obviously, these men were in no condition to ransack the city.
Trainloads of prisoners had been passing through Springfield on their way to Chicago for two days before the men actually destined for Camp Butler arrived on February 22. Many of the same difficulties that accompanied the prisoners' arrival in Chicago were encountered in Springfield. Butler too was without a surrounding fence, and the guard detail was woefully undermanned. Although some 8,000 troops had already been mustered into the army at Camp Butler, none were on hand when the prisoners arrived. The defenseless condition of the camp prompted one observer to remark that "the detention of the prisoners there depends more on their willingness to remain than on any restraint upon them by the guard." Unlike in Chicago, however, the city fathers did not panic. Instead, a civilian guard was raised to supplement the troops that had been sent with the prisoners. Despite Governor Yates' fears that Springfield was an unsafe place for Confederate prisoners and that the camp was vulnerable, no uprising of prisoners and "secessionists" occurred.

The city's apparent unconcern for its own security was probably due to three factors. First, only a relatively small number of prisoners -- about 2,000 -- had been sent to Camp Butler, as compared to the 7,000 bound for Douglas. Second, Butler was located some six miles east of the city, whereas Douglas was only a few blocks away from downtown Chicago. Finally, the generally miserable condition in
which the prisoners arrived caused feelings of pity rather than fear among the Springfield citizens. The *Illinois State Journal*, Springfield's strong Republican newspaper, found their appearance "decidedly grotesque." Nevertheless, the sight of these decrepit warriors touched even the *Journal*, which wrote: "Let us kill with kindness those we did not kill with bullets."  

By late February the prisons in Springfield and Chicago were in full operation. Their establishment overshadowed an event that had occurred earlier that month: the transfer of 500 prisoners from the McDowell College prison in St. Louis to the old state penitentiary at Alton. This transfer signalled the permanent activation of the penitentiary as a U.S. Army facility.  

The St. Louis prisons, then consisting of the McDowell College building and a two story brick structure formerly used as a slave pen, had been accumulating prisoners since the fall of 1861. By January of 1862 they were overcrowded. On January 26, Halleck ordered that the Alton prison be made ready to receive prisoners from St. Louis. The first detachment arrived there on February 12.  

The opening of the Alton prison contrasted sharply with the opening of the other two Illinois prisons. At the latter the process had been chaotic; at the former it went very smoothly. Two factors contributed to that smoothness. To begin, Alton was a real prison, rather than a mustering camp. Naturally, security was built into the institution.
Unoccupied only since June of 1860, it was not difficult to
get the place prepared for its first Confederate occupants.15
Almost as important as this was the fact that the authorities
at Alton had received ample notice (over two weeks compared
to the four days given to Douglas and Butler) of the pri-
soners' arrival.

The month of February had been a busy one. Three
Illinois prisons were added to the nation's infant prison
system; nearly 10,000 Confederate soldiers were now confined
within the state's borders. With the establishment of the
prisons the problem of disposing of the Donelson captives
was solved. As the month of February waned, the commanding
officers at Alton, Butler, and Douglas could turn their
attention to the everyday concerns of prison administration.
Their problems were just beginning.

In the haste and confusion that clouded the disposal of
the Donelson captives, Halleck had neglected to give the
commanders of Camps Butler and Douglas, Colonel Gerald
Morrison and Colonel James Mulligan respectively, any
detailed instructions for the governance of their posts.
"Treat them the same as our own soldiers," he had said
vaguely. He had given some general directions to Lieutenant
Colonel Sidney Burbank at Alton, but these were very
sketchy.16 In the absence of any guidance, the commanding
officers reacted as best they could to problems as they
occurred. They directed their questions to whomever seemed
appropriate, usually Halleck, Hoffman, or Montgomery Meigs, the quartermaster general. There was, however, little co-
ordination among these officers. Inevitably, major incons-
sistencies in the management of the camps developed. This 
unsatisfactory method was especially galling to Colonel 
Hoffman, under whose purview all matters relating to pri-
soners were supposed to be. One of his first actions follow-
ing the announcement of his responsibilities was to issue 
a circular which outlined the duties of the commanding 
officers. 17

The general objective of each commanding officer was 
to provide "for the discipline and good order of his command 
and for the security of the prisoners." Specifically, 
Hoffman ordered each officer to divide his prisoners into 
companies, take daily roll calls, and provide his office 
with a monthly report on the camp and its inmates. In addi-
tion, the camp commander was supposed to requisition cloth-
ing which was deemed "absolutely necessary" to the health 
of the prisoners. Hoffman did not make clear exactly which 
arcticles he considered "absolutely necessary," but he was 
careful to note that "from the 30th of April to the 1st of 
October neither drawers nor socks will be allowed except 
to the sick."

The circular also provided for the creation of a camp 
"general fund." This would be used to purchase "all such 
articles as may be necessary for the health and comfort of
the prisoners and which will otherwise have to be purchased by the government." These items included cooking utensils, table furniture, postage stamps, stationary, and straw for bedding. Any enlargements or improvements to the barracks would also be paid for out of it. The money for this fund was to come from a tax on the camp sutler and from the sale of rations withheld from the prisoners. It had been decided long before to feed the prisoners the same rations, in quantity and quality, as those fed the Federal troops. Hoffman, assuming that these rations would be too large for men leading sedentary life, decided to use the surplus as a revenue source for the prisons. He apparently concluded that it would aid the army by lowering its cost of maintaining the prisoners. He felt it would also improve the lot of the prisoners by supplying them with articles the army might be reluctant to purchase for them.

Hoffman's circular also clarified the official position on three issues which had caused particular problems for the Illinois camps. These were: visitors to prisons, the right of the prisoners to hold and receive money, and the parole and release of prisoners.

At all three of the camps, visitors had been allowed almost free access to the prisoners. A group of Confederate officers confined at Alton was found to be "constantly in conference" with "the rebels of Missouri." These same officers had some three hundred dollars at their disposal.
At Camp Butler H. W. Fredley, one of Hoffman's prison inspectors, discovered that many prisoners had been aided in escaping "by disloyal persons living in the area" and by "persons from Tennessee and Kentucky visiting their friends and relatives confined in the camp." The problem was much worse at Camp Douglas, where Colonel Mulligan was extremely lax in his allowance of both money and visitors to the prisoners. Mulligan's liberal issuance of passes made it possible for almost anyone to get into the camp. The stupidity of that policy was quickly demonstrated. Dr. L. D. Boone, the chairman of a citizens' committee for the relief of the prisoners, had distributed cash to the prisoners during his frequent visits to the camp. The prisoners, much to the dismay of the philanthropic Boone, used the money to bribe a sentinel and make their escape. Twenty-one of them got away in this fashion. Hoffman, reacting to these abuses, ordered that: "Prisoners will not be allowed to hold or receive money." Instead, any private funds or gifts would be credited to the prisoner's account at the sutler's store, and any money left would be returned upon his release. Hoffman further commanded that: "Persons out of mere curiosity will in no case be permitted." Hereafter, only the loyal relatives of seriously ill prisoners would be admitted to camps.

The unauthorized release of prisoners had also been a problem at the Illinois camps. Many of the soldiers captured
at Donelson had been forced into the Confederate service and wanted to be released upon swearing their allegiance to the United States. Halleck, seeing a perfect opportunity to unburden the army of a large number of captives, sent a commission to Camps Butler and Douglas which was authorized to administer the Oath of Allegiance to the prisoners. Before the War Department had even learned of the commission's existence, it had received 1,640 signatures at Butler and Halleck was making plans to close that prison by sending the remainder of its captives to Douglas.22 Meanwhile, at Alton, Lieutenant Colonel Burbank was wondering how he should deal with the three hundred Confederates who were petitioning for release there.23 Typically, the most bizarre incidents were reserved for Camp Douglas. Here the British Consul was attempting to investigate the cases of some three hundred Confederates who sought their release by claiming British citizenship. Colonel Mulligan, however, outdid everyone by enlisting -- against specific orders -- several hundred Camp Douglas prisoners into his command!24 Hoffman, trying to bring some order to this chaotic situation, made his position clear: "Prisoners will be paroled or released only by the authority of the War Department, or by the direction of the commissary-general of prisoners."

Although hospitals and medical attention for the prisoners were among the first concerns of the commanding officers, Hoffman's circular scarcely addressed them, saying
only, "the hospital will be under the immediate charge of the senior surgeon who will be held responsible to the commanding officer for its good order and the condition of the sick." Economy -- of all things -- seemed to determine the quality of medical treatment at the prisons. In an effort to minimize the cost of medical care, captured Confederate surgeons were assigned to the prisons. This practice had to be stopped in June of 1862, when all captured medical personnel were released.\textsuperscript{25} Civilian physicians were hired to replace the Confederate doctors, but in many camps there were simply not enough of them. Hospitals, too, suffered from the government's frugality. Because of the expense, Hoffman was reluctant to enlarge the hospitals, even though they were often too small to accommodate all of the sick. As a result, large numbers of the sick were left unattended; many died in the barracks without ever having seen a doctor. This facet of prison administration required vigorous guidance. It never received it.

Nevertheless, Hoffman's circular gave the camp commanders definite instructions for most of the important matters relating to the prisons. Now the commandants at least knew what was expected of them. Additionally, they had some clues as to how to carry out their duties. In this respect Hoffman's statement was an important stage in the evolution of the nation's military prison system. Unfortunately, no matter what Hoffman ordered and no matter how far his
authority technically reached, his influence over the commanding officers was limited.

A basic flaw in the prison command system insured this limitation: there were no permanent prison commanders. Instead, officers were assigned to prison command according to the availability of their regiments for guard duty. The typical commandant was usually in the process of coming or going to the front. Therefore, his tenure as a prison commander was necessarily temporary.

This lack of continuity in the prison command structure caused major difficulties for Hoffman. The constant replacement of commandants made it almost impossible for Hoffman to keep a close watch on any of the officers. If an officer was not staying within the parameters set down in the circular, Hoffman did not usually find out about it until after that officer had moved on. This brevity of service also affected the way the officers approached their prison responsibilities. These men had joined the army to fight the rebels on the battlefield, not in the prisonyard. For them, prison duty was a sort of diversion. Consequently, they did not always attend it with overt enthusiasm. Only loosely supervised, an officer could operate his camp as he saw fit.

The result of all this was that the prison camps were chameleonic. They underwent drastic personality changes each time they received new commanding officers. Camp police,
garrison discipline, medical treatment, and record organization and accuracy changed every time the chief officer did. Thus, a camp which was in excellent condition under one officer, might, a month later have become a shambles — simply because of a change in command. Examples of this situation occurred throughout the history of the Illinois camps.

During the first months of their existences this problem was already becoming apparent. So too were the problems caused by the physical limitations of the prisons — especially at Chicago. A series of prison inspections made by Hoffman and his aides revealed these problems and gave a vivid picture of prison conditions. Although these reports were made by northerners, they seemed, for the most part, to be remarkably candid.

One of the exceptions was the report about the penitentiary at Alton. Nevertheless, of the three Illinois prisons, Alton was probably in the best condition. The military prisoners there were quartered in the passageways between the cells and in some of the prison's outbuildings. The authorities, respecting the military status of their captives, had not succumbed to the temptation of locking the prisoners in the 256 cells they had at their disposal. Some twenty-four civilian prisoners were, however, placed in the cells. The inspectors, for what their report was worth, found the quarters "excellent;" the hospital "large,
well ventilated, and not crowded." In fact, the only negative comment they had was that straw for bedding was not adequately distributed. When this was corrected they felt that "the condition of the prisoners at Alton will be entirely comfortable and beyond the reach of reasonable complaint." This glowing picture notwithstanding, conditions could not have been so good. One remark by the inspectors unwittingly revealed a truer impression of conditions within the prison. They said that the quarters were "equal if not superior to those at Camps Butler [and] Douglas...." 27 The subsequent discussion will show that "equal if not superior to" Butler and Douglas did not mean very much.

As a mustering site, Camp Butler had a reputation for being filthy and "generally vermin ridden." 28 As a prison it was at least as disgusting. Only two weeks after its opening as a prison facility, Hoffman had deemed the sanitary condition of the camp "not at all satisfactory." He found the water supply deficient and the police of the camp inadequate. The worst aspect of the prison, however, was the hospital which he described as being too small and "in a very offensive condition." The utter repulsiveness of the place led him to hire two civilian physicians to augment the surgeons already on duty. 29

In May, some three months after Hoffman's initial inspection, conditions had not improved. Upon his assign-
ment to Camp Butler, Surgeon J. Cooper McKee found the hospital in a horrible state:

The floors were filthy; deodorizing agents were not thought of; slops and filth were thrown indiscriminately around. The sick were crowded in wooden bunks, some on the floor, many without blankets, and nearly all without straw, either old or new. No attention was paid to ventilation or drainage. The stench of the wards was horrid and sickening. Food was abundant but badly prepared, medicine was deficient. The stewards were ignorant and negligent of their business, the nurses insubordinate and inattentive to the wants of their sick companions. The condition of the prisoners, many of whom had been broken down in service prior to their capture, opened a favorable and unlimited field for the development of low types of disease, and accordingly typhus and typhoid fevers, pneumonia, erysipelas, &c., raged with violence and great fatality.

By July, McKee had improved the medical treatment and cleaned up the hospital considerably. To prevent the spread of disease, he separated the sick according to the illnesses they had contracted. In addition, he scrubbed and sanitized the buildings themselves. From the hospital fund he purchased "many necessary articles, such as ice." When Hoffman's aide, H. W. Freedley, inspected the hospital that month he was able to say that "their [the sick] present condition is very favorable and reflects credit upon all connected with their management."

Unfortunately, Freedley discovered the camp's records to be in a state of confusion. Colonel Morrison turned
out to be a very irresponsible officer. He outranked Hoffman, and this apparently affected his willingness to cooperate with that officer's directives. No accurate record of how many men were actually in the camp existed; indeed, Morrison had not even bothered to take a daily roll call during June. His discipline of the camp had also been somewhat less than satisfactory, resulting in its generally miserable condition. It took Freedley over two weeks to bring some semblance of order to the camp and its records. 32

Camp Douglas, too, was a mess almost from the beginning. The prison had been organized under Colonel Joseph Tucker, commander of the Northern Military District of Illinois, but was first commanded by Colonel James Mulligan. His tenure as chief officer was an embarrassment to the army.

Tucker had organized the camp well. Hoffman inspected the camp a few days after Tucker had placed the camp in Mulligan's hands, finding "the prisoners of war at Camp Douglas very well quartered and the sick comfortably provided for." Though there were some 400 sick among the prisoners, the quality of the camp led Hoffman to expect that number to diminish rapidly. 33 By the time Mulligan relinquished command in June, 1862, the condition of the post had deteriorated sharply. On his second inspection of Douglas Hoffman was compelled to write:
There has been the greatest carelessness and willful neglect in the management of the affairs of the camp, and everything was left by Colonel Mulligan in a shameful state of confusion. It is reported that there is scarcely a record of any kind left in the camp and it will be difficult to ascertain what prisoners have been at the camp or what has become of them.  

Mulligan did, however, manage to execute faithfully one of his prescribed duties: the creation of a camp fund -- from which he promptly stole 1400 dollars.  

In addition to his administrative negligence, Mulligan had almost entirely ignored his responsibility for the prisoners' well being. Hoffman found that "the police of the camp had been much neglected and was in a most deplorable condition...." Henry Bellows, President of the U.S. Sanitary Commission -- an independent organization dedicated to improving sanitary conditions at army camps -- corroborated Hoffman's findings. As he put it, the condition of the prison was "enough to drive a sanitarian to despair."  

Bellows' report also showed, however, that Camp Douglas's problems were not all due to human inefficiency. Primarily because of its location, the camp contained some inherent weaknesses which also detracted from its sanitation. The loveness of the ground upon which the camp was built made adequate natural drainage impossible, and no sewer system had been built to compensate for this. Neither had the barracks been equipped with proper systems
of ventilation. These factors compounded the difficulties created by the poor police making the camp "a source of pestilence." Bellows urged that the site be abandoned.  

Hoffman, realizing that something should be done, but knowing that the tonment of Douglas was out of the question, recommended that a proper sewer and waterworks be installed. He estimated that the project would cost between $5,000 and $8,000. The quartermaster general, however, rejected the proposal and blamed the camp's filthy condition solely on its inmates. "Ten thousand men," he wrote, "should certainly be able to keep this camp clean and the United States has other uses for its money than to build waterworks to save them the labor necessary to their health."

Mulligan was succeeded by the man who had organized the prison, Colonel Joseph Tucker. He immediately set about repairing the damage Mulligan had inflicted. Unfortunately, the prison's advanced state of decay, coupled with the rejection of the proposed drainage system, prevented him from doing anything substantial. Although Tucker did improve the daily police of the camp, he could do little more. The accumulated filth of three months of neglect could not simply be picked up and carted away. The condition of the barracks and grounds were such that, as one observer put it, "Nothing but fire can cleanse them."
Fortunately for all concerned -- but especially for the prisoners -- a general exchange was agreed upon late in July, 1862. After over a year of negotiations, the exchange commissioners, Major General John Dix for the north and Major General D. H. Hill for the south, had finally arrived at an agreement that was acceptable to both sides. According to the terms of the agreement, prisoners would be exchanged, one for one, at Aikens Landing, Virginia in the east (later changed to City Point, Virginia) and Vicksburg, Mississippi in the west. More important, the agreement contained a section which provided for the future release of prisoners. Thereafter, all captured soldiers would be sent to the exchange points where they would be released upon giving their "parole" -- their promise not to return to active military duty until they had been declared exchanged by the proper authorities.  

Questions regarding prison conditions and management were, at the moment, set aside as the prison commandants prepared to release their prisoners. By October, 1862, all Confederate prisoners had left Illinois. 

These first nine months in the history of the Illinois prison had been eventful ones. During this time the United States had held some 20,500 Confederate prisoners; if of them had been confined in the prisons of the Guidelines had been set concerning the administration of the prisons and some early problems, such as
the unauthorized release of prisoners and visitation limitations, had been effectively dealt with. Unfortunately, greater and more fundamental problems remained unsolved. The cases of Colonel Morrison and Colonel Mulligan had demonstrated the weakness of the prison command system, while Camp Douglas' drainage problem revealed that certain defects had been built into the prisons. Together, these problems took a fearful toll in Confederate lives: over 1,000 died during these months. It was an inauspicious beginning.
Chapter II

OCTOBER, 1862 - MAY, 1863

The exchange agreement led to the temporary closing of the Chicago and Springfield prisons. However, it had little affect on the Alton penitentiary. This was mainly because a large percentage of Alton's inmates were of a nonmilitary type. Thus, unlike at Douglas and Butler, the release of the Confederates did not empty the Alton prison. An assortment of "spies, bridge-burners, train-wreckers, and various southern sympathizers," as well as a large number of Union soldiers held on criminal charges still populated the prison. In addition, Hoffman intended to use Alton as a collection point for Confederate soldiers captured after the exchange agreement. When enough of these prisoners had accumulated to make a trip economically worthwhile they would be sent to Vicksburg for exchange. Thus, from October, 1862, to January, 1863, Alton would be the only operating prison in Illinois for Confederate soldiers.

These four months were the beginning of a stormy period in the prison's history. Since its activation in February, Alton had largely been an extension of the nearby St. Louis prison system. Many of the military and most of the civilian prisoners held in Alton had been sent from the overcrowded St. Louis prisons. The status of
these prisoners had always been in doubt. The provost marshal general of St. Louis was under the impression that prisoners sent to Alton were still within his jurisdiction. Consequently, he released and recalled Alton prisoners at will. Apparently this situation did not bother Alton's first two commanders, Colonel Sidney Burbank or his successor, Major Franklin Flint. It did, however, greatly annoy Colonel Jesse Hildebrand of the 77th Ohio who took command of Alton in late September, 1862.

Hildebrand's regiment had been sent to Alton to "recover its nerve" after being routed at Shiloh. His tenure of command was not a very pleasant one. The people of Alton dubbed the 77th Ohio the "shiloh racers" and children ridiculed his soldiers in the street. Disgusted with his regiment's performance and angered by the townspeople's attitude, Hildebrand was in no mood to have his authority as prison commandant undermined by someone in St. Louis. To make matters worse, Hildebrand's appointment to Alton coincided with the appointment of Colonel Thomas Gantt to the provost marshal generalship in St. Louis. Gantt casually disregarded Hildebrand and assumed responsibility of Alton's inmates. The two personalities clashed almost immediately.

In early October, an extremely upset Hildebrand complained to Colonel Hoffman that Gantt:
frequently sends orders to me
to admit ladies and gentlemen
into the prison to see their
friends. He also orders me to
make out the same rolls and
returns that you require. He
wants returns made to him every
two weeks. Now, to undertake
to live and act under the
rulings of two masters is more
than I contracted for and more
than I am willing to submit to.

In addition, he complained that when Gantt bothered to
send rolls with detachments of prisoners -- which was not
very often -- they were almost always inaccurate.

Hoffman, in order "to avoid embarrassment" and
"promote the interest of the service which should be our
first consideration," reminded Gantt of the supremacy of
the commissary general's office. Citing the circular he
had issued earlier that year, Hoffman specifically forbade
Gantt's practice of giving passes to friends and relatives
of Alton inmates. He also instructed Gantt to send only
military and long term political prisoners to Alton and
to be sure to accompany all prisoners with accurate lists.
Hoffman did acknowledge that the provost marshal general
had a limited right to release prisoners that had been
sent from St. Louis while their cases were still pending,
but expressed his desire that, "if practicable," no more
prisoners of this type be sent to Alton. For the moment,
Hoffman's dispatch stabilized the relationship between
Alton and St. Louis.
Hildebrand's troubles, however, were just beginning. Having temporarily fended off the threat from St. Louis, he immediately found his authority under attack from two new sources. First, Governor Yates tried to make personal appointments to the Alton staff. Hildebrand managed, with the firm support of Hoffman, to prevent this intrusion of civil authority. In his dealings with superior military officers, however, he was less successful. Overstepping the Alton commandant and in violation of Hoffman's circular, Generals Grant and Samuel Curtis released and paroled Alton inmates. Hildebrand, apparently assuming that the generals were entitled to this privilege, did not even inform Hoffman that the releases were occurring. Captain Freedley, on one of his frequent inspection trips, discovered the situation while he was investigating the camp's records. "With the orders of the War Department, the circular from your office and your letters before him, wrote a disgusted Freedley to Hoffman, "the commanding officer pleads want of information as his excuse."  

In late November, 1862, only a few days after Hildebrand had been chided for his handling of the unauthorized Grant and Curtis releases, the conflict with St. Louis flared anew. By this date Gantt had been replaced as provost marshal general by Franklin Dick. The new provost marshal general proved to be even more overbearing than Gantt. In defiance of at least the spirit, if not the
letter, of Hoffman's instructions to Gantt, Dick sent 276 prisoners to Alton whose cases had not been decided -- despite the fact that he had plenty of long term captives available for transfer. Moreover, Dick had no list of the prisoners and was under the impression that he was sending 400 men. Even worse, he allowed the detachment to arrive at Alton in the middle of the night. The night arrival, coupled with the absence of rolls, made escape easy and detection virtually impossible. The provost marshal general climaxed his highhanded action with the sneering remark that "according to the instructions of Colonel Hoffman I can send these prisoners at this time to Alton and still retain control over them." Dick had converted the "limited authority" Hoffman had given the provost marshal general over certain Alton prisoners into a license to create bedlam. 7

Dick's total disregard for Alton's security quickly elicited responses from both Hoffman and Captain Freedley, who was still inspecting the prison when the St. Louis prisoners arrived. Freedley, calling Dick's action "inexcusable," bluntly stated that "it is impossible to keep a correct record of this prison if prisoners arrive here after dark and without rolls." Meanwhile, Hoffman reiterated the instructions he had given Gantt and chided Dick for abusing the provost marshal general's right to retain control over certain Alton prisoners. The message also
contained a polite, but firm, warning to Dick not to over-
step his authority again. "The management of the prison
is under my exclusive control," wrote Hoffman, "and only
such regulations as I approve will be carried out there." 8

Interestingly, Hildebrand himself did not respond to
this latest assault. Two months of continuous outside in-
terference seemed to have destroyed his desire to defend
the independence of his command. Since nobody seemed to
care what his opinions were anyway, he was content to let
Hoffman and Freedley handle the affair as they saw fit.
Already vanquished in the field, Hildebrand was losing his
personal battle for self-esteem. Unfortunately, his in-
creasing softspokenness and his inability to command the
respect of his fellow officers were affecting the prison
itself. Freedley's inspection showed that Hildebrand's
administration of Alton left much to be desired.

"The Colonel," wrote Freedley of Hildebrand, "while
he endeavors satisfactorily to perform his duties, has
but little system or organization in his office and there
is culpable want of discipline in his command." His
worst fault seemed to be his ineffective handling of his
inferior officers. In this area Hildebrand demonstrated
the same reserve -- or spinelessness -- he had exhibited
in his relationships with officers of superior rank.
Finding his underlings lacking in administrative ability,
he attempted to oversee personally all their duties.
Regrettably, Hildebrand did not possess the skills necessary to accomplish this formidable task successfully. As a result, Freedley found the prison's records in an extraordinary state of disarray and its management characterized by laziness. Prisoners had not been organized into squads and the rolls for September and October were error-ridden beyond the point of correction. This confusion made detection of escapes almost impossible and Freedley suspected that many prisoners were taking advantage of the opportunity. Freedley's comparison of the prison's most recent records with a head count netted a perplexing result: "Four names were found on the rolls who were not found in the prison, and three persons were found in the prison whose names were not found on the rolls." Hildebrand's incompetence and the prison's resultant disorder prompted Freedley to ask that he be placed in temporary command. Despite the fact that Hildebrand greatly out-ranked Freedley, Hoffman quickly complied with the captain's request.

Prison administration was not the only area to suffer from Hildebrand's ineptitude. The Colonel seemed to infuse everyone who surrounded him with a visible lack of energy. Freedley found the guards performing their duties in a "loose and careless manner" and blamed their behavior on "a relaxation of discipline and from want of force in their officers." The police of the camp, which Freedley noted
"should have been excellent," suffered from "a want of attention of force" in the noncommissioned officers. Even the prisoners, whom the inspector described as being "excessively indolent," were affected by the lackadaisical atmosphere. It took a great deal of effort on the part of Freedley to get the officers and men to approach their duties responsibly and with even a slight degree of enthusiasm.11

While a semblance of order gradually returned to the prison, the jurisdictional battle with St. Louis continued to rage. Dick continued to insist that his office had exclusive control over large numbers of Alton's prisoners. His tenacity seemed to have completely intimidated Hildebrand. After Freedley's departure in December, Hildebrand weekly released several hundred prisoners according to Dick's orders.12 The provost marshal general, however, was not satisfied with simply controlling the Alton commandant, began criticizing Hoffman for releasing prisoners at Alton without consulting his office! He maintained that Hoffman's unfamiliarity with all the facts of the cases had let to the release of some undesirables. Dick particularly noted the case of John Singleton, a Confederate officer whom he believed to be "a bad and dangerous man" and unworthy of release. He also claimed that it was necessary for him to be supplied with complete lists of all prisoners released from Alton by Hoffman.13
Accustomed to the submissive Hildebrand, Dick was wholly unprepared for Hoffman's impatient reply: "All prisoners sent to Alton whose cases are under investigation are entirely beyond your control." Obviously, Hoffman was not used to having his judgement so brusquely questioned by a. inferior officer. Although Dick's conduct towards Alton had been annoying, it was easily overlooked. This utter disrespect for the commissary general, however, could not be ignored. By revoking even the limited authority he had allowed Dick, Hoffman clearly registered his disapproval of that officer's conduct. In case his meaning should somehow remain clouded to the scheming provost marshal general, Hoffman closed his letter in unmistakable terms: "When a prisoner is transferred from St. Louis to another prison this fact noted on your books closes his history with you." This correspondence should have settled any questions regarding the extent of the provost marshal general's jurisdiction. It did not.

In flagrant violation of Hoffman's orders, Dick continued to release prisoners from Alton until March of 1863. Hildebrand was either not aware of Hoffman's orders or simply did not have the courage to resist the St. Louis commander. Not until Hildebrand was replaced at Alton by Major Thomas Hendrickson -- a much more dynamic and independent officer -- did Hoffman's orders become effective.
Unlike Hildebrand, Hendrickson was unwilling to have his command undermined by the overbearing provost marshal general. Hendrickson’s resolve, coupled with Hoffman’s firm support, insured that the Alton prison would never again be bothered by meddlesome officers like Dick.¹⁵ Alton’s status as a separate and autonomous institution was finally affirmed.

As the Alton controversy began to subside, Confederate prisoners once again began to fill the confines of Camp Douglas and Camp Butler. The battle of Murfreesboro and McClellan’s victory at Arkansas Post sent captured rebels streaming northward throughout January and February of 1863. These prisoners were not immediately exchanged because Grant refused to allow any Confederate prisoners to be released at Vicksburg, the predetermined point of exchange. Since Vicksburg was the object of his campaign, Grant felt -- not unreasonably -- that it would be ludicrous for the U.S. Army to reinforce it. As a result, all exchanges would have to be effected at the eastern site, City Point, Virginia. While preparations were made for the trip eastward, the new captives were temporarily stationed at Chicago and Springfield.¹⁶

Although Camps Douglas and Butler had not housed Confederate soldiers for some five months prior to the arrival of these prisoners, they had not remained unoccupied. Camp Butler had once again been used as a mustering camp
for Illinois volunteers. Since September, some 8,000 recruits had been sworn into the U.S. Army there. Butler was in much the same condition as when the last Confederates had left it. The condition of Camp Douglas, on the other hand, had changed markedly for the worse.

Until a few days before the arrival of the Murfreesboro and Arkansas Post prisoners, Douglas had been used as a camp for paroled Union soldiers. Stonewall Jackson's capture of the Union garrison at Harpers Ferry in September, 1862 -- two months after the exchange agreement had been signed -- gave the South 12,000 more prisoners than the North. Thus, the Harpers Ferry captives could not be exchanged until the United States had a corresponding number of Confederates to release in return. Instead, the Union soldiers gave their "parole," their promise not to serve in any military capacity until they had been properly exchanged. Paroled soldiers, while of little use to the army, did not have to languish in southern prisons waiting for exchange. In theory, paroling soldiers was a more humane way of dealing with the prisoner of war problem. In practice it was not. This was because the Federal government did not know how to treat its paroled soldiers. The War Department, fearing desertion en masse if the soldiers were allowed to spend their paroles with their families, decided to keep the men in "parole camps" until they were again available for service in the field.
Eight thousand paroled soldiers were immediately dispatched to Camp Douglas.18 In effect, paroled soldiers became the prisoners of their own army.

It would be a gross understatement to say that the decision was an unpopular one. The Union troops had expected their parole period to be a "vacation from soldiering," so they were very angry about being sent to Chicago. They manifested their dissatisfaction through insubordination and physical destruction. Brigadier General Daniel Tyler, assigned to command the paroled troops at Camp Douglas, described the camp's situation to the adjutant general, Lorenzo Thomas, in a letter of October 23, 1862:

For the last three weeks there has existed in this camp a spirit of insubordination bordering on mutiny, which at times looked as if I had neither moral nor physical force sufficient to sustain order, but last night the crisis came and I think we have won the victory and without undue violence. The Sixtieth Regiment Ohio Volunteers was the cause, and its insubordination and the inefficiency of the officers obliged me to order the entire regiment under guard, and to my great satisfaction our paroled men with arms in their hands stood to duty and the Sixtieth Regiment caved in.... Since I arrived here we have had three incendiary fires which have destroyed quarters for fourteen companies. Fire was set to unoccupied quarters, clandestinely of course, and from the inflammable nature of the barracks there was no chance to stop a fire except by pulling down parts of the buildings....19
An uneasy calm settled over the camp after these early upheavals, but sporadic outbursts of violence and vandalism marked the remainder of the parolees' stay.

It was this battered and drary place -- made even more depressing by the frigid lake wind -- that 3,800 Confederate soldiers were to call their temporary homes. Within a month one out of ten was dead. $^{20}$ This fearful mortality rate was caused by a number of factors. To begin, the physical condition of the prisoners themselves was very poor. Captured at the close of a long campaigning season, they had been weakened by skimpy rations and extended exposure to the elements. The combined riverboat and railroad journey northward was more than many could stand. The broken-down and unsanitary condition in which the paroled soldiers had left the camp contributed to the generation and spread of disease. Furthermore, the poorly-clad southerners had little protection from the harsh northern winter. Finally, the outbreak of a smallpox epidemic among the prisoners shortly after their arrival insured that hundreds would die. $^{21}$

Despite the widespread presence of death, conditions in Camp Douglas were, according to Captain Freedley, improving. Freedley inspected the prison in early March, 1863, and praised General Jacob Ammen, who had assumed command upon the departure of the paroled troops, for his administration of the post. The inspector noted that the
police of the camp was good and the hospital neat and clean. In fact, he was generally impressed by all facets of the medical treatment of the prisoners. He described the chief surgeon, Doctor George Park, as "zealous, energetic, and attentive." Freedley specifically complimented the Confederate surgeons who had volunteered to care for the sick, rather than exercise their right to return south. The high death rate Freedley simply dismissed as being beyond the control of the medical officers present. 22

Freedley's dismissal of the mortality rate notwithstanding, it is impossible to reconcile the large number of deaths with his glowing report of camp conditions. Camp Douglas must have been a dreadful place during this period. Only seventeen days after Freedley filed his report, General Ambrose Burnside, commander of the department of Ohio, recommended -- upon medical advice -- that because of its unsanitariness Camp Douglas be abandoned. The United States Sanitary Commission reached the same conclusion and sharply criticized Hoffman for not effecting the changes it had exhorted the year before. 23 These estimations of Douglas's conditions seem much more accurate than Freedley's; for the February mortality rate exceeded that of Andersonville during its worst months. More enlightening is the fact that the percentage of deaths did not decrease significantly over the next two months. Nearly 300 of the 3,500 prisoners present at the beginning
of March were dead by the close of it. Another 60 died in April, even though after April third there were less than 400 prisoners in the camp.\textsuperscript{24} It must have been a joyful and relieved group of prisoners which boarded the trains for City Point, Virginia in early April. Unfortunately, their relief was premature, for the medical staff which Freedley had so lavishly commended had allowed ten prisoners infected with smallpox to leave the camp among the well.\textsuperscript{25} Not even in flight could these unlucky soldiers escape the horrors of Camp Douglas.

The Chicago prison camp was not the only one experiencing major difficulties during this period. Alton had been ravaged by a killing smallpox epidemic. The highly contagious disease became so unmanageable by mid-February, that Hoffman was forced to suspend temporarily all releases from the prison. Alton's chief surgeon estimated that half of the prisoners had contracted the disease by this time. The disease's spread was checked somewhat when a special smallpox hospital was built on an upstream island in the Mississippi. Nevertheless, prisoners continued to die of the disease for many months. Smallpox accounted for nearly half of the 625 deaths that occurred at Alton during 1863.\textsuperscript{26}

Camp Butler, on the other hand, never developed a serious smallpox problem. It had its own problems. Freedley, in an inspection report that seemed considerably more candid than the one he filed about Camp Douglas, described
Butler as being in a "wretched condition." "The discipline of the camp is not good," he wrote:

a loose manner of performing all the duties of a soldier seems to prevail. There is a decided want of force and energy among the officers and there is not a sufficiently broad line of demarcation between them and the enlisted men under their command. Indolence and a want of energy seem to prevail among the troops as well as among the prisoners. The police of the camp was very poor. No attention whatever had been paid to it. Large amounts of filth and offal had been permitted to accumulate in the vicinity of the prisoners' quarters until they were almost too filthy to visit. 27

Freedley found the interior of the barracks in a similarly vile and unpolicable condition. Because of some confusion as to whose responsibility the physical maintenance of the prison barracks was, the buildings had not been kept up. The floors, roofs, and bunks all required repairs and some additional modes of ventilation were necessary. Nor were the hospital buildings excepted from this unremitting state of contamination. "I was indeed surprised to find such a filthy place for sick men," wrote Freedley. He attributed the lack of cleanliness in the hospital to a want of force on the part of the officers and to the generally indolent attitude displayed by the nurses, attendants, and prisoners. 28

Every aspect of the prison, it seemed, was affected by this indolence. According to Freedley, this attitude
stemmed from the commanding officer of Camp Butler, Colonel William Lynch. Lynch, who had spent some time in southern prisons earlier in the war, had decided to exhibit his contempt for the Confederacy by intentionally neglecting all but the most basic needs of his charges. Not surprisingly, he was hated by the prisoners. Sergeant William Heartsill, a Confederate prisoner at Butler from late January until mid-April, wrote in his diary of Colonel Lynch. "I cannot say anything favorable about him," but, "I do not believe he would steal more than he could carry off, nor do I think he would put a red hot stove in his pocket." More serious, Heartsill and his companions were convinced that Lynch was trying to launch a smallpox epidemic among the prisoners by impeding the surgeons' efforts to isolate the few cases that existed in the prison.  

Although it is doubtful that Lynch would have carried his vengeance to such an unthinkable extreme, he certainly did nothing to prevent the spread of the disease. Lynch was undoubtedly the most insensitive officer to command an Illinois prison.

Despite the miserable sanitary conditions, the neglect of the prisoners' needs, and the heartlessness of the commanding officer, Freedley -- ever the optimist -- managed to describe the prisoners as "cheerful and contented." Entries from Heartsill's diary leave a much different impression.
Feb'y 2nd. Very cold. This is decidedly colder weather than we bargained for. No stove yet, neither wood or cooking utensils. Our only means of cooking is in a large camp kettle, this we all use; making mush, and we keep it hot all day long, and a man is in good luck to get his ONE MEAL of mush each day. We have considerable difficulty in procuring water; we have to use old oyster cans, and our well ropes are composed of suspenders, canteen straps and strips of cloth, and when we get water it is not fit to drink because the wells are nearly filled up with broken utensils and stoves, the Yankees say, were thrown in when the Donaldson prisoners left here. Fire is so scarce that most of the men are forced to keep in 'eir bunks to keep from freezing....
Feb'y 11th. The sun comes out pleasant and revives in all very much, but to mar the beauties of the day; is to witness the melancholy sight of four of our comrades being carried by the dead house, from the hospital. This evening we learn Vicksburg has fallen, dont believe a word of it.
Feb'y 22nd. Today is the FIRST REBEL's birthday, but there is nothing transpiring to remind us of that brave hero, unless it is the deep snow and our sufferings compared to the winter at Valley Forge. The number of deaths daily do not decrease much, seventy five have died up to this time. Madam Rumor has it that we will be paroled in ten or fifteen days....
Feb'y 27th. A fine sun-shinney day. R. S. Willeford of Hart's Battery died last night. Nearly every day one from our barrack dies; how long can this thing last? men in good health to day take sick and in two
days time are in the dead-house, the
number of deaths now runs up to about
ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY FIVE....30

Of course, life in Camp Butler was not always miserable.
The prisoners passed the time by making rings and playing
ball and marbles. Although Lynch prohibited all reading
materials except Bibles, a newspaper would occasionally
"run the blockade" and be read with interest. Letters from
home were also welcome diversions, even though they often
bore news of the deaths of comrades at Camp Douglas.31

For the most part, however, prison life was monotonous
and depressing. The daily loss of friends and acquaintances,
plus the feeling that one was powerless to aid them, created
an air of despondency that Heartsill called "the blues."
Only the possibility of exchange prevented "the blues" from
entirely overcoming the prisoners. The topic of exchange
dominated the prisoners' thoughts and conversations. In
an entry written on one of his final days in captivity,
Heartsill attempted to explain their preoccupation with the
subject:

Oh how eagerly we all clutch at
freedom, reader you no doubt think
that we lay great stress upon our
exchange, will you for a moment
imagine yourself out of the world;
yet in it, inside this enclosure is
all we have known of the world since
we entered its walls, surrounded by
disease and death, discontent, and
misery on every hand; profanity and
irreverence are our daily companions,
do you think it strange that we
catch at every rumor that passes. 32
Exchange finally became a reality for Heartsill and his fellow "Butlerites," as well as for the Confederates at Camp Douglas and Alton, in April, 1863. Camps Douglas and Butler were again temporarily closed, as they had been after the general exchange in July, 1862. The Alton prison was emptied of Confederate prisoners, but was kept open to confine civilian prisoners and Union soldiers held on criminal charges. The prison was also to be used, as it had been after the July exchange, as the primary holding point for Confederate prisoners awaiting exchange.

By May, 1863, the only Confederate soldiers left in Illinois were buried in the cemeteries of Douglas, Butler, and Alton. Although only about 6,600 prisoners had been held during these two and a half months, approximately 1,100 had died. This appalling figure raised the total number of deaths for the first thirteen months to well over 2,000. Certainly, severe weather, exposure prior to their arrival, and their feeble physical condition accounted for the deaths of a majority of the Confederates. Moreover, a large number of these fatalities could have been avoided. Lynch's retaliatory treatment unnecessarily swelled the number of deaths at Butler, while revolting sanitary conditions at Douglas raised the mortality rate there.

The high number of deaths overshadowed the few positive achievements made during these months. On the whole, prison administration had improved. Though many of the
commanding officers were still negligent and incompetent, they at least responded to Hoffman's directives. The weeks Freedley had spent instructing officers and fixing prison records at Alton and Camp Butler had not been spent in vain. By the spring of 1863, these prisons were, from an administrative standpoint, relatively efficient. The same was true of Camp Douglas, where, after the departure of Colonel Mulligan, the prison's records had been accurately kept.

The most important occurrence, however, had been the final separation of the Alton prison from the St. Louis prison system in March and April, 1863. This separation greatly simplified Alton's administration. The elimination of the constant shuttling of prisoners between St. Louis and Alton allowed Alton's officers to keep an accurate record of the number of inmates in the prison. Security at Alton was also aided by the separation. An accurate record of prisoners insured the rapid detection of escapes, thereby increasing the chances for recapture. Finally, Hoffman's successful handling of the Alton issue had demonstrated that the commissary general's office could be a powerful regulating force. Gradually, Hoffman was learning how to be an effective commissary general. Unfortunately, his education, and the constant reeducation of his commandants came at a terrible price in Confederate lives.
Chapter III
MAY-DECEMBER, 1863

With the general improvement in the administration of the camps, Hoffman turned his attention to abating Illinois' high death rates. Thus far, one of every eight Confederate prisoners sent to the state had died. This gruesome toll was unacceptable even to the northern authorities. Over the next few months of 1863, Hoffman began to implement some needed improvements in the prisons.

In late April, 1863, Major Hendrickson had requested funds to repair the roof of the principal hospital building at the Alton prison. The roof had begun to leak badly and was making life in the hospital very uncomfortable. Hoffman immediately authorized the repair project. It soon became apparent that the roof would have to be replaced altogether, raising the project's cost to nearly $2,000. Nevertheless, Hoffman did not withdraw his approval and the new roof was installed. The only stipulation the commissary general attached to his approval was that, if possible, the repairs be paid for out of the prison fund. Hoffman assured Hendrickson, however, that the quartermaster's department would pay the bill if the cost proved to be more than the prison fund could bear. Although these repairs were not regarded as being essential to the maintenance of the prisoners' health, the War Department was willing to pay for them.
Probably the most important improvement made during this period was the construction of the oft-recommended drainage system at Camp Douglas. The absence of an adequate system had caused most of the camp's sanitation problems during the early months of 1863. Apparently, the high death rate in February, March, and April, coupled with the repeated appeals from the Sanitary Commission, had convinced Hoffman and the quartermaster general that the system had to be built. The 8,000 dollar operation was begun in June and there was never any question that the quartermaster's department would assume the cost. This new drainage system improved sanitary conditions at Douglas tremendously and insured that the mortality rate would never -- even when the camp was overcrowded -- approach that of early 1863.

The continued presence of smallpox at the Alton prison led Hoffman to approve the lease of Tow Head, a Mississippi island across from the prison, for the purpose of isolating the infected prisoners. The closely confined inmates at Alton fell prey to the contagion and, as one officer put it, "Every new accession of prisoners only furnished new victims for the disease." By the midsummer of 1863 the guards and townspeople had also contracted the disease. In June, Hendrickson advised Hoffman to cease sending prisoners to Alton until the epidemic had subsided. Hoffman, hoping to avoid closing the prison, suggested isolation of the
smallpox victims. The Tow Head location was chosen in August and the afflicted prisoners were quickly transferred to it. Hoffman also approved the hiring of two extra physicians to care for the smallpox patients. The isolation and extra medical care proved a success. An October medical report revealed that the disease had almost completely disappeared. 3

The War Department had, in all of the above cases, accepted the cost of the improvements as part of its responsibility to its prisoners. In September of 1863, however, its attitude began to change. On September 23, Hoffman asked that the buildings that the paroled soldiers at Douglas had burned down be rebuilt. He noted that the new drainage system made it economical to utilize as much space as possible at the camp. The War Department deliberated over this seemingly sensible request until November 7, when it responded with:

The Secretary of War is not disposed at this time, in view of the treatment our prisoners are receiving at the hands of the enemy, to erect fine establishments for their prisoners in our hands. Whatever is indispensable, however, to prevent suffering, whether from the effects of the weather or other causes, will be provided by commanding officers of prison establishments if ordinary means fail, by the use of the prison fund if necessary to that end, as far as it will go. 4 Nothing more will be authorized.

This vague dispatch did not seem to be much related to Hoffman's query, which had nothing to do with "fine estab-
lishments" at all. Rather, Stanton was using Hoffman's request as a pretense to articulate the War Department's new attitude towards its captives. Thereafter, it seemed, any type of addition to any existing prison would have to be paid for out of the prison fund. Since the prison fund was created from the sale of prisoner rations, the War Department had, in effect, transferred its responsibility of caring for the prisoners to the prisoners themselves. The money that Hoffman had formerly used to aid the comfort of the prisoners would now have to be used for their physical survival as well. Because of the alleged cruel treatment of Union soldiers in southern prisons, Stanton regarded any War Department expenditure for prisoners as superfluous.

The reason that horror stories and subsequent accusations were only beginning to surface in the fall of 1863 was that the exchange process had almost completely broken down. Unrecognized releases by General Lee at Gettysburg and the mass parole of the 30,000 Vicksburg prisoners led to disagreements over how many prisoners each side owed the other. Later, the issue of how liberated slaves captured by the Confederacy while in the service of the United States Army would be treated, together with the Union's knowledge that exchange would aid the southern armies much more than its own, doomed the exchange agreement. With the termination of general exchanges (field commanders still
had the authority to make local exchanges, but few captives were released through this means) the number of Union soldiers held in Confederate prisons swelled. Unfortunately, it was at this very moment that the Confederacy's ability to maintain prisoners was beginning to decline. The deterioration of its internal transportation and communication network made it very difficult for the South to supply its own armies; not even Stanton could expect the Confederacy to feed its prisoners while its own soldiers starved. Under these circumstances it was inevitable that the prisoners' needs would be neglected. The northern press and the more radical members of Congress quickly turned this unintentional neglect into deliberate mistreatment by the southern commandants. It is not clear if Stanton actually believed the accounts or merely used them as a convenient excuse to relieve the War Department of the economic burden of sustaining its prisoners.

The collapse of exchange would eventually have far-reaching consequences for the Illinois prisons, but not until August and September of 1863. In the meantime, Camps Douglas and Butler remained closed to prisoners. From May until mid-August, Alton was the only operating prison in the state. It became the primary holding point for prisoners captured during the Vicksburg campaign and awaiting exchange.
During these three months Grant's army did not capture enough Confederates to warrant reopening Butler or Douglas. It did, however, take enough captives to keep Alton extremely overcrowded. Most estimates of Alton's capacity ranged from 500 to, at most, 1,000 inmates. This 1,000 prisoner maximum was reached sometime in May and on June 9, 1863, almost 1,600 prisoners were crammed into the prison. Fortunately, most of these prisoners were sent to City Point, Virginia for exchange on June 10. The relief was only temporary, though, for by July 13, fifteen hundred men were again held at Alton.

The severe overcrowding placed a great strain on the commanding officer at Alton, whose responsibility it was to keep all these prisoners secure. Luckily, Major Hendrickson, Alton's commandant, was a thoroughly competent officer and his administration of the prison during these trying months was uncommonly good. Nevertheless, he did not appreciate the burden of so many extra prisoners. He constantly complained to Hoffman about the situation, but the prisoners continued to arrive. Finding no relief from the commissary general's office, Hendrickson, on July 26, took the matter into his own hands. He simply refused to receive a detachment of 786 prisoners. Had he admitted these prisoners, the number of inmates at Alton would have been raised to an uncontrollable 2,100. Hendrickson had made his point. Three days later Hoffman issued an
order to the commander of the Department of Missouri,
Major General John Schofield, stating that not more than
1,000 prisoners should ever be confined at any one time.7

By August, it was obvious that the Alton prison was
not large enough to quarter all the western prisoners.
The collapse of exchange was beginning to be felt, for no
prisoners had been exchanged since before Vicksburg and
Gettysburg. To relieve Alton and to accommodate newly
arrived detachments of prisoners, Hoffman decided to reopen
Camp Douglas. On August 18, Colonel Charles DeLand was
placed in command of the camp, which, because of the con-
struction of the sewage system, was very disorganized.
Prisoners began arriving the next day. Although one officer described Camp Douglas as being "in good condition to
accommodate 8,000 prisoners," Colonel DeLand held a much
different opinion. Douglas, he stated, was "a mere cook-
ery; its barracks, fences, guardhouses, all a mere shell
of refuse pine boards; a nest of hiding places instead of
a safe and compact prison...."8

From his arrival in August until November, 1863,
DeLand was constantly engaged in repairing the camp's
barracks and fences and in completing the sewer system.
"Of course," he wrote to Hoffman, "all this has produced
confusion."
Prisoners have slid out the holes in the dark, have passed out as workmen, and in a variety of ways have eluded the vigilance of the guards. The erection of the new fence has made them desperate and they have resorted to all manner of means to escape. Several have been killed and others wounded, and yet some escapes could not be prevented. 9

The escape problem was complicated by the undermanned condition of the guarding force. At no time during this period did DeLand's command number over 900 men and for the first six weeks of his term he only had 600 troops at his disposal. Concurrently, there were never less than 4,000 Confederates at the camp and the average number was closer to 6,000. The insecurity of the prison was fully demonstrated in late October, when twenty six prisoners escaped through a tunnel dug through an abandoned slop sink. 10

Security was not the only acute problem Camp Douglas faced during these months. DeLand's sparse garrison, plus his preoccupation with preventing escapes and various construction projects forced him to neglect most matters connected with the police and discipline of the camp. The result was that the prison was in a most disgusting sanitary condition. A medical inspection by surgeon Augustus Clark revealed a picture not soon to be forgotten:
Discipline in camp -- very lax. Tents and huts, ventilation -- utterly insufficient; sufficiency for 4,500 prisoners, if all barracks were fit for occupation, utterly insufficient for present number; heating -- very few of the prison barracks are heated at all. Sinks, construction -- bad; excavations twenty feet long, six feet wide, four feet deep; not closed in; management -- [of sinks] apparently no management at all, in filthy condition. Removal of offal, &c. -- not well attended to; no receptacles provided. Cooking in camp -- in hospital good, for guard tolerable, in prison barracks no attention is paid to cooking by authorities. Cleanliness of men -- guard and sick very good; prisoners generally filthy; deficient facilities for cleanliness. Police -- this important matter is, with one or two exceptions, most inexcusably neglected over the whole camp. Cleanliness -- there is a great deficiency of laundry facilities. The hospital laundry is a very small building furnished with two 20-gallon boilers. Thirteen 20-gallon boilers (originally intended for cooking purposes) are provided for the prisoners, thus allowing one boiler for about 460 prisoners. Hospital -- additional accommodations should be at once provided for at least 600 patients. There are now some 150 sick men lying in the barracks who should be in the hospital receiving attention. The chapel is being prepared as a hospital against the protest of certain good ministers of Chicago, who claim that the prisoners' souls should be looked after at the expense of their bodies. Prison -- the place of close confinement, or dungeon,
is utterly unfit for this purpose. It is a "dungeon" indeed; a close room about 18 feet square, lighted by one closely barred window. The floor is laid directly on the ground and is constantly damp. A sink occupies the corner, the stench from which is intolerable. In this place were confined twenty-four prisoners. The place might do for three or four prisoners, but for the number now confined there it is inhuman. At my visit I remained but a few seconds and was glad to get out, feeling sick and faint.11

This shocking report evoked a speedy response from Hoffman. Obviously impressed by Clark's report, he immediately ordered DeLand to make some changes at Camp Douglas. To improve the camp's cooking arrangements, he instructed DeLand to repair the prison's ovens and purchase forty-gallon caldrons for the prisoners' barracks. Heretofore, bread had been baked by contract outside the prison and the prisoners had cooked their rations in messes, using small kettles or open fires. Both of these practices Hoffman regarded as wasteful, the former because of the added cost of the contractor and the latter because of its inefficient utilization of fuel. To improve the sanitary condition of the prisoners, he ordered the construction of a laundry. Finally, in order to relieve the overcrowded prison hospital, he ordered DeLand to erect two additional hospital buildings. All of these improvements were urgently needed; unfortunately, they were also very expensive. Hoffman, however, expected all the costs to be covered by the prison fund.12
Colonel Hoffman was quickly relieved of that unrealistic expectation. In a detailed reply to Clark's report and Hoffman's letter, DeLand explained the limitations of Camp Douglas's prison fund. He pointed out that in his first two and a half months as Douglas's commandant, the prison fund had paid for $20,000 worth of repairs and construction. Thus far, however, the money had been spent almost exclusively on rebuilding the camp's fences and installing the sewage system. DeLand viewed these measures as being of primary importance to the security and health of the camp. The improvements Hoffman had itemized, as well as scores of others, would have to be put off until the overtaxed prison fund could afford them -- or until the War Department was willing to contribute toward their accomplishment.\textsuperscript{13} DeLand's rebuttal displayed a responsible and patient reaction to the War Department's growing frugality. The unacceptable number of escapes made increased security imperative, while the new sewage system had to be completed quickly if the high mortality of the previous winter was not to be repeated.

As it turned out, his priorities were in the correct places. A December inspection of the Chicago prison by Brigadier General William Orme, who was soon to command Camp Douglas, showed that conditions there had materially improved. Because of the new sewage system Orme could describe the sanitary condition of the camp as "very good."
The sinks, which Clark had found so offensive, were now "clean and pure." Camp Douglas's security, however, was still questionable, but this was not the result of any physical defect of the prison. Rather, the small number of garrisoning troops provided the prisoners with ample opportunities to get away. Gradually, the prison was being put in good order.

Surgeon Clark also inspected the Alton penitentiary during the autumn of 1863. In stark contrast to Camp Douglas, Clark found Alton in a most satisfactory state. Its sanitary condition was good, its hospital was expertly managed, and its buildings were in good repair. In fact, Alton suffered from none of the problems that were plaguing Douglas. Even the prisoners themselves were clean. The outstanding condition of the penitentiary was the product of the work of two industrious commanding officers. Major Hendrickson, whose merits have already been discussed, disciplined his officers, men, and prisoners rigorously. When Hendrickson transferred command of the prison to Colonel George Kincaid in the late summer of 1863, Alton was efficient and healthful. Happily, Kincaid was as tireless in the pursuit of his duties as Hendrickson had been. Clark's report attests to the competence of these two officers. The only threat to Alton's security and the health of its inmates, was overcrowding. Despite Hoffman's order to the contrary, there were often as many
as 1300 or 1400 men imprisoned there. This overcrowding was not, however, caused by any capricious officer in St. Louis. In the fall of 1863 there was simply no other place to put prisoners.

One of the major reasons that there was no other place to put them was that prisoners were no longer being held at Camp Butler. Although the prison was never officially closed, prisoners never occupied the barracks there after May 19, 1863. The circumstances surrounding Butler's closing are very confusing. Hoffman, it seemed, never intended to permanently close Camp Butler -- only delay its reopening. It is not exactly clear why Hoffman wished to delay the prison's reopening in the first place, especially after the collapse of the exchange agreement and in light of the overcrowding at Douglas and Alton. Probably, however, it was because Hoffman felt that it was unsafe to hold prisoners in the Springfield area.

On several occasions during the winter of 1862-1863 and the spring of 1863 detachments of soldiers attempting to recapture deserters around Springfield had been attacked by mobs of southern sympathizers. Because of these attacks, Governor Yates had objected to Hoffman sending the Arkansas Post and Murfreesboro prisoners to Butler. Apparently, Hoffman did then not have time to divert the prisoners from Springfield, nor the facilities to hold them elsewhere. In the summer of 1863, however, the situation was
different and Hoffman could act on Yates's objections. By overcrowding Alton and Douglas and by sending some of the prisoners captured in the west to Ohio and Indiana prisons, Hoffman found that he could delay the reopening of Camp Butler and thereby avoid the possibility of a mass prison break in Springfield. Nevertheless, his failure to officially close the prison indicated that he believed that Camp Butler could eventually be used to house prisoners.17

In the autumn of 1863 Hoffman seemed to believe that the danger from the copperhead element in the Springfield area had subsided and he again considered assigning prisoners to Camp Butler. With this end in mind, Hoffman dispatched surgeon Clark to inspect the prison facilities at Butler. Much to Hoffman's surprise, the prison was found to be all but uninhabitable.

Clark discovered that of the eight prison barracks, only eight still had bunks in them. All the barracks were absolutely filthy, for the prison had not been cleaned since May, when the last prisoners left it. More mysterious was the apparent abandonment of the place. Clark found nothing in the camp but the "bare barracks." Everything else necessary to the operation of a prison camp was gone. All the prison's stoves, and a conglomeration of socks, underwear, bedsacks and blankets had been turned over to the quartermasters department in Springfield. The prison's
hospital equipment, as well as its hospital and prison funds, had disappeared without a trace. For some reason not now ascertainable -- and also unapparent to Hoffman in 1863 -- the Camp Butler Prison barracks had been closed.18

The Springfield prison could, of course, have been re-opened, but the expense would have been considerable. Hoffman never ordered it. Thus, with the filing of Clark's report, the history of the Camp Butler prison barracks abruptly and somewhat unexpectedly ended. The rest of Camp Butler, however, was not closed. The state continued to use the camp as a mustering point for its regiments, while a large hospital in the camp served convalescing Union soldiers until the end of the war.19

Linked to the closing of Camp Butler -- but primarily the result of the collapse of exchange -- was the construction of the fourth Illinois prison: the Rock Island prison barracks. Hoffman had been considering the possibility of building a new Illinois prison many months before work began on the Rock Island prison in September, 1863. In April, Hoffman had recommended that another camp be built in the Chicago area. He cited the nearness to transportation facilities and the availability of lumber for construction and fuel purposes as reasons for his decision. The only reservation Hoffman had about building the camp in the Chicago area was a fear that the city's large concentration
of southern sympathizers, or copperheads, might undermine the prison's security. While the War Department weighed the advantages and disadvantages of Hoffman's proposal, construction of the new prison was temporarily delayed.\textsuperscript{20}

The breakdown of exchange and the resulting rapid accumulation of prisoners hastened the War Department's decision. On July 14, 1863, the War Department ordered that Hoffman's recommendation be implemented, with one major modification: the prison would be built at Rock Island, Illinois, not in Chicago.\textsuperscript{21} The Rock Island location met most of the requirements that Hoffman had deemed necessary to the quick and economic construction of a prison camp. First, and most important, Rock Island was located in the center of what was probably the greatest transportation facility in the United States at the time: the Mississippi River. Second, most of the materials needed for the prison's construction were available on the island. Any that were not could be quickly and easily shipped to it via the Mississippi. In addition, the Rock Island location offered some advantages that made it greatly superior to the Chicago area as a site for a prison.

For a number of reasons Rock Island was much more secure than Chicago could ever hope to be. Most obvious, of course, was the fact that the prison would be located on an island. Unless prisoners had access to a boat or were exceptionally good swimmers, there was little chance
of successful escape from the island, even if a prisoner managed to get out of the prison itself. In contrast, it was relatively easy for a Camp Douglas prisoner to make his way south once he had escaped from the prison. The decision to build the new prison on an island reflected the War Department's satisfaction with the security record of the Johnson's Island prison, which was located off Sandusky, Ohio, in Lake Erie.²²

More important to the prison's security, however, was the significant difference in population between Chicago and Rock Island. According to the census of 1860, the population of Chicago was approximately twenty-one times greater than that of Rock Island.²³ Moreover, the island upon which the prison was located was almost uninhabited. The higher concentration of people in Chicago made it very easy for escaped prisoners to disappear into the city; in Rock Island it was virtually impossible. The difference in population also meant that there was a much smaller, and therefore less dangerous, number of disloyal citizens in the Rock Island area. Consequently, a combined prisoner and copperhead uprising, if it should occur, could be more easily managed by the prison garrison at Rock Island than by the troops at Camp Douglas.²⁴

Obviously, the Rock Island prison was built with an eye toward maximum security. In this respect it would prove very successful, especially in comparison to the
other two Illinois prisons. From December 1863, when the first prisoners arrived there, until the last prisoners left Rock Island in July of 1865, only forty prisoners escaped from the prison. During that same twenty month period forty-four prisoners escaped from Alton, even though there were only one-third as many prisoners incarcerated there as at Rock Island. Camp Douglas, which held approximately the same number of Confederates as Rock Island did, was a veritable sieve during this period. During these months an extraordinary one hundred and fifty-five escaped.  

Although the camp was ideal from a security standpoint, it was not well suited to maintaining the health and well being of the prisoners. To begin, the prison's placement on the island left much to be desired. The prison was built very close to the shore of the west side of the island and was highly exposed to the wind from the Iowa side of the river. There was also a swamp located very close to the south border of the prison which tended to contaminate the atmosphere of the entire area. In addition, the island was almost solid limestone, with only a one to six foot covering of topsoil. Thus it was good for preventing tunneling, but poorly adapted for natural drainage.  

Had the camp been designed with even a slight bit of care these defects could have been compensated for. It was not.
In fact, the prison was intentionally designed and built in a very hurried and haphazard manner. Montgomery Meigs, the quartermaster general, instructed Captain Charles Reynolds, who was in charge of the prison's construction, that he should "be governed by the strictest economy consistent with the completion of the depot at the earliest practicable period." 27 No time or trouble was taken to choose a location on the island that would reduce the prisoners' exposure to the elements. Nor were the barracks to afford much protection from the chilling northern winter. Meigs ordered that they "should be put up in the cheapest and roughest manner -- mere shanties." The prison's waterwork and drainage system, too, was to be made as cheaply as possible, despite the evil results that frugality in that area had caused at Camp Douglas. In the interest of economy and speedy completion, as few supervisors as possible would be employed on the project, thereby insuring that the workmanship of everything would be shoddy. Furthermore, no accommodations had been prepared for prisoners afflicted with smallpox, even though almost every prison was affected by the disease. This failure was not the worst of the quartermaster's omissions, however. Incredibly, no hospital was to be built at Rock Island! 28

On December 3, 1863, the first Confederates arrived at this wretched place. On their first day in captivity the temperature at the prison dropped to thirty-three
degrees below zero. By New Year's Day, ninety-four prisoners were dead. Happily, not a single prisoner had escaped from the island -- alive, anyway.  

The design and construction of the Rock Island prison barracks manifested the extent to which retaliatory feelings had crept into War Department policy. Economy and intentional neglect were to determine the quality of life in the northern prisons. The United States was quite willing to prove that it could kill -- or at least let die -- as many prisoners as it believed the Confederacy was. Regrettably, these feelings were only to grow more bitter as the war dragged into its fourth calendar year.  

1863 had been an eventful year for the Illinois prisons. Some positive accomplishments had been made. During the year the state had quartered some 24,000 prisoners. The death rate was still high -- about 2,000 Confederates had died -- but it seemed to be declining. Over half of the deaths had occurred during the first four months of the year, when the state's mortality rate had reached a frightening sixteen percent. In contrast, of the 17,400 prisoners held from May to December, only about eight hundred had died, a mortality rate of less than five percent. The improvements Hoffman had ordered at Douglas and Alton during the summer appeared to be showing results. Finally, the inadvertent closing of Camp Butler had rid the state of what was probably its most consistently dirty and ill-managed prison.
The picture, however, was not all rosy. The collapse of exchange was a calamitous event for all prisoners, both north and south. It resulted in the unintentional mistreatment of prisoners in the south and the calculated neglect of prisoners in the north. This inattention was effected through the War Department's complete reliance upon the prison fund to provide for the prisoners' needs. For the Illinois prisons specifically, it meant that urgently needed improvements would have to be delayed until the funds could afford their costs. Thus, at Camp Douglas the hospital would remain overcrowded and sick men would continue to die in the barracks without ever having received medical attention.

Unfortunately, the situation seemed to be getting worse, not better. The shameful construction of the Rock Island prison indicated that the War Department was not going to retreat from the policy of neglect and retaliation that it had embarked upon in the late summer. If the autumn of 1863 was any sort of a predictor, the outlook for 1864 was exceedingly gloomy.
Chapter IV

JANUARY, 1864 - APRIL 9, 1865

"The triumphs which have been achieved by our arms have decided the fate of our nation," announced the Illinois State Journal on New Year's Day, 1864. "That the fate is the triumph of justice and order over misrule and rebellion no loyal heart has, for a moment, reason to doubt." Indeed, the military situation in January of 1864 was much more encouraging than it ever had been before. "Lee's invincibles" had finally been vanquished at Gettysburg and Grant had broken out of Chattanooga, thereby reviving hopes for a spring campaign against the heart of the south. With Grant directing a strategy designed to apply constant pressure on all fronts, there was hope that the war could be won by the end of the summer.

Obviously, the prisoners languishing in Camp Douglas, the Alton prison, and the Rock Island barracks hoped that it would be -- albeit with a different victor. In the meantime, however, they hoped that the promotion of Grant to General in Chief of the army would improve their prospects of being exchanged. This hope was sadly misplaced. Grant was known for his commitment to total war and total victory, not for his humanitarian instincts. There was no room for an exchange of prisoners in his strategy for victory. In 1864 he articulated his views on exchange:
It is hard on our men in southern prisons not to exchange them but it is humanity to those left in the ranks to fight our battles. Every man we now hold, when released on parole or otherwise, becomes an active soldier against us.... If we commence a system of exchanges which liberates all prisoners taken, we will have to fight on until the whole south is exterminated. If we hold those caught, they amount to no more than dead men.2

Grant's attitude was grim, but realistic. Unfortunately, it insured the immiseration of thousands of helpless prisoners.

That misery was felt most profoundly by the prisoners held at Rock Island. There, the careless design and construction of the prison was being paid for in Confederate lives. The cheaply made barracks offered inadequate protection from the killing northern winter. Lafayette Rogan, a Mississippi Confederate who had been captured at the battle of Lookout Mountain, kept a diary during that frigid January.

Friday 1, 1864
The coldest day I ever felt.
Thermometer 30 below zero.
Saturday 3
The cold abates but little.
I suffer greatly for blankets.
Many fellows have no blankets yet & are very thinly clad.
Such men suffer terrible. We sleep by reliefs and fill each bunk heads and tails fashion.
I fear that disease and death will be the result of all this suffering. Deaths have already occurred from freezing.
Wednesday 6
This cold weather is not just suited to the southern constitution. I and the ration detail have had to stand in the open air from ½ hour to a whole hour daily to get what we all eat....
Saturday 9
I feel very sore -- the effect of that awful ague yesterday though I don't feel sick. I attended as usual the drawing of rations. It was a cold job but I got through quite well myself, but some of the detail cried with the pain produced by the cold.3

Yet, the cold weather was probably the least of the prisoners' worries.

A February inspection of the camp by surgeon Clark revealed, not surprisingly, that the prison's drainage system was utterly unable to meet the needs of the garrison and the prisoners. The result was much the same as it had been at Camp Douglas a year earlier: sanitation was practically nonexistent. The limestone substructure of the island prevented natural drainage and led to the accumulation of puddles of stagnant water all over the camp. On days when the temperature reached above freezing, as it occasionally did during February, the prison became a veritable morass. Meanwhile, the camp's sinks, which consisted only of shallow excavations, could not be flushed out because of the absence of a drainage outlet. Clark pointed out that unless movable sinks were introduced, which could periodically be emptied into the river, or a
proper system of drainage installed, the camp would quickly become "a seething mass of filth."\(^4\)

Naturally, the unsanitary condition of the camp made it a breeding ground for disease. The lack of medical facilities insured that pneumonia and various types of fevers would spread quickly among the prisoners. To make matters worse, a smallpox epidemic broke out in January. In order to stem the spread of sickness, eleven barracks were converted into a makeshift hospital, while two small pest houses were constructed outside the prison to isolate the smallpox cases. Unfortunately, these provisions were not enough to meet the problem. The total capacity of these buildings was about five hundred patients; during the month of February 1,555 prisoners were taken sick. Of these, 637 had contracted smallpox. Yet, the two pest houses could only accommodate some sixty-two patients. On an average day in February there were 682 sick men crammed into the prison’s various hospitals and 304 were left unattended in the barracks.\(^5\)

Compounding the problems created by the inadequate medical facilities was the inexperience of the prison’s medical staff. Clark described the three principal physicians at Rock Island in this manner:

Doctor Temple is an acting assistant surgeon and was not aware of the extent of his authority or duties as surgeon in charge. Doctor Moxley is a very young officer,
but recently commissioned, and, though anxious and trying to do his whole duty, is entirely un-fitted both by temperament and inexperience for a charge of this magnitude.... Acting assistant surgeon Iles is an old man, and, as I am informed by the commanding officer, was completely bewil-dered at being placed in such a charge, and, though not unskilled professionally, had not the slightest idea of his duty as an officer.  

These officers had allowed thirty-eight cases of smallpox, some of them in advanced stages of infection, to remain unattended in the barracks. The overcrowded state of the prison hospitals notwithstanding, Clark found this inexcus-able. He urged that a medical officer of "experience and executive ability" be assigned to the prison immediately.  

The only facet of the prison relating to health that the inspector was able to commend was the police of the barracks' interiors and the personal cleanliness of the prisoners. Rock Island's commanding officer, Colonel Andrew Johnson, was a vigorous disciplinarian and enforced a strict standard of body and barrack hygiene. The result was that Clark could report that the prisoners were "clean and neat to a degree surprising in a prison camp."  

In order to eliminate some of the prison's physical shortcomings, Clark approved a plan to construct a legiti-mate hospital that could contain up to seven hundred patients. In addition, he ordered four more pest houses to be built. Clark also forwarded to Hoffman -- with his
hearty endorsement -- a proposal that would install a comprehensive drainage system in the prison. All these measures Clark regarded as absolutely necessary to the preservation of a minimal standard of healthfulness at the prison. He fully expected the quartermaster's department to fund them, assuming that only a hideous blunder had prevented them from being built into the camp in the first place. Consequently, he was very surprised when Hoffman only reluctantly authorized the installation of the drainage system and the additional pest houses; he was shocked when the commissary general sent orders to suspend work on the new hospital.  

Hoffman, it seemed, was under the false impression that the prison's alarming amount of sickness was solely the result of the smallpox epidemic. He believed that once that disease had subsided there would be no need for the hospital. Moreover, he was against having a hospital built outside the prison enclosure, as this one was to be, because it facilitated escapes. These reasons, however, were largely superficial. For the most part, Hoffman was against the new hospital because it cost too much. "It seems to me that there has scarcely been economy consulted in this arrangement," he wrote. "On the contrary, it has the appearance of great extravagance." As far as Hoffman was concerned, a make-shift hospital was good enough for rebel prisoners.
Fortunately for the sick at Rock Island, Hoffman did not stick to his decision. With the support of the acting surgeon general, Joseph Barnes, who made the astute observation that "the necessity of ample hospital accommodations is greater with prisoners than with an equal number of persons under other circumstances," Clark was able to get approval for the hospital. Approval, however, was all he got. Hoffman made it clear that the prison fund would have to pay the construction cost, approximately $24,000.¹¹ As a result of the incident, Clark was eventually relieved of his duties as prison inspector. The hospital was finally completed in May, 1864, six months after the first prisoners had arrived in Rock Island. For many, though, it was simply too late. Already 1,173 Confederates were buried in the prison's cemetery.¹²

The first few months of 1864 had been eventful ones for the other two Illinois prisons as well. Happily they were not nearly as death-ridden as they had been at Rock Island. At Camp Douglas, one hundred and fifty fewer prisoners died during the first four months of 1864 than had died during the single month of February, 1863. Obviously, the introduction of an effective drainage system was greatly improving the healthfulness of the camp. The statistics at Alton were also encouraging. Although some two hundred prisoners died from January to May, 1864, the death rate was decreasing. During April only fifteen prisoners died,
as opposed to fifty-one in March, fifty-four in February, and eighty-four in January.\textsuperscript{13} Despite their relative healthfulness, the two prisons were not without their problems.

At Camp Douglas security became a major concern. In order to prevent tunneling, as well as to improve ventilation, most of the barracks in the northern prisons had, by this time, been elevated off the ground. Because of the expense and inconvenience this had not been done at Camp Douglas. The result was that hundreds of prisoners tried to burrow their way to freedom. Many of them succeeded. The vulnerability of Camp Douglas was dramatically demonstrated in December of 1863, when nearly one hundred prisoners escaped through a single tunnel. In an attempt to prevent further tunneling, Colonel DeLand, who was relieved from command shortly after the incident, ordered the floorboards to be ripped out of any barrack in which a tunnel had ever been discovered, thereby exposing any digging that might be taking place. This precaution did not solve the problem. My May, 1864, an additional fifty-one prisoners had successfully escaped. Scores of others had escaped from the camp, but had been recaptured in the city.\textsuperscript{14}

Maladministration plagued both Alton and Camp Douglas during these early months of 1864. Brigadier General William Orme, who commanded Camp Douglas from December, 1863 -- when DeLand was relieved -- until mid April, 1864,
was not a very competent or diplomatic officer. Colonel John March inspected Camp Douglas in early April, 1864, and wrote that, "General Orme gives very little personal attention to his command at Camp Douglas. The result is a want of harmony and efficiency in the management of every department of this command." Because of Orme's inattentiveness, the prison was badly policed, the prisoners and garrisoning troops were poorly disciplined, and the officers quarrelled.15 Most of Orme's failings as a commanding officer stemmed from his health, which was rapidly deteriorating. While commanding a brigade during the Vicksburg campaign, Orme had contracted tuberculosis. By the spring of 1864, he was dying of the disease. A few days after March filed this report, Orme, realizing that he could no longer fulfill his military duties, resigned from the army.16

While Orme's administrative behavior could be defended on the grounds that he was too ill to perform efficiently, no excuse could be made for the pathetic leadership of the Alton prison during the spring of 1864. That leadership had fallen to Colonel William Weer of the Tenth Kansas Volunteers in January, 1864, when Colonel Kincaid was transferred to another post. Colonel Weer, it seemed, had a drinking problem which impaired his ability to oversee the affairs of the prison. Colonel Marsh described Weer as being "an intelligent, but intemperate man. He was drunk when I saw him, and in my opinion is entirely unfit
to hold any position in the military service of the United States."¹⁷

Within a month and a half of his appointment, Weer was able to undo most of the positive accomplishments that Colonel Kincaid and Major Hendrickson had worked for nearly a year to effect. Surgeon Clark examined the prison on February 18, 1864 and found the prison in a filthy state of confusion. The sewage system was clogged and as a result the prison's sinks were in a "most offensive condition." The prison's kitchen was in "great disorder and miserable police." "Filthy and swarming with vermin" was how he described the prisoners' bedding. Overall, he found the prison police to be "much neglected" and the prisoners and troops to be completely undisciplined. In contrast, Clark reported that the prison hospital, which was not under Weer's direct supervision, was in excellent condition, the patients being "clean and well taken care of." The prison's problems were complicated by severe overcrowding. Only the superb management of the hospital kept the prison's death rate from getting hopelessly out of control.¹⁸

After reviewing Clark's report, Hoffman reprimanded Weer for his poor administration of the prison. He also gave specific instructions to remedy the situation:

You [will] require as an inspector of the prison an active and reliable officer, whose duty it should be to inspect the prison daily in every part and to give all necessary orders for policing, and to make a report to
you in writing every Sunday morning of the condition of the prisoners and prison in every particular -- personal cleanliness, clothing, bedding, quarters, messing, sinks, yards, prison rooms for special purposes, and the hospital and all connected with it. Let nothing pass unnoticed; make your comments on these reports and forward them to this office.... Let the foregoing instructions be put in immediate force. I must rely entirely on your energy and judgement for the proper administration of the affairs of the prison....

Unfortunately, Weer's "judgement" was severely distorted by his abuse of alcohol and he was sadly lacking in "energy." Not even Hoffman's explicit instructions could induce Weer to take some responsibility for his command. Weer never sent a report to the commissary general's office, nor is there any evidence that he ever detailed an officer to inspect the prison.

In April, 1864, Clark visited the prison again. Much to his dismay, he found that its condition had worsened. By this date Weer had done nothing to improve Alton's sanitary condition. In a report reminiscent of the one he had filed about Camp Douglas six months earlier, Clark described Alton's condition:

The police of the prison is especially bad in every part, with the exception of the prisoners' mess rooms and the hospital. The means of supplying the prison with water are entirely inadequate. The prisoners'
bedding and clothing are filthy. The condition of the sinks is such that they cannot but be a pregnant source of disease; the drain leading from them is defective in some portion of its course, permitting the fecal matter and urine to exude to the surface near the hospital kitchen, filling the air with offensive effluvia and rendering one of the hospital wards untenable, necessitating the removal of the patients from it, and thereby overcrowding the remaining ward. There is no deadhouse or other proper place for depositing the dead in the interim between death and burial.... I am also informed that the prisoners' graveyard remains in a dilapidated condition. The roof of the hospital ward known as the convalescent ward is in so defective a condition that the ward is constantly flooded at every rain, to the obvious detriment and discomfort of the patients.... All this should be remedied at once and should have been so long since. 21

In addition to these problems, Weer had immersed himself in a personal quarrel with the prison's chief surgeon, Dr. T. A. Worrall. While in a drunken rage, Colonel Weer had refused to sign the hospital's provision requisition return, with the result that the patients were without food for five days. Only left-overs from the prison's main mess hall prevented starvation among the sick prisoners. Later, Weer evicted Dr. Worrall from his quarters in the prison, claiming that he had occupied them without authorization. 22
Clark, noting that Weer's drunkenness was the major cause of the prison's difficulties, urged that an efficient officer be assigned to the post. Upon receipt of the surgeon's appalling report, Hoffman immediately relieved Weer of his duties at Alton. His removal marked the only instance of an Illinois prison commandant being relieved for gross incompetence and dereliction of duty.

Weer's removal climaxed a turbulent four months in the history of the Illinois prisons. During these first months of 1864, fifteen hundred prisoners, most of them at Rock Island, had died. Nevertheless, important changes had been made at all the prisons. At Rock Island, various physical improvements promised to reduce that camp's high mortality rate. The appointment of a healthy and more energetic officer to replace General Orme would insure that the administration of Camp Douglas would improve. Finally, the removal of Colonel Weer could only make conditions at Alton better. Thus, in contrast to the early months of 1864, May, June, and July were relatively placid.

The completion of the hospital and the isolation of the smallpox cases in May, plus the milder weather, caused the number of deaths at Rock Island to decrease. Only 250 prisoners died during these three months; yet the number of prisoners held there was increased by about 2,000 men. Although the new drainage system was not yet ready for use,
Colonel Johnson had installed the system of portable sinks that surgeon Clark had recommended in his inspection report of February, 1864. Their introduction greatly improved sanitary conditions at the prison. Finally, Colonel Johnson continued to demand a high standard of cleanliness in the barracks and from the prisoners.24

Meanwhile, at Alton, Colonel Weer was replaced by Brigadier General Joseph Tarr Copeland. Copeland had formerly commanded the Michigan cavalry brigade, but was replaced in that capacity by George Armstrong Custer shortly before the battle of Gettysburg. After his relief from field duty, Copeland had commanded draft camps at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Annapolis, Maryland. Consequently he had gained valuable experience in the management of large numbers of closely confined men. In addition, General Copeland, who had served on the Michigan Supreme Court, was a much more temperate man than Colonel Weer had been.25 The effect of Copeland's appointment on conditions within the prison was almost instantaneous. He immediately set about repairing the damage that four months of neglect had caused. By fixing the hospital roof, clearing the blocked drain, and incorporating a stricter system of prison discipline, Copeland was able to keep the total number of deaths at Alton below thirty during May, June, and July, 1864.26

The new commandant at Camp Douglas, Colonel Benjamin Sweet, also acted swiftly to improve the security and
sanitation of his post. By June 1, 1864, Sweet had practically rebuilt the entire camp. In order to make the prison more compact, he had rearranged the placement of most of the barracks within the compound. The result was that there was now room for an additional thirty-nine barracks in the prison enclosure. Sweet maintained that the addition of these barracks would raise Douglas' capacity from about seven thousand to over twelve thousand prisoners, while only requiring an increase of about thirty or forty guards. In conjunction with moving the barracks, Sweet placed them on wooden supports four feet off the ground. DeLand's and Orme's policy of tearing the floorboards out of any barrack from which a tunnel had been dug had turned the floors of most of the barracks into masses of "mud and filth," but had done little to discourage tunneling. Elevating the barracks and reinstalling the floorboards eliminated both of these problems and aided ventilation. Sweet also washed and painted the barracks. Finally, he initiated a rigorous system of camp police. The result of all these changes, according to Colonel Sweet, was to make the camp "clean and commodious."27

Sweet's estimate of the camps' condition was not exaggerated. Charles Alexander, a medical and prison inspector, saw the camp in July and wrote: "The camp is in excellent condition, well disciplined and policed.... I saw the camp last April and the change for the better is astonish-
ing." Alexander's assessment was borne out by the prison's extremely low mortality rate during these months. From May to August, 1864, only about two percent of the 6,900 prisoners confined at Camp Douglas died. Because of the admirable management of Camp Douglas, Hoffman decided to act on Sweet's recommendation that the prison be enlarged. Construction of the new barracks began in August. 28

Unfortunately, a vigorous resurgence of the retaliatory psychosis among the highest officials in the War Department threatened to destroy everything the commandants had accomplished. Actually, the psychosis had been reemerging for some months, but it became destructive in August, 1864. In April, 1864 Hoffman had visited a group of Union soldiers who had just returned from captivity at Belle Isle and Libby prison in Richmond, Virginia. (Some sick prisoners were unofficially exchanged between the two armies via "flag of truce boats" during the spring of 1864.) 29 The visit had a profound impact upon the commissary general. In a letter to Stanton he called the treatment of Union soldiers "shocking to humanity" and advocated a policy of retaliation to be inflicted upon all the Confederate officers held by the United States. Immediately after this incident, Hoffman, with Stanton's approval, ordered a reduction in the rations of all the prisoners. 30 The real storm, however, was to break in early August, when fifty exchanged Union officers arrived in New York City, over-
flowing with tales of cruelty in southern prisons.

"Why should not rebel prisoners be treated exactly as our own?" questioned General Truman Seymour, one of the exchanged officers. "We construct elegant accommodations, spacious, with every convenience, and admit all kinds of luxuries, while our people rot with dirt and scurvy. At Andersonville the scene would disgrace a race of cannibal barbarians." As a direct result of the testimony of these officers, Hoffman and Stanton issued a circular which could drastically affect life in the Illinois and other northern prisons. The circular banned friends and relatives from sending supplies to prisoners, limited the amount of clothing a prisoner could own, and prohibited the camp sutler from selling any articles of food. The most important repercussion of the circular was the virtual elimination of vegetables from the prisoners' diets. Vegetables had never been a part of the rations issued to prisoners -- very small amounts of potatoes, rice, hominy, and onions had been issued sporadically in the past but Hoffman's reduction of rations in April had strictly forbade them. As a consequence, prisoners relied entirely upon gifts from outside and purchases from the sutler to supply the vegetable portion of their diet. The circular made it possible for scurvy, a disease which had been practically nonexistent in the northern prisons before this, to rage unchecked.12
Interestingly, the issue of vegetables and scurvy is very illustrative of the gradual hardening of Hoffman's attitude toward his charges. Exactly two years earlier, in August, 1862, Hoffman had expressed dismay at a report by Colonel Tucker which told of scurvy-afflicted prisoners at Camp Douglas. "The presence of scurvy," he had written to Tucker, "among men where there is an abundance of vegetables and antiscorbutics is a novel state of things to me, and I fear grows out of a want of attention somewhere...."  

By 1864, his concern for his prisoners had so dwindled that he could willfully perpetrate what he had once vigorously opposed.

After August, 1864, public outrage over conditions in southern prisons in general, and Andersonville in particular, led to demands for harsher treatment of Confederates held in the north. An October report by the United States Sanitary Commission concluded that the Confederacy was deliberately destroying Union soldiers. The report also contained a large section on the treatment of Confederate prisoners in the north. The Commission described the northern prisons, without exception, as clean, spacious and healthy -- havens of bliss in comparison to the southern death camps that the report described. Confederate prisoners, it maintained, were "strong and hearty," indeed, their health had actually improved during their captivity!  

It is difficult to believe that this was the same Sanitary Commission that had, in 1862 and 1863, condemned Camp
Douglas as being unfit for human occupation. To the Commission's credit, the report did not specifically advocate a policy of retaliation against Confederate prisoners; nevertheless, it did fuel the revengeful mood then prevailing.

Public reaction to the report was typified in a letter to Abraham Lincoln from the Chicago Board of Trade, which stated that: "If consideration and kindly treatment could awaken in our enemies a sufficient sense of humanity to lead to a reciprocity of treatment then abuses would have been corrected long ago." 35

Actually, the Confederacy was doing the best it could to keep its prisoners alive. Unfortunately, the Confederacy's "best" was, of necessity, not very good. By the autumn of 1864, conditions in the south were incredibly bad. Although there may have been sufficient quantities of foodstuffs in the south to keep the prisoners from starving, there was simply no way to get them to the prison. This was because the transportation system which had been overtaxed and in an advanced state of dilapidation a year earlier, when exchanges had first been suspended, was now all but non-existent. More important, was the fact that it was not merely the Union prisoners that were suffering. Wherever there were large concentrations of people in the south -- whether it be in Lee's army outside Petersburg, the city of Richmond or Andersonville -- severe shortages occurred. The Richmond bread riots in the winter of 1864-1865
exemplified the privations the southern citizenry was experiencing. Meanwhile, the miserable condition of the soldiers that Sherman, Thomas and Grant were capturing showed that the Confederate army was not much better off than the prisoners at Andersonville. Although the northern press and government officials gleefully noted the wretched condition of the rebel armies and the bread riots as signs of the disintegration of the Confederacy, they failed to connect them with the plight of the Union prisoners.

Despite the obstacles, the southern authorities tried not to shirk their responsibility to their prisoners. Regrettably, they had to. In October, 1864, the Confederate government, its railroads worn out and its available supplies exhausted, proposed a bold plan that might, if it were successful, relieve the wants of prisoners in both sections.

In 1864, the only commodity that the Confederacy had an abundance of -- and more important, that the United States lacked -- was cotton. Robert Ould, Confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners, proposed to sell 1,000 bales of the precious fiber in New York City markets and use the proceeds to supply the needs of the Confederate prisoners in the north. Meanwhile, the United States would be allowed to send shipments of food and clothing to the Union soldiers in the south. In theory
it was an excellent plan and Grant immediately agreed to it. In practice it was a dismal failure.

Delay in the implementation of the plan was the primary cause of its failure. The cotton, which was being sent by ship from Mobile, Alabama, was originally scheduled to arrive in New York City in November, 1864. In fact, it did not arrive until late January, 1865. It had been hoped that the money from the cotton could be used to ease the plight of the Confederate prisoners during the harshest months of the northern winter. The late arrival of the cotton made that impossible. Moreover, by the time the cotton had arrived in New York City, the impending capitulation of the Confederate States had driven the bottom out of the cotton market. In November the cotton had had an estimated market value of $675,000; when the shipment was sold it only netted $355,000. 37

For two reasons, the Illinois prisons would probably have been better off if the plan had never been conceived. First, the method of distributing the purchases discriminated against the westernmost prisons because the prisons closest to New York City were supplied first. Thus, the Illinois prisons did not receive any benefit from the sale of the cotton until well into the spring of 1865, long after it could do any appreciable good. Second, Hoffman, who expected the shipment to arrive in November, had instructed the camp commandants to send most of their winter clothing requests directly to the paroled Confederate
officer in charge of disposing of the cotton money, General William Beall. Since Beall did not have any means with which to pay for clothing, the orders remained unfilled and the prisoners remained poorly clad. The economy-minded Hoffman was not quick to fill the clothing void created by the delay in the arrival of the cotton shipment.\textsuperscript{38}

For various reasons, the plan did not work well in the south either. The decrepit transportation system precluded the possibility of helping many of the prisoners held in Georgia and the Carolinas. The prisoners in the Richmond area, on the other hand, seemed to have obtained some benefit from the plan, but the northern press chose to ignore this. Instead, it claimed that the Confederate authorities were stealing the goods intended for the Union prisoners and using them to supply Lee's army.\textsuperscript{39}

Thus, instead of assuaging the vengeful feelings in the north, the failure of the plan made them more bitter. In January, 1865, Senator Ben Wade of Ohio introduced a joint resolution into the Senate and the House of Representatives that called for "retaliation for the cruel treatment of prisoners by the insurgents." Specifically, it called for former captives of the Confederacy to be placed in command of the northern prisons. The effect that such a policy would have on the prisoners had been demonstrated back in 1863, when Colonel Lynch had maliciously neglected the needs of his prisoners at Camp Butler.
Largely, Senator Charles Sumner -- an unlikely defender of the rights of Confederate prisoners -- appealed against the resolution on the grounds that it would tarnish the international reputation of the United States. His opinion appears to have prevailed. A substitute resolution was passed which, though not advocating specific retaliation, stated that:

the treatment of our officers and soldiers in rebel prisons is cruel, savage and heart-rending, beyond all precedent; that it is shocking to morals; that it is an offence against human nature itself; that it adds new guilt to the great crime of the rebellion, and constitutes an example from which history will turn with sorrow and disgust. 40

Surprisingly, the prisoners at Rock Island and Alton never really felt the effects of this resurgence of the retaliatory psychosis. Or, if they did feel them, it was not reflected in the mortality rates of those prisons. Unfortunately, an absence of detailed inspection reports after August, 1864 prevents a more qualitative analysis of conditions at these two prisons. Logically, Hoffman's circular forbidding the issuance or sale of vegetables to the prisoners should have led to an increase in the amount of sickness and the number of deaths at the prisons. Moreover, public sentiment would probably have allowed the prison commandants to neglect severely the needs of their prisoners, if not treat them with outright cruelty.
Neither of these two probabilities seems to have occurred.

At Alton, the average monthly mortality rate for the nine months of August, 1864 through April, 1865, was slightly less than one and one-third percent. This meant that of the 3,316 prisoners confined at Alton, approximately 400 -- or about twelve percent -- died. Most of these deaths, however, occurred during November and December of 1864 and January and February of 1865, when the prison was extremely overcrowded. As a result, the mortality rates for these months range from three to five percent. During the other five months, when the prison was not crowded, the death rate was very low. In August, 1864, there were 1,280 prisoners confined, but only eight deaths. In October, 1864, nine out of 975 prisoners died, while in April, 1865, only six perished out of the 996 confined. Thus, though there was a relatively high percentage of deaths at Alton, those deaths were probably caused by circumstances beyond anyone's control -- not by a specific measure of retaliation. 41

The statistics were much more impressive at Rock Island. There, the average monthly mortality rate for these nine months was less than one percent. For many of these months, however, the rate was significantly lower. For example, in October of 1864, only 52 of the 8,181 prisoners on hand died; in November only 41 died out of the 6,394 confined. Both of these monthly mortality rates
were only slightly more than one-half of one percent. Perhaps more important was the fact that the mortality rates for the coldest months of the period, January and February, 1865, were not much higher. In January, the mortality rate peaked at slightly less than one and one-half percent. In February, it dropped back down to below one percent. During the entire nine month period there were 9,542 Confederates in captivity at Rock Island. Five hundred and three of these, or about one in nineteen, died. Although conditions at Rock Island may have been unpleasant during this period, they were not unnaturally health debilitating.

Two factors seem to account for the low death rate during this period of rising antipathy toward Confederate prisoners. First, there was a slight resumption of exchange in November of 1864. Public clamor for a resumption of exchange as a way to relieve the suffering Union prisoners had been even more vociferous than the cries for retaliation against the Confederate prisoners. Reluctantly -- and only partially -- Grant succumbed to the pressure. In October, 1864, he authorized the Federal commissioner of exchange to release very sick prisoners. "Very sick" prisoners were defined as those who would not be ready to return to service in the field for at least sixty days after their release. As a result of this agreement, many prisoners at Alton and Rock Island who probably would have died had they stayed in captivity, were sent home.
Second, were the attitudes that Colonel Johnson and General Copeland expressed toward their respective commands. Both of these officers were efficient and worked diligently to keep their prisons in as good a condition as possible. It was unlikely that either officer would have allowed his prisoners to die through intentional neglect. The looseness of the prison command structure permitted commanding officers to disregard orders from above, as numerous cases have already demonstrated. Apparently, this was what Johnson and Copeland did with respect to Hoffman's circular, thereby preventing the spread of scurvy among their prisoners.

In contrast to the commandants at Alton and Rock Island, Colonel Sweet, of Camp Douglas -- being, perhaps, a more obedient soldier -- followed the guidelines set down in Hoffman's circular. However, Sweet was not a cruel officer. Although he did abide by Hoffman's circular, he did not agree with it. On numerous occasions throughout late 1864 and early 1865, Sweet appealed to the commissary general to allow vegetables to be reintroduced into the prisoners' diets. Hoffman steadfastly refused to consider it. The result was that beginning in August, 1864, there was "an alarming increase of sickness and mortality" at Camp Douglas. 44

Consequently, by the close of April, 1865, a staggering 1,654 prisoners had died at Camp Douglas! This was
thirteen percent of the 12,000 prisoners confined there. At first glance this mortality rate appears comparable to that of Alton. It is important to note however, that Camp Douglas, unlike Alton, was never overcrowded. In fact, Douglas was only filled to capacity for two months during the period from August, 1864 through April, 1865. Actually, the physical condition of Camp Douglas was similar to that of the Rock Island barracks. Neither of the prisons was overcrowded and weekly reports to the commissary general's office from Sweet and Johnson indicated that both prisons were kept strictly policed and in an excellent sanitary condition. The prisoners even attested to the quality of sanitation at Camp Douglas during this time. John Copley, a Confederate soldier captured at the battle of Franklin and held in Chicago from December, 1864 until June, 1865, described the prison's sanitary regulations as being very strict and the authorities had them rigidly enforced. They required us to keep the streets clear of all trash of every description. We were prohibited from emptying any vessel containing dirty water on the streets. They made it our duty to scour the barrack once a week, or twice each month, anyhow, and to sweep them clean once a day. The barrack sergeant (who was a prisoner) made an alphabetical list of the names of all the members of his barrack, and as the names came on the list, were detailed accordingly until all had scoured the barrack. Spitting on the floor or inside the barrack was strictly prohibited.
Because sanitary conditions at Rock Island and Camp Douglas were roughly equivalent, the higher mortality rate at Camp Douglas would seem to have been caused by Colonel Sweet's enforcement of Hoffman's destructive food regulations. This conclusion is supported by the fact that there was an upward trend in the number of deaths at Douglas, indicating a gradual deterioration in the condition of the prisoners there. The condition of the prisoners at Rock Island, on the other hand, did not seem to be worsening. At that prison, the number of deaths rose and fell randomly from month to month. Perhaps more significant, the number of deaths increased faster than the number of prisoners held did. For example, from October 1, 1864 through January 1, 1865, the total number of prisoners held at Camp Douglas increased by about sixty-six percent, yet the number of deaths rose almost three hundred percent.  

Another, less obvious, reason contributed to the higher death rate at Camp Douglas. Most of the prisoners at Douglas had been in confinement for well over a year. As Colonel Sweet put it, "so long a period of restraint doubtless contributes largely to depression and disease." These prisoners, weakened by their extended incarceration and depressed by the course of the war and their long separation from loved ones, were already susceptible to disease. The elimination of vegetables from their diets was more than the delicate constitutions of many of these despondent warriors could stand.
Not surprisingly, as conditions at Camp Douglas worsened, attempts to get away from the prison increased. Escape attempts became frequent and, because tunneling was now virtually impossible, more desperate. A typical escape attempt during this period occurred on the night of September 27, 1864, when twelve prisoners rushed the fence and guards. The sentinels fired into the attacking prisoners and shot one of them, Lewis Moore of the 7th Florida Infantry, in the face. The other eleven prisoners were recaptured and placed in irons. 51

At least three mass prison breaks, involving all the prisoners at Camp Douglas, were planned, but never executed, during these months. All three of these breaks were supposed to take place on days of political significance. Two of them involved assistance from Chicago's Copperhead element. The first attempt was supposed to occur on August 29, 1864, the day that the Democratic National Convention opened in Chicago. Various treasonous organizations of southern sympathizers were supposed to attack the outside of Camp Douglas while the prisoners stormed the gates from the inside. Because of the inability to coordinate the outside forces, however, the attack was called off and August 29 passed without incident. 52

A second mass escape was aborted on September 19, 1864. This was the day that conscription was scheduled to go into effect in the city of Chicago. The prisoners,
who expected riots comparable to the New York draft riots of 1863, intended to rush the prison guards while their attention was turned to the city. In addition to being coincidental with the expected draft demonstrations, this attack seemed to be connected to a plot to free the Confederate officers imprisoned at Johnson's Island prison in Ohio. There, a group of Confederate soldiers hiding in Canada unsuccessfully tried to sail across Lake Erie and storm the prison. Fortunately, Colonel Sweet, who now had spies within Camp Douglas, learned of the plan. He intended to let the prisoners make their break and then "punish them in the act." The prisoners, however, suspected as much and wisely decided not to execute their plan. 53

The final, most famous, and most nearly successful plot to liberate, en masse, the prisoners at Camp Douglas came on November 7 -- election day -- 1864. This plan, known as either the "Northwest Conspiracy" or the "Camp Douglas Conspiracy," was really only a more organized version of the August 29 plan. Five hundred conspirators were to assault the outside of the prison while the 8,000 prisoners charged the guards from within the prison enclosure. The goals of the conspiracy, as one paranoid Chicagoan put it, were

To attack Camp Douglas, to release the prisoners there, with them to seize the polls, allowing none but the Copperhead ticket
to be voted, and to stuff the boxes sufficiently to secure the city, county and State for McClellan and Pendleton, then to utterly sack the city, burning and destroying every description of property except what they could appropriate to their own use and that of their Southern brethren -- to lay the city waste and carry off its money and stores to Jeff Davis' dominions.54

Although it was doubtful that the conspirators intended to do everything that this Chicagoan feared they would, there was no doubt that, had the plan succeeded, it would have thrown the city into chaos.

Luckily, Colonel Sweet was again aware of the prisoners' and conspirators' intentions. He was able to foil the plot by capturing the ringleaders a few hours before the attack was scheduled to begin. At about 4:30 AM on November 7, Sweet and a band of soldiers entered the residences of, and arrested, the eight principal conspirators. As Sweet put it, "The head gone, we can manage the body." Within the next few days a total of ninety-eight others were arrested and jailed at Camp Douglas. In addition to the prisoners, Sweet also captured two cartloads of loaded revolvers and several hundred muskets, attesting to the preparedness of the conspirators.55 With the thwarting of the Camp Douglas Conspiracy, no more mass prison breaks were planned.

One of the results of all this escape activity was to make the sentinels at Camp Douglas jittery and trigger-
happy. They began firing at prisoners for the smallest infractions of prison regulations. One prisoner was shot and killed for urinating in the prison square! While sleeping in their bunks, many prisoners were killed or wounded by stray bullets. Some of the more vicious guards took advantage of the prison's tense atmosphere to satisfy their own sadistic instincts. Copley recalled one such guard, nicknamed "Prairie Bill" by the prisoners, who shot a prisoner in the thigh for taking a drink of water after lights out. The cruel guard then threatened to kill anyone who attempted to come to the aid of the wounded prisoner. The man died in agony the next day.\textsuperscript{56}

There was another, safer, way to get out of Camp Douglas -- or so the prisoners thought. Prisoners could take an oath of allegiance to the United States; some prisoners had secured their release through this method in the past. As the weather worsened and the guards began indiscriminately shooting at prisoners, the number of men taking the oath increased. These "loyal men," as Copley called them, would be separated from the other prisoners and kept under close guard.

It was well for such men to have an escort of that character, as the remainder of us did not stand on very nice scruples in regard to our conduct toward this class of men, and we cared but little as to what kind of treatment they received at our hands.\textsuperscript{57}
Apparently, some of the prisoners felt guilty about taking the oath, for Copley noted that "these fellows looked like they had stolen something and been caught with it, the ground had a special attraction for their eyes."\(^{58}\)

Many of the prisoners that took the oath were from states which had been overrun by Federal troops. Understandably, these prisoners saw little point in languishing in disease-ridden Camp Douglas when, for them, the war was already over. Much to the "loyal men's" dismay, however, they were not released. It seemed that the northern authorities disliked and distrusted these "whitewashed yankees" as much as their former comrades did. Therefore, the prison authorities decided to keep them in captivity until they were sure that they would not reenlist in the Confederate army. As it turned out, these men were not released much sooner than the prisoners who had remained loyal to the Confederacy.\(^{59}\)

An even greater number of prisoners took the oath at Rock Island. There, however, they also enlisted in the Union army apparently attempting to avoid the fate the "loyal men" at Camp Douglas had suffered. The scheme completely backfired. Colonel Johnson described their plight in a letter to the commissary general's office.

The 1,797 enlisted men recruited from the prisoners' here still occupy a large portion of the prison, separated from the other prisoners by a high board fence...
the object of keeping these men here cannot be fathomed. Their condition is deplorable, as they are poorly clad and clothing cannot be issued to them from the prisoners stock, as they are no longer prisoners. Clothing cannot be issued to them from the quartermaster's department as they are not organized. They are under the same surveillance as the prisoners, as the parapet incloses this division on the outside.\textsuperscript{60}

These prisoners had gained nothing by deserting the Confederacy except worse living conditions and the hatred of their former comrades.

By the spring of 1865, however, it was no longer necessary for the prisoners to try to get out of the Illinois prisons. In February, 1865, Grant, at last convinced that exchanges could not possibly affect the outcome of the conflict, agreed to resume general exchanges. Oddly, many of the Confederate prisoners refused to be exchanged, preferring a few more weeks in captivity to immediate impressment into the doomed Confederate army.\textsuperscript{61} The "Cause" was lost and these men, who had already suffered so much in its name, no longer wished to fight -- or die -- for it.

Nevertheless, about 6,000 of the prisoners held in Illinois were exchanged -- many of them against their will -- during February and March, 1865.\textsuperscript{62}

When Lee surrendered at Appomattox on April 9, 1865, the 11,000 Confederate prisoners still left at Alton, Rock Island, and Chicago must have breathed a weary sigh of relief. Their long captivity was almost over.
CONCLUSION

CLOSING THE PRISONS - AFTERWORD

Closing the prisons after Lee's surrender was a relatively simple matter. However, it did take some time. Prisoners who had applied to take the oath of allegiance before April 9, 1865 were released in April and May. By June, 1865, there were only 4,136 prisoners at Camp Douglas; 392 at Alton; and 1,110 at Rock Island. These prisoners were released after they had sworn to abide by the laws of the United States. Private Copley was one of these prisoners. His account of his stay at Camp Douglas contained a copy of the oath that he and thousands of others like him took.

I, J. M. Copley, of the county of Dickson, State of Tennessee, do solemnly swear that I will support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, both foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith, allegiance and loyalty to the same, any ordinance, resolution or laws of any State, convention or legislature, to the contrary notwithstanding; and further, that I will faithfully perform all the duties which may be required of me by the laws of the United States; and I take this oath freely and voluntarily without any mental reservation or evasion whatever.

For men like Copley, who had, for so many months, suffered so severely at the hands of their Federal captors, taking this oath must have been a bitter anticlimax. By July 1, 1865 all Confederate prisoners of war had been released.
from the Illinois prisons. Each prisoner was supplied with three days' cooked rations and transportation home.²

The prisons themselves remained open after the prisoners departed. Camp Douglas served as a rendezvous point for returning Union soldiers until August, 1865. The prison and the land it was built on were auctioned off in November, 1865. By 1866, all of the 158 buildings that had made up Camp Douglas had been torn down.³ The Rock Island barracks were used to store captured and surplus military armaments. In this capacity the barracks remained functional for several years after the war.⁴ Federal authorities continued to hold civilians and Union soldiers prisoner at the Alton penitentiary for many months after the last Confederate captives left. Eventually, however, the prison was sold and torn down.⁵ Finally, Camp Butler, which had not housed prisoners for over two years, but which nonetheless, had played an important role in the Civil War prison system in Illinois, was used as a camp for returning and invalid Union soldiers until early 1866, when it was permanently closed and dismantled.⁶ Within ten years of the departure of the last Confederate prisoners, there was almost no physical evidence that the Illinois prisons had ever existed.

The prison system that evolved in Illinois during the Civil War was an extremely important one. Illinois' four prisons had held more Confederate soldiers than the prisons
of any other state in the Union. Although about 500 prisoners escaped from Alton, Chicago, Rock Island, and Springfield, over 55,000 had been imprisoned securely. Despite the fact that Camp Douglas and Camp Butler had been located in areas with high concentrations of southern sympathizers, no major prison breaks had occurred. The prisons and their commandants had effectively achieved their first concern: keeping the prisoners secure.

Unfortunately, they were less successful in carrying out their second objective: keeping the prisoners alive and healthy. Because the United States had never had to deal with such a large number of prisoners of war before, it was to be expected that the prison system's early months would be fraught with problems. Inadequate facilities, the expectation of exchange, and most of all, inexperienced commandants, combined to make 1862, the first year in which large numbers of prisoners were held, a very difficult and confusing one. Not surprisingly, the prisoners suffered because of it. A lack of consistency in the administration of the prisons then operational, Camp Butler, the Alton penitentiary, and Camp Douglas, insured that conditions within each would vary considerably -- but only in degrees of unpleasantness.

That year 1863 proved to be the most crucial in the history of the Illinois prisons. In it the War Department determined the direction its prisoner of war policy would
take. During the first part of the year the commissary general of prisoners, Colonel William Hoffman, was still occupied with bringing order to the stopgap and unwieldy prison system that he had been placed in charge of. Conditions within the prisons were miserable during these months. By the summer of 1863, however, Hoffman had solved many of the early problems of administration. The commissary general then turned his attention to making the prisons more healthy places of confinement. For the Illinois prisons this meant the introduction of a much-needed drainage system at Camp Douglas and extensive hospital repairs at Alton. For a few months it appeared that the War Department, through Hoffman, was going to pursue a policy of benevolence towards its captives.

The breakdown of exchange in July, 1863, and the resultant deterioration of prison conditions in the southern prisons, however, changed that. From September of 1863, until the end of the war, the War Department would pursue a policy of "economy" that resulted in the intentional neglect of the Confederate prisoners' needs. This policy was manifested in the design and construction of the Rock Island prison barracks. Although the northern prison authorities knew, from experience, that a proper drainage system, adequate hospital accommodations, and an experienced medical staff were prerequisites for a minimal standard of healthfulness at any prison, they neglected to include
them in the plans for the Rock Island prison. This failure caused hundreds of needless deaths at the Rock Island prison.

During 1864, as conditions for Union prisoners in the south steadily worsened, the policy of neglect in the north grew more ruthless. Moreover, an air of self-righteousness possessed the northern people and the Federal government, who actually believed that Confederate prisoners were housed in "fine establishments" and were receiving "kindly treatment." The U.S. Sanitary Commission's report on conditions in northern and southern prisons graphically illustrated this attitude.

In August of 1864, the War Department's policy of economy, became a policy of calculated retaliation. Believing that the Confederacy was intentionally starving its Union prisoners at Andersonville, Hoffman issued a circular that, in effect, eliminated vegetables from the prisoners' diets, thereby adding scurvy to the list of diseases that afflicted the prisoners. This infamous circular led to a fearful number of deaths at Camp Douglas during the last nine months of the war.

Not even the impending collapse of the Confederacy could persuade the War Department to retreat from its policy of neglect and retaliation. From January 1, 1865, to April 9, 1865, over 1,500 Confederates died in the prisons of
Illinois. Only with Lee's surrender and the subsequent release of the prisoners did the tragedy end.

The story of the Illinois prisons was, as one historian summarized, one of "privation in a land of plenty, of intense loneliness in the midst of a teeming multitude... of suffering and death in the face of the persistent struggle of the human soul to survive."\(^7\)

Today, all that remains of the Illinois prisons are the Confederate memorial cemeteries at Alton, Springfield, Rock Island, and Chicago. The 8,800 graves contained in them serve as grim reminders of a cruel era in the history of Illinois and the United States, silent markers of a time when a government's policy was dictated by inhumanity and vengeance, rather than understanding and compassion.
ENDNOTES

INTRODUCTION

1 William B. Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, (Columbus, Ohio, 1930) 7.

2 Ibid., 11.

3 Ibid., 37-40.

4 Ibid., 37.

5 Ibid., 177.


Chapter I


2 Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, 156.

3 Mathew Forney Steele, American Campaigns, (Washington, D.C., 1909) 157-158.


5 Ibid., 277, 282.

6 Ibid., 315, 333.


9 Mary Livermore, My Story of the War, (Hartford, 1890) 182.


14 Ibid., 257-258.


16 O.R., Ser. 2, III, 236-238, 270.

17 O.R., Ser. 2, IV, 152-156.


20 Ibid., 256-257.


23 Ibid., 371.

24 O.R., Ser. 2, I, 174; IV, 93, 615.


27 O.R., Ser. 2, III, 421-422.


30 O.R., Ser. 2, IV, 255.

31 Ibid., 255-256, 263.

32 Ibid., 256, 324.


34 O.R., Ser. 2, IV, 111.

35 Ibid., 179.

36 Ibid., 111.
Chapter II


2 Norton, History of Madison County, 342.

3 O.R., Ser. 2, IV, 618.

4 Ibid., 619.

5 Ibid., 666.

6 Ibid., 668, 735.

7 O.R., Ser. 2, IV, 762, 768; V, 48-50.


10 Ibid., 734-735, 762-763, 765.

11 Ibid., 763-765.


13 Ibid., 166-167.

14 Ibid., 179.

15 Ibid., 369, 396.

16 Ibid., 180.
Chapter III

1 O.R., Ser. 2, V, 500, 523, 569-570.


3 Ibid., 96-97, 61, 179, 191-192.
Ibid., 315.


8 Ibid., 200, 434-435.

9 Ibid., 434.

10 Ibid., 434.

11 Ibid., 372-374.

12 Ibid., 417-418.

13 Ibid., 460-462.

14 Ibid., 660-661.

15 Ibid., 392-393.


17 Donald Breen and Philip R. Shriver, Ohio’s Military Prisons in the Civil War, (Columbus) 15-16; O.R., Ser. 2, V, 757; VIII, 990-991.


22 O.R., Ser. 2, VIII, 986-1001


26 O.R., Ser. 2, VI, 939.
Chapter IV

1 Illinois State Journal, January 1, 1864.


4 O.R., Ser. 2, VI, 939.

5 Ibid., 938-939, 948-949, 1002.

6 Ibid., 938.

7 Ibid., 938-939.

8 Ibid., 940.

9 Ibid., 938-939, 1021-1022.

10 Ibid., 1021.


13 Ibid., 994-995.


15 Ibid., 57.

16 Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue, (1964) 350-351.

17 O.R., Ser. 2, VII, 43.

18 O.R., Ser. 2, VI, 967-970.

19 Ibid., 998-999.
21 Ibid., 81-83.
22 Ibid., 86-87.
23 Ibid., 43, 87-88.
24 Ibid., 23-29.
25 Warner, Generals in Blue, 92-93.
29 Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, 220.
31 O.R., Ser. 2, VII, 571.
33 O.R., Ser. 2, IV, 325.
34 Narrative of Privations and Sufferings of United States Officers and Soldiers While Prisoners in the Hands of the Rebel Authorities (Boston, 1864) 20-22. 32.
37 Ibid., 28.
38 Ibid., 31.
39 Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, 245-246.
40 Charles Sumner, Treatment of Prisoners of War, (New York, 1865) 4.


48 O.R., Ser. 2, VII, 998-999.

49 Ibid., 954.


51 O.R., Ser. 2, VII, 897.


58 Ibid., 154.


60 O.R., Ser. 2, VII, 1244-1245.


62 Ibid., 1000-1001.
CONCLUSION

1 Copley, *A Sketch of the Battle of Franklin*, 204-206.
2 Ibid., 204.
5 Norton, *History of Madison County*, 244.
6 Sheppley, "Camp Butler in the Civil War Days," 315-316.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Official Publications:


Unofficial Publications:


Memoirs and Personal Accounts:

Ayer, Winslow. The Great North-Western Conspiracy. Chicago: Rounds and James, 1865.


Newspapers:

The Illinois State Journal 1862-1865.


Secondary Sources

Books:


Theses:


Pamphlets:

Breen, Donald and Philip R. Shriver. Ohio’s Military Prisons in the Civil War. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.


Journal Articles:


