THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

SHEILA M. FORAN

ENTITLED... THE DEMOCRATIC COALITION AND ILLINOIS' TENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS IN LIBERAL ARTS AND SCIENCES

Instructor in Charge

APPROVED: [Signature]

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF... POLITICAL SCIENCE

MAY 9, 1983
THE DEMOCRATIC COALITION
AND
ILLINOIS' TENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

BY

SHEILA M. FORAN

THESIS
for the
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE

College of Liberal Arts and Sciences
University of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois

1983
# Table of Contents

## Part I: Background

- Introduction .................................................. 1
- Chapter 1: Party Identification and the Party System .......... 9
- Chapter 2: Shifting Party Coalitions ........................ 13

## Part II: After the New Deal

- Chapter 1: The Coalition Persists ........................... 19
- Chapter 2: Elements of the Coalition ......................... 23
- Chapter 3: The Tenth Congressional District ................. 34
- Chapter 4: Realignment or Dissolution: Conclusions ....... 55

## Endnotes .................................................. 68

## Bibliography ............................................... 75
The election of Harold Washington as mayor of Chicago attracted much public attention. The day after the election, newspaper pages across the country were filled with columns by political analysts proclaiming the start of a new era of the Democratic Party or even suggesting the disintegration of the party system in general. But these kinds of predictions were not based simply upon the recent mayoral election. Political analysts have been saying that the party system is "ripe for realignment" for years.

Has a realignment of the party system occurred? Is the collection of groups which comprised the New Deal coalition of voters no longer intact? Can we view shifts in voter attitudes as evidence of a realignment; or, as some would contend, has the basis for coaltional politics eroded too far for even that?

Considering the fact that some analysts regard the 1980 election as a "critical election," the results of the 1982 midterm races are particularly important as an affirmation or rejection of the Reagan referendum. During the 1982 10th Congressional District race between Eugenia Chapman and John Porter, several polls were administered which may provide some insight into the status of this conservative "referendum."

Since these surveys include the viewpoints of members of the various groups which make up what is called the New Deal coalition, they present an ideal opportunity to judge the extent to which the traditional Democratic core has shifted allegiance in the Tenth Congressional District. More importantly, the outcome may indicate a wholesale shift of allegiance for the parties overall.
The objective of this paper is to analyze and understand the characteristics of the traditional Democratic coalition of voters held by identifying the history of that coalition and studying the data of two polls taken in the 10th Congressional District during the November 1982 race between Eugenia Chapman and John Porter.

The paper is divided into two parts. The purpose of Part I is to establish the presumptions under which this analysis of voter behavior is operating. For example, much of the discussion of the traditional Democratic coalition of voters centers around the variable of party identification. Establishing the validity of the use of such a measure is therefore important. Similarly, the sources of party identification provide a foundation on which to build conclusions about the voting behavior of the 10th Congressional District electorate. And a summary of party coalitions of the past lends some historical reference with which to view the prospect of a realignment in the future. Part II discusses those groups which comprise what is now considered the traditional Democratic coalition of voters as founded during the New Deal. Changes since the New Deal will be addressed, including the arguments not only for the occurrence of shifts in party coalitions but for the impending dissolution of the party system as we know it. Lastly Part II examines the voters in the 10th Congressional District and ends with some tentative conclusions about the future of the Democratic Party and the party system as a whole.
PART I. BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 1

PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

The Party System

Traditionally, political parties have provided a framework within which factions could achieve expression of interests. Historically, the parties have absorbed some of the diverse and divisive elements of American society. In doing so, political parties have alleviated some of the destabilizing forces of ideological differences. Parties have also lent factions a legitimate means by which to potentially consolidate power.

As the 1982 Report of the Panel on the Electoral and Democratic Process states,

As a medium of compromise, political parties function to form majorities out of the confusion of separate and often conflicting interests expressed by individuals and organized groups, thereby providing a stabilizing institution to help balance forces of fragmentation.

Political parties also help the voter to make decisions. Outside of the instance of the straight-ticket voter, a party label may provide a clue to the positions of a candidate on the issues when the voter has no other information about that candidate. Thus, the parties enable the voter to relate particular candidates to general principles.

The inevitable question which this discussion prompts us to ask is whether the purpose of the parties has been undermined. This is a question which is inextricably linked to a related issue; the decline of
Party Identification

Since its introduction in the early 1950's, party identification has proven to be the most significant of the three indices (issue orientation and candidate appeal being the other two) devised to explain voting behavior. For example, in 1956, about three-fourths of the populace identified with one or the other of the parties. About half in each identified themselves as "strong" supporters of their political party. When asked whether they leaned one way or another, 15 percent out of the remaining 24 percent indicated at least some party preference. Most importantly, the bulk of voters in 1956 voted in a way which was consistent with party identification. Four-fifths of those with a partisan affiliation voted consistent with that affiliation.

The predictive power of party identification with regard to projecting the vote did not wane in later years. During what has been called the "steady state of party hegemony" (1952-1964), it was both difficult and unusual for a member to break with his party to support an opposition candidate. For example, in response to a standardized set of questions, more than 95 percent of adult Americans consistently described themselves as Democrats, Republicans, or Independents in 1956, 1960, and 1966. During the 1950's and late 60's, more than 80 percent of the weak identifiers and over 90 percent of the strong identifiers consistently voted for their party's presidential candidate.

Yet, in recent years, party identification has become less meaningful in predicting the vote. Partisanship as a whole has declined; and
It has been documented by a survey in the growth of voters identifying themselves as independents (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950's</th>
<th>1960's</th>
<th>1970's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partisans</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
<td>72.2%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Survey Data Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan.)

The American Political Science Review reports that as late as 1964, 76 percent of the voting population expressed personal identification with one or the other party. By 1976, that figure dropped to 63 percent. Only 23 percent of the electorate were strong partisans of either party in 1980.

*America Votes* correlates this finding:

From 1940 to 1964, independents constituted between 20 and 22 percent of the electorate. A 1975 Gallup poll reported that 32 percent of the voters saw themselves as independents.

The parties have retained disparate percentages of citizens' allegiance. According to the same source, Democrats have kept the emotional loyalty of about 45 percent of the electorate, while Republicans share 25 percent. More specifically, the proportion of voters supporting the Republican party declined from about 30 percent in the 1955-64 period to about 20-22 percent during the Carter era, while those who identified themselves as Democrats have also decreased from 46 percent in 1960 to 40 percent in 1976.
It is the drop in party loyalty which has been the most important development in recent years, however. Party identification is no longer as strong an indicator of how a person will vote. Defection rates across three decades demonstrate the decreasing predictive ability of party identification (See following table).

Defection Rates Within Categories of Party Identification by Decade¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1950's</th>
<th>1960's</th>
<th>1970's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than one-third to one-half of the weak Democratic identifiers voted for the Republican nominee in 1968 and 1972. In 1972, one of four strong Democratic identifiers defected. In 1968 and 1972, nearly half of "independent Democrats"—those who identify themselves as independents, but when asked which way they lean, say Democratic—voted for the Republican presidential candidate. Republican defections peaked in 1964, with 43 percent voting for the Democratic presidential candidate.¹⁶ And in 1972 barely half of all Republicans and Democrats report always having supported their party's presidential candidates, a very substantial decline from the levels reported 20 years earlier.¹⁷

Alternatively, there are those who assure us that party identification is still as strong a measure as ever in predicting the vote. Converse in 1972 reported that "recent SRC (Survey Research Center) surveys
did not show a steady decline in the ability of party identification to predict voting choice at various levels of office." Converse said

"party allegiance remained far and away the strongest determinant of most political cognitions and behavioral choices in the electorate,\textsuperscript{16}.

Most analysts would, however, agree that the value of party allegiance as a clue to voting behavior is on the decline. Why? One reason is an increasing predilection to vote on the basis of issue position. More people have consistent issue positions which guide their voting behavior. More importantly, current issues cut across the old alliance patterns of American politics\textsuperscript{17}; issues such as race, Vietnam, the urban crisis, Watergate, and economic recession surely encourage issue-based voting.

Certainly one reason for the decline in party loyalty is the inability of the parties to adequately represent the myriad of interests and opinions which current issues demand. Another reason is simply related to the decline of political participation and the party system in general. There is diminished trust in government as a whole. There is increased skepticism with regard to the integrity of political institutions due to Watergate and Vietnam. And there is less likelihood to vote. The proportion of potential voters who actually participate in Presidential and Congressional elections has declined steadily since the 1960's. In 1960, 61.1 percent voted for a Presidential candidate; 58.7\% of all eligible voters voted for a member of Congress. In 1976, the rate for Presidential voting dropped to 54.4 percent while that for Congressional races dropped to 49.6 percent.\textsuperscript{18} A third reason for the decline of the party system is the advent of electronic media. TV allows candidates to disregard local party leaders and still gain exposure needed to garner votes.
The decline in organized labor is yet another reason for party decline. Not only has the proportion of workers belonging to a union declined, but union support for a candidate is no longer as influential as it once was. Lastly, the larger number of primaries allows candidates to focus on personal campaign organization rather than negotiation with major leaders of the parties.

Sources of Partisanship

In order to understand the significance of declining levels of party identification as well as party loyalty, it is helpful to examine the sources of party identification. If, for example, the selection of party is based on how well that party's philosophy meshes with one's own views, we should interpret the decline in party identification differently than if "selection" of party is something that is simply passed on by parents. Of all the factors which might be examined to predict party identification (such as race, religion, socio-economic status), the best indicator is the family's party loyalty. As Crotty and Jacobsen state in American Parties in Decline:

It (party attachment) is nurtured in the family and transmitted through the parents to the emerging adult. The dynamics of the process are not unlike those through which other traditional and social values that earmark the individual's personal world are passed on in a society.1

Knocke's Change and Continuity in American Politics correlates this finding:

Independent measurements and comparisons of children's and parents' political views implied that
the family was more important than school, peers and community in establishing early and lasting orientations.  

And Nie, Verba, and Petrocik in *The Changing American Voter* espouse a similar view:

> Attachment to parties is a habitual, somewhat sentimental attachment, not unlike the religious preferences that most citizens inherit from their parents. ... 74% of those in the 1958 SRC study whose parents supported a party supported the same party.

The inheritance of party loyalty from one's parents is consistent with what could be called a "Traditionalist" concept of party identification. The traditional model, "often castigated as 'social determinism'" sees party identification as largely the result of group influence upon individuals to conform to group norms of behavior. Köcke connects the "Traditional" model with Freud's emphasis on the influence of the unconscious.

Identification with political parties, in the Freudian view, might be largely due to an unreasoning linkage of oneself to a charismatic political leader or to a set of emotion-provoking symbols, or it might be a derivative of more primary identifications with parents or social groups.

Many political analysts would agree with this conception of how party identification develops, accounting for party loyalty by reviewing the identification of those around an individual.

Crotty and Jacobson report that:

> Party identification is a psychological measure of voter identification with a political party. It is
grounded in the individual's personal development and his exposure to such things as the influence of his parents, schooling, and its impact, and the network of friends and acquaintances that comprise the social setting in which a person lives and matures.

Gerald Pomper, in The Voter's Choice, sums up the view of the "Traditional" model:

A person's Democratic or Republican loyalty is not explained by his views on policy questions and his evaluation of party nominees. Instead the emphasis is on his categorical memberships, whether class, religion, race, sex, or age. Loyalty is blind, for the voter's vision is so fully shaped by his social groups that he sees only what supports his pre-conceptions.

The "Rationalist" model, in contrast, views party loyalty as a conscious choice based on how closely the party mirrors the individual's own policy preferences. According to Knoke, "the postulate of rationality is that a decision maker will act as if he has calculated the expected utility for each possible act and then chosen the alternative party or candidate which maximizes this payoff." A payoff can be in the form of a personal benefit, such as in the guarantee of a government job or tax relief; a payoff could be found in progress towards a valued goal, such as the control of pollution or the right to an abortion; or a payoff can be something material, such as highways, national defense, or welfare.

Knoke contrasts the two models in Change and Continuity in American Politics:

The Freudian model may depict voters as puppets jerked about by strings attached in childhood, projecting all manner of irrational fears and
nonpolitical needs into the political arena. The Marxist model or a modified version of "interest group politics" may portray political man as a coldly rational accountant, cynically selling his political support in the electoral marketplace to the highest bidder, devoid of loyalty and commitment. Knacke suggests that the models are not mutually exclusive; in fact, he says we must integrate them if we are to understand the real source of partisanship. And certainly, the models can be complimentary. Part of the reason parents are allied with a given party to begin with may be because that party best represents their viewpoints and therefore "maximizes the payoff" for them. Yet the evidence seems to be on the side of the "Traditional" model. Party identification tends to persist even though issues which may have had an influence upon the formation of those identifications to begin with may no longer be salient.Nie and Verba view the voting public of the 1950's and 60's as "an electorate that was allied with one or the other of the major parties by ties that were more a matter of habit than of rational selection."

The new voters who came of age during the fifties had not themselves experienced the political conflicts of the New Deal, nor the trauma of depression that confirmed the partisan commitments of the New Deal generation. Yet, there was nothing to impede their inheritance of the partisan commitments of their parents.

If new information contradicting current beliefs comes to the attention of the individual and it does not cause a recalculation of utilities, which may result in a change in party identification, then we cannot view the process of the individual's identification with a party as entirely rational. And Knacke states "Party preferences are established
early and tend to persist despite wide subsequent diversity of partisans’ positions of issues.*

Some Conclusions

Voters are less likely to inherit party loyalty from their parents today. The parents themselves are not as partisan; broken families fragment the parents’ contribution to their children’s political beliefs; the tendency to be constantly on the move disrupts the rooting of party loyalty; and the turn away from an extended family living situation makes party transmission through generations much more difficult. Even if party loyalty is transferred to a young adult, chances are that his or her underlying political beliefs do not coalesce with that party’s philosophy. The nature of issues today is such that a person may find his or her viewpoints closely allied to interest groups linked to both political parties.

Thus, one threat to the party system may be found in the sources of partisanship. The internal strain caused by a gap between party identification and cognitive beliefs may split the parties apart from the inside. The parties will either dissolve—or change.
CHAPTER 2

SHIFTING PARTY COALITIONS

Coalitions and Realignment

According to Nelson Polsby in an article entitled "Coalition and Faction in American Politics," "Coalition building is the central task of American political parties." A coalition is a fairly cohesive collection of factions. When this loosely united alliance composed of different groups demonstrates "a stable and persistent pattern of voting across different elections," an alignment is said to have occurred. Every so often the factions which aggregate to form a coalition switch allegiance, Walter Burnham, in Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics, refers to this periodic shifting as a "critical realignment."

Eras of critical realignment are marked by short, sharp reorganizations of the mass coalitional bases of the major parties which occur at periodic intervals on the national level; are often preceded by major third-party revolts which reveal the incapacity of "politics as usual" to integrate, much less aggregate, emergent political demand; are closely associated with abnormal stress in the socioeconomic system; are marked by ideological polarizations and issue distances between the major parties which are exceptionally large by normal standards; and have durable consequences as constituent acts which determine the outer boundaries of policy in general, though not necessarily of policies in detail.

According to Burnham and other political analysts, these critical realignments have recurred throughout party history. The term "critical election" is used to describe the particular election which sets this process in motion. It was first used by Key (1955) to "characterize a period of rapid change in the social base of party support in New England.
After a critical election, the winning party becomes the majority party for an entire era. The average length of an era is 28 years. According to James Sundquist, author of *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States*, there are several "requirements" for realignment. The first is the introduction of an issue which is translatable into a political question. The second is that this issue must cut across existing lines of party cleavage. The third is that the realigning issue has to be one on which the major political groups take distinct and opposing policy positions which are easily understood and dramatized. According to *Issue Voting and Party Realignment*, "A realignment crisis is precipitated when the moderate centrist politicians lose control of one or both of the major parties—that is, of policy and nominations—to one or the other of the polar forces."

In *The Party's Over*, David Broder details five major realignments which were precipitated by a "critical election." The first is the election of Thomas Jefferson in 1800, which "ended the Federalist party dominance of the young Republic." The election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 "signaled the victory of the frontier over the landed and commercial aristocracy." In 1860, the election of Abraham Lincoln brought the Republican party to the fore, "precipitating Civil War." This so-called Civil War realignment had repercussions for the party system which are still being felt today. The fact that there was a Republican in the White House during the Civil War is why the South became and remained Democratic in party allegiance. V. O. Key states that the Civil War was instrumental to the Republicans' retention of power:
The long period of Republican rule was based on the successful conduct of a domestic war, which identified the Republican party with the Union, with patriotism, and with humanitarianism. . . . (But) the inner strength of Republicanism did not rest on sentiment alone. To the old soldiers—old Union soldiers—went pensions. To the manufacturers of the Northeast went tariffs. To the farmers of the Northwest went free land under the Homestead Act. To railroad promoters went land grants for the construction of railroads that tied together the West and the North—and assured that the flow of commerce would bypass the South. 

Next, the 1896 victory of William McKinley was viewed as "significant as a victory for the areas of post-Civil War industrialism over the insurgent agrarian populism which captured the Democratic party with the nomination of William Jennings Bryan." The system of 1896 brought the Republican party to national and state dominance following the major economic depression in 1893 under Democratic administration. The panic of 1893 enabled them (the Republicans) to make the Democrats the "party of depression, a label that stuck for a generation." 

That label was turned around completely when the real Depression came along. This time, it was the Republicans who were named "the party of depression." And the label remained for far longer than a generation.

The New Deal

The New Deal realignment was the last realignment that analysts agree did indeed take place. Roosevelt’s New Deal put into place a coalition that was to change the character of the parties for generations to come. Charles Beard, V. O. Key, and Jeane Kirkpatrick summarize the images of the two parties which have their roots in the New Deal era:
The center of gravity of wealth is on the Republican side while the center of gravity of poverty is on the Democratic side. (Beard)

The Democratic following consists in larger proportion of the lower-income groups, of the less well-educated, of the lower status occupations, and of unionized workers than does the Republican following. (Key)

Republicans remind us of corporate boardrooms and country clubs. Frequently, they look as if they have "more" money and sound as if they thought everyone did. Generally, they seem more formal, more buttoned up—the kind of people who call a man named James, James. (Kirkeatrick)

These images of the two major political parties—which still persist today—developed during the New Deal realignment.

How did this massive and durable shift of factions occur? According to David Knocke, the voting participation of a newly defined underclass who were devastated by the Great Depression made the difference:

By stigmatizing the Republican party as responsible for the collapse and by championing legislation on behalf of the socioeconomic have-nots, the Democratic party sharpened the class differences in the mass bases of the two parties. The Democratic transition to the majority party was apparently the result of mobilizing previously non-participating segments of the population, rather than conversion of Republicans en masse. (Knocke)

With a per capita GNP of $1,509 (1977 dollars) in 1929 slipping to 2,421 in 1932, the average citizen had a reason to vote for a change.

Even with these kinds of statistics, however, it is difficult for us 50 years after the fact to appreciate just how significant the economic suffering caused by the "Depression" really was. Some excerpts from Down and Out in The Great Depression; Letters from the "Forgotten Man" illustrate the emotional response to the sudden crash, and help us...
to understand the enormity of the impact the Depression had upon individuals.

A letter to Herbert Hoover cries, "Why does Every thing have Exceptional Value? Except the Human Being—why are we reduced to poverty and starving and anxiety and sorrow," Another to Eleanor Roosevelt is from a sharecropper's wife facing eviction: "It's awful to have to get out and no place to have a roof over your sick child and nothing to eat." A 12-year-old boy writes F.D.R. from Chicago: "My father he starving home. All the time he's crying because he can't find work. I told him why are you crying, daddy, and daddy said why shouldn't I cry when there is nothing in the house," Many in the lower classes saw the President as some kind of savior or at least a father figure. One addressed Mrs. Roosevelt as "Mother Roosevelt . . for such you are in the truest sense. . . Your national children have cried unto you, and you have heard and answered their cry."

V. O. Key explains how F.D.R. "answered the cry" of the American people.

Mr. Roosevelt appealed to all classes; he proposed a farm program, a labor program, banking program, a business program, and stood for the theory of workers in concert with all groups rather than of relying chiefly on financial leadership to lift the country out of the Depression. . . . All types of people had suffered deprivation; all were eager for a change. Poor men, rich men, middle-class men, farmers, workers, all moved over into the Democratic ranks in sufficient number to give Roosevelt a resounding victory.

The electoral vote was Roosevelt, 472; Hoover, 59. And Roosevelt did what he said he would; after getting the banks functioning once
more, he proceeded to drive the Farmers-Agricultural Adjustment Act through Congress; achieved major banking reforms; devalued the dollar; pushed through homeowner loans; got relief voted in; established the Social Security System; and got the National Labor Relations Act passed, which guaranteed labor the right to organize and bargain collectively.  

Walter Burnham sums up the effect of the Roosevelt mandate:

The New Deal era was a time in which political power was reallocated, shifting from the hands of the business elite and its political ancillaries to a more pluralistic, welfare-oriented coalition of elites and veto groups.
PART II: AFTER THE NEW DEAL

CHAPTER 1

THE COALITION PERSISTS

Realignment

According to David Broder in The Party's Over, the realignment of the 1930s did not occur in 1932, but actually took shape in the elections of 1934 and 1936. As V. O. Key reports:

As the New Deal took shape it attracted to the Democratic party even more completely than in 1932, voters of those classes that were its most immediate beneficiaries. On the other hand, the unfolding of the New Deal drove back to the GOP many Republicans who had left their party in 1932.

The population dependent upon public relief supported Roosevelt by an overwhelming margin. And the Roosevelt camp worked to maximize their gains. For example, the peak enrollment of the Works Progress Administration (WPA) of 3.1 million men was achieved during the month of the 1938 elections.

The key elements in the strategy to solidify the New Deal coalition were ethnic voters in large cities, labor unions, and rural southerners. Roosevelt lavished attention, patronage, and relief funds on the big city Democratic machines.

Whether because of these kinds of tactical moves or a more general shift of philosophy in voters brought about by the Depression—from an individualist to a collective ethic—the base of the New Deal coalition broadened yet further. In 1936, Roosevelt was returned by a larger
majority than in 1932, carrying every state except Maine and Vermont. In fact, the coalition of interests cemented together by the New Deal held its main outlines until 1940, when Roosevelt won by an electoral vote of 449 to 82. 

While mass support for the Democratic Party was consolidating, divisive elements did exist within the party itself. For example, Roosevelt's proposal to "pack" the court "set off a battle that solidified the conservative interests of the country and opened wide the split between his party's conservative and liberal factions."

The data on attitudes of the American electorate is much more complete after 1948 largely because of the work of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. In each Presidential election since 1948, a sample of up to 2000 persons has been carefully selected. These people have then been interviewed twice—once before and once immediately after Election Day. According to Angus Campbell, Phillip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes in *The American Voter*, which was completed under the auspices of the SRC, the attitudes of the New Deal era carried over quite strongly into the 1950's. The Democratic Party was widely perceived in 1952 as the party of prosperity and the Republican Party as the party of Depression, according to SRC studies.

According to *The American Voter*,

There was in 1952 a strong sense of good feeling toward the Democratic Party and hostility toward the Republican Party on the basis of the groups each was thought to favor. The Democratic Party was widely perceived as the friends of lower status group... the Republican Party in opposite terms.
The SRC studies also demonstrated that the Democrats were still thought to help groups primarily of lower status: the common people, working people, the laboring man, Blacks, farmers, and the small businessman. The Republicans, on the other hand, were thought to help those of higher status: big businessmen, the upper class, the well-to-do.\(^6\)

Although many Democrats defected in 1952 and 1956 to vote for Eisenhower, they did so without relinquishing their psychological attachment to the Democratic Party.\(^6\) The proportion of current Democrats claiming to have consistently voted for Democratic Presidential candidates was exceptionally high (84.9%) in 1952, demonstrating the high degree of partisan commitment evoked by the New Deal and the Fair Deal. Republican support for Republican candidates during this era was much lower; about two out of three Republicans in 1952 reported always or usually voting for a Republican candidate.\(^6\)

Why did the attitudes of the New Deal persist? According to *The American Voter,*

> It is quite probable that the attitudes from the New Deal era that were expressed in our interviews were associated at first largely with Roosevelt but became embedded so deeply in the image of the Democratic and Republican Parties that they remained powerful ideas years after Roosevelt’s death.\(^6\)

Though the New Deal issues were no longer as important as they had been, the attitudes from that era persisted. *The Changing American Voter* contends that it was more the lack of a replacement set of new issues that were of as much concern to voters than it was an endorsement of the same philosophy/ideology on issues:

> The new voters who came of age during the fifties had not themselves experienced the political
conflicts of the New Deal, not the trauma of depression that confirmed the partisan commitments of the New Deal generation. Yet there was nothing to impede their inheritance of the partisan commitment of their parents.
CHAPTER 2
ELEMENTS OF THE COALITION

Class and Vote

The New Deal realignment is said to be largely based on class lines. According to David Knocke, the New Deal triumph of 1932-46 solidified major class cleavages along party lines which had been structured mainly around sectional interests. Of the class-vote correlation, Knocke cites Allard (1963) and summarizes:

The association of class and vote is "natural and expected" in Western democracies because of the existence of class interests; representation of those interests by political parties; regular association of certain parties with certain interests; and the "tending of voters to choose the party historically associated with the social groups to which they belong—groups with a class and non-class character." 14

Knocke discusses Marx' theory on the correlation of class and vote stating "the rational act would be to support political parties that would further the goals of the class." According to Marx, this consciousness of class interests would be the final outcome of analysis of one's own self interest. According to Knocke, Marx postulated that "parties would draw voting support from one class to the exclusion of the other, so that class and party would be virtual synonyms," and that "any support of bourgeoisie parties by working class people results from false consciousness of one's economic class interests." 15

Gerald Pomper takes exception to the assumption that voters who are aware of their class join in a heightened political struggle. He states:
In 1960 and '64, the relationship between class-identity and vote among those aware of class is less than or equal to the same class-identity vote relationship among those unaware of class, while in 1968 the relationship among the aware voters weakens even when occupation is used as the measure of class position. Pomper also addresses the fact that the number of issues with a class basis has declined; thus, the decrease in the level of class voting. Also, as habitual party allegiances have weakened, traditional class loyalties may be weakened. Yet, party identification still retains some class basis—and the right issue could potentially realign the party system along class lines once more.

As Pomper suggests:

Class politics may reappear in the United States, but it is likely to be different from the direct clash of blue collars and white collars. The true lines of conflict may well be located higher in the social structure, such as between the lower middle and upper middle groups instead of manual versus non-manual.

Labor

The New Deal coalition cannot be viewed as a unified entity. It is essentially a collection of groups, and as such, should be analyzed in terms of its component parts. A core group of support for the New Deal was found in that group of voters at the bottom of the economic scale. Many of these voters were blue-collar workers and labor unions played an instrumental role in consolidating this working class vote. Organized labor officially rejects affiliation with either party by virtue of its "non-partisan doctrine." But as V. O. Key observes,
"Partisanship for principle of course resolves itself into partisanship for candidates who concur with labor's principles." Even back in 1906, the AFL asserted in its Bill of Grievances that Congress had "been extremely pre-occupied looking after the interests of vast corporations and predatory wealth." Yet, although there was certainly a bias in the unions against measures which helped the rich get richer and ignored the working man, labor unions were not all that powerful at the time of the critical election of the New Deal realignment. Roosevelt used legislative and executive intervention to build up the labor unions. Federal encouragement of labor union organizations was accomplished through the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, for example. According to Richard Jensen in Party Coalitions of the '80s,

In 1932, the unions were weak, small, and internally divided. By 1940 they initiated 12 million members, galvanized into class consciousness through a series of major strikes in basic industries. Thus the link between organized labor and the Democratic Party was forged. Rubin, in Party Dynamics, observes:

The Wagner Act, passed in 1935, was perceived by labor as open encouragement by the national government to organize the major mass production industries and this, together with the numerous support programs beneficial to working class interests—such as unemployment insurance and minimum wage laws—clearly identified the Democratic Party as sympathetic to the labor market.

During the years between 1911 and 1919 alone, the number of organized workers went from less than 1 million to over 8 million. Labor, in turn, did its part for the Democratic Party. V. O. Key relates:
In a few states, especially those in which the Democratic party had long been a major labor movement in the 1930's virtually took over the Democratic organization.21

The proportion of union members supporting the Democratic ticket was over 80. In 1936, the split between management and workers did not narrow in 1938. In 1948, the proportion of the Republican ranks composed of professional and management persons was about four times as great as for the Democrats.22 According to Generational Change in American Politics, two-thirds of the 1948 Democratic coalition consisted of working class whites.23 And in 1958, more than twice as large a proportion of Truman voters as of Dewey supporters had only a grade school education.24

In 1952, the proportion of union members supporting the Democratic ticket declined to 60 percent. In 1960, the proportion dropped to 55 percent.25 In the elections of 1952 and 1956 Eisenhower drew far higher proportions of the votes of workers than Dewey drew in 1948.26

Part of the reason for this phenomenon was the decreasing importance of the issues which caused the great split between voters on the basis of class. The class factor includes subgroup polarization, such as the lesser educated versus people with higher education; people of lower income versus those with higher income; and blue collar versus white collar workers and professionals. According to Campbell et al., the economic issues which forced class cleavage had left the scene.

After haunting every Republican candidate for President since 1932, memories of the Hoover Depression had receded at least temporarily as a direct force in American politics.27
Perhaps even more importantly, the Eisenhower Administration embraced the reforms of the New Deal. This disposition to accept and even extend the social welfare policies of the previous 20 years undoubtedly lessened an important difference the public had perceived between the parties. In 1960, with the candidacy of John F. Kennedy, union support of the Democratic Presidential candidate went up to 66 percent. According to V. O. Key, although the Teamsters did endorse the Republican Presidential candidate in 1960, there certainly was no full-throated swing to the GOP for labor. In fact, in that same year, union financial support went to 194 Democratic House candidates but to only six Republican House candidates. On an average, blue collar workers in the North voted 64 percent Democratic in Presidential and Congressional elections from 1936 to 1968. White collar voters in the same period voted 57 percent Republican.

A year-by-year breakdown of the percentage of white working class persons voting Democratic demonstrates more dramatically the falling off of support by the lower class for the Democratic Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent of White Working Class Voting Democratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>40.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>48.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
But according to Labor at the Polls:

Union disenchantment with the Democratic party in 1968 and 1972 was not translated into identification with the Republican party. Rather it was manifested in weakened or no support for both parties by union voters joining ranks of independents. 19.27 of union members proclaimed themselves as independents in 1972."

Rubin in Party Dynamics meanwhile views the 1968 election as evidence of a failure by unions to recognize their own self interest and act accordingly. He observes:

"The increasing volatility of the labor union vote was dramatically demonstrated when Hubert Humphrey, long identified as a friend of unionism and labor leadership was able to win a bare 517 of union voters."

In 1972, McGovern received more of his votes from the white middle class than the white working class. And Nixon got more votes from labor than did McGovern."*

Despite the fact that in 1976, 64 percent of union voters voted for Carter, as opposed to 36 percent of the non-union voters, "union membership has become a much less reliable measure for predicting Democratic allegiance. The vote for Carter had more to do with the fundamentalist-religious and small town farmer image of Carter than his belonging to the Democratic Party. One reason for the decreasing influence of union membership on Democratic tendencies is that more union members are adopting a suburban lifestyle, and along with property ownership, are assimilating middle-class suburban values."

"No matter what the reason, however, union membership and influence has definitely declined, According to Seymour Martin Lipset (1980):"
Trade unions, which have been a major support base of the Democrats for campaign activists, financial contributions, and vote support have dropped in membership from close to one-third of the employed non-agricultural labor force in 1960 to about 21% today.  

Yet the growth in white collar workers could result in two different outcomes for the Democratic Party. With the growing segment of white collar workers, there are two possible results; one might be that unions would intensify their cohesiveness; the other is that middle-class Republicanism would be strengthened. Even more important than the overall decline in union members, however, is the fact that union members generally have less reason to vote for the Democratic Party today as compared to the past. The narrowing of party differences, especially on social welfare issues, reduces Democratic candidates' normal advantage. For example, the COPE rating of Midwest Republicans was 48 percent "right." This is voting correctly from a labor standpoint almost half the time. But in the East, fellow Republicans score 81% on the COPE rating.  

What is the effect of this merging of party performance on labor issues? Rubin states:  

The political effect of these relatively liberal Republican state candidates in the East is to diminish the inter-party differences between candidates and over a period of time change the cluster or constellation of meaning that the voter attaches to the very political symbol "Republican" itself.  

Yet, union ties to the Democratic Party do still exist, especially in the Midwest. Although in the East, union members vote for Republican statewide candidates as often as Democratic candidates, the Midwestern unionists register with a 3 to 1 Democratic preference and tend to vote
just as strongly Democratic in statewide elections: 56 percent Demo-
cratic and 17 percent Republican. The reason for the disparity between
the union membership in the East and Midwest, says Rubin, is partly
because of the persistence of class-based party politics in the Midwest.

In the Midwest... the distance between state-
wide party candidates has sustained class-oriented
party politics and, as a result, New Deal class
cleavages have tended to remain more powerful in
party politics, permeating presidential as well as
state politics. 15

Even if the attitude towards labor on the part of the two major
parties is growing more similar, V. O. Key's observation about which
party labor will lean towards still holds true, especially in the Midwest.
He says:

In the rhetoric of labor conventions warnings re-
cur that the Democrats may not be sure of labor
support unless they deliver. Nevertheless, given
the alternative offered to organized labor in re-
cent decades, the non-partisan policy makes of
labor as one of its leaders has remarked "non-
partisan Democrats." 16

Religion and the Vote

The working-class—blue collar workers, lower-income people,
those of lesser education, union members, and big-city urban dwellers—
comprised the core of the New Deal coalition. But there was another
interesting division which was rooted in class; this was religion.
If we look at class and religious components together in 1980, we find
that Catholic blue collar workers are 76 percent Democratic; Protestant
blue collar workers, 52 percent Democratic; white collar Protestants,
69 percent Republican; and white collar Catholics, 41 percent Republican. 17
Examining income figures and religion together, the class-religion vote correlation is even more dramatic. In 1980, Catholics earning less than $15,000 annually voted Democratic by about 5 to 4; those earning over $25,000 voted Republican by about 2 to 1. Setting aside considerations of class and income, it is clear that Catholics have a strong tradition of voting with the Democratic Party. Northern white Protestants were 58 percent Republican and Northern white Catholics were 68 percent Democratic, in the period from 1936 to 1968.

The association of Catholics with the Democratic Party "had its roots in another century." Catholics and Jews looked to the Democratic Party for protection against Protestant efforts to restrict immigration. As Rubin states, "The political link between poor Catholic immigrants and the Democratic Party in Northern cities was only a natural reaction to the already existing close ties of 'better class' Protestants with the Republican class." The Democrats set up a leadership machine structure which catered to new immigrants with a kind of welfare service.

There were other reasons for the religion-party correlation more tied to cultural background, however. The cultural pluralism of immigrant Catholics and the Puritan moralism of high status Protestants definitely led to disagreements over the role of government in formal religion and public morality. These social conflicts eventually solidified into lasting political cleavages.

The candidacy of Catholic Al Smith in 1928 definitely attached Catholics and Jews more firmly than ever to the Democratic Party. With the Depression of the 1930's, the tie between urban Catholics and local Democratic politics was greatly strengthened. The social legislation of the Roosevelt Administration then fostered the Catholic loyalty
to the national party. In 1948, 2 out of 3 Catholic voters supported the Democratic candidate. In 1952, 57 percent of the Catholic vote was Democratic. And in 1956, the Catholic vote was 53 percent. But with the candidacy of Irish Catholic John F. Kennedy, the percentage voting Democratic shot up to 82 percent. Meanwhile, the Jewish Democratic vote fell off somewhat and the proportion of Protestants voting Democratic stayed about the same. In 1964, the percentage of Catholic voters went down to 75 percent, and Protestant loyalties increased 5 percent with the candidacy of Barry Goldwater. In 1968, only 43 percent of Catholic voters supported the Democratic candidate. And Democratic identification among Protestants dropped off sharply. For example, before 1968, 60 percent of southern Protestants identified with the Democratic Party. In 1968, this figure dropped to less than 50 percent. In 1972, the percentage of Southern Protestants calling themselves Democrats was lower than ever before. The percentage of Catholics identifying with the Democratic Party plummets even further in 1972, dipping below 50 percent. In an article called Catholics and the Democratic: Estrangement but Not Desertion, E. J. Dionne defends the Catholic-Democratic vote as still viable.

Catholics remain more liberal and more Democratic than the mass of white Americans. Even in 1976, for example, when Jimmy Carter's public expression of his born-again religious convictions—and his Southern roots—strengthened his appeal to white Protestants, Catholics were more likely to support him than were Protestants. A CBS News poll in 1976 found that Catholics supported Carter by 54 to 44 percent over Gerald Ford, while white Protestants preferred Ford by 57 to 43.

And in 1980 Catholics were again more likely to support Carter than were
white Protestants. The New York Times/CBS news survey of 15,201 voters found that, while Reagan carried the white Catholic vote 51 to 40 percent, with 7 percent going to Anderson, he carried the white Protestant vote 62 to 31 percent with 6 percent going to Anderson. White Protestants were 11 points more Republican than were Catholics in 1976, and 11 points more Republicans in 1980.

Yet there has definitely been an increase in Catholics voting for the Republican presidential candidate (See table below):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gallup Republican Share of Catholic Vote for President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Why the decline in Catholics identifying with the Democratic Party? For one, there has been a decrease in anti-Catholic prejudice; a rise of the Catholics from working class to equal status with Protestants socio-economically; and increasing numbers of Catholics are being raised in middle class suburban lifestyle households.

The Jewish factor in the Democratic vote is very strong. Although Jews comprise only 4 percent of the voting population, their vote is consistently Democratic; and, even more important, Jewish support of the Democratic Party is manifested in valuable ways. They tend to be active in politics, provide campaign contributions, and tend to live in populous states, thus contributing a large electoral vote, percentagewise.
CHAPTER I

THE TENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

All of the data cited thus far in this paper is based on presidential voting. Had the question "Which candidate for Congress did you support?" been asked in addition to "Which candidate for President did you vote for?" the answers might not have been consistent; that is, one of the choices might have been a Republican, the other a Democrat. Personality factors and campaign platforms can intervene so fully that looking at party identification versus which candidate that person voted for in the presidential race is perhaps completely invalid as a measure of party loyalty.

Not so in Congressional contests. According to Daniel Boeker, "The party label holds primacy in House races." The percentage of difference between Democrats and Republicans in who they vote for in the presidential election is substantially different from the percentage of Democrats and Republicans who do not vote for the same candidate in Congressional races. In 1976, the percentage of difference for the Presidential race was 70 percent. In the same year, the statistic was 82 percent for Congressional voting. So, however, statistics for both levels demonstrate an inter-party convergence on behalf of voters, diminishing the correlation between party identification and vote. In 1976, the percent difference between Democrats and Republicans in voting for the presidential candidate was 52 percent. Congressional voting differences between voters of the two parties was 60 percent.

The particular election examined here—the 10th Congressional District race between Eugenia Chapman and John Porter—occurred in a
non-presidential election year. This is important to keep in mind simply because voter turnout for Congressional races in presidential election years averaged 60.5% over the 1956-72 period, while Congressional voting in midterm election years during 1950-60 averaged 45.1%. Another aspect of this race to be aware of is the importance of incumbency. America Votes reports that "incumbent members of Congress, regardless of party, are increasingly vulnerable to defeat, whatever the fate of the rest of the ticket." Lipset, in Party Coalitions in the 80's, cites a 1981 study by Tom Mann which supports the "benefit of incumbency" thesis, finding that three-fourths of all House incumbents now win with at least 60 percent of the major party vote, an increase over the past two decades of 10 to 15 percentage points. According to Lipset, the incumbency factor is accompanied by a steady increase in the Republican Congressional vote. In 1970, it was 40.4 percent. In 1974, it rose to 42.2 percent. And in 1980, the Republican Congressional vote was 48.7 percent. In addition, the recent redistricting will result in an estimated gain of 5 to 10 seats for the Republicans. "Any change which shuffles voters out of or into districts damages incumbents... Since the Democrats have more incumbents... the process of redistricting per se hurts them." But in the 10th Congressional District, the incumbent was a Republican, John Porter.

The 1982 10th Congressional district race is an interesting contest for examination. This chapter is not, however, devoted to telling the story of that race. It is instead intended to focus upon the perceptions of members of groups which are considered to be part of the traditional Democratic coalition with regard to those survey questions which might indicate party loyalty or general ideology.
This is not to say that nothing of the Chapman-Porter contest will be discussed. On the contrary, quite a bit of information will be presented as a context in which to interpret the data.

The Polls

The two polls administered in the 10th Congressional District were commissioned by the National Committee for An Effective Congress. The surveys were conducted for Eugenia Chapman by Cooper Associates, Inc., an independent national political research firm. The first poll, administered in April of 1982, interviewed 408 voters. The second survey was completed in September, with a respondent base of 399. Respondents for this survey were qualified on the basis of registration, past vote, and intention to vote in the upcoming general election. Controls were placed on the sample to achieve a roughly equal number of people in each age group, and to assure a balance between male and female respondents.

The District

The 10th Congressional District is a new district. Due to reapportionment, the original 10th has been substantially changed. Several cities were eliminated from the original district, which was comprised only of communities in Cook County. The new 10th includes communities in other parts of Cook County as well as from Lake County. Unlike the old 10th, which covered the North Shore Suburbs just north of Chicago, the new 10th runs along the lakefront from Wilmette on the south all the way to the Wisconsin state line on the north and to Arlington Heights, Mundelein, and Libertyville on the west.
The Candidates

The background of both candidates is another interesting aspect of the race and illuminates some of the voting history of the area as well. Republican John Porter, a lawyer, served in the Illinois House from 1973 through 1979. He lost a bid to unseat then-Representative Abner Mikva (Democrat) by 650 votes in 1978 but won a special election in January 1980, to replace Mikva when Mikva resigned to become a federal appellate judge. Porter won again in the regular election in November 1980, when he ran against Bob Weinberger. Normally, Porter would be considered an incumbent; but with reapportionment, only 20 percent of the new district was part of the original Tenth, his old district.

Democrat Eugenia Chapman is a veteran of 18 years in the Illinois House, attaining such leadership positions as Minority Whip, Chairman of the Human Resources Committee, as well as Chairman of one of the two House Appropriations committees. Chapman was the chief sponsor of the Illinois Public Junior College Act which gave authority for the creation of the community college system. In addition to education, Representative Chapman has a strong record of support on health issues. She was the chief sponsor of the Illinois Health Facilities Act, for example. Another issue with which Rep. Chapman has been very involved is women's rights. She was the original chief sponsor of the Equal Rights Amendment and was instrumental to the passage of a package of 15 measures that helped to eliminate sex discrimination in Illinois statutes.
The Race

The November 1962 race between Eugene Chapman and John Porter was particularly important because it occurred in a brand new district. Some analysts said for this reason that the outcome would influence the area for at least another decade. David Broocke sums up why: "Decades of partisan alignments in election after election reflects the 'deciding decision' of communities in favor of a particular party." But the Chapman-Porter contest was not a strict clash of ideology; there was no clear "Democratic liberal" position versus "Republican conservative" stance on most issues. As the Chicago Tribune observed:

The battle over the 10th District seat . . . is not a left-wing versus right-wing dispute, and both Chapman and Porter are out to demonstrate to a region that usually votes Republican but is not ultra-conservative that they are not at the extreme ends of their respective parties.

In one sense, this lack of a direct clash of ideology makes the Tenth District race not a very good test election to examine the loyalties of traditional Democrats. Yet, in another sense, the similar nature of the candidates' respective philosophies provides a much more valid basis on which to judge the persistency of the traditional Democratic coalition. After all, one of the greatest problems with the party system today is the merging of ideologies of the two major parties. The relative lack of differentiation of Republicans and Democrats on controversial issues allows the line of demarcation between the two parties to become clouded. Some would say that party lines have been blurred so completely as to make party labels as cues to general principles distinguishing candidates almost meaningless.
The Issues

It is difficult to attribute changes in the results of the two polls to one factor or another. One element which may account for the shift is the effectiveness of campaign strategy in either camp. Another might be the factor of a changing social milieu. As the Cooper poll summary for April 1982 observes,

As domestic and international events change so do the attitudes and opinions of voters. The reader is advised to keep this in mind when reviewing the findings in this report as they reflect only a moment in time and can change dramatically given the impact of modern communications and news media.

Certainly those in the Chapman camp hoped for a turn-around on the voters' perceptions of the issues if not the issues themselves. At the time of the first poll (April 1982) unemployment rose to its highest postwar peak, yet 75 percent of the voters surveyed in the April poll agreed that the Reagan Administration's economic recovery plan should be given more time to work. The problem with the issue of unemployment is illustrative of the type of problem which the nature of the district presented. The socio-economic status of voters in the 10th Congressional District was extremely varied. That area called the "near north" is composed of the very wealthy communities of Glencoe, Kenilworth, Northbrook, Northfield, Wilmette, and Winnetka in Cook County as well as the newly added Lake County cities of Bannockburn, Deerfield, Highland Park, Highland Park, Lake Bluff, Lake Forest, and Riverwoods. Meanwhile, the "far north" area was extremely hard hit by the economic recession. This area, which includes the Lake County communities of Great Lakes, Green Oaks, Indian Creek, Libertyville, Mettaway, Mundelein, North Chicago, Park City,
Vernon Hills, Waukegan, Winthrop Harbor, and Zion has a large minority population. The area labeled "northwest" is composed of a group of communities ranging from lower middle to upper middle class, including Arlington Heights, Buffalo Grove, Prospect Heights, and Wheeling. Unemployment had quite a different impact depending upon which area was examined. Although the Chapman campaign did focus upon that issue and others related to the economic recession, it is clear that the state of the economy could not have equal impact upon the whole district. What is more is that the April survey found that voters favored the Republicans over the Democrats by a margin of two to one with regard to their overall handling of the economy. Thus the report summary advised, "Given the much greater confidence expressed by voters in this district for Republican economic leadership, Eugenia Chapman should avoid general criticism of Republican economic policy and focus instead on specific issues where alternatives can be most concretely and effectively argued."

The attempt by the candidates to move toward the middle made it difficult to focus on issues, also. Although Chapman worked to establish herself as a candidate interested in fiscal responsibility (e.g., focusing upon her work on bills to curtail welfare fraud), her stance on social issues was fairly reflective of the District at large. Porter, on the other hand, did have to take some calculated steps to appear more moderate on social issues to compete with Chapman for the support of groups such as N.O.W. and the Freeze. While it was true that Porter was pro-choice on the abortion issue, his stance on other social issues was unclear because of his tendency to vote both ways on certain issues. For example, Porter could say that he voted for the Equal Rights Amendment while in the Illinois House to one group. To the next group, he
could tell them he voted against the measure in effect because he voted against the supramajority for an amendment rules change, and he could tell them he was against introducing HIA again. Another issue on which Porter attempted to "be all things to all men" was the nuclear freeze. Porter voted for the House version of the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution calling for a mutually verifiable nuclear freeze; thus he could say to the fast-growing and very vocal proponents of the freeze in the district that he was all for the freeze. Yet Porter also voted to fund the MX missile, allowing him to prove how interested he was in building up military strength to the appropriate interest group.

This "fence-sitting" on issues became an issue in and of itself, and it eventually became a liability to Porter. The North Shores Pioneer Press endorsement of Chapman (the North Shore was the only part of the new 10th which belonged to Porter's original Congressional district) mentions this lack of clearcut positions on the part of Porter:

Porter has argued against the effectiveness of a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced budget, but voted for the amendment. In a recent newsletter, he criticized the manner in which tax breaks for congressmen were passed as "lacking integrity." But he also voted for the tax breaks and, in the same newsletter, defends them as necessary. On both the constitutional amendment issue and the congressional tax breaks, Porter's positions seem to indicate one of three possibilities: 1) The Congressman has a complicated and subtle ability to see both sides of an issue; 2) He can't make up his mind; 3) He wants to be all things to all constituents. In any case, we prefer Chapman's more straightforward approach to issues.117

In this way, personal leadership ability became an issue in the campaign. This strategy of moving towards the middle was not without merit, however. Certain interest groups which on the basis of ideology would normally
become allied with the Democrats were hesitant to support Chapman over Porter simply because it was quite likely that Chapman would lose. Thus, Porter was "close enough" on issues like the freeze to gain support from some freeze groups. His stance on Israel was virtually identical to Chapman's. Why should the substantial Jewish vote support the Democrat, if the Republican promised them the same things and would, in all probability, win?
POLL ANALYSIS

First, a copy of the sample breakdown into subgroups. A look at the statistics of September versus those of April shows they are roughly comparable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample Breakdown</th>
<th>April (%)</th>
<th>September (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake County</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook County</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwest</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far North</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near North</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTY ID</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure/refused</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGE GROUP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCCUPATION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table continued on page 44)
## Sample Breakdown (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>April (2)</th>
<th>September (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>REligious Preference</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No preference</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under $15,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15,000-30,000</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over $30,000</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The sample breakdown of the 10th Congressional District indicates the comparability of the April and September survey respondents. Because the distribution among subgroups is roughly equivalent in the sample for both surveys, differences in attitudes should generally be attributed to something other than sample variation.

The first survey results to be examined are general feelings toward John Porter. Below, the results of April and September polling are compared and net change is gauged. The total sample is broken down into the subgroups of occupation and ideology.

### TRENDS IN FEELING TOWARD JOHN PORTER

#### OVERALL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net.</td>
<td>+6%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### By Subgroup: 1. Occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net.</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net.</td>
<td>+13%</td>
<td>-10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net.</td>
<td>+7%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### By Subgroup: 2. Ideology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net.</td>
<td>+15%</td>
<td>-22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net.</td>
<td>-11%</td>
<td>+3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net.</td>
<td>+14%</td>
<td>-9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRENDS IN FEELING TOWARD JOHN PORTER (continued)

By Subgroup: 3. Party Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>+120</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>+40</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>+100</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>+4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are several observations to be made on the basis of this data. First of all, it should be pointed out that none of the occupational or ideological categories show tremendously positive feelings toward Porter. Some of this lack of positive feeling can possibly be attributed to disaffection with government in general, since feelings toward every public figure asked about were also rather low. This lack of strong positive or negative feelings is perhaps more a product of Porter's lack of name recognition and/or lack of a strong image in the district, however. Even with the predominance of low figures, it is possible to observe some differences based on occupational ideology. For example, there is a 15 percent difference between professionals and blue collar workers in their rating of feelings toward Porter in April. Yet, Porter makes some real gains with blue collar workers, increasing his positive rating by 7 percent, but more importantly, decreasing his negative image by 19 percent among blue collar workers. Similarly, Porter makes great gains among liberals in September. To begin with, the percentage difference between liberals' and conservatives' feelings towards Porter is only 10 percent in April. In September the spread
between the ideological ends of the spectrum remains about the same; they show a positive trend increase for Porter at 14 and 15 percent. Liberals' decline of 22 points in negative feelings towards Porter is graphic evidence of the success of Porter's move away from the right and appeal to the Democratic and liberal communities. Nineteen percent of self-identified Democrats have positive feelings toward Porter in April. This figure shoots up to 31% in September. Even the independent support does not increase by as wide a margin. Negative feelings toward Porter by Democrats drop a full 18 points in September.

One problem with utilizing the contestants of a congressional race for analysis is that there is the chance that candidates are so anonymous that party labels do not become attached to either candidate. Although both candidates had problems with name recognition, even in September fully half of respondents questioned did not recognize Eugenia Chapman's name. Thus, perhaps sometimes responses were made without knowledge of the candidate's party. Yet if we examine the results of polls in races where voters are sure to recognize names and know party labels, other factors intervene. For example, voters were asked whom they supported for governor of Illinois. Most voters were aware that Thompson is a Republican and Stevenson a Democrat, but personality almost took precedence over issue position in the race for governor. Stevenson had long had an "egghead" image; but when Stevenson's "I am not a wimp" hit the media, personality became a major issue in the campaign. The Stevenson-Thompson race is therefore perhaps no better a contest in which to judge the loyalty of the traditional Democratic coalition; yet the results are somewhat helpful. In September, Stevenson had the support of 60 percent of the self-identified Democrats, 38 percent of the blue-collar
workers, and 51 percent of the self-identified liberals. Thompson, on the other hand, had the support of 26 percent of the self-identified Democrats; 48% of the blue collar voter population; and 35% of liberal voters. Meanwhile, he also carried 78% of the self-identified Republicans, 53 percent of the professionals, and 62 percent of the white collar workers. Among moderates, Thompson could claim 34 percent and among conservatives, 71 percent. Before leaving the topic of the governor's race, however, it is important to note that all the polls indicated a landslide for Thompson; and yet Stevenson almost eked out a Democratic victory. Polls are simply compilations of what people think at one very specific point in time. They are good tools to use in analysis but the Thompson "landslide" reminds us not to place total faith in their ability to predict an outcome.

In a direct comparison of the 10th District challengers ("If the election were held today for whom would you vote?") Porter again gets at least a modicum of support from groups which traditionally have Democratic loyalties. The percentages on liberal voters is particularly interesting. In the April survey, Chapman claims 36 percent of them while Porter retains the support of 32 percent. Perhaps the other most striking aspect of this trial heat outside of the large percentage of undecided voters is the extent to which Porter picks up the support of moderate, white collar independents. Fifteen percent of the independents support Chapman while Porter supporters comprise 48 percent of the Independent vote. White collar workers similarly leave Chapman with 17 percent and support Porter at the rate of 54 percent. Lastly, Porter claims almost twice as many moderate voters (43% to 22%).
Porter leads Chapman by 2 to 1, but the undecided voters are a large enough percentage to provide a swing group which could move the election result in either direction. When asked about their feelings toward Eugenia Chapman, voters split in thirds. Thirty-five percent of the responses were positive, 34 percent neutral, and 31 percent negative. But the base of voters who were able to rate Chapman was too small to achieve any kind of subgroup analysis to discover in what pockets her support lay.

Porter's job rating (broken down into subgroups only for April) demonstrates that his strength was among the groups forming a traditional Republican constituency: namely, older, professional, conservative and affluent voters.
PORTER JOB RATING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATION</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Collar</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDEOLOGY</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $15,000</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$15-30,000</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$30-50,000</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over $50,000</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though it is clear that Porter's most solid support comes from professionals, conservatives, and people who earn over $50,000 a year, he also gets a positive rating from a fair amount of blue collar workers (44%), lower income voters (46%) and liberals (53%). It is the traditional Republican group that forms the base of Porter's support, however. Even if Chapman did have support as strong as this from her own traditional Democratic core of voters, it would not be enough to win. According to Cooper Associates' summary report:

While we would expect Chapman to do well among voters on the left of the spectrum, support from this segment of the electorate alone will not be sufficient to win in November. In a district where Democrats are the minority party, where blue collar workers represent 14 percent of the electorate and lower income voters less than 10 percent, support from a traditional Democratic coalition must be augmented substantially by support from the center of the political spectrum.
Correlating a voter's position on the issues with a subgroup classification may cast more light on where the traditional Democratic coalition of voters is today. For example, on the question of whether we should "give Reaganomics more time," only 21 percent of liberals agree, while 65 percent of conservatives agree. Yet blue collar workers, white collar workers, and professionals answer "yes" in almost equal percentages (40, 44, and 43 percent respectively). On the other hand, on the issue of whether to "keep social security strong," 45 percent of blue collar workers contrast with the 30 percent of professionals who agreed. Liberals were for this "New-Dealistic" issue with 55 percent agreeing we should keep social security strong. Only 33 percent of conservatives said yes.

On issues which are not economic, the breakdown becomes even more interesting:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>No Military Aid for El Salvador</th>
<th>ERA good for the nation</th>
<th>Cut defense budget</th>
<th>Solve unemployment today</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Preference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapman</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porter</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White collar</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Two out of five voters (44%) strongly agree that handgun control would reduce crime. Strongest support was found among liberals (61%), and Chapman supporters (51%). Conservatives and blue collar workers offered least support for the statement (36% and 33% respectively). Two out of five voters (42%) also strongly agreed that the U.S. should not give military equipment to El Salvador. Strongest support was expressed by Chapman voters (59%) and blue collar workers (52%). Conservatives agreed least with that statement with only a third of that group expressing support (33%).

Liberals came out 53 percent in favor of the ERA, while conservatives indicated least agreement with 16 percent. Strongest agreement for the statement that the defense budget should be cut was found among liberals (48%) and Chapman voters (42%) while conservatives agreed least with that statement at 19 percent. Support for the statement that the problem of unemployment needs to be solved now even at the risk of increased inflation was found among blue-collar workers (31%), Chapman voters (31%), and liberals (30%). Professionals and conservatives agreed least with the statement (18% and 21%).

When voters were asked which party they thought handled the economy best, the result was 2 to 1 in favor of the Republican Party (41% to 18%). This statistic, when considered with the sample breakdown, is a reminder that the 10th Congressional District includes some solid Republican bastions of support. It is interesting, for example, to consider 70 percent of those earning under $15,000 and 57 percent of blue collar workers rated unemployment as the most serious economic problem today. This stands in sharp contrast to the responses of wealthier voters. Only 35 percent of those earning over $50,000 and 32
percent of professionals viewed unemployment as the most serious economic problem today.

Some Conclusions

Eugenia Chapman lost her bid for the 10th Congressional District seat. Chapman's strongest asset—besides her own personal warmth and image as a caring individual—was her record on social welfare issues. Because the election occurred in the midst of painful budget cuts to social programs and particularly education, the Chapman camp was counting on a voter rejection of the Reagan referendum out of anger. Instead, in the 10th Congressional District the survey found 50 percent of all voters in April agreeing that "We should reduce government spending even if it means a reduction in social programs, such as health, education, and social security." That percentage went up 8 points in September: 58 percent of the voters supported reducing social programs. Considering the predominantly Republican conservative nature of the district and her opponent's advantage in incumbency (name recognition, public forums sponsored under the auspices of congressional duties, and use of the franking privilege) she did quite well. One definitely positive outcome of Representative Chapman's candidacy was the push she gave Congressman Porter towards moderation on several issues, at least temporarily.

What is more difficult to judge, however, is the status of the traditional Democratic coalition of voters. On some issues, it was very clear where the cleavage in philosophy lay and the old Democratic core responded. But on many issues, the "coalition" was extremely fragmented.
One split kept recurring; that between blue collar workers and liberals. The problem is of course the same problem experienced by the Democratic Party since the 1960s when the Old Left and the New Left found that one party couldn't house both interests satisfactorily. Social liberalism versus economic liberalism is the key polarity which threatens to divide the Democratic Party. While it is true that, had the groups of original New Deal coalition united, the race would have been closer, Chapman needed support from outside those groups to win. As it was, however, Chapman did not receive the full backing of the blue-collar workers, union households, people with lesser incomes. Although the 10th Congressional District polls did not subgroup respondents by religion, the same dilemma of traditional Democratic tendencies and conservative religious ideals is a source of conflict for Catholics and Jews. The Tenth Congressional District November 1982 race between Eugenia Chapman and John Porter supports the thesis that the traditional Democratic care is dissolving. The New Deal coalition is fragmented. The question is—by what, if anything, will it be replaced?
CHAPTER 4
REALIGNMENT OR DISSOLUTION: CONCLUSIONS

It is clearly possible to assert that the traditional Democratic coalition of voters still exists. After all, a preponderance of lower class (blue collar, low-income unionist, lesser educated) people vote Democratic. And Catholics and Jews definitely continue to lean Democratic. But the New Deal coalition is no longer. The support base of these core groups has eroded far enough not to be just more different, but to actually not exist any longer. How did this occur? Part of the reason for the decay of the coalition lies in the solving of the problem the groups had come together to combat. The economy boomed again, and the government assumed a permanent social welfare role so as to prevent against the kind of devastation which the Depression caused thousands of people to experience.

In Change and Continuity in American Politics, Knocke observes:

The economic welfare component of partisan attitudes has been clearly diminishing since 1952, with the gap between manual and non-manual workers likewise shrinking. Much of the decline in the Democratic party advantage has occurred among the party's main constituency: manual workers. The impact of "good times" and the abating stigmatization of the Republican party during the Great Depression are important factors in the erosion of class differentials in economic partisan attitudes.118

Another reason for the decline of the New Deal coalition was that, as the Depression faded into history, generations who experienced the Depression firsthand disappeared from the electorate. So the personal experience of the Depression ceased to be a compelling source of Democratic support. According to Richard Rubin, "unreconciled long term
socio-economic and racial forces have been weakening the Democratic coalition persistently since the end of World War II.\textsuperscript{1-4}

Blacks have become important contributors to the Democratic party—about one-fifth of all Democratic votes in 1968 and 1972.\textsuperscript{1-6} The "racial forces" Rubin speaks of is the uncertainty this new electoral group causes traditional Democratic party supporters.

The fragmentation of the New Deal coalition has to do with the effectiveness of the party as a representative of group interests, also. According to Seymour Martin Lipset, the basic political division of industrial society was materialistic, focusing on the distribution of wealth and income.\textsuperscript{1-7} Our society today is post-industrialist. As such, politics is more concerned with social issues. In Party Coalitions of the 80's, Lipset sums up the problems this materialist and post-materialist tension can cause for the party system.

The Democrats . . . have found it increasingly difficult to hold together a coalition of socially liberal and peace-oriented New Politics intelligentsia, blacks, feminists, and trade union leaders who are generally hard-liners on foreign policy, and economically liberal but socially conservative working class whites.\textsuperscript{1-8}

The New Politics of the 1960's made this abstract industrialist vs. post-industrialist clash real. According to Lipset, the reform elements concerned with post-materialist or social issues largely derive their strength, not from the workers and the less privileged, the social base of the Left in industrial society, but from affluent segments of the well educated—students, academics, journalists, professionals, and civil servants. The New Left, the New Politics, receive their support from such strata. Most workers, on the other hand, remain concerned with material questions.\textsuperscript{1-9}
The result is that the greatest Democratic vote comes at the extremes: the professionals and less skilled workers, the most and the least educated. Everett Carl Ladd reports that in 1968 and 1972 the groups at the top were more Democratic than those at the bottom. The result in the 1968 election, according to Lipset, was that many blue-collar voters supported George Wallace, reacting against Humphrey's stand on civil rights, while the New Politics Left refused to back Humphrey because of his lack of commitment to ending the war in Vietnam and his links to Old Politics.

The split is even more obvious in 1972. The New Politics Left won the Democratic Party nomination for George McGovern, but he was the first Democratic presidential nominee not to get support of the AFL-CIO. In 1980, too, the division of the Democratic Party became evident. Anderson absorbed the New Left with his liberal stance on social issues, and Carter took the Old Left's blue-collar wing.

While the Democratic Party was split off into two distinct factions in 1980, the Republican Party consolidated its strength—so much so that some analysts view the Republican landslide (in both houses of Congress as well as in the presidential race) as evidence of a realignment. Reagan received an absolute majority in the three-way race with Carter and Anderson. He defeated Carter 10-1 in electoral votes. The Republicans captured a majority in the United States Senate for the first time in 26 years. And the Democratic majority in the U.S. House of Representatives was reduced by more than half. Reagan's gains were greatest among labor union families, manual workers, Southerners, Jews, Catholics, and older voters—in other words, the core "Old Left" constituency of the New Deal Democratic Party.
Although Reagan's vote amounted to only 26.7 percent of the eligible electorate this was only 3.4 percent less than Franklin Roosevelt got in 1932. The decline in Democratic strength is also seen in state legislatures. The number of states in which Democrats hold control of both houses fell from 37 in 1974 to 28 in 1980, losing 608 legislative seats.

In his article "Party Coalitions and the 1980 Elections," Lipset contends that:

Republicans have built a coalition of affluent economic conservatives and less educated more religious social conservatism. Inflation, the main economic problem of recent times, fosters acceptance of a conservative solution—cutbacks in government spending and activity—even by the relatively underprivileged.

Evidence from 1980 election surveys demonstrates a boost in people identifying themselves to Republicans from 22 percent in early 1981. David Broder reports that 2 polls in May 1981 showed Republicans virtually tied with the Democrats in public support, erasing what had been a 3-to-2 deficit for much of the last century. Not only is Republican party identification up, but Gallup polls in mid-1981 also indicate that the Republican party has taken a 41 percent to 28 percent lead over the Democrats on the question of which party can "do a better job of keeping the country prosperous."

The New Deal coalition formed as a result of the Depression and as a reaction to Republican Party policies which had led the country into economic collapses. The voters' perception of the Republicans as the party of prosperity over the Democrats by 12 percentage points is convincing evidence for the argument claiming the collapse of the New Deal.
coalition. And the Republicans' new strength does not appear to be abating. Broder says:

The Republicans showed remarkable party cohesion in the early tests on Reagan's budget holding; every GOP senator and representative in line and attracting 63 conservative Democrats in the House to establish their de facto policy control of that body.135

While it is true that late 1981, 1982, and early 1983 observations might not paint quite as rosy a picture for the President's party, the Republicans have certainly gained a lot of ground since before the 1980 election. After all, they picked up 33 congressional seats in 1980, the greatest gain by either party since 1966. Yet, some evidence demonstrates that the Republican "mandate" was not a mandate at all. In a survey by Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, 63 percent of those surveyed felt election results were more "a rejection of President Carter" than "a mandate for more conservative policies."136

According to some analysts, the Reagan election was mostly a statement of dissatisfaction with the "state of the nation" in general. There were a variety of reasons for the landslide Republican presidential vote. President Carter had a "light hold" on the loyalties and affections of important constituencies within his own party; there was a strong challenge for renomination posed by Kennedy; inflation; the Iranian hostage situation which "seemed to symbolize the ineffectuality of American power and policy in the world"; and the appeal to conservative social philosophy, with issues such as prayer in the schools and anti-abortion—all of these factors combined to give Reagan victory.137

According to some experts, the Democratic Party maintained strength
because even though in 1980 the Republicans won 22 out of 36 seats in the Senate, as well as 7 out of the 13 contested governorships, the Democrats retained control of the House of Representatives, 243-192.

In addition, the Democrats dominate the State level. The Democrats have a majority in 28 states, with 13 for the Republicans and 7 divided. Patrick Caddell in "The Democratic Strategy and Its Electoral Consequences" states:

The congressional results seem at least as much an overflow of the Carter repudiation as they do an ideological or partisan GOP triumph.137

Lipset contends meanwhile that Reagan's election does not necessarily indicate a growing Republican dominance on all levels of government. He says most people have voted for Democrats in state legislatures, courthouse, mayoralty and congressional levels in the same election in which they elected GOP presidential candidates. For 14 of the 16 postwar years up to 1977 in which Republicans held the presidency, the Democrats controlled both houses of Congress.140 Nelson Polsby ("Coalition and Faction in American Politics") agrees that the 1980 election was not really a Republican landslide. He observes that without counting votes cast for the unopposed Democrat Russell Long, almost 3 million more people voted for Democratic candidates for the Senate than voted for Republicans. Nearly 2 million more Democratic than Republican votes were cast for House candidates alone.141

In 1970, Kevin Phillips postulated a new dominant coalition based on the ideology of limited government; based geographically on the areas of population growth in the South and West; and socially on the "middle American," especially whites, Catholics, and suburbanites.142 Walter
Burnham thinks the 1980 election is a turning point consistent with this idea because of demographic changes in the electorate. According to the census, 17 congressional seats and electoral votes were transferred from declining industrial Northeast and Midwest area to growing Sun Belt states of the South and West. The April 13, 1983 edition of the Chicago Tribune summarized a Bureau of the Census report, stating that:

```
Nearly half of all Americans moved during the last half of the 1970's, with the nation's population slipping away from Northern industrial states towards the South and West.144
```

The urban strongholds of the Democratic party are losing out to the South—formerly Democratic, but today, for all practical purposes, solidly Republican. The Democratic candidate got the majority of Southern electoral votes in only three out of the last six presidential elections from 1952 to 1972, and importantly, practically no support in the last two of these six contests. In 1980, not only did Reagan win almost all of the Southern electoral votes, but the Republicans now hold 11 of the 22 senatorial seats in the once Confederate states. The Republican gain in aggregate party identification from 1980 to 1981 was 11 percent in the South and West compared with a national average of 8 percent.145

Some analysts contend that this shift away from the New Deal coalition began with Nixon's landslide victory in 1972, with the coalition realignment "only temporarily halted and deflected by the Watergate scandal." In the 1972 election, Nixon carried all but one of 50 states. His lead in the popular vote was twice as large as Reagan's.

Podhoretz in The New American Majority states that "Nixon's 1972 inroads into many of the major constituencies of the old Roosevelt
coalition were so dramatic that the new Republican majority seemed indeed to have emerged in that election. Like Nixon, Reagan carried the Catholics and half of the blue-collar vote, and he did as well as Nixon with Blacks and somewhat better with Jews.14 And, in 1972, Senator George McGovern received only 46 percent of the Catholic vote and 48 percent of the labor union vote—the first time since the New Deal that these two key electoral groups supported a Republican over a Democratic candidate.150

But both the 1972 and 1980 presidential elections might be seen as deviating elections. Neither election presages a wholesale change in the alignment structure of the parties; but instead is a temporary phenomenon which occurred on the basis of personality, strategical mistakes, or sudden focus on some new issue. Polsby sums up the difference between a critical election and a deviating or "blip" election:

The critical election interpretation implies the broadening of the Republican coalition from its rather narrow base of true believers; the blip theory implies no such expansion for the Republican party, merely Republican electoral success under conditions that are bound to be unstable over the medium term.151

Because the last realignment was in 1912 and the average length of time elapsing between realignments is 28 years, many observers suggest that the United States is overdue for another critical election and the emergence of a sixth party system. William Schneider in "Democrats and Republicans: Liberals and Conservatives" outlines four factors that have emerged that point to the occurrence of a realignment: one, defection of the South from its historic Democratic allegiance; two, emergence of black voters as a major political force; three, "law
and order*1 backlash among white working class voters in many urban centers; and four, emergence of activist ideological movement on both the Left and the Right.\textsuperscript{152}

David Knocke similarly sees the potential for realignment today, especially because of the recent focus on economic issues because the economic crisis polarizes voters along class lines. And, as Sundquist states:

If new issues arise that coincide with the existing line of party cleavage, they strengthen party cohesion, increase the distance between parties, and reinforce the existing alignment.

One realignment scenario is postulated by Walter Burnham in \textit{Critical Elections: The Mainsprings of American Politics}. He says:

The potential fracture lines around which a sixth party system would be organized are unlike those of the New Deal realignment but very much like those of all preceding ones, overwhelmingly horizontal: black against white, peripheral regions against the center "parochial" against "cosmopolitans," blue-collar whites against both blacks and affluent liberals, the American "great middle" with its strong attachments to the values of the traditional American political formula, against urban cosmopolitans, intellectuals, and students who have left that old credo behind.

Lower middle class and working class people—especially those who are Roman Catholic—are seen as excellent Republican prospects. Jewish voters will also be Republican targets, especially at the presidential level. Many Republicans feel that Jewish voters "traditionally liberal and humanist and Democratic in their views, might be appealed to on a more specific basis of concern for the survival of Israel."\textsuperscript{155}

But the Republican Party has to be careful. If Republicans espouse an ultra right-wing stance on social issues, they risk
alienating the economically conservative and socially liberal sect of the party.

This paper began by mentioning the April 1983 mayoral election. The overwhelming electoral participation of Blacks is the new key element in the Democratic coalition. Their participation has been important to Democratic candidates in the past (providing 19 percent of the Humphrey vote, 22 percent of McGovern's total but are more important now than ever. Blacks make up 10.1 percent of the voting age population concentrated in cities important to the presidential race because of primaries (such as New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York, Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio). In Chicago's mayoral election, more than 100,000 blacks were registered in the last few months. USA Today, in a post-election summary said that the Washington win is viewed as "critical to black support for the Democratic Party in the 1984 presidential year."158

As Blacks become a key electoral group for the Democrats, "Old Guard" Democrats are deserting the party. The New York Times reports that "many lifelong Democrats, including eight of the city's 50 Democratic ward committeemen, openly worked for Epton (the Republican candidate)."159 The factor of racial tension is enough to fragment a coalition which is only being held together as much as it is because of habit and tradition. The problem is, as Richard Rubin states, the absence of something to replace it. He says:

"The intensity, scope and style of vibrant Democratic Party competition seems to have become excessively disaggregative, fragmenting the support of traditional Democratic groups and overburdening the internal system of a faltering old coalition but without being able to establish a sufficient new one."160
Perhaps what is occurring therefore is not a realignment—but a de-alignment. A realignment implies the movement of large numbers of voters across party lines, establishing a new majority coalition. In a dealignment "old coalitional ties are disrupted but without some stable new configuration taking place."[16]

Quite a few political analysts view what is happening now as a product of electoral dealignment; volatile party free voting where all of the factions and interest groups pursue the accomplishment of their own group aims. This "dealignment" implies the fall of the political party. Ladd and Lipset concur in a pamphlet written after the 1972 election, citing several indications that a restructuring of party mass bases would not occur, and that parties were rapidly losing their ability to guide voters' choices. Burnham suggests that the voting behavior we call a result of the New Deal coalition may be based on entirely false perceptions.

In terms of the history of American voting behavior, the New Deal might come to be regarded one day as a temporary if massive deviation from a secular trend toward the gradual disappearance of the political party in the United States.[16]

Conclusions

This paper has attempted to examine the evidence for the persistence of the New Deal coalition. In doing so, it has summarized trends of partisanship and party loyalty; looked at sources for party identification; and highlighted the history of party realignments. Part II studied the factions of the traditional Democratic coalitions; examined the 10th Congressional District's poll results in its most recent race
to check for the loyalty of the groups of the New Deal coalition; and discussed the possibilities for realignment and "dealignment" or dissolution of the party system.

The party system is undergoing great change. While party ties and the perception of party function are still strong enough to doubt that the party system is in danger of disappearing in the near future, there is no doubt that the New Deal coalition is no longer a coalition in the true sense of the word. It is the nature of political parties to drive toward moderation; the diversity of pressures and the need to have appeal for many groups and more than one class combine to make the party a conglomeration of diverse interests. In trying to accommodate all of these interests, the party becomes an adequate vehicle of expression for none of them. Unless the interests which aggregate in a party coalition are of more similar philosophies any "coalition" which may form will be simply a temporary conglomeration of groups with no longstanding commitment to the ideals of the party. Although it is true that the two parties are not absorbing all of the increasing number of economic and social issues, the allegiance of principle social groups is really still in flux. The New Politics types of groups may lead the Democratic Party in the 80's or 90's. Blacks will be a key element in a new Democratic coalition, as will affluent liberal types (as were found in the 10th Congressional District North Shore elite in great numbers). The nuclear freeze issue could become an issue around which popular support could coalesce for the Democrats, especially considering the handling of the issue by Reagan.

The evidence from the 10th Congressional District suggesting that the New Deal coalition of voters no longer exists is consistent with what
is occurring in the Democratic Party ranks nationwide. The election of Harold Washington as mayor of Chicago was a dramatic example of the change which is being experienced by the Democratic Party and affecting the Republican Party. Perhaps it will only take the introduction of an issue that forcefully splits the electorate toward one side of the spectrum or the other which will truly spark a real realignment.
ENDNOTES

1. President's Commission for a National Agenda for the 80's, p. 8.
5. Crotty, p. 36.
7. Crotty, p. 32.
8. Crotty, p. 36.
12. President's Commission, p. 23.
13. Crotty, p. 11.
14. Crotty, p. 32.
15. Knocke, p. 139.
19. President's Commission, p. 22-23.
23. Nie, p. 29.
25. Knocke, p. 3.
29. Knocke, p. 3.
31. Nie, p. 46.
32. Knocke, p. 93.
37. Sundquist, p. 29.
42. Key, p. 171.
43. Key, p. 215.
44. Key, p. 215.
45. Nie, p. 46.
47. Jensen, p. 75.
49. Key, p. 187.
50. Key, p. 188.
52. Key, p. 189.
53. Jensen, p. 78.
54. Key, p. 190.
55. Key, p. 190.
56. Campbell, p. 45.
57. Campbell, p. 45.
58. Campbell, p. 47.
59. Knocke, p. 139.
60. Knocke, p. 137.
63. Knocke, p. 60.
64. Knocke, p. 60, 64.
65. Pomper, p. 47.
66. Pomper, p. 64.
67. Key, p. 177.
68. Jensen, p. 78.
70. Rubin, p. 52.
71. Key, p. 160.
72. Key, p. 67.
73. Key, p. 215.
74. Paul R. Abramson, Generational Change in American Politics, p. 28.
75. Key, p. 215.
76. Key, p. 215.
77. Key, p. 67.
78. Campbell, p. 46.
79. Key, p. 62.
80. Jensen, p. 79.
81. Abramson, p. 15-16.
82. Oh Ru Jung, Labor at the Polls, p. 134.
83. Rubin, p. 67.
84. Abramson, p. 25.
86. Rubin, p. 72.
88. Rubin, p. 69.
89. Rubin, p. 73.
90. Rubin, p. 78.
91. Key, p. 66.
92. Jensen, p. 79.
94. Jensen, p. 79.
96. Rubin, p. 32.
98. Rubin, p. 32.
100. Rubin, p. 32.
102. Rubin, p. 32.
104. Dionne, p. 311.
106. Rubin, p. 33.
111. Mulcahy, p. 66.
112. Lipset, p. 19.
113. Jensen, p. 76.
114. All of the data in this section are from the same source: the Cooper Associates, Inc. report and will not be noted as such throughout. Also, much of the material in this section is generated from personal experience and observation, as I was a staff member of the Chapin campaign.
119. Rubin, p. 4.
120. Rubin, p. 4.
121. Lipset, p. 23.
122. Lipset, p. 32.
125. Lipset, p. 27.
126. Lipset, p. 27.
130. Lipset, p. 2.
131. Lipset, p. 32.
133. David Broder, Party Coalitions of the 80's, p. 12.
135. Broder, p. 11.
136. Lipset, p. 44.
137. Broder, p. 10.
138. Lipset, p. 10.
139. Caddell, p. 274.
140. Lipset, p. 11.
141. Holiday, p. 126.
143. Burnham, p. 201.
144. Chicago Tribune, April 13, 1985, p. 4.
146. Lipset, p. 31.
147. Burnham, p. 201.
150. Rubin, p. 4.

151. Polsby, p. 175.

152. William Schneider, "Democrats and Republicans, Liberals and Conservatives," Party Coalitions of the 80's, p. 182.


156. Rubin, p. 22.


158. USA Today, April 13, 1983, p. 1A.


160. Rubin, p. 84.

161. Ladd, p. 147.

162. Burnham, p. 112.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. The American Voter, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, 1960.


*NOTE*

Poll Data and Summary from the Eugenia S. Chapman for Congress Campaign (Surveys were funded by the National Committee for an Effective Congress and conducted by Cooper Associates, Inc., at Batesville, VA).