UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

1 May 1985

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

STEVEN M. SIEGEL

ENTITLED

THE INDEPENDENT GOVERNORSHIP

OF JAMES B. LONGLEY OF MAINE, 1975-1978

IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF

BACHELOR OF ARTS

IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Instructor in Charge

APPROVED:

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF... POLITICAL SCIENCE
THE INDEPENDENT GOVERNORSHIP
OF JAMES B. LONGLEY OF MAINE, 1975-1978

BY
STEVEN M. SIEGEL

THESIS

for the
DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS

College of Liberal Arts and Sciences
University of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois

1985
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PREFACE

This is a study of the governorship of James Bernard Longley. Elected Maine's sixty-seventh governor in 1974, Longley served one four-year term and is the only Independent to be elected governor in the United States since 1937. This paper will focus on the unique aspect Longley's Independent status gave his administration.

The election of an Independent governor attracted national attention. Columnist David Broder wrote,

What happened in Maine in Seventy-four with the election of an independent, could well be a forerunner of something that would happen in other states or even at the presidential level. 1

It was rumored that Longley himself would try an independent bid for the Senate or even the presidency after serving one term as governor. Longley was a charismatic, popular governor, but had promised in his campaign not to seek reelection. All expectations, however, were cut short when he discovered he was suffering from cancer. He died in 1930 at the age of fifty-six.

One book, The Year of the Longley, by Willis Johnson, has been written about Longley. Published in 1978, the book primarily focuses on the early portion of the Longley Administration. A thesis at Bates College, The Politics of Anti Politics: Governor Longley and the Maine Legislature, by Marc Goldman, examines the Governor's relationship with the legislature during the first year of his administration. There is no work, as far as this writer can determine, examining Longley's entire governorship.

1
The primary source of new information in this study is a questionnaire sent to participants and knowledgeable observers of Maine state government. Two hundred and nine questionnaires were sent and forty-two responses were received, many with extensive comments. Respondents included eleven Republican and twelve Democratic legislators, eight people who served as advisors to Governor Longley, three professors of political science at the University of Maine, and three news reporters. Five responses were anonymous. It must be remembered, however, that the survey is not meant to be a representative sample. The views of most of the respondents are primarily colored by their experiences in the state capitol, Augusta, and may not be reflective of those in other parts of the state. The Maine Times described Longley's personality,

"The more Longley angered the Augusta actors, the more the people loved him everywhere else." 2

Other sources of information include interviews, newspaper and magazine articles.

The paper is organized in four chapters. Chapter one provides background information. Longley's personal history is sketched. An emphasis is placed on the two years preceding his election. Longley became known to the public at this time through his leadership in the Maine Management and Cost Survey, a commission designed to decrease the cost of state government by increasing its efficiency. Longley's philosophy on government and his campaign for governor are also described.

Chapter two examines Longley's working relationships with the other actors in state government. This chapter establishes his identity as an Independent governor, his style of governing, and the political tools he used. Longley's ability to work with the legislature, bureaucracy, special interests, media,
and general public is evaluated.

The third chapter of the paper examines Governor Longley's effectiveness and success in meeting his goals. The focus is on the advantages and disadvantages Longley may have had as an Independent. The quality of the Governor's appointments, ability to manage the government and provide services to the public are evaluated. Governor Longley's attempts to transform Maine's educational system is used as a case study to help assess his effectiveness.

There were important issues during Governor Longley's term which are not a part of this study. They were omitted because they were not judged to be representative of Longley's impact as an Independent. One issue which deserves note is the Indian question. Maine's two original tribes, the Passamquaddies and Penobscots, sued the government for two-thirds of Maine's land. The state was in an uproar when federal courts agreed the Indians had a legitimate case, which was based on the federal violation of an agreement dating to 1790. Longley vehemently denied the Indian claims had any validity and refused to soften his position when it became increasingly evident the Indians did have a chance of winning. State Attorney General Joseph Brennan publicly agreed with Longley. The case was eventually settled after Longley left office.3

The final chapter appraises Longley's overall performance as governor. It attempts to determine whether Maine was better off as a result of his governorship. Questionnaire respondents ranked Longley among Maine's four most recent governors to see if he favorably compares with governors who were elected as part of one of the two major parties. Those who felt Longley did not do well were asked whether his lack of effectiveness was a result of his Independent standing or whether the problem was with Longley's own style of governing. Finally, the chapter explores the possibility of Maine repeating its
precedent and electing another Independent governor.
CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Jim Longley's election to the governorship of Maine in 1974 caught the nation by surprise. The national press wasted no time announcing the victory of the first Independent governor in the United States since 1937.

"One of the biggest upsets of the election," *Newsweek.*

"The biggest upset," *Time.*

"Perhaps the most astounding political upset of the year, even the decade," *New York Times.*

Maine political observers were just as surprised. A *Maine Times* editorial stated before the election that the presence of four independent candidates on the gubernatorial ballot was needless "clutter." Longley ran a poor third behind the two party candidates in election polls throughout the state. Just two days before the election the *Maine Sunday Telegram* declared in its final election poll that a vote for Longley was a wasted vote.

1974 was the year of the Democrats. They gained nine governorships on the Republicans. Watergate set the tone for elections across the country. Disillusioned by the greatest political scandal in the nation's history, voters lost confidence in government, politicians, and especially the Republican party.

Watergate was not the only gloomy element in the political climate. The nation was recovering from the energy crises of 1973-1974. The New England states, heavily dependent on oil, felt the effects of the oil embargo as much as any region in the country. Confidence in America, the superpower, the leader of the free world, was shaken by OPEC.
While oil prices went up, so did everything else. Economists watched their own rules break as quickly as graphs could chart the rise of both inflation and unemployment. A new word was introduced to the American public—stagflation.

The people of Maine felt the shockwaves. The state had been a stronghold of the Republican party since the civil war. Its grasp on power began to loosen in 1955, when Democrat Edmund Muskie became governor. In the 1960s other Democrats began to surface and Muskie was elected to the United States Senate. Factions formed in the Maine Republican party as its strength weakened. In 1967 another Democrat, Kenneth Curtis, became governor and also served two terms. The Republicans, however, still controlled both houses of the Maine legislature as the 1974 elections approached.

Economics conditions in Maine were worse than the national average. Economic expansion from Boston, fifty miles away from the southern tip of Maine, reached only a small portion of the state. Maine's per capita income ranked fortieth in the United States. It had been years since Maine's civilian unemployment rate was equal to, or lower than, the national rate of unemployment.

Maine is a rural state of one million residents. Three cities—Portland, Bangor, and Lewiston—have over 30,000 citizens. The rest of the population is spread over a land surface nearly as large as the combined size of the rest of New England. Over 90 percent of the land is covered by forest. The shoreline, which includes some 200 islands, is the longest on the East Coast. Twisting and turning over 3,500 miles, the Maine coast is famous for its rocky cliffs and picturesque lighthouses.

Most Mainers live off the land in traditional industries. Forestry provides 47% of Maine's industrial employment. Farming is also important. Maine is second only to Idaho in potato production. Maine also credits the ocean
for its productivity, most notably its lobster catch. In the summer, tourists flock to the state for an outdoor escape, transforming the Maine coast and forests into Vacationland.

The people of Maine are known for their independence. One reason may be the geography. The state's large, forested expanse promotes self reliance. Maine is also the only state among the forty-eight contiguous states to share a common border with only one other state, New Hampshire. History may also be a reason. Yankee independence in Maine extends long before 1776. Whatever the cause of this independence, it was not a shocking proposition for Mainers in the 1970s when John Cole, the long time editor of the Maine Times, publicly considered the benefits for Maine if it seceded from the union.11

The rise of James Longley in government was as unexpected as the times. His father, an orphan, died while Longley was in high school. Longley was ready to leave school and enter the mills to replace the income of his father, a street car operator, when his older brother, Howard, decided to work a double shift and keep Jim in school. He went on to graduate from Bowdoin College in two and one-half years and eventually earned a law degree through night school courses at the University of Maine. After working several jobs to pay his way through school, Longley earned his fortune in the insurance business. By 1972 he acquired national and international experience in the insurance industry. He was also president of the Million Dollar Round Table, an elite group of the nation's insurance men who sold at least one million dollars worth of insurance in one year.12

Nineteen Seventy-Two is the year Longley's name was first heard by many of Maine's citizens. A lifetime Democrat and campaign contributor to Governor Curtis, Longley was asked by the Governor to lead the Maine Management and Cost Survey. He accepted. The survey became known as the Longley Commission and produced the Longley Report.
The purpose of the survey was to make Maine state government fiscally responsible by targeting areas of waste and inefficiency. Governor Curtis chose Longley, in part, because he was an outsider to politics and a successful businessman. He wanted the survey to be a non-partisan effort led by an individual who would not use his high visibility position to turn the survey into political controversy.

Longley and his "team leaders," members of the survey effort he delegated authority to, proposed 807 recommendations totalling an estimated $24 million in savings to Maine. Many of the recommendations were controversial, including a proposal to close three rural branches of the University of Maine system in the name of efficiency. In May of 1973, Curtis halted construction on state university campuses while considering Cost Survey recommendations. However, by mid-summer, construction resumed and Longley and Curtis became rivals. Longley spoke loudly and publicly on behalf of survey recommendations, but refused to testify to the legislature in their support. He claimed his role in the Survey was Non-partisan and his neutrality would be questioned if he testified. If the Longley Report was used for partisan purposes, it would lose its tax exempt status with the IRS. Critics later claimed Longley hoped the Survey recommendations were not implemented. This gave him the opportunity to attack politicians and use the Survey for his own personal gain in politics.

Curtis, an initiator of the report, was placed in a politically touchy position. While Longley was challenging him to enact survey recommendations, Curtis determined that many were too controversial. Ninety-two bills containing three hundred proposals were presented to the legislature and thirty-three bills eventually became law. Curtis publicly declared the survey a success, but the actual savings resulting from the
Longley Report is highly speculative. Willis Johnson, in his book *The Year of the Longley*, reports that a Curtis Administration press release was almost issued announcing survey savings of $15 million. Governor Curtis saw the release and declared the figure unrealistic. He randomly estimated a savings of $10 million and that was the figure used on the release.13

Longley was not satisfied with the government's implementation of the Maine Management and Cost Survey. The recommendations made in the Survey were more than efficiency measures to Longley, but the heart of his philosophy on government. Longley believed business techniques in the management of government are essential.

*Strategies for Survival*, by David F. Linowes, is the book which best lays out the Longley philosophy. Longley labeled the book his "bible" on government and, once elected, ordered copies for all department heads. The book measures social needs against economic needs and discards the idea equating dollars spent with program success. Government encourages inefficient programs by throwing increasing sums of money at programs which just don't work. The management of a program is often to blame. When a program is run properly it is rarely given additional funds to reach more people. Instead, increasingly larger chunks of money are given to wasteful managers claiming an ever greater need. The process leads to entrenched mediocrities who are convinced they're on the right track and have a good thing going...maximum ease and minimum accountability.14

Linowes attempts to demonstrate that business executives are no smarter than their government counterparts. The system accounts for the disparity in their effectiveness. A businessman must show a profit or go
out of business. There is constant oversight of each step in the business process and a continual search for improvements which keep pace with the competitive environment in business.

The book then explains that government goals are more complex than showing a profit. However, the goals must be clearly defined so a program's success can be measured. Government usually lacks an oversight process, a key ingredient for success. Facing the competitive environment of business, politicians and bureaucrats will often fight to maintain the status quo and promote programs which lack humanitarian goals beyond protecting their own jobs. The result is an increasingly heavy tax burden on the average citizen.

On April 18, 1974, Longley resigned from the Maine Management and Cost Survey and publicly considered an independent drive for the governorship. Critics felt Longley lacked the necessary experience in government, but the argument did not persuade Longely.

I reject this philosophy because to say that good business practices cannot be brought to government is to say it is the nature of government to be wasteful and inefficient. 15

Governor Curtis, unable to succeed himself in office, left the field wide open for gubernatorial candidates. Longley officially entered the campaign on June 7, 1974. He joined three other independent candidates seeking the governorship. Six Democrats and four Republicans sought their party's nomination in unusually long primary campaigns.

The Republicans chose James Erwin, Maine's former attorney general and two-time loser of previous gubernatorial campaigns. His 1970 loss to Governor Curtis was by the slimmest of margins, 51.1 percent to 49.9 percent. His natural constituency was rural conservatives and he campaigned on a program of limited spending. 16
The Democratic nominee was George Mitchell. Age forty, he was an ally of Senator Muskie and the state's Democratic National Committeeman. Watergate fallout made Mitchell the favorite to win. The Republicans brought in big names to bolster their state convention--John Connally and George Bush--but Connally was almost disinvited when it appeared his presence would only add to the turmoil surrounding the party.

An Independent candidate had several technical advantages in the 1974 election which Maine Independents did not have in previous years. Names were placed on the ballot alphabetically and without party labels. This emphasized the individual candidates over the party. Voter registration laws were made easier. It is reported that there was a campaign spending limit of $160,000.

Despite the new election laws, neither party candidate gave Longley much of a chance. Mitchell felt Longley would hurt Erwin since both of their campaigns emphasized the importance of economic issues. Longley, a lifetime Democrat known to tell "bleeding heart" stories from his own past, was calculated by the Erwin camp to have a greater appeal to Mitchell supporters.

Both Mitchell and Erwin chose to run "low profile" campaigns and refrained from attacking the other. Neither candidate appeared to have a greater personal appeal to the electorate than the other. As the election approached, some polls found Mitchell pulling away from Erwin. Other polls found the two to be running even, with Longley playing the role of spoiler. The last Sunday of the campaign, the Maine Sunday Telegram issued the results of its final campaign poll: Mitchell was predicted to receive forty-two percent of the vote, Erwin thirty-three percent, and Longley, twenty-three percent. The Longley campaign was allowed to
run full steam ahead and was never slowed by attacks from the opposition.

Sleep didn't slow things down, either. Supporters and critics alike agree Longley was a superior campaigner. He allegedly slept only three or four hours a night. Campaigning at factories, he would shake hands with employees of all three shifts and travel to neighboring areas between shifts. Republican State Senator S.W. Collins labeled Longley the "consummate insurance salesman" in his efforts to sell himself to the people of Maine. Others in government considered Longley the consummate politician.

The Longley campaign had two themes: What he wasn't and what he was. First, Longley was not a politician, had never been in politics before, and did not intend to remain in politics. He promised that if elected, he would serve only one term. Longley not only ran as a non-politician, but continually scorned those who were. He defined a professional politician,

One who uses what should be a service to the people to his own benefit and who has no other visible means of support. 21

This theme, aided by good public recognition, an outgoing personality, and a healthy campaign budget attracted a public disenchanted with politics.

Maine citizens may have been especially receptive to Longley's message. The state takes pride in its "citizen legislature." Over half of the legislature typically consists of freshman legislators and most do not make a career of politics. Longley appeared a part of this tradition. He told the people he couldn't lose: he wasn't a professional politician. If not elected, he would return to his own insurance business and work to make it the best in the world.

James Longley was a businessman who believed businessmen were needed in government. The Maine Management and Cost Survey provided him with
statewide recognition and a core of support in the business community. The Longley campaign did not need to make promises. It was a campaign of convictions. Longley tried to extend his core of support by asking voters to take a good look at the government, rising taxes, and the professional politicians responsible. Then he asked the voters to "THINK ABOUT IT."

They did. The campaign grew from one office, a converted garage, to six offices run largely by volunteers ranging from retired citizens to high school students too young to vote. Longley grew into more than just the business candidate for governor. He would hold down taxes and fight the establishment. His simple approach and sincerity attracted "the man on the street" with such devotion his campaign was described as "messianic." A local dishwasher built Longley a birdhouse with arrows pointing toward the governor's residence. Local barbers polled their clients and called in their increasingly positive results.

The people of Maine flocked to the polls, producing an off-presidential year turnout of fifty-seven percent. Longley captured nearly forty percent of the vote and the governorship. Mitchell placed second with thirty-seven percent and Erwin received twenty-three percent of the vote. Longley won approximately forty percent of the Republican vote, thirty percent of the Democratic vote, and fifty percent of the Independents. Longley received strong support in his home town, Lewiston, a traditionally Democratic area.

Senator Charlotte Z. Sewall, a member of the Maine House during the Longley Administration, describes his success,

His timing was right--the voters wanted a stop in the increase in government and regulation--and new taxes. Both parties demurred from taking that hard line--Longley did--and took off!

Maine didn't escape the rising tide of Democratic victories. State
Representative William Cohen was the state's only high ranking Republican. While the Republicans maintained their majority in the State Senate, Democrats gained control of the House for the first time in a decade. The 1974 elections brought Maine a unique experiment in government--tripartisan politics led by an Independent governor.
CHAPTER TWO: GOVERNOR LONGLEY'S WORKING RELATIONSHIPS
WITH MAINE'S POLITICAL ACTORS

Now What
to the editor:
all friends of Jim Longley hope he is not like the dog
that chased a car, caught it, and then didn't know what
to do about it. Mal Clark Maine Times, November 29, 1974

Sometimes Governor Longley must have wondered just what he should do.
Dinner table remarks made the front pages. Controversy raged over the
type of potatoes he served and the kind of car he drove. Critics constantly
reminded him that running the state of Maine was not the same as being chief
executive officer of a corporation. Longley admitted some of his expecta-
tions toward government were naive. The government acted slower than he
expected and did not give him the bipartisan support he hoped to obtain.

The role of Maine's governors was strengthened in the years preceding
Governor Longley's election. The Maine Constitution limits a governor to
serving a maximum of two terms. In the 1950s the governor's term in of-

cice was extended from two to four years. Governor Curtis reorganized
the executive branch and increased its power by funding a larger staff.
Maine governors have the exclusive right to prepare the state's binennial
budget, which the state constitution requires to be balanced.²⁴

However, most observers feel Maine governors face the legislature from
a position of weakness. Longley himself ranked the power of Maine's gover-
nors as fiftieth in the United States. The governor does not have an item
veto. He does have the power to call a special session of the legislature,
but when a special session is called, any matter may be brought up. The governor is not the state's top legal officer. The legislature has the power to appoint the attorney general. It also appoints the Secretary of State, Treasurer, Auditor, and seven member Executive Council.

The Executive Council was a body constitutionally required in Maine the first two years of Governor Longley's term. Its consent was required on all appointments and the allocation of money. It was to give advice and consent on reprieves, pardons, and commutations. The Executive Council was also required to give its approval of the removal of any appointees. During Longley's first year in office the legislature, with the Governor's support, eliminated the Executive Council. The Governor, however, did not play a determining role in the process, which had been discussed for several years.25

Governor Longley was a pure Independent with no ties to either political party. Although he was a registered Democrat before the election his policies were those of a conservative Republican. Longley was not only independent of political parties, but also of the system. He campaigned as a reformer of government. He would fight politicians and all who told the public that government needed to keep increasing their taxes.

Few respondents to the questionnaire believe any group or organization served Longley as a surrogate party in place of his lack of affiliation with the traditional parties. Mentioned by four Democrats and four of Longley's appointees, "Longley's Legion," was the closest to filling some of the functions of a political party. The Legion was Longley's core group of supporters. The group was organized while Longley prepared the Cost Survey and later raised funds for his campaign. He stayed in
touch with them during his term through a newsletter and called on members for advice. Democratic State Representative J. Robert Carrier describes the Legion, "They were good advisors and worked hard to promote his programs against continuous odds." Longley's Legion did help his campaign for the governorship and advisors were drawn from its ranks. However, a more common evaluation of the Legion's role in the Longley Administration is given by Joe Hochadel, a legislative counselor to Longley. Hochadel limits the Legion's function to,

providing moral support and some hard work on particular projects. One must remember he vetoed bills supported by much of the 'private sector' such as special exception legislation that provided a tax break to a particular industry. He truly was independent.

Longley viewed his independence as a two-edged sword. On one hand, he had no political base. On the other, he owed no favors. Not everyone, though, felt Longley needed a party. Democratic State Senator Nancy Rand­dall Clark, a member of the Maine House during the Longley Administration, believes the devotion of his supporters was enough,

Many followed 'blindly'--almost cult like in response and defense of Jim Longley's edicts. His followers would smother legislators with Longley's positions on issues upon request of the Governor--well organized and well financed--with Maine's insurance industry among his chief supporters--yet Longley chided us for responding to special interests. He only saw one side--HIS.

TABLE ONE:
LONGLEY'S OVERALL WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MAINE LEGISLATURE

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<th>excellent</th>
<th>good</th>
<th>fair</th>
<th>poor</th>
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<tr>
<td>Senate (Republican controlled)</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House (Democrat controlled)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>63%</td>
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Table one illustrates the tripartisan nature of Maine's government and Longley's working relationship with each house of the state legislature. Although Longley called for bipartisan party support, his policies remained as independent in practice as they were in his campaign for governor. The results indicate a poor working relationship with members of both houses of the legislature. However, it is not clear whether Governor Longley's independent status contributed to poor executive-legislative relations. Among the factors which may have negatively influenced their relationship include Longley's campaign against politicians, his lack of desire to work with them once elected, and his willingness to work around the legislature. Longley's confrontational style of governing, personality, and inability to form a legislative base were also detrimental to executive-legislative relations.

Longley's reforms were more appealing to conservative Republicans than Democrats. Despite the overall evaluation that only thirty-eight percent of the survey's respondents felt Longley had a good working relationship with the Maine Senate, the figure rises to sixty-percent when only Republican senators are polled. At one point in the Administration, Republican leaders were trying to persuade Longley to join their party. Longley did nothing to indicate he was interested and the alliance the Republicans tried to form never materialized.

Longley's relationship with House Democrats, as Senator Clark's comments indicated, were troublesome. To some, Longley was a traitor. He made no secret of his lifelong status as a Democrat. The Democrats were accustomed to working with a Democratic Governor the previous eight years. Longley, as an independent, left them out of the policy process.

The eight year period prior to the Longley Administration was a time
of dramatic growth in state government. A state income tax was initiated and many new programs and services were developed. In 1969 the Curtis Administration presented a budget which increased state spending for new programs by $8 million. An additional $32 million was requested in the 1969 budget to maintain growth of existing programs. In contrast, Longley's goal was to put a halt to state government growth. Conflict was inevitable. Senator Clark, ranking Longley's relationship with House members as fair, commented,

His way or no way... we learned to work around him... he was generally inflexible; established an alliance with the Republicans to promote agreed upon goals/objectives; finally included the Democrats in his negotiations.

Longley's confrontations with legislators became a regular event in Maine politics. The Governor initially made an effort to work with the legislators. Weekly meetings were scheduled with the leadership of both parties. Tea was held with freshman legislators and county delegations. However, it was at one of Longley's social dinners with legislators in the governor's residence that Longley removed all doubt from observers who cared to guess the tone of executive-legislative relations. Longley accusingly labeled legislators who leaked stories to the press in their own interests "pimps." End of dinner. It was not the last time legislators would walk out on meetings with Longley.

Longley frequently employed two gubernatorial powers to achieve his legislative goals. The first was the veto. A two-thirds vote of both houses of the state legislature is required to override a veto. The second power Longley used is the governor's access to the media. Longley succeeded in capturing the media--and the public's--attention.

Maine government was not accustomed to a heavy reliance on the veto. Governor Curtis used the veto only thirty-two times in eight years. None were overridden. The last veto overridden was in 1955.
When a bill is presented to a Maine governor, he has five days to make a decision. In this period, Longley screened all bills through his liaison staff, the attorney general's office, and the budget office. Governor Longley exercised the veto power a record 109 times. His vetoes were overridden a record fifty-six times. Longley explained his attitude toward vetoes to the legislature,

I do not view any piece of legislation as minor. If it is worthy of the time, effort, and money put forward by the legislature to see it through the process, then it certainly is worth my time and effort to give it full consideration and to base my decision on its merits and demerits and not whether it is a minor bill designated to please a particular group.

Longley's willingness to veto "minor" bills is seen from his very first veto. The bill was to shorten the name of the Bureau of Labor and Industry to the Bureau of Labor. Besides offsetting the symbolic balance between labor and industry, Longley felt the bill was a waste of money (in stationery and other expenses) in a time of fiscal restraint.

The veto was overridden by a vote of 155-16. Legislative leaders triumphantly emerged from the vote, happy to show their Governor who was boss. President of the Senate Joe Sewall labeled the vote as "a little disciplinary action." Democratic Representative Harlan Baker described the legislative process with Governor Longley, "He fought with them [the legislature], insulted them, and they overrode his vetoes most of the time." Democratic State Senator Paul Violette, a member of the House during the Longley Administration, concurs,

The legislature used to take great joy in overriding Governor Longley's vetoes and together both parties overrode more in four years than in the state's history.

Longley's constant attacks fueled a political rivalry between the legislature and the Governor. Longley made phone calls and wrote letters to individual legislators to support his positions, but at times his efforts turned
personal and included "un-American" accusations toward opponents.

Longley also attacked the validity of the political process. His public attacks invited battle with the legislature. Legislative counselor Joe Hochadel describes the causes of Longley's poor relations with the legislature,

First, he was a threat. Second, he was very candid in describing the political process to the public. He did not strike deals or trade one vote for another. He acted based on his ideals and the perceived merits of each bill. He also attacked sacred cows such as legislative junkets, state funded extravaganzas for legislative and executive members, etc. The legislature (generally) resented him for it.

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<th>TABLE TWO: AN EVALUATION OF GOVERNOR LONGLEY'S OVERALL WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH FOUR GROUPS OF GOVERNMENT ACTORS</th>
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<td>excellent</td>
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<td>state government bureaucracy</td>
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Table Two provides an evaluation of Longley's working relationship with actors in the political arena other than state legislators. Responses leave little doubt the Governor was very popular with the people, but perceived negatively by established groups who had to work with him.

Governor Longley was elected with less than 40% of the vote. Nevertheless, he viewed his victory as a mandate from the people and counted on their support for the success of his programs. Longley felt his job was to bring
government back to the people, reminding Maine citizens they were the boss
and elected officials were the public servants. Longley insisted state govern-
ment be more responsive. Longley personally replied to many letters sent to
the state. In all cases, he instituted the policy requiring a response with­
in seven days.

It is hard to find an observer of Maine government who feels any governor,
regardless of party status, could have had a better relationship with the pub­
ic than James Longley. State Senator Violette believes, "He was very good
with the public. Jim Longley could have done anything he wanted and never
suffered the blame." Senator Clark, though critical of Longley's governorship,
also rated Longley's relationship with the general public as excellent,

He was 'an ordinary' citizen disdaining the trappings of
his office. He articulated his frustration and disgust
with bureaucracy--reflecting in large measure the distrust
of John and Mary Q. Maine Citizen at that time.

Senator Clark, like others, does not limit Longley's popularity in Maine as
unique to Maine alone. She continues, "I honestly think he would have run
for President of the U.S. . . . and elected."

Longley did have post-Watergate Presidential qualities. Like Jimmy Carter
in 1976, Longley was an outsider who looked down on the establishment. It was
easy to view Longley as "one of the people." He jogged every morning and was
known to frequent a donut shop at the end of a run. One cold morning a car
got a flat tire on the road outside the governor's residence. The story of
Longley coming out himself to change the tire was widely circulated.

Longley combined this image with the attraction of Ronald Reagan. Longley
appealed to a sense of patriotism and Mainers sense of identity with their
state. Voters knew Longley would "fight the freight train of runaway expense"
and keep their taxes down. Government was to be decreased and Longley, with
the support of the public, would stand up to the establishment, fight the
status quo of bigger government and more spending, and bring government back
to the people.

His sincerity was never questioned. Some opponents, however, felt his
programs and ideas were too simplistic. He told the people what they wanted
to hear—and what he believed—but implementing his plans would be disastrous.

It is no accident the figures in table two indicate Longley's excellent
public relations are in direct contrast to his rating with special interest
groups and the bureaucracy. Both were favorite targets of Longley. Lawyer
and Republican State Senator S.W. Collins describes the correlation, "his
dramatic flailing of straw devils and occasionally those who deserved it
pleased the public in the post-Watergate atmosphere."

Special interest groups could not pressure Longley and did not establish
a working relationship with the Governor. Longley's attitude was oriented
toward what he perceived as the overall good of Maine,

I have learned that it is impossible to be a popular governor
with every special interest group in the state and still do
what you think is right for the people of the state.

Longley was supported by the business community as a whole, but did not
favor specific interests. Educators were furious with Longley's budget cuts.
Women's groups resented his reluctance to appoint women.

Unions did not receive legislative support from Longley. The Maine State
Employees Association made headlines in its fights with the Governor. The
bureaucracy was a favorite target of Longley's and an enemy whose growth was
to be stopped. Longley told the public that bureaucrats should work as hard
for their money as the taxpayers who paid them. Longley stopped hiring state
employees and froze their pay. He left office in the middle of an unresolved
salary battle with state employees. The morale of bureaucrats during
Longley's term was low.

Longley's relationship with the press was, by all accounts, interesting.
Over sixty percent of the survey's respondents in Table Two felt Longley's
working relationship with the press was at least good. However, top ad-
ministration officials and members of the media consistently ranked their
relations as fair to poor. The disparity can be explained: Longley created
difficult working conditions for reporters. This fact is often lost to those
who only had to read, listen and watch the results--Longley made great news
copy.

One of the first promises made by Governor-elect Joseph Brennan in 1978
was to remove the "inaccessibility and secrecy" of the Longley years. Soon
after taking office, reporters found they would not have the same accessi-
bility with Governor Longley as they were accustomed to with Governor Curtis.
Curtis got along well with the media and was available for unannounced, walk-
in visits. Longley had a closed door approach (literally--he installed Dutch
doors) and required appointments. His famous "pimp" comment was directed
toward those who leaked information to the press. Some reporters felt they
were being used by Longley. For example, he would tell stories about welfare
cheats, but refused to give their names or the town they lived in, as the in-
formation was given to him in confidence. Reporters had no way of determining
the authenticity of Longley's stories. Ralph Lowe, one of the top officials
in the Longley Administration, blames Longley's own temperament for problems
with the press,

He tried to maintain the private citizens approach to govern-
ment and never reconciled himself to the idea that the media
could be so interested in everything he did. . . . even going
to the bathroom.

Longley was conscious of the value of the media. His top aides were ex-
perts in handling the media. When angered by what he perceived as unfair press coverage, Longley did not hesitate to respond to the source of the reporting. Often he wrote letters or editorials expounding his point of view.

The Governor and the press were a "dynamic duo" of sorts. Longley needed the media to reach his public; reporters needed good copy. Despite the barriers Longley set up, Lowe believes the press enjoyed the challenge of covering him. Mel Leary, a member of the state house press corps, looks back on the period as "the most exciting time of my career."

Some of that excitement was from the unexpected. Regular press conferences were scheduled and a Longley press conference was different from any other. His isolation as an independent in the policy process and secrecy in general led to surprises when Longley did reveal information. When asked what factors were most likely to affect Governor Longley's actions, State Representative H. Craig Higgins replied, "The moon. The closer to a full moon, the more erratic the actions he took." Frustrating to legislators, the surprises kept reporters on their toes.

Even when Longley didn't have any bombshells to drop on the press, his conferences often were extraordinary. WLBZ-TV news reporter and anchor Don Carrigan describes Longley press conferences as "the stuff of legend." At one conference, Longley used the words from the song 'If I were a Carpenter' to illustrate some point... the song lyrics were totally meaningless in that context, yet you knew, somewhere, there was a deep meaning known only to Longley himself. It was not unusual at press conferences for him to soar off on some flight of ideology that didn't really relate to the topic at hand... reporters would look at each other as he went on for four or five minutes at a time, and eventually would come back to earth.

Longley's relations with every group involved in Maine government was
influenced by one factor above all else—his personality. State Representative Louis Jalbert, from Longley's home town of Lewiston, worked with several governors. He believes Longley's personality compensated for his lack of a political party.

He was probably the most strong-willed person I ever met. It would be very difficult to rate him because he was out of the ordinary. His strong will was his power base.
Governor Longley believed his independent status would not damage the two party system, but strengthen it. He perceived the two parties as growing complacent, catering to the needs of their own institutions before the needs of the people. Longley expressed the anger of the people and felt independents were needed to shake the parties out of their complacency.

Longley wasted no time translating his anger with the system into practice as governor. In his inaugural address, Longley asked a legislature accustomed to eight years of government expansion

... to declare a one-year moratorium on new programs that will cost money, unless the money can be found or is now in an existing program with a lower priority of need. ... the people of Maine deserve this reassessment. ... a period in which we can fully examine the bureaucracy and establish our priorities. 29

Filling gubernatorial appointments was Longley's first major task in the transition between such different administrations. Allan Pease, an administrative assistant for both Governors Curtis and Longley, believes Longley, as an independent, had to look for advisors outside the traditional political arena,

Curtis, being a party man, had a natural nucleus to which to turn. ... Longley had to go to more private people not involved in politics or the governmental process; so he got a different type of input. ... which reflected a smaller pool of information. 30
Table three is an indication that the quality of Longley's appointments was high. Democrats and Republicans praised the Governor's selection process. Longley believed his status as an Independent without political obligations served to his advantage. Longley utilized his contacts in the business community to bring new faces into government. Many appointees left higher paying positions to serve state government. Members of both parties received appointments based on their qualifications. Survey responses praising Longley's appointments included:

- Longley lured people from the private sector, also appointed dedicated career public service people. Free to appoint without the political burdens that seem to hound party candidates.

- A clean sweep of political hacks.

- Selected individuals who came to Augusta to do a job, not get a job.

Controversy did surround Longley's early appointment process. Possibly to avoid the state constitutional requirement that the removal of all appointees must first be approved by the Executive Council, Longley asked each department head to turn in an updated letter of resignation. Roberta Weil, Commissioner of the Department of Business Regulation, refused to turn in an undated letter of resignation as a matter of principle. Her story was front page news before she was finally replaced.
Ralph Lowe believes Longley set policy within the government and then delegated his authority, within established guidelines, to his appointees. However, most observers felt Longley's domineering personality resulted in a power structure more centralized than in previous administrations. Kenneth Palmer, political scientist at the University of Maine, describes Longley as,

a workaholic. He was a self-made man in the insurance business and tried to run the state the same way. For example, Longley personally interviewed every person who requested a pardon. It was a nice thing to do, but a governor doesn't have the time. He tried to do everything himself, just was not a delegator.

Longley received much praise for his judicial appointments. Maine governors traditionally handed these positions out as political favors. Longley changed this process, determining all of his selections on merit. Survey respondents of both parties consider this change one of the lasting accomplishments of his administration.

| TABLE FOUR: A RANKING OF GOVERNOR LANGLEY'S OVERALL SUCCESS IN REACHING HIS GOALS |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|                                     | highly successful | successful | unsuccessful | highly unsuccessful |
| Increased efficiency                | 21%          | 54%         | 25%          | 0%               |
| Budget reduction                    | 23%          | 54%         | 25%          | 2%               |
| Improved economy                    | 20%          | 36%         | 44%          | 0%               |
| Transforming social services        | 0%           | 51%         | 38%          | 11%              |
| Transforming higher education       | 3%           | 35%         | 41%          | 11%              |

| TABLE FIVE: AN EVALUATION OF THE QUALITY OF THE LANGLEY ADMINISTRATION'S IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
|                                     | excellent  | good        | fair        | poor        |
| Managing bureaucracy                | 23%         | 33%         | 28%         | 10%         |
| Delivering services                 | 8%          | 34%         | 37%         | 21%         |
| Health and welfare                  | 5%          | 33%         | 43%         | 20%         |
| Education                           | 3%          | 30%         | 30%         | 35%         |
Tables Four and Five measure the results of Governor Longley's leadership. They are presented together to make a direct comparison easier. Table Four is an assessment of Governor Longley's ability to meet his objectives, regardless of whether respondents felt the Governor's goals were beneficial or detrimental to Maine. Table Five is an evaluation of his impact, not withstanding his success in meeting his own intentions.

Partisan lines were evident in evaluating responses. Longley's advisors, as a whole, gave him ratings of successful or highly successful in every category except education. Republican responses closely matched those of Longley's advisors. Democrats felt the Governor was successful in meeting his efficiency and budget reduction goals, were divided in their judgment on Longley's ability to improve the economy, and gave him unsuccessful and highly unsuccessful ratings in his ability to transform social services and higher education. The trend was continued in responses recorded in Table Five. Democrats were divided in evaluating Longley's ability to manage the bureaucracy. In each of the other categories he was given ratings of fair to poor.

The governor hoped the private sector would help government improve under his leadership. While he was successful in bringing private businessmen into government to serve on boards and commissions, often voluntarily, Longley did not succeed in enticing whole industries to participate voluntarily in state initiatives.

At the beginning of his administration, Longley requested a voluntary, one year moratorium on utility rate increases. The request was ignored by state utilities. Longley's plans to establish a low cost drug program for the elderly also required the cooperation of the private sector. Maine news reporter Bill Johnson believes the program, as Longley envisioned it, did not work. Despite the program's failure, Johnson explains in his response to the questionnaire how the program became a personal success for Longley:
He (Longley) proposed a program of low-cost drugs for the elderly, but called for an appropriation of one dollar. He asked private drug companies to provide drugs, which they didn't do. A state representative then sponsored legislation calling for three million dollars to finance a low-cost prescription drug program for the elderly. Longley vetoed the bill. He praised the idea of a low-cost program for the elderly, but denounced "excessive and extravagant" spending, politics as usual, etc. The legislature enacted the program over his veto. Many elderly people who heard Longley propose the program credit him with being responsible for it. In this case, he seemed to win public approval in two ways. First, he was an advocate for the elderly and a program that had widespread public support. Second, he seemed to win approval by denouncing excessive spending when he vetoed the bill, saying there were more businesslike ways of running the program.

He was in favor of helping the elderly and against excessive spending. That put him in tune with most of the people.

Similar initiatives did not become a major part of the Longley Administration. However, they are one sign of Longley's efforts to work outside the legislature and bureaucracy to accomplish his goals. His initial legislative program consisted of only thirty-two bills and an inaugural speech request for a shortened legislative session so Maine could reassess its government.

### Table Six: Number of Bills Introduced and Passed during Maine Legislative Sessions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislature</th>
<th>Number of Bills Introduced</th>
<th>Number of Bills Passed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>107th Legislature (1975-1976)</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108th Legislature (1977-1978)</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>829</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table Six is a listing of the number of bills introduced and passed by the final legislature of Governor Curtis' tenure in office and the two legislatures which met during Governor Longley's term. Although the number of bills passed through the legislature significantly declined during Governor Longley's terms, the numbers indicate that the 107th Legislature ignored his request for a reduced legislative program.
The Governor's record setting use of the veto power made it difficult for the legislature to initiate major programs, especially since each house was controlled by a different party. The numbers in Table Six only indicate the quantity of bills considered by the legislature. The number of major bills passed, however, was also slim. The Maine Times describes legislative action in 1977,

Like a moose mired in the mud, the 108th legislature thrashes mightily, splashing minor bills in all directions but apparently unable to free itself from the morass of past issues and future taxes. 32

Governor Longly inherited the largest deficit in Maine history upon taking office in 1975. Above all else, Longley wanted to keep government spending to a minimum and protect the Maine taxpayer. Longley intended to eliminate the deficit. This priority, by necessity meant the legislature could not initiate Major programs if he was to succeed.

The two biennial budgets prepared by Governor Longley called for state spending of $703.1 million and $62.5 million. This averages to approximately a ten percent annual increase in expenditures. This figure is significantly lower than the spending increases during the Curtis years. Although Longley's 1975-1976 budget increased spending from Governor Curtis' budget of $530 million for 1973-1974, the budget was balanced without any tax increases. Much of the increased spending was for new and ongoing programs passed by the 106th legislature. 33

Strict economy measures were taken to hold the line on spending. Longley collected only $20,000 of his $35,000 salary as governor. Thousands of dollars were saved on the upkeep of the governor's residence. These savings included a reduction in the maintenance staff. Out of state travel was eliminated for most members of the government. Pay increases were halted. The
operating budget of each department was reduced by seven percent to force efficiency. In some instances programs were eliminated or drastically altered. Town road improvement funds and snowplow services were transferred to the local level.34

In 1975, Longley's first year as governor, Republican President of the Senate and Democratic Speaker of the House John Martin agreed no major legislative changes could be made without a tax increase. The austerity of the Longley budget left little room for new spending. Nevertheless, they proceeded to pass, over Longley's objections, a $4.9 million supplemental budget to be used for human services. Longley vetoed the budget, explaining that it would force new taxes on the Maine citizen. However, the bill had the support of the leadership of both parties and the veto was overridden. Legislative overrides were typical when Longley was up against a united leadership of both parties. The regular session of the legislature was followed by a special session which increased the income tax of Maine citizens by $17 million. Again, Longley vetoed the action only to have it overridden by the legislature.

This was the only major tax increase during Governor Longley's term. Overall, Maine's rate of taxation was the nation's exception to the upward spiral of taxes. Even with the tax increase, the tax burden on Maine citizens, when compared with the national average, decreased. Using 100 as the national average, Maine taxpayers paid at 102.4 in 1975. By 1977 the base number for Maine citizens was 97.2 below the national average. Twice during Longley's four year term Maine was the only state where per-capita state and local taxes were reduced. Nationally, state and local tax rates increased by an average of twelve percent. In Maine, they were reduced by two percent.35

Governor Longley was able to increase modestly the size of the budget,
fight taxes, and still generate a surplus. To do this, he benefitted from improving national and state economies.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>MAINE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
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Maine's own economic recovery outpaced the nation's. Table Seven compares Maine's unemployment rate to the nation's. 1978, Longley's last year as governor, was the first time in years that Maine's unemployment rate was not above the national average.

Governor Longley perceived himself as a goodwill ambassador for Maine. In efforts to improve the state's economy, he went on many unannounced "industrial development missions" in other parts of the country. By the end of his term, eighty-six companies expanded their facilities in Maine and seventy-four opened plants. Two thousand three hundred jobs were added to the state. Longley left office before the benefits of his most successful coup were felt. He gave Pratt and Whitney Aircraft $2 million in special tax benefits to open a plant in southern Maine. Two thousand jobs were expected to be created. All this was accomplished after the Governor reduced the state's economic de-
velopment agency from fifty-three staffers in nine offices to one office and nine staff people.\footnote{37}

Structural changes were made in other state programs. Governor Longley believed the bureaucracy had become too large and too inefficient. Professor Kenneth Palmer agrees, saying in an interview,

> The number of people receiving food stamps was cut by forty-five percent within thirty months. Longley reduced the program's administration from three hundred and two people to one hundred and seventy-eight.\footnote{38}

Longley also transformed Maine's Aid to Family's with Dependent Children program. The maximum allowable grant was increased by forty-five percent, but the number of people served by the program was reduced by twenty-five percent. The purpose of the change was to increase aid to the truly needy and eliminate benefits to those trying to cheat the system and were able to work.\footnote{39} Governor Longley personally visited families who claimed to be unfairly cut from the program.

State bureaucrats were unhappy with Longley policies. A hiring freeze reduced their numbers by fifteen percent in a process labor leaders described as "cutting state jobs by attrition."\footnote{40} State employees and the Governor fought over their pay throughout the Administration. There was a pay freeze in 1975, a seven and seven-tenths pay increase in 1976, and that would have been it as far as Longley was concerned. The legislature issued a pay raise over Longley's veto in 1977. When the Governor left office, longstanding labor negotiations were left unresolved.

Governor Longley and Maine taxpayers reaped the benefits of his efficiency measures in 1973. The Governor reported a $40 million surplus in the budget.
A tax rebate and two tax cuts were made, returning most of the money to the people. All Maine residential property owners received a rebate of sixty-four dollars. Those who rented their residential units received thirty-two dollars. Personal income taxes were cut by $4 million. The first corporate tax cut in the state's history was also passed. Governor Longley and his supporters considered the turn around in the state budget one of his major accomplishments as Governor.

Governor Longley's efforts to transform the educational establishment in Maine were highly controversial and provide a good case study in understanding his policies and impact as governor. When he took office, educational funds were running a $30 million deficit. Longley had been working to erase this deficit before he began campaigning for governor. The Maine Management and Cost Survey recommended that three rural campuses from the seven existing University of Maine campuses be transformed into two year vocational schools. Paul Violette, presently the Senate Majority Leader and a member of the House during Longley's term, believes Longley overstepped his bounds with his recommendations.

Longley went beyond making administrative suggestions on how government should operate and began making political decisions determining policy.

Once elected, Longley found little legislative support for this policy. The seven four-year campuses continued to operate. However, Longley was able to transform the educational establishment in other areas. The University requested a $20 million increase to its $69.9 million budget when Longley was preparing his first budget. It received a $200,000 increase. The University's chancellor called the budget "a disaster." Further reductions in Longley's second budget eliminated all growth. Several survey respondents believed
Longley was successful in meeting his goals to transform higher education, but his success was detrimental to the state. State Representative Robert Murray, Jr., gives Longley no credit, "His budget reductions in the area of higher education were devastating. We are still trying to recover!" The University of Maine receives a smaller percentage of the state budget today than it did before Longley was governor.

Educators hoped to establish a University of Maine medical school. Longley stopped their efforts, but negotiated agreements with Tufts and the University of Vermont to more than double the number of Maine students admitted to their schools. Longley attempted to use the issue to gain administrative control of the University. Claiming officials wasted $500,000 promoting a medical school, he called for the resignations of the entire University Board of Trustees. They did not resign. Their refusal was accompanied by an explanation of the checks and balances of government.

Standardized tests indicating the quality of education students were provided with in Maine do not reveal any effects on education resulting from Governor Longley's policies. However, enrollment in the University of Maine decreased from 31,100 students in 1975 to 30,100 students in 1978. The drop occurred while the overall student population in the state increased. Enrollment in Maine's private schools advanced from 9,400 students to 11,300 students in the same period of time.42

Governor Longley's major impact in education below the University level was his support in changing the funding policy for local school. In 1977 he considered a citizen based plan to repeal Maine's Uniform Property Tax one of his top priorities. The movement had similarities with California's Proposition 13 tax revolt in 1978, but Governor Longley, unlike Governor Brown, gave
the effort his support from the beginning. The Uniform Property Tax was de-
signed to provide equal education funding throughout the state. It failed.
Even "pay-in" towns which received a total of $5.1 million from richer com-
munities were unhappy.43 They resented state involvement at the expense of
local control and the tax change was implemented.

The elimination of the education deficit, increased local funding and
diversion of the need for a medical school illustrate Governor Longley's ef-
fectiveness in bringing a business and efficiency oriented approach to govern-
ment. However, major policy changes, including the closure of three branches
of the University of Maine, were prevented by University trustees and the
state legislature.
CHAPTER FOUR: WHAT INDEPENDENT GOVERNOR LONGLEY MEANT TO MAINE

Question: How do you evaluate Governor Longley and his administration:

Answer one: "Longley will always be a standard to measure all others."
--Ralph Lowe, one of Longley's top aides.

Answer two: "He was a shithead."--a state legislator requesting anonymity.

The comments above represent the extreme variance in rating the benefits of Governor Longley's Independent governorship. All of the Governor's appointees and eight of the nine Republicans who responded to this question indicate the state was at least better off. Seven of the eleven Democrats who answered felt the state was at least worse off. The partisan difference in judgement is a reflection of Longley's conservatism, not his party preference. Longley politically was a pure independent. Maine Senate Majority Leader Paul Violette succinctly summarizes the view of many legislatures, "To Longley, they were all political hacks."

TABLE EIGHT: A RATING OF THE OVERALL CONSEQUENCES OF THE LONGLEY ADMINISTRATION FOR THE STATE OF MAINE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N: 39</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>much better off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17%</td>
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Governor Longley's leadership can be assessed in two ways: the day-to-day operation of state government and the lasting impact he has had on Maine.
government and politics. His objectives and accomplishments did not emphasize initiating new government programs.

Any discussion of the benefits of the Longley Administration must begin with his impact on "the people." At a time when the public was disenchanted with politics and politicians, Longley's popularity ratings tipped 80% in some surveys at the end of his term. Maine political scientist John Nickerson draws a comparison between Longley's leadership and the social contract theorized by Rousseau, "The general public loved everything the man uttered except anything that would hurt their particular interests." Senator Violette agrees, "He was very good with people. Jim Longley could have done anything he wanted and never suffered the blame."

The sincerity of James Longley was a major source of his success with the public. He was stubborn and combative, but the people always felt his battles were based on an ideal, a vision in their best interests and not for his personal gain. Governor Longley considered running for reelection and by almost all accounts he would have been an easy winner. In 1974, the Bangor Daily News broke a fifty year tradition of Republican support to back Jim Longley. It believed Longley was "... more than a carefully organized politician, more than an experienced public servant and, indeed, more even than an aspiring individual, James B. Longley seems an idea whose day has come for Maine." Four years later, it encouraged Governor Longley to finish the job and run for reelection. After a period of indecision, Longley decided to stick to his promise of serving only one term. Longley's top aide, Jim McGregor, later praised Longley for his decision,

I think that the fact that he kept his word and declined to seek reelection, in the face of overwhelming evidence that he could win easily, may have been the best thing to ever happen to Maine politics.
That crucial decision came at a time when people had just about lost all confidence in government and the political system. A successful, popular politician who, in the final analysis, kept his word... that may have been Jim Longley's major accomplishment. 46

Longley may have been the right man at the right time. He arrived after a period of substantial growth and gave the government time to catch up with its own expansion. He also kept the people aware of politics at a time when they were likely to turn their backs on the process. Legislative counselor Joe Hochadel believes Longley's ideas have made a lasting impact on the state.

Every candidate that has since run has emphasized fiscal responsibility. Legislators who never uttered, or probably considered, the phrase before Longley use it as a motto in their campaigns. He brought new people into government. He demonstrated to the public that one man can make a difference. He showed the bureaucracy that people do care about waste and that each dollar wasted works as a hardship in the truly needy.

Both Hochadel and McGregor emphasize the symbolic value of Longley's victory. Supporters of Longley point to his success in taking a financially troubled state and turning the budget into a surplus. Beyond the day-to-day operations of the state, though, they emphasize Longley's impact in terms of ideas. Governor Longley's status as an Independent put him on a pedestal, alone and uncompromising, in his fight against all politicians. George Mitchell, the Democratic front runner for governor in the 1974 election, believes,

Perhaps his most lasting contribution was that at a time when most Americans felt powerless in an impersonal society, Jim Longley showed that one person can make a difference. 47

Longley's impact was the impact of just one person, albeit an energetic one. During the first two years of his term, the number of registered Independents in Maine increased seven and one-half percent. While the number of Independents approached the number of registered Democrats and Republicans, this did not help Independent candidates for public office. In the 1976 elections Longley
encouraged others to run as Independents. Twenty-nine people, including his sister Connie, chose to run. This was three times the number in the previous election. Longley also endorsed twenty Republicans and four Democrats. All twenty-nine Independents and half of the party candidates lost.

In the 1978 gubernatorial election, the Reverend Buddy Frankland chose to run as an Independent on a platform of continuing Longley's policies. He received only thirteen percent of the vote. Both of the party candidates also tried to identify themselves with Longley. Democratic Attorney General Joseph Brennan succeeded. Together Longley and Brennan were seen protecting Maine in the Indian lawsuit. Brennan won the election.

Brennan's election made some view Longley as a caretaker governor with few accomplishments. Brennan, like Governor Curtis, is viewed as a liberal Democrat. His election minimizes the lasting effects of Longley's term. Longley's tenure is especially seen as a holding pattern for Maine because of its tripartisan nature. Longley vetoed more bills than a governor belonging to a political party would be expected to veto. Because the legislature was split, it had a more difficult time overriding the Governor's vetoes than if one party had control of both houses.

Ralph Lowe recognizes these arguments, but still believes Maine was better off as a result of the Longley Administration,

Longley's basic challenge of the premises of the old way, or political way, of doing things has lasted into succeeding Administration. However, by using his first term as a challenge of the system and then leaving without attempting to initiate productive programs in his second, will, I believe, diminish the overall lasting benefits of his incumbency.

There is evidence to suggest Longley would have been successful in a second term as governor, though Lowe admits the nature of the progress Longley might have initiated in a second term is an "enigma." There are two reasons
to predict Longley may have been more successful in his second term than in his first. One, he "mellowed," or politically matured. At the beginning of his term, he was suspicious of everything the government was doing and unnecessarily challenged it time and again. The last two years, he was more familiar with the system and possibly more aware that his attacks were counterproductive. As an independent without a power base, he needed to encourage bipartisan support rather than alienate the legislators. Two, the legislature recognized Longley's immense popularity and became more willing to work with him. Some respondents felt the legislature was intent on proving an Independent could not succeed, but when the legislators recognized Longley had sustained public support, their efforts would only be hurting themselves.

Some feel Longley's Independent status hurt him, regardless of public support. It prevented the continuity of his programs. Republican legislator Darryl Brown explains,

> While Longley had a high level of support from many during his administration, his programs lacked the continuance that an organized political party can offer. Unfortunately, his name lives on, but his program does not.

Senator Clark wishes Longley's program lived on an additional four years, but for different reasons,

> He was the average citizens savior...the "second coming"...but some cracks in his system of governing were beginning to show--I sometimes wish Jim Longley had run successfully for another term--(risking the breaking of his promise to serve only one term) because he would have been elected. Then he would have had to account for the debacle of his first term. Oh, sweet revenge. . .

Those who feel Maine was worse off on account of the Longley Administration offered a variety of reasons. Some felt he simply didn't grasp the nature of government and his attempts to run it as a business bordered on disastrous.
He hurt the bureaucracy. He weakened faith in our political institutions through his attacks. Education was hurt and still hasn't recovered.

Longley was also attacked for promoting a false economy. The tax rebate supporters look at as a major accomplishment, detractors believe left the government nearly bankrupt. They believe the money he gave away was needed for necessary capital expenditures. Leaving office when he did, the Brennan Administration was forced to spend money on the maintenance and replacement of equipment which should have been Longley's responsibility.

**TABLE NINE: A RANKING OF MAINE'S FOUR MOST RECENT GOVERNORS IN TERMS OF THEIR OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS AND SUCCESS.**

n: 38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governor</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Reed (R), 1961-1966</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth Curtis (D), 1967-1874</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Longley (I), 1975-1978</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Brennan (D), 1979-198-</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table Nine compares Governor Longley to other Maine Governors. The trend of favorable responses from Republicans and those who worked within the Administration continues. Democrats generally ranked Longley third or fourth. Governors Longley and Brennan received the strongest partisan evaluations. Governor Curtis was evaluated positively by members of both parties. He is generally considered to be the governor who brought Maine state government
into the modern era and was successful in initiating many new programs. Governor Reed, though favored more by Republicans than Democrats, seemed to rank third of everyone's list. Reed was considered a "stand pat" governor.

The even balance between those who rank Longley as Maine's most effective and successful governor since 1960 and those who rank him as the state's least successful governor is an indication that, overall, his status as an Independent did not affect his ability to accomplish his goals. Predictably, those who rank Longley as Maine's best governor since 1960 felt the state was at least better off on account of his governorship. Those who ranked him third were split in their assessments of him and those who placed him fourth on the list felt that state was worse off.

Respondents who believe Maine is worse off as a result of the Longley Administration were asked whether Longley's own governing style or his Independent status was primarily responsible. A few people felt Longley did the best he, or any Independent, could do. The two-party system, whatever its faults, is the best we can do. Longley was not a part of that system and, as an Independent, had no base of support in government to carry out his policies.

The Maine Times, though critical of Longley, believed Longley's use of the veto provided him with the means of implementing his policy, Longley held up laws that were written only to benefit special interests or drafted without knowledge of their true fiscal impact. In fact, at times Longley was being politically courageous. He threw out the kinds of bills other governors have let slide through for fear of political repercussions. Governor Longley has now developed a consistent pattern of knocking down legislation that would handle a problem piecemeal rather than statewide. 49

However, seventy percent of the respondents to this question believe the negative impact of Longley's Independent governorship was primarily due to Gover-
nor Longley and not his Independent status. Longley's confrontational style and attempts to run government as a business are the two primary reasons why they believe Longley did not succeed. State Representative Ruth Joseph assesses his lack of success as a result of Longley's leadership.

Governor Longley was a very good person--but a terrible governor and politician. As an individual, you would have to look hard and far to find such a fine man. However, his tactics his day to day operation of state government bordered on disastrous. Trying to run government as a private business does not work.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE TEN: WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT MAINE WILL HAVE ANOTHER INDEPENDENT GOVERNOR IN THE NEXT 20 YEARS?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n: 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>highly likely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over ten years have passed since James Longley was elected the nation's only Independent governor since 1937. David Broder's prediction, cited at the beginning of this paper, that an Independent movement was ready to spread through the country, has not proven true. No other Independent has been elected governor of any state since Governor Longley.

Most political observers questioned in Maine believe it is doubtful another Independent will be elected in the near future. Governor Longley was right--his election was more likely to strengthen the two party system than to weaken it, though his reasoning was wrong. Other Independents did not rise up to remind the parties when they were getting complacent. Instead, members of both political parties in Maine determined that it was too easy for an Independent to get on the ballot and requirements were made more difficult.
There are various reasons why it is doubtful Maine will elect another Independent governor soon. The lack of the strong anti-politician sentiment after Watergate is a major reason. However, there are other factors than the political atmosphere. Longley was ignored by the major parties. It is unlikely they will be willing to allow another third party candidate such a luxury. Longley also had the benefit of good name recognition and the money to run a campaign on equal terms with the major parties. These elements are rare in independent campaigns. Longley also had extraordinary energy, which he put to work in his campaign.

Maine news reporters Bill Johnson and Don Carrigan summarize the views of those who feel the election of another Independent governor in Maine is doubtful and somewhat likely, respectively. Bill Johnson explains,

... I think Governor Longley's election was a phenomenon of the times. He capitalized on the distrust that grew from Watergate. He ran as an 'outsider.' His lack of political experience was an advantage at that time. He ran as a business man, a 'non-politician' at a time when people didn't trust politicians and thought government should be run more like a business.

My feeling is that Longley's success was possible because of the political climate at that time, and because of his personal charisma.

Because of his success, the major party candidates have adopted some of his rhetoric and positions, in effect pre-empting another independent from filling the gap that the major parties had left open for Longley.

Don Carrigan believes the gap still exists and there is room enough for an Independent.

I think this possibility exists because the Maine Republican party is in such bad shape, and the Democrats will seem to be putting forth a succession of "politicians"... Attorney General, unsuccessful candidate for senator, etc. There is an ever increasing cynicism, I believe, on the part of the voter. They want people with obvious experience at doing things other than getting elected or being lawyers.
This, of course, is not unlike the national mood that swept Reagan into office... but the Maine GOP is not in a position to really capitalize on the opportunity. The part might rebuild over time, but not quickly. Therefore, a good Independent has a chance... provided he or she has the charisma needed to overcome the political problems.

I think an Independent can be successful, but it will have to be a remarkable person. He or she would have to combine the missionary zeal of Longley with the political savvy and willingness to compromise of Ken Curtis. Having no party, the Independent must be strong enough to function without one, yet sufficiently attentive and attractive to make them both feel a part of what he is doing. Not easy.

This study of Governor Longley is one case study of an Independent. James Longley was unique among American politicians. He remains the only Independent governor elected to any state since 1937. This study, however, does not attempt to determine whether Longley is unique among Independents elected to other political offices in the United States. Further research may prove valuable in understanding the characteristics of Independents and whether they are linked by similarities not traditionally found in members of the two major parties.

Governor Longley illustrates that an Independent may be successful in meeting his goals and objectives once elected. Longley attempted to limit the size of government. It would be interesting to learn how Governor Longley's success compares with the success of independent politicians with similar goals. A comparison between the success of conservative and liberal Independents can be useful in determining whether the potential success of an Independent is limited by his political philosophy.

James B. Longley and other Independent candidates for political office provide valuable lessons in American government. Knowledge of their role and success in government will provide a greater understanding of the two party system.
APPENDIX

An alphabetical listing of the thirty-seven people who identified their responses to the questionnaire. Five questionnaires were returned anonymously.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>PRESENT OCCUPATION(Party affiliation; A=Longley appointee)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armstrong, R.W.</td>
<td>State Representative, Insurance agency executive (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baker, H.R.</td>
<td>State Representative (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bott, John</td>
<td>State Representative (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown, Darryl</td>
<td>State Representative (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown, Larry</td>
<td>State Senator, Developer and Businessman (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrier, J. Robert</td>
<td>State Representative (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrigan, Don</td>
<td>T.V. news reporter/anchor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark, Nancy Randall</td>
<td>State Senator and teacher (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cauvcal, Paul</td>
<td>State Senator and attorney (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collins, S.W.</td>
<td>State Senator and attorney (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daigle, J.M.</td>
<td>President, Casco Northern Bank (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davies, Richard</td>
<td>Lobbyist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis, Leland</td>
<td>State Senator, assistant Republican Leader (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dillenback, Robert</td>
<td>Retired V.P. and Director of a large corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gosselin, H.L.</td>
<td>Hospital Administrator (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hansen, Donald</td>
<td>Editorial Page Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hichens, Walter</td>
<td>State Senator (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higgins, H. Craig</td>
<td>State Representative, Chairman, Taxation Committee (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hochadel, J.</td>
<td>Legal Counsel (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson, Bill</td>
<td>News Reporter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph, Ruth</td>
<td>State Representative (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebowitz, Catherine</td>
<td>State Representative (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowe, Ralph</td>
<td>Director, Maine Department of Mental Health and Retardation (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maisel, S.</td>
<td>Professor of Government, Colby College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo, Joseph</td>
<td>State Representative and accountant (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGregor, Jim</td>
<td>Public Relations Director, Bath Iron Works (Governor Longley’s campaign coordinator and top assistant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millett, H. Sawin, Jr.</td>
<td>Educator (A)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murray, Robert, Jr.</td>
<td>State Representative (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickerson, John</td>
<td>Professor of Political Science, University of Maine, Augusta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palmer, Kenneth</td>
<td>Professor of Political Science, University of Maine, Orono</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Randall, Ed</td>
<td>State Representative (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard, Alex</td>
<td>State Representative (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scarpino, Guy</td>
<td>State Representative, lobsterman, and shipbuilder (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewall, Charlotte</td>
<td>State Senator and Wholesale Lobster Dealer (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafton, Richard</td>
<td>State Senator and lawyer (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violetta, Paul E.</td>
<td>State Senate Majority Leader (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weymouth, Norman</td>
<td>State Representative and teacher (R)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ENDNOTES

1 Johnson, The Year of the Longley, p. 128.


5 Time, November 18, 1974.


7 Maine Times, November 1, 1974.


13 Johnson, The Year of the Longley, Chapter two.


16 Maine Times, April 26, 1974.

17 ibid.

18 Conversation with Maine State Library librarian Lynn Randle.


22 Philadelphia Inquirer, November 11, 1974.
23 Johnson, The Year of the Longley, p. 53.
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31 Maine Times, December 27, 1974.
33 Johnson, The Year of the Longley, p. 115.
36 The Lewiston Daily Sun, August 18, 1980.
39 Ibid.
40 Maine Times, November 21, 1975.


47 Ibid.


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Magazine Articles:


Newspapers:


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A questionnaire sent to two hundred nine political observers in Maine. Forty two responses were received.

Three telephone interviews:

Ralph Lowe, a top administrative official in the Longley Administration.

Kenneth Palmer, political scientist at the University of Maine.

Paul Violette, Maine Senate Majority Leader.