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EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN ELECTORAL STRUCTURE ON VOTER SATISFACTION

BY

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Researchers over the past few years have been concerned with representa-
tional equity for blacks and less affluent whites in the local government
setting. Much of the research has focused on the electoral structure and
the impact it has on representational equity. Many have concluded that
representational equity for blacks is more likely to be achieved in cities
with district rather than at-large councils.\textsuperscript{1} These findings have coincided
with a trend among large cities of the Sunbelt toward replacement of at-
large with district elections. It would seem logical to suppose that greater
black representation on city councils would imply greater satisfaction with
and greater access to government by these minorities. The objective of
this paper is to examine the impact of changes from at-large to district
representation upon citizen satisfaction with city government, citizen's per-
ception of their own access to city government and upon their evaluations of
the quality and the equity of the services that government provides.\textsuperscript{2} I will
first review existing literature and then move to "secondary analysis" of
data.

The at-large method of electing city council members was proposed by
middle- and upper-class Americans during the late 19th and early 20th
centuries--during the Progressive era. At large elections were to act as the
device which would destroy one of the institutional bases for urban political
machine domination by eliminating the feudalistic ties of the predominately
white immigrant urban masses to the urban political machine. Proponents of
at-large systems hoped to establish apolitical, efficient, and business-like city governments that would respond to over-all community needs and not to the particularistic needs and interests of the various ethnic and economic communities. This meant taking government out of the hands of neighborhood and centralizing it under the control of businessmen. Two important vehicles for this municipal reformism, the commission and city manager plans, both originated in the South. The first city in the nation to install a commission was Galveston, Texas, in 1901, and it spread rapidly to other Texas and Southern cities. The initiative for both plans came from business groups who argued that a municipality was essentially a business corporation and should be run according to business principles. The at-large election and the nonpartisan ballot were associated with both the commission and city-manager forms of government. A study of 50 cities that had adopted the manager system by 1938 showed that 40 had at-large elections. In cities that by 1930 had a population of 30,000 or more, Daniel N. Gorden found that in 1960, councilmen were elected at-large in 100 percent of the commission cities, in 76 percent of the manager cities, but only in 22 percent of the "unreformed" (ward-based) cities. At large elections remain concentrated in the South. Albert Karnig had shown that 75 percent of Southern cities elect councilmen at large, compared to 47 percent elsewhere. Despite the lofty intentions of the "Good Government" reformers to run the city as a business with business principles, racism was intertwined with Progressive Reform particularly in the South. Poll tax payment, for example, as a requirement for voting clearly eliminated the blacks and poor whites from the voting populace. Other methods used to eliminate the black vote were intimidation, gerrymandering, literacy tests, and the party
primary system. With the move from ward-elections to at-large elections, blacks and poor whites were disadvantaged in their efforts to elect "one of their own." Galveston, Texas, the birthplace of the commission movement, provides an example of one of the effects of at-large election. The change to at-large elections occurred in 1895. Prior to 1891 the city had operated under a mayor-council charter with twelve aldermen elected from wards. New charter amendments initiated by businessmen—"the Good Government Club"—became effective in 1891 and 1893. These amendments added four at-large seats. The Chamber of Commerce in 1895 proposed and passed a completely at-large council of twelve members. Ten of the twelve members of the Good Government Club—typical middle-class businessmen and a physician—won. Five winners citywide lost their own wards. Conversely two members of the People's Ticket—the incumbent council of longshoremen, bartenders, small businessmen, and a drayman, which included a black—won. The black incumbent carried his ward but was defeated citywide leaving an all-white council in a town that was 22 percent black. The implications are clear. While it may not have been so great a change in the racial content of the council, it was a dramatic change in the social class composition. This change brought on by at-large elections coupled with the reduced ranks of Black voters resulted in the dilution of the minority vote.

A massive Black initiative attempted to bring changes to the electoral system. The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960's succeeded in removing overt, legal restrictions from black political participation, but it failed to bring about black political representation commensurate with the size of the Black population. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 attempted to prevent new structural change calculated to dilute the black vote or limit the effectiveness..
of black political power. Prohibitions were placed on gerrymandering, on changes to multimember districts or at-large voting, and on the creation of substantial filing fees. 

The NAACP Legal Defense Fund has brought numerous suits claiming that at-large elections violate the rights of blacks under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment by diluting black voting strength as well as by violating the Voting Rights Acts of 1965. A recent case is the Bolden v. City of Mobile case. The Bolden v. City of Mobile case was returned to a federal district court by the Supreme Court in April, 1980, after the Court ruled that Mobile’s commission government was not unconstitutional. Four justices argued that intent to discriminate must be shown before an electoral system can be deemed unconstitutional. In May, 1981, the Justice Department entered the case, claiming that discriminatory intent was evident in Mobile election procedures. A final decision is pending.

In the 1973 Zimmer v. McKeithen decision the Court of Appeals established standards by which dilution of the minority vote could occur under the 1965 Voting Rights Act. These standards included:

1. lack of access to the process of slating candidates;
2. unresponsiveness of legislators to their (minority) particularized interests;
3. a tenuous state policy underlying preference for multi-member or at-large districting;
4. existence of past discrimination in general precludes effective participation in the election system.

While the court stated that not all these criteria need be satisfied in a successful dilution claim, the criterion of major interest is "unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests." Use of the Zimmer criteria has resulted in a number of successful law suits leading to the
conclusion that inequalities in the delivery of public services is part of the "unresponsiveness" criteria. In Bolden v. City of Mobile, the plaintiff argued that street maintenance in black neighborhoods was inferior to that in white areas. The plaintiff in Blacks United for a Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. Shreveport, as in Bolden v. City of Mobile, claimed inequality in street maintenance. Jackson, Mississippi was also brought into court. In Kirksey v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, claims brought against Jackson included discrimination in planning, zoning, street resurfacing and lighting, fire protection and parks. Finally, in Malisham v. Collins, the plaintiff argued that Tuscaloosa, Alabama, a city with at-large commission government, provides inferior quality and quantity of services to black residents in the areas of police and fire protection, streets and solid waste collection. The questions arising from suits is how widespread is this discrimination and does discrimination in services diminish with changes to district elections.

EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL STRUCTURE

Recently a variety of studies have been conducted to determine the effect of electoral structure on representational equity. Most of these studies have concluded that equitable representation for black citizens in southern cities depends heavily on the method by which the city governing body is elected. Sixty percent of cities in 1960 with a population above 10,000 elected their councilmen at large, while only 23 percent elected them solely from districts. In cities of at least 5,000 population, most councilmen in 1971 were chosen at large and over twice as many cities elected some councilmen by this method rather than entirely by ward. Less than 1 percent of council
members were Black, American Indian, Oriental, or Hispanic. The at-large system used by two-thirds of the cities seems to have a negative impact on black representation.

In a study of 313 of the 385 American cities with populations over 10,000 which were at least 15 percent black in 1970, Heilig and Mundt concluded that the southern movements to districts is linked to increases in black representational equity. In 1970, 83.5 percent of the Southern and 54 percent of the nonsouthern cities elected councils at large. During the 1970's, one-third of the southern cities changed from at-large to district or mixed systems, and another 22 percent either experienced unsuccessful attempts to establish districts or were in the midst of such efforts in late 1980. By using an equity ratio measure calculated by dividing the percentage of blacks on council by the percentage of blacks in the population, Heilig and Mundt found that southern district and mixed councils now have equity scores almost equal to northern cities. This is a considerable increase over the equity score of the southern cities with at-large councils. Davidson and Korbel (1981) also concluded that single-member districts afford minority groups a better chance for representation than at-large elections. They found that minority representation increased considerably in 21 Texas cities which during the 1970's switched from at-large to district or mixed systems. Engstrom and McDonald, using a regression-based analysis in which proportionality is treated as a relationship across cities with electoral structure as a specifying variable, also found at-large elections for city council seats discriminatory against blacks. They concluded that the electoral format of a city begins to make a difference when the black population constitutes around ten percent of a city's population, and that
the underrepresentation occurring in at-large cities becomes more acute as
the black population proportion increases. However, if the percentage of
blacks is less than 15 percent, income becomes the most important variable
in representation. 30

Margaret Latimer conducted a study of 80 cities of over 10,000 popula-
tion to identify and measure the significant causal variables which affect
black representation in Alabama, Louisiana and South Carolina cities. She
found that only 11 percent of the cities have black representation in pro-
portion to their black population. 31 Black representation in southern city
governments depends on the method by which the legislative body is elected.
District election of councilmen enhances representational equity. Increased
size of the governing body also increases black representation, especially
in cases of at-large election. The areas of higher black population have a
greater likelihood of equitable representation. Occupation and income
variations appear to have some importance due to the effect it has on black
political participation. 32

Albert K. Karnig found that blacks are generally underrepresented on
American city councils, and that southern cities provide the least equitable
penetration rate. 33 He writes that part of the reason for the lower repre-
sentation ratio in the south is the overwhelming adoption of at-large voting
below the Mason-Dixon Line--75 percent of the southern cities, but only
47 percent of the northern cities. 34 Karnig found that district elections
and increasing black socioeconomic factors increase representation for
blacks through council penetration.

Black economic resources signal the availability of money, time, and
skill which can be deployed in an effective political campaign. 35
paradox here is that where blacks have more resources, they can convert them into public-sector representation. These blacks however who possess a greater level of resources generally need the representation less. The poorer black communities, who are most in need of fair council representation, are the ones least likely to gain representation through council penetration.

Given the fact that blacks are numerical minorities in all but a few cities, even if black council members are proportionately elected to the council, they will still constitute a minority. Karnig suggests that their vote will be neutralized by the white majority.36 Black majorities on the council will be a result of black majorities in the city. This minority status of blacks together with the urban financial crisis will lead to few policy changes even if blacks are proportionately elected to the council.

Karnig found that district-based elections provide better representation for blacks on councils in both regions of the nation.37 At-large elections distill minority power. Mundt and Heilig drew similar conclusions in a study on district representation in the urban south. They attempted to explain why efforts to establish district elections occurred in some southern cities but not in others. A strong link between representational equity and pro-district attempts was found. Past underrepresentation increases the desire of black leadership to replace biased election systems with one offering greater opportunities for election for blacks. When there has been no black representation, efforts to establish districts were much more likely where the income differential between blacks and overall community was large.38 This relationship between the income gap and district attempts is conditional depending upon the level of past representation. Population characteristics
and past representation are related to pro-district actions in an interactive manner. Blacks have been elected to councils in most larger southern cities where they constitute at least 15 percent of the population. Efforts to adopt districts were found to occur more often in larger than in smaller cities without past black representation however. City size had an independent effect when blacks have served on councils. However, regardless of city size, lack of representation influences pro-district efforts.

Mundt and Heilig also used equity scores to study the representational effect of changing from at-large to district elections. They found that the equity scores for cities where there was a change to district elections increased from an average of .145 before districts to an average score of .776. This is a striking difference from the average equity score of .38 for cities with at-large elections and which experienced no district efforts, the .205 average for cities where efforts failed, and the .257 scores in cities currently experiencing pro-district movements. They also found that cities which had changed to only district elections, the average equity score was .909. For cities which changed to mixed systems including both district and at-large seats, the average equity score was .68. It is clear that district elections increase representation for blacks.

Jones study of 272 cities supports these findings. Black Americans are underrepresented on city councils. At-large systems are institutional barriers to Black political representation. This study supports the adoption of the following election system reforms if Black representation on city councils is to be increased: (1) replacement of at-large systems with district systems, especially in the South and Northeast; (2) increasing the
number of council seats; if elimination of at-large systems is not politically feasible; and (3) decreasing the district size in cities utilizing the district system. The evidence shows that method of electing city councils, especially number of council seats in at-large systems affect Black political representation.

RESULTS OF SHIFTS TO DISTRICT REPRESENTATION

Since 1970, over twenty percent of all southern cities with populations over 10,000 and which are at least fifteen percent black have changed from at-large to district or mixed systems combining district and at-large seats. In another sixteen percent of these cities, district attempts have failed or are taking place at the present time. While changes to districts have been shown to promote greater equity for blacks, this change does not necessarily mean changes in local politics and policies. Black absence or presence on city councils may or may not be an accurate reflection of Black political influence. Black presence on a city council does, however, indicate Black political accomplishment in the area of placing a Black in public office. It may also indicate a degree of institutional responsiveness to minority interests in that particular city.

Finally, Heilig and Mundt conducted a study of ten large cities to see if the change to districts affected the cities' policies and procedures. In each city there was a change in government form from at-large to districts. After studying the city councils' roll call and member interactions, they found that in some of the cities, district representation was instrumental in creating new lines of conflict and new voting coalitions. In others, however, council coalitions depended on factors such as ethnic conflict,
class-based groups, and "insiders" versus "outsiders." They concluded that it may be more accurate to view the change to districts as simply a result of shifts in community power, rather than a cause of change in either process or policy.

CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN PEORIA

After an independent case study of Peoria, Illinois, my data supported the conclusions drawn by Heilig and Mundt. Peoria has changed governmental structure, including type of council representation, three times since 1951. During the 1970's, it was a deviant case, adding at-large representation at a time when no other large city was moving in that direction.

In 1951, a partisan mayor/district council system was replaced by a non-partisan manager/at-large council government. This change resulted from a classic "reform" campaign against corruption and inefficiency (Martin, 1974). However, politicians of both parties with strong followings in Peoria's then-populous working class areas led a successful drive for re-adoption of a partisan, district council. This change was made by referendum in 1960.

Politics and government in Peoria became particularly chaotic and conflictual following the election of a new mayor and council in 1969. The ten-district council included five members elected with the grass roots support of a conservatively oriented group which had organized to fight the imposition of a utility tax. These five members often voted in a bloc. The other councilmen were not as closely allied, but actions by their colleagues often seemed to create a second bloc, and, in specific situations, one of the more progressive members worked at coalition-building. In addition,
the new mayor, a neophyte to public office troubled with personal problems, never gained control of council meetings. Heated arguments, personal insults and other unseemly exchanges became standard fare during council proceedings.

The League of Women Voters took advantage of the council's problems to argue once more for at-large representation. In 1972, the League organized a successful referendum campaign which resulted in adoption of the current mixed system of five district and three at-large representatives.

Peoria now has a Council-Manager form of municipal government but also has an elected mayor. The Mayor and the Councilmen are elected on a nonpartisan basis for staggered, four-year terms. The Mayor is elected from the city at large. He presides at all Council meetings and has one vote but no veto. He, with the approval of the Council, has appointive powers for nearly eighty boards and commissions. Eight Councilmen, one from each of five districts plus three at-large, are elected and have one vote each. They and the Mayor constitute the policy-making body of the City with the power to hire and fire a city manager. The city manager is the administrative head of the city. He is hired by the City Council to carry out its policy directives in the administration of the various departments. The city has many appointed boards and commissions which advise, assist and are accountable to the City Council. For example, the Police Pension Board, the Fire and Police Commission, the Election Commission, the Planning Commission, Zoning Commission, Zoning Board of Appeals, Housing Commission, Community Redevelopment Commission and the newly created Peoria Civic Center Commission all play vital roles in city management. There are also many commissions and boards with very little influence in the city. These commissions serve the very important function of making the citizens feel
they are part of government. The Department of Public Works is also under the City Council's jurisdiction. This includes the Street Division, Sewer Division, Equipment Division, and the Engineering Division. The City has an inspections department, traffic engineering department, police department and a fire department. Garbage pick-up and disposal is a City service; however, there is no department for this service, since the job is done by a private firm under contract to the City.

As in many other cities, there are essentially three sections of Peoria. The "valley" which is the downtown city and the poor areas bordering it, the "bluff" area which is the next layer or middle layer--once affluent sections of the city and finally, the more newly-developed "fringe areas." Each area has its different interests and demands. The Valley residents want more and better personal services, more jobs, more resources, etc. The Bluff residents want more of the Federal grant money being put to use for special programs benefitting their area, while fringe area residents want more services reaching their area such as a new firehouse, busline, etc.

Looking back to the 1981 city council elections, different issues were stressed by council candidates in each district. In the second district or Valley area much concern was given to the development and urban renewal projects that the city had begun. Valley residents felt that too little attention was given to the needs of the individuals and the small businessmen. The residents were tired of the tearing down, rebuilding, and relocating. They supported more citizen input into the redevelopment planning, work available for all who wanted to work, maintaining rather than curtailing police and fire services, and building up their neighborhoods
with grocery stores and drug-stores rather than moving the people out of the neighborhood. The Bluff residents believed that they, the homeowners, were the hardest hit by the property taxes, the city's reassessment policies, and a citywide multiplier. They wanted this evened out throughout the city. These Bluff residents wanted public input from the city traffic planning division to solve their current traffic problems. Also, they were concerned with preserving the historical buildings, theatres, lights, etc. for it added to the "charm" of that area. The Fringe residents were mainly concerned with zoning in their district, particularly setting up the city's first "thoroughfare zoning" ordinance to deal with the so-called "stop and strip" zoning. They supported basing federal revenue sharing funds for new firefighting equipment and a new firehouse. They were very supportive of the downtown redevelopment programs but also wanted more access to government.

Despite different desires and concerns in various areas of the city, the council decisions are typically unanimous. This supports the notion that since the council has changed towards at-large elections, there will be greater unity within the council. However, there are five district seats. The councilmen from the black and lower-income areas tend in most issues to vote with the Mayor and other councilmen. City council policy decisions may not be greatly affected by the racial or socioeconomic make-up of the council. In this city, a change in election structure did not mean a change in policy or policy procedures. However, symbolic benefits to blacks may still have been present.
CHANGE IN ROLE ORIENTATIONS

The adoption of district elections has clearly resulted in increased proportions of blacks serving on southern city councils. This adoption of district elections and the election of blacks to the council may have tremendous symbolic benefits but does not necessarily bring about a change in local politics, procedures or policy. Heilig and Mundt's intensive study of ten cities which adopted districts showed that unless minority representatives (racial or socioeconomic) comprise a council majority, or unless they become part of a majority coalition, district representation will have few direct effects on policy outcomes.48 They also concluded that even if blacks and low income whites are more satisfied under district systems, such satisfaction can not seriously be linked generally to council decisions concerning distribution of public goods and services.49

An important factor which does change with the adoption of district elections is the role orientations of council members elected by different constituencies. Wahlke, Evlau, et al. discussed role orientations, or styles of representation, in terms of the delegate and trustee models.50 Several congressional studies by Mayhew (1974), Fiorina (1977) and Fenno (1978) suggest the necessity of adding a third model of the representational role— that of ombudsman.51 Delegates make decisions in line with constituent wishes and are concerned that their geographic constituencies receive a sufficient share of public goods and services. Trustees decide on the basis of their own judgement of what is best for the entire city. The ombudsman concept implies an emphasis on serving individual members
of a constituency in largely personal, noncontroversial ways.

Heilig and Mundt also studied the relationship between role orientations and the type of council election. They expected district representatives to differ from at-large representatives with respect to their role orientations. Since district representatives have fewer constituents, they will be known by more constituents and will have the opportunity to see and hear their concerns. They will predictably adopt the role of ombudsmen. Heilig and Mundt hypothesized that (1) district representatives identify themselves as ombudsmen or delegates while at-large members see themselves as trustees and (2) district members have more citizen-initiated contacts with constituents than do at-large members.

After interviewing those council members of all the cities who had served during the three terms preceding the change to districts and during all terms, they found that their hypothesis incorrectly linked representation of any district with an ombudsman role definition. It is only in less affluent districts where this relationship holds. District wealth was linked with role orientations.

District representatives elected from nonaffluent areas—whether white or black districts—described themselves as either ombudsmen, responsible for providing assistance to individual constituents, or as delegates, responsible for seeing that their area is treated "fairly." As Table 1 shows, this sharply contrasts with the trustee orientation selected by nearly most at-large council members but also by district representatives in affluent areas. Over 80 percent of the at-large members and nearly 90 percent of those from upper income districts saw themselves as
trustees; only 5 percent of the council members from the less affluent districts had this orientation.\textsuperscript{57} Income is the key variable in understanding how urban constituencies with district systems are being represented—council members select representational styles in line with the socio-economic context of their district.\textsuperscript{58} Council members elected by affluent districts as well as those elected at-large take on the role of trustee. They focus on large issues and tend to feel that their election to the council is unrelated to the personal needs of the constituent. Councilmen from middle class districts tend to take on the delegate or ombudsman role focusing on the service needs of district. The councilmen from the poorest areas tend to take on the role of ombudsman and deal with the most personalized needs of the constituent. Role orientation, according to Heilig and Mundt, is linked not to district representation per se, but to the income level of the district.\textsuperscript{59} The question that follows from this research is whether the citizens are happy with these role orientations and therefore happy or satisfied with their city government.

LITERATURE ON CITIZEN ATTITUDES TOWARD LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Two major studies have been conducted dealing with citizen attitudes toward local government. The Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan in 1968 conducted a fifteen-city study at the request of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.\textsuperscript{60} The cities included in the study were Baltimore, Boston, Brooklyn, Chicago, Cincinatti, Cleveland, Detroit, Gary, Milwaukee, Newark, Philadelphia, St. Louis, San Francisco, and Washington. Analysis of the data focused on white attitudes toward blacks and black political action or on attitudes
toward local services, local officials, and local government. Various studies have been conducted using this data.

Schuman and Greenberg found that blacks were more dissatisfied than whites with neighborhood schools, parks and playgrounds, police protection and garbage collection. 61 This racial difference in satisfaction occurred in all fifteen. The cities however varied in overall levels of dissatisfaction. 24 percent of the black respondents believed that their neighborhoods received lower quality services than other neighborhoods. 10 percent of the whites believed that their neighborhoods received lower quality services. The differences in levels of satisfaction were not large but were consistent and statistically significant.

Aberbach and Walker used only the Detroit sample of the study for their research. 62 They found that 45 percent of the blacks compared to 29 percent of the whites felt that city officials would do nothing if they complained about a serious problem. Those blacks who had made complaints to city officials were found to be less expectant of a response than those whites who had made complaints. Aberbach and Walker also found blacks to be more concerned with police abuse than whites. The inadequacy of the police force however was not a racial issue.

The final study using the University of Michigan data was done by Rossi and Berk. 63 Rossi and Berk added data from interviews with local elites and "institutional agents" such as teachers, welfare workers and police officers to the University of Michigan data. From this combined data they found links between blacks' ratings of mayors, elite judgements of mayors' sympathies toward blacks, and blacks' confidence that requests for improvements in services would be met.
The second major survey of citizen attitudes toward local government was the Urban Observatory's research study conducted in 1970. The cities included in this study were Albuquerque, Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Denver, Kansas City (Missouri and Kansas), Milwaukee, Nashville, and San Diego. Analysis of this data focused on perceptions of the way city governments were run, on evaluations of local services, and on priorities for government spending.

In 1978 and 1982, and further in 1986, an analysis of the Urban Observatory data for Denver showed that 34 percent of Denver's black and 19 percent of the non-black-African-Americans thought that services in their neighborhoods were better used than those in other parts of the city. Whites thought the city was more run well than did blacks. Blacks were more negatively concerned with police services in their neighborhoods.

Analysis of the Urban Observatory's study shows that the respondents generally believed city governments were well run. Better educated and higher-income respondents were more positive about city services. Whites were more positive than blacks. With the exception of San Diego, over half of the sample in every city believed that they received adequate services for their tax dollars. Each of the major studies of the northern cities led us to the above conclusions.

**TESTING THE LINK BETWEEN ELECTORAL STRUCTURE AND CITIZEN ATTITUDES**

Increased representational equity and activities of district representatives may, directly or in an interactive fashion, lead to positive attitudes toward local government on the part of certain urban residents.
Most recent research supports the notion that a switch to district elections will promote representational equity by increasing the number of minorities—"one of our own"—on the council. It would seem logical to assume that: if the minority groups had their own person on the council that they will have more positive feelings toward city government and will also feel more able to influence what is done by government; that the increased representation will result in increased benefits to formerly underrepresented areas or groups that the residents of such areas and members of such groups will exhibit increased satisfaction with the outputs of their city government. The objective of this research is to examine the relationship between establishment of geographically based systems of representation, attitudes of citizens concerning their access to city government and their evaluation of the quality and equity of the city services they receive as well as their satisfaction with government and its services.

DATA TO BE ANALYZED

For this study, the data collected by Heilig will be used. The data was drawn from a survey conducted by Heilig of 1007 randomly selected residents of fifty southern cities with populations between 10,000 and 50,000 and which are at least 15 percent black. These cities were selected because of their recent political histories. Nineteen of them changed from at-large to district or mixed councils during the 1970's. Another sixteen cities are all of those within their size range which experienced unsuccessful district efforts during the 1970's. These cities
continue to elect their councils at-large. Fifteen cities were randomly selected from 38 cities of this size which had at-large councils in 1970 and which experienced no pro-district efforts during that decade.

A preliminary analysis of data shows no differences between the responses of those persons living in at-large cities which had unsuccessful district efforts and those in at-large cities with no district efforts. Consequently, for purposes of this study, the sample will be divided only by those persons living in at-large cities and by those living in district cities.

Small cities were utilized for several reasons. First, the environment of small cities which adopted (experimental) and which did not adopt (control) districts are more likely to be similar than would be the case with large cities. Second, their smaller scale of government makes it more likely that changes in service or in the characteristics or orientations of officials will be noticed and evaluated by residents. Three, increases in black membership on the councils of the experimental cities was substantial. The measure of representational equity used was determined by dividing the percentage of black council members by the percentage of blacks in the population. A value of "1" indicates equity, values below "1" indicate underrepresentation and values above "1" indicate overrepresentation. The average 1970's equity score of the experimental cities before the adoption of districts was .055. This indicates almost no black council membership. After districts were established the equity score for the experimental cities rose to .759. This indicates a substantial increase in black council membership.
The questions asked of the respondents used for this study focused on their satisfaction with local government, on their views concerning whether local officials cared about them and on their contacts with their council members. (See Appendix A for a listing of the questions used.)

A secondary data set will also be used—the 1982 Illinois Poll. The Illinois Poll is a semiannual random telephone survey of Illinois residents conducted by the Survey Research Laboratory, University of Illinois—Urbana-Champaign. For this study, the sample will be divided by Chicago, by Chicago Suburbs and outstate cities and towns.

HYPOTHESIS TO BE TESTED

Based on the assumptions stated earlier, the following hypothesis will be tested in this study:

1. Blacks in cities which have recently established district representation will be more satisfied with local government than will their counterparts in at-large cities.

2. Blacks in cities which have recently established district representation will be less likely to feel that their neighborhoods are treated unfairly by local government than their counterparts in at-large cities.

3. Blacks in cities which have recently established district representation will have more frequent contact with council members than will their counterparts in at-large cities.

TEST RESULTS

Neither the Southern survey nor the Illinois poll supports the hypothesis that blacks in district cities will be more satisfied than
those in at-large cities. In fact, the respondents from both surveys with the exception of Chicago were very satisfied with their government (See Table 2). In the Southern survey, 77.2 percent of the blacks from district cities were satisfied and 80.0 percent of the blacks from at-large cities were satisfied. Whites in the Southern survey were reportedly more satisfied than blacks, and whites in district cities were no less satisfied than those in at-large cities (see Table 3). Eighty-eight percent of the whites in district cities and 85.1 percent of the whites in at-large cities were satisfied with their government. These findings contradict those found in studies which found blacks to be much less satisfied with government than whites. (See University of Michigan, Urban Observatory 1970 study, Schuman and Greenberg, Aberbach and Walker, Rossi and Berk). Blacks were equally satisfied with the two forms of government.

Data from the Illinois poll reveal a different conclusion. While outstate Illinois respondents were generally satisfied with their government no matter what form it was, Chicago respondents were different. Neither blacks or whites were particularly satisfied. Black respondents were less satisfied than either the black respondents in the Southern survey or outstate Illinois survey (see Table 4).

White respondents from Chicago were not very satisfied either. Chicago has a ward based election system. It would be expected that black as well as white satisfaction would be high. As Table 4 indicates, this is not the case. Sixty-eight percent of the black respondents and 51.1 percent of the white respondents were not satisfied.
These low levels of satisfaction with government probably are not functions of electoral structure. Chicago is an extremely large city with very intense local politics. These factors combined with perhaps unrealistic expectations of government may lead to reported dissatisfaction with government. It should also be noted that the only blacks in the Illinois Poll were those from Chicago.

Outstate Illinois respondents (Chicago Suburbs and downstate cities and towns) surveyed in the Illinois Poll had satisfaction levels close to those found in the Southern survey (see Table 5). Of the outstate respondents, 75.6 percent were satisfied with their at-large government, while 75.2 percent of the outstate respondents were satisfied with district governments. Once again, electoral structure did not seem to have an effect on citizen satisfaction with city government.

When the outstate respondent data is further analyzed, it leads to the conclusion that respondents from the suburbs are slightly more satisfied with government than are the respondents from downstate cities and towns. Satisfaction levels were not linked to electoral structure (see Tables 6 and 7). For respondents from the Chicago suburbs, 80.8 percent of the respondents from at-large suburbs were satisfied while 85.0 percent from district suburbs were satisfied. For respondents from outstate cities and towns, the satisfaction level was lower than that of the suburb respondents. The satisfaction levels for the cities and town were comparable. 66.7 percent of the respondents were satisfied with at-large governments while 68.8 percent were satisfied with district governments. Once again,
it should be noted that all of the respondents in the Chicago suburbs and downstate cities and towns were white.

The second hypothesis for this study was that blacks who lived in cities which have recently established district representation will be less likely to feel that their neighborhoods are treated unfairly by local government than their counterparts in at-large cities. Both the Southern survey and the Illinois Poll showed that blacks in district cities do not necessarily have more positive attitudes towards treatment of their neighborhoods than blacks in at-large cities. The greatest majority of respondents reported their neighborhoods as being treated at least the same as other areas. Electoral structure had no effect on respondents evaluations of their own neighborhoods. Districts do not lead to improved attitudes on the part of blacks.

Results of the Southern Survey show that regardless of electoral structure, blacks believe that their neighborhoods are treated unfairly more frequently than white respondents. This difference is not statistically significant however (see Table 8). The greatest majority of both blacks and whites responding to the Southern survey believe their neighborhood treatment to be the same as other areas (see Table 9).

While the hypothesis was made that blacks from district cities would have a more positive attitude towards their areas' treatment than blacks from at-large cities, this was not the case in this survey (see Table 8). Seventy-three percent of the black respondents from district cities believed the treatment of their neighborhood to be the same as other areas.
Eighty-four percent of the black respondents from at-large cities believed this to be the case. It appears that the blacks in the cities which adopted districts were more likely to say that their neighborhoods receive worse treatment than are blacks in cities which remained at-large. This is exactly opposite to the hypothesis presented.

In Illinois, attitudes toward neighborhood treatment vary. Once again it should be noted that the only blacks in the Illinois Poll were in Chicago. The size and kind of city made a difference as to citizen's attitudes towards the treatment of their neighborhood, not electoral structure as expected.

Chicago respondents would be expected because of their ward based election system to have relatively positive attitudes toward their neighborhood's treatment. What was found, however, was that blacks responding in Chicago were not very positive in their attitudes towards their neighborhoods (see Table 10). Forty-five percent of the black respondents in Chicago believed that their neighborhoods were treated worse than other neighborhoods. This is a considerably higher percentage than was found for blacks in either the Southern survey or outstate Illinois analysis. The white respondents' attitudes were considerably more positive. These results from Chicago are probably related to city size, racial distribution, city politics, and unrealistic expectations not to electoral structure.

Outstate Illinois respondents responded very positively and similarly regardless of whether they were from at-large or district cities (see Table 11). Ninety percent of at-large respondents and 91.0 percent of
district respondents believed their neighborhoods received the same or better treatment than other neighborhoods. Electoral structure had no impact on attitudes as was once again expected. A comparison of Chicago suburbs and Outstate cities and towns reveals very similar results (see Tables 12 and 13). Respondents from at-large governments in both suburbs and outstate cities and towns believed their neighborhoods to be treated the same at a rate of 90.4 percent and 91.8 percent respectively. Respondents from district governments varied slightly in their responses, with 95 percent of suburb respondents and 88.3 percent of outstate city and town respondents giving this response. Once again our hypothesis was disproved.

The final hypothesis for this study was that blacks in cities which have recently established district representation will have more frequent contact with council members than will their counterparts in at-large cities. What was found when looking at the results of the Southern survey was that electoral structure made only a slight difference in whether contact was or was not made with the councilmen for blacks. Black respondents to the Southern survey had a very low contact rate regardless of electoral structure. White contact rate was the same regardless of electoral structure (see Table 14).

More blacks from district cities did have contact with councilmen than blacks from at-large cities but the percentages were very low. Thirty-nine percent of those blacks responding from district cities had contact while 22.3 percent from at-large cities had contact.
White respondents, however, had comparable contact rates (see Table 15). Fifty-two percent of those whites responding to the Southern survey from district cities had contact with councilmen while 54 percent from at-large cities had contact. What was found in the Southern survey was not particularly supportive of our hypothesis. Black contact is very seldom made with councilmen but electoral structure seems to have a slight impact on this.

Chicago representatives to the Illinois poll also reported low contact rates. The black contact rate and the white contact rate were equal at 31 percent (see Table 16). Outstate respondents had a higher contact rate than the Chicago respondents. In this instance, respondents from district cities reported a slightly higher contact rate than respondents from at-large cities (see Table 17). Forty-seven percent of the district respondents as compared to 43 percent of the at-large respondents reported having made contact with councilmen. The difference in the rates is too small to be conclusive however.

An analysis of the contact rates between the Chicago suburbs and outstate cities and towns also indicates a slightly higher contact rate for district respondents than for at-large respondents (see Tables 18 and 19). The contact rates for the suburb respondents and outstate respondents are once again very similar. It should be noted that the only blacks in the Illinois Poll in Chicago. It seems obvious from the Southern survey
data and from the Illinois poll data that whites make contact with their councilmen more often. No correlation was found, however, between contact and electoral structure as was hypothesized.

One implication arising from the desire for increased contact is that if there is opportunity for contact and contact is made, then the citizens will be more satisfied. The data from the Southern Survey finds this not to be the case. Contact with city councilmen had no impact on respondent satisfaction or on their attitudes toward their neighborhood in comparison to other neighborhoods.

Of the Black respondents to the Southern poll who reported they were satisfied, 74.5 percent had previously made contact with their councilmen. 80.3 percent of the satisfied respondents had never made contact with their councilmen (see Table 20). The white respondents to the Southern poll were generally more satisfied with the city government than were the blacks. The percentage of those satisfied with government was the same for those who had made contact and were satisfied and for those who had not made contact and were satisfied (see Table 21).

What was found from this survey was that there is no relationship between contact and citizen satisfaction with government. For blacks, the persons who had never made contact reported being the most satisfied. This could be for any number of reasons.
SUMMARY

Based on the study which was conducted here using the Southern survey data and the Illinois Poll, several conclusions can be drawn. First, regardless of race or type of council, city residents are satisfied with their government. District representation had no impact upon satisfaction reported by blacks. Second, the vast majority of each group felt that their neighborhoods are treated fairly by the city, receiving the same treatment as other areas. Contrary to expectation, blacks in district cities were more likely than blacks in at-large cities to say their neighborhoods receive worse treatment than other parts of the city. Third, the electoral structure of a city had very little to do with the amount of contact with councilmen. Finally, the most satisfied citizens were found equally to be those citizens who have contact with city officials, and those citizens who do not.

After analyzing this data and available literature, I conclude that contrary to my expectations electoral structure simply has no impact upon citizen satisfaction with local government. The major effects of adopting districts are increased proportions of blacks serving on city councils and increased proportions of ombudsman and local delegate role orientations. Only if districts result in the selection of a black council majority will major policy changes occur. If these policy changes do occur, perhaps then citizen satisfaction will be more directly related to electoral structure.
APPENDIX A

Data were drawn from responses to the following questions:

From the Summer 1982 Illinois Poll

In general, how satisfied are you with your city or town government? Would you say you are...(Very Satisfied/Satisfied/Dissatisfied/Very Dissatisfied/DK)

Thinking about all the services your town provides, how do you think the services in your neighborhood compare with other parts of town? Would you say that your neighborhood gets better service, about the same or worse service?

If you had a complaint about poor services, who would you contact? (Open end)

Have you ever had any contact with a member of your city or town council?

Do you believe that the members of your council care what people like you think?

From the Southern City survey:

In general, how satisfied are you with your city government? Would you say you are...(Very Satisfied/Satisfied/Dissatisfied/Very Dissatisfied/DK)

Thinking about all the services your city provides, how do you think the services in your neighborhood compare with other parts of the city? Would you say that your neighborhood gets better service, about the same, or worse service?

If you had a complaint about poor city services, who would you contact? (Mayor/City Manager/Council Member/Department Head/Other)

Have you ever had any contact with a member of your city council?

Was this contact... (answer all that apply)
   a. To complain about poor service
   b. To request additional service
   c. To state your opinion on some issue
   d. To campaign for the candidate
   e. For some other reason (specify)
TABLE 1

ROLE ORIENTATION BY COUNCIL CONSTITUENCY, TEN CITIES ADOPTING DISTRICTS *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORIENTATION</th>
<th>LOW INCOME</th>
<th>MIDDLE INCOME</th>
<th>UPPER INCOME</th>
<th>AT-LARGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trustee</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>82.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ombudsman</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As developed by Heilig and Mundt
### TABLE 2

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE**

All Blacks in Southern Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>District</th>
<th>At-Large</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(142)</td>
<td>(128)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Satisfied</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE**

All Whites in Southern Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>District</th>
<th>At-Large</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(309)</td>
<td>(292)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Satisfied</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>(51)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 4
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND RACE
FOR CHICAGO RESPONDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(92)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Satisfied</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(96)</td>
<td>(73)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE FOR OUTSTATE RESPONDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At-Large</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>75.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(124)</td>
<td>(118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Satisfied</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 6

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE FOR SUBURBS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At-Large</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(84)</td>
<td>(51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Satisfied</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 7

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE FOR OUTSTATE CITIES AND TOWNS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At-Large</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Satisfied</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20)</td>
<td>(30)</td>
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</table>
### TABLE 8
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTORAL STRUCTURE AND CITIZEN ATTITUDES

All Blacks in Southern Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Structure</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(132)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-Large</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(126)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### TABLE 8
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ELECTORAL STRUCTURE AND CITIZEN ATTITUDES

All Whites in Southern Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral Structure</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>(303)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At-Large</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(282)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
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### TABLE 10

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND RACE IN CHICAGO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Comparison</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(146)</td>
<td>(57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(35)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
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### TABLE 11

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE FOR OUTSTATE RESPONDENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Comparison</th>
<th>At-Large</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(150)</td>
<td>(141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 12

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE FOR SUBURBS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Comparison</th>
<th>At-Large</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(94)</td>
<td>(57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
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### TABLE 13

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDES AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE FOR OUTSTATE CITIES AND TOWNS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood Comparison</th>
<th>At-Large</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Better</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>88.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(56)</td>
<td>(83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>11.7</td>
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<td>(11)</td>
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### TABLE 14

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTACT AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE

All Blacks in Southern Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contact with Councilmen</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>At-Large</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(76)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
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<tr>
<td>No Contact with Councilmen</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>77.7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(121)</td>
<td>(136)</td>
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</table>

### TABLE 15

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTACT AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE

All Whites in Southern Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contact with Councilmen</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>At-Large</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(193)</td>
<td>(197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Contact with Councilmen</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(179)</td>
<td>(166)</td>
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### TABLE 16

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTACT AND RACE FOR CHICAGO RESPONDENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact with Councilmen</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
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<tr>
<td>No Contact with Councilmen</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(130)</td>
<td>(75)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### TABLE 17

**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTACT AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE FOR OUTSTATE RESPONDENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At-Large</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact with Councilmen</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(73)</td>
<td>(74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Contact with Councilmen</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(96)</td>
<td>(85)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 18
**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTACT AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE FOR SUBURBS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At-Large</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact with Councilmen</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No contact with Councilmen</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(59)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
</tr>
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### TABLE 19
**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTACT AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURE FOR OUTSTATE CITIES AND TOWNS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At-Large</th>
<th>District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact with Councilmen</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No contact with Councilmen</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
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### TABLE 20
**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND CONTACT**

All Blacks in Southern Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>No Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>80.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(81)</td>
<td>(188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Satisfied</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>(46)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 21
**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION AND CONTACT**

All Whites in Southern Survey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>No Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>85.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(331)</td>
<td>(267)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Satisfied</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(49)</td>
<td>(44)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOOTNOTES


2Peggy Heilig, Proposal to the National Science Foundation 1982, p. 2.


5Davidson and Korbel, p. 987.

6Davidson and Korbel, p. 986.

7Davidson and Korbel, p. 987.


9Davidson and Korbel, p. 989.

10Davidson and Korbel, p. 990.

11Davidson and Korbel, p. 990.

12Davidson and Korbel, p. 990.

13Jones, p. 345.

14Jones, p. 346.


23. Peggy Heilig, Proposal to the National Science Foundation 1982, p. 6.


Latimer, p. 82.

Karnig, p. 235.

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Karnig, p. 236.

Karnig, p. 237.

Karnig, p. 235.

Mundt and Heilig, 1982, p. 1045.

Mundt and Heilig, 1982, p. 1045.

Mundt and Heilig, 1982, p. 1046.

Mundt and Heilig, 1982, p. 1046.

Mundt and Heilig, 1982, p. 1046.

Jones, p. 354.

Peggy Heilig, Proposal to the National Science Foundation 1982, p. 2.


49 Heilig and Mundt, 1983A, p. 3.

50 Heilig and Mundt, 1984, p. 2.4.

51 Heilig and Mundt, 1984, p. 2.5.

52 It should be noted that Peoria, Illinois was studied as a deviant case.

53 Heilig and Mundt, 1984, p. 2.6.

54 Heilig and Mundt, 1984, p. 5.9.


58 Heilig and Mundt, 1984, p. 5.8.

59 Heilig and Mundt, 1984, p. 5.8.

60 Peggy Heilig, Proposal to the National Science Foundation 1982, p. 7.

61 Peggy Heilig, Proposal to the National Science Foundation 1982, p. 7.

62 Peggy Heilig, Proposal to the National Science Foundation 1982, p. 7.

63 Peggy Heilig, Proposal to the National Science Foundation 1982, p. 7.

64 Peggy Heilig, Proposal to the National Science Foundation 1982, p. 7.

65 Peggy Heilig, Proposal to the National Science Foundation 1982, p. 8.

67 Peggy Heilig, Proposal to the National Science Foundation 1982, p. 4.
68 Heilig and Mundt, 1983, p. 4.
69 Heilig and Mundt, 1983, p. 5.
70 Heilig and Mundt, 1983, p. 5.
71 Peggy Heilig, Proposal to the National Science Foundation 1982, p. 11.
72 Peggy Heilig, Proposal to the National Science Foundation 1982, p. 11.
73 Prepared by Peggy Heilig.
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