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ALAN J. MARTIN

ENTITLED

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Instructor in Charge

Approved:

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF
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BY

ALAN J. MARTIN

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I. Introduction

Ever since the end of World War II, Europe has remained partitioned into East and West. Within the bloc of nations comprising the Eastern half of this division, Communist regimes, kept in power by force or the threat of force, rule with an iron hand. Periodically, however, the peoples of these nations rise in opposition to their oppressors. Because the Western world virtually abandoned these countries in 1945 and, thereby, contributed to their current plight and because of the increasing political and economic interdependence of all nations, the struggle waged for freedom within these countries is of particular importance. In fact, since the East bloc represents a de facto portion of the Soviet empire, one organized militarily under the Warsaw Pact and directly facing the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, efforts made by the Soviets or their ruling proxies to suppress popular uprisings always carry with them the possibility of engulfing the whole of Europe and perhaps the entire world in a general war.

Having clarified the importance of East bloc uprisings and reform movements within a general context, we may now turn to the subject of this paper: the internal factors promoting such popular insurrections and reform efforts. Needless to say, the causes of reform and revolution are many and complex, and no one could hope to identify them all nor specify their exact relationship to one another. With this in mind, the author set out to investigate and identify only a few of the more prominent factors conducive to East bloc
turmoil and reform. To this end, a model consisting of three main factors including economic stagnation, an increased atmosphere of liberalization, and the leadership of intellectual organizations will be examined. In addition to these chief considerations, efforts will be made to identify whether a triggering incident—touching off mass opposition—snarked the onset of a particular reform movement and whether a progressive Party faction and its head played a role in promoting reform. Finally, factors limiting the scope of changes and influencing a Soviet decision to intervene will be explored. The specific uprisings and movements examined within this paper include Pilsen (1953), Berlin (1953), Poland (1956), Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), Poland (1970), and Poland (1980-81).
II. The Prelude to Change

Stalin's Death: Uncertainty and a Reduction of Forced Cohesion

Stalin's death in March of 1953 signaled a major turning point in Soviet-East bloc relations. Although the Stalinist system didn't crumble instantly, it developed many serious problems leading to its ultimate transformation. Gradually, the forced political and economic cohesion characterizing Soviet-Eastern European relations under Stalin and owing largely to the dictator's brutal determinism and use of the secret police gave way to a system permitting greater nationalistic diversity in choosing a path to Socialism, though many limitations still remained.¹

During the uncertainty following Stalin's death, a succession struggle and pressing economic problems (centering around investment policies) surfaced in the USSR. Out of the turmoil emerged a collective leadership headed by Georgi Malenkov. Seeking to address the most pressing problems, Malenkov stressed reorganization of Party and administrative branches and a reevaluation of economic policies.² Not surprisingly, such proposals created additional factionalism within the political elite and resulted in a lack of direction for the Soviet satellites. As Brzezinski points out: "... ambivalence in Moscow, thanks to Stalinism, meant ambivalence in Prague or Warsaw."³ Responding to the situation as seeds do to the coming of spring, disaffected Eastern European elements slowly took root.

Although characterized by instability, the Malenkov leadership quickly moved to solidify its position. The burgeoning power of the secret police, Stalin's prize instrument of terror, received the first blow. In July 1953
KGB Chief Lavrenti Beria was arrested. His subsequent execution along with six colleagues promoted further bloc independence from Moscow. With Beria's execution the choker chain of continuous Soviet surveillance and interference was loosened from around the necks of the East bloc leaderships. In fact, the decline of the secret police was coupled with a new official emphasis on relations within the framework of a legal process. Although words and actions don't always mesh, Moscow's new line was encouraging.

Having dealt with Beria, the new regime gradually instituted a reform program entitled the "New Course." Under the New Course power monopolies were to be reduced, and, as Moscow went, so eventually and obediently went the East bloc, with important repercussions. Though initial power sharing plans within the bloc nations were cosmetic in nature (Hungary being an exception), the idea that power shouldn't be concentrated into the hands of a few later led to greater intra-Party strife. Indeed, progressive East bloc Communists could and did use the issue to undermine the Old Guard.

Notwithstanding its political content, the New Course mainly dealt with economic issues. Malenkov, seeking to expand popular support for his leadership through an increased standard of living, shifted economic priorities from heavy (capital intensive) industries to light (consumer) industries. To be sure, the regime realized that any such change necessitated purging the Stalinist command economy of its most unrealistic and unresponsive elements and, therefore, overzealous and unreachable production goals were revised.

Although Malenkov's economic reforms suffered a reversal following his fall from power, they remained in effect long enough to have a significant impact on the satellites. After some prodding from Moscow, most East European Communist leaderships embraced aspects of the New Course, especially the reforms reducing substantial popular dissatisfaction with past policies. Of
course, some foot-dragging did exist, particularly in Czechoslovakia and Poland.\textsuperscript{7}

Thus, in the aftermath of Stalin's death, several factors crucial to reform emerged. First, an unavoidable relaxation accompanied the curbing of the secret police and the decreased emphasis on bloc conformity. Secondly, by stressing power sharing, Moscow helped undermine Old Guard elements. Finally, New Course economic reforms provided an opportunity for new views and solutions to be forwarded, something very alien to the Stalinist system where priorities seldom, if ever, changed.

One more extremely important point emerges from the above discussion; namely, the changes incorporated in the New Course, representing if nothing else an implicit rejection of many Stalinistic economic policies, severely damaged the credibility of East bloc Communist Parties. The more closely a particular leadership was associated with Stalin's policies, the more extensive the damage. Consequently, Party progressives could assail the Old Guard's exposed position. As the monolithic image of Communist Party infallibility and cohesion faded, the willingness of intellectuals and the masses to rise in opposition increased.\textsuperscript{8}

The First Cracks in the Dike: Pilsen and Berlin

In the spring of 1953, although economically well off by Socialist standards, Czechoslovakia nevertheless suffered from an economic scourge brought on by its leadership's pursuit of inefficient and ruthless Stalinist policies. Because of peasant opposition to government collectivization drives, agricultural production dropped dramatically and produced an inflation-creating price imbalance. Rather than denouncing and reforming earlier policies, the regime devalued currency by issuing new notes. The new and unfavorable exchange rates
varied from between 5:1 and 50:1, causing a one-fifth reduction in nominal prices. Although aimed at eliminating the excess purchasing power of independent farmers and small businessmen (thereby stabilizing prices), the policy actually diminished worker buying power.\(^9\)

Because the new currency policy effectively wiped out savings, many workers saw their dreams dwindle along with their hard earned crowns. Of more immediate concern, however, government reductions in worker purchasing power were not matched by similar reductions in food prices, an area receiving a large portion of worker income. As a result, the government announcement of 30 May was followed by riots in Pilsen on 1 June and similar disturbances in Moravska Ostrava between 30 May and 4 June. In Pilsen demonstrators sacked the town hall and called for free elections. Although a military unit was sent, its soldiers refused to fire upon the crowd and, therefore, the protest was not quelled until the arrival of border guards and police troops.\(^10\)

The Czech leadership didn't take the Pilsen uprising lightly as events demonstrated the need for change; nevertheless, the protesters' actions never solidified into an effective reform movement. One major element, economic difficulty, was present and though conducive to reform (indeed it stirred the workers to action), it was not accompanied by other critical factors. Specifically, the party leadership maintained unity during the disruptions and was not yet affected by Malenkov's changes in Moscow. As a result, an atmosphere of decreased repression was not present nor was progressive Party opposition; in fact, the leadership steadfastly refused to denounce or reverse its long-standing policies.\(^11\) Moreover, the lack of a more tolerant atmosphere was paralleled by an absence of a vocal, reform-minded, intellectual organization;
consequently, no focusing of popular discontent and no organizing and articu-
lating of worker demands developed. Without direction and an atmosphere con-
ducive to reform, the spontaneous workers' actions turned out to be just that—
spontaneous, disorganized, and easily subdued.

As was the case in Czechoslovakia, East Germany found itself in an eco-
nomic bind following Stalin's death. Independent farmers and businessmen, sub-
ject to governmental harassment at every turn, fled to the West at an alarming
rate. In response, the East German leadership increased agricultural delivery
quotas and aggressively pursued the collection of back taxes. The ration cards
of those segments of society thought to be hostile to the government (the
"bourgeoisie") were cancelled and all their assets were confiscated as the
leadership sought to stem the flow of capital from East to West. 12

Similarly, the working class fell subject to the government's wrath as a
concerted effort to force increased production was instituted. Workers, al-
ready disillusioned by the sting of inflation, now found themselves confronted
with a ten per cent increase in output norms. Abused and oppressed, the people
of East Germany fled for the West in droves. 13

As the situation became critical, Moscow leaned on the East German leader-
ship and forced the adoption of economic policies in line with Malenkov's pro-
posals for the New Course. Apparently, it was not within Moscow's means to
help the East Germans financially; thus a conciliatory position was the only
alternative. 14 In early June of 1953 the East German Communist Party rescinded
its earlier position in a new resolution:

The resolution enumerated a long list of specific measures
by which to correct old and recent abuses. For example, food cards
were to be restored forthwith to people who had been deprived of them,
and delinquent taxes were to be remitted. Dispossessed small merchants
and artisans were to be encouraged to reopen their businesses; confis-
cated land was to be given back to all farmers who returned from West
Germany; delivery quotas were to be reduced. There was also to be an amnesty for people who had been convicted of offenses against 'national property' (that is, plant thefts). 15

An undercurrent of great anticipation flowed throughout East German Society as the people sensed the weakened position of the government. Hope for good things to come increased, and the workers were particularly anxious for reforms pertaining to the norm system. Unfortunately for the workers and the leadership, reform of the norm system was not passed. Upon discovering this fact in a trade union article, workers in East Berlin and in other major industrial East German cities rose in insurrection. Strikes occurred accompanied by demands for reunification, free elections, and party strongman Ulbricht's ouster. As the situation deteriorated and workers refused to be pacified by the rescinding of the norm increase, Soviet tanks rolled and suppressed the insurrections with the aid of the Communist police. 16

Because of the self-criticism and personal rivalry within the East German Communist leadership, the East German political upheaval contained some elements not found in Czechoslovakia's Pilsen unrest. Nevertheless, the two events parallel one another quite nicely. As in the Czech scenario, the East German incident developed as a result of intolerable economic policies designed to check but not redress serious difficulties within the system. In both cases the workers responded spontaneously to the government's policy by striking, rioting, and destroying symbols of Communist rule. Likewise, a significant parallel is that neither an atmosphere of increased liberalization nor the leadership of an intellectual organization emerged.

In discussing the East German incident, Keczkemeti points out that

... The rebellious workers received no positive encouragement from highly placed opposition or reforming elements. The only stimuli from above were the image of a weakened leadership as revealed by retreat and self-denunciation, and the provocation of the norm decree. 17
Thus, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, East Germany's unquided opposition spontaneously burst into action and, just as quickly, was suppressed by the authorities.

The Rise of Khrushchev and the Twentieth Congress

Another extremely important development conducive to reform was Khrushchev's replacing of Malenkov as Party First Secretary and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's (CPSU) Twentieth Party Congress. Although the Malenkov regime's policies had resulted in some unavoidable relaxation within the Eastern European community, the Malenkov leadership, nevertheless, sought to restrict change to the economic sphere while maintaining Stalinistic rigor in virtually all political matters. Khrushchev, on the other hand, gained the reins of power by denouncing Malenkov's economic initiatives and stressing the necessity of returning to heavy industry intensive development. In order to achieve yet another about face in Soviet policy, Khrushchev decided to trade an unspecified amount of political relaxation and autonomy in exchange for economic conformity.\(^\text{18}\)

As Khrushchev's plan began to take shape, the Soviet leader concluded that ultimate success hinged on gaining popular support for the ruling Communist regimes of the East bloc. Those leaders closely identified with ruthless Stalinistic methods simply represented a liability and, therefore, were not a part of the Khrushchev grand design. Rather, the promotion of popularly-supported Communist leadership figures gained importance.\(^\text{19}\) This policy later haunted Khrushchev by encouraging the rise of nationalistic and progressive Party elements in Eastern Europe.
During the CPSU's Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev surprised everyone with a biting attack on Stalin and his policies. Apparently, Khrushchev's purpose was to expand his decision-making flexibility while at the same time signaling to bloc leaders that change was in the air. The message clearly warned those who blindly followed rigid Stalinistic policies that such behavior was no longer acceptable. The new emphasis permitted greater diversification in national institutional development, though within the context of ideological cohesion. Thus, Khrushchev hoped to permit some independent development at the national level while maintaining ideological leadership and control:

Limited diversity opened a vista for self-supporting Communist regimes but at the price of cohesion of the bloc. Khrushchev's somewhat ambiguous formula attempted to straddle this dilemma by superimposing ideological party unity on an acceptance of some domestic institutional diversity, which in turn would be balanced out by growing economic ties.

Decreased Soviet-bloc cohesion resulting from the Khrushchev plan represented a gain for reform elements as the suffocating repressiveness of Stalinism gave way to increased tolerance.

To reiterate, three critical factors emerged from Khrushchev's rise to power and the CPSU's Twentieth Congress which positively contributed to reform. To begin with, a reemphasis on heavy industry meant a return to economic policies similar to those giving rise to earlier discontent among the people. Although the Stalinist economic system was inefficient and required resources which the nations of Eastern Europe did not have, its failure was not attributed to such causes but rather to entrenched bureaucrats, who Khrushchev hoped to identify and remove. Such simplistic thinking, though perhaps only a rationalization for an unpopular policy, eventually resulted in the sort of uneven
economic development leading to popular discontent and demands for revolu-
tionary change.

Secondly, the sacrifice of strict cohesion in order to obtain imple-
mentation of unfavorable economic policies provided an atmosphere of in-
creased liberalization essential for progressive elements to develop and
confront the orthodox power elite. Because of the emphasis on identifying
popular leadership figures and removing officials associated with Stalinist
policies, the rise of progressive Party factions was more readily achiev-
able.

Finally, in the wake of aforementioned factors, a milieu conducive to
increased criticism of the Party developed; hence, intellectual organiza-
tions already in existence could become more assertive. Likewise, the potential
for new organizations arose as the sterile intellectual atmosphere of Stalin-
ism, where deviation meant death or imprisonment, gave way to a new more re-
laxed attitude. Most importantly, however, the intelligentsia gained the op-
portunity to organize forums for increasing public awareness and solidifying
reform sentiments.
III. Khrushchev and Collision: Poland and Hungary (1956)

Poland (The Economic Situation)

Poland's economic situation in early 1956 forewarned impending trouble. Though phenomenally high post-World War II growth rates were achieved by heavy industry-intensive development, the Polish economy began suffering the consequences of unbalanced development and the absence of a natural resource base to support such a program. Furthermore, bureaucratic inefficiency and the manipulation of economic statistics became apparent as the government uncharacteristically admitted discrepancies in its figures. Of particular concern to the regime was the steadily diminishing flow of manpower into industry, a major factor responsible for previous high growth rates.¹

The main victim of capital intensive development was agriculture. Despite New Course emergency measures directed at improving agricultural production and slowing down collectivization, agricultural target's were not met. With Moscow's renewed emphasis on heavy industry, agricultural production was destined for further disappointment.²

Another area crippled by Poland's investment policy was the people's standard of living. In an effort to lift the spirits of the people and encourage even greater production, the Polish regime drew on economic stockpiles between 1954-55 to artificially boost the standard of living. Nevertheless, the projected 40 percent real wage increase for the Six Year Plan (1950-55) was not only missed, but the actual increase ranged somewhere between four
and six percent. The wage disappointment, the renewed emphasis on heavy industry, and the near exhaustion of economic stockpiles made the Polish situation in 1956 a virtual powder ken.

Notwithstanding its importance, the wage situation was the only thorn in the Polish worker's side. Because of a lack of consumer production and the shoddy quality of those consumer goods produced, workers who managed to save money had very little to spend it on. Moreover, the government continuously exhorted the workers to higher and higher production goals, the benefits of which the workers never saw. Popular disillusion with the norm system and general economic conditions may best be summarized by the comments of one worker in Tygodnik Powszechny (Warsaw), January 29, 1956:

> Very low wages paid to workers in some branches of the economy and administration, the disproportion between prices and wages, the burdening of people with work, the Socialist competitions which force workers to engage in inhuman efforts, the overloading of people with meetings and various social actions, the very poor quality of goods for everyday use, the lack of housing, the lordly attitude, the stupidity and lack of good faith of officials. . .

Against this background, the Polish leaders formulated their Five Year Plan (1956-1960). Despite the people's discontent and weariness, the Plan called for a sixty to seventy percent increase in production. Although technology was stressed, the leadership also claimed that labor discipline would tighten and norms might be raised. The following table demonstrates some of the ambitious goals set by the Party:
In addition to high industrial targets, the regime forwarded an aggressive program for agricultural development. The components of the plan as reached at the Central Committee's Fifth Plenum of February 1956 included:

- Agricultural production to increase by 25 percent.
- Wheat under corn to increase from the present 1,000,000 to 1,100,000 hectares.
- Barley production to increase from 1,900 to 2,125,000 tons.
- Soybean production to increase from 1,000,000 to 1,200,000 tons.
- Grain combines from 25 to 10,000.
- Soybean production to increase from 1,000,000 to 1,200,000 tons.
- Milk production per cow from 1,500 liters to 2,000 liters.
- Vanilin and turpentine production.

Surprisingly, the leadership intended to fill its agricultural quotas while reinitiating a substantial collectivization drive.

Although the policies of the Polish leadership reflected orthodox attitudes prevalent in Moscow, they did not express the sentiments of the entire Polish Central Committee. Indeed, as early as 1954, a strong faction supporting balanced development began forming. Despite the growing strength of the balanced growth faction, Polish Workers' Party Chief Bierut and his economic strongman Mieczysław Moczar kept a lid on the situation. However, with Bierut's death at the CPSU's Twentieth Congress in March 1956, the Polish Politburo's composition began to change drastically as pro-Bierut supporters were ousted. Although new First Secretary Ochab succeeded in removing several Bierut supporters, he maintained Bierut's economic policies, even as they floundered.

The volatile situation in Poland finally ignited in a worker insurrection in Poznan (June 24, 1956). Workers at the Stalin Locomotive Works, already
suffering from the many hardships of the system, blew up at an attempt to reduce their pay. Initially, the workers attempted to go through proper channels to have their grievances addressed and were rebuffed. As a result, a morning demonstration and march was planned. Although peaceful at first, the demonstration quickly became anti-regime and anti-Soviet, turning into a full blown political insurrection. Battles were fought for control of public buildings, communication centers, and transportation stations. Workers attacked the headquarters of the Bezpieka (secret police) with particular animosity. Nevertheless, after roughly a day and a half of fighting, armour units sent by the government suppressed the movement. 9

(Democratization)

Although the Poznan incident seems to parallel the earlier Pilsen and East Berlin examples, it differed significantly because of the context within which it occurred and the regime's response to it. Indeed, Poznan exploded at a time when Poland was in the midst of a political "thaw". At the time, intelligentsia clubs were common throughout Poland and were vocal in their call for reform. Needless to say, in the face of strong winds favoring reform, Poland's leadership was faced with a tough decision: "The Party's choice was quite clear. It could either maintain its allegiance to Moscow and face a full-scale revolution, or place itself at the helm of reform." 10 Before evaluating the leadership's decision, a more detailed examination of the political context within which it was made would be beneficial.

To begin with, as late as 1953, Poland's dependence on Moscow was all but complete. Poland's situation might best be described by the statements of a
former Polish Security official, Lieutenant Colonel Swiatlo, a highly positioned member of the Ministry for Public Security:

Poland is ruled exclusively by Moscow. The general political line is established by conferences in Moscow. They used to be presided over by Stalin, now by Malenkov. Some other members of the Soviet Politburo are present. Generally it is Bierut who goes to Moscow to get the instructions, often he is accompanied by Berman and Misc. However Bierut is the only recipient of the fundamental political decisions. But political only. Military decisions which concern working out of army plans are sent directly to Rokossowski from the Soviet General Staff.

Nothing can happen in Poland which would be contrary to Moscow's will, and the entire mechanism of state life is regulated in the most minute details by the plenipotentiaries of the Soviet Union. The whole complex of Poland's political and economic life is caught in the iron tongs of control which are held in the hands of the Ministry of Public Security. The squeeze is exerted by a group of Soviet advisors, so called, headed by the chief adviser, General Lalin.

The dark shadow of Moscow's oppression gradually faded from over Poland in the aftermath of several key events. First, the execution of Soviet secret police chief Beria resulted in a loss of direction for Poland's Ministry of Public Security. More importantly, however, Lieutenant Colonel Swiatlo (the important security official mentioned above) defected to the West upon hearing of Beria's fate. Among Swiatlo's many duties, the supervision of Poland's communist leadership was the most important. In this position, Swiatlo was privy to the most sensitive information available in the country. Moreover, the arrest of Gomulka, Spychalski, and other political targets was carried out by Swiatlo. In light of changing events in Moscow, Swiatlo headed West before suffering a fate similar to Beria's.

Once in the West, Swiatlo divulged shocking information concerning the excesses of Party officials and the Ministry of Public Security. Soon after, Poles also became aware of this information via the airwaves of Radio Free
Europe. Confronted with an angered public and with its back to the wall, the Polish Party leaders publicly implicated the Bezpieka as the culprit behind the entire affair. In following up on this avenue, the Polish Politbureau discharged Radkiewicz (the head of the Ministry of Public Security) --as well as arresting, and expelling from the Party, several of his closest associates. The shake-up of the security apparatus that followed Radkiewicz's dismissal effectively stripped the secret police of much of their power. Consequently, a new atmosphere evolved as the threat of terror faded. The road to political relaxation and a milieu of liberalization was now open.  

(The Rise of Intellectual Opposition)

Following the decline of the secret police's power, several significant developments transpired. In early 1954, the Polish Communist Party, apparently emulating a policy evolving in Moscow, sanctioned some criticism of itself. Notably, Zycie Literackie carried commentaries reproving the strict censoring of literary works. The general policy seemed to hinge on the idea of a controlled "thaw" in the political climate. In describing this development, Finkelsztajn of the Central Committee stated: "'The Thaw' is a revolution directed from above and supported from below."  

Despite the expectations of the Party leadership, "The Thaw" was anything but controlled once it started. Writers, suffering from internal guilt at having compromised their art in order to spread half-truths, criticized the regime with increasing frequency and candor. Furthermore, it didn't take long for the criticism to spread from issues of censorship to the system itself. In his 1955 work "Poem for Adults", Adam Wazyk gave a scathing appraisal of Soviet-
At the same time that the Party's Writers' Union was vocalizing its displeasure with Party censorship, intelligentsia clubs emerged as an important factor in the political equation. During the Stalinist period, critics of the regime faced serious punishment for their views. Hence, candid discussions only occurred among the closest of friends in small private meetings known as prywatki. In the increasingly liberal atmosphere of Poland following the curbing of the Secret Police, the prywatki expanded into intelligentsia clubs.

The first such intelligentsia club was the Krzywe Kolo Club (named after the Warsaw street on which the group's meeting place was located). Initially, the group consisted of professionals from a variety of fields, and the main focus of discussions centered on cultural matters. Nevertheless, as a matter of course, governmental policies gained increasing importance as a topic for debate. Eventually, the enthusiasm of the group grew to such proportions that regularly scheduled meetings were decided upon as well as expanding the size of the group.

Surprisingly, local government authorities looked favorably on the activities of the Krzywe Kolo Club and even provided a public meeting place for its ever-expanding membership. With the public surfacing of the Krzywe Kolo Club in 1955, Club formation quickly began spreading and was significantly aided by *Po Prostu*'s (the young Party intellectuals' journal) publishing of an appeal for a nationwide club movement. As the club movement grew, *Po Prostu* and *Nowy Nurt* (the internal paper of Krzywe Kolo) coordinated efforts and communications between clubs.
Although a variety of clubs developed, their main functions centered on either increasing their members' awareness of contemporary issues or actively entering the community to provide needed services. Thus, KrzyweKolo's first formal debate focused on the aforementioned work "A Poem for Adults" by Adam Wazyk. Later discussions covered all aspects of the resolutions passed at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. In addition, several clubs interested in community activity initiated legal and medical advisory services, whereas others contributed expertise in the planning of various projects.19

Inevitably, the intelligentsia clubs collided with middle-echelon Party officials anxious about the potential threat posed by the clubs. Nevertheless, several clubs joined together in May 1956 to form a central organization known as the National Center of Inter-Club Cooperation, headquartered in Warsaw. Before long, the club movement received official recognition and gained support from the Polish National Front. Nowy Nurt soon came under the direction of the National Center, and funding for the Center's June Congress was provided by the National Front.20

Although official blessing resulted in some monetary benefits for the clubs, such recognition did not come without strings. Apparently, efforts were made to fuse the clubs into a mass organization, the result of which would effectively wipe out club independence from Party organs. Furthermore, accusations of elitism were sporadically leveled against the clubs. Club representatives, however, quickly defended their position on grounds that true discussion could not occur in large groups.

Club indignation was steadfastly supported by the writers as "the Polish press ardently defended the cause of the clubs' autonomy and particularity,
condemning not only petty harassment but attempts to turn the clubs into official regime organs." In sum, the actions of the Polish intelligentsia clubs and writers contributed to greater public awareness of the issues of the day, mutual support within the society, and a focusing of public opinion on matters of reform.

(Split Within the Communist Party)

It is within this context of increased political relaxation, intelligentsia leadership, and economic stagnation that one must view the Polish leadership's post-Poznan alternatives of either towing the Moscow line at the cost of a revolution or heading the reform effort. Initially, the Polish leadership was split between the hardliners and those favoring reform. In July, matters came to a head at the Seventh Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee. The siding of First Secretary Ochab and Premier Cyrankiewicz with the progressive faction led to a complete reevaluation of Party policy and leniency for those involved in the Poznan uprising.

Although deciding upon a new course at the Seventh Plenum, the Party, because of its damaged public image, did not have the sway to implement changes. As a result, the Party called upon Władysław Gomułka to join the leadership. Gomułka, a lifetime advocate of autonomy for the Polish Communist Party and Polish independence in developing Socialism, was imprisoned (along with many of his associates) during the Stalin era on charges of "deviation". In the aftermath of the Swiatło affair, he was released from prison, though he was kept politically isolated. With the situation in Poland on the verge of explosion, the Party called for Gomułka's return to power, even
at the price of accepting his reform program.25

Despite the victory of Party progressives, the hardliners (known as the Natolin group) mounted a campaign to prevent Gomulka from assuming the post of First Secretary. Various conspiracies were hatched by the Natolin group, and the potential use of Soviet-supported force loomed large. However, the progressives managed to remove several hardliners from their positions, secure the support of the Internal Security Corps by installing General Vaclav Komar (a Gomulka supporter) as its head, and enlist the aid of workers. The workers, well-informed because of the activities of intellectuals and students, organized councils and militias in support of reform.26

The final showdown between reformers and hardliners occurred at the Eighth Plenum of the Polish Communist Party's Central Committee, October 19-21. A Soviet delegation headed by Khrushchev arrived on the first day. The Soviets, hoping to stem reform and maintain their influence in the Polish Politbureau and military, pressured the Polish leadership while initiating Soviet troop movements as a means of intimidation. In the face of an ominous threat from the Soviets and Polish hardliners, the Polish people, particularly the workers, moved to support the reformers. The Szczecin-Gdansk Regional Service later commended the efforts of the workers:

The broadcast went on to explain how the awakened workers protected the process of change. They met secretly with the Gomulka group, in private homes. Thursday night, on the eve of the fateful Plenum, the workers obtained a list of some seven hundred persons—members of the Gomulka group on the Central Committee and in the government, Party leaders among the Zeran workers and leading intellectuals—who were allegedly to be arrested by the Army at the instigation of the Natolin group. The workers warned all those on the list, mounted guard over some of them, prepared pamphlets urging the Army to cooperate with the Gomulka group, and sent emissaries throughout Poland to talk to workers and soldiers.
When, on Friday the 19th, threatening troop movements began, these workers reported them immediately to the Central Committee facing the Soviet leaders. 27

With the overwhelming support of the Polish people, the progressives secured Gomulka's return to power in the face of Soviet intimidation. Gomulka's ascendancy marked the beginning of major reforms and, thus, Poland had its bloodless revolution.

(Overview of Reforms)

Later, in the section detailing the events giving rise to the Polish upheaval of 1970, a general analysis of the ultimate effectiveness of Gomulka's reforms will be presented. For now, however, a brief outline of the more major changes will suffice. First, Party and government personnel changes occurred from the highest echelons to the lowest administrative branches. Second, Soviet officers holding key positions throughout the Polish Military (including Marshal Rokossowski, Defense Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army) were removed and replaced by Poles. Third, the Polish Youth organization was disbanded and supplanted by the Revolutionary Youth Union. 28 Fourth, participation in agricultural collectives became voluntary, and many existing cooperatives were permitted to dissolve. Finally, the Trade Union Council leadership was dismissed, and a new emphasis on better worker representation emerged. On 22 November, Trybuna Ludu published a resolution reached at a Council meeting:

Trade unions must become fully independent, on all levels, from the State and the economic administration. In their further development, they must base their work on the best traditions of the Polish trade union movement of the prewar and earliest postwar years.
The trade union organization on all levels must be based on fully democratic principles... the control of the masses over the activities of trade union organs and full responsibility before the masses on the part of leading trade union authorities.

The relations between the Party and the trade unions must be based on the principle of... Party leadership in the trade union movement... All forms and methods of administrative influence of Party organs upon the trade unions' work must be eliminated. 29

Striving to increase worker input, the government passed a law establishing workers' councils, although their precise functions were not enumerated. 30

In general, the regime could do very little to quickly alleviate the economic mess confronting the country. The Polish media criticized the many problems of the system and gave particular emphasis to two noted economists: Stefan Kurowski and Edward Lipinski (of recent KOR fame). Both men attacked the disproportionate development of the economy and the neglect of agriculture. As Kurowski fumed:

What was the determining factor which caused the maintenance of identical investment proportions in countries drastically different from one another? The scheme of a uniform investment structure was forced upon these countries by the doctrinaire dogmas of Stalinism, which held that Socialist economy could develop according to one model only. The dogmas of Stalinism violated the individuality of individual countries, they abused rational economic proportions, caused terrific economic tensions within these countries—all this in order to satisfy the Stalinist theory of increased tempo in industrialization. 31

Surprisingly, both men called for foreign aid from the West and pointed out that many lessons could be learned from Capitalism. Finally, with the exception of agriculture where nearly 80 percent of the collective farms disbanded, massive economic changes were not quick in coming. The leadership did tamper with new wage schemes, relax certain agricultural and industrial practices, and reduce various taxes, but all such practices only touched the tip of the iceberg. 32
Conclusions

In summation, the events in Poland in 1956 culminated in a bloodless revolution. A major shift in power transpired and many reforms were initiated—all with Moscow's initial disapproval. Two glaring elements differentiating Poland's successful revolution from the spontaneous and easily subdued uprisings of Pilsen and East Berlin include: 1) an increased atmosphere of liberalization ("The Thaw") accompanied by the emergence of progressive Party elements and 2) the emergence of intelligentsia clubs and vocal Party writers who increased public awareness and solidified reform sentiments. Thus, although all three shared the element of economic difficulties, only Poland maintained the political and social context for major reform. As will be discussed in the section on 1970 Poland, Gomulka did reverse most of his reforms upon consolidating power. However, Gomulka could only have accomplished such a reversal because of the Polish people's misplaced faith in him. Later examination of the events of 1970 Poland will demonstrate that the people's faith in and tolerance of Gomulka were not limitless.

Hungary (The New Course and Rakosi's Demise)

The early seeds of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 may be found in the events surrounding the implementation and eventual reversal of the New Course. When Malenkov assumed power in the Soviet Union and instituted the New Course (1953), Hungary was under the leadership of Matyas Rakosi, a true Stalinist. Although Moscow's policy of collective leadership received only cosmetic adherence in most East bloc nations, the principle achieved true meaning in Hungary. Rakosi was called to Moscow and castigated for his past economic
practices. In addition, the progressive Imre Nagy assumed the premiership and headed the new economic program. 33

Nagy inherited an economy suffering from many of the same ills previously described in Poland. Rakosi had zealously pursued a program of forced industrialization, emphasizing heavy industry and neglecting consumer production. Moreover, under Rakosi's stewardship, economic planning geared for higher and higher production levels in what amounted to an almost maddening upward spiral. Tremendous strains developed in the economy and the country's resources were grossly mishandled. As Nagy pointed out in a dissertation to the Hungarian Communist Party's Central Committee:

One of the serious consequences of too rapid industrialization undertaken without regard for national resources was that it developed industries for which basic materials were lacking in Hungary and neglected or even restricted those industries which were based on Hungarian resources and basic materials. As a result, industrial development required more and more imported basic and raw materials and we acquired these on ever less favorable terms. 34

With Nagy at the helm a more rational plan of development evolved—one which sought to stem the many privations afflicting the Hungarian people.

Another ruthless Rakosi policy deeply concerning Nagy involved the program of forced collectivization. Through various cruel methods including land seizure, taxation, crop requisition and denial of credit, fertilizer, and other necessities, the Rakosi regime forced peasants into collectives. Such harsh policies only resulted in peasant hatred, a reluctance to work, and lower agricultural production. Nagy planned to abolish such adverse practices; unfortunately, in the aftermath of his announcement, peasants disbanded many collectives and divided the collective property among themselves. Because
peasant actions occurred at the end of the growing season and threatened to interrupt harvesting, Nagy's government reluctantly moved against the peasants and conflicts ensued. 35

In an effort to reach out to the people directly, Nagy promised to curb the abuses of the secret police, disband internment camps, and release various political prisoners. In addition, the government licensed an assortment of small businesses in hopes of increasing goods and services. Under the new policy, the status and treatment of intellectuals and professional people improved. In sum, Nagy's program created great enthusiasm throughout the country and promoted an atmosphere of increased liberalization and trust. 36

During the entire time that Nagy developed and implemented his policies, Rakosi did everything possible to undermine them. Although no longer in favor with Moscow, Rakosi nevertheless continued in the post of Party First Secretary and maintained close ties with his supporters in the Hungarian Communist Party. When Nagy collided with the peasants over the rapid disbanding of collectives, Rakosi quietly spread rumors of Nagy's threat to the system. Eventually, a split in the leadership developed between Nagy and his Communist intellectual and bureaucratic supporters and Rakosi and his orthodox party followers. 37

As Malenkov's position weakened in Moscow, Nagy came under fire too. After summoning Nagy to Moscow, Malenkov (the original reformer) chastised the Hungarian leader for his policies. Although Nagy's prestige suffered following the Soviet reprimand, and slipped still further after Malenkov's removal, the Premier's position received a critical blow when Nagy fell victim to a heart
attack in January 1955. While Nagy recovered from his illness, Rakosi energetically sought to strip him of all power. In early March, responding to the Rakosi campaign, the Central Committee censored Nagy. The following month, the Central Committee removed Nagy from all Party posts while the Parliament dropped him as Premier. 38

Despite Nagy's removal and the elevation of Rakosi supporters, Rakosi's power remained limited. Undoubtedly, Rakosi's identification with Stalinism weighed heavily against him in Khrushchev's eyes. Furthermore, those Communists released from prison and returned to political life under Nagy's direction remained dedicated to his cause and were joined by many governmental bureaucrats. The general population, remembering past hardships, also opposed a return to Rakosi's previous practices. The most vocal opposition, however, centered around Communist intellectuals who led the opposition and call for reform. 39 The significance of their contribution will now be examined.

(The Writers' Union)

Before the rise of Nagy and the New Course, Party writers concentrated their efforts on supporting regime policy. The sterility and repressiveness of Rakosi's regime actively discouraged literature written for purely artistic reasons. A writer's success in society depended on writing simple and direct praises of the Communist Party, and nonconformists suffered intense criticism from fellow colleagues. So intense was the regime's control over writers' thoughts and actions, that many writers were induced to write (and actually believe) the regime's trumped-up charges against associates and even friends. 40

When in June of 1953 the Communist Party's Central Committee condemned the previous Party policies and practices, the writers, stripped of the cause to
which they had devoted all their energies, discovered the immense and ugly delusion with which they had deceived themselves. Recognizing the Party's deterioration into a stagnant and repressive force, a slide to which they had contributed, the writers sought to make amends by preaching renewal and reform. In Nagy and the policies of the New Course the writers saw an opportunity to invigorate the Party and, thereby, reach some degree of inner peace. In the words of one writer: "the trouble lies not in what I said, but in what I did not say: the whole truth". As will be discussed later, the fall of Nagy and return of Rakosi created a situation where the writers were put to the test.

The earliest criticisms forwarded by the writers emerged shortly after Nagy's rise to power. Peter Kuczka's Nyirseg Diary, a stirring poetical account of the collective farm disturbances, first appeared in Irodalimi Ujsag on November 7, 1953. The poem decries the sufferings of the peasants, exemplified by an old lady, and holds the Party responsible:

Comrade, have you noticed this little old woman in the northern villages,  
where the sky does not carry the smoke of factories,  
where the railroad does not thunder and there is still no electricity?  

The stir caused by the poem resounded throughout the Communist hierarchy and literary circles, and despite the denounciations of middle echelon officials, unorthodox critical essays appeared in VIltang and Csillag, two literary journals.

Kuczka's poem marked only the beginning of the soon to come literary flood. Following Nagy's amnesty for political prisoners, the horrible details
of Rakosi's brutal practices surfaced. As Kecskemti points out: "These confrontations plunged the Communist intellectual into an abyss of remorse and despair: the poems and articles they had written during the period of terror, applauding Rakosi and vilifying his victims, remained as monuments to their shame." In the aftermath of the political prisoner release, the tempo of writings increased, but when compared to the events following Nagy's fall and the CPSU's Twentieth Congress, the atmosphere was more like the lull before the storm.

Nagy's fall and the demise of the New Course stirred the writers to action. Initially, Party writers within the Writers' Union attempted to open the leadership's eyes to the undercurrent of reform sentiment present in society but were unsuccessful. The leadership assailed the writers, prevented the printing of an edition of *Irodalmi újság*, and fired the paper's editor. In response to Party actions, the writers drew up a memorandum denouncing Party tampering with cultural matters and cited various Party resolutions in support of their position. The regime reacted with more scathing attacks against the writers and forced many supporters to withdraw their signatures. Nevertheless, despite Party exertion of pressure and efforts at co-optation, several writers held steadfast.

The full-scale explosion of literary criticism appeared on the heels of CPSU's Twentieth Congress. Up until that time, the Party writers had managed to stave off the leadership's assaults by utilizing the clout that Party membership afforded them. Khrushchev's speech at the Congress, however, provided the ammunition for a counterattack.

In denouncing the "cult of the personality" and political purges, the
Soviet leader left Rakosi exposed to criticism from all sides. Moreover, the new Soviet line also prevented Rakosi from moving against his critics, leaving him practically helpless. The consequences of Rakosi's lame duck position and intense writer criticism became evident as the leadership's authority eroded, clearing the way for the October Revolution. 48

(The Petofi Circle)

A second intellectual organization, more volatile and anti-Rakosi in its outlook, was the Petofi Circle. The Petofi Circle was formed in 1955 by young intelligentsia and constituted a branch of the Communist youth organization DISZ. 49 Many of its leaders had suffered imprisonment under Rakosi and were released under Nagy's direction. As Pal Jonas, last President of the Petofi Circle, bitterly recounted:

... We scraped at the ground with our fingers; we dug holes with bits of wood; we staggered with boulders pushed against our stomachs. Day by day our situation deteriorated. Discouragement set in, and many of us gave up all hope of life. It was, indeed, a "death camp"; for years only the dead issued forth. 50

Maintaining the memory of such brutal experiences, the Petofi members pushed for reform.

Through their actions, the Petofi members hoped to provide a forum, much like Krawie Kala in Poland, for increasing public awareness and stimulating debate. The club's focus sought to uproot past problems and forward new views. For its efforts, the Petofi Circle received a major boost from the "Thaw" proclaimed at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In describing the Petofi Circle and the importance of the Soviet Congress, Pal Jonas stated:

... It [the Petofi Circle] provided a forum where, for the first
time, the important problems of the nation could be freely discussed, where faults and failures were attributed to their real causes, and where the members could speak from their hearts, not merely parroting what the Party wanted them to say. The intellectuals who made up the Circle prepared and created the climate for the uprising of people of all classes and backgrounds against the Communist rulers. [and]

... Indeed it was the liberalizing forces released by this Congress which provided the Circle with its opportunity to prepare the country for democratization, a task which should have been taken on by the Party itself. 51

Thus, the Petofi Circle struck forward to agitate for change.

A major turning point for the Petofi Circle was its debate on the Soviet Congress and its relation to the Hungarian economy in May of 1956. At the forum Rakosi and his policies were severely criticized. Among the more objectionable practices were forced industrialization, agricultural mismanagement and ruthlessness, misdirection of the economy, and a lack of reform in the Five Year Plan. Demands were voiced for revision of the Five Year Plan, valid statistical information, a pricing system move in line with reality, and increased wages. 52

The next major stir caused by the Circle’s activities sprang out of a June forum on partisans and freedom fighters. The fireworks began when the rehabilitated wife of Laszlo Rajk (a Rakosi purge victim) spoke. Mrs. Rajk did not mince words as she addressed Party officials in attendance:

You not only killed my husband but you killed all decency in our country. You destroyed Hungary’s political, economic, and moral life. Murderers cannot be rehabilitated: they must be punished. 53

Mrs. Rajk’s appearance in defense of her husband and in opposition to the regime caused a tremendous sensation throughout the country and promoted greater anti-Rakosi hostility.

Initially, the Rakosi regime hesitated in bringing action against the
Petofi Circle. As previously expressed, Moscow's new line against such actions definitely weighed as an inhibiting factor -- though some contend that Rakosi permitted the Circle's activities in order to more clearly identify his opposition before dealing with it. Whatever the reason, Rakosi began to run into increasing trouble and his attitude changed:

Rakosi was now, and with great reason, becoming increasingly determined to stop the run-away development of the Petofi Circle as a center of mass agitation against his regime, the more so since its main political aim was now clearly his removal and because the ferment it generated did not remain confined to the youth and intelligentsia, but was now beginning to spread among the workers.

Apparently, Rakosi planned (without success) to divide the workers and peasants from their intellectual leaders by producing economic rewards for the former and moving against the latter.

Matters came to a head in the wake of the Petofi Circle's press debate held on the evening of June 27. During the session, at which a huge crowd was present, many prominent writers directly and bitterly attacked the Rakosi regime. Three Central Committee members attended and were hounded endlessly as the meeting carried on into the early morning. Of particular importance, physicist Lajos Janossy, head of the state atomic energy commission, openly questioned Soviet exploitation of Hungary's uranium fields:

... Recently, when we went to Moscow to confer with our Soviet colleagues, it turned out that they knew considerably more about the Hungarian uranium fields than we did. We knew next to nothing about them, but our Soviet colleagues were kind enough to put some of the data at our disposal.

The uranium issue enraged the Hungarian populace and became an important focal point of anti-Soviet sentiments; indeed, an end to uranium exploitation was a major economic demand arising out of the October upheaval.
Responding to the Petofi Circle's debate, Rakosi removed Tardos and Dery (two of the most vocal anti-regime writers) from the Communist Party, denounced the Petofi Circle with an assortment of Communist rhetorical slurs, and initiated an unsuccessful campaign to incite the workers against the Circle. Despite Rakosi's actions, defiance continued, and the Writers Union rejected Tardos and Dery's expulsion. Distrust of the regime spread throughout the factories, particularly in light of Laszlo Rajk's (Rakosi's purged opponent) rehabilitation. Although temporarily stunned, the Petofi Circle eventually reappeared. As the situation continued to deteriorate, Rakosi's removal became inevitable. 60

(Nagy's Return and the Outbreak of Fighting)

Under heavy pressure from the Soviets, Rakosi resigned in mid-July and was succeeded by his right-hand man, Erno Gero. Although outwardly consiliatory toward the reform opposition, Gero implemented no real reforms and only attempted to stabilize the situation (To this end he permitted the reemergence of the Petofi Circle.). As Gero's bandaging operation slowly unraveled, a process hastened by Irodalmi Iisak's articles on the princely lifestyle of the Party's highest echelon, the leadership decided to rehabilitate Imre Nagy (apparently with Moscow's approval).

On October 4, Nagy was readmitted to the Party although not to any official position. Two days later, an official ceremonial reburial of Laszlo Rajk and several other purge victims occurred, notably without uniformed AVH (secret police) agents present. As the power of the regime continued its decline, numerous student organizations broke with the Communist-controlled DISZ (a student federation).
In mid-October, the emboldened students decided to hold a demonstration in the capital in support of Poland's reform movement. News of the planned demonstration spread quickly, and students from a technological university drew up a list of sixteen demands focusing on more equitable Hungarian-Soviet relations, the establishment of a Democracy under the guidance of Nagy, and a restoration of personal freedoms. Although initially banning the demonstration, the leadership finally submitted, and on 22 October the march took place with a crowd in the hundreds of thousands. The demonstrators eventually halted their procession outside the Parliament Building where student demands were read and Nagy spoke.  

On the evening of the demonstration, First Secretary Gero addressed the nation. His speech, void of any indication of bowing to reform, embittered the people—particularly in light of Gomulka's rise to power in Poland. In the absence of a Soviet military intervention in Poland, many Hungarians probably believed similar caution would be accorded to Hungarian developments. Angered by Gero's speech and emboldened by Polish events, demonstrators toppled Stalin's statue—the removal of which was a student demand. Attempting to increase publicity for their reforms, several students converged on the Radio Building seeking to have their demands read over Budapest Radio. A student delegation entered the building, and a large crowd formed outside. A long wait ensued without any word. Suddenly, the AVH (secret police) fired tear gas grenades and bullets into the crowd. A battle for the station followed, and the Hungarian Revolution began.  

As news of the radio station incident spread, fighting broke out in several areas throughout Budapest. The battles that ensued pitted workers, students, intellectuals, and sympathetic military and regular police forces against the
brutal AVH and Soviet reinforcements. During several days of fighting, Revolutionary Workers' Councils formed and usurped power from Communist functionaries. Ultimately, Imre Nagy emerged at the head of a provisional government and called for a cease fire.\(^{65}\)

Among Nagy's first actions was the disbanding of the AVH and the one-party system. As Soviet forces withdrew from Budapest, the freedom fighters consolidated into a National Guard, and Lieutenant General Pal Maléter, a decisive leader in the revolution, became Minister of Defense. Just as the machinery for a new system based on socialism and democracy developed, news of Soviet troop movements across the border arrived.

On November 1, Nagy threatened to declare neutrality if a Soviet withdrawal was not forthcoming. When news of larger troop crossings reached the Hungarian leadership later that evening, Nagy announced Hungary's Declaration of Neutrality. Although a Hungarian delegation had been negotiating with the Soviets for a troop withdrawal, Soviet agents arrested the Hungarians just prior to the second Soviet intervention. The Hungarians fought courageously against the returning Soviet forces but fell victim to superior numbers and firepower. Through deceit and brute force, the Soviets secured Nagy's arrest and installed a favorable government under their puppet János Kádár. Thus, the Hungarian Revolution was crushed.\(^{67}\)

(Conclusions)

In reviewing the Polish and Hungarian movements, one discovers several close parallels. To begin with, both countries experience some liberalization after the initiation of the New Course and the subsequent curbing of the secret police. Secondly, both countries suffered from economic difficul-
ties not remedied in the aftermath of the New Course, particularly after the program’s reversal. Finally, the development of intelligentsia clubs and vocal Writers' Unions within both contributed to increased public awareness and a rallying of reform sentiments. However, an important difference does exist; namely, elements of the Old-Guard Polish leadership recognized the need to transfer power to a more publicly acceptable faction and, therefore, sided with progressive elements. As a result, Gomułka came to power despite the threat of the Kotolin Group and, thus, armed conflict was averted.

In Hungary, however, orthodox elements clung to their position in the face of ever mounting public criticism. The provocative and brutal actions of the AVH merely constituted the match which set the situation on fire.
IV. Czechoslovakia 1968: Socialism with a Human Face

Affect of the New Course and the CPSU's Twentieth Congress

Pressured by the Malenkov leadership to follow its newly developed policy and jolted by the Pilsen uprising, the dual Zapotocky-Novotny leadership in Czechoslovakia adopted some New Course measures. The new plan reduced intensive industrialization and forced collectivization and permitted some collectives to dissolve. Moreover, consumer goods production, agricultural investment, and light industry development received greater priority. Although paying official lip service to its reforms, the Czech leadership pursued the new policies unenthusiastically and gradually permitted their erosion.¹

The erosion of economic reforms, coupled with the lack of any real political relaxation, left the Czech leadership in a hardline position going into CPSU's Twentieth Congress. Following Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, the Czechoslovak Party expressed similar, though limited, sentiments. The only concrete action arising in the Congress's aftermath was the removal of the Minister of National Defense (Alexej Cepicka) on charges of encouraging the cult of the personality.²

The regime's indifference to liberalization led to April and May 1956 demonstrations in Prague and Bratislava. When calls for change were condemned by the Party, resentment increased. Tempers flared at the April Second Congress of Czechoslovak writers as the regime received severe criticism for interfering with cultural affairs. Surprisingly, Party organizations joined the liberalization effort by calling for an end to censorship and supporting
demands for a special Congress. Despite growing opposition, the Party chiefs remained firm in their position and managed to keep a lid on things. As H. Gordon Skilling points out, favorable conditions aided the leadership’s efforts:

As a result of comparatively satisfactory economic conditions, no serious unrest occurred among peasants and workers, as in Hungary and Poland, so that no simultaneous movement of protest by dissenting intellectuals and the broader masses took place. 4

Thus lacking the key element of economic difficulties, intellectuals were handicapped in arousing mass support and eventually failed under governmental pressure.

The Economic Turn-of-Events

Over the next several years, as Novotny continued orthodox economic policies, the favorable economic conditions preventing solidified opposition to the regime deteriorated. Despite remedial efforts at decentralization in the late fifties, a full-blown economic crisis emerged between 1962 and 1963. Up until that period, Czechoslovakia maintained a substantial growth rate by intensive investment in heavy industry. The economic path chosen followed the principle of quantitative or “extensive” development of the means of production rather than a qualitative or “intensive” program. 5 By the early 1960s, the Czechoslovak course of development had exhausted itself as greater and greater inputs were required to maintain production rates. Between 1962-1963 negative growth emerged as a consequence of neglecting technology and a decreasing labor supply. 6 Below are three charts demonstrating the declines in industrial production and labor productivity, as well as the siphoning off of agricultural labor:
### TABLE

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Global Social Product</th>
<th>National Income Originating from Production</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Income in Current Prices</td>
<td>Current prices index</td>
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<td>1970</td>
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In the period 1944 - 1970, comparable prices using 1944 = 100 are given. In the period, 1960 - 1965 comparable prices using 1960 = 100 are given. Means equivalent nation-to-nation calculation on even criteria and adjusted going back.

**Source:** *Statistical Yearbook*, 2, 1964, and 4, 1964

### GRAPH

**Development of Industrial Production and of Productivity at Labour of Industry**

- Industrial production
- Productivity at labour

**Source:** [Based on Statistical Yearbook](https://example.com) 1967, pp. 28-29
The entire economic mess spelled hardships for the Czechoslovak people and potential trouble for Novotny. Notwithstanding initial hesitation, the leadership decided that the economic problems necessitated change and appointed Ota Sik to head an Economic Commission investigating possible solutions. Ultimately, Sik devised an innovative strategy to cure the nation's ills, but Party acceptance didn't occur until 1967. Under Sik's plan, a regulated market system would replace the command structure, thereby inducing an intensive growth pattern. Increased emphasis on the profit motive, technological innovation, reward based on merit (rather than Party loyalty), and enhanced competition served as Sik's principle tools to restore economic health, though central planning and regulation continued at the highest
levels of the economic chain.  

Despite Sik's energetic efforts, conservative and incompetent elements throughout the system, fearing a reduction in power and prestige, subverted the reforms. The economic program suffered from foot-dragging, revisions limiting its scope, and the Party's reflexive inclination to interfere. Frustrated and disappointed at the entrenched resistance to change, many reformers concluded that political changes needed to precede economic ones.

The Writers Union

Not having given up after 1956, the Czech and Slovak writers (formally tied under the Union of Czechoslovak Writers, SCSS) continued struggling for a general liberalization. Using their literary journals Literarni noviny (Czech) and Kulturny zivot (Slovak), the writers pressured the regime which steadfastly resisted. The end result was that "The efforts of the government to harness press, radio, and television to its purposes and to curb the cultural periodicals generated bitter resistance and resulted in a deadlock which contributed to the weakening of the regime and its ultimate collapse."

At the same time that the regime was suffering its economic setbacks, boldness within literary circles increased. The writers, through their journals, developed a network uniting intellectuals. In early 1963, at both the Slovak and Czech Writers' Congresses, criticisms of the system and Party interference reached unprecedented levels. Rather than attempting to appease the writers, Novotny and associates lashed back with bitter denunciations and reiterations of the Party's leading role.

During the latter part of 1963, the regime orchestrated a campaign reproaching the media in general and the writers inspecific. Unswayed, the
writers maintained their demands; Laco Novomesky's request for "absolute freedom of expression for writers to the greatest degree possible" accented the prevalent outlook. When pressure failed, the regime took overt action--shaking-up editorial boards, the Union leadership, the Central Committee's Ideological Department and ultimately shutting-down Tvar (the young writers' periodical).

In 1966, the Party leadership again provoked the writers by passing a new press law. The law legitimized Party censorship and signaled a reassertion of Party intervention. When the Union of Writers held their Fourth Congress in June 1967, the nolves came off as vehement ridicule of Party policy was expressed. Pavel Kohout's deriding of Czech Middle East policy, Ivan Klíma's and Antonín Liehm's belittling of censorship, Milan Kundera's hailing of the country's democratic past, Jan Procházka's calls for increased freedom, and Ludvík Vaculík's biting analysis of the effects of power highlighted the session.

The regime's anger over the writers' actions manifested itself not only in denouncements but in reprisals. Jan Benes, a Czech writer, was sentenced to prison for providing Pavel Tigvid (a Czech journalist in the West) with information; Ladislav Mnacko, a highly decorated writer, was stripped of citizenship and removed from the Party (while in Israel); Vaculík, Liehm, and Klima also were dumped by the Party; and Literarní noviny fell under the control of the Ministry of Culture (receiving a reduction in paper allocation). Thus, the hostility between Novotny and the writers became irreconcilable and continued until the First Secretary's fall from power.
Youth and Student Opposition

Dissatisfaction with the Novotny regime also surfaced among Czechoslovakia's youth, particularly students. In May 1968, young people from throughout Prague and of all occupations marched to Karel Hynek Macha's statue in Petrin park and paid homage to the deceased poet. The march, though initially peaceful, erupted into a demonstration with participants calling for democracy and an end to communism. Several arrests were made and twelve people received jail sentences from five to seventeen months.\textsuperscript{19}

As a whole, the country's youth became increasingly agitated, and the students cultivated a unique movement. The first seeds of student dissent appeared in 1963 as Prague University students organized informal associations. By 1966, the student leader Jiri Muller was agitating for reform of the Czechoslovak Union of Youth (CSM). At a student conference Muller proposed a Union federation according to age and occupational criteria. He also advocated political involvement for older students—going as far as suggestions of opposition to the Communist Party.\textsuperscript{20} Muller's efforts did not go unnoticed, and he soon received his university release, youth organization expulsion, and draft notice. Although Muller's friend Lubos Holecek took up the fight, Party officials were unmoved and dealt with Holecek in a similar manner.\textsuperscript{21}

The uncompromising attitude of the leadership merely served to unite student opposition, particularly as regards the stagnant youth organization. At the Union's fifth Congress in June of 1967, Novotny affirmed Party control over the student organization and stressed continued non-fragmentation. In addition, Muller's suggestions and actions received public condemnation. As
a result, students became further disillusioned with the authorities and in October 1967, matters came to a head. Difficulties first arose when students from Prague's Strahov dormitories, angered by frequent power outages, gathered outside their residences and began a protest march. The candlelight procession soon met police resistance and a confrontation took place. The police dispersed the students, but they returned following news of three arrests. The second encounter turned into a brawl as twelve students and three policemen required medical attention.22

Angered by police excesses and biased media reporting of the incident, students joined in demands calling for official exoneration of student actions, objective media coverage, and police reprimands. By permitting the students to air grievances, the leadership demonstrated a softening of its position—though government intrigues apparently were aimed at preventing the students from agitating among the workers. As one student claimed:

... There have been tangible improvements in the living standard and the government has launched a campaign promising steady improvement. The workers don't want to rock the boat now. They'll join us in 1968, when all this collapses and their pocketbooks are hit hard. I've done a lot of computer-programming for the 1968 plan and it looks horrible. The government is in a cold sweat about it. 23

For the time being, the Novotny leadership seemed again to have weathered the storm; at the same time, however, the regime's grip on society appeared to be slipping.

Dissension Within the Ranks

Mounting opposition to Novotny within intellectual and student circles soon spread to elements of the Communist leadership. During Central Committee sessions in October and December of 1967, Party divisions occurred as Novotny's
leadership and monopoly of power came under fire. When calls for a separation of the President's and First Secretary's functions surfaced, Novotny moved to forestall such a split, and various military officers conspired to keep him in power, forcibly if necessary. Unable to secure full military backing and strong support from Moscow, a politically crippled Novotny witnessed his position weaken. During a January plenum, amidst strong controversy, Novotny was dropped as First Secretary, and Alexander Dubcek was selected as his successor.

Dubcek's rise marked the beginning of serious efforts at reform; however, despite the isolation of Novotny and certain of his associates, the Party and its apparatus remained divided between conservative, moderate, and radical elements. Moreover, public opinion began pushing for a more rapid pace of change, and various conflicting demands on the system emerged. Rather than engage in a tedious step by step account of Party infighting, societal demands on the system, and the leadership's handling of each and every problem confronting it, the author will present a comprehensive summary of the leadership's April 1968 Action Program--the Party's broad outline of reform designed to placate the various competing factions.

The Action Program--The Makings of Revolution

One of the most significant aspects of the Action Program was its call for democratization and an end to the Communist Party's monopoly of power. Indeed, in speaking of the National Front (an organ consisting of various mass organizations and certain remnants of pre-1948 political parties), the leadership claimed:

The National Front is based on the principle that socialist state
power must not be a monopoly of any single party, nor of a coalition of political parties. On the contrary, it must be accessible to all political social organizations of the people, all its social, nationality and generation groups, all citizens. 26

Although the proclamation stops short of calling for the formation of political parties, its recognition of political-social organization's access to state power may be interpreted as tacit approval for such organizations and their right to access on the system (such access to input representing some degree of contention with the Communist Party).

Furthermore, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was being billed as in a position whereby its support and authority had to be earned. Hence, the Party leadership directed its efforts toward gaining popular support (which in many cases they appeared to have achieved). 27 Deputy Premier Oldrich Cernik stated:

Democracy must be established and the task is to bring all the advantages of socialist democracy to life fully and practically. In this entire process of democratization the Party is in the lead and it remains the leading force in society, but of course that means to lead and not administer, much less to order about. 28

Thus, reforms in a society that included "socialism with a human face" would have to encompass a new image for the Communist Party (though it was to remain the leading force at "all" times).

In conjunction with the process of democratization, the Dubcek regime also sought reforms which would guarantee freedom of association. The extension of freedom of association, written into the old constitution but unenforced by the previous regime, was quickly utilized by the various political-social organizations. 29 In addition, the trade union movement took advantage of the situation to create new unions or to create autonomous factions within established organs.
Federation of the trade union movement was also initiated along national lines (Czech or Slovak). Despite the existence of some opinion in favor of totally independent unions, the leadership decided that all unions would remain federated under one main organization. Although this might be viewed as a setback, the trade union movement did achieve greater powers in defending the interests of workers (though it also continued in the sphere of political indoctrination). Similar developments occurred in the agricultural union movement.

Freedom of association was combined with freedom of worship as religious groups began to reassert themselves. The Party forwarded the argument that "believers are an active part of Socialist society." On the whole, one of the most interesting developments regarding religion was the restoration of the Catholic Church of the Old Slavonic Rite (Uniates) which continued to be banned in the Soviet Union. For the reform leadership, this particular church's links to Ukrainian Nationalism in the Soviet Union had ominous implications.

Finally, freedom of association was utilized by various ethnic minorities (especially Ukrainian and Hungarian) in reorganizing or creating councils to present ethnic grievances. Both groups had suffered under Slovakian national fervor. Consequently, the reform leadership began to formulate remedial solutions--including greater representation, increased local autonomy, and restoration of rights; however, the new constitution, embodying the reforms, was never completed nor implemented owing to the Soviet invasion.

Along with its proposals for freedom of association and religious worship, the Dubcek leadership also called for freedom of expression, speech, and press;
without which, freedom of association would be useless. Hence, the new Press Law was instituted to eliminate censorship in Czechoslovakia. As Deputy Jirina Tureckova acknowledged:

... the joint meeting of the Constitutional Legal and Cultural Committee of the National Assembly had agreed on the following formulation of the novelized Press Law: 'by censorship, we mean any intervention by a state body against freedom of speech and illustration and their dissemination through mass means of information.'

Coinciding with reforms on basic civil rights, the Action Program also called for laws rectifying the persecutions of citizens (both Communist and non-Communist) under the previous regime. The culmination of this crusade was the Law on Rehabilitation. Under the new law, unjustly punished individuals would have their homes and certain other confiscated properties returned or would receive compensation. Similarly, compensation for losses suffered as a result of illegal imprisonment would ensue. Each case was to receive special investigation, and final decisions were to be reached by an independent court. Finally, the Rehabilitation Law contained provisions for calling to account those individuals who directly participated in the persecutions.

The reforms' long-run guarantee against arbitrary power shifts and changes of temperament within the Communist Party rested with the establishment of a government and institutions not dominated by the Party. Consequently, a separation of governmental organs from the Communist Party was necessary. As a first step, the Action Program called for an increase in the powers of the National Assembly (the main legislative body which had acted as a rubber stamp on Party policy) and for an increase in its ties to the citizenry:

The Action Program ... cal[led] for a National Assembly 'which will truly make laws and decide important political questions, and not just approve drafts submitted to it.' The Program advocated the strengthening of the control function of the Assembly vis-à-vis the government (and 'all areas of public life'), including subordination of the control apparatus, presumably the control commission, to the Assembly.
While the Program contained nothing on votes of confidence or public proceedings, it did say that the Assembly must be restored its Constitutional position as the supreme organ of state power and must establish closer ties with 'the public opinion of the citizenry'—though how it did not say, in either case. 39

Likewise, in furthering the bonds of various officials to the citizenry, a need for electoral reform arose:

The voting act had become a symbol of a person's support of socialism, and if one failed to turn out for the elections or dared to inspect the ballot—much less cross out a name or try to enter the uninviting booth provided—one was considered 'anti-socialist'. This whole procedure of 'forced voting', whereby voting was a duty rather than a right and turnouts of 99.9 per cent were reached, was, as Slovak Presidium member Hruskový said on television on 29 February 1968, 'ridiculous'. 40

Because of the electoral inadequacy of the system, certain elections were postponed until such time as a new election law could be drafted. In addition, proposals for a recall provision were raised in hopes of making certain officials more responsible to their constituents. 41

Among the reforms initiated in the area of government, perhaps none were of more central importance than those associated with the federalization of the country. The country's Slovak minority hoped to overcome their asymmetrical relation to the Czech majority. 42 Indeed, several of the chief reformers, including Dubček, were Slovaks. In a speech before the Bratislava City Conference, Gustav Husák proclaimed, "It is now generally recognized in Czechoslovakia that a new state pattern on a federal principle is unavoidable." 43

According to a government commission on federalization, the new system would include governments in the Czech and Slovak lands which would serve as executive organs while national councils in both areas would serve as legislative bodies. On the federal level, two legislative bodies would be
The Chamber of the People (about 200 deputies) would be composed of deputies elected by all electors on a representative footing, and a Chamber of Nations composed on a parity basis (50-50). In other words, the federal system would grant the Slovaks parity representation in one body—much like the U.S. Senate, while maintaining proportional representation in another—similar to the U.S. House of Representatives. Czechoslovakia would thus maintain two regional governmental systems with autonomous powers and a national governmental system with specific powers (both having some areas of power overlap). Areas such as foreign policy, defense, federal finance, federal planning etc. would be under the sole dominion of the national governmental system.

While granting greater autonomy to regions at home, the Czechoslovak leadership sought greater independence abroad. During the reform period, Czechoslovak foreign policy was characterized by repeated assurances of loyalty to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact but, at the same time, by a striving for greater independence from both. The Czechoslovak position might best be represented by an article appearing in Rolnicke Noviny on 6 April 1968:

We must consider the interests of the whole socialist community, appreciate the contribution of the Soviet Union towards our well-being and safety, but the decisive consideration of our home and foreign policy should be in the first place our own, Czechoslovak, needs.

In striving for greater independence, the Czechoslovak leadership sought better relations with other Communist Parties and the West. In fact, when five Warsaw Pact nations sent a letter to the reform regime expressing their "concern" over events in Czechoslovakia, the Communist Parties of Western Europe gave near unanimous support to the Czech cause.
leaderships also tended to back the Czechoslovaks—otherwise maintaining public silence. Furthermore, as will be discussed later, the Dubcek regime strove for greater economic independence from its fraternal Socialist brethren.

Finally, proposals for greater Czechoslovak decision-making in the command sector of the Warsaw Pact military alliance were initiated. Czechoslovak Defense Minister, Martin Dzur, formulated suggestions for "international composition of the joint command and further bodies. . ." Dzur went as far as proposing an independent Czechoslovak military doctrine:

Such a specification of the military and political role of Czechoslovakia as a part of the Warsaw Treaty under the many possible conflict situations of the present which harmonizes the national interests with the international ones, can only lead to the improvement of the defense capabilities of our coalition.

Evidently, the reform leadership was even willing to assert its independence in an area of such peculiar sensitivity to Moscow as the military.

Thus, we are brought to a conclusion of the major political reforms initiated under the Dubcek leadership. It would be beneficial to once again reiterate that the Action Program took effect on an ad hoc basis (the Press Law and Rehabilitation Law being two major exceptions). Also, as previously indicated, the Party was not entirely cohesive in its approach to reform and feuds often erupted. Consequently, the final outcome of the Czechoslovak reforms rested with the writing and implementation of a new constitution scheduled to take place at the "14th Extraordinary Party Congress" (planned for early September). Needless to say, the Congress never took place because of the Soviet invasion.

Armed with an overview of political reforms, we may now turn to a consideration of the economic initiatives. Among the most significant developments,
the decision to increase enterprise independence and reduce government interference was of immense importance. In fact, the Action Program called for the government's role to be restricted to general economic decisions, long-term planning, and consumer protection. The various economic ministries experienced losses of power, and a National Council was established as their watchdog. 55

Therefore, with government interference reduced, economic reforms were initiated to modernize industry, enhance competition and efficiency, and increase consumer production (with a subsequent rise in the standard of living). To achieve these goals, Czechoslovak industry required significant changes in its macro-structure and reassessment of its foreign policy. 56

As might be expected, the problems associated with tremendous change in the economy were of massive proportions and complexity. Economist Ota Sik stated:

Enormous tasks face us in the development of production, the changes in the macro-structure, flexible changes of production programmes, some obsolete factories will have to be closed down and our producers must be exposed to the harder pressure of the domestic and foreign market, the monopoly position of enterprises must be replaced by competition both at home and by the medium of foreign trade. 57

To achieve the kind of competitiveness which Sik advocated, Czechoslovakia would have to alter its position within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), increase its trade with the West, develop a convertible currency, and reduce its protectionist policy in industry. Czechoslovakia was suffering from a surplus in trade with the socialist bloc which could not be converted to hard currency. Therefore, reforms in all the aforementioned categories were initiated (much to the displeasure of Moscow and some Eastern European states). 58
As Frantisek Hormouz announced,

... any commitments Czechoslovakia has taken up or will do so in the future are commitments undertaken at our own free decision because they are advantageous to our economy and not because we were forced to take them on by other CMEA member countries.

... Czechoslovakia's cooperation within CMEA will gradually have to be precisely defined... especially because not all enterprises and organizations of the CMEA member countries have such a position and powers as we want our enterprises to have in Czechoslovakia.

On that note, the leadership signalled its aggressive new economic plan and willingness to cross Moscow in order to correct past problems.

Following reform measures forcing Czechoslovak enterprises into positions of world market competition, industrial modernization would have to ensue if the country was to avoid being overwhelmed by the technologically superior Western corporations. In conjunction with their efforts to modernize and reassure the Soviets of a continued pro-Moscow orientation, the Czechoslovak leadership requested Soviet loans in convertible currency. The loans would then be used to purchase Western technology and equipment. Without Moscow's aid, Czechoslovakia would have no alternative but to turn West for badly needed loans.

With reforms on greater decentralization of economic planning, local units of economic management were needed. As a result, the reform leadership proposed programs calling for the establishment of "Worker's Councils". The Councils would be composed primarily of workers, and all workers in the enterprise stood to gain materially from the successes of the company. Moreover, Council members would nominate potential enterprise managers, while retaining a say in his recall. In fact, the Council members would determine the manager's salary and share of dividends. Likewise, the Council also would aid in the assessment of the enterprise's position and would decide matters of fusion or division of the enterprise. The number of members on the council would range
from ten to thirty—the majority being workers elected by their peers through secret ballot. The remaining Council members would be appointed specialists and state representatives. Finally, with the new leadership's increased emphasis on consumer production (at the expense of heavy industry), workers' benefitting directly from the profits of their enterprise would be motivated to higher levels of production since increased earnings would have utility in an expanded consumer market.

Ultimately, the Soviet leadership perceived the Czech experiment as threatening to its position and, therefore, crushed it in late August of 1968.

As H. Gordon Skilling later described the Czechoslovak plight:

Ever since August 1968, Czechoslovakia has been living in the shadow of the invasion and has shown few, if any signs of recovering from that traumatic event. Gustav Husak, who displaced Alexander Dubcek in April 1969 as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (C.P.Cz), moved swiftly to block, or to reverse, the major reforms of 1968, including political democratization, freedom of expression and association, legal reform and rehabilitation, and planning and management reform, thus completing the grim task of dismantling the achievements and plans of 1968 which Dubcek had himself been forced to initiate after his restoration to power.

In the face of Soviet tanks, the Czechoslovak people and their leaders had no choice but to return to the stagnant and repressive methods previously practiced.

Conclusions

During the progression of events leading up to the Czechoslovak Revolution, several trends reminiscent of events in 1956 Poland and Hungary, as well as some novel twists, emerged. To begin with, all three nations suffered from economic hardships associated with disproportionate development of
the economy. Secondly, the common feature of an organized intelligentsia also emerged (the Writers' Union and student groups in Czechoslovakia and the Writers' Union and intelligentsia clubs in Poland and Hungary). Indeed, as previously discussed, the intelligentsia did much to increase public awareness, pressure the regime, and reduce the leadership's authority.

Differences, however, begin to arise when discussing the climate of liberalization prior to the fall of the Old-Guard leadership. Both Poland and Hungary experienced a thaw in the aftermath of the New Course and the CPSU's Twentieth Congress. Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, maintained a relatively repressive atmosphere, though a slight thaw followed the CPSU's Twenty-Second Congress. Under Novotny, the regime appeared ambivalent in responding to its critics—sometimes partaking only in verbal reprimands while at others resorting to overt action (such as dismissal from the Party, loss of citizenship, and legal prosecution).

In addition, in both Poland and Hungary, the masses actively contributed to the hardliners' demise and the progressives' assumption of power. No such actions manifested themselves in Czechoslovakia as the masses awoke only after the progressives were at the helm. A plausible explanation for the Czechoslovak phenomenon suggests that mass action similar to Poland's loomed somewhere down the road, but Novotny's sudden fall precluded its emergence (the outburst of public activity following the dictator's removal might be viewed as supportive of this explanation). Whether the Czechoslovak nation, with its history of civil obedience, could have exploded in a manner similar to Hungary appears doubtful; nevertheless, in light of the street resistance to the Soviet invasion, the possibility should not be entirely ruled out.

Although some of the events associated with the Czechoslovak Revolution
are subject to differing interpretation, two unmistakable conclusions emerge in its aftermath: 1) intellectual organizations, despite a limited degree of political relaxation, still can exert substantial pressure on the ruling regime and 2) the early assumption of power by progressive elements encourages public activity and hastens the reform process.
V. Poland 1970: Riots and the Fall of Gomulka

Economic Decay and Popular Unrest

During mid-December 1970, Poland's political scene exploded as workers and students, responding to governmental fuel and food price hikes, took to the streets in protest. The first anti-government outbreak occurred in Gdansk and was followed by similar disruptions in other major cities. Strong-arm governmental tactics, used to suppress the initially peaceful demonstrations, resulted in their becoming violent anti-regime riots. Ultimately, the mass discontent led to Wladyslaw Gomulka's removal from power and the initiation of various reforms.

Although the Polish upheaval came on the heels of a publicly unpopular and poorly presented price increase, its roots stemmed from much deeper sources. Specifically, Gomulka, the people's hero in the 1956 struggle for liberalization and progressive policies, reversed practically all of his reforms upon consolidating power. In the aftermath of the October Revolution, the leadership instituted an economic Council under the direction of Oskar Lange and assigned to it the task of formulating a new and dramatically progressive economic plan; however, none of the plan's solutions were fully implemented as the government gradually returned to an emphasis on central planning and forced industrialization. By 1958, comprehensive wage and price reforms were shelved, and the active participation of workers in enterprise management ended as Workers' Councils were supplanted by governmentally-controlled "workers self-government conferences". In general, Gomulka, aided
by conservative Party bureaucrats, succeeded in halting the entire reform movement by 1960.²

Having returned the economy to the old practice of extensive development, Gomulka and associates soon confronted serious economic difficulties. In fact, between 1962 and 1963 signs of stagnation, the outgrowth of previous policies, surfaced. Seeing the critical need for revision, the leadership again became interested in reform; nevertheless, the sluggish mechanisms of Party rule detained final approval of the new economic outline until a Central Committee Plenum in July 1965. Not surprisingly, Party hardliners sought to water-down the plan and bureaucratic incompetents further hampered its implementation. Thus, a plan, which represented a step in the right direction, simply petered out.³

The crippling of economic reforms increased economic pressures and produced greater hardships for the Polish people. Throughout 1967, unrest among the people heightened as lines for such basic goods as clothing, meat, and vegetables lengthened. Ironically, at the same time, government warehouses swelled with overpriced and unsalable goods.⁴ Seeking to ration scarce items, the government raised meat prices by thirty-percent and soon followed with coal, electricity, cigarette, milk, fish, transportation and rent hikes.⁵ As a result of government measures, reported demonstrations erupted in Zielona Gora, Warsaw, Bydgoszcz, Poznan, and Bialystok. The government, in an effort to ease mounting tensions, launched a propaganda campaign aimed at blaming the price jumps on unanticipated employment increases and subsequent shifts in consumer demand. Needless to say, governmental explanations fell on unsympathetic ears.⁶
The unhappiness characterizing urban areas was paralleled by similar feelings in the countryside. During a December 1967 farmers' conference in Poznan delegates deplored various governmental practices, including insufficient deliveries of fertilizer, farm equipment, and construction materials; unreasonable compulsory deliveries; and non-extension of health services to peasants. Nearly four thousands delegates attended the conference and the complaints and questions raised numbered in the hundreds. Gomulka, present at the conference, could not miss the gravity of the message.7

The Polish economy's difficulties continued into 1968 and reached critical proportions. The leadership publicly acknowledged the seriousness of the situation and resorted to the standard practice of calling for tighter labor discipline and an increase in worker productivity. Some minor economic changes were instituted; for instance, the direction and rate of investment were altered. In the final analysis, however, little was done to alleviate the most serious economic problems, particularly over-centralized planning. To be sure, the inefficient but politically loyal party officials remained in the driver's seat.8

The Intellectuals and Students

The mounting popular unrest in the wake of economic difficulties was further exacerbated by rising discontent among the intelligentsia. Gomulka's reversal of the 1956 democratization (known as the "small stabilization") never sat well with the intellectual elite. In 1964, undaunted by the regime's tactics of intimidation—which included harassment, restrictions on printing materials, and censorship—non-Party writers released a letter of protest
known as the "Letter of the 34". Two years later, Leszek Kolakowski (Party member and prominent philosopher) spoke out against the reversal of the 1956 liberalization and subsequently was dismissed from the Party. The regime's heavy-handedness brought on still further protest as twenty-two noted Party writers came out in support of Kolakowski. Not being ones to hold out the olive branch, the leadership added several of the twenty-two writers' names to their list of ex-Party members.

In stifling intellectual expression, the Party fueled already simmering anti-government sentiments. In March of 1968, matters came to a head when government censors forced the closing of Adam Mickiewicz's play Dziady (Forefathers). The callous governmental action incensed Warsaw University students who responded by demonstrating. When two students, Adam Michnik and Henryk Szlajfer, were expelled from the University for taking part in the protest, new demonstrations erupted. The government, maintaining its hardline approach, sent busloads of militiamen to forcibly end the disturbance. Several arrests were made including those of Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski.

The students, angered by the government's actions and emboldened by word of growing reform in Czechoslovakia, returned to the streets the following day (March 9) and called on the people of Poland to join them. Intense clashes with the militia, now using tear gas and nightsticks, ensued. The anti-regime demonstrations peaked on March 11, as crowds unknown since the 1957 closing of the student newspaper Po prostu turned out. Tens of thousands of Poles, including adults and youngsters, battled with the militia. Using whatever means were available, the angry mob eventually overran the Ministry of Culture and the Kultura Theater. After a drawn out fight, the militia finally succeeded
in dispersing the demonstrators, and approximately three hundred arrests were made. In the days that followed, large scale demonstrations in support of the Warsaw students broke out in several major Polish universities. For its part, the Party press viciously attacked the student actions, publicly revealed the names of high-ranking Party officials whose children participated, and employed anti-Semitism as a polemical weapon.  

The Catholic Church

One other distinct antagonist of the Gomulka regime emerged before the 1970 riots, namely the Catholic Church. Following the events of 1956, the Party and Church reached a modus vivendi; however, during the 1960's the Party reneged on pledges concerning religious instruction and the drafting of seminary students, thus bringing the truce to an end. In 1966, signalling both its strength and displeasure with the regime, the Church rallied Poles around its cause. The government countered with its own demonstrations, though far smaller in size than those of the Church.  

The End of Gomulka's Reign and the Rise of Gierek

Thus, by antagonizing various sections of society, Gomulka set the stage for his own removal. In describing post-1957 Poland, Zbigniew Pelczynski stated:

The subsequent consolidation of the Party's rule, the abandoning of many hoped-for reforms, and Poland's return to the fold of the Soviet bloc lost Gomulka much of [his] popularity. It was eroded still further by bitter quarrels with the Catholic Church in the 1960's, by the conflict with students, writers, and intellectuals in 1968, and, as far as the working class was concerned, by the stagnation in their living standards during the 1960's. The price
changes of 13 December were the last straw. 14
Having taken all they could stand, the Polish workers fought back in the
only way they knew how: by holding strikes and rioting. 15

The widespread nature and extreme violence associated with the workers' outburst led Gomulka to send in the armed forces to brutally crush the rebellion. Within the Politbureau, however, several members opposed the harsh measures. The Politbureau soon became embroiled in a heated debate; during which, Gomulka suffered a minor stroke. Gomulka's illness provided the opposition with an opportunity to exploit the situation, which they did by securing the First Secretary's resignation. The lack of strong Soviet support for Gomulka, possibly owing to the old leader's normalization of relations with West Germany and independent moves in the economic arena, cleared the way for Edward Gierek's election to the position of First Secretary and the start of reform. 16

Gierek's rise to power marked the beginning of several changes. During the initial stage, the Party leadership was shaken-up as Gomulka supporters were ousted in favor of Gierek appointments. Moreover, the lower levels of the Party also were to be cleansed as interviews were conducted to determine the relative acceptability of Party members. Likewise, the importance of ideological training gained renewed importance and strenuous efforts were made to invigorate the Party. Apparently, Gierek hoped to fashion a Party apparatus capable and willing to enforce his decisions. 17
On the economic front, Gierek moved quickly to stabilize the situation. To begin with, the First Secretary reduced food prices, increased wages, and promised workers a greater voice in management, a democratization of unions, and better working conditions. Next, he moved to increase agricultural productivity by improving conditions for individual farmers. Gierek's many plaudits to the masses depended on increasing foodstuffs, thereby making the farmer's role extremely important. The leadership approached the problem with a two-pronged attack. The first prong aimed at increasing security for farmers; the second focused on making farming more profitable. To increase security, the regime extended legal ownership of the land to the farmers (a matter left hanging in the air since the end of World War II), reduced obstacles blocking land sale and inheritance, and extended the national health service to the countryside. To enhance farming's profitability, Gierek ended compulsory deliveries, revised taxes, abolished Gomulka's grain policy (aimed at autarky), encouraged animal breeding, and increased the accessibility of credit, fertilizer, fodder and other important supplies.

Although no real political democratization took place, the Gierek regime attempted to establish the appearance of such a development. One method was to increase the Sejm's (Parliament) activities, though this consisted of more speeches not more power. A second method concerned court action against enter-
prise managers. Although few managers were dismissed, the workers initiated several legitimate lawsuits, based on managerial violation of contracts. Surprisingly, the workers often won. 19

Finally, the government sought to reduce tensions with the church. Among the agreements reached, the issuance of building permits for new churches, removal of inventory regulations on Church properties, and the transfer of title to former German places of worship were perhaps the most important. In addition, the government promoted good will among the religious and nationalistic by appointing a Catholic bishop to the committee for the reconstruction of the Warsaw royal castle. Finally, the Gierek leadership also moved to better relations with the Vatican. 20

Conclusions

In summation, the 1970 Polish upheaval was brought on by economic stagnation so repugnant to the people that they ultimately resorted to violent opposition. Although the intelligentsia, namely writers and students, also voiced and mounted opposition to the Gomulka regime, their contribution to solidifying anti-regime sentiments and promoting the events of 1970 were minimal. Evidently, workers were just plain fed up with the leadership, and the price hikes of late December triggered their wrath. Thus, without an intelligentsia actively engaged in raising public awareness and focusing pressure on issues of democratization, the new Gierek regime was able to stabilize the situation by implementing only piecemeal economic solutions (aimed at gratifying the immediate worker demands). Lacking true political and economic reforms capable of addressing the root problems and not the symptoms, Poland remained
ripe for yet another upheaval.

Curiously, 1970 Poland represents a development somewhere between the Pilsen-Berlin examples and the Poland (1956)-Hungary-Czechoslovakia examples. Because of the substantial leadership change and the implementation of some economic reform, 1970 Poland somewhat resembled the examples of the latter three. However, the very limited scope of Polish economic change and the lack of political reform, coupled with the fact that perhaps no change would have occurred had Gomulka not suffered a stroke, create a significant resemblance between 1970 Poland and the Pilsen-Berlin examples. Among other factors, perhaps the limited effectiveness of Poland's intelligentsia produced the limited results.
VI. Poland 1980: Failure of the Gierek Gamble and the Birth of Solidarity*

Developments in the First Half of the 1970's

As previously discussed, Gierek's first economic initiatives focused on stabilizing the situation in Poland and not on providing a framework for later, more substantive, reforms. The nation's chronic economic plight, however, necessitated the development of a new and comprehensive economic program if further unrest was to be avoided. Therefore, the leadership formulated its "New Development Strategy"; a plan designed to achieve an intensive pattern of development while retaining substantial rates of investment. By exploiting the slumping world economic conditions and atmosphere of detente present in the early 1970's, the leadership obtained Western credit with which to modernize industry, expand consumption, and maintain a ballooned investment policy. The visible absence of managerial, decision-making, and investment reforms demonstrated Gierek's willingness to substitute an influx of foreign credit—despite the resulting debt—in the place of fundamental reforms.

Gierek's bold gamble rested on several assumptions. First, it was hoped that the newly obtained foreign technology, supported by heavy investment in construction, would promote substantial leaps in productivity, particularly for high technology items marketable in the West. Secondly, planners expected

*Because of its extraordinary developments and recent occurrence, Poland's 1980 reform movement will be treated in a more detailed manner than previous sections.
the technology to diffuse throughout the economy—thereby quickening the pace at which obsolete equipment and Soviet-style techniques were replaced. In addition, with an expansion of consumer production, labor productivity and quality were expected to increase while popular unrest was to decrease. Finally, and most importantly, the regime anticipated export surpluses sometime soon after modernization and planned to use the resulting hard currency to repay its loans.²

If everything had worked according to plan, Gierek probably would have managed to placate the populace without major political and economic reforms; nevertheless, many factors combined to bring the program into a ruinous state. Among the factors outside the leadership's control were unusually harsh weather conditions (which hampered agricultural production) and world economic fluctuations (which disrupted government planning).³ Unavoidably, therefore, Poland procured Western grain and additional, higher-priced, equipment. More serious, however, Poland failed to maintain planned exports. As Gary R. Teske of the U.S. Department of Commerce pointed out:

...This lagging export performance stemmed from numerous factors: supply constraints, reduced Western demand, Western import barriers, product quality shortfalls, marketing and servicing problems, as well as various systemic problems inherent to centrally-planned economies. The resulting huge trade deficits forced Poland to borrow more heavily than expected and pushed its net hard currency debt up from $2 billion at year end 1973 to almost $20 billion by year end 1979...¹

This growing Polish debt signaled the deterioration of Gierek's plan and the ever-increasing danger of economic ruin.

The gathering storm of economic disaster gained on additional impetus when the government lost control of investment and personal income increases. As one might well imagine, a classic case of too many zloty chasing too few goods
ensued, thereby reducing labor incentives and aggravating worker discontent. To make matters worse, unrealistic construction plans produced numerous instances where purchased equipment sat idle; severe damage and even complete ruin of some equipment followed inadequate storage; and rampant corruption permeated the administrative hierarchy. Such large scale squandering of resources promoted adverse public sentiments—both from visible privations and suspected abuses.

1976 Riots and the Birth of KOR

By June 1976, the steady deterioration of Gierek’s New Development Strategy, with its subsequent economic imbalances, necessitated stern measures. The government, resisting reform, enacted price hikes. As in 1970, the Polish workers took to the streets in protest. Disturbances reportedly broke out in as many as seven areas, with those in Radom and Ursus being the most violent. Concurrent with a quick price reversal, the government mercilessly suppressed the demonstrations and severely punished numerous participants. The harsh government action prompted the formation of the intellectual committee for the Defense of the Workers (KOR). Upon its creation, KOR (later renamed Committee for Social Self-Defense) contained only fourteen members but grew steadily. Among the organizations more prominent members were Professor Edward Lipinski (the 1956 reform economist previously mentioned), writer Jerzy Andrewski, and historians Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik.

KOR basically operated as a pressure group and supported the workers in several ways. The most direct method centered on collecting funds for workers fined or fired in the wake of governmental reprisals. In the hope of eliciting...
external support and increasing pressure on the regime, KOR released communiques
describing the workers' plight to foreign correspondents. The Committee active-
ly and meticulously documented cases of governmental abuse:

We have data concerning 11 deaths [in Radom], probably in
connection with the incidents of June 25. However, only
four cases have thus far been fully confirmed: Rev. Roman
Ketlarz, who was beaten up by unknown assailants and died
in hospital on August 13 in Krychowice near Radom; Jan
Brozyna, who was killed by employees of the Citizens Milite-
tia on Koszarowa Street, Radom, on June 24; and Henryk Zeb-
backi and Jan Labecki, who were killed by the trailer-end
of a tractor as they were putting up a barricade.

... The committee investigated 96 cases of detention on
or after June 25 in Radom and 94 cases at Ursus. Of these,
93 persons in Radom and 45 at Ursus declared that they had
been beaten up and their families had seen the traces of
such maltreatment. Both in Radom and at Ursus, as well as
in several other places of detention, those arrested were
passed through the so-called 'paths of health,' i.e., forced
to run militia gauntlets...

Undaunted by government harassment, KOR stressed that it would only dissolve:

... when those institutions [trade unions, social security, etc.]
take up their responsibilities, when the reprisals stop, when
amnesty goes into effect, when all the victimized people are
rehabilitated, when all workers are reinstated on previous
terms, when the public is fully informed of the scope of the
post-June protests, and when those guilty of abuses and of law-
breaking are brought to justice... Until such time, however--
regardless of slander, forgeries, intimidations, and retaliatory
measures-the committee feels it is its duty to the people, who
by their generosity have proved their solidarity with the Committee
for the Defense of the Workers, to continue its efforts, which
correspond fully with moral and legal standards and the expecta-
tions of society.

During the years following the 1976 riots, KOR reorganized and solidified
its position. The committee, though continuing to champion workers' issues and
even producing the unofficial paper Robotnik (The Worker), increasingly pressed
for a general nationwide liberalization. Experience gained from sustained op-
position to the regime led to a more effective, outspoken, and aggressive cam-
paign for reform. Moreover, the growing links between the intellectuals and workers represented significant political clout with which to pressure the Party leadership. KOR possessed the organization, communications, and planning experience necessary for confronting the regime; however, such political commodities alone could not force the leadership to capitulate to any demands and, therefore, some real political leverage was needed. By supporting the cause of the workers, who maintained the ability to cripple the economy through work stoppages, KOR helped forge a loose and tacit cooperative bond of substantial political potential. As will be shown, the events of August 1980 and subsequent developments in Poland bear witness to the combined strength of the intellectuals and workers.

Strikes of 1980 and the Formation of Solidarity

In mid-1980, economic problems and governmental actions similar to those producing the 1976 riots gave rise to major upheavals within Poland. At the time, the nation was suffering from chronic shortages of all types of goods, and by the beginning of 1981, an estimated debt of $27 billion had been incurred. As was the case in 1970 and 1976, the triggering event was a government increase in meat prices (implemented on July 1, 1980). The new meat pricing policy quickly elicited an angry worker response. Between 1 July and 8 August workers from some 150 enterprises throughout the country struck for higher wages. As the strikes gathered momentum, worker demands became increasingly political in nature; for example, Gdansk workers insisted on a memorial for the victims of the 1970 demonstrations and on the formation of free trade unions.
KOR, moving to support the workers on the first day of the strikes, acted as a strike information agency. Soon after, despite government harassment, the committee offered the strikers financial assistance, help in coordinating communications and organization, and aid in securing the advice of experts. By August 16, the strikers, utilizing KOR's assistance, forged the Inter-factory Strike Committee (MKS). The MKS sought to represent all strikers and quickly formulated a large set of demands concerning freedom of speech and information, free trade unions, and the release of political prisoners. Representing some 400 factories strong as of 22 August, MKS and its emerging leadership figure, Lech Walesa, pushed for the opening of official negotiations.

At the outset of the strikes, the government remained adamant in pursuing its policies and downplayed early unrest; nevertheless, as the tide of work stoppages reached critical proportions, the regime adopted a mixed conciliatory-hardline position. Wage concessions were granted in most instances, sometimes without their being requested, as the government sought to undercut unrest before matters got totally out-of-hand. Ironically, at the same time that wage increases were meted out, the government proclaimed its inability to make such concessions—a factor further deteriorating the regime's credibility. Perhaps most indicative of the government's slipping control was the fact that many settlements occurred directly between the workers and management.

Notwithstanding governmental wage increases, several MKS branch leaderships pressed for additional and more political concessions. The first breakthrough appeared on 22 August when Mieczyslaw Jagielski, politbureau member and chief troubleshooter of the government's special strike commission, agreed to open talks with the Gdansk MKS. Negotiations stretched through numerous sessions
and broke off several times. In the early stages the government continuously delayed, appeared unyielding, and even resorted to disseminating false information; however, as the strikes continued to spread, a genuine dialogue developed. The mounting national crisis did much to shake-up the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) as evidenced by the many personnel changes of 24 August, and therein may lie the reason for the regime's new position.15

During the negotiations, KOR suffered from stepped up government harassment, including several arrests, but was firmly supported by intellectuals within and without the country. The Catholic Church, hoping to avert bloodshed, acted as a moderating influence. Within this context, worker resolution finally paid off with the signing of an agreement on 31 August. The agreement included:

. . . [the] right to establish self-governing trade unions independent of the government; submission of a new bill concerning censorship to Sejm by end of this year; radio broadcasts of Sunday Mass; release from jail of political prisoners pending review of their cases; settlement of details of economic matters in further negotiations. Agreement requires publication of minutes of negotiations and full text of accord. Gdansk strike is declared over.16

Despite the conclusion of the Gdansk strike, numerous work stoppages persisted throughout the country; therefore, the regime adopted the Gdansk agreement as a general outline with which to end the nationwide upheaval—much to Moscow's displeasure.17

Though sporadic strikes continued, the nation's labor upheaval gradually subsided as the workers began the process of running their newly-created unions. Needless to say, tensions persisted, and the struggle was no where near complete. Perhaps the most ironic and tragic development of the two months following the initial unrest occurred on 5 September with Edward Gierek's fall from power.
The enthusiastic and sincere popular support once enjoyed by the First Secretary no longer remained in 1980. The fallen ex-crusader, following the pattern of his predecessor Gomulka, was removed from power by the Central Committee during a hospital stay. Stanislaw Kania, head of the internal security aparat, succeeded Gierek as First Secretary and, thus, a new element in Poland's struggle for economic renewal was added. 18

During the closing months of 1980, Poland witnessed a continuation of the labor-government struggle. Despite some positive governmental actions, including the broadcasting of Catholic Mass, stepping up of efforts at rooting-out corrupt Party officials, permitting the formation of the Independent Student Association, and registering of LOT (Polish national airline) workers as the first independent union, labor leaders perceived that, on the whole, the government was seeking to forestall or undermine implementation of the labor accords. In response, Solidarnosc (Solidarity, the central organ of the independent trade unions) carried out a one hour warning strike on 3 October in which hundreds of thousands of workers participated. Undoubtedly, some party officials remained adamant in resisting labor's demands despite the workers' show of force; however, if the removal of several Gierek supporters during a Central Committee plenum three days after the strike is any indicator, the leadership's sensitivity to labor's actions was substantial. 19

In late October, Solidarity's distrust of the government reached new heights following arbitrary changes of the union's statutes by a Warsaw court. Although labor leaders had applied for legal registration of the union in accordance with the Gdansk agreements (on 24 September), the court manipulated the document so as to recognize the existing political system. Union leaders re-
garded such amendments as unacceptable, especially since Solidarity expoused apolitical intentions. Several government leaders, including First Secretary Kania, sought to allay Solidarity's apprehensions by acknowledging the unions' contributions and importance; nevertheless, the olive branch was always accompanied by stern reminders of the Party's leading role. For the most part, the burgeoning crisis was defused on 10 November when Poland's Supreme Court reversed a lower court's ruling and extended legal registration to Solidarity according to its original statutes. Thus, Solidarity became a legal, official, self-governing, and independent trade union.

Unlike their urban counterparts, peasants met stiff governmental resistance to their efforts to establish independent agricultural unions. On October 29, a Warsaw court, arguing that farmers were self-employed and, therefore, didn't need unions, rejected the farmers' petition for legal registration. In the face of popular support for the farmers, however, the court attempted to reduce the conflict to semantics by instructing the farmers to reapply as an "association". Curiously, the growing sympathy for the peasants even spread to government officials as the agricultural unions, pending final decision by the Supreme Court, were permitted to function locally.

The precarious situation in Poland, already exacerbated by the government's conflict with the workers and farmers, was upset further by intra-party factionalism. At the Seventh Plenum of the Party's Central Committee (held during the first days of December), First Secretary Kania sought to stem the Party's deteriorating position by delivering a rallying address in support of Polish socialism. In essence, the First Secretary argued that:

... 1. the current party leadership had obtained the international
conditions necessary for Poland to solve its internal problems, and is grateful to the CPSU for the confidence it had shown in the Polish party; 2. the policy of socialist renewal, the rebuilding of workers' confidence in the party, and the compact with the people are all 'unshakable'; 3. the party's attitude to Solidarity is a positive one; 4. all forces contributing to the threat of anarchy must be resisted; 5. the party allows freedom of expression and criticism, but its program, policy, and resolutions must be observed by all members; 6. the independence, security, and peace of Poland are based on the principle of the party's leading role; 7. it is necessary to distinguish between personal accountability for political errors, which only requires paying the political consequences, and responsibility for actions, which necessitates legal proceedings; 8. the party, as the guarantor of socialist renewal, must also be its prime mover; 9. the party had learned from the experience of December 1970, and its decision in August to solve the crisis through political means was proof of this; 10. the party should strive to build a 'broad alliance of wise and responsible forces' at every level throughout the country; 11. the party is in favor of reconstructing 'branch' (professional) labor unions, of honest and multilateral cooperation with Solidarity. In conclusion, Kania called for an extraordinary Ninth PUWP Congress to be held in the spring of next year. 22

Thus, although somewhat conciliatory toward Solidarity, Secretary Kania asserted Party supremacy in no uncertain terms.

Several developments at the plenum and subsequent to it were of great importance. First, Gierek and his last contingent of supporters within the Party were stripped of their remaining power, and the controversial Mieczyslaw Moczar was elected to the politburo. Second, Jozef Pinkowski delivered a report on the country's economic status depicting a near across-the-board decline. With the coming of Christmas, severe food shortages, especially of sugar, lard, meat, potatoes, and butter, necessitated drastic governmental actions; therefore, food rationing and large-scale importation of foodstuffs (mostly from CMEA countries) ensued. Third, despite increased liberalization of society, vicious attacks against KOR (including such wild allegations as the maintaining
of links with left-wing terrorist groups) persisted. Apparently, by branding KOR as a subversive and antiusocialist element, the government sought to divide the workers and their intellectual supporters. Fourth, in the face of vituperative Soviet accusations and a growing perception of a potential military intervention, Solidarity leaders and Party officials vehemently denied allegations of a counterrevolutionary threat. Fifth, at a Warsaw episcopal conference (held on 10 and 11 December), the Polish Catholic Church expressed its support of the country's social renewal and apprehension over a potential reversal if public calm was not achieved. Finally, private farmers held a national meeting in Warsaw (December 14) and proclaimed the formation of the independent agricultural union "Rural Solidarity". While awaiting legal recognition, the farmers' union drew up demands for better pensions, removal of press censorship, and a reintroduction of religious courses in state schools.23

1981: The Struggle Continues and Peaks

Although 1980 ended without major incident, the early months of 1981 witnessed greater conflict between Solidarity and the government. In fact, while the government experienced intensified pressure from its socialist allies to halt and even reverse reforms, Solidarity pressed for additional concessions, including work-free weekends and access to the media. Unwilling to wait for the government to share available media, Solidarity even began publishing its own weekly Jednosc (Unity). Solidarity's boldness in publishing Jednosc and a decision by the Polish Supreme Court upholding a lower court's refusal to register Rural Solidarity combined to intensify mutual distrust. The already
delicate situation was aggravated further by numerous local disputes and worker willingness to resort to threatened strikes, strike alerts, sit-ins, warning strikes, and general strikes. Seemingly, as soon as the government averted one crisis, a new one appeared. Even the students began agitating—using tactics adopted from the workers. In the wake of the unrest, many local party officials were forced to resign, and at the Central Committee's Eighth Plenum Prime Minister Josef Pinkowski was replaced by General Wojciech Jaruzelski.24

Although the government agreed to a 42-hour work-week, attempted to resolve local disputes peacefully, and began legislation on certain reform measures (i.e. the workers' self-government law), it nearly lost control of the situation when security policemen seriously injured several Solidarity members while physically removing them from government offices in Bydgoszcz (March 19). When Party officials came out in support of the police, Solidarity mobilized for a prolonged general strike—even as Warsaw Pact maneuvers took place in and around Poland. The strike was averted, however, when the government agreed that the police actions ran contrary to the spirit of solving disputes through negotiations and provided Solidarity with televised coverage of its version of the incident. Apparently, many Party members at the Central Committee's Ninth Plenum were less than enthused by the settlement and called for a shoring up of the Communist Party.25

To be sure, a hardline faction existed within the PUWP; however, the numerous Party shake ups and the increased atmosphere of democratization following the August strikes produced significant changes within the Party. Indeed, by the early months of 1981, over a third of the PUWP's members held dual membership in Solidarity. As the Party's membership transformed, calls for reform of the internal decision-making process arose. Of marked importance,
Secretary Kania publicly endorsed the use of secret ballots and genuine competition in electing delegates to the PUWP's Extraordinary July Congress. Efforts were even made to oust Stefan Olszowski and Tadeusz Grabski, two Party hardliners; however, a supportive letter sent by the Soviet Central Committee and Brezhnev's reported phoning of Kania barred acceptance of the resignations.26

The month of May (1981) saw the emergence of four additional developments influencing Poland's reform process. To begin with, Rural Solidarity received its long sought after legal recognition, an act significantly reducing a major source of tension. Second, the government forwarded its long-awaited economic report and stabilization program to the Polish Sejm. Apparently, the Sejm, viewing the document as a mere enumeration of past failures and void of substantive corrective measures, rejected the government's proposal after intense debate (a testament to the Sejm's growing independence from Party control). On the university scene, Polish students held demonstrations calling for a release of political prisoners, and although announcement of the protests was received with considerable apprehension, they passed without major incident. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Stefan Cardinal Wyszniski, Primate of Poland, died on 28 May. Under the Cardinal's skillful leadership, the Polish Catholic Church rose to a prominence unmatched by other Eastern European religious institutions. Loss of the Cardinal's far-sightedness and moderating influence undoubtedly complicated the country's process of social renewal.27

As the Polish Nation approached the one year anniversary of the strikes giving rise to Solidarity, attention focused on the PUWP's Extraordinary Ninth
Party Congress. As previously mentioned, the election process for the Congress included such democratic reforms as secret ballots and multiple candidates. In addition, the Congress, representing a chance for the Polish Communist Party to renew itself and regain some credibility, came at a time when worker-government tensions were once again on the rise. The point of conflict centered on the degree of worker participation in enterprise decision-making. Illustrative of the sharp division between the two sides was the fact that government and union leaders drew up separate draft laws governing the role of workers in decision-making. Although differences existed over a variety of policy and management issues (including the degree to which market factors should come into play), none was more heated than the disagreement over who should appoint enterprise directors, and the disagreement nearly boiled over in early July when Polish Airline (LOT) employees held a warning strike to underscore their position. A prolonged strike was averted only after both sides agreed to further negotiations.28

It is against this background that the Ninth Congress opened on 14 July. The Congress’ most salient feature clearly centered on the multitude of personnel changes within the Party hierarchy.29 The Party rank and file, exhibiting their dissatisfaction with established Party and government bureaucrats, turned them out practically en masse and elected large numbers of workers and technicians in their place. Of the few survivors:

... only three former CC secretaries (Kazimierz Barcikowski, Stanislaw Kania, and Stefan Olszowski); five cabinet members (Wojciech Jaruzelski, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, Jozef Czyrek, Miroslaw Miloswiski, and Jerzy Wojtecki); two deputy defense-ministers; and eight voivodship first secretaries (out of forty-nine) are on the new committee, while none of the seventeen CC
department heads were included in it. In other words, the group that formerly accounted for well over half of the CC membership is now reduced to a mere 3.5.

In a similar vein, the delegates moved against former First Secretary Gierek by removing him from Party membership—an act unparalleled by developments within any other East bloc Communist Party since the burner of the late 1940's.

In addition to selecting a new leadership, the delegates formed sixteen working groups to examine the country's most pressing problems. Reportedly, some of the more important proposals forwarded by the working committees included: reducing harassment of religious Party members, curbing the powers of top Party bodies, strengthening the Sejm and the Supreme Court, relaxing censorship, democratizing the educational system, buttressing the market system, increasing market production, stabilizing prices, reaffirming the importance of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, expanding energy production and conservation, guaranteeing greater recognition and influence to private agriculture, improving intellectual representation in various Party bodies, reorganizing national policy on scientific research and technology, increasing emphasis on national health and environmental issues, treating trade unions on an equal footing (provided they adhered to trade union legislation), fixing a new minimum wage, guaranteeing minimal living standards for the populace, limiting housing to one abode per family, and expanding opportunities for non-Party experts (provided they recognized the principles of Socialism).

All of the above proposals were agreed to after what appeared to be heated, closed-door, debates and under the shadow of repeated exhortations of the Party's leading role.
Following the end of the Ninth Congress, Poland suffered a turbulent one-month period during which preparations were made for Solidarity's First National Congress. At the time, two pervasive problems plagued the nation: 1) continuing food shortages and 2) escalating government-union antagonism, particularly over access to and censorship of the media. As regards the former, the situation became so critical as to prompt Solidarity's National Co-ordinating Commission (KKP) to demand Solidarity-sponsored Social Commission oversight of food production and distribution. For its part, the government created an anti-speculation commission and requested Solidarity to abandon political activities and strikes. Although rejecting the government's request, the KKP urged Solidarity members to halt strikes pending the union's National Congress and to work eight additional free Saturdays during 1981. In a more direct move, Solidarity's Gdansk leadership ordered a loading ban on food exports and in so doing prompted an investigation by the provincial Prosecutor.33

With the approach of Solidarity's National Congress, government-union antagonism over the media became extremely acute, especially after anti-Soviet cartoons and articles surfaced in union journals. The Soviet Union, already outraged by vandalism directed at Soviet war memorials in Poland, underscored its concern with Polish events by orchestrating East block press tirades against Poland and substantially augmenting its Baltic naval forces. Under mounting Soviet pressure, the government halted printing of the Katowice steel works paper Wolny Związkowiec (Free Trade Unionist), a journal notorious for anti-Soviet sentiments and initiated several investigations of papers suspected of similar transgressions. The government's actions set off a
series of printers' strikes, and tensions mounted when the government confiscated a Solidarity publication at Ustrzyki Dolne. Two days before the opening of Solidarity's National Congress, the KKP responded by demanding access to radio and television not only for Solidarity, but for all prominent public organizations. The next day the Soviets followed by beginning land and naval exercise around Poland. Against this background, one of Solidarity's First National Congress opened on 5 September 1981.34

At the onset of the Congress, Solidarity declined to admit the State's broadcasting systems—owing to disagreement over editorial control; nevertheless, the Congress was widely reported by the Polish media. Lech Walesa opened the session with a speech stressing unity as the key to success. The following day, Andrzej Celinski, Solidarity Secretary, was reported by the Polish news agency (PAP) as having claimed: "A revolution, whose main force is Solidarity, is taking place in Poland."35 Apparently, this remark coincided with some debate over recognition of the Party's leading role and the ultimate organization of Solidarity. The real fireworks, however, began on 8 September. The delegates, calling on the Sejm to hold a referendum with regard to workers' self-management, threatened to have Solidarity initiate the proposal itself if the Sejm declined. Next, the Congress drafted a supportive message to East European workers seeking independent unions. Finally, at the close of the Congress, the delegates reiterated Solidarity's goal of a better life for all, called for free elections to government bodies, and stressed the importance of a sovereign Poland (a thinly veiled reference to Soviet domination).36

Surprisingly, Warsaw television and radio carried Solidarity's message
to East European workers; nevertheless, Trybuna Ludy (the Party paper) denounced it, and Zolnier Wolnosci (the Army paper) warned of the consequences Solidarity faced if it continued on its present path. The scolding from the Polish leadership, however, amounted to a slap on the wrists, when compared to the scathing denunciations released from other East bloc countries. Indeed, Solidarity's ambitions were variously portrayed as political, counter-revolutionary, and self-serving, *true sins by Communist standards*. Taking up where the bloc press left off, the Polish leadership strengthened its hard-line stance toward Solidarity. For instance, Party organs and officials released declarations and gave speeches accusing Solidarity of violating its agreements with the government and seeking political power. As the two most vocal critics of Solidarity—Deputy Prime Minister Tchakowski and Party Secretary Olszowski—increased pressure on Solidarity, the union's KKP Presidium sought a compromise. By conceding the State's right to appoint and dismiss directors for nationally sensitive enterprises, Solidarity's leadership hoped to reduce tensions, deter government interference with work-free Saturdays, and remove official restrictions on the weekly *Solidarity*. Despite Solidarity's overtures, tension remained high prior to the second round of Solidarity's National Congress.37

The second part of the Congress opened on 26 September, and activities generally focused on electing a new union leadership; nevertheless, several notable developments transpired. Perhaps most shocking was Professor Edward Lipinski's announcement of KOR's dissolution. In his address, Lipinski explained that since KOR's activities were being assumed by other organizations such as Solidarity, KOR need no longer exist. In light of government attacks
on Solidarity's ties to KOR, the latter's dissolution might best be interpreted as the removal of a liability on the former. 38

Other notable outcomes of the Congress included a rejection of the KKP's worker self-government compromise, adoption of a resolution favoring a Solidarity-sponsored referendum on the worker's-management issue, re-election of Lech Walesa as Solidarity Chairman, election of a new KKP (now called National Commission, KK), and formulation of an organizational programme. The programme, Solidarity's rationalization for its place in society, claimed that:

... Solidarity, having arisen as a 'protest against the existing system of exercising power', desired 'genuinely to socialize the system of management'; the economy should be rebuilt 'on the basis of democracy and all-round social initiative'. The Resolution demanded 'philosophical, social, political and cultural pluralism' and, in particular, legislation to guarantee basic civil liberties and social control of the mass media. Finally it called for an 'anti-crisis agreement'; Solidarity was willing 'to hold an honest and loyal dialogue' with the authorities. 39

Although calling for an "anti-crisis agreement," Solidarity members must have realized that political pluralism and Party supremacy could never mesh.

Whether or not the Congress delegates fully grasped the contradiction between their stated aims and Communist dictates, PUWP members certainly did. Under pressure from within the Party, First Secretary Kania resigned on 18 October and was succeeded by Prime Minister Jaruzelski, who quickly took the offensive against Solidarity. Jaruzelski publicly favored changes of earlier government-Solidarity agreements, and Secretary Olszowski quickly followed by announcing Solidarity's demise if rightest tendencies weren't eliminated. Both sides engaged in threats and polemics, and Solidarity carried out several strikes. As the situation threatened to explode, Walesa, Jaruzelski, and Archbishop Glemp met for discussions (on 4 December). Following the meeting,
tensions somewhat abated, and joint government-Solidarity working groups were formed. By the end of the month, however, tensions flared again. The renewal of mutual antagonism resulted largely from Solidarity’s demand for union oversight of government economic reforms before they went to the Sejm. When the government sent draft laws on various economic measures (including enterprise management and the 1982 provisional budget) to the Sejm without consulting Solidarity, intense opposition immediately surfaced. Moreover, by forcibly ending a strike of Fire Brigade College cadets shortly thereafter, the regime added to the air of an impending clash. 41

During a meeting in Radom on 3 December, Solidarity responded to the government’s actions. First, the KK charged the regime with having “chosen the way of force and [with having] rejected a dialogue.” 42 The union leadership also decried the government’s refusal to consult Solidarity (the oversight issue) and its insistence on obtaining emergency powers to ban strikes. In the event the emergency powers were granted, Solidarity threatened to invoke a general strike.

The eye-to-eye standoff continued up until the Solidarity KK meeting in Gdansk on 11 and 12 December. At the meeting, the radicals in the union’s leadership, angered by government resistance to reform, proposed a national referendum on the existing political system and the leadership of First Secretary Jaruzelski. 43 At midnight of 12 December, General Jaruzelski instituted martial law (official announcement at 0500 GMT), thereby initiating the arrests of opposition figures (some 5,000 in all), suspending civil liberties, and halting the reform process. 44 Nearly five months later, martial law continues in Poland with little sign of letting up. The ultimate fate of Solidarity re-
mains unclear; however, one can be certain that if the leadership provides Solidarity a place in Polish society, it will be a transformed and largely emasculated Solidarity, one presenting no significant challenge to the regime.

Conclusions

As seems to have been the case in our other examples of reform movements, Poland (1980-81) presents both common and unique elements. For example, Poland's recent struggle for reform shared the element of economic stagnation with all the aforementioned upheavals. In addition, similar to developments in Pilsen and Berlin (1953), Hungary (1956), and Poland (1956 and 1970), a triggering incident touched off the uprisings of the Solidarity era. Likewise, in having experienced only a relatively mild political relaxation prior to the onset of the reform process proper, recent Polish events parallel elements of the Czechoslovak (1968) and Polish (1970) movements. For the most part, however, the similarities end here, and Poland of the early 1980's becomes unique.

First, unlike the absence of substantial intellectual guidance in the Pilsen, Berlin, and Polish (1970) examples and the leadership of Party intellectuals in the Polish (1956), Hungarian, and Czechoslovak cases, Poland (1980) witnessed the importance of a non-Party intellectual organization (KOR) in helping unite and organize opposition to the regime. Moreover, the reform process in Poland (1980-81) was carried out by the workers and didn't follow nor wholly depend on the rise of a progressive Party faction but, rather, initiated it. In this respect, by representing a true reform process
initiated from the "bottom", Solidarity's Poland is unique. Finally, though a dubious recognition, the halting of reforms through the imposition of martial law also signifies an event unparalleled in bloc history.

Although keeping in mind the novelty of recent Polish events, one can see, nevertheless, that two basic elements conducive to reform movements, economic stagnation and intellectual leadership, were present. Also, an atmosphere of liberalization, though not initially prevalent, was quickly spurred once the reform movement crystalized—-as was the case in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Therefore, our model of factors conducive to reform and revolution apparently is flexible enough to encompass such extraordinary developments as were exhibited in Poland between August 1980 and December 1981.
VII. The Soviet Factor

Considerations Influencing Use of Military Force

Until now, Soviet military intervention against East bloc reform movements, especially factors influencing such action, was merely touched upon; nevertheless, because the fate of significant bloc changes ultimately rests with Moscow, a more detailed examination is necessary. Specifically, in light of the considerable time and research devoted to this topic by the Western scholar Christopher D. Jones, a review of his findings seems in order.¹

A fundamental argument forwarded by Jones, one truly focusing on the crux of Soviet East European policy, claims that whatever Soviet military or ideological objectives may be, their successful implementation depends on Soviet control over the various East European Party leaderships and their (the Parties') continued maintenance of power.² As a result, the rise of a Party faction favoring autonomy or the collapse of Party power would invite a Soviet intervention. Jones also argues that although the collapse of Communist power almost assuredly would necessitate a Soviet invasion, the rise of an autonomous Party faction might be successful if four conditions were met:

. . . (1) that of mobilizing regular and paramilitary forces for prolonged resistance to a Soviet military occupation; (2) that of maintaining the continuity of political leadership underground or in exile; (3) that of branding any prospective collaborators as traitors to the cause of national sovereignty; and (4) that of mobilizing international support for a war of national liberation against the Soviet army.³
The groundwork for Jones's arguments rests in Soviet military theory, particularly those aspects dealing with troop cohesion and morale. According to Jones, Soviet doctrine stresses that troop perception of whether a war is "just" (in defense of the nation) or "unjust" (aimed at expansion) will significantly influence battlefield performance, especially for multinational armies such as the Red Army. More importantly, however, battlefield failures suffered during an unjust war are said to have a "reverse effect" whereby domestic strains are intensified:

As a result of the 'reverse effect', a government may face threats to the morale of its troops, the stability of its homefront, and possibly even to the legitimacy of the regime itself.

Armed with a basic outline of factors believed to influence Soviet use of military force, we may now examine how our various East bloc crises escaped or invited Soviet intervention.

Application of Criteria
(Berlin and Pilsen, 1953)

In Berlin, Soviet occupation forces formed the power base of the ruling regime. The East German Communist Party was not seeking to break away from the Soviets but, rather, needed Soviet troops in order to quell the worker riots and prevent a possible collapse of Party rule. With World War II relatively fresh in the minds of Soviet troops, application of military force was easily portrayed as "just". Moreover, since the East Germans posed no real threat of resistance, military suppression involved minimal risks. In Pilsen on the other hand, the Czechoslovak Communist Party's loyalty to Moscow and independent ability to smash worker resistance precluded the need for Soviet action.
Unlike our 1953 examples, Poland 1956 represented an actual reform movement, one in which domestic autonomy from the Soviets was sought. By undermining Soviet control of the Polish Communist Party, Gomulka and the progressives flirted with Soviet intervention; however, Gomulka's ability to mobilize national support for his leadership (including large-scale armed resistance if necessary), the unity of purpose characterizing the progressive leadership, and the discrediting of the Natolin faction acted to deter a Soviet intervention. Furthermore, although the Soviets maintained the ability to crush the Polish movement, Moscow undoubtedly recognized the susceptibility of such a war to being perceived as "unjust" once bitter and united Polish resistance was encountered.  

(Hungary and Czechoslovakia)  

The restraint demonstrated by the Soviets in Poland did not occur in Hungary nor in Czechoslovakia. Because Hungary witnessed an end to one-party rule, a collapse of the Communist Party's apparatus, and a failure of the resistance forces to consolidate and, thereby, coordinate opposition to Soviet use of military force, a Soviet invasion involved relatively low risks, particularly after most Hungarian military units were kept out of the fighting, while the payoff in terms of maintaining Soviet control was large.  

Likewise, in pursuing autonomy from the Soviets, neglecting military preparations, and failing to make issue of national sovereignty, the Dubcek leadership in Czechoslovakia also invited a Soviet invasion. According to Jones, if the sustained and widespread occurrence of post-invasion passive
resistance and outbreak of large-scale demonstrations following Jan Palach's protest by self-immolation were any indicator of national sentiments. Dubcek missed a key pre-invasion opportunity to mobilize popular defense of the nation and simultaneously to discredit Soviet sympathizers within the Party. Moreover, had the progressive leadership followed-up on calls for an independent Czechoslovak military doctrine, made preparations for armed defense of the nation, and rallied the populace around the sovereignty issue, Jones concludes a Soviet invasion may have been deterred.7

(Poland, 1970 and 1980-81)

The two major Polish upheavals of the last decade failed to provoke a Soviet invasion but for different reasons. In 1970, Gierek's ability to placate the populace with promises of a better future--while simultaneously convincing Moscow of Poland's continued loyalty--prevented the need for a Soviet invasion. In 1981, on the other hand, General Jaruzelski's successful suppression of Solidarity by using Polish troops ended threats to Party rule (at least for the time being) and, therefore, saved the Soviets the trouble of doing it themselves.
Having examined various elements believed to be conducive to reform and revolution and drawn our conclusions during the course of the examination, we may now summarize the findings. First, economic stagnation, an increased atmosphere of liberalization, and the leadership of intellectual organizations—the three chief factors comprising our model—were found to promote reform movements. In fact, economic stagnation alone could incite an insurrection; however, an increased atmosphere of liberalization (either before or soon after mass turmoil) and the leadership of an intellectual organization were generally needed for mass opposition to solidify into a reform movement. Furthermore, the severity of economic difficulties, the degree of political relaxation, and the assertiveness of intellectual organizations affected the scope of changes.

As regards other factors explored, we found that a triggering incident—one sparking the onset of mass opposition—was present in all our examples with the exception of 1968 Czechoslovakia. In addition, reform Party factions and their heads were found to play a crucial role in expanding or limiting the scope of changes. For example, Dubček and his liberal followers did much to expand the scope of Czechoslovak reforms (1968); while Gomulka and associates, banking on popular support and skillful political maneuverings, succeeded in gradually reversing the Polish reforms of 1956 once consolidating power.

Finally, it also was argued, based on the findings of Christopher D. Jones, that Moscow’s interests in Eastern Europe were best served by continued Soviet control over the Communist Parties of the bloc; therefore, when a Party’s
power collapsed or a Party faction sought autonomy, the danger of a Soviet military intervention became very real. Indeed, it was demonstrated that although a Soviet intervention almost certainly would follow the collapse of a Party's power, such aggression might be deterred by a Party faction bent on autonomy if the following four conditions were met:

\[\ldots\ (1)\ \text{that of mobilizing regular and paramilitary forces for prolonged resistance to a Soviet military occupation;}\ (2)\ \text{that of maintaining the continuity of political leadership underground or in exile;}\ (3)\ \text{that of branding any prospective collaborators as traitors to the cause of national sovereignty;}\ \text{and (4) that of mobilizing international support for a war of national liberation against the Soviet army.} 1\]

For a schematic summation of the author's findings, the reader should see Tables 1 and 2.
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<th>Country/Year</th>
<th>Economic Stagnation</th>
<th>Atmosphere of Liberalization</th>
<th>Leadership of Intellectual Organization</th>
<th>Triggering Incident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilsen (1953)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>New Currency Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin (1953)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Higher Production Norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (1956)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Substantial &quot;Thaw&quot;</td>
<td>Krzywe Kolo Writer's Union</td>
<td>Wage Dispute -- Poznan Rising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary (1956)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Substantial &quot;Thaw&quot;</td>
<td>Petofi Circle Writers' Union</td>
<td>AVH (Security Police) Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia (1968)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>After Rise of Progressive Leadership</td>
<td>Student Associations Writers' Union</td>
<td>&quot;No&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (1970)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Price Hikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (1980-81)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Limited until August 1980 Strikes</td>
<td>KOR</td>
<td>Price Hikes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Factors Deterring Soviet Intervention*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military Preparedness</th>
<th>Continuity of Political Leadership</th>
<th>Discrediting of Soviet Sympathizers</th>
<th>International Support for War of National Liberation</th>
<th>Intervention?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland (1956)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes—Natalin Faction</td>
<td>Not Needed</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary (1956)</td>
<td>Uncoordinated</td>
<td>Collapse of Leadership</td>
<td>Communists in General, Discredited</td>
<td>No Foreign Military Aid</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia (1963)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Not until after Invasion</td>
<td>Unexplored Option</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Our other examples of upheavals are not included because either the Party was capable of handling any threat independent of Moscow or autonomy from Moscow was not sought.
Notes

Section II


2. Ibid., p. 156.

3. Ibid., p. 157.


5. Ibid., pp. 157, 158, 161, 163.


8. Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revolution, p. 120.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., pp. 123, 125.

12. Ibid., p. 126.
13 Ibid., pp. 126-127.


15 Der Volsaufstand vom 17. Juni 1953, pp. 35f, as discussed in Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revolution, p. 129.

16 Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revolution, pp. 129-129.

17 Ibid., p. 134.

18 Brzezinski, Soviet Bloc, p. 176.

19 Ibid., p. 171.

20 Ibid., pp. 182-183.

21 Ibid., p. 184.

22 Ibid., p. 168.
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Section III


2Ibid., p. 6.

3Ibid., pp. 7-8, also see Adam Bromke, "Background of the Polish October Revolution," Canadian Slavonic Papers, no. III (1958) p. 49.

4"Ferment and the Polish Economy," p. 8

5Ibid., p. 9.

6Ibid.

7Ibid.


13 Ibid., p. 47.


16 "Polish Intelligentsia Clubs," East Europe, vol. 6, no. 9 (September 1957), p. 16.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., pp. 16-18.

20 Ibid., p. 19.

21 Ibid.


23 Ibid., p. 52.

24 Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revolution, pp. 137-139.


27 Ibid.
“Poland’s October Revolution—Part II”, *East Europe*, vol. 6, no. 2 (February 1957), p. 8.

Stefan Kurowski, "Industrialization Without Acceleration", *Zycie Gospodarcze*, (Warsaw: November 26, 1956), as discussed in “Poland’s October Revolution—Part II”, *East Europe*, p. 4. Also, for Edward Lipinski’s criticisms see “Revisions”, *Nowa Kultura*, (Warsaw) which ran as a series in late 1956.

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Ibid., p. 13, also see Kecskemeti, *Unexpected Revolution*, pp. 45-46.


Ibid., pp. 46-48.

Ibid., pp. 50-51.

Ibid., pp. 51-53.

Ibid., pp. 59-60.

42 Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revolution, pp. 61-63.

43 As reproduced in the Hungarian Social Science Reader, William Juhasz, ed., p. 170.

44 Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revolution, pp. 64-65.


46 Ibid., p. 67.

47 Ibid., no. 68-69.

48 Ibid., pp. 69-70, 75.


50 Ibid., p. 20.

51 Ibid., p. 22.

52 Ibid., p. 23.


56 Ibid., p. 23.


61 Kecskemeti, Unexpected Revolution, pp. 75-78.


64 Ibid., p. 6.

65 Ibid., pp. 6-7.

66 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

67 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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Section IV


14 Ibid., p. 65.

15 Kulturny zivot, April 22, 1966; Literarni noviny, April 23, 1966, as quoted in Skilling, Interrupted Revolution, p. 66.

16 Skilling, Interrupted Revolution, p. 67.

17 Ibid., pp. 68-69.


19 Ibid., pp. 76-77.

20 Ibid., p. 78.

21 Ibid., p. 78.

22 Ibid., pp. 78-82.


24 For a detailed analysis of the events surrounding Novotny's fall see Skilling, Interrupted Revolution, pp. 163-179.

25 Ibid., pp. 221-224.


27 "Standpoint of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to the Letters of Five Communist Workers' Parties", Czechoslovak Digest, no. 30 (1968), p. 8a. Also see "A Message from the
Citizens of Czechoslovakia to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia", Literarni Listy, as translated in Czechoslovak Digest, no. 31 (1968), p. 7.

"Oldrich Cernick, "Revolutionary and Democratic Tradition", Rude Pravo, as translated in Czechoslovak Digest, no. 11 (1968), pp. 4-5.


Ibid., pp. 66-69; also see "Union of Farmers", Czechoslovak Digest, no. 29 (1968), p. 8.

"Communique of the Presidium", pp. 6-7.

Golan, Reform Rule, pp. 39-90.

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"Law on Rehabilitation", Czechoslovak Digest, no. 26 (1968), pp. 5-6, and "Rehabilitation", Czechoslovak Digest, no. 26 (1968), pp. 11-13.

39 Ibid., p. 149.

40 Ibid., p. 151.

41 Ibid., pp. 151-153.


43 Gustav Husak, speech before the "Bratislava City Conference", in Czechoslovak Digest, no. 28 (1968), p. 9.

44 Dr. Cestimar Cisars, speech before the "Conference of the Six Communist and Workers' Parties in Bratislava", in Czechoslovak Digest, no. 32 (1968), p. 21.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 "Relations with the Soviet Union", Rolnicke Noviny, (April 6, 1968) as translated in Czechoslovak Digest, no. 15 (1968), p. 27.


50 Frantisek Hamouz, "CMEA", Prace, as translated in Czechoslovak Digest, no. 26 (1968), pp. 21-22.

52 Ibid., p. 13.

53 Golan, Reform Rule, p. 185.

54 "Standpoint of the Presidium to Letters of Five Communist and Workers' Parties", p. 11a.

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56 Ota Sik, Czechoslovak Television, as translated in "Ota Sik on TV", Czechoslovak Digest, no. 26 (1968), pp. 20-21; also see Sik's television address one week later as translated in Czechoslovak Digest, no. 27 (1968), pp. 23-24.

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58 "Problems and Difficulties in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance", Czechoslovak Digest, no. 11 (1968), pp. 5-7.

59 Hamouz, "CMEA", p. 22.


61 Golan, Reform Rule, p. 40.

62 "Workers' Councils", Czechoslovak Digest, no. 27 (1968), pp. 14-16.

63 Otak Jilek, "Long Term Perspectives of the Czechoslovak Economy", Hospodarske noviny, 8/68, as translated in New Trends in Czechoslovak Economics,
no. 3 (1968), pp. 57-75. (Gives a detailed description of some of the major changes in the economy).

Section V


3 Gamarnikow, "Polish Economy in Transition", pp. 41-42.


5 Trybuna Ludu, (Warsaw), November 25, 1967, as discussed by Jerzy Ptakowski, in "Behind the Unrest in Poland", pp. 5-6.

6 Jerzy Ptakowski, "Behind the Unrest in Poland", p. 6.

7 Zycie Warszawy (Warsaw), November 17, 1967, as discussed in Jerzy Ptakowski, "Behind the Unrest in Poland", p. 7.

8 Jerzy Ptakowski, "Behind the Unrest in Poland", p. 7.


11 General Demonstrations in Poland, East Europe, vol. 17, no. 4
(April 1968), p. 3.

12 Ibid., pp. 3-4.


15 Ibid., p. 2.

16 Ibid., pp. 2, 3, 16, 18-20.

17 Vincent V. Chrypinski, "Political Changes under Gierek", in Gierek's Poland, Bromke and Strong, ed., pp. 36-41.

18 Ibid., pp. 41-45.

19 Ibid., pp. 45-46.

20 Ibid., p. 47.
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Section VI


2*ibid.*, pp. 4-6.

3*ibid.*, p. 6.


5For a more detailed discussion of the Polish Economic Problems, see Fallenbuchl, "The Polish Economy at the Beginning of the 1980's", pp. 6-11.


7For a detailed discussion of KOR's early days see RFER, Situation Report, Poland/40, November 29, 1976, pp. 5-12 and Situation Report, Poland/36, October/36, October 29, 1976, pp. 10-15.
8RFER, Situation Report, Poland/40, November 29, 1976, pp. 6-7.

9Ibid., Brackets belong to RFER not the author.


11Ibid., p. 6


13Ibid., pp. 3,8,11-12, 15.

14Ibid., pp. 3, 12, also see RFER, Situation Report, Poland/16, August 5, 1980, pp. 3-5.

15Strikes in Poland, pp. 15-17.

16Ibid., p. 22.

17Ibid., p. 23.

18Ibid., pp. 26-27.

19"Danger Ahead? Poland's Crisis Not Over", Studium-News Abstracts, vol. 4, no. 4 (October 1980), pp. 9-10. Studium is a bulletin issued by the
North American Study Center for Polish Affairs (Ann Arbor, Michigan).


21 Ibid., pp. 5-7.

22 RFER, Situation Report, Poland/23, December 20, 1980, p. 2. The RFER outline is based on Kania's speech as reported in Trybuna Ludu, December 2, 1980.


For a more detailed discussion of the Economic Program, the student protests, and the role of Cardinal Wyszinski see RFER, Situation Report, Poland/9, May 29, 1981, op. 2-4, 13-16, and 43-47.


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36 Ibid., pp. 6-8.

37 Ibid., pp. 8-13.


40 Ibid., pp. 5-10.

41 Ibid., pp. 10-11.

42 Ibid., p. 12. Also, see J.B. de Weydenthal, "Political Tension Sharpens in Poland", RFER, RAD Background Report /349 (Poland), December 29, 1981.

43 For a detailed discussion of the Solidarity KK meeting in Gdansk see J.B. de Weydenthal, "Poland Approaching the Countdown", RFER, RAD Background Report/2 (Poland), January 7, 1982, pp. 1-11.

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3 Ibid., pp. 62-63.

4 Ibid., p. 63.

5 For Jones' coverage of the Polish (1956) movement see Ibid., pp. 68-72.

6 Ibid., pp. 72-79.

7 Ibid., pp. 98-100.
Section VIII

1 Jones, Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe, pp. 62-63.
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